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In whose image? Knowledge, social science and democracy in occupied Germany, 1943–1955

Staley, David John, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1993
For my son Adam Winston Staley
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Chapter I

Knowledge, Social Science and Democracy

The story of the encounter between German and American social science begins in the nineteenth century. Many of the first professional American social scientists received their training and advanced degrees from German universities, at a time when the modern American research university was emerging. While in Germany, American social scientists absorbed the philosophical approach to knowledge and to the study of society, in the German tradition of Geisteswissenschaft. By the 1920’s, however, the students of the first generation had sent American social science along a different path, away from German philosophy and toward an image of social science that stressed positivist, pragmatic knowledge useful for the management and control of society, a process one historian refers to as "the Americanization of the social sciences." The bifurcated realms of German Wissenschaft and American science would converge, after the Second World War, during the occupation, when Americans would attempt to finish the process of "Americanizing" German social science, this time by returning to the source, and under the mandate of "democratizing" German culture. The American occupation of Germany--typically narrated through the voice of military men, the Cold War, the geopolitics of European reconstruction--represents a crucial encounter between American and German social science: the intertwining of knowledge, social science and democracy at the boundary between American and German culture.

It is no surprise that German and American social science have been so entwined. Both countries industrialized at roughly the same time, fueled by the emerging technologies of oil, chemicals and electricity.
Both the United States and Germany suffered the strains of rapid urbanization, and both countries sought parallel solutions to the challenges of industrialization. In both countries, social and economic changes would influence the structure and institutionalization of knowledge.

The first modern German university, the University of Berlin, and the educational reforms of Wilhelm von Humboldt would signal one direction the Germans would pursue to cope with the twin forces of industrialization and modernization. The German university provided the prototype of the modern university, as the seminar, the institute, specialized research, and the resources necessary to foster research became a firmly entrenched part of scientific practice. Universities received direct state support, as research—especially scientific research—was tied to the needs of the rapidly industrializing economy.²

It was not only the universities alone that placed German scientific innovation at the research forefront. State support, and the interests of German industrialists such as Werner Siemens, fostered the growth and increased prestige of institutions outside the university, such as the Technische Hochschulen and the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft. These research centers, as historian Alan Beyerchen notes, "weakened university domination of the research enterprise, but... benefited German science with competitive contribution at the forefront of numerous fields and which in turn pressured the universities to become less rigid in order to remain competitive." The interrelations between knowledge, business and state institutionalized "a synergistic system for the generation and dissemination of knowledge that functioned in a sophisticated, modern manner."³ As historian Peter Manicas notes, the Germans had pioneered "the industrialization of science."⁴

Industrialized science places the Baconian ideal of prediction and control of the natural world at the disposal of an industrial economy. "One goal of science is explanation," argues Manicas, "but since a
scientific explanation has the same logic as prediction, we can say that the capacities to predict or, by virtue of this, to generate effective technologies, are the most adequate marks of a science. This is what American practitioners meant by social science.

While German natural science was trailblazing the future path of science, the sciences of society, the Geisteswissenschaften, did not follow along the same path. A prominent feature of the university as drafted by von Humboldt was the emphasis on philosophy as the core of education. The concern for philosophy, rather than addressing practical affairs, structured German social research. While the study of human society would also be an integral part of the German university, this would not mean the "industrialization of the social sciences."

It is in language that the concern for knowledge as philosophy—and, consequently, the differences between German and American ideas of social science—can be located. While German culture experienced its own Enlightenment (Aufklaerung), it was not identical to the Enlightenment that influenced French and English culture. In fact, many tenets of the Aufklaerung rejected the Anglo-French Enlightenment, especially the latter's focus upon empiricism, positivism, and later, technocracy. In describing the traditions of the German "mandarins," historian Fritz Ringer points to this crucial distinction in the status of knowledge between the Aufklaerung and the Enlightenment. German mandarins "felt that many French and English intellectuals from the seventeenth century on associated science and learning almost exclusively with the idea of practical manipulation, of rational technique and environmental control," which became the seeds of American perceptions of social scientific knowledge.

German perceptions of knowledge reflected a concern for the cultivation of the individual and the individual's position within a spiritual and cultural milieu. The German word Bildung conveys a sense of spiritual growth, and not the accumulation of practical skills. As
the philosopher Karl Jaspers argued, education (Erziehung) related to the formation "of the personality in accordance with an ideal of Bildung, with ethical norms...Education is the inclusive, the whole," while instruction (Unterricht) related to imparting information or training in skills. Closely allied to Idealist philosophy, Bildung referred to the exfoliation of the individual personality, in as much as the personality was in harmony with the larger cultural and spiritual milieu.

Ringer stresses that the German word Kultur, and its opposite number Zivilisation, similarly reflected the dichotomy between the exploration of the philosophically pure realm of inner cultivation and knowledge of and control over nature. Kultur meant the development of the mind and spirit of the individual, and was meant to convey the "inscape" of the individual as well as the individual’s links to others who shared in a common experience, a common culture. Zivilisation suggested "a generally practical and worldly sort of knowledge...the term civilization was quite naturally expanded to cover all the results of ‘outward’ progress in economics, technology, and social organization," in other words, to the achievements of industrialization and the industrialization of knowledge.

Central to German Idealist philosophy was the concept of Geist. Difficult to translate into English, Geist usually means "mind," "spirit" or "soul," but more generally stands for "the collective thought of mankind and sometimes even for a transcendental consciousness." When the concept of Geist is fitted within the context of Bildung and Kultur, it is clear that the Geisteswissenschaften, or the disciplines that studied the Geist, were not the same as the "social sciences" that were emerging in England and France, and would stand in opposition to American social science.

German distrust of empiricism and positivism was embedded in the concept of Wissenschaft. Although usually translated as "science" in
English, the term really refers to scholarship, or the systematic search for knowledge, or even "discipline." Germans scholars engaged in the study of humanity evoked the term Geisteswissenschaft. This did not imply a concept of "social science," in the sense of mirroring the natural sciences; such disciplines were condescendingly referred to as "naturwissenschaftlich" or "positivistisch." "In this way," notes Ringer, "the German language itself came to favor certain conceptions of knowledge and learning. As Windelband observed, the Greek philosophia 'means exactly that which we describe with the German word Wissenschaft and which...fortunately includes much more that the English and French science.'" Indeed, German Wissenschaft was an expression of philosophy, not science. Jaspers succinctly stated that "Vitality in wissenschaft exists only in relation to a whole. Every single discipline is such a whole and has to that extent a philosophical character."9

The social position of the university, and the professor within the university, reinforced the values of a philosophically pure, disinterested pursuit of knowledge. In addition to ensuring the centrality of philosophy within the university, von Humboldt's reforms also fostered the belief in Lernfreiheit and Lehrfreiheit, academic freedom for both students and professors, which was to secure the pursuit of truth uncorrupted by outside influences. Closely associated with this was the ideal of Weltfremdheit. As Gordon Craig notes, "in place of the liberal activism that had been admired in the pre-1848 professors, Weltfremdheit, an odd word that means ignorance of the ways of the world, with connotations of distractedness and absentmindedness, was considered to be a respectable and even endearing trait of their successors."10 Professors, and the knowledge they held, remained aloof from practical affairs.

An exception to this tendency was the Verein fuer Sozialpolitik, a professional organization of social scientists who sought to apply their knowledge to alleviating the social problems created by
industrialization by directly influencing social policy. The Verein group recommended policies such as social insurance, state ownership of railroads, progressive taxation and factory inspection laws. Direct influences on Bismarck's social policies are difficult to trace, but it seems apparent that the Verein group had an important effect on these policies. Splits within the Verein, however, rendered it ineffective as a permanent advocacy organization. By the 1905 meeting in Mannheim, factionalism caused the Verein "to decay into a 'scientific society' instead of an active pressure group." The Verein fuer Sozialpolitik remained the exception in the German Geisteswissenschaften.

Embedded in the word Wissenschaft was the concept of knowledge as Idealist philosophy. The philosophers of human affairs "rejected the notion that learning should produce immediately useful results of a technical sort, and they certainly had no 'positivist' conception of social engineering." The Verein fuer Sozialpolitik aside, such knowledge was not easily industrialized, for Geisteswissenschaft did not easily fit into the vessel of Americanized social science, and was antithetical to its implications.

In rejecting the Idealist philosophical basis of social knowledge, the Americans opened the way for the industrialization of the social sciences. Manicas writes that "industrialized science," or "technocratic science" is "legitimated...by a positivist philosophy of science," and that "industrialized science is a symbiosis of science, business, industry, and the state. In this century, it has become an absolutely essential part of the basic mode of production in a modern economy." The Americans pioneered the application of these principles to the Geisteswissenschaften "from the practically irrelevant theoria" of the German tradition "to a practically productive and predictive instrument" of social management and social control, thus creating American "social science." Industrialized, pragmatic knowledge has remained a persistent feature of American social science, so much so
that "it is no exaggeration to say," as Manicas maintains, "that because it is a fundamental feature of Americanized social science and thus constitutes the main vehicle for introducing people to 'science' and to 'scientific method,' it dominates our thinking about science." As America grew in international stature, its vision of social science grew increasingly paradigmatic.

The creation of American social science was dependent upon conditions in the United States at the turn of the last century. American scholars, returning from Germany, brought with them the German concepts of the Geisteswissenschaften, and hoped to transplant these ideas into the American context. This proved a difficult task, however. German Idealist philosophy organized German social thought, a tradition that was not found in America. "It was no mean feat," notes Manicas, "to reconstitute and mesh "American notions of individualism "with the Hegelianized approach of the German tradition." This clash of cultural assumptions is an important leitmotif in the story of the encounter between American and German social science, for Americans arriving in Germany after the Second World War would have similar difficulties in transplanting American ideas of social science in Germany.

Like Germany, the United States was faced with enormous changes created by industrialization and modernization. Unlike their German counterparts, American professors did not have the luxury of remaining aloof from practical affairs, and the messiness of economic and social transformation. Without the same traditions and history to legitimate their claims of "academic freedom," American professors were challenged by the growing influence of new elites, the wealthy industrialists such as Carnegie, the Rockefellers and the Vanderbilts. University professors, and especially those who had knowledge of society, would be brought within the newly emerging power relations governing the United
States, a power relation historian Ellen Condliffe Lagemann refers to as "the politics of knowledge."

The American response to social and economic transformation was to give power and legitimacy to the expert, the manager, who would have the knowledge to control the problems wrought by industrialization. Exploring the political dimension of such "knowledge-related activities," Lagemann explains that "As the United States moved from a preindustrial and industrial state to a postmodern state, knowledge joined land and capital as a critical national resource." In particular, management gained in significance as a means of channeling and controlling social change, to ensure stability. As Lagemann notes, professions began to manage the delivery of human services through varied and complex processes of education and licensure. Governmental agencies began to manage conflict through the regulation of commercial activities in which private interests in profit were often at odds with public interests in health, safety, and the conservation of scarce resources, or in the protection of civil rights. Universities and research bureaus of an ever increasing number and variety...began to manage the development and diffusion of knowledge through the award or denial of support for research, dissemination, and training activities. Management, no less than the production of goods and services, required knowledge: both specialized, expert knowledge to guide and justify the forecasts ventured, the choices made, and the policies established and revised, and popular intelligence to facilitate active participation in management on one end of the spectrum, or passive acquiescence on the other.17

Business and government would, as with the case in Germany, look to science for such knowledge and expertise. In the American context, however, the social sciences would also be included within this nexus. Geisteswissenschaft would be "industrialized," fitted within the culture of management, largely by the students of the first-generation of students who were educated in Germany. It was the second-generation of American social scientists who "defined social science in positivist and a historical terms, and adopted an unabashed technocratic stance."18

The shift toward a practical social science in America began roughly after the First World War, and in response to the changes
produced during the Gilded Age. Social scientists feared the end of American exceptionalism—that America would avoid the misery of modernity that had afflicted Europe—and looked toward scientism as a promise of order in a world of chaos, a means of prediction and control amid a changing world. "Institutional economists, most sociologists, and some political scientists," contends historian Dorothy Ross, "more deeply strained by the rapidity of change and the insecurity of American ideals, sought a different kind of science, an empirical science of the changing liberal world that would allow them technological control. The anxiety to control the careening new world on the one hand, and the narrowed focus and comfortable opportunities of professionalism on the other, turned that scientific impulse toward scientism." As with German *Geisteswissenschaft*, American social science mirrored the culture in which it was embedded. "Like pragmatism or Protestant fundamentalism or abstract expressionism," argues Ross, "social science is a characteristic product of modern American culture. Its liberal values, practical bent, shallow historical vision, and technocratic confidence are recognizable features of twentieth-century America."

Initially, the funds for industrialized social science research came from philanthropic organizations. Andrew Carnegie built his philanthropy around the belief in distributive policymaking, as opposed to the regulatory policy making that would characterize American philanthropy after World War I. Consequently, Carnegie's "gifts to build libraries, purchase pipe organs, and otherwise increase opportunities for the release and development of individual talent, kept the Corporation from aligning itself with the more scientific assumptions that were coming to dominate effective social initiatives." However, after Carnegie's death, Corporation policy shifted, from liberal philanthropy, toward a more "scientific philanthropy" of the trustees Elihu Root and Henry Smith Pritchett, which emphasized the creation of centers of public policy expertise that would draw together leading
scientific experts. Such grants for scientific expertise affected the natural sciences, economics and law.\textsuperscript{20}

Prior to the Second World War, the main source of funds for social scientific research in the United States came from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, later the Rockefeller Foundation. As the chief patron of social science research, the Foundation helped to set the research agenda for American social science. Foundation money went largely to economics, political science and sociology, but more importantly, the Foundation helped to define the purpose of American social science research in the context of public policy. At one level, this meant an emphasis on objective knowledge production, pursued by rigorous scientific methods, which rested on empirical investigation. Beyond this goal, the Rockefeller Foundation, as with other philanthropic organizations, "proceeded in accordance with a conception of social order and the role of cognitive institutions in that order. The process began with the mobilization for the First World War," argue Martin and Joan Bulmer, "and social science began to be called on to contribute much more directly than ever before to the formation of public policy and to the conduct of government."\textsuperscript{21}

Donald Fisher sees such a commitment to public policy formation in Gramscian terms, arguing that the purpose of Rockefeller Foundation patronage was the "reproduction and production of cultural hegemony," meaning "those ideologies in the superstructure which disseminate the particular consciousness of the ruling class and organize the consensus of the masses to the existing social order." Fisher especially notes the significance of social planning and social engineering in Foundation objectives for social research. Social planning fits well within the managerial culture America forged after World War I, and "Rockefeller philanthropy," concludes Fisher, "helped produce a new cultural hegemony" of business, the academy and government "by encouraging those
emergent parts of the dominant ideology that emphasized 'efficiency,' 'planning' and 'practicality.'" The formation of "think tanks," such as the Brookings Institution, offers another example of the institutional arrangements of social science. Funded by both the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation, the Brookings Institution was the first research institute in America. The proliferation of "think tanks" after the 1920's again points to the industrialization of social science, but also, as Donald T. Critchlow has explained, to the ambiguous position of the "think tank" in American democracy. The Brookings Institution represents a case of industrialized social science used by social scientists and businessmen to check the power of political parties, by "depoliticizing public policy." Critchlow argues that the origins of the Brookings Institution are found in a movement by a self-designated "better element" who persistently disclaimed democracy and party spirit. This element, under the guise of progressive reform and efficient government, consciously sought to weaken partisan interests in public policy and to shift decision making as much as possible from elected officials to appointed bodies. The IGR (Institute for Government Research, a forerunner of the Brookings Institution] was organized to bring efficiency to government and to the budgetary system, but beneath the rhetoric of "efficiency and economy" lay a deep distrust toward popular democracy. Indeed, the think tank appears to have been the social science equivalent of the Verein fuer Sozialpolitik. Rather than evoking the language of philosophy, American social science evoked the language of efficiency, management and control.

As historian Gene M. Lyons has observed, "the growth of the federal government itself and the increasing influence of federal policies and programs upon American social and economic life "proved instrumental, and almost inevitable, in the increased role of the federal government in patronizing social science research. The New Deal proved particularly momentous in this shift, as Roosevelt invited social scientists to serve as advisors to his administration--such as in the
Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Department of Agriculture—"roles traditionally assigned to lawyers and businessmen." The Second World War accelerated the process of close cooperation between the federal government and social science. This was especially evident in the prominent position held by social scientists in the Office of Strategic Service, the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Research and Analysis (R and A) Branch of the OSS proves important in the larger encounter between American and German social science in two ways. First, it offers a microcosm of the changes in American social science after World War Two. The processes of objectivity, empirical research and service to the state were intensified and diffused by a generation of American social scientists who served in the OSS and later returned to university life. Scholars of the R and A Branch were charged with the responsibility of providing "thoroughly objective and neutral" data, to be used by decision makers within the government. It also left this generation of scholars with a taste for federal support, the opportunity for federal largess that has become a central feature of the social scientific enterprise in postwar America. Secondly, the R and A Branch offered sanctuary for prominent emigre social scientists from Germany, in particular, members of the Frankfurt School of Social Research. The conflicts between Germans and Americans—over methodology and purpose in social research—foreshadowed the encounter between American and German social science in the occupation.

After the War, American social scientists wished to see their role within the Federal government strengthened. Witnessing the prestige garnished by the physical scientists—and the Manhattan Project in particular—social scientists sought to tie their lot to the funding apparatus of the federal government, hoping to create a "big social science" that mirrored the "big science" pattern of the National Science Foundation. A prominent spokesman in this quest was the sociologist
Talcott Parsons, who argued, in an unpublished report for the Social Science Research Council, that the social sciences were a "basic national resource" necessary for identifying and controlling social problems.25

This goal has remained a persistent part of the institutional structure of the social sciences in the United States. Commenting on the cuts in social science funding during the Reagan administration, Scott Cummings warned social scientists to be less naive about the relationship "between social science research and the larger knowledge industry of which it is a part. While professional societies are becoming more sophisticated about lobbying strategies and techniques, individual social scientists do not typically view the research process, or more generally the production of knowledge, from an economic viewpoint. Failure to recognize the commercial and entrepreneurial bases of social science research is a politically naive conceptual error."26

In a decision social scientists have coveted since the conclusion of the war, the National Science Foundation finally created, on October 11, 1991, a Directorate for Social, Behavior and Economic Sciences, placing the social sciences on equal organizational footing with other sciences. "The change," argues Daniel S. Greenberg, "can be attributed to effective lobbying, the intellectual growth of the social sciences and a maturity on the part of the physical and natural scientists who still dominate the foundation. But also present was the dwindling confidence, among politicians and the public, in America's ability to cope with its many economic and social problems."27 This momentous event is a part of a narrative that has defined American social science since the 1920's. The faith in American social science continues to lie in its promise to offer pragmatic solutions to social problems.

These promises may account for the constancy of the American model as the paradigm of social science research. "After the catastrophe of
World War I," argues Manicas, "Americans would set the style in 'social science.' In Europe, the Bolshevik Revolution, the rise of fascism, and the Second World War persistently stunted, but never annihilated, alternative discourses, especially those nurtured on or in response to the possibility of a Marxist social science. But it was not until the present period, beginning perhaps during the Vietnam war, that American social science, like the United States itself, lost that hegemony which it began to acquire in the inter-war period.\textsuperscript{28} The cultural hegemony of American social science engulfed—but never fully subdued—occupied Germany.

As American social science cascaded toward the "big social science" ideal after the 1920's, German Geisteswissenschaft was nearly extinguished, the result of the Weimar and Nazi periods. The "Twenties" in Germany, which extended from 1919 to 1933, constituted a tumultuous period in the history of German social thought. The promise of the Revolution, of the democracy that was Weimar, was vigorously challenged by the more conservative segments of German society, such as the civil service, the army, but especially the universities. In response to the perceived threat to their social position, the professors of the Geisteswissenschaften maintained and hardened their philosophical approach to the study of society.

Intellectual confrontations within the university, provoked by the political and social changes of the Revolution and the Weimar constitution, tended to reflect these larger concerns outside the university. Those who sought stasis, who rejected the onslaught of modernity, democracy and mass society, stood behind the older traditions of Bildung and Kultur and Geist. Thus, the older traditions of German social thought were redeployed against the onset of the twentieth century. Questions that addressed contemporary economic and social problems were labeled "merely practical," and, as Fritz Ringer notes, "whether in politics or in the affairs of learning itself, the mandarins
were committed to a particularly 'elevated' level of discourse. Their whole tradition forbade them to recognize any limitations upon the autonomy and potency of pure geist."^{29}

The challengers to the mandarins and their detachment from practical affairs were social theorists who wished to confront the problems of industrial society. Carl Becker, a Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs in Prussia, was one such theorist who called for an educational system that forced scholars to confront real social problems. Becker believed sociology particularly important within this new university. "Chairs of sociology are an urgent necessity for all universities," he stated. "By that is meant sociology in the broadest sense of the word, including political science and contemporary history. It is only by way of the sociological approach that a mental habit is created in the intellectual sphere which then becomes political conviction, when transferred to the moral sphere."^{30}

Even this slight move away from the pure realm of Geist, however, was met with scathing reaction. The historian Georg von Below was one such critic, who complained that Becker's program sounded too much like British and French Enlightenment thought. German Romanticism, especially by evoking the notion of the Volksgeist—volk spirit—had already satisfactorily dealt with the problem of the relationship between the individual and his spiritual and cultural milieu. The keepers of orthodox tradition labeled reformers such as Becker as "materialists," "positivists" and "naturalists," evoking images of German scholarship in danger of being "corrupted" by Enlightenment ideas.^{31}

Of course, von Below and Becker were discussing two completely different subjects, ideas, relations between knowledge and its social function. Becker was hardly suggesting radical change—not the type that was being suggested by Marxist scholars, for example—but he nevertheless found it difficult to express new ideas for German social
thought. "To challenge the orthodoxy at all," concluded Ringer, "the critic almost had to make a leap into a new vocabulary, one in which interests could be considered, groups were sums of people, and the rule of the spirit was an ideal, not a reality." To express such ideas, social thought would have to move out of the universities, and even away from the culture in which it was embedded.

With the rise of the Nazis, these debates became moot, for knowledge could no longer remain in the pure realm of the spirit, but neither would it be used to address contemporary problems. Gleichschaltung made it impossible for professors to remain aloof from practical affairs, or to ensure their intellectual freedom, two of the most significant factors that sustained and nurtured German social thought. What remained of Geisteswissenschaft after the forced migration of many social theorists was pressed into the service of the regime. The political scientist Carl Schmitt, for example, became known as the "theorist of the Reich," his ideas redeployed to provide the legal justification of the Third Reich. The political scientists and jurists who in 1934 composed "The German State of Today" argued that "neutral research" was no longer a reality in Germany. Research, before the rise of the Nazis, was characterized as the "institutional reality of the spiritual realm," a realm the Nazis forcibly removed it from. Mirroring the policy of economic autarky, the Nazis restricted intellectual contact with other centers of learning, making contact with social thought in America, Britain, the Soviet Union and France impossible.

The polemical debates of the twenties and the rise of the Nazis silenced alternatives to the Idealist philosophy of the Geisteswissenschaft. However, while university professors stifled debate on alternative conceptualizations of social theory, these alternatives often found expression outside the university. Many disaffected social scientists found opportunities in research.
institutes, independent from or loosely tied to the universities. Other sources were journals and periodicals, such as Die Gesellschaft and Die Arbeit, which provided other outlets for social science research. With the rise of the Nazis, many social theorists left Germany and would pursue research elsewhere, for if the alternatives to Geisteswissenschaft were to thrive, they would have to be outside the cultural context of Germany. Among the most important of the alternatives which found its way to America was the Frankfurt School, the Institute for Social Research.

The emigration of the Frankfurt School to America represents one of the more significant chapters in the story of the encounter between German and American social science. Unlike the first encounter, in the late nineteenth century, the relationship between members of the Frankfurt School and their American hosts demonstrates the divergence between Geisteswissenschaft and social science. There would be mutually beneficial encounters, such as the service of Herbert Marcuse in the OSS Research and Analysis Branch in the later stages of the Second World War. Marcuse authored research reports on the plausible scenarios that would confront a military government over a defeated Germany, as part of the Civil Affairs Division guidebooks. While useful for policy makers, even Marcuse's watered-down Marxism clashed with American designs for a postwar German democracy.

As for any bond between Americans and Germans over method and purpose in social research, such linkage was tenuous at best. H. Stuart Hughes—who associated with Frankfurt School members Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Marcuse—noted that while attempts were made, and some limited success was enjoyed, at forging a cooperative mix between American and German research traditions, this mixture was rarely more than oil and water. "The one significant Institute project that involved native-born collaborators," recalled Hughes was the investigation of the "fascist potential" eventually published in 1950 under the title The Authoritarian Personality.
The book turned out once again to be a curious period piece—or, rather, a hybrid. The American and the German contributors never fused; they remained quaintly juxtaposed. On the quantitative, interview-based findings of the experimental psychologists he had recruited, Adorno superimposed an elaborate philosophical gloss that he could just as well have written without them. What had been juxtaposed were the traditions of Geisteswissenschaft and social science that had split German and American social thought in the 1920's.

If any convergence existed at all during the exile of the Frankfurt School, it was in the realm of the social function of knowledge. Marcuse had served the United States government, a role played by many American social scientists. Part of the Frankfurt School manifesto—Critical Theory—included a concern for contemporary social, political, economic and cultural issues, a position that placed them outside German tradition. However, "working for the OSS and the State Department," notes Martin Jay, "was not precisely what the Frankfurt School had meant when it advocated revolutionary praxis, a point that its detractors on the left were to make in subsequent years." While the Frankfurt School left the pure Idealist realm of the philosophical Geist, it did not enter into the pragmatic realm of American social science. The notion of praxis—as a statement of the relationship between knowledge and social function—sat somewhere between German Idealist philosophy and American technocracy.

Praxis derived from Marxist philosophy, itself a product of German philosophic tradition, which is why, even in exile, the Frankfurt School remained more German than American. As defined by Jay, praxis was used to designate a kind of self-creating action, which differed from the externally motivated behavior produced by forces outside man's control. Although originally seen as the opposite of contemplative theoria when it was first used in Aristotle's Metaphysics, praxis in the Marxist usage was seen in dialectical relation to theory. In fact, one of the earmarks of praxis as opposed to mere action was its being informed by theoretical considerations. The goal of revolutionary activity was understood as the unifying of theory and praxis, which would be in direct contrast to the situation prevailing under capitalism.

Critical Theory resonated with the Left Hegelians of the 1840's, which
points to the philosophical orientation of Critical Theory. In fact, the juxtaposition of the Geisteswissenschaft and Critical theory points to a bifurcation in German social thought, with the former looking more like the Right Hegelians of the same period. Thus, critical theory represented an alternative framework deeply embedded within German tradition.

Although Critical Theory differed from the mainstream German tradition with its concern for matters of the practical realm, its social function would not be like American social science. If traditional research, in the words of Martin Jay, "pointed in the direction of activity, as in the case of Baconian science, its goal was technological mastery of the world, which was very different from praxis." The goal of Critical Theory was neither exclusive speculation on the abstract realm of the Geist aloof from practical affairs, nor the management and control of social change, but rather the theoretically informed creation of social change.

Perhaps as a result of their exile in America, the first generation of scholars who developed Critical Theory jettisoned revolutionary praxis as a realistic goal. Nevertheless, philosophy, Critical Theory and the whole of the German tradition of Geisteswissenschaft would remain a persistent part of the way Germans conceptualized the study of humanity, even in the period of the occupation, and well into the Federal Republic. The spirit of praxis would reignite with the second generation of students—including the sociologist Juergen Habermas—who created an alternative image of democracy, an image of a native form of German democracy.

With the arrival of the American occupiers after World War Two, the encounter between German and American social science entered a new stage. Social science and social scientists were included in both the war effort—in the OSS—as well as in the structure of the military government, the Office of Military Government US Zone (OMGUS).
Initially, the chief purpose of the social sciences was to provide useful information about Germany which would aid in the defeat of the Reich. Social scientists left university life to flock to Washington, to provide expert knowledge on the Germans, as well as offering scenarios as to the shape of a postwar German society. The social scientists of the OSS were not, however, to act as policy advisers, their task being only the production of neutral and objective knowledge, to serve their customers in the War Department. The OSS converted social scientific knowledge into a commodity for social control.

In the early phases of the occupation, American social science was given the task of reorienting German culture and society toward democracy. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of James K. Pollock. A political scientist at the University of Michigan, Pollock became an advisor to Lucius Clay, largely for his expert knowledge of Germany and election procedures. Pollock sought to shape postwar German political practice, and advised Clay that the best way to ensure democracy was to revive representative institutions, as he had witnessed during trips to Germany in the 1920's and 30's. To that end, Pollock proposed, and Clay initiated, the German Council of States, or Laenderrat, Germany’s first postwar system of government. In this case, social scientific knowledge served military power and policy.

Social science found other forms of expression in the occupation. OMGUS, through the Opinion Surveys Branch, sponsored public opinion polls throughout the American zone. The chief purpose of these polls was to obtain feedback from the Germans, of their fears, concerns, attitudes, in order to inform military government policy. Pollsters within OMGUS also noted that obtaining feedback from the public was itself a form of democratic practice, and exposing the Germans to constant polling became away of indoctrinating Germans in democratic experience. Explicitly, social scientific knowledge was used as a form
of social control and engineering, with occupied Germany serving as an enormous laboratory experiment in democratization.

As the occupation entered its later stages, American social science took on the added purpose of serving, in and of itself, as an agent of democratization, thus reconfiguring the relationship between American and German social science. The bifurcation of American and German social science was well understood by the 1930's. With the defeat of the Nazis, however, Americans reconceptualized social science as, by definition, democratic, since it provided useful information about economic life, social conditions and political practice. Geisteswissenschaft, with its airy philosophical speculation, served no useful social function, could not stop the rise of the Nazis, and indeed contributed to its regime. In order to democratize Germany, American social science had to replace German Geisteswissenschaft.

Thus, in addition to providing technically exploitable information, American social scientists also sought to proselytize Germans in American methods of social science. One such case was the exchange between the University of Chicago and the University of Frankfurt, which lasted between 1948 and 1951. The purpose of the exchange was to aid in the reconstruction of German university life, and to reintegrate German culture with the rest of the world. As part of this exchange, the sociologist Everett C. Hughes was sent to instruct German students in American methods of sociology, in effect, to transplant the Chicago School of sociology in Germany.

The Opinion Surveys Branch of OMGUS, in addition to providing information about the Germans, was further charged with the responsibility of controlling the sampling techniques employed by German polling firms. OMGUS held the authority to grant licenses to firms, and insisted that Germans employ random sampling—a new polling technique developed in America—as opposed to the quota sample that most Germans employed—and which had also been developed in America. Once again,
Germany had became a laboratory experiment, a testing ground for the new methods of polling. The random sample, in this context, was redefined as a more democratic instrument, a more efficient way of measuring public opinion, and thus the method with which the Germans were to be inculcated. In this case, knowledge, social science and images of democracy were deeply intertwined.

In the later stages of the occupation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the early great patron of the social sciences in America, sought to use its patronage to redirect German social science research. The Foundation sought out German centers of research, both within the university system and in seminars and institutes outside the university, and offered funds in support of research, provided that that research conformed to American standards of social science. The Foundation did not fund requests from individuals or institutes which carried on the traditions of abstract speculation, but rather encouraged Germans to pursue research that addressed the practical problems facing postwar Germany. The Foundation attempted to make German social scientists behave as their counterparts in America.

The experiment in democratizing Germany through social engineering and proselytizing met with only mixed results, however. In 1979, Rudolf Wildenmann reported that the social sciences in Germany occupied a marginal position, meaning that graduates in sociology and political science often worked in peripheral fields or were unemployed, that the social sciences received little government funding, and that the social sciences were underutilized in the formation of public policy in Germany. In 1981, Wolfgang van den Daele and Peter Weingart, echoing the thoughts of Wildenmann, observed "that a substantial science policy for the social sciences must be achieved if in the near future they are to contribute to the solution of political problems." By the early 1980's, German social science had yet to reach the same position of American social science.
Of all the images of democracy brought to Germany during the occupation, the one that dominated the early history of the Federal Republic was the economist's belief in democracy as "consumer preference." This vision of democracy was tied closely to the neo-liberal philosophy of the Freiburg School, and especially the policies of Ludwig Erhard. If the Germans learned anything from the Americans, if any image of democracy lingered into German practice, it was the image of consumer plenty—cigarettes, jazz, magazines, automobiles, films—that the Americans possessed, and the Germans, still climbing from the rubble, lacked.\textsuperscript{42}

Democracy as consumer preference, buttressed by neo-liberalism, characterizes the democracy of Germany of the Audenauer years, especially the Fifties and Sixties. This was an image of democracy of the first postwar generation, whose political identity was formed during the reconstruction period. This was the generation that voted for the Western alliance and, as Peter Merkl notes was "a generation of nonjoiners." This generation, concerned with the alliance and in reintegrating with the outside world, reflected Audenauer's concern for tying the Federal Republic with the West.\textsuperscript{43}

The assumptions of this generation of Germans were challenged in the late Sixties. The second postwar generation rejected the complacent attitude of the preceding generation. This was the generation of the leaders of the Greens, the peace movement, the feminists, "a highly 'critical' and rebellious generation."\textsuperscript{44} The second postwar generation targeted the university, which had served as the keeper of Kultur, of Geisteswissenschaft, of the antidemocratic forces of German life. According to the student protesters, "university reform and reform of society must go hand in hand and that the university had a duty to study current social and political problems in order to enlighten the public about the threats to democracy."\textsuperscript{45} The student movement challenged the materialism and consumerism of the Adenauer years, and in the process
resurrected Critical Theory and the praxis of the Frankfurt School.

As the resurrection of Critical Theory demonstrates, the Americans never fully Americanized German Geisteswissenschaft. Ultimately, the Americans were unable to recast German Geisteswissenschaft as American social science. If we examine social scientific knowledge as an artifact of culture, both the United States and Germany proved resistant to each other.
Notes


4Manicas, 200.

5Ibid.


7Ibid., 86-87.

8Ibid., 90, 95.

9Ibid., 103, 106.


11Ringer, 147.


13Ringer, 113.

14Manicas, 201, 206.

15Ibid., 214.

16Ibid., 215.


18Manicas, 216.


20Lagemann, 6-7.


26 Manicas, 216.

29 Ringer, 240-41.


31 Ringer, 233.

32 Ibid., 241.


34 Max Weinreich, Hitler's Professors: The Part of Scholarship in Germany's Crimes Against the Jewish People (New York: Yiddish Scientific Institute, 1946):37.

35 Lepsius, 45.


38 Ibid., 4.

39 Ibid., 80-81.


44Ibid.

45Craig, 185.
The Second World War hastened a fundamental shift in the function of American social science. Social scientists who served in wartime agencies, such as the Office of Strategic Services, learned that to receive the benefits of federal largess, they had to move away from the practice of social science as a speculative discipline, or one aimed at social reform, and toward a vision of social science which stressed objectivity and the creation of practical knowledge. Such knowledge would be utilized for the more efficient control of society. The patronage of the social sciences by the federal government, accelerated as the result of the war, reinforced the move toward a "performative" function of the social sciences, its ability to increase power and efficiency over nature and society. Patronage of such knowledge once fell largely to philanthropic organizations, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, but in the wake of the Second World War, that function fell increasingly into the hands of the federal government. Performativity as the criterion for social research has structured contemporary American social science.

The transformation of the sociopolitical function of social science also contributed to a theoretical reconceptualization of the social sciences. Social scientists serving in wartime agencies discovered that their notions of useful applied social science research were insufficient to meet the needs of the army. As a consequence of this perceived failure, many social scientists looked to the physical sciences in general for a model of success, and to the Manhattan Project
in particular for models of expression in social science.\(^3\) The success of the physical sciences led to a similar push among social scientists for the creation of a "big social science" that would serve state and society. Service in the war effort also contributed to the closer alignment between social research and national strategic need. Of the social scientists who served in the wartime agency, many accepted the standards established by the OSS, including the idea of "objective and neutral research."\(^4\) Service in the OSS represented a formative experience for many American social scientists, who would carry this experience back to the university.\(^5\) Wartime agencies such as the OSS R and A Branch represented microcosms of the shifting relationships between social science research, practice and purpose.

Within this microcosm, another relationship was developing: between writers and readers of social scientific knowledge. The OSS helped to establish a pattern of American social scientific research. From conceptualization to finished report, social scientific knowledge within the R and A Branch was a carefully constructed product. The knowledge produced, however, was intended and utilized by those who held power; social scientists held little authority, especially concerning policy recommendations. Social scientific knowledge was embedded within a nexus of power relationships between the OSS and the policy-making community that was its chief patron. The reports produced out of this process provide insight into how social scientists envisioned postwar Germany, as well as the images of democracy that were to be transported to Germany. Here, the strictly information-producing function of the Section collided with the policy-making function denied to—but coveted by—social scientists. In considering the relationship between the
writers and readers of wartime social scientific knowledge, the writer—the social scientist—was to defer to the reader.

The Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS legitimated social scientific knowledge as serving a strategic function; knowledge was "strategic intelligence." The implications of this vision of social knowledge are significant, for they represented a key element of the postwar function of social knowledge in American culture, and shaped the image of American social science that was to be exported abroad.

"Thoroughly Objective and Neutral"

The push for objective social knowledge drew much of its inspiration from the director of the R and A Branch, William Langer. Indeed, the application of the newer social scientific techniques "to the requirements of shadow warfare and the sale of this product to American leaders was a vital element in the development of a regular, central, intelligence system in the United States." Imitation of the physical sciences would produce research that was "thoroughly objective and neutral," a style of social knowledge coined "Langer’s way."

"Langer’s way" rested upon three rules. First, reports had to follow a system of objective and neutral information production, as would be later controlled by the Projects Committee. "Second, the production of strategic intelligence reports in Washington had to be accepted as the raison d'etre of R. and A., and every dispersal of R. and A. personnel that cut into the production of these reports was to be avoided." Finally, all R. and A. personnel had to recognize the suzerainty of Washington within the structure of the Branch.

Much of the reason for this system of knowledge production stemmed from the original mandate handed to Langer, which stressed that the Branch's function would be strictly confined to accumulation, collation and reporting of data. "Opportunities to influence policy would arise,"
as Barry Katz notes, "but only insofar as those authorized to decide policy had confidence in the quality, integrity, and impartiality of their work. In the face of this hostility, and in order to win a clientele for its goods, it was a matter literally of life and death that R&A gain a reputation for its disinterested professionalism as much as for the sheer excellence of its work." These conditions—the place of R and A in the larger structure of OSS and the war effort, Langer's influence over the branch, and the use of objective social scientific methods—formed the parameters of knowledge creation within the R and A Branch.

Any examination of the production of knowledge within the Branch must examine not only matters of epistemology, but also matters of political economy, or rather the rhetoric of political economy. The language employed by members of the Branch—and by Smith and Katz—demonstrate that the knowledge produced by the Branch was viewed as a commodity, and that objective social research made for a better product. Knowledge—or the "goods"—was "produced" for "sale" to "clientele." Any assessment of the significance of the OSS and strategic intelligence to the development of American social science must also take into account the "commodification" of social scientific knowledge, as well as the language adopted to legitimate it.

To ensure objective research readily available for its clientele decision-makers, the Branch established a central controlling agency, the Projects Committee. Reports generated by members of a specific Section would be approved by the head of the Section and the Division chief, before finally receiving approval—subject to revisions—by the Projects Committee. In addition to approving specific proposals and ensuring a uniformity of standards, the Projects Committee also established the rules of the game for the creation of intelligence information. Political intelligence reports, especially, required great attention as to their organization, form and content. The Projects
Committee sought, therefore, to establish strict rules for the creation of such information, in effect, constructing a writer and a reader.

The writer of political intelligence reports, in actuality, did not exist, or rather, served only as a transmitter of objective political facts. Richard Hartshorn, chair of the Projects Committee, sought to remove the perspective of the writer from political reports, to ensure the purity of objective research. Personal judgement was to be strictly avoided. Writers were to observe the "rules of objective writing," including the avoidance of value-laden terms, such as "should" and "ought" and "must," exercising restraint in the use of quotations from foreign sources to mask the writer's own opinion, and the honest use of all available evidence, even if these conflicted with the writer own personal perspective.  

Hartshorn recognized some interpretation of data as necessary, but again subject to specific rules. He asserted that "Such analysis and interpretation may properly include evaluation in terms of an appropriate standard of measurement that is specifically stated, but may not include evaluation according to some unstated standard that is personal to the writer." The basis of evaluation, the fulcrum of objective standards, was the interests of the United States. "Appropriate standards of measurement in an American intelligence agency, "wrote Hartshorn," are 1) the stated war and peace aims of the United States; 2) and such policies as may be assumed to represent accepted articles of foreign policy of the United States; 3) precedents established in similar situations in the past...and 4) what may be clearly demonstrated to be generally accepted or self-evident interests of the United States."

With the writer thus constructed, Hartshorn identified the reader. "It is axiomatic in good writing," began Hartshorn, "that the form and style must be adapted to the reader." The Research and Analysis Branch constructed reports for a specified group of readers, which Hartshorn
described as 1) executives and planners, who must read the conclusions of a large number of reports without examining the evidence in detail; 2) research workers in other agencies; and 3) operating personnel in the field. In order to ensure the "sale" of the Branch's "product" to its readers, the writer of political reports was to make no interpretation, to leave all such judgements to the reader. The writer of political reports was not in any way to recreate the reader of the report. An OSS report was created to inform the reader—to provide data—not to be an experience of transformation somehow altering how the reader looked at and understood the world. When Hartshorn noted that "Proust, Joyce, or Gertrude Stein would all be equally out of place in R & A," he might have been referring to the transformative properties that their works represented. In defining the writer and reader of political intelligence reports, Hartshorn sought to remove all vestiges of the individual researcher, placing primacy upon the reader.

Primacy of the reader was explicitly evoked regarding questions of policy recommendation. Hartshorn understood his readers, the customers for the Branch's product, and recognized that if Research and Analysis was to have any impact on decision-making it would have to dampen the authority of its voice. Policy recommendations depended upon subjective interpretation, and Hartshorn warned that "This is a field in which R & A cannot claim—and most certainly no such claim would be recognized—a degree of competence superior to that of the policy-makers. Consequently, a tone of authority that may be acceptable in the writing of intelligence reports is entirely out of place in the presentation of policy recommendations." In constructing intelligence policy, the voice of the researcher was to defer to that of the decision-maker.

Many researchers— especially the emigre German social scientists— did not always meet the criteria for objective research established by Hartshorn and the Projects Committee, especially regarding the subject of the treatment of postwar Germany. Sherman
Kent, chief of the Europe-Africa Section, addressed the problems of objectivity in reporting on postwar Germany, and of the knotty problems it raised "requiring some basic analysis of the whole process of scientific thought in the social field." Kent defined "objective" in slightly different terms from Hartshorn, but with the same implications. Subjectivity—the perspective of the individual—was ever-present, but objectivity could be maintained provided there was "universal acceptance" of subjective assumptions. In the absence of complete objectivity, "this lack of absolute objectivity creates no difficulties because of universal agreement on the subjective elements."¹⁶

Universal agreement toward Germany, however, was lacking. "In particular," stated Kent, "we need to show more appreciation of the relative position of Germans compared with other peoples of the world."¹⁷ This meant, for example, that a deficiency of caloric intake may well be understood as a tragedy, if one were referring to Appalachia, but in the case of Germany, such an assumption would not be tolerated. "In a dozen other ways far less easily spotted, we are writing on the assumption that it is best that a people be well-fed, well-housed, efficient and prosperous. These assumptions are not permissible. I do not say they could not be defended as propositions, but they cannot be taken as assumptions with which the reader will agree."¹⁸ Here, again, the purpose of the report was to inform, but not to transform, the reader.

Kent did not allow these assumptions because of the effect they would have on the quality of the product:

The moment...that writers and readers are not in agreement on the subjective elements, there is conflict. Since the conflict is over attitudes not scientifically presented in the report, but merely assumed, the report itself does nothing to dissolve the conflict. On the contrary, the conflict may well kill the report in the mind of the reader; worse than that, it may infuriate him at the responsible author of the report. The responsible author of all our reports is the R&A Branch of OSS.¹⁹
Again, the individual researcher was subsumed under the anonymity of the report, the denial of his individual perspective and the strength of the R and A organization. The basis of measurement for the objectivity of a report rested with its reception by the reader, the decision-maker. Objectivity—while conceptualized in academic or scientific terms—in fact was constructed as a product of the asymmetrical relationship between the OSS and its clientele.

Images of the Future

Of the more important commodities created out of this system of information production, the Civil Affairs Guides were to provide information to the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, which would aid decision-makers in their deliberations over the fate of postwar Germany. Work on the Guides began early in 1944, and brought to the forefront of the R and A Branch the work of the Central European Section, which included prominent members of the emigre Frankfurt School for Social Research. The Guides are significant in that they suggest how the members of the Branch viewed postwar Germany, what sort of society was to emerge, what sort of democracy would be present, and how the Americans could shape a future Germany. Additionally, the production of the Guides revealed tensions between the information-production ideal established by the Branch, and the critical function of social science as practiced by the Frankfurt School; it also revealed tensions between the Americans and the Germans as to what a future democratic Germany was to look like. Construction of the Civil Affairs Guides led to clashes between writers and readers.

The final forms of the Guides reveal the priorities set by the Branch regarding how to effectively administer the occupation and democratization of postwar Germany. Twenty-four guides were produced, dealing with six areas of concern. Two guides addressed party politics
in postwar Germany, especially regarding the dissolution of the Nazi Party, and policies on the revival and reestablishment of new parties. A second group of guides focused on social relations, including the police, policies toward established groups and institutions and social security measures. A third group emphasized the German legal system, and dealt with the abrogation of Nazi laws, the creation of a penal law, property relations, hereditary law, and the structure and constitution of the courts. Another series concerned problems of administration, at the local, regional and national levels. A fifth group dealt with information and education, and focussed on propaganda organization, radio, the press, and the reorganization of primary, secondary and higher education. Finally three guides dealt with religion, and the questions of Jews in postwar Germany as well as relations with the Protestant and Catholic Churches. In addition to providing information to military government officers, the Guides subtly suggested the form and pattern of the occupation.

Precisely because of the importance of these reports clashes emerged as to the images of the ultimate future of Germany. As Barry Katz notes, political differences erupted between Americans and the Frankfurt School emigres over the construction of the Civil Affairs Guides, "for the Guides expressed long-range aspirations for the reconstruction of Germany that were not in harmony with the immediate objectives of other agencies involved in the project." Differences between the Germans and Americans stemmed, at one level, from differences in how information was to be constructed. Far from being practitioners of the "objective and neutral" information style preferred by the Branch, the Frankfurt School emigres informed their reporting with the neo-Marxist critical theory that distinguished the School. "Despite their nominal submission to the language, truth, and logic of the Projects Committee," writes Katz, "one can detect traces of the theoretical principles that framed even their most 'objectivistic'
The German members of the Rand A Branch did not always play the role of neutral and objective writer, as the OSS defined the terms.

This conflict between writer and reader is revealed in one report, prepared under the direction of Herbert Marcuse, which dealt with the resurrection of German parties after the war. The members of the Frankfurt School were in general agreement that the Left in Germany would play a significant role in overthrowing the Nazis, and would establish democracy in postwar Germany. This assumption was embedded in the first of the Civil Affairs Guides, which offered information on the revival and establishment of political parties in postwar Germany.

In form, the report conformed to the Projects Committee's standards for political reporting. The Forward to the Guide announced that the report "deals with policy towards political parties in post-war Germany exclusively from the point of view of the security of the occupying forces and the elimination of Nazism...Recommendations are made on the basis of these objectives only." Yet, within the Forward, one may detect a clash of subjective assumptions between writer and reader that Kent feared. Agreement could be reached on one subjective element: democracy was to be restored in Germany, and the report concurred with this objective:

It is assumed...that the elimination of Nazism, as one of the purposes of military occupation, includes the gradual restoration to the German people of the liberties necessary for the reconstruction of their society in a democratic form, which alone can eliminate the roots of Nazism in Germany. Accordingly, the parties and organizations which may be expected to oppose a democratic reconstruction of Germany are considered in relation to a possible revival of Nazism. What remained less clear was what sort of democracy would be restored to Germany.

For Marcuse, the chief architect of this report, this meant the ascendancy of the socialist parties. The report argued that as the war concluded and the Nazi party was gradually dismantled, political parties would resurface, perhaps with different names, but continuing to
represent traditional German social groups. The report identified three such groups: parties representing heavy industry, the landed aristocracy and finance; parties representing labor; and the Center Party. The parties of the Right were understood to be the bastions of anti-democratic forces, and would probably harbor former Nazis. Only the Left, and in particular the Social Democrats, would provide the democratic forces necessary to combat lingering Nazi sentiment.

Marcuse's report argued that the restoration of democracy in Germany could only be assured by relying on indigenous sources. As proof, he evoked the lessons of the First World War. "It is well to recall," the report cautioned, "that one of the reasons for the failure of an enduring peaceful reconstruction of German society after the First World War was the lack of recognition and support on the part of the occupation authorities of the new democratic forces and institutions which had arisen during the revolution...The consequences were that anti-democratic forces in the civil service and in the industrial leadership were encouraged and strengthened." The font of democracy in Germany could only be found with the Social Democrats.

What the report also made clear, however, was that the democracy advocated by the Social Democrats included not only political participation, but social equality. "The Social-Democratic Party," Marcuse argued, "throughout the period of the Weimar Republic, advocated what it termed political and social democracy. Its leaders in the government and in the trade unions accepted the prevailing social and economic system as the framework for their activities. They strove for a better position of labor within this state and society, and they opposed a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and a dictatorship of the proletariat." Social democracy implied not only political participation but also a certain economic and social egalitarianism. Herein lay a conflict between writer and reader over competing meanings of democracy.
To ensure the flowering of German social democracy, the report advocated strict controls over the parties which were antidemocratic. "The principle of equal treatment of all political parties will not be immediately applicable in post-war Germany," the report recommended. Nationalistic, Rightist groups would have to be closely supervised by the occupation authorities, for "To treat these equally with the anti-Nazi groupings...would be tantamount to perpetuating the greatest threat to the security of the occupying forces and to the restoration of a peaceful order."\(^\text{24}\)

The provision for unequal treatment of political parties created problems for the report. One reader, Ralph H. Gabriel, from the War Department, School of Military Government, questioned the efficacy of such a recommendation. "We are convinced," he wrote, "that military government...should adopt the policy and make it known to the German people that all political parties other than the eliminated Nazi Party will be under equal surveillance and supervision." He offered three reasons for this policy, first, that it "seems reasonable for military government to distrust all German political parties and therefore, to establish surveillance over them," and that particular favoritism shown to one party might delegitimate that party in the eyes of the Germans. The third reason Gabriel offered proved more interesting: "If the development of democracy is to be encouraged in a defeated Germany, it is desirable that the victor in his actions carry out the democratic principle of equality before the law."\(^\text{25}\) Both the writer--Marcuse--and the reader--Gabriel--evoked an image of democracy to legitimate a policy recommendation, even though both advocated radically different positions.

"Democracy" would prove to have multifaceted, elusive and contradictory meanings. As the occupation moved from the planning stages to implementation, such divergent meanings of democracy would become more commonplace. "To the German-born Senior Analysts," argues
Barry Katz, "it seemed obvious that the immediate security interests of American Military Government were fully at one with the long-range political objectives of the socialist opposition that was bound to surface as the war thundered to a close." And yet, this objective never materialized, with former Nazis eventually returning to positions of power in postwar Germany. The failure of the Americans to heed the advice of the Germans proves emblematic of the relationship that would be established between Americans and Germans in the occupation. Clashes would erupt over the definition of democracy, and whether its flowering would spring from native or imported sources. "Images of the future" relates not only to the picture of occupied Germany that was envisioned, but to the relationship between Germans and Americans.

Social Knowledge as a Nationalized Resource

An executive order dated September 20, 1945 terminated the Office of Strategic Services. In the year or so prior to this date, William Donovan--director of the OSS--Langer and others within the OSS sought to perpetuate its existence, pointing out the value a secret intelligence agency could play in peacetime. Donovan himself was among those in the OSS who saw the importance of social science research to intelligence gathering, its place in the war effort, and its potential benefits if properly applied to the needs of peacetime. A prominent debate arose at the conclusion of the war concerning the position of the social sciences in postwar American society, a debate which included the role of social science as strategic knowledge.

Donovan believed that the social sciences were indispensable to intelligence work, and sought their patronage by the federal government. He addressed the issue in a memorandum to Congress on the role of social science in government. "In your deliberations on the role of science in government," began Donovan:
I trust that you will not exclude from consideration the Social Sciences. By Social Sciences I refer to such systematic studies as economics, political science, sociology, history, and geography, which treat of man in his relationships with his community. I am confident that you will share the opinion which I here seek to express, namely, that the Social Sciences play a vital role both in the strategy of war, and in the strategy of peace, and that their encouragement is worthy of your sponsorship.

Donovan argued that success in war depended upon reliable information, and that this strategic necessity would also benefit the state in a time of peace.

In particular, the social sciences delivered a strategic commodity: knowledge. Donovan argued that:

Any strategy must be based on knowledge—knowledge of the geography and history of other countries, their political, social, and economic structures, their national psychology without which no analysis of their capabilities, aspirations, and probable intentions can be made. Lacking these estimates and the knowledge behind them, our future strategy of peace is likely to fail and our nation suffer. I submit, therefore, as I have often in the past, that the Government of the United States would be well advised to do all in its power to promote the development of knowledge in the field of Social Sciences.

In conjunction with these formal pleas to the federal government, the members of the Research and Analysis branch composed numerous branch histories, which sought to document the achievements of the Branch as proof of the performitivity of its work, and the efficacy of maintaining an intelligence network. The Branch highlighted its work in providing information on institutional structures, maps and other geographical information, and estimates of enemy capabilities, living standards and morale. The common thread, as Donovan had stressed, was the strategic function of social scientific knowledge. One such report stressed the strategic importance of the knowledge produced:

Strategy is something more than the procedure by which the national interest is defended by arms. The first aim of strategy is the preservation of national interests by means less wasteful than war. That there is a strategy of peace is well known, but that this strategy has intelligence requirements every bit as important as those of war is not so widely appreciated. The strategic intelligence of peace lies almost entirely in the field
of social sciences and has as its aim the composition of international difficulties without recourse to arms. In seeking to perpetuate and legitimate their existence, the social scientists of the Research and Analysis Branch sought to tie their lot to the rising power of the federal government in the patronage and control of science policy.

The bid to perpetuate the strategic role of social scientific knowledge constituted a part of a larger debate among social scientists as to their position in postwar American society. As was suggested earlier, American social science had been tending toward the goal of government patronage for most of the twentieth century, a tendency intensified as the result of the war experience. An important proponent of the close ties between the state and the social sciences was Talcott Parsons. Parsons saw greater potential for the social sciences than simply a strategic role. In an unpublished report prepared under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council, Parsons referred to the social sciences as "a basic national resource." Parsons saw little difference between the natural and social sciences, viewing both as important national resources which had to be mobilized as any other resource. At stake was the stability of modern society:

A certain modesty, indeed humility, should be central to the whole scientific point of view, and is certainly shared by the best of social scientists as of those of other fields. But with all due humility, many will feel that there is no other path to improvement in our social situation, to the mitigation of conflict, to reducing the danger of war, to the increase of prosperity and welfare, than through the application of careful empirical observation and careful theoretical analysis to the solution of social problems. The scientific point of view is probably the greatest hope of modern society and, if this hope is to be realized, it cannot be confined to one sector of the total field of science.

Parsons helped to define the agenda for American social science in the postwar era: the pursuit of its theoretical connections to the physical sciences and its service to government as an instrument of power and efficiency.
One historian has referred to this larger debate as "The Bid to Nationalize American Social Science." Largely under the guidance of the SSRC, social scientists sought a position for themselves in postwar American society. Given the successes of the natural sciences during the war and the enthusiasm generated for federal funding of scientific research, many social scientists feared being excluded from research funds, and therefore looked to the natural sciences for their model of behavior. "The social scientists' own wartime experiences in large-scale organizational research," argues Samuel Z. Klausner, "and their intimate views of the government's own data-gathering activities, offered a vision of social science as sociographics, requiring large-scale data gathering. The same experience opened their eyes to the possibility of social science outside the university."

Social scientists arrived at a rough consensus, of a future tethered to federal research funds. Disagreement arose, however, in deciding how their role would be specifically defined. Within the hierarchy of the SSRC, three views of the role of the social scientist emerged: as agents of information production, as policy-makers, or as commentators of society, hovering above politics as social critics. Few social scientists, however, denied that social science belonged within the newly emerging political economy of federal science funding. "The nationalization of the social sciences," notes Klausner, "the harnessing of the field not simply for human betterment but to the service of the state, was a road to money and influence, to usefulness and social acceptance. The natural sciences and engineering had already traded some of their international ties and freedom of publication for such acceptance. Social science and the humanities were eager to follow." Just as OSS writers deferred to policy-making readers, social scientists sought to bow to the wishes of the state, in exchange for federal largess.
The economist Philip Mirowski uses the term "physics envy" to describe the economists' obsession—and we might include the whole of American social science—with achieving the methodological status of the physical sciences. This term might well apply to an obsession with the institutionalization of social research as well. Although social scientists lack the supercomputers and particle colliders that are normally associated with "big science," many leading social-research centers now involve several elements of the 'big science' pattern, mainly the administrative trappings such as team projects, bureaucracies, laboratories and computing centers. Whether or not social scientists have missed the mark in achieving equal status with the natural scientists, they continue to pattern themselves on the model of "big science." In casting their lot with federal funding and service to government service, American social scientists forfeited other means of expression.

The sociologist Susan Krieger offers some interesting thoughts on other means of expression in social science, which offer an arresting contrast to the vision of knowledge, of objectivity, of purpose that has been pursued by American social scientists, and especially those of the R and A Branch. Objectivity, within the R and A Branch, referred to the process of eliminating all vestiges of the observer, the individual, the writer from the creation of knowledge. In many important ways, this reflects a persistent means of expression in social scientific writing. Krieger writes of a social science that reflects the views of the individual:

The social science disciplines tend to view the self of the social scientific observer as a contaminant. The self—the unique inner life of the observer—is treated as something to be separated out, neutralized, minimized, standardized, and controlled...My central argument...is that the contaminant view of the self is something we ought to alter. I think we ought to develop our different individual perspectives more fully in social science, and we ought to acknowledge, more honestly than we do, the extent to which our studies are reflections of our inner lives.
For Krieger, knowledge is a form of self-discovery, a dialogue with the external world, and not a means of efficient control of that external world. This contrast with the vision of knowledge expressed by Kent and Hartshorn, in the reception of the Frankfurt School, in the manner in which social scientific knowledge fits within the goals of "big science," reveals a latent Faustian element in the nationalization of American social science. In being lured to the power and money of government service, social scientists forfeited the self, and forfeited other ways of seeing social scientific knowledge. Krieger suggests that writers of social scientific knowledge need to be as active, as responsible, as their readers.

The Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services proved to be a microcosm, for the future of American social science and its relationship to Germany. As American habits of thought regarding social science were hardening around the "big science" vision and the belief in the superiority of objective practical knowledge, they tended to exclude all other visions. Many social scientists would carry this vision to Germany, as advisors to the occupation government, or as information-producers. These intellectual and institutional blinders frustrated American efforts at Americanizing German social science, and Americanizing German democracy.
Notes


3Buck, 221.


6Smith, 361.

7Ibid., 368.

8Katz, 14.

9Smith, 363.


11Ibid., 2-3.

12Ibid., 10.


14Hartshorn, 10.

15Ibid., 14.


17Ibid., 4.

18Ibid., 2.

19Ibid.

20Katz, 44-45.


22Ibid., 1-2.

23Ibid., 12-13.
24Ibid., 22-23.


26Katz, 49.


28Ibid., 4.


33Ibid., 11-17.

34Ibid., 11.


Chapter III
Efficiency, Democracy and the Vorgeschichte of the
Federal Republic

Just as their counterparts in the OSS, social scientists in the occupation of Germany lacked the ability to directly implement policy at the highest levels of military government, such power rested with military men. Consequently, historical perceptions of the occupation have been structured by the thoughts of military personnel and by the examination of military records, most notably the records of the Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone (OMGUS). Examining the thoughts of social scientists enhances our picture of the occupation experience, and the encounter between American and German culture.

Since the occupation has been narrated largely through the voice of American military authorities, the significance of the Laenderrat—the first postwar German administrative organization—has been viewed within the context of American policy objectives. The circumstances surrounding the creation of the German Council of States, or Laenderrat, are well documented. As a result of the lack of agreement at the Control Council level, the difficulties of the Military Government in administering the occupied territories and the dire need for action at the local level, General Eisenhower issued a directive on 5 October 1945 which sought the "Coordination of German Laender Governments and Special Administrative Services in the American Zone." Less than a month later, on 1 November 1945, Eisenhower authorized the formation of the Regional Government Coordinating Office. The RGCO, an agency of the Military Government, was to provide "uniformity of administration within the U.S. Zone by insuring coordination of the activities of the
Regional Governments of Bavaria, Great-Hesse and Wuerttemberg-Baden.¹ Until its formal termination in October 1949 the Laenderrat was the only effective civil administrative organ for the U.S. Zone, and the blueprint for civil administration of Bizonia. Beyond reestablishing administration in the US Zone, the Laenderrat sought to return some measure of authority and responsibility to the Germans.

In practice, the Laenderrat functioned as an administrative arm of the Military Government, which sought to coordinate civil administration between the three states of the American zone. Administrative matters were presented to the three Minister-Presidents of the Laender by the occupation authorities, usually the deputy military governor, General Lucius D. Clay, at intervals of about one month. These matters were debated by the Minister-Presidents, then referred to committees, which would act on these recommendations. In the early days of the organization’s existence, such administrative matters centered on economic problems, food and transportation, and, eventually, more complex matters such as health, housing, education and even the denazification laws.

By June 1946, the work of the Laenderrat had bulged so greatly that enormous strain was placed upon the Minister-Presidents and their relatively small staffs, threatening administrative efficiency. Thus, the institution was expanded to include a directorate, which met more frequently than the Minister-Presidents. The directorate sifted through details before presentation to the Laenderrat and was given the authority to act on urgent administrative matters. Additionally, the Laenderrat would grow into sixty-four committees and subcommittees to handle the growing burdens of civil administration.

In 1947, a twenty-four member parliamentary council was added to the organization of the Laenderrat. The Minister-Presidents had been appointed by the military government, thus breaching a democratic protocol. The formation of the Parliamentary Council sought to correct
this lack of democratic procedure by representing the interests of political parties within the state legislatures. The decisions of the Parliamentary Council on matters before the Laenderrat was strictly advisory, although closely followed by the Minister-Presidents.

The RGCO existed alongside the Laenderrat, serving as a liaison between OMGUS and the Laenderrat, and between the Laenderrat and the military governments of the three Laender. The director of the RGCO answered to General Clay directly, and thus functioned as a conduit of recommendations from the military government to the Germans.²

While the story of the creation and purpose of the Laenderrat is well understood, the meaning and significance of the Laenderrat in the larger context of the history of the occupation and its relationship to the broader contours of German history remain more problematic. Some historians, in particular John Gimbel, have viewed the Laenderrat solely as an instrument of U.S. policy objectives, and thus as an artifact of the occupation.³ In his memoirs, Lucius Clay contended that, while it was important to resurrect administration, the Laenderrat itself was not a democratic institution. "We had set the stage for democratic government," said Clay, "but had given it no life. Administration in itself was only a means to an end, the creation of responsible German government."⁴ In the 1970's however, and especially with the opening of the OMGUS collection to the scrutiny of historians, several West Germans sought to place the origins, or Vorgeschichte of the Federal Republic, with the creation of federal self-government that the Laenderrat represented.

An interesting perspective on this question comes from the chief architect of the Laenderrat and the first director of the RGCO, University of Michigan political scientist James K. Pollock. As a special advisor to General Clay, it was Pollock who suggested the idea of a council of the German Laender to deal more efficiently with administrative difficulties. As a result of his intimacy with the
Laenderrat, Pollock expressed great satisfaction and gratitude for its successes. This satisfaction derived from Pollock’s quest for administrative efficiency, not simply as a tool of military government policy objectives, but as the fundamental basis of strong democratic government and the chief obligation of the political scientist. However, Pollock did not see such administrative efficiency imposed upon the Germans; rather, he viewed the Laenderrat as a revival of German governmental institutions he had observed in the 1920’s and 1930’s. Pollock understood that the Americans could bring about democratization in Germany only by resurrecting that which already existed in German culture. “Democratization” did not always mean “Americanization”; Pollock was clearer about this idea than most American social scientists who worked in Germany.

The Political Scientist as Efficiency Expert

Pollock built his career prior to the war around his reputation as an expert on government administration, especially regarding elections and campaign finance. His overarching concern focused on efficiency as the hallmark of good democratic government. Pollock at one time characterized himself as a “mugwump,” referring to the group of reformers of American government in the presidency of Grant who sought, among other things, civil service reform. Pollock’s self-characterization fit well into the ideal of the political scientist as a reformer, as a source of expert information and advocate of efficiency in government that characterized the “Americanization” of the social sciences.

The leitmotif of reform of democratic practice and procedure ran all through Pollock’s government service and scholarly publications. In 1924, he was called upon as an expert witness by the Borah Committee investigating the regulation of campaign expenditures. Campaign
finance was the subject of Pollock's first published work, *Party Campaign Funds*. Pollock sought to bring the light of science to the question of campaign finance, for "if party funds go unregulated there is great likelihood that the very springs of public policy will not escape contamination." Pollock created a source of reliable information intended for public consumption and public action. "When once it is generally understood," concluded Pollock, "that political campaigns under present standards are expensive, and that it is most important to scrutinize the sources of party revenue, as well as the details of party expenditure; and when complete publicity of party funds is enforced, and an interested electorate stands ready to support the parties financially—then, and not until then, will the political millennium arrive." 

Pollock's work included service to Michigan state government. In 1935, he was named the head of the Michigan Civil Service Study Committee, the results of which led, in 1937, to the enactment of Michigan's civil service law. Pollock—the "father of Michigan's civil service"—again sought to bring efficiency to democratic procedure. Pollock also participated in the University of Michigan's Bureau of Government studies of Michigan political institutions and practices. The purpose of this series of monographs was to provide "citizens of Michigan and other interested persons with information on leading government problems," with great care taken "to state all of the pertinent facts with fullness and accuracy and to draw conclusions with scientific impartiality and fairness." Pollock's first contribution was a case study of voting behavior in the city of Ann Arbor. His concern was not to document party preference as such, but to establish general relationships about voting behavior, and to discern their significance for the practice of democracy.

Pollock's concern for efficient democratic institutions was not limited to the United States. Grants from the Social Science Research
Council and the University of Michigan financed trips to Europe between 1927 and 1930 to observe conditions in England, the Irish Free State, France and Germany, with special regard to party political finance. This series of trips provided Pollock with his first contact with German political institutions. The case of Germany particularly intrigued Pollock, for "Germany has...been more or less plunged into the welter of democracy, and it is exceedingly interesting to observe how this intelligent and powerful nation has worked out its democratic salvation." Pollock noted, with some disdain, that the problems of money and politics were particularly acute in Germany. "In this new Republic," reported Pollock, "there have developed tendencies which can only be inimical to the public interest in the long run. When banks and corporations are able to control political parties, and when a few men because of their contributions are able to dictate party policies, it is time to sound a warning."11

This did not suggest that all German political parties were corrupt. Pollock praised the Social Democrats in particular for "working out a system of financing its activities which may well be held up to the entire world as a model of public virtue and efficiency." In particular, the Social Democrats had developed a system of party finance which relied on the contributions of all members. The Social Democrats realized "that money is power, but they have desired and succeeded in developing a system which is not only productive, but secures the cooperation of the rank and file of the party. The contribution of no one member or no group of members is powerful enough to control the policy of the party."12 As with his studies in Michigan, Pollock's concern was not on party policy per se, but on the efficiency in carrying out the democratic ideal.

Consequently, Pollock witnessed other facets of the German political system which merited praise. Although Pollock believed proportional representation to be a destabilizing mechanism, he had high
praise for the system of German elections. He reported high voter turnout at the elections he witnessed and that "neither effort nor expense is spared to arouse the voters to activity and voting, and when the electorate has spoken, the decision is accurately translated into legislative representation." In particular, Pollock singled out the election administration as "honest and very efficient." In 1934, Pollock dealt with the subject of "German Election Administration" in a monograph for a Columbia series on German political institutions. This study delved deeper into the structure of electoral procedure than in his previous work, and touched on themes of organization, registration, polling places, costs and the system of proportional representation. In the end, Pollock gave high marks to the institution:

This study of the German election system has given added luster to the German bureaucracy. It has demonstrated the efficiency of the German administrative system in meeting the test of a complicated electoral system. It has shown that economical, efficient and honest elections have obtained in Germany under the Republic, and that proportional representation has been only a qualified success. Fraud, extravagance and politics have not entered into German election administration, and the needs of democratic government have been met fairly well.

Again, party and policy considerations played but a small role in Pollock’s assessment. When referring to the election of November 12, 1933, Pollock noted that "Even though there was no doubt concerning the outcome of the election, the small percentage of abstention and dissent were a great tribute to the ideology and political strategy of the National Socialist government. Such success has never met the efforts of any other government in Germany." Although this statement did not translate into support for the National Socialists--Pollock was distrustful of them--it nevertheless points to Pollock’s overarching concern for efficient institutions as the preeminent goal of government. “Now that democratic government has disappeared in Germany,” Pollock noted, “elections are not so important. But it is interesting to find that they have been utilized by a dictatorship and that their
administration has at least continued to be smooth, economical and efficient. Good election administration has served both a democratic and an autocratic master."¹⁶

The Laenderrat and the Resurrection of Efficient Administration

Because of his knowledge of German institutions, Pollock was summoned by the U.S. government to serve as an advisor to the military government. As he arrived in July 1945, he recalled in his diary:

Arrived here before noon after a two hours' flight from Paris where I had spent two pleasant days following my flight from Washington. I came in response to a State Department and War Department invitation which said "there was urgent need for outstanding men who know Germany." My passport calls me a "Special Advisor to the American Group Control Council for Germany," and my official appointment calls me a "Special Assistant to Ambassador Murphy" who is General Eisenhower's Political Adviser. It was understood in my conversations with General Hilldring and the State Department that I am to deal with government and politics at the top level of Control Council activities. It is a challenging opportunity and I am happy to play a humble part in a great experiment--to try to govern a nation of sixty million people who have brought ruin not only to their own country but to the whole continent.¹⁷

Pollock's position within the structure of the military government was to be brigadier general and a VIP. His duties were not to include administrative matters; officers and aides were appointed to deal with such matters. General Walter Bedell Smith, the Director of the Division of Civil Administration, informed Pollock that he would be permitted to formulate plans, to think, to advise. "It is my job, he said," recalled Pollock, "to work out a plan by which over a period of years the structure of German government can be rebuilt and the German people prepared for democratic self-government."¹⁸

Pollock's plan for the resurrection of German civil administration had been formulated by his experiences in the 20's and 30's and were subsequently developed in the months prior to the war's conclusion. Pollock articulated these ideas in an article written in 1944 for the
American Political Science Review. Above all else, Pollock argued that coordinated action among the occupying powers was the most critical facet of any occupation of Germany. "Our previous experience in such matters," counseled Pollock, "should teach us the value of unified action. It would be most unfortunate if we repeated the mistakes of the Rhineland occupation, where instead of one over-all administrative authority in the three zones of occupation, we had three different administrations...Such [an over-all] governing commission would then be in a position to secure the uniform control of the whole country regardless of what nation's troops are occupying a particular area."19 Thus, cooperation among the occupying powers remained crucial, above all, for effective administration of Germany.

With cooperation assured at the top, Pollock proposed a system of regional administration which would allow for the stable administration of Germany. "It needs to be emphasized," argued Pollock, "that the occupying powers are at liberty to divide up Germany in any way that will promote proper administration and effective military and political control." To be successful, such an administrative arrangement would have to take into account the historical geography of Germany:

Since Germany, even in modern times, has never been logically divided for political or administrative purposes, it is now possible for the great powers to demonstrate their wisdom and international statesmanship by creating a pattern of occupation of Germany which, with such alterations as experience dictates, would be well calculated to serve as the territorial foundation for a new German government, once the Nazis are eradicated and the German people are again enabled and empowered to create their own system of self-government.20

To that end, Pollock proposed a pattern of military occupation which featured nine "political and administrative regions." These regions conformed as closely as possible to long standing cultural, political and administrative regions and had the advantage of bringing order and logic to the system of regional government in Germany "as well as the possibilities of future efficient administrative organization."21 Pollock was sensitive to German cultural and political geography. Any
hopes of democratizing Germany had to come from within German culture, and not imposed from the outside by Americans.

The situation Pollock encountered in Germany, however, did not fit the plans he had envisioned before his arrival. Pollock encountered problems which would subsequently alter the image he had of a self-governing democratic Germany. The first of these dealt with the territorial administrative entities the military governments drew up. Pollock’s territorial units were based on a three-power occupation which did not include the French. The admission of the French to the Control Council level meant territorial responsibilities which were not to Pollock’s liking. "I definitely do not like the boundaries of the American zone," Pollock would recall, "especially the perfectly silly cutting up of both Wuerttemberg and Baden by giving the French the southern portions of those two states which have always been the most democratic in all of Germany...I learn the Baden-Wuerttemberg line was drawn where it is because the SHAEM transportation men were principally interested in making sure that the Autobahn was in our zone! Administrative and political boundaries apparently meant nothing!" 22 Here, Pollock had his first encounter with the realities of the occupation versus his preconceptions of a future Germany: Pollock’s wisdom would go unheeded—a fate that befell many social scientists—and military authorities would not look to preexisting German institutions for sources of democracy.

Pollock’s attention turned toward the administration of the Hessian area. One of Pollock’s earliest tasks was to formulate a plan for the administration of this territory. "Due to the allocation of Hessian territory to the French, the smashing of Kassel, the former provincial capital, the American Military headquarters in Frankfurt, there is much confusion in this area in many fields. Recommended a unification of the whole area into one Land government. I came to grips for the first time with a real problem of the occupation." 23 In reality, embedded here
were several problems. First, such an administrative unit was not apart of the territorial pattern Pollock had envisioned. Second, administrative difficulties slowed the process of implementation. The memorandum was favorably received and implemented, but not without delay. "It is unfortunate," thought Pollock, "that an agreed solution has been held up at high levels and a number of unnecessary administrative difficulties will be created. When the Germans themselves want to combine the two Hessens, and the best advice is supporting the move, why can't the right decision be made." By September, the administrative structure had yet to be fully worked out, causing Pollock to create another memo on Hesse. This time, the tone of Pollock's recollection was clearly different. "This time I argued for the consolidation of the two Hessen areas on grounds of developing a new state which could be a strong unit in a new federal Germany. Also because all responsible German officials supported it." This example points toward a change in Pollock's thought which would shape the rest of his time in Germany: that the problem of creating an efficient administrative structure in Germany would need a federal solution and would have to involve the Germans.

Pollock's vision of an occupied Germany relied on complete cooperation among the Allied powers. Upon visiting the site of the four-power Control Council meetings in Berlin, Pollock observed that "four flagpoles were erected in the front of the building. Four switchboards were provided for communications. This is indeed a great experiment in international cooperation. This aspect of the occupation has far greater consequences than whether we handle Germany satisfactorily. But if we are able to work out a basis of real cooperation, the tasks of occupation will necessarily be dealt with in a more efficient and prompt manner." Such cooperation, of course, was not forthcoming. The story of Allied disagreement is well documented,
but for Pollock the lack of agreement at the top meant problems of administration at the local and zonal levels.

Pollock singled out the French as slowing the process of resurrecting German administration. Not only had the division of Baden and Wuerttemberg created administrative hassles, but French policies toward Germany were similarly making the job of governing Germany next to impossible. Pollock recalled a meeting with an unidentified ambassador. "He told me the French were objecting to the setting up of central departments in Berlin under the Control Council with State Secretaries to head them up. They want another name for the top German official—Staatssekretaer sounds to them too much like a revival of German government, and they want to fight this at every step." It is just this sort of structure that Pollock will propose for the U.S. zone. Here, again, Pollock saw that rebuilding Germany could only be achieved by rebuilding those facets of German culture that were democratic. Thus, for a political scientist who praised efficient government, the French position could not be defended. "Fundamentally," argued Pollock, "I believe the French desire dismemberment of Germany—a position which if persisted in may wreck any constructive plans for rebuilding Germany."27

Pollock also encountered inefficiencies within the structure of the American occupation. Mention has been made of Pollock's troubles in receiving action on his proposals for Hesse, which revealed a central problem for Pollock. Confusion over proper authority over Germany was not assured prior to the formation of OMGUS, which made the business of effectively governing Germany that much more difficult. "Found out for myself," recalled Pollock, "how difficult it is for MG Officers to function because of interference by tactical officers who always outrank MG Officers. A very contentious [sic] Captain was nearly breaking down because he found himself stopped at so many points from doing what should be done."28 Pollock lamented in one of his entries:
Organizational problems today. Talked with Mr. Fish, General Clay's organization expert and later with General Smith and Ambassador Murphy about procedures to assure proper consideration being given to problems of government and politics on which the success of the occupation primarily depends. I do not find much difference of opinion among thinking people here about what should be done to assure an efficient occupation. But it is certainly difficult to get certain things done. With twice as large a personnel as is needed and with every resource at their disposal, the powers that be can't accomplish very much. USFET is still issuing policy directives and Germany after three months is still languishing in chaos so far as the population is concerned. Maybe things will begin to happen once the Group Hdq. are put in shape and everyone shakes down in his job. I hope, I hope, I hope.29

This entry exemplifies Pollock's sense of growing administrative disorder as well as his near desperation at seeing the process of governing Germany begun.

Pollock's answer to the problems he witnessed was twofold: allow the Germans to resume responsibility for their own administrative affairs and simplify the process of civil administration. Pollock especially praised the British, for they "were accomplishing more than we were largely because they let the Germans do the work, and make them accept full responsibility."30 Two days after this entry, Pollock would be given the chance to see these ideas put into effect in the American zone.

Pollock's meeting on September 27, 1945 with General Clay was important for a variety of reasons, not the least of which in cementing a strong relationship of mutual admiration. Pollock recalled the meeting:

General Clay asked me to see him this morning ostensibly to hear about the Bremen situation, but actually I found, to talk about all aspects of the occupation. He seemed quite different to me than when I last talked with him. He said: "Doctor, how do you think we're doing?" This enabled me to raise a number of important points. With remarkable perception and a keen ability to grasp your point, General Clay listened attentively, argued quite a bit, and came to a number of quick decisions. In fact his lightning like propensity to action made me very cautious in suggestion. Out of the conference came two important orders--given to General Smith and me later in the day. General Clay had thought over what I discussed with him, was ready for action, and bingo, the orders were given. First, a plan to hand over the running of the government to the Germans--
to get Mil. Govt. out of the position of governing into
the position it ought to occupy, namely one of supervision.
This means working out a feasible plan of withdrawing
functional experts from the localities in order to prevent
local interference by us with the German chain of
authority in civil government. The second suggestion of
mine which General Clay wanted put into a directive is
to work out a plan to pull together the present disparate
parts of the government structure in the American zone. In
other words, to pull the states together and to get the
various special administrative services working in unison.
Both of these subjects are of the most vital importance and
when the directives can be worked out and put into effect
we will have taken perhaps the greatest step forward yet
made in our occupation.31

This meeting set into motion the Laenderrat.
The first meeting of the group which was to become the Laenderrat
occurred on October 17, 1945, a conference of the Minister-Presidents
who had been selected by the military authorities to run the newly
formed state governments. General Clay was in attendance and issued the
directives to the Minister-Presidents. After issuing the directives,
Clay withdrew, leaving Walter Dorn, Roger Wells and Pollock to work out
details with the Germans. Pollock noted that "it was a most gratifying
experience because it was an earnest of German cooperation, and a
remarkable demonstration of German administrative capacity." Pollock
seemed to be expressing delight, or relief perhaps, at seeing the
prospect of efficient government returning to Germany, at least in the
U.S. Zone. Pollock placed great significance on the meeting,
significance that he only dimly realized at this stage:

This Council of Minister-Presidents and the Secretariat
set up under them may well prove to be of vast importance.
The meeting held in friendly Wuerttemberg and participated
in by three able Minister-Presidents recently inducted into
office, has historical significance. It marks a turning
point in our relations with the Germans; we are now placing
the responsibility squarely on their shoulders. Furthermore
we have now in a sense put a capstone on the structure of
government in our zone.32

Pollock's praise for the Laenderrat grew, not only because of his
proximity to its work, but because of the efficiency it had introduced
into the U.S. Zone. "I've been evaluating the work of the Laenderrat
during its first two months," Pollock recalled. "Although it has
received little or no attention in the press, its achievements are very gratifying. Take for instance only the three most important matters which General Clay presented to them for solution, namely the problem of working out a plan to receive two and a quarter million evacuees; the problem of taking over the operation of the railways; and the problem of a uniform de-nazification law for the whole zone...no one can accuse German officials of backing away from their responsibilities.\textsuperscript{33}

Slowly, Pollock's perception of the Laenderrat was shifting, from a stopgap measure, to a solid basis of government for the U.S. zone.

This tendency was reinforced in Pollock's assessment of New Year's Day. "I begin the New Year with a mixture of doubts and hopes," began Pollock.

If the stalemate in Berlin can be broken and Germany can be treated as an economic unit, then great progress can be made this year...I cannot avoid saying that the developments here in Stuttgart have played a big part in expediting the strengthening of German government, and in directing military government into more proper channels. I look back on the past two months as very gratifying to me personally because I have seen with my own eyes how much has been done because German abilities have been released and properly guided--not interfered with and restrained.\textsuperscript{34}

Here, again, Pollock revealed an important element of his thinking about the Germans. The Laenderrat--and perhaps the occupation itself--was not a matter of imposing an American democratic structure upon the Germans, but of resurrecting and shaping facets of German culture which had already been present. Germany was not to be built, but rebuilt from elements within its society, albeit with American direction. "If Germany cannot be rebuilt from the center," argued Pollock, referring to international agreement,"may be it can pull itself together as our three states have pulled themselves together in the Laenderrat. The next few months will tell. I have suggested the extension of the idea of interstate cooperation to the other zones.\textsuperscript{35} Pollock was coming to realize that a federal structure might be the best structure of administration for Germany.
The success of the Laenderrat seemed to reinforce the idea of a federal structure to form the basis of a future German government. "The Secretary General of the Laenderrat, a former Reichstag Deputy of the Social Democratic Party just told me that he was finding his position the most interesting assignment he had ever had," reported Pollock. Every decision he said involved a reappraisal of the basis of German government, its administrative procedures, and all the political implications. He is of course in the middle of all the pulling and hauling between Bavaria and the two other states. He can see the difficulties in rebuilding a new Germany on a sound federal basis. But a good start in this direction is being made under the Laenderrat. I have suggested that our three states as now organized meet with the states composing the other international zones, and thus lay the foundation for a working federal system. What Pollock offered was new in procedure, but not new in spirit, as local and regional government had always played a vital role in German political life, a role dampened only by Hitler. Nevertheless, it was quite clear that in its first few months of operation, the Laenderrat had grown in stature and significance for the American occupation forces and for the future administrative direction of Germany. And for Pollock, the Laenderrat received his highest praise. In discussing the Laenderrat with the Minister-President of Bavaria, Dr. Wilhelm Hoegner, Pollock assured him that "the Laenderrat was not a sinister super-government, and that it had not only added to his and Bavaria's stature, but that it had made government in the zone more efficient."

The Laenderrat was not the only democratic institution which occupied Pollock's attention. He also kept close attention on the resurrection of elections in the U.S. zone. In his earlier travels to Germany, Pollock had been interested in elections and praised German electoral efficiency. However, Pollock had argued against early elections in the U.S. zone against the wishes of Clay. "I think the idea [of early elections] is thoroughly unsound," Pollock stated simply, "because I don't think the Germans should be rushed into democratic elections." Nevertheless, by January 1946, Pollock had been convinced of the efficacy of early elections:
It was extremely gratifying to note the efficiency of the whole election machinery and the undoubted interest of the German voters. They knew what they were doing and did it with some enthusiasm...Without question these early elections have been justified. The whole process of government has been speeded up and a sound beginning in the revival of democratic institutions has been made.\textsuperscript{40}

If efficiency was the yardstick of effective democratic government, then Pollock observed the resurrection of that administrative efficiency in the form of elections and the Laenderrat.

The success of the Laenderrat and the elections enhanced Pollock's belief that the occupation would be better served with a laissez-faire approach; to let the Germans develop democratic practices on their own with a minimum of American interference, a position many Americans would not share. Pollock reported on a conversation with the Minister-President of Wuerttemberg-Baden Dr. Rheinhold Maier:

If anyone thinks the Germans are deficient in organization and management problems, they have another thing coming. I was amused to learn that the Minister-Presidents had decided to put a time limit on the grant of powers they are giving to the new Direktorium which is to serve as an interim committee between sessions of the Laenderrat. I had told them in our private conversations on Monday that if they were afraid to make a grant of powers, that a good American democratic device was to put a time limit upon the exercise of power. This they have done, limiting the power to the period up to December 31, 1946. I was interested to have Dr. Maier point out how the new Direktorium can proceed by majority vote, which decision becomes effective unless a Minister-President interposes a veto within three days. What a paradise it is for a political scientist to observe these embryo democratic developments.\textsuperscript{41}

For a political scientist who sought efficient administrative machinery, this indeed must have been paradise. More importantly, Pollock's observation points to the fact that some Germans possessed the propensity for democratic action, with the Americans providing the direction for action. More than many American social scientists in the occupation, Pollock was willing to trust the German propensity for democratic behavior.

While the Americans could offer direction, Pollock argued against the imposition of American culture over the Germans, for what he believed to be witnessing was the resurrection of longstanding
democratic traditions. Pollock—commenting on a discussion concerning a future German banking system with Joseph Dodge, Clay's financial advisor—lamented that "I am afraid that he [Dodge] is carrying over his knowledge of American political conditions and making the assumption that similar political conditions will prevail in Germany—an assumption which is quite incorrect. We can go far in imposing our ideas on the Germans, but I think it is fatuous to believe that we can completely alter the whole economic and cultural pattern...I never have felt that we could do very much ourselves to change the German culture pattern. I feel that all we can do is to create the moral climate and the political environment within which the Germans themselves can adjust to new situations." Pollock seemed to suggest that several "Germanies" existed, including a Germany of efficient democratic administration which, if enhanced by institutions such as the Laenderrat, could produce a lasting democratic tradition. Pollock implicitly understood the resilience of German culture and sought to work within it.

As Pollock's tour of duty in Germany neared its conclusion, the process of administrative resurrection in the American zone seemed well established. However, Pollock continued to believe that a centralized structure of administration was necessary in Germany, although not under the specifications of the Potsdam agreement. "At this stage," Pollock commented, "Germany needs a central government which can be supervised by the Control Council. The steps proposed at Potsdam were necessary then, they are utterly inadequate now and I hope the foreign ministers during their conferences in Paris will not only be able to settle the problem of the Ruhr and the status of the western German boundaries, but will also come up with a new approach in administering occupied Germany." An intermediate solution involved the merger of the American and British zones. Although Pollock chafed at the administrative dissonance between the two zones, he bowed to the administrative necessity of Bizonia.
According to Pollock, it was the British occupation authorities and their German administrators who approached the Americans about extending the administrative model of the Laenderrat across the zonal boundary. "A minute which has just come to my hand from the British Zone," Pollock recorded,

describing discussions which took place in the second meeting of their Zonal Advisory Council contains a very interesting observation by Dr. Steltzer, Oberpräsident of Schleswig-Holstein. Dr. Steltzer, in urging administrative reconstruction in the British zone, stated that this was a central problem to which a reasonable answer had been found. He said that it was not just a question of administration, but of the final political structure of Germany. He added that what was needed was not a theoretical solution, but a formula in accordance with German historical and administrative tradition. He referred to the meeting in Stuttgart on 6 February at which time the administrative heads of the provinces in the British Zone had expressed their views. It is encouraging to find such an eminent administrator being impressed with what we have done here in the American Zone and urging similar action in the British Zone.

Again, Pollock's thoughts on the Laenderrat seemed confirmed, that this structure worked since it conformed to long-standing German traditions, making it legitimate as the basis of a future federal German structure.

Still, Pollock was reluctant to see a union of the two zones. Pollock would remember a dinner with General Balfour, in which the subject of a zonal merger was addressed, where Pollock concluded that "the more we talked, the more convinced I became of the practical difficulty in amalgamating two utterly dissimilar administrative systems." This presented a problem to Pollock: union of the two systems could prove to be administratively disastrous, and yet some steps had to be taken to centralize the process of governing Germany. Pollock opted for the latter. In discussions with Clay, Pollock "point[ed] out all the possible dangers and pitfalls and also my general conclusion that there is little to be gained, even by a successful merger. Of course, I feel that we have to go through with it. Nevertheless, if we cannot join up our two zones, diverse as they
are, how are we ever going to set up a central government involving all four zones?"

Pollock's first tour of duty ended on August 18, 1946. He would return again, between May and July of 1948, but in a less busy capacity. His last few entries in his 1946 diary suggested great satisfaction at the administrative efficiency of the Laenderrat, its usefulness as a model for bizonal administration and its potential for a future Germany. Upon his return in 1948, Pollock noted with pleasure that the French had finally observed the efficacy of the Laenderrat and had formed one in their own zone. Nevertheless, Pollock understood that the institution he had helped create could not last in its present form. "It is, of course," Pollock wrote in 1948, "only a matter of time until the Laenderrat will have to go out of existence and be merged in a larger governmental organization for the three zones." Pollock seemed to have sensed, however, a deeper level of significance for the Laenderrat.

At the dinner with Balfour, Pollock and the General had clashed over competing notions of democracy. "General Balfour brushed me the wrong way," Pollock had complained,

when he implied that there was nothing democratic about what we were doing in the Laenderrat, meaning that our Ministers President were not popularly elected. Coming from a responsible British officer who, with his colleagues, have done almost nothing to revive democratic procedures in their own zone, I could not restrain myself from replying, with some heat, I fear, that, although there could not be anything democratic about Military Government, that, actually, we had progressed very far toward the re-establishment, both of democratic procedures and the development of democratic thinking in the American Zone, not to mention the whole cycle of democratic elections through which we have come.

This clash reveals a crucial element of the occupation: that several notions, models and images of democracy were carried to Germany. Judgements concerning the degree of democratization must be understood as the result of differing perspectives on the nature and purpose of democracy.
Pollock's image of democracy was that of efficient procedures and institutions, a trait he had noted in the Weimar period, in the early days of the Nazi regime as well as with his own Laenderrat. Pollock also observed efficient procedures in the successor state to the military government, the Federal Republic. In describing the elections of 1953, Pollock would note that "as it is, the second German parliament, and a strong government now responsible to it, are functioning efficiently as genuine representative institutions." From Pollock's perspective, efficient democratic procedure remained a deep continuity of German administration from Weimar to the Federal Republic, which could not be imposed from without by the Americans.

The Vorgeschichte of the Federal Republic

Unlike Lucius Clay, James Pollock believed efficient administration was more than a means to an end; it was the basis of solid democratic government. Efficiency defined Pollock's conception of political science and how to improve democratic government. Thus, Pollock's concern for efficiency in Germany was grounded in a wider and deeper perspective than just the effective implementation of American policy; it meant the resurrection of the efficiency he witnessed during the Weimar and even the Nazi periods, a return to solid democratic practice, and a basis for a future federal government built upon such a longstanding democratic tendency.

Pollock's expanded perspective places him within the nexus of a set of issues regarding the significance of the Laenderrat in the larger history of Germany. In his memoirs, the former Minister-President Reinhold Maier reflected on the occupation experience:

This four and a half year pre-Federal Republic period (vor-bundesrepublikanischer Zeit), which has been frequently left out in reports on post-war Germany, belongs to the most ponderous years in the long history of our people and certainly to the most difficult years that ever had to be endured by the Land governments. What an abundance
of unpopular tasks! And what all had to be imposed at that
time on a population who—entangled in the struggle of their
own naked existence—accepted what was not to change.\textsuperscript{51}

Maier's memoirs reflected a subtle shift in West German historical
consciousness, a shift that became more pronounced in the 1970's: the
memory of the occupation was rechristened the \textit{Vorgeschichte} of the
Federal Republic.

Maier's language was critical; in referring to the occupation as
the "vor-bundesrepublikanischer Zeit," he reflected the degree to which
West Germans of the late 1960's and early 1970's sought legitimacy for
their state and sociopolitical order in the years 1945-1949, as the
precursor to the Federal Republic. The historian Diethelm Prowe has
argued that the resurrection of the occupation years as a source of
historical investigation among West German historians "in a larger West
German cultural-political context...has meant the reclaiming of a piece
of German history long regarded as lost together with the war and
assorted eastern territories."\textsuperscript{52} The implications of this shift in
historical consciousness and identity are worth exploring.

Aside from memoirs such as Maier's, the march to reclaim the
occupation for the Federal Republic had been led by the Instituet fuer
Zeitgeschichte. In 1976, the first volume of documents from the
occupation were published under the authority of the Bundesarchiv and
the Instituet fuer Zeitgeschichte, titled \textit{Akten zur Vorgeschichte der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1949}. The title reflects the shift in
language which signaled the shift in historical consciousness: no longer
termed the "occupation period," the years 1945-1949 were now understood
as the "prehistory" of the Federal Republic. The authors made this
intention clear in the introduction:

The situation and development of Germany after the Second
World War has been viewed for a long time predominantly
as the object of international politics and has been dealt
with principally under the categories of the domineering
roles of the occupying powers, the rise of the "Cold War,"
the allied controversy over the German Question and the
partition of Germany. In contrast, the opening series of
"Documents concerning the Prehistory of the Federal Republic"
have been consciously selected from the narrow perspective of internal German politics. They stand in compatibility with other similar pains of contemporary history, which show that the politics of the Federal Republic of Germany in its development is not understandable unless one seeks to fathom in the four year time segment from 1945 to 1949, the constitutional beginnings in which to place the foundations of future developments.  

The documents in the volume shed light on German policy-making and deliberation, and the degree to which German officials possessed freedom of action under Allied auspices. The documents chosen sought to highlight such freedom, and centered on records of the British Zonenbeirat and the American Laenderrat. Thus, in the larger debate about the foundations, legitimacy and sociopolitical consciousness of the Federal Republic, the significance of the Laenderrat was reconceptualized as more than just a tool of American policy making.

Such a reinterpretation of the Laenderrat's place in German history continued in other works published by the Institut fuer Zeitgeschichte. For example, Conrad Latour and Thilo Vogelsang sought an uninterrupted line between developments in the occupation and the Federal Republic. Again, the Laenderrat is viewed as one of these crucial institutions. Thus, from the West German perspective, the Laenderrat represents one of the foundations upon which the Federal Republic was built.

Although he was deeply aware of the future significance of the Laenderrat in establishing a federal state in Germany, James K. Pollock also understood the deep continuities of the Laenderrat with the efficient administrative institutions he observed in the Weimar and Nazi periods. Pollock sensed the political culture of Germany which produced administrative efficiency, strong local and regional government and active voting participation. He also understood that the same values sustained the early administration of the Federal Republic. There is a lesson in Pollock's observations of postwar Germany. Democratization could not proceed by implanting American ideas into German culture, but only by reviving those facets of German culture that were democratic. Many American social scientists who traveled to Germany believed that
democratization meant Americanization. This perspective, however, was not without its price. German culture proved more resilient than anticipated, a point Pollock understood and few others in the occupation appreciated.
Notes


3Gimbel, 36.

4Clay, 87.


7Ibid., 263-64.


10Ibid., 39.


12Ibid., 326.

13Ibid., 326-27.

14Ibid., 210.


16Ibid., 70-71.


18Ibid., July 19, 1945.


20Ibid., 972.
21Ibid., 973.
23Ibid., July 28, 1945.
24Ibid., August 15, 1945.
25Ibid., September 13, 1945.
26Ibid., August 8, 1945.
27Ibid., August 15, 1945.
28Ibid., August 18, 1945.
29Ibid., August 9, 1945.
30Ibid., September 25, 1945.
31Ibid., September 27, 1945.
32Ibid., October 17, 1945.
33Ibid., December 20, 1945.
34Ibid., January 1, 1946.
35Ibid.
36Ibid., December 21, 1945.
39Ibid., September 2, 1945.
40Ibid., January 27, 1946.
41Ibid., June 1, 1946.
42Ibid., April 23, May 16, 1946.
46Ibid., July 12, 1946.
47Ibid., August 7, 1946.
48Ibid., May 16, 1948.
49Ibid., July 12, 1946.

51 Reinhold Maier, Erinnerungen 1948-1953 (Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1966):13-14. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are the author’s.


Chapter IV
Between Silence and Conversation

Upon arriving in Germany, the sociologist Everett C. Hughes entered into a series of conversations, between Germans and Americans, between two different practices of sociology, and between Germans wrestling with their past and their self identity. Hughes arrived as a member of an exchange between the University of Chicago and the University of Frankfurt, which was intended to reconnect Germany to the rest of the Western intellectual community and to resurrect German higher education. While Hughes fulfilled his academic obligations, he also engaged in some important field work of his own, which led him into conversations in the literal sense—with students, professors, and Germans outside the academy. Hughes also engaged in conversation in the metaphorical sense, a dialectic between German and American culture, and between a divided German self.

One conversation engaged Hughes in a dialogue between Germans sociologists trained in the traditions of Geisteswissenschaft and his own American sense of the importance of empirical research. Hughes sought to train the Germans in the methods of the Chicago School of sociology, with its emphasis on both empirical and theoretical research. Additionally, Hughes treated sociology as a cultural artifact, as an object of sociological investigation and experimentation. In studying the institutional setting of German sociology, Hughes reflected upon the nature of German culture and the possibilities for democracy within that culture. German sociology students bubbled with democratic possibilities, as they sought to break through the traditions and bureaucracies of the university. In observing student discussions,
Hughes discovered, one could practice freedom. In addition to his academic duties, Hughes spent considerable time conversing with and observing the Germans, treating them as an academic object, subject to sociological tools of analysis. Based upon some of his more important conversations, Hughes concluded that Germans were using discussions with Americans as a means of overcoming the horrors of their past. The Germans treated the Americans as both judges and high priests, pleading with Americans to absolve them of their crimes. Out of these dialogues, Hughes uncovered a "conspiracy of silence" by those Germans who wished to remain silent about their past. Hughes urged frank and open discussion of that past—however painful such a discussion might be—as the only way to overcome German collective guilt, a lesson which resonates with those of the Historikerstreit nearly four decades later.

Conversation, discussion and dialogue were central themes of Hughes stay in Germany. His story is significant, for he anticipated debates—conversations—Germans would have well into the Federal Republic, about the nature of democracy, German national identity and the troubles of their collective memory.

The University of Chicago-University of Frankfurt Exchange Program

Largely the result of the vision of the president of the University of Chicago, Robert M. Hutchins, an exchange of professors between the University of Chicago and Frankfurt University began on April 1, 1948. The idea of the exchange fit well within two goals of Hutchins: the need for a system of international cooperation and an end to intellectual specialization and fragmentation. To fulfill his dream of a world order that eschewed conflict, Hutchins sought a system of collaboration between the worlds intellectuals, a world order "in which the political barriers to intellectual cooperation will be fewer and lower than they are today." Intellectuals were to play a critical role,
for it is with them that "standards of thought, taste and action" were to be located.¹

Hutchins insisted on greater cooperation between the world’s intellectuals not only across geographic distance but across disciplinary distance as well. He lamented the growing tendency toward specialization, where "scholars who can discourse brilliantly at scholarly meetings in Shanghai, Paris or Budapest can discuss only the weather and politics in the faculty club at home." Only by reasserting the preeminence of a liberal education and encouraging projects of a cooperative nature which focused on fundamental human problems could the specialization of intellectual life be reversed. "This is the kind of intellectual co-operation which is of real significance," concluded Hutchins. "This is the kind which can lay the foundations for world peace. This is the kind in which the intellectuals of all nations should be willing to cooperate and in which their governments should be willing to allow them to cooperate. This kind of intellectual cooperation might give us the new synthesis we must have, which will unite the whole world, and not least the world of learning and scholarship."² In this way, Hutchins was looking beyond the defeat of the Third Reich and toward mending a world torn asunder by nuclear weapons and bipolarity.

The exchange between Chicago and Frankfurt was to be a first step in this direction. Between 1948 and 1951, the exchange was carried out in unilateral fashion, with professors from the University of Chicago travelling to Frankfurt with no real reciprocal exchange and largely through American funding. OMGUS provided logistical support for the project, billeting professors, offering meals at the Officers’ Mess, granting use of postal, transportation and Army store facilities.³

The Rockefeller Foundation supplied the bulk of the funds for the project. The exchange fit well within Foundation objectives for German higher education, such as the reestablishment of international ties via
books and scholarly journals. The foundation was also attracted to the prominent role of the social sciences in reorienting German scholars toward addressing their most immediate problems and inculcating liberal, democratic ideas.⁴

By 1951, the Rockefeller Foundation withdrew its financial support of the project. Questions arose within the Social Science Division about the opportunities for real research work, the real benefits the University of Chicago would accrue, and the fact that social scientists did not figure as prominently as the Foundation hoped. Still, some within the Foundation urged continuation of the project, for the "contribution it will make to modifying university life and thought in Germany in the directions of freer and more effective discussion and criticism, to building up in Germany the social sciences...and to democratizing German values and practice."⁵ Everett C. Hughes, who went to Frankfurt in 1948 to teach American methods of sociological research, enjoyed the sort of success for which the Foundation had hoped.⁶

Within the Frontier of Groups

The foundation of the University of Chicago in 1892 coincided with a transformation in the nature and purpose of the American university. Prior to the 1880's, American aspirants to the Ph.D. traveled to Europe for their degrees; new universities, like Chicago, were to serve that function, along the lines of a German university. The University of Chicago was in the vanguard of the new American university; this was especially true of the social sciences, where Chicago became an important center for professional research in sociology, political science, economics and anthropology. The Chicago School of sociology, in particular, rested on three principles: professionalism, empiricism and service to society.⁷
A sociology Ph.D. from Chicago would emphasize a balance between theoretical work and empirical research. Graduates were expected to engage in research and publication. And indeed, in a city such as Chicago, students had an ample supply of firsthand sociological data from which to consider. Most research problems centered on conditions within the city itself. For example, the work which best describes the Chicago style of sociology was *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, by W.I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, published in 1920. What distinguished this work were the authors' reliance not solely on library and archival material but from direct observation of conditions in Chicago. Other such studies included *The Negro in Chicago*, *Family Disorganization*, *The Gang, Suicide and The Ghetto*, all published by the University of Chicago and all employing empirical methods to examine Chicago city life.

These monographs reveal the outcome of the interaction between professionalization and empirical research, for it is here that "the connection between social science and public policy was first established, with a distinctly local focus." As a city which had grown from a town to a major urban center in less than a century, Chicago faced many social problems tied to industrialization and urbanization. To that end, Chicago social scientists were active in reform movements in the city, and businessmen, clergymen, journalists and lawyers depended on them for social scientific information. Social scientists were members of reform societies, such as the Union League Club and the City Club. Monographs produced from empirical research were to be more than simply academic exercises, but a practical tool in solving urban problems.

By the 1920's the Chicago School had reached a stage of preeminence in American sociology. The work of Robert E. Parks, *The Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, became the standard text in the field shortly after its publication in 1921. Between 1924 and 1950, sixteen
University of Chicago professors or Ph.D.'s held the presidency of the American Sociological Society, which was first organized by Albion W. Small at Chicago. The primary journal in the field, *The American Journal of Sociology*, was located and published at Chicago, and University of Chicago sociologists held important editorial positions.\(^\text{11}\)

Everett C. Hughes' connection with Chicago was intimate. He received his Ph.D. in 1928 and, after time spent at McGill University, returned to Chicago as professor in 1938. Thus, Hughes' perceptions of sociology—and consequently, his perceptions of the world in general—were shaped by this intimacy. Prior to his activities in Germany, Hughes' reputation derived from two principal scholarly interests: his studies of French Canadians in Quebec—published as *French Canada in Transition*—and his studies of relations between ethnic and racial groups.\(^\text{12}\) Both reveal an interest in "minority" populations and how different groups were forced to coexist and interact within one society. It is this core element in Hughes' thought that structured many of his observations of the Germans.

Hughes' conception of "society" mirrored that of his mentor Robert E. Park. As Park defined the term, "society" referred to an organic association between individuals. For Park, "society is not a mere physical aggregation and not a mere mathematical or statistical unit" but rather a "web in which the lives of individuals are so inextricably interwoven." The structure of any society was not determined by innate individual characteristics alone: "The social organization of human beings...the various types of social groups, and the changes which take place in them at different times under varying circumstances, are determined not merely by instincts and by competition but by custom, tradition, public opinion, and contract." Societies cohered as a result of these larger relationships, for "human society...unlike animal society, is mainly a social heritage, created in and transmitted by communication."\(^\text{13}\)
As a student of Park, Hughes would internalize this organic view of society. "While the substance of the courses was new and interesting," recalled Hughes, "it was the point of view that took hold of me. Society is interaction. Interaction involves sensitivity to others, but to some others more than other others." Hughes was particularly interested in Park's study of human ecology:

The most striking new thing was human ecology, which Park was then thinking and talking about...Human ecology was to be a view of things that would keep one on the lookout for the frontiers of any system of things and beyond the frontiers for remote connections with other orders of happenings. While any human phenomenon is worth studying closely, if at all, it is never to be completely understood in terms of itself. Its peripheries must be explored.\textsuperscript{14}

In Hughes' own work, these assumptions were elaborated to produce works which examined groups within a given society. Hughes would similarly describe groups as "grids" or "webs" of relationships between individuals. What distinguished Hughes' outlook was his concern for the relationship between different groups in a given society. His most important distinction was between "in" and "out" groups. For example, when defining an "ethnic group," Hughes rejected the idea that such groups could be identified on the basis of innate characteristics. "An ethnic group," he argued, "is not one because of the degree of measurable or observable difference from other groups; it is an ethnic group, on the contrary, because the people in it and the people out of it know that it is one; because both the \textit{ins} and the \textit{outs} talk, feel and act as if it were a separate group."\textsuperscript{15}

This distinction underscored Hughes' belief that social groups, by definition, exist in relation to and because of the existence of other groups. "The relations [between groups] can be no more understood by studying one or the other of the groups than can a chemical combination by study of one element only, or a boxing bout by observation of only one of the fighters. Yet it is common to study ethnic relations as if one had to know only one party to them." Because of the symbiotic relation between groups, Hughes believed such relations to be the most
important part of research, for "whether a student studies one or all the groups in a situation—and he should study all—he must study relations if that is what he claims he wants to know."\textsuperscript{16}

The study of relations between social groups had a distinct purpose, specifically to ameliorate conflict, or, at the very least, to forge greater understanding between conflicting groups. Hughes seemed primarily interested in the intricacies of the boundaries between groups. Thus, an article on improving race relations in industry was titled "The Knitting of Racial Groups in Industry," and sought to create strategies which would soften the impermeable boundaries between blacks and whites in industry.\textsuperscript{17} In French Canada in Transition, the chosen community for study was not a French rural parish, nor an industrialized metropolis like Montreal, but rather a community on the boundary between French rural and English urban Canada, "a community which stands between these extremes, a smaller town recently enlivened and disturbed by the establishment of a number of large new industries, all started and managed by English-speaking people sent their for the purpose."\textsuperscript{18}

One of the disturbances Hughes examined was the emergence of anti-Semitic feeling in Quebec. Such an outbreak was a product, argued Hughes, of the relations between "in" and "out" groups. In the chapter titled "Quebec Seeks a Villain," Hughes observed that:

No problem of human behavior is more intriguing than that of discovering why people, when they feel the distress of uncertainty and frustration, lay blame upon one villain rather than another. It is common-enough knowledge that groups of discontented individuals seize upon one tentative explanation of their difficulties after another before they arrive at a stable definition of their situation. A fruitful suggestion is that, in such a case, aggression is displaced upon persons or symbols which lie outside the range of those persons and things which one has been taught to love and respect. To this I would add that people, when so disturbed, apparently engage in exploratory aggression. They seek in their environment objects which their consciences will allow them to attack and which may be effectively associated with the circumstances from which they think they suffer.\textsuperscript{19}

Ominously, in French Canada, "among the more severely attacked objects have been the Jew, capitalism, and communism."\textsuperscript{20} Thus equipped with a
theoretical concern for "in" and "out" groups and an interest in the relations and complexities between them, Hughes was dispatched to Germany, to teach sociology and to observe the Germans.

The Sociology of Sociology

As a member of the first exchange team sent to Germany, Hughes' chief obligation was to teach seminars for advanced sociology students, as well as to attend and provide lectures. Although he adhered to the German curriculum of formal lectures, he also attempted to introduce empirical methods into the course structure, and thereby implicitly direct German students away from philosophy and toward American sociological practice. Hughes was— at every turn— acting as a sociologist of the Chicago School, observing German habits and behaviors, and recording the results of this "fieldwork" in his diary. Observing German sociology itself became a sociological experiment for Hughes. While examining German sociology and its position within the seminar and the larger university system, Hughes was simultaneously exploring and seeking to change a microcosm of German culture.

Many of Hughes' observations concerned the difference between German and American sociological practice. Hughes visited a seminar conducted by Leopold von Wiese, whose subject that term was sociological theory. Hughes noted that the subject of the preceding term was empirical research, which included discussion of his book on French Canada. The eighty students present were hearing a discussion of Pareto and the non-rational side of human behavior. "This is by all odds the most active sociological seminar I have seen in Germany," noted Hughes, "but even here there prevails the idea that social theory and social research are essentially not related to each other. Of course, the same is very largely true in the U.S., with the difference that we do a lot of empirical work without bothering about what we learn of the nature of
man and society from it. It is not clear how to read the last sentence. Hughes might have been expressing humility, that American sociology was not necessarily better than German sociology, a humility lacking among many Americans in the occupation. On the other hand, Hughes may have been expressing a sense of superiority of the Chicago School—which presumably did combine theory and research—over other schools in America. In any case, Hughes sensed deep differences between the two cultures of sociology.

German sociology was embedded in a university structure that, again, differed from American practice, revealing another cultural habit among the Germans. Von Wiese quizzed Hughes about a possible successor, and Hughes suggested von Weise's own capable assistant. "He is 32 [years] old, but owing to loss of time in the war, has not his doctorate," wrote Hughes.

Wiese threw up his hands: "He could do it. But it would take him a year to write his doctoral work, and then at least a year or two to write his Habilitations. That would be from two to three years, and besides I want him to have a year abroad in England or America." It was evidently considered impossible to alter the routine for the sake of appointing a good man. Wiese also mentioned the difficulty from the political side: the State councilors all put in a word for members of their own parties. The question has already been raised whether the Social-Democratic point of view should be "represented" in sociology.

"German sociology" could not be understood apart from its context, within the structure of the university system, or within the party structure of German political life. Altering German sociological practice to fit American standards could not proceed simply by introducing new methods.

Hughes recognized that to make American social research legitimate would entail "breaking" the German system of higher education, whose culture constricted opportunities for empirical research. Hughes wrote a letter to the University of Chicago's Robert J. Havighurst, about a proposal for a survey of smaller German industrial cities. At one level, the survey would offer practical information on the social
structures of German workers. The surveys would also, argued Hughes, teach trade unionists and sociology students to view their problems in a new light. "Thus," said Hughes, "an attack not merely on the formality of German social science but on the bureaucratic tendency in the trade unions." What Hughes proposed was nothing less than an effort to alter a portion of German culture.

Empirical field work, argued Hughes, was the only way the old habits of the university could be broken, and the German traditions of formal, abstract social science be redirected. "I see no sign," wrote Hughes, "that there will be a revolution from within the universities and on the initiative of the faculties...The students, for their part, get really no encouragement and no training in research. A few struggle a little, but accept the Bureaucratic pattern of the Universities." Again, sociology—as with all the social sciences—was embedded in a social and cultural structure that shaped its legitimacy. To change sociological practice meant altering the larger culture.

Hughes believed that exchange programs which sent Germans to America would not solve the problem. Germans would treat an exchange to America as an excursion, an escape from problems at home, and not as an opportunity to learn field work techniques. "The big problem," argued Hughes,

is to break the system here for at least a few students. The essence of the system is that they get through to the Diploma examinations as soon as possible so as to have a license to work in some bureaucratic job; then do a Ph.D. thesis on some fiddling project that will please a professor who doesn't himself know anything about empirical research; then, if lucky...he becomes an assistant to a professor, whose books and lecture notes he carries around and for whom he opens doors and whose words of wisdom he echoes in sentences almost as long as the professor's. If this system could be broken by affording a number of young people a chance to get out and learn research methods, I am sure the effect would be greater than that of sending an equal number of people to the U.S. for a year or so. One would develop in a few young people the taste for, and the habit of doing research right here in Germany. My prediction is that they would get rather immediate rewards in prestige and appointments, and that other students would be mightily encouraged."
Hughes suggested that German students should work within the university system, even while they were subverting that system at the same time. Here is the "Americanization" of German social science in a microcosm: to make American notions of proper, legitimate social science "fit" meant radically altering the context, the culture in which it resided. There is a bit of the "Quiet American" syndrome in this effort to make Germany over into America's image.

If change was to occur, the seminar seemed an appropriate—and highly charged—atmosphere for such a redirection of German culture. Hughes observed a seminar in which the professor had been called away to a faculty meeting. His assistants took over the seminar. "A student reported on the appropriate chapter of the book in question," began Hughes' observation:

but dared to mix some of his own observations with those of Robert Michels, author of the book. In fact, it was rather a distraught report; not very coherent, but one in which the student brought in some problems which bothered him. When he got through, another assistant, Dr. C., took him apart for not having made it clear what Michels had said and what he, the reporter, was saying. The student answered back with a combination of self-excuse and defense, on the one hand, and of belligerency. He spoke anxiously but with an awkward freedom, which he would not have shown had the professor been there. The assistant, Dr. C., answered with a punishing vehemence that he, too, would not have dared had the professor been there. The others broke in, and there followed a not too coherent, but half-angry discussion that lasted long over-time. Neither side would stop talking. Dr. C., the assistant, was obviously taking his opportunity to be free, and punish, in the absence of his master. And the whole class was being more free than they would have dared. The main point, to me, was the revelation of so much suppressed heat, an almost hysterical desire to discuss.26

Within the microcosm of the seminar room, Hughes had discovered freedom, even a practice of democracy. The repressiveness of the academic system, which Hughes had referred to in his letter to Havighurst, was relaxed here, unleashing an almost Habermasian desire and freedom to discuss. Such a "freer" classroom space seemed to afford the opportunity to "break" the university system.
In Hughes' own seminars, he found students willing to challenge old assumptions, offering a chance to restructure the university system, as well as the whole of German society. The discussion on this day focussed on why some Germans worked harder than others; had Germany become a nation of "Schieber," of grafters and cheaters? The question itself, and the social conditions which led to them, created the opportunity for change that Hughes was seeking. Answering these questions about German society was put out by Hughes "as a sort of challenge to [the students]...that they were in the intellectually and morally happy situation of being able to make an important practical contribution by studying the realities of German life and also an intellectual contribution, because the cake of custom is so broken that human behavior can be seen in flux." Studying practical realities and redirecting German sociology could work in tandem.

Hughes discovered that the behavior of the students themselves afforded the opportunity for sociological inquiry. "I suggested this--study of student collective behavior and ethics," wrote Hughes, as an important problem which could be studied; as, after all, sociology is basically scientific study of practical morality in various circumstances. This led to further [outbursts] about what would happen to any student who dared make such a study; about the difficulty of doing it in a faculty where there is always an examination on book-keeping or commercial law just around the corner, and where the formula for a doctor's dissertation is so fixed by tradition and by the necessity of being some professor's disciple. I suggested that the situation for doing intellectual work was never perfect, and certainly was not any better generally speaking in America [than] here--and that, if they really wanted to do it, no one could or would stop them. Then came the usual question: how do you do such studies? We in Germany have lost fifteen years, in which other countries have made progress in empirical methods of social science. We don't know how to make up a questionnaire. (God save us.) All I could say to this was that if ever I come here again I will be glad to work with some small group whose members are willing to take the chance on getting out and studying something together; but that they can perfectly well do it themselves if they have a mind to.

Hughes observations seemed validated: students wished to carry out the sort of empirical studies Hughes and other Americans wished, but were
stifled by the traditions of the university system. A corrective, Hughes suggested in the last sentence, would be for the students to take their own initiative. This is an interesting episode; Hughes was encouraging open discussion among all members of the seminar, and for students to demand and press for their own agendas, even if these conflicted with their professors or with the traditions of the university. Although he certainly could not have foreseen them, Hughes seemed to be anticipating the observations of Juergen Habermas, and the student protests of the late 1960's.

The position of the social sciences in Germany was not all gloomy, however. At Muenster, Hughes observed Germans actively engaged in empirical research to solve local problems, the stuff of American sociological practice. Members of the social science faculty accompanied Hughes to Dortmund, to the Institute for Social Research, who were conducting empirical research on the industrial problems of the Ruhr. "This group institute [sic] is the liveliest things [sic] in social science that I have yet seen in Germany," Hughes commended. He was particularly interested in the problem of integrating eastern refugees into the region, a problem of particular scholarly interest to Hughes.29

Another study dealt with caloric intake and the productivity of coal miners. Here, Hughes had the opportunity to suggest some of his own findings on the relationship between "in" and "out"groups. The problem of productivity could not be solved by offering workers more calories or goods coupons, which were often sold off. "Everyone talks of the age of the miners," recalled Hughes, and of the unwillingness of the miners to take the eastern newcomers, who are not miners, into their work teams. Also of the fact, alleged, that it takes years to learn to mine, and of the high turn-over of these new miners from the east. I suggested experiments in the integration of these new people into the old work-teams might be promising,—not trying to force them into old teams, but giving individual old miners especially big bonuses for training entire teams of newcomers. It is clear that the newcomers [feel] themselves strongly rejected by the
closely organized older Ruhr miners, who work as teams of kin and neighbors. This way of thinking was new to the people at the Institute; they seemed interested, but I am afraid not enough so to go after it.\textsuperscript{30}

The problems of the Ruhr fit nicely within Hughes' sociological concepts, despite his inability to change the way the Germans conceptualized the problem.

This episode is instructive, for it demonstrates how Hughes viewed his time in Germany. Hughes was intrigued by the question of productivity and work-teams. "The usual problems of morale and anomy are here, and in very strong form," Hughes wrote,

calories are probably only a relatively small part, given the high [calory] bonuses of industrial workers in the Ruhr. This is a problem is [sic] would be fun to work on. We have assumed that money is not a sufficient incentive largely because real wages go down as money wages go up. Here are some nice controls, [substituting] calories—which are scarce goods in Germany—for money in the equations.\textsuperscript{31}

The social and economic problems of the Ruhr represented an exercise, an experiment to be tested with empirical data. It appears as if Hughes viewed Germany as a laboratory for sociological theory.

"Discussion" was a critical element in Hughes' stay in Germany, as the episodes in the seminar rooms attest. The whole of his diary can be read as a discussion, a conversation between Hughes and the Germans he would encounter, both within and outside the university. Hughes held a particularly interesting conversation with the Marburg sociologist Max Graf zu Solms. In visualizing this conversation, one can almost envision two kindred souls, reflecting on the status of the social sciences in Germany, alone against a culture dominated by philosophy and the economists. The conversation revolved around the ends for which the social sciences be used in Germany.

The conversation began with questions over the definition of "social science." Hughes was pleased to note that Solms held a similar view to his own—and much of the University of Chicago—that there was little difference between sociology and anthropology, and that all of the branches of social science would benefit from better collaboration
and communication. "This means, says Solms emphatically, "that the systematic, theoretical students of society must were closely with the 'applied' social scientist and the practical man," recalled Hughes, who seemed clearly in agreement.

The latter record data for the purposes of social action. They make all sorts of observations. They collect facts. But they are not in position, often, to compare these facts with those from other institutions and from other cultures. The role of the sociologist or other social scientist to "exploit" all of this observation and experience of the practical man, and, then, in return, to give back to the practical man a more fundamental understanding through comparison...

Here, again, Hughes was expressing—through the voice of Solms—his desire to see greater integration of theory and observation in sociology. Hughes was referring to Germany, but this observation might also refer to his perceptions of sociology in the United States as well.

The dynamics of conversation with Solms served as a mirror on Hughes' own thoughts on sociology. "In interests and ideas," wrote Hughes,

Solms is closer to American sociology (i.e., to what I think American sociology ought to be) than any one I have met in Europe—and especially on the fundamental point that the distinction between empirical and theoretical study is false, as ordinarily conceived; that a marriage of the two is the only fruitful course for people interested in developing knowledge of man and society. Also on the point that the case for objectivity in social science rests on no claim of the rights of the scholar, but on the fundamental premise that the moral man, to be effective, must have some organ of objective observation and analysis so that he will know the nature and strength of the evils with which he has to deal and the efficacy of the instruments to be used in dealing with them.

An important part of the conversation, as Hughes recorded it, centered upon comparison as a tool of social scientific inquiry. To what would the Nazis be compared? Solms recalled a professor in Germany in 1932 who compared the Nazis to other movements, including the Bolsheviks, which led to harassment from the Nazi students. Yet, comparison was at the heart of social scientific inquiry. "And that, for me," wrote Hughes, "is precisely the function of social science. It is to compare
movements, institutions, social structures, types of men etc., in such a way that we can point out what is dangerous. In the context of postwar Germany, Hughes suggested, comparison—and we may presume social science—would be necessary.

The conversation turned to how the history of the Nazis would be written. "There are still lots of people inside Germany and out who believe that Hitler invented the youth movement, nationalization of certain resources," and other such things, Hughes recorded.

It is important to see each of these developments in its proper setting. Some think he invented anti-Semitism. It is just as dangerous to believe that he invented these evil ideas as to believe that he invented the good ones he exploited. The truth is the best thing to counteract the idea that all of the aspects of the Nazi movement necessarily rose together and belong together... Telling the whole story, with a system of ideas that will allow significant comparison with other movements makes the Nazi movement not any less terrible (it makes it worse), but less unique. It makes it something recognizable with which we ought to be able to find a way of dealing and which we ought to be able to prevent.

Again, Hughes—and Solms—could not have foreseen the future, 40 years later. Comparison is legitimate, if used for critical self-reflection. During the Historikerstreit—to which we will return—conservative Germans would use comparison as a means of denying the unique position of the Nazis, and thus absolve the Federal Republic of its sins. Would comparison be used to remember, to prevent, or to forget?

"Innocents Abroad"

Hughes' observations and conversations were not limited to the academic community. He had considerable contact with "ordinary" German citizens; these conversations were not exempt from Hughes' sociological gaze. One of the more important observations he made of the Germans concerned the relationship with the Nazi past. He had warned, in one of his journal entries, that Germans would tempt Americans into either
"betraying" other Americans and to seek absolution for the sins of the Nazis.

Hughes digested some of his experiences into a short piece—which was to be an introduction to a larger work on his observations of the Germans, a work, oddly, that was not published—titled "Innocents Abroad, 1948; or How to Behave in Occupied Germany." In it, Hughes warned of the temptations Americans faced:

- The American innocent abroad is led into temptation; each of us according to the kind of person he is taken for by the Germans and according to what he would like to be at home; as well as according to what he is or would like to be in this first prolonged American occupation of a European country, a country whose age we covertly admire and whose material achievements impress the American eye even though they lie in ruin.

The temptation, for Hughes, was to allow the Germans to harden boundaries between "in" and "out" groups: between Americans and Americans, between Americans and Germans and, most importantly, between Germans and Germans.

The first of these temptations Hughes labeled the "Peter temptation," or the desire "to make capital of one's differences from the average." This meant creating boundaries around the self, identifying an outside group and consequently assuming the superiority of the self as a member of the "in" group. Hughes noted:

This temptation turns up in many forms. One is the invitation to be an intellectual...Another time it is the invitation to be a Christian, as against Jews; a white man as against Negroes; a professor, as against army officers, occupation authorities and grasping businessmen; a liberal, as against reactionaries. In the usual human way, the German sizes up one of us for some point of likeness or common interest with himself.

This "usual human way" extended to Americans especially:

In fact, we Americans, of whatever kind, are probably made especially subject to this temptation by our common practice of leading others into it here at home. The Negro American who is liked by his white fellow-workers in industry is often offered fellowship on the condition that he admit that he is an exception in being both a Negro and a good worker, thereby allowing that other Negroes are worthy of the contempt accorded them...It allows us to admit an individual to our group while hanging on to the notion his group is inferior.
To make oneself superior, "one simply dissociates himself from a class of persons."

Hughes recalled such temptations during a public lecture he delivered to a German audience titled "Race Relations in America." As Hughes recollected:

a student got up and asked "What happened to the Indians in North America?" Now the Germans, once they get the idea that they are in a situation where one can talk freely, show a special ability to ask us embarrassing questions like this. On this occasion, the question seemed to be asked with sincerity, and not with the undertone of cynicism one often detected. So I answered that we had found the Indians not willing to get out of our way, so we had killed a lot of them and shut the others up in concentration camps. I could have said that some misguided, malicious people had done it. Or, if asked about lynching, I could have said—as we do in the Northern states—that they, the benighted Southerners do it; or if I had been a white Southerner of the proper social background, I could have said they, a lot of rough people, not the better families, do it. This would of course have been yielding to the old Peter temptation.

The danger of the Peter temptation for Americans was the message it sent to the Germans; yielding to the Peter temptation was tantamount to an invitation to the Germans to legitimate their actions by similar means. Beyond this, Americans faced the danger of separating themselves from the Germans, to fall into the Peter temptation in relations between Americans and Germans:

But if we Americans use these devices, and especially the one of pointing out the greater sins of the Germans, we invite them to do likewise about the Nazi atrocities. They will then say that there were extenuating circumstances, that most Germans didn’t know about it all, and that it was only the fanatical SS who did those things, anyway. Then the talk is stopped or the subject changed to something more trivial.

Which is precisely what happened in the case of Hughes’ public lecture; a question on the effects of climate on American English ended the discussion. What concerned Hughes was not only the implicit lack of responsibility involved, but the "conspiracy of silence" among Germans it perpetuated. "Indeed," Hughes observed, "it was my experience that frank answering of embarrassing questions was about the only thing that would break the conspiracy of silence about the Nazi regime. For there
is such a conspiracy of silence, not merely between Americans and Germans, but as between Germans and Germans.  

Hughes gained a degree of insight into the problem of silence during a conversation with a sociology student. "He asked about my impressions," recalled Hughes. "I told him of the difficulty of talking about the Nazi time to most people, of the wall of silence. He replied: 'That isn't just with foreigners. People don't like to talk about it among themselves. I think it is easier for families like ours, that suffered from the Nazis, to talk about it, than for others. I don't just mean complaining about it either. In fact, the families like ours that suffered because someone—like my father—refused to join the party, are kept just a little bit outside by the others. If we say something, anything at all about the Nazi-time, even people we have known a long time just shut up and say nothing at all'. It is interesting to note that what Hughes recalled of this conversation revolved around the notions of silence, the Peter temptation and the boundaries between in and out groups.

Hughes cautioned that the silence of the Germans would drag Americans toward another temptation:

The odd thing that an American in Germany can, by disingenuous frankness about his own beloved, but less than perfect country, sometimes bring it about that Germans will speak to each other about their own knowledge and feelings concerning the horrors of the Nazi regime. There were occasions when it seemed as if, in the presence of a sympathetic fellow sinner from another country, they were eager to relieve themselves of guilty knowledge, and almost to apologize for their lack of saintly heroism in having been among those who survived the diabolic Nazi inquisition.  

Thus, in spite of the conspiracy of silence about the Nazis, Germans longed to break the silence, but only for purposes of being absolved of their sins.

This represented the more serious of the two temptations, the "temptation to give absolution." The seriousness of this temptation derived from the conflicting moral implications it raised. Should
Americans grant "absolution," and thus ease a guilty German individual or collective conscience? Or should Americans condemn the actions of the Germans, thus acting as judge and hangman? Hughes believed that contacts with the Germans were necessary, but could not offer easy answers to the Germans about how to come to grips with their collective guilt, or how to build relationships with other nations:

How to get good, honest contacts with people who have one of the severest guilt problems of history to deal with (again and again, Germans blurted out in private conversation, "All of us have a terrible sense of guilt.") is part of the problem of the American in Germany today. To find a course that does not imply condescension, the arrogation of priestly powers, the cheapening of the whole issue, or the descent in the abyss of cynicism; that is the question. Contact with Germans is, like contact with a mentally sick person, a confrontation of one's self and one's own soundness.6

In 1948, Hughes could offer no easy solutions, no real answers, only the advice that frank discussion was important.

Hughes published no works which specifically dealt with his time spent in Germany, with one exception, a 1962 article published in Social Problems titled "Good People and Dirty Work." The distance from Frankfurt—both temporally as well as spatially—allowed Hughes to view his time in Germany and his contacts with the Germans from a new perspective. Although many of the conclusions were similar, he seemed more resolute as to the need to knit together social relations and to break the conspiracy of silence among Germans.

The chief function of the article was to contemplate the Nazi experience and the German reaction, in part to understand the Germans but also to address larger issues, most notably, how can such an experience be prevented elsewhere. Hughes offered two general observations about the German experience with the Nazis. The first dealt with the theme of in and out groups. At one level, the Germans acted like all other societies. "Each of us," Hughes reminded his readers, "is a center of a network of in and out groups...nothing is more important for both the student of society and the educator than to discover how these lines are made and how they may be redrawn...But to
believe that we can do away with the distinction between in and out, us and them in social life is complete nonsense." Members of in groups hold strong aggressive feelings about the out group in all societies, Hughes contended. Then why did the Germans overstep this boundary and seek to destroy another out group? The answer was found by examining the social distance between groups. "The greater [an out group's] social distance from us, the more we leave in the hands of others a sort of mandate by default to deal with them on our behalf." Such a mandate, to "do something" to the Jews, went out of hand in Germany. The Nazis, and the layers of in groups within in groups that its organization represented, carried out the mandate so effectively that after knowledge of the Final Solution became known "it was and is easier to the conscience of many Germans not to know," and we may infer, to keep silent about this knowledge.

This raised the second observation: the overwhelming guilt experienced by the Germans and their "unwillingness to think about the dirty work done." What characterized the Germans was their collective inner silence about the Holocaust. Such silence was potentially damaging to the whole of German society:

That people can and do keep a silence about things whose open discussion would threaten the group's conception of itself, and hence its solidarity, is common knowledge. It is a mechanism that operates in every family and in every group which has a sense of group reputation. To break such a silence is considered an attack against the group; a sort of treason, if it be a member of the group who breaks the silence. This common silence allows group fictions to grow up...and I think it demonstratable that it operates especially against any expression...of collective guilt. The remarkable thing in present day Germany is not that there is so little reference to something about which people do feel deeply guilty, but that it is talked about at all. Only rarely would the silence be broken. Hughes recalled a man—not identified, but presumably a university colleague—who, in 1948, was willing to discuss the Nazis openly and frankly "not only to the likes of me, but to his students, his colleagues and to the public which read his articles...whenever there was occasion to do it in the course of his
tireless effort to reorganize and to bring new life into the German universities." What most impressed Hughes was that "he had neither the compulsion to speak, so that he might excuse and defend himself, nor a conscious or unconscious need to keep silent. Such people were rare; how many there were in Germany I do not know."\textsuperscript{50}

Even with the publication of the 1962 article, Hughes could offer no answers or solutions to the guilt the Germans felt; however he seemed convinced that discussion was preferable to silence. This was implicit in his 1948 diary, when he recalled an evening with a German professor of archeology, a German journalist, a musician and an English couple. Although the conversation was pleasant--dealing with music, politics, German culture--Hughes lamented that "I should say that all of the Germans present are passive, convinced democrats, who don't maneuver to do anything about anything, except carry on delightful disinterested conversation."\textsuperscript{51}

Silence, Democracy and German "Reflective Memory"

The conspiracy of silence was the unique result of the German mandate on how to deal with an undesirable out group, an end result postwar Germans have lived with since. Hughes' observations related to the Germany he encountered in 1948; and yet the silence he detected became a persistent cultural trait of the Federal Republic. Other concerns for the West Germans occupied their attention: material progress, relations with the new out group--the East Germans--and reestablishing European, Western and world relations. Perhaps these other concerns fueled the conspiracy of silence.

Hughes had counseled discussion as the way to confront German guilt about the Nazis. Discussion is, by its very nature, a public act. Yet, the culture of the Federal Republic--and the culture of the Germans in general--has not been conducive to such activity. Rather, German
culture has been characterized by an effort to eschew public discourse about the Nazis, a retreat from "public virtues," a silent inwardness or Innerlichkeit.\textsuperscript{52}

Among the most representative of the German Bildungsbuerger, Thomas Mann pointed to the German proclivity toward "inwardness," which is best represented in the figure of Faust:

If Faust is to be the representative of the German soul he would have to be musical, for the relation of the German to the world is abstract and mystical, that is, musical—the relation of a professor with a touch of demonism, awkward and at the same time filled with arrogant knowledge that he surpasses the world in "depth." What constitutes this depth? Simply the musicality of the German soul, that which we call its inwardness, its subjectivity, the divorce of the speculative from the socio-political element of human energy, and the complete predominance of the former over the latter.\textsuperscript{53}

Mann's comment about the predominance of speculation is an observation with which many American sociologists would have agreed. Inwardness, for Mann, was the source of both great beauty and great evil.

For the historian Friedrich Meinecke, as expressed in \textit{Die deutsche Katasrophe}, inwardness was to provide a means of surviving the stain of the Nazi era:

Everything, yes everything, depends upon an intensified development of our inner existence...The heights of the Goethe period and of the highly gifted generation living in it were reached by many individual men, bound together merely in small circles by ties of friendship. They strove for and to a large degree realized the ideal of a personal and wholly individual culture. This culture was thought of as having at the same time a universal human meaning and content. The religious revival that we desire is in its deepest foundation an affair of the individual human soul thirsting for a healthy recovery. It seeks strongly the formation of communities, because most people get a feeling of security and safety only by being linked together in a local religious community as part of a wider church organization. This means a great measure of organization and cooperation. But all organizations always tread upon the rank and file and sacrifice or curtail part of the individual's own inclination. But does organization alone promote spiritual culture? Does not spiritual culture demand a sphere for individual inclination, for solitude, and for deepening of one's self.\textsuperscript{54}

For Meinecke, the response to the Nazi era was to retreat into an ideal
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German past, into a simple pastoral existence while Beethoven was played and Goethe and Schiller read.

This is not to suggest that there were no challenges or efforts to break the silence. A notable exception was the literary movement Gruppe 47, which flourished during the Adenauer years. Although the group lacked any definite center, it did challenge "the inwardness and withdrawal into a sentimentalized private sphere that had offered neither refuge nor resistance" during the Nazizeit. While the group sought to criticize the materialism and consumption of the Adenauer years, the more noteworthy works challenged and confronted the silence about the Nazi past, such as Heinrich Boell's No warst du Adam?—which rejected the bifurcation of private and public spheres which he perceived as vital to the rise of the Nazis—and Guenter Grass Die Blechtrommel which attacked the complacency of the postwar years and similarly addressed the Nazi past. Despite the positive critical response for these works, they remained voices of protest, which reflects the status of silence in the Federal Republic in the 1950's and 1960's.

The German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf addressed the question of German public silence in his Society and Democracy in Germany. A central theme of this work was that any liberal democracy was dependent upon "public virtues," or the relations and behavior between men in society as opposed to those values of inwardness, or "private virtues." Dahrendorf argued that German society in the 1960's had yet to provide the "social basis of the constitution of liberty" since public virtues were lacking:

We are concerned here with German society in which the predominance of private virtues has proved a notable obstacle to the establishment of liberal institutions. In our discussion of social conflict, we saw that what may reasonably be understood by "democratization" does not consist of a simple copy of democratic ideas or institutions in other areas of society...A functioning liberal democracy does, however, require a sense of public life, of the market of men and its rules, which is lacking in those who have fallen in love with private virtues.
Dahrendorf's concerns were echoed by the philosopher Juergen Habermas. Discussion has been a central feature of both Habermas' sociology of knowledge and his political philosophy. First explored in *Erkenntnisinteresse* and later elaborated in *Theorie des kommunikativen Handels*, public discourse remained for Habermas the defining characteristic of a liberal democracy. Knowledge and politics are public activities; as the historian Charles Maier summarizes:

*Whether successful or not, Habermas seeks a firmer ground by focusing, not on the individual thinker's qualifications for objective knowledge, but on the conditions governing the community of language users and the arena of discourse. Emancipatory knowledge emerges only out of public discussion unconstrained by political pressure or economic power. Habermas' work presupposes that knowledge and politics must be shaped in conversation, not in isolation.*

Indeed, Hughes suggested that the heated conversations which arose out of his seminars was a type of emancipation from the authority of the professor, and the university system. In addition to knowledge and politics, furthermore, we may add that national identity must be shaped in conversation.

Habermas sat at the core of just such a public debate on national identity: the *Historikerstreit*. The contours of the debate are intricate, but tend toward two competing historiographic positions on the place of the Nazis in German national history, a condition Hans Mommsen called "a polarized historical consciousness." At one pole are largely conservative historians, who contend that the Nazi era and especially the Holocaust—while deeply tragic—has nevertheless been a part of a larger pattern of the twentieth century, namely totalitarianism and genocide. When one considers the Stalinist purges, German actions under the Nazis seem less exceptional. In this way, conservative historians hope to "historicize" the Nazi experience, which will allow Germans to distance themselves from that period and forge ahead to create a postwar German national history. At the other pole are left-leaning historians and critics, who contend that 1945 was not a
"break" and new start for Germany, but that authoritarianism of the kind the Nazis depended upon is a deeply rooted portion of German culture. No effort to "historicize" the Nazi era, or to silence debate on it, will erase this legacy.

The Historikerstreit was more than simply an academic debate; its battles were carried out in the pages of Der Spiegel, Die Zeit and other popular periodicals, and it has defined contemporary political orientation. The Historikerstreit ended with a proclamation from Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker, who stated that all Germans will continue to carry the responsibility of Nazi atrocities, but that the debate was over.

Although painful and divisive, the Historikerstreit remains a necessary part of German culture. If Hughes was correct, if frank discussion is necessary, then perhaps the debate among historians was needed to break the public silence on the Nazis; perhaps von Weizsäcker's enforced silence of the debate, while a civil gesture, in fact perpetuates the inwardness of the Germans, the retreat from public discourse, the weakening of the "social basis of the constitution of liberty."
Notes

1"International Intellectual Cooperation," Speech at Rectors Conference, May 19, 1948, Robert M. Hutchins Papers, Department of Special Collections, Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago.

2Ibid.


6Despite the loss of Foundation support, the exchange continued in a more formal and bilateral manner. Beginning with the Autumn term of 1951, a new "Agreement concerning a cooperative program of the University of Chicago and the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitaet, Frankfurt" went into effect, with a Committee on the Chicago-Frankfurt Inter-University Program, a commitment of funds from both universities and the blessings of HICOG. See "Report of the Special Investigating Committee on the Chicago-Frankfurt Exchange Program," July 12, 1951; and "Agreement concerning a Cooperative Program of the University of Chicago and the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitaet, Frankfurt," Presidential Papers, 1944-62, Department of Special Collections, Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago.


8Ibid.

9Ibid., 25.

10Ibid., 24.

11Ibid., 41-44.


15Hughes, Where Peoples Meet, 156.

16Ibid., 158-159.

17Ibid., 175-188.

18Hughes, French Canada in Transition, iv.
2019Ibid., 218.

21Ibid.

22Everett C. Hughes, Frankfurt Diary, "Notes on last few days in Germany," London, July 18, 1948, Department of Special Collections, Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago.

23Ibid.

24Everett C. Hughes to Robert J. Havighurst, Presidential Papers 1944-62, Department of Special Collections, Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago.

25Ibid.


27Ibid.

28Ibid.

29Hughes, Frankfurt Diary, Bielefeld, Muenster, Dortmund, May 14, 1948.

30Ibid.

31Ibid.

32Hughes, Frankfurt Diary, "Visit with Prof. Max Graf zu Solms, University of Marburg," July 10, 1948.

33Ibid.

34Ibid.

35Ibid.

36Hughes, Frankfurt Diary, "Innocents Abroad, 1948, or How to Behave in Occupied Germany."

37Ibid.

38Ibid.

39Ibid.

40Ibid.

41Ibid.

42Ibid.

43Hughes, Frankfurt Diary, "Notes on last few days in Germany," July 18, 1948.

44Hughes, "Innocents Abroad."

45Ibid.
46 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 6.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Hughes, Frankfurt Diary, May 25, 1948.
55 Hoffmeister, 91, 94, 140.
58 Ibid., 16.
Chapter V
Random Sampling and the "Voice of the People"

Survey research was still in its infancy when it was incorporated into the structure of the occupation government of Germany. Although the survey itself had a long history, newer, more scientific techniques of opinion polling had been developed in the United States in the 1930's. Many of the debates of public opinion pollsters in the 1940's through the 1960's centered upon questions of the discipline's scientific status, and how polling could be made a more legitimate tool of social science through the development of more rigorous scientific methods. Of the more important methodological contributions, the probability, or random, sample promised a more effective means of measuring opinion than the less reliable quota sample. These methodological debates—especially those surrounding the random and quota samples—spilled over into the occupation of Germany, as the effort to establish a scientific basis for survey research was intensified by the immediate needs of occupying and democratizing Germany.

Public opinion polls served a variety of needs in American culture, such as a tool of Progressive reform, attitude measurement, market research, and as a tool of democracy, by providing the "voice of the people." During the Second World War, the Federal government used surveys in a variety of functions: by the Army, by the Office of War Information and by the United States Department of Agriculture. These surveys provided information on the situation at home, and would also be used to provide information about the enemy. The most important of these surveys were the US Strategic Bombing Surveys, which offered
information on enemy morale in light of allied bombings. At the conclusion of the War, Congress slashed funds for survey research, since many Congressmen "felt they knew their constituencies better than any survey could discover and that they wished to protect their own expertise from such rival incursions." This was symptomatic of a general rejection by both pollsters and politicians of the "civic" model of survey research: of a government that sought the voice of the people, of a people willing to provide a voice to government, of an institution of survey research that served as the information flow of the system. Of its many functions in American culture, survey research was rejected as a tool of democracy.

With funds cut from the federal budget, many survey researchers retreated to the universities or to business. Although Congress had eliminated funding for domestic survey research, funds were, nevertheless, appropriated for surveys of the vanquished Germans and Japanese, and many researchers ventured overseas. Of the variety of functions surveys had played before and during the war, in the German context one overriding purpose was pursued: the use of public opinion polls as a tool in the democratization of German culture. If the democratic function had been taken out of survey research in the United States, democratization played a key role in the use of surveys in the occupation of Germany.

While American researchers and politicians were rejecting the "civic" model of opinion research, this model was explicitly evoked in the occupation of Germany. By providing information to the military authorities about the opinions and attitudes of the Germans, survey research aided OMGUS not only in developing appropriate policies but in gauging the effectiveness of American democratization efforts. Furthermore, by exposing Germans to public opinion surveys, researchers and military authorities believed that they would pave the way for the introduction of polling into the nexus of German life. Relying on the
image of polls as the "voice of the people," the Americans assumed that
the establishment of this institution would, by its very nature,
democratize German culture, by encouraging participation and enhancing
the public virtues that observers such as Everett C. Hughes found
lacking in German culture.

Believing they would make the survey a native part of German
culture, the Americans encouraged Germans to establish their own centers
of public opinion research. After the war, such centers erupted
throughout the US Zone as well as other zones of occupation. OMGUS,
through the Information Control Division and in particular the Surveys
and Opinions Branch, regulated the licensing of these German centers,
both to ensure the proper sponsorship and the proper survey research
techniques. The Americans tended to focus almost exclusively on
ensuring proper techniques, and less on the larger cultural milieu in
which the surveys were embedded. German pollsters placed survey
research in a different context than that envisioned by the Americans,
revealing again the clash of cultural habits between Germans and
Americans. The needs of the occupation—democratizing German
culture—and the desire to enhance the scientific foundations of the
discipline—the use of the random sample—coalesced in occupied Germany.

Random Samples and Democratization

The quota sample was the dominant method of gauging public opinion
prior to the Second World War. Quota samples represented the first
attempts by pollsters to introduce some systematic order in the polling
process. Prior to the development of this method, polls, usually
literary polls, quizzed individuals without special regard to their
statistical connections to the larger population, thus introducing a
rather significant bias. Such polls based their surveys on, for
example, the phone book, or automobile registration—in other words, the
wealthier segments of the population. This style of polling was prominent in the 1920's and early 1930's, and was characteristic of the Literary Digest polls. The Digest predicted that the winner of the 1936 presidential election would be Alfred Landon, since the pollsters failed to survey a large segment of the Democratic vote which lacked phones or automobiles. The Literary Digest "debacle" proved the spark for the development of quota samples.³

Quota samples were pioneered by pollsters such as George Gallup and Elmer Roper, who sought to increase precision of measurement. Quota samples systematized the process of interviewee selection that earlier polls lacked by reflecting a cross section of the larger population. Thus, if 45 percent of a given population was female, then in selecting the participants to be surveyed, 45 percent had to be female. This style of polling lessened some of the imprecisions of earlier methods, but was not without its problems. Since interviewers were left to make their own decisions about whom specifically to poll, they tended to question those individuals more easily accessible, those willing to be interviewed. The problems of the quota sample were revealed in the 1948 elections, when Gallup predicted Dewey as the winner. However, other pollsters, utilizing the more recent techniques of random sampling, correctly predicted Truman the winner.⁴ This election proved the catalyst for the rise of the random sample.

The random sample was developed during the war, and was largely the work of Morris Hansen and William Hurwitz of the US Bureau of the Census.⁵ With the application of probability theory to sampling procedure, random samples proved to be more scientifically rigorous. Like the quota sample, the random sample represents a cross section of the population, but then also includes a method for selecting individuals to be questioned. The pollster would begin by dividing the population into component geographic sections, then stratifying this sample population to ensure the proper proportions of the population,
and then randomly selecting the individuals to be interviewed. Under ideal conditions, the pollster would have the names of every individual in the sampling area, and would then select every n-th person to survey. Random samples proved more reliable than quota samples, but also more costly, since some individuals sampled might be in less accessible areas and interviewers needed advanced survey training.

The Chief of the Survey Branch for OMGUS, Leo P. Crespi, was among those academically-trained pollsters who argued in favor of the use of random sampling in Germany, thus extending the debate among American pollsters into occupied Germany. "The present chief of the Survey Branch," Crespi introduced himself, is an academician who for several years has been among those who have warned the established commercial polls of the necessity of improving their sampling methods, and more particularly of the necessity of utilizing strict random sampling. The objection to this latter has always been its greater expense as compared to quota sampling, and its greater demands in technical training. But in the opinion of the Chief, if these result in greater accuracy and dependability, they are well worth the cost."

Crespi's chief concern, throughout his time with OMGUS and HICOG, remained the maintenance of rigorous standards of measurement techniques.

Crespi argued that the flaws of the quota sample, which were vividly demonstrated in the 1948 election, were especially evident in the case of Germany. Crespi contended that "just as in stateside polling German quota sampling yields too low a proportion of the lower educational levels and too high a proportion of the upper." Crespi argued that random sampling proved a superior technique in the case of Germany, since "the random proportions could be increased in accuracy simply by enlarging the sample, but the quota errors, since they are due to constant interviewer bias would not be diminished in any way by enlarging the sample." The debates on sampling accuracy, seemingly confined within American universities, would play a critical role in the introduction of public opinion polling in postwar Germany.
Crespi's defense of the random sample in the case of Germany was founded not only upon scientific rigor, but also the ideal sampling conditions which postwar Germany presented. The Surveys and Opinions Branch encountered a situation that one pollster, Elmo Wilson, described as a "'sampler's paradise' for strictly random selection of respondents. No comparable opportunities for scientific sampling of cross-section exists in the states." Crespi noted that it has been possible to apply [random] sampling with extraordinary efficiency in Germany because, unlike most places where polling is conducted, a complete list by name of the population to sampled can be found in a card file—the ration list. Under such circumstances a true random sample can be rigorously obtained by selecting out of every n-th card in the file and instructing the interviewers to contact the people whose names are thus turned up. Just as Everett C. Hughes looked upon postwar Germany as a sociological exercise, American pollsters viewed postwar Germany as a great laboratory experiment in the application of the random sample. If Crespi gave a voice to the rising influence of random sampling among pollsters, he also neatly summarized American perceptions as to the interactions between opinion surveys and the democratization of German culture:

It was the hope of those of us engaged in public opinion research in Germany...that this enterprise would not only be of value to the guidance of American policy, but would also contribute to the development of German democracy. This hope was based on the conviction that polling and authoritarianism do not mix well...the experience of being polled and of reading about public opinion issues of the day helps to build the interest in political participation that was at so low an ebb in postwar Germany that is so fundamental to the success of democracy.

Polling in Germany was to play a dual role in the democratization effort: as an institution of democratic procedure, and as a system of information-flow to aid in occupation policy. An important function of the Surveys and Opinions Branch was to provide reliable data on the attitudes of the German people, to aid in the policy deliberations of the military authorities. Surveys and Opinions was to offer a snapshot of the trends and attitudes of the
Germans, to sample opinion and reaction to American policies, and to
gauge the cares and worries of the population. Perhaps most
importantly, surveys were to provide tangible proof of the breadth and
depth of American reorientation and democratization efforts.

Information was requested from all the various branches of the
OMGUS structure. These requests were collated into questionnaires,
constructed by Surveys and Opinions but with input from the division or
branch making the request. From there, the appropriate sample would be
selected. Despite the chaotic nature of the immediate postwar period,
the food ration card system provided a fairly reliable random sample.
With the questions prepared and the appropriate sample selected, the
Branch sent out interviewers to conduct the actual field work
assignments. The Branch fought several logistical battles in order to
secure an accurate measure of German public opinion. Such problems
ranged from a lack of transportation—and, thus, an inaccessibility of
some respondents—to a decentralization of functions, which spread
Survey Branch resources too thin to make for accurate samples.
Eventually, once procedures and jurisdictions had been established, the
Opinions and Surveys Branch could begin the work of tabulating the
results of the surveys, and analyzing their implications for
policy-makers. In almost all cases, the information contained within
the surveys were meant for OMGUS consumption alone. The OMGUS surveys
measured a wide array of concerns, including American-German relations,
economic affairs, education policy, information media, labor relations,
the Nuremberg trials, population problems, religious, social and
psychological concerns, but most significantly, politics, reorientation
and democratization.

OMGUS was especially concerned with surveys that gauged German
reactions to American democratization efforts, which reflected the close
connections between American images of democracy and the
information-production function of the Surveys and Opinions Branch.
Hedvig Ylvisaker, deputy chief of the Opinion Surveys Branch at ICD Neumberg, reported to the World Association for Public Opinion Research in September of 1949 on "German Attitudes and the Prospects for Democracy." Ylvisaker noted that "many of the stereotypes regarding Germans that point up to their basic unfitness for democracy fail to hold up in opinion research findings." Nevertheless, Ylvisaker warned the conference that a "competition of values [was] going on between individuals, more or less democratic in orientation, but also within individuals between their more traditional beliefs and the newer values of democracy."\textsuperscript{14}

The values of democracy that Ylvisaker and the Surveys and Opinions Branch were measuring were shaped by American experience, and provided the standard which gauged the democratization of Germany. Surveys indicated, Ylvisaker reported, that many Germans continued to exhibit a "lack of interest in or assumption of personal responsibility in political matters," noting that many voters were unaware of the issues of the August 1949 elections, or the policies of the various parties. "So in terms of a fundamental prerequisite--individual interest and initiative in political action--the present prospects for a healthy growth and development of democracy in the U.S. Zone of Germany cannot be looked upon as auspicious."\textsuperscript{15} As Everett C. Hughes had observed, postwar Germans retreated from political debate, content to remain silent on matters of public discussion.

The surveys did indicate, however, that while political action remained low, approval of democratic values was evident. Ylvisaker offered four such examples. Although three-quarters of the Germans interviewed by the Branch were uncertain whether their state constitutions allowed for the initiative and referendum, "three-quarters in the US Zone endorse the principle of public initiation of legislation and two-thirds support the principle of the referendum." While many Germans had admitted not attending political meetings, "three-fifths in
the US Zone consider political meetings desirable and two-thirds in the US Zone consider forums desirable." About seventy percent believed that representatives of the Landtag should listen to the opinions of their constituents. And, most notably, when asked to choose among a list of types of governments, "predominant opinion has favored a democratic representative government over any other form for Germany."16

German "traditionalism," defined as the "traditional German tendency to elevate order, authority, and security over civil liberties," proved another brake on democratic reform. A plurality of Germans polled in the US Zone, for example, believed that National Socialism was "a good idea, badly carried out," that "economic security" was preferred over "civil liberties," that the traditional pattern of tracking students between ages ten and twelve should remain intact, and "in connection with the traditional American conception of the separation of Church and State," most Germans favored mandatory religious education in the schools. "This and other evidences of German traditionalism," concluded Ylvisaker, "indicate that many Germans still lack the vigilant regard for individual civil rights which democrats believe to be the main bulwark against totalitarian encroachments in government."17 This survey indicated that deep, culturally ingrained habits remained in German life. Yet, when assessing the effectiveness of democratization efforts, Ylvisaker evoked images of the American democratic experience as the standard by which to measure the response of the Germans. James K. Pollock warned that such a standard was not legitimate; that a German standard was necessary to understand and judge German culture. For pollsters like Ylvisaker, however, "democratization" equated with "Americanization."

Despite the candid portrait painted by Ylvisaker, many within the structure of OMGUS remained wary of the reliability of American-sponsored surveys. Persistent problems of the Branch remained interviewer and sponsorship bias. This meant, specifically, concerns
that the Germans would not answer truthfully to American queries, but would rather give answers that favored US policy in order to curry favor. An important voice in this debate, Leo Crespi rejected such claims, arguing that American-sponsored surveys were as accurate, if not more so, than German-sponsored surveys. Consistent with much of his thought, Crespi held that the scientific rigor of the American samples—maintained through random sampling—ensured their reliability.

Crespi led a project which sought to determine the effects of sponsorship on German opinion, by comparing identical surveys by OMGUS and a German firm. The sample area chosen was Berlin, and the questions of this special survey were selected to reveal the "maximum MG [military government] sponsorship effects, if they exist," such as approval for National Socialism, or where Germans placed blame for the war. A "temporary" German Opinion Institute was established by the Americans for purposes of the experiment, with both surveys employing "a strict probability [random] rather than a quota sample." Both samples were then "matched"—variables between the two samples being statistically "smoothed out"—to account for variations in sex and age, producing two identical samples of 246 cases. "However," noted Crespi when the results began to be compared on these matched samples it was first discovered that the correlation factor introduced into the significance test by the matching was so small (of the order of +.15) that it was more than outweighed by the loss in cases...Secondly, it was seen that the matching process did not appreciably affect the sizes of the sponsorship differences that were obtained...When these considerations are added together, the indication is that matching, if anything, decreases the precision of the experiment. So it was finally decided to employ the original samples for the sponsorship comparisons...With matching the only formula that seemed to be available was the traditional PQ/n formula with the introduction of a correlational factor. It is well known that this formula is lacking in rigor with its assumption that the sample percentage (p) is equal to the population percentage (p). Thus armed with a theoretical apparatus, Crespi's experiment demonstrated that fears of OMGUS sponsorship bias were greatly exaggerated.
Analyzing the responses to the thirty-six questions asked by both polling sources, Crespi discerned no appreciable statistical proof pointing to sponsorship bias. Crespi did not deny that such bias existed, but contended "that neither in frequency or size are the possible sponsorship biases of such as scope as to seriously challenge the over-all value of occupation-sponsored polling in Germany."

Further, Crespi held that the experiment demonstrated that "German-sponsored polling also is open to sponsorship difficulties," and even that German-sponsored polls "greatly increases the proportion of contact failures, and in this and other related ways appreciably impairs what is otherwise an enviable sample." Crespi concluded that American sponsorship was not a problem, that it enjoyed the full confidence of the Germans, "and to raise such confidence to even higher levels it is not a change of sponsorship that is indicated so much as further familiarization and education in democratic polling."20 (emphasis mine)

Crespi's experiment did not go unchallenged. Frederick Williams, former director of Surveys for OMGUS, critiqued Crespi's interpretation of his data, contending that "it is more of an argument than a report on a definitive experiment." Williams held that most of the experiment depended upon Crespi's judgment as to the meaning of the results, not dependence upon proven scientific procedures. Thus, noted Williams, the section on "Experimental Design" did not "refer to experimental design or research plan but rather solely to a routine thought...about matching the two samples for analysis." Williams also took Crespi to task on his failure to use trend questions. "Although he discusses the findings of responses to what he recognizes as 'a basic trend question' he does not even at this point footnote the fact that relative evaluations of
results in time under identical sponsorship conditions provide for useful interpretation of poll results even if bias exists.\(^2\)

Williams' attack might have been based on personal reasons. Crespi's article, although dealing with OMGUS surveys, was published when he was the head of surveys for HICOG, in effect, Williams' replacement, a fact not unnoticed by Williams. "Mr. Crespi," argued Williams, "appears eager to assure the reader that under his direction the MG (now HICOG) operation is in full flower. He writes, for example, '...now that MG opinion polling in Germany has crystallized into a well-established operation...' and again '...danger of sponsorship bias in the early stages of the occupation was greater than it is today. For that reason the very early results of the MG survey operation cannot be looked upon as characterized by the same degree of precision as more recent findings.'" Williams understood these lines as a personal attack, and responded to the charge by asserting that "In every instance, except for deliberate experimentation, random n-th type selection of respondents was the rule. In his [Crespi's] words, 'strict probability' sampling was always employed.\(^2\)

In his rejoinder to Williams, Crespi pled innocence, that the observations of MG operations were not intended as a personal attack, but rather a comment on the dangers of sponsorship bias alone. "More research is needed on the problem of sponsorship in polling," concluded Crespi, "not only in Germany but wherever surveys are made. It is the intention of the survey staff in Germany to continue to study the problem as circumstances permit.\(^2\)

The foregoing episode in the story of random sampling in occupation Germany is significant in demonstrating the interactions between American images of democracy and the desire to "harden" the scientific rigor of sampling. Reliable sampling procedure was a necessary component of American efforts, since only legitimate samples could provide the requisite information on the scope of democratization in
Germany. Further, the Americans viewed German exposure to public opinion polling, in and of itself, as a lesson in democratic culture. The Americans believed that simply introducing polling techniques would democratize German culture. This concern for matters of procedure took precedence over matters of culture. As Ylvisaker's survey revealed, antidemocratic cultural traits remained in Germany, which technical questions over methodology could not solve.

Yet, the Americans still argued over methodology. The battles between Crespi and Williams reveal a discipline still struggling to define its procedures, its criteria of rigor, its source of legitimacy. Both men resorted to scientific procedures—and the random sample—to legitimate their positions; public opinion polling itself was reduced to an "experiment" in procedure.

Control of German Survey Research

The desire to democratize Germany and to create an effective procedure to sample opinion formed the pillars of American efforts to control the operations of German-sponsored centers of public opinion research. In a memo to the chief of ICD Research for the Land Wuerttemberg-Baden, Fred W. Trembour—chief of Field Staff for the Surveys Branch—addressed the question of German public opinion organizations in the US Zone:

There have been recent attempts in the [American Zone] to operate independent opinion polls by exclusively German groups. Particularly active organizations have appeared in Munich and Stuttgart. These we have observed rather closely for some time and have decided that for several reasons they are unqualified to conduct such work. Mr. Moeller in Munich is of the same opinion as a result of his observations; and these plus our stand...have led Mr. Moeller to take action thru his Land ICD to stop such polling by unqualified agencies...Harmful effect [sic] from the activity of such poorly qualified organizations include the spread of misinformation and the discrediting of opinion survey work in general. With the aim of preventing such damaging results, it is hoped that thru procedure by your Land ICD the work of opinion surveying can be confined to approved groups.
To that end, OMGUS, under the jurisdiction of ICD, established rules and procedures for the licensing and operation of German public opinion centers in the US Zone:

1) The following policies are established regarding the foundation of German public opinion survey agencies: a) No agency may be permanently supported by the German government, or by any political, economic, social, or religious interest group. Temporary projects undertaken at the behest of any such group, or supported financially, or by other real consideration, by any such group, must be so designated (naming the government agency or group supporting the project) in all reports of findings or in publications of results.

b) It is expected, as an indication of professional interest in social research, that a reasonable percentage of profits earned by commercial enterprises will be donated to universities or other non-profit research organizations for the purpose of methodological research, for the encouragement of study of the social sciences, or for the building of libraries and archives of publications or data relevant to study in the social science fields.

c) Every agency must be prepared to describe and discuss with qualified applicants the methods and procedures used in work projects whose results are published or otherwise disseminated to the public.

2) Authorization for the operation of a German public opinion survey agency may be granted after compliance with the following standards:

a) A review will be originally made by Military Government officials who are professionally qualified workers in the field of opinion research (e.g. staff members of ICD Opinions Surveys). This review will be based upon a consideration of statements prepared by the appellant agency and upon interviews with leading members of such a proposed agency. Statements will be submitted to the following points:
1. Theoretical or practical training of proposed staff.
2. Type of "sample" to be used and outline of sampling procedure.
3. Interviewing procedures and techniques.
4. Problems to be investigated, types of opinions, behavior, or attitudes to be examined.
5. Source or sources of financial support. If more than one source, estimated extent of each.
6. Methods proposed for publication or dissemination of results.

b) Screening of all leading members for political attitude and history by Land (in Berlin: Berlin Sector) ICD Personnel Control officials.

3) Authorization, once granted, will be continued subject to periodic technical reviews as described in par. 2a, or subject to review of political fitness of members as described in par. 2b. Serious deficiencies in either regard, or violations of basic policies (par. 1), provide sufficient grounds for revocation of authority to operate an agency.25

In licensing German polling agencies in order to ensure objective information dissemination, questions of scientific rigor were as important as political sponsorship. These regulations are reminiscent of OSS standards for creating objective intelligence information, suggesting, again, that technique was the primary concern of American authorities. Embedded in these rules is the faith that by controlling technique, the Americans could establish and control a German tradition of polling.

The Americans sought two avenues in their efforts to establish a polling tradition in Germany. OMGUS, through financial and logistical support, established its own German institute of public opinion. Gordon Textor, director of the Information Control Division, expressed the OMGUS desire to establish an American-style research facility in Germany:

Research Branch this division is interested in the development of a responsible German institute which could lay the ground work for a Public Opinion polling tradition in Germany. At the present time in the American zone there is no reliable German Public Opinion analysis group. The
Public Opinion studies carried out by Research Branch are done entirely under the direction of an American staff. It is felt that it is not too early to begin the groundwork for a German organization which could take over this work when Military Government no longer requires it.26

Textor noted that the British had introduced "the study of Public Opinion techniques at the University of Cologne, apparently with the help of the Gallup organization in the United States." The American-sponsored institute would similarly rely on university research and Gallup's methods of survey research.

ICD selected the University of Heidelberg as the site of a "German Institute for Research of Public Opinion." American instructions to the German researchers of the institute emphasized the rules governing German polling, but also the images of democracy embedded in American perceptions of survey research:

The Institute must be independent from government, political, economic or any other interest group...Research institutes in other countries have demonstrated that they are an important factor in democratic lands, and we have the impression that such an institute in Germany will be of enormous help and an important means of information for all, which will serve in the economic and spiritual "rebirth" [Neuaufbau] of the German people [Volkes].27

Here, again, American authorities assumed that accepting opinion survey techniques was itself an acceptance of American culture and democracy.

The work of the Institute was understood to reflect American values of democracy and science, but also the immediate needs of the Germans. Although the information provided by the Institute was wrapped around democratic images, it was to serve the needs of the press and radio as well as governments and political parties:

The goal of this Institute is to become acquainted with the opinion of the German population through the various...questions of public life, and this knowledge will be at the disposal of the government, the press, and radio broadcasters. By such means, they should provide an essential contribution to the greater contact between the leading offices and the people themselves, and thereby providing essential, practical work with the intention of realizing the foundations of democracy.28

Closely related to these values of democracy were concerns for scientific rigor. The Americans chose to locate the Institute in
Heidelberg since "the work of this research will be given a strong scientific foundation." American perceptions of public opinion polling were entwined with images of science and democracy.

In practice, however, the Institute reflected the practical concerns of the Germans. In the first place, samples would be formed through the quota method. Part of the reason for this may lie in the fact that the Institute was formed before the Gallup debacle in the States, but a more plausible reason was that the method was cheaper and did not rely as much on specially trained personnel. Indeed, the Institute was staffed with several "spare-time" interviewers. In the second place, the actual work of the Institute tended to focus less on the political role of polls, but on market research. Information gained was to benefit radio broadcasters, the press and market research.

The second avenue of American control was through the licensing of preexisting German centers of research. A newspaper report in the Stuttgart Sozialdemokrat of November 7, 1947 announced the formation of a new center of public opinion research, under the headline "Zur Ermittlung des Volkswillens." This choice of words—Volkswillens—ringing as it does with the cadences of the Nazis, seems an ironic term for a style of research that was to democratize German culture. It was perhaps for this reason that ICD sought out the founder of the Buero zur Erforschung der Oeffentlichen Meinung and insisted on a license from OMGUS.

OMGUS learned that the founder, Ulrich Stock, had served in the German army, in the Waffen-SS, but had been reduced in rank to sergeant since "he was not considered politically trustworthy. "While Stock's political background seemed legitimate, his scientific credentials were not. "Mr. Stock has no university training," reported Lefebre. "He has acquired whatever knowledge he has of sociology and psychology through self study. His assistants are mostly very young people who are interested in a branch of research—public opinion surveys—which is
still comparatively unknown to the majority of Germans." Stock's organization was formed at a time when OMGUS had yet to lay down its formal legal structure of licensing for surveys. By December 1947, however, Stock had been informed by Chief Williams' staff that a license was necessary to engage in survey research.

To his German customers, Stock emphasized the scientific methods of his Bureau. Stock, however, was not a university trained researcher, with an interest in pure science. He was a businessman, and, as a "price list" for Radio Stuttgart demonstrates, scientific precision cost money. For RM 3000, Stock promised to Radio Stuttgart a representative cross-section of the entire population of Land Wuerttemberg-Baden (400 people), or a cross-section of 250-300 radio listeners. The survey had a standard deviation of 7%. But "In the interest of greater precision," for RM 6000 the cross-section had 800-1000 people, and the standard deviation decreased to 3.16%. At higher prices, more information could be produced, with a more reliable sample, and with greater precision. The costs of Stock's surveys were tied to sample size, accuracy and range of information, all under the language of science. Stock used opinion polling techniques for economic, not democratic, ends; in effect, he was selling precision information.

It was precisely these methods which concerned the Opinion Surveys Branch. By January 1948, Stock had begun to report to Opinion Surveys. Of particular interest was the construction of the cross-section. The precision of the surveys derived from the identity cards held by all men and women in Wuerttemberg-Baden. Stock's sample was based, however, on the quota method. "Within the regional distribution," reported Stock, "and the determination of the data for sex, occupation and age, the interviewer (with the exception of certain instructions) has a free hand." It was the bias produced by this "free hand" that incoming Chief Leo Crespi abhorred.
While the random sample remained an ideal, the quota sample reflected the reality of German polling. Fred Trembour, by February of 1948, concluded that "It is apparent to us that the strong interest in their work shown by this group plus their intense research in the meager literature available to them is more than offset by their lack of formal schooling, lack of experience, and basically poor orientation with regard to the purpose and nature of opinion study." While not a "scientist," and perhaps not as democratically oriented as the Americans would like, Stock did reflect an important reality of German survey research: that the democratic function of polling would remain a subset in the larger German context of survey research.

Wirkliche Meinung

German survey research did not always converge with the standards set by the Americans, or with American images of the functions of survey research. Often times, Americans viewed German attempts at survey research as "missing the mark," meaning achieving American standards. Far from missing the point, however, the Germans placed survey research within the context of German culture, to service German needs.

One area that Americans viewed with suspicion was German methodological rigor. George Katona, Program Director of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center, stressed the need for improvements in German survey techniques. The lag in the scientific quality of German research stemmed in part, he argued, from the long held tradition of speculative thought in German social science. "In the case of German social science," argued Katona, "there was much resistance to change because emphasis on measurement was frequently considered an American idea, while the development of all-inclusive philosophical systems was associated with the supremacy of German social science." Katona had made a valuable observation: was the real issue the acceptance of
techniques and methodology, or a fundamental difference between German and American culture? Could real change occur when the Germans viewed social scientific techniques as artifacts of American culture?

On the eve of full sovereignty for the Federal Republic, Katona clung to the American preoccupation with the democratic function of empirical survey research:

"Empirical orientation of the social sciences may help strengthen political democracy in Germany. Such an orientation could influence German college education in the direction of greater concern with and respect for facts. Furthermore, frequent use and widespread acceptance of public opinion surveys may help convince the German people that the individual and his opinions matter."

Katona's observations are an example of American democratization efforts via the Americanization of German social science. This logic—that American techniques of social science research were, by definition, democratic—drives Rockefeller Foundation patronage of the social sciences in postwar Germany, to which we will turn later.

Katona congratulated the Americans, and especially the Reactions Analysis Staff (RAS) of HICOG—under the direction of Crespi—for introducing "probability sampling, scientific methods of questionnaire construction and quality interviewing. By demonstrating that reliable data may be obtained through personal interviews, it has set an example to German opinion research institutes." Despite the best efforts of the RAS, however, the Germans, when left to themselves, did not always meet American standards. Katona believed it "appropriate to raise the question whether German survey organizations could do the job, either alone or, initially, under contract with and under the guidance of an American governmental office. Though the RAS has accomplished a great deal in promoting German social research, further methodological improvements are needed before German survey agencies can provide information of the same scientific standards as that collected by the RAS during the past few years."
At issue was the continued use, by the Germans, of the quota sample method. Katona lauded the Institut fuer Demoskopie at Allensbach—under the direction of Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann—for its "attention to theoretically oriented survey research." The Institute provided data on political, social and economic questions, and additionally performed contract research with the Adenauer Government. While the Institut championed scientific methods, however, "The weakest point," Katona noted, "is to be found in the use of quota sampling methods in political studies (some recent surveys have, however, been carried out with random samples)." 36

The value of random sampling was not lost on the Germans. Hans Kellerer, professor at Munich and attached to the Statistical Office of Bavaria, noted that "It would be desirable that also the other agencies in Germany engaged in opinion research seriously endeavor to give preference to random sampling over the quota method." Until such a day arrived, argued Kellerer, the Germans would have to "make do" with the less rigorous, but less expensive, quota method. In describing the use of the quota sample at Allensbach, for example, Kellerer offered that "In favor of the quota method it is said that it is materially cheaper and nevertheless furnishes useful results when adequately designed. The main objective for the foreseeable future seems to be to test and develop the method of representative sampling under German conditions and to make of it as perfect a tool as possible in order to furnish workable surveys for economic, scientific and political purposes at relatively low cost." 37 Indeed, what seemed to separate German institutes from the HICOG surveys was the former's continued use of quota methods.

The clash between American random samples and German quota samples may have resulted from the two competing American techniques of survey research which were transplanted in Germany. As Noelle-Neumann suggests, during the occupation the two divergent American styles of
survey research developed alongside and in contrast to each other.

Quota sampling—in addition to being officially sponsored, as in the case of the German institute for public opinion—worked its way into German practice through students like Noelle-Neumann, who studied in the United States. "In 1937-8," she recalls,

I was a German exchange student in the School of Journalism at the University of Missouri and busy working on the dissertation topic I had been given at the University of Berlin: 'What do American newspapers do to captivate their readers?' With such a topic, I could not help but come across the works of George Gallup...who, along with Archibald Crossley and Elmo Roper, had proved what surveys with representative samples and oral interviews could accomplish in the presidential election of 1936. In 1940, after the war had begun, my dissertation appeared as a book in Germany under the title Researching Opinion and the Masses in the USA: Surveys on Politics and the Press. In 1946, a psychologist working for the French military government saw the book...He found me in the French occupation zone in Allensbach on Lake Constance and commissioned me to organize surveys among young people for the French occupational force. I finished seven surveys; publication of results began in July 1947. Early in 1948 the Allensbach Institut fuer Demoskopie was incorporated.

Much of the early contact German researchers had with American survey techniques derived from the older methods of the Gallup organization.

The second source for survey techniques—the random sample—came from the newer methods of the OMGUS surveys, championed by researchers such as Crespi, and legitimated by the Americans as methodologically rigorous and an institution of democracy. Noelle-Neumann argues that the ideal conditions for random sampling in Germany "led to a continuing strong trust in random surveys in Germany and to a corresponding contempt for the quota method. We see this mood indicated in the title a statistician [Friedrich Wendt] gave to an article published [in 1960] in the official periodical Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv: 'When will the quota method be buried?'" Despite these objections, the quota method persisted among German research organizations. The low cost of such samples explains their persistence; however, Noelle-Neumann suggests that another reason Germans maintained the use of quota sampling lies in their utility. "The almost religious ardor with which
random procedures were championed," argues Noelle-Neumann, "could not prevent the quota method from becoming generally accepted, largely because Allensbach election predictions proved its worth." Far from lacking methodological competency, German researchers struggled with two competing American traditions of survey research.

Perhaps because the field was so relatively new, the Americans were not able to impose a ready-made paradigm of survey research upon the Germans. In fact, the Americans seemed rather limited in their vision of the use of survey research by the Germans. Pollsters in the United States continued to use quotas samples, and opinion polling served other functions beside the civic model of democracy, such as market research and attitude surveys. The Americans made technique the main issue in occupied Germany, believing that proper methodology would lead to democratization. The Germans, while absorbing American techniques and practices, sought to place survey research in a wider, more appropriate context than simply the "democratic" function, to make the survey a native part of German culture.

Survey research fit within the German philosophical tradition. The subject of public opinion became a source of philosophical speculation. Friedrich Lenz, addressing a gathering of opinion researchers in Frankfurt in March 1950, legitimated the value of public opinion by placing it within the German philosophic tradition. Lenz contended that Meinung (opinion) did not equate to offentliche Meinung (public opinion), for as Hegel had argued, "Opinion is a subjective idea, any thought, one's imagination." "Eine Meinung ist 'mein'," argued Lenz, playfully suggesting that "An opinion is 'mine.'" For Hegel, and for Lenz, a personal opinion was not rational (vernunftig), and as a consequence, was not real (wirklich). The only real opinion, therefore, was public opinion.40

Public opinion existed outside the individual, or rather, public opinion was formed within the context of the individual's social
interactions. "The individual," argued Lenz, "is not only an isolated entity, but, through the medium of language, is also a 'social animal.'"

The goal of public opinion research, then, was to discern such social opinions, to examine opinion not as a function of individual expression, but of group opinion. "The key to this discipline," concluded Lenz, "will lie with the exact representative-statistical structure of every group by their characteristics, and only by all their essential (wesentlichen) characteristics." This insight would be shared by other German researchers. Kellerer, in his survey of German public opinion research, noted that the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt engaged in research "based on the hypothesis that an opinion is not formed in the isolated individual as it presents itself in an individual situation, but in the group in which the individual moves."

To understand public opinion, the Germans seemed to have been saying, one must consider its source in the social web between individuals, not within the individual himself. The Americans hoped opinion polling would enhance German social science; some Germans saw its value in enhancing philosophic debate, revealing another clash between American science and German Wissenschaft.

Outside the philosophical questions raised by public opinion, an overwhelming purpose for German survey research was market and consumer research. This was certainly the case with Ulrich Stock's company; further, many of the research centers established by the Germans had consumer and market research as their main objective. These included the Institute for Market Research and Observation (EMNID) at Bielefeld—which included Freidrich Lenz—the Association for Market and Opinion Research at Frankfurt, the German Institute for Statistical Opinion and Consumer Research at Hamburg, the Society for Market Research at Hamburg, and the IFO-Institute for Economic Research at Munich. The last research center proves an interesting case, in that the researchers there established a new technique for measuring opinion,
much to the consternation of some American researchers. The Konjunkturtestverfahren, or Business Test Method, was statistical measure of entrepreneurial expectations used to suggest future trends in industry and to provide reports to the business sector prior to official government statistics. The method, with its apparent lack of rigor, initially met with the disapproval of American researchers—and the Rockefeller Foundation, as we will see in the next chapter—but by the mid 1950's, its use had spread throughout Europe, and even to the United States. Far from slavishly copying the Americans, the Germans set upon new techniques and extended purposes for survey research. Survey research gained legitimacy only inasmuch as it fit within German culture.

At a conference at Frankfurt in April 1952, leading German researchers gathered to exchange ideas and to comment on the state of survey research in Germany. Many of the discussions dealt with topics of concern to the Germans: depth psychology, sociology, group experiments and market research. Leo Crespi was also in attendance, and addressed the subject of "America's Interest in German Survey Research:"

We have tried to provide aid not only because of a general interest in helping scientific colleagues, but also because we feel that public opinion research has so much to contribute to really democratic functioning of social institutions. It is our belief that the understanding that polling can provide of the values, fears, aspirations, and confusions of the rank and file of a citizenry has much to offer to any government that would be for the people and by the people.44

While the Americans continued to evoke images of American democracy, the Germans were already reworking survey research for their own purposes. The Americans could suggest techniques, but could not alter the culture in which those techniques resided.

We are confronted with two images of public opinion in Germany. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, the preeminent opinion researcher in Germany today, epitomizes one image, by suggesting that as the "voice of the people," public opinion represents a culture's "social skin," the values
and assumptions which hold a society together. Evoking Lenz's thoughts or those of the Frankfurt School, Noelle-Neumann argues that public opinion refers to those "attitudes or behaviors one must express in public if one is not to isolate oneself...those attitudes one can express without running the danger of isolating oneself." Closely tied to these definitions is the one which emphasizes public opinion as a form of social agreement:

Public opinion is an understanding on the part of people in an ongoing community concerning some affect- or value-laden question which individuals as well as governments have to respect at least by compromise in their overt behavior under the threat of being excluded or losing one's standing in society.45

"Social skin," in Noelle-Neumann's estimation, "refers to our society, which public opinion protects like a skin, holding it together. On the other hand it refers to individuals, for they who suffer at the hands of public opinion suffer from the sensitivities of their social skin. Did not Rousseau, who introduced the concept of public opinion into modern language, in fact express what was most important about it when he described it as the enemy of the individual and the protector of society?"46 Public opinion polls have created a new social skin, a new form of identity for the Germans of the Federal Republic.

Noelle-Neumann describes the Allensbach surveys as "the nation's own description of itself," a more scientific form of national identity, since "only the self-portrayal of groups in the form of polls results can project a picture that is comparatively objective."47 Surveys offer the Germans a representative-statistical form of national identity, outside of place, language, culture or history.

The Austrian observer of the German language, Hans Weigel epitomizes another image of the survey. In lamenting the debasement of the postwar German language, and the role of consumerism in this debasement, Weigel identifies polling as one of the evils of the consumer society. He singles out the "market consultant," "the hucksters of the representative sample, cross-section analysts of
powdered soaps, bards of body-odor and bad breath, psalmists of underarm moisture," whose influence is felt all through German culture.48 If public opinion polling gauges the "voice of the people," perhaps that voice is that of consumers, not citizens, a position Ludwig Erhard and his Freiburg School advisors would make.

American researchers considered occupied Germany a great laboratory experiment in survey research, where the latest techniques of random sampling were to be tested, at a time when Congress was backing away from support for survey research. The concern for scientific rigor and precise measurement was coupled with concerns for the democratization of German culture. The Americans wove together images of social science and democracy, but in concentrating on techniques and methodologies, failed to address the more important issues of German culture.
Notes


2Ibid., 181, 183.


4Ibid., 34-35.

5Converse, 202-203.

6Weisberg, 35-37.


8Ibid., 8.


10"Brief Comment," 5-6.


15Ibid., 304-305.

16Ibid., 305.


19Ibid., 157.

20Ibid., 158-159, 167, 170.

21Frederick W. Williams, "A Note on 'The Influence of Military
Government Sponsorship in German Opinion Polling by Leo P. Crespi,

22Ibid., 415-416.

23Ibid., 418.

24Trembour to Boxer, February 5, 1948, Box 153, Folder "Stock--Organization--Stuttgart."

25"Policies established regarding the foundation of German public opinion survey organizations," undated, Box 143, Folder "DEM."

26Text or to IA and C Division, E and RA Branch OMGUS, September 5, 1947, Box 143, Folder "DEM."

27Memo, "Grundung eines deutschen Instituts fuer Erforschung der offentlichen Meinung," undated, Box 143, Folder "DEM."

28Memo, "Empfehlungsschreiben fuer Gründung eines deutschen Institutes fuer Meinungsforschung," May 21, 1948, Box 143, Folder "DEM."

29Lefebre to OMG Wuerttemberg-Baden, November 13, 1947, Box 153, Folder "Stock--Organization--Stuttgart."

30Williams to Boerner, December 22, 1947, Box 153, Folder "Stock--Organization--Stuttgart."


32Stock to Trembour, January 22, 1948, Box 153, Folder "Stock--Organization--Stuttgart."


36Ibid., 473-474.


39Ibid., 46.


41Ibid., 7-8.
42 Kellerer, 514.


46 Ibid., 182.


Chapter VI
Democracy through American Social Science

Prior to the Second World War, the Rockefeller Foundation was the chief source of social science funding in the United States. The patronage of pragmatic social science research characterized Rockefeller Foundation support of American social science, as well as that of European universities and institutes. Both the Foundation and its predecessor, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, sought out European social scientists for training in American-style empirical research, and thereby liberate them "from the 'speculative inertia' of traditional social science."¹ Indeed, such a uniformity of research principles was intended to break down national barriers and aid in international cooperation.²

Research in Germany was no exception, and the Rockefeller Foundation patronized those institutes that utilized empirical social research. These included the Institut fuer Weltwirtschaft und Seeverkehr in Kiel, Alfred Weber's Institut fuer Sozial-und Staatswissenschaften in Heidelberg and the Hochschule fuer Politik in Berlin. Still, officers of the Foundation continued to run into "speculative inertia," with most German social scientists content with "equipping themselves with a lot of theories about the subject before they go out to work to study the facts."³ Nevertheless, Foundation funding for the "proper" institutes continued and was even extended, briefly, into the regime of the National Socialists.

At the conclusion of the war, the Rockefeller Foundation resumed the funding of the social sciences in Germany. In its role as patron, the Foundation could control the allocation of badly needed funds
necessary for the reconstruction of German social science, and thereby
had the power to control the research agenda of the Germans in a way not
possible before the war. Foundation objectives remained basically the
same as before the war—to move the Germans away from a speculative,
philosophical orientation toward the American ideal of empirical social
science research. However, in the wake of the Nazi regime, Foundation
policy toward German social science reflected a slightly altered
purpose. American social science was redefined as intrinsically
democratic, and would be used for the reorientation and reconstruction
of German culture toward democracy. The officers of the Foundation
believed that only through American-style social science could Germans
produce knowledge about political practice, economic conditions and
social relations—knowledge believed necessary to solve social problems,
to create an informed citizenry and thus form a democratic society.
Practical knowledge was by definition democratic; airy theory and
speculation had contributed to the rise of the Nazis.

The Rockefeller Foundation played a critical role in introducing
American-style research techniques into the structure of German social
science research. Although the research agenda may have been
redirected, the Foundation did not, however, transplant the entire
sociopolitical context of American social science into Germany. Like
the public opinion pollsters of OMGUS, the Foundation believed that the
introduction of techniques of empirical social science research would
lead, naturally, toward a more democratic society. The Foundation
characterized much of its work in Germany as a "translation" of
American-style research; this proves an appropriate metaphor for
describing the failure of Foundation policies in postwar Germany.
Social science methods were like American words or phrases; the larger
cultural assumptions which sustained American social science were like
the entire language. The Americans could teach the Germans a few useful
"phrases" but in order to carry out the sort of wide scale
The Foundation—and the Americans in general—might have enjoyed greater success had it not subordinated that which was German. As James K. Pollock had warned, to affect real change in Germany one had to work within German culture rather than trying to subvert it. It was this larger culture that the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation could not change; it was this larger culture that offered an alternative to the American definition of knowledge as democratic.

The Rockefeller Foundation and Prewar Perceptions

The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial had been established to fund social science activities; when it and other Rockefeller institutions were consolidated in 1929, the original commitment to fund pragmatic social science research was retained. Both the director of the LSRM, Beardsley Ruml, and the director of the social sciences in the newly created Rockefeller Foundation, Edmund E. Day, sought to strengthen empirical research. Day’s representative in the Paris branch office was Tracey B. Kittredge, who, in 1932, submitted a report to Day’s office on the status of the social sciences in Germany on the eve of the Nazi seizure of power. Kittredge’s report proved catalytic in shaping Foundation perceptions of German social science.

The central thesis of the report was that empirical social research lacked legitimacy within German higher education, and that this should be the target of Foundation activities in Germany. Kittredge reported:

Social science research in Germany suffers, as in most countries, from the fact that the subject matter it deals with is still regarded by those controlling the purse strings as amenable to treatment by the time honored methods of the philosopher. The social sciences are still regarded as speculative rather than scientific disciplines. The conception of them as inductive quasi-laboratory subjects is just beginning to dawn. The consequence of this situation, of course, is that most of the mature leaders are in fact social philosophers
...or social historians rather than social scientists. Of recent years, however, the interest in careful inductive work has increased notably. Many of the younger scholars have had some initiation and some of the older leaders are eager to direct the research efforts of their students in this direction. Inductive research might be given considerable impetus by relatively moderate aid."

In many ways, Kittredge's observations and recommendations provided the blueprint of future funding in Germany, well into the postwar period. The Foundation sought out those Germans conversant with American empirical methods and offered grants in support their work.

The primary targets of Foundation funding were in economics, sociology and political science. These three disciplines appeared as the triumvirate of the social sciences, for they were perceived as having the most developed research techniques. This tendency to locate the center of social science research with the three may have begun with the survey of American social science in 1923—under Ruml's direction—by Lawrence K. Frank, which singled them out as defining social science. Kittredge's report would similarly focus on these three disciplines.

Kittredge considered economics the most developed of the social sciences in Germany. "Economics is well developed in Germany," began Kittredge. "Specialization is carried much further and there is enormously more economic research going on within German universities than within French universities. Until recently, however, German economics had not enjoyed a high reputation outside the country...due to the predominance of the traditions either of the historical or of the philosophical school...Economic research was either minutely descriptive or philosophically speculative...German [economics, however] appears to be on the verge of important developments."

Such developments included the work at the Institut fuer Weltwirtschaft und Seeverkehr at Kiel. Kittredge noted the fine library, the archives and a newspaper clipping service, and described Kiel as "a Mecca for research workers interested in international..."
Kittredge also singled out research on business cycles as one of the more important German contribution to economics, noting the work at Berlin at the Institut fuer Konjunkturforschung and at the University of Frankfurt, and the individual contributions of Arthur Spiethoff, among others. Kittredge also cited work in public finance, transportation economics, agricultural economics, business administration and region economic research as important areas of empirical work.

Kittredge found some important works in German sociology, but that in general, the field was not as advanced as economics. "To understand many a German sociological article," Kittredge reported, "one must know well the entire history of German philosophy." Nevertheless, Kittredge observed some significant developments. He noted that Mannheim's seminars at Frankfurt dealt with research into social problems, such as women in politics, the sociology of the immigrant and the influence of education on social position. Horkheimer's work at the Institut fuer Sozialforschung was singled out for his study of labor attitudes, which relied on questionnaires. Kittredge did not visit Von Wiese at Cologne and the Institut fuer Sozialwissenschaften, but remarked on the scholarly journals in sociology produced.

As for political science, Kittredge remarked that "there is no equivalent on the continent to our term Political Science." If such studies existed, they were part of the study of law, or there search was undertaken by men labeled "economists" or "sociologists." Kittredge did suggest that the Hochschule fuer Politik at Berlin was an important institute: "[It] was organized in 1920 for the purpose of providing a scientific center for the political education of the new generation in Germany. Its curriculum comes very close to covering the whole field of political science in the American sense...since the recent grant from the R.F. [it] may become the most important center for research in Germany."
In general, Kittredge suggested that German social science was not advanced, but showed signs of improvement. It is important to note, of course, that the standards Kittredge applied to the German case were the empirical studies produced in American universities. His judgement was based, ultimately, on the scientific rigor of German social science.

Kittredge concluded his report by suggesting three funding mechanisms the Foundation could employ for German social science. These included long term grants to institutes, short term grants to one-man centers, or grants to fund specific research projects. Beyond these recommendations, the tenor of Kittredge's report was cautious and circumspect. "The above report," Kittredge concluded, "is not a plea for an immediate and large program in Germany. Political and economic conditions there are changing too rapidly to warrant anything else than a policy of caution for sometime to come." This conclusion appears apocalyptic now; with the rise of the Nazis, and the pressures of Gleichschaltung, funding became impossible. What remained of Foundation funding during the Nazi period—such as at Kiel and Berlin—was terminated by 1938.

Surveys of Germany 1946-1950

Caution characterized Rockefeller Foundation policy toward Germany between 1946 and 1950. Some limited funds were granted, for example, to the resurrection of German university life through programs such as the University of Chicago-University of Frankfurt exchange. Funds were also made available to rebuild libraries by restocking books and scholarly journals. In general, however, the Foundation did not leap to fund social science activities with the same energy as before the war. Instead, the Foundation sponsored several trips to Germany in order to survey conditions there and to aid in the formulation of policy.
The first survey was conducted in 1946 by Foundation trustees John D. Rockefeller III and William I. Myers, whose observations were significant in shaping Foundation policy in Germany. Both concluded that the future of Germany was dependent upon an improved economy; all other concerns, whether political or cultural, could not be considered until then. Nevertheless, both suggested ways in which the Foundation could introduce democracy into the culture of Germany, chiefly by focusing on education. Rockefeller suggested five project areas for the "dissemination and application of knowledge" in Germany: provide books; create exchange programs for teachers; establish cultural centers; provide special training for school administrators and teachers; and offer fellowships for promising teachers. Although not all of these recommendations were followed through, they did represent the basic framework of Foundation policies until 1950; for instance, exchanges were initiated, books programs were established. The most important facet of this framework, however, was the implicit recognition that the knowledge transferred to Germany was to be American and democratic.

Another survey was carried out between January and February 1947 by Albert R. Mann. The finished Mann survey reflected a compilation of his notes, Mann having died before presenting his findings. Mann’s survey was broad and comprehensive, dealing with general conditions in Germany—such as the economy, political life, youth problems and education—as well as more technical matters, such as higher education and research in the natural sciences, medicine and the humanities.

Mann found the social sciences in a particularly poor state. His notes pointed to two causes for the poor quality of German social science research. First, the Nazis had cut off communication with the outside world—a sort of intellectual autarky—which denied German scholars access to work produced in England or America. Consequently, what work remained in Germany was tied to the tradition of philosophical
speculation which had dominated German social science. As Mann observed,

Such sociology as existed was largely philosophical and theoretical, as opposed to factual, realistic sociology. And as Professor Thurnwald of Berlin stated to Mr. Mann, philosophical sociology was of little value in Germany today. It was wholly separated from economy and had become a separate discipline. Professor Gerloff at Frankfort, for example, had specialized in public finance, but with the coming of the Nazis he had changed his field to historical studies on the origins of money and ethnology—a complete diversion.*

German social science had long been recognized as "not useful" by Americans, but Mann's observations revealed a subtle shift in perception: because of the control by the Nazis, German speculative social science was now "tainted," by virtue of its survival and persistence under Nazi patronage, a perception that did not exist prior to the rise of the Nazis.

Of more immediate concern was that German social science was not in a position to be deployed to solve the pressing social and economic problems facing postwar Germany. Mann recalled a conversation with Nelson of the Economics Branch, who noted that "there was no German word for 'sampling,' and that the Germans were at least 20 years behind the times on statistical procedures. The authoritarian control had created problems of a very abnormal character and a clear understanding of what made up the market seemed unknown in Germany." Mann himself reflected:

In the new bi-zonal (British-American) government institute being set up at Minden, the joint economic staff was required to set prices and to deal with questions of business cycles. The change from a controlled, autharchic [sic] economy to a free economy called for major economic adjustments, yet the economic staff lacked the basic data for their task. As a result, these economists were undertaking research rather than dealing with economic problems. They needed to look to a research institution outside the government for the facts. Only such an institute, independent of the government, could guarantee a free, objective development, and Hemberg recommended that if the social science research institute at Kiel could be put on its feet, it could render important research services to the bi-zonal government.
Thus, the push for objective, practical social science that characterized Foundation policy before the war carried a renewed sense of urgency in postwar Germany.

The survey of University of Chicago professor and Foundation representative Robert J. Havighurst between September and November 1947 reflected similar observations as Mann; however, Havighurst would lay greater stress on the role of American social science in the democratization of Germany. Havighurst's survey also dealt with higher education, but considered broader contours of German life, including attitudes, health care and daily economic existence. Thus, Havighurst's recommendations to the Foundation were intended to deal with more than simply higher education. He suggested four recommendations: restore communications with the outside world; provide scientific equipment, supplies and printed materials; constant study of the process of democratization in Germany; and training leaders in crucial areas, such as public health, communication, youth work, teacher training and the social sciences and human relations.¹⁷

This fourth recommendation underscored the importance Havighurst placed on the social sciences for the construction of a democratic culture in Germany. The "Ghettoization" of Germany had contributed to the poor state of social science; as Havighurst observed "the Germans seem not to have kept up with modern research in economics nor to have developed the use of essential research tools such as statistics." This was the result of Nazi purges: "The social sciences," Havighurst argued, "suffered more under National Socialism in Germany than any other branch of knowledge. The best of the social scientists were discharged, their books destroyed, and their influence dissipated." [emphasis mine]¹⁸ Thus, for democracy to be fully effective, the social sciences had to be reconstructed in accordance with modern standards, meaning American standards.
The social sciences suffered not only at the hands of the Nazis, but also from a restricted place in the German university system. Havighurst noted that

The social sciences which are thought of in American universities as a well-organized and integrated set of departments of economics, political science, sociology, social anthropology, and psychology with certain aspects of history and geography do not exist and never did exist in Germany. The Universities of Frankfurt and Munich are the only ones in the western zones with a faculty or division of social sciences; all the other universities in the three western zones divide the social sciences between the faculty of the school of law, where economics and a small amount of political science are taught, and the faculty of philosophy, where a small amount of psychology and an even smaller amount of sociology are taught.17

The problem of Germany was not just simply a lack of qualified researchers but of an institutional structure antithetical to American-style social research.

For Havighurst, American-style social science was not only the standard by which the social sciences were to be judged, but was also—by definition—an agent of democratization. Havighurst contended that

The purposes of instruction and research in the social sciences in Germany or any other modern society may be said to be: 1) to provide data and analysis of economic, political, and social processes, 2) to produce informed, active, and moral citizens. If reconstruction is to proceed along democratic lines in Germany, social sciences must be developed so as to achieve both of these purposes fairly well.20

Everyone, including Germans, understood "that the social sciences are not being used adequately for fact-finding and factual analysis,"21 that is, not toward pragmatic ends.

Also implicit in Havighurst's judgement was the belief that social science provided a more effective conceptual framework with which understand and appreciate democratic institutions. He observed a class of university students in English and American literature who aspired to university positions:

In the university they are encouraged to specialize in a particular area and rather discouraged from taking courses
outside their special area. Consequently, none of these young people had studied any of the social sciences except history. Yet they were all going to teach German boys and girls about English and American institutions through the medium of the language and literature of these countries. It seemed to me that they were quite unprepared for this responsibility, not that they should take anything they find in Britain or America as ipso facto democratic but rather that they should have sufficient general knowledge about economic, social, and political life in the modern world to be able to find their way around in English and American literature and to help their students orient themselves to this world.22

Here, again, Havighurst identified social scientific knowledge as intrinsically democratic and a more effective tool in understanding democracy.

The survey of 1950 conducted by Joseph H. Willits, director of the social sciences for the Foundation, marked a critical transition in funding activity toward Germany. Willits' report of his trip suggested that a new direction in Foundation policy toward Germany was necessary, one which was more cost effective and which coincided with Foundation policy of "the promotion of knowledge and its effective application to human interests." He argued that the Foundation had followed policies laid down by the military authorities, and had essentially acted as a supplement to military government funding. Between January 1948 and April 1949, the Foundation had spent over $600,000 on activities in Germany: 32 percent on exchange of experts, 30 percent on general intercultural exchange, 31 percent on youth and student activities and less than 7 percent on research projects. By following a line close to the interests of HICOG, Willits contended, "it is fairly clear that our German program...was essentially outside the Foundation's usual channels of interest. In good measure it supplemented the efforts of the official agencies and, broadly, followed their directions and methods."

Willits' policy suggestion, therefore, was to no longer mimic the military authorities: "Any Rockefeller Foundation program for Germany must therefore be highly selective and for purposes not covered by the program of HICOG."23
The chief area of interest for Willits was funding for higher education. He believed universities had been neglected by the military authorities, overshadowed by funding for and attention to primary and secondary education. While he praised the distinguished history of the German university system, and emphasized the crucial position it held in the future shape of Germany, Willits nevertheless perceived problems. "German universities," Willits reported, "have not kept step with the social changes of the times and...they have concentrated too much on the specialist intellect to the neglect of the whole man. As a system of human relations, the German universities are archaic. Their relations with contemporary social life and the real world are often remote and highly academic in the bad case." He cited a report from Lord Lindsay, which argued:

If men and women do not learn at the university to fulfil their duty within the social body, it will be impossible to avoid a new political catastrophe. Universities which do not teach their students in this way must expect to be faced one day not with constructive proposals for their reform but with indiscriminate revolution.

Foundation policy, Willits concluded, had to focus on "educational the highest cultural and intellectual level." To that end, Willits suggested a five part program for German higher education, which had important implications for the funding of the social sciences. The five were: aid for training students for university, interuniversity collaboration of the sort begun between Chicago and Frankfurt, support of research, support for the Free University and an examination of scientific and scholarly literature.

Of importance to the social sciences was the provision for research. Funds for research were to be limited to those groups with specific research proposals, subject to the Foundation's interpretation of useful research. In terms of social science, this meant "a) scientific study of problems of the real, human world, as distinguished from the armchair logic on which German professors have so heavily
concentrated [and] b) studies which would help the emerging Germany to form its new ideals out of its own better past and its present opportunity. While Foundation policy had shifted emphasis, its perception of the social sciences remained essentially unaltered: social scientific knowledge used as an agent of reorientation toward democracy.

Patronage of Social Knowledge

The funding of the social sciences must be viewed within the larger objectives of the Rockefeller Foundation in Germany, namely the production of useful, practical knowledge that was scientifically rigorous and which would contribute to their orientation of German culture toward democracy. As was the case before the war, patronage favored the disciplines of economics, sociology and political science.

Economics: Economics in Germany had been the most developed of the social sciences, according to the standards set by the Foundation. Consequently, funding policy was aimed less at establishing a tradition as it was to resurrect the better elements of German economics. This included funding the Institute for International Economics at the University of Kiel, but also included centers which studied the business cycle, such as the IFO-Institute for Economic Research in Munich.

Foundation patronage for the Institute for International Economics reflects the shifting funding priorities which characterized the period between 1946 and 1950. The Institute recovered quickly after the war; by 1949 its building had been largely restored and, more importantly, the library had been spared and had been moved back to Kiel. Since the Institute's reputation as a first-class center of economic research was assured, the Foundation sought only to strengthen its position; this meant money for the library, to purchase books unavailable to German scholars during the war. As the Director Fritz Baade stated, "American books, year books and periodicals have always represented one of the
most important parts of our library, and since most of them were not available for us since 1940, considerable gaps must be filled in order to keep up with the research work.\textsuperscript{27} Money for books and scholarly publications fit well with Havighurst's objective of restoring communication with Germany and ending its intellectual "ghettoization."

Funds were also made available for travel grants, the purpose of which was to bring German scholars to the United States to confer with experts and to observe American techniques first hand. The significance of these exchanges went beyond merely the exchange of information; as Baade explained:

An opportunity to study at first hand American taxation policy and the practical administration of US public finance, particularly as regards modern budgeting, would not only be a great personal professional advantage for Dr. [Rudolf] Binder [a potential grant recipient], but also serve public German interests. The USA having made such great progress during the last decade in functional fiscal policy guided by economic principles, it is essential the German experts should become acquainted with this policy and its implementation. This also would be a means of promoting closer economic and political cooperation among both nations.\textsuperscript{26}

In this case, the Foundation could accomplish two goals at once: the introduction of American social science techniques into German public finance and the reorientation of Germany toward the West.

By the mid-1950's, Foundation funding for the Institute reflected Willits' concern for funding specific research proposals. For example, Baade prepared a study for the Council on Foreign Relations titled "The Recovery Program for Western Germany," which relied heavily on statistical techniques. The Foundation also granted $5,000 to Erich Schneider—a fellow of the Foundation before the war and a travel grant recipient after the war—for research into the economic effects of the integration of national markets. The study would examine "a) the influence of different kinds of market integration and their behavior; b) market integration and the balance of payments; c) the influence of integration on incomes and employment; d) the importance of wage levels in market integration; and e) the speed with which changes in certain
variables...show their effects in the economic process." Thus, the Institute proves a useful case study in showing the evolution of Foundation funding— from book and travel grants to funding specific research proposals— but also the connections with centers of German social science reestablished after the war.

The Rockefeller Foundation also aided in the creation of new centers of research, such as the IFO-Institute for Economic Research at Munich. Here, the power of patronage allowed the Foundation to alter the research agenda of the Institute. At issue was the Institute’s Konjunkturtestverfahren, or "Business Test method," which was a statistical measure of entrepreneurial expectations used to suggest future trends in industry and provide information to business quicker than official government statistics. The Foundation expressed interest in funding the project, which seemed to fit well with its objectives for economic research, namely the study of the business cycle and making available useful information. However, debate arose within the Social Science branch about the quality of the research and the usefulness of the knowledge produced. At issue were questions of method and the significance of the data produced in illuminating economic theory.

In 1952, the Foundation rejected an application by the IFO-Institute to fund the Business Test. The initial application for funding, submitted by the director of the Institute, Karl Wagner, emphasized the speed with which the Business Test could report trends in industry and commerce, the areas it opened up to statistical surveys— such as wholesale and retail trade— and the ready information it offered individual firms on the state of a particular sector of the market. Wagner conceded that problems persisted, ranging from methodological concerns such as the need to improve the sample technique, to logistical questions such as the limited scope of the survey, to practical realities such as purchasing tabulation machines to speed the processing of information.
Debate among Foundation grant referees, however, focused on questions over method and the quality of information produced. J.R.N. Stone of the Department of Applied Economics at Cambridge expressed interest over the methods employed, but questioned whether or not the Business Test could provide "economic information which are of wider interest." Arthur Burns of the National Bureau of Economic Research disliked the use of mailed questionnaires, which he found an inferior technique to the interview. More significantly, Burns feared that the purpose of the Test "seems to be to report what is currently happening and what new plans are currently in the making; not to analyze the forces that have shaped or are shaping the fortunes of different industries." Since the interest of the Business Test seemed to rest on "statistical compilation," it was not clear to Burns what contribution the Test would make to economic science as a whole.

Friedrich Lutz of Princeton was the most vociferous critic of the Business Test. Lutz doubted the "scientific validity" of the whole approach: "I am still not convinced," he argued, "that the 'Test' will be of any value to anybody except business itself." In particular, Lutz felt the sample was too small and questioned the reliability of the answers provided by firms. Beyond this, Lutz found little scientific value of the Test for economic science as a whole, being "quite sure that the [Test] is rather if not entirely useless for scholarly work which will always have to turn to actual statistics. The [Test], I am convinced, does not live longer than the current month, and is then never looked at again." In October 1952, the application for funds was declined. European representative Frederic C. Lane informed Wagner of the decision, noting that the concern for speedy reporting of business statistics fell outside of Foundation interests. Yet, Lane held out hope, conceding that the Foundation was interested in the study of entrepreneurial expectations as a potential area of funding.
met with Wagner and other members of the Institute, where Lane "encouraged the submission to RF of a new proposal which would be, not an extension of their reporting system, but an analysis of some part of the value of their reporting for theoretical analysis." Herein lay the power of Foundation patronage.

A new proposal submitted in April 1953 reflected the changes in emphasis suggested by the Foundation. No longer focusing on reporting speed or information to business, Wagner's proposal emphasized the significance of the Business Test for "Theoretical and Applied Economics." The importance of the Business Test now reflected concerns for the theory of economic development, for the interdependence of economic variables, for the expectations of managers, and for tensions and other immediate problems within the economy. The new proposal lessened the significance of the quick flow of information, but placed the reporting function of the Business Test within the language of pragmatic social science: "the results obtained from the BT serve as material for economic reports and for other scientific studies on behalf of Business and the Government." The new proposal won approval of the Foundation, with Lutz even conceding that "as compared with their earlier intentions the emphasis has undoubtedly shifted to fields of investigation which concern the scholarly economist, particularly if he is interested in business cycles, where progress is held back by insufficient knowledge about expectations of business men." The 1953 proposal reflected the deep influence of Foundation patronage and American perceptions of useful economic science.

By 1955, the Business Test method had spread to Japan, Holland, South Africa, France, Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and Italy. The success of the Business Test and German economics in general, such as the work performed at the Institute in Kiel, point to the fact that the Rockefeller Foundation did not need to redirect research in economics, but rather enhance and fine tune it.
Sociology: The resurrection of German sociology would prove more difficult than the case of economics. Although a tradition of sociology existed, it was not as firmly established as that of economics. Consequently, the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation experienced greater difficulty in "translating" American social scientific techniques into the German context. Such difficulties demonstrate that the Foundation was less successful in altering the larger cultural context in which the social sciences resided, specifically regarding the position of sociology within the culture of the university and the function and purpose of sociological knowledge.

Two institutes at the University of Frankfurt demonstrate the difficulties the Foundation encountered in their attempts to foster an empirical sociological tradition. The Soziographisches Institut, under the direction of Ludwig Neundorfer, emphasized empirical research which provided information to local government in order to solve pressing social problems. Such research projects included the study of urban reconstruction, and research on the refugee problem, which included information to aid in resettlement and public assistance. Fredric Lane praised the effort at providing useful information, noting that Neundorfer's "interest is mainly the kind of knowledge about the immediate situation which will open possibilities for better government action, and observation of government action in order to suggest how to do better." 39 The style of information produced also had a latent democratic intention. As Foundation representative Philip E. Mosely noted, "The project [a study of the refugee problem in Schluechtern] has the by-product of developing a community's awareness of its own nature and potential, of promoting a new type (for Germany) of cooperation, and a stimulating self-help rather than reliance upon centralized bureaucratic decisions." 40 Thus, the work at the Institut seemed to conform to Foundation standards of social research.
This is not to suggest, however, that the Foundation did not detect problems. In particular, there were questions over method and legitimacy. Mosely especially observed that Neundorfer, while industrious at fact-gathering, did not have adequate knowledge of scientific techniques such as sampling. Lane as well expressed some reservations, concluding "that [Neundorfer's work] is fully empirical, that it is not directed according to rigorous methods based on general principles but ad hoc methods suggested by particular problems and by a concern with presenting results in a form which will be useful and impressive for administrative purposes...[he] is not a systematic thinker who seeks the general meaning of the data found through the surveys; he has a practical mind which seeks how the data may lead to wise immediate policies." In short, Neundorfer was not a scientist.

Further, Neundorfer lacked the confidence of the faculty at Frankfurt. Many referred to him as "a city planner, an architect and an enumerator," thus calling into question his legitimacy as a sociologist. Lane noted the Neundorfer "is not highly esteemed by the Faculty of Economic and Social Science...has almost no contact with colleagues...and has and will have difficulty in having his students accepted as doctoral candidates in that faculty." Without such legitimacy and credibility within the university, the job of spreading empirical research methods would be that much more difficult. Still, the work at the Soziographisches Institut was funded by the Foundation, since, as Lane concluded, "there are not...more than 1 or 2 institutes in Germany in which students are employed on social surveys under methods or leadership any better than Neundorfer's." Another such institute was also at Frankfurt, Max Horkheimer's Institut fuer Sozialforschung.

If Neundorfer was too empirical for Foundation tastes, then the Institute for Social Research sat at the opposite extreme. After its return from exile in the United States, and largely under the influence
of Horkheimer, the Institute sought to reestablish its position in German social science by stressing the convergence of philosophy with social science techniques. However, questions arose within the Social Science branch as to whether the Institute was really committed to empirical research, or whether this masked another agenda. Louis Wirth from the Social Science Research Council argued that Horkheimer and Adorno were "carrying on a tremendous campaign to get support from UN, UNESCO, the German government, American occupying forces, foundations, and everybody else, and that they [were] representing themselves as the last word in the latest thing in American social science." Another observer argued that "Horkheimer and his group are politically biased toward the left. They are not a 'straight social science' group and are using the 'trappings of research' to get their position across." The Marxist orientation of the Institute did not seem to concern the Foundation as much as the weak commitment to empirical research methods. The assistant director of the Humanities Division, Edward F. D'arms, conversed with staff members of the Institute "who were unanimous in stressing their interest in problems of philosophical significance rather than with some of the contract research which they are forced to do for financial reasons." Perhaps as a consequence of this lack of interest, D'arms noted that "the students seemed able and interested but not yet versed in techniques of sampling, formulation of questionnaires and so forth." Lane approved of the Institute's style of research more than that practiced at the University of Frankfurt's Economics and Social Science Faculty, but nevertheless remained cautious in his praise. Lane was "bothered by two impressions: (a) They don't seem to be getting results by their approach, and (b) they are putting a lot of energy into earning money by carrying through investigations done by methods they don't believe in." Indeed, there were even questions as to which branch of the Foundation should handle the funding of Institute activities. When queried about a specific project, Lane
responded "that [such projects] should go to DH [Division of Humanities] if it was presented as a means of training doctoral candidates in philosophy, but that [they] should go to DSS [Division of Social Science] if it was presented as an investigation in social psychology which would start with personality analysis and investigation of the factors shaping personality." Such a situation demonstrates that the work of the Institute did not "fit" the Foundation image of social science.

The philosophical orientation of the Institute for Social Research was not just simply an alternative to empirical social research, but represented a different judgement as to the function and purpose of social scientific knowledge, a different context for that knowledge. Describing the situation at Frankfurt, Lane reported that Horkheimer believes the philosophical faculty is the best place in which to give a general orientation in social sciences because such an orientation is most needed in Germany among the school teachers, those who take degrees in the Philosophical Faculty and go out to teach history and allied subjects. He believes it the best place in which to start social scientists on an advanced training because in the Economics Faculties the students have to spend an undue amount of time on business subjects, even for the degree Diplom Volkswirt.

Horkheimer argued that the basis of German education was a philosophical education; therefore, his focus was not simply the use of American techniques, but the function and purpose of those techniques, which were aimed not at performative knowledge, but at enhancing a philosophical education. This perception of the role of the social sciences lay outside the collective perceptions of the Social Science Division.

Horkheimer’s vision of social science had to be legitimated within the German context, meaning the examination system. He spoke to D’arms of his thinking in relation to a diploma which would require the combination already achieved at Frankfurt but which would be the entering certificate for the civil service, government and business, in large part. This would be called a diploma in Sociology (in the German sense), but would include work in law, economics, sociology, philosophy, psychology and empirical research. The purpose of this diploma would be to open public service to those who had not majored in law, and, conversely, to
insure a broader training both for civil servants and for those who might go on to teach philosophy.\textsuperscript{49}

The vision of the social sciences expressed by Horkheimer demonstrates that the transformation of German culture through social science could not proceed by simply introducing new methods and techniques; it would mean altering the context in which the social sciences resided.

This clash of assumptions was also evident with regard to Foundation support of the Dortmund Center for Social Research. Havighurst, especially, was an ardent supporter of the Center, which he described as "a place where the social sciences of economics, sociology, social psychology, and law are all being developed in close touch with the practical problems of the industrial Ruhr...Additions of social anthropology and social statistics would make the Center a first-class place for the training of younger social scientists."\textsuperscript{50} Havighurst’s plan for Dortmund, first outlined in 1948, had a well trained sociologist from either America or Britain working at the Center for a year’s time, instructing the staff in American-style research techniques. Because of his experience at Frankfurt and his knowledge of the Dortmund Center, Everett C. Hughes was to be the sociologist in question, but when he could not receive a leave from Chicago, he suggested Columbia Professor of Sociology Conrad Arensberg.

In cooperation with Columbia’s Bureau of Applied Social Research, Arensberg was to supervise a research project in industrial sociology. The goal of the project was to introduce American research techniques in surveying mining conditions in the Ruhr. As Arensberg described it, "During my stay in Germany, my role would be to participate actively in setting up a program of instruction and research, using American sociological methods of investigation and analysis, into the Sozialforschungsstelle’s studies of labor productivity, especially with reference to the conditions and organization in the Ruhr industrial community."\textsuperscript{51} As he would soon learn, Arensberg’s role would be that of "translator" of American research methods.
Most of Arensberg’s correspondences with the Foundation focused on his translation efforts, and the difficulties he encountered. Arensberg soon discovered that transferring American methods did little good if these methods lacked legitimacy and purpose in the German context. He described his relation with one of the sociologists at Dortmund:

Jahnke is a sociologist, so far more highly trained in theory than in practice, but receptive and worth working with here because I can give him the theoretical background of American methods and developments and allow him happily to set them in a German social-science perspective, which is more than half the job of translation and transmittal. The difficulty of Darmstadt and of the von Wiese conference was quite apparent: "American methods" is all too often merely a synonym for new fieldwork or statistical techniques which seem to the Germans to have no theoretical basis. Once the theoretical basis is made clear the new methods become much more understandable, acceptable, and the more readily acclimatizable.

At issue was the process of legitimating new ideas:

Fieldwork on this team work project has thus begun. It seems to me that in the actual carrying through of these plans for fieldwork that the greatest need for assimilating new methods and new concepts arises. Short of field work, with its common problems to be solved on the spot, it is all too easy to mistake good will and fashion quest for a genuine desire to take over new ideas. It is when old ideas, often unconscious assumptions, fail that the new ones are welcome. But even then, here, a new idea depends upon a good theoretical introduction and explanation. The habit of thought here is still thoroughly scholastic. To raise a method to scientific dignity they need to see it as more than an operating technique; they need to see its historical continuity and to give it scholastic authority. A good deal of my work, therefore, has been to present the theory behind newer methods...to put them forward in the planning of field work; and to insinuate them at each successive stage when they show signs of dropping out or of failing to have become part of operating procedure. Otherwise new concepts are interesting exotic definitions and concepts, to be played with as such, no more.

Arensberg’s task was to legitimate American methods, but this could only be accomplished by fitting them within an already established context of German social science.

After a year’s work in Dortmund, Arensberg cautiously reported, in September of 1950, that the new techniques he introduced “have taken root and that a new assurance has developed among the personnel here that empirical research is going to become native, permanent, and
successful in Germany." He would later report to Willits that "progress here [at Dortmund] is slow but genuine...[the Germans] can and do take over what we say for reworking into their own plans and their own concepts...they are rethinking the connections between the new methods and the older philosophizing topological social science and they are spreading, in contact, meeting, and visits, and much discussion of private kind, newer empirical research methods and concepts."  

For Arensberg, Dortmund was a qualified success, however, representing only "an island of research." The achievements of a center such as Dortmund had to be weighed against the situation of the social sciences elsewhere in Germany. Although other institutes and universities had men working with empirical techniques

their professors of social science are caught in older faculties, like law, have no money for research, and no access to the books from the other world that report its development abroad, and seem to vacillate between resentment of the new trends and the repetition of the older philosophical schematics. Yet the universities reach the young and train them for the civil service positions and professions which will continue to run Germany, provide main local support for the ad hoc fact-finding that is so well cultivated there, and continue to equate Sozialwissenschaft with philosophy rather than science and discovery.

This last phrase is perhaps the most significant observation of Foundation efforts in Germany: that the Germans continued to conceptualize sociology—and social science—as a part of German philosophy, not American science. While Americans could introduce new methods and even legitimate them in their new context, the ultimate success of Foundation efforts rested with altering the perceptions of the purpose and function of the social sciences. "The real problem," concluded Arensberg:

is one of university reform. The new institutes will slowly win recognition, but all too often they must find a place for themselves against university opposition or indifference. The problem is an internal German one, that may take a long time or a generation change to solve. Occupation pressure will not do it, as the Germans are tired of such pressure and more and more resistive or evasive of it. But perhaps help to universities in amalgamating
research and teaching can make the solution come the quicker.°7

The Rockefeller Foundation aided in the resurrection of German sociology, and had an effect in introducing new methods which were also to provide useful performative knowledge, goals clearly within the scope of Foundation policy. Yet, the quest to alter German culture through sociological knowledge fell short of expectations. Unlike economics, sociology was not as well established within the intellectual community; the tasks confronting the Foundation were resurrection, introduction of new methods and legitimation. In this endeavor, Foundation achievement was qualified.

Political Science: Of the three branches of knowledge that were to democratize German culture, political science was the least established. In an interview with Foundation associate Kenneth Thompson, Hajo Holborn argued that "the German tendency to divorce philosophy from practice has resulted in an indifference to politics which has been harmful. Studies aimed at current problems and resulting from first-hand investigations would be most useful."58 Thus, Foundation policy encouraged those institutes pursuing empirical research, which would then serve as instruments of democratization, by providing knowledge of democratic practice and procedure, creating an informed citizenry, and democratizing the civil service. More so than with sociology, the Foundation encountered significant problems of "translation," bureaucratic inertia and a lack of legitimacy for empirical political science research. While methods could be easily transferred, the context of American political science could not be transferred to Germany.

Empirical political research provided information on democratic practice. The Berlin Institut fuer politische Wissenschaft, for example, engaged "in basic research in order to assemble empirical data for a comprehensive analysis of Germany's political past and present and the potentialities and limitations of the democratic process within the
framework of the postwar world's political reality on the national and international scene. At the Institut, empirical research was inexorably linked with democracy.

Empirical research also provided knowledge about, and for the benefit of, political parties. The Seminar for the Science and History of Politics at the University of Kiel, for example, carried out surveys of Schleswig-Holstein in order to derive a "political anatomy" of the state. The focus of the survey was the study of voting behavior and party activity, which would yield "the historical, social and intellectual 'areas' of the different German parties...the knowledge of which is of great interest and importance to each German party." At Heidelberg, the Alfred Weber Institut fuer Sozial- und Staatswissenschaften received Foundation support for research on political parties. Lane was "convinced that this organization is one of the most promising centers for research in political science in Germany today. Their analyses of party politics and parliamentary action, based on field work as well as on printed sources, are intelligent and thoughtful. This work is an essential part of political science and is in need of development in Germany, not only for the sake of German intellectual life and to give political scientists generally a knowledge of German political behavior, but also to serve the growth of greater political maturity in Germany." Here, democracy meant party activity, and political science provided pragmatic knowledge of that procedure.

Greater knowledge of party practice was tied to greater knowledge of political practice as a whole. Thus, another important function of political science was to create an informed citizenry. Carl Schorske, who accompanied Willits on his 1950 trip to Germany, recalled a conversation with Alfred Weber in which he noted that Weber was "especially concerned with the rehabilitation of the social sciences in the university. Only if the intellectuals and political leaders are given a broader social outlook, he says, is there hope for an
enlightened public opinion in Germany...Weber was optimistic that a
democratic elite and a public opinion to support it will arise in
Germany." Schorske also reported on a conference at the Hochschule
fuer Politik at Berlin titled "Political Science and its Relationship to
Political Education." Schorske identified a four point platform of the
advocates of political science, which included plans "to educate
students in the higher schools for citizenship as well as for a
profession [and] to create an informed and enlightened public opinion
through adult education and the publication of objective research on
political problems." Useful, scientific knowledge was encouraged by
the Foundation as inherently democratic.

Another platform at the conference in Berlin called for plans "to
impart to future civil servants some familiarity with the realities of
political life and of democratic values and practices, and thus to
supplement their legal training." This concern was voiced by Franz
Neumann to Schorske after the former's visit to the Free University in
February 1950. Neumann favored a plan to merge the Deutsche Hochschule
fuer Politik with the Free University, the primary benefit being the
strengthening and legitimation of social science at the University.
Beyond this, Neumann believed that political science would aid in the
democratization of the bureaucracy. Schorske recalled that

Neumann attached particular importance to the development
in Germany of political science in the American sense.
The bureaucracy of West Germany, he said, was still being
constructed from the university graduates. The old student
corporations were rapidly reviving, and the "Korpsbruder"
system of appointments to the bureaucracy was again in
full swing. This resurrection of the caste system, combined
with the almost exclusively legal training of the
bureaucracy, was a real political threat. The students of
the FU, with the support of General Maxwell Taylor, had
set up a student home which enabled them to compete
effectively with the corps at the university level.
Neumann hoped that the superior training promised by the
merger scheme would enable them to provide a leaven,
however small, within the bureaucracy itself.

Neumann sensed that the creation of a democratic culture in Germany and
the role of political science in this process could only be carried out
by altering the nexus of sociopolitical power. Neumann's observations demonstrated the degree of difficulty in establishing a robust position for political science in Germany.

As with the case of sociology, political science methods were difficult to translate into the German context. Otto Suhr, director of Hochschule fuer Politik, noted this problem when discussing text books:

The publication of a text book in political science is a much more problematic project than the preparation of source books. Thought has been given to the simple procedure of translating one of the leading English or American texts in political science and using such a translation, as a basis for instruction. But on examining this possibility further, the faculty of the Deutsche Hochschule fuer Politik has felt it necessary to advise against such an attempt. All text books introduced in America or in England make Anglo-Saxon institutions their point of departure, presupposing certain concepts which are either unknown in Germany or carry a different connotation. It would be particularly dangerous for the beginner to use books, the fundamental concepts of which do not coincide with his experience or his knowledge of history. Picture for instance the confusion of an inexperienced student who would use a text which speaks of self-government in the Anglo-American sense and who would assume that this term corresponded to the German concept of Selbstverwaltung...A textbook in political science useful to German students must provide German material, must center around German institutions, and must present the problems of political science in the light of German historical, social, economic, and legal developments.

Suhr was referring to a deeper problem than simply translating words: American concepts of political science had to be fitted within German assumptions, values and institutional arrangements; in other words, within German culture. This proved to be the most difficult task facing the Foundation's efforts at introducing political science.

The most significant institutional roadblocks to the implementation of American-style political science in Germany were the universities. Schorske's report from the Berlin political science conference included the observation that

The universities have generally been reluctant to introduce political science into the curriculum. Except in a few progressive states such as Berlin and Hessen, they have been supported in their resistance by the ministries of culture. As a result of pressure from the independent institutes, the recent Rector's conference urged the
establishment of chairs in political science...The field will never become established, however, until it is incorporated into the examination system; i.e., until it is possible to take a degree in political science. This the rectors refused to recommend.66

Schorske's observation suggests that the Foundation perceived German institutional arrangements as "obstacles to overcome," rather than legitimate structures within which social science may fit. Consequently, Foundation tactics were less sensitive to German contributions to social science research. Alexander Rustow, Professor of political science at Weber's Institute at Heidelberg, discussed this problem with Kenneth Thompson:

The remainder of the discussion until a fairly late hour went to the question of Germany's possible contribution to Western thought. Germany through Max Weber and others had given the West one of its major impulses in the direction of empirical studies. The distinction between facts and values was in part a German distinction. Now the trend is perhaps, especially in the United States, too emphatically in the direction of mere data collection by large teams of researchers. There is also a prejudice against political theory and AR's opinion is that Germany can play a role in restoring proper respect for serious individual research...and the legitimate place of political history and political theory. AR noted that Weber never went to the extreme of some American empirical social scientists but always rooted his work in history.67

Foundation efforts in Germany might have been better served if they had focused on cultivating and enhancing that which was German, rather than transplanting that which was American.

The Culture of Social Science and Democracy

The Rockefeller Foundation experienced varying degrees of success in their efforts to foster American-style social science research in Germany. Success in imposing American methods was ultimately tied to the degree of legitimacy each social scientific discipline enjoyed in the German context. Such legitimacy predated Foundation activity in Germany, as was noted in the 1932 Kittridge report. Thus, economics enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy before the war; Foundation policy
aimed at resurrecting and enhancing this tradition. This was not the case for sociology—where Foundation efforts aimed at convincing German researchers of the efficacy of American methods—and even less the case for political science, where Foundation policy was confounded by a lack of any real tradition—in the American sense—of political science research. The inability to alter the German university system to allow a better "fit" for the social sciences accounts for the fact that the vast proportion of Foundation funds went to institutes, which were outside or loosely tied to the university system.

The Rockefeller Foundation played a critical role in resurrecting German social science after the war, as well as introducing empirical methods in German practice. The patronage of institutes not as legitimate as universities nevertheless provided an outlet for social science activities, before their acceptance by universities.68 What the Foundation could not fully sustain, however, was the American purpose of social scientific knowledge, the larger context in which American methods resided. Social science would have to fit into the German context, to be used for German purposes, even if that meant a competing sense of how social knowledge could be democratic.

The lack of success in creating a context for the social sciences that mirrors the American standard indicates that another function must exist in opposition to this tendency. The officers of the Foundation often encountered resistance to the ultimate purpose of social science research. The German insistence upon the importance of philosophy—as expressed by Horkheimer—was not just a rejection of empiricism or speculative inertia, as the Foundation labeled them, but an expression of a different function of social scientific knowledge. In postwar Germany, this was the resurrection of the critical function of social science.

German social science represents a different function of social knowledge, a critical discursive function. This is especially the case
for German sociology, where sociologists have

produced essays and books intended also for broader audiences—not necessarily in order to popularize sociology, but in order to address the significant issues of the day, both as sociologists and as intellectuals who believed they possessed the general intellectual capability, as well as the moral obligation, to speak on such issues. This attitude has remained unchanged from Max Weber to the conservatives Arnold Gehlen, Helmut Schelsky, and Friedrich H. Tenbruck, from the politically engaged liberal Ralf Dahrendorf to the left-wing intellectuals of the Frankfurt School...The widespread participation of sociologists in public debates and disputes, which continues to this very day, indicates not only a particular and widely shared self-conception of sociologists as sociologists but also a receptivity to and an audience for sociological ideas and sociologically informed opinion which is considerably broader than in many English-speaking countries.69

This vision of knowledge does not imply pragmatism, or social control, but knowledge as public, discursive and ultimately democratic.70

Juergen Habermas, especially, has made the connection between the critical function of knowledge and democracy, arguing that "rationalizing decisions in such a way that they can be made dependent on a consensus arrived at through discussion free from domination" is, by definition, a "democratic form of decision-making."71

The resistance the Foundation encountered in the 1940's and 1950's was due to a differing sense of the function of social scientific knowledge and its position in a democratic society. To carry forward the language metaphor, the Foundation successfully translated new "words" and "sentence structures" into the German context—techniques. The Foundation failed, however, in translating its discourse of the higher purpose of social research, for to do so would have necessitated the restructuring of the larger meaning of that research; in a manner of speaking, to make the Germans think in English.
Notes


3 Craver, 212.


7 Kittredge, 9-10.

8 Ibid., 10.

9 Ibid., 18, 19.

10 Ibid., 22, 25.

11 Ibid., 32.

12 See Richardson, 45-47.


15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 98-9.


18 Ibid., 62-3.

19 Ibid., 62.

20 Ibid, 63.

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 64.


24 Ibid., 19-20.

25 Ibid., 20.

26 Ibid., 23.


33 Lutz to Lane, October 6, 1952. Rockefeller Foundation Archives. RG 1.2. Series 717S. Box R1129. Institute for Economic Research.


35 Lane to Wagner, October 9, 1952. Rockefeller Foundation Archives. RG 1.2. Series 717S. Box R1129. Institute for Economic Research.


38 Lutz to Lane, June 20, 1953. Rockefeller Foundation Archives. RG 1.2. Series 717S. Box R1129. Institute for Economic Research.


Lane to Willits, February 24, 1953. Rockefeller Foundation Archives. RG 1.2. Series 717S. Box R1130. Sociographisches Institut, Frankfurt.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., 89.

Ibid., 4.


Schorske, 90.


Chapter VII
The Sanctuary of Economics

After the defeat of the Nazis, Germans sought refuge—from the rubble, from the defeat, from their past—in the sanctuary of economics. American social scientists came to Germany after the war with the goal of "Americanizing" German social science, to make German social scientists act more like scientists than philosophers. Economics appeared to have fit this goal. German economics, as observers from the Rockefeller Foundation had noted, fit within American definitions of social science. German economics was scientifically rigorous, useful and practical, and did not deal with philosophy and airy speculation. What the Americans perhaps did not count on was that economic life would provide postwar West Germans with their image of democracy, as the consumer culture sold it to them. The plenty of the "economic miracle" provided a level of material comfort that many Germans associated with American culture and a democratic way of life. Indeed, among the first postwar generation of Germans, democracy was an exercise of "consumer preference." By turning to economic matters, by looking to economists for guidance, by conceptualizing their democracy on the basis of economics, the Germans sought escape from their past.

For all the efforts the Americans had expended at democratizing German culture—via reeducation, control of the mass media, the reorientation of German social science—the proximity to American movies, cigarettes and jazz had the most lasting effect on the Germans in the American zone of occupation. Among ordinary Germans, Americanization and democratization were synonymous. The "American way of life" equated to a consumer's paradise, and democracy was
conceptualized as the exercise of consumer choice. Concepts such as "choice," "responsibility," "freedom" and "democracy" quickly became symbols to be consumed alongside Coca-Cola and refrigerators. Even among the architects and planners of the economic miracle—such as Ludwig Erhard, Walter Eucken and Wilhelm Roepke—these concepts referred to consumer goods, not civil society. The first generation of postwar Germans considered material plenty as evidence of their democratic orientation.

Economists themselves served as conduits of greater international cooperation. By interacting with economists from around the world, German economists would end Germany’s intellectual isolation and enmesh Germany within larger international organizations, a process which mirrored Germany’s closer military and political ties to the West. Such bonds were meant as a demonstration of German commitments to peaceful cooperation, within the bosom of the Western Alliance, itself a form of sanctuary.

As the economic miracle ended sometime after the first OPEC oil shock, economics continued to provide a level of comfort and sanctuary. Conservative historians, such as Knut Borchardt, used the techniques of economic history as a means of cleansing the stain of the Nazi period, by discovering structural connections between the Federal Republic and the Second Empire. Even into the 1980’s, Germans continued to find safety within economics, as a form of continuity, a reclamation of their past without a place for the Nazis.

Economics and the material plenty of the consumer culture offered Germans insulation and protection from the horror—and responsibility—of their past. Like a sanctuary in the religious sense, economics offered not only material comfort but also the fulfillment of higher moral and spiritual goals. Out of consumption, out of economic knowledge, Germans forged a democratic identity, an identity that was challenged by the second postwar generation, which turned to alternate
images of democracy and knowledge in the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School.

Democracy as Consumption

"Ideas, unless outward circumstances conspire with them, "wrote John Stuart Mill, "have in general no very rapid or immediate efficacy in human affairs."¹ T.W. Hutchison, in citing the above passage, referred specifically to the rise to preeminence of the Freiburg School, but the metaphor could be extended to the rise of the consumer culture in postwar Germany. The economic misery of the early stages of the occupation would conspire to shape much of the postwar German image of the United States and the culture of consumption. As many occupation officials observed, the material situation of the Germans—the lack of food, shelter and fuel—would have to be substantially improved before abstract notions of "democracy" or "freedom" could readily take hold. "In so far as the Germans were without soap," writes the historian Ralph Willett, "the Americans appeared spick and span; in so far as they were stripped of power, the Americans appeared strong and dominant; and perhaps above all, in so far as they were hungry and destitute, the Amis, their prosperity augmented by German servants, appeared blessed with access to a steady flow of coffee, chocolate, canned food—and most coveted of all, cigarettes."² The desire for these goods, whetted during the occupation, were the "outward circumstance" that pushed Germans toward a culture of consumption.

A consumer culture, however, is indicated by more than simply a desire for consumer goods. As a cultural phenomenon, a consumer culture is shaped by images and perceptions as much as by buying habits. As Germans coveted prosperity, and worked toward achieving the material plenty of the Americans, they absorbed the images of that culture as well. In a consumer culture, the symbols—the perceived attributes and
characteristics of the products—are as coveted by consumers as the objects themselves.

The acquisition of consumer goods was extended to the symbolic realm of democracy; "democracy" became a commodity to be consumed. Occupation observers had divined the situation in Germany astutely: the Germans were not prepared to accept the rather abstract notion of democracy while their material circumstances were so appalling. Once the necessities of life were provided, however, Germans were willing to accept the abstractions of democracy as the symbols of the consumer culture presented them. "The messages carried by consumer goods in the 1950's in Germany were clear and direct," concludes Willett: "American-style capitalism and the affluent society signified not only [the abstraction of] happiness but also liberty, freedom, and democracy."³

Historian Jean-Christophe Agnew draws a distinction between the "politicization of commodities" and the "commodification of politics," specifically how citizenship is defined in each. In the first case, consumer goods fit within a larger context of citizenship, defined by religion, ideology or republicanism. In the second case, participation and enfranchisement are defined in terms of purchasing power.⁴ Indeed, by the 1940's, American advertising elites had already conceptualized their audiences as "consumer-citizens," those 30-65 percent of the population—the consumer republic—who had purchasing power.⁵ It is the second case, the "commodification of politics," that describes the Germans in the occupation.

The architects of the economic miracle made the connection between consumption and democracy early in the occupation. Upon being named Director of Bizonal Economic Administration, Ludwig Erhard submitted an economic program which would pull the western zones out of their collective economic misery. Economic policy had concentrated too exclusively on the production of capital goods, for heavy industry, and
had slighted the needs of the German population. Only with a shift to freer markets which produced consumer goods would German workers feel the economic incentive to produce more goods, and thus increase industrial production and manufacturing capacity. In contrast to many of Erhard's later, more self-congratulatory speeches, his speech of April 21, 1948 to the Economic Council focused extensively on the cold realities of economics. Yet within the speech, the seeds of the postwar Sozialmarktwirtschaft can be clearly detected.

In turning away from the strong central controls of the occupation authorities, Erhard was not "by any means advocating a return to the liberalist economic forms and an irresponsible free-for-all, as in the past." Instead, Erhard advocated a middle path, the socially responsible market economy, which guaranteed individuals freedom of choice:

The perpetual tension between the individual and the community cannot be removed by the negation or denial of one or the other, so that the question is always one of principles and means which the individual, without sacrificing his own identity, has to observe in order to fit in with, though not subject himself to, the higher forms of society...If we are not entirely unanimous as to our aims, at least we are clear as to the course we must adopt: to break away from a state-controlled economy, which subjects everyone to the yoke of a stifling bureaucracy, which must kill all sense of responsibility and duty and all ambition and must, therefore, eventually turn even the most loyal citizen into a rebel...Only where freedom and obligation are binding upon us, can the state find the moral justification to speak and act in the name of the people.6

The context, the larger narrative, which gave meaning to the terms "freedom" and "responsibility" and "individual" was the consumer economy and a latent consumer culture. "Any system," argued Erhard, "that does not at least allow the individual to choose his profession and his consumer goods violates basic human rights."7 "As the political right of the citizen to decide is essential in a political democracy," Erhard would write a decade later, "so the competitive order assures the basic economic rights of freedom to work and freedom of choice on the part of the consumer."8 Erhard conceptualized the market mechanism itself,
beyond its function in setting prices and quantities, as the "vote of
the market, which means the voice of the people." In Erhard's symbolic
universe, the individual was not a "citizen" but a "consumer;" "freedom
of choice" refers to purchases, not casting a ballot.

Erhard's policy recommendations were buttressed by the neoliberal
economic theory of the Freiburg School, the intellectual nexus out of
which the "socially responsible market economy," the
Sozialmarktwirtschaft, would emerge. Born of the latent German liberal
tradition, the historical school of economics, and the Marxist critique
of capitalism, the Freiburg School sought an intellectual middle ground
between the inequities of a laissez-faire economic system and the
bureaucratization of life under a planned economy. The intellectual
father, Walter Eucken, and the other members of the Freiburg School
argued for the creation of "ordered competition" within a market
economy, where individuals could pursue their own self-interest, subject
to "rules of the game" set down by the state. In this scheme, neither
the individual nor the state would possess too much power.

At about the same time Erhard assumed the role of Director of
Bizonal Economic Administration, Eucken published an article attacking
occupation economic policy, and encouraging the creation of a
consumer-driven economy for the Western zones. Eucken made similar
claims as Erhard about the connections between democracy and
consumption, between the decentralization of economic power and the
central position of the consumer in a democracy. The article--titled
"On the Theory of the Centrally Administered Economy: An Analysis of
the German Experiment"--appeared as a critique of the failures of Nazi
economic policies, but implicitly attacked the failures of occupation
policies in the Western zones. Eucken dated the "German Experiment"
from 1936 to 1947, and thus included the first years of the occupation
as examples of the failure of centrally administered economic systems.
Eucken attacked many facets of the centrally administered economy—from its inefficiencies to the replacement of exchange with allocations—but his chief criticism was the concentration of too much power in too few hands. "The centrally administered economy embodies the maximum possible concentration of economic power," argued Eucken:

Consumers and entrepreneurs are no longer in control, but the central administration...the meeting of individual consumers' needs recedes into the background, for the central administration is unable to find out what they are, and to weigh them up. It has to fix consumers' needs "overall" or totally...such economies are as a rule dominated by the objective of a maximum of investment, and therefore aim at cutting consumption to the Subsistence Minimum.  

Eucken defined that Minimum as "the quantity of consumers' goods which the different types of labor must get in order to carry out a particular task." Interestingly, subsistence here did not refer to the staples needed to sustain life but to the consumer goods needed to sustain labor. Consumer desires had become needs, a hallmark of a consumer culture.

In Eucken's theory, the "individual" meant the consumer or the entrepreneur, not the "citizen;" "power" was understood as an economic quality:

In the centrally administered economy, the consumer is dethroned. He cannot control the economic process. He can no longer, through the instrument of price changes, attract the factors of production or decide how much of them shall be set aside for investment. The central administration distributes consumers' goods, and it directs the factors to the production-goods industries, or rather, it decides the quantity to be "put back" for these industries. Consumers cannot foil the administration in its plans, for it can do what is not possible in any form of exchange economy, that is, exclude any influence from the side of consumers on the economy, and thereby on the level of investment.  

Eucken conceptualized the individual, the consumer, in similar terms as Erhard: legitimate power derived not from natural right or the sovereignty of the individual, but from purchasing power. Although never explicitly referring to democracy, Eucken created a dichotomy between the evils of centralized economic power and the virtues the
democratization of economic power in a market-driven, consumer-based exchange economy. Presumably, in an exchange economy, the consumer is "enthroned."

If Eucken was the theoretical leader of the Freiburg School, Wilhelm Roepke was its soul. Roepke studied at the University of Marburg, and taught at Jena and Marburg before the rise to power of the Nazis sent him to Istanbul and finally the University of Geneva. Roepke had studied in the United States, on a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation; at Geneva, he was associated with Ludwig von Mises and became close with Walter Eucken. Thus, Roepke's theoretical orientation was grounded in his connections with the Austrian School of economics, his time spent in the United States and the neoliberalism of Eucken and the Freiburg School. During the occupation, Roepke joined Erhard as the latter's economic advisor, and thus helped to shape the policies of the socially responsible market. More than any other member of the Freiburg School, Roepke was best remembered as a champion of liberal humanism, a humanism based ultimately on the market and consumption.14

For Roepke, greater power to the consumer was, by definition, a practice of "freedom." Writing in the early 1960's—in the midst of the economic miracle and the Cold War—Roepke contended that in a market economy competition and the pursuit of profit benefited consumers as well as entrepreneurs, since business people were obliged to provide service to customers to ensure their profits. "The road which leads to profit," argued Roepke, "may be entered only the condition that an equivalent economic service is rendered in return."15 Only under such a "service principle" would the needs of both entrepreneur and consumer be met.

With the concept of the "service principle," Roepke meant to counter arguments that only a collectivist economy truly met the needs of humanity. "These reflections should help us to clear up another prevailing misunderstanding," Roepke instructed:
This is the notion that our economic system is one based on "production for profit" in which mere profitability determines what should be produced, whereas the collectivist economic system ensures "production for use," i.e., production oriented to the needs of mankind. Our investigations up to now, however, leave no doubt that insofar as the principle of service is safeguarded by competition, our present economic order guarantees "production for use," since the delicate and incorruptible scales of the market determine what is profitable and what is not. This means, simply, that the dominance of the service principle is synonymous with the sovereignty of the consumers.

The Western intellectual tradition since the Enlightenment based the sovereignty of the individual upon natural law, and based political participation upon the social contractual obligations civil society. For Roepke, the "sovereignty of the consumer" derived from the market. In Roepke's vision, "freedom" could only spring from economic liberty. The market economy, again, was the only form of economic life that ensured economic—and, hence—political freedom:

In an undistorted competitive system, the plan of production is established by persons whose qualifications for the job we cannot very well question, viz., the consumers. The collectivist state, on the other hand, is placed before the dilemma either of imitating the competitive system, more or less, and basing its production plan on the wishes of the consumers (however ascertained), or of establishing a plan based on other considerations to which the consumers will be compelled to submit. In the latter case, the decisions as to what will or will not be produced will be made on the basis of the thoroughly subjective notions of the leaders of the collectivist state; consumer freedom is at an end, and the population must agree to that use of the productive forces of the country which the dominant group in the government of the moment has decided is good. This, as can be easily shown, is how every planned economy in fact ends up. What results then is a thoroughly bad economic dictatorship which is inconceivable without a simultaneous political dictatorship possessed of the necessary means of coercion. So incompatible is the collectivist planned economy with freedom and the development of personality that this very statement would be added to the long list of crimes meriting death which the penal code of the collectivist state must include. Hence, to want to fight simultaneously for freedom and for planned economy would be to give evidence of a serious degree of mental confusion.

This set of observations fits well within Agnew's notion of the "commodification of politics." Beyond this, Roepke argued that even
the development of the personality—the very stuff of the self—was based on consumption.\textsuperscript{18}

By the early 1960's, Roepke seemed to suggest, the economic miracle could be understood as the unleashing of consumer freedom. Roepke made this connection clear when he noted that "Freedom in the realm of goods, discipline in the realm of money—those were the two principles upon which rested the German economic revival from 1948 onwards, and they have remained the foundation of German prosperity in spite of all the many concessions made to interventionism and the welfare state."\textsuperscript{19}

Unleashing the freedoms of the market economy would lead to nothing less than the spiritual rejuvenation of the Western world, via consumption. "We find," argued Roepke, that this system is composed of a complicated network of contractual relationships which, however, join together to produce an ordered whole—thanks to the mechanism of the market. It is a combination of freedom and order, representing what is probably the highest level to which these two ideals can simultaneously attain.\textsuperscript{20}

The free market and a consumer society were not to be understood as ends in and of themselves, however. Rather, the consumption within a free market provided a framework for solving humankind's spiritual wants.

The material goods with which a well-ordered and highly productive economy furnishes us are indispensable, but they are only a means. The end, on the other hand, is a life which is complete and meaningful, adapted to the nature of man. In our time this kind of life is most gravely menaced by mechanization, depersonalization, proletarianization, break-up of the family, the growth of a mass society, and other items on the debit side of our urban-technical civilization. The rejection of the market economy by many on these counts appears to stem from the most worthy motives. Such persons must bear in mind, however, that the market economy makes no pretense of providing solutions to the problems described above. It merely supplies the framework within which we must seek the answers to these last and most fundamental questions. In the absence of a market economy these problems are, in fact, insoluble; only such an economy can guarantee us order in freedom, without which all the rest is in vain.\textsuperscript{21}

In the same manner in which ordinary Germans sought democracy through the symbols of the consumer culture, the leading architects of the prosperity of the economic miracle sought democracy, freedom,
participation and other images of the Western liberal-democratic
tradition in the market economy. "Crude or not," argues Ralph Willett,
Americanization was one aspect of the amnesiac impulse
in the post-war period, the wish to regard the Third
Reich as a bad dream. For the man or woman in the street
serious issues apart from West Germany’s economic
resurgence were boring or disturbing. Consumer democracy,
a self-referential world that could replace the historical
world of experience, was one means of blotting out the
years of the Nazi regime. It was also daily evidence of
the relationship with another state—the USA—where a
reluctant engagement with history had long been a feature
of national consciousness.22

To distance themselves from their immediate past, Germans sought
sanctuary, comfort, safety in the material plenty of the consumer
culture, and the democracy of the "commodification of politics."

"A New Bond Between Economists"

In 1963, to commemorate the first issue of the German Economic
Review, Ludwig Erhard called for a "new bond between economists," a bond
which would serve as a bridge, a transnational means of linking Germany
to the rest of the Western intellectual community. The Review itself
was to be a pillar of that bridge, "an instrument for informing
primarily foreign readers who are interested in economic science of the
status of economics in the Federal Republic of Germany," reported
Erhard. This bond, this journal, would serve to establish "contacts
between professors and students, between seminars on economics and
research centers in the Federal Republic of Germany and abroad."23
German economists would forge such international intellectual and
cultural arrangements, which mirrored international political and
military arrangements, and thereby seek to place Germany comfortably
within the Western alliance. Through the medium of economics, Erhard
hoped to end the intellectual autarky that had characterized the Nazis
years, and at the same time reconstruct the German self-image.
In his remarks, Erhard recounted the history of German economics, a history that served as a metaphor for the whole of German history in the twentieth century. German economists had contributed substantially to the theoretical growth of the science, but with the Nazi ascension to power, the links between German economists and those in Britain and France were cut off. "It is common knowledge that economics is a relatively young science," began Erhard.

Its cradle stood in France and Britain about two centuries ago. Although initially the guiding impulses came from these two countries, German theorists and practical economists made notable contributions to the further development of economic science, for instance in the fields of price theory, economic equilibrium and... marginal analysis. Since about the end of the past century, however, the influence of German scholars and universities on economic thought has declined appreciably. It is undoubtedly no mere coincidence that this decline ran parallel to an ever more marked self-isolation of German economic science and this ultimately cost German economists a great deal of prestige on the international scene.

True, there was no lack of attempts to re-establish lost connections at international level during the twenties. But the successes that were achieved were still much too young when, in the early thirties, changed political conditions constrained German economic science to pursue a course which once more left very little room for an exchange of views on the international plane. It was only the end of World War II that gave German economic science the opportunity to make a new start. That new start necessarily had to be much more radical and comprehensive than anything that can be described by the term "reorientation"; it was vital to catch up with international developments from which German economic science had been completely isolated for decades, following its own and none too happy course.24

The Nazis had hastened the intellectual autarky of German economics. With the defeat of the Third Reich, however, came a "new start"—an intellectual Stunde Null—in German economics. The postwar period offered a chance at restructuring German economics along more traditional theoretical lines, to reconnect German economics to the mainstream of economic thought within the West, in the same way the Germans sought to prove their good international citizenship. In this brief history, Erhard was constructing the postwar German self-image via the metaphor of economics.
The liberalism of the Freiburg School served as an important means of tying Germany to the larger intellectual traditions of Western culture. After 1840, and continuing into the early twentieth century, German economics came under the influence of the Historical School, a style of economics that emphasized empirical research over the theoretical abstractions of the classical tradition. More troubling to mainstream economists, however, was the belief among historical economists that economic reality could not be understood by observing the behavior of individuals; instead, economic life grew out of the interactions between members of the community. German historical economics was grounded not in methodological individualism, but a more holistic, or Gestalt, vision of economic life. This attack on individualism placed historical economics not only outside the mainstream of economic thought but outside much of the Western intellectual tradition. The Historical School was emblematic of a culture that rejected the sovereignty of the individual, a central thesis of the Western liberal tradition.

The influence of the Historical School dissipated after 1917, and German economics turned toward a more theoretical orientation, especially in the study of business cycles. In the 1920's, many observers held that German economics was once again a part of the mainstream of economic thought. After the war, the liberalism of the Freiburg School, with its emphasis on the sovereignty of the individual consumer or entrepreneur, seemed to place German economics firmly within the intellectual traditions of the West.

Additionally, German economics appeared as the most "Americanized" of the social sciences. An important goal of Rockefeller Foundation patronage was to allow German economics to continue to function like American economics. If German economists could learn anything from their international colleagues, it was that economics proved useful at aiding the formation of public policy, a connection the Americans had
advocated. "The thing that clearly distinguishes economics from other sciences," observed Erhard, "is the fact that it has never been able to influence the practical application of theoretical knowledge to the same degree as other branches of learning, to say nothing of natural science. Only recently—to be more exact, since the end of World War II—has the importance of economic science for economic policy become progressively greater." Erhard tied the newly reconnected economics of Germany with American images of the science.

German institutes of economic research performed this "Americanized" role. In presenting themselves to the rest of the world, in the pages of the German Economic Review, German institutes of economic research emphasized their commitments to a scientific, practical orientation—of which the Americans would have approved—and to their interactions with foreign economists. German economists used the journal—which was published in English—as a means of creating a favorable image of Germany and German economic research. In this way, economists could end Germany's isolation, could reintegrate Germany within the community of nations, and could fulfill Erhard's wish for a "new bond between economists."

German research institutes were committed to the goal of producing scientific data which would be used to advise government, trade and industry. The German Institute for Economic Research in Berlin, founded in 1925, was internationally recognized before the war for its research in business cycles, the results of which were made available to guide policy. After the war, the Institute added to its list of services national accounts, observations of the cyclical trend, studies of foreign trade, and research on the "Soviet-occupied Part of Germany," among others. The Institute for World Economics, founded at Kiel in 1914, was another well-regarded center of economic research before the war, perhaps best known for its extensive library. The Institute "[devoted more attention] than hitherto to the relationships
between economic science and economic practice," an important goal of the American effort at "Americanizing" German social science.

Newer institutes also serviced the practical needs of German society. The IFO-Institute for Economic Research at Munich conceptualized its position in postwar Germany as aiding in the economic miracle. "To serve West Germany's economic reconstruction," wrote Robert Weidenhammer, "IFO decided to fill the existing need for material on the basis of which government, industry, trade, agriculture and labor unions could develop their short-term forecasts or long-term projections of the economy and its branches and sections." The Institute for Applied Economic Research at Tuebingen, founded in 1957, began as a working group in econometric research, thus demonstrating that German economists were keeping pace with some of the more important theoretical developments in the field. Indeed, the existence of these and many other institutes in postwar Germany demonstrated that German economics was the most advanced—most American—of the social sciences in Germany, since its orientation was grounded in science and practical applications, not philosophy and airy speculation. Economics offered a means of connecting Germany to the West.

Each of these institutes emphasized their research connections with economists from abroad, again pointing to the degree to which economics could serve as a bridge between nations. At the German Institute for Economic Research:

Special attention is given by the directors... to contact with research institutes abroad that are working in the same fields. In this connection, the "Association d'Instituts Europeens de Conjoncture Economique"—founded from our Institute in 1957—should be mentioned first and foremost. This is an association of twenty institutes for cyclical research, from ten European countries, which, in conjunction with the increasing coordination of the European economy, also jointly undertake the scientific research in this field. Here, the desire of greater German ties abroad were enmeshed with the early stages of the European Economic Community.
At Kiel, in addition to the journal published by the Institute for World Economics, "the Institute has attached special importance to fostering relations with economic scientists abroad. There are always foreign researchers working in the Institute; and German members of the research department spend more or less lengthy periods abroad on advisory, research or teaching work." The new techniques developed at the IFO-Institute, such as those dealing with business cycles, spread throughout Europe and America, via publications and journals. By the 1960's, "the Institute for Applied Economic Research began informing the public of its work by means of lectures and, above all, started establishing contact with foreign scientists."

The reader should be aware that the above narrative derives from reports written in the "German Economic Review." These reports were intended to be read by economists outside of Germany. Consequently, the author of each report was creating a self-portrait of the institute in question. The images generated conformed closely to Erhard's vision of a "bond between economists," both at a theoretical level and as a means of enmeshing Germany within the larger Western community.

Another such bond between economists was the Mont Pelerin Society. Formed in 1947, the Society relied on economics to serve as a bridge between scholars of different nationalities, all of whom were committed to the spiritual rejuvenation of the Western world. Economists figured prominently in the organization of the Society; among its members were Roepke, Eucken and Erhard, as well as F.A. von Hayek, Frank H. Knight and Milton Friedman. Indeed, the Mont Pelerin Society was one of the few organizations that brought together advocates of the free market, a bond between members of the Austrian, Chicago and Freiburg Schools.

The Society committed itself to preserving the highest values of Western Civilization--individual liberty and dignity--which the members believed were being eroded by the bureaucratization of human life. Yearly meetings were convened to discuss the social, political, cultural
and philosophical dimensions of a free society, but above all other considerations, it was the economic order of a free society that was the guiding spirit of these meetings.

In applauding the goals of the Mont Pelerin Society, Guenter Schmoelders made the explicit comparison to the democracy the Germans had constructed: "the programme set up...for a liberally constituted society culminates in the demand for a constitutional order and true democracy like that on which the concept of the Social Market Economy is founded." (emphasis mine) The constitution of the Society reflected the concerns of Erhard and the Freiburg School: the moral and spiritual dimensions of economic life; the concern for the concentration of power; the logic, efficiency and responsibilities of the market; and the harmony of the international relations made possible through economic life. The international "bond between economists" would simultaneously reintegrate Germany with the West, and place Germans in the vanguard of the spiritual rejuvenation of Western Civilization.

The Second Borchardt Controversy

By the late 1970's and early 1980's, three events signalled a transition in the history of the Federal Republic. The first was the perceived end of the economic miracle, made clear by the OPEC oil shocks and a relaxation in Germany's economic growth. The second was the revaluation of the Mark against the dollar. The third was emergence of the Historikerstreit—the conflict between historians—which saw conservative historians reassess the significance and meaning of the Nazi regime, in an effort to remove the albatross of the Holocaust from around the necks of West Germans. Economics would again play an important role in defining the self-image of the Federal Republic in this critical period. The economic historian Knut Borchardt was emblematic of these events, for both his work on the economic miracle
and his conservative position within the Historikerstreit. With Borchardt's work, Germans could reclaim their past without a place for the Nazis.

Although the contours of the Historikerstreit are complex, at issue was the historical identity of the Germans, and the place of the Holocaust in defining postwar German national character. Conservative historians, utilizing standard historical methods, sought to come to grips with the Nazi period by treating the subject as one of scholarly or scientific interest, and to thus remove the moral and ethical dimensions. An important historiographic tool was the use of comparative history. Conservative historians, such as Ernst Nolte, contended that, although unfortunate, the Holocaust should not be singled out as an exceptional example of genocide; an examination of comparative history would show that the twentieth century has had many examples of genocide, from the Russian civil war, to the Stalinist purges, to the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge. To single out Germany for special blame, or to see the Holocaust as a symptom of an inherent cultural malignancy is not supported by comparative history. In this way, Germans could master their past with the temporal distance and separation afforded by history. Historians on the left—in particular Juergen Habermas—challenged the entire enterprise, especially the notion that German guilt over the Holocaust could be "historicized" away.

Knut Borchardt emerged as one of the conservative voices which sought to challenge the prevailing interpretations of the Nazi regime, especially its antecedents in the Weimar period. The Borchardt Controversy refers to his articles challenging the Left's interpretations of the Bruening government's deflationary policies during the Depression, one assumed cause for the Nazis' rise to power. Borchardt argued that Bruening had few alternatives, and that Keynesian policies—favored by the Left—were ineffective in dealing with the
larger structural problems of the Weimar Republic, such as high wages for German workers. Borchardt's works, written in the late 1970's, coincided with a *Tendenzwende*, or a "conservative comeback" after the resurgence of the Left in the late 1960's. "Borchardt's approach," writes Charles Maier, "acutely discomforted the historical defenders of Weimar democracy and of the welfare state in general."

What I term the "Second Borchardt Controversy" refers to a group of articles written in the early 1980's examining the secular trend of Germany in an effort to understand the economic miracle. The secular trend is, like comparative history, a conventional tool used by economic historians and sociologists to examine trends of very long duration, on the order of 150 to 200 years. In plotting Germany's secular trend, Borchardt used economic data beginning with the Second Empire through the Weimar and Nazi periods and extending into the Federal Republic. The economic miracle, argued Borchardt, was no miracle at all, but rather a continuation of an upward movement of the secular trend that dated to the 1850's.

Borchardt proposed nothing less than a reconceptualization of the economic miracle. "It is conceivable," wrote Borchardt,

that a future history will discern a crucial turning-point in the Federal Republic's economic and political history in the 1970's: not just because of the first oil shock. This raises all the more a question as to what are the salient features of the history of the "economic miracle" in the overall context of German economic history. Specifically, we need to ask whether the word "unparalleled," at first used without hesitation, implies that it was a case of a development out of historical preconditions. The economic history of the era after 1945 has frequently been described in these terms, even if one should not take references to a "Stunde Null" in 1945 too literally. But, in general, observers diagnosed a break, and the economic history of 1945/6 was sharply distinguished from that of preceding periods. Only since the seventies has an attempt been made to see the indisputably peculiar development of the Federal Republic in the context of the long-term history of the German economy."

When viewed in this context, Borchardt argued, the economic miracle appeared less than miraculous. Whether he was measuring real per capita
Borchardt identified deep structural continuities between the Second Empire and the Federal Republic. In each case, the period after 1950 represents a resurrection of trends evident before 1914, thus leading Borchardt to ask if the economic miracle were a miracle at all.

The significance of this analysis, however, lies not in Borchardt's judgement of the economic miracle but his assessment of the place of the Weimar and Nazi periods in the larger secular trend of German economic history. At issue were the larger questions of continuity or discontinuity in German history. Borchardt questioned the wisdom of a Stunde Null after 1945, but was willing to see a disruption in the secular trend during the Weimar and Nazi periods. Indeed, this thirty year period represented a "blockage," a "disturbance," an "irregularity," an "abnormality" that could be disregarded when examining the larger secular trend. Only after 1950 did Germany enter a "period of reconstruction," which reconnected the Federal Republic to the trends evident at the end of the Second Empire, such as involvement in the world economy and—significantly—a resurrection of a market-driven economy. In using the secular trend, Borchardt could see both continuity and discontinuity in German history. The Federal Republic was heir to the Second Empire; the Weimar and Nazi periods were but a perturbation in the secular trend.

The implications of this analysis are important. The twelve years of the Nazis, or the thirty years of the Weimar and Nazi periods, are but annoying "blockages" in the 125 year secular trend explored by Borchardt. The Federal Republic was not the child of the Nazi period, thus allowing Germans the chance to distance themselves from the Nazis, yet regain deep connections with their nineteenth century past. Further, Borchardt hinted that the Weimar Republic should not be a model for the Federal Republic. The German past could be reclaimed without a
place for the Nazis; economic history enabled Germans to master their past, a sanctuary from their darker memories.

By delving into economic history, Borchardt created a landscape devoid of the cultural or political or social baggage of the Third Reich. Within the realm of statistics and economic figures, one could reconstruct a "useable past" that at once held deep continuities without the stigmata of the Nazis. The consumer culture served a similar function, in replacing the memory of the Nazis with images of material plenty. Economic life created a self-image and democratic identity for postwar Germans, an identity and self-image challenged in the 1960's.
Notes


3 Ibid., 116.


7 Ibid., 35.


9 Erhard, Economics of Success, 37.


12 Ibid., 181.

13 Ibid., 176.


16 Ibid., 237.

17 Ibid., 239-40.


19 Roepke, 248.

20 Ibid., 250.
21 Ibid., 256.

22 Willett, 127.


24 Ibid., 1-2.

25 Ibid., 1.


27 Erich Schneider, "The 'Institut fuer Weltwirtschaft' (Institute for World Economics) at the University of Kiel," The German Economic Review 2 (1964): 159.


30 Friedensburg, 332.

31 Schneider, 159-60.

32 Ott, 139.


34 Ibid., 72.


36 Ibid., 38.


38 Ibid., 126, 91, 88, 92.

39 Ibid., 126.
Economics—symbolized by the ascendance of the Freiburg School in the 1950’s--created a democratic self-image for the citizens of the Federal Republic. This self-image--and the sanctuary it had created--was challenged in the late 1960’s, however, by the student protesters of the second postwar generation. The students looked not to economics for their images of a democratic life, but to the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. Postwar Germans have struggled with these two images of democracy.

The Freiburg School symbolized the Federal Republic’s commitment to a westward orientation, in much the way Adenauer wished to tie West Germany to the western alliance. Its liberalism placed it within French, British and American intellectual traditions. Its theoretic rigor and pragmatic uses made economics the most "American" of the social sciences in Germany. With economics, Germany had seemingly overcome its cultural "Protestantism."

The historian Koppel Pinson has written that German culture--since the days of the Germanic tribes--has developed outside of, and in opposition to, the heirs of Roman culture. "Germany never completely identified itself with Western civilization," begins Pinson.

There always has been a strong anti-Western tradition. The Russian novelist Dostoievsky saw this in the middle of the nineteenth century. "Germany’s aim," [he wrote] is "her Protestantism--not that single formula of Protestantism which was conceived in Luther’s time, but her continual Protestantism, her continual protest against the Roman world, ever since Arminius--against everything that was Rome and Roman in aim, and subsequently--against everything that was bequeathed by ancient Rome to the new Rome and to all those peoples who inherited from Rome her idea, her
With Germany’s acceptance of Western-style economics, perhaps that cultural Protestantism had finally ended.

Or perhaps the 1960’s represented a resurrection of that cultural protest. The second postwar generation rejected the complacent attitude of the preceding generation. This was the generation of the leaders of the Greens, the peace movement, the feminists, "a highly 'critical' and rebellious generation."2 The second postwar generation targeted the university, which had served as the keeper of Kultur, of Geisteswissenschaft, of the antidemocratic forces of German culture. According to the student protesters, "university reform and reform of society must go hand in hand and that the university had a duty to study current social and political problems in order to enlighten the public about the threats to democracy."3 American social scientists understood that any meaningful change in German social research—or in German culture—could proceed only by altering its institutional setting within the universities. In the process of contesting the complacency of the Adenauer years and challenging the German university system, the student movement looked to the images of a democratic society as presented by Critical Theory and the praxis of the Frankfurt School.

The sociologist Juergen Habermas reconfigured Critical Theory for this student generation. Democracy, he argued, was born out of conversation and discussion; only out of discussion could the students change the German university—and the whole of German society. “Instead of using the university for pseudorevolutionary adventures,” counseled Habermas, "the [student] movement should aim at creating for it an institutional framework that would make it possible to undo the interlocking of instruction and research with power and privilege inside and outside the university.” The democratization of the university meant the democratization of decision-making processes, in effect, turning rational discussion into a form of praxis. “Preparation for
careers requiring university training," argued Habermas, "would have to free itself from traditional patterns and give way to initiation into critical professional practice. 'Critical' means here the combination of competence and learning ability to permit the scrupulous handling of tentative technical knowledge and the context-sensitive, well-informed willingness to resist politically the dubious functional application or control of the knowledge that one practices." Knowledge, for Habermas, served a social function beyond its pragmatic applications, in contrast to the American conception of social scientific knowledge.

Habermas labeled this form of critical activity "radical reformism."

What Marx called critical-revolutionary activity must take this way today. This means that we must promote reforms for clear and publicly discussed goals, even and especially if they have consequences that are incompatible with the mode of production of the established system... if we do not deem insignificant the goals, forms, and contents of humane social and communal life, then the superiority of a mode of production can only be measured, in industrial societies, with regard to the scope it opens up for a democratization of decision-making processes in all sectors of society.

When the German university was fundamentally changed, it did not unleash social science—as American social scientists had wished—but Critical Theory, a native form of democracy, a native form of social thought. Praxis once again resurfaced as a legitimate form of democracy; knowledge would be created not for pragmatic social control, but for theoretically-informed social change.

Although the Americans had introduced their methods and techniques of social science, these did not displace critical social theory, or the German philosophic tradition in which it was embedded. The juxtaposition of the two types of knowledge—one pragmatic and one critical—has complicated the political functions of the social sciences in postwar Germany. As Daele and Weingart argue, the reappearance of Critical Theory makes the job of Americanized pragmatic social science difficult in Germany:
The loss of technical naivete, destroying illusions and questioning established routines is often dysfunctional, as seen from the limited perspectives of the political demand. Therefore, in the Federal Republic of Germany, there is a growing tendency in some areas to "discard" the social sciences, having been called for to increase the technical efficiency of politics, in order to prevent a further complication of problems and to regain a technocratic impact...So far, there is little indication that by employing the social sciences more complexity can be reduced than is generally being created by it in society. It is highly probable that the development of the social sciences necessary for political purposes is inseparably tied to an increase of the potential of political and social reflection and criticism. Anyway, it can be said that long before increasing the resources for social engineering, the social sciences will increase the complexity of political problems so that they would rather increase than lessen the necessity of returning to democratic and consensual decision-making processes. Social sciences, in such a case, would prove most useful to society in areas in which, in a technical sense, it cannot be utilized.

Daele and Weingart were observing the effects of two competing notions of social research; one, tied to American pragmatic social science, the other tied to German critical social theory. German critical social theory offers an alternative to American social science, both in its social role and its democratic implications. If American social science offers prediction and control—and thus management of social change—then German critical social theory creates complexity, lessens the ability to control, but opens up possibilities for discussion, participation, praxis and democracy.

Critical Theory, praxis, theoretically-informed social change grew out of Marxism, out of German philosophy, not American science. The Frankfurt School was born out of the German philosophical tradition, and thus appears more inward, drawing upon traditional German sources of knowledge. In this way, the Frankfurt School symbolized Social Democratic Party leader Kurt Schumacher's vision of a Germany that looked neither West or East for its legitimacy. If we examine the Freiburg School and the Frankfurt School as intellectual traditions, as cultural artifacts, the former seems more Western than German; the latter seems more German than Western. Within the Federal Republic, the
Freiburg School and the Frankfurt School represent two competing self-images, two competing domains of social scientific knowledge, two competing definitions of democracy.
Notes


5 Ibid., 49.

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