BIG STICK AND SHORT SWORD: THE AMERICAN AND JAPANESE NAVIES
AS HYPOTHETICAL ENEMIES

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
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By

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* * * * *

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Department of History
To my Father, Carlos Rivera DeJesus
Sargeant First Class (ret.) U.S. Army
Who taught me that honor, duty, and courage
are so much more than political expediency
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Development of the Hypothetical Enemy

[T]here remains the question as to why [the American and Japanese naval planners] came to similar conclusions.¹
—Edward S. Miller, naval historian, 1993

[T]he Japanese [N]avy's studies on strategy tallied exactly with their American counterparts. Strategic planning in any nation, even that bearing on the most secret aspects of national defense, should lead to identical conclusions if based on the same premises and reliable data.²
—Admiral Kato Kanji, Chief of the Imperial Japanese Naval Staff, 1930

The fiftieth anniversary of World War II, and the associated American-Japanese conflict, has produced an avalanche of studies. The topics range from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and at times reflect upon events between the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference (1921-1922) and the outbreak of conflict in 1941. Most, though, minimize any number of developments before the Washington Conference that are germane to World War II.


This study focuses primarily upon American naval officers who, long before 1922, influenced the long-range strategies for war with Japan. For the most part, the officers were junior subordinates between 1897 and 1907 and removed from the national level of planning. While the materials available lend themselves to a thorough examination of those American naval officers, this study will also explore, in a limited way, the role of their Imperial Japanese Navy counterparts.

This study's title requires explanation. It illustrates the origins and practices of American and Japanese naval planning. The oft quoted remark, "Speak softly and carry a big stick," served as a metaphor illustrating American naval strategy. The big stick represented normally the American battle fleet, composed of capital ships, a widely recognized

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7 Herein, the term "planner" refers to those officers contributing to the formulation of war plans, including naval attachés, intelligence officers, war college staffers, and those attached to dedicated planning organizations. "[To] be ready when war breaks, the first essential is a plan for preparation of sufficient material and personnel and preparation of plans for the conduct of the war. These two parts are considered "War Plans," Bradley A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine 1916 (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute P, reprint of 2nd ed., 1988), 96.

4 These include John M. Ellicott (1859-1955), Bradley A. Fiske (1854-1942), Frank Marble (1861-1911), Sydney A. Staunton (1850-1939), and Clarence S. Williams (1863-1951).

5 These include Akiyama Saneyuki (1868-1918), Kato Kanji (1870-1939), and Sato Tetsurō (1866-1942).

6 While a big stick might best represent the Roosevelt era, the period extended beyond 1909, encompassing the Taft, Wilson, and Harding administrations. The term did not apply solely to the United States battle fleet either, for Japan "depicted the United States as a wise old grandmother who took a big stick labeled '70% ratio' from the [Japanese Navy]," in 1921, Roger V. Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914-1922 (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1976), 210.
international standard of national strength to 1941. During
the many moments of crisis with Japan, the United States
adopted most often a policy of general non-belligerence. From
the 1897 Hawaiian crisis on, however, American
leadership often used the U.S. Navy as an instrument of
policy to quietly emphasize whatever position the
administration promulgated. Indeed, Theodore Roosevelt
(1859-1919), as Assistant Secretary of the Navy (1897-1898),
discovered at an early juncture that public bellicosity alone
proved inadequate to secure American interests.

The Japanese aphorism, "If our swords are shorter, then,
go a step forward before you strike your enemy," best
described the strategy of the U.S. Navy's putative opponent.

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7 An exception is the cruise of the American fleet (1907-1909), see

8 Captain Caspar F. Goodrich, president of the U.S. Naval War

In the decades before 1922 the Japanese Navy recognized many of its own shortcomings and its planners sought to overcome the deficiencies. The need to deal with first, a growing German and Russian naval threat in East Asia and, then after 1905, the threat of preponderantly larger American forces, drove such planning. The phrase *sotei tekikoku*, or "hypothetical enemy," reflected the lack of any actual hostilities between the two nations. I have introduced it here in recognition that both services viewed the other as the most probable threat well before 1922. Yamagata Aritomo (1832-1922) initiated the phrase into the Meiji-era lexicon in 1871. Then, Yamagata judged Russia to be Japan's primary hypothetical enemy. The phrase assumed greater importance with the implementation of the *Teikoku kokubo hoshin*

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(Imperial Defense Policy), Japan's first coordinated defense policy in 1907 which officially designated Russia the Army's enemy and the United States as the Navy's.¹¹

Historians have, with rare exception, asked little about the naval "strategic elite"¹² between the Hawaii crisis (1897) and the Washington Conference. The naval officers of both nations, however, clearly derived many of their motivations from contemporary events. In 1897 Japan dispatched warships to Hawaiian waters. The Asian power sought to check an American attempt to annex the island group. In response to that deployment, the U.S. Navy then prepared the earliest plans for war with Japan.¹⁵ In the subsequent years, to 1922, the two navies grew increasingly to suspect the motives of the other. From the U.S. Navy's perspective, 1897 is a solid point of reference. "Japan, it is probably accurate to say, was the first of the concrete


¹² "A minority designated to serve a collectivity", and "effective and responsible minorities—effective as regards the performance of activities of interest and concern to others to whom these elites are responsive," Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1963), 4. Success was pivotal for these officers, who embodied Samuel P. Huntington's term 'professional'—"the marriage of intellectual ability, character and leadership and considerable training and experience," The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1957), 11-13.

enemies to emerge in Navy men's thinking. From the Japanese view, the period before 1922 is clearly pivotal. "By the time [Fuchida Mitsuo] entered the Naval Academy in 1921, the Navy was already indoctrinating its future officers with the idea that the potential enemy [was] America." The issues cited above relate to a growing distrust of each other and what I have cited as the evolution of "the Concept"—how naval, and military, organizations develop, in seeming interdependency, the view of their counterparts as the enemy, as well as what leads their respective planners to consider particular strategies for any future conflict. The original statement of "the Concept" dates to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Then, shared preconceptions proved disastrous for the Israelis. However, it does not invalidate the notion as I employ it herein, for:


18 Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortune: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The Free P, 1990), 114-115, applied the phrase to notions held before the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, particularly to potential or real adversaries. As to the validity of "the Concept" for this examination, Cohen and Gooch noted, "it is impossible to conduct intelligence analysis without concepts or hypotheses: A stream of raw data will simply overwhelm decision makers, who will in any case, apply their own hypotheses to such information," 116. Here, the term encompasses such a process in the two navies from beginning to end. Michael Vlahos noted a "continuity of concept" in the U.S. Navy's view of war with Japan after 1919, The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941 (Newport RI: Naval War College P, 1981), 119.
More importantly, however, the Concept was not the product of Israeli analysis of logical Egyptian options: the Israeli Concept was in fact the Egyptian Concept, up through the beginning of 1973. Based on good—indeed, superb—sources, the Israelis understood Egyptian thinking about the initiation of war very well indeed.¹⁹

I will explicate "the Concept" further. Herein, the term applies specifically to the preconceived ideas held by the two navies that (1) conflict was inevitable and (2) the way in which that conflict would play out. Note that such preconceptions need be held only by a small number of officers. In any case, both navies seemingly understood, very well indeed, what the other might do in future clashes.²⁰

I will support such a view with an examination of the import of "contact" between several of the naval officers and their development of programs shaped, but not driven, by such contact. One can define "contact" as "any kind of direct [or indirect] interaction between peoples, whether peaceful or

¹⁹ Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortune, 116.

²⁰ Edward S. Miller pointed out that "geography made the Concept (meaning parallel identical development) almost inevitable," but disagreed with my belief that at a number of levels both the American and Japanese navies influenced each other, particularly in the early stages, Miller letter to Rivera, 3 June 1993.
hostile, continuing or sporadic."  

Other historians have noted that, "Contacts were by no means irrelevant to later developments, however, and probably in many ways set the tone, as well as creat[ed] the context, for subsequent interactions." Archival records in the United States document not only significant contact between American and Japanese naval officers but American concern over such contact. Overall, the process of contact related, as well, to how, or what, influenced something to occur, or causation.

For example, the early careers of officers like America's Bradley A. Fiske and Japan's Akiyama Saneyuki, among others, lend themselves to such an examination, particularly for the years 1897-1907, when through a combination of activities, the junior officers increased

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22 Altman and Butler, "The Contact of Cultures," 493.

23 Asada wrote that most Japanese naval officers after 1921 "had no close firsthand knowledge of the United States," in "The Japanese Navy and the United States," 233. Contact is most suggestive of Sun Tzu's "know the enemy and know yourself ... you will never be in peril," The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., (New York: Oxford UP, 1971), 84.
their professional value to their respective services. Such an examination should include a look at their work.

While Fiske draws recognition to this day, the case of Akiyama Saneyuki proves equally exemplary. Akiyama had a series of experiences that led to great success in 1904-1905, and then continued on to the formulation of the 1907 *Teikoku kokubo hoshin*. As to causation, one scholar argued that event 'A' was not necessarily followed by 'B,' but that there might be a multitude of 'B's for example, 'B_1,' 'B_2,' etc. One can counter, however, that 'B' or 'B's must originate from 'A' or a combination of 'A's, and to suggest otherwise is to ignore any sequence of events that leads to a specific action. While causation and correlation are not synonymous, they deserve attention.

Bernard Brodie seemingly argued that such a view leads to "an exaggeration of the casual relationship between events that succeed each other in time." For Akiyama, the question is, could not the Japanese Navy have profited from another officer's tour(s)? That would be true if another officer had experienced the same explicit chain of events. I contend that in the period examined there was no other officer who approached Akiyama's background. While other Japanese naval officers visited the United States, only he had the specific combination of contact, exposure, education,

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and experience. I argue that 'A' led to 'B,' and Akiyama continued a sequence arguably necessary and certainly sufficient for the Japanese Navy's professional growth and maturation.

I do recognize the trap of the "reductive fallacy," in which one reduces causation from a number of components to a single factor. It is quite probable, however, that one individual could undergo a multiplicity of experiences and link 'A' to 'B' directly. One scholar wrote, "It is not always necessary in history to have a causal explanation that includes either a general statement or deductive certainty."\(^{25}\) That view draws support from other assertions, for, "All that is required in many cases is a demonstration that the causal relationship is possible, and that it probably happened."\(^{26}\) Though it might be difficult to trace "the transmission of intellectual concepts, especially ones that are essential[ly] common sense and thus liable to frequent reinvention," cross-fertilization is not


\(^{26}\) Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, 181.
beyond the realm of possibility. Indeed, as I will argue, it seems eminently probable.

I will examine, as well, how opposing planners might have judged, even depended upon, each other's signals and processes. That is a process labeled by one academic as the mixed-motive interrelationship of competition. Thomas C. Schelling referred to "the ambivalence of [one player's] relation to the other player—the mixture of mutual dependence and conflict, of partnership and competition." The notion included those motives between the American and Japanese navies as well as the intra- and inter-service bureaucracies in each nation. In this case, both services would have to fend off challenges from their respective army counterparts so as to advance naval interests. Such motives seemingly shaped the actions of both American and Japanese naval planners. This is true when one compares the naval planning each nation initiated after 1905, particularly because, as I

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27 Bassford, Clausewitz in English, 53, 163. McNeill dealt with the issue of the spread of disease, but "[as] communications between communities became regular and organized [t]he significance of extended contacts with [extraneous notions] became unusually clear," Plagues and Peoples, 55, 110. In contrast, Miller pointed out that "similar things can evolve more less simultaneously ("in real time") without any contact or borrowing by the parties involved," Miller letter to Rivera, 3 June 1993.

28 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 1960 (London: Oxford UP, 1971), 89, 158, 160. While Schelling referred to gamesmanship, it is quite applicable to the study herein, for Schelling noted that, "the mixed relation is involved in wars [and that would include war planning]," 89.

will demonstrate, by 1907 each service had definitely selected the other as its primary hypothetical enemy.

Since the likelihood of actual hostilities, nevertheless, remained remote throughout the period surveyed, this study will examine how, during peacetime, the officers developed planning, primarily in the strategic environment and not at the campaign level. Strategy seeks to achieve an objective and is defined as "the general concept for the use of [naval] force, [and] is derived from war aims," and is expressed in "terms of geographic areas of operations, the timing of operations, and the allocation of forces." Tactical considerations were most certainly the province of the naval planners, but in most cases the geopolitical arguments they advanced dealt with a "big picture" view of international crises, that is, prepare a strategy, then, as stated by Alfred Thayer Mahan, prepare tactical premises, "[b]efore hostile fleets [w]ere brought into contact (a word that perhaps better than any other indicates the dividing line between tactics and strategy)."

The U.S. Navy saw Japan as a major threat first in 1897, but explicit planning began after the U.S. Naval War College.

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assigned its 1906 class the problem of war with Japan. The college gave the solution to the General Board of the Navy which then developed an outline of "War Plan Orange." The Japanese military looked first at the United States as a major threat in 1906. An early Army draft of the Imperial Defense Policy contemplated action against the Philippines. Senior army leaders deleted the idea in 1906 but reconsidered it in subsequent years when war scares developed between the two nations.

International challenges faced by both the American and Japanese navies well before 1922 suggest a myriad of seldom asked and seldom studied questions. The most compelling related to "the Concept" remain those that deal with the relationship, or contact, between the key strategic thinkers of the American and Japanese navies, (particularly before 1908). These entail the correlation of their actions and reactions, and the impact of international events upon service missions and program funding. One might well ask—What meaningful interdependencies might the two groups have

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That question most certainly refers to the mixed-motive, as both American and Japanese planners needed the existence of the other to promote appropriations increases and fleet construction programs. The two navies worried over more than the "unknowability of the Other," since each had its own set of assumptions about the other's intentions. Nonetheless, the respective naval planners helped advance service goals at times when "each side remained more concerned with its own affairs and conflicts than with significantly understanding the other." As such, I have consciously avoided the use of a phrase considered negative; mirror-imaging. My aim is, rather, to examine the strategic and professional innovations developed by the two services as well as explore the long term mind-sets inculcated in the officer corps of both navies. Before 1922 these mind-sets most certainly shaped the evolution of "the Concept."  

Though the argument is often made that these officers pushed their respective governments toward specific courses

34 Schelling noted "mutual dependence," Strategy of Conflict, 89, in which the competitors cite the other as the basis for proactive or reactive processes.

35 Altman and Butler, "The Contact of Cultures," 488.

36 Vlahos, though, noted a mirrored relationship between the American and Japanese navies, Blue Sword, 130.

of action, the truth is that their civil-military superiors were predisposed, on numerous occasions, to set in motion similar agendas. During this period, though, naval officers held subordinate positions within their respective governments, and rarely exercised any political power. The officers were not part of the formulations of the White House and State Department, and with rare exceptions, far removed from the preeminent levels of the Japanese government.  

In America, naval officers "were subordinate to elected authority," and considered servants of the ruling class, but many officers saw politicians as the enemy. That is not to say that naval officers had no role in the formulation of national policy or planning. There was substantial input from the officer corps of the respective nations. During the period in question, the years before 1922, no active duty or retired naval officer ever became American Secretary of the Navy, while such was the requirement in Japan. The only American naval professional to become president was Theodore Roosevelt, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy and himself a recognized authority on naval topics. In Japan four flag

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38 Peter Karstern, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York: Free P, 1972), xiii, 204-205. Karsten argued further that "[t]he naval officer is not responsible for the shaping of American foreign policy [or politics during the years 1897-1922], but the [navy] certainly influenced [their] outcome," 389. American naval officers did not fit Thomas J. McCormick’s "power elite," for they did not have direct power, China Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901 1967 (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1990), 10; See Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, 35.
officers held the prime minister's position for a total of twelve years before 1922.\textsuperscript{39}

Historians have studied many of the officers of both nations and evaluated the different levels of political influence they possessed. That is particularly true for the Japanese Navy. The Japanese officer corps wielded much more influence than their American counterparts. In Japan after 1895, the military's deliberate failure to nominate a candidate for the Army or Navy ministries could prevent a cabinet from taking office.\textsuperscript{40} That situation, of course, never arose in American politics.

The U.S. Navy's reaction to a number of emerging threats, as perceived by American planners, promises much more illuminating discoveries than have been previously contemplated in published accounts. To assume that racist and bigoted attitudes not only blinded American naval planners but led them to specific actions seems to be an over-generalization.\textsuperscript{41} An examination of the resources at


\textsuperscript{40}Scalapino, \textit{Democracy in Prewar Japan}, 175. Note that members of the naval "strategic elite" discussed herein were for the most part junior officers at the beginning of the era.

\textsuperscript{41}The role of bigotry and racism after 1922 evolved much more differently, see John W. Dower, \textit{War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War} (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).
both the Naval War College and National Archives revealed that more objective criteria influenced planners. The search indicated that the first-rate planning professionals of the U.S. Navy were well aware of the Japanese Navy's combat and planning capabilities.\footnote{42}

The Japanese Navy itself seemingly exhibited a similar level of professionalism, and little evidence exists that racial attitudes played a preemptive role in planning. After 1897 it is most certain that, among other reasons, contact, professional experience, and publications, and not bigotry, proved pivotal.\footnote{43} Those same rationales served to supplement the regular intelligence assessment methods of the respective services. While numbers of officers in both navies certainly held racist attitudes, existing documents and research reveal professional analyses of the "enemy." Generally, bigotry receives the blame for driving American planning. However, "Racis[m] soon faded as a motivation for planners [searching for] a viable war rationale."\footnote{44}

While the United States thought conflict possible with Japan over the question of Hawaii as early as 1897, the two

\footnote{42}{"[I]n preparing plans [for war] we should estimate for the worst condition that is reasonably probable. In the United States, this means we should [prepare for] any foe in Asia," Fiske, \textit{The Navy as a Fighting Machine}, 248.}

\footnote{43}{The small group of officers selected for this study exhibited no verifiable racial bias in the formulation of naval plans. That does not, however, mean that the individuals were themselves free from contemporary attitudes.}

\footnote{44}{Miller, \textit{War Plan Orange}, 22. That view would most certainly mitigate any reductive fallacy, see Fischer, \textit{Historians' Fallacies}, 172.}
governments managed to settle that annexation crisis amicably. Before 1905 Japan represented only a nominal threat but an immigration crisis in San Francisco (October 1906) and a lingering war scare heightened fears of Japanese aggression. Spurred on by the war scare, American naval planners undertook planning for a trans-Pacific campaign against Japan.

The U.S. Navy's subsequent "War Plan Orange" envisioned an economic stranglehold upon the Japanese islands as the final stage of any maritime campaign. American naval planners contemplated that a westward bound battle fleet would destroy Japan's major naval forces in one decisive battle. Such a decision would then lead to the imposition of a suffocating blockade, and threatened implicitly the

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45 Ellicott studied the case, see n. 8. Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor (1845-1904) sought to label Japan a threat, Taylor memo, 31 May 1904, Joint Board 325 (hereafter JB), Records of the Joint Army and Navy Board (hereafter Joint Board), RG 225, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA); Daniel J. Costello, "Planning for War: A History of the General Board of the Navy." Diss. (Medford MA, 1968), 294-295.


47 See Miller, War Plan Orange.

48 For the purposes of this study, the decisive battle refers not only to a tactical victory, but to a strategic victory—the battle should be the means to an end. As such, both navies looked at the decisive battle as a tool to bring about a rapid conclusion to any conflict. The Japanese Navy thought it might dishearten their enemy, while the American Navy saw it as a prelude to a strangling blockade of the enemy.
landing of a hostile force upon the Japanese home islands. The Japanese Navy expected such a strategy and sought to parry any American thrust by a policy of attrition, followed by a decisive engagement. After 1906 the Japanese Navy revealed that strategy, probably quite unintentionally, through a series of publicized naval exercises. The exercises aimed, of course, at preparing the Rengo kantai (the Combined Fleet) for an approaching American battle fleet.

Japan never secured a decisive or strategic naval victory against the American Navy. That failure itself contributed to Japan's eventual defeat in the Second World War. The Japanese proved unable to inflict tangible attritional losses on the American fleet. This situation exacerbated a severe resource deficiency, for the United States could simply outbuild the Japanese. By 1945 the U.S. Navy was free to conduct essentially unlimited operations along the coasts of Japan's home islands. Thus, the worse misgivings of Japan's pre-1922 planners proved realistic. The U.S. Navy consummated its ability to operate


with impunity late in the Pacific war, ironically, aboard a battleship in Tokyo Bay, fulfilling the fears of those earlier planners who had fought to preclude such an event.\(^5\)

Part of the irony arises from the connections to the past. The Japanese prime minister who acceded to surrender in August 1945, Suzuki Kantaro, had decades earlier, in collaboration with Akiyama Saneyuki and Sato Tetsutarō, been one of the Japanese Navy’s première planners.\(^5\) Although less acclaimed, Suzuki Kantaro joined with the other officers and contributed greatly to, and participated in, the navy’s post-1905 strategic planning. More recently, Akiyama and Sato have received acknowledgment as the Japanese Navy’s most foresighted planners of the late Meiji- and early Taisho-eras. The two men helped develop specific responses for dealing with any potential threat posed by the U.S. Navy. Those Japanese planners understood that the U.S. Navy was a "blue water" long-range offensive threat, embracing the

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\(^5\) Though beyond the focus of this study, one might imagine that the U.S.S. Missouri with nine 16" guns—in an age when the aircraft carrier had superseded the battleship as the standard of power—was intended to deliver a very direct message. From my experience, the case seems most reasonable. During a deployment aboard a destroyer, my squadron visited Sri Lanka. With our departure, the Soviets dispatched a larger vessel to the port. The public relations aspect was not hard to see: overwhelm the "natives" with a display of superior firepower.

Mahanian philosophy for global power and prestige. As such, one cannot ignore their roles.

That proves true when one considers the fact that the Japanese Navy viewed its battle fleet as an instrument of policy designed more as a tool for deterrence against interference and for the exercise of local superiority in East Asian waters. The Japanese Empire sought to protect its lines of strategic interests in near proximity. Yamagata Aritomo first delineated such "strategic interests" for Japan. As prime minister Yamagata proclaimed in November 1890 that Japan's national security rested in lines of sovereignty and lines of interests, primarily focused upon the Asian continent. That policy would benefit the army, but the navy, of course, concluded that Japan's security lay in maritime lines of sovereignty and interests. In any case, the Japanese Army, the more politically dominant of the two services, saw little need for a battle fleet for long-range

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offensive operations, while the Japanese Navy argued otherwise.  

Though the Japanese Navy had itself been influenced by the work of Mahan, the American's vision of international sea power did not control or dominate the Japanese Navy's planning process. As such, the Japanese Navy never sought to acquire a massive fleet tonnage equalling that possessed by most of the major naval powers. Recognizing the substantial disparity in economic, matériel, and military strength between the United States and Japan, planners like Akiyama and Sato sought to ensure defensive sufficiency, and not offensive capacity. That situation remained so until 1940.  

Fukudome Shigeru, Chief of Staff to Yamamoto Isoroku when the Pearl Harbor plan was under consideration noted that the navy moved from "its long cherished" defensive strategy to one of offensive purposes to deny the U.S. Navy

54 "The true defence was never to let the foe land [nor near the coast]," Sato, Teikoku kokubu shi ron 1908 (Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1979), 1:205. "The enemy must be kept away from [the nation's] coasts": Mahan, Sea Power, 87. Sato was in Britain when the German government authorized a large expansion of its battle fleet, utilizing Alfred Tirpitz's "risk theory," a defensive or deterrent strategy for dealing with the numerically superior Royal Navy, see Stephen R. Rock, "Risk Theory Reconsidered: American Success and German Failure in the Coercion of Britain, 1890-1914," The Journal of Strategic Studies 11 (September 1988):342-364. Schelling noted that "[d]eterrence involves setting the stage-by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation—and waiting. The overt act is up to the opponent. Deterrence tends to be indefinite in its timing. If [the opponent] cross[es] the line we shoot in self-defense, or the mines explode. When? Whenever [he] crosses the line—preferably never, but the timing is up to [the opponent]," Arms and Influence (New Haven CT: Yale UP, 1966), 71-72.


the initiative, and that the navy "had for thirty years been
arduously studying and training" for the defensive nature of
a conflict with the United States, and that since 1907, "the
Japanese [N]avy had accepted defensive operations against the
United States as its fundamental policy." 57

A summary examination of the professional practices, and
of the interactions among officers of both navies, proved
useful. Clearly, the rise of professionalism in a number of
disciplines during the late 1800s led to higher standards. 58
In an era where technological innovations, among them
advances in steam, armor, and gunnery systems, rapidly
transformed warfare, naval officers had to become more
enlightened about their chosen profession. 59 No longer
could an officer simply use on-the-job training as a
substitute for concrete education and training. New weapons

57 Fukudome, "The Hawaii Operation," in David C. Evans, ed., The
Japanese Navy in World War II: In the Words of Former Japanese Naval
Officers (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute P, 1986), 5, 9. In the same
work, Yokoi Toshiyuki noted that Tsushima confirmed for Japanese officers
the value of avoiding all-out-offensive operations, "Thoughts on Japan's
and the 'Gradual Attrition' Strategy," Naval War College Review 46
(Autumn 1993): 63-74, provided a recent examination of the Japanese
situation after 1905 when a naval staff study concluded the "best IJN
strategy would be to assume a defensive posture," but by 1941 "the
Imperial Navy had to change its strategy" to the offensive, 64, 69.

58 "We will define professionalization as the process by which an
occupational group acquires or develops a specialized, theoretical body
of knowledge related to its area of expertise, [and] develops a
heightened feeling of group identity which is usually accompanied by the
emergence of professional associations and journals," Spector, Professors
of War, 3.

59 One might note that this process took place right in the middle
of a period of unprecedented technological change and not only in the
realm of naval technology, but naval technology led the way in many
facets, see McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and
meant changed strategic and political circumstances and those states that fell behind in training their officer corps to handle new weapons risked the nation's security. Most certainly, a lack of service professionalism meant diminished defense capabilities in an international environment of modern warfare.

In the movement toward professionalism a number of maritime powers created advanced war schools for their naval officers, particularly as navalism emerged as one facet of national security. As such, American and Japanese naval officers, among others, drew many of their attitudes from the Royal Navy, the première maritime model of the era. That process of emulation ensured an intellectual tendency toward similar operational and planning practices among the planners of both services, particularly in the case of naval power. Both services knew of the traditions of power projection through naval strength even before the publication of Alfred Thayer Mahan's pivotal sea power study. The Mahanian fixation upon the "decisive engagement" and command of the

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61 Wayne Hughes noted that the U.S. Navy's officer corps had been "[s]chooled in the tradition of the Royal Navy," Bradley A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine, 253, Naval Institute edition.

62 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783.
sea pointed to the basis for Britain's superior maritime power and, consequently, global prominence. These practices, then acknowledged more and more by ambitious naval powers, derived from the accumulated empirical wisdom gained from centuries of British supremacy on the high seas.\(^6\)

Peter Karsten's study of American navalism noted some of the historical lessons of imprint where the elite American officer corps adopted many of the Royal Navy's traditions and customs.\(^6\) This most certainly would have included the Royal Navy's outlook on maritime and naval power, and imperial defense. Another study examined further the inculcation of Royal Navy tradition and custom in the American naval officer corps after 1919, but did not make the connection between the American and Japanese naval officers.\(^6\) These tendencies cited above also shaped the development of the Japanese naval officer corps after 1868. David C. Evans produced an in-depth study of the social origins and organization of the Imperial Japanese Navy's officer corps before 1912.\(^6\) Though a number of historians have examined various aspects of the events prior to the

\(^6\) Evans and Peattie cite the Royal Navy as a role model for the Japanese, *Kaigun*.


\(^6\) Vlahos, *Blue Sword*.

\(^6\) Evans, "The Satsuma Faction."
Pacific conflict, not one has yet examined the interrelationship between the officer corps of the two navies.

Historiography

Recent questions about the U.S. Navy and its history have been easier to resolve in the last few decades. That ease resulted from the declassification of the U.S. Naval War College archives, as well as the transfer of files from the Naval Historical Center to the National Archives. Many of the records, however, remain under-utilized. New scholarship about the two navies, though, has emanated from Edward S. Miller's study of "War Plan Orange" and a forthcoming study of the Japanese Navy by David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. While these are superior contributions to the existing body of naval history, there is yet no significant examination of the correlations between the actions and reactions of the two navies.

Many naval historians have recognized, though, that the U.S. Navy, driven by the need to protect the Monroe Doctrine and the perceived vital American interests in the Caribbean and the Panama Canal, reacted to the early German naval expansion plans by preparing war plans and fleet expansion

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67 Miller, War Plan Orange.

68 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun.
programs. After 1905 the Japanese reacted similarly to the American responses. Few scholars have examined that relationship as it pertained to the officers of the two navies, nor have they looked at the benefits drawn from the "lessons-learned" that each of the services examined, adopted, and adapted. Miller recognized just such a paucity of research into a variety of interrelated questions—"Perhaps a future historian will write a comparison of the plans of the two antagonists." This study not only compares the plans, but, as Miller suggests, some of the planners as well.

Circumscribed primary research on the Japanese Navy is one reason that the relationship between the two navies has escaped scrutiny. This is due to the massive destruction of records during the wartime bombing of Japan. In addition, the premeditated elimination of records by government

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71 The phrase, "lessons-learned," typically military jargon, refers to the valuable experience passed on to other potential users following any analysis of a specific event or occurrence. Though similar to historical lessons, it yields a sense of immediacy.

72 Miller, War Plan Orange, xx.
officials, military officers, and citizens worried about announced war-crimes trials hurt later historians.\footnote{Dower, \textit{War Without Mercy}, 262.} Other reasons include the lack of substantial first-hand accounts from many of the officers involved in planning well before 1922. This has required a lengthy reconstruction by Japanese historians often dependent upon sources subject to some question.\footnote{It is not a question of credibility, but rather sparse records that makes it difficult to verify fully any assertions. Though Asada Sadao writes extensively of the Japanese Navy, he acknowledged that the loss or destruction of important primary material hampers research, Asada letter to Rivera, 8 July 1993.}

These sources provide usually the only interpretations of the history of the Japanese Navy since most Western, and many Japanese, scholars have accepted as irretrievable the loss of related materials. Scholars continue to lament the loss of primary materials. Asada Sadao noted the scarcity of documents but continues to make use of secondary accounts, biographies, autobiographies, interviews, government records, and personal papers. The loss of primary records limits new insights to those works produced in the last fifty years. Considering the state of primary records described by Asada, it seemed unrealistic to expect that such ever would be corrected.\footnote{Asada letter to Rivera, 8 July 1993.} In the decades following the destruction of
the Imperial Japanese Navy, these historians still managed to examine the history of the Japanese Navy and its demise. 76

One obstacle in examining the Japanese Navy is the language itself. Only a few naval historians have tackled Japanese or Japanese-language materials and they have for the most part focused on the origins, development, and battles of the Japanese Navy. Even so, of the half a dozen or so American specialists on the Japanese Navy few, if any, have looked at the interrelationship of action and reaction between that force and its American counterpart.

In any case, the Japanese themselves have been very prolific with countless secondary accounts, service histories, autobiographies, biographies, and a limited number of official documents related to the Japanese Navy. In the late 1960s the Japanese government embarked upon an ambitious publication project dealing with their military and naval history from 1868 to 1945. The project currently numbers over 100 volumes. 77

Additional challenges include the resurgence of older theories impugning the abilities of Japanese planners in the period before Pearl Harbor. Admittedly, the Japanese were intimately familiar with the world’s leading military and


77 This study will, however, use only three volumes dealing specifically with naval affairs.
naval strategists. Many historians, however, accept the notion that the Japanese Navy often formulated detailed and specific strategic, tactical and operational concepts quite independent of Western influences.\textsuperscript{78} A sort of veil, though, lingers in Japan's academic community. An abhorrence, perhaps even shame, seemingly retards a deeper examination of the questions raised here. There are a few older Japanese naval officers who continue to write about the events of their era, but presently very few academics seem willing to risk ostracism for working in a sensitive area, or even seeking to correct the historical record.\textsuperscript{79} A survey of the current body of literature concerning the American and

\textsuperscript{78} New York Times editor William C. Honan asserted that the Japanese lifted the Pearl Harbor plan from Hector C. Bywater (1884-1940), suggesting the Japanese could not have hatched the attack, \textit{Visions of Infamy: The Untold Story of How Journalist Hector C. Bywater Devised the Plans that led to Pearl Harbor} (New York: St. Martin's P, 1991). On the other hand, Dingman supported the contention that Akiyama and Sato drew lessons from the western experiences but developed a doctrine on their own, "Japan and Mahan." 61.

\textsuperscript{79} For Japanese students in the United States and foreign students in Japan the theme is common. While surviving officers of the Imperial Navy write in the tradition of the "old" school of military history, particularly in the examinations of the Imperial Navy's battle history, recent scholars, such as Asada Sadao, write in the "new" school of military history, examining the social, political, and international aspects of Japanese naval history. Asada differs on the reception of military and naval history in Japan, Asada letter to Rivera, 21 July 1993. Recently, though, the Japanese government has had to deal with the touchy issue of its Justice Minister, who denied any assertion that the Japanese had carried out the Rape of Nanking. The minister was fired but the furor did not abate, for Prince Mikasa, the late Emperor Hirohito's brother, confirmed that he had spoken out against the excesses of the Japanese army in China and Manchuria. One might note that Asada has yet to deal with the tactical and "wartime" operations of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Finally, the recent visit to the United States by Japan's Emperor Akihito caused political problems at home as well. A visit to Pearl Harbor was seen as some form of 'mea culpa.' Under pressure by interest groups at home, the Emperor altered his schedule. Even more current, the questions surrounding "Unit 731," a biological weapons organization stationed in Manchuria during the war, remains a sore point with many Japanese nationalists.
Japanese navies revealed a wealth of campaign and battle histories but little substantial analysis of the two services for the years before 1922.

Outten J. Clinard, Akira Iriye, Vincent Davis, and William R. Braisted produced the works that most nearly approached the proposal herein. While there are a number of other significant volumes in existence, one could not expect to find the analyses considered here. In any case, the four authors cited above provide some useful appraisals.

The lack of access to classified sources severely handicapped Clinard's study. Of necessity, it depended mainly upon secondary materials. Clinard did not deal with the issue of interdependency, rather, he noted what effects Japanese expansion and perceived aggression exercised upon American naval policy. Clinard, though, came to the conclusion that the U.S. Navy most certainly viewed Japan as the "probable enemy" as early as 1897. His work, completed at the time of Japan's defeat in 1945, highlighted the fact that Japan's "startling rise as a new specter on the Eastern horizon" at the turn of the century forced the United States

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to reconsider its strategy in relation to Japan and naval power.\textsuperscript{81}

Many historians argue that Germany seemed the most probable threat to American interests. That would be wholly true if not for the changed international circumstances after the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{82} A series of related events, though, produced different strategic perspectives for the U.S. Navy. These new perspectives left very few real threats on the horizon.\textsuperscript{83} The near elimination of Russia as a major naval power in 1905 reduced the number of potential enemies for the United States and Japan. The acceleration of the Anglo-German naval arms race after 1905 distracted the remaining major European naval powers. As such, Japan emerged as the most probable foe after 1905 because "Japan alone was capable of attacking the United States."\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{81} Clinard, Japan's Influence, 42.

\textsuperscript{82} That is more so evidentiary when one considers that the United States did not possess a full-scale German war plan until 1913, while a rudimentary plan for Japan existed in 1897, and a full scale examination of Japan began in 1906.

\textsuperscript{83} Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 231. After 1904 Britain began to concentrate its naval assets in the European theater. The German navy was forced to counter each succeeding move, leaving the United States in a much improved strategic environment, see Rock, "Risk Theory Reconsidered," 342-364.

\textsuperscript{84} Clinard, Japan's Influence, 166-172. "It was not merely the fact that Japan was the only remaining prospect that could fill the Navy's need for an enemy. On the contrary, the reasons for according this status were far more cogent and persuasive," but Japan represented the strongest remaining rival, Davis, The Admirals Lobby, 130; see Warner R. Schilling, "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919." Diss. (Ann Arbor MI: UMI, 1974).
Davis' work is unique and useful. Though focused more upon the role of senior officers of the U.S. Navy, Davis described in strong detail the American naval officer corps' development of the "sacred central territory" and the "conceptualization of enemies," a process very evident in the Japanese Navy as well. Davis pointed out that the U.S. Navy saw the growth of the Japanese Navy as a threat to American interests in East Asia, primarily the Philippines and the "Open Door" policy. That threat emanated from the Japanese acquisition of a strong navy. Initially, the threat existed in the Eastern Pacific at Hawaii; later the threat would reside in the Western Pacific. At a minimum, any challenge to that threat required a naval response. The U.S. Navy would have to ensure that its hypothetical enemy could not operate with impunity. In addition, the enemy could not approach the continental United States. This was, clearly, a philosophy of sea power driven by Mahanian tenets.  

Iriye's work is among the best in the field. He recognized, in a limited manner, the impact of interaction. Iriye, though, focused primarily upon the non-military facets of the American-Japanese relationship. Iriye stressed the impact of competition by two emerging great powers. That competition focused upon East Asia, an area of security interests for the Japanese and of economic interests for the

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United States. Earlier observers noted too, that the struggle between the United States and Japan dealt first with the issue of economics, "in pursuing her ambition to dominate the East Japan now finds a lion in the way. This is the United States. If American diplomacy actively interests itself in proving the integrity of China and the 'open door,' it will be very difficult for Japan's policy." A later work by Iriye highlighted the rise of tension between the two nations but did not address the interaction of the officer corps of both services. In that examination, Iriye noted that the emergence of the United States as the most probable enemy derived early reinforcement in Japan. Examining contemporary Japanese literature and native observers, that work demonstrated that the "hypothetical enemy" concept was unique to neither American citizens nor naval officers.

Braisted's two volume study is magnificent and made effective use of material previously classified. He also made use of some Japanese language materials. Without a doubt, Braisted performed an outstanding service with his examination of the U.S. Navy's fixation upon Japan as the

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86 Thomas F. Millard, America and the Far Eastern Question (New York: Moffat, Yard and Co., 1909), 37. "The Concept", though, had its first origin in the Eastern Pacific, Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, vii-ix. Iriye noted, "one factor which has not been sufficiently stressed is the possibility that, because of the Japanese crisis in Hawaii in 1897, the United States in 1898 was becoming much more assertive in Pacific affairs," 55. That assertiveness required a greatly enlarged American naval component and the Japanese responded in similar fashion:

most probable antagonist before the Washington Conference. At the moment Braisted is working on a third volume that examines the years 1922 to 1941. Advanced age and failing health has convinced him that he would not finish the study in the near future so any examination of the post-1922 period is unlikely to appear soon. Such a study would have, in my opinion, correlated the long-term consequences of the issues raised. Braisted noted furthermore that Japanese officers often gave greater weight to Western innovations and procedures than Western observers gave to similar Japanese activities.  

For example, one Japanese naval officer instituted a number of curriculum reforms at the Imperial Japanese Naval Staff College, a facility comparable to the U.S. Naval War College. Among these, in 1902 Akiyama introduced an advanced German innovation, the applicatory system. The applicatory system used situation estimates and the formulation of orders to develop realistic contingency plans. The U.S. Naval War

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48 Braisted conversations with Rivera.

49 Braisted letter to Rivera, 30 August 1993.
College implemented the system in 1912. No other historian has yet pointed that out.

Significance and Interest

The relationship between contact, observation, and perception between the two navies, particularly by planners, remains inadequately researched. By 1897 both the American and Japanese navies had achieved a higher degree of professionalism than has been generally recognized. That professionalism included the creation of naval war colleges and the perceived need to secure substantial fleet expansion.

With that in mind, I selected the Hawaii annexation crisis as a point of departure. That was when the U.S. Navy first drafted contingency plans with Japan as a hypothetical enemy. Consequently, the discovery that a Japanese officer had, during that period, visited the United States, and later observed and participated in military and naval evolutions, proved intriguing. Akiyama Saneyuki's visit to America at a

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90 Spector, Professors of War, 117-121; Hattendorf, et al, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial of the U.S. Naval War College (Newport RI: Naval War College P, 1984), 69-73. Austin Knight, "Estimate of the Situation," Naval War College Lecture, Newport RI, 1915. Commander Frank Marble, former attaché in Tokyo, delivered the first paper at the college, Frank Schofield, "Estimate of the Situation," (Newport RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1912), 3. Marble had been associated with Akiyama and it is most likely Akiyama familiarized Marble with the value of the system, as Marble reported Akiyama furnished a myriad of details about naval operations of the Russo-Japanese War, see "Further Accounts," JNOpB, #9, and "Battle of the Japan Sea: Track Chart," JNOpB #14, 1907, RG 8, NHC. Akiyama's planning skills were known to both the Office of Naval Intelligence and Naval War College. Marble considered his relationship with Akiyama close, calling him "my friend," Marble letter, 10 November 1905, "Japanese Battleship Mikasa, various, 1905-1928," 06-490/O-12-a, Entry 98, RG 38, NARA.
time of crisis piqued some curiosity as to the inter-
relationship between the two navies.\(^91\) Most certainly
Akiyama's experiences in America during the Hawaii crisis
coincided with the rise of "the Concept."\(^92\)

At the time of the annexation crisis the United States
ordered an increased naval presence in the islands.\(^93\)
Additionally, the Office of Naval Intelligence ordered future
planner John M. Ellicott to survey the islands for an
appropriate naval base in the event of a successful
annexation effort. The navy, furthermore, ordered Ellicott
to conduct a more sensitive mission—that was to "search the
[Hawaiian] islands for signs of Japanese [naval
activity]."\(^94\) Akiyama was in Hawaii when the United States
responded to threats of Japanese expansion by deploying a
large number of naval vessels to the islands. Although in
Honolulu by coincidence, Akiyama arrived at a most opportune

\(^91\) Peattie, "Akiyama Saneyuki," 60-69.

\(^92\) Akiyama spent three years in America, where he sailed with the
American forces under General W.R. Shafter's (1835-1906) from Tampa to
Santiago. He witnessed the destruction of the Spanish naval forces (July
1898). Akiyama later spent six months with the North Atlantic Squadron,
aboard U.S.S. New York, attached to Rear Admiral William T. Sampson's
(1840-1902) staff. Akiyama attended part of the 1899 U.S. Naval War
College program, and heard lectures by Charles H. Stockton (1845-1924)
and Bowman H. McCalla (1844-1910), Shimada Kinji, Amerika ni ckeru

\(^93\) Roosevelt to William McKinley, 22 April 1897, Theodore Roosevelt
Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington DC, (here-
after LCMD).

\(^94\) Ellicott, "Reconnaissance of Oahu, Hawaiian Islands, 1897," PL,
RG 8, NHC. Ellicott was billeted onboard U.S.S. Marion as an
intelligence officer; William M. Morgan, "The Anti-Japanese Origins of
the Hawaii Annexation Treaty of 1897," Diplomatic History 6 (Winter
time. The future Japanese Navy planner could not have failed to witness the display of what one naval historian referred to as an example of "superior sea power." 95

It seemed curious that the United States allowed a Japanese observer to take part in American military and naval operations after the Japanese government had delivered a strong protest over the proposed annexation of Hawaii. 96 Studying further, similarities in naval operations before Santiago in 1898 and Port Artur in 1904 became apparent. It was not difficult to see that an interrelationship, and a learning curve, existed between the two navies.

From 1897 on it became apparent that, over the intervening decade, there certainly existed a flow of ideas and technological innovation, both civilian and military, communicated back and forth, notions that shaped planning on both sides of the Pacific. In a democratic society, it was

95 Ellicott’s mission began in July 1897, Jeffery M. Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America’s First Intelligence Agency, 1865-1918 (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute P, 1979), 56, 67, 149, 151; Reynolds, Command of the Sea, 2:415, referred to the command of the sea through naval power. In a twist, both Ellicott and Akiyama’s transports were at the same pier in Honolulu. Ellicott had just completed his mission and Akiyama’s transport stopped over in Hawaii enroute to San Francisco, Hawaiian Gazette, 17 August 1897. Though there exists no indication that the two men met, both certainly had the opportunity to witness the “standoff” between the numerically superior American naval presence and the Japanese vessels in Hawaii. The Navy recognized Ellicott’s analytical skills and later ordered him to conduct a similar mission in the Philippine Islands, Ellicott to Caspar Goodrich, 30 August 1898, Area 10, RG 45, NARA, annotated by Henry C. Taylor, “Here is a good man.”

difficult to keep secret many naval programs for long, "for technological transformations could not have proceeded nearly so rapidly if economic interest groups favoring enlarged public expenditure had not come into existence." As to naval warfare, many new ideas would have emanated from the naval engagements of the Spanish-American War, the first in which both opponents possessed armored, steam-powered, deep sea battleships. The preparations by, and the conduct of, the U.S. Navy proved subsequently to be models of a sort.

It was Akiyama's American tour that exposed him (and subsequent Japanese naval officers), personally, or often philosophically, to future American naval planners and leading innovators like Bradley A. Fiske, Henry C. Taylor, Stephen B. Luce, William T. Sampson, Bowman H. McCalla, Charles H. Stockton, French E. Chadwick, Sydney A. Staunton,

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98 Bradley Fiske recognized the connection between contact and potential threats, "We are all imitative, and therefore we tend to imitate each other; but the inferior is more apt to imitate the superior. Japan has imitated so well that in some ways she has already surpassed her models. Japan has learned our secret and mastered it," The Navy as a Fighting Machine, 80-81. One might note that the secret was not solely the province of the American Navy.

99 Dingman noted that Akiyama was the first of the future Japanese strategic planners to actually meet Mahan, "Japan and Mahan," 57.
and Richard Wainwright.\textsuperscript{100} With the exception of McCalla and Staunton, with just a few articles between them, these officers were also prodigious authors.\textsuperscript{101} The group published their research and findings on a regular basis in forums readily available to the Japanese. These officers wrote most often about matters that approximated contemporary American naval strategic and tactical thought.

Much of the material written by these officers, while subject to occasional navy department reservation, circulated in an international environment. Drawing upon much of that professional thought, and related to the issue of contact, one might argue strongly that the Japanese could learn how do

\textsuperscript{100} Fiske became Aide for Operations (1909-1915), the precursor to the Chief of Naval Operations; Sampson (1840-1902) commanded American naval forces off Cuba during the Spanish-American War; McCalla (1844-1910) lectured at the Naval War College before and after the Spanish-American War; Wainwright (1849-1926) directed the Office of Naval Intelligence during the Hawaiian crisis; Chadwick (1844-1919) served as Sampson’s chief of staff from 1898 to 1899; Staunton (1850-1939) was Sampson’s flag lieutenant; Stockton (1845-1924) served as president of the Naval War College (1898 to 1899), Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, passim; Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence, passim. Between 1897 and 1916 Fiske, Wainwright, Luce (1827-1917), Taylor, Chadwick, Staunton, Stockton, McCalla, and Mahan were at one time or another involved with war planning. After 1900 Fiske, Chadwick, Stockton, Taylor, Staunton, and Wainwright served as members of the General Board of the U.S. Navy, an unofficial ad hoc planning body, see Costello, "Planning for War: A History of the General Board of the Navy."

\textsuperscript{101} The group published on a regular basis. The notes and bibliography of Karsten’s Naval Aristocracy cites many of their publications.
deal later with emerging crises. The implementation of several innovations shaped by contact with American officers certainly marked many naval officers and planners, such as Akiyama, as critical members of the Japanese Navy’s strategic elite.

The officers cited above became eventually the best and brightest of their respective navy’s planners in the years before the Washington Conference. These officers each gave their navy a unique perspective of modern naval warfare. The officers drew, as well, upon personal experiences in the exercise of naval power to advance their own professionalism. Most importantly, the officers recognized further the need

102 Reynolds noted that the exchange of ideas formalized with the growth of service journals and publications, Command of the Sea, 2:400-403. Most American naval officers were members of the Naval Institute and often associated with a number of other professional organizations. Akiyama and Sato were members of the U.S. Naval Institute and familiar with many of the works of their American counterparts, "Members and Associate Members List," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 29 (June 1903):525, 528; The U.S. Navy attaché in Tokyo reported later that "the [Japanese Naval Staff College] library contain[ed] a well-selected stock of foreign books, mostly in English and French, and subscribe[d] to the principal foreign professional periodicals," "W" #187, 21 December 1907, in "Japanese Naval War College," JNT, #106, 1910, RG 8, NHC. One might note that security measures were often minor considerations, and a smart foreign officer might discern significant details about American naval tactics, strategy, and operations; see James Goldrick, "Naval Publishing the British Way," Naval War College Review 45 (Winter 1992):85-99. Bassford made note of the transmission of intellectual and strategic thought, see chapter 11, "The Sea Power Theorists," in Clausewitz in English, 94-103.


104 Dingman, "Japan and Mahan," 57-58.
for a modern naval warfare doctrine.\textsuperscript{105} For both navies the less than satisfactory conduct and outcome of the naval battles of the Sino-Japanese and Spanish-American wars produced the prerequisite requirement to prepare each service for modern naval warfare.\textsuperscript{106} Abroad and at home, the officers had witnessed first-hand developments in naval warfare and profited greatly from their own combat experiences in modern conflicts.\textsuperscript{107} Historians recognized the contributions of this select grouping, comparing them often to Alfred Thayer Mahan on numerous occasions. The American, and even Japanese, officers herein most certainly

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\textsuperscript{105} "Doctrine can be summed up in three words: how to fight," Stephen D. Schmidt, "A Call for an Official Naval Doctrine," Naval War College Review 46 (Winter 1993):45-58; "Formally, doctrine is standard battle methodology. [T]here can be no better definition of doctrine than a comprehensive and practiced plan of action. Sound doctrine will establish unity amidst chaos," Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute P, 1986), 24. In the Japanese Navy, Akiyama and Sato were actors in the development of doctrine, while in the American Navy Henry C. Taylor was most influential in that process, Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, 80, 94. Another example of contact relates to the Japanese Navy, which implemented doctrine as a part of its war college curriculum in 1902, nearly a decade before the U.S. Navy.

\textsuperscript{106} Much of the dissatisfaction arose from poor naval gunnery in each case.

\textsuperscript{107} Sato was sent to Britain in 1899 to study imperial defense and maritime policy. He visited the United States in 1901, toured facilities along the Caribbean and Atlantic, and met with Alfred Thayer Mahan before returning to Japan, Shimada, \textit{Roshiya senso zenva no Akiyama Saneyuki} (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1990), 1:82-86, 2:613.
belong to the select membership in the intellectual elite of the "Golden Age of Naval Thought."\(^{108}\)

The shared and common professional experiences after 1898 meant that the naval officers were able to interact based upon familiar experience. Peter Karsten's work pointed to this mentality—"a band of brothers."\(^{109}\) Naval officers shared staterooms, the wardroom mess, liberty, and stood watches together. When encountering naval officers from another nation, the occupational homogeneity was, and remains to this day, an opportunity to experience camaraderie. The chance to exchange information about port visits, operations, service food, and general complaints served to reinforce the elitism of naval service. It would not be unusual, then, to welcome a fellow professional to one's familiar surroundings, even one from a foreign navy.\(^{110}\) That contact eventually proved worrisome to the U.S. Navy. Such was the Office of Naval Intelligence's concern a few years later when it recommended no further visits by foreign officers to the Naval Academy and the Naval War College, for such officers

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\(^{108}\) One Japanese history likened Akiyama and Sato to Marx and Engels, arguing that the two Japanese officers, in response to changed circumstances, would have modified their strategic views in subsequent decades, Nomura Minoru, "Akiyama to Meiji Kaigun," in Oide Hisashi, ed., Akiyama Saneyuki no subete (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu oraisha, 1982), 70. Hughes, Fleet Tactics, differs slightly from Clark Reynolds, labeling the years 1865-1914 the "Golden Age of Tactical Thought," 54-84.


could deduce much about American naval operations and tactics from "signalling methods, battle tactics, and gunnery training," as well as make detailed reports about the "actual condition of our personnel and the 'efficiency of the fleet."

As to American naval officers examined herein, only Mahan, Fiske, Chadwick, McCalla and Wainwright have notable biographies. Braisted and Miller both touted one important figure of note, Clarence S. Williams, but no historian has produced a significant work about Williams. Staunton shared a similar fate, though his close duty with Akiyama during the North Atlantic Squadron fleet operations

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111 General Board (hereafter GB) 420, 18 April 1906 and GB 420, 13 April 1906, RG 38, NARA. Other navies expressed a similar concern about the exchange of information that might be used by a potential enemy, see Goldrick, "Naval Publishing the British Way," 88-89.


113 Williams, one of the most prescient members of the General Board of the Navy, served with board during the last part of Theodore Roosevelt's tenure. See Braisted, U.S. Navy in the Pacific, II, and Miller, War Plan Orange.
in 1899 invites analysis. Other American naval officers often overlooked or discussed superficially in any study of American-Japanese relations include John M. Ellicott, who provided the earliest detailed analyses of Japan's maritime threat potential, and naval attaché Frank Marble, and in a very limited way, his successor, John Dougherty, all important transmitters of Japanese naval thought.

While the intent is to connect the officers, there is no plan to undertake a collective biography of the American and Japanese officers discussed in this study. I intend, by contrast, to examine and correlate the roles of the following American naval institutions: the General Board, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Naval War College, and the Joint Army and Navy Board.

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114 Staunton served with Akiyama for six months onboard New York. Since Staunton was Sampson's flag lieutenant and signals officer, the odds are very good that the two officers discussed the U.S. Navy's operations during the Spanish-American War. Any assertion about Staunton's duties are derived from the fact that the U.S. Navy had a weak signal corps in 1898, "Discussion: The Signal Question Once More," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 28 (December 1902):947.

115 Ellicott served as an intelligence officer from 1896 to 1899 followed by a tour at the U.S. Naval War College, where he conducted studies on the threat from Japanese and German naval power, Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence, passim. Marble served as naval attaché in Tokyo from 1904 to 1906, and lectured later at the Naval War College, Spector, Professors of War, 118-119, while Dougherty (1858-1909) succeeded Marble in Tokyo and provided additional details about the Japanese Navy and Akiyama, Dorwart, ibid., 84-85, 153, and Reckner, Great White Fleet, 38, 113. Neither officer has received a biographical treatment; Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, 94.

116 The author intends a limited survey of one of the Japanese counterparts, the Naval Staff College.
Questions

Perhaps the key question this dissertation will examine is, what did American and Japanese naval officers learn from each other about strategy, tactics, operations, and the propensities for certain activities, and when did they learn it? Acknowledgment that the two groups followed similar routes toward modernization and professionalism dictates an examination of that process.

Another question to ask is—What did specific and individual American naval officers draw, if anything, from their exposure to Japanese naval officers and programs? Records in the National Archives and the Naval War College indicate strongly that the U.S. Navy, rather than basing their views upon racial stereotypes, drew very important lessons from the Japanese Navy's experiences.

Another pivotal question—How did each navy react and adjust to emerging strategies and tactics generated by their naval counterparts?, remains important to the focus of this study. During the period in question, battle fleets were most certainly the international standard of power. How those fleets were used proved of tremendous interest to both American and Japanese planners.

An answer to these questions would go far to support "the Concept." For example, both services began serious war
planning for a trans-Pacific war after 1905. Both shared common assumptions that the American-controlled Philippine Islands would be a target of early activity by the Japanese. The United States would then require an extended period of time to respond to hostilities in the Western Pacific. The two navies based their assumptions in part upon the lessons of the Sino-Japanese War, the Tripartite Intervention, and the Russo-Japanese War, in particular the siege of Port Arthur and the destruction of the Second Pacific Fleet—after a trek of 18,000 miles.

The Russian naval disasters of 1904 and 1905 riveted the planners of both services as they began to hypothesize the conduct of a future war in the Western Pacific. That planning drew heavily upon the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, particularly, upon the respective service's building programs. In subsequent years a number of American naval officers sought to address the difficult challenge of a trans-Pacific campaign and the conduct of a decisive battle with the Japanese Navy in the Western Pacific.

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117 The U.S. Navy would fix upon that strategy for the next four decades. The Japanese undertook such planning, notwithstanding the debts entailed in the Russo-Japanese War and the lack of immediate substantial domestic facilities for rapidly constructing any large battle fleet.

118 Both the American and Japanese Navies understood the tremendous risks entailed in a transoceanic deployment. The Russians had made such a deployment before, in 1894 and disastrously in 1905, see David R. Jones, "Admiral S.O. Makarov and Naval Theory," Naval War College Review 47 (Winter 1993):68-86.

119 Braisted, U.S. Navy in the Pacific; Miller, War Plan Orange.
Many planning officers continued these preliminary studies to the Washington Conference and beyond when a variety of treaty stipulations forced a dramatic change in strategic planning. These studies remained preliminary, for while they shared some characteristics the plans were subject to a myriad of obstacles or lack of execution in the years before the Washington Conference. For example, during the period in question, (1) the Japanese government officially designated a primary (and hypothetical) enemy in a unified and formal defense policy, the Teikoku kokubo hoshin, while the American government never officially designated a primary opponent, nor had any of its plans received approval from the commander-in-chief and, (2) while both navies held the other as the primary opponent they, of course, never executed their plans.

Other issues examined herein are the effects of, for example: the Spanish-American War and the impact of "lessons-learned"; and the impact of crises on strategic plans before the Washington Conference. They contributed to the development of "the Concept."  

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120 Tsunoda, Manshu mondai, passim.

121 "No plan survives contact with the enemy," Helmuth von Moltke, quoted in Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 25. Vlahos made note of the hypothetical nature of any American-Japanese crisis, Blue Sword, 116-121, 127.

122 It seems more correct to assume a cascading influence of all the factors upon the "Concept." Iriye wrote that such events had been thoroughly examined, Pacific Estrangement, xiii-ix, but I disagree, especially when it pertains to the relationship between the two navies.
CHAPTER II
THE AMERICAN NAVY: THE HAWAII QUESTION

Introduction

[In 1897] only a few Americans recognized the growing strength of Japan's sea power; and fewer still considered her the probable enemy.¹

—Outten J. Clinard, historian, 1947

Many standard works infer that the deliberations and results of the Washington Conference (1921-1922) gave rise to American and Japanese naval antagonisms. They are wrong. It would be more accurate to say that the conference reinforced strong convictions, long held by officers of both navies, that the other side posed a threat. For the U.S. Navy, the decades prior to the conference represented a "warscare," while the conference "reinforced" the Imperial Japanese Navy's view of the United States as the enemy.² By 1922, however, there is little doubt that contact between the navies in the preceding decades had shaped "the Concept."

In the Japanese Navy, the sentiment emanated from its helplessness to prevent interference in Japan's pursuit of

¹ Clinard, Japan's Influence, 36.

perceived national interests. That frustration stemmed, as well, from the service's long-term inability to acquire what it considered sufficient naval strength. For navalists on both sides of the Pacific, however, the question of sufficiency proved difficult to settle satisfactorily.

Both the American and Japanese navies sought funding for what Mahan termed an "adequate Navy, however the term 'adequate' be defined." Quite simply, superior naval assets enabled the imperialist powers to intervene in international affairs with relative impunity. In America, awareness of a Japanese naval presence as a counterweight to Western influence came more slowly. As Japan came of age in the late 1800s, it sought to exercise regional, rather than global, influence. That exercise threatened the western-dominated status quo and an intellectual response among Western naval establishments, particularly, the American, was not long in coming.

In the West, however, the idea that Japan specifically existed as an international "Yellow Peril" did not originate in the minds of American citizens. It emanated more from European origins. Specifically, it flowed from Kaiser Wilhelm II's racial philosophy. That is not to ignore the

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4 Richard A. Thompson, "The Yellow Peril, 1890-1924," Diss. (Madison WI, 1957). As used herein, the term refers directly to Japan's emergence as an increasingly powerful actor in the international community.
American viewpoint, for anti-Asian prejudices had a long pedigree in American history, particularly in the western states. American citizens and naval officers throughout the nation held a number of racist beliefs about Asian nationals. The passage of anti-Chinese legislation, and later, the rise of anti-Japanese sentiments certainly attests to those attitudes. The Kaiser, though, among many international observers, imagined a menace to the Pacific littoral from the growing populations and military capabilities of both China and Japan. To those who shared the Kaiser's view, "At the final stage of nearly all yellow peril thought lurked the fear of an East-West appeal to arms." Such thought eventually gained currency among the officers of the U.S. Navy.

In the U.S. Navy, the notion of Japan as a maritime enemy emerged not so much from the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan as from other factors. Following the first American attempt to annex Hawaii (1893), Captain Mahan, the outgoing president of the U.S. Naval War College, inferred in a letter to the editor of the New York Times that China was a threat to American control of Hawaii. Mahan did not cite an acute Japanese threat until 1897 when Japan protested most fervently another American attempt, orchestrated by President

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5 See Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice.

6 Thompson, "The Yellow Peril, 1890-1924," 249.
William McKinley and other powerful elements, to annex Hawaii. Mahan confided to his disciple, Theodore Roosevelt, "That there is danger of trouble with [Japan] towards Hawaii, I think beyond doubt."\(^7\)

The first view of the Japanese Navy as the enemy came more from the experiences of American officials and naval officers in Hawaii during the abortive 1893 annexation effort.\(^8\) The Japanese government, which had not protested the annexation, dispatched warships to Hawaii to protect its interests. These existed primarily in the growing number of Japanese resident in Hawaii. Captain Togo Heihachiro commanded the protected cruiser *Naniwa*, which arrived in Honolulu on 23 February 1893. The future naval hero reportedly "glowered in silence" as Japan could not forestall annexation. "Togo and his compatriots did not relish this aspect but the Japanese Navy had not yet attained a strength warranting defiance to Uncle Sam in his duckpond."\(^9\)

One of the future members of the Japanese Navy's strategic elite, future-admiral Kato Kanji, then an ensign, observed the crisis from *Naniwa*. The junior officer asserted

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\(^8\) In 1893, President Benjamin Harrison "directed naval intelligence to prove the strategic value" of Hawaii and help secure congressional approval for annexation, Dorwart, *The Office of Naval Intelligence*, 46, 148.

later that the Japanese Navy could have overwhelmed the American forces in Hawaii, and then, secured the islands for Japan. That statement seems quite unrealistic, for the Japanese were then in no real position to support maritime operations nearly 5,000 miles distant. Though the Japanese Navy then possessed more vessels, the American fleet was of a more recent construction, taking advantage of modern technological improvements. Figure 1 displays the respective existing orders of battle in 1893. Kato noted that the failure to maintain Hawaii under Japan's influence stimulated enmity between the two nations. While American naval officers did little originally to foster "the Concept," the events in Hawaii remained critical.

By 1893 many influential Japanese had come to believe that Hawaii would eventually join in a growing East Asian confederation. Such an idea began in 1871 when the two states concluded a treaty of friendship. Further discussions encompassed "the concept of a union of Asiatic nations, including Hawaii, under the aegis of the Emperor of Japan." The Hawaiian monarch, Kalakaua, had even sought

10 The list includes those vessels already in service and able to deploy in 1893, see Robert Gardiner, ed., et al., Conway's All the Worlds Fighting Ships, 1860-1905 (London: Conway Maritime P Ltd., 1979).

11 Kato Kanji taisho denki hensankai, Kato Kanji taisho den (Tokyo: Kato Kanji taisho denki hensankai, 1941), 234-238. Kato became later one of the Japanese Navy's most ardent proponent that the U.S. Navy's role was the "hypothetical enemy."

UNITED STATES NAVY JAPANESE NAVY

Armored Cruisers/Armored Corvettes

New York 1893
Chiyoda 1890
Kongo 1878
Hiei 1878

Cruisers/Protected Cruisers/Unprotected Cruisers

Atlanta 1886
Baltimore 1890
Boston 1887
Charleston 1889
Chicago 1889
Newark 1891
Philadelphia 1890
San Francisco 1890
Vesuvius 1890

Chishima 1892
Idzumi 1884
Itsukushima 1891
Matsushima 1891
Naniwa 1885
Takachiho 1886
Takao 1888
Tsukushi 1883
Yaeyama 1892

Miscellaneous Small Craft-Gunboats/Corvettes/Sloops

22 24

FIGURE 1
USN AND IJN ORDER OF BATTLE, 1893
BY CLASS AND DATE OF COMMISSION
to join the future of the two states through marriage. While the Japanese would have liked to acquire the Hawaiian Islands, the desire to revise the infamous "unequal treaties" with the western powers proved a higher priority. Rather than dissipate their diplomatic efforts, the Japanese focused primarily upon treaty revisions. In the intervening years, large numbers of Japanese citizens found work on the plantations of Hawaii. These citizens were seen as an advanced guard of future expansion. The acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands could wait for a more auspicious time.\textsuperscript{11} Such a time, however, arrived at the time that the United States had embarked upon an expansive foreign policy, backed up by a growing fleet.

Between 1890 and 1897 both the American and Japanese navies had reached a level of significant professionalism. Within a decade, the civilian leaders in each nation came to appreciate the importance of modern sea power. The term 'modern,' refers to the high seas battleship and the exercise of sea power in the period after 1890. In the armored battleship age, it was subject to frequent revision when new developments in propulsion, gunnery, armor, fire control, and communications required a technological response. The wiser governments also created naval war colleges for advanced

\textsuperscript{11} Conroy, \textit{The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868-1898}, 50-53.
warfare and professional study. Both navies received, as well, significant appropriations toward the increase of their respective battle fleets, drawing lessons-learned from the application of sea power, particularly after the Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese Navy grew rapidly after 1895, but lacked the necessary strength to forestall most western interventions in East Asia. Nonetheless, both the American and Japanese navies understood that sea power could go far in deterring any potential opponent, and that their battle fleets served as instruments of policy in support of national interests. At times, sea power theorists posited that service and national interests in the respective states coincided to mutual benefit.

While Mahan had not raised the initial alarm, he and other observers viewed the expanding Japanese Navy as a growing threat. From 1890 on, Mahan strongly advocated the American acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands. The theorist aimed to preclude any threats from the East and simultaneously provide a way station enroute to the markets of East Asia. Mahan recognized the potential of Japan,

14 Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars; "At Tokyo there is a Naval War College patterned after our own [founded in 1884]," Ellicott, "Sea Power of Japan," 11, RG 8, NHC. In Japan, the facility was known as the Kaigun Daigakko (Naval Staff College).


though his warnings lacked any extremes of emotionalism. Rather, Mahan's warnings related more to squandered opportunities in East Asia. These were opportunities connected to commerce at a time when the United States needed markets for an over-producing industrial society. Hawaii was one link in a chain stretching toward those markets in Asia.

Officials in Hawaii reported the first threat of Japan's intervention in American interests. The American minister to Hawaii, John L. Stevens, reported "the opinion that there is occasion for keeping a sharp eye on Tokyo [for] intrigues there against our plans of predominance in the North Pacific." The Benjamin Harrison administration (1889-1893) pursued the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands late in its tenure. In response, the Japanese government dispatched two naval vessels to Hawaii in February 1893. The parties settled the affair amicably, when the Japanese looked officially "with favor upon the annexation of those Islands to the United States." Japan's representative in Washington reported on 16 March 1893 that he "would be pleased to see

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18 Stevens telegram to Secretary of State John W. Foster, 1 March 1893, #88, Stevens to Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham, 15 March 1893, #92, 24 March 1893, #93, all enclosures in "Hawaiian Correspondence," House Document #48, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session, GPO, 1893; James H. Blount to Gresham, 6 April 1893, enclosure to Appendix II, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894 (Washington; GPO, 1895), 470-475, (hereafter FRUS).
the sovereignty of the United States extended over [Hawaii]."^{19}

Suspicion of the Japanese, however, lingered well into the following years. Between 1893 and 1895, the American government dispatched warships on a regular basis to represent and protect its interests in the islands. The on-scene commanders reported regularly on the political conditions in the islands. The American government ordered, as well, the navy to prevent intervention by any third party, specifically either Great Britain or Japan.^{20}

The naval missions to Hawaii seemingly reinforced the suspicions of Japan. Rear Admiral John Walker, commander-in-chief of the United States Pacific Station, reported "the Japanese a possible source of future danger, a brave people with military instincts."^{21} His pronouncement emerged as one of the earliest warnings about Japan issued by a senior American naval officer.

It was, however, Japan's triumph in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) that forced the world to take notice of the emerging might of the Japanese Navy. In defeating a Chinese

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^{19} Foster to Harrison, 2 February 1893, Benjamin Harrison Papers, LCMD; quoted in Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands 1936 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books Inc., 1964), 125. The incoming Cleveland administration decided not to annex the islands which remained in limbo for five years.

^{20} Secretary of the Navy Hilary A. Herbert to Rear Admiral John Walker, 27 March 1894, Senate Document #16, 53rd Congress, 3rd Session, GPO, 1894.

^{21} Walker to Herbert, 28 April 1894, Area 9, RG 45, NARA.
fleet, which on the face of it appeared much stronger, Japan gained a considerable international prestige and a new found respect for its naval capabilities. The Japanese Navy handily defeated a numerically superior (and favored) Chinese battle fleet in the Battle of the Yalu (September 1894). 22 That battle was the first true modern naval contest of the era, featuring armored battleships and shell-firing rifled cannon. While less than crushing in its outcome, the battle provided interested observers the chance to evaluate contemporary naval gunnery. Only the Chinese possessed battleships. The Japanese Navy, deploying modern cruisers armed with eight inch naval guns, employed flanking and envelopment tactics to overcome a strong but poorly handled enemy fleet.

Driving the Chinese fleet back to its base, the Japanese Navy gained command of the sea, leaving the Japanese Army free to land unfettered on the continent. The navy’s support entailed the protection of the lines of communications between the Japanese home islands and the landing areas, reinforcing the Mahanian argument about the need to target the enemy’s naval forces first. Mahan posited that once the enemy’s battle fleets were neutralized, the enemy would succumb. Mahan believed in Jomini’s dictum, "that the

organized [naval forces] of the enemy are ever the chief objective." Thus, the defeat, or containment, of the Chinese fleet gave the Japanese freedom to operate at will. In any case, the battle also reinforced the Japanese Navy's view of the importance of "superior" sea power, in particular, the first-class armored battleship. Troubled by the navy's performance, one officer declared, "Never again should the Japanese navy 'go naked into battle, sword in hand against an enemy shielded by heavy armor.' 

By early 1895, it was clear to most international observers that the Japanese had all but won the war. With the subsequent ratification of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 1895), the Japanese received territorial concessions on the Liaotung Peninsula, primarily Port Arthur, and the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, just north of the Philippine Islands. The Chinese also paid reparations totalling $165,000,000, from which the Japanese Navy received $63,000,000. Such an infusion of funds went toward naval expansion and the acquisition of battleships.

There was, however, a more threatening reaction to the Japanese victory. In late April 1895, the Tripartite Intervention (of Russia, Germany, and France) raised the specter of conflict. The three western powers sought to

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strip Japan of some of its fruits of victory. Seeking to further their own interests, the Tripartite Intervention forced Japan's retrocession of Port Arthur to China. While the three powers accepted Japan's possession of Taiwan (Formosa) as one of the fruits of victory, another power did not. The Spanish government sought the retrocession of Taiwan, located dangerously near the Philippine Islands. The Japanese sought, unsuccessfully, assistance from both the United States and Great Britain. Standing alone, the Japanese proved unable to forestall such interference and from then on sought sufficient naval power to prevent such interventions in the future.²⁵

To advocates of Japanese navalism, at least, the lessons were clear: modern sea power facilitated the exercise of regional power and international influence. During the next two years the Japanese government began a large fleet expansion program. One American noted of the expansion, "It can hardly be maintained that Japan aims her vast preparations at the United States; at least not primarily," and "[t]hus I think it may be assumed that Japan's immense naval preparation is not made with the United States in hostile view; certainly not mainly."²⁶ That view proved


most challenging. Feeling more secure, the Japanese government endeavored again to flex its muscle in an international arena and prevent the erosion of the nation's prestige. The pretext would be another American attempt to annex Hawaii.

The Hawaiian Controversy in 1897

By 1897, American theoretical constructs of sea power and Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan's sea power studies, first published in 1890, had provided a much needed shot in the arm for the U.S. Navy. Utilizing the lessons of imperial history, primarily Britain's rise to global predominance, Mahan beseeched his fellow citizens and naval officers to protect the nation's economic security. Mahan referred to a neo-mercantilist policy undergirded by a strong navy. According to "Mahan's imperialistic hypothesis, an expanding foreign commerce was essential to national power and prosperity."27

The American sea power theorist saw the extension of commerce overseas as the best method of carrying out that vision. Such a goal entailed resuscitating the American merchant marine, a victim, partially, of the Confederacy's limited success with its guerre de course strategy thirty

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years earlier. Mahan disdained such a way of making war, asserting instead, that America required a "blue water," or high seas, navy.  

The captain argued that an offensive maritime strategy, and not a passive coastal defense, served America's long-term interests. Such an offensive capability held out the promise that a decisive naval battle protected the nation's vital security, commerce, and political interests. Facing a superior American battle fleet, any maritime enemy, who, by virtue of the reality of America's geographic isolation, would arise from afar, could not threaten the nation's coasts, nor could it institute a damaging economic blockade offshore. That Mahanian view became part and parcel of an emerging "large policy," one that envisioned an increased economic, political, and even global, role for the United States. One might note that such a philosophy also took root, partially, in the Japanese Navy, at the time that many Americans sought to implement such a vision.

The American "power elite" seeking to expand the nation's horizon rarely included naval officers suitably placed to directly "influence national events and alter

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28 That is a fleet capable of deploying well off-shore and remaining so for a long period.

events." The movers and shakers did include those powerful social, economic, political elements which often agreed with the desires of many naval officers. The most frequently cited, or blamed, leaders are Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. They are charged with using extra-legal methods to enact a Mahanian vision for American grandeur. Whether one argues, however, that overproduction or manifest destiny led the United States to look outward, the confluence of interests in the 1890s meant that the "large policy" proponents wielded growing influence upon many American enterprises.  

The acquisition of extensive markets overseas required not only an augmented merchant marine, but the necessary naval assets to protect the sea lanes of communication between the United States and any intended markets. In the Mahanian dialectic, the United States required, specifically, first-class battleships to protect the maritime highways to the markets. Businessman increasingly believed that those exist overseas, primarily in East Asia. Therefore, a growing merchant marine and naval fleet required a number of supporting way stations. In the steam age, ships were no longer dependent upon the wind but did have to replenish their coal supplies on a regular basis. Looking westward,

30 McCormick, China Market, 10.

31 Pratt, "The 'Large Policy' of 1898."; McCormick, China Market.
Hawaii was certainly one of those way stations, for decades belonging unofficially to the American orbit of political and economic influence. For another power to possess them posed a threat not only to the physical security of the United States but also to its future economic well-being.

After 1890 American naval officers, among a number of other interest groups, found a partial answer to the problem of a rapidly changing world. In the decades after the Civil War the U.S. Navy had fallen into disrepute. American naval officers saw their service overtaken not only by long established maritime powers but by numbers of emerging powers, as well. At the same time, the officer corps experienced a debilitating stagnation in service promotions. With the publication of *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, many officers eagerly embraced the Mahanian vision of sea power and naval expansion. Those officers, along with leading navalists like Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, Captain Henry C. Taylor, Commanders Richard Wainwright and Caspar F. Goodrich, and Lieutenant William W. Kimball, also favored the acquisition of strategic *point d'appui*, like the Hawaiian

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Islands. The episode that most certainly sharpened the focus between the American and Japanese Navies, though, came from a distant civilian act and not from naval officers.

A number of economic interests in Hawaii, primarily white plantation owners, sought to exercise more and more authority in the islands. These interests looked to replace the native born ruler. Queen Liliuokalani had raised the threat of an exclusive native-born government controlling the economic and political infrastructure of the islands. The plantation owners eventually revolted in the belief that the United States would annex the islands. A new white-dominated government feared, as well, the continued growth of Japanese immigration, even though the Japanese government never sought, officially, to annex the islands. There is evidence, however, that a number of influential Japanese citizens, within and without the government both in Tokyo and Honolulu, saw Hawaii as part of Japan's future.

A drive by Japanese immigrants for equal rights raised the specter of a non-white population controlling political power in the islands. The Japanese immigrants, along with Chinese coolie laborers, arrived originally as a source of cheap labor at the behest of the plantation owners. Thus,

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33 See Karsten, *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism*, passim. The officers were considered reformers and "Young Turks." Civilian counterparts included Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Benjamin Tracy.

after 1893, the white-ruling class in Hawaii feared not only being overwhelmed by an expansive Japanese empire, but losing, as well, the benefits of belonging to the American sphere of influence.35

In domestic American politics, the Republican candidate for president in 1896, William McKinley, supported the eventual annexation of Hawaii. McKinley also supported many of the international platforms espoused by "large policy" adherents, a group that included Captain Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. These men pursued a variety of interests deemed vital to the United States, among them, the liberation of Cuba, the acquisition of an isthmian canal, the annexation of Hawaii, and last but not least, the construction of a first-class navy. A number of American naval officers supported many elements of the "large policy," elements that would lead to a larger naval force and career security. Much to their relief, McKinley won the 1896 election, though he did not take office until March 1897. The election results, which promised a favorable consideration of the navy, did not, however, lead to crisis in Hawaii, rather the issue arose in the islands.

The provisional leadership in Honolulu, composed of white interests, had taken a provocative step even before word of McKinley's victory reached Hawaii. Beginning in late

1896 and continuing through mid-1897, the white-controlled Hawaiian bureaucracy refused entry to increasing numbers of Japanese immigrants contracted to work the islands' sugarcane fields. Suspicious of the immigrants, the Hawaiian authorities refused to honor what it considered an attempt by the Japanese Empire to flood the island with its citizens. The Japanese government lodged a formal protest. It hinted at military action if the situation remained static. Just days after McKinley's inauguration, the press reported the dispatch of Japanese warships to Hawaii.

Previous diplomatic experiences drove Japan's policy in the Hawaiian crisis. The Tripartite Intervention (1895) had humiliated Japan internationally. Government officials in Tokyo decided to secure Japan's interests in Hawaii before the United States took any prejudicial action. The only way for the Japanese to project power across the Pacific, though, was with its burgeoning navy.

The intellectual background to that proposed projection of power deserves treatment. The Japanese Navy had itself taken Mahan as a model. In the decade after the publication of the theorist's seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power

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17 San Francisco Chronicle, 1, 2, 3 April 1897; The Times, 13 April 1897; Morgan, "The Anti-Japanese Origins of the Hawaiian Annexation Treaty," 28; Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 50-51. The Japanese cruiser Naniwa arrived on 5 May 1897, Ellis Mills to John Sherman, 5 May 1897, "Notes from American Legations (Honolulu) to the Department of State," T-30, NARA.
upon History, 1660-1783, the Japanese Navy rose to become the world's fifth leading naval power. Increased appropriations and a share of the wartime reparations secured that position. By 1896, the monies from China contributed greatly to that growth as the Japanese government supported the Japanese Navy's acquisition of a modern battle fleet. That entailed eventually an expansion to six modern battleships, six armored cruisers, and four protected cruisers. At this point that differing agendas arose, including a desire by the white government in Hawaii to remain tied to America. The Japanese government desired also to protect its interests and keep the islands tied to Japan. Finally, American adherents pursued the "large policy," and the U.S. Navy's vision for grandeur.

One of the McKinley administration's first actions was to increase the number of American warships in Hawaiian waters. Within a few weeks, the U.S. Navy deployed three vessels to deter any Japanese adventurism. The navy also drafted a number of war plans to deal with armed conflict in the islands. Though McKinley's Secretary of the Navy, John

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38 Evans and Peattie, Raigun. The first modern battleships, Fuji and Yashima, were completed about the time of the 1897 Hawaii crisis, however they were still working up in English waters. By mid-1897, the U.S. Navy's modern battleship fleet consisted of four (Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Iowa), but three units were stationed in the Atlantic. For both navy's fleet expansion programs, see Gardiner, Conway's All the Worlds Fighting Ships, 1860-1905.

D. Long, had formal responsibility for departmental affairs, it was McKinley’s choice for Assistant Secretary, Theodore Roosevelt, that proved pivotal.

Roosevelt, who assumed office in late April 1897, emerged as an energetic subordinate. With his superior’s consent, Roosevelt gave McKinley a strategic analysis of the situation and urged the president to deploy overwhelming strength to the islands. Roosevelt hoped to counter the two Japanese battleships nearing completion in British shipyards. The enthused subordinate maintained a regular correspondence with Captain Mahan, who too advocated a forceful response to the Japanese. Mahan feared the Japanese would deploy the two new battleships to Hawaii. The then-retired Mahan had no influence over the operations of the department, and was viewed by many of his senior colleagues as aloof and impractical. Roosevelt, however, shared the theorist’s opinions about the situation. Mahan, vacationing in London, and keeping tabs on the two Japanese battleships nearing completion, urged Roosevelt to push for the deployment of a substantial naval force to Hawaii before the Japanese government sent the new battleships to the islands.40

40 Roosevelt to McKinley, 22 April 1897, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.

The Japanese had acted at a most inauspicious time, for the new administration sought urgently to prevent the transfer of the islands to another power. The Japanese government made no official overtures to annex the islands. There is little doubt, though, that it hoped to exercise a predominant voice in the island's affairs. The large numbers of Japanese immigrants to Hawaii were agitating for a share of political power and the right to vote. Should such a movement succeed, the white-led government feared the political effect of a non-white voting majority in the islands. Therefore, it was in the planters' interest to have another power, preferably, the United States, or even Britain, take control of the Hawaiian Islands.

In June 1897 McKinley secretly drafted an annexation treaty, primarily to thwart Japan. The American Secretary of State, John Sherman, had reassured the Japanese envoy that the United States had no intention of annexing the islands. The Japanese government believed Sherman had lied. Thus the Japanese hastened to influence the Hawaiian question before any direct American intervention led to detrimental consequences.

That quest forced McKinley to publicize his annexation treaty. Simultaneously, the navy thrust headlong in its

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planning for war. Both actions intensified the Japanese government's indignation and its representative in Washington complained that Sherman had misled him. McKinley's failure to keep his cabinet fully informed of secret negotiations between the American and Hawaiian governments contributed to Sherman's miscue. Nonetheless, the Japanese government felt hoodwinked, and delivered a most provocative protest to the American government.

The Japanese Foreign Minister, Count Okuma Shigenobu, viewing "with grave concern and serious objection," delivered a note to the American minister in Tokyo, Edwin Dun, stating that the annexation "would render imminent a disturbance in the general status quo in the Pacific." The wording of the Japanese protest note was comparable to that of the 1895 Tripartite Intervention of Russia, Germany, and France. Then, those powers argued that any transfer or annexation of territory would threaten the international status quo and regional stability. The United States responded that Japan's interests remained safe. Furthermore "nothing had occurred to alter the situation in the Pacific since Japan acquiesced in the annexation negotiated four years ago." That was a clear reference to Japan's willingness in 1893 to permit the

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" Dun to Sherman, telegram, 21 June 1897, "Despatches addressed to the Department of State from U.S. Ministers to Japan, 1855-1906," M133, NARA; Dun to Sherman, "Enclosing copy of Verbal Note from Count Okuma to Mr. Dun, of date June 21, 1897, relative to the annexation treaty between the United States and Hawaii," in "Despatches addressed to the Department of State from U.S. Ministers to Japan, 1855-1906," M133, NARA; Times, 17 June 1897; Clinard, Japan's Influence, 11-12.
islands' transfer to American control. The Japanese protest in 1897, however, raised the specter of conflict.

Already in a heightened state of alert, the U.S. Navy increased its preparations for such a conflict. The steps, while incremental, highlighted the growing impact of naval power. Though Mahan and Roosevelt helped move the process forward, it was well underway upon the latter's ascent to assistant secretary on 19 April 1897. The process, though, displayed the Mahanian stamp through and through.

A growing public and political awareness seemingly drove McKinley's effort to impede Japan. Clearly, the effects of racism emerged as one reason. While McKinley had not spoken of the "Yellow Peril," there certainly existed a strong anti-Asian component to American foreign policy. As the crisis escalated, contemporary newspaper accounts revealed that many Americans, and portions of the international community, expected some sort of trouble. While the domestic news media had not concocted the crisis, they reported many of the rumors. The New York Times recounted that the increasing numbers of Japanese nationals in Hawaii gave "rise to [the] suspicion that Japan [was] stealthily landing soldiers" to

"Sherman to Dun, 25 June 1897, "Despatches Addressed to the Department of State from U.S. Ministers to Japan, 1855-1906," M133, NARA; Foster to Harrison, 2 February 1893, Benjamin Harrison Papers, LCMD; Thomas A. Bailey, "Japan's Protest against the Annexation of Hawaii," American Historical Review, 3 (March 1931):46-61.

The McKinley administration took office on 4 March 1897 while Roosevelt's Senate confirmation took place the following month."
help in a future takeover of the islands. Surprisingly, the major purveyors of "yellow journalism," such as the Hearst newspaper chain, then focused more upon the revolt in Cuba. By ignoring the Pacific crisis, they did not excessively exacerbate the situation.

In Japan, however, the majority of the newspapers remained calm. The Japanese media poked fun at some of the more outlandish assertions. Such reports included secret Japanese preparations for a "descent" upon the Hawaiian Islands. Western observers noted that while many citizens in Japan expressed "high strung utterances," the public at large did not declare any "war like utterances." For the most part, while "most of the Japanese papers still continue[d] to devote their attention to the annexation question," there was little agitation for a forceful governmental response. The strongest opinion came from anti-government newspapers, who argued that they "consider[ed] that from a military and commercial point of view," Hawaii was too important to allow the United States to annex it.

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46 See New York Times, 15 March, 21 March, 2 April, 11 April, 18 April 1897; Oregonian, 10 April, 11 April 1897; Times, 13 April 1897.

47 Japan Times (Tokyo), 16 June 1897.

48 Kokumin shimbun quoted in Japan Times, 28 June 1897.

49 Japan Times, 25 June 1897.

50 Sekai no Nippon quoted in Japan Times, 25 June 1897.
As the pressure mounted in the Spring of 1897 Secretary of the Navy John D. Long took action. He began to revise the navy's war plans. Long also dispatched several small American warships to Hawaii. In addition, Long supposedly ordered "[Rear] Admiral Montgomery Sicard to convene a special board to rewrite the navy's current war plan to reflect the growing possibility of a clash with Japan over Hawaii." Secretary Long's letter, written in Washington, to Sicard, then in New York City, read simply, "Please report to me at the Department tomorrow, the Thirtieth." It is possible that one historian deduced the context, for Sicard eventually convened such a special panel and produced a plan. The entire process, however, accelerated upon Roosevelt's arrival.

Just prior to Roosevelt's taking office, William McAdoo, the outgoing assistant secretary, briefed his successor on the navy's war plans and preparations. McAdoo advised Roosevelt that "in case of war or any foreign trouble" the first place to turn for counsel would be the U.S. Naval War College. The files of the War College contained the latest

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51 Morgan, "The Anti-Japanese Origins of the Hawaiian Annexation Treaty," 29; see Board of Defense, "War with Spain and Japan," 30 June 1897, #253, UNOpB, RG 8, NHC.

52 Long to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Station, 30 March 1897, "Letters Sent to Stations, Squadrons, and Shore Establishments," RG 24, NARA. Throughout the crises the United States maintained a modest presence of sloops, gunboats, and protected cruisers in Hawaii.

53 See Long to Sicard, 29 March 1897, John D. Long Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
accurate information as well as war plans. Furthermore, McAdoo encouraged Roosevelt to reexamine the existing plans. Most certainly, McAdoo conveyed his concern about the ongoing crisis.54

The first official communication from Roosevelt to the officers of the U.S. Navy related to possible war with Japan came about in a convoluted manner. On 21 May 1897 the president of the U.S. Naval War College, Captain Caspar F. Goodrich, asked Secretary Long to propose a problem for the annual student program.55 Long passed on the request to Roosevelt "who was in the process of familiarizing himself with the navy's existing war plans."56 Roosevelt produced a problem dealing with Spain over the recurring issue of Cuba. The problem included war with Japan over the issue of Hawaii.57

By the middle of June 1897 Roosevelt received strong indications that the U.S. Navy might be incapable of dealing with the Japanese Navy. Figure 2 displays the battle of order in 1897. Seeking to energize his uniformed

54 McAdoo memorandum to Roosevelt, 15 April 1897, "Records of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy," RG 80, NARA; McAdoo letter to Roosevelt, 15 April 1897, "Records of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy," RG 80, NARA.

55 Turk, Ambiguous Relationship, 31-32.


57 Roosevelt to Goodrich, 28 May 1897, MRL, 1:617-618. The only significant aspect of the Spanish-American War discussed in this chapter deals with the Philippine Islands.
subordinates, Roosevelt embraced the Mahanian philosophy in his arguments. The assistant secretary asserted that the chief objective of the U.S. Navy should be the Japanese fleet. Roosevelt exhorted the planners at the Naval War College to adopt an offensive spirit. It was a course of action Roosevelt deemed particularly necessary. For on the same day the assistant secretary prodded the navy, President McKinley asked the Senate to ratify his annexation treaty.

Captain Goodrich quickly disabused the enthusiastic assistant secretary about the navy's capacity for potent offensive action against Japan. Concerned about "our numerical inferiority" and the lack of concentration of American forces, Goodrich told Roosevelt bluntly, "you have asked the College the honor to ask its opinion and the College is bound to express that opinion frankly, facts seem to forbid a vigorous aggressive war." Shocked into more urgent action, Roosevelt wrote the former president of the Naval War College, Henry C. Taylor, advising him that he intended to reconvene a board of defense to look over

54 Roosevelt to Goodrich, 16 June 1897, MRL, 1:626.
56 Goodrich to Roosevelt, 23 June 1897, "Strategic Features of the Pacific," RG 8, NHC.
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<th>UNITED STATES NAVY</th>
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**FIGURE 2**

*USN AND IJN ORDER OF BATTLE, 1897*

*BY CLASS AND DATE OF COMMISSION*
existing war plans. As this crisis unfolded, however, press accounts related how the United States would respond to any Japanese aggression.

At that point one member of the U.S. Navy's strategic elite, already mentioned in Chapter I, assumed a pivotal role. This junior officer helped to lay a foundation for a concept of Japan as the primary hypothetical enemy. Lieutenant John M. Ellicott, trained as an intelligence officer, was then in Hawaiian waters onboard U.S.S. Marion as the crisis between the United States and Japan unfolded.

Of the members of the strategic elite selected for this study, three were in Hawaii during all or part of the 1897 crisis—Ellicott, Bradley A. Fiske, who transited through Honolulu enroute to East Asia, and Akiyama Saneyuki.

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61 Roosevelt to Taylor, 25 June 1897, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD. This was the same board alluded to earlier, Long to Sicard, 29 March 1897, John D. Long Papers, and Sicard, Board of Defense, "War with Spain and Japan," 30 Jun 1897, #253, UNOpB, RG 8, NHC. Henry C. Taylor is rated as the most important individual in the professional development of the U.S. Navy War College, Spector, Professors of War, 64-93; Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, 80-81.

62 See San Francisco Chronicle, 2, 13, 22 July 1897.

63 Karsten felt differently about Ellicott, for in describing a dispute between Casper Goodrich and Ellicott, Karsten seemingly inferred that the junior officer was some sort of a Cassandra, "for every Goodrich there were hundreds of Ellicotts," Naval Aristocracy, 387. Karsten did not then have the benefit of declassified records and Ellicott proved to be extremely prophetic.
transiting enroute to San Francisco. As Roosevelt received Goodrich's negative assessments, reports from overseas indicated that the Japanese Navy was about to augment its naval forces in Hawaii with the battleships nearing completion in British shipyards. Additionally, unfounded reports abounded that Japan might be supporting native unrest in Hawaii. Rumors abounded that the Japanese Navy was searching for secure harbor facilities in the islands. Such a search would indicate preparations for hostilities.

The evidence points to a confluence of critical events. The Japanese Navy had a presence on station in Hawaiian waters. The Japanese government had protested most vigorously any diminution of Japanese interests or influence in the islands. The American naval attaché in London reported regularly on the status of the Japanese battleships under construction. Such report, heightened the sense of a

64 Karsten placed Ellicott and Fiske's photographs next to each other, Naval Aristocracy, 303. "Vessels serving on stations and duties performed by each," Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy (Washington: G P O, 1897), 236; Morgan, "The Anti-Japanese Origins of the Hawaiian Annexation Treaty," 33. Some of Ellicott's analytical work was known to Roosevelt, W.S. Hinsman to Ellicott, 15 July 1897, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.


numerical and qualitative inferiority enunciated by Goodrich. Finally, both Goodrich and the Sicard Board emphasized that some sort of reconnaissance survey of Oahu, the political and economic center of the Hawaiian islands, was necessary to determine the extent of any Japanese threat in Hawaii. Goodrich worried that a Japanese collier might use one of the outlying Hawaiian Islands to support any hostile warships in the area.

Between late June and late August 1897 Ellicott conducted such a survey, seeking to determine whether the Japanese Navy could set up an advance base in the islands. Ellicott scouted for appropriate locations that the U.S. Navy could itself use to conduct naval operations. In response to Goodrich’s letter, Roosevelt ordered the Marion, Ellicott’s command, to determine the appropriate location for a cable between Oahu and the other islands. Ellicott then carried

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67 Goodrich to Roosevelt, 23 June 1897, "Strategic Features of the Pacific," RG 8, NARA.

68 Goodrich to Roosevelt, 23 June 1897, "Strategic Features of the Pacific," RG 8, NHC; Admiral Sicard’s panel concluded much the same, Board on Defenses, "War with Spain and Japan," 30 June 1897, RG 8, NHC.
out an independent survey of Oahu, returning to Honolulu upon its completion.\textsuperscript{69}

Ellicott's data proved useful as the navy advocated not only the acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands, but advanced the view that Japan was most certainly a hypothetical enemy. Ellicott's intelligence superior in Washington, Chief Intelligence Officer Richard Wainwright, utilized Ellicott's analysis data to garner governmental and public support for increased naval appropriations. At this point, the appearance of an award-winning article in the United States Naval Institute \textit{Proceedings} helped to shape the agenda for debate over the looming crisis. Wainwright asserted in "Our Naval Power," with the benefit of Ellicott's conclusions, that the United States required an increase in fleet size, in part, to deter further Japanese adventurism. Wainwright did not invoke racial generalities as a method for defining Japan as enemy. Rather, he argued instead that Japan was "the only rival [in Asia] who should closely approach us in sea

\textsuperscript{69} Ellicott, "Reconnaissance of Oahu, Hawaiian Islands," 1897, PL #276, RG 8, NHC; Roosevelt to Commanding Officer, Marion, 25 June 1897, "Letters Sent to Stations, Squadrons, and Shore Establishments," RG 24, NARA, and 17 April 1900, "Proceedings and Hearing of the General Board," RG 80, NARA. Dorwart, \textit{Office of Naval Intelligence}, cited a later date for such an operation, 56, 149; see Ellicott, "The Strategic Features of the Philippine Islands, Hawaii and Guam," RG 8, NHC, and \textit{Hawaiian Gazette}, 17 August 1897. Ellicott transferred to the cruiser Baltimore later that year and saw combat action in Manila Bay, as did Bradley Fiske. The \textit{Hawaiian Gazette}, 17 August 1897, also reported that Akiyama Saneyuki's transport, discussed in a following chapter, arrived in Honolulu on the same day as Ellicott, but no indication exists that the two ever met.
power." The intelligence chief went on at length in assessing the costs of defending American interests in Hawaii, and by extension elsewhere in the perceived sphere of American influence, if the islands fell to another power.

Ellicott and Wainwright’s assessments of Japan, though, proved prophetic, particularly in terms of shaping attitudes towards the Mahanian command of the sea and local superiority. "Japan is now creating a navy that she can maintain easily in strength greater than the forces that any other power can maintain in the China sea." Japan’s central location in the Western Pacific meant that its sea lanes of communication were considerably shorter than those of the United States. Hostile operations against the Japanese islands by any unfriendly nation required, then, "great exertion and tremendous expense." Thus, Japan would never have to build a navy equal to any of its opponents, for its interests, though then pursued in the Hawaiian Islands, resided more in the Western Pacific. Harkening to the future Wainwright noted further that "the manifest destiny of Japan, unless her new civilization be checked, is to be the great maritime power of the East." Ellicott supported Wainwright’s view of Japanese pretensions, reporting that Japan’s "policy

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71 Wainwright, "Our Naval Power," 65. Ellicott debunked the notion that the Japanese government had dispatched army veterans to Hawaii as a prelude to occupation, but reported a rumor about the Naniwa carrying 15000 rifles, "Reconnaissance of Oahu," RG 8, NHC.
seems to have been a waiting one, until, by immigration, the preponderance of her own people in the islands made her interests paramount." He argued further that Japan would use a flimsy pretext to take action in Hawaii.\textsuperscript{72}

As such, Wainwright most certainly understood the impact American naval power exercised upon the Japanese. Following a strong American response and naval deployment, the Japanese government withdrew its protest note in late December 1897.\textsuperscript{73} The Japanese Navy withdrew as well to operating areas in the Western Pacific.\textsuperscript{74} Many American naval officers, however, did not abandon their suspicions about Japan's intent. They and their superiors expected renewed trouble with the Japanese. Frederick V. McNair, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Station, reported that there existed much agitation over the Hawaiian question. Adding to that tension, the American minister to Singapore reported the arrival there of Japan's new battleships, perhaps as a prelude to more forceful diplomacy. As Commodore George Dewey prepared to assume command of American naval forces in East Asia, his predecessor warned him about the Japanese

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Wainwright, "Our Naval Power," 65; Ellicott, "Reconnaissance of Oahu," RG 8, NHC.}

\textsuperscript{73} An indication that Japan feared an American response came as early as late July, \textit{San Francisco Chronicle}, 30 July 1897; Clinard, \textit{Japan's Influence}, 13. The Japanese representative to the United States, Hoshi Toru, had declared publicly that Japan would not withdraw the protest, \textit{San Francisco Chronicle}, 5 December 1897.

\textsuperscript{74} Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Pacific Station to Secretary of the Navy, 13 September 1897, Area 9, RG 45, NARA. The Japanese Navy would not return to the Eastern Pacific in strength until World War I.
threat.75 The explosion of the Maine in Havana sidetracked the navy's suspicion of Japan, at least in the short run.76

75 McNair to Secretary of the Navy, 3 August 1897, Area 10, RG 45, NARA; San Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 1897; Roosevelt to Long, 30 September 1897, MRL, 1:695; Spencer Pratt to Department of State, 8 November 1897, "Consular Despatches (Singapore)," M455, NARA; Rear Admiral Frederick V. McNair reported that the Japanese were still upset about the Hawaii crisis, McNair to Dewey, 31 December 1897, Area 10, RG 45, NARA. Iriye noted that Japan admitted "impotence in the face of vigorous" American objections, Pacific Estrangement, 53.

76 Spector wrote that the Maine's destruction "put a temporary end to all speculation," Professors of War, 96.
CHAPTER III
THE JAPANESE NAVY: COMING OF AGE, 1890-1900

Introduction

The central strategic task, judged Japanese naval planners, centered on establishing naval hegemony in the Western Pacific.¹

—James B. Crowley, historian, 1966

It must therefore be assumed that Japan's purpose is the general one of predominant sea power in the Orient.²

—Charles H. Cramp, shipbuilder, 1897

In the years immediately following Japan's victory in the China war, the Japanese Navy had not yet emerged as a significant threat to any Western power. Neither had the Japanese government given careful consideration to the widespread and growing fear of a strong Asian state. The Japanese government and the nation at large assumed, incorrectly, that its new found international prestige afforded the state more freedom of action in the pursuit of its strategic interests. Many enlightened Japanese citizens felt that, "Certainly our future history will be a history of the establishment by the Japanese of new Japans everywhere in


² Cramp, "Coming Sea-power," 448.
the world."³ That freedom of action, however, required a much larger army and maritime instrument in support of policy, for only force, or the threat of force, seemed to bring about favorable results. A modern observer noted, harkening to Mahanian philosophy, that after 1890, Japan required "the quantitative enlargement and qualitative improvement of [its] armed forces, the acquisition of bases and coaling stations," in order to exercise international influence.⁴

The increasing weakness of China after 1895 encouraged more and more foreign powers to take advantage of that ripe opportunity. The growing presence, however, of the quarrelsome Western powers presented danger to Japan. The growth of spheres of influence meant eventually direct conflict with one or more of the western powers as they staked their claims in areas considered strategically vital to Japan's physical and economic security. Unable, however, to challenge directly the aggressive Western powers, Japan sought opportunities elsewhere to exercise its influence. In the 1890s Japan proved unable again to win another East-West confrontation, the Hawaiian annexation crises. The lessons-learned in the years from 1895 to 1897, however, certainly served the purposes of the Japanese Navy's planners.


⁴ Iriye, "Japan's Drive to Great-Power Status," 5:725.
First, the Japan government deferred until much later engaging in any offensive operations outside East Asia. Thus, until August 1914, naval planners could focus primarily upon the policy of regional dominance in the Western Pacific. For the Japanese Navy, that meant a maritime strategy, as opposed to a continental strategy more advantageous to the Japanese Army.

After decades of subservience to the Japanese Army, the Navy was emerging as a fully independent organization. The Japanese Navy did not receive funding parity with the army until 1893. The army, however, retained responsibility for the nation's defense and the army-dominated government designated the Chief of the Army General Staff as the commander of all imperial military forces. In the struggle to secure a role for itself, the Japanese Navy, overshadowed by army interests, had to overcome the tendency of the government to focus solely upon the continent.

That process evolved rapidly after the publication of Mahan's sea power study in 1890. The Japanese Navy too was the focus of intellectual thought. After 1893, Sato Tetsutaro, a most important member of the Japanese Navy's "strategic elite," and discussed in a later chapter,

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5 As part of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Japanese deployed warships to the Eastern Pacific in late 1914.

contributed much to the Navy’s arguments. Sato, however, also drew upon Mahan and Britain’s Philip Colomb in advocating a naval strategy for Japan’s security.  

Second, the Japanese Navy received a breathing period from crises. As a result of increasing domestic, as well as, international navalism, and of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese government had embarked upon a large expansion of the Navy. Anticipating war with China, in 1893 the Japanese government funded the construction of two first-class battleships. The vessels were, however, unavailable until late 1897, during the Hawaii crisis. In 1896 and 1897 the Japanese government, with an eye toward conflict with Russia, approved a "Ten Year Naval Expansion Program," which funded four more first-class battleships and five armored cruisers.  

That building program had not produced any fruit by the beginning of the Hawaii crisis. As the major maritime powers moved toward the acquisition of first-class battle fleets, the Japanese Navy had to be sufficiently powerful to secure the nation’s strategic interests in East Asia. By 1897, Japan, and the Japanese Navy, had had years of unpleasant experience, or contact, with the Western powers. Both entities were quite ready to take tentative steps. Here, the

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8 LaCroix, "The Development of the Imperial Japanese Navy," The Belgian Shiplover №7 (May-June 1962), 245; Gardiner, Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, 221-225.
importance of historical lessons loomed menacingly. Commodore Matthew C. Perry had forced Japan to abandon its isolation in 1853 by sea power. Perry's success led shortly to follow-on visits by squadrons representing Britain, France, and Russia. Clearly, such examples of superior sea power by the Western powers abounded, including the American use of warships in 1863 and 1864 to force Japan to keep various straits and ports open.®

The Japanese Navy had by 1897 nearly a decade of exposure to the sea power philosophies espoused by Mahan. More importantly, the language proved little challenge, for the Japanese Navy required its officers to be proficient in English. By late 1890 or early 1891 numbers of the Navy's officers, as well as a number of government officials, were familiar with Mahan's work. Kaneko Kentaro, a close acquaintance of Theodore Roosevelt and Japan's future ambassador to the United States, had by Summer 1890 translated portions of Mahan's 1890 volume. In that form, "Mahan appeared in the journal of the Imperial Japanese Naval Officers Association." ¹⁰

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Nonetheless, the Western powers had not yet accorded the Japanese Empire the respect it deserved. The continued rush to partition China after 1895, much to the dismay of the Japanese, ensured that its international relations remained tenuous at best. In a defensive move, Japan's leaders turned "to practice a curious form of anti-imperialist imperialism. They could run with the hare or hunt with the hounds, as external circumstances and internal interests dictated."\(^{11}\) Quite clearly, without a maritime deterrent Japan might suffer China's fate.\(^{12}\)

It was during that period that a number of the Japanese Navy's "strategic elite" emerged. International crises fed the Japanese Navy's appetite for continued professional military growth. The nation's naval officers understood that defending an insular nation required eventually a first-class navy. They understood, further, that a first-class navy required a more professionally trained officer corps.

That training, however, existed primarily in the Western states. One Japanese historian cited the growing internationalization of professional theory, and noted that


"the Japanese awoke to the importance of turning to the West" to become a modern state, that by definition had "greater military resources at its command." The growing number of foreign publications echoing Mahan’s sea power message proved compelling to Japanese theorists. These theorists knew that the flourishing international maritime environment posed a potential threat to Japan’s interests near and far. The acquisition of an adequate naval force, and the training of naval officers, though, entailed, a series of halting steps, primarily financial in nature.

The search for naval modernity entailed, as well, some sort of rapprochement with the major naval powers of the West so as to benefit from their growing professionalism. The Japanese presumed other rationales for such a relationship. Should the Japanese fail to find a benefactor, the islands would face China’s fate. If one examines much of the work done by the Japanese Navy before 1922 it is most certain that the need to prevent enemy forces from operating along the coasts of the home islands drove much of the planning. Yamagata Aritomo, a driving force in the professional growth of the Japanese Army, recalled with shame, the Western use of naval power in the 1860s, when he could only watch helplessly

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as foreign navies wrecked havoc while remaining invulnerable to defensive measures. One might note that such was the situation toward the end of the Second War World. One modern scholar argued that the Japanese surrender in 1945 was not driven by defeat in Manchuria but that, "the decisive factor was Japanese leaders' recognition that their strategy for holding the most important territory at issue—the home islands—could not succeed. As Japanese leaders came to doubt whether they could prevent the home islands from being invaded and overrun, they preferred surrender to the costs of continuing the war."  

One component of that East-West relationship involved a very important member of the Japanese Navy's strategic elite. Combining a deep intellect, natural curiosity, and extreme good luck, Akiyama Saneyuki proved to be a link in the development of "the Concept." When one contemplates the growth of animosity between the American and Japanese Navies it is often difficult to find any specific analyses of the Japanese Navy in the years before the war scare of 1907. The following discussion will confront, in part, many of those unresolved issues.

Akiyama Saneyuki: Japan's Première Naval Planner

I asked him who [was] the best [planner] in the Japanese Navy, and he replied: "among the very young ones Commander Akiyama."\(^{16}\)

—Commander Frank Marble, U.S. Navy, 1907

Akiyama was reckoned to be the best [planner] in the Japanese Navy.\(^{17}\)

—The Japan Times (Tokyo), 1918

A few years ago the most noted authority of modern Anglo-Japanese relations parroted what some may consider an unjustified assessment. Ian Nish maintained the opinion that the Imperial Japanese Navy lacked a certain intellectual depth and had suffered from a "dearth" of creativity in the years before 1919.\(^{18}\) Nish's statement was surprising as he had, on several occasions, made note of one particularly important Japanese naval officer, Akiyama Saneyuki.

Though Akiyama was definitely one of the great minds of the Japanese Navy, Akiyama's significance had escaped Nish, who had also cited the importance of Sato Tetsutaro and Kato

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\(^{16}\) Extract of Frank Marble letter, 12 April 1907, in "Memorandum concerning Japanese Naval Officers of the Suite of Prince Fushimi," 07-323/E-7-d, Naval Attaché Reports, RG 38, NARA.

\(^{17}\) Headline reporting Akiyama's death, 5 February 1918.

Tomosaburo. Most certainly, the impact of Akiyama's contact with American naval officers, both personally and professionally, proved vital to the development of the Japanese Navy. Fortunately, recent scholarship has been somewhat more generous.

In the last years Akiyama Saneyuki has attracted numerous tributes from a variety of scholars: for example, "the most influential staff officer in the history of the modern Japanese navy"; "a pivotal figure who exerted a dramatic and comprehensive impact on Japanese naval thinking"; "a brilliant naval strategist and tactician"; and,

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19 Nish, "Japan, 1914-1918", 233, 237-238, 248; Akiyama's recommendations after a 1916 European tour led to the deployment of warships to the Mediterranean, idem, Alliance in Decline, 206. Akiyama taught at the Naval Staff College three times, July 1902 to October 1903, November 1905 to September 1908, and December 1912 to April 1914, Nomura Minoru, "Tai-Bei-Ei kaisen to kaigun no tai-Bei nanawari shiso," Gunji shigaku 9 (September 1974), 33. Other naval planners included, Sakamoto Toshiatsu (1858-1941), Shimamura Hayao (1858-1923), Yamaya Tanin (1866-1940), and Yashiro Rokuro (1860-1930), Dupuy, Harper Encyclopedia, 652, 683, 819, 821-822.

20 Akiyama was one of the Japanese Navy's "most important early twentieth century strategists," Dingman, "Japan and Mahan," 56.
"Modern Japanese naval thought began with the work of Akiyama Saneyuki."²¹

These strong impressions came from western scholars, but Japanese descriptions have been equally deferential. Noted historian Asada Sadao reported that Akiyama was "known as the 'founder of naval strategy in Japan,'" while a retired Japanese naval officer noted that Akiyama "towered above his colleagues." One Japanese historian pointed out that Akiyama was renowned for his "intellect," and another asserted that among his peers, "Akiyama had no equal."²²

Just who was this outstanding professional?²³ He was a naval officer who never commanded a battle fleet. Though he died a vice admiral, Akiyama never held an ennobled


²³ "The expertise of officership which required the marriage of intellectual ability, character and leadership and considerable training and experience," Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 11-13.
position in the nation's hierarchy. Unwisely, "Akiyama became involved in political activities related to the Chinese revolution" and hastened his retirement after his superiors became displeased.24

As a student, observer, instructor, and staff officer, however, Akiyama exercised an influence upon his peers, as well as upon his seniors in the chain of command. Akiyama also helped to shape Japan's subsequent naval strategy through superior planning skills, reinforced by a keen and critical analytical intellect.25 It is often difficult to argue that significant things happened because of a subordinate, as opposed to the efforts of a commander, but in this case, it is most certain that such a subordinate wielded a disproportionate amount of influence upon the turn of the century Meiji-era Japanese Navy. One post-1945 observer noted, "It is an unrefutable fact that the procedure[s] on naval warfare established by Vice-Admiral Akiyama developed into the Japanese Navy's Combat Doctrine Manual."26

Akiyama was born in 1868, the year of the Meiji Restoration, and died in 1918, having reached the rank of Vice Admiral. Enroute to flag rank, Akiyama was the prime


architect of his navy's monumental victory at Tsushima Straits (May 1905) and developed later the conceptual defensive framework for Japan's subsequent maritime posture. The officer also helped in the process that designated the United States as the Japanese Navy's primary hypothetical enemy. How Akiyama accomplished that is a little known tale and offers an alternative to the typical western view of naval warfare and naval history. That is particularly relevant, for several recent works have implied that the Japanese Navy was incapable of developing ideas on their own and slavishly copied western strategy and policy.27

Akiyama's case is a rarity, as he was most probably the only Japanese naval officer to have enjoyed extensive exposure to, or contact with, American naval officers and operations, both in wartime and peacetime conditions. Akiyama became "the first Japanese naval officer to witness Western sea power in action."28 Akiyama, it seems, benefitted greatly, as well, from his limited exposure to the processes of the U.S. Naval War College.

One can argue that historians have overlooked for far too long Akiyama's role in naval warfare and naval history. Fundamentally, Akiyama's talent complemented the rising


fortunes of the Japanese Navy, at a time when the government and the nation itself was still defining its place in the international community. This examination seeks to correct such a historical oversight cited above. Akiyama Saneyuki, perhaps more than any other Japanese officer, contributed to the development of "the Concept."

Akiyama's Early Career, 1890-1900

Akiyama's active career began in July 1890, when he graduated first in his naval academy class just weeks after the release of Captain Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. If Akiyama had not encountered Mahan's first sea power study in 1890 or 1891, it is most certain that he would have known of it by late 1893 when the European powers honored the American sea power theorist and Akiyama traveled to Britain. Hector Bywater related an encounter Frederick T. Jane had with a Japanese naval officer, possibly Akiyama. Jane mentioned that the officer, then splitting his time between Portsmouth and Elswick, England, awaiting the construction of his command, was found "deep in Mahan, with halma-pieces on sheets of paper to work out the tactics." Akiyama spent some time in both locations awaiting the completion of a new vessel for the Japanese
Akiyama rose through the ranks in a variety of routine assignments and duties that included two deployments to European waters.

The first visit was in 1891 with a return of stranded crewmen to Turkey, and the second in 1893, at the time that Mahan became the toast of not only the continent, but of the United Kingdom. The Navy Ministry ordered Akiyama on the latter voyage to accompany back a British-built addition to Japan, the cruiser Yoshino, the first Japanese warship to be equipped with a new rangefinder system. Shore-based duty included a tour at the Japanese Navy’s Torpedo school. Akiyama then sharpened his analytical skills in the Japanese Navy’s Intelligence Office.

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20 Akiyama was in Europe when Admiral Philip H. Colomb serialized portions of his Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated 1891 (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute P, 1990). There is no indication that Akiyama read it then.


22 Akiyama service record information courtesy of Hirama Yoichi, professor of Maritime Defense Science, Japan Defense Academy, Yokosuka. During his tour with the intelligence office (November 1896-June 1897) Akiyama carried out an undercover mission in Manchuria, Korea, and North China, Shima, "Kaigun heigakko," 78.
Nothing set Akiyama apart from his peers until after the troubling conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). The Tripartite Intervention prevented Japan from enjoying fully the fruits of victory in the war with China. Most likely sharing in the frustration of his fellow officers, Akiyama sought to understand why Japan had been unable to prevent interference by the Tripartite Intervention in April 1895. The three powers, purportedly representing China's interest, asked Japan to retrocede to China the strategic Liaotung Peninsula, with its naval base at Port Arthur. To underscore their resolve the Europeans powers moved naval assets to East Asian waters and threatened dire consequences if Japan failed to acquiesce.  

Japanese faced another challenge to her territorial gains. While the Tripartite powers accepted Japan's retention of Taiwan (Formosa) as one of the fruits of victory, the Spanish exerted additional pressure to prevent such a result. Deeply fearful of further Japanese expansion southward, the Spanish government sought unsuccessfully to require the retrocession of Taiwan to China. The island was located dangerously near the Philippine Islands. The Spanish government offered to provide additional naval support, but nothing came of the

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offer, or, of the Spanish desire to forestall a Japanese advance southward.\textsuperscript{34}

Unprepared to resist the combination of western powers, Japan acceded but swore that it would exact retribution. Spurred on by the humiliating encounter, the Japanese Navy undertook a search for up to date knowledge, information, and training from friendly western naval powers. One modern observer noted that such deployments gave the Japanese Navy an "institutional window on the outside world."\textsuperscript{35} The primary purpose was to prepare its officer corps for the acquisition of a first-class navy in order to deter any interference with Japanese policy. The Russian occupation of Port Arthur in 1898, furthermore, increased the Japanese Navy's sense of urgency and need for a stronger naval force. If the Western powers were going to carve up China Japan required a suitable force to help secure its share of the Chinese "melon."

As part of the program, naval officers began updating their education. Akiyama's preparatory education proved quite vital. The young Akiyama had traveled from his home in Matsuyama to Tokyo to live with his elder brother Yoshifuru, a junior officer and future general of the Imperial Army. Yoshifuru was a pivotal influence upon Saneyuki, providing a

\textsuperscript{34} Cases, "The Philippines in Foreign Relations since 1895," 58-66.

\textsuperscript{35} Dingman, "Japan and Mahan," 57.
strong sense of discipline and order to the adolescent. The youngster took advantage of the more cultured ambience of Tokyo, and enrolled in a preparatory school where he studied English.\footnote{Akiyama Saneyuki Kai, ed., Teitoku Akiyama Saneyuki (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1934), 18, 21-25, (hereafter ASK). Translation courtesy of Professor David C. Evans translation, University of Richmond, VA.}

In 1886 he entered the Japanese Naval Academy and earned a commission four years. Akiyama, proficient in English before his first year at the Naval Academy, began to devour the works of renowned strategists, including the major works of western theorists. Akiyama had read Mahan and Jomini before his journey to the United States in 1897. Clausewitz' \textit{On War} was available in Japanese after 1888 and Akiyama probably learned of it through his brother, future general Akiyama Yoshifuru.\footnote{ASK, 18; Shimada, \textit{Akiyma Saneyuki}, 2:253.} Akiyama drew upon lessons from Asian texts on strategy, including Japan's Takeda Shingen and China's Sun Tzu and Wu Tzu.\footnote{Oide, \textit{Chigo Akiyama Saneyuki} (Tokyo: Kojinsha, 1986), 38, 49; Peattie, "Akiyama Saneyuki," 62. See Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., \textit{The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China} (Boulder CO: Westview P, 1993).}

Seeking to make its officer corps more professional, the Japanese Navy began sending selected officers overseas, a process that continued into the next century.\footnote{Dingman, "Japan and Mahan," 57-58.} The Navy ordered Akiyama, then a lieutenant, to pursue advanced education opportunities in America where he was to seek
admission to the U.S. Naval War College during an expected two year tour. At nearly the same moment the Navy drafted his orders, the United States and Japan became embroiled in the crisis related to the American annexation attempt of Hawaii. Both nations dispatched warships to the islands. The crisis, of course, seemingly precluded Akiyama’s access to professional educational opportunities. Akiyama’s orders were drafted 26 June 1897 and it is quite possible that the Navy Ministry ordered the junior officer to America as a result of the Hawaii crisis. Unfettered, Akiyama made his journey to America. Enroute his transport made a one day stop in the Hawaiian Islands, and the young Japanese naval officer could not have missed the display of superior American sea power. The U.S. Navy maintained a number of warships in Hawaii while the Japanese had dispatched only the protected cruiser Naniwa to Hawaii. The United States even contemplated sending a battleship to Hawaiian waters.

Akiyama’s visit to the United States between August 1897 and January 1900 proved extremely beneficial to his growth as a naval officer. Shortly after his arrival in the New York area, Akiyama contacted Alfred Thayer Mahan for professional advice and recommendations on how to participate in the

40 Japan’s minister sought permission for Akiyama to attend war college lectures, Hoshi to Sherman, 5 January 1898, “Notes from Foreign Legations (Japan) in United States to Department of State,” M-163, NARA.

41 17 August 1897, Hawaiian Gazette; Mills to Sherman, 20 April 1897, and Mills to Sherman, 5 May 1897, "Notes from Legations (Hawaii)," T-30, NARA; Roosevelt to McKinley, 22 April 1897, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.
programs of either the U.S. Naval Academy or the U.S. Naval War College. Mahan proved unable or unwilling to go that far. Perhaps, the American was suspicious for Akiyama "behaved more like an intelligence officer than a would-be student of strategy." Akiyama received instead limited suggestions from the scholar. Mahan provided Akiyama with a reading list related to strategy and tactics, suggesting Jomini's *The Art of War* and Bruce Hamley's *Operations of War*. Mahan also recommended the collection at the Navy Library in Washington. Akiyama would remark later that Mahan's list proved less than useful as he had already read the suggested works. Years later, Akiyama asserted that Mahan's own sea power theories were somewhat flawed, tied as they were to the sailing era.42

Continuing on to Washington, the junior officer would not give up his quest and looked to official representatives. Akiyama sought assistance from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt. Akiyama discovered that the Japanese embassy possessed a number of older course abstracts from the U.S. Naval War College. Akiyama asked the Navy Department for updated versions of the documents. He managed to obtain the new course abstracts after some tension between

Roosevelt and one of his subordinates, Captain Caspar F. Goodrich, president of the U.S. Naval War College.43

Going further, in a letter to Roosevelt, Akiyama delivered an impassioned plea for the opportunity to secure advanced professional education. The Japanese officer argued that he wanted a competitive advantage over his peers in Japan. As an example of what Akiyama sought from Roosevelt, edited portions of Akiyama's five page document are reproduced below:44

I had the luck of being ordered to come here for studying Naval Tactics, Strategy and International Law. [Our] Navy Department sent me to this country because we considered that your Naval War College is the best institution in my branches of study. On arriving here and consulting with our naval attache about my wishes, I found that there may be some official difficulties getting permission to enter the War College, as there are many important and confidential lessons in the college. I trust that you would understand my purpose and situation from the foregoing, [so] I can come to no other conclusion than it would be best for me to inquire of you whether I may ask or not, for the privilege of attending such original lectures as are not confidential at the War College. Allow me to add a few lines as to my personal wishes. Since I came here, I am always afraid that, if I shall fail in the course of my study perhaps I [might]

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43 Roosevelt and Goodrich corresponded throughout January 1898 attempting to settle whether Akiyama should have the abstracts, Roosevelt to Goodrich, 3 January, Roosevelt to Akiyama, 6 January, Roosevelt to Goodrich, 10 January, Roosevelt to Akiyama, 14 January, Roosevelt to Goodrich, 17 January, Roosevelt to Goodrich, 24 January, 1898, Roosevelt Papers, Series II, LCMD. Roosevelt "wrote a pretty sharp letter" to Goodrich to get immediate action, Roosevelt to Akiyama, 17 January 1898, ibid.; Shima, "Kaigun heigakko," 80.

44 "Akiyama to Roosevelt, 31 December 1897, "General Records of the Navy Department, General Correspondence 1897-1915," Serial 5872, RG 80, NARA.
be recalled to Japan. This is another reason why I so eagerly wish to get the grant to the War College for not only official request but my own sake.

Akiyama failed, however, to persuade Roosevelt and did not secure admission to the college itself.  

Akiyama’s tour coincided with the start of the Spanish-American War (April-August 1898) which provided him additional opportunities for professional growth. In June 1898 Akiyama received permission to join the American military forces sailing from Tampa Bay to Cuba under Major General William R. Shafter’s command. Akiyama’s presence had been unexpected and Shafter confirmed the Japanese officer’s credentials after a series of delays. Akiyama’s transport finally sailed from Tampa on 14 June after a series of embarrassing holdups. The U.S. Army had poorly organized the entire affair. Much to the chagrin of the American Army and Navy commanders, newspaper columnists swarmed about the convoy, making the trek even more dangerous by reporting the status and location of the Cuban-bound landing force.

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45 Roosevelt to Akiyama, 6 January, 14 January, 17 January 1898, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.

46 Officials in Tokyo started the process which led to Akiyama’s participation, Sanematsu Yuruzu, Keigun daigaku kyoiku (Tokyo: Kojinsha, 1985), 161; Shafter to Hoshi Toru, 12 June 1898, William R. Shafter Papers, Stanford University; Henry C. Corbin to Shafter, 13 June 1898, Serial 268330, "Adjutant General’s Office, General Correspondence File," RG 94, NARA; Shimada, Akiyama Saneyuki, 1:221-226.

47 French E. Chadwick, The Relations Between the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1911), 2:19, Chadwick cites Akiyama as one of the observers, ibid., 2:20.
Guarded by a U.S. Navy escort force, the convoy took nearly a week to arrive off Santiago. What Akiyama observed from his vantage point on board his transport could be generously characterized as a picture of serious disarray. The American transport vessels proved to be a disparate lot, with significant differences in mobility. During the journey, numbers of stragglers ranged as far as fifty miles behind the flagship. Those stragglers were theoretically vulnerable to any Spanish raiders.48

Arriving off Santiago on 20 June the army forces waited to recover from the trek and did not go ashore until 22 June. General Shafter forced Akiyama and the other foreign military observers to remain onboard their transport until the army finished landing four days later. Again, Akiyama and the other military attachés observed the army's scandalous lack of preparations for carrying out an amphibious ship to shore operation. Once ashore, Akiyama had additional opportunities to witness the U.S. Army's campaign to capture Santiago, as well as observe how the American Navy conducted its blockade operations. Akiyama was ashore at the time that Teddy Roosevelt's "Rough Riders" stormed the hills overlooking the town of Santiago and the Spanish fleet in Santiago Harbor. Later, Akiyama would draft plans influenced by the American experience. The capture of the hills overlooking Santiago

proved decisive. The Spanish naval commander understood that gunnery emplacements placed there would batter his force. That situation occurred again when the Russians found their naval forces bottled up in Port Arthur. Then, the U.S. Navy would examine with a critical eye the future of any major naval base in the Far East, particularly at Subic Bay in the Philippines. 49

Most importantly, Akiyama returned to his transport and was fortunate enough to secure a front row seat to the American Navy’s destruction of the Spanish fleet on 3 July 1898. Akiyama compared the decisive American effort to Japan’s victory against Chinese forces in the Sino-Japanese War. 50 The Spanish fleet, which had taken refuge in Santiago harbor, was under blockade by the vessels of Rear Admiral William T. Sampson’s North Atlantic Squadron. From the transport Akiyama observed carefully not only the system utilized by Sampson to maintain the blockade but also the methodical destruction of the Spanish fleet as it attempted to escape, which he witnessed at about a range of four


nautical miles. Akiyama saw the battle from General Shafter's afloat command-post, the transport Seguranca.  

Bolstered by these experiences, Akiyama submitted a lengthy intelligence report to his superiors in Japan critically analyzing the U.S. Navy's successful Cuban operations as well as noting the problems encountered in the early amphibious operations. Akiyama commented on operations and critiqued the performance of components such as the Fiske rangefinder.  

Akiyama drew later upon lessons from Sampson's deployment of American naval forces. Ordered by his superiors to draft the Navy's plans for dealing with the Russian battleships at Port Arthur, Akiyama knew firsthand how to conduct such an operation. Akiyama drew specifically upon the close blockade instituted by the U.S. Navy as well as the two layered deployment of the blockade forces. Those forces consisted of a number of smaller vessels, usually dispatch boats and yachts, two miles from the harbor entrance. Sampson positioned his battleships and cruisers between four and six miles.  

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51 See Akiyama interviews in 22 July 1898, New York Sun, and New York Herald; Shimada, Akiyama Saneyuki, 1:265-270. Mike Knapp and Richard von Doenhoff (National Archives) looked for manifests and reported record keeping for the operation was poor.

52 The report, reproduced in Shimada, Akiyama Saneyuki, 1:320-351, included a map of the naval battle, ibid., 1:323. The map is also reproduced in Peattie, "Akiyama Saneyuki," 64. Peattie wrote that Akiyama recommended the U.S. Navy rangefinder devised by Bradley Fiske, citing it as marvelous, "Akiyama Saneyuki," 63, but Russel, "Rangefinders at Tsushima," noted that the rangefinder failed at Santiago. Decades later, a participant in the Battle of Manila Bay reported the same failure, Ellicott, "Under a Gallant Captain at Manila in '98," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 69 (January 1943), 39.
miles from the entrance. At night Sampson ordered the fleet to patrol closer to the entrance to prevent any surreptitious escape attempt.\textsuperscript{53} Akiyama reported favorably on Sampson's use of searchlights to keep the Spanish Navy from attempting to escape during darkness.\textsuperscript{54} A British Army officer's unpublished report supported many of Akiyama's observations.\textsuperscript{55}

Following the defeat of the enemy's naval forces in Cuba, Akiyama returned to the United States in late July. Upon his arrival, a number of journalists interviewed Akiyama. The journalists asked him for his opinion of the operations and naval battle. They reported Akiyama's praise of the work executed under Sampson's command. The interviews paralleled partially his intelligence report.\textsuperscript{56}

Akiyama's report served as the basis for future study on how Japan might best utilize its fleet in a limited war. He

\textsuperscript{53} Chadwick, \textit{Relations Between the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War}, 1:348-395.

\textsuperscript{54} Shimada, \textit{Akiyama Sanevuki}, 1:244, 328; "On June 8 [Sampson] issued" a memorandum which has a decisive effect upon the Spanish naval forces, "During the dark hours of the night search-lights will be used," to prevent any egress from Santiago, Chadwick, \textit{Relations Between the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War}, 1:362; Shima, "Kaigun heigakko," 83.


stressed that the lessons of the Caribbean conflict provided superior guidance for the Japanese in the event of war with Russia in East Asia. That meant, specifically, any Russian fleet at Port Arthur. His report was so thorough that it became "the classic source of information" about the application of naval power and helped shape Japanese naval strategy after 1898.  

Following the conclusion of hostilities in August 1898, Akiyama continued his quest for higher education in the United States. Biding his time, Akiyama served for some period as the naval attaché for the Japanese embassy in Washington. Following the successful efforts of the Japanese Minister in Washington, Komura Jutaro, in February 1899 Akiyama secured permission from Navy Secretary Long to serve a six month tour aboard U.S.S. New York, flagship of the North Atlantic Squadron, Rear Admiral Sampson's command.  

At the express direction of Long, Sampson received Akiyama aboard the warship. The admiral ordered Akiyama to duty as a signals and staff officer, which provided him with practical experience in reading and interpreting American naval tactical signals. He also

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58 "Further Accounts," RG 8, NHC; 5 February 1918, The Japan Times.

observed, and participated in, fleet operations throughout the Caribbean and North Atlantic and worked closely with Sampson's flag-lieutenant, Sidney A. Staunton, who served later as a warplanner with the American Navy. Sampson ordered Akiyama to report to Captain Chadwick and Lieutenant Staunton "for duty on the signal bridge." Since Staunton was Sampson's flag lieutenant and signals officer, the odds are very good that the two junior officers discussed the U.S. Navy's operations during the Spanish-American War.\(^\text{60}\)

Akiyama's good luck continued when he received permission from the Department of the Navy to take part in the shortened annual program at the U.S. Naval War College. He attended in lectures which analyzed lessons from the just concluded war with Spain.\(^\text{61}\) Among the lectures delivered at the War College during the period of his visit, Akiyama had the chance to hear Captain Charles H. Stockton, president of the war college, lecture about preparations for war, coastal

\(^{60}\) Long to Sampson, 6 February 1899, and Sampson to Akiyama, 18 February 1899, "Letters Sent to Stations, Squadrons, and Shore Establishments," RG 24, NARA; Army and Navy Journal 36 (15 April 1899), 769. Akiyama reported to New York on 9 February 1899, "LT. Asayama [sic] of the Imperial Japanese Navy came on board as a passenger," 9 February 1899 log entry, New York, RG 24, NARA; Army and Navy Journal 36 (15 April 1899), 769. A search through the decklog for succeeding months found no further reference to Akiyama. Any assertion about Staunton's duties are derived from the fact that the U.S. Navy had a weak signal corps in 1898, "Discussion: The Signal Question Once More," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 28 (December 1902), 947.

\(^{61}\) Log entry 31 May 1899, New York, RG 24, NARA; Shimada, Akiyama Saneyuki, 2:170-188; Komura to Hay, 1 June 1899, "Notes from Foreign Legations (Japan)," M-163, NARA; Endorsement, 12 June 1899, "General Correspondence 1897-1915," General Records of the Navy Department, RG 80, NARA.
defenses, submarine telegraphs, and military operations. Unknown is whether Akiyama met some of the more distinguished visitors in attendance, including the driving force behind the college, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce.

A paper by Lieutenant Albert P. Niblack addressed issues about the Navy's operations in the Philippine Islands and about the maritime organization of the island's defenses. Niblack suggested that the United States could economically maintain a naval presence in the Philippines. Though Niblack had not cited a maritime threat to American control of the East Asian territory, any increased naval presence by a Western power did not bode well for Japan's interests.

Captain Henry C. Taylor lectured on two occasions about naval tactics and gunfire at sea and the importance of economic security for strong maritime nations. Taylor recognized explicitly that the naval battles of the Spanish-American War were not truly enlightening, due to the nature of the weak Spanish fleets. Taylor asserted that in the

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62 Army and Navy Journal 36 (10 June 1899), 976; Shimada, Akiyama Saneyuki, 2:180-182. Evelyn M. Cherpak, Archivist, NHC, provided information about the lectures, but noted that the college took no attendance roll. Stockton delivered four lectures during the period, "Preparations for War (31 May 1899): A Discussion of Some of the Various Elements to be Considered in the Formation of Plans of Operations in the Study of Campaigns"; "Notes on Beachy Head [n.d.]" #64; "Submarine Telegraph Cables in Time of War [n.d.]" #89; "An Account of Some Past Military Operations Directed Against Puerto Rico and Cuba [n.d.]" #319, RG 14, NHC.

63 Army and Navy Journal 36 (10 June 1899), 976.

64 Army and Navy Journal 36 (26 August 1899), 1243; Shimada, Akiyama Saneyuki, 2:185; Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence, 67, 151.
emerging navalism of a number of maritime states the U.S. Navy's future warplans must be based upon an encounter with an enemy at least the equal of the U.S. Navy. Though Taylor had not singled out the Japanese Navy, Akiyama could presume that Taylor argued for a large increase in American naval construction.65

Captain Bowman H. McCalla spoke at length on problems encountered during the Spanish-American War. McCalla had served as one the U.S. Navy's major strategist and tactician before the Spanish-American War. The fleet's operations during the conflict, however, left the senior officer less than satisfied. McCalla criticized the American military's lack of preparations, the inefficient and ineffective chain of command, problems of interpreting international law, amphibious operations, and various maritime activities.66

One might argue strongly that the lectures gave Akiyama a deeper appreciation of the American naval operations during the blockade of Santiago, and the subsequent fleet encounter. The professional activities of that period gave him an insight into contemporary American naval practices, tendencies, and propensities. Akiyama also made contact with many of America's future naval planners.

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65 Army and Navy Journal 36 (5 August 1899), 1177; Taylor lecture, "Introduction to Economics," 26 July 1899, RG 15, NHC.

The openness then demonstrated by the U.S. Navy would change dramatically after 1905. In response, perhaps, to the new international realities brought about by Japan's defeat of Russian in 1905, such openness might prove a point of weakness. Such was the U.S. Navy's concern about "contact" a few years later. In 1906 the Office of Naval Intelligence recommended no further visits to the Naval Academy and the Naval War College by foreign officers. Such officers could deduce much about naval operations and tactics from "signalling methods, battle tactics, and gunnery training," as well as make detailed reports about the "actual condition of our personnel and the efficiency of the fleet." Akiyama could draw upon one additional resource, the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, which published articles about tactical, operational, and strategic developments. Akiyama, and a number of other Japanese naval officers, held associate membership in the Institute.

Akiyama could speculate later as to what course of action might be selected by the American Navy, in particular, what strategic considerations the U.S. Navy's planners might

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67 GB 420, 18 April 1906 and GB 420, 18 April 1906, "Naval Attaché Correspondence," Case 8570, RG 38, NARA.

68 "List of Associate Members," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 29 (June 1903), 525. The American naval attaché in Tokyo during Akiyama's second tour at the Japanese Naval Staff College wrote "the library contains a well-selected stock of foreign books, mostly in English, and subscribes to the principal foreign professional periodicals," "W" #187, 21 December 1907, in "Japanese Naval War College," JNT, 1910, RG 8, NHC.
contemplate. Although one seeks always to avoid any arguments approaching reductionism, in the case of Akiyama, it is important to note that many of the officers he encountered served at one time or another in planning capacities. Taylor, Stockton, Staunton, and Niblack performed duty later in the U.S. Navy's General Board. In any case, the senior leadership of the Japanese Navy thought that Akiyama's professional caliber merited special consideration. Within a year of his return to Japan, Akiyama’s service superiors selected him for specific tasks. That included helping to prepare the Japanese Navy for war with Russia, and Akiyama proved more than adequate for the task.

69 ASK, 59, 135-136, 158-159.


71 Akiyama travelled to Britain in early 1900 and returned to Japan in August 1900.
The Philippines, the United States, and Japan

We need not extend our study to cover a general attack on the [Philippines] since all deductions must confirm the necessity of a powerful fleet and fortified harbor in one place or another. We remind our distinguished reader that Japan lies to the northward of [the Philippines].

—Capitan del Frigata Don Julio del Rio
Royal Spanish Navy, August 1891

The Japanese decision to avoid conflict with the United States over Hawaii had a momentous consequence. Notably, the Japanese disengagement freed the United States to prepare for other contingencies. As such, the U.S. Navy focused its attention primarily upon the recurrent Cuban situation. The continued revolt in the island threatened not only American economic interests but strategic interests as well. American businessmen had invested heavily in Cuba and rebel leaders targeted those investments to foster American intervention. American leadership feared, as well, that such continued instability in Cuba and Spain's international weakness invited European intervention, in violation of the Monroe Doctrine.

As the severity of the real and perceived violence in Cuba increased, however, the United States could not avoid being slowly drawn toward intervention. When war finally erupted, the main theater was the Caribbean and Cuba. The Philippines were a minor operations theater but also a most important geo-political arena. The Spanish-American War has received treatment; therefore, the following discussion focuses on the relationship between the United States and Japan in the Western Pacific.

Though the U.S. Navy possessed a number of contingency plans for dealing with the Spanish, few Americans had dreamed that the conflict would spread to the Western Pacific. War plans, official or otherwise, received no real public debate. Much speculation, however, existed about the course of a Spanish-American War. A number of journalists saw the Philippines falling to the United States. Other nations had long contemplated the collapse of Spanish authority in its Pacific territories. For example, after 1885 German imperialists and navalists coveted the Spanish colonies. Kaiser Wilhelm II actively sought the acquisition of Spanish territories. These included the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Philippine island groups. The German Empire, however,

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2 Spector, Professors of War, 93.

3 Mayo W. Hazeltine, "Possible Complications of the Cuban Question," North American Review, 162 (April 1896), 408; The New York Sun, 8 November 1897; Lieutenant William W. Kimball drafted the most detailed plan related to operations in the Western Pacific, "War with Spain ...," 1896, #255, UNOpB, RG 8, NHC.
was not alone. The Japanese Empire had long expected to expand southward, even through the Philippines. That view was shared by one American observer who noted that, "There is some ground for the belief that sovereignty over the Islands would have passed eventually to the Japanese."^4

Before 1890, the Japanese had acquired a number of territories peripheral to the Philippines and expected to acquire eventually the Spanish lands. As the Spanish-American talks over the future of Cuba deteriorated, the Japanese perceived an increased possibility of opportunity. That perception was justified, for in 1896 Filipino nationalists rebelled against Spanish control and began receiving limited aid from Japanese organizations. As tensions between the United States and Spain increased, the Filipino rebels expected the Philippines would secure its independence after any Spanish-American conflict.\(^5\) The Japanese would too be ready for that eventuality.

Rebuffed by the European powers in 1895, and the United States in 1897, the Japanese government had not expected a repeat of the Hawaii fiasco in its own backyard. Though the Japanese had failed to acquire large territories in China, other than the island of Taiwan and the temporary control of

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^5 Saniel, Japan and the Philippines, 1868-1898, ff.
the Liaotung Peninsula, a number of powers had done much better after China's disastrous loss to Japan. The United States had long balked at such territorial acquisitions, as evidenced by the first Hawaii annexation attempt. There clearly existed a strong streak of anti-imperialism in public debates. The growing numbers of pro-imperialist groups, however, began to shape domestic policy ever so slowly. The public's perception changed dramatically with Commodore George Dewey's victory in Manila Bay. A number of nations had believed "that the United States would not retain the Islands," and the Japanese were quite ready to relieve the United States of any such responsibility.⁶

The U.S. Navy had considered Spanish forces in the Pacific a possible threat as early as 1894.⁷ As the U.S. Navy contemplated the possibility of war in the Pacific, however, the Japanese Navy was itself reconnoitering the Philippines. Perhaps in ignorance, American naval planners expressed no concern about Japanese intentions in East Asia. Dewey's victory in Manila Bay did little to change the analyses. None of the existing war plans envisioned any

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⁷ Charles J. Train, "Strategy upon a war with Spain," 1894, #263; J.B. Bleecker and W.E. Reynolds, "War between the United States and Spain. Plan of Campaign. Consideration of the question of supplies & discussion of both strategy and tactics," 1894, #251; Board on Naval War College Problem, "Situation in the case of war with Spain," 1895, #260; Kimball, "War with Spain ...."; Naval War College, "Situation in the case of war with Spain," 1896, #261; McCalla, "War with Spain," 1897, #256; Board of Defenses, "Rough Draft of Official Plan (July 1897) in event of operations against Spain....," 1897, #262, all found in UNOpB, RG 8, NHC.
territorial acquisition outside of the Western hemisphere. Kimball, though, expected to use Manila as a hostage to force Spain to accept terms favorable to the United States.8

The first reactions by the McKinley Administration provided little indication to guide the Japanese government. Amid all of the confusion, a number of foreign powers dispatched warships to the Philippines. The visiting squadrons represented Britain, Russia, Germany, and Japan. The Japanese government sent three warships to "observe naval operations and protect Japanese subjects."9 Ostensibly there to protect their citizens, the foreign observers wondered if they too might benefit from Spain's misfortune.

Though much has been written about German ambitions in the Philippines, the Japanese were much more involved in island affairs. The Germans, while prompting widespread concern in the U.S. Navy and the American press, had no relationship with the rebels and held few economic interests in the islands. By contrast, the Filipino revolt had received considerable moral and financial support from unofficial and semi-official Japanese organizations. These organizations included numbers of Japanese military officers. Moreover, a number of Japanese Army and Navy officers had

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8 Kimball, "War with Spain," RG 8, NHC.

9 Buck to Sherman, 4 May 1898, "Notes from Foreign Legations (Tokyo)," M-163, NARA; William R. Day to Long, 7 June 1898, Area 10, RG 45, NARA.
carried out surveys of the islands' defenses and investigated various locations for settlement possibilities.\(^\text{10}\)

George Dewey contemplated the chances of conflict with German forces in Manila Bay, but there is little doubt that the German activities lagged far behind Japanese efforts.\(^\text{11}\) Though Ellicott began his intelligence missions in the Philippine Islands after Dewey's victory, at no time did he report any suspicious activity by the Japanese. Such a lack of concern probably stemmed, in part, from a circumspect prudence on the part of interested Japanese nationals. In any case, while McKinley had not considered in depth the effect of victory in Manila Bay, international interests, like the perceived German ambition, guided his decision-making process. To the Japanese, however, previous experience seemed to guide their actions.

After the Sino-Japanese War a number of powers rushed to carve out portions of China into exclusive spheres of influence. These spheres were primarily economic in nature, but the creation of such regions threatened to cut off trade opportunities to those nations that demurred in the land grab. The United States was one such state. Economic

\(^{10}\) Saniel, Japan and the Philippines, 91-95, 226-227.

downturn and depression, beginning in 1893, had contributed
to Grover Cleveland's political misfortunes. In 1896
McKinley had run successfully on a platform of reinvigorating
the economy. As such, most businessmen resisted any
government efforts to involve the nation in conflict or risky
overseas ventures. The costs of arming for warfare
threatened to shift capital from business expenditures to
military armaments, with little tangible reward for the
business community and speculators. The American business
community argued that such activities threatened an economic
recovery at home. With the first news of Dewey's victory,
coinciding with a renewed rush to curve up China, American
businessmen, politicians, and naval officers then saw an
opportunity to advance American interests into Asia.¹²

The Japanese, meanwhile, anxiously awaited any decision
that might benefit them territorially. Instead, first
Germany and then the United States, acquired portions of
Spain's colonies. By treaty, the United States received the
Philippine Islands and the major center of the Marianas, the
island of Guam. The Germans completed secret negotiations
with the Spanish government and purchased the remaining
Spanish colonies. By December 1898, not one Spanish

¹² For an indepth examination of the domestic and business views, see
Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion,
1860-1898.
territory remained available, much to the dismay of the Japanese.

That situation furthered the development of "the Concept." Not only had the United States thwarted Japan in Hawaii, it had, in unplanned conjunction with German actions, blocked Japan's expansion southward. Though the Japanese acquiesced, there was a growing suspicion among some American naval officers that the United States and Japan would clash in East Asia. One American naval officer reported that Japan seemed prepared to forego control of Korea and focus on the Philippines, as their lack of defenses was an "invitation to attack."

Preparing for a Hypothetical Enemy, 1899-1901

The U.S. Navy's raison d'être expanded greatly with the acquisition of territory in the Western Pacific. That process contributed eventually to friction between the United States and Japan. The American occupation of the Philippines meant that more than coastal interests required protection, dictating an increased naval presence in East Asia. Such a strong American naval presence raised the specter of continued intervention in Japan's policies. On the other hand, the maintenance of a weak American naval force in the Western Pacific at a time when Japan was emerging as a

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11 Rear Admiral George C. Remey to Long, 7 October 1901, Area 10, RG 45, NARA.
serious maritime contender for American interests in East Asia.

Related to that situation was the fact that the modern era power brought about "the regionalization of sea power." That is, while the United States sought to protect its interests in near proximity. The acquisition of distant overseas territories, however, imposed additional burdens. The United States lacked significant coaling stations in the Pacific and the lack of a secure naval base at the end of a trans-oceanic trek. The U.S. Navy's existing assets for defending the Philippines proved less than satisfactory. In order to deal with any potentially hostile power, the U.S. Navy required sufficient numerical superiority to oppose the inherent advantages of a regional power. Such a superiority could be had in modern battleships. Even at that stage "superiority" proved illusory, for the U.S. Navy possessed no centralized planning mechanism to identify either likely overseas enemies, or estimate political situations abroad. As a consequence, the adequate size of the navy was subject to differing interpretations.\(^{14}\)

The American use of battleships in the Spanish war increased the demand for modern battle fleets. International observers understood that the U.S. Navy's ability to isolate


\(^{15}\) Schilling, "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919," 14.
Cuba from Spanish reinforcements had contributed significantly to an American victory. The U.S. Navy had successfully isolated the Philippines, as well, from further undertakings by Spain.

The Treaty of Paris (December 1898) terminated the state of war between the United States and Spain. Witnessing the success of the United States, a number of powers digested the lessons-learned. In succession, the world's leading maritime powers raced to increased their naval appropriations. Early diplomatic blunders and domestic legislation by the German Empire alerted the United States to the danger of undefended and distant American territories.

That danger, in part, led to the creation of a semi-autonomous advisory panel, the General Board of the U.S. Navy. Though reformers like Captain Henry C. Taylor had long fought for a German style Naval General Staff, politics killed that process. Any organization that emulated the Germans proved unacceptable to the civilian-controlled department. Accepting such restraints, in March 1900


17 Though other nation's motives were suspect, a detailed study of a German threat to the Philippines is "Problem and Solution, 1903," RG 12, NHC.

Secretary Long authorized the creation of an unsanctioned board composed of senior naval officers and various bureau chiefs. General Order #544, dated 13 March 1900, established the General Board for the purpose of considering and planning for war in the "dependencies." The General Board's responsibilities included recommendations as to the size of the navy and the identification of likely enemies. "The duties of the General Board, purely advisory in character, were to devise measures and plans preparing the fleet for war [and] to prepare war plans." The board lacked any Congressional authorization, but as a planning body, over the succeeding two decades, it often provided the navy and civilian leadership the best analyses of emerging crises.

Long tasked the General Board with specific duties related to the recent American territorial acquisitions. Long directed the board to study the vulnerability of "dependencies." The weakest of them would have been most certainly the Philippines, which faced a danger primarily from the Japanese. Long sought out the highest caliber of advice, which included a number of junior ranking but

19 Long to Captain Charles Stockton, 30 March 1900, Area 11, RG 45, NARA.


intellectually promising officers. Admiral George Dewey served as president of the Board until his death in January 1917. The board alternated its meetings between Washington and Newport to permit the war college a degree of participation. In subsequent years, the college's analyses proved instrumental to the board's deliberations. That included eventual war planning tied to emerging threats in East Asia.

Though Japan accepted the transfer of Spanish territories to Western powers, the specter of Japanese aggression remained. Following the outbreak of the Filipino-American War in February 1899, Lieutenant Albert Key, the American naval attaché in Tokyo, discovered that various unofficial Japanese groups were providing moral, economic, and military support to the rebel forces. To the Japanese Empire, American control of the strategic locale served as an effective barrier to any southward expansion. In a mirror-image of western imperialists, a number of influential Japanese theorists had expected Japan to replace the Western powers in a number of colonies and lead East Asia into modernity. In August 1898 Ariga Nagao, "one of Japan's foremost students of international law, bitterly opposed American policy" in the Philippines. Nagao stated "that the

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most important reason for his opposition to American annexation of the Philippines was that such a development would check Japanese expansion to the south."25

By replacing the weaker powers, the nationalists argued, Japan could provide superior leadership to the Asian colonies. Rather than facing a rotting Western power, the Japanese now faced a major competitor, the United States. Public statements by Japanese citizens conveyed the disappointment, even disgust, many felt at the intrusion of another Western power into East Asia. Such an intrusion challenged Japan's regional exclusivity. "The net effect of America's [Western] Pacific imperialism was to forestall Japanese expansion" southward. One senior officer argued that "we may find ourselves fighting against some body elses [sic] Monroe Doctrine on the other side of the world," and "The time may come when our Oriental trade may involve us in a war of which that trade may be the admitted cause or object."26

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It was John Ellicott again who expounded upon the Japanese threat to the United States in the Pacific. The professional quality of his work in Hawaii and the Philippines drew the attention of his superiors.27 Charged with specific tasks during periods of crisis or hostilities, Ellicott discharged his duties well. After perusing some of his analyses of the Hawaiian and Philippine Islands, Captain Henry C. Taylor recognized his contributions and supported Ellicott's assignment to the Naval War College. To be sure, a majority of the officers of the U.S. Navy, and the nation, continued to view the German Empire as the threat to American security at home and abroad, but Ellicott focused upon Japan. His views were seminal.

Ellicott identified Japan as a likely antagonist because of friction created by the simultaneous expansion of the United States and Japan. After 1898, Japan was "seen as a threat" to the American Pacific territories, and though that threat "was considered much more potential than actual," studies such as Ellicott's shaped how the General Board viewed that potential threat.28

27 Ellicott's other work included "Effect of Gun-Fire, Battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 25 (June 1899):323-334; extract of Ellicott Report, Register #908, in Memorandum of Information (18 October 1899), file PS, RG 38, NARA.

Ordered to the staff of the U.S. Naval War College in 1899, he quickly exercised his analytical skills and made an immediate impact. Ellicott made a number of strategic studies to supplement not only the work of the college but to assist the General Board in its deliberations. Ellicott produced the most cogent statements on the Japanese prior to the war scares of 1906-1907. Though Ellicott's strategic analyses remained classified until 1972, he provided a continuity of "the Concept." In the decades before World War II, American naval officers expressed many of the same judgments delivered by Ellicott earlier.

Ellicott arrived in Newport at the moment that Secretary Long's order created the General Board. The senior staff of the Naval War College used Ellicott's work to define American interests in Asia. Ellicott's influence, however, extended beyond Newport. In its first official meetings, the General Board examined Ellicott's "Reconnaissance of Oahu" and "Strategic features of the Philippines." Ellicott's study

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19 Spector, Professors of War, 112; Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence, 67, 74.

20 Among other studies cited herein, Ellicott produced "Some Strategic Features of the China Coast," "Proceedings and Hearings of the General Board," 17 April, 21 May, 6 June, 26, 27 June, 29 June 1900, RG 80, NARA; Ellicott also produced the study "Sea Power of Germany," Costello, "Planning for War," 133.

21 17 April, 21 May, 6 June 1900, "Proceedings and Hearings of the General Board," M1493, NARA. The two studies were combined later with an examination of Guam, "The Strategic Features of the Philippine Islands, Hawaii and Guam," XSTP, RG 8, NHC.
of the Philippines was most important for the U.S. Navy, for
the Navy, in line with the Mahanian argument about way
stations, had decided to construct a first-class naval base
in the Far East. The U.S. Navy understood quite well the
significance of the European spheres of influence. The major
European powers had all created naval bases out of their
respective spheres, moving significant naval assets to the
Far East in the late 1890s. By May 1897 navy officials
considered acquiring a base along the Chinese coast. The
navy's search for a base in China continued until 1905, when
Japan's victory over Russia changed the strategic
circumstances. Ellicott, though, argued for a Philippine
base and urged the selection of a position well away from the
main island of Luzon.

Ellicott asserted that any base in the vicinity of
Manila would be too vulnerable. The junior officer wrote
that "there remains but one other naval power in the world
from which we need fear attack, namely, Japan." Reviewing
the geographical propinquity, Ellicott minced few words,
declaring, "We must be especially prepared to reckon with"
Japan for "we stand in the way of her natural aspirations in
the Pacific." In the creation of a hypothetical enemy,

32 Braisted, *U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909*, 19; Captain Sydney
A. Staunton, "Plan for the Occupation and use of San Mun Bay, China as

33 Ellicott, "The Strategic Features of The Philippine Islands,
Hawaii and Guam," RG 8, NHC.
Ellicott pointed out the course Japan would undertake four decades later. Though Ellicott was not alone in those assertions, his studies remain the most critical and potent transmission of ideas. Ellicott argued that Japan would find it imperative to neutralize the Philippines before turning east to deal with any American forces approaching to effect the islands' rescue. The Japanese Navy would have to overwhelm any American forces in East Asia prior to any offensive operations against that rescue force. Without a major naval base in the Philippines the small American naval presence in East Asia, as well as any army garrison in the Philippines, would remain at the mercy of any hostile power. Ellicott's study, written in early 1900, certainly crystallized the U.S. Navy's later suspicions of Japan.

Witnessing firsthand the destruction of the Spanish naval forces in Manila Bay, Ellicott fully understood the vulnerability of the commercial and political center of the islands. Ellicott did not want the U.S. Navy to get

34 Ellicott, "The Strategic Features of The Philippine Islands, Hawaii and Guam," RG 8, NHC.

35 Schilling points out that such proved a recurring strategic challenge, "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919," 30.

36 Ellicott, "Effect of Gun-Fire, Battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898"; Ellicott, "The Defenses of Manila Bay," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 26 (March 1900): 278-287; Ellicott, "The Naval Battle of Manila," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 26 (September 1900): 489-514. Ellicott's work was published also by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in "Effect of the Gunfire of the United States Vessels in the Battle of Manila Bay (May 1, 1898)," ONI War Notes Nr. V: Information from Abroad Senate Document #388, 56th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington: GPO, 1899). This last work was written by Ellicott during his survey of the Philippine Islands, "From Ilo-Ilo, January 1, 1899."
trapped in Manila Bay as had the Spanish, rather, the junior officer argued for a more secure naval base. Ellicott suggested the island of Ilo-Ilo, located three hundred miles south of Manila and blessed with two exit routes. Ellicott pointed out that any hostile force required a two-to-one numerical superiority to blockade successfully any American naval force at Ilo-Ilo. Ellicott's observation of the Philippine Islands had convinced him that Manila Bay was the "least fit" location for a modern naval base. In the same breath Ellicott argued that Subig (Subic) Bay was just as "tactically absolutely indefensible." Ilo-Ilo was "tactically the strongest naval base I have seen in the Philippines," possessing sufficient defensive area and deep water.

Though Secretary Long rejected the site at Ilo-Ilo, he acknowledged that an advanced base would permit the United States to exercise influence and project power into East Asia. Long's decision to overrule the Ilo-Ilo selection arose from two reasons. First, Long cited an insufficient inter- and intra-island transportation system in islands. Second, Admiral George Dewey had suggested another location. Dewey had supported the placement of a major naval facility

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37 Ellicott, "The Strategic Features of The Philippine Islands, Hawaii and Guam," RG 8, NHC.

38 Extract of Ellicott intelligence report, "Memorandum of Information for the Chief of Bureau of Navigation," 18 October 1899, PS, RG 38, NARA.
at Subic as early as May 1898. His prestige might have lent credence to Long’s decision to renew the search—"Subig Bay, decidedly the best harbor in the Philippines, having no equal as a coaling station or naval and military base."

Ellicott’s report made note of one more observation. Ellicott could not have then known that Spain’s earlier attempts to build a naval base at Subic Bay had attracted scrutiny. Ellicott and the General Board recognized that any major naval base in the northern Philippines posed a threat to Japan, as indeed it was. An American naval presence in the Philippines "threatened [Japan] at home." The Japanese had long viewed any naval base at Subic as a potential threat to their freedom of action and an advance base for offensive action against Japanese interests. In response to Japan’s acquisition of Taiwan the Spanish government authorized the creation of a major naval facility at Subic, thirty miles northwest of Manila.

In 1900 the United States possessed only limited facilities in the Hawaiian Islands and no modern facilities to speak of in the Philippines. The Japanese and British

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40 Ellicott, "Sea Power of Japan"; Endorsement to Secretary of Navy letter, 12 May 1900, General Board Letterpress, VI, RG 80, NARA.

41 Saniel, Japan and the Philippines, 179-180, 214. The word Subic/Subig is Tagalog and used interchangeably. The author has seen another version in the Philippines, Subik.
possessed more modern facilities available on occasion to the U.S. Navy. Those facilities, however, would be off-limits in the event with any East Asian war in which the United States was a belligerent. International obligations required neutral nations to close their facilities to all belligerents. Of course, any American hostilities with Japan would preclude the use of Japanese facilities. Additionally, Congressional prerogatives forced the placement of most major American naval facilities along the Atlantic seaboard.\textsuperscript{42} One scholar pointed out quite vividly that, "Appropriations for naval bases were more a result of local pork-barrel considerations than an appreciation of the Navy's [perceived] strategic needs."\textsuperscript{43} As long as the Philippines provided no political advantage to members of Congress, a base there ranked low in priority.

The lack of a base in the Philippines forced the navy to consider other unattractive alternatives. If time was important, the U.S. Navy suffered from lengthy lines of communication between the United States and the Philippines. It would be another fifteen years before the Panama Canal became fully functional. Any American effort, therefore, to counter a hostile fleet in the Philippines would prove inadequate. Thus, the placement of a first-class naval base


\textsuperscript{43} Schilling, "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919," 31.
in the islands would allow the advanced deployment of major fleet units to East Asia. Unknowingly, Ellicott’s argument had lit a slow-burning fuse on a bomb that would explode in 1908.\footnote{Ellicott’s “reports provided ammunition for future anti-Subic Bay opponents,” Carlos R. Rivera, “The American Naval Nightmare: Defending the Western Pacific, 1898-1922,” thesis, (Portland State U, 1988), 67.} That bomb prevented the U.S. Navy from ever acquiring a first-class naval base in the Western Pacific. The reasons varied, ranging from scant appropriations to the lesson of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War. In 1907, just at the moment that the U.S. Navy was about to realize its long-held dream, inter- and intra-service infighting scuttled any possibility of a major naval base at Subic Bay.\footnote{The dream turned into a nightmare when naval planners began to contemplate the defense of the Philippines, Davis, The Admirals Lobby, 115.}

Roosevelt’s Navy, 1901-1904

The assassination of William McKinley propelled the U.S. Navy’s best friend into the presidency. Theodore Roosevelt’s route to that office was a torturous one. As the governor of New York, his reform efforts worried a number of special interests. The political machinery of New York got rid of him by promoting his candidacy as William McKinley’s vice-
Then, on 14 September 1901 an anarchist's bullet put the "cowboy" into the White House.

At that point the U.S. Navy had in service, or under construction, seventeen capital ships. "Capital ships" came into general usage by the end of Roosevelt's presidency. After 1905 the Royal Navy recast armored cruisers into battle cruisers. Though not on par with the first-class battleships, a number of maritime powers had adapted the armored cruiser to their fleets. In September 1901 the U.S. Navy had in service, or funded, eight armored cruisers. Maritime powers around the world adopted the term to encompass those fleet units capable of taking a station in the line of battle. Generally, these were high speed vessels armed with large caliber naval guns, but with less armor than the typical battleship. Only seven battleships and two armored cruisers, all pre-dreadnoughts, were in actual service. The oldest commissioned unit dated from November 1895, while the newest unit was not commissioned until July 1907. All of the appropriations for the battleships pre-dated Roosevelt's presidency. Most of the new construction was a consequence of the demonstrated value of battleships in the Spanish-American War. In contrast to the

46 Roosevelt was "temporarily 'shelved' as vice president," Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power, 215.

47 Gardiner, Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, 140-143.
fleets of the modern capital ships possessed by its major leading competitors, the U.S. Navy's total was unimpressive.

When Roosevelt assumed the office of the presidency on 14 September 1901, Germany had in service twenty-three capital ships with five more under construction. German naval assets consisted of sixteen battleships and seven armored cruisers and three battleships and two armored cruisers under construction. The British had in service twenty-four capital ships and awaited the completion of thirty-two more. The Royal Navy possessed twenty-three battleships and one armored cruiser, with thirteen battleships and nineteen armored cruisers under construction. Japan maintained in service eleven capital ships with three in various stages of completion. The Imperial Japanese Navy maintained five battleships and six armored cruisers, and awaited the completion of one battleship and two armored cruisers.

While some might argue Roosevelt had sparked a naval race, the facts certainly demonstrate that the world's naval powers needed no prompting. One American diplomatic historian inferred that Roosevelt's dispatch of the "Great

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50 Gardiner, *Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905*, 221-222, 224-225.
White Fleet" spurred other maritime powers to expedite their naval expansion programs, but a variety of historians have ably demonstrated that each nation pursued such policies well before the round-the-world cruise. The launch of the Dreadnought, by Britain and not the United States, most certainly accelerated the global naval race. The Dreadnought, by Britain and not the United States, most certainly accelerated the global naval race. The launch of the Dreadnought, by Britain and not the United States, most certainly accelerated the global naval race. The launch of the Dreadnought, by Britain and not the United States, most certainly accelerated the global naval race. The launch of the Dreadnought, by Britain and not the United States, most certainly accelerated the global naval race. The launch of the Dreadnought, by Britain and not the United States, most certainly accelerated the global naval race. The launch of the Dreadnought, by Britain and not the United States, most certainly accelerated the global naval race. The launch of the Dreadnought, by Britain and not the United States, most certainly accelerated the global naval race. The launch of the Dreadnought, by Britain and not the United States, most certainly accelerated the global naval race. The launch of the Dreadnought, by Britain and not the United States, most certainly accelerated the global naval race. The launch of the Dreadnought, by Britain and not the United States, most certainly accelerated the global naval race.

By the time of Roosevelt's departure from office in March 1909, the U.S. Navy had secured funding for sixteen capital ships. The American battle fleet consisted then of thirty-one capital ships, with eight more under construction. The U.S. Navy's battle fleet consisted of twenty-one modern battleships and ten armored cruisers, with eight battleships funded or nearing completion. Germany's High Seas Fleet then possessed in service thirty-two capital ships. That included twenty-four battleships and eight armored cruisers. Units nearing completion included eight battleships, one

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armored cruiser, and two battle cruisers.\textsuperscript{53} Japan's fleet consisted of seventeen capital ships with seven more nearing completion. These included six battleships, eight armored cruisers, and three battle cruisers in service, with five battleships and two battle cruisers nearing completion.\textsuperscript{54} The world's leading maritime power, Great Britain, could field ninety capital ships with seven more under construction. The total included five dreadnoughts, forty-seven battleships, thirty-five armored cruisers, and three battle cruisers, with six battleships and one battle cruiser funded.\textsuperscript{55} Figure 3 provides a comparison of the major naval powers.

Between March 1909 and the outbreak of war in August 1914, the U.S. Navy ranked third internationally as a sea power, behind Britain and Germany.\textsuperscript{56} For American naval officers, Roosevelt's affinity for sea power most certainly advanced their dreams of becoming a first-class naval power. Roosevelt understood quite clearly that a strong navy served as an important instrument of national policy. The President

\textsuperscript{53} Gardiner, \textit{Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1906-1921}, 141-142, 144-146, 150-152.

\textsuperscript{54} Gardiner, \textit{Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1906-1921}, 224-229, 233.


\textsuperscript{56} Tillman, \textit{Navy Yearbook}, 605. Tillman tabulated the costs of programs, individual ships, and made comparisons to other maritime powers; Gardiner, \textit{Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1906-1921}, 112-114.
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<th>British</th>
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<td>47</td>
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<td>Battlecruisers</td>
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<td>Totals</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>32</td>
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**FIGURE 3**
FOUR NATION FLEET COMPARISONS BY 1907
pointed out that, "The American people must either build and maintain an adequate Navy or else make up their minds definitely to accept a secondary position in international affairs, not merely in political, but in commercial matters." Although initially Roosevelt had not built up the navy with Japan in mind, it helped partially to protect American interests in Asia.

Roosevelt had little to do with "the Concept" until the Russo-Japanese War. Roosevelt sought instead to provide for American security in close proximity, primarily the Atlantic seaboard, the Caribbean, and any future isthmian canal. The canal would permit the U.S. Navy to transfer its battle fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in response to emerging threats. By building a large and modern battle fleet, Roosevelt hoped to deter Germany. The U.S. Navy, along with Roosevelt, suspected Germany planned to undertake incursions into the Western hemisphere. Such aspirations would be in violation of the Monroe Doctrine, that long had


58 "Deterrence involves setting the stage—by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation—and waiting. The overt act is up to the opponent. Deterrence tends to be indefinite in its timing. If [the opponent] cross[es] the line we shoot in self-defense, or the mines explode. When? Whenever [he] crosses the line—preferably never, but the timing is up to [the opponent]," Schelling, Arms and Influence, 71-72. In the American case, any German aggression in the Americas would trigger the trip-wire.
precluded any non-hemispheric party from acquiring territories or bases in the region.\textsuperscript{59}

If an existing naval deterrence failed to impress Kaiser Wilhelm II, however, the U.S. Navy was acquiring, under Roosevelt's tenure, sufficient defensive strength to ensure the defeat of Germany's growing naval forces. The passage of Tirpitz' 1900 fleet bill,\textsuperscript{60} though aimed at Britain, worried not only the American Navy but Roosevelt as well. Tirpitz expected to utilize what he called the "risk theory." The "risk theory" required Britain to maintain a dispersal of its major combat units throughout the various parts of the empire, while the German battle fleet remained concentrated in European waters. By achieving local superiority Tirpitz challenged Britain directly. Britain might lose, in detail, enough capital ships in any offensive response to Germany that another coalition might overwhelm the remaining units of the Royal Navy. Using Britain's wide-ranging empire against her, the German Navy provided a most formidable naval enemy by concentrating the Kriegsmarine in German home waters.

\textsuperscript{59} Herwig, Germany's Vision of Empire in Venezuela, 1871-1914 and Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-1941

assuring local naval superiority unless the Royal Navy redeployed back to the English Channel. 61

Tirpitz envisioned the German battle fleet possessing thirty-eight modern battleships and fourteen armored cruisers. Rather than pursuing numerical parity with the Royal Navy, Tirpitz sought instead to acquire sufficient battleship strength to challenge Britain in home waters. 62

Tirpitz concentrated the new fleet near the English Channel at a time when Britain had its naval forces scattered throughout a number of stations. Defeating the disparate squadrons in detail, Germany would emerge as the leading naval power.

Therefore, a large German Navy threatened both Britain and the United States. As a result, the U.S. Navy required


sufficient strength to prepare for that threat. How one defined what was sufficient, or adequate, strength remained problematic, for it required much increased Congressional appropriations as well as further strategic analyses of regional and overseas interests. The programs initiated by Tirpitz threatened not only American interests in the Western hemisphere, but interests in East Asia. The Naval War College and its students clearly expected Germany to target the Philippines. The question of sufficiency was debated by the students, who recognized that American naval forces were scattered throughout a number of stations and subject to defeat in detail, therefore "Blue [the United States] must have a fleet at least one and a half times as great as that of Black [Germany]." That ratio was equal to Tirpitz’ 3:2 or a fifty percent numerical superiority. Furthermore, "with an equal or inferior sea force," the United States chances for victory were bleak.⁶³

As Roosevelt undertook the process of creating a major naval force, the planners of the General Board and the Naval War College continued their strategic analyses. By late 1901, however, it was not Japan that threatened the United States in East Asia, but Russia. The outbreak of the anti-Western Boxer Rebellion (1900) in China provided the Russians

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⁶³ The most detailed examination of the German threat was produced by the student class of 1903, "Solution to the Problem of 1903," RG 12, NHC. That document remained the most detailed study of German naval power until 1913.
with an opportunity to occupy Manchuria and make it a Russian sphere exclusively. That process violated the Open Door Policy, and threatened quite clearly a number of American economic interests. The provocative steps by Russia also threatened Japan's strategic interests in the region, particularly Korea, historically cited as a dagger pointed at Japan. Russia was then nearing completion of a massive fleet expansion program and transferred eight new battleships to Asia anticipating hostilities. The Russian threat to Japanese interests in Korea prompted the move to war. Mahan noted then that Russia's deployment of "the more efficient, and by far the larger part, of her so-called Baltic Fleet" to East Asia gave Russia "substantial naval equality with Japan," but failed to note that such a naval deployment also gave Russia a substantial naval superiority over the American forces in the Pacific.

While Russia aimed the transfers at Japan, the U.S. Navy theorized that those Russian naval forces also threatened American interests in East Asia and the Philippines as well.

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"Lieutenant Commander C.C. Marsh, the American naval attaché in Tokyo, reported concern about Russian restrictions upon American government officials as well as American businessmen, ALUSNA Tokyo to Bureau of Navigation, 29 July 1903, GB 409, RG 80, NARA.


Planners begin to speculate about the possibilities of hostile coalitions as the tensions in East Asia escalated. Such speculation ranged from a combined French-German-Russian-Japanese threat against the United States and Britain to a German-Russian-French front against the United States, Britain, and Japan. Many American naval planners, however, gave little credence to the threat of hostile coalitions. Such an alliance of strong naval powers, however, aimed presumably at Russia but equally challenging to the United States, loomed large on the horizon.

In the middle of this speculation and the continued Russian fleet transfers, a most notable diplomatic event changed the international strategic perspective. In early 1902, Britain and Japan initiated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which lasted two decades. Faced with a number of challenges at the turn of the century, Britain abandoned its "splendid isolation" shortly after Germany inaugurated its massive fleet expansion program in 1900. Disgusted with the constant threat from "outsiders," Japan sought an ally to

67 7 May 1903, "Proceedings and Hearing of the General Board," RG 80, NARA; memorandum, 30 July 1903, General Board file 425 (hereafter GB), RG 80, NARA; Frank Marble to Seaton Schroeder, 28 January 1904, GB 425, RG 80, NARA; memorandum read by Rear Admiral Taylor, 31 May 1904, JB 325, RG 225, NARA; "Contents of War Portfolio #2," General Board letter, 1 June 1904, GB 425, RG 80, NARA; Miller, War Plan Orange, 23-24; Davis, Admirals Lobby, 121-122.

deter another third party interference in its pursuit of national interests. The consequences of an alliance that eased the pressure off Britain, however ranged far and wide beyond Britain's interests.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance gave Japan the security of a naval ally in the event of another intervention in East Asia. Specifically, protection against France or Germany should ongoing Russo-Japanese negotiations, pertaining to strategic interests in Manchuria and Korea, lead to conflict. The alliance gave Britain the opportunity to draw down its forces in East Asia and concentrate more of its naval assets in home waters. That concentration defeated Tirpitz' "risk strategy." The British decision to concentrate its navy in home waters served American interests in the Atlantic, for it constrained Germany's freedom of action. Therefore, the threat of any German offensive operations in the Western hemisphere remained low. Due to the British naval concentration in home waters, in May 1906 the Germans ceased all planning for offensive operations against the United States. The redistribution of German and British fleet units, however, did not dissuade the General Board from seeking sufficient fleet strength for what it considered defensive purposes. In early 1903, the General Board went on record, though in classified documents, with a request to seek forty-eight battleships and twenty-four armored
cruisers. The plan never received approval. There was, however, one perceived negative to the whole process. Britain’s withdrawal from East Asia left Japan as the most powerful regional maritime state, fully capable of conducting operations against American interests in the Western Pacific.

Before Japan emerged fully as the primary threat to American interests in Asia, however, international circumstances again produced a different perspective. The negotiations between Russia and Japan over the issue of Manchuria and Korea fell apart in December 1903. As the possibility of conflict increased, the United States saw the possibility of a Russo-Japanese War as a god-send. Such a war might produce two exhausted combatants and help maintain a sensitive balance of power favorable to the United States. That gift, delivered on 8 February 1904 by the Japanese navy's sneak attack upon the Russian forces at Port Arthur, was not to last long.

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70 Mahan cited the sneak attack a "brilliant success," Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute P, 1977), 470; "Roosevelt and his friends...were jubilant in admiration of a 'friend' who was serving our purposes in the Orient," Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power 1956 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Paperbacks Edition, 1984), 268. The prospective commander-in-chief of U.S. Navy forces in the southern Philippines reported "the universal approval of Japanese methods, and congratulation everywhere upon their preliminary successes," Rear-Admiral William M. Foiger to Taylor, 10 February 1904, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.
CHAPTER V

THE JAPANESE NAVY: BECOMING A FIRST-CLASS FORCE, 1900-1905

Introduction

Japan may, and probably does, mediate a renewal of her efforts to establish a footing on the Asiatic continent [but] she intends, before she moves again, to place herself in a position to disregard and defy any external interference.¹

—Charles H. Cramp, shipbuilder, 1897

Following a most successful tour of duty in the United States, Akiyama Saneyuki received orders to survey a number of European naval facilities for a period of five months. He sailed from New York to Great Britain in January 1900. Exercising his intelligence training, the junior officer visited naval bases in Britain, France, Germany, and Russia. In the process, he met with other Japanese naval officers, including Sato Tetsutarō, sent abroad to perform similar duties. It seems most certain that the Japanese officers exchanged details from their personal observations. In any case, this group of officers benefitted from their overseas duties.

In France, Akiyama visited the naval base at Toulon, which shared geographic characteristics with Santiago, Cuba,

¹ Cramp, "Coming Sea-power," 448.
and the Russian base at Port Arthur. The most significant feature proved to be the heights dominating the harbor. From that position, a siege force could unleash devastating artillery fire upon a trapped enemy force. In 1904, Akiyama would recall such a scenario following the successful blockade of Russian naval forces at Port Arthur.²

During Akiyama’s June 1900 stop in Berlin, the German government was then considering Tirpitz’s 1900 Naval Bill, designed to challenge Britain’s maritime supremacy. The bill called for two battle fleets of eight capital ships each, and a substantial number of support units.³ At that time, conventional wisdom seemed to support the argument that the line of battle worked best with eight battleships or armored cruisers. Though Tirpitz aimed his fleet expansion primarily at Britain, the German naval expansion would figure later into Japanese naval planning when the Japanese Navy sought a standard.

After a one month transit through the United States, Akiyama started his return journey home. He went through Canada, during which he surveyed the newly opened Canadian Pacific Railroad, and apparently, the Royal Navy’s naval facilities at Esquimalt, Victoria, British Columbia. Akiyama

² Evans and Peattie, *Kaigun*.

returned to Japan in August 1900, just after the onset of the Boxer Rebellion, but saw no action on the continent.

Taking advantage of his recent exposure to modern naval science in the West, the Imperial Navy ordered him to update the Standing Fleet’s fighting instructions of 1900, the *Kaisen yomurei*, a doctrine of sorts, and take advantage of the growing international navalism and professionalism. Following the revision of the fighting instructions in February 1901, Akiyama continued to perform staff duties at the Naval Ministry.

Shortly thereafter, the Naval Ministry assigned Akiyama to duties as the senior strategy instructor at the Imperial Japanese Naval Staff College, or the *Kaigun daigakko*, located in the Tsukiji district of Tokyo, and considered the equivalent of the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Akiyama had greatly impressed the facility’s president, Captain Sakamoto Toshiatsu, when the two met briefly in a New York City hotel in August 1899. Sakamoto had just left the Hague Conference and met with Akiyama to discuss an effort to procure an American naval officer to teach naval warfare and strategy at the Japanese Naval Staff College. Sakamoto had been impressed by the level of professionalism evident in the western navies. In the

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Netherlands, Captain Sakamoto had met a number of important naval theorists from western countries, among them Britain's future First Sea Lord John "Jackie" Fisher and Russia's Admiral Sergei O. Makarov.⁶

The recruiting effort proved inconclusive. Following his return to Japan, Akiyama emerged as the best candidate for the job. The effect of his observations during the Spanish-American War and his participation in evolutions with the U.S. Navy helped him formulate strategic and tactical doctrine for the Japanese Navy in any future conflict. Akiyama contributed further to the professionalism of the Japanese officer corps when he introduced to the Staff College a German innovation, the applicatory system. Claims that Akiyama's experience at the U.S. Naval War College led to applicatory system's introduction in the Japanese Navy are wrong. Akiyama did not learn of that process from the U.S. Naval War College, which did not implement the applicatory system until much later.⁷

It is highly probable that Akiyama told the American naval attaché in Tokyo, Commander Frank Marble, about the value of the system, as Marble, who considered the Japanese

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naval officer a close acquaintance, reported Akiyama provided a myriad of details about naval operations of the Russo-Japanese War. In 1910, Marble delivered the first paper on the applicatory system at the U.S. Naval War College. The U.S. Naval War College implemented the system in 1912.

Clearly, the officers of the Office of Naval Intelligence and Naval War College recognized Akiyama's planning skills. In any case, the applicatory system utilized situation estimates and the formulation of orders to develop realistic contingency plans. Akiyama instituted, as well, advanced wargaming and tabletop map exercises, benefitting from the abstracts he perused in the United States as well as his experiences at the U.S. Naval War College. One surmises that during his American tour and duty with the U.S. Navy Akiyama had plenty of opportunity to discuss various naval operations with Admiral Sampson, Captain Chadwick, and Lieutenant Staunton.

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8 The system was fully implemented at the U.S. Naval War College by 1912, Spector, Professors of War, 117-121; Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars, 69-73. "Further Accounts," JNOpB #9, and "Battle of the Japan Sea: Track Chart," JNOpB #14, 1907, RG 8, NHC. Marble considered his relationship with Akiyama close and called him "my friend," Marble letter 10 November 1905 in "Japanese Battleship Mikasa, various, 1905-1928," 06-490/0-12-a, RG 38, NARA.

9 Peattie, "Akiyama Saneyuki," 63-64.
Preparing the Japanese Navy for War

Drawing upon his increased professionalism, the Japanese Navy used Akiyama to update the fleet’s annual operating doctrine. The *Kaisen vomurei*, or Fighting Instructions, were "Written originally in 1901 by [Akiyama]," in anticipation of war with Russia. Though the operating doctrine was not a war plan, it served as guidance for the fleet’s wartime activities.

As the continued Russian occupation of Manchuria increased tension between Russia and Japan, the Japanese government began preparing for war. The Japanese initiated the diplomatic negotiations to end the impasse between the two states. Should the talks prove fruitless, the Japanese government aimed to resolve the situation by force. The Russians recognized that threat and by 1903 had deployed eight battleships to East Asia, while retaining six more in European waters.

That deployment challenged the Japanese directly, for the Japanese possessed at the moment war broke out only six battleships in their entire inventory. In an effort to overcome the numerical inferiority in battleships, the Japanese government supported the "1903 3rd Fleet Extension Program" and the "1904 War Naval Shipbuilding Program,"

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10 Boyd, "Experimentation and Innovation," 3; Shimada, *Rōshiya senso*, 1:409-411 indicated that Akiyama contributed to the revision in February 1901; Peattie, "Akuyama Saneyuki," 64.
allowing for the construction of three battleships and three armored cruisers, but none of the vessels entered service before the end of the Russo-Japanese War.\textsuperscript{11}

Commanding a superb professional knowledge and expertise at an unprecedented early age—he was then thirty-four—Akiyama trained officers who were his contemporaries. The usual differences in the ages of the instructors and students had seemingly precluded a close affinity. Such was not the case. Posthumous tributes by his superiors seemingly bear that out.

Following his unexpected death at the age of fifty in 1918, Vice Admiral Akiyama drew a number of accolades, both in the press and among his peers. Akiyama's hometown admirers erected a memorial in Matsuyama, Shikoku. Admiral Togo, Akiyama's wartime commander, contributed his calligraphy to a plaque on the front face of the memorial that read, "His strategic wisdom welled forth like water from a spring." On the back side of the memorial, Admiral Sakamoto Toshiatsu, Akiyama's superior at the Naval Staff College contributed this lengthy inscription:

You suddenly found yourself a member of the staff of Commander-in-Chief Togo, and students whom you had instructed at the staff college became staff officers of the various divisions of the fleet. It was quite natural that at the Battle of the Yellow Sea and the Battle of Tsushima you carried out in actuality the map exercises and war games you had conducted in your

\textsuperscript{11} LaCroix, "The Imperial Japanese Navy," N\textsuperscript{137} (1/1971), 15.
classroom. It was not without reason that under Commander-in-Chief Togo you manipulated the subordinate fleets like the fingers of your hands.\textsuperscript{12}

Akiyama's intelligence, however, contributed to a more demanding and intense relationship. As intimated by the tributes above, this resulted in a system, deeply inculcated in the staff officers, taken back out to the fleet, and shore commands, where most staff officers worked from the same pages, pages written by Akiyama. It is quite clear that Akiyama Saneyuki contributed to a professional naval doctrine.

One biography of the officer noted that, "At the naval war college he always made Russia the subject of various staff studies; so when the war came, various plans had been worked out beforehand; and when his operational orders went to the fleet, the recipients were his own former students who knew his ideas—the head moved the arms and legs."\textsuperscript{13} With little doubt, Akiyama's training abroad proved most beneficial to an increased professionalism in the Japanese Navy.

Akiyama, and his contemporaries at the Staff College, ably formulated the Japanese Navy's strategy and tactics for war with Russia. The Japanese had anticipated such

\textsuperscript{12} Translation courtesy of David C. Evans.

\textsuperscript{13} ASK, 73-74; Evans and Peattie, \textit{Kaigun}.
hostilities since the humiliating 1895 intervention crisis. The planners clearly expected a repeat of 1895, specifically the use of naval assets to pressure Japan. Akiyama had history on his side, for during the years 1894 to 1896 Admiral Sergei O. Makarov, the Russian Navy's leading strategist and tactician, deployed the Russian Baltic Fleet's Mediterranean Squadron to the Far East, and supported the Tripartite Intervention. Appropriately, Akiyama helped prepare fleet staff officers for such a conflict. In comparison, there has been general recognition that Akiyama's Russian counterparts were less than adequately trained or led. The American press clearly rated the Russian Navy as poorly prepared for the forthcoming engagement.

The Japanese Navy officer corps, especially between the years 1898 and 1903, had studied quite prodigiously the conduct of a war with Russia. That was a situation for which Akiyama's staff college colleagues and students proved themselves well prepared. Their joint planning exercises provided a significant margin in the victory over the Russian Navy in 1905, a margin unavailable in 1895. The initiation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 made Akiyama's

14 Jones "Makarov," 69, 71.

planning task much less complicated. The alliance precluded the threat of any third party intervention and forced the Russian Navy to depend primarily upon its own resources.

Akiyama's task entailed two challenges. The Japanese Navy had to neutralize the major Russian naval base at Port Arthur. As long as that facility remained available to Russian naval forces, either those already stationed in East Asia or any reinforcements dispatched from European waters, Japan's freedom of action seemed severely limited. Anticipating, furthermore, a Russian sortie attempt from Port Arthur, Akiyama helped draft portions of the Navy's war plans. Akiyama utilized, in part, the model of the Santiago blockade. A successful Russian sortie would threaten not only the Japanese landings upon the Korean and Manchurian coasts but the sea lanes of communication between Japan and the continent. Interestingly, Akiyama was one of several Japanese officers who had carried out intelligence missions, reconnoitering, possibly, amphibious landing areas in Manchuria, North China, Korea and Russia. Any Russian naval assets remaining free in East Asian waters would threaten Japan's maritime commerce. Some Russian commerce raiding did take place in the first months the Russo-Japanese

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17 ASK, 54-55; Shima, "Kaigun heigakko," 78.
War, primarily in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. That threat, though, would not deter Japan from securing its interests in East Asia.\textsuperscript{18}

Japan's naval resources were inferior to those that their putative enemy could project into an Asia theater of war. The Japanese Navy, therefore, based their strategy upon the preservation of irreplaceable assets until such time as the conditions were appropriate for a decisive fleet engagement. Such a strategy proved important, for the Russians had mobilized only about ten percent of their total military potential. Subsequently, the "myths of military victory" built up an exaggerated expectation of Japan's military forces.\textsuperscript{19}

In 1904, however, the Japanese Navy would have to defeat, in detail, any disparate Russian naval forces capable of interfering with amphibious operations. The pre-war training exercises at the Naval Staff College, under Akiyama's tutelage, shaped the subsequent decision making. The Japanese Navy had guessed as early as July 1902 Russia would dispatch the Baltic Fleet to East Asia. Thus, naval planners concluded that any decisive battle should occur once the Japanese Navy neutralized (by capture or destruction) any Russian forces at Port Arthur, and the Baltic Fleet,


dispatched 18,000 miles to the Far East, arrived exhausted in Asian waters. To that end, in April 1903 the Japanese Navy exercised near Taiwan in preparation for a Russian fleet from the East.\textsuperscript{20}

In the period immediately before the outbreak of war in February 1904, Akiyama, along with other strategists at the Naval Staff College, examined the impact of technology upon sea power. As early as 1884 the Japanese Navy had used torpedo-boats in fleet and exercises operations. Such activities served, in the planners estimation, as a prelude to any major encounter. The torpedoes perceived value ensured their use in future operations, particularly in a surprise attack upon the Russian naval forces at Port Arthur. The harbor at Port Arthur was a small enclosed area and the newly dispatched Russian battleships would have to anchor at the roadstead outside the harbor. That made them inviting targets.

Described as simultaneously eccentric and brilliant,\textsuperscript{21} Akiyama's strategic planning and fleet exercises brought him to the attention of senior officers in Tokyo, in particular,


\textsuperscript{21} Peattie, "Akiyama Saneyuki," 65.
Admiral Yamamoto Gombei, Navy Minister, and Admiral Togo Heihachiro, prospective Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.\textsuperscript{22} Recognizing Akiyama for his immeasurable talents, the Navy Ministry ordered Akiyama to sea in October 1903 as a fleet Special Staff Officer under Togo. Akiyama soon became the Combined Fleet's Senior Staff Officer and Togo directed him to complete the battleplans for neutralizing the Russian Far Eastern Fleet at Port Arthur as well as the expected eastward bound Baltic Fleet.\textsuperscript{23}

Akiyama drew upon his western experiences and strategic planning at the Naval Staff College to carry out Togo's order. He supplemented those Western experiences with lessons drawn from traditional texts, including the work of China's Sun Tzu and Japan's Takeda Shingen. For subsequent fleet operations Akiyama utilized, in part, "wheeling tactics" from Takeda. Takeda's military legacy closely approximated the envelopment tactics of the West. Takeda, a pre-Tokugawa era military figure "renowned for military prowess," was however not the only source of inspiration for the Japanese planner.\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{23} Akiyama completed the planning in January 1904, Shimada, \textit{Roshiya senso}, 2:1122-1126.

Drawing upon his tour in the West, Akiyama also devised a phased blockade plan for Port Arthur. Aimed at striking an early blow at the Russian naval forces, his plan contributed eventually to the defeat of the Russian Port Arthur fleet. That aim reached fruition after the Russian sortie attempt in August 1904. The capitulation of Port Arthur’s remaining army and naval forces in January 1905 left only the harbor of Vladivostok as a suitable facility in Asian waters for the Baltic Fleet. In February 1905 Togo began to brace for a climatic showdown and directed Akiyama to make final preparations for the Baltic Fleet’s arrival. The fall of Port Arthur (January 1905) as well as the defeat of the Russian naval forces in the Far East made the Imperial Navy and Akiyama’s task much easier.

Akiyama’s renowned status began in 1905 when he developed what became known later as the "interception and attrition" ambush operation for the destruction of the Baltic fleet in the Tsushima Straits. The seven-stage plan included a variety of layers to annihilate the Russian forces. Akiyama developed a search grid consisting of numerically designated squares. Once scouting vessels made contact with

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26 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun. The fall of Port Arthur would contribute to a lengthy struggle in the United States as well. The circumstances at Port Arthur mirrored, in part, the U.S. Navy’s attempt to secure a first class naval base in the Far East. When the Russian base fell, the bomb which John Ellicott had unwittingly planted in 1899 finally exploded and is discussed in a subsequent chapter.
the enemy they transmitted their grid coordinates by radio, then a practically new development.

In that regard, it is most probable that Akiyama's observations during the Spanish-American War shaped his war planning. The issue of reconnaissance had dogged the American naval commanders off Cuba. In the years after 1898 the Japanese Navy had been fine-tuning its search procedures, though Akiyama's grid system might have drawn upon the work of the U.S. Navy's Richard Wainwright, who had caught the Japanese officer's attention during his American tour.27

In any case, Akiyama's detailed plan envisioned an offensive use of torpedo boats in both day and night attacks, cruiser attacks at dusk and a battleship coup de grâce at dawn of the second day. The last stage called for mine fields at the entrance to Vladivostok, where the Japanese Navy expected to drive the remnants of the Russian fleet. Akiyama used technology, in this case, torpedo boats and mines, to alter the conduct of naval warfare and improve the Japanese Navy's chances of victory. For example, the Russians "did not know that the Japanese Navy had laid as many as 700 mines in the approaches to Vladivostok."28

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As is well known, the Battle of the Japan Sea (Tsushima Straits) destroyed Russia as a naval power in the Far East. Though his planning work was pivotal in the Japanese Navy’s success, Akiyama still worried about the battle’s outcome. Afflicted by poor weather and even poorer reconnaissance, the Japanese Navy failed to halt the slow moving Baltic Fleet’s advance through the Tsushima Straits. The Russian advance through such weather should not have been unexpected. Just a few years earlier Russia’s Admiral Sergei O. Makarov had made note of the horrid weather conditions in the area and its effect upon operations in the area. In the intervening years, Akiyama had become familiar with the Russian officer’s work, but perhaps overlooked such passages. As a result, however, of this Japanese miscue, the Russian fleet sailed safely past the point designated for the first and second stages of Akiyama’s plan. That failure, however, proved inconsequential.

The battle began with dramatic results at 2:08 p.m. on 27 May 1905. Commander Bradley Fiske described the opening engagement in vivid terms, "[t]he battle was decided in about

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A torrent of Japanese gun fire in the first half hour, when the Russian fleet suffered many of its heaviest casualties, clearly decided the battle’s outcome. As anticipated by Akiyama, the entire struggle broke up into a series of separate engagements. The conflict continued throughout the night to the next day as the enemy fleet attempted to force its way northward to Vladivostok and supposed safety. Continued attacks took their toll upon the Russian fleet. Nearly annihilated by the afternoon of the second day, the Russians surrendered at sea. As a specific honor bestowed upon him by Admiral Togo, Akiyama personally accepted the Russian surrender. The planner, unable to speak Russian, took a French speaking junior officer with him to effect the surrender. Onboard the Russian flagship, Akiyama graciously accepted the surrender, paying homage to the losers. In any case, quite clearly, Akiyama’s multi-stage plan, while not executed perfectly, resulted in the naval battle of the age, one that focused particularly upon the annihilation of the enemy’s forces.

For those who subscribe to the view that Sun Tzu’s philosophy permeated the Japanese Navy, specifically the argument about avoiding combat, such is not the case. One might consider the fact that Tsushima proved to be a decisive

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31 Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine, 41.

battle of annihilation. Though Sun Tzu’s dictum about defeating an enemy without combat held sway throughout the Japanese military, Admiral Togo pursued, instead, a "western-style" battle of annihilation. There is evidence that at the end of the engagement Akiyama appeared shocked. Perhaps the ferocity of Japanese firepower affected his demeanor. Akiyama reportedly wept as the Japanese battleships pounded the Russian units unmercifully. Akiyama repeatedly suggested to his commander in chief, Admiral Togo, that the Japanese cease firing after the Russian units raised the flag of surrender. Togo, however, demurred and continued to fire until the enemy actually brought their ships to a full stop. Admiral Togo might have been fearful of a ruse upon the part of the Russians. One later survivor of the Imperial Japanese Navy suggested that Togo had grown frustrated by the conduct of several unsatisfactory naval battles earlier in the war and sought to avoid again such an outcome. In any case, the battle broke the enemy’s will to continue the war.\(^33\)

The Japanese Navy’s effort at Tsushima compared at times to Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar. Relishing the defeat of one of its enemies, the Royal Navy asserted, "Tsushima is equivalent to Trafalgar."\(^34\) The Japanese case offered an


obvious number of differences. The U.S. Navy, however, did not agree with comparisons to Nelson. As to the Trafalgar reference, reinforced by a number of Akiyama Saneyuki’s anonymous newspaper accounts, the U.S. Naval War College argued that, "[this] comparison is no good," asserting instead that the conditions were much different in the two engagements.\textsuperscript{15}

In any case, Akiyama’s plan sought consciously to engage the opposing fleet with attritional warfare well before the decisive fleet encounter. Like the famed "Nelson touch," though, Akiyama’s influence had been evident throughout the conflict. When one considers the fact that junior subordinates seldom receive due credit, Akiyama stands out as an exception. One of his superiors stated later that during the war Akiyama wrote nearly every fleet order, while more recently a Japanese naval officer noted that Akiyama was "chiefly in charge of fleet operations in the Russo-Japanese War."\textsuperscript{16}

While the Japanese victory at Tsushima had not brought an immediate cessation to hostilities, it supplemented army victories in Manchuria and contributed to Russia’s decision to negotiate terms. There is, however, a difference of opinion as to the effect of Tsushima. One Japanese naval


\textsuperscript{16} Evans and Peattie, \textit{Kaigun}; Toyama, "Years of Transition," 181.
officer credited Russian domestic issues as the major factor for peace after the naval battle, while the U.S. Navy's Bradley Fiske wrote that "the naval battle decided the issue of the war completely." Nonetheless, the Japanese Navy's glorious victory at Tsushima certainly influenced the Russian decision to seek peace. The Japanese Navy's pivotal success at sea certainly shaped subsequent events and history. In 1940, a Japanese naval commander pointed out that in a war with the United States, "it was doubtful whether or not we would even win, to say nothing of a great victory as in the Russo-Japanese War."

Akiyama, his stature further enhanced by his staff work, received his government's designation as its naval representative at the Russo-Japanese peace negotiations in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The naval planner, however, never travelled to Portsmouth. His mother's death in June 1905 probably forced a last-minute change in personnel. Akiyama's selection, though, might have been due initially to his relationship with Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro, Japan's representative at Portsmouth. The relationship began in 1898 when Akiyama operated out of Japan's Washington consulate during Komura's ministry. The relationship extended later to

37 Chihaya in Goldstein and Dillon, Pearl Harbor Papers, 328; Fiske, Navy as Fighting Machine, 41.

include Akiyama's membership in a secret pro-war group in 1903 and continued until Komura's death in 1912. Though the Japanese government chose not to make public Akiyama's most pivotal role, American naval officers knew almost immediately that he had contributed to Japan's great naval victory.

The end of hostilities came with the Treaty of Portsmouth (September 1905), on terms unfavorable to Russia. More troubling to American naval planners, the Russo-Japanese War shifted the Asian balance of power dramatically. Such a shift also led the Japanese government to reassess the nation's strategic posture. In early 1906, it concluded Russia would probably seek revenge. That assessment, driven by army interests, proved highly overrated. Recognizing the unity of common interests, the Japanese and Russian governments eventually cooperated to nullify their past enmity. The two nations exercised economic and political power in Manchuria and portions of northern China through a series of treaties and secret annexes beginning in 1907. To further illuminate the unchanging strategic perspective, one

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might note that the treaties remained in effect until the Bolshevik rise to power in November 1917.⁴¹

Even so, the Japanese government decided to coordinate more effectively national defense with its military through a formal plan. The draft Imperial (National) Defense Policy designated Japan’s primary hypothetical enemy, identified other significant threats to security, and established the military’s force structure.⁴² Coincidentally, at nearly the same moment, the U.S. Navy was itself preparing contingencies for trouble in Asia. In 1906, the U.S. Naval War College too recognized the need to reexamine the new international situation and the possibility of trouble with Japan.

That trouble was soon forthcoming, and Japan’s senior planners would have much to do with the Japanese preparations in response. Within a year of its victory in East Asia, Japan became embroiled in controversy on both sides of the Pacific. The Japanese Navy, drawing principally upon the work of Akiyama Saneyuki and Sato Tetsutaro, soon found itself thrust into the middle of an unexpected war scare. How that process unfolded is the subject of subsequent discussion.


⁴² For the Imperial Defense Policy see Tsunoda, Manshu mondai to kokubo hoshin, 630ff.
CHAPTER VI

THE AMERICAN NAVY: FROM PORT ARTHUR TO CRISIS, 1904-1907

Introduction

We should keep our Navy up and make it evident that we are not influenced by fear. I do not believe that [Japan] will look toward the Philippines until affairs are settled on the mainland of Asia.¹

—Theodore Roosevelt, June 1905

Though many historians have analyzed the years between the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War, these studies have failed to develop any notions of "the Concept." These historians have not dealt at length with the issue of "mixed-motive," particularly as it involved a struggle between the American military over the placement of a naval base in the Philippines. The events of the ten year period are historic, though this discussion deals primarily with the influence and effects of a limited number. It would be impossible to detail chronologically each and every important occurrence, so I have selected those that contributed to a better defined analysis of "the Concept."

The events cited above include the Russo-Japanese War and the later evolution of "War Plan Orange." The war scares

¹ Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War 1925 (Gloucester MA: Peter Smith, 1959), 166.
between 1906 and 1913, and the planning officers involved, are equally important. Indeed, many of the events discussed in this chapter remain intertwined with events documented in the following chapters.

While John Ellicott’s tour at the U.S. Naval War College came to an end in late 1901, his early views about Japan continued to hold sway. The number of officers (discussed herein) who contributed to the continuity of "the Concept" reflected such an influence. One historian alluded to that continuity by noting that both the American and Japanese navies perceived, realistically, a number of common assumptions about each other. Many, if not all, American naval officers supported the large expansion of the U.S. Navy as well. One historian of the period noted that the officers received personal satisfaction from such expansion and rationalized a number of reasons for fleet expansion. One notes that the same characterization applied equally to the officer corps of the Japanese Navy.

The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, anticipated as it was, proved to be a most important development in the relationship between the American and Japanese navies. Initially, a great number of Americans, and especially naval officers, relished the thought of Russia's elimination as a

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3 Schilling, "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919," 40.
potential antagonist in East Asia. Rear Admiral William M. Folger reveled in the fact that Japan was "fighting our battles" against Russia.^4^4^4 Alfred Thayer Mahan, long suspicious of Russian ambitions in Asia,^5^5^5 called the attack a "brilliant success."^6^6^6 President Theodore Roosevelt expected that the two belligerents would exhaust themselves in East Asia and ensure the continuation of a balance of power favorable to the United States. One scholar noted that Roosevelt confided to a foreign representative, "[i]t is to our interest that the war between Russia and Japan should drag on, so that both powers may exhaust themselves as much as possible."^8^8^8 Many Americans expected, also, that American access to the market in China and Manchuria would be unhampered, or even expand. A number of varied interests

^4^ Folger to Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor, 10 February 1904, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD. Folger, the prospective commander-in-chief of American naval forces in the southern Philippines reported "the universal approval of Japanese methods, and congratulation everywhere upon their preliminary successes."


^6^ Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters, 470

^7^ "Roosevelt and his friends were jubilant in admiration of a ‘friend’ [Japan] who was serving our purposes in the Orient," Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power, 268.


^9^ "That after all is said and done, we, more than even Russia or Japan, need China as a market for our produce," Folger to Taylor, 10 February 1904, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD; Taylor memorandum, 31 May 1904, JB 325, RG 225, NARA.
hoped that Japan would simultaneously restrain Russian ambitions, and serve American interests, in East Asia.

As Russia suffered defeat after defeat, however, Japan shattered that illusion by year's end. It appeared more and more apparent to many in the United States that an overwhelming triumph by Japan would lead eventually to the elimination of foreign competition, both political and economic, from its perceived region of strategic interests. That region included Manchuria, Korea, and Northern China. Japanese successes also increased the risk to American territorial interests as well. Roosevelt hoped to prevent such a situation by maintaining a "postwar line of friction along the Korean-Manchurian border" to keep the two belligerents occupied for years to come. He did so eventually, and temporarily, by securing a peace much less draconian than expected by the Japanese citizenry. Roosevelt purposely obviated the Japanese government's wartime propaganda and public declarations that it would punish the Russians and reduce the fiscal burden on its citizens. That proved illusory at the Portsmouth negotiations in the summer of 1905.

Within a year of Japan's victory against Russia, the United States understood that Japan would resist nearly every

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10 One observer noted that Japan sought to "commercially dominate" East Asia, Millard, *America and the Far Eastern Question*, 37.

move to expand Western interests in East Asia. Roosevelt, very aware that the United States possessed neither the will nor the military capability to do otherwise, accepted that inevitability. Shortly after the Russo-Japanese War, in December 1905, Roosevelt himself had slowed down the U.S. Navy's growth. He estimated the navy's strength at forty capital ships, counting those still on the slips, and declared it sufficient. Roosevelt went further and declared that growth beyond the then existing numbers unnecessary "at least in the immediate future."

Such acquiescence, however, did not guarantee harmony between the United States and Japan. Japan's clear, if incomplete, victory in East Asia fed a subtle but growing fear in certain American segments that the Asian power's ambitions were something to fear. Japan's possession of a battle-hardened military and naval force reinforced the perceptions of such ambitions. Respecting the strength of the Japanese Navy, American naval planners observed closely many of the operations of the East Asian conflict and digested the lessons of the war. Senior fleet officers and strategists alike grew increasingly worried about the emerging Asian power. As such, a number of lessons-learned, both strategic and tactical, from the Russo-Japanese War

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12 That figure included twenty-eight battleships, and twelve armored cruisers.

influenced the post war relationship as well as the attitudes of subsequent naval planners.

The U.S. Navy view of the Russo-Japanese War

American naval officers watched with some trepidation as the Russo-Japanese negotiations related to Korea's political autonomy broke down. As the tocsin call sounded the American Navy sought to ensure it too was ready for a number of eventualities. While the Russo-Japanese War is important, and has received substantial treatment, I have limited the events to the effects of the war upon American naval, and to a very limited extent, army, planning.

The General Board reported in December 1903, "[t]hat under present conditions, viz., the imminence of war, [an American] battle squadron in the East is necessary." The concentration of American naval strength in Atlantic waters, coupled with the lack of an advanced naval base in East Asian waters, precluded a rapid response by the United States to any threat against the Philippines if the war spilled over into the islands. One senior officer reported publicly in September 1903 that the "Navy Department should regard only [Subic Bay] as [the site for a] proper naval base," and that

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14 General Board, "Proceedings and Hearings," 4 December 1903, RG 80, M1493, NARA.
there be no more delay in creating such a base. American naval planners suspected that either Japan or Russia might use the pretext of military necessity to violate the territorial integrity of neutral parties, and American interests, to effect victory in any conflict.

Such concern emanated from a fear that Russian military activity in East Asia might eventually involve the United States. Though President Roosevelt adhered rigidly to the international protocols related to war, the U.S. Navy could never be sure that the Japanese would not seize upon any pretext, even the most insignificant, to expand its theater of operations, and simultaneously, occupy additional territories. Therefore, a strong American naval presence in the Philippines, supported by a major naval facility, might deter any hostile movements by either the Russians or Japanese.

On the two points, Russian intrigues or Japanese ambitions, differences of opinion served to work against the interests of the U.S. Navy. President Roosevelt "judged that, so long as the two belligerents were evenly matched," there was little need to reinforce American naval strength in

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16 "W" [Lieutenant Commander Charles C. Marsh] #187, 27 Dec 1904, Area 10, RG 45, NARA; Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909, 167. The "W" designation identified, confidentially, the post of the U.S. Naval Attaché in Tokyo, see Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence, 74.
East Asia. As a result, the U.S. Navy could do little to increase the number of fleet units in East Asia. The navy, though, could feel more secure about its future, for the government had provided for a substantial increase in the battle fleet. In 1904, the United States was constructing simultaneously "fourteen battleships and thirteen armored cruisers." Within the next two and a half years the United States augmented its battle fleet with thirteen new battleships. The problem would be to forestall any potentially hostile action in the interim.

The issue of a naval base in the Philippines proved much more difficult to arbitrate. The continued service discussions about the placement and appropriations for a major naval facility in the islands, a process initiated by John Ellicott's recommendations in 1899, had not yet borne fruit. Admiral Dewey expressed great anxiety about the "defenseless condition" of the Philippines and how that would encourage an "enterprising enemy" to conduct offensive operations against American interests. Such a case resulted from a paucity of congressional appropriations, slow service bureaucracies, and the lack of consensus between the

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20 Dewey to Secretary of Navy William H. Moody, 7 November 1903, GB 405, RG 80, NARA; see Dewey to Moody, 25 November 1903, GB 408-1, RG 80, NARA; minutes of the Joint Board, 15 December 1903, JB 301, RG 225, NARA.
American Army and Navy. The lack of inter-service cooperation proved a pivotal challenge.

To coordinate military planning, Roosevelt had authorized the creation of the Joint Army and Navy Board (hereafter, Joint Board) in mid-1903. Admiral George Dewey, the highest ranking active duty military officer, served as its chief. Roosevelt tasked the Joint Board with ensuring inter-service cooperation and the coordination of planning procedures related to national defense. For this examination, however, the Joint Board received little treatment, but its proceedings and records prove an excellent source of material related to Subic Bay and plans for war with Japan.\(^1\) In any case, the Joint Board met irregularly between 1903 and 1921, for individual service interests often outweighed the real advantages of true cooperation.\(^2\)

Nonetheless, American naval planners grew increasingly nervous as the slightest prospect of conflict with either Japan, or Russia, in Asia increased in intensity. Though many, even Roosevelt, considered such a possibility most unlikely, naval planners hoped to deter any aggression.


\(^2\) "The outbreak of war found American naval officers still laying the foundations for American naval power in the Far East," Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909, 152.
Following the Japanese sneak attack upon the Russian forces at Port Arthur, American naval planners faced a daunting task. They deemed necessary the great naval base in East Asia, long stalled by a Congress unwilling to fund construction that accrued no electoral advantage. The Japanese attack at Port Arthur finally convinced Congress that such a facility seemed justified. An initial appropriation held out hope that the navy would finally secure its long desired naval station. The attack at Port Arthur, however, reopened the question of how and where the United States should construct a major naval base in Asia.\textsuperscript{23} Though the issue received little press attention in Japan, the American discussions related to Subic would later influence Japan’s post-war naval strategy. In the next chapter, the role of Subic in Sato Tetsutaro’s planning will become more apparent. Finally, the American Navy faced a more potent enemy, the U.S. Army, particularly in the person of Major General Leonard Wood, commander of the U.S. Army’s forces in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{24}

It was not the Japanese victories on the mainland on which the attention of American naval planners was rivetted. It was, rather, the gradual destruction of the Russian naval

\textsuperscript{23} One historian pointed out that the "lack of Congressional enthusiasm was soon rendered academic by a division of opinion among the armed services, caused by the emergence of Japan as the most probable Pacific foe," Schilling, "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919," 31.

\textsuperscript{24} See Rear Admiral Charles J. Train, "Memo on Subig Bay Naval Station," 31 May 1905, Area 11, RG 45, NARA, 5-7.
forces and the neutralization of the Russia's major ice-free naval base at Port Arthur. Though initially the Russian naval forces far outnumbered the Japanese Navy, Russian ineptitude and Japanese decisiveness proved quite decisive. Preparing for a conflict, the Russians had been deploying battleships in East Asia. By the outbreak of war in February 1904, the Russians maintained seven battleships at Port Arthur. It is most important to note that throughout the entire conflict Japan never possessed more than six modern battleships in its entire inventory. Within two months of the outbreak of war the Japanese Navy suffered the loss of two battleships to mines. Overall, the Russian Navy possessed fourteen battleships. Unfortunately, the Russians divided those capital assets among widely separated stations. That was a situation the U.S. Navy found true for itself as well. One naval officer pointed out that, "The position of the US in relation to the Pacific is somewhat analogous to that of Russia."  

American naval planners realized quickly that Russian local strength appeared inadequate to defeat quickly the Japanese in East Asia. This was particularly true as is related to the seemingly ineffective use of Port Arthur by the Russian Navy. Reflecting on the Russian failure, the

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struggle over the placement of a major naval base brought heated intra- and inter-service arguments in American planning circles. The Japanese had landed a large number of army forces on the continent and aimed to capture the Russian base at Port Arthur. As the Japanese forces advanced nearer and nearer to the Russian fortress, the similar vulnerability of any base in the Philippines dawned upon a number of influential navy, and army, officers.26

Initially, the U.S. Navy hastened to advance the construction of a major naval base in Subic Bay. In the proceeding years, however, Congress had failed to appropriate any monies for Subic.27 With an eye toward the Japanese offensive upon Port Arthur, the General Board professed, "it is assumed that Subig Bay cannot be held," with the then existing fortifications and military forces stationed in the Philippines.28 So concerned, however, was the Secretary of Navy, William H. Moody, with the possibility of a threat to the Philippines, that he ordered the navy to forego other construction projects in the Philippines and to concentrate its efforts at one site. Moody directed that "[e]very dollar

26 "We would be most certain to lose the Philippines," if Japan took advantage of American weakness in the Western Pacific, Brigadier General Tasker Bliss to Moody, 10 May 1904, JB 325, RG 225, NARA.

27 Congress authorized $1,200,000 in April 1904, but in succeeding years failed to fully fund the creation of a naval base at Subic, Navy Yearbook, 1920-1921 (Washington: GPO, 1921).

28 Dewey to Moody, 20 February 1904, GB 408-4, RG 80, NARA; 2nd endorsement to G.B. 403, Hay to the Diplomatic Officers of the United States, 2 March 1904, RG 80, NARA.
available for such purposes ought rather to be spent at [Subic]" until the United States established a base there.²⁹

Such concerns, however, further heightened the feeling of crisis as a number of disparate interests began to fight the placement of the naval base at Subic Bay. First, a few naval officers decided that Subic was untenable due to its large expanse. The enclosed area of Subic Bay was much larger than that of Port Arthur (Figures 4 and 5). To defend it would have required eventually the deployment of up to 125,000 army troops.³⁰ In addition, many naval and army officers stationed in the Philippines argued that Manila Bay, and not Subic, served as the economic, social, and political center of the Philippine Islands. They argued that the fall of Subic would not present the clear and present danger to American interests and prestige that the Japanese capture of Manila would invoke. Part of that argument probably emanated from the social isolation of Subic Bay.³¹

The U.S. Army has its own service interests to defend as well. General Wood feared that a large base at Subic would lead eventually to the diminution of army influence, both in the Philippines and eventually in the nation's defense.

²⁹ Moody to All Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department, 2 April 1904, GB 401-1, RG 80, NARA.


³¹ Folger to Captain Charles J. Train, 1 June 1904, File PS, RG 45, NARA.
FIGURE 4
SUBIC BAY NAVAL RESERVATION
FIGURE 5
PORT ARTHUR NAVAL BASE
structure. Wood suspected that the U.S. Navy would argue later that an enlarged United States Marine Corps force could alone defend the environs of Subic Bay, and as such, monies slated for army objectives be diverted to that end. Such intra-service battles would yield serious, if not negative, results for both services.\footnote{Hermann Hagedorn, \textit{Leonard Wood 1931} (New York: Harper and Brothers Pub., Kraus Reprint Co., 1969), 71-81.}

Such arguments, though often made in self-interest, could not conceal the fact that Japan had emerged as a perceived, if not real, threat to American control of the Philippines.\footnote{Rear-Admiral Taylor thought that "the present war may cause [a] change of views" as the Japanese contemplated victory, memoranda, 31 May 1904, JB 325, RG 225, NARA.} That concern reached to the White House as President Roosevelt began to receive regular detailed briefings on the Japanese advance upon Port Arthur.\footnote{See Office of Naval Intelligence memorandum, 22 July 1904, 28 October 1904, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.} By the time Japan’s naval forces had driven the Russian Port Arthur squadron back to its base in defeat and blockaded it there permanently, the U.S. Navy, and the administration, had begun to reconsider the deployment of its own naval forces in East Asia.

On 10 August 1904, the Russian naval forces at Port Arthur, known as the First Pacific Fleet, attempted unsuccessfully to sortie. After a pitched running battle lasting nearly the entire day, Japanese naval forces under
the command of Admiral Togo forced the enemy to return to Port Arthur after incurring heavy casualties. The Russian forces never again left Port Arthur.

Historians have often overlooked the importance of that Russo-Japanese naval battle to American naval planning. At the time the U.S. Navy was attempting to construct a naval base in the Philippines, the Japanese Navy successfully entombed a significant portion of Russia's naval strength in Port Arthur. Unable to challenge Japan's command of the sea, the Russian Army adopted the defensive tactics seen later in the trench warfare of World War I. Unfettered by enemy interdiction, the Japanese Army was free to reinforce its continental components almost at will. That was possible once the Japanese Navy had neutralized Russia's naval forces in East Asia. Though reporting was slow, President Roosevelt received a most detailed report on the Japanese Navy's wartime effort as well as the Russian failures.\footnote{See "Memorandum for The President: Battleships in the Russo-Japanese War," [ca 10-27-04], Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.}

Recognizing the weak American naval presence in the Philippines, the navy argued that only a strong naval base at Subic would sustain both the increased naval presence and the American defense of the islands should Japan seek to occupy them. Though, "[Subic] as a fortified base [would] fill a long felt want on this station," the navy understood the problem of attempting to hold both Subic and Manila. The
sense of urgency and real time concern provoked the following statement, "[o]nce Manila Bay is in the hands of the enemy, [Subic] will soon fall. Port Arthur would be repeated." At that point Port Arthur had not yet capitulated, so the urgency was unreasonably dramatic but real.\textsuperscript{35}

Within four months, however, the capitulation of Port Arthur seemed imminent.\textsuperscript{36} Once the Russian command surrendered, Japan would have a complete command of East Asian waters. Only an incoming relief force threatened such singular control. That relief force, however, was proceeding eastward at a very slow pace and not expected to arrive for several months. Britain's recall of its battleships to home waters, a response to Germany's growing naval strength, further enhanced Japan's uncontested command of the sea. Such a withdrawal left only the U.S. Navy to face the Japanese naval forces in East Asia. In any case, Congress finally appropriated monies for a major naval base in East Asia, for "Subig Bay [was] to be made the primary naval base of the Philippines," and its construction would take precedence over all other work in the islands.\textsuperscript{37} That

\textsuperscript{35} Rear Admiral Yates Stirling, Commander-in-Chief United States Asiatic Fleet, to Secretary of the Navy Paul Morton, 10 August 1904, GB 420-1, RG 80.

\textsuperscript{36} Just weeks before the Russian surrender at Port Arthur, American naval intelligence secured a report on the devastating Japanese blockade and the gradual destruction of the trapped Russian naval forces, see "W" #173, #178, 12 December 1904, Area 10, RG 45, NARA.

\textsuperscript{37} General Board [Dewey] to Morton, 30 December 1904, GB 404, RG 80, NARA.
effort, however, flagged in the next year as Congress failed to continue such appropriations for the Philippine base project. The belief that the end of the Russo-Japanese War had eliminated any cause for conflict between the United States and any number of East Asian powers probably shaped that decision.

The final lessons learned from the Russo-Japanese War influenced both the Japanese and American Navies. For the former, the Russian dispatch of a relief force, at first threatened, and then reinforced the advantages of attritional warfare. The Second and Third Pacific Fleet deployed from Baltic waters in October 1904 and sailed toward East Asia. Delayed by logistical, and political, problems the relief force arrived in Asia well after the fall of Port Arthur. That late arrival left only one base in East Asia legally available to the incoming Russian forces. Vladivostok served as the sole maritime terminus after an exhausting 18,000 mile trek. As such, the Russian forces arrived in enemy waters seemingly incapable of supporting full scale offensive operations. In addition, Japan’s battle-hardened forces sat astride the only routes to Vladivostok. The Russian forces would have to fight their way into the only available safe haven. Such a battle and its historic outcome, discussed in an earlier chapter, highlighted the difficulties of a trans-oceanic offensive as well as the advantages of shorter lines of communications for the defending force.
Japan's decisive land and naval victories in Manchuria (March 1905) and at Tsushima (May 1905) proved a mixed blessing to American security interests. President Roosevelt had been looking for a way to interpose the United States between the two belligerents. Roosevelt sought to prevent a complete and humiliating Japanese defeat of Russia, in the hope that any remaining tension between the two states would maintain a balance of power favorable to American interests. "From the onset of the war," one historian noted that "Roosevelt contemplated taking a leading role in peacemaking," and the military situation in East Asia, coupled with the mutual physical and economic exhaustion of the belligerents, served Roosevelt's purposes.  

Approached by the Japanese anxious for a settlement shortly after the naval battle at Tsushima, Roosevelt invited the two belligerents to negotiate an end to the conflict. Convening a peace conference in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Roosevelt managed successfully to balance the competing interests of the belligerents. For Russia, Roosevelt negated any possibility of post-war reparations, and any significant loss of territory. The peace treaty obliged Russia to give up its concessions on the Liaotang Peninsula, primarily the naval base at Port Arthur. In addition, Russia surrendered

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99 Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 40.
the southern portion of Sakhalin Island, and ceded to Japan its economic interests in northern Korea, and Manchuria.

Japan received recognition of its predominant interests in Korea, and secured the withdrawal of all Russian forces from Manchuria. In return, the Japan government reversed an its demand for reparations from Russia. That action dashed the expectations of many Japanese citizens. Such reparations, the Japanese government had earlier, for domestic purposes, stated publicly would ease the burden of the overtaxed citizens of Japan. The Russian Tsar had vehemently rejected such reparations, a decision in which Roosevelt happily concurred. Roosevelt knew that Japan had used such monies in the past to strengthen its military and naval forces in preparation for future conflicts. He, and many naval officers, wished to avoid that possibility.\(^{40}\)

In any case, the parties, physically exhausted, signed the Treaty of Portsmouth and the Russo-Japanese War was officially over in September 1905. What remained for the American and Japanese navies however, was a period of readjustment to a new and troubling strategic environment in East Asia. Russia no longer effectively threatened any major power. Of the remaining potential opponents, Britain, France, and Germany, an emerging European morass engaged their full attention. Thus, only the United States and Japan

\(^{40}\) Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan*, 76-96.
remained as competing powers in Asia. Such competition, however, proved adequate enough to raise mutual suspicions and tensions.

The Emergence of an American Naval Strategic Elite

The war had not gone unnoticed by a number of junior American naval officers. Several served as observers in Manchuria and Port Arthur, while a number of others performed significant duties as intelligence and attaché officers. Nonetheless, these officers would fulfill their duties in the context of "the Concept." For example, two particular officers proved pivotal in the period from 1904 to 1907. The first, Commander Bradley A. Fiske, contributed to "contact" in an indirect manner. The second, Lieutenant Commander Frank Marble, proved equally important. Marble's duties contributed, in a direct, and indirect, manner to "contact."

Fiske, a most important naval inventor, and innovator, had not escaped notice by the Japanese. In 1899 Akiyama Saneyuki reported to his superiors in Tokyo the value of several of Fiske's inventions, including rangefinders, something of which Akiyama was knowledgeable. In addition, Fiske had published a number of books and articles related to wartime service in the Philippines, electrical

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42 Shimada, Akiyama Saneyuki, 1:351.
systems, and naval signaling while continuing to develop numerous other inventions. Fiske's early contribution to "the Concept," however, came from his essay, "American Naval Policy."

The genesis of Fiske's article came from his experiences as a member of the 1903 class at the Naval War College. Though Fiske provided little detail in later works, he did cite the influence of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, founder of the facility. Luce lectured at the college in the summer of 1903 and Fiske related that as a result he then realized the connection between policy, strategy, and tactics.

What is more important, Fiske, never one to shy away from science and technology, began to theorize on the issue of numbers and ratios in naval warfare. Fiske's work took place at a time when the issue, directly related to fleet strength, had not received widespread study. Alfred Thayer Mahan had theorized about such an issue in 1902, when he argued that a maritime power exercising local, or regional, command of the seas would not require numerical superiority over an opposing fleet. Mahan argued that "distance was a factor 'equivalent to a certain number of ships,'" therefore, 

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normal wear and tear incurred during an attacking force's trek would provide distinct advantages to the defending forces. The convention was normally a ten percent reduction per every thousand miles of distance. Mahan was not alone in such formulations, as another American naval officer had argued in 1903 that successful overseas operations required an attacking naval force twice as strong as the defender.

The 1903 War College class conjectured as to what percentage of battle fleet strength the U.S. Navy required to deter the German High Seas Fleet from undertaking offensive activities in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean waters. The class looked as well at the effect of German naval operations against the undefended Philippine Islands. Though the war college students seldom received individual credit, their contributions were important. The students argued that, "[t]o hold the Philippine surely, [the United States] must have a fleet at least one and a half times as great as that of [Germany]."

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46 Schilling, "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919," 12.
47 Sprouts, The Rise of American Naval Power, 275-277; "A fleet's power was estimated to erode by 10 percent for each thousand miles it cruised from its base," Miller, War Plan Orange, 32.
The class went even further, arguing that, "[w]ith an equal or inferior sea force, [America’s] hold on the Philippines is at best very uncertain." Consciously or unconsciously, the class members were borrowing from both America’s Mahan and Germany’s Tirpitz. Both men had understood the difficulties that lengthened lines of communication posed for an offensive force as well as the effects of divided naval forces. The formulations related to ratios dealt as well with the issue of attrition. Without attacking the problem of the Philippines directly the junior officers understood that an enterprising enemy stood "a fair chance of ultimate success by wearing out [the American naval forces]," a clear reference to a policy of attrition.

Fiske and his fellow students understood as well what concentration meant for their nation, for the Germans had concentrated their battle fleet in home waters. Unfortunately, the United States had not yet concentrated its battle fleet, spread throughout a number of stations. If the Germans, who possessed only one major naval base in East Asia, located at Tsingtao, chose to attack the Philippines, the United States would be unable to regroup and transfer its

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51 I am grateful to Holger Herwig, University of Calgary, for bringing Tirpitz’s work to my attention. Herwig posited that Mahan influenced Tirpitz’s ratio formulations. Mahan had cited a precedent from the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 1600s, a "proportion of three to two," Sea Power, 146; see Herwig, Luxury Fleet, 36-38.

52 Part II, "Solution of the Problem of 1903," 11.
battle fleet fast enough to prevent a successful offensive. The students expected such a redeployment might take four to six months. The War College class quite clearly treated Germany as the nation's primary hypothetical enemy. More importantly, the lessons Fiske drew from the student course proved much more pivotal a year and a half later.\footnote{Fiske was not alone in the application of mathematics to modern naval warfare. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916), cited Jehu V. Chase (1869-1937) for the earliest contemporary application of mathematics to naval planning, 283, though he did not know of that work until 1916; see Chase, "Sea Fights, A mathematical investigation of the effect of superiority of force," XTAV (1902), RG 8; Chase's paper is reproduced in Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute P, 1988), fn 240, 375-382. Other contemporary examples of mathematics and naval warfare include, "Broadside and End-on Presentment to Targets," XOGF (1901/1907), RG 8, NHC, and L.C. Lucas, "Armored Ships-Blue and Orange Values," JND (1909), RG 8, NHC.}

convey, though, was a very early formulation of what famed engineer and numbers theorist Frederick Lanchester would produce later in a more refined manner. Lanchester's $N^2$ law of attrition dealt with the disparity of strength possessed by opposing forces. Lanchester highlighted an important fact. In an era of modern firepower, combatants stood to lose assets not on a one to one basis, but in a square proportion. However, in 1905 Fiske had very publicly noted the effects of such attritional warfare. That included the subsequent, and incremental, damage to a numerically inferior battle fleet.

Fiske made clear that in the age of modern battle fleets, possessed of superior armor, gunnery, and training, any contender that failed to meet equally those attributes would suffer damage, and defeat, well beyond the expectations of earlier conventional wisdom. A newer conventional wisdom now asserted that a maritime power required at least a fifty percent numerical superiority over its opponent to successfully conduct offensive operations.

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Fiske was clearly describing "the cumulative effects of a superior concentration of firepower." While Lanchester produced his own force-on-force correlation formulae half a decade later, it would be eighty-one years before an American naval officer cited prominently the importance of Fiske's tables. Quite simply, Fiske argued convincingly that modern naval power then possessed an enhanced and effective synergism. A concentration of superior quantity and quality proved pivotal in combat, and the "bigger, the more stable, the better armed and armored the battleship, the better."  

Why was the publication of Fiske's article important? First, it was produced by the most intellectually capable American naval officer of the "Golden Age." Of that there is no doubt. Fiske's work reflected quite clearly the emergence of an influential intellectual and strategic elite in the U.S. Navy. The article, though, most likely influenced naval planners in other countries, specifically Sato Tetsutaro of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Sato was an important member of the Japanese Navy's strategic elite and receives treatment in the next chapter. While no documentation exists in which Sato credits Fiske, there is circumstantial evidence that such was the case. Again, as Fischer noted, "it is not always necessary in history to have a causal explanation that

59 Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 66.
60 Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 65.
includes either a general statement or deductive certainty." One can buttress that reasoning with the view that "all that is required in many cases is a demonstration that the causal relationship is possible, and that it probably happened." Evidence of such a relationship exists.

Fiske was a lifetime member of one of the world’s leading professional organizations, the United States Naval Institute, which published an internationally recognized publication, the Proceedings. Fiske was a known quantity to the Japanese Navy after Akiyama Saneyuki referred to several of his naval inventions. The membership was open to numbers of civilians and foreign officers. Among associate members, several were Japanese naval officers. These included Akiyama Saneyuki, Japan’s première planner, Saito Minoru, future Navy Minister, and Sato Tetsutaro, a first-rate strategist.

The "contact," though indirect, is most certainly something that transpired. Before the Naval Institute published its articles, board members usually conducted an

61 Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies, 172.

62 Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies, 181; Cross-fertilization and "the transmission of intellectual concepts, especially ones that are essential common sense and thus liable to frequent reinvention," is not beyond the realm of possibility, Bassford, Clausewitz in English, 53, 163.

63 Shimada, Akiyama Saneyuki, 1:351.

64 "List of Members," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 29 (June 1903), 525, 728.
oral and written round-table to critique the submissions. In at least one circumstance, one officer of the Imperial Japanese Navy presented personally his criticisms of Ensign Frank Marble's analyses of the Battle of the Yalu. Such participation did not become worrisome until 1906 when the emergence of a war scare led to the imposition of restrictions upon foreign visitors. Foreign naval officers could deduce much about American naval operations and tactics from "signalling methods, battle tactics, and gunnery training," as well as make detailed reports about the "actual condition of our personnel and the efficiency of the fleet." In any case, Japanese planners had access to the ideas of leading American strategists and theorists. In the next chapter, Sato's development of a ratio formula will reveal the unacknowledged influence of Bradley A. Fiske.

A less noted individual, but equally important, would be Lieutenant Commander Frank Marble, cited above. Marble, long experienced as an intelligence officer, served as the secretary to the General Board from February 1903 to February

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66 GB 420, 18 April 1906 and GB 420, 18 April 1906 in Entry 76, Case 8570, RG 38, NARA.

67 Marble's successor, Lieutenant Commander John A. Dougherty, wrote of the Japanese Naval Staff College, "the library contains a well-selected stock of foreign books, mostly in English and French, and subscribes to the principal foreign professional periodicals," "W" #187, 21 December 1907, in "Japanese Naval War College," JNT, 1910, RG 8, NHC.
During that period, Marble took the minutes at every meeting the General Board convened. Marble's duties exposed him to the emerging professionalism of American naval planners. Marble surely perused nearly every planning document and all official correspondence handled by the members of the General Board, and its chief, Admiral George Dewey.

Marble would have seen committee reports, intelligence surveys, and overseas attaché reports. For example, Marble would have most likely seen documents that dealt with the growing Japanese Navy and its naval bases. This was true for the months just before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. The junior officer personally drafted a letter that dealt with the possibility of hostile coalitions and their threat to American interests. Marble departed that

68 "List of Members of the General Board," RG 80, M1493, NARA.

69 Marble would have handled nearly all the paperwork and correspondence for Dewey. Details of Marble's orders can be found in The Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Navy of the United States and of the Officers of the Marine Corps (Washington: GPO, annually).

70 See Dewey to Moody, 26 February 1903, GB serial #92, RG 80, NARA, and Dewey to Moody, 15 June 1903, GB 405, RG 80, NARA. Marble drafted and signed the minutes of 7 May 1903, in which the General Board expressed growing concern with the possible Japanese threat to the Philippines, "Proceedings and Hearings of the General Board," RG 80, M 1493, NARA.

71 The dispute over Subic Bay took up a lot of the General Board's time, see Dewey to Moody, 15 June, 31 July 1903, GB 405, RG 80, NARA. As the possibility of a Russo-Japanese conflict increased, the General Board analyzed the threats to American interests, Dewey to Moody, 25 November 1903, GB 408-1, RG 80, NARA.

72 Marble to Captain Charles S. Sperry, president of the U.S. Naval War College, 28 January 1904, GB 425, RG 80, NARA.
position in February 1905 and received orders to assume the naval attaché post in Tokyo at a most critical moment. Marble arrived in Tokyo two months before the Japanese Navy's victory at Tsushima and remained there until April 1907.

During the next two years, Marble proved to be a significant conduit of information and more importantly struck up a personal relationship with the Japanese Navy's première planner, Akiyama Saneyuki. Marble's access to Japanese naval officers provided the U.S. Navy a significant window upon the naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War. That included detailed reports about Japan's decisive victory at Tsushima in May 1905. Using his contacts in the Navy Ministry, Marble assessed quickly that Akiyama was the person from whom he should seek details about the Japanese Navy. Marble translated "A Staff Officer of the Combined Fleet on the Battle of the Sea of Japan," written anonymously by Akiyama. The report bears handwritten commentary, presumably

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71 Marble relieved Commander Charles C. Marsh. Although clear evidence is lacking, Marsh had cultivated a relationship with Japan's Akiyama Saneyuki in 1897, and presumably renewed that relationship after November 1901. It is to be expected that the relieving process included Marsh's points of contact in the Japanese Navy, see Shimada, Akiyama Saneyuki, 1:92.

74 Morton to Dougherty, 1 February 1907, "Office of Naval Intelligence Correspondence," Case 7531, RG 38, NARA.

75 "W" [Marble] #54 and #16, 22 Jun 05, in "Further Accounts of the Battle of the Sea of Japan," JNOpB, #9, RG 8, NHC.

76 "W" #65, 7 July 1905, "Further Accounts of the Battle of the Sea of Japan."
Marble's, and on one page Marble calls Akiyama, "gallant," evident recognition of the Japanese officer's importance.

In any case, Marble eventually struck up a professional, if not personal, relationship with Akiyama, especially as Akiyama returned to duties at the Naval Staff College. In one report to his superiors Marble related, "[t]he other day I asked my friend Akiyama" for details about a Japanese battleship." Clearly, Marble had made "contact" with the most important of the Japanese Navy's officers. Marble's professional credentials received great enhancement by contact with other Japanese naval officers.\(^7\) That relationship strengthened over the intervening months as Akiyama seemed to provide Marble a large amount of information about the Japanese Navy and its operations in the Russo-Japanese War.

In the period between October 1906 and January 1907, though, it seems certain that the flow of information receded, for during those months, the United States and Japan neared a crisis over immigration. Talk of hostilities on both sides of the Pacific increased and created a short-lived

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\(^7\) Extract from Marble letter, 10 November 1905 in "Japanese Battleship Mikasa, various, 1905-1928," 06-490/0-12-a, RG 38, NARA.

\(^8\) Marble asked an unknown officer, "'who were reputed to be the best tacticians in the Japanese Navy,' and he replied: '...among the very young [officers] Commander Akiyama,'", extract from Marble letter, 12 April 1907, in Marble, "Memorandum concerning Japanese naval officers of the suite of Prince Fushimi," April 1907, 07-323/E-7-d, RG 38, NARA. Marble intimated much about his contact with Japanese naval officers in Marble to Captain Charles S. Sperry, 28 January 1906, Sperry Papers, LCMD.
war scare. The same months were the period during which the
Japanese Navy further utilized Akiyama's talents. The
Japanese Navy's strategic planners were then in the midst of
drafting their portion of the nation's Imperial Defense
Policy. I will discuss those developments in a following
chapter.\footnote{Marble knew that Japanese Navy was drawing upon Akiyama's talents, "W" #111, "Kaigun Gunrei (Naval General Staff)," 30 December 1906, 07-87/E-7-d, RG 38, NARA.} Eventually, but temporarily, the tensions
decreased and Marble reestablished his relationship with
Akiyama. In January 1907 Marble had been "invited" to visit
the Japanese Naval Staff College, where Akiyama held sway as
the navy's finest mind. Marble toured the facility and
observed that it contained a "well selected stock" of
English-language professional periodicals. One can surmise
that he included the United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, the leading English-language professional
journal of the period.\footnote{"W" #31, 14 March 1907, "The Naval College at Tokyo," in "Japanese Naval War College," JNT, #106, RG 8, NHC. Marble noted as well the use of French language journals, but unfortunately, provided no titles for either language. He mentioned nothing about any German publications translated in Japanese.} Marble witnessed a war game recreating one of the naval
battles of the Russo-Japanese War.\footnote{"W" # 32, 17 March 1907, "Japanese Naval Tactics," in "Japan Navy Training," JNT 1902-1934, RG 8, NHC.} Marble also received
a detailed brief on Tsushima, carried out by Akiyama.
himself. The Japanese Navy and its strategists had been collating the various ship movements during the battle. Marble had known of the document as early as September 1905 and reported, "I have seen this plan in the making two or three times within the past year." The Japanese Navy completed the battle's track chart and detailed movements in late 1906, just as the United States and Japan became embroiled in the immigration crisis.

In January 1907 Marble received full access to the documents. It is uncertain whether Akiyama had been his primary point of contact but Marble reported, "[I] have had opportunities of conversations with several Japanese officers who were present at the battle, particularly with Commander Akiyama, who served throughout the war on Admiral Togo's staff." Clear evidence, though, does exist of the extensive contact between the two officers, for Marble wrote, "[Akiyama] has come to see me several times to talk about the

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"Braithed pointed out that, "the exclusion of Japanese remained high on every list of possible causes of war with Japan that naval men prepared down to 1922," U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922, 14.

85 A copy of the chart is held by the U.S. Naval War College Archives. It is marked for limited distribution and Marble notified his superiors that it not be divulged to foreign sources.

battle, and he spent the whole afternoon with me today going over all the phases of it, step by step, with this chart." Marble's assessment continued with, "I submit that there is no better surviving witness [for] Akiyama stood throughout the whole battle beside Admiral Togo [and] he had general charge of making signals and afterwards of drawing up the reports." That Akiyama proved important to Marble's intelligence analyses gains currency from the fact that "Akiyama [had] assisted in the preparation of this chart [and] most of what follow is based upon his statements." Marble is quite clearly not the only American naval officer to have had contact with Akiyama. The existing records, however, demonstrate that Marble very directly benefitted from his relationship with the Japanese Navy's best thinker. Marble's successor in Tokyo, Lieutenant John Dougherty, maintained a more formal, if not aloof, relationship with Akiyama. Dougherty's reports indicate that the two men were not friends.

In any case, the personal and professional contact between Marble and Akiyama later proved pivotal in three

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arenas. First, as the immigration crisis between the two nations raised the possibility, if slight, of conflict, Marble's reporting provided insights into hitherto classified processes of the Japanese Navy. Second, Marble's intelligence reporting proved pivotal during the war scare of 1906. During that period, Marble analyzed the economic and resource base of Japan and concluded that Japan had neither the financial security, nor the will, to conduct offensive operations against the United States.\(^90\) It seems most probable that the Japanese Navy selected Akiyama to convey the large amount of material to Marble in order to foster better relations between both services, and both nations.\(^91\) Akiyama possessed an excellent command of English, had previously spent time with important officers, and future planners, of the U.S. Navy.\(^92\) One might assume, as well, that Akiyama knew that Marble had been Admiral George Dewey's General Board secretary. More recent observers of that period seem to attribute more to Marble's tour than

\(^{90}\) "W" #82, 11 October 1905, #89, 20 October 1905, in 05-332/O-12-a, "Jap destroyers, armored cruisers and battleships building," RG 38, NARA. At the beginning of the war scare, Marble reported on the Japanese Navy's "lack of money," "W" #73, 7 October 1906, in 06-462/O-12-a.

\(^{91}\) Braisted, U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909, 185-186, hints at such a possibility, though does not cite Akiyama.

\(^{92}\) Akiyama even wrote the Japanese Navy's handbook for writing letters and notes in English, Akiyama, Kaigun Sibun sekitoku bunrei (Tokyo: Suikosha, 1903).
officially recognized by the U.S. Navy or the American government.\footnote{See Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence, 82; Braisted, U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1902, 185-186, 194.}

Finally, and often uncredited, Marble's exposure to Akiyama helped eventually the increasing professionalism of the U.S. Navy. Marble returned to duty at the U.S. Naval War College where he delivered the first paper on a curriculum reform Akiyama had implemented at the Japanese Naval Staff College.\footnote{Marble delivered the first paper at the college in 1910, Commander Frank H. Schofield, "The Situation of the Estimate," U.S. Naval War College Lecture, June 1912, 3; Austin Knight, "The Estimate of the Situation," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (1915), pp. 1-20; Frank Schofield, "Estimate of the Situation." 1912 Lecture (Newport RI: Naval War College P, 1912) and "Formulation of Orders." 1912 Lecture (Newport RI: Naval War College P, 1912); Spector, Professors of War, 117-121; Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars, 69-73.}

I argue that Marble learned the value of the applicatory system from Akiyama and any exposure to the processes of the professional training therein. Marble reported that "copies of two papers were given to me," perhaps by Akiyama, described the courses of study at the college.\footnote{"W" #31, 14 March 1907, "The Naval College at Tokyo."} Marble reported that "the originals were in English."\footnote{"W" #31, 14 March 1907, "The Naval College at Tokyo."}

It is quite possible that Akiyama had translated them himself. In any case, Akiyama was the senior strategist at the facility and most certainly exchanged ideas and information with Marble. Marble returned to the United
States in the spring of 1907. At the same moment, the threat of conflict between the United States and Japan loomed again. Naval officers were not responsible for the rise of tensions between the two nations. Rather, such points of stress emanated from varied and conflicting interests in each nation. The possibility of conflict, however, led naval planners, both in the United States and Japan, seemingly energized planning operations. These officers drew upon a full gamut of resources, including any advantage gleaned through contact. Thus, naval planners employed all of their professional and intellectual skills, a process which rapidly accelerated in Theodore Roosevelt’s second and final term, and beyond. That process is the subject of the following chapters.
CHAPTER VII
THE JAPANESE NAVY: FROM TSUSHIMA TO CRISIS, 1905-1907

Introduction

"Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."^1
—Sun Tzu, General, ca., 500 B.C.

"The inferior navy cannot base its actions on enemy capabilities, but must be risk prone and willing to act on an estimate of enemy intentions."^2
—Wayne Hughes, Captain, U.S. Navy, ret.

Twenty years ago noted naval historian Clark G. Reynolds classified the decades prior to 1914 as "The Golden Age of Naval Thought."^3 His phrase captured the period only partially, for a lack of sources or translations, and the scarcity of linguists limited the members of that "Golden Age" to renowned western theorists.^4 British historian Ian Nish maintained furthermore that the Imperial Japanese Navy

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^1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 84.

^2 Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 228.


lacked intellectual depth and suffered from a "dearth of creative leadership" in the years before 1919.\(^5\) One noted Western academic went so far as to assert that, "Although from 1905 to 19[22] Japan was a major naval power, no Japanese writer ever formulated a significant theory on the nature and employment of seapower."\(^6\) That assertion remained unchallenged in the decades after 1945. A few modern scholars, though, have examined a number of Japanese naval officers and reached much different conclusions. Their examinations revealed a great intellectual depth within the Japanese Navy. Even more relevant, the rising antagonism between the U.S. Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy came to a sharp focus in the period between the Russo-Japanese War and the onset of the First World War. The most definite assessment of that assertion deals directly with the years immediately following the Russo-Japanese War, specifically, 1906-1908, or the tail end of the Theodore Roosevelt presidency. Therein, the issue of contact and "mixed-motives" most certainly played a role.

After 1905, the Japanese Navy sought to ensure the empire’s security. No longer content with simply aping the


\(^6\) Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 128. Huntington went further to denigrate the intellectual capabilities of the Japanese naval officer corps, "Virtually their only writing upon [naval warfare] was sensationalist or highly elementary," ibid. Huntington, and other critics, may have based such assertions upon the paucity of English translations of Japanese-language materials.
success of the major maritime powers, highly professional planners created a modern program for Japan's maritime defense. In that case, the most frequently mentioned individuals remain Akiyama Saneyuki and Sato Tetsutarō of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Two of the most influential naval officers in Japanese history, Akiyama and Sato contributed to several of the Japanese Navy's long-range programs. One Japanese naval historian noted that, "The period before and after the Russo-Japanese War marked an important turning point as Akiyama and Sato [laid] the foundation of naval strategy" for the Japanese Navy.  

While a few Japanese scholars have recognized the duo's relevance to the history of the Japanese Navy the pair has, for the most part, long escaped scrutiny by Western historians, not only in Europe but in America, as well. Consequently, there exists only one English-language study each of Akiyama and Sato. One supposes, however, that we might learn much from a pair who experienced earlier what the United States weathered during later crises. Specifically, that was a detailed process by which the respective

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8 Sato, like Akiyama earlier, received professional recognition from his American counterparts. Sato was "sometimes called the Japanese 'Mahan'," and after the death of Akiyama, was recognized as the best strategist in the Japanese Navy, JNP 1919/118, "Japanese Naval Personnel," RG 8, NHC.

9 Peattie, "Akiyama Saneyuki."; Peattie and Evans, "Sato Tetsutarō."
governments and military organizations identified threats, decided funding priorities, acquired modern weapons systems, and mediated endless inter-service rivalries. We might see, as well, how the two Japanese naval officers contributed, unconsciously, to the growing hostilities between the American and Japanese navies.

In a recent newspaper article Japanese citizens named the United States as the major threat to world peace. This seemed a reaction, perhaps, to America's real and potential military might, and its frequent bullying, real or otherwise. Although the headline was from a more contemporary account, that sentiment prevailed in the years before World War I. The friction, then, stemmed in part from Japan's defeat of Russia—primarily the economic struggle over the "Open Door" policy and China's political and economic autonomy. The Treaty of Portsmouth (September 1905) cemented Japan's victory over Russia, changing the balance of power in East Asia and increasing international tensions.

The East-West confrontation exploded in 1906 and continued throughout 1907. As the tensions escalated on both sides of the Pacific Ocean, English- and Japanese-language newspapers of the period revealed that many citizens thought

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war was highly possible. While the effect of such "yellow" journalism proved overrated, both the American and Japanese Navies recognized the growing tension. Strategists on both sides of the Pacific prepared plans in advance of actual hostilities. As noted many times earlier, the U.S. Navy produced its contingency blueprint, "War Plan Orange," in a unilateral environment. Concurrently, the Japanese Navy developed its own in conjunction with the government and the Imperial Japanese Army. It is to that process—how the Japanese Navy formulated its long-range defense scheme—that an examination of Akiyama Saneyuki and Sato Tetsutaro, proves very worthwhile.

Of the two officers, Sato rose to distinction first. His examination of Japan’s naval past, at a time when Mahan was himself garnering international fame, drew close attention from his superiors. The junior officer’s analytical prowess marked him as a member of a growing strategic elite in the Japanese Navy. Akiyama earned his standing early with several vital deployments to Europe and

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12 See Miller, War Plan Orange. The United States failed to create a unified "War Plan Orange" until 1924 and even then it never received official approval from the president. 124; William R. Braisted, "The Evolution of the United States Navy’s Strategic Assessments in the Pacific, 1919-1931," Diplomacy and Statecraft: Special Issue, 111. Unlike the United States, the Japanese produced a corporate defense policy sanctioned by the emperor in April 1907, Oyama, "Yamagata Aritomo ikensho," 183-195; idem, "Yamagata Aritomo teikoku kokubo hoshin an," 170-177; Tsunoda, Manshu mondai, passim.

a "secret" intelligence mission in East Asia and then finally with his most pivotal planning during the Russo-Japanese War. More than any other Japanese naval officers in the period before 1914, these two were intellectual "hard-chargers," ignored by subsequent scholars, and became later the heart of a deeply professional cadre. A modern historian referred to the Japanese Navy's strategic elite and noted, "From this group came the senior strategists [primarily Akiyama and Sato] at the Imperial Japanese [Staff] College. Collectively these men represented the 'brains' of the IJN over the next three decades." They ensured, as well, the continued development of "the Concept."  

The Japanese Navy and Imperial Defense, 1906-1907

As noted earlier, the Treaty of Portsmouth (September 1905) cemented Japan's victory over Russia, changing the balance of power in East Asia and increasing international tensions. That new balance of power led the Japanese government to review its defense posture. In early 1906, fearing that Russia might seek revenge, the government decided to coordinate national policy and imperial defense

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14 Dingman, "Japan and Mahan," 58.

15 Academics were not the only group to ignore the increased professionalism of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Noted naval historian William R. Braisted noted that traditionally Japanese naval officers accorded greater weight to Western innovations and procedures than their Western counterparts gave to similar Japanese activities, "I believe that American naval men did not credit the Japanese with original thought," Braisted to Rivera, 30 August 1993.
with its armed services. One historian pointed out that, "An irony of history is that after the [Russo-Japanese War], both Japan and Russia developed friendly understanding regarding Manchuria in 1907. In fact, Russia’s defeat opened a new chapter [of] improvement in her relations with Japan." An early army draft of the Teikoku kokubo hoshin (Imperial Defense Policy) designated a single hypothetical enemy, identified other significant threats, and established the nation’s force structure. In a process that quite clearly proved advantageous to the Japanese Army, its planners selected Russia as the nation’s primary hypothetical enemy. That meant Japan would target its scarce resources toward a continental policy.

Following the destruction of Russia’s naval power in East Asia, army officials quickly concluded that Japan faced no significant maritime threats. With such a threat seemingly reduced, Japanese army elites argued for a significant increase in appropriations over the succeeding

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17 Tsunoda, Manshu mondai, 630ff.

fiscal years, primarily for additional army divisions. The Imperial Army deemed necessary the additional divisions for future hostilities in the event Russia sought to exact revenge for its humiliating loss. Due to the costs, however, of financing the Russo-Japanese War, such an army expansion program threatened a corresponding reduction in naval expenditures. The navy, of course, saw things much differently.

The Japanese Navy, not unlike other military organizations, initiated a search for a new mission after its victories in the Russo-Japanese War. Naval officials maintained that the navy served as Japan's first line of defense. Japanese naval planners sought, therefore, to protect not only their appropriations but the navy's position in the nation's defense structure. As such, many navy officers deemed it probable that Japan would clash not with Russia but with one or more western powers (most probably the United States) over the exercise of political and economic

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control in East Asia. Flash points stemmed from the rise of anti-Japanese fervor in the West and the threat to China's political and economic autonomy. Through the device of the "Open Door" policy the Western powers sought to guard their Chinese investments, investments menaced by Japanese ambitions. Only Western naval power could assure a balance of interests. Such naval power threatened Japan's security.

As the post-1905 international environment began to demonstrate the heavy burden of new responsibilities, the Navy Ministry fortuitously ordered Akiyama and Sato back to duty at the Naval Staff College. With peace secured and a concurrent desire by the government to cut back on huge military expenditures, in December 1905 the Naval Ministry reorganized the fleet and placed most of the fleet into a reserve status. Henceforth, the Japanese Navy could utilize both Akiyama and Sato more effectively elsewhere. There the two officers stepped into the middle of an emerging bureaucratic debate. That debate dealt with the changed balance of power. The nature of the Japanese threat in the minds of many Americans changed after 1905. Continued

22 Howarth, Morning Glory, 108.


economic threats to the American stake in the "Open Door," an immigration crisis in California (October 1906), and a related war scare heightened fears in the United States of Japanese aggression. Spurred on by the war scare, U.S. Navy planners designed a trans-Pacific campaign for war with Japan. American naval planners expected that a westward-bound battle fleet would destroy Japan's naval power in one decisive battle. A decision would lead, then, to the imposition of a strangling blockade. Such a blockade would menace Japan with the landing of hostile forces. The Japanese Navy envisaged such an assault upon the Japanese islands as the final stage of a victorious campaign.25

As a result of the lessons learned from the Russo-Japanese War, as well as Akiyama's experience in the United States, the Japanese Navy anticipated the possibility of such a strategy. At a minimum, Japanese naval planners sought to parry an American thrust by a strategy of attrition and in the last stages of a naval campaign, secure victory in a decisive engagement. Both Akiyama and Sato recognized that Japan had stretched its maritime assets to the limit during the Russo-Japanese War. It could not escape the minds of strategists that the Russian failure to mobilize fully

25 The Japanese Navy understood that an increased Japanese presence on the continent would not protect the nation from a maritime power.
created a false sense of security. An illusion of quick victory and quick settlement became ingrained among many Japanese naval officers. They envisioned that in any future conflict Japan would force its opponent to the peace table quickly and secure a favorable termination to hostilities. Therefore, Akiyama, among others, concluded that a defensive posture was in order for future hostilities. The Japanese Navy thus adopted quite early in the twentieth century, a "strategy of the offensive-defensive," or lying in wait.

As a consequence, in late 1906 the Japanese Navy began to practice intercepting a hostile fleet at sea. By late 1907 the Japanese Navy firmly established that strategy. Although the Imperial Defense Policy was a secret document, available material confirmed facets of the Japanese Navy’s strategy.

Sato, joined by Akiyama, recognized that Japan could not reasonably sustain a costly and drawn out campaign of attrition. First, though, the two officers had to help fend

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26 Okazaki, A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense, 54-56. The possibility of resource exhaustion contributed to the Japanese decision to negotiate peace terms with the Russians at Portsmouth.


off the Japanese army's effort to limit naval appropriations. This was a result of the army's early draft of the Imperial Defense Policy, which relegated the navy to a secondary position and sought to designate Russia as the sole hypothetical enemy. The Japanese Navy's success in that endeavor itself furthered "the Concept."

Planning for the Hypothetical Enemy, 1906-1907

Unsatisfied with competing proposals, the Emperor ordered the government and both services to "draft a basic national defense policy and an estimate of the forces necessary for its fulfillment." Spurred on by the army's challenge, as well as by the threat of a naval arms race after Britain launched the all big-gun, high-speed battleship H.M.S. Dreadnought, Navy Minister Saito Minoru, Yamamoto Gombei's successor in January 1906, countered the army effort by turning to his senior officers for recommendations. Though he was then retired, Yamamoto still wielded great influence with the Captain Sakamoto Toshiatsu, president of the Naval Staff College and, Admiral Togo Heihachiro, Chief of the Naval General Staff. The navy's leadership, in turn,
drew upon the work of Akiyama and Sato, among other professionals, for their response to the army draft.29

Tanaka Giichi, future prime minister, had drafted the initial army proposal in August 1906. The army's initial efforts proved quite detailed and posed a major threat to the navy's prestige. The army draft, dated 31 August 1906, envisioned a minor role for the Japanese Navy. Expecting a hostile combination of powers that might include the United States, the army advanced the notion that the Japanese Navy would blockade the Philippines north of the Bashi (Luzon) Straits thereby precluding a threat to Taiwan or the Japanese home islands. The Japanese military would then occupy Manila as a bargaining tool.10 Yamagata Aritomo, founder of the Imperial Army and former prime minister, presented a revised version of the draft policy to Emperor Meiji on 16 October 1906. One might understand the navy's shock to discover that it held a minor role in the army draft. Yamagata had deleted even the proposed operations off the northern Philippines.31


31 Hackett, *Yamagata Aritomo*, 234-235. Yamagata called for joint cooperation between the two services, but the Japanese Army would be considered the senior service.
If the army draft of the defense policy remained uncontested, the Japanese Navy stood to suffer from frozen or reduced appropriations, as well as a reduced prestige. Reacting negatively to the army proposal, Navy Minister Saito, Captain Sakamoto, and Admiral Togo Heihachiro immediately sprang into action, mobilizing the intellectual resources available to them at the Naval General Staff and Naval Staff College.\textsuperscript{32} This was crucial as the war scare was then heating up between the United States and Japan.\textsuperscript{33} The initial army proposal, however, sought to secure the army's superior position in a continental policy rather than tied to the immigration crisis in California. The navy, though, pursued a maritime policy. By 20 December 1906, Togo submitted a counter proposal based upon the recommendations from subordinate advisors. The navy drafted its proposals on the basis of what the United States might do in the event of hostilities.

\textsuperscript{32} Tsunoda, "Nihon kaigun sandai no rekishi," \textit{Jivu} 11 (April 1969), 98. The U.S. Navy knew that Japanese Navy was drawing upon Akiyama's talents, "\textsc{W}" #111, "Kaigun Gunreibu [Naval General Staff]," 30 December 1906, 07-87/E-7-d, RG 38, NARA.

\textsuperscript{33} One Japanese newspaper, the \textit{Tokyo Mainichi}, "called for the dispatch of the Japanese Fleet," to dissuade the United States from any offensive action against Japan should any crisis threaten, Michael Montgomery, \textit{Imperialist Japan: The Yen to Dominate} (London: Christopher Helm, 1987), 204. The U.S. Navy kept tabs on the status of the Japanese Navy. The American naval attache in Tokyo reported that due to financial considerations, the Japanese battleships were in a reserve status, extracts of 06-417/0-12-a, "Ships-Japan Miscellaneous Notes," RG 38, NARA.
For the formulation of the navy’s response, planning officers drew, in part, upon the early work of Sato.\(^4\) The navy already possessed the intellectual arguments for such planning. Sato had argued as early as 1893 that the empire’s defense depended upon the Japanese Navy and not the Imperial Army.\(^5\) Furthermore, Sato had argued that the nation should avoid a primary continental commitment and focus instead upon securing an alliance with China. One Japanese scholar noted that Sato’s volume appeared at a time when the Japanese sought to pick between a policy of greater "Japanism," directed northward and advantageous to the army or, little "Japanism," directed southward and favorable to the navy.\(^6\) Sato felt that the best defense for Japan was one that deterred a foe from threatening the nation’s coast, a process that drew heavily upon the naval history of the British Empire.\(^7\) In 1902 Sato had not designated the United States

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\(^4\) Sato, *Kokubo shisetsu;* idem, *Teikoku kokubo ron* (Tokyo: Suikosha, 1902). Near the end of his second tour (April 1907) at the Naval Staff College, Sato collated his lectures and integrated them into an expanded version of his 1902 volume, *Teikoku kokubo shi ron* 2 vols., 1908 (Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1979). Sato completed *Teikoku kokubo shi ron* in April 1908 at which time the manuscript went to the publisher.


\(^7\) "The true defence was never to let the foe land," Sato, *Teikoku kokubo shi ron,* 1:205. "The enemy must be kept away from our coasts", Mahan, *Sea Power,* 87. Sato was in Britain when the German government enacted a large expansion of their navy, utilizing Alfred Tirpitz’s "risk theory," a defensive or deterrent strategy for dealing with the numerically superior Royal Navy, see Rock, "Risk Theory Reconsidered," 342-364.
as the hypothetical maritime enemy, rather, he suggested that the Japanese Navy "provide adequately for national defense." Just as Mahan had pointed out that the term "adequate" required precise definition, Sato argued that such a definition posed a "difficult problem" but that Japan still required a standard upon which to base the Japanese Navy's expansion and defensive force structure.

In 1902, Sato, and other strategists, pointed to Russia as "the one [nation] we must select as the hypothetical enemy. Its navy should be used to determine the size of the Japanese [N]avy." Sato continued his line of reasoning with "the standard is a minimum standard. The standard, and the nation's requirements, will change with the time; the important thing is to have a standard, flexible though it might be."

The Japanese Navy, under the leadership of Admiral Yamamoto, had delineated such a standard in 1896. The Japanese Navy decided then that it required a capital ship fleet capable of deterring, if not actually defeating, any hostile maritime combination. In 1896, the Japanese Navy thought such a combination would comprise Russia and France.

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38 Sato, Teikoku kokubo ron, 266, David C. Evans translation.
39 Sato, Teikoku kokubo ron, 271.
40 Sato, Teikoku kokubo ron, 274, 286.
41 "Deterrence involves setting the stage—by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation—and waiting," Schelling, Arms and Influence, 71-72.
In subsequent years, Japan's maritime standard consisted of six battleships and six armored cruisers. By the onset of hostilities with Russia, the Japanese Navy possessed the requisite number of battleships and eight armored cruisers. Though victorious in the conflict, the Japanese Navy lost two battleships to mines during the blockade of Port Arthur leaving Japan at the mercy of the numerically superior Russian fleet, divided as it was. Sato's analyses and Akiyama's prewar deliberations, and post-mortem of the navy's operations, convinced planners eventually that future operations would require a larger number of capital ships. This was particularly true in the face of increased global navalism as demonstrated by the *Dreadnought*. The lessons learned from the naval engagements of the Yellow Sea and Tsushima led the planning officers to reconsider the question of a naval standard.

By 1906, just as Sato had predicted, Japan's defense requirements had changed. As a result of victory in 1905, Japan had acquired new territories and responsibilities. Japan also faced a number of international competitors for the perceived wealth in Manchuria, China, and Korea. As a consequence naval planners began to see the U.S. Navy as a future hypothetical enemy and as a benchmark for planning a new standard.

Following Saito's mandate, the planning officers recommended that Japan acquire a battle fleet tonnage equal
to seventy percent of that held by any hypothetical enemy. Sato, trained in Imperial Defense and maritime strategy, worked with Akiyama on expansion programs between 1905 and 1908. Sato had envisaged as early as 1905 that the United States posed a potential for massive fleet expansion and enunciated the need to maintain a fleet at seventy percent of the U.S. Navy.  

Therein, lay the seeds for the controversial naval expansion program known as the "Eight-Eight" fleet, that was eight modern battleships and eight armored cruisers. Deliberating between February 1906 and April 1907, the planners deemed the seventy percent ratio as the minimum required for defensive purposes. The U.S. Navy would seek to achieve at least a two to one ratio of numerical superiority in order to conduct offensive operations in the Western Pacific. The Japanese Navy recognized the debilitating effects of a trans-oceanic crossing.

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43 A calculation approximating the seventy percent figure was enunciated by Germany’s Alfred von Tirpitz in June 1894, who called for a "% [numerical] superiority" over opposing forces to conduct successfully offensive fleet operations, see Herwig, Luxury Fleet, 36-38; Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 75-78. I am grateful to Professor Herwig, University of Calgary, for bringing the Tirpitz figure to my notice and posited that Tirpitz came up with the % figure from Mahan, who cited a precedent from the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 1600s, a "proportion of three to two," Sea Power, 146. Sato rounded up % of 100%, and 66.6% became seventy percent. Schelling noted that the 3:2 ratio was also a factor in an Anglo-French naval race which ended in the 1860s when "England demonstrated the will and the capacity to maintain" its numerical superiority, Arms and Influence, 277.
They recognized, equally, that the U.S. Navy could not detail its entire capital ship inventory at once, nor could the U.S. Navy leave its vital sea lanes of communication subject to attack. The unfinished Panama Canal shaped that decision making process. The Japanese planners recognized that upon its opening, the canal would permit a rapid transfer of naval assets by the United States. Then, the Japanese expected the hypothetical enemy fleet would arrive in local waters at close to numerical parity.

Thus, the seventy percent ratio proved an attractive innovation. That ratio, simplified as 7:10, was recognition that the U.S. Navy's vaunted battle fleet possessed some points of vulnerability. The Japanese Navy's designated hypothetical enemy, would, like the Russian Navy in 1905, reach the Western Pacific after an exhaustive trek over extensive sea lanes of communication. In addition, if the U.S. Navy had no access to any shipyard or repair facilities in East Asia, the enemy fleet would continue to suffer the ill-effects of a lengthy trans-oceanic voyage. Hence, the Japanese Navy's interest in what the United States chose to do with Subic Bay. The naval facility in Hawaii, Pearl Harbor, would not receive major funding until 1909, and would not be completed until after World War I.

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* Rengo kantai, 1:133-134.
The question of an American naval base in the Philippines drew Sato’s attention. Such a facility, like the Russian base at Port Arthur, threatened Japan’s freedom of action in East Asia. Therefore, Sato, like Akiyama earlier, suggested that the Japanese Navy carry out a pre-emptive strike upon any enemy fleet stationed in the Philippines. I differ slightly from one interpretation as to the issue of an American naval base. Sato most certainly had Subic Bay in mind when he referred to pre-emptive strikes, as opposed to any transoceanic trek. The Japanese Navy knew as early as 1900 that the U.S. Navy wanted to build a major facility at Subic.45 If the base and attendant naval facilities were neutralized or proved incapable of supporting the American fleet, the odds for victory shifted in Japan’s favor. The Japanese Navy, then, would not require numerical parity with its designated hypothetical enemy.

It was clearly Sato’s work that produced the ratio calculations for Japan’s national defense policy and set the foundation for long-range strategic planning. The development of the seventy percent ratio was an effort to

maintain some sort of deterrent vis-à-vis the U.S. Navy. It was not a unique effort. Although slighted by subsequent scholars, Sato had joined a growing cast of international planners applying calculations and mathematics to naval warfare. A recent Japanese scholar criticized Sato's ratio as "based upon an arbitrary conclusion," but Akiyama and Sato were sure the navy would never achieve parity with the U.S. Navy. To reinforce that imagery, one need only examine Japan's naval resources. Figure 6 displays the modern capital ships available to the Japanese Navy before 1916. After 1916, the question of parity seemed most problematic. Nonetheless, Japanese naval planners continued to prepare for any contingency.

Sato's ratio originated well before Frederick Lanchester's famed force on force ratio formulae cited prominently after World War I. There is some evidence that the Japanese Navy was working on such a ratio before the adoption of a corporate national defense policy. Akiyama and Sato probably prepared the framework of the navy's annual

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46 Kudo Michiro Nihon kaigun to taiheiyo sensō (Tokyo: Nansosha, 1982), 1:110; Peattie and Evans also rejected Sato's figure because it was based on tonnage, as opposed to fire power, but in the Dreadnought era the Japanese navy required high-speed, big-gun battleships, "Sato Tetsutaro", 37; Fiske, "American Naval Policy."; Fiske was influenced by the 1903 Naval War College class problem, Maurer, "American Naval Concentration and the German Battle Fleet, 1900-1918."; See Chase, "Sea Fights, A mathematical investigation of the effect of superiority of force," XTAV (1902), RG 8; "Problems and Solutions," 1903, RG 12, NHC. Other examples of mathematics and naval warfare include, "Broadside and End-on Presentment to Targets," XOGF (1901), RG 8, NHC, and L.C. Lucas, "Armored Ships-Blue and Orange Values," JND (1909), RG 8, NHC. See Lanchester, "Mathematics in Warfare."
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<td>Tsukuba</td>
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**FIGURE 6**
IJN CAPITAL SHIPS, 1905-1916
BY DATE OF COMMISSION AND CLASS
exercises in 1906. As in most other organizations, the Japanese preparations emerged from careful and thoughtful work. Commander Frank Marble, a "good friend" of Akiyama, provided his superiors with the earliest evidence of the Japanese Navy's experimentation with ratios. He reported upon the early implementation efforts by the Japanese Navy. The December 1906 Japanese fleet exercises demonstrated some evidence of ratios for the offensive and defensive forces. The Japanese Navy had tried to recreate the conditions at Tsushima in reverse by intercepting a numerically superior imaginary enemy fleet. The attacking force possessed six "capital ships" to the defender's eleven, a ratio of .55:1. One might note that the exercises were conducted at the same time that the navy challenged the army's defense policy draft.47

Sato's ratio work drew, perhaps, upon the published work of the American naval officer and exceptional innovator, Bradley A. Fiske.48 In any case, criticism of Sato's work seems unwarranted. That assertion is easy to make based upon the widespread adaptation of mathematics and numbers to naval

47 See The Japan Times, 1 November 1906; The exercises ran from 8 November to 18 November 1906, "W" [Marble] #97, 8 December 1906, 07-5/F-9-c, "Japanese Naval Maneuvers 1906," RG 38, NARA.

48 Fiske had produced tables demonstrating the effect of attrition between forces of correspondingly different quantities. As such, his published work pre-dated by nearly a decade Lanchester's N' law of attrition. "A ratio may be defined on the basis of some theoretical consideration thought to measure defensive needs," Wright, A Study of War, 147.
warfare. Wayne Hughes, an eminent naval analyst and retired naval officer, noted a number of such planners in the French, Russian, Italian, and American navies.\(^4^9\) The pivotal question of firepower versus tonnage for any ratio requires some clarification. Hughes pointed out that as vessels acquired larger caliber guns, the carrying platform required greater amounts of armor, machinery, and stabilizing gear.\(^5^0\) While Sato has drawn criticism for his emphasis on the "Eight-Eight" fleet program as a minimum standard, one must bear in mind that he and subsequent planners were not asking for small capital ships, rather they sought modern capital ships, which by their nature were large, high-speed, single large caliber combat vessels.

Akiyama and Sato did not anticipate any real hostilities between the two countries. Rather, the officers used the U.S. Navy as a budgetary benchmark. The U.S. Navy "stood for a budgetary enemy—the United States served as the target for the navy's building plans and was utilized as such in contests with the army over budgetary appropriations."\(^5^1\) Sato and Akiyama, like Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku later, were not unaware of the potential possessed by the navy's

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\(^{4^9}\) Hughes noted France's Ambroise Baudry, Russia's M. Osipov, and Italy's Romeo Bernotti, *Fleet Tactics*, 56.

\(^{5^0}\) "The battleship with the big gun was the decisive weapon. The bigger, the more stable, the better armed and armored, the better," Hughes, *Fleet Tactics*, 65.

designated hypothetical enemy. Similarly, the men had no clear view of victory over the U.S. Navy. With the seventy percent ratio Akiyama stressed that the odds were no better than fifty-fifty, while Sato argued for a better than fifty-fifty chance of victory. Sato and Akiyama receive credited in numerous sources as key actors at the Staff College. I have concluded the ratio was Sato’s, while Akiyama, using his Tsushima experience, fine-tuned the "interception and attrition" plan.

One reason that individual credit is rare stems from the nature of the navy’s decision making process, based upon reaching consensus. Since the United States posed potentially the largest fleet expansion, for budgetary purposes the Japanese Navy designated the United States as its number one hypothetical enemy. The navy calculated its justification for appropriations and continued expansion upon America’s industrial capacity and existing assets. The designation of the United States ensured also that the Japanese Navy would continue to receive what it considered its fair share of government appropriations. Although the

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53 Renko kantai, 1:115; Sato expressed concern about "abnormal expansion" of the U.S. Navy and its potential use in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, Teikoku kokubo shi ron, 1:27.
planners were preparing for the possibility of conflict, Sato, Akiyama, and Saito expected no hostilities between the United States and Japan. Rather, the officers used the U.S. Navy as a yardstick for appropriations and planning. They deemed eventually that seventy percent was the minimum required for defensive purposes. Later planners simplified the ratio as 7:10.

To maintain the fleet at a 7:10 ratio vis-à-vis the U.S. Navy proved another challenge. Akiyama and Sato concluded the Japanese Navy would require sixteen capital ships, as opposed to the twenty-four in existence, or under construction, for the American Navy. There can be no question that the potential and real naval strength of the U.S. Navy emerged as a significant factor in international relations and weighed heavily in Japanese calculations—"Between February 1906 and July 1907 ten [new] battleships joined the fleet." Japanese planners addressed the issue of American strength from fall 1906 to spring 1907, after Theodore Roosevelt "estimated the effective naval strength at [twenty-three] battleships and [ten] armored cruisers."55

This, then, was the genesis of the famous "Eight-Eight" plan, which called for the construction of two fleets of


56 Reckner, Great White Fleet, 13-14; Sprouts, Rise of American Naval Power, 300.
eight capital ships each (battleships and armored cruisers). Developed originally as a blueprint for expansion, the seventy percent ratio and the "Eight-Eight" plan, (and after 1916, the "Eight-Eight-Eight" plan,57 resulting from the American August 1916 Naval Bill which threatened to create a significantly larger gap between the two navies) became an "unquestioned article of faith" among the officer corps of the Japanese Navy between 1907 and 1922. The Great White Fleet cruise certainly reinforced the Japanese Navy's imagery of the hypothetical maritime enemy, for the U.S. Navy dispatched sixteen battleships to Pacific waters, and mobilized a force of eight armored cruisers in the eastern Pacific just months after the Japanese Navy had codified its force requirements.58 This was the source also of much of the rancor between the Japanese and American navies after 1915. The Japanese Navy deemed its building program imperative, while the American Navy felt the need to continue an undeclared naval race to maintain its qualitative superiority over its trans-Pacific rival.

By late December 1906, following the creation of a joint army-navy board, the navy planners had a substantial body of

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57 In June 1918 the Japanese navy sought an "Eight-Eight-Eight" fleet program after surveying the American enactment of the August 1916 Naval Bill, which envisioned thirty-five (twenty-nine battleships and six battle cruisers) capital ships. The Japanese calculated they needed twenty-four vessels to maintain the seventy percent ratio relative to the U.S. Navy, Nomura, *Rekishi no naka no kaigun* (Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1980), 28-38.

research and studies to support their position. By February 1907 the joint board produced a basic plan, the Teikoku kokubo hoshin, ready for presentation to the Emperor. The plan, much more detailed than the discussion here allows, authorized the army's eventual growth up to fifty divisions and, designated Russia as the army's number one hypothetical enemy. The navy's portion authorized the procurement of the "Eight-Eight" fleet program and designated the United States as the navy's primary hypothetical enemy. Though seemingly flawed by the divided defense priorities, the plan received the Emperor's seal of approval in April 1907.\(^{59}\)

From 1907 to 1919, the Japanese proved unable to fund fully the fleet program. It would not be until 1920 that the Japanese Diet allocated sufficient appropriations to begin the "Eight-Eight" and subsequently, the "Eight-Eight-Eight" programs.\(^{60}\) Those programs threatened to accelerate a global arms race and increased the risks of conflict in the

\(^{59}\) Ren'go kantai provides the best treatment of the joint army-navy process as well as the final document, giving the navy's perspective more light than found in English language documents, 1:112-122. It is quite important to note that the defense policy did not reconcile the interests of either the army or navy, and led to the designation of two hypothetical enemies. The secret defense policy, which guided Japan's national security machinery until 1941, had been considered lost. In the mid-1950's a copy of the final draft was located among the papers of Yamagata Aritomo, Oyama, "Yamagata Aritomo ikensho." At the moment the Emperor sanctioned the defense policy in April 1907, the U.S. Navy had at its disposal seventeen modern battleships and six armored cruisers, that is those vessels built after the Spanish-American War.

\(^{60}\) For efforts to fund the Japanese program, see Dingman, Power in the Pacific, chapter eight; Asada, "The Revolt against the Washington Treaty", 82-97.
More pragmatic leaders in the leading maritime powers envisioned the need to stop such a threat, especially as neither Britain nor Japan expected to be able to secure the tremendous financial and matériel resources available for American naval expansion. Therefore, the leaders convened the first disarmament conference of the twentieth century. The 1921-1922 Washington Conference Disarmament Treaties forced the Japanese to accept a 6:10 ratio in capital ship tonnage, and a concurrent halt to the "Eight-Eight-Eight" program. Nationalists in the Japanese Navy deemed the inferior ratio insufficient for defensive operations and were aghast at the termination of the vaunted fleet expansion program. They perceived the restrictions as an insult to Japan's national honor. Nonetheless, in the intervening years, naval power remained the most recognizable symbol of national greatness. Such greatness would be tested shortly.

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61 In fact, a proposed 1918 expansion program by the United States threatened to overwhelm the Japanese, presenting the specter of an American force of thirty-nine battleships and twelve battle cruisers, Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922, 305-309.


63 Asada, "The Revolt against the Washington Treaty," 87.
CHAPTER VIII

THE AMERICAN NAVY: FROM CRISIS TO GLOBAL WAR, 1906-1914

Planning for the Hypothetical Enemy

[The Philippines] have now become prime factors in any problems of attack upon us in the Pacific, and we must recognize them as such in any scheme of defense.¹
—Lieutenant John M. Ellicott
U.S. Naval War College, April 1900

[W]e cannot prevent the Jap[anese] from taking the Philippines.²
—Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske
Aide for Operations, November 1914

The critical months between September 1906 and January 1907 proved prophetic and would influence the following forty years of naval planning. Both the American and Japanese navies would, in unconscious synchronism, begin to prepare for combat with each other. The discussion herein will deal primarily with the U.S. Navy’s efforts to prepare for war, while the next chapter will deal with the Japanese Navy’s planning.

The staff of the U.S. Naval War College could not have guessed in the Spring of 1906 that its forthcoming student

¹ Ellicott, "Strategic Features of the Philippine Islands, Hawaii, and Guam," XSTP, 1900, RG 8, NHC.
² Fiske journal entry, 30 November 1914, cited in Vlahos, Blue Sword, 119.
class would make a significant contribution to the nation’s war planning efforts. The normal practice at the war college entailed the development by the staff of a problem for the incoming class to solve. One description of that professional practice noted that, "The annual war problem was designed to create a concrete situation for the students so they would have a common practical basis on which to concentrate." After the class completed its annual problem and solution, usually by the end of August, the staff at the War College would themselves analyze the solutions and draw strategic, tactical, planning, and logistical lessons for use by the Naval War College, the General Board, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. In 1906 the student class task was to prepare an American naval response to threatened hostilities with Japan. A modern historian wrote, "the emergence of Japan as the predominant naval power in East Asia" after 1905 sparked such a concern. Quite clearly, the

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1 Hattendorf, et al., Sailors and Scholars, 40. That description is, of course, representative of doctrinal thought.

4 "[D]uring the winter the college staff completed the students’ work," Coletta, Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, 48.

5 Spector, Professors of War, 105.
student solutions proved to be the genesis of "War Plan Orange.\textsuperscript{6}"

The dramatic shift in the balance of power in East Asia, brought about by Japan's decisive victory, and its elimination of Russia as a rival, led to the problem's conception. Preparing the future leaders of the U.S. Navy, the War College developed such a problem in the months before the annual class began in June. Considering the international climate of 1906, it would be natural for the War College faculty to select the possibility of conflict between the United States and Japan. Between June and September 1906, the students produced a working document of nearly one hundred pages that the War College fine-tuned and then passed on the General Board's planners.\textsuperscript{7} As luck, or fate, would have it, the 1906 solution proved timely. The onset of an international crisis between the United States and Japan in October 1906 found the navy with a rudimentary,

\textsuperscript{6} In 1904, the General Board, and the Joint Board, standardized their use of codewords for a number of countries, see Captain John E. Pillsbury to Joint Board, 29 November 1904, approved 23 December 1904, JB 325, RG 225, NARA. "Black" represented Germany, while "Orange" represented Japan. For a complete list of the codewords see, Vlahos, \textit{Blue Sword}, appendix 1, 163; Vlahos, "The Naval War College and the Origin of War Planning Against Japan," \textit{Naval War College Review} 33 (June 1980), 29. The definitive history of "War Plan Orange" is Edward S. Miller, \textit{War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1922} (Annapolis: Naval Institute P, 1991).

\textsuperscript{7} "Problems and Solutions, 1906," RG 12, NHC.
if not primitive, war plan. The development of that solution and early war plan requires detailed examination.

The 1906 problem posed the following situation: "On January 1, 1907, relations between the [United States] and [Japan] become strained, and on June 1 War is declared." The War College staff required the students to formulate solutions to thirty-eight related questions dealing with strategy, tactics, and logistics. The most important of the questions dealt with the disposition of the respective battle fleets "during the period of strained relations." The students conjectured as to what strategic moves Japan would, and the United States should, make before the outbreak of war, and during the conduct of the war. Though the students could not then appreciate the effects, their solutions contributed to "the Concept." The continuity of strategic thought among naval planners up to 1945 drew much from the 1906 class. One analyst noted that, "Plan Orange was noted and filed in the Navy's corporate memory and genetically encoded in [the minds of American] naval officers."^11

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^6 General Board, "Orange-Blue Situation, assumed September, 1906." UNOpP(T) #78, RG 8, NHC. This embryonic war plan drew upon the student solutions of 1906.

^9 Statement of the Problem, "Problem and Solutions, 1906," 1. For simplicity, I replaced the national code words with the proper state.

^10 Michael Vlahos noted a "continuity of concept" in the U.S. Navy's view of war with Japan, The Blue Sword, 119.

^11 Miller, War Plan Orange, 2.
The students tabulated the existing assets of the respective navies. The junior officers recognized explicitly the numerical superiority of the U.S. Navy. The class pointed out that the U.S. Navy possessed "a fairly homogenous and newly constructed fleet of sixteen battleships, six not so modern, and eight armored cruisers," while the Japanese possessed eleven battleships and eleven armored cruisers.\textsuperscript{12} The class also recognized as well that the Japanese Navy had a strong advantage, the concentration of its naval forces in East Asian waters. The students presumed unrealistically that the United States would have advance notice of the outbreak of war and thus, sufficient time to concentrate its naval assets in the Philippines, either at Subic, or Manila Bay.\textsuperscript{13}

Such a scenario assumed that the United States would eventually construct a major naval base at one of those locations to prevent any successful offensive action by Japan. The students noted, "[t]he great importance of Subic Bay to [the United States] would make it particularly desirable for [Japan] to capture this port," and make the American liberation of the islands infinitely more

\textsuperscript{12} "Problems and Solutions, 1906" part II, 27. One might note that the ratio between the two navies then was 73\%, before new construction. That ratio difference would prove critical, first to the Japanese Navy, discussed later, and then to the U.S. Navy.

\textsuperscript{13} "Problem and Solutions, 1906," part II, 1.
difficult. The Japanese Navy's planners also appreciated that prospect. They, too, contemplated the possibility of a major base in the Philippines and reached many of the same conclusions. In any case, the war college students presumed, furthermore, that a sufficiently large defending force in the Philippines would forestall, if not deter, the complete occupation of the islands by the Japanese.

The students noted that Japan then possessed advantages offset only by the American ownership of a numerically superior battle fleet, though, the United States had not yet concentrated that fleet. Should the United States fail to mobilize early, to concentrate its battle fleet in sufficient strength, or to maintain a strong army in the Philippines, dire consequences would follow. The students expected that Japan would "take Manila, seize Subig, and prepare to meet a more powerful enemy afloat." The 1906 problem set clearly the foundation for the U.S. Navy's strategic thinking for the next four decades.

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15 Rengo kantai, 1:133-134; Sato Teikoku kokubo shi ron, 2:300-302.
17 "Problems and Solutions," part II, 7-8.
18 "One unpardonable assumption reveals the Problem of 1906 to be, though still an authentic prototype, something less than a serious war plan," Vlahos, "The Naval War College and the Origin of War Planning Against Japan," 29.
The students completed the problem on 1 September 1906. The War College staff and General Board then scrutinized the solutions. During the month of September, the planners of the General Board cobbled together an early version of "War Plan Orange." Subtitled "In Case of Strained Relations with Japan," the embryonic document radically condensed the 1906 War College solutions. The General Board plan contained only three pages of strategic formulations and nearly forty of logistical data. The General Board plan expressed, however, the same tenor as did the War College students. Most pointedly, the opening paragraph of the document, which bore the title, PROBABLE MOVEMENTS DURING WAR WITH JAPAN, addressed the problem of the next forty years in a stark manner—"The Japanese will probably proceed immediately against the Philippines." The General Board plan noted further that Manila was unprotected and when it fell, "as it is apt to do sooner or later," the Japanese "attack by land and sea on [Subic] will commence. [Subic] must hold out until the last." The whole scenario worried U.S. Army officers, for whom "thoughts of a Pacific war suggested first of all a picture of sacrifice, the sacrifice of [army forces in the Philippines]."

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19 General Board, "Orange-Blue Situation, assumed September 1906."

20 General Board, "Orange-Blue Situation, assumed September 1906," 1; Russel F. Weigley, "The Role of the War Department and the Army," in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as History, 168.
One might reflect further upon the Japanese Army's draft for the Imperial Defense Policy. In August 1906 Lieutenant-Colonel Tanaka Giichi envisioned a similar fate for the U.S. Army forces. Tanaka also saw a limited role for the Japanese Navy in any war with the United States.\textsuperscript{21} His superior, Yamagata Aritomo, however, dropped such proposals from the army version presented to the Emperor in October 1906.\textsuperscript{22}

In late September the Second Committee of the General Board, tasked with war plans, reported that it had "prepared for the consideration of the General Board an outline of the Preliminary Steps...in the case of war with Orange."\textsuperscript{23} That refinement of the War College work proved important, for within four weeks, the General Board received a request transmitted from President Roosevelt, who wanted an "exact comparison of the Japanese ships and our ships which are now available for war."\textsuperscript{24} Even more pointed, Roosevelt wanted to know "if the General Board [was] studying a plan of operations in the event of hostilities with Japan."\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{21} Montgomery, Imperialist Japan: The Yen to Dominate, 199.

\textsuperscript{22} Tsunoda, Manshu mondai, 680-681, 691-692; Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo, 234-235.

\textsuperscript{23} Second Committee report, 26 September 1906, "Proceedings and Hearing," GB 80, RG 80, M1493, NARA.

\textsuperscript{24} William Loeb, Jr., to Secretary of the Navy Charles J. Bonaparte, 27 October 1906, GB 425-2, RG 80, NARA. Loeb served as Roosevelt's secretary.

\textsuperscript{25} Loeb to Bonaparte, 27 October 1906, GB 425-2, RG 80, NARA.
request came just eleven days after the Japanese Army had presented the Emperor with its draft for imperial defense.

The War Scare of 1906

It was a purely civilian act that triggered the onset of an American-Japanese crisis. The San Francisco, California, School Board, fed by an irrational fear of the "Yellow Peril," enacted restrictions upon the education of Asian grade school children.²⁶ The growing resentment by white citizens on the American west coast had been boiling since the turn of the century. Labor competition, racial antagonism, natural disasters, and economic challenges combined to create a firestorm between April 1905 and October 1906.

In the months before the Russo-Japanese War, and during the war itself, the Japanese government had been careful not to protect forcefully the rights of its citizens in America. As Japan, however, amassed victory after victory, a growing if not irrational fear engulfed numbers of Americans in California. Coincidentally, other states in the Northwest, as well as British Columbia, experienced such anti-Japanese fervor. The clamor, driven in part by racism, included a fear of battle-hardened Japanese veterans settling in the

United States. Rumors placed a large Japanese military contingent in Mexico ready to march into California. The San Francisco Chronicle, a Hearst family newspaper, encouraged that view with lurid headlines and cartoons. The Hearst newspapers came in for criticism from the Japanese naval attaché in Washington D.C. Commander Tanaguchi Naomi cited specifically the Hearst chain as a major factor in the rise of anti-Japanese feelings in the United States. Though the Hearst papers used the threat of the "Yellow Peril" to create an anti-Japanese atmosphere, the proverbial last straw emanated from a legislative act in late 1906.

Driven by racist arguments, the school board in San Francisco ordered the legal segregation of non-white grade school students, arguing that white school children would suffer from any exposure to their Asian schoolmates. The Japanese government did not object to that characterization for Chinese and Korean children. Rather, it argued that California should not characterize its own nationals in that manner. As a perceived world power, Japan maintained that it was a legitimate member of the international community and

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28 Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice, 70.
29 Tanaguchi's entire report is published in Shinohara, Kaigun sosershiki, 503-507; Asada cited Tanaguchi's report in "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitation," 143, 162.
30 Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 137.
therefore, due substantial respect. Its defeat of Russia
only reinforced that widely held mentality in many Japanese
nationals. Though the history of the incident proves more
involved than discussed herein, the dispute itself came to a
crisis point in October 1906.

What triggered Roosevelt’s planning request to the
General Board? Roosevelt had not been unaware of the growing
racism in California’s legislative efforts to discriminate
against Asians. To that end, Roosevelt viewed them as
"idiots."

Roosevelt, however, understood the segregation
order’s consequences upon the Japanese. The President also
worried about the state of the U.S. Navy. Roosevelt knew
that the American naval forces in the Pacific were then
insufficient to prevent any offensive moves by the
Japanese. It was a telegram, however, that jolted
Roosevelt into action. Baron Kaneko Kentaro, one of Japan’s
representatives at Portsmouth, and a former Harvard classmate
of the President, wired Roosevelt from Tokyo to complain
about the treatment of Japanese school children in San
Francisco. Kaneko based his plea upon the long and close
friendship between the two men, and asked Roosevelt to
intervene the state matter.

31 Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 130.

32 Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 130.

33 Kaneko to Roosevelt, 26 October 1906, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.
Roosevelt confessed to Kaneko that it was "so purely local" that he had not heard of it in Washington. He repudiated the actions of the Californians, and told Kaneko that he would send a cabinet level official to investigate the matter. Roosevelt, however, guaranteed no favorable action, pointing out, "I shall exert all the power I have under the constitution," to seek, but not impose, a settlement.\(^3^4\)

Before the two nations temporarily settled their differences in early 1907,\(^3^5\) a war scare ensued. Jingoist newspapers in both countries, more so in the United States, grabbed the nation's attention with lurid page one headlines such as, "THREAT OF WAR WITH JAPAN,"\(^3^6\) which ran from coast to coast. In Japan, several newspapers similarly raised the flash point. A number of the papers called for the Japanese Navy's deployment to San Francisco so as to enlighten the ignorant Californians.\(^3^7\) Roosevelt feared that continued incidents might propel the Japanese into precipitous action. The President noted, "The infernal fools in California insult

\(^3^4\) Roosevelt to Kaneko, 26 October 1906, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.

\(^3^5\) The parties negotiated the "Gentlemen's Agreement," in which Japan committed itself to reduce the flow of immigrants to the United States, Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 146-166. Within two years, however, another crisis emerged as Japan failed to abide fully by the terms of the agreement.

\(^3^6\) 27 and 28 October 1906, Oregon Journal (Portland); 28 October 1906, New York Times; 16 December 1906, San Francisco Examiner.

\(^3^7\) 20 October 1906, Hochi Shimbun; 22 October 1906, Mainichi Shim bun, cited in Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 135.
the Japanese recklessly, and in the event war it will be the Nation as a whole which will pay the consequences."^39 Roosevelt feared another crisis would strike while he visited the Panama Canal, then under construction.^39 Seeking professional advice from his naval advisors, Roosevelt queried the General Board about its war plans on 27 October.^40

The General Board responded two days later, "that the General Board has already studied the situation," a somewhat optimistic statement.^41 The board went even further, "Plans are now complete. . .which if put in operation, will in ninety days. . . enable us to command the sea in Eastern waters."^42 Such a concentration of naval strength was certainly a most difficult, if not impossible, task to carry out in ninety days based upon the then existing status of the U.S. Navy. In any case, the U.S. Navy had begun the long process of preparing for conflict with Japan in East Asia. Within the week, the Office of Naval Intelligence gave Roosevelt a detailed examination of the Japanese and American

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38 Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, 27 October 1906, MRL, 5:475-476.

39 Roosevelt apparently confided such a fear to his long-time friend, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge sent Roosevelt's secretary, William Loeb, Jr., a puzzling telegram which alluded to the crisis, Lodge telegram to Loeb, 2 November 1906, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.

40 Loeb to Bonaparte, 27 October 1906, GB 425-2, RG 80, NARA.

41 Dewey to Truman H. Newberry, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 29 October 1906, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.

42 Dewey to Newberry, 29 October 1906, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.
assets. The intelligence assessment left no doubt that the U.S. Navy possessed a significant numerical superiority, but only if the United States concentrated its battle fleet. That potential concentration, however, would depend upon one fact. From where would such a fleet operate in East Asia?

The war scare reignited the worrisome discussion about the location of the primary American naval base in East Asia. The need to prepare in advance for war with an enemy who possessed clear and distinct advantages clearly troubled American naval planners. President Roosevelt, long a supporter of a major facility at Subic Bay, shared the navy's concern. Earlier Roosevelt had expressed full support for the Subic Bay site. The president stated furthermore that the army's opposition to Subic arose from "fallacious reasoning." Unfortunately, Congress proved to be a more difficult entity and barely considered Subic worth any expenditures. A major challenge the U.S. Navy would face until the Washington Conference was the lack of monies that

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Office of Naval Intelligence compilation, 30 October 1906, in Newberry to Roosevelt, 30 October 1906, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.

prevented the construction of a major naval facility in East Asia.  

Part of the problem stemmed from the lessons of war derived from the Russo-Japanese conflict and the ensuing inter-service rivalry. The U.S. Navy appreciated the serious challenges of modern naval warfare and the dangers to naval bases. The Japanese Navy had trapped Russia’s Pacific naval forces at Port Arthur after its failed sortie attempts. The Japanese then utilized high angle howitzers, stripped from coastal defense positions in the home island. Japanese engineers positioned the weapons on and beyond the heights surrounding the harbor. Using direct and indirect naval gunfire, the Japanese slowly destroyed the Russian ships.  

Subic Bay shared the same geographic disadvantages, but on a much grander scale. Such a vulnerability only encouraged both U.S. Army and Navy officers opposed to the selection of Subic over Manila Bay. The struggle culminated finally in the Navy’s decision to abandon any base site in the Philippines. The U.S. Navy pushed, instead, the construction of their long sought Pacific base at Hawaii. The navy based its decision upon the successful cruise of the

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45 Between July 1902 and June 1920, Congress appropriated only $3,119,500 for Subic Bay, while U.S. Navy argued that it required at least $10,000,000 to complete even a small base, Braisted, U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909, 179.

"Great White Fleet." The navy sought as well to ensure that any base it acquired would not fall under army control.47

The whole war scare issue proved a much overrated affair. One voice of reason contributed to the U.S. Navy's sense of peace. Commander Marble in Tokyo reported regularly to his superiors that the Japanese Navy had not taken any steps deemed preparatory to offensive operations. Marble, though, did not overlook the signs that the Japanese Navy was preparing for fleet expansion.48 Though the Japanese military had not made public any of the provisions of the pending Imperial Defense Policy, the Office of Naval Intelligence received details of an effort to increase naval appropriations and an effort to construct eight modern battleships and eight armored cruisers.49 Later historians seem to support the view that the Japanese Navy's effort to secure a substantial fleet expansion was not completely secret.50 That process, however, receives treatment in a subsequent chapter.


48 Marble was in Tokyo when the Diet adopted the "1907 Post Russo-Japanese War Equipment Program," 06-417/0-12-a, RG 38, NARA; LaCroix, "The Imperial Japanese Navy," The Belgian Shiplover №137 (1/1971), 16.

49 Captain Raymond R. Rodgers to Dougherty, 9 April 1907, "Office of Naval Correspondence," Case 8162, RG 38, NARA. Dougherty relieved Marble on 10 April 1907 and would provide important information to the U.S. Navy during the cruise of the "Great White Fleet."

50 Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific, 149; George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None, 174.
In any case, in 1906 and 1907 the U.S. Navy codified several tenets of its naval strategy for the next four decades. In any war with Japan, the United States would have to dispatch a relief force nearly the entire breadth of the Pacific. Naval planners hoped that once the relief force reached East Asia the major repair and support facilities in the islands would still be in American hands. Failing that, the relief force would operate at a real disadvantage. It was clear to planners that the Philippines would remain hostage to Japan if the United States failed to provide for a fortified naval base in the islands. Should the nation not fund or complete the base, the U.S. Navy would find itself challenged to liberate the islands. A relief force arriving in East Asian waters would arrive dissipated after an exhausting trans-Pacific trek. Furthermore, its mission seemed impossible once it found itself cut off from relief and repair. That had already happened to the Russians in 1905. The U.S. Navy hoped to avoid such a fate.

Another War Scare and the "Great White Fleet," 1907-1909

President Roosevelt’s navalism proved a nettlesome thorn domestically and internationally during the war scare of 1906. Powerful members of Congress suspected that Roosevelt had contrived the crisis to muster support for a larger battleship force. Roosevelt would battle over naval expansion with Senator Eugene Hale (D-ME), chairman of the
Senate Naval Committee, and formerly a proponent of the service. The crisis brought heated exchanges between the senator and Roosevelt. While Roosevelt was not above using the crisis to advance his agenda, he did not create the California imbroglio. Though Roosevelt managed to secure an agreement with Japan in early 1907, one that limited the number of Japanese citizens entering the United States, and California, the problem continued to simmer below the surface. In the spring of 1907, Californians created yet another crisis. Anti-Japanese movements and rioting again raised the specter of war. The "yellow press" in both nations produced daily headlines which intimated the threat of war. This time Roosevelt concluded that only an overt display of strength would serve American interests.

On June 14, 1907, Roosevelt ordered the General and Joint Boards to prepare new assessments "in case of war with Japan." The General Board worried that the "present

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52 Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan*, 146-166.


54 See 2 February, 1 June, and 16 June 1907, *New York Times*.

attitude of Japanese agitators" would result in war.\textsuperscript{56} To prepare for such an eventuality, the board suggested the dispatch of "sixteen (16) [modern] ships," and prepared a list of up to twenty-four battleships and ten armored cruisers available for deployment to the Western Pacific, specifically, the Philippine Islands.

The board warned, furthermore, that the Philippines would probably fall if the proposed naval base at Subic Bay remained inadequately fortified. Such a disaster would leave "the United States thereafter with no point of support for its fleet, and giv[e] to Japan the prestige of a decided initial success."\textsuperscript{57} The Naval War College supported the board's view, reporting that, "There should be one harbor sufficiently fortified for a refuge for the fleet in time of war where it could effect necessary repairs."\textsuperscript{58} Unknown to the American planners, the Japanese had too considered the role of such a facility in the Philippines. In 1907, the Japanese military had not yet implemented any planning for dealing with such a situation.\textsuperscript{59}

Fine-tuning their recommendations, the General Board provided President Roosevelt with the language to support

\textsuperscript{56} Captain Nathan Sargent memorandum to General Board, 15 June 1907 in "Proceedings and Hearings, 15 June 1907, RG 80, NARA.

\textsuperscript{57} Sargent memorandum, 15 June 1907, RG, NARA.

\textsuperscript{58} Navy War College letter to Department of Navy, 16 March 1907, GB 403, RG 80, NARA.

\textsuperscript{59} Tsunoda, \textit{Manshu mondai}, 680-681, 691-692.
their desires. The board resolved that, "not less than sixteen (16) battleships be assembled in the Pacific." Such a large number of battleships ensured the U.S. Navy would keep a significant numerical superiority over the Japanese Navy. Figure 7 shows the available American battle fleet, including old battleships, before 1916. In 1907 the Japanese Navy maintained only fourteen capital ships in service. Of those, only ten rated a designation of first-class. Thus, the U.S. Navy would possess a numerical advantage of 1.5 to 1. Quite simply, a ratio of 1.5 to 1, or 1:0.67, represented the 50% probability of winning an encounter. Months earlier, Japanese planners stressed that such a disparity in strength posed a significant problem. An advantage of 1.5 to 1 equated approximately to a 70% figure, the threshold for a successful American sortie against the Japanese empire.

The board strongly stressed, "that present necessities demand that Subic Bay be developed for full use as a naval

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60 General Board, "Proceedings and Hearings," 17 June 1907, RG 80 NARA. This document was the General Board's official opinion to the Joint Board, scheduled to meet with President Roosevelt the next week.

61 The majority of the capital ships were authorized during Roosevelt's tenure as president (September 1901-March 1909).


63 Sato, _Teikoku kokubo shi ron_, 1:24-27, 2:132-134, 210-216, 223, 235. A figure of 1.5:1, or 1:0.67, represented the 50% probability of a winning ratio.
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FIGURE 7
USN CAPITAL SHIPS, 1905-1916
BY DATE OF COMMISSION AND CLASS
base and station," should the fleet be sent westward. One cannot escape the observation that the General Board's actions arose from interrelated reasons. If the U.S. Navy maintained a strong presence in the Philippines, it also required support facilities ashore. The army held primary responsibility for the land defenses of such a facility. The army then lacked the man power to defend every vulnerable location near the bay. Their contribution to that security included the use of mines for "defending the harbor entrance," at Subic Bay. The army seemed to justify the navy's concern over the defense of Subic. Secretary of War Taft reported to Roosevelt, "What steps should be taken . . . in the event of war becoming imminent between this country and Japan." It proved somewhat bleak.

On 27 June 1907 two members of the Joint Board travelled to Roosevelt's vacation home in Oyster Bay. There they met with Roosevelt and formally presented the Joint Board's recommendations. Roosevelt expressed some optimism at settling the crisis peaceably but "concurred" with the Joint Board's suggested course of action. The President ordered

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45 Taft to Roosevelt, 22 June 1907, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD.

46 Lieutenant Colonel W.W. Wotherspoon to the Adjutant General, 29 June 1907, "Correspondence of the Adjutant General," Serial #180092, RG 94, NARA; Reckner, Great White Fleet.
the review of the U.S. Army and Navy's defense plans, particularly for the Philippines. Roosevelt decided, as well, to concur in a show of strength. Roosevelt ordered the dispatch of a battle fleet to Pacific waters, ostensibly on a practice cruise, but made no official statement as to the final disposition of the fleet transfer.67

Unofficially, Roosevelt aimed to suppress any Japanese impression that the United States was susceptible to foreign pressure.68 The official announcement of the fleet transfer to the Pacific silenced the talk of war in Japan. It did, however, reinforce the premise of the Japanese Navy's recent strategic planning. Just two and a half months before the American decision to dispatch the fleet, the Emperor had approved the nation's defense policy. In the event of war with an extra-regional power, the Japanese Navy expected another trans-oceanic trek by the hostile power. Roosevelt's decision only fulfilled their view that their hypothetical enemy would dispatch such a fleet once war threatened, or had broken out, between Japan and the United States.

In any case, the dispatch of the fleet on a round-the-world cruise fulfilled Roosevelt's requirements, for the war talk and war scare disappeared rapidly. A cessation of rhetoric, and cooler heads, in each country succeeded in

67 Roosevelt may have been "pushed" into the deployment, for he reported to Henry Cabot Lodge, "that the [General] [B]oard decided sooner than I had expected," Roosevelt to Lodge, 10 July 1907, MRL, 5:709-710.

68 Roosevelt to Elihu Root, 13 July 1907, MRL, 5:717-719.
dousing the firestorm. The fleet arrived in East Asian waters in late summer 1908 and provided a most visible demonstration of Roosevelt's "Big Stick." The most notable moment of anxiety came from the Japanese decision to hold its annual grand fleet maneuvers about the time the American fleet approached Japan. The Japanese Navy had scheduled fleet exercises well in advance of the American arrival. The exercises, of course, made for a few tense moments. More than one U.S. Navy officer suspected the Japanese Navy would attack the "Great White Fleet" north of the Philippine Islands.69

While the effect of the fleet cruise has received adequate treatment, it was not the navy's primary test.70 One of the Joint Board's suggestions, the reinforcement of Subic Bay, proved impossible to implement. Such a failure carried significant consequences. The continued lack of appropriations, lessons drawn from Port Arthur, and an inter-service challenge emerged as intractable problems.71

The U.S. Army took the crisis as an opportunity to reopen the base question. Arguing that Subic Bay remained extremely vulnerable, the U.S. Army, under the unrelenting

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70 See Reckner, Great White Fleet; Hart, The Great White Fleet.

71 Of the struggle, one scholar noted that "a serious breach over the defensibility" of Subic divided the services, Costello, "Planning for War," 214.
pressure of General Leonard Wood, forced another analysis. Wood, long an opponent of the Subic Bay site, argued that the landward defense of Subic was impracticable. Army planners supported their assault with a detailed strategic analysis of the defense of the Philippines. As a consequence, in 1907 the army with President Roosevelt's backing forced the Joint Board to reconsider its support for Subic Bay.

Just as the "Great White Fleet" reached Pacific Waters, the Joint Board reported to an infuriated President Roosevelt that it had reexamined its previous decision for Subic. Roosevelt's anger came from the vacillation of his senior military planners at a time when he was urging Congress to fund a new base at Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt feared that Congress would reject such appropriations if it appeared that the services were at odds with the administration. The Joint Board reported that, in its opinion, the U.S. Army could not

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73 See minutes, Joint Board meeting, 6 November 1907, RG 225, NARA; Joint Board letter, 29 January 1908, RG 225, NARA; "Army War College Study #29," 1906-1907, Army War College Serial #91, RG 165, NARA. The Army's planners examined in depth the successful use of heavy field guns by the Japanese against Port Arthur.

74 Taft to Secretary of the Navy Victor H. Metcalf, 21 January 1908, GB 405, RG 80, NARA; minutes, 29 January 1908, JB 301, RG 225, NARA; Roosevelt to Metcalf, 11 February 1908, MRL, 6:937-939 and GB 405, RG 80, NARA.

75 minutes, Joint Board meeting, 19 February 1908, RG 225, NARA.
adequately defend Subic Bay. That assessment cited the bay's huge expanse, three times that of Port Arthur, and the now-digested lessons of the Russian failure Port Arthur, to support its change of mind.76

The Joint Board settled upon the army's long desired site in Manila Bay. The board recommended that the navy redirect all allocations slated for Subic to the construction of a base in Manila Bay.77 The minimum estimates for such a base were in excess of twenty million dollars, or twice the projected costs of those for a base at Subic Bay.78 Unfortunately, Congress never fully authorized such expenditures and any major facilities in the Philippines remained a dream.79 It was the anticipation, however, of that base that shaped American's Western Pacific strategy for the subsequent four decades.

The new plan required the navy to concentrate its Western Pacific assets in Manila Bay. The army, meanwhile,
was expected to defend the entire bay. Prophetically, should the Japanese assault the Philippines the new strategy envisioned a phased withdrawal of army forces through the Bataan Peninsula and then onto Corregidor. Following the retreat onto that island, the army expected to hold out until a relief force arrived from the United States. The U.S. Navy, on the other hand, expected the army forces on Corregidor to hold out for a period of six months. In December 1941, the United States government and military carried out that strategy.\(^{60}\)

The U.S. Army's victory in 1908, though, proved pyrrhic. Quite clearly, the case is evidence of the "mixed-motive" interrelationship between the services. Therein, both services worried about the defense of the Philippines and their individual service interests. The fight over the base site, which began in 1898, became an acrimonious inter-service struggle. Unfortunately, the navy could not concur in the army's definition of those interests. "After the Army torpedoed [Subic]," wrote William R. Braisted, "naval officers were less than enthusiastic for the army's alternative Philippine proposals."\(^{61}\)

The General Board, and the U.S. Navy, at large, never actually abandoned the idea of building a base at Subic and


continued to finesse their acquiescence until 1922. The navy seemingly struck back at the army’s choice of Manila Bay. The navy’s leadership understood that any facility in Manila Bay would most probably be subject to army control. Such a case would provide the U.S. Army a clear advantage in front of Congress when the services sought to justify their budgets. The navy threw its support, instead, to the construction of a major facility at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, nearly 5,000 miles from Manila. There are a variety of reasons as to why the U.S. Navy failed to support fully the army’s choice. One reason was the successful cruise of the battle fleet. An ability to operate at long-range convinced many in the U.S. Navy that a base was superfluous and persuaded the Joint Board to "abandon" a base in the Philippines for one at Pearl Harbor.\(^{62}\) Congress proved more amenable to funding such a tropical site nearer the American nation. After 1908, the inter-service rivalry seemingly ensured that military coordination in the Western Pacific would be most difficult, if not impossible.

**The Strategic Elite between 1907 and 1914**

The increased tensions between the United States and Japan produced not only a long-term strategy, but also saw the further development of the American naval strategic

elite. For this examination, I have selected three individuals who exercised a great influence upon the U.S. Navy's plans and consequently, the advancement of "the Concept." Of the officers, one can state unequivocally that they represented the "Golden Age" of strategic thought in the U.S. Navy.81

In the years before 1914 none of the officers effected "contact" with the Japanese Navy. Rather, their planning work, declassified mainly in the last three decades, contributed to an already existing perception that Japan and the United States would clash eventually. All three would come into "contact" with each other in varied ways up, primarily though the General Board.

Even more important, the following examination stresses the importance of Japan, instead of Germany, as the hypothetical enemy. The three officers used realistic planning rationale, and not racial attitudes, to conclude that Japan posed the greatest danger to American interests in the Western Pacific. While a number of American naval officers viewed many non-Western races as unequal, such reasoning did not obviate the obvious. Most non-western nations did not pose a maritime threat. At a minimum, the

81 Miller pointed out, "In search of talented planners, the General Board summoned promising captains and junior admirals, [that included] among them the [navy's] rising stars," War Plan Orange, 16.
idea of racism as a primary determinant in American naval planning before 1922 proves greatly overrated. 84

Germany, of course, troubled many of the naval planners. One must note, however, that such concern did not spur the navy's creation of a German war plan until 1913. "War Plan Orange [Japan]" predated "War Plan Black [Germany] by seven years, undermining most assertions that a German threat dominated the minds of U.S. Navy planners. 85

The first of the officers selected for examination, Lieutenant Commander Clarence S. Williams, suffers historically from the lack of any biographical examination of his career. 86 His contributions to "the Concept" emerge from the declassification of naval records as well as the publication of a major work, Edward S. Miller's War Plan Orange. 87 The second officer, Captain Sydney A. Staunton, cited earlier, sharpened his war planning skills during the Spanish-American War. Staunton also lacks a biography. 88

84 See Howard V. Young, Jr., "Racial Attitudes of United States Navy Officers as a Factor in American Unpreparedness for War with Japan," draft of a paper delivered at the Fifth Naval History Symposium, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis MD, 2 October 1981.


86 A short career summary can be found in Cogar, Dictionary of Admirals of the U.S. Navy, Volume 2, 1901-1918, 300-301.

87 William's work is described in Braisted, U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922; Williams was "the most articulate voice on the General Board's Second Committee...with a flair for strategy," Miller, War Plan Orange, 18.

88 A short career summary can be found in Cogar, Dictionary of Admirals of the U.S. Navy, 1901-1918, 264-265.
but his work is equally important. Staunton served as a war planner between 1907 and 1912 and strongly contributed to the U.S. Navy's development of the hypothetical enemy. Staunton's duties in that period coincided with the planning carried out by Japan's Akiyama Saneyuki. That was at a time when both navies sought to prepare for conflict with the other. The third officer, Captain Bradley A. Fiske, emerged after 1907 to become eventually the second highest ranking American naval officer. Fiske contributed much to the General and Joint Boards, and as Aide for Operations, the precursor to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, contributed to the navy's development of a perspective of Japan as the hypothetical enemy. While I have selected only these three officers for examination, the overlap in their planning duties readily illustrates a continuity in "the Concept."

Clarence Williams reported for duty with the General Board just as the United States was preparing for the

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99 Miller pointed out that Staunton sought to form a Pacific fleet "more powerful than the entire Imperial Navy." This was the moment that Akiyama and his contemporaries were planning for just such a contingency, *War Plan Orange*, 87.


deployment of the "Great White Fleet." Assigned to the Second Committee, Williams helped draft a memorandum proposing "the first steps to be taken in case of probable hostilities with Japan." The memorandum refined further the halting tempo of the 1906 "War Plan Orange." Among the refinement, Williams produced a document that would guide the U.S. Navy, and the United States, to the brink of World War I and beyond. Within a short period, Williams prepared the strategic document "Proposed routes between the Pacific Coast and the Philippines," a transit guide for the fleet.

The strategic and logistical document detailed the various trans-Atlantic and Pacific routes to East Asia. The paper provided a number of alternative sites for coaling and resupply. Williams raised the possibility of using German- and British-held island territories in the central Pacific. Williams produced the route plan at a time when the navy could not be sure that the United States would complete Subic Bay, or that the U.S. Navy could fend off any Japanese attempt to intercept a relief fleet. That possibility

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92 General Board, "Proceedings and Hearings," 29 October 1907, RG 80, M1493, NARA.

93 "Report of the Second Committee," 28 January 1908, General Board, "Proceedings and Hearings," RG 80, M1493, NARA. The memoranda is attached to the original Orange plan.

94 Miller, War Plan Orange, 95.

95 Williams, "Proposed Routes Between the Pacific Coast and the Philippines," November 1907, General Board War Portfolios, War Portfolio No. 3, RG 80, NARA. Portfolio No. 3 was the folder for "War Plan Orange."
emanated from disturbing reports from Tokyo. In March 1908, the U.S. Naval Attaché reported that Japan's forthcoming naval exercises aimed at engaging an approaching enemy fleet "coming from the direction of the Philippine Islands," referring obliquely to the "Great White Fleet." In any case, Williams' work proved pivotal for later planners.

Until that moment, no planner had yet explicitly envisaged what routes the "Great White Fleet," and the navy at large, would employ to reach the Philippines in the event of war with Japan. Just before the fleet sailed for its round-the-world cruise, the General Board approved Williams' work. The board then transferred the route guide to the Commander-in-Chief of the deploying battle fleet. The efficacy of such a fleet transit guide was most important as Williams pointed out, "Japan's great oversea distance from the United States is her greatest source of strength." Quite simply, the U.S. Navy required a trans-oceanic route that ensured it would arrive in East Asia at its maximum fighting strength, regardless of the attrition rate of such a trek.

An important component of Williams' planning was the issue of where the fleet would procure shelter, coal

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96 "W" #34, 8 March, "W" #72, 24 April 1908, in 07-215/F-9-C, "Manoeuvres [sic]--Japan," RG 38, NARA.

97 "Report of the Second Committee," 19 December 1907, General Board, "Proceedings and Hearings," RG 80, M1493, NARA.

98 Williams quoted in Miller, War Plan Orange, 33.
supplies, and repair facilities. The struggle over the naval base site in the Philippines escalated in 1908, and led to the abandonment of Subic. Williams conceded the eventual fall of the islands, with the possible exception of some lonely and reinforced spot. Williams felt, however, that American strength would in the end prevail over Japan. "The defense of the Philippines and the prestige of the United States in the East, then, depends on an efficient and sufficient fleet [and] a base so strong that [Japan] will not be able to readily reduce it." That opinion came from the fact that the "Great White Fleet" had transited, in less than 120 days, the 7,000 mile distance between the Pacific Coast and the Philippines. That success encouraged a number of planners, including Williams, to support a Pacific route, as the quickest way to rescue the Philippine Islands. Subsequent planners later fine-tuned those Pacific routes into the island hopping campaigns of World War II.

The existing alternative, an Atlantic route, seemed most unattractive. Japan's ally, Britain, controlled the Suez

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99 Williams (co-signer), "Report of the Reconciling Committee on Question 4," 30 July 1909, Stephen B. Luce Papers, LCMD.

100 Professor Frederick J. Milford, CDR, USN (ret), pointed out that the fleet averaged a speed over ground of about 2.4 knots. For the journey, though, a number of port visits, and other delays, were involved, both in the America's and the Western Pacific.

101 The Navy used Williams' work in subsequent versions of "War Plan Orange," see Navy Department-General Board, "Memo re plan [of] campaign-Orange [Japan]," UNOpP #150, 1910, RG, NHC; Office of Naval Intelligence "Data for the preparation of Strategic Plans for Possible Hostile Operations Against Japan," UNOpP #149, RG 8, NHC.
Canal. The naval planners of 1908 and 1909 feared that Britain would preclude any transit of the canal by American naval forces sailing to do battle with Japan. Clearly, planners like Williams recalled Russia's fateful sortie of 1904-1905. Then, it appeared that Britain might prohibit a Russian passage through the canal.¹⁰²

In 1910 Commander Williams, still a junior planner, produced another document clearly identifying Japan at the most serious threat to American interests. Williams and several of his contemporaries suspected that the Japanese Navy was about to embark upon a dramatic expansion program.¹⁰³ Such an expansion threatened to overwhelm the then existing American naval resources in the Pacific. The U.S. Navy ranked third in naval power, behind Britain and Germany. Unfortunately, many American citizens, and military officials, worried more about German threats against the eastern seaboard or the Caribbean. Equally, many Americans were uninformed and seemed to underestimate the Japanese threat to American interests in East Asia. As a result the navy had concentrated its fleet assets in the Atlantic. Congressional control of appropriations, in part, facilitated such a disposition.


¹⁰³ They were correct. The Japanese Navy sought to complete an "Eight-Eight" fleet program, that is eight battleships and eight armored cruisers.
Williams argued, however, that Britain's numerical superiority over the German Navy offset any potential threat to the United States. Therefore, going to war with the United States gave Germany no real advantage. Its problems emanated more from European disputes, and not in the western hemisphere. In comparison, Williams pointed out that all of the advantages accrued to Japan should it choose to attack the Philippines while the United States concentrated its battle fleet in the Atlantic. In 1910, Williams argued for a division of American battle fleet strength, with the placement of twenty battleships in the Pacific to offset the thirteen for Japan. That disposition would give the U.S. Navy a great superiority over the Japanese, more than the one-third required for successful operations over a long distance.\(^{104}\)

In any case, the United States chose not to divide its assets in the way Williams had recommended. The officer recognized that such a decision remained one "for the statesman and the political economist rather than for the strategist."\(^{105}\) The planner, however, could lament only, "that the present plan of keeping of all our battleships [in


\(^{105}\) Williams, "Memorandum on the Disposition of the Fleet," 16 March 1910, GB 420-1, RG 80, NARA.
the Atlantic] is illogical and dangerous. If there is any reasonable chance of a war with Japan we are deliberately giving her a tremendous initial advantage." That fleet division would have to wait until 1919, when Williams returned to the General Board as a captain.

Williams' memorandum drew, in part, upon the work of Captain Staunton, a senior member of the General Board, and simultaneously the Joint Board's recorder. Staunton argued that the United States remained at the mercy of Japan as long as the navy remained numerically inferior in the Pacific. Part of that weakness arose from the lack of a secure naval station in the Philippines.

Staunton, attempting to balance service and national interests, pointed out that Japan possessed inherent advantages. These included the shortened maritime lines of communication and the concentration of naval assets. Such advantages contributed to the Japanese Navy's ability to wear

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106 Williams, "Memorandum on the Disposition of the Fleet," 16 March 1910, GB 420-1, RG 80, NARA.

107 Staunton reported for duty with the General Board in March 1908, "Members List," General Board, RG 80, NARA; The Secretary of the Navy ordered Staunton to duty with the Joint Board, Metcalf to Staunton, 6 March 1908, JB 301, RG 225, NARA. In both capacities, Staunton reported directly to Admiral Dewey. Staunton remained connected to the General Board until mid-1912, Costello, "Planning for War," 314-315. Williams and Staunton worked together during a two year period, Williams reported to the General Board in October 1907 and remained a planner until March 1910, while Staunton reported to the board in March 1908 and departed in April 1910. Rear Admiral Staunton returned to duties at the board in August 1911 and remained there until his retirement in June 1912.

108 Minutes, Joint Board meeting, 19 October, 8 November, 1909, JB 301, RG 225, NARA; Miller, War Plan Orange, 87.
down American resolve should conflict ensue. Staunton noted furthermore that the concentration of American naval strength in the Atlantic meant a delay of about sixty days before any American relief force could reach the Philippines. At the moment Staunton proposed the transfer of capital ships to the Pacific, the Japanese certainly possessed a numerical advantage. They, too, recognized that, "The backbone of the so-called Pacific Fleet was eight armored cruisers, wholly unable to face the fire of a first-class battle fleet."109

Staunton's concern emanated from the fact that those armored cruisers faced ten Japanese battleships and three battle cruisers.110 Failing to persuade the navy to redeploy, he next argued that placing an overwhelming American naval strength in the Pacific might reduce any trans-Pacific trek to about twenty-five days.111 Staunton rationalized such a redeployment of American naval forces. He asserted that, "Such a fleet more powerful than that of Japan stationed in the Pacific," provided "a strategic defense against the invasion of the Philippines by [an amphibious landing]."112


110 Costello cited Staunton as irrepresible when it came to the issue of war in the Pacific, "Planning for War," 317-318.

111 The distance from San Francisco to Manila was 7000 nautical miles, which would have required the American battle fleet to maintain an average speed of advance of 10 knots, figures courtesy of Professor Milford.

112 Staunton memorandum, 19 October 1909, JB 305, RG 225, NARA.
In 1907, planners calculated that Japan needed thirty to sixty days to completely occupy the Philippine Islands.\footnote{See "Problem and Solutions, 1907," 1:15, 187-188, RG 12, NHC; "Problem and Solutions, 1909," 1:229.} In recognition of the existing situation, Staunton wrote, "If [Japan] controls the sea the Philippines will fall." The officer argued that a remedy existed only if the United States maintained an "adequate naval force" and a strong naval base in the islands.\footnote{Staunton supported the Subic Bay site, Staunton memorandum, 19 October 1909, JB 305, RG 225, NARA; minutes, Joint Board meeting, 8 November 1909, JB 301, RG 225, NARA.} Staunton went further, arguing that the U.S. Navy "required a [ratio] formula" to support missions in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Staunton’s concern for a formula arose from his anxiety about "the military value of old battleships and armored cruisers."\footnote{Minutes, General Board meeting, 23 February 1910, RG 80, NARA. That issue plagued the Japanese as well, for at the point the United States clearly possessed the assets to overwhelm Japan.} Reports from Tokyo indicated that the Japanese Navy expected to construct sixteen modern capital ships at a time when the American government itself demurred from financing any large fleet expansion.\footnote{Memo, n.d., in 09-373/O-12-b, RG 38, NARA; "W" #93, "W" #(?), translations of Nichi-nichi shimbun [Tokyo] 28 October 1910, 9 Jul 1911, cite a massive expansion program, in 131/O-12-b, "Japanese Building Program," RG 38, NARA. The Taft administration and Democratically controlled House of Representatives, often struggled over the navy’s appropriations projections, see Braisted, U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922, 9-28. The Japanese naval expansion is discussed in the following chapter.} Staunton’s search for such a formula matched the Royal Navy’s development of a formula \textit{vis-à-vis} the German Navy.
The British government settled eventually upon a 60% numerical superiority over the Germans. Britain, however, possessed the fleet assets to maintain such a posture. In contrast, the General Board's planners understood that the government would not authorize greatly increased appropriations, nor would it support such the division of American naval strength in separate theaters. Staunton's words went unheeded and without further action, the board filed his proposals.

It would take the energy of Captain Fiske to cement the view that Japan, and not Germany, posed the greatest threat to American interests. Without any doubt, Fiske's real contributions to "the Concept" coincided with those of Williams and Staunton. Fiske's work clearly laid out the conduct of a Pacific war decades later.

The captain simultaneously impressed his contemporaries and exasperated his superiors. Fiske reported for duty with the General Board just as American naval strength, in terms of dreadnoughts, was emerging and the U.S. Navy had

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119 William S. Sims, one of the U.S. Navy's most influential naval officers, called Fiske, "one of the few thinkers in the navy," Coletta, Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, 80.
decided to revamp its "War Plan Orange." The overhaul of the plan resulted, probably, more from the unfulfilled objectives of Staunton and Williams, and not from the effects of any war scare literature or propaganda. Failing to secure a redeployment of the American battle fleet, the General Board began to press for a new examination of "War Plan Orange." Fiske had served under Rear Admiral Staunton and became his chief of staff just months before the captain joined the General Board. Within a short period, Admiral Dewey put Fiske in charge of the Second Committee, the board's war planning section. Fiske discovered quickly

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120 Captain Fiske reported to the General Board in August 1910 and departed in October 1911. Rear Admiral Fiske returned as Aide for Operations in February 1913 and remained until the position was abolished in May 1915. In November 1910, the Navy ordered its major planning bodies to prepare "Strategic plans of campaign against [Japan]" and prepare recommended courses of action once an American relief force reached the Western Pacific, Meyer to Rodgers, 16 November 1910, GB 425, RG 80, NARA.


122 General Board, "Proceedings and Hearings," 27 April 1910, RG 80, M1493, NARA; "Memorandum of Work in Second Committee," 25 May 1910, General Board, "Proceedings and Hearings, 25 May 1910, RG 80, M1493, NARA; Beekman Winthrop, Acting Secretary of the Navy, to Dewey, 1 October 1910, GB 425, RG 80, NARA.

123 Fiske had "performed well as chief of staff to Admiral Staunton," Coletta, Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, 92, 101. Staunton served as the commander of a special squadron and his tour overlapped with that of Fiske's from April 1909 to August 1910, Cogar, Dictionary of Admirals of the U.S. Navy, Volume 2, 1801-1918, 91, 265.
that the existing plans for war with Japan were simply inadequate.¹²⁴

Taking a lead from the early work of Williams and Staunton, Fiske began revamping the "Preliminary Steps to be taken when War is imminent," for fleet-wide distribution. Fiske, however, grew increasingly frustrated with the lack of a centralized planning and operational authority. Fiske recognized that the U.S. Navy could not coordinate its existing departments and bureaus. Therefore, realistic war planning remained an elusive goal. Such a coordination, however, would not begin until Fiske had forced the issue quite intensely. In late 1914 and early 1915, Fiske worked to produce a legislative creation of a centralized planning authority, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Fiske thought he should receive that position and sought civil intercession. He violated the service chain of command and utilized the support of Congressman Richmond Hobson (D-AL). In early 1915, Fiske's efforts finally paid off. Congress enacted such legislation, though in a more modest form. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels understood quite clearly who had been behind the creation of the new service officer. That creation process ensured that Fiske would not become the primary coordinator.

¹²⁴ Coletta, Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, 92-93.
In any case, Fiske quickly evaluated the existing situation. In a lengthy letter to Admiral Dewey, Fiske concluded that Japan was "the most probable country with which we shall have to conduct a war in the Pacific, and therefore it is against her that our first precautions should be taken." Fiske continued the line of reasoning that John Ellicott, Clarence Williams, and Sydney Staunton had asserted earlier. Fiske, too, expected that Japan would carry out the first strike against American interests, specifically at the Philippines. Fiske argued, however, that Japan might be deterred from aggressive action if the United States possessed a "permanent naval base" in Asia.

Fiske worried about another factor. In the event that Japan should assault the Philippines, Fiske feared that the nation’s citizens would acquiesce in the transfer of the islands to the Japanese. He appreciated the fact that Japan could afford to wait out any American relief of the Philippines. Should the Japanese defeat decisively any relief force, the costs of continuing the campaign might prove unacceptable to the American public.

125 Fiske to Dewey, 25 March 1911, GB 408, RG 80, NARA.

126 Fiske to Dewey, 25 March 1911, GB 408, RG 80, NARA. Of note, Fiske suggested the use of air power to prevent the Japanese from carrying out successfully any amphibious landing in the Philippines. Fiske to Dewey, 7 April 1911, GB 449, RG 80, NARA. The notion proved untenable, then due primarily to the infancy of aviation.
Fiske’s work questioned, as well, the formulations of the Naval War College and, obliquely, Alfred Thayer Mahan. The planners at the war college suggested had that the U.S. Navy should construct a base in Guam, which Mahan had compared to Malta and Gibraltar. Fiske pointed out that the costs for such a base were exorbitant. Furthermore, he argued that a base in the southern Philippines was preferable and less vulnerable than any site in Guam, for the harbor facilities at Guam required extensive renovations. Fiske recognized also that Guam’s lines of communication were vulnerable to interdiction. Fiske asserted that Guam was strategically inferior and inferred that American prestige and trade would suffer should the United States give up on the Philippine Islands. Nonetheless, Congress funded no major work in Guam or the Philippines.

Rear Admiral Fiske departed the General Board in October 1911 but returned in February 1913 as the U.S. Navy’s Aide for Operations. As the senior operations officer Fiske was

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127 Naval War College, "Strategic Plan of Campaign. Orange-Blue, 1911," UNOpP #16, 1911, RG 12, NHC. This was the first and last attempt by the war college to produce a "War Plan Orange."

"chiefly responsible for the readiness of the fleet for war." The post required Fiske's supervision of war planning, naval policy, naval intelligence, and the Naval War College. Fiske was not adverse to exercising such responsibilities, and expected to shape the Navy's future. He thought, particularly, of preparing for conflict in East Asia. That ambition provoked a struggle between Fiske and his civilian superiors. The struggle over naval planning provoked, as well, a crisis in civil-military relations.

Secretary Josephus Daniels was a political appointee of President Wilson with not previous national political experience. Therefore, many naval officers, including Fiske, perceived Daniels as a weak civilian leader. Daniels proved otherwise quickly. A crisis originated, again, in a California attempt to discriminate against Japanese citizens. In mid-April 1913, a strong protest from Tokyo raised the possibility that Japan would resort to means other than diplomacy.

This was the opportunity Fiske had long awaited. He, and both the General and Joint Boards, began to press their

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129 Beers, "Chief of Naval Operations," 10 (Fall 1946), 10; Beers, "Chief of Naval Operations," 10 (Spring 1946), 62.

130 Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion. As to President Woodrow Wilson's perception of the crisis, "it never occurred to me that war could be possible between the two countries until I observed the manner of the Japanese Ambassador, who was very nervous and gave evidence that his country looked for war," Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910-1917 (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1946), 161-168.
respective civilian leaders to redeploy additional military and naval strength to the Philippines. In April 1913, the boards sought to deter any action by the Japanese, but President Wilson, and Secretary Daniels, rejected such moves on the grounds that it might escalate tensions and actually lead to hostilities.

Fiske refused to accept that rationale and sent a letter to Daniels "setting forth the possibility of war with Japan," and the need to protect the Philippines and Hawaiian islands. Fearing an inadequate response from their civilian superiors, Fiske and the Joint Board's Leonard Wood sought to force the administration's hand. The flag officers drafted letters authorizing the redeployment of naval forces throughout the Western Pacific. The administration, however, refused to sanction such an action. It argued, realistically, that the Japanese Navy already possessed sufficient strength to overwhelm the Philippines should the

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111 General Board, "Proceedings and Hearings," 29 April, 2 May, 6 May, 7 May 1913, RG 80, M1493, NARA; Dewey to Daniels, 8 May 1913, GB 425, RG 80, NARA.

112 Daniels thought that a redeployment "might give [Japan] an opportunity to inflame" the situation, E. David Cronon, ed., The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921 (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1963), 58.

113 Fiske to Daniels, 13 May, 14 May 1913, in E. David Cronon, ed., The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921 (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1963), 55-58, 60-64; General Board, "Proceedings and Hearings," 13 May 1913, RG 80, M1493, NARA.

114 See Dewey letters to Woodrow Wilson, 15 May, 16 May 1913, JB 325, RG 225, NARA. The letters were pre-formatted for signatures of the President Wilson, the secretaries of war and the navy, and the senior uniformed officers of each service. The letters remained unsigned.
Japanese be provoked by an overt and untimely redeployment of American naval forces.\textsuperscript{135}

Fiske and Wood felt they had little option but to seek alternative ways to pressure the administration.\textsuperscript{136} The two officers apparently leaked confidential information about the crisis to the news media.\textsuperscript{137} The men, in an unattributed manner, pointed out the administration's reluctance to protect American interests in the Pacific. The ploy backfired and as a result, Wilson prohibited the Joint Board from meeting again without his direct approval.\textsuperscript{138} On the threshold of international conflict, American interests in East Asia were still vulnerable. That would remain true as long as the nation's civilian leadership refused to sanction the placement of superior naval forces in the Western Pacific.

\textsuperscript{135} Daniels recorded that Fiske was greatly disappointed, Cronon, Cabinet Diaries, 67-68.

\textsuperscript{136} Braisted pointed out that "fears of war were apparently generated from within the Navy Department and from the press rather than from Japan," U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922, 131.

\textsuperscript{137} Braisted noted that, "Neither Wood nor Fiske [were] above using the press to advance" service interests, U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922, 134.

\textsuperscript{138} Braisted, U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922, 134.
Global Conflict, 1914

The last months few months of 1914, following the outbreak of World War I, saw the rise of tensions among many officers of the U.S. Navy. Their fear was not what would happen in the Atlantic theater, rather, their concern emanated from the fact that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance bound Japan and Britain in the event of war. The defensive requirements of the alliance meant that Japan might take action against German interests in East Asia. Those interests ranged from the German naval base on the Shantung Peninsula to the German island territories in the Caroline, Marshall, and Marianas island groups. The islands sat astride the extended sea lanes of communication between the American Pacific coast and the Philippines. Should a potentially hostile power, like Japan, gain control of the strategically located territories, the worst fears of Williams, Staunton, and Fiske would materialize.

Just a few weeks after the outbreak of war in Europe, those fears seemed well justified. By November 1914 Rear Admiral Fiske could write, "[W]e cannot prevent the Japanese from taking the Philippines" after they had taken offensive action in the Pacific.\(^\text{139}\) He referred to the Japanese occupation of the German islands cited above. That occupation arose, in part, from the planning of Akiyama

\(^{139}\) Fiske journal entry, 30 November 1914, cited in Vlahos, Blue Sword, 119.
Saneyuki, Fiske's intellectual counterpart in the Japanese Navy. At the end of 1914, however, American naval planners feared that the Japanese might continue to advance south toward the undefended Philippines.

Though the Japanese Navy had not actually envisioned offensive operations against the United States during its anti-German operations, the capture of the German islands certainly contributed to its sense of security. While the United States had earlier contemplated employing the islands in a war with Japan, the Japanese struck first. With a single stroke, the Japanese Empire advanced its strategic lines of interests eastward, and perched menacingly upon the U.S. Navy's sea lanes of communications to the Philippines. The simple counterstroke at German interests in East Asia dramatically raised the estimated costs the United States would bear in any future conflict. Of interest, the Japanese Navy's Captain Akiyama had planned the operation. Most importantly, in the two year period between August 1914 and August 1916, actions by the two navies solidified "the Concept" for both navies.

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140 Hirama reported that Akiyama drafted the occupation plans, "Taiheiyō no kosei: Akiyama Saneyuki," 190-191.
CHAPTER IX

THE JAPANESE NAVY: PREPARING FOR THE ENEMY, 1907-1914

The War Scare of 1906-1907

[An] almost fatalistic belief in the inevitability of war with the United States... pervaded the ranks of the middle-echelon officers [of the Japanese Navy].

—Asada Sadao, historian, 1973

The San Francisco immigration crisis of 1906-1907, and its associated war scare, forced Japanese naval planners to reconsider their maritime strategies. Following the elimination of Russia's naval power, only one maritime power remained a threat to Japanese interests. Both the U.S. and the Japanese Navies each perceived the other as its definite hypothetical opponent.

In any conflict, regardless of who instigated it, both navies envisioned a Japanese advance against American interests in East Asia (Guam, the Philippines, the Open Door policy). Such a perception proved true finally in 1941. However, in 1907, the Japanese possessed no such plans. Nonetheless, American naval planners expected that a Japanese

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advance upon the Philippine Islands would require approximately thirty days. Any American response required, at a minimum, ninety to one hundred and twenty days after the United States first concentrated its battle fleet in the Atlantic. Then, the fleet would sortie into the Pacific. Such a strategy was not totally unexpected among the planners of the Japanese Navy. In preparation for the eventuality of a numerically superior enemy fleet approaching Japanese waters, the Imperial National Defense Policy, adopted formally in April 1907, included the navy's vaunted "Eight-Eight" fleet plan.

Concurrently, Japan secured a rapprochement with two erstwhile associates, the first, its recent foe Russia, and the second, its treaty ally, Great Britain. In July 1907 the Japanese and Russian governments initialed two sets of documents, one public and the other secret. The parties divided Manchuria economically between themselves. They sought, furthermore, to forestall a third party encroachment upon any of their respective interests.

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Bolstered by the treaties, the Japanese Navy could then argue that the army had little to fear from the Russians. Therefore, the navy continued with its quest to procure a larger force. Such a large fleet seemed necessary to deter offensive operations by the U.S. Navy, listed officially in the secret Imperial Defense Policy as the Japanese Navy's number one hypothetical enemy. If that large fleet proved unable to forestall any aggressive action by the United States, the Japanese Navy possessed what it considered a trump card.

Japan had long sought to draw Britain's assent to closer military and naval cooperation. Such an effort then reemerged simultaneously with their Russian treaty success. In July 1905, the Japanese and British governments had renewed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Both parties understood quite clearly the shift in the balance of power at the end of the Russo-Japanese War. Though the renewal committed the respective navies to discuss combined operations, the Royal Navy viewed cautiously the possibility of such joint fleet operations.

In late 1906 the Japanese government attempted to coordinate any future planning and operations cooperation between the Japan and Britain. That meant, specifically, preparing their respective navies for joint operations. To

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6 Asada, "The Revolt against the Washington Treaty," 83; Toyama, "Years of Transition," 172.
that end, in December 1906 the Japanese government decided to dispatch an official mission to Britain.\(^7\) Baron Yamamoto Gombei, former navy minister, accompanied a member of the royal family and travelled to Britain as the senior naval representative. The mission sought ostensibly to secure a working arrangement with the Royal Navy vis-à-vis combined operations under the terms of the renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance.\(^8\) One leading historian noted that, "The two navies discussed arrangements for co-operation in the event of war." This was a distinct possibility after the rise of tensions between Japan and the United States.\(^9\) The talks in London, however, seemed to produce little, if any, concrete agreement as to what the allied navies might actually do in subsequent operations.

The results of the Russo-Japanese War had forced the British government, and the Royal Navy, to reexamine its relationship with Japan. "As early as March 1906," Britain had delivered a protest to the Japanese for its violations of the Open Door Policy in Manchuria.\(^10\) In the two years prior to Yamamoto’s mission to Britain, the Royal Navy had grown

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\(^8\) Rengo kantai, 1:91-98.


\(^10\) Morley, Japan’s Foreign Policy: 1868-1841, 202.
increasingly nervous about the Japanese Navy. One officer reported, "In years not far distant we shall be quite unable to oppose the Navy of Japan in its own waters. It is best to recognize facts but not always to proclaim them from the housetops."11

Royal Navy planners worried also about the possibility of an Anglo-American conflict if the United States and Japan proved unable to settle peaceably their differences in East Asia. In June 1905, the Royal Navy expected the Japanese to attack the Philippines in the event of an Anglo-American conflict, and by May 1907, thought "American [military] aggression in China unlikely, [but] if it did occur than the Japanese might wish to call the alliance into operation and that would prove an embarrassment to England."12 Senior officers of the Royal Navy raised new concerns. They feared the slight possibility of a Japanese attack upon Britain’s Asian interests should the existing alliance prove inconvenient.13

The Royal Navy, under the leadership of Admiral John Fisher, however, refused to commit itself to operations

13 Royal Navy officers felt that "within 5 years [of 1907] Japan was to become a menace rather than a welcome ally," Gooch, The Plans of War, 193.
outside European waters at a time when the German Navy threatened the Royal Navy's local superiority with Tirpitz's "risk theory." In the months after Yamamotos's visit, Admiral Fisher wrote that he and his Japanese counterpart "arranged all our joint navies are to do in case of war." He did not, however, commit the Royal Navy to any specific obligation to counter the American battle fleet.

Fisher was not ungrateful for the potential services of the Japanese Navy in East Asia. He, however, focussed his attentions elsewhere. At that moment, the First Sea Lord became deeply engaged in the restructuring and modernization of the Royal Navy. That entailed, specifically, the retirement of a large number of older fleet units, and a decision to build new capital ships along the model of the Dreadnought. That new class of warship owed much to the lessons of war. In the estimation of Fisher, Japan's victory at Tsushima also "greatly benefitted the British Empire" by removing one international competitor, Russia, and simultaneously providing Britain the opportunity to concentrate its naval forces in home waters.

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14 Yamamoto met with Admiral John Fisher in late May 1907, Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 357-358.

15 "Admiral Yamamoto had gone to London in September [sic] to consult with the Admiralty," Hart, The Great White Fleet, 33-34. The visit actually took place months earlier.

In any case, the Japanese government refused to commit itself to any operations in defense of British India. Although Russian ambition no longer threatened Japanese interests in East Asia, the sub-continent remained a point of stress between Britain and Russia. The original alliance had provided a cooperative defensive arrangement aimed at Russia in East Asia. Now that Russia's naval power no longer existed, the Japanese urgency seemingly diminished. It was the United States that now threatened Japan's sense of security, but "Britain had made [it] clear that she would not risk a collision with the U.S. fleet."  

As a result of the Anglo-Japanese impasse, the two nations concluded little that threatened the United States. At the same time, one might note that the war "hysteria" present in the United States, and the U.S. Navy, had not permeated the Japanese Navy to the same extent. Interestingly, the U.S. Navy worried about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the possibility of combined operations. Excluded from the confidential process, American naval planners grew concerned about "the uncertain application of the Anglo-Japanese treaty in the case of the probability of war between the United States and Japan."  

17 Dua, Anglo-Japanese Relations, 47-57.  
18 Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 353.  
Following his visit to Britain, Yamamoto journeyed next to the United States. In mid-July 1907 Yamamoto, together with Aoki Suizo, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, went to Oyster Bay, New York, for a formal meeting with President Roosevelt. This meeting took place less than three weeks following Roosevelt's decision to dispatch the sixteen battleships of the Great White Fleet to the Pacific Ocean. The original recommendation to send the battle fleet to the west coast had been made on 18 June 1907. Word of the decision leaked quickly and the public, and the Japanese, knew of it the following day. The New York Herald published on 19 June, and again on 1 July 1907, the fact that the U.S. Navy was deploying a large naval force to Pacific waters. Hence, Roosevelt and Yamamoto had much to discuss.

Scant information, however, exists specifically about the lunchtime discussions, political or military, which transpired between the men. Unfortunately, Roosevelt had invited no representatives of the American Navy or military. The record from the American side relates only that Roosevelt, Aoki, and Yamamoto spoke about the ongoing

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20 Entries, 9 July, 12 July 1907, Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Papers, LCMD; Kato Kanji taisho denki hensankai, 524.

21 The decision-making process may have surprised Roosevelt. Roosevelt to Lodge, 10 July 1907, MRL, 2:709-710. Witherspoon memorandum to Chief of Staff, 29 July 1907, Serial 1260092, "Records of the Adjutant General's Office," RG 94, NARA; Reckner, Great White Fleet, 9-10; Morton, "Military and Naval Preparations for the Defense of the Philippines," 95-104.
immigration questions, though Roosevelt claimed to have "spoken freely" about the forthcoming fleet transfer. The public was not privy to any confidential talk, but many suspected that Roosevelt had lectured the Japanese representatives about the war talk in Japan. The media speculated that the president stood up to the Japanese. The Minneapolis Tribune produced an editorial cartoon lampooning Yamamoto’s visit to Roosevelt, and emphasized the nature of Roosevelt’s known propensity for bluster.

Though Yamamoto Gombei might have avoided any public or private dialogue with other navy officials, one of his subordinates went out of the way to make contact with his American counterparts. Commander Kato Kanji, Yamamoto’s private secretary, proved then, and much later, to be a contributor to the development of "the Concept." Interestingly, Commander Marble in Tokyo had made such an assessment of the officer, noting, "[h]e doubtless has a future, though I do not regard him as a man of much original ability."23


23 Marble, "Prince Pushimi," 07-323/E-7-d; Herein, one must be sure to make every distinction between Japanese officers sharing similar family names. Kato Tomasaburo, future navy minister and prime minister, died in 1923, while Kato Kanji, future chief of the Naval General Staff, died in 1939. Yamamoto Gombei died in 1922, while Yamamoto Isoroku died in 1943.
One might recall that Kato Kanji had apparently grown bitter about the American attempt to annex Hawaii in 1893. He could not have been any happier with the American success in 1898, both at Hawaii and in the Philippines. He seems to have acquired additional bitterness in 1907. Kato joined Baron Yamamoto first in Britain, where the junior officer participated in the discussions with the Royal Navy. Kato travelled with Yamamoto to the United States and in July 1907 Kato faced another American crisis.\(^{24}\) Kato encountered directly the widespread war scare evident in American society and the "widespread feeling in American naval circles that Japan was their future enemy."\(^{25}\) In the United States, Kato came face to face directly with American racist attitudes toward Asians. Kato could not avoid, as well, the recurring press speculation that the United States intended to dispatch an extremely large fleet to Pacific waters.

Coming on the heels of the final approval of the national defense policy, such a number of shocks seemingly reinforced the view in Kato's mind that conflict was inevitable. From that point, Kato Kanji dedicated himself to securing Japan's place as an international naval power. By 1921, Kato proved to be a most determined naval advocate. The naval officer sought to ensure that the Japanese Navy

\(^{24}\) Asada, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Limitation," 143.

\(^{25}\) Asada, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Limitation," 143.
would maintain, at a minimum, a seventy percent ratio against
the U.S. Navy. The "Eight-Eight" fleet expansion program,
inaugurated by Akiyama and Sato, proved most indispensable to
Kato and other like-minded Japanese naval officers.26

Yamamoto and Kato returned to Japan at the moment that
the Japanese Navy started implementing portions of its new
strategy. As the "Eight-Eight" plan projected a force at
seventy percent of American naval strength, there was a need
to ensure parity (1:1) for any decisive engagement. The
Japanese Navy expected such an encounter to occur initially
in the waters between southern Kyushu and Taiwan. Between
1907 and 1914, the Japanese Navy tested its ambush plan in
annual exercises. The Japanese fleet practiced most
diligently the interception of an enemy fleet sailing
northward from the Philippines.27 In expectation of such an
enemy fleet, the navy's preliminary defense plans drew upon
Akiyama's seven-stage Tsushima plan. By 1918, such a
strategy was known as the "interception and attrition"
scheme, or ambush plan. At its heart, the plan sought to

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26 Kato Kanji taisho denki hensankai, 521-523; Asada, "Japanese
Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitation: Kato Tomosaburo vs Kato
Kanji," 141-166, provides the most detailed English-language examination
of Kato Kanji.

27 March to April 1908 dates, Office of Naval Intelligence 214/F-9-C,
1907 and 1908, Naval Attaché Reports, RG 38, NARA; 30 September, 27
October, 11, November, and 20 November, The Japan Times; Tsuichiya
Hiromatsu, "Hajimete Beikoku o sotei tekikoku to suru," Toreo (November
1972):18-21; "W" #128, 7 August 1908, "The Fall Manoeuvres, Japanese
Navy," in 08-655/F-9-c, "Japanese Navy: Fall Maneuvers, 1908," RG 38,
NARA.
secure parity prior to any major fleet encounter and a decisive victory.

To increase the Japanese Navy's chances of success, a defending battle fleet would begin whittling away at an advancing American fleet at some distance well before the site of the decisive engagement. As before the start of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese Navy practiced intercepting an enemy fleet at sea in a decisive engagement. This included the interception of an enemy fleet sailing northward from the vicinity of the Philippine Islands and near the Japanese possession of Taiwan (Figure 8). At that point, however, Japan's naval strategy was shaped more by defensive principles and a defensive/offensive scheme. That strategy would remain so for decades.28

First, though, the Japanese Navy would have to deal with the most significant threat it had yet faced. Theodore Roosevelt had dispatched nearly the entire American battle fleet to the Pacific, ostensibly to conduct a practice cruise. The deployment of sixteen battleships and twelve armored cruisers to the Pacific Ocean, though, seemed to portend more than a practice cruise.

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FIGURE 8
SITE OF DECISIVE BATTLE, 1906-1914
As the war scare reignited in the spring of 1907, word leaked out that the United States was deploying the majority of its capital ship assets to the Pacific. While touted as a long overdue practice exercise, there was little doubt in the minds of most Japanese naval officers that the American action presented a definitive, if not real, threat to the empire's security. When the American battle fleet sailed in early December 1907, the Japanese had much to contemplate.

In April 1908, six months before the Great White Fleet sailed into Japanese waters, the Japanese Navy's attaché in Washington posited quite clearly that "yellow journalism" was the origin of much of the war talk in the United States, and hence, the crisis. Lieutenant Commander Tanaguchi Naomi singled out the Hearst newspapers for the continued reporting of "falsehoods." The chain, however, was not alone in such reporting for other media continued the drumbeat. Tanaguchi reported that the stories seemed to play into the hands of those Americans predisposed to believe the worst of the Japanese. The officer reported further that Theodore Roosevelt planned the dispatch of the American battle fleet to quell any belligerency on the part of the Japanese. Of note, the attaché reported that Senator Borah (R-ID), a leading anti-navalist, resisted the president's request to continue building new battleships. In what seems to be an apparent effort to investigate the U.S. Navy's combat
readiness, Tanaguchi requested and received permission to visit several naval facilities shortly after the immigration crisis and war talk began. In any case, the American fleet continued its trek toward East Asia.

Part of the challenge facing the American battle fleet's world cruise emanated from the activities of the Japanese Navy itself. Although naval exercises had been announced previously, tensions rose as the American battle fleet left American waters in December 1907, and then neared Japan in October 1908. Japanese officers were irritated to have their "hypothetical enemy" nearing the home islands at a time when tensions were high. In the first naval exercises carried out after the implementation of the national defense policy, there exists strong evidence that the Japanese Navy sought to practice not only the interception of an enemy fleet sailing north from the Philippine Islands but the seventy percent ratio as well. Starting in September 1907, the exercises focussed upon an enemy fleet approaching Japan from the Southwest, specifically, the Philippine Islands. Most importantly, Akiyama Saneyuki, then at the Naval Staff

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29 Asada cited Tanaguchi's report in "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitation," 143, 162; Tanaguchi's entire report is published in Shinohara, Kaigun sosetsushi, 503-507; see Tanaguchi to Captain William L. Rodgers, 25 October 1906, Case 7693, Office of Naval Intelligence, RG 38, NARA.
College, took advantage of the exercises to test the new Japanese strategy.\textsuperscript{30}

While the event seemed most ominous for the American battle fleet, the Japanese had announced on the day before the Great White Fleet’s departure from Hampton Roads that it would hold a series of naval exercises in the succeeding months.\textsuperscript{31} Though the Japanese fleet deployment was not aimed at the Asian-bound American fleet, the exercises seemingly posed such a threat. "[I]t can be seen that the [Japanese Navy] was exercising plans for operations against a naval force moving north from the Philippines," and inevitably Japan had chosen to prepare for the American Navy.\textsuperscript{32}

On 6 December 1907 Japanese newspapers reported that the exercises would begin in March 1907. Though not officially promulgated, the fleet units scheduled to participate in the exercises were divided between the two forces so as to effect the seventy percent ratio.\textsuperscript{33} A month later Japanese newspapers announced that the Japanese Navy would hold grand

\textsuperscript{30} "W" #187, 21 December 1907, wherein the seventy percent ratio (3:2) is evident, as is the case for "W" #31, 14 March 1907, both found in "Japanese Naval War College," JNT 106, 1910, RG 8, NHC; Tanaka Hiromi, "Sono so no Akiyama Saneyuki," in Oide, \textit{Akiyama Saneyuki no subete}, 145; ASK, 159.

\textsuperscript{31} "W" #175, 9 December 1907, "Manoeuvres [sic]---Japan", "W" #17, 6 February 1907, "Manoeuvres [sic]", "W" #34, 8 March 1908, "Manoeuvres [sic]", "W" #51, 29 March 1908, "Spring Manoeuvres [sic]," in 08-214/F-9-C, RG 38, NARA.

\textsuperscript{32} Reckner, \textit{Great White Fleet}, 119.

\textsuperscript{33} "W" #175, 9 December 1907, "Manoeuvres [sic]---Japan."
That announcement appeared before President Roosevelt accepted an offer (March 1908) from the Japanese government welcoming a visit by the Great White Fleet in autumn of that year. The ominous press reports in Japan made clear that the navy's exercises were unofficially tied to the American fleet's journey. The press reported that "the enemy is supposed to appear in the southwest of Kyushu Island, coming from the direction of the Philippine Islands." Just three weeks after Roosevelt accepted the Japanese request for a fleet visit, the Japanese press reported more details of the Japanese Navy's pre-announced exercises. Suspiciously, the exercises were scheduled to occur at approximately the same time that the Great White Fleet was due to arrive in Japanese waters. Japanese officers knew that, "the enemy's fleet will come from the south of [Taiwan]."

Apparenty, the Japanese Navy wanted to hold the exercises in the Bashi Channel, the straits between Taiwan and the northern Philippines. Fearing an increase in war talk, the Japanese Navy argued, "but then Japan may be

34 "W" #17, 6 February 1907, "Manoeuvres [sic]," reported both the Spring and Autumn exercises.

35 Translation of story in Jiji Shimpo, 2 March 1908, (emphasis added), "W" #34, 8 March 1908, "Manoeuvres [sic]."

36 Translation from Kaikoku Nippo, 18 April 1908, in "W" #72, 24 April 1908, "Fall Manoeuvres [sic] (1908)," in 08-214/F-9-c, RG 38, NARA.
suspected that she selected the place for manoeuvres expecting an enemy." The Japanese Navy decided to hold the exercises in the waters between northern Taiwan and southern Kyushu. That location was, incidentally, where the naval planners expected a decisive engagement to occur.

While the scheduled exercises were widely known in various departments of the U.S. Navy, many officers seemingly chose to ignore the early announcements of the scheduled exercises. The officers attributed offensive intent to the Japanese. Fortunately, as the Great White Fleet neared Japanese waters, an outbreak of influenza incapacitated a major portion of the Japanese Navy's fleet personnel. Unable to operate more than a small number of warships, the Japanese Navy judiciously postponed its full scale exercises until the crews had fully recovered. Coincidentally, that recovery occurred after the American fleet had departed Japan.  

Publicly, the attitude of the Japanese government and Navy certainly lacked a sense of urgency as to the approach of the American battle fleet. Surprisingly, the government did not even not crack down upon any public reporting of the Japanese Navy's specific details of the scheduled exercises. For example, one Tokyo newspaper reported not only the identities of participating fleet commanders and units, but

37 "W" #72, 24 April 1908, "Fall Manoeuvres [sic] (1908)."
38 Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence, 84.
strangely enough, part of the navy's strategy. Clear
evidence that in 1908 the Japanese Navy was testing the
seventy percent ratio advocated by Sato and Akiyama came from
newspapers. One article reported that the "attacking and
defensive fleets will be formed with the ratio of 6 against
4 in force."\(^9\) That disposition matched the seventy percent
ratio enunciated in 1906.

In any case, by the time the Great White Fleet returned
to Hampton Roads, Virginia, in February 1909, it was beyond
any shadow of a doubt that the Japanese Navy had fully
subscribed to the seventy percent ratio. The Japanese
defensive scheme included the concept of the "interception
and attrition" as the strategy for dealing with the U.S.
Navy.

The two nations had temporarily effected a peaceful
solution to the immigration crisis and the war scare. Both
of the respective naval services knew, however, that conflict
preparations were nothing to short change. Part of the
challenge in the succeeding decades revolved around how each
nation sought to acquire sufficient and adequate naval
assets. The challenge included, as well, how the government
leaders of each nation solved recurrent immigration, anti-
Japanese movements in the United States, and any Japanese

\(^9\) The Japan Times, 30 September 1908. The ratio was repeated again
in the same paper on 27 October 1907, after the departure of the Great
White Fleet.
threats to the Open Door. Such challenges remained difficult to solve. It is certain that in the period between 1906 and 1909, both the American and Japanese Navies had laid the foundation for future strategic planning. While the relationship between the two nations remained tense, clear rationales existed to ensure the inculcation of strategic precepts. Although events up to the start of World War One never forced the United States to deploy significant naval power to East Asia, both naval powers never looked at alternative strategies. That proved true even after the departure of such a strategic elite like Akiyama Saneyuki.

The Road to Global Conflict

Akiyama Saneyuki remained an active participant in the Japanese Navy's affairs after 1909, filling a variety of staff and command positions. He commanded three cruisers, served another tour at the Naval Staff College, produced a volume on naval strategy, held a high position in the navy's infrastructure and visited Europe and America during the First World War.\(^\text{40}\) Suffering from ill-health, Akiyama curtailed his activities in late 1917. His unexpected early

\(^{40}\) "W" #87, #127, 0787/E-7-d, Naval Attaché Reports, RG 38, NARA; "W" #123, 5 December 1911, 210/F-9-c, Naval Attaché Reports, RG 38, NARA; "Japan Naval Organization," JNO, 1914-1922, RG 8, NHC.
death in 1918, removed a voice of experience and reason as well as a moderate temperament.

The Japanese Navy filled that void, and more nationalistic naval officers slowly exerted an influence. The 1921-1922 Washington Naval Limitation Conference limited Japan's capital ship tonnage to sixty percent of the Anglo-American totals, the infamous 5:5:3 formula. This proved unacceptable to many numbers of naval officers, but the Japanese Navy was forced to accept the disparity, albeit grudgingly. Pro-treaty officers argued that it was sufficient for defensive purposes after the Americans agreed not to fortify further their Asian possessions, or to maintain the status quo.

For those officers, whom one historian called conservative "hot-blooded young officers," it was the planning for the decisive encounter with the U.S. Navy that beleaguered them for the subsequent four decades. The need to overcome a superior American fleet troubled naval planners throughout the succeeding decades. Such concern led planners later to tinker with the defensive aspects of the "interception and attrition" concept. They made it an

41 5 February 1918, The Japan Times. One headline of that date called Akiyama the "reputed best tactician in the Japanese Navy."


43 Asada, "Japanese Admirals," 149.

44 Asada, "Japanese Admirals", 150.
offensive weapon against the threat of a westward-bound American fleet. The planners sought as well to move the site of the decisive battle further and further eastward. This was a quality exemplified best by the attack upon Pearl Harbor in 1941, designed to substantially negate the American superiority in capital ships. Yamamoto Isoroku’s plan envisioned his battle fleet engaging a much weaker American force in a decisive battle in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands.\footnote{Reynolds noted Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku moved the decisive battle to Hawaii, “Continental Strategy,” 69-71; Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, 83-84.}

The divergence from Akiyama’s original defensive concept contributed, in part, to the annihilation of the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Second World War. While Akiyama draws little interest in the West, he remains respected by subsequent Japanese naval historians. His status as a true naval hero and planner remind many that at one time the Japanese Navy dominated the western Pacific and posed a significant threat to the naval assets of hostile powers. One can argue that Akiyama’s successors in the Imperial Navy proved up to the high standards he set down, but a counter-argument comes from former service members. As a remorseful tribute to Akiyama’s legacy, surviving officers spoke of
their longing for an individual of Akiyama's capabilities and talents. Unfortunately, none was available.

The seventy percent ratio formula later strained Japanese-American naval relations. The strain manifested itself quite prominently after 1916. Japanese officers expressed vehement opposition to any restrictions on implementation of the ratio and fleet expansion programs. American officers, meanwhile, fought to maintain the navy's qualitative superiority, and resisted efforts to limit building programs. That resistance contributed eventually to increased tensions, a naval race, and the threat of war.

Though unexpected, the onset of a European conflict in August 1914 presented opportunities and challenges to the United States and Japan. For the Japanese Navy, several of the members of the strategic elite would re-emerge in stronger and more public roles. Though substantial documentary evidence is lacking, one Japanese historian has provided a tantalizing tidbit related to American-Japanese relations during the war and up to the Washington Conference. Akiyama Saneyuki supported and may have prepared the Japanese Navy's plans for the conquest and occupation of German territories in the western Pacific. One historian cited Akiyama as the "promoter of the occupation" of the German territories. Japan's control of those locations would most

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46 Toyama, "Years of Transition," 179; Hata, Showa shi no gunjitchi, 110-111.
certainly challenge the American ability to defend its interests in East Asia, primarily the Philippine Islands. A subsequent discussion will deal with the mixed-motives held by both services.47

CHAPTER X
FINALE: HYPOTHETICAL ENEMIES

The World War: 1914-1916

Suddenly released from the restraints of peace, Japanese [naval] power spread rapidly [to capture enemy territories].¹
—William R. Braisted, historian, 1971

It is understood that the new possessions are coveted more for [naval] purposes than for trade. A glance will show how important they are from a [naval] viewpoint, since they cover a large area between Hawaii and the Philippines.²
—Edward T. Williams, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, 1917

Of all of the events that occurred between the war scare of 1907, with the dramatic dispatch of a grand American battle fleet to East Asia, and the end of World War I in 1918, two stand out as contributing to the solidification of "the Concept." The first emanated from the Japanese response to the outbreak of war in 1914. The actions involved the dramatic movement of Japan's strategic lines of interest nearly two thousand miles nearer to the United States. Even more threatening, the Japanese Navy now sat astride the sea lanes of communications between the United States and the

² Williams memorandum, 711.94/426, 20 July 1917, "Resume of Certain Outstanding Questions between the United States and Japan," Records of the Department of State Relating to the Political Relations Between the United States and Japan, 1910-1923, M423, NARA.
Philippines. Furthermore, the Japanese Navy operated in an unrestrained manner throughout the entire Pacific Ocean.

Clearly, the skillful exercise of diplomatic initiative by Japan's representatives proved most rewarding. Japan had declared war on Germany on a false premise. Japan deliberately misrepresented the defensive provisions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. As a result, Japanese warships began operating from British naval bases. One was within visual distance of the United States. Esquimalt Naval Base, Victoria, British Columbia, was located on the Straits of Juan de Fuca. Directly opposite lie the small town of Port Angeles, Washington.

The second event, though not actually driven by the Japanese movement in 1914, arose from a fear that the United States might require a substantial increase in the size of its battle fleet as a result of the war. In 1916, the careers of Admirals Fiske, who retired that year, and Akiyama, who exercised less and less influence on the Japanese Navy, reached their finales. In 1916, the United States government appropriated the funds to build sixteen new capital ships, listed as superdreadnoughts. Added to the existing units, the increase threatened the Japanese Navy's long held minimum standard of seventy percent. Should the U.S. Navy actually acquire the projected vessels, it would field a battle fleet of thirty-five dreadnought type capital ships to the Japanese Navy's expected sixteen, or more than
a two to one advantage. At the end of 1916, both navies could thus sense a significant sea change. Each recognized that the other was definitely their primary hypothetical enemy.

Japan perceived the outbreak of the war in Europe as a chance to consolidate its position in East Asia. The Asian power sought to advance its political and economic interests into China and Manchuria. That, of course, would conflict with the interests of the Western powers. Of the major world powers, only the United States remained aloof from the European war and, thus, the only possible obstacle to Japanese ambitions. Initially, the major powers wished to limit the war to Europe. Fear of German naval activity against British interests in Asia triggered, under provisions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the entry of Japan into the war. The alliance was a defensive arrangement for East Asia, since neither party agreed to any other regional stipulation. Should either signatory be attacked by a third party, the alliance provisions obliged the other to come to its assistance. Though the European conflict had not yet spread to Asia, the British government forwarded a request for limited action against German targets in Asia. The British rationale arose from the German naval presence in Asia, a potential, if overrated, threat to Britain's Pacific interests. The British expected Japan to confine their naval operations to East Asia. The Japanese government, however,
recognized "the advantages of raising Japan's status." That objective proved easily accomplished by negating the German threat throughout the Pacific. Thereafter, the Japanese felt free to operate anywhere. Furthermore, Japan perceived the tangible rewards of making war on Germany, primarily territorial acquisition.

In the early weeks of the war, the American government tried to get the belligerents to neutralize "foreign settlements," specifically, the economic concessions in China. In addition, the United States sought to prevent the extension of war to other parts of the Pacific. Through that stratagem, the Wilson administration hoped to protect any number of American interests.4

It appeared certain that the war's spread throughout Asia would, in itself, disrupt normal relations and threaten a shift in the strategic situation, especially as the American representative in Tokyo reported "Japan's intention to seize all German possessions" in the Pacific.5 The British were, however, willing to maintain the status quo in China only. The position arose from the increased risk of

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5 George Guthrie to Bryan, 10 August 1914, Papers Relating to the Foreign Policy of the United States, 1914, supplement, 165, (hereafter FRUS).
German raiders operating throughout a vast area of operations.⁶

Germany agreed to neutralize the Far East if Britain agreed, and "proposed a mutual withdrawal of warships in Eastern waters" if both Britain and Japan agreed. Germany informed Japan that it had no desire for war with that state, an understandable sentiment in light of Germany's military weakness in the Pacific.⁷ Neither Britain nor Japan wanted limits on their freedom of action and, as a result, neither party accepted a wider area of neutralization. As an additional justification, the allies argued that Germany had already engaged in intensive war preparations that endangered the peace in the Far East. Such work, carried out in the facilities of the German naval base at Tsingtao, led eventually to a British request on 7 August 1914 that Japan begin operations against German armed merchant men, though the German naval forces in Asia had not carried out any offensive operations. The British recognized that such activity would constitute an act of war. Japan agreed to the British request but refused to limit its actions solely to East Asia or only to "the hunting out and destruction of


⁷ Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-1921, 105.
hostile merchant cruisers."® Quite simply, the Japanese Navy expected to operate freely anywhere in the Pacific.

On 13 August, Britain concurred in the Japanese government's decision to enter the war against Germany. Though the British hoped that their erstwhile ally would practice some restraint, there was little Whitehall could do to foster such behavior. The British government had hoped to acquire the German Pacific island territories before the Japanese moved on them, but such proved impossible. As long as the German maritime threat remained alive in the Pacific, Japanese naval power proved indispensable. British, and American, misgivings became realistic as soon as Japan became a belligerent.

Japan presented Germany with an ultimatum on 15 August 1914. The Japanese expected Germany to withdraw immediately, or to disarm, all German men-of-war present in Pacific waters. Japan considered it "highly important and necessary to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East."® That same day, Japan's Foreign Minister, Baron Kato Takeji, informed the American Ambassador in Tokyo, George Guthrie, that Japan would not pursue territorial aggrandizement as a result of war. Furthermore, the Japanese

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® Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922, 3:30. Though Japan had not agreed to any geographic limitations, the Times reported such a restriction, 18 August 1914.

® Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922, 3:30-31, 54. On the same day, the Japan Weekly Times (Tokyo) announced that Germany intended to escalate the war throughout the Pacific.
government declared its determination not to infringe upon
the interests of other powers. In any case, on 23 August
the Japanese declared war against Germany and began offensive
operations on 2 September. Such operations included striking
at Germany’s Pacific island territories, the Mariana,
Caroline, and Marshall Islands, as well as pursuing any
German naval assets throughout the Pacific.

It was such actions that worried American naval planners
and delighted their Japanese counterparts. Both groups of
planners had examined earlier the possibility of using the
German territories to their advantage. The U.S. Navy,
drawing upon the earlier planning of Commander Clarence S.
Williams, envisioned the violation of international law by
using the islands as potential refueling sites during any
effort to relieve the Philippines. Such sites included
locations in the Caroline and Marshall Islands, and islands
off the coast of German New Guinea. Williams had considered,
as well, using sites under British, French, and Dutch
control. In late 1912, the General Board authorized an
investigation "with a view to selecting suitable anchorages"

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11 See Office of Naval Intelligence Register #4669, "Japanese Policy
re Territory Occupied During War of 1914," RG 38, NARA.

12 Williams, "Proposed Routes Between the Pacific Coast and the
Philippines," November 1907, General Board War Portfolios, War Portfolio
No. 3, RG 80, NARA.
for a battle fleet approaching the Western Pacific. In any case, the U.S. Navy had done little actual survey work by the start of the world war.\textsuperscript{14}

The Japanese Navy, drawing upon the work of Captain Akiyama Saneyuki, appreciated the strategic value of the islands. The Japanese had cast a covetous eye upon the islands as early as 1890. The Spanish government had then asserted its territorial interests. Following the Spanish-American War, the German Empire bought the Spanish islands, thus thwarting Japan's territorial ambitions. Those ambitions, however, had not diminished in the subsequent years.

Captain Akiyama had foreseen an opportunity to "clear in one clean sweep" the German naval forces in the islands and capture the territories. Apparently, he and other naval planners at the Naval Staff College had contemplated that possibility. Straddling the sea lanes of communication between Hawaii and the Philippines, the Japanese Navy recognized that the ex-German islands posed a clear threat to American command of the sea.\textsuperscript{15} The threat arose from the

\textsuperscript{13} Dewey to Meyer, "Examination of Islands, Caroline and Marshall Groups," 20 November 1912, GB 409, RG 80, NARA; see Miller, War Plan Orange, 91-99.

\textsuperscript{14} See Rear Admiral Charles E. Vreeland to Captain T.S. Rodgers, 22 November 1912, GB 409, GB 80, NARA; Rodgers to Wainwright, 25 November 1912, GB 409, GB 80, NARA; Rear Admiral W.H.H. Southerland to Meyer, 4 December 1912, GB 409, GB 80, NARA.

\textsuperscript{15} In 1911, the Japanese Navy had again considered the possibility of operations against American interests in Asia, and the Philippine Islands, see Ren\textsuperscript{2}ok\textsuperscript{3} kantai, 1:132-134, 138-139, 175-176.
potential forward deployment of Japanese naval forces and the increased costs to the United States should it seek to force its way through the hostile territory (Figure 9). Though uncredited by earlier historians, one retired Japanese naval officer cited Akiyama as the driving force behind the Japanese Navy's occupation plans.¹⁶

The Japanese moved quickly against the German islands. By November 1914, the Japanese Navy had occupied all German-held islands north of the equator, no small achievement logistically. British, Australian, and New Zealander forces secured those islands south of the equator.¹⁷ Though the Japanese government had professed publicly that it sought no permanent territorial acquisition, such a declaration quickly proved suspect. The Japanese government, and army and naval officials, argued that military necessity required the consolidation of Japan's martial control. Moving quickly, the Japanese sealed off the formerly German-held islands from any possible foreign intervention.¹⁸ In the United States, Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, then Aide for Operations, understood the implications for the United States should

¹⁶ Hirama, "Taiheiyo no kosei: Akiyama Saneyuki," 190-191; idem., "Sansen to kaigun," in Hirama, Daiichiii taisen to Nihon kaigun (Tokyo: Boei kenkyu senshibu, 1989), 6. I suspect that Akiyama contemplated such planning during his third tour at the Naval Staff College from December 1912 to April 1914, though Nomura cites no specific duties, "Tai-Bei-Ei kaisen to kaigun no tai-Bei nanawari shiso," 26, 33.

¹⁷ 21 November 1914, Japan Weekly Times.

¹⁸ "W" #82, 30 October 1914, "Japanese Activities in the South Sea Islands," in ONI register #4669, "Japanese Policy re Territory Occupied During War of 1914," NARA.
FIGURE 9
SITES FOR A DECISIVE BATTLE, 1915-1916
Japan continue its advance. He worried, as well, about the possible threat of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The officer noted that the Japanese advance "increases our difficulties in the Pacific," and noted that "it must have been done with Britain's approval."\(^{19}\)

So obvious were those moves that other American naval planners grasped the strategic implications. Should the Japanese retain the islands, any trans-oceanic trek to the Philippines faced a substantial number of dangers. The Japanese could base major naval units and submarines in the islands and threaten an American battle fleet.\(^{20}\) Akiyama's embryonic "interception and attrition" concept would reach full fruition with the acquisition of the former German islands. In support of that assertion, one current historian noted, "At about the time of World War I, the navy formulated a strategy of 'interception-attrition operations.'"\(^{21}\)

Between 1905 and 1914, the Japanese Navy had contemplated the prospect of such operations in the waters near the Japanese home islands. With Japan's territorial frontier, and strategic interests, advanced further eastward, a change was possible. The Japanese Navy could pursue a policy of

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\(^{19}\) Fiske diary entry, 6 October 1914, LCMD.

\(^{20}\) Such a new strategy was documented in a chronological table by Hata Ikuhiko, "Meijiki iko ni okeru Nichi-Bei taiheiyo senryaku no hensen," *Kokusai seisi* 2 (1967), 104.

attritional warfare in the former German possessions. The policy stood a better chance of deterring, if not actually defeating, the U.S. Navy.\textsuperscript{22}

The Japanese hunt for German raiders in the Pacific led to complications. Such naval operations only increased the suspicions of American naval officers. One incident related to that Japanese aggressiveness clearly proved a cause for concern. Exercising a wide-ranging area of operations, the Japanese Navy pursued enemy assets to the Eastern Pacific. The Japanese Navy used bases in Canada and in the Galapagos Islands to hunt down German raiders. The first Japanese warships operated from Canadian waters in early September 1914.\textsuperscript{23} Overall, the threat posed by German raiders proved somewhat overstated. Nonetheless, Britain continued to pursue any possibility that the threat remained viable. Japanese warships assisted in that effort. In mid-December 1914, the Japanese armored cruiser \textit{Asama}, which had been supposedly searching for such German raiders, ran aground in Turtle Bay, also known as San Bartolomé, a protected harbor in Mexico, on the Baja California peninsula and 400 miles

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Hata, "Meijiki iko ni okeru Nichi-Bei taiheiyo senryaku no hensen," 104.
\item see "Esquimalt Naval Base," File 8000, Naval Historical Section, Naval Headquarters, HMCS Naden, Department of National Defence, Kingston, Ontario, Canada; Braisted, \textit{U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922}, 164. One might note that the Galapagos belonged to Peru, but that no protests were delivered by the United States.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
south of San Diego. While the dates of the actual grounding are in dispute, there is no doubt that the Japanese vessel had violated the territorial integrity of Mexico. The Japanese warship apparently ran aground on 14 December 1914, and the U.S. Navy knew almost immediately, receiving an official report in January 1915. To this day, the Japanese have refused to acknowledge much about the grounding and still assert that *Asama* ran aground as late as 4 February 1915. The grounding, however, remained unannounced for months.

While the incident did not raise any immediate alarms, an enterprising reporter from the *Los Angeles Times* managed to hear of the story and travelled to the bay. Reports abounded that the Japanese had established a naval base there. Albert Nathan, a west coast journalist, provided a number of lurid headlines and photographs that seem to indicate as much. Nathan pointed out that the Japanese Navy's presence in the bay consisted of four cruisers, including *Asama*, and one collier, while the Royal Navy contributed three colliers. Apparently, Secretary Daniels

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26 14 April, 16 April, 17 April, 18 April, 20 April, *Los Angeles Times*. 
and President Wilson had known of the grounding. For whatever reason, the administration preferred to avoid any public dialogue.

One rumor, however, seemed to indicate that the Japanese government had dispatched the warship to keep watch on the recently opened Panama Canal. The warship was supposed to pressure the United States at the moment that Japan forced the Chinese government to accept the infamous "21 Demands." Japan had been looking for an excuse to extend its control to larger areas of China, and the European war provided the timely distraction. The demands upon China were Japan's designed to secure it's "paramount interests [and were] an expression of a policy of continental expansion." Japan's earlier efforts proved fruitless, owing to the international balance of power in China.

The rumors about Japan's intentions were far-fetched, but to American naval officers the implications of Japanese warships nosing around in Mexican waters proved unnerving. Furthermore, the failure of the Wilson Administration to protest the violation of Mexico's neutrality seemed odd to

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concerned naval officers. One reason for the administration to downplay the grounding might have originated in a crisis in European waters, the sinking of the civilian liner Lusitania off Ireland in May 1915. Wilson, however, had known of the Turtle Bay affair at least three weeks before the Lusitania disaster. In any case, no evidence exists that the Japanese had intended to pressure the United States as to the "21 Demands."

Nonetheless, American naval officers had much to suspect on the basis of Japanese naval activity in the Pacific. Simultaneously, the U.S. Navy began preparing plans for a massive expansion. Though not aimed explicitly at the Japanese Navy, Japanese naval planners, including Akiyama Saneyuki, could speculate otherwise. Such an expansion had worried Akiyama even before the United States officially promulgated any new construction program.

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29 Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence, 100; Braisted, U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922, 164-166.

30 Coincidentally, the Japanese pressured the Chinese government to accept the earlier diplomatic initiative on the same day, Reinsch to Bryan, 9 May 1915, FRUS 1915, 145.

31 On 4 February 1914, Secretary Daniels had ordered the U.S. Navy to "make inquiry and report as to the operations of the Japanese," after Rear Admiral Chauncey Thomas had notified the department in January 1915 of the grounding incident, 17 April 1915, New York Times. Daniels was a close confidant of the president, and kept the Secretary of State informed about the incident, Braisted, U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 164-165.

The proverbial final "straw" for the Japanese Navy proved to be a culmination of one facet of the "large policy." A greatly increased American naval battle fleet, in the Mahanian tradition, had long been the American Navy's goal. That prospect worried Japanese naval planners. Akiyama expressed such sentiments. Influenced by the outbreak of war in 1914, the General Board began to reexamine America's naval requirements. Between August 1914 and May 1916, however, President Wilson, and his service secretary, Josephus Daniels, resisted any effort to expand greatly the U.S. Navy. Wilson held out hope that he might be able to influence the belligerents through diplomacy and his example of the United States as a great neutral. Fate, manifested in a number of events, forced a change of mind.

One of the most egregious factors proved to be the Royal Navy's continued interference in American commerce and trade with Europe. Britain saw itself engaged in a life or death struggle with Germany. Possessed of the world's prime naval force, the British government proved flexible in its interpretation of international law. Primarily, the Royal Navy served as Britain's legal instrument of policy in enforcing what it considered its rights as a belligerent.

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Through the use of orders in council, various declarations and subterfuges, Britain aimed to isolate Germany from any international transactions.  

Between August 1914 and August 1916, the Royal Navy detained a great number of American flag vessels presumably conducting illegal trade with Germany and its allies. This was particularly galling, for the war had brought about a significant shift in international carrying trade to the American merchant fleet. American commercial interests and the administration, frustrated at Britain's tactics, grew increasingly troubled by the prospect of a victorious post-war British Empire. Quite simply, Americans suspected that Britain might threaten the United States in order to recover its pre-1914 commercial domination.

Wilson, though, had another reason to worry about the post-war environment. In late May 1916, the world's leading naval power, Britain, intercepted the major battle fleet of the world's second leading naval power, Germany. In a seemingly stalemated engagement, the Battle of Jutland, the Royal Navy drove the German fleet back to port. The Royal Navy, however, suffered a number of important losses,

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primarily, the destruction of three battlecruisers and the
crippling of three others, among the most powerful capital
ships in the Royal Navy. After June 1916, the German battle
fleet never again sortied in great strength. The damage to
the Royal Navy's prestige, however, carried repercussions all
the way to the United States.\(^8\)

Woodrow Wilson, already infuriated at the British
violation of American freedom of the seas, had to deal with
the possibility of a German victory in the world war. The
sinking of British capital ships at Jutland raised a new
specter, the possibility of a weakening British wartime
effort. That concern arose from another naval effort.

The German use of a relatively new weapon, the
submarine, seemed destined to dramatically shift the tide of
war. Should the Royal Navy continue to suffer casualties at
the same rate, eventually the Germans would isolate Britain
and force the island nation to surrender. Such a victory
would leave the United States as the only remaining major
democratic state. Wilson expressed bitter dissatisfaction at
the Royal Navy's wartime effort, specifically, the failure of
the world's leading maritime power to decisively win the
drawn out war. The president feared, as well, that the
German Navy would accumulate any surviving Royal Navy units

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\(^8\) Concise examinations of the battle are found in Eric Grove, Fleet
to Fleet Encounters: Tsushima, Jutland, Philippine Sea (London: Arms and
Armour Press, 1991), and John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The
and then sally forth to challenge the United States in the
western hemisphere.\textsuperscript{39}

The possibility of a German victory had been an ominous
notion contemplated by a number of Anglophiles, including
influential public figures like Theodore Roosevelt, Alfred
Mahan, and Henry Cabot Lodge. They, and other, had been
hammering at Wilson’s supposed pacifist ideology, but the
effort assumed increased emphasis in 1916, an election year.
Acting to counter accusations of a perceived lack of
preparedness, the administration threw its weight behind a
naval expansion plan advocated by the General Board.\textsuperscript{40}
Clearly, Wilson worried as a result of Jutland, and its long-
term effects upon American security.

What did the General Board seek? Naval planners argued
that the United States should prepare for a new international
environment and the possibility of challenges in both the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Quite simply, the U.S. Navy
sought assets to sustain separate battle fleets in each ocean
able to deter potential challenges. Though, as early as
1903, the General Board argued for a battle fleet of forty-
eight capital ships, such an expansion proved unsatisfactory


to both the administration and a number of congressional leaders.\textsuperscript{41}

Seeking, instead, a navy second to none the General Board urged the administration to accept a more moderate expansion program spread over seven years. Influenced by the Anglo-German naval stalemate, the administration slowly shifted its support to such a naval expansion. The U.S. Navy, however, expressed a greater sense of urgency, as it seemed that the Japanese Navy was itself intent upon acquiring a number of new capital ships after 1906.

Originally, the Japanese Navy, pushed by Kato Tomasaburo, Akiyama Saneyuki, and Sato Tetsutaro, sought the construction of the "Eight-Eight program, that was, eight battleships and eight battlecruisers to counter the U.S. Navy's projected total of twenty-four (Figure 10). Unable to finance fully the vaunted "Eight-Eight" fleet program between 1907 and 1916, the Japanese government accepted a number of interim proposals. Although the Japanese government had inadvertently announced the larger program in 1911, the Japanese Navy settled first for an "Eight-Six" program and then, an "Eight-Four" program.\textsuperscript{42}


In light of the Japanese plans for expansion, American naval planners argued for a battle fleet twice as large as that possessed by Japan. The then existing international situation and the uncertain status of the post-war world portended difficult times. Thus, the United States Congress authorized one of the largest naval expansion bills in American history. President Wilson went further than the U.S. Navy had argued, persuading a majority of both houses of Congress to pass the Naval Bill of 31 August 1916. Under the bill's provisions, the United States would finance the construction of ten super dreadnoughts and six battlecruisers. Congress ordered that the vessels be completed in three years, as opposed to the General Board's original timetable of seven years. This dramatic expansion proved threatening to the existing status quo.

The Japanese Navy made note of the probable consequences. Observers expected that the new American warships would operate with the U.S. Navy's existing dreadnought era battleships then in service. That raised the possibility of the U.S. Navy eventually possessing thirty-five capital ships to Japan's planned sixteen, or a numerical superiority of more than two to one (Figure 11). ToJapanese naval planners, the American program aimed clearly to deter

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<td>South Dakota</td>
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**FIGURE 10**  
USN CAPITAL SHIPS TO 1915
Pre-1916 Dreadnoughts

Class     Name
Tennessee: Tennessee, California
New Mexico: New Mexico, Mississippi, Idaho
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania, Arizona
Nevada: Nevada, Oklahoma
New York: New York, Texas
Wyoming: Wyoming, Arkansas
Florida: Florida, Utah
Delaware: Delaware, North Dakota
South Carolina: South Carolina, Michigan

1916 Program Battleships and Battlecruisers

Colorado: Colorado, Maryland, Washington, West Virginia
South Dakota: South Dakota, Indiana, Montana, North Carolina, Iowa, Massachusetts
Lexington: Lexington, Saratoga, Constellation, Ranger, Constitution, United States

Total 35

USN vs IJN Ratios, 1906-1916

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<thead>
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<th>IJN Capital Ships</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
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FIGURE 11
1916 NAVAL PROGRAM AND RATIOS, 1906-1916
Japan, not Germany. Rear Admiral Akiyama quickly plotted the tangible threat to Japan. Though his figures differed slightly, there could be no doubt in his mind that the Japanese Navy's number one hypothetical enemy possessed the resources and the political will to overwhelm the Japanese Navy.44

Ironically, Akiyama, cited as the champion of striking Germany's Pacific interests,45 seemed not to recognize his own role in constructing this component of "the Concept." Clearly, the Japanese Navy's operations in the central and eastern Pacific created a part of the rationale for the American passage of a naval bill. In another irony, Akiyama, who had travelled to the United States during the 1897 Hawaii crisis, was again in America at the time the Naval Bill of 1916 became law.46

Conclusion

When first I proposed an examination of the role of naval officers, particularly, junior planning officers, in the contingency planning process during period before 1922, I quickly discovered that little had been published in this

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44 Akiyama, "Beikoku kaigun no tai kakuchō," in Murakami, [Kaigun Gundan], 281-284.


46 Akiyama transited through the United States after an official tour in Europe, Japan Times, 31 October 1916.
area. More interesting, I received the cautionary warning that, due to their junior rank, such planners generally received little, if any, credit for their contributions to national security. That admonition proved true, as well, for foreign naval officers, in this case, those of the Japanese Navy. Part of the problem seemed to be the glaring lack of any official examinations of such individuals.

While the history of the U.S. Navy has received considerable scholarly attention, it seemed that the role and impact of such subordinates merited further investigation. One can find countless autobiographies, biographies, and monographs of important American naval officers, but few, if any, of the junior officers who did their research and staff work, and otherwise supported their careers. What I had hoped to document was the long-term influence and impact of junior planning officers in the period before the Washington Conference. That included, in part, their own subsequent careers as senior officers. Utilizing the often overlooked resources of the U.S. Naval War College and the National Archives, I have documented the importance of a number of junior American naval officers who played important roles in shaping planning.

As to the Japanese naval officers examined herein, none penned his own autobiography. Furthermore, there exist very

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47 Frank Uhlig to Rivera, 23 August 1993.
few biographies about the officers in question, either in English or Japanese. In the American repositories, however, I found substantial evidence of the impact of one Japanese officer, Akiyama Saneyuki, on both American and Japanese naval planning. In addition, I benefitted from the professional assistance of Japanese historians and experts, both in the United States and in Japan. Finally, with the generous and patient support of a number of professionals and fellow students, I conducted a limited but rewarding foray through Japanese language materials.

For this study, I began with the premise of "the Concept"—how naval organizations come to develop the view of their counterparts as the enemy, and what leads their planners to consider particular strategies for any future conflict. To that effect, I have documented how American naval officers first came to suspect Japan of hostile intent. From the first American war plan in 1897 to the 1916 Naval Bill, planning officers of the U.S. Navy exercised their intellectual skills. They rationalized in professional terms the emerging view of Japan as the hypothetical enemy. The Japanese Navy, too, matched such a view of a hypothetical enemy. Its planners begrudged the continued western interference in Japan's pursuit of national interests. That

48 To explicate the "Concept," I chose to speak specifically about the preconceived notions held by the two navies that conflict was inevitable and how that conflict would play out.
view contributed to the Japanese Navy's long-term strategic planning. These planners, too, used professional deliberations to plan a strategy for war with their hypothetical enemy.

I argued as well that "contact" also played a significant role in the evolution of "the Concept." Clearly, the experiences of Bradley Fiske, Frank Marble, and Akiyama Saneyuki demonstrate the value of examining the professional and personal relationships between the officers of the two navies. Finally, the issue of the "mixed-motive" carried some weight in both navies. That included the connection between the respective services, as well as the correlation of action and reaction between each service and its military counterpart.

What of the subsequent careers of various members of the strategic elite? For those of the U.S. Navy, a number lived to see the outbreak of World War II and the fruition of U.S. Navy's forty years of planning. Captain John M. Ellicott, retired before the onset of war in 1914, but lived until 1955, long enough to see the U.S. Navy's successful campaign against the Japanese in World War II, as well as the American-Japanese rapprochement. Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske died in February 1942. Thus, he missed the U.S. Navy's victories against the Japanese at the Coral Sea. Rear Admiral Clarence S. Williams died in 1951, with the full satisfaction of knowing that his planning decades earlier had
contributed to the final defeat of Japan. Williams had returned to the General Board after 1918 and became eventually the U.S. Navy's Chief of the War Planning Division, the prime center for the creation of war plans. In that capacity, Williams continued to advance "the Concept." Commander Frank Marble died in 1911 while on the staff of the U.S. Naval War College. Rear Admiral Sydney A. Staunton died in 1939.

With regard to the strategic elite of the Japanese Navy, not one lived long enough to see the annihilation of their vaunted navy, nor the humiliating surrender and occupation of their nation. Vice Admiral Akiyama Saneyuki died from medical complications in early 1918. Vice Admiral Sato Tetsutaro also died in February 1942, just before the Japanese Navy suffered major losses at the Coral Sea and Midway. Vice Admiral Kato Tomosaburo served his nation as a naval representative at the Washington Conference and rose to become his nation's prime minister but died of cancer in August 1923. Vice Admiral Kato Kanji died in 1939. Between 1922 and 1931, however, Kato Kanji, was active in advancing the notion of "the Concept" and the hypothetical enemy. Ironically, one planner not documented here, Suzuki Kantaro, had worked with Akiyama and Sato to prepare the Japanese Navy's defense plans. Suzuki became a political figure in the post-World War One era. In August 1945, Prime Minister Suzuki accepted the Allied surrender terms.
What lessons might one draw from my investigation? The answer depends, of course, upon a number of considerations and one's own perspective. It depends as well upon how one defines one's enemy. For example, during the period I served on active duty in the U.S. Navy, my peers and I generally assumed that the hypothetical enemy was the Soviet Navy. In addition, the then existing "Concept" asserted that the Soviet Navy would deliver the first blow. Not once, however, did any officer contend that race, or ethnicity, drove the whole issue. Rather, the differences were clearly ideological. Even more striking, we, as junior officers, were routinely informed that the hypothetical enemy, the Soviet Navy, stood, not ten feet tall, but seven feet tall. Therefore, the U.S. Navy would have to engage in combat with a superior foe.

In comparison, in the decades before the Washington Conference, little evidence exists to document any use of racism as a rationale to judge the Japanese. The perceptions then emanated from the conflicts of imperialism and economics. Though the evidence demonstrated a growing racist view of the Japanese Navy after the Washington Conference, more professional practices prevailed in the previous decades. Quite clearly, American naval planners viewed the Japanese Navy in a different light. At various times, American naval planners saw the Japanese Navy as an equal, if not slightly superior, hypothetical enemy. As a result,
throughout this examination, I documented the fact the U.S. Navy had represented its Japanese counterpart in professional terms, as befit a professional organization.

The net effect of such professional thought, on both the American and Japanese naval planners, was the codification of the hypothetical enemy concept among the officer corps of each service. The intellectual interchange between the U.S. Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy contributed to that mindset by the construction of each other as the most dangerous threat to the national security of their respective nations. On the basis of my examination, the intellectual seeds for conflict planning germinated in the minds of naval officers between 1897 and 1916. The maturation of those seeds, however, would take another three and half decades to produce any fruit.
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