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Central-local political relationships in post-Mao China: A study of recruitment policy implementation in Wuhan

Lee, James Zhongzi, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1993
CENTRAL-LOCAL POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS IN POST-MAO CHINA: A STUDY OF RECRUITMENT POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN WUHAN

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By

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1993

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To My Family
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Research Question and Its Significance

One prominent aspect of post-Mao Chinese politics has been the changing relationship between central and local political authorities. The Center has been experimenting with a series of adjustments and readjustments of its political relations with the localities. Political scientists, however, have yet to consider the consequences of these adjustments for central control, nor have they fully explored the extent of decentralization to local level authorities in relation to the Center's goals and intentions. In short, the capability of the Center to control, and the degree that localities can deviate from central policies in this reforming socialist state, awaits close examination.

In general, there are two competing theories that guide perceptions of post-Mao political change. The first view posits that the Center, as a result of the decentralizing decision making authority, has gradually and incrementally lost considerable control to the extent that attempts on the part of central authorities to re-establish their power through recentralization have already become difficult.1 Scholars of this school

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1 For an excellent discussion of the power of local governments, see Daniel Kelliher, "The Political Consequences of China's Reforms," Journal of Comparative Politics, July 1986; see also, Huning Wang, Studies in Political Science (Zheng Zhi Xue Yan Jiu) May 1989, p. 25-31; another article that sheds light on this subject is Bingyu Guo, "Some Information on the Current Personnel System Reform" (Dang Qian Ren Shi Zhi Du Gai Ge De Yi Xie Qing Kuang), Studies in Political Science (Zheng Zhi Xue Yan
argue that factions and bureaucratic interests have evolved in the central Chinese leadership; these factions, they contend, have diverse, fragmented, and conflictual goals and are not, as has been suggested by other analysts, homogeneous and holistic. 2 Administrative and territorial actors, rather than the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) monopoly, have taken the spotlight in the political processes. As Lampton observed, Western interest group theory may be useful in explaining Chinese political behavior:

"With economic power fragmented to some extent, with ideological inhibitions to self-interested activity seemingly diminished, and with economic goals so prominent, the case for interest group perspectives may be stronger than it has seemed in the past." 3
In essence, scholars sharing this perspective argue that since decentralization—with economic development as the main objective—the Center has willingly or unwillingly conceded political power to localities. As a result, central power has gradually eroded and its capacity to control has been significantly reduced. Therefore, it is suggested that bureaucratic politics and/or interest group politics should become the focal point of studying Chinese politics today.4

The second view, however, argues that the Center, despite its extensive decentralization and various deregulatory measures, still possesses sufficient power to effectively control localities. If the Center so chooses, it still has the capability and resources to guide or sometimes coerce, if perceived necessary, localities to fulfill its goals. Local political activities are still licensed, circumscribed, and effectively controlled by the Center. Perhaps, the Center is now attempting to control local policy implementation more effectively through decentralization, with increasing emphasis on reward and cooptation. It seems scholars holding this view are few in numbers and literature reflecting this perspective is difficult to find.5

Both views deserve serious attention and efforts at empirical verification. In order to understand the degree of local power expansion

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4 For more on this perspective, see Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1980; see, in particular, Chapter 1.
5 See, for example, Steven M. Goldstein, "Reforming Socialist Systems," Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. XXI, no. 2 (Summer 1988), pp. 221-237, who calls on western scholars to reevaluate their heavy focus on local implementation processes and give greater weight to the role of central authorities in the policy process: "This essay," the author writes, "is...a modest proposal that the two perspectives which seem to be occupying such a major place in our analysis of post-Mao reform be not only integrated but integrated in such a way as to maintain, and further develop, a focus on the central role of leadership in the reform process."(p. 37)
and the degree of local compliance with the central policies, it is necessary to focus on policy implementation, that is, how central policies are actually executed at local levels. By assessing the degree that the policies are fully carried out or distorted in their implementation, we can gauge Beijing's ability to control. Based on these considerations, this dissertation examines the implementation of one important policy, i.e., the implementation of the cadre recruitment policy.

There are two significant reasons for studying local implementation of cadre recruitment policy. First, it helps us understand several crucial issues in Chinese politics. By studying recruitment policy implementation and observing who secures official positions, we can learn much about changing social mobility patterns and leadership formation at various levels. Since China is the largest remaining communist country, a sound understanding of the current leadership composition and behavior, who they are and what they do, is of tremendous importance to Western political science scholarship.

Second, and more importantly, study of cadre recruitment policy implementation provides an unparalleled vantage point for studying central and local political relationships. In today's China, the most essential central control is control over personnel. To spur economic development and encourage local initiative in policy implementation, Beijing has chosen to give up or loosen some controls, especially in economic spheres over the past decade. However, personnel control essentially remains unchanged in the hands of the Center. This dissertation will show, in fact, that in certain respects it has been strengthened. Without a sound understanding of personnel control, we cannot even begin to comprehend the scope and
effectiveness of central control and we can be easily misled by extensive
decentralization in other, less vital domains. Recruitment politics, a vital
aspect of political power in China, is of primary importance in any
politician's agenda and truly represents the intentions and interests of both
central and local political actors. Unlike other fields or policy areas where
central and local leaders may concede on one objective in order to win on
another, political power, as expressed through control of officials, is of
paramount concern. Nothing in Chinese political life, or perhaps in any
other system, is more important than obtaining political power by securing
political positions.

If localities can defy or resist the center's recruitment policy, for
instance, by promoting different kinds of cadres through different channels
outside those set by the Center, and if localities can twist and bend the
central policies to accommodate their own individual or regional interests,
I would argue that localities can resist the Center on the implementation of
any other policy. Furthermore, if localities can build their power base by
recruiting cadres according to a set of self-defined criteria without fear of
being reprimanded by the Center, it is quite possible that the centralized
Chinese polity may begin to disintegrate into various local power
strongholds.

It is my belief that all significant political changes either start from
cadre policy or in essence center around it. Mao Zedong's famous
quotation expressed his understanding of cadre policy: "Once a correct
political line is chosen, cadres play the decisive role." As early as 1979, Deng Xiaoping echoed Mao's thoughts on recruitment and the urgency with which reforms in this area needed to be undertaken: "After the political line has been established, it is dependent on men to implement it. Implementation results would certainly be different if policy is implemented by those who favor the party's political lines, or those who oppose them or those who hold a neutral stand. This raises the question of what kind of people do we want as our successors."7 Organizational line guarantees the successful realization of the political line.

In short, by focusing on recruitment politics, we can learn much about the systemic capability of a reforming socialist state: that is, to what extent can the political system can still initiate and guide political change and accomplish central policy objectives. In order to understand local recruitment politics, five sets of specific questions seem important and warrant investigation. First, what was Deng's recruitment policy and its specific components? Specifically, what was Deng's political recruitment agenda and the specific criteria for selecting cadres? And what was his timetable for accomplishing the objectives? Second, to what extent have Deng's policy goals and programs been achieved? And, in what areas of political recruitment has the central policy been faithfully and properly implemented? Third, there always exists disjuncture between the central policy intention and actual outcomes. The question is to what degree?

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Further, if a certain degree of compliance is achieved, and at the same time implementation slippage occurs, what accounts for it? In other words, what sociopolitical factors and specific mechanisms produced or facilitated such a pattern of behavior? Finally, what does the observed pattern of compliance and distortion imply about central control and political stability? What can we conclude from this study?

Literature Review and Project Contributions

Merilee Grindle's book *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World*, published in 1980, is an influential and widely cited scholarly work concerning Third World policy implementation.8 It argues that policy implementation is a crucial aspect of Third World politics.9 Thirteen articles in the Lampton edited book *Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China* are examples of the application of Grindle's insights to Chinese politics. These works, along with an earlier generation of policy studies largely produced by scholars associated with the University of Michigan in the 1970s have attempted to explain various implementation issues, disentangle complex causal variables, and explore the relative importance of the assorted independent variables.10

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Several observers have considered China's cadre management system. Among the most widely cited has been A. Doak Barnett's 1967 contribution, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China*.11 This book offered an investigation of the formal structures and processes of the Chinese cadre recruitment system. Later works considered information that was made available by the Chinese government to western scholars after the Open Door policy began in the late 1970's. One example of such a contribution is Melanie Manion's 1985 article, "The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer, and Removal of Party and State Leaders."12 This article was based largely on a handbook published by the Communist Party of China, Organization Department, Research Office and Organization Bureau which gave "relatively detailed information on cadre recruitment criteria, training and evaluation methods, contents and maintenance of personnel dossiers, lines of authority over cadres and veteran cadre management."13 The article examined the technical aspects of managing China's cadre recruitment system, but did not consider the responsiveness of local recruitment policy implementors to central policy directives. John P. Burns sought to understand the factors that determine cadre recruitment in his 1987 article, "China's Nomenklatura System."14 He concluded that cadre recruitment decisions are largely dependent on patron-client relationships and that

13 Ibid., p. 203.
central organizational control mechanisms play only a marginal role in implementation of recruitment policies.\(^{15}\)

Following in the intellectual footsteps of other scholars who have stressed the role of bargaining in Chinese policy implementation, a more recent study by Melanie Manion (1991) echoed Burns' conclusions and argued that decisions about cadre selection and promotion are often the result of bargaining between middle- and lower-level cadres.\(^{16}\)

Despite the contributions of these scholars, some inadequacies in the literature exist. First, comparatively speaking, policy implementation, as an approach to understanding Third World politics, especially the study of Chinese politics, has not yet been sufficiently explored. It is difficult to locate any thoroughgoing analysis regarding Chinese policy implementation, apart from Lampton's 1987 edited volume. Moreover, though more and more policies have been investigated, there still exist many areas that require further analysis.\(^{17}\) Recruitment policy represents one key policy area yet unexplained.

Second, much of Chinese political recruitment literature deals with national-level issues. Subnational levels, including the city and submunicipal levels should be considered in more meaningful detail.\(^{18}\) It is, in

\(^{15}\) Ibid.
\(^{18}\) Many studies limit themselves to the national level and do not pay enough attention to the role of local levels in implementing cadre recruitment policies. See, for example, Melanie Manion, 1985; John P. Burns, 1987; Gucheng Li, CCP: The Highest Echelon, 3rd edition (*Zhonggong Zuigao Lingdaoceng*) (Hong Kong: Ming Bao Press, 1989);
fact, at these levels where final policy outcomes are determined for a variety of policy issue areas. If the central authorities cannot count on cooperative and loyal cadres to hold these local-level positions, then their ability to ensure implementation of their policies may be undermined, especially at a time when these local-level policy implementors are enjoying more and more decision making authority through political decentralization.

Third, there exists a shortage of good, first-hand data, especially about cadres at local levels. Much research still largely depends on secondary sources—especially documents and readings from libraries in the West. Earlier Chinese policy studies almost exclusively depended on sources such as refugee interviews in Hong Kong and Taiwan, exemplified by Barnett's edited book.¹⁹ Some studies exclusively based their analysis on demographic data of elites or official newspaper articles from the Chinese government. What is lacking is first-hand systematic local elite demographic data and interviewing data involving one or more sub-provincial levels. Due to this scarcity of material and the inaccessibility of the inner reaches of the Organization Department for most scholars, few studies have penetrated deep into the dynamics of local politics by linking elite demographic variables with political attitudes. These inadequacies are typically reflected in the first generation of Chinese studies, for example, works by Scalapino, Barnett, and Kau Yingmao. Though the new


¹⁹ One observer explained that scholars who appeared in Barnett's 1967 edited volume typically travelled to Hong Kong, stayed in hotels and waited to interview refugees arriving on boats from the mainland. (Kevin J. O'Brien, P.S. 734, Spring 1990, Ohio State University).
generation of Sinologists have tried to remedy the deficiency, few have made striking headway. Methodologically, very few studies have combined demographic data (e.g., from library and archive research) with process information such as direct interviews with local elites and survey questionnaires. Presently, to the best of my knowledge there exists almost no empirical research on the dynamics of local implementation of recruitment policy involving both archival and interview research through field work.

Finally, in searching for independent variables, most implementation literature (typified by Lampton's volume and Lieberthal and Oksenberg's book *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes*) primarily seeks structural explanations or focuses exclusively on formal political relationships institutional interplay of various bureaucracies in policy implementation. Informal political variables that involve the policy implementors, either treated as individuals, groups or factions, are insufficiently explored. Local policy implementors and their political behavior as a group and a network in interaction with formal political relationship have been neglected or under-researched. In the Chinese context, where institutionalization is fairly limited and where informal political relationships still play an extremely important role, assuming interests to be predominantly institutionally based is misguided or, at best, premature. Likewise, without considering patron-client relations in the proper institutional context, the study of interpersonal relationships will lose sight of the broader picture.\(^20\) To explain Chinese politics, what is

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\(^20\) The most authoritative works on patron-clientelism in Chinese society have been by Andrew G. Walder. See, for example, Andrew G. Walder, "Organized Dependency and
needed is the linking of political institutions (formal political relations) with personalistic relationships (informal relations). The interaction of these two variables ought to be examined more carefully.

Understandably, a number of factors have contributed to this inadequacy. First, for more than a quarter of a century Western scholars were denied access to the People's Republic due to ideological conflicts and the cold war confrontation. It was not until 1978, when China began to adopt its open door policy and Western states, led by the United States, facilitated such a move, that Western scholars began to have the opportunity to do field research in China. Second, even though in general China has returned to the world community, many areas including freedom of press, personnel management, institutional change, and interest representation, are still carefully guarded in one way or another because of their political sensitivity. Much needed information is still difficult to acquire, and interviews with important political figures are still extremely difficult to arrange. The events of June 4, 1989 have, no doubt, only increased these difficulties.²¹ Third, from a cultural and linguistic point of view, it takes time for some Western scholars to absorb and truly understand the complexity and intricacies of Chinese intra-bureaucratic politics. Issues as central as bureaucratic rank and its ramifications on relationships between organizations and individual officials remain a

minefield of complexities that few non-native Sinologists dare enter. Simply using theories and models, which are based upon Western political experience, to explain Chinese politics is not always helpful. To truly explain Chinese politics requires a sound understanding of Chinese political history, culture, and the political actor's mindset. This is obviously a very challenging and long-term task.

This research is expected to contribute to the existing Chinese policy implementation literature, as well as to the study of the central-local political relationships, in a number of ways.

First, theoretically, the study will bridge a gap in Chinese implementation literature by providing a first hand study of recruitment policy implementation. This has not yet been done empirically at a local level. This dissertation is the first attempt to study Chinese recruitment policy to gain a better understanding of the local-central political relationship. Second, this research identifies, pinpoints, and operationalizes the two fundamental aspects (i.e., organizational control and patron-clientelism) that are important not only for policy implementation, but also for Third World politics as a whole. It especially links the two variables rarely considered together and probes into their interplays.

Third, this research presents an argument that was against the grain of much current research. Namely, it questions the widespread belief that central control is weakening as a result of decentralization. On the contrary, this study suggests Beijing still has sufficient resources and power to keep localities contained, primarily by using personnel control resources, whenever Beijing so chooses. This dissertation is the first attempt to study Chinese central and local political relationships by linking
organizational control with patron-client ties. It provides a counter-intuitive argument that both organizational control and patron-client networks have in fact played a facilitory role in implementing central policies.

Finally, empirically speaking, this is the first research on Chinese recruitment policy implementation involving direct and systematic interviewing of local elites. Two data sets of Chinese local cadres are made available for the first time, the local leader's demographic data and survey data of local cadres' political attitudes. These data sets are qualitatively superior to many library-based data, because they were acquired first-hand and because personal contacts were widely employed to encourage cadre respondents to speak candidly.

**Scope**

Undoubtedly, policy implementation is shaped and influenced not just by one or two variables, but by many types of variables, including many with political, social, cultural, historical, and economic dimensions. In fact, there are so many dimensions that scholars have categorized and lumped them under different headings and categories.

Having recognized that there is no one variable that can explain all variance of a dependent variable, however, there are variables that are more important than others and play a much more important role in causing outcomes in different situations. In Chinese recruitment politics, I will argue that variations in formal organization and informal patron-client networks are the two most important variables influencing policy implementation. Therefore, this dissertation exclusively concentrates on
these two variables for in-depth analysis. Some related aspects will also be introduced and discussed. Although other variables, such as ease of implementation of policies themselves, interpolicy and intrapolicy conflicts may also explain variation in implementation outcomes, their roles are largely secondary or marginal. These secondary variables, in fact, interact to affect policy only in the context of the organizational control and informal patron-client networks that I will consider. Scholars who concentrate, for instance, only on interpolicy and intrapolicy conflicts as independent variables in the Chinese policy process capture only a superficial understanding of the contextual determinants of policy outcomes. This dissertation will actually penetrate the Chinese political system for an intricate understanding of how the formal and informal processes operate and interact to produce secondary variables like interpolicy and intrapolicy conflicts and ultimate local-level policy outcomes.

**Methodology**

This dissertation investigates the implementation of cadre recruitment policy in Wuhan, China. Situated in central China, Wuhan in many ways is representative of other cities in China. Wuhan is one of the eight largest cities in the country. With a population of over six million, Wuhan carries commensurate strategic and political clout. Although it is only a city, Wuhan has the full budgetary status and economic power of a province. Politically, Wuhan, like China's other nine important cities, is treated as a
vice provincial (fushengji) unit by Beijing. The Wuhan cadre recruitment system is representative of many other cities of equal or smaller sizes. The same local-level branches of central agencies charged with implementing recruitment policies in Wuhan exist in the same bureaucratic form in all of China's cities. Therefore, studying Wuhan should provide an accurate picture of the politics of cadre recruitment in many parts of the country.

I undertook two field trips for this dissertation. The first, taken from October 24, 1990 to January 8, 1991, focused on data collection. The second trip, from April 15, 1991 to May 20, 1991, primarily involved further interviewing with local officials in order to clarify the theoretical and empirical findings. A subsequent trip in September 1992 allowed me to speak with more Chinese officials holding various offices which updated the data collected on earlier trips. These research trips have resulted in three kinds of data. The first is a demographic data set of 604 Wuhan cadres. This data set covers a wide range of Chinese leaders at various political levels with strong emphasis on local levels. Their hierarchical distribution is summarized in the following table:

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22 In 1984, Wuhan, together with nine other cities, were granted special status (jihua danlie chengshi) by the State Council. This was done primarily to boost the economic development. Since then, a number of other cities were given such a status.

23 Including the 100 cadres who responded to a questionnaire of 15 questions.
Table 1.1. Hierarchical Distribution of 604 Chinese Cadres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Ministerial/Mayor</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Mayor</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau MRP</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Deputy</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department MRP</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Deputy</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section MRP</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section Deputy</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Cadre</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second data set is derived from a questionnaire, designed around each major theme of policy implementation. 100 local cadres responded. The questionnaire was prepared in Wuhan after approximately 100 hours of interviewing and was developed with one of the cadres from the Wuhan Municipal Party Organization Department (MPOD) to improve its conceptual clarity and wording. The 100 sample cadres, accessed through friends, relatives, and formal colleagues, are reasonably representative for

24 MRP (zhuyao fuzeren) is a common expression referring to those persons charged with the responsibility of overseeing a unit's affairs. There are always two MRP's in a unit; one who is in charge of Party affairs and another who is charged with overseeing administrative affairs.
two reasons. First, they come from a wide variety of the Party's and municipal government's functional areas, such as municipal labor, taxation, transportation, construction, radio and TV, public security, district government. Second, the 100 cadres come from four different hierarchical levels spanning the Chinese bureaucracy, i.e., bureau (ju), division (chu), section (ke), and grassroots (jiceng) cadres. More importantly, some interviewees come directly from personnel departments which are in charge of personnel matters in their organizations. Therefore, they are very well qualified to address recruitment questions. Their hierarchical representation of the one hundred respondents is illustrated in the following figure:

![Bar Chart]

Figure 1.1 Hierarchical Distribution of the Sample Cadres (N=100)

---

25 The 100 cadres interviewed are not the same as the 504 position holders from which background and demographic information are gathered.
The third data set, and perhaps the most helpful one, is the interviewing file compiled after more than 350 hours of interviews with six central cadres26 and 15 local cadres; These one-on-one interviews helped me construct the theoretical core of this dissertation. These 21 cadres have had extensive personnel work experience, either having once worked for personnel departments, or still working in the Party organization departments. In terms of rank, these interviewees ranged from the city's mayor to grassroots cadres, representing a wide array of opinions.

Upon returning to the United States, I entered the data into a computer and ran statistical computations, which are presented throughout the dissertation. Based on the data analysis and insights gained from the interviews, causal variables were selected and their effect in causing implementation results were analyzed.

Structure and Hypothesis

Chapter II begins with a delineation of Deng's policy goals and specific policy programs with regard to cadre recruitment. Since Deng's recruitment policy is best summarized by himself as "sihua"27 ("Four Transformations") criteria, i.e., making cadres younger, more educated, more professional, and more revolutionary, each criterion is closely examined. Furthermore, specific action programs initiated by Beijing to

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26 Central cadres mean those who work at central bureaucracies. For more information, please refer to appendix B.

27 "Sihua" is a Chinese word created to denote Deng's new cadre policies. It means that Chinese cadres should go through four transformations in age, education, professionalism, and political standards.
realize Deng's "sихua" are traced and delineated. The information contained in this chapter primarily comes from government documents, leadership speeches, and, most importantly, the concrete working documents of the Central Organization Department (COD). Documents and magazines published by the state personnel bureaucracies and the relevant newspaper articles proved to be helpful as well. It is important to note that many of the cited documents have never been used by scholars before.

Following the policy delineation there next appears a presentation of empirical evidence concerning implementation results in Wuhan. This section explains to what extent and in what areas the central policies have been followed. The implementation results are examined, compared, and discussed alongside the "Si Hua" Criteria. On the one hand, it is important to recognize the capabilities of the post-Mao regime in producing political change and to identify those areas where changes have occurred. On the other hand, we should also recognize that different degrees of variation exist at different hierarchical levels and across different functional units. In no nation does there exist perfect correspondence between leadership intentions and actual implementation outcomes. To protect or expand their own interests, localities may change, bend, twist, adapt, or even distort the central policies to fit their political needs and desires. Few question that there is some slippage and distortion; the question is the degree of deviation and the potential threat that it may pose to central control.

Chapter III seeks to answer the question, "what has led to the high degree of compliance?" A tight, top-down organization control network is identified as the single most important causal variable. Various aspects of
the organization control are explored and analyzed, supported by evidence collected first hand in Wuhan.

Chapter IV attempts to explore the independent variables that have caused the observed pattern of local policy implementation. It is a theoretical voyage that aims to explicate why and how slippage and distortion occurred. Informal political relationships, primarily in the form of patron-client ties, are identified as the most important factors in causing implementation slippage. On the one hand, Beijing has explicitly directed localities not to allow patron-client relationships to influence recruitment decisions; on the other hand, I have found that local patron-client relationships pose no threat to central control and, in fact, may actually function as facilitators of implementation of recruitment policies in line with central policy directives. Patron-client networks are examined in depth, from their formation through their functions.

Chapter V, the concluding chapter, ends with some thoughts on the political implications of post-Mao policy implementation in terms of the system's capability, central and local political relationships, and political stability.
National Post-Mao Recruitment Policy

In this section, I will discuss the goals of cadre recruitment policy reform, the programs promulgated to ensure implementation of these policies with a focus on the Central Organization Department's 1983 Eight Year Plan, and measuring implementation success. After reviewing these national policy objectives, I will examine the implementation of these policies at the local level of the Chinese political system in the city of Wuhan.

The Policy Goals

Deng Xiaoping's official policy goals of cadre system reform are best explained in his important August 1980 speech entitled "On the Reform of the Party and State Leadership System". In this speech, Deng defined and summarized the new cadre recruitment criteria in the post-Mao era as making cadres "revolutionary, younger, knowledgeable, and professional"
(in Chinese it is called Si Hua). Chen Yun, another powerful senior Chinese leader, echoed Deng's viewpoint:

"From now on, we should promote and train thousands and tens of thousands of middle-aged and young cadres. Those who are capable and morally sound should be put into various leading positions. With the help of our senior cadres, they can become strong back-up forces for our party and government, from which leaders can be selected anytime."  

More specifically, Deng's regime intended to achieve four goals. First, by carefully screening every cadre, those who followed the "Gang of Four" and the ultra-leftist line during the Cultural Revolution, could be eliminated from various leadership positions. Those who were actively engaged in persecution of senior cadres like Deng Xiaoping himself during the Cultural Revolution could be expelled from the Party once and for all. Keeping these political enemies out of power, according to Deng, was of paramount importance. This was stressed time and again by Deng, especially shortly after the down-fall of the "Gang of Four". Both from his personal point of view as well as for the purpose of pursuing his new political agenda, Deng wanted this task accomplished as thoroughly as possible, so that there will be no disturbance and sabotage from these hidden political enemies.

Second, by establishing a retirement system which allowed old cadres to give up political power without disgrace, political positions were made available for younger cadres upon whom Deng depended for his...
modernization programs. The goal was to make every leading body younger, manned by cadres in their 50s, 40s, and 30s. A smooth transition of power from the older generation to the younger one is a primary item on Deng's agenda. Leadership reinvigoration was perceived as a critical task, if Deng's new agenda was to succeed.

Third, by emphasizing higher education, various leading organs, especially government bureaucracies, can be run by experts or knowledgeable professionals, instead of aged and often senile revolutionary veterans. Deng astutely recognized the fact that his new agenda could not be accomplished without reforming the existing establishment by infusing "new blood" into the leadership. Maoist ideologues are not equipped with the know-how to carry out his economic development program, let alone the fact that some of them are anti-reform.

Fourth, Deng wants to reform and reinvigorate the rigid and overly centralized cadre management system. Deng explains why:

"Our leading organs at various levels have controlled many things that should not and cannot be controlled. The control of such things should be decentralized to enterprise, administrative and social units, as long as certain rules are followed. We should let them manage according to democratic centralism and they can manage well. Instead, our party and government leading organs and the central departments have controlled everything. It simply cannot be done. No body has such a magic capability to manage so many complex and unfamiliar matters."4

Deng Xiaoping is convinced that Beijing should only control key personnel, instead of being bogged down with trivial matters at lower levels. Therefore, transferring certain personnel power from Beijing to

---

4 See Deng Xiaoping, 1980.
localities and from the Party to the government bureaucracies is not only of no harm to the central control, but may also enhance the effectiveness of central control. This process is frequently referred to as "controlling less, but controlling better" (guan de shao dan guan de hao).\(^5\)

All four goals serve one primary purpose: reforming the recruitment system for more effective implementation of Deng's new economic agenda. In other words, Deng relies on a new generation of cadres to fulfill his broad economic objectives. Deng professed in his well-known recent south China tour:

I said again in late May of 1989 that we should now select those who have been publicly recognized as reform-oriented and have had political achievements. We should boldly put them into the new leadership, making people feel that we sincerely push for reform and the open-door. We should move one step further in selecting young cadres for leadership positions. Right now, top level CCP leaders are old, while those who are a little over 60 years old are considered comparatively young. These people may work for another ten years. How about another ten years? How should we do? Octagenarians, like us today, can only shoot the breeze. For actual work, we do not have enough energy.\(^6\)

The Policy Programs

In order to achieve these goals, a whole series of specific policy programs have been enacted during the past decade. The Central Organization Department (COD) played a predominant role in making these policies. One of the most important action programs was the COD's

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\(^5\) This is a popular Chinese phrase used to describe the objectives of Beijing's efforts at decentralization, which is believed to be a means of increasing the efficiency of the central control.

\(^6\) Speech by Deng Xiaoping during his recent South China trip, The Quest (Tan Suo), June 1992, P. 11.
Eight Year Plan initiated in 1983. According to this program, the realization of cadre "sihua" would involve two stages: the first from 1983 to 1985 and the second from 1986 to 1990. The plan was structured around the "Si Hua" theme. Specific guidelines and hard measures were given for each requirement.

The first criteria was a political one, the so-called revolutionary criterion. Compared with the other three criteria (age, education and professionalism), this criterion is much more difficult to specify and measure. Only general descriptions were given in the plan:

"Cadres must grasp the basic principles of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, establish communist ideology, adhere to the Four Basic Principles, absolutely implement the Party's lines, principles, policies, and decisions, maintain political conformity with the CCP Central Committee, have strong sense of political responsibility to the revolutionary course and serve the people wholeheartedly."

The essence of this criterion is to set a basic tone for everyone, namely, that all cadres should obey central directives. Those who don't are perceived as failing to meet this criterion and, therefore, can be excluded from leading positions. Second, the plan provides specific guidelines for cadres' ages. The following table is a summary of a document distributed

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7 CCP Central Organization Department, "The Eight Year Plan of Leadership Sihua Construction" in Policy research Office of the Ministry of Labor and Personnel, ed., Selected Documents of Personnel Work (VI) (Beijing: People's Press, 1983), pp. 106-114. This publication can be considered one of the most important and indispensable sources of information for the study of Chinese recruitment policies. It actually summarizes and publishes central documents and top-level leadership speeches and those work reports that receive central approval for distribution throughout the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy.

8 Ibid., p. 108.
by central authorities outlining the age requirements for cadres recruited for various local government levels.

Table 2.1.
Age Criterion in the Eight Year Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>MRP &amp; DEPUTIES</th>
<th>OTHER LEADING MEMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>Party &amp; government MRPs under 65</td>
<td>Under 60, Around 50, Around 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal/Bureau</td>
<td>Around 55, at least one under 40</td>
<td>Around 55, Under 50, Under 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>Under 50, ideally 50% under 45, one under 35</td>
<td>Under 50, Around 40, Around 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory (County Level or Higher)</td>
<td>Government MRPs &amp; deputies under 55; Party MRP slightly older. Few major corporations can go up to 60.</td>
<td>Majority should be middle-aged and young.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The age requirements are fairly detailed and straightforward. The timetable for implementation of these guidelines was also included in the circular. In addition to these age requirements, The Eight Year Plan also set specific guidelines on education and professionalism levels for cadres at various levels. Table 2.2 summarized these requirements:

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9 Provincial level takes two steps. In the first three years (from 1983 to 1985), all those who have reached the retirement age set by the Center must retire from their leadership positions, with only a few exceptions that must be pre-approved by the organizational department. The extra period of stay should not be very long. In the second stage, provincial party and government body should be composed of a mix of cadres under 60, around 50 and 40. Party MRP and governor must be under 65 years old. At least one of deputy party boss or lieutenant governor should be around 40 years old.
Table 2.2.
Education & Professionalism Requirements in the Eight Year Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PROVINCIAL</td>
<td>At least high school; 50% achieve college</td>
<td>In general, everybody achieve college level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUNICIPAL</td>
<td>In general MRPs college level; other leaders high school</td>
<td>In general, everybody should achieve college level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUREAU</td>
<td>High school or higher; 50% college</td>
<td>2/3 college level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTY</td>
<td>High school level; 1/3 college. At least 1 MRP college;</td>
<td>2/3 college; MRP should achieve college level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE-RUN FACTORY</td>
<td>2/3 MRPs college level</td>
<td>All college level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following promulgation of these guidelines, the COD took concrete measures to ensure implementation. First, the COD required that the Party organization departments at all levels must work out their own implementation plans and report them to a higher authority for approval. Once a year the implementation of the plan is to be inspected, to encourage timely implementation. Second, every level in the hierarchy should establish a "Third Echelon", which is a back-up cadre pool composed of cadres with tiered ages. From this pool qualifying cadres can be selected at any time to fill vacancies. Third, a retirement system should be established and all related rules should be strictly followed. All cadres beyond age limits for their positions must immediately retire and have their retirement paper work done, except in those special cases pre-approved by higher authorities. Fourth, for those who are not beyond their age limits, but who
have lost their leading posts, efforts should be made to reassign them other jobs. Fifth, cadre training and reeducation is to be streamlined so that every leading member will have obtained at least a high school education. Various party and cadre schools should double their efforts in running short term or long term courses, so that all cadres have an opportunity to upgrade their education. Sixth, leadership at all levels should actively seek out and promote middle-aged and younger cadres (30-40 year-olds) from among the ranks of China's intellectuals. Finally, the three-in-one system should be followed in the selection process which requires cadres to be chosen through mass recommendation, examined by the Party organization department, and approved by the Party committee. These policies and guidelines have been promulgated by the COD over the past twelve years. These policies were meant to encourage the timely implementation of Deng's sweeping recruitment reform package.

Clearly, Deng's leadership has embarked on an ambitious political course to change China's cadre structure with a primary objective of furthering his centrist economic agenda by consolidating support throughout the Chinese bureaucracy. Policy emphases in cadre recruitment have shifted to stress ideological pragmatism, rather than ideological supremacy, professional education and expertise rather than a "red" political background, youth rather than seniority, and functional qualifications rather than political qualifications for elites.

10 These guidelines were issued by the COD in a document entitled "Work Report of Recruiting Provincial Leadership" (Guanyu Peibei Quanguo Shengji Lingdao Banzi de Gongzuo Baogao), in Ibid., pp. 70-80.
Local Implementation of Cadre Recruitment Policy: The Case of Wuhan

This section empirically documents implementation of cadre recruitment policy in Wuhan, based on the findings of the two field trips. It examines each of the "sihua" criteria set forth by Beijing and their execution in Wuhan. That is, more precisely, it examines the question, "to what degree have the four criteria been implemented?" After presenting the data, I seek to explore and explain the pattern of behavior exhibited in the recruitment policy implementation in Wuhan.

Younger Cadres

One undeniable change in post-Mao Wuhan cadre composition is that cadres at various local levels are much younger than before. Wuhan compliance in recruiting younger cadres surpasses that of the other three measures. As a result of one decade of reform, seniority, in the past denoting experience and consistency in decision-making, now carries a more negative connotation and is, in large measure, perceived as the source of immobilism, conservatism, and incapability. In Wuhan today few cadres who have passed their respective age limits retain their positions. This criterion, especially its implementation at higher local levels (municipal and, to some extent, bureau), has been strictly monitored and enforced by Beijing, with assistance from the various local Party organization departments. Through continuous efforts throughout the past decade, it has become a widely accepted practice that once a cadre turned 60, the provincial or the municipal Party organization department would issue an official letter announcing his or her retirement. Few exceptions
were found in this regard. In fact, according to a local official, three months prior to such a date, a letter of reminder is automatically generated and sent to the retiring cadre. A deputy director of the Provincial Party Organization Department once said that he simply goes over the cadre's dossier to generate such letters.11 Consequently, the age parameters of Wuhan cadres at various levels, generally speaking, conform to the age criteria set by the Center. The survey results of the 587 cadres are summarized in Table 2.3.

11 From my local interview, File B, No. 08.
Table 2.3.

587 Wuhan Cadre’s Age by Rank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>N Size</th>
<th>Row %</th>
<th>Ave Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young (30-39)</td>
<td>Middle Aged (40-49)</td>
<td>Old (50-59)</td>
<td>Elderly (60+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Missing= 13

As table 2.3 illustrates, all 17 mayoral level cadres (i.e., the mayor, vice mayor, party secretary and deputies), satisfy the age criteria, that is, no one is 60 years or older. While 11 of them are between 50-59, six of them are under 50. The youngest deputy mayor is only 41. At bureau and division levels, while a few (respectively 2.3% and 4.7%) have passed their age limits, the majority meets its respective age requirements. It should also be noted that the average age of the seven bureau cadres was 61 and the seven division cadres 60.1 years old, slightly beyond the age limits. No
cadre over the 60 years old threshold is found at section or grassroots levels.

Figure 2.1 shows the average age of the 587 cadres in each rank category, including municipal, bureau, division, section and grassroots levels. As is indicated in Figure 3.1, there was no observation of sharp differences between the average ages in each age category as compared with those in the other rank levels. Unsurprisingly, the age structure of Wuhan cadres is tiered; that is to say, cadres at higher levels are older than their subordinates, with the exception of bureau cadres who are fairly close in age to their superiors.

![Figure 2.1 Average Age of 587 Wuhan Cadres by Rank](image-url)
Since these 587 cadres come from many functional units, further investigation is necessary in order to determine whether or not variations exist among departments and bureaus. In other words, although the general pattern clearly meets the criteria, does each unit meet the age criteria as well? Four functional units were examined and the results indicate that the cadre's age patterns were similar to one another. Put differently, no unit had a high concentration of old cadres, or young cadres.

Figure 2.2 compares the age percentages of the bureau level cadres in the four units with the 287 bureau cadres from various other municipal units. As the curve shows, bureau cadres in all four units (security bureau, tax bureau, construction bureau, and Hanyang district) do not differ significantly from each other in their age distributions and they approximately conform to the ages of the 287 general bureau cadres as well. This indicates that all bureau cadres in Wuhan are roughly similar in age.

![Figure 2.2 Age Distribution of Wuhan Bureau Cadres.](image)
Division cadres also have a similar distribution, as we can see from figure 2.3. The young, the middle aged, and the old cadres are relatively evenly distributed in the surveyed four organizations. There were too few section and grassroots cadre levels to analyze.

Moreover, when the 487 cadres are examined according to the nature of their work, they fall into four major functional categories: cultural and research units, factories, administrative bureaucracies, and the Party. Table 2.4 indicates that cadres in different industries are similar in distribution. Their age means are strikingly close to one another.

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12 The 100 cadres data set does not include this variable. Therefore, the N is reduced to 487.
Table 2.4.
Cadre's Age Mean by Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>Young (30-39)</th>
<th>Middle Age (40-49)</th>
<th>Old (50-59)</th>
<th>Elder (60 &amp; over)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural/Research</td>
<td>Ave Age</td>
<td>36 (2)</td>
<td>46 (9)</td>
<td>54 (15)</td>
<td>60 (1)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory</td>
<td>Avg Age</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45.1 (46)</td>
<td>54 (78)</td>
<td>61 (2)</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Ave Age</td>
<td>35 (60)</td>
<td>45 (90)</td>
<td>55 (156)</td>
<td>61 (7)</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Ave Age</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46 (4)</td>
<td>54 (9)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.5.
Cadre's Age Mean by Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WORK</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>Young (30-39)</th>
<th>Middle Age (40-49)</th>
<th>Old (50-59)</th>
<th>Elder (60 &amp; over)</th>
<th>Average Age</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Ave Mean</td>
<td>34 (91)</td>
<td>45 (143)</td>
<td>54 (215)</td>
<td>61 (11)</td>
<td>47.52</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Ave Mean</td>
<td>31 (9)</td>
<td>45 (29)</td>
<td>55 (61)</td>
<td>60 (4)</td>
<td>50.34</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>563</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.5 divides the 563 cadres into party and nonparty cadres. The results indicate that both groups have similar age parameters. The above statistical computations, and the breakdowns done according to level, unit, gender, job nature, and other factors indicate that: 1) Wuhan cadres share similar age patterns; 2) they conform to the central age criterion with only a few exceptions. Therefore, it appears that the effort to reduce the age of officials is not implemented by just a few organizations, but by all Wuhan municipal offices.

Interviews also confirmed the statistical results. 100 selected Wuhan cadres were asked questions about their general impression of the implementation of age criterion; 43.4% of them think it is either very good or quite good; 42.4% think it is reasonably good; and only 14.1% either feel dissatisfied or completely dissatisfied. A cadre may feel dissatisfied for any number of reasons. For instance, older cadres and those who do not quite qualify sihua are bound to be critical of developments in Chinese central recruitment policies that may discriminate against them.

Not only are cadres now younger, the notion of promoting younger cadres has begun to be accepted by local cadres. When the cadres were asked to respond to the following statements, A) "youth are the future of our course, the younger the better," or B) "emphasizing younger criterion cuts off some capable senior cadres and our work suffered," 41.1% chose statement A, while 23.2% chose B (35.8% think otherwise, but gave no further explanations.) While middle age and old cadres' attitudes are somewhat divided, younger cadres and retired cadres have demonstrated a clear appreciation of self-interest. 92.6% (25 out of 27) young cadres
checked statement A, while all four retired cadres checked statement B. With regard to the performance of young cadres, 93.9% rated it positively, 10.2% think they have done an excellent job, and 83.7% think they are capable of handling their assigned duties. The answers to these questions indicate that cadre recruitment policies have been strictly implemented with considerable success at the local level in Wuhan. Although the age criterion has been implemented quite satisfactorily by Wuhan authorities, it is necessary to mention a few shortfalls. First, when the stricter standard is used, some units fall short on younger cadres. Second, some units still have a few old cadres beyond their age limits. Finally, some units do not have a good mix of cadres in their 50's, 40's, and 30's, as the Center has requested. Despite this, the age criterion has been well implemented by Wuhan.

**Better Educated Cadres**
Undoubtedly, meritocracy has become an important standard in cadre promotion. It was observed that in many offices, it was treated as the single most important criterion. The educational achievements of Wuhan cadres has increased dramatically and education as a requirement defined by Beijing has been largely met. The statistics in Table 2.6 shed light on Wuhan cadres' education.
Table 2.6.
Wuhan Cadre's Education by Rank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NSize</td>
<td>College</td>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>Elementary School</td>
<td>Total N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>303</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Cadres</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>574</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A cursory look at table 2.6 tells us that at the four highest levels (municipal, bureau, division and section), more than half of the MRPs and deputies have received some higher education. It also seems that the higher one resides in the hierarchy, the higher one's education is. In percentage terms, 75% of the mayor level, 69% of the bureau level, 60% of the division level, and 58% of the section level have college or higher degrees. Not even one cadre surveyed at these four levels has only an elementary education.
Moreover, when a distinction is made between college education (usually 2 to 3 years) and university education (often 4 to 5 years), we see that the quality of higher education at the mayoral and bureau levels are higher than at the lower levels.\(^\text{13}\) The Eight Year Plan requires that two-thirds of mayoral and bureau level cadres should have received college and/or university education.\(^\text{14}\) Clearly, the results of this analysis indicate that mayoral and bureau cadres have achieved the standard set forth by the

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13 Graduates from two- and three-year colleges receive diplomas indicating completion of their courses of study; these diplomas do not represent Bachelor of Arts degrees. University graduates attend school for four to five years and are awarded Bachelor of Arts degrees upon completion of their programs of study.

Eight Year Plan. It is also worth mentioning that division level cadres also have received an amount and quality of education that is close to the targets set forth by central cadre recruitment policies, while only nine percent of section cadres have not received the education they should have received according to central policies.

This trend towards a better educated cadre force is also apparent in Hangyang, one of the five districts in metropolitan Wuhan. In this district, 88.9% of the bureau cadres, 80% of the division cadres, 65% of the section cadres, and 25% of the grassroots cadres have received higher education. This suggests a similar pattern: cadres at higher levels have higher education than cadres at lower levels. It should also be noted that Hangyang District is in many cases representative because it is a full-fledged local administrative unit where all four bureaucratic levels are represented.

Dividing these 487 cadres according to their type of work, the percentage of who have higher education is also impressive. First, the majority of cadres in different functional areas have received higher education. Second, about 97% of cadres in cultural sectors scored the highest on education. Although administrative cadres score the lowest, 57.59%, nevertheless, more than half have received some form of higher education. Using the two thirds threshold, cadres in different functional units all have met their respective educational requirements, except administrative cadres who are, on average, approximately nine percentage points below the requirement.

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15 The 100 interviewed cadres were not asked this question, the N size is dropped to 487.
Table 2.8.
Wuhan Cadre's Education by Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>N Size</th>
<th>College</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>Elementary School</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture/Research</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row %</td>
<td>96.88%</td>
<td>3.12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30.95</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row %</td>
<td>69.05%</td>
<td>30.95%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42.23</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row %</td>
<td>57.77%</td>
<td>42.23%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CCP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row %</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on these data, cadre education guidelines seem to have been implemented without undue distortion. However, when the question is examined more closely, the indicator of quality of education reveals a complication. Among those who have received higher education in recent years, some were rushed through informal educational institutions. Many cadres nowadays graduate from evening universities, TV universities, correspondence universities, and magazine universities. Many observers, including even the graduates themselves, are skeptical about the quality of education provided by these universities.¹⁶ The Wuhan Tax Bureau, for

¹⁶Evening universities (veda) are primarily for persons who work during the day and want to get a diploma, but do not have the time to attend day classes. Television universities televise classes that are conducted by university professors at television studios; these classes are televised on a city-wide basis and students meet formally and
instance, administered a nine month program for its cadres to rush through six college level courses. Everyone who attended, regardless of true achievements, was awarded a college diploma, which can serve as a certificate for possible future promotion. In responding to whether or not their units have exhibited a tendency to rush employees through substandard programs while ignoring the quality of education, the response of the 100 cadres is almost an even split with 51.7% saying yes and 48.3% saying no. Nevertheless, the fact that units are making efforts to respond to the recruitment policy guidelines in the area of education indicates that progress is being achieved. For those cadres who are rushed through programs with little concern for the quality of education, it is quite possible that on-the-job-training is enough to prepare them for their positions and future promotions. Precisely because of a concern with implementing central guidelines and a recognition that more and more emphasis will be placed on education and college diplomas as justifications for professional promotion, by and large, I found many units trying to administer at least some form of college training to all of their employees.

Despite the issue of education quality, it should be acknowledged that cadre education has been improved substantially and more and more educated cadres are now recruited into local leadership positions. More than half of the 100 cadres surveyed generally rated cadres' educational qualifications positively while 35.4% feel they are acceptable and only

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informally to watch the programs on TV. They are given homework assignments which they hand in to professors or assistants at the studios. Magazine universities are similar to television universities, but are conducted through magazines; students mail their homework assignments to the magazine universities.
12.2% feel dissatisfied. Almost 90% think their units have done an acceptable job in implementing central education criteria. 8.2% even think their units have done a wonderful job. When asked about their personal view of cadres' general educational qualification, 67.3% feel satisfied. 60% of the respondents think that their organizations maintain a balance between emphasizing diplomas and practical experience. However, 27.6% think that their units only emphasize diplomas, not practical experience, while 8% think educational achievements are overlooked by their units.17

More Professional Cadres

Following the central policy, the professionalism of Wuhan cadres has also changed dramatically. Cadres with strong technical backgrounds and good performance records are, indeed, treated with priority in political recruitment. Many newly promoted Wuhan leaders come with various technical and science backgrounds. It has become a common practice to promote technical experts to fill bureaucratic positions, such as a university presidency, a research institution directorship, and government bureau MRPs.

In order to mobilize professionals, technicians and intellectuals into the career track that leads towards leadership positions, the system of

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17 Although one might argue that most cadres in China would say a central policy was important and was being well-implemented, even if they believed the opposite to be true, one can argue that any foreigner conducting political interviews of any type in China would face the same dilemma of deciding whether or not to believe a certain respondent. As a native Chinese who depended on friends and close personal contacts for interviews and data, I am personally confident that my respondents spoke honestly and candidly with me. Their views are important precisely because they are the people who are charged with implementation of the policies and who are most directly affected by the policies themselves.
granting professional titles has been restored. Those who have a technical background hope to obtain some kind of professional title depending on merit and degree of professional attainment. It is in vogue for administrative cadres to earn professional titles, which, among other things, add to their legitimacy when leading a functional unit. Such ranking symbolizes the level of expertise in a technical or a functional area. In a university setting, professors and associate professors have high level rankings, lecturers have middle level rankings, and teaching assistants have low rankings; in factories, senior engineers have high rankings, engineers have middle rankings, and assistant engineer have low rankings. While a bachelor degree holder usually starts with a low ranking, someone holding a master's degree is always granted a middle ranking after a short period of practice. A doctorate usually ends up with a high ranking (e.g., associate professor) after a few years practice (normally two years).

If professional ranking is a good indicator of a cadre's professionalism, it should be acknowledged that Wuhan has scored quite high on this count. Overall, 77.3% of the cadres have high or middle level professional titles. At the municipal level, 63.5% have either a middle level or high level ranking, whereas at the bureau level the rate is 77%.
Comparatively speaking, cadres from cultural institutions have the highest rate of professionalism, with 55.6% holding high ranks, and the rest holding at least middle ranks. The Party cadres, in general, fare poorly in this regard, although the limited number of cases (N=5) prevents us from making overly confident judgments.

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18 Cultural institutions include universities, the press, media, publishing houses, performing arts, entertainment, the Bureau of Culture, and other educational institutions.
Table 2.10.
Cadre's Industry by Professional Title

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>PROFESSIONAL TITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture/Research</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CCP</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the data shows that the professionalism index in Wuhan is high, it should be noted that the amount of missing information is also high. No explanations were given in the roster as to why this was the case, but interviews indicated that implementors of cadre recruitment policies have responded to calls from Beijing to concentrate on recruiting cadres whose training and skills match their assigned duties.

If a cadre's area of specialization is irrelevant to his job duties, no matter how high his ranking and/or educational preparation is, the true value of professionalism needs to be discounted. Caution should be used when analyzing this data, because it is extremely difficult to track down precisely what these 487 cadres studied as their majors in schools and what their current job duties are. Having recognized this fact, the following
findings seem important. First, 85% (N=23) cadres in cultural units have had appropriate education for the positions they hold (meaning they are characterized as "very fit") with 15% (N=4) with less appropriate, but acceptable education for their employment (these employees are termed "basically fit"). Second, more than 50% of cadres in factories and government bureaucracies have had proper education and training for their positions (meaning they are at least average in their "fitness" for their employment positions). There are a number of reasons for these results; 1) There were very few party cadre schools that offered university level programs to party cadres; many of them are short-term training courses, varying form three to six months; 2) Many cadres with technical backgrounds are now assigned to party posts, and given responsibilities with little relevance to their areas of education and training; 3) Perhaps most importantly, many party cadres are revolutionary veterans who received less education to begin with.
Although I can confidently say that compared with Mao era cadres, today's cadres are given more opportunities to utilize their skills and expertise, the "fitness" problem does exist at various levels and, in some cases, is quite obvious, as is indicated in Table 2.11. This situation may result from informal patron-client networks that work to recruit and promote cadres based on political rather than professional considerations. Nevertheless, respondents widely acknowledged that the situation has improved considerably over Mao-era recruitment processes when the professional qualifications of candidates were often not a consideration.19

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19 According to a 1984 article, at the levels of provincial, municipal, and prefecture, the college level cadres had increased from 14% to 44%. Among the new recruits, more than a third were below the age of thirty-five and two-thirds had received college education. (see Qian Qizhi, 1984, p. 13.)
Table 2.12.
Wuhan Cadre's Rank by Fitness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>FITNESS</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Row %</th>
<th>Very Fit</th>
<th>Basically Fit</th>
<th>Not Fit</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30.77</td>
<td>30.77</td>
<td>38.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau</td>
<td></td>
<td>148</td>
<td>60.16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>47.83</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.04</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52.38</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19.05</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55.56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55.56</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>223</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
<td>404</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although recruiting intellectuals into various leading bodies has become a popular practice, many who were promoted are pure technical experts with little or no managerial skills. Some bureau MRPs and deputies run their organizations without prior administrative experience and familiarity with executive work. For instance, the director of the Wuhan Garden Bureau was a glassware technician who had no prior bureaucratic experience at all. Partly because of his lack of political experience and his lack of preparedness for power battles in a new political environment, his short-lived promotion ended with a quick removal from his position.
Despite all of this, it is clear that Wuhan implementation of professionalism policy has been satisfactory to the Center. Regarding professionalism, 46% of the 100 cadres surveyed feel positively about cadre's professionalism. 40% feel acceptable, and 14% think it is poor. When assessing fitness of cadres in their units, 6.1% feel very good, 80.8% acceptable, and 13.1% poor.

More Revolutionary Cadre

Compared to the other three criteria, the definition of the revolutionary criterion is much more difficult. A considerable amount of ambiguity exists at various local levels in understanding and interpreting this criterion, and there are no long-standing or consistent hard measures. However, it should be pointed out that in the earlier stages after the downfall of the "Gang of Four", this criterion was associated more explicitly with a policy that demanded that the "three kinds of persons" should be removed from all leading bodies. The implementation of this criterion in Wuhan under this definition has been truly remarkable. Every Wuhan cadre's political behavior during the Cultural Revolution was thoroughly reviewed, and those who were identified as the "three kind of persons" immediately lost their positions. They suffered political

20 Although the one hundred cadres surveyed are local cadres, they are well aware of when the central authorities are satisfied with local policy implementation in China. Their views are critically important for our understanding of local implementation success precisely because they are the implementors of central policies and because they are immediately affected when central authorities become dissatisfied with local implementation. Central views of successful local implementation of cadre recruitment policies, please, refer to the following article: Qian Qizhi, "On the Central and Provincial Organizational Reform," ("Guanyu Zhongshan Hesheng Ji Jigou Gaige Qingkuang"), Political Science Research Bulletin (Zhengzhixue Yanjiu Tongxun), Vol. 22, No. 6 (September 9, 1984), pp. 9-15.
discrimination and their chances of being recruited back into the bureaucracy became virtually nil.

The content of the revolutionary criterion has been shifted and changed over time. As the central leadership changes its agenda and priorities, so changes the revolutionary criterion. For a period of time when Deng's leadership perceived economic development as the most urgent task, the revolutionary criterion was measured by a cadre's productivity, achievements, and capability in dealing with tough economic issues. This was highlighted by his protege Zhao Ziyang's remarks that as long as a cadre is productive and capable, and as long as he has not committed any social crime, he then should be regarded as a good cadre. Ideology, which was once the core of this criterion, was largely abandoned under the administration of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang.

These evolving policy changes resulted in a strong reaction in Wuhan from emphasizing ideology and loyalty to the Party to productivity and capability. The revolutionary criterion was essentially overwhelmed by the other three criteria—younger, better educated, and more professional. During one of his trips to Wuhan, Zhao Ziyang told Wuhan leaders to remove party organizations in the city functional bureaus and put personnel power into the hands of administrative MRPs. Soon after his directives, all party organizations in the functional bureaus were removed. The Party cadres were reassigned to new jobs in other departments.

After Zhao's purge after the June 4, 1989 incident, the pendulum swung back somewhat. This revolutionary criteria is now being reinterpreted by the Center largely to mean loyalty to the Party. It is
critical now for any cadre who aspires to political promotion to adhere to Party principles and oppose bourgeois liberalism. Those who supported the student movement in 1989 have been criticized and some even purged. Being more revolutionary is now interpreted as unconditionally following the central directives and faithfully implementing the Party policies. Even today, the most important criterion for cadre recruitment and promotion is to maintain a high degree of conformity with the center; this requirement is captured in a popular catchphrase among all Chinese bureaucrats: "Keep A High Degree of Conformity with the Center Unconditionally" (yǔ dangzhòng yàng wùtiáo jiàn bāochí gādōu de yǐzhǐ). Although it is still a somewhat fluid and murky notion to some cadres, it seems that Wuhan cadres are responsive to the general interpretation and have some understanding of it.

Wuhan's response is concretely reflected in the following evidence. First, Party organizations in the functional bureaus have been restored again. The Party MRPs control personnel power. Second, the power of the Party cadres are now increasing, as Beijing has reemphasized absolute Party leadership. In some institutions the Party MRPs are now empowered with full responsibilities over all matters. They are the actual CEOs, with absolute control over administrative work. Many administrative MRPs had been pushed aside or into secondary positions. A good example is Wuhan University where the Party boss now has the final say over every important matter, even including teaching and research which were areas clearly defined earlier as at the presidential discretion. Third, Party activists are now given top priority for jobs and subsidies in order to strengthen Party
leadership. A large number of the Party activists, previously demobilized, have been brought back to various local leadership positions to carry out the Party line. These people are forming new interest clusters, though they are comparatively fewer in numbers. Finally, ideological control has been strengthened as political study meetings have been resumed and the Party's organization meetings have begun to have real meaning again.21

It seems no matter which way the pendulum swung, as long as Beijing provided concrete guidelines to this criterion, Wuhan responded swiftly, obediently, and efficiently. On the surface, it seems that Wuhan has implemented Beijing's policy with little obstruction and is highly responsive to new calls and interpretations of policies from the center. Upon closer examination, however, it is apparent that there are some instances of noncompliance with the central policies. For instance, local political factors affect when actual political promotion occurs. As pointed out earlier, the revolutionary criterion is inherently difficult to quantify compared to the criteria of age, education, and professionalism. Such general central principles are subject to local contextual interpretations and in many Wuhan organizations, the revolutionary criterion has been implemented according to the loyalty one exhibits to one's own superiors.

There are three measures by which one can identify whether the revolutionary criteria are being implemented. First, one can identify implementation of revolutionary criteria in terms of elimination of Deng's

21 These meetings have been ordered by the central leadership and take place in universities and businesses throughout China. Even in foreign-invested enterprises, these meetings have been introduced by local bureaucrats, on these developments, see, for example, Margaret M. Parson, "Party and Politics in Joint Ventures," The China Business Review (November-December 1990), pp. 38-40.
criminal enemies, the so-called da za chang fenzi, who looted, destroyed property, and beat cadres during the Cultural Revolution. Interviews suggest that these people have been uniformly purged from all vital government and CCP positions at all levels. Second, one must oppose Deng's political enemies (zao fan pai), including the "Gang of Four" who organized campaigns against senior leaders like Deng Xiaoping during the Cultural Revolution. Those who followed the ultra leftist lines of the Gang of Four during the Cultural Revolution have also been purged, demoted, or simply returned to their places of origin. These two concrete objectives were of primary importance on Deng's agenda after his consolidation of power in the late 1970's and were implemented swiftly and successfully in Wuhan throughout the 1980's. Third, one must be committed to Deng's Four Cardinal Principles, which include dedication to a belief in the persistence of the CCP leadership, Proletarian Dictatorship, the Socialist Road, and Marxist-Leninist Thought.

After identifying those who exhibit these three characteristics, it becomes more difficult to identify those cadres who exhibit more or less of "revolutionaryness" (geminghua). This situation results in a dilemma; loyalty to the CCP leadership has come to mean that one must exhibit loyalty to one's immediate bureaucratic superior, a situation which will recur thematically and be discussed in more detail in this dissertation. Interpersonal relationships, therefore, have become vital factors in political recruitment in Wuhan in opposition to central directives that discourage the role of personalism in recruitment decisions. Beijing does not want informal political relationships to interfere with personnel policy and,
therefore, has criticized allocations of political power according to personal relationships. While it is virtually impossible for any local cadre to resist clearly defined policy by the Center, (especially requirements concerning age, education, and professionalism), it is easy to exert personal influence when two candidates both meet basic standards. Personal preference of superiors and loyalty shown by followers have become key factors in promotion. 77 cadres surveyed agreed that obedience and loyalty to local superiors is highly important today for political recruitment and promotion, despite Beijing's disapproval.

A legal-rational framework in selecting and transforming cadres is far from established. Personnel decisions are not made through institutional procedures, but by powerful individuals. Local patron-client networks and factional politics are vital factors in deciding a cadre's fate--whether that fate includes promotion or demotion. Personal ties with the top are still vital. The monumental role of patron-client relationships (zhupu guanxi) in China means that protection is expected from proteges in exchange for loyalty. A high ranking official, in fact, explained, that "the most important criterion for choosing a cadre to a key position is that he won't betray his patron under any circumstances."22 There is ample leeway for local cadres to manipulate the implementation results in their favor. Many interviewees agreed that in implementation of revolutionary criteria, personal connections, nepotism, and favoritism play highly important roles in determining who gets what. According to the 100 cadres, patron-

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22 My interview file A. 06.
clientelism, nepotism and favoritism are serious problems in their units and elsewhere. The following table summarizes their observations:

Table 2.13.
Assessment of Noncompliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORM OF DISTORTION</th>
<th>SEVERITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not a Problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-C</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepotism</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favoritism</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 0=not a problem; 1 or 2=minor problem; 3=moderate problem; 4 or 5=serious problem

In responding to the question "what is your opinion of nepotism in the actual political recruitment process?", 15.3% think it is extremely serious; 67.3% think it is quite serious; 17.3% think it is basically not a problem, while no one completely denies its existence.

Although personalism, favoritism, and patron-clientelism exist in Wuhan, we cannot, therefore, conclude that Beijing has lost control. From certain points of view, personalism and central control are totally separate issues. The growth of personal ties does not necessarily lead to indifference to central demands, nor will it necessarily weaken central control. On the contrary, closer personal relationships may act to speed up implementation. After all, a local policy implementor will be more likely to work towards implementation of a policy on behalf of someone whom she/he regards as a
close personal contact upon whom she/he can rely for bureaucratic and professional support in the future. For the time being, although Beijing has frowned on the increasing role of personalism in cadre recruitment policies, it seems willing to tolerate some slippage in this area, as long as other key elements of the cadre recruitment policy are fulfilled.

**Summary of Pattern Behavior**

There is no doubt, from the above evidence and analysis, that the ability of Beijing to produce cooperation from Wuhan with its central policies has been truly remarkable. By almost every hard measure, including hierarchy, gender, nature of work, the conformity between Beijing's policies and the actual implementation results in Wuhan is much higher than many of us might expect. With very few exceptions, no one dares to take the political risk of resisting the Center on these clearly defined requirements. Indeed, only a few deviant cases have been observed on the three hard measures. Even on the soft measure criterion, when the criterion was made clear, for instance, purging the "three kinds of people", Wuhan's compliance was also quite high. It is only when the soft criterion was not clearly defined or when candidates were seemingly equal on hard measures, that slippage occurred. In most cases, the revolutionary criterion has been implemented after being defined primarily as loyalty. Nepotism, the use of patron-client ties, and factionalism are extremely widespread in political recruitment.
Although on revolutionary requirements, local deviations occur now and then, Beijing is still in the driver's seat. Loyalty to superiors cannot be equated with implementation failure. When Beijing and local interest are in conformity, it will help central control, as is discussed in detail in Chapter Four. It is only when interests split, that loyalty to local superiors becomes dangerous to Beijing. The survey results of the 100 local cadres provides a nice summary of this conclusion.

Table 2.14.
Summary of the Implementation of the 4 Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERION</th>
<th>RATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalism</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than 80% of the cadres think that all four criterion have been implemented fairly well or very well in their units. In general, Deng's center has, indeed, scored fairly well on all four accounts.
Much recent western scholarship has stressed the role of bargaining in policy implementation in China and has explained how various government levels bend central policies to fit their own individual interests. Often, these analyses suggest that Beijing increasingly has lost its ability to control local implementation of central policies and that through a complex process of bargaining between central and local policy makers and implementors, the implementation results are often not in accord with Beijing's intentions and objectives. My analysis of implementation of cadre recruitment policies at the local level of the Chinese political system, however, reveals that, according to measures of age, education, and professional background and expertise, these policies have been implemented with overwhelming success at the local level in the city of Wuhan.

Throughout the course of my research, it became apparent that local implementation of Deng's recruitment policies has been efficient and has not exhibited considerable slippage due, for instance, to local implementors who bend policies to serve their own individual interests, despite the wishes and objectives of central authorities in Beijing. Indeed, in the city of Wuhan, the cadres who have been recruited under Deng's reforms are younger, better educated, more professional, and more revolutionary than they were before new recruitment policies were promulgated or implemented. Implementation of recruitment policies in Wuhan has taken place without obstruction from intervening variables, according to the results of my study.

There are several key reasons for success in local implementation of cadre recruitment policies. In the following chapter, I will identify and
discuss these in detail, ultimately arguing that these factors will continue to facilitate central control well into the future.
CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS
AS DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL COMPLIANCE

If the Center says you can, then you can, even if you can't, you still can; If they say you can't, then you can't, even if you can, you still can't.
--Believe it or not.

--A Popular Chinese Political Proverb

Introduction
What accounts for the high degree of compliance in implementing the central recruitment policies in Wuhan? Undoubtedly, we can easily marshal a number of variables that are connected in one way or another with the outcomes of implementation of recruitment policies. However, through my field interviews and subsequent analysis of the gathered data, two variables stand out and outweigh by far all other explanations: political structure and the processes of organizational control used for the implementation of policies. Essentially, I argue that the high degree of compliance is determined by variables associated with structure and process.
The structure that is discussed here is constituted by the network of bureaucratic units within which organizational control operates. It refers to the established and fixed framework within which members of an organizational system function, organizational arrangements are made and controlling actions are taken. Organizational control processes, on the other hand, refers to the actual day-to-day functioning of an organizational system which includes a full spectrum of disciplinary (reward and punishment) mechanisms in action. One way to distinguish between structure and process is to examine their relative rate of stability and change; that is, bureaucratic structures tend to remain constant, while the processes by which their functions are carried out often change due to any number of variables. Structural features are relatively stable and constant and are less likely than processes of organizational control to exhibit rapid change. The actual functioning of organizational control, conversely, varies greatly according to time, place, events, strategies, and tactics used in particular cases at particular moments. This chapter first briefly discusses and clarifies a few important concepts and then focuses on mapping, explaining, and analyzing the structural features and the organizational control processes. I explain how and why they are so effective in keeping localities responsive to Beijing.

Schurmann noted that the word "control" has two basic meanings.¹ The first dictionary meaning is usually "to check or verify".² Exercising

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¹ Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of Californi Press), 1966.
² Ibid., p. 310.
control, for instance, by periodically and spontaneously checking on an individual's performance is one way to ensure that he or she is measuring up to required standards. Another way is to exercise directly "restraint or direction upon the free action of an individual, in order to elicit generally correct behavior and attitude".3 This definition applies perfectly to the Chinese word kongzhi ("control"), which is used in China to describe the way central authorities ensure obedient implementation of their policies by local policy implementors.4

Schurmann also noted that there are two components to the concept of organizational control. On the one hand, control is used to exact loyalty from members of the organization; on the other hand, controls encourage members, through persuasive or coercive means, to perform in the way central authorities expect them to perform.5 Correspondingly, the phrase "keeping an organization under control" encompasses two meanings; in a weaker sense, we may say an organization is under control as long as its members are loyal and remain submissive; in a stronger sense, however, we say an organization is under control only if its members are both loyal and submissive, as well as responsive and effective; that is to say, organizational control is most effective when members zealously perform their duties and maximize their efficiency on behalf of the organization.

A clear distinction between a weaker and stronger sense of "under control" is important. The main reason for distinguishing between these

3 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 309.
two meanings is that performing in an expected way requires more than loyalty. It is common, for instance, that members of an organization are loyal, but incompetent. In this dissertation, I argue that an organization is under effective control as long as its members are loyal. Effective organizational control exists when members act according to rules and directives established by superiors as understood by the superiors themselves. Whether or not members understand rules and directives correctly and whether or not their actions live up to the expectations of superiors are not necessarily relevant considerations. In other words, I do not include administrative efficiency in my discussion of effective central control. In short, as long as localities act submissively, they are under effective control. Deviation from central policy directives during implementation that results from bureaucratic incompetence or negligence is not the type of policy slippage upon which this analysis focuses. Rather, slippage that results from the purposeful acts of policy implementors is the primary consideration of this dissertation.

Secondly, central control encompasses many political, economic and cultural dimensions. In Schurmann's discussion of the distinctions between political and economic control, the author explains that political control is always directed against individuals, their actions, decisions, and behavior. Economic control, on the other hand, aims at measurable performance and the results of decisions. Political control pressures individuals to act "correctly" or punishes them for acting "incorrectly"; economic control checks the tangible results of one's actions against a standard imposed by
the state."6 This dissertation is concerned primarily with political control. Although Deng's regime has, indeed, decentralized its grip on economic power, it has been much more conservative with its political reforms. Indeed, localities now receive a greater share of decision making power in economic matters, but not nearly as much in political spheres.7 In fact, the political decentralization is not nearly as extensive as many western observers might think. Political power and economic power should not be perceived as being mutually dependent on one another. That is to say, just because the Chinese leadership is engaged in economic liberalization, political liberalization will not necessarily follow.

Thirdly, Schurmann distinguished between external and internal controls. "Whereas external controls mean supervision by a body not formally connected with the organization, internal controls mean supervision by individuals and bodies that are a part of the organization itself".8 Similarly, Harding distinguishes between "external remedialism" and "internal remedialism".9 Both of these authors have noted that the CCP primarily depends on internal control mechanisms to garner support for their policies throughout the Chinese bureaucracy and discussed in detail

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6 Ibid.
7 Many authors stress that localities have enjoyed increasing amounts of political power as a result of their greater economic power over recent years. See, for example, Barry Naughton, "False Starts and Second Wind," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, eds., The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); Christine Wong, "Material Allocation and Decentralization," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, eds., 1985. For the classic argument on the power of China's localities, see Audrey Donnithorne, "China's Cellular Economy: Some Economic Trends Since the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly no. 52 (October-December 1972), pp. 605-619.
8 See Schurmann, p. 314.
some of these key internal controls. This chapter presents a more sophisticated and first hand account of how external and internal control mechanisms affect the policy implementation outcome. This objective will be achieved by analyzing the extent to which localities are able to deviate from central directives in their implementation of those policies.

Localism had been a chronic issue (and often a severe one) throughout China's history, especially before 1949. It is identified as the conflict of interest between local governments and the center in the distribution of political power and economic resources. The worst expression of localism is national disintegration, warlordism, and chronic civil war. Although these most severe forms of localism never became reality after the CCP takeover, the government has always carefully guarded against this as a potential threat. National unity has been constantly one of the highest priorities in the minds of Chinese leaders. Since 1949, Beijing has been very alert to any localist tendencies. Defying central authorities and building "independent kingdoms" have been and will remain political taboo, as long as the CCP is in power.

Over the years of CCP rule, especially during the Maoist era, the system has evolved into a highly centralized one, keeping localities under tight control. One can observe China's political system from two vantage points. First, one can concentrate on the structures themselves; second, one can analyze the processes that characterize the decision making of those political structures.

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10 For more detailed discussion of localism and economic regionalism, refer to Zang Xiaowei, Asian Survey, XXXI No. 6, June 1991.
The Structural Characteristics: Preventing Localism and Ensuring Implementation

Three Forms of Localism

There are three types of localism in China: 1. Intra-Regional; 2. Inter-Regional; and 3. Central-Local. The most popular form of localism is the intra-regional type, which may mean conflicts between the Party Secretary and the administrative MRP or conflicts among deputies themselves fighting, for instance, over a vacant bureaucratic position. Intra-regional localism is, in fact, the most frequently witnessed form of localism; it can be very costly and a potentially strong force for implementation slippage. While the central authorities tolerate inter-regional conflict, they fear local intra-regional conflicts because they are often fought covertly at the lowest levels of the Chinese political system where the center has less representation and influence. Local leaders use central policies as licenses to attack one another's programs for implementation, thereby stalling and causing potentially permanent damage to the implementation process and chances for implementation success. Slippage results from a lack of unity among local leaders; rather than working together to ensure implementation of central policies, they engage in endless battles trying to discredit each other's programs for policy implementation.

Inter-regional conflicts represent the type of localism that the central authorities most fear will lead eventually to a threat to central authority. If
regions ever unite to defy the center, Beijing's control would be severely diminished. Therefore, central authorities are all too happy to see inter-regional conflicts that keep regions competing with each other for central favor. The inter-regional conflicts, in fact, circumvent formation of local-central conflict which is the least evident of the three types of localism. Rather than challenge central policy initiatives, localities compete with each other for the good will of central authorities in Beijing by being as cooperative as they can.

The above understanding of the three types of localism has been discussed with a high-level Chinese official, who formerly served as a deputy ministerial official.

**Preventing Localism**

Theoretically, there are several potential conditions that may determine the strength of central control and tendencies towards autonomy among localities. First, if local cadres enjoy strong support in the form of a popular local mandate, instead of having to rely on central appointments for bureaucratic support and upward political mobility, the extent of Beijing's power will be limited. Second, if a local cadre is able to establish a strong socioeconomic and political base, he may be able to demand more freedom in making local recruitment decisions from Beijing or defy, either overtly or covertly, central directives concerning political appointments with greater confidence than cadres with weaker socioeconomic and
political foundations. Third, if a locality is geopolitically isolated from the center, central-local communications will be difficult and local authorities will enjoy greater freedom to defy central recruitment directives, while murmuring the familiar Chinese saying: "the mountains are high and the emperor is far away." Fourth, if a local cadre enjoys ultimate power over the recruitment of subordinates he may be able to establish dominant personal control over them and they, in turn, may respond to his call more readily than to calls from Beijing. Fifth, if local cadres have strong support from a national and/or religious force, they will enjoy substantial decision making autonomy in the area of cadre recruitment. Finally, and, perhaps, historically most importantly, if a local leader controls a military force stationed in his region, the potential

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1 See Michael F. Roehrig, Government Policy and Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Operations: The role of Local Bargaining in Policy Implementation in Contemporary China, Ph.D Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1992, p. 204. The author argues that "Guangdong's role as China's greatest generator of foreign exchange may also give it greater independence from the center, thereby facilitating greater latitude for bargaining over rules and regulations at the local levels." (p. 204) See also Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988, p. 352 for a similar argument.

12 Ibid. Roehrig also concluded that location in relation to Beijing "is also a source of variation in bargaining over the implementation of rules and regulations." (p. 204) The author goes on to cite Lieberthal and Oksenberg who write that "Beijing's presence noticeably diminishes as one moves physically away from it." (See Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988, p. 351)

13 Localism involving a number of key Wuhan leaders did occur in the mid-1950's. There was a coalition of forces at several levels of local leadership which ignored central calls and resisted central directives. The so-called "Ji Kaifu" Incident was severely crushed by Beijing, resulting in removal of some top-level local leaders. This incident is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.

14 The Gang of Four, for instance, had a power base in Shanghai with support from some central leaders.
of his locality to act autonomously from the center will also be substantial.\footnote{Economically powerful areas like Guangdong may enjoy more decision-making autonomy from Beijing than other areas of the country, and "the existing evidence...suggests that revenue-producing areas both have a greater claim upon the center and are the object of tighter control by the center." (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988, p. 351) Ye Xuanping, the governor of Guangdong, was promoted to be vice-chairperson of the Chinese National Political Consultative Conference, which was an attempt by center authorities to limit his growing power in the economically-rich province of Guangdong. Although a leader may preside over an economically-rich area, this does not mean that he himself gains political power vis-a-vis the center; in fact, it may mean that Beijing will increase its pressure on the leader to abide more strictly, perhaps, than others to its policies and directives.}

Although these conditions have been identified periodically by western scholars as variables that may potentially limit Beijing's control, my findings indicate that none exist in strong enough fashion to facilitate substantial deviation by localities in the implementation of central recruitment policies. Indeed, Beijing has been quite effective in checking localities and circumventing the evolution of these conditions to the extent that their power has ever been seriously threatened since 1949.

Respondents generally agreed that the popularity of a local leader within his locality is of virtual insignificance when it comes to his freedom in appointing local recruits. Key local positions, such as gubernatorial and mayoral level positions are single-handedly filled by appointees designated by center authorities. In one case, for instance, an acquaintance was notified that he would be transferred to another province to fill a vacant high-level political position. At the time he was notified of his imminent transfer, he had virtually no knowledge of or experience in the region. Such instances are by no means uncommon and illustrate the enormous
difficulty a cadre may have in cultivating his popularity to such an extent that he will enjoy a political mandate in his locality.

As far as the potential of a local official to build a strong socioeconomic and political base, local political cadres are professional politicians who are officially barred from engaging in profit-making businesses. As a result, they tend to enjoy only modest financial benefits and are totally dependent on political promotion to make their ends meet. Some local cadres, though put in charge of economic corporations, cannot reap economic benefits for themselves because of public ownership. Quite simply, for those who have made their fortune during the past decade, they rarely have any significant influence over political decisions, such as the implementation of recruitment policies. In short, there is a sharp distinction between political and economic power in China and possessing one rarely means that one necessarily possesses the other.

With modern technology and transportation facilities, the center can dispatch work teams, investigation teams, and special task teams in no time to ensure implementation of recruitment decisions. Furthermore, reports from the localities to the center are constantly required and sophisticated surveillance mechanisms are very sensitive to oddities in and apparent deviations from central directives.16

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16 In one interview, a division level MRP explained that he complained in a secret letter to Hu Yaobang that his boss was still promoting people of a Gang of Four orientation. After Hu Yaobang read the letter, he replied that if this behavior could be verified, he should not continue to hold his position. Beijing dispatched an investigative team to Wuhan and, as a result, the boss lost his job.
One of the main reasons that local cadres find it virtually impossible to establish dominant personal control over subordinates has been the "Two MRP System" (liangzhanzhili). This bifurcated structure of administration dictates that for every government official, there is a CCP representative overseeing party issues; each, in turn, checks the other's activities and acquisition of influence and power. In every organization, either political, administrative, or military, there is always one party leader and one administrative leader, equal in ranking. They must both agree with each other before a major action can be taken.

Historically, this system was copied from the Soviet Red Army. In order to secure party leadership over guns, the political commissar was given equal power as military commander. Both of them had to agree before a military action could take place. The Chinese army and, later, the Chinese party state, all were modelled after such an arrangement. While the system may bring inefficiency, it has clearly significantly reduced the danger of revolt that could be initiated single-handedly by the commander. The central control is more stable when two leaders, equal in ranking, share power. Any one of them can sell off the other to Beijing. The "dual leader system" works to the benefit of the Center.

Ultimately, central control is backed by the strong presence of the military. Beijing has exclusive control over all important coercive forces. The coercive forces include a public security system (police

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17 This system was adopted at the Gutian Huivi (Gutian Conference) of 1928. Every military level above the platoon level would have a corresponding unit from the CCP.
18 See The Cadre Division of the General Political Department Military Research Department of the Chinese Military Academy, Introduction to the PLA Cadre System
force), armed police, and military. Although localities control their own police force, they are, nonetheless, trained and equipped to handle social crime and civil unrest, not combat situations. In no event can they pose a threat or be used by localities to challenge the center. Both armed police and the military are tightly under Beijing’s control. Although troops are stationed in localities, they have virtually nothing to do with local leaders politically, militarily, or even logistically. In order to coordinate local government relationships with the military, usually one local official is given a symbolic position in the army (often political commissar). However, he has no real power to command. Conspiracy theories that team local leaders and military commanders are, at best, wishful. It is utterly impossible for them to come together to launch a coup against Beijing. Politically, local leaders are appointed by the COD and military leaders are appointed by the PLA General Political Commission through totally separate channels. Militarily, any maneuver, even a platoon scale, needs approval from Beijing. Logistically, military units are directly supplied by the PLA Logistics Department. Other than a once-a-year courtesy visit with each other during the traditional Chinese Spring Festival, there is

(Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Ganbu Zhidu Gaivao) (Beijing: Military Science Press), October 1988. This explains the control that Beijing has over nomination, training, criteria, transfer, management, exam, reward and punishment, living conditions, welfare, and retirement in the military.

19 In September of 1989, a top research aide for Zhao Ziyang who defected to the United States soon after the June 4, 1989 incident at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, gave a lecture which I attended. During this talk, he suggested that the only hope for true advances in China’s democracy movement would be for local leaders and military commanders to unite on behalf of the democracy movement. In conversations with other scholars from both the United States and China, this theme has often been discussed.
really no incentive for local leaders and military leaders to enter into some kind of political relationship. On the contrary, there is every reason to be cautious, for the center is extremely sensitive to any loss of military control.

The importance of control over military power in China cannot be underestimated. Indeed, it would not be an understatement to profess that whoever controls central military power, in fact, controls China. The Central Military Commission penetrates deeply into the PLA, all the way down to its mobile field armies. Recently, for example, a highly mobile army force was ordered to stop reporting to its two existing command units and to begin reporting directly to the Central Military Commission. Although such an action is rare, it has been known to occur when central authorities perceive type of threat or potential threat from other local military units, possibly with the support of one or two central military leaders. This iron-clad grip over every facet of China's military machine inhibits any deviations among local units or attempts to undermine central control.

In front of this giant coercive machine, localities have no choice but to yield to the desires of the center. Since the Tiananman Incident, Beijing has further recognized the importance of the PLA and the armed police. The military budget has witnessed a steady increase, indicating greater resilience on the part of the center to flex the PLA's military muscle as notice to anyone considering questioning its authority over the country's political and economic agenda. This increase in the PLA's budget has been accompanied by the re-arming of China's armed police (wujing) and public
security forces (gongan) with technologically advanced weaponry, equipment, and training. In recent years, while the army has been cut by 1,000,000 persons, the central authorities have added personnel to the armed police (wujing), which now numbers approximately 1,000,000. Largely in reaction to the events of June 4, 1989, the center decided that it needed to strengthen the armed police force, which was not prepared for the student demonstrations at Tiananmen. The armed police force is now equipped with heavy military weaponry and possesses the official role of maintaining domestic tranquility in the face of social unrest that is too much for the security bureau to handle but not widespread enough for the army to confront. This militarily significant system is also politically significant, because it is independently under the direct control of the central authorities in Beijing.

It is, however, too simplistic to conclude that Wuhan compliance is purely a result of coercion from Beijing. In many instances, compliance has become a voluntary action, a day-to-day operational routine with a high degree of willingness and ideological commitment. The political culture of communist rule which encourages all cadres in the bureaucracy to maintain a similar ideological identification is, without doubt, a facilitating factor for producing voluntary compliance. This cannot be more clearly expressed by the former party MRP of Wuhan who once told me in an interview:
As local cadres, we seldom doubt the correctness of central policies. In our mind, the Center has the mandate of making policies, and for us the task is to implement them. It is very natural.\(^{20}\)

My interviews with many local high level officials indicate that when the local leaders think about the center they seldom challenge the correctness of the central policies. It seems that even today in many cadres' minds the Party Central Committee and its decisions are inherently correct and, therefore, should be implemented faithfully. There is very little doubt in their minds that it is the Center's privilege to make policies, and the localities' responsibility to implement them. The self-consciousness of the Chinese communist cadre, which has been ingrained in their minds for over forty years with endless government ideological campaigns, is a significant structural factor contributing to high compliance, widely recognized by the cadres surveyed. 77% (N=65) assigned 4 or 5 in weighing the significance (on a 0-5 scale) and 11% assigned 3. It is clear that the mindset of local cadres is important in explaining implementation success.

The above factors have contributed to the effectiveness of the organizational control. Currently, Wuhan's opposition to Beijing, involving a large number of local leaders, is almost impossible.

Localism involving a number of key Wuhan leaders has occurred. In the mid 1950s, for instance, there was a coalition of forces at several levels of local leadership which ignored central calls and resisted central directives. The so-called "Ji Kaifu Incident" of the 1950's was severely crushed by Beijing, resulting in removal of some top level local leaders. Ji

\(^{20}\) Interviewing File B. No. 02.
Kaifu was a local level cadre in the Second Hospital of the Wuhan Medical College. The incident began when some money was stolen from the hospital safe. The Party Secretary had Ji Kaifu arrested and sentenced for stealing the money. Ji Kaifu appealed to Beijing authorities who dispatched a special investigation team to Wuhan to look into the incident. This task team concluded that Ji was innocent and requested that Wuhan authorities reverse their decision. The Municipal Security Bureau and other municipal leaders resisted these orders from Beijing, which outraged Mao Zedong, who became personally involved. Several key municipal leaders lost their jobs and several cadres who handled the case were put in jail as a result of this incident and Ji Kaifu was ultimately released from prison. Beijing's power over the localities was resoundingly affirmed by this event.21

**Implementing Recruitment Policies: The Central and Local Organizations**

In addition to the structural features of the political system that Beijing counts on to discourage localist tendencies, the central government also has a wide variety of government and party structures to ensure obedient implementation of their recruitment policies and to discourage and prevent localities from pursuing their own separate policy lines. These bureaucratic structures have played a facilitating role for the faithful implementation of central recruitment policies throughout China's history since the Communist takeover in 1949. These structures include a wide

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21 Interview File B, No. 25.
variety of central and local government and party organizations charged
with developing and implementing central recruitment policies.

Song Renqiong, former director of the COD, said, the Party "has established a whole system of cadre selection, employment, management and caring." The existence and functioning of a sophisticated top-down organizational network constitutes what Grindle called a "policy delivery system". The existence of this organizational network, not a unique phenomenon by any measure in communist states, is well-recognized by Western scholars. But, what is lacking is an in-depth understanding of how it is organized and how it actually functions at various hierarchical levels. Up to now, Western scholarship had only limited understanding of the organizational system charged with implementing central policy directives, especially at the local levels of the Chinese political system.

The Chinese organizational network, which has evolved over many years, especially since the communist take-over in 1949, is highly structured, tight, and disciplined. It is a well-knit web that permeates into every level and corner of the political system. It is a disciplinary machine—a formidable "chain" throughout the hierarchy. In short, the organizational networks play a vital role in reinforcing central control and holding the political system together.

24 Some scholars argue that the level of the CCP penetration into the society is even higher than that of KMT before liberation. Before 1949, the KMT penetrated to the county levels, but not beyond; the CCP, however, penetrates all levels of the government to the grassroots.
This chain of command has the total and exclusive control over the appointment of all important political and bureaucratic positions. This formidable power to control, referred to by many cadres as the control of one's official "cap", is monopolized and exercised by the CCP organization departments at various levels. In order to understand the effect of organizational control, we ought first to look at the complex organization parameters (i.e., who they are, what they do, and how they perform their functions).

The control of cadres includes recruitment, performance evaluation, supervision, dismissal, demotion, promotion, transfer, and retirement. The CCP has established a complicated network of organizations to perform these functions. The most important members of this network are CCP's Organizational Department and Disciplinary Inspection Commission, the State Council's Ministry of Personnel Affairs, Ministry of Supervision, and Ministry of Public Security. To get a clear picture of how this network exercises personnel control, we must delineate how the key organizations are related to each other vertically.

The Central Organizations and Their Power

There are two aspects to the central structure, i.e., formal and informal. Formally, the most important institution that exercises direct organizational control is the Central Organization Department. Figure 3.1 provides us a picture of the COD, that illustrates its position in the system--to whom it reports and whom it supervises.
Defined as one of the working departments of the CCP Central Committee (CC), which is the highest authority in the country, the COD is the most important and prominent institution in charge of personnel affairs in China. It is empowered by the Central Committee to play a leading role in all important cadre related decisions. Key local political and bureaucratic positions, including nomination and approval of lieutenant governor/mayor and positions of equal or higher status, are directly controlled by the COD. In Wuhan, specifically, two cadres—the mayor and
the Party secretary\textsuperscript{25}—are subject to the direct discretion of the COD. Localities have virtually no power and have very limited influence over the appointment of these two positions. By directly controlling these two important posts, Beijing enjoys considerable administrative control over this important city. Whenever deviations in the implementation of central policies occur, these two officials generally are held accountable.

Among many of its functional bureaus, the Local Cadre Bureau (LCB) of the COD is the one that actually enforces the implementation of central policies and regulations regarding the appointment of high ranking local cadres. Although the final approval of these cadres lies in the hands of the COD minister and the deputy ministers, the LCB's roles in local cadre recruitment, including searching, recommending, nominating, screening, and evaluating, are indispensable and sometimes vital to any local cadre's political fate. It deals and interacts with localities on a day-to-day basis, keeping first-hand information about key local leaders. The LCB is the hand of the COD that constantly monitors the pulse of administrative responses to central policies from the localities. To any local leader, maintaining a favorable relationship with the LCB is of vital importance to upward mobility.

Informally, it is a group of senior leaders with Deng as the supreme leader that decide all major issues at informal meetings. Their relationship with the formal structure can be illustrated in figure 3.2:

\textsuperscript{25} Since Wuhan was granted special political status in 1984, the mayor has equal bureaucratic ranking as the lieutenant governor of Hubei Province.
The foremost important factor is, perhaps, the fact that the Center is relatively united under Deng Xiaoping. As the supreme leader, Deng is the critical force in stabilizing the Politburo. Political power is built around him and interpersonal relationships are ultimately connected to him. It is an already established network of command, within which key political and military leaders are highly responsive to Deng's official or personal calls.
After less than a dozen years of power consolidation, this has become a given reality of high-level Chinese politics.

Supreme leaders, either Mao or Deng, have always played a decisive role in the history of Chinese politics. Using the Chinese term, a supreme leader forms the "core" of the leadership. On the one hand, they are the products of Chinese politics, and on the other, they are the innovators of Chinese politics. Although they are heavily influenced by tradition, they are also path breakers. They change and reform Chinese history. To be a supreme leader requires personality, political experience, and opportunities.26

Without such a leader, the stability would be rearranged and the political power redistributed. The Chinese leadership would have to learn how to live under a new arrangement without a supreme leader or with the emergence of a new supreme leader to fill the power vacuum and grasp the reigns of China's organizational control system.27

The price for any leader to oppose a supreme leader is too high. Peng Dehuai's opposition to Mao is a case in point.28 Even under Deng, opposition has its limit. Hu and Zhao paid their prices because they moved

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26 For a more detailed discussion of the charismatic leadership of Deng Xiaoping as an example of the "supreme leader," see Xianglu Li, "Deng's Authority and Ruling By Law in China," *The Chinese Intellectual*, no. 20 (Summer 1990), in Chinese, pp. 3-7.
27 For an excellent analysis that speculates on the imminent power vacuum that will erupt after Deng's death, see Sui Sheng Zhao, "The Pattern of the Power Struggle After Deng," *The Chinese Intellectual*, no. 23 (Spring 1991), pp. 23-27.
too quickly to the right of the core, while other conservative leaders lost their power for moving too slowly on the left.

Terror and persecution are not the only reason for central unity. There exist a mutually beneficial relationship between the supreme leaders and others when they are united and speak in one voice, they all need each other. Having recognized this importance, Deng is now trying to establish a core for the third generation of Chinese leadership. Whether his attempt can be successful or not remains to be seen. It is very doubtful that such a core position can be inherited. Hua, Mao's hand-picked successor, is indicative to this arrangement. As long as Deng lives, his supremacy dictates the central unity. Any factions and/or potential factions that may exist in the Chinese leadership, most notably, many speculate, between Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, will not attempt to destroy each other to take control of the political system, as long as Deng lives. His power remains supreme and policy makers ultimately answer to his call. When he passes from the political scene this relatively stable political situation may change. It is important to understand these dynamics of central leadership for our study, because the implementation of central recruitment policies which I believe to be very successful is, in part, due to the fact that there is a relatively unified central leadership. This central unity inhibits the formation of local inter- and intra-policy conflicts and discourages localities from attempting to undermine central policy directives. It is imperative that the reader appreciate the fact that the overwhelming success with which I found recruitment policies to be implemented is largely due to this central unity which, in turn, is contingent on Deng Xiaoping's role as
China's supreme leader. When Deng passes from the scene, the possibility for central power struggles will increase, especially if there is no one able to fill his role. In turn, local policy implementation slippage may increase substantially.

The Local Organizations and Their Power

At the local level, there are two major institutions in Wuhan that facilitate implementation of the COD policies and directives, namely, the Wuhan Municipal Party Organization Department (WMPOD) and the Wuhan Municipal Personnel Bureau (WMPB). Vertically, the WMPOD is under the leadership of COD. Every year, COD organizes working meetings in Beijing at which directors of local organization departments attend. New central policies or directives are given and discussed by these key people, so that local leaders can keep in sync with central intentions. Figure 3-3 provides an organizational map of WMPOD.
WMPOD is the equivalent of the COD in Wuhan and monopolizes all important power over cadre-related issues at the local levels. Although its power has witnessed ups and downs due to changes at the Center, in general, it has played an unparalleled role in cadre recruitment in Wuhan. WMPOD is run by one director and three to five deputies, who change from time to time. Though consensus-building is always important, the director, who is often a member of the Municipal Party Standing Committee (MPSC)\(^{29}\) is, by far, the most important figure in the political and bureaucratic appointments. It is the discretion of the director and his associates who decide who gets what job, when, and how in Wuhan.

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\(^{29}\) WMPSC, composed of anywhere from eight to fifteen key local leaders, is the ultimate decision making institution in Wuhan. Holding a seat in the committee secures one's place in major decision makings in Wuhan.
Within WMPOD, there are a number of important divisions, each of which manages one or several functional areas. The first one is the Party and Government Cadre Department. This department manages all cadres from the CCP and the government regulatory bureaus. The second is the Economic Cadre Department, which supervises all bureau level cadres in the enterprises and industrial bureaus. An industrial bureau usually runs a number of economic entities, including factories and trading companies, such as the Textile Bureau and the Light Industry Bureau.

The Young Cadre Division, as is suggested by its name, is responsible for the selection and promotion of younger cadres since age has become an important factor in political recruitment. The Young Cadre Division keeps on file archives of thousands of young political hopefuls who were recommended to WMPOD for future promotions. The Young Cadre Division also maintains constant contact with various functional bureaus in order to grasp the first hand information about these recommended young hopefuls.

The Cadre Training Division is in charge of cadre education. It coordinates the curriculum of the party schools and various short term study programs for Wuhan cadres. It is this division's responsibility to make certain that all cadres at some point in time receive some education on the CCP history, theory, philosophy, and other related political courses.

30 There is a fine line between regulatory bureaus and industrial bureaus. A regulatory bureau is normally a government functional bureaucracy in charge of the enforcement of the regulations and codes. Examples are the Personnel Bureau, the Public Security Bureau. Also included in this category are seven district government and four county magistrates that are bureau level administrations.
The primary duty of the Cadre Inspection Division is to check every cadre's background before a promotion decision is announced. The background checks, also called political investigation (zhengshen), always include the following information: a cadre's education, family history, career history, when he joined revolutionary work, party affiliation and most importantly whether or not he has any "historical problems". While the General Cadre Division's main job is to keep and manage a cadre's dossier, the General Office manages all other day to day operational affairs.

![Diagram of Wuhan Municipal Personnel Bureau](image)

Figure 3.4 Wuhan Municipal Personnel Bureau

The second organization charged with implementation of the cadre recruitment policy in Wuhan is the Wuhan Municipal Personnel
Bureau WMPB, a government bureaucracy under the mayor, is in charge of low-level cadre matters. It is responsible for implementation of decisions made by WMPOD. It has no decision power, but rather, is a functional bureau, handling everyday trivial matters regarding grass roots cadres and workers. As their names suggest, various divisions of WMPB handle the paperwork of grassroots cadre transfers (in and out of the city), make official announcements of bureaucratic appointments, arrange cadre training, establish appropriate title categories, set salary and benefit scales, and so forth.

Obviously, every aspect of Chinese cadre recruitment is overseen and monitored by a formidable team of bureaucratic departments. This bureaucratic machine is charged with the responsibility of making certain that local cadres are recruited and promoted according to central recruitment guidelines.

Central Recruitment Process and Methods of Central Control

Organizational control mechanisms are only one of the ways that the central authorities are able to control cadre recruitment. Administrative processes as well as a variety of formal and informal methods of ensuring implementation of central directives are also used by Beijing.

Central Recruitment Processes

Beijing has a whole spectrum of means at hand to exercise its control over Wuhan. Over the years, the COD has developed a set of procedures with regard to cadre nomination, review, evaluation, and approval.
Hierarchically, these procedures are clearly defined and understood by the subordinates and, most importantly, they are strictly enforced.

Based on the information provided by a senior cadre who once served as a senior deputy director of WMPOD for a number of years, the following table is created to illustrate the workings and mechanisms of political appointment for cadres at various local levels.

Table 3.1.
Structure of Cadre Nomination and Approval

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>NOMINATION</th>
<th>APPROVAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>the COD</td>
<td>the Politburo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or Mayor31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Mayor</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>Provincial Party Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Organization Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau MRP/Deputies</td>
<td>WMPOD</td>
<td>Wuhan Municipal Party Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division MRP/Deputies</td>
<td>Bureau Party Organization</td>
<td>Bureau Party Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section MRP/Deputies</td>
<td>Bureau Party Organization</td>
<td>Bureau Party Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 Because Wuhan has been given special status by Beijing, the mayor is equally ranked as the lieutenant governor of Hubei Province.
As this table illustrates, power over political appointments is exclusively placed in the hands of the party organization departments. No other societal forces have anything to do with these appointments. Undoubtedly, it is a highly superior-oriented system aimed at securing maximum control. Furthermore, it is also important to point out that this system is well understood and that all government levels in Wuhan comply with its directives. Bargaining, as many may have observed elsewhere, has absolutely no place here. Violators of these fundamental rules could end up paying dear political prices. It is important to understand the roles and dynamics of the party organization departments for several reasons. First, over the years the cadres have become used to this system and the dynamics of implementation have become routine procedures. Second, there are no mechanisms by which cadres can attempt to change the system through democratic measures. Third, it is a top-down structure that is strictly monitored by central authorities and any deviations may incur punishment. Recently, in Sichuan Province, local cadres set up institutions and promoted a number of officials without approval from Beijing. Beijing immediately announced that these autonomous actions were illegal and the actions were subsequently reversed.32

The central authorities control the nominations and approval, as well as the political futures of key local cadres. This chain of control facilitates the implementation of central policies in accordance with the central spirit of various policy initiatives.

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32 Interview File B, No. 25.
Methods of Control: Persuasion and Coercion

There are a number of concrete means that the COD can exercise to control and assure local compliance. First, the Center can constantly redefine the power relationship with localities whenever it is perceived necessary. Not long ago, for instance, Beijing changed the policy from two-level downward control to one-level downward control. In Wuhan, it means that the city's party committee not only now directly controls the bureau level, but also the division level MRPs (although it does not control deputies, except in a few key bureaus), a power that was previously decentralized to bureaus. Beijing can easily manipulate its relationship with Wuhan to overtake direct control of the deputy mayor level, if it chooses to do so. In other words, Beijing can just as easily revoke the control over administrative recruitment processes as it can be issue this power. At one moment, control over two levels will be enjoyed only to be cut to one and a half levels should an action be taken that incurs disapproval from Beijing.

Another example is the fact that Beijing recently has decided that a number of key local functional bureaucracies will be put directly under the supervision of the Center, including the tax bureau, price bureau, branches of the Bank of China, and the bureau of industry and commerce, in order

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33 Interview File B, No. 1.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
to prevent and curb localism.\textsuperscript{37} Shortly after the announcement of these changes, these four local bureaus were turned over to Beijing, putting them under the supervision of the related ministries.\textsuperscript{38} Not only were their business activities put under central control, but also their personnel matters. It is now the central ministries that decide who should be MRPs and deputies of those local bureaucracies.\textsuperscript{39} Wuhan can only make recommendations, which may or may not be accepted.\textsuperscript{40} Beijing can make this kind of readjustment with localities at anytime.\textsuperscript{41} Sometimes, such adjustments are made with only short notice given to the localities and demand immediate attention and action.\textsuperscript{42}

Many people believe that political power has been decentralized significantly in the post-Mao era. It seems that this belief only holds water in a limited area and only in comparative terms. The extent of decentralization may very well be exaggerated. At least, the widely believed decentralization is not evident in Wuhan. In responding to my question in an interview, a bureau MRP who is very well connected in the hierarchy, made the following remarks:

I can tell you where the power is. It lies in the hands of the central bureaucracies. Localities do not have power, nothing! Anything here (Wuhan) needs central approval, even a friendship visit of an acrobatic troupe of 15 kids to Japan needs central approval. In Wuhan, construction of a tall building [at this point the respondent pointed at a building outside

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{37}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{38}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{39}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{40}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{41}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{42}] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
his window needs central bureaucratic approval. What in the world do these local matters have anything to do with the Center?! Don't believe that localities have power.43

Second, the formal chain of control is usually exercised by issuing central documents or COD directives. The latter are often concrete and detailed interpretations and explanations of the former—the so-called "central spirit".44 Both are perceived as compulsory guidelines of action that leave no room for bargaining, except under extenuating circumstances that are spelled out by the Center in the first place. The COD constantly issues directive documents which are always mandatory in nature and sometimes extremely detailed. For instance, in 1983 the Center issued a document requesting that "every province, city, and autonomous region selects one nonparty cadre who basically qualifies according to sihu to be lieutenant governor, deputy mayor, or vice chairman (of the People's Congress)."45

Third, Beijing uses a number of reward mechanisms to elicit cooperation from localities. Indeed, Beijing has made various concerted efforts to increase its monitoring capability of China's localities through such reward measures. For example, six local leaders from various geographically and economically important areas in China have been

43 Interviewing File, B. No. 07.
44 A frequently used political jargon denoting central intentions. An example of a "central spirit" directive is, for example, COD, Organization Work Bulletin (Zugong Tongxun), 1982-1988, Beijing. In bulletins like this one, the COD discusses policies in terms of "central spirit" to convey the intentions of central authorities. These documents are considered the most important guiding work documents for working cadres. They include central directives, as well as speeches on policy by central leaders.
admitted into the politburo at the 1992 14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Among them are Chen Xitong from Beijing, Wu Bangguo from Shanghai, Xie Fei from Guangdong, Yang Rudai from Sichuan, Hu Jintao from Tibet, and Xie Chunfang from Shandong. This was an attempt by the central authorities to reward local leaders who implemented central directives with zeal and success. This sent a signal to all localities that those cadres who implemented central directives according to Beijing's specifications would be rewarded with promotions and other such favors from the Center. This innovation also represented a new way for Beijing to maintain control over localities. When local leaders become part of the central authorities, this improves communication between the leader's particular locality and the Center by giving the Center a direct link to the area's political situation and an avenue to obtain special, perhaps sensitive information about matters there. Another way the Center has chosen to monitor the localities is through a process called "mixing up the sand" (chan shazi). This process involves sending central bureaucrats as outsiders into positions in local bureaucracies to work as well as to monitor the developments in local leadership circles. For instance, one knowledgeable informant explained that in the next few months, Beijing is planning to dispatch 1,000 central cadres to take up leadership positions in various localities.46 This is an example of the process of "mixing up the sand" to give Beijing constant insight into local political situations and very tight bureaucratic control. Today, in fact, it was explained, there are

46 Interview File B, No. 25.
almost no local leading bodies that are composed of people only from their individual localities. "There are always outsiders," one respondent said, "especially among the MRP's; either the Party MRP or the administrative MRP is from the outside." Indeed, this process, known as "Officials Take Positions in Localities Other than Where They are From" (yidi zuogan), has a long history in China and is still being utilized and improved by today's central bureaucrats in Beijing.

Fourth, the effectiveness of central control does not just result from these mandatory policies, but also from the actual use of personnel power through central bureaucracies. Rotating, transferring, and replacing local cadres are methods used by Beijing to secure maximum obedience.

Rotating local cadres from one place to another under the name of "cadre exchange" (ganbu jiaoliu) is an effective way of preventing regional interest formation that is perceived by Beijing as unhealthy and dangerous and, most importantly, a threat to its central control. There have been some cadre exchanges since 1949, but none of them were as massive as this time. Currently, cadre rotation has become a nationwide political exercise. Local cadres are transferred to remote units where they have no political connections at all, sometimes even no acquaintances. Indeed, it is not only an effective way to prevent faction formation and forging of

47 Ibid.
48 Interview File B, No. 6.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
patron-client ties, but it is also carried out through a kinder process of persuasion.\textsuperscript{53} In less than two years, the Center has transferred both the mayor and the Party boss of Wuhan.\textsuperscript{54} The mayor is now governor of Jiangxi province, and the Party boss is the first party secretary of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.\textsuperscript{55} Changing the mayor and the Party secretary by the COD sends a clear signal to local cadres of what the Center's intentions and expectations are. The message reads "your boss can be changed, and so can you, if necessary".\textsuperscript{56} As one local official put it: "If you don't listen, the Center can transfer you to another place or remove you from your position of power completely."\textsuperscript{57} Sometimes, Beijing's order is totally unexpected. A governor level official, for example, was called in by Beijing on an overnight flight from his post and was given 24 hours to arrive at his new post after a briefing in Beijing.\textsuperscript{58} This can happen to any cadre.\textsuperscript{59} Facing this kind of uncertainty, how can a cadre not be responsive? The effect of this kind of personnel manipulation should not be underestimated.

The cadre rotation may come with a very high price to pay, however. It takes time for a leader to become familiarized with a new place and new working environment. With their frequent transfers, the continuity of work is broken and the experience that a cadre has

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Interview File B, No. 1.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Interviewing File, A. No. 06.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
accumulated on a particular job may be wasted. Having recognized that, Beijing clearly chooses political control at the expense of continuity.

Indeed, one may argue that the fact that such politically costly measures are taken indicates the growing threat of localism. My view, however, is that such policies are implemented effectively; this indicates that the Center still has enormous controlling power over local cadres, despite their popularity and accomplishments in their localities.

In reaction to economic regionalism, politically, the PRC government has resolved to rotate its provincial leadership more frequently in order to evade a possible reemergence of independent kingdoms or mountain tops (shantou). This policy was reportedly formulated in early June 1990. A month later, Beijing announced rotation of governors of Hebei, Henan, and Liaoning, a move, many speculated, aimed at limiting the power of a certain, particularly strong, local leader.

In a People's Daily commentary entitled "Let Cadres Receive Training and Grow Healthily in Rotation", the CCP urges the governmental organs at all levels to implement the rotation policy, claiming that the cadres rotation policy within the Party and the State is realistic and historically meaningful.

Ye Xuanping, former governor of Guangdong Province, for instance, was finally "promoted" to be the vice chairman of the Chinese Peoples' Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in April 1991.

60 The People's Daily, August 5, 1990.
While on the surface this may seem to be a rewarding promotion, it was, in fact, an effort on the part of central authorities in Beijing to limit Ye's growing influence in the region and an evolving socioeconomic power base that threatened some cautious leaders in Beijing. Whether sub-national administrative units would resort to economic means as a way to resist central control to the extent of establishing "independent kingdoms" still remains to be seen; that their muscle is growing tougher and would be flexed without hesitation is something we can be sure of.

Throughout my research in Wuhan, I heard no comments and observed no evidence in Wuhan that the local cadres feel they are powerful enough to ignore central policies. On the contrary, the evidence that I gathered indicates that central control has been effectively strengthened through decentralization. By controlling less Beijing believes that it can relieve the burden of day to day involvement in trivial local matters, while concentrating on macro-level political and economic concerns.

Beijing's control methods are not always persuasive in nature, but rather coercive. Sometimes, they can be even bloody and deadly, if a local cadre blatantly violates Beijing's interests and no better option is available. Beijing usually takes a number of steps to correct local deviations. It often begins with a "reminder" (da zhaohu), unless the severity of the situation clearly indicates that such a step is already unnecessary. Following the reminder is usually a warning (jing gao) which often proves to be sufficient. Demotion is only applied to those serious offenders, when

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63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., p. 46.
Beijing still hopes to keep them in the system. The fatal punch by the "iron fist" is only used when the Center is totally disappointed. At this time, a cadre is thrown out of the political system altogether—he either loses his job, or is put behind bars.

The following chart illustrates Beijing's methods of control on a scale from those more or less gentle forms of persuasion to harsher forms of coercion.

Table 3.2.

Persuasive Forms of Central Control:

1. Readjust the Central-Local Political Relationship (*chóngxíng tiaozhèn zhòngyáng hé difáng de quánlì*)
2. "Central Spirit" Directives Issued (*zhòngyáng jínshèn*)
3. Promotion and Reward (*tībā jiǎnglì*)
4. Rotating Cadres (Transfers) (*gānbiú jiǎolì*)
Table 3.3.

Coercive Forms of Central Control:

1. Reminders (da zhaohu)
2. Reprimand (chufen)
   A.) Warnings (jinggao)
   B.) Internal Criticism (neibu tongbao)
   C.) Demotion (chezhi)
   D.) Probation from the CCP (liudang chakan)
3. Dismissal from the CCP (kaichu dangji)
4. Jail (zuolao)
5. Death (sixing)

During interviews, respondents often discussed both persuasive and coercive forms of punishment that they and their acquaintances had experienced. One popular method of punishment is to transfer a cadre from a desirable geographic location to another less desirable area of the country and to disguise the move as a promotion.65 Another popular form of punishment is to supply a cadre with shoes that are a little too small for his feet (chuan xiaoxie). In both of these instances, the form of punishment is not harsh, but, rather, firmly expresses dissatisfaction with a cadre's performance.66

The Center has the capability to discipline local wrongdoings if they can be discovered and if the Center is determined to do so. Depending on

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65 Interview File B. No. 15.
66 Ibid.
Beijing's perception of the seriousness of the offense(s), it can order a wide variety of solutions that are either persuasive or coercive in nature. The central monitoring devices can be sensitive and prompt in informing central authorities about the gravity of local policy deviations. This is because, first, local levels are required to submit reports to the COD on a regular basis. The fact that local cadres are fragmented and have different interests makes "small reports" (xiaobao) possible; in these cases, a group of cadres reports on other groups' activities directly to the Center, instead of going through regular hierarchical channels. The inside reports (neibu qingkuang), published by various institutions in a timely and accurate fashion, reflect local situations to the Center, which facilitate central control. These reports range from those that are highly classified and distributed to a very limited scope of people to those that are less classified and distributed to a broader scope of people; they are circulated within not among different government and CCP levels. It seems that local politics are not characterized so much by how to resist central policies the ways various groups and interests use and interpret central policies to defeat their political rivalries.

Moreover, the Center sometimes dispatches special work teams to locales to handle special problems whenever perceived necessary. These special work teams are given the highest clearance and are required to report investigation results directly to the Center. Localities not only

\[67\] For instance, Xinhua News Agency publishes an inside report that is circulated only among Politburo members. Information provided by journalists for this report is highly sensitive political data and may concern a number of aspects of the lives and activities of various government leaders.
cannot interrupt central investigations, but also are required to cooperate with central demands.

Central policies dictate the procedures that localities must follow in recruiting cadres to fill positions in the government and Party at all levels of the Chinese political system. Unlike analysts who argue that localities often bend and distort policies to serve their own individual interests, despite central desires often through a complex process of bargaining beyond administrative boundaries, it is my contention that the Center still possesses many effective mechanisms of control ranging from those coercive in nature to others of a more persuasive nature.

Conclusion: The Effectiveness of Central Control

Beijing's combined use of persuasive and coercive organizational control methods is very effective in assuring local compliance with central policy initiatives. 100 Wuhan cadres surveyed indicated that the organizational control, backed by its "iron fist", is, indeed, the most important factor in securing local compliance. On a 0-5 point scale (with 5 as the most important), 86%(N=55) of the 100 cadres assigned either a 4 or 5 to the threat of iron-clad party disciplinary measures as the most important factor leading to local compliance. This acknowledgement is shared by all five bureaucratic levels (provincial, mayoral, bureau, division, and section). This indicates that, as a member of the system, any cadre is very alert to the potential consequences that will result should he or she deviate from policies promulgated by Beijing.
The effectiveness is manifested by the high degree of compliance in the "four transformations" (sihua) discussed in Chapter III. It seems implementability of policy (Grindle called it content of policy) is not a very relevant issue, because recruitment policies are largely zero sum and redistributive in nature.\(^{68}\) Scope of change, interest affected, dispersed geography do not matter in any significant manner.\(^{69}\) Grindle argues that the implementability of policy becomes exponentially more difficult as the scope of the change, the number of interests affected and the geographical area covered increases. Deng's recruitment reform is nation-wide and has touched upon every bureaucratic level. With millions of cadres involved, the interests affected are far and wide. Although certain political positions were created, they cannot all be equally meaningful and powerful. Recruitment is replacement--some in and some out. Evidence suggests that facets of the recruitment policy have all been implemented quite successfully, except when central policies were imprecise, such as the revolutionary criteria, or when Beijing changed or was split in its position.

\(^{68}\) See Grindle, ed., 1980.
\(^{69}\) Ibid.
CHAPTER IV
IMPLEMENTATION SLIPPAGE AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

"Age is a treasure, diploma is indispensable, morale is reference, and connection is the most important."
--A popular Chinese saying about political recruitment

Introduction

In Chapter II, I identified patron-clientelism as the primary cause of implementation slippage in the area of cadre recruitment policy at the local level in the city of Wuhan. Although, according to the all-important measures of age, education, and level of professionalism, cadre recruitment policies have been implemented with overwhelming success, slippage is apparent in the implementation of the "revolutionary criteria" requirement. In this chapter, I explain further the role of patron-clientelism and argue that the predominant causal factor of this slippage has been the need to establish and cultivate these relationships which guarantee superiors obedience and cooperation from lower level cadres who, in turn, expect favorable treatment when it comes time for political recruitment and promotion decisions. This causes the "imperfect correspondence between
policies adopted and services actually delivered."¹ Moreover, I will analyze the political implications of patron-clientelism for the continued strength of central control over China's policy process now and into the future.

Generally, theorists studying Third World implementation are content to measure results in terms of compliance and non-compliance. Based on the data I collected in China, it is apparent that this simplistic dichotomy requires refinement in order for analysts to grasp the unique contextual determinants of non-compliance in the local implementation of recruitment policies. Although slippage is apparent in the implementation of cadre recruitment policies, it does not mean that local implementors are ignorant or defiant of central guidelines; it simply means that, in conflict with Beijing's desires, personalism in the form of patron-clientelism is important in determining decision making outcomes concerning bureaucratic recruitment and promotion. Non-compliance is understood as a failure to implement central policies, including recruiting cadres who fail to meet one or more of the age, education, professionalism, and revolutionary criteria requirements. This form of slippage, I have found, is rare.

Adjusted or adaptive compliance, on the other hand, occurs when two or more candidates meet the basic criteria, but another intervening variable, such as a candidate's strong patron-client relationship(s), determines a recruitment decision outcome in his/her favor. I call this form of slippage adjusted or adaptive, because implementors generally recruit

cadres according to the guidelines promulgated by Beijing, but often make adjustments in the recruitment process to respond to local political pressures associated with the need to satisfy the demands of any number of patrons and clients to whom favors are owed. Although central recruitment guidelines are followed by local implementors, they are known, nonetheless, not to adhere stringently to Beijing's directives to eliminate personalism from recruitment decisions, in order to acquire personal and political gains for themselves in their localities. Graphically, this refined understanding of non-compliance is shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1.

Three Forms of Implementation Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal Criteria Only</th>
<th>Formal &amp; Informal</th>
<th>Informal Criteria Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>Adaptive Compliance</td>
<td>Noncompliance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dependent variable of this analysis is slippage in the implementation of cadre recruitment policies, particularly in relation to the requirement of revolutionary criteria, and the independent variable that explains this slippage is patron-clientelism. Patron-clientelism represents a significant part of Chinese policy implementation processes and the refined understanding of non-compliance that is used in this analysis is important for us to appreciate the significant role it plays in policy implementation in China. A thorough analysis of patron-clientelism, including its formation, structure, and process, will also shed light on our understanding of its implications for central control.
Harding notes that the problem of noncompliance, sluggish compliance, and/or partial compliance with central directives occurs under three kinds of circumstances. "Problems in implementation, first of all, occur when policy directives were vague, .... Problems have occurred, as well, when there was serious division over policy among the central elite. .....And problems have occurred, finally, when the program in question ran counter to bureaucratic interests".2

While Harding's observations have provided some general points regarding the sources of implementation problems, they do not seem to explain very well the problems in the implementation of Deng's cadre policy in Wuhan. First of all, the problem we are facing here is not the one noted by Harding. In Wuhan, total noncompliance in recruitment policy, as the field research results show, is statistically insignificant. The problem lies in adaptive compliance or applying informal criteria rather than directly and blatantly opposing the central directives. Adaptive compliance is still compliance, although not completely in line with the way Beijing intended the compliance with central directives to occur. On the one hand, local cadres obey the Center because of its organizational control apparatus. On the other hand, many local cadres find that it is difficult to pursue a successful political career without cultivating personal relations with superiors. Without a close personal tie(s) with an influential superior(s), especially an immediate superior(s), there is no sense of security. Since personal ties are of such importance, the establishment, cultivation and nurturing of patron-client ties are inevitable. Such

phenomenon cannot be appropriately captured by non-compliance. It requires a new category, namely, adaptive compliance, to help our understanding of this implementation phenomenon.

Harding's diagnosis cannot sufficiently explain non-compliance in the implementation of central cadre recruitment directives. I argued earlier that the Center has been highly unified in implementing the "four transformations" (sihual policy. Though the revolutionary criterion, at times, is somewhat ambiguous in its definition of what constitutes allegiance to the CCP leadership, the other three criteria are explicit, allowing no arbitrary interpretation by local cadres. Even in revolutionary criteria, loyalty to the party and local obedience to the Center always have been priorities of the central leadership in Beijing. On this account, there is no central division.

Recruitment policy is basically a zero sum game, wherein one person's loss is the other person's gain. Political recruitment is a method used to control the distribution of power throughout China's mammoth government and party bureaucracy and nothing, perhaps, is as important as losing or gaining political power, especially to those whose lives are committed to government service. If Beijing can control this critical process at local levels, its capacity to control implementation of its other policies will also be augmented. Moreover, interest group theorists might argue that it is because local cadres have formed interest groups against the center and adaptive compliance is a result of bargaining with the center. This explanation seems plausible. Indeed, one can argue that both sides feel satisfied when generally qualified local cadres get their positions and the
Center gets local subordination. But if we delve deeper into the question and witness how the system works, we will find that such an explanation does not hold water. As pointed out in Chapter III, Chinese leaders will not tolerate the existence of an independent interest group of local cadres which opposes the Center. Any attempt to build local power strongholds or independent kingdoms are deemed by the Center to be intolerable acts, which must be terminated. Furthermore, the slippage is not great enough truly to threaten central control; it is implausible to argue that this slippage is reflective of a conspiracy on the part of independent local interest groups to undermine central cadre recruitment directives. In short, interest group theory cannot explain China's reality. What, then, causes the slippage? My findings indicate that it is the prevalence of patron-clientelism that explains Wuhan's adaptive compliance with central cadre recruitment policies.

Interpersonal Relationships and Chinese Politics

The most noted interpersonal relationships in recruitment are factionalism, patron-client ties, nepotism, and favoritism. Factionalism denotes a chain of people working for their common political gains. In this case, they work together to promote and support each other in gaining political power. Such a phenomenon, involving a massive number of cadres, has not been detected during my two field trips to Wuhan. However, this does not preclude the possibility that in some units, cadres with certain identifications help each other politically. It should be noted

3 In the past some observed that cadres from the Fifth Division, frequently cited as the strongest local power in Hubei, have taken over many leading positions in Wuhan. There is no clear pattern that cadres with Fifth Division background controlling Wuhan.
that the Center is very sensitive to factionalism and will not allow patron-client relationships to facilitate the evolution of factions which threaten implementation of central directives or to undermine central control.

Nepotism involves transferring political power through kinship and blood relationships. Many cases of this kind of network-building have been identified at the Center by Western journalists and scholars. In Wuhan, however, the pattern is somewhat different. There exist almost no cited reports revealing, for instance, local leaders' sons achieving political power by using their father's influence. Throughout my research, I found no instances of prominent local leaders who were directly related to other higher ranking leaders in Wuhan. However, there is evidence to suggest that, rather than seizing political power, some leaders sons' have used their family ties to obtain economic power.

Favoritism through patron-client networks is rather common in political recruitment. A mentality of "you scratch my back and I scratch yours" exists not only in local patron-client networks, but throughout the entire Chinese political system. The question that should be asked is not whether or not patron-client relationships exist, but how severe and widespread they are and whether or not these networks threaten to undermine central control over policy implementation.

Without a strong political network, a cadre is taking a tremendous political risk. Therefore, searching for a patron becomes a vital task for local cadres (clients) who cherish future upward political mobility. Once a patron is located, horizontal and vertical relationships need to be established. In this complex web of networks, a cadre himself can be both a
client and a patron, depending where his position is in the system. A patron expects unconditional loyalty from his clients and, in turn, he provides protection to those who pay him political homage. The protection is usually rendered on a sliding scale depending on the degree of loyalty received, a client's importance, and a patron's available political resources.

**Formation of Patron-Client Relationships**

A patron-client relationship is established when at least two persons, usually a superior and a subordinate, agree, either overtly or covertly, to assist each other in achieving individual, yet interdependent, objectives. Bureaucratically, such a relationship usually involves a superior and a subordinate. The superior is in a position to grant bureaucratic favors to the subordinate in exchange for the subordinate's obedience and loyalty to the superior and his own personal agenda.

Patron-client relationships are not only formed as a result of two parties working together or in bureaucratic proximity of one another in the government or party. In fact, patron-client relationships may be formed as a result of a common place of birth, childhood, education and, then, finally, place of work.

**Common Place of Birth**

China has a long history of faction formation based on geographic locations. In contemporary China, social discrimination exists between the North and South, city and countryside, and in-state and out of state. By exploiting geographic affinities, cadres with the same identifications are
more likely to get along with each other politically. In his 1986 publication, *Paths to Power: Elite Mobility in Contemporary China*, David M. Lampton argues convincingly that leadership interest groups are often formed based on the members' common place of birth and childhood upbringing.⁴ Although a common place of birth is, arguably, an important component of patron-client relationship networks, it should be noted that it is often not a sufficient basis for the formation of such relationships. In fact, it may facilitate knowledge of an acquaintance that encourages a split. When well-known Hong Kong journalist Lu Keng, for instance, asked Hu Yaobang about his relationship with a childhood acquaintance from the same geographic area (in Hunan Province), political conservative vice premier Wang Zhen, Hu responded that Wang was from the northern village and that he (Hu) was from the southern village and that this might mean that, politically speaking, one was "trying to drive south on a road that led north."⁵ This response was meant to discredit those who automatically assume that a common birthplace and upbringing automatically means that common ideological beliefs and political objectives will necessarily follow.

**Common Place of Education**

If two cadres graduated from the same school, the chances for them to be politically connected is higher than should they not share an

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educational background. This is because they know each other better, they share the same kind of educational experience and school culture, and there always exists an alumni association that facilitates network-building. For instance, graduates from Wuhan University, many of whom work in Wuhan, tend to identify with their common alma mater. Various party training programs provide ideal loci for cultivating connections among cadres at different levels. Recently, for instance, the Wuhan Party Committee administered a three month study program for division level cadres during which political connections were actively cultivated by participants. One of them admitted that these cadres promised to use their different resources to help each other upon returning to work. In Beijing, approximately ten years ago, the Wuhan University Alumni Association sponsored a reunion of more than 3,000 graduates living and working in Beijing. As a participant, I witnessed the network-building among the graduates, who ranged from central leaders to grassroots cadres. There are similar meetings taking place for graduates from various universities all over China, facilitating network-building among people exploiting their ties through common educational background.

Bureaucratically, the most prominent example of bureaucrats rising in the ranks of the Chinese political system as a result of network-building rooted in common educational background involves Premier Li Peng, who was educated for several years in the Soviet Union. Since Li Peng came to

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6 Interviewing File, B. No. 06.
power, there has been a significant increase in the number of Soviet-trained bureaucrats rising in the ranks of the Chinese bureaucracy, following in Li's footsteps.8

**Common Place of Work**

A common place of work facilitates the creation of patron-client ties among co-workers. They witness each others' personalities, work styles, and ideological tendencies on a day-to-day basis and, through this interaction, adjust themselves to get along with those persons best-equipped to aid them in achieving their individual objectives.

Usually, patron-client ties forged in the bureaucratic unit consist of a superior and a subordinate.9 If these relationships are successful, superiors who are promoted will always remember their favored subordinates when the time comes for them to help in obtaining approval for promotions. By promoting a subordinate, a leader not only elicits obedience and gratitude from the subordinate, but also enables him to strengthen his newly-obtained power. In return for his loyalty, the subordinate increases his chances for promotion and political protection.

A recent phenomenon indicative of this process has begun to evolve over recent years. Senior cadres are known routinely to turn over political power to their secretaries. There are a number of prominent cases that

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8 Three other Soviet-educated and one Czhech-educated officials have become vice-premiere members, including Song Jian, Zou Jiahua, Li Guixian, and Li Tieying, who is now education minister. (From James Z. Lee, "Personalism in Chinese Elite Politics: An Empirical Research," 1988, presented in P.S. 826 for Professor R. William Liddle, October 1988, Ohio State University.)

illustrate this trend and a political saying has even evolved describing it: China is a "country run by secretaries" ("mishu zhiguo"). For instance, the official who now holds the post of Party Secretary in Wuhan had had a successful working relationship with a superior and was subsequently promoted because of this relationship; previous to his promotion, this official had been the secretary to the Party secretary.10 Another example at the Bureau level concerns a previous municipal leader's secretary who is now director of Wuhan's judiciary bureau thanks to a good patron-client relationship with her previous boss.11

The examples that I briefly discussed in this section illustrate how patron-client relationships are formed between cadres in the Chinese bureaucracy resulting from common places of birth and upbringing, education and places of work. These examples were purposefully chosen to further illustrate how these patron-client relationships are exploited by bureaucratic superiors and subordinates to further their own personal and political agendas and how recruitment and promotion processes are affected by these relationships, as well.

**Patron-Client Relationships: Structure and Process**

The structure of these patron-client relationships is such that central control over the implementation of cadre recruitment policies can not be threatened. Patron-client networks are vertically linked from local levels to the central authorities at the top of the political system. There is always a

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10 Interview File B. No. 4.
11 Interview File B. No. 1.
power source (a patron) in Beijing without whom maintaining power is almost impossible. Sometimes, they are ministers or deputies, meaning they are of approximately the same rank as a provincial governor. However, the central patron is better acquainted with center politics and is, in fact, known as a "Beijing official" (jingguan), which makes a significant difference in the amount of power and influence that the two enjoy. If a local cadre has direct connections with the COD, which is the most important functional bureaucracy for cadre recruitment policy, then they have direct access to the primary decision-making apparatus for choosing key local cadres. If a cadre enjoys a good friendship with a deputy minister, he will enjoy enormous political protection. In contrast to scholars who argue that strong local patron-client networks may cause a loss of central control, I have found that, in fact, they may be sources of greater central control. Cognizant of the endemic nature of patron-clientelism and bargaining to the Chinese political system and the vital importance they play in local cadres' prospects for upward political mobility, it seems that one reason that Beijing is willing to tolerate some personalism in cadre recruitment and promotion decisions is because it is always in control, precisely because the power source for the local patron-client networks is in Beijing.

Every central leader, in addition to his/her official post, enjoys overseeing multiple patron-client networks. There are three avenues by which one can reach the center: through the military, local governments, and through the central bureaucracy. The central leadership is made up of a core, now consisting only of Deng Xiaoping, but in the future, perhaps,
consisting of two or more leaders. Presently, Deng's unity with a variety of central leaders who preside over local patron-client networks is of paramount importance to central unity which ensures central control of all patron-client networks without the threat of disruption from below. The core leader enjoys ultimate responsibility for major leadership decisions. Secondary leaders include Politburo members and the vice premier. A third layer consists of NPC chairpersons and vice chairpersons of the National Political Consultative Conference. The closer a local leader is to the center, the more power he will enjoy over cadre recruitment decisions and the greater his chances will be to enjoy upward political mobility. With thousands of provincial leaders throughout China, it is impossible for all of them to establish relationships with central leaders and to be able to approach them directly. Often, these provincial leaders will forge patron-client relationships with second- or third-level leaders to ensure their upward mobility and the upward mobility of subordinates loyal to them. Some provincial leaders are only able to establish relationships with ministerial officials, who, in turn, become sources of power for local level cadres.

This type of superior-oriented system enables the Center to effectively monitor local political movements and recruitment processes, among many other things. It is precisely because of this ability to monitor local patron-client relationships that slippage in recruitment policy implementation is tolerated by central leaders. In fact, Beijing's denunciation of personalism in recruitment processes may be only a warning to local officials not to support clients who will not enjoy ultimate
central support in Beijing. Even deeper than the concern that local recruits will not work to defy Beijing is the center's primary concern that patron-client relationships do not become inter-regional which has always been perceived to be a threat to central control. Beyond this grave concern, patron-clientelism is tolerated by the center in local cadre recruitment processes.

Examples of the use of patron-client relationships to acquire upward mobility abound. In one case, the Party Secretary of Wuhan was transferred to an insignificant provincial level job by the new governor of Hubei to make room for his own people (bureaucratic clients).\textsuperscript{12} This official had substantial support from subordinate cadres when he approached a second layer central official who had held the highest post in Wuhan's city government approximately forty years earlier and with whom he enjoyed a good relationship. This second layer leader intervened on behalf of his client, who was immediately reinstated to his former post. In another example, on June 4, 1989, the division director of a central bureaucracy called a ministerial level official to obtain details concerning the incident at Tiananmen.\textsuperscript{13} The ministry official, who was a member of the central committee, responded that she had no idea what was going on and suggested that, although he was a lower-level official, he had better informal ties and should use them to obtain details.\textsuperscript{14} These examples illustrate the importance of patron-client relationships in moving upward in

\textsuperscript{12} I witnessed this while working as an official in the local government.
\textsuperscript{13} Interview File A. No. 6.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
the political system and obtaining important information regarding political happenings.

The structure can be illustrated by the following figure:

![Figure 4.1 Patron-client Structure](image)

Informal political relationships are cultivated vertically. Interregional and innerregional coalitions in any real political sense are almost nonexistent and local networks are always led by one or a few central leaders. Central leaders are led or coordinated by one or two prominent central leaders; often, in fact, it is Deng who plays the role of the key central decision-maker. Because of this structure, the central leadership is not challenged by local political forces. The following figure depicts this situation:
Fig. 4.2 Central-local relationships

More often than not, we see local leaders fighting among themselves for power, often, ultimately, bringing their cases to Beijing for mediation and problem-solving. Beijing acts as arbitrator, either in the form of an individual or a collective decision-making unit. A Chinese proverb goes "If the upper beam is not straight, the lower ones will go aslant", meaning that if those above behave in a certain manner, those below will follow suit.

Recruitment Process Illustrated

Since the recruitment process is very superior-oriented, cultivation of patron-client relationships takes place at each step of the implementation
of cadre recruitment policies. A typical cadre recruitment decision involves a number of steps, as shown in table 4.2.

Table 4.2.
The Implementation Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>*Studying policy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Shaping implementation outline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Consensus building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Announcing to the public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At each step, there exist opportunities for leaders to manipulate the results of cadre recruitment decision making. The first step involves understanding one's superior's intentions. This usually involves the study of COD documents to determine what skills and characteristics cadres should possess to qualify for promotion. As noted, consensus is not hard to reach on those clearly defined criteria, such as age, education, and professionalism. As a member of the Party, no one dares to air contending opinions concerning these clearly defined requirements. Nonetheless, COD documents are not so thorough on every count, especially the revolutionary criterion that demands allegiance to the CCP leadership. It is on these vague areas that different understandings and interpretations begin to appear and the opportunities for the use of patron-client ties increase.
MRPs usually have a vital role to play in implementation. Their interpretation of policy always sets a key tone for that unit. Individual networking and private meetings are important parts of consensus building. A favorite candidate is always recommended by a powerful superior and privately agreed upon by key players before an official meeting. Meanwhile, a favorite candidate is often given special opportunities in order to gain public recognition.

At the nomination stage, although bottom-up input begins to be emphasized, in reality, such input only serves as a reference at best, bearing no significant effect on who is going to be nominated. Broader views are usually solicited from higher levels, rather from the grassroots of the political system. For bureau MRPs and deputies, often division level officials are invited for polling and the results are often not made known to the general public. This gives the leadership considerable leeway to manipulate the results. Since bottom-up input only serves as reference, leaders have full control over final decisions. Frequently, a superior expresses his views first, putting others in a very difficult situation to say otherwise. Ultimately, deputies have less resources, and, therefore, they have little chance to veto recruitment nominations and selections.

Usually when an MRP expressed his view, echoed by a few others, the rest always follow the motion. A personnel decision is then made.15

15 Interviewing File, B. No. 02.
A bureau level official who ostensibly failed to meet education and professionalism criteria, is still in charge of an important unit. He once confessed that: "thanks to the concerns of the leadership, I am still able to sit on this chair today. Otherwise, so many other capable people could have taken over my job already." 16 Backed by the municipal leaders, this bureau MRP remains in power, despite opposition from many bureau cadres. The fact of the matter is that as long as he has not committed outrageous mistakes, he cannot be removed or even transferred, for he has "back stage" (houtai) support. Moreover, he has even managed to promote his close associates and followers.

**Patron-Clientelism and Local Recruitment Politics**

Patron-clientelism is, unquestionably, an important factor in Chinese political recruitment, no matter what forms it takes. It has been widely recognized by cadres at all levels. The majority of the 100 surveyed Wuhan cadres think all three forms of patron-client relationships have a strong effect on political recruitment. Comparatively speaking, the common place of work and educational ties are more important vehicles for building personal connections than common place of birth. Table 4.3 records the observations of the 100 Wuhan cadres:

16 Interviewing File, B. No. 20.
Table 4.3.
Effect of Three Kinds of Personal Ties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KINDS OF PERSONAL TIES</th>
<th>EFFECT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Effect</td>
<td>Weak Effect</td>
<td>Moderate Effect</td>
<td>Strong Effect</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Place of Education</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Place of Birth</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Place of Work</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 0=no effect; 1 or 2=weak effect; 3=moderate effect; 4 or 5=strong effect

The 100 Wuhan cadres confirmed both the existence and the severity of patron-clientelism. 74% of them assigned 4 or 5 to describe the importance of "back stage" support in recruitment. In addition, another 22.2% assigned either 2 or 3 to describe the importance of strong patron-client ties. Only 3.7% (3 cadres) believe the importance level is zero.

It is common knowledge that upward mobility in China highly depends on who one's patron is, how long one has had a successful patron-client relationship with one's patron, how well one knows and is known by one's patron, and how well a client pays homage to his/her patron. In many recruitment instances, other factors, including capability and public image, play no role, or marginal roles at best.

Patron-client networks, when conflict of interest is at stake, is a source of implementation slippage and distortion. It is a wide-spread political phenomenon that involves every local level.
Political Implications for Central Control

Numerous characteristics of patron-client networks in China prohibit them from becoming threats to central control and, in fact, often make them devices by which the central authorities can monitor implementation of its policies and further consolidate its power over local level political processes. Among the features of patron-clientelism in China that I consider in this analysis are the lack of inter-regional linkages between patron-client networks, their ultimate roots in the center, limited scope, fragmentation, lack of military power, and bureaucratic rules and procedures that vest ultimate approval over recruitment decisions in the central authorities in Beijing.

Lack of Inter-regional Linkage: In order for central control to be threatened by patron-client networks, inter-regional alliances must develop to garner enough strength to defy central authorities. In order for such inter-regional factions to develop, there must be a central locus to encourage their formation. Presently, there exists no institutional arrangement by which mayors can meet with each other to create inter-regional patron-client networks, except in those instances when Beijing sponsors meetings where they get together. In these cases, obviously, Beijing enjoys substantial control over the mayors and their interaction. In contrast to the formation of local alliances, there is actually a substantial amount of friction between localities who compete for political and economic resources.
Beijing sponsors these meetings to encourage mayors to study central policy directives and for central leaders to consolidate support for such directives among local representatives. Almost without exception, these local leaders seek to strengthen their own patron-client relationships with their patrons in the central government. Rather than being a locus for the formation of inter-regional faction formation, these meetings, in fact, are mechanisms that further perpetuate patron-client networks that ensure ultimate central control. In short, chances for upward mobility are provided by the top of the political hierarchy and, rather than unify to seek to undermine this central control, localities compete with each other for valuable bureaucratic influence at the center.

*Roots at the Center:* All patron-client networks are ultimately rooted in persons at the central level of China's political system. Because the success of patron-client networks depends on cooperation from central authorities, it is unlikely that they will seek to undermine central recruitment policy directives. Rather, patron-client networks have a vested interest in cooperating with central authorities to ensure the success of local patron-client initiatives.

Cadre recruitment and promotion decisions are, by their very nature, characterized by a top-down decision-making process. Ultimate power over nomination, recommendation, screening, reviewing, and approval ultimately lies at the center of the political system. These institutional decision-making processes are greatly influenced by the patron-client networks which work in concert with, rather than in opposition to, these bureaucratic procedures.
Limited Scope: The center is very sensitive to the size of local patron-client networks and whether separate local networks begin to form coalitions across regional and provincial boundaries. During the 1970's and early 1980's, it was a common custom for local leaders to visit each other privately during the Chinese New Year and the Chinese Spring Festival for celebrations and to usher in the new year (bai nian). In recent years, to discourage such small group meetings, where, it was feared the seeds of defiance might be planted, the center has issued explicit directives to localities that once a year, all important local leaders meet to celebrate a happy new year with each other in a large auditorium, at which time a key person(s) (i.e., governor or first party secretary) is chosen to make a speech, emphasizing the importance of central unity and requesting that all localities remain "tightly united around the central leadership" (jingjing de tuanjie zai dangzhong yang zuowei). By doing so, the central authorities strongly discourage small group activities that may result in factions that oppose Beijing. Sponsoring collective gatherings is highly symbolic of local commitment to the center and is an ironic manipulation by the central authorities to limit the scope of patron-client network formation by controlling interaction of local leaders to one time per year and effectively using this one occasion to drive home a stern warning in a celebratory forum, where threatening patron-client networks might otherwise find their birth, that factions are unacceptable.

Fragmented: Generally, the Chinese local political interests are fragmented by a number of factors, outlined in Mao's "Ten Great
Relationships." More particularly, in the area of Chinese policy implementation, Susan Shirk, among others, identified three general cleavages characteristic of China's political system, including industrial, bureaucratic, and geographic factors.

In the area of cadre recruitment policy, age, education, and professionalism requirements create cleavages between younger and older cadres, more educated and less educated cadres (including those with different educational backgrounds), and cadres with more professional credentials and those with less professional credentials. Patron-client networks that influence judgements on the fourth recruitment criterion, the revolutionary criteria, hence, are limited in size and influence by these other three recruitment criteria, effectively undermining the formation of patron-client networks that may grow and threaten other central policy initiatives.

Fragmentation may also occur within patron-client networks themselves. In Hubei, for instance, within a small provincial leadership circle, everybody knew there were sharp conflicts between the Party secretary and the governor. Many top local officials were labelled either as the Party secretary's cadre or the governor's cadre. Their political opportunities waxed and waned according to the fate of their patrons. The

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rift between MRPs can come from a number of additional factors, including differences in career experience, work style, incompatibility of personalities, and different agendas.

**Conclusion: The Strength of Central Control**

In this chapter, I explained slippage in the implementation of the revolutionary criteria component of cadre recruitment policy in terms of the role of interpersonal relationships in Chinese politics. In the implementation of cadre recruitment policies, this interpersonalism often takes the form of patron-client relationships which are usually established as mutually beneficial relationships between politically-motivated bureaucratic superiors and their subordinates. The formation of these relationships may be facilitated by common places of birth and upbringing, education, and/or work. Although administrative procedures have been established to ensure implementation of cadre recruitment policies irrespective of cadres' patron-client ties, evidence of these local relationships exists at every step of the implementation process, especially in the implementation of the revolutionary criterion component of these policies.

The existence of these patron-client networks, however, does not undermine central control over implementation, because they are ultimately rooted in a variety of core, secondary and tertiary leaders in Beijing. Furthermore, these local patron-client networks are kept from forming inter-regional alliances and from growing in scope by a number
of important methods of direct and indirect control by the central authorities.

Patron-client networks do not threaten to undermine the functions of the Center's organizational control network, but, rather, work in concert with these procedures. It is, for example, customary that central leaders travel to the localities where their bases of power are to win the support of local leaders for their policy initiatives. After the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976, for instance, the former President of the People's Republic of China and commander of the 5th Division of the New Fourth Army, travelled to his home province of Hubei, where he met with veterans of the army and local leaders. At this time, he challenged his supporters to follow the new leadership and policy initiatives in the new era, which was a very important catalyst for garnering political support from this powerful province for the central leadership and its central policy lines. In fact, this chapter has demonstrated that such informal networks contribute to the functioning of these institutional bureaucratic procedures, especially at the early stages of the cadre decision making processes. Decisions represent the formal outcome of these behind-the-scenes operations.

In this dissertation, I am not concerned with which of these two processes is more important; I have been strictly concerned with whether these processes facilitate ultimate satisfactory implementation of central cadre recruitment directives or whether the patron-client networks, about which Beijing formally enunciates disapproval, threaten central control over implementation processes. Beijing's cadre recruitment policies have been implemented with overwhelming success along the lines of age,
education, and professionalism requirements. Slippage, due to the phenomenon of patron-clientelism, occurs in the implementation of the revolutionary criterion (particularly in the implementation of the requirement of allegiance to the CCP); however, this slippage is tightly monitored and controlled both directly and indirectly by Beijing and exists well within boundaries acceptable to the Center. In fact, the patron-client networks ultimately work together with institutional procedures to ensure remarkably successful implementation; policy slippage in the implementation of cadre recruitment policies, hence, is better understood as a characteristic of what I have identified as adaptive compliance.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

This dissertation has sought to contribute to our knowledge of the policy implementation process in China. A significant contribution has been the valuable raw data that was presented in this work. The data provide insight into the opinions of a wide-range of local cadres from various levels of Wuhan's bureaucratic hierarchy. Moreover, the data present a snapshot of China's evolving force of local-level cadres. They are a younger, better educated, and politically ambitious group of individuals with a high level of commitment to the CCP leadership and central government directives. Hopefully, this rich collection of empirical data will be useful in further analysis of recruitment policies in China.

Substantively, the dissertation has illuminated China's cadre recruitment system and the strength of central control over the policy implementation process at the local level of China's political system throughout the era of decentralization of power from Beijing to the localities. Indeed, Beijing's control over localities in the past twelve years has been relaxed to some extent. The cadre management system has been decentralized and the nomenclature system has been simplified. The prior two level control system\(^1\) is now being replaced by one level control,

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\(^1\) Previously, any party committee controls two levels below. For example, Wuhan Municipal Party Committee controls bureau and division cadres. Division level cadres previously approved by the municipality are now decided by bureaus themselves.
granting lower levels more personnel power. Tiaotiao² control over personnel is now comparatively less important than Kuaikuai control, giving localities some political leeway. However, the central control is still much tighter than many of us might expect and the level of local compliance is much higher than many would think. Beijing's political control over Wuhan is, by all measures, effective. Though slippage and distortions have been observed, they do not interfere with major policy objectives, nor do they undermine central control over the policy process. Deng's center has, in fact, vowed to strengthen control and any instability will not be tolerated. Should local slippage be believed to threaten central control, Beijing can use increasingly coercive measures until satisfactory cooperation has been elicited.³

Conceptually, this dissertation has refined what was identified as a simplistic, dichotomous framework for the analysis of policy implementation in the third world in general and China in particular. With the introduction of the concept of adaptive compliance, this project was able to grapple successfully with the highly abstract notion of patron-clientelism as a determinant of slippage in the local implementation of central cadre policy directives. Adaptive compliance allowed us to present the implementation slippage not necessarily as a failure of China's "policy

² Politically, Tiaotiao denotes those vertical relationship, i.e., center vs. localities. In Chinese, Kuaikuai means lump and denotes horizontal relations. For an analysis of tiaotiao kuaikuai relationships, see Paul Schroeder, Regional Authority in China: Tiaotiao Kuaikuai Authority in the Chinese political System, Ph.D dissertation, Ohio State University, 1987.

³ An article from The People's Daily quoted Deng Xiaoping as saying that in the future whenever political unrest occur, any methods can be used to stop it, either military curfew or other even harsher methods. The People's Daily, Overseas Edition, April 28, 1992, P. 4.
delivery system," but as a phenomenon tolerated and controlled by a central leadership that has shown itself to be highly cognizant of the endemic nature of patron-clientelism to its political system and society and the inevitable value that cadres throughout the country attach to it.

Theoretically, this project contributed a counter-intuitive interpretation of the role of patron-clientelism in policy implementation in contemporary China. In his 1987 article, "Chinese Politics: The Bargaining Treadmill," David M. Lampton suggested that the creation of a new legal framework in China probably would not limit in any substantive measure the role of bargaining through personal relationships to circumvent administrative rules and regulations.4 In his 1992 dissertation, Michael F. Roehrig convincingly argued that central Sino-foreign joint venture laws and policies tended to be vague and ambiguous and that local level policy implementors enjoyed enormous leeway in interpretation which they used for their own individual gains, often in contradiction to central policy objectives. Scholars who make these arguments tend, in my opinion, to get bogged down in details bordering on minutiae and often miss the bigger, very important picture.5 Implicitly, they seem to assume that because there is local distortion of central policies resulting from a complex bargaining process among any number of interested parties, this is indicative of a loss of central control. What seems to have been discounted in Roehrig's account, for example, is that the primary central objectives of acquiring foreign capital investment, advanced technology, and sophisticated

management training, through joint venture policies have been highly successful. Indeed, further analysis of the implementation of Sino-foreign joint venture laws and policies might benefit from the concept of adaptive compliance to determine more accurately how local level policy manipulations and slippages actually facilitate the fulfillment of Beijing's primary joint venture objectives.

While localities may enjoy a certain degree of power over interpretation of central laws and policies, the macro-level results do not support the notion that they have failed as instruments to achieve Beijing's main goals. In fact, it seems that it is Beijing's intention to allow a certain level of local bargaining as a way to encourage localities to actively pursue implementation of central policies, in contrast with Mao's more coercive political machine which attempted more often than not to intimidate localities into implementation of central policies. By allowing a certain degree of bargaining autonomy, localities act more actively towards the fulfillment of central policy initiatives than the passive manner in which implementors acted under the grip of Mao's totalitarian system. Bargaining at China's local levels over central policies is tolerated and, to some degree, encouraged by Beijing, but there are limits to this bargaining freedom; the moment Beijing feels that localities are bargaining too much on behalf of themselves to the detriment of central policy goals, it has the necessary coercive wherewithal to limit local bargaining freedom and force the localities to be more responsive to Beijing's policy objectives. Beijing's power over cadre recruitment and promotion allows it to change local
leadership personnel until it finds a combination of cadres who can implement policies in a manner satisfactory to the central authorities.

This project, unlike those analyses that concentrate on slippage resulting from local level bargaining, attached enormous importance to the central leadership's organizational control. It successfully demonstrated Beijing's strength in achieving what it wants to achieve and explained the structures and processes by which this goal attainment is successfully accomplished. Structurally, numerous characteristics facilitate the Center's ability to prevent the formation of localist tendencies that may threaten to undermine Beijing's authority and ensure central control over the implementation of its policies. First, local leaders have a very narrow path for upward mobility and career opportunities and their future political success is dependent upon their level of loyalty to their superiors and central leadership; the Center has an effective system to monitor closely local political activities, including investigation and special task teams that can be dispatched at a moment's notice to ensure implementation of central policies; furthermore, the Center has established "Two MRP System" (liangzhangzhili), which designates a CCP official for every government official to oversee policy implementation and ensure allegiance to the CCP leadership. Finally, the Center has a firm grip over military power and coercive forces of all kinds as a symbol of strength and a threat to any ideas local leaders might cultivate about exploiting localist tendencies to undermine central control. Administratively, the Center has numerous structures that act on behalf of the Center in the implementation of policies. In the area of cadre recruitment, the most important structure is the COD
in securing compliance from localities in implementing recruitment policies. Locally, the Wuhan Party Organization was found to be highly responsive to and cooperative with the COD in implementing COD recruitment directives.

Procedurally, the Center has a well-defined set of procedures that are distributed to local level authorities. My data indicates that these procedures are well-understood and play an instrumental role in bringing about successful implementation of cadre recruitment policies. Beijing enjoys an array of methods by which it elicits cooperation from localities in following these procedures with very little deviation from central directives. These methods of control range in severity from a variety of persuasive measures to a host of more intimidating coercive methods of control.

Patron-clientelism is the major source of slippage in the implementation of cadre recruitment policies, especially in the implementation of the revolutionary criteria. However, patron-clientelism is rooted in the Center, where ultimate power sources of local patron-client networks are found to exist. Any slippage in the implementation of central recruitment directives due to patron-client networks ultimately is tolerated by Beijing, where all sources of power for the patron-client networks exist. If slippage is perceived by Beijing to threaten central interests or to weaken central control, the Center enjoys power over a variety of persuasive and coercive methods with which to respond and ultimately use to correct slippage and elicit cooperation.
Future Research Areas

This project's conclusions suggest that future research on Chinese policy should be more focused on central leadership politics. More attention should be paid to individual leaders' backgrounds, personality traits, power distribution and their political relationships with central bureaucracies and their local power bases. Furthermore, more attention should be paid to the bureaucratic structures of the Chinese political system and how they are used to ensure successful implementation of central policy directives. This suggestion is predicated on the counter-intuitive argument of this entire dissertation that local bargaining among patrons and clients over central policies is not nor has it been a source of a loss of central power over policy implementation at the local level of the Chinese political system. If this dissertation has achieved nothing else, it should sound an emphatic siren, warning western scholars that their preoccupation with local implementation slippage has been a source of dangerous intellectual tunnel vision. The enormous concentration on local policy slippage, from which they often mistakenly conclude that the centralized Chinese political system is suffering an irreversible trend of power erosion, has also caused them to lose sight of the bigger picture, namely, that central authorities in Beijing continue to enjoy control over a vast array of organizational and procedural methods to monitor local policy implementation. Any slippage that does routinely occur in any policy area, be it cadre recruitment or Sino-foreign joint ventures, may, in fact, be facilitated and encouraged by the Center, as long as such slippage
does not threaten central control and the major, macro-level goals of these policy initiatives are being fulfilled.

As long as Beijing maintains effective control over local recruitment in Wuhan, that city will not deviate from central directives in any significant manner. At this point, the only threat to central control is a high-level power struggle that might result from, most notably, the death of Deng Xiaoping, the preeminent core of the Chinese leadership. In the meantime, efforts on the part of the central leadership to encourage political change with reform policies will continue to be implemented by responsive and cooperative local bureaucrats who are loyal to the Center's wishes and objectives.
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APPENDIX A

INFORMANTS

IN BEIJING

01 Division MRP, M, 40, the state personnel ministry
02 Division Deputy, M, 42, the state propaganda department
03 Vice Ministerial Official, M, 45, the state Administrative bureaucracy
04 Division Deputy, M, 43, the state agriculture bureaucracy
05 Division Deputy, M, 44, the state bureaucracy
06 Division Deputy, M, 33, the state social science research Institute

IN WUHAN

07 Division Deputy, M, 35, the municipal party organization dept
08 Mayor Level Official, M, 72, the municipal party
09 Division Deputy, F, 40, the city bureaucracy
10 Bureau MRP, M, 58, the city construction bureaucracy
11 Division MRP, F, 62, the party disciplinary committee
12 Division MRP, M, 39, the municipal party committee
13 Bureau MRP, M, 64, the provincial foreign affairs
14 Division MRP, M, 58, the provincial foreign affairs
15 Bureau MRP, M, 55, the municipal party committee
16 Division Deputy, M, 51, the city construction research
17 Division Deputy, M, 52, the university administration
18 Section MRP, M, 39, the city bureaucracy
19 Division MRP, M, 39, the city bureaucracy
20 Bureau Deputy, F, 64, the city bureaucracy
21 Section MRP, F, 34, the city bureaucracy

OUTSIDE OF WUHAN

22 Division MRP, M, 39, the enterprise party secretary