Nationalism, Ethnic Politics, and Democratic Consolidation:
A Comparative Study of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina
Volume I

Dissertation

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by

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ABBREVIATIONS

BH -- Bosnia-Hercegovina
DA -- Dalmatian Action
DEPOS -- Democratic Movement of Serbia
DS -- Democratic Party
DSK -- Democratic League of Kosovo
DSS -- Democratic Party of Serbia
DZHV -- Democratic Community of Croats in Vojvodina
DZVM -- Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians
FRJ -- Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GSS -- Citizen's Alliance
HDZ -- Croatian Democratic Community
HNS -- Croatian National Party
HOS -- Croatian Defense Forces
HPSS -- Croatian Peoples' Peasant Party
HSLS -- Croatian Social Liberal Party
HSP -- Croatian Party of [State] Right
HSS -- Croatian Peasants' Party
IDS -- Istrian Democratic Alliance
IMRO -- Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
JMO -- Yugoslav Muslim Organization
JNA -- Yugoslav Peoples' Army
JO -- Yugoslav Committee
KNS -- Coalition of National Understanding
KOS -- Yugoslav Counterintelligence Services
LSVJ -- League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina/Yugoslavia
MASPOK -- Croatian Mass Movement
MBO -- Muslim Bosniak Organization
MUP -- Ministry of Internal Affairs
NDH -- Independent State of Croatia
ND-PzS -- New Democracy-Movement for Serbia
NRS -- National Radical Party
NS -- People's Party
RSK -- Republic of Serbian Krajina
SANU -- Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences
SAO -- Serbian Autonomous Regions
SAOK -- Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
SDA -- Party of Democratic Action
SDF -- Serbian Democratic Forum
SDS -- Serbian Democratic Party
SFRJ -- Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SIV -- Federal Executive Council
SK -- League of Communists
SKBH -- League of Communists of Bosnia-Hercegovina
SKJ -- League of Communists of Yugoslavia
SKH-SDP -- League of Communists of Croatia-Party of Democratic Changes
SLS -- Serbian Liberal Party
SNO -- Serbian National Renaissance
SNS -- Serbian Peoples' Party
SNV -- Serbian National Council
SPO -- Serbian Renewal Movement
SPS -- Socialist Party of Serbia
SRH -- Socialist Republic of Croatia
SRS -- Serbian Radical Party
SRSJ -- Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia
SSJ -- Serbian Unity Party
SSS -- Serbian Peasant Party
UJDI -- Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative
ZAVNOH -- Regional Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia
ZNG (Zengas) -- Croatian National Guard
CHAPTER I

The Theoretical Framework

A. Statement of the Problem

A recent article in the New York Times surveying the incidence of ethnic wars around the world since the end of the Cold War arrived at a total count of 48 conflicts currently in progress. Characterizing this as the "third wave" of ethnic conflict in this century -- preceded by the phase of state-creation after World War I and the anticolonial and national liberation movements in the aftermath of World War II -- the authors ominously remark that this wave is "even more complex, potentially more threatening to international peace and almost certain to grow in the years ahead."1 In response to the

ubiquity and gravity of ethnic wars in the post-Cold War era there has been an unprecedented expansion of the United Nations' military activities. Since 1988 there have been 14 new peacekeeping operations; that compares with a total of 7 such operations between 1956 - 1987.² Many areas currently in the throes of ethnic strife can be loosely categorized as "developing" countries. Based on the New York Times count, this category encompasses the great majority of cases: 15 separate conflicts in Africa South of the Sahara, 6 in the Middle East and North Africa, 12 in Asia, and 4 in Latin America.³ If one considers the post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there have been 10 ethnic wars since 1988,⁴ and at least 14 crisis points or potential crisis points.⁵ Finally, even in the old "nation-states" of Western Europe and North America ethnic tensions have surfaced -- often with violent results -- in Spain, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, and Canada. Taking note of such trends, scholars have spoken of an "ethnic revival;" "politicized ethnicity" has been characterized as "the world's major


³ These figures do not include former communist countries that are geographically part of these regions.

⁴ Three in the former Yugoslavia, 2 in Russia, 1 in Moldova, 2 in Georgia, 1 in Azerbaijan, and 1 in Tajikistan.

ideological legitimator and delegitimator of states, regimes, and
governments;" and nationalism has been deemed "very much an
ideology with a future."\(^6\)

Alongside the global diffusion of nationalism and ethnic-
based political movements there has occurred a worldwide
victory, at least at the level of ideology, of western-style
democracy.\(^7\) With the international discrediting in this century
of first fascism and then communism as historical alternatives to
liberal-democracy, the ideas and values of the latter are now
attaining universal recognition and are increasingly becoming the
sole acceptable source of regime legitimation. Of course, this is not

\(^6\) The source of these quotes is as follows: Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic
Revival*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Joseph
University, 1981), p.14; George Schöpflin, "Nationalism and National
Minorities in East and Central Europe," *Journal of International Affairs*,
v.45, n.1 (Summer 1991), p.51. See also Arend Lijphart, "Political Theories
and the Explanation of Ethnic Conflict in the Western World: Falsified
Conflict in the Western World*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977),
pp.46-64.

\(^7\) For various perspectives on the world historical significance of this
phenomenon, see Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *National
Interest*, (Summer 1989), pp.3-18; Robert Heilbroner, "Reflections: The
Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of
Communism in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1989).
to say that there has been a great surge of democratic regimes in practice. Where democracy has won is in the battle of ideas, and this is evinced by the fact that even dictators and movements that flagrantly violate human rights often feel the need to justify their behavior in quasi-democratic language. As it will be seen in this dissertation, all significant political elites in the former Yugoslavia verbally support democracy regardless of their actual responsibility for ethnic cleansing and systematic murder.

The simultaneous proliferation of both ethno-nationalist consciousness and democratic ideals around the globe behooves scholars to address theoretically and empirically the nature of the relationship between the forces of nationalism, the occurrence of ethnic conflict, and the prospects for building successful, stable democracies. In many respects, current theories of democratization offer little in the way of explanatory help. The

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8 This concept is generally used in juxtaposition to liberalization, the latter meaning the mere granting of certain rights to individuals and groups that protects them from arbitrary power and allows a degree of freedom in civil society. Democratization in this dissertation will be used to subsume both democratic transitions and democratic consolidation. Democratic transitions are defined as the period between the signal that an authoritarian regime is open to political reforms and the installment of a new democratic regime by a free, competitive election. Democratic consolidation, on the other hand, denotes the establishment of a stable democracy in which all politically significant groups consent to the rules of the game and no such groups or significant sections of the public challenge the legitimacy of democratic norms. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence
substantial body of literature that has developed in this field has been based on intensive studies of the post-war democracies (Germany, Italy and Japan), the Southern European democracies that emerged in the 1970s (Spain, Portugal, and Greece), and the breakdown of authoritarianism in Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Paraguay) in the 1980s. Aside from the Basque problem in Spain, in none of these instances has ethnic conflict represented a defining feature of the democratization process. Hence, there has been little practical


need to articulate explanatory frameworks that capture the unique patterns and dynamic of ethnic politics. Now that the terrain for the next likely democratic transitions has shifted to the developing countries and the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union -- two areas of the world in which nationalist ideologies and ethnic mobilization are basic elements of political life -- it is imperative to reconceptualize and re-equip democratic theory so that it may continue to have theoretical and explanatory utility.\textsuperscript{10}

B. The Basic Research Question

This dissertation explores the relationship between nationalism, ethnic politics, and democratic consolidation in the context of the fragmented republics of the former Yugoslavia. Democratic consolidation is treated as a dependent variable and

various dimensions of nationalism and ethnic politics serve as independent variables. The basic research question centers on how nationalism and ethnic politics may impede and/or facilitate democratic consolidation.

The possibility that ethnic politics may facilitate democratic consolidation has been, for the most part, underappreciated. A far more common conception of nationalism and ethnic politics characterizes them as irrational emotions, inherently divisive, immune to compromise and tolerance, and prone to violence and collective punishment. This assessment, however, does not, and has never exhaustively accounted for the range of national ideologies or the patterns of ethnic politics. Elizabeth Kiss, for one, reminds us that historically "strong links between East-Central European national or religious allegiances and democracy have roots going back to the revolutions of 1848." With regard to the Western experience, Ghia Nodia argues that nationalism and democracy have always had an interdependent relationship in


which nations served as the basic political units out of which democratic government emerged. Victor Zaslavsky contends that the nationalist program advanced by the Baltic Republics and Ukraine (which encompassed a call for a "return to Europe, to a 'normal' economic system and political democracy"), worked to break the back of the pillars of the Soviet state -- i.e., the nomenklatura, the military-industrial complex, and the security apparatus. In this way, the "destruction of the Soviet empire by forces of nationalism and separatism represents ... a necessary precondition for a successful transition to political democracy and a market economy." Similarly, Larry Diamond notes two ways in which the ethnic factor has had a "positive benefit" in Africa: (1) ethnic fragmentation has created problems of governability that exceeds the managing capacity of the generally weak political institutions of African authoritarian regimes; and (2) the salience of multifarious ethnic identities serves as an ever-present base for the flourishing of political pluralism.

13 Nodia, pp.7-9.


In short, contrary to the prevalent view of nationalism and ethnic politics as intrinsically prone to illiberalism, chauvinism, pogroms, and mass expulsions, there is a growing number of scholars who recognize it may, in some cases, prove beneficial for democratization. Therefore, it is incumbent on the researcher to determine empirically the precise relationship between these variables and to specify under what conditions ethnic politics encourages democratic consolidation and under what conditions it undermines democratic consolidation. As Ivo Banac warns: "A proper understanding of nationalism, by the Left no less than by Western governments, presupposes political analysis. Nationalisms can be as far apart as the socialism of Francois Mitterand is from the socialism of Pol Pot."16

Overall, the purpose of this study is three-fold: (1) determine the relationship of nationalism, ethnic conflict, and democratic consolidation in the former Yugoslavia; (2) confirm or disconfirm the explanatory value of the concepts and the theoretical framework that is employed; (3) gain insights and draw conclusions that may be used to upgrade democratic theory and expand its applicability for further comparative inquiry in other multinational societies undergoing democratization.

C. Why Study the former Yugoslavia?

Perhaps no other society in Eastern Europe exemplifies the difficulties that nationalism and ethnic conflict pose for democratic consolidation better than the former Yugoslavia. The depth of ethnic fragmentation in the "land of the South Slavs" is its defining feature: this region is composed of 2 alphabets (Latin and Cyrillic), 3 major religions (Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and Islam), 6 major languages (Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian, Magyar, and Albanian), and 14 national or ethnic groups (Montenegrins, Croats, Macedonians, Muslims, Slovenes, Serbs, Albanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Romi/Gypsies, Slovaks, Turks, and Italians).

Historically, the area has been subject to long periods of foreign occupation which has produced distinct Byzantine, Ottoman, Hungarian, Germanic and Italian cultural zones. In this century, there have been four ethnic wars (the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, WWI, WWII, and the current conflicts) and 4 major attempts to find a viable political solution (the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of 1918; the Royal Dictatorship of 1929; Tito's communist regime; Tito's consociational regime). Since 1990 governments have been elected in all the republics on a nationalist platform, old fears and hatreds have been revived, the validity of the borders has been disputed, the authenticity of some nations has been challenged, and ethnic tensions have been provoked over new constitutional formulas. Civil war eventually broke out in
1991 in Croatia and spread to Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1992. Simply stated, the lands of the former Yugoslavia represent a paradigmatic case for testing the impact of ethnic politics on democratic consolidation.

The specific cases to be studied will be Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. (I am thus omitting from the analysis Slovenia, Montenegro and Macedonia.) The chapters are arranged such that each is area-specific. At the same time, the concepts and hypotheses discussed below will drive the analysis and function to highlight what is unique to each case and what is comparable across cases. In the final chapter, a brief analysis of recent ethnic politics in South Africa will be conducted. The goal of this comparison is to apply the theoretical framework outside the context of post-Yugoslav politics and thereby broaden and deepen the explanation. South Africa's success thus far in consolidating its democracy stands in stark contrast to political realities in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The inclusion of South Africa therefore constitutes what Eckstein calls a "crucial case study" that will test the ability of the theoretical framework to explain the variation in political outcomes.\textsuperscript{17} If factors outside

those posited by the theoretical framework prove to be relevant in the South African case, then theory-repair work may be required.

Before embarking on an extended discussion of the research program, let us turn to a brief survey of how the ideas of democracy and nationalism spread across Europe between the 18th and 20th centuries. The intended upshot of this exercise is to illustrate the historically variable relationship between nationalism and democracy and the greater difficulties nationalism poses for democratic consolidation in the contemporary world.

D. A Historical Excursion: Nationalism and Democracy

The classic relationship between nationalism and democracy is found in the history of Great Britain, France, and the United States. In these instances, both states and nations were forged

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in the early stages of modernization,\textsuperscript{19} which meant that mass demands for inclusion and participation were limited and elites enjoyed considerable autonomy. Therefore, both state-building and nation-building preceded the establishment of fully consolidated democratic regimes.\textsuperscript{20} In 18th century political discourse nationalism had a "revolutionary, democratic" character and was based on the individual consent of the "sovereign citizen-people." In the British, French, and American point of view, the nation was constituted by those willing to submit to, and

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{19} Ernest Gellner makes the argument that nationalism is a by-product of industrialization which requires an amorphous, mobile, highly educated society that shares a single culture. And before nationalism there were no nations. This view prevails in the literature. The important point for my argument is that a definite conception of the nation was formed before regimes permitted voices "from below." Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Basil Blackwell: Great Britain, 1983).

\textsuperscript{20} The state is understood to be the centralistic, administrative, resource-extracting, coercive agency that claims the right to rule and to be obeyed over a given territory. Following Weber, territory is considered to be a key element of the state. Regime is defined by the constitutional order, the accepted rules of the political game, and the prevailing values operative in the political community. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p.78; David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), chaps., 11, 12, 13; Robert M. Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy," World Politics, v.XLII, n.3 (April 1990), pp.422-440.
participate in, the laws and liberties of the land. An additional factor that helped to make nations, especially in the American case, was the presence of assimilatory incentives in the form of economic opportunity. At the same time, such a liberal conception of the nation and nationalism did not preclude the use of forcible assimilation, genocide, and compulsory education into the dominant culture when such practices were deemed necessary (which found their most extreme expression in French and American history). Overall, there was a favorable sequencing of the historical tasks of political development in Western Europe and the US. The building of states and nations before modernization processes came into full swing allowed for the gradual incorporation of different segments of society through the progressive extension of the suffrage. By the time ethno-nationalist consciousness became a universally recognized principle of political mobilization (i.e., after WW I and especially since the 1960s), states were firmly institutionalized on a rational-legal foundation, a definite conception of the nation was hegemonic and reproduced by ideological state apparatuses (e.g., schools, the legal system, cultural institutions), and democratic regimes were at least "partially" consolidated.21

21 I say partially because elite consensual unity was not attained in France until the early 1970s when the French Communist Party agreed to play by the rules of the game; and in the US in the 1960s African-Americans were denied full citizenship rights making the American regime fell significantly short of the indicators of democracy. For a brief analysis of democratic consolidation in France, see Burton, Gunther and Higley, pp.24-30.
The ideas of nationalism and democracy descended on Central Europe in the first half of the 19th century by way of British economic supremacy and French military and political dominance. In this way, German and Italian intellectuals were forced to confront their own relative backwardness and, at the same time, were provided with a model -- the national state -- that would enable them to compete effectively on the world's stage. It should be no surprise then that insurgent German and Italian nationalists looked upon Great Britain and France with a mixture of envy, reverence, and resentment.22

The differential timing of these concepts with modernization, however, was not the only difference between the Western and Central European experience. In the case of the latter, nations preceded states. In other words, the nation was already a meaningful cultural entity -- at least from the perspective of the nationalist intelligentsia -- despite the fact that no state existed to nurture and sustain it. In order for a nation to progress and exercise political influence commensurate with the greatness of its

22 Gellner writes: "As the tidal wave of modernization sweeps the world, it makes sure that almost everyone, at some time or other, has cause to feel unjustly treated, and that he can identify the culprits as being of another 'nation'. If he can also identify enough of the victims as being of the same 'nation' as himself, a nationalism is born. If it succeeds, and not all of them can, a nation is born." Gellner, p.112. Greenfeld sees the differential timing of nationalism as a key variable and employs Nietzsche's notion of ressentiment to account for the genesis of nationalism in the belated nation-states. Greenfeld, pp.8-17.
cultural achievements, German and Italian nationalists fervently believed it was necessary to organize all of their respective peoples into a state. In this context, a very different conception of nationalism began to develop — i.e., one based not on individual consent and political liberties found in the West but rather on the primordial criteria of language, ethnicity, and religion. Although nationalism originally had a liberal form in both Germany and Italy, states based on cultural nations rather than political nations felt soon after their founding to be incomplete as long as their co-nationals would be forever "lost" to other states. The new form of nationalism, therefore, had two components: (1) it regarded its own nation as superior because of its unique primordial traits; and (2) it demanded congruence between state boundaries and the geographical extension of its cultural nation. The consequence of this formulation was the encouragement of a collectivist and violence-prone political culture that found in revanchism and irredentism its spiritual redemption; in the end, it led to the emphatic repudiation of democracy and the installment of totalitarian regimes.²³

When the demonstration effects of nationalism and democracy rolled across Eastern Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries it was tempting to see them as having a salutary effect -- for both ideas were used to justify the break up of the onerous empires of Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. However, the patchwork distribution of ethnic groups representing different cultures and traditions precluded the workable application of principles such as "nation-state" and "national self-determination." Consequently, when the Western Entente powers set down to draw the map single ethnic groups were in many instances divided between several different states and mutually suspicious, if not hostile, ethnic groups were combined within the same state. Rather than explicitly reject democracy, the governments of the time construed it as a tool of nationalism and sought to build "nation-states" (ostensibly following the Western pattern) in a manner that denied heterogeneity within. They also stoked mutual animosities by advancing a host of revisionist-irredentist threats. The demand therefore to make polity and nation congruent, although effective against the old empires, turned against the new states with a vengeance. Because the terrain of competing nationalisms was densely populated, because the masses were considered to be malleable into several different "nations,"24 and because the

24 Hence, the competition in Yugoslavia between pan-Slav movements (Illyrianism, Yugoslavism, and narodno jedinstvo (national oneness)) on the one hand and, on the other, various forms of an exclusive Croatianism and an exclusive Serbianism. It is interesting to note that as late as 1891 it was possible for intellectuals to adopt voluntarily a new national identity,
small Slav states all faced bigger neighbors who menaced them with imperialist ambitions, there was a terrible insecurity and pervasive distrust among them that readily lent itself to authoritarianism and "unusual brutality." Ultimately, the failure in the interwar period to build inclusive nations and consolidated democracies led Eastern Europe once again into the lair of its predatory neighbors.25

Unfortunately, the conditions for contemporary democratic transitions and consolidations are far worse. The tasks of state-building, nation-building, and democratization confront elites simultaneously and demand urgent attention. Modernization and its concomitant processes -- mass communication, mass education, such as Croat who consented to Serbianization, or a Bosnian Muslim who declared himself a Croat. Among Bosnian Muslims it was quite normal for individuals to swing back and forth over the course of a lifetime between Serb and Croat identities. Moreover, in many Muslim families siblings would choose diverse ethnic identities. For example, in the family of Mehmed Spaho (the head of the interwar Muslim party, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization), one brother called himself a Serb and another a Croat (the latter, interestingly enough, was a reis ul-ulema (Muslim religious authority). Spaho himself was a declared Serb as a youth but later rejected any ethnic designation. See Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp.310, 362, 370, 375.

increased expectations, a highly trained, mobile labor force -- has created a public that demands full and instant participation. And the global diffusion of ideas has made ethno-nationalist consciousness a universal principle of political mobilization. In the ethnically-divided societies of Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and the former USSR, there are four general ways in which ethnic politics and nationalism can complicate democratic consolidations:

(1) Once ethnic mobilization has begun there is a tendency for a ripple effect or "chain reaction" to set in whereby all issues are cast in an ethnic zero-sum, all-or-nothing logic. It is generally recognized that ethnic conflicts are more intractable than other types of cleavage and less amenable to distributive solutions. If ethnic issues begin to supersede all other concerns on a nation's agenda, the development of the democratic art of compromise and bargaining is likely to be fettered.

(2) Nation-specific identities often have greater affective appeal than supranational loyalties. In such cases, ethnic groups tend to perceive the regime not as a neutral umpire but rather as partial to one ethnic group. Consequently, the engendering of diffuse support for the regime that cross-cuts ethnic communities will be exceptionally difficult.

(3) Regimes struggling to establish their democratic credentials must confront secessionist movements that also claim the mantle of democracy and equate it with self-determination. In this instance, the normative legitimacy intrinsic to democracy is exploited by competing groups to serve mutually incompatible ends; namely, the unity of the state and its partition. Because democratic values can be used to justify both the sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty of the separate nations that compose the state, democracy per se cannot solve this dilemma.\(^27\)

And (4) the territorial integrity of the state itself is often disputed and directly challenged on the basis of irredentist and/or revanchist claims.\(^28\)

As a result, key elements of the classic, Anglo-American majoritarian model are no longer adequate institutional tools for the aggregation of interests and the mediation of conflict. For example, in ethnically-politicized societies citizenship rights are

\(^{27}\) Ted Robert Gurr writes that in democratizing or quasi-democratic regimes, there is a tendency to "justify restrictions on the rights of communal minorities in the name of the 'democratic will' of the dominant nationality." Gurr, p.361.

dismissed as insufficient means to protect the liberty and equality of all; majority rule is judged to be a method that dooms the minority to perpetual political exclusion; and a market measuring performance on the basis of merit is perceived either as a threat to a traditional way of life (if a complementary and harmonious ethnic division of labor is institutionalized) or, as an ideological rationalization of stratification (if upward mobility and life-chances are disproportionally biased against one group). \(^{29}\) It is also questionable whether the alternative European, consensus-based, consociational model of Switzerland, Austria, and the Low Countries (Belgium and the Netherlands) can effectively manage ethnic conflict in the post-communist and developing countries. \(^{30}\) A regime undergoing democratic consolidation in a multiethnic society must pull off a number of delicate balancing acts between majority rule and minority rights, between the rights of citizens and the rights of nations, between a competitive and a redistributive political economy, and between merit and ascriptive values of social mobility. An important component of this dissertation will be to assess, at various points in the text, the ability of Lijphart's consociational prescriptions to effectuate political stability.


The state problematic poses a particularly grave problem that justifies further elaboration. In a word, problems of stateness must be settled *a priori* to the democratization process proper. As Dankart Rustow observed in a 1970 essay, prior to the building of a democracy there is one essential background condition that must be fulfilled -- consensus on the territorial unit of the state itself. In his words, "the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to."\(^{31}\) And the paradox for the democratization process is that the democratic method of majority rule cannot make right a territorial unit that is perceived otherwise by a minority. In a perceptive article, Robert Dahl reasoned that Gorbachev's use of a referendum to save the Soviet Union from disintegration was bound to fail because the proper domain to use majority rule was in question. Whenever there is an issue of secession before a body politic, it is in the interest of the minority to accept only the majority opinion of its own people, and not the majority in the larger state unit. In Dahl's words, "the principle of majority rule cannot rightly be used to decide its own domain. A justifiable decision on the question of the proper political unit cannot be arrived at by majority vote, because the principle itself presupposes that a proper unit already exists."\(^{32}\)

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In short, securing the legitimacy of the state is actually the first of a long list of conundrums with which the crafters of democratic consolidation in ethnically-divided societies must come to terms.

E. The Research Design and Hypotheses

I propose to examine three dimensions of ethnic politics that are generally regarded as relevant to the constructs of ethnic mobilization and nationalism:  

33 Zaslavksy provides a succinct definition of each concept: "Ethnic mobilization may be defined as potential or actual participation in joint actions when collective membership is based on belonging to the same ethnic group (nationality). It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of nationalism. The latter is understood as a political doctrine and social movement which strives 'to make culture and polity congruent' and has the principal aim of creating a modern nation-state possessing sovereignty over a given territory." Zaslavsky, p.106; Gellner, pp.1-7; Ernst B. Haas, "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?" International Organization, v.40, n.3 (Summer 1986), p.727.

34 By elites, I mean "persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially." Burton, Gunther, and Higley, p.8. Opinion-makers are a subset of elites but are more narrowly defined as significant figures outside the formal channels of power who nevertheless actively shape popular perceptions and indirectly contribute to setting the terms of political discourse and the range of possible policy options, such as the mass media and prominent intellectuals in cultural and academic associations. See Allen H. Barton, "Determinants of Leadership Attitudes in a Socialist Society," in Allen H. Barton, Bogdan Denitch, and Charles Kadushin, Opinion-Making Elites in Yugoslavia. (New York: Praeger
(2) the attitudes, values, and beliefs of the mass public (insofar as the availability of mass survey data permits the testing of this dimension); and (3) the behavior of elites, political parties, and politically significant groups. On the other side of the equation are the various dimensions of democratic consolidation. Actually, what is involved in the latter variable are two conceptually distinct phenomena -- the creation of a democracy, on the one hand, and the consolidation of democracy, on the other. Let us first explore the dependent variable.

1. The Dependent Variable: Democracy and Democratic Consolidation

Democratic consolidation is a term enjoying wide currency in the democratization literature and yet it is very far from a single, agreed-upon definition. At one end of the pole is a maximalist conception advanced by Geoffrey Pridham, who synthesizes the work of Schmitter, Morlino, and Whitehead. In this view, democratic consolidation is a long-term process that is likely to take a generation to complete. It is conceptually distinct from the transition phase proper and involves a number of developments: (1) the institutionalization of a democratic regime (i.e., the conversion of "patterns into structures"); (2) the transformation of key actors from that of instrumental support for democracy to

that of principled support; (3) the gradual removal of transitional uncertainties, anti-system parties, system-focused instability, and the prospects for authoritarian reversals; (4) the "rooting" of political parties in a system which requires a variegated set of relations between parties and the state, parties and society, and interparty relationships; and (5) the internalization of democratic values by the mass public which works to legitimate democracy. In addition, the peaceful alternation in power between parties is highlighted as a crucial test of progress towards consolidation. On the basis of these indicators, neither Spain, Greece, nor Portugal is fully consolidated.35

At the other end of the spectrum is a minimalist definition provided by Guiseppe Di Palma. According to him, the concept of democratic consolidation has little theoretical or empirical utility. While some equate it with institutionalization and routinization, Di Palma notes that institutional fuzziness and incoherence are often intentional parts of a democratic agreement (e.g., Italy). He also rejects the idea that the peaceful turnover of power is a valid indicator of consolidation, for this would have the effect of

mistakenly classifying both Italy and Japan as unconsolidated. Finally, the cultivation of legitimacy as a litmus test of consolidation is objected to on the grounds that what passes for legitimacy is often a simple calculation of material interests, the absence of regime alternatives, and/or behavioral adjustments in light of new opportunities. In the end, Di Palma rephrases the whole problem of consolidation into the question "when can democrats relax?," to which he gives the answer as soon as a democratic agreement is reached among the relevant parties during the transition phase. Ultimately, for him, "the decisive role in establishing democracy belongs to the agreement phase, not to consolidation."36

Situated between such minimalist and maximalist definitions of democratic consolidation is that advocated by Richard Gunther, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, and Nikiforos Diamandouros.37 They argue that prior to measuring the degree of democratic consolidation of a regime, one must first determine


if in fact the regime is democratic. The importance of distinguishing between democracy per se and democratic consolidation is that many regimes may meet all the procedural requirements of a democracy and yet rest on a very precarious foundation susceptible to an authoritarian regress. A historical analogy illustrates this point well: by all appearances the French 4th Republic was democratic, but in the absence of democratic consensus among all politically significant groups the regime eventually collapsed after 12 years of existence.38

A procedural definition of democracy has been chosen for this study and is justified on the grounds of its suitability for empirical testing and comparative analysis. The following definition by Juan Linz, Larry Diamond and Seymour Martin Lipset superbly conveys the core meaning of democracy:

"... democracy ... denotes a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties --

freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations -- sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation."  

Democratic consolidation, on the other hand, is closely associated with the stability and long-term survivability of a regime. According Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros, a democracy is consolidated when attitudinally all politically significant groups accept the democratic rules of the game as legitimate and behaviorally all politically significant groups respect democratic norms. They further specify these dimensions by clarifying when politically insignificant groups outside the democratic consensus can become politically significant and possibly threaten the stability of the system. If anti-system groups begin to gain popular support their capacity to affect the system grows, pari passu. In this sense, there is a "numerical component" to what constitutes "politically significant":


40 Linz and Stepan articulate a similar definition, only adding that structurally no reserve domains of power from the non-democratic regime remain to affect output or system performance. Linz and Stepan, "Democratic Transitions and Consolidation," p.4.
the more numerous anti-system parties are and the more support they receive, the less consolidated the system must be regarded. Furthermore, there is a "strategic location" factor that is relevant. If anti-system groups are concentrated in the military, for example, they would pose a much greater threat to democracy than if they were marginalized political parties. Overall, democratic consolidation is measured by the following criteria: (1) the degree of diffuse support for democracy among both elites and the mass public; (2) behavioral conformity with democratic rules; and (3) the absence of politically significant anti-system and semi-loyal parties. If these indicators are met, a regime may be pronounced "sufficiently consolidated."  

The virtue of the Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros theory is that it avoids the excessive conditions cited by Pridham (which makes democratic consolidation exceptionally difficult to attain) while furnishing the concept with the theoretical substance and empirical applicability Di Palma says it lacks. Because this perspective will be adopted for the present study, it is necessary to expound on a few central concepts in more detail.

First of all, it is critical to underscore the predominance of the elite variable. It is virtually axiomatic in the democratization literature that although the masses are capable of pulling down a regime, they cannot create one. According to Rustow, the elite

41 Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros.
variable is most pronounced during the "decision phase" to reconstruct a political community in the aftermath of an authoritarian experience. And in the perspective of Burton and Higley, elite politics are "empirically distinct" from, and "causally prior" to, the establishment of democratic institutions. The acceptance of these arguments need not entail the neglect of the role of mass politics and political culture. In fact, a democracy should be considered more secure if the mass public has been socialized by democratic rather than authoritarian institutions.

42 Rustow, pp.355-7. Although Rustow considered this part of the transition to democracy, the agreement on elite procedural consensus is the *sine qua non* of consolidation. Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros argue that in Spain the transition and consolidation phases cannot be neatly separated since important elite decisions for consensual unity were made during the transition from authoritarianism. Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros.


At the same time, one need not wait for generational change to pronounce a regime consolidated -- as long as the masses are not attitudinally disposed towards an authoritarian alternative and are not mobilizable on this basis in sufficient numbers to affect the system regularly and substantially, the conditions of sufficient consolidation are fulfilled.\textsuperscript{45}

It is a premise of this research program that elites bear primary responsibility for transforming their relations from that of dissensus and violence to that of procedural consensus, whereby the democratic formula of "certain rules, uncertain outcomes"\textsuperscript{46} is institutionalized. Under this framework, all contenders for power enjoy the right to organize a political base and appeal to the electorate -- this effectively ensures that all have an equal chance of winning. Those who lose in the electoral contest need not fear state repression or permanent exclusion. Rather the right to participate in the next elections is guaranteed. In this way, consenting to lose is a precondition to win. According to Di Palma, such coexistence is both an imperative of democracy and an incentive for it: imperative, in that democracy cannot function in the absence of pluralism, competition and the opposition of groups; incentive, in that otherwise hostile groups can now peacefully compete in a civil society that ensures mutual

\textsuperscript{45} Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros.

Burton, Gunther, and Higley discuss two routes by which elites may attain consensual unity. The first path, elite settlement, represents the decision of politically significant elites to reorganize their relations away from mutual extermination and towards peaceful coexistence. Such settlements are concerned with the "production of contingent consent," described above as the agreement to institutionalize uncertainty. What may serve as a decisive push towards intra-elite accommodation is the recent experience of a bloody, inconclusive, protracted struggle in which all elite groups suffered. In other cases, a major political crisis that demonstrates the incapacity and dispensability of the regime can bring elites together to formulate a settlement. One factor that facilitates the arrival at a settlement is a considerable degree of elite autonomy from mass pressure so that elites are afforded the latitude to secretly negotiate and compromise.

47 Di Palma, pp.27-32, 42, 45, 55, 115-6.


Another route to elite procedural consensus is through a gradual process of "elite convergence." This is a two-step process whereby a section of elite groups initiate consensual unity. However, significant actors remain outside the game of electoral politics and continue breakdown games, "blackmail," and other destabilizing postures. Eventually, the prospect of political marginalization convinces obstructionists to moderate their programs and accept coexistence and the rules of the game. This evolution is neatly conveyed by Di Palma's term "bandwagon effects," by which he means the incentives to play the democratic game when it becomes "the only game in town." As he explains, "[t]he more ... the game goes on, and the more actors practice it, the more costly it seems not to play it. If nothing else, there may be no other or safer way of attending to one's interests."51

Although violence may serve as the catalyst for an elite settlement, there is recognition in the democratization literature of the dilemmas and difficulties posed by the recent experience of atrocities, widespread torture, and other such inhumane acts. While O'Donnell and Schmitter analyze the issue of "settling past

50 Burton, Gunther, and Higley, pp.31-7.

51 Di Palma, pp.113, 58, 96, 168. (The term "blackmail" is borrowed from Di Palma, pp.57,127.) In this same vein, Rustow speaks of a "double process of Darwinian selectivity in favor of convinced democrats: one among parties in general elections and the other among politicians vying for leadership within these parties." Rustow, p.358.
accounts" as a transitional task, if the transition itself is particularly bloody the same dilemmas could apply in the consolidation phase. Specifically, the issue is how to handle those responsible for crimes against humanity. If they are strategically located, such as in high offices in the military, they could represent an obstacle to consolidation if they fear reprisals. This problem is exacerbated when the military-as-an-institution was involved in the crimes, as opposed to special units or paramilitary forces. While admitting the lack of a "satisfactory resolution" to the problem, O'Donnell and Schmitter suggest criminal proceedings against those responsible for the most heinous crimes but caution that this must be conducted in the context of due process and respect for the military-as-an-institution. In the end, confronting a past episode of terror and bloodshed may provide society with the moral regeneration and cultural catharsis necessary to "make its future livable."^2

Finally, the relationship between stability and democratic consolidation requires clarification. As Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros note, one cannot deduce consolidation by the presence of stability. While unconsolidated regimes are indeed inclined towards instability (since no consensus exists among rival elites who have the capacity to affect the system), consolidated regimes may face a normal amount of turmoil (e.g., strikes, street protests) without the prospect of deconsolidation. Thus, key

^2 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Part IV, pp.28-32.
political institutions could be the subject of criticism and social conflict without democracy itself being jeopardized.\textsuperscript{53} Ernst Haas' thoughts on the conceptual problematic posed by instability are worth considering: "Civil strife is a very tricky indicator because we cannot assume that every strike, every riot, every assassination of a political figure provides evidence of deep-seated and widespread dissatisfaction. These events have varying diagnostic significance, depending on the extent of social mobilization, the degree to which the state penetrates the society, the nature of urban-rural, high culture-low culture split."\textsuperscript{54} For the purposes of this study, two measures will be taken as decisive: (1) the target of such instability -- only if the central pillars of democracy (meaningful and extensive competition, inclusive participation, regular and fair elections, and civil and political liberties) themselves are the object of mobilization is there a genuine threat to the democratic order; and (2) the motivational presence of an ideology representing either a historical alternative to democracy or employing pseudo-democratic language.\textsuperscript{55} In this respect, anti-system and semi-loyal parties require

\textsuperscript{53} Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros; Pridham, pp.13-14, 38.

\textsuperscript{54} Haas, p.735.

\textsuperscript{55} In the typology of democratic regimes furnished by Burton, Gunther, and Higley, pseudo-democracies are regimes that maintain a facade of democratic institutions and rhetoric but in actuality are one-party regimes that restrict competition and engage in mass intimidation. Burton, Gunther, and Higley, pp.6-7.
definitional rigor. The former is denoted by its implacable hostility to the regime and its programmatic goal to thoroughly transform it; the latter by its partial embrace of regime values -- reflected in its participation in parliamentary life but its use of obstructionist tactics -- and its instrumental support for democracy.56

If a system has attained consolidation, it should be able to weather important "tests" of its stability, such as the alternation in power between mutually hostile groups, economic hardship, or an attempted coup by a faction in the military.57 Given the predominance of the ethnic variable in the politics of the former Yugoslavia, the crucial tests will have to reflect its unique dimensions: challenges to the integrity of the state, interethnic clashes and violence, and demands for various degrees of separation (federal or confederal arrangements, autonomy, and secession). If national programs seeking hegemony and/or separatist movements seeking exit receive widespread popular support, and if ethnic elites and ethnic-based political parties violate democratic norms in practice, then a system must be designated as unconsolidated. In this case, a system will be highly


57 Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros.
unstable and authoritarian reversals or the disintegration of the state itself becomes likely.

2. The Independent Variables: Ideological, Attitudinal, and Behavioral Dimensions

Before discussing in detail the dimensions of ethnic politics that have been chosen for analysis, an argument will be presented that explains why some factors often associated with the ethnic variable will not be formally examined. First of all, this study will not attempt to hypothesize on the basis of economic variables. Many have theorized that ethnic cleavages get politicized through the mechanism of unequal economic relations. For instance, Hechter's theory of "internal colonialism" rests on the argument that a cultural division of labor overlays a structure of class inequity, such that stratification patterns coincide with ethnic divisions. It is on this basis that Irish, Scottish, and Welsh nationalism emerged and persisted despite modernization. On the other hand, Immanuel Wallerstein argues that a separatist sentiment is likely to be stronger in areas that are economically dominant. The pitfall of such economic reductionist arguments is that empirically nationalism and separatist movements have flourished in both economically advanced and economically depressed areas. Consequently, economics as an independent variable admits of no precise and consistent relationship to ethnic
politics. It therefore must be conceived as a spurious variable.58

A second explanation of ethnic politics that is fundamentally spurious centers on the demographic context as a major explanatory variable. It is hypothesized in a recent paper by Timothy Frye that "the greater the number of ethnic groups, the more difficult it is to find a formula to satisfy them all."59 In other words, the more diverse the demographic context, the less likely a democracy will consolidate. Not only does this claim contradict the experience of other multiethnic societies, such as in India where multifarious and overlapping ethnic cleavages

58 For economistic-rationalist accounts of ethnopolitics, see Ronald Rogowski, "Causes and Varieties of Nationalism," pp.87-108, Mario Polese, "Economic Integration, National Policies, and the Rationality of Regional Separatism," pp.109-127, and Margaret Levi and Michael Hechter, "A Rational Choice Approach to the Rise and Decline of Ethnoregional Political Parties," pp.128-146 in Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, eds., New Nationalisms of the Developed West: Toward Explanation, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985). Of all these thinkers, Mario Polese is the only one who acknowledges the limitations of economic reductionism: "Economic grievances may well be among the factors that impel a region to seek full political autonomy but they will rarely suffice to explain why independence is entertained at all as a possible option." (Polese, p.112.) For the critique of economistic-rationalist theories, see Walker Connor, "Eco- or Ethno-Nationalism?", Ethnic and Racial Studies, v.7, n.3, (July 1984), pp.342-359; Horowitz, pp.63, 82-3, 131-2, 233-259; A. Smith, pp.26-44. Timothy Frye's recent study successfully correlating Wallerstein's thesis with "early sovereignty seekers" in Eastern Europe has been undermined by events as even the lesser developed areas have sought sovereignty. Frye, pp.609-617.

59 Frye, p.618.
actually affords the Indian state greater flexibility and policy options; but also, reversing the statement exposes its superficiality -- a small number of ethnic groups does not mean stability is any more probable. If two groups perceive each other with mutual hostility and fear, then the possibility of finding a peaceful solution is extremely remote. Moreover, if the two groups are aligned along the ethnic stratification pattern of a "bipolar balance," in which one group dominates politically and the other economically, the polity could be full of tension as neither group is fully secure nor content with its status.

In essence, it is not the demographic context per se that has explanatory value but how this objective factor and patterns of ethnic stratification are perceived by national elites and the mass public. To be sure, in the case studies of this dissertation different types of ethnic cleavage are noted. Croatia is labelled an instance of ethnic bipolarity (i.e., Croatians vs. Serbs), Bosnia-Hercegovina is a tripolar case (Muslims, Serbs, and Croats), and Serbia is classified as a dominant ethnic group (Serbs) surrounded by peripheral ethnic minorities (notably, Albanians, Muslims, and Hungarians). All the same, "what matters is not simply the degree


of ethnic division, but how it is structured and managed."\textsuperscript{62}

Consequently, this study will place a premium on political variables and treat the demographic situation as a contextual or background variable against which elites must make decisions, formulate programs, choose policies, forge alliances, and conduct relations. As Joseph Rothschild argues, the existence of objective ethnic markers is a necessary, but not sufficient, factor in ethnic mobilization and conflict. The politicization of ethnicity, the descent into interethnic violence, and the curbing of such violence is in fact overwhelmingly the product of political decisions by ethnic leaders and elites.\textsuperscript{63}

a. The Ideological Dimension: National Ideologies

A key variable to be examined in this study will be the influence of national ideologies. National ideologies represent the collective consciousness of nations. They provide group members with a sense of identity, relative group worth, and status; they define who belongs to the political community and who is endowed with full citizenship rights; and they stake out a given territory over which the group claims the legitimate right to rule. Ernst Haas has devised an excellent definition of national

\textsuperscript{62} Diamond, p.19.

ideologies, from which I quote:

"A nationalist ideology is body of arguments and ideas about a nation advocated by a group of writers and accepted by a specific political movement. Nationalist ideologies embody political programs. ... [They] make assertions about the nation's claim to historical uniqueness, to the territory that the nation-state ought to occupy, and to the kinds of relations that should prevail between one's nation and others. Nationalist ideologies also contain constitutional and institutional programs on how the nation ought to be governed. Finally, these ideologies advance ideas on the historical mission of the nation, ranging from quiet self-perfection to conquest or the restoration of some golden age."64

In Haas' essay he goes on to build a typology of 7 distinct national ideologies, the specific differences of each emanating from their response to the challenge of modernity. Each is based on historical examples and is internally coherent and rationally

64 Haas, pp.727-8. Haas defines nationalism as the belief that a people ought to form a nation, or that they already are one. It is thus divested of the political import he attributes to national ideologies. Following Gellner, I have defined nationalism above as the desire to make polity and nation congruent. I therefore see national ideologies as types of nationalisms. Banac presents a definition of nationalism that is comparable to one adopted here: "The ideology of nationalism seeks to change the world. It promotes the idea of fraternity, interdependence, and common purpose among conationals and sometimes tends to channel social disputes onto the plane of relations with other national communities." Banac, (1984), pp.27-31.
ordered. The present study will identify four national ideologies - pluralist nationalism, civic nationalism, monistic nationalism, and primordial nationalism. The fundamental distinction upon which these national ideologies are based is how they propose to structure interethnic relations. Hence, pluralist nationalism promises the protection of both individual and collective rights; civic nationalism advances the idea that the basic building block of the polity should be the citizen and not the ethnic group; monistic nationalism advocates the dominance and priority of one group over another; and primordial nationalism represents a denial of heterogeneity altogether and the desire to physically remove it. Each ideology will be framed as containing definite characteristics on several dimensions. Methodologically, they will serve as ideal types; that is, as measures against which real world approximations will be assessed rather than as empirically-grounded constructions. The formation of these ideal types derives from two sources: (1) Donald Horowitz's empirical analysis of ethnic conflict in Asia and Africa; and (2) their prima facie relevance to the politics of the former Yugoslavia. Horowitz's study led him to scale ethnic claims on a continuum from equality, to priority, to exclusivity.65 Because the effort here to design ideal types goes beyond his analysis (which focuses on group claims, legitimacy, and group worth), it is incumbent on this study to validate that the dimensions of each national ideology cluster in the assumed manner. And such constraint can

65 Horowitz, pp.196-228.
only be established *a posteriori*; in other words, only after the data has been collected and goodness-of-fit tests have been conducted. If the component parts of each ideal type indeed hang together as outlined, an analytic tool for evaluating the influence of specific national ideologies on democratic consolidation will be furnished. Otherwise, evidence may be on hand that nationalism contains overriding affective, inchoate, and irrational components that preclude a precise typology.

One additional point needs to be clarified before an exposition of the national ideological types begins. The hypothetical relationships drawn between national ideologies and democratic consolidation are conceptualized with the caveat that all else remains equal, such as the institutional setting and the dynamic generated between competing political parties. One facet of this study will be to examine the interrelationship national ideologies have with other factors and to assess the relative causal impact of national ideologies on the dependent variable.

The essence of pluralist nationalism is a realistic awareness that ethnic diversity is an unalterable fact of a polity and that in order to procure the consent and cooperation of minorities substantive measures protecting their rights and way of life must be forthcoming from the dominant group. Pluralist nationalists, therefore, will seek to ensure the constitutional recognition of both the rights of citizens and the rights of nations. National
rights are viewed as necessary features of a successful democratic formula in multinational societies. An example of national or collective rights would be adopting a system of "linguistic parity" whereby multilingualism or alternative official languages are recognized. Short of that, the majority group's language could be deemed official for state purposes while the languages of minorities are officially recognized where they are territorially concentrated. Despite the fact that this would technically be a claim of linguistic priority by the dominant group, its symbolic significance for relative group worth could be tempered and made palatable by a heavy dose of linguistic liberalism at the local level, such as giving the minority language either a priority or an exclusive status in the areas of traffic signs and street names, the local television channel, public schools, and the local government.66

66 An exemplar of the pluralist nationalist approach to the language question can be seen in the Spanish constitution of 1978. Article Three states: "1. Castellano is the official language of the state. All Spaniards have a duty to know it and the right to use it. 2. The other languages of Spain will also be official in the autonomous communities in accord with their respective statutes. 3. The richness of the different linguistic modalities of Spain is a cultural heritage that will be the object of special respect and protection." Cited in Shabad and Gunther, p.460. Spain also typifies some dangers with this policy. Official bilingualism has given Cátalan a superior status within Catalunya, and this has led to charges of job discrimination by non-Cátalan speakers. Shabad and Gunther, pp.469-471.
In terms of other symbolic issues, pluralist nationalists would guarantee the use of cultural symbols that identify minority groups (such as flags, national anthems, and religious ceremonies) and they may adopt an inclusive definition of sovereignty in the constitution, such that all ethnic groups are deemed founding nations of the state. In the political arena, various approaches could be utilized to undercut any rationale for "exit" that minority groups may harbor and to ensure them a "voice" in the system -- reserved seats in the legislature or executive branch, proportional ethnic representation in the state bureaucracy, a special parliamentary commission to handle interethnic matters, the use of qualified majorities when making decisions on ethnic issues, and various divisions of the state (federal or confederal arrangements and/or administratively autonomous territories or provinces). In a word, pluralist nationalism epitomizes the values of inclusiveness and interethnic cooperation and peace. It is articulated by groups who are confident\(^{67}\) of their group worth and harbor no ressentiment towards others.\(^{68}\) In the area of state-to-state relations, it will promote neither irredentism nor

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67 Joseph Rothschild writes "conflict-containing mechanisms and procedures ... require politically secure ethnic leaders and brokers, immune to being outbid by more militant challengers or ousted by grassroots revulsion against the compromises that these devises necessarily entail." Rothschild, (1981), p.164.

68 Liah Greenfeld theorizes on the social psychology of ressentiment and its import for nationalism. The term itself derives from Nietzsche and conveys a mixture of envy, resentment, and hatred. Greenfeld, pp.15-17.
revanchism. All things being equal, if ethnic groups -- either majorities or minorities -- adopt a pluralist nationalist ideology, then the integrity of the state is on a more secure footing and a fledgling democracy is more easily consolidated.

Civic nationalism is based on Anglo-American liberal-democracy and its emphasis on majority rule, the rights of citizens, the philosophy of individualism, and the rule of law. National rights are rejected for imposing ascriptive -- and therefore unjust -- criteria for the distribution of offices and goods. In a word, national rights are identified with invidious forms of discrimination. Rather than institutionalizing an elaborate system of ethnic-based quotas, civic nationalism promises all individuals equal life chances through the medium of formal equality before the law and social mobility based on merit. The mass public will be asked to attach their allegiances not to ethnic symbols and markers but to an overarching ideal (e.g., a supranational identity like "Americans," or an ethnically neutral state tradition) in which all groups have shared values and interests. If a program of federalism or decentralization is offered by civic nationalists it will be built around principles other than the ethnic factor, such as economic rationality, population, or geography. In essence, civic nationalism seeks to redefine the basic state identity of "we the people" away from the *ethnos* and
Ethnic elites that articulate this ideology will typically come from the dominant group in society that is more urban, educated, professional, and westernized. They will uphold the liberal heritage of the West as a model worthy of emulation and will express optimism and confidence that democracy can be consolidated. At the same time, the ethnic elites that advance civic nationalism may be poorly informed as to how minority groups will react to their program.

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69 In a review article of Liah Greenfeld's *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Hugh Kearney argues that civic nationalism is not, properly speaking, a national ideology. By his reasoning, nationalism defines membership on the basis of ascriptive markers and therefore is different in kind from ideologies that define group membership on the basis of a contract or free association. According to Kearney, this means that "the United States is not strictly speaking a nation." And far from being an national ideology, civic nationalism is simply synonymous with what we define as the "modern state." Hugh Kearney, [Book Review], "Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. By Liah Greenfeld," *Political Quarterly*, v.64, n.3, (July/September 1993), pp.364-6. I feel, however, that it is too restrictive to define nations merely on the basis of objective, ascriptive markers. Following Ernest Renan, a nation is any body of people who think of themselves as such ("a nation is a daily plebiscite"). Historically, nations have been created on the basis of widely divergent and often patently false notions, such as shared historical experiences, ancestral and religious myths, and alleged blood ties. (Again to quote Renan: "Getting history wrong is part of being a nation.") It is therefore only appropriate that contractual relations among individuals be considered as a genuine basis for nation-building. See Hobsbawm (pp.1-13) for the presentation of this argument.
In ethnically-divided societies in which nationalism has become a potent force, civic nationalism will more than likely find an unreceptive audience among minority groups. Through the politicized eyes of an ethnic minority, the exclusive recognition of the rights of citizens has the hidden effect of institutionalizing the hegemony of the dominant group. This is so simply because the largest group has the most citizens. As a result, the identity and symbols of the state, the culture of society, and the policy output of the regime will inordinately reflect the values and interests of the dominant group. From the vantage point of the minority, the attempt of civic nationalism to parade notions like a colorblind society is nothing more than a duplicitous effort to mask hegemony behind a facade of equality. Under these circumstances, minority groups will be quite wary of the new regime and will interpret all its pronouncements on democracy, equal rights, the rule of law, etc. as simply a Machiavellian ploy designed to deny them their rights as a nation. The expected recourse for minority groups will be to withhold their consent for the regime and state as long as their national rights remain.

70 I use the word "hegemony" here with its full Gramscian overtones. In other words, hegemony is a form of domination that is established by consent. It takes on the appearance of the general interest and the public good when in fact it conceals the power, privileges, and unequal distribution of benefits enjoyed by the dominant group. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., (New York: International Publishers, 1971). Rothshild also indicates minority dissatisfaction with a meritocracy (or in his terminology, a "cross-patterned reticulate model" of ethnic stratification). Rothshild, (1981), pp.81-85.
unrecognized. It follows then that civic nationalism is not conducive to the consolidation of democracy.

Monistic nationalism occurs among groups demographically dominant in a given area and who claim political rights commensurate with this. Essentially, they insist that their language, their symbols, and their political interests take priority.\(^{71}\) More than likely the ethnic group represented by this ideology will be in a position of political power but, psychologically, they will be insecure about their status and may carry with them a sense of grievance that they have been wronged historically. Such insecurity provides the motive for ethnic elites to affirm publicly their group's worth through constitutions and the symbols of the state.\(^{72}\) Accordingly, they will compel the minority, whom they view with suspicion, to acknowledge at every turn their "preeminence" in the state. In the domain of language rights, the majority's language will be adopted as official for the entire state. Whatever concessions are

\(^{71}\) To continue with the Gramscian parallel, if civic nationalism is similar to his notion of hegemony, monistic nationalism represents a form of "direct domination." Gramsci, p.12.

\(^{72}\) This psychological profile of monistic nationalist elites comes from Rothschild who describes politically insecure ethnic leaders as "apt to protect themselves by taking rigid and aggressive stances," as unable to gain credibility in the eyes of other national communities, and as "anxious, suspicious, and easily distracted" from the work of forging conflict-mediating institutions. Rothschild, (1981), p.164.
granted to minority groups in the area of symbols -- language, flags, ceremonies, etc. -- there will be an accompanying stipulation that ensures the primacy of the dominant group's culture (e.g., a hierarchical arrangement of flags, the mandatory playing of the national anthem before the anthem of the minority group at cultural events, etc.).

A constant theme of monistic nationalism is to deny diversity and to push for a homogeneous state identity. Towards this end, various legitimation or "ownership" claims over a given territory are advanced, such as "prior occupation" of the land, a "special mission" to spread a religion or fulfill an honorable duty, and a history of "traditional rule" over a given territory (otherwise known as historic rights). Based on such legitimation claims, the sovereignty of the state will be located solely in the dominant group while others will be consigned to a second-class citizenship status, such as "guests" or "migrants." Political arrangements

73 Horowitz explains: "Ethnic claims to priority or exclusion are supported by appeals to moral principles. The principles are invoked to justify departures from strict equality. The moral basis of ethnic claims lies in group legitimacy within a territory. Legitimacy is asserted to be distributed unevenly among ethnic groups." Horowitz, pp.201-9.

74 The refusal to grant citizenship rights to minority groups is quite prevalent in ethnically-divided societies. For instance, in Malaysia Chinese were granted citizenship in a constitutional bargain that obligated them to acknowledge the predominance of Malays in politics and the civil service. (Horowitz, pp.582-7.) In the United States it was a mere thirty years ago that African-Americans were guaranteed full citizenship rights by the federal government.
such as autonomy will be sternly opposed as the dominant group prefers instead to build a centralized state. Hence, whatever regions had autonomy will come under attack for weakening the state and for cultivating a secessionist sentiment among the people. Eventually, the dominant group will move to overturn all autonomous jurisdictions. At the same time, it will be preoccupied with the status of its irredenta in other states, often arguing for rights and recognition it denies its own minorities. Its stance vis-a-vis irredenta will consequently be one of active protectionism, to be followed by an irredentist policy if it believes it co-nationals are in imminent danger.

Confronted by a monistic national ideology, minority groups are likely to respond initially with demands for parity\textsuperscript{75} (or pluralist nationalism) which could harden and blossom into secessionist movements if not adequately addressed or if repressed. Much depends on the degree of respect minorities give to the majority's legitimation claims\textsuperscript{76} and that in turn depends on the presence of their own unique sovereignty claims. If they

\textsuperscript{75} Horowitz finds that minorities, when faced by a powerful group advancing exclusivist or priority claims, will typically appeal for equality of treatment. "The asymmetry of group claims means precisely that demands for priority confront demands for parity." Horowitz, pp.200-1.

\textsuperscript{76} Horowitz notes that "of all the foundations of legitimacy, prior occupation is most likely to compel respect across group lines." On the other hand, special religious mission does not carry moral weight across groups who do not share the religion. Ibid., pp.212-3.
have articulated their own ownership claims over the regions in which they are a demographic majority, then the appearance of monistic nationalism could only make them more resolute for exit from the state. In the words of Donald Horowitz, "[i]f there are several bases of legitimacy, it follows that one group may claim priority on one ground, another on another ground. Where claims based on history and geography clash ... moderation will be in short supply." 77 When groups speak in different ideological idioms, they have no shared concepts or common values against which different interests and claims can be assessed and mediated. The situation is analogous to the incommensurability of paradigms Thomas Kuhn examined in the history of the sciences: there can no agreement on the "facts" because the standards on what constitutes facts are paradigm-dependent. 78 When competing ethnic groups debate their respective national ideologies in the marketplace of ideas, their conversation is likely to be "mutually unintelligible" and "incomprehensible." 79 In this context, a democratic agreement will be exceptionally difficult to attain. By contributing to a public discourse marked by

77 Ibid., p.213.


incompatible demands, monistic nationalism is not likely to facilitate democratic consolidation.

The final national ideology to be discussed is primordial nationalism. It shares many goals with monistic nationalism, such as the desire to promote homogeneity and to extirpate heterogeneity. However, whereas monistic nationalism promotes a political claim of priority, primordial nationalism advances a claim of exclusivity; and whereas the former relies chiefly on political means to establish homogeneity, the latter chooses forcible expulsion and physical elimination as a first option and a final solution. The crux of primordial nationalism is to define the legitimate members of the political community on the basis of ethnic-marker criteria (religion, race, kinship, language) and to base group rights on such distinctions. In this way, primordial nationalism articulates ownership claims similar to monistic nationalism -- prior occupation, special mission, and historic rights. If it is possible, it will assimilate or absorb minorities with whom it has close ethnic or historical ties. Otherwise, the group will either be made politically quiescent through repression or, if possible, driven out entirely so as to create an ethnically pure state.80 Primordial nationalists are also inherently expansionist

80 This is, unfortunately, a familiar by-product of ethnic politics: India and Pakistan engaged in wholesale population exchanges and so have India and Sri Lanka; Chinese have been forcibly removed from Vietnam, Bengalis from Burma, Asians from Uganda, etc., etc. (Horowitz, p.198.) See also Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, "A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing," Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1993), pp.111-121.
as they see in the recovery of lost irredenta the completion of their goal to make polity and nation congruent.81

Primordial nationalism has an enormous propensity for aggressiveness and barbarism. The chief psychological disposition of its adherents is ressentiment. Like the integral nationalism of Nazi Germany, it sees in the exercise of violence and terror a purifying act to revenge past injustices and/or fulfill a historical or religious mission.82 Because it is preoccupied with the promotion, glorification, and maintenance of the marker-criteria of its own group and insists that they represent the total definition of the individual's who share the markers, it tends to see others as something less than human. Basically, it perceives minority groups through the medium of an "enemy stereotype"83 whereby they are defined as posing grave threats to the continued way of life and existence of one's own group. As Liah Greenfeld and Daniel Chirot point out, this "tendency to 'demonize' the enemy population" by defining them as on par with the animal world is a "necessary condition for 'crimes against humanity'."84 In sum, if a politically significant group in either


82 Greenfeld, pp.275-396; Liah Greenfeld and Daniel Chirot, "Nationalism and Aggression," manuscript, June 15, 1991, pp.7-9, 22-6.

the majority or the minority adopts primordial nationalism, then the attempt to consolidate democracy will be seriously jeopardized.

The first hypothesis of this study is formulated in the following manner: Holding everything else constant, if politically significant groups in ethnically-divided societies articulate a national ideology that approaches the ideal type of primordial nationalism, then both democracy and democratic consolidation are expected to face severe challenges. Primordial nationalism is incompatible with democracy because it directly contradicts democratic values such as universal citizenship and tolerance. If the protagonists of primordial nationalism practice forcible population expulsions, then the basic protections of civil liberties that democracy provides will be violated. The ensuing animosities between ethnic groups will substantially reduce the incentives for ethnic elites to be moderate and conciliatory. Instead the conditions will be in place for them to develop war-like relations. In this sense, primordial nationalism is the most dramatic antithesis to both democracy and democratic consolidation.

If politically significant groups advocate a national ideology that approaches the ideal type of monistic nationalism, then both democracy and democratic consolidation are assumed to face formidable obstacles. Because monistic nationalism demands the

84 Greenfeld and Chirot, p.9.
supremacy of one group over another, elites that represent it may feel compelled to utilize repressive measures that trample democratic values (such as free speech and association, political competition, offices open to all) under foot. In terms of democratic consolidation, the chauvinism and superiority expressed by monistic nationalists does not encourage elites from other groups to enter into settlements or engage in regular patterns of interaction and communication with them. As such, monistic nationalism does not contribute to the structural integration\textsuperscript{85} or mutual understandings of elites across ethnic lines. To borrow Di Palma's phrase, when a monistic ideology is present there is no point at which minorities feel comfortable enough to "relax."\textsuperscript{86} In short, monistic nationalism is conducive neither to democracy nor democratic consolidation.

If politically significant groups articulate a national ideology that approaches the ideal type of civic nationalism, then conditions are somewhat more favorable for democracy but not for democratic consolidation. Analytically, civic nationalism is not contrary to democracy. Based as it is on western liberal-democracy, civic nationalism supports all essential dimensions of procedural democracy. The problem for this ideology arises when

\textsuperscript{85} By structural integration, Burton, Gunther, and Higley mean overlapping communication and influence networks found among consensually unified elites. Burton, Gunther, and Higley, p.11.

\textsuperscript{86} Di Palma, pp.111, 138-145.
the task at hand is to gain the consent of minorities for the consolidation of the regime. By treating national rights as outmoded solutions suitable only for collectivist societies, civic nationalism ignores the real sense of security that such rights provide minority groups. The dismantling of such rights or the refusal to institutionalize them works to create an atmosphere of interethnic suspicions and fears that is antithetical to the core of democratic consolidation, viz., rational discourse, mutual trust, and the guarantee that no group will be systematically excluded from power. Since the practical effects of civic nationalism will be to marginalize or exclude minority groups and render them unable to affect substantially policy output, minority consent for the regime and/or state is not likely to be forthcoming. In sum, civic nationalism is conceived to be poorly equipped to meet the challenges of democratic consolidation in ethnically-divided societies.

Finally, if politically significant groups articulate a national ideology that approaches pluralist nationalism, then the greater chance that elites representing different communities will enter into a democratic agreement and express allegiance to it and the more they will respect democratic norms in their behavior. Pluralist nationalism is strongly conducive to democracy because it embraces its key values and even extends them to groups that
otherwise would not be able to compete effectively. Furthermore, by cultivating interethnic trust and guaranteeing minority representation pluralist nationalism reduces the risks of playing the game of democracy and therefore creates a favorable climate for attaining minority consent for the regime and the state. In a word, pluralist nationalism is framed as the national ideology most likely to produce democratic consolidation. (See Table 1)
Table 1: A Typology of National Ideologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>pluralist</th>
<th>civic</th>
<th>monistic</th>
<th>primordial</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>political claims equality</td>
<td>substantive equality</td>
<td>formal equality</td>
<td>priority</td>
<td>exclusivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>psychological disposition</td>
<td>confident</td>
<td>confident</td>
<td>insecure</td>
<td>ressentiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definition of the state citizens</td>
<td>sovereignty of citizens</td>
<td>sovereignty of unique ethnic group</td>
<td>sovereignty of unique ethnic group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>balance between civil/national rights both</td>
<td>only civil rights</td>
<td>asymmetrical national rights</td>
<td>only national rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitude towards minorities acceptance</td>
<td>indifference</td>
<td>suspicious</td>
<td>hatred</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>program for minorities measures to equality of security</td>
<td>measures to ensure opportunity</td>
<td>expulsion/ subordination extermination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>likely reaction by minorities acceptance of state demands for national rights</td>
<td>demands for parity/ civil war secessionist movement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitude towards irredenta respect other states' sovereignty</td>
<td>respect other states' sovereignty</td>
<td>active protectionism/ revanchism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impact on democratic consolidation facilitates</td>
<td>obstructs</td>
<td>obstructs</td>
<td>strongly impeded</td>
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Having discussed the impact of national ideologies on democratic consolidation in the abstract, it is important at this point to highlight specifically how they are linked to the dependent variable. National ideologies do not necessarily serve as windows to deeply-held elite values. There are various motivations that compel elites to propagate an ideology, not the least being the perceived popularity of its message. National ideologies are also not inexorably linked with policy outcomes. If a politically significant group identified with a national ideology gains political office, the national ideology itself may become just one of many factors that influence policy choice. Policy output is just as likely to reflect the present balance of forces as well as new opportunities and constraints.

All the same, nothing precludes the possibility that national ideologies guide policy and become institutionally-embodied. In order to have a causal impact on democratic consolidation, however, national ideologies need not attain this level of influence in government or among politically significant elites. All that is necessary is that they be promulgated by the elites of one group and believed by members of another group. The ambience of ethnically-divided societies is punctuated by a host of fears and anxieties -- fears of subordination, anxiety about relative group worth, worries about the prospects of permanent political
exclusion, and fears of extinction.\textsuperscript{87} Often it is the case that the public utterance of a certain word (if it is invested with historical meaning or meant to convey relative group worth) can be a lightening rod for ethnic mobilization.\textsuperscript{88} Once such emotionally-laden terms enter public discourse, ripple effects shoot through each national community as its opinion-makers react by articulating their own counter-ideologies and programs. It is precisely in the creation of a political climate in which group demands, aspirations, expectations, and fears are played out that national ideologies have causal efficacy. Pluralist nationalism, for instance, is conducive to democratic consolidation because it creates an atmosphere of interethnic trust and security in which a consensus on the rightness of the territorial unit of the state can be secured -- a prerequisite to the crafting of a democratic regime. Civic, monistic, and primordial nationalism, on the other hand, generate various degrees of distress and panic. The ensuing ethnic tension, marked by a crescendo of hyperbolic charges and conspiracy theories in the media and outbreaks of violence among the public, tends to push competing ethnic elites towards a variety of breakdown games -- maximalist demands, extremist posturing, a zero-sum game mentality, and inflammatory rhetoric. As a result, these three ideologies do not promote the moderation and conciliation necessary to strike a democratic agreement.

\textsuperscript{87} Horowitz, pp.166-181.

\textsuperscript{88} At the level of individual interethnic contact, these become "fighting words."
The causal influence of national ideologies is accentuated during times of political and social transformation. Large-scale social changes and regime transitions bring with them profound and sometimes overwhelming uncertainty. When traditions begin to falter, when institutions and their concomitant interests are suspended, when routines are interrupted, and when lives become "unsettled," ideologies step forward to help construct new "strategies of action," define interests, and organize social life. Significantly, in Gurr's study of the worldwide trends in ethnic conflict, it was found that both the number and intensity of ethnic conflicts were correlated with the onset of political transitions. It is specifically in such transitional periods that "bursts of ideological activism occur" and do "battle to dominate the world-

89 In one rather dramatic historical example, Stalinist industrialization and collectivization in the USSR produced among the nascent working class "a colossal growth of industrial traumatism" (i.e., alcoholism, hooliganism, and criminality) while among peasants there were widespread reports of visions of the Antichrist. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Cultural Revolution as Class War," (p.30) and Moshe Lewin, "Society, State, and Ideology during the First Five-Year Plan," (p.61) in Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).


91 Gurr, pp.359-363.
views, assumptions, and habits of their members."92 Because national ideologies offer competitive models of identity, justice, authority, and utopia, political transitions present unique opportunities for them to play an exceptional role in the determination of human behavior.

Other important factors to consider are that different national ideologies may be found among elites within the same ethnic group and any group's acceptance of a particular national ideology does not remain static over time. Politically significant groups and elites can move up and down the continuum in response to new conditions and new calculations. The increasing support for primordial nationalism in one community can lead to a reformulation in this direction by another community who feels threatened and begins to believe only equally drastic solutions can safeguard its interests. The incidence of violence can also radicalize demands by undercutting support for pluralist nationalism in favor of a more confrontational approach. Such violence can be capitalized on by more radical elites who exploit it as confirming evidence of whatever insecurities and xenophobia the group may be nurturing. Furthermore, competing elites and parties within ethnic groups can seize on the perceived failure of the dominant ideology by articulating either a more moderate conception or a more chauvinistic one. Finally, all of the

92 Swidler, p.279.
behavioral patterns examined below — chain reactions, census elections, tripolar coalitions, and flanking — could have an enormous impact on the content of national ideologies.

The data source for gathering measures on national ideologies will be the public statements of elites, political parties, and opinion-makers. At this juncture, a practical question comes to mind -- given that in any given national community one is likely to find a multitude of ideologies, how does one determine which to analyze? The solution to this problem is similar to that employed in delimiting the boundaries of what signifies politically significant groups. First of all, it is necessary to determine the strategic location of the articulators of the given ideology. In the former Yugoslav context, if a prominent government official, a leading figure in a significant political party, a member of the military high command, or a party leader who also controls his own "party-army" enunciates an ideology, this will be considered politically significant. In addition there is the "numerical component": the greater audience a national ideology finds among the mass public, the more politically significant it is. This last criterion leads a consideration of the relationship between public support and national ideologies.

b. The Attitudinal Dimension: The Values, Beliefs and Attitudes of the Mass Public

National ideologies are able to affect the functioning of a political order not merely because they are formulated by elites who have resources of power at their disposal, but also because they "strike roots in mass sentiments, apprehensions, and aspirations." 94 A constant theme of the literature on nationalism and ethnic politics is the relative ease with which ethnic groups are mobilized compared to other bases of social cleavage, such as class. One explanation of this is that the conceptualization of a class identity often entails "the difficult task of pushing up the psychological-stereotypical gradient" to a wider and more abstract frame of reference whereas one needs merely to "slide" down the gradient to primordial traits in order to mobilize on an ethnic basis. 95 It is here that the most intense emotions, the most basic identities, and the most ingrained stereotypes can be tapped by ethnic elites.

In the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe and the former USSR, the availability of ethnicity as a base of political organization was only accentuated by the general "flatness" of civil society. Due to the atomization of society and the absence of class distinctions, elites (both new and old) moved directly to the

94 Horowitz, p.105.

exploitation of old interethnic animosities and historical grievances as a source of popular appeal. What is pertinent for this study is the type of national ideology that has hit the most responsive chords within the various national communities. Is there an empirical basis to say that a single national ideology has become modal for a given ethnic group? Or is there a range of ideologies each competing for support? Consistent with the discussion above on the role of the public in democratic consolidation, the masses need not demonstrate a deep-seated commitment to pluralist nationalist values; far more significant is whether or not ethnic groups are mobilizable in support of or in reaction to civic, monistic, or primordial nationalism.

Hypothesis II suggests that if public opinion expresses support for either the ideal type of primordial nationalism or monistic nationalism, then a democracy will enjoy less public support and will have a difficult time consolidating. Both primordial and monistic nationalism promote a type of politics that is incompatible with tolerance, peaceful competition, and respect for civil and political liberties. If the public supports either of these national ideological types then a social base will be in place for demagogues to incite for the purpose of protests and

violence aimed at vulnerable minorities. As stated above, civic nationalism does not contradict democracy per se. But if a minority group overwhelmingly opposes a civic nationalist program of the majority, the minority may refuse to participate in democratic institutions and thus compromise their legitimacy. By so doing, democratic consolidation could be undermined. With regard to pluralist nationalism, the more public support that it receives the greater likelihood that the regime will be democratic and consolidated. Testing this hypothesis is dependent on the availability of mass survey data.

c. The Behavioral Dimension: Political Parties and Politically Significant Groups

The third and final dimension for analysis will encompass a series of hypotheses that focus on the behavior of ethnically-based political parties. A democracy is considered consolidated when all politically significant groups play within the democratic framework. The logic of ethnic politics, however, has a way of inducing behavior that runs contrary to democratic norms. Two questions will be addressed from which will be culled a number of hypotheses. First of all, what is the numerical ratio and balance of electoral strength between ethnic and nonethnic parties? This question is significant for determining the saliency of ethnic politics as opposed to other social cleavages. Secondly, given that political parties are organized on an ethnic basis, how many
parties are there per group? The number of ethnic parties representing ethnic groups has ramifications for the type of politics that will unfold. The Diamond, Linz, and Lipset studies show that if each ethnic group has one dominant party, then this acts as a stabilizing influence on politics and opens up the possibility of multiethnic coalitions and accommodative stances. On the other hand, the presence of more than one party per ethnic group tends to set up a destructive trajectory of intraethnic outbidding that turns parties away from interethnic compromises and alliances.97

Once again the exposition that follows (with the exception of the second hypothesis) is based on the research of Donald Horowitz. The general theme of the following hypotheses considered in toto is that if ethnic elites forego an initial window of opportunity to be conciliatory and accommodating, the emergence of ethnic politics will compel a gradual transformation in the complexion of a political order from one of civil competition and peaceful coexistence to a politics of intolerance, exclusion, and ultimately, authoritarianism.

1. The Chain Reaction Hypothesis. The first empirical question that has to be addressed is the character of the party system. Upon which types of issues and cleavages are political parties organized? Have ethnic parties completely overtaken

nonethnic parties in electoral strength? Have parties representing the ideology of primordial nationalism marginalized parties representing pluralist nationalism? There is a tendency in ethnically-divided societies for ethnic parties to drive out nonethnic parties. For example, if a society is evenly divided between two ethnic groups and one decides to vote as a bloc whereas the other splits its vote along class and ethnic lines, the party representing the former group is put at a collective advantage. This is precisely what happened in Trinidad and Guyana in the 1960s when a major party in each society became popularly identified as an ethnic party. Indian ethnic voting in Guyana and Black ethnic voting in Trinidad compelled nonethnic parties, willy nilly, to line up on the ethnic dimension. Increasingly, elections took the form of a "census." In essence, a "chain reaction" is established when one major party decides to organize on an ethnic basis. This "structural innovation" compels all other parties to adopt an ethnic stance, no less than the "catch-all" party in Otto Kirchheimer's classic analysis forced the "class-mass" and "denominational" parties in Western Europe to broaden their appeal or die.98 To quote Horowitz: "As ethnic party

98 Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party System," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, Sixth edition (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1986), pp.325-340; Horowitz, pp.311-334; 194-6. The chain reaction may also be considered the ethnic equivalent of Di Palma's notion of "bandwagon effects." Both constructs describe a changing structure of opportunities that compel parties to adapt to new practices. However, whereas bandwagon effects represent a centripetal dynamic that leads to democratic consolidation, the chain reaction is a centrifugal force that can tear apart a
systems grow, the stakes become too high and the pressures toward the census-type election too strong to permit the luxury of representation outside the ethnic group. ... Whatever the number of parties, ethnic party systems leave little room for parties organized without regard to the preeminence of ethnic issues in a severely divided society or for politicians aiming to struggle for ethnic interests outside the ethnic party. In such a system, there is a single axis of political conflict and a single way of pursuing that conflict: through the ethnic parties."

In order to grasp why a proliferation of ethnic parties does not bode well for the stability of a regime, it is necessary to consider the character of an ethnic party vis-a-vis the voluntary-associational parties of the West. The latter is inclusive in its membership and seeks to represent the interests of a number of different segments of society; hence, the interest aggregation function normally attributed to such parties. Ethnic parties, on the other hand, define membership ascriptively. Since their pool of support is found within the ethnic group and not outside it, they tend to reinforce cleavages rather than bridge them. In this way, the ethnic party behaves more like an interest group as it promotes its own ethnic interests regardless of their impact on the whole. As Horowitz explains, the ethnic party's "overall mission is state.

99 Horowitz, pp.341-2.
to foster the interests of the group it represents. There are no countervailing competitive incentives."\textsuperscript{100}

The upshot of this displacement of nonethnic parties is that there is "little relief from the ethnic character of politics in the form of alternating issues."\textsuperscript{101} Ethnic parties tend to become immersed in a politics of ethnic symbolism and institutionalizing relative group worth and status. Furthermore, the ethnic dimension becomes all-engrossing as all other salient issues get redefined in ethnic terms. This leads to an increasingly circumscribed national political discourse, for the identification and definition of problems and the formulation of possible solutions can no longer be conducted in nonethnic terms.\textsuperscript{102} Once the ethnic cleavage reaches this level of significance in the polity, the possibility of utilizing the democratic methods of negotiation and compromise becomes increasingly remote.

In sum, the hypothesis reads as follows: if the number of ethnic parties increase at the expense of nonethnic parties, then the more ethnic cleavages become intense, the more time is devoted to divisive, symbolic ethnic issues, and the less likelihood

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., pp.296, 295-8.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p.346.

\textsuperscript{102} Shöpflin calls this a "process of reductionism" (pp.56, 58) and Rothschild dubs it the "overethnicizing" of public issues (1981, p.63).
that a democratic accord can be struck. This hypothesis will be considered falsified if nonethnic parties remain a permanent feature of the political landscape, and/or if they increase in electoral strength. In this event, ethnic cleavages are becoming less important and the possibility of pacifying ethnic interests by cross-cutting them with other types of cleavage becomes possible.

2. The Generosity Moment. The second hypothesis to be expounded is gleaned from the insights of a number of thinkers who advise dominant groups to exercise self-restraint, generously accommodate minorities, and act promptly in introducing confidence-building measures so as not to leave political space for militants to disturb interethnic relations beyond repair. Larry Diamond, for one, compares the very different political outcomes between India and New Guinea on the one hand, and Sri Lanka, on the other, and arrives at a "powerful generalization." In the former cases, elites from the dominant group have pursued flexible and inclusive strategies that run the gamut from symbolic gestures to carving out new federal units (in India). Such policy approaches have been quite successful in maintaining interethnic peace and stability. Sri Lanka, however, is the epitome of what not to do -- the obstinate refusal of the Sinhalese to acknowledge Tamil concerns "transformed the Tamil sense of grievance into a militant and ultimately violent separatist movement."¹⁰³ Both George Schöpflin and Joseph Rothschild agree that ethnic leaders

from the dominant group must bend over backwards and sacrifice some their own short-term interests in order to maintain the integrity of the state in the long-term. And both emphasize a timing factor -- if ethnic elites in the majority community do not act swiftly to address minority interests, mobilization and politicization on the ethnic fault lines will rapidly dissolve any basis for dialogue and compromise.\textsuperscript{104}

Given that elites from the dominant group present a program to minority groups and do not simply ignore, repress, expel, or annihilate them, the program contents could span quite a range. Rothschild provides the following list: removing barriers to integration, social mobility and equality of opportunity; official recognition of cultural pluralism; the granting of cultural autonomy; creating political/cultural satrapies for ethnic elites; and various schemes of devolution, cantonization, and federalization.\textsuperscript{105} Because every ethnic group has its own definition of what constitutes a minimal threshold for living together, and because this definition can be historically variable, it is difficult to specify in a universal sense what the elements of a generous package would be. Certainly it is not up to the analyst to determine \textit{a priori} if a given policy proposal adequately meets the needs of an ethnic group. Perhaps the most that can be done in this area is to determine whether or not the dominant group is

\textsuperscript{104} Rothschild, (1981), pp.28-9, 164-5; Schöpflin, pp.56-8.

willing to adjust its package in light of minority demands. How do the elites of the dominant group react when their initial proposal is rebuffed by the minority as inadequate? Do they harden their position and display an unwillingness to compromise or do they regroup and return to the bargaining table in a spirit of mutual adjustment and reciprocity? If the latter approach is followed, the prospects for undermining the support of primordial nationalists and secessionists in the minority is enhanced.

The formal statement of this hypothesis reads as follows: if the political representatives of the dominant group adopt a conciliatory, flexible, inclusive, and tolerant approach towards minority groups, then the prospects of democratic consolidation are enhanced. Conversely, if the political representatives of the dominant group exhibit a reluctance to reevaluate and reshape their program in accordance with minority concerns then the interethnic goodwill necessary to lead to democratic consolidation is unlikely to be cultivated. This hypothesis will be considered disconfirmed if the elites of the dominant group prove exceptionally generous but either interethnic violence, civil war, or secession occurs anyway.
The Competitive Configuration: Census Elections, Coalitions, and Flanking. The number of political parties representing each ethnic group structures the range of politically possible relations between parties. Horowitz writes that "[t]he possibilities of competition and coalition are affected by the number of parties per ethnic group and how they divide the total vote."¹⁰⁶ What then determines how many parties represent a given ethnic group? Horowitz cites such factors as the existence of social cleavages, the existence of ascriptive differences, a collective conception of how many parties should represent the group without weakening its overall electoral strength, differences of opinion concerning interethnic strategies, leadership rivalries, and the incentives provided by the electoral system.¹⁰⁷ Another element that has to be taken into account is the explosion of parties that normally occurs in the aftermath of an authoritarian experience. This is virtually a universal law in the democratization literature, and it is only amplified in the post-communist societies where autonomous forms of political organization had been suppressed for so long. It is to be expected then that in the early stages of democratic consolidation there are likely to be hundreds of different parties that compete for office. Eventually, most will wither away as the party system begins to stabilize in response to the rewards and penalties of the electoral

¹⁰⁶ Horowitz, p.349.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp.349-350.
Under normal conditions the electoral system not only has an impact on the number of parties that compete per ethnic group, but it also structures party competition and coalitions as well. A major point Horowitz makes in his comparative study is that ethnic parties do respond to the electoral environment. In other words, ethnic elites are not so irrational and single-minded as to be immune to electoral incentives and disincentives. At the same time, the institutional choice concerning types of electoral systems reflects the distribution of power among politically significant ethnic groups. In this sense, electoral systems are recursive variables -- they are crafted by parties seeking to further their own interests but in their "proximal" and "distal" effects they are capable of establishing an incentive structure that


110 Claus Offe remarks that "the situation of extreme contingency invites opportunism, and the veil of ignorance is lifted. Now actors are in a position to see which constitutional design and which ethnic boundaries of the state will best serve their interests in policy outcomes, or their passions for ethnic identities and resentments. The situation is replete with opportunities, rightly perceived to be unique in their scope, to improve one's 'original endowment,' or to take revenge." Offe, p.872.
works to determine elite behavior. Although this study is not focused on the role of political institutions, careful attention will be paid to how the choice of an electoral system reflects the relative configuration of ethnic group strength and how the system in turn structures ethnic elites towards behavior conducive to democratic consolidation and behavior antithetical to it. Suffice it to say, there is consensus in the literature on both democratization and ethnic politics that proportional representation is better suited than first-past-the-post to convince reluctant actors (be they authoritarian holdouts or anxious minorities) to join the democratic game.

There are a number of different patterns of competition and coalition that can commence in ethnically-divided societies, those patterns being dependent chiefly on how many parties there are per ethnic group. What follows will contain an elucidation of hypotheses based on census elections, tripolar coalitions, and flanking. Each hypothesis describes behavioral tendencies destructive to a democratic order.

111 Gunther cites the conditions under which electoral laws can have a deterministic effect on elite behavior, although in his case study such conditions did not obtain. Richard Gunther, "Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain," American Political Science Review, v.83, n.3, (September 1989), pp.835-858.

112 Horowitz, pp.628-651; O'Donnell and Schmitter, pp.60-1.
3. **Census Elections.** The ideal typical case involving the negative repercussions of a census elections is a bipolar society in which one group composes 60% of the population and forms a majority in 60% of the electoral districts, the other group has 40% of the population with a majority in 40% of the electoral districts, and each has one ethnic party to represent it. Under these conditions, neither a single-member district plurality system nor a proportional representational system will change the fact that the majority ethnic group will always form the government. Electoral uncertainty only exists until a "crucial, polarizing election" takes place in which voter turnout mirrors the "census" and thereby seals the fate of each party for the foreseeable future. Prior to this point, politics is especially violence-prone. This is so because the question concerning voter turnout in these conditions is not for which party members of an ethnic group will vote, but if they will in fact vote. Hence, party mobilization drives are conducted to maximize voter turnout and usually take the form of appealing to ethnic stereotypes and animosities, exaggerating the consequences of an electoral defeat, sanctioning deviants within one's ethnic group in order to ensure everyone tows the ethnic line, threatening and intimidating members of other ethnic groups in order to reduce their overall turnout, etc. Once a "census election" takes place, the minority group finds itself suddenly and
permanently excluded from the political process.\textsuperscript{113}

At this point, the impact on democratic consolidation must be made perfectly clear. A central motif of the democratization literature is the incentive that the "certain rules, uncertain outcomes" formula provides to hard-liners from the authoritarian regime distraught over their removal from power (and who therefore constitute a potentially destabilizing element). The basic promise of democracy is that no one will ever face permanent political exclusion since the system will remain open to all contestants. Given the dynamics outlined above, however, it is apparent that in ethnically-divided societies such an electoral incentive will fall on deaf ears -- for an excluded ethnic minority remains an excluded ethnic minority whether or not it agrees to play by the democratic game. Under these circumstances, "contingent consent" is simply of no avail. In the words of Horowitz, the outcome of a census election "provides good reason for the excluded minority to depart from the electoral road to power -- since that road in fact does not lead to power."\textsuperscript{114}

Even from the perspective of the winning party all is not necessarily well. Because political exclusion generates such

\textsuperscript{113} Horowitz, pp.83-6, 324-332, 363, 348-9.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p.360. Lijphart also discusses this problem and poses the grand coalition as a solution. Lijphart, (1977), pp.29-30.
uncertainty and hostility in the ranks of the minority group, the ruling party cannot rest content with its victory. In order to ensure stability it may ban the minority party and institutionalize a one-party authoritarian regime. Another route to authoritarianism in the aftermath of a crucial, polarizing election is if strategically located members of the minority group in the military conduct a coup d'état in order to reverse the election results. As Horowitz explains, "[r]egardless of whether an ethnic party system falls victim to civilian or military authoritarianism, whether party rivalry is suppressed by those who already captured power through the party or by those who have been shut out of power, an ethnic party system is highly vulnerable to being transformed into an authoritarian but no less ethnically partial regime."115

The hypothesis is as follows: if a minority group is territorially concentrated such that it is a majority in a given region and it gives its vote solely to one party, then this party will do either one of two things: either seek some form of "exit" (ranging from confederalism, to autonomy, to secession) from the state as it is presently constituted, or attempt to violently reverse the election results. Given the same conditions, the party representing the demographically dominant group is likely to suppress the minority party in the name of public order and national security. If the minority party agrees to join the

115 Ibid., p.363.
dominant party in a coalition government or participates in parliament, then census elections cannot be said to have such deleterious consequences for democratic consolidation and this hypothesis will be considered falsified.116

4. Tripolarity and Ephemeral Coalitions. Insofar as the system of ethnic stratification involves three primary groups and each group has its own party, then coalitional politics becomes possible and the risks associated with losing elections are reduced. Often the third group is numerically smaller than the other two and is capable of shifting its electoral support from one party to the other in order to produce a majority-backed government. However, tripolarity is not a durable arrangement and more often than not tends towards bifurcation. This is so because the third party comes under intense pressure to choose sides and often gets absorbed into one or the other larger ethnic parties. In other cases, there is a sub-cleavage within the third ethnic group that leads it to form two mutually antagonistic parties which accordingly align on opposite sides with the larger ethnic parties. When either process occurs, "the stage is set for bifurcation" and

116 A bipolar case is not necessary in order to apply this hypothesis. A cursory glance at the former Yugoslavia yields the observation that generally it is only minority groups who have a single, dominant party to represent their interests. This is true of the Serbs in Croatia and the Croats, Hungarians, Muslims and Albanians in Serbia. All of these instances will be used to test the impact of census elections on democratic consolidation, although the dominant ethnic group in each case (i.e, the Croats and the Serbs, respectively) has a multitude of competing parties.
the dynamics described in the previous hypothesis begin to take shape.117

If a multiethnic coalition happens to be forged after an election, it will take one of two forms. A coalition of convenience finds its sole purpose in the need for parties to combine their electoral strength in order to create a government. Because of this limited objective, coalitions of convenience are extremely short-lived. Their demise is usually attributable to the efforts of one party to dominate the coalition, or the sheer incompatibility of coalition partners (which stems from a calculated decision to avoid partnership with parties that compete for the same clientele). Empirically, no coalition of convenience in Horowitz's study lasted for more than one election and their average life was slightly more than a year.118 A coalition of commitment also comes about for the purpose of creating a majoritarian-backed government, but it goes beyond mere convenience and seeks to reduce ethnic conflict and searches for an interethnic consensus. The forces that tear it asunder originate outside the coalition in the form of competing parties who capitalize on the perceived concessions that the coalition partners have made. The one coalition of commitment Horowitz examined -- Sri Lanka in 1965 -- failed, like the coalitions of convenience, to survive beyond one

117 Ibid., pp.360-2.

118 Ibid., pp.369-378.
The hypothesis formulated for this scenario holds that if a tripolar ethnic party system is in place and a coalitional government is formed, such coalitions will prove unstable. In the event that the third party is absorbed and a bipolar contest ensues between the two largest parties, then the second largest party will be excluded from power and pressures will build for it to exit from the state. If flanking parties outside the coalition contribute to its disintegration, then the regime will be unstable and will have difficulty creating a workable government. On the other hand, if a tripolar party system proceeds in relative peace and if any coalitions that are founded prove durable and stable, then the negative impact of tripolarity on democratic consolidation shall be considered falsified.120

5. **Flanking.** The existence of more than one party for each ethnic group mitigates census elections but does not diminish the probability of conflict and the recourse to authoritarian solutions. This is due to the centrifugal quality of ethnic party competition. In ethnic party systems, party competition occurs not between ethnic groups but within them. Because party identification is

119 Ibid., pp.378-395.

120 Obviously this hypothesis has *prima facie* applicability to the politics of Bosnia-Hercegovina and will be tested accordingly.
ascriptively defined, vote transferability by "floating voters" is precluded. In Horowitz's succinct formulation, "[t]here are many working-class Tories, but very few Hindu Akalis ..." Such is not the case in nonethnic party systems in which parties tend to compete for undecided voters located in the ideological center. This gravitation towards the middle gives parties an electoral incentive to moderate their positions. In ethnic party systems such incentives are not present. What intragroup competition occurs is located on the "flanks" of each party as insurgent and more radical ethnic parties push the dominant parties to extreme positions. The existence of flanking parties puts pressure on dominant parties to shun moderation and interethnic negotiations lest they be branded with the stigma of selling out or betraying one's nation. As Horowitz notes, there "is nothing in the competitive equation [that] requires moderation." The "absence of countervailing electoral incentives" (that would come from the ability to appeal across ethnic cleavages) can produce a "politics of intraethnic outbidding" that makes any interethnic "reconciliation difficult."\footnote{Ibid., pp.342-8, 357, 359.}

For the most part, Horowitz specifies the range of patterns that unfold when flanking occurs against a multiethnic alliance in control of the government. In order to craft the hypotheses so

\footnote{Ibid., p.346.}
that they are applicable to the former Yugoslavia, this study will analyze how flanks push a system away from democratic consolidation and towards authoritarian remedies. In the event that there is a clear majority party representing the interests of the dominant ethnic group, flanking will produce one of three possible outcomes: (1) the flanks will erode the support of the dominant party committed to interethnic reconciliation; (2) the dominant party might choose to act in an "anticipatory" fashion and preempt the flanking party's core program; or (3) the dominant party might choose to "simplify" the flanks through repressive measures.\textsuperscript{123} In the event that the second possibility occurs, the dominant party basically takes care of the flanks by appropriating their stance. In the third possibility, flanking parties gain enough electoral strength to provoke worry and agitation within the dominant party. In this instance, the sentiment might develop that "something has to be done about the flanks." As Horowitz notes, "[m]ost often the move to a one-party state occurs as a reaction to flanking."\textsuperscript{124} All three possibilities stand to destroy the consolidation of a democracy. If flanks have no noticeable impact on the politics and behavior of the dominant party, then the phenomenon of flanking will not be considered

\textsuperscript{123} For various "anticipatory" elite actions and means to "simplify" the flanks, see Ibid., pp.309, 420-4, 429-439.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., pp.429-30, 413-6, 421-3, 440.
inherently negative for a democracy.
A Brief History of Nationalism and Ethnic Politics in Yugoslavia

A "... Serb, no matter where he lived, wishes to unite with Serbia, without asking about its internal organization."¹
-- Nikola Pasic', Serbian Radical Party, 1920

"If the Serbs really want to have such a centralist state and government, may God bless them with it, but we Croats do not want any state organization except a confederated federal republic."² -- Stjepan Radic', Croatian Peasant Party, 1918

To say that Yugoslavia was founded under different intentions and with different expectations is a major understatement. It was a precarious union from the beginning, a product of the conditions of war, the collapse of empires, the


² Ibid., p.226.
product of the conditions of war, the collapse of empires, the menace of predatory neighbors, the wishful thinking of many in the Croatian political class, and the wariness of the leadership of the independent state of Serbia. Over the course of its seventy-two year existence, a plethora of ideologies, strategies, institutions, and regimes encountered its ethnic cauldron. A constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary government, a royal dictatorship, foreign occupation, Stalinist-style communism, socialist pluralism, and authoritarian consociationalism all confronted the South Slav national question but, in the end, were overwhelmed by it. This brief history chapter will chart the central themes of Yugoslav history and will provide a backdrop for the case studies that follow. It will largely be a descriptive chronology that is aided, here and there, by concepts from the theoretical framework. The final section of this chapter will be more analytic in approach and contain a critique of Yugoslav consociationalism. The historical account will focus primarily on the former Yugoslav republics that comprise the subject of this dissertation (thus, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia are omitted).

A. Pre-1918 Historical Experiences and Political Culture

When Yugoslavia was created in 1918 it brought together approximately 12 million people who had vastly different historical experiences, levels of political development, and degrees of national identity. What is known today as Croatia was never politically united prior to 1918. For over 800 years, Croatia-
Slavonia existed as a kind of semi-autonomous subkingdom of Hungary, Dalmatia was under the jurisdiction of Austria (and was connected to Croatia proper only in 1939), and Istria experienced successive Roman, Venetian, French, Austrian, and Italian tutelage. Istria was joined to Yugoslavia only after World War II. Bosnia-Hercegovina (BH) was under Turkish rule from 1463 to 1878. After the second Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878), BH came under joint Austrian-Hungarian rule for 40 years. Serbia had fought wars of national liberation against the Ottoman Empire and won its independent statehood in 1878. The Serbian state expanded considerably after the Balkan Wars of 1912 - 1913 and brought into its fold territories that had predominantly non-Serb populations -- Macedonia, the Sandzak, and Kosovo. Vojvodina was annexed to Serbia (i.e., Yugoslavia) in 1920. Before that, it was a district of Hungary. Given their varied historical experiences, it is not surprising that political elites in the newly-constituted Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had difficulty developing regular patterns of interaction and trustworthy communication networks. The fact that the South Slav peoples had never lived together and instead had lived next to each other -- separated by different cultural zones and civilizational fault lines -- cannot be underestimated as an explanatory factor for the subsequent political trajectory of Yugoslavia.

Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Serbia all had medieval kingdoms that crossed each others lands at different points in
history. In fact, what exactly is meant by the terms "Croatia," "Bosnia-Hercegovina," and "Serbia" is historically variable. It is for this reason that Ivo Banac writes "the history of the Balkans is the history of migrations -- not just of peoples, but of lands." The medieval Croatian state led by King Tomislav (910-928) was centered in Knin and extended into Bosnia. The origins of Serbia are found in Raska (now within the Sandzak). From this base, Serbian tsars gradually extended their realm northwest to Dubrovnik and Hercegovina, south to Macedonia, and north to the Danube. Under Tsar Stefan Dusan the Serbian empire reached its zenith. From 1331 to 1335 Serbia meant all the land between Hercegovina, present-day Belgrade, and Western Thrace to the Aegean Sea. At this time, Tsar Dusan moved the capital to Skopje and declared himself "Emperor of the Serbs and Greeks."

Approximately 50 years later Serbia came under the assault of the Ottoman Turks, to whom they eventually succumbed. Once the Turks began to consolidate their control and the Albanians converted en masse to Islam, Serbs began a historical migration northward. The territorial designation of "Serbia" moved accordingly. When the Serbian empire began to wane in face of Turkish incursions, the medieval state of Bosnia, which had been in existence since 1180, took the opportunity to expand and eventually included all the Dalmatian cities (except Dubrovnik and Zadar), the Bay of Kotor (Montenegro), and the Serbian Sandzak. In light of such successes King Stephen Tvrko I (1353-1391)

3 Ibid., p.33.
proclaimed himself the "King of Bosnia and Serbia." The point of mentioning all this is that ownership claims to land often revolve on ideas such as "prior occupation" and "traditional rule." In the Balkans, such historical claims are ubiquitous, overlapping, and antinomic.

If the middle ages represent the highmark of Slav power in the Balkans, it was also the period under which the medieval states fell to foreign domination. The Croatian kingdom contractually consented to Hungarian protection in 1102, Serbia gradually buckled under Ottoman military power after the battle at Kosovo Polje in 1389, and Bosnia relented to Turkish suzerainty in 1463 after decades of Ottoman invasions. The national memory of independence and statehood was maintained in each case but by different institutional vehicles. In Croatia, it was the Sabor (Assembly) that preserved Croatia's past. The Hapsburgs allowed the existence of the Sabor and it was here that Croatian spokesman fought a perennial legalistic battle with the crown in an attempt to augment political autonomy. According to Banac, this is "one of the major motifs of Croat parliamentary life" -- "Sabor after Sabor sought to marshal old documents and privileges against the Hapsburg and Hungarian usurpations." This led to a

political culture described by Joseph Rothschild as "defensive obstructionism." The confinement of Croatian political life to the privileged classes and the multifaceted regional character of Croatia meant that there existed no widespread sense of Croatian identity until the early twentieth century. Much of the efforts of mid-nineteenth century Croatian "national awakener" was thus directed towards educating and molding the mass populace into a national mindset.

In Serbia, the Orthodox Church proved to be the glue that kept intact a common identity among Serbs. The millet system of the Ottoman Empire granted civil authority to local churches. From this base, the church conveyed to its congregation a sense of historical mission, a memory of past glories, national heroes, and statehood, and dreams of national resurrection. Consequently, prior to Serbia's emancipation from the Turks there existed an ingrained sense of national identity. This pre-existing national


mentality greatly facilitated the mobilization of peasants to expel the Ottoman invaders. When Serbia finally was liberated, it found itself with a simplistic social structure. The aristocracy had been liquidated by the Turks leaving behind a largely undeveloped, egalitarian, peasant-based economy. Given such backward conditions, it is quite remarkable that Serbia developed a parliamentary system complete with a constitution, an independent judiciary, a rational-legal bureaucracy, a free press, and a party system. The political culture this experience spawned is neatly conveyed by Rothschild:

"The Serbs, with their political experience of successful nineteenth-century insurrections by a socially homogeneous people to carve its own independent and populistic kingdom out of the decaying Ottoman Empire, tended toward a positive, proud, and possessive view of the state; they were prone to assertive, even aggressive, and sometimes violent, strategies to achieve their political aims, and they were inclined to be rough and ready in dealing with recalcitrant elements. *Samo Sloga Srbina Spasava* (Only Solidarity Saves the Serb) was their historic aphorism and current watchword."\(^9\)


\(^10\) Rothschild, p.207.
It was only in Bosnia-Hercegovina that a clear national idea failed to crystallize. The mass conversion to Islam under Ottoman rule (by the seventeenth century 3/4 of Bosnia's population was Muslim), led to the prevalence of confessional forms of identity. Thus, the Catholics referred to themselves as "latinci" (Latins) or "kriscjani" (Christians) and the Orthodox as "Vlasi" (Vlachs) or "hriscjani" (Christians). The Ottomans themselves used the term "bosnakler" (Bosnians) to refer to all the inhabitants and this notion was revived under Austro-Hungarian rule. Seeking to head-off the spread of Croatian and Serbian national ideologies in the late nineteenth century, the Austro-Hungarian regime headed by Benjamin Kállay (1882-1903) cultivated the notion "bosnjastvo." However, nationalist ideas proved too seductive. By the turn of the century only Muslims had shown any inclination for a Bosnjak appellation; Catholics and Orthodox were fast on their way to becoming Croats and Serbs, respectively.11

B. National Ideologies: From the Nineteenth Century to the Creation of Yugoslavia

National ideologies first began to emerge in Croatia and Serbia in the mid-nineteenth century. Nationalist conceptions were far more uniform in Serbia than in Croatia. Vuk Karadzic' (1787-1864) is usually credited with developing a "modern Serb ideology." He was the first to champion a definition of Serbian identity based not on affiliation to the Orthodox Church, but on the

11 Malcolm, pp.147-9; Banac, pp.38-42, 360-1.
"scientific" basis that anyone who spoke the stokavian dialect was ipso facto a Serb. The practical consequence of this new definition was assimilation as stokavian speakers included many Catholic Croats and Macedonians, and all Bosnian Muslims.\textsuperscript{12} Complementing this national ideology was a political program developed by Serbian interior minister, Ilija Garasanin (1812-1874). His Nacertaniye (Outline, 1844) represents the first formulation of a Greater Serbia project. Defining Serbs linguistically, Garasanin called for Serbia's borders to be coterminous with Serbian population settlements. This program is often condemned for being expansionist and assimilationist. It is only fair to note, however, that its primary motivation was to create a large South Slav state that would pose a credible deterrent to the territorial ambitions of external powers.\textsuperscript{13}

Of all the social forces that came to characterize the Serbian political outlook of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, none was more definitive than the Serbian National Radical Party (NRS). Founded in 1880, the NRS was credited with having "created democratic Serbia out of peasant boots."\textsuperscript{14} The Radicals were the dominant force in Serbia since 1903 and were the first real modern political party in Serbia complete with

\textsuperscript{12} Banac, p.80.

\textsuperscript{13} Dragnich and Todorovich, p.81; Banac, pp.82-4.

\textsuperscript{14} Banac, p.154.
organizational coherence, national-local linkages, and the development of a mass social base. Furthermore, they took Serbian nationalist discourse to a hitherto unprecedented emotional level. For example, Serbia was described as our "bloody and tear-washed homeland," an anti-Austrian sentiment was propagated, and the "holy idea of Serbian liberation and unification" was espoused.\(^{15}\) In a word, the Radicals posed themselves as champions of a Greater Serbia. Nevertheless, when the moment for union drew nearer, the NRS and its leader, Nikola Pasic', began to indicate serious reservations.\(^{16}\) Specifically, Pasic' worried that the multiethnic fabric of the South Slav lands would overwhelm Serbian national identity. He therefore made it clear that "Serbia does not want to drown in some kind of Yugoslavia, but to have Yugoslavia drown in her."\(^{17}\)

The Serbian state expanded considerably after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. Serbia had fought to regain the lands of its medieval empire -- the Sandzak, Kosovo, and Macedonia, to which Serbs fondly called "Old Serbia" and "Southern Serbia." Much to their dismay, however, Serbs discovered their newly-liberated ancient lands were inhabited predominantly by non-Serbs. For centuries Serbs had been reared on the myth of Kosovo, which was a tale of collective Serbian sacrifice for the protection of

\(^{15}\) Stokes, pp.3-4, 196-200, 300-2.

\(^{16}\) Banac, pp.160-2; Rothschild, pp.205, 211.

\(^{17}\) Banac, p.132.
Christendom. The preponderance of Muslims on Serbian holy land was psychologically traumatic and difficult to acknowledge. As a result, Serbian propaganda sought to downplay ethnic heterogeneity and dehumanized Albanians and Macedonians. Albanians in particular were singled out as "prehumans" who lived in "Blutschande" (incest). A pattern of "ethnic cleansing" and "Serbianization" was conducted by the state and involved the wholesale massacre of population settlements, the razing of villages, the expelling of Bulgar teachers and clergy, the Serbianization of family surnames, and colonization by Serbs. By 1929, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could confidently (but dishonestly and scandalously) conclude "there are no national minorities in our southern regions."18

The genuine democracy Serbia developed when it was socially and ethnically homogeneous was lost when the state became ethnically heterogeneous. Pre-1918 Serbian national ideologies had an assimilationist and expansionist character that gave an exclusive legitimacy to Serb rights, denied the existence of ethnic heterogeneity, and used the power of the state to oppress national minorities. On the eve of the creation of Yugoslavia, the modal national ideology found in Serbian political life was primordial nationalism. No other ideal type better matches the Serbian attitude towards interethnic relations or Serbian nationalist rhetoric. Stojan Protic', a leading NRS figure (and eventually the first prime minister of Yugoslavia), best epitomized this

18 Banac, pp.291-328.
orientation when, during the First World War, he said: "As soon as our army crosses the Drina, it will give the Turks [that is, the Bosnian Muslims] twenty-four -- perhaps even forty-eight -- hours to return to the faith of their forefathers [which, in Protic"s view, was Orthodoxy] and then slay those who refuse, as we did in Serbia in [the] past."19

Croatian national ideologies have historically exhibited far greater variation than their Serbian counterparts. Prior to the advent of Yugoslavia, Croatian nationalist expressions oscillated between supranational versions of "Yugoslavism" and exclusive Croatian national formulations based on a "state right." Among the Yugoslav manifestations, there was the Illyrian Movement of 1830-1840, the "Jugoslovjenstvo" (Yugoslavism) of Josip Strossmayer (1815-1903), and the "narodno jedinstvo" (national oneness) of Ante Trumbic' (1864-1938) and Frano Supilo (1870-1917). The common denominator of these various trends was the awareness of Croatian vulnerability to external powers and the need to unite with Serbs for protection. However, the merger that Croatian Yugoslavists proposed was altogether different from how Serbian nationalists perceived a South Slav union. First of all, Croatian proponents of Yugoslavism were usually willing to trade some national characteristic in exchange for the benefits of common association. Thus, for example, the Illyrians voluntarily adopted the stokavian dialect at the expense of their own

19 Banac, pp.105-8.
kajkavian tongue in the hope that this would facilitate cultural unity. And many advocates of narodno jedinstvo adopted "Serbophilism" on the grounds that the Croats were "less national and dynamic than the Serbs." Secondly, the articulation of Yugoslavism in Croatia normally included a strong element of "Slavic reciprocity" and the goal of national preservation within a larger whole. Far from wanting to blend indiscriminately their national identity into a South Slav hybridization, Croatian Yugoslavs expected to maintain national individuality and equality in any new association.

Exclusive Croatian national ideologies were first propounded by Ante Starcevic' (1823-1896). Starcevic' argued that a historical "state right" belonged to Croats who by virtue of their "primary acquisition" of land and the establishment of a medieval Croatian state were duly constituted as a "political people," i.e., "bearers of the indivisible Croat state right." His definition of who were Croats extended to all the South Slav nations, with the exception of Bulgars. Slovenes were called "Highland Croats" and the expression of Serb identity was attributed to the successful inculcation of propaganda from external powers, namely, Vienna and St. Petersburg. In fact, Starcevic' denied any existence whatsoever to the Serbian people. He regarded them as an "unclean race" whose nomenclature is

20 Banac, pp.75-8, 89-91, 96-103.

etymologically found in the Latin term "sclavus" (slave). In an attempt to deprive Serbs of a history, he dubbed the Serbian Nemanjic' dynasty as the "most illustrious Croat family." Moreover, Starcevic' disseminated the idea that Croatians are imbued by God with a historical mission to defend Christian Europe. He treated all his opponents as enemies and traitors of the Croatian people, and directly courted the Bosnian Muslims as candidates for assimilation by flattering them as representative of the "true Croatian spirit." Rather than seek strength through an equal association with other South Slavs, Starcevic' redefined all other South Slavs into Croats and said that strength is best attained by an integral and independent Croatian state.22

Overall, the emphasis on equality, the acceptance of diversity, the promotion of "Slavic reciprocity" and the generally liberal political character of Yugoslavism places that national ideology within the rubric of pluralist nationalist ideal types. Starcevic's ideology, in contrast, is closer to monistic nationalism. In Starcevic's scheme, the fact that the Croats had a historical state means that their claims to present-day statehood are more valid than any supposed universal, natural right that nations have to exercise self-determination. Such a state right lends to its bearers priority and preeminence and relegates those outside the cultural markers to an unhistorical and subordinate position. According to Banac, Starcevic's Party of [State] Right was the modal national

ideology among the Croat opposition in the last decades of the nineteenth century. But what made Yugoslavia possible was that *narodno jedinstvo* "became the most influential idea in prewar Croat politics."23

C. Approaches to the National Question, Part I (1918-1945)

The first Yugoslavia (1918-1929) was a Serb-dominated entity that really made no effort to accommodate other ethnic groups. To be sure, the Corfu Declaration of 1917, signed by the Pasic' government and the Yugoslav Committee (JO, which represented the peoples of the Hapsburg territories), committed the future state to the preservation of equality among its three primary "tribes" (i.e., the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), the coexistence of three flags and three religions, and the official acknowledgment of two alphabets. At the same time, the Serbs vetoed any designation of the new state as "Yugoslavia" considering it an affront to Serb national sensibilities. Serb interests were also granted for a unitary state structure with the Karadjordjevic' dynasty, the Serbian ruling house, at its head. Finally, the Serbs rejected a proposal by Trumbic' of the JO that the future constitution be subject to a "qualified tribal" vote and

23 Banac, pp.89, 98.
instead ensured the passage of a "qualified majority."\textsuperscript{24}

The basis of Serbian domination lay in the fact that the institutions of the new state were in fact mere extensions of the Serbian state and the laws of Yugoslavia for the first two years of its existence were Serbian laws writ large. The crown, the military, and the civil service were all explicitly Serbian and operated to the advantage of Serbian political interests. Even the governments of the parliamentary era (1918-1928), which required multiparty coalitions to create cabinets, were preponderately Serb. In the 121 months of the parliamentary period, Serbs held the Premiership 116 months, Defense 121, Interior 111, Foreign Affairs 100, Finance 118, Education 110, and Justice 105.\textsuperscript{25} To add insult to injury, the Serbs handled the national question with an iron fist. They introduced corporal punishment in Croatia, which had been unknown since 1869. The Serbian gendarme harassed peasants in Croatia and BH who did not express sufficient loyalty to Pasic' and Serbia on demand and they punished Croats who refused to use the Cyrillic script. Paramilitary groups (notably the Chetniks of WW I) were allowed to run rampant in BH. Former officers of the Austro-Hungarian

\textsuperscript{24} Banac, pp.121-5; Alex N. Dragnich, \textit{The First Yugoslavia: Search for a Viable Political System}, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), pp.7-8.

\textsuperscript{25} Rothschild, pp.206, 278-9; Thompson, p.201; Banac, p.217. For an attempt to debunk the thesis of Serbian hegemony in the first Yugoslavia, see Alex N. Dragnich, "The Anatomy of a Myth: Serbian Hegemony," \textit{Slavic Review}, v.50, n.3, (Fall 1991), pp.599-662.
empire faced systematic discrimination, opposition figures that advocated secession from the new state were repressed, and the "ethnic cleansing" tactics of the post-Balkan Wars period were repeated in Kosovo and Macedonia.  

In light of this style of rule, Cohen and Warwick designate the first Yugoslavia as an instance of "charter-group hegemony." This is a political strategy in which "the values and customs of a politically dominant group are considered to be a model which members of other cultural groups must accept and emulate through a process of acculturation or assimilation." In the language of national ideologies, this was the institutionalization of primordial nationalism.

In many respects, the Serb domination of Yugoslavia was unavoidable and practicable in that it was only the Serbs that had the institutional wherewithal and the necessary experience of statecraft to lead a new state. Serbia was widely regarded (even by many Croats) as the "Piedmont" of the Balkans, as the only power capable of uniting the South Slav lands and providing sufficient protection from outside interests. It was in fact this threat from the outside (principally Italy) that compelled the Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to rush into union. And it

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was by keenly understanding ex-Hapsburger fears that the NRS could periodically raise the issue of "amputating" Croatia — i.e., of severing it from Yugoslavia and putting it at the mercy of Italy — and thereby try to exact compliance with Serbian rule.\footnote{28}

The position of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Muslims in particular, was precarious at best in the first Yugoslavia. Since the 1890s fierce polemics had broken out between Croats and Serbs over the land and people of BH. The Muslims themselves formed a privileged class under Ottoman rule. This is reflected, most palpably, in the class structure of BH. In 1910 Muslims accounted for 32.25% of the population, and yet constituted 91.15% of all landlords. Serbs represented a plurality of the population at this time (43.4%), but were disproportionately disadvantaged — 73.92% of the serf population were Orthodox. Croats were 22.97% of the population and 21.49% of the peasantry.\footnote{29} Tensions between Muslims and BH Serbs began to fray as the Ottoman Empire slowly receded from view in the Balkans. The Muslim population watched with considerable consternation as Serbia celebrated its victory over Turkey in the First Balkan War. A cycle of violence soon descended on BH as Serbs were subject to an ethnic cleansing campaign under the aegis of Austro-Hungarian authorities and the predominantly Muslim Schutzkorps, an Austro-Hungarian militia. The founding of Yugoslavia brought Serbian retaliations against

\footnote{28 Banac, pp.118-9, 236; Dragnich, (1983), pp.9, 52; Rothschild, p.205.}

\footnote{29 Banac, pp.360-7.}
Muslims, land reform, and a propaganda campaign that denigrated Muslims as parasitical, "Asian," hedonistic, homosexual, and suitable for assimilation or genocide. Understandably, a massive exodus of Muslims left for Turkey in 1918.30

The primary voice of Muslim interests in the interwar years was the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO), founded in 1919. The party was a supra-class and supranational organization. It was supra-class in that party leaders tried to unite all Muslims in order to defend Muslim landlord interests, and by implication, the Muslim way of life. And despite the fact that the JMO became the de facto party of the Muslim community, it was a party open to all national labels. At this point in time, the idea that a universalist religion could provide the basis for an ethnic "nationality" seemed absurd. Even among the leadership of the JMO most declared either a Croat or Serb ethnic affiliation.31 Under the leadership of Mehmed Spaho, the party had both a Yugoslav perspective and a demand for the autonomy of BH. In the realm of practical politics, the JMO followed a pragmatic line continually shifting its support between the Serbs and the Croats in light of immediate opportunities. Over the course of the parliamentary era, it participated in many cabinets and even provided the crucial vote to ensure passage of the 1921 centralist constitution. In exchange, Pasic' guaranteed the territorial integrity of BH and the protection

30 Banac, pp.149, 366-8, 372.

31 Banac, pp.368-375.
The Serbs of Croatia were politically represented by the Democratic Party (DS), whose most colorful figure was Svetozar Pribicevic'. The DS was unitarist, a proponent of narodno jedinstvo, etatist, and dedicated to obliterating any and all forms of Croatian autonomy and nationhood. Moreover, the party demonstrated quasi-totalitarian traits. It opposed the expression of any differences between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and it conceived nation-building to be an act of voluntarism. It sought "to do away with all regional governments, all autonomies, all historical provinces," and it looked forward to the creation of "one people, one state, one party."

The fundamental drive of Pribicevic' was to ensure that the minority Serb community in Croatia would not be smothered by the majority Croat community and lost forever in the "state right" of Croatia's history and culture. Pribicevic' had previously been a deputy in the Zagreb Diet under Austro-Hungarian rule, and he convinced Belgrade that his firsthand understanding of Croats made him an indispensable leader for the new Yugoslavia. The DS was the second largest party after the 1920 elections and together with the Radicals formed an all-Serb government. Pribicevic' was awarded the post of Minister of the Interior. From this


33 Banac, pp.169-189.
institutional base, he demolished Croatian institutions, purged Croats from the state apparatus and promoted Croatian Serbs, imposed a unitarist curriculm on Croatian schools, hounded the opposition, and imprisoned Croatian separatists and communists. By promoting a program based on the exclusive rule of Serbs (albeit under the cover of *narodno jedinstvo*), by repressing any manifestation of Croatian culture and political traditions, and by attempting to assimilate Croats into a Yugoslav (i.e., Serbian) identity, Pribicevic' personified the ideology of primordial nationalism.

The unchecked, authoritarian rule of Pribicevic' enraged the Croatian population and lent greater electoral strength to the Croatian Peoples' Peasant Party (HPSS), and its leader, Stjepan Radic'. By 1923, the HPSS had become the second largest vote-getter in the country and the Radicals found themselves engaged in ways to induce the HPSS to join a coalition government. When Radic' eventually accepted a partnership with the Radicals in 1925, Pribicevic' was unceremoniously dropped by the Radicals. Overnight he turned from the regime's chief enforcer in Croatia to its most vociferous critic.34 This manipulation of the "precani card" by the *srbijanci* Serbs in the interwar period established a precedent that would eventually be repeated in the post-

Overall, the JMO and the DS were ancillary players in the first Yugoslavia. They were junior coalition partners whose significance and influence were dependent on circumstances and the immediate array of forces. At one moment they could be capable of extracting concessions from more dominant players and at another moment they would be incapable of preventing their marginalization when those forces perceived them as disposable. In short, they were not the principal sites of the interwar dynamic. The real demiurge of the first Yugoslavia is found in Serb-Croat relations, or between the Radicals and the HPSS.

Serbian authoritarianism indeed found its nemesis in the uncompromising secessionism and dogged obstructionism of Radic' and his HPSS. In 1904 Radic' was a proponent of an "Austro-Slav" alliance, believing that Croatia's interests would best be protected

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35 The *precani* Serbs are those who live "beyond" the Drina, Una, Sava, and Danube rivers. In other words, the Serbs of BH, Vojvodina, and Croatia. The *srbijanci* are the Serbs of Serbia proper. Pribicevic' was to later write of his experiences with the *srbijanci*: "Belgrade power holders always called upon the Serbs of Croatia for help when it was feignedly necessary to defend imperiled state unity or to fight against 'Croat separatism.' But as soon as official Belgrade felt that it could profit from some sort of compromise with the Croats, it would sacrifice the Serbs of Croatia without hesitation and with merry heart, making them a red rag to the Croat eyes." (Quoted in Banac, p.189.) It will be seen in subsequent chapters how contemporary leaders of the *precani* have shared a similar fate at the hands of the Belgrade.
in a federal state under the Hapsburg Monarchy. Once the Austro-Hungarian state dissolved, Radic' immediately raised the issue of a "Croat peasant republic." He was the only member of the National Council (which replaced the JO as the representative organ of the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs in October 1918) to vote against union with Serbia and on the eve of that vote famously warned that the South Slav delegates are "roaming like drunken geese into a fog."36

Radic' s national ideology may best be described as an example of monistic nationalism. Abandoning an early attachment to narodno jedinstvo, Radic' became a diehard protagonist of the Croatian state right. The South Slav peoples, he reasoned, shared many characteristics, but their similarities did not reach a magnitude that justified a common state project. On the contrary, national distinctiveness and separate state traditions meant that the Croats could go neither "with" nor "under" Serbia. In this respect, Radic' was the interwar carrier of Starcevic's ideology. In the lands that comprised historical Croatia, Croats had a preeminent right to pursue their own historical course and destiny. Consequently, the two fundamental elements of Radic' s program centered on a refusal to accept unification and a demand for a Croat peasant republic. His talk of a "federal Yugoslavia" (i.e., a joint state with Serbia) was purely tactical. Federalism to Radic' actually meant Croatian independence "at an opportune

moment.‖ In his efforts to build support for a Croat peasant republic, he flattered, wooed, and idolized the Croatian peasantry. In the mind of the average Croatian peasant, a republic conveyed the idea of "no taxes" and "no military obligations." Radic' exploited this sentiment in his struggle against the Serbian monarchy (he characterized World War I as a "king's war") and mobilized the peasants as the historical vehicle for the realization of the Croatian "state right." As such, his HPSS became a bona fide mass movement and successfully posed itself as the chief representative of the Croatian nation.38

Radic's political behavior during Yugoslavia's parliamentary period is the *locus classicus* of Balkan obstructionism and political irresponsibility.39 Radic' and HPSS deputies boycotted any participation in parliament for the first seven years of Yugoslavia's existence. When they finally did participate (upon realizing that their abstention had barren results), they practiced a politics of divisive ethnic symbolism, grandstanding, hyperbole, and intrigue. Radic' regularly hurled insults at the monarch, cabinet ministers, and fellow deputies, and parliamentary sessions


38 Banac, pp.136, 229, 237.

were little more than shouting matches. Under these circumstances, Yugoslavia's parliamentary life careened from one cabinet crisis to another (there was a total of 24 cabinets between 1918 and 1928), reaching its logical conclusion when a Radical Serb deputy from Montenegro, Punisa Racic', fatally shot three HPSS deputies and seriously wounded Radic' at a Skupstina (Assembly) session. In the assessment of Rothschild: "Yugoslavia had proven too big and too diffuse, and it had come into existence too 'suddenly' for the capacities of the Serb elite. The Croats, in turn, had behaved too negatively, too carpingly, too erratically to be of help. Clique [i.e., Serb] government had provoked the opposition into irresponsibility which had then corroded the hopes for conciliation of even the most reasonable Serbs."  

Six months after the Skupstina murders, King Alexander stepped forward and proclaimed a royal dictatorship (January 1929). The reigning monarch had come to the conclusion that democracy had failed to deliver a consensus among Yugoslavia's national communities. As the guardian of the state, he felt obliged to impose consensus from above. During this authoritarian phase (1929-1939), the Skupstina and the constitution were suspended, ethnic parties were abolished, and the only political parties legally

40 For an excellent presentation of inter-party relations and elite politics during the parliamentary era, see Dragnich, (1983), pp.20-73.

41 Rothschild, p.235.
permitted were those that evinced a genuine Yugoslav orientation. Alexander hoped to solve the national question on the basis of an "integral-Yugoslav national unitarist" ideology. This was basically a supranational ideology based on the assumption that a new Yugoslav identity could be molded out of the raw material of South Slav tribes. Towards this end, Alexander changed the name of the country from the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" to "Yugoslavia," allowed only the public display of the Yugoslav flag, and internally reorganized the country from 33 administrative districts into 9 banovinas (governorships) that were named in accordance with major waterways (and not national, cultural, or historical appellations). Despite the ostensible Yugoslav orientation of the Alexandrine period, Serbian control of the government, the military, and the bureaucracy remained.42

Alexander's pan-Slav approach proved to be too little and too late. By 1929 fascist and integral nationalist groups had been formed in Croatia (the Ustasha (Insurgent)) and Macedonia (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO)). These two forces were committed to a strategy of terror and violence which they hoped would tear apart the delicate fabric of the state. Together they engineered the assassination of Alexander in 1934, on the eve of expected reforms to liberalize the dictatorship.43


43 Rothschild, pp.245-8.
The last significant attempt to strike a deal between the Croat and Serb communities came in 1939 amidst the Nazi dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Vladko Macek, Radic’s HPSS successor, exploited the looming European crisis by flirting with Mussolini’s Italy for possible support of Croatian independence. The royal house, led by the regent Prince Paul (Alexander’s first cousin and the custodian of the crown until Alexander’s eldest son had come of age), and Paul’s appointed prime minister, Dragisa Cvetokovic’, wanted to avoid any fragmentation of the state. Consequently, significant concessions were offered to Macek in what became known as the Cvetkovic’-Macek Sporazum (Agreement). Under the terms of this agreement, Croatia was enlarged to a size covering 30% of Yugoslavia and was designated the “Croatian Banovina.” Large tracts of territory from Bosnia and Hercegovina as well as Eastern Srem (Vojvodina) were ceded to the new banovina. Croats would henceforth have their own Sabor, an executive Ban (governor) appointed by the king but responsible only to the Sabor, and decision-making power over all internal matters except defense and security, communications and transportation, and foreign affairs. The Croats had in effect attained political autonomy.\(^{44}\)

\(^{44}\) Rothshild, pp.258-261; Dragnich, (1983), pp.99-122. Cohen and Warwick characterize the Sporazum as an instance of consociationalism, which I feel is completely erroneous. Lijphart makes it clear that the most important element of consociationalism is a grand coalition among the primary groups, and this was not part of the Sporazum. Rather than regard it a form of consociationalism, the Cvetkovic’-Macek pact is best...
Opposition to the Sporazum sprung up immediately after it was promulgated. The Democrats demanded a comparable unit for the Serbs of Croatia and the JMO made similar appeals for BH. Spaho himself sternly opposed the loss of BH territory but was powerless to revise the agreement. The srbijanci felt humiliated and offended by the pact. From their perspective, they had struggled and sacrificed for a unified Yugoslavia, not its partition. When Prince Paul was convinced by Hitler that the best way to save Yugoslavia was membership in the Axis' Tripartite Pact, the Serbian military took matters into its own hands. On March 26-27, 1941, it disposed of "the foreigner" Paul and "the gypsy" Cvetkovic' in a military coup d'état. Fourteen days later Hitler's forces established the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska) in Zagreb and two days later Belgrade fell to the Nazis.45 Yugoslavia was dead, but its ethnic leviathan had an appetite for destruction that was only just beginning to stir.

During the wartime occupation of Yugoslavia, three simultaneous wars erupted. First of all, Tito's communist-led Partisan movement fought a war of national liberation against the Axis invaders and their quislings in Zagreb. Secondly, there was understood for what it actually was -- a form of political autonomy or self-government. Cohen and Warwick, pp.46-8; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), pp.25-36.

an ethnic war between the Croatian Ustasha and the Serbian Chetniks. And finally, a class war was fought between the Partisans and the Chetniks. Both the Ustasha and the Chetniks pursued primordial nationalist programs. The Ustasha, led by Ante Pavelić, controlled the NDH (which stretched territorially to include all of BH, Eastern Srem to the outskirts of Belgrade, and a good deal of Montenegro). The machinery of the NDH state was used to create a Croatia "thoroughly cleansed of Serbian dirt." In a speech in 1941, the NDH Minister of Education and Religion charted the general direction of the regime when he proclaimed "we shall kill some Serbs, we shall expel others, and the remainder will be forced to embrace the Roman Catholic faith." So appalling in fact were the atrocities committed against Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies that even the Nazis were reported to have been troubled. The Chetniks were the defenders of the crown and had their social base in Serbia. Under the leadership of Colonel Draza Mihailović, the Chetniks launched a campaign of terror and destruction in BH that collectively punished Croats and Muslims for the massacre of Serbs in Croatia. Mihailović was of the opinion that Croats were guilty as a nation for betraying Yugoslavia to the Nazis and had to face retribution for crimes against Serbs. Altogether, an estimated 500,000 to one million people lost their lives at the hands of the Ustasha, and as much as 500,000 were killed by the Chetniks.46

The Partisans were the only social force in wartime Yugoslavia that espoused a multinational ideology and had a multiethnic base. The *precani* Serbs composed the bulk of the Partisan makeup (the *srbijanci* were overwhelmingly Chetnik) while Croats entered communist ranks in droves after Italy was defeated in 1943. The formula Tito sought to galvanize all South Slavs was "*bratstvo i jedinstvo*" (brotherhood and unity). Unlike the melting pot vision of *narodno jedinstvo*, *bratstvo i jedinstvo* meant greater respect for the individuality of nations. And in opposition to Serbian unitarism and centralism, it emphasized the full equality of nations.\(^47\) The postwar period ushered in a new phase in which the communists would take responsibility for untwisting the Gordian knot of Yugoslavia's tangled interethnic relations.

D. Approaches to the National Question, Part II (1945 - 1980)

The communist experiment with the national question evolved over time and took many different forms. After World War II the party took a Stalinist approach, which upheld the ideal of ethnically homogeneous socialist men and women. No public

airing of the national question or the interethnic fratricide of the war was permitted. Instead, the regime concentrated on cultivating a revolutionary élan among the masses and exhorted them to build socialism.\textsuperscript{48} The communists did seek to promote new opportunities for minorities and diluted the authority of Belgrade by the establishment of a federal political system with six republics and two autonomous provinces, which were carved out of Serbia. Tito expanded the number of state-forming nations from three in the interwar period (i.e., Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) to five -- the Macedonian and the Montenegrin nations were now formally acknowledged with their own titular republics. It would appear that Tito was guided in his nationalities policy by the understanding that Serbian dominance had wrecked the first Yugoslavia and alienated ethnic groups throughout the country. In order to garner the consent of disaffected groups, Tito felt he had to diminish Serbia's power by creating two autonomous provinces at its expense. In addition, he sought to preempt a return of the bipolar conflict between Serbs and Croats by introducing more players into the system; hence, the Macedonian and Montenegrin republics. So confident, in fact, was Tito with communist policy that he declared in 1948 that "the national question has been solved in our country, and very well at that, to

the general satisfaction of our nationalities."49

Excommunication from the Soviet bloc in 1948 forced the communist leadership to reconsider the Stalinist model. In an effort to articulate a Yugoslav path to socialism free of Stalinist distortions, the communist elite forged an innovative model that emphasized decentralization, market socialism, workers' self-management, and the reconfiguration of the party into a "league" divorced from the exercise of power. While the general trend between 1948 and 1965 was one of increasing liberalization and the emergence of a polycentric system, it is worthwhile to note that some ethnic groups, such as the Albanians, remained suspect in the eyes of the state. In 1944 Tito had to counter an armed uprising by Albanians with violent suppression. Subsequently, the Albanians were treated to a harsh system of police rule under the direction of Alexander Rankovic', a Serb and head of the security services. It was only in 1966 when intraparty debates between liberals and conservatives came to a close that Rankovic' was purged from the party and the last vestige of Serb power was dismantled. From this point on, human rights in Kosovo improved immensely and provincial autonomy became more than just constitutional formalism.50

49 Cohen and Warwick, pp.66-71.

50 Mark Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," Problems of Communism. (March-April 1983), pp.61-74; Victor Meier, "Yugoslavia's National Question," Problems of
While self-management and the decentralization of power to the republic level could be justified as in keeping with Marx's prescriptions about the withering away of the state, the practical consequence was very un-Marxist -- the proliferation of nationalist disputes over economic resources and the distribution of political power. Because the republics were coterminous with officially recognized nations, interrepublican economic conflict necessarily took an ethnic form. The first warning shot fired on this front was the Slovene road building crisis of 1968-1969, but this proved to be merely a prelude to the "Croatian Spring" of 1969-1971.

Since the interwar period and especially in light of the Ustasha atrocities, the Croatian question was a delicate issue to raise. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) took the position that the Ustasha crimes sullied all forms of Croatian nationalism. In the early years of the communist regime, not a few Croatian nationalists were tried and sentenced to long prison

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Once the regime began to relax in the 1960s and even encouraged the pluralism of interests, perennial Croatian complaints began to resurface.

The Croatian Spring was initiated by the intellectual class who took exception to what they saw as fundamental inequities in interethnic relations. Croatian discontent centered on a number of economic, cultural, demographic and constitutional issues. In the economic arena, Croatian economists and business elites complained that the socialist market was systematically biased in favor of Serbia. They argued that Belgrade banks used their control of capital to exploit Croatian enterprises and redirect profits to Serbia. Greater openness to the international market had encouraged a hotel and tourist industry in Dalmatia, but here too Serbs flocked from the hinterland, opened up their own resorts, and took advantage of Croatia's natural resources. Linguistic polemics erupted in 1967 between the cultural organizations Matica Hrvatska and Matica Srpska. Croatian philologists were miffed that a dictionary ostensibly of the Serbo-Croatian language consistently omitted Croatian words but included their Serbian counterparts. The Matica Hrvatska reacted by issuing a "Declaration" which called for the recognition of Croatian and Serbian as two separate languages and insisted that in all areas of life -- from education, to mass communications, to interpersonal dialogue -- Croats should be addressed only in

53 Cuvalo, pp.47-9.

54 Matica is translated roughly as "home" in this dissertation.
the "Croatian literary language." Croatian nationalists also began to interpret the preponderance of Croats among the Gastarbeiter (the "guest workers" who emigrated to Western Europe in search of work) in conspiratorial terms -- the protagonists of a Greater Serbia were luring young Croats out of the country and encouraging Serbs to move into Croatia in an overall strategy of demographic displacement. Finally, Serbia was charged with engineering an autonomist sentiment among Dalmatians and striving to sever the lucrative Dalmatian coast from Zagreb's authority. The articulation of these issues created a "mass movement" (MASPOK) in support of a Croatian nationalist program and even induced the Croatian League of Communists (SKH) to provide the MASPOK with ideological cover.

Within the party, key elites such Savka Dabcevic-Kucar and Miko Tripalo, immediately came to the defense of the Matica Hrvatska. At the Tenth Session of the Central Committee of the SKH (January 1970), Dabcevic-Kucar denied that Croatian nationalism was a problem in the republic and instead asserted the primary danger was "unitarism," i.e., Serbian dominance. Moreover, she explicitly defended the Matica Hrvatska as an organization composed of "progressive members." Between

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56 Burg, pp.107-8; Cuvalo, pp.126-139.
1970 and 1971, the *Matica* grew into a formidable social force. Its membership swelled to 41,000 and it became increasingly ready to exercise and test its political strength. For example, it established cells in economic enterprises where it took "head counts" to determine if Serbs were "overrepresented." If this were found to be the case, "adjustments" were demanded. It also set up a "shadow government" with functional portfolios and began to assert authority over the SKH. In every respect, the *Matica* became a de facto "nationalist party" and an alternative source of power in the republic.57 Spurred by the *Matica* the MASPOK grew, engaging in nationalist demonstrations and acts of interethnic violence. By the spring of 1971, most observers reported an intense, emotionally-charged political atmosphere in Croatia in which everything Croatian was exalted. In the summer of 1971 nationalists inside and outside the party began to raise the specter of an independent Greater Croatian state that would include Hercegovinian and Montenegrin territory. The mass movement reached a fever pitch in November when Zagreb students carried out a strike and demanded "full Croatian sovereignty," which included Croatia's separate membership in the UN and the formation of a separate Croatian army. Amidst growing internal struggles within the SKH, Dabcevic-Kucar presented a report to the SKH Central Committee in which the MASPOK was described as ideologically progressive and politically

57 Burg, pp.121-5; Cuvalo, pp.139-146.
In effect, the party leadership donned the mantle of "national communism" and placed itself at the disposal of a separatist, Croatian national movement.

At this point, Tito swung into action. At a November 1971 meeting with Croatian leaders in Karadjordjevo, Tito labelled the student strike counter-revolutionary, the mass movement thesis of Dabcevic-Kucar was rejected, and a massive purge of the SKH apparatus was initiated. The clampdown in Croatia touched all spheres of social life and involved mass arrests, firings at educational institutions and the news media, and the shutdown of cultural associations and various publications. It was so severe and extensive that Ivo Banac argues its "real effect, at least for the Croats, was the lasting delegitimation of Yugoslavia." The subsequent rise of party hacks and opportunists to positions of power, and the equation of Croatian nationalism with counterrevolution, imposed a "silence" on Croatian political life that was to last until the end of communism.

In the aftermath of the Croatian Spring, Tito moved forward with his most ambitious and far-reaching approach to the national

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59 Burg, pp.151-9; Cuvalo, pp.179-186.

question. In 1971 a series of amendments were passed and in 1974 a new constitution was drafted that had the effect of introducing consociational elements into Yugoslavia's regime. A central motif of this constitutional engineering was to establish a system of rules and institutions that could successfully channel, regulate, and mediate Yugoslavia's multifarious conflicting interests. A by-product of this new orientation was a significant enhancement of the rights of minorities throughout Yugoslavia. In official Yugoslav discourse, "nationality" denoted the ethnic groups whose co-nationals had their own nation-state outside of Yugoslavia. Rather than constituting state-forming "nations," such ethnic groups were perceived as "protected nationalities." They included Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Romanians, Ruthenes/Ukrainians, Czechs, and Italians. These groups enjoyed a plethora of cultural rights that encompassed the publication all laws and regulations in their native tongue, news broadcasts and publications geared specifically for each nationality and issued in its language, the right to be educated in one's language, and government subsidies for various cultural programs and institutions.61

The Bosnian Muslims were also upgraded to a nation in 1971 and saw their rights and status increase accordingly. In an effort to avert a growing Serb-Croat contention over BH, Tito turned to his tried-and-true method of introducing more players into the game. The formal recognition of the Muslim nation now gave

61 Ramet, pp.54-7.
Bosnian Muslim politicians greater legitimacy in pursuing their interests and they gradually came to take a more leading role in the republic.\textsuperscript{62} The problem with this generous approach to nationalities is that it generated the ire and frustration of many nations, particularly the Serbs. Because the Serb nation had its own titular republic, \textit{precani} Serbs were not entitled to the elaborate cultural rights of other minorities. In BH, the creation of a Muslim nation occurred at the expense of Serbs who had hitherto played the dominant role in the republic. In exchange for Serbian compliance, Tito allowed for the overrepresentation of the \textit{precani} in the Croatian and BH civil service, party apparatus, and police. Nonetheless, Tito's nationality policy was taken to be uneven and unfair. Indeed by the 1980s Serb intellectuals began to talk of the punitive nature of Tito's policy and how it was deliberately prejudicial to Serb interests.\textsuperscript{63} This perspective was propagated by the Serbian intelligentsia and gradually became widespread in Serbian society. As such, a climate of opinion was created that was receptive to the reemergence of Serbian nationalism.


The final section of this history chapter will be more analytical in scope and will include a critique of consociational practices in post-Tito Yugoslavia. Arend Lijphart's consociational model is based on a study of Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland and is promoted as an effective tool for developing countries to adopt as a means to ensure state stability and interethnic harmony. An analysis of Yugoslav politics in the 1980s indicates otherwise. Therefore, the burden of proof of this final section will be to show that consociationalism in Yugoslavia exacerbated interethnic relations and put in place the conditions favorable for a revival of nationalism in the post-communist transition.


There is widespread agreement among Western scholars that a primary source of the crisis that beset Yugoslavia in the 1980s and early 1990s was the political system. An ever-growing number of scholars have characterized this system as

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64 Lijphart, pp.1-3.

"consociational" and have considered this aspect of the regime to be its basic defect. Although the constitutional designers of the Yugoslav regime did not have consociational prescriptions in mind when they wrote the 1974 constitution, there is a close correspondence between Arend Lijphart's recommendations for fragmented societies and the structures and rules that evolved in Yugoslavia.

According to Lijphart, a consociational democracy would have the following key features: a grand coalition of all ethnic groups, a mutual veto rule in decision-making, ethnic proportionality in the allocation of offices, and ethnic autonomy or federalism. Underlying these proposals are arguments stressing the value of

inclusiveness and a balance of power in which all groups have input, the benefits of ethnic insularity and boundary maintenance in minimizing interethnic contact and, as a result, conflict, and significant elite autonomy enabling elites to compromise in private interethnic negotiations and thereby restrict the public discussion of politically explosive issues.67

The Yugoslav political system utilized the consociational practice of collective power sharing. The SKJ's Central Committee was organized on a collective basis whereby each republic would send 19 representatives and the autonomous provinces 15. The Presidium was composed of three representatives from each republic and two from each autonomous province. Leadership of the Presidium alternated on a yearly rotational scheme.68 The State Presidency operated under the same collective and rotational principles, with the exception that it had only nine members -- that is, one from each republic and autonomous province and one from the party.69 For all practical purposes, Yugoslavia met Lijphart's condition of a grand coalition of all ethnic groups.

The 1974 Constitution committed Yugoslav elites to a mutual veto rule. This was reflected in the requirement that federal

67 Lijphart, pp.21-44; 53-104.


decisions be made on the basis of a "harmonization" of views (usaglasavanje). This meant that no decision could be made if it did not receive the assent of all republics. On major issues such as monetary policy, prices, the distribution of foreign exchange earnings, etc., usaglasavanje gave to each republic, no matter how big or small, a practical veto over any bills they perceived as threatening to their interests.70

The result of this principle was political paralysis as the most pressing political and economic issues were left unattended. One indicator of political paralysis and the declining effectiveness of federal decision-making was the increasing use of "temporary measures" by the Federal Executive Council (SIV). Temporary measures were a constitutional nicety that permitted the SIV to bypass the unanimity requirement operative in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces and adopt legislation for a one year period. From 1974 to 1980, temporary measures were resorted to only 3 times; between 1981 and 1983 they were relied on a total of 14 times.71 While Lijphart acknowledges that abuses may occur with a veto right "if it is not handled with caution and restraint," it is nevertheless "essential in order to induce all of the


subcultural groups to participate in grand coalitions ..."  

While this rule may have indeed been "essential" in order to gain the consent for decision-making rules in the post-Tito era in the sense that many ethnic groups, particularly the Croatian and Macedonian elite, objected to majority rule (majorizacija),

there is also little doubt among contemporary observers of Yugoslavia that this principle contributed to paralysis, dissensus, and eventual disintegration.

Yugoslavia also institutionalized the consociational idea of ethnic proportionality. Each republic had the right to select personnel to all federal positions. Known as the "national key," the size of the federal delegation from each republic was determined by a regional quota system which abided by the principle of "equal representation of the Republics and a corresponding representation of the Autonomous Provinces." This principle applied to both branches of the Yugoslav legislature -- the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, and the Federal Chamber -- which made Yugoslavia the only bicameral legislative system in the world organized on the basis of equality among its constituent units. As a result, larger republics were underrepresented and smaller republics were overrepresented. Hence, Montenegro's

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579,000 citizens had the same number of delegates in both federal assemblies as did Croatia's 4.6 million and Serbia's 9.3 million inhabitants.\textsuperscript{74}

It has already been noted that Yugoslavia was established as a federal political system after World War II. The subsequent direction of political reform, despite numerous zigzags and temporary reversals, was the movement of power away from the federal government and towards the republics. The 1971 Amendments and the 1974 Constitution continued this decentralization trend.\textsuperscript{75} The autonomous provinces were also significantly enhanced in power and status. Beginning in the 1970s, they were granted the right to amend their constitutions without any input or consultation from the organs of authority in Serbia proper. Furthermore, they had veto power over the implementation of Serbian law within their jurisdictions and the right to conduct their own foreign economic relations. In federal bodies, they pursued their own interests independent of Serbia and they participated as equals (although they were entitled to less representation) with the republics. By the 1980s, the autonomous provinces were republics in every respect but

\textsuperscript{74} Burg, (1983), pp.110-6, 204-247; Mostov, p.118n26.

\textsuperscript{75} Burg writes that "the devolution of power and authority to the regions following the ouster of Rankovic" has been decisive" and "despite repeated efforts during the 1970s to assert central authority in the party, the regional leaderships today dominate Yugoslav politics." Burg, (1983), pp.204-259, 346-7; Ramet, pp.70-5.
The combination of Yugoslavia's decentralized federalism (or confederalism) and its mandatory ethnic proportionality meant that there existed no political institution that directly represented the demos. In other words, the people of Yugoslavia were represented only as microcosms of their nation, not as citizens. While the legislatures were expected to represent the interests of their respective nations-as-republics, this was expressly forbidden for the executive bodies which were, in theory, supposed to represent the interests of the Yugoslav nation. However, because the republics had the power of appointment to these positions, and because when tenure in the federal government was completed federal officials were dependent on the good will of their regional governments for their next appointment, federal executive bodies were staffed by individuals who were de facto representatives of the republics. The upshot of this regionalization of the state is that there existed no political institution that represented in an unqualified sense "Yugoslav" interests. Instead, all interests in Yugoslavia were articulated and aggregated at the regional level and consequently took an ethnic form. This mitigated any possibility that a transethnic liberal coalition for reform could materialize.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{76} Ramet, pp.76-9.

In essence, Yugoslav consociationalism contributed not to national integration but to further separation and ethnic distance. Yugoslavia not only lacked an autonomous civil society due to the post-totalitarian character of the regime, but it also lacked an "all-Yugoslav" civil society. The ethnic segmentation of Yugoslav society is seen in many dimensions of social life: the fragmentation of the party along republican lines which rendered it incapable of serving an integrative function; the absence of any all-Yugoslav organization along commercial, trade union, or professional lines; the republicanization of the economy on an autarkic basis;\(^78\) demographic trends towards the increasing homogenization of federal units as individuals moved to the republic representing their national home; the paucity of self-

identified "Yugoslavs" who amounted to a meager 5.4% in the 1981 census; the high rates of intraethnic marriages among all national groups; and, in elemental aspects of everyday life, such as travel: in 1983 it took an hour longer for a train to cross the country than it did in 1973.\(^79\)

Overall, the promised results of Lijphart's consociational structures were not realized in Yugoslavia. In part, this is due to an erroneous conception of the factors that generate political integration and diffuse support for a regime. Steven Burg's and Michael Berbaum's study of the Yugoslav census found that interethnic contact was one of the most statistically significant predictors of Yugoslav identity. It follows that Lijphart's emphasis on mass segmentation so that elite efforts at cooperation and system maintenance may be enhanced is inappropriate and counterproductive. While consociationalism may have been conducive towards achieving interelite consensus in the short-term, its longer-term impact was to keep ethnic loyalties tied to the nation-as-republic rather than the Yugoslav state. Each nation-as-republic developed its own intelligentsia and political

class, it had the right to use its own language, it published its own newspapers and ran its own media, and it funded and maintained linguistic and cultural institutions to promote the nation's history and cultural achievements. Consequently, ethnicity stood out as the most readily available base for social mobilization in the post-communist period. This is so not merely because of the absence of class distinctions, but because ethnicity was already organized and socialized with a national perspective. In this way, consociationalism bears partial responsibility for the onset of ethnic conflict and the failure of democratic consolidation.
A. Democracy and Nationalism in Croatia's Recent Experience

Nineteen eighty-nine was the year the Croatian republic broke the "silence" imposed on it after the "mass movement" (masa pokret, MASPOK) was crushed by Tito in the early 1970s. Of the many factors that made up the context in which Croatian political society found its voice -- the sweeping changes across Eastern Europe and the USSR, a growing disenchantment with the institutions of Yugoslav socialism, the example of Slovenia which was willing to forge ahead with widespread liberalization, disgust over the Serbian reign of terror in Kosovo -- none was more galvanizing and urgent to address than the resurgence of Serbian nationalism under the direction of Slobodan Milosevic'. Under the banner of "strong Serbia, strong Yugoslavia," Milosevic' had abolished the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo, he had toppled the regime in Montenegro, and there were strong indications that
the next stops for his "anti-bureaucratic revolution" would be Bosnia-Hercegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia.\(^1\) In a word, the spectre of a Greater Serbia was beginning to haunt Croatia again. The looming menace posed by Serbian nationalism provided the raison d'etre for the resurfacing of Croatian nationalism. Because Serbia and Croatia contained the two largest nations in Yugoslavia and were the principal focus of conflict the state had had to confront under all its various regimes since 1918, neither one could begin to play the nationalist card and not have the other respond in kind.

Croatian nationalists themselves had a long list of grievances with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) that had been simmering for some time. Specifically, Croatians felt that ever since the unfortunate experience of World War II, in which the fascist-inspired Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska) committed mass genocide against Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, the Croatian people had been unfairly stigmatized as

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genocidal by nature. This use of collective guilt against Croatia led to a disparagement of Croatian culture and prohibitions against the expression of Croatian national pride. Some of the perennial complaints Croatians had with Yugoslavia -- and that were manifested most conspicuously in the MASPOK -- included the economic exploitation of the Croatian tourist industry by Belgrade banks, Serbian linguistic dominance, the alarming immigration of Serbs into Croatia that threatened to change the republic's demographic structure, and the efforts among Serbian nationalists to separate Dalmatia from the rest of Croatia.


3 In his public speeches Tudjman often cited examples from "45 years of persecution" against Croatia: the monument of the 19th century Croatian military governor Josip Jelacic was removed from Zagreb's square; streets and squares named after Croatian kings were changed; Croatian children were not allowed "to sing innocent Croatian songs;" Croatia was "forced to parade a Yugo-ideology and Yugo-names;" "Croatian man could neither find nor use the normal Croatian language;" and Croats could not "display with pride Croatian symbolism." Borba (April 18, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), April 24, 1990, pp.65-7; Zagreb Radio Croatia Network (May 30, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), May 31, 1991, pp.19-22.

There was a widespread sense in Croatia that it was simply never an equal republic in the SFRJ. Many Croatian nationalists even questioned the degree to which Croatian consent was ever given for its incorporation into Yugoslavia.\(^5\)

In the aftermath of the defeat of the "Croatian Spring" in 1972, draconian measures were instituted to eradicate Croatian nationalism. Such measures included wholesale purges of the League of Communists of Croatia (SKH), a strict recruitment policy designed to weed out anyone remotely inclined towards a nationalist sentiment, and severe repression of intellectuals and dissidents who expressed Croatian nationalism.\(^6\) In light of such tight controls, Croatia became known in the SFRJ as the "silent republic." Ultimately, Tito's repressive policy only served to force Croatian nationalism underground. When the SKH began to

\(^5\) According to one of the leading figures of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), Sime Djodan, the pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia was a completely illegitimate state that had "occupied" Croatia. With the ascendency of the HDZ to power, this idea was enshrined in the constitution. The December 1990 preamble to the constitution reads: "the Croatian Sabor never sanctioned the decision of the National Council of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs to unite with Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes ..." Tanjug (April 8, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), April 11, 1990, pp.68-9; "Ustav Republike Hrvatske," Narodne Novine, n.56, (December 22, 1990).

liberalize the regime in 1989, all the old players of MASPOK reappeared -- Sime Djodan, Valdo Gotovac, Marko Veselica, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, Miko Tripalo, Franjo Tudjman, Drazen Budisa, Ante Paradzik, Dobroslav Paraga, and Ivan Zvonimir Cicak.

The election of the nationalist-oriented Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) in the April 1990 elections released all the tensions and pent-up frustrations in Croatia. Rather than seek to build a bridge of understanding between Croatians and the minority Serb population and thereby consolidate democracy, the HDZ elite sought to institutionalize the "Croatia first" message of its electoral campaign. To this end, the newly-elected president of the republic, Franjo Tudjman, called for the reorganization of Yugoslavia into a loose confederation of sovereign states that would allow maximum autonomy for each republic. He also promised to address the discriminatory policies that favored Serbs in employment opportunities in the state administration. Moreover, the government adorned itself with regalia and symbols from Croatia's past, irrespective of whether or not they were tainted by the fascist experience. As a result, the Serb population (which bore the brunt of the genocidal policies of the NDH) became frightened by and alienated from the new regime. Encouraged by propaganda from Belgrade which portrayed HDZ rule as a return of fascism to Croatia, the Serb minority balked at Tudjman's efforts to alter Croatia's place in Yugoslavia and the status of Serbs in Croatia.
Taken together, the unapologetic chauvinism of the HDZ and the refusal of the Serbs to accept any minority role set the two national communities of Croatia onto a course of ever-increasing confrontation that brought about a ruinous civil war and the failure to consolidate democracy. Democratic values and practices were also violated by the punitive character of HDZ public policy - e.g., forcing Serbs to sign loyalty oaths at their place of work, the bureaucratic ethnic cleansing of Serbs from the state administration, new citizenship requirements that made it difficult for Serbs to be Croatian citizens, and the passage of a new constitution in which Serbs were demoted from a state-forming nation to that of a national minority. As it stands now, the Croatian state is internally divided with one-third of its territory under the control of the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of Krajina (RSK). Interethnic elite relations remain acrimonious and irreconciliable as the HDZ insists on the restoration of state authority over the entire republic and Serb elites demand complete independence.7

B. Ethnic Structure, Regional Subcultures, and the Challenges to Democratic Consolidation

The Croatian population takes the political shape of an asymmetrical bipolar structure. According to the 1991 census, Croats number 3,708,308, or 77.9% of the population. Serbs at this time stood at 580,762, or 12.2%.8 There are many other nationalities in Croatia, such as Hungarians, Slovenes, and Italians, but for all practical purposes Serbs are the only minority group that is politically significant. The civil war has taken a severe toll on the Serb population as its size has been reduced dramatically. Recent estimates indicate that the Serb population now stands somewhere around 376,000, with between 192,000 to 216,000 residing within the jurisdiction of the Croatian state and 140,000 to 160,000 inhabiting the break away RSK.9

While the demographics of Croatia are relatively straightforward, the regional or subcultural aspect of Croatian society is multifaceted and complex. In the 1991 census 47,603

8 The number of Serbs was undoubtedly higher than this figure given that there were 104,728 Yugoslav identifiers in 1991, a category disproportionately filled out by Serbs. "Nacionalni Sastav Stanovnistva, 1991," Jugoslovenski Pregled, n.1 (1992), pp.3-22.

9 It is interesting to note that Tudjman has taken advantage of this dwindling Serb population by emphasizing in his public speeches that Serbs are only "8%" of the population of Croatia and therefore cannot expect to be recognized as a sovereign nation. Stan Markotich, "Ethnic Serbs in Tudjman's Croatia," RFE/RL Research Report, v.2, n.38, (September 24, 1993), p.28, 30; New York Times, (October 14, 1992), pp.1, 10.
inhabitants of Croatia (1% of the total population) proclaimed their ethnic identity to be "regional." While the absolute numbers are small, this figure represented a 450% increase from the 1981 census. From the vantage point of the cultural diversity of Croatian inhabitants, one may designate three main cultural zones: Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Istria. Croatia-Slavonia is the traditional heart of Croatia. From 1102 to World War I, it was ruled directly from Budapest. Demographically, Croatia-Slavonia may be subdivided into the Zagorje of Central Croatia with its relatively homogeneous Croatian population and Slavonia in which Croats, Serbs, Hungarians, and Czechs live in highly mixed settlement patterns.

Dalmatia only became part of Croatia in 1939. It has a Mediterranean cultural heritage and during the course of its history has experienced Roman, Venetian, and Austrian rule. During the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Vienna had jurisdiction over Dalmatia. The 951,641 inhabitants of Dalmatia (19.9% of Croatia) have their own dialect and self-consciously regard themselves to be different from the rest of Croatia. Regional parties have sprung up in Dalmatia, such as the Dalmatian National Party and the Dalmatian Action (DA), which have pressed for various forms of

self-administration and the protection of local traditions.\textsuperscript{11} In the August 2, 1992 elections, the DA sent three deputies to the Chamber of Deputies, and in the February 7, 1993 regional elections, the main opposition party to the HDZ, the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), gained control of Split.\textsuperscript{12}

Istria, a peninsula which has a long history of self-government under a succession of Roman, Venetian, French, Austrian, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian tutelage, also has a very strong regional identity. Among its 250,000 inhabitants (nearly 12\% of Croatia's population), there are 30,000 Italians. Like Dalmatia, residents of Istria readily identify themselves by their regional designation, "Istrians." According to the 1991 census, the town of Labin in Istria registered the highest percentage of "regionals," 36\%, in the whole of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{13} In the 1990 elections, Istrians gave a majority of their votes to the League of


Communists of Croatia--Party of Democratic Changes (SKH-SDP). At this time, the HDZ's programmatic emphasis on an indivisible and unitary Croatia was so disliked in Istria that Tudjman was actually shouted down in one campaign stop in Pazin. Of the many regional parties in Istria that advocate various schemes of autonomy -- the Istrian Democratic Convention, the Popular Party of Istria, and the Istrian Democratic Alliance (IDS) -- the IDS has attained political significance for its impressive electoral successes. In the election of August 1992 the IDS received 51% of the vote in Istria; and in the February 1993 elections it won 72% of the Istrian votes to the upper house of the Sabor (the Croatian Assembly) and took control of the Istrian local government with 35 out of 40 seats in the county parliament.

14 Thompson, pp.62-3.


Like the Croatians, there are many important cultural fault lines that divide the Serb minority. The most salient cleavage is that between the so-called "urban" and "rural" Serbs. The former comprised the vast majority of Serbs in Croatia (approximately 73%). They are well-integrated into Croatian society and live as minorities in populous Croatian cities, such as Zagreb (approximately 100,000 Serbs, or 5% of Zagreb's population), Rijeka (8%), Zadar (9%), Split (4%), and Osijek (18%).

The problem-area for Tudjman's regime lay in the rural areas of Croatia, particularly in the thirteen opstinas that rounded out the series of regions that Serbs collectively called the Krajina (Northern Dalmatia, Lika, Banija, and Kordun). It was here that Serbs stood as an absolute majority in eleven opstinas and a plurality in two.

Knin is the focal point of the Krajina and the home of militant Serb nationalism in Croatia. In World War II Knin (along with the Lika area) was the only Serb settlement in Croatia that overwhelmingly supported the Chetniks against Tito's

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19 Nevertheless, Serbs residing here amounted to only 26% of all Serbs in Croatia. Of all the urban Serbs, only 25% lived in this area. Croats composed 22% (45,000) of the Krajina's population. Cohen, pp.129, 134; Paul Shoup, "The Future of Croatia's Border Regions," Report on Eastern Europe. (November 29, 1990), p.28.
Historically, Serbs migrated to this and the larger Krajina area under the pressure of Ottoman military advances and the incentives issuing from the Hapsburg empire which sought to establish a military frontier (Vojna Krajina) to stave off the encroaching Turks. In return for their military services, Serbs were granted religious freedom and were ruled directly from Vienna, thus freeing them from feudal obligations to the Croatian and Hungarian nobility. Being a military outpost, the Krajina celebrated the gun as a defining trait of its culture. A cultural division of labor eventually developed around the historically strategic function of the Krajisnica Serbs as they came to be disproportionally employed by state institutions. In the Socialist Republic of Croatia (SRH), Serbs constituted 67% of the police force.

20 In contemporary discourse in the former Yugoslavia, the label Chetniks has two connotations: (1) all the various paramilitary groups emanating from Serbia; and (2) Serbs who feel that a common life with Croats is impossible. The word "Ustasha" describes Croats who feel a common life with Serbs is impossible, and "Partisans" refers to both Croats and Serbs who support a multiethnic, multicultural society. See Misha Glenny, "On the Brink," New Statesman and Society, (June 5, 1992), pp.24-5; James Gow, "Military-Political Affiliations in the Yugoslav Conflict," RFE/RL Research Report, v.1, n.20, (May 15, 1992), p.21; Paul Hockenos, "Riding the Nationalist Roller-Coaster," New Statesman and Society, (November 1, 1991), pp.12-13.

(in 1990), 40% of the government apparatus, 61% of the trade
union administration, and 24% of the SKH membership (in
1985). In the December 1990 elections, the five deputies
elected from the nationalist Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) all
hailed from Northern Dalmatia and Lika.

The demography and history of Slavonia, Baranja and
Western Srem differs substantially from that of Northern Dalmatia
and Lika. Contrary to the World War II experience in the Krajina,
Slavonian Serbs enjoyed good relations with Croats even during
the reign of the NDH and contributed to the Partisan cause in the
civil war. Furthermore, despite the fact that over 100,000 Serbs
live in Slavonia, it is only the opstina of Pakrac that has a plurality
of Serbs. In the approximately 18 other opstinas of Western and
Eastern Slavonia, Croats equal or exceed Serbs. The travails of
war in this region have brought about in an increase of the Serb

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22 Ivo Goldstein, "Serbs in Croatia, Croatia in Yugoslavia," East European
Reporter, (Autumn/Winter 1990), pp.64-67; Bogdan Denitch, Limits and
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990, p.141, n.4; Paul Lendvai,
"Yugoslavia Without Yugoslavs: The Roots of the Crisis," International
Affairs, v.67, n.2 (April 1991), p.255, n.6; Borba (April 18, 1990), in FBIS,

23 They were Ratko Licina (Gracac), Dusan Zelenbaba (Knin), Dusan
Ergarac’ (Donji Lapac), Jovan Opacic’ (Knin), and Radoslav Tanjga (Knin).

24 Shoup, pp.26-33; Glenny, p.2.
population; in Baranja the percentage of Serbs has jumped from a pre-war level of 25% to more than 70% today.25

Slavonia is an especially complicated area in Croatia that contains a plethora of subcultures. After World War II, the communist regime sponsored the resettlement of indigent Hercegovinian Croats and Dalmatian Serbs into areas vacated by expelled Germans and Hungarians. These *dosljaci* (settlers) were terribly belligerent and xenophobic and represented a potentially lethal factor tucked inside the tolerant and pacific milieu created by the indigenous Slavonian peoples. When interethnic relations began to crumble in Croatia in 1991, local police records disclosed that colonized villages had ten times more cases of conflict and violence than noncolonized villages. In short, "Pannonian" traditions of interethnic peace were overwhelmed by "Dinaric" violence.26

Croatia's bipolar ethnic structure, its legacy of violence and interethnic strife, and its regional multiculturalism placed several potential hurdles in the path of democratic consolidation. A new government that truly sought to consolidate the fledgling democracy of Croatia would have to earn the consent of Serb nationalists in the Krajina as well as embrace the regional


complexion of Croatians in Dalmatia and Istria. Both achievements would require patience, the show of good will, and a keen sensitivity to minority concerns. Zagreb would also have to undermine propaganda from Belgrade that sought to stir the Serb diaspora into revolt. This would require not just kind words towards the Serb minority but substantive measures to guarantee inclusion and security. The cultural diversity and varied demographic structure of the Serb minority posed its own set of difficulties in the area of interest aggregation. More than likely, several principles and ideals would have to be articulated that reflected the exact conditions and region in question. If Serb nationalists were historically, legally, and morally correct in arguing that the borders of the SFRJ were purely administrative and therefore open to revision, then any secessionist program of the rural Serbs would still require area-specific claims: while the militants of the Serb-dominated Krajina could justifiably advance the "ethnic principle" as the basis of their actions, the lack of concentrated majorities in Slavonia meant that the SDS would have to rely on the more dubious grounds of "historic rights."27 And if the rural Serbs as a whole adopted the Greater Serbia goal of uniting all Serbs in a single state, what would this entail for

27 "Historic rights" is an ownership claim based on a history of traditional rule over a given area. It is not dependent on the present existence of a demographic majority in the target area. The ethnic principle, on the other hand, is based on the will of a majority. Considering the areas of Slavonia, Western Srem, and Baranja, only the latter could accurately be claimed by Serbs as belonging to them historically. From 1918 to the end of World War II Baranja was part of Vojvodina and was only annexed to Croatia in 1945.
their far more numerous brethren in the cities -- the urban Serbs? What sort of protection, opportunities, and future could they realistically hope to attain in a divided Croatia?

What follows is a detailed examination of a number of hypotheses -- national ideologies, public opinion, the chain reaction, census elections, and flanking -- from the theoretical framework that offer some hope of explaining the interethnic and intraethnic relationships that began to unfold in Croatia in 1990.

C. National Ideologies

1. The Monistic Nationalism of Franjo Tudjman and the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ)

In the elections of 1990, the Croatian Democratic Community billed itself as "the most Croatian party." Indeed, the HDZ was something more than just a political party representing particular interests; it was founded as a movement or front for the entire Croatian nation. Franjo Tudjman, a Partisan war hero, a former general in the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA), a leading figure in MASPOK, and a professor of history, spoke a language that was, according to Borba, "comprehensible to ordinary people." He


tapped into long-seething grievances of the Croatian nation that had roots not only in Tito's Yugoslavia but in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as well. Tudjman presented the HDZ as a synthesis and grand reconciliation of all the trends in the "vertical line" of Croatian history -- from Starcevic' to Radic', from Ustasha to Partisans, and from the NDH to the ZAVNOH (Regional Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia). His "Community" proudly resurrected the symbols of Croatian nationalism and his lieutenants -- Sime Djodan, Vladimir Seks, Zarko Domljan -- aggressively attacked Yugoslavia as "Serboslavia," condemned leading figures of the SKH (particularly Stipe Suvar) as cowardly and compromised, rallied against Serbian expansionism, and protested over the privileged position of Serbs in Croatia. Tudjman increasingly became perceived as the only figure capable and willing to stand up to Milosevic'. Over the course of the 1990 elections, Tudjman articulated three issues relevant to this study: the status of Serbs in Croatia, the national identity of the Bosnian Muslims and the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Croatia's fascist past. All three are definite themes of his earlier scholarly writings, indicating that they form part of his core belief system. These and related components of Tudjman's national ideology will be examined in this section.

Europe), March 8, 1990), p.68. For a sample of the HDZ's party platform, see "For A Free and Sovereign Croatia!," East European Reporter. (Spring/Summer 1990), pp.86-7.
A major theme in the HDZ 1990 election campaign was the issue of the overrepresentation of the Serb's in Croatia's state administration. This was the first time Croatian political elites had challenged Tito's tacit social contract between Yugoslavia's two largest communities. The "terms" of this contract had two parts: (a) Serbia would be internally divided with two autonomous provinces which would allay the fears that Croatia and other republics had of Serbian dominance; and (b) in return the Serbian diaspora was allowed overrepresentation in the Croatian and Bosnian SK, the republican bureaucracies, and the police.\footnote{For a discussion of the Titoist system of reciprocal benefits and sacrifices, see Glenny, pp.12-13; Thompson, pp.92-3.} While constantly reiterating that Serbs would be protected by a system of civil and national rights, and by promising no settling of accounts upon taking office, Tudjman nevertheless made it clear that the status quo would not be allowed to stand. In a euphemistic statement for the purges that were to follow the HDZ's ascension to power, Tudjman said "we need to create normal conditions in which the nationality composition of the services will correspond to the nationality composition of the population."\footnote{Danas (May 1, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), May 7, 1990, pp.67-70; Borba (April 18, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), April 24, 1990, pp.65-7.} Judging by Tudjman's earlier writings, this is an issue that had been smoldering in his thoughts for some time.\footnote{Franjo Tudjman, \textit{Nationalism in Contemporary Europe}, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp.145-9.} It was only
with the end of the civil war and the decrease in the number of Serbs residing in Croatia that Tudjman suggested that "Croatia can and must approach the Serb issue from fresh historical grounds ..." In a speech delivered to the Sabor in September 1992, Tudjman reasoned "now that the proportion of Serbs in the entire population has been reduced ... no one should ... see any danger in the proportional employment of Serbs and in the guaranteeing of their civil and ethnic rights."33

Along with the reevaluation of the status of Serbs in Croatia came a host of ill-advised statements from Tudjman that actually betrayed his real feelings towards Serbs. For example, during the election campaign and the early part of his administration he made the following remarks:

--- "in Croatia are all equal, but one has to know who is the host and who is the guest;"34
--- "fortunately my wife is neither Serbian nor Jewish;"35 and
--- "we will not harm the interests of either Jews or Serbs, provided they are capable and loyal citizens."36


35 Cohen, p.112,n57.

36 Goldstein,p.66. Other leading members of the HDZ and the government
With such words, Tudjman made it perfectly clear who has political priority and a legitimate claim to statehood in his republic. In his perspective, if a sovereign nation means anything, it implies that the bearer of that sovereignty enjoys the right to run its own affairs. These ideas were codified in the December 1990 constitution whereby Croatia was designated as "the national state of the Croatian nation and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Moslems, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Jews and others, who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality ..."37 In this formulation, Croatians were given pride of place as the state-forming nation whereas Serbs were relegated to an inferior position and equated with politically insignificant nationalities. The ethnic character of the Croatian state was vigorously defended by Vladimir Seks, a leading member of the HDZ and the head of the commission that drafted the constitution. While acknowledging the HDZ sought to blend ethnic and civil concepts, Seks argued a purely civil definition of the state was out of the


question: "There was no dilemma at all about whether Croatia should be organized as an ethnic and antifascist state. Only the Yugoslavs, the members of the SDS, the members of the UJDI (Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative), and renegades from Croatism favored a pure civil state, whereby they fitted perfectly into what Milosevic’ was saying at that time: 'One man, one vote.'"38

To buttress the claims that Croatians are a unique, sovereign group entitled to a claim of political priority, Tudjman increased the ethnic distance between Croatians and Serbs by assigning each to different world civilizations. According to him, Croatia is an inherent part of the progressive, pluralistic, democratic heritage of Central Europe while Serbia is linked to the backward, despotic, Byzantine culture of the Orient.39 The upshot of this "symbolic geography" is an enhancement of Croatian group worth at the expense of Serbs. Tudjman even takes this analysis a step farther by typologizing the nationalisms of Europe into progressive and regressive camps: to the first belong Polish, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Slovene, Croatian, Macedonian, Basque, Catalanian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Ukrainian, Estonian, Scottish, and Welsh


nationalisms; in the second group are Romanian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, and Russian national movements. The rationale separating these groups is that the former promotes national identity, sovereignty, equality, and democracy, while the latter represents hegemony, expansionism, and authoritarianism.40

A second theme that received a good deal of attention during the campaign of 1990 was Tudjman's opinion that the Muslim national identity is a fabrication of the Titoist regime and that in fact Muslims are really Croats. Furthermore, he insisted that Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (BH) represent an indivisible whole incapable of being separated. In the event that Yugoslavia should collapse, Croatia must emerge with its "historical and natural borders" which go beyond the present administrative unit.41 Such views also have roots in his previous writings. In Nationalism and Contemporary Europe, Tudjman examined how the Communist Party of Yugoslavia flagrantly violated the rights of nations to live in their own national republic when federal boundaries were drawn. Especially cheated was Croatia which actually lost territory in comparison with what it received in 1939

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by the Cvetkovic'-Macek agreement. Of all the disputed tracts of land between Serbia and Croatia, BH was surely the most aggravating for Tudjman. The fact that Muslims are in "ethnic character and speech incontrovertibly of Croatian origin" was ignored in favor of Serbian interests. In Tudjman's words, "the creation of a separate Bosnia and Hercegovina makes the territorial and geographic position of Croatia extremely unnatural in the economic sense and, therefore, in the broadest national-political sense, very unfavorable for life and development and in the narrower administrative sense unsuitable and disadvantageous." Once the war in BH began in 1992, Tudjman cultivated relations with extreme nationalist political elites from Hercegovina to the detriment of Croats from central Bosnia who have typically been more moderate in their political outlook. This

42 Early in his tenure in office, Tudjman made oblique references to the creation of a "Greater Croatia." For example, he would remind his audience that when Croatia joined Yugoslavia Croatian lands stretched to Zemun (a suburb of Belgrade) and Boka (the Bay of Kotor in Montenegro). He would also refer to the "800,000" Croats living in Vojvodina and specifically demanded a negotiated settlement for Croats residing in Subotica (in Vojvodina). Ultimately, Tudjman's major demand for the Croats of Vojvodina was the guarantee of "civil rights on a reciprocal basis."

"Hercegovinian Lobby" became so strong that it secured key posts in the government and became an important pillar of the right-wing faction within the HDZ. It is only since the March 1994 Croatian-Muslim agreement in which a confederation between Croatia and BH was brokered that Tudjman appears ready to step back from his partitionist position and accept the territorial integrity of BH.44

During the campaign of 1990, Tudjman set off a furor over his remark that the NDH was "not just a product of the whim of the Axis powers but also a consequence of the historical aspirations of the Croatian people." When faced with a barrage of criticism for such an irresponsible statement, apart from the expected disavowal that the HDZ did not intend to establish another NDH, he turned the tables and emphasized how official Yugoslav history has downplayed the crimes against humanity committed by the Chetniks.45 This ideological defense of the NDH is a constant in


Tudjman's nationalist paradigm. In his scholarly writings he has claimed that the NDH originally represented Croatian interests but was later corrupted by the Ustasha movement. Moreover, he has challenged the number of NDH victims (which scholars have estimated to be between 350,000 - 450,000) as nothing more than a Serbian plot to besmirch the Croatian national character and has offered his own calculation of no more than 70,000. The uncritical attitude of the HDZ towards the NDH is most poignantly demonstrated in the adoption of an old Croatian symbol that the fascist regime used as its main emblem, the sahovnica (a checkerboard, tri-colored flag that was later to become the official flag of Croatia). Most recently, the government chose to replace the dinar with the kuna, which just happened to be the national currency of the Ustasha regime. Moreover, the HDZ government has systematically replaced every street, monument, square and statue that honored the victims of fascism with names and monuments celebrating Croatian heroes and events.

46 Thompson, pp.267-9; Tudjman, p.106.


authority has been a concentration of power in the office of the president. The opposition in Croatia regularly complains about the hypercentralization of state power in the office of the president and the proliferation of "paraconstitutional" organs, such as the Office of the President for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. The government rarely consults the Sabor when it makes decisions and in December 1992 the Sabor was persuaded to relinquish its veto power over government acts.\textsuperscript{52} To borrow a line from the journalist Jelena Lovric, "[i]t is as though the power of the president were the only, or certainly the most important, attribute of the state."\textsuperscript{53}

A final component of Tudjman's national ideology is seen in his tendency to treat Serbs as a homogeneous entity and hold


them collectively responsible for the extreme nationalists in their own community. After the civil war broke out in Croatia, Tudjman would periodically make appeals to the Serbian community to dissociate itself from the Chetniks. The curious thing about this is that he would put all the burden of controlling the extremists on the shoulders of moderate Serbs rather than have his government undertake innovative initiatives that could either win the consent of the majority of Serbs or extinguish the rhetorical firepower of the Chetniks. The following passage is quite typical of his appeals: "One should expect that the voice ... coming from the sensible Serbs in Croatia will be heard to an even greater extent and that the Serbs themselves will neutralize those elements among their ranks who are really jeopardizing normal coexistence ..."54 Tudjman's attitude toward the politicized and militarized rural Serbs was no better. He summarily dismissed their complaints and regarded them as nothing more than agents of Belgrade whose mission was to create a Greater Serbia. In no instance did he ever acknowledge that the nationalist excess of the HDZ could be responsible for the alienation of the Serb community.

By the end of the war, Tudjman was apparently ready to assign collective guilt to the entire Serb nation in Croatia for the terrible tragedies and crimes against humanity that occurred. In a speech to the Sabor in December 1991, he said "we warned the

Serbian population in Croatia that, with their approval of the policy of the SDS ... they were assuming the responsibility for everything that was happening in Croatia. Our assessment that Serbs in Croatia had been assigned the role of a fifth column and diversionary units in the war ... was shown to be correct.55

Since the civil war (and particularly since the troubled year Croatia faced in 1993 in BH),56 Tudjman has sounded a more moderate note. With respect to Croatia's BH policy, Tudjman's alliance with the partitionist "Hercegovinian Lobby" came to an end as he moved to mend fences with the Muslims of BH and the Bosnian Croat integralists. This was preceded by an October 1993 HDZ general assembly at which Tudjman undercut both the hardline and moderate factions within the party and promoted a new breed of younger technocrats who would ostensibly work to transform the HDZ along the lines of a Christian democratic party. In still other signs of change, he issued a public apology in February 1994 for earlier writings that were interpreted as anti-Semitic and his government chose not to observe the 53rd


56 In 1993 the BH Croat forces took a beating on the ground, losing 40% of their territory in central Bosnia to the Muslims. In addition, Croatia came under international condemnation for its sizable military force in BH. Moore, "A New Stage in the Bosnian Conflict," p.34.
anniversary of the NDH.57

The HDZ national ideology finds its closest fit in monistic nationalism. As the largest nation in their nominal republic, Croatians and their symbols, language, and interests were to take priority over all other groups. While the democratic rights of all would be recognized, it is only the Croatian nation that may legitimately advance an ownership claim over Croatia itself and be the bearer of sovereignty. At any rate, Croatia was not a heterogeneous nation requiring elaborate consociational prescriptions. As indicated by his writings on nationalism, Tudjman felt that any state with a single nation that composed nearly 80% of the total population is "nationally homogeneous."58 Tudjman's preoccupation with the Croatian diaspora, particularly in BH, indicated a stance of active protectionism which segued into an outright irredentist policy in BH that lasted from 1992 to 1993. The HDZ was equally obsessed by the rate of Croatian emigration abroad. Reflecting a fundamental disposition of insecurity vis-a-vis the larger Serbian nation, the HDZ promised to end the "biological dying away of the Croatian people" by the promotion of

57 Moore, "A New Stage in the Bosnian Conflict," p33-5; Moore, "Croatia and Bosnia," pp.113-4; Moore, "Croatia," p.82.

58 Tudjman, p.148.
a "demographic renewal."\textsuperscript{59} The stress on Serb overrepresentation in the Croatian bureaucracy conveyed a suspicion of Serbs and presaged their constitutional demotion to a national minority. Tudjman's dismissal of the Serb community in Croatian politics is nowhere better displayed than in his failure during the 1990 campaign to visit a single village in which Serbs constitute a majority.\textsuperscript{60} In addition, the HDZ presided over the centralization of the Croatian state which undermined the ability of historic and cultural-based regions in Croatia to press for their own self-interests. In all these instances -- the political claim of priority, the creation of an ethnic state, an irredentist policy in BH, the effort to downgrade the status of Croatia's Serbs, the manifestation of a suspicious attitude towards Serbs, and the centralization of the Croatian state -- HDZ national ideology approximated the dimensions of monistic nationalism.


\textsuperscript{60} Goldstein, p.65.
a. Impact on Democratic Consolidation. In this section I will analyze how the most politically significant group in the Serb community, the SDS, responded to the monistic nationalism of the HDZ. It is necessary to examine the political vocabulary of the SDS because democratic consolidation is predicated on the development of networks of communication and mutual understandings among political elites. According to the research program, if a dominant group advances a claim of political priority the minority group will react first with a claim of equality which may easily blossom into a demand for secession if the dominant group appears oppressive.

1. The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS): From Pluralist to Primordial Nationalism. The SDS was organized in Knin in February 1990. In the five years of its existence the party has experienced numerous factional divisions and several leadership changes. An important factor determining the direction of the SDS is the ever-changing immediate political interests of the Milosevic government. From 1990 to the present Milosevic has pursued several different tactics and this has had repercussions for the top personnel and the national ideology of the SDS. Under the leadership of Jovan Raskovic the SDS adopted a minimal demand of cultural autonomy and a maximal demand of political autonomy. In October 1990 Raskovic was unseated from his post by Milan Babic. This marked a major change of course for the party as the new minimal goal became political autonomy and the
maximal goal became secession. Since the end of Babic's leadership in February 1992 the SDS and the Serbian Republic of Krajina (RSK) have been led successively by Goran Hadzic and Milan Martic, both of whom have been resolutely committed to the independence of the RSK. The differences that separate Babic, Hadzic, and Martic are personal rather than ideological and center around power, positions, and shifting alliances with political elites in Belgrade. Let us now turn to a more detailed look at the national ideology of the SDS as it has evolved over time.

At the founding assembly of the SDS, Jovan Raskovic, a psychiatrist from Sibenik, was elected president. The assembly decided that the party should push for an autonomous province within Croatia subject to a popular referendum. A month later, Raskovic stepped forward with his own agenda which was considerably more moderate than the program of the assembly. Specifically, he characterized the SDS as an "ethical party" (and not


an ethnic party) that stood behind the ideals of democracy. Raskovic' felt that the national question in Yugoslavia could only be solved by a democratic federal structure based on one man, one vote, and not the consensual system put in place by Tito. Raskovic' felt that the national question in Yugoslavia could only be solved by a democratic federal structure based on one man, one vote, and not the consensual system put in place by Tito. On the internal politics of Croatia, Raskovic' repudiated "immature" and false assessments that attributed the HDZ's election victory to a "manipulated, loud minority." He proclaimed respect for the right of the Croatian people to a sovereign state and only requested that Serbs have an equal position within it. To his mind, Serb equality would be satisfied by the institutionalization of cultural autonomy. In practical terms, this meant the right of Serbs to speak their own language, write in their own script, and have their own schools, educational programs, cultural institutions, publishing houses, and newspapers. Furthermore, he distanced himself from nationalist extremism by coming out "against speculation over a state for the Serbian people in Croatia" and insisted that the Serbs of Croatia will always find their homeland in Croatia.


The Raskovic' position coincides with the expectations suggested by the theoretical framework; namely, when faced with a majority group advancing a claim of political priority, a minority's first demand is simple equality. Of the range of alternatives the SDS was openly discussing -- cultural autonomy, an autonomous province within Croatia, and a federal Yugoslavia -- none could be construed as involving a claim of political priority. This rather mild political program is actually quite surprising given Knin's rich history of fierce independence and the war psychosis that was being cultivated by Belgrade. The moderation of Raskovic' s position in fact made possible negotiations with Tudjman in June 1990 over cultural autonomy. However, the HDZ effort to implement the program of monistic nationalism quickly stymied any further progress in this area.

In mid-July the HDZ had proposed a number of amendments to the Croatian constitution that significantly revised interethnic relations in the areas of national symbols, the official language, and decision-making rules over interethnic issues. More exactly, the Croatian government enshrined the Croatian literary language as the official language of the state, adopted the sahovnica as the official emblem, and abolished constitutional amendment 59.

65 For example, Politika in October entitled a story "Pogrom Against Serbian Population in Croatia: Croatian Special Forces Throw Serbian Children Around." In the story, it is reported how the Croatian police are "extremely vulgar" toward Serbian girls. Politika (October 1, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), October 4, 1990, p.66; Vanja Bulic', "Tiha Likvidacija Ljudskosti," Duga, n.442 (February 2-16, 1991), pp.16-19.
which had subjected all issues that affect interethnic relations to a two-thirds majority. Adding insult to injury, the HDZ passed these acts with a simple majority and in opposition to Serb deputies in the SDS and the SKH-SDP. These three amendments were a serious affront to Serb sensibilities and provided tangible evidence for the claims of Knin Radio and the Belgrade media that fascism had reared its head again in Croatia. The SDS took the opportunity it was handed by the regime and organized a mass demonstration in the town of Srb where it laid out the ideological groundwork for the possible exit of Serbs from Croatia.

At the mass rally in Srb held on July 25, Raskovic made it clear that the HDZ's constitutional amendments were responsible for what he characterized as "a Serbian uprising without arms." A public show of hands was made by those present (estimates ranged from 50,000 to 200,000) for the sovereignty of the Serbian people and their right to autonomy. It was agreed that in the present circumstances Serbs would seek only cultural autonomy within Croatia, which would involve securing linguistic, educational, and media rights. In the event that Yugoslavia became a confederation, however, Serbs would be entitled, on the basis of this acclamation, to political and territorial autonomy. This became the basic position of the SDS under Raskovic's

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leadership. In order to pacify the suspicions Croatians had with the SDS program, Raskovic' shunned any talk of war and insisted "we want our children to play and be friends with Croatian children." He made every effort to convey to the Croatian people that the Serbs would be quite content with cultural autonomy. Before the Serb public, Raskovic' spoke on how ruinous a Greater Serbia program would be and asked Serbs that, should a civil war develop, they go to battle only against the "Ustasha" and not the Croatian people. Raskovic'’s perception of Tudjman was that he was not an Ustasha but, on the contrary, someone with whom the Serbs could negotiate. There was, at the same time, he felt, an "Ustasha core" in the HDZ that worked to restrict the maneuverability of Tudjman.67

With respect to national ideologies, Raskovic' was closer to pluralist nationalism than any other type. To be sure, during his reign as the undisputed spokesmen of the Serbs of Croatia (from February 1990 to October 1990), he was often taken to task by both the Croatian and Serbian press for being fickle and shaping his message to fit whatever audience he had before him. A careful analysis of his speeches does indicate a tendency towards volatility (moving between an amicable and agitated rhetoric, integrative and secessionist goals, aversion and adoration for

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Milošević'). Nevertheless, Rasković was at heart a moderate who exhibited a flexibility that made dialogue and a negotiated settlement a real possibility. The cornerstone of pluralist nationalism is peaceful coexistence between groups based on relations of equality, and Rasković's public statements reflected these values. He accepted the sovereignty of the Croatian nation and sought cultural autonomy within the Croatian state (although he eventually entertained the idea of a Krajina state linked to the

68 Rasković normally tried to distance the activities of the SDS from any connection with the Milošević regime, so it was most surprising to see him figuratively prostrate before Milošević in an open letter in September 1990. In this letter, Rasković wrote that Milošević is the "most important person in the modern history of the Serbian people"; that he is the "spiritual, moral, and, quite certainly, physical protector" of the SDS; that he personally considers Milošević the "paradigm of everything Serbian"; and that he offers his "sincere and personal devotion" to the Serbian leader. Such adulation can be attributed to a number of things -- the heightened fear and panic in Knin after the August 1990 referendum for Serb autonomy, Tudjman's leaking of the transcripts of his talks with Rasković which was designed to embarrass and discredit the latter since he spoke of the Serbs as a "crazy nation," and rumors bandied about in the Croatian press that Rasković had been saying unflattering things about Milošević. By January 1991, Rasković was less inhibited insisting Milošević cannot negotiate with Tudjman on behalf of the Croatian Serbs and that the SDS would reject "any guardianship imposed on us." Dnevnik (September 1, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), September 13, 1990, p.66; Belgrade Domestic Service (August 29, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 30, 1990, pp.57-8; Belgrade Domestic Service (August 19, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 20, 1990, p.66; Belgrade Domestic Service (August 30, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 31, 1990, p.50; Vjesnik (January 10, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), January 18, 1991, pp.43-4.
Bosanska Krajina as interethnic relations within Croatia deteriorated. He assured the Croatian minority in the Krajina that they would receive equal treatment and not be offended or threatened; he consistently spoke out against war; he despised Chetniks from Serbia like Vojislav Seselj; he never tired of calling Croatia his home; and he constantly reminded Serbs that their problems lay not with the Croatian people but rather with the HDZ regime. Furthermore, he was always ready to reopen dialogue with the regime even after bloody encounters (such as at Plitvice, March/April 1991) and remained to the end opposed to the idea of a Greater Serbia.69

Raskovic's more radical speeches can usually be traced either to pressures from within the SDS or the sheer heavy-handedness of HDZ policy (such as his militaristic language after the Pakrac drama, March 1991).70 When the fall of his successor, Milan Babic', was being prepared in February 1992, the by-then marginalized Raskovic spoke about the opportunities this presented for constructing a "golden bridge" with Croatia that could make possible a new common life between Serbs and


Croats. In the parlance of Yugoslavia he was a "Partisan," not a "Chetnik."

The successor to Raskovic', Milan Babic', is a different case altogether. This former dentist from Vrlika was originally the protégé of Raskovic', who reportedly loved him like a son. But like many sons, Babic' rebelled against his "father" and engineered a coup within the SDS in October 1990 while Raskovic' was on a trip in the United States drumming up support for the Serbs of Croatia. During the absence of Raskovic', Babic' travelled to Belgrade and built-up an array of political and military contacts. From this point on he began to direct the political course of the Serbs of Croatia. The organizational base he used to do this was his appointed post as the president of the Serbian National Council (Srpsko Nacionalno Vijece). The SNV was created during the mass meeting in the town of Srb and was designed to be an extralegal vehicle to represent and protect the Serb nation during the looming crisis. The SNV was granted the right to organize plebiscites on crucial issues of national interest and accordingly organized a Serb referendum on autonomy which


was held August 19 to September 2.\textsuperscript{73} Henceforth, this unconstitutional, unelected body and its president, whose only legally elected position was the mayor of the Knin opština, would present itself as the interlocutor for the entire Serb nation in Croatia.

Both in style and substance the leadership of Milan Babic represented an intense radicalization of Serb politics. A cursory content analysis of speeches from Raskovic and Babic that were given at the time of the clash at Plitvice National Park illustrates the very different temperament of these two men. Speaking in Knin, Raskovic told his audience "yesterday was a crime, but ... Serbs should not respond to it with a crime." Rather than see Serb mothers give birth to children for armies and graves, Raskovic pleaded that they be born for freedom. And he warned Serbs that if they wanted a war leader they would have to look elsewhere.

That "elsewhere" was in fact Titova Korenica where Babic' was in the process of explaining that "the neo-fascist and reestablished Ustasha state that calls itself the Republic of Croatia has carried out a terrorist attack against the Serbian people ..." Babic' then announced an SNV decision to join Serb areas of Croatia to Serbia proper.74

The political strategy of Babic' never deviated from the secession of the Krajina from Croatia. His tactics seemed to be based on obstructing any rapprochement between Serbs and the HDZ and keeping one step ahead of whatever the government was willing to offer. For example, he successfully thwarted the continuation of the HDZ/SDS negotiations over the constitution that had commenced in October 1990; he flatly told Croatian delegates planning to attend talks between the SFRJ and Knin authorities that their security could not be guaranteed in Knin; prior to the promulgation of the Croatian constitution he presented his own plan for the political autonomy of Serb areas which single-handedly moved the minimal goal of the SDS beyond cultural autonomy; and immediately after the Croatian constitution was approved he invited Milan Martic' (a former Knin police chief who lost his job when the HDZ reorganized the police forces) and "Captain Dragan" (a paramilitary leader from Serbia) to organize a

Serb militia for the Krajina.75

Babic’s ideological contribution to the Serb national question came in the form of a statute he had written announcing the formation of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (SAOK) in December 1990. In this document the near-unanimous Serb referendum and the "positive experience of regional autonomy in modern Europe" were invoked to justify the creation a Serbian autonomous region that would include the "historic territories of the Dalmatian and military Krajina" and other areas in which a majority Serb population has voted for accession.76 The powers delegated to the SAOK in Babic’s statute were considerable and included police and judicial functions, economic planning, and authority over language, education, and the media. The central government could only intervene in SAOK areas of competence through the constitutional court. Such an audacious usurpation of power led Borba to make the following comment: "If all these


powers were to be delegated to Knin county, the quite logical question arises of what the Knin authors have left Croatia. It seems, almost nothing.\textsuperscript{77}

One specific point about Babic's view on the right to self-determination is that this principle could only be exercised if Serbs constituted a majority in a given area. In other words, Babic defined "Serbian ethnic territory" on the basis of the ethnic principle, and not the historic principle.\textsuperscript{78} Babic's consistency on this point is observed in March 1991 when the Serbs of Slavonia began to bargain with Tudjman over their status. It was Babic's contention that while it was "understandable" for Serbs in minority areas to discuss a scheme of national rights with Tudjman since they would continue to reside within Croatia, any areas of Slavonia that had Serb majorities would become part of the SAOK.\textsuperscript{79}

The significance of Babic's SAOK statute was that it represented a substantial escalation of demands from the


conditional autonomy of the August referendum. Now the SNV was set on political autonomy no matter what happened to the status of Croatia within Yugoslavia. Such a position was directly at odds with Zagreb's emphasis on centralism. Even more, in the hands of Babic' the SAOK was essentially a vehicle to engineer the exit of Serbs from Croatia. In 1991 a flurry of SAOs were set up in Croatia that covered the following areas: Krajina (Eastern and Northern Dalmatia, Banija, Lika, and Kordun), Eastern Slavonia (Baranja and Western Srem) and Western Slavonia (Packrac, Grubsino Polje, and Daruvar). The efforts of the rural Serbs to organize the SAOs led to a series of clashes between the Marticevci (or militiamen of the SAOK, nicknamed after Milan Martic') and the Croatian MUP (special police forces of the Croatian Internal Ministry) and Zengas (Croatian national guardsmen).80 By December 1991 the SAOs were consolidated into the Serbian Republic of Krajina (RSK), with Babic' standing as the president of the RSK.

In his capacity as the leader of the rural Serbs Babic' controlled Knin radio. The nationalist rhetoric he brought to the airwaves was particularly inflammatory as he regularly referred

80 In Pakrac, the town's municipal assembly decided to secede from Croatia and seized the local police station, thereby prompting intervention by the Croatian MUP; in Plitvice, the Marticevci attempted to take over the Plitvice Lakes National Park and transfer it to the authority of the SAOK. Milan Andrejevich, "Crisis in Croatia: The Pakrac Drama," Report on Eastern Europe, (March 22, 1991), pp.37-41; For various reports on the situation in Plitvice, see FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), April 1, 1991, pp.45-54.
to the Croatian government as "Ustasha" and "fascists" and never took the time to delineate between the regime of Croatia and the Croatian people as Raskovic' so carefully did. Statements by leading figures in Babic's coterie -- such as SAOK Minister of Information, Lazar Macura, who remarked "we could do whatever we want to them [i.e., minority Croatians within the SAOK] but they are completely safe" -- were equally ominous.81 It is thus not surprising to find that Croats who lived in the Krajina complained of constant harassment.82

The unravelling of Babic' began when Milosevic' recalculated the costs of engagement of Serbia and JNA in the war. The threats of international isolation, the economic sanctions against Serbia imposed by the US and the EC in November 1991, the fact that Serbs presently controlled one-third of Croatian territory and were now unable to budge Croatian forces any further, and the opportunities for expansion now wide open in BH all convinced the Serbian leader to sign on to the Vance peace plan in December 1991. Babic' considered the plan capitulation since it provided for the disarming of the Marticevci and the eventual reincorporation of Serb areas within Croatia.83 With the lead of Milosevic'.


official Serbia and significant party elites in the RSK began to turn against Babic'. By February 1992 Babic' was relieved of his post as president of the RSK and in his place was selected Goran Hadzic', a man who was willing to sign the Vance peace plan and was therefore pliable to Milosevic’'s short-term political interests.84

Babic’'s political position matches the ethos of primordial nationalism. Under his rule plans were implemented for the unconditional secession of Serb areas from Croatia, rural Serbs


were organized into a militia to fight against the state of Croatia, an enemy-stereotype of the HDZ regime and Croatians was fostered, all Croatian symbols were abolished from Serb-held areas, and the Croatian minority was placed under duress which led to their mass exodus. For Babic', a common life with Croatians was simply out of the question. In a comparative assessment made by Borba on the political differences between Raskovic' and Babic', it was noted that the former always advocated "a policy that is based on political means in the hands of intellectuals"; the latter, however, felt it was "sufficient to distribute arms to the people or to secede and end the whole story." According to Vreme, "Babic' goes for all or nothing: he wants the recognition of Krajina as a state and international troops

85 The SNV in July 1990 banned the use of any Croatian symbols, such as the sahovnica in Serbian ethnic territories. In May 1991 the Cyrillic script was made official in the SAOK while the Croatian linguistic standard was permitted where Croats reached 8% of the population. Tanjug (July 31, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe) August 1, 1990, pp.65-6; Tanjug (May 29, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), May 30, 1991, p.26.


between Knin and Zagreb, and his own internal civilian authority -
or war." And in Misha Glenny's estimate, Babic' "proved that
he was one of Milosevic's only equals in the politics of deceit and
manipulation. Perhaps he was his only equal."89

2. Summary Statement on Democratic Consolidation. The
mobilization of Serb nationalism in Croatia forced Croatian
nationalists to confront their greatest test. Could Croatia enter its
state of independence as a genuine bi-ethnic polity in which it
enjoyed the consent and loyalty of its Serb minority?
Unfortunately, the HDZ was so obsessed with asserting the
primacy of the Croatian nation that they missed the opportunity
to strike a deal with the pluralist nationalist Raskovic'. Their
program of constitutional revisionism, which had major
ramifications for comparative group worth and the politics of
ethnic symbols, worked only to provoke the more radical
elements in the Serb community and undermine Raskovic's
efforts to attain a civil reconciliation. Furthermore, Tudjman's
historicism, his celebration of everything Croatian, and his mission
to rewrite the fascist experience in Croatia greatly irritated Serbs
and exemplified an insensitivity and outright arrogance with
regard to the sentiments, historical memories, and dignity of the
Serb community. In this way, Babic' was as much a product of

88 Dragan Veselinov, "Kninska stena," Vreme, n.68 (February 10, 1992),
p.12.

89 Glenny, p.18.
Tudjman as he was of Milosevic'. His arrival at the helm of the SDS represented an ideological shift from pluralist to primordial nationalism, from integration to secession, and from Partisan to Chetnik. In a word, it marked the beginning of the end for democratic consolidation.

b. Impact on Democracy. In the discussion of the national ideology of the SDS, it was indicated how respect for human rights deteriorated in areas under SDS control. In this section the relationship between the monistic nationalism of the HDZ and the practice of democracy in Croatia will be considered. It should first be stated that the regime in Croatia falls well below the standards of procedural democracy. To be sure, three multiparty elections have been held in the post-communist period without

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serious questions regarding their fairness and integrity. At the same time, many important fundamentals of democracy are lacking in Croatia. For one, the government has made a concerted effort to control and stifle the media. It has placed HDZ party members, Antun Vrdoljak and Milovan Sibl, in charge of Croatian television and of the national news agency, respectively. Direct control, however, is not the only way the government influences public discourse. The HDZ has also revived the verbal offenses law (a holdover from the communist period) and ingeniously-crafted "privatization laws" that make it easy for the government to take over or close down publications under the pretext that they are bankrupt. Through these and other machinations the critical magazine *Danas* and its successor *Novi Danas* were run out of business, the equally critical *Slobodna Dalmacija* was tamed, and moves were made against Rijeka's *Novi list* and *Novi Vjesnik*. Justifying the government's treatment of *Danas*, Sibl explained that the magazine was "against the Croatian state," and that most of its writers were "children of Yugoslav People's Army officers, children of mixed marriages, or children of Communist Party members." For such heavy-handed treatment of the


press, the government earned the ire of the International Federation of Journalists who petitioned the Council of Europe to deny membership to Croatia.93

Prominent individuals, opposition politicians, and independent journalists also face limitations on their freedom of expression. In his capacity as state prosecutor, Vladimir Seks has initiated proceedings for violations of the verbal offense law -- which encompasses "spreading false reports" and "disquieting the public" -- against Ivan Zvonimir Cicak of the Croatian Peasants Party (HSS), Milorad Pupovac of the Serbian Democratic Forum (SDF), the journalists Tanja Torbarina, Jelena Lovric, and the writers Slavenka Drakulic and Dubravka Ugresic, to name just a few. The regional parties have also been pressured by the ruling party -- the government has vehemently denounced the Istrian Democratic Alliance (IDS) for its stand on regional autonomy and the Dalmatian Action has seen mass arrests of its leadership.94

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In essence, there has been an alarming reduction in the range of acceptable opinions. Criticism of Tudjman, the HDZ, the Croatian state, or any question about the quality of democracy is met with a flurry of government and media attacks. The "enemies" of Croatia today are charged with being "Yugo-nostaglic" and "Yugoslav patriots;" in some cases, their nationality and family history are questioned. The promotion of everything Croatian has reached a fever pitch in the republic and it is has become almost obligatory for opposition politicians, intellectuals, and journalists "to love Croatia loudly and clearly." In the assessment of *Novi Danas*, the fact that the opposition is under the constant suspicion of being "anti-Croat" and even wanting to "destroy Croatia" is the direct product of the HDZ's tendency to


equate itself with the state of Croatia. Since the HDZ perceives itself as the Croatian community in miniature, interests expressed outside this sphere are, ipso facto, anti-Croatian. This generally oppressive atmosphere in Croatia has brought condemnation from Helsinki Watch and has led many to suggest a "creeping authoritarianism" in Croatia.

Another domain in which the regime's undemocratic practices are exemplified is in its failure to protect the rights of Serbs within its jurisdiction. The first instance of Croatian nationalist excess occurred in Zadar. In this port city (which is a stronghold of fierce Croatian nationalism), Croatian nationalists took to the streets in May 1991 and proceeded to smash and loot Serb

97 Novi Danas (June 29, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), July 22, 1992, pp.19-20. Vlado Gotovac of the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) even felt the need during a debate in the Sabor on Serb citizenship to protect himself by noting that he is not calling into question Croatian democracy "in any respect." In the same vein, the president of the HSLS, Drazen Budisa, has been labeled "not a good enough Croat." Novi Vjesnik (December 1, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), December 9, 1992, pp.36-7; Novi Danas (August 7, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 21, 1992, p.26; Novi Vjesnik (May 9, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), May 22, 1992, pp.23-4.

stores. Not a word of condemnation followed from the government. During the civil war, there were numerous reports of ethnic cleansing committed against Serbs by Croatian government troops and Croatian paramilitaries in West Slavonia, Zadar, Zagreb, and Ogulin (by one count, 20,000 Serbs were affected). Since that time, there has been a steady flow of reports on the destruction and confiscation of Serb property, the arbitrary detention of Serbs, their summary dismissal from their place of work, unequal treatment in social welfare policy, difficulties in obtaining Croatian citizenship certificates, and the pressures placed on Serbs to "catholicize" themselves. A principal investigator of these cases was Milan Djukic, a Serb who was eventually appointed the head of the Office for Interethnic Relations. According to Djukic, this pattern of discrimination against Serbs in Croatia was the fault of the government and the Supreme Court which failed to halt such conduct and resulted in a severe compromise of the "democratic character of authority in Croatia."

99 This was done at a time of increasing clashes between the government and the rural Serbs. Thompson, A Paper House, p.261-2; FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), May 3, 1991, pp.36-41.


In addition, the expression of Serb interests has barely been tolerated. In the Sabor in October 1990 HDZ deputy Ivan Bobetko assaulted SDS deputy Radoslav Tanjga for speaking about the oppression of Serbs in Croatia and Djukic testified in 1992 that "whenever I mention the 'Serbian people,' I produce an allergy in the Assembly."\textsuperscript{102}

Overall, the monistic nationalism of the HDZ has made for only the partial realization of a democratic regime. The claims of political priority embedded in this national ideology have led the HDZ to elevate the interests of the Croatian nation above any other consideration. Many observers have pointed to the fixation Tudjman and the regime have with the trappings of power and the symbols of statehood. It seems fair to say that securing the sovereignty of the nation and the independence of the state are Tudjman's primary, if not the sole, objectives. Democracy is seen only in terms of its instrumental value and has been allowed to

languish whenever it has proven ill-suited to nationalist ends. The regime's obsession with finding domestic enemies has engendered a political climate in which one is compelled to present oneself as a "good Croat." In these conditions, democratic values such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of association are quite circumscribed. In the words of the intellectual Zarko Puhovski, "the old right-wing ideology has come to life again in Croatia" and "in its practical implementation, [it] is undemocratic, which can ... be seen from its attitude toward the Serbs, the opposition, and the media."\textsuperscript{103}

D. Public Opinion

The public opinion hypothesis is presented to determine if the concepts and values found in the nationalist parties' programs correspond with the vox populi. If Tudjman's monistic nationalist ideology or Babic's primordial nationalist ideology find approval in their respective national communities, then additional obstacles will be placed in the path of democratic consolidation.

Survey research conducted by Ivan Siber (a Zagreb political science professor) prior to the 1990 elections offers a glimpse into the party preferences, ethnic identities, value orientations, and perceptions of ethnic (in)equality of the Croatian electorate. An

\textsuperscript{103} Delo (December 12, 1992), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), December 30, 1992, p.34.
examination of the party preference of members of nationality groups indicates that 41% in the Croatian community identified with the HDZ, while 46% in the Serb community chose the SKH-SDP and 23% the SDS.\textsuperscript{104} The smaller proportion of support in the Serb community for the SDS reflects the fact that the SDS was not well organized for the elections and was barely noticed. As a result, the SKH-SDP cornered 70% of the Serb vote in Croatia.\textsuperscript{105} This outpouring of Serb support for the communists can be explained by the fact that the SKH-SDP was well-staffed by Serbs and had a pluralist nationalist program geared to make Serbs feel secure in the new Croatia. A Serb refugee who had voted for the SKH-SDP but a month after the elections became a member of the SDS told me, Serbs made their choice on the basis of "who offers less blood."\textsuperscript{106}

A study of the value orientation of party identifiers demonstrates that the supporters of the HDZ and the SDS were


\textsuperscript{105} Thompson, \textit{A Paper House}, p.281.

\textsuperscript{106} Personal interview, Ames, Iowa, 11/18/92. The ethnic composition of the HDZ and the SDS membership did indicate ethnic polarization: the rank-and-file of the HDZ were 98% Croatian, and the SDS was 100% Serbian. Siber, pp.142-3.
motivated by different issues. HDZ identifiers chose "Croatian autonomy" (69%), and a "European orientation" (51%) as their two most salient values while SDS identifiers selected "ethnic equality" (69%) and the "Yugoslav community" (57%). In the general public, a plurality of 35% of the Serbs advocated that Yugoslavia be transformed into a federation with a strong federal component (the position, incidently, of the Milosevic government), 31% favored the existing federal structure, and 23% desired a single state without republics. Among the Croatians 64% preferred a confederation of autonomous states (only 11% of the Serbs accepted a confederal Yugoslavia) and 15% saw Croatia's future outside of Yugoslavia. On the issue of ethnic (in)equality, over one-third in the Croatian community and over one-third in the Serb community felt that the other group has a privileged status. This attitude among the Serbs was especially pronounced in the areas where they constitute a majority.\textsuperscript{107} If we break these figures down along the lines of party identifiers, the differences in perceptions are even more glaring: 56% of the HDZ identifiers agreed that Serbs are privileged whereas 71% of the SDS identifiers contended that Croatians are privileged. Finally, authoritarian attitudes were tested and Siber found that the level of authoritarianism among the electorate was quite high, as enough SDS and HDZ identifiers exhibited authoritarian traits to designate their respective parties as authoritarian (the SDS had

\textsuperscript{107} This observation on the geographic concentration of Serb perceptions of inequality comes from Cohen, p.99.
the most authoritarian identifiers on the Croatian scene).  

Research conducted by Danas in March 1990 focused on the degree to which potential voters supported the elements of the major parties' platforms. The researchers found that 82% of HDZ supporters advocated the sahovnica as the new national flag, 54% wanted Croatia to regain its "natural borders," 61% supported the phrase "state of the Croatian people" as the new state definition, and 54% demanded the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia. A comparison with the supporters of the two other major competing parties -- the SKH-SDP and the KNS -- showed that the details of the HDZ program did not enjoy unanimous support among the Croatian electorate. Among the potential voters of the SKH-SDP, 77% wanted the existing flag to remain, 96% did not want to change the borders, 53% preferred the state to be defined as a "state of all its citizens," and 64% supported a federal Yugoslavia. According to the data collected by Siber, the SKH-SDP had a multiethnic membership at the time of the elections: 52% Croatian, 28% Serb, and 17% Yugoslav. Among the identifiers of the Coalition of National Understanding (the KNS, a multiparty coalition headed by former leaders of the Croatian Spring, such as Savka Dabcevic-Kucar and Miko Tripalo), 45% accepted the existing flag, 82% sought no change in borders, 80% wanted Croatia to be a "state of all its citizens," and 51% advocated a confederal Yugoslavia. When we consider that the ethnic

108 Siber, pp.146-168.
composition of the KNS was 93% Croatian, 1% Serb, and 2% Yugoslav, the conclusion is inescapable that the Croatian electorate was not uniformly monistic nationalist at this time.109

The popular vote the HDZ has received in the three elections since 1990 provides further evidence that the Croatian nation has not been politically homogenized110 behind its platform. For example, in the April 1990 elections to the most important chamber in the Sabor, the Sociopolitical Chamber, the HDZ received only 42% of the vote. In the August 1992 elections two electoral procedures were used: under the proportional system the HDZ earned 44% of the vote and under the majority system the party received 34%. And in the February 1993 elections to the Chamber of Counties and local units of government, the HDZ failed to obtain an absolute majority in seven out of twenty-one zupanijas (including Zagreb), two-thirds (43) of the towns, and nearly one-half of the municipalities. In each election, the HDZ popular vote was greatly magnified by the electoral system when it came to the


110 The term "political homogenization" is used frequently in the former Yugoslavia by scholars, journalists, and politicians to denote a situation in which an ethnic group bridges its internal differences and lines up collectively behind a single party or national ideology.
distribution of seats in the assemblies. Thus, in the 1990 elections the first-past-the-post system devised by the outgoing communists translated a 42% popular vote into 67.5% of the seats. In the August 1992 elections the mixed electoral system awarded the HDZ 50% of the seats under the proportional representation and 90% of the available seats under the majoritarian system. The elections to the upper house in 1993 stands outside this pattern as the two-thirds popular vote the party gained only earned it 59% of the seats. But even here the HDZ crafting of the electoral law ensured it certain advantages, such as granting Tudjman the prerogative of appointing 5 additional members to the chamber and endowing him with lifelong membership in this body upon the end of his tenure in the presidency.111

In December 1991 the Danas research team carried out a study on Croatian attitudes towards Zagreb's plan to create two autonomous districts for the rural Serbs, popularly known as the "Law on the Serbs." In a sample size of 896 (79% Croatian, 12% Serb, and 9% other), three-fourths felt that the law grants Serbs a privileged position in Croatia. In response to the question "would you personally agree to a proclamation of territorial autonomy for

the Serbs in Croatia if this guaranteed an end to the war in Croatia?" 90% answered in the negative. While 94% of the respondents expressed acceptance of democratic principles for resolving interethnic disputes, 53% thought the adoption of such procedures could not help solve the Croatian-Serb conflict. In a final question, the respondents were asked if there were current a Serb politician with whom Zagreb could negotiate a new deal. Thirty-six percent said "there is no such politician at the moment," while 29% and 15% chose Zivko Juzbasic and Milan Djukic, respectively, two Serbs who had cooperated with the government and are regarded as traitors by the rural Serbs.112 This and other data (which indicate that the Croatian electorate would support the government if it decided to take the Krajina back militarily)113 suggests a certain hardening of attitudes towards Serbs since the end of the civil war.

Still, it would be incorrect to conclude that the Croatian electorate has aligned itself with the HDZ program of monistic nationalism. A study conducted by the Croatian magazine Globus in July 1993 indicates that even the membership and sympathizers of the HDZ are divided between the liberal/Partisan faction (Josip Manolic, Stipe Mesic, Franjo Greguric, Slavko Degoricija, and Zarko Domljan) and the conservative/Ustasha


faction (Vladimir Seks, Gojko Susak, Vice Vukojevic', and Ivica Pasalic'). In a sample size of 600, 44.6% of the HDZ members and sympathizers supported the liberal-Partisans and 30% supported the conservative-Ustasha.114

In conclusion, the survey data and election results presented here show that the monistic nationalism of the HDZ has not attained modal status within the Croatian community. While it is true that in 1990 the overwhelming majority of Croatians desired a confederal Yugoslavia, this is the point at which political uniformity ended. If we examine the key dimensions of the ideology of the HDZ, such as Tudjman's emphasis on the privileged status of Serbs, the transformation of Croatia into an ethnic state of Croatians, the change of the flag to the sahovnica, and the extension of Croatia's borders, we see in 1990 most Croatians (51%) felt that Serbs and Croats were equal,115 most did not want to alter the border,116 and many had reservations about adopting the sahovnica and creating a state based on the priority of


115 Siber, p.152.

116 In the Danas study of March 1990, 69% in Zagreb, 66% in Split, and 78% in Rijeka did not want to change Croatia's borders. Danas (April 3, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), April 17, 1990, pp.54-5.
Croatians. Hence, there is evidence on hand that indicates the political class in the HDZ is more radically nationalist than the general population and that its political dominance has been made possible by electoral laws that give it an unfair advantage.

E. The Chain Reaction

According to the chain reaction hypothesis, when one political party organizes itself on the basis of nationalism and achieves political success in an election, other parties will be forced to follow suit or risk permanent political exclusion. The upshot is the withering away of nonethnic parties and the rise of ethnic parties preoccupied with the institutionalization of relative group worth and divisive, symbolic issues that tend to reinforce, rather than cross-cut, ethnic cleavages. If a chain reaction has set in, then the prospects of democratic consolidation are reduced since parties committed to dialogue, moderation, and compromise are marginalized.

A survey of the Croatian political landscape since 1989 leads one to conclude that nationalist parties have basically defined the party system. The HDZ, the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), the Croatian National Party (HNS), the Croatian Democratic Party (HDS), the Croatian Peasants Party (HSS), and the Croatian Party of

117 As mentioned above, most KNS and SKH-SDP supporters accepted the existing flag and advocated a Croatia defined as a state of all its citizens.
[State] Right (HSP) are all ethnic parties. The nonnationalist parties -- the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI), the Party of Democratic Changes (SDP, the party dropped the SKH prefix in November 1990), and the Social Democratic Alliance -- have been few in number and have, for the most part, slipped into obscurity.

When the political transition began in Croatia there was a flood of nationalist parties that tended to drown out voices that spoke from a nonethnic perspective. Nonetheless, the SKH-SDP managed to be the second largest vote-getter (with approximately 37% of the vote) and won 19 of 80 seats in the Sociopolitical Chamber (and 90 of 349 seats in all three chambers). The SKH-SDP position on the national question reflected the ideal type of pluralist nationalism. It called for, among other things, promoting the cultural identity and national equality of Serbs and it rallied equally against Serbian hegemomism and the "unitarist conception of Croatia." In the words of its party leader, Ivica Racan, it is "impossible to struggle enough for national equality." The


party's national ideology plus its proven track record in protecting the privileged status of Serbs in the republic made it a safe vote for the Serb electorate.

The SKH-SDP's downward political tailspin began, pari passu, with the escalation of the Croatian-Serb conflict. Once interethnic hostilities became the centerpiece of Croatian politics in the summer of 1990, the logic of the chain reaction began to take its toll on the SKH-SDP -- in June the party suffered internal fissures on ethnic lines and by August was in the process of being totally eclipsed by the SDS. The mass rally the SDS held in the town of Srb in July was the critical moment when the party succeeded in portraying itself as the best defender of the Serbs. The subsequent referendum for autonomy "homogenized" the rural Serbs behind the SDS and stripped the SKH-SDP of the electoral mandate it had won from the Serb community. In the testimony of Simo Rajić (a member of the SKH-SDP, the vice-president of the Sabor, and a Serb) who spoke before the Sabor in August 1990, "moderate politicians are not popular today. For my people I am also a traitor who is asked to resign. The SDS wants me physically liquidated. The SKH has lost the trust of Serbs ..."


121 Vecernji List (August 25, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe),
Subsequently, the SKH-SDP became a loyal and very quiet opposition in Croatian politics.122

September 6, 1990, pp.60-1; Andrejevich, "Croatian Between Stability and Civil War (Part II)", pp.40-1. A statement released by the nonnationalist UJDI in August 1990 also captures well the logic of the chain reaction: "The two leading parties in Croatia, the HDZ and the SDS, are accusing each other of advocating Chetnik and Ustasha policies, respectively. Both parties interpret democratic processes in Croatia in a biased way. The HDZ is presenting its election victory as the expression of the plebiscite of the Croatian nation. The SDS is supporting it in this belief because it, itself, acts as if it had the plebiscitary support of the Serbian nation in Croatia. In this way, both parties are pushing the Croatian and Serbian people, and all citizens of Croatia and Yugoslavia, to the forecourt of a civil war and military intervention." Belgrade Domestic Service (August 19, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 20, 1990, pp.64-5.

The political trajectory of the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) epitomizes a completely different pattern that does not correspond with the chain reaction hypothesis. Since its founding the HSLS has been a party of civic nationalism. It has placed particular emphasis in its program on the tasks of creating a law-governed state, a market economy, a democratic regime, and a civil society. In its original program, the HSLS described itself as a party of "old-style liberalism" with an "individualistic world view in which the individual is the highest value."\textsuperscript{123} It defined the state of Croatia as "the homeland of all who live in it" and supported proportional representation so that all nationalities could be represented. The party has not taken a clear stand on the type of autonomy Serbs should receive but has stated that any solution should not "be harmful to the interests of the majority people or put in question Croatia's territorial integrity."\textsuperscript{124}

Early in Croatia's democratic transition the HSLS actively played the nationalist card. In October 1989 it was able to attract


between 30,000 and 70,000 people to Zagreb to demand the
return of the statute of Governor Jelacic', a symbol of Croatian
national pride that had been removed from Zagreb's main square
by the communists.125 Moreover, as the Croatian-Serb conflict
began to flare in 1990 the HSLS sponsored a number of "all-Croat"
forums inviting all Croatian parties to discuss events in the
republic and to close ranks in defense of the Croatian state.126

Since the August 1992 elections the HSLS has emerged as the
second strongest party in Croatia. It won 14 seats in the Chamber
of Deputies and in the February 1993 elections to the Chamber of
Counties it won 16 seats, second behind the HDZ. The party's
president, Drazen Budisa, finished second in the 1992 presidential
elections with 22% of the vote. The interesting thing about the
party's electoral successes is that they have been accomplished as
the HSLS has continued to de-nationalize itself. In fact, the HSLS
now calls itself a "post-nationalist party." In Budisa's explanation,
this means that "with the creation of the Croatian state and the
establishment of a situation in which we are not challenged as
Croats, Croatian awareness itself loses the dimensions that it had

125 Borba (October 10, 1989), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), October
23, 1989, pp.56-7; Borba (October 13, 1989), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern

126 Tanjug (August 19, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August
20, 1990, p.67; Vecernji List (August 22, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern
Europe), August 24, 1990, pp.34-6; Vjesnik (August 22, 1990), in FBIS, Daily
in the Yugoslav state ... Now we are in a new situation ..."\(^{127}\) In this "new situation," the HSLS has spoken out against all forms of chauvinism, it has advocated greater attention be given to marketization, and it has appealed for the building of bridges with the Serb community on the basis of minority rights and the equality of all citizens.\(^{128}\) *Vreme* characterized Budisa himself as the only politician on the Croatian scene who is capable of obtaining the votes of both the supporters of the extreme right-wing HSP and the urban Serbs.\(^{129}\) In sum, the HSLS has improved its electoral status not by becoming more nationalist, but by divesting itself of its nationalist characteristics. This obviously contradicts the expected patterns suggested by the chain reaction hypothesis.

Overall, the chain reaction hypothesis cannot be sustained. The experience of the HSLS demonstrates that a party of civic nationalism will not necessarily be marginalized by extreme nationalist parties or be forced to radicalize its program in order to compete effectively. Instead, such "post-nationalist" parties can


attain electoral success and have a very promising future. Although the fate of the SKH-SDP fits the logic of the chain reaction, this explanation could be spurious. An equally plausible argument that explains the decline of the SKH-SDP would be the natural reaction against communist parties seen everywhere in the first post-communist elections in Eastern Europe.

F. Census Elections

Census elections occur when each ethnic group votes primarily for its own ethnic party. When this happens, the minority group will find itself permanently out of power. In these conditions, it is hypothesized that the excluded ethnic party will push for some form of exit from the state and the dominant group will respond with repression.

In the April 1990 elections, the SDS sent only 5 deputies to the Sabor. In addition, 24 Serb deputies earned seats representing the SKH-SDP. Consequently, one cannot accurately describe the Croatian elections as a census type. Despite the fact that the media war in Yugoslavia had been in full swing since late 1989 and the Krajinska were bombarded by a torrent of yellow journalism from Belgrade that was designed to enrage them and conjure up images of a revamped NDH, the Serbs of Croatia were politically unprepared for the elections and failed to line up collectively behind the SDS. Still, Serbs were drastically
underrepresented in comparison with what they had enjoyed in communist Croatia so one could make the point that this was functionally equivalent to the traumatizing realization of exclusion produced by a census election. Many Serb citizens were reported to have been upset with the election results and flooded the office of the president with letters complaining that the SKH-SDP could not represent them since it was a communist and not a Serbian party. However, at no time after the elections did the SDS openly complain about the paucity of its representation in the government. As a matter of fact, the SDS only began to incorporate a stand of exit officially in its program in August 1990 at the mass rally at Srb -- and this was prompted by the HDZ's amendments to the Croatian constitution which altered state symbols and the interethnic balance of power. The evidence of this case, therefore, points to the falsification of the census election hypothesis.

G. The Generosity Moment

The generosity moment refers to the window of opportunity a new regime is given by ethnic minorities to demonstrate its good will. If the regime presents a generous and meaningful package of minority rights and exhibits flexibility and accommodation at the bargaining table, the outlook for both democracy and democratic consolidation should be enhanced. The operational

definition of the generosity concept encompasses two measures: (1) what the incoming government offers minorities; and (2) how the government conducts the negotiation process. If the majority group is dismissive of minority concerns and unyielding at the negotiating table, then democratic consolidation is likely to fail as the alienated elites of minority groups turn towards solutions that invite the collapse of the regime, the partition of the state, and the violation of democratic tenets.

On the heels of its euphoric election victory the HDZ was eager to make good its campaign promises of restoring a sense of Croatian national pride, establishing national sovereignty, and reversing the disadvantages Croatia was saddled with in Tito's Yugoslavia. As already mentioned, a major area of grievance the HDZ focused on was the preponderance of Serbs in the state administration. Although Tudjman promised there would be no revenge against Serbs employed by the state and attempted to play down the changes by suggesting it is normal in democracies that after a transfer of power the bureaucracy is shaken up, wholesale purges did begin and are well-documented. Serbs at many state factories were forced to sign loyalty oaths to the new state or face dismissal. Not only did the more educated urban Serbs suffer from this kind of collective punishment, but Serbs residing in rural areas were particularly hard hit. Misha Glenny

has noted how the farther one moves from Zagreb the further to the right the HDZ becomes. And it is here in regional cities like Osijek, Split, and Zadar that the "hardline dogs" of the HDZ, such as Branimir Glavas\textsuperscript{132} and Vladimir Seks, unleashed a wave of "bureaucratic ethnic cleansing" against local Serbs.\textsuperscript{133} Seks exemplified the priority claims of monistic nationalism when he vowed that "these people in Knin will definitely respect the Croatian banner."\textsuperscript{134}

As could be expected, Knin police were not about to wear uniforms with the sahovnica or sign loyalty oaths to the new Croatia.\textsuperscript{135} The creation of a Croatian National Guard (ZNG) also

\textsuperscript{132} Glavas, the regional leader of the HDZ in Osijek, has been dubbed a "serial killer in fatigues" by Glenny. Glavas' political activities fit the primordial nationalist type. He hails from western Hercegovina, the traditional stronghold of Croatian extremism; he organized the paramilitary unit, the "Wolves of Vukovar" out of the ranks of the fanatical Croatian dosljaci of Osijek; he has verbally justified ethnic cleansing; and he single-handedly acted as a catalyst for the war in Tenja. Glenny, \textit{The Fall of Yugoslavia}, pp.104-113; Vasic', "Osijek, na Drava," pp.20-2; Gow, "Military-Political Affiliations," pp.17-18; Tanjug (December 10, 1991), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), December 12, 1991, p.35.

\textsuperscript{133} Glenny, pp.13, 77, 107; Misha Glenny, "War Returns to Europe," \textit{New Statesman and Society}, (August 9, 1991), pp.10-11; the term bureaucratic cleansing comes from Hayden, p.668.

\textsuperscript{134} Tanjug (October 6, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), October 9, 1990, pp.68-9.

\textsuperscript{135} For example, in Dvor na Uni, a Serb-majority opstina in Kordun and
disturbed Serbs and appeared to them as another means of making Serbian policemen superfluous. Reports in the respected Belgrade newspaper Borba noted that this 4,000-strong unit would be composed of individuals with a "pure Croat" lineage, membership in the HDZ, and a signed document of loyalty to the regime. Its chief function would be to secure order in problem areas of Croatia.\textsuperscript{136} Between August 1990 and the end of the Slovenian war in July 1991, a series of police wars erupted between the Zengas and the MUP on the one hand, and Serbian policemen/irregulars on the other. The first two rounds of violence -- in the Knin area in early August and in Petrinja in late September -- were prompted by the HDZ government's decision to seize weapons in police reservist stations so that they would not fall into Serb hands. Both times Serb citizens reacted angrily setting up barricades and violently clashing with Croatian special forces. The SDS and Radio Knin capitalized on these events warning that "we will not allow anybody to disarm us" and

promising resistance to "the last drop of blood."\textsuperscript{137} While the Croatian government naturally insisted on the extension of its authority throughout the republic and did not desire to see weapons proliferate into the hands of enemies of the state, why the government acted so recklessly in Petrinja is difficult to explain given that earlier in September a deal had been brokered (between Slavko Degoricija representing the government and Milan Babic' of the SNV) which allowed for the reinstatement of the Knin Secretariat for Internal Affairs in exchange for the return of weapons.\textsuperscript{138} In a larger sense, the attention the HDZ gave to the reorganization of the police forces was a poor decision since it, as Misha Glenny explains, "involved depriving the Serbs of their most important possession, the gun."\textsuperscript{139}

Equally counterproductive from the vantage point of making a minority feel safe was the ubiquitous and ostentatious display of symbols and banners marking the supremacy of the Croatian nation. In the months following the election Croatia was awash

\textsuperscript{137} For the situation in Petrinja, see FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), October 1, 1990, pp.61-71; Goldstein, p.66.


\textsuperscript{139} Glenny, p.13.
with the *sahovnica*.\(^{140}\) Once Croatia neared its independence in June 1991, a law on citizenship was passed requiring Serbs not only to prove that their families had resided in Croatia for generations, but that they knew and publicly respected Croatian culture.\(^{141}\) In still more alarming indications of the institutionalization of Croatian supremacy, Cyrillic road signs were removed in favor of the Latin script and memorials honoring the victims of World War II were renamed to commemorate Croatian history and historical figures.\(^{142}\) Finally, it never occurred to Tudjman or any high ranking HDZ official that one way to minimize the knee-jerk reaction many Serb citizens would undoubtedly have after seeing the Ustasha flag being raised again would be a public apology for the genocide of World War II. When Stipe Mesic (then the Croatian representative on the SFRJ Presidency) was asked by a Swedish newspaper why Tudjman did not do something comparable to Willy Brandt's gesture of

\(^{140}\) Glenny, pp.12, 83-84, 92; Thompson, p.283.


\(^{142}\) For example, the Square of the Victims of Fascism in Zagreb was renamed the Square of Croatian Great Men; and the Museum of the Revolution of the Peoples of Croatia was rechristened the Museum of Croatian History. See Thompson, p.279; Tanjug (August 1, 1990), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), August 2, 1990, p.43; Tanjug (October 16, 1990), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), October 17, 1990, pp.56-7; Vjesnik (August 17, 1990), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), August 22, 1990, p.52.
reconciliation with Jews at the memorial for Auschwitz, Mesic scoffed at the suggestion remarking that Yugoslavia has been too obsessed with World War II and that "people should not be overburdened with the past."\textsuperscript{143} In light of all this, the moderate Serb intellectual Milorad Pupovac' was forced to conclude "[w]hat we have is a democratically legitimated tyranny of the majority."\textsuperscript{144}

It appears that Serbs were really an inconsequential element in Croatia to the HDZ. It is perhaps not that surprising to find then that in Tudjman's inaugural address no mention was made of the Serb community and its place in the new Croatia.\textsuperscript{145} By failing to reach out to the Serbian community, and particularly the more rustic and martial rural Serbs, and by casting every Serb protest or rally as an instigation by Chetnik and Greater Serbian elements, the HDZ actually turned local Serbs in eastern Slavonia, Kordun, and Banija -- who otherwise had no sympathy for the Chetniks of Knin -- into steadfast opponents of the Croatian government.\textsuperscript{146}


\textsuperscript{145} Vjesnik (May 31, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), June 19, 1990, pp.82-3.

The personal experience of the Serb refugee that I interviewed represents this general pattern. A resident of Okucani (Eastern Slavonia), he voted for the SKH-SDP in the elections but in the post-election setting he began to feel he had "no choice" but to support the SDS. If decent people are led to believe that their jobs, families, and homes are in imminent danger solely because of their ethnicity, then political choice is reduced to one alternative: support "your" ethnic party or lose everything.\textsuperscript{147} Let us now examine how the HDZ leadership interacted with the leadership of the SDS.

The first notable gesture of conciliation happened immediately after the election when Tudjman offered Raskovic the post of vice-president of the Sabor. In June 1990 Tudjman and Raskovic met to discuss this offer and Croatian - Serb relations in the republic. As evinced by a transcript of the talks released by \textit{Danas}, the two leaders appeared surprisingly tolerant and reached a verbal agreement that Serbs would receive cultural autonomy. It was determined that the next step in forging a "democratically negotiated agreement" would be taken by Raskovic who would present to Tudjman a detailed proposal for autonomy.\textsuperscript{148} Despite the congenial nature of the talks, \textsuperscript{147} See Thompson, \textit{A Paper House}, (pp.277, 293) for a discussion on how nationalism imposes the perception of choicelessness. \textsuperscript{148} Raskovic gained considerable notoriety from a comment in the talks that was widely disseminated in the Yugoslav press: "There are fools who are capable of calling on these crazy Serbs -- and Serbs are a crazy people."
Raskovic eventually declined the post of Sabor vice-president in the wake of the Benkovac affair. In this incident, the president of the SDS branch in Benkovac was physically assaulted by Croatians in an apparent retaliation for the Serb attempt on Tudjman's life in Benkovac a month earlier. The SDS released a statement on this matter contending that it had "all the elements of Ustasha aggression;" SDS deputies accordingly boycotted the first session of the Sabor. The next significant events only increased the mistrust and tension between the two national communities -- in June 1990 the HDZ passed its amendments to the constitution and the SDS responded with the July mass protest and referendum for autonomy in late August. This was a critical juncture for interethnic relations as Babic now began his rise to the forefront of Serb politics.


When the HDZ began preparations for a new constitution, shock waves again rippled throughout the Serbian community. In the highly important symbols of ethnic politics, the draft preamble to the constitution defined Croatia as "the national state of the Croatian people" (nacionalna država hrvatskog naroda).\textsuperscript{151} This formulation implied a significant devaluation in the status of the Serbs. Given that the previous constitutional formula from the communist regime read "the Socialist Republic of Croatia is the national state of the Croatian nation, the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia, and the state of the nationalities inhabiting it," Serbs now appeared to be excluded from the state via constitutional omission. In the words of Lazar Macura, soon to become Minister of Information of the SAOK and director of Radio Knin, this was tantamount to the "elimination" of the Serbs as a people.\textsuperscript{152}

Because of the difficulties Serbs had with the draft of the constitution, a meeting was organized in October between representatives of the SDS and the HDZ. At the meeting an agreement was reached that allowed for the recognition of the SDS as the legitimate representative of the Serb nation and a pledge was made by the HDZ negotiators to throw out the draft.

\textsuperscript{151} Vecernji List (October 3, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), September 26, 1990, p.56.

\textsuperscript{152} Thompson, p.271.
preamble. The SNV entered into the game in early November proposing its own phrases -- "the state of the Croatian and Serbian peoples" (an expression of ethnic parity) and "a democratic, legal, and social state of all citizens living in it" (a civil definition). A few days later Tudjman, in a gesture of good will, publicly proclaimed himself in favor of the civil form: "sovereign citizens regardless of national affiliation." Still, the issue remained unresolved.

Discussing the text before the Sabor on November 23, Zarko Domljan, president of the Sabor, mentioned only the ethnic variant. Evidently a compromise was in the works between the conservative and moderate wings of the HDZ, for the final text of what became the approved constitution read as follows: "the Republic of Croatia is established as the national state of the Croatian nation and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Moslems, Slovenes, Czechs, 


Slovenian, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, and others, who are
guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality and the
realization of ethnic rights in accordance with democratic norms of
the United Nations Organization and the free world countries.\footnote{157}
In this synthesis of ethnic and civil rights, Croatians were assured
of their primacy in the state while all other groups were
"guaranteed equality" at the level of citizenship "with the Croatian
nationality."

When the new constitution was promulgated in late
December, Raskovic greeted it with effusive praise. On the
Croatian television program, "In Focus," he remarked "Croatia,
which a few months ago ... was directed toward ethnocentrism,
has taken a stand in favor of civil, that is people's, and not
national sovereignty." Focusing on the notion of the "guaranteed
equality" of all citizens, Raskovic concluded "I am quite satisfied
with such a constitutional definition ... of Croatia as the democratic
state of all its citizens."\footnote{158} On the basis of such statements, the
moderator concluded that a new consensus between the HDZ and
the SDS had materialized. Such a positive outcome, however, was
not in the offing. The monistic nationalist orientation of the HDZ


had already given the hard core Chetniks of Knin, through the medium of the SNV, the opportunity to preempt the moderates. In the week preceding the promulgation of the constitution, Milan Babic' seized the initiative and announced a statute, purportedly legitimated by the August referendum, for the establishment of a Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (SAOK).159 Having won the upper hand in internal Serb politics, Babic's supporters in the Knin SDS publicly dissociated the party from Raskovic's statement and the SDS deputies walked out of the Sabor on the day the constitution was presented.160 Obviously under pressure to maintain some standing in the party and not be completely outflanked, Raskovic did an about-face and, before an audience in Beli Manastir (Baranja), condemned the constitution as "ethnocratic."161 From this point on the politics of Croatia increasingly became a sparring match between Tudjman and Babic'.


In the month of October, along with preparations for the constitution, Tudjman established a commission to work out a plan for the cultural autonomy of the Serbs. However, when the constitution finally came out in December the article dealing with cultural autonomy had very little substantive content attached to it. Article 15 expressed the equality of all nations and minorities in Croatia and mentioned cultural autonomy, freedom to express one's nationality, and freedom to use one's language and script as the means to guarantee that equality. No other indications were provided on how cultural autonomy could be realized and which institutional forms it would take. Furthermore, Article 12 had already earmarked the "Croatian language and the Latin script" as the official mode of discourse for the state relegating to "individual local units another language and the Cyrillic or some other script, along with the Croatian language and the Latin script." Therefore, not only was the Serbo-Croatian language now referred to only as the "Croatian language," but the constitutional writers deliberately declined to mention the existence of the "Serbian" appellation at all.

In a move designed to bypass the hardline Chetniks of Knin, Tudjman personally met with SDS elites from the Regional


163 "Ustav Republike Hrvatske."
Committee of Slavonia and Baranja in March 1991. The impetus for this meeting came from Slavko Degoricija, the HDZ's point man in negotiations with the Serbs. It was a clever strategy. HDZ elites had previously ruled out any recognition of Babic' and had been searching for so-called moderate Serbs with whom to negotiate. The Serbs of Slavonia fitted this profile. Historically, Slavonian Serbs had Partisan loyalties and much better relations with Zagreb than the Serbs of Knin. Moreover, the Serbs in this region live in scattered settlement patterns and only amount to a plurality in one out of eighteen opstinas. This confluence of history and demography has worked to produce a more moderate political temperament among Slavonian Serbs and one more open to coexistence in a Croatian state.

Among the prominent Serbs attending the meeting was Vojislav Vukcevic', Ilija Sasic', and Goran Hadzic' (the first two being decisively in the Raskovic' wing of the party). The meeting was reportedly amicable and stood as a real breakthrough for the HDZ. An agreement was reached to set up a joint working body to examine all aspects of the Serbs' position in Croatia and propose solutions. A week later the Regional Committee urged the Serb deputies who had boycotted the Sabor since the end of 1990 to return to their seats.164

Two factors conspired to scuttle this developing rapport. The SAOK immediately launched a tirade of accusations against the accord. Two of Babic's men, Lazar Macura and Marko Dobrijevic', attacked the Regional Board delegation as treasonous and illegitimate. Just as in Krajina there existed the SNV which became the power base of the more radical Chetniks, so the SNV of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem set in motion a coup "according to the Knin recipe." Power was quickly concentrated in the hands of the SNV, Vojislav Vukcevic' (a leading voice in the area committed to dialogue) was replaced, and it was officially announced that all Serbs are homogeneous in political orientation. At a "conspiratorial meeting" in Vinkovci on March 22, Goran Hadzic' was elected the new president of the SNV of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. Hadzic', however, defied the expectations built up in the Belgrade press that he would move directly for the secession of Slavonia. Instead, he said the Serbs of Slavonia would only secede if Croatia departed from Yugoslavia. Otherwise, Slavonia would be content in the Yugoslav republic of Croatia.166


The second factor that intervened to disrupt HDZ- Slavonian Serb relations was the outbreak of violence. In the month of March two bloody encounters occurred which were initiated by local Serb leaders: one at Pakrac and the other at Plitvice. The upshot of both incidents pushed the Croatian and Serb leaderships into more extreme, irreconcilable positions. The SAOK, having already passed a resolution to separate from Croatia in February, now made the decision final.\textsuperscript{167} The clash at Plitvice in particular caused Hadzic\textsuperscript{\textdagger} to change his mind about the status of Slavonia. Just 9 days prior to Plitvice he had declared secession to be an option only in the event that Croatia secedes from Yugoslavia. But on the day of the skirmish the SNV of Slavonia expressed outrage at the "state terrorist activities of the Ustasha authorities ... aimed at annihilating the Serbian people in the SAOK" and proclaimed Slavonia's unilateral accession to Serbia.\textsuperscript{168} The wave of violence affected the political temperament of Tudjman as well. By April, in a state of exasperation with the renegade opstinas, he threw down the gauntlet with the warning "we have played democracy for long enough and it is high time to say that Croatia is a republic..."


and that it has the right to establish order."\textsuperscript{169}

Despite the inability of the government to reach a negotiated settlement with the SDS, the work of the constitutional commission continued. On June 25, 1991, when Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia, the commission produced a "Charter on the Rights of Serbs and Other Nationalities." This act permitted proportional representation at the local level and cultural autonomy, although the latter was qualified by the stipulation that no activity can run counter to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of the state.\textsuperscript{170} This plan's lack of substance was overshadowed by the fact that increasing communal conflict had already delivered the coup de grace to Croat-Serb relations. By June 1991 the rural Serb leadership was in no way disposed towards staying within Croatia. Thus, on the eve of independence the window of opportunity for a generous and sincere package of minority rights was already slammed shut.

As the civil war unfolded in the summer of 1991, pressures from within the HDZ rose to the surface demanding a more proactive and genuine approach to the Serbs. Darko Bekić, a


former advisor to Tudjman, wrote in *Vjesnik* that the regime should drop the constant references to the Serbs of Croatia as a "fifth column of greater Serbian imperialism" and get behind the idea of a new "historic accord." Bekić argued that the Serbs of Croatia were honestly frightened by the new Croatian state and were not merely manipulated by Belgrade.\(^{171}\) *Vecernji List*, a Zagreb daily usually close to the government, also suggested the old approach should be scrapped in favor of a new strategy for interethnic peace.\(^{172}\) Another advisor to Tudjman, Zvonimir Lerotic, presented a plan at the Sabor which provided for meaningful political autonomy (i.e., authority over legislation, police, administration, education and culture) in opstinas where Serbs compose a majority.\(^{173}\) While there was a growing chorus of voices for a new policy direction, most of the Croatian media agreed that the opportunity for getting the Serbs to accept the new state and regime had been squandered by insensitivity, clumsy statements, and "tribal stubborness." *Vjesnik, Danas, Vecernji List*, and *Oslobodjenje* (the leading newspaper of BH) all took the regime to task for failing to act promptly with an array of


measures designed to ensure inclusion.¹⁷⁴

When the HDZ assembled a national salvation government in August to get the regime through the perils of war, another plan for cultural autonomy was presented.¹⁷⁵ Considering that the Croatian government had zero authority over the territory controlled by the SAOK and SAO of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, the plan was moot before it was even conceived. The SNV of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem released a statement saying the whole plan was a "waste of time" -- "Serbs have finally come to their senses: They realize that there can be no cohabitation with Croats under Croatian jurisdiction."¹⁷⁶

The last law on Serb rights was passed in December 1991. It was imposed on Croatia by the West as a condition for international recognition. The legislation, popularly dubbed the


"Law on the Serbs," provided for two autonomous districts -- Glina (covering the opstinas of Dvor, Glina, Vrgin Most, Kostajnica, and Vojnic) and Knin (Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac, Gracac, Korenica, and Donji Lapac). The districts are endowed with cultural autonomy and are entitled to local courts, police administrations, and the authority to pass ordinances and decrees. At the same time, there are significant limitations on the exercise of these rights. Each district is to be administered by a government-appointed official, and the police chiefs will also be chosen by the government. In the area of national symbols, minorities are free to choose their own symbols as long as they are not the symbols of another state and the president of the republic has given them his approval.177

In a statement meant to dispel any doubts about the new law's impact on the integrity of Croatian sovereignty, Vladimir Seks affirmed that "Croatia continues to be unitary, unified, and indivisible."178

In April of 1992 the government had a chance to reach out to moderate Serbs but spurned the opportunity. At this time, Milorad Pupovac's Serbian Democratic Forum (SDF) and Milan


Djukic's Serbian National Party (SNS) formed a Serbian National Assembly which was aimed at aggregating the voice of urban Serbs and cooperating with the government. The HDZ, however, treated it with suspicion and contempt leading *Vreme* to conclude the regime was incapable of dealing with this kind of political option from the urban Serbs and felt more comfortable facing off against the aggressive, rural Serbs of the Krajina.179

When the generosity moment arrived for the HDZ, the government simply failed to deliver the goods. This statement should not be read as an exoneration of the SDS, which had no shortage of militants and could afford to play an obstructionist role given its support by the Milosevic' government.180 Still, HDZ policy had its own independent impact on both the radicalization of the SDS and the alienation of the Serb population. The HDZ never really moved away from its dismissive and contemptuous


180 In Belgrade the Association of Serbs from Croatia was set up in June 1990 to support their co-nationals materially and ideologically. Raskovic' was on hand to speak at the inaugural meeting. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) also got into the act and founded the Nikola Tesla Fund to aid Serbs. Technical help in the area of communications came when Belgrade Radio sent new equipment to Knin Radio, a key disseminator of Serbian nationalism, so it could reach Serbs outside the Knin opstina. Tanjug (June 25, 1990), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), June 27, 1990, p.83; Tanjug (June 28, 1990), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), July 3, 1990, p.71; Belgrade Domestic Service (August 20, 1990), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), August 21, 1990, p.39; Glenny, pp.20-1.
attitude towards the Serbs. Swept away by the fervor of an independent Croatia, HDZ elites overlooked the need to convince the Serb community they had a place in the new Croatia. Instead, Tudjman and other key figures such as Stipe Mesic' never tired of saying that Serbs have all the rights of a modern European nation, that Croatia has been exceptionally benevolent towards them, that only a vocal minority of indigenous Serbs are opposing the state, that Serbs who do protest the government are duped and in collusion with the Milosevic' regime, and that outsiders and instigators from Serbia are actually the cause of all the problems.

This sort of attitude conveniently absolved Croatia of any culpability for the deterioration of interethnic relations and ascribed every problem to state-to-state relations with Serbia. On the eve of the arrival of UN troops in February 1992, Tudjman was asked by a journalist if any mistakes were made in dealing with the Serbs. Despite the fact that Croatia had just endured a terrible civil war and no longer controlled one-third of its territory, he responded "No." "We have made no mistakes." He then went on to reiterate the familiar tale of conspiracy and expansionism purportedly emanating from Belgrade.181

H. Flanking

In multiethnic societies flanking is a particular form of intraethnic competition. Because the primary focus of party competition occurs not between ethnic groups but among various parties representing the same group, there is a tendency for insurgent parties to stake out a position more extreme (they might say more patriotic or more loyal) than the dominant party. If effective, a flanking party can place enormous pressure on the dominant party to take a firmer stand with minority groups. Flanking can force a dominant party to move away from interethnic reconciliation and adopt a more intolerant, chauvinistic stance. This could have devastating consequences for democratic consolidation as it causes interethnic hostility. The dominant party could also choose to repress the flanks. In this case, flanking has a negative impact on the state of democracy eroding the level of competition, civil and political liberties, and political participation.

The phenomenon of flanking in Croatian politics is seen most vividly in the conflict between the HDZ and Dobroslav Paraga's Croatian Party of [State] Right (HSP). Politically, Paraga's party is a minor player in Croatia. The HSP sat out the 1990 elections, and in the 1992 elections it garnered a mere 5% of the vote. The war, however, gave Paraga an opportunity to expand his influence.
through military means and realize his goals of a Greater Croatia. Paraga bases his conception of a Greater Croatia on both ethnic and historical principles. This means that if Croats compose a majority of the population in a given area, or if a given area was ever historically part of Croatia, then Croatia has a right to it today. Based on such ideas, Paraga argues that Croatia should rightfully encompass a good deal of Serbia, part of Montenegro (the Bay of Kotor), and all of BH. The area of Serbia Paraga sets his sights on is Eastern Srem, a historical region stretching eastward all the way to Zemun, a western suburb of Belgrade.\(^{182}\)

In his mind, this area was stolen from Croatia 74 years ago and the war offered a chance to take it back. Towards this end, the Croatian Defense Forces (HOS, the military arm of the HSP) carried out two attacks on villages inside Serbia.\(^{183}\) During the August 1992 election, Paraga promised to "put Serbia to the torch."\(^{184}\) It was his hope to inflict on Serbia its "final defeat" and reduce it to the "Belgrade pashaluk" (i.e., the enclave Serbia was confined to under Ottoman rule).\(^{185}\)


The HSP is particularly aggrieved by the borders between Croatia and BH and perceives them as a humiliating legacy of communist Yugoslavia. As party spokesman Milan Vukovic explained, "Look at the shape of Croatia now. Can anyone believe in this crescent, this banana republic? We are looking at our former territories in Bosnia-Hercegovina. This is Croatia and it should have the right to unite with us if that is what it wants. If you take the Croat Catholics and the Croat Muslims together they make up 80% of the population. Of course they want to join us. There is no such thing as [a] Bosnian Muslim." Predictably, a basic tenet of the HSP platform is the "liberation" of BH. According to Paraga, the "thousand-year Croatian state prerogative" is to unify Croatia proper and "Herceg-Bosna" (his term of choice for BH) which together constitute "the same soil, the same blood, and the same nation."

A particularly ominous component of Paraga's rhetoric is his insistence that once all Croatian territories are unified, "only one people" can live in Croatia; namely, "Croats." The implication is


that while Muslims (and Croatia's "regionals") can be redefined as Croatians, Serbs and Montenegrins would be future candidates for ethnic cleansing in a HSP-led Greater Croatia.

Paraga’s nationalism approximates the primordial nationalist type. The party's expansionist goals, its organization of a paramilitary force to fight for a Greater Croatia, its practice of using violence to sabotage peace plans, its redefinition of Muslims as Croatians, and its demand for an ethnically homogeneous state, all match key elements of primordial nationalism. Moreover, the HSP sports all the regalia of the former Ustasha movement, its military wing carried the letter "U" on its uniforms, Paraga normally ends his speeches with a Nazi salute, and he has denied the NDH carried out the mass persecution of Serbs, Gypsies and others because of their ethnic origin. In reference to the leader of the NDH, Ante Pavelic, Paraga said "he was a true Croat patriot and we carry on his work."  

During the war in Croatia, Paraga was incensed by Tudjman's strategy of "playing the victim" in order to earn international sympathy. Consequently, he directed the HOS (whose size was


estimated between 10,000 - 15,000) to take up the cause of East Slavonia, which was being overrun by JNA and the notorious paramilitary forces from Serbia. Paraga vowed that if Tudjman allowed Vukovar to fall, the same fate would be meted out to Tudjman.\footnote{Paris AFP (November 18, 1991), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), November 18, 1991, p.47.} Despite the combined efforts of the HOS and Vukovar Serbs and Croats to defend the city, Vukovar was utterly destroyed.

was released his HOS had been subdued and placed under the command of the Croatian army. The government's harassment of the HSP, however, continued and has been linked to a number of violent acts: in October 1991 Croatian police killed HSP vice-president, Ante Paradzik; in early 1992 seven HSP members died defending Paraga in an assassination attempt; and in the summer of 1992 the HOS commander in Hercegovina, Blaz Kraljevic, was murdered at a Croatian police checkpoint. After the party's disappointing performance in the August 1992 elections, Zagreb police searched HSP headquarters and uncovered a cache of weapons destined for BH. This led to more legal proceedings against the party and the attempt to strip Paraga and three other HSP deputies of their parliamentary immunity.193 Lately, the HSP has spawned several splinter parties leading Paraga to charge the government with planting moles to fragment the party from within.194

Tudjman's move against the HSP followed the option of simple repression. The HDZ government could have waited for the logic of democracy to marginalize what was already a minor, fringe party. With only 5% of the vote in the August 1992 elections the HSP was rapidly heading towards political oblivion. At the same time


time, the party-army of the HSP did constitute a potential threat to the state and its elimination could serve Croatia's international reputation as well as exonerate the government for any war crimes. Furthermore, the "principled and radical" national program of the HSP made the HDZ national ideology look comparatively meek and compromised. In the analysis of some commentators, this caused a good deal of discomfort within HDZ ruling circles. In the end, both the HSP's flanking behavior and the response of the HDZ conformed to the patterns of the flanking hypothesis. The practical result was a political society characterized by violence and the suppression of civil and political liberties.

I. Summary

The public contest between national ideologies defined the central dynamics in Croatian politics. The crumbling of communist authority brought to the forefront the age-old issues that had never been satisfactorily resolved in Croatia, such as the question of statehood and relations between the Croatian and Serb communities. Nationalist perspectives that prevailed in Croatian political society in the interwar period and during the Croatian Spring of the early 1970s again rose to the surface. They rapidly began to dominate public discourse and set the pace of political events. At the same time, the monistic nationalism of the HDZ did

not stand out as the proximal cause of deteriorating interethnic relations. Pre-election public opinion data and the April 1990 election results indicate that the Serb community preferred the communists to their own ostensible ethnic party. The prospects of a permanent Serb minority status in the Sabor also did not incite a general Serb rebellion. Between the SKH-SDP and SDS deputies, there were only 29 Serbs seated in the Sabor. Yet this functional equivalent of a census election did not set in motion any kind of turning point in interethnic relations. On the contrary, it was accepted by the SDS. The SDS itself did not gain the upper hand in the Serb community until the chauvinism and revisionism of Tudjman’s campaign rhetoric was matched by his deeds in office. And it was the deeds, not the words, that proved to be the immediate catalyst for Serb mobilization behind a nationalist agenda. More than anything else, the Tudjman government's reluctance to be generous at the appropriate moment (the first major piece of legislation by the HDZ was the revisionist constitutional amendments of July 1990) convinced Serbs to shift their allegiances from the SKH-SDP to the SDS (which began noticeably in the summer of 1990).

Still, one can only understand why the HDZ government so narrowly pursued a policy of Croatian supremacy if one focuses on the HDZ weltanschauung. Given their sense of Serb privilege in the republic and the historic injustices suffered by Croatia and
Croatians at the hands of Yugoslavia, Tudjman and the HDZ simply did not feel the need to be overly generous towards the Serb community. In this sense, the national ideology of the HDZ was a distal causal factor that conditioned the HDZ approach to the Serb question. It was only after the HDZ’s triumphalist-maximalist policy output had provoked a coup by hardliners within the SDS that Croatian politics became mired in a standoff between two incompatible national ideologies -- the monistic nationalism of Tudjman and the primordial nationalism of Babic’.

The flanking activity of the HSP was also a very public factor at the marketplace of competing national ideologies. The neo-Nazi inclinations of this group made it somewhat of a public spectacle and earned it a good deal of media coverage. HSP ideology espoused the creation of a Greater Croatia and thereby challenged the "Croatian-ness" of the HDZ. This pricked the pride of HDZ elites. At the same time, the political significance of the HSP was not based on its popular support (which was miniscule), but on its military wing, the HOS. The HOS conducted its own independent military campaign in Eastern Slavonia and Hercegovina, and this led to numerous verbal clashes with Zagreb and physical clashes with the Croatian military. Paraga blamed Tudjman personally for the fall of Vukovar and vowed revenge. Tudjman subsequently took advantage of such seditious rhetoric by arresting Paraga and allowing the police and the courts to hound the HSP party
organization. In the end, the lack of popular support for the HSP meant that the party did not represent a serious division in the Croatian community that could hamper the consolidation of democracy. The HSP could only have been relevant to the process of democratic consolidation if it had ordered the HOS to overthrow the legitimate authority in Zagreb, which it had no intention of doing. The sparring match between the HDZ and the HSP did contribute to the degeneration of democratic rights in the country, but this was the fault of the HDZ which chose to repress a party whose mere existence tarnished its self-image as the sole repository of Croatian values.

A survey of Croatian public opinion data indicates that the mass public is not monolithic in its support of the HDZ and its ideology. Several important planks of the HDZ program (such as adopting the sahovnica and creating an ethnic-oriented state) failed to receive the endorsement of majorities in the population. As a result, the political preponderance of the HDZ has been attributed to electoral laws that have given the party disproportional representation in the institutions of government. The non-nationalist dimension to Croatian public opinion has enabled a civic nationalist party like the HSLS to remain a politically significant player in spite of the travails of civil war and a subsequent hardening of mass Croatian attitudes towards Serbs. The public opinion factor therefore has overridden any
chain reaction tendency. In Croatia, ethnic parties have not marginalized nonethnic parties. The viable presence of the HSLS stands as a ray of hope if the power of the HDZ wanes in the future. Given the poisoned relations between the HDZ and the SDS, the HSLS could possibly stand as the future mediator of a new modus vivendi for Croatia's polarized national communities.
Nationalism, Ethnic Politics, and Democratic Consolidation:
A Comparative Study of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina
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by

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A. Democracy and Nationalism in Bosnia-Hercegovina: Obstacles and Opportunities

An examination of Bosnia-Hercegovina (BH) is particularly important for a study of the relationship between nationalism, democracy, and democratic consolidation. The tripolar ethnic structure of the republic suggested a carefully crafted democratic agreement would be necessary to ensure political elites that their respective national communities would be granted inclusiveness, security, and equal opportunities. According to the 1991 census, Muslims represented a plurality of the 4,364,574 inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina with 1,905,829 members (43.7%); Serbs were the second largest with 1,369,258 (31.4%); and Croats numbered 755,892 (17.3%). The actual settlement patterns of these communities was far from being concentrated into compact, homogeneous areas. Instead, BH was highly intermixed at the
local level. Out of its 109 opstinas (counties), Muslims comprised an absolute majority in only 37, Serbs in 32, and Croats in 13. The total population of these majority opstinas covered just over half of Bosnia's population (2.7 million). The other half of Bosnia's population lived in opstinas in which one group composed a slight plurality, such as Bosanski Samac (44.7% Croat and 41.5% Serb) or Doboj (40.2% Muslim and 39% Serb).\(^1\) If Arend Lijphart is correct when he writes that an important condition of political stability in ethnically-divided societies is interethnic boundary maintenance and limited mass contact,\(^2\) then the ethnic geography of BH virtually guaranteed there would be little relief from ethnic politics whether at the local level or the center.

Apart from the demographic context, other factors that promised to aggravate and test the process of democratic consolidation were present in Bosnia-Hercegovina. First of all, there was the legacy of World War II and the fratricidal bloodbath that ensued on BH soil. The fear that democratization would again unleash the demons from the past was very much in the minds of the mass public. Secondly, the renewed conflict between Serbia

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and Croatia that began in earnest after the HDZ was elected in Croatia in April 1990 made it very difficult for the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia not to close ranks behind their respective matica (home) republics and to begin to perceive each other with mutual suspicion and wariness. Thirdly, as the virus of nationalism took hold in Serbia and Croatia, nationalists both in and out of power in those respective republics revived long-standing irredentist claims on BH territory and advanced assimilationist threats towards the Muslims who were redefined as Croats or Serbs. Finally, the paralysis and rapid disintegration of federal authority over the course of 1990 - 1991 deprived BH of an institutional channel that could act as a mediator and court of appeal for internal conflicts. All in all, the depth of ethnic fragmentation combined with divisive historical, cultural and political factors meant that the trajectory of democratic development promised to be tortuous.

On the other hand, the diverse demography of BH provided many potential opportunities for the successful consolidation of democracy. The highly mixed settlement patterns could actually be a virtue if carefully managed by political elites. Ethnic management strategies utilizing various schemes of decentralization and devolution could work to localize political issues and thereby take the focus of interethnic conflict off of the state itself. In this way, the state could present itself as a neutral umpire for interethnic disputes. The presence of strong

regional identities in Bosnia-Hercegovina could also be used to overlap and cross-cut the central tripartite cleavage among the three national communities. The Croats of western Hercegovina, known as they are for their bellicose nationalism, are of a different political temperament than the Croats of central and northern Bosnia. Similarly, the Muslims of the Cazinska Krajina in northwest Bosnia tend to exhibit a more flexible, independent, and secular political culture than do the Muslims of central and southern Bosnia-Hercegovina.4 There is also a deep urban-rural chasm in BH that particularly affects the Serbs and Croats (the Moslems are far more urbanized).5 Cosmopolitan centers like Sarajevo, Mostar, and Tuzla boasted an educated and cosmopolitan population who cherished the uniqueness of Bosnia-Hercegovina as a crossroads of civilizations and world religions; the rural population is less politically sophisticated and more


prone to take its political cues from the symbols and events of the past.\textsuperscript{6} Again turning a vice into a virtue, the urban-rural cleavage could serve to cross-cut ethnic divisions, promote interethic alliances, and force less centrifugal, nonethnic issues to the forefront.

Bosnia-Hercegovina was also blessed with having the second largest proportion of Yugoslav identifiers (239,845, or 5.5\%) in 1991.\textsuperscript{7} The bigger cities of Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Bosanski Brod, Mostar, Tuzla, and Zenica registered Yugoslavs at 10\% of the population and more. The "Yugoslavs" of BH tended to marry other "Yugoslavs" at higher rates than elsewhere (27\% of all marriages were mixed) and nearly 16\% of the children of BH came from mixed marriages.\textsuperscript{8} In this respect, BH offered the clearest test of the vitality of the Yugoslav ideal. After a century of aspiration, could that elusive goal finally come to fruition, this time in the form of a genuine political integration that prudently recognized the long-term benefits of pan-Slav unity while

\textsuperscript{6} Glenny, \textit{The Fall of Yugoslavia}, pp.155, 159-160, 164, 168.


ensuring the separate identities and equal rights of its national communities? Could a formula be found that harmonized the long-recognized rights of nations with the western notion of the rights of citizens? Could the irredentist and secessionist appetites salivating both inside and outside this potential state be thwarted and the legacy of interethnic violence overcome in this quintessentially Balkan republic? In short, could democracy and nationalism be reconciled in Bosnia-Hercegovina?

B. Factors in the Breakdown of Democracy and Hypotheses

The answers to all these questions in the previous paragraph is, unfortunately, no. The coalition government of Bosnia-Hercegovina representing its three national communities effectively ceased to exist in October 1991 when the Muslim and Croat parties passed a resolution on the sovereignty of BH. This move forced the Serb party to withdraw from the government and operate solely from its extra-institutional organizations. International recognition from the EC and the USA came in early April 1992 -- at a time when sporadic fighting had already commenced and the Serb party (the SDS) was adamant about seceding from BH (or remaining in Yugoslavia). In other words, the international community recognized a state that was stillborn. In the ten months between the multiparty elections and the collapse of the coalition government the elected officials of the
three ruling parties -- the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) -- failed to arrive at a negotiated settlement that would provide legitimacy for the state. In fact, the government of Bosnia-Hercegovina failed to pass a single law during this period. Hence, a necessary factor to consider is the pattern of interaction between the three ruling parties during this critical period.

The "tripolar coalition" behavioral variable will serve as the avenue to analyze the manner in which the three ethnic parties related to each other. Tripolarity as an independent variable is considered to be unconducive to democratic consolidation. This is so because interethnic coalitions formed for the purpose of creating a government are prone to divide along the major interethnic cleavage in the polity and thereby force the third party to choose sides. Once this party swings its weight consistently behind one of the two stronger parties, the party outside of this coalition will find itself politically excluded. Exit from the state is likely under such conditions.

Also critically important will be the role of national ideologies and intra-ethnic flanking. National ideologies have prima facie importance in that the three top vote-getting parties in the 1990 elections were nationalist in orientation. Hence, determining
where they are located on the national ideological continuum and how their rhetoric either inflamed or pacified interethnic relations has explanatory potential for the course of events in Bosnia. Flanking also holds some promise in offering an account of changes in national ideologies that are modal from one period to the next as well as elucidating the causes of leadership changes and divisions within parties.

Bosnia-Hercegovina is unique among the former Yugoslav republics because of its high degree of dependence on events and actors outside its borders. Whenever Yugoslavia has undergone a major crisis between its two largest communities -- the Serbs and Croats -- the existence of Bosnia-Hercegovina was immediately brought into question as both republics advanced ownership claims over its land and people. Similarly, any internal ethnic conflicts in BH automatically pulls in Serbia and Croatia as their BH co-nationals sound the alarm for help. The parties of Bosnia-Hercegovina certainly recognized the interdependence of their republic with Yugoslavia. All initially agreed that BH would be better off remaining within Yugoslavia. As the drama unfolded in 1990 each party advocated secession conditional on what was to happen to Yugoslavia -- the SDA and HDZ would seek an independent BH if Croatia and Slovenia seceded since they refused to remain in a rump Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia; and the SDS would unite Serb areas with Yugoslavia if BH seceded from it since
they refused to be a national minority in an independent BH.

Among the external actors, there can be no doubt that both Serbia and Croatia had designs on Bosnia-Hercegovina. This can be seen in their support of the SDS and the HDZ, respectively, the series of closed meetings between Milosevic and Tudjman in early 1991 which were widely speculated to be about the division of BH.\(^9\) Tudjman's numerous public statements on the division of BH and his heavy hand in the internal politics of the HDZ of BH,\(^10\) and the disclosure in August 1991 of Milosevic’s RAM plan to aid militarily the Bosnian Serbs.\(^11\)

Having acknowledged, however, the intrinsic connection between BH and Yugoslav politics, it is important to emphasize


that this work is not about interrepublican relations in Yugoslavia, the collapse of the federal state, or the various civil wars. The primary focus of this study is how nationalism and ethnic conflict influenced democratic consolidation (or lack thereof) in each of the former republics. In this sense, the internal relations of each republic is the decisive arena for analysis. The specific factors whose significance will be tested will be what the three ethnic parties publicly stood for (national ideologies), how they interacted with each other (tripolar coalition), and how they interacted amongst themselves (flanking). The role of interrepublican relations and external predators will be considered only to the extent that they impact on the internal dynamic of elite and party interactions.

C. The Democratic Transition: Electoral Laws, a Census Election, and a Frightened Public

The critical task of crafting an electoral system fell to the League of Communists of Bosnia-Hercegovina (SKBH). The SKBH was well-schooled in the Titoist methods of interethnic balancing so it was natural that its electoral laws would reflect the ethos of pluralist nationalism. For example, it was mandated that no ethnic party could have seats in the Assembly that were more or less than 15% of its size in the population. Furthermore, the 7-member State Presidency would be based on the parity principle, which meant 2 Muslims, 2 Serbs, 2 Croats, and 1 representative
from the numerous national minorities. Voters would directly elect a bicameral parliament (a Chamber of Citizens and a Chamber of Municipalities (opstinas)) from party lists and would choose individual candidates for the Presidency. The government would be formed by the party (or parties) in the assembly with the plurality of votes. A supplementary institution to guarantee national rights was the Council for Equality of Bosnia-Hercegovina Peoples. Staffed on a parity basis, it was conceived as a body to intervene on the questions of national equality and interethnic disputes.

The election results in Bosnia nearly perfectly matched the national composition of the population, as can be seen in the following table.

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12 The law initially was based on the proportional principle, i.e., 3 Muslims, 2 Serbs, 1 Croat, and 1 other nationality, but was later changed. Tanjug (October 9, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), October 10, 1990, p.58; Milan Andrejevich, "Bosnia-Hercegovina: Yugoslavia's Linchpin," Report on Eastern Europe, (December 7, 1990), p.22.

Table 2: Bosnia-Hercegovina's Census Election, November 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of population</th>
<th>ethnic parties</th>
<th>% of vote</th>
<th>total seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Action</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim Bosniak Organization</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbian Renewal Movement</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Community</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from the figures above that the population of Bosnia-Hercegovina based its vote on ascription rather than on other types of cleavage, such as class or ideology. All in all, 80% of the vote was cornered by ethnic parties. A regional breakdown of the vote, at least in the case of Mostar, also reflected its census-like quality. In this capital of Hercegovina, Croats accounted for 33.8% of the city's population, Muslims were 34.8%, and Serbs comprised 19% of the population (12.4% of the population were "others"). Accordingly, the HDZ received 30% of the vote, the SDA got 19% of the vote, and the SDS won 15%. (The census election as an independent variable will not be tested here since the conditions for the full flowering of its effects are not present. Census elections only have potentially damaging effects for democratic consolidation when there is a two-way contest between ethnic communities. In a three-way contest, coalitions become a possibility and thus mitigate the prospects of permanent political exclusion for the losing party (or national community).
lower election results for the SDA may be explained by Muslims voting in higher numbers for the SKBH/Socialist Alliance which received 15.9% of the vote in Mostar.)\textsuperscript{15}

The remaining 20% of the national vote went to nonethnic parties. In the BH assembly, the League of Communists-Party for Social Change got 18 seats (4 in alliance with the Democratic Socialist Party); the Alliance of Reformist Forces got 14 (1 in alliance with the Democratic Party of Mostar), the Socialist Youth League-Democratic Alliance together with the Ecological Green Movement got 2, and the Democratic Socialist Alliance received 1. In the State Presidency, the SDA candidates Fikret Abdic' and Alija Izetbegovic' won 44 and 37% of the vote respectively; SDS candidates Biljana Plavsic' and Nikola Koljevic' 24.65 and 24.02%; and the HDZ candidates Stjepan Kljuic' and Franjo Boras 21.1 and 18.65%. The seventh member Ejup Ganic' garnered 29.81% and was to represent "Yugoslavs," although he was an SDA member.\textsuperscript{16}

In light of the census-voting of the citizens of BH, it is most curious to note that the election results completely belied the pre-election polls and the received opinion on the political leanings of


\textsuperscript{16} Andrejevich, "Bosnia-Hercegovina: Yugoslavia's Linchpin," p.27.
the Bosanci and Hercegovci. For example, the Zagreb magazine Danas conducted a study with a sample of 1,039 in the spring of 1990 and found that 74% supported a ban the SKBH had placed on nationalist parties early in the democratic transition. This poll was stratified to take into account the national composition of various regional centers and the results indicated the law had transethnic support: 72% support in Sarajevo (which has a Muslim plurality), 81% support in Banja Luka (a city with a majority of Serbs), and 68% support in Mostar (where Croats are the plurality). Moreover, in another study carried out in June 1990 it was determined that 69.3% of the respondents in BH favored a federal option for Yugoslavia (rather than the confederal plan of Slovenia and Croatia). In addition, a number of different opinion polls revealed that the SKBH and the Alliance of Reform Forces (SRSJ -- Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic's transethnic party committed to marketization) would win the elections.

However, when election day arrived both the SKBH and the SRSJ were totally eclipsed by the nationalist parties. The SKBH in


fact received the smallest percentage of votes of any communist party in the Yugoslav elections of 1990. How is it possible to explain this dramatic shift in voter preferences? One interesting thing the pre-election polls show is a large number of undecided voters (on some questions has high as 40%). This indicates a good deal of uncertainty on behalf of the average citizen. The people of BH may have feared the return of the slaughter of World War II, but apparently they feared the consequences of not mobilizing behind their ethnic party while the others did even more. Vladimir Goati reasons that, faced with the turbulent times of post-communist politics, the citizens of BH returned to the only source of security they knew -- to the "primary community" (primarnoj zajednici) of the nation.\footnote{Goati, p.57.} Let us now turn to the national ideologies of the three major ethnic parties to determine precisely what kind of security they were offering and against what.
D. National Ideologies

1. The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS): From Monistic to Primordial Nationalism

If the ideology and politics of the SDS of Croatia could be characterized as essentially a response to the reawakening of Croatian nationalism in general and the monistic nationalism of the HDZ in particular, the SDS of BH was from the outset a driving force of ethnic division and conflict. Having seen firsthand the fate that befell the Croatian Serbs as Croatia moved towards statehood, the Bosnian Serbs vowed not to be caught off guard. Consequently, their rhetoric was crafted to spread fear among the ranks of the Serb community, and they persistently chipped away at the sovereignty of BH by forming extralegal bodies and arbitrarily partitioning the country at the local level. On the fundamental questions of the integrity of the state and the nature of the regime, the party's line was quite consistent: the BH Serbs are a sovereign nation and will never tolerate being treated as a national minority. On the state level, the only guarantee of protection for the sovereign rights of the Serbs of BH is if the republic would remain in Yugoslavia, which would mean that Serbs would constitute a demographic majority. With regard to the regime, the SDS did not feel bound to honor any institutions or

20 As Radovan Karadzic', the leader the SDS of BH said, "We are grateful to Mr. Tudjman for opening our eyes so that we could see what could happen to us." Vjesnik (December 28, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), January 9, 1991, pp38-9.
decision-making rules that were judged to work against the interests of the Serb community. It is in this sense that the ideology of the SDS best fit the monistic type: the only kind of polity acceptable to the SDS is one that would allow for the unhindered pursuit of Serb interests. As the politics of BH lurched towards independence and international recognition, the modal ideology of the SDS accordingly changed to fit the new circumstances. Unable to keep all of BH within a rump Yugoslavia, the SDS, with the firepower of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) and paramilitary groups from Serbia behind them, adopted a primordial nationalist program. The key goal at this juncture became the creation of areas of demographic majorities by moving out other groups by force. Let us first turn to examine the constellation of beliefs and values of the SDS as a party of monistic nationalism and how it effected the consolidation of democracy.

From the outset of its founding, the SDS promoted the traditional idea of a Greater Serbia, best conveyed by the phrase "all Serbs in a single state." Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the SDS, openly stated on many occasions the view that the notion of a Greater Serbia is dear to the hearts of all Serbs. Moreover, the

21 For example, "I say that a Serbian state that gathers together all Serbs, and those who want to live with us, into some kind of greater Serbia, would be the ideal cherished by every Serb." And "just as it is natural that rain falls, it is quite natural for Serbs to live in the same state." Novi Sad TVNS Sat TV (October 20, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), October 21, 1991, pp.39-40; Oslobodjenje (February 23, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), March 5, 1991, p.54.
SDS would not hesitate to use all available means necessary to secure this goal. As he explained, "the state issue is the primary issue for Serbs and there is no price that would not be paid for it because they would not allow Serbs to be in several states."22 With Yugoslavia intact, a framework was provided in which all Serbs could reside and it was under these circumstances the party respected the existing borders of BH. An independent Bosnia-Hercegovina, however, was out of the question and would never receive the consent of the SDS. An independent BH would have the two-fold effect of violating the sovereign right of Serbs to live in a single state and would reduce them to a national minority where they would be easy prey for a program of genocide at the hands of a Greater Croatia (which was initially perceived as the main external threat) or an Islamic Republic (which eventually became the main enemy stereotype in late December when the SDA began pushing for the international recognition of BH).23

The rhetoric of the SDS was hyperbolic and aggressive and, as such, made problematic a smooth consolidation of democracy. In


particular, it deliberately stoked nationalist fears and passions in the Serbian community by referring to the fate of Serbs at the hands of other ethnic groups in the terms of "annihilation," "extermination," a "funeral of the Serbian people," and a "St. Bartholomew's night" (reference to the massacre of Huguenots in Paris in 1572). The constant reiteration that the goal of the SDA was the establishment of an Islamic Republic was also widely disseminated by SDS elites who were clearly aware the SDA program was oriented towards a secular republic but chose instead to capitalize on the anxiety of the Serb population. In one such striking remark made in the context of negotiations with the EC on the status of BH, an SDS deputy, Slobodan Bijelic, claimed "we are witnessing the birth of a Muslim bastard on the territory of the land of our grandfathers." Equally provocative was the warning issued by Karadzic in October 1991 when the SDA and the HDZ were pressing for a law asserting the sovereignty of BH: "Do not think that you will not lead Bosnia-Hercegovina into hell, and do not think that you will not perhaps lead the Muslim people


This type of inflammatory rhetoric did nothing to lay a foundation of interethnic trust and goodwill that could buttress the new regime and state.

In terms of the nature of the regime, the SDS demanded that the structure of ethnic relations within BH must respect above all the sovereign rights of the Serbs, who constitutionally-speaking were one of the three state-building nations of BH. For example, in September 1990 the SDS judged that the bicameral parliament, based as it was on a Chamber of Citizens and a Chamber of Municipalities, would not sufficiently incorporate Serb interests and, in fact, made possible the "extermination of Serbs." They thus proposed the creation of a Chamber of Nations in the National Assembly, which was subsequently rejected by the BH Constitutional Commission. Before a decision was handed down, however, the party announced the creation of a parallel governmental authority, the Serbian National Council (SNV), which would protect Serb sovereignty and ensure that they did not become a minority. Nine days before the election the SNV released a statement to the effect that it would not accept any law passed by the BH Assembly if it was deemed detrimental to the

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interests of the Serb nation.\textsuperscript{27} With the establishment of the SNV, fully one month prior to the elections, the consolidation of democracy was already facing a severe test. Uncertainty surrounding the policy output of the new regime led the SDS to seek security in an extralegal and unelected organ.\textsuperscript{28}

Indicative of the priority claims of monistic nationalism, the SDS treated the principle of majority rule as an egregious affront to the sovereign rights of the Serbs which would doom them to be perpetually "outvoted" by a Muslim-Croat alliance. From the vantage point of the party, it was not possible to be a minority and not be thoroughly dominated by other ethnic groups. Quite naturally then, the SDA program calling for a unitary republic and a civil state did not sit well with the SDS. According to Nikola Koljevic\textsuperscript{3}, Serb member on the BH Presidency, a civil republic (\textit{gradjanska republika}) would effectively disenfranchise the


\textsuperscript{28} Comparatively speaking, the SDS of Croatia formed their SNV 3 months after the Croatian elections and in reaction to the brazen, hegemonic policy of the HDZ. The SDS of BH, on the other hand, had much less to fear and complain about and were more of a catalyst for ethnic animosity rather than an innocent victim.
Serbs. When the SDS decided to establish parallel authorities, for example, the assembly of the Serbian people in October 1991 and the *republika sprske bosne i hercegovine* (Serbian republic of BH) in December, it cited the "domination" of the government organs by the "majority." At the same time, the SDS appeared impervious to the criticism from the SDA that any plan for the division or cantonization of BH would make Muslims a minority in areas under the authority of other nations. Karadzic’ in fact specifically said it does not matter if Serbs constitute 55% of a given area or 5%; either way, Serbs are a state-building nation and this fact transcends their numerical size. In his words, "our task ... is to make it possible for the Serbian state to function and its constitution and laws be implemented in the areas where the Serbs live." When the text declaring the Serbian republic was made public in January 1992, it included within its jurisdiction all


areas where Serbian autonomous regions had been established, all Serb ethnic areas in BH, and all areas where there was a majority of Serbs before World War II but there now exists a minority due to the atrocities at the time.32

The priority the SDS accorded to Serb interests did not mean that they advocated the disappearance of BH. In January 1992 Karadzic' still felt it was possible for Bosnia-Hercegovina to remain a single entity. Internally, however, it would have to allow "all three ethnic communities [to] develop their own natural potential without mutual interference and hindrance."33 In essence, only a "separate but equal" principle or the cantonization of BH (a process actually begun by the SDS in Banja Luka in April 1991) would enable Serbs to feel comfortable that they effectively controlled their own destiny.34 Under these conditions Karadzic' felt life together with Muslims (who are intermixed with Serbs in 104 out of 109 opstinas) was possible. Amidst the SDA call for international recognition and the SDS declaration of a Serbian


34 In explaining the creation of the Serb republic in January 1992, Karadzic' said "we have opened up a process of democratic transformation into a triune community, into a republic of three nations, that is, three national republics." Tanjug (January 12, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), January 13, 1992, pp.51-2.
republic, Karadzic' even expressed a note of interethnic commonality: "we come from the same ethnic roots, ... [and] in our life together we have not been so intolerant of one another, because if we had, much more homogenous communities would have been created in BH -- purely Serbian and purely Muslim. We can, then, live together, assuming, of course, an authentic democratic, not Bolshevik, community ..."35

As the SDA drive for independence and international recognition continued, however, SDS ideology began to radicalize in the direction of primordial nationalism. The main catalyst for this ideological transformation was the BH referendum for independence held February 29 - March 1 and the accompanying protests and violence. Particularly disturbing to the Serbs was the murder in Sarajevo of a member of a Serb wedding party for carrying the Serbian flag. In response to these events, the SDS and Karadzic' warned that this was but a preview of what an independent BH held in store for the Serbs. According to an SDS statement, "until yesterday, the Serbian people had unreservedly believed in the traditional values of living together in BH. ... Unfortunately, our expectations were betrayed ..."36 This


statement marked a turning point. Henceforth, Karadzic's spoke of BH only in the past tense.\(^{37}\) As long as maintaining BH in Yugoslavia was possible, the SDS pledged respect for its external borders and said the three communities could live together (i.e., by way of separate cantons). However, once the path for BH independence was traversed and a trajectory of violence had commenced,\(^{38}\) the SDS spokesmen began to say the three national communities could never live together. We thus find Karadzic in January 1993 stating that Serbs and Muslims are like "oil and water." "When you shake us we mix, when we are left alone we separate. This is natural." When asked how this explained cities like Sarajevo, he replied that such mixing was forced on the people by the communists and was not a matter of free choice.\(^{39}\) Such a statement could not be more different than his remark a year earlier on the common ethnic roots and a tradition of tolerant cohabitation between Serbs and Muslims.

Since bringing all of BH into the rump Yugoslavia was now impossible after the BH referendum and the subsequent granting


\(^{38}\) Sporadic regional fighting began in BH in the middle of March 1992 and full scale war commenced in April after BH was recognized by the EC and the USA.

of international recognition in April 1992, the SDS essentially did what it said it would do all along if such events transpired -- namely, take up arms.\(^{40}\) Henceforth, the party's strategy became the forcible seizure of as much territory as possible and altering its demography by the systematic application of *ethnicko ciscenje* (ethnic cleansing). Ethnic cleansing has been technically defined as "the expulsion of an 'undesirable' population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these."\(^{41}\) It fits into primordial nationalism in that it represents the extremes of the nationalist program -- every nation deserves its own ethnically-pure state. Once primordial nationalism becomes the modal ideology of a movement, other ethnic groups are defined strictly in terms of an enemy stereotype who have no redeeming value. In the vocabulary of the Serbs of BH, Muslims became "fundamentalists" and "Turks" who had betrayed their Christian roots centuries ago.\(^{42}\) Because the targeted ethnic

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\(^{42}\) New York Times, (July 20, 1992), pp.A1, A4. While the Serb reference to Muslims as "Turcin" was common in BH, the top leadership of the SDS only began to employ systematically such derogatory stereotypes when the
group is corrupt in its cultural makeup and poses a threat to the purity of the "clean" group, any means implemented to extinguish the former is justified. From the vantage point of democratic consolidation, the acceptance of primordial nationalism by groups capable of substantially effecting outcomes indicates the absolute failure of a multiethnic polity to arrive at a modus vivendi.

The movement from monistic nationalism to primordial nationalism within the top echelon of the SDS coincided with the interests of an array of forces ready to pounce on BH and ensure its national communities would never again think about life

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43 This meant not only the much publicized concentration camps, mass rapes, burning of homes and whole villages, and razing of mosques, but apparently the willingness to sacrifice a considerable portion of one's own population for the paradise of a state for the Serbs. In July, Karadzic' was reported to have said "I am willing to sacrifice this entire generation if it means that future generations will live better." Cited in Thompson, A Paper House, p.330. In another example, Biljana Plavsic', who had been elected to the Bosnian Presidency, said that if 6 million Serbs died in a war with the West that would be acceptable since there would still be 6 million left. Quoted in Milan Andrejevich, "Serbia's Bosnian Dilemma," RFE/RL Research Report, v.2, n.23, (June 4, 1993), pp.14-21.
together. The paramilitaries from Serbia that had ravaged Eastern Slavonia turned with a vengeance towards eastern Bosnia in early April 1992 with the aim of "liberating" a string of towns that bordered Serbia -- Bijeljina, Zvornik, Bratunac, Srebrenica, and Visegrad. During the fighting in Croatia the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) itself underwent a significant transformation, reformulating its strategic objective from that of toppling the HDZ regime to that of establishing the new borders of a rump Yugoslavia. The practice of massive shelling of cosmopolitan areas like Vukovar and Dubrovnik in Croatia and Sarajevo in BH were part of this larger strategy, the tactics of which were to drive out non-Serbian populations and obliterate any trace of communal life. Ideologically-speaking, JNA self-cleansed itself at this time purging its "partisan" components (i.e., those dedicated to the

44 In this way, primordial nationalism is self-prophetic: its proponents argue different ethnic groups cannot cohabitate. They then initiate a dialectic of violence that completely estranges the ethnic groups from each other, thereby "proving" their point.


Yugoslav ideal of interethnic cohabitation) in favor of Chetniks (or those who reject any possibility of communal life).\textsuperscript{47} Within BH, Serbian irregulars were recruited from the rural population who were then used to lay seige to cosmopolitan centers like Sarajevo. As a symbol of successful communal living, the city (with its 100,000 Serbs who defiantly remained) had to be erased from historical memory.\textsuperscript{48} Most observers agree Karadzic' himself was directly involved in the decision to destroy Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{49} By August 1992 the superior forces aligned on the side of the Serbs enabled Karadzic' to assert triumphantly "we have everything. We now control 70% [of the territory of BH]. But we claim only 64%. All we need now is a negotiated settlement."\textsuperscript{50}


\textsuperscript{48} Estimates by the BH government put the number of Serbs residing on the territory it controls (30% of BH) at 200,000. In addition, Serbs account for 6% of the BH army. \textit{New York Times}, (September 26, 1992), p.A5.


\textsuperscript{50} Patrick Moore, "Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia: Outrage but Little Action,"
2. The Party of Democratic Action (SDA): Civic Nationalism

There are essentially 4 constants in the program of the Stranka Demokratske Akcije that were amended only by the reality of battlefield losses. They are: (1) the claim that Bosnia has a bona fide state tradition; (2) the goal of establishing a bourgeois republic whereby sovereignty is based on citizens; (3) the insistence on a unitary state in which power would be centralized (the flip side of this being the unacceptability of cantonization and decentralization); and (4) the position that under no circumstances would BH remain in Yugoslavia if Slovenia and Croatia seceded. Overall, the ideology of the SDA best fits the civic nationalist type. An examination of points 2 and 3 will make this correspondence particularly clear.

At the founding congress of the SDA, Alija Izetbegovic' spoke on the "thousand years" of a Bosnian state tradition in which it existed "as a separate political entity." He went on to add that the "Kulin Ban (11th century ruler in Bosnia) charter is the oldest preserved state and legal document among South Slavs in the Balkans, and as for the document, which is written in the vernacular, it is the oldest document of this kind among European

peoples." And in February 1992 as BH was preparing for international recognition, Foreign Minister Haris Siljadic remarked that BH has been "a sovereign state since the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz." Both statements reflect the attempt of the SDA to defend the territorial integrity and historical validity of BH amidst the ownership claims from both Serbia and Croatia to the effect that BH as a republic and Muslims as a nation were an artifice of Tito's nationalities policy. The central state-building problem for the SDA was how to convince fellow Serbs and Croats that a definite Bosnian state tradition was intact and overrode any fidelity the latter felt for their *matica* republics. The solution the SDA arrived at was to emphasize not a national or ethnic state, but rather a "*civilna gradjanska drzava*" [civil citizens' state].

From its conception, the SDA was thoroughly opposed to the equation of BH with the Muslim nation and publicly disavowed any desire to create an Islamic Republic. Instead, it advocated a "*gradjanska republika*" [bourgeois republic] whereby sovereignty would be located in citizens and the principles of individual rights, equality before the law, and individual mobility free of ascriptive

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criteria would be upheld. The elaborate mechanisms of interethnic inclusiveness and equality that had carried over from the communist period, such as consensus rules of decision-making and the national key (or quota) principle to staff state offices, were repudiated by the party. During the debate over the election laws in 1990, the SDA unsuccessfully challenged the parity principle for the BH Presidency (in which there would be 2 Muslims, 2 Serbs, and 2 Croats) contending it would be harmful to Muslim interests. Although consensus decision-making in the State Presidency and the National Assembly were part of the interparty agreement after the November 1990 elections, Izetbegovic increasingly became disenchanted with this rule and eventually sought a constitutional amendment to limit its application strictly to matters dealing with interethnic relations.

By the time the referendum for BH independence


54 Belgrade Domestic Service (October 9, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), October 10, 1990, p.58.

was on the agenda, Izetbegovic’ was opposed to the consensus rule as a matter of principle. Ostensibly looking to West European political practices as the model after which he wanted to fashion the regime of BH, he argued that the only type of procedure Europe will respect is one based on the preferences of citizens, and not nations.56

The position the SDA took on constructing a civil state placed its program within the rubric of civic nationalism. The choice of this national ideological type was based on its perceived payoff in both the international and domestic arenas. Internationally, SDA figures sought to compel European support for the independence of BH by demonstrating their respective states were founded on shared principles.57 Collectivist rights, on the other hand, were frowned upon as antiquated rules from the communist era that


57 Shoup, "Uloga Domacih . . .," pp.81-2.
would slow the entry of BH into Europe. The articulation of civic nationalism by the SDA also had a domestic purpose -- it served as a practical solution to the tripolar ethnic structure of BH. Simply stated, Bosnia-Hercegovina could not be constituted as a national state because of its very makeup. As Izetbegovic' explained, since "nobody has so far given a decisive and clear theoretical answer" to the question of how to realize the self-determination of nations with a population that is so intermixed, the "practical answer" is "the historical formula of Bosnia as a multidenominational, multinational, and multicultural community." By constructing a civilna gradjanska drzava, an overarching framework would be established transcending religious or ethnic identities in which all would be treated by the state as equal citizens and the maximum amount of liberties and rights would be universally enjoyed.

What Izetbegovic' failed to realize, however, is that a civil state is not the only practical answer and in fact does not constitute "the historical formula" of BH. Much more conducive to the multinational reality of BH and part of its Titoist heritage is the program of pluralist nationalism. But here the SDA faced a conundrum: to travel the full pluralist nationalist road would legitimize the cantonization plans of both the SDS and the HDZ, and


cantonization was perceived by the SDA to be a slippery slope towards secession and the disintegration of BH. On the other hand, to impose on BH the generic identity of citizens would not be accepted by those nations with numerically fewer citizens. In a polity in which ethnic groups are mobilized under monistic nationalist ideologies, the hidden effect of civic nationalism, viz., consolidating the hegemony of the largest group, will eventually be exposed. The political implications of civic nationalism were certainly not lost on SDS deputy Aleksa Buha, who suggested that the only reason Izetbegovic favored a civil republic is because in it a Muslim-Croat alliance would be able to pass anything it wanted.60

An example of how civic nationalism alienated the SDS and did not contribute to democratic consolidation can be seen in the BH referendum for independence. Had the referendum been conducted on the basis of nations it would have failed, since the boycott (or even a "no" vote had they participated) by the Serb nation would have invalidated it. But since it was based on citizens, and Serbs comprised only 31.4% of the citizens, their unanimous opposition as a sovereign nation could be obscured by a strong turnout of citizens of the other two nations. Speaking to the Bucharest daily Adevarul, Izetbegovic in fact indicated that

60 Borba (January 13, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), January 30, 1992, pp.30-2. Interestingly enough, Buha said the only level at which a civil republic would be acceptable to the SDS is at the federal level. And of course it is here that Serbs are the largest group and would be able to realize their will.
it was just this consideration -- i.e., a Serb veto on a referendum based on nations -- that led the SDA to opt for a citizens' referendum.\textsuperscript{61} The Serb response in the aftermath of the referendum is instructive as to how a party mobilized by monistic nationalism will never be hoodwinked by the rhetoric of civic nationalism. In the words of Miroslav Toholj, member of the Crisis Headquarters of the SDS, "by transforming the Serbs into citizens, they have finally taken away the Serb name, to which Serbs will not consent."\textsuperscript{62} In short, the civic nationalism the SDA promoted did not contribute to a common discourse with the other politically significant parties and only heightened their fears that their sense of identity and sovereign rights as a nation would be undermined. Consequently, it did not facilitate the interethnic sense of security necessary to consolidate democracy.

The civic nationalist disposition of the SDA is also found in its opposition to any cantonization of BH. If the SDA conceded to cantonization it would legitimize the ownership claims the SDS and the HDZ had to various territories within BH and would prepare the grounds for their eventual secession from BH. By demanding a unitary state, the SDA hoped to prevent the decentralization of powers to various ethnic enclaves and to keep intact the territorial integrity of BH. Just as important was their intent to

\textsuperscript{61} Tanjug (January 8, 1992), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), January 9, 1992, p.44.

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Vreme}, (March 9, 1992), p.54.
make sure Muslims did not get trapped into Serb or Croat cantons and become national minorities. The fear of the SDA was that local Serb leaders would discriminate against Muslims and turn them into second class citizens. Irfan Ajanovic, vice president of the SFRJ assembly and SDA secretary, dramatically expressed Muslim anxiety with regard to cantonization when he declared "Muslims will never be Kurds." Much to the relief of the SDA, the BH referendum results showed that out of the total electorate 62.68% voted for a sovereign and independent BH. This led Izetbegovic, overtaken by the enthusiasm of the moment, to announce on Sarajevo Television that the "people had decided against an internal division."64


64 Tanjug (March 6, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), March 6, 1992, pp.34-5. This statement infuriated the SDS who in early March had come to the position that international recognition is acceptable as long as it is preceded by the creation of three national republics. Tanjug (March 10, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), March 10, 1992, p.34; Danas (January 27, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), February 7, 1992, pp.31-2.
When the EC stepped into the debate on BH independence and international recognition in February 1992, a series of negotiations took place under the direction Jose Cutilheiro at which the SDA consented, subject to further negotiations, to a March 18th plan for cantonization (in exchange for the guarantee of BH as an integral state and respect for its current borders) that would be conducted not only on national lines but economic, geographic and other nonethnic criteria. This was a difficult compromise for Izetbegovic' to make and one which did not sit well with hardliners in the SDA. In fact, after the agreement had collapsed (no sooner than at the end of the month) it was revealed that the SDA had been against it from the start although they did not want to take such a public stand for fear of being perceived as obstructionists. From this point on, Izetbegovic' steadfastly opposed cantonization until January 1993; the catalyst for a

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66 Shoup, p.84. Irfan Ajanovic', in particular, balked at any ethnic cantonization plan. Tanjug (February 26, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), March 2, 1992, p.36; Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network (February 26, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), February 27, 1992, p.33; Oslobodjenje (February 26, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), March 6, 1992, p.36. Remington points out the USA bears some responsibility for the collapse of the "Lisbon Plan" for giving the SDA leadership the false impression that Muslims would get a better deal if they backed out of it. Robin Alison Remington, "Bosnia: The Tangled Web," Current History, (November 1993), pp.364-369.

change in ideology being battlefield losses suffered by the Muslims. Overall, by maintaining BH as a sovereign, indivisible country with government powers concentrated on a unitary model, the SDA hoped to realize its civic nationalist aspirations in two ways: (1) Muslims would not be dominated by local Serb or Croat authorities who did not respect the rule of law; and (2) Muslims would remain the majority group in BH, albeit under the guise of citizens. The SDA's unwillingness to give up the idea of a unitary state based on the rights of citizens caused justifiable concern among the ranks of Serbs and Croats that led them to initiate their own de facto partition of the country. In this way, the SDA stance proved counterproductive and contributed to the loss of the very thing they sought to preserve -- the territorial integrity of the state.

The question of the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina can also be linked to the issue of preserving the hegemony of the Muslims. From the very founding of the party, Izetbegovic' made it clear that in the event that Slovenia and Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia, BH would not remain in a rump Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia.68 Such a position is certainly understandable given the authoritarian rule and the Greater Serbia pretensions of

Milosevic'. As Vreme perceptively noted, "there is nobody, except for Momir Bulatovic' [Montenegrin president], whom Milosevic' can convince that he does not want to dominate ..."69

Still, Izetbegovic' was not blind to the fact that he was sailing between Scylla and Charybdis. With Croatia's declaration of secession from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991, there was no way the HDZ of BH would keep Croats in a rump Yugoslavia; and, as we have seen, there was no way the SDS would allow Serbs to stay in an independent BH. In the interrepublican debates on the future of Yugoslavia held the first two months of 1991, Izetbegovic' (along with President Kiro Gligorov of Macedonia) presented the idea of an asymmetric federation which was a compromise plan that sought to keep Yugoslavia together in some sort of loose association.70 However, Izetbegovic' was criticized so harshly by members of his own party for what they saw as capitulation to Belgrade that he was compelled to take a more forceful stand. At


the February 27th meeting of the BH assembly, he laid down the gauntlet: "I would sacrifice peace for the sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina, but I would not sacrifice Bosnia for peace!"\(^{71}\)

From the perspective of the SDA, to stay in Yugoslavia meant certain domination. The Muslim population concentrated in the Sandzak in Serbia were under the thumb of the Milosevic\(^{'}\) regime while the Albanians of Kosovo were under its fist. Hence, the prospects of protecting Muslim interests in a truncated Yugoslavia looked slim.\(^{72}\) Independence offered the opportunity for BH to order its own affairs but at the risk of losing Western Hercegovina to Croatia and most of Bosnia to Serbia. Having clearly made the decision for independence, the SDA leadership faced only one question, which was poignantly verbalized by Izetbegovic\(^{'}\): how to arrive at an independent state "without passing through hell?"\(^{73}\)


\(^{72}\) That is, in the short term the prospects looked poor. But what most analysts fail to see is the long-term picture and how Bosnian Muslims, admittedly with the advantage of hindsight, would have been far better off in a rump Yugoslavia. The population of Kosovo Albanians is approximately 2 million and growing. And in the Sandzak (a swath of territory overlapping the border of Serbia and Montenegro), Slavic Muslims number close to 230,000, which is a majority in the opstinas that compose this region. Given that the Milosevic\(^{'}\) regime cannot exist forever, and that the demographic trends favor the Muslims, the next decade promised a far more flourishing existence in the rump Yugoslavia and one less risky than the perils of independence.
3. The Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ): Flanking and the Vagaries of National Ideologies

Of all the national ideologies in BH, the HDZ ideology is the most difficult to categorize. The Croat political class is the most complex group in BH. Internally, they fall essentially into two factions describable in terms of the very appellation of the republic: in other words, a Hercegovinian faction and a Bosnian faction. Western Hercegovina is a predominately Croatian region in BH (Eastern Hercegovina is predominately Serbian). It is popularly known in Yugoslav political culture as a place where only "snakes, stones and ustashas" grow and whose inhabitants proudly present themselves as "more Croatian than Croatia." In a word, Western Hercegovina is the home of virulent Croatian


75 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 155-6; Tanjug, Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network (February 4, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), February 5, 1992, pp.49-50. According to Mate Boban, eventual president of the state of Herceg-Bosna, "this is the area whose inhabitants are lambs, the viper, and man. That Western Hercegovinian, in essence, by his nature, in his respect for other people, is a true lamb, but he can also be a viper if someone rubs him the wrong way." Vecernji List (February 17, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), March 2, 1992, pp.37-9.
nationalism and was the scene of severe bloodletting in World
War II. This is the area as well where Dobroslav Paraga's
neofascist paramilitary, the Croatian Defense Forces [HOS] made its
greatest inroads, claiming 16,000 Hercegovinian volunteers in
January 1992.76 The Bosnian Croats, for their part, live as
minorities in ethnically mixed areas throughout Bosnia and in the
major cities; they only attain a majority in a few opstinas in the
Bosanska Posavina, a region in Northern Bosnia that borders
Croatia. Bosnian Croats have usually been far more committed to
an integrated BH whereas the Hercegovinians have rarely hid
their intentions to annex their region to Croatia. Much of the
turns and twists in HDZ ideology can be attributed to one section
outflanking the other. As a result, any description of HDZ ideology
must take into account the role of flanking.

There is also another factor that has determined the
articulation of the HDZ national ideology, and that is the role of the
HDZ of Croatia. Tudjman has consistently spoken about the desire
to incorporate parts of BH into Croatia, and many observers have
noted the inordinate influence the HDZ of Croatia has on the HDZ of
BH. The importance that Tudjman places on this issue is perhaps
best indicated by the fact that in every HDZ government since the
first free elections in 1990 there has been included a

76 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network (January 22, 1992), in FBIS, Daily
Report (Eastern Europe), January 23, 1992, pp.57-8; Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo
Network (January 31, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe),
February 3, 1992, p.32; Nedjelja (January 26, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report
(Eastern Europe), February 13, 1992, pp.32-4; Gow, p.3.
"Hercegovinian lobby" to advocate the claims of the region. The problem for Tudjman, however, is that he could not afford to be too overt about his irredentist designs lest he undermine his claim to the territorial integrity of Croatia proper and lose the Krajina to the Serbs. And it is due, in part, to the risks associated with this policy direction that the HDZ has been split into two factions, the partitionists led by Tudjman, deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Seks, and Defence Minister Gojko Susak (who hails from Hercegovina) and a group of integralists led by Sabor speaker Stipe Mesic’, who argue for the territorial integrity of BH and a firm alliance with the Muslims. Hence, the relative strength and influence of the HDZ factions in Croatia stands as an external factor that must be taken into account when presenting the modal ideology of the HDZ of BH at a particular juncture and explaining why it changes over time.

The first significant event that occurred with the HDZ of BH after it was organized in August 1990 was the decision, made in Zagreb, to replace the founder of the party, Davor Perinovic’. In one of the many bizarre incidents of the Yugoslav drama, the HDZ of Croatia discovered that Perinovic’ is a Serb. At the HDZ meeting in Zagreb held in September, Tudjman reportedly waved Perinovic’’s birth certificate showing he was not a full-blooded Croat. Issues of genealogical purity aside, the real reason the HDZ of Croatia unseated Perinovic’ was his support for the sovereignty of BH and the organizational autonomy of the HDZ of BH from Zagreb.78

The replacement for Perinovic’ was the journalist Stjepan Kljuic’. Kljuic’ actively supported the independence of BH from Yugoslavia. With the renewal of tensions between Croatia and Serbia which ultimately culminated in war, Yugoslavia was universally disavowed by all Croat politicians. In terms of the internal organization of the BH regime, Kljuic’ was only willing to consider partition if it could save BH from civil war. And even under these conditions he did not demand the merger of Croat

cants with Croatia but rather a common life with Muslims which would be independent or join Slovenia and Croatia in a confederation. In addition, he repeatedly resisted the encroachments of the HDZ right-wing from Zagreb. His greatest hope was that BH could be constituted as a state which all three communities identified as their homeland and in which all would be on equal footing. The following quote, culled from an October 1990 interview, offers a flavor of Kljuić's political temperament: "I am ... appealing to all people of good will, regardless of their political and national affiliation, to lead other people toward agreement, tolerance, cohabitation, and not to inflame passions ..." 79

In the terminology of Yugoslav politics, Kljuić was a "Bosnian integralist" who stood for the unity of BH and a regime based on respect for national rights, inclusiveness, reciprocity, and parity. In the framework of national ideological types, he was a pluralist nationalist. During his tenure as party president and representative on the BH state Presidency, his ideological orientation inclined him towards a close working relationship with the SDA as both parties sought BH sovereignty and independence. An alignment with the monistic nationalism of the SDS would prove contrary to the interests of the Croats of BH, since the SDS was on a one track mission to divide the country which would

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inevitably take minority Croat populations into a Greater Serbia. Despite the fact that pluralist and civic nationalism point to different visions for the foundational principles of a regime, the SDA was certainly a far less threatening partner than the Serbs, who had already demonstrated a capacity for ruthlessness in Kosovo and in the war in Croatia. At the same time, the desire to maintain BH as a multinational republic proved to be the undoing of Ključić, as he was unable to please the Hercegovinians on the one side and the balance of forces in Zagreb on the other. At a February 2nd HDZ meeting in Siroki Brijeg (Hercegovina), Ključić was relieved of his post as party president for being, in the words of Mate Boban, "too much Bosnian, too little Croat." Ključić, however, did not depart without firing a final salvo at the Hercegovinian extremists: "Many of you who are sitting here and support cantonization will actually be living in a greater Serbia. I'll leave for Australia ... and then you will realize that I was right.


81 Hayden, pp.2-3.
all along."82

With the rise of Mate Boban and the Hercegovinian faction in the HDZ, the SDS found a tacit partner in the politics of partition. Under Boban's direction the HDZ had already founded an autonomous region in Western Hercegovina, formally designated as the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, and another in the Bosanska Posavina in November 1991. These Croatian communities were purportedly established (a third one was created in Central Bosnia in January) in reaction to the proliferation of Serbian autonomous regions and were presented as no threat to the territorial integrity of BH as a state nor to the authority of the government as long as BH remained independent of Yugoslavia.83 In actuality, they represented a major shift in the balance of power within the HDZ. While the Bosnian faction still prevailed in the central government and maintained close ties with the SDA in preserving the unity of BH, the Hercegovinian faction was outflanking them on the ground by setting up their


own institutions of authority. Still, all HDZ elites were guarded in their public statements given Croatia's official position that the borders of the individual republics must be respected. It was not until Ključić's departure that Boban's very different ideological stance became clear.

As noted above, monistic nationalism represents the position that sovereignty is based on nations and that wherever a given nation is (or was) territorially concentrated it is entitled to the right to rule. Boban reflected this notion perfectly in an interview in February when he called for the autonomy of Western Herzegovina and the Bosanska Posavina ("the Croatian people held these areas in 1941 when they entered the war") and said the HDZ supports BH as an independent state community of three sovereign and constituent nationalities. Such terms of discourse were much closer to the position of the SDS rather than the civic nationalism of the SDA. In light of this, fissures began to appear between the SDA and the HDZ; the first erupting over

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84 Shoup argues that it was HDZ policy to conceal their designs. Shoup, p.83.


86 Misha Glenny offered the following analogy: "if Karadžić is a wolf ravaging Bosnia's defenseless carcass, Boban is a vulture content to pick off the juicy bits that Karadžić has politely left." Misha Glenny, "The Balkans: Games without Frontiers," New Statesman and Society, (October 23, 1993), pp.24-5.
the wording of the BH referendum. Basically, the HDZ felt that the referendum question -- "are you in favor of a sovereign and independent BH, a state of equal citizens and nations of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, and members of other nationalities who live in it?" -- did not sufficiently recognize the sovereignty of nations. In its place, an alternative was offered by HDZ figures in Capljina (Hercegovina): "are you for a sovereign and independent BH, a state community of the constitutive and sovereign nations -- Croatian, Muslim, and Serbian -- in their ethnic regions (cantons)?" The HDZ failed to convince the SDA to alter the wording of the referendum. At the same time, the HDZ (and the SDS) scored an international victory; for when the EC entered the fray in February it put its weight behind the conception of BH as a state of equal nations that would be cantonized. Given this new development, the HDZ called on all Croats to vote "yes" in the referendum.

Meanwhile, there were a series of closed meetings in January and February between representatives of the government of Croatia and SDS figures indicating a deal was in the


making to divide BH at the expense of the Muslims. With Boban at the helm in Hercegovina, it was just a matter of time before Herceg-Bosna was upgraded to a Croat state (July 3, 1992) and the military alliance with the Muslims disintegrated into a dialectic of ethnic cleansing campaigns (October 1992).

In sum, there is evidence that internal flanking occurred in the HDZ of BH that moved the party in more radical directions.

Tudjman and the HDZ leadership in Croatia have a long public


90 Moore reports that Boban revealed his distrust of Muslims on several occasions. Patrick Moore, "A New Phase in the Bosnian Crisis?," RFE/RL Research Report, v.1, n.31, (July 31, 1992), pp.1-7; Mark Thompson, "The Bosnian Victims Fight Back," New Statesman and Society, (June 18, 1993), pp.14-15. By July 1993, Boban remarked "the atrocities and crimes committed by the Bosnian Muslim army in the past three months have been much greater in many cases than the atrocities and crimes committed by the Serbs in twenty-two months." Quoted in Moore, "Endgame in Bosnia and Hercegovina?", pp.19-23.
record indicating a desire to carve up BH and annex Croatian areas to Croatia proper. Treading a careful line so as not to appear hypocritical before international bodies, the Hercegovinian lobby in Zagreb manipulated the political cleavages within the HDZ of BH and undermined the Bosnian integralists. In this way, the pluralist nationalism of the party, as personified by Ključić, gave way to the monistic nationalism epitomized by Boban. The results were catastrophic for the unity of BH as a nascent state. As early as January 1992, reports on events in Western Hercegovina -- the ubiquity of the Croatian flag, the use of Croatian currency, and the movements of the Croatian army -- indicated the area was already a de facto part of Croatia.⁹¹

4. Summary: National Ideologies and Democratic Consolidation

The range of national ideologies prevalent in Bosnia-Hercegovina did not offer much hope that democracy could be consolidated or that BH could survive as a state. The monistic nationalism of the SDS meant that this party, on the basis of the sovereign rights of Serbs as a nation, would block any proposal by the government and disregard any procedural rule hitherto agreed upon that did not suit their interests. Their two most

important goals, keeping BH in Yugoslavia and cantonizing it internally, were beyond compromise. Anything less than the realization of these two ends would result in the transformation of Serbs into a national minority, which to them was synonymous with being dominated. The civic nationalism of the SDA hardly seemed well-intentioned by the SDS and was taken as a veil for Muslim hegemony. The initial pluralist nationalism of the HDZ under Ključić enabled the HDZ and the SDA to work together towards the common ends of separation from Yugoslavia, but as the Hercegovinian proponents of monistic nationalism outflanked the Bosnian bearers of pluralist nationalism in the HDZ, the SDA was left as the only party advocating a sovereign, independent, and integral BH.

It is interesting to note that with the convergence of a common ideological framework, the SDS and HDZ became much closer in their relations. This is demonstrated not only by the frequency of high-level contacts between SDS figures and officials of the HDZ government in Croatia, but public statements by Karadžić to the effect that the SDS will not contest Croatian areas.\footnote{In one address aimed at the HDZ in September 1991, Karadžić said "we will never come to your communes, to the communes in which you constitute a majority, and impose our will on you." Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network (September 17, 1991), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), September 1991, pp.39-40.} Theoretically, if two ethnic groups articulate a monistic national ideology there would be little chance for civil peace since both advance a claim of political priority. However, in BH Croats
and Serbs only resided together in a few opstinas. This fortuitous demographic distance enabled two parties representing otherwise incompatible claims to strike an agreement. In early May 1992, Karadzic' and Boban did just that signing onto a deal to partition BH between them. In conclusion, the national ideologies adopted by the three main parties in BH made a significant contribution to the collapse of the regime and the disintegration of the state. By representing conflicting positions on how to structure interethnic relations within the regime and by pointing to different visions of the state, the modal national ideologies of BH frustrated meaningful dialogue among the parties, failed to develop mutual understandings, and did not permit a sense of security to be cultivated that would lead to a negotiated agreement in favor of an unified state entity and a democratic regime.

E. Flanking: the Cases of the SDS and SDA

The analysis of the national ideology of the HDZ yielded the result that flanking had causal significance in turning the HDZ from a party loyal to the emerging BH state to one that sought exit

93 In the 20 opstinas in which Croats are a plurality, Serbs represent only 9% of the population. And in the 37 opstinas in which Serbs are a plurality, Croats represent only 6% of the population. "BiH-nebih," Vreme, (March 9, 1992), p.26.

from it. This section will explore two cases in which flanking did not produce such an outcome. In the SDS, differences between the main party organization in Sarajevo and the regional center of Banja Luka surfaced from time to time. The local elites in Banja Luka were consistently more radical than Karadzic' and his coterie (Koljevic', Krajisnik, and Velibor Ostojic'). In late February 1992 the "banjalucke frakcije" pushed for a Krajina state that would unite the Bosanska Krajina with the Republika Srpska Krajina of Croatia. Since this plan would affect only the Serbs in northwestern Bosnia, it was opposed by Karadzic', who insisted on a solution that took into consideration the interests of Serbs scattered throughout BH. The factional infighting, however, did not have any bearing on the ideological position of the SDS as a party of monistic nationalism and was quickly


overshadowed by the outbreak of civil war.

Within the SDA, there were persistent reports of a militant Islamic faction. While most of these claims emanating from the Serbian media to the effect that the hidden agenda of the party was to establish an Islamic republic must be taken as propaganda pure and simple, there is no doubt that beneath the main forces of civic nationalism in the party there lurked a definite clerical movement that promoted Islamic fundamentalism. In late January 1992 in the context of expounding his vision of BH as a civil state, Izetbegovic' himself acknowledged that this concept was not acceptable to some Muslims. More than likely, it was under the aegis of these currents that the Muslim community responded in-kind to the SDS forming a Muslim National Council in April 1991 and an autonomous Muslim Community in Eastern Hercegovina in June. All the same, the Islamic wing within the SDA did not produce any substantive change in the program of civic nationalism prior to the outbreak of war. The phenomenon

98 After his break with the SDA, Zulfikarpasic' cited specific figures in the party who were extremely right-wing and noted that in Mostar the party was recruiting "semi-literate muezzins and imams." Belgrade Domestic Service (September 18, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), September 19, 1990, p.69.


of flanking within the SDA therefore had no causal impact on
democratic consolidation. Once the war began, however, and the
terrible onslaught of violence descended on the Muslim
community, the SDA began to fractionate into hardliners opposed
to any negotiations with the Serbs (Ejup Ganic', Major Sefer
Halilovic'), a contingent in central Bosnia loyal to Izetbegovic'
(Haris Siljadzic'), and a more flexible, pragmatic current
emanating from the Cazinska Krajina that was ready to concede to
the division of the republic (Fikret Abdic', Alija Delimustafic').

What accounts for the fact that flanking had a significant
impact on the HDZ but not on the SDS and SDA? In comparing the
circumstances surrounding these three parties, the one variable
that stands out as unique is the interest of the Tudjman regime in
changing the direction of the HDZ of BH. To be sure, the SDS and
the Milosevic' regime were exceedingly close in their relations.

p.5; Mark Thompson, "No End to the Tragedy," New Statesman and Society,
Milan Andrejevich, "The Bosnian Muslim Leader Fikret Abdic'," RFE/RL
Research Report, v.2, n.40, (October 8, 1993), pp.16-20;
102 This points to another difference between the SDS of Croatia and the
SDS of BH. In the former case, Raskovic' repeatedly denied his party had
any connection with the SPS whereas in BH Karadzic' boasted of his close
relationship with Milosevic' and even mentioned his "regular, sometimes
daily" contacts with him over the phone. See Karadzic' statements in the
following: Oslobodjenje (December 14, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern
Europe), January 2, 1991, pp.41-2; Borba (February 26, 1991), in FBIS, Daily
Report (Eastern Europe), March 6, 1991, pp.54-5; Duga (October 26 -
November 10, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), December 27,
At the same time, the SDS and the SPS were of one mind in their pursuit of a Greater Serbia. Milosevic did not have to interfere in the internal politics of the SDS since his protagonists were already leading the party. As a matter of fact, it is reasonable to assume that Karadzic had the support of Milosevic against the banjalucke frakcije since the plans of the latter ran contrary to Milosevic's overall political strategy at the time. Having just subdued the strongman of Knin, Milan Babic, in early February 1992 in order to secure an international settlement on the Croatian question, Milosevic now wanted to concentrate his resources on fortifying the most advantageous position of the Serbs in BH. A Krajina state that would reopen the issue of Croatia's borders was simply not in his interests. With regard to the SDA, its factions were bereft of a larger matica republic in which they could find endorsement. Hence, the role of an external

103 The harmony between Karadzic and Milosevic was not to last. Just as Milosevic nurtured the rise the Babic in the Krajina and then dumped him when his own political interests changed, so Milosevic attempted the same on Karadzic in May 1993 when Serbia, under intense international pressure, was ready to sign onto the Vance-Owen peace plan. Milan Andrejevich, "Serbia's Bosnian Dilemma," RFE/RL Research Report, v.2, n.23, (June 4, 1993), pp.14-21. This pattern of relations between the precani and srbijanci Serbs is not without precedent. As the pre-World War II leader of the Serbs of Croatia, Svetozar Pribicevic, observed: the srbijanci behave towards the precani "the way that a master behaves toward his dog. When he needs its barking, he lets it off the chain. When it has barked enough, in his estimate, the master ties it to the fence and leaves it to languish." Quoted in Danas (January 28, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), February 10, 1992, pp.25-6.
sponsor stands as a causally effective intervening variable that can make or break the influence of flanking on national ideologies, and consequently, its import for democratic consolidation.

F. The Tripolar Coalition

If a polity is composed of three major ethnic groups there is a certain advantage for the prospects of democratic consolidation in comparison to a bipolar ethnic society. Assuming at least one party per ethnic group, tripolarity opens up the possibility of coalition governments which are more inclusive than if a single party gains a majority of electoral votes and forms a government. If democracy carries its own set of incentives (such as the promise of mutual security, peaceful competition, and offices open to all) to convince elites to trespass into democratic behavior, then the need to form coalition governments in tripolar ethnic societies should only add to such incentives. Empirical studies of the ethnically-divided societies of Asia and Africa, however, suggests that tripolar ethnic party systems have a tendency towards bifurcation as the smaller party aligns with one of the larger two in such a way that the main political cleavage or central interethnic hostility is made manifest. Once this occurs, the party on the losing end of this realignment will find itself excluded from power and will likely choose some form of exit from the state while the parties in power will resort to authoritarian measures to prevent
this from happening. In brief, tripolar coalitions are hypothesized to be unconducive to the consolidation of democracy.\textsuperscript{104}

As the three largest vote-getters in the 1990 elections, the SDA, SDS, and HDZ agreed to create a government. In terms of the comparative politics literature, what they formed may be described as a coalition of convenience. Such coalitions are denoted by the following criteria: (1) they are established merely for the purpose of creating a government; (2) they are formed after elections, and not before; (3) they compete for office from the position of separate party organizations; and (4) their policy positions are formulated independently and are often incompatible. Empirically, coalitions of convenience are very fragile, the rapidity of their demise normally being attributable to the efforts of one party to dominate the coalition or the sheer incongruity of their positions.\textsuperscript{105}

The three ruling parties of BH characterized their relationship as a "partnerstvo" [partnership], a term which reflected the absence of any ideological common ground and instead denoted more of a decision to share power. Negotiations on the distribution of government seats began immediately after the elections in November 1990 but were not completed until the end

\textsuperscript{104} Horowitz, pp.360-2.

\textsuperscript{105} Horowitz, pp.369-378.
of January 1991, an ominous sign of the gridlock the new
government was to face. The agreement the three parties reached
divided the government in the following manner: the head of the
7-member presidency would go the SDA, the president of the
National Assembly would be a member of the SDS, and the prime
minister of the government would fall to the HDZ. Out of a 22-
member government, 10 positions went to the SDA, 7 the SDS, and
5 to the HDZ. The delegation to the SFRJ assembly was also chosen
at this time, and seats were distributed, like that of the BH
government, on a proportionality principle: 5 from the SDA, 4
from the SDS, and 3 from the HDZ. Many delegates in the National
Assembly proposed the nomination of self-declared Yugoslavs and
representatives from other nationalities in the delegation to the
Federal parliament, but such demands were rejected.106 In this
way, the ruling national parties cornered the market on the
articulation and aggregation of interests in BH and shut out the
expression of voices that spoke from a nonethnic platform. In
addition, the three parties treated each ministry they were
allotted as their own property and accordingly began a process of
bureaucratic ethnic cleansing, in which the members of nations
different from the minister of a given agency would be purged.

106 Tanjug (December 27, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe),
December 27, 1990, pp.43-4; Tanjug (November 28, 1990), in FBIS, Daily
Report (Eastern Europe), November 29, 1990, p.74; Tanjug (December 20,
1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), December 20, 1990, p.58; Borba
(January 18, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), January 24, 1991,
p.72; Politika (January 10, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe),
January 24, 1991, pp.72-3; Tanjug (January 30-31, 1991), in FBIS, Daily
This process played itself out at the local level as well; only here, there was no pretense of partnerstvo. In the opstina governments the party that won the largest number of votes simply swept aside representatives from the other parties and installed its own people in every key position. As a result, partnerstvo remained confined to the national level whereas at the opstina "jedinstvo vlasti" [homogeneous government] was the rule.107 Such moves represented a calculated decision by the ruling parties to shun any ethnic management strategies that could mitigate ethnic conflict. As indicated in the introduction of this chapter, BH was replete with opportunities to bridge the ethnic chasm. Instead, the ethnic parties became obsessed with gaining a comparative advantage in the polity and thereby chose to reinforce rather than cross-cut ethnic cleavages. Introducing national divisions in the institutions of government was but the first step in the political segmentation of BH.

Ironically, the first substantive issue that came before the new government was the very same one that brought about its collapse -- an SDA proposal for declaring the sovereignty of BH. On January 30, 1991, the SDA presented to the National Assembly a document entitled "Declaration of State Sovereignty and

Indivisibility of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina," to which the HDZ immediately responded with support. The wave of constitutional revisions and sovereignty declarations that swept across Yugoslavia (viz., in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia) represented the desire to solidify the borders of the republics and place each on equal terms for negotiations on a future Yugoslav association. Understandably, the SDA did not want to be left behind in this process and subject BH to the easy prey of irredentists in Serbia or Croatia. A problem arose, however, in that the SDS interpreted such declarations to be merely a stepping-stone towards secession and thereby the destruction of Yugoslavia. The revelation by an SDA deputy at a National Assembly session in late February that his party's executive committee had decided to side with the confederal option for Yugoslavia only further confirmed the suspicions of the SDS. In the debates on the future of Yugoslavia over the course of 1989 - 1991, confederalism was advocated by Slovenia and Croatia whereas federalism was promoted by Serbia and, ipso facto, Serb political leaders outside of Serbia proper. From the perspective of the Serb side, confederalism was equated with the creation of independent states in which the Serb diaspora would be cut off from its *matica* republic. It was the position of the SDS leadership in BH that the existing BH constitution already guaranteed sovereignty and it did so explicitly within the framework of Yugoslavia. Therefore, any proposal on this subject was thought to be redundant and involving motives deemed
suspect. In order to allay SDS fears, the SDA produced a second draft that more explicitly defined BH as a state of three sovereign nations (rather than the sovereignty of citizens mentioned in the first draft) and located BH specifically within the framework of the Yugoslav state. Still, however, the SDS remained fundamentally opposed to the draft citing its potential to turn Serbs into a national minority.

According to the decision-making rules adopted in December as part of a postelectoral agreement, all draft legislation dealing with the status of the three nations of BH was subject to a vote of unanimity among the three ruling parties. This enabled the SDS to block at will any proposal it did not support. Upon hearing that Izetbegovic would seek to pass the declaration despite the opposition of the SDS, the latter began in April a process of "regionalization" creating the Municipality of Communes of Bosanska Krajina. This entity was composed of 14 opstinas and had its headquarters in the Serbian stronghold of Banja Luka. Ostensibly promoted as a means to ensure the economic vitality of the region, regionalization was in fact a euphemism for the establishment of purely Serb organs of authority that would


promote Serb interests at the local level.\textsuperscript{110} Karadzic\textquoteright in fact defended regionalization in the context of complaining about possible "outvoting" in the National Assembly.\textsuperscript{111} In May SDA presidency member Ejup Ganić\textquoteright attempted to promote an all-BH party resolution on the issue of sovereignty but this failed as well owing to the continued obstinacy of the SDS.\textsuperscript{112} In light of such developments, the Yugoslav media began to predict that the fall of the governing coalition was imminent.\textsuperscript{113}


The summer of 1991 failed to bring any relief to the paralysis of the BH government. After the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence were issued in late June, an SDA-HDZ proposal for the Assembly to assess "dissociation" from Yugoslavia as a legitimate expression of the right to self-determination was stymied by SDS deputies, who refused to discuss the matter. Simultaneously, representatives of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (Croatia) and the Bosanska Krajina met in Bosansko Grahovo to promulgate the unification of the two Serb regions. In essence, by the summer of 1991 a pattern of interaction among the three parties was established that would persist -- the SDA and HDZ would coalesce on a range of issues and the SDS would block their proposals all the while undermining the authority of the central government at the local level and laying a foundation for exit from the state. This pattern followed the expected path of development suggested by the practice of tripolar coalitions elsewhere. The SDA-HDZ alliance was quite in keeping with traditional Bosnian politics as Muslims and Croats typically banded together to fight off what they perceived as a common Serb threat. The SDS, for its part, decried the forging of an "anti-Serb coalition" in the Assembly and from the very first session of the National Assembly repeatedly accused government bodies of "outvoting" (or making decisions based on majority rule

rather than unanimity). Under these conditions, BH politics took on the character of a bipolar conflict. The SDS, being the smaller party in this alignment, predictably sought refuge in extralegal institutions and walked out of the Assembly in July on the grounds they would no longer recognize the decisions of a "bi-national parliament."  

Frustrated by the SDA-HDZ hold over the government, the SDS in July 1991 moved to undercut the position of the SDA in the Muslim community by negotiating with the Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO] for the purpose of forging a "new historic agreement" between Muslims and Serbs. The MBO was the product of a preelection split within the SDA. A faction within the SDA centered around Adil Zulfikarpasic' and Muhamed Filipovic' broke from the party in September 1990 complaining that it was dominated by a militant Islamic wing. The MBO presented itself as a liberal party that would promote the founding a "modern bourgeois republic," cultivate the self-identity of "Bosnjaks," and

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maintain a separation of politics and religion. The accord that was signed pledged the MBO to give priority to Yugoslavia as a state community over the sovereignty of its constituent republics and obligated the SDS to preserve BH within its present borders. Most important for the SDS was the principle that the status of BH in Yugoslavia would not be dependent on the actions of Slovenia and Croatia (which was directly opposite to Izetbegovic’s position). Muslim supporters of the document stressed its long-term perspective and the fact that in a Yugoslavia with only 4 republics Muslims would constitute the second largest national group.


Once again, such maneuvering falls within the range of the dimensions of tripolarity. Horowitz discusses cases of the Javenese in Surinam and the Yoruba in Nigeria in which these less cohesive groups split into two parties and subsequently allied themselves with different ethnic parties. The danger latent in all this is that "the reduction of the contesting parties to two saps party maneuvering of all flexibility. From then on, the sights of each ethnic party are fixed, not on a quest for coalition partners but on the struggle to defeat, and even destroy, the other ethnic party." As it turned out in BH, the MBO-SDS agreement fizzled in the face of verbal attacks on Zulfikarpasic' from militants in the SDA that he betrayed the Muslim people. At the same time, a rapprochement between the SDS on the one hand, and the SDA and HDZ, on the other, was not in the offing.

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In June the deputies of the National Assembly, exasperated over the deadlock on the issue of sovereignty, turned the matter over to the seven-member state presidency in the hope of reaching a consensus. Deliberations in this body in the month of August, however, proved to be a replication of what had transpired in the Assembly. The two SDS representatives, Nikola Koljevic’ and Biljana Plavsic’, charged the presidency with ignoring the interests of Serbs, making decisions by a majority vote, and functioning without any clear code of procedure. Consequently, they froze their membership in the presidency. This time, however, the SDA-HDZ alliance was prepared not to be hamstrung by SDS recalcitrance. In the words of SDA presidency member Ejup Ganic’, "we can work and make decisions without them as well."121

The months of September and October proved to be the breaking point of the partnerstvo. On September 11, Prime Minister Jure Pelivan spoke to the Assembly and discussed the complete paralysis of the government at all levels.122 The fragmentation of the government however only went from bad to


worse as mid-September witnessed a string of Serbian autonomous regions (SAOs) spring up that amounted to the de facto cantonization of the republic. The SAOs elected their own governments and vowed that if BH left Yugoslavia they would immediately secede from BH.¹²³ The next significant move came from the SDA-HDZ, who in October before the Assembly broached the sovereignty issue again, only this time in the form of a memorandum that was based on the presidency's draft of August. The memorandum affirmed the constitutional status of BH as a sovereign state of equal citizens and nations, it stipulated that BH will not belong to any future Yugoslavia that does not include both Croatia and Serbia, it called for the demilitarization of the republic,¹²⁴ and it included a provision for its confirmation on the basis of a majority vote. As could be expected, the SDS rejected the entire text. The Assembly president Momcilo Krajisnik (SDS)


¹²⁴ According to official figures 271,000 citizens of BH had registered 323,000 firearms. Unofficially, the estimates ran as high as 1 million citizens who were illegally armed. Moreover, the war in Croatia was raging at this time and regularly spilled over into BH. There was also a proliferation of paramilitary formations taking place all across BH. Milan Andrejevich, "More Guns, Less Butter in Bosnia and Herzegovina," RFE/RL Research Report, v.1, n.11, (March 13, 1992), pp.10-17.
arbitrarily adjourned the session without calling for a vote, and SDS deputies withdrew from the Assembly before any vote on the memorandum could be taken. On October 15 the vice-president of the Assembly, Marioful Ljubic' (HDZ), assumed the seat of the departed Krajisnik and reconvened the body. This time the memorandum passed on a majority vote. By this act a point of no return was reached by the ruling three-party coalition. A few days later the SDS formed an alternative Serbian assembly, withdrew the right of the SDS deputies to represent the Serb nation in the National Assembly, and scheduled a referendum for the Serb populace to determine its future. By the same token, the SAOs announced that BH no longer exists and that they have no responsibilities towards it.

The BH dance of legislation happened one more time, on the issue of sanctioning the SDA-HDZ referendum for the independence of BH. In November the Serb referendum produced an 85% turnout (out of 800,000 eligible voters) with 98% of those


voting in favor of establishing an independent Serb republic within the borders of BH and keeping these areas an integral part of Yugoslavia.\(^{127}\) Having bolstered their sense of confidence by this single-nationality ballot, the SDS sent an appeal to the SDA and HDZ on December 10th to resume negotiations on the fate of the country. The HDZ and SDA both responded positively, the former requesting as a precondition that SDS deputies return to the Assembly and the latter serving notice that the issue of BH sovereignty was nonnegotiable.\(^{128}\) Around this time the SDA held a party congress in order to assess recent moves by the SDS and the HDZ, the latter of which had recently founded two Croatian autonomous communities. Hemmed in by such partitionist action by both the SDS and the HDZ, the party congress decided to seek help in the international arena and concluded that the SDA should request the international recognition of BH.\(^{129}\)


requirements for recognition recommended a referendum, the SDA proposed that a citizen’s referendum be presented to the National Assembly for ratification on January 24th. It was here that the coup de grace was delivered to the three party coalition. In a remarkable repetition of the moves made in October over the memorandum, the SDS -- upon realizing that they did have sufficient support for their demand that cantonization must precede any referendum -- had Krajisnik adjourn the session, and SDS deputies walked out. In their absence, the SDA and the HDZ deputies resumed the session the next day and passed the resolution in a unanimous vote. From this point on, the SDS deputies never returned to the National Assembly, and negotiations on the future of BH were moved to the international level. The regime had collapsed.

In summary, the behavior of the three ruling parties in BH closely mirrored the experience of tripolar coalitions elsewhere. The evidence for this conclusion is found in the following events: (1) the three-way coalition was quickly transformed into a bipolar conflict (SDA-HDZ vs. the SDS); (2) the losing party in this realignment began to lay the basis for exit by establishing extra-institutional bodies in order to avoid perennial exclusion (the SNV, regionalization, the proposed Krajina state formation, the SAOs, and finally the Serb republic of BH); (3) the losing party also

sought to bolster its strength by playing on cleavages within the largest party (the SDS-MBO accord); and (4) the duration of the coalition of convenience matched the average life span of one year (depending on where one places the markers, BH *partnerstvo* began in November 1990 (the elections) or January 1991 (the formation of the government), and lasted until October 1991 (the memorandum vote) or January 1992 (the referendum vote). Since a stable, durable coalition did not occur, tripolarity earns increasing empirical support as an independent variable that is understood to be detrimental to democratic consolidation.

G. Conclusion: What Could Have Been Done?

It is now pertinent to ask what specific factors explain why tripolarity in this instance did not lead to democratic consolidation. First of all, the postelectoral agreement on consensus decision-making stands out as a particularly ineffective tool for governing. Paradoxically, while the consensus requirement was a necessary ingrediant to gain the initial consent of the ruling parties to participate in the regime, it immediately became a source of paralysis and caused considerable frustration for the SDA in particular.\(^{131}\) Insofar as the essence of procedural

\(^{131}\) As Lijphart recognized, the mutual veto "is essential in order to induce all of the subcultural groups to participate in grand coalitions, but if it is not handled with caution and restraint, it is likely to produce the very stagnation and instability that consociational democracy is designed to avoid." Lijphart, (1968).
democracy is expressed in a "certain rules, uncertain outcomes" formula, a unanimity rule tends to violate this stricture by producing certain outcomes; namely, gridlock on the most important issues facing a polity. Given that a single party can inhibit a polity from addressing an issue if it deems the solutions to be contrary to its own interests and that political issues rarely have positive-sum solutions, unanimity rules render impotent the very art and purpose of politics. Instead of institutionalizing conflict as procedural democracy attempts to do, unanimity rules represent the desire to avoid it. In the politics of BH, the consensus requirement enabled the SDS, a party representing only 1/3rd of the population, to block legislation at will. Dissatisfaction with the inability of the government to act prompted the SDA and HDZ to violate the interparty agreement and make decisions on a majority basis.

A second factor that appears to have contributed to the coalition debacle is the perspective the individual parties brought with them to the government. In other words, national ideologies are perceived to have played a significant role in the disintegration of the regime. Because each party spoke in a different ideological vernacular in which concepts and values had no shared meanings, the government could not possibly speak with a united voice. In fact, the parties in government treated the state institutions allotted to them as their own political spoils in a myopic bid for national aggrandizement. And instead of utilizing a treasure house of traditional Titoist tactics for managing ethnic
conflict, the national parties preferred to play the nationalist card hoping to ensconce themselves as the sole legitimate spokesmen for their respective nations. Such behavior reflected the particular national ideologies of each party. For example, the obstructionist behavior of the SDS in the National Assembly matched perfectly its monistic ideological framework in which it claimed a right to expect the complete realization of interests. In a similar vein, the SDA turn to majority rule in the National Assembly was congruent with its predilection for a state based on citizens. And the movement of the HDZ relationship with the SDA from that of harmony to discord (which began with the dispute over the wording of the referendum) coincided with its ideological transformation from pluralist to monistic nationalism.

Overall, BH was immersed in a cauldron of centrifugal nationalism that was irreconciliable with the consolidation of democracy. The obstacle posed by nationalism is no better exemplified than in a statement of Karadzic: "We will agree with the SDA and the HDZ on all issues concerning the economy, politics, culture, democracy, and so on." He went on to say, however, that the SDS cannot agree to the separation of BH from Yugoslavia. The ironic fact is that the three ruling parties could probably agree on all nonethnic issues. But since their respective national

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ideologies led them to different conceptions of how to define the state, they never moved beyond this single issue.

The lessons, therefore, from the BH tripolar experience are (1) an alternative mechanism of garnering consent to the regime should be found other than a unanimity decision-making rule; and (2) in forming a government it is best to avoid choosing ethnic parties who represent conflicting visions on the nature of the regime and the state. In BH the SDA would have found more suitable ideological coalition partners in the SKBH and the SRSJ (the former being close to pluralist nationalism and the latter civic nationalism) which collectively would have amounted to 115 assembly seats against the 95 seats of the SDS-HDZ. While this configuration would no doubt alienate the SDS and HDZ, ethnic management strategies could have been employed to segment their national communities. For example, decentralization schemes that played off the urban-rural cleavage or the various subcultures within the three ethnic groups and granted local officials a source of authority independent of the ethnic parties could have neutralized SDS and HDZ efforts to homogenize politically their respective national communities. At the very least, such a coalition had the potential to change the focus of BH politics away from the state issue and towards the tasks of marketization and democratization.

An even better solution that could have possibly squared the BH circle is Lijphart’s proposal for a grand coalition. By expanding
the coalition to include the SKBH and the SRSJ, the government would have been blessed with a greater number of officials who had "overarching loyalties" to the state.\textsuperscript{133} This enlarged coalition would have provided more room for inner-cabinet maneuvering and bargaining and could have potentially lessened the feeling in the SDS that it had been excluded by a SDA-HDZ alliance. Furthermore, the participation of the SKBH and the SRSJ in government bodies would have given those who support a multiethnic, multicultural, pluralist BH an institutional base and an official voice in the public contest of national ideologies. It is certain that there are ethnic management strategies available that could have reduced ethnic conflict in BH. However, the ideological orientations of the three principal ethnic parties simply precluded their consideration.

CHAPTER V

Serbia: The Politics of a Dominant Ethnic Group
and Peripheral Ethnic Minorities

A. Democracy and Nationalism in Serbia's Recent Experience

Serbian political culture has often been described as a constellation of beliefs involving historical myths, tales of military valor, values of self-sacrifice, a sense of historically undeserved punishment, tendencies for paranoia and hero worship, a penchant for conspiracy theories, and an exaggerated sense of self-importance on the world stage. The historian Aleksa Djilas

1 In what follows I by no means assume that all Serbs think within these parameters or that this general orientation does not change historically. In other words, I am not attempting to present an hypostatized "national culture" that may explain political behavior. Instead, I am merely trying to offer an impressionistic and highly general account of certain central tendencies in Serbian political thought, literature, and historiography that sets the stage for a more analytic and empirical study.

2 In the words of Mark Thompson, "[t]here is no understanding Serbia without fathoming its wounded self-righteousness, its perception of
uses the term "historical nihilism" to capture the essence of Serbian political consciousness, which to him involves a combination of "noble idealism," humiliation, suffering, self-pity, anger, and hatred. This Serbian collective psyche was molded, first and foremost, by the horrific defeat of Serbian forces in 1389 at the Battle of Kosovo, a defeat that led to approximately 400 years of Turkish domination. The significance of this event was not that the Serbs lost, but rather that they had the courage to stand up to the Islamic Turks and sacrifice themselves for the sake of protecting Christian Europe. By so doing, Serbdom won a hallowed place in heaven and the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo became the Serbs most important national holiday. An equally pivotal event in modern history was the wholesale genocide of precani Serbs at the hands of the fascist quisling governments of Croatia and Hungary in World War II. In the aftermath of the war the communist regime added insult to injury by denying the equivalent of a Nuremberg trial under the pretext that it would discourage the development of "brotherhood and itself as more sinned against than sinning." Mark Thompson, A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), p.198. See also, Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War. (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), pp.43-4, 50; W. L. Webb, "Driven Mad by History," New Statesman and Society, (April 23, 1993), pp.18-19.

3 Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," Foreign Affairs. (Summer 1993), pp.81-96. Such traits as fatalism and pessimism are identified by some scholars as basic personality profiles of Serbian elites, such as Slobodan Milosevic and Dobrica Cosic. See Paul Shoup, "Serbia at the Edge of the Abyss," RFE/RL Research Report, v.1, n.36, (September 11, 1992), pp.7-14.
unity." However, it is not just the shedding of blood on the battlefield that has molded Serbian political consciousness; for as the prominent Serbian intellectual and statesman Dobrica Cosic' has expressed it, Serbs tragically "win in wars but lose in peace."

The post-war political formula of Tito's Yugoslavia was also the source of profound aggrievement for Serbs. Specifically, Tito has been taken to task for allegedly implementing a policy guided by the thesis "weak Serbia, strong Yugoslavia." The protagonists of this view cite the internal territorial division of Yugoslavia as a prime example of Tito's bias against the Serbs. During the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes the srbijanci widely regarded Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Bosnian Muslims as Serbs. Hence, the decision of the communists to establish republics in each of these cases was perceived to be highly unjust. Even more humiliating was the 1974 Constitution which turned the Serbian provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina into de facto republics. Moreover, in order to garner the consent of Albanians for his regime, Tito purportedly imported Albanians into Kosovo and turned a blind eye to Albanian mistreatment of Kosovar Serbs who in turn were fleeing this Serbian holy land at alarming rates. In sum, the very state for which Serbs sacrificed


5 Serb nationalists fail to recognize that a good deal of the emigration from Kosovo is due to economic factors. Alex Dragnich, "The Rise and Fall
themselves — to a degree they felt more than any other nation — left 1 out of 4 of their members inside the administrative units of other nation-republics where they could easily be persecuted again as national minorities.

More than anything else, it was this undercurrent of emotions and pent-up frustrations that Serbs felt — towards Albanians, Croats, Yugoslavia, Tito, and history itself — that Slobodan Milosevic was able to seize upon, mobilize, and direct against the institutions and prevailing distribution of power in the SFRJ. Within Serbia, the nationalist policies of Milosevic worked to restrict the rights of minorities, elevate the interests of Serbs above all other national groupings, and concentrate power in the state apparatus, chiefly in the office of the president. By constitutional revision the formerly autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina were reintegrated into Serbia, albeit as subordinate parts. In addition, Milosevic employed the coercive agencies of the state as well as extralegal paramilitary groups to institute a virtual military occupation of Kosovo, to conduct a reign of terror against suspect minority groups in the Sandzak and Vojvodina, and to frighten, repress and isolate the Serbian political opposition. As a result, the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) has failed to develop a polity marked by tolerance, the rule of Yugoslavia: The Omen of the Upsurge of Serbian Nationalism," East European Quarterly, v.23, n.2, (June 1989), pp.183-198; Ivo Banac, "The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia's Demise," Dædalus, v.121, n.2, (Spring 1992), pp.141-174.
of law, and the practice of compromise and dialogue between the regime, the opposition, and minority groups. In short, nationalism and democracy have proven to be fundamentally antithetical concepts in Serbia's recent experience. It is the burden of this chapter to explain why and how.

B. Ethnic Structure, Regional Subcultures, and the Challenges to Democratic Consolidation

Serbia is actually a very heterogeneous republic. The striking features of its ethnic composition are twofold: (1) minority groups are geographically concentrated, and (2) the two largest minority groups (Albanians and Hungarians) are non-Slavic peoples with their own distinct languages and religions (Albanians are largely Islamic, Hungarians are Catholic, and Serbs are Christian Orthodox). As measured by their size, ability to affect the system, and the attention the regime has given them, the three politically significant minority groups in Serbia are the Albanians, the Muslims, and the Hungarians. Each group is territorially concentrated in a specific region in Serbia and each has varying degrees of ethnic distance from Serbs. Before turning to an examination of each one let us first study the demographics of the dominant group, the Serbs.

Serbs constitute nearly 6.5 million inhabitants in Serbia and comprise over 65% of the total population. Serbs themselves are
divided along several cultural fault lines in Serbia. Belgrade is of course the political and cultural center of Serbia. Serbs represent 84.9% (1,374,487) of the city's population and cohabitate with 17 other ethnic groups. There has always been a cosmopolitan flavor to Belgrade and it is only Belgraders who receive Radio B-92 and Television Studio B, the only two independent and critical broadcast media of Serbia. Lying south of Belgrade is the region known as the Sumadija, or "forest land." This is central Serbia and its population -- nearly 100% Serbian -- is largely settled in rural villages and a few industrial towns (e.g., Kragujevac). Politically, this region has been a traditional stronghold of Serbian nationalism.

In the Serbian holy land of Kosovo, Serbs are a paltry 10% of the population. Nevertheless, they became an important force in Serbian politics in the late 1980s when Slobodan Milosevic built his power base by exploiting and accentuating the fears and anxieties of Kosovar Serbs and dramatizing to the Serbian nation

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7 Recent reports from journalists who have visited Belgrade indicate that the liberal spirit of Belgrade's past has eroded and given way to a paranoid, simplistic and crude nationalism. Its demographics have also changed with a flood of refugees from war-torn Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Thompson, p.204, 213-4; Mark Thompson, "Belgrade's Hoop of Steel," New Statesman and Society, (November 5, 1993), pp.18-19; New York Times, May 16, 1993, p.E5.
their precarious position in Kosovo. Through regime-sponsored organizations like the Committee for the Protection of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins and the Bozur Association for the Return of Serbs and Montenegrins to Kosovo, the Kosovar Serbs were a recruiting ground for Milosevic's shock troops who took to the streets in Novi Sad, Pristina, and Titograd, where they successfully brought down governments that were deemed contrary to Belgrade's interests.\(^8\) These organizations were vehemently anti-Albanian, they formed paramilitary branches that promised to terrorize the Albanian community into submission, and they had little tolerance for the Serbian opposition in Belgrade (such as Vuk Draskovic\(^9\)), whom they perceived as forces that played into the hands of Serbia's enemies.\(^9\) Despite their emphasis on Serbian unity, "violent arguments and mutual intolerance" among the Kosovar Serbs has been noted; the most salient cleavage being


that between indigenous inhabitants and pre-World War II colonists from Hercegovina and Montenegro. A final indicator of the politics of this Serbian subculture is the election in the Kosovo electoral district of 5 deputies from the party of the notorious paramilitary leader and war criminal "Arkan" in the 1992 elections.

Vojvodina is home to the most westernized and liberal-minded Serbs. Vojvodina only became part of Serbia officially in 1920, but Serbs had been steadily migrating to the Pannonian plains since the late 17th century and often at the invitation of the Austro-Hungarian empire who employed them as frontier guards. Along with Serbs the Hapsburgs brought in Magyars, Germans, Croats, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Romanians, Czechs, etc. making Vojvodina the most multinational area of all the former Yugoslavia. There is in Vojvodina therefore the self-conscious image of being a "Little Europe" which is pluralist, cosmopolitan, and tolerant. In the 19th century the Serbs of

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Vojvodina developed a cultural elite who were instrumental in Serbian nation-building. When Serbia gained its independence in 1878, Vojvodina Serbs contributed substantially to the emerging political elite. Today, Serbs make up 57.3% of the population of Vojvodina. Vojvodina Serbs have traditionally been politically divided between "pan-Serb" and "autonomist" political currents.\textsuperscript{12}

Standing at approximately 2 million, Albanians are the largest minority group in Serbia and are concentrated in the province of Kosovo where they comprise roughly 90% of the population.\textsuperscript{13} Kosovo is an extremely impoverished area of Serbia. It has the highest birthrate in Europe at 32 per 1,000 inhabitants.\textsuperscript{14} With reference to the former Yugoslavia, the Albanians of Kosovo had the highest unemployment rate in 1981 (27.5%), the lowest GNP per capita in 1984 (26.3%), the highest infant mortality rates, and the highest illiteracy rates.\textsuperscript{15} The Albanians were the last group

\textsuperscript{12} Thompson, \textit{A Paper House}, pp.235-251; Rothschild, p.209.

\textsuperscript{13} Albanians boycotted the 1991 census. Their phenomenal birthrate made these non-Slavs the third largest ethnic group in the former Yugoslavia, behind the Serbs and Croats but ahead of the Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins. Hence, the Albanian sense of outrage for not receiving their own republic.


in the Balkans to develop a national consciousness (signified by the creation of the League of Prizren in 1878) and have continued many pre-modern practices into the late 20th century, such as blood feuds which have only recently have shown signs of abating.\textsuperscript{16} There are religious and ethnic cleavages within the Albanian community: Albanians are divided between Islam (roughly 2/3rds of the population) and Catholicism (approximately 1/3rd), and the Kosovo community is technically identified as Gegs while their brethren in Albania are Tosks. Genealogically, Albanians consider themselves to be the descendants of the ancient Illyrians and therefore autochthonous to the region. Enjoying a privileged position under Ottoman rule (under which they adopted Islam), the Albanians offered resistance against Serbian incorporation in the Balkan War of 1912 and fought against Serbs and Montenegrins in both World Wars. It is fair to say that the Albanian acceptance of Yugoslavia was never complete and this fact has manifested itself periodically in violent disturbances and passive resistance from 1912 to the present.\textsuperscript{17}


Hungarians are the third largest nationality (430,964, or 3.5%) in Serbia and they are found in the northern province of Vojvodina where they form a majority in 8 out of 45 opstinas (or 22% of the population of Vojvodina). At the level of villages and towns, Hungarians are a majority in 81 out of 463 settlements.\textsuperscript{18} Vojvodina became part of Yugoslavia by the mandate of the Treaty of Trianon, two years after the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It was taken away from Hungary, to which it is historically and geographically linked. When it was awarded to Yugoslavia, the population of Vojvodina was trifurcated with one-third composed of Hungarians, one-third Serbs, and one-third Germans. World War II significantly altered the demographic position of these three main groups as Germans were expelled en masse, Serbs from Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia moved in, and Hungarians stayed at roughly the same level.\textsuperscript{19} Despite atrocities carried out against the Serbs by (April 3, 1992), pp.7-15.

\textsuperscript{18} These figures come from data gathered prior to the outbreak of hostilities so they are certainly off the mark today. There have been reports of a large exodus of Hungarians out of Vojvodina (as high as 35,000), partly due to political pressure, and partly due to young men not wanting to fight in an inter-Slav war (an estimated 25,000). "Nacionalni Sastav Stanovnistva, 1991," p.10; Edith Oltay, "Hungarians Under Political Pressure in Vojvodina," \textit{RFE/RL Research Report}, v.2, n.48, (December 3, 1993), pp.43, 45.

\textsuperscript{19} Thompson, pp.236-7.
the Hungarian fascist quisling government during World War II, and postwar reprisals by Serbs against Hungarians, interethnic relations in Vojvodina during the communist era were quite calm. Relations between Serbs and Hungarians began to fray in 1991 when it was learned that a Hungarian firm had exported 10,000 Kalashnikov machine guns to Croatia. Another sore point was the provocative statement made by Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall that the Treaty of Trianon had given Vojvodina to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and not to the republic of Serbia. The implication was that the collapse of Yugoslavia reopened the question of Vojvodina's status. These two events worked to set the stage for a deterioration in Hungarian-Serbian relations in Serbia and cast the Hungarian community in a suspicious light to the Serbian regime.

If the category of "Yugoslav" is discounted as a meaningful form of identity, Muslims stand as the fourth largest ethnic group. Numbering 156,115 people and composing 2.4% of Serbia's population, Slavic Muslims are concentrated in the region of Sandzak, a swath of territory in southwestern Serbia that overlaps with Montenegro. In this area, there are 3 opstinas in which they constitute an absolute majority and 2 in which they represent 30

and 43% respectively. Overall, Muslims account for 60.5% of the population of the Serbian Sandzak. Like Kosovo, the Sandzak forms part of the lands on which the Serbian medieval empire was centered. (To Serbs, this area is known as the Raska region.) The Slavic peoples inhabiting this area converted to Islam under Ottoman rule and the region was critically located for the Ottomans as it connected the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina with the Muslims of Kosovo and western Macedonia. Likewise, the Sandzak was vital for Serbia as it linked Serbs and Montenegrins (the "two eyes in the head," as the saying goes) and provided Serbia with an outlet to the sea. Serbia regained the Sandzak in the First Balkan War of 1912. Towards the end of World War II, Tito's regime experimented for a brief period with autonomy for the Sandzak, but this lasted only for two years, from 1943-1945. Just as with Kosovo, the share of the Serbian population has been diminishing over time and the proportion of Muslims has

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21 Again these figures do not take into account recent population shifts due to the war in Bosnia and tensions in the Sandzak. The CSCE estimates that between 60,000 and 80,000 Muslims have left since November 1992. At the same time, thousands of Muslim refugees from Bosnia have been pouring into the Sandzak. Milan Andrejevich, "The Sandzak: The Next Balkan Theater of War?" RFE/RL Research Report, v.1, n.47, (November 27, 1992), pp.26-34; Fabian Schmidt, "The Sandzak: Muslims Between Serbia and Montenegro," RFE/RL Research Report, v.3, n.6, (February 11, 1994), pp.29-35.

22 Zecevic' and Lekic', pp.20-1.
been increasing.\textsuperscript{23}

Overall, the ethnic structure of Serbia takes, in political terms, the shape of a centrally-located dominant group surrounded by numerous peripheral minorities\textsuperscript{24} who, by virtue of their territorial concentration -- in particular Albanians, Muslims, and Hungarians -- are politically significant groups whose consent the regime must gain if a democracy is to be considered consolidated. Ethnically homogeneous areas with their own ethnic, linguistic, religious and historical features pose specific challenges to democratic consolidation. From the vantage point of aggrieved minorities, secession from the state appears a relatively easy

\textsuperscript{23} Between 1978 and 1988, the Serbian population fell from 39% to 29.5% of the total population while the Muslims grew from 58% to 67%. In 1953 in Kosovo the Albanians were close to 65% of the population while Serbs and Montenegrins made up over 26%. As noted above, today the figures are 90% and 10% respectively. Schmidt, "The Sandzak," p.29; Meier, p.58.

\textsuperscript{24} Croats, Slovaks, and Bulgarians are also found in Serbia. Although their absolute numbers are relatively small (109, 214 Croats plus 21,662 Bunjevci (a Catholic ethnic group close to Croats); 67,234 Slovaks; 25,214 Bulgarians) what makes them more significant than Gypsies, for example (who number 137,265), is that they too are territorially concentrated and they have states outside of Serbia, which the Gypsies lack. Croats-Bunjevci are primarily found in Vojvodina, Slovaks actually are a majority in 2 Vojvodina opstinas (Backi Petrovac and Kovacica), and Bulgarians are a majority in two southeastern Serbian opstinas (Dimitrovgrad and Bosilegrad). Since the war between Serbia and Croatia, an estimated 30,000 Croats have left Vojvodina. "Nacionalni Sastav Stanovnistva, 1991;" Borba (January 27, 1992), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report (Eastern Europe)}, February 18, 1992, pp.45-6; Markotich, "Vojvodina," pp.15-16.
process since it would not entail large-scale population transfers or forcible resettlements, such as the highly mixed ethnic structures in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Slavonia, Croatia required. Moreover, the geographic compactness of an ethnic group and its cultural distance from the dominant group lends to secessionist claims greater moral weight in that they can be framed as simply an exercise of majority rule and the right to self-determination. These factors also place on the dominant group a greater responsibility to craft the regime in such a way that it preserves - and perhaps enhances -- the cultural institutions and ethnic rights such areas have traditionally enjoyed in order to convince minorities that their rightful home is within the territorial confines of the state.

The hypotheses to be tested in this chapter include national ideologies, public opinion, the chain reaction, the generosity moment, census elections, and flanking.
C. National Ideologies

1. The Powers That Be: The Monistic Nationalism of Slobodan Milosevic' and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)

There is near unanimity among scholars of the former Yugoslavia that the resurgence of Serbian nationalism under the direction of Slobodan Milosevic' bears the greatest responsibility for the destruction of Yugoslavia. Exactly how to interpret Milosevic'’s policies, however, is subject to dispute. Many portray him as a practitioner of realpolitik -- a Machiavelli who is concerned most of all to maintain his personal power. Political realism, in this view, is what best accounts for the various turns and twists in Milosevic’’s public policies (e.g., his initial support of Serbian nationalists in Croatia and BH and his eventual decision to abandon their cause, remove their leaders, and agree to a peace plan that undermined the gains they made in civil war).25

The thesis presented here is that there is an unmoving core to Milosevic’’s ideology and it is best described as monistic nationalism. During his rise to power (1986-1989), he began to sound the themes of the infamous Memorandum from the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (written in 1986). In this Memorandum, it was argued that the Serbs were the most

persecuted group in Tito's Yugoslavia. Serbia was the only republic to have had carved out of it two autonomous provinces (despite there being equally good reasons to divide other areas of Yugoslavia, such as Croatia, in a similar manner), the authorities allowed the Albanian provincial leadership to conduct "physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide" against Kosovar Serbs. Serbian culture was disintegrating along republican lines, there was a conspiracy to portray Serbs as hegemonic and repressive, and Serbia itself was saddled by weak and ineffectual leaders. Essentially, the Memorandum (thought to be largely the work of the Serbian novelist and eventual president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic'), argued that Tito had humiliated Serbia by unjustly creating a Yugoslavia around the thesis of "weak Serbia, strong Yugoslavia."26

The brilliance of Milosevic' lies in the fact that he saw earlier than other Yugoslav politicians that Titoism was dead in Yugoslavia and that the field was wide open for mobilization on an agenda different than social class; namely, nationalism. At the same time, his public rhetoric has never fully betrayed him as a

great Serbian nationalist. On the contrary, Milosevic usually appears as a level-headed statesman who speaks in the language of "democracy," "progress," the "rule of law," and "civilization." His initial formula to galvanize mass solidarity meetings and topple the governments of Vojvodina (October 1988) and Montenegro (January 1989) was in fact an ideological halfway house between Marxism and nationalism, known as the "antibureaucratic revolution." According to it, a coalition of national bureaucracies had developed in Yugoslavia in the 1960s which successfully aborted the 1965 market reforms and engineered the passage of the 1974 constitution. This constitution's confederal character allowed the bureaucratic class of each republic to dominate its own national economy. By 1988 "the bureaucracy in Vojvodina," according to Milosevic, had become "the mainstay of all conservative forces in Yugoslavia" and its "separatist policy" was "aimed at destroying Serbia." In justifying the putsch that he engineered in Vojvodina, Milosevic weaved together Marxist and nationalist strands explaining that the autonomist leadership followed a "policy of division, which was anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav, petty ownership-minded and conservative."


28 In this amalgamation of Marxism and nationalism, Milosevic got considerable help from prominent Serbian Marxists, such as Mihailo Markovic and other former dissidents from the Praxis group of Marxist humanists who readily traded class for nation as the demiurge of history. As Markovic himself exclaimed after the October putsch in Vojvodina, "the
In order to carry out the objectives of the antibureaucratic revolution, the Milosevic' regime sponsored various militant organizations of Serbs from Kosovo and paid gangs of unemployed youth from Serbia to travel to various locales in Yugoslavia where they would practice the art of "street democracy." Essentially, Milosevic' cultivated a mass totalitarian movement from below in the finest of Stalinist traditions. The outcome was directly antithetical to the definition of procedural democracy adopted in this study. Milosevic's wife, Mirjana Markovic', in fact provided the philosophical defense for the violation of democratic norms. At a meeting of the Belgrade LC Municipal Committee for Ideological and Theoretical Work, she said that when citizens take to the streets it shows that the "procedural rules of the game" have been compromised and deserve to be rejected. "Herein lies the disagreement between procedure and the antibureaucratic revolution. Procedure has still not won a single such people has again become a protagonist of history." Tanjug (January 5, 1989), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), January 10, 1989, pp56-7; Vreme (November 25, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), December 27, 1991, p.41; Milan Andrejevich, "Milosevic and the Socialist Party of Serbia," Report on Eastern Europe, (August 3, 1990), pp.41-5.

29 For a glimpse at the perspectives of Milosevic’s henchmen, such as Miroslav Solevic’, the head of the Committee for the Protection of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, see Borba (February 22, 1989), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), March 1, 1989, pp.74-5; Tanjug (March 21, 1989), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), March 24, 1989, p.57; Borba (May 8, 1989), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), May 17, 1989, pp.53-5.
disagreement, at least not in the last resort.\textsuperscript{30}

Undoubtedly the most tormenting aspect to the Serb mind of the politics of the coalition of national bureaucracies was that it allowed "nationalist and separatist tendencies" to grow within the Albanian community in Kosovo. It was precisely when Milosevic began to confront the Kosovo question that he dropped any lingering Marxist rhetoric and stepped forward as the quintessential nationalist. At a now legendary meeting of the SKJ held at Kosovo Polje in 1987, some 15,000 protesting Kosovar Serbs and Montenegrins attempted to enter the hall but were beaten back by club-wielding police. When Milosevic heard of this he went to greet the crowd and vowed to them that "[n]obody, either now or in the future, has the right to beat you."\textsuperscript{31} With this statement, Milosevic earned his nationalist credentials, momentarily won the adoration and support of virtually the entire Serbian nation,\textsuperscript{32} and became what Dobrica Cosic called


\textsuperscript{32} In an open letter to Milosevic published in \textit{Delo}, the Slovene Ciril Zlobec explains the Milosevic phenomenon: "no ruler [has] succeeded in
the "most popular Serb of the twentieth century."33

From the Kosovo Polje meeting of 1987 to the passage of the new Serbian constitution in September 1990 (which "settled" the Kosovo issue), the Kosovo theme was a primary focus of Milosevic's public speeches. During this time period, Milosevic deliberately stoked the passions of Serbs and successfully made the fate of 200,000 Kosovar Serbs a paramount interest to Serbs everywhere. The central tenets of his position on Kosovo were, and have been, as follows: (1) Serbs have been the principal victims of violence and forced exodus at the hands of Albanians: "Albanian nationalist activity ... has led to physical, political, and cultural violence against Serbs and Montenegrins in the province having such deep roots in his or her people as you have done. ... the relation between you and your people is even erotic -- the Serbian people love you persistently and passionately. ... Comrade Milosevic, you are a contemporary Serbian unifier, like some princes and kings before you. ... A greater Serbian intellectual (in order to avoid confusion, it was not Dobrica Cosic), who is 100% loyal to you, more or less explained your phenomenon to me: A hero is anyone who wins in any way whatsoever, even by aggression or crime, only one small mountainous village for his or her people or state; a traitor and incapable person is anyone who loses a small village. Milosevic ... 'restored Vojvodina and Kosovo to Serbia, and again drew Montenegro into the circle of family friends. Who has done so much for his or her people in post-war Yugoslavia? Now you understand why everybody -- intellectuals, workers, farmers, bureaucracy, and the Army -- support Milosevic?'" Tanjug (March 12, 1989), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), March 13, 1989, p.71.

and ... is unprecedented in Europe ..."34 (2) Because Serbs have born the brunt of repression in Kosovo, their protest gatherings are defensive in nature and therefore legitimate whereas Albanian uprisings are chauvinistic and nationalist in orientation.35 (3) The Albanians of Kosovo have no legitimate reason to protest since they enjoy rights coextensive with European and international norms.36 (4) Albanians who have participated in protests are the pawns of a disinformation campaign emanating from Tirana and are goaded by its agents in Kosovo.37 (5) Serbs have a historic right to the territory of Kosovo since they were the first settlers there and the Serbian


medieval state and the Serbian Orthodox Church were established there.\textsuperscript{38} (6) The provincial autonomy of Kosovo that gives it near state-like elements must be abolished for its existence undermines the territorial integrity and unity of the Serbian state.\textsuperscript{39} And (7) all necessary means will be used to solve the Kosovo question. As Milosevic\textquoteright noted in a 1989 interview with \textit{Politika}: "There is no force which would halt the process of eliminating the counterrevolution in Kosovo."\textsuperscript{40}

The position outlined here corresponds very well with the dimensions of monistic nationalism. Serbs are demographically dominant and yet are portrayed as having suffered unjustly and been humiliated vis-a-vis other ethnic groups. Far from being


authoritarian and expansionist (as many in the northwestern republics perceive Serbia), Milosevic insists that the Serbian people are a unique group whose basic political culture is freedom-loving and emancipationist. At a speech at Gazi Mestan in 1989 in honor of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Milosevic highlighted the special qualities of the Serbian nation: "Serbs have never in the whole of their history conquered and exploited others. Their national and historical being has been liberational throughout the whole of history and through two world wars, as it is today. They liberated themselves and when they could they also helped others to liberate themselves. The fact that in this region they are a major nation is not a Serbian sin or shame; ... but I must say that ... the Serbs have not used the advantage of being great for their own benefit either."41

To restore the rightful group worth of Serbs Milosevic argued that constitutional revisions were necessary whereby Serbian dignity, power, unity, and prestige would be institutionalized. Practically speaking, this meant the end of autonomous territorial formations, the centralization of state power, and moves to establish a homogeneous state identity. The first two goals were accomplished with the 1989 amendments to the Serbian constitution and the promulgation of a new constitution in September 1990. Henceforth, Serbs were assured of their preeminence in the republic. In terms of constructing a

homogeneous state identity, social institutions in Kosovo and Vojvodina were Serbianized in a number of different ways -- restricting the use of the Albanian and Hungarian language in education and media services, changing the designations of streets and landmarks into the Serbian language, hiring and firing employment practices that favored Serbs (particularly in Kosovo), and staffing the provincial decision-making apparatus with Serbs from outside the province (e.g., in Vojvodina the power elite -- Radoman Bozovic', Dragutin Zelenovic', Nedeljko Sipovic', and Jugoslav Kostic' -- were from Hercegovina and Montenegro).42

Milosevic’s commitment to a centralized Serbian state was sustained throughout 1992 at the international meetings at the Hague and in Brussels conducted on the Yugoslav crisis. According to Milosevic, some forces had broached the idea of creating regions with a special status in Serbia or even the cantonization of Serbia. Milosevic’s response was unequivocal: "The offer of cantonization according to the size of ethnic minorities in some areas of the republic would not only be national treason after the huge efforts that all citizens of Serbia have made in the last few years for Serbia to again become a territorial and political whole, but also an absurdity that not one single state in present-day Europe would voluntarily decide upon."  

In sum, Milosevic’s centralization and homogenization goals and his characterization of Serbs as a unique group with a legitimate claim to preeminence fits perfectly the dimensions of monistic nationalism.


In 1990 the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the fate of Serbs outside of Serbia (particularly in Croatia) began to command the attention of the Milosevic' regime. Milosevic' felt that it was the right of Serbs everywhere to continue to live in one state, and the right of those nations seceding could not be greater than the right of those who wanted to stay. Because the republican borders were administratively determined by the previous communist regime, and because nations, not republics, created Yugoslavia, the Serbian nation was rightfully entitled to the unification of all Serbs in a single state. In the event that the republics of Yugoslavia seceded, the Serbian diaspora could legitimately exercise its right of self-determination and stay within a reconstituted Yugoslavia. Milosevic' himself warned that Serbia would not stand idly by and allow Serbs to be forcibly divided into several states where they could be persecuted as national minorities. In essence, Milosevic' put his regime behind the idea of a Greater Serbia.44

44 In the words of Milosevic', "[e]veryone knows that we in Serbia, both in all our documents and in our entire political life, have committed ourselves to the stand that Serbs must live in one state, and, of course, we want that state to be a Yugoslavia ..." Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network (May 30, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), May 31, 1991, p.23; Belgrade Domestic Service (June 25, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), June 26, 1990, pp.51-5; Belgrade Domestic Service (November 1, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), November 2, 1990, pp.69-70; Tanjug (February 1, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), February 1, 1991, p.43; Belgrade Domestic Service (March 11, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), March 12, 1991, pp.49-50; Belgrade Radio Beograd Network (February 27, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), February 28,
Milosevic’s espousal of a Greater Serbia provides two additional pieces of evidence of his monistic national ideology. Firstly, he forges an irredentist policy based on the political ideal of all Serbs in a single state. Any Serbs that remain outside this state make the Serbian state incomplete. Furthermore, Serbs “lost” in other republics face imminent danger from dominant groups traditionally hostile to Serbs and thus require protection from their matica (home) republic. Secondly, an unapologetic priority claim is presented as a natural right for Serbs, while being systematically denied to other Yugoslav peoples. The Albanians, for instance, certainly felt that they as a people of 2 million had every bit the same right as 600,000 Serbs in Croatia to determine their own fate. Not so, however, according to an ideological sleight-of-hand developed during Tito’s rule and perpetuated by Serbian nationalists of all stripes and colors. In a nutshell, it was reasoned that Yugoslavia was founded by nations -- Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims, Montenegrins, and Macedonians -- each of whom are entitled to their own titular republic and the right of self-determination. All other ethnic groups were classified as nationalities, or national minorities, and under international law were entitled only to the protection of

their culture.

The asymmetry of group rights existed, according to the SPS, regardless of group size and settlement patterns. Thus, when confronted with the charge of hypocrisy for advocating the right of Serbs in Croatia to secede while denying the same right to Albanians, Milosevic' and top-ranking SPS officials never tired of reiterating the nation - nationalities formula.45 Viewed from the perspective of national ideologies, this formulation allowed for a differential evaluation of group worth that gave the Serbian nation a veneer of legitimacy for what was in fact a priority claim.46

Contrary to exemplary monistic behavior, Milosevic' has never disparaged other nations or ethnic minorities. While he has occasionally mentioned the role of agents from Tirana in


46 In a heated exchange on this issue in the SFRJ Federal Chamber between an SIV delegation and Riza Alaj, who was representing Albanian opposition parties, Alaj said the nation - nationalities bifurcation "smells of provocation." "[F]rom the imposition of the term nationality alone, or national minority ... some people do not have full human rights. Nobody, not even an African would agree to something like that. Three million Albanians in Yugoslavia are a people, not a nationality." Borba (October 9, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), October 15, 1990, pp.75-6.
fomenting Albanian protests and resistance in Kosovo, he has never attempted to classify Albanians as second class citizens or guests.47 Similarly Milosevic' has never publicly denigrated the various ethnic groups of Vojvodina, although on one occasion he did praise assimilatory trends in the province.48 Bellicose styles of discourse are apparently reserved for SPS officials and the media. Serbian newspapers in the late 1980s were overflowing with tales of Albanian atrocities committed against Serbs -- rapes, the desecration of graves, the destruction of monuments, harassment, etc. Along with this came the social acceptability of racial epithets directed against Albanians in everyday language. The Albanian newspaper *Rilindja* documented the racist terminology that had become part of the Serbian press and Skupstina's (assembly) normal discourse, such as "Albanian cannibals," "ape people," and "Albanian Blackshirts."49 Thus, while Milosevic' himself was cautious and restrained in what he


48 In a speech in Novi Sad he honored Vojvodina as an example of how Yugoslav peoples can "aspire to become closer and increasingly similar by abandoning mutual differences." *Politika* (December 6, 1990), in FBIS, *Daily Report (Eastern Europe)*, December 12, 1990, pp.63-5.

said publicly, the nationalist milieu which he cultivated allowed for the full expression of incendiary, chauvinistic language which divided Serbia's national communities and weakened the prospects for a civil and pragmatic-oriented dialogue that could move them towards the mutual understanding and tolerance so essential for democratic consolidation.

His emphasis on the rights of citizens is another way in which Milosevic' appears not to conform to the ideal type of monistic nationalism. Milosevic' has consistently argued that Serbia as a state is to be founded on the rights of citizens, not nations, and the September 1990 Serbian Constitution enshrined this concept. While this appears to steer Milosevic' s national ideology towards the civic nationalist variant, his position is actually quite different from that of the Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic', who enunciated unambiguously a civic nationalist paradigm. A careful study of his speeches shows Milosevic' s position to be much less genuine. For instance, in a speech he delivered to the Serbian Skupstina on May 30, 1991, Milosevic' proudly affirmed his

government's commitment to the sovereignty of citizens and the absence of any discrimination in Serbia on a national basis. Following the logic of the civic nationalist paradigm, it makes sense Milosevic' would be so enamored with citizens' rights because Serbs obviously have the most citizens. At the same time, Milosevic' is only willing to apply this concept in instances favorable to the political interests of Serbs. For in the very same speech when he turned to the question of Serbs in Croatia, he said "the right to self-determination cannot be reserved only for a majority people in a nationally mixed republic. If that were so, the interests of those peoples who constitute a smaller number in a part of the Yugoslav territory within the borders of individual republics would be violated under the guise of civil democracy." In others words, the acceptability of majoritarian democracy depends on its domain of application. If it is applied to Serbia, Milosevic' cherishes it as the only legitimate method of decision-making, but when it is applied in areas where Serbs are a minority he sees clearly the ruse behind it. This overriding emphasis on the rights of Serbs effectively shows Milosevic'’s nationalism to be monistic rather than civic.


52 Hayden notes that the Serbian constitution has "covert political aims" but fails to notice exactly how a civil-oriented constitution directly secures the hegemony of the dominant group. Robert Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics," Slavic Review, v.51, n.4, (Winter 1992), pp.654-673.
The final consideration of this section is whether Milosevic’s is a political realist and not a nationalist. The primary indicators of Milosevic’s realism are taken to be his about-faces in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Recently, Milosevic has made another maneuver that appears odd for any bona fide Serbian nationalist - he repudiated the SANU Memorandum. Let us consider each of these events in turn.

In December 1991 Milosevic signaled his willingness to sign onto the Vance peace plan in Croatia that would allow for a cessation of hostilities, the introduction of UN troops, the demilitarization of the region, and the guarantee of a special status for Serbs in Croatia. This change of course was met by a virtual rebellion in Knin under the direction of Milosevic’s minion, Milan Babic. The analysis that followed by many observers and the press concluded that Milosevic, facing both foreign pressure and domestic opposition, caved in and sold out the Serbs of Croatia and thereby abandoned the goal of a Greater Serbia.53 The contrary view, however, is that Milosevic’s acceptance of the

Vance peace plan was an adroit move that advanced his Greater Serbia agenda in the following way: (1) it enabled him to solidify the gains made by Serbian nationalists in the civil war (for verbally agreeing to turn in weapons, allow the return of Croats, etc. was one thing and actually doing it is quite another), (2) it would appease the West and perhaps avert international sanctions against Serbia; and (3) it would free JNA and Serbian paramilitaries to move on to the next target -- Bosnia-Hercegovina.54

After a year of civil war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the ratio of costs and benefits began to change for Serbia's continued engagement and once again Milosevic stepped forward as a peacemaker and put pressure on the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, to sign the Vance-Owen peace plan. In a repetition of the events of December 1991 in Croatia, a flurry of

54 Another point confirming this thesis is that the man Milosevic replaced Babic with, Goran Hadzic, had previously taken just as hard a line against the Vance plan as Babic but moderated the moment the Milosevic-Babic conflict flared. Once in power, Hadzic signed all the agreements but so far has refused to implement them and is now adamantly opposed to any negotiations with Zagreb. Hence, Milosevic got everything he wanted -- a loyal servant in the Krajina and UN forces who stand as de facto protectors of Serbian gains. Stan Markotich, "Croatia's Krajina Serbs," RFE/RL Research Report, v.2, n.41, (October 15, 1993), pp.5-10; Stan Markotich, "Serbian President's Political Machinations," RFE/RL Research Report, v.3, n.8, (February 25, 1994), pp.1-5.
media reports as well as the vocal opposition of Vojislav Seselj\textsuperscript{55} all concluded that Milosevic' was betraying the cause of the Bosnian Serbs and repudiating the idea of a Greater Serbia.\textsuperscript{56} What Seselj and others failed to realize, however, is that Milosevic' was again making a tactical maneuver based on an assessment of how best to achieve a Greater Serbia in light of the current array of constraints and opportunities.\textsuperscript{57} The ensuing confrontation between Milosevic' and Seselj broke the parliamentary coalition between the SPS and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in the Serbian Skupstina and led to a regime-


sponsored media campaign designed to destroy Seselj in the eyes of the Serbian public. It was in this context of marginalizing Seselj that the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs leaked a personal note suggesting Milosevic' had reservations about the SANU Memorandum.\textsuperscript{58} Rather than indicating a fundamental change of heart, this move is best seen as an attempt by Milosevic' to exonerate himself from the war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia and pin the blame squarely on Seselj. In the end, Milosevic' surely is, as Glenny describes him, the mastermind of the politics of "deception, corruption, blackmail, demagoguery and violence."\textsuperscript{59} At the same time, his adherence to monistic nationalism is consistent; only the means change.

\textbf{a. Impact on Democracy.} How specifically then, is Milosevic's expression of monistic nationalism related to democracy and democratic consolidation? The regime over which Milosevic' presides falls significantly short of the indicators of procedural democracy. There have been a total of four elections (one was solely for the reconstituted Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRJ)) since 1990 and everyone has been marred by systematic fraud and abuse.\textsuperscript{60} While the opposition has been allowed to organize,


\textsuperscript{59} Glenny, \textit{The Fall of Yugoslavia}, p.36.

\textsuperscript{60} In regard to the 1992 election pitting Milan Panic' against Milosevic', Douglas Schoen, from the political consulting firm Penn and Schoen
compete, and participate (at the last count there were some 90 opposition parties and groups in Serbia), it has not been able to do so on an equal footing with the ruling regime. The SPS controls the only media sources that can reach the entire republic and it has used this advantage to ignore or malign the opposition and build a cult of personality around Milosevic'. The priority claims the SPS advances for Serbs vis-a-vis other ethnic groups apparently extends to the Serbian opposition as well which has been routinely portrayed as traitorous, cowardly, and unstable. In this way, the integrity of political competition has been violated. If one were to classify the type of democracy that exists in Serbia, it would probably fall within O'Donnell and Schmitter's

notion of *democratura* (i.e., a regime that has begun democratization but still restricts liberties of individuals and groups) and Burton, Gunther, and Higley's model of an unconsolidated democracy (in which democracy exists in a legal and constitutional sense and there is mass participation but elites are disunified and there is a strong potential for political violence).61

There is a fundamental incompatibility between the priority claims of the SPS and the basic values of democracy. To affirm the priority of Serbs means to deny equal rights to other ethnic groups. This was evident during the first stage of Milosevic's reign as the anti-bureaucratic revolution found its ideological underpinnings in strict opposition to the norms of procedural democracy. Once Milosevic articulated a monistic nationalist paradigm, the tremendous pressure brought to bear on the democratic rights of minorities only increased; despite the fact that he now publicly affirmed his support for democracy. In Kosovo and the Sandzak such key democratic tenets as freedom of expression and participation have been confined to parties and

individuals that accept the territorial integrity of the state. In Kosovo over 5,000 Albanians have been imprisoned for their political beliefs. In the Sandzak, the main Muslim party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), has had its leadership decimated by arrests. The major Hungarian party, the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (DZVM), has faced periodic...

threats from the authorities and Serbian paramilitaries.

The Slovene publication *Delo* astutely captured the incongruity between the verbal support of the SPS for democracy and its treatment of minorities: "When they speak about Yugoslavia, they advocate the principle of one man, one vote, but nothing less than prison is in store for anyone who would dare to say this in Kosovo." Overall, there has been a dramatic reversal of Titoist-inspired cultural rights in Kosovo and Vojvodina in the areas of constitutional law, education, the media, and language policy. The military has been employed to maintain order in Kosovo and the Sandzak; and the regime has tolerated the free movement of Serbian paramilitary groups in all three regions.

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In short, the post-communist transition in Serbia, rather than ushering in an expansion of democratic rights, has actually led to a situation comparable to the pre-communist era when Serbs flagrantly dominated the region.

b. Impact on Democratic Consolidation. Logically speaking, if there is no genuine democracy in Serbia there cannot be any degree of democratic consolidation. Thus, this section must focus on how Milosevic’s monistic nationalism has alienated minority groups from expressing their allegiance towards the regime and the state. Given that democratic consolidation is dependent on the cultivation of mutual understandings among politically significant groups, an exploration of the counterclaims, concepts, and values of the ethnic opposition in Serbia will highlight the political distance between Serbs, on the one hand, and the minorities of Serbia, on the other. What follows therefore is an examination of the national ideology that the most politically significant party for each ethnic minority has articulated in response to the monistic nationalism of the Milosevic regime.

1. The Albanian Opposition: The Democratic League of Kosovo (DSK) and a Discreet National Ideology. Of all the conflict areas of the former Yugoslavia, and indeed the Balkans, none is more potentially explosive, more emotional, more deep-seated, and more far-reaching in its implications than that of Kosovo.66

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At the level of national ideologies, the conflict between the Serbs and Albanians centers on a clash between two incompatible principles: historic rights and ethnic rights. The Serbian position insists that Serbs were the original settlers in the area. Due, however, to the interests of the Tito regime in maintaining Albanian consent, a forced exodus of Serbs from Kosovo and a corresponding influx of Albanians from Albania was permitted to change the region's demographic composition.67 Today, the proportion of Serbs stands at only 10% (200,000) of the Kosovo population and therefore the ownership claim to Kosovo must be based on historical grounds -- Serbs were the first occupants of the land, they founded their civilization in Kosovo, and they were unjustly removed from their homeland. In competition with this claim is the ethnic principle advanced by the leading figures of the Albanian opposition. Albanians are the majority group in Kosovo and therefore, it is asserted, have the right of self-determination that all nations of the former Yugoslavia have exercised. Being the third largest ethnic group in the former Yugoslavia (with a population at 2 million), it appears inconceivable to Albanians that they would be denied the right to determine their own status on the grounds that they are a "national minority." As one prominent figure and leader of the

67 Statisticians from Serbia claim that approximately 300,000 Serbs have left Kosovo since the end of World War II. Tanjug (March 3, 1989), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), March 3, 1989, p.65.
Kosovo Social Democratic Party, Shklezen Maliqi, put it: "The theories according to which the Serbs have more of a right to set up their own state than others, and according to which one set of rules applies to Serbs in Vojvodina, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, and another to Kosovo and Albanians, are in fact strange and racist."68

The principal party of the Kosovo Albanians is the Democratic League of Kosovo (DSK) led by Ibrahim Rugova, which was founded in December 1989 and claims to have over 900,000 members. Other notable parties include the Kosovo Social Democratic Party and the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo, as well as independent intellectuals with their own agenda, such as Redzep Cosja, but the DSK is widely respected as the voice of the Albanian people. In the May 1992 underground elections to the illegal parliament of Kosovo, the DSK took 76.44% of the vote and won 96 of 143 seats.69 Despite the preponderance of the DSK, efforts have been made to ensure inclusiveness and Albanian national unity, through the creation in July 1991 of an interparty coordinating council that includes all the Albanian parties in the


69 Indicative of just how great the gulf is between the DSK and every other party, the Parliamentary Party came in second with only 4.86% of the vote and 13 seats. Fabian Schmidt, "Kosovo: The Time Bomb That Has Not Gone Off," RFE/RL Research Report, v.2, n.39, (October 1, 1993), p.23.
The role the DSK plays in Kosovo political society is more akin to a movement for national independence than a party. This in part explains why it avoids the public airing of intra-Albanian conflicts. The other parties are essentially based on personalities rather than programs or they are organized on corporatist lines to serve various clienteles (e.g., the Kosovo Peasant Party as the party for the agricultural sector and the Kosovo Parliamentary Party as the party of the youth).

The public articulation of DSK goals has evolved over time in reaction to the changing circumstances the Albanians have faced. Rugova's basic demand in 1989 was to restore the 1974 constitution and, thereby, the provincial autonomy of Kosovo. In this way, the DSK followed the hypothesized pattern of nationalist politics whereby a priority claim is countered with a claim of equality. In 1990 as Yugoslavia began to convulse during its first free elections the DSK insisted that Kosovo be reconstituted as a republic within Yugoslavia. Rugova noted time and again that his party saw the future of Kosovo within

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72 See the statement by Rugova in Zeri i Popullit (April 30, 1989), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), May 9, 1989, pp.3-4.
Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{73} And it still stood behind a basic demand for equality. In the words of DSK secretary, Jusuf Buxhovi, "it is not a question of irredentism of any kind or of a fundamentalist-Marxist movement aiming to destroy Yugoslavia, but of a democratic movement for equality with others within the Yugoslav community."\textsuperscript{74} In September 1990 Albanian legislators met clandestinely at Kacanik and promulgated a new constitution which accorded Kosovo full republic status. A year later (September 26-30, 1991), the Albanian community approved the document in a referendum with 99.87\% voting in its favor.\textsuperscript{75} Emboldened by the popular mandate, the Kacanik legislators expanded their demands in October and proclaimed Kosovo an independent state. Finally in late 1991 and in 1992, the DSK and other Albanian parties began to discuss publicly the issue that


\textsuperscript{74} Flaka e Vellazerimit (September 14, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report (Eastern Europe)}, September 19, 1990, pp.67-8.

Serbia had long sought to supress -- unification with Albania. In short, DSK reactions to the conditions imposed by the Milosevic' regime have moved from equality to exit.

Many DSK statements match the dimensions of pluralist nationalism. While the party leadership demands the right of ethnic self-determination for the majority Albanians, it never fails to offer guarantees to minority Serbs and others that all civil and national rights will be protected. Rugova has often stated that all the peoples of Kosovo will be treated equally in an independent state and specifically noted that Serbs, Muslims, and Turks will be treated not as national minorities, but as "nations" with full rights in all social spheres of life. Thus, the Kosovo parties agreed to reserve 14 seats for Serb and Montenegrin candidates for the shadow parliament during the underground elections of 1992.

The constitution of the Kosovo Republic that was drafted at


Kacanik in September 1990 sanctioned bilingualism. The Albanian language was made the official "state" language, while Serbo-Croatian and Turkish languages were deemed official "in areas where members of other nationalities ... live."78 This sort of inclusive ethos best approximates pluralist nationalism.

Also pluralistic in essence is the celebrated Gandhi-like strategy of nonresistance to Serbian aggression. Referred to as well as the "policy of patience," the DSK has been committed to a path of peaceful political change. Fully aware that any armed conflict or violent opposition to the Serbian state would spell certain disaster for the essentially defenseless Albanian people, the DSK prudently and diligently sought a path of boycott and separation from Serbian social, political and economic life. The moral authority the DSK has in the Albanian community is exemplified by that fact that for two tumultuous years in Yugoslavia (1990-1992), Albanians managed to avoid any major violent standoff with the Serbian regime.79 Equally impressive is

78 Flaka e Vellazerimit (September 14, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), September 18, 1990, p.50.

79 Thousands of students did take to the streets in Pristina in October 1992 and were put down brutally by Serbian police. The students were demanding the reinstatement of Albanian language education. New York Times, (October 14, 1992); Flaka e Vellazerimit (August 20, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), September 6, 1990, pp.55-9; Borba (November 25, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), December 9, 1991, pp.52-5; Der Speigel (June 6, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), June 10, 1992, pp.44-5.
the adherence of the Albanian population to the DSK request that no Serb or Montenegrin in Kosovo be harmed in any way. The prevalence of the twin values of inclusiveness and peaceful coexistence offers prima facie evidence that the DSK has responded to Serbian monistic nationalism with a national ideology that includes some elements of pluralist nationalism. However, there are other parts to the DSK program that invite a skeptical view of this claim.

For instance, Article 1 of the Kacanik constitution, which defines the state, gives pride of place to the Albanian nation: "The Republic of Kosovo is a democratic state of the Albanian people, of the members of other peoples and national minorities, and of its own citizens, Serbs, Muslims, Montenegrins, Croats, Turks, Romani Gypsies, and others who live in Kosovo." In this formulation, the Albanian definition of the state resembles the monistic nationalist constitution of Croatia. Also highly suspicious is the neglect of Kosovo's 36,000 Gypsies who, despite being recognized in the definition of the state, did not have any seats reserved for them in the proportional system. The DSK has not been able to satisfy the cultural interests of Slavic Muslims in Kosovo either. The SDA of Kosovo has demanded autonomy (which would include

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80 Flaka e Vellazerimit (September 14, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), September 18, 1990, p.50.

the areas of Prizren, Gora, and Vitomirica-Dobrusa), citing the increasing threats to the national and cultural rights of Muslims, the desire to use the Latin alphabet of the "Bosnian language," and the demand to introduce a Muslim content into school textbooks.\textsuperscript{82} Kosovar Serbs as well simply do not believe that an Albanian-run Kosovo will adequately protect their rights. Collective reprisals and ethnic cleansing at the hands of Albanians are long-standing Kosovar Serb fears. For this reason, Rugova's repeated assurances that "the Serbs will be able to live here the same way as in Serbia"\textsuperscript{83} are not taken seriously in the Serb community.

Further evidence pointing to a more monistic nationalist orientation among the DSK elite is provided by Western journalists who have grown leery of the widely-accepted view of Albanians as an oppressed people merely seeking to build a democratic state. An article in \textit{New Statesman & Society}, for one, pointed out that Rugova has refused to discuss any kind of power-sharing in Kosovo, that the DSK program is a "crude nationalism" no different in kind to that of the Serbs and Croats, and that if Albanians were allowed to come to power the Serb minority would be


"emasculated." For similar such reasons the author of a story in The New Yorker concluded with the statement "I could not say that I blamed the Serbs for mistrusting them."

Ultimately, the DSK national ideology is situated somewhat cautiously and discreetly between pluralist and monistic nationalism. This lack of ideological clarity reflects the unstable and perilous position the Albanians face in Serbia. The desire and need to win international support for independence imposes on the Albanian leadership the necessity of speaking the language of human rights, democracy, and the protection of minorities. It remains to be seen if such values will be implemented in practice or if more cynical interpretations of DSK intentions turn out to be true.

What is unequivocally clear is that the DSK program is the product of the brutal conditions in Kosovo created by the Milosevic' regime. There is a clear line of radicalization over time. Had the SPS been more conciliatory early on when the DSK still saw its future in Yugoslavia a democratic agreement might have been easier to attain. Instead, the monistic nationalism of the SPS

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worked to create its own self-fulfilling prophecy -- swept away by the self-generated image of primitive, chauvinistic, and separatist Albanians, strong-arm rule from Belgrade completely eroded any desire among Albanians to remain part of Serbia. Shkelzen Maliqi makes this point very clear: "If most Albanians did not want to be in the Serbian state even earlier, there were many who felt that Kosovo's place was in a Yugoslav federation, with the status and rights of a republic. After everything that has happened, they are now in the minority."86 At this point in time, the two national communities are so alienated from each other that reconciliation appears impossible.87

2. The Muslim Opposition: The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and Monistic Nationalism. The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was founded in August 1990 as a branch of the SDA of Bosnia-Hercegovina. According to the ideologists of the SDA and Muslim intellectuals, Sandzak Muslims are ethnically neither Serbian nor Turkish. Rather, they are "Bosnjaks" or "Bogomils" who speak the "Bosnian language" and locate their homeland in Bosnia-Hercegovina.88 The formation of the SDA was stimulated


by ethnic tensions that began in 1989 when the Serbian media, prompted by Milosevic's agenda, began a series of stories on the forced migration of Serbs from the Sandzak, the alleged discrimination against Serbs in employment opportunities, and the use of the Albanian language in Islamic schools. The SDA participated in the 1990 elections and placed three deputies in the Serbian Skupstina, winning hands-down in the Muslim-dominated opstinas of Novi Pazar, Tutin, and Sjenica. The party has since boycotted every election.

Sulejman Ugljanin, the leader of the SDA, developed a national program that paralleled the claims the Serbian regime made on behalf of the Serbian diaspora. Namely, Ugljanin argued that the Sandzak Muslims want no more or less than the Serbs of Croatia. If the SRFJ remains intact, the Muslims will be satisfied with cultural autonomy. But if there is any territorial redefinition of Yugoslavia, the SDA expects political autonomy for the Sandzak.90

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90 Borba (August 1, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 8, 1990, pp.44-5; Belgrade Domestic Service (February 21, 1991), in FBIS, Daily
The SDA grounded its demand for autonomy on both "historical and ethnic principles." As SDA secretary Rasim Ljajic' explained: "The Muslim population has always been in the majority on the territory of the Sandzak and the Sandzak has always enjoyed the status of an autonomous region, not to mention autonomous province [sic], so that we are now not asking for more than what was once taken away from the Muslim people."91 A more elaborate defense of the Muslim position was provided in a "Memorandum on the Special Status of the Sandzak." Published in September 1991 (and then quickly confiscated by the police), the memorandum both identified the opsdnas that were to form part of the autonomous territories of the Sandzak and contained plans for Muslims to set up their own parliament, governor, and cabinet with extensive authority over a broad range of local issues (such as schools, banks, taxation, and police).92

The SDA position has actually oscillated between minimal and maximal demands, much of the fluctuation being attributable to the perceived imminence of state repression. For example, in the summer of 1991 when the war began to rage in Croatia and


relations between Muslims and Serbs took a turn for the worse, Ugljanin declared that the SDA was seeking a "Sandzak republic." After the October referendum for autonomy (approved by 98.8% of those voting), however, the SDA began to backpedal in light of government moves to ban the party. In this context, Ljajic' offered assurances that the referendum did not represent a unilateral act of secession or imply any alteration of borders. In 1992 when war engulfed Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbian paramilitaries frequently spilled over the border to terrorize the local Sandzak population, SDA leaders made a concerted effort to enlist international help for their cause, which at this time, according to Ugljanin, was minimally a "special status" and maximally a republic. By late 1993 the Serbian government carried out mass arrests of SDA members. This compelled Ugljanin to remain in Turkey, where he was on party business; he has since not returned to Serbia. In the aftermath of


the arrests, Ljajic downplayed any talk of separation and clarified that the SDA was opposed to the government, not the Serbian state.96

From the vantage point of national ideological types, the SDA reacted to the monistic nationalism of Milosevic with their own version of monistic nationalism. If we consider the population of the Serbian Sandzak opstinas, 3 have clear Muslim majorities and 3 have a Serbian majority. Consequently, any "right" that the SDA claims Muslims have over the Serbian dominated areas can only be justified on "historical" grounds (viz., the area used to be part of the autonomous Sandzak, either under the Turks or the World War II Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of the Sandzak). The ownership rationale of historic rights is meant to bestow an exclusive title of sovereignty on the group which advances it and, as such, it approximates the priority claims of monistic nationalism. Moreover, the referendum held by the SDA in October 1991 was particularly inflammatory in that it called not only for "full political and territorial autonomy" but also for the "right to [integrate with] one of the sovereign republics."97 In this regard, the referendum was nothing less than a call for territorial revision whereby the Sandzak would be annexed to Bosnia-Hercegovina. In this scenario, Serbia would lose the historic regions of its medieval empire and the local Serbian


population would be turned into a national minority.

As far as the character of any hypothetical SDA-led regime is concerned, Ugljanin has assured European diplomats that he would build a secular, law-governed, democratic state without fundamentalism and religious fanaticism. Casting suspicion on such promises, however, are reports from French journalists who have noticed portraits of the late Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini in SDA offices (with the inscription "the Great Victor of the Gulf War") and interviews with SDA militants who glowingly praise "the reforms of Khomeini."98

The ideology of the SDA did nothing to abate extreme Serbian nationalism. Reports flooded the Serbian media on the presence of Green Beret Muslim paramilitary formations in the Sandzak and the Sandzak Serbian group "Ras" spun tales on the beleaguered plight of local Serbs.99 As for the Serbian regime, SPS spokesmen rejected SDA historical accounts purporting to prove ownership of various opstinas and ridiculed SDA demands.


for autonomy on the grounds that Serbia was a state of citizens equal before the law.\textsuperscript{100} The SDA monistic nationalism thus ignited the combustible mixture of Serbian paranoia, aggrievement, and militancy. As a matter of fact, the SDA played right into the hands of the Milosevic\textsuperscript{-} regime, which thrives when an "enemy" of the Serbs can be identified -- for it was the SDA hardline stance that complemented the war-like relations between the national communities that the Serbian government coveted and which ultimately gave the Serbian authorities the excuse they sought to crackdown on the SDA and arrest its leaders.

In this instance, therefore, the confrontation between two monistic nationalisms ruled out any chance of rapprochement between ethnic elites in which ethnic relations could have been normalized and democratic consolidation secured.\textsuperscript{101} When two


\textsuperscript{101} That dialogue between Serbs and Muslims is not impossible if one side or the other speaks in a more flexible, pragmatic, ideological idiom is indicated by the SDA deputy, Mahmut Memic', who opposed the concept of autonomy and instead advocated dialogue with the government and peaceful coexistence within Serbia. He reasoned that Bosnia could not be the homeland of Muslims since it was the parent state of its own three constituent nations. This meant that Muslims had "no spare homeland" and would thus have to make peace with Serbia. He was eventually expelled
priority claims are advanced over the same territory, there is little room for compromise since both positions are absolutist in nature. Force ultimately decides.

3. The Hungarian Opposition: The Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (DZVM) and Pluralist Nationalism. The DZVM was founded in 1989 for the express purpose of protecting the interests of Hungarians in Vojvodina. It is not a party but rather a national movement encompassing the entire range of interests of the Hungarian national community. As such, it has within its ranks Christian Democratic, conservative, and left-wing factions. It is led by Andras Agoston, who is the Community's


chief spokesman. Since its inception, the DZVM has had two primary goals: (1) preventing the conscription of young Hungarians into the JNA to fight in Croatia; and (2) attaining political autonomy for the Hungarian population. During the civil war in Croatia, Hungarians were forcibly conscripted in numbers beyond their proportion in the population and suffered correspondingly high casualties.\textsuperscript{104} The sentiment quickly grew that Hungarians were being used as "cannon fodder" in an inter-Slav war in which they had no interests. The distress in the Hungarian community was only compounded by the prospect that Hungarian draftees in Croatia would be fighting Hungarian draftees from Serbia. The DZVM took a strong line against the war and was attacked in the Serbian press as a "fifth column" in the service of Croatian fascism. It was also threatened with legal proceedings by the Vojvodina government for allegedly calling on Hungarian troops to desert from JNA.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{104} Vreme reported that every fifth casualty among the Vojvodina reservists is a Hungarian. Vreme (November 11, 1991), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report (Eastern Europe)}, December 13, 1991, pp.39; Oltay, "Hungarians Under Political Pressure," p.44.

In response to the dismantling of Vojvodina’s autonomy and the annulment of cultural rights previously enjoyed by Hungarians (particularly in the domain of language rights), the DZVM has articulated a plan for local autonomy and self-government. As outlined in the "Vojvodina Hungarian Autonomy Memorandum" of April 1992, the plan calls for three different levels of autonomy for Hungarians. The operative level is dependent on the proportion of Hungarians located in a given area. At the "personal level" of autonomy, the Hungarians who comprise a minority of the population at a given locality would elect representatives to a minority council. This council would handle the educational, cultural, and social functions that serve the Hungarian populace. At the "territorial level," a Hungarian Autonomous District would be established and would cover the opstinas in which Hungarians are a majority: Mali Idos, Backa Topola, Becej, Ada, Senta, Coka, Kanjiza, and Subotica. The district would have its own coat of arms and flag, and it would run the police, education, economy, social affairs, the judiciary, local finances, and administration. The official languages would be Hungarian, "Serbian," and "Croatian." Finally, for those settlements and villages with a Hungarian majority that lie outside the District there would be a "local level" of autonomy, which would have

106 Oltay, "Hungarians Under Political Pressure," p.44.
self-governing bodies to deal with cultural issues. At no time has the DZVM advocated secession from Serbia. In one interview, Agoston even labelled any thought of union with Hungary an "empty dream."

Where does the DZVM program fit on the national ideological continuum? First of all, it is necessary to note that the demands of the DZVM are comparatively moderate. Unlike the DSK and SDA, they have not broached the issue of secession; nor have they conducted an illegal referendum for autonomy. Instead, they have played within the system (the DZVM participates at all levels


109 At one point a referendum for autonomy was planned but was never held. With regard to the war in Croatia, however, mass protests involving both Hungarians and Serbs took place in Senta and Ada and compelled the Senta Opstina Assembly to pass a referendum on the war. Vreme (November 11, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe). December 13, 1991, pp.38-9; Poulton, "Rising Ethnic Tension in Vojvodina," p.24.
of government and even runs some city governments) and they envision their future within Serbia, albeit in a reorganized state that includes arrangements for various forms of autonomy. Much to the credit of Agoston and the party's leadership, the DZVM has not been provoked into a cycle of ever-increasing demands in spite of authoritarian rule from Belgrade, ethnic cleansing from paramilitaries, and pressure from the Vojvodina Serbian political elite. Moreover, the slated autonomous district does not even include all of the Hungarian majority opstinas. According to the 1991 census Vrbas is an opstina with a Hungarian majority. But since Serbs constitute between 40 - 49% of the opstina, it

110 In the elections of 1990, the VMDK placed 8 deputies in the Serbian Skupstina. In the May 1992 elections to the reconstituted Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the VMDK earned 2 seats and had a few members appointed to posts in Panic's government. Local elections in June 1992 saw the VMDK, in a coalition with Croat parties, take control of the Subotica Opstina Assembly and a VMDK member became the town's mayor. The December 1992 elections to the Serbian Skupstina saw them increase their representation by one seat, from 8 to 9. In addition, their representation in the Vojvodina Assembly grew from 9 to 18 seats (out of 60). The December 1993 elections to the Serbian Skupstina saw their share of seats drop to 5.


was apparently considered wise to leave that opstina outside of Hungarian authority.

The party's ultimate goal is to enable Hungarians "to live as free citizens in a democratic state based on the rule of law and on a market economy." At the same time, the only way to ensure that citizens may be equal in a multiethnic context is to institutionalize a scheme of national rights. As the DZVM memorandum states: "for national minorities only the attainment of collective rights offers a real opportunity for freedom and self-determination." Hence, the preponderance of evidence leads to the conclusion that the DZVM ideology fits best under the heading of pluralist nationalism.

The pluralist nationalism of the DZVM is a force that can possibly play a positive role in the consolidation of democracy. The moderation and caution of the DZVM has contributed to a less confrontational stance with the Serbian state. Consequently, the presence of the Serbian army has not been necessary to maintain domestic order as it has in the Sandzak and Kosovo. Because its principal focus of political activity has been directed against the regime and not the state, the DZVM has gone a long way in

113 Interestingly enough, every political party in Vojvodina has rejected the DZVM autonomy plan. For instance, Nenad Canak, of the League of Social Democrats (an autonomist Serbian party that cherishes the multicultural mosaic of Vojvodina), has spoken out against it because it seeks only the particular interests of one ethnic community as opposed to the restoration of autonomy for Vojvodina as a whole. Oltay, "Hungarians Under Political Pressure," pp.45-7.
earning the description of a "loyal opposition." The fact that the DZVM has worked closely with other ethnic parties (such as the Democratic Community of Croats in Vojvodina (DZHV)), including some in the Serbian opposition, lays the basis for regular channels of elite interaction and communication. This could turn out to be critical for democratic consolidation should the SPS monopoly of power falter. Under these circumstances, the DZVM could be in a good position to press for its interests and even to shape events given its rapport with the Serbian democratic opposition.

4. Summary. The national ideology of Slobodan Milosevic has impaired ethnic relations in Serbia and, ipso facto, the possibilities of democratic consolidation. His version of monistic nationalism has alienated each of the three main ethnic groups in different degrees. By far the most estranged are the Albanians who, under the leadership of the DSK, have given up on any hope of finding a sympathetic interlocuter in Serbia (in the Albanian view the opposition is monistic nationalist as well) and instead

114 The Serbian press has in fact referred to the VMDK in precisely these terms. NIN (November 27, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), December 17, 1992, p.47.

have simply divorced Albanian civil society from Serbia by way of underground educational and social service networks and the creation of a parallel government. The Muslim SDA has withdrawn from Serbian political society and has sought independence for the Sandzak but, in the aftermath of a recent wave of repression, has taken a more conciliatory tone.

The unfortunate aspect of interethnic relations in Serbia is that it is likely that both the DSK and the SDA would have granted consent to the Serbian state if it were not for the heavy-handed rule of the SPS. In neither case was a secessionist program inevitable. However, SPS intransigence made a common life in Serbia appear infeasible and led both minority parties to articulate their own versions of monistic nationalism. As a result, the ideology of the DSK and the SDA has recursively alienated Serbs and has thereby functioned to dim the already poor prospects for democratic consolidation. It stands to reason that if two ethnic groups confront one another from the standpoint of monistic nationalism, then it will be very difficult to consolidate democracy.


The DZVM political trajectory is on a different track. Its ideological orientation accounts for the main reason it has had better relations with the regime than the DSK and the SDA. In short, a pluralist nationalist perspective is less threatening to the SPS than is a monistic national ideology. The DZVM has taken the opportunity to exercise its voice within the system and fight for the reestablishment of minority rights. In so doing, it has initiated the structural integration (i.e., the development of communication networks and regular patterns of interaction) of its elites with the leadership of the Serbian opposition parties.

D. Public Opinion

The key question of this section is whether there is evidence on hand to suggest that a single national ideology has gained the allegiance of the mass public and what effect, if any, this has for democratic consolidation. A survey of the major publishings of public opinion polls from 1990 to the present indicates that the Serbian public is very nationalistic. In August 1991 a study was conducted which attempted to measure the acceptance of extreme nationalism among Serbian citizens. On a scale from zero to 10, in which zero indicates the absence of any nationalist sentiment and 10 represents support for the most extreme national solutions, the Serbian public ranked 6.22. Other studies have filled out the

content of views of such a ranking. Research conducted in November 1993 involving a sample size of 1,511 found that 3/4 of the respondents felt that the protection of the rights of Serbs outside of the rump Yugoslavia was a priority or a highly desirable goal of the government. Thirty-seven percent believed that the Bosnian Serbs should keep all the land they had won on the battlefield, and 15% supported the idea that there were additional territories in neighboring countries that rightfully belonged to Serbia. In December 1991 a study (n=1,100) was carried out on the degree of public support for war. It found that 57.7% of Serbs supported Serbia's role in the war in Croatia while 60% of the Hungarians and 91% of the Sandzak Muslims opposed it.

Taken together, these measures indicate support among the Serbian public for the program of a Greater Serbia -- precisely the program Milosevic has pursued. Moreover, there is a xenophobic quality to the Serbian public's attitudes which undoubtedly helps the Milosevic regime maintain its power amidst severe economic privation and international isolation. Forty percent of the respondents believed that "foreign countries and politicians, international organizations, and foreign media" were in a conspiracy to demonize Serbs and hold them responsible for the


violence in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Such a worldview correlates well with the propaganda disseminated by the regime as well as the traditional Serbian siege-mentality.

The Serbian populace also exhibits negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities. The November 1993 study found that 74% registered a "very unfavorable" or "somewhat unfavorable" attitude towards Croats; three-quarters were "very unfavorable" or "somewhat unfavorable" towards Muslims; and 81% expressed a "very unfavorable or "somewhat unfavorable" attitude towards Albanians. This type of popular sentiment is very fertile ground for the priority and exclusive claims of both monistic and primordial nationalism, respectively. Not surprisingly, there has been no groundswell of discontent among Serbs over the government's reversal of the 1974 constitution and its liberal package of minority rights. In terms of the status of Kosovo, 69% felt that the province's current status should remain the same and only 7% thought it should return to the conditions under the 1974 constitution. This support for Milosevic's domestic policies is confirmed by other studies. A survey conducted in October 1992 found that 53% of those interviewed (n= 1,500) felt that Albanians should not have a university with instruction in their own

121 Markotich and Moy, p.36.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.
language and only 6.3% felt they should.\textsuperscript{124}

A striking feature of Serbian public opinion is that there is no public differentiation on the basis of Serbia's cultural regions. Thus, for all the traditional cosmopolitanism of Belgrade and its role as the cultural center of Serbia, and conversely, in spite of all the characterizations of Southeastern Serbia as holding some of "the most authoritarian values ... on the world scale,"\textsuperscript{125} either the SPS or the SRS has been the most popular party in Belgrade since 1990. While it is true that the core support of the democratic opposition (i.e., the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the Democratic Party (DS), and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)) is found in Belgrade, and that the SPS margin of support is much greater in southern Serbia, Belgradians still find the type of nationalism expressed by the SPS and the SRS more to their

\textsuperscript{124} Vreme (November 16, 1992), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report (Eastern Europe)}, December 8, 1992, pp.58-9. In an unscientific poll conducted by Borba in 1989 in which the sample size was only 140 (i.e., 5 people from three big cities in each republic and Kosovo), it was found that Serbs felt the most effective solutions to the Kosovo problem were expelling Albanians without citizenship, punishing ringleaders, and using birth control. In contrast, Slovene respondents (whose government at this time was a public champion of the Albanian cause) listed their preferred solutions to be dialogue and abatement, letting Albanians solve their own problems, and nonviolent solutions. Albanians themselves were also interviewed and the solution ranking the highest here was "by not changing the 1974 constitution." Borba (February 27, 1989), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report (Eastern Europe)}, March 21, 1989, pp.73-4.

liking.\textsuperscript{126}

This is not, of course, to say that Serbia's political society is not marked by important cleavages. Studies point to the significance of socio-economic and ideological variables that distinguish the social base of support of the government and the opposition. The SPS is strong among older citizens, the lower educated, pensioners, housewives, and those employed in the social sector. The parties of the democratic opposition represent a different cluster of Serbian society. They rely for their support on high school students, the unemployed, professionals, and those more highly educated. Comparing these two bases of support, it is found that the SPS social stratum fills out about half of the electorate in Serbia, whereas the profile of the opposition composes only a bit more than one-fifth.\textsuperscript{127} The SPS also receives the bulk of support from those who express sympathy for


\textsuperscript{127} Srbobran Brankovic', "Ram koji puca," \textit{Vreme}, (June 29, 1992), pp.31-3.
authoritarianism (49.8% in one sample) and the fewest from groups who demonstrate an anti-authoritarian, democratic orientation.128

The maintenance of the regime in power over time has not only been facilitated by a solid base of support, but the regime's ability to win the hearts and minds of the Serbian citizenry through its control of the major media institutions. To be sure, there are critical media sources in Serbia with newspapers and magazines, e.g., *Borba* and *Vreme*, an independent television station, Studio B, and an independent radio station, "B-92." The rub of this, however, is that with the decline of living standards newspapers are too expensive to purchase, and Studio B and B-92 have weak transmitters and therefore cannot reach areas outside of Belgrade. This leaves the bulk of the population dependent on the official government television station for their news.129 From

128 Ibid.

this media base, the SPS has been able to win over the public for any major policy shift it has sought. Thus as Vojislav Seselj changed from being an enemy of the regime (his Chetnik Movement - Radical Party was the only party banned in the 1990 elections) to being its supporter, his public rating in opinion polls witnessed a corresponding rise, from minus .15 in October 1990 to .49 in November 1991. Similarly, Milan Babic' experienced a drastic fall from popularity as he began to clash with Milosevic' over the Vance peace plan for Croatia, from .6 (date of measure unknown) he fell to minus .1 by March 1992. In neither case was there a change in attitudes of the individual politicians themselves but rather a change in the government's assessment of them and a parallel adjustment of their portrayal by the media.130 This pattern has been repeated for other events, specifically the about-face Milosevic' made by coming out in favor of the Vance-Owen peace plan for BH in April 1993, and the breakup of the SPS-SRS coalition in October 1993. In each case, the new enemies of Milosevic' (Karadzic' and Seselj, respectively) were vilified in the press and witnessed their approval ratings by the Serbian public drop precipitously.131


130 Komlenovic', pp.28-9. The exact meaning of the percentage points are not provided in the article.

131 Prior to the clash between Milosevic' and the Bosnian Serbs in the summer of 1993, a poll published on April 9th indicated that 70% of the
It thus seems to be the case that there is a firm foundation in the electorate for the monistic nationalism represented by the ruling SPS. A vast majority of the population has a negative attitude towards ethnic minorities, it favors the restriction of cultural rights to minorities, it believes in a Greater Serbia, and it is suspicious of outside powers and the international community. Moreover, the public has shown itself quite amenable to whatever "line" the government is currently promoting, whether it be the fall of Babic' or the rise of Seselj. In terms of the impact of such public attitudes on democracy, it is worthwhile to note that Serbian citizens register a very favorable attitude towards democracy when compared to other political systems (viz., autocracy, oligarchy, and anarchy), and the percentages in favor of democracy has continually increased over time (from 48.5% in November 1990 to 69.4% in November 1991).132 Nevertheless, respondents opposed the signing of the Vance-Owen peace plan. Once the conflict between Pale and Belgrade broke out, however, Karadzic' began to be depicted in the Serbian media as a wreckless gambler and a "greedy adventurist." The Serbian public dutifully followed the regime's new perspective. As early as May 7th 61.7% of the respondents felt the Bosnian Serbs should have ratified the plan. Similarly, once Seselj became the enfant terrible of the regime and the media began to denounce him, his popularity plummeted from a 15% approval rating to 8% in less than a month. Andrejevich, "Serbia's Bosnian Dilemma," pp.16-17; Markotich, "Government Control over Serbia's Media," p.38; Stan Markotich, "Serbia Prepares for Elections," RFE/RL Research Report, v.2, n.49, (December 10, 1993), p.16; New York Times, (May 12, 1993).

the verbal support for democracy is overridden by the overwhelming endorsement of extreme nationalist positions indicated most clearly by the fact that the SPS and the SRS continue to be the two most popular parties in Serbian political life.

Practically-speaking, this has meant that the democratic opposition (SPO, DS, DSS) has not been able to capitalize on any social discontent with the regime since they are perceived to be too weak to protect Serbian interests vis-a-vis former Yugoslav nations and the international community.\textsuperscript{133} When one considers the results of a March 1992 poll -- which showed 65\% of the electorate believed that the situation in Serbia would improve if the military immediately took control, arrested and convicted all the traitors, and established order in the country\textsuperscript{134} -- the inevitable conclusion is that the social base for a democratic transformation of the country is simply lacking. As Ljubljana Radio lamented in the aftermath of the December 1992 elections when Panic was beaten by Milosevic', the Serbian president "still enjoys the support of the majority of the Serbian electorate." The commentator went on to add: "Even though Prime Minister Panic,}


\textsuperscript{134} Brankovic', "Ram koji puca," p.33.
the entire opposition, and international observers are protesting
about alleged irregularities, it would be just another great illusion
to believe that the results of the elections would have been
significantly different had the electoral procedures been executed
correctly.\textsuperscript{135}

E. The Chain Reaction

The chain reaction hypothesis describes the tendency in
ethnically-divided societies for ethnic parties to marginalize
nonethnic parties, inject zero-sum politics and divisive nationalist
rhetoric into the body politic, and thereby hamper the
consolidation of democracy. The first important point to make
about the Serbian party system is that it is not entirely built on
ethnic parties. The Democratic Party (DS), the Democratic Party of
Serbia (DSS), the Serbian Liberal Party (SLS), the Serbian Peasant
Party (SSS), the Reform Democratic Forces of Vojvodina (RDSV),
the Citizen Alliance (GSS), and the League of Social Democrats of
Vojvodina/Yugoslavia (LSVJ) are all nonethnic parties.
Nonetheless, only the first two of these parties are politically
significant, and just barely so. Among the insignificant parties one
can find a number of pluralist nationalist programs: the LSVJ, led
by Nenad Canak (a Serb), appeals for a vision of Vojvodina that is
cosmopolitan, multicultural, and within the framework of a

"confederal Serbia." There is also Dragan Veselinov (also a Serb) of the SSS who is an advocate of Vojvodina autonomy and would be willing to grant minorities in Serbia "everything they want." In both cases, however, such tolerant and generous views are irrelevant since these parties have no mass support and can only continue to exist through multiparty coalitions, such as the Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEPOS).

Of the nationalist parties, there is the SPS, SRS, the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the Serbian National Renaissance (SNO), the Serbian Unity Party (SSJ), and the People's Party (NS). Out of


137 Vjesnik (November 24, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), December 16, 1991, pp.50-53. It is also true that not all of these nonethnic parties are exactly generous with minorities. For example, the SLS leader Kosta Cavoski is against territorial autonomy for Kosovo and Vojvodina and would only be willing to consider cultural-educational autonomy for the former. "Serbia's Complete Isolation: Interview with Kosta Cavoski," East European Reporter, (May/June 1992), pp.9-12; NIN (February 14, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), February 28, 1992, pp.41-4.

138 In the 1990 elections, the DS got 7 seats, the Peasant Party got 2 seats, and the RDSV 2. The SLS boycotted the elections and the DSS was not created until July 1992. In the 1992 Serbian elections, the DS won 6 seats, DEPOS (which included the SPO, DSS, SLS, ND-PzS, and the SSS) won 50 seats and the RDSV 2. In the 1993 elections DEPOS (SPO, ND-PzS, SSS, GSS, and a faction of the SLS) won 45 seats, the DS 29, and the DSS 7. The LSVJ currently has no parliamentary representation.
this list, the first three are politically significant. The second two, Mirko Jovic's SNO and Arkan's SSJ are politically marginal but may be considered significant since they command their own party-armies. Finally, the NS is a minor extremist party whose leader, Milan Paroski, earned a seat in the 1990 elections and is a champion of a Greater Serbia. In sum, the large, popular parties are all ethnic; the climate of nationalism has worked to drown out voices that speak from a nonnationalist, pluralist nationalist, or civic nationalist framework.

Both the SSJ and the SNO are full-fledged primordial nationalist parties. Arkan's party-army, the Tigers, committed numerous atrocities in eastern Croatia and Bosnia and are notorious for delivering to their enemies a "fast and honorable death -- by firing squad." In the 1993 election campaign Arkan promised ethnic cleansing in Vojvodina, the Sandzak, and Kosovo for all those who are not loyal to the Serbian state. Having won 5 seats from Kosovo in the 1992 elections, the SSJ lost every seat in the 1993 elections. The SNO of Mirko Jovic also commands a few party-armies -- the Vitezovi (Knights of Serbia), Dusan Silni (Dusan the Mighty), Beli Orlovi (White Eagles), and the Gavrilo Princip. The slogan of the SNO is "If we are moving forward, follow us; if they kill us, avenge us; if we stop, kill us." Jovic has on more than one occasion threatened terrorist retaliation against the West if it intervenes in the Yugoslav conflict and he advocates a Greater Serbia that includes Kumanovo and "Skopje Montenegro" (both of which lie within Macedonia). The SNO has never won a parliamentary seat.

This chain reaction logic of an ethnic party system can be seen most vividly in the political history of the DS and the DSS. These two parties (actually the DSS is a splinter with a more maximalist program than the incrementalist DS) have consistently attempted to present a program that could enable Serbia to make the transition from a post-communist to a democratic regime. Both parties seek a polity based on the rule of law, a political system based on the supremacy of the legislature, a market economy, the development of a civil society, and a

Another characteristic of the Serbian party system is the generally weak structures of most parties. The political society of Serbia is underdeveloped and thus parties are primarily grouped around prominent personalities. In this situation, interparty clashes take more the form of personal, rather than ideological, differences. Moreover, there is a great proliferation of parties that are constantly merging or splintering. For objective and professional analyses of the Serbian party system and its main players, see NIN (January 31, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), February 25, 1992, pp.50-53; NIN (December 20, 1993), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), January 14, 1992, pp.48-50; Milan Andrejevich, "What Future for Serbia?," RFE/RL Research Report, v.1, n.50, (December 18, 1992), pp.7-17; Milan Milosevic', "Srbija umorna od referendum," Vreme, (October 5, 1992), pp.10-13.

Serbia integrated into Europe. In terms of interethnic relations, neither of these parties could justifiably be labelled generous. Although the DS program speaks of a "historic agreement" with Albanians, Hungarians, and Muslims, both the DS and DSS are on record disapproving of autonomous territories or any special status for Vojvodina, Kosovo, and the Sandzak. Instead, the DS and the DSS perceive themselves as "modern, democratic" parties which place a premium on citizens as political subjects and put the "equal rights and obligations of all citizens" above the concepts of religion and nationality. The most tangible offer to minorities has been proportional representation in government bodies, which they hope will have the effect of "taking away the reason for the existence of purely national political parties."


emphasis on the rights of citizens and their aversion to the politics of nationalism, the DS and the DSS are ideologically best conceived as parties of civic nationalism.

Because the DS and the DSS are parties of civic nationalism, the electoral logic of the chain reaction has made it extremely difficult for them to have any effect on the substance of Serbian political life. A DS spokesman, Djurdje Ninkovic', is even on record testifying to the enormous roadblocks the nationalist imperative has put in the way of parties organized in accordance with a wholly different weltanschauung: "We have serious difficulties in offsetting the chauvinism embodied by ... [the SPS] ... We don't think that our vision will be widely approved at this stage: we think that simplified solutions to the problems of Kosovo offered by Serbian and Albanian nationalist parties are more striking ..." 145 In the aftermath of two elections (1990 and 1992) in which the democratic opposition's great hope of ousting Milosevic' was decisively dashed, both the DS and DSS learned some tough lessons. Rather than face political extinction, they reformulated their programs and took a strong nationalist line in the 1993 election.146

145 "We are unstoppable," pp.87-9.

No single individual is a better indicator of what can happen to a nonnationalist program in an environment completely immersed in nationalism than the fate of Milan Panic. As Prime Minister of the FRJ and candidate for the president of Serbia in 1992, the American businessman presented what was essentially a civic nationalist platform. He sought the transformation of the truncated Yugoslavia into a state based on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and an economic revival on the principles of private property and the market. He also hoped to turn Yugoslavia into a South Slav melting pot on the model of the United States. He emphasized the common Yugoslav identity of Serbs and Albanians and felt it to be perfectly legitimate for Albanians to speak their own language and have as many universities as they want, as long as they were private institutions.

A democracy, to Panic, meant that groups should be able to demand whatever they want and speak to each other in any language they want, while simple economics (and not repressive laws) would supply enough incentives for Albanians to learn

Serbo-Croatian. He was thus opposed to the elaborate state-sponsored system of minority institutions and programs that defined the Tito era. Along these same lines, he rejected any kind of special status for Kosovo or autonomy for Vojvodina and declared Kosovo an inalienable part of Serbia. According to Panic, the guarantee of civil rights would be sufficient to protect minorities. Still, he was open to ideas on the inclusion of Albanians into the system and had his ministers in the federal government work on a plan to reinvigorate education in Kosovo.

It also should not be overlooked that Panic made a major symbolic breakthrough by meeting on several occasions with Rugova and


149 In the words of his Minister of Human Rights in the FRJ, Momcilo Grubac: "It is the goal of the government to create a bourgeois society as soon as possible, a society in which the individual or the citizen, rather than a nation or a national minority, plays the determining role. ... If we base our society on the individual citizen, the ethnic problems caused by the idea of a nation state will no longer arise or will be solved much more easily." Budapest Uj Magyarorszag (August 18, 1992), in FBIS, *Daily Report (Eastern Europe)*, August 21, 1992, pp.39-40; Tanjug (September 6, 1992), in FBIS, *Daily Report (Eastern Europe)*, September 9, 1992, p.39; Tanjug (October 4, 1992), in FBIS, *Daily Report (Eastern Europe)*, October 5, 1992, p.27; NIN (November 13, 1992), in FBIS, *Daily Report (Eastern Europe)*, December 2, 1992, pp.39-44; Budapest Pesti Hirlap (November 20, 1992), in FBIS, *Daily Report (Eastern Europe)*, November 30, 1992, pp.59-60.
the leadership of the Albanian opposition.\textsuperscript{150} All in all, the Panic program exemplifies the national ideology of civic nationalism.

In political competition with the combined nationalist forces of the SPS and the SRS, Panic was simply steamrolled. Both parties challenged him every inch of the way -- from his spur of the moment meeting with Rugova in London to his plan to reopen schools in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{151} Seselj in particular vigorously attacked him for betraying Serbian interests at international forums. During the election campaign in December 1992, Serbian Prime Minister Radoman Bozovic' and Seselj colluded in the dissemination of an avalanche of allegations against the Panic team charging them with inviting foreign troops onto Yugoslav territory, being in favor


of international sanctions, deliberately destroying the economy, and planning bloody riots. Belgrade Television took its cue from such charges granting in the last 8 days of the campaign 80% of its election coverage to Milosevic and only 20% to Panic, all of it for the latter in unflattering reports. Overall, the onslaught of nationalist tirades against Panic completely overwhelmed his own message and is responsible for his stunning defeat in the election and his rapid exit from the Serbian political scene.

In conclusion, the chain reaction phenomenon has empirical significance in describing the evolution of Serbia's political society and helps to explain the failure of democratic consolidation. A brief analysis of the electoral history of nonnationalist parties suggests that there are only two options -- either start to play the nationalist card or be eclipsed. The first option was chosen by the DS and DSS who have found that the only way to survive as a party is to fan the very flames of nationalist animosity that they initially found to be so objectionable. The latter course is signified


by Panic (and SFRJ Prime Minister, Ante Markovic', before him) whose bright star of political and economic liberalism was quickly swallowed by the black hole of nationalism.

In both cases, the consequences for democracy and democratic consolidation have been negative. The absence of a nonnationalist force in the Serbian polity that is capable of articulating an alternative vision to the politics of nationalism has narrowed the range of what is politically possible and has drowned out rational discourse in favor of the nationalist predilection for history, romanticism, and violence. Panic himself testified to the stultifying omnipresence of nationalist themes -- how "everyone makes speeches about Kosovo ... what Kosovo is and that the battle of Kosovo was in 13[89] and what happened and that this is our cradle and so on. All of them make speeches. ... [W]hen I was in the Assembly, they talked about the same thing for five hours, everyone repeated the same thing."154 Furthermore, the advances that Panic and others before him might have made in terms of interethnic relations quickly dissipated with their personal political demise.155 The Vreme


155 For the most part, the DSK remained wary of Panic. There is actually some speculation that they wanted Milosevic' to remain in power since the tougher the regime in Belgrade the better claim they could make to the international community for exit. Most observers agree that the Albanian boycott of the December 1992 greatly facilitated Panic's defeat. Among the
journalist, Stojan Cerovic', captured one facet of the relationship between the chain reaction phenomenon and democracy when he wrote "for two years Serbia threw out and overturned as traitors two liberal governments -- Markovic' and Panic', just like a sick person who attributes the sickness to the medicine. ... So everything will go on until somebody finds the courage to reformulate the so-called national question, which is ... deeply undemocratic, whenever it poses itself as a problem of tying together 'all of the Serbian lands.'"156

F. The Generosity Moment

The generosity moment represents a test of how sincere a regime is in developing good relations with a minority group. It is hypothesized that if a regime strikes early in the transition and is


willing to negotiate in good faith over minority rights it may earn for itself respect from the minority and an important groundwork will have been laid for the consolidation of democracy.

The degree to which the Serbian regime has been generous has already been indicated in the analysis of Milosevic's monistic nationalism. From the outset, the Milosevic' regime has operated under the assumption that Tito's Yugoslavia emasculated the rights of the Serbian nation. The only way Serbs could be collectively vindicated and restored to their rightful place among Yugoslav nations was if the excessive rights and privileges granted to national minorities by the 1974 constitution were reversed. Because the SPS has treated the politics of the present as an avenue for the redemption of the past, the regime has simply denied any responsibility for the fate of minorities, notwithstanding all the assurances that new constitutions, laws, etc. will not in any way deprive minorities of their rights and freedoms.157

It is a bitter irony for the Serbian nationalists that the very monistic nationalist agenda they implemented as a means to secure the priority of the Serb nation has deprived Albanians and Muslims of any reason to stay in Serbia and has made the

157 Amidst the constant reiteration of this guarantee from the regime, Rugova perceptively asked "If Kosovo loses nothing and Serbia gains nothing, then why the change?" Zeri I Popullit (April 30, 1989), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), May 9, 1989, pp.3-4.
fragmentation of the Serbian state more likely than it otherwise would have been. Given that neither the DSK nor the SDA were founded with a nonnegotiable goal of secession, SPS public policy in both cases created "reluctant secessionists."\textsuperscript{158} Albanian spokesman themselves have affirmed this conclusion. The academic Rexhep Cosja, for one, explains: "For more than 8 years now, we have not heard a single good word about ourselves, not a single opinion that indicates respect for us. We have not noticed a single initiative to bring us closer together, no hand of friendship has ever been stretched out to us, and not the slightest desire for equal dialogue has been expressed. Goodwill can accomplish much more than verbal terror or political and state repression. Albanian cultural tradition preserves the idea that a kind word wins a friend and a harsh word merely loses one, and Serbian policy today is simply alienating us."\textsuperscript{159}

Once the international spotlight got turned on Serbia in 1992 and the regime felt obliged to make a good show of itself by sending out communiques to the Albanian opposition for talks, it was already far too late. The DSK responded each time that these overtures were made in bad faith and could not be taken seriously.\textsuperscript{160} So wary in fact did Albanians become that even the

\textsuperscript{158} This is a term from Horowitz, pp.247-9.


\textsuperscript{160} Tirana ATA (June 16, 1992), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report (Eastern Europe)}, June
extended hand of Panic was greeted with cynicism.161

A similar pattern is evident in Serb - Muslim relations. The moves made by the SDA were, for the most part, driven by the conditions the Milosevic' regime imposed on the Sandzak and the former Yugoslavia. The SDA creation of a Muslim National Council (MNV) as an extralegal institution of authority,162 the withdrawal of SDA deputies from the Skupstina, the attempt to create a shadow government,163 and the boycott of subsequent elections164 were all defended as being in reaction to the


"conditions of military-political terror"165 (i.e., the large presence of the Serbian police and JNA in the Sandzak and the free hand enjoyed by paramilitaries), the daily threat of "physical annihilation,"166 the alleged SPS portrayal of Muslims as a "savage people,"167 the unwillingness of the SPS to engage the SDA in dialogue over the status of the Sandzak,168 and the perceived pursuance of a Greater Serbia at the expense of the Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina. When a Skupstina delegation (among whom was Zoran Djindjic' of the DS) opened channels of dialogue in the Sandzak and an agreement seemed possible, the government initiated a motion to ban the SDA.169 Again, another window for calmer interethnic relations was closed.

In conclusion, the public policy of the Serbian regime has mirrored its monistic nationalist ideology and, as expected,


democracy and democratic consolidation have been set back. The complete lack of generosity from the dominant ethnic group has led both the Albanians and Muslims to deny legitimacy to the state. The behavior of the DZVM is the one qualification to this trend and this may be explained by the party's acceptance of pluralist nationalism. As Horowitz has noted with regard to rival ownership claims, if minorities do not fundamentally challenge the legitimation claims of the majority this can act to restrain the intensity of interethnic competition.¹⁷⁰

G. Census Elections

The idea of a census election is that in ethnically-divided societies if each group begins to vote ascriptively, i.e., vote collectively for their own ethnic party, then incentives will be in place for minorities to seek some form of exit since they have no hope of ever running the government. This, in turn, is likely to provoke repressive measures from the dominant group who seeks to maintain the integrity of the state.

In Serbia there has not been a pure census election because the Serbian electorate has consistently split its vote among several Serbian parties. With regard to minorities, however, collective ascriptive voting has taken place. The only election the SDA participated in was the first one in 1990, when they completely

trounced their competitors in the Muslim-dominated opstinas of the Sandzak.\textsuperscript{171} The DZVM has participated in every election since 1990 and routinely garners 80 - 90\% of the Hungarian vote.\textsuperscript{172} Whereas this sort of collective support from their respective national communities has only earned the SDA three seats in the Serbian Skupstina and the DZVM an average of 5.5 seats per election,\textsuperscript{173} in neither case has there been a reaction per se to their meagre representation in the political system. To be sure, both have sought versions of exit, with the SDA trying everything from cultural autonomy to secession and the DZVM developing a detailed plan for political autonomy. However, neither party advocated exit in light of a "crucial, polarizing" election in which it suddenly dawned on them that they would forever be a minor player in the system. In fact, not once did the SDA or the DZVM issue public complaints over the paucity of their parliamentary representation. For its part, the SDA was far more overwhelmed by the collapse of Yugoslavia and the violence visited upon the Sandzak by Serbian paramilitaries. The DZVM, as a party of pluralist nationalism, certainly perceived the vehicle of collective

\textsuperscript{171} Vujasinovic', pp.20-2.


\textsuperscript{173} The VMDK got 5 seats in the December 1990 elections, 3 seats in the May 1992 elections to the FRY assembly, 9 seats in the December 1992 elections, and 5 seats in the December 1993 elections.
rights to be necessary for the full representation of Hungarian interests, but even in the absence of such rights they have become for all intents and purposes a loyal opposition party in Serbia. Lastly, the Albanian boycott of Serbian political life has less to do with the slim chances of the DSK in any Serbian election and everything to do with the annulment of Kosovo's provincial autonomy and the accompanying harsh repression.174

In conclusion, the census election as a causal factor that sends minorities into exit and majority groups into a repressive mode did not occur in Serbia. The Muslims, Hungarians, and Albanians all sought some type of exit but not because they faced governmental exclusion. Rather, Belgrade's harsh rule seems to be the main motivation behind the political schemes of the SDA, DZVM and the DSK. As a result, census elections appear to be spurious variables that have no independent effect on democratic consolidation.

174 In explaining why the Albanians boycotted the 1990 elections, Shklezen Maliqi mentioned that winning only some 20 seats in the Serbian parliament was hardly a prize worth shooting for. But in confirmation of the argument I am advancing he placed the meaning of those 20 seats in the context of the disbanding of the Kosovo assembly, the annulment of autonomy, and the fact that Albanians simply do not recognize Serbian authority. Danas (December 25, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), January 8, 1991, p.55.
H. Flanking

Flanking is a phenomenon whereby insurgent nationalist parties challenge the leading role of an ethnic group's dominant party in a "politics of intraethnic outbidding." In this scenario, pressures build for the dominant party to reject any conciliatory attitude towards minorities. Moreover, if the flanking parties appear as if they have gained the initiative on the national question and threaten the dominant party's power or status, the dominant party may respond with repressive measures.

The two most significant opposition parties in Serbia since 1990 have been Vojislav Seselj's Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and Vuk Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO). Both parties have placed enormous pressures on the regime at various times since 1990 and Milosevic has adroitly handled them utilizing strategies of repression, character assassination, and cooptation. However, neither party's behavior truly reflects the hypothesized pattern of intraethnic flanking. It will be seen below that Draskovic competed against Milosevic on a pacifist platform and Seselj's SRS joined a parliamentary coalition with the SPS. Nonetheless, each party will be analyzed in this section. Because the SPO and the SRS represent the primary Serbian opposition to the SPS, a study of their varied patterns of interaction with the regime may offer insights into the general impact that intraethnic
party competition has for democracy and democratic consolidation.

Vuk Draskovic' has attempted to overtake Milosevic' from just about every conceivable political angle. Draskovic' entered the political fray in 1990 as an exponent of primordial nationalism hoping to outflank Milosevic' on the nationalist card. He thus referred to Albanians in derisive terms such as "Shkipters" (considered insulting when used by a Serb but commonplace when used among Albanians), "Arnauts" (Turkish for Albanian) and "guests" (rather than citizens of Serbia). He conjured up images of Croat-Muslim conspiracies ("Ustasha janissaries"), talked about the resurrection of a "Pavelic' Croatia," demanded revenge for "every killed, injured, and humiliated Serb," and told Albanians that if they want a republic for Kosovo they "can pack their bags immediately." Moreover, he supported the abrogation of Albanian cultural rights (in the areas of language and education), denied the existence of a Macedonian nation, and asserted that 99% of the Bosnian Muslims are in fact Serbs.175

Having already established his nationalist credentials, Milosevic could afford to moderate his position prior to the elections and thereby allow Draskovic to appear as a dangerous and unstable figure ill-suited for the demands of statesmanship. Thus in contradistinction to Vuk's incendiary speeches, Milosevic spoke of conciliation with Slovenes and Croats and warned the public to beware of the "representatives of historical primitivism" who are offering nothing but "the past" to the Serbian people. This strategy proved successful as Draskovic and the SPO were routed in the December 1990 elections.

From the mass protests in Belgrade in March 1991 at which Draskovic witnessed first hand the brutality of the regime, to the

(Eastern Europe), March 15, 1990, p.62.

176 TV Belgrade pulled out all the punches against Draskovic calling him a liar, a man with no honor, and one who is planning to betray Serbia in an orgy of violence and blood. Apparently aware that he was being painted into a corner, Draskovic attempted a month before the elections to move towards the political center, and his SPO accordingly altered their appearance and demeanor. Belgrade Domestic Service (November 4, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), November 5, 1990, p.50; Politika (August 23, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), September 6, 1990, p.65; Belgrade Domestic Service (September 7, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), September 10, 1990, pp.61-2; Belgrade Domestic Service (November 21, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), November 23, 1990, pp.58-9; Vjesnik (September 11, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), September 13, 1990, pp.63-4; Vjesnik (November 22, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), December 6, 1990, p.38.
horror at the Croatian city of Vukovar which the JNA mercilessly and senselessly turned into rubble, Draskovic’ slowly underwent a profound metamorphosis from a primordial nationalist to a pluralist nationalist. During this phase he developed a pacifist line that exposed a covert alliance involving the JNA, the SPS, and the Serb elites of BH and Croatia who found their common interests in the forcible creation of a Greater Serbia.177 His powerful and eloquent writing on the Vukovar tragedy represented some of the most morally-upright, clear-sighted, and honest analyses from a member of the Serbian political elite.178 Moreover, he and his wife, who is editor of the SPO weekly, Srpska Rec, published exposés on Serbian ethnic cleansing in BH.179

In terms of the national question, Draskovic’ hammered out a reasonable plan for the exchange of regions among the former


Yugoslav republics (e.g., Hercegovina would go to Croatia, the Serbian-inhabited Krajinas of Croatia and Bosnia would become one unit), he emphasized Europeanization as an ideal towards which to aspire in place of Serbian nationalism, he advocated dialogue with Albanian and Hungarian nationalities (although "every blade of grass" in Kosovo remained sacred to him and the territorial integrity of Serbia was nonnegotiable), and he promised the Bulgarian population concentrated in southeastern Serbia "maximum cultural rights."\(^{180}\) In a direct repudiation of his earlier rhetoric, Draskovic' expressed the idea that all minorities in Serbia should feel like "landlords" rather than "guests."\(^{181}\)


Confronted with a pluralist nationalist Draskovic', the Milosevic' regime responded with repression. Vuk was arrested for his part in the March 1991 demonstrations and later was threatened with an indictment for the responsibility of the two deaths, numerous injuries, and property damage. In the summer of 1993 riots in Belgrade flared over the ouster of Cosic' from the FRJ presidency. During the protests, Draskovic' and his wife were arrested by the police and beaten so severely that they required hospitalization. During his incarceration, Draskovic' reportedly promised to quit politics upon his release.

Between the fall of 1990 and the spring of 1991 Draskovic' was widely recognized as the principal opposition figure to Milosevic'. However, his public approval ratings have declined steadily ever since. By June 1992 his approval rating stood at less than 2% and opinion polls taken between November 1992 and November 1993 found him to be the least popular Serbian politician, ranking just above the Hungarian Andras Agoston.


184 Although Draskovic' s personal popularity has sagged, the multiparty coalition, DEPOS, that his SPO leads has maintained the second largest
Perhaps in an effort to pick up his sagging fortunes, Draskovic once again returned to the nationalist card for the 1993 elections. In a complete reversal of his politics over the last two years, he now vociferously condemned Milosevic for betraying the interests of the Serbs in Croatia and called Sarajevo a "part of Serbia." Owing to the continued decline in the significance of Draskovic, the SPS ignored his diatribes and instead focused their energies on what had become the more serious flanking party -- the SRS.

Contrary to Draskovic's many unpredictable incarnations, Vojislav Seselj and his Serbian Radical Party has been an unshakeable voice of primordial nationalism. Seselj envisions a Greater Serbia that extends westward along the Karlobag, Ogulin, Karlovac, Virovitica line. Effectively, this means that Croatia would be reduced to little more than the Zagorje, the region around Zagreb. At other times Seselj has argued that Croatia should simply be returned to Hungary (and, for that matter, Slovenia could be divided between Austria and Italy) since it "lost its statehood 900 years ago." This historical revanchism would allow Serbia to reclaim its lost brethen and territories: the number of parliamentary seats in the last two elections. Markotich and Moy, "Political Attitudes in Serbia," pp.33-36; Vreme (May 25, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe). June 9, 1992, pp.54-57; NIN (November 27, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe). December 17, 1992, pp.45-48; Andrejevich, "The Radicalization of Serbian Politics," p.16.

"Serbian Catholics" of southern Dalmatia, the "Serbian city" of Dubrovnik, the Krajina and Slavonia, the "Islamized Serbs" of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and "Serbian Macedonia." Naturally, such revisions would entail population transfers as Serbs in Zagreb and other Croatian cities would have to be resettled, Muslim resisters in BH would be deported to Anatolia, and all people would be moved out of a 50 kilometer zone along the border with Albania so that a state of war could be declared in Kosovo.\(^\text{186}\) Certainly what must make such brutal actions palatable in the mind of Seselj and the SRS is that the ethnic groups affected are deemed inferior peoples. Thus, Croats are labelled "cowards," an "unhistorical people," and a "spoiled people." In fact, in one interview Seselj admits "I have never met a decent Croat."\(^\text{187}\) In a similar vein, Albanians are called a "primitive and barbarian


The SRS and its paramilitary arm, the Serbian Chetnik Movement, has committed its share of massacres in Croatia and BH. In Serbia itself, it has been directly responsible for terror campaigns and ethnic cleansing in Vojvodina. In one such incident in the Vojvodina village of Hrtkovci, Seselj read publicly a list of Croatian families who were disloyal and warned that they had to evacuate their homes or face reprisals. Afterword, several Croats were found murdered.

Seselj began his political relationship with the regime as a hostile critic. During the 1990 election campaign he promised that if he came to power he would put on trial 20 of the "biggest
Serbian traitors" (among whom he included Milovan Djilas). At this time, the verbal exchanges between Seselj and Milosevic were completely acrimonious: Seselj announced the gap between himself and Milosevic was unbridgeable; at the Austrian parliament Milosevic called Seselj a "liar;" and in an interview in Der Spiegel in August 1991 Seselj declared that if he ever came to power he would "probably arrest Milosevic." Thus, at this point in the game, Seselj attempted to outflank Milosevic. The Serbian government responded by denying registration to the Serbian Chetnik Movement in the 1990 elections (it was the only party to face this discrimination).

Any attempt to explain the change in the relationship between Seselj and Milosevic must look back to the March 1991 protests in Belgrade. During the six days of demonstrations, it appeared the Milosevic regime would be overthrown. Seselj, however, played an instrumental role for the regime by refusing to support the students. Instead he issued appeals for order and Serbian unity. From his point of view, chaos and anarchy on the

streets of Belgrade would only benefit Serbia's enemies. This must have made some impression on SPS ruling circles. Seselj's commitment to internal Serbian unity and patriotism was even evident in the Der Spiegel interview in which he said he would arrest Milosevic; for in the next sentence he added that "as long as the Americans try to overthrow Milosevic by supporting the crazy Vuk Draskovic and Micunovic's DS, I will help Milosevic ..." Another factor to consider is that once the war in Croatia began the Serbian media put its spotlight on Seselj and glorified the exploits of his Chetnik paramilitary unit. From this point on, the democratic opposition began to notice a change in Seselj's activities as well. Increasingly leaders of the opposition parties and independent journalists spoke of Seselj and his party-army as the regime's praetorian guard ready to crush the opposition if it ever rose against Milosevic again. The characterization of


Seselj as some sort of pit bull that did the regime's "dirty work" was given further credence by Milosevic himself when he stated in a March 1992 interview that Seselj's SRS was his favorite opposition party.\textsuperscript{197}

Hence, the conditions for a convergence of interests between Milosevic and Seselj seemed to be in place in March 1991. The regime's steady cooptation of the once firmly anticommunist Seselj solidified with the May 1992 elections to the reconstituted FRJ and the December 1992 Serbian elections and earned Seselj the derogatory nickname, the "Red Duke." In these two elections the SPS was unable to gain a parliamentary majority and subsequently forged a coalition with the second largest vote-getting party -- the SRS. During the course of the SPS-SRS coalition, Seselj and his Radicals certainly did utilize the politics of intimidation to frighten the opposition: Seselj's entourage had violent standoffs with taxi drivers (who have been some of the more raucous opponents of the regime) in the front of the parliamentary building,\textsuperscript{198} they brandished weapons in public, they repeatedly harangued the Serbian opposition as "domestic


pressed the Bosnian Serbs to sign the Vance-Owen peace plan. Seselj interpreted this as capitulation to the West and took his stand firmly behind the Bosnian Serb assembly at Pale. In addition, he warned the West that if they intervened in BH Serbian forces would bomb UNPROFOR units. Milosevic subsequently began to reassess the value of a continued alignment with Seselj. The regime's *enfant terrible* was quickly becoming an international embarrassment. Even more, Seselj began to demand more as the price for his parliamentary support, reminding the regime of the numerous times he had saved it from "treasonous parties" and insisting that his choice be respected for appointment to the military chief of staff. A war of words soon erupted between Milosevic and Seselj which rivaled any of the interethnic vitriol that had been heard over the years. Seselj, having cowed the democratic opposition, now stood alone as the only conceivable domestic threat to Milosevic. In these circumstances, Milosevic's next move was a given -- repression. He dissolved the parliament in October and initiated a wave of

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204 The SPS claimed that Seselj "personifies violence and primitivism," and charged that he is responsible for "war crimes." Seselj responded that "Milosevic is the head mafiosi in Serbia" and that "crime on such a high level could not have taken place without Milosevic's knowledge and agreement." *RFE/RL News Briefs*, (September 27 - October 1, 1993), p.13, 15; *RFE/RL News Briefs*, (November 8-12, 1993), p.18.
mass arrests against SRS members.\textsuperscript{205} As Mark Thompson effectively explains, "Milosevic' must be glad to have ditched the Radicals, if only because they are too principled to be reliable as tools. ... With sanctions pushing them to end the war and disown their wilder allies, Seselj is more useful in disgrace -- and as a candidate for future show-trials of war criminals."\textsuperscript{206}

In the end, Milosevic' has certainly proven himself the master politician in Serbia. He has skillfully managed, exploited, isolated, and broken all his domestic flanks. Draskovic' first attempted to outflank him on the nationalist card and Milosevic', having no need to prove his fidelity to the cause of Serbia, disseminated a kinder, gentler message for the 1990 election and successfully outmaneuvered him. When Draskovic' transmorgified from a wild-eyed nationalist into a pacifist and gained moral leverage over the regime, Milosevic' allowed Draskovic' to be arrested and beaten in prison. Seselj's unswerving primordial nationalist outlook was first greeted by an election ban. Later, Milosevic' realized what an asset a loaded gun like Seselj could be and coopted him for the purpose of scaring the opposition into submission. Finally, when Seselj accomplished his mission and began to be too recalcitrant for the regime, Milosevic' turned the engines of repression against him.


\textsuperscript{206} Thompson, "Belgrade's Hoop of Steel," p.19.
Throughout all of this, the main loser has been democratic consolidation in Serbia. The efforts of the SPO and the SRS to outflank the SPS by appearing more nationalist sent shock waves of suspicion, anxiety, and fear throughout the national communities of Serbia and helped make racism and prejudice an acceptable and everyday existential fact of Serbian political life. This directly hampered interethnic communication which is deemed to be so vital to democratic consolidation. And Milosevic's use of Seselj as the regime's hired gun to terrify the opposition and his own use of repression against opposition parties ran contrary to democratic practices. The patterns of interaction between the regime and opposition did not exactly follow those associated with the flanking hypothesis. First of all, Draskovic's initial flanking efforts were met not by cooptation or repression but by moderation. Secondly, his adoption of pluralist nationalism represented an attempt to outflank Milosevic by becoming more moderate rather than more radical. And thirdly, Seselj's cabinet coalition with the SPS and the de facto praetorian guard role played by the SRS for the regime did not match flanking behavioral patterns. In essence, there are more avenues through which an ethnic party may seek to outflank a dominant party and the latter has more policy choices before it than is postulated by the flanking hypothesis. Still, intraethnic competition comprised a crucial dimension of Serbian politics and
was matched in severity only by the intensity of interethnic conflict.

I. Summary

Slobodan Milosevic's national ideology is the epicenter of the nationalist earthquake that convulsed Yugoslavia. The fault lines dividing Yugoslavia's ethnic communities were easily jarred by the expression of Serbian nationalism. During Tito's reign, the prevailing opinion among the communist elite was that Serbian domination was the main cause of the collapse of the first Yugoslavia. Many of Tito's institutions were crafted with the intention of diminishing Serbia's power and augmenting the power of other nations and nationalities. Politically, therefore, Serbia could hardly express its national voice without threatening the rights and prerogatives of other nations and nationalities. It is for this reason that Serbia's reaffirmation of its national interests in the post-communist transition necessarily produced multiple aftershocks of nationalism as each ethnic community in the former Yugoslavia responded to the Serbian challenge.

Within Serbia, the combined effect of chauvinist and racist rhetoric and the retrenchment of ethnic rights generated national movements in the Albanian and Muslim communities that are firmly committed to exit. Just as in Croatia, the politically
insignificant representation that minority groups have received from census elections has had no discernible effect on the ideology or the behavior of minority ethnic parties. Instead, the national ideology and generosity factors have been the primary determinants of interethnic relations. The Muslim SDA reacted to Serbian rhetoric and rule with its own version of monistic nationalism while the Albanian DSK was verbally more cautious and restrained but nevertheless steadfast in demanding the independence of Kosovo. In both cases, the only way the Milosevic' regime has been able to prevent the fragmentation of Serbia is through the use of force. The pluralist nationalist orientation of the DZVM has guided that party to participate in Serbian political society, but its core program calls for political autonomy. Even the DZVM, therefore, hopes to obtain a degree of Hungarian separation from Serbian authority. Altogether, the monistic nationalism of Milosevic' and the complete lack of generosity towards minorities has thwarted any hope that the DSK and the SDA will grant their consent to the regime and has created long-lasting enmity among the national communities. Moreover, the development of democratic institutions has been severely retarded. So fundamental in fact was the SPS dismantling of special collective rights that the communist period actually provided greater human freedoms for minorities than the post-communist nationalist period.
Nationalist ideals have always been a defining component of Serbian political culture. Much to Milosevic's credit, he understood the wellspring of opportunity that could be tapped by playing the nationalist card. His rhetoric struck deep chords in the fears, anxieties, and hopes of everyday Serbs. He recalled their past glories, expressed their present frustrations, and gave them reason to believe in the future. The survey data examined in this chapter shows that Milosevic has successfully cornered the market on mass public opinion. This has undoubtedly contributed to his longevity in office despite the hardships of war and international sanctions that have been imposed upon the Serbian people. Public opinion has also contributed to the manifestation of a chain reaction in the Serbian party system. The reason that civic nationalist groups like the DS and DSS have been unsuccessful in their struggle with the regime is because they are simply out of step with mass attitudes. Panic himself initially appeared as a *deus ex machina* who would rescue Serbia from economic ruin and international isolation. But his bid for the presidency crumbled under the dual weight of the SPS near-monopoly of the mass media and an orchestrated SPS-SRS verbal assault. In short, nonethnic political parties have been marginalized in Serbia's political society.

Attempts by Draskovic and Seselj to outflank Milosevic on a national program also failed. Draskovic realized at the end of the
1990 election campaign that he could not beat Milosevic at his own game. His national ideology subsequently underwent several mutations and this fueled the popular perception that he is erratic and unstable. The extreme nationalist Seselj was invited by the SPS to join a ruling coalition, which lasted from December 1992 to October 1993. But this invitation had less to do with any flanking pressure Seselj exerted on the regime and more to do with the regime's need for a "hit man" to subdue the opposition and to play the "fall guy" once it was in Milosevic's interest to appear moderate and conciliatory. In sum, Milosevic's nationalist agenda produced not only intense interethnic conflict in the republic, but unrestrained and violent intraethnic party competition as well.
CHAPTER VI

Conclusion: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy

"Everything was just fine before, we didn't care who was a Croat and who was a Serb, then all of sudden the Devil sent hate."\(^1\)

-- 63 year-old Serb woman from Borovo Selo, Croatia

The Yugoslav tragedy is a testament to the destructive power that nationalism and ethnic politics are capable of engendering. The brutal civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina have shocked the world by their barbarity and wanton destructiveness. The Albanians of Kosovo continue to live under a virtual Serbian police state. Serbia's military support for its diaspora throughout the former Yugoslavia has earned it the status of an international pariah. Lawrence Eagleburger, former United States Secretary of State and once regarded as sympathetic to Serbian interests, now

voices the opinion that war crimes committed by Serb forces "mimic those of their former tormentors."² Nationalist rhetoric and practice in the former Yugoslavia has even contributed its own neologism to contemporary discourse -- "ethnic cleansing."³

Still, one is left puzzled by the depth of hatred that was unleashed during the post-communist transition. After all, Yugoslavia was the first socialist country to reform the Stalinist model and reinvent a socialist political economy. While the other countries of the Soviet bloc languished under a moribund economy and a police state, Yugoslavia made meaningful advances in the realm of political liberalization, decentralization, and marketization. Yugoslav citizens could travel abroad, the country had a flourishing tourist industry, and the average Yugoslav enjoyed freedoms and a standard of living (in the northwestern part of the country) unknown to Romanians, East Germans, or Russians. Statistics as well as anecdotal evidence seemed to point to the conclusion that the animosities cultivated in World War II had significantly diminished. The number of Yugoslav identifiers increased 4 and 1/2-fold between the 1971 and 1981 censuses (from 1.3% to 5.4%). In absolute numbers, 1,219,024 people declared themselves a Yugoslav in 1981. There was also a steady


growth in the number of mixed marriages in the Serb, Croat, and Hungarian communities between 1951 and 1981. To be sure, there were many trends in Yugoslav society since the death of Tito that pointed towards increasing ethnic segmentation. But this alone cannot explain the eruption of intense interethnic strife.

This conclusion will be geared towards an explanation of why this occurred. In other words, what factors best account for the revival of interethnic hate. Why were democratic values so easily flaunted in the former Yugoslavia? Were the indigenous forms of nationalism that found expression in the land of the South Slavs inherently anti-democratic? Was there some sort of inevitability to the civil wars, and therefore the failure of democratic consolidation? These questions will be explored at three levels. First of all, a summary of the findings of this dissertation will be presented. Here I will seek to determine precisely which hypotheses demonstrated the most explanatory power and hold the greatest promise for explaining the relationship between


5 See Chapter Two.
ethnic conflict and democratic consolidation elsewhere. A second
section will examine recent political events in South Africa.
Because South Africa is a multiracial society and has had a
remarkably successful democratic transition, it constitutes a
crucial case study that will test the ability of the theoretical
framework to explain why a similar country (in terms of its ethnic
makeup) experienced a different political outcome. The third and
final section of this conclusion will contain a general exposition on
the relationship between nationalism, ethnic politics, and
democracy.

A. A Summary and Assessment of the Hypotheses

This study has tested ten different hypotheses. Within the
ideological dimension, four ideal types of nationalism were
articulated -- pluralist, civic, monistic, and primordial. They were
each assigned a hypothesized relationship to democracy and
democratic consolidation. Only pluralist nationalism, with its
premise of peaceful coexistence among ethnic groups, was
postulated to facilitate both democracy and democratic
consolidation. Civic, monistic, and primordial national ideologies
all proposed various forms of ethnic inequality and were
therefore hypothesized to be incompatible with the consolidation
of a democracy. Public opinion constituted another dimension of
this study. A review of mass survey data was undertaken to
assess the degree to which a given national ideology had gained public acceptance. Within the behavioral dimension, five hypotheses were presented. The chain reaction, the generosity moment, census elections, tripolar coalitions, and flanking were highlighted as depicting salient patterns of ethnic politics. The general theme of the behavioral hypotheses was that if ethnic elites do not promote inclusion and accommodation by an appropriate time (the generosity moment), nonethnic parties may be eclipsed by ethnic parties (the chain reaction), minorities may take drastic measures to avoid political exclusion (census elections), government coalitions may fractionate into ethnic divisions (tripolarity), and extreme insurgent parties may push dominant parties within the same ethnic group into a politics of uncompromising chauvinism (flanking).

1. National Ideologies. A centerpiece of this study has been the role of national ideologies in determining the fate of democratic consolidation. By constituting central frames of reference for group identity, interest articulation, political communication, and collective goals, nationalist ideologies are capable of influencing the mix of interests, perceptions, and calculations that come into play when politically significant groups decide whether to enter into negotiations over the nature of the regime. The empirical part of this dissertation has validated the
theoretical utility of pluralist nationalism, civic nationalism, monistic nationalism, and primordial nationalism as ideal types of nationalism. Approximations of all four ideal types were found in the case studies and the dimensions of each national ideology cohered together reasonably well. (See Table 3)

Table 3: Classification of Politically Significant Parties and Elites on Basis of National Ideology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>pluralist</th>
<th>civic</th>
<th>monistic</th>
<th>primordial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DZVM</td>
<td>SDA of BH</td>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>SRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS of Croatia (Raskovic')</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ of BH (Kljuic')</td>
<td>Milan Panic</td>
<td></td>
<td>HDZ of BH (Boban)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ of BH (Kljuic')</td>
<td>DS/DSS(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td>SDS of BH(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ of BH (Kljuic')</td>
<td>HSLS(a,c)</td>
<td></td>
<td>DS/DSS(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/DSK/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HSLS(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO(b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>/DSK/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPO(a,c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Letters a, b, c indicate consecutive time points.
Some political parties have remained consistent in their core values while others have transformed themselves drastically. The SDS of Croatia, the HDZ of BH, the SDS of BH, and the DS and DSS have all radicalized their programs in response to changing circumstances and opportunities in their respective republics. The HSLS and the SPO epitomized greater fluctuation. The HSLS began as a party of civic nationalism, played the nationalist card for a short time, and then gradually began a process of "de-nationalization" once Croatia won its independence. The SPO was originally a party of primordial nationalism. Vuk Draskovic softened his stance during the war in Croatia but eventually returned to a firm nationalist position in hope of greater electoral success. The content of national ideologies is thus affected by the political environment. But national ideologies are recursive phenomena as well that are capable of influencing political behavior and shaping political events. In fact, it is the first conclusion of this study that an analysis of national ideologies has made for a credible explanation of politics in the former Yugoslavia.

Monistic nationalism was the predominant ideology among most parties in the cases under review. A total of six major parties (the HDZ, the SPS, the SDS of BH, the SDA of the Sandzak, the HDZ of BH under Boban, and partially in the DSK) articulated programs representing this ideal type. Considered in total, these
parties shared a few characteristics: (1a) they expressed a series of grievances with the communist system and demanded in the post-communist setting the rectification of perceived historical injustices (the HDZ, the SPS, the HDZ of BH under Boban); or, (1b) they felt that the group status and rights they had experienced under Tito were now in jeopardy and that they would have to organize to prevent any retrenchment of those rights (the SDS of BH, the SDA of the Sandzak, the DSK). (2) They believed that some unique characteristic of the ethnic group they represented could only be satisfied by a claim of political priority (both the ethnic and historical principles justifying ownership over a given territory were widely used in varying formulations). And (3) they equated a minority status with being politically dominated. This collective psychological mindset militated against attention to the fine art of regime construction that would secure the inclusion of all and instead channeled political energies onto the state level. The zero-sum quality of this ideological perspective was succinctly captured in the form of a question by the Macedonian writer Vladimir Gligorov: "Why should we be a minority in your state, when you can be a minority in our state?"6

It is no accident that the three parties that bear primary responsibility for the failure of democratic consolidation in their respective republics -- the SPS of Serbia, the HDZ of Croatia, and

the SDS of BH -- were all parties of monistic nationalism (the SDS of BH eventually altered its core position to primordial nationalism). None of these parties took significant steps to craft an elite settlement or to initiate the two-step process of elite convergence. Instead, each party promoted the perceived interests of its own ethnic group above any other consideration. In Serbia, ethnic minorities were not offered genuine democratic institutions; in Croatia, the democratic package was not inclusive enough to overcome Serb minority fears of permanent political exclusion; and in BH, the SDS was predisposed not to trust the SDA and refused to accept the status of a national minority. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that democracy failed first and foremost because these three powerful parties promoted a weltanschauung that placed a higher value on pursuing national interests than building a democratic regime. For each party, the state issue (i.e., securing the priority of their group in the state) had to be settled first before the question of democracy could be seriously considered.

This study strongly confirms Dankart Rustow's thesis that the essential background condition of democratization is national unity. In explaining why this is so vital for a democracy, Rustow quoted Ivor Jennings: "the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people."7 Because parties of monistic

nationalism elevate one part of the people above the rest, they pose fundamental obstacles to democracy and democratic consolidation. They impede democracy because they have no qualms about violating democratic tenets in order to ensure the supremacy of their group. And they hinder democratic consolidation because they typically attempt to solve the issue of relative group status by broaching what Linz and Stepan call the "stateness problem." By establishing their supremacy in the state, monistic nationalist groups hope to obtain a certain level of fixity and naturalness to their rule that cannot be altered by electoral vagaries. But it is precisely in seeking to avert this permanence that other ethnic groups will respond with violent and/or secessionist strategies.

These three parties of course did not act in a vacuum. The rhetoric they disseminated was both in reaction to the disintegrating Yugoslav state and a contributory factor to that disintegration. Their discourse strongly influenced the parties of other national communities and set in place a centrifugal dynamic that encouraged belligerence, chauvinism, and xenophobia. The resurrection of Serbian nationalism under the aegis of Milosevic's

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certainly lent credibility and indispensability to Tudjman's nationalist posturing. When Tudjman reacted to the threats from Belgrade by reaching for the unifying symbols of Croatia's past, Milosevic was handed the very evidence he needed to convince his audience that fascism was returning to Croatia and had to be stopped. In a multiplier-like effect, Tudjman's priority claims for the Croatian nation provided the impetus for more radical Serb elites in the SDS to undermine the pluralist nationalism of Raskovic and pave the way for the primordial nationalism of Babic. Minorities throughout the former Yugoslavia kept close tabs on these developments and insisted that they too have an equal right to the Serbs of Croatia to exercise self-determination. This was the position of the SDA of the Sandzak and the DSK in Kosovo. Despite the wishful thinking of many Bosanci and Hercegovci, BH could not remain immune to these general trends and soon found itself in the maelstrom of three national ideologies that produced impossible demands, incompatible claims, and conflicting visions of the regime and the state. The milieu of the former Yugoslavia, therefore, was one in which the reciprocal influence of nationalist ideologies spawned a negative dialectic of uncompromising, single-minded, incendiary public discourse.

As this study has attempted to demonstrate, however, not all manifestations of nationalism are detrimental to the consolidation of democracy. Wherever empirical approximations of pluralist
nationalism were found (in the SDS of Croatia under Raskovic', in the DZVM in Vojvodina, and in the HDZ of BH under Kljuic'), a social force was present that represented dialogue, moderation, and a disposition in favor of a negotiated settlement. Unfortunately, in none of these cases were parties of pluralist nationalism the only or the most significant players. In fact, once more extreme forms of nationalism began to proliferate the voices of moderation and tolerance found they could not generate significant popular support. Parties, elites, and factions that failed to exploit nationalist symbols, speak in a vocabulary of national aggrandizement, and adopt an assumption of inherent interethnic animosity were rapidly overtaken and marginalized (witness the fate of Ante Markovic', Jovan Raskovic', Stjepan Kljuic', Milan Panic, the DS and DSS of Serbia, the UJDI, and countless other parties and associations with a Yugoslav or nonethnic orientation). The conclusion is inescapable therefore that the prevalence of monistic nationalism made a major contribution to the failure of democratic consolidation in the cases under review.

2. The Chain Reaction, Public Opinion, and National Ideologies. The chain reaction hypothesis was formulated with an eye towards the tendency in ethnically-divided societies for ethnic parties to overshadow parties that are organized on the basis of other cleavages, such as class, region, social function or values. At
the outset of the democratic transition in Yugoslavia there was a bewildering array of parties of varying orientations: ethnic parties, communist/socialist parties, liberal parties, Yugoslav parties, economic associations, and special interest groups (like the Greens). If we examine the top three parties that competed in the 1990 elections in each republic, we can in no way conclude that the elections were purely ethnic contests. There was general uncertainty prior to the elections about who would emerge victorious. (See Table 4) The post-election durability of competitive nonethnic parties, however, turned out differently in each republic.

Table 4: The Three Most Politically Significant Parties that Competed in the 1990 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Croatia^a</th>
<th>Serbia^b</th>
<th>Bosnia-Hercegovina^c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDZ (e)</td>
<td>SPS (e)</td>
<td>SKBH (ne)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNS (e)</td>
<td>SPO (e)</td>
<td>SRSJ (ne)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKH-SDP (ne)</td>
<td>DS (ne)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: e = ethnic party; ne = nonethnic party.


In Bosnia-Hercegovina, all the opinion polls indicated that ethnic parties would not receive much public support. On election day, however, the SDA, SDS, and HDZ cornered the market as the popular vote took the form of a census election. Henceforth, neither the communists nor Ante Markovic’s reform party were a factor in BH politics. Instead, the ethnic parties completely monopolized interest articulation and worked to intensify interethnic antipathy in the republic. The experience in BH, therefore, lends credibility to the chain reaction hypothesis.

In Serbia, the evolution of the party system provides ringing confirmation of the chain reaction hypothesis. Here civic and pluralist nationalist parties have consistently been unable to compete with monistic and primordial nationalist parties. The rapid departure of Milan Panic from Serbia’s political scene, the gradual adoption of nationalist rhetoric by the DS and DSS, and the failure of Vuk Draskovic’s pacifist incarnation to translate into votes all provide ample evidence that in Serbia nationalist parties have captured the largest dimension of political space. The result for Serbia has been the absence of a powerful, centrist voice that would press for the building of an inclusionary democratic regime free of any larger, nationalist objectives.

In Croatia, a chain reaction was not uniformly observed. The SDP (the former communists) lost their social base in the Serb
community but the party managed to hang on to a portion of the electorate as they emerged from the second national elections in 1992 as the third strongest party. But it is the ascendancy of the HSLS that really runs counter to the chain reaction. Over the course of three elections the HSLS has established itself as the main opposition party even as it has dispensed with the nationalist component to its program.

What accounts for the fact that Croatia stands apart from Serbia (in BH the party system did not have a chance to develop) with respect to the post-election fate of nonnationalist parties? Both the HDZ and the SPS have promoted monistic nationalist ideologies, both have established presidential political systems and highly unitary, centralized states, and both have made it equally difficult for the opposition to present its program to the electorate. One critical difference, however, is found in the public opinion variable. A careful study of the available data on public perceptions indicates that the Croatian electorate has not lined up fully behind a nationalist agenda. While there can be no doubt that the average Croatian supported independence, that average Croatian may not have agreed with many other elements of the HDZ program, such as adopting the sahovnica, altering the borders of the republic, or creating an exclusive ethnic state. As a result, there has been a sizeable portion of the Croatian population quite
open to appeals made on the basis of nonnationalist principles. Serbian political society, in contrast, has been marked by a "homogenization" of public opinion. Overwhelming majorities have a prejudicial view of minorities, support the government's curtailment of minority rights, believe in the goal of a Greater Serbia, and are paranoid about foreign powers. This greater acceptance of nationalist themes among the Serbian population goes some length towards explaining why the democratic opposition has had such a difficult time making any electoral progress.

In sum, the chain reaction appears to be more of a spurious variable, dependent on the variations and central tendencies in the mass electorate. Party systems will become more ethnic in orientation if the mass public swings its allegiance behind nationalist values. An ethnic party may dominate a polity, such as the HDZ in Croatia, without smothering nonethnic alternatives. In the case of Croatia, the electoral dominance of the HDZ is in many respects due to an electoral system that manufactures majorities. Chain reactions as empirical phenomena are not inherent aspects of ethnic politics.

The precise effect of chain reactions on democratic consolidation is in need of clarification. While it is true that in Serbia and BH the marginalization of nonethnic parties occurred in
tandem with a growing fixation on nationalist issues, this type of chain reaction can only establish the general political environment in which a democratic accord may be struck. In other words, the behavioral manifestations of a chain reaction serve more as a barometer that measures the saliency of the ethnic cleavage. But it is an empirical leap to conclude that just because ethnic parties are gaining electoral strength that more divisiveness and conflict will occur. The most that can be said is that there is a strong probability of this happening, given the kinds of issues (viz., zero-sum) that ethnic parties are normally preoccupied with in comparison to nonethnic parties. However, what this study has attempted to demonstrate is the importance of the type of national ideology that an ethnic party supports. If the ethnic parties that are brought to the forefront of the polity represent irreconcilable visions of the regime and the state (such as in BH), then the results for democratic consolidation are more likely to be catastrophic. However, if the ideological orientations of the ethnic parties are not mutually exclusive (e.g., the pluralist nationalism of the DZVM and the monistic nationalism of the SPS), then the consequences for the regime and the state are likely to be less severe and more manageable. In short, the chain reaction is more of a distal variable whereas national ideologies are a proximal variable.
Another relationship that needs to be examined is that between national ideologies and public opinion. It appears that the impact a national ideology has on the consolidation of democracy will be enhanced if the mass public adopts the values of that ideology. For instance, the Milosevic' government's pursuit of a Greater Serbia, and its repression of opposition figures and ethnic minorities have certainly been made easier by the fact that large majorities in the Serbian electorate have supported such policies. At the same time, widespread adherence to the values of the ruling national ideology is not necessary for that national ideology to influence the fate of democratic consolidation. The monistic nationalist ideology of the HDZ did not receive the full endorsement of the Croatian electorate prior to the initial, founding election of 1990. Nevertheless, HDZ elites, bolstered by an electoral law that manufactured a parliamentary majority, acted as if it had a mandate to pursue its nationalist agenda. The HDZ effort to insitutionalize Croatian preeminence in the republic and the ensuing civil war both seem to have shaped Croatian public opinion in a direction favorable to the regime's objectives. Public opinion polls since the civil war indicate that the Croatian public now holds a more prejudicial view of Serbs and is sternly opposed to any territorial concessions. Data from Serbia in fact indicate just how manipulable public opinion is when alternative media sources are not widely accessible. Dramatic shifts in
Belgrade's public policy were met with equally dramatic shifts in public attitudes.

The conclusion, therefore, is that the role of elites as bearers of a given national ideology is far more significant for the state of interethnic relations than is the general orientation of the mass public. The ethnic wars of the former Yugoslavia cannot be explained as some inevitable by-product of Balkan culture or as the necessary consequence of ancient, mass-level animosities. Rather, these were primarily elite-driven conflicts in which elites found it in their vested interests to drive a wedge between the national communities and exploit objective social cleavages for their own political advantage. This interpretation corroborates findings on elite-mass linkages in other ethnically-divided societies that are undergoing a regime transition. For example, Shabad and Gunther write with reference to ethnic politics in Catalunya and Euskadi:

"Perhaps more important (from the standpoint of the polarization of a society and the intensity of its internal conflicts) is the crucial role of party elites in translating latent social conflict (as reflected in objectively definable social cleavages) into manifest or overt political conflict. This

10 The dissolution of Czechoslovakia followed this pattern. Despite the fact that public opinion polls consistently showed Czechs and Slovaks wanted to remain together, the collision between Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar caused the breakup of the state. Marvin Ott, "Czechs and Slovaks Go Their Own Way," The Christian Science Monitor, (October 2, 1992), p.19.
function is performed by first placing issues related to social cleavages on a governmental policy-making agenda, which raises the salience of those cleavages and provides an incentive for competing groups to mobilize ... The manner in which elite representatives of those groups then articulate their conflicting demands in the course of the decision-making process will further affect the salience and level of intensity of that conflict at the mass level."\textsuperscript{11}

3. Flanking and Ideology-Shifts. The flanking hypothesis did not earn consistent empirical support in the Croatian and Serbian cases. In Croatia, the activities of the Paraga's HSP did create problems for the HDZ along many dimensions. Internally, the HSP's paramilitary wing, the HOS, conducted its own military campaigns and followed an agenda independent of the official Croatian military strategy. Paraga made many threatening remarks against Muslims and Serbs and his uncompromising program of a Greater Croatia irritated HDZ elites who hoped to corner the market on the expression of Croatian nationalism. Internationally, the HSP was a source of embarrassment at a time when the HDZ was attempting to curry favor with the West. The challenge represented by Paraga was met by a state-sponsored program of harassment which succeeded in subduing the party.

This campaign proceeded amidst a good deal of protest from the Croatian opposition and the general deterioration of civil and political liberties in the republic. In this case, flanking occurred in the pattern predicted by the hypothesis and had a negative impact on the quality of democracy.

In Serbia, the trajectory of two opposition parties was analyzed -- Vuk Draskovic's SPO and Vojislav Seselj's SRS -- and no consistent flanking pattern was found. Both Vuk and Seselj confronted the regime from a number of different angles. The haphazard and often contradictory views of Draskovic compelled the Serbian magazine *NIN* to write "the road that the SPO has traveled, following its leader Vuk Draskovic, is so long that it already belongs in textbooks of political theory and practice."\(^{12}\) Seselj, for his part, evolved from the most vociferous critic of the regime, to the loyal coalition partner of the SPS and intimidator of the opposition, and finally, to the object of a government campaign of vilification and repression. In neither of these cases did the unfolding of regime-opposition relations confirm the flanking hypothesis. It can only be concluded therefore that the behavior patterns of intraethnic competition are more variegated than this hypothesis suggests.

Far more important than the impact of flanking were the key turning points at which politically significant parties adopted a more radical ideological stand. When Babic' took control of the SDS in Croatia (October 1990) and when Karadzic' began to talk about BH in the past tense (March 1992) a qualitatively new level of discourse and temperament began to surface that was more suitable for waging war rather than for striking an interethnic deal. The ideological direction for both parties was primordial nationalism. Once this plateau was reached a green light was given to the worst elements in both communities to organize paramilitary forces and prepare for campaigns of terror. But what prompted such an escalation in rhetoric and ideological perspective? The SDS of Croatia and the SDS of BH, however condemnable for gross violations of human rights, initially were responding to the realization of their greatest fears. The largest parties in their respective republics, the HDZ and the SDA, were pushing for an independent state and were unwilling to compromise on this issue. The HDZ was unrelenting in its triumphalist posturing over the Serb community and Tudjman proved more than willing to sacrifice the democratic credentials of his regime for the sake of realizing the "millenial" goal of Croatian statehood. Similarly, SDA elite figures insisted on an independent and unitary Bosnia-Hercegovina with or without the consent of
the Serb community. Faced with what amounted to a worst case scenario, SDS elites in Croatia and BH adjusted their ideological premises accordingly and prepared to meet "fire with fire."

The incidence of violence was another element that prompted ideological radicalization. Skirmishes between Serbian irregulars and Croatian police effectively scuttled a developing rapport in March 1991 between Slavko Degoricija (the HDZ's point man in negotiations with the Serbs) and members of the SDS Regional Board for Slavonia and Baranja. The series of police wars in Croatia affected Tudjman as well, who admitted in April 1991 that democracy would have to take a backseat to the establishment of order. The murder of a member of Serb wedding party in Sarajevo -- the first casualty of the BH civil war -- in March 1992 led to the erection of barricades throughout the city and greatly disturbed SDS elites who began to talk of betrayal. Two years of brutal civil war also took a toll on the operative national ideology of the SDA which, by 1994, essentially turned to a monistic national ideology, in the form of Islamic authoritarianism. The influence that violence has on national ideologies is not without precedent in ethnically-divided societies. Shabad and Gunther report that political violence in Euskadi significantly polarized politics in that region of Spain. In their words, "overt conflict often serves to intensify in-group identification and loyalties, and

to further sharpen the divisions between those groups engaged in conflict."14

A final observation is the tendency for parties representing minority groups to escalate their demands from equality to exit. This occurred with the SDS of Croatia, the DSK, and the SDA of the Sandzak. In each case, the reluctance of the dominant party to take seriously minority demands prompted minority parties onto a course of increasingly drastic options. It is only the DZVM in Serbia that has shunned the possibility of a complete exit and instead has worked for a voice within the Serbian state.

4. Census Elections. In Serbia and Croatia, where the census election hypothesis was tested, minority parties displayed no signs of seeking secession on the grounds that their smaller population base would relegate them to a status of permanent political exclusion. This hypothesis is consequently falsified.

5. The Generosity Moment, Tripolarity, Institutions, and National Ideologies. The "generosity moment" hypothesis provides an account of what happens to interethnic relations, and thereby, democratic consolidation, if the dominant group appears headstrong, hidebound, and ironfisted. The Tudjman government is the archetypal case in this instance. To be sure, the Milosevic' government was no more magnanimous than the HDZ. But the SPS

14 Shabad and Gunther, pp.454-5.
was in a stronger position vis-a-vis ethnic minorities in Serbia and made no pretense of being concerned about minority consent and interethic equality. Instead, the program in Serbia was constitutional revisionism and the establishment, by force if necessary, of a new asymmetrical distribution of power in the republic.15 The HDZ faced a different situation. They were under the spotlight of the international community and had reason to be concerned about what that spotlight illuminated. The concerns of the international community stemmed from its decision to allow the principle of self-determination to take precedence over the principle of state sovereignty. In order to justify the international recognition of seceding republics from Yugoslavia, the EC set up the Badinter Committee to determine if minority rights were adequately protected. Seceding republics that failed to protect minorities would not be recommended for recognition.16 For its


part, Croatia needed international support in order to legitimate its secession from Yugoslavia and to erect a deterrent against any possible armed intervention from Serbia and JNA. In addition, the HDZ had to confront the Serbs of Krajina, who unlike the Albanians of Kosovo in their struggle with Belgrade, were armed and had a powerful matica (home) republic to provide ideological support and matériel. All in all, the incentives were in place for the Croatian leadership to present a genuinely accommodative program to the Serb community.

Unfortunately, the HDZ in power provides a textbook account of how to alienate severely an already aggrieved, somewhat confused, and historically militant minority. The key turning point in HDZ - SDS relations was the July 1990 amendments to the Croatian constitution. By so brazenly adopting the sahovnica (essentially the moral equivalent of the swastika to the Jewish community) as the official symbol of the state, by declaring the "Croatian literary language" to be the sole official language of the state, and by altering the rules that govern interethnic decision-making, the HDZ compelled the Serb community to mobilize in support of the SDS. The mass rally at the town of Srb brought political consciousness to the Krajina Serbs and, more ominously, gave Babic an organizational base in the SDS hierarchy. Other generosity "moments" did present themselves prior to the
outbreak of civil war, but each time the HDZ proved itself intrinsically myopic and intransigent. Because the steady ungenerosity of HDZ policy is directly related to the growth of suspicion and militancy in the SDS and Serb community, the generosity moment hypothesis provides a credible explanation of the failure of democratic consolidation in Croatia. Moreover, the generosity moment demonstrates a close nexus between what politically significant groups say they are going to do (national ideologies) and what they actually do (policy output). In the case of both the HDZ and the SPS, the policy agenda pursued in office flowed deductively from ideological premises.

At this juncture, one may question why the HDZ was so insistent on a maximalist policy agenda? After all, no ideology is so complete that it eliminates the need for discretion, the translation of broad objectives into a specific set of tactics or policies, opportunity cost-type decisions, and short-term versus long-term trade-offs. There is normally room for maneuver within any ideology between a moderate and an extreme stance, a

17 The government met with SDS elites on three separate occasions: (1) the June 1990 Tudjman - Raskovic meeting in which Tudjman offered Raskovic the symbolic post of Sabor vice-president; (2) the constitutional negotiations in October 1990, and (3) a March 1991 HDZ meeting with moderate Serbs from Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem. This latter meeting produced an initial breakthrough in the form of a working body to solve the position of Serbs in Croatia. By the end of the month, however, the agreement had crumbled under the dual pressure of Babic's forces who opposed it and in reaction to the clash at Plitvice between Serb irregulars and the Croatian MUP.
left and a right option, a minimalist and a maximalist strategy or, as Gramsci would have it, between a "war of position" and a "war of manoeuvre." One additional factor that may explain the behavior of HDZ elites in office would be the institutions that comprise the Croatian regime and the incentives that issue forth from them. There has been a good deal written recently on the effect institutions have on political behavior. Although there is considerable disagreement in this literature, many agree with the proposition that presidential political systems, first-past-the-post electoral rules, and unitary state models encourage majoritarian rather than consensual politics. Presidential institutions are thought to contribute to majoritarian politics because of the winner-take-all nature of the office and the aura it provides.


presidents as embodying greater legitimacy than any other political actors or institutions. Plurality electoral rules enable parties without majority support in the electorate to capture the majority of seats in the legislature. As a result, this "manufactured majority" does not need to interact or negotiate with opposition parties to pass legislation. Finally, a unitary state creates an asymmetrical distribution of power at the center and can lead central governments to ignore regional interests.

It just so happens that Croatia has all three of these majoritarian-inducing institutions. The first elections of 1990 were conducted in accordance with the rules established by the SKH-SDP. Under this system the president was appointed by the newly-elected Sabor. While the source of the president's legitimacy was thus found in the legislature (which in principle should act as a dilution on the president's ability to act in majoritarian fashion), the fact that the president's party was in power gave the Sabor reason to accept a subservient role to the president. The constitution of December 1990 formally institutionalized a dual executive system. Henceforth, the office of the president was to be subject to a direct, popular election, and was granted the power to appoint the prime minister (who has the confidence of the Sabor), dissolve the Chamber of Representatives (along with the consent of the prime minister and a no confidence vote in the government by the Chamber), and
pass decrees during state emergencies. Because Tudjman's party has enjoyed majority support in the Sabor, Croatia's dual executive system has functioned much like the French system during the times that presidents have enjoyed majority support in the National Assembly; in other words, as a de facto presidential regime.

The election method in the first elections of 1990 was a first-past-the-post rule. The HDZ was the chief beneficiary of this as the party took 67.5% of the seats with only 42% of the vote. Since the 1992 August elections the electoral system has been a combination of proportional representation and first-past-the-post. Nevertheless, the results have still disproportionately favored the HDZ.

The state model in Croatia is based on unitarism. The 1990 constitution defines the Croatian state as "unitary and indivisible." The Tudjman government further centralized Croatia in 1992 when it passed the "zupanija (county) law" (against the will of the opposition) and effectively ended the

20 "Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Narodne Novine, n.56, (December 22, 1990), articles 95, 98, 101, 104.

21 Lijphart, p.95; Linz, pp.48-55.

22 See Chapter Two.

Marxist-inspired system of opstinas (communes).

Thus, one could say the HDZ government has been institutionally predisposed to pursue solely the interests of the majority community. It needed the Serbs of Croatia neither to win office (electoral laws), pass binding decisions (presidentialism), nor to proclaim independence, promulgate a new constitution, and rearrange Croatia's internal scheme of territorial authority (unitarism). Still, the exact relationship between institutions and political behavior requires clarification. It is necessary to note, first of all, that institutions themselves are a product of the interests, values, and aspirations of elites. Essentially, the institutions of the Croatian regime reflect the general paradigm of monistic nationalism. Secondly, no set of institutions are so deterministic of elite behavior that they eliminate choice. What was previously set forth with regard to the degree of determinism ideology has on behavior is equally true of the causal role of institutions. As Gunther and Mughan point out, "whether elites actually behave in accord with the incentives implied by these institutional relationships is a function of a variety of other variables, most of which involve elite political culture, calculations, tactics, and ultimate objectives."24 Indeed, there were plenty of other incentives pointing towards the protection of minority rights that could have modified the majoritarian political logic of Croatia's institutions, such as

24 Gunther and Mughan, p.293.
avoiding civil war, winning international recognition, and marginalizing radicals in the Krajina. The point is that the HDZ was blinded to this alternative set of incentives because the ethos and the telos of the party's ideology gave it no reason to go beyond its own ideologically-inspired institutional framework. In this analysis, ideology and institutions are seen as mutually reinforcing a politics of rigid, exclusive majoritarianism.

If the politics of Croatia presents an instance in which ideology and institutions are co-determinants of elite behavior, the tripolar politics in Bosnia-Hercegovina demonstrate how ideology can mitigate institutional incentives. The political framework of BH was based on a consensus model. The 1974 constitution, which guaranteed the equality of the three constituent nations, remained operative in the post-communist setting. The electoral laws and structure of the post-election regime were also engineered by the communists along "semiconsociational" lines.25 Seats in the National Assembly were distributed on a proportional basis with the stipulation that no

25 I say "semiconsociational" because the BH regime did not fit all the indicators of Lijphart's consociational model. In particular, they did not have what Lijphart considers the most essential feature of consociationalism -- a grand coalition of all groups. At the level of ethnic identity, Yugoslav identifiers were not included in the partnertvu; among politically significant groups, the SKBH and the SRSJ were excluded. BH also did not have territorial ethnic autonomy (or federalism). Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), pp.25-36; 104-5, 119-134.
ethnic party could be over- or underrepresented by a margin of 15% of its share of the population. The seven-member presidency was organized on the principle of absolute equality among ethnic elites. The parties of the partnerstvu agreed to an ethnic division of power such that a Moslem would lead the presidency, a Serb the National Assembly, and a Croat the government. Furthermore, the victorious parties signed onto a unanimity rule that would govern all interethnic issues. Despite such institutional mandates for power sharing and negotiation, tripolar coalition behavior in BH was marked by a politics closer in style to majoritarianism than consensualism.

The tripolar hypothesis accurately depicts the pattern of interaction as it unfolded in BH. The three-way contest quickly reduced to a bipolar conflict with a de facto SDA-HDZ alliance against the SDS. Frustration with governmental immobilism compelled the SDA and the HDZ to violate the interparty agreement and make decisions on the basis of majority rule. For its part, the SDS sought refuge in extralegal institutions that pointed towards its exit from the state. While the tripolar hypothesis correctly anticipated political events, what is left unexplained are the underlying forces driving the bifurcation and ultimate collapse of the regime. It is perhaps understandable that with majority decision-making rules one party would feel permanent political exclusion if its positions were consistently at odds with those of the other two parties. However, in a
consensus-based regime the rules (in this case, a mutual veto and proportionality) are crafted precisely to avoid exclusion. The aim of any system approximating consociationalism is to assure the parties of all significant segments inclusion and security, and to encourage cooperative behavior. The intended upshot is that ethnic elites will develop lines of interethnic communication in which explosive issues can be quietly mediated without public uproar. The missing link in this equation, however, is the degree of commitment (or lack thereof) that elites have to the system itself. Many scholars have noted how the successful practice of accommodative strategies is dependent on elite commitment to regime values.\textsuperscript{26}

The different ideological perspectives of the three BH ethnic parties pointed to irreconciliable positions on the basic institutions of the regime. The SDS expected that Serb interests be given priority in the republic, the SDA repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the consensual model and sought greater use of majority rule, and the HDZ alternated its stance from a commitment to consensus to advocacy of Croatian priority. Lijphart himself acknowledges that incompatible ideologies may be the source of profound conflict that hampers intersegmental

elite agreements. In this sense, the three competing national ideologies within the partnersvu led to the abuse of both the mutual veto and the proportionality principle (in the latter case, each party vied towards jedinstvo vlasti (homogeneous government) in its area of authority). The most destabilizing issue, however, concerned the "stateness problem." To put the matter simply, the SDA and HDZ refused to remain in a rump Yugoslavia, and the SDS refused to leave it. Exacerbating the grave difficulties of any stateness problem was the fact that the politics of BH were unfolding against the backdrop of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Transition periods are always marked by acute strains and uncertainties -- rules and institutions are in flux, outcomes are unknown, and all players are essentially behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance with regard to their future status. Consequently, the elites of the partnersvu could not relax enough to confine the debate on "stateness" to closed door interelite negotiations or place any kind of short-term moratorium on the issue. It is concluded, therefore, that a consensus regime is less likely to mollify conflict when the following three elements are in place: (a) political actors display greater commitment to a national ideology (particularly monistic, primordial and civic nationalism) that is antithetical to the regime; (b) a period of transition from one order to another has commenced; and (c) centrifugal issues like the existence of the

27 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p.234.
state are on the agenda. Out of these three elements, "a" is considered to have the greatest impact on interethnic relations. Transition periods can be overcome and questions of the state resolved if politically significant elites are ideologically prepared to compromise.

An alternative explanation to the role of national ideologies may rely on the concept of "interests." Thus, if it is in the interests of elites to compromise they will regardless of ideological commitments. It is certainly possible that if interests and ideology diverge, agents will alter their ideological commitments to suit their interests. Many of the parties examined in this study have done just that (e.g., the SPO, the SDS of BH, the HSLS, and the DS and DSS). At the same time, a national ideology provides its carriers with a frame of reference by which alternative strategies, incommensurable choice situations, and morally complex wants can be weighed and assessed. In this sense, interests can only be defined and pursued if agents have an ideology which renders their interests intelligible and coherent.

No causal statement in this dissertation should be construed to suggest that national ideologies explain everything. Ideologies are also not irreducible, ontological "givens." Rather, I argue that specific national ideologies are articulated for a variety of reasons and that they influence interethnic relations by establishing a framework of public discourse in which group interests, aspirations, expectations, and fears are played out. And national ideologies are more deterministic during periods of political transition and social upheaval.
This is especially so in transition periods where the institutions and relationships that normally give rise to interests are disrupted. Ann Swidler, for one, argues that in "unsettled periods" ideologies generate "new capacities for action and regulating the action of others [which in turn] shape[s] the interests its adherents come to have."29 In the politics of Bosnia-Hercegovina, it was patently not in the objective, long-term interests of any party to be completely uncompromising and to lead the national communities of BH into a gruesome civil war. Yet their incompatible national ideologies prevented them from pursuing any other alternative.

In sum, the hypotheses of the theoretical framework that had explanatory significance across all the cases for the relationship between ethnic politics and democratic consolidation are as follows: national ideologies and the generosity moment. Tripolarity had empirical significance but did not explain events. The chain reaction, flanking, and public opinion hypotheses contributed to an explanation in some instances but not in others. Consequently, they cannot be confirmed as having unqualified causal efficacy. The last hypothesis, the census election, failed to earn empirical support.

B. A Brief Analysis of Recent Ethnic Politics in South Africa

A brief discussion of the ongoing consolidation of democracy in South Africa is necessary in order to test satisfactorily the theoretical framework developed herein. The cases examined in the former Yugoslavia all yielded the same result -- the forces of nationalism and ethnic politics thwarted both democracy and its consolidation. South Africa, in contrast, has thus far represented a different outcome. The four year "negotiated revolution" in South Africa culminated in a watershed election in April 1994. This election marked the historic enfranchisement of the black majority and the close of a successful transition to democracy. Substantial steps towards the consolidation of democracy have already been made by South African elites. The current democratically-elected government enjoys widespread popular support and the consent of all significant players. Anti-system and semi-loyal parties have either been coopted (the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini) or marginalized (the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB)). Moreover, since the election the government has gracefully eased into "parliamentary routine."\(^\text{30}\) The only consideration withholding the designation of South Africa as "sufficiently consolidated" is the uncertainty surrounding the political fissures

\(^{30}\text{New York Times, May 8, 1994.}\)
that will emerge towards the close of the five-year interim
government (e.g., will the head of the IFP, Chief Mangosuthu
Buthelezi, attempt to play the role of a spoiler again?). Because
South Africa is a multiracial, multiethnic society and thus far has
had success in consolidating democracy, it is a perfect comparative
case for this study. The key question guiding this section is as
follows: given that the objective social conditions in South Africa
are comparable to that of the former Yugoslavia, can the
theoretical framework explain the variation in the dependent
variable (i.e., democratic consolidation)?

The first point to establish is the validity of the ceteris
paribus clause; in other words, is South Africa a case truly suitable
for comparative analysis in this study? Demographically, South
Africa has two major racial groups, blacks (30.7 million) and
whites (5 million). There are also two smaller communities:
Colored (3.3 million) and Indian (1 million). Masked by this
aggregation are politically salient cleavages that particularly
divide blacks and whites among themselves. Although there are 8
main black tribes (each of which had its own "homeland" under
apartheid), the two largest divisions are the Zulus (8 million) and
the Xhosa (7 million). The Zulus are further distinguished by an
urban-rural divide which is associated with opposing political
loyalties (urban Zulus tend to favor the African National Congress (ANC) and rural Zulus form the social base of Inkatha). Within the white race, the Afrikaner and English communities have different cultural, historical, linguistic, and political identities. An additional pluralizing element to South African society is the existence of eleven different languages. South Africa is in every respect an ethnically-divided society equal in complexity to the ethnic composition of the former Yugoslavia.31

Other comparable features between South Africa and the former Yugoslavia is that both underwent fundamental "power transitions"32 which have a high association with civil and communal conflict, and both have experienced the rise of anti-system parties that place the stateness problem on the agenda. How then was South Africa able to navigate through the tidal waves of nationalism and ethnic conflict while the former Yugoslavia capsized and sank?


The most dramatic differences between the Yugoslav and South African experiences lie in the ideological and generosity factors. Ideologically, the two most significant forces in South Africa -- the ANC and the National Party (NP) -- have pluralist nationalist perspectives. In the ANC's "Freedom Charter" (adopted in 1955), the rights of nations and individuals are accorded equal standing. Among the individual rights the ANC advances are universal suffrage, offices open to all, equality before the law, and freedoms of speech, association, and movement. In the realm of national rights, the ANC recognizes the equal status of all national groups in the bodies of the state, the courts, and the schools, an equal right for all national groups to use their language and to develop their culture, and protections against racial insults. The ANC defines the "nation" in its most inclusive manner (i.e., as the whole community of South Africans), and divests this concept of any racial distinction. As a matter of fact, the ANC rejects race as a legitimate ethnic marker and has made it known that any national rights it recognizes in a future constitution cannot be

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33 "The Freedom Charter," published by International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, Canon Collins House, 64 Essex Road, London, N1 8LR. Lest there be any suspicion that such a dated document has relevance for the ANC's national ideology, Mandela in his post-election speech said that the ideas which guide the ANC spring from the Charter, and he described it as "our fundamental policy document." New York Times, May 3, 1994.
founded on race (i.e., skin color or physical appearance).  

This ideological repulsion of race is understandable given its use as an instrument of repression and discrimination by the regime of apartheid. It is also interesting to point out that the ANC's conception of the nation is at odds with that of other black movements like Inkatha, which, by locating its constituency solely within the Zulu nation, is effectively an ethnic party.  

Similarly, the ANC is opposed to the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) which conceives of the nation in exclusive terms — "Africa for Africans." Unlike forms of African nationalism elsewhere on the continent, the ANC vision allows for the continued presence of peoples of European descent.

Some analysts have attempted to portray the ANC position as an embodiment of civic nationalism. The party's position in favor of a nonracial, unitary democracy and its rejection of elaborate consociational prescriptions for South Africa are usually taken as


evidence of this claim. Mark Gevisser, writing in the op-ed page of the *New York Times*, even argues that the nonracial philosophy of the ANC "masks a threatening African nationalism" and that the party is "conceptually unable to resolve the ethnic dilemmas that face it."  

While it is true that the ANC rejects consociationalism, it does so because to structure a regime primarily on the basis of group rights is too similar to the organizing principles of apartheid to be accepted as legitimate. The same can be said about the ANC's insistence on a unitary state. Anything less than a unified South Africa would potentially keep intact bogus black "homelands" that were central pillars of apartheid and would hamper efforts to distribute more equitably the country's wealth. It is also true that Mandela has admitted that at the end of the five-year interim government the ANC will move towards a "majoritarian democracy." However, what is missed


40 *New York Times*, April 30, 1992. In an interview with *Time* magazine,
by this characterization of ANC ideology is the party's ethos as a builder of consensus and its commitment to interethnic reconciliation. ANC elites apparently feel that the consensus-based interim government is a necessary transitional period to ensure in the white community a sense of security and continuity and that once whites grow accustomed to black leadership the consensus model can be phased out. In this regard, ANC goals are comparable to developments in many former consociational democracies that no longer use consociational techniques -- their very success has rendered them superfluous. At any rate, to designate a party as pluralist nationalist does not, ipso facto, wed that party to consociational methods of conflict management. Consociationalism is merely one among many techniques that may be used to contain ethnic conflict. The crux of pluralist nationalism is the recognition of multiethnicity as an unalterable fact of a polity and a genuine commitment to resolving interethnic

Mandela said "After the next five years, I don't think anybody will ever hear of the National Party." Time, (May 16, 1994), p.65.


42 Donald Horowitz, for one, has been a consistent voice against consociationalism and argues that ethnic conflict is better managed through electoral devices and federalism. Donald L. Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict Management for Policymakers," (pp.115-130) and Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," (pp.451-475) in Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies. (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990).
problems. It is in this sense that pluralist nationalism differs from civic nationalism (which benignly neglects the ethnic factor), monistic nationalism (which grants one group priority in the regime), and primordial nationalism (which advocates repression, assimilation/separation, or expulsion). Out of these four ideological types, ANC national ideology is certainly closer to pluralist nationalism than other type.

Fortunately for South African democracy, the NP also developed a pluralist nationalist perspective, albeit with stronger consociational elements. In its post-apartheid incarnation, the NP defines itself as a multiracial party of the right. During the four year negotiation process, the NP came out with a variety of proposals geared to weaken majority rule, such as a collective presidency, a regionally-based upper chamber in the parliament based on "disproportionate representation" (i.e., one that favors whites), ethnic representation in the parliament, strong regional governments, federalism, and consociational power-sharing. Overall, the NP committed itself to a negotiated transfer of power that would preserve the national rights of the white


Its ideological differences with the ANC are more subtle than glaring. As Craig Charney has written, "ideological contrasts between the main parties -- the ANC and Mr. de Klerk's National Party -- are less sharp than many outsiders realize. The parties differ not on absolutes but on questions of more-or-less ..." This ideological congruence of the ANC and the NP made it possible for each to talk to each other, rather than past each other, and to negotiate based on commonly-held values, objectives, and mutual understandings. Although each had different emphases and timetables, a common ideological framework aided greatly the rapport between the ANC and the NP. In fact, for South Africans outside the parameters of a pluralist nationalist worldview, the negotiations between the ANC and the NP were completely unintelligible.

45 The NP's impressive electoral showing (20%) of the vote, indicates that de Klerk succeeded. As he stated in his post-election speech: "Just as we could not rule South Africa effectively without the support of the ANC and its supporters, no government will be able to rule South Africa effectively without the support of the people and the institutions that I represent." *New York Times*, May 3, 1994.

46 He went on to write that "the ANC is moving center-left, the National Party to center-right. Consider the ANC's formula for economic growth: investor confidence, government aid to small businesses and public works. The National Party's formula? Investor confidence, aid to small businesses and controlling inflation." *New York Times*, April 27, 1994.

47 It has been reported that radicals in the black townships spread rumors that the real Nelson Mandela was murdered in prison as only an imposter would negotiate with the white regime. The Left within the ANC -- Winnie
Given the objective social cleavages in South Africa and the fact that race was a basic organizational feature of the apartheid regime, it is not surprising to find that the democratic transition was marked by a proliferation of ethnic parties. The chain reaction of competing ethnic parties advancing their own nonnegotiable demands and mutually exclusive symbols, identities, and sense of group worth did not have fatal repercussions for democratic consolidation. Two factors can account for this. First of all, the most powerful parties -- the ANC and the NP -- both define themselves as multiracial. The NP specifically saw its electoral fortunes in wooing the colored and Indian communities and therefore it could not afford to promote a program based on exclusive white interests. While the NP did engage in smear tactics against the ANC and blacks in general during the campaign (e.g., raising the traditional white fear of a *swart gevaar* (black bogeyman) in racially mixed areas like the Western Cape), this actually amounted to no more or less than


48 Sarah Baxter, "The mouse that roared," *New Statesman and Society*. 
the negative campaign advertising now ubiquitous in politics like the United States. The NP's larger commitment to a successful democratic transition was more decisive in determining its behavior.

There was also a frightening level of violence in South Africa over the course of the transition. A total of 13,000 people were killed between 1990 and 1994, making South Africa one of the most violent countries in the world. Much of this killing was black-on-black violence in the province of KwaZulu/Natal, where ANC and Inkatha supporters waged a deadly vendetta. The response by the ANC and the NP to this situation brings into consideration the second factor that mitigated the centrifugal chain reaction of ethnic parties. In essence, the ANC and the NP were ideologically committed to reconciliation and perceived each other as indispensable to the transition. This was in fact formally acknowledged in the "Record of Understanding" of September 1992. As the violence began to reach alarming levels in the early part of 1994, de Klerk and the ANC began to worry that the violence would engulf them. Consequently, the government


declared a state of emergency in KwaZulu/Natal on March 31st and summit meetings were held between de Klerk, Mandela, Buthelezi and Zwelithini.\(^5^0\) Mandela even went so far as to upbraid publicly the rank-and-file in the ANC who were responsible for political murders. At a rally in Johannesburg, he said "a level of criminality" has cropped up within the ANC and that "nobody should come to our meetings armed."\(^5^1\) Thus, the conscious elite decision to contain intercommunal violence (rather than exploit it) marks a fundamental difference between South Africa and the former Yugoslavia and helps to explain why democratic consolidation has so far been successful in one but not the other.

The burden of being generous fell on the shoulders of the ANC. The enfranchisement of the black majority would inevitably catapult the ANC to power. The congress therefore had the obligation to allay white fears and demonstrate during the transition that it would accommodate white interests. There can be no question that during the democratic transition the ANC leadership exemplified the very model of generosity. The outcome of four years of negotiation with the NP was an ANC pledge to accept a consensus-based government that would


include a collegial coalition Cabinet and a dual vice-presidency (with one member from the majority party and one from the largest opposition party). The 27-member cabinet was to be staffed on a proportional basis and was open to all parties that earned 5% in the founding elections. Based on the April election results, the ANC (with 62.7% of the popular vote) secured 18 ministerial posts, the NP 6 (20.4%), and Inkatha 3 (10.5%). In a move to win the trust of important institutional interests in the white community, such as the military, the foreign services, and business, the ANC allowed the continued presence in the new cabinet of 3 prominent NP members from the outgoing government. Chief Buthelezi, who demanded autonomous provincial governments, was offered the post of minister of Home Affairs. And de Klerk took one of the two vice-presidential posts. Another part of the ANC's agreement with the NP was the "sunset clause," which was first broached by the South African Communist Party leader, Joe Slovo. The intention here was to place strategic institutions of the old regime, in this case, the civil service and the security forces, at ease by guaranteeing their jobs.

52 But even here Mandela sought more inclusiveness and expressed a desire to invite the PAC, who won only 1.2% of the vote, into the Cabinet: "I have got certain ideas," he reasoned. "They have suffered together with us." *New York Times*, May 3, 1994.

for the next 5 years.54

ANC generosity was not confined to explicit agreements made with the NP. On the contrary, both in large and small ways, the ANC revealed its intrinsic magnanimity and its commitment to accommodation as truly genuine.55 Over the course of the transition Mandela made it a point to talk with every major South African figure, with the sole exception of the neo-Nazi leader, Eugene Terre'Blanche.56 He also made it clear that even if the ANC won the necessary two-thirds of the seats in the interim parliament that would enable it to single-handedly write a new constitution, it would still search for consensus.57

On the day of inauguration, Mandela praised de Klerk as "one of the greatest reformers, one of the greatest sons of the soil," which is one of the highest forms of praise a black South African can offer. During the same ceremonies, ANC leaders made a

54 The Economist. (February 13, 1993), p.44.

55 For an opposite, and I feel exaggerated, view that ascribes to the ANC the traits of "intolerance of competition and the determination to crush all political rivals," see Marina Ottaway, "Liberation Movements and Transition to Democracy: the Case of the A.N.C.," The Journal of Modern African Studies, v.29, n.1, (1991), pp.61-82.


friendly gesture towards Chief Buthelezi and King Goodwill Zwelithini by moving them from their assigned "B-seats" to the front row. And at a post-inaugural speech, Mandela lectured his black audience on the need to learn the words to the Afikaner national anthem, which would now coexist with the black liberation anthem. In a statement that captures the essence of pluralist nationalism, he insisted "if you don't know Afrikaans, you must learn it. If you don't know Zulu or Xhosa, you must learn those."58

In the days after the election, Mandela forged ahead with a reconciliation program promising to whites there would be no dismantling of Afrikaner monuments or symbols, and no renaming of streets or cities that bear the names of (in)famous Afrikaners. He granted immunity to white police officers accused of murder or torture and the new government pledged itself to subsidizing schools for ethnic minorities (i.e., Afrikaners). According to Mandela, "we believe that by recognizing diversity we will actually be uniting the people of South Africa."59 In all of this, the maturity, benevolence, wisdom, and absence of any resentment among ANC elites is striking and must be regarded as a critical factor for South Africa's great leap forward in the


consolidation of democracy.

The generosity moment had ramifications as well for the role that flanking would play. Indeed, it was the unceasing generosity of the ANC that proved to be strongest medicine against the virus of flanking parties. During the democratic transition Inkatha often played the role of a flanking party to the ANC by charging that the ANC was really a Xhosa-based organization that did not adequately represent Zulus.\textsuperscript{60} However, it was Mandela's constant overtures to Goodwill Zwelithini that impressed upon Buthelezi that he could potentially lose his alliance with the Zulu king and with that, his legitimacy as the political spokesman of the Zulus. According to many observers, Buthelezi's fear that the ANC would undermine his relationship with the king was one important element that prompted him to suspend Inkatha's boycott of the elections and agree to participate five days before the election.\textsuperscript{61}

Mandela was also able to undo the flanking pressures coming from the white extremists. The Afrikaner right-wing was united

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{New York Times}, April 4, 1994.

in its demand for a white *volkstaat*.\textsuperscript{62} Mandela's proposal to establish a commission to study the issue, however, caused serious turmoil within the radical Afrikaners and contributed to a split between those who sought to achieve their aims through negotiation (General Constand Viljoen's Freedom Front) and those who were determined to rely on the barrel of a gun (Eugene Terre'Blanche's AWB).\textsuperscript{63}

The last hypothesis applicable to the South African case is the public opinion hypothesis.\textsuperscript{64} It was found that in Serbia the congruence between elite and mass values facilitated the regime's objectives to engage in a policy of minority repression. In South Africa, the similarity between elite and mass attitudes in the Afrikaner community has been a factor aiding the consolidation of


\textsuperscript{64} The census election is not applicable in this case because all major ethnic groups (in particular, whites and Zulus), have more than one party so it is unlikely that any would face sudden and permanent exclusion. Moreover, the inclusiveness of the election rules prevented any such outcome. Given the span of time analyzed for this case, tripolarity does not apply. However, tripolar coalition behavior among the ANC, the NP, and Inkatha may become a factor as the interim government sets to work on a new constitution.
democracy. In a study of Afrikaner attitudes conducted by Kate Manzo and Pat McGowan, it was found that a sense of fear and insecurity had gradually increased over the course of the 1980s and that elite Afrikaners began to see apartheid itself as cause of that insecurity (47.2% identified apartheid as "some threat" to South African security).65 Basically, a consensus began to emerge that P. W. Botha's policy of repression had failed abysmally in containing the insurgent black movement and that the time had come to forge a new strategy. The new strategy represented by de Klerk was based on the goal of a negotiated settlement and, in a whites-only referendum in March 1992, the public gave their overwhelming approval (68%) for the new course.66 According to Manzo and McGowan, "it is rare in survey research that such large majorities consistently agree or disagree with specific questions -- indicating the great homogeneity of Afrikaner attitudes."67 Thus, vast public support for the inclusion of blacks into South African politics must be seen as another important element in the consolidation of this nascent democracy.

All in all, the theoretical framework of this study does furnish the conceptual tools and hypotheses that can explain cases of both successful and unsuccessful democratic consolidation. In South

65 Manzo and McGowan, pp.8-18.

66 Laurence, "Competition or Coalition?," pp.64-7.

67 Manzo and McGowan, p.17.
Africa, the ideological proximity of the ANC and the NP and their shared objectives to end apartheid and institutionalize democracy made possible a very successful negotiated transfer of power. In contrast, the former Yugoslavia witnessed the rise of national ideologies that promoted incompatible claims of ethnic priority. The transition in South Africa was marked by a chain reaction of ethnic parties whose exclusive demands and intra-ethnic competition led to interethnic violence. But the determined spirit of cooperation between the ANC and the NP enabled South Africa to overcome such challenges. In the former Yugoslavia elites exacerbated instances of violence by exploiting them for their own gain. Not one post-Yugoslav elite had the moral courage Nelson Mandela displayed when he chastized his own supporters for acts of violence. The overflowing generosity of the ANC greatly facilitated the cooperation and consent of all major players and permitted strategically important segments of the white community (such as the military, the police, and the civil service) to relax. Furthermore, the overall inclusive and accommodationist stance of the ANC eroded the ability of flanking parties to win popular support and reduced the costs and pain associated with losing an election. In the former Yugoslavia both the HDZ and the SPS failed to offer a generous package of minority rights and flanking parties such as Seselj's SRS were allowed to wreak havoc on democratic rights in Serbia and beyond. Finally, public opinion
in South Africa expressed a readiness for an expansion of democratic rights. In sharp contrast, public opinion in Serbia displayed an intolerance for minorities and felt that minority rights should be curtailed.

There were other factors that stand outside the theoretical framework but nevertheless present additional contrasting features of these cases. First of all, in South Africa there was a convergence of elite interests. The ANC realized it could not win a guerrilla war and the NP perceived Botha's policy of repression an absolute failure. This perception of interdependence served as crucial link between the two parties and aided the structural integration of ANC and NP elites. Another factor relates to the sequencing of reform. In South Africa negotiations occurred over a long period of time and preceded elections. The upshot was the provision of *garantismo* to the white community and, correlative, a reduction in white anxiety and fear of election results. The last factor falls into the category of the fortuitous:

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69 There is a debate within democratization theory between those who argue negotiations are productive for democratic consolidation and those who view them as negligible. Huntington and Di Palma favor negotiations, Przeworski and Horowitz do not. See Shapiro's book review of these authors' latest endeavours (pp.127, 135, 147). This study confirms the usefulness of negotiations.
the Zulu nation was politically divided in its loyalties. Had the Zulus homogenized behind Inkatha, Buthelezi would have been a formidable force and the transition to democracy in South Africa may have faltered.

Thus, the elite realization of interethnic interdependence, the utilization of negotiations prior to elections, and favorable fortuitous circumstances all gave South Africa additional advantages in its passage to a democratic regime. At the same time, national ideologies and the generosity moment still stand out as crucial explanatory factors. The convergence of elite interests and the success of negotiations would not have been as easy without a common ideological framework and a readiness to be accommodating.

C. Nationalism, Ethnic Politics, and Democracy in Comparative and Historical Context

A comparative study of the politics of the former Yugoslavia and South Africa elicits a number of crucial differences that account for the variance in the two cases. But why did the expression of nationalism take such different forms in the first place? Why was it that in South Africa the leading organization of the black community -- a community that had been despised, repressed, humiliated, tortured, and dehumanized -- stood for a
national ideology predicated on peaceful coexistence? And why was it that in the former Yugoslavia -- where each national group enjoyed full national rights, substantive group equality, and inclusive and consensual based institutional rules for some 45 years -- that the transition was marked by the rise of the worst kinds of national chauvinism and intolerance?

The answer to these questions is an irony. At first glance, it makes sense that a regime founded on the natural superiority of whites and, concomitantly, the natural inferiority of blacks would produce a powerful, exclusive black organization that would demolish every last vestige of a white presence in South Africa. Similarly, a regime built on the basis of interethnic brotherhood and unity (bratstvo i jedinstvo) should only give rise to an opposition that fought over marginal adjustments in the distribution of rights, offices, and goods. The nature of the authoritarian regime in each case conditioned the response that the leading opposition movements would take, but the response in each case was counterintuitive. It was precisely because South African blacks were heteronomously defined by a racist ideology

70 The violence committed by black township youth indicated just that. In explaining the eruption of conflict in South Africa during the transition, Anne Shepherd paraphrased the thoughts of Oscar Dlomo, chairman of the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy: "South Africans have been taught ... that they cannot live together; opposition was ruthlessly crushed and diversity discouraged. This in turn fueled the attitude among liberation movements that those not for them were against them, and branded them as sell-outs." Shepherd, p.42.
that the ANC felt a special mission to stretch out its hands to all
peoples genuinely committed to end apartheid and build a new
society based on what blacks themselves were denied, elemental
human dignity and freedom.\textsuperscript{71} In Yugoslavia, Tito's balancing act
of interethnic rights and benefits was never sanctioned in a
popular referendum or legitimated in a democratic election. In
addition, any expression of discontent with the SKJ's national
policy was met with repression. As a result, interethnic harmony
in Yugoslavia was more of an ideological facade that was imposed
"from above." It never earned the kind of legitimacy and respect
that would presumably be forthcoming from a genuinely open
discussion. Moreover, the clampdown on any public airing of the
national question robbed the people of a cathartic outlet for the
trauma of World War II and meant that dissatisfaction with the

\textsuperscript{71} In recounting their prison days when they forged their nonracial
creed, Mandela and Walter Sisulu realized that it was better to understand
their oppressors rather than demonize them. In fact, ANC figures note that
those most "embittered" and "twisted" are the blacks who cooperated with
apartheid and therefore remained mentally oppressed. \textit{New York Times},
May 1, 1994. The philosophical explanation of this transcendence -- from
de-humanization to humanization -- is found in Hegel's master-slave
dialectic: "The complete, absolutely free man, definitively and completely
satisfied by what he is, the man who is perfected and completed in and by
this satisfaction, will be the Slave who has 'overcome' his Slavery."
Alexander Kojève, \textit{Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lecture on the
Phenomenology of Spirit}, Allan Bloom, ed., (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1969), p.20. See also Paulo Freire, "Pedagogy of the
Oppressed," Charles K. Wilber, ed., \textit{The Political Economy of Development
pp.445-461.
status quo could only seethe in an undercurrent of unresolved emotions, bitterness, and anger. Because the ideology of brotherhood and unity was so drastically out of step with the way in which many people felt, it is understandable that the opposition movements in the post-communist transition would move directly towards tearing down this pretense and the unrestrained assertion of their own long-denied sense of group status and worth.

In short, the modal national ideologies that arise after an authoritarian experience are immediately conditioned by that experience, but in unexpected ways. The brutal reality created by a dominant form of primordial nationalism (apartheid) does not necessarily create an equally menacing opposition but, rather, its antithesis -- pluralist nationalism. In the same way, an authoritarian regime that coercively imposes pluralist nationalism dialectically creates the conditions for the rise of monistic nationalist forces. The failure to detect this is why so many warned about a bloodbath in South Africa and so many denied that communal violence could ever return to Yugoslavia.

The character of a regime influences the general ideological tendencies of the movements that arise in opposition to it. But what turns an ideological tendency into a social force are elites
who must make choices about the type of system they are to build. To borrow Weber's famous metaphor about culture, elites are the "switchmen" of history who stand at the intersection of competing ideologies and regime-types. The quality of leadership is a fortuitous factor whose influence cannot be underestimated. A comparison of Mandela's moral character or his calibre of leadership with that of Milosevic' (or any post-Yugoslav elite, for that matter) speaks volumes about the very different political outcomes in South Africa and the former Yugoslavia.

Other background conditions that gave rise to separate patterns of ethnic politics in Yugoslavia and South Africa include the existence of border and diaspora problems. These two elements -- the fact that the borders between the republics were subject to dispute and that sizeable minorities (particularly Serbs) who had their own titular republic were spread throughout Yugoslavia -- immediately brought the stateness problem to bear in Yugoslavia. The negotiations in South Africa were primarily over the nature of the regime as the principal partners (i.e., Mandela and de Klerk) were convinced of the rightness of the South African state itself. This was not so in Yugoslavia and as such it placed a different set of problems on the agenda. State-building and democratization are qualitatively different historical

tasks and have typically involved a different pattern of interaction between elites and masses.

In the Western experience states were created at a time when norms for the universal respect of all peoples were not widely recognized. Because the building of a state requires that the sovereign authority of a core area be territorially and demographically expanded, state-building has often been accompanied by acts of conquest and the subduing of indigenous populations. If the history of Western Europe and the United States is to be taken as a model, then the most propitious sequencing of historical tasks is for democratization to follow state-building. According to Charles Tilly, by 1700 the "first great national states" had been formed and by 1850 the rest of Europe had consolidated itself into a system of states (the US still had to settle this issue in the Civil War). Middle class demands for

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73 Charles Tilly writes that first major historical path to the state "is the extension of the power and range of a more or less autonomous political unit by conquest, alliance, bargaining, chicanery, argument, and administrative encroachment, until the territory, population, goods, and activities claimed by the particular center extended either to the areas claimed by other strong centers or to a point where the costs of communication and control exceeded the returns from the periphery." Charles Tilly, "Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation," in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975,) p.636.

74 Tilly, p.637.
inclusion only began in the 1820s-1830s (e.g., the 1832 Reform Bill in England, Jacksonian democracy in America, Russian "Decembrists," the French Revolution of 1830, etc.). Hence, states in the Western world were, by and large, established by the time that demands for greater inclusiveness were in full swing and involved the political rights of the working class. By the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Western European and American politics could center on the extension of citizenship and a more equitable distribution of civil and political liberties against the backdrop of firmly rooted states. Success at political incorporation cultivated a kind of civic nationalist pride in the institutions of liberal-democracy.

Throughout this entire period of state and regime-building, different national ideologies became modal at different times in response to the unique conditions that each state confronted. So, for example, the Risorgimento nationalism of Italy in the 1850s, with its linkage between individual freedom and national independence, was followed by the slogan of "Italia irredenta" in 1877 after the Italian state was founded.75 The classic French definition of the nation, provided by Abbé Sieyès -- "a body of associates living under one common law and represented by the

same legislature"\textsuperscript{76} -- did not prevent the French state from pursuing centralistic and assimilatory policies to create Frenchmen. In England a feeling of national superiority and intolerance found expression at various points in its history -- in its relations with Scotland and Ireland, and later in its ideology of imperialism.\textsuperscript{77} And in the United States, where the "Founding Fathers" eloquently championed universal ideas of individual liberty, "common ethnicity played a quiet role by reinforcing the basic moral and cultural consensus on which the new democratic order was to rest."\textsuperscript{78} Indeed, when this common ethnicity was challenged the United States had no qualms about advancing various forms of primordial nationalism, be it in the form of justifying genocide against the American Indian population or the enslavement of Africans.\textsuperscript{79} In fact, all the great nation-states of the Western world practiced ethnic cleansing at one time or

\textsuperscript{76} Alter, pp.56-7.


another -- Spain cleansed itself of Jews (1492) and Muslims (1502), France purified itself of Protestants (1685), England expelled Irish Catholics from Ulster (1640-1688), the United States forcibly resettled conquered Indian tribes into reservations (1830-1886), and Germany pursued a Reich that was Judenrein, i.e., "clean of Jews" (1933-1945).80

The point to all this is that the current history of the Balkans is a path already traversed by the developed West. The periodic manifestation of primordial nationalist ideologies in Western history eventually gave way once the transition to, and consolidation of, democracy was successful. From this point on, the collective need for self-affirmation was satisfied by embracing the institutions of a free and stable society.81 It is in this sense that Nodia writes "the problems connected with nationalism are ... inherent components of the general problem of democratic transition." If a nation fails to develop a consolidated democracy in which there are "institutional achievements to take pride in, people may boast instead of their inherited racial, linguistic, or

80 Bell-Fialkoff, pp.112-4.

81 At this juncture in a nation's development, the range of competing nationalisms is likely to move away from civic, monistic, and primordial nationalism and begin to oscillate between civic nationalism and pluralist nationalism. The recent debates in the United States on affirmative action and multiculturalism serve as an example of competitive civic and pluralist nationalisms in a consolidated democracy.
cultural identities."82 Because the search for a definitive solution to the state question has eluded the South Slav peoples, the monistic and primordial nationalist options that have long been discredited in the West remain in the East just as viable today as they did a century ago.83

The difference, however, between the Western past and the Eastern present is that at the close of the twentieth century democratic norms have attained worldwide legitimacy, communication networks span the globe, the ability to travel has expanded to unprecedented levels, and an international community is present that takes an active interest in the internal politics of states. In this setting, state-building conducted at the expense of democracy is likely to backfire in undesirable ways and destroy the very nation it is purported to save. This is a cruel irony for contemporary nationalists. The pursuit of a national

82 Nodia, pp.15-17. Rustow's observations are similar. He writes that national unity "is best fulfilled when ... [it] is accepted unthinkingly, is silently taken for granted. Any vocal consensus about national unity, in fact, should make us wary. Most of the rhetoric of nationalism has poured from the lips of people who felt least secure in their sense of national identity -- Germans and Italians in the past century and Arabs and Africans in the present, never Englishmen, Swedes, or Japanese." Rustow, pp.351-2.

program like the ideal of a Greater Serbia requires such devastation and turmoil that what is left in its wake hardly provides the basis for a flourishing society. Apparently, a good many Serbs have come to this same conclusion as Serbia has experienced an enormous brain drain and the Krajina has witnessed a large-scale and probably permanent exodus of Serbs. Through the former Yugoslavia, nationalist dreams of communal reunion, cultural renaissance, state power, and self-determination, have given way to depopulated and destroyed cities (e.g., Vukovar, Bosanski Brod), regimes that repress their own citizens, a benighted cultural milieu, and a hopeless economic future. However, the lesson that should not be lost is that such an outcome is not inevitable but rather the result of elite decisions to pursue nationalist objectives with antidemocratic means. The recent experience in South Africa demonstrates that the self-conscious determination among elites to promote more inclusive forms of nationalism can work to mediate successfully the passage


to a democratic order in an ethnically-divided society.


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