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Marx, freedom and education

Davison, Trevor, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1993
MARX, FREEDOM AND EDUCATION.

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Trevor Davison, B.Ed. Studies, M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
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PRESENTATIONS


FIELD OF STUDY

Major Field: Education
# Table of Contents

**Vita** .......................................................... ii

**Chapter**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statement of Purpose</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plan of the Project</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>'Freedom': Problems and Issues of Meaning and Analysis</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Problems and Issues Associated With Analysis of Ordinary Language Use</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Freedom': What use is &quot;use&quot;?</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A brief conceptual analysis of 'freedom'</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analyses of 'freedom' and the role of context</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. A Selective Literature Review of 'Freedom'</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The meaning of 'freedom' is private?</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There are different &quot;kinds&quot; of 'freedom'?</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There are only two &quot;kinds&quot; of 'freedom'?</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is one meaning to 'freedom'?</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Marx and Freedom</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Marx and Variable 'x': The Human Agent</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marx and what human nature is not</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marx and human nature</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Marx and McCallum's Variables 'y' and 'z': Freedom From and Freedom to</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Product alienation</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary choice and natural character</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self realization and the products of labour</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The human race and nature</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process alienation</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Species-being alienation</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Note on Gender Terminology.

Every citation, quotation, etc. in this project is presented as found. No changes have been made regarding gender terminology and no excuses are provided for the male gender preference evident throughout any work cited. My own claims, however, are always in gender neutral terms and this includes any interpretations of the gender preference claims of others. My claims and my interpretations of Marx and other writers are mine to defend.

I do not defend Marx and any other writers referred to in this project from any criticism regarding the gender bias in their work. Whether any of these writers meant anything significant by using 'men' or 'man' as opposed to 'humans' or 'human beings' is another project altogether.

However, I do believe that much of Marx's arguments work much better if all instances of gender preference usage are replaced with gender neutral ones. The interpretations of Marx and the arguments presented in this project provide justification for this belief.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Statement of Purpose.

The overall purpose of this project is to answer two questions: 1) What does Karl Marx mean when he uses 'freedom', and 2) what substantive issues might his use of 'freedom' suggest for education? A considerable number of other questions will be addressed in this work, but it is these two questions that always remain central.

Pratte (1992), agreeing with MacIntyre (1981) and Mendus and Kennedy (1986), argues that we are not autonomous persons, featureless bearers of human rights and responsibilities, devoid of social standing and interests. Rather, each person is always situated in one circumstance or another dependent on personal and historical, social, economic and cultural contingencies. This makes each person, as MacIntyre points out, "...someone's son or daughter, someone else's cousin or uncle...[and that I]...am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to
this clan, that tribe, this nation" (ibid, p.220). My reasons for addressing the two questions that are central to this project adds support to these claims.

First, as a novice philosopher of education, I am intellectually stimulated and personally intrigued by the preeminence of 'freedom' in much of Western philosophy. The abundance of philosophical attention given to 'freedom' is evident in any decent library. For instance, in the main library of The Ohio State University there are over 600 titles under the heading 'freedom'.

Included in these titles are offerings so central to the history of Western philosophy that one could chart the history of Western civilization itself by using 'freedom' as a central construct. Indeed, Patterson has attempted just such a project and chronicled the history of 'freedom' from its Greek origins to Medieval times. In his Freedom: Freedom in the Making of Western Culture, (1991) he argues that the first conceptions of 'freedom' can be found in the works of Euripides and Epictetus. His main thesis is that the history of 'freedom' can best be

---

1 This line of reasoning is a theme that runs throughout the next two chapters. In them, I take the position that any actual person is always the product of a continuing dialectic between these same contingencies and their individual selves.
understood when analyzed against its counterpart 'slavery'. (More will be said about this intriguing point in the second section of Chapter II)

The centrality of 'freedom' in philosophy continues throughout the Middle Ages and beyond. Augustine and Aquinas (1973), for instance, both grappled with the relationship between human freedom and God. Both made concerted efforts to reconcile the contradiction between claiming that God is omniscient while also maintaining that human beings are still free to act in one way or another.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth century further attention is given to 'freedom'. Pivotal here are the views of Locke. Osbourne (1992) claims that Locke's liberalism, based on his interpretation of the State of Nature where "...man is free and in this condition all men are equal", laid the groundwork for what was to become known as the Age of Enlightenment (p.88-89). Additionally, Hume (1977) also paid considerable attention to 'freedom'. He wrote with disdain about the futility of arguing over the relationship between liberty[^2] and necessity when all

[^2]: Of course 'liberty' is not the same word as 'freedom', but neither is 'liberatus', claimed to be the Latin word which most closely corresponds to modern (Footnote Continued)
that is required are "...a few intelligible definitions" (p.54).

Rousseau's political theory marked a major turning-point in the Enlightenment and his beliefs and claims about freedom are central to his theory. In A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1991), for example, Rousseau claimed that liberty is "...the noblest faculty of man" (p.104), that it "...results from the nature of man" (p.182) and is an "...essential gift of nature of which man cannot be alienated from" (p.105). In Chapter III of this project we will find that Marx relies on these ideas to argue that human beings are alienated

(Footnote Continued)

conceptions of 'freedom' (Patterson, 1991, p.221) or any other word in any language claimed to also "correspond to modern conceptions of 'freedom'. Patterson is well aware of the difficulties that are inherent to charting the history of 'freedom' when one has to search for common concepts and I address some of these difficulties in Chapter II. One common distinction between 'liberty' and 'freedom' is one concerning individual human action and any social and political conditions that may confine it. For instance, Greene (1988) states that 'liberty' "...may be conceived of in social or political terms: Embodied in laws or contracts or formulations of human rights..." (p.117). 'Freedom', however, is more to do with personal autonomy, 'freedom' signifies how individuals act "within given conditions of liberty" (ibid). Yet Buckland (in Patterson, ibid, p.220) states that it is 'liberty' that signifies "...the natural capacity (facultas) of doing what we like, except what, by force of law, we are prevented from doing". One premature suggestion for future research then would be to examine the historical and conceptual relationships and differences between 'liberty' and 'freedom'. 
when they are not allowed to live and labour in accord with their human nature.

Understanding the centrality of 'freedom' in Western philosophy cannot proceed without some mention of Immanuel Kant. Kant, perhaps more than anyone, has been used, rightly or wrongly, to set the foundation for more modern notions of 'freedom'—notions that focus primarily on individual autonomy.

Kant's claims regarding the autonomy of each individual will and the relationship each one has to the "real" or phenomenal world are fundamental to his *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1981) and have underpinned much of western philosophy that followed him. For example, in Chapter III we find that Marx firmly believed that human beings are capable of making judgements devoid of any historical, social, cultural and economic influences. This notion of Marx's sounds very familiar to Kant's belief in the efficacy of the human

---

Kant envisions two worlds. The **phenomenal world** is the world of matter, of objects, of things that human senses have access to. These things that humans have access to however, are mere "representations", they are "things-as-they-appear". "Things-as-they-are", on the other hand, are beyond human reach, beyond human knowing. Whatever it is that is "behind" or "beyond" representation or appearance lies in the **noumenal world**. A world where human will operates from though the effects of each are always in this other **phenomenal world**.
will. Paradoxically, it also is a belief that seems inconsistent with other beliefs that Marx holds that I also address in the same chapter.

Rawls (1971) is a more recent example of a philosopher who relies on Kant to ground human freedom. His metaphorical image of the "veil of ignorance", for instance, falls right out of Kantian metaphysics. Rawls believes that the "veil of ignorance"—the ability human beings have to chose, to make "good" judgements while their existential circumstances and individual psychology are unknown to them—is implicit in Kant's work (p.140).

Other contemporary writers such as Walzer (1983) and Sandel (1989) are critical of this interpretation of 'freedom' and are more inclined to take a stand with Mill than Kant. For them, 'freedom' means to judge and act with others rather than by oneself or alone. They contend that 'freedom' always means to judge and act while conscious of being someone somewhere rather than from Kant's and Rawl's perspective, a perspective that which appears to some as a "view from nowhere" (Nagel, 1986).

It seems then that for novice philosophers of education hoping to become more mature ones, there are certain issues that just have to be dealt with as part of their training. The issue of "meaning" seems one of them, issues about the meaning of 'freedom' perhaps another.
A second reason why I chose this project is that as a novice philosopher of education and a practicing teacher, I am interested in the educational implications that various conceptions of 'freedom' suggest. Like the philosophical history of 'freedom' in general, much has been written about the relationship between freedom and education, e.g. Chambers (1983), Dewey (1944, 1989), Freire (1983), Greene (1988), Peters (1969, 1979), Power (1982), Pratte (1992), Straughan (1985) and Vandenberg (1983). Not surprisingly, different conceptions of 'freedom' have led to different claims about what teachers and students should expect in any educational endeavour.

Dewey (1944), for example, in Democracy and Education claims that:

the demand for freedom is the need of conditions which will enable an individual to make his own special contribution to the group interest, and to partake of its activities in such ways that social guidance shall be a matter of his own mental attitude, and not a mere authoritative dictation of his acts" (p.301)

Dewey, like Marx, attempts to find the right balance between the individuality of being a human being, "...one is mentally an individual" (p.302) and the alternative to believing that there is an "...inherent opposition between working with others and working as an individual (ibid). One of the aims of freedom in education, according to
Dewey, is to provide some of the conditions conducive to students finding their own group interest and acting on it. This would also encourage students to develop that mental attitude which allows each student a "...fair leeway of movements in exploration, experience, application, etc. (ibid, p.305).

Peters (1979), a British philosopher of education, is also concerned with the educational importance of freedom and the problematic relationships freedom suggests between individual human beings and the communities or societies of which they are a part. For him, there is always a tension between individual and unfettered or unrestricted freedom and the moral line is crossed when the exercise of freedom is "...likely to occasion great unfairness or suffering to others" (p.148).

Establishing what counts as "great unfairness or suffering to others" is where the hard work lies, of course, and many might consider Peter's analysis and others like it an inadequate response. Why inadequate? Because it is a response that avoids the real problems that actual human beings face--such as whether being laid-off due to corporate restructuring is a "great unfairness" or whether a pregnant woman being unable to get an abortion due to lack of state support is "great suffering". To his credit, however, Peters does point to
the role of education in addressing some of these problems. One of his claims in this regard is that education can provide the form of the moral consciousness that students require to sensitize them to what is relevant when we think about what is right and wrong (p.144). In other words, teachers can get students to be critical of objectionable human practices and actions by referring them to principles that often demonstrate the tenuous nature of the line between individual and unfettered or unrestricted freedom.

Both Pratte (1992) and Vandenberg (1983) see the place of freedom in education as one of promoting moral agency. Pratte argues that promoting a student's freedom is basic to respecting them as persons (p.267). This would mean that teachers would respect the personhood of each actual student rather than some abstract notion of 'person' or even the "general good" of each classroom. Of course, acting on the "general good" of classrooms may often be the best way that teachers can respect each individual student. Like Dewey and Peters however, Pratte argues that this may mean there will be justifiable limitations placed on individual freedom—some based on the aim of broadening each student's cognitive perspective (p.263), some based on how much equal consideration teachers and students receive (p.264).
Vandenberg also supports the idea of freedom as being necessary for moral agency. His strategy, however, is to focus on teachers helping students to become responsible for their actions. For him, the role of freedom in education is to get students to become increasingly aware of the kinds of responsibility that belong to the exercise of moral agency, especially the moral agency they are expected to act from when they become adults (p.77). Importantly, the parameters of these adult responsibilities have to be defined by each human being (ibid). Hence, for Vandenberg, freedom in education means that:

At each age level, in each subject, and every day, children and youth ought be allowed the freedom they can manage because they learn to be free by being responsible for progressively larger, more complicated things (p.78)

Richardson and Rossman (1981) provide good examples of Vandenberg's view of freedom. During their teaching of a basic humanities course at La Guardia Community College, students are forced to confront the responsibilities inherent to their own education. One of the main goals of the course is to help students understand that human freedom is a "process of becoming" over which personal responsibility must be taken. In the course itself, freedom is studied with a view based on human activity and individual responsibility (ibid).
One could give other examples of how 'freedom' is of central concern to the writings of philosophers and practitioners of education. Mention could be made of radical understandings to those already addressed. Freire (1972), for instance, sees hope in education in the possibility of it helping human beings "name" the world. This is important to Freire because to name the world is to change it, and in changing the world human beings express their freedom (p.61).

Greene is another writer who has fairly strong views concerning the relationships between freedom and education. In her *The Dialectic of Freedom* (1988), she supports Freire's beliefs about the importance of students being able to name the world as a necessary condition of their freedom. For her, education is crucial in equipping students to be better able to "break habits", "surpass givens", and "open new spaces and perspectives". When students are involved in activities such as these, she contends, it is then that they experience freedom.

Kane (1984) and Arons (1983) take a more radical line concerning freedom and education. Both argue for a separation between school and state in the same way that there is a separation between church and state. Kane argues that the state would actually preserve freedom of intellect and belief if it got out of the business of
schooling altogether. Arons argues that the way schools are presently run undercuts the freedoms of expression and beliefs of those parents who are often a dissenting minority. The only reasonable response to this restriction on freedom, he argues, is the separation of school and state. This would guarantee, he claims, the same governmental neutrality and parental choice that the separation of church and state does.

Patently, these are issues that loom central in philosophy and there clearly are some issues that are central in philosophy of education. The relationship between freedom and education is one issue that requires considerable attention if one is to take philosophy of education seriously.

Being a philosopher and being a philosopher of education however, are not distinct and independent from other aspects to one's personal history. Hence, the decision to address the two questions central to this project is also informed by my own personal history and a complex host of other factors, some I am conscious of, and some not.

Perhaps this is no more evident in the fact that I was born and raised in a mining village in the north of England where an informal understanding of Marxism can still provide a reasonable explanation of why there are
objectionable states of affairs in the lives of men and women working under stringent capitalist conditions. Also, being an apprenticed and fully qualified tradesman for a number of years provided me with valuable experiences on which to draw in trying to make sense of many of Marx's claims, especially those about alienating labour. For me, Marx provides a reasonable and all too familiar interpretation of what it is that is objectionable about living and working under stringent capitalist conditions.

Explaining why something is objectionable however, is very different from suggesting what should be put in its place and how this can be achieved. Ultimately, this project is my attempt to do just that.

**Plan of the Project**

Chapter II is divided into two sections. In the first section I provide a lengthy introduction in order to answer the question: What does Marx mean when he uses 'freedom'. I commence by highlighting some of the thorny and philosophically fundamental problems and issues associated with questions of language use and meaning. This strategy is adopted because if a project includes a purpose concerning the use and meaning of a particular word, then something needs to be said in the first place about the use and meaning of words.
However, this project is primarily devoted to philosophy of education and delving too deeply into questions of language use and meaning could turn it into a project about philosophy in general. As Chambers (1983) points out, philosophy of education is one branch of general philosophy and thus the aim of "...trying to become clearer about concepts, about meanings that escape our notice, about various assumptions we may be making without being aware of them..." (p.1) may be just as relevant here. Thus, my approach will be to address some relevant issues about use and meaning, particularly the problems of an analysis of use, without straying too far afield from the more substantial issues of freedom and education.

To achieve this delicate balance, certain assumptions will have to be made, especially about language use and meaning, so that one can move on and try to deal with more substantive concerns. Some of these assumptions will be obvious, some not; some may appear readily defensible, others somewhat questionable.

My departure point in Chapter II will be to assume that there is a significant relationship between meaning and use and that analyzing how some writers use 'freedom' will provide valuable information and insights regarding the substantive issues that concern them. Having commenced
from this assumption however, I immediately address what use analyzing "use" is. I argue that it is of little or no use if what we are interested in are changes in objectionable states of affairs concerning the human condition. And, of course, this includes changes in educational policies, school curricula, teaching practices, and student learning experiences.

In addressing some of the problems and issues associated with the analysis of language use, I argue that most words (and any other communicative symbol) carry neither inherent "positive" or "negative" meanings or connotations. That is to say, I argue that most words do not mean anything necessarily good or bad. Concomitantly, I also argue that the vast majority of words (and any other communicative symbol) are not value-free either. Words, etc. necessarily reflect human values and interests in one way or another. Thus, what people mean by using words, etc. cannot be understood independent from their conscious or unconscious values and interests.  

4 In the U.S., people often argue about "respecting the flag" and that burning it is not one way to do this. The act of burning the flag and what it means to "respect" something are uses of two different communicatory symbols. Both are open to interpretation and what this act and word means will be dependent on each users' views about being an American, America itself and the good and bad of both (Footnote Continued)
In support of this claim I argue that what an individual human being values and/or is interested in is dependent on both interpersonal and intrapersonal contexts. Put simply, the social, economic, cultural and historical circumstances that contribute to each person's existence and the uniqueness of each individual provide the range of options from which one can make choices about values and interests.

The second section of Chapter II serves as a selective literature review of how certain writers have used 'freedom'. From this review I suggest that the various uses of 'freedom' and what it means can be arranged on a continuum ranging from multiple meanings to singular ones. Put differently, the literature review will demonstrate how some writers could well argue that 'freedom' could mean anything the user wants or that there are "kinds" of freedom. Additionally, it will also show how 'freedom' has been conceived of in terms of opposed-pairs or dichotomous relationships, e.g. positive/negative, individual/social, and how for some writers that 'freedom' means one thing and one thing only.

(Footnote Continued) of these. For instance, it is not coincidental that many blacks in the U.S. do not get as nearly as upset as many whites when the flag is burned.
As a part of this review, one writer, McCallum (1967), provides a triadic schema that I adopt in Chapter III. McCallum's intent in designing this schema is to apply it to the claims of writers who have used 'freedom' and establish the substantive issues that each is concerned about. In effect, McCallum devises this schema so that we are better able to discern and debate what each use of 'freedom' suggests for the actual affairs of human beings rather than merely arguing about differences in the meaning of 'freedom' itself.

McCallum further argues that identifying the substantive issues that underpin uses of 'freedom' can be achieved by answering the following questions: 1) What does each user of 'freedom' assume about human nature?; 2) what is it that the user desires human beings be free to be or do?; and 3) what prevents them from achieving or doing this? Thus, McCallum claims, it is the answers to these three questions represented by each variable in his triadic schema that will reveal what it is that users of 'freedom' value and the substantial issues they are interested in.

In Chapter III I follow McCallum and apply his schema in analyzing Marx's claims about 'freedom'. This serves as a convenient and useful strategy to understand the specific and substantive issues Marx is concerned with and
what changes he believes are required for humans to be free. Ultimately, I will use McCallum's schema to better understand Marx's intrapersonal context; to establish what he valued and what he was interested in.

The first variable of McCallum's schema, variable 'x', applied to some of Marx's claims will reveal Marx's dualistic position on human nature. The range of this variable will demonstrate that Marx believed that there was a static element to being human and there was another element that changes dependent on the "ensemble of social relations". In this section, I argue that Marx believed all human beings have a "natural character", a will (that allows them to make "independent judgements"), "needs" and "fixed" drives. Moreover, that all human beings are species-beings, capable of considering themselves as such and importantly, that each is capable of producing, through labour, on behalf of the species.

In this section I will also point out some of the difficulties of Marx's position on human nature. I will argue, for example, that Marx's belief that human beings have a "natural character" is very difficult to defend, even though it has a ring of "common sense" to it. One particular difficulty I will address is how one could "know" one had a certain "natural character" or specific "characteristic" if it was not possible for it to become
evident because, or due to a lack, of particular historical, economic, social, cultural circumstances. Another difficulty I will address concerns Marx's belief that human beings are capable of making "independent judgements". Marx has much riding on these two beliefs and I will argue that they are not tenable, worse still, they contradict other claims he makes.

The range of McCallum's variable 'z' applied to some of Marx's claims will reveal that Marx believes human beings ought be free to be or do. These beliefs include that human beings are free when they live and labour in accord with human nature itself. Hence, I will argue, Marx believes that human beings are to be allowed to labour in a way that is expressive of their "natural character". Why? Because this allows them to become self-realized through labour. The importance of human self-realization is also addressed in this section.

The range of variable 'z' will demonstrate that Marx believed that human beings labouring in a manner that is expressive of their "natural character" is not enough. The application of variable 'z' will also highlight the importance Marx gives to human beings as species-beings. Thus, I will also argue that Marx believed that for human beings to be free, they must labour in a way that personifies their species-beingness.
Variable 'y' applied to some of Marx's claims will explicate the conditions that prevents human freedom. I will argue that one word signifies this condition: 'alienation'. 'Alienation', it will be shown, is a central and complex concept within Marx's philosophy and thus, I will pay considerable attention to it by analyzing the three separate, but related, components: product alienation, process alienation and species-being alienation.

Utilizing McCallum's triadic schema in this section will reveal how complex Marx's notion and use of 'freedom' truly is. However, because of its complexity and the second question that this project addresses--What substantive issues does Marx's use of 'freedom' suggest for education?--some decisions will have to be made as a matter of expediency.

The first decision is to examine only one aspect of Marxian freedom. The particular aspect addressed is Marx's imperative that human freedom requires human beings to at least recognize and act on their species-beingness. The second decision is to examine human beings as species-beings only in terms of education.

In Chapter IV then, I argue that if teachers encourage students to be empathically disposed, this is a promising vehicle for helping them become species-beings.
My strategy for teasing out this issue will be to once again utilize McCallum's triadic schema.

Recalling the first variable of McCallum's triadic schema, variable 'x', I commence by making some brief comments about the conceptual relationships between 'human being' and 'student'. The next variable I address is variable 'z'. This move allows me to argue for what I believe teachers and students can do in order to promote human freedom.

To achieve this end, I examine what 'species-being' entails in its ideal sense and then move on to offer what I believe to be a more practical interpretation. Included in this interpretation will be mention of how Marx's notion of human beings as species-beings and what is entailed in being a species-being is a theme common to many other writers, e.g. Boyea (1991), Buber (1965, 1970), Gilligan (1982), Greene (1988), and Noddings (1984).

My main argument—that teachers can help students become species-beings by encouraging them to be empathically disposed—commences with a brief conceptual analysis of 'empathy'. This analysis will demonstrate that 'empathy' is a conceptually vague term, where much of the vagueness hinges on how "much" of one person has to be "put in the shoes" of another in order to be empathic. However, regardless of the disagreement over what being
empathic requires of people, I will demonstrate that the various conceptions of 'empathy' analyzed are all underpinned by the same point—a fundamental concern for other people and a willingness to act on that concern.

Next, I pay attention to the idea of encouraging students to develop an empathic disposition. In order for students (or anyone) to have an empathic disposition, I will argue that what is required is that teachers implement activities designed so that students share experiences with other people. Encouraging students to become empathically disposed requires their being involved in activities that allow them to try to feel and experience what other people feel and experience.

Importantly however, I will also argue that by themselves activities designed to allow students to feel and experience with others is not enough. What is also required is that: 1) students must try to understand how and why others feel the way they do and crucially, 2) students must try to and understand their own feelings and experiences. The reason for these two points, I will argue, is simple: Empathy is a relational phenomenon. In order to "feel with others", to experience what others experience, one must also be able and willing to be self-critical of one's own feelings and experiences. Anything less could result in students being merely
sympathetic rather than empathic. Worse still, any person some student is being encouraged to be empathic with could remain the other person rather than someone they are fundamentally related to and connected with by virtue of the common nature that they share.

Finally, suggestions are provided for what kinds of schooling activities could encourage students to develop an empathic disposition. These suggestions will include community service and other activities that focus on students gaining experiences with those they might otherwise consider not "one-of-them", not part of those they would normally include in any sense of "we" they might possess.

To complete the chapter I utilize McCallum's variable 'x' to highlight some of the "preventing conditions" that can hinder or deny the aim of teachers encouraging

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5 In the conceptual analysis of 'empathy' I provide in Chapter IV, Goldstein & Michaels (1985, p.7) make the following distinction between 'empathy' and 'sympathy': 'Empathy' is to "feel with others", 'sympathy', to "feel for others". This distinction contributes to the vague nature of 'empathy' as "feeling sorry for" seems a commonly used interpretation of 'sympathy', yet intuitively, there also seems a subtle distinction between "feeling sorry for" and "feeling for (others)"—the latter appears much "stronger" than the former. Yet 'empathy' as "feeling with others" seems "stronger" still. Fortunately, within the conceptual confusion, there is also enough common ground to suggest some practical guidelines for teachers and students.
students to develop an empathic disposition. I examine
some "preventing conditions" inherent to the aim itself
and the difficulties students could create in teachers
working towards it. Also, some possible "preventing
conditions" both within and beyond school settings are
identified and addressed.

The final chapter, Chapter V, is comprised of two
sections: 1) An overall summary of the project and some
tentative conclusions, and 2) suggestions for further
research.

Limitations.

It seems rather unfashionable these days to interpret
Marx in ways I will argue for in Chapter IV. The recent
rise of new and alternative "voices" and "traditions" and
their growing influence and acceptance has sometimes
resulted in Marxism being cast as just another "Great Man"
theory. Seminal works such as Gilligan's In A Different
Voice (1982) and Noddings' Caring: A Feminine Approach To
Ethics & Moral Education have served as a well-needed
intellectual jolt to many (mostly men) and made some
sharply aware that much of Western philosophy has been
more often than not a "Men Only" club with a "rational"
facade to conceal its exclusivity. Other works have
pointed to the racial and cultural biases inherent to much of Western philosophy. Minh-Ha's *When the Moon Waxes Red* (1991), Anzaldúa's *Making Face, Making Soul - Haciendo Caras* (1990) and hooks' and West's *Breakin' Bread* (1991) are just three examples of this genre.

However, when long-standing philosophies and theories are subject to considerable criticism, there is always a danger of "throwing the baby out with the bath water". This is no less the case for Marxism and I am of the opinion that Marx still offers some valuable insights into explaining what it is that is objectionable about living and labouring under stringent capitalist conditions, and of course, for schooling in capitalist societies. I also believe that there are aspects to Marxism that still offer substantial insights and suggestions for change and these are consistent with some of the new "voices" and "traditions" alluded to a moment ago.

Hence, this project is an attempt to save the "baby" by arguing for an interpretation of Marxian 'freedom' that is not inconsistent with many of the new and alternative "voices" and "traditions". In order to arrive at some practical suggestions that can deal with the substantive issues that concern me, some limitations have to be placed on the project.
First, I am interested in Marx's use of 'freedom' and not other pivotal concepts in his writings such as 'class' or 'labour'. Second, since I argue for what Marx's use of 'freedom' suggests for education, other equally important implications will be ignored. For instance, I will not address what Marx's use of 'freedom' implies for industrial training or industry in general.

Third, in focusing on what human beings as species-beings suggests for education, I will not address any other avenues that may result from Marx's use of 'freedom'. For example, I will not offer any arguments supporting how teachers could contribute to students identifying and producing from their "natural characters".

The progression from Marxism in general to arguing that teachers could help students become species-beings by encouraging them to be empathically disposed is also warranted for reasons other than expeditious ones. It allows me to offer suggestions that focus on "...men in the here and now" (Aristotle 1984, p.57) and it also allows me the opportunity to establish how I could contribute to "changing the world" and "improving prior social conditions".

The interpretation I argue for is based on research from the following:

I also use a number of secondary sources. These sources often include interpretations of many of Marx's claims that I am also interested in and address within this project. I am unsure of whether these sources are "Neo-Marxists", "Classical Marxists", "Post-Structuralists" or whatever other distinctions there are among Marxists. I am also unsure of which one of these, if any, my arguments makes me. Whatever my arguments are and whatever kind of Marxist they may make me, my approach for this project has been to try to understand Marx's own writings to the best of my ability. This has meant also reading how others have interpreted Marx and those whose interpretations I have followed are listed in the bibliography.
CHAPTER II

'FREEDOM':
PROBLEMS AND ISSUES OF MEANING AND ANALYSIS

What is freedom and why is it prized?
(Dewey, 1989, p.11)

Almost every moralist in human history has praised freedom. Like happiness and goodness, like nature and reality, the meaning of this term is so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist.
(Berlin, 1969, p.121)

Introduction

In my judgment, philosophy of education is of little value unless it results in significant changes in educational practice. Consistent with Marx, this view derives from the belief that if one of the tasks of philosophy in general is to change the world and not just interpret it (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.145), then equally, the task of philosophy of education is to result in significant changes in educational practice that can contribute to "changing the world".

Changing the world is not easy. Invariably, it requires normative judgements. Something has to be said about why certain states of affairs are "not good", "not right", "unfair", "unjust", etc. and that change is
necessary. Justification will have to be given for any change and why some particular change rather than another.

It would be a gross understatement to say that Marx offers suggestions for changing the world yet, paradoxically, the richness and complexity of his suggestions also allows for obfuscation, even contradiction. Therefore, not only is there a need to assess Marx's justification for the changes he suggests, but also, a need to interpret, as best we can, the claims and reasons inherent to that justification.  

This chapter aims at preparing the way for understanding and assessing the changes that Marx associates with the promotion of human freedom. The

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6 It may appear here that I am presupposing a distinction between "meaning" and "value"; that normative claims about changing the world, for instance, are somehow "independent" of the meanings ascribed to the words, terms, etc. that the claims themselves are couched in. This distinction is actually one of the main themes of this chapter and whether it makes sense to refer to a distinction between "meaning" and "value" is something I try to address throughout it. My present view lies somewhat with Quine who draws on Neurath and Hempel to argue that the structure of language is "...a single connected fabric including all sciences, and indeed everything else we ever say about the world (p.12). ...a fabric of sentences variously associated to one another and to non-verbal stimuli by the mechanism of conditioned response" (p.11). Where the "...uniformity that unites us in communication and belief is a uniformity of resultant patterns overlying a chaotic subjective diversity of connections between words and experience" (p.8). Word & Object (1960).
changes themselves are addressed in the next chapter.

First, however, I set out in this chapter by giving considerable attention to the concept 'freedom' itself.

The first section of this chapter deals with some of the problems and issues associated with any analysis of language that focuses on use or usage. Why? Well for one thing Marx "used" 'freedom' in a very specific way and only his writings can give us clues to what he meant by 'freedom'. Countless others have used 'freedom' differently but yet again, "use" is often all there is to understand meanings. Perhaps the best we can do in understanding what others mean by what they write and say is to examine things like intent and context—establishing

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7 Having said this, a "red flag" should be immediately obvious to the philosophical eye; a red flag indicating an assumption about a distinction between 'meaning' and 'use'. 'Meaning' and 'use' separately, and the relationship between them, are fraught with deep and difficult issues, perhaps ones most fundamental to all philosophy. No philosopher worth his or her salt though can afford to ignore the question of meaning yet too much attention to 'meaning' takes this project far away from the substantive issues that I believe philosophy of education should be concerned with. Therefore, my first tentative claim is to state that there must be some relationship between "use" and "meaning". If this were not the case then it would make no sense to say that when I tell my children to pick up their Lego that in using 'Lego' I am referring to those interlocking plastic blocks on the floor but that I don't mean by 'Lego' those very same toys.
how words are used may be the best chance there is of determining meaning.

I begin by arguing that analyzing how others use 'freedom' does not necessarily lead to changes in those substantive issues that very often motivate people to be interested in 'freedom' in the first place. In fact, any desired changes might even require arguing for alternative or specific uses of 'freedom'.

Next, I provide a brief conceptual analysis of 'freedom' based on ordinary language examples. There, and contrary to common practice and understanding, I argue that 'freedom' is not always used with "positive" connotations. My main claim will be that 'freedom', like any other word, is neither inherently "positive" or "negative". Rather, it is the substantive issues that each meaning ascribed to 'freedom' results in or implies that reveals where the "valuing" lies. This means then that 'freedom' is used "positively" or "negatively" only if the practical implications of such use are also valued or not.

The role that a language user's personal values plays in ascribing meanings to words then becomes the focus of the final issue in the first section. There I address the
role of context\textsuperscript{8} in language analysis; both in terms of carrying out the analysis as well as analyzing how others use 'freedom'. My main arguments will be that (1) meanings and use of words are never somehow "value-free" or "neutral" and (2) that meaning and use are always inextricably bound up with context.

The second section of the chapter is where I present a selective literature review of how others have used 'freedom' whose meaning, we recall, Berlin claims is so "porous". The results of this review suggest strong support for Berlin's observation, and furthermore, by utilizing a continuum, I argue that past and present uses of 'freedom' can be conceived of in radically different guises, ranging from 'freedom' meaning whatever one wants to the view that 'freedom' has only one "true" or "real" meaning.

\textsuperscript{8}'Context' as used here includes both intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions. The 'intrapersonal' dimension refers to the individual's psychological make-up, including: attendant values, beliefs, attitudes and "conceptual baggage". The 'interpersonal' dimension will refer to those forces "outside" of each individual that has contributed to their personal development, e.g., historical, political, social, cultural and economic ones. More will be written about context as the chapter progresses.
As stated earlier then, this chapter, in effect, serves as a lengthy introduction and preparation for the following one. The aim of that chapter is to provide an analysis of how Marx used 'freedom' and to achieve that end I will capitalize on the themes addressed here.

Principally, I will examine Marx's intrapersonal context and argue that his use of 'freedom' is also inextricably bound up with other values and beliefs he holds. Some of these values and beliefs will be identified and explicated by the use of a triadic schema introduced at the end of this chapter. This schema will also be utilized in Chapter IV where I address one specific implication that Marxian 'freedom' suggests for education in contemporary, capitalist-based industrialized societies. The implication itself, I will argue, suggests particular educational activities for teachers and students that could serve as a vehicle for them contributing to "changing the world".
A. Problems and Issues Associated with Analysis of Ordinary Language Use.

'Freedom': What use is "use"?

A common strategy for ascertaining what 'freedom' or any other word means is to examine how the word is ordinarily used. Words, after all, are always used for some reason by someone, and so one way to address the thorny problem of "meaning" might be to pay close attention to the use of words themselves. Examining the conditions of when 'freedom' is used: who uses it, how it is used, where and why can provide a wealth of information. Hence, the reasons how, where, when and why 'freedom' is used could also tell us an awful lot about what 'freedom' means to a particular 'freedom' user.

One problem in limiting an analysis of 'freedom' to use, however, is that there is always the risk of committing a "linguistic naturalistic fallacy". What this means is that even if it is possible to provide an analysis of 'freedom' that is fully agreed to (whatever that would entail) it could still be said of that analysis, "So what?". Put differently, though people use 'freedom' in particular ways and that they seem to mean something by it, it does not necessarily follow that they (or we) should continue to use it that way, or even that they (or we) should have been using it that way in the first place.
For instance, there is an argument central to the abortion debate today that focuses on whether some sectors of the populace are justified in calling what a pregnant woman "carries" a 'fetus'. Inherent in this argument is the idea that even though some do use 'fetus' in such circumstances, they should instead, call it a 'baby'. One can imagine a stronger claim like: "Fetuses should have always been called 'babies'" accompanying this reasoning.

This use of 'baby' would obviously require some justification and the justification would rest heavily on the conceptual and practical relationship between 'baby' and 'person', a relationship that is not so obvious with 'fetus' and 'person'. The important point is that this justificatory requirement would be no different from the requirement for continuing with a particular use of 'freedom' or changing it for another. If someone wants to argue that fetuses should be called 'babies', then this claim will have to be justified. If someone wants to argue that 'freedom' should mean "doing anything one wants", then this claim will have to be justified too.

Chambers (1983) provides another example of this problem in claiming that "...in ordinary language the chief use of the word 'freedom' is in connection with an absence of restraints or coercions" (p. 138). He may well be correct but his further claim that "...['freedom'] has
developed for the good reason that it marks a key concept in civilized social and political intercourse..." (ibid) seems more a statement about his views concerning "civilized and political discourse" than why we should adhere to this particular meaning of 'freedom'. Chamber's claim could be taken to infer that societies who do not "use" 'freedom' in the manner suggested by him are ones without "civilized and political discourse". Worse still, that language users who have no concept comparable to Chamber's are ones devoid of "civilized and political discourse".

One obvious response to the criticism of limiting one's language analysis to use is to comment that this is all language analysis is or can be. It is an activity concerned with explicating and clarifying language use. Thus, the intent of the philosopher who is interested in 'freedom', who utilizes analysis of language use, is to simply make clear its various uses. If this is the case, it might be claimed, perhaps it is best that these kinds of activities be left to lexicographers--those involved in that arduous work necessary for the production of dictionaries.

As already stated, Marx believed that one of the tasks of philosophy was to change the world and not just interpret it (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.145). Clearly, the
task of changing the world requires some normative standard to change to. Analyzing language appears to be as much a normative activity as any other but the normative standard for change demands much more than reporting on language use.

For Pratte (1992) much of philosophy of education has been involved with and built on both the activities of language analysis and arguing for normative standards. Philosophy of education, for him, is built on two traditions, the twin traditions of clarification and justification (p.ix-xxii). He argues that while language analysis has an important role to play regarding both educational theory and teaching practice, by itself it is not enough. If this is correct then we need some guidelines for what will count as "good" language analysis.

Perhaps Berlin (1969) is helpful here. He offers one guideline within the context of analyzing 'freedom'. He argues that if we are interested in what 'freedom' means, for whatever reason, then we should limit the analysis to how we usually use it. The point is that if we are offering an argument for how 'freedom' is used or how it should be used, then the arguments themselves have to be expressed in familiar terms, concepts, etc. Thus, even if we wish to argue for a use of 'freedom' that is not in
terms of how we usually use it, the argument itself must be in terms that we usually use if we expect others to understand.

One problem with the foregoing emerges. Who is this "we" that Berlin refers to? Who are the people who require an analysis of 'freedom' in words, terms, concepts, etc., that they "usually use"? For instance, it is quite possible that the reader of this project will be "used to" the terms used in this particular analysis of 'freedom'. Many others though, who, while also "users" of 'freedom', may find the words, terms, concepts, etc. used here unlike the ones they "usually use" (assuming they would even care about language analysis and/or the main themes of this project in the first place). Thus, if this analysis of 'freedom' is couched in terms "usually used" by those reading it have I necessarily provided a "good" one?

The phrase "how we usually use it" could be taken to mean what some philosophers mean by "ordinary language". Within philosophy much is made of the distinction between "ordinary language" and "technical language". For example, "ordinary" 'power' is often about the relations between people, "technical" 'power', however, is often more about the relations between time and energy. Many words, like 'power' and 'freedom', are common to both "ordinary" and "technical" language yet they have very different meanings (and uses). Yet even if an analysis of 'freedom' is in terms "we usually use" is this all there is? It seems that a normative dimension remains to be addressed. If we are happy with some analysis of 'freedom' isn't there still a question of "What next?".
It seems to me that Berlin's guideline serves to support my argument about the relationship between language use and human values and interests. Why? Well one of the criteria for whether the analysis of 'freedom' presented here is a good one or not will be whether I am able to present my argument in terms that reflect the particular values and interests of those responsible for judging the analysis. And these values and interests are not necessarily individual ones of course. They can be, and often are, ones that reflect long established, communal traditions.

Much will depend here then on not just the criteria for a "good" analysis of 'freedom' but who is arguing for the particular criteria and why these criteria and not some others. Berman claims that the "...key questions for understanding the production of knowledge have become not just "What do we know and how do we know it?" but "Who

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10 It seems to me that to be accepted into the "community" of philosophers requires being able to communicate with other philosophers on terms acceptable to the community. One example of this is the intellectual and political weight given to being able to express one's thoughts, beliefs, etc. in terms of arguments, and in particular, impersonal ones. Moreover, if particular words are used and certain words are used in specific ways, then these words and arrangements are given more credence than others, e.g. words like 'moreover' and "if...then" arrangements.
wants to know and why do they want to know it?" (1992, p.416). His claims redirect us to the significant problems inherent to Berlin's guideline that language analysis should be couched in terms of "how we usually it". Berman's claims point again to the relationship between language use and human values and interests. The problems and issues that this relationship suggests sets the tone for the remainder of the chapter.

A further problem in regard to the analysis of language use is that even if an analysis reveals (in Berlin's "usually used" terms) that the most common use of 'freedom' is something like "doing whatever one wants", solving problems claimed to be attributable to this use may very well require arguing for an alternative use of 'freedom'. If one is interested in solving such problems, this cannot be achieved simply by "...determin[ing] the mere definitions of terms as such a solution would carry us no further than the use of the word in the present context" (MacMurray, 1940, p.507).

Berlin's claim does raise some important issues about any analysis of the use of 'freedom' but rarely is anyone's concern about freedom merely about about how people use 'freedom'. Surely most people who read, write and talk about 'freedom' have some interest in the substantive issues that different conceptions of 'freedom'
result in or imply. For many, the word 'freedom' (its various uses and the implications of each use) signifies important concerns they have regarding human existence. Obviously, addressing those concerns will require more than just the analysis of language.

Possible solutions for substantive issues like racism, classism and sexism invariably require action. Actions are often motivated by a normative reaction to specific phenomena. "Normative" actions and reactions require justification; reasons why a specific action is called for and not some other. We not only need to be "clear" then about any substantive issues that concern us but we might also consider why alternatives are more favourable than the situation which motivated the concern.

Like most people, hopefully, I get upset when I see old footage of lynchings of blacks. This emotional response could be the result of how the lynching as perceived by me is inconsistent with some values I hold. The lynching generates a "normative reaction" within me that "triggers" the anger. In this case, the value is prior to the emotional response.

What of young infants though who have emotional responses who seemingly have not had the time or experience to "formulate" values? One response: Such children are responding behaviourally; the emotional response is "triggered" by biology or physiology. If this is the case it seems to me that many adults react to certain phenomena in the same way, e.g., sexual attraction, random violence. I am hesitant then to claim that seemingly moral actions by humans are all motivated by a "normative reaction".
An analysis of ordinary language use of 'freedom' may well explain how it is used and what it may mean to people. Following Marx and others, the more problematic issue, however, is whether such use can lead to or has led to circumstances or consequences that some may argue to be objectionable. Thus, once 'freedom' is explicated as a result of such an analysis there may be good reason for those concerned to try to change a particular use of 'freedom' for something else. The hope being that this "new" use could contribute to the negation or amelioration of these same circumstances or consequences that are a concern to us.

A brief conceptual analysis of 'freedom'.

Trying to determine the ideas, concepts, notions, values etc. that 'freedom' signifies by an investigation of its use is, I believe, not a fruitless exercise. Where else, apart from stipulating use, could we come to grips with issues of meaning except where words originate? It is important to bear in mind that words in particular and languages in general are created by people in particular times and places for specific purposes. Therefore, an examination of how 'freedom' is used can be a valuable starting point in understanding what purposes the word 'freedom' is serving when it is employed by particular language users. This is no unimportant point.
At first glance, an analysis of the ordinary language use of 'freedom' might lead one to believe that it always has a "positive" bias. 'Freedom', in other words, is often used as a shorthand means of expressing something valuable or favourable.

For instance, when we read of "freedom fighters" or that the aim of Operation Desert Storm was to "further freedom" in Kuwait and the Middle East, it is generally supposed that even though those involved were fighting, and perhaps even dying, they were fighting for something good, something morally laudable, noble even. Similarly, the 1960's civil rights movement in the U.S. was also imbued with talk of "freedom" and though what had to be done to acquire such freedom often meant great personal risk and sacrifice, the idea was that the people involved hoped to gain something of value that they had not previously possessed.

There are, however, other uses of 'freedom' that are not so straightforwardly positively biased. Bykhovsky (1964, p.29) provides an example. He asserts that the unemployed person is "free" all day though such "freedom" is of little value. In other words, the person unemployed and collecting unemployment benefits may be moved to comment that she possesses considerable freedom but that
is the problem—such freedom to her is of little or no value. 12

Hopefully, these examples illustrate that 'freedom' is a word with neither a necessarily "positive" or "negative" sense. Why? The first two examples are uses of 'freedom' with a "positive" sense, the third example a use with a "negative" sense. The use of 'freedom' in "freedom fighters" implies that the user also values what this fighting will result in; more democracy, for instance. Conversely, the use of 'freedom' with regard to unemployed persons implies that being without work, having no money, etc. is of little or no value. The actual use of 'freedom'

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One could argue that there is a confusion here with the value of freedom and value of the choices or available options. If I dislike my job but don't like the alternatives either, e.g., unemployment, starvation, then although none of the choices are appealing to me I still have the freedom to choose from them. Thus, the choices may be "negative" but the freedom to choose from these options remains "positive". Personally, I would not consider such freedom "positive" at all. The value of freedom seems always bound up with the value of the available choices. If I am given the freedom to choose how to be executed for instance, I don't see any consolation in having such freedom, that having the freedom to choose from some "death options" was "better" than no choice at all. The same can be said for education. Like some of the poor black children described in Kozol's Savage Inequalities (1991), having the freedom to choose between learning about computer operations with only a keyboard or science without scientific equipment makes a mockery of the claim that the freedom itself was still good even though the options available were not.
in this third example might be laden with cynicism and sarcasm, or perhaps sorrow, concern, or pity.

The analysis of these examples suggests a new issue—the relationship between word use and what each user values. That is, the non-necessary relation between 'freedom' and either a "positive" or "negative" use now raises the issue of whether it is possible to analyze and make claims about use and meaning without having to take into account something about the values, beliefs, attitudes, etc. (what I have referred to on p.32 as the intrapersonal context) of both the language-using subject and the analyst him or herself. Put bluntly, the issue now is this: Isn't use and meaning always bound up with values? And isn't 'freedom', for instance, often used to express in a shorthand way the substantive issues that concerns each user? If this is correct then this could explain why some words, including 'freedom', are "essentially contested concepts" (Gallie, 1955) since different views on the meaning of them may depend upon "...fundamental differences of attitude, of a kind for which no logical justification can be given" (ibid., p.191).

In contrast, Chambers, aware that 'freedom' is used in many ways in ordinary language, could respond that in acknowledging these various uses this does not mean he
values all of them. He does value one particular use: "[T]he meaning of 'freedom' must be understood as the taking away of or the "absence of restraint" (1983, p.137), but while being aware of other uses this does not necessarily mean that he values what these other uses might imply. He can maintain a distinction between use (and meaning) and value.

One response to the above is that this only changes the "venue" for an examination of the relationship between use (and meaning) and value. I suggest that Chambers, in analyzing language by a focus on use and doing language analysis itself rather than, say, the history of philosophy of education, reflects a choice. This choice implies something about Chamber's own contexts. Instead of a choice regarding which 'freedom' from the many options of use he is aware of, Chambers has made crucial choices in other areas. He has made a choice about how to frame the problem of 'freedom' and a choice about how the issues raised ought be addressed and resolved. Thus, the problem of being able to maintain a distinction between the various uses of 'freedom' and the one use preferred is now replaced with a meta-problem. The new problem is whether there is a valid distinction that can be made between how we choose to frame and address problems and issues of
meaning and language use and the language used to couch those problems and issues in. 13

Gray (1991) provides another example of this meta-problem. He argues that 'freedom' has one meaning but it is how it is interpreted that reflects the values of the user. Gray's claim, in other words, is that it is the interpretations of the core-concept 'freedom' that are value-laden while the meaning of the core-concept itself remains value-free (pp. 6-7).

Gray's argument is another example of the aforementioned meta-problem because if Gray claims that 'freedom' has one "core-concept" and that it is how this "core-concept" is interpreted that reflects the user's values then this implies that the "value-free" "core-concept" itself is something no-one values. Yet in order to make a distinction between a "value-free" "core-concept" and "value-laden" interpretations some intellectual process or methodology would have had to be used to arrive at this distinction. Gray, like any other

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13 Another example of this problem is this project itself. My decision to focus only on Marx's intrapersonal context in the next chapter probably reveals a lot about me and my contexts. Furthermore, if I had attended a different university with a different philosophy department and different professors I could well have addressed this project from a different perspective. I may well have chosen a different project altogether.
philosopher, would have drawn on his philosophical training (and other aspects of his life, no doubt) to arrive at this distinction and not some other. Thus, Gray would have made many choices from a variety of sources and options in order to end up with this "value-free core concept" and "value-laden interpretations" distinction. Many of these choices would derive from what he judged to be the best way and means of addressing the issues he chose to deal with. Hence, when Gray makes this distinction he is ultimately acting on his own values and interests and values and interests themselves are central to what I will be referring to as the intrapersonal context.

The importance of context is addressed in the next section. Introducing a focus on context now though also serves as a reminder that analyzing linguistic use is fundamentally a social activity. It is a relational enterprise between people since words are the building blocks of a language and languages are created by people as a result of the relations between them and the material world. Thus, if any language is a system of communication designed and developed in some context by some people, then:

...language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic
If this is the case, then analyzing and understanding uses of 'freedom' must also entail some understanding of the user of 'freedom' and the contexts of the use. That is to say, the reasons behind the use, the time, place and circumstances inherent to the time and place that have contributed to the use itself should all have an important bearing on the analysis.

Analyses of 'freedom' and the role of context.

'Context' is a conceptually difficult word and to claim that context should be taken into account helps no-one unless 'context' is clearly specified. To make matters somewhat clearer, I will specifically use 'context' here as a short-hand means of expressing this idea of the when, where and why words are used by particular people. I will use it in this manner as a reminder that there is more at stake when people use words than simply finding out what they mean.

'Context', as used here and already mentioned (footnote, p.32), includes both an intrapersonal and interpersonal dimension. Within the confines of this project, the intrapersonal dimension refers to the relationships between the concept freedom and the concomitant values, beliefs, attitudes, dispositions, etc. of the person using 'freedom'. The interpersonal
dimension, on the other hand, is the society or societies which the user of 'freedom' considers him or herself a member of. This membership could range from a broadly conceived "universal" kind of membership; a recognition of one's place and connectedness with everyone and everything, to a narrower one that reflects one's membership of this (my) tribe whose world (society) ends at the surrounding mountains and jungle. Such membership would also include some acknowledgement by other members of one's inclusion in that same society.

When it comes to 'freedom' then (and any other word, for that matter) use and meaning are related fundamentally to the user's intrapersonal and interpersonal contexts. This means that how each person uses 'freedom' may depend on other norms he or she holds, norms such as the end(s) of humankind, the good life and assumptions about the nature of humankind itself. It may be the case then that in analyzing various uses of 'freedom' "...different concepts of [it] are fully intelligible only against the context of the particular view of man presupposed in each" (Smith, 1984, p.185). Berlin (1969, p.134) is also aware of this relationship between how 'freedom' is used and what it might mean for the user and the relationship to their intrapersonal context when he states that;

...conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what constitutes a
self, a person, a man. Enough manipulation with the definition of man, and freedom can be made to mean whatever the manipulator wishes.

The relationship between the use of 'freedom' and intrapersonal context also helps explain why 'freedom' can, and often has, ended up being defined as what one favours most (Patterson, 1991, p.2). It also helps explain how different uses of 'freedom' may reflect differences in personal conceptions about "what persons are and about what can count as an obstacle to or interference with the freedom of persons so conceived (MacCallum, 1967, p.320)."

Of course, those "other norms" people hold and the things they "favour most" that bear considerably on their use and understanding of 'freedom' need not be so philosophically fundamental as those suggested by Smith, Berlin and Patterson. Uses of 'freedom' could just as easy

14 Much of what I have argued so far will support the claim that there is no "real", "true", "one" or "only" meaning to any word. This is an issue I address in the second aim of this chapter. How this relates to these introductory remarks about context is expressed in a recent dispute in Vegetarian Times concerning the meaning of 'vegetarian'. One letter to the editor included the comment that: "The "real meaning" of vegetarianism is only for the individual to decide. One's perception of what it means...[is]...dictated or determined by...personal and political values and choices" (emphasis added, Colleen Sheely, "Letters", Vegetarian Times, August 1993, p.8).
depend on norms about how one should spend one's income or how one should pass the time of day. Even a child's basic and rudimentary norm like obeying adults and favouring their praise could underpin how they use 'freedom'.

The distinction between intrapersonal and interpersonal context is a very difficult one to maintain of course, as it is hard to imagine how, as individuals, we can make any kind of claim that is not dependent somehow on the numerous forces and circumstances that have impinged on our upbringing and experiences. It is difficult to imagine how any concept could be conceived of in a way that did not have some relationship to both our own intrapersonal and interpersonal contexts. This is an idea brought to the fore by Durkheim when he claimed that: "Concepts are collective representations...they belong to the whole social group" (1915, p.435). It is also an issue, I argue in the following chapter, that surfaces again and again in Marx's use and conception of 'freedom'.

One example of this idea of concepts as "collective representations" is found in the variations among how "the self" is conceived. In Vietnamese for instance, the English word 'I' (toi) means "your servant"; "...there is no [self-concept] 'I' as such" (Williams, 1991, p.62). On the other hand, in American-English the word 'I' implies something far removed from this Vietnamese usage. In
American-English 'I' has mostly an individualistic usage; a use often evident in claims concerning moral autonomy: "Who are you to tell me what to do? I will decide for myself" and claims concerning economic autonomy: "It's my money and I will spend it any way I want". There is rarely any hint of 'I' as "your servant" in these kinds of remarks.

Both languages have words then (though different ones, of course) that signify an individual person but how these words are used and what they are taken to mean are very different things. The point of the example is that these differences could probably be well explained by examining the wide interpersonal and intrapersonal contexts of both American-English and Vietnamese language users.

If this is right then what this also implies for any analysis of 'freedom' is that even the analysis itself may also be determined by some sense of 'context' (MacMurray, 1940, p.508) and that no analysis of 'freedom' can ever escape, to one degree or another, the dictates of context. Like Berlin's concern over a "sociology of knowledge", our claims about how 'freedom' is used could also reflect that "...not only our methods but our conclusions and our reasons for believing them...can be shown to be wholly or largely determined by the stage reached in the development
of our class or group, or nation or culture, or whatever other unit may be chosen..." (1969, p.109).

This creates particular problems for anyone interested in 'freedom', for such persons must be continually aware of not only the context of the 'freedom' user(s) under analysis but also their own contexts, both intrapersonal and interpersonal. If there is no such awareness, then the analysis itself may become not a report of how 'freedom' is or was used but instead, what ought be or should have been meant. Rather than a report of how 'freedom' is or was used, as Norman asserts, there is the risk of confusing the politics of language with the language of politics (1991, p.21). When this confusion occurs the analyst restricts the meaning of important words like 'freedom' in a way that "...echo[es] the moral and ethical implications of its manufacturer—whether he realizes it or not" (ibid. p.154). The analysis itself then can end up being a kind of linguistic imperialism (Pratte, 1992, p.x) that seeks to coerce or impose certain meanings on others (ibid, p.xv).

To be fair, Norman does also state that honest analysts do confess to the stipulative nature of their projects. My claim is thus quite modest: Such honesty requires the recognition of the role of both intrapersonal and interpersonal context. Anything less runs the risk of
the analysis becoming a "...man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest" (Simon & Garfunkel, 1970).

Some final comments on the role and importance of context. Too much emphasis on context may result in more time and energy spent on trying to establish the reasons why a something is said or written rather than establishing what was meant. This point raises difficult issues regarding distinctions between the "disciplines" of philosophy, history, anthropology, sociology, psychology, etc. and what counts as "doing these". Raising it here may reflect an underlying concern regarding the demarcation between these disciplines rather than one regarding the possibility of too much contextual analysis.

Nevertheless, and reiterating, choices about how to "do" these disciplines must also inevitably be choices that are dependent somehow on these same contexts. In this case they will be choices expressive of the personal values, beliefs, etc. of the analyst and reflective of the time and place the analysis occurs.

Other difficult issues that a focus on context raises are much more problematic than the choice of methodology. These issues take us into the murky, yet inviting waters, of the meaning of meaning itself.

For instance, too much importance paid to intrapersonal context may lead to the deeply worrying
conclusion that meanings are somehow ultimately "private" and thus, the meaning of 'freedom' can only be understood in terms of each individual's intrapersonal context. On the other hand, a detailed focus on interpersonal context may lead us to conclude that meanings are ultimately the result of some kind of rigid "conceptual determinism". A conclusion equally as worrisome.

Some of these issues are addressed in the next section. There, I will provide the selective literature review of 'freedom' that is the second aim of the chapter. Within that section I examine how others have used 'freedom' and to accomplish this I adopt a classificatory scheme suggesting a continuum of meaning and use of 'freedom' ranging from 'freedom' as meaning whatever one wants to 'freedom' having only one meaning. The result of

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15 At its worst, 'rigid conceptual determinism' would mean that, as individuals, we would have no control or choice over both our ideas and language. Thus, every thought we conceive and every word we use would have some traceable genealogy, demonstrating that ideas and language are "inherited" rather than "created". My own belief is similar to Berman's expressed in his "Only A Glancing Blow" (Science as Culture, Vol. 3, part 3, no. 16, 1992). There, Berman makes the claim that "[l]anguage shapes our perception of reality, but it is also shaped and changed itself by the creation of new ideas and words. The relationship between language and mind is thus essentially dialectical" (p.424).
this literature review also serves to highlight some of the problems and issues addressed in this first section.
The meaning of 'freedom' is private?

Taken to the extreme, to suggest that there are many meanings to 'freedom' would imply that all users of the word 'freedom' have their own particular conception of it. Thus, the meaning of 'freedom' for each particular user can only be explained in terms of each user's intrapersonal context: the values, beliefs, attitudes, etc. that comprise their whole psyche. This we could call "radical conceptual relativism".

This view of how 'freedom' is used and what it may mean gets us very close to Wittgenstein's concerns in *Philosophical Investigations* (1968) regarding sensation language and the individual privacy of that language. If intrapersonal context becomes paramount in regard to language usage, then we may be left with the conclusion that when person A uses 'freedom' (or any other word) it is not clear how one could determine whether it is used in the same sense or with the same meaning as person B. Thus, and exaggerating Kripke's (1980, pp.126-127) analysis of Wittgenstein's examples concerning pain sensations, in the same way that I may feel pain and yet have no idea of what it is for this pain I have to be felt by another, so too could I conceive of 'freedom' and have no idea of whether
this concept is the same as that possessed by another when they too claim to be conceiving of 'freedom'.

Sounding very similar then to the claims of Kuhn (1970, pp.111-135) with regard to the evolution of scientific knowledge, differences in the meaning of 'freedom' could be akin to differences among scientific claims as we are different observers of the same world who come to it with incommensurable systems of concepts. We use the same words, we apparently observe the same phenomena but in the interpretation of that phenomena with those words there is never any guarantee that we are talking about the same thing.

Even if we assume that meanings are somehow "shared" in order to communicate and get things done, this would only push the problem of context to a level larger than

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16 Across the richness and diversity of human existence there are countless examples of where one language using group "possesses" certain ideas, concepts, etc. that can only be minimally grasped by a different language using group. Any interpretation of one group's ideas, concepts, etc. by these others barely touches on the complexity of that trying to be understood. The Vietnamese use of 'toi' referred to on p.52 is one such example. Thus, if there was no way at all of even trying to explain to American-English users what this Vietnamese 'toi' meant then the two language using groups, the Americans and the Vietnamese, would have "incommensurable systems of concepts". There would be no common "measure" or "standard" that would allow the two to "talk" to each other about 'toi'.

the individual. In other words, 'freedom' ends up meaning whatever it does dependent on cultural, ethnic, national, etc. contexts. We recall that this highlights again Durkheim's claim that concepts are "collective representations". Adams makes this point much clearer, that is, relevant to the American situation, when he comments that:

The American concept of freedom has not been an abstraction. It has grown from the circumstances, needs, aspirations and beating hearts of innumerable human beings of all races, creeds, and classes, under conditions which promised opportunity. (1940, p.113)

According to Adams, 'freedom' in the American context has a certain meaning (to some? all?) because of the history of the development of America the nation-state and the citizens within it.

If these kinds of claims regarding the meaning of 'freedom' and the role of context (at either the individual or national level) are warranted, then it makes no sense to make claims regarding the "true", "real", "one" or "only" meaning of 'freedom'. There could not be a "metanarrative" (Lyotard, 1984, p.xxiv) of 'freedom'.

Hobbes seems an example of someone who believed in this "metanarrative" of 'freedom' when any use of it for him meant "...the absence of all impediments" (1967, p. 272),...the absence of all the impediments to action that
are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent" (ibid., p.270).

At this end of the suggested continuum though there is the complete opposite of Hobbes' use of 'freedom'. This end of the continuum suggests that 'freedom' (like any other word) can be no other than a word that has more than one meaning and that those differences in meaning are due, perhaps, to all sorts of variations in context.

In response to this, one could say that our language usage—the various ideas, concepts, values, notions, etc. that the language expresses—must have something in common otherwise we would not be able to communicate at all. Conceptual relativism, "...that of differing points of view, makes sense but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them" (Davidson, 1991, p.184). Thus, to even disagree about meanings requires some agreement about what it is that is being disagreed about. Disagreements about the meaning of 'freedom', for instance, would require some kind of agreement about the meaning of 'meaning' to get the first disagreement "off the ground". The "common co-ordinate" here then is the notion of 'meaning' itself.

Of course the response may be that this simply pushes the problem back one step further: We now introduce another meta-problem; a problem of the meaning of the
'meaning of meaning'. This line of reasoning may support the conceptual relativist position yet still, at no matter what "level" the problem, some meanings have to be shared to at least get the problem "out on the table". The alternative, that at any level there is no guarantee that the discussants are "on about" the same thing, is difficult to make sense of. Or alternatively, perhaps the ramifications of that particular line of reasoning are too disturbing for us to contend with. 

There are different "kinds" of 'freedom'? 

From the analysis of the ordinary language examples of the use of 'freedom' in the last section it is clear that every use of 'freedom' does not necessarily mean the same 'freedom' in each case. There are also other examples to be found in support of this point. 

For instance, it is not unusual to hear of "political freedom" in terms of voting for whomever one wants and "economic freedom" in terms of earning or spending one's money in any way one wants. Many also believe in a kind of individual, "moral freedom" when it comes to being responsible for one's actions and receiving any appropriate praise or punishment. Furthermore, whereas most uses of 'freedom' make reference to human actions and affairs, animal lovers often talk of "giving animals their
freedom" after observing the conditions some are held under in zoos and back yards.

On the other hand, diesel mechanics, and tradespeople in general, rarely, in the workplace, talk of components "having the freedom to move", one way or another. If they did, it would be difficult to comprehend their meaning. Instead, they refer to components "being free", "being freed up" or "moving freely".

These distinctions underline two important points in examining the use of 'freedom': One, there is not a "true", "real" or only one meaning to 'freedom'; there is no "metanarrative" of 'freedom'. Two, 'freedom' seems always concerned with living things rather than inanimate ones.

The first point introduces the idea of "kinds" of 'freedom', although someone like Hobbes would claim that, at root, all these "kinds" are the same. For instance, it may be claimed there is a "metanarrative of 'freedom' and that it is expressed by the phrase "absence of restraint". Thus, 'economic freedom' means "absence of restraint in economic affairs"; 'political freedom', "absence of restraint in political affairs".

The second point raises deep and difficult issues regarding the meaning of 'living thing' and 'life' and the associated distinctions between 'human beings', 'animals'
and perhaps 'persons'. In this project 'freedom' will eventually be limited to uses pertaining to human beings. 'Freedom' here will be used to reflect issues and problems bound up with human agents and human agency (MacCallum, 1967, p.315).

Much of the literature reviewed for this project seems to support the idea of "kinds" of 'freedom' rather than the other more "unitary" position. In Gray's "Freedom" (1991) for instance, the author devotes a chapter to what he terms "conceptions of freedom". These conceptions look very similar to "kinds" of freedom since the chapter includes seven headings such as "Freedom as absence of impediments", "Freedom as status" and "Freedom as self-mastery". As another example, Fitzgerald argues

17 To my knowledge, Marx never uses 'person' to refer to human beings. The questions of what is a person and what is the difference/relationship between 'human being' and 'person' are perennial ones and will continue to be so. Here I introduce one more distinction—a distinction between human beings and animals. In the next chapter I provide some evidence that Marx, at one point, alluded to the idea that perhaps there is no significant distinction between human beings and animals, even everything else. The reason why this project eventually limits 'freedom' to human agency is that it is my belief that only humans are capable of willing actions. Like Marx, I see the "possession" of a will and the ability to act from it as fundamental to being free. Thus, those entities that cannot act in someway and somehow in opposition to their physiology and biology can not experience freedom. Those entities whose existence is one of continual behavioural response can never come to know freedom.
that Adler's work, "The Idea of Freedom", suggests five categories of freedom (1989, p.50) and Torre, tying Maritain, Simon and Adler together, argues that there are several freedoms and they "...are distinct [and] there is an evident order between them" (emphasis added, 1989, p.272). Furthermore, Patterson, in his comprehensive "Freedom, Volume 1" (1991), provides the metaphorical image of human freedom in terms of a musical chord that requires the "notes" of personal, sovereignal and civic freedom to make the chord complete. Interestingly, this metaphor also seems like another way of talking about the "kinds" of freedom discussed earlier.

Other writers go one step further. Instead of implicitly or explicitly arguing for multiple meanings or "kinds" of 'freedom', they focus on dichotomous or opposed pairs analyses. Some of these writers and their claims are examined next.

There are only two "kinds" of 'freedom'?

While the previously considered examples give evidence of at least two uses of 'freedom', it is a peculiarity of 'freedom' that it seems much of its literature has been couched in dichotomous or opposed-pairs terminology. Furthermore, of these dichotomies or opposed pairs it is argued that one of the two meanings is "better".
For instance, one example of opposed-pairs 'freedom' terminology is "freedom in the abstract" versus "freedom in the particular (or concrete)". In this regard King (1967, p.98), Brightman (1940, p.493), Adams (1940, p.112) and Freire (1985, p.52) have taken great pains to point out the value of 'freedom' couched in terms of "freedom in the particular (or the concrete)". "Freedom in the abstract" is objectionable, it is argued, as it denies the plurality or communal nature of our being (Beiner, 1984, p.353), that it reifies freedom of the will to object status; something independent of humans (King, 1967, pp.97-98), or both.

The support for "freedom in the particular (or concrete)" is generally derived from normative views about persons in actual circumstances and contexts. Thus, for freedom to make any impact on how we live and treat each other 'freedom' is conceived of in terms of being free in society as opposed to being free from society (Bykhorsky, 1964, p.14). Talk of 'freedom', from this perspective, only makes sense in terms of situated, contextualized persons rather than unencumbered, decontextualized ones. This position is put succinctly by Chattopadhyaya when he states that: "Boundless freedom, freedom in vaccuo, is not what is available for man. Being a part of the world he cannot rise completely above the same" (1989, p.97).
The notion of being able to "rise above the world" is central to 'freedom' couched in terms of "freedom in the abstract". In this use, 'freedom' is conceived in relation to the role of individual reason and rationality, often accompanied by normative claims regarding "freedom of the will" and "freedom of the intellect". Kant is an obvious proponent of this sense of 'freedom'. Support for this claim is to be found in his distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. 18

Another example of the dichotomous approach to 'freedom' is the marking off of whether 'freedom' is a

18 For Kant, there are some judgements we can make and act on that are independent of our subjective inclinations. These judgements can derive solely from the will. For instance, my wife and I are volunteers for a local welfare agency and look after a small child on a fortnightly basis. If we did this because it made us feel good then our judgement (termed by Kant an "imperative") would be a hypothetical one. We would be acting on the hypothetical imperative: "You ought care for others (if it makes you feel good). However, if we choose this course of action because being rational could demand nothing less and our good will motivates us to act on this basis then this is closer to being an example of a categorical imperative. The "You ought care for others (if it makes you feel good)" is replaced with simply, "Care for others". This is "closer to" and not an "actual" categorical imperative according to Kant, as we can never know when we are acting in this way. (Transition From Popular Moral Philosophy To A Metaphysics Of Morals in Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, pp.19-44, Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis).
word with ultimately an individualistic or a social basis. In other words, the issue is not that the meaning of 'freedom' can only be determined individually or socially but rather, that essentially or necessarily, 'freedom' means either having something to do with individuals or having something to do with the social.

In the individualistic camp the basic idea of 'freedom' is fundamentally about individual liberty (and here I assume 'liberty' to be synonymous with 'freedom'). Again, this particular sense of 'freedom' is reflected in the Kantian tradition whereby individual liberty is dependent on and inextricably bound up with individual rationality and will.

What 'rationality' and 'will' are and their relationship to being free are all major issues that numerous philosophers have grappled with. Bloom (1988, p.180) continues this tradition. He claims that 'freedom', used in this sense, means "...legislating to [one]self and to nature without guidance from nature". Once again then, this reasoning suggests that we are free when we make judgements while engaging in the world while at the same time not letting worldly concerns "sway" these judgements.

Another use of the individualistic sense of 'freedom' suggests the idea that individuals ought be allowed or left to do what they want. No restrictions ought be placed
on "...pursuing our own good in our own way" (Mill, 1978, p.12)). But Mill himself is not a staunch supporter of this position and such a meaning ascribed to 'freedom' does not attract much philosophical credence in general, as it has several obvious flaws.

For instance, 'freedom' as "doing what one wants" needs to be tempered with conditions that guarantee this same freedom to others. Once these conditions are agreed upon then 'freedom' as "doing what one wants" becomes limited. Inevitably, individual "wants" will conflict. 'Freedom' as "doing what one wants" as an ideal for all usually ends up in practice with limitations on doing what one wants. This kind of reasoning reflects Mill's own view and is evident in "On liberty" (1978) where "pursuing our own good in our own way" for him is always bound up with the communal or social good.

Furthermore, even if somebody wanted to limit the use of 'freedom' to "doing what one wants" this use is much more valuable when conceived of in social or communal terms. Why? Well individuals on desert islands can certainly have and act on their wants but the possibility and value of having wants is greatly improved if there is more than one person around. If people believe this is how 'freedom' ought to be used, then both the number of wants and the possibilities for the satisfaction of any
particular want are increased when people act together rather than individually. It is the communal and social nature of our dealings with each other that allows for an increased value of being able to do what one wants. Therefore, if 'freedom' is used as "doing what one wants", then the value of what this use results in is increased the more "socially" we interpret this "doing what one wants".

A final dichotomous distinction in contemporary writings in regard to 'freedom' has been the distinction of "positive liberty" and "negative liberty". Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1987) is generally taken to be the best explication of this distinction. Berlin argues that it is 'freedom' as "negative liberty" that should be taken as "the" or "best" meaning of 'freedom'.

Berlin's explication of this dichotomous classification has resulted in many subsequent texts, articles and discussions both for and against his position. Their strength and numbers are testimony to the importance of Berlin's work and the fundamental issues it raised and still does today. As Gray affirms;

Berlin's distinction has proved fruitful even for those who do not endorse it, or accept it in all its implications. It has proved the focal point in post-war discussion in analytical political philosophy and in the history of political ideas, and its power continues to pervade current discussion even when
Briefly, Berlin's distinction between negative and positive liberty is this: **Negative** freedom is "...not being interfered with by others. The wider the area of non-interference the wider my freedom" (1969, p.123). **Positive** freedom is freedom "...to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside" (ibid., p.131).

As a means of explicating Berlin's claims it is often argued that those "for" positive freedom are those more in favour of self-government and self-control in a collective rather than individualistic sense (Gardiner, 1984, p.84). Marx and Marxist oriented writers are usually cited as prime proponents of positive freedom. Walicki, for instance, comments that the young Marx believed that "...true freedom, worthy of man as a creative being, can only be "positive" freedom or the ability to achieve definite ends" (1984, p.229) and that Marx himself is an excellent example of someone who considers 'freedom' in this positive sense (ibid., p.226). In analyzing Arendt's work and her concern over the 1980 strikes in Gdansk, Poland, Beiner (1984, p.368) argues that her sense of freedom is obvious when she claims that the strikers in question were not striking to be without interference from others, but
rather, claiming the positive freedom to participate and to participate because public imperatives, and not just private ones, were at stake.

Negative freedom proponents, on the other hand, focus on the idea of how much individual actions are free from constraint or coercion; that is to say, the extent to which an individual's zone of privacy is immune from coercive interference (Snauwert, 1992, p.352). Nozick is a strong, contemporary supporter of this use of 'freedom' and his Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) gives a good idea of what negative freedom means and some of the substantive issues it implies.

This "negative" meaning ascribed to 'freedom' is often couched in terms of being "free from" and within these two words there is the idea of a lack of interference. Substantive interpretations of this sense of 'freedom' in education can be found in the point of education being a process or activity that enables persons to be free from ignorance (Chambers, 1983, p.133).

Chambers also implies the obvious relationship between this "negative" meaning of 'freedom' and the previously discussed "individualistic" sense when he comments that:

Persons have freedom to the extent that they are not restrained by others from doing the things that they want to do and are not forced to do things they do
not want to do. The term 'freedom' refers to an area of conduct in which a person chooses his own course and is uncompelled and unrestricted by others. (ibid., p.136).

Taken to the extreme though, negative 'freedom', as construed, can be used to justify discrimination (Myrdal, 1962, p.573). With this particular use of 'freedom' there is the danger that all manner of social ills can be framed in individual and pathological terms which often hinders many prescriptions for alleviating them. Historically, one way to alleviate these kinds of problems has been to restrict the liberty of persons through state reinforced interventions such as unequal income tax payments. This example and others similar to it illustrate the problem of the extent of limitations on individual liberty within some social setting. Mill's words in this regard sound a warning.

There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence...the practical question where to place the limit--how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control--is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done. (1978, p.5)

Finally, a telling criticism of the positive/negative distinction is that the distinction itself is not warranted: Any claimed example of negative freedom can be just as easily made into an example of positive freedom.
For instance, if teenagers claim to want to be free from the control of their parents (negative freedom) then it makes just as much sense to say that they want to be free to decide for themselves (positive freedom). Or another example: If students want to be free from the school's dictates regarding what to wear at school, then there is little difference between saying this and saying students want to be free to wear what they want.

McCallum (1967) takes the criticism of the positive/negative distinction one step further by arguing that the distinction itself has moved the debate to who is right or wrong, or which sense, positive or negative, is the "right" one, from the more important issues that are fundamental to all talk of 'freedom'. For him, these issues are: 1) What assumptions are being made about human nature? 2) what ends is it persons or human agents ought be free to pursue or achieve? and 3) what are the obstacles to the attainment of those ends (p.19)?

These assumptions that others make in their use of 'freedom', McCallum argues, can be identified by adopting a triadic schema that he provides. The three variables inherent to his schema can be used as a means to explicate the assumptions stated in the previous paragraph.

If my claims regarding the relationship between any use of 'freedom' and context are warranted; that meanings
and uses of words like 'freedom' are inextricably bound up with the user's values, beliefs, assumptions, etc., then McCallum's schema will be useful in explicating these relationships. His claims regarding the schema are examined in more detail in the next section in preparation for its utilization in the following chapter. His position will also serve as an example to complete the continuum of the uses of 'freedom'.

There is one meaning to 'freedom'? Claims regarding the possibility of only one meaning of 'freedom' are difficult to maintain considering the complexities, vagueness and ambiguity, of ordinary language and what has been argued and demonstrated so far.

Moreover, claims about the "one", "true", "real" or "only" meaning of 'freedom' are also difficult to defend considering what I have argued regarding the role of context. Claims concerning singular or unitary meanings or uses of 'freedom' make the importance of the role of context strikingly obvious. In order to justify some claim regarding a singular or unitary meaning or use of 'freedom', context would have no bearing whatsoever. That is, it would have to be shown that 'freedom' always signified something no matter what the context. This would be akin to arguing that meanings derive from nowhere and that whatever they may be, they are eternally fixed. It
would be analogous to believing that language itself was not a human creation, but something "natural" like the earth and sky and denying that even the language of mathematics:

...is addressed to a human audience...
[it is] a human interchange based on shared meanings, not all of which are verbal or formulaic...Mathematics in real life is a form of social interaction where "proof" is a complex of the formal and informal, of calculations and casual comments, of convincing arguments and appeals to the imagination...(Davis & Hersch, 1986, p.73).

Claiming singular uses or meanings of 'freedom' is further compounded in examining any use of 'freedom' in history. In these cases there is a further difficulty that all historians are faced with—a difficulty regarding what evidence is available and what will be counted as evidence to support any resultant claims. This is an added difficulty. If any analysis has to take context into account in order to be a good one, then a historical analysis of the use of 'freedom' is faced with the extra problem of dealing with contexts that may provide little evidence. Once again, in such circumstances, each analyst has to be careful not to simply transpose his or her own present use or more favoured use of the term into the time frame actually studied.
Nonetheless, many philosophers have attempted this formidable task. Hobbes, as previously discussed, argued for one meaning of 'freedom' based on mechanical assumptions that underpinned his explanations of geometry and its workings in the universe. These assumptions allowed him to attempt to "...explain the behavior of men in the same sort of way as the behaviour of bodies" (Peters, 1967, p.14) and that liberty was "...the absence of the lets and hindrances of motion" (ibid., p.10).

'Freedom' for Hobbes then was intended to be used in one way no matter what the context.

Others have also attempted to explain 'freedom' in singular or unitary terms. Examining what is claimed to be the initial and earliest recorded uses of 'freedom' many have argued (e.g., Gray, 1980, p.512, Mulgan, 1984, p.8, Feinberg, 1980, p.11) that 'freedom' used in these instances alluded to the distinction between slaves and non-slaves. In this sense 'freedom' was often used as "freedom as status".

Furthermore, it is also claimed that this earliest sense of 'freedom' has little to do with modern, liberal conceptions of 'freedom'. For instance, Taylor (1984, p.100) argues that the claimed "original" sense of 'freedom' is alien to the modern liberal and individualistic sense of 'freedom' as 'freedom' there had
no metaphysical basis but instead signified a political freedom.

In contrast, Patterson suggests that most writers have not taken context into account enough and he disagrees with the idea that the earliest sense of 'freedom' was more communal in nature (1991, pp.47-81). Though he agrees with the early relationship between 'freedom' and 'slavery', Patterson's argument is that it was women who were first to value freedom and that the value of what 'freedom' implied or resulted in was underpinned by individualistic reasoning among the women. This is so because, he argues, for the menfolk of the free class the only acceptable consequence of defeat in battle was death, not slavery; death was an honorable outcome of war. For the women though, a loss in battle by the menfolk created the possibility of them becoming slaves. Therefore, unlike the men, death was not a valued option. Thus, the importance of not becoming slaves motivated the women to value freedom itself. Of course, "actual" slaves were also aware of their lack of freedom. But they did not value freedom like their female masters did since moving toward freedom was akin to "...jumping from a slave-ship into a shark-filled ocean" (ibid., p.42).

Patterson's general thesis is that all senses of 'freedom' are motivated by various conceptions of slavery:
'Freedom' as "freedom from; slavery to the master, slavery to God, slavery to the King, slavery to one's passions, or slavery from one's "actual" self to become one's "true" or "real" self".

Wertheimer supports Patterson's explanation of the relationship between 'freedom' and 'slavery'. For him, the history of humankind can be explained in terms of a history of the fact of slavery and that "...in his successive attempts to realize the Idea of Freedom, man is constantly changing one form of slavery for another" (1940, p.558).

What Patterson's (and Wertheimer's) reasoning implies is that the meaning of 'freedom' is best understood through the metaphorical "lens" of 'slavery'. In other words, 'freedom', at bottom, gains its meaning from 'slavery'.

Patterson though, while seemingly more aware of the importance of context than many others, ends up shifting

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19 It has been suggested by Richard Pratte that for Patterson, 'freedom' is a "trouser" word--it is one leg of a pair of pants. The other "leg" is 'slavery' and it is not possible to understand one without the other. I find this a rather illuminating metaphor with a lot to be said for it. It is also consistent with my claims regarding language analysis and context for if 'freedom' and 'slavery' are Patterson's "trousers" then these trousers are also part of his "wardrobe". And wardrobes always say something about the person wearing the clothes.
the problem by his use of 'slavery'. 'Slavery', for him, becomes the "tool" or "lens" to solve the problem of the use or meaning of 'freedom' where for others different "tools" have been or can be utilized.

Patterson, of course, is not just interested in the meaning of 'freedom'. He is primarily interested in human affairs, especially slavery, and the relationships between language and those human affairs he finds objectionable. Patterson then may be no different from any other user of 'freedom'. His particular understanding of 'freedom' reflects the substantive issues that concern him.

So, while Patterson analyses 'freedom' with the aid of the paired concepts 'freedom' and 'slavery', Berlin, instead, utilizes a "positive and negative" classificatory scheme. Others, we have seen, have couched their claims in terms of the "individual" and the "social", the "abstract" and the "concrete" and perhaps there are similar analytical "tools", "lenses" or classificatory schemes not mentioned in this project.

The important point is that analytical "tools" or "lenses", classificatory schemes or methodological choices etc. are never arbitrary in the sense that the author just picks any one. Analytical "tools" and "lenses", etc. are dependent on purposes; they are matters of convention dependent on which questions one is asking (Norman, 1991,
p.33) and it has been argued throughout here that these purposes are inextricably dependent on intrapersonal and interpersonal contexts.

McCallum, I believe, is on the right track in his concern with some of the assumptions that motivate a particular use of 'freedom' than simply its meaning. McCallum's concerns are basically those suggested by my use of 'intrapersonal context'. To expose some of the substantive issues composite of the intrapersonal context of a person who is interested in freedom McCallum offers the following triadic schema:

\[ x \text{ is (is not) free from } y \text{ to do (not do, become, not become) } z; \]

where \( x \) ranges over agents, \( y \) ranges over such "preventing conditions" as constraints, restrictions, interferences and barriers, and \( z \) ranges over actions or conditions of character or circumstance. (McCallum, 1967, p.314)

McCallum's position is that this schema, when applied to the claims of someone using 'freedom' and ascertaining what each user believes regarding the range of each variable, will reveal the substantive issues that are at stake. Thus, instead of disagreeing over which is the better use or "true" meaning of 'freedom' we can, instead, expose the following: What is assumed about human nature? (variable 'x') and what is believed to act as a restriction or constraint (variable 'y') on the normative
aims (variable 'z') that each user of 'freedom' values most?

Let us take an example to illustrate the above. Teachers, in their educational relationships with students, may claim to be contributing to their freedom, but applying McCallum's triadic schema can help identify what the substantial issues are that concern them. In this case it may be the following: Teachers believe that all students are capable of learning (variable 'x'), becoming educated is a good thing (variable 'y') and it is each student's personal ignorance (variable 'z') that acts as a constraint or restriction on them becoming educated. So, while teachers may wish to promote students' freedom, applying McCallum's schema and expanding on the variables inherent to it can help make clear the substantive issues at stake for teachers and students. Here, of course, the substantial issues focus very much on what counts as "education" and "ignorance".

Utilizing McCallum's triadic schema shifts the dispute from problems associated with "the meaning of 'freedom'" to disputes over the extent of the variables for each user of 'freedom'. My claim, like McCallum's, is that getting users of 'freedom' to expound on their views regarding the range of these variables is where the differences between them will be revealed (ibid., p.320)
and will also help us see better what needs arguing about (ibid., p.327).

Having said this, it is ironic that McCallum also serves as a final example completing the continuum of the use of 'freedom'. His triadic schematical representation of the variables he claims are inherent to all talk of 'freedom' seems also to imply that there is one meaning of 'freedom' and that meaning is value-free. Let us consider this point.

It seems that for McCallum, 'freedom' always means something like "human beings are prevented or restricted from achieving some normative aims". For him, the problem of the meaning of 'freedom' now becomes a meta-problem, namely, determining the meaning of McCallum's one meaning; determining what is meant by the variables 'x', 'y' and 'z', and specifying 'human being', 'preventions', 'restrictions', 'normative aim', etc.

McCallum is not alone of course in implying that there is some kind of central or common thread to all uses of 'freedom'. I have mentioned Hobbes several times as one example and earlier I addressed how Gray holds this position too (p.47). Gray's own research informs him that Benn and Weinstein (1971, p.194), Rawls (1972, p.202), Bayles (1972, p.24), Blackstone (1973, pp.423-4), Feinberg (1980, pp.3-4), and Goodin (1982, p.152) have all also
supported, in one way or another, McCallum's thesis (p.15).

Norman, who considers himself a conceptual pluralist (a person who believes there can not be any one meaning to anything (1991, p.6)), generally agrees with McCallum's conceptually restrictivist position. Though he prefers some kind of classificatory scheme as a means to analyzing 'freedom', there are important similarities between his classificatory schema and McCallum's triadic one. The most important similarity being the role that context plays for both of them in language analysis: On the side of language use we find that the intrapersonal context of those who use 'freedom' bears heavily on the explication of the range of the variables inherent to McCallum's schema. On the side of language analysis, we find that it is in the construction and use of some classificatory scheme or analytical "lens" or "tool" that some of the values and interests of the analyst are revealed.

Both McCallum and Norman then give support to the importance of taking intrapersonal context into account in analyzing 'freedom'. This is an idea perhaps best summed up by Dewey when he comments:

We are concerned with the problem of freedom rather than solutions, in the conviction that solutions are idle until the problem has been placed in the context of the elements that constitute culture as they interact with elements.
of native human nature. The fundamental postulate of the discussion is that isolation of any one factor, no matter how strong its workings at a given time, is fatal to understanding and to intelligent action. Isolations have abounded, both on the side of taking some one thing in human nature to be a supreme "motive" and in taking some one form of social activity to be supreme. Since the problem is here thought of as that of the ways in which a great number of factors within and without human nature interact, our task is to ask concerning the reciprocal connections raw human nature and culture bear to one another (1940, p.374).

It would behoove us then to heed Dewey's advice whenever we are faced with issues about language usage and meaning, and in particular, important words like 'freedom'. Instead of our energies being directed towards questions like "What does 'freedom' "really" mean?" we may be better served by being continually aware of the myriad connections between the languages used by human beings, the places and times they are situated in, and the values, beliefs and attitudes they hold. In the long run, perhaps, we are better served by providing comprehensive explications of those connections.

Summary

In this chapter I have tried to achieve two aims. The first was to deal with some of the problems and issues associated with language analysis that focuses on use or
usage. To accomplish this I examined three separate, though related, issues.

First, I examined what purposes analyzing language use served. I argued that although clarification of use was important, clarification alone was not enough to deal with the many issues associated with 'freedom'.

Put simply, my claim was that philosophy of education requires action, and both philosophy of education and action require normative judgements. Moreover, while such judgements may require clarification or "being clear", there is also a requirement of justification. My reasoning behind this was that change will not come about by analysis alone though neither does change necessarily require analysis and justification prior to action. Eventually though, we will have to justify and defend the why of some action, the why of some change at all.

This introduction of the importance of justification and the role of values then served as a transition to the next issue inherent to the first aim. The second issue I dealt with was how a selective ordinary language analysis of 'freedom' can reveal important aspects regarding the relationship between meaning and value. In this particular section there were two main themes: One, that 'freedom' (and any other word) is of necessity neither "positive" or "negative" and two, that any use of 'freedom' (or any
other word) is never "value-free" either. Moreover, from these two distinct yet related claims, I also argued that 'freedom' is only used "positively" when what it leads to or results in is also viewed "positively" by the user. Conversely, 'freedom' is used "negatively" when what such 'freedom' implies or results in is also viewed "negatively" by the user.

The reason why there is this claimed relationship between meaning and value was addressed in the third part of the first section. There, I continued by arguing that use and meaning of words are always dependent on the context of the user. Equally so is the analysis of the use of words by others.

These contexts are comprised of both intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions and thus use and meanings cannot be divorced from the values, beliefs, attitudes, etc. that the language user holds and the forces beyond the individual that contributed to the formulation of these same values, beliefs, attitudes, etc.

Any use of 'freedom' then derives from very complex and intricate social relationships between philosophy and psychology, between history and culture, between sociology and economics, between geography and biology and the various and myriad permutations that could result from any
"intersection" between these "disciplines". As a result, and inherent to these various relationships, linguistic systems arise that reflect the purposes, goals, motives, etc. that underpin them. Within these linguistic systems any attempt at understanding an important word like 'freedom' cannot be divorced from an understanding of the linguistic system in total and these purposes, goals, motivations, etc. themselves.

The underlying theme I identified and dealt with was that language, the use of communicative symbols within any language and the meanings of these symbols, are never in some sense "value-free" or "neutral". Use and meaning are always inherent to linguistic systems that are found in social circumstances where the people found in such circumstances create and use such linguistic systems.

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20 A most common example of this seems to me that amusing situation at parties when a young child names every male present 'Dad'. Here the child perceives all male forms as 'Dads' because while it has learned that one particular male form, its biological Dad, is called 'Dad', the child has not yet learned to distinguish from among all male forms the "real" Dad from the "look-a-likes". When incidents like these occur they are amusing because they raise deep issues about sexual mores, families, personal relationships within them and individual identities. Examined more critically, these same themes end up being ones that have, and continue to be, central to many of these same "disciplines".
primarily to communicate with one another. When it comes
to language analysis then it must be remembered that:

Language...is not a free-floating
entity, subject to dispassionate
analysis and stipulative reformation.
Rather, language use is intertwined with
a range of existential, institutional,
historical, cultural, ideological,
political, economic relations and one
can not talk about language and meaning
without at least addressing those kinds
of factors" (Pratte, 1992, p.x).

The second aim of the chapter was to provide a
selective literature review of how writers have used
'freedom'. The methodology included the idea that the many
uses of 'freedom' could be arranged on a continuum from
'freedom' conceived of as having only "one" or a "true" or
"real" meaning to 'freedom' meaning whatever the user
wants it to mean.

21 Of course I should mention here that one can use a
word to mean whatever one wants. Too much of this though
can be seen as sufficient cause for institutionalization.
Why? Well words are used primarily for communication and
ascribing arbitrary or even random, non-conventional
meanings and uses to commonly held words is often viewed
as a mark of mental instability. Yet although each society
has its own way of approving and penalizing specific
utterances, words are social tools and "...objectivity
counts towards their survival" (Quine, 1960, p.7). And
objectivity for Quine seems equated with maximum
intersubjectivity; a maximum "symmetry" obtaining between
each subject's cues for the use of words in particular
circumstances (p.6).
Finally, one writer, McCallum, offered a triadic schema that he argued could be applied to any use of 'freedom'. The point of adopting this schema, he argued, was not to establish the meaning of 'freedom', but instead to determine how each user of 'freedom' would interpret these variables. Moreover, determining what each user of 'freedom' believed in regarding human nature, what counts as the Good, and what prevents us from achieving the Good would reveal the more substantive issues at stake for each user. For McCallum then, these issues are more important to grapple with than the meaning of 'freedom'.

The basic argument, and one supported by McCallum's schema, was that when each user of 'freedom' interprets the three variables in the schema then this will be no less than the expression of the more basic assumptions inherent to each user's intrapersonal context. Claims about human nature, the Good and what prevents human beings achieving or acquiring the Good are fundamental to anyone trying to give serious consideration to problems and issues central to human affairs. And while the relationship between one's intrapersonal and interpersonal contexts is always dialectical, McCallum's schema can serve as a useful tool in identifying those assumptions basic to the intrapersonal context of those who have used 'freedom'. 
Karl Marx was very much interested in freedom. Indeed, much of Marx's philosophy can be explained by examining how he used 'freedom' and the central role it plays for him. Marx also has a considerable amount to say about the human condition, specifically those aspects to living and labouring under stringent capitalist conditions that he finds objectionable. Moreover, he also has a lot to say about what ought replace them. Included in these suggestions are some possible implications for education and I address a specific one in Chapter IV.

What Marx means by 'freedom' will be dependent on some of the many and various assumptions, values and beliefs that he holds. An examination of some of his writings and the claims he makes within them can give us some clues then in beginning to find out what he meant when he used 'freedom'. This is the aim of the next chapter and there I utilize McCallum's triadic schema to achieve this.
CHAPTER III

MARX and FREEDOM

For Marx, ... freedom meant self-determination in accordance with one's inner constitution; it meant not being determined from without, by one's relations to other things, but by the logical principle of one's own development (Kamenka, 1962, p.23).

Introduction

The dominant theme of the last chapter was that languages always reflect human values and interests. This means that the use of words inherent to any language cannot be understood independent of these same values and interests. Actual values and interests are to be continually found in the rich diversity of human existence in its entirety; from the individual expression of personal values to the many forms of social relations and structures that humans construct.

Much of Karl Marx's values and interests focused on social relations, on the kinds of relationships people have with one another. Central to these values and interests was the concept 'freedom'. Kamenka (1962, p.23) is in agreement here in suggesting that Marx saw philosophy as a normative study where the "good" included the criterion of freedom. Walicki (1984) also points to
the centrality of freedom in Marx's work in claiming that freedom had a pivotal role in his explanation of the history of man (p.239).

The aim of this chapter is to understand how Marx used 'freedom'. If it is the case that freedom plays such a central role in his work, then understanding how he used 'freedom' can be an excellent vehicle for understanding Marxism in general. Moreover, because 'freedom' has held such a fundamental place in not just philosophical and educational writings but also, in the actions of literally hundreds of thousands of human beings, a better understanding of Marxian 'freedom' could provide valuable insights for present and future human affairs. It can help in establishing what it is about the world that ought be changed.

In order to achieve an understanding of Marx's use of 'freedom' I will utilize McCallum's triadic schema introduced towards the end of the last chapter. My methodology will be to examine some of Marx's writings and apply McCallum's schema to them.

Thus, what follows is an exercise in textual research in order to answer the following: What was Marx's position regarding the nature of the (human) agent (McCallum's variable 'x'), what are the "preventing conditions" (recalling McCallum's criteria, p.81) to be removed
(McCallum's variable 'y') and what is required in place of them (McCallum's variable 'z') in order that such agents can experience freedom?

A. **Marx and Variable 'x': The Human Agent.**

Philosophy asks what is true, not what is held to be true. It asks what is true for mankind, not what is true for some people. Is there no universal human nature, as there is a universal nature of plants and stars? (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 1, p.191)

The first variable in McCallum's schema, variable 'x', deals with human agency. It is McCallum's view that any claim about freedom always presupposes something about human agency or human nature. Thus, if we want to understand how Marx used 'freedom', then we should find out what Marx assumed about human agency and human nature.

In this first section I shall argue that "human nature" was something that Marx was very much interested in and that "human nature" was something he firmly believed in. In support of this claim I will provide textual evidence demonstrating that Marx believed that there is something that can be justifiably claimed to be true about each and every human being. Whether in terms of "true Man" or "his true nature" or "Man's being", this evidence will demonstrate that "human nature" was an issue Marx did not ignore or shirk from.
Initially though, and considering Marx's philosophy in general, it may seem somewhat inconsistent for him to claim that there are some universal truths regarding human beings. Given his unavowed belief in the dialectic between material productive circumstances and the concomitant moral, social, cultural and political relations, even ideas or "products of consciousness" themselves, it may seem odd for Marx to posit a claim about humans that is held to be true for each and every one of them. A claim held to be justified regardless of time, place, material conditions and concomitant social relations.

Geras (1983, p.46) argues that much has been made of the early Marx's claim in the Sixth Theses of Feuerbach in this regard. He suggests that the claim that "...the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations" (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.145) has been used by many to support the claim that Marx did not believe in the idea of a "human nature".

Geras' own position, however, is that there is considerable other textual evidence to support the claim that Marx did, in fact, believe that there is a human nature, and emphatically so. Moreover, Geras goes on to argue that even though there is considerable reason for some confusion over whether Marx believed that there is a
human nature, though we may not know what it is even though we do know that it manifests itself differently under different social relations, or, that there is a human nature but it is conditioned by social relations, either way there is something there to be called "human nature". Patently, Geras argues, in either case there is a constant in both claims that can be referred to as "human nature". This "constant" is either "manifested" differently under different conditions or is "conditioned" by different conditions. 22

Perhaps adding to the confusion over whether or not Marx believed in human nature are the various other pieces of text revealing Marx's criticisms of what "human nature" is not. Criticizing what 'human nature' is not, however, 22

An example will help here. Let us assume that being human, "human nature", always includes the possibility of being creative. The actual expression of this capability though is very much dependent on the conditions each lives within and under. At the same time, these same conditions can temper, mould and influence the capability itself. For instance, those whose creative bent is inclined towards music there are many more opportunities to express this capability today than in previous generations. Computer generated or assisted music has only been around for about thirty years. Yet what the computer offers has also had a tremendous effect on the creation of music itself. The possibility of "sampling", recording backing "loops" and being able to manipulate notes and chords infinitely has had a tremendous influence on much of the music people now create. This creative aspect of human nature then is both "manifested" differently dependent on "conditions" and, in turn, is also "conditioned" by these same "conditions".
is not the same as claiming there is no 'human nature'. It may be true, for instance, that I do not believe that the so-called "fat-free" candy bar I buy has no fat in it. It would be silly though, to conclude from this that I must therefore believe the same candy bar has nothing in it.

Still, understanding Marx's view of what human nature is not can help in understanding what he believed human nature actually was.

Marx and what human nature is not.

Consistent with the first part of the Sixth Theses of Feuerbach, Marx was very much set against conceptions of human nature that were "abstract" and without some kind of material substance. For instance, while grateful to Feuerbach for what Engels would later describe in a letter to Marx as "man without the theological halo of abstraction" (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 38, p.12), Marx goes beyond Feuerbach's critique of the theological assumptions regarding human nature and denies any abstract essentialness at all. Even though Marx was grateful to Feuerbach for bringing the idea of the human species from "the heaven of abstraction to the real earth" (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.53), he was still critical of Feuerbach's position regarding human nature. Why? Because once again
it expressed something abstract to each individual, something that could be found in no-one in particular. This line of reasoning is consistent with Geras' critique of the previously addressed passage taken from the Sixth Theses of Feuerbach: If there is any essentialness to human nature at all, it will be found among the "ensemble of social relations".

**Marx and human nature.**

For Marx, abstract ideas of human nature exist only in the realm of philosophical fantasy (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 6, p.511) and any claimed abstract basis to human nature, like Kant's noumenal self or Hegel's self-consciousness or mind, as being considered the "true essence of man" (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.I11) are ill-conceived notions. "[M]an is not an abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the human world" (ibid., p.53).

In denying all kinds of "immaterial" and "abstract" claims regarding the nature of being human and arguing, instead, for a material or substantive basis, it remains for Marx to specify this material basis itself.

As evident from the epigraph that introduces this section, Marx clearly believed that there was some underlying truth that connects phenomena in the natural
world, i.e., plants and stars. Neither does Marx take umbrage with Engels in his excitement over Joules' work which Engels claimed appeared to reinforce the idea that humans and other animals have the same basic features in common and that their "structures correspond" (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 40, p.327).

These kinds of claims though are more indicative of a "theory of everything". What is required here is an explanation of 'human nature' and not 'nature' (if 'nature' is conceived of in this all encompassing sense).

Adhering to Marx's presupposition of a material basis to "human nature", one place to start is his claim that some human drives are "fixed" while others are "relative" (Fromm, 1966, p.11). Examples of "fixed drives" are that we all must be fed, clothed, have a place to live and there must be some procreation if the human race is to survive and continue. "Relative drives", however, are "drives" that come and go dependent on material conditions, time, place, etc.

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23 Much depends here on 'clothed'. People in very hot conditions wear little attire but they do adorn themselves someway, even if just for protection from the elements and terrain. Whatever they use in such circumstances would have to fall under the rubric 'clothed'.

24 One of the most overwhelming examples of a (Footnote Continued)
If we add this interpretation about "fixed" and "relative" drives to the further claim that there is human nature in general and human nature as modified in each historical epoch (ibid., p.25) we get an increased substantive idea of Marx's notion of 'human nature'. There are elements to human nature that remain common no matter time and place, others that are dependent on time and place themselves. A simple example based on the idea of being 'clothed' again can be used to illustrate this point.

We all need or have a "fixed drive" to be clothed but what we actually decide to wear is dependent on a host of variables, such as environmental conditions, available materials and relative norms about acceptability and appropriateness of dress styles. A very detailed and complicated story could be told then about why it is permissible to wear oversize and baggy clothes in 1993 when not so many years (months?) ago this "look" would

(Footnote Continued) "relative drive", I believe, is the drive in capitalist-based societies to own or to possess. The need to own and to have is much more prevalent in capitalist-based societies than those with other forms of economic and social organization. When I lived in Papua New Guinea for instance, some of the most highly esteemed people there were those who were owed favours, those who had gave and done for others. They possessed and "owned" very little. Perhaps more importantly, they appeared to have no desire to either.
have looked quite stupid. Whatever one's view on this "baggy, oversize" look, those who dress this way are clothing themselves nonetheless.

While this example helps to introduce the distinction between "fixed drives" and "relative drives" it also serves to raise the issue of human "needs". Here there is a suggestion of a need to be clothed and a need that all humans possess. Marx gave considerable attention to this idea of humans having "needs" and the following examination of his claims regarding them embellishes the explanation of his views on human nature.

Starting out with "basic needs" as implied by "fixed drives", e.g., food, clothing, shelter and sex, a subsequent and more extensive examination of Marx's writings reveals that his range of "needs" becomes increasingly larger and more complex. It increases to include clothing in adequate quality and quantity (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol.5, p.38) and the need of people for a breadth and diversity of pursuit and personal development (ibid, p.255). This breadth and diversity is required because human beings have a need for "all-round activity", "all-round development" (ibid.), "free development" (ibid., p.439) and "the means of cultivating gifts in all directions" (ibid., p.78).
It seems then that Marx's theory of human nature thus includes the idea that human beings are creatures who are, at least, capable of having needs. The needs themselves are quite broad and to claim they are aspects of human nature is guaranteed to attract strong criticism. There are more claims that Marx makes in regard to human nature that are even more problematic though.

For instance, in arguing for the manner in which individuals decide what kind of labour they should perform, Marx is emphatic that whatever it is that is chosen, it should somehow reflect or derive from the individual's "natural character" or will. Some individuals, for instance, produce under conditions incorporating a mass of premises that do not stem from the will of the individual or [their] immediate character" (emphasis added, Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 29, p.465). They enter into productive relations independent of their will (emphasis added, ibid., p.263). This is objectionable to Marx for in any work "...the aim of it should be stripped of its external natural necessity and instead become an aim which only the individual posits" (emphasis added, Vol. 28, p.530).

From these claims it would appear that each human being also has a will, and a will that can have some effect in the material world. Individual human beings also
are taken to have an "immediate character" as well as a "natural character". Moreover, they are capable of making judgements of the will independent of the particular and specific circumstances that provide the foundation for their own personal history. This is possible even beyond the choice of how to labour for "... in contrast to the utilitarian intelligence which fights for its hearth and home, the free intelligence fights for what is right despite hearth and home" (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 1, p.301).

25 Marx's notion of a 'natural character' is fraught with difficulties, some of which I address shortly. The distinction he makes between "natural" and "immediate" character is introduced, I believe, to deal with some of the difficulties. My interpretation is that "natural character" refers to something like the latent potentialities within each individual. These potentialities are always there, some we get to know of, some we do not. Those we do know of are those that comprise our "immediate character". For example, after three years of practicing the electric bass guitar (and various other experiences) I am aware of or know that there is a musical aspect to my own "natural character". On the other hand, I may also be capable of many other things yet the circumstances and conditions conducive to the realization of these have yet to become evident (or they already have been evident and either I was not aware or did not take advantage of them). Being able to play the bass is now evidence of both the "natural" and "immediate character" I have. Any other latent potentialities I possess are also composites of my "natural character". It is only when the appropriate circumstances arise and allow for the expression of these that it will be possible to claim that they have become aspects of my "immediate character".
Now Marx's view of human nature begins to take shape. He assumes that each human being has "a will", a "natural character", an "immediate character", has "needs" and each is capable of making choices somehow independent of material conditions.

While these latter claims expand Marx's notion of 'human nature' from a simple and generally physiological/biological account, they are even more problematic if we reconsider the argument I have presented in Chapter II regarding the relationship between meaning, value, and context. For instance, in deciding how to labour, if I act from my will in the manner Marx suggests, then how can the "best" way to labour for me not be dependent somehow on the jobs that are available for me? Furthermore, what of Marx's claims about the relationship between the "ensemble of social relations" and human nature? If part of my human nature is dependent on my "ensemble of social relations" then surely these relations must always have a bearing on who I am and how I can labour? If so, my choice of labour can never be independent of these same conditions and neither could I "will" this to happen. Perhaps an example will help here.

Some of my former friends in Papua New Guinea could not "choose" to be draftspersons. Many of them are the first members of their families to leave their ancestral
tribal villages. Hence, many may not even understand the concept 'draftsperson', nevermind there being any such labour available. Of course it may be the case that they may have some "natural characteristics" conducive to being a draftsperson, but draftspersons aren't to be found in some societies, especially those comprised of tribal villages often surviving on subsistence farming like many in Papua New Guinea. Like mine and everyone else's, each aspect of their "natural character" can only become actualized given specific and particular material conditions and existential circumstances.

Marx's claims concerning human nature are problematic for other reasons. Even if we have some "natural character" there is the possibility that some of us have "natural characteristics" that may be objectionable; e.g., predilections to excessive alcohol consumption, to illegal and dangerous drug use, to violence, etc. Does Marx's

26 It is interesting that two of the most popular movies recently have dealt with this issue of "natural characters" and what control individuals have over them. 'Bill Munny', the retired gunslinger, played by Clint Eastwood in "Unforgiven" tries hard to prove his former killing ways are not part of his nature and that those ways can be given up. 'Fergus', a central character in "The Crying Game", tries desperately to prove that in being Irish and a member of the I.R.A. that it is not in his nature to be a terrorist; someone having no regard for the lives of those they perceive as "the enemy".

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26
position entail that all characteristics inherent to the "natural character" of some individual be allowed to flourish? 27

Finally, Marx also has a deep and abiding belief that all individuals are capable of recognizing their species-beingness. In contrast to animals, only human beings are capable of considering themselves as members of a species (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.76). Only human beings are capable of seeing themselves in others and the human race in total. And being able to consider oneself and others in this light is of vital importance with respect to how we live and interact with one another.

For instance, in choosing how to labour if "...we have chosen the position in life in which we can most of all work for mankind, no burdens can bow us down..." (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 1, p.8). And:

While individual humans can only decide for themselves how best to achieve this enoblement of humankind, and even if this privilege that humans have over the rest of the natural world is as potentially destructive as it is liberating, the ability to conceive of ourselves as members of a species; as species-beings, remains, nonetheless (ibid., p.3.).

27 I provide a brief response to this question in the footnotes on page 117.
The labour we perform then must not deny this aspect of human nature, it must express it. It is through labour that we find the means for recognizing and expressing our species-beingness and when this recognition occurs we apprehend our human essence itself (ibid., p. 33). 28

In utilizing McCallum's triadic schema and focusing first on variable 'x', the human agent, I have tried to identify Marx's beliefs and assumptions about human nature and human agency. Marx's view of human nature includes at least the following: Human beings have fixed or relative drives and/or needs, both biological and psychological. Human beings also have a will, a "natural character" and an "immediate character". Human beings are also able to recognize themselves as members of a species as opposed to disparate individuals brought together by chance, happenstance or some kind of socially derived relationship.

Utilizing McCallum's variable 'x' has also helped to establish that Marx differs from many other thinkers regarding the status of human nature. While many have believed in human nature "in general", or in abstract

28 A more detailed examination of the importance Marx places on humans being species-beings is presented beginning p. 143.
notions of human nature, Marx claims to reject these. Those before him, he believed, got human nature wrong, for they had failed to recognize that human nature is the;

...sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse, which every individual and every generation finds in existence as something given, [as] the real basis of what [they] have conceived as "substance" and "essence of man" (Marx, 1965, p.51)

Marx presents us with a 'human nature' claimed to be grounded in the real and one that is not some "philosophical phantasm". Yet, paradoxically, he also claims that ideas themselves are:

interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life" (Marx, 1965, p.37) [as]...[m]en are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.,--real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these (Marx, 1965, p.37).

This is a crucial insight, and ironically, one that raises serious questions about Marx's claims themselves. If all ideas are "interwoven with the material activity of men and the material intercourse of men" and "conditioned by a definite development of productive forces", then so too is Marx's idea of human nature, and, of course, all his ideas. Hence, this makes him no different than anyone else expressing their ideas and so it remains to be
established why we should adopt Marx's account of 'human nature' rather than some other.

The substantive issues that Marx's human nature raise have to do with how we choose to act on the world and in the way we choose to labour and transform material conditions. The next section utilizes McCallum's schema to add detail to the substantive issues raised by Marx's views on human nature. They also provide compelling reasons why Marx's view ought be accepted.

B. Marx and McCallum's variables 'y' and 'z': Freedom From and Freedom To.

Productive life is the life of the species, the whole character of the species is contained in its life activity and the life activity of man is free, conscious activity... Estrangement from life-activity produces estranged man (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.76).

Alienation (or "estrangement") means, for Marx, that man does not experience himself as the acting agent in his grasp of the world, but that the world (nature, others, and he himself) remain alien to him (Fromm, 1966, p.44).

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29 I address the 'y' and 'z' variables in unison for stylistic reasons. Examining what Marx believed are "preventing conditions" very often provides direct evidence of what he believed ought replace them. Addressing the range of 'y' and 'z' separately would lengthen the project unnecessarily.
Turning now to McCallum's variables 'y' and 'z', we can begin to address some of the substantive issues that Marx is concerned with when he uses 'freedom'. McCallum argues that any use of 'freedom' can always be couched in terms of both "free from" (or not "free from") and "free to" (or not "free to") (1967, p. 319). Hence, in this section I am particularly interested in what Marx believed human beings ought be free from and what it is they ought to be free to do or be.

The next step then in continuing to apply McCallum's schema to Marx's writings is to focus on the variables 'y' and 'z'. Examining the range and extent of variable 'y' will reveal those "preventing conditions", those constraints, restrictions, interferences, barriers that Marx finds objectionable. The same detailed focus on variable 'z' will also establish what it is that Marx believes ought happen in their place.

One of the claims I intend to argue for in this section is that as a result of applying McCallum's schema to Marx's writings, the variable 'y' can be summarized in one word: 'Alienation'. This will mean that if human

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30 Isidor Walliman (1981) claims that customarily, based on inadequate translations, social scientists in the English-speaking world have seldom made the distinction (Footnote Continued)
beings are alienated, then they are not free. Furthermore, McCallum's 'z' variable in this case, I will argue, represents the idea that human beings must create those conditions that allow them to live and labour in accord with human nature itself.

Initially, the condensed picture is that only when human beings live and labour where there is no alienation and instead, live and labour under conditions that allow for the expression of human nature, will they experience freedom. And although it is possible for humans not to be alienated and still not free—the conditions that cause alienation could be removed and nothing or something different (worse?) put in their place—an analysis of the conditions that Marx argues cause alienation can also reveal what ought replace them. Both the conditions that cause alienation and the conditions conducive to human freedom then can be ascertained by examining in detail how Marx used 'alienation' itself.

In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx describes three components or aspects to alienation.

(Footnote Continued) between 'alienation' and 'estrangement' (p.xxi). She also admits that the terms are not mutually exclusive (p.40). I admit to my own shortcomings in this regard and assume 'alienation' and 'estrangement' to be much more synonymous than Walliman would allow. How Marx used 'alienation' is explained as the chapter progresses.
These are; 1), the alienation of human beings from the products of their labour, 2), the alienation of human beings from the form of the process of labour and 3), the alienation of human beings from each other, from the human species. To provide some substance to McCallum's variables 'y' and 'z' in terms of Marx's use of 'freedom' I now examine each of these three components or aspects to alienation in turn.

**Product Alienation.**

**Voluntary choice and natural character.**

To understand Marx's use of 'alienation' one must also understand the pivotal role and importance he gives to being able to labour and all that it signifies for human beings. While animals may appear to have the equivalent of labour in their "life-activity", e.g., building nests, dens, and foraging for food, human labour is pivotal as only human beings are conscious of their "life-activity", Marx claims. Only human beings are conscious of their capability of creating an objective world through their labour (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.83). It is through labour, through human "life-activity", that human beings and the human race in general "work-up" inorganic nature and transform the natural world (ibid, p.76). And crucially, Marx believes, it is only human
beings who can make this "life-activity" the object of their will (ibid).

This importance of labour is underpinned by the relationship between the human being performing the labour and the ontological status of that human being. For labour not to be alienating, labour itself must be voluntary (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 5, p.47) and one's labour must be precisely one's real freedom in action (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 28, p.530). Thus, Marx's belief that each human being has a "will" and is capable of making a "voluntary choice" becomes crucial in the context of how and what to labour in. Our labour must be the means whereby we can actualize our freedom.

Here then is one component of Marx's use of 'freedom' that using McCallum's schema has helped reveal. Human beings should be free to choose how to labour and free from conditions that prevent this.

Immediately though, this first condition raises difficult problems, one of which is that Marx's claim appears viciously circular. Why? Well, I have argued earlier that adopting McCallum's variable 'x' demonstrated that Marx believed human beings, by "nature", have a will, which presumably is the basis of his claim that we could act freely or voluntarily in regard to our choice of labour. In this section I am trying to reconstruct Marx's
argument that being free requires not being alienated while performing labour. Yet not being alienated while performing labour, according to the preceding citations, seems to require that our labour must be freely chosen. Marx seems to be claiming then that in order to be free we must act freely.

In order to deal with the tautological nature of this claim it has to be established that persons can be something "naturally" while never having this actualized. In other words, can it be sensibly said that human beings are free (or anything) by "nature", "inherently", "essentially" or otherwise and yet never somehow be free? My answer is "no" and a brief examination of an analogy that seems to raise the same kinds of issues will help explain why. The analogy will also question whether Marx's claim is as tautologous as it first appears.

Jim Nash, ethicist, moral theologian and Assistant Professor at The Catholic University, Washington, D.C. in a discussion on National Public Radio (February 8-11, 1993) expressed his interpretation of the Catholic Church's position regarding homosexuals and homosexuality. Nash argued that there is a logically justified distinction to be made between being a homosexual and homosexuality. Nash's interpretation was basically that being a homosexual is not immoral but active homosexuality
is. As long as one is a homosexual but remains homosexually inactive then this is morally permissible. If any homosexual activity, like sodomy, is practiced, then it is the act itself and only the act that is immoral (and regardless of whether homosexuals or heterosexuals practice the act).

Considering Nash's interpretation, a question arises: What kind of homosexual never acts homosexually? What sense can we make of saying that a person is of a certain "kind" yet never actualizes or realizes the kind of person he or she is? For the kind of person in question here, a homosexual person, alternatives could include that he or she is a virgin, celibate or frustrated. These alternatives all give clues to Marx's point in claiming that humans beings are free "by nature" yet may not act freely.

Marx's claim is not tautologous if 'human beings' is understood as those creatures that are free by definition, but certain conditions or circumstances frustrate or even deny opportunities for acting or being free. This approach avoids the tautology because in order to say someone has a certain "natural character" some kind of evidence is required to support this. After all, we are referring to a "natural" and not "spiritual" character here. And Marx did
claim that he was trying to give a **scientific** account of human affairs.

In order to claim that someone is a virgin, celibate or frustrated homosexual it must also be known somehow that the said individual is capable of and desires or has some tendencies towards homosexual acts, purposes, thoughts, etc. The Catholic homosexual who is homosexual by "nature" but does not "practice" homosexual acts because of his or her religion must somehow "know" he or she is or was homosexual for this to make any sense.

The analogy only helps Marx if the homosexuals or heterosexual in question have once practiced or know they can practice homosexual acts and have the desire or inclination to do so. Religious beliefs and/or other extenuating circumstances somehow prevent them from acting on these desires or inclinations. The individuals in question are something "by nature" (predisposed to homosexual acts) but they must also have "acted" in some manner that justifies claiming this.  

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31 Mary Leach raises the question here of whether this means, for Marx, that such "inactive" homosexuals (or heterosexuals) are not free? This insight returns us to the issue I raise on p.107 regarding whether all aspects to any individual's "natural character" have to become actualized in order for them to be experience freedom. My response would be that this cannot be the case for some
It does not seem possible then to defend the claim that someone can have a certain "natural character" that never gets actualized or realized. To make a claim about someone's "natural character" at all implies that we have good evidence that they have this particular "natural character" in the first place.

Marx's claim is not tautologous then if understood from the same perspective: Marx believes that all human beings are "free" by nature. He also believes that certain material conditions prevent human beings from acting freely. Importantly though, there must have been (and still are) other material conditions that demonstrated to him that human beings can (and do) act with freedom in the manner desired by him. The overarching aim of Marx's

(Footnote Continued)

may well be "naturally" inclined to violence towards others. If such persons were allowed to act in accord with their "natural character", then others may end up having no freedom at all—they may end up dead. Judgements have to be made then regarding which "characteristics" are allowed to flourish and which ones not. My belief is that a good argument justifying this approach could be constructed based around Marx's faith in the idea of 'species-beingness'. 'Species-beingness' itself is addressed beginning p.117.

Some of these conditions and the nature of them are addressed throughout this section, specifically where I examine the causes of alienation in more detail.

What those conditions are is the central theme of this project. I cannot provide the examples that Marx must
philosophy is, of course, to describe those alternative material conditions that would allow freedom for all.

This approach to negating the apparent tautologous nature of Marx's claim regarding being free and acting freely can be supplemented if we focus more closely on Marx's idea that each human being has a "natural character". To reiterate, in their everyday existence humans enter into relations that are independent of their will (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 29, p.263). These relations derive from historically shaped divisions of labour "...incorporating a mass of other premises which do not stem from the will of the individual or from his immediate natural character..." (emphasis added, ibid., p.465).

Marx seems to suggest that acting voluntarily in regard to one's labour also requires somehow acting in accord with one's "natural character". Moreover, this "acting voluntarily" also requires making some choice about how to labour independent of any present "relations" and "historically shaped divisions" of labour.

(Footnote Continued)

have believed supported this particular belief but it should be obvious by now that they would have included ones where he believed human beings have at least acted in accord with their "natural character" and made judgements from their "will".
Presumably, this would mean that "by nature" I could be predisposed to artistic endeavours for example, and if I so wished, could choose to labour in some manner that expressed this artistic aspect of my character. Yet again, however, this would also mean that I "knew", somehow, that I am artistic or that there are artistic elements inherent to my "natural character". Moreover, my choice of labour must also somehow transcend any influences by the then present organization of labour of which I am a part. So, even though I may live in a mining village and everyone around me is employed by the mine and its supporting services, I must somehow "rise above" all this and choose to labour in a way that stems from this "natural character" of mine. It is possible then that while I may be artistic, the conditions may or may not be ripe for me to act artistically.

As highlighted by the "homosexual Catholic" analogy, these are problematic criteria and I will have more to say about them shortly. There are more problems with them though if we recall that Marx's work is underpinned at a fundamental level with the idea of an inextricable relationship between human beings and the historical, social and economic circumstances we are a part of.

We have already seen that human nature has a close relationship with the "ensemble of social relations".
Elsewhere, Marx also claims that "...man is neither free
to choose this or that form of society due to the then
present productive facilities, corresponding forms of
commerce and consumption" (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 38,
p.96). Even the ideas and the products of consciousness of
human beings are:

interwoven with the material activity
and the material intercourse of
[humans], the language of real life"
(Marx, 1965, p.37)...[as]...[humans] are
the producers of their conceptions,
ideas, etc.--real, active men, as they
are conditioned by a definite
development of their productive forces
and of the intercourse corresponding to
these..." (ibid).

If these conditions play such a determining role
regarding what we can be and what we can choose from, and
even how we think, it would seem impossible, even
according to Marx, for any one to choose labour that was
not, somehow, the result of these same "productive forces"
and "intercourse corresponding to these". Moreover, even
if we accept Marx's claims about each individual having a
"natural character", if there is no "outlet" for this then
how would we come to "know" or be able to identify what
each "natural character" was?

For example, if I had a "natural character" that
included the talents, traits, disposition, etc., to be a
soccer player, how would I know I had them if I lived in a
society that did not have any idea what 'soccer' meant?
What would the basis be for me even talking about having these talents, etc. if I have no access to the meaning of 'soccer' itself? If there was no way of playing or even talking sensibly to others about soccer, of judging whether these aspects of my character were those that would make me a "natural" soccer player then it is difficult to imagine what sense can be made of the claim that I had the "natural character" for soccer in the first place. It is one thing to know I have some characteristics but don't act on them, e.g., the "homosexual Catholic", but another to claim to know I have some characteristics at all.

Of course we could keep in mind Marx's distinction between the "fixed" aspects to human nature and the "relative" ones; those dependent perhaps, on the "ensemble of social relations". I could always have been predisposed to being a soccer player (the "fixed" aspect) even though the conditions were never right in my lifetime for this "fixed" aspect to be realized. Yet still, this doesn't help in answering the problems raised previously--problems regarding how I would know I had these particular "fixed" aspects and what sense it makes to refer to "natural characteristics" when they have no outlet or means of being communicated about to others.
Perhaps Marx's distinction between "natural character" and "immediate natural character" (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 29, p.465) can help here. Perhaps what Marx means is that our voluntary choice of how to labour is limited to what we "immediately" are aware of regarding our "natural character" and the opportunities available, as opposed to "unimmediate" possibilities. Thus, the choice of what activities to undertake in labour become choices indicative of a relationship between elements of an individual's "natural character" that are "known" and what is possible given the productive forces and relations the individual is a part of. I can only freely choose from what is possible for me, and what is possible is limited by what I know; about me and about my circumstances, my "ensemble of social relations".

This approach need not necessarily imply some "strong" kind of determinism either. Obviously, I still have some choice in the matter and included in the range of possibilities between my individual character and the "ensemble of social relations" present in my lifetime is the concomitant possibility of changing those same "social relations". As with West's response to the claim that popular music today is largely a "social cement", that it serves to perpetuate and legitimize the market economy and social order, "...there's always, within the market
itself, *oppositional possibilities*" (emphasis added, 1993, p. 66). Furthermore, choosing from any "oppositional possibilities" has an added bonus too. It can allow for previously "hidden" or not utilized "natural characters" and "natural characteristics" now becoming realized. Popular music can serve as an example again.

Who could have predicted that the drive for deskilling through the technologizing of the workplace would have had a side effect in the design and production of musical instruments and recording equipment. The exponential development of the micro-chip in reducing labour costs and mechanizing much of human labour has also allowed tremendous changes in the way music is produced and performed. The application of micro-chip technology to computers, keyboards, synthesizers and recording equipment has allowed numerous opportunities for increasing numbers of young people to realize previously

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34 One can turn to the automotive industry to find numerous examples of this phenomena. Engine tuning equipment and more basic tasks like measuring, for instance, that once relied heavily on human skills, energy and a considerable amount of time are now under the purview of the machine. Tune-up equipment is designed to be operated by almost anyone—the sensors are plugged in, the diagnosis is given—and measuring crucial engine components is now achieved with devices that present the results on digital displays. The mechanic is no longer required to use fairly complex math skills and logical reasoning to get the same critical measurements.
undeveloped musical talents. One could argue in effect that the technology introduced, in part(?), to gain more control over productive labour has actually provided greater control to individuals who previously had very little. 35

Up to this point then, applying McCallum's schema to some of Marx's writings has revealed the following: Included in the range of variable 'z' is the idea that human beings ought be allowed to act from "voluntary choice" and in accord with their "natural character". In particular, both of these notions should be given a central role in the performance of one's labour: "Natural character" in what to do and "voluntary choice" in deciding what to do and how to do it.

Some idea of why these criteria signified by variable 'z' should be actively encouraged as a means of eliminating alienation and promoting human freedom can be

35 Here I am referring to the way rap music is presently dominating popular music and given increased opportunities for young blacks to have more control over their own labour. The most popular and successful artists like Ice-T and Ice-Cube, who readily admit to being former drug dealers and criminals are examples to the point. Having once being excluded from "regular" and socially acceptable labour, they now find themselves with increased options and control over their personal futures.
found in the role labour plays in human self-realization. To this I now turn.

Self realization and the products of labour.

Understanding product alienation does not end with understanding the roles that "voluntary choice" and "natural character" play. A further condition that explains product alienation is one that focuses on the final "possession" of the products of one's labour and what this implies for the producer's self-realization.

Being involved in some labour activity always means to be involved in the production of some thing. Being able to produce some thing also offers the possibility of individual self-realization. Self-realization through labour is the objectification of the subject in the product(s) of the subject's labour. The subject (the person who provides the labour power) becomes objectified through the creative act of productive labour that results in some product. Therefore, my labour, my ability to "give life" to my labour power, like anybody else's, can serve as the vehicle for my self-realization. When I produce some thing that very thing holds the possibility of my own objectification, my self realized.

All labour has this possibility of producing some self realized, some self made object. Yet by itself the objectification of labour creates no problems in regard to
product alienation for Marx. Objectification is separable from alienation (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 29, p.209) as it is only when the products of labour, the products that objectify each subject are appropriated by another that alienation occurs.

Here then are more substantive issues revealed by applying McCallum's variables 'y' and 'z' to Marx's claims. The first issue supports the already addressed importance of the role of "natural character" and "voluntary choice" in regard to human labour. Because what each human being produces can become their own self made object what is required (variable 'z') is that each be allowed to labour in this fashion. Each must be given the opportunity to choose to labour in a manner that is expressive of their "natural character". The second issue reveals what ought to be denied or prevented (variable 'x'). When human beings labour the products of their labour must not be appropriated by others. Perhaps an example will help make this last point clearer.

On the one hand, I can offer to repair your car because I have a "natural character" that includes those skills necessary to repair cars. I realize I have these skills, and decide this is how I would like to labour. When I repair your car, my objectified self ends up belonging to you: It is your car, you drive off with the
products of my labour. In this example, it is the skills and experience embodied in my repair of your car that is being appropriated by you.

On the other hand, when I am employed on a wage basis to repair cars at a commercial garage, there is no option in deciding which cars to repair and which not to repair. If I need the wage I have to repair what I am assigned. Here my skills and experience are also appropriated by others. In this case it is the garage owner.

There are very important differences, however, between the two seemingly similar examples. In the first case, my choice of repairing your car reflected my will in action in both the repair itself and the choice of what to repair. While the products of my labour, the repairing of your car, are still appropriated by another, you, crucially, this appropriation is also something I willingly agree to. In the second case, however, (being in the employ of another), I have little or no choice over what to repair and have no say in who can appropriate the products of my labour.

Why this appropriation of the products of one's labour by another is alienating ties directly in with the idea of self-realization through labour. If the product of my labour is me objectified, is my self realized, then when it ends up belonging to another, so too do I. Thus,
it is the case that the more I produce and that produced is appropriated, the less I am me. The more I am required to produce, especially when what I actually produce does not stem from my will or natural character, and even more so when that produced is not willingly allowed by me to be appropriated by another, the more that the object that I produced is controlling my life rather than I, it. I become related to the product of my labour as an alien (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.72) and I become a servant to it (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 3, p.217).

As a result, it seems that I, the mechanic, must comply with what each defective car requires of me. The demands and expectations of the tasks inherent to being a mechanic seem to have more control over how my labour is performed than I do. Instead of my labour supplying me with the means of expressing my essence, my "natural character", my labour reduces my essence to that which provides the means for my existence (Fromm, 1966, p.53).

Examining these particular claims that Marx makes by way of McCallum's schema now informs us that variable 'z' now includes that the labour human beings perform must be the means for their self-realization, for the objectification of their natural character. However, at the same time, the range of the 'y' variable also increases to suggest that the labour each chooses to
perform must not transform their "natural character" into a commodity. If this occurs there is every possibility that each self becomes a commodity up for exchange in the marketplace like any other. When this happens, each becomes alienated from their self.

As well as the range of variable 'z', including the idea that each human being must labour for self-realization this section has also shown that if the products of labour must be appropriated by another, then this too must result from the individual's voluntary choice or will. Conversely, the range of the 'y' variable now also includes that any appropriation of the products of the labour of another without the producer's conscious consent must cease.

The human race and nature.

Two more aspects of product alienation are revealed after applying McCallum's schema to Marx's views concerning the relationships he believes human beings have with each other and the non-human, "natural" world.

Recalling Section A., "Marx and variable 'x': The human agent", I argued that Marx claimed there is a fundamental and inherent relationship between each and
every human being within the human race. Here I introduce Marx's concern regarding the relationship between the human race or species and the non-human, "natural" world.

Reading Marx one could well believe that for him it does not make much sense to even refer to a "relationship" between humans and nature. Marx often gives the impression that humans are nature--"nature itself is man's inorganic body" (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.75). Marx also does not take umbrage with Engels in his excitement over Joules' work, a work that Engels claimed appeared to reinforce the idea that humans and other animals have the same basic features in common and that their "structures correspond" (Marx & Engels 1976, Vol. 40, p.327). Geras supports this line of reasoning. He claimed that Marx seemed to believe that human beings, like all other species "...[are] irredeemably rooted in a given biological constitution; absolutely continuous with the rest of the natural world" (1983, p.97). To understand this belief Marx has concerning a deep and fundamental relationship between

36 To avoid unnecessary repetition, I will leave addressing the aspect of alienation that deals with the relationships between each human being and the race in total to the section titled "Species-being alienation" (p.144).
human beings and the natural world it will help to reflect on the role that the natural world plays in human labour itself.

First and foremost, without nature human beings could neither produce nor survive. It is in the natural world that we find the material conditions to house, clothe and feed ourselves. This relationship is always a tenuous one because the more we use nature in survival and production the less there is for future use.

Any productive activity or relation that denies this necessary relationship is another component to the range of McCallum's variable 'x' as applied to Marx's work. It is one more "preventing condition" that needs to be eliminated. On the other hand, recognizing that the labour human beings perform always has this fundamental and inherent relationship with nature is something that must be actively encouraged. This criterion would obviously embellish the range of McCallum's variable 'z' in reference to Marx's work.

These are important criteria for Marx because in any act of labour there is always the possibility that what is produced appears as though it has no connection or relationship with nature or other people. For instance, it takes a considerable amount of effort to imagine the range of human effort and materials involved in the production
of the objects surrounding me as I sit in front of my computer, in this room, in this house, situated on this street, in this city. It is easy to forget that humans, in relation with nature and one another, produce all these things and that it is humans that can change material conditions and forms and relations of production, if they so desire.

The general picture so far is that one of the dominant "preventing conditions" (McCallum's variable 'y') that must end is the alienation that can arise between producer and product. This alienation can result from the fact that what individuals choose to produce is somehow not a voluntary choice or not a choice that stems from each individual's "natural character". Product alienation can also result because the object produced ends up belonging to another without this also being the result of the producer's will. Finally, if the object produced contributes to the denial of the inherent relationship between human beings and the natural world then this too generates alienation. Each producer loses sight of the fact that all products are brought into existence by people as a result of their creative capacities employed in the transforming or "working-up" of material conditions.
This interpretation strongly suggests that Marx believed each individual does have a "natural character" and whatever each individual is will be manifested differently under different conditions that are fundamentally underpinned by productive forces and productive relations. A major criticism of this view, I have argued, is that individuals can only "choose" to labour from what is available and possible given their location in time and place and knowledge of their personal capacities and limitations.

Importantly, I have claimed, this does not deny the possibility that some can work towards changing or modifying those very same productive forces and relations. We can choose to labour from either the possibilities that continue the present conditions or those that can change them. Marx's essential point though, I believe, is that there is always a significant difference in choosing as best we can based on our will and "natural character" and present circumstances rather than letting productive forces and relations choose for us.

**Process Alienation.**

Alienation is perhaps easier to understand when the focus is on the processes involved in carrying out one's labour rather than on what is being produced. Focusing on
the form of the process of labour can help explain 'alienation' as "...it [alienation] makes no difference whether it is sugar or steel that is produced (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 29, p.220).

What then can McCallum's schema tell us about Marx's use of 'freedom' if we apply it to his claims about the form of the process of production? What is it about this aspect to labour that must be ended? What does Marx desire in its place?

Marx is concerned with the form of the process of production for it too can be alienating. This occurs when the form of the process, like the choice of what to produce, does not embody the will or voluntary choice of those involved. Like the products of labour, the process or processes of production can also appear to be independent of the will of each person actually performing the labour. Therefore, just as the products of labour must be something that people voluntary choose to produce, so too must the means or objective conditions of the processes of production be "permeated with the will" of each.

McCallum's variable 'z' once again serves to highlight the importance of voluntary choice in labour. Variable 'x' helps to demonstrate again that what is not needed are material conditions and relations that appear

One example of this is how time, under certain productive relations, seems to have a life of its own. To many workers time often appears "as an objective force within which [they] are imprisoned" (Thompson in Schor, 1991, p.50). Time itself becomes a commodity like any other (Schor, 1991, p.139).

The commodification of time is made strikingly obvious for many workers with the arrival of the "time and motion man". The bureaucrats who monitored and timed every move a worker made in order to "cost out" his or her activities are vivid representations of the occupational dogma that "time is money" and that less time per job means less money (less outlay for the employer). This project often resulted in the time set for a job took

37 This is an old phrase but the work these men (rarely were there women involved) did continues. Now, however, evaluating the amount of time a job should take has frequently become one of the roles of professional bodies associated with the relevant occupations. In many automotive repair establishments throughout the U.S. for instance, you will find trade manuals put together by the Society of Automotive Engineers. These manuals provide comprehensive lists and information regarding how long it should take for specific jobs on particular vehicles. The mechanics in these establishments are often paid according to the times stated in these books and not according to how long each job actually takes.
being held as sacrosanct while the stresses the worker
experienced in trying to maintain these times were ignored
or attributed to faults or failings with the individual
themselves.

For labour, under these conditions, preventing
alienation may require a reassessment of the value of
time, an evaluation and a sympathetic understanding of the
human costs resultant from the never ending quest to
minimize production and labour time. It may even require a
reconceptualization of time itself.

38 Of course, on these occasions many such workers
found "oppositional opportunites" (recalling West's
comment on p.124) aplenty. For instance, the clever worker
under observation from the "time and motion man" knew fine
well how to make the job stretch out. The worker was
clever enough to accomplish this and also, at the same
time, give the impression that "real" work was taking
place. The time taken for these activities under
observation was duly recorded. When it came to earning
money though, the same worker could significantly reduce
the time the same activities took. This created more space
in the work day for more jobs or more "free" time,
depending on how he or she was paid ("piece work" or
hourly wages).

39 Joan Morgan, a reporter for "Vibe" magazine,
returned to her home in Jamaica after living in the U.S.
for a number of years and was immediately reminded of the
radically different conceptions of time between the two
countries. After living in Papua New Guinea for four years
I sympathize with her and could confirm her experience
that in many places outside of the U.S. "'Soon come'"
means 'I'll see you in anywhere from five minutes to five
days; a morning appointment...means showing up before
three o'clock'" (October, 1993, p.80). The larger issue is
(Footnote Continued)
Another reason to be concerned about the form of the process of production hinges on the reasons why something is actually produced in the first place. For Marx, the difference between producing for use-value and producing for exchange-value is pivotal in understanding why the form of the process of labour can be alienating. The difference between the two may be grasped as follows. When something is produced in order to be exchanged for money (wages) and the money is then used to purchase the things needed or wanted, then the decision to employ one's labour is motivated by the possibility of the exchange transaction and the currency inherent to it. What this results in, according to Marx, is that we fail to recognize that we produce for human beings, for other people. Worse still, even when we are aware of the significance that humans play in regard to our labour, certain conditions of the process limit our awareness of them to solely those that signify their place in productive relations. Under such conditions, other people become nothing more than the bearers of the currency that productive persons seek to gain in exchange for the

(Footnote Continued)

whether these different conceptions of time are dependent on differences in productive and material conditions and relations.
products of their labour. Performing my labour in this manner, producing for exchange, reduce[s] others to things (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 29, p.466) and inevitably presents others as only a means to my end (ibid. p.471).

Marx wants to turn this aspect of the form of the process of production on its head. For him, the desire to employ one's labour ought be motivated, at least in part, by the usefulness of the product itself, in the possibility of it satisfying some human need. Production that led to exchange would still be evident but this would be secondary. Only after production for use is satisfied will excess production be made available for exchange (ibid. p. 466).

Here is another substantive finding made evident by utilizing McCallum's schema: Production motivated predominantly by exchange must end (variable 'x'). In its place, there ought be a major shift towards production motivated by use, production for human need (variable 'z').

I offer this interpretation and return to the idea of human "needs" again for it seems that there is a conceptual relationship lurking in Marx's work between 'use' and 'need'; and perhaps even 'natural character'. The relationship, I suggest, is that human beings, as
individuals or as a species, have numerous requirements reflected in Marx's use and range of 'needs' (see p.102).

We know that "needs" can be met in all sorts of ways, but one very significant way could be by individuals producing in a manner that reflects each's will or "natural character". If this is plausible, Marx "kills two birds with one stone". First, each individual gets the opportunity to produce in a manner that reflects his or her will and "natural character". Second, these same individuals can be organized (including by themselves) to produce for these "needs".

What I am suggesting is that Marx's larger vision is that there are enough universal human needs and a sufficient range of individual "natural characters" and numbers of them that everyone able to produce could do so in a manner that would satisfy these needs and not be alienating in the process. Moreover, it is these needs themselves that indicate what it would mean to produce for "use" rather than "exchange".

For example, I am good at carpentry and work in the construction industry, building houses say. You, on the other hand, are good at farming and growing crops. Yet how we eventually get enough housing and food for everyone need not necessarily be driven by a market system built primarily on exchange or modes and relations of production
that result in alienation. How? Well individual labour could be rewarded by some kind of voucher or "labour credit" system. The products of my labour would be distributed according to general need and individual specific need above and beyond this in a way agreed to by the community I am a member of. This seems to be the kind of distribution of the products of labour and rewards for work Marx has in mind in his explanation of the "needs principle" (Marx & Engels, 1978, pp.527-532).

Importantly, and under such conditions, my own personal production would not be based merely on my required use or my immediate needs. Production for use-value is intended to be production that takes everyone into account. It is production that takes me beyond immediate and or physical need; that produced has a use-value for all (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.74). This is because "...really free production arises only when production is beyond immediate and/or physical need" (ibid, p.76). Thus, it will only be when we produce beyond the satisfaction of these needs and produce for all that we can begin to consider ourselves as free beings. This explains the requirement of a "...high degree of development in productive power..." (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 5, pp.48-9) prior to the negation of alienation. Everyone must have their basic, physical and immediate
needs met before we start producing in a way that is a manifestation of human freedom.

Productive labour that focuses on "use" rather than "exchange" has another advantage. If people are assured their needs are being taken care of, then the pressures of working to get the money that normally is exchanged for these "needs" becomes minimal or nonexistent. This would allow for people to concentrate more on establishing what their "natural characters" are and finding the labour to suit. Providing these kinds of conditions to the process of labour would be more conducive to "...developing all...abilities in the creative manifestation of life" (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 38, p.225) rather than "...forcing [them] into exclusive spheres of activity from which [they] cannot escape" (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 5, p.47).

In other words, assuming Marx's use of 'abilities' here has some conceptual relationship with his use of 'natural character', Marx is arguing for the adoption of conditions in the process of production that are more amenable to each individual "natural character" becoming realized. Moreover, creating such conditions would also allow for increased opportunities for more and more selves becoming realized as the "ensemble of social relations" changes to accommodate this new "creative manifestation of life".
These latter points are all further examples of how we can understand the range of McCallum's variable 'z' within the context of Marx's writings. Instead of humans being "forced into exclusive activities from which they cannot escape" (another aspect to the range of variable 'x') they should, instead, be labouring under the conditions described.

The idea that production for use also includes production for all and as a means to develop "all abilities in the creative manifestation of life" helps introduce and understand the final aspect of alienation. If labour is alienating, then it can also deny the inherent relationship each human being has with each other. Such labour can deny human species-beingness and not having this sense of species-beingness is one of the conditions of human unfreedom. In order for humans to experience freedom they must also possess species-beingness. Thus, applying McCallum's triadic schema to Marx's claims regarding species-being alienation will help in understanding alienation in general and also complete the chapter.

**Species-Being Alienation.**

We have seen that production for exchange-value is one of the contributing factors to conceiving of others as
things, seeing them as a means to ends. To conceive of others in this way is alienating to all concerned for it denies one crucial aspect of human nature. It denies the species-beingness that Marx believes all humans are capable of possessing.

McCallum's variable 'z' directs our attention to the importance of human beings having this species-beingness. And living and working conditions that act as constraints, restrictions, etc. to this serve as additional components that explain the range of variable 'y'. These conditions must be eliminated if alienation is to end. Alternatives that promote and foster species-beingness must replace them if no alienation and ultimately, freedom, is the aim.

The final aspect of alienation to be addressed then is 'species-beingness' itself: What is it, what prevents it, and how it can be achieved?

It should come as no surprise that like both the choice of what to produce and how to produce, the awareness of our species-beingness must also arise "naturally" and not be the result of historical and economic conditions:

[T]o be aware of my species-beingness is an awareness of myself as a social individual determined by my immediate natural character as opposed to being a social individual determined by society and my will as an outcome of this (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 29, p.465).
Faced with the same difficulties of having to choose what and how to produce independent of existential circumstances, Marx also argues that this awareness of our species-beingness must also arise "naturally". It must come about as a result of understanding human nature itself, through realizing that all humans are social beings "by nature".

Believing that I have come to recognize my species-beingness "willingly" while it is particular social and economic circumstances that have led me to believe this is something that must be avoided. For instance, President Clinton's offer of college funds in exchange for my community service should have no bearing on my motivation to work for others in this fashion. This kind of incentive and any others similar to it is not what Marx desires. Marx wants the willingness to be involved in community service to be derived from a recognition of one's species-beingness. A recognition that in helping others one is helping the species in total, including oneself.

Waldman (Newsweek, September 20, 1993) is critical of President Clinton's plan for an even stronger reason--it "...pitch[es] the reward--college benefits--more than sacrifice" (p.49). For him, a National Service plan like Clinton's may indeed attract "middle-class and rich kids"
(ibid) but there is a strong possibility that the parents of these young people and the students themselves may only be willing to be involved because they have a financial investment (ibid).

For Marx, however, a young person's desire to participate in something like Clinton's National Service should derive from his or her own recognition of human nature itself and why one should act in accord with this recognition. Not because it provides some of the resources required for college.

Recalling Marx's claims about human nature, the reasoning behind this belief he has in species-beingness lies in the important distinctions he sees between humans and animals. Only humans are capable of conceiving of themselves as a species (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.76) and only humans are capable of being conscious of their "life-activity", conscious of their labour (ibid, p.83).

I believe there is an important distinction to be made here between Waldman’s and Marx's positions. To be a species-being is not about making sacrifices. To be a species-being is to do what is best for the human community. In doing what is best for the human community, however, I am also doing what is best for me. If I believe community service is a good vehicle for me to be a species-being, then it is not a sacrifice that I make. It is not that I agree to be involved in community service but would rather not or wished I was doing something else. On the contrary, I willingly participate for the good it does my community and me.
These two factors are of considerable importance to Marx.

The first, species-beingness, is important because it can result in the possibility of producing for the species. In other words, I, as a human being like any other, am not only capable of producing for my own needs and wants but also for the needs and wants of others. The second, being conscious of one's "life-activity", is important because this is a necessary condition of being able to reflect on one's labour and the productive relations and structures inherent to it. To operationalize one's will through labour requires being cognizant about one's actual labour in the first place.

The first factor is particularly important. If it is true that individual human beings have innate dispositions and capacities for certain kinds of labour (a "natural character"), then in order for these to be made evident and even useful, conditions must be present and amenable for them. For instance, if I have a "natural character" comprised of dispositions and capacities that allow me to be skilled in mechanical repairs, then these dispositions and capacities will never become evident or useful unless mechanical kinds of things are available. This being the case, the provision of these mechanical kinds of things would also seem to require human beings, including me, who have dispositions and capacities to conceive of, design
and build these things themselves. Persons with the requisite dispositions and capacities would also be required in the first instance to suggest how some mechanical thing could be used to solve specific problems or whatever reason these mechanical things are conceived for.

These kinds of relationships between people with various dispositions and capacities for whatever kind of material production are not specific to some particular time frame either. As Marx (Marx & Engels, 1978, p. 76) points out, even the original "life-activities" of the human species, the satisfying of "basic needs", would have been achieved through the use of the various dispositions and capacities of each individual within the "community". Some would search and track those animals to be eaten, some would do the actual killing, and others would prepare and cook the spoils of the hunt. In any epoch then it is the "...exchange of both human activity within production itself and of human products, against one another, [that] is equivalent to species-activity" (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 3, p. 216-7).

Ultimately, what this relationship between individuals and their "natural characters" implies for overall material production is this: The best way for human beings to have any chance of producing as a result
of their natural character, of realizing their selves in the objectification of their labour, is when they produce communally. Human nature is expressed and allowed to flourish when the desire to live and work together is motivated by some sense of "community".  

Only production that is socialistically rather than individualistically motivated allows for the realization of human nature as only it provides the means for the cultivation of all individual gifts (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 5, p.78). Production in this sense then has instrumental consequences for it can extend the possible range and quantity of what can be produced and also increase the opportunity and possibility for the "natural

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41 Communities come in many forms of course. Examples could include ones based on religion, interests or ethnicity. It would be no small undertaking to establish how Marx used 'community'. Schmitt provides an introductory definition: "By 'community' [Marx & Engels] meant a society in which the sorts of decisions that can only be made effectively by everyone are, indeed, made in genuinely democratic ways" (1987, p.202). Communities under communism would differ from ones under capitalism because people would be able to "...think about how to shape society...and accomplish this end with confidence" due to the "...enormous increase in productivity" (ibid, p.201) that capitalism provides. Thus, communities, after capitalism, will make and shape those social institutions that under capitalism were the unplanned outcomes of the pursuit of separate individual interests and the anarchy of the marketplace (ibid).
character" of each member of the community having their selves realized.

This interpretation should be familiar as it returns us to Marx's comments about human nature and how some aspects are "fixed" and some "relative". It brings to mind again Marx's claims that "...there is a human nature in general and a human nature modified in every epoch..." (in Kamenka, 1962, p.131). That "...all history is the continuous transformation of human nature.." (ibid, p.123) and "[t]he nature of individuals thus depends upon their material conditions concerning their production" (Marx, 1965, p.32).

These comments and the role of producing in community suggest the idea of a continuing dialectic between human nature and material conditions of production. In the creation of ways and new ways of transforming the material world, which is actually the manifestation of the forces of human nature, there is always a possible enrichment of human nature itself (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.93).

Yet even if individuals within some community find it increasingly easier for their various "natural characters" to become evident in productive activities, this is not enough for the recognition of species-beingness.

Individual labour resulting from the actualization of some natural character could lead to products that have no
social character (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 29, p.470). It could lead an individual to produce for his or her own immediate and/or physical need and not to produce for all (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.76). Thus, negating species-being alienation also requires that each individual not produce as a private individual but that each produce as a social individual.

Once again, McCallum's triadic schema has helped identify the specifics of what it is that Marx finds objectionable about productive relations and conditions under capitalism and what he considers are better alternatives. Human beings should labour in a way that is expressive of their species-beingness. They should produce with the human race and its needs in mind. Those conditions that are conducive to human beings producing as isolated individuals, brought together with others only by the vagaries of the marketplace, must end.

Ben Hamper in *Rivethead* (1991) provides a contemporary example of the direction labour must take in order to be less alienating and more amenable to the expression of human freedom. Though Hamper is far from being free on Marx's terms, his realization that he is riveting together a General Motors Suburban for Louise Mandrell gives a flavour of what Marx has in mind. The flavour is there because in the first instance, he claims
it is in his genes ("natural character") that he rivet rather than fit tailgates. Secondly, he sees some faint connection between his labour and the people he produces for (species-beingness). In other words, Ben Hamper, being aware he is the riveter of Louise Mandrell's Suburban, is less alienated than Ben Hamper the tailgate fitter of the thousands of John or Susan Doe's plain old auto he has assembled up till then.

Education has an important role to play in the promotion of species-beingness.\footnote{This is the aim of the next chapter and I introduce several more examples there.} For instance, though multicultural education may aim at nothing more than student awareness of Hanukkah and tasting "foreign foods" in many schools, it still holds the promise of much more than this. Adopting a multicultural focus on many issues can help students recognize that all humans have this common nature that Marx believes in. It can also help students become more tolerant by reflecting on whether those they usually consider as "weird" are perhaps better described as "different".\footnote{It is important to point out here that I am not suggesting that 'different' is the same as 'acceptable'. There seems to be an increasing tendency to equate "multicultural education" with "accepting differences" and (Footnote Continued)} Multicultural education can
also help the students learn that what they claim to be "weird" is perhaps more a case of "different" based on material and productive conditions that are often beyond the control of the individuals their scorn or whatever is directed towards. In the end, multicultural education may help students realize that they have more in common with these "weird" "others" than not. 44

(Footnote Continued)

this is definitely not my argument. The briefest reflection on the immense range of human actions and practices should make it clear to anyone that all "differences" cannot be allowed or are equally "acceptable". Better judgements though of which differences are acceptable and which not can be made by encouraging students to commence an attempt at understanding others with "different" rather than "weird". 'Weird' logically implies a negative judgement and when students claim that some action or practice they observe or learn of is "weird" the judgement has already been made. Encouraging them to start out with "different" gets students to look more closely at the claimed "weirdness" of others. Done well, it can also get them to question the standards they use to judge others "weird" by, and hopefully, to also engage then in some self-criticism.

44 A person from China once asked me did I know that most Westerners had a distinctive smell—they stank of meat. Whether this is right or not is irrelevant. Asian-Indians living in England were frequently mocked and jeered for always smelling of curry (so it was claimed) and those who did not include animal meat in their diet, like some Chinese, were called 'odd' and much worse ('weird' is more American idiom than English). Unaware that I had a distinctive aroma relative to the perceptions of others and that I also had certain dietary patterns motivated me to believe that my standard was the one to judge everyone else by. Some introduction and awareness of the culture's of others; including eating habits and how these habits are underpinned by economic, cultural,
As a measure of how far any particular society has progressed towards the full development of this species-beingness, Marx offers a very fundamental and difficult paradigm case. He suggests a very specific relationship between a man and woman as the exemplar of human relations under conditions of species-beingness.

The model to strive for is one where a man and woman love each other and decide to have a child together as an expression of that love. This relationship is one of a "...direct, natural and necessary relation of person to person" (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.83).

This particular kind of relationship turns out to be the paradigm case for several reasons: One, to decide to act together out of love for each other in this fashion is to act in accord with one aspect of human nature--humans need to procreate. Two, both man and woman are providing for each other's needs as a result of their love for each other. Three, to decide to have a child itself reveals the human relation with nature--human beings must at least manipulate their own physiological and biological structure in order to procreate.

(Footnote Continued) religious and geographic circumstances may have helped me accept Asian-Indians and Chinese as people, just like me. I would not have used Marx's words but the sentiment would have been the same.
Importantly though, the procreative act itself has to also be the result of "sex love" and not "erotic love". Procreation must derive from reciprocal love between the two and arise out of mutual love for one another (ibid., pp. 735-750) if species-beingness is to be the basis of the relationship.

This is an extremely difficult paradigm case for many reasons. One being that, it is hard to conceive how individuals and the whole human race could live and work in a manner consistent with the example. At a local level it may be possible that small numbers of individuals could labour and produce out of love for one another in a way that derives from will or natural character. In such situations these persons could also produce to satisfy the needs of all including any beyond the immediate and physical and in a way that maintains their inherent relationship between each other and the natural world. The problem though is that Marx mandates these same conditions for humankind as a whole. Another aspect to the range of McCallum's variable 'z' then is that all should labour in a way that reflects their reciprocal love for each other.

Another reason is that the paradigm case is an analogy. A man and woman loving each other and deciding to have a child as an "expression" of this love is only
possible for men and women. 'Love' is also a very ambiguous concept and the love between a man and woman under these conditions is different than the love between good friends (same sex or not), between parents and children and between siblings. This love of a human kind is also very different from loving certain kinds of food and music.

The kind of love Marx requires between everyone has been introduced in various parts and in numerous ways throughout this chapter. It is to be found in the notion of 'species-beingness' itself. Arguing whether it is possible for every single human being to feel this way about everyone, for all to possess this species-beingness would be an undertaking of mammoth proportions. Furthermore, even if one chooses to assume that this is possible, that universal species-beingness is realizable or just approachable, one has to contend with the feeling and criticism of being idealistic, naive, or foolish.

45 Trying to establish how Marx would react to developments in artificial insemination and invitro-fertilization, how he would respond to the recent rise in single females and gay and lesbian couples deciding to "have" children would be an excellent departure point in applying Marx's philosophy to late twentieth century productive conditions.
My own position is an idealistic one. In response to any suggestions that it is a naive or foolish position I concur with West: "[I]’m a thoroughgoing universalist. But like Sly, like Arrested Development\textsuperscript{46}, it’s got to be grounded in whence I come, even though it is critical of elements of my tradition" (1993, p.68).

Ultimately, I believe, it is not impossible for all\textsuperscript{47} human beings to conceive of others in the terms Marx demands. How to get there requires starting out from the local, the particular. It must commence with the

\textsuperscript{46} Here, Cornell West is referring to two prominent musical artists/groups—'Sly' of 'Sly and the Family Stone', most popular in the late 60’s and 70’s and 'Arrested Development', a popular band today. Both, in their music, express strong beliefs in the "Brotherhood of Man" (their words) but not a "brotherhood" where everyone is highly assimilated and West’s fears that he becomes universalist in the form of "whiteface as a black person" (1993, p.68) are confirmed.

\textsuperscript{47} It may be argued that surely it is possible for some human beings to have "natural characters" that included not having this species-beingness. If so, then Marx’s claims about "human nature" are suspect too. Why? Because a contradiction arises in claiming that "by nature", we all have a "natural character" and we all have this species-beingness yet also some have "natural characters" that include not having this species-beingness. My response, and in support of Marx, is similar to the earlier distinction I made between "being free" and "acting freely" (pp.114-118). All humans do possess this species-beingness but specific and particular material conditions and relations prevent them from realizing and acting on it.
circumstances of actual individuals in specific material contexts.

The role education can and should play in this journey from the local to the ideal is the aim of the next chapter. There I take a "medium-range, problem solving" approach (C. Beck, in Pratte, 1992, p.xii) and add some flesh to the notion of 'species-beingness', focusing on some specific examples of how it can be achieved.

Summary.

In this chapter my aim was to utilize McCallum's triadic schema in order to determine how Marx used 'freedom'. Like McCallum, I argued that the application of this schema to some of Marx's writings would reveal the many beliefs and assumptions Marx held that were of central importance to his philosophy in total. Put differently, I utilized McCallum's triadic schema to try and demonstrate how Marx's intrapersonal context underpinned his use of 'freedom'.

The overall picture gleaned from the application of McCallum's schema and some general research of Marx's writings was that Marx holds an ethic of labour. What it is that is fair, just and good for human beings and the human race is to be found in particular and specific ways that productive labour is chosen, performed, organized and
controlled. This view is supported in Marx's criticism of Adam Smith's views on labour and its relation to freedom. In contrast to Smith, Marx saw freedom not as freedom from labour but freedom that is inextricably bound up with labour. Labour, in fact, is a need of human beings and labour itself holds the means for the manifestation of freedom (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 28, p.530). Thus, freedom is to be found in labour and not outside of labour for it is in labour that we find the avenue for freedom, a freedom in being and not some abstract individual freedom that, in the end, is a freedom from being (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 1, p.62).

The extent and range of the three variables of McCallum's schema also revealed that not any kind of labour will do. It is the actual conditions of labour, the conditions inherent to what, how and why something is produced that will determine whether humans are free or not. These conditions included that there has to be a voluntary choice in deciding what to produce, how and why something is produced, who finally ends up "possessing" the products of labour and why.

The extent of the variables also included that the end of the will in labour is to produce in a way that has some connection with one's natural character. This entails the very problematic notion of such an end deriving from
conditions independent of those historical conditions each one already finds themselves to be a part of. A problematic notion, but one firmly believed by Marx nonetheless.

The reasoning behind these claims was that the activities germane to one's labour can become the means for the expression of one's natural character, an avenue for self-realization. What this means is that each human being shares a common nature with others; there is a human nature, but each individual also has a "natural character", specific to each one, that must be expressed through their labour if they are to be free. How this expression is actualized differs dependent on material conditions and productive relations. Hence, not being able to labour in a manner that is expressive of both one's will and one's "natural character" become two of the necessary conditions of human unfreedom.

Labour, as the outcome of voluntary choice and the expression of one's natural character, however is not sufficient for humans to be free, for as such, the labour has no social character. The idea that the relationship between labour and freedom is simply the "...clash of unfettered individuals actuated only by self-interest...in the sphere of production and exchange is far removed from the truth" (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 29, p.37). Human
freedom is only possible within the community (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 5, p.78) and this requires individuals recognizing and acting on the essential bond they have with each other. To be free then is to live and labour in a manner that expresses one's love for others, one's love for the human race in total.  

In McCallum's terms then, and put generally, freedom requires that the labour human beings perform must not entail conditions that are alienating. Alienating labour, signified by variable 'y', is the "preventing condition", the "constraint", "restriction", "interference", "barrier" that must be eliminated. In its place (that signified by variable 'z'), labour must entail conditions that allow all to live and labour in a manner that is in accord with human nature, in both its universal and individualistic sense. Human beings can become free when there is no alienation but it is only when they are able to live and

48 In the next chapter I address the vagueness of such a claim. There I deal with the obvious physical impossibility of loving everyone and suggest that the best interpretation is more a case of being disposed to love those one comes into contact with. I argue that Marx's ideal makes better sense if understood in these terms and is also consistent with many of his other beliefs; we can only love individual, "real" people, not humankind in general or the abstract.
labour in a way that epitomizes their human nature will they be free.
'Justice', 'humanity', 'freedom', etc., may demand this or that a thousand over, but if the thing is impossible it does not take place and in spite of everything remains an "empty figment of a dream" (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 8, p.365).

The school...should contribute through the type of intellectual and emotional disposition which it forms to the improvement of [prior social] conditions (Dewey, 1966, p.136).

In a word then, like activities produce like dispositions...So it is a matter of no little importance what sort of habits we form from the earliest age--it makes a vast difference, or rather all the difference in the world (Aristotle, 1984, p.92).

**Introduction**

Given the analysis of Marx's use of 'freedom' presented in the last chapter, it would seem that changes of immense proportions in advanced, capitalist-based societies are necessary if human beings are to be free on his terms. This chapter deals with how education can contribute to these changes in small, but significant ways.
Much can be argued about which aspects of Marxian freedom are ideal but possible or approachable, and which are ideal and unrealizable. For many, Marxian freedom and what it implies would be wide open to his own criticism that introduces this chapter: Marxian freedom demands a great many things that are impossible and thus, his demands remain an empty figment of his dreams.

For teachers in advanced, capitalist based societies in the late twentieth century, such pessimism is further compounded when contemporary Marxists claim that in order to make any desired changes in education, changes in production relations must occur first (Geuttel, 1974, p.23). Individual teachers may find it very difficult to be motivated to attempt any kind of change when they are faced with the psychologically debilitating paradox that "Nothing [in education] can be done until the basic structures of society are changed but the structures prevent us making any changes" (Willis, 1977, p.186).

To reduce such pessimism and also contribute to the substantive changes necessary for the actualization of Marxian freedom, I intend to argue that: 1) Helping students to be species-beings is an aspect to Marxian freedom that teachers can confidently handle and incorporate in their relationships with students,
2) one way to achieve this is by teachers encouraging students to develop an empathic disposition.

Both these claims will be explained and justified by the utilization of McCallum’s triadic schema. Hence, I begin by briefly addressing McCallum’s variable 'x' (the human agent) and how it relates to what is generally meant by 'student'. Next, I move to McCallum's variable 'z'. There, I reexamine Marx’s notion of 'species-being' and try to make some distinctions between 'species-being' in its idealistic and practical sense. I then argue that teachers encouraging students to be empathically disposed is one realistic strategy they can adopt to help students become species-beings. The argument itself includes a brief conceptual analysis of 'empathy', some attention to empathy as a disposition, and numerous examples and suggestions for how teachers can encourage students to have this disposition.

To complete the chapter I focus on McCallum's variable 'y'. It will be recalled that this variable is meant to signify any "preventing conditions" to the achievement of what it is that variable 'z' represents. Thus, I conclude the work of this chapter by highlighting some of the "preventing conditions" that can thwart attempts by teachers helping students become
species-beings by way of encouraging them to be empathically disposed.

In short, the central theme of this chapter will be that encouraging students to be empathically disposed is one vehicle that teachers can use to achieve Marx and Dewey's aims of "changing the world" and "improving prior social conditions".

A. McCallum's Variable 'x': The Human Agent as Student.

Little will be argued here about the relationship between 'human agent' and 'student'. What is generally meant by 'student' provides few or no problems with regard to the complex and historically difficult issue of determining what it is that makes some entity a 'human being', 'human agent' or 'person'. In fact, the concept 'student' embodies all or most of the criteria that have been argued as required for personhood and/or human agency. Chambers (1983) provides some idea of these

49 I am not suggesting that these terms are synonymous. Many do use 'human being' in the same way others use 'person' (and often also implying some sense of "agency"). There are also obvious distinctions that can made between the three terms too. 'Human agency', for instance, may require human beings who at least have a will, yet there are examples of some human beings ('human being' in the basic biological and physiological sense) who may be difficult to include in this conception, e.g., fetuses, comatose individuals.
criteria when he suggests that 'person' often includes concomitant notions like, "...mind, rationality, cognitive perspective, creativity [and] self-conscious awareness..." (p.117). Hence, when someone uses the word 'student' it is most difficult to also bring to mind these same criteria.

Marx's views on human nature also coincide with commonly held views we have of students. Much of what we want students to learn requires their being able to make independent judgements, for instance. Moreover, teachers are often delighted when they find that some students in their care have "natural talents" for the subjects they teach. Parents too are well aware of the feasibility of claiming that human beings have "natural characters". It is not uncommon to hear parents tell friends how their children have been predisposed to act or behave in certain ways since birth. Eager fathers are often enraptured to find that their sons are "natural" athletes, even footballers. Other parents have often felt that their offspring were "born to dance".

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50 Michael Jackson, who some would say was such a person, was recently accused of child abuse. In his defense, Frank Dileo, his former manager, stated that "There is no way that he did that. It's not in his nature" (Rolling Stone, 1993, October 14, p.21).
The idea of human beings possessing a "natural character" is not limited to children. Some adults are overjoyed after years of paid labour and parenting to find that they have skills and capabilities previously hidden or unaware of. Commonly, these adults are to be found in universities, community colleges or adult education settings rapidly learning about photography, beer-making, world religions or political science.

In the confines of this project then, I wholeheartedly concur with many of Marx's assumptions about the human agent and about human nature. It would be absurd to use 'students' and also not assume that one is not also referring to some human being. It would also be incomprehensible to understand some use of 'student' without also not referring to human beings who are at least capable of learning.

51 This is not just a matter of semantics. The meaning of 'student' could be best explained by a long and complicated story about how individual humans actually develop. Thus, it could be argued that the claim "Students are capable of learning" is not "empirically empty" and tautologous but that the word 'student' itself is only applicable to those human beings that have shown or demonstrated they are capable of learning. The claim, "Students are capable of learning", would have an empirical and not just linguistic or "analytical" basis to it.
However, dealing with how and why students learn are difficult substantive issues that practicing teachers face daily. Yet many of them, I believe, would echo Marx's beliefs about human nature if asked how they intend to address such issues. Teachers would probably respond that what, how and why students learn depend very much on each one's "natural character", their willingness to learn and the social, cultural and economic circumstances that impinge on these.

B. McCallum's Variable 'z': Helping Students Become Species-Beings.

The range of McCallum's variable 'z' signifies what users of 'freedom' believe that human beings ought be free to be or do. What it meant for Marx for human beings to be free was addressed in the last chapter. Here, I will continue to use McCallum's variable to hone in on one particular aspect of Marxian freedom.

In this section I will focus on Marx's belief that freedom requires each human becoming a species-being. Hence, I commence by reiterating what it is to be a species-being and then move on to examine 1) 'Species being' in idealistic terms, and then 2) 'species-being' in what I believe to be more practical terms. Finally, I will argue that one practical vehicle that teachers could use
to help students become species-beings is to encourage them to have an empathic disposition.

'Species-being' reiterated.

The central educational problem of this project is this: How to help students to become species-beings.

Species-beingness is important to Marx and fundamental to his views on human freedom because:

Man is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those of others things) as his object, but—and this is only another way of expressing it—also because he treats himself as a universal and therefore free being (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.75).

In order for teachers to help students become species-beings, much will depend on each student's perceptions of other human beings and their relationships with or to them. How students react to those who are different in significant ways from them and how they perceive and relate to others will be of tremendous importance for whether they are going to become species-beings or not. Perhaps the most difficult task

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52 Young people are often very curious about those who appear different to them. This is not the problem. It is how the difference is perceived that is. For example, to a child a particular person may appear much larger than average but there are fundamental differences between calling that person 'fat' and calling them 'overweight', (Footnote Continued)
for teachers then is this: Teachers will have to get each student to recognize that the:

...need on the part of one can be satisfied by the product of the other, and vice-versa, and that one is capable of producing the object of the other's need proves that each of them reaches beyond his own particular need etc., as a human being, and that they relate to one another as human beings; that all know their species nature to be social. (as translated by Walliman, 1981, p.17).

In practical terms this means at least two things. First, teachers have to try to help students to become aware of or recognize their species-beingness and that species-beingness is founded on the relations between human beings and not the separation of them. Marxian freedom requires that we "...see other men as the realization of one's freedom and not a limitation on it" (ibid, p.42). Second, that the attainment of anyone's freedom is dependent on the work they choose to perform; what they "produce", the manner in which they produce it and why.

The idea that freedom can be found in labour, in human production, is important here. Human production is

(Footnote Continued)
'heavily-muscled', 'thick-set', 'big-boned', etc. How children react when they see such people is probably part instinctive, part learnt. It is the learning part that helping them become species-beings is directed towards.
one area that teachers exercise considerable control because they play a pivotal role in each student's "production". Not too many would disagree that a teacher's prime responsibility is to control and influence what it is that students are to learn. In the educational context then, what students learn can be considered as a "product" of their labour, students are involved in the "mental production of knowledge" (Robenstine, 1987, p.171).

Kamenka (1962) is supportive of this interpretation of "production" and its importance for species-beingness. She suggests that Marx saw his own philosophical criticism as the means to express his own species-beingness (p.54). Marx was aware of the relationship between his own "production" and freedom when he chose a profession that he claimed allowed him to "enoble mankind and himself" (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 1, p.3), even if this meant sacrificing for the benefit of all (ibid, p.8). Hence, it is not the form of the product that is important—human beings are able to produce more than just physical objects. Rather, it is the reasons why one produces one thing rather than another and the reasons why one produces at all. And, of course, this is no less the case for students.

If the aim is for teachers to help students to "produce" so that they contribute to the "enoblement of
mankind", then my argument is simple. This can be achieved by teachers providing educational experiences that promote and encourage students to be species-beings. Teachers must strive to implement learning activities that contribute to each student's species-beingness necessary for their (and everyone's) freedom. 53 One specific means of achieving this aim, I will argue, is that teachers encourage students to develop an empathic disposition. The link between students being empathic and their species-beingness, however, can be stated succinctly here: Encouraging students to get into the habit of empathizing with others can contribute to their recognition of the common nature they share with others. Recognizing the common nature that all human beings share is fundamental to Marx's notion of species-being itself. Encouraging students to have this empathic disposition is suggested as a starting point for them recognizing this and also acting on that recognition.

53 I do not address that species-beingness is possible in the relationships between students and all other adults within school settings. Neither do I address how this is also possible between individual students in one school or classroom. I certainly believe these to be the case, even necessary to Marx's aim, and much of what I argue for can be extended beyond the teacher-student relationship.
Before expanding on and providing suggestions for how teachers can encourage students to be empathically disposed, I will first address the idealistic nature of Marx's notion of human beings as species-beings. This is necessary since much of what Marx claims about species-beingness appears to be out of the reach of practicing teachers working in classrooms in advanced, capitalist-based societies. After addressing the idealistic nature of 'species-being' I move on to suggest what I believe is more practical for such teachers.

'Species-being': The ideal.

We saw towards the end of the last chapter that one way to understand human beings as species-beings is to recognize a certain kind of love one must have for others. Recalling Marx's paradigm case, species-beingness requires a reciprocal love for each other, akin to where "...men and women relate to each other under conditions which are indicative of them being on a par," (Marx & Engels, 54)

54 Considering the importance of this paradigm case it would be interesting to examine Marx's marriage and family life. For instance, what motivated Marx's wife, Jenny Marx, to frequently help the poor and less well off by inviting them into their home and caring for them even when the Marx's themselves were having severe financial difficulties (in Fromm, 1990, p.235)? Did Marx help out or was their relationship "traditional"? Paul Lafargue gives the impression that the Marx's relationship was the epitome of what Marx argues for (ibid.).
1978, p.746). This love-for-others has been a central theme in all kinds of writings concerning the human condition of course, a prime example being the Christian Bible.

Martin Buber, a prominent and more contemporary writer, in "I and Thou" (1970) reflects the same central theme inherent in Marx's position. For Marx, species-beingness is a universal construct; whatever species-beingness requires, it is required of all and is applicable to all. The same is said by Buber about love:

Love ranges in its effect through the whole world. In the eyes of him who takes his stand in love, and gazes out of it, men are cut free from their entanglement in bustling activity. Good people and evil, wise and foolish, beautiful and ugly, become successfully real to him; that is, set free they step forth in their singleness, and confront him as Thou (p.48).

Nel Noddings, in "Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education" (1984), sounds close to Marx when she argues for an ethic of care which includes the idea that "...[o]ne loses both the "human" and the "being" when one is severed from all relation" (ibid., p.174). Again, like Marx, Noddings sees the absence of relation with other people as something antithetical to actually being human.

What these writers suggest then is what seems to many intuitively obvious—the recognition that "...every other
person is part of that giant collection of everybody that we are "connected" to by virtue of being a person" ("Claire", in Gilligan, 1982, p. 57). For Noddings and Gilligan this is founded on an ethic of care, a caring for others, whose nurturance is the responsibility of all (Noddings, 1984, p. 173). For Marx, it is the recognition of one's species-being that provides the foundation of this "connectedness" we have with others.

While there appears to be considerable textual evidence to suggest some strong affiliations between the aforementioned authors and Marx, particularly their shared belief in universal love for others, Marx's idea of species-beingness does not necessarily imply a sense of love or caring. It could be argued, for instance, that achieving species-beingness simply reflects some kind of notion of "identity" or "equality" with others. Thus, teachers could get students to become species-beings by some other means than encouraging them, like Buber and Noddings suggest, to love or care for others.

For example, in the aftermath of the 1992 "L.A. riots" there is a commonly stated view that if people do not work together in the rebuilding of the riot torn areas, then they will all "pay the price" in increased crime and other social problems. This "rebuilding" may require that people work in a way that is expressive of
them all being "in it together" (which could be a more common or popular way of expressing 'species-beingness'). Here though, the willingness to work this way is built on more utilitarian reasons than caring for or loving others. The main impetus behind the commonly stated views has more to do with maintaining community safety and security than promoting freedom. Teachers might even get students to become involved in this "rebuilding" but it will make all the difference in the world why students should.

Some of the reasons why we should act from our species-beingness rather than from some other reasons have already been addressed. They are reasons that derive from Marx's assumptions about human nature itself and the specific ways we can express our "reciprocal love for others". For instance, the willingness to "enoble mankind", if we recall, ought not derive from an egoism of selfish desire, but instead, an egoism of the heart that is expressive of a love for humanity; an egoism to be a human being" (Marx & Engels, 1976, Vol. 38, p.12).

Marx's demands that all labour in a way that expresses a love for humanity was also strongly influenced by the developing material conditions and productive relations of his lifetime. Marx saw something inherently unfair and unjust about productive relations that treated and rewarded variations in the expression of human nature
when much of what it was that people were capable of expressing was beyond their control. The case for this claim can be made by recalling Marx's dual approach to human nature. My interpretation was that while Marx believed there is an aspect to human nature that is the same for all (shared biology, same needs, etc.) he also believed that there is another aspect dependent on historical, social, cultural and economic circumstances—we share a common "nature" but we all have personal and unique idiosyncrasies that become evident or not dependent on the "ensemble of social relations" (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.145) of which we find ourselves a part.

It is basically a matter of luck, a result of the genetic lottery, which capacities, dispositions, etc. each person has. Yet under capitalist conditions some capacities, dispositions, etc., are rewarded more than others. If individuals have little or no control over the particular capacities, dispositions, etc. they possess, then something seems inherently unfair from the onset if what it is they actually have to offer through labour attracts little or no reward. Moreover, being a member of a society that views people predominantly in terms of what they possess in the way of capacities, dispositions, etc., and the societal value of these is a sure fire way to conceive of them as a means rather than ends. This surely
underpins some of the reactions to homeless people—they contribute nothing, therefore they are worth nothing.

For Marx, there had to be an alternative to productive conditions that valued the expression of some "natural characters" but not others, an alternative that would allow all to be considered as ends-in-themselves no matter what "natural character" they possessed. And importantly, conditions that would foster and embody species-beingness in all, thus placing freedom in terms of freedom with others and not freedom from them.

Consequently, it is not just some idea of "equality" or "similarity" that underpins Marx's notion of 'species-beingness'. Rather, it is Marx's beliefs in human nature and the concomitant possibility of reciprocal love for all. The material conditions and productive relations that were becoming evident under the burgeoning growth of capitalism were an obvious influence on these beliefs.

55 One student I was working with decided to try and empathize with a homeless person. She dressed like one and met a homeless man who allowed her to spend the day begging with him. She was horrified when two adult males tried to make them "perform" for money. The men in question threw a quarter each into the air and shouted: "Fetch!". The experience led the student to comment that she had never known what is was like to be seen as "...less than human, but now she knew". As a result she felt obliged "...to see homeless people in a different light".
These same conditions and relations, however, also contributed to Marx believing that they should be rejected. Hence, Marx is arguing for certain conditions under which human beings should live and labour while supporting this argument with specific beliefs about human nature and ones indicative of his concern for the human species in general. It is these beliefs and this concern that put Marx on much the same footing as Buber, Noddings, and Gilligan.

Additionally, like Aristotle, Marx believed that ethical deliberations about human affairs, any suggested alternatives to objectionable conditions, must commence with "...men in the here and now" (1984, p.57). 
"[T]ransforming the world requires transforming with other men" (ibid., p.66). My suggestions for how to "transform the world" are claimed to "commence" with the "here and now" too. Thus, I now turn from the idealistic sense of 'species-being' to what I believe it would mean and require of teachers and students in their real and everyday affairs.

'Species-being': The practical.

Noddings claims that universal love is an illusion (1984, p. 90) and that "[w]e cannot love everyone. We cannot even care for everyone..." (ibid., p.112). These
are strong claims and quite understandable if Noddings is referring to actually loving and caring for everyone.

Marx, on the other hand (as I have argued already), consistently believes that universal species-beingness is possible and required if humans are to be free. What also is required here is an analysis of how both these—the actuality and the universalness—are possible.

One suggestion, provided by Hostetler (1992, p. 316-322) is that a "..."we-consciousness" is strongest when those with whom solidarity is expressed are thought as "one-of-us". Marx's notion of humans as species-beings is founded on the idea that the 'we' in "we-consciousness" is everyone, that each human being conceive of every human being as "one-of-us". To be able to think in "one-of-us" terms in any sense, however, requires at least two conditions: 1) Each individual must be somehow cognizant of the characteristic, interest or other criterion that is common to some or all people that identifies them as "one-of-us", and 2) that whatever this criterion is, it is considered significant and important enough to allow for the 'us' in "one-of-us". 56 Hence, "one-of-us", like

56 In classrooms, students share at least one common characteristic—they are there to learn. Whether each student considers this an important and significant enough
'we-consciousness', not only signifies "community" but also, each and every individual human being that any community is comprised of.

Central to being a species-being is the idea that the human race is the community that one belongs to. Every individual human being is "one-of-us" and the human race is the "we" that we ought be conscious of. The criterion that binds us together in this case is human nature itself—we all have a "natural character", a will and the same needs. We all are capable of conceiving of ourselves as species beings and providing for the human race as a result of our productive capacities that allow us to transform material conditions.

What teachers should do then to help students become species-beings is encourage them to view the people they come into contact with throughout their school experiences

(Footnote Continued)

factor to consider other students in "one-of-us" terms is a different matter entirely. On the other hand, there are communities where individuals within them may have difficulty in identifying and deciding what it is that does tie them together. They may profess to "having a sense of community" but be unable to specify what makes them a community. This phenomena also points out the complexity of 'community' itself. Communities are not necessarily fixed nor homogenous. The border of any community may be fluid or in flux, as may be the borders of communities within communities. However, individual human beings have a fair idea of whether they are in some community or not. And so are individual human beings often aware when someone is a member of their community.
in "one-of-us" terms. Learning experiences must be implemented so that those who students are more inclined to view as "one-of-them" become, instead, "one-of-us". Teachers would be helping students to enlarge any sense of "we-consciousness" that they already possessed by encouraging them to include more and more of those they would be willing to conceive of as "one-of-us".

Teachers can encourage this "we-consciousness" among students by requiring them to become involved in community service. Popular press journalists like William Rasberry have argued that such involvement would foster a sense of social responsibility and community that he feels students presently lack (1991, p.15). His argument includes suggestions like students identifying a social problem that interests them, developing a plan for their personal involvement, helping solve the problem, and reflecting on their experiences. These kinds of activities would be designed to give young people a "...better sense of other people..." (La Placa, ibid).

Young people possessing a "better sense of other people" is central to "we-consciousness". It is only through getting to know more about other people and trying to experience what they feel that students will begin to recognize the human nature that Marx believes we all share. It is experiences designed to give young people a
"better sense of other people"; how others experience the world and how they feel about and interpret these experiences, that are necessary for establishing a "we-consciousness" with other people, for developing a personal sense of species-beingness.57

Pratte (1992) argues that community service is an appropriate strategy for cultivating a student's disposition to be reasonable and caring (p.123). In the last section I argued for the similarities between Marx and Noddings in regard to a shared concern both had for the human race. Noddings' approach was to argue from an ethic of care, Marx's from his idea that each human being is a species-being. If Pratte is correct in claiming that community service can cultivate a student's disposition to be reasonable and caring, and I believe he is, then it

57 Strong families are perhaps good examples of how this works. Each member has a very rich and complex sense of the individuals within the family. This sense of each individual that comprise strong families allows the family itself to operate as a "unit" or micro-community. Individual needs and interests are considered and negotiated so that very often, the family's needs and interests coincide with individual ones and vice-versa. When these do not coincide the process of determining which ones are to be acted on and which ones not is also often the result of a "family decision": "This time we'll eat out where Grant (my son) wants, next time where Laura (my daughter) does--is everyone happy with that?" is a conversation that often occurs in our house and an example to the point.
follows that community service can also help students become species-beings.

As stated earlier, however, for community service to be one means of helping students become species-beings, teachers will have to encourage them to be involved for reasons that are inherent to being a species-being itself. Students would have to be encouraged to perform community service because it would be one means of "producing" for the community, the human community. They would also be encouraged because it would be one means of demonstrating that those needs that are common to being human are capable of being met by others, in this case, by the students themselves. Moreover, students helping others through community service would also serve to help them realize how much in common they have with those they perhaps consider as "one-of-them".

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58 Schoolchildren are often asked to be involved in some fund-raising activity that teachers arrange. In my own experience as a parent, one such activity has been for students to collect and donate cans of food for some charity. It is interesting to observe the differences in reaction from some children, including my own, on those occasions when their involvement in activities like these gets them material rewards (candy, toys, etc.) and on those occasions when it does not. This seems a vivid example of the differences in reasons that can move students to act on behalf of others.
For instance, in encouraging students to perform some volunteer work in homeless shelters, students can learn that they are capable of "producing" for the needs of others—it will take some of their time, energy and skills to help feed and care for the homeless people they choose to work with. Furthermore, through experiencing more graphically what it would be like to be homeless—talking with, listening to, and help feed homeless people, etc. is more "graphic" than just seeing them on the street—each student would get a better feeling for the plight of the homeless. Trying to experience how homeless people feel may give students cause to reflect on the basic humanity they share with them rather than focusing on those factors which often make homeless people appear to the students as "one-of-them" rather than "one-of-us".

My suggestion for teachers helping students become species-beings is that teachers should encourage them to have an empathic disposition. I argue for this claim by first addressing the concept 'empathy' itself, then explaining what it would mean and require for teachers to encourage students to be empathically disposed. Several examples are also provided to give some idea of what teachers and students could do to practice the disposition.
Encouraging students to be empathically disposed.

Empathy as a concept.

Pratte (1992) claims that there are three forms of empathy. He also claims that empathy is a feeling and "...is not an exact match of another's feelings" (p. 153). One form of empathy, he suggests, is empathic distress; an emotional response to another's distress that is sympathetic. Another is empathic anger; a mixture of sympathetic distress for the other accompanied by a feeling of anger toward any culprit(s). And finally, there is empathic injustice; a feeling beyond sympathetic distress and anger to one where we recognize that others may be benefiting from an unjust situation (ibid).

Others have somewhat different views on what 'empathy' means. Stein (1970), for instance, argues that 'empathy' means a particular way of considering others. When we empathize with others we engage in a "...kind of act of perceiving...[an] experiencing of foreign consciousness in general" (p. 11). Goldstein & Michaels (1985) argue that being empathic is a case of "feeling together with another", (p. 7) defending their claims in part based on 'einfühlung', the etymological origin of 'empathy', best translated as "feeling oneself into" (ibid., p. 4).
Initially and intuitively, all these views resonate with the use of 'empathy' as expressed in ordinary language terms—"to put oneself in another's place" or "to be in someone else's shoes". However, within the literature on 'empathy' there is also a significant rift between two general positions. A rift hinging on how much of oneself is "felt into the other" when one claims to be empathic.

One position is that 'empathy' means requiring some kind of suspension of one's own personal situation and circumstances and a "transference" of oneself into the life and experiences of another. Hartman (1984), for instance, argues that 'empathy' requires a kind of "fusion" between empathizer and empathizee, even if it just a temporary one (p.223). Buber (1965) is in support here by suggesting that:

Empathy is to glide with one's own feeling into the dynamic structure of an object (including man), and as it were, to trace it from within, understanding the formation and motorality of the object with the perception of one's own muscles; it means to transpose oneself over there and in there (p.97).

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59 A reporter interviewing Mike Tyson within the prison in which he is incarcerated said she "knew where Tyson was coming from" and could well understand what it would feel like to be in his situation. Tyson retorted that there was no way she could feel what it was like to (Footnote Continued)
Stein, on the other hand, comments that "...empathy, strictly speaking, is not a feeling of oneness" (1970, p.17). For her, empathy does not require "complete" fusion ("oneness") and neither does it mean denying "one's own concreteness". The problem with 'empathy' as a "feeling of oneness" is that it suggests a loss of what was originally two unique individuals. 'Empathy' in terms of "oneness" or "fusion" can lead to a denial of the real and existing circumstances that persons find themselves in when actually relating to each other. Marx would be supportive Stein's criticism if 'empathy' is to be understood in these terms.

On the other hand, if being empathic requires a distinct sense of separateness, then there is always the risk that we do not get close enough to be able to recognize what kind of shoes others are wearing, never mind attempting to try them on. If this is the case, then we may fail to empathize and instead, sympathize with them. We may end up "feeling for" rather than

(Footnote Continued)
be in jail--she had to be in jail in order to do that. (Dateline, N.B.C., April 23, 1993). Tyson's response is a good example of 'empathy' couched in terms that require this denial of "one's own concreteness". Tyson is suggesting that being empathic is very much dependent on how much we "become" the "other".
"feeling with" the other (Goldstein & Michaels, 1985, p.7).

This distinction that Goldstein & Michaels suggest adds further to the conceptual confusion when compared with Boyea's (1991) analysis. She argues that caring is different from empathy and it is caring that is associated with "feeling with the other", not empathy. She claims that it is 'empathy' that is associated with a "feeling for the other" (p.341).

The vagueness and conceptual uncertainty does not end here. Noddings (1984) offers a criterion for caring that is almost identical to the various conceptions of 'empathy' mentioned earlier that require some sense of a denial of one's own "concreteness":

When my caring is directed to living things...I try to apprehend the reality of the other. This is the fundamental aspect of caring from the inside...displacement of my own reality to the reality of the other (p.14)...it is characterized by a move away from the self (p.16) [and] involves stepping out of ones own personal frame of reference into the other's (p.24).

What we can conclude from these various (and confusing) claims then is that empathy is a feeling. It is not clear though whether empathy is a "feeling with the other" or a "feeling for the other". Goldstein and Michael claim it is the former while believing the latter is indicative of 'sympathy'. Boyea, however,
believes that it is caring that requires "feeling with the other", not empathy. 'Empathy', for her, is a "feeling for the other" (Goldstein & Michael's 'sympathy'). On the other hand, Noddings believes that it is caring that requires the "displacement of one's reality" that others have argued as being necessary for empathic relationships.

Fortunately, there is a fundamental and common thread to be found in these various claims. It is a thread that weaves its way through the confusion and vagueness and one that signifies a shared concern each writer has for individual human beings and the human race. It is a shared concern built on a sense of basic connectedness and "we-consciousness" with others I believe best represented by "feeling with others" rather than "feeling for others". To "feel with" someone implies a sense of "weness" and "togetherness" not necessarily reflected in "feeling for" someone.

The differences between the aforementioned writers lies in the extent and scope that each believes the connectedness and "weness" is, in how much one has to be "feeling with the other" in order to be empathic. Regardless of whether this concern and willingness to "feel with other" derives from 'species-beingness', 'love', or 'caring'; fundamentally, each is moved by the same concerns. It remains to suggest how this shared
concern and "feeling with others" can be translated into possible and achievable educational experiences for students.

**Empathy as a disposition.**

My argument is that encouraging students to have an empathic disposition is one practical vehicle that teachers can adopt to help students become species-beings. Teachers implementing activities designed to encourage students to feel and understand how others experience life is one way to help students act on this fundamental concern for others that Marx, Buber and Noddings share and express.

In addressing the concept 'empathy' I have concluded that it is a feeling, though the research has revealed that there is considerable disagreement over what kind of feeling and the extent of the "connectedness" or "we-consciousness" with others required. There is agreement, however, I have argued, over where this feeling derives from. It derives, I contend, from a willingness to recognize and act on the common nature that each individual human being shares. In other words, it is the recognition of the human nature that we all share that is sufficient reason for many to want to care for and love others where possible.
Here then, is the link between students becoming species-beings and encouraging them to be empathically disposed. Teachers implementing activities for students that have empathic qualities can be one means of helping students recognize and act on the basic humanity they share with others. This is fundamental to being a species-being and so what is required is some idea of how empathy can be encouraged to become a disposition.

Aristotle claims that:

To have a disposition is to have neither a faculty or a feeling (1984, p.99). While dispositions themselves are determined by a rational principle (p.101), we develop them by giving activities a certain quality and it is the characteristics of the activities themselves that determine the resulting dispositions—"like activities produce like dispositions" (p.91).

If teachers are to encourage students to be empathically disposed, then what is required is that students be involved in activities that have "empathic qualities". Students have to be encouraged to be involved in activities where the aim is to get them to "feel with others". The long term aim is that in requiring students to be involved in activities like these, the students would develop the habit of empathizing with others given the appropriate conditions. 'Disposition' then is used here as a means of predicting future actions:
It is restricted to those actions that are voluntarily undertaken in response to a set of existing conditions that are identified as relevant and that result in deliberative activities that characterize the dispositions (Arnstine, 1990, p.233).

However, if teachers encouraging students to develop an empathic disposition is one means of helping them become species-beings, then the students will have to accept a particular set of beliefs. These beliefs would be those regarding the fundamental relationships human beings have with one another and the natural world. It would also include beliefs concerning how and why one should labour or "produce". But as Dewey (1966) points out, teaching beliefs cannot be forced;

...beliefs cannot be hammered in; the needed attitudes cannot be plastered on. But the particular medium in which an individual exists leads him to see and feel one thing rather than another... (p.11)...[it is]...habitual dispositions [that] fix forms for norms (p.234)

If it is "habitual dispositions" that "fix forms for norms" and dispositions are "formed by a rational principle" (Aristotle, 1984, p.101), then encouraging students to accept and act on the beliefs that being a species-being entails will require a combination of both. It will require students to be involved in activities that have "particular mediums", empathic "qualities" in this case, and also to have some understanding of the "rational
principle" that underpins Marx's idea of human beings as species-beings. Put simply, not only will students have to experience something—"feel with others"—they will also have to try to understand what it means to be empathic and why they should be so disposed. Again, Dewey provides an example that highlights the importance of both the "medium" that students experience and the understanding of that experience:

A youth who has had repeated experience of the full meaning of the value of kindliness towards others built into his disposition has a measure of the worth of the generous treatment of others (ibid., p.235).

Dewey's example supports my claim concerning what is required of activities designed to encourage students to be empathically disposed. Regardless of how Dewey used 'kindliness' the "meaning of the value of kindliness" is not self-evident in acts of kindliness. The meaning of the value of kindliness involves both acts of kindliness and some understanding of what acts count as kindly ones, ones not, and why be kindly rather than something else; selfish, for instance. Thus, learning from others; talking with and watching them act kindly and practicing kindly actions oneself are all, I believe, components to what Dewey means by the "intermediary of the environment" and an example of what he believes is necessary for the "...development within the young of the attitudes and
dispositions necessary to the continuous and progressive life of society" (ibid., p.22).

What teachers have to arrange and implement then are activities that are designed so that students can be empathic, activities where students are encouraged to "feel with others". Teachers, however, cannot just tell students to "go feel". There is more to encouraging students to being empathic than requiring them to have a particular feeling, even if this is possible. To "feel with others" also requires knowing what others are feeling and having some understanding of why they feel the way they do.

For instance, it will not work to simply ask students to feel hurt for others when they are the brunt of someone's jibes, callous remarks, etc. This would be no more than modifying behaviour. What is also required is some explanation of why hurting others is objectionable—something about respecting persons, for instance—and why feeling the hurt of others may even be cause enough to act in some way to prevent the hurt. On the other hand, of course, all the explanations in the world will not necessarily encourage students to be empathic towards others.

Thus, activities that teachers design to encourage students to be empathically disposed will require a
combination of both the experience of "feeling with others" and also helping them understand how and why others feel the way they do. As Hamilton (1984) suggests, empathy is not just a feeling, it is "...our vehicle for understanding one another in a meaningful way (p.217).

Student activities and exercises built on these two criteria can contribute towards helping students becoming species-beings because the "...the power to develop dispositions is the power to modify actions on the basis of the results of prior experiences" (Dewey, 1966, p.,44). One of the aims then of asking teachers to encourage students to become empathically disposed is that the experiences the teacher arranges and provides for the students will also encourage them to modify their own actions, especially actions by the students that significantly affect others. For instance, King (1967), who believed that empathy is "...a fellow feeling for a person in need..." (p.101), is well aware of the relationship between empathy and human action and doubts if...

...the problems of our teeming ghettos will have a great chance to be solved until the white majority, through genuine empathy, comes to feel the ache and anguish of the Negroes' daily life (ibid).

The long-term aim of encouraging students to be empathically disposed then is that they will be more able
and willing to act for and with others from a personal sense of species-beingness. King is right in claiming that many objectionable states of affairs, like racism and poverty, will never change until more people empathize with non-whites and the poor. What remains then is to consider a more specific sense of what teachers can do in order to encourage students to be empathically disposed.

**Empathy as a practice.**

In practical terms what is required of teachers is that they get students involved in activities that prompt them to empathize with others simply because other people are human beings like themselves. Evidence of students being so disposed would include at least two separate criteria: 1) students would be inclined to want to be empathic, and 2) students would try to be empathic.

I suggest that analogous to Noddings' idea of teachers getting students to agree to "...a verbal commitment to the possibility of caring" (1984, p.18) teachers get students to commit to the possibility of being empathic. In other words, in making this commitment each student's disposition to be empathic does "...not wait, Micawber-like, for a stimulus to turn up so that it may get busy; it actively seeks for occasions to pass into full operation" (Dewey, 1966, p.48). And even though this
does not necessarily require that students actually empathize with everyone, they would be agreeing to the possibility of this with those whose lives intersect with theirs in one way or another.

In helping students become empathically disposed teachers will have to transform a student's awareness of being part of a group, or worse, any awareness of being one among many, to being disposed to consider each person they come into contact with as "one-of-us". As Pratte (1992) correctly points out: "[A] group of people does not make a community" (p.141) and thus teachers will have to teach students to consider those individuals they usually conceive of as "them" in "us" ("we-consciousness") terms instead.

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60 The recent Reginald Denny beating incessantly displayed on national television provided excellent examples of how ideals like these can be met by seemingly "ordinary" people. During the trial of his alleged assailants, Denny himself walked across the courtroom and individually embraced each of the mothers of the accused, telling them he loved them. When the beating actually occurred, four unrelated individuals saw the attack live on T.V., and left their homes to save Denney, consciously ignoring the "why nots" of whether they should act or not (Greenfield, *Newsweek*, September 13, 1993). Though occasions like these may be rare, they do provide substance to Marx's belief that the sense of species-beingness which underpins these acts of love and care for others can become actualized even under the most pressing and distressful circumstances. And very often, they become actualized by individuals sensing or feeling what it would be like to be "in the shoes" of another.
One practical suggestion for achieving this aim has already been given—getting students involved in community service. This strategy was proposed as one possible means of achieving a greater sense of 'we-consciousness' among students. Why community service would help is directly related to the notion of 'community' itself. Communities are founded on a sense of "we-ness", on deep and significant relationships (a we-consciousness) felt between its members. If Pratte (1992) is correct in claiming that community service is an appropriate strategy for cultivating a student's disposition to be reasonable and caring (p.123), and, that the link between empathy and caring is "...direct and obvious: empathic affects and caring operate in the same direction: considering the welfare of others" (p.153), then community service can be also be one means to help students become empathically disposed. Regular community service can become the vehicle, the beginning of a habit, that makes students more inclined to try and understand, and hopefully feel, how others interpret the world and their experiences in it.

At the same time, community service could also provide students with valuable experiences about the importance of community itself. My argument here is that teachers encouraging students to be empathically disposed
is one practical means of helping students become species-beings. In order for students to become species-beings though this will require that teachers help students conceive of the human race as their own community. In practical terms this aim can be furthered by teachers encouraging students to:

...seeing the world comprised of relationships rather than of people standing alone, a world that coheres through human connection rather than through systems of rules...where an awareness of the connections between people gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another, a perception of the need for response (Gilligan, 1982, p.29).

Gilligan's claims tie directly in with my argument regarding teachers encouraging students to be empathically disposed. "Seeing the world comprised of relationships" and a "recognition of responsibility for one another, a perception of the need for response" go hand-in-hand with being empathic. To want to empathize is to act on the recognition of a "world comprised of relationships". Being empathic is an excellent vehicle for finding out what "response" is needed. "Connecting" with other people through whatever activities are used to encourage students to be empathic provides them an opportunity to respond, to be responsible for others.

The importance of "seeing the world comprised of relationships" and a "world that coheres through human
connection" also drives right to the heart of what teachers can do to help students be empathic. Being empathic is always a relational event. At least two people are required for empathy to occur. Therefore, one necessary practical requirement for encouraging students to be empathically disposed is for teachers to implement learning activities that focus specifically on people, not things. Community service has already been discussed as one option that can provide opportunities for these kinds of activities. Fortunately, there are also several other ideas that teachers could consider.

The Central Ohio Special Education Regional Research Center, for example, opens its doors to all teachers who are interested in experiencing, for a brief period, what it is like to be a student with physical disabilities. Exercises include student teachers being blindfolded, tying their legs together at the knees and other kinds of physical restraints while undergoing learning activities they expect their own students to have. These teachers are actively encouraged to feel, experience and understand what it is like to be disabled. Similar kinds of experiences could be devised by teachers for younger students.

Another idea is to be found at The Ohio State University Nisonger Center. There, module sessions are
devoted to developing an empathic disposition among medical students. The students are required to spend time on campus confined to a wheelchair and to work alongside people employed at ARC Industries; a training centre for developmentally disabled adults (The Lantern, 10th August, 1991).

In Columbus, Ohio, CALLVAC Services offers a "Beyond the Freeway Tour" where middle class adults visit inner-city neighbourhoods for "...encounters with poverty, hunger and homelessness" (Columbus Dispatch, August 22, 1993). The purpose and effects of this tour reflect much of what I argue for regarding teachers encouraging students to develop an empathic disposition. Participants of the tour have reported that it was "...a morning of myth-breaking", designed to "...refute many of the stereotypes assigned to people on public assistance".

In my own teaching undergraduate student teachers I work with are required to question some of their own assumptions about others and to try and feel and understand the world from their perspective. To achieve this some students have visited and worked in homeless shelters and retirement villages. Others have volunteered to help in a school for the blind, spent time at ARC Industries (mentioned earlier) and even stood on busy streets holding "Will work for food signs".
Examples can also be found in industrial settings. "Multi-cultural training" and "cultural awareness" are popular buzzwords in human resource and training departments throughout much of American industry. While I was employed in the training department of the State of Ohio's Rehabilitation Services Commission, employees were required to participate in programs that gave them a different perspective on organizational problems. This was achieved by employees gaining some idea of what it was like to be employed in some other capacity than their own. Managers became janitors; secretaries, human resource personnel, etc. The motives here for such exercises had little to do with human freedom of course. The idea, however, is readily translatable to a schooling context.

When teachers require that students be involved in activities like these, they contribute to the aim of students being empathically disposed for two reasons. Why? Because they give the students an opportunity to experience and feel what others feel, and they give students the opportunity to learn more about other people.

The practical implication of the previous is this: Teachers must provide significant and varied opportunities for students to experience what others feel and that allow them to try and understand others from their perspective, from their situation. Students would be required to at
least "...hear those whose perspectives they don't share" (Guinier, 1993, p. 25). In their weakest form, these activities and experiences would require students to see, experience and feel what another person sees, experiences, and feels in his/her world. In their strongest form, they may require [students] making the other's ends their own (Downie & Telfer in Katz, 1991, p. 192). Volunteering to work in a homeless shelter might be an example of the former; being white and joining the N.A.A.C.P. an example of the latter.

What teachers would be asking of students then is not simply to "feel with others" but to also "...interpret from as many vantage points as possible lived experience, the ways there are of being in the world" (Greene, 1988, p. 120). As teachers attempt this task, however, there is a danger that students may be left with only an "individual reference...[and they may not feel any] mutual bonds of solidarity..." (ibid, p. 93) with those they are trying to be empathic with. So, while the students are encouraged to "feel with others" and learn of the "ways there are of being in the world", teachers must always keep in mind why they want students to be empathic in the first place. They want students to be empathically disposed as a means of helping them become species-beings. Thus, in learning of the "many vantage points" that "ways of being" can be
"interpreted from" the students would also have to be encouraged to recognize that these "ways of being" are products of beings-in-the-world. And importantly, that they share a common and fundamental nature with these "beings" regardless of the "ways of being" they produce.

It is also very important however, for teachers and students not to forget the relational activity that characterizes empathy. Encouraging students to be empathic not only requires them trying to "feel with" and understand the experiences of others. It also requires that students try to understand their own feelings and experiences. Thus, if teachers are going to encourage students to be empathic, then there is another element they will have to consider. Not only will teachers have to arrange learning activities that allow students to experience an empathic response and understand how others interpret the world and their experiences in it. Additionally, they will have to encourage students to understand more about their own feelings and about how they themselves interpret the world and their experiences in it. Therefore, it is crucial that students discuss and examine how they feel about particular situations and compare these with the feelings of those whom they are being encouraged to be empathic with. If not, activities designed to promote an empathic disposition run the risk
of being nothing more than "neat", "cool", and "Gee, I learnt so much about them" experiences indistinguishable from visits to the zoo.

The practical implication here is that teachers should encourage students to not only try and experience how others feel but to reflect on some of the assumptions and beliefs they have about others and the relationships they believe they should and/or do have with them. Teachers would encourage students to suspend these relationships and, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, "put them out of play".

Not because we reject certainties of common sense and a natural attitude to things—they are, on the contrary, the consistent theme of philosophy—but because, being the presupposed basis of any thought, they are taken for granted and go unnoticed, and because in order to arouse them and bring them into view we have to suspend for a moment our recognition of them (Merleau-Ponty in Greene, 1988, p.122).

Here, of course, the "relationships" I am referring to that Merleau-Ponty suggests require "suspension" are human ones. Encouraging students to have an empathic disposition will require that students suspend whatever prior "relationships" they may have had with those people they are being asked to be empathic with. Two examples will help here in supporting the claimed connection
between encouraging students to be empathic and the requirement that they "suspend relationships".

Young people (and many adults) often have pre-conceived notions about those who have physical disabilities. A severe physical disability, being quadraplegic for instance, is often associated with a lack of intelligence. As a result, people often look on disabled persons with disdain, even disgust. They may even believe that being a quadraplegic would be a terrible life, perhaps a wasted of one. However, if teachers encourage students to help and work with disabled people, the students can begin to have a better understanding of what it is like to be viewed by others on these terms. They can begin to feel what it is like to be "in the shoes of the other". To accomplish this good students would not only need to experience, as best they could, what it would be like to be disabled, they would also have to examine any assumptions they had about being disabled, which ones were warranted, which ones not, especially in light of the experience just suggested.

Another and more personal example involves my two children. They recently went through a phase of being disgusted at nearly every example they saw of males kissing each other. When they saw this they usually called those involved: 'Gay' (and in a derogatory tone). As
parents, we quickly pointed out some examples where males kissed and those involved were not "gay", e.g. a father and son kissing. We also discussed homosexuality in general and the various uses of 'gay'. We also attempted to get our children to try and feel what it would be like to be called something "nasty" and to get them to reflect on how objectionable some words can be. A common strategy that many parents use in these situations is to say to children "How would you like it if you were called a nasty name". When this strategy is used, it seems a common example of parents encouraging children to be empathic--children are being asked to feel what it would be like to be in the shoes of others, by drawing on their own similar experiences and feelings. Also, conversations like these are often appropriate opportunities to discuss what is implied by the use of certain words in certain contexts and what assumptions underpin particular uses.

So, when we ask teachers to encourage students to experience empathy through exercises and activities like these we are very often asking them to do what Descartes referred to as "an attempt to doubt". An attempt to "...set aside all previous habits of thought, see through and break down the mental barriers which these habits have set along the horizon of [their] thinking" (Descartes in Marguiles, 1989, p.9). Teachers are asking students
"...not to suppress but to place in suspense, or out of action, all the spontaneous affirmations in which [they] live, not to deny them but rather to understand them and to make them explicit" (Merleau-Ponty, ibid.). Thus, students are expected to not only share some experience with others, but to also question and be critical of the "mental habits" they might have formed regarding the very same people teachers may encourage them to be empathic with.

These expressions sound very similar to Marx's belief that we are capable, as humans, of making judgements not influenced by material conditions, productive and social relations, etc. Here of course, the issue is about each student's "judgements" of other people, themselves and the relationships they have with and to other people, even if they believe there are none. It is about encouraging students to feel with others and understand their "way of being", as well as their own. The hope being that activities and experiences like these will allow them the possibility for more people being added to their sense of "one-of-us", an opportunity for them to increase the range of their "we-consciousness". Ultimately, it is to help them become species-beings.
While it appears that much of what I have presented here is neither original or uncommon and that there are many examples and resources for teachers to call on, there can also be much resistance to the aim of helping students become species-beings by way of encouraging them to have an empathic disposition. Continuing to use McCallum's schema, I now turn to variable 'y' and highlight what some of those resistances may be.

C. McCallum's Variable 'y': Some Preventing Conditions Against Students Becoming Species-Beings.

The aim itself.

The aim of getting students to be species-beings by way of encouraging them to be empathically disposed can be seriously hindered by the nature of any exercise inherent to the aim itself. Like critical thinking classes, activities that promote and encourage an empathic disposition can become "...bleak, jumbled, scary, boring, boring, boring..." (Noddings, 1984, p.37) Perhaps worse, activities that promote this aim can also become just another example of the "...blather about the need for caring and sharing and the rest" (Greenfield, 1993, p.80). Teachers have their work cut out for them in ensuring that learning activities utilized to promote this disposition are not boring and more than just blather.
Good teachers of course are always worried about interesting students in their lessons and in the subjects they are taught. Most teachers work hard not to let their lessons become boring. Ensuring that lessons designed to promote an empathic disposition are meaningful rather than "blather" however, is a different kettle of fish.

Teachers often have to explain and justify to students why they should learn anything in school at all. The situation in question here is more difficult because teachers may not be able to use utilitarian reasons like "help you get a job", or "make money" as they sometimes do. Even these reasons do not lead some students to accept that they should learn what the teacher has prepared, yet sometimes, these are the best (only?) reasons teachers give. If these reasons are not effective in getting students interested in becoming empathic, then teachers will be hard pushed to get some students interested at all.

The above is a very important "preventing condition" to be overcome. Teachers want students to develop an empathic disposition for the right reasons, reasons, I contend, based more on Marx's idea of human nature than utilitarian ones. Teachers face a difficult task in convincing students to actively participate in class without having to resort to motivate them with these
reasons or the power of grades, fear of punishment, or their own institutional authority.

The aim of getting students to be empathically disposed has other inherent "preventing conditions" too. Like any other aim in education that focuses on developing dispositions, teachers are faced with particular and regular uncertainties. These include uncertainties about whether the students learn what it is they are supposed to and what will happen to what they have learned once the formal arrangement, the teaching/student relationship, no longer exists.

These uncertainties are of particular concern when teachers have to contend with the demand of trying to assess student learning, of trying to "test" students. Dispositional learning is notorious for its lack of amenability to testing. Testing has invariably focused on behaviour and short-term memory, rote-learning, kinds of skills. Encouraging students to have a particular disposition often includes these kinds of skills but dispositions are also about future actions and conditions. Although it is possible to test for propositional knowledge designed to promote an empathic disposition, e.g., teachers could test whether students could correctly answer "Of which ethnic group is not looking into the eyes of an authority figure a mark of respect?". The correct
answer to this propositional knowledge question though in no way guarantees that the respondent will perform in a way that shows or exhibits respect for Native-Americans.

Sullivan (1993) offers a response to this "preventing condition". He argues that "[i]ndividualized testing sends students the message that they are responsible for themselves" (p.176) and if testing is a necessary evil in public education, then one way to overcome this barrier is to promote group-based testing.

What the above suggests is that rather than students working individually and competing with one another, they would be encouraged to help each other. Helping others is inherent in promoting a we-consciousness with others and in group testing situations students could develop this we-consciousness with their classmates for at least two reasons. First, students would have to understand and learn more about their peers in order that they all can contribute to what teachers ask of them and to demonstrate that they all have met whatever standards are required. Second, students would share those feelings that were previously only felt by some(?) under individual testing conditions--students would get a taste of success and failure together. In other words, group testing, "...sends the message that we stand or fall together" (ibid).

However, if this is one answer to the problem of testing a
student’s disposition, then teachers are going to have a hard job convincing students that Sullivan’s alternative is better than "standing or falling alone.

Moreover, there are other "preventing conditions" that may be beyond the control of teachers. For one, where will the aim of getting students to be species-beings be located in the curriculum. With the dominance of subjects like math and science in most schools, teachers can rightly question where any activities inherent to the aim are to be located within their school curriculum and everyday practices. I assume that the aim might be accommodated in classes like "multicultural education", "social studies" or "community service", yet without having presented an argument to support this assumption. Yet what of those school systems that do not include multicultural education or outlets for community service in their curriculum? Will teachers have to overcome the fundamental "preventing condition" of getting such an aim in their school's offerings in the first place? The answer is probably, and I have also failed to offer any suggestions of how this could be achieved.

In such circumstances perhaps political action will be required on the part of teachers. This would be an enormously difficult undertaking for as Rasberry (1991) points out in his response to the State of Maryland's call
for "compulsory" volunteer work in the high-school curriculum, "...the proposed 75 hours of service work...won't reform the state's schools, raise its test scores, improve college attendance rates or turn selfish brats into Mother Teresa" (Columbus Dispatch, 1991, September 2, p.23). If Rasberry is right and his claims are generalizable, then one prior and fundamental barrier most teachers will have to face is not only convincing others that the aim of fostering students' empathic disposition in schools is valid, but why an empathic disposition is important at all.

Students

The students can also be a "preventing condition" to achieving the aim of an empathic disposition. There are some students who have a general apathy and unwillingness regarding anything having to do with school. Furthermore, by virtue of their age and states in society, many students are in the process of forming assumptions and beliefs about other people regardless of what schools and teachers offer. Dependent on age, maturity and personal experience, some students will have these assumptions and beliefs well established. It would be naive to believe that learning exercises and activities designed to promote this empathic disposition would always counter or put in
jeopardy basic assumptions and beliefs that the students may already possess.

For instance, the mass media's portrayal of blacks is still dominated by images of athletes and artists. Raybon (Newsweek, 1989, October 2, p.11) has criticized the continual negative portrayal of blacks and Greider (Rolling Stone, 1993, May 14, pp.37-38) has addressed the perpetual and false image of the "Welfare Queen". Students are not immune from adopting these images. Thus some of them will have already bought into the stereotypes of welfare recipient as "ghetto mama as broodmare" (Greider, p.38) and blacks as "poor, criminal, addicted and dysfunctional" (Raybon, p.11). Teachers will have to contend with the powerful forces and influences outside of schools that contribute to these assumptions and beliefs. Teachers may have to face up to the fact that the assumptions and beliefs that the students have about others (and themselves) may be founded on more powerful forces than they could ever muster.

Getting students to empathize with others can also be a very psychologically difficult undertaking. Students, as

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Bill Cosby makes an even stronger criticism by suggesting that the dominant image of blacks on T.V. is one of "minstrel" (Arsenio Hall Show, September, 1993).
previously suggested, will have to come face-to-face with well-established assumptions and beliefs about others and themselves. This aspect, perhaps, explains Anderson's (1993) recent teaching experience. In using Kozol's book "Savage Inequalities" for a graduate class, the students, when presented with strong evidence regarding inequitable distribution of educational resources and how this can affect individual student learning, denied that the evidence represented the general case. They were more inclined to believe that the problems revealed by the evidence had nothing to do with community and/or human concerns but were, instead, individual ones (p.1). Kozol raises the question of whether this denial by the students was not ultimately bound up with the assumptions and beliefs they already held about poor, uneducated non-whites. If Kozol's explanation is correct, then this would be an all too vivid example of another obstacle that teachers will have to overcome.

Being self-critical can be a very uncomfortable experience and this will be another "preventing condition" that teachers will have to deal with. Very few enjoy finding out that their world is not everyone's world, that others do not feel the way they do about particular situations, and worse, that other people see oneself as somehow connected with what they take to be the ills of
the world. This was brought home recently when two white, female students with whom I was working decided to go to a meeting entitled "Black Rage: What Is It and Why?". There they found themselves to be the only white students attending and seemingly "representative" of a host of problems from "the black perspective".

Nightingale and Wolverton (1993), citing Hamburg and echoing some of Marx's claims, believe adolescents, like all human beings, have a common human nature that includes a range of needs. There appears to be:

...fundamental human needs that are enduring and crucial to healthy development and survival. These fundamental needs include the need to find a place in a valued group that provides a sense of belonging and the need to feel a sense of worth as a person" (p.473).

Some of the needs that Hamburg claims we all possess have been addressed in my interpretation of Marx's notion of 'human nature'. There I argued that teachers can help students satisfy these needs by requiring students to participate in exercises that encourage them to be empathic. Paradoxically, the students themselves can and will often act as a considerable resistance to the achievement of this.

Student's personal lives beyond school can act as an obstacle to their developing an empathic disposition in other ways too. Many work part-time while attending
school, some up to 45 hours per week (Columbus Dispatch, 1993, p.2A). Others are also heavily involved in extra-curricula activities. For those students who do both, or even just one, their parents will attest to the hardships and inconvenience involved in getting them to places of employment, practice sessions, and games. Where students are involved in these kinds of activities they usually have an interest in them. It will take particularly strong parents however, to get their children to be involved in activities like volunteering to work in a homeless shelter or attending cultural and ethnic events other than their own. And this problem will be compounded when the parents too may doubt the value of these same activities.

Within schools.

Teachers also are not immune from some of the difficulties that students are faced with. Self-criticism can be difficult for anyone. Commonly, as people get older, assumptions and beliefs can become even more well-established. It will take particularly open-minded and self-critical teachers to design and construct learning exercises that encourage an empathic disposition in such a way that the teacher's own beliefs and assumptions about others do not detract from the aim of the exercise. For instance, my daughter's teacher
attempted to get her class to understand and experience the conditions that the first European immigrants to America lived under. However, she failed to question whether any parents would find anything objectionable in the killing and eating of a deer for the exercise. Unknown to the teacher, some of the parents were vegetarian, others just plain "animal lovers". 62

There are other factors within schools that also add to the range of McCallum's variable 'y'. I have already argued that this disposition, as a means of promoting the larger aim of species-beingness, is dependent on a strong sense of community. Meier (1993) argues that the "...typical high school is a setting in which the adults and the students are not members of the same community. Instead, they exist in two unconnected communities inhabiting the same building (p.656)...[e]ven the nature of the school buildings themselves can resist any sense of

62 This particular "preventing condition" raises serious issues about the role of the teacher in getting students to be empathically disposed. It points to the importance of teacher modelling and the learning environment that teachers provide for their students. If being empathic is a virtue, then teachers will have to arrange those conditions "...in which the virtues can be nurtured and sustained" (Pratte, 1992, p.151). These conditions will include the teacher's actions and students are always looking to see whether teachers act as they say or act inconsistent with what they say.
community" (ibid, p.657). Thus, teachers are faced with a difficult problem of how to get students to feel some sense of community, some "we-consciousness" with others outside school when the place they spend most of their day may often work against this aim. Meier's analysis sounds all too familiar to teachers and the aim of encouraging students to be empathically disposed will be severely thwarted if there is little or no sense of community felt in schools between teachers and students, between teachers and administrators, between ancillary workers and everyone else.

There are more immediate and seemingly mundane barriers within schools that can act as "preventing conditions". Kozol (1991) vividly and continually provides us with images of school experiences for many black students that are more reminiscent of prison camps than places of learning. It would be patronizing and condescending for teachers to suggest to these students that they ought be species-beings, that they should be empathic towards oppressing others, when the rest of America seems to ignore them, or worse still, denies their humanity altogether. For students in these circumstances, the idea of being a member of the same community that other better-off Americans are would be beyond belief when this same "community" cannot supply them with meaningful
employment, working bathrooms, operational sewage systems, functioning heating and cooling systems, protection against roving gangs, personal health problems etc.

Beyond schools.

Another barrier teachers will face in getting students involved in exercises that promote an empathic disposition will be the conflict between the value of the aim and the values that each student's parents hold. Again, Kozol (1991) provides many examples of how attitudes towards race, individualism, and work have motivated many parents not to support fiscal measures intended to help the less well-off. The unwillingness to help these less fortunate children through a reformulation of public school funding for instance, is often motivated by the belief that such measures will "...undermine diversity and even elegance in our society and the best schools will be dragged down to a sullen norm, a mediocre middle ground of uniformity" (ibid, p.172).

Reactions like these, usually by more affluent Americans, sends a message to those economically less fortunate that they are entitled to inequities in schooling. In the state of New Jersey, for example, the idea was proposed that money from the towns that have high property value be used to help support the urban districts. One parent responded to this suggestion by
stating that: "It will bring mediocrity to every classroom in the state...it won't change anything...Money is not the answer...It has to begin in the home" (ibid, p.170).

Of course such parents may well have a legitimate complaint. Why should they bear the tax burden of fixing problems with schools in other districts when there are problems with their own children's schools? Kozol's analysis provides a possible answer to this question: Problems of not having enough funds for school trips to Europe or equipment so that the students can have archery, fencing, etc. in their curriculum are not comparable to the problems faced by those less well-off.

With these kinds of attitudes still pervasive in American society, one has to question how much support parents will give when teachers require students to be involved in an activity, experience, etc. designed to promote an empathic disposition and species-beingness. One has to question if there will be any parental support at all.

This situation is not unique to white perceptions of blacks and other non-whites of course. There is a tremendously complex range of forces at play that contributes to people's views and judgements of others. The mass-media, in conjunction with mass-marketing and sophisticated advertising techniques, often appear
ubiquitous in their influence on the formation of personal beliefs. Perhaps this is no more evident than with the young people that attend school and these young people are not just influenced about music and fashion by the mass-media. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that in the late twentieth century, the young's beliefs about practically everything of importance will include information and images they have received from the mass-media.

In June of 1992 the White House launched the "Summer of Service" to promote the broader idea of "National Service". Seventy-five percent of the participants in this program were non-white. Yet, by the third day of the project, Waldman (1993) reports, the 1,500 young people from around the country had split into black, Hispanic, Native American and gay/lesbian caucuses. And sadly, "[s]ome of the African-American groups debated whether whites should even be allowed to attend their meetings" (p.46). 63

63 This is a very difficult issue for me personally. I have been involved in a number of volunteer projects that focus on the problems of racism. During these projects I have often had to defend why I, a male "W.A.S.P., should be involved at all. My interlocutors usually argue that they are sick of relying on the help of "whitey" and that it's time for them to "stand on their own two feet". I (Footnote Continued)
Of course, many blacks and other non-whites have considerable justification to feel this way. Close (1993) reports that Massey and Denton have argued that the best way to "...provide a pathway out of inner-city misery may depend less on government programs than on whether whites are willing to welcome blacks to their neighborhoods" (p.29). Yet, as Close correctly points out, "...uptil now many blacks have abandoned hope that such a day will ever come. The reason being the skittish some whites get when even well-to-do blacks try to move into certain white areas" (ibid).

Students' assumptions and beliefs about themselves, their community and others may well be on the way to being rigidly entrenched before teachers get a chance to talk to them about empathy, "we-consciousness", "one-of-us" and community. The forces that students are exposed to in their formative years can be more permanent than individual teachers can ever hope to be. These influences

(Footnote Continued)
understand this position and when I once asked what my role should be I was told to work with other whites. I also understand the logic behind this reasoning but I don't fully agree with it. The problem for me personally is that I want a foot in both camps. This leaves me with the double-edged problem of making sure that I am not another example of the old "whitey" while at the same time, realizing I may not be welcome in circles that seem to share the same concerns I do.
beyond school settings can dominate a student's life and can be present and perpetual barriers, obstacles and interferences to teachers encouraging students to be empathically disposed, to helping them become species-beings. In fact, these formative forces can be "preventing conditions" to the achievement of practically any aim that schools work towards.

Summary

In "Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education", Noddings claims that caring is an innate trait of being human; that "...the impulse to act in behalf of the present other is itself innate. It lies latent in each of us, awaiting gradual development in a succession of caring relations" (p.83).

I have suggested that this "impulse to act in behalf of the other" is a common theme in many writings, both philosophical and otherwise. This is no more true, I have claimed, than in Marx's case. Marx's belief that human freedom requires at least that everyone be a species-being is underpinned with an idealistic notion of each loving and caring for other human beings and the human race in total. Thus, if the impulse to care is innate and there is this strong relationship with "caring" and "species-beingness", then the capacity to be a
species-being is innate to everyone also. This is Marx's point of course, we are species-beings by nature.

This aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate how this innate capacity of all human beings, whether latent or active, can be encouraged and promoted. Noddings claims that for those who feel nothing in regard to others, whether directly or by remembrance, we must prescribe re-education or exile (ibid., p.92). This project, and this chapter in particular, has focused on "re-education" rather than exile.

My main claim was that teachers can help students to become species-beings by encouraging them to have an empathic disposition. Encouraging them to be empathically disposed means requiring them to be involved in educational experiences that promote the disposition itself--"...like activities produce like dispositions" (Aristotle, 1984, p.91). Suggestions for achieving this have included that students participate in some community service or be involved in learning activities that get them to experience and understand more about others, themselves and how each interprets their experiences in the world.

The basic reason for these suggestions was that these kinds of activities are practical vehicles that teachers can use to get students to become cognizant of the common
nature they share with others. In other words, it was argued that encouraging students to develop an empathic disposition is one specific approach that teachers can adopt to get students to become species-beings. However, there are many "preventing conditions" that will hinder teachers in working towards this.

The students themselves may not value or be interested in trying to experience and understand the world from the perspective of others. Much of this resistance will derive from the myriad images and messages, often confused and contradictory ones, they receive from the mass-media, their friends and any other significant person in their life. The power and pervasiveness of these images and messages can be tremendous obstacles for any educational aim and all teachers will have to contend with them.

Parental values about the purpose of education, what counts as valuable learning and views about people teachers try to encourage students to be empathic with can also be real and significant barriers. Teachers are not immune here. Like any other adult, teachers also hold assumptions and beliefs about other people, regardless of whether based on ignorance or prejudice. Teachers, like their students, also will have to be self-critical and try
to be honest about any assumptions and beliefs they may hold.

For those teachers whose school has no formal place for the promotion of an empathic disposition, the aim will be severely restricted. For teachers in these circumstances I am at a loss to provide any suggestions other than attempting political action that would generate support for the aim and its inclusion in the curriculum. Yet if, like Marx (and Aristotle), I sincerely believe that "ethical deliberations must always be with men in the here and now (Aristotle, 1984, p.57), asking teachers to be politically active with this aim in mind seems to be asking a great deal. Such a suggestion conveniently ignores the realities of teaching in public schools in advanced, capitalist-based societies in 1993.

Nevertheless, having identified some "preventing conditions" to the students being empathic and becoming species-beings, education still has a crucial role to play. Encouraging and even requiring students to experience with and understand others is necessary if students are to learn about the similarities between themselves and others. This is even more crucial for the students who have prejudices and hardened biases. Any exercise in learning more about those who were originally thought of as "different" or "one-of-them" can serve to
reveal what was previously hidden. It can make the student aware of the values and beliefs that she or he holds, the assumptions that underpin them, and the many contributing factors in the formation of those beliefs and assumptions. It can help students learn of the values and beliefs that other people hold, and importantly, how the social, cultural and economic circumstances and conditions that these people are a part of have contributed to the formation of them. The students may then begin to realize how much their own social, cultural and economic conditions and circumstances have contributed to their values and beliefs.

What teachers and schools offer always remains of fundamental importance no matter the "preventing conditions". The learning experiences and activities that comprise students' education can always be possible opportunities for them recognizing and acting on the belief that all human beings are as alike as they are different. The social and material relations that human beings construct can serve to deny or promote the basic and fundamental bond they have with one another. This chapter has been an attempt to argue how education can contribute to the promotion of the recognition of this bond and that teachers helping students to become species-beings by encouraging them to have an empathic
disposition is one realistic means of achieving this. And in achieving this, education can also contribute to "changing the world" and improving "prior social conditions".
Chapter V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The overall purpose of this project was to answer two questions: 1) What did Marx mean when he used 'freedom', and 2) What substantive issues might his use of 'freedom' suggest for education? These two particular questions were chosen for a variety of reasons, not least of which that the attempt to answer them afforded me the opportunity to establish how I could contribute to "...changing the world rather than interpreting it" (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.145).

In this final chapter I will summarizing the points raised in attempting to answer these questions and offer some tentative conclusions. To complete the chapter, I will offer some suggestions for further research.

Summary and Conclusions

In Chapter II, I began by focusing on some of the problems and issues associated with the analysis of word and language use. The reason I commenced in this fashion was because of the first question central to the project. This question dealt with how Marx used 'freedom' and what
he meant by it. Thus, it seemed appropriate to give attention to some of problems and issues involved in answering questions regarding word and language use.

I commenced Chapter II by accepting that one strategy for answering questions of meaning was to pay particular attention to how words are "used". I agreed that this approach, when done well, can be an effective strategy for finding out what words may mean to people when written, spoken, etc. However, I argued, if one is interested in substantial changes in human affairs, in "changing the world rather than interpreting it", in "improving prior social conditions" (Dewey, 1966, p.136), then determining use and nothing more is of little or no use.

"Changing the world" and "improving prior social conditions" both imply normative standards—there are objectionable states of affairs that should end, and there are better alternatives to these. In the first section of Chapter II, I argued that normative standards were also of fundamental importance with regard to language and word usage. One of my claims was that use and meaning of words cannot be understood independent of normative standards, they cannot to be explained apart from particular human values and interests. And, of course, this is no less so for any use of 'freedom'.

To support this claim I provided a brief conceptual analysis of 'freedom'. As a result, I argued that contrary to popular understandings, 'freedom' is not a word that always has "positive" meanings or connotations. 'Freedom', like any other word, is neither necessarily "positive" or "negative" and importantly, neither is it "value-free". I argued for these claims by once again pointing out the relationship between particular uses of 'freedom' and the values and interests each user holds.

The central thesis of the first section of Chapter II was that how words are used and what they are taken to mean is dependent on each user's context. By 'context' I stipulated that this signified both an intrapersonal context; a person's individual psychology, their personal values and beliefs, etc., and an interpersonal context; the historical, economical, cultural, social factors, etc. that each word user is a part of. Thus, both these contexts and the intricate and complex relationships between them provided the backdrop for understanding how particular words are used and what they mean.

In the second section of Chapter II I provided a selective literature review of how writers other than Marx have used 'freedom'. Because of the ambiguity and vague nature of the concept 'freedom, and the normative and
political baggage historically associated with it, the research for this review revealed, as Berlin stated, that it seemed 'freedom' could mean nearly anything a user wanted (Berlin, 1969, p.121). From this same research I attempted to demonstrate that these various uses of 'freedom' could be arranged on a continuum ranging from 'freedom' as meaning anything to 'freedom' as meaning only one thing. From one end of the continuum to the other, I examined why it could be claimed that 'freedom' (like any word) could mean anything, that there could be "kinds" of freedom as well as opposed-pair or dichotomous approaches to, and singular meanings of 'freedom'.

McCallum (1967), one of the writers unearthed in the literature review, argued that debates and disputes about the use or meaning of 'freedom' usually miss the point. He believes that intellectual energies would be better spent otherwise. For McCallum, it was not the meaning or how 'freedom' was used that was important, but rather the differences in the substantial issues that each use of 'freedom' assumed and/or implied.

To identify these substantial issues he offered a triadic schema that could be applied to the claims of those who were interested in 'freedom'. In examining McCallum's schema, I explained how it was suited to answer the following questions: 1) What does each user of
'freedom' assume about human nature?, 2) what is it that the user desires human beings be free to be or do? and 3) what prevents them from achieving or doing this? Thus, McCallum claimed, it was the answers given to these three questions that would reveal what it was users of 'freedom' valued and the substantial issues they were interested in.

Since one of the main reasons for undertaking this project was to focus on the problem of "change" rather than on mere "interpretation", I agreed with much of McCallum's argument and utilized it fully in Chapter III. There, I adopted McCallum's triadic schema to get a better idea of what it was that Marx valued and to try and ascertain the substantial issues that he was interested in. In other words, applying McCallum's triadic schema allowed me to achieve a better understanding of Marx's intrapersonal context and how this underpinned his particular use of 'freedom'. In effect, I utilized McCallum's triadic schema to establish what social conditions Marx thought objectionable and the changes he desired.

The first variable of the schema, variable 'x', revealed Marx's dualistic position on human nature. Marx believed that there is a static element to being human and another element that changes dependent on the "ensemble of social relations". The static element is represented by
his complex idea of every human being having a "natural character", a will (that allows them to make "independent judgements"), "needs" and "fixed" drives. Moreover, Marx's 'human nature' also included that, unlike animals, each human being is a species being--individuals are capable of conceiving of themselves as members of a species and importantly, also capable of producing, through labour, on behalf of the species.

The element of human nature that is dependent on the "ensemble of social relations" plays its part in how each "natural character" is expressed or actualized. Individual "natural characters" can only become expressed or actualized dependent on then present historical, economic, social, cultural circumstances. Thus, as these circumstances change, so does the individual expression of human nature.

In this section I also pointed out some of the difficulties of Marx's position on human nature. I argued, for example, how difficult it would it be for one to "know" if one had a certain "natural character" or "characteristic" if it was not possible for it to become evident because, or due to, a lack of particular historical, economic, social and cultural circumstances. I also addressed how the same difficulties arose in connection with Marx's other firm belief that human beings
are capable of making judgements independent of these same circumstances. Given my position about the role of context expressed in Chapter II, I argued that human judgements can be no other than those underpinned and/or impinged upon by historical, economic, social, and cultural circumstances.

Using MCallum's triadic schema, I applied the variables 'y' and 'z' to some of Marx's claims. The range of variable 'z' revealed what it was Marx believed human beings ought be free to be or do. These beliefs included that human beings are free when they live and labour in accord with human nature itself. Hence, it was shown that Marx believed that human beings ought be allowed to labour in a way that is expressive of their "natural character". This point was claimed to be important for it allowed each person the opportunity for self-realization, for the objectification of the self, through labour.

To balance the individualism of human beings labouring in a manner that is expressive of their "natural character", I also highlighted the importance Marx gave to the role species-beingness plays. To be free also required that human beings labour in a way that is the recognition of their species-beingness. Put simply, when humans produce, they should produce for the species itself--labour must have a "social character". And
crucially, both these, producing for the species, for the needs of all, and producing from "natural character", must also be willingly agreed to by all.

Variable 'y' was used to reveal what Marx believed hinders or prevents human freedom. I argued that one word catches or signifies what Marx thought prevented humans from being free: 'alienation'. While it may be just one word, however, I also explained that for Marx, 'alienation' was quite a complex one—a word comprised of three distinct, yet related, components.

The first component I addressed was product alienation. This occurred, I argued, when what it was that human beings produced did not reflect their "natural character" and/or neither was the product something they agreed to produce. Moreover, regardless of whether each human beings produced from "natural character" or not, if the products of their labour were appropriated by another without their consent, then this...

64 It is important to note that Marx did not believe that it was only "workers" or "producers" that were alienated under capitalism—capitalism alienates all: "The possessing class and the proletarian class represent one and the same self-alienation. But the former feels satisfied and affirmed...[t]he latter, however, feels destroyed in this alienation" (Marx & Engels, 1978, p.133). Hence, any argument that is designed to help human beings become species-beings is an argument about the good of all, about what is good for the human race.
too contributed to their alienation. Furthermore, if that produced denied or obfuscated the fundamental and inherent relationship human beings had with the "natural" or material world, then this also added to their **product alienation**.

The second component I addressed was **process alienation**. This occurred when human beings were not afforded the opportunity to contribute in deciding **how** production would take place, how labour would be carried out. Dewey captures this idea of process alienation in commenting that:

> Most of those who are engaged in the outward work of production and distribution of economic commodities have no share---imaginative, intellectual, emotional---in directing the activities in which they physically participate (1930, p.131).

Like the products of labour, if the form of the process of labour was not something human beings willingly agreed to, then this also would be cause for their alienation. One only has to experience or recall the animosity and sometimes anger one feels when one's labour is being evaluated, while never having some input into how this would take place, for a vivid example of Marx's insight.

The third component of alienation I addressed was **species-being alienation**. In recalling Marx's position on
human nature revealed by the application of McCallum's variable 'x', I returned to the claim that Marx believed there was an important distinction between human beings and animals. Only human beings could conceive of themselves as a species, as having a species-beingness. This distinction had critical and important ramifications for human labour and human production, for it meant that human beings could produce for the species. And importantly, Marx believed, the recognition of our species-beingness was reason enough to produce for the species, to act on one's love for others, for humanity.

This third component to alienation revealed, in essence, that not producing in a manner that was expressive of one's love for humanity was to deny human nature itself. Why? Because it denied the common nature all have and it denied the fundamental relationship between the human race and the natural world. Moreover, to be species-being alienated was to produce and labour in isolation. Being a species-being meant that each human being was capable of producing for the needs of others and for the continuing development and good of all of humanity.

Producing as a species-being meant that whatever good came from individual production was for the good of everyone. Producing for the good of everyone allowed for
the continual growth and enrichment of human nature itself. And, importantly, what enriched human nature enriched all.

Using McCallum's triadic schema revealed the complexity and richness of Marx's notion of 'freedom'. In order to establish any substantive issues that Marx's use of 'freedom' suggested for education some decisions had to be made as matter of expediency. Hence, I chose to focus specifically on what education could offer in terms of helping students become species-being. After all, I argued, according to Marx, being a species-being was a necessary condition of human freedom. My strategy here was to argue for one specific way in which teachers could help students become species-beings.

Thus, in Chapter IV I argued that teachers should encourage students to develop an empathic disposition to help them become species-beings. This strategy also allowed me to suggest one means for how substantive changes in the human condition could be made. Rather than becoming overwhelmed or contributing to the pessimism sometimes generated after reading Marx and concluding that "Nothing [in education] can be done until the basic structures of society are changed but the structures prevent us making any changes" (Willis, 1977, p.186) I
tried to follow Willis' advice that teachers (and other "practitioners")

...have to work at two levels simultaneously—to face the immediate problems in doing the best (so far as they can see it) for their clients whilst appreciating all the time that these very actions may help to reproduce the structures within which the problems arise" (ibid).

Teachers "facing the immediate problems" was addressed at the end of Chapter IV. I applied McCallum's variable 'x' and identified some of the "preventing conditions" regarding teachers encouraging students to become empathically disposed. First, however, I addressed what is required of teachers and students so that they could work towards this aim.

Encouraging students to be empathically disposed, I argued, was one means of helping them become species-beings. Implementing learning activities designed to get students to "feel with others", experience their world and to provide them an opportunity to understand how others experience the world is one vehicle for helping students recognize the common nature they share with others.

In support of this claim, I addressed the idealistic nature of Marx's notion of human beings as species-beings and tried to offer some practical interpretation of it. Rather than naively and idealistically believing that
teachers could help students become species-beings in a universal sense that persuaded them to love and care for everyone as a result of some school experience, I offered a more practical interpretation. I argued that teachers encouraging students to become empathically disposed by organizing educational experiences and learning activities for them that focused on sharing experiences with other people was something consistent with Marx's notion and more achievable for teachers working under advanced, capitalist-based societies.

Empathy, as a result of a brief conceptual analysis, was found not to be so clear-cut a concept. Disagreement ranged over whether there was only "one" 'empathy', whether it was a "feeling for" or "feeling with" others, and how much of oneself must be "put into the shoes of another" when one attempted to be empathic.

It was argued that to have an empathic disposition, or any disposition that the focus should be on experiences with other people. This means more than students just reading about or listening to teachers talk about other people. It means students actually getting involved with others. In other words, encouraging students to become empathically disposed requires activities that allow them to at least, as best they can, experience what others experience, feel what other's feel.
I also argued that this was not sufficient. Students cannot be expected to be involved with other people and automatically "feel" the way they do. What was also required, it was claimed, is that students must also try to understand how and why others feel the way they do. This requirement introduced the cognitive aspect that must accompany the emotive state if we want students to be empathically disposed. Importantly, I argued that students would also have to try to and understand their own feelings and experiences if there was to be any chance of such activities leading to students recognizing the common nature they share with those they perhaps previously thought of as "one-of-them" or not part of their "we-consciousness".

Suggestions for activities that could encourage students to develop an empathic disposition included community service. Community service activities could be designed to give students the opportunity to experience and understand the various "vantage points" that others possess. Other suggestions focused on students getting involved face-to-face with people whom they might otherwise consider as "one-of-them". For example, middle-class white students working with less well-off, non-white students, and students spending some time
engaging in an activity with a homeless, retired or incarcerated person were some of the examples given.

To temper any idealistic tendencies my argument embraced I concluded by continuing to utilize McCallum's triadic schema and applying variable 'x' to some of my claims. Chapter IV ended with my highlighting some of the "preventing conditions" teachers could experience when encouraging students to become empathically disposed.

One of the "preventing conditions" was the aim itself. Activities designed to encourage students to be empathically disposed could be mushy "one-worldisms" rife with a loving, caring, etc. emphasis that often end up actually working against the aim. "One-worldisms" at their best, those designed so that students learn about others, could easily lead them to believe that world problems are individualistic rather than social. At their worst, however, they could lead students to believe that world problems are problems that belong to others, the problems are not their problems.

Another "preventing condition" was the students themselves. They may not be interested in experiencing empathically with others and requiring or even encouraging students to try to feel and understand the experiences of others may actually make them hostile towards others. Additionally, as a result of some activity designed to
encourage an empathic disposition, the activity itself could even reinforce any unwarranted assumptions, beliefs or prejudices about other people the students may already possess.

I also suggested that parental views about what education is and what it should be can be significant obstacles to be overcome in encouraging students to be empathic. Student enthusiasm for school activities is often dependent on parental guidance and support and if parents do not "see the point" of activities designed to promote an empathic disposition, or even if they do but do not support the idea, then the aim itself can be seriously blunted.

I also addressed other "preventing conditions" both within and beyond schools. For some school personnel there will be a major problem when any "empathic activities" are offered within the curriculum. This will be especially problematic for those schools who have more pressing and immediate concerns, like the students' health and safety. Outside of schools, the stereotypical images evident in many mass-media productions and various marketing devices and techniques will, for some students, be more "real" and "accurate" representations of people no matter what activities teachers get them involved in. These
"preventing conditions" will appear insurmountable to some teachers.

My approach to answering the second question central to this project was to adopt Geuttel's suggestion. She claims that while teachers should be aware of the fundamental importance of changing productive relations prior to significant changes occurring in schooling, political choices also have to be made as a matter of strategy (ibid., p.80).

One of my choices was to focus on one aspect of Marxian freedom. I attempted to translate Marx's belief that human beings are species-beings into realistic and possible learning activities that teachers could implement in school.

One reason for this strategy was that it is my belief that teachers and students can contribute to changing objectionable states of affairs, even if radical changes in productive relations are also required. My aim, in fact, in offering this strategy for change, is that encouraging students to be empathically disposed can lead to them contributing to changes in the world.

Admittedly, this is hoping for a great deal. It necessitates that students have some idea of what states of affairs are objectionable, it will also require their understanding why they are objectionable. Moreover,
perhaps the most difficult task will be teachers and students determining what they can personally do to change objectionable states of affairs.

My argument was that encouraging students to try and feel how others feel, to understand how other people experience the world and interpret those experiences, can be an effective vehicle for change that teachers can realistically utilize. It must not be forgotten, however, that empathic students must be self-reflective, they must try to understand their own feelings and interpretations of their experiences. In being empathically disposed students will have a better chance of recognizing the common nature they share with others, especially those they are trying to be empathic with. Hopefully, not only will they recognize the common nature they share with others, they will also feel obliged to act on this recognition. And in doing so they will be expressing their species-beingness and contributing towards human freedom.

Suggestions for research

On the one hand, I am not entirely convinced of my tentative foray into the murky waters of "meaning". One of my claims in Chapter II was that the meaning of words, etc. cannot be understood independent of the user's values and interests. On the other hand, for human beings to have
any values and interests at all, whatever it is they value or are interested in must also mean something to them. If meanings do not "fall out of the sky", then neither do human values and interests. Thus, I am left with trying to defend that values are "prior" to meanings while believing that the reverse is also difficult to defend. The research suggestion here then is the need to return to philosophy of language (and perhaps science, psychology, anthropology and history).

With respect to Marx, there are two areas that suggest possibilities for further research. One is to compare Marx's understanding of 'freedom' as presented here with Marx's later works, which predominantly dealt with economics. The other suggestion is Marx's idea of

65 The tentative claim I make in Chapter II about the relationship between the use of words, etc. their meaning and human values and interests derives from a much stronger intuition. It seems to me that even simple words like 'a', 'and', 'but', etc., at a fundamental level, are indicative of how human beings, especially English-language speaking ones, experience and interpret the world. Support for this intuition comes from my own experiences and understandings of philosophy of language. For instance, in philosophy one branch of formal logic is predicate logic. Formal logic has had a central role in philosophy of language yet there are some languages, I believe, do not include "subjects" and "predicates", e.g. Mandarin. This being the case, it could be possibile that differences like these in languages may signify some fundamental differences in the way humans experience the world and how their experiences are interpreted.
human beings having "natural characters". With the increased scientific interest in genetic research, exemplified by the Genome Project, identifying what "characteristics" each individual human being has seems an idea now not so farfetched. The moral and ethical implications of scientific endeavors like these are considerable, and many are in immediate and desperate need of serious philosophical attention.

Finally, two issues for further educational research that bear on the aim of teachers encouraging students to be empathically disposed. First, it would be valuable to examine any empirical research designed to demonstrate how successful or not the teaching of dispositions is. The results of this research can then be compared with the suggestions made here. Secondly, the aim itself is of no

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66 The Genome Project is a major undertaking, sponsored by the federal government, designed to identify what each gene is responsible for within the human body. Troubling speculations have already been made about the realistic possibility of ending homosexuality and variations in skin colour. Bruce Hilton, director of the National Centre for Bioethics has commented on how the gene responsible for most Alzheimer's Disease cases has already been identified. He also raises two of the ethical questions that have to be addressed: Who will control the knowledge that gene research produces and what will become of the distinction between "normal" and "disease"? He also makes the startling claim that more than one-fourth of the Fortune 500 companies are already doing genetic testing of potential employees. *(Columbus Dispatch, October 17, 1993, p.7F).*
value if there is no support for it from teachers. Hence, it would also be valuable to ascertain teachers' views on encouraging students to be empathically disposed and their ideas on how to achieve this aim if they agreed with it.
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