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What hour of the night: Black enlisted men's experiences and the desegregation of the Army during the Korean War, 1950–1951

Ducksworth, Selika Marianne, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1994

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Selika Marianne Ducksworth, B.A., M.A. **** The Ohio State University 1994

Dissertation Committee
W. Van Tine
M. Stevenson
J. Guilmartin

Approved by
W. Van Tine Adviser
Department of History
To Jace, Mom, Andrew, Vincent, and Lindsey
VITA

April 28, 1966 ............ Born - Slidell, Louisiana

1988 ....................... B.A., The Ohio State University
               Columbus, Ohio

1988-9 ..................... Minority Fellow, The Ohio State
               University, Columbus, Ohio

1988-9 ..................... Ohio Board of Regents Fellow,
               Columbus, Ohio

1989-1993 ................. Teaching Assistant, Department
               of History, Ohio State
               University, Columbus, Ohio

1991 .... Master of Arts, European Military History,
               The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1992 ............ Graduate School Alumni Research Award,
               Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1993 ......................... Rand Summer Internship,
               RAND Corporation,
               Washington, D.C.

1993 ........ Small Research Grant, Graduate School,
               University Of Wisconsin - Eau Claire,
               Eau Claire, Wisconsin

1993-Present .............. Assistant Professor,
               Department of History,
               University of Wisconsin -
               Eau Claire, Eau Claire,
               Wisconsin

1993- Present ............. Consultant, RAND Corporation,
               Santa Monica, California

Fields of Study

Major Field: History
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INTRODUCTION

BLACK GIs AND THE FIRST YEAR OF THE KOREAN WAR

Over thirty thousand men died in one of the most unpopular wars America has ever fought: the Korean War. Of all of the wars of the twentieth century, this one has received the least amount of scholarly attention. Moreover, the fact that Black Gis played a pivotal role in this conflict has all but escaped scholarly and public attention. Yet the experiences of Black soldiers during this conflict may have made it the most socially influential war of this century. Black soldiers during the Korean conflict faced situations and gained experience that gave them the skills and persistence necessary to become foot soldiers during the second confrontation that they faced coming off of buses and trains during the nineteen fifties' civil rights war. During the Korean conflict itself, these soldiers also faced a problem from within: some Black commissioned and non-commissioned officers resisted desegregation, fearing to lose comfortable positions within segregated units, and unwilling to abandon the lowered expectations of race for newer, higher standards.

As veterans, Black Korean war soldiers along with Black
Black World War II veterans, risked their lives to register to vote, boycott, testify before Congress, and advocated armed self-defense in the face of hostile white supremists. A number of Black veterans actually died trying to register to vote. Black veterans were also a favorite target of white lynchers. The following pages will argue that the death and destruction that they faced in the South was more manageable to them after the experience of fighting North Korean and Communist Chinese soldiers, white attempts at humiliation, surviving POW camps and the U.S. rear areas, and winning Army desegregation. In the Army, Black men and women often faced Confederate flags, racial slurs, and other manifestations of hostility. These vets came home with an overdue notice for white supremists, a bill for which they would demand payment, even at the cost of their own blood.

This work will explore the Black military experience in the Korean War. Black enlisted men’s fought in Korea initially as a part of the United States’ Eighth Army (mainly in the 24th Infantry Regiment, the 77th Engineers, and the 159th Field Artillery Battalion), elements of the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Division, and several attached armor regiments during the Korean war. This study emphasizes the effects of these soldiers’ actions on military decision making, and also highlights the links between their Korean experience and later involvement with the civil rights movement through voter registration participation. This
dissertation will also explore social forces on the home front such as the extended influence of Black newspapers. This work will survey the events of the war and interpret them within the framework of soldier action and institutional response.

The military long has been known as an incubator for business leadership. This work points out that the military also forged leaders in voting rights protest and the political area of leadership. Scholars have long recognized that Black military veterans, along with Black women, have been the backbone or "cannon fodder" of civil rights protests and demonstrations. The positive re-enforcement of Black soldiers' fighting against discrimination in the military seems to have informed Black servicemen's activities in the voting rights part of the Civil Rights movement during the Fifties and Sixties.

Several themes evolve within this framework. One overarching theme is that Black enlisted soldiers' individual actions against discrimination, and white stereotypes of Blacks as violent, motivated white officers actions to integrate the army. This dissertation will demonstrate that Black enlisted men provided actual leadership and impetus for desegregation; by and large, the Army's commissioned white leadership reacted and followed.

The continuous undermining of institutional perceptions through competence and resistance is a central idea in this
work. The fact that Army general officers, often socially conservative, racially biased Southerners, were willing to sacrifice efficiency, effectiveness, and the lives of white men due to perceptions of race will also be emphasized. These officers found their racial perceptions increasingly under attack starting in World War II. From 1914 to the late 1940s, the rationales for racial beliefs evolved from perceptions affected by both the fact of segregation and simple bigotry to more sophisticated excuses based on education and testing in the late 1940s. These arguments excused or covered poor leadership and lack of training often given Black soldiers by biased white officers.

Prejudicial perceptions of white officers also contributed to the overall discrimination that Black enlisted men experienced. Black units, for example, received harsher evaluations than white units for similar breaches of military discipline and conduct, and white officers generally tied racial incompetence to Black enlisted men’s infractions. In response, Black enlisted personnel used newspapers and the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) as channels to protest blatantly discriminatory treatment, especially involving courts martial. Finally, the perceptions and incompetence of many of their white officers, colored the experience of the Black soldier in combat, and made the face of battle more dangerous for him.
The only semi-academic work to focus extensively on the experience of Black enlisted men and women during the Korean War was the military commissioned sociological study by Leo Bogart et al., *Social Research and the Desegregation of the Army* (1969). Yet this work spent much more time on white officer and enlisted attitudes towards Black officers and enlisted personnel than on Black attitudes towards whites. While several works, such as Richard Dalfiume's *Desegregation of the United States' Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts* (1969), focus on integration, these works tend to emphasize Black soldier militancy during the Second World War. They pay little attention to the Korean War, mentioning it almost in passing, usually with only a page or two. There is no equivalent work to Ulysses Lee's exhaustive inquiry into the World War II Black soldiers' experience in *The Employment of Negro Troops* (1966). All in all, more literature exists about the Black soldier experience during the Civil War, World Wars I and II, and Vietnam, than about Korea. Yet many Black historians, most recently Steve Lawson in *Running for Freedom* (1991) and George Lipsitz in *A Life in the Struggle: Ivory Perry and the Culture of Opposition* (1988), point to Black enlisted veterans as catalysts in the civil rights movement, and to links between Korean war service and community activism.

The military reflects and magnifies certain values in American civilian society, mirroring and functioning like
other big institutions, especially corporations. Skills such as efficiency, discipline, effectiveness, team leadership, and management have great value in fielding an army. Black soldiers used these values against the Army, demonstrating again and again the high price exacted by the inefficiency and demoralization of segregation. Through direct and indirect action, Blacks used these values to modify policy implementation and make segregation unworkable. In doing this, class differences between Black enlisted soldiers and Black commissioned officers arose. Black commissioned officers generally preferred to work within the system and "prove" Black fitness for equality, as then Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. advocated. Black enlisted men and non-commissioned in the segregated infantry divisions and the numerous smaller attached units preferred to use their competence and military expertise to create problems for white officers who discriminated against them. Black enlisted men's ideas of manly behavior threatened white officers, and therefore affected the Army.

A study of Black soldiers during the Korean War is significant for several reasons. Policy makers tend to believe their policies will be implemented exactly as they are drafted; this work will study the ways that policy can be shaped and stopped from below during implementation. Current literature on Blacks in the military, with a few recent exceptions, emphasizes institutional evaluations of
performance almost uncritically. This work will evaluate critically both perceptions of performance and actual performance. Many works, such as Bernard Nalty’s highly influential Strength for the Fight (1986) and Max McGregor’s Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 to 1965, (1981) do not adequately evaluate the impact of action from below on policy, preferring to emphasize Black performance and institutional policy making. Ironically, in light of the increased attention given the Korean war recently, only one author, Clay Blair in The Forgotten War (1987) gives any real attention to Black soldiers. Unfortunately, Roy Appleman discredited history, North to Naktong, South to the Yalu (1961), still influences how Black performance is perceived. Although the United States’ Army admits Appleman’s bias (as of 1989) and is having the evaluation of the Black units rewritten, this volume’s status as an official history perpetuates its misinformation, most currently seen in Robert Goulden’s Korea: the Untold Story of the War (1982) and Max Hastings’ The Korean War (1987). Continued reliance on Appleman’s work perpetuate not only an unwarranted insult to Black soldiers, but hides their influence on integration.

Official and civilian sources discredit Appleman’s negative interpretation of Black military performance. Newspaper and anecdotal sources suggest Black performance equaled whites in battle. This dissertation will draw from
official documents, newspapers, biographies, and interviews with veterans from the 24th Infantry Regiment to create a record of the experience of Black soldiers in and out of combat. This account will fill a significant void in the literature as to the extent of Black contributions during the Korean War.

Currently, research on the Black military experience largely focuses on Black officers and the views of white officers. Very little work outside of biography addresses the African-American military experience from the perceptions of the enlisted men. This has caused certain things to be downplayed or overlooked. One way to fill this void is to utilize government commissioned surveys of Korean lines soldiers, specifically Project Clear. The state of social science methodology during the 1950s creates doubt about the validity of conclusions drawn from the raw data of these surveys, but not on the validity of the raw anecdotal responses. Comparing the available data with the institutional records, newspaper reports soldiers' letters, and oral history should provide a different perspective than is currently orthodox.

This dissertation fits within the boundaries of the "new" school of military history which emerged in the 1960s. This school, in the words of one of its most famous practitioners, Paul Kennedy, "provided a larger social and historical context that was lacking in old style,
The new school "also focused on the raising of armies, their social composition, civil-military relations, logistics, the financing of war, the economic and social consequences of war, war and demography, and warfare and technology." For the most part, this social school of military history still retains an institutional focus. A few historical works, such as John Keegan's *Face of Battle* (1978), discuss the enlisted man's experience. This dissertation will contribute to this significant and neglected area by examining both officer and enlisted actions; not merely focusing on Black officer attempts at integration.

The story of Black Korean War soldiers also has implications for American history and Black history. Within American history many students examine World War II for its impact on the American homefront and on post-war society. This work will examine the impact of the relationship between Korean War Black soldiers and the Army, an institution that reflected American society and reacted to these individuals. Within Black history, one important trend has been to examine the grassroots basis for civil rights militancy and the differing groups' actions within the Black community. Considering the prominence of Black veterans at the local level in the Civil Rights movement, and especially in the NAACP, it can be surmised that these individuals served almost a "mass direct action" apprenticeship in the
military. The Army experience also raised their self-esteem and lowered their tolerance of discriminatory behavior at home. These soldiers eventually played an important role in shaping the history of the United States, by joining local NAACP chapters in the South, and becoming involved in community work, the NAACP, and the Urban League in the North and West. They deserve to have their stories told; not to be "invisible men."

Korean War integration's beginnings, borne of improvisation and desperation, shaped its implications. Top leadership legitimized integration only after desegregation spontaneously evolved in Korea. However, Army leaders continued to fight desegregation in Europe and the U.S. for three years after integration proved its military worth in Korea. The high level of Southern representation in the Army, intransigent powerful Southern Dixiecrat politicians, and the lack of effective planning prevented the destruction of all discrimination from the Army. While segregation's costs and fragility made it vulnerable to structural changes, Southern officers found discrimination easier to maintain.3

This study focuses on the Army because the Army in Korea emerges as key in this puzzle from sheer size. It contained the greatest number of Blacks there, provided the bulk of the forces in Korea, and shouldered the majority of the fighting. The Marines only had sixteen corps there, and
the Air Force contained the fewest number of Blacks. The Navy remained only peripherally involved; few sea battles, aside from the Inchon landings, accompanied this conflict. The Army also remained the most stubbornly segregated branch of the armed forces, with its numerous Southern officers.

Korea became America’s first real test of the Truman Doctrine. Within the framework of ideological war, the struggles of Black soldiers took on even greater meaning than in previous conflicts, due to the implications of fighting communism and supporting American values. Within the American military, with its emphasis on discipline, efficiency, meritocracy, conformity, egalitarianism, initiative, will, and obedience, Blacks used the very values the military hierarchy prized to turn segregation on its head, and the Black press publicized it.
ENDNOTES


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CHAPTER I
BLACK MILITARY SERVICE

Black Americans have served in combat ever since the various colonial conflicts with the Native Americans and the French. The Civil War institutionalized Black service in the United States’ Army. During the early part of the Civil War, white Northerners resisted strenuously the idea of Black military service, even though Blacks served in the merchant marine and the Navy without blemish. Even after Congress authorized Black enrollment in early 1863, following the first Emancipation Proclamation, discrimination and discouragement continued. This bigotry disturbed Black abolitionist Frederick Douglass as he attempted to mobilize Black soldiers.

[Frederick] Douglass found, as he continued his recruitment efforts, that he was more and more embarrassed by the disparity between his assurances to black men and the realities of their army service...They suffered insults and harassment at the hands of Union army officers and men. When captured by the Confederate army, they were treated as slaves and fugitives rather than prisoners of war. They were denied honors they had earned, and they were not promoted into commissioned ranks. From the beginning Douglass had warned that black troops would suffer
annoyances...He had not been prepared, however, for systematic discrimination, purposeful and official insult by the Union army and government.

Yet Black men, especially ex-slaves, continued to enlist. They believed, as did Frederick Douglass, that unless Black men bore arms, Black men could not claim to have fulfilled all the requirements of citizenship, and therefore could not argue about the morality or legality of continued oppression. As long as the Civil War was a "white man's war", slavery and discrimination could not be assailed. Only through Black Army service could Black manhood win the right to demand emancipation as a major war aim. Historian Nathan Huggins observed, "The more blacks participated, shifting the balance, the more they could be certain of affecting their future.... Manhood required them [blacks] to serve in the army. White Americans would deny them citizenship; only by assuming the responsibility of citizens could they rightfully challenge the denial."

They came, slave and free Black men, as enlisted men, because giving commissions to Black men met strident resistance, although two slipped in. Black women also came, slave and free, for several reasons: to follow their men; to escape slavery; to find employment; to provide intelligence services; to volunteer. The Army provided ex-slaves with their first access to educational opportunities and limited
leadership opportunities.

Several works, most notably Dudley Taylor Cornish's *The Sable Arm* (1987) and James McPherson's *The Negro's Civil War* (1965), address the campaigns and valor of Black troops during the Civil War. The attack of Fort Wagoner, portrayed in the film *Glory*, was only one of many acts of valor committed by Black soldiers in the Union Army despite Union discrimination and Confederate abuse of Black prisoners of war. The controversial Fort Pillow Massacre, a cold-blooded massacre of over 300 surrendered Black Union soldiers by General Nathan Bedford Forest's men, inspired many black troops to anger and stubbornness on the field. Modern authors agree that the employment of Black soldiers made a critical contribution to the North's winning this war, by freeing up white soldiers and for the psychological effect losing to Black soldiers had on Confederate morale.

In gratitude for the extraordinary service of Black soldiers, Congress created several permanent Black units. Military historian Bernard Nalty related the details of this plan:

Congress in the summer of 1866 decreed that the Regular Army should include six black regiments, four of infantry and two of cavalry but none of artillery, even though the wartime U.S. Colored Troops had formed units in all three of the combat arms. As a result of this law, the Army was authorized a total of ten regiments of cavalry, forty five of infantry, and five of artillery. A subsequent Army reorganization in the spring of 1869 consolidated the four black infantry units into two, part of a reform that
eliminated twenty regiments of infantry. The 38th and 41st Regiments became the 24th Infantry [Regiment] (Colored), while the 39th and 40th emerged as the 25th Infantry (Colored). The two regiments of cavalry, the 9th and the 10th, retained their original designations.⁴

As the United States released white volunteers from service during the 1865-66 period, the Army in the South grew progressively darker. By 1866, mainly Black troops and white officers occupied the South and trained the newly formed Black militias against white terrorist actions. This was especially hazardous duty due to white guerrilla violence and intransigence. In the case of the militia, white traitorous activity took an especially ugly turn. The worst recorded cases were in Mississippi, where murderers recorded the names of Black militiamen (ex-Black servicemen) in 'dead books' and sniped at units while they drilled. White guerrillas also pressured Black men into quitting, sometimes by raping their wives in front of them in the middle of the night. White bandits deliberately stole weapons shipped overland to Florida, South Carolina, and Arkansas.

Individual militia leaders were murdered, among them Jim Williams of York County, South Carolina, who was hanged, and Charles Caldwell of Mississippi, lured by a white acquaintance into a cellar to drink to the Christmas season and shot and fatally wounded as he raised his glass. Members of a white paramilitary group attacked the lawfully constituted black militia in Hamburg, South Carolina, firing upon the armory with a cannon, driving the blacks from the building,
and murdering five men who could not escape.\(^5\)

Such ruthlessness did not meet equally ruthless counterforce from white Republicans, and therefore triumphed. As the white planter elite began to regain control in the South during the waning days of Reconstruction, they began to eradicate evidence of honorable Black Civil War service, a move which white Republicans allowed as they sought to build a "lily white" southern Republican party.

Between 1869 and 1898, Black service in the West was equally valorous and received equally little attention. Black reenlisted at a high rate and rarely deserted, at a time when three out of ten white recruits were expected to desert and when less than a fifth of the white recruits would spend more than five years in uniform. Black regiments also had a lower alcoholism rate, at a time when most court martial transgressions resulted from alcohol abuse. Despite this evidence, white communities and white members of the Army constantly attempted to humiliate and discriminate against Black soldiers.\(^6\) Yet the Buffalo Soldiers, as Native Americans called Black troops in admiration for their abilities, compiled an excellent record despite harassment from Native American enemies, the United States' Army, and far too often the very civilians they were trying to protect.\(^7\)

Despite this treatment, Blacks continued to enlist in
numbers disproportionate to the Black presence in the population. Several factors contributed to this: the opportunity to obtain an education (many Black men enlisted as illiterates, and the Army taught them to read); the pay was higher than most civilian occupations open to Black men; Blacks in the Army faced relatively less discrimination than the general civilian Black population had to put up with; and the ethos of meritocracy led to some opportunities to advance for competent Blacks. The military in some Black families became a tradition, while for other families it was a way to instill discipline in an unruly youngster. Overall, before World War I, most Blacks looked upon military service favorably, as a method to advance economically and socially.

The 1898 Spanish American War brought new challenges for Blacks soldiers. Because the U.S. Army was not authorized to buy equipment before declarations of war, it increased the strength and training of regular units, white and Black, through recruitment, before weapons arrived. Many of the new soldiers trained without any weapons whatsoever. Since all four of the Black regiments had long-service men in them, and Blacks were perceived to be 'suited' to tropical climates, the Army placed greater reliance on these soldiers than ever before. Yet while this was happening, Jim Crow became enshrined in the Army's statute books. The few Black officers were discouraged or drummed out wherever
possible. Black units training in Georgia and Florida experienced violent hostility from racist whites in those states. White violence and incivility sparked retaliatory violence from Black soldiers in Lakeland and Tampa, Florida.

The 9th and 10th Cavalry were critical elements in the success of the division that took San Juan Hill (despite Roosevelt's deliberate distortions of record to make his Rough Riders look better). The 10th Cavalry's timely arrival saved the Rough Riders, "relieving them from the volleys that were being poured into them from that portion of the Spanish line." With the war's end, however, Jim Crow was then also imposed in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, a slap in the face to the Black soldiers who had fought to "free them".

In the Philippines, despite resistance to Black service from the Black community and guilt-inducing propaganda from islanders asking how "could the black soldier believe that the very government that allowed his brothers to be terrorized and lynched was promoting justice in the islands?" only five Blacks deserted. The most notorious deserter, Corporal David Fagen, made the United States' Army pay a price for racial discrimination. Fagen clashed with his sergeant in I company, 24 RCT, and was unable to transfer away from this harassing boss. He deserted in November of 1899, and joined the Filipinos, were he quickly
became their de facto general. His knowledge of Army life and tactics made him a dangerous foe. Fagan was not stopped until a bounty hunter killed him in 1901."

Despite Fagan, segregated units served with distinction during the conquest of the Philippines. Theodore Roosevelt ignored this service and the debt of gratitude he personally owed black soldiers for their conduct at San Juan Hill. Instead, he reacted in an arbitrary and racist manner to the 1906 Brownsville "massacre", where three companies of the Black 25th Infantry Regiment were framed for a rape and minor riot by white civilians in the town of Brownsville, Texas, for racial and economic rationales. Despite a Senate investigation which documented how the "eyewitness" accounts of white citizens violated the laws of science, Roosevelt ordered several men executed on questionable evidence and a mass dishonorable discharge for the others. This situation was not rectified by Congress until 1976.

Discriminatory treatment and unjustified doubts about Black fitness to serve dogged segregated units in an increasingly Southern-dominated Army. The advent of the First World War brought the subject of Black military service again to the foreground of discussion. White Southern influence on the officer corps reached its peak during the First World War, and with it came further institutionalization of racism within the Army's structure. The Army accepted uncritically the Southern declaration that
Southern white officers were better for Black troops than Northern whites because Southern whites "knew" Blacks. This asserted denied evidence of the successful combination of Northern white officers and Black enlisted men during the Civil War, and that Black soldiers preferred Northern white or Black officers. The Army also bowed to Southern white pressure and intended to utilize the segregated units only as labor battalions. This plan fell in the face of the meatgrinding Western Front. The Black U.S. 93rd Division (Provisional) was broken up, attached in small units to the French army, and fought under French command. Notably, the Black men of the 93rd received more favorable evaluations than those of the Black U.S. 92nd Division, which American commander General Pershing, assigned to the Western front, retained under United States' command.

With the development of the two large Black Divisions, the 92nd and 93rd Divisions, in addition to the two Calvary and two Infantry regiments, the problem of providing officers became acute. In response, the Army tried the Des Moines experiment, was the first attempt to provide Black officers for segregated units, while quieting Black civilian leaders at the same time. This experiment seemed perfectly placed to increase Black influence through efficiency in the Army. Unfortunately, efficiency was not the true governing policy of the United States' Army: maintaining the status quo was much more important. General officers in the Army
sabotaged the Des Moines experiment. The same system that molded 639 Black officers out of the original 1,250 doubted the abilities of these men. This system was receptive to Southern conservative political pressure, which led to directive restricting Black officers to commanding Black soldiers or other Black officers, never whites. Furthermore, The Chief of Staff made it clear that higher levels of command in the segregated Black units could only be filled by whites.¹³

Black officers were later limited to infantry use only, and certain commands limited Black officers to second lieutenant and below. Southern fear of the proximity of large numbers of armed Black men resulted in orders for the dispersal of Black units to mainly Northern and Midwestern camps, including Camp Funston, Camp Dodge, Camp Grant, Camp Sherman, Camp Meade, Camp Dix, and Camp Upton. These political concessions resulted in organizational chaos, which interfered with the functioning of both Black officers and Black enlisted soldiers.¹⁴

During the two decades preceding the First World War, a new phenomena, the "New Negro", Blacks born outside of slavery, and sometimes Southern repression, appeared. These people felt no need to be grateful for discrimination and crumbs; they wanted to be valued, not tolerated; and debated whether to assimilate into white society or maintain separately Black standards. Once in the Army, these "New
Negro" officers and enlisted men rebelled against discriminatory treatment in the United States and abroad. In France, this rebellion hit especially high levels, because it was hard to justify the wastefulness and effort it took to maintain segregation to a society without a history of it. The Army did try to transport segregation and discrimination to France as it transported supplies. White officers attempted to maintain second-class citizenship for Blacks in France through the use of curfews and the military police. For the white officers, the good relations that developed between French citizens, especially French women, and Black soldiers, was a problem. French officials and French Army officers, however, refused to cooperate in maintaining segregation, and were confused by how white Americans could look down on fellow fighters for democracy.\textsuperscript{15} The French refusal to participate created such great difficulty that segregation became almost impossible to enforce in parts of France and England.

The United States' Army also wasted lots of effort trying to "protect French women from the 'brutal instincts of the Negro soldiers'". In reality, someone should have protected Black soldiers from the "rape mania" manifested in American white officers' minds. According to historian Gerald Patton, despite widespread allegations of rape against the 92d Division, "in reality, documented cases of rape were rare."\textsuperscript{16} Yet, ignoring this reality, white officers
instituted "hourly checks between the hours of reveille and 11:00 P.M., written records showing the results of each check, a one-mile limit on those allowed outside camp, and control of passes to ensure that they were issued only to men of 'known reliability'". Journalist Charles H. Williams proved that the intentions of military officials to discourage any interaction between Black soldiers and French women. Williams evidence showed that this was a high priority, and the failure to implement this policy led to threats of "undesirable consequences".17

False accusations of rape were not the only humiliation awaiting the men of the 92d in France. Black troops were judged more harshly than whites for similar failures under fire. When white troops broke under fire in the Argonne, their failure was not blamed on race. In the case of the Black-officered 368th Infantry Regiment of the 92d Division, however, white officers used race as the excuse for not being able to advance across the barbed wire protected no-man's land in the lethal hailstorm of bullets, shrapnel, and limb-destroying bombs from German artillery. White Army leaders, especially General Ballou, commander of the Army group that contained the 92d, used this episode as an excuse to proclaim all Black officers incompetent, and relieve or remove many from positions of responsibility.18

Most Blacks felt that Black officers did very well under trying circumstances, and that white leaders
downplayed Black competence and success while publicizing the few isolated failures disproportionately. The military and the press focused on the few failures, indicting the entire Black race for the incompetence of a few officers, "whereas no one thought of concluding that because several thousand white officers were found to be incompetent and were sent home, the white race was therefore a failure." In reality, the Black 92d did a creditable job, on par with white divisions, while the 93rd benefitted from being used by the French and performed better than most white divisions, especially in the first year of U.S. involvement in the war.

While segregation in the Army had been questioned by civil rights advocates since the Civil war, the breakdown of segregation under wartime conditions was a phenomena the Southern-dominated U.S. Army rarely discussed, especially in public. The French allocated small units (platoons or companies, etc) of the Black 93rd Division to different, larger French units on the Western Front. The unit level integration by the French dismayed White Southern reared-officers almost as much as the resulting Black units' achievements in the field.

Black soldiers returned home in 1919 to an America torn by the Red Scare and a resurgent Ku Klux Klan. Lynchings soared, especially of Black men in uniforms, because Black soldiers threatened Southern white sensibilities. Post-war
white terrorism discredited Booker T. Washington's accommodationist rhetoric, widely supported by whites, that the Black race needed to "prove" its "fitness" for rights by assimilation, economic advancement, non-competition for jobs, and as his disciples argued, through military service. Serving the nation at war, some Black leaders had argued, would force whites to end segregation and other forms of legal discrimination. Yet in the end, the lack of progress towards integration discouraged many Blacks and increased support for more militant leaders like Marcus Garvey. The targeting of Black veterans for lynching during "Red Summer" 1919 pushed "New Negroes" to consider more direct actions. During the Twenties and Thirties, first prosperity and then poverty made Black military service a low priority, as the armed forces contracted. Then war in Europe broke out in 1939, and preparedness raised the controversy over Black service from its resting place.

Much has been written on the triumphs of the Tuskegee airmen and the trials of Blacks in service during the Second World War. Ulysses Lee in his official study for the Army, *The Employment of Negro Troops During the Second World War* (1966), detailed the humiliations, here and abroad, of racism and segregation, and the surprisingly overt, violent, and sustained efforts of Black servicemen, especially enlisted men, to prevent segregation from being enforced and to avenge racial insults. Most of these servicemen were
wasted in noncombat units, at a time when a manpower shortage limited the nation's ability to race to Vienna and Berlin ahead of Stalin. Morris MacGregor noted that "Segregation in turn burdened the service with the costly provision of separate facilities."  

While more Northern officers began appearing as a result of the primitive Reserve Officer Training Corps and preparedness schemes, conservative Southern officers dominated. These officers, like those during World War I, again sacrificed efficiency in order to maintain the racial line. The Red Cross even segregated blood for storage and use. Many Southern white commanders went beyond Army Jim Crow regulations to adopt the local ordinances of the South, where most Army bases were located. This further aggravated Black service men, who knew that Army regulations did not call for "separate but equal" officer's and NCO's clubs, eating facilities, libraries, or buses. That many of these facilities were flagrantly "unequal" and inferior did not help Black morale. The Army's deliberate refusal to commission appropriate numbers of Black officers for the Black units also led to friction. According to Morris MacGregor in the official history of integration in the armed forces,

The attitude and caliber of the white officers assigned to black units hardly compensated for the lack of black officers. In general, white officers resented their assignment to black units and were quick to
seek transfer. Worse still, black units, where sensitive and patient leaders were needed to create an effective military force, often became, as they had in earlier wars, dumping grounds for officers unwanted in white units. The Army staff further aggravated black sensitivities by showing a preference for officers of southern birth and training, believing them to be generally more competent to exercise command over Negroes. In reality many Negroes, especially those from the urban centers, particularly resented southern officers.22

As more militant "New Negroes" began demanding equality of treatment, serious racial trouble developed.23 Black newspapers championed an end to segregation, using military efficiency and effectiveness as key arguments against the Army's policy of Jim Crow. These newspapers constantly reported racial incidents, especially those happening at Southern bases. These pressures led to limited action.

The Tuskegee Airmen experiment, meant by Franklin Delano Roosevelt to placate the Black press, Walter White of the NAACP, and other Black leaders, was a success, disproving arguments about Black intelligence and fitness as pilots. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr, and "Chappie" James would organize and lead the Tuskegee group. Davis Jr.'s father, first Black General Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., however, was denied the command his rank deserved, since white officers would have to serve under him, even though he had more experience in service than the majority of white generals. For the airmen and the other Black units, enough incidents developed to force the easing of some segregationist
policies, especially on buses, in officers' clubs, and messes by 1944. Southern officers often resisted implementing "desegregation" orders, however. "Necessity and error caused segregation to be bypassed, leading occasionally to Black and white soldiers sharing work and living spaces in the rear, in hospitals, and in units."\textsuperscript{24}

By 1943, the manpower shortage made Black service necessary.\textsuperscript{25} The Black 93rd Division, as before, enjoyed a better overall assignment than the 92nd, and performed better. The 93rd was sent to the Pacific, and saw combat. The 92d was sent to the European Front, and, due to manpower shortages, also saw limited combat.

The breakdown of segregation into unit by unit allocation in World War II is well documented. According to Bernard Nalty,

Throughout the fighting in Europe, some commanders routinely mingled black and white artillery battalions and attached black tank or tank destroyer elements to white organizations. Not until late 1944, however, did the need for infantry replacements become so acute that black platoons were incorporated into white rifle companies.\textsuperscript{26}

Following the Battle of the Bulge, the desperate counter-attack by the Wehrmacht against the Allies in December 1944, the Army was strapped for frontline soldiers. Consequently, Lieutenant John C.H Lee, who was Eisenhower's deputy for logistical support, decided that "a limited number of colored troops who have had infantry training"
could enjoy "the privilege of joining our veteran units at the front." The First and Seventh Army in the Mediterranean were integrated in this fashion, and performed well. But some commanders, like General George Patton, were so biased that even exceptional units, like the celebrated 761 Tank Battalion attached to Patton's Third Army, could not dent the image of Blacks as incapable of combat.  

The Army maintained a deliberate policy, dating back to World War I, of assigning mostly Southern white officers to Black units.

The basic misconception was that Southern white officers understood Negroes; under such officers Negroes who conformed with the Southern stereotype were promoted regardless of their abilities, while those who exhibited self-reliance and self-respect—necessary attributes of leadership—were humiliated and discouraged for their uppitness. "I was astounded" he (Lt. Col. Marcus H. Ray) said, "by the willingness of the white officers who preceded us to place their own lives in a hazardous position in order to have tractable Negroes around them."

The Army's leadership persisted in this belief despite the fact that Stouffer in The American Soldier, a study commissioned by the Army during World War II, proved "that Negro troops preferred Northern white officers to Southern whites." As for the high representation of Southerners in Army service overall, Leo Bogart observed that states that provided their sons with more restricted civilian opportunities, as did those in the South, had long
traditions of professional military service. The top ranks of the Army naturally mirrored their most consistent and powerful patrons: Southern conservative legislators. Many Southern officers held segregationist views, and did not try to hide their contempt for Black troops.

Edward "Ned" Almond, a Tennessean, who will be a Major General in Korea, was the white colonel who commanded of the segregated 92nd Division during World War II. Thanks to Almond’s inattention to training and deplorable leadership from white officers, the 92nd did not perform uniformly well during the Second World War. The small units, most notably the 367th and 371st tank units (attached to Patton’s Third Army in Europe) performed much better. Because of this, many high-ranking officers concluded that Blacks only fought well in mixed or small units. Some, like Almond, concluded that Blacks could not fight at all. Only a few blamed the poor quality of the white officers, a conclusion now justified by time.

After the war, the Army disbanded the 92nd and 93rd divisions of Eighth army, leaving mainly the 24th Regiment, along with small units like the 9th, 3rd, and 5th Infantry Battalions to absorb the former two divisions’ remnants. These units became overstrength on occupation duty in Japan between 1945 and 1950, due to limited options for Black troops within the military and problems in the postwar economy. Despite Truman’s 1948 Executive Order 9981, which
declared that "there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin"\textsuperscript{13}, most of the military hierarchy, especially in the Army, opposed desegregation, and delayed enforcing it for as long as possible.\textsuperscript{34}

The cultural assumptions of military academy-educated Southerners within the Army officer corp clashed with the perceptions and assumptions of the newer, Northern-born officers, products of the emergent ROTC programs of the pre- and post-World War II period. This clash influenced the argument over the utilization of Black troops in the post-World War II Army. Officers argued over whether to retain the "big unit" orientation of only allowing Black units to work within Black Divisions (i.e. the 92d and 93rd Divisions), integrating small units in white divisions by attachment (maintaining World War II desegregation by unit), banning Blacks from the Army, or individual integration. The crux of the argument revolved around perceptions of Black fighting ability and competence, and various experiences with integration. Those officers who experienced small unit integration argued for it. Staff officers who did not see combat and who felt that Blacks could not fight argued either for the extension of the large units, quotas on Black enlistments, or outright bans on Blacks in the Army (or at least on Blacks in combat). Officers who believed Blacks
could fight argued for small units, individual integration, quotas, and the use of the General Classification Test (GCT) to remove illiterate or poorly educated Blacks from service.

In 1945 the Army established the Gillem Board to advise it on which action to take. The Gillem Board recommended small Black units (not above Regimental level) integrated or attached to large white units, a 10% quota on Blacks, opening new specialties to Blacks, offering training for Blacks at all of the Army schools, and maintaining the current system of integrated officer training (but not accommodations). It also recommended denying reenlistment to servicemen who "meet only the minimum standards." The Gillem Board's recommendations were adopted officially, but some parts were passively and actively resisted, which ultimately undermined the recommendation's effectiveness. Ultimately, only a few new specialties were included and only seven more schools allowed Blacks. In 1946, recruiters' demands that first-time Black enlistees have experience in certain fields. However, War Department policy to mean that Black applicants had to attain test scores 30 points higher than whites to be accepted by the Army. This policy drew criticism. The War Department argued that the higher standards for Black soldiers were selectively enforced and temporary. This argument won the Army a political reprieve.

On 26 July 1948 President Truman, in an effort to woo Black voters and unify anti-communist support, issued
Executive Order 9981. This order declared equality of treatment in the military. Executive Order 9981 created the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Service (known as the Fahy Committee, after its chairman, Congressman Fahy) to create enforcement mechanisms. Truman intended 9981 to eventually end segregation in the military. The 1949 report from the Fahy Committee recommended ending the quota system and opening all military specialties to Blacks. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Army objected to the Fahy Committee recommendations.

Initially, the Army stalled implementing the Truman Order and the Fahy Committee recommendations. The Secretary of the Army, Gordon Gray, commissioned the Chamberlin Committee on 30 November 1949 to reexamine Army segregation policy. It issued the first of its two reports on 9 February 1950. As historians Nalty and MacGregor commented, "The board's report represents the last official defense of segregation in the service." The Chamberlin board recommended staying with segregation and quotas.

Eventually, the Army consented to most of the Fahy Committee's recommendations, but only after using the Chamberlin Committee's findings to force Presidential concessions on quotas that limited Black recruitment and retention. The White House and the Army finally reached a compromise in January 1950, that lifted the quotas, but
allowed for their reimposition if the Army felt that too many Blacks were in service. In Special Regulation No. 600-629-1 (issued on 16 January 1950), the Army agreed to open up new specialties to Black soldiers by creating new units in previously closed branches (mainly the newer armor, artillery, and anti-aircraft specialties, along with the signal corps, ordnance, finance, and some medical corps) and to raise the General Classification Test entry score from 70 to 90 for everyone while maintaining separate parallel units. This policy disqualified significant numbers of rural, Southern whites as well as Blacks from service due to the quality of Southern education.

While the Army attempted informally to maintain the 10% quotas in re-enlistment and assignment, officially the quota for recruitment ended in March 1950. Secretary Gray also attempted to maintain the letter but not the spirit of the Truman Order by establishing a single promotion standard regardless of race.

Several committees examined the problems of segregation from 1945 to 1950. The Army's Gillem Board, convened from 1945 to 1947, recommended that segregation and separate units be maintained. The 1949 Chamberlain commission recommended gradual integration. The Fahey Commission, appointed by President Truman to recommend ways to implement 9981, urged desegregation in its 1949 report, especially in light of the military's critical need for manpower in
specialties currently not accessible to Blacks. Project Clear, an official Army sociological survey in Korea during 1950-1951, also reported favorably on desegregation.

Yet high-ranking officials stonewalled these efforts at integration. Desegregation occurred only under commanders who believed in it. This response governed Army policy from 1949 to March of 1951, when the Korean war created de facto integration in some areas by undermining officers' ability to enforce segregation under combat and garrison conditions to such an extent that reimposing it would have entailed unacceptable costs in life and resources.
ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., p. 375.


5. Ibid., pp. 49-50.

6. Ibid., p. 52.

7. Ibid., p. 54.


9. Ibid., p. 69.

10. Ibid., p. 75.

11. Ibid., p. 76.


13. Patton, p. 68.

14. Ibid., p. 70.

15. Ibid., pp. 88-9.

16. Ibid., p. 104.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., pp. 94-5. "Blacks did not agree that black officers were to blame for the blunders of the 368th Regiment... the problems resulted from the fact that as a whole the regiment was not equipped for battle in the front line. Artillery support [to wipe out German artillery and stop the hail of bullets and shrapnel] did not come until the sixth
day of battle and was limited even when it did come. The regiment had no grenades, no trench fires, tromblons, or signal flares, no airplane panels for signaling and no shears for German wire. They had no maps...Further, blacks felt that the failure of the unit was due to the incompetence and cowardice of the second and third battalion commanders [white], not black officers. For example, Major Elser, during the attack, was 'lost' for several hours, leaving no one in command of the [that] battalion..."

19. Ibid., p.106.


21. Ibid., p.36.

22. Ibid., p.37.

23. Ibid., p.35.

24. Ibid., p.46.

25. Ibid., p.33.


27. Ibid.


29. Letter, Ray to Gibson, 14 May 1945, WDGAP 291.2 in MacGregor, p.133.


31. Ibid., p.12. Note: this is the Project Clear data on the integration of the Army. While utilizing it, this author recognizes three limitations; the interpretational nature of the excerpts (they were edited for this work to specifically refute Afro-American nationalist charges (p.1), Bogart et al gave no specific dates or unit identification although they all took place in Korea between October 1950 and February 1951; and some of the white and Afro-American troops could conceivably have masked their true feelings in answering these surveys, especially if they felt that their answers would be used against them.

32. Ibid.

34. Ibid., pp. 240-246.

35. Ibid., pp.189-90.

36. Ibid., p.200.


39. Ibid., pp.239-40, 254-258, 292; Bogart., p.18.


42. Nalty and MacGregor., pp.264-5.

43. January 16, 1950 U.S. Army Special Regulation No. 600-629-1, "Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army" (Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C. "The Policy of the Department of the Army is that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the army without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. All manpower will be utilized to obtain maximum efficiency..." Nalty and MacGregor., pp.284-5. Because this regulation was vaguely worded, SR 600-629-1 was interpreted by the military as allowing either segregation or integration.

44. Nalty and MacGregor, p.291. "...in 1949 the army had 490 active occupational specialties. In 198 of these specialties, there were no authorizations at all for Negroes. There were 245 specialties with authorizations for 10 or more whites and authorizations for 10 or less Negroes. In 91 specialties there were authorizations for 10 or less Negroes and for 100 or more whites. There were 144 specialties with authorizations for 10 or more whites and no authorizations for Negroes..."

45. Ibid., pp.258, 261-5.


47. Bogart, p.18.
48. MacGregor and Nalty, p. 287.

49. Nalty, pp. 245-251.
Chapter II
The First Year of the Korean War

Section I. Origins of the Korean Conflict

The rigidity and fear that characterized the Cold War era gave birth to the Korean war. The United States, having "liberated" South Korea from the Japanese, started its first true experiment with "nation building" there, although it did not call it by this name. Due to the lack of language skills and cultural insensitivity, the United States first used Japanese officials and former Korean collaborators with the Japanese in its occupation government. Once it rectified that grave political blunder which alienated the U.S. backed government from loyal nationalist Koreans, it made an even worse error. Due to fears of Communist expansion (after all, the Soviet Union was ensconced north of the 38th parallel and were building, in U.S. eyes, a "Communist dictatorship"), the United States allowed conservative Koreans, often former Japanese collaborators, to dominate the new government it set up. American officials perceived moderate reformist parties as Communists and excluded them from shaping the new state, in part due to their advocacy of land redistribution. The United States installed Syngman
Rhee, an American educated conservative independence leader, as head of the Republic of Korea's government. This further alienated large segments of the South Korean population, because Rhee was an autocrat. Some experts now feel that if Communist leader Kim Il Sung had waited, Rhee's corrupt and cruel government would have fallen from internal dissent. Yet Kim Il Sung's lack of patience led to the June 22, 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops. Ironically, North Korean soldiers' atrocities against civilians gave Rhee the legitimacy to rally his people.2

While the true catalyst of the Korean invasion remains shrouded in mystery, many scholars blame it partly on an unfortunate speech just a few weeks before the invasion given by Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State, who omitted South Korea from the officially defined United States perimeter of strategic interests. Whether this event, or any of the other, was the catalyst of the invasion cannot be conclusively determined because the Communist regimes in North Korea and China maintain official secrecy, while the chaos in the former Soviet Union has prevented extensive review of their files to date.3

Evidently, Kim il Sung of North Korea did not believe the United States would rescue Rhee's government. Kim wished to reunify Korea cheaply. He did not recognize that the Red Scare ignited by the 1946 "loss" of Eastern Europe to Communism and the 1949 "loss" of mainland China effectively
negated consideration of any moderate or neutral U.S. reaction to Kim's outrage. The 1946 Truman Doctrine, promising to aid any government fighting Communism, also precluded moderate action. The belief that communism would attack any weak parts of the "free" world, led the U.S. government, then under Harry S. Truman, to believe that Korea was just a feint in the world wide conspiracy, and that a Soviet attack in Europe would follow shortly. Korea had to be pacified efficiently so military forces could be reserved for Europe.

The Chinese and Kim did not think that the United States would react to a Chinese sphere of influence over Korea that appeared to them every bit as logical as the United States' in Latin America. The Soviet Union did not care, and even once the conflict had begun continued to boycott United Nations' Security Council meetings. The Soviets even offered to mediate the conflict. Truman utilized the walkout of the Soviet representatives to obtain United Nations approval for international intervention, headed and mostly manned by the U.S. He instructed General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the Far East Asian Command (FECOM) to simply "contain" North Korea.

MacArthur quickly committed troops from his Eighth Army. In all the Eighth Army included approximately 35,600 soldiers, roughly 90% of whom were white and 10% were Black in accordance to Army unofficial quotas. At the beginning of
the war, all of these soldiers were in segregated units. Almost from the beginning of the battle, integration spontaneously occurred. There was one major segregated unit in the 25th Division: the 24th Infantry Regiment, with its mated segregated 159th Field Artillery Battalion and its mated segregated 77th Engineering Corps. Members of the segregated 555th Paratroopers were also attached to the 24th Infantry Regiment from time to time.

MacArthur saw the North Korean invasion as his chance to regain China for the West, and attempted to achieve this goal throughout most of his tenure, from July 1950 to April 1951, despite Washington's instructions to fight a limited war. The first U.S. unit, Task Force Smith of the 24th Infantry Division, arrived in Korea on July 1st, 1950, and set up a blocking position at Osan, and was promptly overrun.

U.S. Army units sent to Korea in July of 1950 harbored serious deficiencies. Most of the deficiencies were attributable to: economically inspired size cuts, an emphasis on maintaining divisions at the expense of effectiveness, occupation mentality, lack of consistent and appropriate training, alcohol, inadequate leadership, lack of up-to date and appropriate weapons, morale, and lack of available soldiers. William Stofft concluded that "In the end, problems encountered during the first battle in Korea came down to training areas, shortages, and the distractions
of colonial life in Japan... In the end, none of these units.... initially able to stop the enemy." ^6

While most scholars are critical of the performance of white troops during the opening months of the war, more are critical of Black units. Most notably, Roy Appleman accused the Black 24th Infantry Regiment of breaking, excessive cowardice, and being totally ineffective. He made this assessment despite the fact that the first reported victory in Korea came from the 24th Infantry Regiment at Yechon in July. At a time when all of the units in Korea were performing poorly, Appleman and others, including senior 25th Division officers, perceived the 24th Infantry Regiment's problems as being racially rooted and therefore worse than whites. Most of the scholarly literature agrees that all of the U.S. units in Korea during July and August of 1950 performed poorly, ran or withdrew when surrounded, had major problems holding defensive lines, and fell prey to the North Korean tactic of fixing their fronts with artillery fire while sneaking around to the sides and rear dressed as refugees or Republic of Korea (ROK) soldiers. White units failed the majority of the time against the numerically superior, better supplied, Soviet and Chinese trained North Korea People's Army (NKPA). ^7 The following two sections will explore what the 24th Infantry Regiment (Regimental Combat Team= RCT) did in Korea, and how segregation broke down during the first year. Special attention will be paid to the
actions of July and August 1950, two months controversial in Roy Appleman's official Army history, *South of the Naktong, North of the Yalu: June-November 1950.*

SECTION II. ACTION IN KOREA FOR THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

On June 25, 1950 the North Koreans invaded South Korea with 135,000 men organized into seven assault infantry divisions, one tank brigade, one independent elite infantry regiment, one motorcycle regiment, three reserve divisions, and five border constabulary brigades. The Republic of Korea Army (ROKs) had 98,000 men in eight infantry divisions. The real differences between these two combatants were not numbers, but training and experience. The conventionally trained NKPA were tactically better than the glorified thugs-turned-police ROKs. The ROKs did not train in conventional warfare; Rhee used them mostly as an internal police force against political dissidents.

On June 27, 1950 the United Nations Security Council passed its resolution proclaiming "breach of peace", and authorized intervention. On June 28, Seoul, capital of South Korea, fell to the NKPA. The all-white Task Force Smith, comprised of the 21st Infantry Regiment and a few associated elements of the 24th Infantry Division, arrived under the command of Colonel Charles Smith. The rest of the 24th Division, the 34th and 19th Regiments, arrived on July 4, 1950, and under Major General Collin Dean, promptly met the
same fate as Task Force Smith. The 25th Infantry Division, containing the Black 24th Infantry Regiment. The 24th Infantry Regiment arrived on July 12, 1950. By July 13, U.N forces total 75,000 persons, divided between 18,000 U.S. soldiers and 75,000 ROKs.

Task Force Smith and the rest of the white 24th Infantry Division did the best it could, given inadequate artillery support, outdated weaponry, and inadequate anti-tank weapons from World War II against Soviet T-34s and captured Shermans the Chinese gave the North Koreans. It was still overrun several times, consistently broke in the face of the enemy, and often retreated. This performance was repeated with almost every unit in Korea, with the possible exception of the 27th Wolfhounds of the 25th Infantry Division. Between July 1 and August 20th, 1950, U.S. and Republic of Korea units (Republic of Korea units are also referred to KATUSAS; Korean Augmentation Temporary U.S. Army) retreated to below Seoul. American lack of knowledge about Korean culture and language complicated use of the KATUSAs, and their inadequate training strained American patience. KATUSAs, many originally trained as police against an unarmed populace, and others, untrained individuals pulled off the street, suffered during the Korean conflict and regularly broke under fire in the first year of the war.

The United States' first military success in the Korean
conflict occurred July 20, 1950, when the 3rd battalion of the 24th Infantry regiment (3/24) at Yechon, retook the hill that they were run off of earlier. From July 20th, with the 24th Infantry Division’s loss of Taejon to the NKPA (Major General William Dean, 24th Division commander, was reported missing in action during the fall of Taejon) to October 9th, the rest of the American experience was a mixed bag of victory and retreat: occasionally organized, more often not.

One of the major battles that the Black 24th RCT took part in during those critical months of July, August, and September 1950 was the Battle for Sangju. It was accused of problems during this battle, problems that the veterans hotly contest. This battle, as described in the 25th Division and 24th RCT War Diaries, encompasses both the problems all units had in Korea, and the kind of battle that the 24th RCT encountered in Korea.

Sangju is also notable because of the dichotomy between the war diary records and the Appleman account. Appleman supports his perception of Black performance at Sangju (were Appleman was not present) with a block cite from the 24th RCT War Diary, 25th Division War Diary, Inclusion 3, July 22, 1950, the EUSAK Inspector General report on the 24th Infantry Regiment, 1950, testimony of the battalion and regimental officers, 2nd Battalion and 24th Regiment with a section on the withdrawal of the 2/24 on July 22, 1950. This
one cite, which covers approximately a half page, contains no page numbers and no direct quotes. It does sound similar to the hearsay evidence and opinion on Black "characteristics" offered in the March 1951 Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK) Inspector General's Report of Investigation Concerning the 24th Infantry Regiment and Negro Soldiers in Combat (EUSAK Inspector General 291.2 file), a report of dubious value, as will be shown in Chapter Six.

Appleman claims that on July 22, 1950 E and F Company, advancing with elements of the ROK 17th Regiment, met disaster west of Sangju.

With E Company leading, the battalion moved along the dirt road into a gorge with precipitous mountain walls. Suddenly, an enemy light mortar and one or two automatic weapons fired on E Company. It stopped and the men dispersed along the sides of the road. ROK officers advised that the men deploy in an enveloping movement to the right and to the left, but the company commander apparently did not understand. Soon enemy fire came in on the dispersed men and E and F Companies began withdrawing in a disorderly manner.

Col. Horton V. White, the regimental commander, heard of the difficulty and drove hurriedly to the scene. He found the battalion coming back down the road in disorder and most of the men in a state of panic. He finally got the men under control...The tendency to panic continued in nearly all the 24th Infantry operations west of Sangju. Men left their positions and straggled to the rear. They abandoned weapons on positions.

Black officers and enlisted men present during the July combat at Sangju strongly dispute Appleman's official Army
account. Clay Blair noted that

The 24th suffered 323 battle casualties... Whether true or not, word began to spread through the white Army that the 24th was not dependable, that the blacks were cowardly and would not fight. In the words of black paratrooper Bradley Biggs, the 24th was summarily 'lynched' then--and in later in the Army's official history....However, even a cursory examination of the charges by the blacks who were present leads to the conclusion that the Army's official account is thinly researched, canted, insensitive, and utterly unreliable as 'black history.'

Evidence in the 25th Division War Diary differs from Appleman's account and does not support his accusations.

The 25th Division War Diary described several problems in the white 35th Regimental Combat Team (RCT). For instance, Jack Pancake, the Army Infantry historian for the 25th Division, reported that on July 22 at 11:00 am, in a driving rainstorm, the enemy attacked and penetrated F Company, 35th RCT, forcing it to withdraw. Several men drowned in a river trying to escape due to the disorganization and panic of the retreat. This experience can be compared to the 24th RCT's experience that same day. The CO (Commanding Officer) of the 24th RCT "re-assumed command of the 2nd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion 24th RCT engaged the enemy at (1090-1515) for approximately four hours, before withdrawing on the order of the CO. Companies E and H left their heavy weapons when forced to withdraw. Poor visibility and radio communications hindered effective use of artillery on enemy positions." Radio communications'
problems would be one of the main causes of the problems at Pusan.

By following the movements and incidents of combat for the 24th RCT from July to September, the performance of the 24th RCT can be seen to fit within the performance pattern of the American troops as a whole. On July 22, the 3rd Battalion of the 24th RCT arrived at Hamchung, where it secured the withdrawal of the 35th RCT, and then returned to Sangju. On the morning of 23 July 1950, 1st Battalion moved to high ground across the main road west of Sangju to block enemy attack or infiltration from the west "3rd Battalion moved into assembly area north west of SANGJU from which all units were deployed into defensive positions north of CHONGSAN."12 They relieved the 19th Regiment of the 1st ROK Division there. On the 24th of July the 24th and the 35th RCTs received orders to block "all avenues of enemy advance from the north or west into the SANGJU area." with the 35 RCT (less 1st Battalion) in defensive positions around Chungchon-ni.13 At 6:30 am the true Battle for Sangju started, with the white 27th RCT drawing enemy fire.

The 2nd Battalion of the 24th RCT moved into new defensive positions around Sangju that day, where they received heavy artillery bombardments, but no attack. Many soldiers, white and Black, felt that the 24th RCT was singled out by the NKPA for more bombardments than other units. These kinds of bombardment stretched men's nerves,
because it convinced them an attack was on the way, and they waited for it with every body part tense and alert. The tenseness tired out people more quickly than normal alertness. The rest of the 24th RCT "continued to occupy defensive positions and patrol aggressively. The 1st Battalion kitchen train was taken under enemy artillery fire at 240730 July 1950. The train moved and no other fire was received." In other words, NKPA ambushes in the rear, which characterized the American experience in Korea, here hit the 24th RCT.

The North Koreans partially succeeded in using a double envelopment against the U.S. and ROK forces on July 25th. This was a standard tactic for them. North Koreans attacked with tanks at 6:00am on the 25th, hitting the 27th RCT. U.S. artillery ended this attack within a few hours. The NKPA withdrew and penetrated through the 27th's left side and the 1st Cavalry Division's position. This allowed the North Koreans to attack the 1st Battalion of the 27th RCT's sides and rear, and to grab the high ground at the rear.

"The 3rd Battalion 24th RCT received fourteen rounds of enemy mortar fire in its area at 250015 July 1950. Resupply over rough terrain became an increasing problem. At 242315 July 1950, several rounds of artillery fire was received in the vicinity of the Battalion CP." The North Korean 1st, 2nd, and 15th Divisions continued to attack the 25th Division's positions. They were aided by heavy artillery and
armor, which the 25th Division lacked.

On the 26th, as a part of the overall plan to defend Sangju and Taegu, the 27th RCT withdrew into a new position, with the 35th to the right and the 7th Cavalry Division to the left. Major Jack Pancake reported in the 25th Division War Diary that

All Battalions of the 24th RCT were employed in defensive positions north and west of SANGJU, on a frontage of more than 17,000 yards over extremely rough mountainous terrain. At 260639 July 1950 an enemy attack started against the 3rd Battalion. A penetration of Company I positions was made at 261025 July 1950 causing a withdrawal of some of the battalion units. The entire battalion area was heavily shelled with mortar fire. Company L was surrounded and ammunition supply became critical. Elements of the 1st Battalion were committed to ease the enemy pressure.¹⁷

North Korean artillery shelled the Regimental command post in the late afternoon, forcing it to be moved. Using the few tanks at the 25th's disposal, the 24th RCT withdrew under the cover of night to new defensive positions.¹⁸

Despite the withdrawal, North Korean forces continued to infiltrate the entire line. These infiltrations led to new positions. To the left of the 24th now stood the 27th RCT, with ROK forces on the right side. The 2nd Battalion of the 24th attempted to counterattack positions formerly held by its own F Company, but was surprised by North Koreans who had slipped into the area just vacated by the 2nd Battalion. Twenty-fifth Division headquarters abandoned the
counterattack due to the numbers and volume of fire of the enemy.

On the 28th North Koreans, dressed in U.S. uniforms and using U.S. weapons, slid past Company C of the white 27th RCT and forced the company to withdraw into its sister Company B's position. North Koreans also infiltrated around the rear of the 1st Battalion, 27th RCT at the same time. While this went on, the 1st Battalion, 24th RCT attacked at 10:30 on the 28th and "seized the high ground to their front (1094.3-1502.5) Enemy counter attacks failed to dislodge the battalion...One enemy tank was destroyed in the 2nd Battalion area. There were evidences of an enemy build up in front of the 3rd Battalion throughout the day." The 2nd Battalion stood heavy enemy attacks at starting at 6:10 pm. Eighth Army headquarters, continuing the overall strategy of delay, withdrawal, and putting in units one by one, withdrew parts of the 24th RCT that night.

The 25th Division War Diary noted that the North Koreans spent the rainy 29th alternating between digging in and harassing the 24th RCT. HQ EUSAK moved the 25th Division during the night to positions meant to prevent North Korean movement east of the Sangju area. The 24th moved, while the 35th, with a company of tanks (minus 1 platoon), reconnoitered in the Oksong Dong area for the left half of the 25th Division's defensive line.²⁰

North Koreans attempted to slip through U.N lines
dressed as South Korean farmers and refugees. "Enemy artillery and mortar fire were continuous in the 24th RCT area. Automatic weapons were also used extensively. Air observation reveals that the enemy build up in this area continues. Enemy action has been vicious and vigorous." The attack on all of the battalions of the 24th RCT increased in size on the 30th. The North Koreans broke through between 2nd and 3rd Battalion, but were beaten back by two friendly tanks in combination with artillery support.

The penetration between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions' positions was 1,200 to 1,500 yard deep. The positions of elements of the 2nd Battalion were overrun at 301200 July 1950. The withdrawal was covered by the remainder of the battalion. The 2nd Battalion was then forced back to the 3rd Battalion positions. Company L was sent up to counter attack and retake lost ground, but was also forced to withdraw." Positions on the left of 1/24 were also heavily hit. The 1st and 3rd Battalion moved to the right and the left of the 35th RCT on the entire Division's new defensive line, while the 2nd Battalion moved back to reorganize.21

EUSAK ordered the entire division (two Regiments on the line, one in reserve; in this case, the 27th was in reserve behind the lines) to move during the night of the 31 of July east of Sangju to prevent North Korean moves east and southeast of the Sangju zone. The 24th RCT got the northern part, the 35th RCT received the southern part of the new defensive line. The 25th Division War Diary also noted that the 24th RCT, with more men than either the 35th or the 27th
RCT, received less ammunition.

### TABLE 1.

**Total Ammunition issued during the Month of July 1950**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>27th RCT</th>
<th>35th RCT</th>
<th>24th RCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.30 caliber</td>
<td>1,153,433</td>
<td>500,017</td>
<td>470,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 caliber</td>
<td>140,890</td>
<td>20,340</td>
<td>24,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm mortar</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm mortar</td>
<td>2,685</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>3,966</td>
<td>1,738</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the 31st, the North Koreans continued to attack the 24th RCT's areas. By 5:00pm the North Koreans managed to get around both the 35th and the 24th RCTs to emplace snipers and machine gunners. These groups used automatic weapons on the roads to the rear. This ended the Battle for Sangju with the withdrawal of the United Nation's forces.

Clay Blair commented on the Battle for Sangju that "Michaelis's 27th and Fisher's 35th Infantry both performed well. White's 24th Infantry was viewed as a doubtful asset and, as a consequence, the overall effectiveness of the division was impaired...and much of the energy of the 27th and the 35th was expended in plugging holes created by alleged bugouts in the

*Jack Pancake, 25th Division War Diary, 31 July 1950, p.2.*
24th.... Owing to the weakness of Walker's forces, the failure of most of the 1st Cavalry Division, and the growing doubts about the reliability of the 24th Infantry."23 One must question the accuracy of this assessment considering that the 35th Rct had to withdraw through the 24th RCT several times, and suffered several defeats, including the one described earlier. Considering that the 1st Cavalry had the highest readiness rating of all of the Army units in the Far East Command in peacetime, its total failure, which required the infusion of non-commissioned officers from the 24th and 25th Divisions throughout this time period was a far greater problem. First Cavalry was considered unreliable until well into September. Sangju showed the weaknesses of the white and Black units to infiltration and guerilla tactics. It paved the way for the bloody fight for the Pusan Perimeter, where U.S., ROK, and other U.N. forces almost were pushed off into the sea.

After Sangju, division gave the 24th orders to move to Samnangjin. EUSAK headquarters changed these orders halfway through the move on August 1st to a final destination of Masan. Once arriving there, the 24th RCT received orders to suppress guerilla activity and prevent North Korean infiltration into the Masan
area. This placed the 24th RCT in the southern area hills, with the 5th RCT on the south section of the road and the 35th RCT on the northern sector, to the right of the 24th RCT. On August 5, the capture of two enemy soldiers revealed plans for the North Koreans to capture Masan. At 2:00am August 6th, NKPA soldiers ambushed Company L (less one platoon) of the 3rd Battalion in the Sobuk-san area as they were returning from patrol. Individuals were scattered by four machine guns, and returned throughout the morning to Haman. Two more units would be grinded by North Korean ambushes in the Sobuk-san area by August 7th.

Between August 6th and August 18, all three battalions of the 24th faced sporadic, harsh fighting, NKPA artillery attacks, ambushes, and sniper attacks as they did their part to mop up Masan. Without detection by the intelligence and reconnaissance (I&R) units, the NKPA achieved tactical advantage. Several thousand NKPA troops infiltrated into the hills between the "north" and "south" roads and controlled the high ground overlooking the "south road". Essentially, the NKPA soldiers drove a wedge between the 35th and the 5th RCTs without alerting the victims. This lapse of attention allowed the infiltrators to strike the 24th RCT, who occupied the hills between the 35th and 5th RCTs.
Colonel Horton White, the overage, unaggressive commander of the 24th RCT known for nervous breakdowns and 'disappearances' during battles, received the blame for perceived 24th RCT failures. On August 7, White was shot by a sniper after disregarding a warning while visiting the front lines. Colonel Arthur Champeny promptly relieved Colonel Horton White as commanding officer of the 24th RCT because of the events on August 6. Champeny gave the 24th RCT a mission to clear the area west of Masan as far as the road between Chungam-ni to Chindin-myon. Battles at Haman and Sobuk-san welcomed the 24th RCT into the Pusan perimeter, a fight many of the veterans remember vividly and sometimes bitterly.

The men of the 24th RCT spent most of August trying to clear out formidable Battle Mountain, a large mountain riddled with old mine shafts and tunnels that the North Koreans turned into a fortress and used as a base to launch attacks on the rest of the Pusan area. The North Koreans grabbed Battle Mountain, really part of the Sobuk-san mountain mass (or Hill 665), before the 25th Division headquarters sent the 24th RCT into the hills around it and Obong-san, a mountain ridge west of Battle Mountain and P’il-bong, and separated from the 24th RCT’s base by a large, steep, and rocky valley. From the top of Battle
Mountain, the North Koreans could see and bomb the Haman valley to the east. Since first Colonel White, and then Colonel Champeny, assigned the 24th RCT to this valley, the North Koreans could observe and shell the 24th RCT's command post, supply road, artillery positions, and approach trails. Appleman commented that "Whichever side held the crest of Battle Mountain could see the rear areas of the other. Both sides fully understood the advantages of holding the crest of Battle Mountain and each tried to do it in a 6-week-long battle. The approach to Battle Mountain and P’il-bong was much more difficult from the east, the American-held side, than from the west, the North Korean side..."27

On August 15, the 24th RCT received orders to cease attempting to seize Obang-san, and to move to Battle Mountain. They established a defensive line on the high ground west of Haman, another part of the Sobuk-san mountain area. Here, the North Koreans aimed two full regiments with tanks at the 24th. Over the next several weeks, Battle Mountain would change hands 19 times, as the 24th RCT attacked continuously throughout rain and wind caused by a gathering typhoon in the Pusan area. From August 23 to August 31, the fight for Battle Mountain seesawed back and forth, grinding up Americans, South Korean, and North
Koreans, to no decisive end. Clay Blair noted that

The Army historian’s account of the 24th’s August fighting on Battle Mountain is the most scathing indictment of an Army regiment (white or black) ever published. Black GIs are repeatedly depicted as fleeing cowards, white officers as heroic figures attempting to stem the stampedes, often at great personal risk. Many black officers who were on the scene insist that the historian’s account (which fails to note the 24th’s 500 battle casualties) is grossly inaccurate...part of the Army’s public ‘lynching’ of the regiment, which, they assert, did no worse than some white regiments...[28]

Five hundred casualties does not support Appleman’s contention that Black soldiers fled combat. The 24th RCT suffered 75 dead and 425 wounded in the particularly vicious and physically exhausting fighting up and down the side of hills 665 and 625. Appleman referred to the 24th constantly as having been "routed", "broken", or "abandoning" positions. He used more favorable terms to describe the actions of the 5th Infantry Regiment, which alternated with the 24th RCT trying to secure Battle Mountain, and met no greater success. The Fifth Infantry RCT "was driven" off the mountain, "could not consolidate" gains, or was "unable to secure". Appleman also relied heavily on the testimony of white officers, testimony which seemed self-glorifying. He claimed that on August 22, an enemy platoon surprised L Company and dropped a grenade in a platoon leader’s foxhole. He alleged that
The hot and sultry weather made climbing the steep slope grueling work... The other two platoons of the company, upon hearing the firing, started to leave their positions and drift down the mountain... Shortly after dawn, August 22, I and L Companies resumed the attack. Lt R.P. Stevens led L Company up the mountain, with I Company supplying a base of fire. Lt. Gerald N. Alexander testified that, with no enemy fire whatsoever, it took him an hour to get his men to move 200 yards. When they eventually reached their objective, three enemy grenades wounded six of them and at this his group ran off the hill. Alexander stopped them 100 yards down the slope and ordered them back... The remainder of the company reached the objective on Battle Mountain with a total loss of 17 casualties in three hours' time. A few hours later...the company withdrew back down the hill to I Company's Position...

This does not correspond with the report in the 24th RCT War Diary, which noted that on the 21st "Companies I and L were reported at 1440 hours being driven from Battle Mountain by a counter-attacking enemy force estimated to be one thousand..." The 24th RCT's War Diary reported that by 9:45 am on August 22 Company I had wiped out their initial opposition and secured better than half of their objective, fire being put on the remainder of the objective to secure it. Company L was used to support Company I's attack. At 1045 Company I reached its objective... but was hampered by heavy mortar fire. At 1645 hours the 3rd Battalion Commander reported he was still attempting to go forward and was within three hundred (300) yards of the hill crest....

Appleman cited the EUSAK War Diary, G-3 Section, 22 August 1950; EUSAK Inspector General "Report of the Investigation of the 24th Infantry Regiment and Negro
Appleman evidently did not utilize the 25th Division's War Diary or the 24th RCT's War Diary, which are both considered more credible than the sources he chose to utilize.

The North Koreans launched a huge attack involving two divisions, the 6th and the 7th, on September 1. Most of it hit the 24th RCT's sector. The NKPA pushed the 24th RCT back to Haman by September 4th. By September 6, they had returned to their original positions. Again, there were many casualties, but no decisive gains. The one good thing that happened was that John Corley took over the regiment after Champeny stupidly got himself shot on a visit to the 24th RCT's by ignoring a warning to be careful of sniper fire on top of the ridge. Corley was a more able commander than White had been, and he believed in his men.

From September 6th to the September 15, the NKPA were either tearing up or being torn up by the other units in the Pusan area. Victims of this attack on the American side included the entire Second Division, which was cut in half; the 9th Infantry Regiment, most of whom were killed heroically or surrendered; the 23rd Infantry, which suffered heavy casualties, and the 35th RCT, which was surrounded and had to be rescued by the 27th RCT.

The Inchon landings on September 15th stopped the North Koreans dead.
The Masan and Pusan Perimeter battles, including the fighting on Battle Mountain, as well as from Masan to Pusan, raged from August 18 to the successful September 16th breakout by the 25th Division. The 24th RCT War Diary noted that a number of problems showed up in the Pusan perimeter. These problems plagued all of the units, white or Black, in Korea during those first three months. These men lacked accurate maps that noted where the hills and the mountains were. This led to getting lost, to orders to hold rough or defensively difficult terrain, and to supply problems. In the defense area near Haman, all supplied had to be hand carried up, because vehicles could not make it up the rough, hilly ground. This distance could be as long as the six hour long trip that pack trains going up Battle Mountain endured. All units used South Koreans to carry supplies, but this made them vulnerable to enemy infiltration. These carriers also needed rice, protection in the trains, and interpreters, needs that consumed extra Army personnel. These personnel loses were felt by the units.

Evacuation of wounded also caused problems. It took six men plus medics and a few riflemen to provide protect to evacuate one soldier off Battle Mountain. The terrain around Sangju and Masan was hilly, rough, and equally vulnerable to snipers and machine gun nests. This also drew men off the line.

Language problems crippled the use of the ROKs. Many of
the South Koreans by August were not even trained soldiers. In the Pusan perimeter, police and police dog teams were used in place of ROKs to plug holes. These men did not know English, military custom, maneuvering, or what to do when under attack. They and the non-combatant South Koreans distrusted the Japanese interpreters and the Nisei, Japanese Americans used to interpret for the Americans.

In the Pusan perimeter, the 25th Division controlled 4 regiments: (south to north) 5th RCT, Champeny's 24th RCT, Michaelis's 27th Wolfhounds RCT, 35th Cacti RCT. Johnny Walker, commander of U.S. forces in Korea, deployed all three 2d Division regiments, 9th RCT (without the 3/9), 23rd RCT (without the 3/23), 38th RCT northward to Naktong Bulge. The 9th and 23rd RCTs, "3,500 men in four battalions defending the Naktong Bulge..."34, held this, the weakest sector. During the month of August and the first two weeks of September, the 24th RCT saw fighting in Taegu, Haman, Masan, and Pusan itself.

The U.S. Eighth Army counterattack, which began on September 16, bogged down until September 19th as bad weather (the offshoot of a typhoon in the area) prevented the close air support needed to balance the knock out the North Korean artillery and lower the number of NKPA in the hills in front of the 24th RCT. Task Force Woolfolk, organized around the 3rd Battalion of the 35th RCT with elements of the 35th and the 27th RCTs, linked with the 24th
RCI to attempt to drive the North Korean from the hilltop fortress they had created in front of the 24th RCT. Task Force Woolfolk attacked this fortress with close air support denied the 24th RCT, sustained heavy casualties, and couldn't budge the North Koreans. The 6th and 7th North Koreans inexplicably withdrew from the 25th Division's front on the 19th, and the entire 25th went over to the attack.35

The 25th Division, including the 24th RCT, drove towards Chinju, where they stopped to ford a river on the afternoon and evening of September 26. By September 27, they started moving towards Namwon. Enroute to Namwon, they liberated 97 American P.O.Ws. The 24th RCT and Task Force Torman met the 35th RCT and the 89th Tank Battle at Namwon during daylight on September 28, and raced on to Kunsan that evening. On the 29th the 24th RCT took Kunsan. " Clay Blair noted that "What was particularly heartening was the performance of the 24th Infantry. Although Corley had encountered only slight resistance in his 220-mile roundabout dash to Kunsan, the 24th had carried out its part of the operation-and rescued ninety-seven American POWs-with remarkable aggressiveness and without a single foul-up.36

The famous amphibious landing by the First Marine Division of X Corps at Inchon in early September, miles behind the Communist line, wreaked havoc on the enemy and marked the beginning of a three-week-long series of
successes. Parts of the 24th Infantry Regiment made it as far as Chosin reservoir; the majority made it past Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. Here, MacArthur made a fatal mistake. Almond’s X Corps went too close to the Chinese border for Chinese Communist liking. Between October 14 and October 20th, the Chinese began to infiltrate into the chaotic North Korean front. By October 20th, four 30,000 man teams were in place. On October 25th, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) launched their dramatic counterattacks against United Nations forces.

Here MacArthur made a huge, costly mistake. By November 22, the 25th Division, along with the rest of Eighth U.S. Army, had joined the Marines at the Yalu. Eight Army waited to jump off from Sinanju. Off the cuff remarks by MacArthur caused reporters to dub this the "Home by Christmas" Offensive. It was set to start on November 24th. On November 23rd, MacArthur issued a communique’ telling the world that he was in the final stages of starting an offensive to finish pushing the North Koreans into China. His communique’ laid out the plans for the entire offensive, giving the Chinese all the information they needed to prepare a big surprise for the U.N. forces. MacArthur’s blunder cost American lives over the next few days. Generals in wars before and after Korea have been relieved and court martialed for less.

On the northwest front, eighteen divisions of Chinese
Communist Forces (CCF), 300,000 men, and the remaining NKPA forces, targeted the weak and less disciplined ROK II Corps on the evening of November 25th. They tried to envelop Eighth Army by cutting deeply through its right side and then turning west, thus trapping Eighth Army at the Chongchon River. The rest of the CCF forces fought holding or blocking battles to hold Eighth Army in place.

On November 24th, ROK II Corps (3 ROK Divisions, 2 forward, one in reserve, the standard U.S./U.N. deployment) broke and allowed the Chinese to infiltrate behind and partially envelop the U.S. On November 27, the 1/21 and the 3/24 fell back to Yongbyon. Half of the 2/24 were now fighting with the 3/9. By November 28, most of the 25th Division held new positions around Yongbyon. The hardest hit elements of the 25th Division included Task Force Wilson, the 2/27, the 1/24, and the 2/24. On November 26th, CCF forces surrounded two companies of the 24th RCT as they received an air drop in an isolated area on the east side of the defensive line. Billy Mossman wrote that "Most of the members of the two units managed to slip out of the encirclement and withdraw eastward into the 2d Division sector." The Chinese forced Eighth Army to fall back to Kunu-ri by November 29th. Major ammunition shortages on the American side marked this battle.

For the 24th RCT, the Chinese infiltration made its
impact in the Battle for Kunu-ri, from November 29th to December 2nd. Kunu-ri took place in western Korea during the withdrawal from the Yalu River to Kunu, then west by the south bank of the Chongchon River to Siananju, to finally fall back south to Pyongyang. The Chinese roughed up the 24th RCT. The 24th RCT met considerable opposition along the Chongchon River Righting the overwhelming numbers of Chinese was not helped by the onset of the 24th RCT’s 3rd Battalion’s white commander Melvin Blair’s psychological problems. His increasingly bizarre behavior culminated in a complete nervous breakdown on November 29th at Kunu-ri. His Black warrant officer, Thomas Pettigrew, Jr., received a Bronze Star for taking command and leading Blair, other white officers, and 60 enlisted men to safety. John Corley relieved Blair on November 30th. 42

By December 3rd, the entire Eighth Army abandoned Pyongyang, and retreated to near Munsan. Eighth Army continued to retreat until December 13th. On December 13th, Eighth Army established a defensive line along the Imjin River. Holding Line B, along the Imjin River, west to east, were the Turks to the left, the 24th RCT center, the 35th RCT to the right, with the 27th RCT in reserve. Line B bought time for X Corps to get to Pusan. Waiting for the Chinese as ‘bait’ strained the nerves of the men on Line B, who became targets for North Korean guerrilla activities. 43

By January 7, Eighth Army was ensconced at the 38th
parallel defensive line. This marked the beginning of the 'limited war' fighting in Korea. The tug of war fighting over hills made barren by napalm and artillery to gain negotiating points at the off and on cease fire talks began here.

General Walker, killed in a jeep crash in December 1950, and General MacArthur made many mistakes throughout the opening months of the war. While Appleman refused to summarize these mistakes and judge MacArthur or Walker in South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, several other historians have not been so kind. Even Appleman in his book, Disaster in Korea (1989) does admit that MacArthur "had an unrealistic faith in the ability of American air power to destroy the Chinese in North Korea." Other historians have not been so kind. Callum MacDonald in Korea: the War Before Vietnam detailed the sense of unreality that surrounded MacArthur and Walker. In the judgement of Clay Blair, "Most of the large mistakes had been MacArthur's: grossly underestimating the professionalism of the NKPA; piecemeal commitment of the untrained Eighth Army; the shift of X Corps after Inchon from hot pursuit to a meaningless amphibious landing at Wonson; the foolish 'race' to the Yalu in both the Eighth Army and X Corps sectors. As a result, some 60,000 American soldiers and Marines, and probably five times that number of ROK soldiers were dead, wounded, or missing." MacArthur's loose tongue about the November 24th
Offensive also stands as a major mistake. Historian Joseph Goulden concluded that, "By any reckoning, MacArthur’s decision to take half of his army out of the battle when the enemy was on the run ranks as one of the more glaring blunders of American military history—one that well cost his command victory." While MacArthur received more sympathetic treatment in Edwin P. Hoyt’s *The Pusan Perimeter* (1984), because Hoyt blamed the Truman and Congressional budget cuts and the withholding of soldiers by the Pentagon for the major Soviet invasion of Europe that the Pentagon and State Department "knew" were coming, this is an exception to the later works. Appleman, therefore, was a little too willing to let officers off the hook for the problems encountered here. Appleman neglected to say what MacDonald, the British, the Chinese, and several historians did; that all Americans relied too heavily on machines, especially jeeps, instead of walking; that all Americans reacted with panic in the face of encirclement; that American discipline broke down during the retreat from the Yalu without regard to racial barriers, and that "There were no reliable troops on the Eighth Army flank until January 1951...." Ironically, the British and the Turks had the same perception of all Americans that the white Americans had of Blacks: they would not stand and fight. One British soldier summarized British feeling when he wrote to his wife "'We would be winning if only the Yankees would stand, but they won’t' .... The Turks ....
complained that they had been 'let down' by their American allies..." The problems the 24th RCT faced in 1950 echoed the problems of the entire American contingent.
ENDNOTES


4. Originally meant to allow aid to embattled Greek moderates fighting off an attempt by Greek Communists to capture control of the government, this policy, in conjunction with the NSC 68 position paper, helped to define the policy of "containment" of Communism.


7. "Face" is roughly respect; to admit a mistake, to accept aggression passively is to be submissive, to "lose face". By fighting, even if one does not win, one does not lose "face". This same attitude created problems in the Republic of Korea (South Korean) forces. One cannot "dress down" (criticize or reprimand sharply) a South Korean officer without him losing face, and reacting accordingly (suicide or attack). Therefore, wrong orders could not be countermanded. Nor could mistakes be admitted.

8. While Appleman finished and published this book in 1961 as an Army Center of Military History publication, it was limited to internal circulation. The Superintendent of Documents did not publish it as a publicly circulating document until 1986.


10. Jack Pancake, War Diary, 25th Division, 22 July 1950, p.2. "The rain swollen river was quite an obstacle and some of the men were drowned. Others walked down the river bank to a ford. In what the Army historian described as a 'fiasco, F Company was thoroughly disorganized and sustained heavy casualties." Blair, p. 163.

11. Blair, p.3.

12. Pancake, War Diary, 25th Division 23 July 1950 (Con't), 2nd page.


15. Double envelopment is an attempt to run around both sides, or flanks, of a force to get behind and ultimately attack from the rear. The North Koreans will successfully attempt to envelope American forces several times, depending on the ROKs to collapse. The ROKs consistently folded under North Korean attacks, allowing this maneuver.

16. Pancake, War Diary, 25th Division 24 July 1950, p.3

17. Ibid., 26th July 1950, p.2.

18. Ibid., p.3.


22. Ibid., pp.2-3.

23. Blair, p.163.

24. Ibid., pp.184-5.

25. _____, War Diary, 24th Infantry Regiment, August 1-31 1950, pp. 3-8.


27. Appleman, p.369.


30. War Diary, 24th Infantry Regiment, August 1-August 31, p.20.

31. Ibid., p.21.

32. From his citation, it is hard to know if he is citing the report in October 1950 or November. He gave no month or record number. This citation is very irregular.

33. Champeny's incompetence caught up with him after he achieved brigadier general rank. His commanding officer relieved him of duty while on his next job, training ROK troops, for characteristics "not compatible with those required of an officer holding a high rank in the United States Army." Blair., p.245.


35. Ibid., pp. 281-2.


38. Ibid., p. 323.

39. One example of the seriousness of this offense is that the commanding General of the Air Force was relieved of duty for comments he made about the Air Force ability to fight Desert Storm to reporters. Bob Woodward, The Commanders, 1992, p.

40. Blair, p. 453.


42. Blair, pp. 475-6.


45. Blair, p. 554.


CHAPTER III

SEGREGATION'S BREAKDOWN IN KOREA, NOVEMBER 1950-OCTOBER 1951

The U.S. Army ignored evidence dating from World War I that segregation was less effective in combat than integration. The most significant proof that the Army was less interested in military effectiveness than maintaining the status quo racially comes from the Army's 1945 refusal to maintain the successful results from black rifle units integrated with white divisions. The Army's refusal to act on the findings of Stouffer's World War II surveys of soldiers, published as the American Soldier series, also shows that generals were less interested in military effectiveness than maintaining Jim Crow. Stouffer proved a number of "common knowledge" policies wrong. For example,

he showed that Negro troops preferred Northern white officers to Southern whites, contrary to the prevailing Army conception that the latter 'understood' them better...
he demonstrated that platoons of Negro volunteers introduced into white companies functioned well without impairing the performance of white soldiers...Stouffer's findings were ignored by the Army, which reverted quickly to the historical pattern of segregation once the emergency had ended."

The Army's Southern influenced general officers were less
interested in proven military effectiveness than in protecting the status quo. To them, the social status quo equalled military effectiveness, and they could not adapt to objective evidence which conflicted with their personal beliefs. These officers were the products of service academies in the 1920s and 1930s; they were influenced by their main patrons, Southern conservative Democrats, and by demographic trends. Southern officers were more likely to stay in longer due to the lack of economic alternatives that were equally lucrative in the South. Business opportunities lured many Northern and Western officers out of the Army. Geographic location and Southern customs, especially since many enlisted men were Southern, also influenced the remaining non-Southerners.

In 1948, Truman issued his famous executive order banning discrimination in the military. This order did not desegregate the military, despite his intentions, because of Army intransigence and stalling among general officers, supported by Secretary of the Army Gray. The Army opened up several specialties and argued that this ended discrimination. By February 1950, the Army basically won its confrontation with the President, giving up in compromise only their quota on Blacks with the possibility of reinstating it. Secretary Gray used the Army's Chamberlain Committee report in February 1950 to claim segregation was necessary for military efficiency and white morale.
In October and November of 1950, individual white junior officers in the field began to assign black replacements on an individual basis to white units. This individual integration was unofficial, and was reversed a few times by intransigent senior white officers, such as Col. Ruffner. By May 1951, when segregation was still the law of the Army, 61% of the line combat companies in the 8th Army in Korea were integrated by junior officers.²

Secretary of the Army Gray asked the Chamberlin board in February of 1951 to prepare a new report based on the then current Korean war experience. The board reported the same recommendations, but admitted that Blacks performed better in integrated units. EUSAK also studied the 24th RCT and Blacks in combat at various times from August of 1950 to March of 1951. These investigations covered the integration issue in Korea and all recommended integration, including: 1. Removing segregated units from Korea; 2. Allowing EUSAK to place white replacements in Black units on infantry and engineers; and finally 3. Enforcing SR 600-629-1 through integrating combat, engineer combat, artillery and other forward area Black units.³

These EUSAK studies all reflected the breakdown of segregation during actual combat in Korea.

The combination of several factors in Korea simply made segregation unworkable and too expensive. The Army failed to adequately prepare in peacetime for war; the prewar years in
Japan led to very inadequate training and readiness procedures, along with serious deficiencies in officer leadership. By November 1950, overruns by the Chinese were a regular occurrence for Black and white units. One veteran claimed that the Chinese integrated the Army by making all of them run together, Black and White. See Appendix A for an overview on Eighth Army unpreparedness in July of 1950.

Officer perceptions of Blacks led to blaming unit failure in combat on race. Inadequate leadership, logistical support, training and preparation, and the failure to train above battalion level in Japan, were blamed for white unit failures, not race. The perception that the problem were racially based protected inadequate white officers. Major General Ned Almond, the incompetent former commander, as a colonel, of the Black 92nd Division, was protected by his argument that problems in the unit stemmed from Black racial incompetence. White non- and commissioned officer perceptions of Black male violence and fear of large groups of Black men acting violently began to color not just evaluations, but approval of segregation. These officers’ minority status vis-a-vis their Black troops led to unease and fear of militancy.

Combined with manpower shortages, this uneasiness led some field officers to practice individual integration on their own. Individual integration provided several advantages: it prevented large groups of Black men from
associating and "brewing trouble", it alleviated officers' fears by returning Blacks to their percentage as seen in the general civilian population, it diluted low GCT (IV and V) score individuals, allowing for easier remediation of educational disabilities, it provided quickly accessible manpower (Prior to this, Blacks were mainly eligible for support/service units under segregation), and it was perceived to make Blacks "more manageable".

Matthew Ridgeway became theater commander in Korea in December of 1951. He arrived, confronting extremely low troop morale and a hard task; pushing up to the 38th parallel (UN forces had been pushed down to Pusan). On April 4th of 1951, Truman sacked MacArthur for insubordination. No one expected this action in Korea, or the elevation of Ridgeway to head the Far East Command. He took over, determined to manage the morale problem and wage limited war. After surveying the troops, Ridgeway began his campaign against morale and discipline problems. Ridgeway's initiative included the official desegregation of Eighth Army. He concluded that it would allow efficient use of troops and increase morale.

Matthew Ridgeway, an Easterner, believed segregation to be morally wrong and militarily unwise. He pointed out in his autobiographical account of the Korean war that

> It was my conviction, as it was General Kean's, that only in this way [desegregation] could we assure the sort of esprit a fighting army needs, where each soldier stands proudly
on his own feet, knowing himself to be as good as the next fellow and better than the enemy. Besides it had always seemed to me both un-American and un-Christian for free citizens to be taught to downgrade themselves this way, as if they were unfit to associate with their fellows or to accept leadership themselves.⁶

On May 12, 1951 Ridgeway recommended the complete desegregation of the theater, and asked permission from Washington because of the presence of activated National Guard units. According to Blair:

The Army’s G-1⁷, Tony McAuliffe, favored it, as did the G-3, Max Taylor. Joe Collins and Frank Pace also favored desegregation, although Pace stressed caution....In the top levels of the Army only Ham Haislip strongly opposed desegregation, but he was soon to retire... Van Fleet and many other senior generals favored desegregation. But others, notably Ned Almond, did not. Almond opposed integration in the Army then and for the rest of his life.⁷

Integration and the Mechanisms the Army Used for Implementation

Bogart study: May -June 1951 Project Clear, De Facto Integration, and Planning:

The Army commissioned Project Clear in April 1950 to detail a method of integrating EUSAK with the least amount of racial tension and discord, similar to the

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⁶ 1=personnel head, 2= intelligence, 3=plans, and 4=logistics among staff officer positions. Command levels are alphabetically designated: S for Special Staff at battalion, regimental, or company levels, G for General Staff at the division, corps, or Army levels, and J for Joint Staff (for the combined services. (David Hackworth, About Face., p.116.)
anthropological studies it commissioned and used to
determine how to rebuild Japan and create a democracy there.
EUSAK and the War Department used its findings as a
blueprint for integration. The Clear report was turned in 1
July 1951; Compared to integrating South Korean and other
U.N. troops linguistically and culturally, Black integration
seemed straightforward and simple. One survey instrument,
the Joe Doakes question, required survey participants to
respond to hypothetical integration situations and spell out
what Joe Doakes could, should, or would do. This instrument
was extremely successful and useful, because it showed that
most whites would acquiesce to integration quietly, and what
to do to make those who did not want integration tolerate
it. Identifying important attitudes and assumptions allowed
for smoother maintenance of more important parts of the
status quo. The tools recommended by Project Clear can be
divided into three kinds: methods of enactment, persuasive
tools, and coercive tools.

Neutral Methods of Enactment of Clear Recommendations

Project Clear reported that quickness and utilizing
surprise facilitated acceptance of integration. "Integration
often seemed to have occurred almost by accident, with no
one aware that new replacements were Negro until they
arrived... these "accidents" usually resulted from
replacement procedures that had been set in motion at higher
headquarters." This moderated attempts at stalling and
Clear showed that the ratios of Blacks to Whites should mirror society. There is a "tipping point" or fear threshold for whites when Blacks get over a certain number or percentage of a population (it seems to appear for other minorities, by gender and sexuality, as well). Under this threshold, integration leads to acquiesce, while over it whites respond in a "flight or fight" manner. The threshold appeared to be close to 10 or 15% in Korea.\textsuperscript{11}

The Army maintained most of its current system by assigning replacements individually. Either small numbers of Blacks were assigned to white units, or larger numbers of whites to Black units\textsuperscript{12} White soldiers assigned to Black units fared better than vice versa; Blacks tried to accommodate them. This system created less strain in racial relations, accommodated the current white replacement system, and created contact at a non-threatening threshold.

All standards applied equally (there was no lowering of standards). This was also a part of the "fear threshold". This fear of "special privileges or treatment" for Blacks created tension in whites. Reassurances of equal treatment allayed white fears.

Division commanders should be made responsible for enforcement.\textsuperscript{13} This worked fairly well in eliminating obvious, violent forms of discrimination; division
commanders were not, however, in a good position to deal with institutional racism.

The Army utilized bureaucratic inertia. Once a policy is in place, bureaucracies tends to perpetuate it. This works a little like the physics theorem about a body at rest tending to incidents. Their removal took away one cause for racial incidents.

NCO discipline and other informal methods of discipline helped create the impression that fighting segregation was more trouble than it was worth. While this informal tool applied to everyone, Black and white, and was not limited to integration enforcement, informal justice helped to bureaucratize integration. These uncodified measures included beatings, large amounts of unpleasant duties, tedious and unnecessary duties meant to humiliate and punish people (scrubbing toilets with a toothbrush, for example), excessive physical training (extra running, calisthenics, etc), and withholding of passes to town. At the officer level, informal discipline could mean unpleasant duties or administrative retaliation (supply and equipment orders "disappear") or the withdrawal of certain privileges. These informal disciplinary measures were severely restricted overall by the Uniform Code of Military Justice in the late Fifties (concerning mainly physical discipline and abuse), and then by modifications in the early Seventies (concerning verbal discipline and abuse).

These methods were based around the idea of separating
thought from behavior. Even when commanders themselves opposed desegregation, the expectation that they would enforce it, the punishment for overt discrimination, and the expectations of appropriate behavior facilitated integration.¹⁴

"Clear demonstrates that authority exercised firmly and without ambiguity can control behavior and shift opinion in politically tense situations."¹⁵ Vagueness and hesitation encouraged defiance and stalling. Expectations sometimes became self-fulfilling prophecies.

Despite segregation and discrimination, the military was still more comfortable and better at recognizing and rewarding merit, through promotion and pay, than civilian life for the average Black male. (By the late Sixties, the senior Sergeant Major of the United States Army was Black, for example.) This fact intersected with the loss of lucrative unskilled factory positions in the United States just as the Civil Rights movement began to force unions and companies to open these positions to Blacks. The lack of well-paid, unskilled civilian jobs made the Army, even a segregated or discriminating Army, seem attractive.

The Korean war integration appeared before it was ordered. The integration policy utilized implementation and enforcement mechanisms that regularized and bureaucratized what was already occurring. Project Clear information provided a blueprint for integration that protected status quo military efficiency standards as much as possible.
Emphasizing the refusal to bend standards was important to White acceptance of this policy. The military addressed behavior with clear standards and definite, consistent punishments.

The Army recognized that perceptions were important motivators for behavior; more important, sometimes, than reality. It used surprise and "business as usual attitudes" in desegregation because Clear showed that fait accompli acts were usually accepted, albeit grudgingly.

Army policy recognized that ethnic conflict does not have to be resolved to be lowered or managed. By separating thought from behavior, the military can tell soldiers "You can think this, but you can't act on it. Racial animosity may not disappear, but it can diminish. "Equality of treatment would be the rule in formal and task-specific relationships."16 Treatment of people as a class, or group, rather than as individuals, inspired people to act and think of themselves as a class, not as individuals." By treating people as individuals, the Army lowered the racial perceptions and expectations that lead to racial conflict.

Army integration was facilitated by military structure. There are characteristics of the military (i.e. the Army) that facilitated integration. According to Charles Moskos, the hierarchial power structure meant that some policy decisions could discount the personal views of personnel. Additionally, because roles and activities are more defined and specific in the military than in most
other social arenas, conflicts that might have ensued within a more diffuse and ambiguous setting were largely absent. Likewise desegregation was facilitated by the pervasiveness in the military of bureaucratic ethos...the military establishment has means of coercion not readily available in most civilian pursuits. Violations of norms are both more visible and subject to quicker sanctions...on the accountability of its members for effective performance. Owing to the aptly termed 'chain of command', failures in policy implementation can be pinpointed.18

Through assigning Black replacements individually to units as they arrived, and disbanding the segregated units, the appearance of racial harmony emerged. Within one year after firmly defending segregation, the military leadership embraced desegregation.

Ridgeway recommended integration and received permission to integrate on 28 May 1951. He desegregated by introducing white and Black replacements to small units individually, and by recommending de-activiztion of the 24th Infantry RCT of the 25th Division, the largest Black unit in Korea, effective October 1, 1951.19

Ridgeway initiated the official desegregation of Eighth Army soon after, forcing it on the few remaining holdouts. He obtained permission from the leadership in Washington in part because aide for manpower Eliza Rosenberg "mentioned the threat of a Congress which might force more drastic measures upon the Army"20 and in part due to Ridgeway's convincing case that the Army needed desegregation.21
Ridgeway deactivated the 24th Infantry Regiment on October 15, 1951, dispersing its members between other units in Korea and within the Eighth Army. It would take another three years, until well into April of 1954, for the rest of the Army outside of the Far East command to believe in and accept integration, despite the successful results in Korea.22

This decision came about in part because of "the large number of Negroes among wartime enlistments. The percentage of Negroes among those enlisting in the Army for the first time jumped from 8.2 in March 1950 to 12.9 in August, averaging 18 percent of all first-term enlistments during the first nine months of the war. Black reenlistment increased from 8.5 to 12.9 of the total reenlistment during the same period, and the percentage of Black draftees in the total number of draftees supplied by Selective Service averaged 13 percent." By April of 1951, some Black outfits were overstrength by more than 60 percent their authorized strength.23 Unemployment led to the record number of enlistments; many unions threw out Black war workers to make a place for returning whites. Others Blacks joined the Army for a chance at an education. Some Blacks saw the military as the closest to a "good life and fair shot" that they could get, in the words of Ivory Perry.24 Many came determined not to be humiliated. These soldiers utilized the military for these and other goals. After integration some
factors at the front continued to cause problems, like the weather, but morale lifted incredibly.

In the rear, change came more slowly. White officers suspended segregation, but still discriminated. Ivory Perry noted that "he felt that some of the white non-commissioned officers discriminated against Black soldiers under their command. In turn, some of the white officers resented Perry's quickness to criticize them." Evaluations became fair game: "although the accused has a comparatively good record up to the present time he apparently has been a troublemaker in his organization." Racial integration remained relatively superficial, with some exceptions. One anonymous white Project Clear respondent claimed that "We can joke with them about their race. We call them niggers. They do the same with us.... We play poker together, eat together, sleep together." Incidents continued, occasionally, but for the most part white enlisted men accepted Blacks as long as these Blacks conformed to the norms of the whites. One Black enlisted man commented in the Project Clear survey that "You learn to hold your tongue. The white boys don't say anything about the colored race and we don't say anything about their race...We get into arguments just like any group of fellows will do but it never gets out of place by bringing in the race angle." Non-conformists seemed to only associate with other Blacks, according to observations from Project Clear personnel.
For the most part, Black soldiers did perceive life as better in the mixed units. An anonymous Black Project Clear respondent commented that "The mixed units are best. The white soldier gets a chance to learn about us and we can learn about them. Many of the white boys in this unit are from the South.... I fell out going up a hill and do you know who carried me to the top of the hill? It was two white boys."30
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p.19.

3. Ibid., p.57


7. Ibid.


9. Ibid., p.142.

10. Ibid., p.106.

11. Ibid., p.121.

12. Ibid., pp.121-5.

13. Ibid., p. 105.


15. Ibid., p.39.

17. Nalty, p.231.
21. Wade "Ham" Haislip was the vice Chief of Staff for the Army. Blair., p.19.
22. Nalty., p.262.
23. Ibid., pp.430-1.
24. Interview with Cal Brunson, April 24, 1991; Program by Columbus chapter of Tuskegee Airmen, March 7, 1991.
27. Bogart, p.118.
28. Ibid., p.103.
30. Ibid., p.103.
CHAPTER IV
THE BLACK SERVICEMAN AND THE BLACK PRESS

They wanted to let the 'Man' know they were unhappy with Jim Crow. It was a long wait. I took some precautions. I called my brother, Ed. Brother Ed prepared wires to each of the leading Negro newspapers: the Chicago Defender; the Pittsburgh Courier; the Baltimore Afro American.

During the Korean War, as it had during World War II, the Black press acted as a shield, protecting Black soldiers from official retaliation for direct and indirect acts of protest, acting as an advocate, bringing soldier's problems to the attention of the public, and acted as a safety valve for soldier complaints, and protecting soldiers (along with the NAACP) from unfair court martials. This chapter discusses the utilization of the Black press by Black soldiers, and the reciprocal use of Black soldier exploits by the Black press to push for desegregation gains in the military and at home.

Black newspapers were important for several reasons. In addition to their functions as shields, protecting some enlisted men from possible military retaliation for resistance to racism and from discriminatory court martials, the Black press also acted as filters, pushing more radical demands to the side. Black newspapers publicized blatant
discriminatory treatment of Black soldiers by the military and ignored some of the far subtler forms of discrimination practiced by the military. Finally, they kept the soldiers abreast of news at home, be it the scores of the Black baseball league, employment trends, or civil rights abuses or triumphs. The press served as a vital connection between the soldiers in a foreign land and home. The Black press encouraged enough militancy to anger the American military establishment several times. By analyzing the coverage, editorials, and letters in the Chicago Defender, the Pittsburgh Courier, and the Baltimore Afro American, as well as comments and attitudes in print and soldier memoirs about the press from 1950 to 1951, the relationship of the Black press to the Black soldiers emerges. That relationship is highly colored by Black middle class values.

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Several disastrous defeats, the impressive actions of Black units like the 9th Battalion, the Chinese offensives, and the horrible morale problems helped make desegregation a viable alternative. Civilian pressure, especially in the form of political lobbying, also influenced this decision. Here, the actions of Black troops were central, and Black newspapers reported them.

The Black press kept pressure on the military. During the war years, the civilian civil rights movement began to emerge as a threat to the Southern values and political
emerge as a threat to the Southern values and political segregation. Large numbers of Black draftees and volunteers, Black resistance to segregation, press pressure, and military necessity combined to convince white officers to assign Black replacements to understrength white units. The success of these units in the field gave Ridgeway proof for the efficiency argument and gave the Black press a wedge to utilize to attack segregation not only on the battlefields in Korea, but also in Europe and the United States.

The Black newspapers' case for desegregation became "effective use of manpower." They emphasized the achievements of mixed units and racial harmony within them. Black soldiers also utilized these newspapers as pressure vehicles. Letters from soldiers, both published as letters to the editor or published within stories, tended to emphasize the humiliation and senselessness of segregation. Extensive Black press coverage of Black exploits and segregation enforcement failures infuriated military leaders, just as it had during World War II. In Korea, the white press joined in. Colliers, the New York Times, and Time during the first few months of the war provided glowing reports of Black prowess and predicted the end of segregation soon. Then the white press began to print the claims of senior white officers that Blacks were racially unfit to fight, with former 3rd Battalion of the 24th Infantry Regiment's Melvin Blair's account being the most
scathing. With the arrival of Ridgeway, this process accelerated. As the few memoirs available indicate, Black soldiers welcomed reporters because "recognizing the threat posed by distortions of the battlefield situation, Black soldiers fought a dual battle-to perform well in the field and to demand recognition for that performance behind the lines." In the United States, Black reporters and editors challenged the biased picture presented of Black troops.

Black reporters in the field exposed problem of leadership and incompetent white officers. One Chicago Defender article on the forcible desegregation of the Second Infantry Division, Eighth Army in Korea, criticized the former regimental commanding officer, Colonel John Hill, who, because of his wish to distance himself from Blacks ordered the regiment’s units on separate missions. He ordered "the all-Negro Third Battalion and attached units .... to Pohangdong as a security force. Enroute, it was ambushed twice." As a result of casualties taken due to this ill-advised separation, which made each unit vulnerable, Third Battalion and the two white battalions required extensive replacements. The division command decided to commit the Black replacements to all of the battalions. The Defender emphasized the resultant harmony of the units. This article also boasted that "Negro officers and non-commissioned officers are leading mixed units in the
First and Second Battalions of the Ninth Infantry Regiment..."  

Desolation, disorientation, atmosphere of battle, prejudice against Asians, and social conditioning also led to a sense of unreality. Unit histories and Black and white newspapers show that Blacks performed as well and as poorly as white units. These units continually dealt with racial slurs, unfair criticism, and the threat of unjust court martial. Being called "nigger" was common. The black press exposed these conditions to public scrutiny.

In the rear, conditions remained worse. Black had no clubs for recreation. Major General Ned Almond and some other white officers unofficially banned Black newspapers and magazines. Some soldiers, however, managed to receive them from home, and whole units devoured them. Corporal Leonard Payne wrote that "The paper is read by everyone in the barracks. I can't say whether it is out of curiosity or interests that the white fellows read the AFRO". Many soldiers also wrote letters to the papers, begging for pen pals and letters or complaining about treatment. As an outlet for complaints, the papers coordinated with the NAACP in their advocacy of soldiers' rights.

In the newspapers, many soldiers blamed MacArthur for allowing Jim Crow conditions. An anonymous sergeant commented in the Baltimore Afro-American that "I don't think he has much for the colored man to do." The howls of
outraged Black soldiers in the newspapers over the record number of Blacks court-martialed in Korea throughout MacArthur's tenure, especially during a mass drumhead court martial in Autumn of 1950, many without other evidence than the word of a white officer, drew fire from civilians at home and forced MacArthur to allow Thurgood Marshall to investigate the mass Army trials. Civilian reviews of these court-martials revealed major inconsistencies, as historian Bernard Nalty noted that "twice as many blacks as whites faced military tribunals in the Far East Command even though fewer than one soldier in six was a Black... Black officers rarely sat as members of courts-martial, and Black defendants tended to receive harsher punishments than whites convicted of the same crimes." After investigating, Thurgood Marshall reported in the Chicago Defender and in the Sunday Compass that many of the court martials were racially oriented, pointing out that while "only two white soldiers were convicted for failure to obey an order on the battlefield, ....60 Negroes had been charged with the same offense. Twenty-three were convicted." Appeals boards reversed most of these cases afterwards. The Army convicted four soldiers of misconduct before dropping charges after an NAACP/Afro-American investigation exonerated them. These drumhead court martials drew heavy public criticism for the Far East Command's (FECOM) policies, since most of the trials lasted less than 50
Perceived attitudes of Northern and Southern Koreans became another source of morale problems for Black soldiers that they complained about in the press. Many Black troops believed these people held contemptuous attitudes about Blacks and acted out their beliefs. Sergeant L. C. H. in the Baltimore Afro-American, observed that

The Koreans, as a whole, are poor.... Colored Americans are brought to them by the movies, in history books and by radio. The movies convey a much clearer picture because many of them can not speak English. They understand pictures. Because they see us only as servants and in other menial jobs, and because we are pictured as lazy and ignorant, they distinguish between us and white soldiers, although we are all allies, fighting for the same cause. Some of this, of course, is due to white soldiers and officers. So here we must fight for peace and against the teaching of white Americans.16

These perceptions resulted in Black resistance to discrimination that the Afro-American and the Defender, especially, covered in full. Black soldiers in Korea protested and resisted humiliation, in print and out. Black soldiers invaded "white only" movies and clubs, much to the chagrin of the army. Some directly and indirectly challenged racist officers. Many internalized their frustrations.17 The refusal of some Black soldiers to submit to segregation led to problems; sometimes to court-martial.18

Eventually, "extra" Black soldiers began to be assigned
to white units and vice versa in a very limited fashion between late December 1950 and early January 1951, both to replace casualties and break up the threat of violence that groups of Blacks seemed to pose for whites. A few racial clashes occurred over trivial problems. These clashes died down during 1951. Black soldiers often did their best to push or "stretch" this desegregation.

The newspapers responded vigorously. From June of 1950 to April 1951, the term of MacArthur's command, the Defender and the Afro-American covered the Korean conflict extensively, keeping two reporters, James Hicks for the Afro-American, and L. Alex Wilson for the Defender, with the Black troops at the frontlines and rear, most notably with the 24th, but also with the 9th. These papers printed letters in which soldiers complained about the conditions. The Defender averaged two editorials a month about segregation in the forces, and continually pressed for an Black general, even going so far as to suggest candidates. These papers also printed extensive coverage of the desegregation in the United States during the Korean War. On the Korean frontlines, as the conflict settled down to the modified attrition/trench warfare at the Iron Triangle, Black soldiers enjoyed the psychological blessings of integration. Ridgeway officially disbanded the Black units by October 1951, and gradually integrated the rest through
assigning Blacks by specialty and rotation to units as others rotated out. Soldiers continued writing to the newspapers, describing conditions and asking for letters. Lieutenant F.L.X. wrote in the Baltimore Afro-American that "Our regiment has had more casualties than any other regiment; killed and captured more enemy troops than any other Regiment." Many soldiers continued to complain about conditions, as did Sergeant Gerald Wilson: "My personal opinion about Korea is really low. Sanitation is unheard of. Only a fool would remain in Korea if his time had expired.... Last winter I really suffered in the snow and cold weather." Private First Class Albert S. Moore claimed that "We would like to correspond with some girls because Korea is a very lonely spot...." Sergeant Frank W. Harris complained that "All of the soldiers here would like to receive mail. This place is no more than a [P]risoner of [W]ar camp.... There are no clubs." Amazingly, even a few Koreans wrote in. Some simply sounded off about events at home. One anonymous letter in the Pittsburgh Courier complained "The United Nations' forces have been over here fighting for more than a year to save such people as those who pitched that shameful riot." referring to Koje-do riots. Several letters expressed upset or fear about the treatment of Black Korean veterans. One anonymous soldier writing in the Baltimore Afro-American commented that "I imagine Mr. Hicks (the Afro-American reporter in Korea for
the first year of the conflict) is wondering why some of us have stayed here over a year. Well, we have passed up our rotation because we are not sure, particularly after reading his items, that we want to be reassigned to the United States." Sergeant William H. D. Brown questioned

Can we as leaders of the "free world" tell anyone about democracy when we have organizations like the Ku Klux Klan running people out of certain places because of their color? The people of the Far East are not as crazy as some Americans think...They do not like these white people coming in to their countries spreading that type of a "free world". It is something these people have never known.

These soldiers' fears were legitimate. Articles about the prevalence of Confederate flags in Korea, continued court martials in Korea, the Red Cross's refusal to store Black blood, combined with reports of stubborn segregation and racial incidents at bases in the mainland United States and Europe, bred Black discontent.

Most letters to the editors of Black newspapers came from men at the rank of lieutenant and lower; the average writer was a sergeant, with a few lieutenants writing anonymous letters. The articles, however, were usually about officers above the rank of lieutenant. It is interesting to speculate on why fewer higher ranking officers wrote letters. While the Chicago Defender had the most extensive coverage, the Baltimore Afro-American stayed close. The Pittsburgh Courier devoted much less attention to the war,
focusing mostly on segregation at United States' bases instead. The Afro-American printed the most soldiers' letters between June 1950 to the Armistice; the Defender had far fewer, and the Courier with the least.

The Black press attempted to continue to draw attention to discrimination problems, but other events in 1952 and 1953 overshadowed problems in Korea. Before and after desegregation, the military seemed an oasis compared to civilian life. Discrimination and segregation in the civilian world seemed more severe. The newspapers, while still devoting pages of coverage to Black achievements, shifted the focus of their reporting to the efforts to desegregate bases at home and in Europe. They continued to print soldiers' letters, but these receded from the front page. Increasingly, the press left the complaints to the NAACP to investigate. Individual incidents received large amounts of attention. Possibly this is due to the difficulty in reporting discrimination, especially institutional discrimination. With the integration of units in Korea in October 1951, the basic problem, in the eyes of the middle-class press, was solved. Reporters and editors only kept enough attention on Korea to "prod" Ridgeway and "control" flagrantly racist officers. This left the Army in Korea at the armistice with segregation dead there and dying elsewhere, but discrimination still entrenched and flourishing.
In retrospect, the goals of the soldiers and the goals of the Black press converged in Korea for a time. Black soldiers and newspaper reporters both wanted to prevent distortions of the truth that would reflect badly on the race; both also wanted to attack segregation. The press wanted to psychologically support Black soldiers in a stressful environment, utilize Black battlefield achievements as a wedge to force greater civil rights at home, and use advocacy to publicize the ineffectiveness of integration. The soldiers needed press coverage to prevent abortions of justice, such as the "50 minute court martials" of MacArthur's South Korea, to highlight the humiliations and absurdities of segregation during war, and to reveal the tribulations of service in Korea. Through letter writing and reporting, the Black press served as a safety valve; the soldiers could let off steam.\textsuperscript{33} Black soldiers could beg for the letters so vital to their morale.\textsuperscript{34} They could also read about racial incidents and gains at home; the evidence is clear that this had some effect in Korea\textsuperscript{35}. In the United States' camps, it is well known that the papers' reports often led to militant action.\textsuperscript{36} There seems to be evidence to support the supposition that the Black press affected the rear areas during the Korean conflict. The press shamed and pressured officials into action, and often named discrimination perpetrators, sparking investigation.

Black press action in tandem with Black soldiers
actions influenced adoption of the integration policy. The Truman order remained in effect; while military historians and officers claimed that military necessity solely forced implementation, comparison with the experience in World War II undercuts some of this argument. Even during the worst of U.S. performance in the Pacific, MacArthur did not consider integration. Many of the Southern officers in the Army also did not consider it. While it took an extreme situation to help Ridgeway ram this policy down the throats of uncooperative officers in Korea, civilians and top brass did remain sensitive to the Black press, and especially its perceived influence on Black voters and soldiers. Perhaps this is because military necessity is defined differently by different people at different times. For Southern officers, it meant avoiding untested desegregation and clinging to the familiar; for people in the field, it meant not wasting time and bodies to maintain a system that hampered unit strength and provoked resistance to military discipline.

The threat of newspaper attention did curb some excesses. The refusal of some Black soldiers to accept discrimination, and their increasingly strong performance on the battlefield gave the Black press fodder to use at home. Racial incidents contrasted with fighting to keep a country free; the fears of communists playing on this theme helped to give the press influence.

The performance of mixed troops gave the papers
evidence to push desegregation. These units performed remarkably well, with relatively little tension; Black press reports of this underlined the ineffectiveness of segregation in war.

Black soldiers, through their letters and actions, acted partially as news gathering agents. Through complaints about treatment, and through cooperation with the reporters, these soldiers took a very active role in publicizing their exploits, defending their mistakes, and publishing their problems. The Black national press and Black soldiers in Korea enjoyed a reciprocal relationship throughout the Korean war based on necessity and a similar goal for different rationales: integration of the Eighth Army in Korea.
ENDNOTES


3. Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966), pp.383-387. Many Afro-American papers were banned on base illegally due to infuriated military brass at the steady stream of critical reports and racial incidents in the Afro-American press. Even mail was censored for a while due to this. Press outrage soon stopped both practices.


5. Ibid.


12. Ibid.


James L. Hicks, "Army Officer's Sentence Termed 'Grudge' Action", Baltimore Afro-American, October 6, 1951, p.1.

"'Cowardice' Charge Leveled by Chaplain", Pittsburgh Courier, April 14, 1951, p.3.

32. Lipsitz, p.39.


35. Ibid.


37. MacGregor, p. 609.
CHAPTER V
THE FACE OF BATTLE FOR BLACK AND WHITE SOLDIERS

To fully appreciate the impact of the Korean War on Black soldiers, it is necessary to examine the quality of their experience in combat as individuals and members of small units. This analysis should begin with pre-war occupation duty in Japan. In 1950, FECOM duty in Japan came as close to traditional colonial duty as the United States would get, for white AND black troops. Roy K. Flint, a distinguished Army historian, described the prioritization of responsibilities in the following terms:

Military-police functions so necessary in occupation were more important that combat readiness...Its infantry regiments and artillery battalions were organized on a scale of two-thirds of their required units and...were understrength. Divisions were short of equipment and parts... Units conducted little training that was or could be effective...Officers and soldiers alike succumbed to the life of a colonial army and lost the sharp edge they had honed in World War II.

Soldiers received little training. The training areas available were only large enough for training to battalion level. There was no training for fighting at night. It emphasized technology and riding vehicles, not discipline.
and walking on foot. This lack of training contributed to both Black and white units breaking in the face of the enemy. These men fought at night, conditions for which they were not trained. Soft and lacking discipline, the disorientation caused by night envelopments was particularly effective in panicking American soldiers. "Once in the rear, their [North Korean] success was assured, for American units were ill-prepared for the mental stress of being physically cut off.... The soldiers lost their concentration and thought only of escape." Commented on in the reports, over and over, was the fact that all enlisted men refused to dig foxholes. White officers of Black soldiers blamed this on race during court martials, but white men also refused to dig. These men said that perceived foxholes as traps in this new environment. Perhaps, they were just in too poor of a physical condition to dig.

During the first three months of the war, the weaponry was inadequate. Rifle platoons were initially equipped with BAR (Browning Automatic Rifles) and M-1 rifles, later to be replaced by M-14 rifles. They lacked HEAT (High Explosive Anti-Tank) shells, 3.5" bazookas, and 90 mm anti-tank guns in the artillery. Until November, they were forced to rely on 2.36" bazookas which did not penetrate Soviet T-34 tank armor and ordinary explosive 105mm rounds. Soldiers in Korea were short of 81mm and 4.5" mortars. Rifle platoons were equipped with one to two .30 caliber machine guns with worn
out parts and warped barrels. Artillery consisted of 105mm howitzers, 105mm light howitzers, (There were no heavy 155mm tractor and self-propelled howitzers until late November 1950), a few tractor drawn 8" howitzers until later. They lacked of 60mm mortars.³

In July 1950, the 25th Division was a weak organization in reality, but deceptively large on paper. Only the 24th Infantry Regiment¹ had its full complement of men (and was, due to Black enlistment rates, overstrength), and all regiments in the four Eighth Army divisions stationed in Japan lacked heavy artillery. "Although the army maintained its authorized ten-division structure, it did so at the expense of combat readiness by eliminating units that were part of the mobilization base.... Even though the percentage of combat forces in the Army increased, the statistic was deceiving, for it indicated a dangerous reduction in combat support units-the "fat"-so essential for sustained combat.⁴ Except for the 24th Infantry Regiment, (to absorb excess Blacks) each regiment had only two instead of three battalions; none had their authorized tank companies, only light tanks, and "artillery units were operating at reduced

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7. The largest Black unit left in existence by the Gillem board's actual reorganization, it joined just two other, smaller Black units (most notably the "Black Panther" 3d Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment) as an organic part of the organization it worked with, and several smaller Black units, which were "attached"; not "organic". Attached or "bastard" organizational structures tend to be unwieldy and hard to command.
strength and with only two thirds of their units."

A regiment was comprised of three companies. Rifle companies and rifle platoons were the heart of the Army; the basic organizational units. A rifle Company contains 3 60mm mortars; A battalion has 3 81mm mortars, A regiment controls 6-tube section of 4.2" (107mm) heavy) mortars. There were two 57mm recoilless rifles per weapons platoon per rifle company (only good for killing people, not tanks as originally intended.) "An Army Division of 1950 was authorized four artillery battalions of about 500 men each, manning 18 howitzers (in three batteries, A, B, and C0 per battalion. Three of the artillery battalions directly supported the three infantry regiments with 105-mm howitzers. The fourth artillery battalion, equipped with longer range 155-mm howitzers (in three batteries, A, B, and C), provided additional support to any or all three regiments or to other divisions nearby."

The white experience combat as described by white veterans, usually starts with hills. Korea, as a country, was covered in hills that American soldiers experienced as small mountains. These small mountain ranges required soldiers to climb steep slopes, often under fire, to attack. Black soldiers did this carrying eighty to 100 lb weapons and communications equipment, white soldiers had civilian South Koreans who acted as bearers, climbing the mountains bearing ammunition rice, water, and other staples. The
mountain slopes were broken by man-made rice paddies. Lacking large amounts of vegetable and animal waste to fertilize the rice paddies, the farmers utilized human and dog wastes. In the summer of 1950, the smell was almost too much for American born soldiers. It added to the prevalent solipsism (feeling of superiority and communication/cultural misunderstandings "If they knew better, they would be like us" attitude.) When it rained, the paddies turned into swamplike bogs, and the hills into mud-sodden slides.

The weather in Korea added to the discomfort. The paddies and heat combined meant HIGH humidity. For soldiers playing mountain goat while carrying a 23 pound BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle) or an even heavier 75mm recoilless rifle, among other heavy pieces of equipment, this was physically challenging. Dehydration and insects, especially mosquitos, were a never ending problem. The paddies and the hot weather contributed to trench foot, trench mouth and rashes; dehydration caused headaches, heat stroke, and heat prostration, especially when combined with lugging equipment. The men’s poor physical shape from occupation duty (as well as excessive drinking and carousing) in Japan contributed to the problems of the heat and humidity.

In winter, the humidity, mountains, low temperatures and wind produced bone chilling cold. The temperature dipped below -40, plus wind chill, in December through February.
Frostbite, especially on feet, was common, as supply screwups kept many men without adequate winter clothing, especially shoes. Some men wore tennis shoes. Lack of coats and clean socks (that universal soldiers' complaint, were common. Men refused to use sleeping bags, since zipped up in one, you were vulnerable to enemy sneak attacks. Consequently, some men were so desperate they fought for sleeping bags or blanket, since some preferred two or three blankets. In the words of David Hackworth, a white enlisted veteran,

Trying to beat the elements became a war in itself. It was so bitterly cold you couldn't sleep. You had to keep moving, stomping feet and flexing fingers twenty-four hours a day. Those who didn't were saying good-bye to their hands and feet (and in some cases their lives); for a while every day a couple of men were evacuated because of frostbite- black toes and fingers to be cut off at the hospital. Grenades, knives, and ammo would freeze fast in to the foxhole brim. Weapons froze, too- you'd have to kick the bolts of the M-1s and Browning automatic rifles (BARs) to get them back.... When we passed through villages, if a house had a lot of wood...even the most beautiful hand-carved furniture- we'd burn it, one piece at a time, finishing off the job by throwing a thermite grenade on the thatch roof and standing by until the whole structure was burned to the ground.... At night, we would carefully-obsessively-bundle, stack, and restack kindling wood, while waiting for daybreak when we could light our fires, The thought of those friendly flames allowed us to make it through the night.\^
Problems with supply mingled with the weather and the hills. Food is problematic in combat under most circumstances, but the North Korean and Chinese skill at encirclement led to real hunger as supplies dwindled. C-rations, easily portable canned food that were the standard field fare of Army soldiers, ran short. Sometimes men went for days without food, or lived off the land. Chickens and other poultry were fair game to the hungry men. Shoes and winter supplies also ran short, although in the literature, more Marines than Army soldiers groused about inadequate supplies. Since MacArthur did not expect the conflict to last long, he did not prioritize winter clothing. This delayed requisitions.

Lack of education meant that soldiers sometimes could not understand the paperwork necessary to fix problems, or how to untangle red tape. Most of the white enlisted were poorly educated working class men. Hackworth noted that "the fact was that infantrymen in Korea came, as a rule, from the bottom rung of the social and economic ladder. The squads were mainly made up of poor whites, blacks, and yellows-a dispensable rainbow-uneducated, with nothing to keep us a step ahead of the point of a bayonet." For some sergeants, the paperwork which attempted to account for everything down to the last bullet, was a nightmare to master.9

Educational deficiencies and lack of experience with different races caused problems for soldiers within the
coalition. American soldiers had considerable trouble understanding, appreciating, and tolerating the Korean Augmentation To U.S. Army [KATUSAs] (South Koreans integrated in units or individually with American forces) and, to a lesser extent, the Turks. Racial stereotypes made the Turks out to be more fierce than they actually were, and the South Koreans less. American soldiers could not distinguish North from South Koreans, and displayed little wish to expend much effort in the enterprise. This facilitated North Koreans in slipping behind U.N. lines in the American sectors. The "they all look alike" syndrome also applied to the Chinese and the Koreans, as far as American soldiers of all ranks were concerned. The Chinese, using captured uniforms, also slid through American lines while masquerading as South Koreans.

During World War II Army policy became increasingly anti-homosexual. The change in policy culminated in 1947 with the use of "blue" discharges to discharge white gays without court martial or due process. The same infamous "blue" discharges for being "undesirable" were used by white officers to discharge "uppity" Black soldiers for having "undesirable traits of character". Ironically, the Pittsburgh Courier and NAACP campaigns against these discharges helped white gays, because of the 68,000 Army soldiers receiving "blue" discharges during demobilization
by 1946, 10,000 were black and 5,000 gay. The Army appeared to tolerate gays during Korea due to personnel necessity and expediency. "More liberal provisions were made for personnel who were not 'true' and 'confirmed' homosexuals yet became involved in homosexual acts, so they could be retained in service." While discharges did continue, soldiers needed to almost be "caught in the act". While an anti-gay witch hunt spread in the States as a part of the Red Scare, tolerance appeared to be the norm at the enlisted level in Korea.

In October 1950, the Chinese generally did not take enlisted men prisoner; they usually shot or bayoneted American and South Korean enlisted personnel, while taking officers prisoner. The North Koreans did not respect rank from July to October 1950; they were equal opportunity summary executioners. By January 1951 the Chinese and North Koreans had learned the negotiating value of POWs and regularly took all ranks prisoner. A.J. Barker's Prisoners of War, Clay Blair's The Forgotten War, Hasting's The Korean War, and Knox's Korea: An Oral History: Pusan to Chosin all comment extensively on this. POW conditions during Korea were closer to the Japanese camps during WORLD WAR II than the German or Soviet camps.

In World War I the casualty rate among prisoners crossing No Man's Land after capture.... was very high.... When the Korean War settled into a static phase the circumstances were similar to World War I.... the routine in Korea was similar to that which prisoners experiences in World War II-
from the battle zone by stages to a camp where other prisoners were concentrated. Like their predecessors in the earlier wars, the prisoners in Korea got little food, little water, and precious little rest.\textsuperscript{14}

If wounded after 1950, the men were considered lucky, since wounded POWs were killed, tortured and robbed under the old policy. (Healthy POWs were just interrogated and robbed.) Under the "New, Lenient Policy toward POWs", their wounds were barely cleaned if that, and they were subject to indoctrination.\textsuperscript{15} While the Prisoners of War Convention in Geneva in 1949 did not prohibit interrogation of prisoners, it left in several loopholes that the Chinese exploited against all soldiers during the Korean conflict.

The 1949 Geneva Convention definitively said that "'No physical violence or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatsoever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.'...Until the end of 1950 the term 'brainwashing' was virtually unheard of. Following China's entry into the Korean War, however, it became synonymous with the horrors of North Korean prison camps. In effect - 'indoctrination' - .... more accurately describes the process to which the United Nations POWs were subjected."\textsuperscript{16} In blatant violation of the letter and the spirit of the Geneva Accords, the Chinese used interrogation and indoctrination techniques.
Interrogation was an important part of the legal 'bending' of the Geneva Accords. "During 'simple' interrogations - i.e. those which were undertaken to obtain military information or to maintain security in their camps (as distinct from those whose alternate aim was to effect a permanent change in a man's opinions and character) - 'simple' physical tortures were the normal treatment." 17 These included savage beating, refusal of medical care, standing at attention for hours, standing on tip-toe with a tight noose around the POW's neck (which would strangle him if he relaxed), being burned with cigarette butts, sleep and food deprivation. The food and sleep deprivation were important, not just during interrogation, but after. "After the Korean War, 192 Americans were found guilty on charges of misconduct while prisoners of war. Most of the charges involved the exploitation of other men’s hunger. One officer, who allegedly courted favor with his captors as soon as he reached his POW camp, was recorded as saying: 'The more men who die here, the more food for the rest of us.' For extra food he signed peace petitions, made propaganda broadcasts, and 'ratted' on the other prisoners.... Many of the accused informed on their fellow prisoners with a view to getting extra food - with dire consequences for the victims who were usually severely punished.... a hungry man will do anything for food." 18

Sleep deprivation played a large part in the relatively
The extraction of confessions is a comparatively recent technique used by the Communist Bloc countries who have made a significant reservation to Article 85 of the 1949 Geneva Convention. Under this reservation a prisoner of war who may be convicted of all alleged war crime under the laws of the captors loses the protection of the Convention. In Korea, UN prisoners who made and signed statements which would be interpreted as confessions found that they had provided evidence for a war crime charge to be brought against themselves. They also found that they had signed away any protection due to them under the Geneva Convention — including repatriation until their sentence was served. How a confession is extracted may be as relevant to a prisoner’s guilt as its substance. Under torture a man may eventually confess to almost any crime.¹⁹

Since a prisoner knew that his statements could be used by his captors to punish him, he had no voluntary reason to confess to anything, and especially not to a war crime. Prisoners also knew that statements used for propaganda would be punished when they were repatriated. With the full wisdom of hindsight, a prisoner’s best action was to remain silent. The favorite subject for "confession" was germ warfare, and the Chinese, who had learned their techniques from the Soviets, were particularly successful in extracting "confessions" on that subject. Sleep deprivation, beatings, slaps, kicks, cold, humiliation, starvation, and physical pain forced cooperation. Sleep deprivation, in particular,
eased the process, because it combined with exhaustion to break down memory, discipline, and the ability to think. This allowed others temporarily to manipulate memory recall and perceptions. This technique convinced some American POWs to sign confessions which they later repudiated.20

The Chinese aimed most of their indoctrination efforts at the 7190 Americans. Of them, 4428 survived and returned to the U.S., 2,730 died and 470 others were recorded as "missing". Few Americans were prepared for the indoctrination program. The communists had clear aims: short term propaganda, and the long term goal of returning American POWs as Communists. Their short term goal met with reasonable success, while the long-term goal failed miserably.21

During the Korean War, combat thus extended into the prisoner of war camps. The North Korean camps were the worst. Regardless of rank or service, prisoners were organized into companies of 200, and then subdivided down to squads of 15 or 16. "These squads were the work units of the 're-education' program which constituted prisoners' work."22 The Chinese ran most of the camps, but reserved the North Korean camps to create fear by their being "outside Chinese jurisdiction" and having "an exceptionally high mortality rate, and a reputation for the tortures inflicted on prisoners." The first step in 'specialized' interrogation for the 'reactionaries' (anyone who did not cooperate with
the Chinese) was the North Korean prison camp known as 'Pak's Palace', for its sadistic chief interrogator. The Chinese had several levels in their system of indoctrination that American soldiers had to endure. In 1950, officers were not given respect for their ranks and left in with the other prisoners. In 1951, the Chinese began to segregate first officers, then senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and finally, any natural leaders who stepped forward. "The object was to destroy the soldier's sense of discipline and loyalty based on rank and place authority in the hands of the 'Progressives'. (These individuals were graduates of the 'Peaceful Valley' camp and others who accepted Communist schooling. Prisoners who refused to show proper spirit were considered 'Reactionaries')."  

After removing the leaders, the Chinese began 're-education.' The first step was at Pak's Palace, where the soldiers were confronted with questionnaires and requests for personal biographies. "Following the interrogations prisoners were classified according to their political convictions. A POW might start the hard way- and be punished by restricted rations and other privations. But if he began to show the 'proper spirit' and cooperate with his captors, he was lectured and issued communist literature." Prisoners who co-operated with the Chinese graduated to better classes. If a prisoner was especially co-operative, he could be sent to 'Peaceful Valley', a lenient camp with relatively
good food and tobacco. Once they graduated from Peaceful Valley, they were 'Progressives'. These men were sent back to other camps, expected to actively promote communism, to inform on other POWs, and to actively find military information for the Communists. The Chinese considered physical violence justifiable on prisoners who did not cooperate. "Solitary confinement, Chinese style, was among the worst of the tortures. According to one victim the 'normal' method was to make a prisoner stand or sit to attention with legs outstretched in complete silence from 4:30 am to 11 pm daily. For the remainder of the time the man was allowed to sleep but was aroused continually by the guards 'to make sure he was still there'. There were no beds and no bedding. Shoes and all clothing, other than underclothes, were often taken away even in the middle of winter; washing facilities were often denied, sometimes for months on end..." Once he broke, the Chinese expected the 'reactionary' to write a confession. The POW was then tried and sentenced. Sometimes the sentence was suspended, with the threat of it being served in solitary confinement if the POW did not 'learn the truth'.

The average POW's daily life revolved around indoctrination. "The POWs' day started at 7 am and ended at 7 pm when they went to bed. Five of these twelve hours - from 9 am until noon and from 2 pm until 4 pm - were spent listening to lectures or attending discussions...The
lectures pursued one of two themes: the first criticized the attitude, behavior {sic} and conditions in the capitalist western world; the second told of the idyllic life under Communism...²⁶ The problem for the Chinese was that most of the men had not heard of Marx, Lenin, world affairs, and history- nor did they really care. Most of the less- than-well educated men had real problems grasping the concept of communism, dictatorships of the proletariat, "will of the people", and stolen surplus value. While morale decayed and organization broke down due to the lack of leadership and the fear of physical torture, the majority of the men never accepted communism.²⁷ "Postwar studies were to show that only 12% of American POWs.... 'actively and consistently' resisted the program. The great majority 'cooperated in indoctrination sessions in a passive sort of way, although there was a tendency to refuse to say anything obviously traitorous."²⁸ In all, only 21 Americans of the estimated 12773 non-Republic of Korea prisoners of war allegedly refused repatriation to the West and returned to the Communists. ²⁹

The breakdown of morale and organization in itself was horrible. In this situation, the sick and the faltering could not be helped. "Most of those who could adjust and who wanted to live on, lived. it helped if a man cold hold on to something. Some lived simply because they came to hate the Chinese so much. And there were some, determined to live,
who took food from the sick and dying, and there was no one to say to them nay. Since no man would accept orders from any other, and the remaining officers refused to organize and resume authority, in some camps, men reverted to childlike or animal like behavior. "In Korea, it was noticed that 'every trace of adult sexuality tended to disappear from conversation and obscene jokes were made...' General degradation and coarsening of manners is usually accompanied by concern with animal functions—not even trying to restrain wind, and disregarding laws of personal cleanliness.... A combination of fatigue, hunger, and watery food with a high carbohydrate content is believed to be the cause of the high incidence of bed-wetting and bed fouling in POW camps in the Far East." As the average diet consisted of turnip soup and rice for breakfast, 2-3 oz. of rice for lunch, and more soup and rice for dinner, many Europeans and American, used to richer, more varied diets with more meat-based protein in them, suffered. "POW rations during the Korean War were almost as scanty—a basic diet of rice, occasionally leavened with vegetable soup." For many POWs, survival was the major concern.

Black soldiers experienced discrimination, official and unofficial, in Korea. There were few Black officers, who were mostly confined to Black units. Until November of 1950, when spontaneous desegregation appeared, Black units
remained objects of abuse, especially in the rear. Black success at Yechon and other areas did not change this treatment. Segregation, as shown in chapter six, magnified stereotypes so that successful performance was perceived as less than adequate.

Black troops who went to Japan and Korea faced segregation the minute they disembarked. MacArthur, influenced by his own racism and by the bias of his second in command Major General Ned Almond, distrusted Black competence, maintained segregation in Japan, and disregarded orders to avoid egregious discrimination the same way he disregarded a number of other orders from Washington that he did not agree with. MacArthur's headquarters sent Black soldiers in the 24th Infantry Regiment to Gifu, far away from Tokyo and white units. There, black combat troops trained incessantly from boredom and the lack of "occupation duty" distractions.

The 25th Division had 13,000 men; the other divisions contained 11,000 or less. The Black 24th Infantry Regimental Combat Team (RCT) was organic to 25th Infantry Division (8th Army). It was organized as other units were organized, but was different in that it was organic (contained within holistically) and not attached (added on in an irregular, expedient fashion). Most other Black units were attached, not organic. The exception was the Third Battalion of the 9th Division (the Black Panthers). The 3/9 was organic to
the 9th Division.

Black soldiers experienced the same difficulty all American soldiers had in distinguishing enemy North Koreans from South Koreans allies, which aided North Korean soldiers in slipping behind enemy lines. Several Black veterans felt that North Koreans were using refugee "white pjaymas" to slip through and attack from behind. Black soldiers who reacted to this phenomena by shooting first and asking questions later faced legal problems white soldiers did not. One Black soldier was court martialed for killing a South Korean he thought was North Korean. No whites were court-martialed for the same offense, although it did happen with them also.

These units faced the same disorientation and fear white units faced. Frontline fighting contained hardships that included lack of food, proper clothing, inadequate or inappropriate ammunition, and unfamiliar terrain, in the best of times. For Black units, these hardships were sometimes added to by logistical negligence or incompetence, real or suspected, on the part of white officers. While one of the problems of war historically has been getting supplies past rear echelon troops, screwups combined with segregation made racial bias seem a part of the lack of supply. Some soldiers were marching in sneakers due to a lack of boots; others suffered foot ailments. By November, many were hungry.
Lieutenant Bussey of the 24th pointed out that "Our equipment was shabby and badly worn, with no replacement issues...We had no cots, no bedding, no mosquito netting, no tentage. The canned food we were issued left much to be desired..." Macron Justice pointed out that the was not enough weapons at Haman and the Pusan Perimeter, which hampered the defense. Sergeant Fletcher added that in his case,

as I was talking to Colonel Cash (the Army historian re-writing the Korea case today) he didn’t realize that, when we surrendered, we had no ammunition left, I was down to maybe one clip of ammunition, which is about 8 or 10 rounds. No one in the company had any ammunition. By the time we got captured... we followed the Chinese from November 22nd until the 27th, five days. We’d called for air drops, for ammunition and food, for five days we didn’t have any food.... The Chinese, by the time we surrendered, out of 250 men and for the first time, in the time we got to North Korea, after being hit by the North Koreans, we never went back to full combat strength. My company was normally around 249, 250 men. We always carried around 210, 220, 200 men. All the time. We never.... sometimes we were down to 180. but we never, never got back to full combat strength. On the 22nd, or the 21st, we had just come back to what we call full combat strength. We were hit by the... Chinese, on the 22nd. From the 22nd to the 27th, we had lost approximately, oh, I would say, 170, approximately a hundred and fifty some men. Lost, I mean wounded, or killed. When we surrendered to the Chinese, after Captain Stanley asked the platoon leaders and us sergeants to go back and check and see how much ammo we got. They reported to him that we had none. So he, he said "I won't make a decision, but ask the men. We can fight until we're all killed or we can surrender. If we surrender we stand a fifty-fifty chance." We surrendered cause, we
just knew.... we couldn't fight. I was told by the Chinese at that time, that if we would have made the decision to fight, which, we had a short period of time to make up our mind, they would have completely annihilated all of us. They had approximately 20 to 30,000 Chinese at that point, and there were only 137 of us that surrendered. The rest were.... not there. They were either dead or captured.

Communication wires were often cut; when they were not cut, communication was still a process controlled by Murphy's law. Communications men had to range out in front, and were great targets for snipers.

These men were tired, dirty, hungry, and sleep deprived. Lice were common. It was easy for untried or incompetent officers sometimes to not be careful about where they asked for air strikes or artillery barrages to be located. White Clay Buckingham remembered that it was nighttime. The tank battalion of which I was a part had been heavily engaged during the day in support of an infantry regiment in a river crossing operation. Now we were defending against a flank attack by a Chinese force on the near side of the river. There was a lot of mortar and artillery fire, including illumination and white phosphorus; many casualties; and general confusion. The friendly force was withdrawing and I ended up with my tank platoon fighting a sort of rear-guard action in pitch dark along a road. About the time I got my platoon past a certain checkpoint, I got a radio call asking if I was the last friendly force to cross the check point. Since we were in close contact with the advancing Chinese force, I said yes.... Shortly thereafter a long and intense American artillery barrage was laid down in the area I had just vacated.... A friendly unit somehow had been intermingled with the Chinese force and had sustained casualties in
he artillery barrage. The combination of inexact technology with human incompetence meant that accurately requested air strikes alternately did not show up at all, or fell on "friendly forces." This phenomena affected Black and white units, but Black enlisted men perceived more of this incompetence as deliberate when they requested air strikes. One unidentified Black respondent to the Project Clear survey complained that

Most of our [mens] got [kilt] by their own planes and artillery. They order artillery on a hill and then send us up the hill before the artillery aid come. We take the hill and no sooner than we get on top and our own artillery open up and kill most of the boys... (different soldier, same unit) And look how we had to beg for an airstrike. Other outfits need an airstrike, they get it anywhere they want it and when they want it.

Problems with Black wounded obtaining air ambulance (helicopter) service for the wounded plagued Black units. Another anonymous Black Project Clear respondent pointed out that "In those white companies, when they get hit and the men get wounded, that's when you see all those helicopters taking them off. With us, some of the men die because they make us carry them down off the hill." Some Project Clear Black subjects and court martial victims accused military doctors of returning wounded Blacks too soon to their units. Many sergeants felt that Black soldiers "faked
injury or injured themselves, or that Black enlisted men overreacted to minor injuries. While in reports senior white officers removed from fighting felt that soldiers used escorting casualties and alleged casualties as excuses for malingering, veterans complained of their legitimate wounds being ignored.

While Black soldiers had positive things to say about the 24th Regiment, they had very little that was positive to say about Korea. In interviews for this project, and in memoirs, many remember the hills. Climbing up one hill and down another were a recurring definition of Korea to several men. Men spoke of bonechilling cold and fatigue. Fletcher remarked on the cold that it was, "So cold that it chilled you to the bone. It had to be minus 40." William Matthews didn’t have a sleeping bag but had a few blankets. Henry Wright got frost bite.

Under MacArthur, frontline Black soldiers felt that they received horrible placements, partially due to the belief that they were "expendable" or trouble shooting. The alleged North Korean and Chinese practice of targeting the 24th RCT for attack, and targeting the ROKs to the sides of all of the units, help to explain this perception. The 24th RCT did receive the brunt of all of the attacks in the first three months of the war (See chapter 2 for details.) The 24th RCT originally served as division reserve, and this fact combined with the ad hoc nature of U.N strategy, meant
that these men were not utilized in a coherent fashion. For some companies of the 24th, this meant that from July 1950 to November 1950, they saw continuous front line combat without rest and refitting. In answer to the question, "Did you think your unit was treated differently or unfairly from white units?" Joel Ward said that "I know it wasn't, because they accused us of running when we didn't run. We were pawns when we first got over there. I know, because I was a front man. We were on line for forty-six straight days without any let up. Sometimes we went 2 1/2 days without food because the supply unit couldn't catch up to us." One former POW was in line continuously from July to December. Under the conditions of war, this extended usage was debilitating.

William Matthews commented that ambushes were a way of life. He noted that when the Chinese came, Eighth Army pulled out and left them; they had to come back with the Chinese in front and in the rear, and sometimes on their own. On the psychological and physical dangers of being in the valley under the continuous sight of the North Koreans at Battle Mountain, Macron Justice remembered that one morning, going through the 27th, the enemy started dropping mortars; you had to "dig in where you can". When William Moore, from Mobile, Alabama, was decapitated, a "shot of fear went through all of us.... the next guy was shot in the mouth, John Goodman.". They "try to deal on those machine gunners... to zero, they do so much damage." Alvin Bryant
remembered no panic at Sangju; they retreated "when they were ordered to." There was no bugout. Ellis Dean noted that "If we'd see an officer, a North Korean or Chinese officer, that's where the concentrated fire would be. Because you dispose of the leader, then you don't have a leader, so they'll have to pick up, right? You don't have the right person to pick up, right, so it's no good. So you try you try to eliminate that leader." Although they were accused of lighting cigarettes on the line, making the line a target, Matthews and Tucker claimed that they didn't have cigarettes to light.

While the *Investigation into the Utilization of Negro Soldiers in Combat* (March 1951) claimed that Black soldiers lit cigarettes on line against orders, ran and "straggled" (i.e. wandering away from the fighting to the rear), William Matthews saw no straggling, although he did see units become disorganized and separated after being overrun. Dean saw these as isolated instances. "Now don't get me wrong, I'm not saying no one did that.... because I witnessed a person coming over the hill, screaming, with no weapon, hollering "There's too many of them, too many of them" you know, and he had no weapon and he was running down off the hill.... So I can't say, but that's an isolated situation. But I'm gonna tell you that the majority or even less than 3 quarters did that.... But I did witness one person, I can say I witnessed
one person doing that." Dean also pointed out that this behavior would get one killed. "The only way you lose a weapon is to drop it and run, and that's stupid. Any time a person, a GI, would drop his weapon, he has nothing to fight with; that's kind of stupid... There's time when you run out of ammo, and you have that light weapon, and you'll have to fight hand to hand. You'll need the butt of something; you're going to need the bayonet of something on that rifle, or carbine, or whatever weapon you may have." Several veterans, like Joel Ward, noted that every body ran when told to retreat. They didn't have cigarettes to light. David Blackmon noted that "the bunch of guys I was with would have probably shot 'em." if they had seen men "straggling" away from the line or drifting away from combat.

From August to the end of October 1950, the 25th Division headquarters initiated a series of "50 minute court martials" (also known as drum head court martials). Thurgood Marshall investigated these drumhead court martials in 1951 for the NAACP in response to Black soldiers letters and Black soldiers' families' requests. He found numerous irregularities and biases. In one case, Black Private J.P. Morgan was charged with violating the 75th Article of War (misbehavior before the enemy; running, falling asleep on duty, cowardice, etc). He was convicted and sentenced to ten
years at hard labor.

Although he was able to prove that he was in an Army hospital during the period when he was charged with not being on duty, his conviction was upheld by headquarters of the 25th Division...When his case was taken to Washington by the NAACP, the conviction was reversed... These are but some of the astonishing examples of what happened to Negro servicemen, 32 of whom were convicted under the 75th Article of War. During this same time period, August through October 1950, only two white GIs were convicted. Two whites convicted of intoxication on line and disobedience in front of the enemy, each received three years or less. One white soldier was acquitted "although his commanding officer testified that he had seen him asleep." Marshall outlined other outrageous failures to observe due process under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and lack of common sense in the Autumn 1950 Army court martials in the NAACP pamphlet Report on Korea. He found that there were 118 complaints for all offenses at the 25th Division. Of these, 82 were taken to trial, "the remainder were either withdrawn or dropped. Of the 82 servicemen tried, 54 were Negroes, 27 white, and one Japanese. Twice as many Negroes were tried, although there were four times as many whites in the Division! Sixty-six of these 82 cases were investigated by white officers and 16 by Negro officers." Marshall felt that the mutual lack of confidence between Black enlisted and white officers combined with the high officer casualty rate to cause the drum head court martials.
It was the prevalent attitude and created lack of confidence between the men and their assigned leaders. As a consequence, the casualty rates among the enlisted and officers were disproportionately high... The high rate of casualties among officers made it necessary to blame someone. The Negro soldier was the convenient scapegoat.®

Some of these men met their defense counsels for 15 minutes before the trial. Others were pulled from the line at night and first met their counsels in the court room.® In a summary Marshall had typed and placed in the NAACP Legal Aid files, he documented the results of the NAACP intervention.

TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF COURTS MARTIAL IN KOREA®

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISPOSITION</th>
<th>BLACKS</th>
<th>WHITES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accused</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charges Withdrawn</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charges Reduced: AWOL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquitted</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentenced</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 3. ACTION TAKEN ON NEGRO CONVICTIONS UNDER THE 75TH ARTICLE OF WAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENTENCE REDUCTIONS</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>YEARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Death commuted by President to</td>
<td>20 years</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life reduced to</td>
<td>20 years</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life reduced to</td>
<td>15 years</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life reduced to</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life reduced and suspended</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 yrs reduced to</td>
<td>15 years</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 yrs reduced to</td>
<td>15 years</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 yrs reduced to</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 yrs reduced and suspended to</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"In addition to convictions under the 75th AW there are 12 Negroes convicted for alleged violations of other Articles of War who have ... NAACP aid"

TABLE 4. CONVICTIONS OF NEGRO GIs FOR VIOLATIONS OF OTHER AW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTICLE</th>
<th>SENTENCE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBSEQUENT ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Life</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No final Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 years</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>No final action: 2 reduced to 10yr: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>No final action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92nd</td>
<td>Life</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No NAACP intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sentence approved and forwarded for appellate review</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5. CONVICTIONS OF NEGRO GIs FOR VIOLATION OF OTHER AW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTICLE</th>
<th>SENTENCE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBSEQUENT ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>2 years, 6 months</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sentence approved and forwarded for appellate review</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In times of strain, like during the court martials, the atmosphere of the regiment helped. Matthews said the outfit was a family and that feeling of family helped them to survive. Several veterans said everybody ran when ordered to retreat, but not before, and definitely not to straggle. William Matthews saw no straggling, although he did see units become disorganized and separated after being overrun.

Several men had specific comments about battles. From the critical Battle of Kunu-ri, George Bussey, a Silver Star winner, remembered November 28th as very cold. At midnight he received orders to dig foxholes; the ground was too hard, so the men stacked rice around the holes. At daybreak the North Koreans and Chinese started blowing bugles. The enemy was only 500 yards away. When they received orders for the battalion to withdraw, L Company was the rear guard. It was unorganized because they were overrun—several ROK units seemed to break. This was not the first time the ROKs turned out to be unreliable. William Matthews noted that "the ROKs and First Cav[alry] was sorry and the 35th (RCT) was sorry." This does coincide with reports and official observations.
The Intelligence and Reconnaissance platoons (I&R) had the toughest job, and received lots of blame when things went wrong. At Taejon, George Bussey said "I&R let us walk into an ambush there. The difficulty of all of the soldiers' jobs were exacerbated by iffy weaponry. George Bussey said the M-1s were from Japan and were worn out before they got to Korea. Bussey also felt that only "at times, there was enough ammunition." David Blackmon loved his BAR. "Had to baby it a little bit." He kept the clip loaded; he had eight on, and two more in his pocket. At Pusan and Haman, Macron Justice pointed out that there was not enough weapons. The soldiers of the 24th Infantry Regiment also felt that they did not get adequate support. William Matthews argued that "the ROKs and First Cav was sorry and the 35th (RCT) was sorry."

Commanders in July and August 1950 assigned most of the Blacks soldiers in Korea to truck, cook, and supply companies. The Chinese fired upon or engulfed several of these allegedly non-combat units. By May 1951, the majority of Black troops remained in support units; it was a bare majority, however.

**TABLE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF BLACK TROOPS IN EIGHTH ARMY, MAY 17, 1951**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In integrated units</th>
<th>20%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>combat arms (infantry, artillery, armor)</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In all-Black units</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat arms</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many Black soldiers suffered or died because of generally inept white leadership, although a few white officers, such as Clyde Baden of the 3/15, enjoyed excellent reputations for competence with their men. For its part, the Army tried to maintain the fiction that all of the white officers leading Black troops were exceptional, later historians, including Morris MacGregor, who wrote the official history of the desegregation of the Army, have acknowledged that most of these officers were woefully inadequate. The problems with many of the white officers came from lack of training, lack of faith in their men, and other disabilities. Many were officers "dumped" from or unwanted by white units. Few of them made any effort to motivate their Black men. Weapons were always continually lost and misplaced, and Black troops broke as did white units, where white leadership was inadequate, also.

The criteria for promoting enlisted Black soldiers caused problems as well. Some white officers were accused of not promoting by merit. The Army's basic misconception was
that all southern white officers understood Blacks; under such officers Blacks who conformed with the southern stereotype were promoted regardless of their abilities, while those who exhibited self-reliance and self-respect, necessary attributes of leadership, were humiliated and discouraged for their uppitiness. "I was astounded" he [Lt. Col. Marcus H. Ray] said, "by the willingness of the white officers who preceded us to place their own lives in a hazardous position in order to have tractable Negroes around them."^52

The Army's leadership persisted in this belief despite the fact that Stouffer in The American Soldier proved "that Negro troops preferred Northern white officers to Southern whites..."^53 As for the high representation of Southerners in Army service overall, Leo Bogart observed that "The die-hard segregationism of powerful legislators was not unnaturally echoed within the top ranks of the Army itself. Since its early days, the Army has drawn a higher-than-to-be-expected proportion of its professional personnel from the Southern states-states that provided their sons with more restricted civilian opportunities...had a long tradition of professional military service."^54 Many Southern officers held segregationist views, and did not try to hide their contempt for Black troops.

Black men preferred Northern white or black officers to Southern white officers, feeling that their lives would not
be needlessly wasted by the former. Southern white officers were much more likely to fight to maintain extreme, inefficient, de extra-legal Jim Crow rules and attitudes than black or Northern white officers.

Black enlisted men also accused white non-commissioned and commissioned officers and military police of disproportionately court martiauling Black enlisted for "straggling", when these enlisted were having wounds tended, getting ammunition, or had been cut off legitimately from their units, claiming that these officers and military police did not punish white enlisted men for the same activities. Black enlisted men also had to worry about libel from their white officers. Melvin Blair, a white officer who suffered a nervous breakdown and was relieved of duty during the retreat from the Yalu, showed how white officers used rumor and race to cover up their own incompetent leadership. After the attempt by white officer Melvin Blair to cover his nervous breakdown by blaming his Black troops, several historians picked up and recorded his slurs. In a letter to Bruce Jacobs, author of Korea's Heroes, Lt. Bob Moorman specifically refuted several of the white accusations. Blair accused the 24th RCT's soldiers of composing and singing a song called "Bug Out Blues" or "Bug Out Boogie" as the Regimental theme song.55 Other whites pointed to this as proof of Black unreliability.

Moorman, who started out an enlisted man but was as
lieutenant by Korea, argued that "During that period I never heard this 'Bug Out Blues'. Had this been the official regimental song, as you stated, I am certain I would have heard it because during the early months I was the regimental public information officer and I was continually taking trips from unit to unit." Moorman, who received a Bronze Star for helping to organize the defense of Sangju and for delivering ammunition to a tank crew under heavy mortar and artillery fire. He noted that as a platoon leader, he never had soldiers refuse to fight under him.

In the Army's investigation of the mass court martials of Autumn 1950, several sergeants and officers were accused of using racial epithets in chewing out soldiers. They were never reprimanded for this, and the words of these white officers were received uncritically, as opposed to the word of Black enlisted men, which was minutely scrutinized. Black enlisted men were aware of the lack of faith in them. Easley summed up the experience best by saying that "Some people had probably never been around that many Black people before." Some didn't know how to act.  

The discriminatory nature of the system spanned the rank spectrum. Racism on the part of white enlisted humiliated Black enlisted men and hurt morale. Tension existed between Blacks and whites in segregated companies. In one manifestation of tension, Black soldiers had to deal
with a traditional stereotype. White perceptions of the "Black male rapist" manifested themselves in Korea, which made life dangerous for Black enlisted men. The NAACP received numerous complaints of false accusations of rape. One of the reasons for sending the 24th RCT to Gifu was to keep them away from women. Racial fights, especially over women, showed up.

White contempt and harassment of segregated Black units also lowered morale. George Lipsitz noted in his biography of Ivory Perry that

White soldiers still harbored contempt for veterans of the Twenty-fourth Infantry Regiment and other black units that they believed fought poorly, and they retained stereotypes about black cowardice and inefficiency.... It fell to soldiers ...to make their own responses to institutionalized racism in the military, even as they carried on the already difficult work of waging war.58

Confederate flags were abundant in Korea and blatantly displayed by Southern white enlisted men.59 Some white enlisted men refused to salute Black non-commissioned and commissioned officers. Other racial incidents marred the rear.60 "Maggio and other eyewitnesses describe the ferocious racial tensions between American groups among the guards (of the North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war) notably the Blacks and Chicanos against the whites".61

Segregated in housing and supply, the morale of these
men and women (in the segregated nursing corps) fell sharply, contributing to the debilitating morale problem in Korea. Lieutenant Jesse Johnson remembers that in 1946 that "The real inconvenience and expense of segregation in the Army came into sharp focus in Korea. We two Negro officers were assigned to a twelve-room house while the other officers were housed on the opposite side of town. Separate clubs were built for the officers and enlisted men, but none for the two Negro officers. For one and a half years we had no access to officers or civilian clubs or recreational outlets." Things remained essentially the same until May 1951. Black facilities remained scarce, and Southern white officers tried to prevent Black usage of "white" facilities. Almond and some other white officers unofficially banned Black newspapers and magazines.

The attitudes of British, and Australian soldiers often mirrored white America's, and contributed to low Black morale. Many white soldiers had low morale, too; Chosin and the long retreat from the China border contributed to that.

Sgt. Stewart, a career Army man, commented eloquently on orders and racism in the Army that

I rotated from Korea in July of '51, and there was rumor out that if you served your time there, you wouldn't have to go back for a period, you know...So, like an idiot, I re-enlisted for the Far East, unassigned, thinking that I wouldn't have to go back to Korea. On the 29th of December, 1951, I was back in Korea, and I didn't intend to go back there, but I was back there. Because I came
back, they allowed me to serve in any unit I wanted to, so I went back to the 25th Division, 65th Engineer Battalion, and was assigned to the 77th Engineer Company... they had a job open there for me, supposedly. I went down to take the job, at the 77th, they had been integrated by this time. The lieutenant told his corporal, who was running the job, that "I don't like those kind of sergeants"..., meaning a Black person. And, uh, he never gave me a job.... I was there for twenty nine days, and on the twenty ninth day I got angry, and I told the commanding officer, "if I find a unit that will accept me, will you approve of the transfer?" And he said yes.... And I went to battalion headquarters and was reassigned. And that's the shortest hitch, military assignment I ever had. And it was because of, let's face it, the man said he did like those kind of crazy niggers?... Interviewer: So this was one way he managed to get rid of.... Stewart: Yeah, I went through the battalion and became an inspector, and they had to bring their equipment up to me to inspect it, to be evacuated. And I kept sending it back, and the lieutenant came up to see way and.... then he found out I was in charge, so he didn't say anything.

Black men found solace in the regiment, in competence, in "knowing their rights", and in feelings of manhood, known to whites as "uppitiness". A number of enlisted personnel were underage when they signed up, and felt that Army training gave them confidence and competence.

The North Koreans and Chinese tried to exploit Black dissatisfaction with discrimination through the propaganda radio broadcasts by "Seoul City Sue". "Sue" especially angered Black soldiers. Ivory Perry recalled that "Her nightly ten o'clock broadcasts... taunted Black GIs about defending a country that refused to grant them full rights
and privileges as citizens. She reported a steady stream of racist incidents involving Blacks in Korea and back in the United States in an attempt to persuade black soldiers to defect. In spite of this, no known Black soldiers defected.

The Chinese also tried to utilize segregation and white discrimination to indoctrinate Black prisoners of war against the United States and capitalism. One POW recalled the North Koreans as the worst of the two for this. He still carries the burns from his escape (he and others near Chosin were herded into a wooden school house while tied, and the house was set on fire. Some broke their bonds and fought their way out of the burning building.) Both efforts failed. When asked if the Chinese had ever tried to indoctrinate him while he was a prisoner of war, Sgt. Fletcher replied

Oh yeah, yeah.... They tried to indoctrinate everybody they had in prison camps.... you want to get to indoctrination, yes they tried for approximately not quite a year to indoctrinate us. They taught us that, uh, and I think they pushed very hard at Black Americans, at here in America, white America, if you want to call it. That’s what they called it. They would never let us succeed. We would never accomplish very much. Whatever we did would always work for some white. They would always get the benefits, the largest portion of the pie, and so on. I.... don’t believe anybody really believed that. I think, by born here and raised here in American we knew that it... through the right work ethics, education... we could succeed. What’s succeeding, I can’t answer that for everybody, I can only answer that for myself;
and that is living comfortably, having money in the bank, being able to do what I want to do when I want to do it. Yes, the indoctrination was very, very heavy; it was a must, you had to go, you had, then afterwards, you would sit in semicircles and discuss what they had talked about. I still don’t think this had any influence on any Americans.

Like in the white units, gay men also existed in the Black units. While some men could not identify who was gay and who was not, others could. Their fellow soldiers called these semi-closeted gays "sissies". While some evidence exists of officer resentment, little evidence exists of enlisted resentment. Most of these men claimed that gays self-selected themselves by higher education or preference to the medic, administrative (particularly personnel), and cooks branches of the services. The homosexual and heterosexual medics, who suffered under fire as much as the combat soldiers, were actually particularly admired.

When a number of the Black veterans went home, they promptly tried to register to vote, and joined the NAACP. Several joined while in the service. Veterans seemed more secretive about the Deacons for Defense and Justice, a secret organization of Korean War veterans to fight the Klan. No member of the 24th Regiment Association interviewed had heard of it. In 1963, one member was interviewed. Others were a little more active. Korean War veterans helped found the Deacons For Defense and Justice in 1964. The Deacons
escorted Civil Rights workers, provided protection, and deterred random white violence through armed self-defense. "It also seems more than coincidence that the ten founders of the Deacons for Defense and Justice, a paramilitary group organized in 1964 to counter Ku Klux Klan terrorism, were all Black veterans of Korea and World War II." The Deacons, founded in Jonesboro, Louisiana had an estimated 50-60 chapters dedicated to armed Black self defense in 1965. During the summer of 1965, they were responsible for transporting CORE workers in Louisiana and Mississippi. Mainly, they scared night riders out of the Black communities, because the police protection was considered inadequate. They also felt that police protection was dubious due to the problem of police brutality. Charles Sims, President of the Bogalusa Chapter, described his group's role this way "I would say a defense guard unit. We're not authorized to carry weapons." These veterans worked with the mainstream Civil Rights community as a secret society, refusing to publish members names. A measure of their success was that nearly every Black man who resisted segregation was seen as a Deacon. The men interviewed here were, in the main, still in the service in the 1964-5 period when the Deacons were at the height of their influence, and had little contact with this group. It was a little too militant for them.

The face of battle for Blacks contained all of the
threats of combat, plus the psychological threats of racism, unfair court martial, harsher evaluation, and discrimination. These men turned to the unit as the touchstone of manhood and identity to sustain themselves.
ENDNOTES


2. Heller and Stofft, p. 299.


5. Ibid.


9. Ibid., p. 56.


13. Ibid., p.91.


15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p.71.
17. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 127.
20. Ibid., pp. 169-175.
21. Ibid., pp. 169, 179.
22. Ibid., p.88.
23. Ibid., p.169.
24. Ibid., p. 170.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 89.
27. Ibid., p. 89.
29. Ibid., pp. 966, 975.
30. Barker, p. 79.
31. Ibid., pp. 79-80.
32. Ibid.
34. Interview with Robert Fletcher, February 1994. See Appendix B. for transcript.
37. Ibid.


41. Fletcher.


43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., p. 18.

46. Ibid.

47. March 1, 1951, Library of Congress Manuscript Collection, NAACP Legal Aid Files, Box marked II, 1951.

48. Interview with Cal Brunson, April 24, 1991.


50. Blair, p.887.


52. Letter, Ray to Gibson, 14 May 1945, WDGAP 291.2.


54. Ibid., p.12.

Note: this is the Project Clear data on the integration of the Army. While utilizing it, this author recognizes three limitations; the interpretational nature of the excerpts (they were edited for this work to specifically refute Black nationalist charges [see p.1]), Bogart et al gave no specific dates or unit identification although they all took place in Korea between March 1951 and June 1951; and some of the white and Black troops could conceivably have masked their true feelings in answering these surveys,
especially if they felt that their answers would be used against them.


63. Brunson.

64. Lipsitz, p.56.

65. Ibid., p.56.


CHAPTER VI
WHITE PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATION OF SEGREGATED TROOPS

The dismal initial American performance from July to November 1950 in Korea has been blamed on many things. Overall, American troops failures had their genesis in leadership, training, and materiel, not the enlisted men. Within the confines of the American military environment from the onset of hostilities to May 1951, the unfair criticism of the performance of Black troops stands out. The 24th Regiment’s problem were blamed on race; in contrast, the failures of white units were attributed to blamed on leadership, education, alcohol, and a lack of training. The 24th was accused by white officers of cowardice, losing weapons, etc. in larger proportions than whites with little verification other than white officers’ perceptions.

The perception that race created bad performance covered the incompetent actions of white officers, which where one of the real causes of the problems in the whole U.S. Army. How could officers have ignored these problems, and simply blamed race for the perceptions of the performance of the 24th Infantry Regiment? Why were they blinded by these beliefs in the case of the 24th? Perceptions, and the way selective perceptions affect
behavior, give the strongest answer, and provide the strongest argument against the overly negative official evaluations of the 24th Infantry Regiment's performance. The perceptions of the officers and the system of segregation itself literally and figuratively blinded these senior white officers.

What the majority of senior white commissioned and noncommissioned officers believed affected the analysis of the evaluation process. From education and the social sciences, the literature on how expectation affects performance itself has been long accepted. The tipping point theory and knowledge of how pre-existing beliefs affect perceptions of performance, intelligence, and competence, are also fairly well established, although the tipping point theory is still somewhat controversial because of the way contact, education, necessity, and class interact with it. The existence of tipping points is not controversial. Through looking at the historical evidence of white officer beliefs, and comparing it to general white beliefs, Army beliefs, and Black views, the impact of perceptions emerges.

The first tier traits or values that the Army has traditionally valued include discipline, stamina (mental and physical), skill, competence, loyalty, duty, courage, selflessness, integrity, and commitment. These traits are based in broader American values of individual rights,
efficiency, progress, tolerance, valuing reason over sentiment all derived from the Enlightenment and the Functionalist Ages. These broad American values are distilled through the screen of bureaucracy and military necessity; they are distorted, but still remain an image of the original. Overlaying these American and military values were perceptions and stereotypes based on race and class which affected the application of military standards.

The Southern background of the majority of the long-service white enlisted men and senior officers, especially of flag (general) ranks, during the interwar period and the first year of the Korean conflict points to the basis for the military perceptions and "common knowledge" of Black soldiers. As Gunnar Myrdal noted in his 1940s study on American racial attitudes, *An American Dilemma*, certain values underlay Southern perceptions.

Even a poor and uneducated white person in some isolated and backward rural region in the Deep South, who is violently prejudiced against the Negro and is intent upon depriving him of civic rights and human independence, has also a compartment in his mind housing the entire American Creed of liberty, equality, justice, and fair opportunity for everybody.... to some extent, these ideals shape his behavior.¹

Segregation was seen as a protection of whites.² Poor and under educated whites benefitted from protection against competition with middle class whites, and by receiving services paid for by Black taxes, like education, but not
extended to Blacks. Segregation also allowed poor whites to cross class lines. Upper and middle class whites benefitted in not having to pay for deference, and in having a dependant, cheap source of labor to play off against poor whites and keep overall wages low. The conflict between segregation and American values, values which Myrdal calls the "American Creed", created the perceptions and biases to rationalize segregation. Gunnar Myrdal noticed "A tendency to exaggerate the lower-class traits of Negroes is apparent. One is told constantly that all Negroes are dirty, immoral, and unreliable... that Negroes like to be separated, that they are happy in their humble status and would not like to be treated as equals." These perceptions show a remarkable similarity to white officer perceptions and beliefs in Korea.

Project Clear showed that the tipping point, or percentage of Blacks in a unit, magnified existing negative perceptions and triggered white fears of loss of majority status. In Clear, the percentage hovered around 10 to 15%, or the proportion of the civilian Black population. Above this figure, tension, violence, and white flight seemed to occur. While Clear does not conclude this, more recent studies of race and perception are showing that when minorities reach or exceed certain percentages, it becomes harder for whites to differentiate group from individual behavior among the target minority group. This phenomena
enhances selective perception, making it easier for some whites to selectively perceive individual traits as racial characteristics. Clear noted that "Under conditions of integration, the attitudes of white soldiers are most favorable when Negroes are in the minority, as they normally are in the population. Where Negroes are actually in a majority, the attitudes of whites are least favorable."^6

David Hackworth (of the 35th and 27th Infantry RCTs) wrote in his biography that the low morale in the 24th Regiment was easily explainable:

The regiment had been badly bloodied since then, [Yechon in July of 1950] and with the attendant loss of many of its fine black NCO (too many of whom were replaced by white NCO who were unable or unwilling to bond with the troops—and vice versa), it seemed the 24th had gone to hell in a handbasket...as a fighting organization, its leadership was too thin and its combat scars too many... "Everybody thought he was going to die."^7

Hackworth, then a sergeant in the 27th Wolfhounds (later a battlefield commission who left the Army a full colonel) was not blinded by the tipping point (fear threshold) because he was not in this unit; unfortunately, some of the white non-commissioned and commissioned officers in the unit evidently were affected by the tipping point and their own lack of training in evaluating the 24th Regiment's performance. Not only did the presence of large congregations of perceived undisciplined, potentially violent Black men unnerve some white officers and lead them
to blame race for problems caused by alcohol, lack of training, and bad officership; the fear magnified the perceptions of the extent of these problems. Today, several survivors of the 24th Infantry Regiment today suggest that this fear of armed, trained Black men explains to preference for small Black units, the perception that larger units (like the 24th) performed below average, and the "stress" on white officers in Black units. Being in the minority instead of the majority combined with stereotypes to make some white officers perceive Black performance as worse than it actually was.

Perceptions are important because they can have significant impact. Hackworth commented on this when he discusses the time on November 1950 that the 27th Wolfhound's Third Battalion, G Company was overrun and cut off by masses of the Chinese.

as the Chinese yelled in unison and steamrolled their way through our 1st and 2d platoons, like a great wave washing over the battlefield. They smashed the position in half, creating a gap of five or six hundred yards. From the high ground we could see them rushing behind us, flattening everything in their path... George's [G Company] mortars were firing...Then the flood hit them and the little sparks were submerged. No more mortar section...According to Ranger [5th Ranger Company, 27th Division] witnesses the men came back as a "panic stricken mob", and hot on their heels were the Chinks. The Rangers could not tell friendly from the enemy...but the enemy was mixed among George's people and some got behind the Rangers. It was bedlam.
While G Company was verbally accused of "bugging out", it was not mass court martialed like the 24th Infantry Regiment, even though this happened several times to both the Wolfhounds and to the 35th Regiment’s Cacti. Their race (white) was not blamed for the success of the Chinese massively attritting attacks, many of which caused large numbers of officers to be killed. Yet in the 24th Regiment, both at the mass court martial and in subsequent investigations, the same terms ("many officers killed", "weapons lost", "wasted ammunition", "bugged out and stragglers") appeared, over and over. Applying the standards of these terms meant that all the units in Korea were equally unfit, then, without the excuse of race.

Many officers above the level of major not only did not see the front, but according combat veterans, held highly unrealistic ideas about fighting. They would drive or fly in, drive or fly out, and then evaluate the situation, oblivious to the overall war environment and actual fighting. To these white majors, colonels, and generals in the rear, this seemed a bug out; the fact that it was the white 35th RCT mitigated their perception. Hackworth and others emphasized that few senior officers were actually out in the field, or actually realized what was happening in the field, due to some of their orders.

In evaluating the 24th Infantry Regiment, the Army did not consider the differing times spent in line, or that the
24th Infantry Regiment had three battalion instead of two, like the 27th and the 35th. It defined "excessive" loss of weapons as

**TABLE 7. Excessive Weapon Loss, 25th Division, 12th July to 2 August 1950**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIMENT</th>
<th>24th Regt</th>
<th>27th Regt</th>
<th>35th Regt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAR</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.36 Launchers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortars</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun 1919 A4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun 1919 A6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun 1917 A1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun 50 Cal</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbines</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet the 24th Infantry Regiment was overrun several times, was in continuously line longer, was attacked more often and harder than other units, received fewer working weapons and ammunition in relation to numbers of soldiers.
than other white units in the first place, and munitions of lower quality, than the white units. Billy Mossman noted in *Ebb and Flow* that as late as April 1951, the 4.2" mortar Company B of the white 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion, "Fearful of being overrun, the mortarmen abandoned thirty-five vehicles loaded with equipment." When the fact that the 24th RCT was short of weapons during this same time period is taken into account, the numbers are also less persuasive.

The 25th Division *War Diary* also noted that the 24th RCT, with more men than either the 35th or the 27th RCT, received less ammunition. In July, the 24th RCT had three full battalions; the 27th and the 35th each had two battalions, or 2/3rds the men of the 24th RCT. The 24th RCT received less than one third of the ammunition total for July. In other words, white officers expected the 24th RCT to perform better than inadequately equipped white RCTs with even less ammunition. Notably, the 27th RCT, perceived as performing the best, received the most ammunition.
### TABLE 8.
Total Ammunition Issued during the Month of July 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>27th RCT</th>
<th>35th RCT</th>
<th>24th RCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.30 caliber</td>
<td>1,153,433</td>
<td>500,017</td>
<td>470,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 caliber</td>
<td>140,890</td>
<td>20,340</td>
<td>24,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm mortar</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm mortar</td>
<td>2,685</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>3,966</td>
<td>1,738</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Today's United States' Army Center for Military History refused to compare the 24th and the 27th, because the 27th was used as battalion reserve and as a raiding unit. (like the rangers) Richard Dalfiume wrote that "The all-Negro Twenty-fourth Infantry Regiment.... was charged by one battalion commander with fleeing 'like rabbits' before the enemy.... Many white units fled 'like rabbits' during the first months of the Korean War, but race did not figure into the explanations as it did for black units.... Negro units suffered from the same handicaps as in the past - a concentration of poorly educated personnel, low morale, and a tendency for commanders to blame their unit failures on race."
In Exhibit D-23, the Inspector General's Report of the Investigation Concerning 24th Infantry Regiment and Negro Soldiers in Combat noted that "Some of the medical men refused to treat the men unless they had been wounded by a gun shot. If a man reported to the medics for treatment other than a gun shot wound he was called a coward and ordered back to duty. When newly assigned leaders failed or made costly mistakes they would cover this error by saying the Negroes ran and left him, negroes were afraid.... This was followed by a wave of arrests and court martials and in fourteen days (60) sixty men were in confinement." One Black court martial victim. Peter Paulfrey, M/Sgt. victim of a blow to the head, sought medical help and was ordered back to line, where he blacked out. He was court martialed on 24 Aug 1950, and received 20 years."

One influential perception that Clear seemed to deliberately ignore is the white officers perceptions of Blacks being more militant together. Even though many of them commented on this, the academic commentary ignored this. Another is white perception, enlisted and officer, that Blacks together are violent towards whites, and that Blacks in segregated units gang up on whites. These two perceptions are barely addressed in the text, and then as if there are always valid reasons for the white perception. For example, "'(Infantryman)they [Blacks] get sassy and smart and first thing you know they're cutting some white boy up
and then there’s a big fight’... This may be due not to any inherent fault in Negro soldiers... but simply to the company of undesirable Negro civilians. Under these influences, the vicious and immoral behavior attributed to some Negro garrison troops will become the pattern for all or most of them.\textsuperscript{15} Clear’s quotes are notable for the prevalence of examples expressing fear of "uppity" behavior and violence from black men in groups.

Several whites expressed fear of Black group behavior as being militant or "uppity", slacking off, creating lower performance through carelessness, etc. "(Chief of Staff, integrated infantry division): if we have got to have them let’s spread them around thin enough so that they can be controlled."\textsuperscript{17} An unidentified divisional staff officer claimed that "I think when you group them they don’t trust their own people in tight situations. I think as a group they have a habit: they scare each other. They generally sweat out a little more the position they’re in." This links to the "scared of the dark, childish" white perception Myrdal identified, as well as the "preferring white officers and trusting whites" perception. One white artilleryman claimed that "By themselves, they’re not worth a damn."\textsuperscript{18} Another white enlisted man spoke of group slacking, claiming that "We have four [Blacks] in this platoon and every one of them has been right up to pitch... I bet these same boys, if they were in the -th, would fuck up and bug out just like
their friends do." Another perception from Myrdal shows up from an unidentified general who could possibly be Almond, since he complained about having a Black unit in World War II that was also careless. "Negroes are notoriously careless. In their own squads in combat especially so. From that point of view they may get less scared if you put one or two of them in with a squad of white men whom they can look up to for leadership." Another unidentified white argued that "You get 'em altogether and they're bucking you all the time." One white artilleryman, reminisced about a fight between the 159th Field Artillery Battalion (FAB) and his unit. "There was always trouble between the -th and the -th. The colored guys started acting pretty big, and most of the guys from the South didn't like it." Others claimed Black soldiers formed cliques and would show off. Some whites felt that Black soldiers got bad habits from other Blacks, and felt that all Blacks had no morals. One staff officer claimed that while at Fort Polk in Louisiana "We picked up a couple of 'em that had been in a fight and the story was that one had been doing a nice business out in the woods behind the barracks giving blow jobs." and the fight was over being shortchanged for the service. This same officer said that also at Fort Polk two Black soldier did a roaring business renting out a female goat to sex-starved soldiers. Many felt that "Well, the colored fellas will start running around with whooping niggas who have no responsibility, and
then they become the same way and they embarrass you when you go out with them, the wild way they act and what they talk about."^24

Clear noted the fear of violence. Fears are expressed regarding their [Blacks] lack of self-control, with apprehension expressed as to the likelihood of violence- the wielding of razors, knives and so on. But Clear did not entertain the idea that these fears led officers, in the confused climate over policy during the war, to integrate. The fears of violence were well entrenched. One infantryman in an all white unit noted that "A man was afraid to go to a bar alone,'less he run into about 20 of them [Blacks] with their razors and long knives. They gang together over one white man, but not ever two."^25 This fear of Black soldiers ganging up against whites, especially in garrison, is repeated several times. Clear again does not question the validity of the complaint. "Negro soldiers are said to have a tendency to clique, to bunch together and to gang up against white soldiers... Many of these observations refer to past experience with Negro troops in segregated units based at the same post.'I don't think they ought to put too many of 'em in a squad. Not more than two. You get too many in a squad and they try to argue with the whites."^26 That the Army and Project Clear were reluctant to say that Army integration took place due to white fears of Black soldiers "acting like men" or "acting uppity" is understandable, but
misses one of the "tensions" Clear alluded to regarding white officers. These tensions were very influential in white culture at the time, and Blacks evidently utilized them.

These fears of Black violence and "uppitiness" also help to generate the tipping point and to maintain white dominance. The Army's 10-12% quotas for integration guaranteed that outnumbered Blacks would not "gang up" on whites.

Clearly, the evaluation of Black soldiers suffered from the perceptions of the white officers. There is no proof the 24th RCT performed worse than its sister 35th RCT or than the 24th Division's 34th RCT. Some evidence indicates that 1st Cavalry may have performed worse than the 24th RCT. But segregation, and especially the reality of large groups of Black men, both triggers tipping point magnification of stereotypes and the inability to see Black as individuals, and also triggered white fears of Black violence. Together, these perceptions led to the blaming of leadership and structural failures on race, and led to the integration of the Army by junior and mid-level officers, uncaring of or confused about policy by the chaos and immediacy of combat, who wanted to "control" potentially "uppity" and "violent" Blacks through dilution, and who wanted to use Black bodies with white bodies as cannon fodder. Not quite as neat and logical as the Army's "manpower integration only" argument,
this interpretation fits the facts and both sets of racial perceptions, Black and white, more accurately. Project Clear\textsuperscript{27} raw responses from whites (as reported in Bogart, et al.), show that officers projected their beliefs onto the soldiers under their command. Sociological research from the 1960s to today shows that the tipping point's (or percentage at which a minority population triggers white fears of losing majority status) impact on white evaluations of black soldiers. The large numbers of Blacks together, far in excess of Black people's percentage in civilian society, magnified perceptions and incidents of incompetence and the unease and tension in the white officers, who were in the unusual position of being a minority among people perceived in mainstream American society as violent and inferior.

By examining the overall American performance in Korea during July and August of 1950 and comparing the official evidence of Black and white performance in the 25th Infantry Division with the perceptions of performance, the impact of the tipping point and white selective perceptions becomes apparent. The evidence definitely suggests (sometimes directly from white officers) that blaming performance on race protected inadequate policies and officers within Black units, and that segregation made race seem responsible for problems that were really caused by individual actions. The official dictum that these Black units were worse in battle than the white units then must be discarded: it can be shown
that they were not worse than white units, and that the same problems plagued white units.

The overall American performance, be it Black, white, Puerto Rican, or South Korean was abysmal. Task Force Smith was the first unit in Korea. It was composed of a combination of half of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment (Gimlets) of the 24th Infantry Division and an artillery battery. Task Force Smith, and the rest of the white 24th Infantry Division, serves to illustrate the general problems with American readiness that affected performance.

From July 5 to 19, Task Force Smith and the 24th Division, both comprised of all white units, was cut to pieces by the North Koreans. After the collapse of Taejon, it was relieved. Roy Flint commented that "During those weeks, the 24th suffered heavy casualties and gave up more ground than it should have in nearly every engagement... in truth, the poor performance of the 24th was more the result of inadequate preparation during the prewar years in Japan than of any specific lapse on the battlefield..."\(^{29}\)

One of Task Force Smith's problems was the plan that controlled their use. Clay Blair notes in The Forgotten War that "While this scheme displayed an appropriate 'can do' spirit for the Eight Army spearhead, on analysis it could be characterized as foolhardy. It committed piecemeal three green, ill-equipped understrength battalions to the defense
of three objectives eleven miles apart with scant or no communications between the units and only the haziest notion of how they might consolidate in event of a setback..."30
This characterization also applied to almost every American unit in this theater until January of 1951.

A second major problem for Task Force Smith, the 24th Division, the 24th Infantry Regiment in the 25th Division, and other combat units were the Army’s priorities. This problem specifically affected the conditions and structure of the forces. Eighth Army in Japan, the force available to the Far East Command in July-August 1950, was not combat ready due to the lack of manpower, support structure, and training. Roy K. Flint wrote in one Army analysis of the problems of Task Force Smith and the 24th Infantry Division, problems that would be encountered continuously until October 1950, that

In the end, problems encountered during the first battle in Korea came down to training areas, shortages, and the distractions of colonial life in Japan...He had no effective anti-tank defense because he had no tanks and no anti-tank mines and because the 2.36-inch rocket launchers and 75-mm recoilless rifles did not stop enemy tanks. He had no communications with higher headquarter, with his artillery, or even within his infantry much of the time. His radio batteries had gone dead, and enemy tanks cut the wire lines. He had no intelligence of the enemy, no means of resupply, and because of bad weather, no air support...he could not even talk to the South Koreans...Bad as things were for Task Force Smith, it fought well. Such was not the case for the 34th Infantry.
Nowhere were the failures of the prewar Army more prevalent. In part because...were new to their responsibilities, command in the 34th broke down. Company commanders, junior officers, and noncommissioned officers mirrored the uncertainty of their commanders and in general performed badly. The regiment lost its bravest officers early and eventually lost the survivors to physical and mental collapse. In the end, all seemed more concerned with escape than fighting.  

The Army senior staff's focus on saving "flags" (combat divisions) on paper than readiness caused the lack of manpower and support. This was a response to the rapid demobilization in 1946 and President Truman's fiscal attacks on the military in general. "Although the army maintained its authorized ten-division structure, it did so at the expense of combat readiness by eliminating units that were part of the mobilization base." This was a hollow army. Four infantry divisions were assigned to Eighth Army in July 1950. They were the 7th, 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry Divisions, combined within a "bastard", i.e. ad hoc, organization. While three of the four (the 25th Division was the exception), were understrength, all lacked important components due to policy and cost-cutting. "On paper, an American infantry division at full war strength numbered about 18,800 men." To cut costs but maintain divisional "flags", the 1st Cavalry, 7th, and 24th Divisions were authorized at 12,500 men, but actually had about 11,300, making each one about 7,000 men short of combat-ready strength. The 25th Division, which contained the 24th
Infantry Regiment, was authorized at 13,500 to allow the 24th Regiment to contain most of the Black personnel in the sector. These men were mainly sent to quartermaster units, which became de facto housekeeping units. "The 24th Regiment at the same time reported that it had only 60 percent of its Table of Equipment allowance of radios and that four-fifths of them were inoperable." The 25th Division actually contained 13,000 men, leaving it about 5,500 short. "Available manpower had been consolidated so that each regiment, except for the 24th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Infantry Division, had only two instead of the normal three battalions; none of the regiments had its authorized tank companies. Division medium-tank battalions were armed with M24 light tanks. Furthermore, artillery units were operating at reduced strength and with only two-thirds of their units." The M24 tanks could not take on the bigger and technically superior T 34 of the Soviets. "In addition, economies had dictated that each Eighth Army division deactivate 4 artillery batteries, 4 antiaircraft batteries, 100 antitank guns, and most of its armor ...On the whole, none of the four divisions was capable of laying down more than 62 percent of its normal infantry firepower." First Lt Philip Day pointed out that "We used World War II leftovers and we apparently had a lot left over. We had, for example, the 2.36-inch rocket launcher [bazooka]. I learned later it hadn't worked in the Second World War and it sure as heck
didn’t work on Russian T34 tanks in Korea. No question about it, much of our gear and equipment was shabby..."³⁸ Lacy Barnett felt the manpower cuts personally.

In Sasebo (34th Regiment was stationed in Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan) I was assigned as a clerk. Within a couple of months, I became company clerk. The first sergeants I worked for were good men and had all served during World War II. As time passed I gained additional responsibilities which should never have been performed by a corporal. For example, the Regimental Combat Effectiveness Report was due every three months. Regiment would hold a quarterly conference on how to complete the report. I was detailed to attend these conferences. Afterward I would report to my CO (commanding officer) and try to explain the report to him. His instructions to me were always the same: ‘Make sure the medical company looks combat effective.’ I would then prepare the lengthy report and the CO would sign without reading it..."³⁹

These men met North Koreans armed to the teeth with top of the line heavy Soviet and captured German weapons and artillery that the Americans, Black or white, could not match in killing power and range.

Inadequate training magnified the effects of the lack of manpower and killing power. Adequate training could have allowed them to compensate, or at least conserve and use their resources more effectively. Training ensured that non-commissioned officers (non-coms) kept their men awake, reacted in combat, and modified or adapted supplies to the occasion. It allowed enlisted men to employ old soldier tricks like stuffing hay in a poncho and wrapping it tightly
around to men to keep them warm. Flint noted that the North Koreans attacked with superior strength in tanks and infantry. Moreover, they attacked with a well-rehearsed, predictable, but remarkably effective scheme of maneuver. They fixed the American front with a tank charge, an infantry attack, or heavy shelling. As the Americans reacted to their front, North Korean infantry enveloped both flanks in search of the command post and indirect fire units to the rear. Once the mortars and artillery were defeated and communications disrupted, the enemy infantry formed roadblocks to prevent reinforcement and resupply while cutting the escape route. Once in the rear, their success was assured, for American units were ill-prepared for the mental stress of being physically cut off...The soldiers lost their concentration and thought only of escape. Small unit commanders found it impossible to fight their way out of these situations.

Training kept men alive; it showed them how to use the geography to stay alive, why they needed to conserve ammunition, multiple uses for a simple spoon, that grenades did not necessarily give away a position but a misused M-1 or M-14 would attract attention and artillery fire, when to use a BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle, the consummate infantry platoons’ weapon, assigned two to a platoon, and mainly how to survive. White David Hackworth claimed that "The first U.S. troops to come to Korea from occupation duty in Japan had been soft and badly trained, and each generation of replacements seemed worse. Those of us who’d been there awhile quickly became training madmen..." As late as July 1950, American units in Japan had not trained above the
battalion level; until Lt. Gen. Walton Walker assumed command of the Eighth Army, it did very little training, period. Under him, it did relatively more, but still not enough. The environment produced an occupation mentality in the personnel of Eighth Army; occupation mentality does not place a high value on training and combat readiness. Pfc. Leonard Korgie, L Company of white 34th Infantry (24th Division) recounted in Donald Knox’s The Korean War: An Oral History: Pusan to Chosin that "Occupation duty was heaven. I was a troop commander and education NCO [noncommissioned officer] at Sugamo Prison, where Japanese war criminals were held. My unit did very little military training. Life away from the prison consisted mostly of athletics, clubs, nightly dances, theater, and Japanese girls. Although in those days alcohol made me sick, there was always plenty to drink. GI money and cigarettes went a long way on the Black market."

Officers did not really know their men, and tended to think enlisted men were not too bright anyway, Black or White. First Lt. Philip Day (C Co, 21st Infantry Reg, 24th Division) claimed that "The enlisted men left something to be desired. Enlistees, I learned, were not a very bright bunch of guys... With most of the enlistees, we really did have disciplinary problems, everything from VD to fighting, disobeying orders to showing up late, going AWOL to drinking too much." Corporal Lacy Barnett, Medical Company, 34th
Infantry, 24th Division, concurred. He described his all-white unit in the following terms: "The troops always talked about booze or broads. Even the lowest-ranking private was able to afford a steady 'shack gal' and all the beer he could drink. VD was quite prevalent and although there were exceptions, many of the GIs were unlucky or ignorant enough to get a good case of gonorrhea..." Yet venereal disease was still perceived in reports as a particular problems of Blacks by white senior officers in charge of the 24th Regiment.

Clearly the U.S. Army in the Far East had serious problems. These problems of leadership, supply, and manpower in the white units previously described could not be blamed on race. Yet in the 24th Infantry Regiment, these problems were blamed on race, not on the conditions outlined above. Richard Dalfiume complained that "In the past, white officers of Negro units tended to attribute all of their units' problems to race; integration created a situation in which officers regarded their problems as military ones..."

Most of the 24th Infantry Regiment's soldiers, including combat units, were reduced to janitorial, groundskeeping, and other service tasks. Twenty-fourth Infantry Regiment soldiers, and soldiers from the 27th Wolfhounds and the 35th Infantry Regiment as well, received training on the line. As long as experienced NCO were present in these units, this practice barely worked. The
lack of experienced NCOs by November of 1950 endangered many men, Black and white. As Hackworth noted of the all-white 27th Wolfhounds, "It only took a couple of days for a new replacement to become a seasoned veteran. Before that, in fast moving, heavy combat like we were in, he was a liability - cannon fodder - the first to get hit." The practice of ignoring systematic training had deadly consequences.

The all-white Task Force Smith suffered from all of the problems associated with inadequate training, lack of artillery, garrison attitudes, and inadequate leadership. MacArthur ordered Task Force Smith into Korea to halt the initial North Korean drive from the July 10th invasion. He reinforced it less than a week later with the rest of the white 24th Infantry Division. Placed together piecemeal, with unrealistic goals considering its lack of material and manpower, the 24th Division floundered. The North Koreans overran it continually. This situation embarrassed the U.S.

Inadequate performance also characterized the 35th Infantry Regiment. It arrived in Pusan on July 13th. It, and the 27th, were fragmented. General Kean, commander of the U.S. forces in Korea from July 13, 1950, sent the 1/35 to Pohang to relieve the 2/27, and the 2/35 to the rear area near Kyongju. Clay Blair pointed out that "This brief interlude before battle provided Fisher and his men with time to adjust to Korea, assimilate fillers, and engage in
training exercises."

On July 22, the 35th finally saw action, with North Korean probing attacks. The South Korean units to the right of F Company, 2/35, broke and fled, allowing the North Koreans to go around F Company and attack it from the rear. According to Blair, "The NKPA infantry flanked F Company and brought it under fire from the rear, causing panic and a bugout. Most of the Americans escaped, but some were lost trying to get across a stream swollen by the incessant rain. In what the Army historian described as a 'fiasco', F company was thoroughly disorganized and sustained heavy casualties." The 2/35th held throughout July 23, with the help of the FEAF (Far East Air Force) airstrikes and HEAT (High Explosive Anti-Tank: armor piercing 'shaped-charge'anti-tank ammunition) shells used to kill T-34 tanks. On July 24th, another collapse by the South Koreans on the right combined with the battle at Sangu led Division commander Bill Kean to withdraw the 2/35th to help the 24th defend Sangu. Kean sent the 1/35 to the left flank of the 24th Infantry, next to the Wolfhounds (27th RCT), "where the NKPA 2d Division was threatening to force a breakthrough at Hwanggan. By July 26 Bill Kean's entire 25th Division was under massive attack." The white First Calvary also suffered from the effects of garrison life. They broke under fire frequently. "From Taegu Johnnie Walker sent word that he was 'disappointed' in the performance of the 1st
The disastrous overall performances in the early months of Korea were compounded by inept officers and morale problems among all of the men. White or Black, "you just prayed for a clean wound to get you out of there... the other thing the sun meant: the beginning of yet another long day, another step south, the never-ending bitter taste of defeat in all our mouths..." Low morale and straggling were widespread. Officers were disproportionately killed. Some staff officers' and white MPs racial attitudes made worse problems for Black soldiers.

The disastrous performance in the early months of Korea were compounded by inept officers and morale problems among all of the men. Officer mistakes and misplaced priorities that emphasized bureaucracy and style over readiness often hurt morale and performance. In the white 34th Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division,

the regimental commander decided to stamp out V.D. once and for all. To an increasing degree, men of the 34th found themselves restricted to post, treated more as prisoners than soldiers. As a result, morale plummeted in the 34th, the regiment's performance deteriorated, and the regimental commander eventually lost his job. Not surprisingly, its performance was far worse than that of the 21st and the 19th Infantry Regiments.

The Black 24th Infantry Regiment was regularly treated this way by white senior commanders fearing possible rapes by "savage" Blacks. This treatment, which can be traced back as
far as the Spanish American War, stemmed from a longstanding white perception that Black men raped white women and violently attacked white men when not closely supervised by whites. Historically, this mentality has affected performance among Black troops.

In the March 1951 Inspector General Report of the Investigation Concerning the 24th Infantry Regiment and Negro Soldiers in Combat White officers accused the 24th Infantry of refusing to use foxholes and emplacements, running, moving to the rear, not being trained, straggling, disproportionate wounds to the lower extremities (implied self-inflicted), and a higher than usual officer casualty rate.

In Exhibit D-27, Summary of Comments by Witnesses, there is a list of "Negro Characteristics" that lays out general perceptions of the staff officers of Blacks. These varied. They included accusations that Blacks are not alert, that they have a tendency to sleep on duty; that Blacks straggled more than white units, were not as close knit and individuals would not accept responsibility. The accusations also include claims that Blacks were reluctant to stay in their foxholes, trusted whites more than other Blacks, could not be depended on, were twice as hard to handle, got panicky, had "no sense of responsibility for equipment and supplies", demonstrated a tendency to panic, and would fight when integrated. The 25th Division's commander Church
claimed in the report that "Individual Negro is just as brave as a white soldier, but not in a group of Negroes. Afraid of the dark".

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS BY WITNESSES

NEGRO CHARACTERISTICS

Negro soldiers are not alert. They have a tendency to sleep on duty. (A130 Cook; A138, Thompson; A162, Britt; A185, Carter; A192, Kennedy; A206, Simonovich; A244, Donaho;

More stragglers than in white units. Not as close knit. Individuals will not accept responsibility. (127-130, Roberts (W), Regt. Exec)

Reluctant to dig or stay in foxholes. Have more trust in whites than in other Negroes. (147, 187-191, 212-213, Carson (W), Battalion Executive Officer & Battalion Commander)

Do not like to dig foxholes or stay in them. No loyalty to unit. Too easily influenced as a group. Some individuals do outstanding jobs. (386-288, 298-299, 307, McMurray, (W) Platoon Leader)

No mutual trust. (330-332, Ellis (N), Company Commander)

Do not like to stay in foxholes. Tendency to straggle. (376-378, Robinson (N), 1st Sergeant)

Do not like to stay in foxholes. No sense of responsibility. (464-469, Herren, (W), Platoon Leader)

Reluctant to dig foxholes deep enough. (692, Jackson (N), Weapons Platoon Leader)

Not as alert as white soldiers, tendency to go to sleep on duty. Respond well to direction. Cannot be depended on. Not as stable or reliable as other troops. Fighting ability, of those who stay and fight, is all that can be expected. (10, 714, 723, Corley (W), Regimental Commander)

Tendency to straggle. Negro units are twice as hard to handle. Discipline is more difficult. Can dish it out, but can't take it. Not cohesive. (786-788, White (W), Regimental Commander)

Too much imagination at night; get panicky. Cannot be depended upon. Excessive straggling. Do not like to dig foxholes deep enough. (798, 805, 808, 817-818, Champeny (W),
No sense of responsibility for equipment and supplies. Men are not alert. Tendency to fall asleep. (A30-A31, Corcoran (W), Company Commander)

Tendency to panic. (D-5, Bigart, Correspondent)

Only a few stay awake or remain alert on guard posts. (D-3, Camp (W))

3d Battalion, 9th Infantry does have an Esprit de Corps. (851, Keiser (W), Division Commander)

Exhibit D-27

In the summary, views of the problems were mixed. They ranged from verbal disrespect to excessive straggling. Except for De Veaux, who was Black and a chaplain behind the lines, the officers who perceived a disproportionate straggling problem tended to be white and behind the lines.

In Exhibit D-27, the officers blamed excessive enlisted casualties on lack of utilization of foxholes, moving to the rear, attempting to flee mortars and artillery fire, running, self-inflicted wounds, and lack of junior leaders. Ironically, they did not cite being overrun by the North Koreans (which happened several times), bad training, running out of ammunition and trying to retrieve more, ambushes, bad leadership, and friendly fire. However, several Black enlisted veterans emphasized ambushes, overruns, and inadequate amounts of ammunition. Another explanation suspicious by its absence was the lack of adequate heavy artillery support. Ironically, all of the
"Negro Characteristics" listed in Exhibit D-27 were also found in abundance among the white units, which included large numbers of low-income, badly educated white Southerners. The reports of combat veterans diverged from those of the headquarters' staff officers further back.

Hackworth referred to the remoteness and lack of connection between the staff and real combat veterans, especially in terms of real experience and practice. This may be showing up here. The lack of a limited, objective definition for straggling created problems too. Several Black veterans spoke of being accused of straggling when they were either sent back to regroup or sent back for ammunition. They would stay until they ran out of ammunition (firepower conservation and training again), and then leave to get more or regroup.

The statements of the one Black and several white officers accusing the 24th themselves conflict and appear not credible. Evidence of bias is abundant.

Captain De Veaux claimed that when he confronted "stragglers", "They [the Black soldiers] usually say the company is withdrawing. I am convinced they were stragglers and I have sent them back." He also noted later that "So many of our officers expect the men to break in the face of fire that the men react this way... I don't believe that the men under the above leaders have withdrawn without orders, and I know that F and A have a minimum of stragglers."
Captain De Veaux also provides evidence of the bias problems in evaluation. "I asked an officer of the 3d B[attalion]n how many stragglers we had. On one occasion he said about 1/3, but when I checked with the B[attalion]n Adjutant, who should know, he stated only 10 (Out of several thousand)." Colonel Horton White claimed that

Three times during the next week it was necessary to turn out the entire Regimental staff to establish road blocks to collect stragglers from the line Companies when the only action taken by the enemy was sporadic artillery and mortar fire and patrol activities...Each of these spontaneous movements to the rear was disorganized and not justifiable by the enemy’s action and characterized by high losses through abandonment of crew-served weapons, radio and other signal equipment, and in many cases individual weapons.

Another example of the impact of perceptions is provided by Major Owen Carter.

For instance, company L counter attacked on 20 August, moving into the attack from their reserve position, had 4 officers and 105 enlisted men. When they were relieved on the evening of 24 August there were only 17 men in the fox holes. The number of casualties during the period and men evacuated for other reasons was 1 officer and 17 enlisted men, leaving 3 officers and 88 enlisted men unaccounted for. As the unit moved down the mountain side stragglers joined the column, and when the unit arrived at the base of the mountain where they were fed, the strength of the company had increased to 1 officer and 35 enlisted men. This is the type of difficulties encountered during the entire period the unit has been in combat.

Eight men is not overwhelming, or a greater percentage than
the number of white stragglers (if, indeed, these men were stragglers). At an authorized strength of 88 enlisted men, only 37 made it back. Eight men to escort or carry 57 wounded or dying enlisted men to treatment is reasonable, unless a person is already biased. Owen claimed that this regiment was on good defensive terrain and a well organized defense. With 57 dead? Since it is well known that the majority of the white officers sent to Black units were incompetent, perhaps making this officer define "good defensive terrain" and "well-organized defense" would have given him more credibility today. Owen also claimed that "He (Champeny) is limited in obtaining the results desired because of the lack of Non Coms [non-commissioned officers] capable and willing to perform their duty."^63

Major Theodore Cook also gives an example of white perceptions of Black soldiers. "Has anyone ever refused to obey your order? NO, but they obeyed in such a manner as to get negative results...Do your men go to sleep when they are on outpost? Yes, they do. It has been reported to me on numerous occasions... Many claimed they had to go to the aid station, but B[attalio]n Surgeon could find nothing wrong..." This officer was not asked to give a number for many, and vague generalities punctuated his testimony, and the testimony of others.^64

Project Clear also recorded white officer perceptions of segregated units. "(A CO [commanding officer] of a Negro
company) When I was in the -RCT [Regimental Combat Team], you could outline a mission for me, and I could tell you whether or not my boys could do it without help. Here I never know. Sometimes they do very well, sometimes they even stand on the defense, but other times they straggle badly on the attack, and bug like hell on the defense. You just don't know what they can and will do." The white officers in Project Clear aimed the majority of their comments "at the functioning of all-Negro or predominately Negro infantry units...these units fail to take or hold ground as directed, endanger the flanks of adjoining units by pulling out suddenly and without notice, waste and abandon large quantities of equipment and supplies. The adjectives 'unpredictable' and 'unreliable' occur with great frequency." An unidentified battalion CO for a white unit which had sat on the side of a Black unit in combat noted that "The company commanders automatically turn their flanks when they're being covered by the -th, just as though they were open." The high officer casualty rate in Black units was blamed on the officers having to expose themselves to get the men moving. This was accepted uncritically. There was another, much more likely explanation that the headquarters people knew about but did not investigate. James Dunnigan and Alfred Nofti noted that
During World War II, copious records were kept of combat units and their performance. One seeming oddity was that many units became more effective after their first few battles, even though their losses were not yet replaced. Research revealed that the most important losses in those first few battles were the inept troops and officers. Good people were also lost, but unit efficiency improved more because the worst troops were lost more rapidly than the best ones. Moreover, it was found that it was not efficient to send new troops in as individual replacements to units still in combat. Experienced troops were not about to trust unknown newcomers, and tended to shun them. This is one reason why rookies became casualties so quickly. It is much better to introduce replacements when the unit was behind the lines. That way the veterans could get to know the newcomers without immediate risk to life and limb.

Basically, knowing already that these officers were ASSIGNED because they were seen as inept, the high death rate makes sense, since their ineptness would cause them to die at a higher rate. Of course, in war, officers do tend to die a lot; especially since the North Koreans picked them out to shoot. Also, In World War II, the German Army experienced an officer turnover rate of about 9.2 times higher in combat than in support personnel. This averaged to be an officer turnover of about once a month, due to death and injury.

Several times the NKPA and the Chinese overran the 24th Regiment, and white units accused the Blacks of bugging out. Some of these Black men broke and run; so did whites. Those who escaped being cut off were generally accused of running
away; many were court martialed under Article 75 for misbehavior in front of the enemy. White soldiers who escaped from encirclements also faced verbal accusations of "bugging out", but they did not face courts martial.

White perceptions allowed white officers to blame their own and other whites' incompetence on the race of their enlisted personnel. It unnecessarily risked the lives of good men. These perceptions have also led to unwarranted slurs on the honor of brave men. Blaming race rather than reality hurt other whites, because the distrust and discrimination deprived the 25th Division of confidence, morale, and the benefits of a full, adequately utilized regiment at a time when bodies were desperately needed. To a growing body of historians, segregation almost lost the conflict in Autumn 1950. Segregation and the resulting perceptions definitely hurt American abilities to effectively project and assess power in Korea.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p.190. "The rules are understood to be for the protection of whites and directed against Negroes."

3. Ibid., pp.118-9.

4. Ibid., pp.192-3.


16. A number of black veterans felt that "manly" behavior was perceived by white officers, MPs, and enlisted personnel as "uppity", not the more modern academic word, militant. But the fear of "uppity" behavior is actually in this case a fear of "militant" behavior, because the "uppity", i.e. aggressive, competent behavior was seen as breaking Southern norms and white beliefs.

17. Ibid., p.62.

18. Ibid., p.72.

19. Ibid., p.73.

20. Ibid., p.59.

21. Ibid., p.91.

22. Ibid., p.115.

23. Ibid., p.116, 163.

24. Ibid., p.164.

25. Ibid., p.81.

26. Ibid., p. 164.

27. Project *Clear* is explained fully in chapter II; it studied in May 1951 the spontaneous unauthorized integration of blacks into white units which lieutenants and captains authorized between November 1950 and March 1951.

28. Americans trained them, and American prejudices, differences in culture, and language problems gave the South Koreans major problems in saving their lives on the field and in being militarily effective. See Colonel David H. Hackworth
195


31. Heller and Stofft, pp.274, 298-299.

32. Army generals, including MacArthur, were more interested in retaining the divisions, even if they were not combat ready, than in using their funding to create a smaller number of fully ready combat divisions. They cut out necessary units to save the divisions, which were important due to prestige, opportunity for promotion, and future funding.

33. Ibid., p.269.

34. Blair, p.48.


36. Heller and Stofft, p.269.


38. Ibid., p.10.

39. Ibid., pp.9-10.

40. Hackworth, p.64.

41. Heller and Stofft, 288-289.

42. Hackworth, p.80-1;79, 64.

43. Ibid., pp.69-70.

44. Several Black soldiers pointed out that THEY trained regularly because there was nothing else to do on Gifu; Gifu was far away from Japanese metropolitan areas.


47. Ibid., p.9.

48. Ibid.

49. Dalfiume, p. 214.

50. Hackworth, p. 79.


52. Ibid., p.163.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p.160.

55. Hackworth, pp. 55,64-5.

56. Flint, p. 272.

57. Hackworth, pp. 64-5,91, 142-3.

58. Perry, B-34, p.2.

59. Ibid., (Lt. Col De Veaux, p.27 (?), Ex B-34)

60. Ibid., (De Veaux, p.1-2

61. Ibid., Horton White.

62. Ibid., p.3 actually 15.

63. Ibid., Owen, p. 3. Note, most Noncoms were in the 24th initially were Black; later white noncommissioned officers replaced Black ones.

64. Ibid., Maj. Theodore J. Cook, p.3, B-33, A-128)


66. Ibid.

67. References to the -th have to be taken as the 24th RCT, as they were the largest unit over there, and the only unit so numerically designated that this usage could apply. The 3/9th, for example, would have been called the 3rd; the 2/5 the 2nd or -nd.
68. Ibid.


70. Ibid., p.296.

71. The US Army Center for Military History is currently revising the official history. In comparison with the 35th and the 5th Infantry (24th Division) the 24th compared favorably (July 17th, 1993, 24th Infantry Regiment Reunion Banquet, Col. (ret.) John Cash)
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS

I. Placing Segregated Black Soldiers in Context

The world Black segregated veterans and active Army soldiers faced was a world of tokenism, "that existed throughout the nineteen fifties and early sixties". Just as the Army faced manpower shortages during the Korean War, "during the fifties American industry began experiencing a manpower shortage—a shortage of trained people to manage expanded industrial facilities of the nation. It was not a period characterized by deep moral fervor, but there were without a doubt many whites who felt that it would be a decent gesture to hire more blacks." In many ways, the Black men who left the service in the Fifties or retired in the Sixties or early Seventies, repeated their Army experiences. The same reluctance to group too many Blacks together in one company mirrored the reluctance to integrate units to more than 10% Black. In the civilian world, other Black army experience characteristics also seemed to appear in a familiar, but civilian, fashion. As a non-veteran explained it "They had these preconceived notions: you're black so you really can't do better than you're
doing...There was more overt racism back then, more open resentment and little respect for blacks. You had to bend over backward so that it wouldn't seem that you had a chip on your shoulder. One thing they wouldn't deal with is an angry black man, so you had to be careful even about the tone of your voice. Because they hadn't been around too many black people they used to test you. For example, they would tell a racial joke to see if you would laugh. Then they would tell 'nigger jokes' and substitute pollack for nigger...."² Much of this sounds like the black Army experience post-integration before the racial deterioration from the Vietnam conflict.

A number of studies of successful Blacks have identified traits that "lead to success in a white world." The long service Black veterans in this history displayed many of these traits. Audrey Edwards and Craig Polite in Children of the Dream: The Psychology of Black Success (1992) consolidate these traits into nine points:

1. Personal Responsibility and Integrity
2. Goals, Organization, Planning, and Action Sequences
3. Managing Others' Racial Perceptions and Reactions
4. Pioneering
5. High Degree of Self-Reliance
6. Positive Self-Acceptance
7. Balance in Life
8. Giving Back, Reaching Back
9. Faith^3

Of these traits, managing racial perceptions, pioneering, positive self-acceptance, and giving back all show up in the attitude, the civil rights activities, and community uplift activities of these veterans. While the men involved in the 24th Regiment Association* (who have cooperated with this work) may self-select themselves, the Project Clear data also shows that skills at managing racial perceptions and positive self-acceptance were very well represented among Black Korean War veterans. The Army seemed to reinforce or cause positive views of self by building a positive view of manhood and competence. This "uppitiness" seemed to motivate the community uplift activities.

Integration facilitated racial perception management.

White fear of blacks, white distrust of blacks, white discomfort with blacks, white disdain for blacks... these are just a few of the negative impulses all blacks will be hit with at some point in their interactions with whites. Successful blacks manage not only to diffuse such impulses, but to turn whatever negative perceptions into, if not a more positive view of the black race, then at least a positive perception of a black individual. Successful blacks are the ones inevitably viewed as 'exceptional' by whites—not like 'those others' of their race.*

Positive white responses to integration in Project Clear suggest that was happening.

*All men in segregated units, including the 555th Paratroopers, 159th Field Artillery Battalion, 77th Engineers, several tank units, and the 3/9th Black Manchu can join.
(White EM): ...It's the type of guy they send to the -th that bugs out. They type they mix with us are something different. I bet the Army picks very carefully the guys they put with whites. Have to. It's a new thing and they don't want to fuck up the experiment before it gets started. It's pretty obvious from the other colored guys I've seen in other outfits. They're the cream of the crop. The shit, the men with the lowest IQs and backgrounds, they put in the all-colored units. I wouldn't be surprised if they all got rated by a psychologist as to who's fit to go into a white unit.

The belief that they were uplifting themselves and the race, as well as belief in their competence and manhood sustained black soldiers.

II. Black Soldiers and Manhood

Some Black veterans were influenced by Army training and experiences in their conception of manhood and their involvement in community services. The bitter ones seemed to work out their frustration by becoming NAACP members and working in voter registration, their churches, and in educational desegregation. A few became labor leaders. The men who felt they were influenced by the Army, all felt that it instilled "confidence, competence, and aggressiveness."

These were not men who felt comfortable fighting with militant tactics, unlike the Vietnam Veterans who sometimes joined the Black Panthers and fought what they perceived as the capitalist/representative system of government and restrained police brutality. Even the Deacons for Defense
and Justice stayed within the bounds of legal self defense and standing up for rights; they did not engage in firefights with police SWAT teams, as the Panthers did. Korean veterans, like David Dinkins of New York, were more comfortable working within the system. They simply wanted their fair share. Southerners, more than Northerners, found themselves joining the NAACP after they left the Army. Northerners tended more for church leadership or labor leadership.

These men were (and still are) remarkably comfortable with their manhood. The ones who perceived gay men (called "sissies" in the vernacular of the time) in the mess branches, the personnel and administrative branches, and the medical corps were tolerant. "As long as they didn't bother me, I didn't bother them" was a refrain. Another refrain claimed that men do not care who pulls them off the battle field as long as they do it. These men watch the current arguments over openly homosexual personnel serving in the Army with a mixture of condescension and disgust.

Did their "uppity", confident behavior, help integrate the Army by playing to white fears of Black violence and large groups of Black men. The evidence suggests that this was the case. Fear of violence, as the civilian reforms after the riots in 1965 and 1968 show, is a strong motivator of change. That these men were perceived as possibly violent cannot be discounted.
More work will need to be done on the subject of the Army as an incubator for organic intellectualism and manhood in the coming years to clarify these tentative interpretations.

III. The Tipping Point

Leo Bogart lamented the Army’s resistance to declassifying Clear. He noted that it is hard to say whether open publication of the findings of Clear would have influenced the Supreme Court Decisions on the schools or the implementation of that decision, or whether it would have influenced any of the subsequent measures to desegregate other sectors of civilian life...the indications from Clear suggested that most whites would flee when they felt their dominance threatened, at which point a segregated pattern would recur. This important lesson of Clear had to be painfully relearned in the late 1950’s and the 1960’s when desegregation occurred in the schools and federally-supported housing. In urban areas undergoing transition, it has been learned by bitter experience that 'integrated' housing projects have a way of becoming segregated de facto; and this can happen very rapidly once whites felt they are in a minority, a thought which occurs to them well before they actually are.6

Today, education and business both provide examples of how knowledge of the Black experience in the Army during integration continues to be important to policy makers. Andrew Hacker in Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, and Unequal, pointed out that

Here we have no shortage of studies. By and
large, this research agrees that white residents will stay- and some new ones may move in- if black arrivals do not exceed 8 percent... once the black proportion passes that point, whites begin to leave the neighborhood and no new ones will move in... What makes integration difficult if not impossible is that so few whites will accept even a racial composition reflecting the national proportion of 12 or 13 percent. In this regard, one or two attempts have been made to impose ceilings on the number of black residents in housing projects and developments, so as not to frighten away whites... Those administering such 'benign' quotas have found they must maintain two sets of waiting lists... The result is that black applicants have to wait longer, and are less likely to get their first choice of accommodation. Whites and blacks who want to achieve and maintain interracial housing- itself a rarity- find they are forced to defend 'benign quotas' that are biased against some blacks, since there are fewer 'black' places...

Recent evidence supports Korean War Black soldier contentions of harsh or racially based evaluations of incompetence. Racially biased teacher evaluations have been documented famously by Kozol’s Savage Inequalities, less famously by a host of earlier studies. One recent example is the judicial injunction against Rockford, Illinois teachers April 1994 who ignored test results to place students by skin color in slow learner groups. The Urban Institute proved in 1992 that even when identical Black and white applicant go on interviews, Blacks are rated lower; the Urban Institute also showed that less than 10% of whites knew of an incompetent minority being hired over a competent white. Davis and Clegg noted that "Honest white men admitted
to us that even among white males there has never been a 
true meritocracy." In an interview with a white business
man, he admitted that "It's a myth that keeps the system 
going, but everyone knows that the person with the most
merit is not the person who rises to the top... I know a man
right here in this company who has never been successful at
a single goddamn assignment. He is ambitious and he knows
how to kiss the right ass... Right now he's in a vital
position in the company, and they've given him a strong
staff to support him...." Davis and Clegg also pointed out
that the white feeling that affirmative action gave avenues
of redress to individual white women and minorities without
creating such avenues for white men gave rise to the
unsubstantiated cries of reverse discrimination today. This
argument is similar to the white Korean War soldier fears
that they would have to "bend over backwards" not to offend
Blacks or would be victims of reverse discrimination
themselves if segregational discrimination was abolished
in the Army.

IV. Integration and the 1951-3 period.

Segregationists in the Army refused to believe that the
lessons of the Korean War integration could be applied to
the United States and Europe. They resisted desegregation
until sheer force and logic overwhelmed them in 1953. Again,
they relied on perceptions, and fear of "social" garrison
incidents. In 1953, segregationists used the Army drawdown as an excuse to release large numbers of Blacks with low AGCT scores, and to lower the percentage of Blacks in the Army to 10%.

Under integration, some discrimination still occurred. Black enlisted personnel were very vulnerable to officers, and intransigent officers led to frustration. In the United States, off-base housing and other areas of discrimination continued to sting, especially in the South. These problems would not be seriously addressed until 1963. In 1966, a new program emerged to strain the tenuous bonds of racial peace.

Project 100,000 had two goals. It originally intended to fill the Army's need for bodies as the Vietnam War intensified. Bernard Nalty noted that "Secretary McNamara sincerely believed that the war could produce social benefits. To that end, he launched Project 100,000, begun during 1966 to assist at least that number of the unemployed and poorly educated by lowering standards, admitting them to the armed forces, and teaching them skills they could not otherwise acquire." This was an attempt to use the military as a vehicle for social mobility within the bounds of Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society social engineering framework. Volunteers and draftees, these barely literate youths, white and Black (41% of them were Black) "usually ended up riflemen". Most of them did not qualify for training, and the Army did not provide it. Bored and lacking the mutual
self restraint that characterized whites and Blacks in the Fifties, these men were a combustible mix. The combination of the college and marriage deferments and Project 100,000 meant the level of Blacks in rifle platoons and the rear passed the tipping point. Whites felt threatened, Blacks refused to back down; Black Power met white separatists. Interracial war, intensified by racially unequal administration of justice and discipline under Article 15 and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, made a bad situation worse. The physically deteriorating barracks in the U.S., Vietnam, and Europe had the same anti-social effects on these men as crowding rats in a box. Finally, the easy availability of marijuana in Vietnam, along with marijuana and hashish in Europe and the U.S., destroyed already low levels of self-restraint. Racial incidents racked the United States Army from 1968 to 1978.

V. Selected Integration Methods Utilized Post 1958: One Legacy

After the several racial incidents culminated in the Kitty Hawk incident in the Navy in 1972, all of the services examined racial relations across the board. The Kitty Hawk race riot in October of 1972 and the two subsequent racial incidents on the "Hassayampa" and the "Constellation"
involved violence stemming from perceptions of racial injustice and discrimination. A number of inter-service reforms came from these events.

Bases included Black barbers and beauticians. This lowered some of the tensions in the Seventies by creating the perception that the services would try to cater to Black needs. Adding Black books, magazines, and culture items to commissaries also lowered tensions in the Seventies. This was somewhat more successful with short timers than career service personnel. This may not be appropriate for integrating women or gays; the refusal of white barbers and beauticians to study and appropriately treat physically different forms of black hair was an insult. Even today, many black men and women will be refused service at predominately white salons with "We can’t handle black hair" or will be forced to pay a surcharge. This is not a problem for White gays or most White women; their hair is the same as the rest of White America’s.

Streamlined reassignment procedures minimized idle time for soldiers while awaiting transfers. As soldiers spent less time sitting idle waiting for new assignments, they had less time and energy to create trouble. This was especially targeted at, and successful with less educated service people of any race, who felt that they were in dead-end positions with no prospect of advancement. These individuals had the least to lose from creating racial incidents, or any
sort of trouble.

Seminars on racial relations often eased short-term interracial relation problems by focusing on behavior, lowering White fears, and giving Whites practical actions to use to interact with minorities. Collaborative contacts were very effective in combination with more active remedies, partially because they were not seen as coercive, like the official educational classes, and because they involved unit commanders.\textsuperscript{12}

Reassigning racially insensitive commanders began being used by the Army in the Seventies, after two Blacks won a public Army court martial over desertion. "Faulkner proved that the treatment they had received from white soldiers forced them to flee... the defense attorney emphasized mitigating circumstances, such as the knowledge by the defendants of instances of suicide or mental breakdown by blacks subjected to racial harassment while serving in Europe.\textsuperscript{13}" The court martial and publicity were public embarrassments for the Army, spurring punishment by reassignment of offenders, especially when officers. This was effective in removing the impression that discriminatory actions were appropriate and would be tolerated.\textsuperscript{14}

Investigating charges of racial bias in promotions created at least the perception that the Army was concerned and making a good faith effort to promote meritocracy. Combined with protection of complainants from retaliation,
this was effective.\textsuperscript{15}

Attempts to increase the numbers of minorities in the officer corps have been moderately successful. The examples of Colin Powell and other successful Black officers reinforced the perception of opportunity in the Army, and therefore lessened perceptions and evidence of discrimination.

The volunteer Army attempted to eliminate unnecessary procedures in the early Seventies. One example was ignoring some facial hair. While this addressed not specifically racial concerns, by addressing aspects of military culture not easily justified on efficiency grounds, it eliminated one avenue for clashes and harassment. Ultimately, this was unsuccessful because the training and discipline crackdown which followed the failure of Desert One in 1980 ended this leniency without race relations deterioration.

Encouraging consensual concessions and restraints (both sides compromise, accommodate each other) worked best as a part of an education program focusing on attitudes and tolerance, where they were clearly defined and rewarded. Combined with remedial education programs, these concessions successfully ease tensions. Remedial education has been used in promoting peaceful race relations from Civil War to the Seventies; it is a time-honored military tradition.

The military reformed military testing and channeling to promote equity. The GCT has now been replaced by the
ASVAB (Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery). It is a less culturally biased test and seems to be resented less.

Studies indicate that contact alone, without education, leads to selective perception of only those traits within a minority population that reinforce the prejudice or stereotype the perceiver already holds. Bigots will ignore non-stereotypical or competent behavior and either focus only stereotypical behavior, or will perceive competent behavior as incompetent. Access without education leads to the persistence of prejudice.16

V. Women and Homosexuals: Comparisons and Cautions

There are a number a people who, for various reasons, wish to compare integrating women into combat and including open homosexuals in the Army with the experiences of Black men and their integration in the Army. These comparisons need to be made with caution. It may actually be easier to include women and openly homosexual soldiers now than it was to integrate Black men then.

Women and gays in the military are more proportionately represented in the officer corps than minorities were historically; this allows for greater success from mentoring and role modeling. Class differences and education also play roles here. Minorities, homosexuals, and women are diverse. Homosexuals and minorities who join the military will tend
to be more conservative than the rest of their respective subgroups in American society. Women who join have tended to be neither more radical or conservative, but more independent. Women's independence threatens some older men.

Women and homosexuals do not usually have separate cultures from American mainstream culture. What the media calls "gay culture" (i.e. the extremists and militants seen at "Gay Pride" parades, "drag queens", effeminate behavior in men, anti-male behavior in women) does not define the norms of the majority of homosexual people's behavior, especially in the military. Joseph Shapiro noted in 1993 that "The closet divides not only gays from heterosexuals, but gays from other gays. That is clear in the "queers" vs. gays debate. A small but growing number of gay radicals - the queers - argue for a militant celebration of gay culture...the gay community's most extreme fringe members - including drag queens and leather fetishists - were pushed aside at the April gay-rights march..." Minorities, due to ethnic ties, do have an identifiably different ethnic based culture; tensions and incidents are caused by violations of cultural norms in these cases.

Media culture perceptions of women (makeup, etc) does not define the majority of female behavior. Media and social perceptions are manipulated fairly easily, (as in the power of videos and rap in shaping anti-female attitudes) and must be viewed with extreme caution.
While several of the stereotypes invoked to deny equity to women and gays in military service seem to mirror those utilized to maintain racial segregation, there are two subtle differences. The perception of choice in relation to gays’ right to serve differentiates the subject from gender-based and racial discrimination. The issue of physical strength is a real concern over the issue of women in land conflict, although technological innovations in battlefield weapons and support already make most of this argument moot. These are arguments racial minorities could answer in a visible manner; even when visible untrue, White perceptions and evaluations were still biased and tried to make excuses. Abstract perceptions are harder to modify.

Perceptions of gays as sexual predators in the military do mirror perceptions of Black men as sexual predators**, both being without evidence for their foundations, but the remedies include some differences. Including gays in the military police may not be enough to limit resentment of false accusations, or to restrain some prejudiced heterosexuals from "gay-bashing"; it did limit attacks on Black males for interracial relations with white European women.19

** See Susan Brownmiller’s stereotyped remarks in On Rape, and Paula Giddings, When and Where I Enter for more information on white perceptions and the myth of the Black male rapist, which the mainstream white women’s movement has only just seemed to discover.
Tokenism and Military Integration

A quick look at the literature on the Black experience in corporate America shows certain disturbing parallels to the Black military experience. This makes sense, in that corporate America and the military have long exchanged managers (i.e. officers), and since both are hierarchical in their structures. Corporate America and the U.S. military also share values that are more conservative than the civilian world.

VI. Conclusions

This is a history, utilizing oral interviews, documentary evidence, and modern sociological and educational theory to explain a previous contradiction. This is along the lines of a group biography.

Definitely even within these limits, certain conclusions stand out. One is that the Army argument that it integrated during Korea for manpower and effectiveness reasons alone does not stand. Fear of Black violence on the part of White officers was a persuasive influence that could not be discounted in the decision making process.

A second conclusion is that these Black men were not passive victims. They insisted on their dignity and their equal treatment to the letter of the law. "I knew my rights" was a constant refrain in the interviews. These men fought on the field for their country, and off the field for their
reputation. Evidently, Black individuals insisting on "manhood" could scare a lot of officers.

Third, perceptions played a big role in the evaluation of soldiers, effectiveness, and utilization. The excuse of low educational standards must be mitigated by poor white officer perceptions and performance. Integration stripped away racial perceptions that protected incompetent white officers. Appleman's history must be discounted for this reason. Appleman evidently was influenced by low expectations and perceptions.

Fourth, the evidence points to one conclusion: Black performance was equal to whites in the segregated units, but was perceived as worse because of the tipping point, fear, and expectation effects. Whites and Blacks ran, and stayed, and fought. While lack of equipment, supplies, adequate leadership, and adequate training hampered all soldiers, Blacks adapted as well as whites to these conditions. Black assessments that race and numbers helped to cause the unduly harsh evaluations do seem justified in light of the recent advances in sociological and educational perceptual and evaluation research.

Finally, a certain number of these men used church, community activities, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to attempt to "uplift" the community. From the men here, it seems safe to say that a large number were involved in voter registration activity,
although more research is needed to confirm this point. These men contributed to the civil rights movement through support of the NAACP and the Deacons for Defense and Justice in the South.

It is this author’s hope that this study will spur further research into the lives and impact of these "forgotten soldiers’. These men certainly do not deserve to be forgotten. Their legacy evidently impacts several important areas of American civilian and Army life. Abraham Foxman pointed out that "We’ve been to the moon and come up with a polio vaccine, but we have not come up with a solution against bigotry and racism. Our scientists and engineers have not felt this is of such importance." These men’s experience is important in creating such a solution. Perhaps this will be a step.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 27.


4. Ibid., p. 249.


8. Davis and Clegg., p. 60.

9. Ibid., p. 59.


12. Ibid., p.327-8.

13. Ibid., p.327.


Appendix A

Interview Instrument
QUESTIONS FOR PHONE INTERVIEWS
24TH INFANTRY RCT VETERANS

1. Do you want me to use your name?

2. Rank in Korea

3. Company, Battalion (and/or platoon)

4. MOS or job description

5. Time in service overall? Were you in more than one war? Which ones?

6. Dates in service in Korea

7. Geographic areas where you saw combat?

8. Where did you enlist from?

9. If you were to describe to your children or grandchildren what you experienced in Korea, or the experience of the 24th RCT in Korea, how would you describe it? Were you involved in hand-to-hand combat? Were you involved in any ambushes?

10. Did you see straggling? Black men leaving foxholes on the line? Sleeping when they were on watch? Lighting matches on the line?

11. What condition was your equipment in? Was there enough ammunition? Was it powerful enough? Did you receive adequate artillery and air support?

12. Was your unit involved in a Chinese attempt to overrun or envelope any positions? Can you describe it? Can you
describe the experience of being under fire and/or taking a hill?

13. Did you see men in your unit or other unite waste ammunition by shooting at sounds or shadows? Not practicing firepower restraint and/or control?

14. Either in Japan or with the white officers, did you observe white officers seem uneasy about either the large numbers of black men, or black men not behaving in a stereotypical fashion (uppity), or seem uneasy because black soldiers seemed confident and/or competent and/or manly? Did the large groups of armed black men seem to make white officers or white soldiers in other outfits (like the 1st Cavalry) uneasy?

15. Did you see white senior officers? Did your unit have white officers? Were there problems with them?

16. Did you see or know of gay men in the Army while you were in Korea? If so, were they grouped in certain jobs, or in all jobs? Were they resented?

17. Problems with the white MPs? Fights over jumpboots or sleeping bags? Women?

18. Did the Army or Army training shape or affect your idea of manhood? Did it make you feel competent or confident? Do you think your experience in the 24th RCT helped you in civilian life?

19. When you came back to the U.S, How did you feel about
221
civilian life?

20. When you left the Army, did you join any community or neighborhood service organizations, or Civil Rights Organizations like the NAACP? School desegregation?

21 Were the black newspapers important for black soldiers?

21. Were you an eldest son? How old were you when you entered the service? (if from the South) Did you support family members from your Army checks?
Appendix B

Selected Oral Histories
Bessemer
Sergeant. I got to Korea on July 13 1950. March 8th 1951. Fr
The army ? Well I was in the Navy first. I was in the Navy
in WWII. I came in from Louisiana. Yeah UNCLEAR. I am from
Louisiana.

Yea, I was in heavy mortar company, 24th Infantry
Regiment, 2053? unclear. My MOS (Military Operations
Specialty) was 3060. I was a cook, but they always say that
the cook, you serve first and cook later (sic), but anyway
they wanted to discuss it, because everybody fought there.
You better believe I saw combat, Every day I saw combat,
ever day for six days. Masan front, Pusan perimeter, then
up North to Chundri- Ri, and up to PYONGYANG, the North
Korean capital, we fought all the way up to 17 miles to the
Manchurian border.

Over all twenty years in the army. (DESCRIBING COMBAT):
plain hell, just plain hell. What you say? Plain hell.
There’s no comfort there. No I didn’t get into hand to hand
fighting. But I got into shooting plenty of times. Yes, it
was. We was up at Chundu-Ri, my unit was up there, in fact
the whole 8th Army was up there; and when the Chinese came
it dispersed everybody. that I can’t say if 1st Cav was
there, in front of me or behind me. When I tell you this
much, ain’t nobody no where anybody was because the Chinese
hit and dispersed anybody. As I said before, uh we went in
battle with all black, but when we come out, we were all mixed up. And this is when we got integrated, the Chinese integrated us. We were supposed to be got integrated back in 1948, when Pres. Truman supposed to have integrated us, so this is how I saw it myself, when (sic) in combat.

AMBUSHES BY CHINESE Yeah well, the Chinese had, well yes we was ambushed, we went out on patrol one time, and uh and we was ambushed, but the thing was we wasn’t caught in a situation where we would get caught, a place where we couldn’t get out. I do remember things that happened to our R & R platoon, they was ambushed and was hit, well the North Koreans this time, we was on our way North. they hit our R and R platoon from front and rear, and the enemy was dispersed underneath those rice paddy mounds, and our soldiers ran right into their arms, and there was nothing we could do, but ones they didn’t kill they put gas on them and burned them; and we sat there and watched them and couldn’t do anything because all of our people were out there and we couldn’t get near them, we couldn’t shoot or fire or nothing. We could not get near them; they were intermingled with the Korean troops, with the Communist troops. And so they killed a bunch of our guys, and captured some as well, during that time, I don’t know dates this was but I’m quite sure it was early Sept. or late August of 1950 I’m not sure. (AMMO) I had all the ammunition I needed. At times what I needed wasn’t the ammo it was the weapons that we had,
didn't have firing pins half of them. And the firing pins had worn out, everything, cause we went over there with substandard equipment. As far as being equipped for that type of weather we were sitting ducks I mean the Chinese had on this padded stuff on, the Koreans had padded, and we had regular doggone clothes that was issued back in Garrison. We never had any winter type gear not heavy winter type gear we had regular long Johns, or whatever, but they were not like the regular UNCLEAR they had now, like the Chinese had, and the Koreans had, They was outside in that area, and we would be freezing to death, and they had all of the good equipment and we had none. I think I changed clothes 3 times while I was in Korea, but every time I jumped to another UNCLEAR, there was nothing left. I didn't see any fights over sleeping bags, but didn't have nothing but we didn't have nothing but a little blanket, that was cut into the form of a body. And this is what we usually had repellant uh water repellent on the outside for our to stop water from coming into the bag. Keep from getting wet. But as far as fights over sleeping bags I don't know anything about that. UH, we seem to have every man had is own equipment, up to that point. As far as the weapons are concerned, we had trouble with weapons over there with no firing pins in them. All I know is this may sound funny, I know that because I had one when we had an attack, and I couldn't fire, and then when I fired, and finally stopped the fighting. (sic). We went over
there ill-equipped in the first place. And it appeared to me that every time we got anything it was substandard.

FOOD- Well at times we had enough food, but we raided villages and got chickens and things like that to eat. And we had C-rations, we had what every we could get. We only had fresh eggs over there when that general when that General Ridgeway taken over, and he says everybody gets fresh eggs, and that only time we got fresh eggs, when he had taken command over there. I was a cook and I know this what I mean, so he ----(sic), and then they started disbursing a cook out to each platoon, to where the people would get some fresh food. As far as they was concerned. But the rest was all canned goods, you know and all, and we were in combat and I didn’t expect to walk off the story, but we good had better. We could of had a lot better.

I & G report> No, No, not in My unit, that anyone could remember, that anyone turning, , now this if a bunch of stuff that comes up, from a historian named Applemann, and he started this garbage, see and the thing of it is that we tried to get in touch with him, and he wouldn’t let us see him, because he told a lie. See he lied about that. Now uh, I always said in some there was some isolated cases, but it wasn’t all over the place, you know what I mean. I was not all over the place, so therefore I can’t vouch for anybody doing anything but doing there regular job in combat. I hadn’t seen anybody in my unit takeoff or go the other way.
The only thing that I saw was a checkpoint, that was the road guards, directing traffic, and troops going to and from, and to and fro. That's all that I know they were there for. And at any given time there was a number of MP's, at certain points where you would have to give information from them pertaining to going to a water point, or going to a ration breakdown. or whatever you had to go back to the rear for. See if you was in the forward CP, you had to go back to the rearward CP for your supplies. No, not with black MP's. Well that was back in garrison we did. In Japan, we went to Tokyo in 1949, uh to have parade for Gen. MacArthur. The MP's in Tokyo arrested some of our troops being in town, so somebody got loose and called the Col. and told the Col. that they had arrested some of troops. And the Col. called up there and told them to turn them loose, Or he was going to send the rest of us up there to take the town. Now that happened. So they turned them loose, and we went on and had our parade for Gen. MacArthur.

ON LEAVING FOXHOLES- No I can't say that I ever saw anybody leaving foxholes when they wasn't suppose to leave foxholes. When you get in combat there you may get an order to move over and tell somebody something else, but you always transmit from one to the other, they tell so and so something, and they tell so and so something and so and so something, and there is no reason to be walking around and doing anything otherwise unless you was ordered to do so.
No. No, there was smoking of course on the line, and I smoked on the line as well, but the thing of it is what I mean you smoke in the foxhole down in the foxhole with no light; and uh we had these little ole butane lighters that you mash, and you hold it underneath and there was no flash of light. DID MEN FALL ASLEEP> Well I tell you this much, I can't say they fell asleep when they was on watch, but I can't stand up for these troops and this is the story; My goodness if you stayed on the line for 14 and a half months, and you never got any sleep at all, any time that you got a chance to get you a little wink you would get it, now whether or not he was on duty and did this I can't say; but thing of it is, it is so very hard for a person in combat unless you switch over and have a regular crew to switch over with, to where one can have an hour sleep or two hour sleep, or whatever it may be. And if there are two guys on a machine gun or three guys on a machine gun, one guy watches while the other two sleep, and this is the way they do it. Somebody had to be awake, and I don't know of many guys, that just literally went to sleep on me.. RESPONSES TO GEN. KING'S AND WHITE OFFICER ALLEGATIONS OF SLEEPING ON DUTY: General King ? I don't know him. General Keen you mean, yea well, I far as I am concerned I never saw him in the presence of any troops in Korea, and when the Chinese hit us all of them was back in Tokyo, they took off and went away to Tokyo, they left us back up there on the line. We didn't
have any leaders up there, no more than a few black officers. No. No more than Col Corley. He was a Reg. commander, and the other one he came in and in went to work in two days he faked a heart attack and went home. I'm telling you the truth.

PROBLEMS WITH WHITE OFFICERS > I didn't see that many white officers. In my unit, we was all surrounded (?) UNCLEAR> To the point that where the officers stayed with themselves, and I tell you I don't know of any white officers that I ever came in contact with other than Col. Corley. He was uh a regimental commander, he would come around and check and see what was going on, but the rest of them if they was any there, they was up in the hills with the other platoons and what have you. No white Lieutenants. We had all the Lieutenants in our outfit UNCLEAR

ON FIRST CAV. IN JAPAN.> I didn't deal with the 1st Cav. or the 27th in Japan. They was in a different camp altogether; they put all the Black troops way down in Gifu. and we stayed down in Gifu,... Tokyo and Yokahama, and someplace, then they had the 159th field artillery at Nora. and some of the other guys up at UNCLEAR... We had the worst camps there was, and as far as the area concerned, because we were stuck back in the boondocks, but wasn't supposed to have this and the white troops got the best areas.. No, we was all alone. WHITE SOLDIERS; ATTITUDES; Listen, I myself what I mean in
my unit, I never saw or had any white troops at all into the Chinese army dispersed the 8th army. And they mixed them up at night, because they was running everywhere. And talking about the 24th running, hell everyone was running, the whole 8th army was running. Because I was there. I had to blow up a train, UNCLEAR, to get off the hill, to get back; to Sobuk-san. And that was November 1950. during thanksgiving time.

AFTER INTEGRATION> You see regular contact with these people at this time, when they started to come in and started to refill the units what I mean, with guys that had been wounded and what have you, these guys would come in and fill their places and all. And this is the only time that we came in contact with these people, when they first came, you know when the Chinese hit and then they started to refresh the unit with whatever they could come up with. Now this,, I’m telling you the truth, and uh,. I was just saying about the troops themselves when we had to feed them we fed what was there when they came in, I didn’t no anyone by name, But I could name just about anybody in my Company. From the officers to all the enlisted men. And uh so like I say, most of my first sergeant. and my co. clerk they.down in the Ft. Washington area. UNCLEAR TO LISTENER. And my old CO.I just picked up the paper, yesterday of Clifford A Allen he was my Co. commander in Japan, he just passed on a couple of days ago. I just read it in the paper yesterday. He was 3rd
man on the list, the 2nd or 3rd man on my list. Post Office box 8040 Silver Springs Md. But he was my company commander in Japan. He passed on. He was my Company commander in Japan. And capt. Martel Collier was my company commander he passed on as well, in Korea. Then we had Cory Martin, UNCLEAR. AND WE had a lot that just died. And these was black officers, but I never seen any white officers in the units.

GAY MEN IN ARMY; Gay men in the army in Korea? In Korea? Well there's always been people in the military, back in Japan, yeah I knew people's in the gay family or whatever you want to call it. That was in Korea sure. They did there job, They did there job and they did it well. Cause most of the time they was medics. Medic corps and cooks, and medical cooks and some in the bands and what have you, but Band troopers they stayed back in Japan for a while. They took over constabulary duty back there. Not to my knowledge ON (RESENTMENT OF GAYS) , we had a Col. that had uh that knew that this was existing in the unit in garrison, and he made and announcement that these people would not be in the field with, what I mean activities or whatever it was, as long as they did there duties and it was not out in the open. And he informed all the officers of this action as well. And we never had any problems with these people, as least I didn't.

SHOOTING AT SHADOWS; BAD FIRE CONTROL; I want to tell you something here, in the evenings, in answering your question. In the evenings, about 4 o'clock when you set up a
perimeter, wherever you are in combat, all stumps all broken trees. all humps in the ground, and they are talked to and told that these things do not move in the middle of the night. When you are sitting up there in a foxhole in the middle of the night, and all of the sudden you look out there and see a stump, this has happened where people have mistaken it for an enemy at night. But just to jump up and start firing no. I wouldn't, I haven't seen this at all. But you are really told what to do and how to do it, and give you the markings of the terrain, so will not make these mistakes to give away your position to the enemy.

INFLUENCES IN MILITARY SERV.> Well I feel it goes a little far back than the 24th, since I was a world war II veteran, and I wasn't in the 24th unit at that time, and was in a segregated unit at that time. And uh but you see, when it some down to the point to where you have been right there in combat you go over and do your job whatever it may be, in combat. and you come back home and your not welcome at home nobody no you at home, nobody cares about you. You get out there in civilian life and people look down on you and people want to spit on you because you were the military men and you went over to protect there interests. Because the average black person didn't have nothing in the first place, and then came back to American and still ain't got nothing.

COMMUNITY ORG. I am I am not. Yes I am a member of the NAACP. I am active in that and the Masonic order
KIMBERTON

Sergeant first class. Okay I was with the third battalion I company. Uh. Well it was infantrymen, you know infantry squad leader and platoon sergeant, I believe it (MOS) was 2745 if I can remember that decimal or. I enlisted from North Carolina, Boonesville NC. I was in Korea from the 25th day of June until August of 1952 I'm sorry Aug. of 1951. COMBAT > you mean in Korea? We landed at the Pusan perimeter, or Pusan combat zone, we had to fight our way in, I mean the North Korean and everything was right in Pusan so we had to fight our way in. Oh I was all the way up to there uh Chundu-Ri. Yeah. Yeah TO ALL THE QUESTIONS ABOUT PLACES OF COMBAT> (YES)

In military service? 26 years I got discharged out of the army in 1952. Then I reenlisted in the air-force and I served the remainder of my time in the air-force.

COMBAT IN KOREA>Well I would say that was my living hell on earth. Well our company was the 24th infantry regiment you know. We were assigned to the 25th division, we were a part of that 25th division you know. When we first landed in Korea, we landed with the same type weapons with the same weapons that we had been in training in Japan with, they were worn out they were no good and anything else, and we
were undermanned against the enemy, and our equipment was substandard, and we were called into combat so quickly after you know the 25th day of June 1950 that I think the war started when was it I forget exactly what date it was there maybe a week after the war started. We were in garrison back in Japan camp? Japan. We was thrown into that situation with the same weapons we had that were substandard uh against the enemy of the enemy that we were facing .... was well equipped with everything else and we had the same weapons that we were training with in Japan for the last 2 or 3 years. We were just outmanned and everything else. No TANKS I never got involved with any tanks, but I certainly saw tanks that were attacking us.

Me personally being involved with my squad or my platoon in tanks no fighting tanks, but hand to hand combat. WHAT WAS IT LIKE? > Oh Oh. it was just ah I can’t describe it I mean being a young soldier and everything and uh. you read about these things and you see them in the movies, but when your personally involved, you really don’t have time to be afraid until after the thing is over, and you sit there and think about the position that your in, it is just a traumatic experience. You see everyone has a problem taking someone else’s life you know what I mean? When you realize the fact that you have to defend yourself, then after you take a life it becomes a how can I say this, uh uh it’s a situation of survival. It’s a real bad experience. But after your in
combat for a while you get used to these things and you realize that in order to survive that's what you're there for to win the war and you do whatever it takes.

WHITE OFFICERS> Uh. had the experience when we were back in Japan, we were just like I say basically all the enlisted people back there were Black. The officers that we had we had very few black officers who were company commanders. My company commander was black (IN JAPAN)

In combat we had a captain Perowski who I used to operate the FCR300 the communication that was a radio, he was killed in combat, right after we were breaking out of the Pusan perimeter. The highest ranking officer we had back in garrison, was a Col. Michael Holloward. He was an older gentleman but he had moved back to the states when the Korean war broke out. We had a Col. John D.Corley who was our regimental commander. Yes Col. Corley was a gentlemen that was concerned about his troops he spent time in the field he did not sit back at the command post and was right up at the front with us, and so was Capt. Perowski he also was white, he was from Michigan you know. But we did have a few prejudiced officers would come in but I think the conceptions about being assigned to an all Black outfit, one in particular I had the third platoon of "I" company - and he was our platoon leader, and I think his name was Lt. Teague, he was from Florida. I think he had a real bad experience about being around black folks. In fact he was
outright prejudice. His effect on the platoon, everyone knew he was prejudice, and uh the moral was bad enough as it was, and I remember one incident where he told me that I was to take my squad I was a squad leader, I was to connect up with friendly forces down to our right flank, and we had been fighting there for four or five days. And it was just impossible for anybody to make contact with physically with the uh with our friendly forces, so he ordered me to take my platoon to go down to make contact. I said "sir I beg to differ, it’s impossible to get through there." And then he made the remark to me that he would take himself to put himself in danger, in order for me to get through there he would have about to have got killed. I said "Well If that’s the way you feel about it I will have to follow you. I will not disobey your orders." you know, however he changed his mind when he seen the situation. You know UNCLEAR there were several racial incidents you know that we heard about, because some of these white officers they couldn’t accept the fact that there were Black soldiers. They would do anything they could. the reason why the higher powers; now this is my analysis of the situation, the reason why these white officers probably was assigned to Black outfits, is because they goofed up someplace and this was a kind of punishment for the higher ranking officers. To be assigned to Black units, you know what I mean? They came there with an attitude. However some of them actually reformed -uh you
know a combat role will make you change your mind about a lot of things when your life depends on another soldier. You know what I mean? A lot of them changed in combat.

WHITE FEARS> White soldiers, I didn’t serve with white soldiers in Korea, but in the rear? Well the first CAV. You may not want this information and you can decide what you want to do with this. Back in Garrison in Japan the first Cav was stationed in Tokyo, Japan. That’s what they called GHAQ, General headquarters, that’s where MacArthur was quartered at. Every fourth of the July, we were stationed south of every Gifu [sic], but every fourth of July, they would bring all the units, every Black units all the (unclear) in Japan, to the big parade in Tokyo, Japan. We were soldiers, were some kind of soldiers, you know, we won every event that you can imagine, well the 1st Cavalry, well there were certain parts of Tokyo that we could not go. Into certain areas we were restricted to certain areas there in Tokyo Japan. and uh there was the most prejudiced outfit, See I came from North Carolina originally, and I know about segregation, but when you got overseas, or places like that you got to kind exercise a little freedom and you was away from home and things like that, you really didn’t expect things like this in the military, you know? But that was the most prejudice place I ever seen in my life, in fact there was lot of fights, and a lot of name calling, and this type of thing, from the white soldiers. Although we were
restricted to one area, they wasn't restricted to anything, they could go anywhere they wanted to you, to visit our area or whatever, you know? Oh there was several fights that broke out because of the racial things that they would call us. Especially 1st Cavalry yea. Everything seemed to change at all when it was in Korea (unclear). We sometimes when we would regroup and go back into the resting areas a few times that we got to rest in combat, is what we would be back in the area with the 1st CAV 8th army and this type of people. But there attitudes didn't change we were still segregated back there you know? Right because we were all black.

(WHITE OFFICERS)- Absolutely, they came there with a preconceived idea, that Black soldiers weren't worth anything, they couldn't fight in combat, they retreat, and desert and all this kind of thing, but they was really surprised when we put all of our efforts and we were right there, we didn't go any place. You know? It is a funny thing when we broke out of the Pusan perimeter, when we was going North to Korea, when we got to the North Korean capital, ,,,, Pyongyang (sic), of course the enemy always did outnumber us. So as we were going up, the uh 7th Division. I believe it was, an all white division. The 1st CAV and those really got in trouble. you know. So they gave an order, that this is a strategic withdrawal, get back any way the best way you can. In other words they is was in the 24th Inf. was not capable of holding their line or holding their position,
that they would retreat that they would run off the hill or
something. But it's funny when the white troops got into
trouble that this was a "strategic" withdrawal. You know
what I mean. To retreat. Right. It's a strategic withdrawal.
See we had a lot of trouble when we first got there we were
so outnumbered with the N. Korean troops, and especially
when the Chinese intervened into the war. We had trouble
keeping the ROK forces that's the Republic of Korea forces.
what we would do we would take a certain position, and then
we would turn that position over to the Korean Republican
Army, you know ROK troops and then we would go and fight and
take another position. However you talk about people
retreating, as soon as we turn this over them and we would
go to another area for combat they would run off the hill
and give up their weapons, we were caught in quite a
dilemma. ROK that was the republic of Korea. I believe so.

That was one of the problems that we have. And I
UNCLEAR (sic), our equipment was totally inadequate, now I
don't know if everybody else has told you this or not. But I
will certainly voice my concern especially you know doing
these histories and so forth, But our equipment was totally
inadequate for combat. However, they saw (sic) united
states, and we were lacking for supplies and clothing, and
everything else. You know what I mean, but they saw fit to
equip all of the ROK troops, all of the white troops like
the Marines, and the 1st CAV. they had brand new equipment
brand new tanks, brand new tanks, brand new everything. And we were in combat for over six months, before we even realize before we were getting anything type of equipment, we were the last ones, it was equipped with the things that we needed to fight in combat WWII EQUIP. Beg your pardon, yea it was WWII equipment. But like I say the rifles and the ammo, I mean not the ammo, but the weapons that we carried into combat in Korea, was the same weapons that we used back for every day training back in Japan. We couldn’t get parts for the weapons or anything else. you know. AND, like for an example I had an BAR that’s a Browning Automatic Rifle. and that was a BAR team in our rifle squad, That weapon actually stopped firing, it wasn’t no good whatsoever. We didn’t have .............that team it was a three man team we had what was called an extra barrel (sic) because that was a rapid fire weapon, and you fired it sometimes that the barrel would get so hot that you’d have to change barrels, you ‘d have to have an extra barrel, to keep up the fire power, we didn’t have an extra barrel, so when the you know when the equipment ran out we didn’t have anything it was useless. We were left in combat with that, and what are supposed to do?

IG REPORT- The only people that I saw were the people that were wounded, you know what I mean. Only the wounded that were evacuated. I has never seen anybody desert they post.
They were some problems with a I heard I never seem this happen. They said that some of our guys had shot themselves. What they called the SIW, self-inflicted wound, this is a rumor that they had put out, some of the white medics who had come and evacuate, some of our guys, I never seem this happen, I seen a lot of my guys a lot of my buddies, who I took basic training with and everything stick right in their post and a lot of them got killed, before they’d leave. But you know I never seem nobody leave, you know I never seem anybody leave while in combat. LEAVING FOXHOLES Never. The only time I ever seen we got out of our foxholes was when we were engaged in hand to hand combat. SLEEP sleeping? no man We didn’t have time to sleep. What I did see, is that when we would withdraw to go to another area, and we were forced to march all night long, I seen guys and this actually happened, to me. you know, go to sleep while marching. No, No the thing of it is, it was like a daze. you know, you weren’t actually be out sleeping. On the forced March back, when you were relaxed a little bit, I’ve seen guys, from exhaustion fall asleep. LINE- No No, there was days that you didn’t dare go to because if you went to sleep that would be your last you be sleeping right down. you got to imagine you got to imagine this. WE were there in the wintertime when the winter hit us. Like I said, we had no supplies, we had the same combat shoes, I did, and a lot of my buddies that we went into combat with, now this
was in June. In November October, Nov. the temp. got 20-30
40 degrees below zero, especially in N. Korea, I was
evacuated the first time, for frozen hands and feet, because
our equipment was totally inadequate. This they didn’t write
about. I actually marched in my shoes, my shoes, the bottom
of my shoes was worn completely out. The only thing that I
had was sometimes we had to wrap old blankets around and
pieces of blankets around our shoes to keep our feet, you
know with some feeling in them. I can’t hear you darling.

HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THIS EXPERIENCE?

I was so happy to get back to the US. I’m telling you I
was the most grateful and best guy in the world. After I
visited my family on a thirty day leave and so forth, no let
me back up a minute. When we got to the processing station
we came into Ft. Lewis Washington. There we were given our
back pay and all this thing, and then we were given a thirty
day leave. And I didn’t realize just how prejudice the
United States was. We actually when we got, (sic) until we
got to Cincinnati. Ohio, that’s where we changed south
coming to my home in North Carolina. They actually came
through, the white overseers the conductors or whatever they
was, moved us back into like cattle cars, and says we
realize that you boys is in (sic) but niggers ill have to do
this, you have to go back to your own train. You know I
didn’t realize just how segregated it was, and then a lot of
us wondered if as well as my self, why did we have to go and make this sacrificed, and come back to the United States and be treated this way. DID YOU OR YOUR FRIENDS JOIN? We were not permitted to join at that time. Cause I you know stayed into the service until 75 you know. But certainly you know, after I retired I joined these organizations. You were not permitted to join anything like that. I am sure that in come cases in the Air Force that I could have joined the NAACP. without anything being said. But actually we were prohibited from being involved, with any of these type of organizations.

GAY MEN IN SERVICE-I don’t want any to think that I’m naive or what but I didn’t know what a homosexual was until early 60’s. Now I’m sure that we probably had some there, I’m you know what I mean. I am sure that there were guys in the military who had different sexual preferences, you know what I mean.? As far as them approaching me being or anything like that. Yes, there was even in Japan, there was a couple of guys that we were told were Homosexuals, you know. To me they didn’t act any different than any body else. I wasn’t interested in them, and I doubt any of them were interested in me. If they was they never said anything about it. Absolutely not.

I am sure from experience and uh in the things that we ran across in garrison back in Japan, there was a couple of
people that they said was funny, but they never said anything to me, and I never struck up a conversation with them. Or sexual misconduct but I'm sure there was (sic).

ARMY IMAGE- I can appreciate the fact that I was in the military, and I appreciate the discipline and the things I realize now that I saw in the military made me more determined to succeed. If being black, than anything I ever got involved in. Uh you know just from the way they mistreated us. And the segregation before I went into the military, and the segregation after I got into the military. Let me give you an example of what happen when I was at Ft. Jackson South Carolina after I came back from Korea. After I was on vacation. I reported to Ft. Jackson SC. There was three of us. I was a Sergeant first class, there was a staff sergeant. There was a master sergeant. We were all black. When we reported in they didn't know what to do with three Black noncommissioned officers, we top three graders. As they called us back then. And they had facilities that all black troops were put into tents. All the white troops were put into brick quarters (processing). After we got there, a little PFC came up and says "Sarg, you three sergeants got KP in the morning". You know, and I looked at him and said "you gotta be kidding you a PFC and you telling me I got KP?" The master sergeant said "Well I'm not going, I am a non-commissioned officer". I says "no" "I think what we ought to do, because the army always tell you to respond,
you do it then ask questions later. We will report to the mess hall at 3:am in the morning, and we will just sit. We didn’t refuse to come. So when we got there the cook there says "Sarg what do want, you want the pots and pans, dining room orderly, or the outside?" I said "we don’t want any of that, we are non-commissioned officers in the US. army and we demand to see the food service officer". so the food service officer came in I’ll never forget him his name Capt. Stone, he was angry because he had to get up in the morning. So his question when he approached us was "what is the problem here", and so I was the spokesperson, for the group, for the three of us, I says "we are noncommissioned officers who just came out of combat, and were not ....it is unlawful for and NCO to pull KP and were not pulling KP. he says "your refusing an order". I says I’m refusing and you can take us the regiment commander or whatever". Well what they did that was 3 in the morning, they led us back to the tents, where we were stationed and at 5:00 clock that afternoon we were reassigned to Ft. UNCLEAR Illinois (sic)

END OF INTERVIEW.
Henry Wright Tape A2 and 2

My rank was Corporal.  
I was in the 64th tank Battalion. 
1693 (cannoneer) MOS. 
22 years 14 days.  
I was in during the Vietnam war but served in Korea. Army 
I went to Korea in Nov of 1950, left in Nov. of 51. 
We were from S. Korea to N.Korea. 
I was in Seoul I was in Haman, Ham nag, the Iron Triangle. 
Pyongyang (Capital N.Korea). 
I enlisted in Bessemer Al. actually it was in Birmingham. Al 
But I was living in Bessemer at the time.

I was in Japan with the 24th, but not in Korea with the 
24th. The 64th in Korea, it was an all black outfit also. My 
experience with it was, uh uh, we knew we were always on the 
short end, for instance uh, Photographers and reporters came 
out numerous of times, and sometimes more than not, they 
would sit right there at the command post and get the 
description of war and this is what they wrote, what some 
oficers told them, and usually they would talk with the 
white officers, I would say that the fighting was, you know 
about he the same for both white and black-but the black 
always got the short end of everything; for instance
sleeping bags, we got them late- whatever was issued out from the division, always saw that the white troops got it before the back troops. We had plenty of ammo though.

When I say white troops I mean units. They got things....that because my unit was all Black, so when they got to my unit everybody was equal. But like stuff comes down to division, it went to the white units first, and I also recalled that they said because of the meanest of our unit, that they'd put us in the line and wouldn't let us off. Outside of combat as well, because we’d had a lot of fights with the white troops and what not. In Korea-

INTERVIEWER (ON THE SUBJECT OF SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT AGAIN). I would say when we first went in it was outdated, but like I said sleeping bags and things came around maybe a couple of months after we got there we all got them. but then once we got that we just as modern as any other troops, what they issued was as good when we got it.

I recall we did not outrun it (LOGISTIC SUPPLY) we got cut off for awhile, but is wasn’t long, maybe a day or something of that nature but it wasn’t a long time.

Questions about I.T. REPORT on NEGRO SOLDIERS LEAVING FOXHOLES OR LINES.- No I only somebody I saw doing this was the Korean troops, In fact we took them in our tanks-and they refused to fight. (laughing).
ON STRAGGLERS

Well, that's hard to answer, I've forgotten a lot of it but I do recall I know guys who would shoot themselves or frostbite their feet, and leave the line, but I didn't see any walking off. Well I won't say what they did (STRAGGLERS AND MP's) All I know is that the MP's would check guys out and if you didn't have a reason to be where you were they would take you to the staging area and from there I don't know what the disposition was.

INTERVIEWER- (PROBLEMS WITH MP's "WHITE")

Well we were up front most of the time, I don't recall having too many problems with any MP's; We had problems with the Chinese, The Marine MP's a couple of times we had altercations with them, but that was just over just being prejudice, it wasn't like, they had a little club we went to Masan, we were going back up,and they didn't want us to use their club, but we used it anyway. Those were some of things that they said we had done that caused us to be "volunteered" back into the line; in fact the General put us into the line and didn't let us off.

INT>WHICH GENERAL?

No No, it was the 3rd Infantry Division- General Sewall. (ABOUT SENIOR WHITE OFFICERS) - "Did I ever see any senior White officers ? Yea, I saw them, in fact we had
contact with our Battalion commander, was constantly right there with us. And he was a Lt.Col. and you would periodically see white officers of senior rank, They weren't up there fighting, you might see them when you come off the line for maintenance or rest etc. They would not be up there directing anything because the company commanders did that."

(INTERVIEWER: ABOUT REAR AREAS; WHITE ATTITUDES)
During the Korean war, I don’t know, I certainly can’t answer that. Well I tell you what I did see, and was a part of. The Marines had what we call a mountain sleeping bag, and we had a light sleeping bag when we were first in, I can remember a Marine pouring gas on their extras rather than giving them to the other units. That I thought was kind of crazy, because we almost ended fighting each other over those sleeping bags because we needed them. (ON JUMP BOOTS) NO.

INT> WHITE FEAR OF BLACKS
my contact with white troops everybody seemed to be at the point where I was contacting was afraid of what the enemy had for us, and we kind of stuck together because we supported them, As with tank support it was kind of like a regimental combat team. No fights there."
I saw a lot of fights there. (JAPAN) up until 1947 to 1950. We had a lot of Southern Officers, and a lot of Northern Officers, but the Southern officer more felt that the blacks
should carry themselves in a manner that they were uppity in some cases. Yes, (IT BOTHERED THEM). Theoretically we were angry young Black men before the war it was chaos there at times in Japan, there were lot of fights between Blacks and whites. Did the Black troops seem to bother the white officers more? I don’t think so, I do know the Southern white officer was a good fighter when he fought, like I said back in Japan, there seemed to be a lot of problem. But in Korea, he was glad to see them.

INT> BLACK UNITS AND THE CHINESE ENEMY.
Yea, when they first came into Korea, we set there and watched them and they walked past us, as long as we kept going north they kept going South. Right we had a picket line set on the West side of Korea and we walked out to the ocean, and on the 23rd of Dec. got on a ship and they didn’t;‘t bother us, and we didn’t bother them, You could set there and watch them, by the thousands they would filing across the river. They did everything, trying to crawl up on the tanks and throw grenades down the barrel, they tried to take logs and railroad ties, rr.tracks actually and pry the tracks off the tanks, they tried everything. No we were pretty well stocked. (AMMO)

INT< EXPERIENCE> OF BEING UNDER FIRE
Well, as long as you didn’t get artillery or bombs at the time we were there you were pretty well safe, because we had
a superior tank when we were in, I guess a state of the art
the M46; 46 ton tank that when we went in to Korea our tank
was superior to what the Koreans were using.

ON WASTING AMMO
Well I saw guys uh after we came off the line just shooting-
target practice I guess - in front of us some time. But the
heavy tank stuff we didn’t we couldn’t shoot that, somebody
would have gone to jail.

ON GAYS (INT.)
You found them in all jobs, but mostly personnel, and I
would say the medics, you know admin. positions.
I don’t think so. most of the people we were used too this
is what they expected, at least when we were in all black
units nobody seemed to have thought the problem just another
person, and you hung out where you wanted to hang out.

INT> (ORGANIZATIONS AFTER WAR)
When I left the army? No. I didn’t. Well I’ve always been
member of them (NAACP). Even while I was in service. When I
got out and I taught Rotc for 17 years. yes. No. (CHURCH).
IDEAS ON MANHOOD- When I first went into the army the moral
standards and the ethics was high, and your value system had
better conform to what the army had expressed, you were
punished and punished severely. You just didn’t goof around
like these youngsters do today, if you had a child with a
lady, you just couldn’t walk if she had ways to inform them,
now if she never informed them then not only with nobody she
informed them then you paid restitution to that child.
Made me feel confident? Yea. Yea, I think the Army had a lot
of bearing on me, because I was 17 when I went in. Things
especially in the black units

Fletcher, POW:

I was a private... 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, C
Company... My MOS was 4745... well, a general type of
classification... I was a gunner, but I didn’t carry a
gunner’s MOS...

Did you enlist from an urban or rural area?

Fletcher: Well, I would say from a rural area... that wa sin
the North. I went to Korea... we got there mid to late July,
more mid July... 1950. I didn’t leave until August, the 8th,
1953... I was a prisoner of war.

Could you tell me where, geographically, you were in combat?

Fletcher: Yeah, I fought from Taejon, Taegu, out of the
Pusan Perimeter, and in the, oh, Sobuk-san, down in the
mountains, in Sobuk-san, down in the basin, as we called it.
Fought up to, oh, we kind of went over to the left, fought
up through and across the 38th parallel, ended up at what the call the triangle, which was the two basic cities, I can’t remember the names of them. (The Iron Triangle?) Yeah, in North Korea.

How many years of service did you have overall in the Army?

Fletcher: I had 44 months of active duty...I was discharged October 1st of 1953.

If you were going to describe you experience in Korea to your grandchildren, how would you describe it?

Fletcher: Hell... (what specifically would you tell them or me?) Well, I was... When I went to Korea, I went to Korea with an illusion that it was a police action... nightsticks and moping up a few people, in a matter of two or three weeks we would be back home. I was only seventeen years old when we went to Korea. I had no concept of more than what the movies I had seen of what war was like. And it was nothing like I saw in the movies. We pushed, as we were moving up on, six (fighters)guys in every truck, The first truck got hit, the last truck got hit, the middle of the convoy got hit, and we were all bailing out of the trucks. And as I turned to who was my squad leader at the time, Jerry Morgan, I used a term I said "Shit, these son of a
bitches are killing us." And I was just shocked. And he said, "Yes, this is what war is all about." And he said, "We've got to move back and set up a line. " In other words, he snapped me back to the reality... from shock to reality, that it wasn't the type of police action that I thought it would be. He knew what, I'm sure, he knew more about what to expect than we younger people did.

When you were captured, were you captured by North Koreans or by the Chinese?

Fletcher: I was captured by the Chinese. I've had two POWs tell me they thought the North Koreans were worse than the Chinese were.

Fletcher: They were. Number one, the, of all my experience of fighting the North Koreans, which was July, August, and September, and parts of October, not any really hard fighting in October. The North Koreans took very few, lower rank American prisoners. They...they killed them. They'd tie their hands up, their feet up, and tie 'em up in trees and use 'em for bayonet practice or just ... blow their brains out.

Did the Chinese ever attempt to indoctrinate you?

Fletcher: Oh yeah, yeah... They tried to indoctrinate
everybody they had in prison camps. I'd like to back up and
go through some of the capture, which I don't think... as I
was talking to Colonel Cash ( ) he didn't realize
that, when we surrendered, we had no ammunition left, I was
down to maybe one clip of ammunition, which is about 8 or 10
rounds. No one in the company had any ammunition. By the
time we got captured... we followed the Chinese from
November 22nd until the 27th, five days. We'd called for air
drops, for ammunition and food, for five days we didn't have
any food... The Chinese, by the time we surrendered, out of
250 men and for the first time, in the time we got to North
Korea, after being hit by the North Koreans, we never went
back to full combat strength. My company was normally around
249, 250 men. We always carried around 210, 220, 200 men.
All the time. We never... sometimes we were down to 180. but
we never, never got back to full combat strength. On the
22nd, or the 21st, we had just come back to what we call
full combat strength. We were hit by the North Koreans, I
mean the Chinese, on the 22nd. From the 22nd to the 27th, we
had lost approximately, oh, I would say, 170, approximately
a hundred and fifty some men. Lost, I mean wounded, or
killed. When we surrendered to the Chinese, after Captain
Stanley asked the platoon leaders and us sergeants to go
back and check and see how much ammo we got. They reported
to him that we had none. So he, he said "I won't make a
decision, but ask the men. We can fight until we're all
killed or we can surrender. If we surrender we stand a fifty-fifty chance." We surrendered cause, we just knew... we couldn't fight. I was told by the Chinese at that time, that if we would have made the decision to fight, which, we had a short period of time to make up our mind, they would have completely annihilated all of us. They had approximately 20 to 30,000 Chinese at that point, and there were only 137 of us that surrendered. The rest were... not there. They were either dead or captured. So we didn't stand much of a chance, and we went back in the prison camp, uh, you want to get to indoctrination, yes they tried for approximately not quite a year to indoctrinate us. They taught us that, uh, and I think they pushed very hard at Black Americans, at here in America, white America, if you want to call it. That's what they called it. They would never let us succeed. We would never accomplish very much. Whatever we did would always work for some white. They would always get the benefits, the largest portion of the pie, and so on. I... don't believe anybody really believed that. I think, by born here and raised here in American we knew that it... through the right work ethics, education... we could succeed. What's succeeding, I can't answer that for everybody, I can only answer that for myself; and that is living comfortably, having money in the bank, being able to do what I want to do when I want to do it. Yes, the indoctrination was very, very heavy; it was a must, you had
to go, you had, then afterwards, you would sit in semicircles and discuss what they had talked about. I still don’t think this had any influence on any Americans.

Stewart:

I attained the rank of sergeant before I left Korea. I was a member, during my entire stay in the regiment, of regimental headquarters company. I went to the unit as an air conditioning/refrigeration person, and then I worked briefly as an automotive repair person, and finally, I was a airplane mechanic. I had that MOS, I had several MOSs. During peacetime, I took care of the airfield. My job was to ...oh, while we didn’t keep an airplane but only a few days, because they had decided to keep all of the airplanes down at division headquarters, and they would bring one up, and it would stay for a few days. I arranged the air transportation for regimental staff and took care of the airfield.

Did you stay in the Saegu area, or in different areas.

To Begin with, before the war, we were in a place called Gifu, in Japan.

me: And when you were in Korea, where were you?

Stewart: Well, we moved around... I can’t remember all of the different places... Haman, the Pusan perimeter, etc...
I arrived there [in Korea] on the 13th, to the best of my knowledge, of July in 1950, and left on the 9th of July of '51.

As a so-called gung-go young black person, I thought that it was... to serve in the military was great challenge, so I added a year to my age and got drafted in. From Jacksonville, Florida...

I was in the army about 22 years. I didn't go to Vietnam, but I was in service, during that period...part of it, anyway.

Well, there would be, I would say, there were different periods, there were periods when wasn't too much going on, a lull as we call it, a period between battles, and other times... all hell broke loose. There was a... the enemy threw everything they could throw at us, and we threw everything we could throw back... It would be a long story to try and explain what happened one while or at different times... we would be under mortar attack, or would have snipers in the area... or actually have the enemy try to overrun the headquarters, that kind of thing. I was... when I went to Korea, I lost my job as a airplane mechanic, so to speak, because the division had the airplanes so I had to have another job and I went to the security platoon for a
while, and became an assistant squad leader. and provided
security for the regimental headquarters. Setting up
outposts, some distance from the headquarters out in the
hills, and, what have you, to prevent... enemy from getting
to the headquarters. And, there would be all kinds of
stories, like...ch, we took people out on patrol
occasionally, and just it could go on and on

me: You were fired on, then.

Stewart: Oh yeah... Silly things happened... I remember when
we were in the Pusan Perimeter, that every day the enemy
would adjust their guns to make sure that they were firing,
that the guns were on target... and they would fire in a few
rounds. Some place, there was a forward observer observing
where these rounds fell, and that would tell his gunner, you
know, that it was still on target. Cause when night came, he
would have fun with us, you know. Firing, throwing shells on
us. And the one day we were in the chow line and of course
you were about five yards apart and staggered in line for
food. And a few rounds came in and we all hit the dirt.
Someone got into a hole; one fella got into a foxhole, and
then he decided to get out of there for some reason, I don’t
know why. But just after he got out a shell landed right in
the hole...and everybody laughed. And somebody said, "Well,
probably the next one’ll get ya, you know"... that’s stupid
but that’s the humor we had in combat...

Do you feel that that experience changed you in any way?

Stewart: It did. At one time hey, I said I was getting out of this Army... and this is no place for me, and we weren’t as well equipped as we should have been, I thought, because the Caucasians got everything before we did and we got whatever was left. Because, you have to remember that was a...we were in a segregated army at that time. It changed me... I grew up real fast...

IG report questions: did you see men straggling or running from the front?

Stewart: No, no I never saw any of that sort of thing.

Did you see men sleeping when they should have been on watch?

Stewart: No. I never saw that... being in charge of an outpost, that was almost the kiss of death to be caught asleep on post. No one would tolerate that kind of thing. There were times when people were put on duty when they just, were required to perform so much duty until they become exhausted, that sort of thing, but I never really saw an incident where someone deliberately or negligently
allowed himself to go to sleep on post.

Did you see men getting out of foxholes when they shouldn't have on line?

Stewart: No. Oh, once in a while, you'd get some young person who was inexperienced, and may panic. One individual, or something... I remember in North Korea, a forward headquarters element was moving because of, because we were really surrounded by the Chinese, and I think they had a fire on one hill and some of our people had a fire on the other one. It was just so cold that at that point in time I think there were an unannounced truce... and, this group of people left our headquarters to form another headquarters. We had what we called a forward and rear CP, and they were going to move back and establish the new headquarters and we were going to stay there until they got there and until an order was given... And a young man, after they left our position a few minutes, they were ambushed... meaning that there were some people hiding along the road and when the vehicle got within range they opened fire from both sides. And a young man panicked... and ran back to our position, yelling "Ambush!" I never will forget this. But I think, in his case, he went into the enemy lines cause we never saw him again. That as far as people just throwing their weapons down and this kind of thing, I never saw
anything like that. As a matter of fact, one of my best friends, who I managed to talk to occasionally when we had the time, was the I&R platoon sergeant, a person named Waymon Ransom, and he was highly decorated, and "when he was wounded?" and he and I would, when we were friends before the war, ...when we had the opportunity would spend time discussing the war late in the evening, you know, if he got back from his patrol or ...and I had some time, we meet up and discuss the day's activities, that kind of thing.

He didn't see anything like this either, then?

Stewart: Not to my knowledge. I never discussed anything...I never remember.. he and I discussing anything like that.

Do you feel that the way that the Black soldiers held themselves, that they weren't submissive, sometimes scared white soldiers in say, the 1st Cav, the 27th or the 35th?...especially in the rear, or white senior officers?

Stewart: This has, as far as I'm concerned, always been a type of thing our Caucasian people impose on us or tried to. So as far as saying that we weren't worth anything, we couldn't do anything, or this kind of thing that we were laborers, so to speak, rather than fighters. I recall that there was always something to try and discredit you. You had
to be four or five times better than the other person just to get average recognition. That was a just a kind of routine thing. I remember one regimental commander we had, he was with Colonel Champeny, he was only with us a short time but he came in and he made a statement, not even knowing any of us, that we weren’t fighters, we were service people, people to do service work but we weren’t any good as fighters. And he made that statement as soon as he got into the regiment. We had a news person there from, I believe, the Pittsburgh Courier, or the Chicago Defender, one of those newspapers. He overheard these remarks, and he approached the Colonel and said, "Did you really say that", and he told him yes, he said it. As I recall, the newsman prepared a dispatch back to his newspaper, which had to go through division public information. They questioned the Colonel, "Did you say this?" and he admitted it. I noticed after that he was quietly relieved from command. As a matter of fact, he went up on the line and was hit (Horton White, presumably) maybe that same day or within a short period and was evacuated for his wounds, as I recall, when he came back to the regiment, they kind of disgraced him. They allowed him to come all the way back to the regiment and be told by the new regimental commander that he had been relieved of his command. . . yeah he was relieved, and it was under a...scandal cloud because of, and I would say, most of it was ... his remarks. I clearly remember him coming back
to the regiment and the new regimental commander telling him that he had been relieved and his new assignment was the Seoul area command, I think.

Did you see anybody who was gay, or seemed to be gay, and if you did were they sent certain job occupations, like cook, or

Stewart: This is so funny, those people tended to wind up in the medics, as cooks, in personnel, or in some administrative job, in some responsible job, it seemed that they, as far as being academically qualified, they were; we used to joke about this, you know, but those people usually were in good jobs. They weren't necessarily people out on the line...

Did you see any intolerance towards gays, or did people get upset because they were in the so-called soft jobs,

Stewart: We joked about those people but generally there wasn't within the regiment, as far as I'm concerned the effort to degrade them that's going on today. We knew who they were...it was known, we had some sergeants who would make remarks, "I'm gonna catch you, and if I do, I'm gonna hang you", you know, that sort of thing... Those kind of
remarks were made. But in a few cases, there were some people caught in those compromising positions, and they were court martialled... or eliminated, sent away from the regiment. There were some few, few that I know of.

I'll tell you a joke that the General, the general came to make an inspection during peacetime, and he said to the regimental commander "I notice you still have some homosexuals in the outfit, and I told you to get rid of them,". So the colonel made a wisecrack, se said " If I get rid of the homosexuals, I won't have any soldiers." And the General just shook his head and got on the air plane and left.

Did you see any training above the battalion level for the 24th RCT, when you were in Japan?

Stewart: The regiment as a whole went to field training at a field training area at Mount Fuji, at a training area, and periodically the regiment, in its entirety, would go to that training area. And of course the battalion would then do their thing, whatever that was supposed to be. I did not go on these, because I had that air field job and I did not leave my job.

Did you have adequate equipment?
Stewart: As far as what I was supposed to have, yes.

Do you think the Army molded your image of manhood?

Stewart: It, I got some good directions and, let's face it, I'm really proud of the service that I gave and I always felt that it was wrong to be segregated, but, other than the segregation, that part of it, I benefitted from being in the military.

Do you feel it gave you confidence, or a feeling of competence?

Stewart: I gained experience, knowledge, and confidence about myself. As a matter of fact it helped me, what they taught me helped me to be able to fight discrimination. I had seen, now, of course I getting away from the regiment, times when I've attacked people for wrongdoing in the area of discrimination, and I got that basis in the regiment; that I could do a job, that I was competent and capable, and why should I take a second place?

When you came out, or while you were in maybe, were you involved in any community uplift organizations or civil rights organizations, (No) or a member of the NAACP?
Stewart: I later became a member of the NAACP. (After you came out?) After I left Korea. While I was in the military I joined the NAACP. I was considered to be a kind of a militant by some people's standards, because when I saw something that was wrong, I tried to do something about it, even if it wasn't directly, and I was good at writing letters. And I still do that today.

I did... I once was able to get a charge against the Army substantiated... I charged discrimination, I was in an outfit called "Polar Research and Development Center" and when I was sent to take over a job up in Greenland, when I arrived there and they saw my face, they made another job for me... and I filed a complaint with the Inspector General of the Corps of Engineers, that's the outfit that we worked directly for, and got an investigation done. And instead of him finding a case of discrimination, he came back with a judgement against the unit of gross negligence... Though, in those days was worse than discrimination. And I, .... the NAACP representative in Washington D.C. told me at the time, he said you usually don't get this kind of action, and he said you should feel that you've accomplished something... well, first the colonel, when he came to address me, he tried to intimidate me by pulling rank and saying that you are bordering on insubordination and all that sort of thing, and I told him that "Okay, if you're going to feel that way, I probably want to deal with some civilian person, like a
Congressman, or something"...and he proceeded to do a good job on the investigation and I was treated different from then on.

I rotated from Korea in July of '51, and there was rumor out that if you served your time there, you wouldn't have to go back for a period, you know...So, like an idiot, I re-enlisted for the Far East, unassigned, thinking that I wouldn't have to go back to Korea. On the 29th of December, 1951, I was back in Korea, and I didn't intend to go back there, but I was back there. Because I came back, they allowed me to serve in any unit I wanted to, so I went back to the 25th Division, 65th Engineer Battalion, and was assigned to the 77th Engineer Company... they had a job open there for me, supposedly. I went down to take the job, at the 77th, they had been integrated by this time. The lieutenant told his corporal, who was running the job, that "I don't like those kind of sergeants", meaning a Black person. And, uh, he never gave me a job... I was there for twenty nine days, and on the twenty ninth day I got angry, and I told the commanding officer, "if I find a unit that will accept me, will you approve of the transfer?" And he said yes...

And I went to battalion headquarters and was reassigned. And that's the shortest hitch, military assignment I ever had. And it was because of, let's face it,
the man said he did like those kind of crazy niggers?...

me: So this was one way he managed to get rid of...

Stewart: Yeah, I went through the battalion and became an inspector, and they had to bring their equipment up to me to inspect it, to be evacuated. And I kept sending it back, and the lieutenant came up to see way and... then he found out I was in charge, so he didn’t say anything.

They (the VA) did nothing for us... we all went to our own doctors... I went to my own doctor for my PTS... I didn’t go to the VA because I wasn’t even told I was eligible to go; this was a conflict, this wasn’t even a war... And to me, you weren’t eligible to go unless you were in a world war... Our government didn’t say, "If anything happens you are entitled to go to the VA hospital, we want you to go "... None of that was told to us...

me: Did they tell you if you were eligible for a pension or anything?

Stewart: Heck no. I put in for a pension, and they told me "you’re too young, heck, ain’t nothing wrong with you. Get a job and go to work." So I did. I never started drawing any disability until 19... I applied for it in ’84, I didn’t get it until about ’87, and that was 30%, then I re-applied and
went to 60%, and then it stayed there. And I applied for my knees, because I had to have them replaced, the doctor wrote it up that it was because of the lack of vitamins and I was only a teenager, and my body never stored up calcium for old age, and the joints, while in prison camp, it took me three years more to get that... They said, the doctor's opinion is speculative, and that's something the VA says it can't do.

Bill Winters

Sgt First Class
July 10, 1950 to April 11, 1951
1st Battalion, A Company, 1st Platoon, 1st Sgt
MOS 1745 Rifleman
Enlisted from North New Jersey

I can tell you almost every place I was in Korea, from beginning about 40 miles north-west of Saegu... When I left we had just crossed the Han-ton River, which is about 21 miles above, uh, the Hahn River.

Manhood
Do you Think your Army service had any impact on your idea of what being a man is?

Winters: Not really...No, see, because, uh, I played the part of a man even though I wasn’t one before I went into the Army. I went into the Army at eighteen, and that was in 1942... and I had been on my own since I was 15... So when I went into the Army I don’t think it had an effect on my manhood because I had... done just about all you can do as a man by the time I reached eighteen years old...I was working to support my self; I was by myself. I was rooming in a house, you know.

Description of battle:

I was a professional soldier. I thought I was well trained, and I enjoyed my job.

Interview with Joel Ward July 16 1993

Ward: It was hard... We were segregated... We were an all black unit... with some white officers and some black officers.

Well, on the idea of running, when you’re out of ammo...you know the odds are... you can stay there, and with the enemy
got you outnumbered five or ten to one, it was better to move back and... fight again another day than to stay there and get killed. You see what I'm saying? But... and another thing,

First, when we were in Japan, we trained, every day. Those black officers, and white officers worked together. In my unit, Easy Company Second Battalion (24th Regiment)...

NCO discipline

Well, in the first place, the officers I was with, around in my company, they were professional soldiers, and there was never any time, that anybody or I heard or saw any officer trying to demean or belittle anybody. Our officers were strictly above board and correct. So therefore we rarely, the only thing we did was follow orders as a professional soldier should, and to the best of our ability.

Do you think that these officers believed in the fighting ability of the black man?

Yea, they knew. They knew we could fight...we had the championship football team, the baseball team. We had the championship heavyweight boxer of the whole Army, all
service boxing championship, Levi (roi?) Jackson. He got killed by a grenade. We were professional soldiers. For most of us, this was our only way out of the ghettos back home.

For me, I joined the Army so I could get the GI Bill and go to college. I didn’t have money to go to college with. For three years in the Army, it was a good thing to me, at that time.

There was no opportunity for us, for the Negro at that time, or Afro-American, because, just like it is now, all the job opportunities were blocked, there just wasn’t any jobs and no way to advance?

Did you think that the evaluation of your unit was fair?

I know it wasn’t, because they accused us of running when we didn’t run. We were pawns when we first got over there. I know, because I was a front man. We were on line for forty-six straight days without any let up. Sometimes we went 2 1/2 days without food because the supply unit couldn’t catch up to us.

Did you feel that draftees and volunteers felt differently?
All the Army were volunteers, black and white. They had done away with the draft. You had some guys still in there, from the draft, making a career out of the Army, but everybody that came into service then were volunteers.

Civil Rights

While in route to Fort Sam Houston, I had to change buses at Jackson, Mississippi. My buddy and I were in the station, and they took up the seats, so we couldn’t be served. The Greyhound bus station. Today they have a black vice president; definitely didn’t have any black bus drivers.

Sat in at a steak house in Louisville, Kentucky. They didn’t have any kind of steak, but a ground beef steak, hamburger, and I refused to buy that. I wanted a steak. My unit, now at Fort Benning, Georgia, all the whites called me "little Martin Luther King". Cause I didn’t scratch my head, grin, and shuffle my feet. When the Army integrated in 1953, I left Fort Hood, Texas as the first sergeant of the headquarters of a service unit. When I got to Europe, they wanted me to work under a guy that had one stripe less than me. And I refused to do it... It was the first group of Negro NCOs going into that unit. There were Georgia National Guardsmen in the unit that was activated. They didn’t want no Blacks over any whites,
believe it or not.

Did you find that alot among the officers?

This wasn't just the officers, this was white soldiers period.
Did you think alot of the white soldiers were from the South?
Yeah. In this unit, it first had a West Point boy as CO, and he was from New York, and he was decent. When he left, then all of them were white, and another captain took over the unit. As far as I know, he was half-way fair.
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