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BUILDING FOUNDATIONS TO SETTLE PROTRACTED CONFLICT: THE INDO-PAKISTANI CASE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Tinaz Pavri, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1994

Dissertation Committee

D.A. Sylvan

C.F. Alger

M. Hermann

R.K. Herrmann

Approved by

Adviser

Department of Political Science
To my parents
For their belief that I could do anything
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An award from the Graduate School enabled me to conduct interviews in India and thus acquire an understanding of the problem that words cannot always convey.
VITA

March 11, 1966 .................. Born, Bombay, India

1987 ............................ B.A., St. Xavier’s College, Bombay

1989 ............................ M.A., Ohio University Athens, Ohio

1989-present .................. Graduate Assistant, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science

Studies in: International Relations Conflict and Peace Comparative Foreign Policy Transnational Relations
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Chapter I
Introduction

This chapter introduces my proposal for a foundation-building stage as the key to the de-escalation and settlement of crises that arise within the context of protracted conflicts. It makes a case for intervening at a stage which is prior to prenegotiations as they are currently defined. It reviews the existing literature on prenegotiations upon which this theoretical extension is based, introduces specific hypotheses that will be tested on the role and strategy of third parties and on communications structures and processes during foundation-building, and places these hypotheses in the context of work already existing in these areas.

The Study of Conflict

The understanding, management and resolution of conflict is considered by many as the essence of International Relations. It has been the general domain of peace scientists, conflict analysts and scholars of strategic studies, even though their specific foci and
recommendations have differed. Classic studies of conflict, a single solution for which remains ever elusive, have included the macro approaches of Rummel (1972), Wright (1955), Choucri and North (1974), Kenneth Waltz (1979) and Richardson (1960). Choucri and North identify three processes - domestic growth, competition for resources and superiority in arms - as being ultimately responsible for conflict. Rummel and Wright posit dyadic relationships of either conflict or cooperation based on socio-economic, positional and other variables. For arms race theorists, weapons define conflict,\(^1\) while neorealists have tended to confine their analyses to the inter-state structure and have employed the state and the distribution of power as their primary explanatory variables (Waltz, 1979, for instance).

Yet, these traditional approaches have failed to advance our knowledge of conflict in two major respects. They have generally failed to aid in our comprehension of a strain of invidious, globally prevalent and, in recent times, more highly "visible" conflict - protracted, ethno-religious conflict.\(^2\) As we have seen, in the post-Cold War

\(^1\) It should be noted that these theorists do recognize that the causes of conflict differ and that arms races are often the symptoms rather than the roots of conflict.

\(^2\) Different scholars have emphasized different factors in their characterization of protracted (social) conflict. In this study, I define the term as those conflicts which are typified by elements of shared history, ethnic or religious strife, nationalism, or any combination of these elements. In this chapter, I do not consider
world, this is the type of conflict that has manifested itself in almost every region of the world and which threatens to pose the biggest problem to peace in the future. Secondly, in part because they have generally failed to distinguish among conflicts, these approaches have neglected to offer methods of de-escalating, managing or resolving conflict specific to its different types. Apart from these classic studies, some scholars have now begun to address concerns in these areas. However, as we will see in the rest of this chapter, much remains to be done in terms of the testing of hypotheses and the building of cumulative knowledge and theory.3

This dissertation proposes to examine over time several sub-cases from one protracted conflict, the Indo-Pakistani, and to offer a new stage of "foundation-building" as the key to the de-escalation and settlement of conflicts such as these. The "foundation-building" stage is proposed in an attempt to answer the puzzle posed by a consideration of the larger conflict - why prenegotiations were successfully engaged in and war avoided in some of the sub-cases of

it necessary to enter into the largely unresolved debate on such contested terms as ethnicity and nationalism.

3 For the most part, this dissertation defines conflict narrowly - as a situation characterized by hostility and violence or with the potential for such hostility and violence. It recognizes that not all conflict is violent or necessarily negative, and that some forms of conflict might indeed be inevitable.
crisis, while they failed to transpire in others. India and Pakistan, in spite of their rocky relationship, have nevertheless not been in a state of constant war with each other. Why was war averted in some crises but not in others? What can we learn from both types of sub-cases? Were foundations to negotiate conflict successfully built early in some escalating crises but not in others? The elements of this puzzle will be more carefully specified and elaborated in subsequent sections of this chapter.

Although the focus is on the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the sub-cases of crises that have been selected over its half-century-long span offer sufficient variation in outcomes or dependent variables to enable rigorous and empirical comparison. Hence, we are in effect analyzing not one, but several cases. On the other hand, the very nature of this project namely its focus on protracted conflict, demands that one such conflict be examined over time if we are to truly grasp the element of protraction. Hence, the need for numerous and comparable cases must be balanced with the need to comprehend the protracted nature of conflict.

---

4 Rather than defining crises as existing solely at a certain point in time (say, when conditions like short time, high threat, probability of violence etc. are all met), I view a crisis as a continuum from greater to lesser, in this dissertation. This addresses otherwise distracting questions raised by whether some of the "crises" analyzed here are really "pre-crises," or when a crisis ceases to be a crisis and becomes a war. Merritt's views (in Frei, 1982) in this regard are instructive - he advocates a focus not on the crisis per se, but rather on the different dimensions and extent of the problems that are being considered at different times.
I believe that employing sub-cases of crises from the Indo-Pakistani conflict best achieves this.

Further, the defining elements of this conflict - memories of past history and grievances, ethnic and religious sentiment - are common to many other conflicts of a protracted nature like the Azeri-Armenian, Sinhalese-Tamil or the more current Serbian-Muslim conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Results and recommendations from the analysis of the Indo-Pakistani conflict will, I argue, be generalizable to these other protracted conflicts that essentially share the same specifying elements and that plague the world in our time. Hence, one of the offerings of this project will be recommendations to policy-makers and other actors involved in such conflict, both as third parties and participants, about third party strategies that will be most likely to bear the greatest fruit, about the nature of and role that communications, both direct and indirect, play in such conflicts and what can be done to enhance the role of communications, about the amount of leverage, if any, third parties should employ in attempting solutions and about the necessity of third party even-handedness. Essentially, this project will offer to interested parties a list of variables that have appeared to work in the Indo-Pakistani case, and the opportunity, thereby, to employ these variables in other, similar contexts.
In addition, the study will attempt to contribute to existing knowledge in two other ways. First, through the testing of specific hypotheses, it will add to and refine recent attempts at theory-building in the fledgling areas of conflict de-escalation and resolution at pre-negotiating stages and the importance of timing in such efforts. Second, it will offer a unique comparative view of the forty-six year old Indo-Pakistani conflict that focuses on the causes, consequences and prospects of its protraction. Although there have been a number of studies of the various wars that have engaged India and Pakistan, most of them have tended to be either heavily descriptive or polemical and non-empirical [see Mankekar (1966); Chopra (1974) for instance]. Further, they have tended to view each crisis or war that has arisen between the two sides as a unique phenomenon rather than as events in the progression of a larger conflict, thus failing to consider the possibility that relations and experiences of the past might have an impact on present crises.

Hence, this dissertation is an ambitious effort that employs several sub-cases from one explosive conflict in offering some answers to a critical problem of our time, the existence and intransigence of protracted, ethno-religious conflict.

**Settlement and Resolution: A Clarification of Terms**
In general, scholars studying protracted conflict are agreed that the reasons why such conflict continues over extended periods of time have as much to do with those indicators that preoccupied traditional analyses of conflict and that are readily captured in aggregate data -- population, technology, arms -- as they do with individual and society-wide psychological, historical and cultural factors that condition how the enemy has been viewed by each side for decades, and how it continues to be viewed (see Azar, 1990; Volkan, 1988; Rothman, 1990 for instance). A study of such conflict appears to demand, then, a comprehension of the identities, perceptions, needs and fears of both sides in addition to a comprehension of the concrete issues, and its de-escalation and eventual resolution appear to require an emphasis on formal and informal negotiation and communication at relatively early phases of developing crises.

What is meant by the resolution of conflict has been the subject of much theoretical and conceptual scholarly debate. A working definition of the terms resolution versus settlement or de-escalation is therefore critical. My study views the resolution of protracted conflict as a prolonged (more than a decade) cessation of the hostile manifestations of the conflict that have existed in the past, and the substitution of some measure of institutionalized
cooperation in their place.\(^5\) It assumes that this behavioral change is predicated on a change in the perceptions, images and views of past history on the part of actors and a recognition of the validity of each other's needs and interests.

Except for recognizing the definitive, conclusive and lasting — and therefore certainly preferable — nature of resolution as opposed to other forms of dealing with conflict, it does not enter into the debate on the relative comparability of the different forms of responding to conflict, management versus settlement, for instance.\(^6\) It accepts that the eventual resolution of any conflict must include the meeting of the basic needs and interests of conflicting parties (Burton, 1990), and that anything that falls short of the stringent criteria of resolution is, simply, a form of conflict de-escalation or management that might result in settlement.

By these terms, there has clearly failed to be a "resolution" to the protracted conflict that has engaged India and Pakistan over four and a half decades. Those sub-

\(^5\) Note that cooperation is not necessarily viewed as the only positive response to violent conflict and therefore the only goal to be striven towards in all cases.

\(^6\) Burton (1990), for instance, has described management as handling disagreements among parties who have common interests and goals, and settlement as the employment of consensual norms or enforced rulings. Bercovitch (1984), on the other hand, prefers a focus on conflict management and likens the process to learning to make the conflict "less costly."
cases of crises (within the larger conflict) that were settled by means of some form of third party intervention - border skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch in early 1965, tensions over Kashmir in 1990 - are more in the vein of examples of successful de-escalation and settlement, rather than any long-term resolution.

This study defines a settlement as a short- to medium-term solution\(^7\) to the immediate crisis at hand that is acceptable by both parties (hence implying the meeting of needs and interests to some extent, because in the highly-charged context of protracted conflict, it is difficult to imagine any movement on settlement if some common ground on needs and interests is not found). Because the most fundamental underlying causes may not be dealt with, however, the conflict cannot be said to have been definitively resolved. Hence, successful settlement as it is employed in this study is more than merely a glossing over of underlying causes, and in many cases may set the stage for the facilitation of the eventual resolution of the larger conflict.

Further, settlement is almost always preceded by de-escalation. It appears that as in the Indo-Pakistani case, de-escalating and settling crises within other protracted conflicts might be quite different processes from the de-escalation and settling of crises arising in other contexts,\(^7\)

\(^7\) Only resolution is viewed as a long-term end to conflict.
in terms of the scope of conditions to be met, range of actors involved, etc. -- the suggestion, therefore, is that a crisis is not a crisis is not a crisis.\(^\text{8}\) For example, during the Cold War, a crisis arising within the larger superpower conflict, like the Cuban Missile Crisis, could conceivably be settled without the consideration of any underlying needs or interests, but merely on the "issues" involved in that particular crisis. I am arguing that this may not be the case for protracted conflicts, because the past inevitably and to a much greater extent has an impact on the present.

**Introducing Prenegotiations:**

A body of literature, introduced below, has developed around the subject of protracted conflict and the prenegotiations and communications that are intrinsic in its management and settlement. It is within the general realm of this literature that my research proposal lies.

\(^\text{8}\) The sub-cases of crises that are considered in this study are embedded within the larger Indo-Pakistani protracted conflict. The existing literature on crises (Hermann, 1972; Purkett, 1992), however, tends to be generalized and acontextual and therefore does not shed light on the particular circumstance of protracted conflict; of course, this is partly because the preoccupation of much of this literature is with decision-making by single governmental groups during crises.

On the other hand, scholars writing on protracted conflict have tended not to focus on specific crises within the larger relationship. Clearly, then, the problem presented by crises arising out of protracted conflicts needs to be addressed.
In recent years, the study of prenegotiations has become the subject of considerable interest among scholars and practitioners of diplomacy and conflict resolution, especially those within the area of protracted conflict. This literature, as I will make clear, has attempted to articulate and analyze a phenomenon—prenegotiations—that had previously been all but ignored in favor of a preoccupation with formal negotiations.

As was briefly introduced earlier, my research is centered around a puzzle that arises out of the larger sphere of prenegotiations—why prenegotiations are successfully arranged and settlements occur in some crises in protracted conflict, while they fail to come about in others. The answer to this puzzle is, I believe, crucial in avoiding the strife and human misery that are often the consequences of failure to commence prenegotiating on the part of conflicting actors. On the other hand, if actors can be persuaded to engage in prenegotiations through a focused effort on the stage prior to it, the holding of prenegotiations, settlement and the eventual resolution of conflict might hold a better chance of success.

Hence, my response to this general puzzle lies in the introduction of and focus on a new stage on the negotiation continuum (what I have called or foundation-building or pre-

---

9 See definition developed by Stein et al. and referred to in the following sections.
prenegotiations) that is prior to prenegotiations. It is my belief that a comprehension of this antecedent stage is crucial; if conflicting parties can be urged to communicate and to modify perceptions so that cooperation becomes viewed as possible at this stage rather than waiting for them to acknowledge that a problem exists (a requirement for prenegotiations in the existing literature), many a war might be thwarted.

The following pages constitute a review of the existing literature in the area of prenegotiations, a highlighting of some of its shortcomings and proposals to address these theoretical weaknesses and omissions. It is apparent that within the rubric of this literature falls a disparate group of scholars and examples of scholarship.

The Existing Literature on Prenegotiating Stages:

The prenegotiations literature attempts to fill a void that had existed in the study of negotiations (especially in its organizational and management manifestations) which, with its emphasis on formal negotiations, bargaining and classical rationality on the part of actors concerned did not, according to proponents of the concept of prenegotiation, address all cases of conflict. The rational approach assumed that decisions were made by detached individuals who objectively calculated the expected utility of available choices before embarking on a course of action;
in reality, decision-makers had to contend with emotions, unconscious motives and differing cognitive capabilities as they made decisions (Janis and Mann, 1977). Further, the rational approach focused heavily on formal negotiation processes defined by narrowly-delineated contexts, whereas in reality, historical and cultural experiences had a great impact on the possibility and success of negotiations.\(^{10}\) Even the definitive works on broadly-defined negotiation theory and practice employed as their illustrations, examples of formal negotiation that more often than not resulted in explicit, written agreements (Touval and Zartman, 1985).

Scholars like Doob (1970), Kelman (1979; 1986) and Saunders (1985; 1987), through their sustained involvement with protracted conflicts the world over acquired the sense that theories of formal negotiations were not helpful in understanding the dynamics of such cases, where actors involved nursed decades-long grievances in the face of which they would often have trouble accepting the legitimacy of their opponents' very existence, the validity of their positions and the weight of their problems. In general, these scholars were in agreement with the proponents of problem-solving workshops as tools of conflict management,

\(^{10}\) Formal negotiations are characterized as starting at "the table." Past history is generally not taken into account in these theoretical approaches, thus leading critics like Stein to label them acontextual (Stein lecture, Aug 1992).
in stressing the need for building longer-term, cooperative relationships which would facilitate formal negotiations."

Where some of these scholars differed from proponents of problem-solving workshops, however, was in their willingness to also consider explicit roles for governmental or official representatives in informal negotiations (see Saunders, for instance; Stein, Zartman, 1989;). One early effort by Kelman and Cohen attempted to create a bridge between problem-solving workshop approaches involving academics and other influential community members, and the more official negotiations involving governmental representatives, but there is no clear indication that this bridge has been successfully built, that the efforts of problem-solving workshops on a non-governmental level have borne fruit at the inter-governmental/official level (Kelman, 1979). Also, the time frame employed in the work done in the general prenegotiation area is somewhat less long-term than that in problem-solving workshops.

Analyses of prenegotiations, as this theoretical

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11 As first exemplified by Burton in the 1960s, these workshops were designed to induce discussion among unofficial representatives of conflicting parties. Representatives were chosen, however, for their links with decision-makers. It has been acknowledged that because of this rather tenuous link with official decision-making, the direct or indirect impact of workshops cannot be accurately measured. Hill (1982) suggests other problem-areas for this approach - type of participants, facilitators, length of undertaking, etc.

12 Burton et al., on the other hand, have focussed almost exclusively on non-governmental participants in building cooperative relationships among peoples.
addition to traditional treatments of formal negotiations has come to be recognized, are an amalgamation of insights from all these schools of thought, although prenegotiations continue to focus on interaction among official participants while problem-solving workshops and "track-two" diplomacy concentrate on unofficial relationships and interaction. A broadening of negotiation theory has accordingly been called for by these authors (see Saunders, 1985, for instance;).\textsuperscript{13}

The informality and tentative nature of interactions prior to formal negotiations have found an echo in proposals by other scholars like I. William Zartman (1982), Jay Rothman (1989) and Stein et al. (1989).

Indeed, one of the most comprehensive, conceptually advanced and recent treatment of prenegotiations, one that may be credited for the recent popularizing of the term, is undertaken by Stein et al. (1989).\textsuperscript{14} While constituting an important contribution, one that claims to speak for

\textsuperscript{13} While Kelman avers that his interactive problem-solving approach is not negotiation or even official prenegotiation but is only conceptually linked to the negotiating problem, and Saunders' framework for public intercommunal problem-solving is also strictly non-official, these approaches and others like them have been loosely included under the rubric of prenegotiations; I will therefore include them in my discussion of prenegotiations (Kelman, forthcoming; Saunders, July 1992).

\textsuperscript{14} Some scholars have begun to view the two broad approaches to conflict resolution/settlement and negotiations as distinct paradigms, the "static," which focuses on the more formal, non-contextual negotiations and the "developmental," which includes a recognition that formal negotiation theory does not work in all cases and encompasses much of the prenegotiation literature, broadly construed (see Mitchell, 1981; Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis, 1993).
prenegotiations in all contexts including those of protracted conflict, I contend that its assumptions fail to capture the essence of interactions at certain stages of crises between parties engaged in protracted conflicts. Many of the sub-cases that I examine within the protracted Indo-Pakistani conflict support the need for an expansion of prenegotiation "theory" in the form of the conceptualization of a stage more nascent than and prior to prenegotiations.

Stein et al. assume that at least one of the parties engaged in prenegotiation necessarily holds a desire for cooperative agreement/negotiation as its end goal and that at least one of the parties frames the crisis facing them in terms of a joint problem. The definition they propose (they define prenegotiation as beginning "when one or more parties considers negotiation as a policy option and communicates this intention to other parties; it ends when the parties agree to formal negotiations or when one party abandons the consideration of negotiation as an option") echoes this. Similarly, Jay Rothman (1990), another prenegotiation proponent, defines prenegotiations as an "integrated process in which highly-placed representatives of parties in conflict prepare for negotiations by jointly framing their issues of conflict, generating options for handling them

It is interesting to note that Kelman also believes that the problem-solving approach is most relevant in cases where parties have already concluded that it is in their interest to resolve the conflict (Kelman, 1992 lecture).
cooperatively, and interactively structuring substance and process of future negotiations."

Stein characterizes prenegotiations as beginning when parties begin to think in terms of negotiating a cooperative agreement, but are not yet committed to it (Stein, 1992 lecture). Further, it is clear that these authors imbue the concept of prenegotiations with an inherent ability to promote cooperation. For instance, Zartman opines that "prenegotiation is a purposive period of transition that enables parties to move from conflicting perceptions and behaviors to cooperative (ones)." Zartman's preferences are made more clear when he explicates the functions of prenegotiation: it makes the extent of risk clear to actors and may reduce risks associated with cooperation; it enables an estimate of the costs of success and failure of agreement before formal negotiations; it is a time to show commitment of reciprocity to the enemy and to consolidate domestic support for such a positive shift in policy; it involves the setting of "perimeters and parameters" that guide solutions and finally, it enables the selection of appropriate participants. Prenegotiations, hence, are supposed to "build bridges" from conflict to cooperation with the appropriate alterations in actor perception, decision-making, behavior etc. Prenegotiation process and function become conceptually indistinct in a treatment such as their's. The possibility of prenegotiation failure, and
the knowledge that can be gained from pursuing the reasons behind it, are neglected.

Judged by the criteria afforded by the prenegotiation literature, an analysis of the data suggests that prenegotiations were clearly not engaged in in the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Bangladesh. No negotiators were selected on either side; no face-to-face communication was engaged in; no structures of communication were built. Yet, communication in the form of the issuance of a plethora of diplomatic, press and other "indirect" statements about decisions made on either side in response to perceived hostilities or overtures could be viewed as having constituted some form of interaction between the two sides, and this phenomenon merits recognition and further study through data furnished by the other sub-cases constituting the Indo-Pakistani protracted conflict.

Further, while the prenegotiation literature generally makes a note of the unique nature afforded by contexts of protracted conflict and the historical and psychological barriers that make its management especially difficult, a systematic analysis of the impact and consequence of such factors on the progression and resolution of these conflicts is not undertaken. How does the legacy of past history and experience affect the perceptions and decisions of actors in crises arising within these contexts? How will conflicting actors begin to consider negotiation and communication on
their own accord or form a "desire to end conflict" in the context of such a legacy? Will deep-rooted hostility predispose actors to accelerate crises rather than seek their resolution? Can crises be de-escalated and settled in circumstances such as these without some third party intervention? Ultimately, answers to questions such as these will throw light on the broader puzzle of why prenegotiations can be successfully organized in some cases and not in others, and the solutions that can be found to the problem this poses for those actors who fail to reach the prenegotiating stage.

I believe, therefore, that the prenegotiation literature leaves many questions unresolved, including those that deal with the processes leading to prenegotiations, the success or failure of outcomes and the reasons why some parties engaged in protracted conflict fail even to initiate/engage in prenegotiations, while others succeed. While some factors leading to prenegotiation and its success have been cursorily addressed by the existing literature, I contend that there are other crucial factors - the impact of past history and past interaction with the enemy, the lack of avenues for direct communication - which, if left unaddressed, will mitigate against the very holding of prenegotiations and, subsequently, against its success.
Foundation-Building or Pre-Prenegotiation: A Model

As I have already noted, the prenegotiation stage as conceptualized by Saunders and others and further developed by Stein et al. is one of considerable "advancement" (if we are to view various stages on a negotiation continuum with formal negotiations as the final stage), in terms of facilitating face-to-face communication of conflicting parties. Stein et al. assume that some "groundwork" - implicitly or explicitly accepting that a joint problem exists and making the decision whether or not to even initiate a structure and procedure to communicate and whether or not to choose negotiators and begin prenegotiations - has already been laid.

My contention, supported by data from the Indo-Pakistani wars, is that we cannot assume this. Hence, the weaknesses in the existing literature warrants the conceptualization of an antecedent stage (pre-prenegotiation or foundation-building) which, if successfully established, would be more likely to result in the building of official communication structures and processes and in the willingness on the part of actors to de-escalate and settle the crisis between the two sides. Hence, the foundation-building stage is as much about timing as it is about strategy.

This section will not introduce the hypotheses and tests thereof that arise out the foundation-building stage;
it will, rather, focus on a description of the stage. Concerns about specific hypotheses and their tests will be addressed in the following section.

In large measure, the successful establishment of the foundation-building stage is contingent on the role of third parties in aiding conflicting actors to recognize and address the impact of negative perceptions and history and in setting up structures of direct communications. I believe that these two elements might be mutually reinforcing, in that addressing affect and history will make the setting up of communications easier; and conversely, setting up communications structures might enable the airing of grievances and make a dent in the entrenched nature of affect and history. The successful establishment of the foundation-building phase, in turn, might enable prenegotiations to occur and might increase their chances for success.16

The proposed construct of a foundation-building stage will be mainly concerned with the establishment of direct communications between official governmental or non-governmental representatives of conflicting sides, although it will certainly consider the role of non-official efforts

16 I have wrestled with whether to conceptualize the foundation-building stage as an expansion of the prenegotiation stage, or to present it as a separate phase. I have chosen to view it as a distinct stage, one which if successful, would then facilitate the process of prenegotiation; others might disagree.
as they appear in the cases. Whereas Kelman, Doob and Burton have quite correctly focussed on non-official, supplemental, prenegotiations among non-official and non-governmental actors, I believe that a need also exists to address and facilitate a more immediate (as opposed to longer-term) interaction among officials. This need has been indirectly acknowledged at different times by such scholars as Saunders and Fisher. In some of the sub-cases characterizing the Indo-Pakistani conflict, and in the case of other crises like these that demand more rapid responses and strategies, had an effort been made to establish direct communication between the official representatives of the two sides, perhaps the outcome might have been different. Hence, the foundation-building stage will focus on facilitating immediate, official communication between parties.

It is most probable that at this stage, no official representatives will have been selected, no proposals for face-to-face intercourse discussed, no plans for meetings made. The establishment of direct communication will therefore take the form of specified, mutually-recognized avenues of interaction - be they through respective high commissions, written or telephonic exchanges etc. - that will require an acknowledgement of receipt and a response. This will avoid the occurrence of situations like in ’71, where rhetoric from either side flooded the press but no
direct response was necessitated, conceivably leading to worsening relations, as no effort to clarify positions or dignify inquiries with responses was made.

Lastly, the proposed construct of a foundation-building stage would be viewed within the context of structural limitations - the existence of other major powers or considerations, regional or international institutions and events with the potential to impact decision-making and the economic and military capabilities of the two sides. In no way does this study imply that successful interaction at the foundation-building stage is the only avenue for de-escalating or resolving protracted conflict. Systemic and structural factors often set the context within which the processes of foundation-building can be viewed, and it is assumed that these factors will have consequences on their progress (Azar, 1990). These factors will also serve as parameters or constraints that parties will need to manipulate or influence as the crisis wears its course (Simon, 1989). On the other hand, processes at the foundation-building stage might make the crucial difference in the eventual outcome of the crisis.

Elements of Foundation-Building: Relating Hypotheses and Propositions to the Existing Literature

It is evident from the preceding description of the foundation-building stage that third parties, communications
structures and timing are important constituent elements. In this section, components of the foundation-building stage are viewed in the context of literature drawn mainly from three distinct areas - the timing of intervention in resolving conflict, the importance of communication during conflicts and the roles, strategies and characteristics of third parties in resolving conflict.

The existing literature in these areas does not address the specific problems with which the foundation-building stage is concerned. Yet, each of these areas speaks to a component of the foundation building stage, and is therefore relevant for our purposes. For instance, the foundation-building stage focuses on the phases before prenegotiation; similarly, the literature on the timing of intervention pays attention to early intercession. The foundation-building stage accords an important role to third parties; correspondingly, the broader literature on third parties offers a context within which to evaluate this role and enables a testing of hypotheses.17

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17 The variables that follow are arranged in roughly the same numerical order as they appear in the case analyses and final conclusions that constitute this dissertation. This is done to foster greater consistency through the chapters and to make for easier reading. Obviously, differences do obtain among chapters. This introductory chapter, for instance, is more theoretical, while the following chapter on methodology offers greater detail on variable indicators, operationalizations and measures, etc.
Timing:

The proposed construct for a foundation-building stage makes an argument for efforts at de-escalation and management at incipient stages of threatened violence. Although the timing of third party intervention has been the subject of some current research (see Kriesberg, 1992; Kriesberg and Thorson, 1991; Rupesinghe and Kuroda, 1992; A. Curle as reported in Miall, 1992), the authors in question either fail to view early intervention in terms of a prior "stage" of crisis resolution with diverse actors and strategies, or continue to prescribe preconditions which are evocative of those imposed in Stein et al.'s conceptualization of when early intervention can become a reality in prenegotiations. A volume on early warning edited by Rupesinghe and Kuroda (1992) underlines the importance of taking action at incipient stages of a conflict, but the focus is much more on an effective monitoring of the crises at hand and especially of their more "physical" consequences like refugees, human rights violations and epidemics, rather than on steering conflicting parties towards communication, interaction and prenegotiation. Structure rather than process appears the focus of the authors in the volume. Hence, although the authors seek a spotlight on early intervention, they appear to "settle" for an effective monitoring of the course crises run, instead. Their focus, hence, quickly becomes the
developing crisis rather than intervening early to prevent it, the purported "raison" for their work.

Most significantly, many in this genre argue that there is a "right" time for de-escalation, and that efforts towards this end may not bear fruit until the conflict is ready for resolution (Kriesberg and Thorson, 1991). ¹⁸ Some of the cases that have been studied, the INF negotiations for instance, where immediate consequences of inaction are not attendant, afford the "luxury" of being able to wait until the "ripe" moment; in the more urgent contexts provided by most protracted conflicts with their potential for rapid escalation to violence and bloodshed, I believe that such an indulgence is often lacking. Indeed, I would contend that the historical and affective nature of relationships between parties engaged in protracted, ethno-religious conflicts makes a "ripe" moment, with its implicit assumption of shared perception of the desirability of a mutual accord, very difficult to come by (Haass in Kriesberg and Thorson, 1991).

Indeed, it is acknowledged by some of the authors that "appropriate" moments for de-escalation in any context are often those after the occurrence of violence or war. Must we then wait for violence in order to attempt efforts at ending it? What appears to be more relevant in contexts of

¹⁸ Note that this is analogous to prenegotiations becoming possible upon one of the actors involved framing the conflict in terms of a joint problem (Stein et al., 1989).
protracted conflict is intervention that would aid in making a ripe moment happen when conflicting parties themselves are unable to, the optimum moment being sooner rather than later. Hence, it is hypothesised that in the context of protracted conflict, early intervention and foundation-building at an incipient point before crises escalate will help in their settlement.

This is the rationale for the foundation-building stage.\(^\text{19}\) The data provided by the sub-cases of the Indo-Pakistani conflict enable a comparison of when intervention to de-escalate actually took place as opposed to when indicators that I specify, such as increased hostility in verbal statements on the part of actors, increased border and airspace violations, etc., suggest the incipient moment for intervention might have been, and whether the two were synchronous in any sub-case. Hence, the assumptions of my model differ greatly from those that lie behind the call for a need for the "ripe" moment.

Third Parties:

Third parties - their roles, strategies and identities - have been the subject of increasing study in the past

\(^{19}\) Zartman and Aurik (in Kriesberg and Thorson, 1991) refer to this problem fleetingly, but their emphasis is then on the importance of ripeness as a concept. Rubin (in Kriesberg and Thorson, 1991) concedes that the literature should not imply that there is a "wrong" time to attempt de-escalation lest it become an excuse for passivity.
couple of decades (Bercovitch and Rubin, 1991; Touval and Zartman, 1985). In the post-Cold War world, where previous attention on the bilateralism of superpower relations is fast giving way to a broader view of international relations, it is inevitable that intervention by third parties will merit further analysis. To date, however, there has been a dearth of studies on third party intervention in actual inter/intrastate conflicts. Much of the work on third parties continues to be of a purely theoretical nature, and this theory has, alas, been diverse and disparate rather than cumulative, although some cumulation has occurred (see Wall and Lynn, 1993).

Where applications to interstate conflict are made, they are mostly case-studies of single negotiated treaties or outcomes (Touval and Zartman, 1985; Stein, 1989; Princen, 1992) rather than analyses of the chronological evolution of protracted conflicts and the role of third parties therein; again, the Arab-Israeli case appears the one that is most frequently employed, while others lie untested and fallow. It would appear, then, that a study such as this one, which examines hypotheses of third party intervention - timing, role, strategies - in the context of a little-considered protracted conflict over time, would be in order.

Considerable definitional confusion and debate exists around the concept of third party. There are those, like Fisher (in Stein, 1989; 1991), who insist on distinguishing
between third parties as mediators, conciliators, consultors, arbitrators etc., and argue that it does the furthering of knowledge a disservice to use these terms interchangeably. Others (Bercovitch, 1991; Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille, 1991; Inbar, 1991) employ the term mediation to cover a wide range of diverse third party activity. In my study, third party intervention or mediation will be defined in a similarly broad manner.

Much of the literature has traditionally concentrated on the role of third parties in formal negotiations (see especially the large literature on the US-Soviet conflict and arms control). It is only very recently that third parties at pre-negotiating stages have begun to receive attention. While it is beyond the purview and intent of this study to review the existing literature on third parties, it is important to attempt a clarification of the nature of third parties and the role they are hypothesized to play at the foundation-building stage as distinct from what the existing literature already has to say.

I. Third Party Characteristics:

Leverage

The opinion of scholars is split between whether a third party must be characterized by neutrality and impartiality to achieve the best results (Kelman and Cohen, 1979; Kelman, 1992 lecture; T. J. Pickvance and Hezekiah
Assefa in Mitchell and Webb, 1988) or whether third parties with leverage and resources will meet with most success (Susskind and Cruickshank, 1987). Some argue that third parties by their very presence in the arena of the conflict affect its outcome, and hence can never be considered neutral (Bercovitch, 1984).

Princen (1992) draws a contrast between what he terms the "principal mediator," or one with indirect interests in the problem and the resources that can be employed in dealing with it, and "neutral mediator," or one with neither interests nor leverage. He suggests that neither is necessarily the "better" mediator, that a combination between principal and neutral will tend to be more effective and that only that intervention will meet with eventual success which satisfies the needs and interests of conflicting actors. Mitchell (1988) suggests that drawing a distinction between an "impartial" and "interested" mediator in all cases might be misleading, and that the motives of either kind of mediator could range from material benefits gained by carrying out their roles, increasing their (third party) influence over the region in general or establishing peace and stability where none existed previously.

Touval and Zartman (1985) on the other hand, while accepting that a mediator could either facilitate conflict by changing mutual perceptions and images of conflicting
actors and helping to redefine the problem or use its leverage as the "ticket" to mediation, contend that a third party cannot assume both roles, that the use of leverage would automatically nullify the facilitator role of the third party. Finally, it has even been suggested that mediation is not necessarily inconsistent with coercion (Van der Merwe in Mitchell and Webb, 1988).

Importantly, none of the assertions above have been put to the test by the authors. They have not related their contentions to data provided by specific cases. Hence, cumulative theory has not been built that would permit definitive statements regarding the characteristics and roles of third parties in specific kinds of conflict can be made.

It would appear that in a conflict such as the Indo-Pakistani, where the causes of protraction run deep and a relative equality in power appears to be one of the factors preventing either party from initiating steps to manage the conflict, a third party with the leverage to propose steps towards de-escalation and management might meet with success in its efforts. Contexts like the Indo-Pakistani, then, might be more responsive to the employment of leverage by third parties. To my knowledge, there exists no literature that talks about the appropriateness of the use of third party leverage in different contexts.

My study therefore hypothesizes that it is a third
party mediator with leverage who is best placed to play an effective role in conflicts like the Indo-Pakistani. Through this hypothesis, I hope to address some of the issues raised in the debate summarized above regarding the role of leverage in third party efforts and whether leverage matters. Testing this hypothesis will offer insight on such questions as whether neutrality or leverage are the characteristics that make for successful third party interventions (Kelman et al. vs. Susskind and Cruickshank and for instance), and whether third parties can both employ leverage and serve as facilitators (contra Touval and Zartman, 1985). It will address the possibility that if conflicting parties are not given an adequate "incentive" to communicate and seek settlement, the impact of historical factors serve to ensure that they will choose not to?20 The hypothesis will be tested through cases of intervention by third parties with differing resources and levels of interests in the sub-cases offered by the protracted Indo-Pakistani conflict through the years.

II. Third Party Strategies:

Timing of: When to intervene?

Echoing much of the pre-negotiation literature,

20 It is important to note that leverage may be employed by third parties not to necessarily further their own interests (although their interests might be better served in the process), but rather to have a positive impact on the crisis and the general situation at hand.
successful mediation or third party activity is currently viewed widely in conjunction with a desire, self-formulated, on the part of parties to settle their conflict (Bercovitch, 1991; Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille, 1991; Haass, 1991; Ferrick 1986; Blades, 1984). The difference in my conception of the timing of third party intervention is that I envisage third party action in the foundation-building stage as crucial in eventually enabling actors to come to this conclusion, rather than assuming this desire as pre-existing at the outset. Given the affective and historical conditions surrounding protracted conflicts, actors may not themselves move to settle their conflicts. As Wall and Lynn (1993) put it, they might "prefer confrontation (or even war) to mediation." Hence, I hypothesize that third parties are crucial in enabling actors to accept the preferability of conflict de-escalation and settlement to its continuation.

My research seeks to understand what the roles are that third parties can play to foster within conflicting actors a desire to cease the conflict, and what strategies can be taken towards the goal of such a cessation. Data obtained from the sub-cases will test the specific sub-hypotheses

\[21\] Certainly, this has also been true of past studies (see Touval and Zartman, 1985, for instance).

\[22\] Zartman and Rubin (in Kriesberg and Thorson, 1991) do acknowledge that third parties may decide when to intervene in certain cases, but do not follow through the consequences of what this entails.
regarding third party role and strategy. Indicators such as the avenues created by third parties for the promotion of conflicting actors' views and perceptions, for the engagement of conflicting actors in direct communication, etc. will enable the testing of these sub-hypotheses. These have been elaborated in detail in the methodology chapter.

Specific Strategies:

In somewhat the same vein as Princen and Touval and Zartman, Fisher and Keashly (1991) distinguish between third party mediation and consultation. Consultation appears to be a more diagnostic and non-directive process of third party intervention, where neutral and impartial third parties work with conflicting actors to improve communication, probe underlying sources of disagreement, etc. and is evocative of Touval and Zartman's conception of facilitation, while mediation includes the use of leverage by intermediaries to induce third parties at the more formal and advanced negotiating stages. Fisher and Keashly insist that any blurring of the two categories is unfortunate. However, they fail to offer explanations as to why conflicting parties, especially those mired in a history of conflict, would readily accept the role of a consultor if there were no "incentive" for them to do so.

My model envisages that just such a dual role for third parties will result in greatest success at the foundation-
building stage. It hypothesizes that that third party role will be most conducive to conflict de-escalation and settlement which will foster initial communication, interaction and exchange of opposing views and perceptions between actors in an effort to build a semblance of trust.\textsuperscript{23} This role must be viewed in the context of the leverage that the third party brings in playing its role. Hence, for the purposes of my model, the characteristics and strategies that yield greatest success on the part of third parties appear naturally complementary (contra Fisher and Keashly). Again, this hypothesis is tested in the light of the data offered by the sub-cases of the Indo-Pakistani conflict through indicators such as specific avenues provided by third parties for communication, ties of aid and trade between the parties concerned, etc.

III. and IV. Perception by Conflicting Actors of Third Party having the Capacity to Assist and Resolving Crisis and their Perception of Third Party Even-handedness:

In addition to the characteristics of and strategies adopted by third parties, we hypothesize that conflicting actors must believe that third parties have the ability and will to assist in resolving their conflict and that they

\textsuperscript{23} This is akin to the role of the conciliator as described by Fisher and Keashly and echoed by others (Van der Merwe in Mitchell and Webb, 1988; Princen, 1992; Miall, 1992) and the role of facilitator as conceived by Touval and Zartman.
must perceive them as even-handed in their approach to them (conflicting actors). Without this belief on the part of conflicting actors, it would be exceedingly difficult for them to accept as legitimate any intervention by third parties.

V. Direct Communication:

My proposal for foundation-building includes an important role for structures and processes of direct communication that might be constructed (or already in existence) and employed by conflicting actors themselves. It hypothesizes that the greater use of direct rather than indirect communication in sending and receiving messages will aid in settling crises. Direct rather than circuitous routes, I contend, will minimize the possibility of miscommunication, afford better opportunities for airing grievances and be more conducive to responsible responses.24

Some existing work in this area appears to support this contention. In laboratory experiments that have been conducted, those groups that have access to direct, unrestricted communication in situations of artificially-created crises indicate a much lower level of perceived hostility from other relevant parties and are less likely to exhibit aggression than are those who have access to

24 Note that operational definitions for "direct" and "indirect" communications are offered in my methodology chapter.
unrestricted communication\textsuperscript{25} (Laponce in Frei, 1982).

Dessouki (in Frei, 1982) admits that communications in a third world context are especially vulnerable to breakdown during troubled times, as typically, diplomatic relations are terminated, borders are closed and private citizens from each other's countries are dismissed. On the other hand, some of the literature does not appear to distinguish between direct and indirect communication channels in conflicts, claiming that what is important to prevent misunderstanding is keeping channels of all communication open (Chang in Frei, 1982).

In the following chapters, the definitions of direct versus indirect communication are carefully elaborated. While direct communication would include such channels as foreign ministries, decision-making groups etc., indirect communication is characterized by the employment of channels such as the press, public meetings etc. To my knowledge this important contention has not been previously examined with the help of actual case studies in the literature that already exists on this topic.

VI. Other Independent Variables:

Although not a part of my original model, I began coding for such variables as leader personality and

\textsuperscript{25} The study does mention the possibility that communication channels might themselves become "conflictual," in which case their role might not remain positive.
socialization on both the Indian and Pakistani side and the impact of domestic opposition, as the dissertation progressed. Repeated references to both these variables (the latter more than the former) as I proceeded with analyzing available data suggested that it would be an error on my part if I were to completely overlook their role in cases of settlement and war. Results of coding categories for these variables will therefore appear in each of the case analysis chapters as well as in final conclusions. Obviously, no hypotheses about their nature and role were made at the outset.

**Conclusion:**

Proclaiming an existing body of theoretical knowledge as inadequate and proposing an extension to it is challenging under any circumstance. When the "theory" in question is itself incipient and requires further testing, the task becomes somewhat more difficult, because there is not a solid theoretical base upon which to build.

I believe, however, that the prenegotiation literature is too important a contribution, especially in the context of present-day ethno-religious violence between and within nations and states, with too many vital implications for the de-escalation, settlement and eventual resolution of such conflict, to leave fallow. While accepting some of its
assumptions, the extension that I propose in terms of a foundation-building stage will no doubt contribute to the refining and broadening of the existing body of theory.

The implications of the foundation-building stage for the making of policy are also direct and quite significant, especially in light of the fact that protracted ethno-religious conflict is in evidence today in almost every area of the world. My proposals argue that policy-makers should follow closely the turn of events between actors engaged in these conflicts; they should plan to intervene before violence erupts and they are faced with a full-fledged crisis or war -- the existing focus on pre- and formal negotiations does not address this critical aspect of timing. Further, the proposals argue that in the face of the years of history between actors engaged in such conflict, their strategies should be geared towards the delivery of messages and perceptions, and the initiation of direct communication between actors. The next few chapters will present findings on these variables that call for, among other things, the establishment of direct communications because they seem most likely to assist in settlements, and that seem to direct interested third parties towards eschewing the use of overt elements of leverage in favor of incentives, and that stress third party even-handedness as they formulate their strategies.

I therefore ask that our present focus on formal,
concluding negotiations be stretched to include the crucial stages that come before them; nor should policy-makers wait for parties engaged in relationships of protracted hostility to realize the preferability of settling their grievances, for this wait might well be in vain. Rather, energy should be expended on helping parties to come to this very realization.
Chapter II
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter lays out the method of analysis that has been employed to test hypotheses related to the construct of the foundation-building stage that were raised in the introductory chapter. It discusses the selection of cases, sources from which the data have been drawn and the operationalization and measurement of the dependent and independent variables. Coding instructions for the measurement of different variables are provided in this section, so that the analyses of the different cases presented in following chapters will be better comprehended.

The General Strategy:

The comparative case study method, particularly the method of structured, focused comparison, is employed in this dissertation. As I mentioned in the introduction, five cases have been drawn from the protracted Indo-Pakistani conflict since 1947. In the following pages, I elaborate on the specific time periods under study, the reasons for their choice and the variations in independent and dependent variables that they embody. Here, I will merely defend my choice of the larger strategy.
While the rich description and analytical detail that might be afforded by the study of a single case is not to be decried, it is my belief that knowledge is best extended and generalizability to other contexts, however limited, afforded, through comparison. Without embarking on a debate on the relative merits of single versus multiple cases, a debate that is well recognized and has no doubt graced the pages of International Relations texts and graduate student General Examinations alike, I do wish to reiterate that if a contribution to the extension of theory and the relative generalizability to other contexts of results are our goals, then comparison is well-neigh imperative. Further, in this dissertation, data have been collected in all five cases in response to certain questions; obviously, their analysis has also been conditioned and limited by the questions posed.

The content analysis of newspapers and archival materials is employed as the major way to analyze data and to thereby obtain measures of the independent and dependent variables over the different time periods under study. Newspaper reports on relevant events during the periods under consideration, leader speeches, government statements and responses to messages from each actor and events in each country are the primary documents analyzed. Interview data and data from memoirs and other written accounts of significant actors are also used. Obviously, these by no means constitute all the data available for the situations
I believe that they are, however, a fair representation of all the material that might exist.

My employment of the strategy is consistent with Krippendorff's (1980) broad definition of content analysis as a "... scientific method that promises to yield inferences from essentially verbal, symbolic or communicative data." Since the five cases that have been selected for analysis range from 1947 onwards, it is inevitable that a large part of the analysis is obtained from inferences from the data, rather than interviews in every case. Although some data are quantified, especially of communication variables, most of the analysis that constitutes this dissertation is qualitative. Further, because of the nature of this dissertation and its aim to look at both perceptual as well as structural variables in determining outcomes, both the content and structure of communication conveyed by the data are examined (Hermann, 1977).

Units of Analysis:

Sampling units are individual newspaper reports, leader speeches etc. They may include reports on events that took

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1 For instance, I have relied primarily on two newspapers, the Times of India and Pakistan Times; a plethora of other suitable newspapers exist on both sides that might have been examined - Hindustan Times, for instance, or Dawn, but in the interests of manageability, have not. As I reiterate later in this chapter, the two newspapers consulted more than satisfy the standards of rigor commonly expected in the collection of data.
place, messages that were sent from one country to another, parliamentary proceedings or meetings with the leaders and foreign policy elites.

Sampling units may not always correspond with the recording units, which are tailored to the main questions this project seeks to answer. Separate recording units are made necessary because each sampling unit may be too complex or deal with too many issues to serve the purpose of this research. For example, many of the speeches made by Indira Gandhi during the months leading up to the 1971 war dealt at once with several issues that pertained to the crisis, like Pakistan’s history of confrontation with India, the proper role of third parties in settling the crisis or domestic opposition support (or the lack thereof) within India. Such a sampling unit would be divided into different recording units which would then better lend themselves to coding and analysis. Certainly, in those cases where the document analyzed focuses on a single issue, an issue that pertains to the crisis, there is a congruence between recording and sampling units.

On the other hand, if more than one sampling units refer to essentially the same event or issue, they will obviously be coded only once. For instance, several units refer to specific fears on the part of the Indian opposition regarding India’s position on the de-facto cease-fire in the Rann of Kutch crisis and the response of Prime Minister
Shastri to these. These have been reported during a single parliamentary session on May 5, 1965 (see Times of India, May 6 and 7, 1965, p. 1) and in fact form parts of a single debate. They have therefore been coded as one entry.

The Cases: Time Periods under Analysis

Each variable is operationalized and measured for the distinct sub-cases of crises that have been selected within the protracted Indo-Pakistani conflict from 1947 to present day. This will enable a comparison over time of change in either the independent or dependent variables as well as the disclosure of unique factors that might characterize each case.

The time periods under consideration are several months leading up to the wars of 1947, Sept. 1965 and 1971 and the successfully de-escalated crises of March 1965 and Spring 1990.² The cases were chosen on the basis of three main considerations: First and most importantly, wars are the ultimate and gravest failures in crisis de-escalation. Hence, it is important for a study that aims to understand why some crises in protracted conflicts fail to de-escalate, to ponder the reasons behind this failure through the cases afforded by war. On the other hand, while many have

² For the specific number of months, please refer to the analysis of each individual case. Although this number varies over the different cases, a baseline for comparison has been established.
focussed on the wars between India and Pakistan, no-one, to my knowledge, has employed cases of successfully-settled crises where war was avoided, to further our comprehension of what elements facilitated settlement in those cases.

The successfully de-escalated crises over the Rann of Kutch in 1965 and Kashmir in 1990 provide a necessary variation in outcome by which to compare the impact of the independent variables under consideration. The Rann of Kutch constitutes a model case of committed third party effort, in this case on the part of the British government under Wilson, that I argue played an important role in settlement. The 1990 crisis in Kashmir is considered by many as the most serious to confront the two countries since the war of 1971 and in many ways it embodies the subtly changed circumstances on the sub-continent since that time, changes that will continue to characterize relations between the two countries into the future - Kashmir is today, more than ever before, more truly a problem of Kashmiri nationalism than an Indo-Pakistani one and while India and Pakistan will continue to play vital roles in the region and while the region will continue to impact relations between them, it appears that any solution will now necessarily have to include Kashmiri input.\(^3\) In this latter case, the Bush administration intervened to persuade India and Pakistan to

\(^3\) For further explication see a description of the crisis in chapter three.
settle their differences before war occurred. The impact of this intervention is assessed.

The various third parties playing a major role during the time periods under consideration in the five sub-cases - the U.S., the Soviet Union, The U.N. and Britain - enable us to compare the impact of their characteristics and strategies on the outcome of the crisis at hand.

The second reason for selecting these time periods is somewhat more prosaic. The wars constitute the best-documented cases in the history of Indo-Pakistani relations thus far, and therefore afford the most fodder for analysis. The successfully de-escalated crises, on the other hand, offer the challenge of not having been analyzed systematically before and are therefore attractive.

Finally, one must say a few words about the larger context afforded by the Indo-Pakistani conflict, from which these cases have been selected. A study that aims to extend knowledge in the area of protracted conflict is best served by focusing on the data provided by such a conflict in its entirety. Important variables and insights, indeed the very essence of such a conflict, might be lost if it were not traced from its inception to present times. Methodologically, also, much is gained by the comparison of cases that are examples of "the same class or universe" (George, 1979). Much can be held constant in cases such as these, thereby enabling a more rigorous measure of change on
independent and dependent variables.

Variable Descriptions and Coding Instructions:

Independent Variables Constituting Foundation-Building Stage:

I. Independent Variable: Third Party Characteristics:

Several measures of this variable are proposed.

A. General Influence of Third Party

This study has proposed that third parties with influence and leverage over conflicting actors are best suited to resolve protracted conflicts like the Indo-Pakistani. In so doing, it has brought under scrutiny one side of an extant debate in the larger mediation literature on the characteristics of third parties that are most viable in managing conflict (see Princen, 1992; Mitchell and Webb, 1988) and has attempted to make a link between these characteristics and outcomes in the settlement of conflict. In the sub-cases of crises that have characterized the Indo-Pakistani conflict, third party intervenors have included at various times and at different levels of intervention the U.N., the United States, Britain and the former Soviet Union.

In light of the limited number of cases under study, results will be suggestive rather than definitive; however, the knowledge that is gained by testing the association of third parties with and without influence/leverage with the specific strategies that they undertake, and the outcomes
that then ensue, will offer important additions to existing literature.

General influence has been coded in terms of the third party's:

a) Centrality and prominence in the international system. This provides information on the place of the third party actor in the international system, on the basis of certain "objective," non-perceptual indicators. Indicators for this include the number of international and regional economic, military and political organizations that the third party is an important member of.4

b) Other indicators are the percentage of global arms the third party holds, its percentage GNP compared with world GNP and the percentage and scope of economic and military aid of total world aid that it gives to other countries. These percentages will be for the time period under study and will reflect the centrality of the third party for that time period only.5

The greater the percentage held by the third party in these areas compared with other countries of the world, the better will its centrality and prominence be established.

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4 Since many of the third parties involved in the five cases -- the U.S. and former Soviet Union, for instance -- held well-defined positions of prominence in the international system, this indicator is not always explicitly referred to in the cases.

5 Again, because of the well-known nature of such attributes of the U.S., U.K. and former Soviet Union, they are not always explicated in the cases, but rather referred to implicitly.
B. Leverage over conflicting actors.

This attribute is more specific to the relationship of the third party with conflicting actors. It continues to provide information on the basis of "objective" indicators. Indicators include

a) the amount of assistance to each actor and its relative generosity vis a vis assistance offered by other states for the same period.\(^6\)

b) the amount of trade with each actor and the percentage of this bilateral trade of each actor's total annual trade. Exports to and imports from the third party state in question are examined. Wherever possible, they are placed within a time-frame so that trends over time may be established.

c) the amount of annual military assistance to the actors in cash or kind and the percentage of this assistance to actor's total annual receipt of such assistance. The amounts of aid and trade are not important in themselves, but rather as indicators of the extent of third party connections with actors.

C. Willingness and ability to provide protection/guarantees to conflicting actors.

Centrality and leverage alone will not determine

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\(^6\) Note that assistance is defined as including loans, credits and grants.
whether a third party will act to intervene in any case; willingness and the ability to do so must be present on its part.\footnote{Bercovitch and Wells (1993a) acknowledge that although much has been written about third parties and mediation in general, very little work has been done on what affects third parties' choice of specific strategies of intervention. To this I would add that even less attention has been paid to the reasons why third parties decide to intervene at all and how this decision is arrived at.} This is measured by

a) the number of written and oral guarantees of protection of each actor in case of aggression. Written guarantees such as treaties are weighted more heavily than oral guarantees such as statements by leaders as they show greater commitment on the part of third parties. For instance, the Indo-Soviet Friendship treaty signed in August 1971 was an explicit written guarantee of protection by the Soviets in case of aggression on India. On the other hand, the Chinese leadership sent oral signals of support at various times to Pakistan through the 1971 crisis.

Scale: 1 = very few; 2 = few; 3 = some; 4 = many; 5 = very many

Weighting: To score highly on this scale, there must be either several oral assurances of intervention or support, or a single written guarantee or treaty to that effect.

b) The scope of written guarantees - whether provisions for direct and indirect military supports are made (commitments of troops, arms, naval power, transfer of

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Scale: 1 = very few; 2 = few; 3 = some; 4 = many; 5 = very many
technology, intervention in conflict) and whether this protection is comprehensive or minimal - will be more fully described. To score highly, there must be within written guarantees either multiple provisions for indirect support or one or two provisions for direct support.

D. Third Party Perception of Gain

The perception that third parties hold of any possible gain through their intervention in the conflict will also contribute to their willingness to become involved. These have been measured by references on the part of the third party to:

a) its interest in balancing power in the region of conflict
b) maintaining existing trade connections to India, Pakistan or surrounding regions
c) international goodwill gained or lost through its involvement
d) the protection of its allies. For instance, the Soviet Union began backing India more openly as the 1971 crisis progressed. The signing of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in August 1971 was also a clear signal of protection by the Soviets of their Indian ally. In the 1965 conflict, British P.M. Wilson was eager to protect both actors as members of the Commonwealth.
e) influential domestic interest groups with a stake in
resolving conflict in the region. The term "influential" has been defined in terms of the potential of these groups to have an impact on the making of policy.

Scale: 1 = very few; 2 = few; 3 = some; 4 = many; 5 = very many

Weighting (by degree of centrality to third party interests and therefore likelihood to settle)

5. references to influential domestic interest groups (motivated most by narrow third party interests)
4. references to maintaining trade links (motivated by narrow self-interest)
3. references to interest in balancing power (motivated by a broader self-interest)
2. references to protection of allies (not solely its own interests, some altruism)
1. to gaining international goodwill (not overtly self-interested, most altruistic)

Hence, to score highly on this scale, either there must be many references by third parties to the protection of allies or gaining international goodwill, or a few references to domestic interest groups, maintaining trade links or balancing power in the region.

On the other hand, references might also be made to reluctance or eagerness for involvement. e.g. The U.S. declined an offer made by Ayub Khan for greater involvement
during the 1965 crisis.

II. Independent Variable: Third Party Strategies.

In addition to the nature and characteristics of third parties, the roles they play and strategies that they employ will influence outcomes in each sub-case of crisis. The study has proposed that those third party interventions are best suited to de-escalate crises arising within protracted conflict that enable conflicting actors to deal with history and grievances through a. the provision of channels for direct communication between them and b. through serving as a communication channel through which actors can transmit positions and perspectives. In that sense, I have characterized third party roles as being a combination of what is maintained by some in the literature to be a strict dichotomy between mediation and consultation. These have been measured through:

A. the number and scope of third party-provided envoys/fora (e.g. summits, third party diplomats and embassies, receiving Indian/Pakistani diplomats) for sending and receiving messages between conflicting actors

Code:  1. very frequent

2. frequent

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8 See Princen (1992); Fisher and Keashly (1991). This has been fully explicated in the previous chapter and hence will not be elaborated on here.
3. sometimes
4. infrequent
5. very infrequent

[frequencies will be compared over time-periods]

Weighting: (in order of third party commitment and advances towards settlement)

3. summits (showing greatest commitment and effort)
2. third party diplomats and embassies
1. receiving Indian/Pakistani diplomats (showing least commitment and effort)

To score highly on this category, either there should have occurred many instances of receiving conflicting actor diplomats and making available third party diplomats/embassies, or single efforts at organizing summits between actors concerned.

B. the number of third party meetings with each actor

Scale: 1. frequent 10 and above
2. sometimes 5-9
3. infrequent 0-4

[frequency will be compared over time periods]

and the scope of third party meetings with each actor

a. advancing conflicting actors' perceptions, positions and perspectives of the crisis at hand (e.g. the British High Commissioners to India and Pakistan served this
purpose during the Kutch crisis in 1965).

b. advancing conflicting actors' perceptions, positions and feelings on past history. (e.g. a Security Council resolution in Sept. 1965 touched on these subjects in calling for a cease-fire).

Advancing conflicting actors' perceptions and feelings on the past will be weighted more heavily than advancing their perceptions of the crisis at hand. Since the past plays such a vital role in most protracted conflicts, helping actors to deal with it is made much more difficult, but might advance de-escalation more than strategies that focus on the present.

C. references made by third parties that convey anxiety or pressure on India and Pakistan to resolve the conflict (e.g. the Soviet Union attempted to pressure both India and Pakistan early on in the 1971 conflict to de-escalate; its actions and words became more partisan as the crisis wore on)

D. the number and scope of efforts by third parties to link movement towards resolution of conflict to bilateral aid and trade issues.

E. references clearly delineating broad third party positions on the crisis at hand (e.g. there were a number of
references made by the Soviet Union that pertained to their support of India during the 1971 war).

Weighting: (in order of third party commitment and effort towards settling crisis)

5. third party meetings (indicating most commitment);
4. third party-provided fora;
3. efforts to link movement towards resolution to and trade;
2. references conveying anxiety;
1. references delineating third party positions

Hence, a high score on this category will be obtained either by many references on third party positions and the conveying of anxiety, or fewer instances of third party meetings and fora.

III. Independent Variable: Perception of conflicting actors of third party having the capacity to aid in resolving crisis:

In addition to the nature and role of third parties, it is contended that conflicting actors must hold the perception that third parties do in fact have the capacity to aid in some fashion in the resolution of the conflict, if third party intervention is to meet with greater success. This variable has been measured by references by India and
Pakistan to
A. its international power and influence or the lack thereof (e.g. Indira Gandhi issued numerous statements about the role of the force of world opinion and of the great powers in resolving the 1971 crisis)
B. its leverage over the opponent and,
C. to the aid and trade links that India and Pakistan have with the third party (e.g. India requested both superpowers during the 1965 crisis to stop the flow of arms to Pakistan).

Weighting: The evidence obtained from all three of the above categories will be weighted equally, since no inherent difference in degree of importance affords itself.

IV. Independent Variable: Perception of conflicting actors of third party even-handedness

Did India and Pakistan view relevant third parties in the different crises as even-handed in their approach to them? Did their view of third parties have an impact on outcomes? Do we see differences in the perceptions of conflicting actors in the cases of war as opposed to the cases of settlement? This variable seeks to provide responses to these questions. References made by relevant officials in India and Pakistan about third party even-handedness are coded across the five cases (e.g. Indian dissatisfaction with America's role in the 1971 crisis
increased as it wore on, as did its perceptions of American prejudice against it; India also protested perceived British partisanship in the 1965 crisis, while both India and Pakistan lauded Britain in the Kutch crisis).

V. Independent Variable: Structure and Process of Communications between Conflicting Actors.

This variable must be distinguished from the channels of communication that are made available through third parties in each sub-case and that therefore form a part of third party strategy. There are three ways in which this variable is measured.

First, it is important to provide operational definitions of direct and indirect communications. The direct communication referred to in this variable is that which is engaged in or that which fails to be engaged in by conflicting actors themselves, without initiation by third parties. It is measured in terms of the number of messages sent by one actor to another through channels that are determined as "direct." On the other hand, indirect communications are those again engaged in or which fail to be engaged in by actors themselves, that are measured in terms of the number of "indirect" messages sent by one actor to the other. The terms "direct" and "indirect" will both be further specified in the paragraphs that follow. Finally, face-to-face meetings that are arranged by actors
themselves to discuss the problem at hand also constitute a measure of this variable. They are a form of direct communication, but will be weighted more heavily than direct messages, since they involve a greater commitment on the part of actors and greater opportunity to convey perceptions and positions.

It is important to note that only those messages, threats or other communication that are clearly directed towards and meant for one party by the other are included in this category, as either direct or indirect communication. There are many instances where officials on either side, in their speeches and statements, refer to the general situation at hand and assess, in philosophical terms, the relationship between the two countries. If these don’t contain direct messages or obvious implied references to the other party, they are not included in the counting of number of messages. For instance, in the Kutch case, the Indian Home Minister Nanda briefed newsmen in April of the Indian position and the seriousness of the situation. However, nowhere was Pakistan directly mentioned, nor was any oblique message being sent. Instead, he talked in general terms of aggression by one country on another being a "very serious thing" (Times of India, April 11, 1965). Bhutto, on June 30, 1990 assessed the forthcoming meeting between Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries in general terms (FBIS, July 6, 1990) but sent no overt or implied message to India.
Instances such as these are not included in coding for number of messages sent.\textsuperscript{9}

Again, instances of officials on either side recounting to the press or public their meetings with their counterparts on the other sides and the messages that might be implicit in these press briefings are not included since they will already have been noted as an instance of direct communication. For example, Indian foreign secretary Dubey recounted his meetings with his Pakistani counterpart Khan on July 19, 1990 to the press a day later, where he referred to many of the same issues raised at the meetings (FBIS 20 July, 1990, p. 53). In the same vein, Khan reviewed the meetings with pressmen at the airport after seeing off Dubey (FBIS, July 23, 1990, p.67). "Messages" such as these, which recount already-recorded events or instances, are not included as instances of direct communication.

On the other hand, included in the coding are clear and unambiguous protests or messages sent through direct or indirect channels during the relevant time periods by one actor to the other, that refer to related matters that arise out of the crisis at hand, but perhaps not to the specifics

\textsuperscript{9} I realize that the making of a judgement on whether or not an oblique message was being conveyed will be difficult, considering how salient the on-going crisis between the two countries must have been in the minds of concerned officials at all times. However, some remarks by relevant officials, as when they talk in broader or more reflective terms and refer to other world actors, appear to transcend any preoccupation with the Indo-Pakistani relationship.
of the crisis itself. For instance, in May 1965 India protested to Pakistan over the "discourtesy" shown to its official, the Indian Commissioner for Indus waters, who was in West Pakistan at the time. Pakistani authorities refused him permission to travel to Lahore by road (Times of India, May 30, 1965, p.1). Although this was not an issue inherent in the Kutch crisis, it is evident that tensions at the time contributed greatly to this decision. It is hence included in the coding of communication sent through direct or indirect channels.

A. Direct channels include statements from the foreign ministries, decision-making groups or policy-making leaders in India or Pakistan to their counterparts in the other state. Often, statements are referred to in the data as emanating from "India" or "Pakistan;" these have been included within this category, as long as they are sent to one of the above channels. If they were sent through indirect channels, they would not be included. This category also includes those statements that involve the high commissions of one party and any of the other channels listed above, of the other.

To be included in this category, then, either both parties must be one of the entities above, or either the sender or recipient may be a high commission, with the other being one of those entities. For example, the Indian High
Commissioner to Pakistan was summoned to the Pakistan foreign office on April 17 to clarify statements on the Kutch that had been made by Shastri in parliament earlier (Pakistan Times, April 18, 1965, p.1). This would certainly qualify as direct communication.

B. **Indirect channels**, on the other hand, take the form of press statements and radio and television broadcasts,\(^{10}\) releases through and to high commissions of conflicting actors involving the press, radio etc., statements made at rallies, public meetings and in parliament, and statements made through third party actors (states or international organizations).\(^{11}\) For instance, Indira Gandhi stated to the Indian press during the build-up to the 1971 war that India would not hold talks to negotiate with Pakistan regarding a pull-back of troops from the border (Times of India, October 20, 1971, p.1). This is a clear message sent through an indirect channel, and would be coded as such.

C. **Face-to-face meetings** are quite self-explanatory. They

\(^{10}\) To further clarify, this variable is constituted by messages sent by relevant actors (as already defined) on one side to the other that pertain to the crisis at hand and are either released to these media for public consumption, or are conveyed in interviews with journalists, or in broadcasts to the nation.

\(^{11}\) It should be noted, however, that if a channel of communication is *initiated* by third party actors themselves (rather than the conflicting actors) then it will be coded as an indicator comprising third party strategy.
involve meetings between selected representatives from both sides to discuss the problem facing them, and constitute a "higher," as it were, form of direct communications. Representatives must be specially selected for the occasion by either side, and do not include more ordinary face to face contacts such as with high commissioners. Obviously, to be included in this measure, third parties must not play any role. For example, during the tension over Kashmir in 1990, Indian and Pakistani officials at the highest level, including the Pakistani foreign minister and the Indian external affairs minister, met at three separate occasions, in January in April and in July, to discuss the Kashmir situation. Certainly, U.S. pressure might have contributed to their decisions to meet, but the initiative was clearly taken by the actors themselves and no third party influence can be directly detected.

The number of messages sent, acknowledged and responded to by each actor in each category is measured, as is the number of warnings on intent or position. The hypothesis that is tested through these data is that conflict has a better chance of being successfully settled if direct communications are engaged in between conflicting actors (see Laponce, Dessouki in Frei, 1982).\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{12}\) The relevant literature is described fully in the introduction.
Code:  I. raw numbers

II. frequencies [compared over different time periods and within time periods]
1. frequent 14 and above
2. sometimes 7-13
3. infrequent 0-6

Weighting: No inherent weighting scale affords itself with regard to the different measures of direct and indirect communication. The different communications channels, hence, are equally weighted. However, face-to-face meetings are more highly weighted than other forms of direct communications.

VI Other Independent Variables: Leader Personality and Socialization and the Impact of Domestic Opposition

Mention must be made of other variables that while not central to the construct of a Foundation Building stage, are still systematically examined and coded for in each of the five cases. These include the personality and socialization of the heads of government in power in both states during the different time periods, and the nature of domestic opposition during these times.

Although these variables did not constitute a part of the original model, their potential importance manifested itself to me as I proceeded to examine and analyze available data for the different cases. Repeatedly, I would come
across entries on the role played by opposition parties and leaders, particularly in India, and concluded that this would be a variable worth examining consistently through the different cases. The importance of examining leader personality and socialization was not as manifest; it occurred as a result of reading memoirs written either by the predominant leaders during the different crises, as in the case of Ayub Khan or Benazir Bhutto, or biographies that documented their role.\textsuperscript{13}

With regard to personality and socialization, the questions that are posed include whether it made a difference if leaders were of the "independence" generation, as Nehru, Shastri and Jinnah were, or children of the post-independence generation, as were Benazir Bhutto and V.P. Singh. Further, did it matter whether they were "born" into politics, as it were, or whether they chose their political paths later in life? Certainly Nehru, Indira Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto were involved in politics from very early ages, so much so that politics became a part of their very identities, as Bhutto writes in her autobiography. Finally,

\textsuperscript{13} The leaders on both sides during the five crises have tended to be predominant leaders, although there have certainly been exceptions. Nehru was very influential, even though he did tend to take into careful consideration the opinions of others; Shastri, on the other hand, wielded limited influence. On the other end of the spectrum, we see a concentration of power in the position of prime minister during Indira Gandhi's rule. I focus on pre-eminent leaders rather than on members of larger decision groups not because decision groups are not important, but because that route would extend beyond the bounds of this dissertation.
borrowing from Barber’s (1965; 1985) personality typology, did outcomes differ depending on whether the leaders displayed characteristics of Lawmakers, Reluctants, Advertisers or Spectators?

In Barber’s classic study (1965) on U.S. presidents, he classified them into the above character patterns. Leaders were classified on two dimensions, whether they were active/passive, which related to their level of activity in undertaking their tasks, and whether they were positive/negative, which related to their broad outlook on life. Accordingly, the active-positive individual or Lawmaker is goal-directed and interested in politics to achieve results. The active-negative leader or Advertiser is ambitious, manipulative, competitive and seeks power as a tool of dominance. The passive-positive person, or Spectator tends to avoid conflict and actively seeks cooperation with others. Finally, the passive-negative leader or Reluctant has a strong sense of morality and social obligation. The leaders in this study have been classified in much the same manner, according to the typology presented by Barber, in order to determine whether these characteristics made an impact on eventual outcomes in the five cases under consideration.

Domestic opposition has been limited to political parties or organized political groups and is coded for its "source" (simplistically, whether it was left- or right-
wing/fundamentalist) and its volume (how persistent and vocal it was). Indicators in the form of statements made by opposition leaders or groups urging government action in a particular direction during each conflict are noted. Neither of these two variables are weighted.

**VII Dependent Variable: Conflict De-escalation and Settlement (In Crises Arising out of Protracted Conflicts)**

Protracted conflicts continue to be so precisely because they resist final and lasting resolution, especially if we frame resolution in terms of the meeting of each conflicting actor’s needs and interests (Burton, 1990). Very few protracted conflicts that have been characterized by ethnic, religious, linguistic or other potentially divisive elements have managed to achieve complete resolution.

However, crises that have arisen within the duration of protracted conflicts as in the Indo-Pakistani, have often been successfully defused, settled or de-escalated, with or without third party intervention. Because of the deep historic and affective components to most protracted conflicts, defusion or de-escalation implies some measure of positive perceptual and image change, the rationale being that under the circumstances, without such change, any settlement would be impossible. A successfully defused
crisis, therefore, holds the potential to build the ground for an eventual resolution of the conflict. Hence, this project chooses to look at the period of crisis de-escalation before a war can occur, rather than resolution, as its dependent variable. The dependent variable is operationalized and measured by:

1) mini-summits/face-to-face meetings between selected representatives (a form of pre-negotiation, indicating that the mutual problem has been recognized and dealt with)

2) positive declarations (single and joint) as to the end of crisis/permanent ceasefire

3) renewal of diplomatic ties, if broken
   a) exchange of ambassadors and ambassadorial staff
   b) increase in the number of visas issued to conflicting actor nationals (from the inception of the crisis)

3) increase in no. of "goodwill" gestures
   a) visits of officials
   b) concessions on symbolic issues

4) increase in no. of positive statements by leaders and diplomats in press and official releases (relative to all statements made about the relationship during the crisis)

5) decrease in no. of negative references to history of dispute and past by leaders in speeches and press (relative to all references made in speeches and press during the crisis)
6) decrease in no. of hostile references to conflicting actor in non-government controlled media (relative to total references during the crisis)

7) increase in no. of cultural exchanges (by students, tourists, artists, scholars) compared with duration of crisis. More "official" exchanges (sponsored by governments, governmental institutions) will be weighted more heavily than tourist visits. [all changes will be compared across the different crises.]

**Weighting** for different indicators: Written indicators, because they convey a greater strength of commitment and responsibility from conflicting actors will be weighed more heavily. Hence, to score highly on this category, there must be a great increase in goodwill gestures, positive statements and cultural exchanges, or a few declarations made and summits held.

**A Discussion of Data Sources:**

The data have been mainly drawn from the major Indian and Pakistani newspapers, the *Times of India* and *Pakistan Times*, for the time periods under study.\(^\text{14}\) Although the

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\(^\text{14}\) In the 1947 case, the *Pakistan Times* is substituted by *Dawn* (with some gaps in dates available for the time period under consideration) since the former cannot be obtained from any U.S. library for that year, to the best of my knowledge.
Times of India has sometimes been accused of partiality initially towards the long-ruling Congress party, and more recently, towards the ruling party of the day, it has been and continues to be the most universally respected newspaper in India. Both the newspapers are routinely employed by scholars of the sub-continent as primary data sources.

The *Asian Recorder*, a compilation of news summaries from several Indian and Pakistani newspapers (*Times of India*; *the Hindu*; *Pakistan Times*; *Dawn*) and organized by year, constitutes another source from which the data have been drawn. While I am fluent in the official Indian language, Hindi, scholars of Indian politics have traditionally relied on English-language newspapers such as the *Times* and *Hindustan Times* for their analyses; as such, they are well representative of the print media in the country. More importantly, no problem of translation is posed, since not only are the newspapers in English, but English also happens to be, most frequently, the language of choice for officials of the sub-continent at news conferences, for official releases, etc. Perhaps public rallies are the only arenas where Hindi or Urdu might be used with greater regularity in India and Pakistan respectively.

Finally, the *London Times* was perused for the Kutch case and the 1947 because of Great Britain's prominent role in both crises; similarly, the *New York Times* also provided
data in the 1990 case where the U.S. played the predominant role. For the 1990 crisis, data have also been drawn through the daily reports of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) for South Asia. This source did not exist for the other four cases, hence its employment is limited to this one case only.

Memoirs of the three wars that have engaged the two countries form an alternative source of data, although accounts written by officials directly involved in the wars tend to be biased and polemical. U Thant's memoir and that of his aid Nassif were particularly useful for the 1965 and 1971 wars. The use of memoirs in general is increased through corroboration by newspaper accounts. I have drawn upon them only when corroboration through relatively independent sources exists.

Finally, primary interview data are drawn upon wherever they are available. Interviews of Indian officials who were either directly or indirectly involved in the different crises under consideration were conducted in Bombay and New Delhi in December 1993 and January 1994. Perspectives, opinions and other information from these interviews have been employed, for the most part, to fill in any "holes" that might have been remaining after a perusal of other data sources is complete. Hence, where written data were

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15 A list of interview respondents and a copy of my questionnaire appear in appendices.
incomplete, or were too sketchy to base judgements on, interviews have served as a useful alternative source of information. They have also served as yardsticks with which to measure the reliability of analyses of the data. Finally, they were a source of great insight into the emotional and psychological underpinnings of the conflict on the Indian side.\(^\text{16}\) Whereas the written data could not answer all my questions on the affect and history that give the conflict its flavor, I could often ask interviewees direct questions like what they thought captured the essence of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, and receive thoughtful and thought-provoking answers from them on such subjects. The interviews enabled me to actually get inside the "black box," as it were.

**Accounting for Bias:**

Newspapers have been perused daily during each time period. In other words, whatever data on each crisis was available through the different newspapers through each period constitutes the sample for that particular source. The same is true for the Asian Recorder and the FBIS. Obviously, there is some potential for oversight and simple human error in locating and gathering relevant data,

\(^{16}\) I regret that I was unable to undertake primary interviews of Pakistani officials; my inability was in large part due to the extreme difficulty most Indian nationals face in obtaining Pakistani visas.
especially since the Times of India and Pakistan Times existed in the form of microfilm for which indexes were not existent.

However, because I have employed such a variety sources of data, it is hoped that selection bias will be minimized. For instance, there is a tendency for the Times of India to give much greater coverage of the comments made, messages sent and initiatives taken by Indian leaders, and the same is true for Pakistan Times in the case of Pakistan. This is especially significant in the case of certain variables like the coding for the number and scope of messages sent to each other by the two parties through different channels of communication. It is obvious that the consistently greater reporting by each newspaper of its own country's efforts might have posed to be a problem in the analysis. However, by drawing on both these sources, I believe that the "advantage" that might be gained by either side is minimized. In addition, the Asian Recorder, which is a compilation of Indian and Pakistani sources, and the FBIS which also draws on both country sources, serve as minimizers of bias. This is in keeping with Holsti's (1968) suggestion that a comparison of data sets might aid in marginalizing selection bias.

Further, any bias that might have the potential to be introduced through errors on my part, mostly of omission in the case of the Times of India and Pakistan Times, is almost
certain to be random rather than systematic. It is almost impossible that a whole class of events, for instance all instances of communication through high commissions or through the press for a particular case through a certain time period will have been overlooked by me. More likely is a scenario where events on a certain day might have been missed at random. This latter case poses a lesser problem.

Finally, doubts about any inherent bias that I, as an Indian citizen, might possess in viewing such an emotion-laden conflict must be addressed. Scholarly objectivity and detachedness aside, my not being a member of either the Muslim or Hindu communities of the sub-continent lends a certain distance, I believe, from the conflict. It is easier, hence, to view the subject matter as a scholar and, to some extent, an "outsider."

How Chapters are Organized:

The chapters that follow include a detailed description of the five cases, in-depth analyses of each case in turn, and final conclusions. Each case analysis and the concluding chapter follow the same variable numbering that was adopted in this chapter. To summarize:

I. Third Party Characteristics
II. Third Party Strategies
III. Perception of Conflicting Actors of Third Party having the Capacity to Assist in Settling Crisis
IV. Perception of Conflicting Actors of Third Party Even-handedness

V. Structures and Processes of Communication — Direct, Indirect and Face-to-Face

VI. Other Independent Variables — Leader Personality and Socialization and Domestic Opposition

VII. Dependent Variable — Crisis Settlement
CHAPTER III
The Five Cases

This chapter introduces the five cases that have been selected from the larger Indo-Pakistani conflict since 1947 in order to test hypotheses introduced in the first chapter. It offers a rationale for the selection of these particular cases and aims to provide a descriptive and historical context within which the reader may place the arguments, analyses and prescriptions that constitute the different chapters of this dissertation.

Although there is a substantial descriptive literature that exists on the three Indo-Pakistani wars and on the general relationship between the two countries, much of it is polemical or heavily descriptive rather than analytical.1 Specifically, such issues as the role of third parties, of early intervention and of communication structures and processes between the conflicting actors in times of crises have not been the subject of study. This dissertation,

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1 A portion of it is written by retired army personnel in both countries, and offers an inevitably one-sided picture. The accounts of other authors are also not necessarily above bias (Akbar Khan, 1970; Lakhanpal, 1965).
hence, employs cases from the larger protracted conflict between India and Pakistan in a way that has not, to my knowledge, been previously attempted.

In addition to the three wars - of 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 - I have chosen to analyze two cases within the protracted conflict where de-escalation and settlement, in both cases with the aid of timely third party intervention, was successfully achieved. The developing crisis in the Rann of Kutch in the middle of 1965 was mediated by Great Britain, while the more recent escalation over Kashmir in 1990 saw the intervention of an American delegation from the Bush administration. Neither of these two cases has received much mention in the scholarly literature on the foreign policy of the sub-continent.2

Yet, they are crucial because they offer hope that the relationship between India and Pakistan is not as intractable as an exclusive focus on the wars might make it appear. And, they raise questions of great import that are not confined merely to the Indo-Pakistani context, but have a bearing on other conflicts of a protracted, ethno-religious nature, including why de-escalation was successful in these instances but not in others, what specific role third parties played, and whether successes such as these can be replicated in the future.

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2 While the Rann of Kutch is viewed mainly as a prelude to the 1965 war over Kashmir rather than in its own right, the crisis of 1990 has not been systematically analyzed at all.
The five cases were specifically chosen to reflect variation on the dependent variable to be explained, the settlement of crises that arise within protracted conflicts. They also reveal substantial differences in the independent variables - third party characteristics and roles, and extant structures of communication employed by the conflicting actors - that are at play, hence allowing us to make comparisons and draw conclusions as to the relative import of each variable in different circumstances.

The descriptions of the cases that follow focus mainly on the prelude to each crisis, whether it culminated in war or was successfully settled at a point prior to it. This is in keeping with the focus of this dissertation, which is the incipient phases of crises where "foundations" might be built and prenegotiations then attempted. In contrast, much of the existing literature on the Indo-Pakistani conflict tends to focus on the nuts and bolts of the wars themselves - who attacked when, what the response evoked was, how many were killed, what territory was lost and gained, etc.

Finally, it should be noted that the existing literature tends to view each war or crisis that has arisen between India and Pakistan, in isolation. Certainly there has been no previous juxtaposition of wars with cases of successful de-escalation. Important lessons that could be learned by viewing cases on a continuum, are thereby missed. This dissertation aims to draw comparisons among the cases,
to pronounce on similar or dissimilar trends evident among them and to hence draw some generalizable conclusions on settlements in protracted conflicts such as this one.³

The descriptions that follow are provided in the hope that an overall context for each case will be formed within which the reader may place hypotheses, theoretical questions and the forthcoming analysis of data. The reader will then be able to recognize names, places and events as the analyses are presented. A consideration of different variables like third party strategies, the use of communication channels, etc. will not be undertaken in this chapter; the purpose of this chapter, rather, is to provide descriptive content for the analyses of these and other variables that will follow.

It is a task of great difficulty to summarize so many years of history in one short chapter. So much is relevant; and a comprehension of the complexity of the whole often depends on the seemingly inconsequential incidences and occasions that mark the relationship between the two countries and people, as well as the more momentous ones. The following pages attempt to summarize this complexity, and while much must necessarily be omitted, it is hoped that

³ The chronological reconstruction of events for the three wars and the Rann of Kutch crisis have benefitted from descriptions in Lamb (1991), Thomas (1992), Brecher (1953), Ganguly (1986), Brines (1968) and Gupta (1966) in addition reports in the Times of India, Pakistan Times, New York Times and London Times. For the crisis of 1990 I have had to rely solely on newspaper reports.
the essence is conveyed.

The First Indo-Pakistani War: To Whom does Kashmir Belong?

The problem that Kashmir posed for India and Pakistan arose directly out of the pre-Independence partition of British India into two countries in 1947. When it became clear that there would be an inevitable division of the sub-continent into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan, British disengagement policy from India had to include conditions upon which this partition would occur.4 These would include guidelines for the division of government assets and the armed forces; more importantly, the expected movement of populations across the newly-demarcated borders would need to be regulated.5

A critical problem was also posed by the 500-odd princely states that were in existence in India throughout British rule. With the British gone, would they claim independence, or would they be forced to align with India or Pakistan? On what basis would their alignment with either

4 Mohandas Gandhi remained opposed to the concept of partition to the very end, while other prominent leaders in the Indian National Congress like Nehru began to accept its inevitability. Jinnah, the first leader of free Pakistan, would accept no other alternative short of the creation of two separate states from the beginning of negotiations.

5 In spite of the existence of guidelines that aimed at providing order out of the chaotic operation of partitioning British India, the unprecedented difficulties of apportioning assets and the violence, riots and mayhem that accompanied the movement of people across the border imparted a hostile context within which events between the two countries unfolded.
country be claimed? It quickly became clear that the existence of independent princely states in India was not a viable option. Hence, it remained to be defined how they would join India or Pakistan. The criteria decided upon were largely geographical location and the religion of the majority of the subjects (Ganguly, 1986, p. 42). As most of these states were geographically in the far interior of India it was obvious that they accede to it, and most chose freely to do so.

In the case of Kashmir, with its Hindu ruler, Muslim majority and contiguity to both India and Pakistan, it was not as easy to make a decision. India claimed that the Hindu ruler had the right to decide, Pakistan wanted the Kashmiri people to make the choice, while the vacillating ruler himself remained undecided. Kashmir was important to both countries for strategic and other reasons -- for India, Kashmir would serve as the showpiece of its secular ideals, the physical reminder that while Hindus predominated in India, Muslims and followers of other religions were equal citizens; for Pakistan, Kashmiris were their Muslim brethren and Kashmir a logical extension of Pakistani territory.

With Kashmir’s accession at a temporary standstill, the invasion of armed tribesmen from northwest Pakistan into Kashmir in October 1947, according to most Indians and the international community with the Pakistani government’s complicity (see Ganguly, p. 51), precipitated the ruler’s
decision to call on India’s help. The armed tribesmen were motivated by both religious zeal and mercenary impulses - Kashmiri towns and villages reeled under the vicious attack by the invaders, and the state did not have the resources to fight back - and were backed by Pakistan. India’s aid was sought and India agreed to send troops -- but only after Kashmir officially acceded to it; the Maharaja, lacking an alternative, promptly agreed. Indian troops were then airlifted to Srinagar, the capital, minutes before the invaders arrived at its airfield.

Immediately after the incident, Pakistan began to press India to retreat and declared Kashmir’s accession illegal. Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, declared:

We do not recognize this accession. The accession of Kashmir to India is a fraud, perpetrated on the people of Kashmir by its cowardly Ruler with the aggressive help of the Indian Government (Brecher, 1953).

Claims and counterclaims were exchanged by the two countries, with the press and national broadcasts serving as the main vehicles. Mountbatten met with Jinnah to facilitate negotiations between the two sides, but the meeting came to naught (Gupta, 1966, p.130). Meanwhile, the war between the Indian army on the one hand, and the

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6 Although the Pakistani government admitted that they were sympathetic to the cause of the tribesmen, they denied that they were involved in the initial invasion in any way.

7 Each country accused the other of pre-mediation in their actions in Kashmir.
invaders (along with regular Pakistani forces who had joined by this time) on the other, continued through the winter of 1947 and spring of 1948 (Brines, 1968). Urged on by Mountbatten, the two sides met to talk directly in December 1947 and agreed upon the framework for a possible solution which was partially employed by the U.N. when it later intervened in the matter in January 1948 (Brines, 1953).

Some authors have reflected that had the British departed from their former colony in less haste and with greater planning, the extent of the tragedies that beset the sub-continent in the wake of their departure -- the hundreds of thousands killed in mass migrations from one newly-created state to the other, the bloodshed in Kashmir -- might have been alleviated (see Lamb, 1991, p. 102). As it was, Britain was in an inordinate hurry to leave and had neither the will nor apparent means to intervene. Mountbatten's role in the developing crisis over Kashmir echoed the British role in that it lacked direction and imagination; rather, it was passive and reactive to the events underway. No third party, then, played a clearly-defined role in mediating this first crisis between India and Pakistan.

A U.N.-concluded truce was accepted by the conflicting

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8 This included Pakistani efforts to withdraw the tribesmen from Kashmir and accept a cease-fire for their troops, an Indian withdrawal of most of its troops and U.N. intervention in the area to conduct a plebiscite.
actors on December 31, 1948. On January 20, 1949, a ceasefire line was drawn which reinforced the positions of the two countries at the cessation of hostilities. The U.N., in negotiating a ceasefire, determined that a permanent solution would be decided on the basis of a plebiscite (Thomas, 1992, p. 20). In this, it echoed a provision of the document of accession itself, which included plans for the "settling" of the "question of accession" by a "reference to the (Kashmiri) people" (Brecher, 1953). However, this provision was never fulfilled. India, in continuing to resist the notion through later decades, has insisted that had a plebiscite been held in Kashmir immediately following the tribal invasion, the vote would have been in its favor. However, since a part of Kashmir was still occupied by Pakistani troops in the years following the invasion, India maintains that the time for a plebiscite is now past.

The first war over Kashmir was both a consequence of the age-old distrust and hostility between the Hindus and Muslims on the sub-continent and the cause of continued hatred between the two countries into the future. If there had been any chance of a fresh beginning for the two communities, the war ensured that this was quickly reversed; instead, it reinforced existing negative images and

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9 See Gupta (1966) on Indian and Pakistani positions on the matter.
stereotypes and added another chapter to the history of hostility between the two sides. Further, the status of Kashmir, as yet undecided, has remained the bone of contention between the two countries. The U.N.-sponsored ceasefire of 1949 has divided Kashmir into a Pakistani-controlled third (termed "Azad" or Free Kashmir, with comparatively greater autonomy than its Indian counterpart and with its capital in Muzaffarabad)\(^{10}\) and an Indian-held two-thirds, (the Kashmir valley, with its capital in Srinagar). Today, of course, the majority of valley Kashmiris want nothing to do with either of their two neighbors, fighting, instead, for complete self-determination and complicating an already-complex situation on the sub-continent.

\(^{10}\) India refers to this part of Kashmir as Pakistan-held Kashmir (POK), a reflection of Pakistan's great influence in the area.
### TABLE 3.1

**CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, 1947 WAR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-1947</td>
<td>Drawing up of Partition plans, including guidelines for the division of government assets and the armed forces, the expected movement of populations across the newly-demarcated borders and the accession of princely states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15, 1947</td>
<td>Partition of British India into independent states of India and Pakistan; Accession of Kashmir at temporary standstill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1947</td>
<td>Invasion of armed tribesmen from northwest Pakistan into Kashmir; Ruler calls on India for help. Kashmir accedes to India, Indian troops are despatched and the two states are involved in war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1947</td>
<td>Pakistan continues to protest Indian involvement and declare Kashmir's accession illegal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1948</td>
<td>India refers dispute to U.N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1948</td>
<td>Security Council resolution calls on withdrawal by both sides; remains unenforced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 31, 1948</td>
<td>U.N. sponsored truce declared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 20, 1949</td>
<td>Ceasefire line drawn reinforcing the positions of the two countries at cessation of fighting. Becomes de-facto international boundary pending recommended plebiscite.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Rann of Kutch: Successful De-escalation and Settlement

In April 1965, fighting broke out between Indian and Pakistani border troops in the Rann of Kutch, an area that lay on the north western border between the two countries. Periodic squabbles had erupted over the status of this area in the past, with India claiming the entire Rann and Pakistan disputing this claim and asserting its ownership over the northern half of the area. The northern half, then, constituted the area that formed the disputed territory.

In a sense, the emotional and affective nature of the Indo-Pakistani relationship was most clearly brought to light in this dispute, since the area of contention had almost no inherent worth: it was uninhabitable, inhospitable, a virtual wasteland that was made inaccessible for half of each year during the monsoon season. Its worth, then, was clearly only in the eyes of the beholders - Indian and Pakistan.

It is not clear just which side started the conflict in April - each party has pointed to the other. Indian troops struck a Pakistani post in the disputed region in early April, ostensibly as a response to Pakistani provocation. Pakistan retaliated on Indian posts near Kanjarkot in the Rann, in effect capturing the area. At this point, Pakistan offered a cease-fire proposal but this was rejected by the Indian side which laid down the withdrawal of Pakistani
troops from Kanjarkot as an essential precondition. This quickly solidified into the official Indian position; while Pakistan appeared ready at different points in the next two months for an immediate ceasefire, India made it conditional upon troop withdrawal and a restoration of the status quo ante (see for instance, Pakistan Times, April 11, 15, 16, 24, 1965 and the Times of India, April and May 1965).

Early in the developing crisis, Britain offered to intervene to seek a settlement. To this end, the British high commissioners to India and Pakistan, John Freeman and Morrice James, became the main vehicles to transport messages, seek compromises and urge settlements between the two sides, creating, in effect, their own brand of shuttle diplomacy. Numerous meetings took place between them and the top officials of the two countries between April and June. British Prime Minister Wilson took a personal interest in resolving the dispute, often writing to Pakistani President Ayub and Indian P.M. Shastri and reporting events in the British parliament.

For the rest, the U.S. openly supported British efforts and urged a settlement but otherwise made no effort to become actively involved. In fact the U.S. cancellation of a scheduled meeting between President Johnson and the leaders of India and Pakistan, Shastri and Ayub, caused much resentment against the U.S. in both countries, and U.S. credibility suffered as a result. The roles of the U.S.S.R
and the U.N. were also virtually non-existent this crisis.

Persistent British efforts towards a settlement began to pay off in June, when Shastri and Ayub met at the urging of Wilson, at the Commonwealth Premiers’ Conference in London. Shastri reported a "happy meeting" with Ayub (Pakistan Times, June 18, 1965). A ceasefire was signed shortly thereafter, on June 30, which restored, for the most part, the status quo ante before hostilities and provided for submitting the dispute for formal negotiations between the two countries and binding resolution by a three-person arbitration team. A date for these formal negotiations was set for August but this was eventually canceled as hostilities began to escalate between the two states in the building Kashmir crisis.

Britain, hence, played a crucial role in de-escalating this crisis, offering channels of direct communication for the two parties as well as serving as a tool for conveying each side’s positions and perceptions to the other. In addition, the Kutch crisis was distinguished by the frequent use of direct communications channels by conflicting actors themselves. The foreign office and foreign ministers of the two countries were the importers and receivers of messages rather than the more oblique channels of the press, parliamentary speeches or impersonal releases by respective high commissions.

Some scholars and politicians on the Indian side have
claimed that the Kutch affair was an attempt by Pakistan to test the Indian mettle, as it were, for the real contest which would be the attack on the Kashmir valley later in 1965. Various claims have been made that Pakistani plans for the attack on Kashmir had been drawn up even as the two countries engaged in skirmishes in, and then settled, the Kutch crisis.

I believe, however, that it is important to view the two cases as distinct. There is no incontrovertible evidence that Kutch was a test-case for anything else, and skirmishes in the area had taken place periodically even prior to 1965. As the Kutch crisis wore on, reports in the Pakistani press about the situation in Kashmir did indeed become more vocal and numerous, but this could be interpreted as responses to the situation of internal unrest developing within the state rather than any calculated escalation on Pakistan’s part. Further, through the history of the relationship between the two countries, it has been customary for each actor to doubt the other’s every action and intention, and the Kutch case was in that sense no different. Scholars like Lamb (1991), on the other hand, have tended to agree that the Kutch crisis was not in fact a curtain raiser for Pakistan’s attack on Kashmir a few months later but rather involved its own dynamics.

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12 Scholars like Lamb (1991), on the other hand, have tended to agree that the Kutch crisis was not in fact a curtain raiser for Pakistan’s attack on Kashmir a few months later but rather involved its own dynamics.
more hard-line Indian response in the crisis, did not really affect the eventual cease-fire. Much of it was confined to right-wing Hindu nationalist parties like the Jan Sangh who advocated war rather than compromise and who opposed the ceasefire agreement as a sell-out. It is certainly likely, however, that the hard-line set by the right-wing opposition during the Kutch crisis reduced the Indian government's flexibility in negotiating a settlement in the time period leading to the second war over Kashmir, which was to erupt only a few months later.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1965</td>
<td>Skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani border troops break out in the Rann of Kutch. Indian troops strike a Pakistani post, supposedly in response to Pakistani provocation in area. Pakistan captures Indian post of Kanjarkot; offers ceasefire. Rejected by India, which makes ceasefire conditional on troop withdrawal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-May 1965</td>
<td>Britain intervenes. British high commissioners to India and Pakistan, Freeman and James, transport messages and seek compromises. Wilson writes often to Ayub and Shastri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1965</td>
<td>Ceasefire signed that restores status quo ante before hostilities and provides for submission of dispute to formal negotiations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kashmir Again: The Second War, 1965

While the unresolved problem posed by the status of Kashmir remained the overarching cause for the 1965 war, more immediate reasons were constituted by the internal unrest within the state itself and Pakistan's infiltration into it, in part as a response to this unrest.

In the years immediately preceding 1965, Kashmir became the scene for instability and simmering hostility. In December 1963, violence had followed the theft of a religious relic, widely believed to be a hair belonging to the prophet Mohammed, from a Kashmiri mosque. As part of a series of fumbling responses by the Indian government to the situation, Sheikh Abdullah, a popular Kashmiri leader who had been under arrest for the past decade, was released and then re-arrested. Instability in Kashmir increased, and the Indian government invoked articles 356-357 of the Indian constitution to declare "President's rule" over the state, thus effectively opening the way for the treatment of Kashmir as an integral part of India, as just another Indian state in the Indian union. This was a direct violation of the "special status" of Kashmir under the Indian constitution's article 370 and the prevailing understanding since 1948, and served as evidence of further Indian duplicity for Pakistan (Cheema in Thomas, 1992).

In Pakistan, Ayub Khan was facing some domestic opposition to his rule and needed an attractive foreign
policy maneuver to bolster his sagging image. To him, war with India might have appeared just such an alternative. Added to this, there was growing frustration both within the Pakistani government and in the country at large, at what were perceived as Indian attempts to alter, subtly but surely, Kashmir's international status and integrate it completely and irrevocably with India.\textsuperscript{13}

The war began in August, with Pakistan sending armed infiltrators at several points across the cease-fire line in Kashmir. The plan was for these infiltrators to pass off as Kashmiri "freedom fighters" and to incite an internal revolt within the state. Indian and global intelligence recognized the thinly-disguised plan almost immediately for what it was; as prime minister Shastri commented at the time, "the whole world knows there was no revolt" (Brines, 1968).\textsuperscript{14} India responded by retaliating against Pakistani posts, and increasing Indian gains were made through the month. Airpower, limited in the main to military targets, was called into play in September. By the end of September the two sides had reached a stalemate.\textsuperscript{15} It was clear to both

\textsuperscript{13} India's earlier invoking of President's rule in Kashmir certainly lent some truth to that claim.

\textsuperscript{14} Although Pakistan's official position has been that there was absolutely no Pakistani involvement before September 1, independent foreign sources, including a United Nations observer group, confirmed the infiltration by Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{15} During that month, Indian forces had launched attacks towards Lahore and Sialkot in Pakistan, while Pakistan had attacked Punjab.
sides that there would be no decisive military victory for either of them.

Third parties states played a minimal role through the duration of the crisis. The United States and Britain, who had been chagrined to discover that the war had been fought in great measure with weapons supplied by their countries, declared that military supplies to the two parties would be halted until a ceasefire was called. But there was no effort on their, or any other country's, part to employ specific strategies that might persuade the conflicting sides to de-escalate their building dispute.

U Thant visited the two countries on September 9 and 12 and held talks with Shastri and Ayub. This was the culmination of a subdued - and lonely - role that the U.N. secretary-general played from early August. It was followed up by letters to the two heads of state calling for a ceasefire. When his call was echoed by the U.N. Security Council, which in a resolution demanded that a cease-fire should take effect, it was accepted by India and Pakistan on September 21 and 22, respectively (Lamb, 1992). Nowhere was the status of Kashmir mentioned in the resolution. The Tashkent agreement, mediated by the Soviet Union, was signed a few months later and in effect brought the Kashmir issue to temporary closure.16

16 Through this war the Soviets had maintained a posture of neutrality that was convincing to both parties. Even though they had publicly declared themselves supporters of the Indian position
TABLE 3.3
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, THE SECOND WAR OVER KASHMIR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1963-1964</td>
<td>Sporadic violence in Kashmir following theft of a religious relic. Fumbling responses on part of Indian government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Increasing instability in Kashmir. India declares &quot;President's Rule&quot; over the state, in violation of Kashmir's &quot;special status.&quot; Pakistan views this as unacceptable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1965</td>
<td>Pakistan sends armed infiltrators, disguised as Kashmiri &quot;freedom fighters,&quot; across the border into Indian-held Kashmir. India retaliates against Pakistani posts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1965</td>
<td>Airpower is called into play on both sides. A stalemate is reached. U Thant holds talks with Ayub and Shastri; calls for cease-fire. His call is echoed by the U.N. Security Council, which demands a cease-fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 21-22</td>
<td>Cease-fire accepted by India and Pakistan, respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 22 and Nov. 25</td>
<td>India and Pakistan, respectively, accept Kosygin's offer for meeting at Tashkent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 10, 1966</td>
<td>Tashkent agreement signed, bringing temporary closure to Kashmir issue.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

on Kashmir earlier, their recent efforts had been aimed at strengthening ties with Pakistan. Hence, they were the logical choice of third party intervenors (Lamb, 1992).
1971: War and the Creation of Bangladesh.

The immediate cause\textsuperscript{17} for the war of 1971 between India and Pakistan was the exacerbation of the civil war in East Pakistan through the months leading up to the war, and the tensions created by the increasing stream of refugees that fled over the Indian border to seek sanctuary within India.

The situation in Pakistan was created by Pakistan's military rulers led by General Mohammed Yahya Khan, when they called for the first direct elections in the history of independent Pakistan. East Pakistan gained an absolute majority in Pakistan's 300-seat National Assembly.\textsuperscript{18} The Awami League party, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, won all but two of the seats in E. Pakistan while the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, won a majority of the seats in the regions of West Pakistan. Each party demanded the right to form the government at the center and the situation rapidly deteriorated into near-anarchy in E. Pakistan, as negotiations on power-sharing between the two parties failed.\textsuperscript{19}

The Bengali leadership and indeed the peoples of E.

\textsuperscript{17} As with the other cases, one assumes that the underlying causes are rooted in history.

\textsuperscript{18} In the theatre of Pakistan's checkered post-independence history until 1971, three constitutions, two military governments and fledgling parliamentary rule had all played roles.

\textsuperscript{19} Although the Awami League had won an overall majority of seats in the election, Bhutto and the PPP conspired to paint the party as a regional, E. Pakistani party, one with no legitimacy in the west and therefore unfit to form the government.
Pakistan had long felt that they had been marginalized in the politics and larger society of their country. Their demands for linguistic and cultural recognition had not been well received in the short history of Pakistan's independence, and riots had sometimes ensued in the past over these issues. In the years preceding the 1971 election, Rehman had adopted a "six-point manifesto" which called for some measure of economic and political autonomy for E. Pakistan. Similarly, many in West Pakistan, including the military elite, viewed E. Pakistani Bengalis with suspicion, as somehow not being "true" Muslims, Pakistanis true to the cause. Hence, Yahya's call for direct elections in 1971 and the power struggle between Bhutto's PPP and Rehman's Awami League served as the catalyst which brought already-poor relations between the two peoples to a head. Where Pakistan's military leaders had previously been committed to a transfer of power to a civilian government, they now felt compelled to crackdown on East Pakistan, where a resistance movement was rapidly gaining ground because of the events that had conspired, and impose a solution, which they did on March 25, 1971.

India's initial response to the unfolding crisis in Pakistan was cautious and non-committal. It viewed the crisis as an internal Pakistani problem, only affecting

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20 Riots over the question of Bengali recognition had sporadically broken out from the earliest days of Pakistan's independence. Those of 1952 were among the most destructive.
India to the extent that refugees had started to cross over into the Indian side. This problem would take care of itself once Pakistan's leadership was able to restore stability, India believed. Statements made in public by Indira Gandhi and other members of India's ruling party in the initial period belied this belief. India simply did not want to become involved, and through the early months of the crisis, it was not militarily prepared for involvement. However, events in Pakistan soon ensured that it had to be.

Indira Gandhi's section of the Congress party had just won a convincing victory in the March 1971 general elections. Some authors believe that the opposition had been subdued as a result and that the decision-making group within the ruling Congress had a free hand in framing the Indian response to events in Pakistan (Sisson and Rose, 1989). However, a closer scrutiny of the data reveals that Gandhi did face some pressure, especially in parliament, to take a more aggressive stance towards Pakistan. This was especially true after the military leadership banned the Awami League and arrested Mujib.21

As refugees continued to stream across the border, India became more vocal in support of the Bangladeshi "cause," while still denying that it would in any way be involved in materially supporting the Awami League.

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21 This has been echoed in accounts like Jackson's (1974) on the 1971 war.
Similarly, third party response to the unfolding crisis was also slow in coming, and careful references to "the whole Pakistani people," as by the Soviet Union, were the norm in the earlier stages (Jackson, 1974). China was alone in proclaiming support for Pakistan from the beginning, but as the conflict unraveled, it was plain that this support would fall short of any intervention on Pakistan's behalf. In general, the focus of third powers remained more directly on the refugee situation rather than on the rapidly escalating crisis that the situation was creating between India and Pakistan, and no attempts were made to persuade the actors to communicate directly with an end to de-escalation. Curiously, this was echoed by the Indian position, which reiterated at certain points that the problem was not an Indo-Pakistani one but rather Pakistan's alone. It urged third party efforts to persuade Pakistan to solve the crisis posed by E. Pakistan.

United Nations' efforts in E. Pakistan increased as the crisis wore on and India often found itself in the position of rejecting a greater UN role for fear that the crux of the problem, the recognition of some measure of independence for Bangladesh, would be obscured by UN attention on the more "physical" and tangible elements of the crisis, the refugees.\textsuperscript{22} The signing of the Indo-Soviet Friendship

\textsuperscript{22} For instance, U Thant's suggestion in July 1971 of stationing UNHCR troops on either side of the north-eastern border was categorically rejected by India.
Treaty on August 9 changed the flavor of the crisis to the extent that it provided for immediate "mutual consultations" in the case of aggression or the threat of one on either party, "in order to remove such threats..." (Jackson, 1974). Soviet backing for the Indian position increased notably in the UN, where a diplomatic offensive by the two countries raged from September until the war in December. However, the Soviet Union at no point intervened directly in the conflict. Border skirmishes became increasingly common and, after Gandhi's tour of Western states proved fruitless, full-scale war broke out December 3, initiated by Pakistan's pre-emptive strike.

The events leading to the 1971 war are distinguished (most importantly for the purposes of this research) by the relative absence of direct communication between India and Pakistan. Even as the crisis escalated and threats and warnings were bandied about, neither country chose negotiators or suggested meetings or other channels through which relevant issues might be aired. Instead, indirect

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23 Indian and Pakistani positions were crystallized during this period, with Pakistan promoting a mutual troop withdrawal and international supervision on the border, and India insisting that no such move was possible until the political problem in E. Pakistan, compounded by the detention of Rehman, was resolved.

24 Although Gandhi was well received by the European leadership and sympathy in those countries largely lay with India, her meetings with Nixon were unfriendly and less than satisfactory. This, in particular, along with the fact that Western Europe was unwilling to act on their convictions, might have convinced her that no help was going to be forthcoming from third party quarters.
channels - the press, the parliament, high commissions and consulates - became the avenues of choice, inviting a greater recklessness of charges than might have been the case if selected representatives were involved.

Again, third parties fell short of playing the critical role that they might have. Both India and Pakistan had turned at different times during the crisis to influential third parties - the U.S., the U.N., the Soviet Union and Britain - only to discover an absence of commitment on their parts to stop the escalation. Indeed, third party states played the intriguing role of at once being involved in the crisis yet stopping short of offering concrete options for settlement. Their efforts were focused mainly on the manifestations of the E. Pakistani situation - the refugees - rather than on the roots of the escalating crisis - past and present animosity between India and Pakistan.

The existence of the Cold War also ensured that neither superpower could play honest broker to both parties; their primary allegiance lay with their clients and they were unwilling and unable to look beyond the single clients to the relationship between the two.²⁵ The "Nixon Doctrine" underlined that U.S. interests lay in defending friends and allies but not in undertaking "all the defense of the free

²⁵ Some authors (see Choudhury, 1975) have recognized the debilitating and restrictive effects of the Cold War on great power mediation, effects that prevented either superpower from gaining a "diplomatic coup," through wielding meaningful influence in the crisis, against the other.
nations of the world" (Dutta, 1990). Today's changed global climate promises that should a third party with influence wish to play a definitive role in crises such as this one, not only might their task be made somewhat easier, but their role might also be viewed as more credible by conflicting actors.

In the absence of clear third party pressure to the effect, India and Pakistan were not likely to initiate talks themselves and sure enough, they did not. Left to their own devices, India spurned Pakistani overtures rather than accept them; Pakistan viewed ultimate Indian motives in Bangladesh with suspicion rather than take them at face value; in light of their past relations, both parties looked for that explanation which made the other side look their worst. The war might not have occurred if the burden of the past had been stemmed through the initiation of direct communication and the airing of grievances, both of which however presumed a major role from an influential third party. The war, in that sense, was much more about India and Pakistan than it was about Bangladesh.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 7, 1970</td>
<td>First direct elections held in Pakistan. East Pakistani party gains majority in Pakistan National Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-March 1971</td>
<td>Negotiations on power-sharing between parties in East and West Pakistan break down. Situation of near anarchy prevails in E. Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 25, 1971</td>
<td>Pakistani armed forces crack down on E. Pakistan. Refugees begin to stream across the border into India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1971</td>
<td>Subdued response on part of India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-September, 1971</td>
<td>Indian response becomes increasingly vocal, demanding a return of refugees, attention to Pakistani &quot;genocide&quot; and finally the need for an independent Bangladesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September-November, 1971</td>
<td>Increasing border skirmishes. Gandhi undertakes tour of Western countries to vocalize Indian position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 3, 1971</td>
<td>War breaks out.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Crisis of 1990: Timely De-escalation

In January 1990, a brewing crisis claimed by many as having the potential to be the most serious since the war of 1971, arose between India and Pakistan over the continuing disputed status of the Kashmir valley (Kamen, 1990; Hazarika, 1990). Demonstrators from "Azad" or Pakistan-held Kashmir (POK) numbering in the thousands descended upon the valley claimed by India for the past forty years, and vowed to liberate it from Indian rule.26

Following the unrest by Azad Kashmiri demonstrators, a battle of words and publicly-issued protests followed between the two countries. India blamed Pakistan for playing a direct role in the initiating the crisis, while Pakistan denied the charge and insisted that the problem had been created by India's continuing illegal occupation of the valley. The foreign offices of each country summoned high commissioners to issue protests, and India's army chief Gen. Sharma vowed to defend the cease-fire line by force, if necessary (Hazarika, Jan. 30, 1990).

26 Although the Kashmir valley has been in dispute since the first war between India and Pakistan and unrest is not new to the region, escalating violence and a serious separatist movement backed by Azad Kashmir have emerged only since the mid-1980s. To some extent, the movement is more truly Kashmiri and more completely one of self-determination today than it has been at any time before; it is more than the manipulations of either India and Pakistan and truly has a life of its own.
By March, troops from both sides were flooding the border region, moving them perilously close to another war. India's Prime Minister V.P. Singh and other Indian leaders warned that the country should be prepared for such an eventuality. Agitators who attempted to cross the cease-fire line into Indian-held Kashmir were fired upon by Indian troops, and a few deaths were reported.

In April, the rapidly-escalating hostilities prompted the U.S. to call upon the two sides to take steps at de-escalation.\(^{27}\) Officials in the Bush administration began to recognize that the conflict was the gravest in almost two decades. Bush sent personal messages to the leaders of both countries and Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates along with an American delegation was dispatched to India and Pakistan in May to urge the Indian leaders to seek a political settlement and to open a dialogue towards this end. The U.S. delegation made it clear that while America did not want to play the role of formal mediator in this conflict, it would certainly act as an interested third party to "contribute to a reduction of tension" (Asian Recorder, July 9-15, 1990, p. 21235).

Indian and Pakistani proposals to de-escalate arose out of this visit and out of American recommendations for confidence-building measures (Gordon, June 15, 1990). India

\(^{27}\) The U.S. had already sent messages of concern to both sides early in the escalating crisis and had since been monitoring its evolution.
proposed a series of such measures at the end of May, in response to which Pakistan suggested face-to-face meetings between representatives of the two sides in Islamabad. Accordingly, the foreign secretaries of both countries met with each other and with other members of both delegations on July 18 and 19. Pakistan's president and prime minister both had a chance to talk with the Indian delegation, and comments following the meetings ranged from "useful and purposeful," according to Indian foreign secretary Dubey, to the meetings having "reduced the danger of war," according to his Pakistani counterpart, Khan (FBIS July 20, 1990, p. 53; FBIS July 23, 1990, p. 67). These meetings were followed by a visit to Delhi by Pakistani foreign secretary Khan in early August.

Although the American role in this crisis displayed less of a commitment than British efforts during the Kutch situation, it did share some similar strategies in that in both cases, third party representatives conveyed the perceptions and positions, especially on the circumstances at hand, of each country to the other.28 Personal messages to both Singh and Ishaq Khan by Bush were also conveyed by Gates.

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28 It displayed less of a commitment in that no specifically selected U.S. representatives (as with British high commissioners Freeman and James in the Kutch crisis) worked continuously with the Indian and Pakistani sides over an extended period of time.
Further, both cases are characterized by a relatively substantial exchange of direct communication from the inception of the problem. From the visit of Pakistani special envoy Abdus Sattar to India in January to the meeting by the foreign ministers of both countries in New York in April to discuss the situation in Kashmir, to the July meetings between the foreign secretaries in Islamabad to lower-key meetings by "lesser" officials like the interior secretaries, face-to-face communication was evident through the whole time. A "hotline" had also been developed to speed communications between the two countries, and this was employed through the period under study, particularly by the military commanders from both sides (FBIS-NES-90-073, April 16, 1990).

As in the case of Kutch, the 1965 and 1971 wars, the role of the political opposition was more important for India than it was for Pakistan, although during this last case Pakistan had taken steps towards democratization and did have to contend with a more vocal opposition than it had in during the other time periods. It is significant that the right-wing political parties including the Jan Sangh that had aggressively demanded firmer Indian action in 1965 had consolidated themselves into the Bharatiya Janata Party, a powerful force in Indian politics by 1990 and a force that
continued to advocate tough action against Pakistan.29 Another significant change in the structure of Indian politics by this time was the enormity of the domestic problems that the government faced, and that all future governments will continue to face. Punjab was in turmoil during 1990 and communal tensions were rising throughout the country. These constituted some distraction from the Kashmir problem. In Pakistan, there was great unrest in Sind, and the government was somewhat preoccupied by events there.

Although this particular crisis was settled, the conflict over Kashmir is far from resolved. In the years to come, it will require the acceptance from both countries of Kashmiri input and ideas if there is to be any hope for a lasting resolution. One of the first overt and unmistakable indications of the integral Kashmiri role in the conflict over their nation was the 1990 crisis. In a sense, then, India and Pakistan can never go back to making decisions about the area with scant regard to the people themselves, as has been the case for most of the post-Independence period. However, they do continue to play the most vital roles in seeking solutions and are inevitably involved in the future of Kashmir, just as Kashmir necessarily forms a part of the future relationship between India and Pakistan.

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29 Today the BJP is India’s largest opposition party and is slated by many to form the next government, either through the winning of a parliamentary majority or through a coalition. It still maintains its hardline view of relations with Pakistan.
TABLE 3.5

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, THE CRISIS OF 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1990</td>
<td>Demonstrators from &quot;Azad&quot; Kashmir descend into the Kashmir valley vowing to liberate it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-April 1990</td>
<td>Mounting violence in the Kashmir valley; India and Pakistan begin a war of words and issue warnings. Troops from both sides flood the Kashmir region and border clashes ensue. Gujral and Yakub Khan meet in New York; discuss Kashmir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1990</td>
<td>American delegation visits India and Pakistan, offers American help in settling situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 1990</td>
<td>Some troops withdrawn from border regions. Confidence-building measures proposed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1990</td>
<td>Foreign secretaries meet in Islamabad over two days. Indian foreign secretary meets with Pakistani president and prime minister. Talks declared useful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1990</td>
<td>Pakistani foreign secretary arrives in Delhi for three day visit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER IV

The First War: Kashmir, 1947

This chapter constitutes an analysis of the first war fought by India and Pakistan over Kashmir. It presents results obtained from coding categories and draw comparisons between this case and the other cases that have been selected. As with the other cases in this study, a detailed description of this case, including the conditions for accession of the independent princely states to either India or Pakistan is provided in the chapter on case descriptions. This section, then, will not detail events surrounding the war except as necessary to comprehend results from coding categories.

The case represented by the first war, fought so soon after India and Pakistan became independent states, is inevitably made unique by its place and time in history. Some would argue that this case, because it was so inextricably linked first with events set in motion during the painful years before independence and then with the partition, does not belong with the other cases selected - the second war over Kashmir, the war over Bangladesh and the
crises in the Kutch in 1965 and in Kashmir in 1990. These other cases, they might assert, are made comparable because they offer a similar context within which to view particular elements of foundation-building; they are fully representative of the relationship between the two independent states, while the 1947 case is clouded by the recency of colonialism and the transition to independence.¹

I believe that a more forceful argument can be made for the inclusion of the 1947 case along with the others. The essence of the relationship between India and Pakistan that has contributed to the protracted nature of hostilities—the mistrust, fear and memory of the past—existed in equal, perhaps greater, measure during 1947. People were acutely aware of their religious and ethnic differences, and suspicion between the two camps was heightened by the protracted and heated bargaining over the physical elements of partition. 1947, in that sense, was a show-case of Indo-Pakistani relations, and a forbearer of things to come. Viewed that way, the 1947 war was not "merely" about partition, it was about the relationship between what was represented by India and Pakistan.

¹ For instance, one Indian scholar argues that the 1947 war was part of the larger partition crisis and hence essentially different from the other wars India and Pakistan have fought since then (Interview with K. Subrahmanyam, December 1993).
The data for this case were drawn from some of the same sources that informed the other cases - *The Times of India*, the *New York Times*, and a variety of books and memoirs. Because this is a case from several decades ago, there is a plethora of secondary material, both descriptive and analytical, that exists on it and that benefits this presentation of results. There is, however, a dearth of primary material: collections of press reports from both countries like the *Asian Recorder* and *Asian Press Digest* were not available for this crisis and it was impossible to obtain copies of the *Times of India* and *Pakistan Times* for this time-period from U.S. libraries.²

It must also be noted that the data provided by the *Times of India* for this case are somewhat different in their content from the data that I have obtained from that paper during other time periods. For the purposes of this dissertation, this point of difference is particularly important - the style of reporting differed slightly in this case, with less attention being paid to such details as *where* or *in which arena* leaders on both sides made statements about the other side. Obviously, when the arena is not mentioned, that entry cannot be used in coding for channels of communication.

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² I managed to get relevant copies of the *Times of India* from the archives of the newspaper in Bombay; available issues of *Dawn* were substituted for *Pakistan Times*. 
The 1947 case exhibits certain unique characteristics and trends that were either absent, or not present to the same extent, in the other cases. Because of situation created by partition posed a host of functional and political issues to be addressed by the two sides - the division of resources, both human and material, the refugee problem - there was a steady dialogue between the two sides on these issues in the period leading up to the war, and indeed through the duration war.\(^3\)\(^4\) There are no comparable circumstances to these in the case of the other two wars. It must be noted, however, that this close functional cooperation on issues between the two sides had not, as a Times of India editorial from that time is quick to remind us, ever led to an "increased amity" between the two neighbors, and that the Kashmir situation only made things worse (Times of India, December 25, 1947, pp. 1).

Again in contrast with the other cases, there is no clear role played by any third party in this war. The U.N. did not involve itself until well after hostilities had commenced, and the U.S. and Soviet Union were not involved

\(^3\) It should be noted that while the two sides talked about these "partition" issues, dialogue on disagreements over Kashmir and the threat of imminent war was not engaged in to the same extent or with the same freedom. This will be further clarified in the section on communications between the two sides.

\(^4\) In presenting the number and scope of formal meetings between Indian and Pakistani officials during this time period, a distinction will be drawn between those meetings discussing purely functional issues and those discussing the threat of war, including over Kashmir, between the two countries.
in the general de-colonization process on the sub-continent. Britain, of course, was the prominent third party in this case, but it was by virtue of its long involvement in the sub-continent and the still-existing ties that it had there, rather than by any active effort to settle the crisis as it unfolded. The lack of a clear third party role in the period leading up to the 1947 war is important because it offers a "test," as it were, of the overall importance of third parties in final settlements.

**Time Period:**

Three months before the war in October 1947 are considered. Specifically, the time-period for the case extends from August 1, 1947 the month during which the two states became formally independent, to October 22, when the first, protracted war over Kashmir began, a duration of approximately three months. August is selected as the starting point because the threat of war - not linked merely to the Kashmir question but also posed because of generally tense relations - between the two countries began to crystallize by then. Pakistan appeared convinced at many points that India was trying to de-stabilize it by creating, among other situations, a "mass exodus" to Pakistan, and to eventually "destroy" it (Times of India, October 15, 1947, pp. 1; September 17, 1947, pp. 1). Ganguly (1986, pp. 47)
reiterates that both Jinnah and Liaquat Ali, Pakistan's Governor General and Prime Minister, respectively, feared that the Indians were "not reconciled" to the reality of independent Pakistan. Talk of impending war, then, was fairly common on both sides since August 1947 (New York Times, September 17, 1947, pp. 16; 27, 1947, pp. 6, etc.).

The escalation leading to war over Kashmir - the infiltration into the valley by Pakistan-supported tribesmen and the corresponding response by India - was very rapid, and took place in a matter of days, between October 22 and 27, 1947. In this quick acceleration of the conflict, too, the 1947 case is distinguished from others. It presents a special difficulty for third parties and others who might be interested in intervening to prevent escalation, and raises questions about the possibility of such intervention in so short a time. By December, a stale-mate had been reached on Kashmir, which was not to change until the settlement accepted by the two parties in 1949.
I. Third Party Nature and Characteristics:

Elements of Third Party Leverage:

A. Table 4.1 Bilateral Assistance

By U.K. to Pakistan

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loans &amp; Credits</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>162.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5 Figures for 1947-48 have been calculated from figures given for the entire pre-plan period of 1947-1954, a period of seven years. They are in thousands of US dollars.

6 Comparable figures for India were unobtainable.
B. Table 4.2 Bilateral Trade, 1948:7

U.K. with Pakistan

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani imports from UK</td>
<td>270.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani exports to UK</td>
<td>171.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% imports from UK of total Pakistani imports</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% exports to UK of total Pakistani exports</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


U.K. with India

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian imports from UK</td>
<td>1523.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian exports to UK</td>
<td>977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% imports from UK of total Indian imports</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% exports to UK of total Indian exports</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1950-52. UN Statistical Office, pp. 91. Percentage computed from figures. All figures in millions of Indian rupees).

It is evident that the U.K. accounted for quite a hefty portion of the total Pakistani foreign trade, surpassed only by imports from India. Trade with the U.S., the next significant trading partner, constituted only about a third of that with the U.S. (U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1950-52, pp. 124). Similarly, the U.K was also

7 We choose the year 1948 for trade figures because India and Pakistan were still one country for most of 1947.
India's most important trading partner, with the U.S. in second place and other states lagging far behind (U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1950-52, pp. 91).

We see that the assistance given by the U.K. to Pakistan during the pre-plan period of 1947-1954 was not overly generous—it was much less than that given by the U.S., which gave almost five times as much in the form of grants, and somewhat less than Canada. However, since it was one of only five states that were responsible for any assistance during that period, its contribution takes on some significance.

When we consider trade figures for both India and Pakistan with Great Britain as a percentage of their Gross National Product, we find that in both India's and Pakistan's case, British trade accounted for only about .4% of GNP. Hence, while Britain was an important trading partner, the trade that it accounted for as a percentage of total GNP was not significant.

Perception by Third Party of Gain through Involvement in Crisis:

As I have noted in the chapter on methodology and again in subsequent chapters of this dissertation, this measure comprises one of several elements of the larger third party strategy and attempts to establish third party motives in
intervening in crises as they are building. The assumption is that third parties might be more likely to intervene if there is the anticipation of some gain or the meeting of some interest. Indicators for this measure range from references by third parties to their interest in balancing power in the region, to the existence of aid and trade links with conflicting actors.

Britain did not have much to tangibly gain from intervention in the 1947 crisis. What was at stake, however, was maintaining the good-will and respect of both India and Pakistan that Britain had earned through the difficult period of partition. As Stafford Cripps remarked just before the partition became reality, England hoped for greater ties with the sub-continent (Times of India, July 16, 1947, pp. 5). However, this would have to be balanced by the need not to appear in the guise of colonizers again. It would appear that Britain decided that the latter concern would determine the extent of their commitment; it played a marginal role in the months following independence.

Britain’s involvement in the crisis, such as it was, was motivated by a predominantly altruistic desire to see

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8 It may be recalled that Lord Mountbatten, India’s last British Governor General and the person who oversaw much of the dismantling of the empire, was not only respected by the masses as a true friend of India/Pakistan but was also a personal friend of Nehru, and to a lesser extent, of the other independence leaders. Hundreds of thousands of Indians showed up to cheer him during his last days in India (New York Times, August 18, 1947). Mountbatten’s reception was an indicator of the general feeling for the British government in India during that time.
peace in the region that it had only a few months ago ruled over. However, this altruistic desire was balanced against the lack of threat to Britain's strategic interests by a war in the region. Thus, the British role during this time has parallels with both the role of third parties in crises that were successfully settled and their role in crises that ended in war - as with the U.S. and Soviets in the 1965 and 1971 wars, no pressing and immediate third party interests intrinsic to the region were involved that might be enhanced through settlement, even though Cold War calculations might have existed during 1965 and 1971. Of course, the global balance-of-power situation was substantially different in 1947 than it was during the time of the two later wars.

II. Third Party Roles and Strategies

I have already established that Great Britain was the only significant third party involved in Indo-Pakistani relations in the build-up to the war since August, and that this involvement was by virtue of its long-established and, at that point, still continuing ties in the area rather than by any active role it sought to play in the escalating

9 It may be recalled that both Britain during the Kutch crisis and the U.S. during the 1990 crisis were mostly-disinterested third parties.

10 It is particularly evident that during the 1971 war, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were interested in maintaining the power balance in the region.
crisis. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union had great strategic interest in the South Asia region yet; the U.N. did not enter into the picture until after hostilities had begun (Lamb, 1989).

This lack of any clear third party role is, as I have mentioned earlier, is unique compared to the other cases. It might be recalled that the Kutch case and the 1990 crisis had in common roles played by predominant third parties, Great Britain and the U.S. respectively. This is in contrast to the many different third parties, including the U.N., who played a role in the 1971 and 1965 wars.

Indicators for measuring third party strategies include the scope of third party-provided fora for the sending and receiving of messages between conflicting actors, the number of third party meetings with each actor and the scope of these meetings etc. They also include such indicators as efforts by third parties to link settlement between actors to trade and aid with the third party.

Great Britain, although it was best posed to play a significant, positive role in the brewing crisis over Kashmir by virtue of its on-going involvement in its former colony, chose instead to play a very low-key role initially and only became more actively involved after the issue was placed before the United Nations in 1948. Parallels may be drawn between Britain's role in this crisis and the delayed
action on the part of the U.S., Soviet Union and U.N. in the 1965 and 1971 wars. Britain's hesitant role in this crisis, however, might well have been due to its sensitivity of the two states' independence after long years of colonization.\footnote{Some scholars (see Lamb, 1989, pp. 158) suggest that Mountbatten was biased in favor of India and used his power as Governor-General to aid India's cause.}

On the other hand, this can be contrasted with the prompt action taken by Great Britain in the Kutch crisis and the U.S. in the 1990 crisis.

It is not amiss to speculate here, that had Great Britain played a more positive role in the Kashmir crisis, perhaps an early resolution might have been found. As it is, Britain has been blamed by historians and scholars of the sub-continent for its hasty departure that left in its aftermath, indeed that accelerated, the bloodshed and horror of the partition (Ganguly, 1986). An interesting counter-factual presents itself: had Britain charted a more lingering and disciplined exit from their former colony, one that addressed the manifold issues that partition inevitably raised and that more actively mediated between the two sides over problems of accession like Kashmir, perhaps a different legacy might have been left to India and Pakistan.\footnote{Some scholars have echoed this feeling. As Lamb (1991, pp. 101-102) writes, "it took the British more than three hundred years to build up their Indian Empire. They dismantled it in just over seventy days." About the partition itself he remarks, "such traumatic surgery was unlikely to heal without complications."}
III. Perception of Conflicting Actors of Third Parties 
having the Capacity to Aid in Settling Crises:

I have noted in other parts of this dissertation that 
third party intervention might have a greater likelihood of 
success if conflicting actors believe that third parties 
have the ability to positively influence outcomes. This 
variable is measured in terms of statements by India and 
Pakistan regarding the international influence and power or 
lack thereof of the relevant third party, the aid and trade 
links that bind them to the third party, etc.

The data indicate that although India and Pakistan 
believed that third party states, particularly Great Britain 
and the U.S. had the capacity to aid in settling their 
growing crisis they also believed that the two states were 
not interested enough to do so. For instance, Vijayalaxmi 
Pandit, India's ambassador to the U.N. urged the U.S. to 
take a greater interest in Asian problems (Times of India, 
October 20, 1947, pp. 9). Third parties were frequently 
requested for assistance by both sides. Pakistan called on 
the U.K. and other commonwealth states to assist in the 
situation with material and "advice" (New York Times, 
September 28, 1947, pp. 46; October 6, 1947).

IV. Perception by Conflicting Actors of Third Party 
Evenhandedness:

Not much evidence exists to tell us specifically
whether India and Pakistan viewed any potential third party
as even-handed. In the earliest stages of the crisis, third
parties were not sufficiently involved for even-handedness
to pose a question. As the war progressed, however, a belief
grew on the part of Pakistan that the U.K. favored India
over them (Brecher, 1953). India also did not always
consider the U.N. "impartial" (New York Times, September
24, 1947, pp. 34).

V. Structures and Processes of Communication between the
Actors:

In this section I will discuss evidence of the nature
of channels of communication employed by India and Pakistan,
the frequency of their use and whether direct or indirect
channels predominated.\(^\text{13}\)

Messages sent through either channel must originate in
officials/organs of each government. As in the other cases,
those messages are coded that are either sent to
corresponding officials/bodies on the opposing side (in the
case of direct communications) or are conveyed through
indirect channels like the press, parliament, public rallies

\(^\text{13}\) Please refer to chapter on methods for definitions and
operationalizations of direct and indirect channels of
communication.
etc. It should be noted that the range of actors that were included by the above definition was somewhat wider in this case than it was in the others, because in addition to strictly government officials like the prime ministers, foreign secretaries, etc., one is also faced with such quasi-governmental but exceedingly important personages as Mahatma Gandhi, and must include communication by them in the codings.

Table 4.3

Number of Messages sent by Pakistan to India through Indirect Channels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANNEL</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press/Radio/TV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Rallies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTPs</td>
<td>1¹⁴</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OTPs=Other Third Parties (not directly involved in crisis)

¹⁴ This was a message sent by Liaquat Ali through Mountbatten. It conveyed to India, Pakistan’s acceptance of the plebiscite plan for the kingdom of Junagadh. Mountbatten was acting Governor-General of India at that time, but because he was an official of the British government, messages sent through him are equivalent to messages sent through third party channels.
Table 4.4

Number of Messages sent by Pakistan to India through Direct Channels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANNEL</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader, etc.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5

Number of Messages sent by India to Pakistan through Indirect Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANNEL</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press/Radio/TV</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Rallies</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTPs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6

Number of Messages sent by India to Pakistan through Direct Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANNEL</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader, etc.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.7
Number of Formal Meetings between Indian and Pakistani Officials to Discuss Options in Kashmir.

| Number of Meetings | 0\textsuperscript{15} |

Table 4.8
Number of Formal Meetings between Indian and Pakistani Officials to Discuss Functional and Partition-Related Issues.

| Number of Meetings | 0 |

We see that in India's case, indirect channels of communication predominate, with the press, public meetings and the parliament being almost equally employed. Neither third party states nor the U.N. constituted a channel for India prior to the invasion. On the other hand, Pakistan employed more direct channels through which to communicate.\textsuperscript{16} Both channels (not including the face-to-

\textsuperscript{15} The Prime Ministers of both states did meet in Lahore and New Delhi to discuss the situation in Kashmir, but the meetings were held in the first week of December, well after the war had broken out.

\textsuperscript{16} Note that the discrepancy in total numbers of messages sent by India versus those sent by Pakistan could be a reflection of my inability to obtain any Pakistani daily newspaper during the months of September and October, 1947, although I did peruse Western newspapers and the Times of India during that period.
face channel) were employed infrequently by both actors.  

Formal, face-to-face meetings between the two actors, unique for this case in both number and nature, are described below. They took place through the duration of the time-period considered, and are separated by the nature of the meeting - whether representatives met to consider mainly functional and partition-related issues or whether they met to consider threats of war, including that posed by the Kashmir situation.

In August, representatives of both sides met to consider the relief and rehabilitation of the refugees caused by the partition and this was followed up in September by a meeting in Lahore by Nehru and Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali (Times of India, August 7, 1947, pp.1; September 15, 1947, pp. 1). A series of high-level meetings were also held in September over the situation in the Punjab (Times of India, September 4, 10, 1947, pp. 1) and followed up by a meeting between Nehru and Liaquat Ali on the issue, in October (New York Times, October 1, 1947).

A number of agreements were entered into between the two states as a result of these and other meetings,

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17 As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, this might have to do with the difference I observed in reporting styles during this time period by the Times of India and Dawn; channels of communication were not clearly reported as they were in later years and it was therefore often difficult to trace the source of messages.
including general financial and taxation agreements (Times of India, August 27, 1947, pp. 1; New York Times, December 13, 1947, pp. 8), import agreements (Times of India, September 1, 1947, pp. 1) and agreements on military cooperation (Times of India, November 4, 1947, pp. 7). This is a significant amount of cooperation between two countries who were shortly about to launch a war, even though it was not specifically about the Kashmir problem. It suggests that hostilities can escalate in the midst of communication and apparent cooperation on a host of issues.

It is important to note, however, that the two sides did not meet face to face nor enter into any agreement about the Kashmir problem before fighting took place, although Nehru and Liaquat Ali did meet twice in Delhi and Lahore in December, to discuss this after hostilities had begun (Gupta, pp. 134; Times of India, November 29, 1947, pp. 1). Meetings between representatives of the two countries continued to be held thereafter under different auspices, including those of the U.N. (Gupta, pp. 149; New York Times, February 8, 1948, pp. 37). Confidence levels on this measure are high.

VI Other Independent Variables

Role of the Opposition:

Because 1947 was a unique year in the history of both states, the opposition on both sides was also molded, to a
great extent, by the events of the time.

On both sides, feelings of patriotism ran high and prominent political leaders generally stood behind their government. It is interesting to note that even Mahatma Gandhi, associated throughout his life-time with pacifism and non-violence, backed military action against Pakistan if it was warranted and warned that "there was bound to be a war....if Pakistan persisted in wrong-doing." He later reflected that the dispatch of Indian troops to Kashmir had been "right" (Times of India, September 17, 1947, pp. 1; October 31, 1947, pp. 1). 18

There was no organized opposition of any great consequence in either state in 1947. In India, the All India Hindu Convention had reiterated that it would not accept the legitimacy of Pakistan's independence and had then urged its followers to press for the declaration of India as a Hindu state, but it had no significant mass following (Times of India, August 11, 1947; Dawn, August 11, 1947). The Hindu right wing in general called the loudest for hard-line action against Pakistan, but again, it consisted of isolated groups which, like the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS), lacked much mass support. 19 Hence, the

18 It should be noted that Gandhi later qualified his warnings on war with Pakistan and reiterated his belief in non-violence (New York Times, September 29, 1947, pp. 6).

19 A member of the RSS was later to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi because of his alleged partiality towards Muslims. Today the RSS is a much more prominent player on the Indian political scene, often
governments had a free hand in decision-making during this time. As we see in the other crises that are analyzed, a vocal (and, particularly in the case of India, varied) opposition would form in later years, until governments in both countries faced their most severe opposition in their dealings with each other in the 1990 crisis.\footnote{It may be recalled that in India, right-wing groups had organized to form a powerful political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which advocated a hard line towards Pakistan, while the Bhutto government in Pakistan, the first democratically-elected government in that state which had been allowed to carry out the people’s mandate, was also faced with a significant opposition.}

The Leaders: Jinnah and Nehru

Jinnah can be characterized as a unique mix of the Advertiser and Lawmaker. His training in the legal profession compounded his qualities as Lawmaker, although the greatest evidence of these came during the birth of Pakistan, when a whole new state, with accompanying laws, rules and constitution was fashioned.

Jinnah was also an Advertiser. Many accounts have noted his search for power that eventually led to his insistence on the separate state of Pakistan.\footnote{See, for instance, Stanley Wolpert’s \textit{Jinnah} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984) or other books on the independence of India and Pakistan.} Jinnah as a young man was agnostic, committed to secular beliefs, unmindful of his Muslim identity; however, as it became involved in electoral agreements with the right-wing national party, the BJP.
evident that the destiny of free India was to rest largely in the hands of Nehru, Gandhi and other Hindu leaders of the independence movement, Jinnah's Muslim roots deepened and his demand for a separate state of Pakistan for the sub-continent's Muslims was born. Evidence that at least a part of this new-found Islamic identity was exaggerated exists through Jinnah's down-playing, as leader of independent Pakistan, of religious differences and his reversal to the same secular stances that he had espoused in his early years. Hence, Islam was a tool Jinnah used to gain and consolidate power. Jinnah also displayed a deeply negative and suspicious side and as a result of his suspicions spent much of his time in solitude. For him, the motives of his fellow-independence leaders were always suspect and he was often bitter about their differences of opinion on his cherished "two-nation theory" that separated the Hindu and Muslim nation.

Unlike his Indian counterpart Nehru, Jinnah was not "born" into politics. Although Nehru's family did not start out as a political one, they all became deeply and irrevocably involved in the freedom struggle. On the other hand, Jinnah's was a lonely path into politics, with his family remaining in the trading business that they had inherited and managed over the past several decades. Politics offered a path to the kind of power and prestige that Jinnah could never hope to gain as a mere businessman.
Nehru, on the other hand, was very much the quintessential Lawmaker - the positive, idealistic individual who was to be the major architect of free India. Nehru has often been described as a philosopher and visionary, but he was also one to carry plans through. His belief in socialist values for independent India was embodied for decades to come in the predominant role given to the state in the planning of the economy and the protection of infant Indian industry from external competition.22

Jinnah’s insistence on the partition of the subcontinent and Nehru and other Hindu leaders’ deep antipathy towards the idea led to great suspicion, mistrust and ill-will among them. This was compounded by the unpleasantness that accompanied the "nuts and bolts" of partition itself - where borders would be drawn, which independent state would receive what, the division of revenues, troops, assets. This bitter legacy between the two sides that was left in the wake of partition was to contribute to the fighting of

22 In these issues, Indira followed quite firmly in her father’s footsteps and it was only with the Janata government that some of the hallowed socialist principles were questioned. However, the Janata government was in power too briefly to institute any real change. Rajiv Gandhi’s government in 1984 attempted some change under the banner of "entering the twenty-first century" but no clear path was followed. It was only with the definitive steps towards removing government controls and instituting free market reform that were taken by the government of P.V. Narasimha Rao since 1991, that Nehru’s economic legacy began to be slowly dismantled.
their first war only a few months after their independence. Nehru the Lawmaker could not give up a Kashmir that had acceded to India by its own decision and by a strict following of existing rules; Jinnah the Advertiser could not easily give up the power that the loss of Kashmir would surely mean.

VII. Dependent Variable

War and Ceasefire: Settlement Fails

As the chapter on methodology notes, a crisis is considered to have been successfully settled when the conflicting actors agree, first, to end hostilities before they escalate into war, and second, when they also consider certain positive steps to replace the existing hostility, including joint declarations, formal meetings to discuss their future relationship, the offering of symbolic gestures of goodwill, etc. Formal meetings, because they convey a deep sense of commitment, are weighted most heavily, with other indicators like joint declarations and good-will gestures weighted less heavily.

Although Nehru and Liaquat Ali met in Delhi at the end of November, 1947 to discuss the war, the talks failed to put an end to the hostilities. In December 1947, India presented the Indian side to the United Nations, where it was put before the Security Council on January 1, 1948 and where it was the subject of many a debate the rest of that
year. Fighting between the two sides continued into 1948, as Kashmiri forces were increasingly reinforced by Pakistani troops (Lamb, 1989). Finally, at the end of 1948, negotiations leading to a cease-fire took place, and a cease-fire of sorts took effect on January 1, 1949. It was not until July that same year, however, that an agreement was signed between the two sides that essentially demarcated the cease-fire line in Kashmir.

As is evident from the above account, the indicators for successful settlement are absent in this case. Aside from the one unsuccessful meeting between Nehru and Liaquat Ali in November, 1947 after the commencement of hostilities, there was no other attempt to bring closure to the conflict. This can only be said to have been effected with the agreement between the two sides signed in July 1949. Through 1948, India's representative to the U.N. Ayyengar and his Pakistani counterpart Zafrullah Khan traded charge and countercharge in the Security Council, and were echoed by the leadership of their countries in other fora. No joint statements were issued and no positive statements of friendship exchanged, as would be the case in the successfully settled Kutch and 1990 crises. Rather, as in 1971, accusations, as in Nehru's accusation of Pakistan trying to cover its "complicity in Kashmir," and Liaquat's counter-charges, were common from both sides until the agreement of 1949 was signed and during the period
thereafter which was inevitably marked by the bitter legacy of the preceding years (January 3, 1947, Times of India, January 4, 1947).
Table 4.9

1947 at a Glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Confidence Level</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Communication Structures &amp; Processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mix of direct and indirect channels)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Indirect Channels Moderate (^{23})</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Predominate for India)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan - infrequent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India - infrequent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Direct Channels Moderate</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Predominate for Pakistan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan - infrequent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India - infrequent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Face-to-face Meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over Partition Issues - 8 Very High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over Kashmir - 0 Highest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Third Party Strategies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Perception of gain - no</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Number of meetings - none</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Strategy - advising restraint</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on issues - yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{23}\) Note that moderate levels of confidence on these indicators are a reflection of my inability to obtain any daily Pakistani newspaper for the months of September and October, 1947 although other relevant newspapers were perused.
Table 4.9 continued

Conveyance of positions & perspectives - no

3. **Third Party Leverage**

Sanctions - no

4. **Perception by Conflicting Actors of Third Party having Capacity to Assist**

a) Yes Moderate

b) Perception of even-handedness -- No

5. **Dependent Variable: (Lack of) Settlement**

a) Post-deescalation formal "summits"/meetings - Yes (unsuccessful)

b) Positive assessments - No " Lower

Other Variables:

6. **Existence of Prominent third party** - No

7. **Early Intervention** - No High
CHAPTER V

The Rann of Kutch: Successful Settlement

The following pages present an analysis of the 1965 Rann of Kutch case which saw successful settlement through the timely intervention of Great Britain as mediator. The analysis is based on my construct of a Foundation Building stage and the hypotheses introduced in chapter one, and the coding strategy that has been outlined in chapter two. Also, since a relatively detailed chronological description of events that make up this case was offered in chapter three, the analysis that constitutes this chapter will assume, for the most part, that the reader has an existing context within which to place it.

As was mentioned earlier, the data that were perused for all the cases have been drawn from a variety of secondary sources, newspapers and primary interviews. For this particular case, the Times of India and the Pakistani newspaper Pakistan Times constitute the primary sources of data. In addition, data from the London Times were significant for this particular case because of the important third party role played by British Prime Minister Wilson and the British government. The New York Times and the Asian Recorder have also been perused for entries on the
I have concluded that the case constituted by the Rann of Kutch exhibits substantial variation in many of the independent variables examined, compared with the three other selected cases in which settlement was not successful. In particular, third party strategies varied significantly in this case from those cases that ended in war, and a comparatively extensive use of direct communication was engaged in by the conflicting actors right from the initial stages of the problem. Third party strategies were geared towards both the encouragement of direct communication between actors and the advancing of conflicting actors' perceptions and positions on the conflict.

The following sections present my codings for each variable and the analyses that are then made possible. For added clarity, each variable is separately considered.

I. Third Party Nature and Characteristics:

Perception by Third Party of Gain through Involvement in Settling Crisis:

As described briefly in the chapter on methodology, the perception by third parties of gain through an involvement

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1 Comparisons among cases will be made more difficult by the fact that some cases, like the Rann of Kutch case, because they were characterized by relatively early intervention and settlement, allow for only about three months of data. Hence, raw numbers in this case for any category will almost certainly be smaller than another case, the 1971 war, for instance, which offers relevant data over a nine-month period.
of the crisis at hand constitutes an important element of third party characteristics. The assumption is that without an expectation of some tangible or intangible gain, a third party will not be motivated to enter into a potential trouble spot and that it might be unreasonable to expect a third party to consider intervention on purely altruistic grounds.

References by the third party to its interest in balancing power in the general region where the conflict is taking place, to maintaining existing trade connections to India, Pakistan or surrounding regions, to international goodwill gained or lost through its involvement, to the protection of its allies in the region, and to influential domestic interest groups with a stake in resolving conflict in the area make up the measure of this indicator. This indicator has been weighted in terms of the degree of centrality to third party interests in the crisis, and therefore its likelihood to act. To score highly, there must be either multiple references by third parties to the protection of allies or of gaining international goodwill, or few references to domestic trade links, interest groups or balancing power in the region. The rationale behind the weighting is prompted by Realist assumptions - third parties are more likely to act to protect or promote their own

---

2 This also includes a general reference to its protection of larger interests.
interests rather than the interests of the larger world community.

The data available to evaluate this variable are sketchy on some indicators. Available data do suggest that the primary motivations of third parties in the Rann of Kutch case were not, in fact, those of protecting tangible interests like trade but rather less self-interested ones of looking out for their "friends" or "allies." There are no entries on domestic trade links or the influence of domestic interest groups on the part of the U.S., the U.S.S.R or Great Britain. However, Wilson, on multiple occasions, did refer to the anxiety caused to Britain by the existence of conflict between two commonwealth members, two allies of Britain. The British government expressed "deep concern" to the Indian and Pakistani governments at the turn of events. (Times of India, April 27, 1965, p. 1; Pakistan Times, May 6, 1965, p. 1; Asian Recorder, May 21-27, 1965, p. 6463). Britain appeared to interpret its interest in settling the conflict mainly through the common bond of membership of both countries in the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the British Commonwealth Relations Office occasionally served as a liaison between the two British

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3 Accordingly, the British Commonwealth Office and Commonwealth Secretary Bottomley were intimately involved in the British mediation strategy, meeting often with the Indian and Pakistani High Commissioners to Britain (Times of India, April 27, 1965, pp. 1).
High Commissioners. In a somewhat similar vein, the U.S. referred to the hope that ways would be found to avoid conflict between "two friends of this country" (New York Times, April 28, 1965, p. 12) and urged the two countries to start talking (New York Times, April 30, 1965, p. 12). Its official position maintained that it fully supported British efforts in mediating a settlement to the Kutch crisis (Times of India, May 27, 1965). Finally, in the first of only a few references made by the Soviets to the Kutch situation through its duration, they called for direct talks between the two sides (Times of India, May 9, 1965).

In the other case of successful settlement, that of the 1990 crisis, we see a similarly benign and non-self-interested intervention role played by the U.S. and backed by the then Soviet Union; on the other hand, the intervention by the U.S. and then Soviet Union in the period prior to the 1971 war was motivated primarily by Cold War considerations of balancing power in the region.

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4 Some scholars (see Johal, 1989, for instance) have argued that the Commonwealth connection had the most positive impact on matters of the sub-continent in the early years of independence, and that its effects subsequently wore off as Britain's influence in the area waned.

5 In that the U.S. clearly sought to convey that any interest it had in the Kutch case was solely one of concern that it should not escalate.
Third Party Leverage:

Table 5.1. Bilateral Assistance

To India by Great Britain:

Figures are available for 1961-1966, the period of the third "plan," rather than for separate years during that period and are in millions of Indian rupees, assumed current.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans &amp; Credits</th>
<th>2378m (475.6m/yr)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>10m (2m/yr)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

6 Since Great Britain was the single most important third party in the Kutch case, only its leverage on both actors will be considered here. In the next case, the 1965 war, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. will be considered as significant third party states, even though it was the U.N. that played the most important role.

7 As noted in the chapter on methodology, assistance is defined in this study as comprising loans, credits and grants.

8 Different sectors comprising the Indian economy were "planned" in five-year periods in accordance with the tenets of Nehruvian socialism.

9 This represents the third largest amount for that time, after the U.S. and W. Germany. Loans and credits from international organizations like the IBRD are not considered here (Central Statistical Organization, New Delhi, 1974).

10 Significantly, the amount of 10m by the U.K. was much less than many other countries who offered grants to India during that period, including not only such states as the U.S. and Canada, but also the Soviet Union and Sweden (CSO, New Delhi, 1974).
Table 5.1 (continued)

To Pakistan by Great Britain:\textsuperscript{11}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans &amp; Credits</th>
<th>123,420 (24,684/yr)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>5696 (1139.2/yr)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{11} Figures are in thousands of US dollars.
Table 5.2. Bilateral trade

India and Great Britain, 1965-66

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian exports to UK</td>
<td>1464.2m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Indian exports to UK of total exports</td>
<td>18.1(^{12})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian imports from UK</td>
<td>1491.1m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% imports from U.K. of total imports</td>
<td>10.7(^{13})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign private investment by Britain in India in 1965 as % of total foreign private investment</td>
<td>50.2(^{14})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: S.A. Anwar, 1983. Figures are in millions of Indian rupees, assumed current).

Pakistan and Great Britain, 1965-66 \(^{15}\)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani exports to UK</td>
<td>354m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Pakistani exports to UK of total exports</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani imports from UK</td>
<td>637m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% imports from UK of total Pakistani imports</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The picture presented above affirms that imports from

\(^{12}\) Note that this percentage represented a modest decrease over the years since the 1950s, declining an average of about 7 percent (Anwar, 1983).

\(^{13}\) This figure represents a continuous decline in imports from Britain beginning from the 1950s. By 1965, imports from Britain had declined more than 10 percent (Anwar, 1983).

\(^{14}\) This percentage represents a steep decline from the hefty 80.5% British investment (of total foreign investment) in India in 1948 (Anwar, 1983, pp. 89).

\(^{15}\) Figures are in millions of Pakistani rupees. Percentages are computed by me from available figures.
and exports to Britain had registered considerable declines by 1965, although British private investment in India was still significant (Anwar, 1983). Britain's potential leverage over India by 1965, then, was certainly less than what it might have been in the early 1950s. As we can see, however, it was still a significant lender of assistance (in the form of loans and credits) to India although this assistance was only about 1% of India's GDP (Calculated from U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1965).

For Pakistan, Great Britain as a lender of assistance was surpassed by the U.S., Germany and Japan, but was still not insignificant. Its exports to and imports from Great Britain, while not overwhelming, were a notable fraction of its total trade, and its trade with Great Britain constituted around 2% of its total GDP. One might conclude, then, that Britain's overall leverage over India and Pakistan during this period was neither overwhelming nor insignificant.

II. Third Party Roles and Strategies:

As was described in the introductory pages of this study, I have hypothesized that those third party strategies are most likely to meet with success in crises arising from

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16 The percentage of British trade of India's GDP for 1965 was only around 1.2 (Calculated from U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1965).

17 Calculated from U.N. Statistical Yearbook GDP figures for Pakistan for 1965.
conflicts like the Indo-Pakistani, which provide channels of direct communication between conflicting actors and also advance their positions, perceptions and values. As I also explained, these two strategies have generally been characterized in the existing literature as separate styles of intervention not often employed by a single third party (see Fisher and Keashly, 1991, for instance).

Third party strategies have been operationalized in terms of several measures that include the type and scope of third party provided fora (summits, third party diplomats and embassies, the receiving of conflicting actor representatives) for sending and receiving messages between conflicting actors - an internal weighting obtains, where summits, indicating the greatest effort and commitment on the part of the third party, are weighted highest, followed by the sending of third party diplomats and the receiving of Indian/Pakistani representatives; the number and scope of third party meetings with each actor (whether conflicting actors’ perceptions of and perspectives on the problem and each other were advanced, whether their feelings on past history were addressed); references made by third parties that convey anxiety or pressure on actors to settle conflict; the number and scope of efforts by third parties to link movement towards resolution of conflict to bilateral aid and trade issues; references delineating broad third party positions on the crisis at hand.
In an attempt to weight the different strategies that might be attempted by third parties, those indicating greatest third party commitment like meetings, summits and fora with India and Pakistan are more highly weighted than mere references to third party positions or conveying anxiety.

The Rann of Kutch case presents a very interesting analysis of the complex and committed role played by Great Britain. From the incipient stages - early April, 1965 - of the building crisis, Britain offered concrete suggestions to both actors on steps to de-escalate and offered the services of its embassies and High Commissioners to India and Pakistan, although its formal offer to mediate did not come until April 27.\textsuperscript{18} The British efforts were persistent, continuing through phases in the crisis when it appeared that they might come to naught. For instance, changes were suggested in British draft proposals more than once by both countries. At one point in the middle of May, Pakistan submitted entirely new additions to the proposals at hand that had been agreed to in large part by both countries. It now suggested that not only should the status quo ante be reverted to in the case of the Kutch, but also in the case of the entire Indo-Pakistani border, a suggestion wholly

\textsuperscript{18} Interview data appear to confirm that this element of timeliness in Britain's intervention, as well as the relatively slow unfolding of the crisis itself, might have had a positive impact on the final outcome (interview with Prem Chand, December 1993).
unacceptable to India. By the end of May, both countries were expressing doubts over the utility of continuing the mediation process. However, British efforts persisted until they engineered a meeting between Shastri and Ayub in London on June 17, a meeting which led to settlement soon thereafter.

The following analysis speaks directly to the operationalizations laid out earlier. In describing each one, a full picture of actual third party strategies will be obtained.

Only one summit meeting was engaged in between representatives of India and Pakistan that was a direct result of the British efforts at mediation, that in London during the Commonwealth leaders' conference. Britain had opened the way, as it were, for this meeting to happen. During this time, Shastri and Ayub also met separately with Wilson on a couple of occasions. At no other point was there a face-to-face meeting between selected representatives of the two sides before the conflict was settled. There were, however, a number of meetings of Indians and Pakistanis with various British diplomats, with Prime Minister Wilson and of course with the two main mediators, Freeman and James, the British High Commissioners for India and Pakistan, the latter of which often took place at the British embassy in the two countries.
Table 5.3

Number of face-to-face meetings with third party diplomats/high commissioners:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Pakistan&quot; w/ British H.C.s</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayub w/ P.M. Wilson</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;India&quot; w/ British H.C.s</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shastri w/ P.M. Wilson</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scope of these meetings:

The numbers above do not convey very much by themselves, although the number of meetings of each actor with the third party is impressive relative to the other cases studied, especially the wars of 1965 and 1971. British efforts in Kutch take on much greater significance when the actual strategies since April are scrutinized. From the formal initiation of British mediation efforts at the end of April, greatest stress was laid on the advancing of each actor's perceptions, positions and perspectives on the crisis at hand to the other. Initial British proposals were modified several times by both the Indian and Pakistani sides, and the High Commissioners to both countries conveyed these modifications to each of the sides. The earliest

\[19\] Note that 1 "meeting" is constituted by a single proposal or a single modification to a proposal under consideration at a particular point of time. It might ostensibly have included several "sub-meetings" of the High Commissioners with different representatives of the Indian/Pakistani governments.
British suggestions, broached at the end of April, included an immediate ceasefire on the Kutch border, with the eventual restoration of the status quo as it existed on January 1, 1965. Pakistan was initially reluctant to accept the reversion to the status quo, seeking instead a redefinition of the Kutch-Sind border. This became a primary issue in the mediations that were to follow.

For the most part, the British representative to India would serve as India's conduit, while the same was true in the case of the Pakistani representative, for Pakistan. However, there were several occasions when the High Commissioner to Pakistan, James, would confer with Indian representatives and the High Commissioner to India, Freeman, with the Pakistanis. At several occasions, clarifications of each actor's positions were sought by the other through the British mediators, who would report back with the specific information only days later. Direct communication, hence, was very much in evidence -- specific fears and perceptions on the part of each actor were not allowed a chance to take on added dimensions, but were rather directly addressed and responded to, thanks to the mediators' efforts.

For instance, when efforts became bogged down in late May due to Pakistan's new insistence on including the entire Indo-Pakistani border for re-evaluation rather than merely the one between Kutch and Sind, Shastri and other Indian
leaders were quick to condemn what they saw as Pakistan's efforts to stall the endeavor (Times of India, May 26, 1965. p.1). However, these feelings of bad faith were not allowed to escalate by the mediators, who succeeded in getting Pakistan to modify its new demands and conveying this modification to India. Their efforts were supplemented by personal letters to Shastri and Ayub by Wilson, which while not referring to the developments in the mediation process at that point, stressed the need for an early settlement. The letters appeared aimed specifically at preventing a breakdown in mediation efforts (Pakistan Times, May 28, 1965). The culmination of British efforts was the organization of a meeting between Ayub and Shastri in London, in June, the preparations for which were launched weeks in advance by the mediators. This was further reinforced by meetings both leaders had with Wilson.

Third party intervention and strategies in the 1990 case are consistent with those that represent the Kutch case. In both, relevant third parties intervened fairly early in the building crisis; both are cases of a relative lack of calculated self-aggrandizement on the part of third parties through intervention; both included third party representatives visiting India and Pakistan and listening to the grievances of both sides. There is no specific evidence in 1990, however, that the perspectives and positions of one conflicting actor were conveyed to the other as we know to
be the case in the Kutch.

Not much evidence exists for other indicators that seek to test sub-hypotheses. For instance, there is no evidence that British mediating strategy included specifically advancing either India’s or Pakistan’s perceptions and positions on past history. To the extent, however, that proposals, counter-proposals and demands for modifications from one side to the other formed the essence of the strategy, and that these were sometimes viewed by either side as examples of continuing bad faith on the part of the other (the new Pakistani demand for a reassessment of the entire Indo-Pakistani border, for instance), it appears conceivable that the third party strategy did indeed have to address the impact of the past on the present situation.

Evidence suggests that Britain did not make any effort to link the movement towards resolution of the crisis to bilateral trade and aid issues. On the other hand, and as I have mentioned earlier, Britain’s role in Kutch began with the conveying of Britain’s anxiety to both India and Pakistan about the building crisis and its offer to help in any way. From the beginning, then, its position on the crisis itself - that a settlement should be found and that it was very unfortunate that two Commonwealth countries should be threatening violence - and on its role in mediating it, was unambiguous and consistent. It also helped that Wilson himself laid out the British position on
several occasions, thus underlying British commitment.

III. Perception of Conflicting Actors of Third Parties having the Capacity to Aid in Settling Crisis:

I contend that in addition to the characteristics and role of third parties, conflicting actors must believe that third parties do in fact have the capacity to help in some fashion in settling the crisis at hand and will do so with an element of fairness, if the intervention is to meet with success.

This variable is measured by references on the part of India and Pakistan to the international influence and power or the lack thereof, of the third party, to its leverage over the opponent and aid and trade links that the two countries might have with the third party; it is also measured by the degree of perceived even-handedness by conflicting actors of third parties.

In the context of the mistrust that characterizes the relationship between the two countries, I assert that the perception on the part of the two actors of third party even-handedness becomes very important. On the other hand, belief in the power and influence of the third party might also be important in determining conflicting actor calculations that third parties have the capacity to help. Hence, coding for both variables must be undertaken.

There are very few references to the international

IV. Perception of Conflicting Actors of Third Party Even-handedness

On the other hand, a larger number of references to the perceived fairness of Great Britain were present. Ayub referred approvingly to the "great patience" of the U.K. in their role of mediators (New York Times, June 2, 1965, p. 5) and India expressed its appreciation at multiple points of time for the British role as "honest broker." Interestingly, the press in both countries, as evidenced through general reports in both the Times of India and Pakistan Times through the duration of the crisis, was also appreciative of Great Britain's role in what they viewed as "narrowing the gulf" between the two countries (Times of India, May 26, 1965, p.1). It is significant that this positive image of Britain's efforts was in evidence through the duration of the crisis, even through the time period when it appeared as if efforts might fail. This perception of even-handedness of the third party in this case is consistent with such a perception of the U.S. (and of the then-Soviet Union as a more minor actor) by both India and
Pakistan in the case of the 1990 crisis. For instance, the Pakistani foreign office had positively assessed Gates’ visit as proof of American interest in alleviating tensions (FBIS, May 21, 1990, pp. 54) and the Indian media applauded America’s "neutrality" (Times of India, May 23, 1990, pp. 1). On the other hand, India consistently accused the U.S. of a lack of fairness during the period leading up to the 1971 war.

V. Structures and Processes of Communication (between Conflicting Actors):

As noted in my chapter on methodology, channels of direct communication have been defined in terms of communications—messages, threats, overtures—that emanate from those groups on either side making decisions on the crisis at hand (including External Affairs and Foreign ministries) and from leaders (including the prime minister, president, foreign ministers etc. on either side), and that are sent to either similar bodies or the high commissions(ers) on the other side. On the other hand, channels of indirect communications take the form of press

20 Note, therefore, that statements issued by one high commission(er) to the high commission(er) of the conflicting side will not constitute direct communication.
and other media (radio or television) releases, statements made by political leaders in parliament (or, in the case of Pakistan, the National Assembly), at public meetings and rallies or to third party governments or organizations.

For the purposes of my research, both the raw numbers and the frequencies of both forms of communication are important for this variable. Both will enable comparisons to be drawn first within the Rann of Kutch conflict (between the use of direct versus indirect channels) and second, among the other cases that have been selected (among the relative frequencies of direct versus indirect channels in the different cases). The different indicators that operationalize this variable have not been weighted; no inherent weighting scale affords itself among indicators of indirect communication like the press versus the parliament.

The time period that is under consideration for this case extends from March, when earliest signs of trouble in the Kutch became evident, until early July, when a ceasefire was declared and a consensus arrived at, approximately four months.
Table 5.4

Number of Messages sent by Pakistan to India through Indirect Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indirect Channels</th>
<th>Raw Nos.</th>
<th>Nos/mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press/Radio/TV</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Rallies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTBs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OTBs = Other Third Parties (not actively involved)  

Note that this channel should be distinguished from those messages sent by conflicting actors through a third party that is actively and directly involved in the crisis, in this case Great Britain. In this latter case, the third party vehicle ensured that messages were received and was at hand to deliver responses. Often, these messages were not made public without the consent of the parties concerned. This role constituted a part of its larger strategy for settling the crisis, and hence should be distinguished from arbitrary messages, threats and warnings sent publicly by one conflicting actor to another through third parties not extensively involved in the crisis that are characteristic of other cases.
### Table 5.5

Number of Messages sent by Pakistan to India through Direct Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Channels</th>
<th>Raw Nos.</th>
<th>Nos./ mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaders, Decision groups, etc.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.6

Number of Messages sent by India to Pakistan through Indirect Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indirect Channels</th>
<th>Raw Nos.</th>
<th>Nos./ mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press/Radio/TV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Rallies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTBs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.7

Number of Messages sent by India to Pakistan through Direct Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Channels</th>
<th>Raw Nos.</th>
<th>Nos./ mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader, Decision Groups, etc.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.8

Number of Formal Meetings between Indian and Pakistani Officials to Discuss Kutch Options.\(^\text{22}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meetings</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the inception of the crisis, both India and Pakistan employed direct channels of communication as their apparent preferred routes. For Pakistan the earliest record of messages sent through direct channels is April 8 (Times of India, April 9, 1965) and for India, the date is in mid March (Asian Recorder, 1965, pp. 6424). Certainly, indirect channels were also employed throughout this time. It is clear, however, that they were not employed to the same extent as were direct channels. This predominance of direct channels in this case is in direct contrast to the situation in the case of at least two of the three wars, where the opposite was the case.

The contrast between the two channels is clearer during the Kutch case for Pakistan; this might be attributed in great measure to the fact that the Pakistani government was not responsible in the same way and to the same extent as India, to their opposition parties and leaders, to the press

\(^{22}\) Note that this refers to meetings arranged without the aid of the third party.
and to the Pakistani people in general. Pakistan’s political system was not a democratic one, with freedoms guaranteed to the press and opposition, as was India’s. Hence, it is evident that while Indian leaders like Prime Minister Shastri, Home Minister Nanda and Foreign Secretary C. S. Jha, among others, felt obliged to clarify their positions on the Kutch situation in parliament and at national meetings, this was not true in the case of Pakistan. To summarize, a pattern of employing channels of direct communication was established between the two countries and this pattern was used throughout.

The High Commissioners of both countries met at several points during the months of April and May with each other and with members of the foreign offices of both countries to discuss options in Kutch. There was also direct contact between the military leadership on both sides throughout the crisis (interview, S.N. Chopra, December 1993). This is especially significant because no such direct contact was made between the two parties in the cases of the 1965 and 1971 wars.

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23 Indeed the Indian government had to face quite a lively opposition in parliament, particularly from the Hindu right-wing party the Jan Sangh which demanded to be kept abreast on developments in the Kutch.

24 Meetings between officials like high commissioners are characterized as lower-level; those that included top officials like the heads of government or foreign ministers are high-level meetings. The Kutch case was characterized by numerous lower-level meetings but comparatively few high-level ones -- to be specific, one before the settlement of the crisis and one directly
Before the formal British offer to mediate was made on April 27, 1965, there had already been a formal Pakistani proposal for a cease-fire and for talks between the two countries in early April. This had been conveyed to the Indian foreign office and the Indian Foreign Secretary C. S. Jha. Towards the end of April, Pakistan again proposed a troop withdrawal in Kutch prior to the possible holding of official talks (Pakistan Times, April 11, 1965, p. 1). Although this was ultimately rejected by the Indian government, it had received close scrutiny and an official response had been formulated.

Hence, the pattern during the Kutch crisis was one of frequent employment of direct channels of communication.

VI. Other Independent Variables:

Ayub and Shastri: Personality and Socialization

There is little doubt that Shastri was a Spectator, somewhat of an aberration in a country that has spawned and

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25 Britain had already been expressing its "concern" to both India and Pakistan from early April.

26 In drawing a sketch of Lal Bahadur Shastri the leader and person, I have drawn mainly from my own general knowledge of Indian politics and history. This has also been the case for other Indian leaders in other chapters. The sketch of Ayub, on the other hand, has benefitted greatly from his own autobiography, Friends Not Masters.
nurtured dominant leaders like Nehru and Indira Gandhi. As in Barber's typology, Shastri was politically unambitious and had a well-developed sense of moral consciousness that had been nurtured by his role in the freedom struggle. He viewed himself as a means towards the larger end of India's development. Shastri became prime-minister upon Nehru's death and continued to espouse many of Nehru's policies like non-alignment. He had no major agenda of his own, being content to follow the path that his predecessor had charted. He was generally viewed as modest and unassuming, and unlike Nehru, wore the mantle of leader with some discomfort (Misra, in Damodaran and Bajpai, eds., 1990). He had not been "born" into politics, as had Nehru, but had rather been initiated into political life during the fight for independence. This fight for freedom and the experiences of the partition that followed might have colored the way in which his government handled relations with Pakistan during 1965.

If Shastri had difficulty assuming the role of leader, Ayub practiced it with greater ease. He had been born into a "military" family, and in 1950 was made the first

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27 The prime-ministers who came after Indira Gandhi - Morarji Desai after the Emergency, her son Rajiv, V.P. Singh and P.V. Narasimha Rao after her death - were also relatively weak, if not reluctant, leaders; however, it was Nehru and Indira who dominated India's political scene in the last several decades and any contrast must hence be drawn against their predominance.
Pakistani and Muslim Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{28} Martial law was declared again in Pakistan in 1958, giving him virtually unchecked power to pursue any policy that he saw fit, including the framing of a new constitution. As an Advertiser, he pursued power relentlessly and attempted to consolidate it at every turn, especially when it appeared that his popularity was waning; some scholars have suggested that the Kutch crisis was begun in an attempt to rally the country behind him at a time when his influence was waning.

Like Shastri, Ayub had grown up in British India and had lived through partition, independence and what they represented.\textsuperscript{29} It was inevitable that these experiences color his perceptions of India.

**The Role of Domestic Opposition:**

As in 1971, the strongest opposition to the government during the Kutch crisis came in the form of the right-wing party, the Jan Sangh.\textsuperscript{30} The basic demand put forth by them and other opposition parties was that the Indian government not negotiate a settlement over the Kutch issue without

\textsuperscript{28} Prior to this a British General, Gracey, had held this post.

\textsuperscript{29} In his autobiography, he refers repeatedly to India's perpetual hostility towards Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{30} As I explain in later chapters, this party was to eventually form the nucleus of the Hindu chauvinist Bharatiya Janata Party which in the 1990s was to become the single largest opposition party in parliament.
first securing a return to the status quo in terms of territory (Times of India, April 16, 1965, pp. 1; May 6, 7, 1965, pp. 1). Shastri held his ground and went ahead with negotiations despite this considerable opposition and was faced with increasing opposition hostility and some demonstrations against the settlement through July.31

In Pakistan, Ayub did not have to contend with either an articulate opposition or an independent press (London Times, May 7, 1965, pp. 12) and his decision-making tasks during the crisis were thereby made relatively more facile.

Efforts of "lesser" third parties:

The role of the U.S. and Soviet Union was confined to a few messages urging talks between the two countries, deploiring the violence and conveying anxiety to settle the conflict (the Soviet Union recommended a bilateral solution). At the end of April, American and Soviet envoys did call on the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, but both these meetings were initiated by India who wanted to brief them on the situation; hence, they were not signs of American or Soviet commitment about their concern at the turn of events (Times of India, April 27, 1965, p.1).

The final settlement proposed different stages, including an immediate cease-fire followed by a withdrawal

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31 Shastri would face a swelling opposition that was both more vocal and more dissatisfied in the crisis over Kashmir that was to arise only a month later.
of forces by both countries and provisions for meetings at the ministerial level between the two sides in the following months to formally negotiate specific aspects of the settlement. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following pages, when I provide the results of the dependent variable, settlement of the Kutch conflict.

VII. Dependent Variable: Successful Settlement

Several indicators of success in the settlement of crises that arise within larger protracted conflicts have been introduced in the chapter on methodology. To summarize, a building crisis is said to have been successfully settled not only when there is agreement for the immediate violence to end but also when certain positive steps are agreed to by the erstwhile conflicting parties like joint declarations on the future of the relationship and when goodwill gestures and exchanges are in evidence. Obviously, in the context of Foundation Building, settlement must ideally occur before a crisis has escalated into full-fledged conflict or war. This section will evaluate, employing these indicators, whether the Rann of Kutch crisis was, in fact, successfully settled.32

32 While I argue that the Rann of Kutch crisis was indeed successfully settled and present evidence to back my argument, there are those, scholars and policy-makers, who claim that because the 1965 war followed so closely on the heels of this crisis, it could not have been successfully settled, that it was, instead, the cause of the war that ensued (Personal Interviews, Dubey, 1993 and Verghese, 1993; Sisir Gupta, 1968; Ganguly, 1986). This argument
A joint, formal declaration as to a new phase in the relationship or a summit meeting are given the highest weighting since they are concrete evidences of settlement. Parties, once they have signed a document, or met cordially with representatives of the country they had been in conflict with, have gone a very long way in indicating their belief that the conflict has been settled. In the Kutch case, both these indicators were present. The final document outlining the Kutch settlement was drafted by the British and presented to the Indian and Pakistani governments by the British High Commissioners on June 29. It was approved formally by the two countries on the same day, and was signed the next day simultaneously in Delhi and Karachi by official representatives in the presence of members of the British High Commissions.

Immediately following the signing of the agreement, a high-level meeting was held between representatives of the two countries in July to move further on cementing the new turn in the relationship and working out the details of the cease-fire. The Indian Minister for External Affairs, Swaran Singh met with the Pakistani High Commissioner Hussain on July 3 for a "general exchange of views" (Times

appears to be, at best, a post-hoc attempt to make sense of the two crises of 1965 -- "war followed the Kutch settlement, therefore it could not have been a settlement." Such an argument fails to view, as I do, each crisis as a distinct event with distinct causes and consequences and instead attempts to explain one event through another.
of India, July 4, 1965, p.1.) and Shastri and Ayub exchanged notes on the possibility of resolving all border disputes. Communications at a diplomatic level continued during this time regarding the composition of and representatives to the more formal meetings that were slated for August. There were also meetings between border police officials who had been involved in the Kutch to work out details on police patrolling in the area, and troops pulled out on either side as per the agreement (Times of India, July 9, 1965).

The indicators measuring settlement in the Kutch are paralleled in the 1990 case, where a formal meeting between selected officials of both sides positively assessed the future and references to "good beginning(s)" were the order of the day (FBIS, July 23, 1990, pp. 67). On the other hand, the lack of successful settlement in such cases as the 1971 war is underlined by the complete absence of such face-to-face meetings and the continuation of such warnings (here, by Pakistan) as there being no "rest" until the honor of the Pakistani people had been "vindicated." A stark comparison, hence, is afforded by the outcomes of the different cases under consideration.
### Table 5.9

**The Rann of Kutch at a Glance:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Confidence Level</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Communication</strong>&lt;br&gt;Structures &amp; Processes&lt;br&gt;(Direct channels predominate)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Indirect Channels</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Direct Channels</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Face-to-face meetings</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Third Party Strategies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Perception of gain?</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Altruist&quot; motives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Number of meetings</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson with Shastri - 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson with Ayub - 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Strategy</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on issues - no</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conveyence of positions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; perspectives - yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Third Party Leverage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions levied - No</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.9 continued

4. **Perception by Conflicting Actors of:**
   
a) Third party having capacity to assist - Yes
   
b) Third party even-handedness - Yes

5. **Dependent Variable:**
   **Settlement**
   
a) Formal "summits"/ meetings - yes High
   
b) Positive assessments - Yes Lower

**Other Variables:**

7. **Existence of "other" relevant third parties besides prominent third party (the U.K.)** - No

8. **Early Intervention**
   - Yes High
CHAPTER VI
Kashmir Again: The Second War, 1965

This chapter will present coding results from the case of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir. This was a war that followed closely on the heels of another crisis earlier in the year, over the Rann of Kutch, which had been successfully settled with the help of speedy third party intervention. Yet, these are two distinct cases, both geographically and with reference to the issues under consideration. This proximity in time, then, makes the contrast between the two outcomes more stark, and enables a comparison of the effects of the different independent variables at play.

In keeping with the strategy that I am following for writing up results from the other cases, this presentation of results will also be short on case description, the assumption being that the reader has availed him or herself of the chronology of events offered in an earlier chapter. Again, the data for this case were drawn from the usual sources - the Times of India, Pakistan Times, the Asian Recorder, a variety of books and journals and personal interviews of relevant officials.
This case manifests many of the symptoms that I have proposed are evident in the other instances of war between the two states - there is a greater use of indirect, rather than direct communication (the reverse was found to be true in the Kutch case), third parties - the U.N., in this case - do not enter into the picture until the war is well under way (as opposed to their intervention early in the Kutch and 1990 cases) and their strategies are significantly different.

The time period for this case extends from August, when signs of disaffection were apparent on both sides, until the end of September, when a cease-fire called for by the U.N. was accepted by both India and Pakistan, two months.¹

In the paragraphs that follow, I will present the analyses made possible through my codings for each variable.

¹ Although a U.N. call for a cease-fire was accepted by both countries on September 21 and 22 respectively, skirmishes, cease-fire violations (one report cited in the Times of India, October 13, 1965, claimed 251 violations by Pakistan as of that date) and hostilities continued well into November. Hence, the 1965 war was temporally very ill-defined. I have therefore chosen to include the period up to the ceasefire (whereas in other cases I focus on the periods leading up to either war or settlement) - because in this case the actual end came in late November, so in a sense this two-month period that I consider was, in fact, a follow-up to what was continuing war.
I. Third Party Nature and Characteristics:

Perception by Third Parties of Gain through Involvement in Settling Crisis:

As has been noted before, this measure constitutes part of the variable of third party nature and determines the motivation of third parties to enter into crises. It is expected that a third party will consider intervention based on the anticipation of some tangible or intangible gain.

This indicator is measured by references made by the third party to such issues as interest in balancing power in the larger region within which the conflict is taking place, to maintaining its trade links in the region, to international goodwill likely to be gained or lost through its involvement, etc.\(^2\) It is weighted in terms of the degree of centrality to third party interests in the crisis, which, it is contended, determine its likelihood to act. I assume that third parties are more likely to intervene when interests central to their well-being are in question. Hence, they would be more likely to act to maintain a balance of power in the region, or to maintain trade links, rather than out of a general sense of global or regional responsibility, although the two do not have to be mutually exclusive categories. Of course, data might prove the reverse to be true, as was the case with Britain’s

\(^2\) For a more complete description, please see the section that describes this component of third party strategy in the chapter that lays out the methodology pursued in this dissertation.
intervention in the Rann of Kutch case.

The data for the case of the 1965 war indicate that there was a general reluctance on the part of third party states to become involved in the crisis. The U.S. turned down an offer to intervene made by Ayub in the middle of September. This lack of interest on the part of the U.S. has been explained by some authors in terms of its preoccupation at the time with Vietnam (see Ganguly, pp. 91, for instance). The U.K. and the Soviet Union showed a similar disinclination. This is somewhat analogous to the situation in 1971, when the U.S. and the then Soviet Union also displayed reluctance to intervene with the aim of settlement, although they were much more interested in promoting the interests of their allies in that case. On the other hand, the contrast offered by the committed, interested roles played by the British in the Kutch and the U.S. (backed by the Soviets) in the 1990 crisis, is informative.

In the case of the 1965 war, it was hence left to the U.N., which presumably is not motivated to act by considerations other than those of general harmony and global well-being, to intervene. This it did, beginning in late August. ³ Third party states then assumed the role of urging India and Pakistan to work with the U.N. in resolving

³ By this time, the war was well under way, having begun in early August.
their differences. Britain's Wilson issued such a call in the beginning of September and the U.S. urged this at several points during the conflict (Times of India, September 7, 1965, pp.1). The Soviet Union preferred that the two sides would resolve the issue bilaterally and even issued warnings to other "powers" to stay out of the conflict; the U.N., however, was an acceptable actor for the Soviets. For its own part, it made luke-warm offers to the two sides for the availability of its own "good offices," offers which eventually came to naught (Times of India, September 11, 1965; Times of India, September 14, 1965, pp. 1).

The role of the U.N. quickly became embodied in the efforts of its Secretary-General, who traveled to India and Pakistan from September 10-15. The trip did not succeed in even the limited goal of securing acceptance by the conflicting sides of a cease-fire. U Thant states that his efforts were constantly "frustrated by the recalcitrance of either or both parties" (Thant, 1978). While this is not very revealing about third party motives, it does betray the frustration that accompanied U Thant's efforts and it might be said with moderate levels of confidence that might have

\[4\] Indeed, U Thant, in his memoirs, notes somewhat bitterly that the Security Council "shifted the responsibility for stopping the fratricidal war to me" (Thant, 1978).

\[5\] This is described in greater detail in the section on third party strategies.
had an effect on their results.

### Third Party Leverage:

**Table 6.1. Bilateral Assistance**

To India by U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Average per Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loans &amp; Credits</td>
<td>7666m for &quot;planned period&quot; 1961-66, or 1533.2m/yr</td>
<td>1533.2m/yr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>216m for the &quot;planned period&quot; 1961-66, or 43.2m/yr</td>
<td>43.2m/yr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To India by U.S.S.R.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Average per Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loans &amp; Credits</td>
<td>1005m for &quot;planned period,&quot; or 201m/yr</td>
<td>201m/yr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>38m for &quot;planned period,&quot; or 7.6m/yr</td>
<td>7.6m/yr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

6 This figure is the largest of any donor state to India for that period. W. Germany, who is in second place, is responsible for only half that amount.

7 This figure does not include grants from the U.S. under the PL 480 program.
Table 6.1 continued

To Pakistan by U.S. 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans &amp; Credits</th>
<th>841,826 (168,365/yr)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>160,662 (32,132.4/yr)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To Pakistan by U.S.S.R.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans &amp; Credits</th>
<th>39,000 (7800/yr)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We see from the above figures that the U.S. is clearly an important lender of assistance to India during this period, having lent the greatest amount of any state. The U.S.S.R. is much less significant. Similarly, the U.S. also tops the list for Pakistan, with West Germany and Japan straggling far behind. For Pakistan, the amount of assistance offered by the U.S.S.R. is trifling.

8 Figures are in thousands of US dollars, and exclude, as with India, US aid in the form of P.L. 480 grants.
### B. Table 6.2. Bilateral Trade

**U.S. with India**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports from U.S.</td>
<td>5255.9m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to U.S.</td>
<td>1471.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Imports from U.S. of all Indian imports</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Exports to U.S. of all Indian exports</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**U.S.S.R. with India**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports from U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>835.3m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>928.7m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Imports from U.S.S.R. of all Indian imports</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Exports to U.S.S.R. of all Indian exports</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**U.S. with Pakistan**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports from U.S.</td>
<td>1737m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to U.S.</td>
<td>226.2m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% imports from U.S. of all Pakistani imports</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% exports to U.S. of all Pakistani exports</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.2 continued

U.S.S.R. with Pakistan

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports from U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>65.6m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to U.S.S.R</td>
<td>26.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% imports from USSR of all Pakistani imports</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% exports to USSR of all Pakistani exports</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The above figures reveal the growing importance of the Soviet Union to India in matters of trade. Both imports from and exports to the U.S.S.R. grew from negligible amounts in the 1950s, to 5.9% and 11.5%, respectively, of total imports and exports. Assistance to India was by far the greatest by the U.S; the Soviet Union was not an important aid-giver.

For Pakistan, the percentages clearly reveal the great importance of the U.S. as a trading partner, particularly as a source of imports. The U.S.’ strong position as a source of imports becomes evident from the late fifties, after which it continually gains strength.

II. Third Party Roles and Strategies:

As in previous cases, third party strategies are operationalized in terms of several measures that include
the type and scope of third party provided fora for sending and receiving messages between conflicting actors; the number and scope of third party meetings with each actor (establishing whether conflicting actors’ perceptions of and opinions on the conflict and each other were advanced and whether their feelings and positions on past history were addressed); references by third parties conveying anxiety to settle the conflict, to link movement towards settlement to aid and trade issues, and references delineating broad third party positions on the crisis at hand.9

As I have referred to above, it is obvious that third party states were not significantly involved at any time through the duration of the 1965 war. The big powers, the U.S., the Soviet Union, Great Britain, all essentially stayed out of the conflict; at no point were the services of high commissions or other officials offered to either India or Pakistan, as had been the case in the Kutch and would be the case in the 1990 crisis. It was hence left to the U.N. to take on the role of mediator.

Also in stark contrast to the Kutch case, intervention on the part of the U.N., such as it was, came after fighting on a serious level had already begun. There was no effort to intervene in the early days of the illegal infiltration into Kashmir. It may be recalled that earlier in the Rann of

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9 Since these have been described in detail in earlier chapters especially in the description of methodology, they have only been briefly listed here.
Kutch, Britain made overtures to both countries immediately after skirmishes were engaged in. Again, one of the first moves by the U.N., made on its behalf by U Thant when he privately circulated a draft of a proposed statement according blame on Pakistan, was a rather inauspicious one. This is also in contrast to the relatively smooth intervention by Britain in Kutch right from the beginning.

In the following paragraphs, a more complete picture of the U.N.'s role in the 1965 war emerges out of the operationalizations described earlier.

Scope and Number of Meetings with Third Party Representatives:

Unlike in the Kutch case, the U.N. in the case of the 1965 war was either unable or unwilling to engineer a face-to-face meeting between Indian and Pakistani representatives. There were, however, meetings with U.N. officials and with U Thant himself. U Thant first met separately with Indian and Pakistani representatives to the U.N. in New York at the end of August to discuss the developments in Kashmir. This was the culmination of a series of consultations with the two delegations over the past few days. This was followed by a trip to the sub-continent in the middle of September, where he, along with

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10 It is not clear whether these consultations were also face-to-face; it is more likely that they were the follow-up to a single face-to-face meeting.
a U.N. delegation, met with Shastri and Ayub and urged that they accept the ceasefire resolutions passed by the Security Council. These two lone meetings are in contrast with the numerous meetings between Indian and Pakistani officials and British representatives, usually the high commissioners, that characterized the Kutch case.

Table 6.3

Number of face-to-face meetings\(^{n}\) with third party representatives:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Pakistan&quot; w/ U Thant/U.N.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayub w/ U Thant/U.N.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;India&quot; w/ U Thant/U.N.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shastri w/ U Thant/U.N.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comparison base will be established that will enable us to compare face-to-face meetings of conflicting actors with different representatives of the third party in question, across the different cases. It will clarify, for instance, how we will compare the meetings in this case with U Thant and U.N. officials, with those in the case of the Kutch, between Indian and Pakistani officials and the British high commissioners. There was also a meeting of Ayub and Shastri with British P.M. Wilson, which might be "equivalent" to the

\(^{n}\) A "meeting" is constituted by consideration of a single proposal or a single modification to a proposal at a particular point in time by conflicting actor and third party representatives. It might have included lesser "sub-meetings" at lower levels in working up to the level of a "meeting."
meetings with U Thant. If I employ a comparison scheme along these lines, it quickly becomes apparent that the Kutch case was characterized by numerous lower-level meetings that were absent in the case of the 1965 war.

**Scope of these Meetings:**

A consideration of the scope of third party meetings with representatives of the conflicting sides is rather more revealing than what is conveyed by mere numbers. As I noted earlier, U.N. efforts to bring India and Pakistan to a settlement were somewhat late in coming, and commenced with the unfortunate fracas created by the distribution of the draft of U Thant’s intended statement criticizing Pakistan.

In his meeting with the U.N. representatives of the conflicting sides in New York, there is no evidence that U Thant attempted to convey to each side the perceptions and positions on the conflict of the other, as had been the case with the British in the Kutch. At no point did he or any other U.N. representative serve as conduits between India and Pakistan, a role often played by the U.N. high commissioners to the two countries during the Kutch crisis (and to a lesser extent by U.S. representatives in the 1990 crisis), nor is there any indication that clarifications were sought by one party of the other through U.N. channels, as was the case with the Kutch crisis.

In a visit to both countries from September 10 through
13, U Thant's primary, perhaps sole, aim appeared to be that of persuading both sides to accept the recent Security Council resolutions for a ceasefire. In his memoirs, U Thant's press spokesman Nassif, who traveled with him to Karachi, Rawalpindi and New Delhi and was present at all meetings, writes that U Thant "stressed that his mandate from the Security Council was to achieve an immediate cease-fire" (Nassif, 1988). U Thant himself writes baldly that "my only mandate was to achieve a prompt and effective cease-fire" (Thant, 1978).

Again, lacking was an effort to help each side understand the positions and perspectives of the other. Indeed, his admission upon his return that "each is convinced that the other has committed aggression" might be construed as evidence of precisely this failure (Asian Recorder, Oct 8-14, 1965, pp. 6703). Nassif, his spokesman, remembers that upon U Thant's return to the U.S., he reported that the positions of both countries had, in the duration of the conflict, been allowed to "harden" (Nassif, 1988). Hence, it appears that efforts that might have prevented such recalcitrance and promoted compromise and understanding were not engaged in.

On another measure of the scope of third party efforts, that of advancing conflicting actors' perceptions and

12 These were not accepted by either India or Pakistan; however, a ceasefire resolution by the Security Council passed later in the month, was.
positions on the past, there is no evidence that U Thant engaged in this during his visit or by other U.N. actors. Indeed, past history was only referred to by the Security Council when it passed its resolution at the end of September "demanding" a cease-fire. The Council said that it would also consider steps that might be taken to help towards the "political problem underlying the present conflict" (Asian Recorder, Oct 6-14, 1965, pp. 6704). There is not much evidence supporting this measure from the Kutch case, either, although interview data are awaited. Codings on all the measures discussed above are presented with a moderate level of confidence.

Although the major powers played a small role in this conflict relative to the 1971 crisis, for instance, there is some evidence that they attempted to link movement towards resolution by India and Pakistan to bilateral aid issues. For instance, the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on both sides during the war, and some authors believe that this aided in the eventual acceptance by both sides of the cease-fire (Ganguly in Thomas, 1992, pp. 355). In addition, commodity assistance by the U.S. to the two countries was suspended for the duration of the hostilities (Nelson, 1968). Britain had also imposed an arms embargo against India from the middle of September that covered Indian purchases from British stores and factories. While Britain claimed that the same could not be imposed on Pakistan simply because
Britain did not supply any arms to Pakistan, the move was widely perceived as discriminatory in official Indian circles (Times of India, September 13, 1965). Beyond these embargoes, the role of these powers did not extend much beyond the voicing of their positions on the conflict, their calling for restraint and for early settlement. Occasionally, they urged both parties to heed the U.N.'s efforts (Times of India, September 7, 1965).

The Security Council's "demand" on September 20 that India and Pakistan heed a cease-fire was accepted by India on the 21st and Pakistan on the 22nd. It was apparent that the cease-fire resolution did not aspire much beyond its face value. The status of Kashmir, ostensibly the raison d'etre of the war, was not referred to. It was obvious that much had been left unsaid and undone, and that this was not a successful settlement in the way that the conclusion of the Kutch case had been. The most that could be said for it was, as Security Council representative Goldberg remarked, that it would be a "prelude to a better understanding between the parties" (Times of India, September 23, 1965).

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13 It is interesting to juxtapose these punitive measures with the largely conciliatory gestures offered by the U.S. to both countries during the 1990 crisis, gestures which included the extension by a year of a waiver for Pakistan from a U.S. law barring American aid (under the Symington Amendment) to countries importing "unsafeguarded" technology (Pakistan Times, June 16, 1990, pp. 1) and deciding to take no action against India even though it was cited in the Super 301 list (Times of India, June 15, 1990, pp. 1); see also case of 1990 crisis for details.
III. Perception of Conflicting Actors of Third Parties Having the Capacity to Aid in Settling Crises:

As was noted in earlier chapters, I have contended that there is a greater likelihood of success in third party intervention if conflicting actors hold the belief that third parties have the capacity to influence in some way the settling of the conflict at hand. This variable has been measured in terms of references made by India and Pakistan to such things as the international influence and power or the lack thereof, of the third party concerned, its leverage over the opponent and the aid and trade links that bind the two countries with third parties. Another, related variable is the degree of perceived even-handedness by the third party on the part of the actors. In the context of the relationship of distrust between India and Pakistan, the latter becomes an important determinant of acceptance on their part.

In the case of the 1965 war, there are only a few references to third party leverage over the opposing actor. In early November, Pakistan asked the U.N. to use its power to name India the aggressor in the recently concluded war, while India sought assurances from the U.S. at different points in time that it would cease arms supplies to Pakistan, recognizing, in doing so, the influence of the U.S. on Pakistan (Asian Recorder, Nov 26-Dec 2, 1965, pp.
There is also an unconfirmed report that Pakistan asked France to mediate in early September (Asian Recorder, Oct 1-7, 1965, pp. 6695). Later that month, on September 15, Ayub invited initiatives from the U.S. or the Commonwealth countries towards a cease-fire (Asian Recorder, Oct 1-7, 1965, pp. 6700).

IV. Perception of Conflicting Actors of Third Party Evenhandedness:

Concerning the perception of India and Pakistan about the evenhandedness of third parties in the crisis, China and Turkey were singled out by India as allegedly having designs to weaken her. Neither, however, were significant third parties at any point in the conflict (Asian Recorder, Oct 1-7, 1965, pp. 6695-6). Britain came under fire when India protested its perceived "partisanship" in September, and again later when it imposed an arms embargo on India alone\(^\text{14}\) (Asian Recorder, Oct 22-28, 1965) and Shastri also commented that the "attitudes" of the Big Powers might drive India into "a desperate position" (Times of India, Sept 27, 1965, pp. 1).\(^\text{15}\) The contrast in Indian perceptions of Great Britain's role in Kutch and this later war is marked. It may

\(^{14}\) Britain claimed that it had no arms connections with Pakistan and therefore the question of an embargo did not arise. Indian officials expressed disbelief at this.

\(^{15}\) Note that codings on this measure are at a moderate confidence level.
be recalled that Britain was lauded by both countries during the Kutch crisis on its patience, honesty and fairness, among other attributes. The U.S. was also similarly praised for its efforts in the 1990 crisis.

It is clear through a perusal of the data that both India and Pakistan had problems, at different points in time, with the more familiar third parties - the U.K. and the U.S. Since they, on their part, as well as the Soviet Union showed little desire to become actively involved, the U.N. remained the only significant third party actor that might intervene.

An interesting problem was posed when it was learned by both countries that U Thant intended to issue a statement in the U.N. that quite openly accorded a majority of the blame in the recently-started hostilities, to Pakistan. A draft of the statement had been circulated at the end of August, when the U.N. first entered into the conflict, to the permanent missions of several countries at U.N. headquarters. The publication of this statement was withheld, however, when Pakistan threatened a "walk out" of the U.N. if the statement were read. Pressure was also understood to have been applied on the Secretary General by Britain and the U.S. to desist in the interests of maintaining the role of the U.N. as a neutral third party. There is no evidence in the days and weeks that followed, that Pakistan harbored any resentment towards either U Thant
or the U.N. because of this incident, although it might not be amiss to speculate that the hitherto impartial image of the U.N. might have been tarnished somewhat in the view of Pakistan, and that this might have added to the overall difficulties the U.N. experienced in mediating this particular conflict.

V. Structures and Processes of Communication between Conflicting Actors:

This section presents the way in which channels of communication were used by conflicting actors, which channels were used and how frequently they were used. Since I have already defined what is constituted by channels of direct versus indirect communication earlier,16 I will not repeat definitions and operationalizations here.

Both raw numbers and frequencies for both types of communication are important for my research, not for their inherent worth but rather to enable comparisons to be drawn among the other cases.

16 See chapters on methodology and the Rann of Kutch.
Table 6.4
Number of Messages sent by Pakistan to India through Indirect Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indirect Channels</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press/Radio/TV</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public rallies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTBs(^{17})</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OTBs = Other Third Parties (not actively involved)

Table 6.5
Number of Messages sent by Pakistan to India through Direct Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Channels</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision groups, etc.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{17}\) In this case, all third parties would fit this description until September, when the U.N. could be said to have been the most "actively involved," and would therefore be excluded.
Table 6.6
Number of Messages sent by India to Pakistan through Indirect Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indirect Channels</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press/Radio/TV</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Rallies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTBs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OTBs = Other Third Parties (not actively involved)

Table 6.7
Number of Messages sent by India to Pakistan through Direct Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Channels</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision Groups etc.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.8

Number of Formal Meetings between Indian and Pakistani Officials to Discuss Options before outbreak of war$^{18}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Meetings</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The summaries presented for this case do offer contrasts from those that appear for the Kutch case. A cursory examination of the two cases shows the more extensive use of indirect versus direct communication in the period leading up to the 1965 war. On the other hand, the dominance of indirect communication channels in this case is consistent with their dominance in another war, that of 1971.

The press and parliament became the two indirect channels most widely used during the case of the 1965 war. In addition to their use by Shastri and Ayub, the two national leaders, Pakistan’s foreign minister Bhutto often gave statements to the press either defending Pakistan’s positions or according blame on India. India’s Defence Minister also used the press and parliament as fora through which to announce the preparedness and abilities of the Indian army and by implication, their readiness to fight Pakistan.

$^{18}$ Consistent with its employment in other cases, this category refers to meetings that are arranged without the aid of an involved third party, because such meetings would then part of the operationalization for third party strategies.
As was the case with the Kutch, the Indian parliament was more frequently employed as a channel through which messages, threats and warnings were sent to Pakistan, than was for the case of Pakistan. This could again be explained in terms of the fact that the Indian government had to face greater pressures from the opposition parties and often had to answer questions posed by them about the progression of the crisis.\(^{19}\)

The U.N. was initially (from mid August) employed as yet another channel of indirect communication through which to issue protests against border violations by the enemy (Pakistan Times, Aug 18, 1965, p. 1); its use by both countries continued after its more active involvement from September on, but expanded by then to include messages that India and Pakistan sent to the U.N. that were meant for the U.N. as an established third party actor and not necessarily for the other side.\(^{20}\) The U.N. by that time had become the most, indeed the only significant third party involved.

It is significant that no face-to-face meetings, an indicator that is most highly weighted, took place between Indian and Pakistani officials at any level of importance.

\(^{19}\) It is interesting to see that the Pakistani government begins to face some of these same oppositional pressures and constraints as it moves towards a more democratic form of government from the late 1980s. This is especially evident during the crisis of 1990, and will be further explained in the analysis for that case.

\(^{20}\) Obviously, such messages have not been included as instances of indirect communication between actors.
through the duration of the escalatory period prior to the war. Again, this is consistent with the findings in the period leading up to another war, that of 1971, and at odds with findings for the Rann of Kutch case. There were no meetings between High Commissioners, members of foreign offices of both countries or other high-level meetings as there had been during the Kutch crisis. The confidence level for all parts of this variable is very high.

VI. Other Independent Variables:

The Role of Domestic Opposition:

The opposition in India, much of it from the right-wing Jan Sangh, which had been very dissatisfied over the government’s role in handling the Kutch crisis, now increased the pressure on the government to respond to Pakistan’s moves in Kashmir with aggression (Times of India, August 24, 1965, pp. 1; August 26, 1965). There is some indication that this pressure weighed quite heavily in the decisions made by Shastri and his cabinet in the follow-up to the war, and they were also careful to keep the

21 There was in fact one discussion between the Pakistani High Commissioner Hussain and a secretary in the Indian External Affairs Ministry but its sole purpose was to arrange for the mutual recall to their home countries of non-essential personnel in the Indian and Pakistani missions. No other issues were discussed. Therefore, this meeting cannot be included in the category of direct meetings between officials, which in the Kutch case met specifically to discuss issues surrounding the crisis itself.
opposition appraised of issues as they unfolded (Times of India, September 3, 1965). Because Shastri had not heeded many opposition demands during the Kutch crisis, he might have felt beholden to take them into greater consideration now.

Hence, while the opposition in Pakistan remained inconsequential, it is conceivable that the Indian opposition did have a significant impact on the government’s decisions and actions during this crisis and hence on its ultimate outcome.

VII. Dependent Variable: Ceasefire - Failure of Settlement

In the following section, I will assess the extent to which the ceasefire and end to the 1965 signified closure on the issues and demands that had led to it in the first place.

I have earlier contended that crises are considered to be successfully settled, either with or without the involvement of a ceasefire, when there are provisions for more than merely the end to immediate violence, when provisions include positive steps agreed to by both parties like joint declarations, formal meetings on the future on the relationship, the exchange of goodwill gestures, etc. It is apparent that on many of these measures of success, the end to the 1965 war fell quite short.
Of the most striking characteristics of the end of the war was the continuation, through October and November, of negative assessments by both sides of the other's actions and intentions, and of the failure to believe on the part of both actors that the ceasefire was a gesture of good faith. This fact is made more stark through comparison with the Kutch case. In that case, since the meeting of Ayub and Shastri in London which had made prospects of a settlement imminent, there had been references by both sides to a general optimism about the future of the relationship and to a positive assessment of the other's actions and remarks. For instance, a spokesman had announced that India was hopeful of an agreement as early as after the Ayub-Shastri meeting in London. Later in July, when Indian and Pakistani representatives met, there was a generally useful "exchange of views" between the two sides. Shastri and Ayub expressed a common desire to improve relations and Ayub even went so far as to term the Kutch settlement "an act of high statesmanship" (Pakistan Times, July 1, 1965). Such a general optimism also prevailed between the two countries after U.S. intervention in the 1990 crisis.

In stark contrast, Shastri cautioned that the U.N. sponsored ceasefire after the war in September not be mistaken "for the dawn of peace." He referred to an "uneasy" truce and the "bellicose mood" of Pakistan and said that any threat would be met with "full determination and
full force" (Times of India, September 23, 1965). He cautioned that the nation should be prepared for a breakdown in the ceasefire because of Pakistani "intransigence" (Times of India, September 29, 1965, pp.1). Ayub, in his turn, blamed the war on the Indians' "attitude" and said that Pakistan might have to remain "harnessed in eternal vigilance" (Pakistan Times, November 17, 1965, pp. 1; October 15, 1965, pp. 1). This is evocative of the statements made by both sides after the 1971 war, when, for instance, India was cautioned by Bhutto "not to gloat over a temporary victory" (Times of India, December 31, 1971, pp. 1).

In 1965, the battle of words was also played out in the U.N., as cease-fire violations became increasingly common in the months of October and November. Letters were sent by both countries to the U.N. charging the other of violations. Pakistan demanded that a U.N. commission be sent to Kashmir to document what it alleged were atrocities on the Kashmiris by Indian troops, an allegation denied by India. The confidence level for all these measures is very high.

The ceasefire of September 20, then, was at best an official end to full-fledged war. It resulted in neither a change of official stances towards conciliation nor an agreement on bilateral steps to be taken in the future, both of which characterized the Kutch settlement. No joint declaration was signed by the two sides, as had been the
case with the Kutch, no high-level meetings between officials took place and no notes were exchanged between leaders.

A final -- and delayed -- settlement only came in January, when the Soviet Union mediated a meeting between Ayub and Shastri in Tashkent. It had been clear in the months following the U.N. sponsored cease-fire that the U.N. was unable to bring the two parties towards a settlement, and the other major powers were either unable or unwilling to become involved. The U.S., for instance, was preoccupied with its growing involvement in Vietnam and had distanced itself from both India and Pakistan through an arms embargo imposed on both countries during the war (Ganguly, 1986). It therefore remained for the Soviets to engineer a meeting, which they did on January 4, 1966.22

22 The Tashkent meeting and the Declaration that came out of it, while quite important in the general context of Indo-Pakistani relations, is not within the purview of this dissertation, coming, as it does, months after the war has been fought and concluded.
Table 6.9

The 1965 War at a Glance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Confidence Level</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communication</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures &amp; Processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect channels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Indirect channels</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sometimes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Direct channels</td>
<td>&quot;  &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- infrequent</td>
<td>&quot;  &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Face-to-face meetings</td>
<td>&quot;  &quot;</td>
<td>Highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Third Party Strategies**

a) Perception of gain       Moderate
U.S./Soviets lack of
interest - yes
U.S./Soviets narrow
interest in settlement
only - yes

b) Meetings                 Very high
U Thant with India
& Pakistan - 2

b) Scope of meetings
(U Thant with India &
Pakistan)

  - Focus on issues - yes    Moderate
Conveying perceptions &
  "  "                        Highest
  positions - no

3. **Perception by Conflicting**
   **Actors of Third Party having**
   **Capacity to Assist**

   a) Belief in capacity -
### Table 6.9 continued

#### Some Moderate

**b)** Perception of evenhandedness - No " "
(For U.S., Soviet Union, Britain, China)

#### 4. Dependent Variable: Settlement (Lack of)

**a)** Formal "summits"/ meetings - No Very high Highest

**b)** Positive assessments - No " " Lower

#### Other Variables:

**5.** Presence of "other" relevant third parties - Yes Very high

**6.** "Early" intervention by third party (before serious hostilities) - No High
CHAPTER VII

1971: War and the Creation of Bangladesh

The following pages present the results from categories coded for the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, a war which resulted in the birth of Bangladesh. A full description of the events leading up to this war have been offered in an earlier chapter, enabling a concentration on analysis at this point. The data for this case have been collected from the same sources as were those for the other cases. In addition, a number of books on the war have been perused, this single event having been the subject of perhaps the greatest volume of writing from the entire Indo-Pakistani relationship.

This case shares with the other cases of war some of the same values of independent variables including a greater employment of indirect as opposed to direct channels of communication and a significantly different level and role of third party effort than is true in the cases of successful settlement. There are some features, however, that appear unique to this case, and they will be elaborated upon in the coming sections. For instance, the range of third parties that played some role in this case is much
wider than in any of the other cases under consideration. Again, both India and Pakistan, at various times, clearly found fairness and impartiality wanting in the different relevant third parties; this was certainly not the case during the Kutch crisis, when the U.K. was lauded by both sides for its fairness, and it is also not true to the same extent during the 1965 war.

The time period under consideration for this case is more extensive than in any of the other cases I employ. This is because this was a conflict that built gradually over several months and that started as a Pakistani domestic problem which did not concern India at its inception. India’s involvement increased with the refugees that made their way across its border in ever larger numbers as the crisis in Pakistan deepened.¹

Since the first signs of trouble between the two states become apparent from late March, I have chosen to begin the collection of data from that month.² The conflict then

¹ See the chronological description of this case that has been provided earlier for details.

² It must be noted that sharp words had been exchanged by the two governments as early as February 1971, following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines airplane to Lahore, and its consequent destruction by the Kashmiri hijackers. The Pakistani government had issued statements applauding the brave "freedom fighters" and the Indian government had retaliated by issuing a ban on Pakistani flights over Indian territory. This incident, however, is not directly related to the events that were eventually to lead to the war over Bangladesh, and I have therefore chosen not to include it in coding.
escalated until war was declared on December 3.\(^3\) Hence, the time-period under consideration becomes about eight months, a span of time that is about three times as long as either the Kutch crisis or the 1965 war.

In the following pages, I present analyses made possible by the coding of data for each variable.

I. Third Party Nature and Characteristics:

Perception by Third Parties of Gain through Involvement in Settling Crisis:

This measure of third party strategy serves to determine the motives third parties might have in intervening in building crises and it operates under the assumption that intervention might appear more attractive if there is an anticipation of some gain or the meeting of some interest on their parts. As has been described in prior chapters, different indicators for this measure include references by third parties to their interest in balancing power in the region, to maintaining trade links to the region, to international goodwill that might be gained or lost through intervention, etc.

The assessment of third party strategies in the 1971 case presents greater difficulty than in any of the other cases, because there were more third party players involved

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\(^3\) Since the war was declared on December 3, only 2 days in December can be included in coding. The entire month, therefore cannot be and is not counted in the span of time characterized as preceding the war.
in this case and none predominated through the whole time period. Hence, unlike in the Kutch case where Britain served as the single relevant third party, there were several relevant third parties in this case. Again, in the case of the 1965 war, the U.N. served, albeit by default, as the predominant party. In the 1971 case, it also fell upon the U.N. to take on the responsibility for mediation, but the U.S. and the Soviet Union were clearly more actively partisan than they had been during 1965, and were therefore third parties that had to be contended with.

There is some evidence through the data that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were interested in maintaining the power balance in the region. Authors writing about this war have maintained that the U.S. was reluctant to censure Pakistan in part because they did not want Pakistan turning to China for support (Sisson and Rose, 1990). The Soviet Union signed the Indo-Soviet Friendship treaty with India on August 7, ensuring a strengthening of its links with India and thereby a strengthening of its position in the region. It can be noted with moderate confidence, then, that balance of power considerations did figure in the actions of the U.S. and Soviet Union. It is unfortunate, however, that instead of motivating them to act to resolve the crisis, they served to impede such action. As Haendal (1977) notes, U.S. interest in keeping the Soviets under check hindered any "honest" effort, one that would promote a settlement
without regard to which side emerged looking better, on their part in resolving the crisis.

The difference between the findings on this variable in this case and in the 1990 crisis is stark. In the latter crisis, the classic Cold War considerations by the superpowers that certainly characterized earlier cases had all but ceased to exist; in 1990, then, the U.S. and Soviets played a role that was mutually agreed-upon and that focused on a fair settlement rather than on helping either India or Pakistan gain an edge.

Perhaps following from the above indicator, there were more explicit references by third parties in this crisis than is the case in any other, to protecting their allies. For the Soviets, the Indo-Soviet Friendship treaty was the culmination of a trend toward a clear preference for the Indian side. From then on, Soviet arms shipments began to be sent to India, and their support became more unequivocal. During President Podgorny’s visit to India in October, an offer of assistance to India in the "spirit of existing friendly relations" was made (Times of India, Oct. 2, 1971, pp.1). The U.S., for its part, showed more sympathy for Pakistan. As the crisis progressed, it began to view India as the aggressor and wanted to protect Pakistan (Haendal, 1977). China was another third party actor whose position

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4 It may be recalled that treaties or equivalent documents signed between conflicting actors and relevant third parties receive the highest weighting.
right through the conflict favored Pakistan. It was unclear until the end whether any action would be taken by it in support of Pakistan, however, as statements made in support of Pakistan were frequently issued but they did not unambiguously declare future intent or action. As war became more imminent, it became clear that China would not act on its statements of support.

Despite their interest in maintaining a balance of power in the region, both the U.S. and to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union, were generally reluctant to get more fully involved in the crisis. Haendal (1977) maintains that the U.S. did not have an adequate incentive to act nor an expectation of gain from action. In the larger scheme of things, South Asia just wasn’t important enough. The Soviet Union was also initially reluctant to become involved, and maintained in the early months of the crisis that this was an internal matter for Pakistan. This slowly changed after the signing of the treaty. Britain resisted involvement through the conflict; this, of course, is in direct contrast with its role in the Kutch crisis (Jackson, 1974).

As in the case of the 1965 war, then, it fell upon the U.N., as a third party acceptable by both India and Pakistan, to act. Its involvement increased steadily until it became the most important actor in the latter months of the crisis and in the post-war period. Also as is the case in the other conflicts under study, there is no evidence
that domestic coalitions or groups at home in either the U.S. or Soviet Union exerted any pressure for action.

The picture that emerges of third party motivations in this case, then, is one of much stronger interest on the parts of the U.S., the Soviet Union and China to maintain the balance of power in the region -- to refrain from conceding points to the other side, to maintain positions of strength for their allies, etc. -- than is true for any of the other cases we have analyzed; this resulted in third parties being less inclined to seek mutual paths through which India and Pakistan might have settled their conflict short of war.

Elements of Third Party Leverage: 1971

Table 7.1 Bilateral Assistance

By the U.S. to India 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans &amp; Credits</th>
<th>1215m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>125m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5 Corresponding figures for Pakistan could not be obtained.
Table 7.1 continued

Amount of aid by the Soviet Union to India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans &amp; Credits</th>
<th>537.4m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>5.3m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 7.2 Bilateral Trade

Between India and the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports from US</th>
<th>550,434</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports to US</td>
<td>350,582</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% Imports from US of all Indian imports 22.8
% Exports to US of all Indian exports 16.6


Between India and the Soviet Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports from USSR</th>
<th>116,899</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports to USSR</td>
<td>287,413</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% Imports from USSR of all Indian imports 4.9
% Exports from USSR of all Indian exports 13.6

Between Pakistan and the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports from US</th>
<th>232,083</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports to US</td>
<td>67,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Imports from US of all Pakistani imports</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Exports to US of all Pakistani exports</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Between Pakistan and the Soviet Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports from USSR</th>
<th>23,934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports to USSR</td>
<td>36,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Imports from USSR of all Pakistani imports</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Exports to USSR of all Pakistani exports</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By 1971, the U.S.S.R. had edged out Britain and almost equalled the U.S. as the primary recipient of Indian exports. The U.K. and Australia, which were in the first and third spots, respectively, in 1951-52, were now third and (in the case of Australia) too insignificant to be
ranked (Wali 1976).\textsuperscript{6} Imports from the Soviet Union also registered continuous increases up to 1971 (Stanislaus, 1975). Soviet trade accounted for about .7% of India's GDP.\textsuperscript{7}

On the other hand, aid (in the form of grants) to India by the U.S. registered continuous and drastic declines since the 1950s. Whereas in the period 1951-56 it had been Rs. 918 m, in the period 1969-1973, this had been reduced to a mere Rs. 156 m, in current rupees (Central Statistical Organization, 1974). Aid in the form of loans and credits from the U.S., however, remained at very high levels relative to loans and credits from other states (Central Statistical Organization, 1974). U.S. aid accounted for about 1.6% of India's GDP (1971 figures from U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1968. Dollar-rupee exchange rates estimated and conversions done to obtain this percentage).

What we have, then, is the U.S.S.R becoming an increasingly important trading partner of India, while the U.S. still remains the most generous donor of loans and credits to India. Both states are therefore possessed of elements that might be employed as leverage against India.

In Pakistan's case, the U.S. was clearly the most

\textsuperscript{6} It should be noted that actual differences among the first three positions were very slight, differing by a fraction of 1 percent.

\textsuperscript{7} Calculations from figures for 1971 obtained in the U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1968, with appropriate calculations made and rupee-dollar exchange rates estimated.

II. Third Party Roles and Strategies:

I have elsewhere described in detail the indicators that measure third party strategies. These include the type and scope of third party-provided fora for sending and receiving messages between conflicting actors, the number of third party meetings with each actor and the scope of these meetings (whether conflicting actors' perceptions and positions of the conflict are conveyed and whether their feelings on past history are raised and addressed). Indicators also include references by third parties conveying anxiety to settle the conflict, to link movement towards settlement to bilateral aid and trade issues between actors and third parties and to delineating broad third party positions on the crisis.

For the most part, third party states did not attempt to bring India and Pakistan together either through diplomatic fora provided by them, or through the communication of their specific messages. This is in direct contrast with the role played by Britain during the Kutch crisis. Kissinger did travel to India and Pakistan in early
July, but his trip was more in the nature of what was termed a "fact-finding" mission, rather than a specific strategy to convey perceptions and positions of each actor to the other. And, there is no indication that he did more than reiterate U.S. positions to the actors. A six-member team was selected by Nixon to visit the two countries later in December, but this was preempted by the war which broke out earlier that month. Other than these efforts, there were formal calls made by the U.S. and President Nixon on both countries to show restraint (Pakistan Times, Nov. 29, 1971, pp. 1)

Soviet representatives visited India at various times during the crisis. After the Indo-Soviet Friendship treaty was signed in August, diplomat Tsarapkin arrived in India for talks with the Ministry of External Affairs in the last week of September. His visit was followed by visits in October from deputy foreign minister Firyubin and Soviet president Podgorny, who vowed to "render all possible assistance to India to achieve a peaceful settlement" (Pakistan Times, October 3, 1971, pp. 1) and a visit from a high-ranking delegation at the end of October. It was clear that the October visits were meant to consolidate Soviet support, both in terms of arms and rhetoric (Sisson and Rose, 1990). Hence, the Soviet role was much more in the nature of providing evidence of support specifically for its ally, rather than offering its bipartisan services in
seeking solutions for resolution, as was Britain's role during Kutch.

A brief Swiss role in one event during the crisis is instructive. They intervened to help solve logistical problems and problems that resulted from mis-communication between the governments of the two sides, both of which had arisen over the mutual repatriation of diplomatic personnel from Dacca and Calcutta. From the time of their offer to help in May to the time that the issue was settled in July, the Swiss employed strategies similar to the British in the Rann of Kutch. The positions and perspectives of either side were conveyed through the Swiss ambassador, until a satisfactory solution was agreed upon. The Swiss did not re-enter the picture, however, after this narrow accord was achieved.

The U.N. soon became the only third party that both India and Pakistan viewed as acceptable. As in the case of the 1965 war and unlike in the Kutch case, intervention came fairly late in the conflict, although much before any fighting began. The following paragraphs will outline U.N. strategy more completely.

What we see in this case, then, is the existence of a plethora of significant third parties which eventually give

---

8 You will recall that in the case of the 1965 war, intervention by the U.N. came after fighting on a fairly serious level had already begun between the two sides.
way to the role of a single third party, the U.N.

**Scope and No. of Meetings with U.N. Representatives:**

As was the case with the 1965 war, the U.N. was unable to bring about face-to-face meetings between Indian and Pakistani representatives. Unlike the period leading up to the war of 1965, however, U Thant was not successful in 1971 of even arranging separate meetings between U.N. representatives (including himself) and representatives of the conflicting actors. He did meet once in June with the Indian foreign minister, where he was urged to work towards ensuring the return of refugees back to East Pakistan. No U.N. delegations traveled to India or Pakistan as they had in the early stages of the 1965 war.

**Specific Third Party Strategies:**

It is apparent that none of the relevant third parties were possessed of a well-thought out strategy that might have been employed to resolve the problems confronting India and Pakistan. As I mentioned above, the roles of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were primarily confined to providing support for their allies and to occasionally exhorting both parties to work towards a settlement.

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9 It may be recalled that Britain succeeded in accomplishing this in the Kutch case. The Kutch case was also characterized by numerous lower-level meetings between Indian and Pakistani officials, some of which were arranged through the third party, Britain.
U.N. efforts in this conflict were very issue-specific. They focussed on the issues that had been created by the crisis, in particular the refugees that were streaming into India from the east, rather than the overall relationship between the two actors, which was certainly part of Britain's effort in the Kutch. As U Thant wrote to Yahya Khan in April, in light of the refugee situation, "the U.N. and its specialized agencies have a most useful role to play....in providing emergency assistance" (Jackson, 1974). In his memoirs, U Thant recalls that having received no assistance from the Security Council, he "therefore had to confine (himself) to the humanitarian aspects of the problem" (Thant, 1978). While it was Pakistan that rejected U.N. intervention at this point, in later months it welcomed a U.N. role, while India became the one to refuse it. Gandhi was most interested in aid from the U.N. and the international community in meeting the needs of the refugees and in persuading Pakistani leaders to reverse their course so that the problem might then, according to her, resolve itself.

The head of the U.N. high commission for refugees (UNHCR) visited the border area in May and later in June, U Thant met with the Indian foreign minister. Other U.N. suggestions included that for a UNHCR presence in Indian refugee camps, a suggestion that was rejected by the Indian government. It was not until late October that U Thant
moved from an almost-exclusive focus on the refugee issue to offering his "good offices" to both countries, an offer that was also rejected by the now increasingly obstinate Indians (Sisson and Rose, 1990). For the purposes of this dissertation, it is most important to note that through the span of their involvement the U.N., as in the case of the 1965 war, had done nothing to convey perceptions and positions of one actor to another, or to bring representatives from the two sides together for talks as had Britain during the Rann of Kutch crisis.  

This case was characterized to a greater extent than others by the imposition of trade and aid sanctions upon India and Pakistan as punitive measures by states with the power to do so, although we do see these sanctions being imposed by the U.S. and Britain during the build-up to the 1965 war. While some of these measures were declared some months after the beginning of the conflict, the majority of them came either just before war was declared or during the war itself.

As early as May, Britain and the U.S. declared that the future of developmental assistance to Pakistan would be contingent upon its cooperation with relief efforts.

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10 U Thant writes in his memoirs that he was initially "in almost daily contact .... with India and Pakistan" but that after months of this "futile exercise," he had to abandon it. Since he does not elaborate on the nature of this contact, one can only speculate that it was not consistent and systematic as was the contact of British representatives during Kutch.
(Jackson, 1974). In July, the West German government suspended development aid to Pakistan until it satisfied certain preconditions including "a political settlement for East Pakistan which would satisfy all sides (Pakistan Times, July 9, 1971, pp.1). Swedish and Dutch aid schemes to Pakistan were also suspended during that month (Jackson, 1974). India experienced a cancellation of export licenses and the deferment of pending developmental loans and PL 480 credit by the U.S. in the beginning of December (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978). Licensing of arms shipments to both countries was suspended by the U.S. (Pakistan Times, December 2, 1971, pp. 1). Certainly the extent of sanctions imposed in this case exceeded those that characterized the case of the 1965 war, where an arms embargo had been imposed on both sides by the U.S. and on India by Britain a little more than a month before the war. In the Kutch case, of course, no effort was made by any third party to link the movement towards resolution of the crisis to bilateral aid and trade issues.

III. Perception of Conflicting Actors of Third Parties having the Capacity to Aid in Settling Crises:

I have noted elsewhere that third party intervention might have a greater likelihood of success if conflicting actors believe that third parties have the capacity to positively influence outcomes. This variable is measured in
terms of statements by India and Pakistan regarding the international influence and power or lack thereof of the relevant third party, the aid and trade links that bind the country to the third party, etc.

There is some evidence for the belief on India's part of the leverage that the U.S., the Soviet Union and the U.N. had over Pakistan. India was generally unhappy with the U.S. for not doing more to persuade Pakistan to resolve the East Pakistan situation (Sisson and Rose, 1990). It often urged it to use "its influence" with Pakistan towards this end (Times of India, May 22, 1971, pp.1). Interviews with officials in the Indian External Affairs ministry during the crisis confirm that while India believed that while the U.S. could certainly have played a role in settling the crisis, that in fact it did not (Interviews with T.N. Kaul, S.N. Chopra, December 1993). The U.N. was also similarly asked by India to employ its authority to prevail over Pakistan (Pakistan Times, August 13, 1971, pp.1).

Both parties appeared convinced that third parties did indeed have international power and could thereby influence outcomes. The help of the U.N., U.S., Soviet Union and the general international community was repeatedly sought by both sides. During the trial of Mujibur Rehman by the Yahya Khan government, Indira Gandhi wrote letters to world leaders to use their influence to save Mujib (Times of India, August 12, pp.1). Help with the creation of
conditions for the return of refugees to East Pakistan was repeatedly sought by India from the U.N. and the international community. Similarly, Pakistan sought the aid of Commonwealth leaders, the U.N. and both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. at different points during the crisis. Towards the end, when war appeared ever more likely, the belief in the influence of third parties turned to disillusionment, as evidenced by statements (here, by Indira Gandhi) like "the international community can't be depended upon" to help (Times of India, November 16, 1971, pp.1). This belief in the leverage the three main third parties had and their ability to influence outcomes is more marked in this case than in any of the others. There are some parallels with the case of the 1965 war, however, where it may be recalled that the U.S. and the U.N. were called upon at different times by both India and Pakistan to assist in specific situations created by the conflict. The confidence level on this variable is moderate.

IV. Perception of Conflicting Actors of Third Party Evenhandedness:

It can be stated with a high level of confidence that more than at any other time, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were viewed as suspect by India and Pakistan respectively.\[11\]

\[11\] Although both India and Pakistan complained occasionally about Britain and the U.S. in the period leading up to the 1965 war, their unhappiness with third parties during the 1971 crisis was greater.
Interviews with Indian officials in the External Affairs ministry confirm this generally negative image of the U.S. on the part of India (Interviews with T.N. Kaul, S.N. Chopra, December 1993). The U.N. was also accused of unfairness at different times by both actors, and the U.K. by Pakistan. This is in stark contrast with the Rann of Kutch case and the case of the 1990 crisis, where third party Britain earned praise by both actors for its evenhandedness in intervening in the former, and the U.S. and Soviet role was appreciated in the latter. It is rather more in keeping with the case of the 1965 war, where the "attitudes" of the "big powers" were lamented by India (Times of India, September 27, 1965, pp. 1). In this case, India accused the U.S. at various times of "encouraging genocide in Bangladesh" and taking a "narrow view" of the crisis (Times of India, July 29, 1971, pp. 1; November 3, 1971, pp. 11). Indira Gandhi lamented the lack of fairness in the world governments' response and claimed that "no justice" could be expected from the U.N. Security Council (Times of India, November 4, 1971, pp. 1; November 27, 1971, pp. 1). Her views on America's lack of fairness have been documented by different authors (see Sisson and Rose, 1990; Haendal, 1977). In its turn, Pakistan protested Britain's partisanship in the conflict and threatened to break ties with the Commonwealth because of it (Pakistan Times, July 6, 1971, pp.1; July 16, 1971, pp. 1). The U.N.
came under fire for issuing a statement against Mujib-ur Rehman's trial (Pakistan Times, August 16, 1971, pp. 1).

It is certainly conceivable that the resentment that India and Pakistan felt due to their perceived lack of fairness on the part of different third parties might have had a negative impact on third party efforts to mediate in the conflict.

V. Structures and Processes of Communication between Conflicting Actors:

In this section, data are presented on the way in which direct versus indirect channels of communication were employed by India and Pakistan, and the relative frequency of their use. Since operational definitions for the terms direct and indirect communication have been provided at more than one point in prior chapters, they will not be repeated here. Raw numbers and frequencies will be presented to eventually facilitate comparison with other cases, and, more importantly, the scope of communications will be carefully described.

As I have noted before, only those messages are counted that are sent by officials/organs of each government to either the officials/organs on the other side or are conveyed through indirect channels like the press. These could include the prime minister, president, army chief (especially for Pakistan, where chiefs like Ayub Khan and
Yahya Khan functioned as heads of state), cabinet ministers, high commissioners or ambassadors, or organs like the foreign ministry or high commissions, in other words, those individuals or organs with the authority to speak on behalf of their governments.

It may be recalled that in the months leading up to the 1971 war, Pakistani politics were in turmoil since direct elections had pointed to two clear leaders, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in west Pakistan, and Mujib-ur Rehman in east Pakistan. The army under the leadership of General Yahya Khan, which had been poised for a return to civilian power, was stopped in its tracks by the problem created by the election results that favored both men, and continued to remain power. Gradually, Bhutto became a spokesman for the Yahya Khan government, while Rehman was marginalized, and later imprisoned. Hence, I have elected to include in coding for communication in this case, all communication engaged in by Bhutto.
Table 7.3

Number of Messages sent by Pakistan to India through Indirect Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIRECT CHANNELS</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press/Radio/TV</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>15(^{12})</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Rallies</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTBs</td>
<td>1(^{13})</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OTBs = Other Third Parties (not actively involved)

\(^{12}\) This does not include the number of times Indian and Pakistani representatives to the U.N. faced each other in debates in the General Assembly and other such arenas; those meetings are described elsewhere.

\(^{13}\) Because the U.S., U.S.S.R. and U.K. were all involved in varying degrees in this crisis, messages sent through channels involving them will not be included; on the other hand, a lone message sent by Yahya through Sri Lanka is included.
### Table 7.4

**Number of Messages sent by Pakistan to India through Direct Channels.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT CHANNELS</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision groups, etc.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7.5

**Number of Messages sent by India to Pakistan through Indirect Channels.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIRECT CHANNELS</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press/Radio/TV</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public rallies</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTBs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7.6

**Number of Messages sent by India to Pakistan through Direct Channels.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT CHANNELS</th>
<th>RAW #s</th>
<th>#s/MTH.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision group, etc.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.7

Number of Formal Meetings between Indian and Pakistani Officials to Discuss Options before the Outbreak of War.\textsuperscript{14}

| No. of meetings | 0\textsuperscript{15} |

The patterns that are indicated by the numbers presented above are generally in line with the pattern evident in the case of the 1965 war, where there was a more extensive employment of indirect as opposed to direct channels of communication and in contrast with those in the Kutch crisis, where direct channels of communication predominated.

The press/radio/T.V. is, collectively, a channel that is most frequently used by both countries in both the 1965 and 1971 wars. This was a channel that was beginning to reach more and more South Asian citizens as access to the different media increased over the years. In India, the

\textsuperscript{14} That is, meetings arranged without the aid of any third party involved.

\textsuperscript{15} There were several occasions when the Indian and Pakistani representatives to the United Nations came face to face and responded to each other in U.N.-sponsored fora like General Assembly debates. These, however, were not formally arranged meetings between the two parties and hence cannot be included in this category.

Again, the inability on the part of India and Pakistan to find a mutually-acceptable scheme by which to repatriate each others' diplomats led to an offer by the Swiss government to help. This effort included separate meetings between Swiss representatives and Indian and Pakistani officials. The conflicting sides, however, never met face-to-face.
parliament was a forum that was also quite frequently utilized, as government officials had to justify policies to the opposition; it is not surprising that the same is not the case for Pakistan, which was a military dictatorship through this time period. This finding is consistent with the 1965 war and the Kutch case, when Pakistan was ruled by another military general, Ayub Khan. Again, public rallies were used more extensively by the Indian government, perhaps another indication of its greater need to explain and justify policies to the public and opposition.

A wide range of actors represented their respective governments through indirect channels, including cabinet ministers, ambassadors to other countries and to the U.N. and of course the Indian prime minister Gandhi and the Pakistani leader Yahya Khan. Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party also emerged as a very significant actor, and I have already noted why he must be accorded the status of official representative although he was not technically part of the Yahya Khan government.

As in the case of the 1965 war and unlike in the Kutch case, there were no face-to-face meetings between Indian and Pakistani officials at any time in the months leading to war in December. There were no formal meetings between high commissioners or members of the foreign offices to discuss the situation, although high commissioners on either side were often issued protest notes for their governments. The
Pakistani ambassador to the U.N. Aga Shahi and his Indian counterpart often clashed in U.N. debates that were aimed at discussing the crisis over East Pakistan. However, these do not count as formal meetings; rather, they were forced encounters, when each representative's role was to defend his government and present it in the best possible light. The confidence level in coding for the above measures of the variable is very high.

VI. Other Independent Variables:

The Role of Domestic Opposition:

In India, domestic opposition in this crisis had two basic planks: the first was to urge the Gandhi government to recognize the independence of Bangladesh, a step which the government had moved very cautiously on. This had the special support of the socialist-communist opposition parties in parliament, many of whom have spiritual roots in the Indian state of West Bengal and were hence particularly affected (Times of India, March 28, 1971; July 7, 1971, pp. 7). The second was to push the government into a more aggressive stance with Pakistan. Not surprisingly, this was espoused mainly by the Jan Sangh, a right-wing party, many of whose members would later become the leaders of the

16 This is better understood in light of the fact that the Indian state of West Bengal which borders what was then East Pakistan and was later to become Bangladesh and which has historic ties to the area, has returned to power many communist-party governments at the state level over the decades.
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which was born in the late eighties and was responsible for inflaming communal hatred in the country (Times of India, May 7, 1971, pp. 1; October 20, 1971, pp. 5; November 12, 1971, pp. 8, November 18, 1971, pp. 3).

Although opposition parties kept up their demands through the duration of the crisis, the Gandhi government was successful in resisting their pressure. It moved very cautiously on according recognition to Bangladesh, and was not hastily drawn into a war. In the final months before the war, we find the opposition falling in line with the government and offering its support (Times of India, November 25, 1971, pp. 9; November 28, 1971, pp. 1). This support accelerated after the war commenced until hardly any dissent was voiced.\footnote{There is no doubt that Gandhi's political standing was better in 1971 than it had ever been before -- she had just won a general election early that year, in which her party had experienced resounding success and the opposition, grave losses.}

In Pakistan, domestic opposition had been suppressed and a ban imposed on political activity in the aftermath of the elections and the civil war that ensued, so it is hardly surprising that there was not much disagreement with the policies initiated by the Yahya Khan regime by those in West Pakistan.
Dominant Leaders: The Role of Personality and Socialization

There is little doubt that both Indira Gandhi and Yahya Khan can be termed predominant leaders. Yahya was the head of a non-democratic state where power was concentrated in his office, while Gandhi, although the head of a democracy, and although known to seek and take the advice of her closest aides, was, as Sisson and Rose (1989, pp. 138) put it, "the final source of authority."

Once again employing Barber's (1965; 1985) typology of personality types, India's Indira Gandhi certainly falls into the Active-Negative or Advertiser category. Numerous books have been written about Indira Gandhi the woman and politician, and although they tend to be either charitable and glowing encomiums or more acid portrayals depending on the authors, all tend to agree about Gandhi's need for power and influence at any cost. They cite as evidence, variously, her imposition of the now-infamous Emergency in 1975, her decimation of Congress party heavy-weights after her ascent to Prime Ministership in 1966 and her ruthless suppression and dismissal of opposition governments that had displeased her in different Indian states.

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18 Among the better biographies of Gandhi, encompassing both views, are Pranay Gupte's Mother India (1992) and Inder Malhotra's Indira Gandhi (1989). Another useful work is a volume edited by A. K. Damodaran and U.S. Bajpai, India's Foreign Policy, the Indira Gandhi Years.

19 A detailed account of the weakening of the Congress party and democratic institutions on the hands of Gandhi is given in different accounts, including India's Democracy, edited by Atul
That she viewed the world as essentially bleak is revealed by the numerous letters written by her to her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, over a span of nearly three decades. These letters constitute an intimate portrait of a fiercely lonely leader whose world was often dark and, as she has often admitted herself, tinged with sorrow.

Since no biographies, comparable or otherwise, exist of Yahya Khan, one must rely on assessments by scholars writing on the 1971 war, and the data provided by newspapers. Khan comes across as a passive-positive leader, a Spectator with the need for approval from the world, who attempts to avoid conflict and is relatively uninterested in his job. Many writers have noted (see Malhotra, 1989, for instance) that Yahya Khan was more interested in drink than in politics, and often over-indulged. His relative readiness to compromise is seen in his offers, albeit veiled, to India in mid-October and again in November to seek a settlement of the crisis (Sisson and Rose, 1989).

VII. Dependent Variable:
War and the Acceptance of Ceasefire - Failure of Settlement

As I have noted in previous case descriptions, a crisis is considered to have been successfully settled when erstwhile conflicting parties agree to more than merely an

Kohli (1988), and the writings of Lloyd and Suzanne Rudolph.
end to the immediate violence at hand, when there are in place positive steps that both sides have agreed to for the future of their relationship, which might include joint declarations, formal meetings to discuss their future, the exchange of symbolic gestures of goodwill, etc. I have weighted formal meetings between representatives most heavily, and joint declarations more heavily than other "lesser" indicators like symbolic good-will gestures.

The U.N-sponsored ceasefire was accepted by India and Pakistan on December 17. However, it was clear that the conflict was not settled even after this, if we employ the definition of settlement given above. Unlike in the Kutch case, there were no formal meetings between officials, an indicator that is given the highest weighting, no laudatory references on both sides, no positive assessments of the future of the relationship. Rather, as in the case of the 1965 war, negative references to the other side continued after the ceasefire had been accepted.

In his speech on Pakistan's acceptance of the call for a ceasefire, Yahya said that it was "unfortunate that India showed total disregard to all urgent expressions of world opinion which would have spared bloodshed and suffering" (Pakistan Times, December 18, 1971, pp. 1). The Pakistan foreign office sent messages to third party governments informing them of India's violation of human rights in
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed leadership of Pakistan after the war, and in one of his first broadcasts as President, he reiterated that East Pakistan was an integral part of Pakistan and that Pakistan would never abandon it (Pakistan Times, December 31, 1971, pp. 1). He also cautioned India "not to gloat over a temporary victory" (Times of India, December 21, 1971, pp. 1) and swore that he would "not rest" until he had "vindicated the honor of (his) people" (Pakistan Times, December 31, 1971, pp. 1). On the Indian side, Gandhi warned that although the war had ended, it was not clear whether there would be "real peace or just a breathing spell" (Times of India, December 25, 1971, pp. 1). She reiterated that India would not be deterred by threats (Times of India, December 30, 1971, pp. 1).

The difference between the end to this war and the settlements of the Kutch and 1990 crises is marked. In the latter two cases, it may be recalled, a general optimism prevailed on both sides about the future of the relationship and plans were made for meetings to be held between officials. The conclusion to this war bears echoes to the conclusion to the 1965 war, when caution was advised on both sides lest there be, as Prime Minister Shastri described it, a breakdown of the "uneasy" truce due to the "bellicose mood" of Pakistan (Times of India, September 23, 1965).
Table 7.8

1971 at a Glance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Confidence Level</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Communication</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures &amp; Processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Indirect channels predominate)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Indirect Channels</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Press; U.N. - frequent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others - sometimes to infrequent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Press; parliament; public rallies - frequent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others - infrequent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Direct Channels</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>- frequent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>- sometimes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Face-to-face meetings</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- none</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2. Third Party Strategies | | |
| a) Perception of gain | High | |
| US & Soviets | - protecting allies | |
| | - balancing power | |
| b) Number of meetings | Very High | Highest |
| US with India and Pakistan | - 1 | |
| UN with India and Pakistan | - 0 | |
| c) U.N. Strategy | Moderate | Low | |
| Focus on issues - yes | | |
| Conveyance of positions & perspectives - no | | |

\[20\] Internal weighting.
Table 7.8 continued

3. **Third Party Leverage**

Sanctions
By U.S. - yes **Moderate**

4. **Perception by Conflicting Actors of Third Party having Capacity to Assist**

a) Yes **Moderate**
b) Perception of evenhandedness - No

5. **Dependent Variable: (Lack of) Settlement**

a) Formal "summits"/ High **Highest^21**
   meetings - No
b) Positive assessments - No " " Lower

6. **Existence of "other" High relevant third parties besides prominent third party (here, U.N.)**
   - Yes

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^21 Internal weighting.
CHAPTER VIII
The Crisis of 1990: Timely De-escalation

The following pages present an analysis of the most recent crisis that faced India and Pakistan in the first part of 1990. They present results expressed through the different categories coded for this crisis and draws wide comparisons between this case and the other cases that have been studied. As in previous chapters that presented results on other selected cases, this one also assumes that readers have availed themselves of the description of events and chronological evolution of this case that have been offered earlier, and is therefore short on narrative. Fewer secondary data were available for this case than the others, no doubt due to its relative recency; I have therefore relied mainly on the Indian and Pakistani newspapers, the Times of India and Pakistan Times, a variety of Western newspapers including the New York Times and Washington Post, as well as reports from the Asian Recorder and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). The Indian Foreign Secretary during 1990, Mujkund Dubey, was also interviewed for his insight on the crisis.

This case is made unique by the occurrence of the
largest number of face-to-face meetings between representatives of India and Pakistan, more than was true in the other successfully settled crisis, the Rann of Kutch. These were relatively evenly spaced throughout the duration of the conflict, and were both initiated by the conflicting actors themselves and urged on by the U.S. This case also displays a distinctive third party role (on the part of the U.S.) that bears some parallels to the role played by the British in the Kutch. This role will be fully described in the following pages. Further, in both these successfully settled cases, we find that the role of the U.N. was minimal whereas we see in the cases of war, that it was left to the U.N. to assume ultimate third party responsibility after third party states proved unwilling or unable to do so.

The time period for this case extends from mid-January 1990, when the first signs of trouble appeared in Kashmir, and consequently, in the Indo-Pakistani relationship, upto (and including) mid-July 1990, when a planned, face-to-face meeting between Indian and Pakistani officials in Rawalpindi consolidated movement towards a settlement. Another such meeting took place in August, which lends credence to the conclusion that this crisis was, in fact, quite successfully settled.¹

¹ Certain scholars and policy-makers contend that the episode between India and Pakistan in 1990 was not a crisis at all. They argue that since the situation was successfully resolved, it could not have been a "real" crisis (Personal interviews, Dubey, 1993;......). I contend that we cannot define a situation by its
I. Third Party Nature and Characteristics:

Perception by Third Parties of Gain through Involvement in Settling Crisis:

As has been previously noted in this project, this measure constitutes one element of third party strategy and serves to establish third party motives in intervening in crises as they are building. The underlying assumption is that third parties might be more likely to intervene if there is an anticipation of some gain or the meeting of certain interests on their parts. Indicators for this measure range from references by third parties to their interest in balancing power in the region to international goodwill that might be gained or lost through intervention.

Assessing third party motivations and indeed assessing third party strategies in this case is relatively straightforward compared to the more numerous third parties and more complex third party actions and strategies in the cases of war, especially that of 1971. It may be recalled that particularly in that case, regional Cold War considerations complicated the potential actions of third party states and made it difficult for them to act in good faith or, indeed, be accepted by India and Pakistan as acting in good faith. No doubt the end of the Cold War outcome, but rather by the signs that were extant at the time. Accordingly, the following pages provide data that clearly show that not only did those involved consider themselves to be in a crisis but that independent indicators that might be employed (short time....etc;) also pointed to the existence of a crisis.
prompted this novel behavior by both the Americans and the Soviets, behavior that we have since come to recognize in other areas of the world and that demonstrates a relative lack of interest in issues that predominated in the past like maintaining regional balances of power.

As was the case with Britain in the Kutch, the only third party of any significance in the 1990 case was the U.S. This is in contrast to the many different third parties with different interests intervening in the 1971 crisis before the U.N. took over.\(^2\)

In this crisis, the data indicate that the interests of the U.S. lay mainly in preventing the outbreak of another war between the two countries. This has been corroborated by individuals involved in the making of American policy for the South Asia region during that time (Herrmann, 1993). Further, and in a significant departure from the Soviets' role in the 1971 case, the Soviet Union backed U.S. proposals and actions completely in this case. There was virtually no favoritism shown to either state by the U.S. or Soviets, as had been the case during 1971 and virtually no calculations made on regional balance-of-power considerations, considerations which marked U.S. and Soviet action every step of the way in 1971.

The situation in 1990, then, was analogous to the Kutch

\(^2\) The U.S. and Soviets continued to be important third parties even after the U.N. undertook the manifestation of third party mediator.
case, where Britain observed this kind of neutrality between the two sides and obtained support from the international community for its efforts. There is some evidence that both the Soviet Union and the U.S. feared that if a war broke out between the two countries at this time, nuclear weapons might be used by both sides; both sought to ensure this would not happen (Gordon in New York Times, June 17, 1990, pp. 14).³

The U.S. role in this crisis, however, did not quite equal the committed role that Britain played during the Kutch conflict. The U.S, pointed out on more than one occasion that it was not a mediator in this crisis, but rather a third party whose role it was to urge the two sides to resolve their differences (Pakistan Times, May 23, 1990, pp. 1). Herrmann (1993) affirms that South Asia and the Indo-Pakistani crisis never received top billing in terms of interest or commitment by the Bush administration; the limited U.S. interest was in preventing another war. However, the U.S. did manifest considerable concern about the progression of the conflict, concern that was reflected in the strategies it undertook and the representatives it sent to meet with Indian and Pakistani foreign policy

³ Herrmann (1990) who was a part of the larger U.S. team formulating policy in South Asia during that time believes that although the possibility of a nuclear war was not discounted, there was no overwhelming fear that this would in fact occur. The greater fear was that of a conventional war between the two countries. Other South Asia experts (Cohen, 1994) have echoed this belief.
Elements of Third Party Leverage:

Table 8.1  Bilateral Assistance:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US to Pakistan</td>
<td>357m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US to India</td>
<td>127m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 8.2  Bilateral Trade, 1990:

U.S. with India

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian imports from US</td>
<td>253,2358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian exports to US</td>
<td>2,643,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% imports from US of total Indian imports</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% exports to US of total Indian exports</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S.S.R. with India

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian imports from USSR</td>
<td>922621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian exports to USSR</td>
<td>2895928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% imports from USSR of total Indian imports</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% exports to USSR of total Indian exports</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 Aid for both India and Pakistan includes official development assistance and other official flows. It is computed in millions of current U.S. dollars.
Table 8.2 continued

U.S. with Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pakistani imports from US</th>
<th>943425</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani exports to US</td>
<td>693097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% imports from US of total Pakistani imports</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% exports to US of total Pakistani exports</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S.S.R. with Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pakistani imports from USSR</th>
<th>62876</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani exports to USSR</td>
<td>74744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% imports from USSR of total Pakistani imports</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% exports to USSR of total Pakistani exports</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We see that in the case of India, the amount of aid offered by the U.S. in 1990 was the lowest since 1985. This was also true for Pakistan, except for 1988, when aid levels were somewhat lower than in 1990. However, the U.S. was still a significant donor to both states. It was also a significant trading partner for both states in 1990, the continuation of an on-going pattern over the years. For Pakistan, it continued to be its single-most important trading partner. Hence, the U.S. had some tools of potential leverage over both sides at its disposal.
II. Third Party Roles and Strategies:

As I have stated elsewhere in this project, indicators measuring third party strategies include the scope of third party-provided fora for sending and receiving messages between conflicting actors, the number of third party meetings with each actor and the scope of these meetings (whether the perceptions and positions of conflicting actors were conveyed and whether their feelings on the past were discussed) etc. Indicators also include efforts by third parties to link movement towards settlement by actors to bilateral aid and trade issues.

It became quickly evident that the U.S., with the implicit support of the Soviet Union, was the only relevant third party in the 1990 crisis. A brief outline, presented below, of the extent of participation by other third parties in the crisis makes it clear that their roles were peripheral.

Benazir Bhutto visited 12 muslim states in the Middle East and North Africa in May and June 1990 to discuss, among other issues, the Kashmir crisis. It is not clear whether Bhutto expected any overt support from these states; it is more likely that she went with the hope of gaining moral support for Pakistan's position. Accordingly, some sympathetic statements were issued by the leaders of such states as Jordan and Syria; but for the most part, all steered clear of pointing fingers or taking strong sides in
the conflict, reinforcing, as it were, their positions as actors with little influence on the outcome. Britain's stated position was that the situation should be peacefully resolved; some luke-warm and rhetorical offers of assistance were accordingly made to both sides (FBIS, April 16, 1990, pp. 41; Pakistan Times, May 16, 1990, pp. 1).

U.S. Role and Strategy:

The U.S. showed interest in the settlement of the 1990 crisis from its inception in January. Its role began with calls from State Department spokesmen for "restraint" and resolution through "peaceful negotiation" (Pakistan Times, January 27, 1990, pp. 1; March 4, 1990, pp. 1). These calls were supplemented by subtle warnings of repercussions of continued conflict on each actor's relationship with the U.S. As Bush told the new Indian ambassador to the U.S. at a meeting where he presented his credentials, "war would badly disrupt our relations with India and Pakistan" (Pakistan Times, May 31, 1990, pp. 1).

The U.S. underlined its interest in settling the conflict by sending representatives early on to both countries. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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5 Herrmann (1993) clarifies that although concern about the Indo-Pakistani conflict did not much appear to preoccupy the highest rung of U.S. decision-makers including Bush and Baker until the conflict began to escalate, it did loom very large in the minds of the bureaucrats and South Asia experts in the State Department from its inception in January.
Robert Kimmitt visited New Delhi and Islamabad in January to offer the "good offices" of the U.S. in normalizing the Indo-Pakistani relationship (Pakistan Times, January 23, 1990). During the visit of the Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers to the U.S. for a special session of the U.N. General Assembly, Stephen Solarz met with Indian external affairs minister Gujral while Dan Quayle and Scowcroft met with his Pakistani counterpart, Yaqub Khan. Both were urged to resolve the conflict peacefully. In what appears to be an on-going role approved by the Bush administration, Solarz again travelled to India and Pakistan in May and June.

This early interest shown by the U.S. in the 1990 case has parallels with Britain's role in settling the Kutch crisis. On the other hand, there are definite dissimilarities with the role of the U.S. and the U.N. in the wars of 1965 and 1971, where these third parties did not become involved until the crisis had rapidly unfolded and steps had been taken towards war.

In mid-May 1990, underlining continuing American commitment, President Bush sent Robert Gates as a special envoy to India and Pakistan to specifically assist the two parties in finding solutions to the problem facing them. He was accompanied by John Kelly, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs and Richard Haass, special assistant to the President on the Near East and South Asia. Gates delivered personal letters from Bush to Bhutto
and Singh, listened to the grievances of both sides and urged a peaceful settlement. Although there is no specific evidence that the grievances and perspectives of each side were in fact conveyed to the other, it is conceivable that the U.S. representatives' strategies included this, especially since they visited each side separately (FBIS, May 21, 1990, pp. 54; May 22, 1990, pp. 33; May 23, 1990, pp. 35). Hence, four meetings were held between U.S. officials (without the inclusion of Solarz' meetings, because it is not clear what role the administration had in arranging or approving these) and Indian and Pakistani representatives. The confidence level for this is very high.

No trade or aid sanctions were imposed during this crisis. Unlike the cases of the 1965 and (especially) the 1971 wars when extensive sanctions were imposed on both India and Pakistan by Britain and the U.S. as well as certain European countries that included the cancellation or suspension of even developmental aid, there were no analogous steps taken against the two countries in this case (Bleichman and Kaplan, 1978). The U.S., hence, was careful not to use its leverage punitively. Rather, there is evidence that the U.S. was careful to halt and even reverse

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6 It may be recalled that during the 1971 war, for instance, the West German government suspended development aid to Pakistan and the U.S. deferred India's developmental loans and credit under the PL 480 plan.
any action that might be construed as threatening or offensive by India and Pakistan. For instance, the Bush administration succeeded in extending by a year a waiver for Pakistan from the U.S. law barring American aid (the Symington Amendment) to countries that were guilty of importing "unsafeguarded" nuclear technology (Pakistan Times, June 16, 1990, pp. 1). And, although there were some indications earlier in the year that India might be cited for unfair trading practices under the Super 301 list, the U.S. government explicitly stated that it did not want to penalize India but rather negotiate with it on the trade issue; it was finally decided in June that there would be no action against India (Times of India, June 15, 1990, pp. 1). Hence, potential thorns in the relationship between the U.S. and both Pakistan and India were successfully removed. The confidence level on this variable is moderate.

The conciliatory behavior displayed by the U.S. in 1990 is quite unique when compared with other third parties and the roles they played in the other cases. In fact, India's foreign secretary during 1990, Dubey, categorically stated that there was a "big difference" in U.S. roles in the subcontinent in previous times and its role during this crisis. For instance, during this crisis, the U.S. "did not come out with any statements....which in any way...(reflected) their attitude on several Indo-Pakistani problems. This is how they succeeded..." (Dubey, 1993). Only in the Kutch might
British behavior be construed as similarly conciliatory, although it did not involve the taking of specific measures, as in this case.

III. Perception by Conflicting Actors of Third Parties having the Capacity to Assist in Settling Crises:

It has been noted earlier in this project that third party intervention might be more likely to result in success if conflicting actors believe that third parties have the capacity to assist in settling the crisis confronting them. Measures for this variable include statements by India and Pakistan regarding the international influence and power or lack thereof of third parties, aid and trade links between conflicting actors and third parties, etc.

It would appear that the U.S. was considered the third party best in the position to assist in the 1990 crisis by both actors, although the Soviet Union was also considered important. India’s representative S. K. Singh visited both Washington and Moscow in early February to appraise officials there about events in Kashmir. Other states were periodically consulted, as is evidenced from Bhutto’s trips to the Middle-East to gain support for Pakistan’s position on Kashmir, but with the knowledge that their influence was limited. Although not many specific references to the power and influence of third parties including the U.S. exist, the general interaction of India and Pakistan with the U.S. can
be interpreted as reinforcing this belief. The confidence level in interpreting this variable is strengthened through statements corroborating India’s belief in the U.S.’ power by the Indian foreign secretary in 1990, Muchkund Dubey.

IV. Perception by Conflicting Actors of Third Party Even-handedness:

As in the Kutch case and unlike in the cases that ended in war, both India and Pakistan appeared to believe in America’s evenhandedness in this crisis. After Bush envoy Gates’ visit to Pakistan, the foreign office positively assessed this as proof of American interest in alleviating tensions (FBIS, May 21, 1990, pp. 54). The Indian media applauded America’s "neutrality" and officials viewed Gates’ visit as a "serious attempt" to help (Times of India, May 23, 1990, pp. 1). The confidence level in interpretation is very high, once again reinforced by interview data from Dubey who reiterated India’s belief in American evenhandedness in this crisis.

V. Structures and Processes of Communication between Conflicting Actors:

This section presents evidence of the channels of communication that were employed by India and Pakistan in 1990, compares the employment of direct versus indirect

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7 It may be recalled that especially in the time period leading to the 1971 war, the U.S. was accused by India of a great lack of fairness; the U.N. and Britain came under fire by both sides.
channels and the frequency of their use.\textsuperscript{8} We are interested in both the numbers that represent the extent to which both these channels were used, as well as a detailed description of the scope of their use; both will be provided.

The actors sending messages either through direct or indirect channels are restricted to officials/organs of each government. As in the other cases, those messages are coded which are sent either to corresponding officials/bodies on the other side, or are conveyed by relevant actors through indirect channels like the press, public rallies, etc. In the 1990 case, officials on either side included the prime ministers, presidents, foreign secretaries, army chiefs as well as lower-level officials like high commissioners.

\textsuperscript{8} See previous chapters for operational definitions of direct/indirect channels of communication.
Table 8.3

Number of Messages sent by Pakistan to India through Indirect Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIRECT CHANNELS</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press/Radio/TV</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public rallies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other third parties</td>
<td>5⁹</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.4

Number of Messages sent by Pakistan to India through Direct Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIRECT CHANNELS</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision groups, etc.</td>
<td>12¹⁰</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁹ Benazir Bhutto visited a total of fourteen Muslim states in the Middle East and North Africa in April and again in early July. Kashmir was not the only item on the agenda, although it was certainly extensively discussed as an issue of concern to the Muslim world. To be included as instances of communication through indirect channels, there must be explicit reference/messages to India in her larger talks with these leaders.

¹⁰ Each face-to-face meeting involved the exchange of numerous direct messages. However, the data do not clearly reflect all these, and they are hence difficult to enumerate precisely. I have therefore chosen to include one direct message to represent each meeting.
Table 8.5
Number of Messages sent by India to Pakistan through Indirect Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIRECT CHANNELS</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press/Radio/TV</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public rallies</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other third parties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.6
Number of Messages sent by India to Pakistan through Direct Channels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT CHANNELS</th>
<th>Raw #s</th>
<th>#s/mth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision group, etc.</td>
<td>22&quot;</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.7
Number of Formal Meetings between Indian and Pakistani Officials to Discuss Options

| No. of meetings | 5 |

---

11 See footnote 3.

12 Note that these represent meetings arranged without the aid of any third party.
From the numbers presented above, it is evident that indirect channels of communication predominated in the 1990 crisis. Since this is a case where conflict was successfully settled before the outbreak of a war, I had expected to find, as in the Kutch case, the greater use of direct versus indirect channels.\textsuperscript{13} This has not been borne out by the data. The press (including radio and television broadcasts) was clearly the communication channel of choice, with other indirect channels being somewhat less frequently used (ranging from "sometimes" to "infrequent" on the provided scale).\textsuperscript{14} This might be explained by the increasing access to radio and television by the masses in both countries, which in turn might increase the proclivity of the leadership to employ those channels in their delivery of messages. It is important to note, however, that the use of direct channels is not insubstantial, scoring a "frequent" on the scale provided.

Further, although indirect channels were indeed extensively employed, a unique pattern characterizes the content of messages conveyed through them in this case. In the messages sent back and forth, there are a significantly high number of references on both sides to the need for the

\textsuperscript{13} Consistent with the hypothesis introduced earlier, on the impact of direct versus indirect communication on outcomes.

\textsuperscript{14} As I mentioned previously, the measure constituted by "Press/Radio/T.V." refers to messages that are sent by Indian and Pakistani officials through these channels to each other about the crisis at hand.
avoidance of war, to the belief that there would be no war and to reassurances by each actor that they would not initiate war. This characterization remains consistent through the duration of the conflict. For instance, a Pakistani press report stated that the January talks between the Pakistani foreign minister and his Indian counterpart in New Delhi had resulted in an "understanding" that neither country wanted a war (Pakistan Times, January 30, 1990). Perhaps this set the context within which both sides played out the conflict. Top leaders on either side periodically underlined this. For instance, as early as February, Bhutto categorically stated that "we don't want a war" (Pakistan Times, February 14, 1990, pp. 1) and the Pakistani foreign secretary Tanvir Ahmed Khan said that he "(did) not see a war scenario at all" (Pakistan Times, February 16, 1990, pp. 1). In June, Benazir Bhutto stressed that war was "not inevitable," while India's V. P. Singh reiterated that war with Pakistan "made no sense" (Pakistan Times, June 1, 1990, pp. 1; June 2, 1990, pp. 6).

This pattern appears unique to this case, and could certainly have contributed to the positive outcome. Since the rationale for hypothesizing that the employment of direct communication is more likely to result in outcomes of successful settlement is the greater possibility for a clarity of intent to be conveyed and the lower likelihood of the formation of misperceptions, these specific references
to the avoidance of war, albeit through indirect channels, might have served the same purpose.

Face to Face Meetings Between Actors:

As in the Kutch case and unlike in the cases that ended in war, this crisis was characterized by a number of face-to-face meetings between Indian and Pakistani representatives, although the number is larger for this case. These meetings were held from the beginning of the crisis in January, through to its settlement in later months. One of the indicators of settlement is the formal meeting held in Islamabad in July that discussed a range of problems and assessed the future of the relationship, and its follow-up in New Delhi in August.

A closer examination of the face-to-face meetings during the crisis is warranted. During a visit from January 11-15, Pakistani special envoy Abdus Sattar called on Indian Prime Minister Singh, met with the Indian External Affairs minister I. K. Gujral and affirmed Bhutto's wish for better relations. Following this visit during the same month was another visit by Pakistan's foreign minister Yaqub Khan during which meetings took place between him and external affairs minister Gujral and topics of discussion ranged from the up-coming SAARC summit to the Kashmir situation. In April, Yaqub Khan and Gujral met in New York where they had come to attend the 18th United Nations General Assembly
Special Session on International Economic Cooperation. Again, the most important item on their agenda was Kashmir.

Finally, high-level Indo-Pakistani talks were held in July in Islamabad to specifically discuss the future of the relationship in light of the crisis that the two countries had weathered. The Indian delegation, led by foreign secretary Muchkund Dubey, met at different times with their Pakistani counterparts, and with the Pakistani president and prime minister (Times of India, July 20, 1990, pp. 1). This last meeting may be compared to the meeting between Indian and Pakistani representatives in July 1965 that also appeared to reaffirm a successful settlement to the Kutch crisis - both were meetings that symbolized the end to the specific conflict that had faced the two states and both discussed in hopeful terms the future of the relationship.

Except for this last meeting where the level of participation is equivalent in both cases, the meetings that characterize this case tend to be of a rather higher level than was true in the case of the Kutch, where barring the last formal meeting between foreign ministry officials in July, the High Commissioners on either side tended to be the actors that met to exchange views.
The confidence level for the coding and interpretation of data for this variable and its components is very high.\textsuperscript{15}

VI. Other Independent Variables:

The Role of Domestic Opposition in both Countries:

In India, right-wing opposition was the most vocal during this crisis, as it had been in the past with the Rann of Kutch and the wars of 1965 and 1971. The difference in this case was that whereas before the 1980s right-wing opposition was constituted by a motley bunch of right-wing parties including Hindu fundamentalists that were of little electoral significance, by 1990 several of them had come together to form the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a new and powerful force on the Indian political scene.

As had been the case in the past with the smaller right-wing groups and parties, the BJP during 1990 consistently bullied the government to get tougher with Pakistan. Several of its leaders including L. K. Advani and A. B. Vajpayee were now nationally-recognized political figures who not only urged the Indian government to take firmer action but also directly admonished the Pakistani government through the press and other media. Although there is no clear evidence of the impact of the BJP's role on the policies of the government, it is not inconceivable that it made it harder for the government to choose

\textsuperscript{15}See summary of confidence levels at end of chapter.
conciliatory options with Pakistan; obviously, it did not succeed in sabotaging the eventual settlement. It is also interesting to speculate on what the BJP’s continuing impact on Indo-Pakistani relations will be, as it moves from its present status (in 1994) as the country’s largest opposition party to a possible future government.\^16

In 1990, the Pakistani government of Benazir Bhutto, the first democratically elected government that had actually been allowed to govern, faced an opposition made newly significant under the new rules of the game.\^17 This is the only case we have considered in this study where the Pakistani government must also be accountable to a vocal domestic opposition, one which included a number of political parties like the coalition of combined opposition parties (COP) and the Muslim League; in 1965, the military had been in power and in 1971 opposition had been ruthlessly suppressed. Bhutto was under constant pressure from opposition parties to be more aggressive in her support for Kashmir and to take a harder line with India.

\^16 Cohen (1994) believes that even if the BJP does come to power in the future, the event will have little bearing on Indo-Pakistani relations. He believes that the top leadership in the BJP, including Advani, Vajpayee, Jaswant Singh and others, are responsible individuals who will not misuse the religion card. Other politicians and scholars in India (Dandavate, 1993; Rajan, 1993) think the BJP poses little threat because if they do form a government at the center, they will be restrained by the checks and balances of India’s democratic institutions.

\^17 It may be recalled that direct elections had been held in 1971 but following the crisis in West Pakistan no government had been formed and the army continued to rule.
Hence, we are confronted by a scenario wherein the governments on both sides were faced with strong domestic opposition that advocated confrontation but were yet able to avoid it. This could be interpreted as diminishing the overall importance of this variable on outcomes. The confidence level for the coding of this variable is high.

The Leaders: V. P. Singh and Benazir Bhutto

Although neither V. P. Singh nor Benazir Bhutto enjoyed the political predominance that characterized the roles of leaders in some of the other selected cases - Nehru, Indira Gandhi or Yahya Khan - their role is still significant because they were the heads of state and most powers did reside in their hands. Borrowing from Barber's typology, Singh's personality type can be characterized as the Lawmaker. He ran against Rajiv Gandhi on an anti-corruption platform, determined to make changes in politics-as-usual and achieve results. One of his projects upon election was to expose and publicize alleged illegal commissions paid by a Swedish arms manufacturer, Bofors, to members of Rajiv

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18 V.P. Singh's coalition government came into power in 1989 and ruled a mere eleven months before it was toppled. It cannot be compared to the robust Congress party infrastructure that supported Nehru in the years after independence and Gandhi in 1971. By 1990, India had moved towards a semblance of multi-party democracy from the overwhelming dominance of the Congress in previous decades. Benazir Bhutto's government, the first democratically elected one to be permitted to govern, certainly faced more opposition than had her predecessors.
Another issue that was of utmost importance to Singh was that of affirmative action policies towards India’s Harijans, or so-called "untouchables," the lowest and most hapless rung in the Hindu caste system, who had suffered systematic discrimination against the hands of caste Hindus and Indian society in general for centuries. Policies initiated in 1947 to rectify societal ills against the Harijans included the reservation of seats for them in choice colleges, government agencies and other employment. By the 1980s, however, these were being increasingly resented by other, often equally poor and desperate Indians who claimed that affirmative action policies towards Harijans were excessive and unfair. Singh continued to champion their cause over increasingly strident opposition, and even increased existing quotas. Riots broke out in protest in different parts of the country, and certainly contributed to the fall of the Singh government (Gupte, 1992). Singh’s willingness to stand by these policies and to act on his principles indicates a strong streak of the Lawmaker in him.  

Benazir can also be characterized as a Lawmaker.

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19 After his government fell, a successor coalition government led by Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar proved unable and unwilling to pursue this case to completion. Rajiv Gandhi maintained his innocence throughout.

20 Critics have claimed that Singh only took on this cause to ensure lower-caste votes for his party.
Through her years in and out of Pakistani jails during Zia-ul-Haq's martial law regime, Benazir had remained focussed on the return of democracy and the rule of law to her country. Like Nehru and Indira Gandhi, Benazir Bhutto clearly saw herself as destined to rule her country and had been groomed for political leadership by her father in much the same ways as had been young Indira. She was therefore conscious of the burden of the Bhutto legacy. The socialization of Benazir, however, was quite different from these other leaders of the sub-continent who were also "born to rule." She, like her Indian counterpart Singh, was born in a country that was independent from foreign rule; nor she harbor the horrifying first-hand knowledge and experience (and the bitterness that must surely come in their wake) of the partition. She writes of her feelings at the Simla conference of 1972 which she attended with her father,

"I had never been an Indian. I had been born in independent Pakistan. I was free of the complexes and prejudices which had torn Indians and Pakistanis apart in the bloody trauma of partition....Did we have to be divided by walls of hatred or could we, like the once-warring countries of Europe, come to terms with each other?" (Bhutto, 1989, pp. 72)

Perhaps both these young leaders represented a new generation of leadership on the sub-continent, one that was

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21 In her autobiography (revealingly entitled "Daughter of Destiny") Benazir writes about the unfinished work begun by her father that she began to take upon herself to complete and her acute consciousness of her place in Pakistan's future by virtue of her being a Bhutto.
more willing to compromise and less willing to rush to war.

Benazir’s writings also reveal a sense of political realism on her part towards the U.S. and towards Pakistan’s need for U.S. support. This realism was preserved through the years when the U.S. backed General Zia, whose regime had incarcerated her for almost a decade. It might also have played a part in Pakistan’s acceptance of the U.S. role in the 1990 crisis even though the U.S. by that time was moving away from the close friendship it had once shared with Pakistan, towards a more balanced role in the region. She wrote of America’s support for the Zia regime without bitterness - "The Americans are supporting Zia because of their strategic considerations. We must not get involved in superpower rivalries...we can’t afford to fight global politics" (Bhutto, 1989, pp. 273).

VII. Dependent Variable: Successful Settlement

In this project, a crisis is considered to have been successfully settled when conflicting sides agree to steps that go beyond merely ending the current violence or hostility that has characterized relations between them, to include positive future steps that will be mutually undertaken. These steps might include formal meetings, the exchange of symbolic gestures of goodwill, positive assessments of the relationship, etc.

Keeping the above indicators in mind, it is clear that
settlement in this case was indeed successfully accomplished. This becomes even clearer when compared to past failures of settlement, as in 1971, when a cease-fire was finally signed by both sides in December after a war had been fought, but there were no formal meetings or discussions between representatives, no laudatory references on either side and no positive assessments by each actor of the other. Rather, what we saw was the continuation of such negative references as threats by Zulfikar Bhutto about "vindicat(in)g) the honor of (his) people" (Pakistan Times, December 31, 1971, pp. 1) or Indira Gandhi's bleak assessment that it was unclear whether the cease-fire was a "real peace or just a breathing spell" (Times of India, December 25, 1971, pp. 1).

In the 1990 case, as in the case of the Kutch, settlement was marked by a formal meeting between selected officials of both sides to assess the future of the relationship and the specific elements of settlement, a measure that is weighted highly. In the Kutch case, a high-level meeting between officials was held in July 1965 where there was both a "general exchange of views" (Times of India, July 4, 1965, pp. 1) and a cementing of the new relationship. Analogously, in the 1990 case, the foreign secretaries met on July 18-19 in Islamabad.  

---

22 These have been described in the section in this chapter on face-to-face meetings.
to that meeting was held in New Delhi in August where a range of issues were discussed (Times of India, August 12, 1990).

Assessments of the bilateral relationship, both a month or so before the July talks were held, and immediately thereafter, were very positive. Accordingly, India's foreign minister Dubey stated that India would go into the talks with an "open mind" (FBIS, July 19, 1990, pp. 56). Pakistan's president Ishaq Khan stressed that Pakistan sought cooperation with India (FBIS, July 19, 1990, pp. 57). The talks were said to have helped a "better understanding of each other's perspective" by Dubey and were assessed to have substantially reduced the threat of war by the Pakistani president (FBIS, July 23, 1990, pp. 67). Their follow-up in August was applauded by the Pakistani foreign secretary as having established "excellent progress" (FBIS, August 14, 1990, pp. 62). It becomes apparent, then, that when measured in terms of the indicators of successful settlement, the crisis of 1990 like that over the Rann of Kutch, was indeed successfully settled.
Table 8.8

1990 at a Glance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Confidence Level</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures &amp; Processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Indirect channels</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press - frequent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others - sometimes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Direct channels</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Face-to-face meetings:</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Third Party Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Leverage -</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>some potential existed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Third Party Strategies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Perception of gain</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- interest in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- limiting conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- non-self-interested role</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Meetings with</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflicting actors = 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Perception by Conflicting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors of Third Party having</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to Assist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Perception of capacity -</td>
<td>Yes Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Perception of evenhandedness -</td>
<td>Yes High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 Note that the scale extends from 1-5, with 1 representing low confidence and 5 representing high.
Table 8.8 continued

6. **Dependent Variable: Settlement**

   a) Formal "summits"/meetings - yes  
      Very High

   b) Mutual positive assessments - yes  
      " "

Other Variables:

7. **Other Significant Third Parties** - No  
   High

8. **Early Intervention** - Yes  
   High

9. **Vocal Opposition** - Yes  
   High
CHAPTER IX

The Results: A Comparison

This chapter provides an assessment of the endeavor that I have been engaged in in the preceding pages. It offers concluding observations on the patterns that have manifested themselves in the different cases that have been selected -- the importance of the different independent variables considered, their impact on the dependent variable, and conclusions that might be drawn thereby.¹ It also attempts to make a link between the findings in the different cases and the hypotheses that were laid out at the beginning of this project, hence bringing back the data and the analyses to their theoretical starting point.

I will attempt to structure this section in the following way: I will first offer trends and conclusions from the variables and indicators that form a part of my original "model" of foundation building - the structure and processes of communication, third party characteristics, and their roles. I will then describe some of the other factors

¹ The three cases of settlement failure are the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1974, 1965 and 1971; the two cases of settlement success are the crisis over the Rann of Kutch in 1965 and the crisis over Kashmir in 1990.
that distinguished themselves as I proceeded with the coding of these "original" variables -- factors such as the role of domestic opposition, leader personality and socialization, etc. -- that were undoubtedly important in themselves but whose impact on final outcomes was sometimes unpredictable. Finally, I offer some thoughts on the future of the Indo-Pakistani relationship and on other relationships of protracted hostility like it, based on the results that have been obtained from my analysis of the different cases.

One of my broad, over-arching hypotheses - that third parties are indeed crucial in enabling actors to accept the preferability of conflict de-escalation and settlement to its continuation - appears to have been borne out by the five cases I have considered. In the two cases of settlement, there was a prominent and committed role played by third parties, while this was conspicuous in its absence in the three cases of war. Contrary to what some scholars and practitioners in the field might advocate, conflicting actors are not "best left alone" to sort out their differences; the role of a third party appears necessary.² The following pages will attempt answers to the questions that such a broad hypothesis inevitably raises -- if third parties are indeed crucial, then when should they intervene,

² It is interesting to note that a similar observation has been made in the India-Pakistan context by South Asia expert Stephen Cohen (Cohen, 1994). He asserts that the two states cannot manage the relationship on their own and that the U.S. can and should provide a "framework" for them to "rethink their relationship."
how should they enact their roles and what should their characteristics be?

I. Third Party Characteristics:

Perception by Third Parties of Gain through Involvement in Settling Crises:

This measure aimed at establishing the motivation of third parties in intervening in crises, and was one measure of the larger variable of third party strategies. It was expected that third parties would consider intervention based on the anticipation of some tangible or intangible gain or the meeting of some interest. This assumption, in turn, was based on Realist tenets of actor self-interest.

It would appear that this expectation has not been met through an analysis of the five cases. In the two cases of successful settlement, both Britain (in the case of the Kutch in 1965) and the U.S. (in the case of the 1990 crisis) intervened without apparent expectation of any obvious gain to themselves. Rather, as in the 1990 case, their interests appeared to lie in the prevention of the outbreak of another war between India and Pakistan and they observed a strict detachedness in their dealings with both countries. In 1990, the U.S. were aided in their endeavor in no small measure by a changed geo-political situation which had resulted in the discrete backing of the Soviet Union. Similarly, in the case of the Kutch, Britain played the
neutral role of a concerned friend for two fellow members of the Commonwealth. No obvious issues of self-interest were at stake; no obvious gain was expected out of their intervention.

In the 1971 war, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were actively partisan in their dealings with India and Pakistan with clear strategic interests in the area and were hence both unable and unwilling to play the role of "honest broker." Hence, it could be stated that their competitive self interest in the area precluded the possibility of their acting together for a settlement that would benefit both sides. Some scholars have offered an alternative explanation for U.S. reluctance to play a more overt and positive role during this crisis (see Haendal, 1977 for instance). He has stated that while the U.S. did have Cold War concerns for the South Asia region, it did not have an adequate incentive to act nor an expectation of gain from action. This was certainly also the perception of many officials within India (personal interviews, T.N. Kaul, 1993; S.N. Chopra, 1993).

There was also a general reluctance to act on the part of third party states during the 1965 war. While the U.S. and the Soviet Union were also engaged in strategic competition in South Asia during this time, the U.S.' general reluctance to act was compounded by its growing preoccupation with Vietnam, and, again, the lack of clear
gains through intervention.
Hence, it would appear that disinterested third parties that enter into the conflict out of a sense of "altruism," if it may be so described, or merely out of concern, are those that succeed in aiding settlements. Cold War alliances, on the other hand, while making the superpowers very powerful players, don't always make them successful third parties or third parties who necessarily desire involvement in the settlement of the conflict.\(^3\)

\(^3\) An interesting question that remains to be pursued is raised by the findings on this variable. Are third parties more likely to intervene in crises where settlements appear more plausible at the outset? Is this the factor that motivates their apparent altruism? In the case of the Kutch crisis, at least, the issues at stake appeared "non-critical" -- marshland that had little inherent worth, a border that was much less confrontational than others. Might these seemingly easily-settled issues have contributed to Britain's calculation to intervene?
Table 9.1

Expectation of Gain Through Intervention by Relevant Third Party:

In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Settlement Successes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9.2

Motivation of Third Party in Intervention/Non-Intervention:

In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>sensitivity to time and place (end of colonialism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 War</td>
<td>Cold War strategic concerns; preoccupation with other problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Cold War strategic concerns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Settlement Successes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>&quot;altruism&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>&quot;altruism&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One Third Party or Several?

Whether there is one, unambiguous third party involved in helping settle crises as they arise or whether there are less well-defined roles played by several third parties appears to make a difference on outcomes. This is an aspect of third party intervention that has not, to my knowledge, been previously studied by scholars of mediation and third party intercession, and the findings from the five cases are therefore made more interesting. In the two cases of successful settlement, a single third party took the
initiative and played a prominent role, to the marginalization of all other third parties. Britain played this role in the Kutch crisis and the U.S. took on this task in 1990. On the other hand, the three wars reveal ambiguous roles played by multiple third parties, both states and organizations. Both superpowers, Great Britain, some Western European states and the U.N. were involved, in varying degrees, in the wars of 1965 and 1971. In 1947, Great Britain had the most influence but did not play a clear role, and the U.N. soon became another important actor. An analysis of the five cases reveals, then, that single, committed third parties appear to be more conducive to outcomes of eventual settlement. Single party intervention appears to bring in its wake less scope for confusion on the part of conflicting actors about the intention, commitment and motivation of the third party. In the Cold War context, the role of a single third party held greater clarity for the actors than the scenario of competing interests that was represented by multiple third parties. An analogy might be drawn to the U.S. role in bringing about the Camp David accords, an event that was certainly defined by the action of a single third party within the Cold War context.
Table 9.3

One Third Party or Several?

In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Single</th>
<th>Multiple</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 War</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Settlement Successes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Single</th>
<th>Multiple</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third Party States or Organizations?

In both cases of settlement, clear, unambiguous roles were played by third party states - Great Britain in the Rann of Kutch, the U.S. in 1990. Third party states were also involved, to varying degrees, in the other crises. However, their intervention, to the extent that it can be termed that, was sporadic and uncommitted. Hence we see the U.S., some states of Western Europe and the Soviet Union imposing arms embargoes and offering support to their allies in 1971; in 1965 and 1947, we find third party states generally reluctant to enter the arena although they periodically issue exhortations to both sides to settle the conflict.
In both these cases, it remained for the United Nations to accept the role of major third party. However, we see a pattern in the intervention by the U.N. in all these cases. It enters into the conflict relatively late, after large-scale hostilities between India and Pakistan have already been launched. In 1947, the U.N. did not become involved until India brought the Kashmir problem to the Security Council in January 1948. In 1965, the U.N. entered the conflict in late August after war had commenced earlier that month, and U Thant traveled to India and Pakistan in September. In 1971, the U.N. became involved in the months prior to the war, but its greatest involvement was evident in the latter months of the crisis and in the post-war period. The U.N., then, appears to navigate crises towards their end and to help negotiate cease-fires rather than intervene when crises are building, in an attempt to forestall their escalation. It is interesting to also note that India and Pakistan appear to choose this role rather than a more pre-emptory one for the U.N.
Table 9.4

Third Party States or Organizations?

In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Orgns.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 War</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Settlement Successes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Orgns.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Third Party Strategies:

When? Early Intervention Matters

In the two cases of successful settlement, it is evident that the third parties concerned began their association with the two actors relatively early in the crisis. Hence, the U.S. revealed interest in the settlement of the 1990 crisis from its inception in January. Its role began with calls for "restraint" and resolution through "peaceful negotiation" (Pakistan Times, January 27, 1990, pp. 1; March 4, 1990, pp. 1) and escalated during the period that followed with the sending of its representatives to both countries in January and May. The Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers, during their visit to the U.S. to attend
a U.N. special session, were invited to meet with Vice President Quayle and Brent Scowcroft. This early interest shown by the U.S. in this case has parallels with Britain's role in the Kutch, where Britain began offering concrete suggestions -- and its services -- for de-escalation from the incipient stages in early April.

In 1971, neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union showed interest early; the crisis had escalated for months. The U.N., which was a major actor in this war, also entered late into the crisis. More importantly, the two sides went to war without admitting that they shared a mutual problem. Hence, Stein et al.'s (1989) pre-conditions for prenegotiations to commence would never have been met in this case. The same was the case in 1965: the U.S. turned down an offer made by Ayub to intervene and the U.K. and Soviet Union showed a similar disinclination. The U.N. hence was the most prominent third party, intervening by late August, 1965 (the war having already begun earlier that month).\(^4\) Again, in the case of the 1947 war which escalated rapidly in the space of about five days, the U.N. became involved after hostilities had escalated and after the problem was placed before it in December that year by India.

\(^4\) Lieutenant-General Prem Chand who was in charge of border forces during both wars reiterates that Britain's early role in the Kutch in 1965, as opposed to the lack of intervention by a third party state coupled with rapid escalation during the war later that year, did make a difference in outcomes (Personal interview, Prem Chand, 1993).
The U.K. also took a more active interest months after hostilities had begun. It would certainly appear, therefore, that early intervention matters in eventual outcomes. A third party expressing interest early appears to serve as a check to escalating hostilities, a reminder to the two sides that there is concern and interest on the outside for developments on the inside. Early intervention further appears to offer conduits through which grievances can be transmitted early, before they can contribute to the escalation of the conflict. The recent scholarly preoccupation with the timing of intervention in conflict, then, is well warranted (Kriesberg, 1992; Kriesberg and Thorson, 1991; Rupesinghe and Kuroda, 1992).
Table 9.5

**Early Intervention by Third Party?**

In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 War</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Settlement Successes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The crucial question of **when** exactly to time early intervention appears more difficult to answer. The cases perused certainly appear to indicate, however, that third parties cannot wait for externally-imposed pre-conditions to be met (e.g. the acceptance of a mutual problem by conflicting actors, as in Stein et al., 1989; the "ripeness" of the moment, as in Haass, 1989) but must rather be actively engaged with conflicting actors in creating these conditions. There is, unfortunately no clear answer to when, exactly, to intervene; the answers at this point appear to indicate, simply, that the earlier the intervention, the better.

The 1947 case also presents another dilemma for third
parties - in conflicts where escalation is very rapid (in this case, in only five days) and there is little prior evidence, either through increasingly hostile references on either side or troop movements, etc., that a conflict is about to flare up, what roles can third parties play and how? Can "early intervention" be possible in such cases? The 1947 case offers some insight. Although escalation was indeed rapid and there was not much evidence of a conflict brewing over Kashmir, there was a large amount of evidence that relations between India and Pakistan were very troubled. Since August, there had been references on both sides to the possibility of war if the overall situation - the refugee crisis, the accession of the remaining princely states of which Kashmir was one, the Hindu-Muslim riots - were not ameliorated. In cases like the 1947 case, then, third parties could look towards such general signs to prepare for intervention should a specific situation, as in Kashmir, arise.

Intervention How? Specific Third Party Strategies

Exchange of Actor Perspectives and Perceptions:

In the two cases where settlement was successful, the strategies of third parties included their meetings with Indian and Pakistani officials in which the perspectives, perceptions and positions of each side were solicited. Accordingly, in the Kutch case, there were several meetings
of Indian and Pakistani officials with the British high commissioners to both countries and the gist of what transpired at these meetings was then conveyed to the other side. There was much scope, hence, for clarification and modification.

Similarly, in the 1990 crisis, the U.S. sent representatives to India and Pakistan in January and again in May. Robert Gates, U.S. special envoy to India, John Kelly and Richard Haas delivered personal letters from Bush to both Bhutto and Singh, listened to grievances on both sides and urged a peaceful settlement. Although there is no specific evidence that the grievances and perspectives of one side was conveyed by them to the other, it is probable that their larger strategy did include this step (FBIS, May 21, 1990, pp. 54; May 22, 1990, pp. 33; May 23, 1990, pp. 35).

On the other hand, it is clear that meetings of this nature between representatives of third parties - be they states or organizations - and the conflicting actors did not take place in the case of the wars. In 1971, U Thant met once with the Indian foreign minister, but the scope of the meeting appears restricted to the refugee issue. Indeed, the efforts of the U.N. during this crisis were almost-wholly issue-specific, focusing in particular on the refugee crisis that had been created by the trouble in East Pakistan. In his memoirs, U Thant writes that having
received no support from the Security Council for a larger role, he "therefore had to confine (himself) to the humanitarian aspects of the problem" (Thant, 1978). Again, the 1965 and 1947 wars were characterized by the lack of meetings between third party representatives and conflicting actors, save for the single trip made by U.N. secretary-general who traveled to India and Pakistan from September 10-15, 1965, in a vain attempt to secure the ceasefire of a war that had already begun. These findings suggest that the "consultative" aspect of third party intervention, where third parties become intimately involved in improving communication, probing underlying sources of disagreement between actors, etc. (Fisher and Keashly, 1991) is an important determinant of successful interventions; a strategy that merely focusses on the issues at hand might not be enough.

On another indicator of third party strategy in the model, whether third parties specifically advanced conflicting actors' perceptions and positions on past history, there is not enough evidence in any of the cases to make reasonable judgements. One can only speculate that in the cases where third parties transmitted actors' positions and perspectives, past hostility might also have been brought up and addressed.
Table 9.6

Specific Third Party Strategies:

In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGY</th>
<th>'47</th>
<th>'65</th>
<th>'71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of Actor Positions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Narrow Issues</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of Past History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Settlement Successes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>'65</th>
<th>'71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of Actor Positions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Narrow Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of Past History</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?(^5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Link to Bilateral Aid and Trade: The Use of Leverage

In the two cases of successful settlement, the Kutch and 1990 crisis, evidence suggests that the third parties concerned did not make any attempt to link movement towards settlement to bilateral (with the third party) trade and aid issues. In fact, it might be recalled that in the 1990 case, data indicate that the U.S. was careful to halt any action that might be construed as threatening or offensive.

\(^5\) See text above for clarification.
by India and Pakistan. The Bush administration succeeded in extending a waiver for Pakistan from the U.S. law barring American aid to countries importing "unsafeguarded" nuclear technology (Pakistan Times, June 16, 1990, pp. 1) and chose not to cite India for unfair trading practices under the Super 301 list (Times of India, June 15, 1990, pp. 1).

In the case of the 1971 and 1965 wars, there was some attempt to link settlement between the actors with aid and trade issues. The U.S. imposed an arms embargo on both sides during the 1965 war, while the U.K. levied a ban against India on Indian military purchases at British stores and factories (Times of India, September 13, 1965). Again, during the 1971 war, trade and aid sanctions were imposed on both actors in the period leading up to the war and during the duration of the war itself. These sanctions differed in severity and were imposed by the major third party states involved, the U.S., the U.K., as well as peripheral states like Sweden and the Netherlands. Although there is no analogous evidence for sanctions against India and Pakistan during the 1947 war, this was surely due to the fact that the new two states were in the throes of a crisis of immense proportions with the on-going migration between the two states and the misery of the hundreds of thousands of refugees that were created on both sides. No third party would have been so callous as to have imposed further sanctions on already so bleak a situation. It is also
important to remember that no third party played a significant role in the time leading up to the war; third party states and the U.N. became actors after the war had begun.

Table 9.7

**Attempt by Third Parties to Use Aid/Trade Leverage:**

In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Some</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Settlement Successes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Some</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A review of third party strategies in the five cases, then, indicates that carrots have tended to work better than sticks. India and Pakistan have responded well to conciliatory gestures by third parties, perhaps viewing them as overt symbols of good faith, while sanctions have not necessarily deterred them from escalating hostilities. "Carrots" have appeared to allow actors to trust third party intervention and to believe that it is offered in their best interests.
This appears to substantiate the claims of such authors as Fisher and Keashly (1991) who argue that consultation (third parties working with actors in diagnostic and non-directive ways) and mediation (third parties using different forms of leverage to influence conflicting actors) functions cannot be blurred in the same third party.\(^6\) While we may not accept the narrow definitions for the activities they set forth, it does appear that third parties played non-directive roles that fostered communication and interaction in the cases of settlement, while they attempted to use some form of leverage (albeit in uncommitted and half-hearted ways) to influence outcomes in the case of the 1965 and 1971 wars.\(^7\)

Hence, my hypothesis set forth in the beginning of this study, that third parties with leverage were best placed to play effective roles in protracted conflicts where elements of history and prolonged hostility precluded actors from resolving differences if they were not "compelled," as it were, to do so, does not appear to be borne out by the evidence present in the five cases examined. Rather, as I

\(^6\) In the section on conflicting actor perceptions of third party neutrality and even-handedness, I attempted to make a connection between such perceptions on the part of the actors and the actual use of leverage by third parties.

\(^7\) It might be argued that while the U.S. displayed no overt attempts at employing any instruments of leverage against India and Pakistan in 1990, the changed nature of global circumstances with U.S. omnipotence clearly evident, might have served as a form of hidden leverage to which the two actors responded.
explained, third parties offering conciliatory gestures -- the U.S. in 1990, for instance -- appear to have had the best results.

What emerges from the sub-cases analyzed is a set of guidelines for third parties to formulate their strategies in cases like the Indo-Pakistani case, cases that are characterized by ethnic, religious and nationalist components. We find that third parties might see more success if they employ persuasive rather than punitive strategies. These could even extend to the holding out of tangible assurances of third party intent to both side, as the U.S. did in the 1990 case. This does not mean that a third party must have no leverage, or that a third party must not be perceived to have leverage; in fact, one third party who met with success appeared to have a great store of instruments of potential leverage. However, conflicting sides must be convinced that the third parties will not use this leverage punitively or in a partisan fashion. Further, third parties who can bring representatives of conflicting sides face to face, or who can at a minimum convey feelings and perceptions of one side to the other, have seemed to succeed in bringing about eventual settlements. In the next couple of sections, we consider how the perception of conflicting actors of third party attributes and strategies has the potential to eventually affect outcomes.
III. Perception by Conflicting Actors of Third Parties having the Capacity to Aid in Settling Crises:

I had contended much earlier in this study that in addition to the role and characteristics of third parties themselves, the conflicting actors must believe in the capacity of third parties to help in engineering a successful settlement.

Data reveal that both India and Pakistan believed quite firmly in the capacity of the U.S. to help in the crisis of 1990. In the other case of successful settlement, the Kutch, there are fewer data revealing this sentiment, but the U.K. was generally considered suitable. In the 1971 war, India strongly believed that the U.S. certainly had the ability to help through influencing its ally Pakistan. Indian officials have stated in retrospect that if the U.S. had wanted, it could have prevented the war (personal interviews, T.N. Kaul, 1993; S.N. Chopra, 1993). The influence of the Soviets was also sought by Pakistan. Finally, the U.S. was also asked by India to help during the follow-up to the 1965 war. The variation on this variable, hence, is not systematically different with different outcomes.

IV. Perception of Conflicting Actors of Third Party Evenhandedness:

When we consider the perception by conflicting actors of third party even-handedness, however, there is
considerable systematic variance with outcomes. In both the cases of successful settlement, data indicate that India and Pakistan appeared convinced about the fairness of the third parties involved. On the other hand, in both the cases of war, India and Pakistan viewed the U.S. and Soviet Union, respectively, and the U.N., to a lesser extent, with suspicion. Most scholars talk in terms of neutrality and impartiality as attributes of third parties, claiming either that these are important for successful interventions (Burton; Kelman, 1979; Mitchell and Webb, 1988) or that the overt use of leverage rather than attempts at neutrality will meet with most success (Susskind and Cruickshank, 1987). The finding on this variable suggests that it is equally important to consider conflicting actors' views of third party neutrality or the lack thereof. Interested third parties would be well-advised to heed the lessons that emerge from the Indo-Pakistani case on this variable; hence, if it is important for eventual settlement success that third parties be viewed as fair, even-handed and neutral,

8 Note that the perception by actors of third party even-handedness is distinct from certain "objective" factors that might characterize third parties themselves and determine the extent of their leverage over conflicting actors in different situations. These are considered in later sections.

9 It is interesting to note that in both cases where India and Pakistan were convinced of third party even-handedness and neutrality (in the Kutch case of 1965 and in the 1990 Kashmir crisis), third parties had chosen not to employ overt instruments of leverage like trade and aid sanctions. However, the beliefs of conflicting actors about third parties may not always be synchronous with corresponding actions by third parties.
third parties can take concrete steps to ensure that they will be perceived in this fashion, thus enhancing their scope of their impact on the outcome. As in the 1990 case, they might offer gestures of conciliation -- the approval of a pending trade agreement or the withdrawal of a punitive measure that has been formulated in another context and now has the potential to damage the full impact of their role in the conflict.

Table 9.8

**Perception by Conflicting Actors of Third Party Having Capacity to Aid in Settling Crisis and of Third Party Evenhandedness:**

### In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Capacity to Aid</th>
<th>Evenhandedness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### In Settlement Successes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Capacity to Aid</th>
<th>Evenhandedness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. Communication Structures and Processes:

In the case of two of the three wars, the 1965 and the 1971 - clear and unambiguous failures of settlement, as we shall see when we discuss dependent variables or outcomes - the use of indirect communication channels by conflicting actors clearly predominated over the use of direct channels. In both cases, the press and parliament (the latter, especially in the case of democratic India) were widely employed as channels of preference. On the other hand, in the case of the Kutch crisis of 1965, a crisis that was successfully settled, the employment of direct channels - leaders, decision-groups, official bodies like the foreign ministries - predominated on the part of both actors.

In the other successfully settled crisis, the 1990 crisis over Kashmir, we find that patterns of communication do not echo those employed during the Kutch case, that indirect channels in fact predominated. However, the pattern of use in this particular case is much closer to the Kutch case than to the wars; the content of messages sent, even though through indirect channels, was overwhelmingly positive and reassuring, with a number of messages on both

---

10 The 1947 war presents evidence of a greater use of direct rather than indirect communication. This evidence must be placed within the context of the times -- contact between the two sides had been made inevitable by the number and complexity of issues left unresolved by partition.

11 Since this was a case of successful settlement, the expectation was for the predominant use of direct channels.
sides referring to the need for the avoidance of another war. The lesson to be learned here might be that an expansion of the original model is in order, to include not only an examination of the channels of communication, but also a much closer look at the pattern and content of messages sent through these channels.\(^2\)

Table 9.9

**Predominant Channel of Communication**

In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREDOMINANT CHANNEL</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1965 War</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Settlement Successes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREDOMINANT CHANNEL</th>
<th>1965 Kutch</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) There might, on the other hand, be another lesson to be learned from the use of communication channels in the 1990 case. Perhaps the protracted nature of the conflict has institutionalized the preferability of indirect channels of communication between the two sides - the context and flavor of the relationship makes indirect channels more "appropriate" for the actors. If this is the case, then it could be a potentially dangerous trend; the positive content of messages sent through indirect channels might not create quite the impact that they would through direct channels.
A more detailed comparative look at patterns of communication during the five crises is presented in the tables below. We see from these patterns that India with its democratic traditions relies on such indirect channels as the media, parliament and public rallies, while these latter two are employed to a much lesser extent by Pakistan prior to 1990, when it was a dictatorship. The media channel is widely used by both states in 1990, a reflection both of Pakistan's move towards democracy and the increased access of radio and television to citizens of the subcontinent, especially in rural areas.
Table 9.10

**Communication through Direct Channels:**

In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 (War)</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Settlement Successes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965 (Kutch)</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Note that all numbers in the following tables are numbers per month. All these have been gathered from a careful coding of indicators of the different variables from different sources, particularly *The Times of India* and *Pakistan Times*. The methodology chapter specifies coding instructions, describes indicators, etc.
Table 9.11

Communication through Indirect Channels (total of all indirect channels):

In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Settlement Successes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965(Kutch)</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6.72</td>
<td>5.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9.12

Communication through Indirect Channels (considering each channel separately.)

In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANNELS</th>
<th>'47</th>
<th>'47</th>
<th>'65</th>
<th>'65</th>
<th>'71</th>
<th>'71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press/Radio</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Rally</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTPs</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OTPs = Other Third Parties (i.e. Third Parties other than those intervening)

In Settlement Successes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANNELS</th>
<th>'65</th>
<th>'65</th>
<th>'90</th>
<th>'90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press/Radio</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Rally</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTPs</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Face-to-Face Meetings (Direct Communication):

It is significant that in the cases of the 1965 and 1971 wars, there were no face-to-face meetings between officials of both sides in an attempt to solve the building
In stark contrast, such meetings characterized both the Kutch and the 1990 cases and took place before final settlements were agreed upon. In the 1990 case, five such meetings took place, from the beginning of the crisis in January 1990 through to its settlement later that year. We do see evidence of face-to-face meetings between Indian and Pakistani officials in the period leading up to the 1947 war, but these meetings were necessitated by the circumstances surrounding partition and dealt with issues like the division of resources, the welfare of refugees and the bringing of peace to riot-affected areas like the Punjab. Officials did not meet over the Kashmir situation until after the war was under way.

---

14 It may be recalled that Indian and Pakistani representatives to the United Nations confronted each other in that arena during the follow-up to the 1971 war; however, these were not formally-arranged meetings between the two parties and hence cannot be included in this category.
Table 9.13

*Face-to-Face Meetings (Direct Communication) on Crisis:*

**In Settlement Failures:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**In Settlement Successes:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What we see, then, are some indications that the use of direct rather than indirect channels of communication by conflicting actors might be more conducive to successful settlements, thus lending some weight to those who argue in this vein (Laponce, 1982; Dessouki, 1982) against those who claim that the nature of communication does not matter but rather, the fact of communication does (Chang, 1982) and offering more concrete guidelines to policy-makers both at the third party level and the conflicting actor level as they attempt to structure communications. Direct channels appear to mitigate the potential for miscommunication and misinterpretation that exists when channels like the press are involved. They also appear to lend a face, as it were, to the "enemy," to establish human relationships between officials and to thereby promote settlements.
My initial hypothesis, then, that direct rather than indirect communication between conflicting actors is more conducive to outcomes of settlement, appears to have been confirmed, for the most part, by the study. To ensure greater generalizability of results, we would have to test this hypothesis in other cases of protracted conflict. However, this case has served as an important test of the role of communications in actual conflict situations; hitherto, much of the research on communication in crises including that done by Dessouki and Chang, has been carried out in experimental or laboratory situations.

VI. Other Variables:

The following are variables that were not part of the original "model" of foundation building but were found significant enough in terms of having the potential to influence outcomes to warrant their study and to assess whether they might become part of a revised model.

The Opposition in both States:

What is evident in both states is a pattern of increasingly vocal opposition on both sides in the years since 1947. In the case of India, this has most frequently taken the guise of Hindu fundamentalist groups who advocate ever harder lines to be taken with Pakistan. In 1947,
groups like the RSS, the Hindu Mahasabha etc. were fringe fundamentalist groups, that although were taken seriously in the context of partition and the migration of hundreds of thousands of Hindus and Muslims from one country to another, were not politically strong and did not have much mass support. We find that they consistently advocated tougher action with Pakistan over the years, in the cases of the 1965 and 1971 wars, but there is not much evidence to suggest that their exhortations were ever strong enough to sway the government, although it is certainly the case that they influenced decision-making to some extent. It is only by the 1990s that had they coalesced into the largest single opposition party in the country; certainly by 1990 they were politically very important, providing coalitional support to the minority government of V.P. Singh. Yet, the outcome in this case was settlement. In the case of Pakistan, the first government in 1947 did not have to deal with much opposition. In 1965 and 1971, Pakistan was ruled by the military and domestic opposition was necessarily

15 A faction of the domestic opposition in India had been consistently opposed to settlement attempts in the Kutch; they claimed that these betrayed weakness on the part of India. Therefore, when an opportunity for confrontation against Pakistan arose again later that year, they seized it with renewed fervor, exhorting the government to be more aggressive and declaring that war was inevitable this time.

16 A potential explanation for why opposition strength increased since the 1980s is that the era of strong leaders of the nature of Nehru and Indira Gandhi who inspired mass followings had finally drawn to a close; the role of the opposition has necessarily become more important in Indian politics since then.
muted. It was only in 1990 that the first democratically elected government, that of Benazir Bhutto, the had been allowed to rule, and it faced a number of opposition political parties, many of which pressed for a greater show of aggression towards India. As we saw, the crisis was successfully settled.

The impact of domestic opposition on the outcome of crises, then, appears a complex one to assess. Although there can be no argument that governments in power are indeed influenced by the positions and pronouncements of the opposition, especially opposition groups with wide-spread support from the people, the final impact appears dependent on several factors. These include the context of the particular crisis, the government and leaders in power (and their popularity with the people at the time) and the nature of the opposition itself -- whether different opposition parties are united on their prescriptions and positions, and what their existent relationship with the government is.
Table 9.14

The Impact of Domestic Opposition:

In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 War</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Settlement Successes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S/C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M = marginal  
S = some  
C = considerable

Leader Personality and Socialization:

Some patterns are evident from a comparison of the different personality types of the heads of government during the crises. Some of the leaders in crises that ended in settlements and war - Ayub, V.P. Singh, and to some extent, Jinnah - could be characterized as Lawmakers.17 18

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17 It should be reiterated that focusing merely on one leader is a minimalistic strategy, adopted in this dissertation in the interests of brevity; one might keep in mind that while leaders like Indira Gandhi were more likely to maintain all decision-making power in their hands, other leaders like V.P. Singh and Benazir Bhutto were constrained by other powerful figures in their governments and tended to have less influence over the making of decisions.

18 For an exposition on Barber's typology and its application to the leaders in this study please consult the chapter on methodology.
the case of many of these leaders, their "lawmaking" characteristics appeared consistent with the enormously difficult transition that India and Pakistan had to undergo from 1947 as they moved from dependent colonies to more independent, sovereign states; however, in keeping with the characteristics of the category, they were also preoccupied with the wielding of power and were quick to resort to manipulation when it was needed. On the other hand, in the case of Mrs. Gandhi, clearly an Advertiser with personality characteristics of ambition, dominance and competitiveness, these traits might have accelerated the movement towards war in 1971. Benazir Bhutto could be characterized as the Reluctant, propelled into politics, as it were, out of a sense of duty, responsibility and mission. Finally, Shastri was a Spectator, an observer to whom advisors and consultants were very important. We find that whenever Advertisers and Lawmakers were involved even on one side, there was a war; when Reluctants were at the helm, as in 1990, there was settlement.

19 It is interesting to make a link between this variable and the role of the opposition. In addition to contextual factors, it could well be the case that leaders who jealously guarded their power, Lawmakers or Advertisers, as was the case with Jinnah in 1947 and Mrs. Gandhi in 1971, minimalized and marginalized the role of the opposition, disallowing the opposition, as it were, from having any input into the situation and choosing their own path towards war. Reluctants and Spectators, on the other hand, Bhutto and Shastri, might have allowed a more vocal opposition (and we find that this is indeed the case in Pakistan in 1990) and might have paid greater heed to all its nuances including those urging peace, attempting compromise, as in the Kutch and 1990 cases, instead of confrontation.
Table 9.15   Extending Barber's Typology to the Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Advertiser</strong></th>
<th><strong>Lawmaker</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Gandhi</td>
<td>Jinnah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ayub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reluctant</strong></td>
<td><strong>Spectator</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Bhutto</td>
<td>Shastri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.P. Singh?</td>
<td>Yahya Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nehru?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Socialization and life experience might also have played some role in the decisions made by leaders during the five crises. Of all the leaders, only V.P. Singh and Benazir Bhutto were part of the post-independence generation. As Benazir herself wrote in her autobiography, "I had been born in independent Pakistan. I was free of the complexes and prejudices which had torn Indians and Pakistanis apart in the bloody trauma of partition....Did we have to be divided by walls of hatred....?" (Bhutto, 1989, pp. 72). Perhaps these two leaders could make more detached decisions about the crisis they were facing, decisions that were not mired in the history of partition and beyond.

It is also significant that there were those among the leaders who saw themselves as destined to rule, as inextricably linked with the countries they represented, for whom leadership was their life rather than their work. Certainly this had been the case with Nehru and Jinnah, and to a lesser extent with Ayub, Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto. It
is conceivable that this passion might have hindered the making of detached judgements in times of crisis. We see that Nehru and Jinnah went to war in 1947, Ayub in 1965 and Mrs. Gandhi in 1971.

Hence, we do find that patterns emerge on the personality variable that are helpful in furthering our understanding of final outcomes.

Table 9.16
Leader Personality and Socialization:

Socialization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Early Intro. to Politics</th>
<th>&quot;Independence Leaders&quot;</th>
<th>Post-Independence Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nehru</td>
<td>Jinnah</td>
<td>B. Bhutto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shastri?</td>
<td>I. Gandhi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late Intro. to Politics</td>
<td>Ayub Khan?</td>
<td>V.P. Singh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahya Khan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VII. Outcomes: Settlement Failures and Successes

In earlier chapters of this dissertation, I maintained that it was not enough to judge the success or failure of settlement merely in terms of whether or not a war occurred; rather, we considered a crisis to have been successfully settled when erstwhile conflicting parties agreed to more than merely an end to the immediate violence at hand, when there were in place positive steps that both sides agreed to
with reference to the future of their relationship. These included joint declarations, formal meetings to discuss the future, positive assessments of each other, etc., with indicators like formal meetings being weighted most heavily because they implied the greatest commitment.

It is evident that both cases of settlement passed this "test." In both, settlement was marked by a formal meeting between selected officials after the cessation of hostilities to assess the future of the relationship and the specific elements of settlement. In the Kutch case, a high-level meeting between officials was held in July 1965 where there was a cementing of the new relationship, and in the 1990 case, foreign secretaries of both sides met in July in Islamabad and later in Delhi (Times of India, August 12, 1990). Further, assessments of their relationship were positive in both these cases. The talks were labeled a "good beginning" by India's foreign secretary in 1990 and as having established "excellent progress" by the Pakistani president (FBIS, July 23, 1990, pp. 67; FBIS, August 14, 1990, pp. 62), while in the Kutch case, Shastri and Ayub exchanged notes on the possibility of resolving all border disputes.

On the other hand, the circumstances surrounding the three wars, obvious failures of settlement, were quite different. Negative assessments by both sides of each other continued even after cease-fires were declared, with Shastri
warning in September 1965 that the U.N.-sponsored truce, what he called an "uneasy truce" not be mistaken "for the dawn of peace" (Times of India, September 23, 1965). Yahya Khan, in December 1971 reflected that it was "unfortunate that India showed total disregard to all urgent expressions of world opinion which would have spared bloodshed and suffering" (Pakistan Times, December 18, 1971, pp. 1). Gandhi warned that it was not clear whether the ceasefire would be a "real peace or just a breathing spell" (Times of India, December 30, 1971). Again, in the case of 1947, hostilities and the exchange of negative rhetoric dragged on until 1949, when a U.N.-sponsored cease-fire was accepted by the two sides. As the history of Kashmir would reveal, it was a cease-fire that neither side was satisfied with. Hence, settlements as defined in this study are very different outcomes, with different indicators and different feelings on the two sides than are those instances of failed settlement, the wars.
Table 9.17

Outcomes: Settlement Failures or Successes?

In Settlement Failures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint declarations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive assessments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimism for future</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative rhetoric</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Settlement Successes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal meetings</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint declarations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive assessments</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimism for future</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Rhetoric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Essence of the Conflict:

My examination of the relationship between India and Pakistan over time reveals some insights on the reasons for the protracted hostility that has characterized it, but no definite answers. Past history appears to play a significant role - we have seen some references to the past
in almost every crisis. We find that these references include those that are made routinely and rhetorically as well as those that betray a depth of real feeling about the salience of the past in present crises and in the on-going relationship. Both sides have readily turned to the past for explanations of unacceptable present behavior on the part of their opponent. Although I have found no evidence that the third parties involved in the successful settlements made specific attempts to deal with the "baggage" of the past in trying to achieve a breakthrough in the present, it is conceivable that these issues were addressed in oblique and implicit ways as direct communication was fostered and trust built. What the data do establish, however, is that there is little doubt that the past remains salient, to Indian and Pakistani actors, to the present. In attempting to resolve crises in the future, then, practitioners and policy-makers on all sides would do well to bear this in mind.  

Yet, cooperation has also been possible - the past has not predetermined outcomes in all cases. Such variables as leadership, communication, third parties and the geo-

---

20 In my talks with Indian officials and scholars, there appeared a division of opinion on this subject: there was that school of thought which believed that the past, with its pattern of hostility and ill-will essentially determined the future or at the very least influenced it heavily (K. Subrahmanym, for instance.); and there were those who believed that the problem was merely one of power, of politics between the governments on both sides rather than the people (M. Dubey; B.G. Verghese; M. Dandavate; N. Palkhivala).
political situation extant at the time also matter. This is especially relevant in our changed world; if 1990 is any indication, India and Pakistan are cognizant of the loss of support of the superpowers and appear to have become more responsible as a result.

To the extent that the Indo-Pakistani relationship is reflective of innumerable protracted conflicts between two states who share elements of past history and a habitual mistrust, the lessons that are learned from the impact of the past on the outcomes of the different crises in this relationship are easily generalizable to these other contexts.

**Does Building Foundations Matter? How?**

It would appear that building foundations early in the escalating crisis certainly matter in the outcomes of particular crises. In the two cases of successful settlement, Kutch and 1990, we see the committed, timely intervention of third parties; we also see evidence of either directly conveyed communication or communication, a significant portion of which is positive in content. These factors appear to be conducive to outcomes of settlement - in both these cases, goodwill reigned on both sides and face-to-face meetings were engaged in and agreements signed.

However, at least in the Kutch case, we see that the
settlement was short-lived: the two countries who had only a few months ago concluded agreements and expressed optimism for the future were now enmeshed in a war. The good-will established by the Kutch settlement, hence, was lost. Foundations, if they had been built, appeared to be built on unsteady ground in this case. The Kutch experience presents some insights on what sustained foundation building might entail. Good-will gained with such difficulty cannot afford to be squandered and some way of extending its duration must be found.

The original model might be modified, therefore, to reflect this concern. Third parties might have to remain involved in the time-period after the settlement to ensure that it is sustained. Conflicting parties must be urged to keep up direct communication and frequent meetings and to refrain from reverting to hostile rhetoric, and the best way to ensure this is by demonstrating the continued interest of the third party. If Britain had not "exited" with such alacrity in the aftermath of the Kutch settlement, perhaps the second war over Kashmir might have been avoided. Not only is the time-period leading up to crises important, then, but so also is the time after settlements. This might be the key to more lasting settlements and perhaps to eventual resolutions of protracted conflicts.
Foundation Building: A Revised Model

In light of the findings from the different cases, a revision of the original model is warranted. While some of the original hypotheses or contentions have been validated by the data revealed in the five cases, others require additions, revisions or qualifications.

Clearly, the overall context within which a foundation building stage should be viewed remains the incipient stages of a crisis. Timing appears exceedingly important for the success of foundation building and hence for the settlement of the crisis at hand. We now have some clues as to how to time, as it were, timing. Concerned parties need to look at general signs of escalation between actors in relationships of protracted hostility to prepare for intervention. These might include sharpening rhetoric on general issues of contention within the relationship, the movement of troops along border areas or any warnings that might be issued.

In light of the two cases of successful settlement, particularly the Kutch settlement, we also know that settlements might be short-lived if third parties consider their job done after agreements are signed; rather, a longer involvement, one that would monitor the post-settlement relationship, appears to be in order.\(^{21}\) Third parties might

\(^{21}\) It should be noted, however, that the prolonged involvement of a third party might also pose some problems. Opposition groups might begin to question such a long-term proposition, and third parties might also be reluctant to make such commitments.
set up periodic meetings with actors so that their continued involvement and interest is underlined. Actors would thus also get a longer-term perspective on the settlement and might be less likely to challenge the boundaries of the settlement.

As it was claimed at the outset of this study, third party intervention is indeed crucial; the cases studied would indicate that settlement cannot be achieved without such intercession. We can also now state with more confidence that one third party rather than several is more likely to meet with success and that third party motivations reflecting "altruism" have been manifested in cases of successful settlement. It must also be noted that it is important that conflicting actors view third parties as even-handed.

We are also now more clear on those third party strategies associated with success. It would appear from the cases studied that third party strategies must include the exchange of the perspectives and perceptions of conflicting actors; left to their own devices, conflicting actors rarely achieve this, and often confront a resultant lack of comprehension of each other's views. The sending of third party representatives to foster this exchange is also critical. Finally, third party strategies that focus on providing positive incentives to conflicting actors rather than punitive action appear to have met with success. The
proverbial carrot works better than the stick.

Finally, contextual factors like the nature of domestic opposition appear to have largely arbitrary impacts on outcomes. Although they can certainly make it easier or more difficult for the leadership to chart a particular course, they do not appear to have any bearing on whether that course will eventually be taken or abandoned. With reference to leader personality and socialization, the generational factor appears to be of most import; Benazir Bhutto and V.P. Singh, representatives of the subcontinent’s post-independence generation, appear to have been burdened less by past traumas and more interested in settlements.
Figure 9.1 Foundation Building: A Revised Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foundation Building</th>
<th>Prenegotiations</th>
<th>Negotiations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timing:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Timing:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Timing:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incipient Phase of Crisis</td>
<td>De-escalating Crisis</td>
<td>Fully De-Escalated Crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Third Party**

Characteristics:
- Single actor
- "Altruist" motivations
- State vs. organization

Strategies:  

- Exchange of actor perspectives
- Presence of third party representatives
- Carrots rather than sticks
- Direct channels
- Face-to-face communication
- Positive content

---

Mutual problem recognized and exchange of actor perspectives for mutual, long-term solution accepted; terms of preferability of agreement

Nuts and bolts

Communication solution
Foundation Building and Pre-negotiations: A Return to the Beginning:

The findings on the different variables considered in these five sub-cases do point to the need for attention to a phase in building crises that is prior to the pre-negotiating phase as it is commonly defined (Stein et al, 1989). We find that in all five cases, we were faced with two conflicting parties who were reluctant to communicate their grievances to each other, who certainly failed to view the problem facing them in terms of a joint problem at initial stages. Hence, this study is in agreement with proponents of pre-negotiations on the value of studying phases prior to formal negotiating stages. However, the pre-negotiation literature generally agrees that before efforts at pre-negotiation can commence, the pre-condition of conflicting actors agreeing on a mutual problem must first be met. Foundation building disagrees that such a pre-condition should be set, and offers a response to this dilemma. It describes specific factors -- increased direct contact between conflicting actors and the positive nature of messages sent; third parties who work towards bringing conflicting actors together in ways that eschew the blatant use of punitive instruments of leverage in favor of communicating conflicting actor positions and perspectives -- that if instituted at incipient stages of a building crisis, might lead towards actors accepting the desirability of viewing the problem facing them in terms of a joint one,
and might lead to the eventual settlement of the problem. We see that in the two cases of successful settlement, this is exactly what foundation-building achieved. Pre-negotiations on both the Kutch and the 1990 Kashmir crisis were engaged in as elements of settlement. But they were preceded by those factors whereby foundations are built. On the other hand, we find that in the cases representing failures of settlement particularly in 1971, the two sides went to war without ever really "talking" to each other (and third parties did not make concerted attempts to help achieve this) and without acknowledging that the problem they faced was indeed a joint one. Hence, foundation building and pre-negotiations as stages differ mainly in terms of timing and assumptions.

Although they examine similar variables as making the difference -- third parties, communication -- and are both mindful of the negative impact on settlement of the psychological and historical factors that characterize protracted conflicts, pre-negotiations begin when conflicting actors have grappled with the issues facing them and agree that they need to act together in addressing them. Foundation-building focusses on a period prior to this; it looks at what can be done before crises escalate, so that joint problem definitions will be actively facilitated rather than awaited or assumed. Foundation-building thus makes the time element an explicit and critical focus of
enquiry; in so doing, it spells out and addresses an issue of great import, an issue that the prenegotiation literature upon which it builds is rather vague about, and which certainly does not attempt to find specific elements of identification or indicators for. The prenegotiation literature does not tell us when to intervene or how soon to identify a building crisis. It certainly does not ask us to monitor specific elements of crises so that we can identify them at their inception and move quickly to settle them - prenegotiations, as I have reiterated before, may only begin, according to proponents, when both sides have realized the existence of a mutual problem and at least one side seeks a solution to it. The foundation building stage attempts to do exactly these things, and in so doing, outlines an area of enquiry that is not explicitly addressed by the existing prenegotiation literature.

Although my study has limited itself to official or governmental interaction at the foundation-building stage, it encourages the parallel building of foundations in the larger society among individuals in an unofficial capacity, realizing that without conflict, particularly of a protracted, affective nature, being settled among the people it involves, there can be no lasting prospect for peace. It recognizes the immense importance of the contribution of strategies like problem-solving workshops of the nature of those advocated by scholars like Kelman, Burton and Volkan,
and agrees with them that conflicting sides must recognize each other as legitimate actors with legitimate grievances, feelings, hopes and fears. Because this study looks at building crises where official rather than unofficial action necessarily must become the focus, it limits its extent to official interaction -- always recognizing, however, that the aim of problem-solving workshops and building unofficial foundations is essentially the same as the focus of this study, addressing the complex governmental and societal issues that surround protracted, entrenched conflicts steeped in history and affect.

**Foundation Building: Generalizing to Other Contexts**

It remains for those elements that appear to "work" during the foundation-building stage of building crises -- face-to-face communications, third party strategies that focus on encouraging an exchange of conflicting actor perceptions and positions, etc. -- to be examined in other cases of protracted conflict. Particularly now in the post-Cold War era, conflicts characterized by ethnicity, religion or nationalism are appearing in greater and greater numbers around the world, to more and more calamitous consequences. We only have to turn to Bosnia, a tragedy of our times, to recognize the truth of this claim. The need is greater than ever to find means of settling these conflicts. I expect that the variables analyzed in this study will throw light
on the enormity of what is at stake in such conflicts, what demons of the past conflicting actors must wrestle with and which third parties strategies might hold a greater chance of success. Hence, the Foundation Building model will be of use in cases where actors have been involved in protracted hostilities, where they are mired in historical grievances, where communications have often failed in times of crises, and where third parties have the potential to make a difference.

The Egyptian-Israeli relationship appears suitable for testing the Foundation Building model in light of its revisions. Like India and Pakistan, Egypt and Israel engaged in a series of wars and faced a number of crises since the birth of Israel. Unlike India and Pakistan, however, these two states appear to have resolved their protracted conflict since the Camp David accords were signed. We know that prior to the accords, the two sides engaged in extensive direct communication and that the U.S. as the single third party involved was responsible in great measure for ensuring that fora for meetings were available and for transmitting the perceptions, perspectives and anxieties of one side to the other. Will a perusal of time-periods prior to the wars between these two states reveal different roles played by third parties with different characteristics? Was more than one third party involved? Were direct communications between Egypt and Israel engaged
in during these times? Did opposition parties and groups play a defining role in any of the crises facing the two sides, or was their impact on outcomes as arbitrary as appears to be the case for India and Pakistan?

Although India and Pakistan are states with well-defined governments, an established territory that is essentially mutually uncontested (except for the Kashmir region) and more or less equality of power, elements of their conflict -- the redrawing of borders and the central question of the recognition of the rights and freedom of a separate ethnic group, the Kashmiris -- have echoes in those protracted conflicts that are not state-bound but are rather carried on between national groups. Generalizability of these findings, then, might extend beyond merely those protracted conflicts that exist between states of more or less equal power, to the plethora of ethno-nationalist conflict that we see in increasing evidence between national groups and nations. Like with India and Pakistan, ethnicity, religion and history cloud the relationships of these actors, making it imperative for a third party to move in with a plan for settlement.
APPENDIX A

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

R. K. Bajpai
Former General Secretary, All India Congress
Veteran Congress Leader

Lieutenant-General Prem Chand
Director of Military Intelligence, India, 1965
Chief of Command, Western Border Regions, 1965

S.N. Chopra
Director, Indian External Affairs Ministry’s Pakistan Division, 1960-1970

V.H. Coehlo
Indian External Affairs Ministry, 1947-1959

Madhu Dandavate, Veteran Indian Parliamentarian
Joined Praja Socialist Party in 1948
Janata Party 1977-present

Muchkund Dubey
Indian Foreign Secretary, 1990

M.V. Kamat, Veteran Indian Journalist
Times of India, Mid-day

T.N. Kaul
Minister of External Affairs, 1962-68
Indian Ambassador to U.S., 1973-1976
Nani Palkhivala
Former Indian ambassador to the U.S.
M.S. Rajan, Professor of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

K. Subrahmanyam
Former Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
New Delhi

Atal Behari Vajpayee
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
Current Indian Leader of the Opposition

B.G. Verghese
Research Scholar, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi
APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

Re: the cases of failure.

1. Why did India and Pakistan go to war in...(1947, 1965, 1971)

2. What, if anything, could have been done to avoid it?

3. What role did third parties play?

4. Who (states, organizations, other entities) do you believe would have been appropriate third parties in these cases? Why?

5. How did India/Pakistan perceive the role of third parties? Were they viewed as fair? Were they viewed as having the leverage to persuade India and Pakistan to settle?

6. When in the crisis did third parties intervene? If they had intervened earlier, would there have been a different outcome?

7. If an appropriate third party had been committed to settling the conflict and had conveyed this commitment to India and Pakistan, do you think their role would have been accepted?

8. What channels of communication were employed between India and Pakistan? What channels could have been employed?
Re: Cases of success

1. Why was war avoided in ...... (1965 - Kutch, 1990)

2. What role did third parties play?

3. Would war have been avoided without the intervention of ---? Were they trusted? Were they viewed as having the capacity to make a difference? Were they viewed as having the necessary leverage to persuade both sides to settle?

4. At what point during the crisis did third parties intervene? Was this an appropriate time?

5. What strategies did they use? Was any one strategy especially successful/unsuccessful?

6. What do you think the third party had to gain through intervention?

7. What strategies did third parties use? Was any one strategy particularly associated with success?

8. What kinds of channels of communication existed between India and Pakistan? Which were the direct channels that were used? Which were more indirect? Which were used more frequently?

9. Was the settlement viewed as fair by India/Pakistan? What evidence existed thereafter that settlement had come about? Did cultural ties improve? Did official-level visits increase? Were summits held?

10. What do you think are the roots of the Indo-Pakistani conflict?
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August 27, 1947, pp.1
September 1, 1947, pp. 1
September 4, 1947, pp. 1
September 10, 1947, pp. 1
September 15, 1947, pp. 1
September 17, 1947, pp.1
September 29, 1947, pp. 6
October 15, 1947, pp.1
October 20, 1947, pp. 9
October 31, 1947, pp. 1
November 4, 1947, pp. 7
November 29, 1947, pp. 1
December 25, 1947, pp. 1

May 9, 1965
May 26, 1965, pp. 1
May 27, 1965
July 4, 1965, pp.1
August 24, 1965, pp. 1
August 26, 1965
September 3, 1965
September 23, 1965
September 27, 1965, pp. 1
September 29, 1965, pp. 1

March 28, 1971
May 7, 1971, pp.1
May 22, 1971, pp.1
July 8, 1971, pp.7
July 30, 1971, pp.1
August 12, 1971, pp. 1
October 20, 1971, pp.5
Singh. November 3, 1971, pp. 11
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November 12, 1971, pp. 8
November 16, 1971, pp. 1
November 18, 1971, pp. 3
November 25, 1971, pp. 9
November 27, 1971, pp. 1
November 28, 1971, pp. 1
December 21, 1971, pp.1
December 25, 1971, pp.1
December 30, 1971, pp.1
December 31, 1971, pp.1

May 23, 1990, pp.1
June 15, 1990, pp.1
July 20, 1990, pp.1
August 22, 1990
Pakistan Times

May 28, 1965
July 1, 1965
August 18, 1965, pp. 1
October 15, 1965, pp. 1
November 17, 1965, pp. 1

July 6, 1971, pp. 1
July 9, 1971, pp. 1
July 16, 1971, pp. 1
August 13, 1971, pp. 1
August 16, 1971, pp. 1
October 3, 1971, pp. 1
November 29, 1971, pp. 1
December 2, 1971, pp. 1
December 18, 1971, pp. 1
December 20, 1971, pp. 1
December 31, 1971, pp. 1

January 30, 1990
January 31, 1990
January 27, 1990
February 14, 1990, pp. 1
February 16, 1990, pp. 1
March 4, 1990
May 16, 1990, pp. 1
May 23, 1990, pp. 1
May 31, 1990
June 1, 1990
June 2, 1990
June 16, 1990

New York Times

August 18, 1947
September 17, 1947, pp. 16
September 24, 1947, pp. 34
September 27, 1947, pp. 6
September 28, 1947, pp. 46
September 29, 1947, pp. 6
October 1, 1947
October 6, 1947
December 13, 1947, pp. 8

June 17, 1990, pp. 14