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U.S. foreign policy toward empowerment in the Middle East: A cognitive and group process approach

Hoyt, Paul Daniel, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1994
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD EMPOWERMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 
A COGNITIVE AND GROUP PROCESS APPROACH

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate 
School of The Ohio State University

By

Paul Daniel Hoyt, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

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To my family
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PREFACE

The collapse of the Soviet Union and its global alliance structure has been widely heralded as a watershed in international politics. The intense geopolitical rivalry of the Cold War, that has guided and influenced so much of world politics over the last half century, has been diminished to the point of virtual irrelevance. There has been a great deal of speculation as to the ramifications of this sea change, but no consensus has yet been reached.

Policy analysts and national security scholars are particularly sensitive to concerns over what the future security issues will be in the post cold war world. Are the same types of issues and worries such as arms proliferation and military aggression still paramount? Or are there new forms of political change and instability which warrant increased consideration and analysis?

This thesis argues that within the current period, and into the future, another security issue is taking shape that could have as equally far reaching consequences as arms proliferation or regional interstate conflict. What makes this new concern fundamentally different from those of the past is that conflict has increasingly moved from the international to the intra-national arena, thereby making foreign
intervention and international efforts at resolution, via force, less feasible.

The issue is the increasingly pervasive trend of political instability in other states caused by challenges to the regime by domestic forces. Specifically, these challenges involve the demand by broad segments of the population for a restructuring of the regime along more participatory lines. These challenges can, and have been, manifested both in a legal manner, as through the election process, or extra-legally, as in the outbreak of riots or civil war. Both manners of expression of political discontent pose a challenge to the current regimes which then must seek recourse either in accommodation or repression.

One difficulty for the United States is that since these political challenges are domestically based, the ability of the United States to exert influence through military power to resolve the crisis, is severely constrained. Consider, for example, the following scenario: King Fahd of Saudi Arabia is overthrown by an internally-based coup or uprising. How would the United States respond to this event? Intervention, while an option, would be a difficult choice. It would likely receive almost no international or regional support and the logistics of intervention would be highly problematic if the new regime chose to resist the intervention.
The success of diplomatic initiatives designed to maintain positive relations with Riyadh would remain unknown and highly variable. Success would likely depend on such considerations as: the political attitudes and agenda of the new Saudi leadership, American policy makers views of this ruling group, and relatedly, America's previous policy stance, if there had been any such policy, towards the group prior to its coming to power.

It is arguable that scenarios such as this represent the real future threat to America's interests throughout the world. Regional allies of the United States may either be overthrown or forced to alter their policy stances because of domestic political considerations. In both cases, the result could be a fundamental alteration of America's position in the region. Such scenarios need not be seen as purely hypothetical as recent events in Egypt have shown.

Such political change is, however, neither inherently beneficial or detrimental to the interests of the United States. Instead, such challenges represent a period of uncertainty in the other state and, as such, a decision point for the United States. At such times, the United States must determine which side to support in the crisis, if either. A policy dilemma arises at this point, because it can be argued that it is just as wise to follow a policy of courting such political movements, at times, as it is to confront them. This thesis will explore how the decision, of whom to support
and what form the support should take, are made by the American policy making community.

Within the Middle East, the area focus of this study, three broad classes of such domestic political challenges can be distinguished. They are: Arab nationalism, especially during the 1950's and 1960's; Khomeinism, of the late 1970's and early 1980's; and, Islamism, which has always been a powerful force but is particularly salient in the current period. This thesis will examine America's response to such indigenous political movements over time. A central issue underlying the thesis is whether the end of the Cold War will affect America's views of such potential change in the region.

Chapter one argues that domestic political challenges in Middle Eastern states, in the form of mass-based political movements, or "popular empowerment", represent a potentially crucial national security and foreign policy concern for the United States. Empowerment is further defined and an explanation for its occurrence is presented.

I then turn to the question of how America's policy responses can be explained. Factors that have been posited to explain America's policy choices in the Middle East are advanced and then examined for their ability to predict America's policy choices in cases of empowerment. These factors in isolation do not demonstrate tremendous predictive capacity. However, it is argued, that as possible political
values held by policy makers, they, in various combinations, do constitute the motive force behind individual decision-making behavior.

Chapter two thus argues that policy preference formation is multi-causal in nature. Therefore what is required is a means to distinguish between individuals as to the motives and perceptions underlying their policy preference. The theory advanced here argues that, arising from concern over a number of possible factors (such as fear of the Soviet Union, concern over the security of Israel, or a desire for democracy), individuals can be distinguished by the degrees of threat or opportunity which they perceive in a political situation. These perceptions then lead the individual to construct a mental image of the other international actors such that preferred policies can be advocated and enacted without remorse.

In addition to affecting the person's policy preference, it is also argued that these perceptions affect an individual's tolerance of contrasting positions within the decision making group. This variable of tolerance/intolerance is hypothesized to affect the way in which the decision making group is structured which has consequences on the final decisional output.

This theory is then tested through a series of three case studies. These studies are the simultaneous coup in Iraq and civil war in Lebanon (1958), the Iranian revolution
of the late 1970's, and the Islamist political movement in Algeria of the early 1990's. As these cases span the last forty years, it is possible to examine the influence of the Cold War on U.S. foreign policy decision-making toward the region. In each case, the images held by members of the policy elite will be identified as will their subsequent policy preferences, and the effect of these images and preferences on the group decision making process.

In the final chapter the hypothesized relationship between the perception of threat and opportunity and the types of policy advocated by American policy makers in response to Middle East empowerment will be examined and assessed. The potential implications of any such relationship, if found, for the future of America's position in the Middle East will be offered. One possible conclusion would be that with the end of the Cold War, American policy makers will have to re-examine the assumptions and beliefs they may have previously developed as to what the political situation in the Middle East is and what should be the United States response.
CHAPTER I: EMPOWERMENT AND THEORIES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST

Introduction

In the near future the United States may face some hard decisions over its policy towards the Middle East. In some ways, this prediction may appear unduly pessimistic. Positive signs include the possibility of a Soviet incursion into the region having now faded into history. And the likelihood of another Arab-Israeli war is slight given the prevailing power asymmetries of the region, plus encouraging signs of progress in the peace process. However, these circumstances are by no means a guarantee that peace and stability have now emerged in the region. Security issues still exist with potentially serious implications for the United States. Two central concerns are the continuation and expansion of arms proliferation, and regional conflicts like the Gulf War. While important, these concerns do not constitute the universe of political forces that could serve to upset the status quo.

The power of political challenges to the status quo within the region from domestic political unrest is potent. The presence and strength of mass-based political movements in countries of interest to the United States constitutes a
challenge not only to the governments in power in these states, but also to the leadership of the United States. Policy makers must make policy choices on how to respond within this changing political environment. The particular policy question that will increasingly need to be addressed is; when confronted with popular demands for political change in states in which the United States perceives itself as having interests, will the United States decide to support these nascent popular political movements or continue to back its traditional friends? And, how will the decision be made?

This thesis examines the growth of popular political empowerment in Middle Eastern states as it represents a policy choice point for Washington. To answer this strategic policy question of how the United States will decide to respond, I employ a decision making framework that emphasizes the role of motivations and perceptions in foreign policy preference formation. The policy preferences of the individual decision makers are understood to be a consequence of the way in which they define the situation as to who are the relevant actors, and what are these actors' motivations and attributes.

However, the ability of an individual to single-handedly determine policy is a rarity. This is particularly true in the American system where decision making, even in crisis situations, can best be characterized as a group process. I do not attempt to solve the difficult question of how
individual preferences are aggregated into a group decision. However, there is one aspect of the interplay between individual and group processes that will be included in this study; the effect of an individual's perceptions upon the composition of the decision making group.

The question of participation in a decision making group is argued to have an influence upon the type of policy that emerges from that group. If membership in the decision making group is subject to systematic patterns of exclusion, inclusion, and (in)tolerance of deviant viewpoints, based on the views of the decision makers, then an examination of the mechanisms through which this process takes place, helps to explain, in part, the final group decision.

In this chapter, I begin with a discussion of the rise of political empowerment as a security issue confronting the United States. The position of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe in the late 1980's is offered as an analogy to the choices the United States may have to make in the Middle East in the future. I then turn to a fuller discussion of the concept of political empowerment, providing a definition and a set of indicators, plus some discussion of it's possible origins. Having thus set the stage, some prominent theories of foreign policy formation towards the Middle East are examined as to their utility in correctly predicting American policy choices towards twenty three historical instances of political empowerment in the region. Finally, an alternative
conception of foreign policy decision making, which will be elaborated in the next chapter, is advanced.

The Policy Dilemma

The analogy of Eastern Europe in the late 1980's provides a disturbing picture of the possible future of the United States in the Middle East. During the late 1980's, as domestic political challenges to the regimes in Eastern Europe grew, the Soviets were placed in an increasingly difficult position. Years of direct, and indirect, control over the region had led to the Soviets being labeled as imperialists who sought domination over Eastern Europe. As the grip of Moscow's allies in the bloc weakened, and the possibility of Soviet action under the Brezhnev Doctrine declined, a new dynamic emerged in these countries. Groups within these societies organized for the purpose of affecting change in the ruling structures. Their demands for a liberalization of the political process presented the Soviet leadership with a dilemma.

Standing by long-time allies, who had lost whatever legitimacy they once had, would result in continued friendly relations if the old regime was able to maintain power, probably only possible through coercion. At the same time, such support also meant the alienation of the opposition and the renewed charge of neo-colonialism. Such alienation ran
the risk of a loss of influence and positive relations with any new regime that may come to power.

The alternative policy, of conceding that the future lay with the new political movements, could be argued as a way of laying a basis for positive future relations if they should come to power. Instead of being perceived as an impediment to change, the Soviets could be its promoters. However, doing so was certain to damage relations with the current regime. Such a policy could also bring about a political change that might have been avoided. That is, it could serve to excite the revolutionary forces and thereby create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Furthermore, there was an additional element of risk in pursuing such a strategy. There could be no guarantee that any new political leadership would necessarily be friendly to Moscow.

The Soviets chose a middle ground policy of actively supporting neither side. While understandable, the results of this approach leave little to recommend it to the United States: the old regimes, comprised of leaders friendly to Moscow, fell quickly without Soviet support. The new leaders of Eastern Europe then adopted new political systems while showing themselves to be disinterested in close relations with Russia. The rapid collapse of both COMECON and the Warsaw Pact attest to the rejection of Moscow. In the end, the worst case scenario of no influence and poor relations came to pass.
The United States may face a similar dilemma in the Middle East. Many of the states in the region are currently undergoing similar internal political challenges. In Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, there are mass-based forces pressing for significant political change. Here, it is the United States that is presented with the dilemma that confronted the Soviets so recently. In a state that faces rising domestic instability, how should the United States respond?

The analogy to Eastern Europe is not perfect though it is instructive. Differences exist between the Soviet situation in Eastern Europe and that of the United States to the Middle East. These include: the Soviet argument that the eastern bloc was vital as a security buffer from aggression; the presence of other communist states helped to maintain the claim to socialism's growth; through the COMECON and other arrangements, there was a strong tie between the economies of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe that was perceived as crucial; and, the Soviets exercised a high degree of control over the governments and economies of Eastern Europe. In contrast, the Middle East performs none of these functions for the United States, though the need for imported oil comes close. Also, the actual degree of U.S. control is very low, though it is often perceived to be quite high by local opposition elites.
What is similar about the two circumstances is that the actor, be it either the Soviet Union or the United States, saw the region as strategically valuable, if not, vital to its interests. Also, the United States in the Middle East, like the Soviets in Eastern Europe, is perceived by the people of the region, rightly or wrongly, as being the foreign patron of the status quo. In some, more conspiratorial, views, the United States is even seen as actually controlling the region through client states. Such views of U.S. control over the region may or may not be accurate. What is more important is that such perceptions are likely to affect the dynamics and direction of revolutionary blame.

The question of how the United States will respond takes on added significance in the post Cold War world, when the logic of that conflict is no longer present to serve as the determinant of many policy choices, as it had for previous decades. This thesis will examine the debate over U.S. policy towards political empowerment in the Middle East. It is a question which the United States has faced in the past and will likely face in the future.

In the aftermath of World War II, as the world underwent the difficult process of de-colonization, a similar set of circumstances emerged. Either the colonial power itself, or their hand-picked local rulers, came under increasing pressure from elements within the state to alter the
political relationship between the ruler and the ruled. In many cases, these demands led to a rejection of the ruling group or person such that the domestic political situation became fluid and unstable. In these situations, the United States, as it does now, had multiple options. One was to try to coerce these emergent political forces so that they could be repressed and controlled. A second option was for the United States to court these new political forces.

However, during this phase of political upheaval, what Samuel Huntington (1991) calls the "second wave" of democratization, the constraints of the Cold War made the engagement, as opposed to the confrontation, option appear too risky and unnecessary. It was believed that revolutionary forces could be defeated. The idea of inevitable change was rejected as sounding Marxist.¹ And the perceived need for allies in the global competition made running the risk of an uncertain future with largely unknown groups appear too great to be considered. Thus, for the most part, the United States adopted a confrontational, or antagonistic, posture towards political challenges to the status quo in the Third World (see Stivers, 1985).

What is tragic about this choice is that it is arguable that opportunities for positive relations with many newly emerging nations were missed because of this unwillingness to

¹ This may no longer be the case, however. Increasingly, the move towards democracy in many states is interpreted as being part of an inexorable process.
consider change as a positive feature. By labeling these movements as anti-American and often communist, the United States, through its actions, may have created a self-fulfilling prophecy. In perceiving such revolutions as inimical to the United States, the course of the revolution may have been affected. If American decisions and behaviors had been the product of a different set of perceptions and actions, rather than the most extreme type of leader gaining control of the revolution, others may have prevailed. Thus, Barzagan may have led the Iranian revolution, not Khomeini. Or Madani could set the pace for the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria instead of the more militant Ali Belhaj.

Such alternatives are even more plausible because even if some foreign leaders are immutably hostile, it is rarely a certainty that they will be the one to necessarily succeed. Many of the revolutionary movements in the developing world are not monolithic in character, that is, significant differences are evident from group to group. Just as these groups are usually not united in their relations with other groups, so too they are often factionalized internally. Contending leaderships frequently being the norm. Such a possibility of a divided leadership allows for the untested proposition about the chance for a more liberal outcome. This may come about because of the actions of outsiders, such as the United States, which can affect the internal power struggle in self-promoting ways.
This argument about the self-fulfilling prophecy and the chance for alternative scenarios to develop is by no means accepted by all. However, such a proposition is a counterfactual that cannot be empirically tested. To the extent that it is plausible, it does demonstrate the potential effect of actions of the United States upon the course of political life in other areas.

The Theoretical Dilemma: Understanding the Interaction of International and Domestic Change

The relationship between the international political behavior of the United States and the internal political dynamics of other states is important because the final outcome in a challenge to the state is not solely determined by factors internal to the state. In a global political system where the actors are so intertwined and interdependent, the actions of one state have ramifications for other states. The extent of this influence varies from country to country and from case to case, but to some degree it is always present (Gourevitch, 1986).

Gourevitch (1986) applies this argument to a study of the policy responses of states during international economic crises. Such crisis periods, he argues, are times of fluidity within states, where policies and leadership are open to change. The international economic system, he argues, imposes constraints upon domestic decision making
during such uncertain periods. It thereby, acts as a variable in deciding the domestic outcome.

Extending Gourevitch, I argue that instances of political empowerment similarly constitute a period of crisis within a state in which old policies and regimes are vulnerable. The outcome of this challenge is not solely determined by internal forces. Actors in the international system may also play a role. Thus, there may be structural effects upon the state that affect the outcome of the domestic political struggle.

The United States, having continuing interests in the Middle East, is in a position, both as to capabilities and motivation, to influence such outcomes. It can do so by providing support to one of the domestic actors or the other. Such support is likely to influence the policy alternatives that each party to the struggle sees itself as possessing. The United States can thus affect the domestic outcome by taking actions that either expand or contract these perceived options.

Given this capability, it is important to examine the views of those who make and influence policy on such issues as political empowerment. What underlies these views and policy preferences, and how do they affect the decision making process?

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2 The third option, of supporting neither side, will also effect the outcome. In fact, it can be decisive.
Before trying to answer this question, the stimulus of political empowerment, both in terms of its origins and consequences, needs to be discussed at greater length.

**Political Empowerment**

**Defined**

The concept of political empowerment comes out the literature on social mobilization (see Deutsch, 1961). Social mobilization occurs when people within a society, due to modernization, lose their loyalty to traditional forms of authority. At that point, they become available for new forms of organization and participation.

Political empowerment builds upon the concept of social mobilization. Political empowerment incorporates the ideas of an increase in the political awareness, participation, and, if successful, such as in Iran, control of the political system by an elite that has mobilized mass-based support. In addition, it entails a change in the beliefs of the masses about their position in the political structure of the state. Political empowerment is thus a fundamental re-definition, by the individual, of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.

Political empowerment occurs when these mobilized persons organize for the avowed purpose of reconstructing the governmental system. The preferred outcome can take on any
form and tactics can include such methods as electoral contestation, non-violent protest, civil war, and secession.³

For a situation to qualify as an instance of political empowerment, it should display certain characteristics.

1. As an outgrowth of social mobilization, political empowerment is associated with an increase in the percentage of the politically attentive sector of society.

Empowerment is conceived of here as an increase in the belief in one's own political efficacy and right of participation. This is personal empowerment. Political empowerment must also incorporate some notion of popular support. A situation will be counted as an instance of political empowerment when the leadership of the movement is able to mobilize over 10,000 persons into the street in opposition to the regime and in support of the movement.

Thus, political empowerment need not occur throughout the society. Instead, it can be confined to certain sectors of the society. Thus, there can be, for example, Kurdish political empowerment in Iraq or Islamic political empowerment in Tunisia.

2. The ability to acquire legitimacy and acceptance is crucial to any political movement. For a group or movement to be considered an instance of political empowerment, it

³ I realize there may be disagreement over the exact scope of the definition of empowerment. My purpose here is not to rigidly impose a definition of the concept. I am more concerned with the consequences of empowerment, however defined, as it provides an opportunity for the United States to consider policy options about how to respond to the existence of alternative political movements in other states.
must rely primarily on symbol manipulation as opposed to coercion, utilitarian appeals, or a laissez-faire acceptance of habitual patterns, for its means of achieving support.\(^4\) Legitimacy can thus be thought of as the ability to gain support and extract human and material resources on the basis of symbol manipulation alone (Herrmann, 1991).

Of course, it is unlikely that any group or state will utilize only a single method to gain acceptance. However, since coercion and utilitarian means rely upon the implementation of negative and positive sanctions respectively to achieve support, they can hardly be said to be primary components of the social mobilization and popular participation that is at the heart of political empowerment. Political empowerment is thus not a sanction driven phenomenon. It is an indigenous, grass roots, alteration in the thinking of sectors of the society.

This is not to imply, however, that there is no organized leadership present. Almost all organizations have some form of leadership, and it is this leadership that makes use of symbol manipulation to garner support for the group's political agenda of change.

3. There must be a political movement in opposition to the incumbent regime. For my purposes, this opposition is not merely a reaction to a particular policy with which the

---

\(^4\) This typology of the methods of political control is taken from Etzioni (1968, pp. 313-395), and Weber (1947, pp. 324-386).
group disagrees. Instead it is a fundamental rejection of the incumbent ruling structure.

Since political empowerment thus defined is an opposition phenomena, efforts by the regime to enhance its own legitimacy through the manipulation or promotion of popular sentiment are not taken as aspects of political empowerment.

The Origins of Political Empowerment

Why political empowerment occurs is not a settled question. However, there appear to be a set of circumstances that together can be thought of as the "political empowerment syndrome". There are three components to this syndrome; 1) social and economic modernization, 2) relative economic distress in the affected social sector, and 3) a change in the power relationship between the ruler and the empowered group.

Social and economic modernization results in the breakdown of traditional authority structures (Deutsch, 1961). Under modernization the older social systems of authority and material well-being come under pressure due to changes in communication, demography, and production. The inability of former rulers and authority systems, to meet the rising demands of the citizens leads to a loss of legitimacy. The citizenry becomes increasingly politically aware, and thus available for mobilization to new conceptions of
politics. In essence, modernization creates a situation where personal empowerment has occurred but it is essentially latent, awaiting leadership and facilitating conditions to turn it into political empowerment. Two factors appear to make this latency manifest.

The first is an economic downturn among the affected sector of society, especially if this downturn is prolonged. The longer and more severe the economic crisis within the state, the more rulers lose legitimacy and popular support. Dissatisfaction sets in and the right of the leader to rule is increasingly questioned. Some examples of this include Iran just prior to the revolution, where inflation and unemployment were rampant, and Algeria, Jordan, and the Soviet Union more recently.

The second facilitating circumstance is either a loss in power by the leader, or a leader's lack of willingness to use their power to confront the opposition. As seen in the cases of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, once it was clear that Moscow was not going to stand in the way of political change, including the ousting of communist leaders, the political collapse of these regimes was nearly immediate. The Shah of Iran's inconsistent use of force against the demonstrators, applying it at times with terrible brutality and then punishing the security forces for their actions, undermined the regime's ability to stave off the revolution. A decline in the real power of the leader to control events,
or in the leader's willingness to use what force is available, allows political challenges to the state to emerge and grow.

Of these components, the one that is probably least obvious is the role of modernization in creating the conditions conducive to personal empowerment, and thereby political empowerment.

**Modernization**

The process of modernization is probably the most commonly accepted explanation for why societies exhibit political empowerment and its effects. Modernization, as a theoretical framework, arose in the 1950's and 1960's as scholars became particularly interested in the political development of the newly independent colonies of the South. Modernization, as a societal phenomena, can be viewed as the process whereby technology is increasingly harnessed and diffused into the population. This process then has far-ranging effects upon the society.

One of the best statements of the theory is by Karl Deutsch (1961). He speaks of a recurring set of associations between aspects of modernity (such as population mobility, literacy, urbanization, access to mass media, and economic growth).

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5 For early statements of the general theory of modernization and social mobilization see, Karl Deutsch (1961), Manfred Halpern (1963), and Daniel Lerner (1958). For more in-depth studies on the relevance of modernization on changing social and political patterns in the Middle East see Norton (1987); Kepel (1986); Hunter (1988); and Esposito (1987).
growth) and social mobilization. Social mobilization was, for Deutsch, defined as the erosion of old social, economic, and psychological commitments leaving people available for new patterns of socialization (1961, p. 494). Deutsch observed that along with social mobilization, through an expansion of the politically relevant strata of the population, came heightened demands for popular participation and for greater accountability of the political regime (1961, pp. 497-98).

According to the theory, the increasing numbers of politically active people and their demands for political decisions and governmental services leads to increased political participation. This participation may take the form of political parties, secret societies, unions, and unorganized political expression such as demonstrations, riots, and strikes. These newly mobilized sectors of society then place mounting pressures upon the system for the transformation of political practices and institutions. These pressures and demands can rarely be met by the incumbent authority system (Deutsch, 1961, pp. 497-499).

This produces a questioning and, at times, a challenging of the old societal patterns of authority. A legitimacy crisis occurs as previous legitimating formulas are seen as increasingly invalid by the population. The people begin to believe in their own political efficacy and to demand a greater voice in their governance. If the state is incapable
of meeting these demands or is unresponsive to them, then it will lose additional legitimacy and will be forced to rule increasingly by force. The state then faces the possibility of being replaced unless viable alternatives can be identified (Deutsch, 1961, p. 501).

Exactly what the end product of these demands for participation would be was left open in Deutsch's version of modernization. He argued that the process of social mobilization could lead to either state consolidation or fragmentation. The key determining variable here being the degree of societal homogeneity (Deutsch, 1961, p. 500). Because Deutsch was more concerned with the process of modernization and its effects upon the old social and political systems, he avoided making definitive statements about the end results of modernization.

Other theorists of the day, however, were more conclusive than Deutsch. Gabriel Almond (1960) equated modernity with the rise of secularism and rationality. Edward Shils (1962) took the modernization process to its most extreme conclusion. He explicitly linked political development, due to modernization, with the creation of a democratic system.6

6 The potential for a transition to democracy in many Middle Eastern states has become a hotly debated topic in recent years as more and more of these societies begin to experience pressures for reform. See, for example, works by Hudson (1991); Esposito and Piscatori (1991); Mortimer (1991); Eickelman and Pasha (1991); and Muslih and Norton (1991). On a more abstract level, the debate continues as to whether Islamic liberalism is a plausible future or simply wishful thinking. For the two sides of this controversy see Said (1979) and Binder (1988).
Consequences of Political Empowerment

The predictions of Almond and Shils about democracy for the most part have failed to materialize, but the basic insight of modernization theory appears valid. The factors mentioned by Deutsch appear to create a crisis in a state as its previous policies and institutions are discredited. The state loses legitimacy and there is a demand for more open and participatory political structures and processes.7

The incumbent regime then faces a choice of either reforming, in a bid to reestablish its legitimacy, or of repressing these demands, hoping that coercion will be sufficient to offset its lack of popular support. The final results of this mobilization are unknown. A state can either rally around new authority structures or it can spin out of control, leading to violence and instability.

Democracy is by no means the only possible outcome of the process of political empowerment. The forces that are unleashed by political empowerment could just as easily lead to demagogic structures, fascism, messianism, and other forms of authority. Huntington (1968) argued that the outcome of the rejection of incumbent authority structures is largely dependent upon the strength of the political institutions in the society. If the institutions are strong and viable in

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7 The classic study of the legitimacy problem in the Middle East is Hudson (1977).
the changing environment they then provide a means of channeling demands into constructive uses. Without such strong institutions, the result is undirected civil unrest that will be destructive and easily manipulated by charismatic, authoritarian leaders. It is worth keeping in mind that strong institutions as Huntington speaks of are consistent with many different regime formulas. Huntington's point is about the stability of the state not whether it will be democratic or not.

Political Empowerment in the Middle East

Whatever the causes and consequences of political empowerment, demands for political change are common in the Middle East. As economic and social development has occurred in these societies there have been changes in their political structures as well.8

In this environment the technocratic, bureaucratic-authoritarian leadership structures find it harder and harder to cope with these new demands and political forces. They face a situation where they either must reform, repress, or risk being pushed aside (Cottam, 1989). Recent examples of this overall trend include the 1989 elections in Jordan and Algeria,9 plus the growing political strength of Islamist movements in Egypt.

It has been argued that the prevalence of mass politics in the Middle East in the past was minimal. Cottam (1989) argues that while social change due to social mobilization has historic precedents, its effects were not widely felt in terms of political participation, in most cases, for some time. Waterbury (1983) and Bill and Leiden (1984) tend to agree, pointing out that what political participation there was, was usually channeled into structures and institutions that were designed around mobilization and control of popular forces for the benefit of an elite ruling group.

While perhaps not the dominant trend throughout the post colonial period, political empowerment is hardly a rare or recent phenomenon. There are a number of cases, such as Mossadeq in Iran, Nabulsi in Jordan, and the Iraqi revolution of political empowerment during the 1950's. The existence of such early cases points to the fact that political empowerment is an issue with which the United States has had to deal historically. It is also an issue that appears to be more and more prevalent.

Increasingly, what were previously viewed as quiescent societies with relatively stable leaderships, are rife with groups challenging the regime's leadership and policies.

9 In Algeria, elections in December of 1991, and subsequent run-off elections scheduled for January 16, 1992, would have given the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a mass based Islamic fundamentalist group, as much as 80 percent of the seats in the Parliament. The old ruling party, the FLN, polled a distant third in the initial elections. Of course, the military coup of January 1992, just prior to the secondary elections, has, for the time being, eliminated the possibility of an Islamic electoral victory. For more on this case, see chapter 5.
This change has many causes including the consequences of modernization, such as urbanization and public education, and also the creation of a differentiated middle class in many of these states, which feels that its ambitions are being thwarted by the convergence of the interests of the state and big business (Richards and Waterbury, 1990).

To explore how the American policy response to political empowerment has been formulated, the next section presents some of the most common theories and hypotheses that are advanced to explain American policy formation towards the Middle East.

Theories of American Foreign Policy and Political Empowerment

I have already argued that political empowerment is not a new phenomena in the Middle East. As such, the United States has made policy decisions in the past as to how to respond to this challenge to the status quo. Given this policy dilemma between courting change and opposing it, the question arises as to how to best explain the choices that the United States has made when confronted with this dilemma.

A logical starting point is to begin with an examination of the numerous theories of international politics and American foreign policy towards the Middle East that have been advanced to account for the United States' policy choices in the region. The utility of these theories in explaining American policy towards political empowerment can
be assessed by comparing their predictions of American policy choices against the record of actual United States behavior.

Table 1 presents the universe of cases that fit the definition of political empowerment outlined above. Whether or not the United States played a role was not a deciding factor for inclusion.

This set of twenty three cases serves as a data base against which the predictive utility of various theories of American foreign policy in the Middle East can be evaluated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Winner</th>
<th>U.S. Supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran 1953</td>
<td>Mohammed Reza Shah</td>
<td>Mossadeq</td>
<td>Shah</td>
<td>Shah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt 10/54</td>
<td>Nasser</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
<td>Nasser</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria 11/54-7/62</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan 12/55-1/56</td>
<td>King Hussein</td>
<td>Nasserite riots</td>
<td>King Hussein</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cases were identified by reviewing numerous secondary sources on the history of the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, individual country studies, and the memoirs of former CIA agents. The list only includes cases of empowerment since 1952. I have somewhat arbitrarily chose 1952 and the ascension of Nasser and the Free Officers as my beginning point. Nasser did not make the list because the Free Officer Movement did not represent the political interests of large segments of the Egyptian population. Instead, Nasser undertook a coup, planned in isolation and secrecy, without any visible organization that was seeking to rally mass support. Mitchell (1969, p. 157) argues that it wasn't until after Nasser's repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, following their unsuccessful assassination attempt of Nasser, that Nasser gained any real following in Egypt. The case of Algeria in the 1990's was not included in this data set because the comparable methods used to score the other cases were not available at the time.
Table 1 (continued).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Leader 1</th>
<th>Leader 2</th>
<th>Leader 3</th>
<th>Winner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Ben-Youssef</td>
<td>Bourguiba</td>
<td>Bourguiba</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/56</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Nabulsi</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Hussein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Hussein</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 7/58</td>
<td>King Faisal</td>
<td>Gen. Kassem</td>
<td>Kassem</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon 1958</td>
<td>Chamoun</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Neither^</td>
<td>Chamoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 3/59</td>
<td>Kassem</td>
<td>riot in</td>
<td>Kassem</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco 1959-1974</td>
<td>King Hassan II</td>
<td>UNFP</td>
<td>King Hassan</td>
<td>Hassan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 1961-1970</td>
<td>Ba'ath</td>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Ba'ath</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria 4/63-5/63</td>
<td>Ba'ath</td>
<td>Nasserite</td>
<td>Ba'ath</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>riots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran 1963</td>
<td>Shah</td>
<td>Khomeini</td>
<td>Shah</td>
<td>Shah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria 4/64-7/64</td>
<td>Ba'ath</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Ba'ath</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brotherhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt 7/65-8/65</td>
<td>Nasser</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Nasser</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brotherhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman 1965-1976</td>
<td>Sultan</td>
<td>Dhofar</td>
<td>Sultan</td>
<td>Sultan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>rebellion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Yemen 1967</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>FLOSY</td>
<td>FLOSY</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan 1970</td>
<td>Hussein</td>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Hussein</td>
<td>Hussein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria 2/73-4/73</td>
<td>As'ad</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>As'ad</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brotherhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 1972-1975</td>
<td>Ba'ath</td>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Ba'ath</td>
<td>Kurds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran 1977-1979</td>
<td>Shah</td>
<td>Khomeini</td>
<td>Khomeini</td>
<td>Shah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria 1977-1982</td>
<td>As'ad</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>As'ad</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brotherhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brotherhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>backed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^ This case is difficult to score as to winner and whom the United States supported. Chamoun was removed from office, but was replaced by a non-rebel. The United States did intervene, but acquiesced in the removal of Chamoun from office.
Realism

Realism, in particular neo-Realism, views political outcomes as arising out of an anarchic world, populated by competitive states, each trying to guarantee their security. The result is the recurring formation of a balance of power, though in differing manifestations. Since the end of World War II, the world has been generally characterized as a bipolar division between the United States, its allies and dependents, and the Soviet Union, its allies and dependents.

When this theory is applied to the foreign policy realm, the basis for policy choices is straightforward: A state should take whatever actions are necessary to maintain or expand its power base and, whenever possible, diminish the power base of competitors. In fulfilling this dictum, the search for allies becomes a primary means of acquiring power and security.

This is the case, because a state's power can be augmented both through internal and external means (Waltz, 1979, p. 119). Internally, a state can advance technologically, or by increasing its economic, material, and human resource bases. Such internal methods are considered more desirable because they are directly manipulable and are

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11 Most sophisticated proponents of Realism explicitly acknowledge that Realism is not a theory of foreign policy, and thus I do a disservice to the theory to use it so here (see for example, Waltz, 1979). However, since realism has been so often used to explain foreign policy, inclusiveness requires it be examined.
not dependent upon interactions with other actors; autarky being a goal in Realism (Waltz, 1979, pp. 168-69).

Despite a preference for internal power acquisition, this is not always functional. National attributes, like level of technology and population size, tend to change rather slowly so their utility in the balancing of other powers is less immediate (1979, pp. 177, 181). In the absence of a quick method of increasing a state's internal power capability, it is easier to balance another state through external means. External means of augmenting power include conquest and the acquisition of allies.

The primary means through which states have sought to achieve balancing is through the acquisition and maintenance of alliances. Alliances and fraternal relations lead to an immediate and visible increase in a grouping of states power capability. This point is borne out in history where the competition for allies by both superpowers has been a recurring theme of the post-war period. In this search for alliances, a state's policy strategy must be to please a potential or satisfy a present ally (Waltz, 1979, p. 165). This implies the objective of gaining and maintaining alliance partners. Morgenthau (1973) concludes that because of the motivation of power maximization, a state must seek to protect an alliance especially in a bipolar system.

As defined, political empowerment entails a situation of, at least potential, political change. The incumbent
regime may survive the current political challenge, be overthrown completely, or it may be forced to institute reforms to the system such that a new power configuration arises. Times of active political challenge, brought on by political empowerment, thus represent a period of uncertainty within the affected state.

This uncertainty also applies to a state's subsequent alliance choices. Unstable states are in flux and future alliance patterns are unsettled. Realism would thus expect these times of uncertainty to be of great concern to the superpowers, since they represent the possibility of perceived shifts in the global balance of power as a result of new alliance formations.

The question of which side the superpower will support in any of these cases is, for Realism, easily answered. According to the theory, policies and actions will be designed to acquire, maintain, and, hopefully, enhance relations with the state. Whether the state is ruled by the incumbent regime or another is immaterial.

Therefore, according to Realism, the only consideration for the United States, when confronted by an instance of potential change due to political empowerment, would be which of the opposing forces will, if it prevails, maintain or enhance the United States' role in that state.

Ideological considerations should play little to no role in this policy choice, according to Realism. Since power is
what motivates states, ideology is seen as an epiphenomenon used to justify policies when convenient. A common feature of Realist thinking is the perceived failure of ideology to explain U.S. alliance choices (see Waltz, 1979; Morgenthau, 1973; and for a specific application of this premise for Middle Eastern cases, see Walt, 1987, especially pp. 199-200).

Thus, when superpowers do act in the periphery they should show no systematic preference for sitting governments or opposition groups. For Realism, the guiding principle for policy should be the maintenance or acquisition of allies.

However, the record shows that, in terms of outcomes, the United States has backed the losing side in many of these political empowerment struggles. In these cases the United States made a policy choice that in the end resulted in a loss of influence and hence a reduction in the aggregate power resources of the U.S.-led bloc. Instead of protecting an alliance, the United States actually lost it, and thereby power. What is troubling about these cases is that, as Waltz states, in Realpolitik, success is the ultimate test of a policy (1979, p. 117). And success is defined as the preservation and strengthening of the state. States, in reality, seem to have a hard time living up to Realism's tenets.

Applying Realism to the data set, the United States actively supported the losing side in thirty six percent of
the cases. By including the "Neither" category, where the United States did not take any action to either maintain or acquire an alliance, the United States failed to follow the dictums of Realism in seventy percent of the cases. Applying a chi-square analysis of the table reveals that the two variables of "winning" and "U.S. support" are independent of one another (see Table 2).

Table 2.
Relation Between U.S. Behavior and Regional Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. supported</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>Empowered group</th>
<th>Neither</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>Iran-1953</td>
<td>Iraq-'72-'75</td>
<td>Egypt-1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan-1957</td>
<td>Syria-'77-'82</td>
<td>Iraq-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco-'59-'74</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq-'61-'70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran-1963</td>
<td>Syria-1963</td>
<td>Syria-1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oman-'65-'76</td>
<td>Syria-1964</td>
<td>Egypt-1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowered group</td>
<td>Algeria-'54-'62</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Tunisia-1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran-'77-'79</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq-1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Yemen-'67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table doesn't include Lebanon 1958 and Jordan 1956.

As for all the tables in this thesis, the cases in the off-diagonal, running from the lower left cell to the upper right cell, indicate instances where the United States' behavior was in contravention to the expectations of the theory. Cases where the United States backed neither side are also disconfirming of the theory as they represent cases
where the United States deprived itself of an opportunity to either gain new allies, weaken Soviet allies, or to strengthen previous allies. In the tables that do not represent a chi-square analysis, cases listed in italics are disconfirming cases.

The United States supported the eventual winning group in seven cases; the losing group in four cases and neither in twelve cases. Based on these figures, the United States supported the winning side in sixty four percent of the cases where it did intervene.

For all cases (N=21), \(X^2 = 0.093; \text{df}=2; \text{Critical value} = 5.991\). The relationship is not significant.

For only those cases where the United States chose a side (N=11), \(X^2 = 0.0749; \text{df}=1; \text{Critical Value} = 0.841\). The relationship is not significant.

It is impossible to state that if the United States had backed another set of forces in these cases that it would have necessarily achieved a net gain in its power resources. However, the lack of correspondence between the predicted policy response and the behavioral record must be noted and accounted for.\(^{12}\)

\(^{12}\) The failure of the United States to consistently back the winning side illustrates two further points. One, as Gourevitch (1986) noted, domestic outcomes are rarely determined by the international level. Instead the international level is best viewed as a constraint on policy. Secondly, many would argue that the U.S.-backed side lost because of a lack of exertion on the part of the United States. While, there is undoubtedly some truth to this explanation, it does not save Realism as an explanatory theory for these cases because Realism does not account for variation in this national level variable.
Rational Choice

The Rational Choice approach is a useful paradigm for studying political behavior. The development of the ideas of subjective expected utility (Steinbruner, 1974) and nested games with maximization occurring given multiple arenas (Tsebelis, 1990) are particularly relevant to this thesis as they focus on the values and interests of the actor rather than those ascribed to the actor by the observer. However, while the rational choice approach is philosophically compatible, it is difficult to utilize in this exercise because it requires an a priori statement as to what are the values in the actor's utility function that are to be maximized. Too often, these values are asserted by the researcher without a solid empirical underpinning. As I develop in chapter two, this is where the value of a decision making approach may be useful.

The possible values are numerous and changing. Therefore, I cannot claim to know what is being maximized in each of the twenty three cases. However, if this goal is assumed to be power, this approach is very similar in terms of policy predictions to the Realist position detailed above.

According to this variant, a purely rational actor would desire to have positive relations with the state in the post-crisis period, regardless of who is in power. The actor would then evaluate the likelihood for each side prevailing in the political contest within the state. The policy choice
should simply be based upon an evaluation as to the eventual winner. To back the loser is to most likely alienate the winner who will then remember the lack of support during the previous lean times.

As shown in the section on Realism, in numerous cases United States policy did not result in positive relations following the crisis (see Table 2). This can occur due to backing the losing side, as in America's periodic support of the Kurds in Iraq, or by not taking actions that would possibly promote positive future relations, such as ending support for the Shah earlier in the crisis. Another commonly taken policy option is to do nothing. This can be due to either uncertainty, a lack of resources and access, or for domestic political reasons. However, this option is by its nature an abdication of involvement. Choosing this policy makes influencing events in other states in self-promoting ways impossible.

While the logic of the rational choice approach is powerful, it's utilization necessitates a valid statement of preferred states and alternatives. This fundamental task is extremely difficult and should not be left in the realm of assumption and speculation. Theoretically-based and empirically-validated methods of identifying these interests and values need to be utilized.
Balance of Threat

Steve Walt (1987) provides another variant on the Realist paradigm. In this conception, a state's policies are designed to identify and balance against the existence of threat in the environment, rather than counter power asymmetries.

Walt argues that the perception of threat from another state, or group of states, is derived from calculations as to the other's aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and, finally, aggressive intent. He then uses this set of concepts to explain the patterns of alliances that have developed and changed in the Middle East since the end of World War II.

In a study of United States' policy choices towards an internal conflict based on political empowerment, most of Walt's variables have little applicability. Geographic proximity, which equates physical proximity with threat, should have no bearing as all of these states are located in a region far removed from the United States. Also, whichever side is ultimately successful will occupy the same territory as the other side would have, so this dimension does not provide a means for determining which group will be seen as more threatening.¹³

¹³ Some may raise the point that there are American interests in some of these states that may play the same role as geographic proximity. Doing so shifts the argument to a national interests type explanation. These sorts of explanatory theories will be dealt with later.
Walt's next two threat instilling variables are aggregate power and offensive power. Aggregate power is a determination as to the total power resources of a state; be they military, economic, human, or whatever. Offensive power roughly equals the military capability of a state. While this is less inclusive than aggregate power, it is based upon the same threat calculation, that is, the ability of a state to project its' power externally. In the Middle East, the states of the region have no ability to make use of their power capabilities, assuming they would be risk-acceptant enough to even do so, directly against the United States. However, these states could still pose a threat to the United States. They could threaten American allies or align with other "enemies" of the United States and thereby radically alter the global threat situation.

No matter what type of power is being considered, these variables are indeterminate in specifying with whom the United States will choose to align. After identifying the power of each side within the state, the United States can either decide to court or coerce. As Walt himself acknowledges, aggregate power can be either feared or prized and therefore can lead to both bandwagoning (courting) and balancing (coercing) behavior (1987, pp. 22-23). Therefore, both types of strategic behavior are consistent with Walt's power calculations.
What remains is the variable of perceived intentions. Walt says a state will balance against perceived aggression and threat coming from another actor. Overall, Walt sees this variable as the most important. He uses the example of World War II where the Allied coalition remained united up to the final defeat of Hitler despite their overwhelming power capability relative to the Axis powers. In a pure balance of power world, he argues, the allied coalition should have split up once its power was greater than that of the Axis powers. This did not happen, Walt argues, because Hitler was simply seen as being so aggressive that to not pursue the war to his destruction was unthinkable (1987, p. 25). The need was to balance against Hitler's threat rather than his power.

For Walt, a state, or in my cases a domestic actor, will be labeled a threat, and thus deserving of balancing type policies such as confrontation, if it is seen as possessing desires that, if acted upon, would cause harm to the perceiver.

This idea of perceived intentions as influencing policy choices appears appropriate in the cases with which I wish to deal. Since these states are neither near nor powerful relative to the United States, perhaps it is on the basis of their perceived intentions that the United States' decision to back one side or the other is based. This aggressive intent would be synonymous with a perception of "Anti-Americanism". In this view, the United States should
undertake actions designed to balance or confront whoever is seen as a threat within these states.

Two problems arise with this view of policy making. The first is why must a perceived threat always be balanced against? If threat is a variable, then it may be possible to take actions designed to remove the threat and promote positive relations. And, secondly, how does this designation of threat take place? How does another state come to be labeled a threat?

The first question raises the point that threat and aggressive intent may not be immutable. It is possible that the threat an actor faces can be removed by courting the other actor. And, in practice, this strategy has been tried. For example, the willingness of the United States to engage in selling arms to Iran during the early 1980's with the goal of improving relations as a counter to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, demonstrates how far U.S. thinking had changed from the time of the Iranian revolution.

Contrary to Walt, perceived threat isn't the determinant of policy. Instead, the existence of threat opens a policy debate over how to best respond. One strategy is to balance against threat, the Walt view. Another is to attempt to defuse the threat through a policy of engagement, though not necessarily bandwagoning.

Secondly, Walt begs the question of how an actor comes to be perceived as a threat in the first place. Walt does
not state through what process this designation occurs. And, in fact, he admits that, although important, determining intentions isn't easy (1987, p. 180). However, this point is absolutely essential to understanding the policy decisions that get made. Therefore, we must be willing to confront this difficult task, and strive to construct some means for doing so.

In speaking of states as feeling threatened, Walt treats the state as a unitary actor, reifying it for analytical convenience. I am certain that Walt would readily admit that a state does not really perceive threat, but its leaders do. If everyone making policy sees the same threat, then it is an acceptable convenience to speak of the state as seeing threat. Parsimony aside, however, the identification of threat is unlikely to be unambiguous. Disagreements may arise over the definition of what is a threat, where the states interests lie, and whom to support.

This point is especially crucial when looking at the cases. The perception of an actor as a threat is not always a shared belief. In cases like those of Mossadeg, Nasser, and even Khomeini, there were high level government officials interested in the policy choices of the United States on this issue who did not see a threat to the United States from

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14 Walt concludes that in cases where intentions are unclear, it is better to balance than to bandwagon (1987, pp. 179-180). This may be true for inter-state relations, but when trying to choose a policy strategy towards domestic instability in another country, balancing can be just as dangerous as bandwagoning.
these leaders. While such views clearly did not become the basis of U.S. policy, their existence does point to an interesting puzzle of just how a decision making group comes to take a position such as defining a leader or group as a threat.

In brief, Walt ignores the point that the perceived intent of another actor is an output of the decision making process not an input to policy making. Acknowledging this distinction leads to a need to examine the policy making process. Now the key question is whether there are aspects of the decision makers and the policy making process that influence the determination of perceived intent in systematic ways. I consider such individual views and the policy process important in understanding the policy choices that get made, and will therefore return to these points later.

In defining who is a threat to the United States based on aggressive intent, decision makers are likely to use what they perceive as vital national interests as a gauge of a group's intent. The position a group advocates in regard to these interests thus becomes a means of determining who within another state has aggressive intentions and thus is a threat to the United States, or at least these interests. Since national interests may thereby play a determining role in U.S. policy formation, it makes sense to examine national interests and see how effective they are in predicting U.S. policy towards political empowerment.
National Interests as Determining U.S. Policy

The following is a list of issues which have, at times, been presented as impinging on the American national interest and thereby serve as guides to American policy formation: Israel, Oil, the Soviet Union, Communism, Islam, and Democracy.

Israel

A common argument is that a guiding interest of the United States in the Middle East is safeguarding the security of Israel. This view of American decision making towards the region argues that due to such factors as, cultural similarities, American feelings of guilt over the Holocaust, the fact that Israel has a democratic system of government, the stability and reliability of Israel as an ally in the region to protect America's interests, and the political strength of the pro-Israeli lobby in Washington (for example, AIPAC), the United States, has developed a special relationship with Israel. This symbiotic relationship then motivates the United States to take actions that serve to protect and benefit Israel.\(^{15}\)

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\(^{15}\) For authors that make this argument see, Findley (1985); Green (1984); Curtiss (1982); Blitzer (1985); Kenen (1981); Grose (1983); Feuerwerger (1979); Isaacs (1974); and Spiegel (1985).
If this view is correct, the United States should: 1) take action when a group emerges that is either pro or anti-Israeli, 2) support the group that is either pro-Israeli or, at least, fighting against the anti-Israeli group, and, 3) not be concerned in cases where both or neither side has a strong stand on Israel.

This hypothesis failed to predict American foreign policy for forty two percent of the set of political empowerment cases (see Table 3), and the relationship is not statistically significant (see Table 4).
Table 3.16

Relation Between U.S. Behavior and Views on Israel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empoweree is</th>
<th>Pro-Israeli</th>
<th>Anti-Israeli</th>
<th>NA*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Israeli</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraqi '61-'70-N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraqi '72-'75-E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Israeli</td>
<td>Iraqi '61-'70-N</td>
<td>Egypt '54-N</td>
<td>Iraqi '58-N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq '72-'75-E</td>
<td>Jordan '56-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan '57-I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq '59-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '63-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '64-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt '65-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan '70-I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '73-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '77-'82-E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan-E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Algeria-I</td>
<td>Morocco-I</td>
<td>Iran '53-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia-N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oman-I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* NA=Not Ascertained17

N=23 (with NA included) 42% of the cases do not fit the hypothesis.

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16 An "N" next to a case indicates that the United States supported Neither side in the case. An "I" indicates U.S. support for the Incumbent Regime. And an "E" indicates U.S. support for the Empowered Group. Italicized cases are disconfirming of the theories expectations.

17 Cases were scored in NA category either because 1) the regime or empowered group simply did not have a position on the issue under consideration, say for example their views on the United States and Soviet Union, or 2) the regime or group did have a position, but my review of the secondary sources did not provide enough information to warrant a scoring. To make sure that this difficulty in scoring was not effecting my results too strongly, I ran the data both with and without these NA cases being included; this explains the second reported result based upon the smaller N.
N=17 (with NA counted as missing data) 39% of the cases do not fit the hypothesis.

Table 4.
Chi-square Analysis of Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One actor is Pro-Israeli</th>
<th>U.S. Supported</th>
<th>U.S. Didn't Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran 1963</td>
<td>South Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq 1972-1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both or neither are (is) Pro-Israeli</td>
<td>Jordan 1957</td>
<td>Egypt 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan 1970</td>
<td>Jordan 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria 1977-1982</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Iraq 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria 1973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=17; $X^2 = 1.033; df=1; Critical Value= 3.841. We cannot claim a relationship exists between these variables.

Oil

A second argument posits that the United States government is responsive to the politics of oil.\(^\text{19}\) There are two possible variants here. The first, or domestic politics

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\(^{18}\) As for all the chi-square tables, cases in the off-diagonal, running from the lower left cell to the upper right cell, are disconfirming. The chi-square tables were created by collapsing all instances of U.S. action, either for the incumbent regime or the empowered movements, into the "U.S. Supported" column. U.S. support for neither domestic actor was recoded into the "U.S. Didn't Support" column. All cases coded as "Not Ascertained" were treated as missing data and excluded from the chi-square analysis.

\(^{19}\) For authors that make this argument see, Emerson (1985); Curtiss (1982); Kenen (1981); Blitzer (1985); Spiegel (1985); Stivers (1987); and Stivers (1986).
version, is that the United States government realizes that both the general public and the business community have a desire for cheap oil. Low cost oil leads to lower gas prices and cheaper petroleum products, such as plastic and fertilizer. The motivation for the policy makers in this view is to maintain popular support by maintaining a continuing flow of oil, at "reasonable" prices, from the Middle East.

The second view, more Marxist in orientation, is that the American oil companies control the American political system and thus have the government undertake policies and actions designed to protect the interests of the oil companies. A primary interest of the oil companies is to continue to extract and market oil from the Middle East. Foreign politicians and political movements that could disrupt either the physical flow of oil or the profit margins of the oil companies would thus be seen as threatening.

In either case, the policy implication derived from the oil argument is that the United States will take actions to forestall the policies of Middle Eastern leaders or political movements if they are seen as a potential threat to the oil interests of America.

If this view is correct, the United States' policy would be to: 1) take action anytime a group emerges that is possibly threatening to oil, 2) support pro-oil groups and
act against anti-oil groups and, 3) not be concerned with situations where there is no threat to oil.

This hypothesis failed to predict American foreign policy for forty six percent of the set of political empowerment cases (see Table 5), and the relationship is not statistically significant (see Table 6).

20 The crucial criteria in making this determination are likely to be beliefs about the willingness of a state to continue with current agreements as to access, production, shipping, price policy, royalties and profit sharing. Any group perceived to advocate a radical re-negotiation on such issues will likely be viewed as a threat who will, according to this argument, then be confronted.
Table 5.
Relation Between U.S. Behavior and Views on Oil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incumbent regime is Threat</th>
<th>Empoweree is Threat</th>
<th>No threat</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '77-'82-E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No threat</td>
<td>Iraq '61-'70-N</td>
<td>Iran '53-I</td>
<td>Morocco-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq '72-'75-E</td>
<td>Algeria-I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran '58-N</td>
<td>Jordan '57-I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon-N</td>
<td>Iraq '59-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq '63-N</td>
<td>Syria '63-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran '63-I</td>
<td>Iran '64-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '64-N</td>
<td>Iran '77-'79-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Jordan '56-N</td>
<td>Egyptian '54-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oman-I</td>
<td>Tunisia-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Yemen-N</td>
<td>Egypt '65-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan '70-I</td>
<td>Afghanistan-E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '73-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* NA=Not Ascertained

N=23 46% of the cases do not fit the hypothesis.

N=13 (with NA counted as missing data) 43% of the cases do not fit the hypothesis.

* The Shah is somewhat hard to score on this. He gave no reason to believe that he would do anything to slow the flow of oil, but it must also be remembered that he was at the forefront of the 1973-74 quadrupling of oil prices after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
Table 6.
Chi-square Analysis of Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One actor is Threat</th>
<th>U.S. Supported</th>
<th>U.S. Didn't Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to Oil</td>
<td>Iraq 1972-1975</td>
<td>Iraq 1961-1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria 1977-1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both or neither is</td>
<td>Iran 1953</td>
<td>Iraq 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Oil</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan 1957</td>
<td>Iraq 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran 1977-1979</td>
<td>Syria 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria 1964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=13; \( \chi^2 = .0413 \). We cannot claim a relationship exists between these variables.

Anti-Soviet

With the advent of the Cold War a global competition developed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Initially, this competition was viewed as being over the physical possession of territory. During the 1940's the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the Soviet sphere was commonly seen as part of a larger desire to expand Soviet borders through conquest or the installation of client regimes. In the Middle East, the most clear example of this supposed Soviet expansionism was in Iran immediately after the war, from which the Soviets appeared disinclined to leave.

The West's response was containment. Through this doctrine the United States sought to deny the Soviet's future gains. Some policy manifestations of containment were the
Marshall Plan designed to rebuild Western Europe in order to deny the local Communist parties popular support, the formation of NATO, the Truman Doctrine, and, later on, the Baghdad Pact.

Since the 1950's, containment took on a new meaning, that of resisting the spread of Soviet and communist influence. The new battleground was the Third World. As the former colonial lands gained independence there was a competition for influence in these states. Friendly relations with Third World states were seen as important in the strategic competition between the superpowers.

In the Middle East, this shift in emphasis was evidenced by a lessening interest in a physical buffer to the Soviet Union, such as the Baghdad Pact, in favor of the diplomatic isolation of the Soviets from the Middle East. These efforts were ultimately and, probably inevitably, unsuccessful. Most analysts point to the 1955 Egyptian-Czech arms deal as the first instance of Soviet "leapfrogging" of containment in the Middle East. However, the desire to limit Soviet influence in this region has continued to be cited as a primary motive of U.S. policy (Congressional Quarterly, 1986).

If this view is right, then the United States should act in all cases where pro-Soviet forces are involved. The United States should not act if both sides are pro-American, pro-Soviet or neutral.
This hypothesis failed to predict American foreign policy for thirty seven percent of the set of political empowerment cases (see Table 7), and the relationship is not statistically significant (see Table 8).

While this hypothesis appears useful in predicting U.S. policy, it should be remembered that this hypothesis is also no longer operative as a guide to future policy making. The end of the Cold War thus raises an important policy point; if U.S. policy in the past has been guided by a reliance upon the simple decision rule of how an event affects the East-West conflict, it is imperative that policy now be grounded upon a more refined appraisal of the situation.
Table 7.
Relation Between U.S. Behavior and Alliance Patterns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incumbent regime is</th>
<th>Empowered is</th>
<th>U.S. ally</th>
<th>Soviet ally</th>
<th>Neutral/ neither</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. ally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq '72-'75-E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regime is</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia '56-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soviet ally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regime is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neither</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regime is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=23</td>
<td>37% of the cases do not fit the hypothesis.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Tunisian case is interesting in that it wasn't a struggle between the previous regime and a single empowered group. Instead, France, the colonial power, had already decided to leave Tunisia. What was uncertain was who would replace the French colonial administration. Essentially, the power struggle was between two factions of the secular nationalist party, the Neo-Destour, one headed by Ben-Youssef and the other by Bourguiba. This case is an excellent example of the type of fluidity in the domestic situation that can occur. For the purposes of these figures, and completely arbitrarily, the Ben-Youssef faction is considered the incumbent group while Bourguiba is the empowered group. Scoring the actors this way does not effect the results.
Table 8.
Chi-square Analysis of Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One actor is Superpower ally</th>
<th>U.S. Supported</th>
<th>U.S. Didn’t Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan 1970</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 1972-1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran 1953</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan 1957</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran 1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran 1977-1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria 1977-1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both or neither is Superpower ally</td>
<td>Jordan 1956</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt 1954</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 1959</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 1961-1970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria 1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=23; $X^2$ = 1.7727. We cannot claim a relationship exists between these variables.

Anti-Communist

During the height of the Cold War, there was a pervasive conception in the United States that communism was a monolithic entity. In this view, no distinction was made between the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the numerous local communist parties throughout the Third World.

Counter-examples like Tito of Yugoslavia and the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960's later forced a recognition that many local communist groups were not necessarily the mere
puppets of Moscow. However, the recognition that there may be independent tendencies within some communist groups did not immediately make them any more acceptable as the political leadership in other states.

According to the anti-communist argument, the United States has not been guided exclusively by its distaste for the Soviet Union. Instead, the United States is seen as having an incompatibility with the broader concept of communist rule, no matter the communist's foreign policy tendencies.

If this hypothesis is true, the United States should act in support of any group that has displayed anti-communist tendencies and policies.

This hypothesis fails to predict American foreign policy for forty six percent of the set of political empowerment cases (see Table 9), and the relationship is not statistically significant (see Table 10).
Table 9.
Relation Between U.S. Behavior and Views on Communism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empoweree is</th>
<th>Anti-communist</th>
<th>Pro-communist</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-communist</td>
<td>Iran '53-I</td>
<td>Iraq '59-N</td>
<td>Tunisia-N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt '54-N</td>
<td>Afghanistan-E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq '61-'70-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '63-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran '63-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '64-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt '65-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '73-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq '72-'75-E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran '77-'79-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '77-'82-E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-communist</td>
<td>Jordan '57-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq '58-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oman-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Yemen-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Jordan '56-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan '70-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* NA=Not Ascertained

N=23 46% of the cases do not fit the hypothesis.

N=20 (with NA counted as missing data) 43% of the cases do not fit the hypothesis.
Table 10.
Chi-square Analysis of Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One actor is Anti-Communist</th>
<th>U.S. Supported</th>
<th>U.S. Didn't Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan 1957</td>
<td>Iraq 1958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Iraq 1959</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran 1953</td>
<td>Egypt 1954</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran 1963</td>
<td>Iraq 1961-1970</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 1972-1975</td>
<td>Syria 1963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran 1977-1979</td>
<td>Syria 1964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria 1977-1982</td>
<td>Egypt 1965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria 1973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=20; \(X^2= .2198\). We cannot claim a relationship exists between these variables.

Islam

A fear among many Muslims is that the United States is prejudiced against Islam. An analogy can be made to the historical experiences of the Crusades when European Christian knights made forays into the Middle East to "rescue" the Holy Places from the Muslims. Some Muslims, aware of the analogy, like to point to the triumph of Saladin (Salah Ad-Din) over the Crusaders in 1215 as a portent of the future.

\[21\] Of course, religious fervor is only one of many possible motivations for the Crusades. Others include a desire to pillage the wealth of these areas.
Recently the argument has centered more over concepts such as secularism and the primacy of individual rights over communal rights as a basis of government. A conflict is seen between these concepts and certain precepts of Islam which, for example, makes no distinction between church and state. Disagreements of this sort are argued to have led to misgivings and hostility between the Western and Muslim worlds.

No matter the motivation for doing so, U.S. policy, this argument holds, will be guided by a desire to repress and destroy Islam. One specific manifestation of this theory of American policy making is that this fear of Islam will lead the United States to favor secular governments over Islamic governments.

If this view is correct, the United States should act to oppose Islamic forces in their competition with secular forces.

This hypothesis fails to predict American foreign policy for fifty seven percent of the set of political empowerment cases (see Table 11), and the relationship is not statistically significant (see Table 12).
Table 11.
Relation Between U.S. Behavior and Religious Beliefs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empowered group is</th>
<th>Secular</th>
<th>Islamic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Iran '53-I&lt;br&gt;Algeria-I&lt;br&gt;Jordan '56-N&lt;br&gt;Tunisia-N&lt;br&gt;Jordan '57-I&lt;br&gt;Iraq '58-N&lt;br&gt;Iraq '59-N&lt;br&gt;Iraq '61-'70-N&lt;br&gt;Syria '63-N&lt;br&gt;Oman-I&lt;br&gt;South Yemen-N&lt;br&gt;Jordan '70-I&lt;br&gt;Iraq '72-'75-E</td>
<td>Morocco-I&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td>Egypt '54-N&lt;br&gt;Iran '63-I&lt;br&gt;Syria '64-N&lt;br&gt;Egypt '65-N&lt;br&gt;Syria '73-N&lt;br&gt;Iran '77-'79-I&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;Syria '77-'82-E&lt;br&gt;Afghanistan-E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12.

Chi-square Analysis of Table 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One actor is Iran</th>
<th>U.S. Supported</th>
<th>U.S. Didn't Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Iran 1963</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran 1977-1979</td>
<td>Egypt 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria 1977-1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both or neither is</td>
<td>Iran 1953</td>
<td>Jordan 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan 1957</td>
<td>Iraq 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Iraq 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq 1972-1975</td>
<td>Syria 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=22; $X^2= 1.3107$. We cannot claim a relationship exists between these variables.

Democracy

A final argument, taken from political culture type explanations, is that the United States is guided by certain principles in the determination of its foreign policy. A central principle of the United States is said to be its support for democracy and democratic forces.

This hypothesis fails to predict American foreign policy for forty eight percent of the set of political empowerment cases (see Table 13), and the relationship is not statistically significant (see Table 14).
Table 13.
Relation Between U.S. Behavior and Democratic Tendencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empoweree is</th>
<th>Non-democratic</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-democratic</td>
<td>Egypt '54-N</td>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '63-N</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia-N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '64-N</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Yemen-N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt '65-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan-E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Iran '53-I</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon-N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan '57-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq '58-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran '63-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran '77-'79-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA*</td>
<td>Jordan '56-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq '59-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq '61-'70-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oman-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan '70-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria '73-N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq '72-'75-E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Syria 1977-82 could not be included because my sources indicate that the Muslim Brotherhood both is and isn't a democratic entity.

* NA=Not Ascertained

N=22 48% of the cases do not fit the hypothesis.
N=15 (with NA counted as missing data) 60% of the cases do not fit the hypothesis.
Table 14.
Chi-square Analysis of Table 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S. Supported</th>
<th>U.S. Didn't Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One actor is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Iran 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran 1977-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both or neither is Democratic</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Egypt 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=15; $X^2 = .0961$. We cannot claim a relationship exists between these variables.

One of the interesting findings from the data is that the category of Not Ascertained did very little to skew the overall results. For all the hypotheses where this category was coded, only in one instance was the difference between the two findings greater than five percent, that one instance being Democracy.

Discussion

In assessing the predictive capability for each of these hypotheses, the Cold War or anti-Soviet argument fares best. A prediction that the United States would court political empowerment where it was anti-Soviet and coerce it where it was pro-Soviet would have been incorrect in just over one-
third of the cases (thirty seven percent). The pro-Israeli argument fared next best at forty two percent disconfirmation rate. In ascending order the rest of the hypotheses predicted incorrectly in forty six percent of the cases for the Anti-Communist argument, the Oil hypothesis in forty six percent, American support for Democracy in forty eight percent, and a preference for Secularism versus Islamism in fifty seven percent of the cases. In addition to these results, a test of association for each of the pairings showed no significant relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable. See Tables 15 and 16 for a summary of the results of these hypotheses.
Table 15.
Applicability of the 7 Major Theories of U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East Between 1953 and 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Realism&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Israel&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Oil&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Soviet&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Communism&lt;sup&gt;j&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Islam&lt;sup&gt;k&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Democracy&lt;sup&gt;l&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran '53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt 10/54</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria 11/54-7/62</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan 12/55-1/56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia 3/56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan '57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 7/58</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon '58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 3/59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco '59-'74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq '61-'70</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria 4-5/63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>f</sup> The guiding principle for policy should be the maintenance or acquisition of allies.

<sup>g</sup> The United States will support those regimes or groups that are supportive of Israel.

<sup>h</sup> The United States will work against regimes or groups that are perceived as a threat to oil.

<sup>i</sup> The United States will act: 1) to protect friends, be they incumbent regimes or empowered groups threatened by the Soviet Union, 2) to counter Soviet allies.

<sup>j</sup> The United States will support regimes and groups that are anti-Communist.

<sup>k</sup> The United States will favor secular forces over Islamic forces.

<sup>l</sup> The United States will support democratic forces in a country due to belief in the sanctity and primacy of the principle of democracy.
Table 15 (continued).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>x</th>
<th>x</th>
<th>x</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>6/63</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>4-7/64</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>7-8/65</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>'64-'76</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Yemen</td>
<td>'67</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>'70</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2-4/73</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>'72-'75</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>'77-'79</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>'77-'82</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanis</td>
<td>an '79-'92</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

x = disconfirming case

Table 16.
Results Derived from Table 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Disconforming</th>
<th>14/23</th>
<th>10/23</th>
<th>11/23</th>
<th>8/23</th>
<th>10/23</th>
<th>13/23</th>
<th>12/23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Disconfirming</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x²</td>
<td>0.093 (N=21)</td>
<td>1.033 (N=17)</td>
<td>0.0413 (N=13)</td>
<td>1.7727 (N=23)</td>
<td>0.2198 (N=20)</td>
<td>1.3107 (N=22)</td>
<td>0.0961 (N=15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results demonstrate the problem with relying on such mono-causal arguments for predicting U.S. policy toward political empowerment in the Middle East in all cases. While a particular argument may be compelling for explaining a particular case, often there are other cases which are
contrary to the theories' expectations. Therefore, monocausal arguments appear to be insufficient to describe the policy choice.

These results suggest that policy is not made automatically on the basis of any such "guiding interests", and that a simple reliance upon such conventional wisdoms or heuristics, as represented by the hypotheses above, is inadequate to explain American policy choices. However, these arguments are an important step in moving beyond idiosyncratic studies of decision making in that they propose some general categories of explanations that can be applied in multiple settings. Their shortcoming is an inability to specify when they will and will not apply. They also lack the richness of description and complexity that we intuitively know characterizes the decision making process.

Specialists in American foreign policy and Middle Eastern politics can provide such details based on their knowledge of the specifics of the region and their awareness of the complexity of policy formation. What is often missing from their accounts however, is a systematic process through which their predictions are made.

In this thesis I try to walk the line between these two positions. I begin with a conviction that detailed knowledge of the subject under study is crucial. I also attempt to impose some discipline upon the collection and interpretation of the data. By taking the more positive aspects from each
approach, I strive to present a study that is substantively rich and accurate while also being a theoretically interesting and valid study of the foreign policy decision making process.

Motivation, Perceptions, and Group Decision Making

It would be an error to reject the hypotheses examined as irrelevant to explaining American foreign policy towards political empowerment in the Middle East. While any single one in isolation is not so compelling that the others could be totally discounted, these explanations do seem to account for some, and probably a large, portion of the total variance in policy choice on this issue.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{22} For example, the two hypotheses of the United States being anti-Soviet and pro-Israeli combined account for American behavior in about ninety-seven percent of the cases. While a powerful finding, it is hardly surprising. Scholars studying the Middle East have long noted that these two interests, plus a concern over access to cheap oil, apparently dominate American interests in the region.

However, noting the explanatory strength of these interests does not allow the conclusion that the question of what drives American policy has been solved. Two problems still remain.

The more obvious one is that the Soviet Union has been dismantled and is no longer perceived by most Americans as a threat to the Middle East. With such a major interest removed, how will subsequent American policy be shaped?

More importantly, noting that these three interests account for a tremendous amount of the observed variation does not serve as a reliable guide to either the creation or explanation of American policy behavior. Oftentimes, these interests are incongruous leaving it indeterminate as to which one(s) will shape policy for any particular event.

Also, there are often usually multiple policy options available in pursuit of these interests. Knowing what the interests are is of little value in predicting which policy option will be chosen in pursuit of that interest. For that we need to examine the constellation and competition of interests and options as they are played out within the decision making process. A means of doing such an analysis is presented in chapter two.
Rather than thinking of these as competing hypotheses of national interests, a more effective approach may be to see them as complementary components of the explanation whose mix varies as a function of situation and individual.

Each component, be it feelings about Israel, oil, Islam, or whichever, can be thought of as a political value possibly held by an individual. People are then motivated to act in defense or promotion of these political values.

Other political actors, be they states, groups, or individuals, are then perceived according to their relation to these preferred political values. When the environment encourages the promotion of these values the person perceives an opportunity. Conversely, when these values are seen as being under attack, a perception of threat dominates.

Such perceptions manifest themselves in two ways. First is in the policy preference that the individual advocates in response to the situation. But this can be ambiguous. A single action or policy stand can reflect multiple perceptions and motives. A second set of indicators are the statements an actor uses to describe another actor.

However, identifying the policy preferences and inferring the underlying perceptions of the actors does not explain the decisional output. Such preferences are merely the inputs into the decision making process. In most cases, not all members of the policy elite define the situation the same way. Some may see a great deal of threat in the
environment while others may see none or even an opportunity. Such differences will often be reflected in the differing policy preferences put forth by the actors. How then does the decision making process operate in these situations of uncertainty and dissensus? Out of the sum of views held by members of the policy elite, which ones will be considered?

I argue that perceptions of the other also affect the degree of tolerance for deviancy possessed by a policy maker. The higher the intolerance, the greater the efforts to recompose the group in ways designed to lessen the impact of the deviant.

The success of these strategies affects the range and strength of views from among the policy elite which are present among the presidential elite where the decision actually gets made. In this way, the reconfiguration of the decision making group, because of perceptual differences among the members, affects the final decision output.

Chapter two elaborates on this theory of perceptions, preference formation, and group composition.
CHAPTER II: THE ROLE OF PERCEPTIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCE FORMATION AND THE TOLERANCE OF DEVIANCY

Political Values and Policy Preferences

Returning to the question of how does the United States respond to empowerment in the Middle East, there is little doubt that we can draw tremendous insight from the theories that have traditionally been used to explain American behavior in this region. However, the exercise in chapter one suggests that a reliance upon mono-causal theories is inadequate to explain the variance in observed behavior. At the same time it is clear that collectively these perspectives explain much about American behavior in the region. The lesson to be drawn from the exercise is that we cannot assume or assert the relevant interests of the actors for any case. Instead what is needed is a careful examination of the combination of interests held by multiple actors. This requires an approach that examines the process through which trade-offs are reconciled and balanced.

An alternative approach is to consider each of the theories presented in chapter one as a political value that can be held by some members of the policy elite during an event. It is expected that most individuals will hold
multiple values concurrently, and that the specific combination of values will vary from event to event.

The actor is presumed to be inclined to act to either defend or promote this set of political values. The way in which the environment affects these political values, shapes the actor's perceptions of threat and opportunity, with subsequent effects upon their policy preferences and tolerance of deviancy.

Disagreements over policy are likely to come out of differences as to the political values that are seen as at stake. Motivational and perceptual differences will also exist making agreement difficult.

Understanding the basis of policy preferences and how this leads to dissent is a key point in explaining a policy choice. However, identifying policy preference differences and seeking to infer the underlying bases of these differences does not explain the final policy choice.

Policy is rarely made by a single individual acting in isolation from others. Thus, there is a need to be sensitive to the issue of how differences in policy preference are acted upon in the group decision making setting. While the complex process of aggregating numerous individual policy preferences into a single decision is beyond the scope of this thesis, I will explore one means through which the perceptions held by an individual affect the group. I will focus upon the toleration of deviancy in the group as a
function of the perceptions held by each individual decision maker.

Motivations and Perceptions in International Relations

Motivation in International Relations

As suggested above, the theory presented here argues that what are usually considered to be explanatory theories of American foreign policy in the Middle East can alternatively be thought of as political values held by individuals. Thus, the security of Israel, the promotion of democracy, and so on, represent potential components of a person's value system. Events in the external environment that are seen as impinging on any of these political values will then become salient to the individual. Action taken in defense or promotion of these values has many possible sources. A motivation is the reason(s) why an actor takes action in a particular case.

International relations theory has long recognized the centrality of motivations in explaining policy choices. However, observed behaviors are not unambiguous when it comes to determining the underlying motivations of the actors. A single action could have multiple motivations and a single motivation could lead to numerous policy choices.

The difficulty of assessing an actors motivation has led many scholars to seek ways to circumvent the analysis of motives in international politics. Often this dilemma over
motives has been resolved through an assumption of the actors motivation. In the Realist school, for example, the concept of power is utilized as the guiding interest of states (Morgenthau, 1973, pp. 4-7). Thus, policy is interpreted as being actions designed to increase the relative power of one state as compared to others.

However, this scheme is not satisfactory in getting past the notion of motivation. While it is appealing to think of states as power-maximizers, it does not answer the question of for what ends are these means being acquired. Knowing that a state seeks power is of little help to a policy maker who must consider for what purpose that power will be used. Is the acquisition of power a means to increase the defensive capabilities of the state, or is it a prelude to aggression? The answer to this motivational question leads to widely divergent policy responses. Thus, policy and political strategy are intimately connected to questions of motivation.

Hans Morgenthau, despite being a Realist, understood this limitation of a power-determinant model. After declaring that the study of motives is "futile" (1973, p. 5), Morgenthau, to his discussion of power, added the division of states based on a rough typology of motivations. He classified states as to those that seek to preserve the status quo, pursue imperial designs, and to gain prestige (Morgenthau, 1973).
Other theories of international politics, operating at lower levels of analysis, also contain either implicit or explicit claims about motivation. For example, many scholars have sought to explain America's actions in the Middle East as arising out of concerns over what are considered national, vital, and/or traditional interests in the region. The proposition that America acts in this region to either; counter Soviet advances and influence, protect the security of Israel, or maintain access to oil at reasonable prices, plus others, all explicitly contain a motivational argument.

Usually such claims, and their assumption of motivation, are asserted but not empirically ascertained through an examination of the evidentiary record (Simon, 1985). With so much of the explanatory power of these theories originating from their motivational claims, any real understanding of the means by which policy gets made requires a careful investigation into exactly what these motivations are (Herrmann, 1988).

Cottam (1977) presents a thorough critique of monocausal motivational explanations; whether they are power-deterministic, economic-deterministic, bureaucratic-deterministic, or individual-deterministic. He argues that understanding the policy preferences of policy makers requires a more discriminating analysis of motivation. In their stead he proposes a typology of motivations that includes such items as; defense of the state, military and
bureaucratic vested interests, cultural and ideological messianism, personal power drives, plus others. While this leads to increased complexity it is also more accurate as a description. Following Cottam, I argue that motivation is multi-causal and that there are multiple interests that can be pursued.

Perceptions of the Other

Psychologists inform us that people can be described as naive scientists who seek to bring order and a sense of control to their lives by attempting to understand the underlying causal reasons for actions, including the actions of themselves and others (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1972). The usual explanation is that this is a aspect of a desire to control the environment. Thus, when a problem is identified in the environment by an individual, that person seeks to understand the problem and define the situation such that they can draw meaning from what is occurring. The person will also evaluate how the problem affects the political values he/she holds.

Another aspect of the process is an effort to understand the reason for the actions of other actors. This explanation is then used as a guide to one's own actions. This process works through perceptions as to what the other is like and an attribution as to their motivation in taking the observed
behavior. This effort at causal attribution occurs not only towards foreign actors but also domestic.

One means through which this causal understanding can proceed is through the application by the individual of a perceptual World View. A person's world view is defined as that construction of reality through which an individual perceives and chooses among policy alternatives (Cottam, 1977, p. 10). It thus serves as a lens for understanding the actions of other actors and as a guide to policy preference formation.

The perceptions held by the individual are thus central to understanding how preferences are formed. I begin with the notion of perceptions of threat and opportunity (Cottam, 1977; Herrmann, 1985, 1988). Threat is perceived when another state poses a challenge to preferred political values. An event that entails a chance to promote preferred political values, either through exploitation of cooperation, will lead to a perception of opportunity.

As the perception of threat or opportunity to preferred political values increases, so does the desire to take immediate action. However, there are likely to be moral restrictions that require that actions such as killing and control over others be justified. The conflict created between these two drives is argued to create dissonance. Balance theory argues that in an effort to reduce the dissonance, an actor will construct a view of the other that
legitimates the desired action (Heider, 1958; Herrmann, 1988). The constructed image of the target then relieves the actor of any guilt over the morality or wisdom of confronting the target or undertaking the desired action.

In this way, affect towards the target is balanced with the mental image of the attributes of the target. Thus, threats are seen as originating from enemies who are perceived as possessing all sorts of negative attributes. Allies who are intensely liked, and present an opportunity, possess only positive attributes. The result is a balanced mental picture of the other such that actions can be taken in pursuit of these political values free of inner dissonance. Threats are to be killed as part of a noble cause and opportunities can be pursued without guilt.

These balanced mental pictures of the target consist of four perceptions. These are: (1) perception of threat, (2) perception of opportunity, (3) perception of capability differences between the actors, and (4) perception of cultural distance between the actors. These perceptions are then integrated, as a gestalt, into a single image of the other.

These images can be conceived of as a series of continuums which range from an anchoring point called "Complex" to a Weberian ideal-type point which is labeled with a metaphor for an extreme stereotypical view of the other, such as "Enemy" or "Child". Which of the stereotype
continuums is appropriate depends on the combination, and strength, of the four perceptions.

It is important to keep in mind that perceptions are not reality. They do not actually exist in the mind of the individual. Instead they are concepts created and utilized by the researcher to better understand and explain behavior. Since they are not real, they cannot be directly observed. Thus some means must be created by which they can be inferred.

This is accomplished by examining the imagery that a subject uses in describing other actors and the situation. This imagery will be visible in the subject's public and private statements. These images are not just rationalizations. Following Herrmann (1988), I argue that these images are caused by the underlying perceptions and serve as the basis for problem solving and decision making. When these images are observed, we have a data-driven method of identifying the underlying perceptions.

The four images that are most relevant to the study of American views of empowerment in the Middle East are; the "enemy", the "child", the "ally", and the "complex". Since it is unlikely that an American policy maker will believe that the United States is inferior to another state as to culture and capability, the first three images listed define the range within which the images will fall. The "complex"
image is included as a common point of reference for all the images.

A generalized map for plotting these images is presented below.

![Graph](image)

Figure 1.
Graph for Plotting Image of the Other

The underlying perceptions and the overarching metaphor for the image of the target are presented below.

Table 17.
Image Metaphors and Their Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metaphor</th>
<th>Target State Represents A</th>
<th>Target State's Culture Level Is</th>
<th>Target State's capability Level Is</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Comparable</td>
<td>Comparable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>Opportunity</td>
<td>Comparable</td>
<td>Comparable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>Opportunity</td>
<td>Inferior</td>
<td>Inferior</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The characteristics of each of these images, or metaphors, are detailed below. For analytic purposes, each image has two variants; extreme and moderate, with complex being a base point shared by each image.

Images, or perceptual patterns, are multi-dimensional. Cottam (1977, pp. 64-74) identifies five components for each perceptual pattern. These components are:

1. Motivation of the other actor. Here the critical aspect is the simplicity/complexity with which motives are described and the willingness to judge as good or bad the resultant policy position.

2. Capability. This goes beyond a simple evaluation as to a state's capability on objective criteria. Instead variation in image will be seen in terms of a state's will to act, national morale, and quality of the military and government.

3. Decisional style. The other will be seen as having either a highly rational style that is capable of elaborate orchestrations, or as utilizing an ad hoc, incremental style.

4. Locus of decision-making. The target state can be described as either monolithic and hierarchical or as having a divided decisional structure where elaborate coordination would be difficult.¹

¹ For this thesis, this component plus the "decisional style" component will be combined to form a single category.
5. Domestic forces interaction. Here the key is how other domestic actors who see the external situation differently are judged.

In this scheme the first four components relate to the actor's view of the target state. The final component, the domestic forces interaction, entails the actor's perception of the motivation of other domestic actors. This attribution of motivation is an effort by the decision maker to understand why the other domestic actors hold the views they do regarding the problem. Other actors are seen as ranging from being either complexly motivated, or as naive dupes or traitors, depending upon the type of image held. How policy makers perceive one another is central to understanding their tolerance of deviants in the subsequent group decision making process. The domestic forces interaction component thus provides the key link between an individual's perceptions and group interaction.

Identifying the appropriate image, or stereotype, and its strength, is accomplished by looking at the verbal imagery the subject uses in describing the target. The imagery is contained in a subject's statements about the target's motivation, capability, and decisional locus. The degree to which a subject's imagery resembles the ideal-typical stereotype provides a measure of the strength of the perceived threat or opportunity (Herrmann, 1988).
With changes in the threat/opportunity perception will come variability in the degree of elaboration and differentiation used to explain the causes of the problem and also the proper policies to solve the problem (see Cottam, 1977; Herrmann, 1988, 1985). The individual's set of perceptions thus incorporates their definition of the situation and shapes their preference for how to deal with the problem.

**Complex**

In this image, there is no perception of either threat or opportunity. Judgments as to culture and capability are made on primarily objective criteria.

Motivation: Governments will be seen as complexly motivated. There will be little tendency to describe it's actions as good or bad. Defense will be seen as a primary motivation.

Capability: This will be judged on the basis of empirical estimates of the targets resource base, armed forces, and training instead of focusing on estimates of will and cunning.

Style and Decisional Locus: The locus is highly diversified, with decisions made incrementally, not coldly rationally in pursuit of some preexisting master plan (Herrmann, 1985, p. 35).
Domestic challenges to a regime will be viewed as manifestations of a rise in popular discontent with the incumbent leadership. The ability of external powers to play a determining role in how this situation is resolved is considered small, and potentially dangerous.

Each of the following represents the extreme form of the stereotype along these same dimensions.

**Enemy**

The "enemy" image is probably the most studied of these perceptual patterns (Holsti, 1967; White, 1970; Cottam, 1977). Specifically, this pattern entails a view of another actor who is seen as threatening to the actor, comparable in culture and in capability to the threatened state (Cottam, 1977, p. 62, 65; Herrmann, 1985, 1988). While an actor can never reach the most extreme point, the closer that this pole is approached, the closer the actor parallels a stereotypical pattern of thinking in regard to the other actor. Individuals holding this image will respond in a near paranoid fashion.

**Motivation:** The "enemy" state's motivation is seen in an extremely simple fashion which emphasizes its aggressiveness and drive for power. It is seen as being evil and its desires unjustified.

**Capability:** The power of the "enemy" is pictured as deriving, in large part, from weakness in one's own state.
Thus, the "enemy", if met forcefully, will be exposed as a "paper tiger" who will back down.

Style and Decisional Locus: The leaders of the "enemy" state are described as extremely rational, cunning, and conspiratorial. The state is capable of complex plots and evil plans. Its decision makers are seen as like-minded and part of a monolithic structure (Herrmann, 1985, p. 36). Acts of compromise are disingenuous subterfuge. And, there is no public opinion in the threatening state.²

Allies of the enemy are seen as parts of a larger monolithic decisional structure that receives instructions from the center. Any policies of the ally are seen as initiated by the government of the primary enemy. These allies have no independent policies; they are simply satellites of the main enemy.

Child

The "child" or "imperial" pattern is characterized by a perceived opportunity to achieve some goal at another people's or state's expense. Accompanying this view of high opportunity is a view that the other peoples are significantly inferior in culture and capability. This

² In the theory of images and stereotypes developed by Cottam (1977), and then refined and advanced by Herrmann (1985, 1988), as the perception of threat increases there is a corresponding tendency to use simple imagery to describe the motivation and intent of the other actor and the situation.
stereotype justifies extreme coercion, especially against those in the target state who express resistance.

Motivation: There is a sharp distinction made between those members of the state willing to cooperate with the observer's country and those that will not. The first group is described as enlightened, responsible modernizers who are benign and morally correct. The others are seen as agitators and radicals who have only their own interests in mind or are the agents of foreign powers.

Capability: In this view, the "child" state has lower capability than it would appear objectively because of the incompetence of its leaders and the cultural inferiority of its citizens. They are unable to master advanced technology or administration and thus need tutelage.

Style and Decisional Locus: Cooperators are described as tolerant, incremental, and slightly diversified in their decision making, yet troubled by incompetence. The "agitators" are conspiratorial, xenophobic and radical. The "modernizers" desire to implement beneficial changes that are proper, but unfortunately, unpopular. The "agitators" instead, are followers of a dictator, have almost no popular backing and are often the agents of a foreign power. The mass of the people are seen as too immature to be possess political opinions or to support any genuine nationalist movement (Herrmann 1985, p. 39).
Ally

In this perceptual pattern, an opportunity is seen to exist in a state perceived as being comparable in terms of capability and culture. Cooperation as a means to realizing the opportunity is emphasized.

Motivation: An "ally" is credited with being defensively motivated, even when engaging in an imperialist activity, and benign in intent.

Capability: The "ally" will be seen as having greater power capability due to its high level of national morale and the high quality of the government.

Style and Decisional Locus: The decisional process will be viewed as diversified and incremental. Those favoring the alliance in the "ally" state will be seen as having substantial domestic support; those opposed to the alliance will be seen as either traitors or the dupes of traitors (Cottam 1977, p. 66).

Relation of Image to Policy Preference

The perception of another as highly threatening or as presenting an opportunity is argued to incline a subject to act in pursuit of preferred political values. To justify these interventionist impulses, the image that is evoked by the actor portrays the target in ways that excuses the action (Herrmann, 1988).
In the "enemy" pattern the other actor is depicted as evil, untrustworthy, and hostile. This relieves the actor of any guilt over confronting the enemy. The image also includes the belief that the target is a "paper tiger" that will back down if confronted. Therefore, active confrontation is not only justified and moral, it is also guaranteed of success.

In the "child" pattern the desire to act to take advantage of the opportunity, is accompanied by a view of the other that legitimizes such intrusive action. Actions are justified as being undertaken for the benefit of a backward other who needs help. The native people are viewed as "children" who are too immature to rule themselves and therefore need guidance. The stereotype allows the intervening power to feel good about it's actions because they are interpreted as part of a great civilizing mission. The most famous of these legitimating formulas was the so-called "white mans burden" from the British colonial era. Another variant of this image occurs when the actor perceived great threat from a third state. An opportunity may be perceived in the third state to confront the enemy.

In the "ally" pattern, an opportunity is seen in another state through policies of cooperation not exploitation or domination (Herrmann, 1985, p. 32). Therefore, active intervention is not possible, though vigorous diplomacy may occur. The success of such dealings is considered certain
because of the perceived near-total agreement between the two states on important matters.

In all of these images, the more extreme the image, the easier it is to rationalize action. A "complex" view hinders such behaviors because it removes the justification for such activism.

Specific predictions of an actors policy preference are not possible without a detailed knowledge of the case at hand. However, knowing the operative image an actor holds provides an indication of the nature and strength of the actors policy preference.

Differences in the policy preferences among actors can thus be empirically identified and explained as a function of differing perceptions as to the nature of the situation and the target state.

In sum, policy preferences thus come out of the perceptions an individual holds about other actors that are derived from the relation of the other to preferred political values which are being maximized for many reasons.

Policy Elite and the Presidential Elite

The above scheme will be used in identifying the policy preferences, motivations, and underlying perceptions of individual actors.

However, policy decisions are rarely the result of a single individual following their policy preference. The
reality is a group of individuals each holding unique political values, motivations and perceptions meeting to discuss the issue and the proper policy response. Therefore, the process of decision making constitutes an additional source of variation.

A central concern is what set of views enter into the policy making process. In a decision making situation two concentric circles can be imagined. The outer, larger circle encompasses all those individuals who because of their position or expertise potentially could have access to the final decision making group. I call this group the policy elite. It includes individuals both within and without the executive branch, for example members of the Congress.

The inner circle consists of those individuals who are actually brought into the decision making meeting on the issue. It thus constitutes the presidential advisory system. I call this the presidential elite level.

Membership in both sets of elites is highly fluid and can shift from issue to issue and even from meeting to meeting. In such a system, what is crucial is access to the presidential elite level. Without access, one's views will not be heard and therefore will not affect the final policy choice. Because of this importance, it is reasonable to assume that access is something that will be valued. It also makes control over access a powerful political tool. The
ability to construct access in favorable ways can be an asset in influencing the final decision.

The control of access means that disagreements at the policy elite level over preferred policies, may or may not be reflected at the presidential elite level. This will clearly then affect the course of the discussion over a policy issue.

The question then is which views among the policy elite are brought into the presidential elite level. I will argue that a central feature in the granting of access is the degree of tolerance an individual possesses for divergent viewpoints.

**Tolerance of and strategies for the treatment of deviants**

With access being such an issue, the issue becomes on what basis are questions of access decided? When is a person likely to be considered an asset to the process who should be included and encouraged as opposed to those whose views make them a potential liability whose influence needs to be curtailed? A second issue is once these determinations of access are decided, how are they carried out? What strategies are used to limit access for some while encouraging it for others?
Tolerance of Deviants

Both within the policy elite and the presidential elite, dissent, based on differing perceptions and policy preferences, is likely to occur. This dissent can be viewed as a form of deviance.\(^3\) For my purposes, deviance is defined broadly as characterizing any actor who holds a contrary policy preference and is not part of the subject's own faction. Deviancy is an attributed characteristic attached to individuals based on a comparison of their views and preferences with one's own. Therefore, deviancy is a relational concept and can apply to one or many individuals within a group.

The presence of opinion deviates in a decision making group can foster a powerful incentive to end the deviancy. While research has focused upon numerous motivations for reacting to deviancy,\(^4\) the underlying conclusion is that deviancy is not readily tolerated in decision making groups.

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\(^3\) For a helpful review of the deviancy literature, see Levine, 1980.

\(^4\) While most scholars agree that consensus seeking is a nearly universal goal of groups, there is much less agreement as to why this is the case (see Levine and Russo, 1989). Festinger (1950) speaks of two major sources of pressure for uniformity among people; social reality, and group locomotion.

Social reality is an individual's drive for opinion validation through the agreement of valued others who share similar beliefs. This drive becomes more acute the further the opinion, attitude, or belief, is from physical reality or certainty. If there is disagreement among this set of persons, then there will be pressure to communicate among the members on this issue.

Group locomotion is a second type of pressure towards uniformity. Such uniformity may be perceived as desirable or necessary for the group to move toward some goal. Obstacles to this goal based on group divisions, or factionalization, leads to pressures to communicate to achieve uniformity.
The key question then becomes, how are individuals who represent an alternative position or interpretation, that is deviants, reacted to by other group members? Most of the explanations for a faction's response have focused upon either attributes of the group (such as its level of cohesion, and the relevance of the issue confronting the group to the group; see Schachter, 1951) or attributes of the environment (usually things like time pressure, or noise; see, for example, Kruglanski and Webster, 1991).

The psychological studies described above, while relevant, do not address a key issue. Their chief failing is that they explain the rejection of deviants as arising out of group-level attributes shared by all members, or aspects of the external environment. For example, previous studies using the presence of external threat (such as Lauderdale et al, 1984) are informative, though not directly applicable, because they assume that the external threat was objectively present and recognized by all members.

An important question is what would the group process be if the members disagreed on the very presence of threat. Would those perceiving a threat respond differently to other members than those who see little or no threat? Similarly, Kruglanski and Webster (1991) conclude that the motivation for consensus could instead reflect a desire for collective cognitive closure, which they saw as related to Festinger's (1950) goal of social reality. The need for collective closure through agreement and interpersonal consistency on the discussion issue, could thus be seen as conceptually similar to an individuals need for personal closure in their own cognitive system.
very little work has been done on the consequences of a perception of opportunity in the environment as a stimulus.

I start from the conviction that threat and opportunity are perceptual variables that may or may not be shared by all members of the group. Differences among the members on this variable are seen to affect the type of motivations that are attributed to a deviant for holding his/her position. A key difference here from the approaches presented above is that the group, in my view, is not the unit of analysis. Instead, I focus on perceptual differences among the members of the group.

I argue that beliefs about who should have access to the group are affected by the views an individual holds about the motivation and attributes of other actors. These beliefs are derived from the perceptions the subject has about the target in the external situation. That is, a person who sees high threat or opportunity in the external environment will react differently on questions of access than a person who has a more complex view.

Cottam includes the notion of deviancy, and peoples' reaction to it, in his discussion of perceptual patterns. He labels this the "domestic forces interaction". He sees this component as characterized by the "harshness with which those who see the situation as different from the prevailing view are judged." (1977, p. 64). Thus the image one has of another actor, say a country, in a situation has
ramifications for how one also sees other members of the decision making body. Tolerance for deviancy within the decision making group is a variable that co-varies with the strength of the image an actor holds regarding the external target.

My hypothesis is that as the perception of either threat or opportunity is increased for a particular individual, their intolerance for deviancy in the decision making group rises correspondingly. As intolerance increases there is an effort made to limit the access of deviants. Therefore, individuals holding a more extreme image of the other international actor will also be less tolerant of those within the decision making group that they perceive as deviant and will seek to limit their influence on policy formation through various strategies which manipulate the group process.

The reason for these differences in the tolerance of others relates back to balance theory as discussed earlier. In situations where an individual wishes to take action to maximize some political value, but there are fellow members of the elite who oppose the preferred policy choice, dissonance is created. In order to restore affective harmony between the view of the target and the view of the member, the individual must either alter their desire towards the target or their view of the dissenting group member. In this choice it is easier to alter the view of the group member
than it is to alter the political values that led to the original policy preference. Once the dissenting member is viewed in a way that makes their dissent understandable, balance is achieved. However, this balance comes at the price of tolerance.

Complex individuals will be viewed harshly by those who see high threat or opportunity. Their resistance to interventionist actions will be interpreted as arising from their being either traitors, or naive do-gooders who refuse to understand the real content of the situation.

Once a person has made this strong judgment about the reliability of another group member, their tolerance for the presence of such deviants in the decision making process will decline sharply. Extreme image holders, who already have grave doubts about deviants as to their wisdom and trustworthiness, are expected to display a strong tendency towards intolerance, in comparison to a complex image holder. Those with more extreme views would see the inclusion of alternative viewpoints as potentially dangerous, especially if the disagreement appears intractable.\(^5\)

Those holding a "complex" view will see those with a more simple, or extreme, viewpoint as deviant, but not for such negative or dangerous reasons.\(^6\) Dissent will be

\(^5\) As Kaplan and Miller (1987) show, this is especially troubling if there is a unanimity decision rule in effect, since this would give an included deviant veto power.
interpreted as arising out of a sincere difference of opinion. Often, dissent will be seen as a strength of the group because multiple positions will be advanced and considered. Therefore, the tolerance for deviants by those with a more complex image of the target will be higher.

Cottam, through the domestic forces interaction component of an image, provides a means to explain the definition of deviancy within a group and a general understanding of how deviants will be viewed. He does not however, provide a discussion of what strategies will be utilized to deal with deviants.

To better understand the relationship between individuals who differ as to their image of the target and aspects of the group decision making process requires some elaboration of the processes that are available to handle the existence of deviant positions.

The Problem of Non-meetings and Non-line Policy Papers

Before turning to some of the possible strategies used, it is important to recognize the difficulty of studying decisions in a large bureaucracy. Two particular problems must be kept in mind by any researcher trying to reconstruct

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6 In this thesis, since both perceptions of threat and opportunity lead to a view of dissimilar policy makers as either traitors or dupes, these two perceptual patterns can be seen as variants of one another, and thus treated similarly. Therefore, they will often be referred to as simple, or extreme images.

7 These terms were suggested by Joseph Nye.
the decision process. The first is the distinction between meetings and what one scholar has called the non-meeting. Governmental, bureaucratic meetings are public events which are noted on appointment calendars, and have summaries prepared and archived. Their purpose is to provide a forum for public posturing and constituent appeasement. The problem with studying such meetings is that they can be virtually irrelevant to the actual process of decision making. Often, the real action has occurred in a non-meeting.

Non-meetings are informal, non-recorded events that precede or parallel the public meeting. They are not noted on official calendar books and no notes or summaries are available, or usually even prepared. This feature of security is undoubtedly what makes these meetings so popular within the bureaucracy.

A second problem with the study of decision making in a large bureaucracy is the distinction between policy papers that have gone through the "line" and policy papers which are "non-line". In the State Department for example, the "line" is the process through which any action or policy paper is signed off on by a number of desks and offices. Once a paper clears the line it becomes policy. Only those papers which clear the line are compiled and archived. The problem for the researcher is that often a paper is only sent to the line after the policy has already been decided. A paper is sent
to the line as a signal to the rest of the bureaucracy as to what policy is. Therefore, these papers do not speak to the actual decision making process.

Many policy decisions in such a system are made "non-line". Non-line papers are prepared, circulated, and discussed privately as the author seeks to determine whether the policy recommendation will receive favorable treatment. Only after determining that the policy will succeed will it be sent to the line. If support is lacking, then the paper is simply destroyed and no record of the effort exists.

In sum, a reliance on the archival record tends to leave out some important aspects of the decision process. The record better reflects decisions made and implemented, then it does the process of policy formation. The lack of a written record for non-meetings and non-line policy papers makes recreating the decision process difficult. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to overcome these problems. The best that can be done is to work with the available record as rigorously as possible while remaining sensitive to these issues.

Strategies for Dealing with Deviants

Disagreements can occur both within the policy elite and the presidential elite, and between the policy elite and the presidential elite. In each case strategies will be utilized to deal with the dissent. The primary goal of these
strategies is to lessen the impact of deviant positions on the final decision.

Once a deviant has been identified either outside or inside the group, there are means available, to those willing to make use of them, to lessen the influence of the deviant on the decision. These strategies can be grouped into two categories: composition practices and communication pressures.8

In the first category, it is literally the physical makeup of the group that is manipulated. What is key in these situations is control over who is allowed to attend the meeting that will decide the policy. When this process systematically over-represents some views and under-represents other views the final decision will be skewed towards certain policy preferences.

Exclusion

One strategy of dealing with deviants is to alter the composition of the group so that only those members with a

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8 Unfortunately, the structure of the group, that is, who is allowed to participate, is often taken for granted in research and is rarely studied as a variable with consequences upon the decision process or output. In doing so, an important step in the decision process is missed that should be included. How the group alters its membership has effects upon the nature of the final decision. To leave out this prior step in the process misses a significant source of variation in explaining the final policy.

How readily restructuring occurs may depend upon whether the group is ad hoc, and thus not bound to a certain specified membership, or already in place and restricted by regulations and norms as to who is to attend. An ad hoc group, freed from membership stipulations and restrictions, is more amenable to manipulation in its makeup.
sympathetic viewpoint are included. This is what Halpern (1974, pp. 124-127) calls "reducing the circle". This is accomplished most readily by simply failing to invite a particular participant to the meeting. The goal is to agree on a decision in the absence of this potentially obstructing individual.

Numerous rationales can be presented to justify the exclusion of another actor. Halpern argues that usually the rationale of security is advanced, requiring the exclusion of certain individuals from the group. He gives the example of the Bay of Pigs invasion where members of the CIA argued that other analysts from the CIA and the State Department should be left out.

A person may also be excluded if the case can be made that they do not have any responsibility for the problem under consideration. Finally, it may be put to the President that those who oppose his preferred action should be excluded (Halpern, 1974, p. 125).

Evidence for the prevalence of exclusion is available not only anecdotally as Halpern provides. The rejection of opinion deviates has also been studied in the social psychology literature.

In the experimental research on reaction to deviancy in groups, group members are not allowed to meet more than once. Thus, there is no direct evidence that deviants will be removed from the decision making group. However, there is a
significant body of research to show that when given the opportunity to recompose the group for future meetings, not held, deviants do get rejected. Schachter (1951) asked subjects with whom they would like to work with on future projects. Opinion deviates from the first meeting were rejected from further inclusion significantly more often than a person who conformed or was "persuaded" to join the majority faction.

Lauderdale et al (1984) also studied the rejection patterns in groups subject to external threat. When asked in a post-discussion questionnaire who should be excluded from a subsequent meeting (that did not take place), deviants in the original group were rejected much more often, and deviants were six times as likely to be listed as persons that the subject would not like to work with further in the future. Finally, Kruglanski and Webster (1991) also obtained high degrees of rejection of deviants in post-session sociometric questionnaires.

Overall, these studies indicate that groups negatively evaluate deviants and will try to exclude these individuals from both interpersonal contact and future meetings of the group.

Inclusion

A counter strategy to reducing the circle of participants is to attempt the reverse; that is, what Halpern
calls "widening the circle" (1974, pp. 127-131). This is an attempt to diffuse the influence of a deviant by packing the group with additional participants who are of a like mind. In such a group, the deviant is seen as constituting a small minority position. The deviant position looks weaker as a result. This appearance of being outnumbered may also have some affect upon the deviant who, seeing the deck stacked against him, may decide it is better to give in.

Discredit

Here an individual who is likely to be included will be undermined by those who do not wish to have him/her participate in the meeting. Statements to other members can be made which question the morality, motivation, or wisdom of the deviant. By the time the group meets with the deviant in attendance, his/her credibility may have been seriously damaged. If successful, this strategy results in the deviant being given no credence, regardless of the possible wisdom or appropriateness of his/her position.

A well-timed leak to the press can also destroy a position before it has come under consideration by the group. A leak stating that a member's policy preference will lead to a lessening of national security or is motivated by self-interest or personal grandeur can often serve to kill that
position before it has even been formally aired in the decision making group.

Non-connected Officials

In this strategy, the goal is to have a deviant policy position presented by a person with little political clout. Having a person who is "outside the loop" be the spokesperson for an undesirable position makes that policy appear weaker. Thus, there will be a move to have more junior level officials or those without many political allies act as advocates. Such a strategy, if successful, does not remove the policy from consideration but it lessens its strength.

Communication Pressures

In addition to these efforts to reconstruct the group in a more favorable way for one's own position, a final set of strategies is to engage in communication with the deviants to persuade them to alter their public stand in favor of conformity.

In general, there are three main means of using communication to achieve consensus. The first is to direct a large proportion of the group discussion towards the deviant(s) in an effort to persuade them of the need to change their position. A second method is to use more normative, as opposed to informational, types of communication to induce change. And, finally, if the first
two fail, all communication to the deviant may be suspended, thereby isolating the deviant.

The proportion of communication a deviant receives was first studied by Stanley Schachter (1951, 1954). Taking his hypothesis from the work of Festinger (1950), Schachter observed experimental groups discussing a case over how to deal with a juvenile delinquent. His results indicated that under all the experimental conditions, except one, the amount of communication directed towards a deviant increases throughout the meeting. The only variation on this was in the condition where the group was both highly cohesive and the issue was deemed relevant by the members. Here, again, communication rose during the course of the meeting, but then dropped off dramatically after a certain point. This point signals the beginning of the isolation phase previously mentioned.

Other studies (Festinger, Gerard, Hymovitch, Kelly, and Raven, 1952; Hochbaum, 1954; see review in Levine, 1980) have tended to support the main findings of Schachter. In both studies, it was noted that deviants receive a much higher proportion of the total communication. Deviants receive a great deal of communication while conformers receive very little.

The type of communication that a deviant receives is another method of dealing with dissensus. Here the key distinction is between normative and informational influence.
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) defined normative influence as "influence to conform to the positive expectations of another" (p. 629), while informational influence is "influence to accept information obtained from another as evidence about reality" (p. 629).

A crucial finding based upon this distinction was reported by Kaplan and Miller (1987). They studied the type of influence attempt and its relation to the type of issue that was before the group; it was either intellective or judgmental. Their finding was that in cases where the issue was judgmental in nature (i.e., there is no demonstrably correct answer or single logic pattern to decide the issue), there was a substantially higher use of normative influence communications.9

A final deviance handling strategy based on communication is what I call "isolation". A deviant who receives the isolation treatment from another member, has been deemed by that person or faction as being intractable in their opposition. Communication to this individual ends and they are effectively removed from the group, though they may

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9 For more on this analytic distinction, see (Davis, Laughlin, and Komorita, 1976; Laughlin, 1980; Laughlin and Earley, 1982; Kaplan and Miller 1987).

As opposed to intellective tasks or issues, judgmental issues possess no correct answer and no single logical criteria for arriving at one. Appeals to 'the facts' in the search for a preferred alternative are not convincing. Their results show that when confronted with a judgmental issue, as is most often the case in political situations, "the preferred alternative depends not only on the marshaling of facts and the discovery of truth but on the assertion of preference and the attainment of consensus" (Kaplan and Miller, 1987, p. 307).
remain physically present. Efforts by the deviant to reenter the group will be rebuffed unless they display conformity to the opposing faction's position. Recall that this took place in the Schachter study previously mentioned (1951). Under conditions of high group cohesiveness and issue relevance, after a period of time in which the deviant received a disproportionate amount of attention and communication, there was a sudden and precipitous drop in communication to the deviant.

The practice of isolating deviants may prove useful in two ways. The first is that the deviant may so fear or hate isolation that they, at least publicly, conform. This takes two forms. Refusing to divulge a state of deviancy out of a fear of real or imagined consequences is called anticipatory conformity (see Caldini and Petty, 1981; Saltzstein and Sandberg, 1979). Public conformity in order to remain in the group once deviancy has been noted may be called ingratiation conformity.

Secondly, psychologically removing the deviant from the discussion, through isolation, allows the other faction to distance themselves from the deviant so that they begin to believe that no divisions in the group exist. If the deviant can be psychologically defined as no longer a part of the group, then agreement can be achieved.

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10 This tendency is what Sorrells and Kelley (1984) have labeled "conformity by omission".
These communication and composition strategies are employed as means of diminishing the influence of deviant others in the setting of policy. Their use is an indication of the lower tolerance an individual has for the presence of deviants and dissenting positions within the decision making group.

Extending the hypothesis, this means that the more simple, or extreme, an image the actor holds, the lower is their tolerance of deviance and hence the greater the likelihood of their engaging in the strategies outlined above. For example, enemy, ally, and child image holders should be quicker to end communication to a complex image holder than would a complex image holder to those with a more extreme image.

The contents of the enemy, ally, and child images are rooted in subjective determinations as to national will, political culture, and so on. This will lead these individuals to see the situation before them as being more judgmental in nature. Complex images are empty of these types of subjective evaluations. Instead they focus on the objective conditions within the target state. Therefore, they will see the issue as being more intellectual. Based on this difference, there should be variation in the type of communication influence attempt that the image types use.

More extreme image holders will make greater use of normative influence attempts as they try to convince the
deviant that they should go along for the good of the group. Complex image holders will be less concerned by the subjective evaluations of the target and will favor informational influence attempts as they try to convince the others of the facts of the case.

The occurrence of a strategy of isolation signals a faction's or individual's belief that a deviant is either intractable or susceptible to peer pressure; the deviant individual is ignored and communication towards them is ended. Since an enemy, ally, or child image holder already has serious doubts as to the desirability of including others with divergent viewpoints, these individuals will be faster to engage in the isolation strategy than would a person with a complex image.

To reiterate, a perception of high threat or opportunity reduces a person's tolerance of deviation and induces the use of deviance control strategies against more complex image holders. If successful, the results of these strategies towards deviates, will be a decline in the influence of the position they advocate.

While clearly a significant source of influence, deviance reduction through communication strategies will not be studied in this thesis. Instead, I will focus on changes in the group's composition as a means to reduce the influence of known deviants.
All of these elements can be combined into a diagrammatic flow chart. Interests/values --- Perceptions of Threat/Opportunity to these Values --- Image of Others --- Tolerance/Intolerance --- Differential Use of Deviance Reducing Strategies.

Two broad paths through this model can be described, both of which have connections to existing ideas in the decision making literature. A more inclusive and tolerant group process mirrors most closely the Multiple Advocacy view described by Alexander George (1980). Intolerance leading to successful exclusion on the other hand helps to promote the conditions that have been identified as leading to groupthink (Janis, 1982).

The Framework and Views of Empowerment

This relationship between the images held by policy makers, their policy preferences, and their tolerance of deviants in the decision making group will be tested through a set of case studies of instances of Middle Eastern empowerment over time.

To examine these broader issues, I take as a starting point the standard explanation that American attitudes and behaviors towards empowerment were a consequence of the global competition with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the decision to court or coerce such movements was derived from a consideration of the effect of such moves on the broader
strategic contest. The link between concern over the Soviet Union and action towards empowerment derives from one aspect of the enemy image. Cottam (1977, p. 68) states that one of the primary reasons why a person perceives opportunity in another state is because of a motivation of defense. He states that this seeming paradox occurs,

if a people perceives a serious threat from a great enemy and perceives the probability of that enemy's expanding its influence into a third country. When in response to this threat an opportunity is perceived to gain a controlling influence in the threatened third country, thus obviating the threat, that third country will be seen in a way that conforms to the imperial [child] ideal typical image.

Specifically, if an American decision maker perceives a high level of threat from the Soviet Union then this policy maker should have an extreme enemy image of the Soviet Union and a derivative extreme child image of the third state. Perceiving high opportunity allows the decision maker to advocate policies designed to counter the perceived gains in Soviet influence in a Middle East state where empowerment is occurring.

Thus, the perception of threat from the Soviet Union leads to a perception of empowerment such that the United States is free to act to counter "Soviet influence" in that third state. The "child" image will be evoked to justify intervention and control.

If this hypothesis is incorrect, then the collapse of the Soviet Union will have only a small effect upon American
policy making towards Middle Eastern empowerment because the perception of the situation in the target state is independent of views about the American-Soviet relation.

In determining policy, a crucial factor is what is the original relationship between each superpower and the regional state. This helps to define how each party to the conflict will be viewed. It is particularly salient for individuals with extreme images.

For example, in some cases the empowerment process will occur in a state seen as aligned with the United States against the Soviet Union. A perception of high threat from the Soviet Union is expected in these cases, according to the theory, to drive out perceptions within the individual of regional complexity. High threat will also motivate a balance process between the desire to act and their view of the other that justifies the maintenance of pro-American control by de-legitimating the native agents for change. Therefore, the leaders of populist movements will be seen as dangerous radicals and, in the most extreme case, as agents of the Soviet Union. Overall, the empowerment process will be seen in negative terms. The policy preferences for such individuals will be one of a need for action to protect the embattled friend. Success in the re-establishment of stability will be expected.

If the regional state, on the other hand, is an ally of the Soviet Union, as was the case in Afghanistan, then the
theory would expect Americans seeing high threat from Moscow to define the empowerment movement at the regional level as legitimate, real, widely supported, and deserving of U.S. support. Again, intervention in some form will be prescribed and success expected.

These two variants of the three way relationship are presented graphically in Figure 2.

```
Current regime
is U.S. ally

US

- -
USSR + EP

Current regime
is U.S. enemy

US

- +
USSR - EP

EP=Empowerment Process in Middle Eastern state
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Figure 2.

Balanced Triads For U.S. Actors

Who See High Threat From The Soviet Union

In both cases the resultant world view for an actor who sees serious threat from the Soviet Union will reflect a child image of the regional state in order to justify efforts at U.S. control. By perceiving an opportunity in the regional state that invites and even necessitates
intervention of some sort, the actor can undertake with a clear conscience actions they believe will remove the influence of the enemy great power. The perceived need to respond to the threat from the Soviet Union thus leads to a motivation, and a rationalization, to act in the third state (Cottam, 1977, p. 68; Herrmann, 1988, p. 189).

The perception of opportunity will be great towards the regional state for these threat driven group members. High levels of opportunity will be perceived in the regional state and the political situation there will be defined in a way that allows the United States to pursue its interests free from moral restraints (Herrmann, 1988, p. 188). The empowerment process in the regional state will be seen in terms that protect and promote U.S. control.

The child image does not include the possibility of genuine nationalism in the regional state. The image includes the belief that these people are too immature politically to support such movements. Lacking such abilities, the child state is seen as needing guidance and tutelage.

Members of the potential decision group that argue that such nationalism, as a genuine movement independent of external manipulation exists, will be seen by those with a high threat or opportunity perception as, at best, naive do-gooders, and possibly as traitors (Cottam 1977, p. 65). Policy makers holding this combination of images, will then
try to structure the decisional group so that those with a
dissimilar perception, of the situation in the regional
state, are unable to make a strong case for their position.

If the threat from the Soviet Union is perceived to be
in decline, as is likely to have been the case during periods
of U.S.-Soviet détente, then there will be more tolerance for
complex regional world views in the decisional group. Many
of the world views will be nearer the Complex pole.
Consequently, there will be an increased tolerance of
divergent viewpoints, more open discussion, and a more
accepting group structure. It is unlikely that all the
members will share this new viewpoint and therefore a
minority may still hold to a high threat based image. These
members will continue to resist the efforts of other factions
to open up the group to alternative viewpoints and they will
treat with suspicion those that disagree with them.

If the threat from the Soviet Union disappears for the
group members, more complex perceptual patterns will be
widespread in the group. The superpower rivalry will be de­
coupled from perceptions of regional affairs. Open debate on
the cognitive constructions of the regional situation will be
allowed and even sought. Those who perceive the regional
situation differently will be described in complex
motivational terms (Cottam, 1977, p. 66). There will be a
shift away from the child image of the target state in favor
of a complex view. Subsequently there will be little use made of the deviance control strategies.

The decline or disappearance of threat from the Soviet Union will not automatically translate into a sudden change in either the images held by policy makers or the final policy decision. There are likely to be both bureaucratic and perceptual lags in recognizing that a change has occurred in the relationship with a great power. Thus, there will likely be a gradual shift in world views, not a sudden transformation from the stereotypical image to a more complex image.

Some members of the group may see a threat independent of the Great Power Enemy. However, to guard against this independent threat, these actors will press for the Great Power Enemy image to still determine the Prevailing View and policy choice. They will interpret regional episodes in a way that highlights the enemy's continued evil intent. In such cases, there will not be a unanimous move closer to the complex pole, as some will continue to have views based upon a perceived threat.

**Hypotheses**

In brief, the above discussion can be summarized in three hypotheses.

1. As elite images move toward imperial patterns, U.S foreign policy will oppose popular empowerment and act to
defend sitting governments. In the imperial image, nationalism is not recognized as a factor complicating U.S involvement. Consequently, as the perceptions of top policy makers move in this direction, U.S. policy will become more hostile to empowerment and will intervene against it.

2. Individuals holding an extreme enemy view of the Soviet Union will be more likely to hold an extreme imperial view of the Middle Eastern state. This hypothesis examines the relationship between the Cold War and American attitudes towards change in the Middle East.

3. As the level of perceived threat and/or opportunity is increased for an individual, there is a corresponding decrease in that person's tolerance for contrary positions in the decision making group. This will lead to a heightened utilization of strategies designed to restructure the decision making process in ways that limit the influence of contrary positions.

More specifically, with regard to the decision making process, I am asking the following questions:

1. What views affected the decision making? and
2. Why did certain views win?

For the second question, I have directed attention to the effect the images held have on the decision making process, thereby reversing the common causal arrow in institutional arguments. The more common argument is that peoples views and attitudes get affected by the institutional
norms and rules of the game of which they are a part. Individuals then must work within this set of constraints and are, in fact, affected by them. My argument reverses this logic to test the proposition that a person's perceptions and attitudes can lead individuals to question these constraints and undertake reshape the institutional structures. In effect, they seek to modify the rules of the game in self-serving ways. In this way, individuals affect the behavior and structure of the institution.

Research Design

The Case Studies

In all of the cases the research will seek to determine if the policy maker's motivations and perceptions have an effect upon their definition of the situation (who is involved and what is at stake in the case), their policy preference, and their tolerance of deviancy.

To examine the second hypothesis the perception of the Soviet Union as a Great Power threat to the United States constitutes a key independent variable across cases and time. To study the possible effects of the American-Soviet relationship upon the policy making process towards empowerment, three forms of the superpower relationship will be examined: Cold War periods, such as the 1950's, where the perceived threat from the Soviet Union was high for many decision makers; periods of détente, such as the mid 1960's
and much of the 1970’s, where the perception of threat was somewhat diminished; and finally, the post Cold War, present-day, situation where, for many people, an active threat from the former Soviet Union is hardly seen.\textsuperscript{11}

Along with variation in the Great Power relationship, this research requires instances of mass political mobilization in Middle Eastern societies across the three proposed American-Soviet environments. The political buildup to and eventual overthrow of King Faisal of Iraq by Brigadier General Kassem in 1958 will constitute the first case study. Unrest in a key Arab ally in a period of intense Cold War tension provided the United States with a choice point in an early case of empowerment. Interestingly, the primary response of the United States to this crisis was an intervention in Lebanon. It is instructive to examine the operative images of the American policy makers with regard to this related, but secondary, crisis where empowerment was also occurring. This case represents the Cold War, high threat, environment.

Iran and the rise in the political power and popularity of Khomeini, and other anti-Shah elements finally culminating in the Iranian revolution, will serve as an instance of empowerment in the 1970’s. At that time improved U.S-Soviet

\textsuperscript{11} It is not assumed that all individuals will have the degree of threat that I say characterizes each U.S.-Soviet environment. Instead, I merely offer these periods as times when it is expected that such a perception of the Soviet Union was prevalent. Only empirical study will determine if my assumptions about degree of perceived threat are appropriate in each time period.
relations had likely lessened the degree of perceived threat from the rival Great Power.

Algeria will be studied for the current period, where the perceived threat from the Soviet Union is most likely minimal for many policy makers. Here, the electoral success of an avowedly Islamic political movement, up until the coup of 1992, presented American decision makers with the realistic probability of an empowerment victory through the ballot box.

Method

Data has been gathered from a variety of sources utilizing a number of techniques. For the Iraqi-Lebanese case where direct access to the participants is not possible, data has been drawn from the published memoirs of the actors and from the archival record. Since it is imperative to have the imagery actually used by the actor, such primary sources are crucial.

In the two more recent cases, while memoirs will be used, due to the recency of these cases the archival record is not sufficient as a data source. Therefore, in-depth interviews with key decision makers from both cases have been conducted by the researcher.

In terms of coding statements, I return to the point about perceptions as concepts. It would be naive to assume that we can get a true picture of the perceptions and
motivations of actors by looking for direct statements of their perceptions. A statement that an actor felt threatened could be disingenuous and therefore of little analytic value. Therefore a method must be utilized that can infer the perceptions of an actor.

What is available to the researcher is the verbal imagery that an actor employs to describe another actor. By creating a theoretical connection between the imagery that would correspond with a particular set of perceptions, it is possible to infer the actor's perceptions by coding their verbal statements (see Appendix A for the full codebook). By systematically coding all instances of verbal imagery about another actor, a rigorous analysis of the perceptions and motivations of the actor can be undertaken.

A systematic analysis of the treatment of deviants within the group is complicated by the lack of detailed transcripts of the meetings in which these decisions were made. Without access to such records, any findings and arguments about the groups treatment of deviants must remain tentative. However, in the two more current cases, an explicit aspect of the interviews was to include questions as to the presence and treatment of deviants. Though highly imprecise and subject to numerous confounding biases, such evidence should not be completely discounted.
Format

To facilitate cross-case comparisons, each case study utilizes the following general structure:

Topic A: Background - Each case study will begin with a brief description of the political events in the country leading up to the specific incident(s) that involved the United States. Central to this description will be a discussion of the empowerment syndrome as it occurred in the country under study.

Topic B: Views Among the Policy Elite - This identifies the scope of positions advocated by members of the policy elite for possible consideration by the presidential elite in deciding the issue. The purpose is to identify the presence of alternative policy preferences that were being expounded with regard to the event.

Topic C: Views Among the Presidential Elite - The individuals who, at least initially, form the presidential advisory structure (presidential elite) for the issue will be identified. This grouping is then monitored over time. Utilizing the perceptual scheme already discussed, and developed further in Appendix A, each member of the group is examined in order to determine their initial image and their policy preference. This identifies the scope of positions advocated by members of the presidential elite.

Topic D: The Policy Process - What positions are represented? While the ambassador is not likely to
physically attend; are his concerns raised or ignored? Who is not present and what is their position?

Topic E: Evidence of Exclusion - Each case is then analyzed to detect instances where deviants in the presidential elite were the object of the deviance reducing composition strategies mentioned. Who is affected by these strategies and who initiates them?

Topic F: Prevailing Image/Group Policy Decision - The final policy decision or output and the behavior taken will be discussed as to its relation to the perceptions of the various policy makers.

Returning to the central strategic question with which this thesis began, this model proposes that differences in the policy preferences of individual policy makers can be understood and explained as resulting from variation in their perception of the situation and the other actors. These same perceptions then play a role in determining the composition practices of the group in which the strategic question is decided.

The next three chapters explore this model and its propositions at greater length through its application to three case studies of American policy towards empowerment in the Middle East.
"[Iraq] was the country that we were counting on heavily as a bulwark of stability and progress in the region" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 269).

Introduction

On July 14, 1958, the American administration was "shocked" and "surprised" to hear that the pro-western monarchy in Baghdad had been overthrown. Reports indicated that King Faisal, Crown Prince Abdul Illah, and the strongman Prime Minister, Nuri As-Said, the three primary political players in Iraq, had all been killed. In one stroke the American strategic position in the Arab world had been dealt a heavy blow. Iraq was the only Arab signatory to the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact and Faisal was seen as a possible counter to the growing power and influence of Nasser.

The Eisenhower administration responded to this strategic blow by intervening in an on-going civil war in Lebanon. It was believed that Lebanon was the only state where circumstances favored U.S. action. Thus the American intervention in Lebanon should be seen as directly connected
to the events in Iraq. Lebanon served as the stage for an American response to the Iraqi coup.

A persistent question is why was the United States caught so unprepared for the overthrow of the King by the Free Officers of Iraq? The answer lies in the failure of the American government to recognize that Iraq was experiencing a growing demand for political change from an increasingly active population. Such faith was placed in the strength of Nuri and the Iraqi coercive apparatus that indications that the regime was at risk due to a loss of legitimacy were ignored. An awareness and responsiveness to these signs may have allowed the United States to take actions and promote policies in Iraq that, while not necessarily having saved Nuri and the King, at least may have placed the United States in a better position to maintain her influence in the Arab heartland.

This chapter will examine these events and views in greater detail, beginning with a discussion of empowerment in Iraq prior to the coup. The evidence indicates that the coup was not simply an opportunistic act by a few army officers, but instead was reflective of a growing dissatisfaction with the regime by large numbers of the Iraqi population. I then turn to a discussion of American views of Arab nationalism and argue that these views influenced the way that empowerment was understood and responded to.
While a number of views can be identified among the policy elite, this diversity was not reflected at the presidential elite level. This narrowing of the range of views brought into the decision making for the case had important consequences for the policy options considered and the final policy choice. The decision process will be examined in detail to pursue the proposition that certain views were systematically excluded from the decision making process with contrary positions being ignored or discounted. Finally, I examine whether a person's view of the Soviet Union tended to determine their view of the regional and local situation.

Empowerment in Iraq

Iraq in 1958 was a powerful and trusted friend of the United States. In 1955 she had signed on to the Baghdad Pact, the only Arab country to join this anti-Soviet containment effort. Iraqi prospects for the future appeared bright as there had been a surge in oil revenues during the decade. Policy makers and analysts alike were confident that Iraq was a stable country due to the two-part strategy of coercion mixed with vigorous economic development projects. It was widely cited at the time, with obvious admiration, that Iraq was spending over seventy percent of her oil revenues on development projects. Such beneficence and
economic growth were considered certain to generate legitimacy and acceptance by the bulk of the population.

Yet this surface calm belied a turbulent society. Frustration and resentment of the ancien regime were spreading throughout the society. The use of coercion was resented as were the pro-western foreign policy stances of the regime. Also, the supposed economic benefits were not generating support among a population that was increasingly aware that personal success was being blocked by a political system that did not represent or consider their desires. Indeed, the more the society modernized and the more the citizens became politically active, the less they were willing to accept the old system of rule. This frustration exploded violently on July 14, 1958, when two units of the Iraqi army moved into Baghdad, capturing and executing the King, the Crown Prince and the Prime Minister. The coup itself occurred swiftly and without opposition.

The immediate collapse of the Nuri regime was brought about by a coup led by Arif and Kassem. These leaders, plus others within the Iraqi military, had been planning a coup against Faisal and Nuri ever since 1952 when Nasser and the Free Officers in Egypt had overthrown King Faruq. However, to simply accept the coup as an isolated act, disconnected from the social and political context of Iraq, is to miss the underlying cause. The coup was a symptom of a larger societal frustration with the regime. Many efforts had been
made among the civilian population to achieve reform but these had been beaten back by the strong-arm tactics of Nuri. The coup was the culmination of a series of efforts to alter the Iraqi political structure brought on by the empowerment of broad sectors of Iraqi society.

Empowerment in Iraq

In the 1950's, Iraq was undergoing the classic modernization process. The country was experiencing rapid change in the rate of urbanization, a rise of literacy, and improvements in transportation and communication.

The primary reason for the loss of support on the part of the regime was the fact that Iraqi society was changing in ways that brought increasing numbers of people into the political sphere while the regime refused to reform itself to give these newly politicized sectors some political control. It is this conflict, brought about by the empowerment of large sectors of the citizenry, that accounts for the revolution. The legitimacy of the old regime was also hurt by its specific foreign policy stands which were perceived as indicating a preference for the West over Arab interests.

The primary factor facilitating the rapid development and alteration of Iraqi society was a sudden increase in the revenues acquired from oil sales. Production increases and a more favorable oil concession agreement provided Iraq with
enhanced wealth which was made available for development projects (Marr, 1985, pp. 129-130).

Much of the new-found wealth was put into development programs. The primary beneficiaries of these investments were agriculture and infrastructure. To facilitate transport, the total mileage of roads tripled between 1944 and 1955, rising from 500 to 1600 miles (Batatu, 1978, p. 32-33). And to increase the amount of land available for cultivation, numerous dams were built and irrigation was promoted (Batatu, 1978, p. 33). Smaller, but still substantial, amounts were spent on communication (Batatu, 1978, p. 130).

However, the rewards of this development plan were unequally shared. The primary beneficiaries were the tribal shaikhs and large landowners who could purchase new land holdings or whose present holdings were large enough to make irrigation and commercial farming practical. This tended to help the large landowners but not the established small cultivator or landless peasant (Marr, 1985, pp. 130-32).

The pattern of land distribution worked to continue this separation of the people from the state. One set of statistics noted that, "by 1958, 2,480 individuals, about 1% of all landowners, owned over 55% of all land in private hands in 1958. At the other end of the scale, about 60,000 rural heads of households (out of a total rural population of 3.8 million in 1957) were completely landless and 64% of
landowners held 3.6% of all cultivated land" (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987, p. 32). This inequitable distribution resulted in a deterioration in the living conditions of the peasants.

Agricultural reform, which mainly benefited the wealthy elites, led to a more conspicuous income gap. This served to convince many Iraqis that deeper and more pervasive political reform was needed (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987, p. 54).

Overall, these policies were costly to the regime as it increasingly came to be identified as an impediment to advancement. As Batatu put it, "In other words, by its alliance with the shaikhs, the monarchy ceased, in effect, to play a unifying social role. Moreover, by its commitment to a rural social structure, which condemned the majority of the inhabitants of the country to depressed conditions and which, therefore, constituted a serious impediment to the progress of the Iraqi economy as a whole, the monarchy itself became, in a crucial sense, a retarding social factor" (Batatu, 1978, p. 32).

The agricultural sector was not alone in being affected by the changes going on in the country. There was a rapid increase in the rate of urbanization within Iraq. This trend was intensified by the land practices of the regime which made cultivation a difficult profession. Baghdad was the
main recipient of this rural-urban migration (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987, p. 33).

However, the move to the cities did little to ease the plight of these people. An overabundance of labor, most with no industrial skills, resulted in "low wages, friction, and higher unemployment" (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987, p. 34). And much of the blame for these conditions was put upon the government.

The peasants and urban poor were not the only groups that were increasingly disaffected from the regime. A sense of alienation and powerlessness was evident among these economically disadvantaged groups, but also among the very sectors of society that are usually considered to be the strongest supporters of government, the middle class.

The middle class was relatively new to Iraq, but it was growing rapidly. The oil revenues flowing into the society, and the development projects they funded, greatly increased the size and awareness of this group. Easier access to education, a growing market sector, and government expenditures all made socio-economic mobility a common goal. However, for members of this sector, as their abilities expanded it was not mirrored in easier access to political advancement. This caused an increasing resentment against the entrenched elites. This situation was exacerbated by education which made higher status seem attainable while improvements in communication made people more aware of their
This alienation led to a rejection of the traditional ruling structure by the middle and professional classes. The new generation consisting of intellectuals, professionals, civil servants, army officers, and the like came mainly from the lower and middle classes. They had been exposed to western views of liberal political institutions. And, as one leading scholar of Iraq stated, "They came to the conclusion that the old nationalism, in whose name the old generation had been ruling, had become meaningless and began to advocate new social and political ideals" (Khadduri, 1969, p. 6). When legal political activities proved fruitless they turned to extra-legal means.

The final blow to the regime occurred when increasing numbers in the military also decided that political change had to take place. "Perhaps most ominously for the regime, and in spite of considerable improvements in the status, pay and conditions, discontent was spreading in the army, where Nasser's pan-Arab doctrines were finding a ready and appreciative audience" (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987, p. 44). The army had been ripe for dissent since 1935 because it relied on universal conscription and thus tended to mirror trends in society, thereby bringing in more members of the lower and middle classes. Also, the military was not

a privileged group like the parliament or the Cabinet and thus resented the old regime (Batatu, 1978, p. 764).

To sum up, by the time of the coup the regime had lost the support of the peasants, Arab nationalists, urban unemployed and industrial workers, the middle class, intellectuals, and the all but the highest levels in the military. These groups resented the ruling coalition which they saw as blocking access to higher levels of status and participation. As Marr argues, the problem for the people, and eventually for the regime, was that social change was taking place in Iraq without social reform (Marr, 1985, pp. 127-28).

The result was a legitimacy crisis for the state as numerous sectors of the society turned against the political system that they saw as an impediment to progress. The unwillingness of the regime to engage in substantive reform efforts to meet the demands of the population cost the regime whatever broad based support it may have once had.

The frustrated political ambitions of the citizenry led to numerous attempts to alter the regime, some peaceful, others violent. Over the years, a number of efforts had been made to alter the composition and orientation of the regime.1

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1 The civilian population had tried both violent and electoral strategies for transforming the government, but with little success. On the violent side, there had been riots and demonstrations against the regime and its policies in 1948, 1955 and 1956, mainly in response to foreign policy decisions which were interpreted as being pro-western (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987; Khadduri, 1969; Kimball, 1972).

Electorally, the 1954 elections had been contested by the National Front (consisting of the National Democrats, the Istiglal and the Communists. The Front won eleven of 135 seats, but Nuri stepped in
When it became clear that the civilian leadership did not have the resources either in the government or in the street to combat the vested power of the regime or its security apparatus, the military stepped in. As Khadduri put it,

Failure of the young civilian leaders to achieve power prompted the young officers to intervene, for these officers shared the same ideas and aspirations as their civilian contemporaries. They moved to achieve by force of arms what civilian leaders could not do by strikes and street demonstrations. The military uprising of 14 July 1958 was the outcome of a social revolution for which the new generation had for long been preparing (Khadduri, 1969, p. 7).

The overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq was thus a consequence of processes and forces within Iraqi society that had been percolating for some time. As the society changed, the people became more politicized and empowered, demanding change in the ruling structures. As Phebe Marr points out, "by 1958, the fabric of traditional society was beginning to unravel under the impact of oil wealth, economic development, urbanization, and education. A new, educated generation had emerged, shaped by intellectual and cultural influences different from and inimical to those of the established regime" (1985, p. 151). In essence, the empowerment of the

declaring all opposition parties and newspapers banned, and constructing a totally servile Parliament" (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987, pp. 43-44).

Efforts at electoral change, mainly centered on the Parliament, were also unsuccessful because either the elections were overturned or the parliament was given little real power. In either case, the regime still maintained control over the instruments of coercion (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987; Batatu, 1978).
people of Iraq brought their interests into conflict with the
traditional structures of Iraqi rule. These structures
refused to yield or even engage in meaningful compromise.
The resulting clash brought about the end of the old regime,
the installation of a revolutionary regime that had come to
identify the West as the enemy, and the collapse of the
American position in Iraq.

The legitimacy crisis faced by Nuri and the King,
brought on by economic dislocations and political stagnation,
was further exacerbated by the foreign policy orientation of
the regime. The traditional close orientation of the regime
to Britain and the West in general cost the regime legitimacy
in the eyes of many Iraqis who were drawn to the anti-
imperialist messages of Arab nationalism. Nuri did little to
appease these demands and in fact seems to have been
contemptuous of them.²

Such policies furthered the legitimacy crisis for the
regime as it lost whatever nationalist credentials it may
have once had. The opposition was then able to pick up this
mantle, and with it much support, by merging popular desires
for independence and reassertion with other political and

² The list of Iraqi actions certain to arouse the suspicion, if not
hostility, of the Arab nationalists is long. In 1955, Iraq joined the
Baghdad Pact reaffirming the link to Britain and, informally, to the
United States. During the Suez Crisis of 1956, Nuri was reluctant to
condemn the tri-partite attack of Britain, France, and Israel against
Egypt. In 1957, Iraq, while not signing the Eisenhower Doctrine, did
agree to receive foreign aid from the United States under its auspices.
At every turn Nuri and the king made it clear where their loyalties lay
(Batatu, 1978).
social aspirations (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987, pp. 17-18; Khadduri, 1969, p. 44).

Interestingly, this social situation was not completely lost on the American government. In an embassy study on the army ten months before the coup, it was noted that the officers and men shared the opinions and emotions of the civilian population [Arab nationalist, anti-Israeli and to some extent anti-British]. According to the ambassador, "We concluded that a situation which stirred deeply any of these emotions might cause the army, like any other group, to react so violently that even loyalty to the Crown would be abandoned. This was proven correct when Qasim's coup destroyed the monarchy" (Gallman, 1964, p. 92).

The overthrow itself was a fairly simple affair. Kassem and Arif were in command of two army brigades which had been ordered to leave their posts east of Baghdad and proceed to the Jordanian border by way of Baghdad. As they entered the city they surrounded the Palace and other strategic locations. They were not opposed. The king and Crown Prince were captured at the Palace and were killed, though whether this was ordered or was the act of a single individual remains unknown. Nuri was able to evade capture at first, taking refuge in the homes of friends. The next day he was spotted by a mob as he attempted to leave the city dressed in women's clothes. He was set upon by the mob and brutally
killed, with his body being dragged around the city tied to a wagon.

While the actual overthrow was achieved by the military, it would be a mistake to conclude that this action was done independent of the forces acting within the overall society. In fact, there was a great deal of consultation between the Free Officers and the civilian opposition leadership. (Dann, 1969, p. 25; Khadduri, 1969, pp. 30-32). This interaction was not in the form of operational coordination, but more a consultation and to make contacts in order to construct a post-coup republic.3

It also is clear that the Free Officer movement was independent of control from Cairo. President Nasser of Egypt was kept informed of the activities of the officers, but was not a key figure in either the planning or the execution of the coup (Dann, 1969, p. 25; Khadduri, 1969).

What is particularly telling about the coup is the near total lack of resistance to the coup. The military, that wasn't originally part of the movement, acquiesced to the coup and the civilian population was exhilarated by the demise of the regime. Support for the government had declined to the point where in the end the regime had been unable to bring to its defense either the military or the

3 The stated initial preference of the Free Officers was to establish a republic in Iraq led by civilian politicians. History has shown this to have not been the case as Kassem never moved to relinquish political control, but there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of these views at the time.
civilian population (Dann, 1969, pp. 31-32; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987, p. 49).

Examined from this perspective, it is only possible to conclude that the coup was not the isolated act of an ambitious petty dictator, but was instead the visible expression of the frustration felt by many in the society. The military coup was launched because of the inability of civilian efforts to alter the regime. However, the coercive power of the state was simply too great to force change through strikes and demonstrations. The coup succeeded because these same feelings of alienation and powerlessness were felt by many in the military. And here there was sufficient means to force change. The coup was not challenged because there was no group willing to defend the old regime. As Batatu put it, "the coup succeeded so swiftly and so conclusively because it expressed a basic bent in the society, if only in a negative sense" (1978, p. 805).

American Awareness of Iraqi Empowerment

The coup of July 14 caught official Washington flat-footed. In subsequent reports, the lack of forewarning was termed an "intelligence failure". But was this the case? Was Washington so ill-informed about the goings-on in Iraq that the coup was completely unforeseen? This question needs to be examined at two levels: was there knowledge of the coup itself prior to its execution, and more generally, was
the United States aware of the rise of empowerment going on in Iraq and its revolutionary potential?

Predicting a specific instance is a difficult task for an intelligence agency. There are often an abundance of reports, many of which are contradictory, and most of which are false. To raise the alarm at each rumor of a coup would be inappropriate. In the Iraq case there are indications that the CIA had reports of a possible coup but that these were never brought to the attention of the policy makers (Lyon, 1974).

There is also some evidence that King Faisal in Iraq was aware of the coup against him but that he considered them groundless. The details of the coup attempt were supposedly provided to the King by his cousin, King Hussein of Jordan, whose security forces had captured an Iraqi agent trying to rally support in Jordan (Hussein, 1962, pp. 193-96). There is no evidence to corroborate the King's story nor to indicate that Washington was ever told of Hussein's information.

Thus, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the reports from policy makers as to their surprise over the occurrence of the coup on that particular day. However, it is reasonable to question whether there was an awareness of the broad changes that were affecting Iraq and the possible consequences of these changes.
While the specific timing of the coup seems to have been a total shock to the United States, the other Western powers, Israel and even Iraq (at the time of the coup the royal family and Nuri were preparing to depart for an upcoming Baghdad Pact meeting in Ankara), the possibility of internal dissent was, at times, given attention by the American intelligence community and the embassy in Baghdad. However, for the most part, there appears to have been a woeful lack of understanding of the processes and forces that were in operation in Iraq.

A report by the Operations Coordinating Board of the National Security Council, entitled "Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Iraq and Recommended Action" dated December 14, 1955, concerned itself almost exclusively with the strength of communist groups in Iraq, which was negligible due to Nuri's effective use of the secret police (FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XII, pp. 979-986). A preoccupation with Iraqi communist activities missed the growing power and frustration of other segments of the society.

A more mixed evaluation of Iraq was reported by the United States ambassador in Baghdad, Waldemar J. Gallman. In a telegram dated January 15, 1956, he reported signs of growing opposition to Nuri. He credited its rise to the poor performance of the development effort. But, having laid out the possibility of a future problem here, Gallman then dismissed its potential strength and recommended that the
United States join the Baghdad Pact. In hindsight, such an action would only have served to further the legitimacy crisis in Iraq by identifying the United States even further with the old regime. Gallman concluded by saying, "Yet notwithstanding its shortcomings Nuri government may fairly be considered most effective friend West can expect in Iraq in near future. It is decisive, reasonable and we can work with it" (FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XII, pp. 988-992).

Gallman's mixed assessment of the situation did not have much of an impression in Washington. The next National Intelligence Estimate, or NIE, (36.2-56 dated July 17, 1956) praised Iraq's stability and characterized the opposition as weak and intimidated, incapable of challenging the regime. The report stated that there "is no evidence of a revolutionary-minded military clique among Iraqi officers—such as that which overthrew King Farouk in Egypt—and Iraq's ruling family is in any case more popular than Farouk" (FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XII, pp. 997-1010).

Following the Suez Crisis of late 1956, the perception of Iraq changed somewhat. Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, distributed a CIA memorandum on conditions in Iraq. He wrote that the regime, "long regarded in the Arab world as a British stooge", had been "severely shaken" by the attack and "is being popularly indicted as having been involved in the British-French-Israeli action". The memo reported strong internal pressures on Nuri to step down and
for Iraq to leave the Baghdad Pact. The memo also mentioned growing dissatisfaction among the lower levels in the government and in the Iraqi army, particularly among the junior officers" (FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XII, pp. 1012-1014).

The NIE for 1957 (NIE 36.2-57 6/4/57) tread a middle ground between the positive reports of 1955 and 1956 and Dulles' more dire evaluation in late 1956. The 1957 NIE acknowledged that "Undercurrents of opposition to the regime will probably require continuing reliance on authoritarian methods and, over the longer run, demands for broader participation in governmental affairs will probably become increasingly forceful". It also repeatedly made mention of the stability of Iraq as long as Nuri was in power.

In this report, for the first time there was mention of growing opposition among students, urban labor groups, peasants, professionals, military officers, and certain tribes. However, it reported that the army was not involved in politics and would "probably remain loyal to the regime over the next few years". It stated that dissident elements did exist in the military but that they were disorganized and not politically capable of moving against the regime (FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XII, pp. 1048-1058).

Two other intelligence estimates were produced, both in 1958. Allen Dulles in explaining the "intelligence failure" that let the coup occur made reference to a March CIA report which detailed possible subversion in Iraq. And at a May 13,
1958 conference with the President, mention was made of the 1958 NIE for Iraq. While the contents of these reports remains speculative, one wonders just how serious either one portrayed the threat given the shock over the news of the coup.

Overall, the United States appears to have been unaware of the forces that were shaping the political struggle in Iraq. The potential for domestic unrest caused by development and a closed political system were barely recognized. The emphasis was clearly on the strength and stability provided by Nuri. Concerns that Nuri's style of rule was potential destabilizing are not evident. This finding is not that surprising. Empowerment was basically a new phenomenon and common wisdom held that economic development constituted a stabilizing force, not the opposite.

There were other factors working against the United States in collecting information about the growth of Iraqi opposition. Iraq did not want to admit to domestic troubles and the United States for the most part was eager to maintain this fiction as well.

Because of the western view of Iraq as a bulwark against communism plus the effective control of information by the regime, the world was ignorant of what was happening in Iraq. One analyst later commented that Iraq came the closest in the
Middle East to being a police state, despite manifestations of democratic institutions (Shwadran, 1960, p. 12).

The United States ambassador in Baghdad seems to have been unawares of the social changes that was occurring within the country. A lack of contact with the opposition, in part caused by a lack of Arabic speakers in the embassy, and a high regard for Nuri, made Gallman blind to the empowerment trends going on in Iraq. In his memoirs, Gallman, even in hindsight, indicates a hostility and contempt for what occurred referring to it as simply a coup not a revolution, with only minimal popular support. Perhaps his admiration for Nuri, also plainly visible in his memoirs, continued to cloud his evaluation.4

4 Gallman later wrote, "the action of July 14 is often called a revolution, but this is misleading. 'Revolution' connotes a popular uprising against those in power. What took place in Iraq on July 14, 1958, in no way resembled that. It was simply a seizure of power by a small, determined group. It is true that hordes of unruly jubilant people roamed the streets for several days. They were not representative Iraqis, but were hoodlums recruited by agitators. There was nothing spontaneous about these demonstrations. Although there was general discontent in the country and much criticism of Nuri and his government, there was no unified, determined protest, or program of reform. The July 14 coup cannot justly be called a 'popular revolution'" (Gallman, 1964, p. 205).

As for Gallman's regard for Nuri, "I would say that with the death of Nuri, illiberal as he was at times in dealing with domestic issues, Iraq lost her best leader toward an eventual life of dignity and decency, and her strongest bulwark against recurrent chaos, if not savagery" (Gallman, 1964, p. 230).
Views Among the American Policy Elite

However, these were not the only views circulating in 1957 and 1958. Numerous commentaries were being written at this time by members of the policy elite.

I will first concentrate on the range of views within the policy elite, and then turn to the presidential elite level to see if this range of opinion was evident at the highest levels of decision making. The bulk of this section will focus on evidence of the implementation of various types of deviance reduction strategies employed against individuals who did not share the high threat view.

In the period leading up to the Iraqi coup of 1958, the policy question confronting Washington was how to react to the growing influence of Arab nationalism as a political force in many Middle Eastern states. Nasser of Egypt had attracted a huge following in the Middle East and was widely regarded as the father of Arab nationalism. Of particular concern was a civil war sputtering along in Lebanon.

Among the policy elite, five views can be identified. Representative quotes are then given for each position.

1. Arab nationalism is a threatening force because it is tied to International Communism.

Former President Harry Truman argued that the real threats to the region were the Soviets, which he deemed expansionistic, and Nasser who he felt was a dictator and a threat to peace. He urged an aggressive economic development
strategy to halt Soviet and Nasser efforts to control the region \((\text{New York Times, 3/13/58, p. 1})\).

Dr. Israel Goldstein, President of the American Jewish Congress stated that "Nasser's expansionist ambition, powered by a policy of playing off the East against the West" was the chief danger in the Middle East. "The conspiratorial hand of Nasser" was "aided and abetted by the Soviet Union." "But his expression of friendship for the Soviet Union are unvarying, apparently a fixed point in his foreign policy." He then warned the State Department against "appeasement" of Nasser \((\text{New York Times, 5/16 p. 5})\).

2. Nasser is an aggressive leader who must be confronted.

Dr. Emanuel Neumann, President of the Zionist Organization of America, charged an "inadequate appreciation of the nature of Nasserism as there had been of the nature of Hitlerism in the early Thirties." "We have failed to grasp the fact that every concession on our part and any indication of friendliness or goodwill is exploited by Nasser to bolster up his ever-precarious positions. Our moderation is regarded as weakness or irresolution" \((\text{New York Times, 4/21/58 p. 2})\).

3. Relations with Arabs should not come at the price of ignoring Israel.

Senator Mansfield of Montana argued that the administration "has toyed with autocratic and dictatorial movements and nations, while it overlooks with almost
snobbish disdain countries like Lebanon and Israel which are struggling to keep the concept of freedom alive in an area that reeks of terrorism, militarism and conspiracy" *(New York Times, 4/23/58, p. 2).*

James B. Carey, President of the International Union of Electrical Workers stated that John Foster Dulles had maintained a "policy of appeasement of dictatorships and tyrants from the Middle East to the tip of South America." He added that "Israel is our invaluable ally in the Middle East" *(New York Times, 5/20/58, p. 8).*

Senator Jacob Javits of New York crossed the first three positions by arguing that troubles in the Middle East were "all part of the effort to realize the end of President Nasser's ultranationalist Communist-oriented movement—a take-over of the Arab sates by him and another effort to defeat Israel" *(New York Times, 5/20/58, p. 9).*

4. Oil is America's most important interest and access should be protected

James Morris argued that Nasser was not a puppet but a client of the Soviet Union. He added that unfortunately the United States had "found herself in precisely the old British position, with kings for allies and republicans for enemies." Despite this acknowledgment, Morris went on to argue that the real interest of the United States in the region was oil and therefore Washington must continue to ally itself with these governments *(Morris, New York Times Magazine, 3/2/58).*
5. Arab nationalism is an indigenous force that should be recognized as a popular political force and accommodated to.

Others argued that the Middle East was undergoing profound social change. They refused to condemn this turn of events and in fact argued that the United States needed to recognize this change and begin to accommodate itself to the new realities. To do otherwise would be to create the very circumstances which America feared.

William Polk, a prominent Middle East expert, criticized the unwillingness of the United States to accept the leadership of Nasser. "To us he [Nasser] has become a hodgepodge of Hitler, Stalin, and a wily Oriental despot. In Egypt he represents the younger generation and is most popular among them" (Polk, 1957, p. 63).

Polk argued that the United States had created an artificial division in the Arab world between those states with whom it would cooperate, give aid to, and expect very little and those whom are shunned and have convinced of American animosity. But, Polk pointed out, is Syria less of a democracy than Jordan or Egypt less than Iraq or Saudi Arabia? Why are we convinced our goals are incompatible? "Or have we arrived at the position where our only answer to Russian propaganda—or indeed to ideas and aims which are much closer to our own than to Communism—is the rule of tired old men and kings?" (Polk, 1957, p. 65).
Ray Alan agreed with Polk about the changes going on in the region, though he was somewhat pessimistic about the form that such regimes may take. He argued that "if the present pro-Western governing cliques in Baghdad and Amman suddenly relaxed their oligarchic grip their successors would be mob-dominated anti-Western claques—which would advance no one's interests, the Arabs' or the Wests'. But to face this dismal fact is not to venerate it—to consider the Arab oligarchies immutable features of the Near Eastern landscape and try, stupidly, to stem their subject's evolution toward more liberal rule." He feared that opposing change would only help the Soviets (Alan, 8/57, p. 137).

He concluded that the West must seek to identify itself with democracy even at the cost of some loss of authoritarian friends, otherwise the West would always be assumed to be anti-democratic (Alan, 8/57, p. 139).

John Badeau, President of the Near East Institute, argued that the United States had the wrong view about events and beliefs in the Middle East. He argued that alignment by the Arabs with the West was not possible because the United States was seen as an imperial power. Conversely, the Soviet Union was not seen as aggressive and was perceived as an opportunity to acquire the benefits of the West. However, primary among all this was the goal of pan-Arabism, with its doctrines of independence and anti-colonialism. Rather than seeing events in the Middle East from an East-West
perspective, Badeau took a more regional focus. Less inclined to interpret Arab nationalism as a threat to the West which would benefit the Soviets, he saw its popularity as arising from basic changes in Arab society.

But though social and economic development is clearly a priority in the Middle East, it is extremely difficult to implement without a revolution. That is why the Egyptian revolution is so basic and so significant for the whole area. We think of it in terms of Nasser and his military junta, but I believe that in the perspective of history the Egyptian revolution will be to then Middle East what the French Revolution was to Europe. It, too, had its self-seeking leaders, its power cliques, its political nationalism; but it let loose forces that finally changed the pattern of social life in most of Europe. That is what the Egyptian revolution has begun to do in the Middle East and that is why it strikes fire in some form in every country (Badeau, 1958, p. 240).

Senator Humphrey argued that "Nasser may be hostile to us, but politicians come and go, the people go on forever" (New York Times, 2/2/58, p. 10). He added that, in fact, "nationalism can also be a positive force if properly channeled and nationalism today stands as a mighty bulwark against communism" (New York Times, 2/4/58, p. 4).

Vera Dean, a foreign affairs commentator, argued that history may show that Nasser was not a Soviet stooge or imperialist. He may be remembered instead as a symbol of Arab independence. "Instead of undermining the West, an independent, united Arab area might safeguard the Middle East from Russian intervention and even have sufficient confidence
in its own future to open negotiations with Israel" (Dean, 3/1/58, p. 96).

It is obvious that most of these positions were hostile to Arab nationalism though the underlying logic of why this movement was a threat varied. The final position was more accepting of Arab nationalism as a political force though not necessarily enthusiastically. However, the existence of these views does not mean that they were part of the decision making in regards to the situations in Lebanon and Iraq. For that we must turn to the presidential elite level where the decision was made.

Views at the Presidential Elite Level

At this level it is useful to distinguish two periods in the course of the Iraqi-Lebanese crisis. The first lasted from May 8, 1958 through the July 14 coup in Baghdad. The second period included the coup and the immediate aftermath as the United States decided how to respond to this strategic blow. Briefly, the history of the Iraqi-Lebanese crisis is as follows. In Lebanon tensions had been building for some time, triggered mainly by the highly credible rumor that the pro-western Maronite Christian President, Camille Chamoun, was planning on amending the Lebanese Constitution so that he could be elected to a second term. The situation turned violent on May 8, 1958, when a prominent opposition newspaper editor was assassinated in Beirut reportedly at the order of
Chamoun. At this point civil war broke out. On May 13th, Chamoun requested information from the United States as to what type of assistance could be counted upon if requested. The administration signaled its willingness to assist Chamoun but only if the situation was dire. The situation then cooled in Lebanon with neither the government nor the opposition willing to seriously challenge the other. By mid-July many believed the crisis to be near settlement.

This calm was shattered on July 14, when two officers in the Iraqi army ousted the King, Crown Prince and pro-western Prime Minister of Iraq. The news of the coup was greeted with jubilation among major sectors of the society in Iraq and Lebanon while in Washington there was shock and panic. On July 14, in a series of meetings the decision was made to send American marines to Beirut.

Despite the diversity in opinion displayed at the policy elite level, there was a surprising degree of consensus within the presidential elite as to the definition of the situation and the proper response. I will lay out this position in a moment. However, there was some disagreement with this broad consensus within the government. It came from two actors in particular. Within the executive branch, the American ambassador to Lebanon, Robert McClintock, did not share all the perceptions of the majority in the White
Additionally, there were clear signs that at least some members of Congress would be unlikely to follow the administration's lead. In the next section I will present the majority position and those of the dissenters. I will then show how these dissenters were handled by the majority in ways that tended to negate their possible influence over the decision.

In the period leading up to the coup the consensus view among the presidential elite was that Nasser, acting on his own, was seeking to exploit internal troubles in Lebanon for his own gain. The Soviet Union was seen as having no role in Lebanon's difficulties. The source of the turmoil was seen as coming from the infiltration of arms, money and material from Syria, now joined to Egypt in the United Arab Republic.

Domestic causes for the unrest were given little to no attention. Chamoun was seen as a decent leader who was mainly concerned about continuing the pro-western orientation of Lebanon. Intervention was possible but not desirable because it was thought that the United States would lose the goodwill of the Arab peoples. However, over the course of this period, the intervention option was seen as being more and more necessary lest the United States be perceived as unwilling to live up to its international commitments. This, in generalized terms, was the opinion shared by Eisenhower.

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5 The Director of the United States Information Agency, George Allen, also appears to have doubted the wisdom of intervening in the Middle East. However, there is not enough data to score his position.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, CIA Director Allen Dulles, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Twining, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles, and numerous lower officials in State, Defense, and the White House.

**U.S. Decision Making in the Iraqi-Lebanese Crisis**

Prior to the renewal of violence in Lebanon in early May, two patterns of thought were evident among the policy makers in Washington. The first was that there was a legitimate world-wide Soviet-communist threat that had to be met forcefully by the United States.6 Despite this obsession with perceived communist expansion, when pressed on specific cases, especially with regards to the Middle East, there was a tendency to not see the Soviet hand. Both Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles argued that there was a distinction between Arab nationalism and communism, with John Foster Dulles adding that while there was communist influence in Cairo, there had not been a communist take-over.7 Furthermore, Eisenhower in a letter to John Foster Dulles even asked whether "there would be any percentage in

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6 For examples of this line of thinking see, Eisenhower "Message of the President on the Middle East, January 5, 1957" in *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958, pp. 195-204* and "Message of the President on the Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1958, May 21, 1957" in *Documents, 1958, pp. 53-65*. Also see John Foster Dulles "Dynamic Peace: Address by the Secretary of State (Dulles) before the Associated Press, New York, April 22, 1957" in *Documents, 1958, pp. 36-44* and Dulles' article in *Foreign Affairs, 10/57*.

7 See the testimony of Foster Dulles on 1/9/58 and Allen Dulles on 2/7/58 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in *Executive Sessions, 1980*.
initiating a drive to bring back Nasser to our side?" (11/13/57).

These two patterns of thought continued to be held by the policy makers throughout the first phase of the crisis, May 8–July 14. After the 14th, there was a re-definition of the situation which now linked the two previously distinct patterns into a single pattern. Briefly put, events in the Middle East led the policy makers at the presidential elite level to connect the Soviet Union to the actions of Nasser and Arab nationalism. Previous hesitation to intervene in the region was removed. Complex images were replaced by more simple and connected images of the Soviet Union and actors in the Middle East.

This section will detail the decision making process at the presidential elite level on this issue of unrest in Lebanon and more generally, the existence of Arab nationalism in the Middle East. Specific attention will be focused on how the situation was perceived and who was included in the various decisions. The history of the civil war in Lebanon will be reviewed as it relates to the decision making process, but this is not meant to be a thorough review of that conflict. I will try to paint a picture of America's awareness of and reaction to social and political changes in Iraq and Lebanon.

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8 For more on the Lebanese civil war itself, see Qubain (1961), Quandt (1978), Dowty (1984), Meo (1965).
The first indication of unrest in Lebanon came on April 18, 1958 when the American ambassador in Beirut at the time, Higgs, reported on a visit he received from Lebanese opposition leaders, both Moslem and Druze, rejecting the possibility of a Chamoun bid for re-election (Higgs to John Foster Dulles, Telegram #3495 DDRS '76-98E). This was followed four days later by another telegram from Higgs reporting the rejection of the pro-Chamoun Lebanese Prime Minister Sami as-Solh, a Moslem, by the Moslem opposition. Higgs also reported on a break between the Maronite Christian Patriarch, Meouchi, and Chamoun over the issue of Chamoun's re-election bid (Telegram #3521 from Higgs to John Foster Dulles in DDRS '76-98F). Thus, by mid-April, Washington had information regarding the primary issue behind the political conflict and indications that major sectors of the population, drawing from the Moslem, Druze and Maronite communities, opposed Chamoun.

Washington took little notice of the situation until May 8, when Nasib Matni, the editor of an opposition newspaper The Telegraph, was assassinated in Beirut. The killer was not caught, but blame was immediately placed on Chamoun and his political allies. This event ignited the simmering conflict. That same day, Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA, in a briefing of the National Security Council (NSC), cited reports from Higgs stating that Chamoun would probably run again. But Allen Dulles added a new twist to the reports by
stating that Chamoun's decision "would be bound to cause internal difficulties which Nasser was certain to exploit" (May 8, 1958, 365th Meeting of the NSC; DDE Diaries-NSC Series).

On May 13, Chamoun, nervous over the violence in Lebanon, contacted Washington to inquire as to what would be the United States' response should he request assistance. That day, there was the first meeting held in Washington among the presidential elite to specifically discuss Lebanon. It was held in the White House and was attended by Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State Christian Herter, Allen Dulles, Nathan Twining, presidential advisor Alfred Gruenther, presidential secretary Andrew Goodpastor, John Irwin from Defense, and William Rountree from State. The discussion revolved around the possibility of intervening in Lebanon. A policy dilemma was immediately clear.

Eisenhower, interpreting the crisis from a broader perspective, raised the point that "larger problems" may arise if the United States did not respond to the Lebanese request. John Foster Dulles agreed, but pointed out that troops could not go in under the Eisenhower Doctrine because this would require a finding that the United Arab Republic (UAR) had attacked Lebanon and that the UAR was under the control of international communism.
Clearly unwilling to make that assessment at the time, John Foster Dulles proposed a way out of the dilemma by arguing that intervention may be possible under the Mansfield Amendment to the Eisenhower Doctrine which allowed actions to preserve the integrity and independence of nations in the Middle East vital to America's national interests and world peace. Dulles added that the traditional argument about protecting American lives and property could also be raised.

For Dulles the problem was not just how to rationalize intervention. He also worried about its consequences. He warned that intervention might create a wave of anti-western feeling in the Arab world similar to that following the Suez Crisis of 1956. He argued that it was probable that oil pipelines through Syria would be closed, the Suez Canal would be closed to American and British ships, and that any support by Iraq or Jordan may lead to their collapse.

After stating these possibilities, John Foster Dulles then reversed himself. In the meeting he reviewed communist methods of warfare in the world emphasizing the inciting of rioting. He argued that while usually this is "extremely difficult to combat", in Lebanon there was an opportunity to respond to a legitimate request as set forth in the United Nations Charter (Memorandum of Conversation "Lebanese Crisis" 5/13/58; DDRS '83-1434). The final decision was to respond to Chamoun with a message stating that the United States was ready to assist Lebanon, but that intervention was not
preferred and that any action would not be an effort to maintain Chamoun in power. It was also required that Lebanon first submit a complaint against the UAR to the Security Council and that at least one other Arab state support this complaint (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 267).

Years later, Eisenhower displayed a greater concern with the possible communist and Soviet role in Lebanon than is evident in the documents. In his memoirs he wrote that the May 13 meeting was held "in a climate of impatience because of our belief that Chamoun's uneasiness was the result of one more communist provocation" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 266). He added that he was not concerned over the possible Soviet reaction because "I believed the Soviets would not take action if the United States movement were decisive and strong, particularly if other parts of the Middle East were not involved in the operations" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 266).

By mid-May the dominant definition of the situation was beginning to solidify. In the new interpretation, first mentioned by Allen Dulles on May 8, Nasser was seen as bent on taking Lebanon. Chamoun was increasingly seen as a benevolent leader, ignoring the fact that he was opposed by virtually all sectors of Lebanese society. While not claiming Soviet involvement, the early reports by Higgs emphasizing the issue of Chamoun's re-election were downplayed. In light of this interpretation, on May 17, 1958, deliveries of military equipment to Lebanon were
speeded up, the Marine contingent with the Sixth Fleet was doubled, and transport aircraft were moved from America to Germany (Hoopes, 1973, p. 433).

Three days later in a NSC meeting, Allen Dulles stated that "Chamoun was by all odds the strongest man among a pretty weak lot of Lebanese politicians". Emphasizing a motivation of paternalism instead of personal ambition, Allen Dulles argued that the election crisis was resolvable because Chamoun would not run again "if he could be assured of a strongly pro-Western substitute for himself" (May 22, 1958 366th NSC Meeting DDE Papers NSC Series).

One week later, at the 367th NSC Meeting, Allen Dulles said that Chamoun’s declaration that the constitution would not be amended had had little effect and that the opposition demanded Chamoun step down. He also stressed the involvement of Syria and Egypt in Lebanon's difficulties. He termed the civil war "admirable cover" for their involvement (May 29, 1958 367th NSC Meeting; DDE Papers NSC Series).

Indicating a belief that the conflict was primarily externally generated, Allen Dulles also reported that eighteen U.S. light tanks had arrived in Lebanon the day before by sea and would be promptly turned over to the Lebanese Army.

The one voice present at the NSC meeting that continued to emphasize the internal nature of the problem and the complexity of the situation belonged to George Allen,
Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA). He argued that intervention would be interpreted as being done on the behalf of the Christians. He argued that it would be "very much better if somehow the Lebanese could win through with our political and military backing, but without the actual intervention of U.S. troops" (367th NSC meeting May 29, 1958, DDE Papers NSC Series).

The sectarian nature of the conflict eluded most of the policy makers who preferred to interpret the situation as the work of a few Moslem rebels supported by the UAR (see Allen Dulles June 3, 1958, 368th NSC Meeting; DDE Papers NSC Series).

When reports reached Washington that General Fuad Chehab, the Lebanese Chief of Staff, was unwilling to attack the rebels, his leadership was immediately questioned. At the June 3 NSC meeting, Allen Dulles argued that Chehab "seemed to lack the guts to use his army against the dissident forces" (June 3, 1958 368th NSC Meeting; DDE Papers NSC Series). The argument that Chehab feared that if pushed, his army would disintegrate mainly in favor of the rebels, was not recognized.

Meeting one of the conditions coming out of the May 13 meeting, Charles Malik, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, on June 6, 1958, lodged an official complaint against the UAR before the UN Security Council (McClintock, p. 104). Five
days later, on June 11, the Security Council decided to send an observer force to Lebanon (McClintock, p. 104). 9

On June 6th, Nasser contacted the United States with a proposed settlement. Chamoun would finish out his term, due to end in September; General Chehab would succeed Chamoun; and the Lebanese rebels would be given amnesty. This suggestion was passed on to Chamoun without American recommendation (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 268). As the telegram from Washington to the embassies in Beirut and Cairo put it, "We are conveying this information as matter loyalty to Lebanon and not because we endorse proposal which is for Lebanon to decide. Neither can we assume any responsibility for Nasser's good faith" (Telegram #4710 June 11, 1958; FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, pp. 108-09).

On June 15 1958, a meeting was held at the White House. 10 Eisenhower was clearly aggravated. On the one hand, Eisenhower was disinclined to intervene because he did not believe the Lebanese leadership was strong and capable. He asked rhetorically, "How can you save a country from its own leaders?" He then went on to say "that what was really needed in Lebanon was a strong leader whom we could back strongly. Otherwise we would be intervening to save a

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9 For text of resolution see Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958, p. 298-99.

10 It was presided over by Eisenhower and attended by John Foster Dulles; Christian Herter; William Rountree; Bill Macomber; Bill Hayes, all from State; Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles; Nathan Twining; Allen Dulles; George Allen; and Arthur Minnich.
nation; and yet the nation is the people, and the people don't want our intervention." He concluded that "he had little, if any, enthusiasm for our intervening at this time."

John Foster Dulles commented, however, that "if Chamoun calls on us and we do not respond, that will be the end of every pro-Western government in the area. This leaves us with little or no choice, even though every alternative is 'wrong'." Despite his misgivings, Eisenhower agreed and noted that the United States would have to fulfill its commitments.

Once the intervention option received endorsement, Bill Rountree argued that if the United States were to go in it must establish a regime that could survive American withdrawal. This would mean "in all probability a pro-Western dictatorship, since there is not sufficient popular support in Lebanon for western intervention."

Allen Dulles persisted in the existent definition of the situation. Chehab's lack of action was interpreted as indicating political ambition on the part of Chehab and a desire to undermine Chamoun.

Interestingly, the Soviet role was considered insignificant in the crisis. Allen Dulles noted "the Soviets had not entered Lebanon at all except by radio."

For the first time during the crisis, Iraq was specifically mentioned. John Foster Dulles, in a comment that received no further attention, noted the unstable and
The dominant perspective received its first public airing two days later. In a news conference, John Foster Dulles announced that Lebanon was covered under the UN resolution of 1949 on indirect aggression, which denounces the fomenting from without of civil strife (June 17, 1958 in *Department of State Bulletin*, v. 39 (July 7, 1958), p. 8).

On June 19, John Foster Dulles sent a telegram to McClintock in which he was instructed to visit Chamoun and explain the American position. In his instructions, Dulles again demonstrated the basic pre-coup position. Intervention was to be avoided because this might cause confessional strife and that "there is a grave danger if not certainty that reaction in the Near Eastern area to intervention would represent a victory for Nasser in that there would be aroused strong popular feeling which could well sweep away regimes of pro-Western Arab leaders in other countries." At the same time however, and perhaps reflecting more of Dulles' position than Eisenhower's, Chamoun was to be bolstered. The telegram stated that "Chamoun should be reassured of our full confidence in him personally. Tell him that we realize that he is the symbol of Lebanon's determination to defend its independence and integrity..." (Telegram #4890 NIACT from John Foster Dulles to McClintock; DDE Papers International Series).
Eisenhower tended to accept the dominant perspective, yet an ambivalence over intervention continued. In a letter to a friend, Paul Hoffmann, Eisenhower said to not intervene may be fatal to the West. Yet, "on the other hand, to intervene would increase, in the Arab world, antagonism toward the West and might even bring Nasser closer to his Pan-Arab ambition."

Eisenhower also belittled the Lebanese leadership. He stated that "Chamoun is most friendly but indecisive. Chehab seems to be playing some political game of his own rather than to take energetic action in suppressing the rebels."

In addition, a new twist to the perspective became evident. After mentioning the complexity of the Lebanese situation, Eisenhower stated that above all the problem was "a great internal campaign of subversion and deceit, possibly communistic in origin" (June 23, 1958 in DDE Diaries).

The dilemma over intervention was settled soon thereafter by denying its relevance. On June 24, John Foster Dulles cabled a telegram to the American embassies in Paris, Beirut, London and the UN. In it he stressed the following points.

1. That the civil war in Lebanon was a domestic political struggle but which "would not be prolonged and might not have started without foreign intervention." Dulles termed this indirect aggression fomented by the UAR.
2. "Lebanon has thus become test case for preservation of independence of small states and respect of their right to solve their internal problems by themselves."

3. The "issue therefore far transcends the purely Lebanese domestic political aspects which are involved. If Lebanese could be left to themselves these aspects would present no insoluble problem." The United States would support the UN mission, but if it failed, "It would be a terrible thing for conscience of world if small state like Lebanon, in danger of losing its independence as the result of indirect aggression, were to appeal for help and this help were refused."

4. He also warned that if the UN effort failed, "the United Nations might go the way that the League of Nations went when it failed to take effective action in defense of Manchuria and Abyssinia. Nor do we believe that the situation will be better if Lebanon is in effect coerced into Munich-like appeasement, which in effect is surrender to UAR." (June 24, 1958 Telegram #4837 by John Foster Dulles; DDRS '77-64C).

Concern over Arab reaction was not mentioned. Lebanon was seen as being under attack from without, with the internal dynamics given almost no weight. Finally, the stakes were recalculated. Lebanon was now seen as a "test case" for the world and the United Nations. Given such stakes, the intervention option was more readily considered.
The next day John Foster Dulles repeated his views to the Italian ambassador to the United States. He warned that "If we stand idly by and permit take over here it could start a chain reaction in other areas. It is possible for countries or adventurers bent on subversion to find some cause to foment internal disorder almost anywhere in the world" (MemCon "The Situation in Lebanon"; DDRS '76-101A).

Another exchange over the Lebanese situation occurred on July 1 between Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles and the Shah of Iran. The Shah, repeating the chain reaction analogy that Dulles feared, stated that "it might be worthwhile to accept the dangers of this extreme measure [intervention], because if Lebanon should fall [into hands of the communists or Nasser], other states in the area would do likewise."

Eisenhower was less convinced, saying that "the problem was to determine whether the Lebanese problem was primarily one of communism, or one of a rebellion of peasants and tribes. To the extent that it was merely an internal uprising against the regime, the sending in of foreign troops would be extremely unpopular not only in Lebanon but also in other countries since it would be considered a fight to keep Chamoun in power rather than to save Lebanese independence."

The Shah responded that Lebanon was a domestic problem being exploited by Nasser and the communists, as these forces continued "probing for weak spots."
Eisenhower relented saying that he and John Foster Dulles both felt that intervention was better than doing nothing. He termed it "the lesser of two evils."

The conversation then shifted to a discussion of Nasser in general. Eisenhower asked the Shah if Nasser could be "recaptured" and "brought back into the fold." Citing Nasser's book, Dulles responded that Nasser's ambition was to control oil supplies and thus the Western European economy. "The Secretary compared Nasser and his pan-Arabism with Hitler's pan-Germanism. Nasser saw an opportunity for advancing the grandeur of Egypt and of setting himself up as the Arab 'hero' with the West in his clutches." The Shah agreed with John Foster Dulles and claimed that pan-Arabism was an illusion.

Still uncertain, Eisenhower stated that nationalism was "an effective counter to communism", but that this nationalism must be "constructive". For Eisenhower, nationalism must be tied to freedom and "other free world ideals" (MemCon "Lebanon and the Middle East"; DDE Diaries).

The last discussion of Lebanon prior to the coup in Iraq occurred on July 5, during a meeting of the NSC. Allen Dulles in his weekly intelligence briefing indicated that there had been little change. There were indications that the government was doing better and that the rebels were running out of supplies. Concerning Chamoun, Allen Dulles stated that "apparently Chamoun still thought it might be
possible for him to pull off another six-year term. Indeed, maybe he could. He was a very courageous individual" (July 5, 1958 371st meeting of the NSC; DDE Diaries NSC Series). Apparently, previous reports of Chamoun's withdrawal from politics were premature. The quote from Allen Dulles seems to indicate a degree of support, or at least respect, for Chamoun.

The period from July 5 through July 13 is empty of American action or discussion. In fact, many policy makers in their memoirs indicate that they believed the situation was moving towards settlement (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 269). This complacency was shattered with the revolution in Iraq. News of the coup reached Washington in the early hours of July 14. This was followed by a frantic set of meetings and phone calls as efforts were made to assess the situation not only in Iraq, but also in Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

With the news of the coup in Baghdad, a radical shift occurred in the thinking of many policy makers. The previously moderate positions regarding Arab nationalism and the situation in Lebanon were quickly replaced by a more extreme, threat-driven, viewpoint. In response to events in Baghdad the policy makers acted where they felt they could, in this case, Lebanon. This section will examine the decision making process and the underlying set of perceptions
that drove the process. Special attention will be paid to
the participants and their views of the situation.

That morning a meeting was held in the Dulles' office.11
The intervention option dominated conversation. Rather
quickly, "there was general agreement that the effects of the
United States doing nothing would be: 1. Nasser would take
over the whole area; 2. The United States would lose
influence not only in the Arab States of the Middle East but
in the area generally, and our bases throughout the area
would be in jeopardy; 3. The dependability of United States
commitments for assistance in the event of need would be
brought into question throughout the world".

A new viewpoint was already evident at this meeting.
The primary culprit was Nasser who must be stopped. The
stakes were seen as so high that a confrontation with the
Soviets was deemed an acceptable risk. "General Twining felt
that in these circumstances we had no alternative but to go
in." Loy Henderson stated that the United States should face
the risk "now as well as any time" (Memorandum for Record
"Meeting re Iraq" in Papers of John Foster Dulles; John
Foster Dulles Chronological Series). Previous concerns over
negative regional consequences were not mentioned.

11 It was attended by John Foster Dulles, Lampton Berry, Stuart
Rockwell, Richard Murphy, Loy Henderson, William Reinhardt, William
Macomber, Robert Sanger, Mathews, Greene, Nathan Twining, Donald
Quarles, Mansfield Sprague, Allen Dulles, and Norman Paul (Mem for
Record "Meeting re Iraq" in Papers of John Foster Dulles; John Foster
Dulles Chronological Series). This group represented State, Defense,
and the CIA.
Interestingly, alternatives appear to never have been seriously considered. As one participant later put it, "Within an hour, I think each of us there reached the conclusion that action was the only course. That meant landing troops and taking the risk" (Knebel, 1958, p. 18).

This conclusion was already being heard at the White House. Even before the official meetings began, Eisenhower had been urged by John Foster Dulles, Vice-President Nixon and two key Republican Senators that intervention was required (Newsweek, 7/28/58, p. 24).

The regularly scheduled NSC meeting for that morning was quickly concluded with no discussion of Iraq or Lebanon. Selected participants were then invited to stay for a subsequent meeting.\(^\text{12}\)

It was also a meeting where the decision had already been made. Prior to the NSC meeting, Eisenhower reportedly told John Foster Dulles, "Foster, I've already made up my mind. We're going in" (Hoopes, 1973, p. 435). Robert Cutler stated that before things began, "[Ike] knew exactly what he meant to do." (cited in Ambrose, 1990, p. 466).

\(^{12}\) The participants were Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, Twining, Donald Quarles, Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Anderson, Richard Nixon, Gerard Smith, Asst. Secretary of State for Policy Planning; Presidential Press Secretary James C. Hagerty; presidential secretary Andrew Goodpastor, Robert Murphy, Loy Henderson, National Security Advisor, Robert Cutler, Mansfield Sprague; Bill Reinhardt; Bill Macomber; Lampton Berry; Stuart Rockwell; General Persons; and Gordon Gray (Lyon, 1974, p. 772; DDE Diaries Schedules 7/58; Dulles, (1963, p. 143; Dulles, 1968, p. 276; "Special Meeting of NSC 7/14/58" DDE Diaries NSC Series).
Eisenhower himself remembered the meeting in much the same way. In his memoirs he records that "because of my long study of the problem, this was one meeting in which my mind was practically made up regarding the general line of action we should take, even before we met. The time was rapidly approaching, I believed, when we had to move into the Middle East, and specifically into Lebanon, to stop the trend toward chaos" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 270). Whether Eisenhower had already made up his mind or not, he did participate in the "Special NSC" meeting as it came to be called.

According to one prominent scholar of the Eisenhower Presidency, the meeting proceeded in strange fashion due to Ike's strong inclination to act. Ambrose reports that the meeting began with Allen Dulles providing a briefing on the situations in Iraq and Lebanon. When he was finished, Eisenhower turned to General Twining to discuss the readiness of the Sixth Fleet and Marines in the Mediterranean. Supposedly, John Foster Dulles interrupted to ask, "almost plaintively, 'Would you wish to hear my political appreciation?'" (Ambrose, 1990, p. 470). John Foster Dulles then outlined three possible courses of action; do nothing; go to the United Nations; or land troops (Knebel, 1958, p. 18). When Dulles was finished, Eisenhower instructed that a meeting be set up for that afternoon with the legislative leaders. He also told Twining to begin troop movements towards Lebanon (Ambrose, 1990, p. 470).
In a statement that demonstrates Eisenhower's motivations and perceptions, "The President said that the situation is clear to him--to lose this area by inaction would be far worse than the loss of China, because of the strategic position and resources of the Middle East. In further discussion the President commented that the most strategic move would be to attack Cairo in the present circumstances, but of course this cannot be done" (Memorandum of Conference with the President, 7/14/58 (7/16/68) in FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI).

As to the possible Soviet reaction, John Foster Dulles said, according to Eisenhower, "'The Russians will probably make threatening gestures--toward Turkey and Iran especially--but will not act unless they believe the results of a general war would be favorable to them.' John Foster did not believe the Soviets would put this to the test because of their respect for our power--especially overwhelming in bombers" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 271). John Foster Dulles did point out the potential for negative reaction in the Middle East and that there was no real chance for a counterrevolution in Iraq without Nuri.

That afternoon at 2:30, twenty-two congressmen arrived at the White House where they joined Eisenhower; Vice President Nixon; Twining; Quarles; Allen Dulles; John Foster Dulles; Macomber; and Anderson (DDE Diaries Schedules 7/58; MemCon July 14, 1958). The meeting began with another
briefing by Allen Dulles. The picture Allen painted of the situation in the Middle East was not pretty. He stressed that the coup in Iraq had a strong Nasserite connection. In Lebanon, President Chamoun had asked for American intervention, requesting "the Sixth Fleet be there within 48 hours, or else he would at last know where he stood as far as assurances from the West were concerned."

A possible coup in Jordan was reported to have been detected and blocked. And King Saud of Saudi Arabia warned that if the United States did not intervene in Iraq he would not be able to stand alone against the UAR. Dulles warned that if the coup succeeded in Iraq, it would set up a "chain reaction" bringing down Chamoun, Hussein, and Saud. The only positive note was that Allen Dulles was certain that the Soviets wouldn't risk general war ("Briefing Notes: Meeting at the White House with Congressional Leaders" 7/14/58; DDRS '79-12D).

John Foster Dulles spoke next. He acknowledged that if the United States were to go in, it would accentuate the anti-Western feeling of the Arab masses. After recognizing this consequence however, Dulles appears to have doubted the strength of this concern because he quickly put a new interpretation on the situation. "However, if we move quickly and decisively the Soviet Union--which is undoubtedly behind the whole operation--may feel that Nasser has gone too far too fast and may call on him to pull back. Secretary
Dulles did not think that the Soviets wished to risk general war."

After raising the Soviet specter, Dulles then echoed the warning of his brother about a ripple effect. Non-intervention would mean that "the non-Nasser governments in the Middle East and adjoining areas would be quickly overthrown." There would be a loss of confidence in the United States by other states from "Morocco to Indochina". From these premises the appropriate action was clear, the United States must intervene because, "if we do not act we will have to take greater losses than if we do. We would soon be faced with a stronger Soviet Union, with a worsened situation on our own side."

At this point the floor was opened up to discussion. Most of those assembled were supportive of the intervention option. They cited the possible loss of the Middle East and the need for the United States to be seen as upholding its commitments as reasons for intervention.13 Others were less convinced.14 The primary concern of these congressmen was the fear that the United States was getting involved in a civil war. Both Eisenhower and John Foster quickly responded that Nasser was behind the problem. Senator William Fulbright, a

13 One senator reportedly even asked Ike "'don't you think it would have been infinitely better to have allowed Britain, France, and Israel to have finished off Nasser a couple of years ago?" (Newsweek, 7/28/58, p. 24).

14 See New York Times, 7/15/58, for a rough listing of who opposed and supported intervention.
member the Foreign Relations Committee, challenged the assumption that the Soviets were involved. Eisenhower responded that "whatever Nasser may think he is doing, the Soviets have a tremendous interest in this." Eisenhower defended the intervention option by arguing that "our action would be a symbol of American fortitude and readiness to take risks to defend the values of the free world." He added that "free government is on trial."

Twining concurred with the President and the global implications of Lebanon saying that "if we do not go in we must expect to lose the Middle East and Africa and encourage Communist expansion in the Far East" (MemCon Congressional Meeting 7/14/58 (7/16/58) in DDE Diaries.

After the congressional meeting Eisenhower met with John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, Twining, Quarles, Hagerty, and Goodpastor "to fix firmly upon specific action steps" (MemCon July 14, 1958, in DDE Diaries). Operationally, the Marines landed in Beirut the next day taking up positions at the port, airport and capital.

Having made the decision to intervene, much of the complexity that was evident in the pre-coup period vanished. In its place was a more extreme and simple view of the situation, its causes, and of U.S. motivation.

On the morning of the 15th, Eisenhower met with Nixon and further detailed his view of Nasser's role. "The present incident comes about by the struggle of Nasser to get control
of these [oil] supplies—to get the income and the power to
destroy the Western world." However, while viewing Nasser as
an aggressive and evil leader, some of the previous
complexity still remained. Eisenhower was forced to admit
that Nasser was a popular figure in the Middle East. "The
trouble is that we have a campaign of hatred against us, not
by the governments but by the people. The people are on
Nasser's side" (Staff Notes 7/15/58 in DDE Diaries).

Later in the day, Eisenhower mentioned another part of
the child image of Nasser while also linking Nasser to the
Soviets. In a meeting with Twining and Goodpastor,
Eisenhower states "The fact is that he is so small a figure,
and of so little power, that he is a puppet, even though he
probably doesn't think so" (MemCon July 15, 1958 in DDE
Diaries).

On the 15th, Eisenhower made three statements concerning
the intervention into Lebanon: a written statement; an
address to Congress; and an address to the American people
carried on television and radio. In all three messages,
Eisenhower began by declaring that the troops had been sent
to "protect American lives and by their presence there to
courage the Lebanese government in defense of Lebanese
sovereignty and integrity. They will demonstrate the concern
of the United States for the independence and integrity of
Lebanon, which we deem vital to the national interest and
world peace" ("Statement by the President, July 15, 1958"

In the message to Congress Eisenhower played up the negative role of Nasser and the UAR in the crisis. Regarding the reported infiltration from Syria into Lebanon, "the avowed purpose of these activities was to overthrow the legally constituted Government of Lebanon and to install by violence a government which would subordinate the independence of Lebanon to the policies of the United Arab Republic." He continued, "we share with the Government of Lebanon the view that these events in Iraq demonstrate a ruthlessness of aggressive purpose which tiny Lebanon cannot combat without further evidence of support from other friendly nations." "Readiness to help a friend in need is an admirable characteristic of the American people" ("Message of the President to Congress, July 15, 1958", House Document 422, 85th Congress, 2nd Session).

The perceived Soviet role was mentioned in the radio and TV address that evening. In an indirect reference to possible Soviet involvement in the crisis, Eisenhower stated that "what we see now in the Middle East is the same pattern of conquest with which we became familiar during the period of 1945 to 1950. This involves taking over a nation by means of indirect aggression; that, under the cover of a fomented civil strife the purpose is to out into domestic control those whose real loyalty is to the aggressor." Eisenhower
then invoked the analogies of Greece (1947), Czechoslovakia (1948), China (1949), and Korea and Indochina (1950). He added that "Lebanon was selected to become a victim."

Eisenhower then justified the United States intervention by arguing that the United States was upholding the principles of the UN. "If ever the United States fails to support these principles, the result would be to open the floodgates to direct and indirect aggression throughout the world" (Radio-TV Address by the President, July 15, 1958" in Documents, 1959, pp. 306-311).)

The uncertainty that Eisenhower displayed as to what was going on in the Middle East continued after the intervention. On the one hand, he continued to see the threatening hand of Nasser and the Soviets, but on the other, he recognized that Arab nationalism was a popular force with which the United States was not making headway.

Yet Nasser was also described a few days later as a "rabble-rouser...and that fact combined with the over-all support of Soviet Russia was causing the trouble" (MemCon "Presentation of Credentials to the President by the Swedish Ambassador"; DDE Diaries, July 17, 1958).

The next day, Eisenhower wrote a draft letter to British Prime Minister Macmillan. In it, Eisenhower asserted that Nasser had been able to associate himself with nationalism while the United States had failed to attract "the support of nationalism to the support of Western ideals. As a result,
the governments of other Mid East countries, in most cases based on feudalist traditions rather than on any popular sentiment, have been living in a precarious situation" (7/18/58 in DDE Diaries). Yet despite this realization, there was also a belief that public sentiment could be controlled and Nasser and the Soviets thwarted. In the same letter, Eisenhower stated that "If a vast majority of both our peoples stand four-square and sturdily behind the great effort to preserve the Mid East we need not fear either the dictators in the Kremlin or a puppet in Cairo." A few days later in a letter Eisenhower again reports on his view of the Soviet role. "The men in the Kremlin are serving only their own selfish purposes. They are not trying to do anything decent for any other portion of humanity" (Eisenhower letter to George Humphrey 7/22/58 in DDE Diaries).

These threat based views of Nasser and the Soviet Union were reflected throughout the presidential elite. Allen Dulles made an explicit connection between Nasser, Moscow, and threats to Middle Eastern stability and oil. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations on July 29th, he stated that on March 6 of 1958 "I made a report which was disseminated at the highest levels of the Government, to the general effect that unless existing trends were reversed there was grave danger to the present regimes in Jordan,

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15 See also MemCon 7/20/58 and Eisenhower letter to George Humphrey of 7/22/58 (both in DDE Diaries) for similar statements about Nasser's popularity.
Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. And the threat that Nasser, backed by the U.S.S.R., would come into the political control of the oil-rich Arab lands" (Executive Sessions, 1980, p. 643).

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time of the crisis, Nathan Twining, possessed a strong cold war mentality. While we have little record of his views from the archival record it is clear that he was a firm supporter of the intervention option. His views are more explicitly laid out in his memoirs, which stands as a classic statement of the enemy image of the Soviet Union. Speaking about the threat of Soviet action on July 14, "I assured him [Ike] that the Soviets would do no more than wring their hands and deliver verbal protests. We knew this because U.S. military forces could have destroyed the U.S.S.R.—and Russia knew it" (Twining, 1966, p. 64).

The conclusions that Twining drew from the Lebanon experience indicate a preoccupation with a Soviet enemy that had to be forcefully resisted. "It was only when the Soviets pushed "too far" and really high-level decisions had to be made that America toughened its stand." "When the enemy was challenged, he drew back" (Twining, 1966, p. 74). He concluded that because of the intervention, "the Soviet bluff to take over in Lebanon was called. As a consequence, Lebanon is free today" (Twining, 1966, p. 148).

Secretaries Anderson and McElroy were less convinced of the Nasser-Soviet connection, but they did see Nasser as a
threat which the intervention plus other actions should be used to curb. Secretary Anderson felt "the problem for the United States was to dissociate Nasser from Arab nationalism and show him up as an ambitious person seeking to take over foreign governments and become a dictator in other countries." He added that his reading of the intelligence showed that Nasser was not so popular in the Middle East" (NSC meeting #374 8/1/58 in DDE Diaries NSC Series). Secretary of Defense McElroy said that "we must separate Nasser from Arab nationalism. Nasser has to feed on red meat--that is, on continuing victories. The opportunistic nature of Nasser's exploitation of Arab nationalism should be publicized" (NSC meeting #374 8/1/58 in DDE Diaries NSC Series).

This connection was also seen by some in a different context. At a meeting of the NSC soon after the coup, John Foster Dulles described his view of Iraq. As the meeting recorder puts it, "in Secretary Dulles' view, the real authority behind the Government of Iraq was being exercised by Nasser, and behind Nasser by the USSR" (NSC meeting #373 7/23/58 in DDE Diaries NSC Series).

Despite these more extreme views, no further actions were taken. Iraq was not invaded as part of an effort to reverse the coup (though there are some indications that this was seriously considered) and Israel was not unleashed against the West Bank, to secure it from possible unrest in
Jordan. In fact things calmed down very quickly. The new Iraqi government was recognized by the United States on August 2, 1958, and Robert Murphy was able to arrange a political settlement in Lebanon. In an ironic twist the Murphy brokered settlement was almost exactly the same as that proposed by Nasser back in June which the United States did not recommend. Finally, on October 25, 1958, the last of the American troops left Lebanon with only one casualty, and that due to an accident.

**Evidence of Exclusion**

The lack of casualties and the continued pro-western orientation of Lebanon has led many participants and analysts to count the Lebanese intervention as a success for American foreign policy in the Middle East. Others argue that this result is hardly surprising given there was so little risk involved in the Lebanese situation. American action may have in fact done more to damage the American position because it put the United States on the side of an unpopular regime in Beirut and in conflict with Nasser and the Arab nationalist movement.

This position is not just evident in retrospective accounts of the crisis. The consensus view that I have described above was not shared by all, even within the highest levels of government. Alternative perspectives were evident in two areas; the United States Ambassador to Lebanon
and among several members of Congress. However, these sources of opinion appear to have played almost no role in the formulation of American policy on July 14.

First I will discuss the policy positions of these actors to show how they were incompatible with the consensus position in the presidential elite. Then I will present some evidence of the means through which these contrary positions were kept out of the decision making process.

Throughout the Iraqi-Lebanese crisis, the American Ambassador in Beirut was working on the basis of a different set of assumptions and beliefs about what was occurring in Lebanon and what sorts of steps were needed to meet the crisis. Robert McClintock's actions also reflect a set of attitudes that were not part of the consensus position in Washington.

He differed from the majority in the presidential elite primarily on two issues. First, he quickly concluded that Chamoun was an obstacle to peaceable settlement. In his eyes, Chamoun was responsible for much of the conflict and should be replaced. This contrasted with the common position in Washington which increasingly saw Chamoun as a strong and reliable ally who should be maintained if at all possible.

Secondly, because McClintock saw the Lebanese conflict as primarily internal in origin, he focused upon solutions that dealt with the internal Lebanese political situation while paying little regard to the alleged intervention by
Nasser and the Soviets. He was convinced that the United States should not intervene because this would quash efforts at a negotiated settlement. The dominant position was unaware of the complexity of the Lebanese case, preferring to define it as a case of external aggression. As long as the threat to Lebanon was perceived as external, then intervention was a viable option. These differences were known in Washington, but as the crisis progressed McClintock was less and less effective in influencing policy choices. In this section I will discuss how McClintock was viewed and treated in the policy making process.

One of McClintock's first duties as the newly-installed ambassador was to deal with the aftermath of the initial burst of rioting following the murder of Nasib Matni. McClintock met soon after the USIS library in Tripoli was burned with some of the key opposition leaders (May 10 Telegram #3766 Beirut to John Foster Dulles; DDRS 76-99E). This contact with the opposition began a pattern of direct involvement by the ambassador in the search for a negotiated settlement.16

During this time, McClintock continued to keep Washington informed of the intricacies of the internal Lebanese political situation.17

16 See telegrams #4140 from Beirut to John Foster Dulles May 22 DDRS '76-99H, #4945 from McClintock to John Foster Dulles, June 20, 1958 DDRS '76-194E, #4911 June 19, 1958 DDRS '76-100A, #5062 from McClintock to John Foster Dulles June 24, 1958 DDRS '76-100F.
For a period, McClintock's cables were accepted in Washington. The differences in the position of McClintock and the majority in the presidential elite were of degree not substance. However, as the crisis deepened, the distance between these positions grew. Whereas McClintock was willing to remove American support for Chamoun, and in fact saw him as a hindrance, Dulles and others were seeing Chamoun as a courageous ally.\(^{18}\) McClintock emphasized the domestic nature of the conflict while increasingly in Washington it was the work of Nasser. Intervention was never seen as a viable option by McClintock while Eisenhower and others saw this as increasingly necessary to counter the perceived moves of Nasser and the Soviet Union.

As the gap grew between Beirut and Washington, McClintock lost influence. His efforts to fashion a compromise settlement were rebuked and reports indicate that his opinion was given little credence in Washington.

McClintock was at first a firm supporter of Chamoun and supposedly even gave encouragement to the idea of Chamoun running for the second term (Copeland, 1969). However, McClintock quickly altered his stand. He increasingly saw Chamoun as an obstacle to settlement. McClintock's response was to seek out the key opposition leaders in an effort to

\(^{17}\) See, for example, Telegram #4911 from McClintock to John Foster Dulles, June 19, 1958 DDRS '76-100A.

\(^{18}\) This view did not receive confirmation from Lebanon however, when McClintock reported that settlement was being blocked by both sides (Telegram #4140 from Beirut to John Foster Dulles in DDRS '76-99H).
achieve some sort of settlement. He saw the Lebanese crisis as arising out of domestic conflict over Chamoun and his re-election bid, plus the alienation of many Lebanese due to Chamoun's close attachment to the West.

McClintock's efforts at negotiation were continuously fruitless. Chamoun was intransigent and it appears that this attitude was at least partially derived from the advice Chamoun was receiving from other American officials. In one case, Miles Copeland, a CIA officer in Beirut and Fawzi el-Hoss went to see Chamoun about possibility of his meeting with such prominent opposition leaders as Karami, Hamadi, and Jumblatt. The proposal was for a truce in exchange for Nasser no longer aiding the Beirut rebels. "Chamoun was not receptive to the idea. Clearly, behind his reaction to it was the assumption that American intervention, under the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine, would be forthcoming on demand. "He [Chamoun] had no confidence in the American Ambassador, whose fault it was in the first place that the re-election issue had become so important, and that Bill Eveland [another CIA agent], in whom he did have confidence, was advising him to stand firm" (Copeland, 1969, p. 236).

Once McClintock decided Chamoun must step down, he worked hard to bring Chamoun around to this position. Copeland reports of a meeting between Chamoun and McClintock in which "the American Ambassador had told Chamoun that evidence of U.A.R. interference was far from conclusive-the
United Nations observers on the scene had found no proof of it—and that invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine to the extent of bringing in the U.S. Marines was out of the question" (Copeland, 1969, p. 238-39). Copeland added that "with Chamoun thus 'deactivated,'...a compromise settlement was possible whether Chamoun liked it or not" (Copeland, 1969, p. 238-39).

In Washington, McClintonck had little support among the presidential elite. When McClintonck approached Chamoun with a compromise settlement, Chamoun rejected it claiming that the advice he had received from Eveland was sounder. A few days later, back in Washington, Eveland was briefed by Allen Dulles prior to a meeting with John Foster. Allen Dulles reportedly told Eveland that "I showed Copeland's message to my brother. His reaction was that Chamoun had been right in his perception of both you and the ambassador" (Eveland, 1980, p. 284).

This discounting of the value of McClintonck's views continued during the crisis. In early June, Eveland was again called back to Washington, this time to see Under-Secretary of State Herter. Herter is reported to have said, "'We've good ambassadors and bad ones, and I'm afraid that the one you are working with [McClintonck] has let the job go to his head'" (Eveland, 1980, p. 278). Herter intimated that John Foster Dulles was tired of McClintonck's crisis telegrams and his consultations with the British and French
ambassadors. He felt this "tended to convey the impression that U.S. foreign policy was being made in Beirut" (Eveland, 1980, p. 278). Finally, unable to allow McClintock to continue on with his activities, Dulles sent a telegram to McClintock ordering him to stop meeting with the opposition (Eveland, 1980, p. 284).

When the situation was perceived in even more extreme fashion in the aftermath of the Iraqi coup, McClintock was no longer just seen as naive or as having gone native. Instead he was perceived as a detriment to the American cause. At this point, McClintock was not only ignored and disregarded, he was virtually replaced.

McClintock was very upset over John Foster Dulles' order. He attributed this action to the influence of Eveland who continued to support Chamoun (Eveland, 1980, pp. 292-93). Eveland reports that McClintock was worried that intervention would end his efforts to resolve the crisis and therefore tried to prevent the U.S. landing. At this point, John Foster Dulles called McClintock and told him pointblank to stop interfering (Eveland, 1980, pp. 292-93). This seems to have completely alienated McClintock from the Washington leadership. For example, the CIA chief in Beirut was subsequently instructed not to show communications intercepts to the ambassador (Eveland, 1980, pp. 292-93).

With John Foster unwilling to trust McClintock an alternative to him had to be arranged. This was reinforced
by the fact that Chamoun was unwilling to work with McClintock (Eveland, 1980, p. 287). The solution was to send out a more acceptable source, Robert Murphy (Copeland, 1969, p. 241). Murphy essentially took over the ambassador's duties; reporting on the situation, meeting with the Lebanese government, and promoting America's interests. What is ironic is that when Murphy arrived in Beirut, he followed a similar path to that of McClintock; he met with the opposition, finally arranging a negotiated settlement whereby Chamoun would declare his intention to not run again and to step down at the end of his term, and he agreed with McClintock, in direct contradiction to the statements being made in Washington that "much of the conflict concerned personalities and rivalries of a domestic nature, with no relation to international issues. Communism was playing no direct or substantial part in the insurrection" (Murphy, 1964, p. 404). Thus in the end it was Washington that came around to McClintock's views.

In addition to McClintock, there were other voices which were not convinced that intervention was the best way to handle the crisis. For some time, there had been individuals within the Congress who questioned the dominant interpretation among the presidential elite. Their position demanded that they be given consideration, but their views were contrary to those among the presidential elite. As with
McClintock, the issue came to a head with the coup in Baghdad.

On the afternoon of July 14, Eisenhower summoned twenty-two Congressional leaders to the White House for a discussion of the Iraqi coup and Chamoun's request for American intervention. According to Eisenhower, the reason for the meeting was to "probe the thinking of the leaders of Congress and to give them our latest intelligence and the lines of action under consideration" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 272). He reportedly told the congressmen that "no decision has been made. You see you are not being called in here after a decision has been reached" (Gurtov, 1974, p. 35).

This was hardly the case. In fact, the decision to intervene had already been made in the previous meeting. In fact, there is some question as to how much even this meeting really played a role in making the decision.19 Thus when Eisenhower went before the congressmen his purpose was not to have them assist him in the decision making.

Making the meeting more of a briefing than a policy setting meeting was a smart strategic move. As we have

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19 Sherman Adams, the Chief of Staff, reported that Eisenhower was "already clear in his mind about the course that the United States government must follow in the emergency [when] the President met with the National Security Council, and obtained approval of his plan" (Adams, 1961, p. 291).

Ike later admitted that "because of my long study of the problem, this was one meeting in which my mind was practically made up regarding the general line of action we should take, even before we met. The time was rapidly approaching, I believed, when we had to move into the Middle East, and specifically into Lebanon, to stop the trend toward chaos" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 270).
already seen, Eisenhower had basically already made up his mind as to the need for intervention which was then unanimously endorsed by those present at the Special NSC meeting. The reception this option received was not nearly so favorable in the congressional meeting. Not only was the intervention option challenged as appropriate, but many of the congressmen directly challenged the very assumptions that were held by the presidential elite as to the situation. Their questions and critiques, if incorporated into the decision making process, would have made the unilateral intervention option more difficult to advocate.

The primary counter argument to intervention was that the situation in Lebanon was primarily a civil war that could not be solved by external force. This point was raised by Senators Rayburn and Mansfield. Senator William Fulbright added that the UN had found no evidence of massive external intervention. He later went on to note that even if Nasser were somehow involved, it was not at all clear that the crisis in the region was communist or Soviet inspired. Senator Mansfield finally raised the option of going before the UN and seeking authorization for a multilateral intervention (MemCon July 14, 1958 in DDE Diaries). These positions indicate a set of different operating beliefs about the crisis in the Middle East and Lebanon in particular from those held and acted upon by the presidential elite.20

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20 Other participants at the meeting were in complete agreement with the President about the nature of the crisis and the appropriate policy.
These were not new positions, as such statements had been made throughout the life of the crisis. From the way the decision making process proceeded, it appears that such counter positions were not desired to directly influence the decision making. Thus the decision was made in a small private meeting attended by those who agreed with the President. Then the congressional meeting was held to provide an appearance of consultation.

The fact that the congressional meeting was not a decision making meeting appears to also have been clear to the participants. "The President put before the Congressmen the decision which faced him and left no doubt in their minds how it was going to go" (Adams, 1961, p. 291). "None of the leaders attempted to dissuade the President from the course he was planning to follow but they made it plain that they had little enthusiasm for his decision and no desire whatever to share in the responsibility for it" (Adams, 1961, p. 291).

As Senator Green, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and participant in the congressional meeting, expressed it two days later, "we had been called there in order to be able to say they had consulted us and to find out what, if anything, we had to offer in the way of help or advice". But, "we were not supposed to ask questions" (Executive Sessions, 1980, p. 557).

See the New York Times for 7/15/58 for a rough listing of who opposed and who supported. This debate was also carried out in the Congress during sessions held on 7/14 and 7/15.
Discussion

The decision to intervene in Lebanon as a response to the coup in Iraq and unsettling reports from Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was made in an environment relatively free of opposition. The presidential elite was in this case virtually unanimous in their perception of the situation as to who was involved, what was at stake, and what should be done.

This position was initially fairly moderate in extremity towards Lebanon and Nasser during the pre-coup period. Complexity was seen in the Lebanese situation and Nasser, though not considered benevolent, was seen as having a limited involvement and possibly open to improved relations with the United States. The Soviets were not seen as having any role. At this point there was no connection between a strong enemy image and a strong child image of Lebanon. Over time, the dominant viewpoint became more extreme. For example, Chamoun was increasingly described as a strong leader with firm domestic support interested only in benefiting Lebanon, whereas before the opinion of Chamoun was less praiseworthy. This position reached its most extreme point in the immediate aftermath of the coup in Iraq.

With the coup in Baghdad, descriptions of the situation changed to emphasize an aggressive Soviet Union and a hostile puppet in Nasser. Complexity in the internal Lebanese
situation was erased and Chamoun was promoted as a valued ally. This position was nicely summarized by Eisenhower in his memoirs, "Behind everything was our deep-seated conviction that the Communists were principally responsible for the trouble, and that President Chamoun was motivated only by a strong feeling of patriotism. He was the ablest of the Lebanese politicians and would undoubtedly agree not to be a candidate again for the Presidency if only he could be assured of a strong and sincere pro-Western successor" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 266).

According to this view, Lebanon, and the region, was under hostile external attack. "It seemed likely that Lebanon occupied a place on Colonel Nasser's timetable as a nation to be brought under his control" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 265). In such a case, allies had to be rescued. There was a high level of confidence that forceful action would carry the day by demonstrating a resoluteness that would deter the attackers. Here there is a connection between a strong enemy image of Moscow and Cairo and a strong child image of Chamoun.

Those few voices that raised alternative positions to this were at first tolerated, though given very little weight. This changed with the coup and the appearance of a high threat perception. McClintock was at first accepted, but over time his cables were given less and less credence. His effort to remove Chamoun appears to have particularly
cost him influence with Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles. Finally, McClintock was virtually replaced by Murphy. Through the course of the crisis McClintock continued to see Lebanon in close to complex imagery. As the distance between his image and that of the presidential elite grew, he suffered a corresponding loss of influence in Washington.

Several voices in Congress had long been critical of the administration's handling of the Middle East and the Lebanese crisis. Prior to the coup, there is no archival record of any consultation between the executive and legislative branches on the crisis. When the situation became so serious, with the events in Iraq, that consultation could no longer be avoided, it was handled in a way that removed the Congressmen from the actual decision making process. Any intimations that the meeting was setting policy were clearly misleading. Eisenhower had essentially made the decision in isolation and then convened a "Special NSC" meeting where all those attending supported the same decision. The subsequent Congressional meeting, where opposition was expected, was virtually window-dressing.

Through these strategies of downgrading, replacement, and the non-meeting, those individuals holding more complex viewpoints regarding the situation were removed from having an influence over the decision making process. While intent cannot be shown, the correspondence between viewpoint and inclusion in the decision making process can be demonstrated.
As for American policy towards empowerment, the Iraqi-Lebanese case demonstrates a certain ignorance. While there were some among the policy elite who mentioned the growing politicization of the masses due to social change, the predominant position was characterized by a lack of concern over the phenomenon of empowerment. Intelligence estimates gave at best cursory attention to broad based social unrest. When Lebanon simmered and Baghdad exploded, the reaction in Washington was to define the situation in terms they were familiar with. Therefore, social change and distress were not accepted as instrumental. The more familiar and comfortable explanation of external, especially Soviet, subversion dominated the discussion.

In terms of why did the presidential elite advocate the positions it did, two motives appear to dominate. These were prestige and defense. The policy makers appear to have had two main goals in undertaking the intervention. One was to stop what was perceived as aggression against U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. As Eisenhower recalled, "this somber turn of events [the coup in Iraq] could, without vigorous response on our part, result in a complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 269). Such a loss of influence was seen as a threat to more immediate goals of containment and the protection of regional interests.
A common argument was the need to act quickly and forcefully lest a domino effect take place. "Neither alternative was attractive. In Lebanon the question was whether it would be better to incur the deep resentment of nearly all of the Arab world (and some of the rest of the Free World) and in doing so risk general war with the Soviet Union or to do something worse—which was to do nothing" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 274).

The other motive was prestige. A consistent theme in the documents and discussions is a desire to demonstrate America's power, resolve, and commitment to allies. This as definitely the lesson success in Lebanon generated. For Eisenhower, as a result of Lebanon there "was a definite change in Nasser's attitude toward the United States". "In our action and the Kremlin's cautious reaction he found much food for thought, it would appear. Presumably he concluded that he could not depend completely on Russia to help him in any Middle East struggle, and he certainly had his complacency as to America's helplessness completely shattered" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 290).

The motive of prestige can be placed ahead of defense mainly because of the quick and easy acceptance of the administration to the loss of the Arab linchpin in America's Middle East containment alliance, the Baghdad Pact. While a counterrevolution would have been difficult, especially with the deaths of all three Iraqi leaders, the lack of panic
evident in the data would indicate that strategic concerns were not paramount.21

In one of its first encounters with empowerment, the United States was basically oblivious to the phenomena. Cold War concerns and attitudes took precedence, leaving little time for a reconsideration of what had occurred. Over the next twenty years, Washington displayed a greater awareness of empowerment in the Middle East, at times supporting it and others confronting.

However, the United States did not have to face the prospect of widespread empowerment in a strategically vital country again until Iran in the 1970's. Here again, massive social change coupled with authoritarian control, had led to the emergence of a mass opposition to the established ruler. As the country slid towards civil war, the United States again faced the policy dilemma of how to respond to popular political empowerment in a strategically valuable state.

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21 There are many reasons why an American move against the coup leaders in Iraq was not feasible, including a lack of easy access, the deaths of Nuri, Faisal, and the Crown Prince, and a lack of an alternative leadership (Dulles, 1963, p. 142; Lyon, 1974, pp. 771-772). Some have even argued that the congressional leaders were able to exercise a "non-presidential veto" over such a move (Tillema, 1973, p. 105).

However, there are also some reports that some leaders favored action beyond American intervention in Lebanon and British intervention in Jordan. In a phone call between Ike and the British Prime Minister, Macmillan appears to be sounding Ike out on the possibility of a joint move to retake Iraq (DDRS '92-987). Others have suggested that Twining wanted to go into Iraq and also to unleash Israel to take over the West Bank as part of overall counteroffensive (Quandt, 1978). And Gallman was reportedly told by the Department of State that the Marines in Lebanon might be used in Iraq (Lyon, 1974, p. 776).
CHAPTER IV: AMERICA AND REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN IRAN,
1977-1979

"Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world" (President Jimmy Carter, December 31, 1977)\(^1\)

Introduction

Barely one year after President Carter made this statement in a New Year's Eve toast in Tehran, the Shah boarded a plane and left Iran forever, a monarch without a throne and a leader without a country. Two weeks later a seventy year old cleric returned to Tehran to a tumultuous welcome by millions of Iranians.

The United States lost a valuable military and economic ally in the Middle East with the fall of the Shah. What caused this "island of stability" supported by "the respect and the admiration and love which your people give to you"\(^2\) to be so quickly overturned and so widely condemned by his own

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citizens? And what options were available to the United States to cope with this domestic unrest in Iran?

To answer the question on the nature of Iranian state-society relations, it is useful to examine the socio-economic changes that were taking place in Iran under the rule of the Shah. Equally important was the lack of political change at the same time. This chapter studies this transformation in Iranian society and the Shah's efforts to create a modern, socially mobilized society without simultaneous change in the political structure.

The second question requires an examination into the attitudes and beliefs which constituted the policy debate over Iran within the Carter administration. A strong attachment to the Shah and an unwillingness to see perhaps fatal flaws in the regime led many to accept the Shah as unshakably secure. American policy during the revolution tended to reflect this image of the Shah. This does not mean that all policy makers were united in their thinking on this issue. Dissenting views were present, but when voiced, they were given little heed within the administration.

After discussing the factors leading to empowerment in Iran, I identify the images and views held among the American policy elite and the presidential elite. The final section turns to the internal decision making process within the United States as policy makers tried to form policy during the course of the revolution. The central question here will
be why did certain views dominate the decision process and how were dissenting views treated?

**Empowerment in Iran**

During the 1960's and 1970's, Iran underwent a massive social and economic transformation. This rapid evolution is often credited with producing strong societal frustrations that led some groups to oppose the Shah and finally force his departure in January of 1979. By the time of the Shah's exile, his rule was opposed by almost all segments of the society. In this sense it was truly a popular revolution (Cottam, 1988, p. 13).

Under the Shah, Iran underwent the classic modernization syndrome, as described by Deutsch and other theorists in the 1960's. The Shah appears to have actually been aware of these development theories and actively implemented them. The goals of this modernization were many; some benign, some more self-interested.

The Shah clearly desired to be the leader of a great state. He longed for Iran to be a prosperous and respected state. Part of this status was to be achieved through military power. Throughout his reign, but especially after the oil price rise of 1973-74, the Shah continuously worked to increase the military capability of Iran. Just before the revolution, the Shah possessed a military of enormous strength, mainly acquired through a permissive arms sales
relationship that had developed with the United States (Keddie, 1981; Bill, 1988). According to one set of figures, America's arms sales to Iran went from $.1 million in 1963 to over $1.8 billion in 1978. At the same time, Iranian military expenditures rose from $191 million in 1963 to $95 billion in 1978 (Gasiorowski, 1991, p. 112).

The Shah believed that it was impossible for Iran to emerge as a global power as long as its economic and social structures were still pre-modern. He often spoke of the need to educate and transform Iranian society so that it could play its rightful role on the world stage (McDaniel, 1991).

To accomplish this goal, the Shah embarked on a sustained economic development program. Massive funds were spent on infrastructure, industrial growth, and training. This effort was largely funded by the increasing revenues obtained from oil sales. At the start of the White Revolution in 1963, oil revenues had just hit a new high at $555 million per year. This income continued to rise, reaching $1.2 billion in 1970-71, $5 billion in 1973-74 and almost $20 billion in 1975-76 (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 427; see also Gasiorowski, 1991, pp. 102-03).

The White Revolution

Simultaneously, the Shah acted to lessen the resistance of those groups most likely to oppose his modernization efforts. This effort was undertaken in earnest in 1963 with
the declaration of the White Revolution, later called the Shah-People Revolution. The White Revolution was a series of programs designed to alter the basic economic and social underpinnings of Iran.

It also was designed to benefit the Shah personally. Iran would move into the modern age, and in doing so, the power of potential rivals would be reduced while, the Shah believed, his own prestige and legitimacy would be enhanced (McDaniel, 1991; Cottam, 1988; Green, 1982). Groups such as the landowners, religious establishment and traditional bazaar merchants who were expected to oppose these reforms were to either be co-opted into the system through side payments or repressed through organizations like SAVAK, the Shah's secret police.

Land reform was a key factor as the Shah sought to break the power of the large landowners (Green, 1982). Industries were also put up for public sale and profit-sharing was introduced in order to get the workers more involved in ownership and management. On the social side, the White Revolution also included many provisions for improvements in education, health, and gender status. The mass media was deliberately used to spread these new ideas to more and more people. The Shah reasoned that such benefits to these sectors would generate greater loyalty to the throne (Green, 1982).
Overall the Shah was extremely successful, though not without opposition and difficulties. By the mid-1970's Iran, by most indicators, appeared to have achieved, or at least was approaching, modernity.

Another result of these reforms was increasing numbers of Iranians were being mobilized into the political sphere. Unfortunately for the Shah he was ill-prepared for the form that much of this emergent political participation took. His inability to reform the political system to guide the mobilization was a key factor in his eventual ouster.

However, more needs to be said on the specifics of Iran's modernization and the subsequent empowerment of much of the Iranian population.

Urbanization

Iran experienced a tremendous growth in urbanization as a result of the Shah's policies. The combination of land reform and industrial growth had large-scale consequences on the rural-urban balance. In creasing numbers of rural peasants were drawn into the cities by the expectation of employment in one of the many industries that were springing up as part of the economic development program. The higher pay promised in the cities was a big draw for many.

At the same time, there were also forces at work serving to push many Iranians away from the countryside. Despite the initial aims of the White Revolution, many poor farmers were
hurt or ignored by the reforms. For example, when the program ended in 1971, seventy five percent of the peasants had less than the amount of land needed for subsistence and thirty two percent of all peasants still had no land at all (Gasiorowski, 1991).

Also the rapid influx of so many petro-dollars had created high inflation in Iran making purchasing difficult (Keddie, 1981). It soon became cheaper for Iranians to buy imported rather than domestically produced food hurting Iranian farmers. The farmer's situation was also hurt by the implementation of price controls by the government on agricultural products in an effort to generate greater political support from the city-dwellers (Keddie, 1981). These forces pushed down demand for Iranian agriculture leading many farmers and laborers to move to the city in search of employment.

The result of these push-pull factors was a rapid urbanization in Iran (Abrahamian, 1982; Gasiorowski, 1991). However, this urbanization was not all that beneficial to the regime because in the cities jobs became scarce, living standards deteriorated and, as a consequence, resentment grew (Kazemi, 1980; Keddie, 1981). Additional factors such as substandard employment and lack of low-cost housing in the cities further eroded whatever support base the regime had.

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3 Gasiorowski (1991) cites figures showing that forty seven percent of Iran's population was urban in 1976 as opposed to only thirty one percent in 1958 and thirty nine percent in 1966.
among the poorer urban sectors of Iranian society (Keddie, 1981).

Infrastructure

The modernization of Iran was also evident in the burgeoning industrial sector which was supported by infrastructure improvements in transportation and communication (Gasiorowski, 1991). For example, between 1963 and 1977 three major dams were built dramatically increasing electrical output, port facilities were improved and expanded, and new rail and road connections were built linking virtually all of the cities and villages of the country (Abrahamian, 1982). At the same time, there was an effort to spread mass media. The number of radios in Iran doubled and the number of televisions increased from 120,000 to 1,700,000 (Abrahamian, 1982). The isolation of previous times was replaced by an awareness not only of what was going on inside Iran but also throughout the world.4

Industrialization

Industry also received a healthy stimulus under the Shah. One scholar concluded that with generous state investment, Iran underwent a minor industrial revolution (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 430). As part of these reforms, the

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4 Ironically, many attribute a good portion of Khomeini's success to his ability to make use of Iran's modern tele-communications network to spread his message.
number and diversity of factories dramatically grew between 1963 and 1977, and industry became a larger component in the national economy (Abrahamian, 1982).

Education and Health

To acquire the skilled and educated work force that would be needed to operate this modern industrial economy, the Shah promoted education throughout the state. Literacy and school attendance rates jumped upward as a result of these efforts. Of particular importance, so did the number of Iranian students sent abroad to receive advanced technical training and college education (Abrahamian, 1982). The Shah was aware that they were outside his control once overseas, but he hoped that upon their return they would enter the governmental bureaucracy and serve the state. Many of these students later became members of the opposition.

Other social changes intended to move Iran into modernity included an emphasis upon health care. As a result, the number of hospital beds, nurses and doctors all at least doubled during this same time period (Abrahamian, 1982).

Growth of the Middle Class

The result of this massive effort was wholesale change in the social and economic fabric of Iran. By many standards, the White Revolution and subsequent reform efforts
were tremendously successful. Coming out of these changes, there was tremendous growth in the number of people classified as either working class or middle class (Gasiorowski, 1991). Having benefited from the improved access to education, these groups was now ready to enter positions made available through the rise of industry and governmental bureaucracy (Abrahamian, 1982).5

Social Mobilization

The Shah realized that one outcome of all these changes would be social mobilization of the Iranian masses (Green, 1982). In fact, he counted on this as a means to counter the power of more traditional sectors, such as the religious establishment and the bazaaris. He also believed that these actions would increase his own prestige. What he did not adequately plan for, or respond to, was the form that the people's demand for participation would take.

Social Discontent with the White Revolution

The expected social mobilization was replaced by political empowerment, or what Green has termed "countermobilization" (1982), as increasing numbers of Iranians began to question the political structure of Iran and even the legitimacy of the Shah.

5 For a summary of the mixed record of the White Revolution, see Abrahamian, 1982, pp. 446-449.
Much of this was the result of the modernization efforts undertaken since 1963. Some were upset over the slow pace of change, some with the results of change, and others that change had occurred at all.

While the economy grew at a tremendous rate, not everyone shared equally. The higher rates of economic growth and urbanization led to a greater awareness of an income gap between the rich and the poor (Keddie, 1981; Cottam, 1988). Two striking examples of this gap were the self-coronation ceremony of the Shah as emperor in 1969 and the 1971 Persepolis ceremony marking the 2500th year of the Iranian empire. Such ostentatious display was resented by many who could barely find shelter and food in south Tehran.

Another source of resentment was the corruption which had flowered with the new-found wealth from oil. This resentment was fueled by the conviction that some of the primary beneficiaries of corruption were living in the royal palace (Cottam, 1988).

Over time, more and more Iranians began to question the legitimacy of the Shah. The conviction that he had been placed on the throne by the West in 1953 and his close ties to the West made some question the Shah's right to rule (Cottam, 1988). In fact, the Shah had launched this social revolution in part in an effort to demonstrate his concern for Iranians and thus build domestic support. In essence, it
was a straight use of utilitarian means to garner legitimacy (Cottam, 1988).

However, in his desire was to build up an identification between himself and the people, the Shah also made some mistakes. Vivid examples included the Shah's efforts to downplay the Islamic history and culture of Iran. He also returned Iran to the Persian calendar, repeatedly invoked the symbols and history of pre-Islamic Persia, and moved to discard some Islamic practices such as the wearing of the veil by women. While many were quite willing to allow such moves, others were uncomfortable with them and saw them as inappropriate.

In this situation, perhaps the biggest source of discontent arose from the Shah's failure to meet the political desires of the population (Abrahamian, 1982). On political matters, the Shah's plan was simple; he would create modernization through social and economic reform, leading to social mobilization as well. This process would create a new political force in the country strong enough to counter the landowners, religious reactionaries, and traditional bazaaris. He expected this newly formed political force to be grateful for their new-found power and wealth and would thus follow his lead.

To organize this newly emergent political force, the Shah created a political system in the 1960's with the Mardom and Melliyun, later called the Iran Novin Party, parties
serving to mobilize and control political activity in acceptable ways. Both were essentially extensions of the Shah's power. This system was later changed, in 1975, when the two parties were merged into the single party, the Rastakhiz (Gasiorowski, 1991; Bill, 1988).

The plan failed in that it was obvious to all Iranians that the parties lacked any independent power (Gasiorowski, 1991; Green, 1982). The purpose of the parties was not to allow free expression of opinion or to influence policy making. Instead, they were designed to "strengthen the regime, institutionalize the monarchy, and firmly anchor the state into the wider society" (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 445). Many who did join these parties, especially after the Shah made membership a requisite of government employment, were disappointed to discover that membership did not lead to political power.

The result was participation without power. This lack of real participation, when added to the resentment caused by the regime's efforts to exert control over the religious establishment and the bazaar, further isolated the regime from the masses (Abráhamian, 1982; Green, 1982). Further adding to the frustration and anger was the additional factor of coercion. Denied access to the highest levels of political power by the creation of an illusory political system, those who sought to influence the system from without were subject to ruthless intimidation and coercion by SAVAK,
the CIA and MOSSAD trained Iranian secret police (Gasiorowski, 1991; Cottam, 1988).

Thus, on the eve of the revolution Iran was a classic case of empowerment. Modernization, fueled by oil revenues, had led to social mobilization which had been denied meaningful access to the political system.\(^6\) As resentment grew, the Shah's legitimacy was increasingly called into question (Cottam, 1988). A minor economic downturn in the mid-1970's and the Shah's attempted liberalization created the remaining conditions of the empowerment syndrome (Keddie, 1981; Cottam, 1988). The result was a sudden flurry of rather mild criticism of the regime. This opposition then grew and hardened throughout 1977 and 1978 as the regime alienated more and more sectors of the society and vacillated between repression and accommodation (Gasiorowski, 1991). The unwillingness, or inability, of the Shah to fully repress the opposition early on, created the final element in the empowerment syndrome.\(^7\)

**Background**

The Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was placed on the throne by the Allied powers during World War II out of fear

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\(^6\) One expert on Iran later called this combination of economics and authority, "petrolic despotism" (Katouzian, 1981).

\(^7\) Greene also notes the declining will or capacity of the state as a contributing factor to the success of the revolution (1984, pp. 157-160).
that the Shah's father was too pro-Nazi. Iran was considered a strategic asset since it served as a supply route into the Soviet Union. Thus, Iran was occupied by the Russians in the north and the British in the south. Theoretically, the central region was still Iranian ruled, but this was essentially a fiction.

The new Shah's power was first threatened in the early 1950's when the Prime Minister, Mohammed Mussadiq, increasingly consolidated control over Iranian politics. While popular among many sectors of Iranian society, Mussadiq was feared and hated by the Shah, the British, some religious elements in Iran, and to a degree, the United States. In 1953, the political struggle between Mussadiq and this coalition reached the boiling point and a move was made to remove the Shah from the country. The Shah acquiesced and left the country. To reverse this action a countercoup was successfully launched by pro-Shah elements with the support of the CIA. Mussadiq was arrested and the Shah returned.

The next decade was stable in Iran as the young Shah worked to assert his control over Iranian politics. By 1963, the Shah felt strong enough to attempt to expand his domination over three groups that jealously guarded their power; the landed aristocracy, the religious establishment, and the traditional merchants, or bazaaris. An opposition movement sprang up led by a cleric from Qom, the Ayatollah
Ruhallah Khomeini. The uprising was brutally suppressed and Khomeini sent into exile in the Iraqi city of Najaf.

With much of the opposition either repressed or co-opted, the Shah then enjoyed a decade or so of internal stability and tremendous economic growth. Thinly veiled dictatorial control, with a strong coercive element, was established while oil revenues and foreign aid brought newfound wealth into the country.

A key element in the Shah's foreign policy was close ties with the United States. These became especially strong in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and Vietnam as Washington increasingly wanted to rely on regional allies to guarantee stability. The willingness of the Shah to act as America's regional proxy and the provision of intelligence-gathering sites on the Soviet border, coupled with the foreign exchange revenues earned from arms sales to Iran led many in America to overlook the authoritarian nature of the Shah's regime.

Liberalization

In 1976, the Shah began a policy of gradual liberalization. There has been much speculation as to why he undertook this policy change, including a heated debate over the role that Jimmy Carter's human rights campaign played. Some point to the Shah's illness with cancer or his desire to pave the way for a smooth transition to his son upon his own
death, others to a desire to increase his popularity and legitimacy, and others to a wish to make Iran appear more like the western world. Regardless, this move towards liberalization constituted a first step in the Iranian Revolution, though they were no signs that this would be the result. The Revolution itself, can be divided into essentially three phases.

**Phase One: The Secular Intellectuals in Charge**

The first phase began with some opening moves towards liberalization by the Shah. These included a willingness to allow into the country fact-finding missions on human rights from the International Council of Jurists, Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross. An easing of censorship and retaliatory practices led to a more assertive intelligentsia which began to circulate letters criticizing certain policies of the regime. For example, in May a letter was sent to the Prime Minister by forty members of the Writer's Association asking for cultural freedom. The next month another letter was sent to the Shah by members of the National Front, a secular-liberal political association formerly headed by Mussadiq, calling for a return to the 1906 Constitution which limited the power of the shah. Throughout the year other signs of dissent appeared, mainly headed by secular intellectuals and student groups (Green, 1982; Bill, 1988).
Some in Iran welcomed the election of Carter as they saw his commitment to human rights as a signal that the Shah would be forced to reform Iran's political system. These hopes were dealt a serious blow with Carter's toast of the Shah on New Year's Eve, 1977-78.\footnote{Strangely, though, these hopes were not crushed entirely until September of 1978.}

The first phase was essentially reformist in nature and was led by secular intellectuals. Their popular support was minimal, but they did represent the established political forces in Iran.

**Phase Two: The Religious Establishment Takes Over**

This opposition took on a more popular, and radical, face when the Shah attacked the religious establishment. First the regime circulated a crude and insulting article about Ayatollah Khomeini. When this brought religious students into the streets in Qom, they were fired upon by army troops.

This action began a cycle of violence as demonstrators would take to the streets in commemoration of those killed after a forty day mourning period as practiced in Shia Islam. New demonstrations would be met forcefully by the police and military thereby providing martyrs for the next round of demonstrations.
For a period the opposition was mainly centered on these two groups, the intellectuals and the religious establishment. This pattern was altered however in the late summer and early fall when the new Prime Minister, Sharif-Emami, instituted price and wage controls to curtail spiraling inflation. This action served to alienate the regime from the bazaaris and the middle classes which had already been hit hard by the economic slowdown in Iran. The result was strikes, mainly for economic concessions, that the Shah was quick to concede.

**Phase Three: The Desertion of the Middle and Working Classes From the Shah**

The third phase began when the secular, liberal, political opposition and the religious leadership, were joined by new elements of Iranian society. An overheated economy, price controls, inflation and unemployment, and strikes all served to place great pressure on the Iranian economy. The inability of the government to effectively deal with these problems led many in the middle and working classes to now join the opposition.

The regime equivocated, responding to the unrest with both harsh repression and accommodation. At times the regime appeared willing to inflict considerable violence on its own citizens, most notably with the Cinema Rex fire in August of
1978 and the Jaleh Square massacre in September. However, each wave of repression was usually followed by concessions, such as the release of prisoners, a reshuffling of the government, and even the arrest of some prominent authorities for corruption. This carrot and stick approach, however, failed to stop the protests. The success of the protests to achieve some concessions made the opposition less willing to bargain, while the repression only served to further isolate the Shah from the people.

The vacillation between concession and coercion by the Shah was ineffective. Indecisive as to how to act, he was unable to split the opposition, to appease it, or to crush it. Additional efforts at political maneuvering, such as the installation of new governments, were not enough for the opposition which increasingly demanded the Shah leave the throne.

A continuing sticking point was the unwillingness of the Shah to make significant political reforms whereby he would give up some aspects of authority. The intransigence on both sides served to add fuel to the fire. One consequence was the polarization of society and the unification of the opposition. Groups that normally would have little to do with one another, the secular liberal politicians and the

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9 It is still unknown as to who set the fire, in which over 400 people were killed. In the mind of the Iranian public, however, it was the work of the SAVAR.
religious establishment, for example, now found themselves united in their desire to remove the Shah.\(^{10}\)

Thus by late 1978, the Shah was opposed by the intellectuals, students, the religious leadership and their followers, the middle class, the working class, and the bazaaris. The peasants and urban migrant workers were mostly passive, leaving only the military and the upper class loyal to the Shah.

The United States was increasingly seen by the opposition as an obstacle to settlement. Earlier hopes that the United States would use its influence to force reform on the Shah were given a death blow in September when Carter took time away from the Camp David negotiations to phone the Shah and offer his support in the aftermath of the Jaleh Square killings. Regardless of Carter's true intent, the action was perceived by the opposition as a sanctioning of the violence.

The situation continued to deteriorate throughout 1978. A military government formed in November under General Azhari was unable to break the strikes that had paralyzed the country. When Azhari suffered a heart attack, the Shah tried to form a civilian government headed by a loyal politician.

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\(^{10}\) Some groups in the opposition, such as the National Front, were willing to have the Shah remain in power, though with diminished authority. However, the Shah's intransigence on this issue forced the center and the moderates to join with the radicals, centered around Khomeini (Greene, 1982). The inability of the Shah to offer up sufficient concessions to split the opposition was a key factor in his eventual downfall.
When this proved impossible, the Shah, in December 1978, turned to Shahpour Bakhtiar. Bakhtiar, a long-standing member of the National Front, was expelled from that group upon his acceptance of the job of Prime Minister under the Shah. However, Bakhtiar agreed to the job on the condition that the Shah leave the country "on vacation".

The Shah finally did leave Iran on January 16, 1979, thus beginning his odyssey in search of medical treatment and exile. Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Tehran on February 1, 1979 at which time he proclaimed his associate Mehdi Bazargan as the legitimate Prime Minister. A dual government existed for two weeks until finally the military refused to suppress a revolt by a group of air force technicians and their sympathizers. Instead the military returned to the barracks and declared their neutrality. With this final support base removed, Bakhtiar fled the country. The collapse of the Shah's regime was complete.

Views Among the American Policy Elite

As the crisis deepened in Iran during 1978, it received an increased amount of attention within the American policy elite. A review of the opinion journals and editorials indicates a diversity of perspectives on events in Iran, their meaning and the proper U.S. response.

Such a review also indicates only minimal attention to Iran for most of the pre-crisis period. What little there
was, tended to be supportive of the Shah and his position. This is what James Bill calls the "Pahlavi premise", an unspoken and unquestioned assumption that the Shah was a stable and valuable ally who should receive the full backing of the United States (Bill, 1988).\textsuperscript{11} This assumption was accepted among politicians, military and business leaders and even the American press. It is testimony to the strength of the premise that so little critical attention was focused upon the Iranian regime for so long into the revolution.

However, as the revolution progressed events demanded that more attention be focused on Iran. Once trouble was recognized, a common theme among the policy elite was that Iran was undergoing tremendous internal transformation and that these societal changes had unleashed forces which made a continuation of old practices impossible. Much of this debate however, only focused on diagnosis and ignored policy prescription.

Morton Kondracke, a prominent political commentator, argued that the rise of Islamism in Iran was due to "disappointment and disillusionment with Western-style modernization and an attempt by culture-shocked societies to return to familiar values." He argued that forces such as urbanization, a growing income gap, and social anomie had led many Iranians to seek a return to the familiar, in this case,\textsuperscript{11}

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\textsuperscript{11} It was considered heresy in the government to suggest that the Shah would not stay in power (Interview with Gary Sick, 5/28/93). \\
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religion. Kondracke suggested that a further cause of the unrest was a dissatisfaction born out of a resentment over the lack of participation in Iran. Despite these factors, he concluded that the Shah would stay in power but that he needed to develop "a self-sustaining stability for the country" (Kondracke, 1978).

Walter Laquer saw a diversified opposition. The clergy was described as reactionary, but as representing a mass movement. The middle class was seen as upset over their lack of political power. Laquer argued that trouble had arose when the Shah ignored the clergy and did not work with its more enlightened members.

Yet, Laquer had hopes for the future of Iran because of his reading of the nature of the opposition. Political change away from the strong rule of the Shah was acceptable in his mind because "Iran is now too much advanced to be ruled by the ayatollahs, or to be taken over, like Afghanistan, by an openly pro-Soviet clique" (Laquer, 1978).

A piece in The Nation echoed these views by arguing that "the small, spontaneous demonstrations that broke out in isolated spots around the country a year ago have coalesced into a massive resistance movement encompassing virtually every sector of the society." The author, Linda Heiden, argued that the opposition was chiefly due to economic change which had uprooted millions and caused staggering inflation. She added that real reform must occur because, "the reforms,
symbolic moves that changed nothing of substance, only
further enraged the resistance movement."

Heiden argued that the emphasis on the clergy as a
reactionary force was wrong. Instead the central issue was
whether the Shah must reform or be removed. She saw this as
the dividing issue between secular liberals and the religious
groups. While not advocating a particular strategy, Heiden
warned of the "dangers of ignoring a growing mass opposition
movement which the government seems barely able to contain"
(Heiden, 1978).

Other analysts agreed that to simply view this as a
religious movement was incorrect. Fuad Ajami argued "that
the eruption was expressed in religious terms and that it
brought to the fore by Moslem mullahs is no accident. It is
partly due to the fact that Islam had not been 'contaminated'
by reality and partly to the lack of an alternative channel
for expressing what are basically socio-economic political
grievances" (Ajami, 1978).

Ervand Abrahamian, an academic, pointed to two myths
about Iran. The first, was that the Shah was a beloved and
revered leader. Abrahamian claimed that this had already
been dispelled. The second myth was that the Shah was in
trouble because he was a well-intentioned and wise ruler who
moved too quickly to bring his backward people into
modernity. Another aspect of this myth, said Abrahamian, was
that the opposition was comprised of religious reactionaries
and fanatics who wanted to return Iran to medieval times. "While the opposition leaders predominately come from the clergy and the intelligentsia, the millions of Iranians who have demonstrated against the Shah come from three major groups—the salaried middle classes, the commercial middle class, and the urban working class"

After discussing the moderate, secular, and liberal views of the National Front, Abrahamian stated that "the Shah's religious opponents have been equally misrepresented. Dismissing them as Islamic reactionaries is little like accusing liberal Catholic reformers in Latin America of wanting to bring back the Inquisition." He argued that the religious aspect of the opposition was strong because "with all secular means of opposition rigidly suppressed, the mosques have been the only non-government forums allowed to function in the country." (Ervand Abrahamian, January 1979).

With Iran appearing to be heading out of control, other members of the policy elite began to urge that specific policy actions be taken. These ranged from strong support for the Shah so that he would be willing to act against the opposition, to those who felt the Shah was wounded and needed to consider altering the political structure, to some who had concluded that the Shah was fatally wounded and what was needed now was an American policy of openness to the forces of change.
This first view was based on the belief that there was a need to stiffen the nerve of the Shah so that he would act forcefully against the opposition.

Nadav Safran, a Harvard academic, argued that as the crisis progressed, "we [the United States] should have been doing everything we can to stiffen the Shah's resolve and prevent loss of nerve on his part, as in 1953... I believe that if the Shah can hang on a little longer he may well make it. His salvation may, ironically, come from a resort to terror and guerrilla warfare by his opponents. This would very likely polarize the opposition, drive to his side the classes that have much to lose from anarchy and violence, and give him a sense that he is fighting to put down armed rebellion, rather than shooting down demonstrators and strikers in order to hang on to his throne and absolute power" (Nadav Safran letter to Brzezinski, 12/8/78, in WHCF/Sub File/Countries/CO-32).12

A related preference was based on the idea that the United States must support the Shah, or the military, in order to combat the evil designs of the Soviets and the communists.

As one academic put it in a private letter to Brzezinski, "1) The Communists are in control of the street mob and the mullahs who are politically naive. Knowledgeable
Iranians are convinced that a substantial number of KGB men are behind the scene manipulating the Iranian communists. The present situation was caused by the persistent contacts which William Sullivan's boys had with the opposition leaders. Numerous discussions by American officials with opposition leaders stiffened their determination to push for the ousting of the Shah." (Edward J. Rozek in letter to Brzezinski, 1/15/79 in WHCF/Sub Files/Countries/CO-32).

For Rozek, this situation called for strong U.S. behavior, in this case intervention. "If the Soviets can send Mig 23s to Cuba, why couldn't we send several squadrons of armed jets to our Cuba--Iran? That would be quid pro quo and it is language which Brezhnev understands". The idea was that since the Soviets were perceived as being behind the unrest, the United States must face up to them, at which point they would retreat being a paper tiger. (Edward J. Rozek in letter to Brzezinski, 1/15/79 in WHCF/Sub Files/Countries/CO-32).

Rozek wrote to Brzezinski because "All reports indicate that you are the only one, along with Schlesinger, who understands what is going on. I pray that you are successful in persuading President Carter to do what President Truman would have done." (Edward J. Rozek in letter to Brzezinski, 1/15/79 in WHCF/Sub Files/Countries/CO-32).

Former President Richard Nixon also advocated firm support for the Shah because, "the bottom line is that if the
present government falls, a new regime would be friendly to the Soviets." He added that "the Communists are on the offensive and the non-Communist nations are on the defensive" (Nixon, 1978).

One argument was specific in stating that the United States must support the Shah lest the United States lose access to a valuable oil supplier and geo-strategic ally. As such, democratization would have to wait. Implying that Khomeini may be Soviet agent, James Burnham in The National Review argued that "it is plain how vulnerable an anti-government, messianic, populist socialism is to infiltration linked to the northern colossus." He concluded that despite the admission that only the military still supported the Shah, the armed forces may try to retake Iran unless American ideologues like Senators McGovern and Church "prefer to watch Iran collapse rather than use the measures that may be needed to stand firm at the northern gate" (Burnham, 10/13/78).

One editorial in the National Review expressed contempt for the opposition. It argued that the clergy, plus the bazaaris and rural elements, were reactionary sectors who had been untouched by the economic, scientific and political advances of modernization. They were joined by a "rootless fringe of students in Iran and abroad who ride the traditionalist upheaval like parasites..." The editorial argued that this group was "numerically insignificant and hypocritical, and a possible opening to communist

The common themes in this position were that the Shah must be supported and that he could overcome his opposition, usually with the suggestion that American intervention also occur.

Others were less optimistic about the Shah's chances and while they hoped he would survive, their faith in his future was less. They therefore argued that the Shah must accept the opposition in some form and work to restructure the government in order to be more acceptable to the mass of the Iranian people.

After scoring the record of the Shah as mixed, William Safire, a pro-Israeli columnist in *The New York Times*, looked at the alternatives and rejected the Islamists because they were fundamentalist, and a military junta because it would be unstable and undependable. He concluded that the United States would best be helped by helping the Shah to "make a deal with moderate political opponents, shoring him up, giving him confidence, showing his supporters—and our other allies—that the United States is not only a fair weather friend" (*New York Times*, 1/4/79, p. A 19).

Anthony Lewis, another *New York Times* columnist, argued that it was clear that the Shah was opposed by farmers, shopkeepers, and the middle class as well as the religious fanatics and political radicals. He stated that "there were
the strongest reasons, economic and political and human, for opposition to the Shah." He also noted that the opposition did include some extremists, but also included moderate men and women who could have related to the United States.

Given this pervasive opposition to the Shah, Lewis criticized a view attributed to Henry Kissinger that the United States should stand by the Shah and help him crush the opposition. Instead, Lewis argued the United States should move quickly to negotiate with the moderate opposition (Lewis, 1/1/79).

Still others indicated their acquiescence, if not ready willingness, to have the Shah step down.

One senator in a letter to Carter argued that "American interests have been ill-served in the past by wedding them to the survival of a particular regime and I believe the particular case at hand entails precisely the same sort of risk. I was heartened to hear your statement earlier this week that the United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of Iran, nor allow others to do so. That well-advised policy deserves support and continuation" (Senator Edward Zorinsky-Nebraska letter to Jimmy Carter, 12/15/78 in WHCF/Sub File/Countries/CO-31).

James A. Bill, a respected academic on Middle Eastern affairs, explicitly called the opposition a "mass movement", and argued that previous views of the opposition stressed the
role of the mullahs and the leftists, without pointing to the growing role of the middle and working classes.

The causes of the opposition were seen as many, but Bill stressed the lack of political participation. "What the Shah has done, in effect, has been to encourage enormous economic change and some social change in order to prevent any basic political change." However, "there is an inherent tension between rule by absolute monarchy and a growing, active middle class whose members seek to control their own destinies."

Bill saw the opposition of the religious leaders as only partially derived from a reaction to modernization. Bill also emphasized the repressive nature of the regime towards the religious establishment. Finally, he noted the pervasiveness of official corruption as repulsive to both the middle class and the religious leaders.

For Bill, the Shah was a weak figure "almost totally devoid of charisma and a figure unprepossessing in appearance and speech". The idea of military rule was also discounted because "the military may have the temporary capacity to control the major cities but without any base of popular support it will be unable to run Iran's economy and administrative system."

Bill concluded that it was time to consider American support for the opposition. He stated that "there is a popular assumption that any successor government to the Shah
would be irretrievably anti-American or inevitably pro-Soviet. Although this assumption gains greater credibility the longer the United States unquestionably supports the current regime, it must not stand unchallenged, for it entails serious policy implications." He urged that the United States no longer unequivocally support the Shah and instead should either help move to a different role for the Shah or even remove itself from Iranian politics altogether (Bill, 1978).

Presidential Elite Views

Pre-Jaleh Square

Throughout the reign of the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the United States had maintained a close relationship with Iran. The birth of the alliance came in 1953 when the United States played a role in deposing the popular, leftist-leaning, government of Prime Minister Mossadeq, and in re-installing the Shah who had fled the country.

The relationship grew and deepened throughout the 1950's and 1960's as Iran became increasingly useful in fulfilling America's interests in the Middle East. Listening posts were established along the Iranian-Soviet border which were useful in monitoring Soviet missile development and Iran agreed to sell oil to Israel in contravention of the Arab boycott.

The relationship reached its zenith under the Nixon-Kissinger administration. Eager to avoid overt overseas
involvements in the aftermath of Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine was developed whereby regional surrogates would be promoted to guarantee the security of American interests in turbulent regions. The Shah was selected to fulfill this role in the Middle East. The result was virtually free access to American military equipment, short of nuclear weapons. These purchases were financed through the tremendous boom in oil profits following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and subsequent Arab oil boycott.

By the time that the Carter administration took office, the mythology of Iranian stability was firmly ingrained in both the Washington bureaucracy and much of the policy elite. The combination of seemingly ever-growing oil revenues, a large and loyal military, and an intimidating secret police force, SAVAK, made critical judgments of Iranian society virtually unknown.

This was the situation inherited by Carter when he took office in 1977. At first, the reports he received about Iran continued to represent the unquestioned belief of a stable regime. As the liberalization and unrest proceeded in Iran during 1977, and more so during 1978, some warning signs were given by elements in the government, mainly from the embassy. But at this point there was no concern over whether the Shah would continue to reign.

From the first day of the Carter presidency, and reflecting a long-standing tradition in Washington, reports
issued from the various intelligence agencies predicted a long and continued reign by the Shah. For example, in January of 1977, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) issued a report on Iran which opened with the prediction that "Iran is likely to remain stable under the Shah's leadership over the next several years" adding that "Iran will have relatively clear sailing until at least the mid-1980's..." ("The Future of Iran: Implications for the US", 1/28/77, in National Security Archive, "Iran: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1977-1980, NSA Document #1144).\footnote{This document was obtained from the National Security Archive volume entitled "Iran: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1977-1980". This compilation represents an excellent source of documents on American policy towards Iran during the course of the revolution. Each document has been given a number which I use here as an indication of the document's source as well as its specific location in the collection. Henceforth I shall identify documents from this source as NSA #XXXX.}

Later that year, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) published a report entitled "Iran in the 1980's" which was based on assumptions that included that "the Shah will be an active participant in Iranian political life well into the 1980's" and that "there will be no radical change in Iranian political behavior in the near future" ("Iran in the 1980's", 8/77, NSA #1210). In the executive summary to this report, which was published in October of 1977, the CIA noted that "the Shah seems to have no health or political problems at present that will prevent him from being the dominant figure
in Iran into and possibly throughout the 1980s" ("Iran in the 1980s: Executive Summary", 10/5/77, NSA # 1229).

After the Qom disturbances in January of 1978, there was an increased interest in the power of the religious establishment. For those who accepted the Pahlavi premise, this was an area of little concern. An intelligence appraisal by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on the religious opposition mentioned that since the time of the Shah's father, when a series of reforms and modernization efforts were begun, "the influence and powers of the religious leaders have gradually eroded" ("Iran: Religious-Inspired Opposition", 3/29/78, NSA #1350).

A further report in August of 1978 by the DIA concluded that despite a recent resurgence in demonstrations, "there is no threat to the stability of the Shah's rule..." ("Iran: Renewal of Civil Disturbances", 8/16/78, Asnad-i Jasus-i Lanah-i Amrika, vol. 63, pp. 1-9).\(^1\)

This report was supported by a CIA assessment in August which asserted in its preface that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a 'prerevolutionary' situation" ("Iran After the Shah", cited in "Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior To November 1978", staff

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\(^1\) This document is taken from a series of volumes published by the Iranian students who occupied the American embassy in Tehran. The volumes contain documents taken from the embassy files, including some shredded documents which were pieced back together. Henceforth, this source will be cited as Asnad-i plus the volume and page number(s).
Such positive assessments were dominant in Washington until the last few months of the Shah's regime. However, there were some hints that the Shah may be facing a severe crisis.

In January of 1978, INR published a report on the growth of the Iranian opposition. Arguing that the violence at Qom represented the "most serious [threats] of their kind in a decade", even though they did not pose "an immediate threat to the Shah's regime, they may have put his traditionalist Islamic opponents in their strongest position since 1963." The report concluded that "the greatest potential danger to the Shah is that he may lose control over the religious elements and their adherents, leading to the inherently more dangerous confrontation of secular modernizers against fundamentalist religious leaders--a problem that has been avoided for almost 15 years" ("Iranian Dissidence on the Increase", 1/29/78, NSA #1294).

The embassy as well followed developments in Iran closely and while it did not issue warnings of doom in Iran, it did report on the growing opposition. As early as July 1977, the embassy began to report on opposition to the Shah.\footnote{See "Straws in the Wind: Intellectual and Religious Opposition in Iran", cable by John Stempel, 7/27/77, NSA #1201.} After the incidents at Qom in January, 1978, the embassy
began to more closely follow the opposition and to make
greater efforts to identify the various groups and their
stake in the opposition.  

Some of the trends identified by the embassy in Iran
over 1977-1978 were summarized and analyzed by George
Lambrakis, an embassy political officer, in a prescient piece
in August 1978. Lambrakis stated that Iran was in a
turbulent transition both economically and socially, mainly
due to the rapid affluence of the society which had undergone
tremendous material advances but was also suffering from
inflation, an income gap, urbanization, and unfulfilled
popular expectations. He argued that the Shah believed his
best chance was to coopt the modernizing sectors, but that so
far this had failed, because they did not see the political
institutions as representative. Lambrakis believed that the
Shah was unlikely to ever accept a diminution of his power.
Most ominously, Lambrakis argued that the Resurgence party,
and hence the regime, "is losing what few chances it has of
mobilizing general public opinion."

The religious opposition was described as mainly loyal
to the Shah, as staunch opponents of communism, but upset
over the various secularizing programs of the Shah. The
characterization by the Shah of the opposition as black and

16 See "Religion and Politics: Qom and its Aftermath", cable by
Stempel, 1/24/78, Asnad-i, vol. 12, part 2, pp. 24-30); "The Iranian
Opposition", cable by Stempel, 2/1/78, Asnad-i, vol. 12, part 2, pp. 31-
38; and "Iran: Understanding the Shi'ite Islamic Movement", cable by
red, meaning composed of rightists and leftists supported by external forces, had only served to unite the opposition when the best strategy would be to divide them. Lambrakis recommended that the Shah deal with the religious opposition, act on some of their complaints, and thereby divide the opposition. He believed this wouldn't solve the problem of political participation in a changing society but it would provide a measure of stability in which other changes could take place (George Lambrakis "Iran in 1977-78: The Internal Scene" airgram to DOS, 6/1/78, in Asnad-i, vol. 12, pt. 2, pp. 114-124).

The message that the Shah may have to deal with some aspects of the opposition in order to regain control was reinforced by a subsequent telegram composed by a political officer and the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Tehran. They described the situation as follows:

[The] Shah is on a tight rope--trying to minimize violence while channeling political conflict into electoral realm. Success is to a considerable extent dependent upon continued exercise of restraint by army and security forces. We believe he must maneuver carefully, perhaps including some steps to meet opposition demands, if violence is to be reduced. Given the nature of the opposition, however, the Shah may ultimately have to resort to force. The primary hope of this option is to reshape moderate opposition attitudes and improve government sensitivity in the process of further political activity.

They added that "a substantial, if not overwhelming, majority of Iranians however agree with the Shah that the
monarchy remains necessary for the country but they wish to see its operations adjusted."

The cable saw minor concessions as perhaps being adequate to move the moderates into the political process, thereby freeing the security forces for dealing with the "extremists who are undoubtedly receiving help from ex-Tudeh party elements, and other outside forces. However, given the organizational fluidity of the opposition, its penchant for pressing for the jugular rather than compromising and simply the evanescent nature of public outbreaks over the past few months, even this might not be enough" (Charles Naas and John Stempel, "Iran: Where Are We Now and Where Are We Going?", telegram to DOS, 8/17/78, in Asnad-i, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 9-18).

However, this does not mean that the embassy was on top of things all along. For example, in May of 1978 Ambassador Sullivan wrote a cable which stated that "Iran has now reached the position of a stable and moderate middle-level power..." ("Inspection Memorandum", 5/4/78, Asnad-i, vol. 1-6, pp. 564-566).17

Within Washington, there were also some who early on were concerned about the size and diversity of the opposition. They feared that it could not be easily controlled and therefore represented a serious threat to the

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17 See also Gary Sick's book (1986) which describes how much of the embassy reporting was positive and optimistic.
regime. For example, in August of 1978, Harold Saunders, the Undersecretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) forwarded a memo to Vance, drafted by the Iran country desk officer, Henry Precht, which dissected the opposition into its constituent groups. Precht, and Saunders, saw the religious opposition as internally divided between those following Khomeini and those following another, more moderate ayatollah, Shariatmadari. Both factions were assessed to draw their support from the bazaaris and from the masses of single underemployed young men who had come to the cities for work and had been disaffected by the experience. In addition, the student population was seen as opposing the regime.

Most troubling however, was the observation that the Shah had lost the support of large parts of the middle class. Precht argued that the opposition was not simply a reaction to modernization and secularization, though these were playing a role. Instead, Precht argued that people were upset over an income gap, corruption, waste, and the economic downturn in Iran ("Assessment of Internal Political Scene in Iran", 8/17/78, NSA #1476).

High Level Attention and Discord

Until the fall of 1978, Iran was simply not on the scope for most policy makers in Washington. A combination of the assumption of Iranian stability, mostly positive reports by
the intelligence agencies and the embassy, and an unwillingness by the embassy to "make the call" that the Shah was in serious trouble, made a sustained focus on Iran seem unnecessary. Instead, attention was primarily focused on the SALT negotiations with the Soviets and the Camp David negotiations between Egypt, Israel and the United States.

After the Jaleh Square massacre, on September 8, 1978, this pattern changed. More and more attention came to be focused on the events in Iran, and the preconception of the Shah's stability also came into question for some actors. Essentially three positions, with numerous variations, were advanced within the presidential elite in response to the question of how the United States should respond given the unrest in Iran.

The first group had difficulty recognizing that the Shah had been weakened by the unrest. Given this view, they believed that there must be some way of salvaging the Shah. In terms of policy, this group pressed for strong support of the Shah and actively considered various forms of American intervention in Iran in order to preserve the Shah. This group consisted principally of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, General Robert Huyser, Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger, Assistant Secretary of Defense Duncan, and Secretary of Defense Brown.

A second group, constituting the majority of policy makers, tended to agree with the first group in principle but
was uncomfortable with the idea of taking overt action to preserve the Shah. This group included President Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, NSC staffer for Iran Gary Sick, Special Counselor George Ball, embassy political officer John Stempel, Undersecretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Harold Saunders, CIA Director Stansfield Turner, and Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom.

A third group which was "not represented at the higher echelons of government" believed that the Shah was lost and that it was now time for America to cut its losses and try to create links to the opposition in Iran.18 This was the view, especially as the crisis wore on, of Ambassador William Sullivan, State Department Desk Officer for Iran Henry Precht, and some other lower level officials at State.

Each position can be analyzed along four dimensions; its view of the Shah, the opposition, the role of the Soviets in Iran, and finally, its preferred policy preference. While serving as a convenient way to compare the positions, more importantly, these dimensions function as indicators of the operant image, both as to type and strength, for the actors.

Group 1: The Shah and the Military Option

This position argued that the Shah, a benevolent and wise leader, was facing internal unrest but that the main problem was that the Shah had simply lost his confidence.

18 Interview with David Newsom 6/8/93.
The opposition was viewed as not particularly strong and was seen as mainly comprised of religious reactionaries who were upset over secularization and the suspension of their government subsidies. Khomeini was seen as a radical and implacably hostile leader who would not negotiate or mute his hostility for the United States. The opposition's actual power and following was seen as small, but impressive because the Shah, despite his supposedly strong and loyal military, refused to move against them as he had in 1963. To varying degrees, holders of this position also believed that the Soviet Union was stoking the unrest in order to oust the United States from a major strategic position.

For this view, the proper policy response was to get the Shah to crack down, causing the opposition to vanish and foiling the Soviet plans. Later on, reforms to offset some of the opposition demands may be necessary, but order and stability must be foremost.

View of the Shah

In hindsight, both Brzezinski and Huyser, report that they were always very supportive of the Shah and considered him a strong and valuable ally. They also maintain that they both had sincere misgivings about the future stability of the regime. Brzezinski believed that "the Shah was transforming Iranian society, unleashing new social forces, but without a political framework which could contain them and direct them
Brzezinski also reports that as early as August, Gary Sick, his NSC deputy for Iran, was reporting that the religious and social forces in Iran could not be easily placated. Brzezinski states that "Gary's expression of concern, though isolated and in conflict with both Embassy reporting and CIA analysis, reinforced my growing uneasiness about Iran" (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 359).

Huyser, who seems to have genuinely liked the Shah, reports on meetings between himself and the Shah where he urged the Shah early on to engage in political evolution lest a political revolution take place (interview with Huyser, 6/25/93).

This positive vision of the Shah was tempered by an underlying attitude of condescension towards Iran overall. Huyser in particular appeared to see the Iranians as "children" needing discipline and control. The Iranian people were seen as brilliant negotiators but also manipulative (interview with Huyser, 6/25/93). Persians were characterized as being filled with overdrawn personal pride and a reluctance to take responsibility (Huyser, 1986, p. 28), and overly emotional (Huyser, 1986, p. 35). Huyser speaks of the difficulty of keeping the Iranian generals optimistic because "Persians always seem to believe anything in print" (Huyser, 1986, p. 67).
This attitude may be best summarized in Huyser's recollection of his efforts to pull the Iranian military leadership together. He reports that after some bloodshed at the Gendarmerie headquarters, Gharabaghi gets upset with Huyser. Huyser then asks did the tactic achieve the objective? "As always, this gave me an odd sensation: I felt like I was scolding children" (Huyser, 1986, p. 231).

The belief that the actor must act for the good of his charges is clear when Huyser stated that "then I dropped all finesse and said that they had to start taking action on their own initiative. I pointed out in clear-text English that the only things which had been done so far were as a result of my constant pressure and prodding" (Huyser, 1986, p. 265).

View of the Opposition

The opposition was portrayed in this argument as small in number, implacably hostile, and, despite its surface appearance of strength, easily defeated.

For example, Huyser even seven years after the victory of the revolution continued to assert that "in my opinion, which has not changed, the total support for the opposition never stood at more than fifteen to twenty per cent of the population" (Huyser, 1986, p. 12). Huyser listed the opposition as consisting of the National Front, Khomeini supporters, the Tudeh, the Mujahideen, the Fedayeen, and
other small elements, not acknowledging that the opposition ranged across the social spectrum. This view is derived from his conviction that "there were millions who would support the legal government, given some encouragement, but they were all silent" (Huyser, 1986, p. 85).

Khomeini was pictured as hostile and vindictive, not likely to have been influenced by American action, and who only understood force (interview with Huyser, 6/25/93).

Huyser viewed Khomeini as a zealot, single-minded and with a certain contempt for people, even his own followers. Huyser wrote in his memoirs that "I wasn't convinced that he had all that much compassion for his own people" (Huyser, 1986, p. 114). A similar view was expressed by Sick who in a memo to Carter on 6/1/78, wrote that "the religious leaders had had a taste of blood and seemed to like it" (Sick, 1985, p. 43).

To Huyser, Khomeini's opposition to the Shah came out of the deaths of Khomeini's father and son supposedly on the order of the Shah. "Westerners seldom think in terms of revenge or family vendettas at this level of politics; but to the Persian way of thinking, a blood feud can be a driving political force" (Huyser, 1986, p. 10).

But Khomeini was also very calculating in this view. Huyser has argued that Khomeini used religion as an instrument because it was a convenient rallying point and one which was immune to attack by the Shah's forces who would not
assassinate a religious leader or attack mosques (interview with Huyser, 6/25/93). He also argued that Khomeini's anti-Americanism was not ideologically driven but instead was a cynical calculation because he needed to have a whipping boy in the United States, therefore his quest to oust the Shah required poor relations with the United States (interview with Huyser, 6/25/93).

The perceived ephemeral nature of the opposition, which rationalized force, was a constant theme in this position. Huyser argued that crowds in Iran can be created and manipulated for almost any cause. Their depth of conviction was considered small, and therefore political threats could be removed by aggressively moving against the leadership (interview with Huyser, 6/25/93).

Sick essentially saw two sectors in Iranian society, the loyal upper class and a large poverty-stricken, lower class, with the middle class small and disorganized (interview with Gary Sick, 5/28/93).

Overall, Sick saw the opposition as comprised of "an aged cleric who had fulminated against the shah from exile for fourteen years to no avail and a congeries of aging Mossadeghists, village ecclesiastics and disgruntled job seekers" (Sick, 1985, p. 41). Sick saw no communist link and instead portrayed the problem as the work of "the reactionary Muslim right wing which finds his [the Shah's] modernization
program too liberal and moving too fast away from the traditional values of Iranian society" (Sick, 1985, p. 35).

For Sick, Khomeini was not just the leader of the opposition, he was in fact the mastermind behind the revolution, manipulating its progress. "By September it had become unmistakably clear that Khomeini, from his residence in exile in nearby Iraq, was not only inspiring the opposition to the shah's regime but was in fact orchestrating the rebellion" (Sick, 1985, p. 57). He later described Khomeini as an "extremist" with a "radical medievalism" type of viewpoint (Sick, 1985, p. 85). 19

View of the Soviet Union

Another part of the argument asserted that the opposition was incapable of creating this movement on its own. For Brzezinski and, even more so Huyser, the hand of Moscow was seen as at work in Iran during the revolution.

In his memoirs of this period, Brzezinski avoids implying that the Soviets were active in Iran, though this aspect of his position at the time is recalled by other participants. What does come through in his memoirs, and also those of Harold Brown the Secretary of Defense, was a central concern with the Soviet Union, which was pictured as

19 Sick is hard to code on this issue. In addition to these statements which are more reflective of a moderate to extreme child image, he also, in his memoirs, paints a more complex view of the opposition describing a society undergoing massive change without proper reform brought on by economic and social dislocations (Sick, 1985, pp. 158-161).
an aggressive and expansionist, though opportunistically-driven, state.

Brzezinski expressed a strong concern over Soviet power and ambition which he felt the Soviet Union would "become increasingly tempted to use its power either to exploit Third World turbulence or to impose its will in some political contest with the United States" (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 3).

Sullivan has maintained that Brzezinski was motivated by his world view which centered on the Soviet Union which Brzezinski saw as the "real menace". According to Sullivan, for Brzezinski the role of the United States was to frustrate the ambitions of the Soviet Union. Sullivan also recalls Vance telling him that Brzezinski had convinced the President that the Iranian opposition was a front for the communists (interview with William Sullivan, 5/24/93).

Further evidence of Brzezinski's operating view is provided by Gary Sick who mentions an article by Robert Moss, a British journalist, entitled "Who's Meddling in Iran". This article argued that the Soviets were guiding events in Iran. Sick reports that "Brzezinski did not use these words, but he reproduced the Moss article, circulated it to the president and other top policy makers and cited it in policy meetings for weeks" (Sick, 1985, p. 106).

The prominence of the Soviet threat in Brown's mind is revealed in his memoirs where he noted two sources of threat to the United States. The first was regional warfare or
internal political change. In the Middle East this meant a threat to oil supplies. The second was "creeping Soviet political dominance over various parts of the region, with the Soviets exercising increasing control over decisions about oil exports and prices" (Brown, 1983, p. 143). Brown scored the second threat "more severe".

Huyser was more candid about his views of Soviet involvement in Iran. In general, Huyser saw a long-term desire by the Soviets to control Iran. "Iran is just another piece in their grand design of world domination. With their burning desire for access to warm-water ports and the historical Russian view of the importance of Persia, the Soviet Union can be expected to manipulate the situation to their utmost" (Huyser, 1986, p. 292). Based on this view, Huyser was certain that the Soviets were active in Iran. "I explained to General Haig that these third parties [PLO, communists, and/or hoodlums] were almost entirely responsible for the outbreak of violence in the last two or three days. Up till then it had been relatively peaceful and orderly. I was convinced the situation was being manipulated to a large extent from an external source, and I thought its headquarters were in Moscow" (Huyser, 1986, p. 235).

In Huyser's mind, the Iranians were not capable of such organization on their own. He believed that "there were so many clever moves on Khomeini's side that I continually
wondered who was doing their planning for them, and I would still like to know the answer" (Huyser, 1986, p. 184).

Policy Prescription

Based on this view of the situation, the policy preference outlined by this viewpoint entailed getting the Shah to crack down on the demonstrators, arresting opposition leaders and forcing an end to the strikes. American policy should promote these ends and wait on, if not ignore, other issues until after order had been reestablished. If the Shah proved unable to act on these issues, then a coup was to be launched by the Iranian military which would then move against the opposition.

Brzezinski believed that the United States must prioritize its policy with order being given first place and other concerns a distant second. He argued that "given the central role of the Shah in a system of power that was almost uniquely personal, I argued that the deliberate weakening of the beleaguered monarch by American pressure for further concessions to his opponents would simply enhance instability and eventually produce complete chaos" (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 355).

Given the perceived power asymmetry between the opposition and the Shah's forces, the problem was seen not as a lack of capability but as the Shah's lack of decisiveness.
Therefore what was needed was to buck him up in order to get him to take the necessary action (Sick, 1985, p. 42).

Brzezinski argued that the United States should stick with the Shah if at all possible, with the second preference being a military government. When George Ball presented his recommendation for a Council of Notables, Brzezinski's rejected this position stating that a military government that eventually became civilianized may be the best solution but that Iran was not yet ready for democracy (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 373). If the Shah failed to act, a coup was necessary to avoid civil war which would benefit the Soviet Union or chaos which Khomeini would use to seize power (Brzezinski, 1983, pp. 378-79).

Acting on this view Brzezinski tried to get the Shah to move against the opposition. As Huyser saw it, Brzezinski saw his messages to the generals as a "green light to stage a military coup" (Huyser, 1986, p. 18).

Central to this position was the conviction that the Iranian military was a stable and powerful force that either with or without the Shah could regain control (Huyser, 1986). This belief led directly to the Huyser mission. According to one actor, Brzezinski was unable to recognize just "how headless the Iranian military was once the possibility of the Shah's departure became a reality." This was because Brzezinski "looked at the military options in terms of a European military structure where you had a structure that
you could deal with apart from the monarchy." Newsom recalled a meeting where Brzezinski said he couldn't "understand how an army of 300,000 can't take over the country" (interview with David Newsom 6/8/93).

Reflecting a disdain for policy makers who opposed a coup, Brzezinski admitted that he was "dismayed that anyone at this late stage would actually wish to prevent what was clearly in the collective interest of the West" (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 380).

Huyser as well believed that American policy should be to urge firm and decisive action. He believed that such a move would have been successful because part of the Persian mentality was a respect for force, which if shown early would have caused the opposition to melt away (interview with Huyser, 6/25/93). 20

The argument that the Shah must be supported is perhaps best reflected in a rhetorical statement by Huyser who asked, "if it is morally right to intervene to protect a staunch ally against invasion, is it any less virtuous to protect a staunch and deserving ally against internal subversion supported and motivated by external elements?" (Huyser, 1986, p. 297).

Overall this position saw an aggressive Soviet Union exerting control over a polarized Iranian society. This is

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20 Unlike Brzezinski, Huyser also argued for an American opening to Khomeini, not to negotiate but to feel out the opposition (Huyser, 1986, pp. 73-74).
reflective of a Moderate to Extreme Enemy image of the Soviet Union and an Extreme Child image of Iran.

**Group 2: The Shah Must Reform**

This group operated from the premise that the Shah had been hurt and would not survive as absolute monarch. The opposition was seen as simply too strong and representative of Iranian society to be appeased without major concessions. These group's demands were seen as legitimate and arising out of social transformations that had caused serious dislocations in the economic sphere and the political arena. The Soviet Union, though seen as perhaps benefiting from changes in Iran, was not perceived as a force behind the revolution.

This position was not unified along all dimensions, however. Some were more supportive of the Shah than others and their views as to the nature of the opposition differed slightly as well. This position was united in the recognition that the Shah had to reform, that he couldn't turn to the "iron fist" option alone, that some reforms were necessary in order to turn back sectors in the opposition, and that the Soviets were basically uninvolved in the crisis.

**View of the Shah**

Within this group, George Ball was probably the most critical of the Shah's regime. Ball saw the Shah as
"isolated", and as having "lost touch with his nation's intellectual elite--able and Western-educated Iranians who should have formed the hard core of his support" (Ball, 1982, p. 455). Ball believed that the problem was not just that the Shah pushed modernization beyond the "nation's antiquated political structure--that was only part of the problem; much more important was his lack of sensitivity to his people's needs, hopes, and aspiration, which were by no means identical to his." Ball also condemned the corruption, "obscene display of wealth", and "brutal abuses and repression", in the Shah's regime which alienated the Shah from the people (Ball, 1982, p. 456).

Ball was skeptical of the Shah as a reformist leader. He believed the Shah "didn't want to liberalize the political system because he was very uncertain of his position." For Ball, this derived from the fact that the legitimacy of the Shah was always suspect (interview with George Ball, 5/27/93).

While some felt that the Shah was "insecure" (Vance, 1983, p. 318), the more common view was "that he had a great deal of flexibility and could undoubtedly handle the situation." This view was based on past experience and faith in the Iranian armed forces (interview with Charles Naas, 6/7/93). As the director of the CIA recalled, "we did know there were these opposition groups, they were strong, they had a fair amount of acumen, but it did not occur to us that
the Shah of Iran, with SAVAK and the big army, was going to sit by and be toppled by a crowd of one hundred thousand, two hundred thousand people in the streets of Tehran" (interview with Stansfield Turner, 6/8/93). In fact, "we applied to him the image of a Middle Eastern potentate who really doesn't care much about human life, and therefore would turn out the troops in the street and if there were ten thousand killed, there were ten thousand killed" (interview with Stansfield Turner, 6/8/93).

Henry Precht, the desk officer for Iran at State, noted in a briefing paper that the Shah did not appear to be leading affairs which was costing him support among the middle class and the military leadership. This perceived weakness was a political liability.

Precht also argued against a military intervention because it would be unable to govern or win support. Instead the result would be a polarization and radicalization of the Iranian political system. He concluded that there was no "realistic alternative to the Shah and that the United States must continue to support the Shah while also pressing him to adhere to promised economic and political liberalization (Precht, "Iran Political Assessment", 10/18/78, NSA # 1602).

Thus the Shah was seen as a fair to poor leader, but nevertheless, still a strong one who would likely be able to weather the storm. If this view proved false, then he should begin meaningful adjustments in the Iranian political
structure. This was seen as the only way of dealing with the opposition.

View of the Opposition

For members of the second group, the opposition was seen as more of a mixed bag, consisting of a diversity of groups, each motivated by its own concerns. Thus a more complex view of the opposition is evident in comparison to the first group. Again, within this group there were differences as well.

A more complex view of the opposition was held by Ball, Turner, Vance, Stempel, and Precht. Ball wrote that "it seems clear that the revolution which was building up all through the year 1978 was not an Islamic revolt so much as a revolution of a thousand discontents, for which Islam merely provided the flag of respectability" (Ball, 1982, p. 456).

According to Turner, the CIA knew that the mullahs were upset over secularism, westernization, and the loss of government subsidies. The CIA was also aware that the secular opposition was driven by the desire for political power and the bazaaris for their not sharing enough in Iran's economic development. What the Agency didn't predict was these groups all uniting under Khomeini's banner (Turner, 1985, p. 115). Turner was hampered by the belief that the opposition consisted primarily of the religious right. At the time there was a lack of "an appreciation of how far it
permeated in the society, most particularly even up to the upper levels where the lack of political participation had antagonized even people who were economically advantaged" (interview with Stansfield Turner, 6/8/93).

Vance recalled his position as believing that "economic growth and a facade of Western institutions obscured the narrowness of the shah's political base and the deep internal problems of a traditionalist society in transition. The economic changes brought about by the White Revolution had not been accompanied by real political change" (Vance, 1983, p. 314).

This stood in contrast to Brzezinski who some saw as operating from the "1953 paradigm." This meant that "the embassy saw, and I think Vance accepted, certainly Harold Saunders and Precht saw, that what you had here was a breakdown of society that was different from '53 in the sense that there was a real opposition. Furthermore this opposition had the support growing over the period of time thanks to the inept handling of the Shah. By the time Khomeini took over he had the support of over 95% of the people in Iran" (interview with John Stempel, 5/20/93). For Stempel the opposition was aroused by corruption, economic decline, an end to religious subsidies, and disaffection due to a lack of political participation (even among the middle classes) (interview with John Stempel, 5/20/93).
Precht made the argument that the Shah was in deep trouble in October. He warned that "during the past six weeks, the growth in the intensity and scope of the opposition and the inability of the GOI [Government of Iran] to respond effectively present the Shah with the most serious threat he has faced since 1953." Precht stated that "underlying the politically focused hostility are economic grievances--the conviction that Iranian oil revenues have not benefited the masses." While acknowledging that the religious leaders assert "predominant authority", Precht also noted that the National Front leaders, despite having no significant following of their own, coordinate activities and help manage demonstrations. "Despite the religious leadership role, it is not clear that, if a settlement were reached with key mullahs [moderate clerics in Iran], the majority of discontented youth and poorer classes would cease their violent hostility towards the regime" ("Iran Political Assessment", 10/18/78, NSA # 1602). For Precht, the opposition was more widespread and committed than commonly believed.

Other members of this group held a different view of the opposition. Some described a bifurcated opposition composed of moderates, upset over economics and politics, and radicals, centered on the "fanatical" Khomeini. Carter, plus Newsom, were the main proponents of this view.
Carter believed that Khomeini had an "air of martyrdom" about him, "religious belief bordering on fanaticism" and a "militant attitude in demanding action and violence" (Carter, 1982, p. 440). Newsom believed that "the enmity of Khomeini towards the United States was so deep that overtures to him would probably only have been exploited to our embarrassment" (interview with David Newsom 6/8/93).

Carter appears to have been aware that the Shah was facing some opposition at home as early as their first meeting in November of 1977. "My intelligence briefings revealed that despite increases in the Iranian standard of living from the distribution of oil revenues, the Shah's single-minded pursuit of his own goals had engendered opposition from the intelligentsia and others who desired more participation in the political processes of Iran" (Carter, 1982, p. 435). Carter indicates an awareness of the revolutionary potential of the middle class, student groups and the religious community (Carter, 1982, p. 436).

However, this sensitivity appears to not have been lasting. Rather surprisingly, in his memoirs Carter then makes no mention of Iran from December 31, 1977 until October 25, 1978. At that point he described the opposition as mainly coming from "right-wing religious leaders who don't want any changes made in the old ways of doing things" (Carter, 1982, p. 438).
Carter maintained that the Shah was attempting to give his people a greater say in public affairs, "but instead of restoring order and harmony, his faltering efforts only aroused further dissatisfaction" mainly by religious groups (Carter, 1982, p. 438). Despite these feelings, Carter did not foresee trouble in Iran. He positively noted the CIA assessment that Iran "is not in a revolutionary or even a prerevolutionary situation", that the military was loyal and that the opposition did not have the capacity to be more than a bother to the regime (Carter, 1982, p. 438).

In the second group, there was little fear of a Khomeinist or communist take-over in Iran. Khomeini was viewed as an anti-communist who "intended the formal structure of government to remain in the hands of secular politicians while he and the clergy shaped and guided the revolution into fundamentalist Islamic channels" (Vance, 1983, p. 336-37).

View of the Soviet Union

A cable was sent out in December discussing the likely future foreign policy orientation of a Khomeini regime. In the cable Vance argued that policy under Khomeini would be based on "militant nationalism, Islam and (probably) socialism, with assertions of non-alignment, non-interventionism, and anti-western rhetoric." Specifically, relations with Israel, South Africa, and U.S. intelligence
and business interests would be reduced, and higher oil prices would be sought. In the absence of a communist takeover, which was deemed "unlikely", Iran would return to its traditional interests of resisting Soviet expansion, protection of its oil resources, and a desire for economic development "with foreign assistance" (Vance, Cyrus "Iran's Opposition and Foreign Policy", 12/2/78, Asnad-i, vol. 13A, pp. 73-77). Vance clearly saw American relations with a Khomeini regime as possibly correct if not cordial given this intersection of interests.

In addition, the Soviet Union was seen as not directly involved in the Iranian crisis, though there was some fear among this group that the Soviets may gain from a change of regime in Tehran. There was no belief that the USSR was directing the revolution, but there was always a background fear that the Tudeh may benefit from instability and unrest (interview with Stansfield Turner, 6/8/93).

However, even this last point was debatable as Vance argued in a cable that while the downfall of the Shah would create "new opportunities" for the Soviet Union, there was no evidence that the Soviets were actively engaged in efforts to overthrow the Shah either directly or through the Tudeh. In fact, they may be concerned over the fall of the Shah due to a fear that it may endanger working arrangements on issues such as natural gas (Vance, "Assessment of Soviet Posture and
Neither State, the embassy, the CIA, nor Sick at the White House believed there was any significant Soviet involvement in the revolution.\textsuperscript{21} As Vance summed it up, "we had no solid information on Soviet involvement in the demonstrations, although the Communists doubtless were attempting to take advantage of the turmoil. It appeared that the snowballing unrest in Iran was not the product of Soviet or Communist manipulation, but a massive outpouring of pent-up economic, political, religious, and social forces" (Vance, 1983, p. 326).

This was also true in the field. The DCM in Tehran, Charles Naas, reports that the embassy at no time saw a Soviet role despite requests from the White House to identify their role (interview with Charles Naas, 6/7/93).

**Policy Prescription**

Based on these considerations, proponents of this second position were much more reticent to urge a military solution. However, while unified on how not to respond, they were much less agreed as to the proper course of action. In general, they believed, and hoped, that the Shah could survive the current upheaval, but they felt that dramatic changes were probably necessary. Their specific proposals varied within

\textsuperscript{21} Interview with Gary Sick, 5/28/93.
this general framework. Some, like Carter, urged continued support of the Shah without drastic changes, while others, for example Ball, favored the creation of alternative opposition-based governments which then may or may not be able to salvage some role for the Shah.

The theme of the second group that the Shah must accept limited rule and the unacceptability of a military option was laid out by George Griffin at INR in a memo for Vance. Griffin foresaw two choices for the Shah; a constitutional monarchy with "severely limited powers", including handing government power over to a coalition of moderate politicians backed by moderate religious leaders, or to abdicate and trigger a military take-over. Option two was flawed in that a crackdown may be necessary to establish order, but "this crackdown, however, is no answer to the basic problem, since repression inevitably will lead to even greater violence and risks the total collapse of authority and the radicalization of Iranian politics." It would eventually fail because "there is no way that the military can force the millions of newly sensitized Iranians to return to work willingly for the glory of the badly tarnished Pahlavi regime" ("The Gathering Crisis in Iran", briefing memorandum drafted by Griffin, submitted by David Mark to Vance, 11/2/78, Asnad-i, vol. 13A, pp. 9-11).

The embassy also ruled out the iron fist approach because it believed that the Shah was unwilling to use this
option because he realized that if he did so he could maintain the monarchy for his lifetime but his son would be unable to rule in that manner (interview with Charles Naas, 6/7/93). This view was shared by many in Washington as well (interview with Gary Sick, 5/28/93).

Some held that there simply were no real options for the United States. David Newsom stated that there was no one to deal with in Iran "given the deep alienation of much of the alternate Iranian structure from the U.S., because of history". The National Front was seen to have no mass following or real power and "if you did deal with the mullahs then you ran head long into the strong opposition of the Shah." Finally, an effort to turn to the military was not possible because they were a "weak reed" (interview with David Newsom 6/8/93).

A second variant was that the military could be used, but only in conjunction with substantial political reforms. Stempel argued that if the Shah had been willing to use force and simultaneously make strong statements of political reform, including the allowance of parties, the opposition could have been simultaneously repressed and split thereby effectively ending the revolution. This solution included a so-called "decapitation strategy", meaning the arrests of the more radical religious leaders (interview with John Stempel, 5/20/93).
Sick reports that at the time he was convinced that the moderates would be swept aside in any power play situation and therefore were not a viable option (Sick, 1985, pp. 54-55). Unable to turn to the moderate center of the opposition, Sick also argued against a military solution, or at least one without a simultaneous political solution. He argued that the military could not hold for long and that in any case the United States would have a hard time supporting such a government. His own preference was for the Shah to declare a return to the 1906 constitution, which would allow for religious oversight of Iranian law, and to get an opposition politician to head up a new government of national salvation (Sick, 1985, p. 120).

A third view, and the one that best reflects official U.S. government policy, essentially was a continuation of previous American policy. This consisted of statements of American support for the Shah, and later the Bakhtiar regime, while also encouraging the continued liberalization of the Iranian system. This was the approach favored by President Carter, Secretary Vance, and, for a period, Iran Country Director, Henry Precht.

On November 9, 1978, Ambassador Sullivan sent a telegram which suggested that the Shah may not survive the political challenge he faced. After receiving this message Vance spoke with his advisers. In this meeting Vance reported that some believed the Shah was finished, even as a figurehead, and
that the military option was unworkable. Some of Vance's advisors agreed with Sullivan and urged the promotion of negotiations between the military and the clergy. Vance recalled that his feeling was that

pressure from the White House to encourage the shah to use the army to smash the opposition was becoming intense. I shared the judgment of Sullivan and my other advisers on Iran that such a move would be wrong, because it would lead to the disintegration of the army, which was more than 50 percent conscript. Still, I did not believe that we should abandon the shah or promote an arrangement between the generals and the religious hard-liners while there was still a chance that the shah might succeed in reaching an agreement with responsible members of the opposition on an orderly transition to a constitutional monarchy (Vance, 1983, pp. 329-330).

A month later, in December, Vance maintains that differences between Brzezinski and himself had been "laid bare". "Zbig [Brzezinski] appeared to see a military coup, preferably in support of the shah, as the only hope of protecting American interests. I strongly advocated a political solution with the shah remaining as constitutional monarch if possible, but without him if necessary, coupled with efforts to preserve the Iranian military as an institution" (Vance, 1983, p. 331).

Carter was enigmatic throughout the crisis. In fact, many of the participants, years later, expressed uncertainty as to where Carter had stood on this issue. In his memoirs, Carter displayed a total allegiance to the Shah, stating that "there was no question in my mind that he deserved our
unequivocal support. Not only had the Shah been a staunch and dependable ally of the United States for many years, but he remained the leader around whom we hoped to see a stable and reformed government organized and maintained in Iran" (Carter, 1982, p. 440). However, this support did have one limitation. Carter stated that he believed that "he [the Shah] needed all the support the United States could properly give him, short of direct intervention in the internal affairs of his country" (Carter, 1982, p. 439).

Henry Precht was less willing to continue United States support for the Shah. He reports that "the day after Jaleh Square I decided the Shah was finished, was aware that he would be done in. We ought to begin to prepare for a different relationship with the Iranian leadership, whatever that might take. And we ought to begin to know the opposition, which we didn't know, and begin to think about the future of that country" (interview with Henry Precht, 5/18/93).22

At first, however, Precht was unwilling to put his views on paper. In a memo to Vance in October, Precht concluded that the United States must continue to support the Shah "as the only person capable of leading the country through a transition to a Government that will (if we are lucky) respond to our interests. It is not certain that even he can do this, but there is no realistic alternative at this time."

22 This timing of Precht's conversion is supported by Saunders and Sick.
Precht also urged that the United States press for continued liberalization and a redirection of resources into projects designed to benefit the mass of the population ("Iran Political Assessment", 10/18/78, DOS Briefing Paper, NSA #1602). This point of view was later rescinded by Precht in December, when he expressed his real point of view.

George Ball, who was brought into Washington in December to review American policy towards Iran and make suggestions, was less interested in retaining the Shah as a primary end-goal. In his opinion what was important was the continuation of good relations with the people of Iran and the government of Iran. If this could be the Shah, so much the better. After extensive consultations in Washington, Ball prepared a report for President Carter. In this paper, he reported a gloomy prognosis for the Shah and then offered a series of concrete policy moves to be undertaken.

Ball began the report with his major conclusion. "The Shah has been irreparably damaged by recent events. He cannot regain his absolute power position except through violent repression that could turn Iran into another Lebanon." Ball argued that the only way to save the dynasty and keep American support should be "for him to transfer his power to a government responsive to the people."

Ball then forcefully argued against a continuation of repeated statements of U.S. support for the Shah. "At the same time we should not let our expressed loyalty to the Shah
inhibit us from a quiet dialogue with representatives of the various moderate interests." "Thus, instead of letting the Shah think we are with him all the way no matter what he does, we should firmly and repeatedly lay out the terms essential to a peaceful transfer of power." Ball concluded that there was a vital need to open a channel to Khomeini in order to more accurately assess his position on a transfer of power. The bottom line was Ball's recommendation of a Council of Notables comprised of representatives from the various moderate political groupings, not selected by the Shah, which would then have the task of creating a representative government to which the Shah would hand over control of civil affairs ("Issues and Implications of the Iranian Crisis", report by George Ball, 12/12/78, copy provided to author).

The lack of perceived Soviet involvement among members of this group makes the Enemy image irrelevant to this position. A moderate to complex Child image is seen towards Iran which is pictured as possessing a varied opposition and a leader of limited value. Obviously some such as Ball were much closer to the complex image than say Carter who was more strongly supportive of the Shah. There was also some variation as to the perceived proper level of American support. Some actors were more willing than others to actively move to a post-Shah arrangement. Despite these
minor variations, all were agreed on the rejection of an interventionist American policy.

**Group 3: The Shah Must Leave**

This final position urged an acceptance of the fact that the Shah was finished as a political leader. Their sense of the revolution's popularity and the complete lack of support and legitimacy felt towards the Shah by the population made further support for the Shah foolhardy. In their eyes, Iran was undergoing a fundamental transformation that had made the Shah irrelevant. The Soviets were seen as, at best, a minor actor.

Based on this assessment, it was argued that the United States must accept this new reality and begin to make contacts with the opposition in order to preserve some American position in a post-Shah Iran. Adjustments in the political system, as prescribed by the second group, were seen as having no real hope and therefore only served to delay the inevitable while simultaneously costing the United States goodwill among the eventual victors.

**View of the Shah**

In this view, the Shah was not seen to have the personality necessary to lead Iran out of its troubles. Henry Precht, who had moved from group two to three in the fall of 1978, described the Shah as a weak and indecisive
man, noting that "I had a different view from, I think, a lot of people who didn't spend a lot of time studying the Shah or didn't know a lot about the historical background" (interview with Henry Precht, 5/18/93). Precht also commented that the Shah "had never had any particular legitimacy in the country. Everyone thought his father had been imposed on the country by the British" (interview with Henry Precht, 5/18/93). This made a reliance upon the Shah for continued leadership a risky proposition.

Sullivan had similar conceptions of the Shah. "He [the Shah] was a rather indecisive and a rather gentle person, a man who was confused about what to do, over how, over the next few years, he would turn over the realm to his son" (Sullivan, 1987, p. 215).

The contrast with other views of the Shah was recognized by the actors. Sullivan felt that "Brzezinski's view was that the Shah was by nature a very fierce patriarchal figure and that the only reason he wasn't acting was that the State Department and the Ambassador were restraining him. This represented a total misreading of the Shah's personality. His father was a tough old lion, he was not" (interview with William Sullivan, 5/24/93).

View of the Opposition

As with the second group, the opposition was considered to consist of numerous groups, with widely divergent goals,
that had unified for the purpose of ousting the Shah. The opposition was thus widespread, with legitimate grievances that could not be easily assuaged, and likely to succeed.

For Precht, the opposition consisted of the middle class, religious elements, students, intelligentsia, and the urban poor (interview with Henry Precht, 5/18/93). This view was reinforced on 10/30/78, when Sullivan reported a shift in public attitudes in Iran with a growing questioning of the Shah's effectiveness and legitimacy by groups, such as the middle class, which previously had given at least their tacit allegiance to the regime (Looking Ahead: Shifting Iranian Public Attitudes", 10/30/78, Asnad-i, vol. 12, part 3, pp. 166-174).

Sullivan acknowledged that the opposition was led by the clerics, but their following was motivated more by other concerns. In one telegram he argued that the Iranian political system must be opened and broadened, noting that the mass of the opposition was led by the religious leaders who "launched strong appeals to large sections of the economically disadvantaged elements of society who nurse a whole host of economic and social grievances. These are grievances brought on to a considerable extent by the frustrations, inequities, corruption, and rising expectations engendered by the Shah's program of economic development and westernized social reform since 1963" ("Iran and the Shah: A
A key reason why they believed the opposition was a real force was that Iranian society was seen as altered in ways that made easy control from the center no longer possible. Precht argued that the "tolerance the people had for the regime withered with economic downturn and withered also with the developing political mobilization you had." For Precht this mass mobilization represented the key difference between 1978 and 1963 when the Shah had been able to use force to stop anti-regime demonstrations (interview with Henry Precht, 5/18/93).

Sullivan also argued that most of the people in the opposition were not ideologically driven. Instead, he claimed that the real power of the revolution was in the street mobs which were comprised of frustrated people looking for a fight, any sort of fight, without any real purpose or ideology (Sullivan, 1984).

These two policy makers did differ in their opinion of Khomeini. Sullivan saw him as less of an ideologue, reacting to events and therefore, perhaps, amenable to American overtures (interview with William Sullivan, 5/24/93). Precht, on the other hand, was convinced that the clergy "were a retrograde, backward people", and therefore he was less interested in opening talks with the religious leaders. However, he also believed that, in time, Khomeini "was
probably someone we could live with and work with" (interview with Henry Precht, 5/18/93).

Sullivan also rejected the idea that the opposition could be shooed away by the suggestion of force. As he later recalled, "I think that sort of myth was one of the real problems that the United States decision makers had as they approached the crisis" (Sullivan, 1987, p. 216).

View of the Soviet Union

Sullivan did not see the Soviets as involved in Iran at all. Reports and views seeing such a presence he portrayed as efforts at manipulation of the decision process. For Sullivan, "the idea that he [the Shah] was a very tough guy, that the Iranian army was a very forceful instrument, that the rabble in the streets were communist controlled and dominated, that the ayatollahs were a front for the communists," was all "misinformation being put into the system" (interview with William Sullivan, 5/24/93).

Policy Prescriptions

Sullivan for a long period was of the opinion that the Shah may be able to ride out the crisis, though some form of reform may be necessary. Thus for most of the crisis, he essentially was in the second group. However, in early November he parted company with the mainstream when he decided that the Shah was fatally wounded and, in fact, was
becoming an obstacle to peaceable settlement. His new reading of the situation, and of the proper course for American policy, was spelled out in a lengthy telegram to Washington entitled "Thinking the Unthinkable" on November 11, 1978.

The intent of the telegram was as "an opening shot to Washington. We had not until that time clearly stated that a revolution was on hand and we had not clearly stated that the Shah was in major trouble" (interview with Charles Naas, 6/7/93). The belief was that this alarm would lead Washington to pull together a policy group and start a dialogue (interview with Charles Naas, 6/7/93). Sullivan expected the cable to be a seminal piece which would precipitate some change in policy (interview with William Sullivan, 5/24/93).

Sullivan wrote the cable to "examine some options which we have never before considered relevant." As to the Shah, "his support among the general public has become almost invisible these days." Sullivan doubted that the Shah or Prime Minister Azhari would plunge the country into a blood bath, and also doubted that the senior military would invite the Shah to abdicate. This could lead the Shah and the senior military to flee leaving the military in the hands of more junior officers who "would be prepared to reach an accommodation with the religious." Given this scenario, Sullivan argued that A) both the military and the Khomeinists
are "strongly anti-communist and anti-Soviet." B) "the younger military officers have a genuine pro-west orientation." C) despite rhetoric about the West stealing Iran's oil, the logic of the Iranian economy would assert itself. D) the military would be able to preserve its integrity and this would be accepted by Islamists who had no instruments for maintaining law and order. E) "As consequence of any military-mullah accommodation, Khomeini could be expected to return to Iran in triumph and hold a 'Gandhi-like' position in the political constellation." Khomeini was then expected to name his political candidate who would "presumably have to be someone acceptable to the military rather than a Nasser-Qadhafi type that might be the ayatollah's preferred candidate." F) if a moderate political type like Bazargan were to emerge on top, there would be elections for a constituent assembly, which would likely be comprised of a large percentage of "non-communists, non-Islamist fanatics, and pro-western moderates who would have considerable influence in developing a responsible constitutional document." G) any new government would likely "maintain Iran's general international orientation", except that it would break ties to Israel and South Africa. H) the American position would be reduced but not severed.

Sullivan conceded that this may be a rather "Pollyannish scenario" that could be easily pushed off course. Therefore the only safe course was to continue to trust that the Shah
along with the military would stand up to the "Khomeini threat". However, he concluded by arguing that the United States must begin to "think the unthinkable" [that the Shah may be ousted] and prepare contingency plans ("Thinking the Unthinkable", 11/9/78, NSA #1711). A key policy prescription for the United States was to open relations with Khomeini and between the Iranian military and Khomeini.

Sullivan, in contrast to Huyser, was convinced that the Iranian military was a weakening force that could not be relied on to crack down on the opposition. In a cable Sullivan reported that the military was "carrying out in a creditable way most of the many demands placed on it". However, he noted that the "current trend is toward weakening the strength, cohesiveness and loyalty of the armed forces..." He later concluded that "the trend is in a discouraging direction and seems to be picking up momentum" ("Attitudes and Troubles in the Iranian Military", 12/21/78, NSA #1950). Therefore, rather than place them in a position of conflict with the opposition, Sullivan advocated an effort to use the military to moderate the future tone of the victors, which he now saw as inevitable.

Similarly, in late December, Precht decided to make a strong plea for his position. This came in the form of a memo from Precht to his superior, Harold Saunders. Precht argued that "there is general agreement that the Shah has only a marginal chance of surviving as a constitutional
monarch." "I believe the Shah's position has eroded more rapidly than our perception of it. I do not think that it is now possible to salvage even a 'king of Sweden' role for the Shah..." Precht argued that the traditional arguments for supporting the Shah (his presence assured stability; he offered the best means of protecting American interests; any civilian alternatives were dubious) were no longer valid given the radical changes that had occurred in Iran. He argued that the United States must:

• "Enlarge our contacts with the opposition and independent Iranians with the object of assuring them that the United States is interested in Iran and downplaying our interests in the future of the Shah."

• "We should extend these contacts in a discreet way to the Khomeini factions."

• "We should move vigorously to promote, with the Shah and the opposition a scheme such as the 'Council of Notables' idea that will preserve a minimal role for the Shah as a constitutional monarch. We should be prepared to fall back fairly quickly from this position, acquiescing in the departure of the Shah if we cannot obtain for him a 'King of Sweden' role."

Precht then pointed out that "there are moderate and responsible groups which would be friendly towards the United States and could also govern" ("Seeking Stability in Iran", memo from Precht to Saunders, 12/19/78, NSA #1939). What
Precht was arguing for was a willingness on the part of the United States to let the Shah fall. He believed that the logical successors to the Shah would be the secular democrats of the National Front.

The need to let the Shah fall was reflected in Precht's belief that "the task seems to me to be one of finding a graceful exit for the Shah while gaining a fair amount of credit in doing so for the United States" (letter from Precht to Sullivan, 12/19/78, NSA # 1938).

Precht had no faith in the military option and believed that statements of American support were only serving to alienate the United States from the opposition. Instead, he proposed that the United States "develop some kind of relationship with the opposition so that they could not be hostile to us, might have some modicum of trust in us and convince the Shah to reduce his powers and ease them in" (interview with Henry Precht, 5/18/93).

The basic difference between Sullivan and Precht was whereas Precht wanted the United States to turn to the National Front, the embassy wanted to turn to the military plus religious moderates (Sullivan, 1987, p. 217). Both agreed the Shah was no longer viable.

In sum, the first view tended to be more extreme in its imagery of the situation. Iran was seen in a pattern similar to the Imperial-Extreme image. This was combined with an Enemy-Moderate image of the Soviet Union. Neither of the
other two positions shared this view of the Soviet Union, instead they both display a Complex view of the Soviets. Where they differ is in their view of Iran. The second view, which saw the Shah as valuable and the opposition as relatively small and hostile can be scored as Imperial-Moderate. And the third view which had no tie to the Shah and saw a diverse and legitimate opposition was closer to the Complex view.

These differing views of the situation led to divergent policy positions. They also influenced the actions that each group favored and how they acted in the policy making process.

**Actions**

In addition to these verbal arguments, a number of actions were also taken to promote a particular position. By far, the first group was the most active in taking actions designed to affect events in Iran. Intervention appears to have been seriously considered as an option in their campaign to support the Shah. The other two positions were much less active in support of their positions.

1. Overt American intervention in Iran appears to have been considered by Brzezinski and Huyser.

   "In early December, concerned not only by the deteriorating situation in Iran but also by the signs of growing Soviet interest, I requested the Defense Department
to initiate contingency plans for the deployment of U.S. forces, if necessary, in southern Iran so as to secure the oil fields" (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 372).

At the December 27, 1978 meeting of the Special Coordinating Committee, chaired by Brzezinski, an aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. Constellation was ordered prepared for possible deployment to the Indian Ocean (perhaps in anticipation of overt American intervention in Iran to forestall the revolution). Preparations were also made for talks with Saudi Arabia about deploying a squadron of F-15's as a gesture of support, plus other steps to lessen the American presence in Iran (Sick, 1985, p. 125).

In January, 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the Constellation to move to an area near Singapore for possible deployment to the Arabian Sea (Sick, 1985, p. 127).

Huyser reported that as he surveyed the balance of forces available on January 11, 1979, these included, a carrier task force coming into the Indian Ocean and plans for placing F-15's into Saudi Arabia (Huyser, 1986, p. 90).

Despite these moves, the participants did not acknowledge that these moves were designed to provide the United States with military capability to intervene in Iran. One possible scenario is that they were activated in order to scare the opposition. Another is that they were designed to bolster the resolve of regional allies. Whatever the reason,
it is plausible that their utility for intervention, if deemed necessary, was at least a secondary consideration.

2. In addition to possible intervening in the military sphere, Brzezinski attempted to influence the Iranian political situation.

Late in 1978, Brzezinski urged Carter to send either himself or the like-minded Secretary of Energy, James Schlesinger, to Iran "to give the Shah the needed political-military support, because it was becoming increasingly doubtful that the Shah could act on his own" (Brzezinski, 1983, p 372). Then, as the Shah vacillated, Brzezinski was willing to take an even more assertive role in Iranian affairs. "Thus I gradually came to believe that we had no choice but, for overriding strategic and geopolitical factors, to make the decision [to use force] for him [the Shah]" (Brzezinski, 1983, pp. 396-97).

At first it appeared that Brzezinski was going to make such a trip, but in a meeting between Carter, Brzezinski and Ball, Ball was able to cancel the trip after declaring it "the worst idea I have ever heard" because he believed it would only exacerbate the troubles in Iran (Ball, 1982, p. 461). Upon saying so, Ball remembers Brzezinski glared at him "with daggers in his eyes" (interview with George Ball, 5/27/93).

3. One of the more overt actions in the crisis was the mission of General Robert Huyser to Tehran in January and
early February 1979. Huyser was a four-star general in command of American forces in Europe at the time of the revolution. He also had had experience in Iran. His mission, which was the brainchild of Brzezinski and Schlesinger, was to convince the Iranian military leadership to remain supportive of the Shah, later Bakhtiar, and if this proved impossible, to develop plans for a military coup in order to forestall the revolution. As such, it was a direct effort at intervention in Iranian politics.

Brzezinski was strongly committed to this possibility, and worked to promote this option at the expense of others. Vance reports that efforts to arrange for negotiations between the military, Khomeini and secular opposition forces were "impeded by Brzezinski's determined opposition to direct contacts with the ayatollah,.., and by his persistent arguments to the president that we advise the Iranian military to seize power" (Vance, 1983, pp. 340-41).

The unwillingness of Brzezinski and his fellow thinkers to accept the revolution led them to repeatedly seek to implement the coup option. This led to tension in Washington and confusion in Tehran. "Sullivan reported that Brzezinski was trying to get General Huyser to push the military into a coup attempt. I told Sullivan that he and Huyser should understand clearly that a military coup should be discouraged, and that neither he nor Huyser should be misled by any unauthorized communication" (Vance, 1983, p. 337-38).
Late in the crisis, as the Shah's system was collapsing, there were still strong pressures from Brzezinski and others in Washington to begin the coup. David Newsom reports on a conversation between himself and Sullivan about the possibility of a coup d'état in Iran on a line monitored in the White House. Sullivan replied that a coup was not feasible given his low evaluation of the Iranian military. When Sullivan was pressed harder, Sullivan's response was "expletive, do I have to speak Polish to be understood?" (interview with David Newsom 6/8/93).

Even as late as February 11th, 1979, this hope was still alive for some. Back from Tehran, Huyser received a call from Jones, Duncan and Brzezinski. Duncan asked Huyser if he "would be willing to go back to Tehran and conduct a military takeover" which Huyser stated was not feasible as it would require massive U.S. intervention (Huyser, 1986, pp. 283-84).

4. One of the more remarkable strategies designed to alter the course of events in Iran was the consideration of the assassination of Khomeini.

The first proposal was to get the Iranians to carry out the hit. Huyser reports on talks with the Iranian military leadership during which he argued that "if the military felt so strongly about Khomeini, I could not understand why they were reluctant to act on their own account—almost anything could be done for money" (Huyser, 1986, p. 93).
When this proved fruitless, an alternative was planned. A plan was developed, by Americans, to assassinate Khomeini in Paris using Israeli agents. It is unknown how far the planning went, but Huyser contends there was a secret fund of $10 million to pursue the project. The scheme never received the go-ahead from Washington. When Carter heard of the operation, he questioned its originators sanity (interview with Huyser, 6/25/93).

There is some evidence of Israeli concerns about Khomeini which may have led them to go along with such a plot. A cable from the American embassy in Tel Aviv at the time in question reported that the "Israelis have watched with awful fascination Iran's progression to the lower depths. They believe the friendly and staunchly pro-west regime of the Shah has crumbled beyond repair and await with foreboding its successor" ("Israel and Developments in Iran", 1/5/79, Asnad-i, vol. 63, pp. 27-29).

The logic behind such a plot was simple. Based on a belief that the opposition was small and manipulable, Huyser believed that a decapitation strategy would have been effective in dealing with the opposition by getting rid of Khomeini who Huyser saw as the mastermind and manipulator of the revolution (interview with Huyser, 6/25/93).

5. Throughout the crisis, the Shah kept asking for American advice over what to do, perhaps to avoid responsibility (interview with Gary Sick, 5/28/93). The American response
was to continue to express support but to not issue a direct order to the Shah as to how to behave. A major difficulty was that the United States was not speaking with one voice on this issue. Some policy makers were unwilling to order the Shah to move while others sincerely wanted the Shah to act.

On December 28, 1978, a message was sent to the Shah regarding the possible use of the "iron fist" approach by the Shah to restore order in Iran. As reported by Sick, the message had four parts. First, continued uncertainty in Iran was causing the breakdown of army morale and political confidence. Second, a moderate civilian government that could maintain order was the preferred alternative. Third, that if this was viable, then a military government should be created to restore order and end the violence. However, if this seemed impractical then a Regency Council should be established to oversee the military government. Finally, while American support was steady, it was the American belief that the Shah's absolute power could not be restored (Sick, 1985, p. 126).

This same message was interpreted differently by Brzezinski and Vance. For Brzezinski, it was the "clearest and most direct effort to get the Shah to do what had to be done..." (Sick, 1985, p. 126), while for Vance, "The shah could not fail to see from this message that we would support a military government only to end bloodshed, but not to apply
the iron fist to retain his throne" (Sick, 1985, p. 126). Such ambiguity made signaling difficult.

6. Not all such actions were taken by Brzezinski and those who shared his views. As the crisis deepened, Sullivan also began to implement a plan. The difference was that Sullivan was acting to ease the transition to a post-Shah Iran. There is some disagreement over how open Sullivan was with Washington as to his actions and intentions. Gary Sick has argued that Sullivan did not mention his actions because he wanted to avoid interference from Washington. According to Sick, Sullivan's plan was to let the Shah collapse, while he arranged an agreement between the junior military officers and the moderate clerics. Once the Shah was gone, then Sullivan would implement his own plan and save the day. When Sullivan finally made Washington aware of this, through the proposed Eliot mission, this policy initiative was resented and rejected by Washington (interview with Gary Sick, 5/28/93).

Sullivan remembered it differently. He stated that on December 21, 1978, he met with Prime Minister Azhari, who was recovering from a stroke. Azhari informed him that the Shah would take no action and that the military was badly demoralized. Sullivan stated that he reported this conversation to Washington and said that the cable, "Thinking the Unthinkable" had come to pass. Therefore he was going to begin talks between the military and the clergy. He reported
that he received no negative response and in fact, two days later was "astounded" to hear another U.S. statement that it supported the Shah and expected his government to survive (Sullivan, 1981, pp. 211-12).

A similar pronouncement was made on January 12, 1979. In response, Sullivan sent a cable desperately trying to get Washington to move on the military-clergy negotiations. He wrote that, "we must put the shah behind us and look to our own national interests as foremost in Iran" (Sullivan, 1981, p. 233). Again he received no response. And in fact, "instead, Huyser continued to get telephone instructions designed to brace the military for a confrontation with the revolution" (Sullivan, 1981, p. 233).

After the Shah fled, Sullivan cabled that the revolution was going to succeed, that Bakhtiar was a hollow shell, and that the United States should begin to accommodate itself in order to protect American national interests. "In response to this message, I received a most unpleasant and abrasive cable from Washington, which, in my judgment, contained an unacceptable aspersion upon my loyalty" (Sullivan, 1981, p. 241). The cable originated in the White House.

Overall, the first group was much more active than any other set of actors in undertaking action designed to affect the course of the Iranian revolution. Specifically, these actions entailed efforts at overt American intervention in
Iranian affairs both in the military and political spheres. The other two sets of actors were much less active.

Exclusion from the Policy Process

In furtherance of their preferences, a number of bureaucratic maneuvers were used by participants to affect the course of the policy argument. These strategies were mainly used by holders of the first position against those of the third.

1. While Henry Precht may have been reluctant to distribute reports of his views, his views were still well known around Washington. Unfortunately, for Precht, his views were not welcome by much of official Washington. Over time there was an unwillingness to listen to Precht and eventually, he was simply no longer allowed to participate in policy formation on Iran.

This was because in Washington questioning the stability of the Shah led people to be viewed as disloyal. The argument was that if you talked about Iran and the Shah as unstable, maybe you were "disloyal" (interview with Charles Naas, 6/7/93).

Over time, a primary schism developed between Brzezinski and Precht over Iran. It was a schism of which both actors were aware. "As the crisis unfolded, it became evident to me that lower echelons at State, notably the head of the Iran Desk, Henry Precht, were motivated by doctrinal dislike of
the Shah and simply wanted him out of power altogether" (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 355).

This disagreement led Brzezinski to seek to isolate and exclude Precht from further input on Iran policy. George Ball noted these efforts at isolation when he was brought in. "Brzezinski was systematically excluding the State Department from the shaping or conduct of our Iranian policy" even warning Ball to not talk to Precht because he "leaked" (Ball, 1982, p. 458).

Several participants also noted that Precht was subsequently excluded from meetings on Iran in order to remove his viewpoint from consideration (interview with David Newsom 6/8/93 and interview with William Sullivan, 5/24/93).

This schism extended down to the relationship between Precht and Sick, the two individuals with primary responsibility for Iran at the time. Sick argued that Precht was among the first to conclude that the shah was finished, and that his devotion to this belief plus a policy prescription which favored the moderate constitutionalists of the National Front made him a leading policy proponent. As time passed, Precht's forceful arguing of his views led Sick to end communications with Precht. A narrowing of policy debate occurred as, "whatever the reasons, the result was not the lively discussion of policy that might have been expected, but rather the gradual choking off of any useful communication at all" (Sick, 1985, p. 69).
Precht was aware of his status and the kind of treatment he was receiving. In an "Official-Informal/Secret/Eyes Only letter to Sullivan, Precht wrote, "I presume you are aware of the Top Secret list of questions that was sent out over the weekend for the Shah. I have not been shown the list, such is the level of distrust that exists in the White House towards the State Department (and egoistically, I feel, towards myself)." "I have probably confided more than I should to a piece of paper, but I doubt I have much of a future anyway. I would ask you to protect me for the sake of the education of the young" (letter from Precht to Sullivan, 12/19/78, NSA # 1938).

2. Another mechanism was the so-called "Brzezinski-Zahedi channel" between the National Security Advisor and the Iranian Ambassador in Washington. This channel of communication was used to bypass the State Department and the embassy. It was also important because Zahedi was pursuing his own policy agenda and Brzezinski was getting much of his information about Iran from this channel (Ball, 1982, p. 458).

Brzezinski has admitted to the channel, claiming that it was "a useful source of information, though I was aware that his [Zahedi's] perspectives were skewed and one-sided" (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 360). Sick downplays the utility of the Brzezinski-Zahedi channel, but acknowledged that this "independent pipeline to Brzezinski was evidence that the
White House had begun to have serious doubts about the completeness and accuracy of the ambassador's reporting" (Sick, 1985, p. 99).

A number of actors were aware of the channel and set out to curb it. Ball noted that the channel was being used to bypass Sullivan (Ball, 1982, p. 458). According to Ball, Brzezinski was acting in a "free-wheeling manner, calling in foreign ambassadors, telephoning or sending telegrams to foreign dignitaries outside State Department channels, and even hiring a press adviser so he could compete with the Secretary of State as the enunciator of United States foreign policy" (Ball, 1982, p. 457).

In mid-December Vance called Ball to discuss Ball's report. At that time, Ball discussed with Vance the "shockingly unhealthy situation in the National Security Council, with Brzezinski doing everything possible to exclude the State Department from participation in, or even knowledge of, our developing relations with Iran, communicating directly with Zahedi to the exclusion of our embassy, and using so-called back channel (CIA channel) telegrams of which the State Department was unaware" (Ball, 1982, p. 462; Vance, 1983, p. 328).

The utility of this unofficial channel is hinted at by Sullivan who reports that in the fall of 1978 the embassy did not receive any suggestion from Washington that the Shah be urged to use force. "But some encouragement was coming in
one form or another, and eventually the shah did institute martial law" (Sullivan, 1987, p. 217). Sullivan appears to imply that the Shah was being urged by Brzezinski through Zahedi.

Precht himself sent a letter to Sullivan in which he stated that "I consider Zahedi to be a disastrous counterpart in dealing with the Iranian crisis. In my view he is utterly self-serving, lacks good judgment and is prone to act quickly on the basis of bad information. I regret that I believe his counsel has been one of the strongest factors working on opinion in the White House" (letter from Precht to Sullivan, 12/19/78, NSA # 1938).

Similarly, Sullivan and the embassy tried to warn Washington that Zahedi was not to be trusted. Two cables are instructive. On November 2, 1978, Sullivan reacted against a Zahedi plan to bring the mullahs and the bazaaris into support for Shah. Sullivan reported that the Shah told Zahedi that "this was not 1953 and was not even the same situation that existed two weeks ago when Zahedi was here" ("GOI Tactics", 11/2/78, NSA #1660).

Three days later, Sullivan reported on Zahedi's efforts to create pro-Shah counter demonstrations. The demonstrations were described as obstacles to the Shah's accurate grasping of the nature of the opposition to him. Overall, "Zahedi's reported optimism is probably no help in that regard" ("Organization of Pro-Shah Counter-Measures"
11/5/78, *Asnad-i*, vol. 65, pp. 12-14). By reporting on these statements and measures, Sullivan attempted to counter the positive impression of Zahedi held in Washington.

3. A third effort to alter the decision process was the Huyser Mission.

Neither Sullivan nor the Department of State were aware of Huyser mission until it was underway. As Sullivan saw it, "basically, it was to short-circuit the normal policy procedural system that had been set up over the years for getting the input from all the concerned agencies" (interview with William Sullivan, 5/24/93). Others in the embassy "saw it, definitely, as a mark of a lack of confidence in the embassy" (interview with Charles Naas, 6/7/93).

Huyser's presence also had implications for the conduct of American policy in Iran. By acting as another American agent in Tehran, Huyser's presence introduced a further element of confusion into American diplomacy. This was compounded by the fact that Washington was not unified as to how Huyser and Sullivan should advise the Iranians.

Huyser was charged with dealing with the Iranian military and Sullivan with the political leadership. Each night Sullivan and Huyser would call Washington, with Sullivan talking with Newsom or Saunders from State and Huyser with CJCS Jones or Brown from Defense. Afterwards they would compare their conversations. Sullivan recalled,
"there were times when we felt we must have been talking to two different cities" (Sullivan, 1981, p. 230).

4. Over time there was strong discounting of Sullivan's cables in Washington.

"Thinking the Unthinkable" was sent to Washington after Sullivan believed that the Shah's promised political reforms were only a gesture (Sullivan, 1987, p. 217). Because this cable challenged central assumptions of many policy makers, this cable led some in Washington to conclude that the embassy no longer supported the Shah (Sullivan, 1987, p. 217).

After the Hugh Callaghan visit to Tehran, at Brzezinski's request, Sullivan complained to Brzezinski about the use of a private emissary, especially one who worked for a corporation seeking a big contract with the Shah. "Brzezinski sent back a sharp, tart report suggesting that what the administration chose to do was none of my business. I was aware from the tenor of this reply that my views were no longer held in much regard at the White House" (Sullivan, 1981, p. 194).

Sullivan appears to have been correct in this conclusion, especially in the waning days of the Shah's reign. Whether Carter came to this view of Sullivan on his own or was influenced by those around him is unclear. What is clear was Carter's increasing disregard for Sullivan and his advice. When Carter rejected direct contact with
Khomeini to resolve the crisis, Sullivan responded with a harsh letter, "bordering on insolence." To Carter, "he [Sullivan] seemed unable to present an objective analysis of the complicated situation in Iran. I was well aware that he had been carrying out my directives halfheartedly, if at all" (Carter, 1982, p. 443).

This view of Sullivan led directly to the Huyser mission "because Sullivan seemed unable to provide us with adequate reports from the military, which was a crucial source of information and advice" (Carter, 1982, p. 443). Sullivan's status in Washington continued to fall during Huyser's stay. Carter later admitted that "I relied primarily on General Huyser, who remained cool and competent. He sought to maintain as wide a range of contacts as possible around Tehran during these last days of the Shah's reign, and as far as I could tell, he always sent back balanced views" (Carter, 1982, p. 446).

Huyser has confirmed Carter's feelings. He reported that years later Carter told him that when he was briefed by Carter in January (pre-departure) Carter believed that Sullivan was "deranged and disloyal" (interview with Huyser, 6/25/93).

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23 Carter appears to have forgotten that Huyser only met with the military command structure and did not interact with the general population or military. In fact, Huyser only met with the Shah once (Huyser, 1986).

24 Brzezinski and Sick in their memoirs also place a great deal of the blame on Sullivan and Precht.
Sullivan was aware of his declining influence. For example, in response to an assertion by Professor Richard Falk in the *Washington Post* that there were "differences" between Sullivan and Washington, Sullivan reported to Vance in a Confidential/Eyes Only cable that "I am disturbed by implications of questions which you asked. If these suggest I no longer enjoy confidence or trust at White House, I am, of course, prepared to draw appropriate conclusion and submit my resignation." He continued, "in the meantime, it does not contribute to my effectiveness in this messy situation if I am given to understand that the White House puts more faith in the statements of a trouble-making professor than in my reports as the U.S. ambassador" ("Comment on Press Articles", January 1979, NSA #2197).

In his memoirs, Sullivan summed up this facet of American decision making with the statement that "what was new was my inability to exert any constructive influence over Washington policy decisions" (Sullivan, 1981, p. 8).

5. A key way that the policy process was influenced was through the gate keeping function of Brzezinski. His control over this aspect of the policy process gave Brzezinski considerable power in influencing the course of that process.

Brzezinski's memoirs admit to a strong desire on his part to be the foremost, if not the sole, source of foreign policy advising to the president (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 4). Brzezinski deliberately designed a national security
apparatus which gave him tremendous control over the process. For example, he placed himself either as the chair of the Special Coordinating Council (SCC) meeting or his office was in charge of preparing and submitting to the president the memos summarizing the Policy Review Committee (PRC) meetings which were chaired by other Cabinet officials (Brzezinski, 1983, pp. 60-61). According to Brzezinski, "what I sought, therefore, was to have an institutional arrangement whereby I could help to shape those decisions. The new system made that eminently feasible" (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 63).

Brzezinski further described how this system required that all cable traffic be cleared by the NSC. He stated that this "gave the NSC staff considerable leverage over both the making and the implementation of policy" (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 72).

Finally, he mentions how the NSC controlled the CIA, with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) only having "relatively limited access to the President, briefing him only once a week and then, later, only twice a month, and always with me in attendance" (Brzezinski, 1983, pp. 72-73).

In order to maintain this advantage of "propinquity" (interview with George Ball, 5/27/93), "from the very first day of the Presidency, I insisted that the morning intelligence briefing be given to the President by me and by no one else" (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 64). Brzezinski was also able to influence the content of these briefings by
determining what matters were included or left out (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 64). This gives him a great deal of control over presidential attention to security matters.

This description has been supported by the CIA Director, Stansfield Turner, whose interaction with the President was mainly through documents such as the CIA Morning Briefing, and, occasionally, Intelligence Estimates. In all cases, Brzezinski and his staff would act as gatekeepers as to what the President would hear in most cases. Turner later recalled that he "didn't have a feeling that Brzezinski was screening things out, I had more a feeling that Brzezinski was putting things in" (interview with Stansfield Turner, 6/8/93).

Once brought in, Ball was depressed by the "distorted role of the National Security Council (the NSC)" (Ball, 1982, p. 457). Ball saw this first hand when he attempted to circulate his report. The contrary conclusions of Ball's report led Brzezinski to try, though unsuccessfully, to block its distribution to members of the National Security Council (Ball, 1982, p. 460).

The effort by Brzezinski to gain predominant influence over national security matters has also been mentioned by Sullivan. For Sullivan, Brzezinski's "purpose was to seriatim destroy the power centers that he found in his way for total control. First of all CIA, Stan Turner, how he cut him off, then Harold Brown, and then, finally Cy Vance"
(interview with William Sullivan, 5/24/93). Sullivan found Brzezinski to be "a ruthlessly ambitious person who was prepared to do anything to have his views and, more particularly, his power prevail" (interview with William Sullivan, 5/24/93).

In the Iran case, this predilection of Brzezinski was facilitated by Carter being a "weak" president, with a limited understanding of the larger principles of foreign policy. It was also helpful that Carter and his wife had developed a certain fascination with the Shah and Shahbanou. In Sullivan's words, "Brzezinski very cleverly played on all those weaknesses to enhance his point of view, that there should be maximum confrontation with a change in the Iranian regime because whatever that was going to be, it would represent a weakening of the common front against the Soviet Union" (interview with William Sullivan, 5/24/93).

Sullivan describes one method of Brzezinski's use of the system to affect the process. When Sullivan would send in a cable to which the State Department would prepare a favorable response, Brzezinski would then block the cable from being sent. This tactic was especially effective because, according to Sullivan, Vance was not strong enough to go to the President to override Brzezinski or simply to send out the cable despite the objection (interview with William Sullivan, 5/24/93).
6. Private emissaries.

In addition to the Zahedi channel, there were numerous visits by dignitaries to Tehran throughout the fall of 1978. These were seen in the embassy as an effort to "undercut" the ambassador and also to build support for Brzezinski's position in the Senate (interview with William Sullivan, 5/24/93).

The first visit was by Hugh Callaghan, a former CIA station chief in Tehran, at the time in private business. He was sent by Brzezinski to Tehran to get an independent assessment of the scene and the Shah. His report was mainly upbeat, though this may have been influenced by the nature of the mission and the fact that his company had a large contract under consideration with the Shah's government (Sullivan, 1981; Bill, 1988).

Other trips by Secretary of Treasury Blumenthal and Senator Byrd were less successful. Each of these visitors was expected to buck up the Shah and convince him of continued American backing. However, both returned to Washington even more pessimistic about the Shah's future (Sullivan, 1981; Bill, 1988; Brzezinski, 1983).

7. Brzezinski's efforts to silence other voices in the administration reached their apogee in November. In mid-November, Carter sent notes to Vance, Turner and Brzezinski in which he criticized these agencies for the lack of quality intelligence on Iran. The note was then immediately leaked
to the press, though in this version only Turner was mentioned.25

For Turner, "it was obviously an implied complaint to me about our intelligence reporting on Iran." "I suspected that Zbig Brzezinski was behind it." He realized that "I had been set up as the scapegoat" (Turner, 1985, p. 113-14).

In his memoirs, Brzezinski admitted that he was the instigation behind the note and that it was directed against Turner (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 367). According to Gary Sick, Brzezinski's assistant, "the immediate leaking of President Carter's note was undoubtedly motivated by the desire to undercut Turner's relationship with Carter" (Sick, 1985, p. 90).

For the embassy, the publication of the memo was the first sign "that the information going into Washington was not necessarily getting to the President" (interview with John Stempel, 5/20/93).

Sullivan considered the episode a motivation for Brzezinski's subsequent support for the Shah. With the intelligence failure episode everyone then tried to show that they were not the one who had dropped the ball on Iran. Sullivan argued that Brzezinski from this point on tried to do anything he could to maintain the Shah in power in order to avoid any future blame (Sullivan, 1981, pp. 304-04).

25 It cannot be shown that this event was a consequence of differing views on Iran or was simply a convenient opportunity for Brzezinski to act to improve his bureaucratic position.
8. Brzezinski's efforts to control the flow of information into the process is best illustrated by his reaction to George Ball being brought in to review American policy. Brzezinski later admitted that "in selecting Ball I violated a basic rule of bureaucratic tactics: one should never obtain the services of an 'impartial' outside consultant regarding an issue that one feels strongly about without first making certain in advance that one knows the likely contents of his advice" (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 370-71). Clearly, Brzezinski was not primarily interested in obtaining as wide a range of opinion in the formulation of policy.

9. Not all of the actions taken in support of a position were done so by the National Security Advisor. The Department of State also made efforts to affect the flow of information through the system for the purpose of affecting policy formation.

In the fall of 1978, three officers from the Department of State were sent to Iran to get an independent assessment of the situation. Upon returning to Washington they reported that the place was "a mess" with the Shah in serious trouble. Upon hearing this, Brzezinski was "furious" that they had been sent out at all, and reportedly saw this mission as "the State Department undermining the effort to save the Shah" (interview with David Newsom 6/8/93).

Precht was convinced that those above him were unclear as to what was going on in Iran. In an effort to bolster his
position, in November of 1978, he convened a meeting with leading academics on Iran in Washington. The guest list was specifically chosen to include certain academics who were not getting a hearing from the other actors in the process (interview with Henry Precht, 5/18/93).

In addition to putting new information into the system, an effort was also made to take some out. For example, David Newsom tried to stop the distribution of "Thinking the Unthinkable" to the White House because "we knew it would cause all kinds of problems, but distribution was automatic." The reaction to the cable from Carter after talking with Brzezinski about it was "strong and negative" (interview with David Newsom 6/8/93).

In addition, there were numerous other non-structural bureaucratic moves designed to affect the decision making process.

Many officers at State advocated direct meetings between the United States and Khomeini in order to gauge his terms for a settlement of the crisis. This option was most actively pursued with the proposal to send Ted Eliot, a Department of State officer, to meet with Khomeini in Paris. Vance pitched the idea to Carter who, along with Brzezinski, was attending a summit in Guadeloupe, and at first, the idea seemed acceptable to Carter. But Brzezinski was opposed to opening channels to Khomeini. To forestall the mission, Brzezinski argued that a decision of this magnitude should
only be made after returning from the meeting (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 380). This gave Brzezinski time to convince Carter to reject the idea, which he eventually did.26

Stempel reports that the choice of a high level envoy to Paris was the subject of much internal debate and maneuvering. He argues that the proposal of Eliot was opposed because some considered him a "wimp" who would seek out a political solution. Conversely, Vance was opposed to the use of Al Haig as an envoy because of a fear that his recommendation to the Shah would be to kill the opposition (interview with John Stempel, 5/20/93).

A second way some officials tried to influence policy was through the use of leaks to the press. By publicizing the actions and views of those they opposed, officials tried to turn public opinion against official policy (Sick, 1985). The situation became so bothersome that in January, 1979, Carter called in the State Department's analysts on Iran and threatened to fire them all if the leaks did not stop (Carter, 1982; Sick, 1985).

26 Sick argues that the Eliot mission was part of Sullivan's plan as outlined in "Thinking the Unthinkable. According to Sick, the mission had been prepared by the embassy without White House knowledge but with the help of DOS. It was rejected because Brzezinski and Carter were unwilling to buy a "pig in a poke" (Sick, 1985, pp. 132-34).

"Any approach to Khomeini was vetoed--presumably on Brzezinski's advice" (Ball, 1982, p. 462).
Discussion

All three hypotheses are well supported in this case.

Hypothesis one argues that individuals holding more extreme Child images of the other actors would advocate a policy line which entailed continued support, including the possibility of American intervention, for a friendly government threatened by mass politics. In this case, the group of actors holding more extreme images, namely Brzezinski, Huyser and those around them, were the most supportive of the Shah both verbally and behaviorally. As the crisis deepened, this group continued to place American interests on the survival of the Shah. To promote this goal not only were verbal efforts made to convince the Shah to crack down, but also, when these proved unsuccessful, plans were made to act on the Shah's behalf through such possible scenarios as American intervention, a military coup, and the murder of Khomeini. Actors in the other groups, which had less extreme images, were unwilling to advocate any form of intervention to save the Shah, and some were even expressing serious doubts as to the desirability of maintaining the Shah at all.

The second hypothesis, that extreme Child images are associated with extreme Enemy images, but not so for more complex images, is also supported by the evidence. In the Iran case, it was only those actors who saw Iran in the Extreme-Child image who also perceived any significant
involvement by an external enemy, in this case, the Soviet Union. An inability to accept the revolution as indigenous led these actors to conclude that devious external forces must have been at work behind the scenes, controlling the Iranians and determining the course of events in pursuit of their own aims. For those actors with a less extreme view of Iran, there was no perception of external subversion or manipulation. At this level, the two images, of Iran and the Soviet Union, are disassociated.

Finally, hypothesis three proposes that individuals with more extreme images will attempt to influence the decision making process by excluding, through a variety of mechanisms, individuals from the process who possess a more complex view of the situation. Overall, this hypothesis is also well supported in this case. The first group of actors, those with more extreme images of the other actors, appears to have been particularly active in seeking means to reduce the presence and influence of others with whom they disagreed. Those who dissented from their position, especially those in group three, were bypassed, discounted, excluded, and undercut. While the members of group one was ultimately unsuccessful in getting their policy agenda of overt support and intervention to prevail, they were successful in discrediting group three such that its policy preference never received a full hearing in Washington.
It must be noted, however, that some actions were taken by actors in groups two and three to affect the process as well.

One participant has argued that the Iranian Revolution was difficult for the United States to get a handle on because it was primarily a revolution from the right, and particularly, the religious right. History has taught Americans to prepare for revolutions from the left but has provided no experience for the opposite (interview with Charles Naas, 6/7/93). This lack of experience in dealing with rightist political opposition may have hampered American policy making during the Iran crisis.

To the extent that this argument is valid, Iran represented an exemplar for many Americans of the new form of revolutionary change that could occur in the Middle East. Regardless of what lessons may or may not have been learned from the American experience in Iran, this episode did have one important outcome, that is, that Americans became sensitized to political challenges coming from the religious right.

This new awareness was the put to the test in the late 1980's and early 1990's when there were a number of political challenges to established regimes in the Middle East, mainly in North Africa, from Islamic-based political groups. It is also important that this ground swell took place in the post Cold-War environment.
The next chapter will examine American foreign policy towards the Islamist political challenge in Algeria.
CHAPTER V: U.S. POLICY AND EMPOWERMENT

IN ALGERIA, 1988-1992

With the Iranian Revolution, Islam as a political force came to new prominence in the minds of Middle Easterners and Westerners alike. In the Middle East, the ability of a popular, religiously-based movement to overthrow a western client regime was greeted with astonishment by all and welcome by some. An indigenous movement, based on an indigenous ideology, had triumphed over a regime closely allied to a major foreign actor. While few were anxious to recreate the Islamic Republic exactly, its success was widely proclaimed.

In the West, the fall of the Shah was widely perceived as a great blow to the fortunes of the United States in the region. The general reaction was one of fear and animosity, especially with the taking of the American embassy in November of 1979. One fear was that Islamic movements, inspired and assisted by the Iranians, would now sweep over the Middle East in an orgy of revolution and anti-westernism. While this was clearly a goal for some groups, including the assassins of Anwar Sadat of Egypt in 1981, for the most part these dire predictions have, so far, gone unfulfilled.
However, in the wake of the revolution, Islamic movements did gain support in many countries in the Middle East. This was probably the case more as a sign of resentment and dissatisfaction with western ideologies and unpopular regimes than out of religious conviction. Simultaneously, many of the governments in the Middle East through the 1980's came to the conclusion that business as usual held little hope for the future. In response to both internal and external pressures, it was increasingly recognized that the system needed to become more responsive to the needs of the population. In response there has been an opening of the political system in many Middle Eastern states, though there has been tremendous diversity as to the speed and scope of these changes.

In some states, such as Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria the response by some Islamist groups was to applaud such reforms and to begin to organize political movements dedicated to working within the system to achieve their aims. At this point, a dilemma was raised for the United States; how to respond to the inclusion of Islamist groups in a democratic process?

This chapter examines the American decision making process on this dilemma as it related to Algeria in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Before turning to the policy process, it is instructive to have some historical background on the rise of political empowerment and the electoral
process in Algeria. I then turn to the debate among the American policy community over how to respond to the demonstrated power of the Islamists in Algeria after their initial electoral victories. Finally, I turn to the views held among the presidential elite regarding the possibility of an Islamist victory through the ballot box.

The inaccessibility of government policy documents from the period and the lack of available memoir materials has led to a reliance upon interviews, conducted by the author, with officials within the government.\(^1\) The paucity of information for the presidential elite level forces the inclusion of some hearsay information and a healthy skepticism of any results.

**Empowerment in Algeria**

The National Liberation Front, or FLN, led the fight against French colonialism in Algeria during the civil war of 1954 to 1962. With the final collapse of the French colonial government, and the Fourth Republic in Paris, the FLN took over the reigns of political power in Algeria. A single-party, socialist state was adopted which maintained itself as the sole legal political movement in the country until 1988.

During this quarter century of FLN leadership a concerted effort was made to modernize and develop the Algerian state. Political power was firmly controlled by the

\(^1\) In all, five interviews were conducted by the author with officials connected to the Algerian case. They represent four different offices with responsibility for monitoring Algerian affairs. They all asked that their names and positions be kept anonymous.
FLN, which drew legitimacy from its central role in liberating the state from France.

In the 1960's and 1970's the FLN promoted an aggressive effort at forced modernization in all areas of the society, with special attention being given to the development of heavy industry. Much smaller portions of the budget were devoted to consumer goods and social programs. The revenues needed to construct this new Algeria came from earnings from the sale of oil and natural gas. For a period, this strategy was successful, fueled by the price rise of 1979. This trend continued as in May of 1981, the price of oil reached a new high of forty dollars a barrel. This massive inflow of funds led to a new round of economic development and a willingness to devote a higher percentage to social spending. In fact, the 1985-89 Development Plan for Algeria increased the outlay for social services to thirty percent of total investment.

Because of these oil revenues, Algeria acquired the resources needed to modernize the society. For example, education spread rapidly, reaching about eight nine percent of the population at the primary level and seventy six percent for secondary schools. These figures represent tremendous increases from the immediate post-revolution period.

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2 Essentially a rentier state, ninety seven percent of Algeria's foreign exchange comes from oil and gas sales.
In terms of communication, oil wealth gave ever-increasing numbers of Algerians access to radio and television, which meant ready access to European broadcasting. The result was an aware and informed Algerian population. Also, Algerian guest workers in places such as France also served as an alternative source of information to Algerian government communication.

However, many of the benefits of this economic boom were offset by a rapidly growing population base. The population in Algeria increased tremendously with a yearly increase of over three percent, one of the highest birth rates in the world. While a slight majority of the population consisted of rural peasants and small landholders, a failing agricultural sector and the lure of jobs and wealth in the cities resulted in an annual rural to urban migration rate of over 100,000 people, mostly young men. Many of these migrants were unable to find meaningful employment or proper housing upon reaching the city. They thus became disillusioned and bitter.

In the midst of these development efforts, the oil bubble burst. The price of oil fell dramatically in 1985 and 1986 reaching a new low of ten dollars a barrel in July of 1986 before stabilizing at around seventeen dollars a barrel by late 1990. Overall, state revenues dropped forty percent

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3 This has resulted in a population which is sixty percent under the age of nineteen.
(from $13.1 billion to eight billion between 1981 and 1986), and Algeria experienced its first foreign debt, of around twenty four billion dollars.\(^4\) The annual interest on this debt is over six billion dollars, the repayment of which has diverted needed development funds from other projects. At the same time as the price collapse, prices soared for all basic items, while wages remained steady.

With the collapse of the oil market in the mid-1980's, "the regime's capacity to distribute services became constricted, and dissatisfaction with the government's performance began to grow in various sectors of the society" (Mortimer, 1991, p. 577). One analyst noted that the state's oil revenues fell by eighty percent in 1985-86 (Hudson, 1991, p. 415).

These economic setbacks, consisting of falling revenues and a burgeoning population, made the regimes commitment to social welfare, full employment and development simply infeasible. As a result, quality of life declined, income fell, consumption dropped, and productivity sunk (Hudson, 1991, p. 415).

The fall of the Algerian economy was not due solely to the vagaries of the international oil market. One scholar of Algerian society also points to the collapse of Algerian

\(^4\) The primacy of oil revenues in the Algerian economy is demonstrated in the fact that even when oil revenues dropped thirty six percent from $12.5 billion to $8 billion in 1986, oil revenues still accounted for ninety five percent of Algeria's export earnings (Duran, 1989, p. 408).
agriculture due to state policies of collectivization and an emphasis on heavy industrialization (Duran, 1989, p. 408). Whereas previously Algeria had been self-sufficient in food, by the early 1980's it was importing a majority of its basic foodstuffs. The result has been a steady and large scale rural to urban migration.

These economic difficulties led to criticism of the political structure as well. The 1980's witnessed a growing sense of popular frustration over a lack of consumer goods and a statist bureaucracy that was seen as causing inefficiency and bottlenecks (Mortimer, 1985, p. 210).

The inability of the regime to provide for the citizenry as a result of this economic slowdown led to tension between the ordinary citizens and the bureaucratic elite. A visible income gap and credible charges of corruption also led to unrest (Mortimer, 1991, p. 577; Duran, 1989, p. 410).

In the social sphere, while education had been promoted and improved, the collapse of the economy and rapid population growth overwhelmed and weakened the system (Duran, 1989, p. 408). A lack of jobs in the weakened economy has fostered resentment as unemployment took off. Estimates of unemployment from the late 1980's ran at over twenty percent with the number soaring to fifty percent for those under age twenty. This had serious implications for the regime, as "with jobs increasingly scarce, educated young people have
turned to politics to express their discontent—and to violence" (Duran, 1989, p. 409).

The continued inability of the FLN to correct the economic situation led increasing numbers of Algerians to lose confidence in its leadership. Support was also missing among the young people who felt little attachment to the revolution (Duran, 1989, p. 411). And, "the failure of the government's economic policies to keep pace with the needs of a rapidly growing population—exacerbated by the austerity policies of the mid-1980s—proved fertile soil for the Islamic movement" (Mortimer, 1991, p. 578).

Not everyone was upset solely over the difficult economic state of Algeria; others had become disillusioned with the political structure of the state. As people became more involved economically in the activities of the state they increasingly resented the lack of political participation under the FLN.

The collapse of the economy in 1986 thus served as a strong inducement to begin structural reform. Mainly this reform took place in the economic sphere while the political structure of the past was maintained (Mortimer, 1990, p. 161).

Over time the more liberal elements in Algeria grew disenchanted with the bloated, statist bureaucracy and the controlled media. They began to call for greater economic and political freedom (Mortimer, 1991, p. 577). As one
analyst summarized it, "events since 1989 indicate that Algerians want more channels of political expression than the single-party order permitted them in the past" (Mortimer, 1991, p. 593).

The situation grew increasingly desperate until in October of 1988 many citizens throughout Algeria took to the streets protesting the situation, with special anger being directed towards government facilities. The rioting continued for four days and had to be repressed by the military.

In response to these outbreaks, Chadli Bendjedid, the Algerian President proposed a change in the political structure, which, among other things, would allow for the creation of alternative political organizations. With the allowance of political parties, the Islamists in Algeria came to the fore as the predominant opposition group. The Islamists based their message on a renunciation of the policies of the FLN. One particular criticism was that the western secular elites had betrayed the revolution by failing to benefit the Algerian people (Mortimer, 1991, p. 577). It was argued that the deviations of the FLN from the path of Islam had led to the desperate state of economic and social affairs in Algeria.

Support for the FIS came from many quarters, including some of the more westernized elites. However, the bulk of the Islamist's support came from the poorly educated,
unemployed, poorly housed, the young, and the migrants (Mortimer, 1991, p. 577). For these people, the revolution held less and less popular appeal, with more and more young people attracted to the Islamic cultural model (Mortimer, 1985, p. 202). The Islamists appeal also spread to shopkeepers upset over socialist state control, and among those who appreciated the social services which the Islamists were spreading in the poorer and more overcrowded neighborhoods (Mortimer, 1993, pp. 37-38).

Background

This sense of frustration finally culminated in a series of riots that occurred throughout Algeria in the beginning of October 1988. The causes of the revolt were a poor economy, high unemployment, and, more immediately, increases in food prices (Hudson, 1991, p. 415). Initially the main protagonists were school children and unemployed youth. The rioting lasted from October 5th until the 12th. In response to the crisis, President Bendjedid called on the army to suppress the rioters. Calm was eventually restored but only after a significant loss of life.

To help defuse the crisis Bendjedid went before the nation on October 10th and while pledging to end the uprising, also promised economic and political reform. Most significantly, this included the pledge to put an end to the "monopoly of power at all levels" (Duran, 1989, p. 405).
Bendjedid lived up to his word and in February of 1989 the Algerian Constitution was revised to include the right to form "associations of a political character", thereby ending the single party system of the FLN. One of the first groups to take advantage of this change was the Islamic Salvation Front, or FIS, which was created in March of 1989 after meetings of the Algerian Islamic leadership at the Ibn Badis mosque in Algiers. In July of 1989, the National Assembly made the electoral changes official. The FIS was granted legal status in September 1989, despite a prohibition against parties of a religious nature (Mortimer, 1991, pp. 578-79).

In all, over thirty parties were accredited prior to the local (1990) elections (Mortimer, 1991). However, the majority of these parties were narrowly based along ethnic or ideological grounds and were not expected to fare well in the elections (Mortimer, 1993, p. 38).

Municipal elections were then held in June of 1990 with multi-party contestation allowed for the first time. In sixty seven percent of the provinces and fifty five percent of the municipalities, the winner was either a member of, or affiliated with, the FIS. Overall, the FIS won fifty four percent of the vote with the FLN garnering twenty eight percent. In all, the Islamists controlled 853 of the 1539

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5 The FIS was initially headed by Abbasi Al-Madani and Ali Belhadj. Subsequent arrests of FIS leaders and the banning of the party in 1992 have deprived the movement of an easily identifiable leadership.

At the time, the success of the FIS was widely considered to be a consequence of a protest vote against the FLN and its failed development policies.

The next step in the electoral process was to be elections for the National Assembly, though not the presidency. In March of 1991, the government presented a plan to the assembly, still FLN controlled, that amounted to gerrymandering in order to overrepresent the more rural southern parts of the country where the FLN had its strongest backing. The bill also provided for a run-off of the top three candidates in each district, later lowered to two, if there were no majority winner in the first round. The hope was to force a choice by the voters between the FLN and the FIS (Mortimer, 1991, p. 588).

The FIS responded by calling for a general strike in May demanding the abrogation of the law, plus the inclusion of presidential elections. When very few workers joined the strike, the FIS organized its core followers, mainly unemployed youth, to occupy the main squares in Algiers (Mortimer, 1991, p. 589). Bendjedid ordered the military to clear the streets leading to violent clashes between the military and the Islamists. The military again put down the demonstrations but then forced the government to oust the Prime Minister, Hamrouche, who had created the electoral law.
The military also attached a condition that there be presidential elections in the next round as well (Mortimer, 1991, p. 590). Bendjedid was forced to agree.

The elections were postponed for six months due to the street violence. On December 26, 1991, national parliamentary elections were finally held. The competition was fierce, as the FIS ran a candidate in every district, the FLN in all but one, and five other parties had candidates in at least two-thirds of the districts (Mortimer, 1993, p. 39).

The results of the December 1991 elections came as a surprise to many observers. The FIS, instead of losing electoral strength as had been predicted, won over forty percent of the available seats in Parliament outright, just twenty eight seats short of an outright parliamentary majority. The ruling FLN came in a distant third in the initial round, gathering in sixteen seats as compared to 188 for the FIS and twenty five for the Berber dominated, secular, socialist, party of Hocine Ait Ahmed (Mortimer, 1993, p. 39). The remaining seats were then to be contested in run-off elections. Here, FIS candidates were considered to be the clear favorite for the run-off elections to be held in January 1992. Most western analysts estimated that after these elections, the FIS stood to control as many as eighty percent of all the seats in the new Parliament.

Political commentators were astounded by the success of the FIS. Most had expected a significant move away from the
FIS, noting that the FIS had not had a very strong record of governance in the municipalities they had held since the 1990 elections. Additionally, the idea of voting for the FIS as a protest against the FLN made less sense in December 1991, since this message had already been sent and received through the 1990 elections. Many observers had believed, therefore, that the FLN would capture a significant number of votes as Algerians reacted to the inability of the FIS to govern any better than the FLN. This prediction seemed to be combined with the unspoken assumption for many observers that the people of Algeria surely did not want to be actually ruled by "Islamic fundamentalists."

While it may or may not be true that most of the population really did not want to be ruled by Islamists, the results did show that most Algerians had little interest in the continued rule of the FLN.

The eventual makeup of the Parliament became a moot point, however, on January 14, 1992, when the military, most likely with the covert approval of President Bendjedid, took power. The pretext for the military's action was the sudden resignation of Bendjedid. Using a constitutional loophole regarding the succession of a retiring president, the military was able to gain control of the government, declare martial law, and subsequently cancel the upcoming scheduled elections. These actions, just prior to the holding of the
second round of elections, eliminated the possibility of the FIS coming to power through the ballot box.

**Views Among the American Policy Elite**

At first virtually no attention was given to these events in Algeria by the policy elite in the United States. The riots of 1988 and the promulgation of a new Constitution went by virtually without comment. Algeria finally did catch the eye of some commentators in 1990 with the success of the FIS in the municipal elections. Few in number, these commentators were supportive of the direction Algeria seemed to be heading. Dire warnings about the meaning of the election were conspicuously absent.

Representing one of the more accepting views of the Islamist victory was a piece by Robin Wright, who had just published a book on Islam and politics. Wright argued that the victory of the Islamists demonstrated that they can work within the system and abide by its rules. Wright saw this as a sign that "the Iranian model has been shunned and fanatic's bullets forsaken for ballots of moderation. Islam and democracy may not be incompatible".

In explaining the vote, Wright cited the pervasive problems of housing shortages, land policies, and education. He compared the situation in Algeria to that of Eastern Europe where people also rejected the old system out of a

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desire for an improved standard of living. However, with the government saddled by debt, it could not do much to alleviate these social ills. Wright therefore concluded that a vote for the FIS was more than a vote against the FLN.

Wright advocated a strategy of co-opting the Islamic forces rather than coercing them. "Indeed, one of the reasons Islam has become so potent is due to the absence of democratic outlets—in Algeria for 28 years, in Jordan for 22 and in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood has been banned since 1954, for 33 years" In sum, he saw Algeria as a "test case" for western reaction to Islamic politics. After acknowledging that there were two tendencies in the FIS, one for pluralism and the other more radical, he concluded, that "confrontation will only encourage extremism" (Robin Wright, "The New Islam Shuns Fanatic's Bullets for Ballots of Moderation" in Washington Post, 6/24/90, p. M2).

A similar but less accepting view was voiced in an editorial in the Wall Street Journal days after the FIS victory ("The Revolution Goes South" in The Wall Street Journal, 6/22/90, p. A8). According to the editors, the legacy of the FLN was one of stifling dissent, while creating a rich and corrupt "apparatchik" class. It rooted this dissent in the squandering of oil revenues on industrial public works, the negative effects of the collectivization of agriculture, currency deflation, and denied opportunity for the young. Given these failures, it was argued to be
inevitable that "opposition to the government flocked around Islam, as opponents to communism in Poland flocked round the Catholic church".

These problems were portrayed as arising out of the crisis of a large, young, urban, and unemployed mass. It further noted that these were the very groups that were being nurtured by the social welfare organizations sponsored by the Islamists.

In viewing the electoral victory of the Islamists, the editorial suggested that "the proper course now would be to throw the political doors wide open. The Algerian government should allow an array of non-fundamentalist opposition parties, and reduce the danger of an Islamic revolution. The worst course would be measures to stifle dissent".

While not welcoming an Islamist victory, the editors argued against "brain lock-up" which could too readily see Algeria as another Iran. "Rather than being imprisoned by the experience of Iran, the world might better view these election results as an Eastern European democratic revolution stuck in an Arab context". It continued that, "if real reform continues, the election results aren't likely to lead to an Islamic revolution, or a wave of chaos and emigration".

This view was supported in a commentary by Shireen T. Hunter ("What Algeria's Fundamentalists Can Teach the West" in Christian Science Monitor, 7/2/90, p. 19). Hunter, deputy director of the Middle East Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, began by agreeing with Wright that it would be a mistake to interpret the FIS victory in local elections as firm support for its program; instead she saw this success much more as a repudiation of the FLN and as a "crisis of confidence" between the state and society.

To back up this point Hunter described the lack of a viable industrial sector, the decline in the agricultural sector, and despite natural resources, the country's high debt. Inflation, unemployment and a high birth rate were also cited as leading to disenchantment and hence a receptivity to the program of the FIS, especially among the unemployed young.

The influence of foreign actors, including Iran, in the crisis was dismissed. Hunter argued that most of the foreign support for the FIS came from Saudi Arabia not Iran, and that this support had not bought loyalty.

She concluded that the United States should support economic and political reform throughout the region as a way to check the growing power of the Islamic fundamentalists.

Not everyone was willing to accept the Islamists as simply the outgrowth of economic dislocations. Some pointed more to the possible threat that an Islamist victory would represent (Andrew Thibault "Democracy's Rough Road in Algeria" in Christian Science Monitor, 6/25/90, p. 18). Thibault agreed with the rest of the commentators that the
legitimacy of the FLN had eroded due to a failing economy, high birth rate, housing and unemployment problems.

However, Thibault was uncomfortable with the possibility of the FIS acting as the instrument of what he perceived as solely a protest vote. He argued that "the latest elections represent the birth of democracy. Unfortunately, Algerian democracy appears stillborn". In his view, a victory for the FIS at the national level would mean an end to democracy in Algeria.

Thibault stated that while the program of the FIS remained undeclared, much of it could still be inferred. He maintained that the FIS was an outgrowth of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and which advocated the imposition of Islamic law as the sole source of Algerian jurisprudence, arabization (implying discrimination against the Algerian Berber population), and the persecution of women. He concluded that "while free elections are normally cause for rejoicing, the Algerian case dangerously resembles the rise of fascism through electoral victory in the German Weimar Republic. In the end, the Iranian example may also provide a clue as to what will follow."

Soon after this statement, commentary on Algeria by the policy elite died down. It was not renewed until the June 1991 riots and postponement of the parliamentary elections. When the topic of an Islamic victory in Algeria was raised
again, only those viewing this development with favor spoke out.

Mamoun Fandy, an analyst of Middle Eastern affairs, in an opinion piece (Mamoun Fandy "Algerian Opposition Isn't 'Fundamentalist'" in *Christian Science Monitor*, 6/17/91, p. 19) argued that the Islamists were a political movement not a fundamentalist religious ideology. He pointed out that the Islamist leaders throughout North Africa were western-educated intellectuals not religious leaders, who were committed to democracy and fair representation of all groups.

As for Algeria specifically, he argued that Madani, the FIS leader, was gathering followers, including many French speaking and educated Algerians who were upset over corruption and dictatorship, because of his message, not simply as a protest vote.

A similar view was expressed in an editorial in the Los Angeles Times ("Democracy in an Unusual Place" *Los Angeles Times*, 7/14/91, p. M4). After reviewing the situation, the editors concluded, "but if parliamentary elections are permitted next October, there is no reason the principles of Islam and democracy cannot coexist. With patience--and without interference from other fundamentalist countries--Algeria's experiment with democracy can work. And, in time, the inspirational effects might just be felt throughout the Arab world".
Members of the policy elite were then quiet on the possibility of an Islamic electoral success throughout the fall of 1991, perhaps believing that the effects of the spring riots and new electoral law would weaken the FIS. The resounding success of FIS candidates in the December elections brought forth a new series of analyses of these events by the policy elite. Again, as in June 1990, the views were mixed.

Mohammed Akacem, an academic, ("Islam Scores a Fundamental Victory" Los Angeles Times, 1/3/92, p. B7) wrote that the FIS victory was nothing worth being shocked or alarmed about as it was the "inevitable response to years of repression" by the FLN.

He argued that the FIS had a certain legitimacy for many Algerians and that the FIS made effective use of the mosque network to talk to the disenchanted and disenfranchised. Though he discounted economic explanations as too deterministic, Akacem did point out that the FIS had been helped by the collapse of the Algerian economy. He placed greater emphasis on the fact that the FIS gave people the Islamic-Arab identity they sought. This popular support for the FIS was said to reflect a desire for honesty and due process in government.

Akacem rejected any analogy of Algeria to Iran. But he did admit that another Iran could be created if the West
refused to abide by the results of the elections or acted to harm the Algerian economy.

Finally, he argued that the West should not support the repression of Islamists elsewhere in the Middle East as this would increase their domestic support and drive them underground where more radical forces could come to dominate. As for the FIS, "whether it can deliver is doubtful, given its lack of a clear program to deal with Algeria's abysmal economy. But it has at least earned the right to try".

These views were echoed by RAND Middle East analyst, Graham E. Fuller ("Islamic Fundamentalism: No Long-Term Threat" Washington Post, 1/13/92, p. A17). Fuller began by arguing that "the world—and especially the West—has got to come to terms with Islamic politics whether we like it or not, especially when it wins in democratic elections. Or is democracy great only as long as the people we like win? Is that the political message we want to send to Muslims about our Western political system?"

Answering in the negative, Fuller maintained that the West should not panic over this victory or move to have the election annulled. For Fuller, Islamism is "a movement that is historically inevitable and politically 'tamable.' Over the long run it even represents ultimate political progress toward greater democracy and popular government". Through political participation, greater moderation will emerge".
While Fuller saw a hijacked democracy as possible, he also said this would not be a smart move by the Islamists as it would hurt the future electoral chances of other such movements in the region.

He concluded with the admonition to "let Islam come out of the underground and learn to survive in electoral politics as it now does in Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. Give the process a little time. Political evolution always has rocky periods, but Islamic politics may not be quite the bogey-man we fear".

An editorial in the New York Times immediately following the coup echoed Fuller's admonition ("Algeria: Democracy Betrayed" New York Times, 1/14/92, p. A22). The editors admitted that the FIS was not a "paragon of pluralist virtue", but argued that democracy represented the best hope for managing the tensions in the region. It went on to argue that the United States should follow this up behaviorally. "If the Bush Administration is sincere about encouraging democracy in the Arab world, it has a responsibility to press Algeria's army to reverse its reckless course before the damage gets worse".

Another opinion piece in the Los Angeles Times argued that such a course would be in the best interests of the United States (George Black "Our Love for Democracy is Selective" Los Angeles Times, 1/19/92, p. M5). Black, a columnist for the Los Angeles Times, feared that the
acceptance of the coup and the mild response from the West could have serious negative consequences in the future. "Until January 12, a strong current in the Islamic front favored the politics of consensus. But now the call for armed insurrection fills the mosques, and the fundamentalists will remember where the United States stood".

Similarly, an editorial in the New York Times a few days later argued that "the duty of Western democracies is to treat Algeria's democratically elected Islamic government on the basis of its performance in office, not the deeds of fundamentalists elsewhere" ("Algeria Chooses Islam" New York Times, 1/23/92, p. A26).

Other commentators reacted to charges that the FIS was not really that popular and that the actions of the army were thus allowable in order to halt the tyranny of the Islamists. Mohammed Akacem, ("Algeria's Mistaken Path" Christian Science Monitor, 2/5/92, p. 18), repudiated the idea that the Islamists would have used power to end democracy. He also noted that even if this were the case, the army could have moved in to prevent such a power grab. He also grappled with the idea that the Islamists had received no mandate because of low voter turnout. Akacem interpreted this as evidence of dissatisfaction with all the choices being offered, including the FLN. He also asserted that the Algerian people voted with the knowledge of what that vote meant. To reject these results, he said, would send the message that the West would
only accept democracy if it created secular governments; that
the West was hypocritical on democracy and therefore violent
struggle was the only way to achieve social and political
reform in the Middle East.

Akacem admitted that life under the FIS may not be
desirable, especially for women, with many intellectuals
emigrating, but he feared that the annulment would cause many
Algerians to lose their faith in democracy. Fears of an
Islamic regime would also be groundless as the Islamists may
be driven from office rather quickly given the complexities
of the Algerian economic and social ills.

Finally, an editorial in the New York Times came out
strongly against the actions of the military ("Radicalizing
stated that the coup may lead to a radicalization of the
opposition, thereby creating the very extremism that the
regime hoped to contain. "The Islamic Salvation Front is
being denied a fair chance at the polls based on assumptions
about intentions, not its deeds. Those intentions may well
be undemocratic, but it was not the Islamic opposition that
brazenly voided the elections and pushed the nation toward
extremism."

In sum, the "fear of fundamentalism does not justify
reversing the gradual democratizing moves that since 1988
have given Algerians their first taste of political freedom."
However, many commentators and policy analysts were less charitable to the FIS. Some adopted a more middle ground position while others applauded the coup as the only course available to halt what they saw as the Algerian slide into Islamic government.

Taking a more ambivalent stance was an editorial in the *Christian Science Monitor* ("Algeria's Turmoil" Christian Science Monitor, 1/15/92, p. 20). The editors portrayed the annulment as risky since it could lead to heightened radicalism, and increased support for the FIS. While this strategy may work in the short run, it would eventually be ineffective because Islamism was not going to go away. The other option would be to allow the elections and hold the FIS to its pledge of honoring political diversity. Support for the FIS was seen as likely to diminish given the steadily worsening economy. While not supportive of the FIS, the editorial concludes that, "the decision is not easy. But the better option is to give democracy a chance to function—even if the initial winners are people who have little conception of its meaning".

More prevalent were views that accepted the coup as a necessary step. More accepting views of the FIS as held by the first set of commentators were seen as overly optimistic and, perhaps, naive.

One editorial ("Algeria's Democratic Path to the Past" Boston Globe, 12/31/92, p. 14), written between the two
rounds of voting, predicted that if the FIS were to take power, it would do away with the "un-Islamic practice of democracy". Overall, an Islamist victory in Algeria would serve to galvanize others in the Arab world. And while the Islamists would do no better in solving pressing economic issues, they would represent a threat to all the secular regimes in the region.

Following the publication of the Fuller piece, Amos Perlmutter, a former government official, responded with his own commentary on the issue of Islamic democracy ("Wishful Thinking About Islamic Fundamentalism", Washington Post, 1/19/92, p. C7). Perlmutter declared that Fuller "takes a decidedly sanguine view of the very real threat of Islamic fundamentalism as expressed in the recent election results in Algeria." Perlmutter argued that Islam, of any variety, was incompatible with western style democracy and liberalism, since it was "contemptuous of and hostile to the entire democratic political culture".

He also criticized the notion that there were moderate elements in Islamist political movements. Instead, "in Algeria or in Egypt, the modern Islamic movement is authoritarian, anti-democratic, anti-secular and a protest movement of the economically deprived. Once in power, this movement will eliminate the electoral process". For Perlmutter, Islamic movements are "inimically hostile" to
democracy, and like Khomeini, dedicated to destroying the very institutions and ideas that brought them to power.

In this sense, fundamentalism is an "aggressive revolutionary movement as militant and violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist and Nazi movements of the past". In his opinion, experts who believe that Islamists could be reformist, and act as players in the democratic game, are deceiving themselves.

Then invoking the analogy of Iran and Khomeini, Perlmutter argued that once in power, these movements would move to destroy any opposition, secularism, freedoms and pluralism. In sum, "this protest movement should not and cannot be confused with democracy, but should be stifled at birth".

Richard Cohen, a columnist for the *Washington Post*, ("Phony Democracies* Washington Post, 1/21/92, p. A19) took a similar position to Perlmutter. He asserted that if in power the Islamists would assert their beliefs, and end pluralism and democracy. Cohen criticized those western leaders who condemned the coup, arguing that simply because westerners, did not have a direct national security concern in Algeria there was no reason to accept an Islamist victory. To Cohen it was "mindless to insist that any result, democratically arrived at, has to be accepted like some change in the weather. We have an obligation to assert our own fundamental
beliefs—in democracy, sure, but also for 'inalienable rights' that no majority can abrogate".

A final editorial ("The Battle of Algiers" National Review, 2/17/92, vol. 44, p. 18), argued that the United States must share some of the blame for the Islamic upheaval in the Middle East because of its proclaimed support for democracy and democratic regimes. The editors argued that the beneficiaries of this policy were the Islamists who would not respect constitutionalism but instead would impose democratic authoritarianism. Therefore, the United States should change its rhetoric and accept other governmental forms in the Middle East. As the editors put it,

We should ease up on forcing Western electoral forms on societies that have their own dynamics, beyond our ken. We should accept that moderate Arab governments which govern by their own social contract in traditional ways may be as legitimate as any other, and that destabilizing them in the name of democracy will do no one any good if it gives an opening to more regressive forces. When determining our attitude to the rise and fall of political forces in other countries, we should consult our interests before recommending our values.

Views Among the American Presidential Elite/Decision Making

Among the presidential elite, two levels need to be distinguished when discussing Washington's reaction to events in Algeria. The first set of actors are those government officials, mainly at State, charged with the day to day monitoring of events in Algeria. The second set of actors
are those officials operating at the highest levels of policy making such as the Secretary of State and his chief advisors.

For officials at the higher levels of policy making, Algeria was a matter of little concern throughout the period under examination. At the time, Algeria was not seen as a strategic priority and thus did not rise to the top policy making level.

However, the situation in Algeria was being monitored by some in the American foreign policy establishment. At the working level, the events in Algeria were, for the most part, viewed with interest and some hope that Algeria may serve as a test case for future instances of Islamic politics operating through the ballot box.

With the January coup, these roles were reversed as, briefly, Algeria came to the attention of high-level policy makers as there was a perceived need to make some response to events in Algiers. Thus, there was a brief flurry of high-level attention to Algeria. For those at the operating level, the coup meant the temporary loss of control over American policy on Algeria. This is significant because there is some indication that the views of actors at these two levels may not have been in agreement.

In the lengthy build-up to the 1991 and 1992 elections, official U.S. policy was to wait and watch events unfold. Algeria and its reforms were not a high-level policy concern as the Gulf War and subsequent Arab-Israeli peace process
dominated American attention. One of the few policy statements to come out of the policy making level on the issue of democracy in the developing world was made by Secretary of State Baker in an address before the World Affairs Council in Dallas, TX (3/30/90, "Democracy and American Diplomacy" U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 1, no. 1, 9/3/90, pp. 22-25).

In this speech, Baker pledged that "the time of sweeping away the old dictators is passing fast; the time of building up the new democracies has arrived. That is why President Bush has defined our new mission to be the promotion and consolidation of democracy." He continued, "I reject and I hope that America always rejects the view that democracy is for certain societies but has no place in Africa or Asia or South America, or even in the Middle East."

While Baker may have been advocating democracy around the world in his statement, in terms of Algeria specifically, this did not translate into American contacts with the Algerian opposition. There was a fear that such an action would serve to legitimate these groups. Perhaps indicative of differences of opinion on other issues, one official at the State Department later described this policy stance as false and counterproductive (interview with the author 6/24/93).

Other than Baker's statement, Algeria was not on the scope for most actors as an issue requiring high-level
attention or action. Therefore, for most of the course of
the Algerian case, events were monitored, and policy made, at
the working level at State and the National Security Council.
Here, there was a willingness to let events in Algeria run
their course as an experiment in what was possible in a post
Cold War North Africa. This wait and see approach was
permissible because Algeria was seen as having no strategic
value in either a European or Gulf context. For one middle
level official at State, this situation meant a few more
risks were acceptable (interview with the author, 6/4/93).

At the working level, there was a high degree of
consensus as to the nature of the FIS and its degree of
support among the Algerian population. It was widely agreed
that the FIS was a complex organization consisting of a
coalition of groups; some essentially liberal, modern, and
democratic, while others were more militant, radical and
fundamentalist. While these divergent trends in the FIS made
conclusive classifications difficult, overall the FIS was not
seen as evil or as part of a monolithic movement. The
Islamists were also not perceived as being necessarily
democratic or libertarian either. This ambiguity made the
United States unwilling to engage with the FIS (interviews
with the author, 6/4/93 and 6/24/93).

The rise of the FIS was attributed by the working level
officers to a sense of frustration and resentment towards the
failed economic and governing policies of the ruling FLN.
Problems with housing availability and unemployment added fuel to the fire already evident with frustration over such issues as corruption and mismanagement (interviews with the author, 6/4/93 and 6/7/93). This societal frustration led many to utilize the FIS as a vehicle of opposition to voice their complaints and register their dissatisfaction.

The FIS was also seen as benefiting from its Islamic nature because other alternative ideologies such as secularism, nationalism and socialism had all been discredited by their association with the government. Islam thus served as an effective rallying point, especially in a country divided by so many different language and ethnic groups (interview with the author 6/24/93). Islam was felt to provide a common sense of identity for many in Algeria, especially among the young who did not feel any connection to the revolution, and hence the FLN (interview with the author 6/24/93).

It was further believed that the perceived lack of options to either the FIS or the FLN led many Algerians to vote for the FIS simply because of the lack of choices. Some analysts blamed this on the rapid pace of liberalization inside Algeria, believing that a slower pace of liberalization may have led to a more pluralist and peaceful transition. Instead the result was a sudden and complete rejection of the FLN. Since other parties were unwilling to
enter the political arena the protest vote was left to the FIS (interview with the author, 6/4/93).

At the same time, there was perceived to be only a minimal attachment among the population to the actual policy agenda of the FIS. All of the analysts interviewed put the figure of hard-core support for the FIS at somewhere around twenty percent of their vote count (interviews with the author, 6/4/93 and 6/24/93). In this sense, support for the FIS was seen as a classic protest vote.

An important aspect of the views of many analysts was a rejection of the idea that the FIS was part of a monolithic Islamic movement with roots in Iran or Sudan seeking control over the Middle East. All the analysts were adamant in their conviction that what was going on in Algeria was an indigenous movement arising out of the frustrations of a frustrated society. In their minds Iran and the Sudan, as leaders of a militant Islamic movement, were uninvolved. A small role was granted to the Saudis who were known to be providing some financial support to the FIS. However, there was also an acknowledgment that this money was not garnering either loyalty or subservience (interviews with the author, 6/4/93 and 6/24/93).

Policy Preferences

As events unfolded in Algeria, there was little sense of concern among these analysts and therefore the issue was not
brought to the attention of higher levels of government. For the most part Algeria was seen as a low priority issue (interview with the author 6/7/93). The United States was also not seen to have pressing interests in the region and the one possible interest present, oil and natural gas resources, was believed to be invulnerable to disruption due to economic necessity regardless of who was in power in Algiers (interview with the author 6/24/93).

Therefore, American policy was to simply monitor events. As one analyst put it, at the time America's guiding principles for policy were: non countenance of coercion and repression; a ready acceptance of elections and multi-partyism; and a neutrality as to whether the army or the FIS should rule (interview with the author, 6/4/93).

Another prevalent belief which mitigated against a strong United States role was that Algeria was seen as France's area of concern and American officials did not want to intrude (interviews with the author, 6/4/93). The belief was that Europe was more likely to be threatened, in the form of a refugee influx and resource scarcity, from any change in the Algerian regime and therefore should be left to their judgment (interview with the author 6/24/93).

The American government was also unwilling to take a strong stand on the rise of the FIS because while little threat was seen from the FIS, the lack of an explicit policy agenda by the FIS also made many analysts wary.
As one analyst explained, the lack of a clear policy statement by the FIS left their agenda open to interpretation. There was also some concern that the known split between the more moderate Madani and the more radical Belhaj was being used as a means to tell people what they wanted to hear (interview with the author, 6/4/93).

Within the government there was no clear idea as to where the FIS was headed. Would Algeria become another radical state like Iran or, instead, play by the rules, continue with democratization, and seek good relations with the West? Given the ambiguity of their agenda, American policy was to error on the side of conservatism and withhold open support for the FIS (interview with the author, 6/4/93).

One analyst suggested that the answer to this debate depended upon one's position in the policy making hierarchy. At the working level there was a willingness to accept a benign interpretation of the FIS. This group was termed, by one analyst, the "complexifiers". These analysts saw the FIS as an indigenous movement, internally divided, and likely to play by the rules of the game if they achieved power. A second group, consisting of high-level policy makers, came into the process late and held a less accepting view, seeing the FIS as aggressive and anti-system. This group was termed the "simplifiers" (interview with the author 6/24/93).

All of these factors resulted in Algeria not being a major concern for most of official Washington. The only
reason that Algeria came onto the scope for policy makers was a fear that events in Algeria, resulting in a FIS victory, would have a domino effect upon Egypt leading to an Islamic victory in Cairo which would then withdraw from the Arab-Israeli peace process. Analysts at the working level, however, did not share this as a likely scenario (interviews with the author, 6/4/93).

Within the United States government the possibility of a total FIS victory was seen as unlikely. The accepted scenario of the time was that there would be a three way split in the elections between the FIS, the FLN and an expected "third force", consisting of the other secular parties. In this split, the FIS was predicted to garner between fifteen and twenty percent of the vote. If this came to pass, the FIS would then have to enter a coalition government and some sort of co-habitation arrangement with Bendjedid. In this way, the FIS would have to enter the system and probably thus take on a more moderate stance (interviews with the author, 6/4/93).

However, reality soon overtook these predictions. The riots in June of 1991, elevated the Algerian issue and worried many in the American government. The situation was seen as critical after the December 1991 elections as the possibility of a total FIS victory loomed. The expected "third force" had proved to be imaginary.
At this point three possible scenarios were envisioned. One was that the FIS would try to take over the military as well as the government upon their succession. This was seen as leading to either civil war as the military resisted or, if the FIS were successful, a radicalized and militarized Islamic state. Others argued that the FIS would only control the government and thus would be balanced and restrained by the military. A final scenario was that the FIS would accept and operate within the democratic system that had brought them to power (interview with the author, 6/4/93).

Policy Making Moves to Higher Levels

With the coup of January 13, it was impossible for the United States to continue with the wait and watch policy. The intervention of the Algerian military into the electoral process required some sort of response. Initially this took the form of a statement by Margaret Tutwiler, Secretary Baker's spokesperson. Tutwiler expressed "concern [over] the interruption of the electoral process." However, she added that the actions of the military were in accord with the Algerian Constitution, indicating an acceptance of the military intervention as a legal response to the president's resignation (Washington Post, 1/14/92, p. A16).

Interestingly, this position was then revised the next day to take a more neutral tone on the intervention. Tutwiler made a new statement, which she characterized as
"definitely a change" from the previous days statement, indicating that the United States was not taking sides on the issue of the constitutionality of the military's move (Washington Post, 1/15/92, p. A19).

Among the working level officials there was disagreement as to why the initial U.S. policy response was so tame. One respondent at State attributed the mild response to the fact that all of the principal policy makers at State were out of town the day of the intervention. In the absence of guidance from Baker or his deputies, Dennis Ross (Undersecretary of State), William Burns (Principle Deputy Director of Policy Planning) and Stephen Grummon (a staff member of Policy Planning responsible for the Middle East), the Tutwiler statement was portrayed as a bureaucratic response, not reflective of official opinion. The subsequent turn-around was then attributed to the involvement of these individuals the next day (interview with the author, 6/4/93).

Another respondent, also at the DOS, recalled it differently. Here, the Tutwiler statement was interpreted as an accurate reflection of opinion held by higher level policy makers. The failure of the moderate "third group" to materialize in the elections had worried many in Washington so that the intervention of the military was accepted and to some degree welcomed by some high level policy makers. The Tutwiler statement thus reflected a fear among some policy makers that Algeria was becoming an Islamic dominated
government similar to Iran. This knee-jerk response was then modified when it was realized that accepting the intervention was in contradiction to many official American policies (interview with the author, 6/4/93).

In terms of overt behavior, regardless of policy preference, the possibility of American intervention in Algeria either to reinforce or reverse the coup was never considered (interview with the author, 6/4/93).

**Policy Splits Within the Government**

The differing interpretations of the Tutwiler statements have been pointed to by some as indicative of a split within the bureaucracy between the working level and the policy making level on Algeria.

Those who had been tracking developments in Algeria for some time were convinced that there was no significant connection between the FIS and Iran. They saw the FIS as an indigenous movement responding to domestic ills using a language and set of symbols which appealed to many Algerians. When the crisis broke, this view was then relayed to the policy makers.

However, the feeling was that this view was ignored by policy makers who were more inclined to interpret the FIS and its electoral strength as an Iran in the making. Their perceptions and behaviors were thus more threat-driven, leading to a discomfort with the FIS and an acceptance, if
not welcoming, of the military intervention (interviews with the author, 6/4/93 and 6/24/93).

One analyst at State attributed this split to two factors. The first was that the Algerian government moved too quickly with liberalization and democratization. This led Algeria to move away from the status quo too quickly making American policy makers nervous about the future of the country (interview with the author, 6/4/93). Second, this policy split between the working level and the policy level may have been reflective of a generational split within the DOS. More senior officers were characterized as seeing Algeria in terms of geo-strategic issues and were less comfortable with new forms of governance than the more junior officers (interview with the author, 6/4/93).

As for the potential role of Moscow in these events, regardless of a person's view on the military's action, the idea that events in Algeria were somehow connected to manipulations from Moscow were firmly rejected by all parties within the United States government (interviews with the author, 6/4/93 and 6/7/93).

Evidence of Exclusion

In this case, it would probably be more accurate to speak of two decision processes. The first process was characterized by the involvement of low to middle level officials, directly concerned with Algeria. Higher level
policy makers were absent from considerations about Algeria as the situation there was not seen as warranting attention. Within this group of working level officials there was agreement that the situation in Algeria was proceeding in an acceptable way and that the United States should be content to sit back and observe. This group displayed a Complex image of the FIS and the Algerian situation.

The second process began with the Algerian military's intervention. Higher level officials who had been growing increasingly concerned over Algeria, especially with the FIS electoral victory in December, inserted themselves into the decision making process to determine the United States response to the intervention. In the end a fairly mild policy response was adopted. At this policy making level there was no evidence of a difference in opinion. In both cases the policy making group appears to have been unified.

A possible split may have occurred between the two groups. A common theme among the working level officials was that when the time came to make a policy response to the military intervention, their opinions and preferences were not sought leaving the decision making to officials with only a minimal amount of personal knowledge of the case. Thus, policy was guided more by preconceptions and memories of Iran than by informed analysis.

If true, this would indicate a policy split between the two level of government, with the more senior policy makers
rejecting and excluding the individuals and opinions of the working level officials. Thus there may be some evidence that exclusion did take place as higher level officials were unreceptive to the dissenting viewpoints of the working level and thus excluded these actors from the process.

While plausible, this scenario may not be accurate for two reasons. One, we do not have an accurate picture of the opinions of more senior officials. The only evidence available are the retrospective recollections of others. Therefore it is wise to be skeptical of these accounts due to selective memory and self-serving remembrance.

Two, this possible incidence of exclusion may more accurately be viewed as standard bureaucratic procedure. During periods of unrest, where an official administration response is deemed requisite, it is understandable for higher level officials to make decisions and policy responses without seeking the input of all relevant, though subservient, officials. Therefore this may not be a case of motivated exclusion in order to influence policy making, but instead the normal workings of a complex and hierarchically arranged bureaucracy.

Based on the nature and amount of information currently available, it is impossible to definitively decide this issue. Additional sources will have to become available before this can be settled.
Discussion

While acknowledging that data problems make analysis difficult and more conjecture than demonstrated fact, some preliminary results and analysis are possible.

Working level officials exhibited a mainly Complex image of Algeria and the FIS. In examining the situation, these officials emphasized that the FIS was an indigenous movement, motivated mainly by economic hardship and frustration with a secular regime described as corrupt and inefficient. Its support base was seen as widespread and popular, though the actual figure of hard-core support was always put at less than twenty percent. The advocated policy preference of these officials was one of letting the Algerian "experiment" run its course and thus serve as an indicator of the possibility of populist Islamic groups operating within a democratic system. Overall, this was a very accepting and non threat-driven image of the other.

This view can be contrasted with those at the policy making level in the government. Here, reports indicate a less tolerant and accepting attitude towards the FIS, and Islamic populism in general. This moderately threat-driven, Imperial, view focused on Algeria and the FIS as examples of the spread of a populist but aggressive Islam. Ideological and material connections were made to Iran, which was seen as the archetype of the aggressive, anti-western, Islamic state. These emphases indicate a more threat-driven motivation.
This view was scored as moderate in intensity for two main reasons. First, high-level attention to Algeria was missing for essentially all of the case except for the very end. Such inattentiveness is not consistent with a high degree of perceived threat. Second, the policy preference of this position was to neither accept nor reject the action of the Algerian military. A more extreme viewpoint, which saw Islam as a real threat, would have been more open in its acceptance and pleasure with the intervention.

Both positions, overall, saw little that the United States could do to affect events in Algeria in either direction. It was not perceived as a strategically vital area and was also seen as more in the French sphere-of-influence.

In sum, those at the policy making level with a more Imperial view were more comfortable with the idea of the continuation of FLN rule through the military. As a result, the coup was not strongly condemned and there were essentially no political or economic costs imposed on the coup leaders. Those with a more Complex view, while not angry over the coup and subsequent American policy, did exhibit a feeling of disappointment on both of these issues that was absent from higher level officials.

To repeat, there was no perceived connection between the events in Algeria leading to a probable FIS victory and any actions of the Soviet Union. This form of the Imperial-Enemy
connection was not evident for any presidential level actor. However, the perceived connection between the FIS and Iran may indicate that in the post Cold War period, a new perceived Enemy is emerging in the Middle East to replace the threat once seen as originating in the Soviet Union.

As discussed, the effect of these different policy positions and perceptions on the policy process was rather ambiguous. It does appear that the more Complex views of the lower levels were not included in the decision making on the response to the coup. This may indicate a unwillingness to include these views because they were less accepting of the intervention. However, this result may also have occurred simply because of normal operating procedures in which policy gets made without a central role for those at the working level.
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS:

U.S. POLICY AND MASS POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
A TROUBLED PAST AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

In this final chapter, I summarize the evidence presented in the case studies and draw some conclusions as to how well behavior both at the group level and the policy level are explained using the theory laid out in chapter two.

I begin by summarizing the operant images held in each case by the policy makers. Then I examine American behavior in each case as an indicator of the prevailing view within the American presidential elite. Such a review will enable a discussion of the validity of the three hypotheses relating image theory to policy preference formation and behavior. Included in this will be a discussion of the inferred motivating factors in image formation and policy preference.

Review of Images Held in Each Case

In the Iraqi-Lebanese case, there was minimal diversity as to the views held among the members of the presidential elite. The majority view perceived High Threat originating from Moscow, acting through its local surrogate in Cairo. There was a strong belief that this challenge had to be met quickly and forcefully. The civil war in Lebanon was thus
seen as an ideal opportunity to react to the Arab nationalist Iraqi coup and to demonstrate American resolve at the same time. The unrest in Lebanon was seen as arising from the aggressive actions of external agitators who lacked popular support among the Lebanese population. Shades of domestic opinion in Lebanon were not recognized nor were the domestic causes of opposition. Overall, verbal behavior is indicative of an Extreme Enemy image towards the Soviet Union and an Extreme Child image of Lebanon. A few dissenting viewpoints were expressed, but these were not included in the actual decision making process.

This near-unanimity had broken down by the time of the Iranian Revolution. Within the presidential elite, three positions were visible. The dominant position did not see Soviet intrigue in Iran but it was fearful that the fall of the Shah could provide a temptation to Moscow. Within this group, a Moderate Enemy image of the Soviet Union was visible. As to Iran itself, there was a strong desire to see the Shah remain in the face of growing domestic opposition. Views as to the relative capability of the Shah and the opposition were such that American intervention was not perceived as necessary to counter this challenge. This set of views indicated a Moderate Imperial image.

This dominant view stood in sharp contrast to the other two positions. A small group within the presidential elite, essentially perceived the Iranian case in terms similar to
those held during the 1958 Crisis. A strong connection between events in Iran and Soviet adventurism was perceived, as was the necessity and ability of the United States to meet this challenge in Iran. An Extreme Imperial view of Iran is evident from arguments such as those which stated that the Iranian opposition was a Khomeini creation, sympathetic to, if not affiliated with, the Soviet Union, which would immediately dissipate without his presence.

The other view not represented within the dominant position was more Complex in nature. This view rejected any supposed connection between the unrest in Iran and actions of the Soviet Union. As to Iran, the opposition was seen as representative of large numbers of Iranian citizens expressing legitimate grievances against a corrupt and illegitimate regime. Their power was seen as significant and their goals reasonable. It was also argued that the United States should accept this instance of mass politics and begin to make efforts to build ties to this movement.

Finally, in the Algeria case, splits were evident within the presidential elite as to how to understand events in Algeria. Here the split appeared to follow overlapping generational and status lines. At the working level of government, the political events in Algeria were perceived as expressions of societal frustration with an inefficient and corrupt political system. The strength of the FIS was seen as, in part, arising from its ability to articulate the
feelings of large numbers of Algerians. At this level, there was a willingness to accept the FIS as part of the reforming Algerian political system and even a willingness to have it win and control Algerian politics. This scenario was not necessarily greeted with enthusiasm but there was no move to deny such a course.

With the January coup, policy making shifted away from the working level and up to the policy level as some response was deemed necessary. Reportedly, decision makers at this level were far less comfortable with the FIS and the possibility of its coming to power. The motives of the FIS were questioned as sincere and it was seen as a fringe element without significant popular support, likely being a front organization for Iran.

The lack of attention to the on-going crisis in Algeria since its outbreak in 1988 indicates that high level policy makers were unconcerned about events in Algeria. That is, they saw neither a threat nor an opportunity to American interests in this case. When the coup took place and a response was called for misgivings about the FIS led to a weak condemnation and virtually no political sanctions.

The unwillingness to take action moves the image away from the Extreme pole. The fact that Algeria did not remain a policy concern again demonstrates the low stakes perceived at risk in the case. Overall, we see two positions both near the Complex pole. The actual decision on how to respond to
the coup indicates a move by the policy making level towards a more Moderate Imperial image. The complete lack of a Russian connection in all this indicates a Complex view of Russia on this matter.

American Political Behavior in Each Case

In the Iraqi-Lebanese case, American behavior in this dual crisis was to intervene in the Lebanese civil war as a means of protecting the Chamoun government but more importantly as a signal of American resolve to stand by its allies in the face of what was perceived as a region-wide assault on pro-western governments by a Moscow-Cairo axis.

This policy response is indicative of a perceived opportunity to demonstrate American power and will. Acting to counter a perceived threat from the Soviet Union working through its local surrogate, Nasser, an opportunity was viewed in Lebanon to confront and negate the sources of domestic unrest. Reflective of a more Extreme image, the questionable utility of using military intervention to counter domestic social unrest did not deter this action.

During the Iranian Revolution, despite conflicting opinions within the presidential elite, American behavior was to provide statements of support for the Shah as a means of urging him towards more forceful action against the opposition, along with some unspecified political reforms. Overt intervention does not appear to have been seriously
considered by most participants, with Brzezinski perhaps being a notable exception.

The lack of action in this situation tends to indicate that the participants did not feel a particularly strong sense of either threat or opportunity. However, the repeated statements of support for the Shah to counter this unrest indicates a belief that a simple use of force, perhaps followed by economic and political reform, would be sufficient to meet this challenge. A more complex interpretation would have recognized the futility of such stop-gap measures and instead recommended a more immediate and fundamental alteration of the Iranian system. In splitting the difference between intervention to save the Shah and abandoning him entirely, the policy of overt diplomatic support indicates a moderate image.

In the Algerian case what was most striking was the notable lack of attention and action on the part of the American policy makers to the growing crisis in Algeria. Clearly, in the initial stages of the Islamist challenge in Algeria, policy makers did not consider the situation as constituting either a source of threat or opportunity. The relatively weak American response to the Algerian military's intervention in January also would tend to indicate a lack of perceived threat or opportunity in the situation. This derives from the fact that American interests were not seen as sufficiently at stake in this crisis to warrant strong
action in support of either side. Overall, a Complex prevailing view is indicated.

**Hypotheses**

Given these images of the other actors, how well have the various hypotheses and questions which motivated this study been borne out through the case studies? That is, is there evidence of a relationship between differential types of images and the group decision making process and the policy preferences of the policy makers? I deal with the hypotheses in reverse order, starting with the more specific hypothesis on group composition and then moving on to the other hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 3:** As the level of perceived threat and/or opportunity is increased for an individual, there is a corresponding decrease in that person's tolerance of contrary positions in the decision making group. This will lead to a heightened utilization of strategies designed to restructure the decision making process in ways that limit the influence of contrary positions.

Overall, this hypothesis was well supported in the case studies, though a few possibly anomalous results can be noted.

In the Iraqi-Lebanese case, the dominant view was Extreme regarding both the Soviet Union and Lebanon. The
expectation then is that more Complex views will be subject to strategic manipulations of the group's composition. The high degree of consensus among the decision makers makes it somewhat difficult to identify strategic manipulations. However, there were two ways in which group membership was shaped during the decision making process, both relating to when the actual decision was made.

The first was that the National Security Council was not utilized in the decision making process. The case shows that the actual decision to intervene in Lebanon was made, after the NSC had met on July 14, by a smaller and select group of actors all of whom had views similar to Eisenhower. Once this decision had been made, a second manipulation took place. A congressional delegation was called to the White House to consult with Eisenhower and his advisers. The delegation contained a number of officials with a more Complex viewpoint on the question of whether the United States should intervene in Lebanon. Eisenhower told this group that no decision had yet been made. However, anticipating that there would be contrary positions among this delegation, the decision had already been reached thereby effectively excluding these views from the process.

The evidence in the Iranian case was more clear cut. Interestingly, in this case the more extreme viewpoint was not the dominant one nor was the complex viewpoint. Both were in the minority and struggled to have their opinion
count. In this struggle for influence with the majority position, as ill-defined as it was, the more extreme viewpoint, characteristic of Brzezinski and those around him, attempted to reduce, if not remove, the influence of the complex position, most forcefully argued by Henry Precht in the State Department and Ambassador William Sullivan in Tehran.

Over the course of the crisis, Brzezinski was able to reduce the influence of these two actors. As Precht became more and more convinced of the vulnerability of the Shah and the need for the United States to begin to consider an Iran without him, he also found it increasingly difficult to find forums in which he could express this view. With Carter increasingly preoccupied by Camp David, Brzezinski found himself with even greater control over the policy making structures. Using his ability to control the agenda and the guest list, Precht was simply no longer invited to meetings on Iran, despite being the State Department officer tasked with monitoring events in that country.

Ambassador Sullivan, stationed in Iran, was not susceptible to physical exclusion as was Precht. However, there were other means of limiting his influence in decision making circles. Two primary strategies were employed. The first was to mount a campaign aimed at destroying Sullivan's credibility with Carter. Sullivan was portrayed to the President as a renegade, unwilling to follow policy, and
contemptuous of Washington. As the revolution unfolded such contempt was clearly obvious but in large part it was a reaction to the inability of Sullivan to have his voice carry any weight.

Once Sullivan was labeled as insubordinate, he was further removed from the decision making through the use of alternate sources of information. This meant that Sullivan's views were given less weight as other information channels, promoted by Brzezinski, were utilized. Specifically, the use of the "back channel" communications between Brzezinski and the Iranian ambassador to Washington, Zahedi, and the Huyser mission were means designed to bypass Sullivan as a player in the decision making process.

The record for the Algerian case was a bit less clear. There was a slight split among the potential policy makers regarding the appropriate response to the January coup. And, there was some feeling among the working level officials of the government that they were not adequately consulted on what American policy should be. However, it is difficult to categorize this as strategic manipulation as evidenced, perhaps, in 1958 and, definitely, in 1978-79.

The key difference here is that working level officials do not normally act as policy makers, therefore their exclusion may not reflect deliberate strategy on the part of higher levels. Instead this may simply be a case where policy makers believed that a policy statement was necessary,
despite Algeria being a low priority issue, and acted on their own. The feeling among some of the working level officials that they were removed from the policy process may also be a reflection of a general feeling that their views are underutilized by higher-ups, with no real connection to strategic manipulation of the group's composition.

This being the case, we do not see unambiguous examples of strategic manipulation of group composition in the Algeria case. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis, since we also do not see extreme images in this case. Without this extremity of opinion, tolerance for diversity should be the norm.

To be convincing, this hypothesis should also work the other way. That is, there should not be instances where more Complex actors were intolerant of others and acted to remove them from the group. How well is this alternative formulation of the hypothesis supported?

Again, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis. One searches the cases in vain for examples of strategic manipulation of the group by more Complex actors. One possible case would be the number of leaks made to the press during the Iran case, which may have been an attempt to undercut Brzezinski's position by subjecting it to critical public attention. While plausible, there is no direct evidence that shows that it was Precht or like-minded individuals who made these leaks.
The other possible example of strategic inclusion was the bringing in of George Ball into the policy process in December of 1978. Ball quickly took a position at odds with the majority opinion and the minority opinion of Brzezinski. The problem is that Ball was not brought into the picture by a disgruntled minority seeking to alter the group in self-serving ways. Ball was, in fact, suggested as an outside analyst by the Secretary of the Treasury, W. Michael Blumenthal (Sick, 1985, p. 103), whose own position was reflective of the majority.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals holding an Extreme Enemy view of the Soviet Union will be more likely to hold an Extreme Imperial view of the affected Middle Eastern state.

This hypothesis attempted to ascertain whether there was a correspondence between a person's view of the global rival, the Soviet Union/Russia, and their view of mass politics in the regional context. This was an effort at determining whether the view of the regional actor was derivative of perceived threat from the global rival.

On the surface, these three case studies, taken from different periods in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, do appear to show a connection between these two images. In examining the correlation of image of the Soviets and image of the regional actor, there appears to be a correspondence between these images at the extreme level. That is, there is a
tendency for extreme views of the Great Power enemy to coexist with extreme views of the Child regional actor.

Thus, in the Cold War period of the 1950's, the actors with Extreme Enemy views of the Soviets also have an Extreme Child view of Lebanon. In the Iranian case, during a lessened period of U.S.-Soviet rivalry, only those with an Extreme Enemy view of the Soviets also have an Extreme Child view of Iran. Others with more Moderate or Complex views of one of these actors, has a similar view of the other. Finally, in the post Cold War period, the actors had Complex views of both actors.

Based solely on the evidence at the presidential level, there would appear to be a direct connection between the nature of the view of the Soviets and that of the state experiencing mass politics. However, such a simple one-to-one relationship does not hold if we move to the policy elite level. In examining the nature of views at this level, it is possible to still see Extreme views of the regional state without any perceived threat from the Soviet Union, especially during the Iranian and Algerian cases.

This seemingly contradictory finding is neither surprising nor contrary to the hypothesis. It also may be a disturbing omen of future American policy towards mass politics in the region.

The answer to this puzzle lies in the fact that there are multiple interests which people may see as being
threatened in the regional state due to mass politics. The correspondence of these views during the existence of the Soviet Union may have reflected a legitimate fear of Soviet expansion leading to an image of the regional state which allowed forceful action. However, this correspondence, for others, may have been more strategic as it was common, and perhaps more politically acceptable, to invoke the Soviet threat even where it was not seen as applicable. Through the use of the Soviet specter other, more truly felt, interests could be protected.

The problem was that this ability to make use of the Soviet bogeyman, was rendered ineffective by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but really as early as 1989. Having lost this convenient cover, the defense and promotion of interests was forced to be more up front. The result was the separation, for some, of their views of the global threat from the regional situation. Thus, for example, a perceived threat to Israel from the growth of Islamism could lead to an extreme view of the regional state, in order to take actions to counter Islamist gains, without a corresponding extreme view of the Russians.

The implication of this finding is that hopes that the United States may become more accepting of mass politics as a result of changes in the Great Power relationship may be disappointed as other interests may continue to lead to policy preferences hostile to empowerment. I will return to
the future of American policy towards empowerment in the epilogue.

**Hypothesis 1:** As elite images move toward imperial patterns, U.S. foreign policy will oppose popular empowerment and act to defend sitting governments. In the imperial image, nationalism is not recognized as a factor complicating U.S. involvement. Consequently, as the perceptions of top policy makers move in this direction, U.S. policy will become more hostile to empowerment and will intervene against it.

In the three case studies, American policy was in the direction of supporting sitting governments that were being challenged by mass political behavior by an empowered population. This aspect of American policy was constant across the cases. Where the policy response differed among the cases was in the degree to which the United States took action in support of this government.

Along this dimension we do see differential effects. In the Lebanese case overt action in Iraq was considered but rejected as impossible given the lack of a group to support. However, based on the belief that action in Lebanon constituted a response to unrest in Baghdad, the Eisenhower administration did take overt military action to safeguard the regime in Beirut.

In the Iranian case, the dominant image among the policy makers was Imperial but at a more moderate level. The challenge posed by the opposition was seen as real and multi-
faceted, but this was combined with the belief that American action was not necessary as the Shah would be able to meet the threat and reassert control. To facilitate this outcome, continuous statements of American support for the Shah were voiced. As another part of this strategy of supporting the Shah, the dominant position also rejected suggestions that meetings take place with the Ayatollah Khomeini until very late in the game and even then only at relatively low levels.

More Extreme Imperial views advocated stronger actions to support the Shah including possible military intervention and the assassination of Khomeini. More Complex images were unwilling to accept the continuation of the Shah and in fact tried to find ways to open links to the empowered groups under Khomeini's leadership.

Finally, in 1992, the choice of whom to support, if anyone, was made a little less clear due to the fact that the incumbent regime of Algeria had been removed. This left two main political groupings, the FIS and the military. As predicted the lack of strong Imperial images in this case led the United States to be unwilling to strongly support either side. The best that the United States would do was to first issue a statement calling the coup consistent with the Algerian constitution and then to rescind this statement the next day to declare American impartiality on the issue of the legality of the coup.
Overall, as Images moved from Extreme Imperial towards Complex, we do see a concurrent declining interest in, and advocacy of, overt support for regimes challenged by empowered groups.

A Motivational Interpretation for American Foreign Policy Towards Empowerment

To return then to the original question which drove this thesis, what motivated America's policy in the Middle East towards cases of empowerment over the last fifty years?

In the Iraqi/Lebanese case, a number of motives were evident among the policy and presidential elites. The most dominant motives appear to have been defense and prestige. A strong element in the argumentation for intervention was the perceived need to act forcefully in order to protect America's image of strength and support for allies. This was argued as necessary to halt a potential domino effect in the Middle East which would only be to the benefit of the Soviets and Nasser. Inherent in such arguments were concerns over particular interests that were seen as warranting intervention. Three interests seem particularly relevant in this case.

The first is the previously mentioned concern that American acquiescence to events in Lebanon would lead to the loss of the rest of the Middle East, as American allies under pressure from domestic Arab nationalism would succumb to such
pressures because of a fear that the United States would not act to protect them. Within the presidential elite, this motive was combined with a perceived connection between Arab nationalism and communism. Thus the global battle against the Soviets required that Nasser be repressed. The motive of anti-Sovietism was quite clear in this case.

Others saw less of a direct Soviet threat to the region but still advocated American intervention. Here, the motive was a desire to keep the Soviets out and Nasser restrained due to fears about the possible loss of oil access, not only to the United States but, more importantly, to American allies in western Europe. Secretary Dulles, for example, interpreted what he saw as Nasserite expansionism in Lebanon as a first step towards gaining control over oil supplies. The desire to intervene in this interest was strengthened by the delivery of a Saudi telegram on July 14, which warned that the coup in Iraq necessitated a western response lest the western powers be removed from the region.

A final motive, not evident at the presidential level but which was prevalent at the policy elite level, was the need to face Nasser down as a means of protecting Israel. Major Jewish organizations and their political supporters urged a firm stand against Arab nationalism and, hence, Nasser.

In this case we saw a conjunction of interests all of which argued for a firm response in Lebanon, though for
different reasons. Such a confluence of interests allowed for the high degree of consensus evident in the decision making process. Those seeing a Soviet threat found support for their desired course of action from those concerned over access to oil and the protection of Israel.

Other interests, such as support for self-determination, democracy, and good relations with Arab nationalism as a bulwark against communism, did not influence the decision making process. When actors attempted to express such positions, they were ignored or provided little access to decision making.

This concurrence of opinion among the vast majority of actors implies that role or bureaucratic factors had little effect in the determination of an actor's policy preference.

In the case of Iran this convergence of interests began to break down leading to more divergent policy recommendations. For some actors the old Cold War consensus still held and in this conviction they were supported by interests in oil and, perhaps Israel. However, this overlapping of interests did not hold for all officials. For the majority of the actors in the case, these specific motives were of a lesser relevance with the motive of proper relations and liberalization playing a slightly greater role. It is interesting to note that these divisions for the most part also reflected a difference of opinion between State and the Department of Defense and the National Security Council.
Reminiscent of the Eisenhower period was the tough line advocated by Brzezinski in the NSC and among Defense officials such as Secretary Brown, Assistant Secretary Duncan, and General Huyser. Emphasizing motives of anti-Sovietism and a concern for oil resources, this group pressed for vigorous support of the Shah. However, this support was not solely predicated upon the continuance of the Shah. For example, the Huyser mission was an effort to organize a military coup if the Shah should waver.

For Carter and those of the majority group a different set of motives was operating. While maintenance of the Shah was preferable, it was not seen as imperative. Other than this, this group appears to have had a hard time defining what goals and interests it saw at stake in the crisis. The Soviets were not seen as players in the crisis and few substantive threats were perceived to oil or Israel. At the same time, this group was unwilling to consider overtures to the Khomeini camp. Perhaps their previous support for human rights and liberalization made it hard to take a firm stand behind the Shah.

It is also intriguing that the actors in this group came mainly from State. This may be reflective of bureaucratic norms which favor diplomacy and good relations as opposed to the more action oriented nature of Defense.1 Officials in the

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1 Many members of the first group have sought to explain the downfall of the Shah and hence America's position in Iran as arising out of the supposed weak support given to the Shah due to diplomatic niceties (see Brzezinski, 1983 for example).
first group may also have been motivated by a desire to maintain the close and profitable relations between the American and Iranian militaries.

The final group, which advocated a rapid move away from the Shah and the establishment of working relations with the Khomeini camp, was essentially identical to the second group in terms of perceptions and motives. They saw few threats arising from the Khomeini camp and were more interested in liberalization and good future relations. Their difference with the second group was one of degree. They also were more adamant in their view that the Shah was a lost cause who should be abandoned. Bureaucratically, it is interesting to note that these were also the people most involved with the day to day monitoring of Iran, that is, the ambassador and the Department of State desk officer.

In the case of Algeria, what was most notable was the relative absence of strong motives among the actors. In this period, the Soviet Union was collapsing, Israel was not involved and American oil interests in the Gulf were not likely to be affected. In such an environment, other interests dominated the process, at least early on. Significant among these was the interest in examining the possibility of Islamist participation in a freely contested election. In this sense, Algeria was often pictured as a "test case" of the compatibility of Islam and democracy.
As the second round of elections neared, and then with the coup, a new set of motives entered the process as new actors turned their attention to the case. Some officials argued that the weak official response of the American government to the coup represented a certain acceptance of the coup. This weak response was attributed to an uneasiness on the part of certain policy makers to the idea of Islamic governance.

Historically then, a number of motives have driven policy preferences for American policy makers when confronted with instances of empowerment. In the cases examined here, fear of the Soviet Union and the protection of oil resources have been central. Concerns over Israel, political liberalization, and Islamism are also evident, though to a lesser extent and not in all periods.

In the Iraqi-Lebanese case perceived threat to many of these interests prompted a policy of confrontation with empowerment, leading to American intervention. With time this Cold War consensus has broken down. This means that the number of actors seeing high threat to these various interests has declined. Increasingly policy makers have not seen empowerment as an inherent threat to valued interests. Significant as well is that the convergence of interests which generated widespread support for a particular policy has also weakened. Within the policy making community the presence of conflicts and value trade-offs between
alternatives is increasingly recognized making agreement among various positions more difficult.

Overall, American policy has been to reject empowerment in countries allied to the United States. In the height of the Cold War it was not conceptually possible for most American policy makers to separate regional events, such as mass politics, from the on-going global competition with the Soviet Union. While American policy may have been to reject such movements, this was derived from an overall defensive policy rather than an effort at imperial control in the Middle East for its own sake.

As the threat from the Soviet Union has diminished, there has been less and less of an automatic rejection of mass politics by the United States in the region. Instead a more active policy debate has arisen as other motives now are argued within the policy process without the unifying interest of containing the Soviet Union. The process is likely to be much more divisive as a result. This could also make intervention increasingly unlikely as fewer interests are seen as threatened and those that are now must compete for policy dominance.²

² This may not be the case, however. It could be argued that the recent peace accord between the Israelis and the Palestinians could serve as a bridge between those favoring close ties to Israel and those wishing to protect the American position in the oil industry.
Lessons and Conclusions

For the Study of Institutions

The results of this study contain important implications for how we, as academics, view the relationship between institutions and individuals and between some of the more dominant theoretical paradigms in the field of foreign policy research.

A common assumption in the literature has been that when individuals are placed in an institutional setting their perceptions are shaped in meaningful ways by this experience. For example, the notion of accepting the norms of the institution as one's own is well established. In this conception the direction of influence is mainly unidirectional, that is, individuals enter the institution and then are affected by the dominant norms and beliefs of the institution. This study has sought to reverse the causal arrow and examine whether institutions are affected by the ideas and perceptions which the actors bring into the institution.

What the cases demonstrate is an effort by certain individuals to alter the structure of the decision making institution so that it is more conducive to promoting a desired outcome. Success in this endeavor is by no means assured as questions of status, position, and power all interact to further shape the process. However, the potential for failure does not lessen the significance of
this effort at shaping the institution. It appears that the relationship between individuals and institutions is in many ways interactive and reciprocal.

This study may also have some implications for how the rational choice and decision making paradigms may be integrated. In chapter one an effort was made to show the difficulty in applying rational choice type logic to a study of decision making towards empowerment. The difficulty was in precisely and validly specifying what were the interests and utilities being maximized by the actors. Often, this vital component of the rational choice approach is left to casual assertions based on weak empirical foundations. While this is a serious issue it need not be a fatal one.

What is needed is to empirically identify the specific interests and motives of the actors who are part of the decision making process. This is where a decision making approach, such as that used in this study, can prove useful. This approach views interests and motives as variables to be empirically identified rather than asserted. In this way, the two approaches can be integrated to some degree. Questions as to the validity of the rational choice view of process still remain, but in meaningful ways this intersection of the two approaches assists researchers in more accurately specifying vital sub components. Therefore, rather than seeing rational choice and decision making
approaches as competing paradigms, a more fruitful task may be to seek methods of further integrating the two approaches.

For U.S. Policy-making Procedure

An underlying argument of this thesis has been that the utility of the decision making process is diminished in cases where plausible alternative positions on policy are not presented fully or adequately due to the strategic manipulation of the decision making process by motivated actors. While a different, or better, policy may not have emerged from a more inclusive and tolerant process, it is hard to imagine that such a process would be damaging either.

The counterfactual argument is that, perhaps, by giving greater access and attention to alternative positions, American policy could have been shaped in ways that would have lead to an improved American position in the Middle East. For example, Nasser could have been more vigorously courted by the United States and thus heightened American influence within the Arab nationalist movement. Of course, such a move, while potentially useful in containing the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East, would, however, only have been possible if other interests, such as supporting Israel, were not also being pursued. Or, the Khomeini coalition could have been treated more receptively perhaps influencing the constellation of leaders in the post-Shah period. Finally, the United States may have been more
supportive of Islamists in the Algerian electoral process, thereby placing itself on the side of democracy and popular rule in the perceptions of regional actors, rather than being identified with what are seen locally as corrupt and illegitimate regimes.

Such outcomes are, of course, speculation and are no more likely to have occurred than other, more negative, outcomes. However, the possibility that such alternative outcomes may have been influenced by American policy requires some comment on how the American policy process could be reshaped to facilitate a more thoughtful decision.

A possible reform, which has long-standing roots in the literature, is the suggestion that policy makers be trained to more explicitly examine the underlying assumptions and beliefs that they hold about an issue or actor. Bringing out the perceptual bases of policy prescription has been argued as a means to facilitate debate over what it is that really divides actors. It is hard to argue against such a proposal. It is intuitively obvious that the more actors can identify the root causes of policy differences, the more fruitful policy debate will be. However, such introspection is difficult, subject to numerous biases and is unlikely to occur at all. Such reflection is not natural to most individuals, and if done, is likely to be interpreted in benign self-serving ways. In fact, such self-serving
attribution is a key underlying component of the image theory utilized in this thesis.

Furthermore, simply acknowledging the bases of differences does not guarantee that resolution is possible. Having greater knowledge about what is taking place does not inevitably translate into resolution.

Other reforms have been suggested focusing on structural changes to the process, such as the ideas of the "devil's advocate" or "multiple advocacy" (George, 1980). Such reforms center on the idea that too often in the process alternatives to a common view are not aired leading to an overly restricted debate on policy (Janis, 1972). The suggested solution then is to make an explicit part of the structure the presence of actors to argue against the dominant policy and present alternatives to that policy choice.

Such suggestions suffer from a common shortcoming. That is, the person serving as the advocate of an alternative position may not be committed to that position. If that is the case, it is unlikely that he or she will argue forcefully for that position. More importantly, if the other actors are aware that this person is being critical out of duty and not conviction, it will be easy to discount their objections. Such advocates may also be seen as imaginative people good at constructing counter positions but without bureaucratic
support. In sum, while alternatives may be presented through these strategies, their impact may be slight.

I suggest a slight modification of the multiple advocacy position, adding the requirement that such advocacy be done by those who actually hold the alternate position. Conviction for the position being argued will likely increase the quality of the argumentation. Also by having actual representatives of alternative positions present, even if only as advisors and advocates not as policy makers, the decision makers will be forced to note that there is an actual policy debate within the government, rather than simply seeing the devil's advocate as a clever person who can create contrary positions, but that lack backing.

To make such a system of competing advocacy feasible the types of strategies and communication pressures described in this thesis need to be rejected. Bureaucratic gamesmanship would need to be removed from the process. There would also be a need to monitor the process and structure very carefully to make sure that alternatives are noted and brought into the process. Finally, there would need to be a commitment on the part of policy makers to such a structure. Failure by those in authority to accept the modified system will surely condemn it.
Caveats

Some limitations of this study should finally be noted. The first is that this study does not purport to explain the totality of the decision making process. The success or failure of these strategies of bureaucratic gamesmanship plus the final decision output of the group are both affected by a number of variables, such as status, group cohesion, and external influences, that are not covered in this study. For example, efforts at exclusion may be unsuccessful because of alliances within the decision making group. What I have examined is the extent to which these strategies tend to be used and to determine whether their use is a function of perceptual differences among the participants.

A second, and related, caveat is that power differences among the group members have not been incorporated into this thesis. For example, what happens to the process when power within the group is diffused, that is, when a deviant is someone who must be included?. Or when power is concentrated, that is, only certain individuals really matter? Clearly, power distribution acts as an intervening variable. The question for future consideration is how do differences in the power distribution affect the process of strategic group composition manipulation?

The lack of a sufficient number of cases makes definitive statements impossible. However, it could be posited, as an initial hypothesis, that power distribution
within the group affects the strategies available to the committed thinker. Strategies of exclusion; the use of non-meetings; and off-line papers would not be possible because of the need to keep valuable deviants involved. However, their power and influence could be diminished through strategies of inclusion; discrediting; leaks, and various communication strategies.
A central premise of this thesis has been that empowerment will continue to be a prominent feature in Middle Eastern politics. A second premise has been that the removal of the Cold War competition may have affected the combination and intensity of American interests in the region. If these premises are accurate, and recent events have done little to show them to be false, then perhaps the time has come for a reappraisal of American policy in the region.

After a quick review of American policy towards empowerment in the Middle East historically, I will turn to a more specific discussion of recent policy and then conclude with some possible alternative stances for the United States as it tries to construct policy on this issue.

**U.S. Policy Towards Empowerment in the Middle East**

**The Cold War Period**

During the height of the East-West conflict the existence of popular sovereignty in the Middle East was recognized by most policy makers, but when policy choices based on this recognition came into perceived conflict with
the interests of the broader geo-political competition with Moscow then the latter interests took precedence.

Internal value trade-offs contained in this mix of interests were not recognized, for the most part, because of a convergence of global and regional interests. As a result, American policy was to reject popular sovereignty in the Middle East as it was portrayed as being susceptible to, if not instigated by, Soviet adventurism. American alliance patterns reflected these concerns and were thus based on the logic of supporting and preserving staunch anti-communists and bolstering their domestic stability. The risk of alienating popular movements was recognized but deemed acceptable given these larger interests.

Détente

With the lessening of East-West tensions the idea of an aggressive Soviet Union, actively seeking to foment unrest in the Middle East, was much less widely accepted among the policy and presidential elites. Still, a preference for the status quo remained, especially if the local Middle Eastern elites were either moderate on Israel or oil pricing policy.

Domestic agitation for political change was interpreted as a relevant social and political concern but was not considered a particularly worrisome issue for the United States. While the potential for political change was now recognized as arising out of socio-economic and political
frustrations, and less due to Soviet instigation, the social sectors traditionally monitored for such activity, such as communists and intellectuals, were not seen as being strong enough to constitute a serious challenge to friendly allies.

There thus existed a certain blindness to the idea of empowerment and political agitation being led by the right, that is, from the religious community. This made American policy makers slow to see the strength of the opposition in Iran. It also left the United States with no coherent strategy for dealing with such a challenge. The idea that religion could serve as a viable organizing set of symbols was given little credence.

Policy, while increasingly cognizant of domestic factors, still was mainly status quo in orientation. A more vigorous debate over the direction of American policy was now evident but policy still exhibited a preference for traditional alliance patterns and political behavior. The main difference from the past was the breakdown of the Cold War consensus based on a convergence of interests.

Post Cold War Period

With the success of the Iranian Revolution, the scenario of Islamist empowerment entered into the active consideration of policy makers on the Middle East. However, this awareness of a source of potential future political challenges did not translate either into a greater acceptance of such movements
or a coherent agreed upon strategy for dealing with their development. In the absence of a plan to deal with political empowerment led by the Islamists, American policy for the 1980's continued with a preference for traditional alliance partners in spite of growing evidence that these regimes were increasingly unpopular with their own populations.

While American behavior still reflected a preference for established regimes with historical ties to the United States, this surface unanimity belied a more contentious policy process based on the breakdown of the Cold War consensus.

American policy towards empowerment has changed rhetorically in the 1990's, though the case of Algeria may indicate that this may not yet be the case at the operational level. Overlaying the traditional, and often unstated, interests of the security of Israel and the protection of oil accessibility a growing theme among the American elites has been support for democratization. This advocacy was often hard to put into practice as it tended to be seen as critical of long-time American friends in the region.

Subsequent policy statements from the presidential elite in the aftermath of the Algerian experience and the Gulf War have sought to defuse critiques that the United States is anti-Islam or anti-democratic. An effort has been made to distinguish between the religion and those groups which are extremist in nature and use Islam as an organizing set of
symbols. A further effort has been made to demonstrate American approval of democracy but only in those cases where it is felt that the democratic process will be maintained and respected by the participants.

U.S. Policy Since Algeria

Recovering from the unexpected events in Algeria, American policy makers turned to the question of how to deal with the new regime in Algiers. While some may have welcomed the intervention of the army as a way to keep the Islamists from power, there was little enthusiasm for the creation of a military dominated government either.

American policy towards Algeria has thus been to use what little resources and leverage are available, mainly in the form of moral suasion, to institute both economic and political reform to break the cycle of economic frustration leading to political instability. The new strategy has been to promote economic growth and rationalization along with a more open and participatory political system. Yet, as two State Department officials separately clarified the policy, at the same time there was also a perceived need to make sure that this process was not so open that the result was a transition from one authoritarian regime to another (interviews with the author, 6/4/93 and 6/7/93).

Such a policy of gentle persuasion may also have some costs however. As one analyst in the Department of State put
it, U.S. acceptance of the coup and continued relations with the military government in Algeria may lead to a more militant and radicalized FIS. By refusing to condone a political process in the Middle East that Washington supposedly supports world-wide, the United States may be seen as hypocritical. This perception may then lead newly empowered groups to reject the democratic process and instead turn to violence as the only means to oust what they see as illegitimate governments. Frustration on the part of these groups may thus lead them to engage in the very practices that American policy hopes to avoid (interview with the author, 6/4/93). There is a clear recognition of the possibility of self-fulfilling prophecies on this issue.

In the wake of the Algerian experience, and to counter criticisms of hypocrisy, an effort was made to more explicitly state American policy on the rise of Islamism in the Middle East. The point person on this has been Edward P. Djerejian, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

The new policy was laid out in a speech a few months after the Algerian coup. In the Meridian House speech, Djerejian stated that "if there is one thought I can leave you with tonight, it is that the US government does not view Islam as the next 'ism' confronting the West or threatening world peace...The Cold War is not being replaced with a new competition between Islam and the West."
Djerejian stressed that Islam, as a religion, is a "historic civilizing force" with a rich tradition of culture, arts, sciences, and tolerance. He also noted that the use of Islam as a vehicle for legitimate social grievances was acceptable to the United States. "In countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa, we thus see groups or movements seeking to reform their societies in keeping with Islamic ideals...We detect no monolithic or coordinated international effort behind these movements."

As part of this policy, Djerejian pledged that the United States was "committed to encouraging greater openness and responsiveness of political systems throughout the world. I am not talking here about trying to impose an American model on others. Each country must work out in accordance with its own traditions, history, and particular circumstances, how and at what pace to broaden political participation."

However, this support of the democratic process was not absolute. Djerejian clarified that the United States supported political participation but was suspect of those who may use this process to destroy it and retain power and dominance. He reduced this to the simple formula of "While we believe in the principle of 'one person, one vote,' we do not support 'one person, one vote, one time.'"

In his summation, Djerejian reiterated that "simply stated, religion is not a determinant--positive or negative--
in the nature or quality of our relations with other countries. Our quarrel is with extremism and the violence, denial, intolerance, coercion, and terror which too often accompany it."¹

The degree to which the Clinton administration has internalized the tolerance of Islamists in the political future of the Middle East is still somewhat unclear, however. In May of 1993, Martin Indyk, Special Assistant to the President and in charge of Middle Eastern Affairs for the National Security Council, gave an address at the Washington Institute which seemingly ran counter to the policy line advanced by Djerejian. In this speech Indyk sought to lay out the Clinton administration's position on the strategic balance in the Middle East and on the Arab-Israeli peace process. In addition to the "dual containment" of Iran and Iraq and "seizing the moment" in the peace process, Indyk also gave some mention to empowerment in the Middle East.²

Indyk stated that "decades of neglect and dashed hopes for political participation and social justice have nurtured some violent movements cloaked in religious garb that have begun to challenge governments across the Arab world with the potential of destabilizing the region." Indyk acknowledged that not all such movements were violent, but he appeared


² Indyk is also the former director of the AIPAC-affiliated Washington Instate for Near East Policy.
unwilling to consider them as potential players in the political system. He argued that an "alternative vision of democratic political development" should be held out to the peoples of the Middle East, implying that Islamism may not be compatible with this vision. He also indicated the answer to the question of whom to support in empowerment challenges by stating that "success in both realms [dual containment and the peace process] will affect our ability to help friendly governments create a better life for their peoples than that offered by proponents of violence [the Islamists].³

Both of these statements are hobbled by the common weakness that they fail to state American policy and behavior prior to an examination of the specific case. Such statements are beneficial in that they preserve some level of flexibility on the part of American policy. However, this very flexibility leaves the policy open to interpretation and, hence, manipulation. Regional actors, on the other hand, may not be convinced of the sincerity of the policy and thus react suspiciously to American initiatives.

Policy Future

The dilemma between verbal support for a democratic process while limiting this support to only certain types of

actors remains a troublesome diplomatic issue for the United States.

Professions of support for democracy by Washington may directly and indirectly promote groups in these societies that do not meet expectations as to what a loyal opposition should look like. However, efforts to control such popular expressions may prove futile and precious time may be lost waiting vainly for "silent majorities" and "third forces" to emerge.

The trouble is that an unwillingness to accept the types of actors that do emerge, and continued support for repressive, illegitimate regimes, will make the United States appear hypocritical in its professed support for democracy. Subsequent repression by regional states with American acquiescence may convince populist empowerment movements that democracy is not possible in the Middle East. The result may then be a radicalization of such movements leading to the very sort of extremism that was feared.

The question then is, given this situation, should American policy be modified? It appears that some type of policy clarification is needed. The issue of popular empowerment does not appear likely to disappear from the political landscape of the Middle East, as empowerment is an outgrowth of some of the very goals that states seek. If the question is not whether or not empowerment should be allowed
at all, then the next question should be how should policy towards it be directed.

Policy Alternatives

If empowerment is accepted as an on-going aspect of Middle Eastern political life with potentially strong effects on a multitude of perceived America interests in the region, then there is a need to consider what U.S. policy should be towards this phenomena.

Numerous options are available, some more viable than others, none of which are risk free.

1. The United States should encourage friendly governments to repress empowerment movements while simultaneously providing economic aid and urging a slow movement towards a more participant structure. While long term liberalization is desired, short term interests are argued to demand an emphasis on order and stability. This is essentially the type of policy advanced by Samuel Huntington in his critique of modernization theory (1968).

Such a policy would demonstrate a preference for current regimes and the maintenance of the status quo in the region, even if this occurs at the expense of liberal democratic principles. In this policy strategy, American behavior should be designed to maintain in power those regimes with which the United States is seen as having common interests.
This strategy is still possible in the region, at least in the short run. As evidenced by Syria in 1982 and Algeria in 1992, for example, state coercion does remain a viable strategy for dealing with challenges to state authority. The main benefit of this strategy would be a more certain world, at least for the short term, as familiar leaders would remain and uncertain political forces would be denied, at least legitimate, political expression.

The potential problems of this strategy are many. For one, expressions of support for democratic processes would be a certain victim of this strategy. While there may be a loss of support for the United States as a result, this may be offset by removing the cause of the charge that the United States is hypocritical.

Allowing state coercion may breed radicalism internally and anti-westernism externally as the United States is equated with local, unpopular leaders. The ability of the United States to work with such groups in the future would be minimal.

A reliance upon known leaders, with suspect domestic legitimacy and support, is also problematic. One problem is that a reliance upon the coercive power of these leaders is uncertain. There is a concern over just how long a leader can rely upon coercion as a primary means of enforcing domestic stability before an eroding legitimacy base causes
the whole system to collapse. The case of the Shah should act as a vivid warning sign.

Relatedly, this strategy may also fail because the local leadership refuses to go along. The United States does not control local leaders and the situation may arise where such a leader decides to make concessions to the opposition as a means of defusing and channeling the opposition. At such a point the original policy dilemma is renewed. American efforts at convincing the leader to reverse his course may fall on deaf ears just as would American proclamations of its support for democracy, a stance weakened by previous actions.

2. A less repressive policy stance would be for the United States to favor a continuation of the status quo while encouraging the beginnings of a national dialogue between local governments and oppositions. The goal would be to co-opt and appease moderate elements of the opposition while isolating more extreme elements.

This policy takes as a key assumption that the opposition mainly arises out of economic and political grievances that if met, even incompletely, would serve as an inducement to reject their opposition and work within the system. More extreme and committed oppositionists would thus be exposed as a small sector within the population and would lose support, depriving them of a key element in their drive against the government.
If successful, this policy will remove a lot of the opposition's strength, helping to stabilize the regime. It would also require that the regime give up some degree of political control as it brings more moderate political elements into the system.

However, this policy stance may not be properly targeted. It may not be successful in solving issues of legitimacy and corruption which led many to reject the current government originally.

Finally, the status quo may no longer be viable as a organizing structure for the Middle East. The demands for popular empowerment and political reform have gotten so strong, and the legitimacy of many regimes is so weak, that future efforts at stage-managing these changes may lead to a repetition of the American experience in Iran where precious time was lost because of continued efforts by the Shah and the United States to solve massive social problems with political manipulations.

3. A more radical departure would be for the United States to openly declare its support for the democratic process in the Middle East, encouraging popular participation for all sectors. This strategy is particularly difficult to enact. However, it may also bring some benefits.

If sincerely followed, America may be able to act as a positive force in the democratization of the Middle East. It could use its entrée with current regimes as a lever in the
transition towards more open and participatory regimes. Such a facilitating role would likely bring the United States plaudits from the world community and, more importantly, gratitude on the part of any new power structures. Through this role, the United States could hope to retain some of its influence, though likely at a lower level than currently, in these states. This influence could then be useful in the protection of other American interests in the region.

However, the pitfalls in such a policy are many.

A. The beneficiaries of this policy stance may not be as likely to act as guarantors of American interests.

B. Such a policy may be interpreted as a rejection of current allies, leading to a crisis in America's current relations.

C. A stated commitment to democracy may, as it has in the past, force tough choices when this policy goal conflicts with other interests.

D. Efforts to manage the process may prove difficult to control and, if discovered, may alienate all the parties involved.

4. Finally, there is a hands-off strategy. This policy begins by asking some fundamental questions about America and the Middle East. What American interests are truly involved in these states and even if such interests do exist, are they threatened? And, if such interests are felt to exist, how
much control can the United States exert over the political process in other states?

It may be that the best policy for the United States in the region is no policy at all. An argument increasingly heard is that the United States no longer has interests in the Middle East which warrant an active U.S. policy in the region. Furthermore, there is some concern over how much control the United States has over events in the Middle East even if there were a desire to intervene.

Reviewing the three interests that have so often been cited as those driving American policy in the region (Anti-Sovietism, Israel and oil), there is a body of opinion which maintains that there no longer exist threats to these interests which requires American involvement. According to this view, the collapse of the Soviet empire and the subsequent internal difficulties of the former Soviet republics has essentially removed these actors from the Middle Eastern stage. Israel is increasingly seen as secure not only because of its vast strategic advantage over its neighbors, but also because of the progress, however slow, of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Finally, in terms of oil, the effectiveness of the Arab oil weapon is being increasingly questioned. The near total reliance of the oil exporters on overseas sales to generate needed revenues, their weakness to economic countermeasures, and the fungibility of oil, virtually guarantees that oil will be
accessible from the Middle East in the future, regardless of whom is in power.

Even if this argument is rejected, there is also the point that the United States actually possesses few levers in the region through which to control events in self-serving ways. While we may have economic leverage over some states, such as Israel and Egypt, the vast majority of these states are not so readily open to influence. Economic leverage is also a declining resource due to the decreased willingness of American politicians to expend resources on foreign aid projects, especially in light of a diminished threat from external actors.

The issue of limited American leverage is compounded by the fact that empowerment is essentially a domestic phenomena. American military leverage is still extremely viable from a strategic standpoint. As demonstrated in the Gulf, there is no question that the United States can influence, if not control, events in the Middle East if the vast American arsenal is utilized. However, such power is a marginal asset in empowerment cases. The ability of the United States to inject itself into domestic crises while logistically feasible, is politically untenable. Charges of imperialism and neo-colonialism would make such an action a non-starter.

Such a strategy is also flawed in that the American public would likely give little support to such an action.
More importantly, while the immediate crisis may be defused in this way, the ability of the United States to intervene and then reverse the causal factors for the original challenge must be rated as poor at best.

Finally, the exercise of these few options may only breed resentment both among regional governments and the opposition.

Obviously there is no clear better option as to these policy strategies. That remains a question of interests and beliefs. However, the fact that the choice is difficult does not mean that it should not be made. Two factors argue for a clearer policy direction for the United States on this issue.

1. Some choice needs to be made so that the United States can remove itself from the difficult position of being seen as violating its stated principles.

2. Continuing with the current policy ambiguity is likely to lead to the alienation of all societal actors, leaving the United States with few friends and little influence.
APPENDIX A:
CODEBOOK FOR IDENTIFYING IMAGE OF THE OTHER

Enemy (Extreme)

Motivation

A. Degree of Aggressiveness.

In this stereotype the subject claims that the target state is very aggressive. It is described as actively moving to engineer events and plots and is engaging in every scheme available to it. It is pictured as exercising absolutely no restraint and as using all of its means and regional surrogates for aggressive purposes.

It is not satisfied with the status quo but is seeking further gains for itself by "rolling back" or undermining the position of other countries.

B. Aims.

The subject claims the country is striving for world domination and global supremacy. The notion developed is that the state is actively seeking expansion and new conquests. It is not simply dominating some countries but is "on the move" for more. In the context of regional cases the subject claims that the target is seeking to enhance its regional power and domination.

1 Adapted from Herrmann, 1985.
C. Evilness.

The subject makes a explicit and sharp moral evaluation. The observed country is described as seeking immoral aims and is evil. It is held responsible for continuing violence and turmoil in the world and stoking violence and conflict wherever it can. The subject argues explicitly that conflicts would be resolved and violence would not occur if not for the evil instigation of the target country. Regional causes of conflict and violence are either not mentioned or discounted as minor factors with the primary culpability laid exclusively on the target. The target state is said to stoke violence, turmoil, and divisiveness for its own selfish interests of conquest and domination.

D. Interests.

The subject claims that the observed country is at root driven by only one concern, that is its leaders' thirst for power. The only motives discussed derive from the interests of rulers and their desire for power, wealth, and domination. They are said to be driven to spread their control and enforce their ideology worldwide.

Capability

A. Degree U.S. Strength is Derived from the USSR's Behavior.

The subject argues that weakness or disunity on the part of the USSR and Socialist countries invites U.S. aggression
and expansion. The U.S. will derive strength and the ability to pursue its evil designs if the USSR relaxes its vigilance.

The subject may present essentially the same idea in a more positive formulation. The subject might argue that Soviet strength and socialist unity deprive the U.S. of the ability to pursue expansion and aggression. As long as the USSR is vigilant the U.S. will be incapable of achieving global aspirations.

B. Recognition of Inherent Capability.

The subject describes the U.S. as inherently weak and as incapable of continuing its "adventures" if met by firm resistance. The U.S. is said to have an unpopular government alienated from its citizens and as incapable of rallying them to its cause. The economy is described as on the verge of total collapse and the country depicted as vastly overextended.

Decisional Process

A. Complexity of Decisional Locus.

The subject describes the decisional process as highly centralized and as ruled by a very small clique, perhaps one ruler. The ruling circle is described as small, just a handful of people, and as homogeneous. It is essentially a monolith with hierarchical control exercised by a single like-minded nucleus.

B. Linkage between Decisional Locus and Broader Citizenry.
The subject describes the ruling clique as totally divorced from the general public. It is pictured as completely separated from the mass and as ruling them from above - through coercion. The decisional center is said to be unresponsive to the public and the general citizenry is said to have no influence over decisions whatsoever. Any talk of democracy is considered a total sham.

The media like all related institutions such as universities, think tanks, labor organizations, private foundations, and other mass organizations are described as controlled by the ruling clique. These institutions are pictured as agents and tools of the rulers.

C. Rationality of the Decisional Output.

The subject argues that the country because of its tightly knit decisional locus acts with brilliant calculation and rationality. It is capable of masterminding complex conspiracies and its secret agencies are said to be responsible for a vast net of subversion and intrigue. It is able to plot conspiracies and political actions in many countries and coordinates these efforts into a masterful overall plan. The subject blames the country for being responsible for nearly all the turmoil in different regions of the world.
Enemy (Moderate)

Motivation

A. Degree of Aggressiveness.

The subject describes the observed country as aggressive but as relatively cautious and at times restrained. It is pictured as using some of its means to enhance its influence and regional advantages but the author recognizes some actions as those which the country has refrained from taking. It is described as pushing its regional proxies and clients into aggressive adventures that it itself would not take. The subject also argues that in some cases the country gets pulled into aggressive and conflictual situations by its clients and the target country's inability to control the clients reckless behavior. In these cases the regional aggression that the subject describes is attributed to the target's allies and not to the target.

B. Aims.

In this variation the subject labels the observed country as imperialist but as primarily striving to continue the domination it has already established. It is not actively seeking expansion or rollback although it would seize opportunities for gain if they presented themselves. The country has long term expansionist aims but is first committed to perpetuating its hegemony in arenas in which it already enjoys supremacy. In the context of regional cases the subject claims the country is intent on preserving its
existing influence for defensive as well as imperialist reasons. Some mention of the targets concern for security is made.

C. Evilness.

The subject leaves no doubt that the country's aims are bad and unjust. The evaluation while clear is less sharp than in the extreme version and less emotionally loaded. Words like evil, sinister, and diabolical are not used. The country is not blamed for all the violence and turmoil in the world or even in a particular region but is said to be one of several contributing factors. Regional causes of turmoil and conflict are discussed and recognized as problems independent of the observed country's participation. The country's role is described as unhelpful and as an obstacle to peaceful resolution but not in highly charged terms like evil, and diabolical. It is not identified as the single obstacle to peace and the competing terms for peace promoted by regional disputants are recognized as far apart. It is said to favor the continuation of turmoil and instability as to insure its continued involvement and to promote opportunities for gain. Regional resolution is said to be possible only if the country's role is excluded.

D. Interests.

The subject explains that the main interest driving the country is geostrategic advantage. The country is described as driven by power politics much the same way as other "great
It is driven foremost by power and security consideration in the international struggle for power. A number of other interests might be included such as vested interests of various bureaucratic actors like the military, and the personal interests of specific leaders.

Capability

A. Degree U.S. Strength is Derived from the USSR's Behavior.

The subject argues that Soviet might is essential to deter the U.S. and that weakness will invite American aggression but does not develop the relation as clearly mechanical.

The subject may mention the continuing importance of vigilance but also highlights the possibilities of a relaxation in Soviet-American confrontations. U.S. policy is not said to derive exclusively from Soviet might but also from Soviet cooperation.

B. Recognition of Inherent Capability.

The subject argues that the U.S. can be contained and deterred by Soviet might but is nevertheless very powerful in its own right.

The subject notes in an empirically based fashion some of the bases of American power such as its technological capacity, population, military machinery, and political allies.
The subject does not claim that the U.S. always backs down in the face of countervailing power. Rather the subject explains the U.S. may resist and resist effectively, and can draw on indigenous resources. Economic problems and domestic dilemmas (e.g. race relations) are not used to discount totally the inherent capabilities of the U.S.

Decisional Locus

A. Complexity of Decisional Locus.

The subject describes a dichotomy within the ruling circle. The two groups are seen as competitive and the balance between them fluid. The forces seen as realistic are described as powerful and located within the top circles of power even if they do not prevail. The realistic forces are described as important and not simply as minor actors.

B. Linkage between Decisional Locus and Broader Citizenry.

Both groups within the ruling circle are described as quite separated from the general public. The ruling elite are pictured as responsive to a number of organized interests but only at the elite level. Various special interests are described as competing for elite favor and as able to effect political decisions. The general citizenry is said to have no real impact and democracy available only to the rich. The general public is simply manipulated by the competing elite circles.
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The subject describes a set of competing media and research institutions. The media is seen as differentiated and as controlled by competing elites and political interests. The same is said to be true of think tanks, labor unions, universities, etc.

C. Rationality of the Decisional Output.

The subject argues that the competition among the elite interferes with rational and consistent policy. While the country may be described as engineering a number of conspiracies and plots and as capable of orchestrating complex events, the direction is described as inconsistent. An overarching common interest is said to unite all the competing ruling elites but the implementation of effective policy or strategy is pictured as complicated by the internal complications of political struggle.
Enemy (Complex)

Motivation

A. Degree of Aggressiveness.

In this variation the subject describes the observed country as both active and reactive and in various contexts as both aggressive and passive. Consequently, active and reactive descriptions are for the most part context specific as are evaluations about aggressiveness. The subject argues that the country employs its power and regional leverage for a variety of reasons, including defense, and at times exercises restraint. The country is said to in some cases be drawn into regional crises by its clients and conflicts beyond its control. The subject does not attribute all the regional difficulties and turmoil to the country's aggression or to the aggression of the country's allies and/or agents. The competing claims for justice and fair terms among the regional disputants are discussed and the complexity of attributing the "causes" of the violence recognized. The subject recognizes that the ally or client of the observed country has important grievances against other regional parties including the allies of the subject's country.

B. Aims.

The subject describes the country as pursuing a number of aims including both the preservation of its defense and the enhancement of its material well being. The importance
of defensive motives are recognized along with those related to economic self interests and personal power.

C. Evilness.

The subject avoids presenting a sharp moral evaluation. Normative judgments about the evilness or goodness of the country are not major aspects of the description. The subject may make clear a lack of "sympathy" or approval and even disapproval but does not couch the description in affective and normative tones. The country is not blamed for all the turmoil or violence in a region as indigenous causes are discussed. The country's aid to a regional party is not described as necessarily promoting turmoil and instability nor as illegitimate or always sinister. The subject recognizes that in many cases regional turmoil and instability are very much not in the interest of the country and that conflict can jeopardize its positions as often as open new opportunities. Its interest in stability and instability is evaluated on a case by case basis within a regional context. The country's participation in the resolution of the regional dispute is not ruled out nor is its exclusion or the defeat of its client equated with peaceful resolution.

D. Interests.

The subject describes the country as driven by a number of concerns including strategic defense. The subject explains that many interests motivate the country. These
include economic considerations of trade or investment, bureaucratic vested interests, interests of the military, personal interests of specific elites and ideological or national messianism. The subject treats the issue as a complicated problem with the number of potential variables difficult to sort out or evaluate with any certainty.

Capability

A. Degree U.S. Strength is Derived from the USSR's Behavior.

The subject evaluates U.S. capabilities on an empirical basis and does not relate the to claims about Soviet will and vigilance. Soviet power may be compared to American power and the subject may claim Soviet might can deter American aggression but this relational claim is a judgment on the military balance. The subject does not claim that U.S. capabilities derive primarily from Soviet behavior but from U.S. resources and political situations. Empirical dimensions of capability will be highlighted as will issues such as logistics and regional leverage.

B. Recognition of Inherent Capability.

The subject recognizes the resources indigenous to the U.S. as well as the government's ability to mobilize them. Problems in the economy and political system are recognized and discussed but are not lifted to crisis dimensions predicting paralysis or near term collapse. The U.S. is not said to retreat in the face of opposition and is not seen as
incapable of using its might. The subject argues the U.S. is unlikely to retreat in the face of Soviet might and action. Rather it is likely to escalate its own resistance. The subject develops a notion of action-reaction and possible spiral of escalation rather than possible retreat in the face of resolve.

Decisional Process

A. Complexity of Decisional Locus.

The subject describes many different groups within the process. The elite are not dichotomized but divided into many categories on a series of cross-cutting criteria. Similarities and differences are noted between various elites on domestic and foreign policy. Inconsistencies and different groupings are noted. Additionally, on foreign policy differences among various leaders are noted and regional variation recognized. For example, differences on Middle East politics among leaders who are like-minded on Soviet policy or differences among Democrats on African policy are explored. The locus is pictured as diffuse and complicated.

B. Linkage between Decisional Locus and Broader Citizenry.

The subject argues that the ruling leaders are separated from the general public but are responsive to organized activity and elite representation. Many public organizations, private corporations, and mobilized concerns
are described as having significant access to elites and impact on decisions. Elections are described as serious events and politicians are presented as responding to constituent preferences rather than simply manipulating public opinion.

Different organizations in the media are described as independent and different, expressing both competing interests and political preferences. The media is not described as only a tool of the ruling clique but as engaged in an interactive process with the public. The media is seen as both influencing the general public and as responding to the predisposition's within the general public.

Organizational control from the center is not said to extend throughout all facets of society. Independent think tanks, universities, etc. are recognized.

C. Rationality of the Decisional Output.

The subject describes a process that is not efficient or particularly rational. The process is pictured as encumbered by competing loci of power, bureaucratic competition and inertia, and tradition. It is seen as producing incremental decisions that often seek an efficient solution. The results are described as satisficing rather than maximizing and unlikely to facilitate innovation or bold initiatives.
Imperial (Extreme)

Motivation

A. Degree of Dichotomization.

The subject may not acknowledge or recognize that there is a division within the target country, even if there is evidence for such a division. When the subject recognizes the presence of other positions with the target state, the subject describes a sharp dichotomy in the country separating all elites into only two camps. The elite that are said to be willing to cooperate with the subject's nation are labeled progressives and modernizers. The elite that are said to reject and resist the preferences of the subject's nation are labeled reactionaries, rebels, or bandits.

B. Evaluation of Recognized Positions.

1. The subject describes the progressive forces as enlightened and responsible. They are defined as good and the normative judgment is unequivocal.

2. The subject describes the other elite grouping as unenlightened and as either reactionary or irresponsibly radical. They are defined as evil and the normative judgment is unequivocal.

C. Interests.

1. The subject argues that the progressive forces are driven by noble concerns of human and the national well being. They are said to be striving for economic and social development and cultural and educational advancement. They
are described as sacrificing self interest for the development of their people and country.

2. The subject argues that the reactionaries and rebels are interested only in personal power. They are said to be committed only to their personal influence and are serving as agents of a foreign power in order to achieve domestic domination. The interests of their foreign masters is described as the foremost force behind the rebel's existence.

Capability

A. Technological and Cultural Discount.

The subject argues that the level of technological and organizational skill in the country are so low that empirical indicators of strength like number of troops, weapons, or resources must be discounted. In this picture the country is depicted as incapable of using sophisticated technology because of a low educational level and an incompetence among its citizens. The abilities of the country's trained professionals such as military pilots, doctors, accountants, engineers, etc. are disparaged and said to be inferior.

B. Dependence.

The country is described as in great need of the subject's nation. Because of its low level of economic and educational development the country is said to need the tutelage of the subject's nation. The country is described as incapable of "progress," independence, or well-being
without the "help" of technicians, advisers, engineers, etc. from the subject's country.

C. Modernizers Mass Support.

The country is also said to be weak because there is no national identity and the masses cannot be mobilized. They are unaware of politics and localized in concerns.

D. Reactionaries.

The reactionaries are described as by themselves, very weak, and insignificant. However, they are said to receive active and massive foreign assistance and are directed by foreign capitals. The foreign assistance is described as dramatically effecting the capability of the rebels and as responsible for their ability to persist with violence and terror.

Decisional Process

A. Complexity of Decisional Locus.

1. Progressive forces.

The subject describes the decisional process of the progressive forces as moderately diversified and as complicated. A number of centers of power are identified and various bureaucratic and political interests are described as important. The process is described as perhaps too diversified undermining the sort of leadership that is required. The progressive forces are described as perhaps too liberal and too ready for multiple representation that would hinder efficient and rational planning and policy.
2. Reactionaries.

The subject describes the reactionaries as organized in a tightly knit monolith that has a small core. The center of decision making is small and tied directly to a foreign capital.

B. Domestic and Foreign Support.

1. Progressive forces.

The progressive forces are said to enjoy rather modest domestic support. The subject argues that the society is still politically undeveloped and the majority of the people are either still unaware of politics or just awakening. A vanguard leadership is said to be necessary in such a situation. The progressives are described as parental guides to national modernization. Any unpopularity of the progressive forces is described as a reflection of the backwardness of the society and its culture.

2. Reactionaries.

The subject argues that the reactionaries have no domestic support and are at best a fringe group forcing cooperation from a few by terror. They are supported and orchestrated from abroad.

C. Rationality of the Decisional Output.

1. Progressive forces.

The subject argues that the decisional process of the progressive forces is plagued by incompetence and lack of organizational experience. The decisions are not optimal or
always rational and reflect a need for foreign assistance and guidance.

2. Reactionaries.

The reactionaries are said to be extraordinarily cunning and rational plotting elaborate conspiracies and intrigues.
Imperial (Moderate)

Motivation

A. Degree of Dichotomization.

The subject identifies three or four political positions within the country and describes a middle ground between progressive forces and reactionaries. Those willing to cooperate with the subject's nation are labeled progressive forces. Those who reject the preferences of the subject's nation are called reactionaries or rebels. Those who would partially collaborate with the subject's nation but not as completely as the progressive forces are described as in a middle ground and as partially progressive and modern.


1. The subject describes the progressive forces as good and as mostly noble in intention. The normative judgment, however, is not unequivocal and "bad" aspects such as a reliance on coercive control is mentioned. The subject emphasizes that the progressive forces greatest redeeming feature is a sophisticated understanding of the geopolitical "realities."

2. The subject does not identify the center positions as clearly good or bad but rather as naive and too idealistic. They are said to advocate morally defensible goals but not sensible or credible policy options. The subject describes these positions as out of touch with the indigenous social and political conditions of the country and
as modeled too much on more advanced socio-political systems. The groups in the center are also said to not understand the geopolitical dangers facing the country and as insensitive to the need for a protective power.

3. The subject describes the reactionaries as irresponsible and bad. The normative judgment is clear and firm. The description emphasizes that the rebels inflict senseless violence and brutal terror and stresses only violent dimensions of rebel activity.

C. Interests.

1. The subject suggests that the interests driving the progressive forces are mostly noble and benign. They are said to include the economic development and political independence of the country and the well being of its people. The picture also identifies a strong interest in personal power among the modernizing elite.

2. The subject suggests the groups in the center are motivated by a combination of interest in personal power and legitimate socioeconomic concerns. They are said to be interested in improving the developing economy and in pressing more quickly for wider democratic participation.

3. The subject claims the reactionaries are driven by a desire for personal power and control. They are serving as willing agents of a foreign power in order to achieve control domestically.
Capability

A. Technological and Cultural Discount.

The subject in this version as in the extreme stereotype discounts the country's capability because of its lack of technological skill and educational sophistication.

B. Dependence.

The subject also describes the country as dependent on the subject's nation for economic, technological, and military assistance and tutelage.

C. Progressive forces.

The subject suggests that among the progressive forces a failure to institutionalize achievement rather than ascriptive based advancement weakens the country and the ability of the progressive forces. This may be noted especially in the governmental bureaucracy and the military.

D. Middle Ground Groups.

The subject describes the elite resisting full cooperation as politically weak and arrogant. The subject may criticize or mock them for their presumptuousness or misplaced conceit that they are as competent and equal to the technical and professional advisers of the subject's nation. The subject dismisses them as idealistic and arrogant elites who fail to see how dependent their country and they are on the subject's nation. They are said to have no skills or talent for leadership, organization, planning, or governing.
E. Reactionaries.

The subjects describe the reactionaries as weak by themselves but as enjoying foreign support. Their power is said to be only capable of disruption and terror and as derivative of the foreign power.

Decisional Process

A. Complexity of Decisional Locus.

1. Progressive forces: same as in extreme version.

2. Middle Ground Positions.

The subject describes these elite as unorganized and ad hoc. They are said to operate as individuals more than representatives. There is said to be no coordination or center of decision making among them.

3. Reactionaries: Much the same as in the extreme version.

B. Domestic and Foreign Support.

1. Progressive forces: same as in extreme version.

Perhaps less emphasis on the need for parental leadership.

2. Middle Ground Positions.

The subject argues that these positions have little public support and are exclusively elite phenomenon. They are said to represent concerns that are not shared by the general public and are strictly limited to elite interests. These elite are said to be more alienated from the general population than are the paternal progressive forces that
while pressing for change, are more in tune with traditional structures of authority.

3. Reactionaries: same as in extreme version.

C. Rationality of the Decisional Output.

1. Progressive forces: same as in extreme version.

2. Middle Ground Positions.

The subject describes these elite as offering no credible programs and no viable alternatives. They are presented as unhelpful critics that point out shortcomings and offer no sensible or practical remedies and alternatives. They are also criticized for exhibiting a moral arrogance and a presumptuous inclination to lecture the subject's more advanced nation on principles of right and wrong.

3. Reactionaries.

Mostly the same as in extreme version. The subject might recognize some variations within the rebels or describe a less rational and more ad hoc confused process or both.
Imperial (Complex)

Motivation

A. Degree of Dichotomization.

The subject describes an elaborate political spectrum with many positions and does not define the spectrum as running from progressive forces to reactionaries. Differences are described within many groups both inside and outside of the government. Many differences are seen between various elites willing to cooperate the subject's nation and numerous differences are also identified among various elite unwilling to cooperate with the subject's nation. Many cross cutting cleavages are identified including values such as ethnicity, religious identity, and political orientation.

B. Evaluation of Recognized Positions.

1. Those identified as willing to cooperate are labeled progressive forces and are said to be good. The changes they are said to be implementing are evaluated as "progressive" and moving the society in a "good" and more "advanced" direction. The normative support, however, is qualified and the subject tends not to offer a moral endorsement or evaluation. These progressive forces are not labeled as "responsible" and contrasted with the "irresponsible" but rather are described as leaders that have important strengths and serious weaknesses.

2. Among those less willing and unwilling to cooperate with the subject's nation several quite different groups are
identified. Some are described as responsible, serious and important actors within the country. Their positions are described as representing legitimate domestic concerns and as worthy of consideration. Normative judgments are mostly withheld as are any evaluations about the "progressiveness" or "goodness" of the changes these groups advocate.

3. The subject describes a set of rebel opposition groups that are quite diverse and often competitive, similar mainly in their inclination to resort to violence. Some of the grievances and frustrations that are said to fuel the resort to violence are described although the violence of the rebels is not condoned. The suffering and violence that might have preceded the rebel behavior is also described.

C. Interests.

The groups seen as progressive forces are said to be driven by a number of motives including both personal and national concerns. Their desire for personal power and wealth is made clear as is their concern about national development and independence.

2. The range of groups that are not part of the progressive allies are described as motivated by many different concerns. As in the Moderate Imperial version concerns about economic deprivation and inequity along with political injustice and lack of participation are said to be primary interests. Unlike in the moderate version, in this variation the subject also stresses the importance of the
desire for self-determination and nationalism. Nationalism and a frustration with foreign interference including the involvement of the subject's nation is identified as the strongest political motivation undermining their inclination to cooperate.

3. The rebels and violent opposition groups are not described as exclusively foreign agents or driven only by personal ambition and foreign interests. Many of them are described as indigenous and as products of domestic conditions not foreign export. They are said to be driven by a complex set of motives including an interest in personal power and genuine interests in economic development, redistribution, national independence and self-reliance.

Capability

A. Technological and Cultural Discount.

The subject minimizes national generalizations and recognizes that within the society there are many different people with varying talents. A professional class is recognized and its competence and the ability of individuals to master sophisticated technology acknowledged. The subject bases the description of capability upon empirical indicators and attempts to evaluate the availability of trained manpower to particular tasks.

B. Dependence.

The subject describes the country as benefiting from the association with his country but does not argue that tutelage
is required. The subject expresses confidence that elites in the country can best decide what assistance and direction they may prefer.

C. Progressive forces.

The groups most willing to cooperate are described as organizationally troubled and as in need of managerial advice and training. They are described as technically competent as long as there is proper instruction available. It is also argued that they gain domestic credibility by their ability to garner support from the subject's state. The foreign dependence, however, is highlighted as a double edged sword that also raises a very serious political liability. It is argued that their close association with the subject's nation complicates their domestic legitimacy and ability to attract mass support.

D. Groups Less Willing and Unwilling to Cooperate.

The subject describes some of these elite as professionally competent and as powerful politicians. Some are said to raise popular symbols and to attract very significant followings. They are presented as able to capitalize on frustrated nationalism and pent up aspirations for cultural dignity and respect.

E. Groups in Violent Opposition.

These groups are described as basically weak capturing relatively small followings. Their resort to violence, however, is said to elevate their influence and international
recognition. Their power is also said to derive from the failure of the progressive forces to institute changes ameliorating the grievances that are said to provoke opposition. The failure of other groups to succeed with non-violent alternatives and produce the desired change is also said to enhance the leverage of the armed rebels. They may also be said to receive aid from foreign suppliers that improves their capabilities.

Decisional Process

A. Complexity of the Decisional Locus.

1. Groups Willing to Cooperate.

The subject describes these groups as moderately diversified and in some areas competitive. Bureaucratic and personal differences are recognized as are the complications of implementation. A number of elite are described as influential, leading to confusion and corruption. An institutional routine and ultimate locus, however, is identified.

2. Groups Less Willing or Unwilling to Cooperate.

The subject describes a set of very different groups that do not share any coordinated decision making system. The decision process in each may be described quite differently and the set of them considered unmanageable. The subject might argue that given the enormous diversity among the groups there is no alternative to the rule of the more
coherent groups willing to cooperate. The diversity is likely to be presented as an obstacle to democracy.


The subject describes a number of difference and competitive groups that have little or no coordination between them. While no overall locus is identified, each group is said to be organized with identifiable leaders and a small decisional locus.

B. Domestic and Foreign Support.

1. Groups Willing to Cooperate.

The subject recognizes that these groups lack mass based support but suggests that they can maintain sufficient control through a process of education and cooperation. These groups are said to have support among modern and professional sectors. Their unpopularity is attributed to both the cultural differences between the modern and traditional sectors and their association with foreign involvement.

2. Groups Less Willing or Unwilling to Cooperate.

The subject describes most of these groups as divorced from the general public and as representing an elite phenomenon. However, some are described as mobilizing significant public support on a number of issues. In particular some are recognized as able to play on national and cultural symbols and ignite a significant mass based opposition to the plans of the modernizers.

The subject describes these groups as enjoying very modest domestic support but as having intensely loyal support from a core of followers. The strength of the various groups is differentiated as is their ability to attract support. The subject also differentiates between the different group with respect to the amount of foreign support they receive and describes some as mostly indigenous, some as receiving marginal aid, and some as closely aligned to different foreign powers.

C. Rationality of the Decisional Output.

1. Groups Willing to Cooperate.

The subject describes a good deal of inefficiency and irrationality in the system and discusses some of the complications that his country's involvement introduces. The decisions are described as often inappropriate and as reflecting an unwise ordering of priorities.

2. Groups Less Willing or Unwilling to Cooperate.

Some of the groups are said to produce intelligent plans but overall the lack of coordination results in confusion. Because of the diversity among the groups decisions are said to be temporary and implementation or constancy unreliable.


Groups are differentiated with some described as more efficient and conspiratorial than others. For the most part
they are not described as particularly farsighted or rational, but often ad hoc and situational.
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