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THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: AFRICAN NGOs AND THEIR RELATIONAL ENVIRONMENT -- A STUDY OF MAENDELEO YA WANAWAKE IN KENYA

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Lisa Marie Aubrey

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1995

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C. Alger
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Department of Political Science
To My Parents Luke and Shirley Aubrey & My Daughter Kaari Makeda Aubrey
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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**VITA**

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**FIELDS OF STUDY**

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This study is an investigation of interorganizational development relationships. It examines the partnerships of foreign donors, African governments, and African non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that come together in cooperative endeavors to implement development programs and projects. More specifically, this research examines the manner in which foreign donors and African governments through their Ministries, assist NGOs in Africa both financially and technically. The politics involved in their interorganizational development cooperation is this study’s primary focus.

This research utilized the case study approach to examine the interorganizational relationships of the largest women’s organization in Kenya -- Maendeleo Ya Wanawake (MYWO) which claims to be a grassroots NGO. I selected this organization for several reasons. One, MYWO has had longstanding interorganizational relations with foreign donors and the government of Kenya, having initially received financial and technical assistance from the British colonial government and foreign donors prior to its official inception in 1952. Two, it has had extensive countrywide networks extending between its national headquarters in Nairobi and local villages, thereby including grassroots women. Three, it has been considered a “model” national women’s NGO, often discussed as such in the West among feminist academic circles. It is also rumored to be the oldest and largest national women’s organization on the continent. Four, the literature on MYWO, written in the 1970s by sociologist Audrey Wipper, posed contradictions and challenges to our current knowledge regarding the organization’s evolution and interorganizational
relations, particularly with the Kenyan government. This study aimed to broach those contradictions and challenges. In addition, the literature raised questions about MYWO’s autonomy in its interorganizational relationships which have still not been satisfactorily answered. This research attempts to grapple with this issue of autonomy. Five, I chose MYWO in order to investigate the legitimacy of its claim that it is an NGO. Even after its official affiliation to the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) in 1987, MYWO continued to claim that it was an NGO. Many in its relational environment however argued that it was not. Six, I am able to speak Kiswahili, thereby facilitating my ability to conduct interviews in Kenya.

The underlying assumption in this study is that in interorganizational development relationships, resource contributions by foreign donors and the Kenyan government to MYWO equals power over MYWO and influence over its development agenda. Hence, the hypotheses follow: the more resources MYWO accepts from foreign donors and the Kenyan government, the less power and autonomy it will have to implement its own indigenous agenda, thereby decreasing the possibility for MYWO’s development success. The corollary to this is, the fewer the resources MYWO accepts from foreign donors and the Kenyan government, the more power and autonomy it will have to implement its own indigenous agenda, thereby increasing the possibility for MYWO’s development success.

The key variables in this study are power, autonomy and dependence. Dependence is defined as the opposite of autonomy. The analytical framework which I applied in this research is a modified version of International Organizational Relations’ Resource Dependency Model (RDM). This model was modified so as to draw in the necessary gender perspective which this problem brings to fore.

There are two schools of thought which support these hypotheses. The first school advocates the indigenization of development initiatives on the continent of Africa,
arguing that indigenization will lead to successful development and eventual self-reliance. NGOs represent the vessel of indigenization, and the hope for development into the twenty-first century. This school highlights the development potential of women, as women are the overwhelming majority of NGO members. Its proponents believe that it is possible for the trilateral partnership of foreign donors, African governments and African NGOs to bring forth development of the continent. This school is perhaps blinded by romanticism.

There is a second school of thought which is much more pessimistic. This school argues that African NGOs are but foreign creations to be used and abused so that Africa will remain colonized, not through its leaders as under neocolonialism, but this time, in the 1990s, from the bottom up. This school sees NGOs and foreign donors as the new faces of imperialism, engaged in a new form of colonialism of Africa -- grassroots colonialism. There are also some in this school who argue that NGOs are also creations of African governments as their means to solidify their political patronage bases. This school does not believe that development is possible through the trilateral development partnerships of foreign donors, African governments and African NGOs. It is my contention that without thoroughly examining these partnerships, this school is perhaps too suspicious and too premature in its criticisms. It may dismiss the answer to Africa's development woes.

With both of the these schools, there are obvious conceptual and scientific caveats. Neither of these schools has systematically tested the relationship between foreign donors, African governments, and African NGOs, therefore they cannot adequately capture the nature of the interaction between the partners in development or assess their interorganizational effect on development initiatives in Africa. For that reason, I argue that there must be systematic observation and testing of their relationship in order to construct a model which has more explanatory power of this foreign donors, African
government, and African NGO development cooperative phenomenon. This research intends to contribute to the construction of this model and perhaps even lay its rudimentary foundation by conducting numerous and diverse intensive field observations, data collection through interviews, archival research, and critical analyses.

A Legacy of Africa’s Failed Development Policies: the Challenge for Scholars

This study of the partnerships of foreign donors, African governments, and African NGOs is a result of the scramble to find solutions to Africa’s development problems. Although more than a quarter of a century has passed since the end of colonial rule on the vast majority of the African continent, the prospects for substantial economic development remain dismal. On the balance sheet of development endeavors, failures of development initiatives far outweigh successes. To many -- development planners, recipients, activists and scholars -- this means endless frustrations, and makes the need to find solutions to Africa’s development problems even more urgent.

Many have attempted to discern the reasons why Africa has failed to develop. The legacy of colonial underdevelopment, neocolonial exploitation of former colonies, internal mismanagement of development resources, the weak political will of African leaders, natural disasters, misguided economic policies, and, political instability have all been cited, either singularly or concurrently, among the reasons for Africa’s continued development malaise.4

Exactly one decade ago, in 1984-85, this malaise reached endemic proportions with the Ethiopian famine, to which the world was held witness. Over one million people died and many more still suffer. The effects of the famine are clearly tragic indeed, yet this is but one example of Africa’s current development condition, and as some would argue, merely one example of an outcome of Africa’s development failures.5 Other disasters had
occurred before the Ethiopian famine and many are still occurring across the continent today. Though less publicized, many were and still are as grippingly devastating. Moreover, the continual deteriorating economic conditions of the continent makes the need to find solutions to Africa’s development problems even more eminent.

The scramble for solutions to Africa’s development problems has led many scholars to rethinking and reshaping the development research agenda. Besides focusing on discerning reasons for Africa’s development or non-development predicament, more and more attention is being placed, particularly within the last decade, on trying to rid Africa of its immense human suffering, pervasive poverty and increasing dependence on Western financial institutions, specifically the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. From one perspective, this requires minimizing development failures and increasing development successes. The trilateral partnerships of foreign donors, African governments, and African NGOs represent an attempt by development practitioners to do this. Scholars have concomitantly begun to take a research interest in this interorganizational phenomenon.

Africa’s Human Cries: The Practical Rationale for this Study

The issues which this research raises are not only of scholarly importance for the development of Africa, they are also of utmost practical importance in that they speak directly to the current nature and seemingly unsolvable complexities of development issues and problems of the contemporary world. These issues are timely as well. For scholars, these issues require critical observations and analyses as NGOs possibly lead us into a new era of development (or grassroots colonialism) in Africa. For development practitioners and recipients, it is long past the eleventh hour for relieving human suffering and breaking Africa’s cycle of poverty and dependence.
As we approach the twenty-first century and as our world becomes smaller and more intertwined through networks of interdependencies, it becomes clear that a continent’s, a people’s, and perhaps the world’s future hinges on finding solutions to Africa’s development problems. Because of this realization, I was propelled into this study. Pierre Pradervand’s news article, “Self-Reliance for Survival in Africa: Peasant Groups Key to Continent’s Future,” and eventually his book Listening to Africa: Developing Africa from the Grassroots which elucidate the work of grassroots NGOs on the continent from the late 1980s, and which offer a glimmer of hope for development in an otherwise disturbingly hopeless area of study, were the secondary impetuses for this study. More compelling for my tackling this study were the raw, hard facts which demonstrate that Africa is on the verge of economic collapse and there is devastating human suffering.

According to World Bank studies of the condition of the continent, along with some current research by London-based New York Times correspondent John Darton, the following hold true: The 1992 GNP of the continent of Africa - South of the Sahara and home to over 600 million people -- was almost the same as the GNP of Belgium, a country with 10 million people. Thirty of the world’s forty poorest countries are in Africa. The external debt of the continent has tripled since 1980, now amounting to US$ 180 billion, a burden so big no one even thinks it can be repaid. Africa’s share of world trade is now only two percent. Ghana’s GNP per capita is only $450 annually, among the lowest on the continent. Between 1980 and 1990, the vast majority of African countries experienced “negative” per capita growth, with few exceptions.7

What this mean in terms of human suffering is that Africa has fallen behind the rest of the world, and an overwhelming majority of its people are entrenched in poverty. An estimated 220 million people, more than one out of three, live in “absolute poverty.” Four
million children born this year will die before the age of five. Nearly thirty-three percent of all children are severely malnourished. In the past decade, in Zambia, the proportion of children who were malnourished rose from five percent to twenty-five percent. Over 10,000 children die everyday from preventable diseases. The number of children who have a chance at getting an education is declining. Education is not free. Since 1980, the enrollment of children in primary education has dropped from seventy-nine percent to sixty-seven percent, and national expenditures per student has declined over thirty-three percent. Food production has also dropped to twenty percent of 1970 levels, and the downward trend continues. Inflation is soaring across the continent; and mothers often cannot buy bread for their children to eat. In addition, poverty is becoming more and more feminized. To further compound these problems, Africa has the highest birth rate in the world -- 3.2 percent a year. Population projections suggest that sub-Saharan Africa’s population could reach 1.6 billion by 2030, with nearly thirty African countries doubling their present population.8

How can these problems be resolved; and how can Africa develop? What will it take for Africa, which has the world’s largest reservoir of arable land -- almost 2.5 billion acres, to at least, be able to feed herself? This study ponders whether interorganizational partnerships between foreign donors, African governments and African NGOs offer possible solutions to the continents’s development problems. It is my belief that without systematically testing the relationship between these interorganizational partners, our opportunities to understand, evaluate and facilitate development in Africa may be foregone.
Chapter Previews

The remainder of this study will be presented in the following manner:

**Chapter 2, Bridging Literature Gaps: Framing the Problem of the Politics of Development Cooperation,** will be a review of the relevant literature for this study. Four interrelated bodies of literature that are interconnected by this research problem will be presented so as to provide a context for this study. These bodies of literature are: Interorganizational Relations Theory; NGOs in Africa; Development Theory; and Women in Interorganizational Relations. Out of these bodies of literature will evolve the framework for analysis for this study.

**Chapter 3, The Evolution of MYWO from 1952 to the Present,** will present the political history of MYWO. It will provide a discussion of its changes over time and document its interorganizational relations. This chapter will also look at MYWO's cyclical pattern, beginning as an appendage organization to the colonial state in 1952 lasting to 1961, and then returning to the independent state as an appendage in 1987. Despite its return to the state in 1987, constitutionally MYWO continued to define itself and to be defined by the KANU ruling party as an NGO. The impact that MYWO's affiliation to the ruling party and the state had on its interorganizational relations with foreign donors will also be analyzed.

**Chapter 4, A Changing Research Methodology Amidst Political Volatility, Environmental Uncertainty and a Culture of Fear and Silence,** will be a discussion of the evolution of the research methodology I used. During the course of my fieldwork in Kenya from August 1991-- August 1992, the country was undergoing perhaps its most significant political and economic changes since independence in 1963. These changes inevitably had drastic effects on the nature of the political climate in which I worked, and hence, shaped the context of this study. For example, internal and external forces called
for the introduction of multipartyism in Kenya. Foreign donors threatened and eventually tied social, political and economic conditions to aid to Kenya -- conditions including an end to human rights violations, and a call for new elections for the national executive and Parliament. The Moi regime taunted the public with threats of a declaration of a state of emergency, and Kenyan citizens took their cries for "democracy" to the streets. All of these events and more caused me to alter my original proposed research strategy, because many of my original research intentions could not be executed or no longer seemed relevant. One barrier that I faced was that very many of my proposed interviewees would not talk, for legitimate fear for their lives. Thus, my initial methods proposed for this study differed from the actual methods used, both of which will be described in this chapter.

Chapter 5, Findings, will describe the findings of this study. This chapter will summarize 1) the data collected as answers to the research questions posed; and 2) the data collected from archives. This chapter will also indicate whether or not the data collected supported or invalidated the hypotheses in this research.

Chapter 6, Significance of Findings and Conclusion, will discuss the findings of this study in light of the current state of knowledge in this field of inquiry. It will tease out the implications of this study for the growing literature on NGOs, the theoretical bases of interorganizational relations, development theory and feminist theory. The limitations of this study will also be acknowledged. In addition, recommendations for optimizing interorganizational contributions for development in Africa, and for conducting further scholarly research will be made.

1 MYWO was discussed as a women's NGO at a panel on "NGOs and Gender" at the 1988 African Studies Association Meeting in Chicago, Illinois. It is considered a possible "model" for women's NGOs in other African countries. From MYWO, other organizations glean valuable lessons about relationships with resource donors, including government. Some African scholars have suggested, in conversations with me, that
MYWO may be the largest and oldest women’s NGO on the continent. I intend to determine whether or not this is the case in further research.


3 These two schools of thought I call the School of NGO Optimism and the School of NGO Pessimism. Both will be discussed at length in Chapter 2 with the other relevant literature.


8 Ibid.
CHAPTER II
BRIDGING LITERATURE GAPS: FRAMING THE PROBLEM OF THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

This chapter will review the relevant literature for four distinct areas of research and demonstrate their interconnectedness. They are 1) Interorganizational Relations Theory, 2) NGOs in Africa, 3) Development Theory, and 4) Women in Interorganizational Relations. Although these bodies of literature at first glance seem disparate, particularly the women's studies research, and are rarely integrated into mainstream research, they are very much interconnected by this research problem. Out of the merger of these bodies of literature will evolve the framework of the Research Dependency Model (RDM) which this study will modify and apply to analyze the politics of development cooperation between Maendeleo Ya Wanawake (MYWO), and its partners in its relational environment -- foreign donors and the government of Kenya. As the review of literature will establish the basis for the applicability of a modified RDM, the literature will be discussed first, then the RDM and its modifications will be presented.

As this study focuses on the politics of development cooperation between MYWO, foreign donors and the Kenyan government, specifically the Kenyan bureaucracy, the literature on interorganizational relations (IOR) provides a starting point for understanding and analyses of interactions between organizations as they work together toward a particular goal. Development interorganizational cooperation is simply “a process in which organizations pursue their own goals and thus retain autonomy, while at the same time orienting their actions toward a common issue or outcome.” Thus, IOR theory offers a
basis to begin to systematically understand the relations between organizations as they cooperate in terms of often synonymously used concepts of linkages, networks and partnerships between organizations, and their subsequent effects. Leonard argues that understanding these concepts are critical for "Linkages (between organizations) can be extremely powerful... (since they) are a central component of international aid."2 Linkages in general, Mulford, and Gordenker and Saunders purport, exist because organizations do not operate alone. Inevitably they must interact with other organizations that comprise their clientele, suppliers, supporters, critics and competitors.3

There has not been sufficient research attention by scholars to development via interorganizational cooperation between foreign donors, NGOs and African governments. There are however some studies and research findings which provide a contextual foundation from which to build this study. This chapter will present this literature and build on it. The contextual information that this literature provides will give us insight into why the merger and linkages between foreign donors, NGOs and African governments have not been studied, and will bridge the gaps where the literature has been undeveloped.

State of IOR Theory

Although a significant amount has been written in the general area of organizations, relatively little attention has been paid to the relationships between organizations, or as it has come to be defined as a field of inquiry, interorganizational relations (IOR). Researchers from various disciplines -- particularly psychology, sociology, political science, economics, business administration, management science -- have historically concentrated primarily on studying the intraorganizational phenomenon, thus the findings they have amassed focus on either: 1) the behaviors of individuals as members in organizations; or 2) the more sociological concepts of structures and functions
of organizations, rather than the more political concepts of power, autonomy and
dependence. The instances in which the interrelatedness or the relational properties of
organizations have been considered, the scope of those studies have been geographically
narrow, mainly restricted to the United States in context.

More and more however, it is becoming necessary to understand the nature and
the consequences of interorganizational relations globally, for whether we realize it or not,
all of us, individual, groups and institutions, interact with and depend on organizations.
As students at universities, consumers of health care, members of professional, church or
advocacy associations, or even participants in activities that are sponsored by
organizations, we are directly and indirectly affected by interorganizational relations in a
multiplicity of ways. In addition, solutions to so many of the world's problems such as
hunger and destruction of the rain forest depend on interorganizational communication
and cooperation to the extent that it becomes imperative that we make a greater effort to
understand relationships that develop between organizations. One example of such an
effort is L. Julian Efird's 1977 pathbreaking scholarly study aimed at looking at various
international organizations and their interrelatedness to each other in the world food
problem area.

The undeveloped state of the theoretical literature on interorganizational relations
as compared to intraorganizational relations, as well as its limited focus to the United
States is ironic, especially for the discipline of political science and its subfield public
policy, considering the facts that:

1) organizations engaged in interorganizational relations are, by their very
nature, political. That is, their operations and memberships are political ends, for
organizations' objectives include maximizing their control so as to not only realize
shared goals, but also influence, through lobbying and alliance building, those
factors in their environment which cannot be directly controlled.
2) International interactions between and among organizations, units and institutions are the "stuff" international relations as an area of political science is made of;®

3) So many basic human activities in the twentieth century are internationalized - communications, technology, science, production of goods, consumption, pricing, development to name a few;® and,

4) Most if not all of the world's problems and their solutions (which I touched upon earlier) -- preservation of the environment; eradication of hunger, poverty, homelessness and inequality; ending nuclear proliferation; and attainment of world peace -- transcend national boundaries.

For these very reasons it is surprising how little is known about how we, the world's population, and creators and members of organizations and institutions, are "linked" to each other. Perhaps a greater understanding of how we are, in fact, "linked" with one another through organizations will bring about an impetus for more systematic studies of IOR. Solutions to our world's problems, only to be reached through individual, organizational and institutional communication and cooperation, depend on it.

IOR Scholarship Focus -- A Bias toward Domestic Relations and Against International Relations

One of the reasons that development interorganizational relations between foreign donors, NGOs and African governments have not been a research priority is that there has been a bias in academia against international relations and international organizations. For example, Alger, in a ten year review from 1960 -1969 of research on international organizations, made some critical findings which spoke to the state of IOR at that time. He found that of 61 studies, none of them focussed on relations between international organizations. He did note however that "those familiar with the global complex of United Nations activities realize(d) that relations between organizations (was) a matter of
increasing concern. Despite this finding, IOR studies that blossomed thereafter were national in scope, not international. Many organizational scholars had broadened their focus from controlling internal activities to managing organizations' external environments, which included other organizations. Concomitantly, from the mid-1960s, urban sociologists began redefining urban communities as networks of organizations and relationships with social meaning, as compared to a mere collection of individuals occupying a particular space. Community organizational reference was important, particularly with regard to the delivery of social services, hence the need for interorganizational coordination. That the dynamics of communities could be better understood through IOR remained the state of the field well into the latter years of the 1980s.

Despite the increasing attention to IOR, studies about IOR in the United States far outnumbered studies with an international dimension. For example, research following Alger's ten year review found that between 1970-1974 only one study had been done which examined the interrelatedness of international organizations. A greater number of studies would flourish however, after 1974, in response of scholars to the recognition of the inevitability of global interdependence and the remarkable growth of governmental and non-governmental organizations, internationally and nationally respectively. Noting this inevitability, in 1976, a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development spoke of a "world of cooperation" which must be built to reflect the "fundamental interdependence of our destiny." During this same period, by 1978-79, independent international organizations grew to at least 2700, more than doubling the number that had existed in 1960. In addition, "about 400 U. S. national non-governmental organizations (became) substantially involved in development assistance issues with LDCs" in the South. Specific to the continent of Africa, it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of grassroots
African non-governmental organizations existed on the continent during this period. In Kenya in particular, it is posited that between 16,000 and 25,000 organizations sprang up in the 1970s. Subsequently other organizations -- governmental and non-governmental donors, primarily from the North, came to their assistance, hence establishing transnational interorganizational linkages in international relations. The term, the “North,” refers to the industrialized states including most of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, most of whom belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the “rich man’s club.” “North” is sometimes used interchangeably with “The First World” or the “developed countries.” The term, “the South,” refers to the world’s less developed or developing states. It includes the rich but yet-to-industrialize oil states of the Middle East to the so-called Fourth World, the poorest countries on the globe located for the most part in sub-Saharan Africa, on the Indian subcontinent and in the Caribbean. “South” is used interchangeably with “less developed countries” (LDCs), underdeveloped countries, developing countries and “The Third World.”

Attempts to Expand IOR Focus

Among scholars who attempted to expand IOR’s focus beyond domestic organizational relations, particularly because of expanding international relations, Gordenker and Saunders are notable. Their criticism of the academic neglect of the international dimension of interorganizational relations is especially important. They argue that international relations utilizes peculiar forms and processes which the literature on organizations does not discuss, and which differs from organizations as they are normally conceived. Hence, in an effort to capture these peculiarities, Jonsson, who agrees with the Gordenker and Saunders’ critique, proposed that transnational organizational
networks serve as the constructs to guide analysis in interorganizational relations. Jonsson defined transnational organizational networks as "national networks of private and public organizations (which) constitute subsystems, and where intergovernmental as well as non-governmental international organizations (IGOs and NGOs) typically participate." In this study, in which transnational networks guide the analysis of interorganizational relations in Kenya, it is important to note that particular attention must be paid to the role of the government and the state in this network, as African development policies have historically been heavily statist.

Organizations and their Relational Environment

As we approach the 21st century it is commonplace that "all organizations have relationships with other organizations," with whom they interface and interact. This interfacing and interaction defines their organizational relational environment and grows out of the very fact that many organizations are not self-sufficient and can not operate alone. An organizations' "environment", as defined by Hawley is "all phenomena that are external to and potentially or actually influence the population under study." Thus, most organizations, regardless of their size, scope, or reputations represent only part of a larger system or suprasystem of organizations within which they must relate, link, or connect with other organizations in order to secure the necessary goods and services to maximize their ability to meet their defined goals. This relational environment has come to be conceived in IOR theory as a "social network."

Mitchell provides a definition of a social network which will serve as a starting point in conceptualizing linkages, connections, relations between and among organizations in this research. He defines a social network as a "specific set of linkages among a defined set of persons with the additional properties that the characteristics of these linkages as a
whole may be used to interpret the social behavior of persons involved.”25 Laumann, Galaskiewicz, and Marsden take the initiative to modify this definition to give it wider applicability to both individual and organizational behavior. They define a social network as “a set of nodes (e.g. persons, organizations) linked by a set of social relationships (e.g., friendship, transfer of funds, overlapping membership) of a specific type.”26 Evan, Gordenker and Saunders, and Jonsson, as discussed earlier, go further with this definition by bringing in an international dimension to the discussions and understandings of IOR, thus making it more applicable for this research. Their contributions basically expand the traditional conceptualization of social networks and widens the purview to apply transnationally.

Aldrich brings to light the practical utility of conceptualizing interorganizational relations in the form of networks. The basic purpose of networks, he argues, is to (allow a researcher to ) track down all of the ties that bind organizations in a given population, “as all organizations (are) linked by a specified type of relation, and (are) constructed by finding the ties between all organizations in a population.”27 Conceptualizations of organizational linkages in this way also appear crucial for determining the outcome effectiveness of organizational ties. For instance, Van de Ven and Ferry state that networks are “the total pattern of interrelationships among a cluster of organizations that are meshed together in a social system to attain collective and self interest goals or to resolve specific problems in a target population.”28 Lauman and Pappi’s perspective supports this. They surmise that network analysis “assumes that the ways in which nodes (persons or organizations) are connected to one another, both directly and indirectly, influence the behavior of particular nodes and the system as a whole.”29
IOR, Transnational Networks, Relational Environments and NGOs

For this study, IOR theorists' assessment of the present state of IOR, despite its caveats, is encouraging. Scholars agree that although what we know about IOR is fragmented, and despite the scholarship being lacking and biased, there is a sufficient amount of rudimentary knowledge to serve as a foundation to guide basic understanding of IOR and further research. They warn however, understanding may be challenging, as “IOR analysis is...a complex and potentially confusing enterprise, since various studies have different foci, with less clarity in the level of analyses than would be desired.” IOR is further challenging in that it is “often unclear where organizations end and environment begins.”

There have been four works which will be discussed in detail which directly address the research problem at hand - the relationship between NGOs, foreign donors and African governments. These works demonstrate the fluidity, unclarity, diverse foci, as well as some inherent conflicts in transnational linkages and cooperative endeavors. These works moreover demonstrate the importance of understanding organizations and their relational environment in a transnational IOR context.

The first work and the one most similar to this research problem is Ernesto Garilao’s “Indigenous NGO’s as Strategic Institutions: Managing the Relationship with Government and Resource Agencies.” Garilao’s major argument is twofold. He focuses on “more stable development NGOs in Asia,” and argues that 1) Third World NGOs are more than just a conduit for foreign aid; and 2) long-term foreign aid does not lead to NGO survivability, instead it undermines the very existence of the NGO.

Although Garilao’s study offers valuable information and insights, it is problematic. First, it does not offer the reader a description of the research methods used to test assumptions/hypotheses and base conclusions. Second, although Garilao proposes
to explain the relationship between NGOs and government, and NGOs and resource agencies, his study concentrates on the latter relationship. The only issue he raises about NGOs and government is that their relationship can shift between collaboration and animosity. He does not expound on this. Third, he flirts with issues of dependence, autonomy and power which lay at the crux of the problem, but he never addresses them directly. Fourth, he offers prescriptions for NGOs, well-intended as they are, while we still do not have a clear understanding of the phenomena with which were are dealing.

The second work is a presentation for the World NGO Symposium, Nagoya Japan Congress by the United Nations Development Programme Assistant Administrator and economist Ryokichi Hirono entitled “How to Promote Trilateral Cooperation Among Governments, NGOs and International Agencies.” Hirono’s work is very valuable in that he brings to light relevant issues critical to development cooperation rarely discussed in the literature. Hirono identifies and describes the “attitudes” of mutual hostility and suspicion between the partners in development which he argues impedes cooperation, hence development. He states that NGOs (which he refers to as voluntary development organizations - VDOs) may fear the power of the government over them, suspecting that government may try to control or repress them; and the government may consider NGOs subversive to national policies and politics. Consequently governments may resist NGOs’ unwelcome participation in politics. Moreover, Hirono states, NGOs may consider foreign donors too bureaucratic, inflexible, establishment-oriented and distant from the poor, while foreign donors may condescendingly consider NGOs as amateur, naive or insignificant. Hirono does not address the relationship between Northern foreign donors and Southern governments.

Hirono does offer prescriptions for increased cooperation between the partners in development. Chief among those prescriptions is the need for NGOs, foreign donors and
governments to change their attitudes toward each other. He argues that a simple application of the laws of supply and demand will change negative attitudes. That is, when partners in development recognize "demand," supply will follow. To illustrate, Hirono asserts that there is a demand for partnerships among the trilateral organizations. One, governments need NGOs to expand their development outreach and impact into remote, poor areas. Two, foreign donors need NGOs because they are cost-effective and they bring fresh approaches and skills to development. Three, NGOs need foreign donors and government because their assistance allows NGOs to affect national development policies and approaches.34

Hirono's presentation makes solutions to a very complex problem seem simple. Although his presentation offers some vital information, "attitudes" of individuals and organizations, as we know, are very difficult to change. They are embedded in generations of history, culture, tradition and values all of which are mutually reinforcing. Moreover, some of the attitudes, such as suspicion of Southern NGOs of the motives of the North or of the sincerity of government, are not unfounded given the history of their respective relationships. Hirono's supply and demand prescription is also not very realistic. He assumes that all partners are rational actors defining their need, hence their demand, on the basis of what is good for "development" and for the "whole." We can not make that assumption, for there is individual motivation, profit maximizing and political maneuvering also at work which can defy simple, rational, apolitical laws of supply and demand. Moreover, what one views as "development" and what is best for the "whole" may differ from another, based on ideological, ethical, class and gender perspectives, all of which shape, to a large extent, the way we perceive and define development problems and their solutions.
There is a third piece in the literature by Nigel Tworse, "European NGOs: Growth or Partnership?," which is also essential for this study. Tworse's piece is an essay in which he addresses a number of dilemmas facing Europeans NGO donors who form "partnerships" with African NGOs. The issues that Tworse raises are fundamental to this research as they address NGO relations with donors and African governments. Tworse argues that foreign donors and NGOs must recognize their role in development within the broader international political and economic context in which they operate.

With regard to African NGOs' relations to European foreign donors, Tworse argues that linkages go beyond the boundaries of those organizations. They extend to the governmental and economic policies of European home governments to which foreign donor funds are tied. Tworse also makes the case that African NGO development projects conceived and developed outside of the African state development strategy have little chance of success. He questions how development relationships with African governments should be nurtured, and by whom -- African NGOs or foreign donors? Tworse also raises the gender issue, stating the difficulty in "hand(ing) over all decision-making power to structures which do not involve women in any significant way and do not intend to." Tying all of this together, Tworse wrestles with the best way to resolve all of these issues -- "by dangling a financial carrot around, or by approaching them in a spirit of genuine partnership?"35

Lastly, de Graaf who focuses on local and national Zimbabwean NGOs, argues that NGOs can only be effective when they know, appreciate and can influence their wider environment. He posits that NGO success or failure depends on the ability to optimally influence the environment and appreciate outside forces correctly. de Graaf proposes a very useful model of three concentric circles proposed by Smith, Lethem and Thoolen to represent organizations and their environment.36 This model is presented in Figure 1.
The Organization has most control over these elements.

The Organization negotiates for mutual influence over these elements.

The Organization responds to the impact of these elements but has no direct influence.


**FIGURE 1. AN ORGANIZATION'S RELATIONS TO ITS ENVIRONMENTS**
The innermost circle comprises those factors that are managed by the organization - the NGO, such as staffing, budgeting, setting objectives. The second circle represents those factors that can presumably be influenced by NGOs through persuasion, lobbying, patronage, exchange. These factors include government institutions and the donor agencies. The third and widest circle is that part of the NGO environment that can only be appreciated. That is, it can not be changed, influenced or controlled by the NGOs. It includes major national political structure and macro-economic systems -- national and international. The boundaries between the circles are permeable.

De Graaf’s presentation of the problem and the model he proposes for understanding the problem are quite insightful and thought-provoking. His application of the model is disappointing however in that, other than a few token references to Tendler’s analysis of the risks and disadvantages of external financial dependence, he restricts his discussion of the economic environment influenced and appreciated in circles one and two to Zimbabwe only, and does not tie in the international dimensions of NGO funding.

Unlike Garilao, de Graaf pays a significant amount of attention to the relationship between NGOs and government. At one point he argues that NGOs linkages with government are weak, yet in another context he cites instances in which the government’s behavior was influenced by NGOs. He makes a very important point however -- de Graaf states that NGOs in Zimbabwe see government not as a resource to be used, but as a political authority to which they must be deferential. With regard to women which he mentions albeit briefly, de Graaf observes that women’s NGOs make no attempt to (re)shape institutions which could affect the position of women.37

All of these works by Garilao, Hirono, Tworse and de Graaf raise important issues that are not yet resolved in the politics of development cooperation. Systematic field observations overtime, representative samples of interviews with all of the partners in
development cooperation, and critical analysis of data may begin to offer some resolution. This author is not aware of any study which has systematically examined and analyzed from the field the transnational network linkages of development cooperative partnerships between African NGOs, foreign donors and African governments satisfactorily. Notable studies have been undertaken, but they either do not 1) grasp the entire network of the all of the organizational partners, or 2) examine the depth and politicization of the partners’ interrelatedness in which they jockey for “who gets what, when, how” and “how much,” and at what cost. Studies which include the comprehensiveness of partnerships and the intricacies of partners’ involvement with each other are necessary in attempts to understand how and why decisions regarding power, autonomy and dependence in partnerships are determined. Understanding these power differentials between organizations will evolve over time, as Southern NGO partnerships with transnational connections are a relatively newly recognized phenomenon for research.

Defining NGOs and Linking the Literature on NGOs to Foreign Donors and African Governments: Two Schools of Thought

Only in the last decade has the role of NGOs from the South in the development process come to the fore in social science literature. Consequently, very few scholarly works or empirical investigations exist. This lack of scholarly literature on NGOs reflects a lack of systematic understanding of the importance of the role of NGOs and the trilateral development partnership in the development process. Moreover, this lack of professional literature indicates that the nature of the relationship between NGOs and their partners in development has not itself been rigorously investigated. “What are NGOs?” and “What exactly do NGOs do?” are questions still posed by scholars, the answers of which are frequently ambiguous and are left unchallenged. Therefore, much remains unknown about
the actual functioning of NGOs in the development process vis-a-vis the nature of their
development partners.

Definitions -- NGOs, Foreign Donors and Governments

NGOs

Acronyms, lexicons and varying imprecise definitions convolute an already
complex area of investigation, therefore it is necessary to spell out as clearly as possible
the definition of NGOs in Africa. Fowler in “NGOs in Africa, Naming Them By What
They Are,” argues that NGOs can not be defined as simply not being governmental.41
That is not enough -- there must be criteria an organization must meet to qualify as an
NGO, and to distinguish itself from other organizations. Tworse warns against Northern
imposed criteria to define NGOs, for there is the risk of cultural imperialism in trying to
make Southern NGOs mimic Northern NGOs.42 There is also the risk that the academic
community will follow Hyden’s footsteps and mistakenly assume that most African NGOs
are local branches or affiliates of foreign-based organizations.43 Although some may be,
the vast majority of African NGOs spring from African roots. That is, some have
traditional roots and were formed in the early nineteenth century before the advent of
colonialism on the continent; some were formed to specifically challenge colonialism in the
1950s and 1960s -- officially and underground; and, some were formed after 1970 in the
spirit of self-help and self-reliance.44

The Courier, a development journal published in Brussels, in a special issue on
“Development NGOs” offers the following criteria that an organization must meet in order
to be classified an NGO:

1) it should be autonomous, neither depending substantially on the State for it
funds (though it may, and often does, receive a proportion of its funds from public
sources), nor being beholden to Government in the pursuit of its objectives;
2) it should be non-profit making, the funds it acquires being destined exclusively for the projects it undertakes;

3) the major part of its funds should come from voluntary contributions; and,

4) it should be created and run by the nationals of the developing country of its origin and it must work for that country's own development.\[45\]

Northern NGOs share this definition with Southern NGOs, except for criteria four. For Southern NGOs, this definition is a malleable definition, often molded to meet the needs and requirements of Northern NGOs or their governments, thus at times undermining this criteria and mocking the notion of "NGOs."\[46\] The Courier recognizes the broadness of this definition and warns against other types of organizations that may disguise themselves as NGOs. Some NGOs are involved in development activities, though involvement in development is not mandatory for an NGO. Those who become involved in development specifically and exclusively are sometimes, but not consistently, referred to as non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs).

NGOs may be local or national. At the local level, they are community-based and are run by the local members. They may or may not be linked to a national NGO. National NGOs tend to have countrywide memberships and/or have countrywide operations, while they are based in capital cities. They have executive, administrative and sometimes professional staffs. They may or may not have NGO branches at the local level. National NGOs and local NGOs may or may not be assisted, both financially and technically, by foreign donors -- international governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) -- or by their home governments. It is not uncommon for national NGOs in Africa to be assisted by both.
Foreign Donors

Foreign donors who become involved in development in the South may include the following: Northern governmental organizations (GOs), international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and businesses. Definitions will be provided as follows:

Northern governmental organizations (GOs) are organizations that are 1) created by legislative or executive measures of governments of organizations' origin, and/or 2) are funded by governments of organizations' origin. GOs include organizations such as USAID, the U. S. Peace Corps, and the German Technical Agency.

International intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are organizations established by agreements engendering obligations between governments. (IGOs) include the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.47

International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are international organizations that are not established by intergovernmental agreements. They must meet the following criteria:

1) They must be international in character. That is, they must have intentions to cover operations in at least three countries;

2) There must be participation, including full voting rights, from at least three countries. Voting power must not be controlled by one national group;

3) A constitution must provide for a formal organizational structure and continuity of operations, giving members the right to periodically elect a governing body and officers. There must be a rotations of officers among various member countries;

4) There must be permanent headquarters for the organization that rotates at designated intervals among the various member countries;
5) Substantial contributions to the budget must be made from at least three countries. There must be no attempt to make profits for distribution to members; and,

6) Organizations may have relations with other organizations, but there must be evidence that the former leads an independent life and elects its own officers.

NGOs include OXFAM and Salvation Army.

NGOs, both Northern and Southern types, were previously defined. Northern NGOs, which are not international, include organizations such as CARE and Africare. Southern NGOs include organizations such as MYWO.

Padron makes a very thought provoking argument stating that “The concept NGO is wrongly used to denominate non-governmental organizations (NGOs),” namely the ones from the South. He argues that development organizations from the South should be identified as NGDOs, and they should be distinguished from grassroots sector organizations (GROs) -- NDGOs are local or national and GROs are grassroots. Padron’s points are well taken as “NGO” is generally used to refer to an amorphous set of organizations ranging from religious institutions to trade associations to cooperative societies to international agencies. Little distinction is made between international, national and local NGOs. This “generic” use of NGO speaks to the conceptual muddle and confusion surrounding NGOs and calls for clarification.

Businesses are private profit-making enterprises. They may be local, national or international. Those that become involved in development partnerships are generally transnational corporations (TNCs), otherwise called multinational corporations (MNCs). An example of a business is Coca Cola.

Together GOs, IGOs, INGOs, NGOs and businesses comprise the “foreign donors” for this study.
African Governments

Governments are defined as the occupants of public office who make decisions at a particular time. They may be viewed as the policy actors of the state. The state is the organized set of institutions, associations and agencies claiming governing power over a defined territory and its population. With society, the state and the government-of-the-day may engage in acts ranging from negotiation to domination. The state and government institution that becomes involved most directly and actively in development cooperation with NGOs is the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy represents civil servants in the various government Ministries or Bureaus. That is, bureaucrats from the lower rung to the top level managerial staff become involved in development cooperation by providing technical and/or financial assistance to NGOs. They do this at the will of heads of governments who may create environments of cooperation or conflict with NGOs. African heads of governments are able to do this as they often have de facto unchecked and unlimited state power to facilitate or quell development efforts. How the government engages in development in Africa depends on the regime type and the nature of the state. With regard to women’s development activities, much depends on the head of government’s ideological and personal views toward women. The Moi government from the years 1978 to 1992 is the most important period for this study. During this time, the Ministries most actively involved in development partnerships are the Ministries for Culture and Social Services, Agriculture, Energy, Livestock, Health, and Home Affairs.

NGOs and their Partners: Two Schools of Thought

The nexus between NGOs, foreign donors and African governments is truly a complex and potentially fluid and volatile one indeed. A review of the two schools of thought regarding their development cooperative relationship illustrates this, for there is a
dissension among scholars as to the role of NGOs, the contribution they actually make to
development, and the nature of their relationship to their partners in development. Within
the last fifteen years, for example, there have emerged two schools of thought, both
descriptive and prescriptive, with diametrically opposite viewpoints.

There is one school of thought on NGOs, the pessimists' school, which obviously
emphasizes the politization of the relations between partners in development. The other
school, the school of optimists is, on the surface, more naive to international power
relations between states, organizations, and their subsequent effects. This school does
however take into consideration, though not as critically, the politics involved in
development cooperative partnerships.

The School of NGO Optimism

The first school of thought suggests that NGOs become agents of development
representing the interests of indigenous people. Antrobus argues that NGOs "can be seen
as an expression and outgrowth of the ending of colonial rule, a symbol of people's new-
found confidence in defining their own needs and priorities and in taking responsibility for
addressing these." Pradervand and Lecomte agree that NGOs become the leaders in the
development process--taking responsibility for meeting the needs of their constituency
and setting their own agenda. Generally, it is believed that NGOs have demonstrated the
capacity to design and implement development programs, using innovative approaches,
without the governmental hassles and bureaucratic red tape, which actually reach the
people at the grassroots.

This school generally supports its optimist view by citing instances in which NGOs
have demonstrated potential for sensitive, successful and self-reliant development in
Burkina Faso, Mali, Kenya, Senegal and Zimbabwe. Generally, NGOs are believed to
assume charge and direct their partners in development -- foreign donors and the
government, implementing their own development agendas with the financial and technical
assistance of their partners, but not becoming beholden to them. More and more from this
school’s perspective, NGOs are viewed as perceivably playing a more effective role in
responding to Africa’s crises and in building strategies which will bring substantial
development to the continent.  

Garilao supports this view of NGOs by asserting that NGOs are emerging as
advocates for self-reliance who will, by themselves, bring about significant policy and
institutional change. He calls for NGOs’ partners in development to aid in defining an
agenda without imposing their own agenda, to be “facilitative not directive.”  
Fernand Vincent, founder of a Geneva-based foreign NGO makes the same argument, in a different
manner: “Western NGOs should efface themselves more and more and let this movement
come to fore. The future belongs to (Southern NGOs) --if they manage to acquire the
needed means and know-how and a real understanding of economic forces.”  
Generally, this school takes the stand that NGOs perhaps hold the key to Africa’s future. Steel,
Program Coordinator of the World Bank Administration has described NGOs in this way,

...NGOs are already substantial contributors to the global and local dialogues on
development issues, are substantial providers of human, financial and resources in
kind, and are well positioned to respond to the challenge of the 21st Century.  

The School of NGO Pessimism

The second school of thought is less optimistic however. This school was borne
out of beliefs that NGOs are being “oversold,” as their presumed effectiveness is not as
positive as the school of optimists tend to think. In this school it is argued that NGOs
may become mere vessels through which their partners gain support for their own
programs with no real regard for NGOs themselves. For instance, van der Heijden has discussed threats to the autonomy of NGOs due to their excessive dependence on foreign financial support resulting in the subordination of NGOs' own “internal” agendas. He uses figures from Mvangi who demonstrated that in 1986 the dependence rates of Sub-Saharan African NGOs exceeded 90%, which van der Heijden positively correlates with weak internal capacity for development program formulation. de Graaf further argues that “there are no immediate prospects that this tendency will abate” for NGOs are not “systems on their own” but are integrated into a wider and more complex political and administrative environment in which they have “limited influence and even less control.”

Allison uses an example to illustrate: “British aid is moving away from helping the poorest people and is increasingly being used to sell British exports and to further the governments’ foreign and economic policies.”

Kinyanjui further speaks to the involvement of foreign donors in the African development process. He argues that increasingly foreign aid is being used to 1) control international trade in the favor of industrialized nations, 2) depress agricultural commodity prices, and 3) prescribe the “bitter-medicine” conditionalities of the World Bank and IMF. In essence, Kinyanjui argues that foreign aid is being used as a foreign policy tool. Kobia evaluates the functions of foreign donors in Kenya and lends support to Kinyanjui’s views. He believes that NGOs and foreign donors “run the risk of being pawns in the chess game of manipulating the poor in order to perpetrate unjust global socioeconomic relationships.” He argues that through operations disguised as development “partnerships “the rich North reaps handsome benefits while the South is always the loser.”

According to Kobia, development partnerships are merely token mechanisms promoted by the rich North to forestall any serious attempt to redress the unjust international economic order. Charles Elliot, former director of the INGO Christian Aid speaks to this possibility.
He states, "Aid can be used as a way of diverting attention from much deeper economic injustices which perpetuate poverty on a far greater scale than the most generous aid programme can relieve."65

Tandon, perhaps the most critical of the pessimist school, argues that NGOs may in fact be a new form of colonialism from the grassroots in the 1990s. He bases his argument on several factors. One, he charges that foreign donors in Africa are a "secret lot." Not much is known about them and their origins. Two, although much of foreign donor monies come from government, most are called "non-governmental." Three, Tandon states that foreign donors development agendas are decided in the North and not with their target populations in Africa. Four, many Northern NGO donors in America were founded at the height of national anti-communist paranoia and have since been involved in counter-revolutionary activities in Southern Africa, particularly Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Five, Northern NGOs make an issue of violations of political rights by African governments, but they do not make issue of violations of economic rights by the international capitalist system which exploits peasants' labour. Lastly, Tandon posits that all of the Northern NGOs come from countries which plundered Africa, through slavery, colonialism, then neocolonialism. The North's next step, Tandon argues, is colonialism on a different level -- the grassroots.66

These two schools of thought regarding the role of NGOs in development and the nature of their relationships with their partners represent the current competing paradigms regarding development cooperative partnerships. This dissension and competition between these schools of thought underscore the importance of understanding the linkages and effectiveness of development cooperation between organizations as North and South come together in NGO, foreign donor and African government partnerships.
Neither of these schools takes a definitive position with regard to NGO - African government relations. More of their focus is directed toward NGO - foreign donor relations. From the literature and from observation however, it appears that in this trilateral relationship, African governments are in very precarious positions. They want the financial resources that NGOs are able to attract and secure from abroad as well as the political patronage they are able to acquire through allocating these resources locally, yet they do not want the political challenge from the independent power base that NGOs often build. Bratton demonstrates that NGOs are among few organizations in developing countries to maintain a direct presence among the grassroots, and on that basis he argues they may be perceived as threats to the state. Korten and Brown, and Bratton further take the position that popular mobilization, participation and pluralism are part and parcel of NGO's development successes, and are essential elements in what makes autocratic governments uneasy. They state that the very existence of NGOs promotes a democratic political culture which 1) encourages and supports popular participation, and 2) presents serious contenders for competing ideas and alternative political leadership with legitimate grassroots support. Esman and Uphoff argue that such a reality, as perceived by the government, may be detrimental for NGOs and their potential for development success. Hence, they argue that most successful NGOs "enjoy the support or at least acquiescence of government and are linked to services and resources that originate in the state." For this reason they argue that absolute autonomy of NGOs is not desirable for rural development. If a government feels its hegemony is threatened, as Bratton argues, it may resort to one or more mechanisms of control including: 1) Monitoring and Registration, 2) Coordination, 3) Co-optation and 4) Reorganization, Dissolution and Imprisonment.
Women, NGOs and IOR: A Missing Link In Development Theory and Practice

Glaringly absent in the above discussions of NGOs and IOR is the inclusion of women. One would imagine that in the literature on NGOs particularly, there would be a wealth of information on women, as women comprise the bulk of NGO memberships. This however is not the case. Assessing the proliferation of NGOs on the African continent in the late 1980s Pradervand notes that NGO memberships are predominantly comprised of women, even when they do not appear at the heads of organizations. For example, in the Sahel, Pradervand estimates that women made up between two-thirds to three-fourths of organized peasants, and in Kenya up to 90%. He further explains that women make up the overwhelming majority of NGO members because women are the rural inhabitants and farmers who produce over 75% of Africa’s food, while, in some areas, men go to the city to look for work.

Despite these facts, many studies point to the undisputable exclusion of women from development planning and development scholarship, beginning with Boserup’s Woman’s Role in Economic Development in 1970 which tied women and development concerns together in an international context. In spite of noting this exclusion of women, relatively little has been done to reverse this omission. An increase in the research and literature on women engaged in development work has since been produced and recognized, but much of this literature remains effectively separate from other works on development. Generally, much of the research on women in development tends to be in-house evaluations by international organizations such as USAID (special section on women in development), or special series papers on “women and development.” This in itself is not problematic. What is problematic, however, is that these studies are kept for the most part, in-house, and consequently remain separate and apart from “mainstream” development literature. Moreover, research on women is often perceived as qualitatively
less rigorous, less scientific and less scholarly than mainstream research. There is further criticism that these in-house papers on women in development are rarely used to initiate development action on women's behalf. Charlton argues that we may one day conclude that the greatest impact of the focus on women in development is not the betterment of women's life chances in tangible ways, but instead the financing of a collection of a wide array of studies relevant to development in general.74

**Male Bias in Development Theory**

The marginalization of women and works on women is a direct consequence of male bias in development theory, which spills over into the formulation and implementation of development policies and practices.75 Just as IOR has been marginalized by mainstream political science, women have been marginalized throughout the evolution of development theory since the 1940s. Development theory overtime has generally been created by men from the North, and when these theories have attempted to paint a human face they have been biased, whether intentional or not, toward men in “developing” societies in the South.

From modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s which stressed tension and conflict between tradition and modernity, and assumed that societies would choose modernity and thus “pass” from the former to latter, there has been male bias. For instance, modernization theory measures the extent of “modernity” or “backwardness” of a society based on variables that are, by their nature, biased toward men. It measures: 1) performance and stability of political systems, “systems” being patriarchal and male-dominated in its conceptualization; 2) quality of the politics, “politics” defined as taking place in the “public sphere” which is the traditional domain of men; 3) percentage of literate persons in the population, a reflection of gender bias as men were more likely that
women to be formally schooled; 4) percentage of workforce in non-agricultural occupations, a reflection of men as women's primary occupation was (and still is) that of farmer; and 5) percentage of urban population, again a reflection of men as most women remained on the farms in the rural areas to work while more men traveled to the urban areas.\textsuperscript{76}

In addition, underdevelopment and dependency theories of the late 1960s and early 1970s have further focussed on men. These theories focus on extraction of resources from the periphery by external forces at the center. This extraction serves to perpetually bankrupt the periphery, which includes the African continent. Moreover, center-periphery linkages serve to the create a comprador elite or a local bourgeoisie, which emerges as a male elite group that benefits from this extraction, and that protects the interests of the center in the periphery. This group also protects male-state interests in the periphery.\textsuperscript{77} Women from the periphery, as a group, are the most marginalized in this equation. Even the more sensitive of theorists to Africa's condition of underdevelopment and dependence, such as Rodney, Amin and Leys, did not explicitly address the plight or the potential of women in the periphery. Wallerstein's World Systems/Dependency work did not address the issue of women either until an edited work in 1984.\textsuperscript{78}

The statist approaches to development theory in the 1980s also focused on men. In that African states began to assume the brunt of responsibility for development (or lack thereof) in this period, African states focussed more directly at this time on urbanization and industrialization as the catalysts for development. Development in this vein was projected to come from male urban working class labor, although the state lacked the skilled male labor power in the urban centers as well as the appropriate technology to industrialize. These statist approaches ignored women who live predominately in the rural areas, who are agriculturalists primarily, and who are the bulk of the continental labor
force. Political development theorists, including Huntington, Myrdal, and Binder from the West, indirectly perpetuated this bias against women, as they separately supported, since the 1960s, statist theories. Their writings suggested that 1) the state harden its stance against popular mobilization and political activity as state institutions were still "weak;" and 2) the state moreover draw "peripheral" populations into national development, only under the terms of the state. More important than their contribution to development theory might have been their justification for statist one-party regimes in Africa.

The political economy approaches to development of the late 1980s and early 1990s have also been biased against women. They have focussed on replications of the industrial production and export schemes of the Asian economic miracles -- particularly those of Asia’s four tigers --Taiwan, Hongkong, Singapore and South Korea) as they correlate development with economic growth. Despite the exploitation of women’s labor being part and parcel of these economic growth models, they are endorsed by development theorists of this school as “exportable” development models. Much of the bias against women stems from the oppressive myths that women are necessarily docile, dexterous, and able to complete painstaking tasks. They are also perceived to be the most reliable and least demanding of all workers, as job options for them are few to nil. Women laborers in export industries are the least regarded and most exploited of all laborers under these development models.

Lastly, the policy process approach, as Liddle argues, interjects the mandate to formulate and implement the “right policies” in discussions of development theory. It is the newest of the approaches to understanding the causes of development in this decade. To extend Liddle’s argument, I contend that as development theory begins to consider the calculations of politicians, both male and female, in their attempts to maintain power in
their separate gendered spheres, juxtaposed against 1) the pressures they face from internal and external sources, and 2) the sincerity of their desire for "national development," we may begin to have some insight as to the causes of development or non-development. Policy formulations in Africa assuredly must be considered in the context of 1) the coexistence of the primordial public and the civic public, 84 2) the separate political cultures of men and women, and 3) the pressures from the international capitalist economy. This holistic, interactive policy approach which Liddle illuminates, when coupled with a gender perspective, may offer women recognition and voice in development theory hitherto they have not had -- that is, if scholars and practitioners are truly committed to formulating policies devoid of male gender bias.

With the exception of the policy process approach, almost all of the other theories and approaches to development share urban, elite and industrial biases which are tantamount to male bias in development theory as it relates to Africa. Generally development theory ignored the rural populations, who are the women, until the WID decade. In spite women's recognition currently, as a consequence of the WID decade, there is still bias in favor of male leaders in rural areas.85 There is a glimmer of hope however. As women, the state and foreign donors come together in this era, interlinked as a new institutional interorganizational phenomenon on the cutting edge of development implementation, development theory shall be forced to grapple with women and NGOs "front and center" it is discussions, debates, and theory reformulations.

To rephrase Marx, "Woman makes her own history, but she does not make it under conditions of her own choosing."86 Fatton agrees and highlights this phenomenon in the African context. He demonstrates that "women's access to political and economic resources have been severely constrained by pervasive and overwhelming patterns of male domination."87 In relatively all aspects of life, women's opportunities and status are
determined by their connections to men — fathers and husbands. Using Ghana as a case study, Robertson further notes that gender identity in Africa can often be the basis for objectification, blame and persecution, when one is female.8

From a global perspective, in most if not all societies, women's opportunities are determined by men to varying degrees.89 Women, as a class worldwide, are politically, socially, economically dependent on men. The reason is that, with respect to class, race, ethnic and country-of-origin-differences and their corresponding privilege differences, "women in general have little or no formal, institutionalized power at the local, national, and international levels in comparison to men."90 Moreover, the increasing interrelatedness of these three levels — local, national and international — further reinforces the political power differences between women and men. Thus, women from the South are likely to have least power of all, as men from the South have less political and economic power than men from the North.

Stoltenberg and Hooks separately argue that men, as a class worldwide, dominate women by establishing patriarchal control over women through a process which Stoltenberg describes as male bonding. He provides the following definition:

Male bonding is institutionalized learned behavior whereby men recognize and reinforce one another's bona fide membership in the male gender class and whereby men remind one another that they were not born women. Male bonding is political and pervasive.91

Hooks agrees, but points out that even though men have political privileges and power over women, simply because they belong to the gender class of men, it is possible for men to change. For example, she argues that when men raise their political consciousness and realize the oppressive system that interlinks classism, racism, capitalism and sexism, they come to the realization that although women are more oppressed, men are not free either.92 Hooks goes further than Stoltenberg and states that it is not individual
men who are the real enemy of women or the cause of the power differences between men and women. Instead, Hooks argues, it is a ruling class patriarchal system which perpetuates itself through the socialization of men to engage in and encourage men's sexist and oppressive practices against women. Its ultimate aim is the control of nations, states and economies. With a view to women globally, Lewis demonstrates that this patriarchal system of which Hooks writes is in fact a global patriarchy, bonding men and oppressing women worldwide. Despite the magnitude of the patriarchy, Hooks' argument strongly suggests and recommends that male bonding be unlearned.

Nzomo argues that Kenyan men are part and parcel of this global patriarchy which oppresses women. She demonstrates Kenyan ruling class men's successful attempts since independence to systematically exclude women from the formal political and economic structures of the state, sanctioning only the censored and supervised presence of hand-picked government-and-male-identified women within their ranks (albeit on a lower level). Generally, politics and economics in Kenya, as in many other countries, are considered male affairs. Concomitantly, the home and childcare are considered women's affairs. Nzomo proposes a challenge to these separate gender spheres, stipulating that politics and economics not be deemed the domain of "men only." Nzomo calls for women to "own" their organizations, to make their agendas political, and to reorient their activities toward women's economic control.

Women, Organizations and IOR

What we know about organizations, from a pathbreaking study on Gender and Bureaucracy, which attempts to mesh organizational theory and feminist theory, is that organizations are in fact "gendered." Despite this fact, little work has been done on women in organizations, and even less on women's organizations in IOR, especially
women's NGOs. Nonetheless, recent scholarship on women and various types of organizations is instructive and have some applicability for understanding women organizations in IOR studies. For example, Davies, in a study of women and nursing organizations found that gender is a "relations quality" in organizations and gender relations are power relations. In addition, Ramsay and Parker in "Gender, Bureaucracy and Organizational Culture," argue that within organizations "women are excluded as equal organizational participants by patriarchal structures and processes," while men as a group retain power and authority through legitimizing hierarchical organization structures. Pringle, in "Bureaucracies, Rationality and Sexuality..." challenges this structural determinist perspective and argues that men do not necessarily unilaterally impose male power on women. Instead, Pringle argues that gender relations are more a process involving strategies and counter strategies of power.

Ramsay and Parker provide the most relevant information from which we may conceptually understand a female-gendered organization in a patriarchal world. They state that "organizations are (mere) constructs with the interpretive resources that any culture provides,...(thus) gender oppression is common to most if not all organizations..." Hence, based on this, it is unrealistic to expect that women in organizations and women's organizations in IOR would not be subordinated by the power differential which exists between the gender class of men and the gender class of women, and which is supported in their relational environment internationally. Boulding argues that this power differential has been an impetus for the creation of NGOs as alternative organizations for women. Writing from a historical perspective on NGOs globally, Boulding states:

The phenomenon of the women's NGOs stemmed in part from the inability of women to get men to give priority to decentralism and non-violence, and in part from the fact that men could not perceive women as individual human beings in their own right, let alone as partners in major public enterprises.
Specific Reference to Africa

Outside of impact studies on women’s contributions to community development, serious scholarship on women’s organizations in mainstream development IOR literature in Africa is lacking. Moreover, in-house studies tend not to be available for public consumption. This is problematic considering the fact that IOR involving women’s organizations has grown phenomenally on the continent in the recent past.

To date, women’s organizational affiliation in Africa is exponentially higher than men’s. Subsequently, women’s IOR affiliation are markedly higher than men as well. Despite this organizational affiliation and IOR involvement, women organizations’ gains remain minimal. After a critical look at women and the state in Africa, Parpart and Staudt argue, and Chazan concurs, that the women remain outsiders in their relations to the state, severely restricted from voicing their concerns in the public political arena. Generally, organizational affiliation offers them no real independent voice. Likewise, Nzomo argues that women organizations become more exploited, oppressed and dehumanized when they interact with foreign donors, as donors treat them as an always available pool of cheap labour. Rogers notes that she is not surprised by the treatment of women’s organizations by foreign donors as she points out that international organizations are not exempt from Western male bias in development. Yudelman supports Rogers’ point by demonstrating that some Northern donors have not done very well at integrating women into their own Northern organizations. Glickman and Staudt posit that international organizations may in fact be part of the problem, allocating resources to men, via men, while simultaneously being slow to respond to women’s work and needs.

At a very fundamental level, women’s organizations in Africa operate in a relational environment in which they are particularly vulnerable to male domination and patriarchal ideology, policies and practices that are fostered either by the state or foreign
donors, or by both. To state this differently, women’s organizations are dependent, to varying degrees, on the patriarchal structures of the state and foreign donors for their continued existence and prosperity. This is not surprising as patriarchal traditions are deeply rooted in both the fabric of African traditions and in the politics of interorganizational relations, which serves to reinforce oppression against women, as individuals and in organizations.

Nzomo argues that part of the blame is women themselves, for women’s passivity has allowed men, hence states and government, to succeed with the implementation and continuation of patriarchal policies and practices. An argument by Staudt however demonstrates that the situation may be far more complex than Nzomo represents. Staudt argues that it is sometimes difficult for women to act on gender-based concerns consistently, as women also have concerns of family and other matters which may cross cut gender concerns. Bujra accepts Staudt’s contention as she argues that to believe that women’s organizations in Africa emerged to challenge the patriarchy is to begin with a false premise. Bujra states:

The existence of women’s organizations in Africa is not...unthinkingly to be equated with the existence of any specifically feminist consciousness, or any desire to transform the class or economic structures of postcolonial society. Women’s liberation is disruptive in its challenge to male prerogatives; of hand because of this would be shortsighted, however. For, despite their primary significance as institutions of class control, such organizations, in bringing women into communication with each other, can provide arenas of struggle within which women who are poor and subordinated can speak out and exert pressure on those who enjoy the rewards of postcolonial society.

There are scholars who would challenge Bujra’s argument, yet her point is well made and well taken. There are some cases in which women have resisted openly patriarchal control, yet in most instances women have, exited, albeit quietly from the fringes of the political domain rather than challenge men and the state. This seemingly
passive, apolitical stance that women take may seem perplexing on the surface, yet when one digs deeper it becomes clear that "exit" is a very rational stance, and that its fundamental underpinnings are extremely political. That is, women’s organizations and individual women who exit, often exist because they have contrived formulas for survival which maintains for them at least limited voice and chances for success (however small) in a very limiting patriarchal, oppressive and often misogynistic environment. They aim to at least survive, and at most, prosper.

That women’s organizations in IOR are confronted with and are dependent on male power in a patriarchal relational environment, nationally internationally, is an avenue of investigation IOR must undertake.

Framing The Transnational Relationship of MYWO, Foreign Donors and the Kenyan Government: Building on the Foundation of IOR’S Resource Dependency Model (RDM)

There is no explicit model in the literature which brings together IOR, NGOs and women, as the interconnectedness of these areas of research have heretofore been unrecognized and unexplored. There is however an IOR model, the Resource Dependency Model (RDM) which is capable of addressing, at least in part, the politization of the transnational network linkages which exists when foreign donors, NGOs and women’s organizations come together as “partners” in development cooperation. The foundation of the RDM offers a starting point to begin to identify, assess and compare variable impacts of power, autonomy and dependence of the partners in development cooperation. This model however must be modified in order to address the scope and peculiarities of this research problem.

Specific to this research problem, IOR’s RDM appears quite applicable in that questions regarding the autonomy of MYWO, as a Kenyan women’s NGO, and its
dependence on foreign donors and the Kenyan government in its relational environment are the foci of my project. Autonomy, relative power and dependence are the key concepts around which RDM revolves. As IOR scholars have argued, "Avoiding or exploiting dependence relations is a central dynamic of IOR, and concepts of dependence and relative power are crucial to interorganizational analysis." Because MYWO is a women's organization makes RDM an even more appropriate basis for analysis in that women as a group, in a world of patriarchal power and politics, have less autonomy and power, and are more dependent than men, on men for resources, in their relational environment. Thus, for this research problem, a gender component of RDM must be created.

**Defining RDM**

RDM has strong conceptual and theoretical ties to the political economy model of organizations and the dependence-exchange approach of IOR. Moreover, RDM appears to have grown out of expansions of and challenges to Levine and White's exchange theory (1960-1961) which served as the dominant model for analyzing and explaining interorganizational behavior for over a decade.116 Organizational exchange, Levine and White define, is "any voluntary activity between two organizations which has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their respective goals or objectives."117 From Levine and White's propositions, other IOR theorists, in contributing to defining RDM, argue that organizations which lack the necessary resources, which they define as 1) recipients to serve, 2) resources, and 3) personnel to direct resources to recipients to achieve their goals and objectives, engage in exchanges with other organizations.118
One of the major challenges to Levine and White which brought to bear RDM was based on their conceptualization of "exchange." It has been argued that Levine and White's definition of exchange was so broad that it could include "any form of voluntary activity between organizations, (thus merely) rendering the term "exchange" synonymous with interaction." Furthermore, it has been shown that Levine and White's definition of "voluntary" exchanges captures the 'normal' aspects of exchanges brought about in the absence of power differences and dependencies. From an RDM perspective, such a definition of exchange is apolitical, naive and unrealistic. It excludes interorganizational relationships that involve coercion and domination, where exchanges might be involuntary. This is important to note, for when women's organizations are involved in male-dominated IOR, because of gender differences and subsequent power differences, there is a strong likelihood that exchanges embedded in the politics of coercion and domination may be frequent occurrences; hence the need for gender analysis.

Resource dependency theorists argue that "potential power is equivalent to the possession of scarce resources" and "organizations that acquire a monopoly over resources are able to establish dependencies over other organizations that cannot reciprocate resource exchanges." As Emerson, in attempts to construct a theory of power aspects in social relations, argues, "power implicitly resides in the other's dependency." Hence, organizations that possess those scarce resources which lead to power over other organizations can force the compliance of others (e.g. individual, organizations, institutions). For example, consider organizations A, B, and C. The exercise of organization A's power may be seen through its use of resources to gain the compliance of other organizations B and C. Thus, organization A's power can be inversely related to organization B's and C's power, and can be directly related to
organization B’s and C’s dependence, if organizations B and C have no access to other resources from sources other than A.

This scenario very cogently describes the relational environment of local grassroots NGOs and national NGOs in Africa that make the claim that they are attempting to work toward the economic development of the continent through the formulation and implementation of indigenously-defined development agendas, with the assistance of foreign donors and African governments, both of whom are their material, technical, and financial resource bases. Local grassroots NGOs and national NGOs struggle with establishing autonomy, and less dependence for their organizations, making the case that their organizational autonomy will enhance the possibilities for actually and expeditiously achieving not only “successful” substantial development, but also eventual self-reliance of their communities and the continent. Whether interorganizational transnational network analysis, RDM and gender analysis can lend some insight and some answers to this proposition by local grassroots NGOs and national NGOs, and some direction to foreign donors and governments, this research intends to determine. Some major research questions which emanate from this are:

1) What implications does the RDM have for organizations which lack the necessary resources to meet their stated goals without the assistance of other organizations? Is autonomy possible, despite assistance?

2) Does and can networking or linking between and among organizations change the distribution of resources and hence the balance of power? Is it possible for financially and technically resourceless organizations to direct and control joint organizational endeavors? Is it possible for resourceless women’s organizations to control joint organizational endeavors?

3) Are there ways to change resource dependence among organizations into facilitative cooperation, particularly when one of those organizations is a women’s organization?
4) Can NGOs realistically achieve autonomy, self-directed development and eventually self-reliance while depending on foreign donors and African governments for foreign and technical assistance?

Defining Power: A Consideration of Gender in RDM

Application of RDM to interorganizational relations appears to have utilized the operational definitions of "power" as defined by 1) Dahl, the ability of one to have another do what s/he would not otherwise do; and 2) Emerson, as previously noted, power lying asymmetrically in dependence. Moreover, IOR theorists further argue that these definitions do not negate Levine and White's exchange model as much as they incorporate it.

Blau, applying these definitions to IOR, specifies the conditions necessary for the possession of resources to lead to power of one organization over others:

1) an organization does not have resources to reciprocate;
2) no alternative suppliers exist;
3) no possibilities exist for using coercive power against the resource holder; and,
4) the organization cannot get along without the scarce resources.

Blau, as well as other IOR scholars, have omitted one of the essential conditions for the possession of resources to lead to power. That condition is to have membership in the gender class of men. Being male in a patriarchal world of power and politics lends itself the male prerogative and privilege to dominate and to have control over women's organizations in IOR through patriarchal structures. IOR has yet to deal seriously, systematically and scholarly with the gender issue. As an overwhelming number of NGOs, particularly from the South, are women's organizations that have become institutionalized
partners in IOR, the gender issue cannot be sidestepped. On that basis, I have formulated this research project with MYWO as the focal organization among its partners in development, requiring that gender analysis be central to this study.

Applying Transnational Network Analysis to IOR Phenomena With Resource Dependencies

Both Evan and Jonsson suggest similar steps to approach interorganizational studies. These steps facilitate the application of the foundation of the RDM in this study. The first step is to locate a central or focal organization around which to center a study. The focal organization is the organization or organizations "that is the point of reference" which "interacts with a complement of organizations in its environment." The second step is to identify those organizations and institutions in the focal organization's relational environment with which it interacts, bargains, coalesces or allies.

Evan refers to those organizations in the relational environment of the focal organization as "input organizations" and "output organizations" according to their function, adapting his methodology from Talcott Parson's general systems theory. Evan defines input organizations as those organizations that provide resources to the focal organization. Output organizations are the organizations that receive the goods and services, including the organizational decisions. This overall systems analysis requires that the effects of the output organizations be traced back to the focal organization and the input organization so as to analyze the system in its organizational entirety. Figure 2 illustrates a general systems theory sociogram of interorganizational behavior as conceptualized by Evan. Figure 3 illustrates a general systems theory sociogram as applied to this study.

**FIGURE 2. INTERORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM**
Application of General Systems Theory to this study.

FIGURE 3. INTERORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM
From another view, Jonsson views interorganizational relations in terms of what he calls "the game-theoretical notion of 'strategic interdependence.'" He defines strategic interdependence as "the ability of each participating actor (in IOR) to gain his ends (being) dependent on the behavior of other participating actors." Jonsson views the focal organization, which he refers to as the "linking pin" as the broker organization which: 1) keeps the network of organizations together, 2) serves as the communication channel between organizations in networks, and 3) directs the behavior of other organizations. Jonsson basically adopts the linking pin definition of Aldrich and Whetten who describe the linking pin as "the nodes through which a network in loosely joined." One major problem with the broker role of the linking pin the way Jonsson describes it is that the organization that assumes this role is not entirely selfless. Hence, its role is not static as Jonsson suggests. Its role may change, depending on its individual organizational goals which may change over time, its self-interest, and its relative power (and dependence) on other organizations in the network. Figure 4 illustrates hypothetical network links with a linking pin as conceptualized by Jonsson. Although Jonsson conceptualizes an international organization as the linking pin in his model, MYWO - the Kenyan national women's organization is the linking pin in the model of this study. The reason is that MYWO is the organization that ties together all of the other organizations in the relational environment. It is the center for all activities.

The Resource Dependence, Transnational Network and Gender Framework for the Study of the Politics of Development Cooperation

The fact that MYWO's partners provide the lion's share of financial and technical development resources to projects and programs suggests that the outcomes of development cooperative efforts may not be solely reflective of MYWO's indigenously

**FIGURE 4. TRANSITIONAL NETWORK LINKAGES**
defined goals and priorities, but may instead reflect unequal power and gender relations, and hence, the goals and priorities of its partners - foreign donors and the Kenyan government. The degree to which MYWO may be able to direct development as an autonomous body, free from the pressures of the exchanges made with foreign donors and African governments determines its indigenous institutional effectiveness as a development policy actor, inspite of dependencies inherent to unequal resource contributions and unequal gender relations in development partnerships. The degree to which development partnerships are able to meet MYWO’s development goals, despite the unequal distribution of power within the partnerships, will hopefully give some indication as to how development successes might be optimized in the future, utilizing the myriad of available resources in the organizational relational environment. Analyzing the politics of gender in IOR cooperation is extremely important in that gender differences reinforce and reflect the politics of unequal resources, as well as shapes the current character of development partnerships in contemporary Africa.

This chapter has merged four distinct areas of research: 1) IOR Theory; 2) NGOs in Africa; 3) Development Theory and 4) Women in IOR. This chapter has also reviewed the relevant literature so as to construct an appropriate framework for analyzing the research problem at hand -- the Politics of Development Cooperation. The next chapter (3) will provide a political history MYWO, so as to lay the necessary background information for the presentation and discussion of the fieldwork in Kenya.
1 Richard Hall, Organizations: Structures, Processes and Outcomes (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1991), 236. Hall defines "cooperation," drawing on works from other IOR scholars. For the purposes of this study, I have extended Hall's definition to refer to development interorganizational cooperation.


4 Gordenker and Saunders, "Organization Theory," 89.

5 Mulford, Interorganizational Relations, 1-3.


Several books provide useful discussions of the heavy-handedness of the African state. Among them are: Naomi Chazan and Donald Rothchild, ed., *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), and Kathleen

23 Hall, *Organizations*, 216.


31 Hall, *Organizations*, 222.


34 Ryokichi Hirono, “How to Promote Trilateral Cooperation Among Governments, NGOs and International Agencies,” in *World NGO Symposium Nagoya Congress October*
35 Nigel Tworse, "European NGOs: Growth or Partnership?" World Development vol. 15 supplement (1987): 7-10.


40 de Graaf, "Context," 277-278.


42 Tworse, "European NGOs," 9.


Tworse, "European NGOs," 9.


Ibid.


Garilao, "Indigenous NGOs," 119.


60 Hendirk van der Heijden, “The Reconciliation of NGO Autonomy, Program Integrity and Operational Effectiveness with Accountability to Donors,” World Development vol. 15 supplement (1987): 111. (Cite Mvangi)


65 As quoted in Kobia, “The Old and New,” 35.


72 Ibid.


75 Rodgers in *Domestication*, p. 44 makes this point somewhat differently. She states, "Male bias has been built into development institutions, processes and policies, and even if all new programs were placed overnight on a foundation of equal access for all, regardless of gender, the momentum of unequal processes already in operation would remain very powerful."


78 The specific Wallerstein work referred to here is Joan Smith, Immanuel Wallerstein and Hans-Dieter Evers, eds., Households and the World Economy (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984). It is important to note that Wallerstein is not a dependency theorist. He has however been influenced by underdevelopment and dependency theory. He has also contributed to the theory’s growth. The book cited here has been criticized for dealing with gender very tangentially.

79 Chazan, Politics, especially Chapters 2 and 9; Most of the works in Naomi Chazan and Donald Rothchild, The Precarious Balance: State and Society in in Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988); Parpart and Staudt, Women, 3-7.


81 Many of the political economy strategies are discussed in Frederick Deyo, ed, The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Mc Williams and Piotrowski, Chapter 13.


84 Peter Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement,” Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 17 No. 1 (1975): 91-112. Ekeh identifies the primordial public as that public identified with primordial groupings and sentiments. It is moral and operates on the moral imperatives of the private realm. The civic public is identified with civil structures associated with colonial administration. It is amoral and lacks the moral imperative of the private realm.


Claire Robertson, Sharing the Same Bowl: A Socioeconomic History of Women and Class in Accra, Ghana (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 244. Misogynist statements cited were spoken during the destruction of the Makola No. 1 Women’s Market in Accra on August 18, 1979. This market had been established in 1924 as the center of trade in Ghana. In 1978, before the destruction, it was chief among 19 markets in Accra, controlled by women traders.


Charlton, Women, 24.


Ibid; hooks, Ain’t I A Woman, entire work; hooks, Feminist Theory, entire work.


96 Staudt and Glickman, “Beyond Nairobi,” 5, drawing on research by Bonnie Keller in Zambia.


102 Ramsay and Parker, “Gender, Bureaucracy,” 259.


107 Rogers, The Domestication of Women, entire work.


110 Fatton, “Gender,” 54.


115 Mulford, Interorganizational Relations, 83.

116 Hall, Organizations, 277-282.


118 Mulford, Interorganizational Relations, 79.


120 Ibid; Mulford, Interorganizational Relations, 81-83; Aldrich, Organizations, 267.

121 Aldrich, Organizations, 267.

122 Mulford, Interorganizational Relations, 47 and 83.


129 Evan, Organization Theory, 149-150.


131 Ibid; Evan, Organization Theory, 149.

132 Jonsson, Interorganization Theory, 42.

133 Ibid, 43.

CHAPTER III
THE EVOLUTION OF MYWO SINCE 1952 TO THE PRESENT

This chapter will present a political history of Maendeleo Ya Wanawake in Kenya (MYWO). It will discuss the evolution of the organization from 1952 to the present, noting the establishment of and changes in its interorganizational relationships with donors in its relational environment -- namely, 1) the Kenyan government -- colonial and post colonial, and 2) foreign and international governmental and non-governmental organizations and businesses.

This chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1 addresses the period from 1952 until 1987, during which time MYWO moved full circle from officially existing as a colonial state organization between 1952 and 1961, and again becoming a post colonial state organization in 1987. Part 2 deals with the period from 1987 until 1992 during which time MYWO attempts to frenetically reconfigure itself amongst its interorganizational partners -- foreign donors and and the Kenyan government. Special attention will be paid to 1) the 1989 KMYWO elections and the subsequent changes in in the organization's interorganizational relationships; and 2) the 1991-92 period during which time MYWO and it partners were involved in heated squabbles over multipartyism. The central argument of this chapter revolves around the question of whether or not MYWO could ever really be considered a genuine and autonomous NGO, truly committed to representing African women at the grassroots and their interests. Providing contextual historical information is critical as this chapter traces the linkages between MYWO and its interorganizational partners in a transnational network.
PART I: MYWO and the State of Emergency

MYWO has a very complex and seemingly contradictory history. Its roots were planted during the colonial period, from which its critics argue, it has not been able to disentangle itself. Its proponents however have chosen to forget its beginnings, or simply not acknowledge them, particularly after the organization assumed a more nationalistic posture in the 1960s.

MYWO was officially founded in 1952 by European colonial women who were the wives and relatives of British colonial officers. Its founding occurred simultaneously with the declaration of the State of Emergency in Kenya when virtually all African political organizations were outlawed and African leaders detained. MYWO was officially recognized by the colonial state at this time because of the critical role it was to play in repressing Kenyan nationalism.

Audrey Wipper, who has done the most extensive work on MYWO from 1952 to the mid-1970s, has argued that it was mere coincidence that the organization was founded at the same time that the Emergency was declared. She maintains that MYWO played no covert conspiratorial role with the colonial state in attempting to subvert the Kenyan national resistance movement. Instead she argues that it was European women’s empathy for the plight of African women and their aversion to African's women’s lag behind African men in development, along with their spirit of noblesse oblige, that were the major forces for their creation of MYWO.

Cora Presley, who has written on Kikuyu women and Mau Mau, provides evidence that suggests quite the opposite -- that it was not mere coincidence that MYWO was officially founded at the height of the State of Emergency. Without entering the debate as to why MYWO was created, Presley demonstrates that MYWO was indeed used by the colonial government to subvert Mau Mau by gathering information about
resistance and guerrilla activities. She argues that MYWO's aim was to persuade Mau Mau adherents to abandon the movement.\(^3\) Presley recounts how African women were told to abandon their commitment to Mau Mau or lose the "humanitarian" services MYWO clubs provided.\(^4\) Archival data which will be presented in the following pages supports Presley's argument and turns Wipper's assertion on its head.

MYWO was modelled after English women's tea clubs. The first President was Miss Nancy Shepherd, the granddaughter of one of Kenya's first missionaries, the Venerable Archdeacon H. K. Binns.\(^5\) Shepherd became the Principal of the Jeanes School (now the Kenya Institute of Administration) and the colonial supervisor of MYWO's activities. This was her domain as Assistant Minister for Women and Girls and later Assistant Minister of Community Development and Rehabilitation in the Department of Community Development of the Colonial Government. Under Shepherd's direction, the Jeanes school became the training center for MYWO African women leaders and the springboard for MYWO clubs.\(^6\) The Department of Community Development of the Colonial Government had realized early on the need to train African women who could "accelerate Maendeleo's expansion in the villages where most potential members resided."\(^7\) Its aim was to create MYWO local clubs of African women members to carry out anti-nationalist activities.

Although African womanpower had been declared necessary for the effective administration of the colony, no Kenyan woman was allowed to be in the effective leadership of MYWO. The first headquarters committee of MYWO was composed of all white women, apart from the honorary vice chair, Harriet Musoke, a Ugandan woman who was then a Probation Officer in the colonial government.\(^8\)
The original constitution of MYWO stipulated that the organization was formed to develop and improve conditions for Africans through social intercourse by bringing the women together, encouraging neighborliness and cooperation and education which could be largely informal and practical in scope.9

The curriculum for the first class focussed on sewing, cooking, child welfare, hygiene, games, singing, dancing and outdoor games.10 It is reported that not until later did the curriculum embrace areas such as community development which had been, since colonial intrusion, the domain of Europeans.11

Although the organization gained membership of African women with a reported 172 clubs in 1952 and a total of seventy-two women leaders passing through Homecraft at the Jeanes School in 1952,12 there was resistance to MYWO. From one direction, colonial settlers, in what was then called the “White Highlands” of Kenya, demonstrated extreme resistance, as they opposed any education for Africans. Because many African women were squatters on or near colonial farms, the colonialists felt that the “ignorance of the African woman was a great advantage in terms of having an available supply of cheap labour.”13 From another direction, there was resistance from the African population, especially in Central Province, mostly among the Kikuyu, but also among the Meru and Embu. They felt that the colonial authorities were using MYWO as a tool to suppress the efforts of Mau Mau. It was their belief that

in Central Province, where most (white) club leaders were wives of white DOs (colonial district officers), African club members would give information on the latest movements of their husbands day and night. This way, those whose movements were deemed suspicious would be picked up and locked up in concentration camps as members of Mau Mau.14
African women might have given this information as many of them were not suspicious of Shepherd’s motives. She is still very much revered as a “very devoted social worker who mixed freely with Africans.”

There is ample evidence in the British colonial archives to support the allegation that MYWO was, in fact, an informant organization and part and parcel of the colonial police state. After the reported “outbreak” of Mau Mau in October 1952, the colonial government began a systematic, coordinated program code-named “Anvil” designed to “clean-up Nairobi, disrupt Mau Mau organizations and stop Mau Mau progress.” One of the main methods used to accomplish this was the suppression of African women.

Although African and Africanist historians have traditionally recognized and acknowledged that the top Mau Mau leaders were men, namely Dedan Kimathi, Stanley Mathenge, General China, and Kimbo, women have become belatedly recognized “among the most fanatical supporters of this secret society.” Women’s active resistance roles in Mau Mau have been neglected by most scholars, with the exception of a few works including recent ones by Tabitha Kanogo and Presley who both write about Mau Mau and women. Archival data indicate that British colonial authorities reported that it was in fact women who moved between the settled areas and the forests from where Mau Mau launched their attacks. Colonial reports indicate that “They (the women) carry food and information, and when necessary, take part in the fighting. They also help to intimidate the peasants and conduct the oath-taking ceremonies...” The Provincial Commissioner of Central Province was categorical about the role of women:

In information to all sections the women present a particular problem and one in which special attention must be paid, since it appears that it is the women as much as, if not more that the men, who are keeping the spirit of Mau Mau alive.
The Commissioner for Community Development, T. G. Askwith, in a colonial newsletter blatantly revealed the government’s intended use of women’s groups to counter subversive elements.²¹ He stated,

African women’s clubs, particularly those in Emergency areas are regarded by the Kenya Government as valuable rallying points which are doing a considerable amount to overcome the influence of Mau Mau.²²

In exchange for efforts to overcome Mau Mau, Askwith, at a conference arranged by the Ministry for Community Development and Rehabilitation, revealed that the government had been allocating development funds for the women’s clubs at the rate of 12,000 British pounds a year.²³ Hence, the colonial state had begun government financial support for MYWO. The government had also begun the practice of exempting Kenyan women from the compulsory five to six days forced labour. In effect, colonial government’s financial assistance and exemption from forced labour were clandestine exchanges and rewards to entice African women to work against Mau Mau.²⁴ These appear to be the first interorganizational exchanges, in cash and in kind, in which MYWO and the colonial government would engage, in their interorganizational relations.

Other colonial officials and British royalty also used women’s clubs to attempt to crush Mau Mau. In a conference in 1955 in Kiambu organized by MYWO Homecraft Officer Mrs. Winifred Moore, the District Commissioner Mr. Frank Lloyd opened the conference by saying that it was up to women to fight Mau Mau influence and help maintain law and order.²⁵ Lady Mary Baring, wife of Kenya’s Governor and her mother, Lady Grey, also travelled and appealed to women’s groups. Lady Baring, in a speech to the women, praised the work of women’s groups and told them that “Kikuyu women could do a lot to help finish Mau Mau trouble by working well together, sharing their pleasure and being good friends to all.”²⁶ In response, the women’s club leader Louise
Williams, told Lady Baring that “the club agreed that the Mau Mau troubles hindered their programmes but they were determined to help in ending Mau Mau and use their club activities to improve living conditions in the village.” Colonial officials in Kiambu further endorsed the idea by demanding more women’s clubs in the area.

Efforts to contain Mau Mau were also promoted outside of Kikuyu areas in Central Province, suggesting that the movement may have been more widespread than the Kikuyu areas. For example, in 1954 Lady Baring addressed women’s groups in Machakos, Eastern Province. Among them was one of the oldest groups in the area, Iveti’s Women’s Club. Mrs. Penwill, a MYWO women’s group leader, identified this group as having raised alarm of a “gang” in the area. This “gang” was later wiped out by the colonial-created-and-armed Kamba Home Guard. Mrs. Mary David, another MYWO women’s groups leader in this area, during Lady Baring’s visit, expressed gratefulness to the colonial government on the part of all Kamba women (Eastern Province) that Mau Mau had not come into the district. The proliferation of groups in this area further demonstrated the extent to which the campaign to end Mau Mau had penetrated. From forty-five groups in 1953, the number of women’s groups had doubled to ninety in the Machakos area by 1954.

Clubs in other areas had been created as well. The Community Development Annual Report of 1952 noted the type of club work that had been done in the following Districts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Type of Club Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nyeri</td>
<td>some of the most successful women leaders;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hall</td>
<td>Had 6 clubs, numbers declined with Emergency;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiambu</td>
<td>Had 33 more to open at Githunguri;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Embu  Successful club at Boma;
5. Meru  Plans for future;
6. Garissa 1 Somali woman did a little with DC’s wife;
7. Kitui Some work but no evaluation;
8. South Nyanza 19 Clubs;
9. Baringo Several established clubs;
10. Tambach Improved with European women;
11. Nakuru 2 excellent clubs;
12. Machakos Over 30 clubs;
13. Mombasa 2 trainees to with women of all ethnic groups;
14. North Nyanza In the forefront of all districts. Women’s institutes are the local names of MYWO;
15. Central Nyanza 12 groups;
16. Nairobi Started its first group at Kaloleni. Other groups expected;
17. Kilifi Trainees went to Embu for further training;
18. Taita Taveta Just received qualified teachers.

After 1952, the mobilization of MYWO clubs continued, led by European women and by African women graduates of the Jeanes School. For example, Mrs. Alice arap Kirui, in 1954, established a Homecraft Center for Kipsigis women in Kericho, Rift Valley Province, in which thirty-five women enrolled. In that same year, a group of European women, including Sheppard, built a club for African women in Karen to teach Homecraft and Domestic Science. In Kitale, Rift Valley Province (1955) and Nakuru, Rift Valley Province (1954), courses were also offered for a fee in sewing and knitting, and domestic
science respectively. The Kitale group was being assisted by Mrs. Gladys Ombara, an ex-Jeanes School student and by a government grant of twenty-five British pounds. This is another instance on record in which a MYWO group received financial assistance form the colonial government. In Nakuru, the colonial mayoress for the area, W. H. Sayer assisted a group and told the women as a follow up to the course she would check the “cleanliness” of their homes.

By 1955, there were over four hundred African women's clubs in Kenya with a membership of over 40,000; and, as the Colonial Press Office reported “all of these clubs were part of the country-wide Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Movement sponsored by the Government.” To further this effort, more resources were poured into the campaign against Mau Mau. For example, in Kenya Newsletter No. 90, it was stated that African women's clubs sponsored by the Ministry of Community Development's MYWO movement had been allocated 40,500 British pounds for the purchase of equipment, furniture and materials during the three and one-half years covered by Kenya's new Development Plan. Concomitantly, the Council of Ministers of the colonial government argued that continued supervision of women's clubs was critical to keep them from Mau Mau influence. Based on this, the colonial administration decided to continue channeling funds to the groups even after overall cuts had been made in the Emergency budget in Kenya in 1958. It was believed that if the funds were withdrawn, clubs would fail and British efforts to destroy Mau Mau would be compromised. Thus, the colonial government would again provide financial assistance to MYWO in their interorganizational relationship. Its aims were to 1) keep MYWO clubs beholden; and 2) keep the colonial state cushioned and secure from Mau Mau resistance.

MYWO had also begun establishing relations with foreign donors who were providing financial assistance to the organization. For example, as early as 1955, the...
Associated Country Women of the World (ACWW), an INGO, provided financial and technical assistance to MYWO.\textsuperscript{39} In addition, in 1959-60, the United Nation’s International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) donated a grant of $88,500 (which the colonial government matched) for the expansion of health and homecraft activities at the village level.\textsuperscript{40}

The creation and financing of African women’s clubs represent only a fraction of the colonial state’s efforts to crush African resistance to British colonialism. Working in conjunction with the state-assisted African women’s club movement was a program of psychological warfare that was declared by the colonial government against Kenyans in 1953. This psychological warfare was a mass propaganda campaign directed toward various “classes” of people defined by the colonial government. The intent of this campaign was to totally annihilate Mau Mau. One of the main avenues that the government used to filter its propaganda was through women’s groups.\textsuperscript{41} Colonial records indicate that the government was “planning to start a fortnightly women’s paper in Kikuyu to meet the need for the Emergency and political news for women.”\textsuperscript{42} By 1954, the paper was not only published in Kikuyu, but in Kikamba, Luo and Kiswahili.\textsuperscript{43} The groups on which the government focussed primarily were the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru as they were considered to be the bulk of the “terrorist” strength.\textsuperscript{44}

There is conflicting evidence on the extent of the circulation of the paper. In 1952, records indicate that the government produced and distributed a quarter of a million copies per week. In 1954 however, it was reported that the paper had a circulation of 18,000.\textsuperscript{45} In addition to the paper, the government used radios, posters, captions, films, cinemas and vans for distributing its propaganda.\textsuperscript{46}
The “themes” of the colonial government’s psychological warfare campaign were:

1) **Mau Mau** was an evil thing bringing hardship and misery to thousands, and the task of destroying this thing lies with Africans themselves. Europeans and Asians would help;

2) The white settlement was critical to the economy;

3) Within the government there is the possibility of advancement for all, so that that all may march to prosperity together; and,

4) “Prestige” was due to African government servants, particularly chiefs, giving Africans a sense of loyalty to the Commonwealth.47

The colonial government focussed on brainwashing the women with this psychological warfare propaganda. By the systematic propagation of this “very hotted up information”48 disguised as women’s political news, the government further relied on women to filter this information into the community through MYWO groups. The government’s position was that

We shall give courses to picked leaders at the Jeanes School (this has been done before) and then send them out to proselytize in the Reserve.49

Africanization of MYWO and Disassociation from the Colonial State: Revolution from Within

While the colonial government expanded MYWO’s women’s clubs and secretly plotted psychological warfare, Kenyan women were also secretly developing a resistance agenda of their own. From within MYWO, Kenyan women, who had been trained at the Jeanes School to take lower level domestic positions within MYWO, orchestrated a coup against the colonial leadership of the organization. In 1961, at the Annual General Meeting of MYWO, the British leadership of the organization was voted out and a
decision was made to change the policies of the MYWO movement for the benefit of its majority African members.\textsuperscript{50} Mrs. Phoebe Asiyo replaced Shepherd, as MYWO's first African President.

Asiyo's words indicate the inevitability of this revolution from within the organization:

When I joined Maendeleo in 1956, it was after fruitless efforts to set up our own indigenous African controlled national women's organization. We failed because of lack of womanpower and financial problems. Still when we joined Maendeleo, our clear intention was to take over its leadership gradually because as African women, we understood our problems better. Things like queen cake baking and other European dishes which provided the bulk of Maendeleo clubs' syllabus were not the answers to our problems. African children still had less than enough to eat. True, the white ladies tried hard and they were sympathetic but they did not understand the African woman's needs.\textsuperscript{51}

Thus, it was declared that MYWO be converted into a more meaningful indigenous African woman's organization, not only concerned with "feminine - domestic" issues, but moreso with the overall welfare of Africans.

There was much surprise and resistance to the leadership takeover of MYWO, namely by Shepherd, European settler wives and colonial government officers. Shepherd was devastated as she would no longer be in control of the organization; and the settler wives found it difficult to accept Asiyo as their leader and treat her with respect and equality. Asiyo noted, "The settler wives had this peculiar idea that since I was African I should be served tea in the kitchen."\textsuperscript{52} In addition, the colonial government, whose plans of infiltration and psychological warfare had taken an unexpected turn, were baffled. They had tried unsuccessfully to hold on to MYWO. The new African women leadership reacted in this way:

When the first African dominated National Executive Committee of Maendeleo in its first session decided to break away from the central colonial government in
favour of autonomy, we met with a lot of opposition. This patriotic move on our part was condemned in public and the colonial establishment even went out of its way to use brainwashed African women to attack us.53

When the colonial government realized that they could not hold the independent spirit of these African MYWO women under their thumb, they kicked them out of the government-owned premises, with only one old typewriter and one file with a copy of the constitution, one desk, one wooden chair and a grant of 20,000 Kenya pounds.54 What the colonialists were forced to face was that a critical pillar of their colonial apparatus had been dislodged. African women had disassociated MYWO from the colonial state and, in effect, declared MYWO an autonomous non-governmental organization (NGO).

Within two years of the takeover of the organization, the new MYWO had run out of finances. The colonial government grant had been expended. The Africanized MYWO did not fold however. Instead, it continued the implementation of three programs more “suitable” for the African women.55 Its new leaders agreed to work strictly voluntarily, without the rewards and exchanges from the colonial government as before. They used their personal finances, and monies that they had amassed by sponsoring fundraisers. In doing these things, MYWO underscored its autonomy from the colonial state. Moreover, MYWO declared that its organizational autonomy was more important than interorganizational exchanges with the colonial state.

During this period MYWO survived principally because of 1) the determination of the new African women leaders in the organization; 2) the assistance of African nationalist and Pan Africanist leaders such as a) Tom Mboya, a Kenyan nationalist who would later become the Secretary General of KANU and the Minister of Economic Planning in the first independent government; and b) Kwame Nkrumah, the first post-colonial President of Ghana and one of the pioneers of Pan Africanism; and 3) foreign donors who would provide financial and technical assistance to the organization.
Some of the first foreign donors to assist the autonomous MYWO were the League of American Women Voters, ACWW and UNICEF. ACWW and UNICEF basically continued the interorganizational relationships that had been established with the colonial MYWO. Noting these relationships that were created at this time is critical in that this is the first time MYWO -- the autonomous NGO, established interorganizational linkages with foreign donors. This collaboration with donors -- both foreign and government -- would continue and expand to include the Ministries of the 1963 post colonial Kenyan government, even after Asiyo’s resignation as Chair of MYWO that year. It is no surprise that the autonomous Africanized MYWO survived, as Kenyan women had already proved their strength as warriors in adverse times.


Despite MYWO’s autonomous status and its focus on social welfare, during the period between Africanization and the wake of Kenya’s liberation it became imperative that MYWO formally and publicly involve itself in the independence struggle. In a nationalist undertaking, Asiyo led MYWO in a petition to the colonial government against the detention of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta and his colleagues. In another undertaking, Asiyo and a MYWO delegation visited Kenyatta in prison. They recounted:

We (MYWO) stood for the release of Jomo Kenyatta and the true independence of Kenya. At Lodwar, we gave Mzee flowers and vegetables and in appreciation he remarked that women saw deeper than men in all spheres. He promised us a place in his government and this was reflected in the original KANU manifesto which said among other things that it would work side by side with Maendeleo Ya Wanawake.
Whether it was desired or not, MYWO had become inextricably tied to the impending first independence government. After all, it was African women in Mau Mau and in MYWO who had demonstrated that revolution from within was indeed possible. In an attempt however, to either wrench itself from KANU and politics completely, or to avoid killing itself by siding with (what might become) a losing party, or perhaps even to maximize its negotiating power with the new government which would replace the colonial government, MYWO refused to commit itself in support of either KANU or KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union) -- the two Kenyan opposition independence parties.59

With KANU having won the elections in 1963, and more importantly with the colonial regime having been ousted and the first independence government formed, MYWO felt that it had also won. The women felt that they were finally rid of the repressive regime which had intended to make Kenya a “white man’s country,”60 which had jailed and killed Kenyan leaders, and which had used unsuspecting African women to conspire with them. In expressing MYWO’s new role, Asiyo noted that,

Immediately after independence we were frequently invited to sit in important policy making meetings and the new majority government consulted very closely with women not only on social service matters but also on other matters of national importance. That is how Maendeleo got its current format of an autonomous national women’s organization.61

How stable and effective this new role was, and how autonomous the NGO MYWO would actually be, would be a frequently recurring question for MYWO, the Kenyan state and scholars.

Despite the optimistic outlook with which Asiyo approached the era of independence, MYWO after independence did not prove to be a top priority of the government. From 1963 to 1976, the new post colonial government did not recognize and cultivate the potential of women.62 Certainly, the post colonial government did not have
the same degree of financial and administrative resources to allocate to Kenyan women that the colonial government had had to allocate to European women.

Maria Nzomo of the University of Nairobi provides a very poignant analysis of the relationship of women to the newly independent government. She states that, “During the 1960s and 1970s, the government completely ignored women’s issues. It acted as if the gender question did not exist in Kenya.” Her argument suggests that the government’s nonprioritization of women goes beyond the possession of sufficient of resources. Fundamentally, she implies, the governments’ choices involved values, power and patriarchy. Her argument is solidly supported by the manner in which Kenyatta formed his regime and government, and reconstituted the state. Kenyatta concentrated power at the top in patriarchal institutions, particularly 1) the Gikuyu Embu Meru Association (GEMA) -- the political machine that supported the Kenyatta regime and maintained Kikuyu hegemonic control in Kenya, and 2) KANU. Kenyatta also surrounded himself with an all male vanguard. Moreover, his government and state policies were much more male and urban-focused, rather than rural and female-focused. All of these factors had an impact on the sustenance of MYWO groups and their expansion in the rural areas.

There is conflicting evidence as to MYWO’s effectiveness as a mobilizer of women’s groups after 1963. At the thirtieth year anniversary celebration of the organization, it was stated that MYWO’s effect on the mobilization of women became insignificant immediately following independence, especially in the rural areas. The organization’s lack of mobilization power was a direct consequence of the destruction of the colonial administrative network from the capital Nairobi to the Local Native Councils in the rural areas. MYWO’s lack of mobilization effectiveness was further exacerbated by 1) the many African women who refused to be any part of the organization because of its colonial legacy, particularly in the Central Province, and 2) the Kenyatta government’s
overall lack of concern for women’s groups and their activities. Ironically, it was the colonial government that had decentralized MYWO and taken it to the grassroots, whereas the first post-colonial government would break its links with the grassroots.

The second African chair of MYWO, Mrs. Jael Mbogo, who assumed the leadership of MYWO in 1963 after Asiyo’s resignation, poses the most conflicting and challenging evidence to MYWO’s decreasing effectiveness as an organizer women’s groups. Mbogo claimed to increase the membership of the organization phenomenally while other records indicate that MYWO membership had waned. For example, Mbogo, who had spent much of her time organizing MYWO groups in the Rift Valley, provides the following information,

During my term in office as President (1963-1967), Maendeleo clubs rose from a mere 4,000 to 85,000 with each claiming a membership of over 3,000 women. I also started 3,500 nursery schools run by MYWO.68

Mbogo further indicated that during this time MYWO received government financial assistance from Dr. Gikonyo Kiano, then the Minister of Commerce for 1) a handicraft exhibition, and 2) for international exhibitions to explore world markets.69 This financial assistance is important as it illustrates the furtherance of interorganizational linkages between MYWO and the independent Kenyan government in development cooperation.

Mbogo’s successor, Mrs. Elizabeth Mwenda, who was chair of MYWO from 1967-68, is recognized by MYWO as having brought 50,000 more women members into the organization, and as having created 16,500 more nursery schools.70 During her administration, the government further cooperated with MYWO by donating vehicles for their work. With regard to this interorganizational donation, the then Director of Community Development, Mr. Johnathan Njenga stipulated,
Depending on your ability to run the new vehicle in addition to the VW you already have, we shall consider your request to have more vehicles to cover the provinces.  

Mrs. Ruth Habwe, the chair of MYWO 1968-71, seems to have followed the path of her predecessor Mwenda by creating more women's groups. Habwe is credited with expanding MYWO to Lamu island where she established its first branch. In addition, during her term in office, MYWO began to function as a political pressure group. Records of MYWO's annual general meeting in 1968 are demonstrative. At this meeting, MYWO passed several resolutions concerning the rights and demands of women. One of the resolutions called for equal employment terms with men in the public and private sector. Another resolution was for an increase in the number of places for women students at the University of Nairobi.

There are very scanty records on MYWO groups during these periods. In explaining why records have not been kept, Mrs. Dar, who was the National Treasurer of MYWO from 1971-1980, stated, "One reason there is not a lot of information on file is that women were doers, out in the field." Records do indicate however that women's groups did spring up during this period independently of MYWO. Many of these groups were comprised of women who provided each other mutual assistance to meet needs of their community, lessen their individual workloads and save money. One example is the mabati women's groups, who thatched roofs.

Particular attention must be paid to the chairship of Jane Kiano, for she has emerged as one of the most important and dynamic leaders of MYWO. Her name reverberated in the interviews with women throughout Kenya, in their discussions of MYWO “before the affiliation to KANU.”

Kiano was the chair of MYWO for thirteen years, from 1971-1984. She held the longest running term in the history of the organization. Today, she is one of the best known women leaders in Kenya and she is the Patron of MYWO. She is also criticized by some outside of the organization, particularly intellectuals and leaders of other women’s organizations, who argue that she has compromised the potential of 1) women in Kenya, and 2) a more radical women’s movement.76

Kiano holds to her credit the “unprecedented growth” of MYWO after its decline in the 1960s and 70s. From a reported 2,085 MYWO and non-MYWO women groups exiting in thirty-five or the forty districts in Kenya in 1971-75, it is reported that “Mrs. Kiano saw MYWO (alone) become 6,000 affiliated women’s groups with an individual membership of 327,000 by 1983.”77 Still, this figure hardly sounds astounding given the reported figures of the Mbogo administration which claimed a membership of 85,000 affiliated groups.

Kiano is the wife of Dr. Gikonyo Kiano, the current Chairman of the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) and the Muranga District KANU Branch. He was also the Minister of Commerce during the first independent government. Mrs. Kiano was elected to the chair of MYWO in one of the “toughest contests” in the history of the organization.78 Kiano defeated Mrs. Nyiva Mwenda, a former KANU Member of Parliament (MP) for Kitui Central and the wife of former Chief Justice of Kenya, Mr. Kitili Mwenda. After Mrs. Kiano first victory, she was reelected chair of MYWO several times
with no significant opposition. Her marriage to Dr. Kiano had a direct influence on her victories.

MYWO enjoyed relative successes during Mrs. Kiano’s terms in office. Kiano also enjoyed organizational support from the state, which had been unprecedented since colonial times. For example, during Kiano’s term, the MYWO headquarters -- Maendeleo House, a project which cost ksh 14.5 million, was completed. In order to accomplish this, MYWO had the support of not only its members, but also “the strong support of the government of Kenya, local banks, voluntary organizations and international bodies.” In addition, the Maendeleo Handicraft Shop was converted into a successful cooperative and business inspired by Dr. Kiano, who, through his Ministry, assisted the organization. Mrs. Kiano also personally secured major funding from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation for MYWO’s Leadership Development (LD) program. In addition, during her administration, long-term funding for MYWO’s other three major programs -- Maternal Child Health and Family Planning (MCH/FP), Special Energy Program - Jiko (SEP-Jiko) and Nutrition were secured.

There were several factors which led to Kiano’s successes. They are: 1) her personal style of leadership; 2) MYWO’s homemaking ideology; 3) her diverse economic and political alliances which enhanced MYWO’s ability to deliver goods and services; 4) MYWO’s endorsement and participation in Harambees; and, 5) her high profile in women’s affairs internationally.

Kiano had a very strong, personalized leadership style. She made personal requests to individual women leaders for their individual and organizational assistance. Very early on Kiano had begun to create a network for assistance through her involvement with women’s groups and development projects. Kiano stated,
Even before I became involved in the leadership of Maendeleo ya Wanawake I was involved and I am still involved in community work in Muranga (Central Province), leading women in self-help projects such as the building of maternity clinics, nursery schools, water projects, adult education classes and in mabati groups.

Kiano also used her personal leadership style to request individual men who were connected to the state in official capacities to assist the organization. One of Kiano’s close counterparts gave this example: “Men used to help by support and anonymous donations, because MYWO was a strong organization.” She stated that these were men with power and money, involved in the government of Kenya. Kiano’s husband ranked prominently among them – “Dr. Julius Kiano used to boost morale and guide MYWO.”

Mrs. Kiano even used her personal relationship with Kenyatta to raise MYWO issues. She is a Kikuyu from Central Province and as such, because of Kenyatta’s tribal politics, she was guaranteed an audience with him. In addition, her husband was part and parcel of the ruling machinery. He was a cabinet member, a close personal and political ally of Kenyatta, and a key member and officer of the GEMA. Dr. Kiano was appropriately placed in the government to lobby on his wife’s behalf, and more importantly to direct monies to MYWO as the government’s Minister of Commerce. In important ways, MYWO was dependent on Mrs. Kiano’s personal networks.

MYWO was also successful because of its conservative ideology, which did not challenge Kenya’s patriarchy. Kiano was able to meet and work with Kenyatta because the organization did not make radical demands for women’s rights. Instead, MYWO concentrated on non-threatening, feminine “homemaking” issues, at least most of the time. When MYWO did tread on issues that might be construed as “non-feminine” such as housing allowances for women, it was careful to approach Kenyatta in a nonaggressive, unchallenging, soft, mild, and stereotypically (and often deceptively) subservient ladylike manner. Kiano’s strategy was to avoid publicly disturbing the gendered spheres of power.
How this played out in interorganizational relations with the government is that whatever MYWO requested, Kiano somehow directly or indirectly linked to "homemaking." She was careful not to bruise male egos.

Fundamentally, MYWO was a welfare and development organization under Kiano. It gained attention and respect as a "women’s" organization from the state because of its apolitical, subtle and stereotypical feminine approach, as opposed to a political, up front, more radical, feminist approach. Kiano publicly stood against women’s liberation and equality, not really fighting for women’s rights directly. Ironically, she was the epitome of a liberated woman and a feminist. Despite this, the role that she created for MYWO was one couched in dependent, subservient politics in its interorganizational relations with the Kenyan government.

MYWO was further successful because Kiano used non-exclusionary alliance-building tactics to create coalitions that were non-ethnic and non-racial. Kiano worked with all women -- African, European, Asian, citizen, expatriate, rural, urban. Europeans and Asians were fewer than Africans in the organization’s membership.

Shepherd and a number of her European cohorts to continued to work with MYWO. There were some Asian members, but much of the Asian community had left at Kenya’s independence. The Asian women who remained in Kenya had limited involvement in MYWO. There has been however at least one high profile Indian woman in the organization, Mrs. Dar. She was the National Treasurer under Kiano, from 1971-1980. Dar used her influence in the Asian community to secure economic assistance for MYWO from the local capitalists class who were Indian. Some of them provided assistance, albeit quietly, wanting to remain anonymous. One example of a consistent, dependable Indian supporter was Julie Manji of the House of Manji to whom Dar went for financial support for the organization. Manji was able to provide contributions and
assistance because the House of Manji, her father’s business, was and still is one of the wealthiest and most prosperous local industries in Kenya. The House of Manji became a key interorganizational financial supporter of MYWO in the 1970s, though anonymously.

It is important to point out that this interorganizational support from Manji was not for MYWO’s programs or priorities necessarily; rather it was given because individual women in MYWO’s leadership had personal ties to Manji. That is, Julie Manji, Dar and Kiano were all from the same district area in Central Province -- Nyeri. Moreover, both MYWO and the House of Manji stood to benefit from Manji’s financial contributions to the organization. That is, Manji’s business could benefit in that Indian industries in the 1970s needed state sanctioning to remain in business in Kenya, and Mrs. Kiano was well connected to the state -- herself an extension of it. In exchange for financial assistance, she could lobby her husband, the government, even the head of state - Kenyatta - on the House of Manji’s behalf.

Kiano’s alliance building extended to include not only the government of Kenya, but also foreign donors. With the government, the marriage between the Kianos informally made a strategic alliance between MYWO and the Ministries in which Gikonyo, Kiano’s husband, was very well placed to issue assistance to MYWO. Unofficially, Mrs. Kiano also made alliances with the Ministry of Culture and Social Services (MCSS) who provided an MCSS officer and the use of a land vehicle for MYWO’s development trips into the countryside. Occasionally, MCSS also provided grants for MYWO projects, hence establishing more interorganizational linkages between MYWO and the government. In 1984 however, this relationship between MYWO and MCSS nearly came to a head when Dr. Kiano and the MCSS Minister, Kenneth Matiba, challenged each other in an election in Muranga. Matiba won the election and Kiano charged that Matiba
had bought the votes of the constituency. Friction thus surfaced between MYWO and the MCSS, thereby causing strains in their interorganizational relations.

With foreign donors, Kiano also made short term and long term alliances during her term as chair of MYWO. Some of these donors include The Kenya Lions Club, and Coca Cola—Kenya. Kiano used these alliances to deliver goods and services to persons in need. Much of these goods and services, though not all of them, went to women. For example, the Lions Club in a short term interorganizational relationship with MYWO donated wheelchairs to disabled persons in the North Eastern Province. Coca Cola, in a longer term interorganizational relationship with MYWO, set up kiosks for MYWO members in the Eastleigh area of Nairobi so that some women might generate income for themselves. Kiano also maintained relations with the ACWW. They continued their donor support for MYWO by providing, among other things, the salary of a field worker and a vehicle for MYWO to be maintained by the government, thus drawing MYWO, a foreign donor and the Kenyan government in a single interorganizational relationship. In the mid-late 1970s, other foreign donors began to financially assist MYWO in support of projects and programs, namely OXFAM, the Ford Foundation, Pathfinder International, an individual Briton gallery owner in Nairobi. The establishment of these interorganizational linkages between MYWO and these aforementioned donors would serve as a continuation of a substantial increase in the numbers of foreign donors “interviewing” MYWO while looking for women’s projects to fund during the Decade for Women (1975-85). Moreover, the establishment of these interorganizational linkages would serve to substantially increase the amount of foreign funding assistance MYWO would have at its disposal.

MYWO’s successes under Kiano can also be attributed to its endorsement of and participation in harambees. Under Kiano’s leadership, the organization had begun to
generate a significant amount to monies through its own local income-generating activities including fundraisers, fashion shows, barazas (receptions, meetings), jumble sales and yard sales. The Kianos (Mrs. and Mr.) were often principal donors.

MYWO’s move toward self-help was fostered by the spirit and ideology of Harambee, popularized by Kenyatta upon his declaration of Internal self government for Kenya. Harambee, which literally means “Let’s pull together” became the national motto of Kenya, aiming to bring together communities to meet their own needs with their own resources. Ultimately, the goal of Harambee was to facilitate the overall development of Kenya. Thus, in support of Kenyatta’s declaration of Harambee, MYWO’s focus from the national office under Kiano became local income generation. As indicative of MYWO’s focus the chair of MYWO Central Province Grace Wanyeki stated,

In the 1970s we started to think of income generating projects such as pig keeping, livestock rearing, poultry keeping and many more. It was heartening the indiscriminate participation of women of all ages.

Over time, Harambee would include the utilization of “outside” resources as well to meet local community needs. The Kiano administration embraced this modification and expansion of the Harambee ideology, as it was simultaneously securing foreign donors for development projects. Unlike Tanzania, which stressed “ujamaa” self-reliance and rejected external aid in the 1970s, Kenya welcomed it. Women’s groups in Kenya increased in number as well at this time. This increase in number is likely a direct result of the increasing availability of aid to women’s groups in the country, and the subsequent the belief that women’s groups had a strong chance of getting funding for development projects.

Lastly, Kiano’s influence in women’s affairs internationally is a direct cause of MYWO successes. Kiano was key in securing foreign donors for the organization
because she played such a high profile role in women's affairs internationally. It was Kiano who brought MYWO to national repute primarily because of her dynamism and political savvy on the international scene, and secondarily because of her personal connections to top Kenyan government officials who could promote MYWO. MYWO had made accomplishments, but based on those accomplishments alone, MYWO would not have secured the degree of funding assistance that it did in the late 1970s into the early 1990s from foreign donors.

Kiano was a mover and a shaker and she networked quite effectively in the international circles among those who could allocate large sums of money for development projects. For instance, Kiano had served as the key representative and voice of women of Kenya and as the chief delegate of MYWO in the Women's Conference in Mexico in 1975. She was also the chief delegate in Copenhagen in 1980 where women from both beneficiary and donor countries met to discuss women's issues and plan programs to integrate women into the development of their home countries. In very important ways, these conferences lent women from beneficiary countries the opportunity to make their case to foreign donors for assisting their particular organizations and countries. Kiano, the politician, seized these opportunities. Moreover, in 1980 at a meeting in Hamburg, Germany, Kiano was elected co-Deputy President of ACWW, an organization nine million strong that has been engaged in interorganizational relations with MYWO since colonial times. Kiano is the first African woman to have been elected to this post. This is only one example which illustrates the leverage Kiano had on the international women's network. She had gained outstanding recognition for herself, MYWO and Kenya from donor countries.

Kiano had many assets in her favor in attempting to secure foreign donor support for MYWO. For example, she could boast that MYWO was the largest countrywide
women’s organization in Kenya, with a women’s group infrastructure already in place to implement programs from the national headquarters to the grassroots. She could argue that Kenyan women made overwhelming contributions to development, as women in Kenya are the agriculturalists and are major contributors to the economy. She could speak to Kenya’s political stability, at the time. In addition she could also boast of Kenya’s phenomenal economic performance since 1963 compared to other African countries. Generally, donor countries already viewed Kenya as a capitalist success. Kiano had a host of assets from which to draw as she campaigned for donor funding for MYWO and for Kenya. This was quite satisfactory for the requirements of many donor programs, as many foreign donors look for development successes first, and then decide to put money into women’s projects.101

The larger external donors that made long-term interorganizational funding commitments to MYWO projects and programs did not begin to fund MYWO for extended periods until the late 1970s. Of the four major long-term programs with foreign donor funding during the time of my fieldwork 1991-1992, three of the programs began their implementation phases and one its formulation phase during Kiano’s administration (1971-84). The MCH/FP Program, funded by Pathfinder International, World Bank, USAID and the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD) began its implementation in 1979; the Nutrition Program, funded by Marttaliitto, began its implementation in 1980; the SEP-Jiko Program, funded by GTZ, began its implementation in 1983; and the LD Program, funded by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, began its formulation in 1984 and its implementation in 1985. There was another program of income generation which had begun in 1984 and which was projected to be long term. Instead it ended abruptly without much explanation, other than the Ford Foundation would not fund an NGO which had become part of a political party.102 This income-
generating program was being managed by Mrs. Onsando, the current Chair of MYWO, who had resigned as the chief executive officer (CEO) of MYWO to manage the program. The program was being implemented in the districts of Muranga and Kisii, the home areas of Kiano and Onsando respectively. Until these foreign donors began providing major financial assistance to MYWO, the organization had not had programs on a large scale. They simply did not have the sufficient financial resources to implement them. Therefore, they engaged in interorganizational exchanges to do so.

The KANU Governments' Move Toward Affiliation of MYWO: Key Players Set the Stage

In an interview in 1982, Kiano was asked whether or not there was a sect in MYWO that sought a more militant approach to development which some members felt might alienate men. Kiano responded:

Our aim as an organization is not to fight anybody and certainly not to fight men. We view harmony as the foundation for working together and understanding each other. We don't have any group whose militant approach can alienate men. We are out for cooperation and mutual coexistence is our ideal.

This statement aptly describes MYWO's approach to cooperation with the government for the development of Kenya. Since MYWO's disassociation with the colonial state through Kiano's terms, MYWO's relationship with the government had been informal, with no specific definitions of their respective organizational duties and responsibilities in interorganizational development cooperation. Generally, it was assumed that MYWO would work with the government as a complementary interorganizational entity in the development direction the government chose. Personnel from the Kiano administration explained that this was not unusual as "most of the work of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) then was complementing the work of the government, although there was no formal coordination.\textsuperscript{105}

The national leadership of MYWO used motivational propaganda to encourage local women to contribute to this effort, yet they simultaneously and contradictorily said that they developed their own agenda from the perceived direction of MYWO grassroots members.\textsuperscript{106} "Cooperate with the Government" was a common theme of MYWO to encourage women to participate in as many development projects as possible.\textsuperscript{107} Although this theme was much more pronounced in the Moi administration after 1978 than it was in the Kenyatta administration, women's call to involvement in development after independence originated with Kenyatta (1963-1978).

Though Kenyatta used rhetoric favorable toward women's involvement in Kenya's development, there was little encouragement by his government, in the way of investing resources in women -- individuals or groups, to facilitate women's involvement in development in any meaningful way. For example, Women of Kenya, A Review and Evaluation of Progress reveals that in 1975/76, during Kenyatta's presidency, only 0.54% of the total MCSS recurrent budget was allocated for direct support of women's activities -- a total of 8,400 Kenya pounds for women's groups with a membership of over 156,892 women.\textsuperscript{108}

Generally, during Kenyatta's administration, women, as a group, were hardly mentioned in development policy or other major policy statements.\textsuperscript{109} The government did not feel it necessary to mention women or acknowledge their contributions to the national economy,\textsuperscript{110} as their role in development activities was not regarded as official business of the state. Generally, women's contributions tended to be seen as unofficial and informal, hence less important than men's contributions. Although women's contributions were critical to the economy, they were regarded as peripheral. Women and their labour were
exploitable. Kenyatta’s personal dealings with a MYWO women’s group is a case in point.

The Thika Township Women’s Group of 150 women organized in 1971 and set a goal to buy some land to grow coffee. There were problems because the group did not have a means of raising all the money. After the women searched for alternatives to no avail, they were hired by Kenyatta to cultivate his garden. In exchange, he paid the women K Sh 2 per day (less than five cent) for their labour. After some time, the group was forced to increase the membership of the organization by 700 members, from 150 to 850 women in order to get enough money to purchase the land. The government however maintained that it “(was) not aware of overt discrimination against women in the country.” It argued that Kenyan women are not discriminated against and therefore do not need to struggle for rights they are already enjoying. The Kenyatta government was able to both personally and publicly exploit both the fruits of women’s labour and their contributions to local and national development through their participation in Harambees. MYWO not only allowed, but also encouraged this exploitation.

Women in the rural areas were in fact the backbone of the Harambee movement; and as such their overall contributions to national development far outweighed government contributions and foreign donor contributions. For instance, Orora and Speigel, in a study of harambee projects in Kenya between 1967-73, demonstrate that the lion’s share of the monies for Harambee projects came from local people. In their study they found that about ninety percent of contributions for harambee projects came from wananchi (ordinary citizens). Comparatively, they found that of a total of ksh 382,000,000, the central government contributed only 20,000, local authorities 3,000,000 and other donors, including foreign, only 12,000,000. The local people -- mostly women though not identified as such by Orora and Speigel -- had raised and contributed
almost all of the monies for the projects. Contributions by government and foreign donors for development cooperation were negligible. In addition, in 1976 Kenyatta acknowledged the contributions of harambee projects announcing that local people had contributed “forty percent of capital development in the rural areas” as well as made voluntary cash contributions of KSh 1,000,000 in 1976 alone (approximately US $13 million). Although Kenyatta did not speak of women specifically, it is a well-established fact that women are the bulk of the rural population, and were in fact the main contributors to this effort. Kenyatta used MYWO, specifically rural women members as well as non-members, with the leadership’s complicity, to meet the development demands that Kenyans made on the state.

Kenya’s 1989-1993 National Development Plan, written during the Moi administration, demonstrates that the government’s contributions to harambee development projects have remained consistently low overtime. For example, although the total value of harambee contributions had increased by almost 400% from 9.79 million Kenya pounds in 1979 to 37.29 million Kenya pounds in 1985, the Kenyan government had contributed on average only 9% of the project costs over the seven year period. It is important to note the mention of women in this Development Plan of 1989-93. This plan was written after the Decade for Women when the mention of WID was fashionable and expected, and when its neglect carried a stench of a major international sexist social faux pas. With specific regard to women and harambees, the plan states:

Women’s group participatory initiatives have also contributed tremendously to economic and social progress in the country. Besides their contributions in cash to Harambee projects, they have also made major contributions in terms of materials and labour particularly because they constitute the majority of the rural population. Through various women’s organizations in the country including KANU-Maendeleo Ya Wanawake, National Council of Women of Kenya (NCWK), the Women's Bureau (WB), the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) and the Girl Guide Movement, there has been growing and effective participation of
women in developmental activities across the country. Such organizations will continue to receive encouragement and support during this Plan period.\textsuperscript{118}

On the surface it seems that the mention of women in the 1989-1993 in the National Development Plan is progressive. But this, in and of itself, does not indicate that women have been fairly acknowledged or integrated into the the national development planning in any significant way. On the contrary, during the Moi administration, at which time this plan was written, women have remained very marginally integrated in official strategies for development. Moreover, when they are marginally integrated, they are very often supervised and censored by men, as in the case of MYWO. Beyond broad statements of recognition and praise for compliant women and the consequent "good" intentions of government to support women, there is very little substantive policy or genuine intention to take action to assist women. With this in consideration, the statement in the National Development Plan merely indicates that the Moi government recognizes the role that MYWO (and other women's organizations) play in the mobilization of women's labor for harambees, and publicly calls upon them to continue to host harambees and raise more money.\textsuperscript{119}

In his book \textit{Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles} Moi deceptively gives the impression that women are highly regarded in the development policies of Kenya. He posits,

The Government of and people of Kenya will give the progress of women the highest priority. Their progress is our progress; their stagnation is our backwardness.\textsuperscript{120}

In further reading however he qualifies this assertion. In a chapter devoted to women, notably separate and apart from the chapter on strategies for national development, Moi indicates that
Further progress for the women will be achieved only by continued cooperation with the Government, in faith, loyalty and co-action with the leadership from the grassroots to the top.\textsuperscript{121}

Moi moreover admonishes women not to measure their progress in terms of rebellion and confrontation with men, but instead on the basis of cooperation with them.\textsuperscript{122} That is, women were to pledge their loyalties to the government, to men, seeking their permission and consent for their actions to ensure their continued progress. With specific regard to MYWO, Moi subtly announced what was to come -- the affiliation of the women's national organization to the KANU ruling party and the KANU government. Moi justified this impending merger by stipulating that MYWO's affiliation with KANU would "let it (MYWO) evolve into a new stage of dynamic maturity."\textsuperscript{123}

Moi, who had been Vice President to Kenyatta, became President of Kenya in 1978 upon Kenyatta's death. Although Moi was versed in the post -1975 Women in Development (WID) rhetoric, and used it often, the budgetary allocations during his administration for women's programs demonstrate the impotence of his words and his lack general disregard for women's activities. Between 1978, the year that Moi assumed the Presidency, and 1982, the government allocated the equivalent of 0.1 percent of the total government expenditures to women's programmes. Moreover, since that time, government grants to women's groups have consistently dropped, from ksh 3.3 million in 1986 to ksh 2.6 million in 1987 to ksh 1.7 in 1989.\textsuperscript{124} Moi's strategy has been to wait on women's groups to capture money for the state. He managed this through the affiliation of MYWO in 1987.

Both Kenyatta and Moi had attempted to officially affiliate MYWO to KANU -- the party and the state -- when Kiano was chair of MYWO. Both Presidents had waged private, intense battles against Kiano to make MYWO a official part of the state apparatus. Kiano's cohorts revealed that one of the main reasons she remained chair of
MYWO for thirteen years was to prevent this affiliation. She had successfully resisted for twelve of those years. In April 1984 however, in large part because KANU could no longer be prevented from affiliating MYWO, Kiano resigned as chair of MYWO. She resigned three years before her current term was over -- on the eve of the UN Decade for Women meeting in Nairobi in 1985.

Asiyo, the first African woman chair of MYWO, may have been aware of this pressure, as she forewarned in a 1982 interview:

> There have been a lot of handicaps and bottlenecks but Maendeleo is the only organization that has succeeded against a lot of difficulties both before and after independence. It is my sincere hope that nobody will attempt to meddle with it. It would be a shame if anybody discouraged Maendeleo from aiming even higher. We have come so far and Maendeleo will live forever.

KANU had in fact “meddled” with MYWO. KANU’s affiliation of MYWO was most clearly an attempt to increase state control over non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Kenya, specifically the largest women’s NGO. Many wondered why KANU chose to affiliate MYWO over other organizations such as Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU), Law Society of Kenya (LSK), National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK), and NCWK. There is a multiplicity of reasons for this.

One, MYWO was perceived as an organization which could be particularly useful to the state. MYWO reportedly had a membership of over 1.5 million women who could be co-opted supporters for KANU. Its network, though weaker than during colonial times, stretched between the national headquarters in Nairobi to the rural villages, thus they could be useful support to KANU candidates at all levels. Moreover, it was commonly known that it is the women’s votes who determine who goes to Parliament, thus it was important to KANU to capture these votes.
Two, MYWO could further assist with the implementation of the decentralization initiative which Moi announced in October 1982 since many of the women were already involved in rural development. The women had already demonstrated their contributory potential to national development and their commitment to nationbuilding. They were a pool of cheap labour who could implement low cost development projects with minimal government contributions.\textsuperscript{129} KANU’s rationale in this matter was clear -- by completing rural development projects which serviced local areas, the women fulfilled a tremendous amount of the state responsibility, and thus cushioned and mitigated citizens’ demands and frustration toward the state.

Three, in addition and of extreme importance to KANU, MYWO could also attract various foreign donors to Kenya to fund projects with particular emphasis on women. MYWO had been particularly successful in securing millions of dollars under Kiano. For example, for at least two projects for which funding had been secured under Kiano, the chief executive officer (CEO) of MYWO, Mrs. Jane Kirui, in 1990 announced that the organization would spend ksh 50 million in thirteen districts.\textsuperscript{130} Thus, by being affiliated to MYWO, the party-government and state would capture MYWO’s purse strings and have power to control MYWO’s finances and spending decisions. For a country whose external aid debt had reached ksh 154 billion (US$5.5 billion) at the end of 1990, this was important.\textsuperscript{131}

Four, MYWO was considered particularly vulnerable by the male-dominated KANU because it is a women’s organization. By virtue of its femaleness, it was considered to be less forceful, less resistant to being overtaken, and easier to dominate. As one interviewee stated, “MYWO was KANU’s cheapest hunt.”\textsuperscript{132} KANU had in fact tried to affiliate COTU and LSK, but to no avail. Both organizations which were traditionally
male dominated had resisted the affiliation. KANU would try to dominate those who it believed to be weaker.

Five, MYWO had also proven itself to be the most accommodating and least threatening to the government of all women's national NGOs, taking conservative to moderate non-confrontational stands on women's homemaking issues. Because of the organization's posture it was believed that MYWO could be used, as it was used, to silence other non-compliant "unruly" women's organizations, particularly NCWK. The government had a personal vendetta against NCWK's leader, Professor Wangari Maathai, who has consistently challenged the government on its blatant violations of human and environmental rights; and who has been victorious. MYWO would become the mouthpiece of the government to try to control Maathai and other women in Kenya.

It was Mrs. Theresa Shitakha, who became Kiano's successor as chair of MYWO in 1984, and who had been Kiano's vice chair and a member of the MYWO national executive committee, who set the the stage for MYWO to eventually assume the role of appendage to KANU. Shitakha's brief chairship (1984-85) was marked by allegations of inefficiency, financial mismanagement, corruption and nepotism which provided the near ideal circumstances for KANU's intervention into MYWO's affairs. Problems and confusion surrounding the Shitakha chairship's and the eventual decline of MYWO began before the Decade of Women Conference. Although the conference went on smoothly, problem loomed large.

In October of 1985, only one year and six months into Shitakha's chairship, the Standard, a leading Kenya newspaper made public the aforementioned allegations against the chair and her national committee. The newspaper further asserted that MYWO was in a "financial quagmire" owing the Commissioner of Income Tax nearly Ksh 6 million.
These allegations would begin a process of unraveling MYWO and altering its interorganizational relations with the government and foreign donors.

Kenneth Matiba, who was then the Minister of MCSS and Eliakim Masale the Permanent Secretary, along with three other senior officials promised to create a government probe committee to “unearth the truth” with regards to these allegations against Shitakha. This committee was to investigate the following:

1. A tax debt of ksh 5.9 million;
2. Failure to account for expenses incurred for the project “Information for Rural Health/Family Planning (IRH/FP) in the amount of ksh 145,000;
3. Payments for goods not tendered; and,
4. Tribalism and sackings.

By mid-December, 1985 Shitakha and her executive officers were suspended. Before the end of 1985, two senior officials were also ordered to stop using the MYWO vehicles and turn the keys over to the accountants. Stipulations were made for the MYWO vehicles to be used only for official functions and finances to be spent only for official expenses.

The MCSS probe found evidence to support all of the allegations of inefficiency, financial mismanagement, corruption and nepotism. It concluded that MYWO’s financial undertakings were in need of complete reorganization. KANU -- the party would step in to assume the responsibility.

Shitakha was immediately dismissed as chair of MYWO and replaced by MYWO Coast Province chair, Mrs. Mary Mwamodo. Mwamodo had been a member of MYWO since 1956. Shitakha’s chief executive officer Mrs. Gladys Mulindi was also replaced by Mrs. Dorcas Kamau, a long standing member of MYWO and the LD program officer 1985-1991. It was expected that Mwamodo would serve until the new MYWO national
elections would be held. Mwamodo announced the polling would be April, 1986 with no specific date.\textsuperscript{139}

Shitakha challenged the findings of the MCSS probe. She insisted that she was still the undisputed leader of MYWO despite the findings of the committee. She filed an injunction with the High Court against MCSS, which was thrown out.\textsuperscript{140} Shitakha claimed that she was a scapegoat, a fall guy. She argued that when she took over as chair of MYWO, the organization already had “money problems and this became an obstacle to many projects.”\textsuperscript{141} She implied that these were problems of which Kiano was acutely aware and which she passed on. Kiano and her treasurer who succeeded Dar, Mrs. Florence Gichuhi, had resigned just prior to the surfacing of these problems. Gichuhi indicated that she had resigned in 1985, not long after Kiano, because “when Shitakha took over, she misused money. When Mrs. Kiano left, money began to be used for many unauthorized things. There were many bills.”\textsuperscript{142} Gichuhi insisted that she did not want to be involved in a financial mess.

Chaos gripped MYWO as it split into factions, many of which looked to the government for direction. The KANU government immediately seized the opportunity to direct MYWO out of its furor. It kicked out Shitakha’s entire executive committee, postponed the MYWO polls until June 1987, and appointed a Caretaker Committee to be headed by a civil servant Mrs. Francisca Otete to run MYWO’s affairs commencing May 1986.\textsuperscript{143}

A review of MYWO and KANU correspondences between January 9, 1987 and April 16, 1987 reveal that the affiliation had taken place before that time. A working committee of KANU and (K)MYWO redrafted the MYWO constitution into the KMYWO constitution, effectively changing MYWO’s status from a non-governmental organization (NGO) to a “women’s development body of KANU,”\textsuperscript{144} hence
constitutionally altering the separateness of the organization in the transnational interorganizational network under investigation. Despite the fact that this constitutional change had been made and MYWO's status had been radically changed, MYWO continued to claim, especially to foreign donors, that it was still an NGO. The reason is that it wanted to continue to be eligible for NGO funding from foreign donors. This claim that it remained an NGO was a desperate attempt to maintain the type of interorganizational linkages it had had under Kiano, as it had linked with its partners as an independent organization. It was a desperate attempt to continue to receive funding from foreign donors.

The KANU/MYWO working group determined that MYWO owed a total of nearly ksh 12,000,000 to a long list of creditors. Hence, they made the case that because MYWO could not pay its bills alone, it needed KANU's assistance. KANU wanted affiliation. Had MYWO forgotten the power of women, of rural women, who had in 1976 alone, through Harambees, raised 13 million US Dollars (ksh 100 million)? That certainly would have been enough to pay off MYWO's debts. Perhaps the KANU/MYWO working group did not realize the financial potential of women in Kenya precisely because they were not rural women.

By affiliating MYWO to the ruling party, KANU had assumed the role of "savior" of MYWO, bailing it out of its financial quagmire and appointing its leadership to mitigate its political squabbles. In exchange for KANU's assistance to MYWO, KANU had gained control over MYWO in significant ways which would change its organizational character and overall interorganizational operations. These changes would have far-reaching effects for the dynamics of interorganizational relations and development in Kenya. No longer was the transnational network trilateral between MYWO, foreign donors and the Kenyan
government; it was instead bilateral -- the state and its substructures including MYWO on one side, and foreign donors on the other.

Most importantly, MYWO had compromised its autonomy by becoming KMYWO. Organizational constitutional changes had given KANU the power of voting, overseeing, censoring, condoning, defining or rejecting its activities -- locally, nationally and internationally. KANU had also assumed the power to approve or disapprove of MYWO's internal and external affairs.\(^\text{146}\) (K)MYWO had exchanged its fate as an NGO for affiliation to the ruling party and the government. It was now inextricably tied to the party and the state. Its interorganizational linkages necessitated reconfiguration at this juncture.

A critical look at the relationship between KANU and KMYWO suggests that the events which transpired prior to the affiliation, specifically those between Shitakha and Matiba which to some extent legitimized the affiliation, were part of a plan by members of KANU and MYWO leaders to 1) solidify the state and the patriarchy; 2) strengthen the ruling party; and 3) protect African bourgeois and petty bourgeois interests. Kiano is a case in point. Although Kiano had declared that "Maendeleo is in my blood and I will always be involved in development activities,"\(^\text{147}\) and although she remained patron of (K)MYWO, she was unusually quiet throughout the tumultuous events which led to the actual affiliation. This is problematic, particularly since she vehemently opposed the affiliation for twelve years.

Foreign donors were not very vocal as they observed the affiliation take place. Many of them watched anxiously as the dynamics of interorganizational relationships changed. Some, though not all foreign donors funding projects, did not buy the line that KMYWO was still an NGO. Ford Foundation and Martallito are examples of foreign donors that did not accept the claim that MYWO was still an NGO. After the affiliation,
Ford Foundation withdrew their funding for income-generating projects. They argued that they could not support a political party, which they would, in effect, do if they continued to fund MYWO projects. In addition, Marttaliitto, upon the instructions of the Finland government, could not renew their Nutrition Program with KMYWO, as KMYWO was now part of a political party. Moreover, foreign donors did not feel particularly comfortable in knowing that KANU would be the “supervisor” of KMYWO’s development funding and spending, given KANU’s shady history and lack of credibility. Thus, the nature of the interorganizational relationships between KMYWO and its foreign donors had begun to change. The perception of many foreign donors influenced their involvements with KMYWO at the national headquarters, and ultimately with women at the grassroots. KMYWO at the national headquarters may have made some short term gains as KANU “saved” it financially, but women’s losses in the long term would far outweigh the short term gains.

By KMYWO’s affiliation to KANU, the women’s organization had come full circle. After twenty-five years of functioning as an independent women’s organization since the African women’s leadership coup and their disassociation from the colonial state, KMYWO reverted to its initial status as an appendage of the state. The difference was this time KMYWO would be directed and controlled by the Kenyan “independent” state for its own ends. The KANU-KMYWO working group even considered returning to the Kenya Institute of Administration (the old Jeanes School) where Shepherd and the colonial government had used African women in attempts to crush Mau Mau, as the venue for their workshops. Because of KMYWO’s financial problems and its perceived inability and lack of resources to solve those problems, KMYWO was particularly vulnerable to and dependent on the KANU party and the state. At least its leadership gave the impression that it was. In its interorganizational relations, KMYWO had been co-opted by
a larger and more powerful organization in its network, with perceivably more resources at its fingertips, thus able to keep MYWO afloat. Of course, this was at a significant cost to MYWO in that its organizational autonomy had been severely compromised.

MYWO’s status as a benefactor of development and asset to the state had changed as well. That is, KMYWO, with the possible exclusion of the leadership -- themselves extensions of the state -- was tricked into believing that the organization was a beneficiary of the state to be aided by KANU. As such, KMYWO would allow its labor, finances and political patronage to be exploited by KANU in interorganizational exchange for KANU’s paternal assistance and “protection.” There is no doubt that KMYWO felt beholden to KANU. Ironically, KANU was benefitting more from the affiliation than (K)MYWO grassroots women were benefitting. KANU would now have control of the foreign donor assistance MYWO secured.

Kenyan women had been used by the colonial state through MYWO. They revolted however and won the war. Now they were entrapped by the post-colonial state, undoubtably in a battle that promised to be more protracted.

PART II: Reactions to Affiliation and the KMYWO 1989 Election

Initial reactions of KMYWO and KANU leaders to the affiliation were overwhelmingly positive. For example, KMYWO leaders and KANU women leaders gave the public the impression that MYWO’s problems had been solved by “chivalrous” acts of KANU, and that women’s status and power had been enhanced by the merger. Otete, the chair of the KMYWO caretaker committee said, “The merger had helped in many ways, one of which is the exemption from income tax payments for the Maendeleo house.”

Dr. Julia Ojiambo, then the KANU Director of Women and Youth Affairs and former Assistant Minister and Member of Parliament, said that the affiliation would secure for
women representation in decisionmaking committees in all development sectors in the
country. She claimed that KMYWO was under her jurisdiction and as such the merger
would ensure that women's issues would be closer to the government's ear. Ojiambo
agreed with the patriarchal KANU government on the dependence of women. She
justified the affiliation by saying, "They (women) have more chances of developing, as
they are working in close collaboration with and partnership with KANU." In an
editorial in Viva magazine, which since the affiliation included men on the board, the
affiliation was referred to as a positive step to toward the "regeneration of women's
activities," from which KMYWO and the country would benefit. Viva declared the
merger between KANU and MYWO "A marriage full of promise." There was overall
optimism among the leadership, particularly since Mr. David Amayo, then the National
Chairman of KANU pledged that KANU’s relationship with KMYWO would be "one of
non-interference."

Nothing was further from the truth. KANU’s interference with MYWO became so
heavy-handed that KMYWO leadership could not be distinguished from KANU
leadership. Men assumed the running of the organization, by making up the rules under
the auspices of KANU -- the party and the government, and through women puppets. As
with KANU, whose entire national leadership is male, men were in control of KMYWO.
This was most evident in the national elections of MYWO held October 30--November 4,
1989. Moreover, KANU was the cause of the elections’ 8 time postponement. KMYWO
elections were initially scheduled for April 1986 after KANU’s intervention into MYWO
affairs, but amidst continual problems and the obsession with MYWO’s affiliation to
KANU, elections were held nearly four years later. It was not uncommon for newspaper
headings to read: "Maendeleo elections postponed"; "Maendeleo polls postponed again";
The reasons cited for the postponement of KMYWO elections in August 1989 include the national census, the first taken since 1979 and the Mombasa Agricultural Show which was scheduled for August. KANU argued that these two events would have reduced the registration time for women voters and affected the outcome of the elections. The Nairobi International Show, scheduled for September 27, and Moi and Kenyatta Day celebrations scheduled for October 10 and 20 respectively, were again reasons for postponement of elections in September 1989. KANU National Chair Peter Oloo Aringo announced that finally KMYWO's poll would be held in late October after a "breather" from these events. KANU very strategically utilized the time during the postponements to further plan the women's elections and to recruit voters for KMYWO and KANU primarily. It was argued by some that this was the real reason for the postponements. KANU announced that women had to show their KMYWO cards in order to vote and their dues had to be paid up-to date. Pending the election, Ojiambo, the Director of KANU Women's Wing (of which KMYWO was not part), and Aringo announced that 1.12 million registration cards had been sold to women throughout the country. 1.12 million out of 10 million (the number of women in the country), as estimated by the Central Bureau of Statistics, is hardly a number to boast.

During this time, KANU men began charging each other with interference in the women's elections in attempts to end each others (men's) political careers. Rivals within the party accused each other of wooing particular women with the intent of forging political allies. Women were being used as pawns in men's political games. The editor of the Nation observed:
Some men were claiming there were fake party stamps from within and outside Maendeleo being distributed (to women) on a selective basis. Men were accusing other men of dishing out huge sums of money in various parts of the country in a bid to influence the women's elections. Men were accusing the male branch chairmen of selling KANU stamps to women on a selective basis. The powerful men of the party branches were issuing their own versions of the procedure for the women's election issued by the headquarters.

Other issues contrived by KANU men became part of the melee as well. For example, Mulu Mutisya, Machakos District KANU chairman and MP, warned that there were "some women" native to Machakos, but who now lived elsewhere who were planning to contest the elections. He advised his constituency that "Such women should be rejected during the elections since they are not acquainted with the problems the district residents have." Councillor Tony Ndilinge, Machakos District youth leader, also alleged that "some people were planning to interfere by bringing candidates of their choice from outside the district." From another area, the Narok District Commissioner and KANU member, Mr. John Sala stressed to Narok Chiefs and KANU officials the importance of ensuring that all members of KMYWO were registered so as to facilitate their full participation in the elections.

Even President Moi became directly involved in the women's elections. He warned women not to be "cheated" and "bought," and he alerted men to "keep of the polls." He however intervened. Four days before the elections, Moi announced that the only requirement for women to vote in the KMYWO elections was that they should have their national identity cards. This meant that KANU party rules were turned on their head -- neither did a woman have to register as a KANU member, nor did she have to be a member of KMYWO in order to vote. Moi argued that he ordered this action to avoid confusion brought on by fake membership cards and the intentional maldistribution of membership cards. By making these pronouncements, Moi had succeeded in undermining those KANU members and politicians who schemed to
undermine the women's election. He had also cleverly increased his own popularity among women at the grassroots, but his order did not stop the confusion.

Men were determined to participate in the elections at all costs. Perhaps their most bizarre plot was revealed by KANU District Officer for Kiamaa Division in Kiambu District, Mr. Haroun Ichima. Ichima revealed that there was "a well organized plot by some men to not only influence the outcome (of the elections), but to actually participate in a more direct way. The men planned to pose as women by wearing dresses and stuffing oranges down their shirtfronts in order to pass muster as bona-fide women voters." Although no men were found with oranges in their shirtfronts on election days, men were front and center at the elections. Many women boycotted elections because of men's meddling. For example, at the sub-national levels, in Nyeri district a group of women refused to vote in protest of men's interference in the polls. In Dandora Ward, Nairobi, a group of women voters forced a truck carrying women voters off the road. They claimed that these women were being transported to the polls by a senior politician from the area who had bought the women's votes. Mrs. Lydiah Wanjiru, leading the women said, "We cannot allow these elections to be tampered with. We want our elections to be for the womenfolk alone." Another group of women at Ngong claimed that KANU officials had given chai (bribes) to the women to vote for hand-picks of KANU. They also named other areas politicians had poured money into -- Quarry Ward, Ongata Rongai Ward, Maasai Ward, Lenana Ward, Scheme Six Ward, Kisumu Ndogo Ward and Ngai Murunya Ward. A group of women in East Wanga location, Kakamega District also protested the interference of KANU men in the elections. As a result, the chief of the location, Mr. J. A. Kodia, ordered the police to arrest the locational KANU chair for interference.

Perhaps the most flagrant of all KANU officials who tampered with the elections was Mombasa's Mr. Shariff Nassir, Assistant Minister for Information and Broadcasting.
Shariff was accused by the former Mombasa District MYWO leader, Mrs. Zubeda Sumba, of openly campaigning for “a particular woman of his choice.” This woman was his sister, Aisha Shariff. Sumba and others also charged that Nassir openly dished out money in the campaign.\textsuperscript{172} Nassir had attempted to disguise his moves by calling a press conference two weeks before the elections to publicly state his position against men’s interference in KMYWO’s elections. He stated, “There should be no interference by men at any quarters.” Again, prior to the elections, he held another press conference warning his political rivals not to show up at the polls. It was Nassir however, and not his rivals, who was spotted at two polling places in Mombasa -- Majengo and Shimanzi.\textsuperscript{173} It was Nassir who reportedly mobilized KANU youthwingers to bar women who opposed his sister from the polls.\textsuperscript{174} Between 8,000 to 10,000 women demonstrated along Mombasa streets after boycotting the elections due to Nassir’s blatant interference in the elections. Singing songs of protest they appealed to Moi to nullify the elections and called for a repeat of the polling.\textsuperscript{173}

Men had demonstrated quite obviously that they had a vested interest in the polls. They had planned the elections, spoke on behalf of women, argued with each other, attempted to vote with women, bought votes, lied and schemed. They had demonstrated that they would go to far-reaching lengths to be in control of women’s activities, and to maintain control of the former relatively independent women’s organization.

At the national level elections, men also attempted to influence and control the elections, but more shrewdly and surreptitiously than at the sub-national levels. The \textit{Weekly Review} reported,

\begin{quote}
Male politicians from all over the country, present as observers, were very much in evidence at the Nyayo national stadium, apparently giving instructions to the female delegates as vigorous lobbying for the various posts at stake continued.\textsuperscript{176}
\end{quote}
Men as well as women were anxious to see the face of KMYWO for the next three years, as well as speculate on the nature of the partnership it would have with KANU. Although the men were restrained in overtly influencing the women, kinks in the women’s negotiations demonstrated the extent of the role KANU senior politicians had played as “advisors” to the women. For example, Kiambu District KMYWO chair Mrs. Rose Waruhiu led a protest against the Central Province delegation for not including a Kiambu representative. It was KANU men officials intervened to break the deadlock.177

Another event which adds suspicion to the extent of involvement KANU politicians had in KMYWO’s elections was a slip-of-the-tongue by the Nairobi Provincial Commissioner, Mr. Fred Waiganjo, who officiated the elections. Without the official nomination forms for candidates in hand, which Ojiambo claimed that she forgot on election day, Waiganjo began to announce the names of the nominees. He should not have been aware of the names of the nominated, since they had not yet been revealed. Waiganjo however began to read the name of the nominator, Mrs. Ester Wandega from Western Province, and her nominated sole contender for the chair of KMYWO, Mrs. Wilkista Onsando, from an unofficial list of names in his hand before realizing that Wandega had not yet introduced herself to him or revealed the name of the nominee.178

That men had taken an interest in women’s elections is an understatement. They were the most prominent figures in the event, causing much more of a squabble and ruckus than the one they took credit for resolving within MYWO. The women on the other hand did not appear very excited about the organization or the forthcoming elections. As the daily and weekly news indicated, until the eve of the election no single woman had declared her interest in the top post of the organization. Moreover, only four women had declared any interest in the running for office by election time. The offices in which they expressed interest were the lower-level, sub-national offices.179 Undoubtedly,
MYWO's troubles of the immediate past had led to women's disinterest in running for office. Moreso, MYWO's merger with KANU, had confused and dismayed many women to the extent that they refused to participate in elections which turned out to look like a sham. The consistent postponements of election dates and the constant changing of election rules by KANU, especially the requirement of queue voting, further caused women to lose interest. Even "prominent female politicians and activists who had indicated a wish to vie for the leadership post in the first (scheduled) elections were obviously absent from the polls." Clearly, KANU's persistent entanglement in MYWO's affairs and its characteristic hawking were major disincentives to women's participation in the KMYWO elections. As expressed by one woman who seemed to sum up many women's views about the elections and the events surrounding it, "This is a women's show and they should stage it in their own style."

The elections resulted with the following women taking the National Offices:

- Chair: Wilkista Onsando, Nyanza Province, Kisii District
- Secretary: Mareso Agina, Rift Valley Province
- Treasurer: Florence Maingi, Eastern Province
- Vice-Chair: Nelia Githeka, Central Province
- Asst. Secretary: Phoebe Alouch, Nyanza Province
- Asst. Treasurer: Joan Mjomba, Coast Province
- Executive Officer: Jane Kirui, Rift Valley Province

The Executive Officer was appointed on election day by the KMYWO national executive committee. All of these women listed above were KANU and MYWO members. Some of them were even life members of both organizations. Mjomba had had the longest membership in KANU, and as elected national assistant treasurer of KMYWO she had no qualifications to serve in that post. Onsando's husband had previously served as an MP for their home area in Kisii. She had also had connections with KANU as MYWO's CEO under Kiano before resigning to take the post as Program Officer for Income-Generating...
Activities supported by the Ford Foundation until its withdrawal of its funds upon MYWO’s affiliation with KANU. Onsando had worked first hand with the development cooperative partners — MYWO at national headquarters and grassroots, the KANU government and foreign donors.

All of the women who took KMYWO national offices, though they may not have held posts in KANU, as it is an unwritten requirement that to be in the party hierarchy one must be male, were considered important women in KANU politics. That is, they assumed the highest unofficial, complementary roles women could — “assisting” the party. Finally, through them, women’s importance could be “legitimized” by their attachment to KANU, even though they represented a subordinate and unequal women’s body in the party.183

Outside of the elected leadership, many women were enraged at KANU men’s interference in the polls. In protest, they did not vote and they further appealed to their representatives and to Moi for some type of redress. These appeals were in vain since their representatives were KANU members, most of whom would not rock the boat. Moreover, the opinions of many of the rank-and-file members of KANU mattered little anyway. One group of women referred to the entire elections process as a “defeat (of) the process of democracy — linking the elections sham to the widespread corruption in Kenya and to foreign donors call for democratization.184

Not surprisingly, the calls to nullify the elections and host new ones, fell on deaf ears. One can but agree with Nzomo in her assessment of the situation. She states, “Despite ordinary women’s cries of “rigging” and “male interference” the powerlessness of the majority of women in (MYWO) was again reaffirmed.”185 Ordinary women’s, that is, grassroots women’s, political proximity to KANU was not close enough to matter on the Kenya political front. The leadership of KMYWO, whose voices might have carried
more weight had been coopted and silenced, such that their political fate was entrusted to KANU, the patriarchy these women would dare not defy.

Moi made an announcement following the KMYWO’s elections which would further seal the fate of the organization. He stated that all foreign donations to women’s groups in Kenya would from that point be channelled through KMYWO. That is, KMYWO would receive all of the monies for women’s groups in Kenya, whereas before the affiliation and the elections, foreign donations went directly to the independent women NGOs. In effect, Moi was taking away the independent status of all women’s organizations and linking them to the party and the government through KMYWO. MYWO had been reconfigured into an umbrella women’s organization, and was being used as a tool to usurp the power and independence of all women’s groups in Kenya. Moreover, Moi was placing KANU in control of all women’s groups’ purse strings. All of their foreign funding would now be overseen by KANU, and would be directed, controlled and utilized by KANU, for KANU’s best interest. Most importantly, Moi was placing the KANU government at the top of the interorganizational development partnership hierarchy, in charge of KMYWO and foreign donors, whose resources it had stealthily garnered and would now exploit.

Post-Election Changes and Disintegration: KMYWO’s Relations with the Government and Foreign Donors

KMYWO’s first meeting after the elections suggested, very loudly, that KMYWO would not be exerting much autonomy as an “independent entity” of KANU. Instead, the meeting suggested that it would be dominated by KANU’s continuing paternalistic control.
KMYWO’s first meeting was chaired not by its new chair, Onsando, but by KANU’s Director of Internal Audit, Mr. A. M. Aburi who is said to have analyzed MYWO’s performance in 1986-87 under the caretaker committee. Aburi reported that 1) MYWO did not have an “enlightened leadership, an adequate management system or an accounting system”; 2) MYWO never used funds for the purpose for which they were intended, and some funds were fraudulently misappropriated; and, 3) More than sixty percent of the organization’s annual income of ksh 33 million was used to pay salaries.\textsuperscript{187}

Otete, the chair of the caretaker committee, vehemently challenged Aburi on his facts, figures and ability to conduct a thorough and accurate study. She was however silenced by Kiano, who symbolically had given her support to Aburi and KANU, and had discredited Otete.\textsuperscript{188}

Aburi made the following recommendations for KMYWO which would cement KANU’s partnership with KMYWO, clearly establishing KANU as the senior partner. Aburi recommended that although KMYWO was an “independent” organization it should be overseen by KANU’s Directorate of Youth and Women Affairs. This Directorate would be responsible for coordinating KMYWO activities, and controlling its foreign funds. This was a tremendous task KANU was willing to take on, as all of the monies in foreign financial assistance given to any and all women groups in Kenya would be overseen by this directorate.

By these actions, KANU was entrenching its control over KMYWO, as the leader of the interorganizational development partnership. KANU was establishing rank -- placing itself at the apex to direct its subordinates, KMYWO and foreign donors. In order to do this, KANU was replacing the old guard of MYWO with its own people, especially in matters concerning finance and development planning. KANU was determined to control KMYWO finances and activities agenda. Through its interactions with KMYWO,
KANU was also indirectly speaking to foreign donors of women's development projects. Their messages were mixed, and may sometimes have seemed contradictory, because KANU was speaking out of both sides of its mouth. On one hand, KANU was insisting that MYWO was still an NGO, maintaining its autonomous nature despite its merger with the party, and as such KMYWO was still eligible for foreign donor assistance for women's development projects. On the other hand, KANU had affiliated KMYWO to the ruling party, making it an organ of the party and compromising its autonomy as an NGO. KANU wanted financial and political control of the women's groups and all of the foreign monies they were able to solicit. At a very basic level, what KANU really wanted was to have Kenyan women secure foreign donor funds on the international market under the guise of support for their development work, while the KANU party -- men -- sat and waited for the women to turn the money over to them. KANU's plan was to capture the money after the women's work secured it. In exploiting women, and their labor, KANU had made a mockery of Kenyan women and their remarkable contributions to Kenya's development. Moreover, KANU had assumed the role of a Madame over Kenyan women.

Some of MYWO's past leadership, most notably Jane Kiano, seemed to be in active compliance with KANU in these efforts, urging KMYWO's elected officials to work closely with government officials. The recently elected leadership seemed to be in complicity. That is, Onsando and her national executive appeared to be KANU puppets in silent acquiescence. Perhaps Aburi's performance at KMYWO's first meeting was staged to show Onsando what would happen to an unruly and rebellious chair of the KMYWO. Clearly, the affiliation between KANU and KMYWO was not a marriage of equals.

KMYWO's relationship with KANU after its first meeting reflected the hierarchy which had been established. KMYWO, while still claiming a non-political autonomous nature, became the politicized echo of the government, particularly to foreign donors,
multiparty proponents -- domestic and foreign, and Kenyan political activists. As an opening to her chairship, Onsando announced to women’s groups who were reluctantly merging under the umbrella of KMYWO, that “No differences exist between the party, KANU and women’s organizations.” KMYWO became the defenders of the KANU government, Moi and Kenya’s one-party state.

Onsando was often quoted in the newspapers between 1990-91 speaking to the “unreliability of foreign donors” for women’s development projects. She defended Moi’s dictatorial practices against multipartyism, as well as the KANU government’s widespread corruption. She took on the international community who was waging pressure against Moi and KANU, by calling them “foreign meddlers out to destabilize the country (Kenya) by pouring in money.” Onsando went further and said that KMYWO would not accept funding from “foreign countries who wanted to buy the country.” She vowed that KMYWO would “never accept any aid which might later be used to fight the Nyayo government.” In a lengthy speech to women in Mombasa, Onsando stated,

Those who think they can use women for their own selfish ends are cheating themselves. The few disgruntled Kenyans and foreign donors who may think of using women in this country to carry out their devilish thoughts will never succeed... We (KMYWO) shall play a big role in defending the country’s peace and stability under President Moi’s leadership...the foreigners who dream of buying us with money to destabilize the government will feel ashamed of even approaching us.

Onsando was not specific in naming the foreigners or the countries to which she was referring, as the very foreign countries who were pressuring Moi and KANU to change were the same ones currently funding MYWO projects -- primarily, the United States through USAID which was funding at least seventy-nine percent of all KMYWO’s operations, Germany, and all other Western member countries of the World Bank.
KMYWO was apparently redefining it relationship with its foreign donors, calling for the conditional end to its partnership with its foreign donors if their agenda included human rights, accountability and pluralism, while seemingly consolidating its marriage to KANU. As an alternative to foreign donor funding, Onsando called for women’s groups to “search for self-reliance.” This however was only rhetoric.

Many people and institutions, Kenyan and foreign, were calling for an end to the one party state which had existed defacto since 1969 and de jure since 1982. They wanted a multiparty state and new elections. Like Onsando challenged foreign donors, she also challenged them.

Moi had succeeded Kenyatta after his death in 1978 and had created a very closed and increasingly repressive authoritarian environment in Kenya. His administration was characterized by a culture of lies, manipulations, contradictions, embezzlements, corruption, mismanagement, human rights violations and political thuggery, of which KANU’s behavior was symptomatic. The ethnicity of Moi’s Vice President and Minister of Finance, Professor George Saitoti, who is really a Kikuyu from Muranga District, Central Province pretending to be a Maasai, was even lied about. This lie was promoted throughout Kenya with Saitoti’s knowledge and consent, and probably even his orchestration, to maintain control and political hegemony through trickery. As Nyayo literally means “footsteps”, Moi had followed in the footsteps of his predecessor Kenyatta, although many would beg to differ.

In a publication of Finance, appropriately entitled “Moi Time To Go,” teachers, trade unionists, industrial workers, farmers, university students, doctors, the media, lawyers, priests and churches, former university professors ousted by Moi, Kenyan students abroad, the unemployed, jua kali artisans, politicians, young, old, cooperatives and even civil servants and former KANU rank and file members, as well as KANU top
ranking members called for the end to the Moi regime. There were women who also called for the end to the Moi regime, including Mrs. Wambui Otieno, widow of Professor and advocate S. M. Otieno. Otieno had caused a stir in Kenyan politics when she fought an extended battle with the Luo Umira Kager clan for the body of her husband, during which time women’s organizations did not come to her assistance. Otieno had been the one who publicly exposed Saitoti and challenged his Vice Presidential seat. She and all of the groups aforementioned wanted political and economic changes and a new leader and government.

Many foreign donors also wanted changes and tied political and economic reforms to the continuing flow of aid to Kenya. They included: the Consultative Group chaired by the World Bank, and comprising representatives from Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, the African Development Bank, the Commission of European Communities, the European Investment Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations Development Programme.

Onsando and her national and district leadership campaigned heavily against those calling for reform. At the District Level, Kirinyaga women, led by KMYWO Chair Fatuma Mohammed, announced on several occasions that they supported a one-party state. In exchange, they were given a ksh 300,000 donation by Moi, reminiscent of the exchanges between colonial state and MYWO thirty years prior. Moreover, women were advised by the KANU District Officer to “avoid disgruntled elements wishing to plunge Kenya into chaos.” KMYWO national office, shortly thereafter, pledged to back the government against anti-government elements in the country. Rallying their numbers, forty-two district chairs of KMYWO, in a meeting chaired by Mrs. Grace Ogot, MP and Assistant Minister of Culture and Social Services, resolved that their districts
would hold a demonstration against advocates for a plural political system. Nearly one year after this resolution, Aringo, then KANU’s National Chair, in response to the intensification of citizen’s demands for reforms and multipartyism, urged women to “counter the campaigns against the Kenyan government by its critics and foreign governments and organizations.” Onsando, as the dutiful partner to KANU, responded on behalf of KMYWO. In an attempts to prevent the inevitable, she stated:

We have full confidence in the President, the ruling party, and the leadership of the country, we would like the multiparty advocates to know that they have no support from the women of this country.

KMYWO also threatened to sue the Law Society of Kenya for challenging the prerogative in the President in their request to dissolve the Parliament.

Moi and the KANU government also used KMYWO to challenge political activists who held them accountable for their wrongdoings. Chief among them and their strongest opponent was Professor Wangari Maathai, environmentalist and former wife of Lang’ata KANU MP Mwangi Maathai. Professor Maathai is the former chair of NCWK. Maathai is currently the coordinator of the Green Belt Movement (GBM) in Kenya and is an internationally acclaimed activist for human rights, environmental conservation and social justice. The GBM had been started as a project by NCWK in the late 1970s. KANU’s use of KMYWO to wrestle its opponents is obvious in the following example.

Maathai had challenged the government on its proposal to build a triple tower 60-story building in the middle of Uhuru (Freedom) Park in Nairobi. It was planned to be the most prestigious piece of architecture in Africa, to be built by the Kenya Times Media Trust (KTMT) corporation, jointly owned by Robert Maxwell, international industrialist, and Aringo, KANU National Chair. The building was to serve as, among other things, KANU party offices, and all of it cost of $US 200 million was being borrowed for its
Maathai opposed the construction on the grounds that a green belt of land measuring 1.5 acres would have been taken by KTMT for another unnecessary highrise, and also because a national site commemorating Kenya’s struggle for independence would have been destroyed. In a heated battle with scores of KANU heavyweight MPs who pressed for the building of the tower, Maathai argued:

From Uhuru Park, one can see the magnificent Nyayo monument which is the symbol of peaceful transition. When the children of Nairobi walk through Uhuru Park, they are able to appreciate the symbols of victory as the children of Mombasa walking through Fort Jesus are able to recapture the oppressive and inhuman nature of slavery...A Member of Parliament is not a deity.

MPs argued that the highrise should have been constructed in the name of modernization and because “Uhuru Park is the ‘only green spot in the city which was fast developing into a concrete Jungle.’” Not able to defeat Maathai by sound reason or logic, as they had none, KANU men resorted to personal mudslinging and degradation. They publicly misogynized Maathai, calling her “ignorant,” “a frustrated divorcee,” plotted to “curse” her, and made references to her “anatomy below the line.” In spite of this, Maathai was relentless. KANU also used KMYWO to chastise Maathai as they had chastised foreign donors and multiparty proponents. Maathai did not bend.

KMYWO “flayed” Maathai for her opposition to the the KTMT complex. Spearheaded by women from Kilifi District, Coast Province, Chair Mrs. Beatrice Charo and Malindi division KMYWO Mary Chizi called a press conference to disassociate KMYWO from the GBM as it was against the Government. KMYWO reportedly also vandalized the premises the GBM had occupied for ten years -- government owned wooden premises on land belonging to the Nairobi Central Police Station. They further allegedly uprooted and destroyed billboards belonging to the GBM. In KMYWO’s
defense, Onsando said that “maybe the women (KMYWO) had been angered by the movement and had acted to vent their frustrations.”

This was not the first time KMYWO was in confrontation with Maathai. KMYWO probably used this opportunity to get revenge for the past two incidences in which Maathai blocked their plans against her. The first incident was in 1981 at which time “MYWO decided to pull out of NCWK (a coordinating body of women’s organizations) after attempts by prominent members of MYWO failed to unseat (her as) chair.” Kiano, who was then chair of MYWO, and Maathai were from the same home district of Nyeri and they were political and personal rivals -- Kiano on the side of the government, and Maathai on the side of principle confronting the government when it infringed on citizens” and environmental rights.

KMYWO and Maathai had also butted head in 1984-85 when Shitakha tried to unseat Maathai as NCWK chair again. “Insiders saw the move as MYWO’s bid to take over the activities of the council.”

KMYWO was impelled to oust and discredit Maathai because, over time, she had managed to cultivate an autonomous women’s movement, separate and apart from MYWO, taking stands on women’s issues, human rights issues, and the environment against the KANU government; and she had won the battles consistently. Maathai had done what MYWO with a membership of over 1.5 million women had not. She had also empowered rural women in Kenya thought the GBM tree planting program.

Maathai had not only held her ground against (K)MYWO, knocking them down each time, she had also won the battle against KANU MPs, despite their mobilization of KMYWO and its affiliate group to attack her. The KTMT 60-storey proposed building was not constructed, and Uhuru Park was saved as a national site.
The state attempted to deny its loss to Maathai. It took steps to “punish” her for her headstrong and ungovernable behavior, particularly since “Kenyan politicians are not receptive to criticism ‘especially from a woman who challenges state decisions.’”\(^{219}\) The Court kicked the GBM out of its government owned premises; the Registrar-General of the KANU government, Mr. Joseph King’arui order Maathai to furnish audited accounts of the GBM for five years prior to the the KTMT incident; and, KANU party members, with the sanctioning and assistance of KMYWO, continued their verbal abuses against Maathai. Nassir claimed that Maathai was against the Moi government and measures should be taken against her. KANU’s reactions were not surprising. As Nzomo noted,

> Those women organizations or individuals within them that have resisted state control and/or challenged the oppressive status quo, have in the past often come under heavy censure and harassment, while the acquiescent ones have been rewarded and accorded high official status.\(^{220}\)

**Party and Partnerships Begin To Fall Apart**

In intraorganizational relations, KMYWO became involved in the rifts that had begun to form in KANU. Although KANU had ruled Kenya as a one-party state, there were substantial, though latent, ideological differences between members of the party. Those differences began to widen and air publicly with discussions of multipartyism and democracy in Kenya in mid-1991. Some KANU members began to question KMYWO’s affiliation to KANU. KMYWO’s CEO, Jane Kirui, called those KANU members “hypocrites and political opportunists with chameleon tendencies.”\(^{221}\)

KMYWO’s support was to President Moi, whose style of rulership was to surround himself with personal loyalists, such as Dr. Kiano and by extension his wife Mrs. Kiano. As multipartyism demands become more threatening, Moi had engaged in several cabinet shuffles to ensure his centrality of power and reinforce his control as President. Unlike the Kianos, some KANU members had begun to waver. Moi and KANU - party
and government - were in trouble; and by affiliation, KMYWO was in trouble. KANU was questioning and changing its relationship to KMYWO, a relationship which it had created. For example, KANU headquarters was requesting clarification as to whether or not KMYWO were automatically members of KANU. In addition, KANU was pressuring KMYWO to repay the party over ksh 1.3 million which it had spent on elections, as well as turn in monies from sales of KANU memberships. The Nyeri District, Karatina KMYWO chair Veronica Mairimu Mugo was even jailed for allegedly stealing ksh 156,530 from her group.

By early 1992 a substantial number of KANU members had defected from the party, a reported 100 from the Ikolomani constituency in Kakamega District alone. Some KANU member had been fired by Moi, notably Aringo, who was the KANU Chairman and the Minister for Manpower Development and Employment. Key members of KANU had declared their allegiance and memberships to opposition parties. Moreover, many former KANU members and Moi political allies took the leadership of opposition parties to which KANU members defected. For instance, Mwai Kibaki, former Vice-President (1978-88) and Minister for Health, was Moi’s chief opposition in the Democratic Party (DP) with ally John Keen, a former Assistant Minister of State in the Office of the President and nominated MP. Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Kenya’s first Vice President (1964-66) under Kenyatta and KANU first Vice President concurrently, took the leadership of Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) Kenya Martin Shikuku, former Moi ally in KADU and former Assistant Minister of Home Affairs, Minister in the Office of the President and Assistant Minister of Livestock was a founding member of FORD Kenya Kenneth Matiba, former Minister for Culture and Social Services, Permanent Secretary in various ministries, and MP for Kiharu, and Moi’s toughest opposition, took the leadership for FORD Asili. Kibaki and Keen had defected.
from KANU. Odinga had been expelled by Moi in 1982. Shikuku had been dismissed by Moi in 1984 and Matiba resigned from the Moi Nyayo government, and had been detained by Moi and expelled from KANU.228

Concomitantly, there was also growing confusion in KMYWO and foreign donor interorganizational relations. KMYWO tried very frantically to woo itself back to the donor community, despite the allegations that it had made against donors while defending Moi and KANU. In a twist of fate, KMYWO became more dependent on its interorganizational linkages to foreign donors as its ties to KANU began to unravel. KMYWO took desperate measures to save itself from disintegration with what seemed to be a dying party.

After having denied that KMYWO had lost foreign donor support,229 on December 7, 1991, Onsando capitulated and announced that three of the organization’s programs had ceased to operate due to foreign donor withdrawals. She identified the donors as NORAD, Marttalitto of Finland and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of Germany. Onsando expressed concern for the job security of KMYWO members who were employees of these programs, paid by donors.230 Onsando make no reference of the loss of foreign donor support being related to KMYWO’s affiliation to KANU.

Other prominent politicians however, led by Mrs. Agnes Ndetei, MP for Kibwezi and one of two women in Parliament, made the connection and requested that KANU end its affiliation with KMYWO on the grounds that foreign donors “were unwilling to assist the organization because of its links to KANU.” Ndetei’s request was seconded by MP Peter Okondo from Bunyala.231

On December 11, 1991 Mrs. Grace Ogot, MP for Gem and Assistant Minister for Culture and Social Services announced to Parliament that “KANU and KMYWO had signed an agreement (to disaffiliate) to avoid confusion about relations with foreign
This was the first time KANU had acknowledged a problem with foreign donors had arisen out of its affiliation of MYWO. At the time, KMYWO would revert to the use of its old name again, MYWO.

On that same day, Onsando retracted her statement of one week earlier. She said that foreign donor assistance to KMYWO had not been cut. She argued that foreign donors had simply handed projects over to KMYWO to be self-sustained. Onsando further said that new agreements had been made with new international donors whom she did not identify. The evidence surrounding the withdrawals of foreign donors that Onsando referred to in her first statement did not support her story.

NORAD had been kicked out of Kenya because of diplomatic disagreements between Kenya and Norway over Koigi wa Wamwere, a political dissident and former MP, who had sought and been granted asylum in Norway. Norway attempted to intervene in discussions regarding Wamwere when he was accused of allegedly having clandestinely returned to Kenya carrying contraband (guns and grenades) for which he was charged with treason. Moi kicked NORAD out of Kenya for interfering in the sovereign affair of the state. Some program areas of MCH/FP which had been covered by NORAD were no longer covered. Marttaliitto had not renewed its funding for the Nutrition program because of KMYWO's affiliation with KANU under orders of the Finland government. Konrad Adenauer Foundation pulled out in 1992, after two three-year contracts with MYWO funding its LD program. Its pullout was because of MYWOs' and KMYWOs' gross inefficiency, mismanagement and overall non-compliance with the foundation's requests for necessary financial reports and evaluations.

Despite KANU's official disaffiliation of KMYWO, unofficially their relationship remains the same. MYWO continues to support the state and echo its views. Disaffiliation did not sever the loyalty that MYWO's current national leadership --
Onsando and her national executive-- and their Patron Kiano has for KANU and for Moi. Onsando publicly announced that she planned to remain a part of KANU, despite the disaffiliation. Her national executive is sticking with her. Kiano has demonstrated her quiet but solid support for KANU during its process of affiliating MYWO to the party and thereafter. She remains its watchful and influential Patron. Moreover, the current MYWO leadership, elected as KMYWO leadership, is holding on to power, postponing until 1995 elections which should have occurred in 1992, according to the (K)MYWO constitution.

Disaffiliation of KMYWO from KANU was merely a symbolic act for foreign donors to again pour money and other assistance into MYWO and Kenya. It was a desperate measure to reactivate interorganizational trilateral relations, as they had existed when Kiano was chair and when MYWO was at least a quasi-NGO, somewhat autonomous yet unofficially but closely linked to the state. Nothing has really changed -- except the rhetoric of (K)MYWO leadership. They are the real chameleons -- not at all committed to representing Kenya women's grassroots interests. In addition, Kiano remains, though less so today, the linchpin between MYWO and KANU, and a fading link to foreign donors.


4 Ibid.
Wipper, "Co-optation.


Ibid.

Ibid.

   1) bathing a baby
   2) health and hygiene in the home
   3) agriculture - rotation of crops
   4) children’s play, training in character building
   5) clothing - choice of suitable clothes for climate, etc.
   6) how to build a mud stove (if the women have their own house)
   7) child welfare
   8) hygiene and health in the home
   9) recipes or cooking demonstrations
   10) agriculture - compost and compost pits
   11) handiwork or needlework demonstration
   12) tea party and concert
   13) talk on current affairs
   14) literacy classes should be held in addition to the club meeting.


Ibid, 15.


19 Ibid.


21 Presley, Kikuyu Women: 166.


23 Ibid.


27 Ibid.


41 Public Records Office. Colonial Government of Kenya. “Psychological Warfare.” Colonial House 1953. Africa Information Services in Kenya. The “classes” of persons to whom this propaganda campaign was targeted among Africans were:

1) The Loyalists to the colonial government;
2) The Waverers, who might be responsive to Mau Mau but not totally committed;
3) The Mau Mau "Gangsters," and,
4) Those involved in development and reconstruction projects, including MYWO club women.

Ibid.


Ibid; and "Information on the Kikuyu, Meru and Embu in the Rift Valley Province and the Settled Areas of Central Province."


Otieno, "History of Maendeleo," 17.

Ibid, 15-17.

Ibid, 88.


55 Ibid. One of MYWO's programs was a literacy program in which one literate member of the organization would teach at least one illiterate member. Another of their programs focussed on Homecraft, particularly in rural areas, making it income-generating. Their third program was the revival of the oral tradition -- story-telling and oral literature.

56 Ibid, 89.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.


62 Nzomo, Schemes To Divide and Oppress,” 17.

63 Ibid.

64 See David Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State and Development (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers 1994): 27-28, 94-95; and “Renewed Calls of Majimboism,” Weekly Review - Nairobi (September 13, 1991): 5-12 for a discussion of members and impact of GEMA on Kenya’s politics.

For the shift to rural focus, see Joel Barkan and Michael Chege, “Decentralizing the State: District Focus and the Politics of Reallocation in Kenya Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 27 No. 3 (1089); For the bias against women, see Maria Nzomo, Women as Men’s Voting Tools, Kenya Times 4 September 1991 and Maria Nzomo, “Women’s Passivity to Blame for Their Woes, Kenya Times 8 September 1991.


67 Otieno, “Past Chairmen,” 23.

68 Otieno, “History of Maendeleo,” 89.
Otieno, "Past Chairmen," 23.

Otieno, "History of Maendeleo," 90.

Otieno, "Past Chairmen," 23.

Otieno, "History of Maendeleo." 90.

Mrs. Dar, Former Treasurer of MYWO 1971-80, 1992 interview by author.


Otieno, "Past Chairmen," 23.

Otieno, "Committee Members," Viva (Nairobi) 9, Special Issue (July 1982): 63.

Jane Kiano, "What We Stand For," Viva (Nairobi) 9, Special Issue (July 1982): 7, 73.

Otieno, "Committee Members," 63. In an interview with Mrs. Dar, she indicated that during Kiano’s chairship, it was a national obligation to become involved with development and with women. “Work was a must...The nation had to be built.” She and Otieno recounted how Kiano had grown up in a tradition of assisting women -- her sister, Gladys, aiding widowed women in their home areas, and she and her school friends helping older and more needy women. Thus, Kiano continued the tradition of working with women and called on all women to respond in the spirit of Harambee.

Dar, 1992 interview.

Ibid.
For a discussion of Kenyatta's tribal politics, see Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, 94-95 and 118-119.

Ibid.

Dar, 1992 interview.

Ibid.

To fully understand the importance of unofficial exchanges one must know how tenuous the position of Indian entrepreneurs was in the 1970s. As Himbara in Kenyan Capitalists argues, Indians were often intentionally displaced by the policies of Africanization formulated and implemented in the early post-independence period. The House of Manji was not financially affected, though many other businesses were. Overtime however, after African would-be entrepreneurs most times failed, many Indians were able to return, with an even stronger economic base. (pp. 59-65).


Ibid.

Otieno, "Maendeleo and the Women of the World, " Viva (Nairobi) 9, Special Issue (July 1982): 37.


Ibid.


Ibid.
100 Otieno, "Interview with Kiano," 33-34.

101 Ezra Mbogori, Undugu Society Director, 1991 interview by author.


104 Otieno, "Kiano Interview," 29.


106 Interviews with Gichuhi and Dar 1992 who were MYWO officials in the 1970 and 1980s reveal that their perception was that MYWO members created their own development agenda.


113 For an analysis of the position of the government see Nzomo, "Impact of the Decade," 9.

114 Orora and Speigel, "Harambee," 244-246.

115 Ibid, 249-250.
116 Ibid, 243.


118 Ibid, 259-260.


121 Ibid, 116.

122 Ibid, 118.

123 Ibid.


126 Onyango, “Terminal Crisis?,” 19.

127 Otieno, “History of Maendeleo,” 90.


Helmut Hellman, Director of Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1991 interview by author.


Ibid; Onyango, “Terminal Crisis,” 19.


The MCSS probe report was released on February 14, 1986. MYWO was threatened to be slapped with lawsuits from merchants who had tried unsuccessfully to collect payments for debts which MYWO had made. These included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ksh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dharamshi Devraj Shah</td>
<td>247,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munshiran International Business Machines</td>
<td>40,103.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Plastics Ltd.</td>
<td>33,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menegai Furniture</td>
<td>21,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gut Ltd.</td>
<td>7,408.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The MCSS probe found that:

1. MYWO’s financial undertakings and procurement procedures were in need of an overhaul. Most of MYWO’s financial transactions had not followed the constitutional stipulations of necessary sanctioning by the financial or national executive committee;

2. Shitakha had, in fact, practiced nepotism in contracting her relative Mr. Matthew Shitakha of East West Communications for the publication of the April, May and June editions of the Women’s Voice, the official journal of MYWO. There had been no other bids solicited from other publishers. This deal between Shitakha and Shitakha cost MYWO Ksh 165,000, whereas formerly the journal is reported had been self-supporting from advertisements. East West Communications had pocketed Ksh 142,000 that had been collected in advertising revenue. East West Communication were further awarded another 115,000 by MYWO. Above all, they were not even publishers;

3. MYWO had used improper procurement worth Ksh 1.449 million for the Decade of the Women Conference;

4. MYWO had unaccounted sales of Ksh 78,858.15 and an outstanding imprest of Ksh 61,000;

5. MYWO had improperly managed vehicles;

6. MYWO had run bank accounts poorly; and,

7. MYWO irregularly made appointments on tribal grounds.


Onyango, “Terminal Crisis,” 19.


Onyango, “Terminal Crisis,” 19.

KANU/MYWO Working Committee, Minutes of March 3, 1987, Third Meeting on KANU/MYWO Merger at KANU Headquarters. Reference number MYWO/KANU/12/3; KANU/Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organization Constitution and Rules, Objective Section, Number 4.

The Caretaker Committee and the KANU/(K)MYWO working group found that MYWO owed Ksh 5,974,655 in taxes to the Commissioner of Income Tax. In attempts to resolve this enormous tax problem, the Caretaker Committee wrote to MCSS in an appeal to the Minister of Finance requesting that MYWO be exempted from paying these taxes. The Minister of Finance agreed to waive the accumulated taxes, but ordered that the late payment penalties of ksh 821,003 be made. This waiver did not include income taxes of 1985-86 totalling ksh 3.5 million as they were not assessed at the time of the negotiations. MYWO also had a host of creditors which it had not paid for “bills incurred in 1985 during the UN End of the Women’s Decade Conference.” These creditors included, but are not exclusive to the ones aforementioned. They follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>ksh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation Newspaper</td>
<td>2,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture Centre</td>
<td>7,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biuk Electrical Ltd.</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menegal Furniture</td>
<td>21,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Plastics Ltd.</td>
<td>33,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maanki Auto Garage</td>
<td>23,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rex Rotary</td>
<td>5,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rentokil</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dharamshi Devraj Shah</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gut Limited</td>
<td>7,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Times</td>
<td>4,968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. City Council of Nairobi  7,556.05
13. GTZ  300,000
15. Munishram International  40,103.25
16. Genuine Merchants  38,000
17. Grace Ngethe  14,700
18. Computer Typesetters  6,200
19. Copy Cat  5,600
20. MCH/FP  94,465
21. KP&T  6,406.40
22. Keni Office  2,229.95
23. Tarpo Industries  15,750
24. East West Communication  100,000
25. Dharamshi Devraji Shah  197,300

(Court Judgement was entered against MYWO)

26. Design Directions  79,650
27. Time Joints  300,000
28. African Insurances  18,696
29. Water A/C  33,668
30. Minanzo Ltd.  3,053
31. Vincent Mugemi  4,200

Total Ksh  1,431,989

Overall liabilities totalled -- ksh 11,762,990.00

According to the constitutional changes:

1. MYWO's title was changed to KANU MYWO (KMYWO). MYWO ceased being a non-political NGO and became part of a political party and the state.

2. KMYWO was declared the official voice and coordinator of all women's organizations in the country. This placed KANU above and in-charge of all women's organizations, and all of their finances.

3. KMYWO would be disciplined by the National Disciplinary Committee of KANU, subject to it rules and regulations. Hence, any member of KMYWO perceived as bringing "disrepute" to the organization or party would be disciplined. That is, women could not speak out against KANU and would be further silenced against challenging the Moi's government and the state.

4. KMYWO committees would have additional voting members, each committee would have 1 voting KANU representative, with the exception of the Annual General Meeting. KMYWO's policies, practices, agenda and "women's voice" could be affected.
5. KMYWO would prepare and submit to the KANU National Executive Committee a financial statement every quarter. KANU would be consistently privy to MYWO purse strings.

6. KMYWO would submit to the KANU National Executive Committee quarterly reports on all overseas funding. KANU would be privy to all financial negotiations and donations from foreign donors to KMYWO. KANU would moreover have the power to impact the relationship between KMYWO and foreign donors, as KANU now had the right to vote in committees that made decisions about donors, funding and projects.

7. KMYWO would only pay affiliation fees to other national or international associations approved by KANU. KANU could now determine the involvement of KMYWO in women’s and other activities worldwide. It could restrict KMYWO’s growth and involvement.

8. KMYWO would have a KANU representative present at KMYWO’s Annual General Meetings to observe. KANU could now “watch” first hand what the women were up to and censor their planning for the next year.

9. KMYWO would now elect at every General Meeting a KANU representative to be a trustee of KMYWO. KANU would have a vested interest in all assets acquired by MYWO, and would be a beneficiary if those assets became profit-making.

10. KMYWO’s constitution would be amended only in consultation with KANU. MYWO would not change in structure or function without the said permission of KANU, of men.

11. Women running for office in KMYWO would be registered members of both MYWO and KANU. KANU would gain the memberships and membership dues of women who, if not for being members of MYWO, might not join KANU.

12. KMYWO would change its traditional voting system from secret ballot to queuing. KANU could now see who individuals and groups of women were voting for and hold account them accountable. They could also influence who the women queued behind, and thus voted for. As Nzomo indicates, “a husband could then successfully order his wife and other members of his family not to line up behind a female candidate .


149 Mrs. Raili Owinding, Marttaliitto Project Representative, 1992 interview by author.


152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.


155 Ibid.


165 Ibid.


172 Ibid.


177 Ibid. From Central Province, Muranga’s and Kirinyaga’s District Chairmen Messrs. Joseph Kamotho and James Njiru, with Kipipiri MP, Nyandarua District Mr. Kabingu Muregi persuaded the Waruhiu to accept the delegation as already recommended -- the vice chairship going to Nyeri District and 2 provincial seats going to Nyandarua and Kirinyaga districts. She accepted reluctantly. It was rumored that Waruhiu herself may have had her eye on one of the two top offices. Perhaps her difficulty rested in that she was not a KANU hand-pick, although she was a member of the party. And perhaps, as Kiambu had been the political center of the Kenyatta power base and of GEMA, Kikuyus from Kiambu were not accustomed to not being central to the political organs of the day. Moi had tried to replace and annihilate them. Waruhiu may have seen this an another tribal blow against Kiambu political power, and a trick that KANU played on her. See Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists for a discussion of the consolidation and collapse of Kikuyu power, and the rise of the Kalenjin.


Elections at the sub-national, grassroots levels looked different from elections at the national level. KANU presence and influence was much more obvious. KANU wives and relatives took 20 seats in KMYWO. They included, but were not exclusive to:

Mrs. Eunice Kamotho who took the KMYWO Kangema Chair, Muranga District. She is the wife of Joseph Kamotho, the then KANU Secretary General and Minister for Transportation and Communications;

Mrs. Mary Kamuyu who took the KMYWO Dagoretti Division Chair, Nairobi. She is the wife of Chris Kamuyu, MP and KANU Sub-branch chair.

Mrs. Isabel (Ezabel) Mwenja who took the KMYWO Embakasi Division Chair, Nairobi. She is the wife of David Mwenje, MP Embakasi.

Mrs. Clare Omanga who took the KMYWO Kisii District Chair and a Kisii delegate seat for Borabu Division. She is the wife of Andrew Omanga, MP of Nyaribari Chache and former Minister for Tourism.

Mrs. Mary Sagini, who took a Kisii delegate seat for Borabu Division. She is the wife of Lawrence Sagini, Kisii KANU Branch Chair.

Mrs. Rebecca Wanjiru Ndung’u, who took the KMYWO Kigio Sublocation Chair. She is the wife of George Mwicigi, former Assistant Minister for Energy and Regional Development.

Mrs. Margaret Ndang’a Mundia, who took the KMYWO Thika Division Assistant Secretary seat. She is the wife of Douglas Mundia, Mayor Councillor of Thika Division.

Mrs. Aisha Shariff Taib Busaidy, who took the KMYWO Majengo Division Chair, Mombasa District. She is the sister of Shariff Nassir, Assistant Minister for Information and Broadcasting.

Aburi made the following recommendations for KMYWO:

1. As the auditors for MYWO, Messrs. Gichohi and Company and Messrs. Kimani and Onyancha and Company “did not act responsibly,” they should be dismissed.

2. Although KMYWO was an “independent” organization it should be overseen by KANU’s Directorate of Youth and Women Affairs. This Directorate would be responsible for coordinating KMYWO activities, and controlling its foreign funds. This was a tremendous task KANU was willing to take on, as all of the monies in foreign financial assistance given to any and all women groups in Kenya would be overseen by this directorate.

3. KMYWO should dismiss its current top management staff for a permanent staff to be controlled a an executive director.

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188 Ibid. Otete argued that MYWO had not received more than ksh 10 million annually since 1952, and at a later time, because she had been silenced during the meeting, compiled her own counter report with documentary evidence to show the “fictitiousness” of the Aburi report. It was Mrs. Kiano, still patron of KMYWO, who silenced Otete, grabbing the microphone and forcing Otete to sit down.


194 Ibid.


201 Ibid.


207 Ibid.


209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.

211 Ibid.


217 Nzomo, "Schemes to Divide and Oppress," 17.


220 Nzomo, "Schemes to Divide and Oppress," 17.

221 Onyango, "Terminal Crisis," 10.


Among the ones who created a crisis in Parliament by their defection were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Constituency Representing</th>
<th>Party Defected To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George Muhoho</td>
<td>Juja</td>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mjenga Karum</td>
<td>Kiambaa</td>
<td>DP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Gachui</td>
<td>Gatunga</td>
<td>DP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyale Mwendwa</td>
<td>Kitui West</td>
<td>DP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oloo Aringo</td>
<td>Alego</td>
<td>Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (Ford)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geoffrey Kare’ithi</td>
<td>Gichugu</td>
<td>Ford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maina Wanjigi</td>
<td>Kamukunji</td>
<td>Ford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabibi Kinyanjui</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>Ford</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mbooni</td>
<td>Mbooni</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Ejore</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

228 See the following for further discussions of Moi and KANU’s opposition: “Moi Time to Go” Edition, Finance (December 16-31,1991); “Who Will Be the Next President of Kenya,” Finance (March 15, 1992); “Is He (Matiba) Fit to Be President?” Finance (April 15, 1992).


This was obvious in the state’s and MYWO’s reaction to the Mother’s Hunger Strike of February-March 1992 and their joint continued harassment of Wangari Maathai. The mothers and supporters of 8 political prisoners, including Wamwere, who were being detained without trial, staged a peaceful Hunger Strike in Uhuru Park Freedom corner commencing February 28, 1992. Maathai was one of the strikers. After 5 days of peaceful protest, on March 3, 1992, the Kenyan riot police savagely attacked the women with brute force, using tear gas and batons. Maathai was beaten unconscious and remained in critical condition for 3 days. The mothers and grandmothers stripped half-naked, responding to police attacks and daring the police to kill them. They were cursing Moi and the cruelty and repression of his regime, and the police for being his henchmen. In many African traditions, stripping is an irrevocable curse of last resort.

KMYWO’s Chair Onsando and Patron Kiano criticized the mothers for their stripping protest, calling their act of defiance “very shameful” and “unAfrican.” In response to their criticism, Onsando and Kiano were challenged by women in Kenya to “tell who they represent.” They were criticized for having “never raised a finger or come to the aid of their fellow women, yet they are supposed to be leaders.”

See “Moi’s Day of Shame,” Finance (March 15, 1992): 4-5; Shelia Wambui, George Owour and Willys Otieno, “Police Break Up ‘Freedom’ Demo” Daily Nation, 3 March 1992; Starving for a Just Cause Standard, 5 March 1992; “Beauty and the Beast: The Curse of Women Fury,” Drum (April 1992): 16-20. The author explains stripping as a curse in this way: “Traditional folklore among various African tribes in Kenya and other countries speak of what are known as curses and taboos in different societies. These curses and taboos have been with us from time immemorial and are strictly observed by all members of the society as failure to do so can result in the greatest punishment. The offender may be ostracized -- made an outcast in his or her own community, die or run amok...Stripping is a desperate act one takes as a last resort when a women’s anger has reached a boiling point. Historically the crux of the phenomenon was the imagery and symbolism applied to the protest against threats to women as a group or to an individual...the first act of women stripping took place 70 years ago...protecting the colonial regime’s use of the kipande...” pp. 16-20; “Maendeleo Boss Challenged.” Daily Nation 25 March 1992; “Wangari Maathai.” Presence (January 1992).

CHAPTER IV
A CHANGING RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AMIDST POLITICAL VOLATILITY, ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY AND A CULTURE OF FEAR AND SILENCE

This chapter will present the research strategy that was used in this study for collecting data. This strategy evolved in attempts to grapple with questions of resource dependency, assistance, autonomy, balance of power in IOR, indigenous development, gender and self-reliance as they relate to MYWO and the organizations in its relational environment. This chapter will be divided into three parts. Part I of this chapter will present and discuss: 1) hypotheses; 2) key variables and their definitions; 3) the study instrumentation; 4) a description of the study participants, archival research and events observations; and, 5) an outline of the procedures used for analyzing the data. Part II will demonstrate the maturation of this research strategy overtime, in light of the political and economic changes which took place in Kenya relevant to MYWO during two important periods: 1) the first period being that time between my application for in-country field research in 1988 and my being granted research clearance in 1991; and 2) the second period being the time between August 1991 and August 1992 during which time I conducted my fieldwork in Kenya and my archival research at the Public Records Office (PRO) in England. Part III of this chapter will discuss the benefits and limitations of the research strategy which I utilized.
PART I: Hypotheses

The hypotheses for this study were derived from the current state of knowledge on 1) the schools of NGO optimism and NGO pessimism; 2) IOR theory and 3) MYWO. The four major hypotheses that were proposed in this study are:

1. a) The greater the financial and technical assistance MYWO receives from foreign donors and the Kenyan government, the less autonomy MYWO will have to formulate and implement its indigenous agenda, hence the less successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.

2. a) The lesser the financial and technical assistance MYWO receives from foreign donors and the Kenyan government, the more autonomy MYWO will have to formulate and implement its indigenous agenda, hence the more successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.

3. a) The more directive the assistance MYWO receives from foreign donors and the Kenyan government, the less autonomy MYWO will have, hence the less successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.

4. a) The more non-directive the assistance MYWO receives from foreign donors and the Kenyan government, the more autonomy MYWO will have, hence the more successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.

Figure 5 presents a graphic illustration of these hypotheses. Appendix A also gives a more detailed list of sub-hypotheses which are derived from the four major ones presented here.

Key Variables and their Definitions

Figure 5 illustrates a graphic interplay of the variables which will be discussed in this section.
Independent Variables

Financial Assistance

Technical Assistance

Directive Assistance

Non-Directive Assistance

Intervening Variable

Autonomy of MYWO

Dependent Variables

Success or Failure of MYWO Projects/Programs

FIGURE 5. PRESENTATION OF HYPOTHESES PROPOSED
The independent variables (IVs) for this study are:

1) **the amount of financial assistance** provided by foreign donors for MYWO's programs and projects;

2) **the degree of technical assistance** provided by foreign donors for MYWO's projects and programs;

3) **the amount of financial assistance** provided by the Kenyan government for MYWO's programs and projects;

4) **the degree of technical assistance** provided by the Kenyan government for MYWO's projects and programs;

5) **the extent of directive or nondirective assistance** that is provided to MYWO by foreign donors; and,

6) **the extent of the directive or non-directive assistance** that is provided to MYWO by the Kenyan government.

**Financial assistance** is defined as the granting of monies in the form of gifts or loans, 1) from foreign sources outside of Kenya which shall be referred to as foreign donors; and 2) from the Kenyan Government. This assistance is provided to MYWO for the purpose of assisting MYWO with the implementation of a specified development project, or with a general development program.

**Technical assistance** is defined as the provision of skills, knowledge, and techniques 1) by foreign personnel who come from outside of Kenya who shall be referred to as foreign donors; and 2) by the Kenyan Government. This assistance is provided to MYWO for the purpose of assisting MYWO with the implementation of a specified development project, or with a general development program.

**Directive assistance** is defined as that assistance MYWO receives from foreign donors and/or the Kenyan government which simultaneously brings requests/demands for
MYWO development agenda changes made by a) foreign donors, or b) the Kenyan government which may include, at the extremes, threats of withdrawal and actual withdrawals from organizational cooperative partnerships by a) foreign donors, and b) the government. Non-directive assistance is the diametric opposite of this definition.

These IVs will be considered the instruments of foreign donor and government influence in MYWO’s relational environment.

Foreign donors that provide the types of assistance mentioned above were initially thought to be all foreign NGOs, primarily because there is a tendency in the literature and in lay discussions to refer to all foreign donors as NGOs. Upon closer inspection however, it was clear that some of the donors were technically not NGOs. Instead they were IGOs and businesses, such as the World Bank and Coca Cola respectively. This called for a reconceptualization of this issue and a renaming of the external organizations providing assistance to MYWO from the narrower category of NGOs to the broader category of foreign donors, which encompasses NGOs and IGOs - as well as INGOs, and businesses.

The intervening variable is autonomy of MYWO in development program/project formulation and implementation. Autonomy was defined and measured as MYWO’s ability and freedom to formulate and implement its own “indigenously” defined development agenda as initially conceived and agreed upon by its members, making no changes, modifications, and/or accommodations to the government and/or to foreign donors in its relational environment for the specific purpose of securing and/or maintaining financial, technical and other resources. Various methods of analyses were used to determine whether or not changes, modifications, and or accommodations in the MYWO development agenda are related to the instruments of influence of foreign donors and the government, and if they are, to what degree.
The concept of autonomy is particularly intriguing, as well as problematic for this research. References to "autonomy" are used in the literature on NGOs relatively frequently, yet the literature has not yet operationalized a working definition for it. Moreover, the distinctive quality and very essence of an NGO according to its definition is its "autonomy" from the government, yet the factors that constitute its autonomous nature have not been clearly defined. For instance, the literature suggests that an NGO should not receive "substantial" contributions from its home government, yet there is no consensus or even discussion as to what constitutes "substantial."

The dependent variables (DV) are success or failure of MYWO programs. Success shall be defined as the state of reaching the desired objectives and goals of development projects and programs as initially defined by MYWO before these goals and objectives are influenced by MYWOs' development partners. Failure is the opposite of success.

Instrumentation -- Oral Interviews

This research was conducted in two phases, 1) in Kenya, from August 1991 to July 1992, and 2) at the PRO in England in August 1992. Some preliminary data had also been gathered at the PRO in July 1989, and some observation had been conducted in Kenya from July 1989 to October 1989.

In Kenya in 1991-92, the study instrumentation that was utilized was an oral interview survey method. Open ended interview questions were drafted and used as a guide for the interviews, adapting the questions for the peculiarities of the each individual situation. A detailed list of those questions are provided in Appendix B. All the responses were recorded by hand, during the time of the interview or as soon as possible thereafter. The interviews were conducted in Kiswahili and in English, determined by each individual
research situation, and the preference of the interviewee(s). Sometimes both languages were used.

There were four target interview populations: 1) Local Grassroots Women, 2) MYWO Officials and Staff, 3) Foreign Donors, and 4) Government Bureaucrats. There also emerged a fifth set of interviewees that will be referred to as “Other Relevant Persons.” They will be discussed in greater detail later.

The questions asked of each group attempted to solicit general perceptions about issues of indigenization, assistance, autonomy, dependence, and evaluations of MYWO program/project successes or failures. These perceptions were to be used as a gauge to support or invalidate the hypotheses presented. For instance, perceptions of the following were sought: 1) Was the MYWO agenda indigenous and grassroots?; 2) What were the roles and opportunities for participation for rural women in the formulation of the MYWO agenda?; 3) How closely was MYWO associated with its development projects in the rural areas?; 4) Was MYWO regarded as the initiator of development projects?; 5) What types of linkages existed between MYWO and its partners in development?; 6) How much financial, technical or other type of assistance did donors provide to MYWO and under what conditions?; 7) What degree of negotiating strength did MYWO have vis-a-vis its donors?; 8) Who among the partners took the leadership role in defining the development agenda and implementing it?; 9) Was there equality among the partners in development, or did a hierarchy among the partners exist?; 10) To what extent, if any, did MYWO compromise to keep resources it received from donors? What impact did compromises have on MYWO autonomy or dependence?; 11) What ways, if any, did the more resourceful donors wield their influence in IOR over MYWO?; 12) Was MYWO autonomous? Was MYWO an NGO?; 13) To what extent were MYWO’s projects and programs successful? Was their success or failure attributed to MYWO and/or its donors;
and 14) Did women's participation with MYWO lead to greater power and more gender equality for women as a group?

The Study Participants: Descriptions

During the period of my fieldwork in Kenya, I interviewed 106 research participants. Of this total, twenty-four (24) were identified as women's groups, ten (10) were past and present MYWO elected officials, sixteen (16) were MYWO staffpersons, sixteen (16) were representatives of foreign donors, nineteen (19) were Kenyan Government Ministry personnel, and twenty-one (21) were other relevant persons. All of the interviewees are listed in Appendix 3.

Women's Groups

The twenty-four (24) women's groups represent five (5) of Nairobi's seven (7) provinces and the Nairobi area. (Nairobi is not incorporated in any of the provinces). Fifteen (15) of the groups were rural groups. Nine (9) of the groups were semi-urban groups. One (1) of the groups was started in 1958. Five (5) of the groups were started in the 1970s. Six (6) of the groups were started in the 1980s. Six (6) of the groups were started in the 1990s. Six (6) groups gave no starting date or year. The groups ranged in size from six (6) members to over 1,000 members. The larger size groups were usually coalition groups of most or all women's groups in a particular area. There were six (6) coalition groups in this study.


MYWO Elected Officials and Staff

The Elected Officials

Four (4) national elected officials were interviewed. Among them, two (2) were national treasurers from the past Kiano administration, and two (2) were national officers from the current Onsando administration. They were the National MYWO chair Mrs. Wilkista Onsando and her national assistant treasurer Mrs. Joan Mjomba. One (1) provincial elected secretary was interviewed. Two (2) district chairs were interviewed. One (1) Divisional Chair and one (1) divisional treasurer were interviewed. One (1) village chair was interviewed. Except for the two elected officials from the Kiano administration, all of the elected officials were elected to office during or after the MYWO 1989 elections.

The Staff

Of the sixteen (16) interviewees, nine (9) were from the national headquarters. They included MYWO's Chief Executive Officer (CEO), four (4) National Project Managers, two (2) Assistant Project Managers, one (1) archivist and one (1) national accountant. From the district level, two (2) accountants and five (5) fieldworkers were interviewed. All of the persons interviewed were MYWO personnel serving in the current Onsando administration.

Foreign Donors

A total of nine (9) foreign donors providing or who had recently provided financial and/or technical assistance to MYWO were interviewed. They included: one (1) IGO, the World Bank; two (2) GOs, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and The United States Peace Corp; one (1) INGO donor, Pathfinder
International; four (4) NGOs, Center for Population and Development Activities (CEDPA), German Technical Agency (GTZ), Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF), Marttalitto of Finland; and one (1) business donor, Coca Cola of Kenya. These donors are categorized here according to organizational definitions which they provided. All provided financial and/or technical and/or material assistance to MYWO.

A total of sixteen (16) foreign donor representatives of the aforementioned donors were interviewed. A brief description of these foreign donors is provided in Appendix IV. Findings with regard to their operating functions as NGOs, INGOS, GOs, IGOs and businesses, which sometimes conflict with their self-definitions, and their donors relationships to MYWO will be presented in detail in Chapter 5.

Kenyan Government Ministry Bureaucrats

Nineteen (19) persons were interviewed from various government ministries. One (1) was from the Ministry of Livestock. Six (6) were from the Ministry of Agriculture. Of these, five (5) were from Home Economics Extension and one (1) was a Special Appointment for Irrigation Rehabilitation. Ten (10) interviewees were from the Ministry for Culture and Social Services (MCSS), holding various positions within that Ministry. Two (2) interviewees were from the Ministry of Home Affairs and National Heritage. One (1) was “on loan” to MYWO during the period of my research. He was with MYWO from 1990-92 for the specific purposes of writing proposals and conducting project evaluations. One (1) was from the National Council on Population and Development (NCPD). Ministry personnel are almost always university graduates. The interviewees were from four (4) provinces and the city of Nairobi. Although no one was interviewed from the Ministry of Health, this Ministry was involved with MYWO in the
implementation of the MCH/FP Program. A brief description of the Ministries is provided in Appendix E.

The Ministry of Energy was to be included in the interviews, however this Ministry was undergoing major crises during the period of fieldwork and was thus not open to interviews. No interviews could be conducted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation either because the murder trial of its former Minister, Dr. Robert Ouko, was ongoing.

With regard to the role of the ministries in development, the Ministry of Health planned programs to ensure the health quality of the nation. The Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock Development provided technical experts and specialists to assist with programs and projects which were in keeping with government’s objectives. They provided skills and training to groups and individuals, particularly farmers. The MCSS provided varying types of motivational support to groups engaged in community development activities. The Ministry of Home Affairs and National Heritage created the National Council for Population and Development (NCPD) under the Population Guidelines contained in Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1984 as the government arm to coordinate and monitor all programs geared toward family planning.

Other Relevant Interviewees

Interviews and discussions were also conducted with a total of twenty-one (21) other relevant persons. They included government officials such as district commissioners and district managers. Others included international NGOs not funding a MYWO project, such as Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA); women who were not members of MYWO; KANU women’s league members, some of whom were members of
women's groups; other grassroots organizations not affiliated with MYWO; political activists, former political detainees, academicians, and professionals.

This group of "other relevant interviewees" emerged as an unintended group. They were not targeted during the proposal stage of this study. This group came about because all of the avenues which I had planned to pursue to reach the target groups were closed when I arrived in Kenya. Kenya was undergoing very tumultuous times, some of which I discussed in Chapter 3 and some of which will be discussed in Part 2 of this chapter.

One of the main reasons the unintended group emerged is that for the first few months in the field in Kenya, it was impossible to get an interview with anyone associated with MYWO, especially MYWO at the national headquarters. Moreover, it was near impossible for me to get my research permit issued from the Office of the President (OP) of the KANU government, despite my having been granted research clearance. The research permit is the official authorization to begin fieldwork and official permission to travel to research sites. No one would talk and the Office of the President would not issue the permit.

After tremendous frustration and careful contemplation I decided that I must work on the "magendo" and find persons knowledgeable about MYWO and KANU to interview. In East Africa, magendo refers to underground transactions, particularly economic ones. I shall use magendo here to refer to an overall underground network of which research connections and the economy are both part.

Since 1987 I had been connected with one of Moi's former detainees, Advocate (Attorney) Willy Mutunga, who got me on my way to meeting people on the magendo. Most were more than willing to talk about MYWO, KANU and President Moi. In effect, the snowball method of interviewee selection emerged. Each interviewee would suggest...
another and send me on by reference. From this group of "other relevant interviewees" I was able to secure very valuable and insightful information that I otherwise would not have gotten from official research channels. A situation which began on a downturn turned out to produce very positive results.

Archival Research

During the period of my fieldwork in Kenya from August 1991 to July 1992, I also conducted archival research at MYWO headquarters, the Kenya Times, the Daily Nation, the Standard, the MCSS Women's Bureau and the Kenya National Archives. In August of 1992, I conducted archival research at the PRO in England.

In Kenya

MYWO headquarters had very little archival information available to the public. MYWO claimed that they did not have many records. The MYWO national archivist had recently been hired to create the library. Mrs. Kiano, the past chair of MYWO, at a personal meeting at their home in October 1991 gave me an issue of Viva magazine devoted to MYWO and a MYWO pamphlet and wished me luck with my research. In June 1992 she invited me to read her personal files, but then she left Kenya suddenly due to a family emergency. I never got a chance to read her files. From the newspaper archives aforementioned, I collected detailed data on the contemporary development of MYWO from the early 1970s to 1992. The Women's Bureau had useful, but scant information pertinent to MYWO. The Director of the Women's Bureau Mrs. Oeri would not agree to meet with me. The Kenya National Archives did not house information directly relevant for this study.
In England

At the PRO, I was able to read the original correspondences from the Kenya Colonial Period. From this I could document the development of MYWO from 1952 to 1961. There is a period of 30 years within which records are not made public. I did not allow myself enough time at the PRO. There was ample information to read, and the process of securing the documents is very slow.

Events Observation

During the period of my research in Kenya I was able to directly observe events and activities, both planned and spontaneous, that had direct bearing on my research. I was able to observe the behavior of persons directly relevant to the research problem in attempts to unravel the politics of development cooperation. I was also able to observe events in their actual environmental context in which this research problem unfolds. By having this kind of access I was able to better determine whether or not my proposed hypotheses captured the dynamics of the interaction which I was observing, or whether or not they required further observations and reconceptualization.

In conducting my observations, my role shifted between 1) participant-as-observer, at which times I participated with the groups I studied while I made clear that I was conducting research; 2) observer-as-participant, at which times I identified myself as a researcher and I did not participate in the groups' activities, and 3) strictly observer, at which times I did neither participate in groups' activities nor identify myself as a researcher.³ I merely observed events. For safety reasons, strictly observation was sometimes necessary, as there were some events I had not planned to witness.
Following are singular events and categories of events which I observed in one of these three capacities:

1) Grassroots women’s groups development and celebration activities -- participant as observer;
2) Grassroots women’s group meetings -- observer as participant;
3) National NGO meetings on the Proposed NGO Coordination Act -- observer as participant;
4) National MYWO meeting with Chinese women’s delegation -- observer-as-participant;
5) National Conference on Protection, Promotion and Support of Breastfeeding -- observer-as-participant;
6) Christmas Tree Harambee -- participant-as-observer;
7) Mother’s Hunger Strike -- observer-as-participant;
8) Multiparty Political Meetings -- strictly observer;
9) Ethnic Clashes -- strictly observer.

Each event or category of events required a specific role for me as observer, as well as the flexibility and versatility to be comfortable and effective in each situation and role.

Procedures for Data Analysis

The procedures I used for analyzing data emerged from both the normative school and the positivist school, though I relied more heavily on the former. The school referred to as the “postpositivist” as described by Lincoln and Guba in Naturalistic Inquiry expressly explains the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods in this approach, albeit highlighting a heavier reliance on the qualitative. As they demonstrate, postpositivism is fundamentally conventional.4
The approach that I utilized in this study was particularly useful for several reasons: 1) It underscores the importance for research to be carried out in its national environment as naturalistic ontology stipulates that research problems are parts of wholes that cannot be understood properly outside of the context within which they exist, hence the necessity of field observation; 2) It is more useful for the kinds of data acquired in field research with human participants as it acknowledges the everchanging, non-predictable dimension of human behavior. In other words, it is more appropriate for qualitative research and open-ended data analysis; 3) It allows for the adaptability of the research design in the field as it realizes that every situational reality is different; 4) It is adaptable to the case study approach as it considers the particulars of a case important; 5) It sees the research problem as constantly being shaped by actions, reactions and interactions, such that there may not be isolatable specific cause(s) and corresponding isolatable specific effect(s); and, 6) It acknowledges, unlike the positivist school, the constant role of values in conducting research -- from choosing what problem to study, what paradigm and theory to use to guide the investigation to what context within which to conduct the study. Overall the postpositivist approach is less constraining than the positivist approach, allowing for the holistic and human nature dimension of the problem to be considered.

The positivist approach also had much to offer. For instance, the positivist approach stipulates the following guiding principles so that researchers are not merely asking questions which produce answers that become data which are not analyzable. The steps of the positivist approach which were most helpful in doing this were: 1) considering theoretical perspectives; 2) devising sampling and instrumentation; and 3) considering data analysis procedures. All of these steps were extremely important, though tentative. They helped me to: 1) “make sense” of the data; 2) extract similarities and construct order of that data; and, 3) identify themes and patterns which emerged from the data. Solid
research that utilizes conventional qualitative methods intrinsically utilizes quantitative methods as well, albeit unappreciated by positivists.

The construction of appropriate data analysis procedures occurred in three major phases: 1) in the proposal writing stage, 2) in the field; and 3) in the write-up phase. In the field, I was able to modify the research strategy I devised in the proposal stage and still get the targeted information, thus the importance of theory and instrumentation. During the write-up, I was able to determine and utilize the appropriate procedures to tease out all of the important information and allow the patterns, themes, and explanation(s) of the research problem to emerge.

The use of both the normative and positivist approaches in a postpositivist vein were very critical for my doing the above. Only a mix of the two approaches allowed me to capture the holistic problem as well as the cyclical nature of this research process in which recursive steps were repeated over time. During this process, I modified the data analysis procedures which I used, particularly in the field, and refined them overtime to fit the research problem and the nature of the data I sought and collected. Moreover, I used both deductive and inductive logic, and I evaluated and revaluated theories and models of explanation. Overall, I used a multimethod research strategy.

Following is an outline of the steps I used to analyze the data once collected:

1) **Data transcription**: I wrote down as fully as possible, and sometimes translated from Kiswahili, interviews, fieldnotes, records, documents, colonial correspondences, news articles;

2) **Data Contextualization**: I placed the data in the broader environmental context in which they were collected;

3) **Data Categorization**: I categorized similar responses, perspectives, positions, experiences, feelings;
4) **Data Theme Identification**: I identified patterns, themes or norms that emerged from the categories of data established;

5) **Data Theme Deviation**: I identified deviations from the patterns, themes or norms that emerged from the categories of data established;

6) **Hypotheses Testing**: I determined if emergent patterns, themes or norms supported or negated the proposed hypotheses; and,

7) **Theory Application**: I determined if the patterns, themes or norms and the overall research results supported existing schools of thought or generated new ones.

**Part II**

The methods utilized in this research project changed and matured overtime as the political and economic situation in Kenya changed between 1) the time that I applied for research permission; and 2) the time that research permission was actually granted so that I could go to the field. I applied to Kenya’s Office of the President for research clearance in 1988 and I received official clearance in 1991. This section of this chapter will highlight and discuss events which occurred while I waited on the clearance between 1988-1991 and while I conducted the fieldwork between 1991-1992. These events, some of which involved political changes orchestrated by the KANU party and state and some of which originated from the people’s dissatisfaction with KANU, overtime created environmental uncertainty and a culture of fear and silence. These inevitably had direct relevance on my research.

**The First Period, 1988-1991**

When I applied for research clearance in 1988, MYWO and KANU were in the midst of defining their relationship, after MYWO’s affiliation in 1987. One might say that
I jumped into the fire. At this time, there was no precedent set yet, as to how to deal with a research project that involved both MYWO and KANU. There was however the long-time practice of not allowing research on the party in a one-party state. My fear was that this practice would now be extended to MYWO. On one hand, many argued that MYWO was now part of the party, but on the other hand MYWO adamantly denied that it was part of the party and of the state. In light of this, my hope and expectation was that my research proposal would follow the normal procedures of all proposals. That is, it would be reviewed and decided upon by Kenya Institute for Research, Science and Technology.

I was fortunate to have received a predissertation fellowship in 1989 which allowed me to go to the field and attempt to expedite matters for clearance. In the field I was able to see persons relevant to my receiving research clearance, and I was able to tentatively assess, from a distance, the viability of my project. This was not without obstacles however.

The first obstacle I faced was a train workers strike in London in July 1989, 2 days after my arrival. My research plans were to go to the PRO for two weeks to secure archival information on MYWO. These plans had to be changed because there was no transportation.

The second obstacle I faced was upon my arrival in Kenya. The Director of the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi, Dr. Kabiru Kinyanjui, with whom I had applied for research association had been replaced. This was problematic in that in order to receive research clearance from the government of Kenya one must have research association with a learning or research institution in Kenya. The Director's replacement caused a further delay in my receiving clearance. I had to reactivate my application. As Moi has overtime systematically replaced academicians at Kenyan universities with KANU members as a means to extend his dictatorial control, this
is precisely what had happened in this instance as well. He had replaced Kinyanjui with a KANU member -- a realization that I have made in hindsight. Moi demands "uncritical loyalty from the university."

The third obstacle was that the procedure for securing research clearance seemed to be changing along with the nature of KANU's relations, not only with MYWO but with other organizations and institutions in Kenya as well. KANU appeared to be extending and tightening its control over every and all entities in Kenya that it could. In an unprecedented move, KANU required that I meet with a delegation of the party as KANU declared it would have the final say as to whether or not I would receive research clearance. My first meeting was with the the KANU Director of Education, Research and Development Dr. Nicholas Wanjoji, and the then new Director of IDS Dr. Njuguna Ngethe at the University of Nairobi. My second meeting was with Dr. Wanjoji and Mrs. Laura Mngawbi, Wanjoji's Deputy Director. Subsequent meetings involved Dr. Julia Ojiambo, KANU's Director of Women and Youth Affairs. In these meeting, particularly the first two, KANU officials asked questions about my research proposal, my background, my reasons for choosing this project, my expectations regarding the outcome of this project, my ambitions, my research methodology and my interview questions. Mr. Wanjoji said that Kenya's National Research Council of the Institute for Research, Science and Technology could tentatively approve of my proposal, but that the final and official approval must come from KANU. KANU requested that if my project was approved the following conditions be met:

1) An explanation of my methodology and a copy of my interview questions be submitted with KANU's Director of Education, Research and Development, Dr. Wanjoji;

2) Dr. Julia Ojiambo, with whom I should meet weekly, would have joint supervision of the my research with IDS; and,
3) A final copy of my research findings and final document be submitted to KANU.

I agreed to these conditions in hopes of getting the permit in hand in 1989 in order to begin my fieldwork. As I waited for KANU's decision I also waited on KMYWO elections which had been postponed a total of eight times as discussed in Chapter 3. It was my intention to be an observer of the elections. During this waiting period I was also able to unofficially talk to some foreign donors about their projects in general. Some would not talk because I did not have clearance. I was very cautious not to aggravate an already precarious situation since generally researchers are not allowed to conduct research without official government clearance. This situation was particularly precarious since KANU was operating from an unwritten set of rules, making them up as they went along. I was restrained in the research activities I might engage in because I did not want to ruin my opportunity to get clearance.

I waited to receive clearance in Kenya from the government and the party as long as my original visa plus one extension would allow (four months). Without the official research clearance I could not extend my stay in Kenya. Therefore, I reluctantly left Kenya without the official clearance and without having had the opportunity to observe the long awaited KMYWO elections because they had still not been held. Two years later, in 1991, I received the notice from the office of the President that I could return to Kenya to conduct my research.

The Second Period, 1991-1992

During the course of my fieldwork, Kenya was facing some major political and economic challenges which had a direct impact on my research. Because of these challenges, I had the rare research opportunity to personally witness events that gave me
priceless insights into the tumultuous conditions MYWO was facing. These research challenges proved to be of extremely positive research value. Many of them, though not all, were discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The specific ones that will be discussed in the following pages are: 1) the call for multipartyism; 2) foreign donor withdrawals; 3) the Ouko trial; 4) citizens' reactions and demonstrations against Moi and the KANU government; 5) the formation of new political parties and the eventual repeal of Section 2A of the Kenya constitution; and 6) ethnic clashes. This section will briefly discuss these challenges so as to demonstrate 1) their impact on the research design; 2) the political volatility of the environment within which I worked; and 3) the precarious conditions they created for MYWO.

1) The Call for Multipartyism

The one-party state of the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) had existed de facto since 1969 and de jure since 1982. Kenya had become independent on December 12, 1963 and Jomo Kenyatta, the head of KANU had become Kenya's first President. Other political parties thereafter disappeared. The minority party, Kenya Africa Democratic Union (KADU), of which Moi was a key member of the leadership dissolved itself in 1964 and joined KANU. A small leftist opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU) surfaced in 1966 lead by Oginga Odinga, who had been Kenyatta's Vice President 1964-66. In 1969, KPU was banned and KANU became the sole ruling party, thus making Kenya a de facto one-party state. In 1982 under President Moi, the Kenyan constitution was amended making Kenya a de jure one-party state.

Almost 30 years later, Kenyans were demanding an end to the one-party state and the autocratic rule of President Daniel Arap Moi. They were calling for multiparty politics and elections for a new President. Amid resistance and repression from KANU, other
parties began to form. Tensions heightened between the citizens and the state. One of Moi’s and KANU’s tactics to solidify their hold onto state power had been to coopt or dissolve national organizations. MYWO had been coopted.

KANU’s attempt to consolidate the state had a direct impact on access to interviewees, hence this affected my research design. MYWO as a state organization had become a mouthpiece for the state. It was not amenable to being researched. MYWO was in a tenuous position vis-a-vis the state.

2) Foreign Donor Withdrawals

During the last quarter of 1991, donors began to threaten withdrawals of foreign assistance to Kenya. Foreign donors posed withdrawal threats as conditions tied to human rights violations, corruption and political and economic reforms. The United Kingdom, Canada and Germany were among the first nations to tie assistance to human rights violations stating that they could not subsidize repression. Moreover, NGOs from fourteen Commonwealth African nations at the Commonwealth Heads of State meeting in Zimbabwe in October 1991 demanded the imposition of sanctions on countries violating human rights. Kenya was spotlighted.

Corruption by Kenyan officials was also a major cause of Western nations cancellation of aid. Denmark, Britain and the US argued that they were no longer confident that aid was reaching the people for whom it was intended. Northern NGOs also expressed concern, and linked their concern to the flow of NGO assistance to Kenya. To demonstrate this corruption, the American Ambassador in Kenya, Smith Hempstone reported in a “get rich now cable” in 1990 that four Kenyan government officials and three relatives of President Moi had “greatly enriched themselves through their public office or access to officials.” The embassy listed the names as President Daniel T. Arap Moi,
Minister of Energy Mr. Nicholas Biwott, Vice President George Saitoti, and Permanent Secretary in the President’s Office for Internal Security, Hezekiah Oyugi. Biwott, like Moi, is a Kalenjin. He is considered to be Moi’s closest political confidant and is rumored to be Moi’s nephew. Biwott’s estimated wealth is in the hundreds of millions of dollars, while his salary as Energy Minister was approximately $750.00 per month in 1991. In the midst of the donor freeze on foreign aid to Kenya, Biwott had successfully obtained a Kenya High Court injunction blocking New York’s Citibank from collecting over US $14 million worth of loans to his companies, most of which had been secured through credit to Biwott’s Swiss bank account.

To further speak to the corruption allegations, President Moi is also known to have benefitted from partnerships and payoffs in countless business ventures. Moi is believed to be a partner in an oil refinery in Puerto Rico with an Israeli business man; he is believed to have a share in a Nairobi casino and a hotel in the Maasai Mara game park; he is believed to be a member of the Dolphin Club and one of the primary owners of the Nairobi Trade Bank. It is also alleged that Moi received a “seven figure” commission from the European consortium of Airbus Industries from whom Kenya purchased two planes. Two Kenyan businessmen are believed to be front men for Moi. Moi provides the business opportunities and the front men provide the “cut.” Newly emergent Asian business tycoon Ketan Somaia is reportedly the main front man. Somaia is regarded by elder Asian businessmen as “an ‘overzealous favour seeker’ who enriched himself as a proxy of political godfathers.”

It appears that it has become practice and even expectation that Kenyan politician-businessmen amass large sums of wealth by siphoning aid, demanding kickbacks and even shares and controlling interest in companies that start businesses in Kenya. Though Kenyatta’s acquisitions in land, precious gems, ivory and casinos from 1963-1978 were
great, they pale in significance to what economists contend Moi and some of his associates have acquired. Some of MYWO’s leadership has even tried to get their cut by endearing themselves to Moi and his associates through KANU.

The lack of political and economic reform was also a major reason for suspending aid to Kenya, as mentioned in Chapter 3. Donor nations were calling for democratization of the political structure and liberalization of the economy. Among the more specific demands of the donors were the adoption of a multiparty democracy and structural adjustment programs (SAPs) including the privatization of the public sector, particularly the sale or liquidation of parastatals, a reduction of the budget deficit, and a reduction in the overemployment in the civil service whose wage bill accounted for 50% of the total government expenditure. As no signs of progress sufficient for donors were shown in these areas, in November 1991 donor governments suspended their annual practice of pledging aid to Kenya. They also suspended mostly “budgetary facilities and balance of payments support.”

The Kenya government reaction to foreign donors was that Kenya was being abused by the West, and the sovereignty of Kenya was being undermined. For example, Moi made appearances to the wananchi (citizens) inciting anti-Western sentiments announcing that he would not take the abuse. He did this however while he simultaneously and hypocritically made promises of change to donors. In support of Moi’s anti-Western stance, the Secretary-General of the Central Organization of Trade Unions of Kenya (COTU) Joseph Mugalla stated that the World Bank and the IMF wanted to “enslave” Kenyans by creating “mass unemployment and depreciating wages.” The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, agreed with the sentiments of Moi declaring that aid conditionality amounted to “blackmail” of African countries. Though both sides had some justification for the
positions they took -- the donors were correct in that political and economic reforms were overdue in Kenya, and the Kenyan government was correct in that SAPs had actually worsened instead of improved structural inequities and economies -- there were few signs that the Moi government was willing to make changes, and few signs that foreign donors would reneged on their demands.

Much of the Kenyan government's reactions to donor withdrawals which were played out in anti-Western sentiments roused Kenyans' suspicion of foreigners. This had an impact on my research design because it affected the willingness of Kenyans to being interviewed. Many simply would not talk. Moreover, information that circulated and implicated high level politicians in corruption had an impact on my research design. One interviewee from the World Bank Kenya Office, Peter Godwin, made a point to tell me to be very careful 1) with whom I talked and 2) about the subjects that I broached. He was particularly concerned that I not mention the Dolphin Group and the Trade Bank. Godwin and others seemed to be aware of Onsando's (MYWO national chair) protection of KANU. The political and research climate at this time was particularly volatile. MYWO's focus was on defending KANU and its corrupt practices. It was not open to being interviewed as it could also be exposed.

3) The Ouko trial

While all of this ruckus was going on between foreign donors, the Kenyan state and MYWO, a commission of Inquiry was conducting a judicial probe into the events surrounding the February 1990 murder of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Dr. Robert Ouko. This inquiry was being held at the time I began my research in Kenya. It had begun October 16, 1990 and it continued through November 26, 1991 at which time it was abruptly halted by Moi. One hundred seventy-three (173)
witnesses had testified, including Inspector Graham Dennis and Detective Superintendent John Troon of Scotland Yard. Allegations were made and suspects were named surrounding several incidences which could have been the precipitating causes of Ouko's death. These incidences (as they will be discussed below) had critical impacts on the research climate during the time I was in the field.

One incident involved Biwott, who had made a sarcastic referral to Ouko as the President of Kenya in January 1990 when a delegation of Kenyan officials had travelled to the US to meet with President George Bush to request financial assistance for the construction of the Kenya Times Trust Building. Biwott was said to be incensed by the preferential treatment he perceived Ouko was receiving from US officials. Moi was reportedly angered and jealous of the manner in which Ouko was being received. Magendo rumors allege that Moi conspired with Biwott to have Ouko eliminated. Ouko was killed one month later.

A second incident involved the revival of a Kisumu molasses plant which had folded in 1982 though it was 95% complete. Ouko was attempting to rehabilitate the plant. He was said to have been negotiating with several investors. Biwott and Saitoti had different plans however. They were negotiating with a rival group of investors, against the plans of Ouko. Reportedly, Biwott and Saitoti worked together to "frustrate Ouko." Saitoti would not sign the necessary papers for Ouko to begin the project, and Biwott simply did not like Ouko's choice of investors. Furthermore, Biwott wanted a commission for the project from investors as a payoff. During the inquiry it was reported that Biwott had received a bribe of Ksh 85,000,000 from the Asea Brown Boverie, a foreign electrical equipment firm. This leads to the third incident.

The third incident was Ouko's completion of an anti-corruption report. Ouko, who reportedly never accepted a bribe, spoke out strongly and loudly against high level
corruption. He had compiled a report on corruption which he was to submit to Moi. Many politicians, including Biwott, Saitoti and Oyugi disliked Ouko’s stand in this regard because many of them were vulnerable to being exposed.\footnote{13}

A fourth incident was the rivalry of Ouko and Mr. Job Omino for the Kisumu Town Parliamentary seat in the 1988 general election. As the inquiry probed into this rivalry, Ouko’s former campaign manager, Mr. John Eric Reru named “powerful individuals” who stood against Ouko in fear that Ouko might be appointed vice-president. Reru named Biwott, Oyugi, the former Nandi District KANU branch chair Mark Too, the then Minister for Local Government and Kakamega District KANU branch chair Moses Mudavadi, and one more person who the inquiry deemed could not be publicly identified.\footnote{14} They encouraged the rivalry between Ouko and Omino.

A fifth incident involved an alleged affair Ouko had had with the wife of Nakuru District Commissioner Mr. Jonah Anguka. Magendo sentiment was that the “affair” was a diversion and Anguka was the fall guy used to deflect from the real murderers. Attention was being placed on Anguka as a jealous husband who murdered Ouko in a fit of rage.

Scotland Yards’ Troon had been charged with the investigation of Ouko’s murder. In his report, Troon named Biwott and Oyugi, who had by then become former Minister and former Permanent Secretary respectively, as prime suspects. Anguka and the former Nyanza Provincial Commissioner Julius Kobia were identified as “suspects on the periphery.” Troon’s report called for further questioning and investigation into the matter, but Moi immediately dissolved the inquiry upon the release of the report. This dissolution came as a surprise to the judges holding the inquiry. Shortly thereafter, Biwott, Oyugi, Anguka and the Ouko family lawyer George Oraro were arrested. The magendo rumored that the arrests occurred abruptly because Oyugi was preparing to testify to the
Commission the next day at his request. Two weeks after the arrests, Biwott and Oyugi were released for "lack of evidence," and Anguka was charged with murder.\textsuperscript{15}

Dr. Ooka Ombaka, the lawyer who represented Ouko's Ominde Society during the inquiry, protested against Moi's dissolution of the inquiry commission calling it unconstitutional. He further stated that from the evidence presented in the inquiry "Moi knew the identity of Ouko's killers." Ombaka was picked up for questioning by the police.\textsuperscript{16} He was also linked to Wangari Maathai, who is his client.

All of these events related to the Ouko trial stirred public fear, and this inevitably had an impact on my research design. I was not able to interview anyone from the Ministry of Energy or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Biwotts' and Ouko's ministries respectively. They were very suspicious of my motives, and leary of journalists or spies who might pose as researchers. The fact that I could not interview any one from these Ministries was important information for my research. MYWO made no public statements about the Ouko trial.

4) **Citizens' Reactions and Demonstrations Against Moi and the KANU Government**

While I was in the field, several institutions and segments of Kenyan society protested against Moi and the KANU government. This posed challenges for my research. These institutions included the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) of which Paul Muite was Chair and Dr. Willy Mutunga was Vice Chair. Since the 1980s, LSK had been one of few active opposition forces against the government and for this they have received international recognition and support, having received the International Human Rights Award from the American Bar Association in October 1991. The National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCCK), of which Sam Kobia is head, has also been a force of opposition against the inhumanity of the Moi regime. The Kenya Professional and
Business Women’s Club (KPBWC) chaired by Beth Mugo, not known for its particularly political posture, also took a staunch opposition stance against the government. It requested that the government resign because of its involvement in “ethnic clashes.” The citizens’ demonstration that drew the most national and international press attention and public participation was the Mother’s Hunger Strike which was discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The press, particularly the magazines *Society, Finance, Weekly Review* and *Nairobi Law Monthly*, remained critical of the government and Moi. Overtime, they became overtly anti-Moi, reflecting widespread anti-Moi public sentiment. The government charged that these magazines had “‘godfathers or foreign masters’ funding them.” The three daily newspapers also provided very current and detailed information of the issues. During the period of my research I witnessed the press become more open as it distanced itself from the influence and censorship of the Kenyan government.

In addition, virtually all of the persons who took stands against the government were either constantly harassed or running underground because of fear of harassment or worse. Non-Kenyan associates of these persons were also targets of suspicion. In November 1991, an American student working with members of the LSK was attacked, picked up for questioning by the Special Branch and then requested to leave Kenya by escort to the airport. This invariably had an impact on my research design. By the very nature of my study, I was associated with dissidents and thus a target of suspicion. Perhaps this speaks to why some of the MYWO leadership would not agree to speak with me.
5) The Formation of New Political Parties in Kenya and the Repeal of Section 2A of the Kenyan Constitution

Despite Moi’s reluctance to open up the Kenyan political structure and reintroduce multiparty politics, the fervor of multipartyism had gripped the Kenyan citizenry by mid-1991 as discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, the donor community was exerting more and more pressure, including tying aid to political democratization. Moi continued allegations that “foreigners” were dictators of African political systems for which Africa was not ready; that foreigners were imposing their will on Africa; and that African systems of government which now existed emanated from African political traditions. MYWO supported Moi in making these allegations, yet these allegations did not stop the inevitable. At the scheduled consultative donor meeting in Paris in November 1991, Vice President Saitoti humbly presented a privatization plan for Kenya and further stated that Kenya was fighting corruption and was not against a pluralist democracy. The participants in the conference agreed that “‘Kenya’s economy has been highly dependent on external assistance and ...continued and significant aid flows are needed to support Kenya’s economic development.”

On December 6, 1991, Moi finally recommended that the delegates at the Special Delegate Conference at Kasarani approve an amendment to repeal Section 2(a) of the Kenya Constitution which made Kenya a de jure one-party state on June 9, 1982, thus officially reintroducing multipartyism is Kenya.

That very day Forum For the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) officially launched its party, followed at later dates by the Democratic Party (DP), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), Democratic Movement (DEMO) and other smaller parties following suit. On June 8, 1992 voters began to
register for the general elections which were held December 1992 amidst several postponements.21

There was suspicion that foreigners in Kenya were inciting the creation of parties to destabilize Kenya, thus affecting my research. Onsando, the chair of MYWO, geared her speeches to women against foreign "meddlers" and "imperialists."

6) Ethnic Clashes

During the last quarter of 1991, ethnic clashes between neighbors had erupted, displacing and killing thousands of Kenyans. This inevitably had an impact on my research. The clashes began in October between the Kalenjin and the Luo reportedly for control of land and farms in the Rift Valley and Nyanza Provinces, which during the colonial period had been designated at "White Highlands." The clashes spread thereafter and included other ethnic groups as well: Kisiis, Luhyias, Kikuyus and Maasais. Questions began to circulate about the real reason for the clashes. They were no longer about land. On the surface, they seemed to be more about "naked tribalism," not only in the rural areas but in Parliament as well. Two Kalenjin politicians, Biwott and Kipkalia Kones and one Maasai politician William ole Ntimama told their constituencies to "arm themselves and drive out "foreigners" (other Kenyans) from the Rift Valley Province. Moi himself challenged the collective manhood of his Kalenjin tribesmen, revealing his ethnocentrism and misogyny. Moi stated "that he will consider them (Kalenjin men) 'women' if they let the monster (multiparty) set foot in the province."22

Kenyan political analysts were insightful to point out that the clashes were not really ethnic as the instigators would have the international community believe. They were instead political and economic clashes, not perpetrated by all Kalenjin, but instead by a small group of Kipsigis Kalenjin led by Biwott and Moi, who had interethnic co-
conspirators such as Saitoti and some Maasais. Kipsigis Biwott and Moi seemed to have more in common with Kikuyu Saitoti (who poses as a Maasai), both politically and financially, than they do with their intraethnic tribesmen and rivals, the Nandi Kalenjin. The Nandi have historically been more powerful than the Kipsigis. As evidence of their involvement in ethnic clashes, in March 1992 Biwott was identified as the supplier of arrow heads imported from North Korea to his army in Kalenjin territory. Customs officials at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport confiscated the arrows enroute from Korea, and Biwott was subsequently questioned. In June - July 1992, Saitoti’s farm in Molo was discovered to be storage place for arms used in the clashes. All evidence pointed to top KANU party and state officials as the perpetrators of the clashes.

It is believed that KANU stalwarts encouraged the clashes for several reasons: 1) to demonstrate to the international community that although section 2a of the constitution had been repealed Kenya was not ready for multiparty democracy -- “tribalism” was still volatile and divisive; 2) to prevent the registration of voters for the general election because Kenyans were ready to oust Moi. The logic was that Kenyan potential voters would be to fearful to register, hence Moi would hold on to power; 3) to bring about Majimboism (a federal system of government) allowing the Rift Valley Province where the Kalenjin live to become an autonomous region; and, 4) to deflect from the real problem -- the determination of a small group of politicians-thieves-thugs to hold on to power without popular support and “by any means necessary.” MYWO supported this small corrupt group. It did not take a stance against the clashes either.

Ethnic clashes very seriously affected my research design in a number of ways. It made many project areas off-limits to my investigation. For instance, I stayed clear of the Rift Valley Province where most of the clashes were occurring. I was also caught in a clash in Kipkarren, Kakamega District Western Province in which Luhyias were murdered
by Kalenjin, and sent into hiding. Their homes were looted and burned. I was also delayed in Molo for similar reasons. Molo borders Central and Rift Valley Provinces. In addition, I was cornered in my hotel room and questioned by a woman who called herself Rosemary Chemutai who I suspected and now believe to be Kalenjin spy. She said that she was a Maasai and pretended to know me from a woman’s group meeting. She prodded me about multipartyism, Moi, the clashes, the American Ambassador -- trying to get me to make seditious statements. I believe she taped the conversation. She prevented me from going to scheduled visits at various research sites in Kisii, Nyanza Province.

The political and economic events which I have discussed invariably had significant impacts on my ability to carry out my research design as I had proposed. These events called for insightfulness, flexibility and caution in all situations. I was never really certain of the stability of the situation at hand, or the stability of the country from one day to the next. During the entire time of my research, the Kenyan political environment was extremely volatile in virtually all respects. My encounters with the police are numerous. All of these experiences however gave me insight into the Kenyan political culture that I otherwise would not have had. These experiences overall provided a richer context within which I could place MYWO's actions.

As an African American foreign female researcher conducting research on women I face a triple jeopardy. One one level, the suspicions of many interviewees were heightened as they told me that they expected me to be a mzungu (a European). I believe that I would have gotten more information and assistance at national level offices in Nairobi if I were a mzungu. There was tremendous disbelief that a non-mzungu was conducting research. This was very shocking for me. Secondly, many interviewees expected a male interviewer. Some asked why “a woman” would want to do this work, particularly when it meant traveling throughout the country. Lastly, many men who were
the politically appointed gatekeepers of the various administrative divisions within Kenya and with whom I was required to meet most times before I met the women's groups, asked me questions, half-jokingly but serious none-the-less, about whether or not I was not plotting with the women to stage a revolution against men. Asking this question was partly their job, partly paranoia, and partly fear of backlash from the personal and political oppression of women.

Taking into account these events that I have discussed, from the calls for multipartyism to ethnic clashes, it becomes understandable how the repression of Kenyan citizens by the Moi government had created a culture of fear silence in Kenya. When I arrived in Kenya in August 1991, most people would not talk about the state, the government, Moi, MYWO to each other, much less to a researcher. One could not even mention Moi's name in public. There was widespread suspicion of spies among the Kenya population. My first reaction was that this was paranoia, but after some time I came to understand Kenyan citizens' suspicion, and to some extent became suspicious myself.

Women particularly were muted by this culture as they feared repercussion from the government, and from the men in their families for the ills of the state and for "conspiring with foreigners." This culture of silence permeated women's groups, particularly ones in the rural areas and affected my interviews. This culture of fear and silence may have been a reason MYWO officials would not talk with me, and a reason women would not talk about MYWO.

**Locating Interviewees**

As I mentioned in Part 1 of this chapter, I began my interviews on the magendo with the introduction of a well-known and well-respected Kenyan dissident, Dr. Willy Mutunga, who was detained by Moi from June 1982 for two years for allegedly "teaching
subversive literature aimed at creating disorder in the country.” Mutunga is currently the chair of the LSK and is a former Professor of Law at the University of Nairobi.24 From the first interview organized by Mutunga, the snowball effect of interviewee selection emerged. That is, each interviewee referred me to other interviewees. So as to not only get the magendo perspective, I also employed other methods of securing interviews. Some of the methods are relatively unorthodox, yet they were necessary given the research environment.

**Women’s Groups Interviewees**

Various procedures were used to contact women’s groups. These procedures included 1) going to field and seeking groups out without previous contact; 2) meeting women leaders at community functions and arranging meeting times with the groups; 3) formally asking MYWO officials and staffs to introduce me to groups; 4) establishing contact with women’s groups through international NGOs introductions; 5) writing letters and making phone calls to women leaders; 6) meeting women on the local matatu transportation system and establishing meeting times; 7) asking the District Commissioners office or the Peace Corps representatives to take me out into the field to meet groups; 8) going into the field with Ministry personnel; and, 9) sometimes asking the relatives of women’s groups and friends to make introductions.

When I met the participants, I introduced myself, presented my research clearance permit, explained what I was doing in my study and gave the groups a one page summary of my proposed research when they requested. Most times, we then arranged a meeting time within the next couple of days, allowing time for all of the women to be contacted and gathered.
MYWO Officials and Staff Interviewees

As MYWO is headquartered in Nairobi, I wrote letters to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Jane Kirui, indicating my arrival in Kenya and my affiliation with the University of Nairobi for my research period. Thereafter, I visited her office and brought her a copy of my proposal. I made several subsequent appointments to meet with her, none of which she kept. Kirui was irritated by my presence and made no pretense about her feelings. According to the organization's protocol as I was informed, the CEO was supposed to assist me with introductions and information, and facilitate my meeting officials of the organization and other staff. When this did not happen after some time, I contacted some staffpersons directly and cautiously, beginning with the archivist and then the individual National Program Managers. They referred me to others, hence the snowball effect again. I also befriended the secretaries. Some were hesitant to see me, but some were welcoming. They did not want to talk about MYWO however. One national elected official, the Assistant National Treasurer Mjomba, was particularly welcoming and helpful. She had a defensive adversarial role toward other national elected officials. They withheld important financial organizational and interorganizational information from her. She had no knowledge of the organization’s finances.

I was introduced to some MYWO officials and staff at the district and sub-district levels by some women’s groups. Some names I gleaned from newspapers and other documents and contacted them by mail or through personal word-of-mouth contacts.

Foreign Donor Interviewees

I made contact with foreign donors either by going to their Nairobi offices directly, being referred to them by MYWO Program Managers, or through personal mutual friends. The meeting with Peace Corps volunteer Michael Carson was arranged by a mutual
Kenyan friend who wanted merely to introduce one African American in Kenya to another. Carson and his wife Mary, who was also a Peace Corps volunteer, arranged for me to meet women's groups with whom Michael worked, local Ministry personnel, and other Peace Corp volunteers. Thus the snowball method of interviewee selection was implemented again.

**Government Ministry Interviewees**

I made contact with personnel from the Ministries through women's groups, international NGOs, MYWO Program managers and MYWO's Assistant National Treasurer Mjomba, District Commissioners, and personal friends.

**Part III: Benefits and Limitations of this Research Strategy: Benefits**

There were several research benefits in employing the multimethod research strategy which I previously described for collecting data in the field.

For instance, the case study approach to studying MYWO as a representative of national African NGOs took an in-depth look at a national African NGO and its relational environment. It allowed for MYWO to be observed, studied and understood in the context within which it operates everyday. Observing both MYWO and its environment overtime was important for dissecting the research problem realistically, as MYWO does not exist in a vacuum. The case study approach allowed the necessary focus on a consistent phenomenon, allowing time for probing and sorting out inconsistencies in patterns that emerged. The case approach, in that it does not focus on the quantity of data collected, allowed for greater assurances of validity (credibility and fittingness), reliability (auditability), and the overall quality of data collected. The case study approach also
allowed me to look beyond the surface of the research problem and appreciate the depth and richness of the information regarding the research phenomenon.

Case studies are particularly important for studies undertaken in foreign environments, as one must take time to become familiar with the environment, before one can understand the data from any research phenomenon in that environment. During the period of my fieldwork, I was not only researching MYWO and its relational environment, I was studying Kenya's most significant political changes on the state, party and societal levels since independence in 1963.

Fieldwork in Kenya was also beneficial in that it posed more than just a challenge for data collection. It required observation and understanding of a complex political environment in which significant changes were occurring quickly and simultaneously, all of which affected the research problem. The fieldwork gave me a comprehensive perspective that I otherwise would not have gotten if I had not gone to the field. Fieldwork, both inside and outside of Nairobi, allowed me to look closely and deeply at the research problem. It also allowed me to understand more clearly the cultural, class and gender perspectives of Kenyans as they relate to the politics of development cooperation. From the field I was able to witness the dynamics of development cooperation and their spillovers as they manifested in their natural setting. Fieldwork was further beneficial in that it allowed me to see first hand what NGOs are really doing in the politics of development cooperation in the field, as opposed to having a textbook idealized view of NGOs as an "armchair observer."

Interview interaction from conducting personal interviews was also beneficial for my research. It allowed me to show human concern for the interviewees. This is important as many people feel dehumanized and objectified by questionnaires and mass data collection methods of hurried researcher, particularly number crunchers. Conducting
personal interviews also allowed for exchanges between the interviewees and me, the interviewer. Through the interviews we reversed assertive and passive roles, interchanging roles between the giver and the receiver in the interview process. This role reversal approach was beneficial for a number of reasons: 1) It gave the interviewees an assertive prerogative, allowing them a chance to “tell their stories” and hence, provide information which made significant revelations that a fixed set of questions may not have ascertained; 2) It forced the interviewer (me) to take a passive role and “listen;” 3) It allowed for greater equality and ease between the interviewer and the interviewees; and 4) It allowed for interviewer and interviewee interaction to develop timely. In the Kenyan context, this is particularly important, specifically in the rural areas. It seems that Kenyans feel very strongly that they should not be rushed. Thus, if a researcher tries to rush them, they become even slower in providing information, if they provide any at all.

Interview interaction is generally beneficial in that although it allows a researcher to engage in interviews with no rigidly fixed agenda, it also allows a researcher to personally ensure that a standard of scientific rigor is maintained in each interview. The latter of course depends on the conscientiousness and integrity of the researcher.

The frustration at the beginning of my fieldwork in Kenya because no one would agree to be interviewed about MYWO and because MYWO’s CEO blocked my introductions, turned out to be beneficial overall for my research as well. By being forced to conduct some of my interviews on the magendo I was able to secure information I otherwise would not have gotten on the formal and official research channels. Operating on the magendo also allowed me the opportunity to witness the defiance of so many Kenyans, despite the culture of fear and silence and repression that Moi’s regime and government had created. In hindsight, it was beneficial for my research that I was forced to modify my proposed research strategy which initially included a very specific purposeful
sample of interviewees, into one that attempted to balance a snowball groups of sources with a modified purposive sample. Not having MYWO's official approval to conduct research was also a blessing in disguise. It meant that I was not constantly guarded and censored at my interviews with MYWO representatives from the national headquarters, although at the district and subdistrict levels MYWO representatives were often present at interviews with groups and answered questions on their behalf.

Limitations

There were also limitations in this research strategy due to problems I encountered in the field. The major problems and their subsequent limitations will be discussed below.

One of the first problems I faced in the field, which caused a delay in my beginning my interviews and which was the first hint of the problems I would face, was the securing of my “research clearance permit” from the Office of the President (OP). Once I received the letter from the OP in 1991 stating that I had been granted permission to conduct research, I assumed that that meant that I could go to Kenya and begin my research. It did not mean that. What it meant instead was that I was to go to Kenya, report to the OP and then I would be issued a “research clearance permit” at the discretion of the Permanent Secretary's (PS), Mrs. Mwango. Each day, for at least 3 weeks, I was told to return to the OP to discuss my research permit. Some days I waited as long as four hours. Among other requirements, I was to stipulate the districts and provinces in which I would be traveling, along with corresponding dates, so that the appropriate Provincial Officers, District Commissioners and District Officers could be notified. That was near impossible since I had no way of knowing what areas MYWO had on-going projects. MYWO's CEO was not helpful in identifying these areas. Thus, I chose provinces and districts that I recognized from predissertation research, and these did not necessarily correspond to
areas in which I did my research. I wondered why friends and associates from IDS were not very helpful in recommending areas. They did tell me however that the delay at the OP was so that I would offer chai (bribes) to Mrs. Mwango and her colleagues. Offering "chai" could also get me kicked out of the country.

The PS was in the process of making a transition to becoming the Kenyan government and the KANU liaison for the NGO Coordinating Body established in 1991 to monitor NGOs in Kenya. This worked both in my favor and to my disadvantage. She was curious about my interest in NGOs, interested in my focus -- MYWO, but was not forthcoming with the permit because of the political sensitivity of my topic.


Given the constraints aforementioned, I selected these areas to attempt to ensure that all MYWO four program areas - Nutrition, MCH/FP, SEP-Jiko, and Leadership Development -- would be covered, although I had no way of definitely knowing if these programs were being implemented in these areas. I also selected these areas in an attempt to interview a diversity of women groups and make comparisons between groups in the same MYWO program.

This formal schedule stipulated by the research permit proved unrealistic. It set too stringent restrictions for travel which was long and tedious, and for transport which was unreliable. It made no allowances for days of protocol and ceremony from the PC and DC offices before I was able to meet and interview the women groups. It did not allow for
delays, rescheduling by the interviewees, extended time needed in a particular area, or return visits to groups. Moreover, it made no provisions for necessary changes in research plans due to political problems and volatility. If I had followed the schedule strictly, I probably would have missed some of the most valuable interview sessions.

I made an attempt however to stick as closely to the research permit schedule as possible, for a failure to do so could result in trouble. To be in an unauthorized area at an unauthorized time can land a researcher in jail and/or out of the country. When I did not follow the schedule (which after a few months was most of the time), I tried to be as unobtrusive as possible and have as many personal references as possible, hence the value of the snowball method again.

A second set of problems which posed limitations for this research strategy involved the interviews - specifically the questions and the writing of the responses. Given the repressive nature of the Moi regime and culture of fear that had gripped Kenya during the period of my fieldwork, there were questions which I asked interviewees that were sometimes viewed as “too political” and perhaps even “suspicious.” Moreover, questions about MYWO sometimes angered interviewees. Unease that surfaced because of these questions sometimes totally destroyed interviews, caused the interviewees to clam up and killed my chances for getting referrals to other groups or persons. Therefore, sometimes I tried to broach the questions from another angle, and depending on my assessment of the openness of the interviewee(s), sometimes I did not ask certain questions.

Cultural connotations of words also had an impact on the interviewee perception of the questions and their responses. For instances, questions about “power” and “feminism” caused tremendous confusion (sometimes anger) and muddled some interviews. I eventually tried to find other creative ways to ask the questions, and
sometimes I did not address them at all. I also found that often interviewees, particularly women groups, had as much a desire to ask questions about me as I about them. In the rural areas they were particularly interested in knowing about "Africans in America;" women's groups in America; how I came to know about their group; how I came to learn Kiswahili; how I got a chance to go to school; would their children have better life chances in America; why I did not have any children yet; and, what my family and friends thought about my being in Africa.

Regarding the writing of interview responses, this was sometimes irritating to interviewees. Some interviewees felt that writing while we were discussing was rude. They asked how one could really listen and pay attention if the concentration was on writing. Some interviewees were suspicious, wondering if their names would be associated with the answers. Many asked to whom these answers would be given. Thus, writing during interviews often changed the nature of the answers interviewees gave to questions. (I did write during most of my interviews however). Not writing during interviews was problematic for my response recall and field notes, particularly when I was not able to write the interview notes and my thoughts down immediately following the interviews. Some situations and circumstances such as having no lights or no privacy, particularly in the rural areas where I spent a great deal of my time, did not lend themselves to immediately writing/rewriting fieldnotes.

A third limitation is researcher subjectivity. My closeness to the research problem and my passion for this project were factors in my decisions in the field and my judgement of situations. For instance, despite the danger in some situations in the field, I was determined to complete my data collection. Balanced with my time away from the field however, my passion for this subject is the driving force for my completion of my dissertation.
A fourth limitation is the limited generalizability of my research results. The results of this study will be particular to Kenya, and not easily generalizable to all of Africa. This research strategy has made a tradeoff—large sampling of many countries for comprehensiveness and richness of a case study of one country. This case study does however contribute to generalizability in the long run for it provides these research results based on Kenya as a general source of insights into NGOs, gender and the politics of development cooperation. Hence, in the long run, I will be able to make linkages to, and comparisons and contrasts with, other women groups and NGOs in Africa.
The Minister of Energy, Nicholas Biwott was one of the key Ministers shuffled by President Moi in September and October 1991 in a major government reorganization. In early 1992 Biwott was implicated and later arrested as a prime suspect in the murder of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Dr. Robert Ouko in early 1992. Mid-year 1992 Biwott was further alleged as being a key instigator of “ethnic clashes,” along with the Vice President George Saitoti.


Ibid, 247-248. Babbie describes the various roles of observers in the field.

Yvonna Lincoln and Egon Guba, *Naturalistic Inquiry* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1985. The postpositivist school is also identified by other names including ethnographic, subjective, qualitative, humanistic. The positivist school is also identified as objective, quantitative, scientific.


13 It was testified that Ouko had never taken commissions or received bribes.


17 For information on LSK and award, see "Law Society To Get International Award, Nation, 23 October 1991; For information on NCCK - government conflict, see Kenyan daily newspapers and weekly magazines from mid 1988 through 1989; For KPBWC’s request for government to resign, see Njoroge wa Karuri, “Govt Asked to Resign,” Nation, May 18, 1992; For government allegations against the press, see "‘Society’ Magazine Runs into Trouble," Weekly Review 10 January 1992.

18 Moi Day Speech covered by all the daily newspapers Nation, Times Standard, October 10, 1991; Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, 29.


24 For a concise history of state repression at the University of Nairobi, see “The University of Nairobi: A History of Intimidation,” Finance, December 16-31, 1991. This report was initially compiled by Africa Watch and was published in “Academic Freedom and Human Rights in Africa” in April 1991. Other University Lecturers arrested along with Mutunga were Al-Amin Mazrui, Edward Oyugi, George Mkangi, Kamoji Wachiira. Mukaru Ng’ang’a. Others had been arrested before and some were arrested after. Some fled arrest and remain in exile.

CHAPTER V
FINDINGS

This chapter will present the findings of this study. These findings will mainly reflect the unsuitability of the research hypotheses in the field, and the responses from interviews. They will also draw in observations from field notes, records and documents. In Part I, the proposed research hypotheses and model intended to direct the research on the politics of development cooperation will be critiqued. In Part II, the findings from each interview groups’ responses -- 1) women’s groups, 2) MYWO elected officials and staff, 3) foreign donors, 4) Kenyan government ministry personnel, and 5) other relevant interviewees -- will be presented in summary form. A discussion of the findings will follow in Chapter 6.

PART I: The Proposed Research Hypotheses

This study assumed a causal relationship between the following variables:


2) Autonomy of MYWO, the Intervening Variable.

3) Success or Failure of MYWO projects/programs, the Dependent Variables. The graphic presentation of this relationship was presented in Chapter 4.

Very early in the fieldwork, the findings from this research demonstrated that the general model for understanding and explaining the politics of development cooperation which emanated out of the existing literature on NGO optimism and NGO pessimism, and
which reflects the framework for the hypotheses proposed, was overly simplistic. As a result, the hypotheses which evolved from the NGOs schools of thought were not able to capture the complex interaction of organizations and forces in MYWO’s relational environment, which includes, but is not limited to, MYWO’s foreign donors and the Kenyan government. Moreover, the hypotheses were not able to provide fundamental explanatory power as to how development partners actually interact one with the other in a cooperative endeavor. Furthermore, the hypotheses did not offer insight as to how development cooperative partnerships, as development entities, deal with their larger contextual environment. The hypotheses proved additionally problematic for the following reasons:

1) The relationship between the variables in this study is all but straightforward, for there are many confounding and extraneous variables to be considered, making linkages between cause and effect extremely difficult, and perhaps even impossible to establish;

2) Certain types of data were not available to support or invalidate the hypotheses -- such as the amount of financial assistance and degree of technical assistance provided by foreign donors and the Kenyan government to MYWO. Assuming that this data would have been available was based on preconceptions of access, disclosure, and what was deemed public information. While in the field in Kenya I found out that I had very limited access to basic information, and that all interorganizational partners - MYWO, the Kenyan government and foreign donors - were reluctant to disclose information which I fallaciously assumed would be public. Most information, including basic demographic data, was considered private and was not easily divulged;

3) MYWO under Onsando did not maintain the organizational autonomy that it boasts of. The fact is -- MYWO’s organizational autonomy after Shitakha was nil, since MYWO had officially become part and parcel of KANU. Therefore, in considering the
hypotheses proposed, it was fruitless to attempt to measure MYWO's autonomy in its relationships with both the Kenyan government and with foreign donors;

4) MYWO was not as a "grassroots" women's organization representing the indigenous development agenda of Kenyan women. Thus, it was useless to attempt to determine whether or not indigenization, as the optimist school argues, was positively linked to success of development projects and programs. The fieldwork demonstrated that MYWO, at the national headquarters, was not indigenous at all. Thus, there could not be linkages between MYWO's indigenization and development success.

Overall, the inadequacy of the hypotheses proposed meant that the hypotheses were non-testable in the field, as they were formulated. That these hypotheses were non-testable was itself a very significant finding. It demonstrated the unsuitability of simplistic linear hypotheses juxtaposed against a very complex, circuitous, multidimensional problem. The non-testability of the hypotheses further suggests that the way in which we are asking questions in the field of interorganizational relations and development, in attempts to address and clarify issues of assistance and dependence, autonomy and self-reliance, indigenization and development, and grassroots participation and development, should be changed. Not only must our questions be reframed, but our models must be reconstructed as well.

More relevant and suitable questions relating to development cooperative partnerships and Africa's development prospects emerged from the field, specifically out of attempts and frustrations of trying to test the hypotheses as formulated. The more relevant questions will be addressed in the research findings in Part II of this chapter and in the discussion of the findings in Chapter 6.
PART II: Interview Summaries

Women's Groups

The following is the summary of interviews conducted with twenty-four (24) women's groups in Kenya, six (6) of which were coalition groups of almost all women's groups in a particular sublocation, location or division. Also included is a business, run by a man - Mr. Adjoba, and his family, because MYWO claims their business as its project. MYWO makes this claim because of the organization's connection to the Adjoba's family work.

I found early in the fieldwork that there are no such entities as "MYWO groups." This is of particular importance for unraveling the confusion which surrounds MYWO and its relational environment. MYWO propaganda refers to MYWO groups, but technically there are no MYWO registered "groups." What exists instead are groups comprised of individual women, some of whom may be members of MYWO. Women often hold concurrent memberships in grassroots groups in their home area, and in MYWO. Moreover, MYWO registers individual women, not groups, although its constitution makes provisions for the registration of groups. MYWO national headquarters does not refute its reputation of having group memberships when it actually does not have them, for this makes its network seem larger to those it courts for assistance. Some groups even refer to themselves as MYWO groups. Many groups which had come to be referred to as MYWO groups did not even have projects which fell under the rubric of MYWO's four (4) National Programs.

Of the twenty-four (24) groups interviewed, the majority of them had some or all of their members who were members of MYWO as well. The "group" comprised of Mr. Adjoba and his family who made pottery, including the Maendeleo jiko, had no members in MYWO. This family enterprise is presented as a MYWO group because of the training
for making the jiko that the Adjoba family provides to MYWO leaders and representatives. MYWO at the national headquarters does not clarify that this family is not a MYWO group.

It is of further importance to clarify the women's groups ties to MYWO since there is also another group which is confused with MYWO. That group is the KANU Women's League. KANU Women's League was created in 1989 as part of a KANU Directorate of Youth and Women's Affairs. It is considered an integral part of the KANU party and is subject to party control and discipline. It handles women's issues in development, politics and economic advancement. This group is very similar to MYWO in its appearance, activities, functions, and relationship with KANU. A significant number of women seem to hold concurrent memberships in both KANU Women's League and MYWO, even though one does not necessitate the other.

Of the twenty-four (24) groups interviewed, two (2) of the groups indicated that they were KANU Women’s League groups and three (3) other groups reported that they had members in KANU Women’s League and in its leadership. It appeared that there was no blatant competition between KANU Women’s League and MYWO and women’s groups at the district and subdistrict levels outside of Nairobi. At those levels, outside of Nairobi, KANU Women’s League and MYWO local leaders seemed to work together, on issues of community development in particular. MYWO local leaders appeared to make attempts to include KANU women’s league in its activities. KANU women’s league, like MYWO, seemed very intent on attracting foreign donors. The group that granted me my first women’s group interview was a KANU Women’s League group.

There was however tension and competition between MYWO national headquarters and KANU Women’s League in Nairobi for favor with KANU and Moi. MYWO’s chair Mrs. Onsando had as her biggest competition Mrs. Martha Othiambo,
who was the “Mama” of KANU Women’s League, a close consult of the Moi, and a MYWO Provincial Representative for Nairobi. Moi and KANU exploited the competition between these groups.

The women’s groups interviewed appeared to be relatively new groups. Of the ones who could recall their starting date, some of them reported having been organized in the 1970s, some in the 1980s and some in the 1990s. The groups seemed to have membership open to all women, although some required that eligibility be contingent upon one having borne children. Some groups however had male members and men on their project staffs. There was also a great deal of flexibility in membership qualifications. Qualifications seemed to rest on participation in group activities and periodic payment of dues, both of which were not stringently imposed. As long as one paid what she could, she could be considered a member of a group. She also attended meetings when she could.

Membership in MYWO was more stringent however. One had to pay annual dues to MYWO to be a card carrying member of the organization. Moreover, to run for KMYWO office in the 1989 elections, one had to also be a current card-carrying member of both KMYWO and KANU. For district and national offices, one had to be a life member of KMYWO.

With regard to the women’s groups projects, an overwhelming number, twenty-two (22), said that it was the group alone that formulated the ideas for their projects. Four (4) of these groups stated however that they had consulted with various Kenyan government ministries, one Kenyan NGO (Christian Health Association of Kenya - CHAK), as well as one foreign donor (USAID) for assistance in the formulation of their ideas.
It was not surprising that the groups said that they had formulated their projects on their own when it was noted that none of the projects of the twenty-four (24) groups fell directly under the 4 National Program areas of MYWO - Nutrition, Leadership Development, MCH/FP, or Special Energy-Jiko. Although some of the groups' projects (10) incorporated some of the elements of MYWO National Programs, these had not been introduced to the groups by MYWO. Because the projects were implemented throughout the country, in some instances MYWO national office were not even aware of their existence. Elements of MYWO programs had either been introduced by Kenyan government ministry personnel or foreign donors. Elements of programs similar to MYWO programs had also been gleaned by women's groups from other groups with whom the women came into contact. For instance, one of the groups interviewed had copied the construction of a jiko for cooking from a DANIDA jiko project in their home area. In addition, several of the groups were assisted in their activities by a MYWO fieldworker employed by the Leadership Development Program. In assisting the groups, the Leadership Development employee was implementing her women's training program. She was not by design introducing MYWO programs and projects to women's groups. She mainly assisted and advised whatever project(s) the groups were implementing. Perhaps because of the nature of the Leadership Development program, the only type of assistance MYWO could provide through its Leadership Development employees was indirectly related to the other three (3) MYWO national programs.

The women's groups interviewed had a variety of activities ranging from gardening, to teaching reading, to providing shelter for women and children, to chipping ballast. Some groups had several projects functioning concurrently. Fewer groups had no functioning projects during the time of fieldwork, yet the women still met in regular group meetings. One of the common threads of all groups is that they all had income generating
components attached to their projects. They sold handicrafts, milk, water, fruits and vegetables, etc. Although the groups attempted income generation, whether the groups made money or not did not seem to be their sole or primary determinant of success. The groups seemed to be more concerned with providing basic services to their community, and coming together.

Most groups considered their projects both successful and unsuccessful. Some of the common indicators of success they used were: 1) the benefits of the project to women; 2) reciprocal help between women; 3) the provision of goods and services to the community, i.e., bread, vegetables, education, health care; 4) good group participation; 5) sales. Some of the common indicators for lack of success were: 1) no market for their goods; 2) no sales; 3) loss of land; 4) financial and legal problems; 5) being forgotten by donors. Only two (2) groups said outright that their projects were indeed successes. No group used the word “failure.”

The women's groups relationship to MYWO national headquarters and foreign donors seemed to be less institutionalized than MYWO claims, as well as less entrenched than the research proposal assumed. The women's groups had no direct linkages to MYWO national office. For example, only nine (9) groups of the twenty-four (24) groups reported having requested assistance directly from MYWO through its national headquarters or through their local MYWO elected representatives. None of the nine (9) groups received direct assistance. Four (4) of these groups received training and motivational assistance from employees of the Leadership Development Program, and one (1) group received assistance from the MYWO National Assistant Treasurer Mrs. Mjomba who lobbied and networked on their behalf. MYWO National headquarters did not provide this assistance. It seemed that assistance to these groups was provided through Leadership Development individual employees because of their ties to employees or
MYWO leaders. Assistance was not provided because of specific objectives of the Leadership Development program. The National Assistant Treasurer complained that the foreign and Kenyan government assistance to MYWO and to women in general was being hoarded in Nairobi by MYWO elected officials. She searched for means to make this assistance more available and more widespread to other areas of Kenya as well.

Five (5) groups reported not having requested assistance from MYWO: two (2) groups because their strategy was to apply to the Rural Development Fund at the District Level and gain MYWO leverage there; one (1) group because their locational elected representative had yet to visit their group and they were waiting to go through her as protocol required; one (1) group because they did not know how to contact MYWO; and one (1) group because it was not a women's group though it had MYWO connections (Adjoba family). Five (5) groups could not recall whether or not they had requested assistance form MYWO, because their record keeping had been neglected. Four (4) groups were ambiguous or contradictory in their answer, thus I could not determine whether or not they had requested assistance from MYWO. There was one (1) group to whom I could not ask the questions because of language barriers.

The women's groups seemed to receive more assistance from donors --either Kenyan government or foreign or both --than from MYWO at the national headquarters. A total of thirteen (13) groups reported having received some type of donor assistance. It is important to note two things here. One is that donor assistance to these twenty-four (24) groups was not channeled through MYWO even though Moi had declared in 1989 that MYWO would function as the focal and coordinating body for all assistance to women's groups in the country. The other important thing to note is that it must be qualified what type and how much assistance these groups really received from donors. Assistance included anything from donations to loans to bicycles to skill transfer seminars.
to cow sheds. Donations and loans also varied widely in range—from 3,000 ksh to 150,000 ksh (equivalent to $100.00 to $50,000.00), according to what was reported.

It appears that groups may have received either "on-going" assistance or "push/crisis" assistance or both, from foreign donors or Kenyan government ministries. On-going assistance I defined as continual assistance for the specified duration of a project. Push/crisis assistance I defined as usually one-time intervention assistance to either begin a project or to help at a critical point for the survival of a project. Nine (9) of the groups reported having received some type of ongoing assistance—financial, technical, social, material—from either one or from both foreign and Kenyan government donors. Only three (3) groups however seemed to have a schedule of assistance and mandated field evaluations by foreign donors. These groups also seemed to get more financial assistance. Nine (9) groups also reported having received, at some point, push/crisis assistance. Within this group of nine (9) there is substantial overlap with the aforementioned group receiving on-going assistance. The groups that did not receive donor assistance survived on members contributions.

There were three questions which posed particularly difficult problems for collecting data. Two of the questions sought similar data regarding Kenya’s leaders in development—1) Which of the partners in development took the lead in development? Was there a hierarchy or equality between partners? and 2) Who should be credited for the overall development of Kenya?

With regard to question 1, most of the groups did not answer. Of the ones who did, all of them cited the government of Kenya and various Ministries and foreign donors as taking the lead in Kenya’s development. Some groups added women. Only one (1) group ranked a hierarchy— the Ministry for Culture and Social Services (MCSS) at the top, followed by MYWO and then the Government respectively. MYWO was mentioned
only in this response. The same answers were reiterated by the groups for question 2, with the addition of the Government’s National Development Plans by one group as an entity deserving of credit for the overall development of Kenya.

It was no surprise that these questions were problematic given the political climate within which this research was taking place. As Chapters 3 and 4 discussed, the government and donors were at odds on issues of funding, accountability, responsibility, transparency, human rights, and in some cases sovereignty. In more sensitive environments within the country, and at times when donor-government relations were particularly precarious, the questions may have been reworded in attempts to depoliticize their nature and still solicit the information.

The third question which posed some problems was whether or not the women’s participation in the project had increased their power as women. For several reasons this question may have been problematic: 1) the concept of “power” seemed to have a different, perhaps cultural connotation; 2) there was a reluctance to answer the question in front of men who may have been present, and 3) often women explicitly did not want to be associated with politics. When I mentioned “power” the women seemed to automatically relate it to the politics of Kenya.

Most of the groups who answered the question did not use the word “power.” They instead said that they had increased “rewards” or “satisfaction” from participating in projects, such as more food and education security for their children, more money and more bargaining strength with their husbands. One group, a Kenya Somali Muslim group in Garissa, said that they had always been “stronger” than men in their area and “stronger” than women in other areas of Kenya. Only three (3) groups used the word “power.” They said that they felt an increase in personal power as well as public power, for women were
now running for political office, and serving as judges. One group said that they felt no increase in power because they had always been powerful.

A comprehensive view of the interviews with the women's groups adds a dimension not considered by interorganizational relations. That is, there were very tenuous linkages, when there were linkages at all, between the women's groups and the focal organization, MYWO national office. The linkages seemed much stronger between the women's groups and the Ministries, and the women's groups and some foreign donors, particularly NORAD who ceased being an official donor in MYWO in 1990 after the Wamwere incident discussed in Chapter 3.

For this group of interviews it must be noted that particular problems may have affected the responses and their interpretations. There were language barriers with two groups, which affected parts of the interviews. One (1) groups' project was in the middle of an ethnic land clash during my visit there. Moreover with two (2) other groups, the MYWO District chair was present during the interviews and responded often on the groups' behalf. With one (1) group, the District Social Women's Officer (DSWO) of the Ministry for Culture and Social Services was present and challenged the answers of the group in my presence, especially their praises of Kiano. In other instances as well, other persons including politicians, government officials -- men, and women leaders, may have been present during the interviews, and their presence may have impacted the interviewees responses and my interpretations.

MYWO Elected Officials and Staff

Elected Officials

The following is a summary of interviews with ten (10) MYWO elected officials. All the interviewees agreed that the general role of MYWO was to assist women
throughout the country, especially at the grassroots. Only one (1) interviewee responded that the role of the organization was to meet the national development needs of Kenya. There were varying views of the ways in which women were being and should be assisted, demonstrating that MYWO elected officials did not have a monolithic purpose. As one (1) interviewee stated, "MYWO's purpose depends on who the leader is." Two (2) of the current elected officers said that it was the organization's purpose to improve the economic standing of women, for it was the belief of many, though not all of the Onsando administration, that "money is the key to empowerment." From the interviews, it seemed that the diversity and unclarity of purpose of the organization may have been problematic for the functioning of MYWO.

From the interviews it seemed that MYWO had shifted in focus over its life span as a women's organization. One (1) interviewee outlined the following changes in MYWO's role over time as:

1) the "civilization" of African women by Europeans;
2) the raising of African women's standards to that of Europeans; and,
3) the catering to African women through development and income-generating activities.

This interviewee identified phases of MYWO's evolution through Kiano's resignation in 1984. She and another interviewee agreed that following independence, and during the Kiano administration (1971-1984), MYWO functioned as a welfare and development organization whose focus was nation building and development in the spirit of Harambee (Let's all pull together). Today, they contrasted, MYWO's focus is changed. It is not nation building.

These interviews with two (2) veteran members of MYWO from the Kiano administration demonstrated that MYWO's national headquarter linkages to women
groups, especially rural women, was also different in the 1990s. These interviewees recounted how MYWO used to provide stoves to needy families, wheelchairs to the disabled. They stated that in the past, persons MYWO assisted did not necessarily have to be members of MYWO. Today however, according to the current MYWO President (Onsando), local women must be affiliated with the national office of MYWO in order to be assisted. That is, local women must have purchased a current membership with the organization or be affiliated in some other way in order to be assisted. One other way to be assisted, as I observed, was to live in an area where there was an active employee of the Leadership Development program who was trying to assist and revive women’s programs. One (1) of the interviewees from the current administration stated that MYWO’s revival efforts in her areas were fruitless because the educated and wealthy women were not interested in joining MYWO, and the poor were too poor to buy membership cards to join.

One of MYWO’s national headquarters main selling points on which it secures foreign donor funding is that it claims that it works to assist economically marginal women. Ironically, a membership fee is required from these women to qualify for assistance. Hence, a major question emanates out of this and was asked of the interviewees -- Do women representatives of MYWO know where the foreign donor funding goes when MYWO national headquarters secures funding to assist women? All of the interviewees at the provincial, district and divisional level, except one (1), said that they did not know anything about MYWO’s dealings with foreign donors. Many of them did not know the names of the donors who funded MYWO’s current national programs. Their exposure to donors, and to matters between foreign donors and MYWO was very limited. Interviews indicated that the women seemed ignorant of their rights in MYWO,
or too timid to express them. Some of the interviewees further added that MYWO raises the economic hopes of women by its propaganda campaigns, but does not meet them.

The Assistant National Treasurer of MYWO Mjomba, as she discussed in our interviews, did raise questions about the allocation of foreign donor funding as it was not trickling down to her area. She also raised questions as to the whereabouts of the 50,000ksh allocated to women’s groups in each district in Kenya by Moi in 1992. Surprisingly however, as interviews and discussions indicated, in spite of her being the national assistant treasurer she had no knowledge of the monies of the organization. She was generally not privy to the financial matters of the organization. It seemed that her election to the position of national assistant chair was more symbolic than anything. The only persons who appeared to have knowledge and decision making power with regard to the finances in MYWO were the President, the CEO, the Secretary, and to some extent, the National Accountant.

During our interview, the MYWO chair would not speak of the finances of the organization or decision making power with regard to the finances, despite probing questions. Instead she talked of other organizational matters, albeit very superficially. She was uncomfortable, restless, overly busy with others things simultaneously, and would not focus on our interview. Some the major complaints which she as well as other interviewees raised with regard to MYWO’s relation with foreign donors was that:

1) Donors place too many restrictions on foreign financial assistance;
2) There was too much imposition of foreign donor ideas, not allowing MYWO enough say;
3) Too much of the money goes to foreign donor preferred areas; and,
4) Too much of the money goes to MYWO national leaders preferred areas.
Examples to support many of these complaints (especially 1 and 2) were lacking. The interviewees who made the complaints, including the chair, could not really provide concrete instances, or documents as evidence to support the charges, although some of the charges of donor and ethnic preferences for certain areas seemed to have some degree of legitimacy.

From the recollections and comparisons by interviewees, the Onsando experience with foreign donors seemed very different from the Kiano experience. Whereas under Onsando relations seemed to be strained with many donors, interviews from veteran MYWO members stated that in the 1970s, MYWO under Kiano, had eased relations with donors. They stated that there had been no pressure or monitoring from donors, and that MYWO enjoyed a great deal of flexibility in utilizing the assistance it received. They stated that foreign donors took their direction from MYWO, and MYWO implicitly took their direction from the Kenyan government. One interviewee stated it this way, “Most of the work of NGOs (Kenyan and foreign) was complementary to the work of government, although there was not formal cooperation.”

With regard to MYWO relations with the Kenyan government, most of the interviewees stated that there was “good” cooperation with government, while they clearly made a distinction between the Ministries and KANU. The Ministries’ work was the work that was deemed “good.” KANU, the party, however, according to many of the interviewees, had caused some problems. For example, some interviewees blamed KANU for the loss of foreign donors, and some felt that KANU had not been helpful to MYWO in reaching its aims at all. One (1) interviewee was very staunch in disagreeing with the belief that KANU had caused problems for women. She stated that KANU had been most helpful in the 1989 elections in “protecting women from foreign ideas.” She was the sister
of a KANU Minister and MP. Some interviewees agreed with her that KANU had not caused problems, but they were not as staunch in their response.

Not many of the interviewees wanted to address the issues of development cooperative partnerships or state whether or not a hierarchy or equality existed in the partnerships. At the lower administrative levels -- division, district, province -- the interviewees seemed to have limited awareness of partnerships. Thus, most did not discuss partnerships because of this. Only three (3) interviewees from the current administration answered, all with differing perspectives. Two (2) of the interviewees said that a hierarchy existed. According to one (1), women were at the apex (contributing at least 80% of national development), followed by government then foreign donors. According to another (1), government was at the apex, followed by many institutions including but not exclusive to, government and foreign donors. She did not rank these. The chair of MYWO was very vague in her answer. She said that the partner who leads depends on what is needed and this determines what the partners give. She added that when partners can not agree on program formulation and implementation, generally it is MYWO who is forced to bend by the pressure of foreign donors. Another interviewee voiced a similar view and stipulated that when MYWO does not bend, it is depicted unfairly as a “culprit.”

The interviewees from the Kiano administration said that in the 1970s, the government was at the top of the hierarchy of all development partnerships, because nation building needs were the priority of all. They agreed with each other that the nature of development relationships changes with the Presidents of the country and perhaps this partly explains why MYWO is different today compared to Kiano’s time. One (1) of the interviewees made the following comparison, (to paraphrase): “During the tenure of President Kenyatta (1963-1978), the focus of the country was development. With
President Moi (1978-present), this focus had changed from cooperation to “politics and control.” These two (2) interviewees felt that development partnerships had become too politicized, mainly because the government wanted control and was greedy.

Most of the current elected officials agreed that it is the national office of MYWO and local groups that formulate the ideas for the MYWO programs/projects that are implemented. The Chair did not acknowledge the role of MYWO’s national office in program/project formulation at all. Instead she identified local women, District Commissioners (DCs) and District Development Committees (DDCs) as the formulators of MYWO programs and projects. She also said that local women may propose ideas which the national office merely writes into a proposal.

Most elected officials identified no tangible and measurable indicators for project success or failure. Moreover, they were very vague as to whether or not programs/projects they had implemented had been success or failures. Of the current administration only the national chair claimed overwhelming success for projects. Her indicator was the vast membership of MYWO, a reported 1.5 million, for which there are no current statistics. Of the elected officials who did discuss indicators of program/project success or failure they seemed to look at indicators other than whether or not groups had reached their specific objectives. Some indicators which they voiced in interviews included: 1) having something to do other than kitchen work, and 2) the continued motivation of the women to remain in groups. From the interviews it seemed that many women felt that if their projects did not survive or were not successful, it was not their fault. They blamed program/project unsuccessfulness on not having resources. It is important to note that many of these women, especially at the national level, were not involved in any hands-on development projects. Many were politicians.
The interviewees from the Kiano administration claimed outright success for their projects, unlike interviewees from the current administration. One (1) of the interviewees from the Kiano administration said that a major reason for success of MYWO under Kiano was that MYWO was "not racial or tribal." The other interviewee (1) from the Kiano administration said that one of the things that led to her disillusionment with MYWO and the failure of MYWO programs/projects was that most of foreign donor funding to MYWO was being allocated to salaries and transport. Very little money was actually going to the projects. For these reasons, she decided to leave MYWO.

Instead of success of programs/projects, the current MYWO organization seemed to be riddled with problems. Many of the interviewees discussed or alluded to these problems. The chair either denied or did not acknowledge them. From the interviews it seemed that the problems which led to the current crisis of the organization were: 1) the financial mismanagement of Mrs. Shitakha who was the chair of MYWO during the mid-1980s; 2) the affiliation of MYWO with KANU in 1987-- an affiliation which Kiano had reportedly, according to one (1) of her former treasurers, resisted for 12 year; 3) the rigged elections of 1989 during which time KANU women and staunch Moi supporters were placed in office; and, 4) donor withdrawals from MYWO in the 1990s. One (1) interviewee indicated that the organization had become too large and its enormous size had caused these problems. Superimposed on all of the problems seemed to be MYWO's current national leadership's hunger for political and economic power, with the exception of the national assistant treasurer. Not all of the interviewees stated all of these reasons, but each interviewee stipulated at least one of the above reasons as a cause for the organization's crises.

Most of the interviewees would not address the affiliation of MYWO with KANU, and its subsequent disaffiliation. Of the interviewees who responded, some felt that the
affiliation was political maneuvering by KANU to control women, which also caused unanticipated donor withdrawals. Most interviewees welcomed the disaffiliation. The chair and another district official disagreed with the disaffiliation. The chair did not regard affiliation to KANU as a problem for the operation of the organization. The district official who felt that KANU protected women from “foreign ideas” also thought that the affiliation was a good move, for according to her “It (was) not possible for women to function independently.” She further said that MYWO was not an autonomous body and should (could) not be.

This district official’s view of not wanting autonomy for MYWO “because women should not act alone” did not correspond with the other interviewees who responded to the question. The chair claimed that MYWO was in fact autonomous, even during its affiliation with KANU. She said since her election in 1989, “affiliation, disaffiliation has not made much of a difference...MYWO has not operated with KANU despite the name KMYWO.” Her national assistant treasurer’s response diametrically opposed this. She stated, “MYWO is KANU.” For her KANU was so subsuming that even her women friends could not be women disliked by KANU, because she is KANU. In her interview, she spoke of Wangari Maathi, world renown professor, activist, environmentalist, whose work the national assistant treasurer respects and admires. The national assistant treasurer lamented on how her area could have benefited from Maathai’s Green Belt Movement in their fight against erosion. She could not however be friends or have a working relationship with Maathai because of the different nature of their relationships to KANU. Whereas the national assistant treasurer is KANU, Maathi is KANU opposition. She takes KANU to task for its ills as described in Chapter 3. Regarding the autonomy of MYWO, the national assistant treasurer did not think that MYWO was not autonomous because “it
could not be.” Instead, she said, MYWO was not autonomous simply because it was a part of KANU. She welcomed MYWO’s disaffiliation.

The national assistant treasurer felt that MYWO had assisted in increasing women’s personal power, as well as women’s confidence to run for public office. She added that men were not happy with successful women’s projects. Only one (1) other interviewee agreed with her and used the word “power” as well. The other interviewees talked about social and economic improvements women had experienced -- which they attributed partly to MYWO.

There were several recurrent recommendations which emerged from the interviews for more effective approaches to cooperative development partnerships. They include: 1) More dialogue between partners; 2) Identification of “real” Kenyan NGOs. This is very interesting considering MYWO’s dubious status as an NGO; 3) Publication of donor financial records for they had no idea either how much assistance MYWO received from its donors; 4) Allowance of foreign donor access to grassroots without going through government or MYWO national headquarters; and, 5) Keeping of men out of women’s affairs. One (1) interviewee even called for new and legitimate elections for MYWO.

From these interviews with elected officials, several issues became apparent: 1) The majority of the interviewees were not concerned with creating self-sufficiency for the organization; 2) There was a great dependency on foreign donors, not only financial and technical dependency, but also, and maybe to an even greater extent, psychological dependency; and 3) To some degree, securing a foreign donor was considered a success in itself. Only one (1) interviewee talked about creating wealth for the organization from within, to the extent that she would not spend time answering questions that dealt with donors -- foreign and governmental. The interviewees did not recognize the Kenyan government ministries as donors.
From the interviews, it became obvious that MYWO national office seemed to have few and weak network linkages with local elected officials. Many times elected officials from the lower level administrative units did not seem to be aware of what the national MYWO was doing. Many times MYWO national level did not seem to care what lower level administrative units were doing. There seemed to be little unity and coherence in MYWO's intraorganizational interlevel leadership. Moreover, the national chair seemed to be detached Kenyan women.

Throughout these interviews, two (2) of the interviewees were quite restrained in their answers as their District chairs often assumed the prerogative of answering on their behalf.

**Staff**

The following is a summary of interviews with sixteen (16) MYWO staff persons. In this set of interviews, there were five (5) male interviewees. Including men in MYWO staff interviews was not expected. Men however occupied staff positions and agreed to interviews. It is noted that only men were hired to perform the technical work, i.e. accounting, budgeting, and evaluation of the organization.

When asked of MYWO's role in development, most of the interviewees said that it was to assist women in Kenya. Two (2) national program managers gave answers more specific to their programs, i.e., maternal child health and family planning (MCH/FP) and leadership development (LD). The MCH/FP program manager said that MYWO's role was to provide family planning so as to assist the government's efforts in reducing population growth and providing good health for mothers and children. The LD program manager said that MYWO's role was to develop leadership of women, improve living standards for women, and voice the ills of women.
Most interviewees referred to their job descriptions, albeit unwritten, to describe their specific roles as Staff Persons in MYWO. For instance,

1) the SEP-jiko program manager stated that it was her role to disseminate jikos and follow government-Ministry of Energy guidelines for the implementation of this project;

2) the LD Program manager said that it was her job to give training, motivation, skills and build esteem of women so that they could fight for their rights and withstand being patronized by male government leaders; and,

3) the MCH/FP program manager said that it was her role to implement the program according to the government’s national development plans and to try to fill the gaps for family planning and child health that the government could not reach.

Two (2) of the program managers’ roles were to implement programs according to the agendas of the Kenyan government -- SEP-Jiko and MCH/FP. One (1) of the program officers, LD, was more activist-oriented in her role. She took the position of opposing the government. The Nutrition program manager did not have a current role in the program as the program had ended, though she was still on MYWO’s staff.

Most to the staff persons interviewed seemed to be the actual linkages in MYWO’s relational environment to the women at the grassroots. Many of them identified target areas and traveled, or delegated representatives to travel to projects/programs sites. Each program officer and her staff met with women at the different administrative levels -- province, district, division -- though irregularly. Other staff at the headquarters, such as the archivist and the accountants, were to keep records of MYWO activities, including activities at the grassroots.

Only two (2) of the interviewees stated that their programs were formulated by MYWO, one of which was created by Mrs. Kiano (LD) and the other (Nutrition), created
by the program staff. The latter project had ended at the time of my fieldwork. The other two (2) national programs—MCH/FP and SEP-Jiko—were created by the Kenyan government, both of which the program officers did not know or did not give specifics about their formulations. The other staff interviewed said that they had no information as to who was involved in the formulation of the programs. They merely came to work and did their jobs. Most of these interviewees seemed to be technocrats and professionals who did not ask questions about MYWO. They merely performed their duties.

Little was known among the staff about program/project changes. Most interviewees deferred to the national program managers when asked. National program managers were unclear about how changes were dealt with in the Onsando administration, other than the fact that meetings were sometimes held with foreign donors “to sort things out.” They said the elected officials often did not abide by these decisions made at these meetings. The program managers blamed the MYWO elected officials for the uncertainty about organizational matters, arguing that they were non-communicative, inconsistent, disinterested in the organization, and aloof to how interorganizational relations should be handled between MYWO and its donors. The national program managers were fully aware of the threats MYWO elected officials posed to the development partnerships of MYWO.

Only few of the MYWO staff outside of the headquarters at the Nairobi office seemed to have a comprehensive view of the actors and interactions in MYWO’s relational environment. Lower level staff in and outside of Nairobi may have vaguely known of some of the partners in development, if the donors visited their particular site. They seemed to know less about MYWO’s national office interactions with their foreign donor partners. The sub-national staff interviewees were more consumed with the day-to-day organizational activities in their particular area. Their interaction with MYWO
national office with regard to their particular program seemed to be mostly top-down, on occasions when there was communication. The local staff, from the grassroots, were less likely to approach MYWO national office. They seemed to wait for MYWO national office to come to them. There seemed to be deference and timidity on the part of most of the women at the grassroots, and arrogance at the national level within the elected leadership. There was also a great deal of friction and resentment between the national program managers and the national elected officials. To the national program managers, these elected officers "slowed down progress" and were a hindrance to development as program managers were required to have all of their programs' activities approved by them. One (1) program manager remarked that MYWO's development programs had been held back since the 1989 elections because of the current elected officials' incompetence and disinterest in women.

Most of the program managers felt that the government was at the head of development partnerships. To some this was positive, to others it was not. The SEP-jiko Program manager felt the government was at the top of the hierarchy and that the partners in the program worked well together in partnership. The MCH/FP program manager felt that the government was at the top of the hierarchy, but that something other than partnerships existed. She felt the relationship between foreign donors and MYWO was stronger in terms of implementation of the program, and that government intervened only on policy concerns. The LD program manager agreed that government was at the top of the hierarchy, but that instead of a cooperative arrangement existing between partners, there existed opposition. She stated that the government was against both MYWO (excluding the elected officials) and foreign donors because it wanted to remain corrupt. She argued that the KANU government did not want to share power, therefore it was against multipartyism, and all of its suspected proponents.
The national accountant further revealed very important information on foreign donor support to MYWO. He stated that 79% of all of MYWO's operations are funded through Pathfinder International, who receives 93% of its funding from USAID, thus placing USAID at the top of the hierarchy of the partners in development in terms of resource contributions to the partnership and organization. Because of this, he said that USAID called the shots for MYWO. He also considered USAID his employer, not MYWO. He said that he was inclined to follow USAID's orders to the letter as he did not want to face unemployment. This shed some light as to why USAID yielded considerable power with MYWO and Pathfinder (to the extent that they could summon personnel to meetings at the drop of a hat) and with other US foreign donors engaged in family planning programs/projects as well. For example, all US donors to family planning projects must get clearance from USAID. This is reportedly US policy relating to development funding in Kenya. Moreover, the MCH/FP program manager discussed the restrictions placed by USAID on development finances because of US laws. For example, assistance to the MCH/FP can not be used to fund abortions. The program manager felt that this was a case of US law being imposed on Kenya. The MCH/FP program manager charged that foreign donors, particularly USAID, wanted to choose sites for program/project implementation where they can get quick results and successes. This often caused overlap with NCPD and project duplication for the same target areas and groups.

There were very conflicting views among the staff about the role the government has played in development partnerships. On one hand, the national program managers who implemented programs initiated by the government felt that the government had a development master plan which was to be followed by MYWO and foreign donors so that the country would develop. On the other hand, some staff interviewees, including one (1)
program manager, felt that government’s only plan was to maintain political, economic, and patriarchal hegemony at all costs. These interviewees asserted that there was too much control and corruption by government. They felt that KANU’s affiliation of MYWO in 1987 was to take power from MYWO and cause confusion among women. This confusion, they argued, facilitated the exploitation of the MYWO elected officials by KANU. One (1) of the interviewees went further to say that all of Kenya’s problems, not only MYWO’s, were created by a corrupt KANU and Moi. The interviewees saw the ministries as separate from “government.”

KANU was definitely blamed for the withdrawal of donors from the organization and for the disinterest of women from joining the organization. KANU was also blamed for the unemployment of over forty former MYWO staff who were displaced when NORAD was kicked out of Kenya by President Moi. Moreover, KANU was accused of hijacking MYWO by the affiliation in 1987 and rigging their elections in 1989. Some interviewees either stated outright or implied that KANU had placed hand-picked KANU women in office to secure donor funding for them and to serve as its mouthpiece to women and to foreign donors in support of government policy. Though not all interviewees would speak on this subject, some believed that KANU was exploiting women for its own ends and the elected leadership of MYWO was allowing a women’s institution to be exploited for their personal gains of money, power and status within the male-identified and dominated KANU party.

One (1) of the program managers welcomed the disaffiliation as she felt that MYWO should never have been affiliated with KANU in the first place. She hoped that disaffiliation might bring an end to the confusion between elected officials, program managers and grassroots women. Moreover, several of the interviewees hoped that disaffiliation might bring donors back to the organization. As one interviewee indicated,
"...donors are confused as to the autonomy of MYWO. They do not understand MYWO's position." As relayed by two (2) of the program managers, many donors refused to support a political system, therefore the donors left MYWO and Kenya. For example, the MCH/FP program officer said that US donors have stated that their money will not support political activities. (Perhaps for this reason any funds that are directed to the MCH/FP program from a US-based NGO must be cleared through USAID. Ironically, USAID via Pathfinder and other US foreign donors have continued to increase its financial assistance to MYWO, in spite of MYWO's affiliation to KANU).

Most of the interviewees agreed that MYWO was not autonomous. Two (2) of its national programs are directed and controlled by government, while MYWO is part and parcel of KANU. Only one (1) of the interviewees - the MCH/FP program manager argued that although MYWO was affiliated to KANU, it was not a part of KANU. She stated, "The Chair (of MYWO) sits with KANU only to represent the interests of women."

The MCH/FP and LD program managers felt that their programs were successful. The MCH/FP program manager enumerated some obstacles which stood in the way of increased success -- money, resources, donor withdrawals, and demand for services being greater than ability to supply. The LD program manager believed that women had increased self-esteem and power as women. The SEP-Jiko program manager did not know if her program was successful or not because MYWO did not conduct evaluations. She was satisfied with this.

Three (3) of the fieldworkers and one (1) accountant felt that the projects in their areas showed some signs of success. Among their indicators for success were: 1) the revival of projects; 2) women showing more confidence; 3) women in greater control of how many children they had and subsequently their ability to educate them; and, 4) the
increasing numbers of women who wanted family planning services. Some interviewees, particularly one (1) district accountant felt that tensions spawned by multiparty politics had caused a problem for the successful implementation of projects and the delivery of supplies to certain areas. He expressed concern about the long-term effects of multiparty politics on development. Others welcomed multiparty politics. They thought that if there were multiparty politics MYWO might regain its pre-affiliation status.

Some interviewees felt that women had increased their power because of their involvement with MYWO. They said that women had more control over their bodies and childbearing. They felt that the MCH/FP program gave them a better chance to make a living. Most did not use the word power however. There was only one (1) interviewee who used the word power -- the LD program officer. With regard to the women in the LD program, she said that they had increased their power by learning their rights, hence making it more difficult to be used by men. The LD program manager also felt that women should be leery of the NGO Coordination Act as she felt it was another instrument of control contrived by the government.

There were many suggestions made for more effective development partnerships. Some of the suggestions are for particular programs, fewer are for MYWO in general. The SEP-Jiko program manager felt that the foreign donors should bring the most lacking of all necessary resources -- water -- because its shortage was a major technical resource problem. The MCH/FP program manager felt that foreign donors make too many demands for little money, particularly the foreign donor CEDPA. Instead she felt that there should be fewer demands and more financial support for MYWO. In addition, she insisted that foreign donors should establish offices in Kenya, as opposed to remaining overseas, in order to facilitate communication, coordination and cooperation. Moreover, she stated that money needs to arrive on time. The LD program manager said that
government needs to leave MYWO alone, and that government should not bully foreign
donors. She asserted that donors should put more pressure on the Kenyan government to
end repression and human rights violations, and that Kenyan citizens should take the fate
of their country and their future in their hands. To paraphrase, she stated, "if donors leave
and the government falls, it falls and this Kenya has to deal with." She was frustrated that
women in particular did not have an open environment within which to work. She stated,
"When you start talking politics, they (men) think you are after their blood." She also
added that women at the grass roots need expertise, not money, and donors should be
aware of that. Her assistant added and she concurred that donors should not be adverse
to paying salaries to the implementors or staff of the program.

In the LD program, the Program Manager, Assistant Manager, Program Secretary,
Program Driver and twenty-two field (22) coordinators were receiving regular salaries,
25% annual gratuity and leave allowance. All were enrolled in a National Social Security
Fund (NSSF) and comprehensive group insurance. The Program Manager and Assistant
Manager were receiving a housing allowance. This was paid by KAF. In the MCH/FP
Program, the Program Manager, Assistant Program Manager, Program Secretary,
Program Driver (2), an unknown number of the following: District Coordinators,
Divisional Coordinators, Accounts Assistants, Copy Typists, Watchmen, Nurse
Coordinators, Office Messengers and approximately 500 Community Based Distributors
(CBDs) were being paid regular salaries, and receiving annual gratuity and leave
allowance. They were also enrolled in NSSF and group insurance. This was paid by the
MCH/FP foreign donors, of which USAID was the major donor.

A few caveats are necessary here. My interviews with the Nutrition Program
Manager, Leah Muuya, really did not focus on this study. She was more interested in
discussing the Anita Hill - Clarence Thomas and the Desiree Washington - Mike Tyson
cases. I did manage to salvage some information. As I delved deeper into my research, I
discovered that the Nutrition Program Manager was in quite an unstable position with the
organization. Her program had ended, and the CEO and Chair were trying to oust her.
She was successful however as a 13 year veteran of MYWO at being requested by the
Population Crisis Committee of Washington, D.C. to participate as an advisor and
fieldworker in a study on female circumcision called “Harmful Traditional Practices that
Affect the Health of Women and Children” which was being conducted through MYWO
in 1992. Perhaps Mrs. Muuya’s uncertain future with the organization influenced why we
never talked at length about MYWO. After she became involved with the study, our paths
did not cross again though I attempted several meetings with her.

In two (2) interviews with Assistant program managers, very scant information
was obtained directly, as most times they referred me to their program managers, perhaps
because their knowledge was limited or they feared saying something contradictory.

In two (2) other interviews with the Machakos District Accountant and the
Mombasa Leadership Development (LD) fieldworker, the interviews were not private, and
the interviewees really did not answer very many questions, either because they appeared
timid or some “authority” answered on their behalf or diverted from the question at hand.
In some instances they just did not want to talk about MYWO.

Of this group, two (2) key people in MYWO refused to talk with me -- the CEO
and the fieldworker for Muranga District. They were angry at my presence and despised
the fact that I was doing the research on MYWO. Both gave me the run around and a
very hard time when I tried to talk with them. The fieldworker asked me to buy her a new
set of tires for her MYWO vehicle so that she could consider if I should be granted an
interview.
Foreign Donors

Following is a summary of the interviews conducted with foreign donors providing assistance to MYWO. These donors -- USAID, World Bank, US Peace Corps, Pathfinder International, CEDPA, GTZ, KAF, Martalitto, and Coca Cola -- are referred to in Chapter 4 and described in greater detail in the appendix. These donors provided one or more of the following to MYWO projects/programs: financial assistance, technical assistance and training, material assistance i.e. supplies, materials, and educational assistance and training. Most of the donors did not reveal the amount of financial assistance they provided to MYWO for the implementation of their projects/programs.

As foreign donors, their roles in Kenya, were, very broadly, either humanitarian, environmental, diplomatic and/or political. That is, their projects were geared toward the promotion of human welfare, protecting the environment, nurturing “good” relations between nations, as well as, and sometimes concomitantly with promoting “democracy” and capitalism.

One of the reasons these donors said that they chose to operate in Kenya is that Kenya has historically had a conducive environment for donor relations and activities. Donors could gain relatively troubleless access to Kenyan NGOs and government. Moreover, these donors could justify the implementation of their projects in Kenya to their home governments and agencies. In addition, as they pointed out, expatriates were welcome and could function in Kenya with few problems. Kenya has, since independence, and perhaps until recently, been considered a favorite nation by Western donors.

MYWO was reportedly selected by the foreign donors in this study as the institution with which the donors would interact principally because it was believed to be an organization which had established networks throughout the country, and also because it had been delegated by Moi as the national center for all women’s groups. The women’s
groups to which MYWO headquarters was reportedly linked had the reputation of being dynamic. They were believed to have the potential to interlink urban and rural, province and district, older and younger, and rich and poor in the development of Kenya. For many foreign donors, MYWO had already established the necessary infrastructure for the implementation of large scale development programs brought to Kenya by foreign donors. As Martalitto stated, its basis (as a foreign donor) for choosing MYWO is that it decided to "leap over when the fence was lowest." Not all of the foreign donors were as blunt about their choice of MYWO as Martalitto.

The most common short-term overarching objective of the foreign donors as a group, seemed, from their interviews, to be -- the making of women’s health and life chances better through population control (family planning), health care access, economic and social empowerment, and environmental conservation. The long term goal of these donors seemed to be the "development" of Kenya, and Kenyan citizens’ acceptance of liberal democratic and capitalist ideals.

In order to reach these objectives and goals, the majority of donors appeared to have brought with them all-ready formulated ideas, projects and programs geared toward making women’s health and life chances better. Thus, these donors expected projects and programs to be implemented as they had formulated in the foreign donors home countries. KAF was an exceptions to this. It had no obvious agenda attached to its financial assistance. Martalitto, to a lesser extent, did not have an obvious foreign donor agenda either. For the other donors however, MYWO seemed to be merely a conduit for the implementation of foreign donors’ all-ready formulated projects and programs. The donors also taught, in their seminars, the fundamentals of creating and maintaining democratic political structures and the financial benefits of entrepreneurship. Of the donors, it was Peace Corps that focused most on creating and maintaining democratic
political structures, and Peace Corps and Coca Cola that focused most on promoting entrepreneurship. To varying extents, all of the donors, with the exception of GTZ, focused on fostering entrepreneurship.

Overall, the donor institutions did not seem to have respect or particularly high regard for MYWO. They simply saw MYWO as a vessel for their projects/programs. As KAF stated, "Pathfinder merely uses MYWO as a cover to do good work. Pathfinder has the organizational capacity to run a project. They have management, administrative and recruitment teams and adequate personnel." KAF added, "Pathfinder must operate in spite of MYWO...MYWO is a lot of propaganda. It is nothing." The World Bank interviewee made similar observations about USAID. He indicated that USAID had large in-country offices and its staff plays a direct role in the implementation of the program/projects that it funds.

MYWO's reputation of having a functioning national network of women's groups (earned justly or not) was clearly its most important asset for attracting donors. Donors seemed to be attracted to MYWO because of its "reputation" in the past. MYWO of the 1980s and 1990s had attracted only 3 of its current donors through the submission of proposals or formulations of projects --Coca Cola, KAF, and Martalitto. The idea for the Coca Cola project was reintroduced to Coca Cola by the current chair Mrs. Onsando. A similar project had been implemented during the Kiano administration. The Leadership Development Project with KAF was introduced by Mrs. Kiano, a former chair of MYWO. The proposal for the Nutrition project with Martalitto came from the MYWO national office, in collaboration with Martalitto. All of the other donors brought their agendas with them from their home offices, already formulated. Peace Corps Volunteers may be an exception because they do some limited negotiations with their clients. They, however, have an overall job description and goals that they must fulfill as volunteers. These
findings suggest that MYWO’s program agenda was not indigenous, for the most part. Certainly, it was not grassroots.

Furthermore, there seemed to be few agenda changes in MYWO’s projects and programs. Negotiations between MYWO and donors before project implementation was initiated were reportedly almost nonexistent. It seemed that there may have been interorganizational meetings before implementation, but little negotiation. MYWO appears to accept the terms of foreign donors, almost unequivocally, especially when they concern finances. Pathfinder stated it this way, "MYWO’s MCH/FP program must follow the tighter targets of USAID and submit to the restrictions on the funds...MYWO and Pathfinder are trapped by USAID." Pathfinder added that there is however more flexibility with private funds. There did not appear to be much flexibility with Coca Cola’s private funds however.

Donors did not willingly describe the partnerships between MYWO and foreign donors and the government. Most refused to answer the question. Of the donors who answered, all thought that they there was a hierarchy between "partners" in development. The institution at the top of the hierarchy varied depending on who answered the question. For example, Pathfinder identified USAID as being at the top of the hierarchy; Martalitto identified MYWO as being at the top, placing itself there after the KMYWO 1989 elections as way to demonstrate its arrogance and flex its muscle to their partners. This, Martalitto said, caused the breakdown of MYWO’s interorganizational relations. One (1) Peace Corps volunteer identified the Kenyan government as being at the top of the hierarchy because of its sovereignty as a state in spite of interdependencies.

One reason why donors may not have wanted to answer the question on description of partnerships is that they may not have wanted to acknowledge the “power” they had, because of the financial and other assistance they provided, relative to the
government of Kenya, particularly at a time when foreign donors and the Kenyan
government were butting heads over this very issue. During my fieldwork, Kenyan
newspaper headlines read, “Condition for Aid Spelt Out,” Nation, August 19, 1991; “UK
to link aid to Human Rights,” The Standard, August 19, 1991; “Aid: I will not take this
Abuse, says Moi,” Nation, September 19, 1991; “Now Denmark halts rural project fund,”
Nation, October 19, 1991; “Less aid for dictators: US sets out its conditions,” Nation,
“Donors: Change in 6 months or else...” Nation, November 27, 1991; “Conditions for
German aid to developing world,” : Nation, January 9, 1992; “Donor funds freeze begins
to hurt Kenya -- Kenya begins to feel the pinch,” Nation, April 16, 1992; “US won’t aid

Another reason why donors may not have responded to the question is that this
issue of partnerships raises questions about the definition of “partner.” What conditions
must one meet to be a “partner” in a relationship? Must a partner in a relationship be
“equal?” Can a “partner” ever truly be “equal?” Is it possible for one to be a “lesser” or
“greater” “partner?” KAF stated that in its development relationship with MYWO “there
was equal partnership in theory, but it was hard to live as such.” KAF added, “Initially,
MYWO was first among partners.”

MYWO entered many partnerships as a Kenyan NGO, yet there were questions as
to whether MYWO was truly an NGO. It called itself an NGO, but it was chameleon in
character. It claimed an NGO status and autonomy in its development activities, to attract
donors, yet between 1987 and 1991 it was officially affiliated to KANU, the ruling party,
at which time it officially changed its name to KANU MYWO (KMYWO), and submitted
to KANU’s rules. In interviews, many donors pointed out this anomaly.
All of the foreign donors who agreed to discuss MYWO said that MYWO was not an autonomous body, not an NGO. They classified MYWO as part and parcel of KANU, both during its affiliation and after its disaffiliation with KANU. KAF was most open in its criticism of MYWO with regard to this matter. For instance, KAF was very critical of MYWO’s affiliation to KANU and made charges that MYWO was KANU’s “cheapest hunt,” calling the affiliation “dirty politics” and an attempt to control and take away the power of the women.

The majority of the donors, including KAF, said that the affiliation did not affect their decision to continue to fund and to implement projects and programs with MYWO. It appeared that being able to utilize the national network of MYWO for the implementation of development projects/programs (i.e., humanitarian, environmental, diplomatic, political) was more important than MYWO’s dubious status as an NGO. Martalitto was the exception. It indicated that it could not continue to fund MYWO when it was affiliated to KANU due to its home government’s regulations. The Finland government would not support an organization that was not a bona fide NGO. The Ford Foundation made the same argument in an unofficial interview in 1989.

Only two (2) of the foreign donors - GTZ and KAF - indicated that they felt that their programs/projects with MYWO were successful, yet they did not attribute this success to MYWO’s participation in the partnership. On the contrary, they saw MYWO national headquarters as causing hindrances for successes in development endeavors. They felt that key organizational problems of inefficiency, poor organizational performance, leadership incompetence, lack of administrative and management capabilities, lack of organizational transparency, and MYWO’s affiliation to (or lack of autonomy from) KANU were barriers to project/program successes. These problems instead led to program/project failures.
A critical issue to be considered here is how success and failure were defined and measured by the donors. All of the foreign donors involved with the implementation of family planning had very vague, amorphous definitions of "success." For instance, USAID did not use the word "success," but did say that the project "has done well." The other donors had more obvious, tangible definitions which matched with the objectives of their projects. Some donors had more simplistic definitions of success. For instance, KAF counted MYWO's turning in financial reports on time as an indicator of success. Individual Peace Corps volunteers seemed to have the lowest thresholds for project success. Their indicators included: 1) groups setting goals, and 2) groups and individuals learning basic skills of record keeping and marketing. It seemed that the larger the foreign donor and more assistance it provided to MYWO, the less clear its definition of success was.

With regard to measuring success of projects/programs, MYWO as an organization had not conducted consistent evaluations of projects/programs, if at all. Most of the donors had not conducted evaluations either, as some did not think that evaluations were important or would have made a difference in the overall operation of the project/program. It was my impression from the foreign donors that, in the field, evaluations are not as important as those of us in the academy think that they are. It was further my impression that evaluations are not considered a part of the overall development policy process. Evaluation was seen as something separate and apart from the process. The family planning donors especially did not seem to prioritize evaluations of their projects/program with MYWO very highly. Perhaps they suspected that evaluations would have been poor.

For the creation of more effective partnerships, disaffiliation of MYWO from KANU did not appear to most donors to be a necessary or sufficient condition. The
proposed NGO Coordination Act was not seen as a sufficient condition for more effective partnerships either to the three (3) foreign donors asked. What was necessary for more effective development partnerships instead was increased institutional competence and accountability on MYWO's part, and greater complementarity between the partners in development relationships.

In sum, MYWO as the focal organization in this development cooperative partnership lacked the financial, technical and material resources to implement its programs and projects on its own, at the level that the donors provided. The foreign donors in MYWO’s relational environment lacked organizational access in Kenya and clientele to serve on their own, thus the creation of the partnership with MYWO. MYWO and its foreign donors in its relational environment therefore engaged in exchanges each to meet its own goals -- MYWO to give the appearance of providing services to women and children in Kenya, and foreign donors to implement its humanitarian, environmental, diplomatic and political programs/projects.

It should be noted here that the donors who were most willing to participate in the interviews were the ones with little or no active involvement with MYWO. It appeared that the greater the extent of the foreign donor's involvement with MYWO the less willing the donor was to participate in the interview. Often, when they did participate in the interviews, many questions regarding their feelings about MYWO or their relationship with MYWO were left unanswered. For example, GTZ flatly refused to talk about MYWO.

The reasons for the overall negative foreign donors' reactions to MYWO seemed to be the following:

1) MYWO's politicized nature since its affiliation to KANU in 1987;
2) Mrs. Onsando's bogus election to the chairship of MYWO in 1989;
4) The time that the interviews were conducted (1991-92) mutual suspicions and hostility among interorganizational partners as well as government repression ran high; and,
5) MYWO had become a despised institution because of its ties to KANU and Kenyan national politics.

**Kenyan Government Ministry Personnel**

The following is a summary of the interviews with nineteen (19) bureaucrats of Kenyan government ministries who worked with development projects. The Ministries they represent are -- Agriculture, Livestock Development, Culture and Social Services (MCSS), and Home Affairs and Heritage (MHAH) which are described in the appendix. Most of these interviewees who worked at the sub-national level would not acknowledge the presence of MYWO members within the groups with which they worked, for they insisted that they worked with the groups in spite of some of the women’s connections to MYWO. Two (2) of the interviewees in this group were government special appointments. One (1) was a National Irrigation Specialist Appointment in the Ministry to Agriculture stationed in Garissa to work specifically with the foreign donor DANIDA. The second interviewee (2) actually worked in MYWO national headquarters with MYWO national elected officials, national program officers and staff. He had a two year assignment to MYWO from the MHAH. He was a bureaucrat on loan, and an economist by training. He was charged with writing proposals for the organization and conducting program evaluations as part of a technical support staff.

Although all of these Ministries are obviously organizational extensions of the Kenyan government, many bureaucrats did not feel that they were part of the government,
and made very clear the distinction they drew between the Ministries' work and the
government, the latter which they saw as Moi and the KANU party. They saw themselves
as separate and apart from government. According to the interviews, their work as civil
servants was for the development of Kenya, and not necessarily complementary to any
work the government might be doing, and certainly not because of allegiance to Moi and
KANU. There seemed to be a strong desire from many of the interviewees to disassociate
from the government and the party. Many of the Ministries' bureaucrats indicated that
they were university graduates who were placed in the civil service in their respective
workplaces, usually away from their home areas. The Irrigation Specialist and the MHAH
bureaucrat acknowledged openly, unlike most, that they were government employees.

The Ministries had diverse types of relationships with partners in development--
foreign donors and MYWO. For example, NCPD had a formally established relationship
with foreign donors USAID, World Bank, CEDPA, and with MYWO - national office.
Together, these partners collaborated on a national MCH/FP program which was
implemented in seven project areas throughout Kenya. Although NCPD was part of the
MHAH, it appeared more as part of the Ministry of Health, because it worked with family
planning and health projects.

The Ministry of Agriculture on the national level had ties to the foreign donor GTZ
with which it participates in an interministerial approach to implement jiko-related
activities. GTZ refers to the Ministry, not as a partner, but as an “active participant” in the
project. The interviewees from the Ministry of Agriculture, both from the national and the
local levels, expressed that they had unofficial ties to MYWO. Many further stated that
they had "undesired" ties to MYWO. Generally, it seemed that the ministries had no
official communication with MYWO national level with regard to this project. One (1)
interviewee said that she felt that “MYWO is nothing.” Others stated clearly “MYWO has
little to do with the MYWO jiko.” All of their collaboration -- Ministry with MYWO -- was indirect, through GTZ. The Ministry bureaucrats often worked with women who were individual members of MYWO, when they were in other women’s groups however. The relational environment within which the Ministry, foreign donor and MYWO operated in this instance was very tense. It appeared that MYWO was overlooked, ignored and dismissed as the focal organization in interorganizational relations.

The Ministry of Agriculture seemed more closely associated with the MYWO jiko project as the interviews suggested, but the SEP-Jiko project was officially a project of the Ministry of Energy.

The Ministry of Agriculture’s Irrigation Rehabilitation special appointee officially collaborated with the foreign donor DANIDA (who had no direct ties to MYWO) and a local women’s group. Some MYWO members were members of this women’s group and were in the MYWO’s local leadership as well. This collaborative project was not coordinated through MYWO national or local office. All MYWO connections were coincidental.

The Ministry of Agriculture’s Irrigation Rehabilitation special appointee saw MYWO somewhat differently from the other interviewees. He saw a local MYWO leader, in her capacity as a MYWO leader and simultaneously as the chair of the District Development Committee (DDC). He felt that her overlapping roles were positive because, in them concurrently, she was able to politically engineer benefits for the women’s group in which she was a member. He felt that her various power bases had been critical for the group’s success. Though he talked of MYWO within the locality in which he worked, he did not address MYWO at the national level.

MCSS had no formal projects with MYWO. In some areas there were high levels of interaction between MCSS and MYWO, and in some areas there were not. In some
areas there was assistance from foreign donors - locally based, not secured through MYWO national headquarters. In a greater number of areas however, there was not assistance from foreign donors. Much of the cooperation was with local Ministries and was locally-based. Foreign donors seemed to depend on the reputation of the local women's groups in determining whether or not they would assist them.

The MHAH bureaucrat on loan to MYWO worked with MYWO at the national level. From this vantage point, he stated that part of MYWO problems and a reason for MYWO not having much success as an organization is that MYWO had no national centralized planning. Another reason he cited is that it was impossible to distinguish between MYWO and MCSS's groups, making isolation and evaluation of MYWO projects near impossible. Further complicating matters, he stated that there were major divisions in MYWO at the national level between the program managers and the elected officials. On one hand, the national program managers were professionals who were concerned that programs were implemented and they worked toward that end. On the other hand, the elected officers were inexperienced and were more concerned about politics than about implementation of programs for development. From his observations and cursory evaluations he stated that MYWO did not (and perhaps could not) have an impact at the village grassroots level.

MYWO the organization, and its national elected officials, seemed despised by most of the ministries' interviewees. Questions about MYWO nearly ruined many of my opportunities to conduct interviews. Many interviewees simply did not want to talk about MYWO. MYWO's unpopularity with the ministries' interviewees was resounding. From the interviews, there seemed to be two main reasons for this: 1) Many people felt that MYWO did not do much development work. They merely got the credit for the work that others -- including the ministries -- had done; and, 2) Many felt that since affiliation with
KANU, MYWO had become "big-headed." For example, one (1) of the interviewees described MYWO's behavior as equivalent to "haughty," for with their "partners" it was their stance that "If you don't do this (follow MYWO's orders), you'll know that we are KANU." The consensus from the interviewees was that of the partners in development -- the national elected officials of MYWO who represented MYWO the organization -- did not have a cooperative spirit. It was also expressed by some that MYWO's destiny was inextricably tied to KANU. They did not want to be associated with this. Many saw KANU as a sinking ship. The MHAH bureaucrat on loan was the most open to talking about MYWO (while in the US however).

It was obvious from the interviewees' responses to questions that they did not consider MYWO an autonomous or indigenous organization. The MHAH bureaucrat on loan was most expressive about this. He stated, "MYWO does not have an indigenous agenda and they have little resistance to donors' agendas. When the women were left alone, they were indigenous. They have lost their direction with the affiliation to KANU."

Some of the other interviewees further stated that the Ministries' relationship with MYWO became confused when MYWO was affiliated to KANU and when the 1989 elections were held. Although local MYWO representatives were elected, they have no network or effective avenue to communicate with MYWO at the national level. As one interviewee stated, "Coordination is there at the local level, but not at the national level. Local level MYWO needs more contact with National level MYWO. The problem comes from the National level." Clearly, this caused a bottleneck, for there could be no reliable back and forth communication between local and national leaders, hence local MYWO leaders could not be accountable to the local women. This caused resentment from the local women toward local MYWO leaders.
Overall and somewhat paradoxical, from the responses of these interviewees it seems that project coordination worked better when MYWO at the national headquarters was not involved. Stated differently, project coordination seemed to work better when local Ministry personnel had access to local donors, and when they did not have to go through the MYWO national office. To the few interviewees who were willing to discuss MYWO's disaffiliation from KANU, this move seemed to offer little increased hope that MYWO at the national headquarters would not continue to stand in the way of coordination. Disaffiliation was seen as a symbolic act for foreign donors' continued investment in the development of Kenya. The MHAH bureaucrat on loan explained it this way: (to paraphrase)

Disaffiliation was action on which MYWO had to follow through to appease donors and stay in their good graces in order to continue to get funding. MYWO will not effectively disaffiliate from KANU however, as its key elected officials and appointees, including the Chair and CEO are KANU members themselves. If the women are not active members of KANU, they are the wives of KANU members.

Almost half of the interviewees stated that they did not regard MYWO as a critical actor in development partnerships. One (1) interviewee said that MYWO should be a critical actor as it should represent all women and all women's interest in Kenya. NCPD however stated that MYWO is a critical partner in the MCH/FP program. In this program, NCPD stated that there existed an unstable hierarchy because MYWO and foreign donors each wage threats to get the program implemented according to “its agenda,” -- MYWO pushing its KANU weight around and foreign donors threatening to take back their money. Another interviewee viewed this differently. She identified the government of Kenya and its National Development Plan at the top of the hierarchy. The MHAH bureaucrat on loan to MYWO offered important insight in this matter. He stated that MYWO was important for development partnerships as it could be the implementing
arm of a partnership. In terms of program/project formulation however, he admitted that MYWO had no power. He stipulated that it is the government and the foreign donors in shifting positions who have power in policy/project formulation. The impact that this has on the hierarchical ordering of a partnership, he argued, is that there is not "one" consistent partner at the apex all of the time. Instead, there is a shifting leadership position for the top of the hierarchy between government and foreign donors. Who is at the apex depends on what is at issue -- policy compliance or resource necessity. In all negotiations however, he stated, MYWO is consistently in the weakest position. He used the incident between NORAD, Wamwere and the government of Kenya to illustrate this point. He further demonstrated the strength of foreign donors and weakness of MYWO by stating that an approximate breakdown of resource contributions reveals that foreign donor contributions to MYWO are 70% of its overall operating resources (9% short of the national accountant's figures), KANU contributions 20% and MYWO 10%. Because of this breakdown, he stated that donors tend to force what they want on NGOs (in which he included MYWO) and they are able to do this because foreign donors also have the access to Kenyan political elites that Kenyans themselves do not have.

In terms of how this resource contribution affects MYWO agenda changes, the MHAH bureaucrat on loan stated that generally it seemed that when program/project changes were proposed by a partner in the development partnerships, meetings were held to determine if and what type changes should be made. He recounted that when the proposed changes were about resources, the foreign donor usually prevailed; and, when the proposed changes were about policy the government usually prevailed. Basically, foreign donors were unbending about resource issues and the Kenyan government was unbending about policy issues.
Most of the interviewees felt that a significant number of their projects were successes. The personnel from the Ministries of Agriculture and NCPD were more definitive in their answers as they had objectives, goals and numerical targets which were tangible and could be measured.

MCSS's responses were different. They spoke of broader, more fluid goals -- such as assisting groups with problems, listening to their problems, assisting them in finding solutions, looking for markets for their goods, etc. MCSS seemed less focused in their objectives than the other interviewees. A reason for this might be that the bureaucrats in the MCSS are not trained in technical fields. That is, the personnel in the MCSS are social workers by training, who may possess empathy, altruism and social vision, but unlike the Ministry of Agriculture Home Economics Extension, they had not learned technical skills which they can transfer to women's groups. MCSS seemed to serve more of a motivational and support purpose for the groups. The MCSS interviewees, when compared to other Ministry interviewees, seemed more likely to link their definition of project success to whether or not a project or group had been able to secure a foreign donor.

The MHAH bureaucrat provided the most critical view of successes and failures of MYWO programs. Overall, he felt that MYWO programs had not achieved a lot of success. The most successful (which was about 60% successful in his estimation) was the SEP-Jiko program because of its education, outreach and acceptance among women. The LD program was not very practical, therefore not very successful. The MCH/FP was also not very successful in that it served a few women at very high costs, and was limited to certain women in certain ethnic groups and areas. Moreover, he pointed out that MYWO did not own its own clinics and its budgets are very prohibitive because of interorganizational stipulations. The Nutrition program had ended when he began his
appointment with MYWO, thus his knowledge of this program was very limited. The Coca Cola program had not yet begun its implementation.

The majority of the interviewees agreed that it was the collaboration between partners -- foreign donors and ministries primarily -- that created the development successes. MYWO was not identified by any of the interviewees, except NCPD, as a reason for program success. NCPD did qualify its position however by stating that its collaboration with MYWO was difficult at best. Other institutions the interviewees credited for development successes are: other women’s groups, local chiefs and some individual women leaders, including Kiano, Mjomba and Maathai. Many of the interviewees felt that MYWO was actually a hindrance to success.

MYWO’s relationship with the government and foreign donors was seen as having no significant positive impact on gender equality. For the most part, gender relations were regarded as staying quite the same.

The interviewees made many suggestions for more effective approaches to development and development partnerships:

1) NCPD said that it (NCPD) should be strengthened as an institution and that its Ministry workers should be paid more as an incentive to do their jobs. Moreover, they said that contraceptives should be sold as a means to generate income. About MYWO, one (1) interviewee only commented, “I’m not so interested (in MYWO) anymore since it is KANU. It’s bad considering how people feel about KANU these days;”

2) The Ministry of Agriculture interviewees suggested the following: a) More needs assessments should be conducted; b) No impositions of projects from outside should be allowed; c) No technical experts from abroad should be brought in when Kenya already has the expertise; d) Foreign donors should make the provision of money their priority.
They do not need to be in Kenya to supervise; and, e) Groups should communicate more with Ministries;

3) MCSS had fewer and less specific recommendations: a) More coordination between partners is necessary; b) Donors must understand the unique cultural background of each area; c) Assistance from foreign donors should be given directly to women’s groups; d) Men should not sit on executive of any women’s groups; and, e) Men should allow women to work without fear.

4) The Ministry of Livestock Development indicated that women’s groups should solicit their assistance at the beginning of their projects, not when it is too late to save the livestock and salvage the project; and,

5) The MHAH bureaucrat on loan recommended the following: a) MYWO needs to engage in more central planning in which it creates development plans which are continuous; b) MYWO should correct their leadership problems by having new and honest elections; c) MYWO should identify and use local resources, as well as woo Kenyan businesses and professional elites; and, d) The Kenyan government should leave women alone to find their direction again and reindigenize.

**Other Relevant Interviewees**

The following is a summary of interviews and discussions I had with twenty-one (21) knowledgeable persons regarding the politics of development cooperation. These interviewees are an unintended set of relevant persons who were not initially part of my targeted interview groups. Due to unanticipated circumstances in the field they became a very important resource and data base. A general description of these twenty-one persons is provided in Chapter 4.
A very different view of MYWO was presented in this set of interviews as compared to the other interviews, and a more consistently critical perspective of MYWO’s “partners” in development was presented as well. Many of the interviews described MYWO as a middle class women’s organization that never really caught on at the grassroots, even after the organization disaffiliated from the colonial state and was Africanized in 1961. MYWO’s evolution out of the colonial period, having been started by the wives of colonial officers seems to have branded the organization mcoloni (colonialist), and this has created a reputation for MYWO which would come back to haunt the organization only 25 years after Kenya’s independence. That is, MYWO had again become an official vessel and an agent of the state in 1987, affiliated not to the British colonial state, but to the KANU “independent” state.

With regard to the affiliation of MYWO to KANU, one (1) of the interviewees recounted that since the 1970s, there had been a trend to destroy organizations in Kenya, especially those that were land-buying, and especially women’s organizations that functioned as interest groups. This trend, he said, was reflective of an overall government attempt to disintegrate society. It seemed that when the government could not control an entity it set out to destroy it, especially if that entity was forceful enough to influence the politics of the country. Thus, when women at the grassroots showed national and international development potential, the Women’s Bureau was created by the government as a component of the Ministry of Culture and Social Services in 1976. The government stipulated that the Women’s Bureau was to address rural women’s needs and coordinate their activities with MYWO. Some interviewees argued that the Women’s Bureau was merely a smoke screen. It was actually created by the government to control women’s activities and undermine their political potential.
One decade later in 1987, MYWO, who had never submitted to coordination with the Women’s Bureau under Kiano, was affiliated to KANU. Two years after that, in 1989, MYWO was named, under Moi’s mandate, the functionary for channeling finances and assistance for all women’s groups and women’s projects in Kenya, much of which is provided by foreign donors. Hence, many of the foreign donors saw MYWO as the central mechanism for distributing financial assistance to women in Kenya, though many of them began to question MYWO’s legitimacy in this capacity. One (1) interviewee said that KANU had affiliated MYWO not only because MYWO represented a vast number of votes and political support, but also because MYWO was considered one of the easier organizations to coopt and control. That is, KANU considered women to be weaker than men, and thus easier to control. The interviewee compared MYWO to the Kenya Council of Trade Unions (COTU) which is predominately male and which KANU had tried but failed to affiliate.

Many of the interviewees felt that KANU affiliated MYWO purely for political reasons. KANU wanted to control MYWO’s activities and development agenda, as well as covet the money MYWO was able to secure for development purposes. One (1) interviewee described MYWO as merely a “tea club,” existing solely for the exploitation of KANU men.

Foreign donors were also seen by many of the interviewees as not merely providing financial and other assistance to MYWO with no strings attached. They were considered a devious lot. Most of the interviewees were of the opinion that MYWO’s agenda is that of its Western donors since MYWO accepts most of its finances from the West. The interviewees felt that MYWO really had no room to negotiate with its foreign donors as they argued it is the donors and not MYWO keeping the organization in operation financially. One of the interviewees said that it was not the fact that MYWO had
foreign donors that was the problem. The problem was that MYWO did not have a
diversity of donors, each providing a small amount of funding. Instead MYWO had only a
few donors who provided the bulk of its finances. The interviewee who took this view
(himself a director of a successful NGO) argued that an organization utilizing outside
funding must secure a diverse donor base to maintain its agenda and its autonomy. He
said that many Kenyan NGOs can be autonomous, though many are not. The key to
maintaining autonomy he said, is having a diversity of funding sources and a clear, defined
agenda before the money is accepted. He further added that an NGO must know what it
is doing and it must also know what the donor is doing. He also stressed that money
should not be taken just because it is offered. One must be able to say no, when the terms
are not acceptable.

It was expressed by most of the interviewees that foreign donors use their money
to bring clout and influence into Kenya. Moreover they said that foreign donors were not
interested in MYWO’s or other Kenyan organizations’ agendas because they “want to do
what they want to do,” and Kenya puts up no effort to negotiate or resist. One
interviewee for example, stated that “Kenya’s National Development Plans merely mimics
the World Bank.” It was also added by many interviewees that Kenya’s exploitation by
foreign donors was obvious by such requests by the IMF and World Bank, to cut the civil
service by 25% and teachers by 50%, which amounts to millions of people, or else lose its
funding, as reported in the January 31, 1994 issue of the Nation.

Many interviewees were very critical of the in-country expatriate staffs of the
foreign donors. They questioned their commitment to Kenya’s development. They
charged that many of the staff knew little about Kenya and its people and many were not
genuinely interested in learning. Instead, they claimed, the in-country staffs were more
interested in “big salaries, taking safaris to national parks and mingling with other
expatriates.” They further commented on seeing the same faces around town forever, implying that there is a small network of expatriates who make up an “elite international donor community” who get more than they give by working in development in Africa. Many interviewees believed that most of these people did not take development seriously, and of those who did, they saw development as their “job.” One interviewee explained that in order to be effective, “One must live development, not just do it as a job.”

Several of the interviewees felt that as Kenyans their hands were tied with regard to development in their country. They felt that they could do nothing to influence foreign donor agendas, and by extension Kenya’s development agenda. They charged that foreign donors had more say in Kenya than they (Kenyan citizens) did; and that foreign donors had access to networks of political elites that the average Kenyan citizen did not have. They alleged that foreign donors were aware of this and utilized this to push their development agendas whether Kenyans agreed with them or not. This they referred to as “diplomatic arrogance.” These interviewees had little hope in their political representatives’ or the Ministries’ changing the situation. They stated that

politicians do not understand the process of development. They do not understand the necessity of needs assessments and studies and they often stand in the way of development. They want to use (development) money for huge structures and vehicles.

These interviewees also charged that politicians use development money to line their pockets; and that the “ministries were lax and that of all the Ministries, MCSS was the weakest. There (was) no discipline.” They did not make a distinction between the KANU government and ministries. Overall, these interviewees felt that there was too much of a focus on money and not enough of a focus on development policy negotiations, technical training, and credit schemes versus aid.
MYWO was not seen as an entity to enact change either, as it is part of the state, bent on maintaining the status quo. Instead, it was seen, under the leadership of Mrs. Onsando as directing much of its attention and money to the Kisii area, the area from where Mrs. Onsando originates. Thus, in addition to charges by interviewees of being middle class political pimps, they were also charged with being “tribalistic.”

These are some of the reasons why some foreign donors refused to discuss MYWO at length. The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) that conducted surveys of the needs of women in Kenya in the early 1992 decided not to support MYWO in any of its current programs or begin a new program in conjunction with them because of MYWO’s organizational affiliation with KANU and because of the foci of their programs. DANIDA refused to discuss MYWO as well, merely saying MYWO had been “bulldozed” by KANU and no one was interested in them any longer. To put an end my questions and probing about MYWO, the DANIDA interviewee very curtly said, “We are talking about MYWO, not about politics.” As an employee of DANIDA she was more critical of DANIDA using rhetoric about women, but not really having a women in development (WID) component and not really being sensitized and committed to women in general.

MYWO was clearly more popular outside of Kenya than it was inside of the country. Many interviewees clearly stated outright that it is the women of Kenya who keep the economy going, but many of these women, it seems, operate outside of MYWO, although MYWO (mis)represents itself as the umbrella group of all women’s groups in Kenya. Its reputation is very different from the reality.

Many women in their twenties and thirties, especially those who live in Nairobi, are not interested in joining MYWO at all. Many feel that MYWO is not a viable organization for women anymore, because of its corrupt nature, affiliation to KANU, and colonial
legacy. Instead these younger women are drawn to either more professional organizations, local organizations in their area, and increasingly, to private entrepreneurship. For example, one woman interviewee was a member of five (5) women's groups in her area in which all groups used the merry-go-round concept. In a merry-go-round group, each group member contributes a set amount of money weekly and one-by-one each member receives the lump-sum contribution at the group’s weekly meeting. If there are ten members in a group who each contribute KSH 20 each week for ten weeks, each member will receive KSH 200 at her turn in the merry-go-round. In addition, professional groups have increasing numbers of younger women members. For instance, the Kenya Professional and Business Women's Club (KPBWC), under the leadership of Beth Mugo, has been gaining tremendous momentum as Mugo stresses to women “Go it alone” in business endeavors. There are also many younger women not interested in women’s organizations at all; instead they are seriously undertaking individual business enterprises.

With regard to the overall inefficiency of MYWO in turning in reports and records to foreign donors correctly and timely, one of the younger women interviewed said,

Not to worry, the inefficiency of MYWO is intentional. If the records are not done properly, they must be redone. That means that the person responsible can keep (his/her) job and pay longer, because there is still work to do.

In sum, the interviewees seemed fed-up with Moi, KANU and MYWO. Though they wanted change and pushed for change (many of them), they were not very enthusiastic that change would come with multiparty politics and impending elections. Just as MYWO's disaffiliation from KANU was seen as symbolic and bogus, so were the impending presidential and parliamentary elections. The interviewees seemed lost as to what to do about corruption and repression. It seemed to be a situation of either accept it
and hope to personally benefit from it, or despair. Some interviewees in the NGO sector however had some recourse. They had organized an NGO Task Force for the Eastern and Southern Africa regions to address the growing frustration of finding themselves, as they argued, "responding increasingly to donor's priorities rather than to those of the communities they serve." One way that they were addressing this was to challenge the NGO Coordination Act of 1990 which was created to register and license all NGOs -- international, national and local -- operating in Kenya.

The following chapter will discuss the findings presented in Part II of this chapter as they relate to the politics of development cooperation. It will also present an alternate model for guiding inquiries into development interorganizational relationships involving NGOs, women, foreign donors and African governments.
CHAPTER VI
SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The previous chapter demonstrated a barrage of contradictions about MYWO and its relationships. Some of these contradictions exist because there is confusion about what MYWO is actually doing in terms of organizational and interorganizational activities. Some of these contradictions reflect the dual character of MYWO -- the development organization, and the political KANU appendage. Some of the contradictions seem intentional from the MYWO leadership, attempting to cause confusion and inertia among women.

This chapter will discuss the significance of the research findings documented in the last chapter, and present some conclusions about the politics of development cooperation. More specifically, Part I of this chapter will discuss the main research findings for each group of interviewees and assess the contributions these findings make to the literature on IOR, NGOs, development and women. It will also tease out their implications for development cooperation relative to organizational integrity, authenticity, will, autonomy and dependence, and raise questions. Part II of this chapter will acknowledge the limitations of this study, and make recommendations for development
implementation in the field and for further research. It will also present some concluding remarks.

PART I: Discussion of Research Findings

Of the main research findings, this research demonstrated that MYWO is more highly recognized as a development organization outside of Kenya among academic circles than it is noted as such in Kenya by Kenyans and by organizations in its relational environment. This research determined that MYWO has a falsified reputation and it consciously misrepresents its activities and linkages to grassroots women in order to secure foreign donors. MYWO elected officials attach the organization to successful individuals such as Mrs. Mjomba and Mrs. Kiano, and businesses such as the Adjoba family pottery to steal their reputation for MYWO. MYWO -- national headquarters -- also competes with other women’s groups such as NCWK and KANU Women’s League for preference with KANU and foreign donors. KANU purposely affiliated MYWO and made it an extension of the ruling party so as to force MYWO to compete with KANU Women’s League - Nairobi. KANU projected that through a “divide and conquer strategy” waged against the women, the party would ultimately benefit. It did.

Women’s Groups

There was a definite disjuncture between being a member of a grassroots women’s group and being a member of MYWO. That is, grassroots women’s membership in groups seemed to be based on promoting women’s togetherness primarily, and MYWO
membership seemed to be grounded more in certain individual women's expectations of
gaining political and economic power by exploiting women's mobilization and solidarity.
These individual women are MYWO national leaders who attempted to become rich by
endearing themselves to KANU. They did not genuinely promote, or fundamentally
believe in women's solidarity. They are anti-feminist.

KANU realized these women's intentions, promoted their beliefs in individualism
and used them. One obvious way in which KANU did this was by declaring MYWO the
clearinghouse for all women's activities and finances in 1989 (although this did not take
root). In becoming the clearinghouse, MYWO national leaders would continue to use the
"women in development" propaganda to secure foreign financial assistance for MYWO on
behalf of the women's groups. In actuality however, the donor assistance would be
channeled through MYWO, guarded by elected officials, and placed at KANU's disposal.
Moreover, with the new arrangements governing interorganizational relations between
KANU and MYWO, after affiliation and the 1989 elections, KANU would assume
authority over MYWO in determining how this assistance would be spent.

That KANU would capture MYWO's organizational finances and that MYWO
national elected officials would front for KANU to secure foreign donations is not
surprising since MYWO elected leaders were politicians, desperately aspiring to be
recognized by KANU men. As politicians, these women undermined development
endeavors. They were not development professionals; and they were not committed to
grassroots development causes. Instead, MYWO national elected officials were more
identified with the male politicians, whose political maneuverings and trickery had
amassed fortunes for many of them. As Fatton demonstrated, women’s access to power and resources in Africa is directly dependent on their linkages to men.¹ This was the case in Kenya, to the extent that if gaining power meant betraying women’s causes, many women did. Moreover, as Bujra has argued, and as this case study has demonstrated, women’s organizations do necessarily mean that its female leaders and memberships espouse or hold true to a feminist ideology.²

In effect, MYWO national leaders were not responsive and accountable to the women’s groups that they claimed to represent. Network linkages between elected officials and women’s groups were most times mythical. Hence, women -- groups and individuals -- were disenchanted with MYWO not only because of its political nature, but also because of its failure link with them. Although networks which interlinked national MYWO with provinces, districts, divisions, locations, sublocations and villages had been created, particularly since the MYWO decentralized elections of 1989, interlevel communication remained elusive.

Women’s groups at the grassroots had more faith in and relatively stronger linkages (though still tenuous) with the foreign donors in their home areas and with local government ministries who assisted them in their development endeavors than they did with MYWO. Women’s groups expectations of foreign donors seemed to be greater than their expectations of the Kenyan government, as many women were both knowledgeable of the limitations of the government ministries and disenchanted with KANU -- party and government. Most saw MYWO, not as an indigenous women’s organization, but as part and parcel of KANU.
MYWO Elected Officials and Staff

Elected Officials

Among MYWO's elected officials, there was a diversity and inconsistency of organizational purposes and goals. The women in MYWO's elected leadership were not unified in their goals for the organization. Onsando was trying to change the organization into an income-generating and profit-making business, although she continued to claim that MYWO was an NGO. Onsando’s attempts to turn MYWO into a business were clear, but she did not have organizational backing, nor did she have the mobilization skills to garner support for her plan. Moreover, Onsando did not care if she had the backing of MYWO, for she looked to KANU rather than to MYWO for support, direction, approval and protection.

One of the critical issues of the Onsando administration which contributed to its problems is that MYWO had no national planning. That is, the elected leaders did not set specific goals and objectives, formulate policies or plans for program/project implementation for the organization. Moreover, when the development professionals within MYWO, (i.e. the professional staff specifically program managers) attempted to lay a foundation for continuity and perpetuity of programs, the elected officials undermined their efforts. It seemed as if the elected officials intentionally blocked program implementation and in effect sabotaged potential development program successes. As a result of MYWO elected officials and professional staff discontinuity, MYWO members -- national staff and local women -- were frustrated because they had no idea of the organization’s day-to-day agenda and much less its long range goals and direction. There
was virtually no intraorganizational communication, laterally or hierarchically. Moreover, veteran MYWO members were disturbed with what they perceived to be a shift of the organization's focus from Kiano's time of “social welfare and development” to “politics and individual financial aggrandizement” under Onsando.

During the Onsando administration, MYWO’s interorganizational relations, specifically regarding financial matters, were kept very secret, even from the assistant national treasurer Mrs. Mjomba. Mjomba was used by MYWO for her reputation and connections, and was disregarded after her usefulness had ceased to serve the elected officials. Mjomba, as a result, tried to use resources at her disposal to get back at them.

Beyond some program managers, no one really seriously asked about the finances of the organization. This research demonstrated that women sometimes wondered about the monies, but the consensus was they were going to be lied to by MYWO leaders (and KANU) anyway, since deceit and corruption were the norm. The women were also fearful to ask. There might be repercussions. Basically, MYWO was not accountable to women groups and MYWO members, and KANU was not accountable to MYWO. Moreover, MYWO was far from transparent. Overall, MYWO’s interorganizational relations lacked accountability and transparency. In addition, MYWO was a closed organization, very vulnerable to graft.

This research demonstrated that in MYWO’s intraorganizational relations, MYWO elected officials were disconnected from grassroots women; and, they were fierce opponents of MYWO’s professional staff. In MYWO’s interorganizational relations,
MYWO elected officials were controlled and manipulated by KANU. Moreover, MYWO was schizophrenic toward foreign donors.

In interorganizational relations with foreign donors, MYWO elected officials spent most of their energy either courting them for aid or criticizing their restrictions on aid, often simultaneously. MYWO likened their restrictions on aid to the imposition of foreign ideals -- which in 1991-92 were liberalization of the Kenyan economy and the introduction of multiparty politics. After foreign donors publicly tied economic liberalization and political reform to aid in November 1991, they were constantly at the center of government and MYWO criticism -- as MYWO was the KANU government's mouthpiece. Foreign donors were blamed for everything from failed projects, to MYWO's and KANU's poor performance reputations, to donor withdrawals, to inciting local people toward popular unrest and demands for multipartyism. Ironically, MYWO engaged in no self-criticism or self-evaluation, nor did it take a critical look at the KANU party and government with regard to the issues aforementioned.

One of the factors which led to the schizophrenic posture that MYWO elected officials took vis-a-vis foreign donors is that instead of focusing on program development and sustainability for the organization, MYWO elected officials focused more on "getting money" from donors. As a result they did not lay a solid programmatic foundation for the organization. Instead, they uncritically embraced donors programs and projects as long as donors "brought money." This research found that MYWO had no indigenous projects. MYWO projects were basically extensions of government projects, or foreign donors projects, or residuals of Kiano's projects, or a combination thereof. The motto of the
elected officials in most instances was “get the money and then worry about the project.”

As a result, donors did not have to do much “imposing” of their “foreign” development agendas in their interorganizational relations with MYWO. MYWO, and by extension KANU, showed virtually no resistance, as long as donors brought money.

MYWO’s schizophrenic behavior was obvious in its shifting positions in its interorganizational network. MYWO did not operate in the static manner that Jonsson describes of a focal or linking pin organization in the “game theoretical notion of interdependence.” Instead MYWO was in constant flux. To potential foreign donors, MYWO misrepresented itself as an indigenous women’s NGO leading development in Kenya, thus it took a position at the top of the development hierarchy -- directing its partners. For KANU’s benefit however, MYWO had to take both the lead position in interorganizational relations to secure monies from foreign donors, and also a subservient position to KANU simultaneously to demonstrate that it knew its “rightful place.” As a women’s organization, it was MYWO’s responsibility to take a subservient position to KANU men, as politically, economically, socially and culturally women could not be equal to men. Thus in interorganizational relations, because of gender differences MYWO could not really be an equal partner to KANU, although it had to give the impression that it could.

Anthropology’s Female Private Sphere and Male Public Sphere Theory argues that social, political and economic life are indeed gendered. That is, the public sphere of politics and economics remains overwhelmingly, both effectively and symbolically, the domain of men; and the private sphere of the home, domesticity and childcare remains
overwhelmingly, both effectively and symbolically, the domain of women, albeit increasing
women's participation in public life. This was, in fact, the case with MYWO and KANU.
Moreover, some MYWO elected officials rationalized their subservient position, and
justified KANU's generally denigrating, patronizing and misogynistic statements and
actions. Despite male and female interactions in public life (though limited), men and
women live separate realities.

Staff

Just as MYWO national headquarters was not interorganizationally linked to
women's groups at the grassroots, MYWO program managers (i.e., professional staff) at
the national level were not very closely linked with MYWO elected officials either.
Whereas the elected officials were more closely tied to KANU than to the staff, the staff
was more closely linked to the grassroots than to the elected officials and KANU. That is,
the staff was only closely linked to the grassroots in those areas where their programs
were operational.

The national MYWO staff seemed also to have stronger linkages to the foreign
donors than it did to the Kenyan government, even though some of MYWO's programs
are appendages of government programs. In spite of this, there was generally little
acknowledgement of the role of Kenyan government ministries in and their contributions
to development partnerships. MYWO staff relied much more, both financially and
psychologically, on foreign donors for project support and implementation. Moreover,
MYWO staff seemed to work more closely with foreign donors than with MYWO elected
officials. Their psychological reliance on foreign donors seemed so great that it explained, to some extent, why there was little belief at MYWO headquarters in project sustainability if donors withdrew.

Some national program managers, in their capacity of development professionals, were very frustrated with MYWO's politics in its interorganizational relations. Moreover, they were anxious about the funding for their programs -- because funding uncertainty was problematic. On one hand, some of the MYWO staff took an apolitical stance trying to keep politics, development and personal feelings separate. On the other hand however, some of the staff were activists who linked politics, development and personal criticism. That is, they took stances against MYWO elected officials and KANU for deceiving women and undermining MYWO's development potential. They blamed KANU for placing a group of incompetent elected officials at the helm of MYWO. They argued that these women did not possess the most rudimentary of skills to run the organization. They blamed these women, and by extension KANU, for MYWO's poor performance in intra and interorganizational relations. This ignited a great deal of friction and animosity between the two groups -- elected officials and particularly program managers at the national level. Elected officials had no proof which would exonerate them from the charges against them.

Intraorganizational relations were somewhat different at the sub-national levels. Generally, at the these levels, program staffs were not very knowledgeable about MYWO headquarter activities with its partners. Elected officials and staff worked together more harmoniously, though not always. Although the subnational levels looked to the national
headquarters for direction, national headquarters could not provide any because national elected officials had no development direction and clear organizational goals. Moreover, MYWO elected officials at the headquarters did more to block networks for activities and communication, than they did to facilitate them.

With regard to interorganizational partnerships, the program managers readily acknowledged that the government was at the head of the development partnerships. They had no illusions that women led these partnerships. They acknowledged that hierarchical relations existed instead of equality between partners. They differed however in that some saw the government as apolitical and they justified the government's position at the head of the partnerships. They argued that the government merely served as a watchdog of Kenya's development, intervening only on policy matters to ensure the implementation Kenya's "Masterplan" for development. Others did not justify the government's maneuvering toward the apex of development partnerships. They saw the government as basically conspiring to 1) control development partnerships, and 2) maintain political, economic and patriarchal power, as well as foreign assistance at all costs. They argued that the government was not really concerned about grassroots development or women.

Although most of the staff readily acknowledged that MYWO was not autonomous from KANU, some program managers tried keep up appearances that it was. They tried to rationalize MYWO's autonomy within a merger. They also did a cheerleading routine about the successfulness of their projects. This "successfulness" and "autonomy" propaganda proved to be strictly for the benefit of the foreign donors in order
to continue to get funding. Program managers and other staff were fully aware of MYWO’s programs/projects limitations and the organization’s relative overall unsuccessfulness and ineffectiveness, but they were not likely to reveal this, if this meant donors would be lost. The national accountant was most categorical in affirming that MYWO could not be autonomous from KANU and USAID.

Foreign Donors

Regarding MYWO’s interorganizational relationship with foreign donors, it is critical to note the diversity of the foreign donors involved in IOR relationships. They are a diverse lot, ranging from foreign governmental organizations to businesses. Despite their differences, foreign donors providing assistance to Kenyan NGOs tended to be lumped into a generic category of “NGOs,” even by persons involved in planning and implementation in the development milieu in Kenya. This generic categorization all donors as NGOs is problematic for research for several reasons: 1) It does not allow for determining exactly what this NGO phenomenon really is; 2) It does not provide for unraveling the kinds of relationships that develop and exist within MYWO’s relational environment; and 3) It does not facilitate the assessment of future IOR development prospects while “NGOs” remain critical partners in development cooperative endeavors.

Ironically, none of the foreign donors that funded MYWO development program/projects are technically non-governmental organizations (NGOs) according to the working definition of “NGO” provided in Chapter 2. This raises questions as to the amorphousness of this NGO phenomenon. See Figure 6 for the (re)classification of
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**FIGURE 6. FOREIGN DONORS FUNDING MYWO PROGRAMS / PROJECTS**
foreign donors. For example, Coca-Cola is a private business enterprise. It is not an NGO because it operates primarily for profit. In addition, none of the other foreign donors were significantly unassociated from their home governments in terms of funding, therefore they are not genuine NGOs either. Moreover, many of their development agendas, including monitoring, were also closely tied to their home governments, again eluding the NGO definition.

For example, USAID, Peace Corps and the World Bank are all direct governmental organizations. That is, USAID, created in 1961 by the Foreign Assistance Act, is the primary economic assistance agency of the US government which implements broad foreign policy objectives of the US in the developing world. The Peace Corps, also created in 1961 by the Peace Corps Act, is a US technical assistance organization created to foster skill transfers and cultural exchange between the US and the developing world. The World Bank is a specialized agency of the UN and an international organization created at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 to assist in the reconstruction and development of member territories. Today, the World Bank’s focus is on providing economic assistance to developing countries. The World Bank, USAID and the Peace Corps are classified as IGO, GO and GO respectively as Figure 6 illustrates.

Pathfinder International claims to be a private philanthropic organization -- an NGO, yet as of the late 1980s Pathfinder receives over 90% of its funding from USAID and it also implements USAID policies. Hence, Pathfinder is quasi-governmental. CEDPA has not provided information on its funding and agenda matters, yet previous studies as well as my field interviews indicate that CEDPA relies heavily on USAID funds
and USAID's family planning agenda. Moreover its agenda reportedly changes based on US congressional modifications of financial allocations for family planning programs abroad. \(^1\) CEDPA also is quasi-governmental.

GTZ and KAF, both German-based organizations, are quasi-governmental as well. GTZ is both a business enterprise and a public corporation. It works directly with the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in the scope of German Federal Government's development policy and is subject to government regulation. \(^1\) KAF receives most of its funding from the German Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry for International Cooperation. It receives hardly any private contributions. \(^1\) Although KAF claims not to be tied to the German government or the German Christian Democratic Movement of which Konrad Adenauer, the first German Chancellor of the West German government, was a principal founder, its activities and fiscal operations today are monitored by the German government.

Marttaliitto of Finland is also quasi-governmental. It receives 75% of its financing from the Finland government and it subject to government regulations. In Finland, Marttaliitto is regarded as a state agency. \(^1\)

All of these organizations with the exception of Coca Cola depend substantially on their home governments for their operating funds, and four of them -- USAID, Peace Corps, World Bank and Pathfinder -- are directly beholden to their home and member governments in pursuance of their objectives. These organizations are part and parcel of state and interstate governing apparatus in that they are relatively permanent and powerful institutions which establish and enforce policy outlines and priorities.
With regards to agenda adoption and implementation, USAID adopts and implements policies of the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) whose specific charge is "policy planning, policymaking and policy coordination"... "through the effective use of US bilateral development assistance programs and US participation in multilateral development organizations." 14 Thus the World Bank works with USAID. In the case of MYWO’s MCH/FP program, the World Bank provides financial assistance to MYWO in terms of loans, and defers to USAID for program implementation. Peace Corps volunteers work independently of USAID, but are able to request financial assistance in the form of grants from USAID for certain “training” projects. Pathfinder also implements USAID policies, even though it sometimes resists -- albeit unsuccessfully. 15

Three organizations -- GTZ, KAF, Marttaliitto -- claimed that they were not beholden to their home governments' foreign policy agendas but this research found their claims questionable. The reason is that their funding and their future operations with MYWO in Kenya were, to varying degrees, determined by their home governments. It is important to note however that these organizations were not as closely linked to their home governments as the organizations previously discussed.

KAF, for instance, was accountable to the German government for the monies spent for MYWO’s LD program. When KAF could not demonstrate to the German government that the monies were put to “good” use during the last program period between 1988-1991, the program was not funded for the next period. MYWO had not turned in required accounts records for this period.
GTZ and Marttaliitto also depended on their home government’s approval of their continued interorganizational relations with MYWO. The renewal of their operating budgets were based on evaluations of program performance by their home governments.

Marttaliitto appeared to be the most transparent foreign donor with its agenda. The focus was on food, nutrition and environmental technology so as to protect against times of hardship. At the onset of this project Marttaliitto was contributing 60% of the funding for the project and the Finnish government was providing 40%. During the course of the project, Finnish government increased its contribution to 75% and Marttaliitto contributed 25%. GTZ also appeared to have no underlying agenda.

This raises some important questions: What constitutes “substantial” contributions from a Northern government to a Northern NGO? At what point is the latter’s autonomy compromised? Does the compromise of its autonomy mean it is dependent on the state? Does it mean that it adopts the policies and agenda of the home state? If that is the case, can foreign private donors be transparent? To what extent do Northern governments - Northern foreign donor relationships differ, for certainly Northern governments differ in their ideologies and approaches to development in the South? Are the approaches and intentions of development different among government agency donors and private agency donors that are substantially funded by governments? Why do governments assist private agencies?

It is important to note that this research found that some donors, such as Marttaliitto and GTZ, had genuine commitments to grassroots development. As a group however, the donors’ objectives varied widely. Few donors were as transparent as
Marttaliitto. More donors had political and clandestine objectives such as the promotion of liberal democratic and capitalist ideologies, sometimes at the expense of development (albeit for the short term they would argue). These donors, which include USAID and the World Bank, are the stalwarts and watchdogs of the global interventionist strategy of this decade which have dictated the adoption of structural adjustment economic reforms and multiparty liberal democratic political reforms for the Third World.

On one hand, it appears that MYWO's national leadership complied with foreign donor program/project implementation, without substantial input often, in exchange for foreign donor assistance and its spillovers -- spillovers which enhanced their personal and class interests. On the other hand, it appears that foreign donors cooperated in development partnership endeavors with MYWO, in spite of MYWO's organizational problems, in order to continue the implementation of their projects. Concomitantly, and maybe even more importantly, foreign donors perhaps maintained relations with MYWO to specifically have influence in Kenya's internal political and economic affairs. MYWO (and KANU) maintained relations with foreign donors to have access to their finances. Thus, these partnerships between foreign donors and MYWO were ones of mutual dependence and exploitation between the partners.

MYWO appeared to have more autonomy from some foreign quasi-governmental donors in program/project implementation -- those not associated with GOs and IGOs -- i.e., Marttaliitto, GTZ and KAF -- than it did from the business Coca Cola - Kenya. MYWO appeared to have least autonomy from foreign and international governmental
donors - i.e., USAID and the World Bank, and from quasi-government donors associated with GOs and IGOs - i.e. CEDPA. 18

Generally, foreign donors overall - government, quasi-government and business - seemed to have more power than MYWO in development partnerships as they could implement programs/projects more-or-less as they pleased, and/or they could end partnerships when they chose. For example, USAID had the most power in determining family planning issues relative to all governmental and quasi-governmental organizations involved in family planning, because of USAID’s bilateral terms and arrangements with the Kenyan government. There was also strong donor solidarity among foreign donors - governmental and quasi-governmental - which they used as a political bargaining chip to flex their muscle and get what they wanted in Kenya and with MYWO. For example, foreign donors banned together in support of NORAD during NORAD’s disagreements with the Kenya government which led to Kenya’s eventual severance of diplomatic ties with Norway in 1990. Foreign donors, as a group, refused to take over MYWO projects that had been funded by NORAD. Some of those projects are still not covered. It is important to note that while donors flexed their muscle to show their strength in interorganizational relations, and while the Kenyan government demonstrated its sovereignty, it is people at the grassroots who suffered because they no longer received development-related services.

This research further determined that foreign donors have more power in enforcing the adoption of their policies than both MYWO and the Kenya government. MYWO’s and the Kenyan government’s dependence on foreign donors for assistance, coupled with
the lack of will of their leaders, make them unlikely to effectively resist foreign donor demands. Although this runs contrary to what many African state sympathizers such as Kinyanjui, Kobia and Tandon argue, it is partly by choice that the Kenyan government and MYWO do not effectively resist.\(^9\) As demonstrative of this, the Kenyan government’s themes and policy framework of its Sixth Development Plan for the years 1989-1993 fundamentally mirrors the strategies for structural adjustment proposed by the World Bank and the IMF, with apologies by the government of its poor performance to date.\(^{20}\)

In light of this, it is no wonder that most foreign donors seemed to “bring” their development agendas with them. When understood that MYWO implements supplemental programs to that of the Kenyan government which has embraced World Bank and IMF policies, it is then clear that MYWO has no indigenous grassroots women’s agenda, partly because the Kenyan government has no indigenous national agenda. When understood that MYWO receives the bulk of its funding for its operations and programs from institutions that create policy priorities for major multilateral institutions and bilateral institutions which heavily influence governments, it is then clear that MYWO can not really have an indigenous agenda. When understood that KANU and MYWO leaders are in class positions which allow them to benefit economically and politically from “going along” with foreign donor agendas to get more assistance, it is then clear that MYWO does not desire to have an indigenous development agenda. Moreover, it is clear that in KANU’s clever maneuvering to capture foreign donor funding through MYWO, it also captured a global interventionist development agenda that can not be easily, if at all, modified.
Just as MYWO has no real autonomy from KANU, this research found that MYWO has virtually no real autonomy from foreign donors either, particularly since MYWO is a resource dependent partner in development relationships. Given that 79% of MYWO's funding for all of its operations comes from USAID calls this issue to question. Can MYWO be autonomous when it receives such an overwhelming amount of its resources from a foreign donor? To further complicate this matter, governmental and quasi-governmental foreign donors do not appear to have complete autonomy from their home governments either. Smith, Lethem and Thoolen, and also deGraaf and Tworse separately, have demonstrated quite correctly that organizations must interact in a larger political and economic environment which extends beyond the immediate environment of development implementation. They argue quite effectively that in that larger environment Northern donors are necessarily connected to their home governments. This research has further shown that the extent to which they are connected - Northern donors and Northern governments - differs. Whether or not this makes a difference for the nature of interorganizational development relationships that develop and for development outputs and outcomes in the South is a question that must be probed.

This connection between Northern donors and their home governments proved to be a fundamental part of MYWO's interorganizational relations. This research demonstrated that interorganizational relations become hypocritical when foreign donors withdraw funding or make threats thereof because of MYWO's affiliation to KANU. The reason is that these foreign donors themselves are affiliated to their home governments or political parties, many of them pushing policy objectives and ideologies on behalf of their
governments. It is further hypocritical that these donors make charges that KANU is using MYWO, when many foreign donors are themselves using MYWO. In many instances it was the fundamental belief that MYWO could be used that was the critical motivation for the creation of development cooperative partnerships with MYWO in the first place.

To label foreign donors' criticisms and their interorganizational behavior hypocritical is not to suggest that KANU's affiliation of MYWO was justified; nor is it to suggest that KANU should not be justly criticized for its exploitation of MYWO. To label their criticisms and behavior hypocritical is merely to point out that in the politics of development cooperation in Kenya there are conflicting standards by which development partners are supposed to abide. On one hand, it is acceptable for Northern donors - private and governmental - to be associated with their home governments, but on the other hand is not acceptable for the Southern NGOs to be associated with their home governments. Moreover, a major undercurrent in development "cooperation" is that Northern donors, on behalf of their governments, have a right to exploit their "partners," and have a responsibility on act on behalf of and/or be exploited by their home governments. Southern NGOs and governments however do not have those same rights, and perhaps should feel "morally" opposed to exploitation. It is almost as if we do not expect the North to oppose exploitation, as we legitimize their exploitative actions "on behalf of their government" or "necessary for their security." When the South does not oppose exploitation however, but instead participates in it, we refer to their actions as amoral and corrupt. Stated differently, somehow we expect the North to be exploitative and sinister, and the South to be non-exploitative and demure.
This research found that these double standards offer an outmoded, overly simplistic framework for understanding IOR and the politics of development cooperation in Kenya. That is, IOR in Africa between the North and the South can no longer be analyzed from the perspective that the North’s governmental and non-governmental institutions are the calculating villains and the South’s governmental and non-governmental institutions are the innocent victims. IOR relationships and networks have become extraordinarily complex and IOR political actors too strategically interdependent and manipulative of their environment to be understood and explained by unsophisticated models. More applicable models must, for instance, consider African elite women’s power maximizing strategies in IOR.22

Kenyan Government Ministry Personnel

The Kenyan ministry personnel represented an often ignored link in development interorganizational relations. They were a very frustrated local civil service who had been drawn into this development network reluctantly. As a group, they remained significantly delinked from MYWO's interorganizational relations, to a large extent by choice. The female personnel particularly despised MYWO. They also remained subjectively delinked from "the government."

The ministry personnel were, for the most part, very knowledgeable, highly skilled development professionals, except for the MCSS who were not technically skilled. They were university graduates, and many prided themselves that they were not politicians. Of all of the groups of interviewees, they had the most realistic sense of grassroots
development issues. Ironically ministry personnel represented the lowest rung of development consultants. Their commitment to development, for the most part, was surprising and commendable considering their very low rates and undependability of pay. Further surprising is the fact that most of them did not complain. These findings are the diametric opposite of what one might expect from a bureaucracy in the Third World, based on our cumulative knowledge of bureaucratic behavior.

Although each Ministry had a unique relationship with projects that may have involved MYWO, it was near consensus that MYWO was despised by most of the ministry personnel. MYWO was seen as nothing but KANU. They were very critical and loathsome of MYWO. Their belief was that MYWO had become an inept parasitic organization with which they would have no involvement. They felt that MYWO was a time bomb that would blow up with KANU. The ministry personnel saw MYWO as neither autonomous from KANU nor indigenous. They regarded MYWO's disaffiliation as mere symbolism to remain tied to foreign donors.

MYWO was not considered a partner in development by ministries. Partnerships were identified as existing between the foreign donors and government; and the Ministries which were the implementing arm, notably separate and apart from MYWO networks.

Ministry personnel were also critical of foreign donors. They believed that providing foreign technical experts was a way to impose a foreign agenda on Kenya and development groups.
Other Relevant Interviewees

The ministry personnel views corresponded somewhat with the views of the unintended group of interviewees who emerges on the magendo as “other relevant interviewees.” They believed that historically MYWO had been detached from grassroots women. They argued that MYWO had never really caught on at the grassroots. Since colonial times of European leadership to the time of its disaffiliation from the colonial state and its Africanization MYWO had been a middle class women’s organization.

This group was not surprised that KANU had affiliated MYWO. The pattern of the government was to control entities that it could not destroy. Bratton has noted that one of governments’ reactions to hegemony-threatening organizations is co-optation. 24 For the Kenyan government, it would have been politically and financially unfeasible to blatantly destroy MYWO, as public opinion would have condemned KANU as sexist and non-populists; and foreign donors would have withdrawn all or substantial parts of funds used for Kenya’s development. (The latter assuredly carried the most weight in the government’s decision.) Thus, it was to KANU’s benefit for its purse and public opinion to become a member of development cooperative partnership with donors and MYWO. KANU manipulated MYWO in order to do so, by imposing itself on MYWO. Thus, KANU was seen as a manipulator of the women’s organization. Foreign donors were also seen as manipulators of MYWO and the Kenyan government, using their finances to push their foreign policies and ideologies. MYWO leaders, who were KANU, were seen as interorganizational co-conspirators.
This research found that this group felt that all of the partners in development realized their relative gains within development cooperative arrangements -- foreign donors receiving most and women receiving least. They argued that if MYWO were smarter and diversified its funding, it would have more power with foreign donors than it did. They argued that MYWO could have taken some actions to increase its relative power vis-a-vis donors, but they were blocked by doing so by constraints in their interorganizational relations with KANU. There was also a possibility that MYWO could design development cooperative partnerships so as to have some degree of autonomy from foreign donors as other Kenyan organizations had done. With KANU constraints, with a self-interested MYWO elected leadership who were not development conscious, and with all partners in development realizing some relative gains within development cooperative arrangements however, there was no desire on MYWO’s part to arrange development cooperative partnerships to this end.

This group argued that foreign donors could not be trusted, as they neither were committed to development in Kenya, nor did they provide development assistance without strings attached. The unspoken exchange for foreign assistance was that Kenya national planners not engage in national policy formulation that would deviate from World Bank strategies, nor challenge the conditions of the donors who set the development agenda globally. In 1991, the foreign donor agenda was no longer subtle as they directly linked economic and political reforms as essential conditions to be met in order to receive aid.

Their cynicism extended to the Kenyan government and MYWO as well, as they could not be trusted either. Both government leaders and MYWO leaders had
significantly contributed to the very conditions which “necessitated” the call for reform conditionalities by donors. They were part and parcel of the graft, the inefficiency, the lack of accountability and transparency, the repression, and the gross mismanagement of the Kenyan state and the KANU government. They were the very folks who had benefitted and entrenched their class positions from these ills. In light of this, civil servants could not be effective in implementing development as its top echelon, who were KANU stalwarts, were amenable to being bought off. Moreover, average Kenyans felt powerless to fight those institutions they saw as the enemy -- the World Bank, the IMF, KANU and its appendages including MYWO. The forces against them were totally inequitable.

Contributions to the Literature

A Reconsideration of IOR’s RDM

Considering these findings, this research demonstrated that the creation of development partnerships between foreign donors -- governmental, quasi-governmental and business, the Kenyan government and MYWO was grounded in very specific reasoning, which included but was not exclusive to resource dependencies. Advocates of the resource dependency model such as Cook, Mulford, Burt and Blau focussed primarily on 1) the objective need for resources as the basis for the creation of interorganizational relations, and 2) the nature of the interorganizational relationships that resulted from creating unequal resource interdependencies. As this case study of MYWO and the organizations in its relational environment has demonstrated, there were other propelling
forces which provided the bases for establishing interorganizational relations. These were subjective motivations for the creation of interorganizational relationships which underlie organizations' objective resource needs, and which overtime shape the character of the interorganizational relationship. For instance, in this case study, the primary reasons for establishing interorganizational development partnerships were:

1) MYWO's lack of financial, technical and material resources to implement its programs and projects on its own, at the level that the donors provided;

2) the KANU government's lack of financial, technical and material resources to implement its programs and projects on its own, at the level that the donors provided;

3) foreign donors lack of organizational access in Kenya which could provide them the necessary clientele to serve and consumers and supporters of their programs;

4) MYWO's desire to have financial partnerships and bring more monies into the country;

5) MYWO's elected leadership desire to benefit financially as individuals;

6) KANU's desire to bring more money into the country as to benefit financially as individuals;

7) KANU's nonprioritization of development programs with government resources;

8) foreign donor countries' desire to have presence and political influence at the grassroots in Kenya.

Reasons 1, 2, and 3 are supported by the RDM, as they represent the objective quantifiable resource needs of MYWO, foreign donors and the Kenyan government.
Reasons 4 through 8 however pose challenges for the reevaluation of the RDM. MYWO and its partners in its relational environment clearly had subjective, selfish and sometimes sinister motivations and goals, such as greed, domination, control and the maximization of power, for entering into interorganizational exchanges that RDM does take into consideration. Less apparent secondary motivations than reasons 4 through 8 are: MYWO elected leadership wanted 1) to provide financial and job security for themselves and select staff; 2) to solicit monies for KANU; and 3) to give the impression for working within the rubric of “women in development” in Kenya; KANU wanted to 1) capture and control MYWO and foreign donor finances; and 2) give the impression of integrating women in development; and foreign donors wanted to implement humanitarian, environmental, diplomatic and/or political programs/projects in Kenya most times with economic and political conditions attached. Thus, not all of their interorganizational exchanges were resource driven -- objectively defined. This calls to question the overall explanatory power of IOR’s RDM in the politics of development cooperation.

A Reconsideration of NGOs’ Two Schools of Thought: A View Toward an Alternative Model -- The Web of Deceit

The findings of this study also indicate that neither of the two schools of thought on NGOs -- the optimist school which ignores power differentials in relationships, or the pessimist school which maintains the villains and victims perspective solely -- offer accurate and acceptable explanations for development cooperative relationships in Kenya. The reason is that the optimist school is too romantic, and the pessimist school’s
Southern victim - Northern villain dichotomy is too simplistic. This research found that what is really at issue in the politics of development cooperation between MYWO, the KANU government and foreign donors is a development game of users grounded in exploitation, expedience, hypocrisy, convenience and corruption, in which MYWO and the Kenyan government and foreign donors in its relational environment all play a part -- and the victims and villains are intertwined between the North and the South and between women and men. In this interorganizational network of development partners exists a "Web of Deceit" in which all of the partners are relative strategic winners, and in which those who are the consistent losers are the women at the grassroots. They are the losers because it is on their reputation that the "women in development" ideology is based. It is on their reputation that bogus development cooperative partnerships have been created, as grassroots women are the imaginary direct beneficiaries of development programs implemented by MYWO and its donors in its relational environment.

This research demonstrated that as KANU uses MYWO to secure monies from foreign donors, a chain reaction occurs -- foreign donors use MYWO to implement their programs and projects; MYWO national elected leaders use women at the grassroots to build a development reputation; MYWO elected leaders use KANU and foreign donors for personal gain; foreign donors use MYWO and KANU to implement market-based economic strategies and multiparty political systems; and ultimately the web of deceit becomes more intertwined and enlarged while the presumed goal of "development" is ensnared and forgotten. Generally, this research determined that there was very little interorganizational sincerity between and among most partners in development; and there
was no indigenous grassroots agenda to which they addressed themselves. Most partners had a very selfish agenda which had little or nothing to do with development at the grassroots. For the leaders of MYWO and KANU party, interorganizational relations had to do with personal enrichment and political power, literally at the “expense” of foreign donors. For many foreign donors, interorganizational relations ultimately had to do with maintaining the divisions between the North and South through the implementation of paternalistic, often ill-conceived policies (such as structural adjustment) that are fallaciously called “development.” The attitude of suspicion that Hirono spoke to is part and parcel of IOR relations. Mutual hostility is disguised however, though this disguise was unraveling in MYWO’s and KANU’s actions toward foreign donors in 1991-92. The issue of mutual insincerity which Hirono and the other literature did not address was most critical and problematic. 27

To expose this Web of Deceit is not to suggest that there are not individuals and organizations both in the North and in the South who are sincerely committed to development. There are, but they are mere pawns in a very sinister anti-development game. Those committed to development are the real development practitioners -- women at the grassroots, local Kenyan ministry personnel, and some smaller foreign donors (for there does exist a hierarchy among donors). 28 These groups are strongly committed to people-centered grassroots development, but they are a much smaller and less powerful force that operates on the periphery of the politics of development cooperation. As their awareness grows, many of them -- women, civil servants in the ministries and foreign donors -- delink themselves from the international and national development networks.
Instead of delinking, Nyoni and Schneider separately argue that rural people and local governments ought to be actively included and remain in interorganizational development partnerships with foreign donors. Nyoni, for instance, urges INGOs to link with local groups instead of promoting "international developmentalism,"\(^{29}\) and Schneider admonishes governments to train their civil servants and motivate them to be functional participants in development implementation.\(^{30}\) How this is to be done however is a question still unresolved. This study, for instance, has demonstrated the extent to which people at the grassroots and local governments are actually marginalized and overshadowed in the politics of interorganizational development cooperation.

This research further found that issues of integrity, authenticity and will lay at the very foundation of development cooperative partnerships. For example, at a very fundamental level, donors, both KANU and foreign, did not respect MYWO as an organization, much less consider it a partner in development -- not necessarily because it had fewer resources, but because it had no principles or integrity. This only exacerbated the fact that foreign donors and KANU were already less inclined to have respect for MYWO in IOR as it is a women's organization.

In this web of deceit, MYWO presented itself as an NGO committed to development of women and of Kenya, but lacking of the necessary resources to implement development projects/programs. This research found the MYWO is a chameleon with multiple personalities, and the NGO persona was one of its facades. MYWO at the national level was basically a tea club for KANU women; it was a political appendage of the KANU party and government. MYWO was not a committed grassroots development
NGO for women though it posed as such. All of the critical political actors in development partnerships knew that MYWO was not an authentic development organization. Even women at the grassroots knew it. MYWO was, in effect, not a women’s organization with a women agenda. Its leaders had undermined its genderedness and patronized women at the grassroots. Fundamentally, MYWO leaders had no will.

KANU had helped to create this veneer for MYWO with the complicity of MYWO elected officials. Some donors acknowledged this and despite MYWO’s denial, they decided to withdraw from MYWO -- i.e., Marttaliitto. Other donors knew it but did not acknowledge it because they wanted to continue their work -- development and/or political -- i.e. USAID. Some donors might even have been drawn to MYWO purely because it is not a committed development women’s organization.

KANU -- the party and government -- also lacked integrity. It has a long standing history of dishonesty, fraudulence, untrustworthiness, and craftiness. As an institution, its reach had extended far beyond democratic governance to autocratic control and repression peaking in its relations with MYWO and foreign donors during the period of my research. KANU wanted to dominate all institutions -- political, economic, social, cultural, developmental -- and was effective at managing none. KANU was paranoid of potential opposition, including women’s organizations. Its was threatened that women’s power (real and imagined) would loosen the pillars of patriarchal control. It was also threatened (perhaps most threatened) by foreign donors and their economic and political power. Like MYWO, KANU leaders -- party and government -- did not have the will to implement development in Kenya.
Foreign donors, like MYWO, are also chameleons. Many of them became involved in development partnerships under the guise of desiring to implement grassroots development by providing financial and technical assistance. It is no surprise that many of them attempted to bypass Kenyan government corruption, mismanagement and red tape by going directly to NGOs, as African states have generally failed in their attempts to implement development. As a result however, foreign donors have not only undermined the sovereignty of the Kenyan state by going directly to NGOs, they have also contributed to the creation of the myth that "Northern and Southern NGO partnerships are leading development in Africa."

Moreover, many foreign donors have dubious development goals since most originate in countries whose governments have tainted histories with the South in general and Africa in particular. As a result, many questions linger with regard to their integrity and will. Cynical minds might even argue that foreign donors have used MYWO and KANU dependence and greed in interorganizational partnerships in an attempt to capture the Kenyan state.

With regard to the issues of autonomy and dependence, both of which suffer from imprecise definitions, this research has made the following observations. Historically, MYWO has not been truly autonomous. Even when not officially affiliated to the government between 1961 and 1987, and after 1991, MYWO was still tied to the state by its leadership who would were wives and relatives of KANU men. Because of gender discrimination these women were not accepted members of KANU. Thus, for
some women, to be MYWO leadership meant that she was one step closer to KANU. Dependence was somehow positive and functional for them.

MYWO had little autonomy from most foreign donors in terms of determining policy or funding during the period of my research as well. When MYWO did have some degree of leverage or autonomy, they were to confer with and defer to KANU for direction since MYWO was beholden to KANU for “saving it from itself.” Thus, MYWO had no indigenous policy or agenda of its own. The irony of it all is that although MYWO was to defer to KANU, Kenyan government policy was really foreign donors’ policy in the first place. Thus, the overall policy framework was basically that of the World Bank and the IMF, for the Kenyan government had been placed and had placed itself into a position of adopting the development policies of these IGOs.

This suggests that in many instances it is useless to negotiate “policy” in development “partnerships” between the North and the South as it is foreign donor policy that the partners will most times embrace anyway, whether they agree with this policy or not. Much of this also depends of the foreign donor’s relationship to the global policy making institutions of the World Bank and IMF, and the will of Southern leaders. Many times, in development interorganizational relations, the lesser partner has little real option to say no. As this research demonstrated, the lesser partner may not even have the will and the vision to find out what the foreign donor policy and goals are, as this partner is too often blinded by the monetary assistance it will invariably gain.

In the development cooperative partnerships in Kenya, foreign donors most times set the stage with policy initiatives and supporting financial, technical, material assistance.
MYWO was the vessel through which many foreign donors channeled their ideas and their monies. KANU was the cosmetic regulator of the partnership and the real coveter of foreign donors support of MYWO. KANU and foreign donors had little direct communications with matters relating to MYWO. MYWO was the conduit.  

MYWO was the ideal choice for this arrangement with foreign donors and KANU, despite its not being a bonafide NGO. Both foreign donors and KANU could capitalize. As women, MYWO was likely to be reliable in implementing their “development” agenda; and as corrupt politicians, MYWO leaders were not likely to be resistant to the demands of their partners. Moreover, women at the grassroots, silenced by fear and limited information would not challenge them.

MYWO was ideal in this “development cooperative partnership” because women are an effective buffer between the imperial strong arm of many foreign donors on one hand, and the easily bruisable male ego of the African state on the other hand.

Galtung argued, quite insightfully, over one decade ago, that international organizations, such as the World Bank and its related organization the IMF would be exposed to increasing criticism as to their imperialist roles. He stated,

... international organizations may become giant mechanisms through which people in the stronger states that started these organizations can imprint a message on the people of the weaker states: ‘You must have this ministry and that profession, this hobby and sports association and that ideological movement, you must produce this and that in order to be full-fledged members of the World.’

The extent to which African states and African elite women would support this move by international organizations, as their co-conspirators, was underestimated.
PART II: Limitations of this Study, Recommendations and Conclusions

Limitations of this Case Study

This study is limited in that it is a case study of one national women's organization and its relational environment in one African country. Although it contributes much because of its depth to the understanding MYWO and its interorganizational relations, it does not provide the benefits of cross-national comparisons.

degraaf, however, has provided some observations of IOR in Zimbabwe which offer a springboard to begin systematic comparisons cross-nationally. He has made three observations which support the patterns which I have observed in my study. One, he has noted both weak and strong linkages between NGOs and government. Two, he has observed that NGOs look more to foreign donors rather than to government for assistance. Government is seen more as a higher political authority rather than a resource donor. Three, women's NGOs tend not to have particularly feminist consciousness. They do not push for changes that positively affect the condition of women.

Whether or not these patterns will be replicated in other countries will be determined as other studies involving IOR, NGOs and women will be conducted. There is a text forthcoming which promises to bring further insight into this matter --Julie Fisher's, Cultivating Civil Society: NGOs, Donors and Governments. From its contributions, along with those of deGraaf and those of this study, we may then consider whether or not this cumulative knowledge will be able to generate some lawlike generalizations or theories about IOR, NGOs and women.
Recommendations for Practitioners and Scholars

For those in the field in Kenya, implementing development programs/projects, the web of deceit is woven so tightly, one almost feels defeated before tackling it. For the grassroots to experience development, however, that is people's participation without fear in bettering their life conditions and prospects, in an enabling environment free from structural violence of institutions and ideologies in both their immediate and extended relational environment, the web must be tackled. Recognizing that the web exists is the first step. Delusions that development as currently implemented through MYWO in Kenya is anything but a web of deceit must be discarded, if the development game is ever to end. Women's groups' reputations (real and conjured) should no longer be used by national organizations such as MYWO, political parties, governments or foreign donors. Women need a bonafide women's organizations if they are to continue to work in women's groups. MYWO is but a sham and new elections are not likely to produce significant changes.

Attitudes and practices of women, MYWO leaders, government leaders and foreign donors must also change. Women must realize the potential that they have and hone it, for they contribute tremendously to development. Women at the grassroots, MYWO staff and leaders must release their beggars' frame-of-mind and relinquish their emotional dependency on "money from the outside." As Nzomo argues women must also rise above passivity toward men and institutions - domestic and foreign. Moreover, women must stop using this thing called "culture" to justify their own oppression.
The attitudes and practices of MYWO and KANU elites must also change. We must be prepared for more deceit however, for when we ask them to acknowledge the development game and end it, we are asking them to reprove their “wabenzi” and comprador class positions. They are not likely to change as they already realize their anti-development ways. They are cognizant that they are part and parcel of this game. They are the linkage which allows the web of deceit to remain firmly entrenched.

With regard to foreign donors, many of them maintain attitudes and actions which must change if development in Africa is ever to occur while they are present on the continent. The indirect forces that support those foreign donors who may have paternalistic and/or clandestine motives must also change. International relations between the North and South are structured such that for a foreign donor to effectively change its behavior and goals in interorganizational relations, the fundamental relations between nations must change. For relations between nations to change, world systems and world values must change. Basically, the entire environmental context within which foreign donors and organizations exit and function must change. The reason is that organizations are not mere products of themselves; they are products of a larger interconnected political and economic environment.

In addition, development must be left to the people for them to guide, and for them to be assisted by trained development professionals, not politicians.

As this study attempted to bridge literature gaps between four seemingly disparate bodies of literature, future research should further meld this literature and close this gap. Gender should be central to further investigations. More research should be done on
women's participation in development which raise questions as to the legitimacy, indigenousness, and preponderance of women's organizations. Nzomo, for example, demonstrates that only a small fraction of women in Kenya -- one out of eleven -- belonged to women's groups at the close of the 1980s decade. The women in development ideology and its translation in program implementation and results for women should also be more closely scrutinized.

Regarding NGOs, there is much work to be done for understanding this phenomenon in the North and in the South. NGOs remain, to a large extent, anomalies to development practitioners and scholars. They have yet to be clearly defined and analyzed as institutions involved in development.

Research should also focus more on the interdependence of world systems -- governmental and non-governmental. The world's move toward globalism into the twenty-first century necessitates this. Whether or not functional autonomy of women's or other organizations can exist in this interdependence is a critical question to be investigated. Esman and Uphoff have already argued that functional dependence of NGOs on states is important for development in the South.

Lastly, scholars must reconsider the definitions of "development success" and "development failure." This research found that determining project success or project failure was not given high priority in the field -- among the partners in development. Though academics might think that determining success or failure of a program/project is important (and it is), this is not what the real development cooperation "game" on the ground is about. "Development" on the ground among partners is more about foreign
donors and national political elites satiating their political and personal appetites than it is about meeting needs and enabling populations at the grassroots. For scholars, another reconsideration of what is meant by “development” is imminent.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, this study suggests to development practitioners and scholars that Africa’s peril will not be solved by NGO partnerships. Development optimists are romanticizing the prospects for development that NGO partnerships are projected to bring. Development pessimists are not hopeful for Africa’s development, yet they do not have an accurate understanding of the politics of development cooperation. While they put blame for lack of development on the North, they do not recognize the culprits in the South. They must be recognized as part and parcel of the peril if Africa is to ever develop.

The study demonstrated that women are being used by a multiplicity of sources in a very dangerous global patriarchal development game. Some of the users are men (and women) from the North as well as men from the South; some of the users are women from the South -- all of them participants in this patriarchal game of money, power and politics. Feminist theory and development theory must reconcile that class and political considerations by women often override their gender solidarity considerations. Both Staudt and Nzomo separately have implied this in their work. Thus, the women in development ideology must be reevaluated. We must also ponder the degree of Northern paternalism that is built into “women in development.”
This study further illustrated that there are motivating factors for establishing interorganizational relations other than resources necessities which IOR’s Resource Dependency Model does not capture. Greed, domination, control and power are those critical factors. They proved to be the axes on which interorganizational relations turned.

This study further indicated that autonomy of Southern NGOs may not be as important a consideration as functional dependence, if that dependence brings organizational elites personal satisfaction. Generally, autonomy of a Southern NGO may not be an important organizational feature, as leaders may not have the will and commitment to development and to people in the first place.

The (im)balance of power in interorganizational relations is firmly entrenched, reflecting power differentials in international relations between nations. NGOs “partnerships,” are not interested in challenging these power differentials. Instead, they are mere microcosms of these differentials. In light of this, real development cooperation can not exist if there are no challenges to the international power structure. Women from the South are not likely to challenge “the system.”

As Africa remains ensnared by this Web of Deceit created by the politics of development cooperation, there is little hope that the continent will become self-reliant. In this Web of Deceit, those who will remain most exploited are those at the grassroots, for there is little chance that interorganizational relations can be sufficiently restructured to bring about non-exploitative and appropriate assistance to the grassroots. African national elites --specifically male state leaders and patriarchal-identified women in NGOs such as
MYWO, the oldest women's NGO on the continent -- remain that critical link which will not only allow, but will also invite, continued exploitation of the continent.

Hence, we must ask ourselves -- is there a way for development to take place in Africa outside of the type of interorganizational relationships that we have discussed? Is there a way to bring about development without Northern financial assistance? Perhaps further research will offer some answers.
1 Fatton, “Gender, Class and State,” 49.


3 She was merely a figurehead as she was a very prominent woman in Kenya, in KANU and among women. Mjomba was a veteran women’s leader, one of the few women recognized as KANU, and also the mayor of her municipality of Voi.


6 Charlton, Women, 200.


9 Keyonzo interview 1992; Pathfinder International in Boston did not respond to repeated letters and phone calls I made to them to get more information.

10 Adar interview 1992; Charlton, Women, 208.


12 Conversations with Charlotte Kessler, Assistant Director of the KAF in Washington, D. C.

13 Conversations with Anneli Halonen, Cultural Counsel of the Embassy of Finland in Washington, D.C.

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15 Keyonzo interview 1992; I also witnessed USAID strong arm Pathfinder while being disturbed in 3 separate meetings in progress which had to be cancelled because of USAID demands.


17 GTZ’s agenda had developed as a response to a United Nations Conference on Energy Crisis in the 1970s. The SEP-Jiko project was aimed at reducing Kenya’s spending on oil imports and focussed on the efficient use of renewable energy resources in-country. GTZ collaborated with the Kenya’s Ministry of Energy.

18 With the quasi-government donors of Marttaliitto, GTZ, and KAF -- Marttaliitto offered advice and training to MYWO program managers when requested; and GTZ and KAF adopted a “hands-off” policy in the day-to-day implementation of the program/projects they funded. With Coca Cola, MYWO would be strictly monitored and penalized for not following established guidelines by Coca Cola. MYWO’s relations with USAID and the World Bank, and the quasi-government donors they funded were all different, but they all required constant supervision, reporting, monitoring and meeting. It is important to note that only when Peace Corps volunteers received grants from USAID that the foregoing occurred.

19 These sympathizers represent the pessimist school as presented in Chapter 2.


21 Smith, Lethem and Thoolen discuss the larger environments within which organizations operate. Their arguments are presented in Chapter 2. deGraaf addresses organization’s environment in Zimbabwe. Tworse looks at North - South partnerships.

22 Pringle’s notion of women’s counter strategies of power alludes to this.

23 There were some ministry personnel who did complain of low rates and delays in pay. They tended to be civil servants with Master’s Degrees who lived and worked in urban areas, and who had studied abroad.

24 The other reactions are 1) Monitoring and Registering, 2) Coordination and 3) Reorganization, Dissolution and Imprisonment. See Bratton, “The Politics,” 23-35.

25 These are discussed at length in Chapter 2.

26 Both schools of thought which framed this research are presented at length in Chapter 2.
27 Hirono’s perspective in IOR is presented in Chapter 2.

28 A hierarchy of donors was clear. USAID was at the apex -- directing Pathfinder, CEDPA and Peace Corps when volunteers received grants. The World Bank deferred to USAID for implementation. GTZ, KAF and Marttalitto were regarded as a lower caliber of donors. Unlike USAID, they did not establish policy. Coca Cola was also a lower caliber of donor. Of the donors, USAID and the World Bank were clearly the policy makers. The carried the most weight and received the most deference from all communities.


31 Garilao in “Indigenous NGOs” argues that Southern NGOs are more than mere conduits. MYWO defies his argument.


33 Julie Fisher, Cultivating Civil Society: NGOs, Donors and Governments (Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, forthcoming)


36 Esman and Uphoff, Local Organizations : 267.
APPENDIX A
SUB-HYPOTHESES

Following are the sub-hypotheses which branch from the 4 major hypotheses that were proposed for testing in this research:

1.  
   a) The greater the financial assistance MYWO receives from foreign donors, the less autonomy MYWO will have to formulate and implement its indigenous agenda, hence the less successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.
   
   b) The greater the technical assistance MYWO receives from foreign donors, the less autonomy MYWO will have to formulate and implement its indigenous agenda, hence the less successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.
   
   c) The greater the financial assistance MYWO receives from the Kenyan government, the less autonomy MYWO will have to formulate and implement its indigenous agenda, hence the less successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.
   
   d) The greater the technical assistance MYWO receives from the Kenyan government, the less autonomy MYWO will have to formulate and implement its indigenous agenda, hence the less successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.

2.  
   a) The lesser the financial assistance MYWO receives from foreign donors, the more autonomy MYWO will have to formulate and implement its indigenous agenda, hence the more successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.
b) The lesser the technical assistance MYWO receives from foreign donors, the more autonomy MYWO will have to formulate and implement its indigenous agenda, hence the more successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.

c) The lesser the financial assistance MYWO receives from the Kenyan government, the more autonomy MYWO will have to formulate and implement its indigenous agenda, hence the more successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.

d) The lesser the financial assistance MYWO receives from the Kenyan government, the more autonomy MYWO will have to formulate and implement its indigenous agenda, hence the more successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.

3. a) The more directive the assistance MYWO receives from foreign donors, the less autonomy MYWO will have, hence the less successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.

b) The more directive the assistance MYWO receives the Kenyan government, the less autonomy MYWO will have, hence the less successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.

4. a) The more non-directive the assistance MYWO is able to receive from foreign donors, the more autonomy MYWO will have, hence the more successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.

b) The more non-directive the assistance MYWO is able to receive from the Kenyan government, the more autonomy MYWO will have, hence the more successful MYWO development projects and programs will be.
APPENDIX B

SURVEY INSTRUMENT: LIST OF OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

A. Local Women at the Grassroots

1. How did this project come into existence?

2. Did you (the local women) request the project currently being implemented? From whom? In what setting? If not you, then who?

3. If you requested the project, what role did you play in the formulation of the project?

4. Do you agree with the way in which this project is being implemented? Why? Why not? What would you change?

5. Who do you credit for the presence of this project in this area? its successes? its failures? Is it MYWO, FNGO or the government? Why?

6. Who takes the leadership role in the implementation of the project? Who makes the decisions, the changes? Should they be the leaders?

7. Who are the assistants or partners in the implementation of this project? What role do they play? Would you change any of the partners in development or their roles? Why? Why not?

8. What power do the partners in development yield relative to each other? Do some partners have more power than others? Are they equals? Why?

9. Do you think that this project is a success or failure? Why? Why not?

10. What defines project/program success? failure?
11. What are your overall aims in the implementation of this project? Have they/are they being accomplished? Why? Why not?

12. Does your participation in this project affect your power as a woman? How?

13. Who do you credit for the overall development of Kenya? Why?

B. **MYWO Officials And Staff**

1. What is your role in development as an NGO?

2. How do you choose which development projects to implement? Who is involved in the formulation of these projects? In what way?

3. What is your relationship with FNGOs and the government? How are relationships with FNGOs and the government created? Are they partnerships? How would you describe them?

4. Who decides which FNGOs will be involved and in what capacity? Who decides how much financial and technical assistance FNGOs and the government will provide? Are there tradeoffs for this assistance? If so, what are they?

5. Are development projects affected when relationships with FNGOs and government are formed? In what ways? Are there changes from the indigenous agenda? Who approves these changes? Why are the changes made?

6. Are there consequences for 1) MYWO, and 2) development prospects when agenda changes are made? What are they? Are there consequences for not making agenda changes? What are they?

7. Do FNGOs and government make demands or requests as partners in development? If so, describe them. What are their reasons for demands/requests?

8. Are there areas of negotiables and non-negotiables between MYWO and FNGOs and governments before and after demands are made? What are they? Why do they exist? Has your organization ever withdrawn from a development partnership? What
were the circumstances? Has the government or FNGOs ever withdrawn from a
development partnerships? What were the circumstances and the impacts?

9. How would you describe the arrangement between the partners in
development? Why? Is it an equal partnership or does a hierarchy of institutions exist?
Which is more conducive to development? Does any one partner take the lead in
development? Which one? Why? Should one? Which one?

10. How autonomous is MYWO? Why? Why not? Does this have an impact on
development relationships and prospects?

11. What percentage of MYWO’s projects are successes? failures? Are the
specific Nutrition, MCH/FP, Energy and Environment, Leadership Development projects
successes or failures? Why?

12. What defines project/program success? failure?

13. To which institution or combination of institutions do you attribute project
success? project failure? the overall development of Kenya?

14. Do development successes occur because of MYWO partners, or inspite of
them? Why?

15. What suggestions would you make for more effective approaches to
development with regard to the NGO, FNGO, government relationship?

16. In what way does involvement with MYWO affect the power of women?

17. How has MYWO impacted gender equality in Kenya?

18. Does MYWO have a feminist agenda?

19. What are your feelings toward the NGO Coordination Act? the NGO
Standing Committee? Is MYWO part of the standing committee? Why/why not?

20. What are your feeling toward MYWO’s affiliation with KANU? What has
been the impact of this affiliation?

21. What do you see for the future of MYWO?
22. What does MYWO need for its continued success?

C. **Foreign Donors**

1. What is your role in development as a FNGO?

2. Why are you involved in the development of Kenya?

3. What are your organization's goals? What are the objectives in the projects and programs you assist?

4. How and when do you communicate your goals and objectives to MYWO? Do you communicate them into the implementation phase of development projects? What happens when your goals differ from those of MYWO?

5. Are there areas of negotiables and non-negotiables when you forge a relationship with MYWO?

6. How would you classify MYWO? Is it an autonomous body with an indigenous agenda? Why? Why not? What impact does this have on your partnership and your financial and technical assistance?

7. How would you describe the arrangement between the partners in development? Why? Is it an equal partnership or does a hierarchy of institutions exist? Which is more conducive to development? Does any one partner take the lead in development? Which one? Why? Should one? Which one?

8. What percentage of MYWO's projects which you have assisted in funding been successes? failures? Are the specific agriculture, health, income-generating projects which I am studying successes or failures? Why?

9. What defines project/program success? failure?

10. To which institution or combination of institutions do you attribute project success? project failure? the overall development of Kenya?
11. Do development successes occur because of a) FNGO presence, b) government presence? inspite of them? Why?

12. What suggestions would you make more effective approaches to development with regard to the INGO, FNGO, government relationship?

13. What effect does FNGO participation with MYWO have on gender equality in Kenya? Why?

D. Government Bureaucrats

1. What is the government's role in development?
2. What is the government's relationship to a) MYWO, and b)FNGOs?
3. Does the government perceive MYWO's development goals complementary to its own? What happens when those goals are not seen as such?
4. Is MYWO viewed as an autonomous body? Why? Why not? What does this mean in terms of their taking independent development initiatives? Does this have an impact on the financial and technical assistance the government provides?
5. Under what circumstances does the government enter into development relationships with MYWO and FNGOs? Are there areas of negotiables and non-negotiables when the government enters into a development relationship? Has the government ever withdrawn from a development partnership? Under what circumstances?
6. How would the government describe the arrangement between the partners in development? Why? Is it an equal partnership or does a hierarchy of institutions exist? Which is more conducive to development? Does any one partner take the lead in development? Which one? Why? Should one? Which one?
7. What percentage of MYWO's projects has the government assisted in funding been successes? failures? Are the specific agriculture, health, income-generating projects which I am studying successes or failures? Why?
8. What defines project/program success? failure?

9. To which institution or combination of institutions does the government attribute project success? project failure? the overall development of Kenya?

10. Do development successes occur because of a) the government, or b) FNGOs? or inspite of them? Why?

11. What suggestions would you make more effective approaches to development with regard to the INGO, FNGO, government relationship?

12. What effect does the government's relationship with MYWO have on gender equality? Why?
APPENDIX C
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Women's Groups

Tupange Women Group
Eastlands

Amani Women Group
Eastleigh

Mugano Women Group
Embakasi

Bibironi CBH/C/CBD Project
Kiambu, Laari Division

Ngutu MYWO Store
Muranga, Ngutu Location

Manyatta Women Group
Garissa

Iftin Women Group
Garissa

Kabiro Women Group
Kawangware

Women's Health Group
Kawangware

MYWO Wholesale Store
Kakamega, Kipkarren
Kilogwa Women Group
Wundanyi, Mwenda Sublocation

Kaloleni Women Group,
Voi Division

Jitegimia Women Group
Voi Division

Voi Bakery Women Group
Voi Division

Furaha Women Group
Mombasa District

Maisha Women Group
Mombasa District

Shinyalu Women Group
Kakamega District

Kamwangi Women Group
Muranga District

Mwanda Women Group
Wundanyi District

Karura Forest Women Group
Kiambu District

Posho Mill Group
Machakos District

Furaha Women Group
Nairobi

Starehe Women Group
Nairobi

Ilesi Pottery
Kakamega District
MYWO Elected Officials and Staff

Elected Officials

Wilkista Onsando
MYWO National Chair

Jane Kirui
MYWO National Executive manager

Major Joan Mjomba
MYWO Assistant National Treasurer

Mrs. Dar
Former MYWO National Treasurer

Florence Gichuhi
Former MYWO National Chair

Sophia Bare
Northeast Provincial Secretary

Elizabeth Kyule
MYWO District Chair - Machakos

Aisha Busaidy
MYWO District Chair - Mombasa

Mary Chizi
MYWO Divisional Chair - Malindi

Mwamahamis Omar
MYWO Divisional Treasurer - Likoni

Millicent Oriyo
MYWO Village Chair - Embakasi

Staff

Jane Kirui
MYWO National Executive manager

Paul Bosire
MYWO National Accountant
Dorcas Kamau
MYWO Leadership Development Program manager

Jane Adar
MYWO Maternal Child Health and Family Planning Program manager

Leah Muuya
MYWO Nutrition Program manager

Juliet Makokha
MYWO Special Energy-Jiko Program manager

Leah
MYWO National Archivist

Kimanthi
MYWO Leadership Development Assistant Program manager

Seth Ndumbali
MYWO Maternal Child Health and Family Planning Assistant Program manager

Mary Gakere
MYWO Fieldworker, Muranga

Khadijah
MYWO Leadership Development Fieldworker, Garissa

Haron Musee
MYWO Accountant, Kakamega

Aisha Mohammed
MYWO Leadership Development Fieldworker, Mombasa

Josephine Mutua
MYWO Leadership Development Fieldworker, Machakos

Anna Nzomo,
MCH/FP Fieldworker, Machakos

Felix Muli
MYWO Accountant, Machakos
Donors: Foreign

International Governmental Organizations (IGOs)

Peter Godwin
World Bank

International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs)

Nelson Keyonso
Pathfinder International

Governmental Organizations (GOs)

Polly Mott
United States Agency for International Development

Michael Carson
Charisse Tillman
Carla Ellis
Norma Brewster
Gina Bowler
Shanti Parikh
Calvin Taylor
Ken Hayashi
United States Peace Corps

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Patricia Ferguson-Smith
Center for Population and Development Activities

Noel Chavanji
German Technical Agency

Helmut Hellman
Konrad Adenauer Foundation

R. Owindi
Marttaliitto
Businesses

Ben Waweru
Coca Cola

Donors: Kenyan Government Ministry Bureaucrats

Eunice Kyalo referred by Linus Ettang
National Council for Population and Development of the Ministry Home Affairs

Nancy Njuriu
District Agriculture Officer, Kiambu

Mary Kungu,
Divisional Agriculture Officer, Laari Division, Kiambu District

Willis Wasonga
Locational Agriculture Officer, Laari Division, Kiambu

Anne Okoth
Agriculture Home Economics Officer, Garissa

Tom Owuri
Livestock Officer, Garissa

Mr. Muthigani
Special Appointment with the Ministry of Agriculture
Irrigation Rehabilitation Specialist, Garissa

Mr. Wahoti,
District Social Development Officer, Muranga

Millicent Okiya
Social Development Officer II, Muranga

Joseph Kuria
Registrar of Groups, Muranga

Margaret Ndewa
District Social Women’s Officer, Garissa

Fred Ombajo
District Social Development Officer, Garissa
Peter Mwatati  
District Social Development Office Staff, Voi

Fatma Mohammed  
District Social Development Officer, Malindi

Phydilliah Mborig  
District Social Women’s Officer, Wundanyi

Donald Ndau  
Social Development Officer, Wundanyi

Christine Kachi  
Social Development Officer, Kakamega

Ms. Waweru  
Ministry of Agriculture Staff

Walter Obiero  
Ministry on Home Affairs Staff on loan to MYWO

Other Relevant Interviewees

Willie Mutunga  
Advocate and former Detainee

Ezra Mbogori  
Undugu Society

W. Karugu  
Assistant to District Commissioner, Muranga

Z. O. Ogongo  
District Commissioner, Machakos

Captain Raphael Mwakesi  
St. John’s Church - World Vision Staff

Mwakingali Women’s Group  
Voi

Mr. Mtwanguo  
Former Provincial Officer, Coast Province
Martha Mwenya
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

Brenda Rakama
Danish Agency For International Development (Dannida)

Jennifer Gathoni
Women Groups Member Non-MYWO

Felicity Karuthi
Kenyan Woman Professional formerly employed with a Japanese NGO, currently employed with NGO Medicos Sin Fronteras - Spain

Mama Fatuma
Mama Fatuma Children’s Orphanage, Eastleigh

Dr. Eric Mngola
Physician

Irungu Houghton
Kenyan Professional, Activist and Research Consultant

Ignatius
Coca Cola Staff, Nkuru

Rosemary Chemutai
CID/Kalenjin spy

Memba Muriuki
Advocate

NGONG Discussion Group
Ngong

Atwas Ah- Amed
Kenyan Postal and Communications Employee

Wildebeeste Environmental Workshop International
Lamu, Athi River Kenya and Washington, D. C.

Doris Amman
Hans Siedel Foundation
APPENDIX D
FOREIGN DONORS

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

USAID is a governmental agency of the United States International Development Cooperation Agency. Its function is to provide economic and foreign assistance through grants to foreign governments and private educational and interest groups for research, employment and training programs, as well as materials for those programs, in the developing world. Since the passing of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act USAID programs focus on: health care, population reduction, education environment, agriculture, energy, economic growth, human resource development, housing and political freedom and good governance. In 1973, special attention called to focus AID policies to address the needs of women in “foreign countries,” thus the creation of the WID component of USAID.

USAID is Kenya is an AID Mission because its economic assistant is “major.” The Mission is subject to the direction and guidance of the US Ambassador to Kenya.

USAID is the principal funder for the Maternal Child Health and Family Planning Program (MCH/FP) of MYWO National Office via Pathfinder international. This program provides health care services for mothers and children, while focussing on family planning as it primary program. USAID supports other MYWO operations as well.
USAID cooperates with Pathfinder International, World Bank, CEDPA and the National Council on Population and Development (NCPD) of the Kenyan Government, and MYWO as the focal organization to implement the MCH/FP Program.

World Bank

The World Bank is a specialized agency of the United Nations which is intergovernmental and international. It states that its aim is to raise the standard of living in the developing countries by conveying financial resources from the "developed" world through loans. In this case, the World Bank assists in providing financial loan assistance for the implementation of the MCH/FP program. All of its resources for lending come from member "industrialized" countries. The World Bank is one of the contributors to the MYWO MCH/FP program. The World Bank's partners in this program are USAID, Pathfinder, CEDPA, and NCPD Ministry of Health, and MYWO is the focal organization.

United States Peace Corp

The United States Peace Corp was established by the Peace Corps Act of 1961 and was deemed an "independent "agency by Title VI of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act. Peace Corps Volunteers do however act as representative of the United States government abroad. They are also subject to the governance of the United States.

The Peace Corp was established to promote world peace and friendship, to assist in training human resource power in foreign countries and to foster understanding between different peoples of the world. Basically, volunteers aim to assist in the local and national development of their host countries.

Peace Corps' linkage to MYWO was through various projects in which volunteers worked, such as Small Business Development, and Water Engineering. Peace Corps
volunteers did not work as direct attaches to MYWO. Work with MYWO groups was purely coincidental. Their hosts or partners in development were the Kenyan Government Ministries, mainly the Ministry for Culture and Social Services. The Ministries placed volunteers at their work sites. Peace Corps volunteers had varying, but generally very limited interaction with MYWO and their foreign donors.

Pathfinder International

Pathfinder International began as a private fund, initially created in 1957 by Dr. Clarence Gamble, a philanthropist. Its aim is to increase the number of individuals in developing countries who have access to family planning.

Through the MYWO MCH/FP Program, Pathfinder provides family planning services, teaches technical training and supplies family planning commodities. According to its Kenyan representatives, Pathfinder currently receives 93% of its funding as grants from USAID. It considers itself and is considered by the donor community an NGO.

Center for Population and Development Activities (CEDPA)

CEDPA is based in Washington, D.C. It defines itself as a private organization whose objectives are to improve the management skills of family planning and health officials of developing nations. Since its incorporation in 1975, it has relied heavily, though not solely, on USAID funds.

CEDPA is one of the donors of MYWO’s MCH/FP program.
**German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ)**

GTZ defines itself as a private organization. It works on some of its projects with the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation of Germany. GTZ provides the funding for the women and energy project which was launched in 1983 as part of the Special Energy Programme of the Kenya Ministry of Energy, sponsored by GTZ-German Technical Cooperation. This project focuses on improving the living and working condition of Kenya’s rural areas by reducing fuelwood requirements in general. In particular, this project focuses on the production and distribution of energy saving stoves, Maendeleo jiko.

GTZ lists as it most active partners: Ministry of Energy, MYWO, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry for Culture and Social Services, various church organizations and women’s groups. As the foreign donor for the jiko project, GTZ allocates to MYWO a percentage of the budget for “jiko activity.”

**Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF)**

This Foundation is considered a private non-governmental organization, yet its programmes are financed out of Germany’s public funds. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation states that it aims to promote political education, and practices international cooperation through exchanges of information and contacts and through the provision of aid on a partnership basis. In the developing world, the Adenauer Foundation cites as its goals:

1) liberal democratic political reform;
2) economic liberalization toward the adoption of market strategies;
3) advancement toward self-help, and,
4)  cultural and religious orientation of individual and group development.

The Konrad Adenauer Foundation funds MYWO's Leadership Development program. MYWO and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation are the partners in this program.

Marttaliitto

Marttaliitto of Finland became involved in the development of Kenya in 1981 as a women's non-governmental organization based in Finland. It states that its aim is the development of responsible and enlightened populations in home economics so that families and communities are able to withstand hardships. Marttaliitto does this through teaching nutrition, diet, gardening, and food preservation. Marttaliitto is a women's home economics extension organization.

Marttaliitto supported the Nutrition Program of MYWO. Other partners that it coordinated with are: Ministry of Agriculture and Home Extension Offices, though informally. In 1984, the Finland government decided that it would supplement Finland NGOs -- NGO contribution 60% to the government’s contribution 40%. In the late 1980s, the government began giving 75% and the NGO 25%, with the stipulation that there would now be “conditions” the Finland NGOs must meet.

Coca-Cola

Coca-Cola is a transnational corporation which manufactures, markets and distributes carbonated soft drink concentrates and syrups. Coca-Cola soft drink products have been sold in the United States since 1886, and currently they are sold in more than 195 countries in the world. Kenya is one of them. Coca-Cola also manufactures, produces, markets and distributes juice products.

Coca-Cola-Kenya is an independent business in Kenya. It bottles and sells Coca-Cola soft drink products. Coca Coca Enterprises Inc. headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia
maintains that the Coca-Cola-Kenya operation is separate from Coca-Cola enterprises. Kenya bottlers are local businessmen and over 95% of the employees are reportedly Kenyan citizens.

Coca-Cola—Kenya Office is one of the partners of the MYWO kiosk project, along with MYWO, Nairobi City Commission and the Trade Bank.
APPENDIX E
KENYAN GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES

The following Ministry descriptions are taken from a history of KANU documented in 30 Great Years of KANU Handbook 1960-1990 written by the KANU National Secretariat.

Ministry of Health

The Ministry of Health is charged with the responsibility of providing quality health care for all wananchi (citizens) so that they may lead economically and socially productive lives. The major health care policies are: 1) Increased Coverage and Accessibility of Health Services in Rural Areas; 2) Consolidated Urban, Rural, Curative and Preventative Services; and, 3) Increased Emphasis on Maternal/Child Health and Family Planning Services. As this paper is concerned with MYWO’s Maternal/Child Health and Family Planning program, the government then stipulated the following: The 1992 target was to reduce population growth from 3.5 to 3.0 and infant mortality from 87/1000 live births to 77.3/1000 live births.

Ministry of Agriculture

This Ministry’s objectives include increasing food production, growth in agricultural employment, expansion of agricultural exports, resources conservation and poverty alleviation. In its current operations, the broad areas assigned to the Ministry include crop production, protection and marketing, land preparation (irrigation and
drainage), soil and water conservation, agricultural inputs and agricultural education and extension. Most closely related to this topic of research is the Ministry's initiative aimed at assisting small scale farmers boost production of food crops and adopt methods/techniques for protecting crops against insect pests, birds and other environmental contaminants. Home economics extension offices are charged with this responsibility.

This Ministry worked with MYWO's Nutrition and Jiko projects.

**Ministry of Livestock Development**

This Ministry is responsible for: 1) the implementation of an efficient animal production and marketing system; 2) the provision of appropriate livestock technology for dairy, beef, white meat, honey, etc.; 3) the provision of suitable land and water resources for animal production; and 4) the development of supportive institutional infrastructure for pastoralists. This Ministry works closely with the Ministry of Agriculture, thus indirectly with MYWO.

**Ministry of Culture and Social Services**

This Ministry has 7 departments. It lists as its functions: 1) Social Welfare and Community, 2) Community Development, 3) National Library Services, 4) Vocational Rehabilitation, 5) Women's Bureau, 6) Youth Centres, 7) Adult Education, and 8) Sports. MCSS states that it created programs for the enhancement of the quality of life of Kenyans after independence. For example, in 1976 the Government created the Women's Bureau to coordinate women development activities in collaboration with various women organizations, including MYWO.
Ministry of Home Affairs and National Heritage

This Ministry is charged with the implementation of policies on: prisons, the NCPD, children, probation services, archives, refugees, museums, lotteries, betting and gaming control. Various departments within this Ministry are charged with the implementation of specific policies.

This ministry worked with MYWO's MCH/FP via NCPD. It also loan one of its economists to MYWO for program/project evaluation purposes.
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