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United States defense reorganizations: Contending explanations

Ward, Bryan Howard, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1993

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UNITED STATES DEFENSE REORGANIZATIONS:
CONTENDING EXPLANATIONS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Bryan H. Ward, B.A., J.D.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1993

Dissertation Committee:  Approved by
Dr. Joseph Kruzel
Dr. Charles Hermann
Dr. James Harf

Advisor
Department of Political Science
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1993
To Mom, Dad, and Jean
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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VITA

August 25, 1961 .................. Born - Ashland, Kentucky

1983 ............................. B.A., Ohio Northern
University, Ada, Ohio

1986 ............................. J.D. University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill
School of Law

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science

Studies in: International Relations
Comparative Politics
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

At the end of World War II the United States began a series of wrenching organizational changes in its defense establishment. In 1947 the entire defense establishment was reconfigured and significant changes in civilian control of the military, command structure, and administrative structure were effected. These new structures were further refined by the reorganizations of 1949, 1953, and 1958. Then, for a period of twenty-eight years, no comprehensive defense reorganizations occurred. The reorganization which broke this period of organizational quiescence, the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization bill of 1986, was considered by some to be one of the most significant defense events in United States history. As House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin stated, the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization was "probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American military since the Continental Congress."¹

This pattern represents a puzzle for scholars of defense policy and organizational theory. Why there were a series of reorganizations in a little over a decade
following the end of World War II and then no comprehensive reorganizations for the next twenty-eight years? Before one can answer such a question, however, one must first understand what it is that leads to defense reorganizations. Unfortunately, such an understanding is not settled in the academic or policy communities. Thus, in order to properly address the question of time lag between defense reorganizations one must address a more important fundamental question: what inspired the postwar defense reorganizations of 1947, 1949, 1953, 1959, and 1986?

Beyond this question of causation, however, one must be open to a second issue. Is it fair to characterize the reorganization of 1986 as just one more in a series of defense reorganizations which commenced in 1947, or was it substantially different from the earlier postwar reorganizations. Questioning the similarities or differences of the various reorganizations gets to the root of the issue of generalizability. Thus, a second significant question, beyond that of the reasons for the individual reorganizations, is whether the postwar defense reorganizations and the reorganization of 1986 can all be explained in the same manner? Were all of these reorganizations inspired by the same factors? How inclusive can one be when generalizing about the defense reorganization process since 1945? Addressing this issue may well address the question of the twenty-eight year gap,
as well as provide clues as to the future of defense reorganization in the United States.

In effect, two questions exist which, when fully articulated and placed in order of importance, appear as follows:

**Question One.** What inspired United States defense reorganizations since the end of World War II?

**Question Two.** Are the explanations for United States defense reorganization the same throughout the post-World War II era?

Answers to these questions may point the way to a more systematic understanding of the defense reorganization process and may allow for more reasonable assessments of the likelihood of addition defense reorganizations in the future.

**WAYS OF EVALUATING DEFENSE REORGANIZATIONS**

The phenomena of defense reorganization is not one which fits easily into a particular theoretical niche, either in the study of international relations or in the study of political science in general. One possible approach to the study of defense reorganizations is to view reorganizations, an element of defense policy, as an aspect of foreign policy. Roger Hilsman has argued that "Defense policy, or national security policy, is really an aspect of foreign policy."² This being the case, it can be argued that defense reorganization can best be explained by international relations theory; specifically, by looking at
those theories which explain the foreign policy choices of states in the international system.

Within international relations scholarship in general, and the study of foreign policy in particular, theory has been arranged around the concept of the levels of analysis. J. David Singer first pointed to the inherent levels of analysis question within international relations and the need to consider the appropriateness of the level chosen when assessing the efficacy of a given theory.3 Essentially, the construct of the levels-of-analysis identifies the different levels of social aggregation within which one may seek explanation for the foreign policy choice of states. Different theories are associated with each level of social aggregation, with theoretical disputes often centering on which level of analysis is best when attempting to explain a particular phenomena. As stated by Alexander Wendt, "the levels of analysis problem has to do with determining which level of social aggregation offers the most promise for building theories that explain the behavior of state actors; the nation state or the international system, and, in subsequent extensions of Singer’s framework, domestic politics, bureaucratic politics, or individual psychology."4

The most macro level of analysis, the system level, has been used to advance the theoretical proposition that foreign policy choice is a factor of the configuration of
states within the international system and the rules which govern that system. Stepping down one rung on the level-of-analysis ladder, one may argue that the calculus of nation-states, acting as a unitary actor concerned with the behavior of other nation-states, best explains the foreign policy of states. 

At a lower level of social aggregation, one could argue that the behavior and choices of sub-national groups, such as bureaucracies, political parties, the media, etc., may best explain the foreign policy of the state. Finally, at the lowest level of societal aggregation, the preferences and choices of key individuals may best explain the foreign policy of a particular state. Perhaps somewhere among these various levels of analysis is a theory which can account for the defense reorganization process as an aspect of international relations/foreign policy.

Despite the rather fertile area for theoretical exploration found in the study of international relations and foreign policy, it may be the case that such an approach cannot capture the issue of defense reorganization. It may be that defense reorganization cannot be appropriately characterized as an aspect of foreign policy, but instead as a component of domestic policy. If so, then defense reorganizations may be best understood by looking at the types of issues that typically affect domestic policy choice, or by looking at studies of other forms of
governmental reorganization. The literature of public administration, insofar as it attempts to explain the governmental reorganization process, may be a useful tool in explaining defense reorganizations.

Finally, it can be argued that defense reorganizations cannot be fairly categorized as either foreign policy or domestic policy. Rather, defense reorganizations may be at the intersection of these two policy areas, with the result being a unique policy area in which explanation need be sought in the particularities of the issue. A useful source in exploring a particularistic explanation of defense reorganization is the historical literature on the defense reorganization process, which tend to postulate unique explanations for defense reorganization. This literature implicitly accepts that defense reorganizations are odd birds which may not be best explained by generalized theories of domestic or foreign policy, but rather by a theoretical approach stressing the uniqueness of the defense reorganization process.

EXPLANATIONS OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION

As can be seen, an issue such as defense reorganization may fall into a variety of different theoretical traditions. Nevertheless, one cannot evaluate every potential theory which may be useful to a better understanding of defense reorganization. Rather, choices must be made which reflect
realistic assessments of theoretical utility and which attempt to achieve breadth of coverage. By breadth of coverage, I am referring to the goal of obtaining a set of potential theoretical explanations which do not all arise out of the same theoretical traditions. Breadth of coverage occurs by crossing theoretical traditions in order to take advantage of the variety of work that has been done. The end result should be to reach better conclusions as to the reasons for defense reorganization.

DEFENSE REORGANIZATIONS AS FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES MOTIVATED BY EXTERNAL CONCERNS

The external explanation for defense reorganization relies, first of all, upon the assumption that defense reorganizations, as forms of defense policy, are explained in a manner similar to the explanations given for foreign policy decisions. This assumption contradicts the conclusions of Samuel Huntington, who contends not only that defense organization is a "structural" issue that is influenced by domestic policy, but also that only issues associated with "strategic" decisions are determined by international political concerns. Huntington defines "strategic" decisions as, "1) program decisions concerning the strength of the military forces, their composition and readiness, and the number, type, and rate of deployment of their weapons; and 2) use decisions concerning the
deployment, commitment, and employment of military force, and manifested in military alliances, war plans, declarations of war, force movements, and the like.\textsuperscript{9}

Huntington does not argue that there is a complete and constant division between "structural" and "strategic" defense issues or that international political concerns never affect "structural" decisions (or, conversely, that domestic political concerns never affect "strategic" decisions). He does, however, argue that those instances in which international political concerns affect "structural" decisions or those in which domestic political concerns affect "strategic" decisions are largely episodic. Such mixing of influences is not pervasive within defense policy. Thus, structural and strategic influences may be complimentary at a given time on a specific issue, but not all of the time.\textsuperscript{10}

Henry Kissinger, on the other hand, is not willing to draw such a clear line between strategy and structure. Kissinger has argued that the resolution of strategic questions have been impeded by organizational configurations.\textsuperscript{11} He states that, "Among the obstacles to an adequate response [to strategic challenges] is the organization of our military establishment. To develop a strategic doctrine requires an administrative structure which leads officers to reflect spontaneously about questions of over-all concern throughout their careers."\textsuperscript{12}
From this perspective, structural considerations may always play a significant role in strategic deliberation, with the result being that structural issues significantly affect strategy and behavior in international politics. This being the case, one could argue that structural defense issues are just as much an element of foreign policy as are strategic issues, and thus can be explained in a manner similar to explanations given for foreign policy decisions.

As a means of reemphasizing how a structural issue such as defense reorganization can be considered an aspect of foreign policy, one can look at how the substance of defense reorganization falls within a standard definition of foreign policy. Walter Carlsnaes argues that foreign policies are,

"those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated directives, and performed by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are manifestly directed towards objectives, conditions, and actors - both governmental and non-governmental - which clearly lie beyond their sphere of territorial legitimacy."

He further argues, in defining the concept of foreign, that:

"given the obvious fact that we do not mean 'crossing' in a literal sense, we can specify such activities in terms of actions directed at, affecting, or responding to, individuals, groups, organizations, states or conditions situated outside a sovereign community and its geographical jurisdiction, i.e. to actions which generally speaking are directed at what is usually called the international environment."

It would seem evident that defense reorganizations are undertaken as a means of enhancing the mission of the defense establishment, i.e. the physical protection of the
United States and its vital interests beyond its borders. As such, defense reorganizations are responding to an international environment which poses threats to the security of the United States. In addition, defense reorganizations may respond to conditions within the international system which have illustrated lessons about the ability of the U.S. military to adequately perform their missions. By effecting changes which are inspired by the results of conflict with other states, defense reorganizations are reacting to situations which are only revealed in the context of the external international environment. If we accept that defense reorganizations are an aspect of foreign policy, then they may be best explained by theories which account for foreign policy decisions.

As previously discussed, the different theoretical approaches to explaining the foreign policy of states can be classified according to the level of analysis within which the theory falls. The nation-state level of analysis, with its focus on individual states within the international system, as the most appropriate level for the study of defense reorganizations. Within this level of analysis, a useful theoretical starting point is the theoretical grouping described by Morton Halperin as the "foreign policy branch." Halperin argues that this particular branch of the study of the behavior of states concentrates "on individual nation states rather than adopting a system
perspective. Foreign policy objectives usually are attributed to the specific nation as a whole or to the particular leaders of the country. In the former case, these goals are held to be substantially invariate with regard to the particular incumbent leadership – i.e. they are traditional, historical, or objective goals of foreign policy. ... Policymakers are assumed to be rational, value maximizing individuals whose choices reflect a reasonable selection among alternative courses of action designed to achieve the desired objective."

Fleshing out this description, in the case of the United States, the primary objective goal of its foreign policy has been to maintain the security and territorial integrity of the United States. From this baseline objective goal, other "traditional" or "historical" goals have followed. These include: European non-intervention in the Western Hemisphere (Monroe Doctrine), preference for self-determination for the world's peoples and the rule of law (Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and the Atlantic Charter), the promotion of democracy and the containment of communism (the Truman Doctrine and the Eisenhower Doctrine), and the protection of U.S. allies in Europe and around the world (the NATO charter). Aside from these specific goals of foreign policy, the United States has also had a traditional mode of foreign policy which has opposed aggression and favored peaceful cooperation and settlement
of disputes. The key issue to U.S. foreign policy is, however, the maintenance of security and stability – both at home and overseas.

If we view defense reorganizations as foreign policy issues, then, according to the "foreign policy branch," we should anticipate that U.S. foreign policy goals will define the objectives of the defense reorganization process. In this light, defense reorganizations can be viewed as attempts to enhance the ability of the U.S. to maintain its security as a nation state and advance its security interests throughout the world. This being the case, defense reorganizations occur when something significantly affects these primary U.S. foreign policy objectives. The events which might affect these foreign policy objectives could be actions taken by others in the international political arena or could be the result of military operational activity undertaken by the U.S. defense establishment in an attempt to defend U.S. security interests against external threats. Taking this one step further, one would expect defense reorganizations to occur in response to a change in the level of external threats posed to U.S. security interests or as a means of institutionalizing lessons learned by prior U.S. military operational activity. In conclusion, a full elaboration of the external explanation is as follows:
Defense reorganizations occur in response to a change in the threats posed to U.S. security interests by external forces or as a means of institutionalizing lessons learned in previous U.S. military operational activity against external forces. Defense reorganizations may assist in offsetting a new or heightened external threat or may be undertaken in response to a dramatically reduced external threat. In addition, defense reorganizations may be seen as a means of correcting organizational flaws revealed in previous operational activity or as a means of institutionalizing ad hoc organizational structures or arrangements which proved to be successful in prior operational activity. One can expect a defense reorganization when there is a change in the level or nature of the external threat posed to the United States or when the U.S. military learns a significant organizational lesson due to recent operational activity.

DEFENSE REORGANIZATIONS AS DOMESTIC ISSUES MOTIVATED BY DOMESTIC CONCERNS

The starting point for an explanation of defense reorganization as a domestic policy issue is the work of Samuel Huntington. Huntington contends that defense reorganization decisions can be described as "structural" decisions. As such, they "are made in the currency of domestic politics." Huntington contends that structural choices (such as defense reorganizations) are made when domestic policy goals are at issue. This being the case, "structural" decisions associated with defense reorganization are made in order to advance domestic policy goals or address domestic policy concerns.

Huntington's assessments of the nature of defense policy should not be surprising given the unique nature of
the defense establishment. The Department of Defense has a budget in excess of any multinational corporation in the United States. It employs, either directly or indirectly, millions of people. Its construction and procurement programs are the lifeblood of a large number of communities. As such, structural decisions pertaining to the defense establishment are inextricably linked to domestic political concerns, with domestic politics acting as a primary motive for defense organizational changes.

One can identify two policy concerns commonly associated with domestic policy decisions. The first is the domestic economy. When the domestic economy is performing poorly, domestic policy decisions may be taken with an eye towards improving the performance of the economy. The second is concern with administrative performance. A constant concern of domestic policy makers is the ability of large organizations to function effectively and with a minimum of waste and abuse. The inability of an organization to perform adequately reflects badly upon government in general, and requires corrective measures. One can argue that if defense reorganizations are in fact domestic policy decisions, they would occur in response to these two common domestic policy concerns.

This explanation is reenforced to some extent by the broader literature on domestic governmental reorganizations. This extensive body of literature identifies two potential
domestic policy motivations for governmental reorganization: economy and efficiency. The significance of these two domestic policy concerns and their relationship to governmental reorganization is illustrated by the Reorganization Act of 1949, which required that all governmental reorganizations be justified in terms of their contribution:

(1) to promote the better execution of the laws, the more effective management of the executive branch and of its agencies and functions, and the expeditious administration of the public business;
(2) to reduce expenditures and promote economy to the fullest extent consistent with the efficient operation of the Government;
(3) to increase the efficiency of the operations of the Government to the fullest extent practicable;
(4) to group, coordinate, and consolidate agencies and functions of the Government, as nearly as may be, according to major purposes;
(5) to reduce the number of agencies by consolidating those having similar functions under a single head, and to abolish such agencies or advisory functions thereof as may not be necessary for the efficient conduct of the Government;
(6) to eliminate overlapping and duplication of effort.21

If concern with economy and efficiency explains governmental reorganization in general, then these concerns may also explain the more specific phenomenon of defense reorganization. Within the context of defense reorganization, the domestic explanation contends that defense reorganizations are undertaken in order to save money and improve the organization's performance of administrative tasks. This explanation is in accord with the intuitive assumptions concerning the importance of
economic and administrative performance issues previously discussed.

We can flesh out this domestic explanation of defense reorganization as follows:

The decision to reorganize the defense establishment is undertaken as a means of addressing the domestic policy imperatives of saving money with an eye towards improving the overall economy and correcting poor administrative performance. One can anticipate that a defense reorganization will occur when the domestic economy is performing less than satisfactorily and when there have been instances of waste, fraud, duplications, and inefficiency in the administration of the defense establishment.

DEFENSE REORGANIZATIONS AS CONSOLIDATIONS OF CIVILIAN EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

A final potential explanation for defense reorganization is that which contends that defense reorganizations are unique events not driven by foreign or domestic political concerns. Rather, they are best explained by focusing on the exceptional aspects of the defense establishment and its organizational structure. In particular, this explanation would investigate the extent to which defense reorganizations are periodic attempts to adjust the uneasy relationship among the many competing groups within the defense establishment.

At a macro level, the defense establishment is divided between civilians and military professionals. An ideal description of the relationship between civilians and the
military is Huntington's notion of "objective civilian control."^22 Objective civilian control, according to Huntington, "is the maximizing of military professionalism. More precisely, it is that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps. ... Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state."^23 Huntington envisioned a relationship in which the civilian leadership dealt with political questions and a professional military dealt with strictly military questions, with the military clearly subordinate to the civilian leadership. Huntington recognizes, however, that "subjective civilian control," in which the military may be engaged in political decision making, does occasionally exist.24 Conversely, it is also possible for the civilian leadership to impose its judgement on questions of a purely military nature, to the detriment of the overall effort.25 In the event, civilian control of the military is mandated by the United States Constitution, and is an organizational goal within the defense establishment for which civilians must constantly strive.

On a more micro level, it is apparent that divisions exist within the ranks of both civilians and the military. The division among civilians, in the area of defense policy, is between the executive and legislative branches of
government. As in many other policy areas, a constant battle is waged between Congress and the Executive over the level of policy influence which each will have. This policy conflict is amplified, in the case of defense policy, by the nature of the constitutional provisions which allocate policy authority to the executive and legislative branches of government. The Constitution is intentionally divisive on this issue, granting the President the authority of Commander-in-Chief, yet giving the Congress the authority to raise and support the Army and to provide and maintain for the Navy. Inherently the President and Congress will fight over defense policy authority.

On the military side, conflict is also present. Beginning with the advent of the airplane as a weapon of war and continuing through to the nuclear age, the different branches of the military have fought over roles and missions. Roles and missions can be defined as the tasks to be performed by the individual military services in combat. Necessarily, the debate often centers on the weapons systems needed to perform the roles and missions in question, with the ultimate issue being one of the money to be allocated to each service. The more roles and missions a service performs, the more money the service gets. No service wants to relinquish any of its existing roles and missions, and all of the services want to acquire any new roles or missions that become necessary. Because of the roles and
missions debate, the individual services have felt the need for a high degree of autonomy in order to best preserve their individual roles and missions and to best advance reasons for why they should acquire any new roles or missions which become available. The roles and missions debate has thus led to autonomous military services in constant competition with each other for scarce resources.

Given the conflict between the Executive and Congress among civilians in the defense establishment and between the various services within the military it is little wonder that a great diversity of interests exist within the defense policy making community. Narrowing the focus to only the Department of Defense (and thus excluding Congress from the quotient) reduces but does not eliminate the conflict. Civilian executive branch employees battle with military personnel and military personnel battle among themselves on many issues.

Given this rather unique configuration, one explanation for defense reorganization is that it is driven by the particularities of the situation more than by overarching policy considerations, be they international or domestic. Specifically, one can argue that defense reorganizations are undertaken by new top level civilian executives (i.e. the President or the Secretary of Defense) in an attempt to strengthen their control over the military as well as to centralize decision-making on defense-related issues within
the Department of Defense. The objectives are to eliminate civilian-military confrontations over policy issues, cut down on inter-service squabbling within the military, and consolidate the decision-making process on defense issues so as to create a smooth-running Department of Defense under clear civilian authority.

Given this explanation, defense reorganizations should occur when new civilian executives for defense policy, either a President or a Secretary of Defense, take over and discover the existing constraints on civilian authority, the existing level of inter-service military competition, and the lack of centralized decision-making. Thus, defense reorganizations occur only when new officials discover how the defense establishment really works (or fails to work).

In conclusion, the civilian/executive consolidation explanation can be elaborated as follows:

Defense reorganizations are undertaken in an attempt to correct inadequate levels of civilian control over the military, inter-service competition, and decentralized decision-making by enhancing civilian control and centralizing decision-making under civilian leadership. One can expect defense reorganizations to occur when new Presidents or Secretaries of State take office and initiate reorganizations in an attempt to correct the existing deficiencies of the defense establishment.
METHODOLOGY

The methodology that will be used to test each of the three explanations for post-war defense reorganizations discussed in this chapter is that of the focused comparison case study. This choice is dictated by two factors. First, there is an extremely small N for the dependent variable. I have chosen the legislatively enacted comprehensive defense reorganization as the dependent variable. Since the end of World War II there have only been five such reorganizations. Given this small N, meaningful statistical analysis is out of the question. It would be literally impossible to generate statistically meaningful generalizations from only five cases.

The focused comparison case study approach offers a degree of methodological rigor not typically found in the classic case study method. This rigor may allow for a more "scientific" process of arriving at meaningful generalizations about defense reorganizations. As Alexander George has noted, "Controlled comparison studies ... accomplish some of the objectives of a statistical-correlational analysis of a large N that seeks to identify causal relationships. Controlled comparison does this insofar as each case identifies an outcome for the dependent variable and provides a historical explanation for it that is couched in terms of the independent ... variables of theoretical interest."26
Aside from considerations of scientific rigor, the focused comparison case study allows for an investigation of causal relationships which may not be fully uncovered utilizing the statistical method. Often, the statistical method does not allow for contextual nuances which are often vital to a firm understanding of a particular phenomena. In particular, it can be argued that the civilian/executive consolidation explanation would be ill-served by a statistical methodology. The focused comparison case study takes the best of the historical approach, in which nuance and situational evidence is at a premium, and standardizes the investigative process so as to better allow for cross-case generalizations. Such a methodology will no doubt be useful in examining cases across a forty year time span in which the primary research sources are historical studies.

This said, the following is a compilation of the independent variables which are associated with each of the potential explanations to be investigated in this study. For a particular explanation to be considered significant, the independent variables associated with the explanation should be linked in a meaningful way with the process of defense reorganization.

**Domestic Explanation:**

1. A decline or anticipated decline in the state of the domestic economy
2. Poor administrative performance in the defense establishment
External Explanation:

1. A significant change in the nature of the external threat to U.S. security
2. U.S. military operational lessons with organizational implications

Civilian/Executive Consolidation Explanation:

1. A new President or Secretary of Defense
2. Perceived inadequate civilian control of the military
3. Perceived inadequate centralization in the decision-making process within the Department of Defense

Having postulated three possible explanations for the dependent variable of legislatively enacted comprehensive defense reorganizations after World War II and having set forth the independent variables associated with each of these explanations, my final task is to formulate general questions to ask in each case study which will reveal the significance of the independent variables in an explanation of defense reorganization. As George has stated, "these standardized questions ... must be carefully developed to reflect adequately the research objectives and theoretical focus of the inquiry. These questions must be of a general nature, not couched in overly specific terms relevant to only one or another case but applicable to all cases within the class of events in question. ... Using a standardized set of questions in the controlled comparison is necessary to assure acquisition of comparable data from the several cases."27
The following questions, ordered with the explanation to which they apply, will be asked in each case study:

Domestic Explanation:

1. What was the current state of the domestic economy?
2. What was the perceived trend for domestic economic performance?
3. Were there publicized instances of administrative waste, procurement scandals, duplications, etc. in the year of the reorganization or the preceding few years?
4. Were there references in the debates surrounding the reorganization in question to the issues of economy and administrative performance?
5. Were aspects of the reorganization specifically intended to address economic or administrative performance problems?

The first question, which seeks to establish the current state of the economy, evaluates the economic indicators for the year of the reorganization compared to the economic indicators in the preceding few years. Essentially, three answers can be expected: 1) the economy improved, 2) the economy declined, or 3) the economy stayed the same. Standing alone, answers to this question do not necessarily indicate that the case in question falls within the domestic explanation. Rather, question number one must be viewed in conjunction with question number two.

Question two attempts to establish the future trend in U.S. economic performance as perceived by governmental officials. As with question one, there are three possible trends: 1) an improving economy, 2) a declining economy, or
3) an economy which is holding steady. This information, coupled with that discovered in question one, allows one to make some assessments as to the utility of the domestic explanation for the case in question. For example, if one were to observe a poor state of the current economy and a perception that the trend for future economic performance would continue to decline, one can claim that the economic conditions are in place for the domestic explanation to predict a defense reorganization. Similarly, if the current state of the economy is good and the current trends indicate a growth trend in the economy, the economic circumstances are not in place for a defense reorganization premised on the domestic explanation. A more difficult case occurs when current economic conditions are good, but the perceived trend in the economy is negative. In such a case, one could expect a defense reorganization premised upon the domestic explanation. The following chart illustrates the inter-relationship between questions one and two. The axes indicate the responses to the questions and the information in each cell indicates the relevance of the domestic explanation, given the particular combination of responses.
Question One

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+ indicates conditions correct for domestic explanation
- indicates conditions incorrect for domestic explanation
= indicates information in inconclusive

Figure 1: Interrelationship Between Questions One and Two of the Domestic Explanation

Question three seeks to establish the relevance of the issue of administrative performance. As with question one, the information sought needs to be compared with previous years. Thus, one can see three potential answers to this question: 1) increased numbers of reported incidents, 2) decreased numbers of reported incidents, or 3) a steady number of reported incidents. The domestic explanation is supported when increased numbers of reported incidents of poor administrative performance are found.

Question four is a subjective evaluation of the significance of domestic issues in the reorganization debates. In this case, only two results are possible: 1) significant references to economy and administrative performance in the defense reorganization debates, or 2) insignificant references to these issues in the debates.
The domestic explanation is supported when significant references to these issues are made.

Finally, question five attempts to establish that the domestic issues of economy and administrative performance were actually part of the defense reorganization legislation for the case in question. Once again, this subjective assessment can produce two responses: 1) a significant linkage between the legislation and the domestic issues in question, or 2) no significant linkage between legislation and domestic issues. The presence of a linkage between legislation and domestic issues is highly suggestive of the utility of the domestic explanation.

Once these questions are answered, they need to be evaluated in an order of importance. Of primary importance is question five. Even if the objective circumstances and the tenor of the debates indicate reorganization premised on the domestic explanation, if the actual reorganization legislation does not address these issues, then the domestic explanation cannot be seen to have driven the reorganization. After question five, of equal importance are questions one, two and three. Each of these involves an assessment of the circumstances which the domestic explanation claims propel the reorganization process. The presence or absence of these factors is vital to the utility of this explanation. The presence of these factors
obviously suggests the relevance of the domestic explanation.

Of least importance is question four. As much as one would like to see debates that reflect reality, the truth is that the debates may or may not address the issues which truly are driving the reorganization. Public administration scholars have argued that the references to economy and efficiency are rhetoric which is mechanically referred to in the debates without actually reflecting the motivations for the reorganization process. Such accusations necessarily make the answers to question four suspect.

At the end of this process, one can assess the relevance of the domestic explanation for the case at hand, yet a final assessment demands a comparison of the judgement with respect to the domestic explanation with the judgements reached on the other potential explanations.

External Explanation:

1. Was the level of the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the security of the United States changing?
2. Were there any new threats posed to U.S. security or new crises unfolding in the international system in the preceding three years?
3. Was there any significant operational activity during the preceding three years and what was the outcome of such activity?
4. Were there any references in the reorganization debates to operational performance or operational lessons, irrespective of the time in which they occurred?
5. Were there any references in the reorganization debates to existing threats to U.S. security which might compel reorganization?
6. Were aspects of the reorganization specifically
intended to address issues of external threat or operational performance?

The first question in the external explanation attempts to assess the current level of the Soviet threat by looking to the change in the Soviet threat over the previous few years. There are essentially three responses to this question: 1) the Soviet threat was significantly increased, 2) the Soviet threat had significantly decreased, or 3) the Soviet threat had essentially remained the same. A change in the Soviet threat, in the form of a significant increase or decrease, would support a prediction of defense reorganization according to the external explanation.

Question two examines the extent to which new, non-Soviet, threats arose to challenge U.S. security. One can answer question two in two ways: 1) there were significant new, non-Soviet, security threats facing the U.S., or 2) there were no new significant, non-Soviet, security threats facing the U.S. The presence of new security threats supports the external explanation.

Question three attempts to establish the presence or absence of significant operational activity, a necessary prerequisite to the learning of any operational lessons. Before operational lessons can influence the reorganization process, operational activity must have taken place in the recent past. Thus, question three can be answered in two ways: 1) significant operational activity did occur in the
preceding years or, 2) significant operational activity did not occur in the preceding years. The occurrence of operational activity supports the external explanation.

Question four attempts to further establish the relevance, or lack of relevance, of operational lessons to the reorganization process by assessing the extent to which operational lessons were part of the reorganization debates for the case in question. Here, one can answer question four in two ways: 1) that operational lessons were a significant part of the reorganization debates or, 2) they were not. References to operational lessons in the reorganization debates supports the external explanation.

Question five looks to the same source as question four, the debates during the reorganization process, and attempts to assess the extent to which concern with the external threat motivated defense reorganization in question. As with question four, two answers are possible: 1) there were significant references to the external threat during the debates or, 2) there were not. References to the external threat during the reorganization debates supports the external explanation.

Finally, question six attempts to draw a link between the actual legislation produced in the reorganization process and the external explanation's emphasis on the external threat and operational lessons. This question can be answered in two ways: 1) the legislation did reflect
concern with the external threat and operational lessons or, 2) it did not. Legislation which does reflect such a link supports the external explanation.

These questions can be arranged in an order of importance. As was the case with the domestic explanation, the most important question is question six. If there is no linkage between the reorganization legislation and the issues of the external threat and operational lessons, then the external explanation is unlikely to be relevant for the case in question. Questions two, three, and four, in which the objective conditions of the external threat and operational activity are evaluated, are the next group of questions in order of importance. If there has been no change in the external threat or if there has been no recent operational activity, then the external explanation is placed in doubt.

Question four is the next most important question. Operational activity alone is not definitive for the external explanation. It is also necessary for lessons to be drawn from that activity. References to such lessons in the reorganization debates establishes the connection between operational activity, lessons from that activity, and reorganizations undertaken in light of these lessons. This in turn supports the external explanation.

Question five is the least important of the questions associated with the external explanation. A lack of
references to the external threat may not be fatal to the relevance of the external explanation if clear evidence of a change in the external threat exists. There may be an reluctance on the part of the administration in question to draw strong references to the change in the external threat. While such references are suggestive, they are not vital.

As was the case with the domestic explanation, a positive evaluation of the relevance of the external explanation for a given case is not definitive. The final assessment demands a comparison with the other explanations.

Civilian/Executive Consolidation Explanation

1. How recent was the assumption of office by the President or Secretary of Defense?
2. Who initiated the reorganization process in question?
3. How was the level of civilian control of the military perceived by the top civilian executives?
4. How was the level of centralization of decision-making perceived by the top civilian executives?
5. Were there any references in the debates on the reorganization in question to the issues of civilian control and centralization?
6. Were aspects of the reorganization specifically intended to address the issues of civilian authority and centralization?

The first question associated with the civilian/executive consolidation explanation attempts to establish the extent to which new civilian executives were to be found within the defense establishment. The question can be easily answered either yes, the President or Secretary of Defense was new to their office, or no they
were not. An affirmative answer supports the civilian/executive consolidation explanation.

Question two explores the origins of the reorganization process of the case at hand. The civilian/executive consolidation explanation depends upon a reorganization process whose origins can be traced to civilian executives within the defense establishment. This question can be answered in three ways: 1) clear civilian executive origins, 2) non-civilian executive origins, or 3) and ambiguous origin. Civilian executive origins support the civilian/executive consolidation explanation as ambiguous origins do, given other favorable responses.

Question three attempts to assess the perceptions of civilian executives within the defense establishment of the existing level of civilian control of the military. The civilian/executive consolidation explanation expects civilian executive perceptions of inadequate civilian control of the military. This question can be answered in two ways: 1) perceptions of adequate civilian control, or 2) perceptions of inadequate control. Perceptions of inadequate civilian control support the civilian/executive consolidation explanation for the case in question.

Question four focuses on the civilian executive perceptions of the existing level of centralization with the military establishment. The civilian/executive consolidation explanation expects civilian executive
dissatisfaction with the existing levels of centralization. This question can be answered in two ways: 1) the existing level of centralization is perceived to be adequate or, 2) the existing level of centralization is deemed to be inadequate. Perceptions of inadequate centralization by civilian executives support the civilian/executive consolidation explanation.

Question five looks to establish the presence or absence of concerns with civilian control and centralization in the debates surrounding the defense reorganization process. The presence of these issues in the debates is suggestive of the relevance of the civilian/executive consolidation explanation. This question can be answered in two ways: 1) the issues of civilian control and centralization were significantly discussed in the reorganization debates or, 2) they were not.

Finally, question six attempts to draw a connection between the actual reorganization legislation and the issues of civilian control and centralization. Such a connection is suggestive of the relevance of the civilian/executive consolidation explanation. The question can be answered in two ways: 1) a significant link between the issues and the legislation exists, or 2) it does not.

In assessing the civilian/executive consolidation explanation as a whole, the question of primary importance is question number six. Some linkage between the
reorganization legislation and the issues of civilian control and centralization should exist if this explanation is accurate. Next in importance are questions one, two, three, and four. Each of these questions attempts to establish the presence or absence of conditions the civilian/executive consolidation explanation holds are preconditions for defense reorganization. If these conditions are present, the explanation is more likely to be relevant in explaining the case in question.

Of least consequence is question five. While it would be advantageous for there to be references in the reorganization debates to the issues of civilian control and centralization, it is nevertheless possible for the civilian/executive consolidation explanation to adequately explain the reorganization process in question without such references. As many in public life will attest, there is often a large gap between the reasons an action is taken and the stated reasons for the action.

In the final analysis, the relevance or irrelevance of this explanation, as with the other two, is based upon a comparison of all three explanations and the manner in which all of the questions for each explanation are answered.

EVALUATION OF THE CASE STUDIES

Each case study concludes with a comparative assessment of the contending explanations. It is unlikely that in any
case study of defense reorganization reality will conform completely with any of the three postulated theories. In order to evaluate the efficacy of a given theory of defense reorganization, therefore, emphasis should be on which of the three theories provided the best explanation for the reorganization under consideration rather than which theory of defense reorganization is identically duplicated in reality. The latter is a standard which will never be met and which, if utilized, would result in the rejection of many useful theoretical frameworks. What we are seeking is the best of three theories, not the best theory possible.

EXPECTED RESULTS

I expect results on two levels from this study of defense reorganization. At one level, I expect to be able to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter - namely; 1) what best explains U.S. defense reorganization since the end of World War II, 2) are the explanations for defense reorganization the same in the post-war era, and the corollary question 3) is the defense reorganization of 1986 significantly different from the earlier post-war reorganizations, and what may this difference tell us about future reorganizations? In answering these questions, this study will expand the knowledge of defense reorganizations as well as address the
policy question of when reorganizations may occur in the future.

On a second level, I expect to be able to address broader issues pertaining to international relations theory. Specifically, I expect to be able to comment on the efficacy of nation-state level foreign policy theory in explaining structural changes in a government agency charged with some foreign policy responsibilities. This study should also allow one to draw conclusions as to whether the broader subject of defense policy is more like foreign policy, domestic policy, or is unique as a policy area.
NOTES


5. The classic example of a systemic explanation for state behavior is in Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957).


10. Ibid., 4-5.


12. Ibid., 389-390.


14. Ibid.


16. Ibid.

17. It would seem likely that the goal of maintaining the security and territorial integrity of the state would be the primary objective foreign policy goal of all states.


19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.


23. Ibid., 83.

24. Ibid., 80-83.


27. Ibid., 62.
Prior to beginning the actual case studies of defense reorganization since World War II, we need to take some time to more thoroughly examine the existing literature. Such an examination may provide some insight on the process of defense reorganization. I propose to conduct this inquiry by undertaking a more comprehensive examination of the literature which pertains to each of the three postulated explanations for the defense reorganization process: the domestic explanation, the external explanation, and the civilian/executive consolidation explanation.

THE DOMESTIC EXPLANATION

As discussed in Chapter One, the first significant assumption found in the domestic explanation is that defense reorganizations are aspects of domestic policy and are therefore influenced by factors which typically influence all domestic policy issues. In Chapter One, this assumption was substantiated by the work of Huntington. Huntington’s contention is supported by the work of a number of scholars who have noted the linkage between domestic policy and
defense policy. As Davis Bobrow has observed, "Domestic politics unavoidably affects the defense policy behavior of leaders..."

This linkage between domestic policy and defense policy is seen to be even stronger by those scholars who view defense policy largely in economic terms. To these scholars, the economic/domestic aspects of defense policy may in fact dominate the overall concept of defense policy. From such a perspective, defense policy, on the whole, is inextricably bound up in domestic policy. Thus, aspects of defense policy may perhaps best be understood via domestic policy theory. If we accept that defense policy is, to some degree, affected by domestic policy considerations, then it is necessary to identify what specific domestic policy factors play the most significant role in shaping overall defense policy. A typical investigation of factors likely to influence domestic policy would probably identify two prominent considerations: economics and administrative performance.

There are obviously numerous other factors which affect domestic policy decisions. Nevertheless, these considerations offer a starting point to investigate the links between domestic policy and defense reorganization. In addition, scholars such as Hitch and McKean have emphasized the significance of the economy and administrative performance in generally assessing defense
Hitch and McKean, "regard all military problems as, in one of their aspects, economic problems in the efficient allocation and use of resources." The authors go on to consider the resources available (an economic problem) and the utilization of these resources (an efficiency problem). Significantly, efficiency is linked to the institutional arrangements within government and the manner by which they function.

Beyond the more general manner in which the domestic policy concerns of the economy and administrative performance affect defense policy, some scholars have identified the significance of these issues to the process of governmental reorganization. These public administration scholars have examined the phenomena of governmental reorganization in general, and have reached some conclusions on the process - conclusions which may also be true for the more specific case of defense reorganization.

Public administration scholars first attack the issue of governmental reorganization by attempting to establish the origins of the reform impulse. B. Guy Peters has argued that there are essentially three models of governmental reorganization. First, the purposive model of reorganization holds that government reorganization is the result of purposive action undertaken by one or more actors in the process who "have an end-state in mind when they propose the reform or reorganization." The second model,
the environmental dependency model, stands for the proposition that organizational changes are the result of structural adaptation by the organization to its environment. This process is automatic and occurs over a long period of time. The third model, the institutional model, stands for the proposition that collective goals are pursued by organizations in an "attempt to match its actions with some standards of 'appropriateness' derived from the history and collective values of the organization or even from a broader social foundation."

Of these three approaches, the purposive model appears the most useful for our purposes, thus demanding a closer examination. Guy proposes three potential purposive explanations of governmental reorganization - administration as usual, overload and governance, and economic/rational actor. Of these three, I believe that the most useful for our purposes is the administration as usual approach. Guy notes at the outset that this approach to understanding governmental reorganization "is the one most commonly used in the real world, and also most commonly used (at least over time) in academic studies of public administration." Essentially, in this process, the actors observe the inadequacies of existing governmental structures and change them in order to address a political need. As Guy notes, "In reality the need is usually the one perceived by a political leader ... who wants to achieve a set of goals
Scholars who have used this approach have observed that governmental reorganization plans since the Roosevelt administration have pursued the objectives of economy and efficiency. While this rationale has not often been borne out by the outcome of the reorganization, it nonetheless has been the basis of reorganizational appeals for over forty-five years. James Marsh and Johan Olson have argued that the objectives of economy and efficiency are part of a stock "reorganization rhetoric" which is part and parcel of orthodox administrative theory and is found in the works of both students and practitioners of governmental reorganization. While March and Olson reject this orthodoxy, they nonetheless acknowledge its continued prevalence in the study of governmental reorganization.

Thus, in terms of existing theoretical literature, theories of defense policy and public administration theory support the proposition that defense reorganizations are undertaken in order to address the perceived domestic policy problems of sluggish economic performance and poor administrative performance within the defense establishment. Defense reorganizations are purposive actions undertaken to achieve the end-state of improved economy and improved administrative performance within the defense establishment. While public administration scholars have observed the
failure of most governmental reorganizations to achieve organizational economies, this does not detract from the theoretical proposition that the process is undertaken in an attempt to achieve such results.

THE EXTERNAL EXPLANATION

As set forth in Chapter One, the external explanation relies, first of all, upon the assumption that defense policy is one aspect of foreign policy and that defense reorganization, as a component of defense policy, is thus also an aspect of foreign policy. This contention may be considered a truism by many, but is also specifically supported by the works of Roger Hilsman as well as that of Donald Snow. One alternative to this approach would be to contend that in some instances foreign policy is subsumed by defense policy. As Richard Rosser has noted, "For many years Americans wrote on international politics, on foreign policy, on military strategy, but not on the unique ground where these subjects meet - American defense policy." A third alternative would lump together issues of foreign and defense policy under the rubric of "national security policy." As Peter Mangold has observed, national security is a post World War II term used to refer to the formerly separate issues of military affairs, foreign affairs, and foreign policy.
I have chosen to consider defense policy as an aspect of foreign policy insofar as defense policy choices are in effect choices on one of the means by which foreign policy objectives are achieved. Because the defense establishment serves foreign policy goals, decisions pertaining to it are affected by the foreign policy goals of the state in question. Accepting this assumption allows one to examine theories of foreign policy decision for insights into the defense reorganization process.

Having proceeded to an examination of theories of foreign policy decision as a means of uncovering explanations for defense reorganization, it is next necessary to considerably narrow the focus. As mentioned in Chapter One, from among the vast number of theories across all levels-of-analysis, I have selected the nation-state level of analysis as appropriate for this study. Therefore, I will focus only on those theories of foreign policy which contend that the foreign policy decisions of states are best understood by looking at the nation-state level of societal aggregation.

There are a variety of studies found within the nation-state level-of-analysis. Some of these studies, such as those by Graham Allison, and Alexander L George and Richard Smoke, focus on the foreign policy behavior of states during particular crises. Others examine the foreign policy of states over a longer period of time, yet with a focus on the
interaction between states in the international system. Finally, this level-of-analysis includes rational actor theories which attempt to predict foreign policy behavior without an examination of individual nation-states, but rather by the use of game theory and deductive reasoning. The common link among all of these nation-state theories is the contention that foreign policy is the result of interactive situations with other nation-states. These theories postulate the reasons for a state's behavior in a given situation. In a broader sense, these and other studies consider the foreign policy of nation-states in light of the behavior of other states in the system.

A second type of theory of foreign policy found within this level-of-analysis is that which focuses upon the unique motivations of a given nation-state as a means of explaining foreign policy choice. One characteristic which may motivate foreign policy choice is the political culture of a particular nation-state. For example, some scholars would contend that the liberal tradition within American politics would lead to a particular type of American foreign policy choice. Others have pointed to other "national" characteristics of the United States to explain U.S. foreign policy choice.

From this broad spectrum of theoretical approaches, I have chosen to view foreign policy as the result of situational interactions with other states in the
international system during which the state makes choices which reflect its particular policy objectives. Having postulated this approach, I have gone on in Chapter One to posit two circumstances which may motivate foreign policy decisions. First is the change in the nature of the external threat. The very nature of foreign policy, as found in the Carlsnaes definition cited in Chapter One is to respond to conditions found in the "international environment." As Linda Brady notes, "In making foreign policy, decision makers continuously respond to situations created by stimuli in the international environment." Clearly, a particularly alarming situation in the international environment may be one in which the external threat posed to the state is increased. On the other hand, a decrease in the external threat is a less alarming situation which may also require some sort of foreign policy response.

Defense policy is also made in response to threat situations in the international environment. Within the U.S. defense establishment, policy is premised upon threat assessments. In defense policy, threat assessment is based upon the power of one's enemies. As Frederick H. Hartman and Robert L. Wendzel have observed, "Each state must, to survive, gauge its power problem (that is, the power that can be mustered against it) and prepare an adequate defense while pursuing a policy designed to minimize the danger
This process of threat assessment is ongoing and situational insofar as the nation-states which pose the threats, as well as the nature of these threats, change over time.

Thus, if we assume that foreign and defense policy choices are made in response to situations in the international environment - with a significant type of situation being a change in the nature of the external threat - then we can also argue that defense reorganizations, as forms of foreign and defense policy, also are driven by the external threat environment. Thus, part of the external explanation stands for the proposition that defense reorganizations will occur when the nature of the external threat changes.

The second circumstance which may motivate foreign policy decisions can be characterized as the "lessons" learned from previous operational activity. In the case of foreign policy, operational activity includes previous foreign policy initiatives and previous foreign policy behavior. Theory suggests that past behavior may affect future policy choices. Clearly, in weighing what foreign policy decisions to take, states often reflect upon choices made in the past and the outcome of such choices. For example, after the end of World War II, U.S. policy makers, drawing upon the lessons of the policy of appeasement pursued by the British and the U.S.'s own policy of
isolationism, concluded that these policies had been partially responsible for the rise of fascism and World War II. In response, the U.S. pursued a internationalist "containment" policy against the post-war rival, the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{31}

This tendency to base current policy upon an evaluation of prior policy and its results may or may not produce good results,\textsuperscript{32} but the fact remains that the process does occur. Richard Neustadt undertook a study in which he not only assessed the efficacy of the application of historical lessons to current policy choice, but also provided recommendations on how to improve the use of history in policy formation in the future.\textsuperscript{33}

This notion that the lessons from prior operational activity may affect decisions on current policy choice finds support in the literature on defense reorganization as well. One source has noted that, "A constant theme which characterizes reform proposals is the claim that a relationship exists between structural military organization and combat performance. This oft stated premise seems commonsensical." \textsuperscript{34} Some, like Allan Millett, however, have strongly argued against linking organization structure with operational performance.\textsuperscript{35} Millett contends that organizational structure has played only a very small role in determining military success or failure.\textsuperscript{36} Be this correct or not, it is not fatal to this aspect of the
external explanation. Even if, by some historical measure, organizational structure plays only a small role in predicting operational success or failure, the fact remains that common perception accepts the linkage between structure and performance. Millett acknowledges the prevalence of this perception after Vietnam. This being the case, if the common perception is that there is a causal link between organizational structure and operational performance, then, following significant operational activity, decision-makers will look to learn lessons about structure from this activity.

Thus, the external explanation, which contends that external factors such as a change in the nature of the external threat or the "learning" of lessons from operational activity lead to defense reorganization, has roots in general foreign and defense policy theory. These theoretical roots link foreign and defense policy to the behavior of other states in the international system and to the evaluation of a state's prior operational behavior in the international arena. This theoretical framework contends that defense reorganizations are responses to international situations or conditions which are revealed by the conduct of other states or by the efficacy of one's own prior operational activity.
CIVILIAN/EXECUTIVE CONSOLIDATION EXPLANATION

The civilian/executive consolidation model begins by defining what defense reorganization is not. This explanation holds that defense reorganizations are aspects of neither foreign nor domestic policy. Rather, this explanation stands for the proposition that defense reorganizations are unique policy issue areas which cannot be explained by lumping them into a broader theoretical framework. In order to understand defense reorganization one must understand the unique relationships and processes of the defense establishment.

Before continuing on this path, however, it is necessary to digress for a moment and discuss the utility of a broad theoretical field known as "organizational theory." Organizational theory may offer some insights into the general concept of organizational change. However, it does not assist in the development of a unique explanation of defense reorganization for three reasons. First, organizational theory does not provide extensive discussions of the process of reorganization and organizational change. As noted by James Thompson, "Although reorganization is a frequent phenomena in complex organizations in modern societies, our social-scientific understanding of it is meager and largely derived as a by-product."³⁵

Aside from the meager amount of research on reorganizations and organizational change, a second, and
more troublesome, problem with organizational theory is its inability to theoretically distinguish between the explanations postulated in this study. Theory on organizational change and reorganization could be read to support any of the three theories proposed herein. For example, Greiner and Barnes have argued that organizational change occurs for one of two reasons: 1) to bring about changes in the way the organization adapts to its external environment, or 2) to bring about changes in the behavior of organizational employees. This adds little to distinguish between our three potential explanations of defense reorganization. Depending upon one's perspective, the external environment of the military establishment could be the international environment or the domestic environment. In the case of all three explanations set forth herein, changes in the behavior patterns of employees is desired.

The inability of organizational theory to assist us in differentiating between explanations for defense reorganizations is highlighted by other organizational theory propositions. Anthony Downs, for example, contends that "No bureau will alter its behavior patterns unless someone believes that a significant discrepancy exists between what it is doing and what it 'ought' to be doing." Downs goes on to argue that organizational change is motivated by changes in the bureau's external environment and by the perception that the organization is failing to
perform adequately. Such explanations attach equally well to the three explanations of defense reorganization stated herein. Similar vague statements on organizational change are found throughout the literature of organizational theory.

The third problem with organizational theory is that it envisions a reorganization process which does not conform to the reality of the process of defense reorganization. Many organizational theorists see reorganization or organizational change as a product of "managed change" engendered by a "change agent." As described by Warren Bennis, "The process of planned change involves a change-agent, who is typically a behavioral scientist brought in to help a client-system, which refers to the target of change. The change-agent, in collaboration with the client-system, attempts to apply valid knowledge to the client's problems." This process assumes a cooperative organization looking for insight on how to best bring about constructive organizational change. Such a vision falls far short of explaining the process of defense reorganization in which the organization to be changed is split over the advisability of such change, where changes cannot occur without external Congressional consent, and where the overall process is hardly "scientific," but rather, is clearly a process of bargaining and compromise.
The shortfalls of organizational theory force us to undertake an examination of the unique nature of defense reorganization and the theoretical underpinnings of the civilian/executive consolidation explanation. In order to understand the unique process of defense reorganization, we need to get a feel for the cleavages that exist within the defense establishment and the competing goals of the participants. As discussed in Chapter One, a primary cleavage within the defense establishment is between the civilian executive branch and the Congress. This cleavage is constitutionally mandated, with a great deal of significance for policy choice. Several authors have written about the general nature of the conflict between the executive and the legislative branches over defense policy issues.44

Other authors have written on the specific influence of one or the other branch of government on the defense policy process.45 While all of these studies have different viewpoints and tend to view one or the other branch of government as the most influential in the defense policy process, the point to be drawn from this research is the significance of the division between executive and legislative branches to an understanding of defense policy-making in general, and defense reorganization in particular. These two branches of government are in competition over the authority to decide defense-related issues, and each seeks
to enhance its authority at the expense of the other. The civilian/executive consolidation explanation recognizes this and argues that an intended off-shoot of the reorganization process, from the executive branch point of view, is the consolidation of the executive branch's authority in defense matters via the process of centralization.

A second cleavage within the defense establishment is that between civilians and military personnel. As noted in Chapter One, defense policy decisions often involve disputes between the civilian leadership and the military professionals. A number of scholars have written on civil-military relations including Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and David Hendrickson. The consensus among these authors is that there is considerable tension between civilian leaders, vested with supreme command authority, and military professionals, vested with the technical skills to perform military tasks, over the extent to which each party can (or should) encroach upon the domain of the other. Military leaders are criticized for taking political stances on particular issues while civilian leaders are criticized for making technical decisions. While the civil-military relations scholars have offered solutions to these conflicts, the fact remains that defense policy problems often witness division between civilians and the military, based in large part upon the cleavages caused by their respective roles within the defense establishment.
The civilian/executive consolidation explanation acknowledges the significance of this division, and anticipates that defense reorganizations are partially motivated by a desire to mitigate civilian-military conflict. While this may be a desire of both parties, the realities of the process are that only the civilian leadership can effect changes to address the problem. Thus, the civilian/executive consolidation explanation stands for the proposition that civilian executives attempt to cut down on civil-military conflict by enhancing civilian control over the military and by clarifying and simplifying this control.

The final cleavage noted in Chapter One was that between the various services within the overall military establishment. Inter-service rivalry has been endemic within the U.S. military and reflects two sources of inter-service difference. First, each of the services has a distinct history, tradition, and ethos - all of which stress the independence of the particular service and its necessity for successful defense of the U.S. In addition, each service has acquired over the years a number of distinct roles and missions, some of which overlap the roles and missions of other services and some of which reenforce the roles and missions of other services. Conflict results from disputes over duplicative roles and missions as well as from disputes over who will acquire a new role or mission.
There is a significant general literature on the issue of inter-service rivalry and military organization. These authors have focused on the problem of inter-service rivalry and how organizational solutions may diminish this rivalry. In addition, authors such as Vince Davis have focused on inter-service rivalry and military organization from the perspective of a single service.

The common thread to be found in much of this literature is the debilitating effect that inter-service rivalry has upon not only military operations, but also on planning, acquisition, and all other aspects of defense policy. The inability of the services to work together undermines the attempts by the civilian leadership to effect good defense policy. With this in mind, an explanation of defense reorganization could view the process as an attempt to address the inter-service rivalry problem. The civilian/executive explanation, to some extent, incorporates civilian concern with inter-service rivalry insofar as the explanation states that the purpose of defense reorganization is to increase civilian authority over the military and centralize the defense decision-making process - both outcomes which would mitigate to some extent inter-service rivalry. Increased civilian control would allow for a civilian override on contentious service issues and centralization would undermine the independence of the services and encourage cooperation.
Having examined the theoretical literature on the cleavages found within the U.S. defense establishment and commented on how the civilian/executive consolidation explanation is cognizant of these cleavages as a potential motivation for defense reorganization, I will now examine the extent to which the existing literature on defense reorganization supports this particular explanation. At the outset one must acknowledge that there are currently two types of useful literature on post-war defense reorganizations. The first type is purely historical, and does not draw many conclusions as to the underlying motivations or explanations for defense reorganization. The second type of literature, and that which is most useful for our current purpose, is the literature which attempts to evaluate the process of defense reorganization within its historical context.

In this "evaluative" literature one discovers various explanations given for the reorganization process. First are those scholars such as Vince Davis, Gordon Keiser, and Victor Krulak who argue that the defense reorganization process, specifically the process from 1947-1958, can best be understood as a process of centralization of authority, with the authority going to the civilian Secretary of Defense. As Vince Davis notes, "Centralization has been the inexorable trend in virtually all large formal organizations in this century. ... This has been the
dominant trend in all reorganizations of the U.S. military establishment..."^ This being the case, these scholars view the reorganization process as a function of civilian/executive attempts to concentrate and centralize authority, not as a reflection of any external or domestic motivations for change.

Within the context of centralization, we must consider those scholars who have argued for inter-service rivalry as a motivation for defense reorganization. The linkage between the problem of inter-service rivalry and the objective of centralization is framed by William Lynn, who observes that there is an "inherent tension between the recognized requirement for centralized planning and direction of the armed forces, and the natural desire of the military services organized separately for land, sea, and air warfare to retain their historic autonomy. The history of postwar reform of the joint military structure consists of a series of efforts to reconcile these conflicting forces of service autonomy and centralized direction."^ This position is reenforced by David Hendrickson, who argues that the defense reorganizations of 1947-1958 were attempts at dealing with "servicism" by promoting a consolidation of the services into a more unified force.^^

Another group of scholars reflect upon the extent to which defense reorganizations were inspired by the desire to improve civilian control of the military, or at the very
least was an intended outcome of the reorganization process. Scholars such as Hendrickson have argued that a partial motivation for the reorganizations of 1947-1958 was the desire to enhance civilian control. Huntington, on the other hand, argues that, while some reorganizations had the intention of establishing stronger civilian control of the military (namely the 1947 National Security Act), others had a significant but unintended impact on civil-military relations.

Finally, there is one scholar who actually sees the objectives of civilian control and centralization as competing, with the end result being reorganizations which attempt to balance between the two. Paul Hammond contends, particularly with respect to the military planning function, that it is difficult to achieve strong civilian control, "without jeopardizing the effectiveness of centralized military planning." Thus, from Hammond's viewpoint, defense reorganization may be motivated by the twin desires of enhanced civilian control and enhanced centralization, but these objectives must be balanced within the reorganization plan.

The conclusion which can be drawn from this is that there is theoretical support for the proposition that defense reorganizations can be explained as attempts to centralize the military establishment (thereby reducing inter-service rivalry) and enhance civilian control over the
military. These conclusions conform with the civilian/executive consolidation explanation, which stands for the proposition that reorganizations are proposed by new civilian executives as a way of enhancing civilian control of the military and of centralizing the defense establishment under such civilian authority.

CONCLUSION

This has been an exercise in attaching existing theoretical strands to the theories of defense reorganization which I have proposed. Of secondary importance has been an attempt to place my theoretical propositions into some existing theoretical framework. In some cases the fit has been better than in others, but the utility of the process has been in the extent to which I have shown the reader the origins of the theoretical propositions I have articulated.

A literature review gives insights on the thought process associated with the formation of a particular theory, and may provide intellectual grounding for those who have little background in the specific subject area of defense reorganization. Clearly, however, a literature review cannot make a theory more or less likely to be true; only empirical investigation can do that. It is to this empirical investigation, in the form of focused comparative case studies, that we now turn.
NOTES

1. Chapter One, p. 7.


7. Ibid., 107.


9. Ibid., 201.

10. Ibid., 205.

11. Ibid., 211.

12. Ibid., 201-204.
13. Ibid., 201.

14. Ibid.


18. Ibid., 284.


22. On a grander scale, I would likely accept the proposition that the term "national security policy" is a more acceptable phrase insofar as it encompasses a variety of like issues formerly considered separately.


32. Contrast the famous admonition of Santayana that those who do not learn the lessons of history are "doomed to repeat it" with the classic complaint about military leaders who are still "fighting the last war."


35. Allan Millett, "The Organizational Impact of Military Success and Failure: An Historical Perspective," in *The Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 1-17.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., 15.


41. Ibid., 192, 193.

42. See Paul S. Goodman and Lance B. Kurke, "Studies of Change in Organizations: A Status Report," in Goodman and Kurke, eds., *Change in Organizations* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass


54. Ibid.

In 1947, President Harry Truman signed into law the National Security Act of 1947 which attempted to fundamentally restructure the nation's military command structure and its national security apparatus. For the first time, a single Secretary of National Defense was established to coordinate the disparate services that then existed. It was assumed that this single secretary would facilitate coordination between the services with respect to all of their functions (i.e. operations, supply, research, logistics, training, etc.). The reorganization process was loosely referred to as unification, though actual unification of the services did not take place. The Act itself was the result of an arduous period of negotiations and deliberations that began as early as 1943 and which were characterized by a high level of acrimony between the various services. Anyone looking at the first proposals for unification set forth in 1943 would hardly recognize the eventual Act of 1947 which attempted to bring it about.
BACKGROUND OF THE LEGISLATION

The first major step in the War Department's efforts to unify took place on November 3, 1943 when General George C. Marshall submitted a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) calling for a "Single Department of War in the Post-War Period." The Marshall-endorsed plan, first submitted by the Special Planning Division of the Special Staff, called for a combined general staff with four services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Supply) each with an Under Secretary and a Chief of Staff all under a single secretary. There was also to be a Chief of Staff to the President.

A direct result of Marshall's plan, as well as other pressures for change, was the convening of the House Committee on Post-War Military Policy (hereafter referred to as the Woodrum Committee) in the Spring of 1944. Ignoring the extremely divisive issue of whether the topic of wholesale reform of the armed forces should even be considered in wartime, this committee allowed for the two sides in the unification debate (the Army and the Navy) to clearly stake out their positions.

The War Department had General J. T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, present its substantive proposal for reorganization. Essentially, the McNarney Plan called for a single Secretary for the Armed Forces with Under Secretaries for the Army, Navy, and the newly created Air Force. Under each of these under secretaries was the Chief of Staff for
each service. There also was to be created a Director of Common Supply Services who was directly under the Secretary of the Armed Forces. The JCS was composed of a Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, the three service chiefs, and the director of supply. The Chief of Staff was to have the power of decision for the JCS as a whole. The JCS as a group was to be the advisor of the Commander-in-Chief and was to advise on strategy and budget concerns.²

The Navy's reaction to all of this was negative on two levels. First, and perhaps primarily given the time and circumstances, the Navy opposed making any decisions on organizational structure during the midst of a war. The Navy argued that any contemplated change must be fully examined in detail and that it wasn't reasonable to assume that such detail could be generated by a service engaged in war planning and operations. The Navy was not willing to accept any notion of unification "in principle."

Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee was quite suspicious of the Army's ability to devote so much time to the proposed unification. During the Woodrum Committee hearings Vinson noted, "It forces me to make one or two conclusions, either that we have so many officers in the armed forces who are not necessarily required for carrying on the war that they can devote a considerable part of their time to the preparation of statements or else they diverted their attention from the
main objective, the prosecution of the war, in making learned treatises on the subject." On a more substantive level, the Navy argued against the McNarney Plan by arguing that bigger was not necessarily better.

Eventually, the Woodrum Committee produced no real results. An agreement was reached between the committee, the Naval Department and the War Department in which the hearings were suspended, and the War Department refrained from calling for an immediate decision on the question of unification "in principle."

Following the Woodrum Committee Hearings, the JCS commissioned the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense (hereafter referred to as the Richardson Committee) to conduct an intensive study on the topic of reorganization and particularly on the notion of unification. The Richardson Committee, taking a suggestion which came from the Woodrum Committee Hearings, attempted to gather the opinions of top ranking armed forces personnel in the field on the issues at hand. The conclusions of all of the Richardson Committee members, except the Naval representative Admiral Richardson, favored a single department of the Armed Forces with a civilian Secretary for National Defense, a statutorily mandated Armed Forces General Staff, and a Commander of the Armed Forces who would also act as Chief of Staff to the President. The committee also called for the creation of an Air Force
separate from the Navy and the Army with its own Chief of Staff. The Commander of the Armed Forces and the Armed Forces General Staff would both be under the civilian secretary. In the Richardson Committee plan, the budget would also be under the control of the secretary. There would no longer, however, be civilian secretaries for each of the services.4

While the JCS was unable to enact the Richardson Committee's plan due to the opposition of the Navy's representative, Admiral King, the Navy still felt the pressure of unification bearing down upon them. In response to the Richardson Committee report, Forrestal commissioned his friend Ferdinand Eberstadt to undertake a study of the proper organization of the armed forces in the post-war period.5

Eberstadt produced a report more closely correlated with the Navy's concerns on unification. The report opposed the notion of unification based on the twofold belief that any defects that were to be found in the cooperative relationship between the Army and the Navy could be remedied without the need for unification and that unification would undermine the more important concern of coordinating work between various departments within government (i.e. cooperation between the State Department and the Navy and War Departments).6
Eventually, this dispute once again found its way back to the U.S. Congress. In the fall of 1945, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs opened discussion on the issue of unification. The list of witnesses from 1944 was further supplemented by the presence of some of the war's great heroes who had returned to voice their opinion on the concept of unification. General Marshall renewed the War Department's call for unification by focusing upon the defects of the existing cooperative arrangement with the Navy.

The War Department concluded by submitting what became known as the Collins Plan, a revised plan for unification which differed from the McNarney Plan submitted in 1944. The Collins Plan called for a single Department of National Defense, a civilian secretary to head the department, no individual secretaries for the individual services, with a statutorily authorized JCS. The JCS would provide recommendations only for issues such as strategy, policy and budgets. Budget recommendations would be made through the Secretary of National Defense, but the secretary could make no alternations on the budgets submitted by the JCS. There would also be a Chief of Staff who would be the primary military advisor to the President. A separate Air Force would be created encompassing all aircraft not required for the Army and Navy.
Not surprisingly, the Navy opposed the Collins Plan. The Navy pointed to the successes in World War II and argued that before any substantial changes were made in the system which brought about victory it was necessary to establish beyond a doubt the deficiencies of the old system. On December 17, 1945 the Senate Military Affairs Committee hearings were closed without consensus having been reached. Two days later, on December 19, 1945, President Truman sent a message to Congress staking out his position on the unification issue. In one fell swoop Truman was able to essentially settle the issue of whether unification was advisable, and move the debate to the more detailed issues of how it would actually work.

Truman set forth what he felt were to be the main components of a unification of the armed forces: a single Department of National Defense, a civilian secretary heading the department, three coordinated branches of the armed services (Army, Navy, and Air Force), a Chief of Staff of the Department of National Defense and commanders for each of the three branches, these individuals to form a collective body acting as an advisor to the President. From this point onward, the debate that continued to rage between the War Department and the Navy Department was over the intricacies of unification, not over whether the concept itself would be adopted in some fashion.
Eventually, in 1946, the Senate began consideration of a new bill authorizing unification. The Senate Unification Bill of 1946 called for a single Department of National Defense, a civilian Secretary of National Defense who was given an under secretary and a number of functional assistant secretaries, a Chief of Staff who was chief military advisor to the President and the Secretary (yet who possessed no command authority), a JCS composed of the Chief of Staff and the service chiefs, and a separate Air Force. The JCS's budget recommendations could only be commented upon by the Secretary, thus continuing to remove the Secretary from the substantive budgetary process. Finally, the service secretaries which were created would perform only administrative functions within the department.

The Naval Affairs Committee began hearings on the Senate bill and from the very outset it was clear that the Navy did not accept this new bill either. The Navy accepted the retention of the JCS as opposed to a single Chief of Staff and accepted that the JCS would have more than an advisory role. However, they still opposed a single, unified Department of National Defense, as well as a separate Air Force within the armed forces. They wished the Navy to have the maximum amount of autonomy possible.

Once again, perceiving the disagreement between the services, President Truman stepped in and attempted to personally settle the areas of difference. Truman came out
in favor of the establishment of an Air Force within a single Department of National Defense lead by a Cabinet-level civilian secretary, with service secretaries to be retained. Truman opposed the creation of a single Chief of Staff, citing his personal concern with the possibility of a "man on horseback." The guiding principle should be to allow the services to retain their autonomy and integrity subject to overall control by the Secretary. This message was sent to the two service secretaries and the chairmen of all of the appropriate Congressional committees. Based on this communication, the Senate modified their bill to reflect the proposed changes.

In November, 1946, recognizing the increasing difficulty of his and the Navy Department's position, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal attempted to reconcile the War and Navy Departments via the formulation of a joint unification plan. He entrusted to General Lauris Norstadt and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman the task of forging a consensus on the issue for legislative drafting. The Norstadt-Sherman Plan called for a JCS established by statute, a full time joint staff, separate service departments (Army, Navy, Air Force) over which the Secretary for National Defense had control. It was unclear within this framework if the Secretary was the head of any department himself, or rather was merely in control over other departments.
The President, intent on pressing ahead, accepted the Norstadt-Sherman Plan as the basis for legislation to be presented to Congress in 1947. Congress again began unification hearings in 1947, and despite an initial lack of agreement between the House and the Senate, a Joint Conference Committee was able to produce an acceptable bill.

The final version of the National Security Act of 1947, signed into law on July 26, 1947, established not only the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Securities Resource Board, but also created the National Military Establishment. Within that establishment, a Secretary of Defense was established who would act as the principle assistant to the President on national security matters as well as exercise broad and rather vague authority over the National Military Establishment. The Act also created the Air Force and the associated Department and officials associated with a separate service branch.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff was formally established within the National Defense Establishment, consisting of the three service chiefs of staff and the chief of staff of the President. Though not in the chain of command, the JCS were to act as the principle military advisors to the President and undertake other planning and policy tasks. A Joint Staff was created, staffed by officers from all of the services, to perform duties for the JCS. A Munitions Board
was created to deal with industrial mobilization during times of war as well as undertake duties pertaining to logistics and procurement. Finally, a Research and Development Board was created to integrate research and development programs within the military services.

The National Security Act of 1947 put into place a structure for the National Military Establishment where no structure had existed before. The duties and responsibilities assigned to both military and civilian personnel within the National Military Establishment were often vague or too broad. This reflected the ad hoc nature of duties and responsibilities performed by both civilians and military personnel during World War II. Often, the anticipated behavior of particular officials did not correspond to the actual authority or directions which were granted that official by the 1947 Act. In the event, the 1947 Act is the foundation of post-war U.S. military organization, and was likely the most comprehensive defense reorganization undertaken to that point in U.S. history. With this in mind, we now move to an investigation of how the three explanations postulated in Chapters One and Two square with the reality of the National Security Act of 1947.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

The Soviet Threat

Despite the disagreement over the extent of the Soviet threat during this period of time, there was a clear belief by 1947 that the Soviet threat had increased since 1945. This increase in the Soviet threat began to evolve by the latter part of 1945. As the Soviets had marched across Eastern Europe towards Germany, they had created sympathetic governments or political parties in their wake, with little concern for the pre-war governments that had existed in these states. At the Potsdam Conference of wartime allies in July, 1945, the U.S. failed to obtain Soviet support for monitored elections in Eastern Europe. Stalin opposed the possibility of any government in Eastern Europe which was not "friendly" to the U.S.S.R. He was quoted as saying at the conference that, "A freely elected government in any of these East European countries would be anti-Soviet, and this we cannot allow."15 Nevertheless, Secretary of State James Byrnes left the conference believing it was successful, but his optimism soon changed.16

By September, 1945, at the London Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Soviet intransigence over Eastern Europe deepened. There, the Soviet Union demanded
that the other allies recognize, and conclude peace treaties with, Soviet-inspired regimes in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The U.S. and the other attending wartime allies refused, and the conference broke up without agreement.

The final blow to the diplomatic resolution of the Eastern European problem came in Moscow in December, 1945. There, Secretary of State Byrnes met with Stalin and, while not backing away from the U.S. position on free elections in Eastern Europe, did recognize the existing governments in Romania and Bulgaria. President Truman and most within and outside of government were furious with this outcome. From this point on, the attitude of the U.S. government towards the Soviet Union began to harden. Truman adopted the so-called "get tough" policy towards the U.S.S.R., based on the belief that heretofore the U.S. had coddled the Soviets and that only by tough future action could results be achieved.

The diplomatic intransigence of the Soviet Union and its dominance over Eastern Europe was coupled with an apparent level of aggression throughout the international system which the U.S. now perceived as foreshadowing Soviet expansion. In August, 1946 the Soviet Union sought international recognition of its right to occupy the Dardanelles from Turkey, which was justified as a means of preventing future enemies from entering the Black Sea and threatening the Soviet Union. This, coupled with other
Soviet actions, raised the possibility of a Soviet threat to Turkey as a whole.\textsuperscript{17}

The Soviets also exhibited an apparently aggressive attitude towards Iran. In 1942, the Soviets and the British, who were jointly occupying Iran for the duration of the war, agreed to withdraw at the close of the war - an effective date later set for March 2, 1946. The British withdrew prior to the effective date, but the Soviets failed to withdraw in time. Eventually, they withdrew on March 24, only after apparently obtaining oil concessions from the Iranian government.\textsuperscript{18} The Soviets also attempted to establish a separate government in northern Iran, along its border with Azerbaijan, which eventually collapsed.

The final international event which most clearly raised concerns over potential Soviet expansionism, was the Greek Civil War. In May, 1946, Greek Communists commenced a rebellion against the British-supported Greek monarchy. The Greek Communists were supported by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. The U.S. had difficulties with Yugoslavia in August, when unarmed U.S. transport planes were shot down over northern Yugoslavia. Eventually, in 1947, the British withdrew from Greece and the U.S. assumed responsibility for backing the Greek monarchy. The fighting in Greece was the prime stimulus for the Truman Doctrine, articulated in March, 1947, in which President Truman pledged U.S. support for free peoples fighting against outside aggression or
pressure. In general, the U.S. perceived the Greek Civil War as being inspired and supported by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{19}

The perceptions of an enhanced Soviet threat were somewhat muddled by the ambiguous numbers present on the existing Soviet military threat. U.S. intelligence assessments of Soviet military expenditures indicated a significant decline in the level of expenditures from 1945 to 1947. A Department of State Intelligence Research memorandum from the Division of Research for Europe Office, issued in July, 1947, forecasted a decline in Soviet defense expenditures from 1946 to 1947 of 76.6 billion rubles to 67.1 billion rubles.\textsuperscript{20} This followed a tremendous decline in Soviet defense spending, as a natural byproduct of the end of World War II, from 137.9 billion rubles in 1945 to 76.6 billion in 1946.\textsuperscript{21}

In terms of troop levels, the U.S. estimated that, as of April, 1946, the U.S.S.R. had a total of 6,400,000 troops.\textsuperscript{22} By September, 1946, it was estimated that that number would reduce to 4,500,00.\textsuperscript{23} While the estimates envisioned a decline in overall Soviet troop levels, they also anticipated that these levels would be enough to seriously undermine the security of Europe. According to a September JCS report, from which the above troop estimates were taken, the Soviets had the capability to "overrun and occupy most, if not all, of Germany, France, and the Low Countries," as well as a number of other areas including
Greece, the Persian Gulf, Manchuria, Korea, Spain, Denmark, Italy, and parts of Afghanistan. Thus, the primary threat to U.S. security appeared to be the Soviet Union, however, the level of that threat was unresolved as of 1947.

Other Security Threats

Aside from the Soviet threat, the U.S. faced little in the way of new external threats to its security or security interests from 1945 to 1947. As previously mentioned, some U.S. aircraft were shot down by Yugoslavia in 1946, but the U.S. viewed Yugoslavia as a Soviet puppet, with aggressive Yugoslavian activity being attributed to hostile Soviet intent. Aside from this, an examination of the literature on international crises reveals little in the way of a potential security threat for the U.S.

The only other potential threat to U.S. security interests at this time was posed by the Communists in the Chinese Civil War. The Chinese Koumintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party, was strongly supported by the United States during and immediately after World War II. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), had, with the backing of the Soviet Union, suspended its rebellion against the KMT by 1937 and adopted an official policy of a united front against the Japanese. At the end of World War II, however, there was profound confusion as to the likely outcome of the situation in China. The CCP was intent upon commencing
their war against the KMT, and the KMT was just as eager to fight. The U.S. supported the KMT, but wished for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. The Soviet position was somewhat ambiguous. The Soviets had supported the KMT and Communist cooperation with the KMT in the 1920s, and it was not certain the Chinese Communists forgave the Soviets for their eventual betrayal by the KMT or for their lack of support in general. The ambiguous attitude towards Soviet-CCP cooperation is reflected in the thought of George Kennan who was not convinced that the CCP was subservient to Moscow, or that it was part of a grander expansionist Communist movement.\(^{26}\)

It is this ambiguity which complicates the consideration of the CCP as a separate threat to U.S. security. In 1946 and 1947, there was no consensus on the extent to which the Chinese Communists followed orders from Moscow. Dean Acheson, for example, absolved the Soviets from responsibility for CCP successes in Manchuria in early 1946, whereas U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the U.S.S.R.\(^{27}\)

Even if we do consider the CCP as a separate entity from the Soviet Union, it appears that there was a difference of opinion as to whether the ultimate takeover of China by the Communists was a threat to U.S. security. George Kennan contended that:
this deterioration of the situation in China did not strike us as fatal, in itself, to American interests. China was not a strong industrial power. She showed no promise of becoming one for a long time in the future. In particular, she could not become in any short space of time a strong military power anywhere beyond the mainland of Asia. She had not ability to develop amphibious power on any serious scale. ... the deterioration of the situation in China did not seem to constitute in itself any intolerable threat to our security. 28

Dean Acheson viewed China as a quagmire which the U.S. should avoid at all costs. 29

Others were far more concerned by the CCP, however. For example, Senator Arther Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was gravely concerned by the course of events in China and U.S. policy towards the country. He wrote in January, 1947 that, "there will never be a minute when China’s destiny is not of acute concern to the United States..." 30

Ultimately, the U.S., while attempting mediation in 1946, withdrew its mediation efforts and the U.S. Marines stationed in northern China. By giving the Chinese a chance to work things out on their own during the midst of a savage Civil War, the U.S. indicated implicitly that China was not an ultimate U.S. security concern. Thus, it is probably not fair to consider the rise of the CCP in China as a serious security threat from 1945-1947.
Operational Activity

Prior to the reorganization of 1947, the only significant operational activity undertaken by the U.S. military was during World War II. In World War II the U.S. had mobilized more troops and had spent more on military production than ever in its history. For the first time, truly combined operations, involving land, sea, and air forces were used. The end result was complete strategic success and overall tactical success as well. Very few times during the war did U.S. troops fail in their strategic missions.

THE DEBATES DURING THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The Debates and the External Threat

During the debates leading up to the reorganization of 1947 there were no references to specific external threats, nor calls for reorganizations so as to address specific external threats. This may have been, in large part, a reflection on the ambiguous nature of the external threat at the time. Nonetheless, advocates and opponents of defense reorganization in the period 1945-1947 did not make reference to any specific external threat while discussing the need to reorganize the structure of the military establishment.
The Debates and Operational Lessons

The debates surrounding the 1947 National Security Act did not include any reference to operational activities aside from World War II. There were, however, a significant number of references to World War II in these debates. These references presented ambiguous evidence of the relationship between operational lessons and the defense reorganization process. The advocates of the National Security Act of 1947 claimed that the reforms were driven by a reflection on the operational lessons of World War II and the desire to enhance "combat effectiveness". These buzz words were echoed by both the Army and the Navy, as well as Congress, the mass media, and even the President. Operational lessons, which pointed to the need for increased combat effectiveness, were easy to explain to the doubting members of Congress and the public, and were of such serious import as to almost demand action. Unfortunately, the calls for unification and defense reorganization, based on the desire to learn from previous operational activity, were, in large part, lacking in substantive evidence of support. Rather, it was often taken for granted by the supporters of reform that operational lessons demand a significant defense reorganization.

Perhaps the earliest, and most persistent, operational lesson drawn upon was the tragedy of Pearl Harbor. The form of command coordination between the Army and the Navy at
Pearl Harbor was based on the old notion of "mutual cooperation." Critics of the existing operational system pointed to Pearl Harbor as evidence of the failure of this system in combat.\(^3\) This assessment of Pearl Harbor was reenforced by President Truman in 1945. When calling for unified direction of land, sea and air forces for the armed forces, Truman noted that, "We did not have that kind of direction when we were attacked four years ago - and we certainly paid a high price for not having it."\(^3\) Congress supported this claim in the floor debates on the 1947 Act, where Congressmen asserted that unification would prevent a future Pearl Harbor.\(^3\) The mass media also accepted the judgement of failure given to the existing command structure at Pearl Harbor. The *New York Times*, commenting on the report on Pearl Harbor released in 1945, asserted that the failure at Pearl Harbor was a failure of the system (implicitly the defense organizational system).\(^3\)

Other than the tangible evidence of Pearl Harbor, those pointing to operational lessons as a reason for reform relied upon little of substance to base their calls. During the early days of the war, Congressional proponents of unification and reform pointed to the combat effectiveness of the German model, and particularly its success in combined operation in the European theater, as evidence that a change in the U.S. system (to one more closely resembling the German model) was necessary.\(^3\) Yet, little attempt was
made to show how the organizational structure of the U.S. military during World War II significantly detracted from its operational performance.

One of the strongest organizational lessons which appears to have been drawn from the operational experience of World War II was the desirability of formally establishing the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).\textsuperscript{36} President Truman, who was quite skeptical of the military and its procedures, was impressed by the World War II activities of the JCS. On one occasion Truman told Admiral Leahy, the wartime chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that if the Confederacy had had a military organization like the JCS, the South would have won the Civil War."\textsuperscript{37} Truman conceded that the JCS, as it stood in 1945, was not adequate, but nevertheless, encouraged the formal creation of a JCS with more specified duties and procedures.\textsuperscript{38}

Another organizational lesson learned during World War II which had organizational implications was the efficacy of air power. The air forces came of age during World War II, and with their new-found effectiveness also came concerns with the organizational restraints within which they had to operate. The vast majority of land based air craft were still, organizationally, under the control of the Army. Advocates of air power argued that the existing organizational structures impaired air operations. They
believed that the success of air operations during the war justifi
did the creation of a separate air force.

Arguments were made that the Army Air Force had been hampered in procurement during the war, that successful operations demanded control at a higher and separate level of authority, and that the future nature of warfare would be dominated by strategic bombing which could best be conducted by a separate service. The Navy opposed the creation of a separate Air Force, primarily for reasons of bureaucratic politics. However, some Navy pilots did testify in 1947 that there was no evidence to suggest that the air forces would be as significant in future wars as they were in World War II.

A final organizational lesson learned from the operational experience of World War II was the apparent organizational needs necessary for successfully conducting warfare in the future. By the end of World War II, observers were noticing the rapid advancement of weapons technology and its integration into the overall strategy for the conduct of warfare. It was obvious to most that weapons such as the atomic bomb and ground launched missiles would play an even greater role in future conflict and these technological changes would require organizational responses. As President Truman noted in 1945, "If there is ever going to be another global conflict, it is sure to take place simultaneously on land and sea and in the air, with
weapons of ever greater speed and range. Our combat forces must work together in one team as they have never been required to work together in the past."  ^43

It is necessary to note that not all references to U.S. operational activity during World War II were linked to support of the 1947 reorganization effort. The strongest opponent of the reorganization process, the Navy, utilized the operational lessons of World War II to support their position that the existing structure was fine. The Navy claimed, at the outset, that a key lesson of World War II was that military success depended upon a strong Navy. Thus, in evaluating a potential reorganization, one needed to consider whether the reorganization would enhance or detract from U.S. naval capabilities. A diminished role for the Navy, as a result of reorganization, would go against the lessons of World War II, and should therefore be avoided. ^44 The Army Air Forces countered by alleging that the true lessons of World War II indicated that the Navy was not the most important aspect of national defense, but rather, that success can only be achieved via a combined arms approach which would require single direction for the nation's land, air, and sea forces. ^45

The Navy also argued that there was no proof that a new structure would work as well as the existing system in an operational situation. The Navy's position was "that the ultimate test was success in battle." ^46 This contention was
coupled with the Navy's assertion that, insofar as success in battle was concerned, the lessons of World War II were that the existing system had produced victory. The Navy saw no need to change what had previously been successful.

The Navy supplemented their opposition to structural reorganization with operational evidence of the efficacy of the organizational structure in place during the war. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal noted that had he not, as Secretary of the Navy, had access to the highest levels of strategic debate during the war, the U.S. would have suffered significant combat losses during the war. Specifically, Forrestal pointed to the Guadalcanal campaign, when he alleged that without his personal efforts to obtain reinforcements for the battle, that the island may have well been lost with an attendant increase in U.S. casualties.\(^47\) Forrestal asserted that the reorganization plans of 1947 would prevent such access in the future, thus ignoring the operational lessons of World War II.

Finally, it should be noted that two factors may well have limited the reference to operational lessons during the 1947 reorganization debates. First of all, the higher levels of the U.S. staff (the JCS) were not directly responsible for operational planning during World War II. Rather, this was left to theater commanders.\(^48\) This being the case, operational failures (or successes) would be difficult to attribute to the structural aspects of high
level command. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, few advocates of unification and structural reform were willing to allege that there were operational lessons indicating failure at the top levels of the defense establishment. Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, and their secretaries, were seen as responsible for the victory of World War II. Joint Chiefs of Staff members Marshall, King, Arnold, and Leahy had become national heroes and it would take a brave soul indeed to point to the work of these men and claim it was deficient. In fact, most advocates of unification stated that the wartime JCS worked admirably given their impossible position, but that such effective cooperation was based on a level of personal compatibility which could not be translated into structural effectiveness.

THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

There is little in the National Security Act of 1947 which specifically addresses the concerns of the external explanation; namely, the external threat and prior operational lessons. Insofar as the external threat was ignored in the debates surrounding the 1947 reorganization, it is not surprising that specific aspects of the legislation were not directed towards dealing with this concern.

The legislation was somewhat more responsive to the concerns of those who pointed to some operational lessons
learned in World War II. First, and most obviously, the formal creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was intended to respond to those who felt that the wartime JCS was an effective body. The legislation took a small step towards a more "unified" military, which many felt was a necessity revealed by the lessons of the Second World War. Yet, the creation of a National Military Establishment headed by a civilian Secretary of Defense with few formal powers was a far cry from the level of unification called for by those pointing to the necessity of combined operations.

Finally, if the lessons of World War II pointed to the indispensability of the air forces, the 1947 legislation added some legitimacy to this branch of the service by creating the Air Force. However, by responding to the reality of the times, this part of the legislation also further fragmented the overall military establishment and undermined attempts for greater unification of the military as a whole.

It really should not be surprising that operational lessons were not reflected more clearly in the eventual legislation of the 1947 reorganization. Many of those in Congress and the public at large were well plugged in to the notion that the operational lessons of World War II pointed to the need for reorganization. Yet, aside from Pearl Harbor and a few other isolated instances, little actual evidence was given to illustrate how the defense structure
during the war adversely (or positively) affected operational performance. This being the case, it is not unusual to find that little of the concern over operational lessons was translated into hard legislation.

THE DOMESTIC EXPLANATION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

The Domestic Economy

In the immediate post-war period, U.S. economic health declined in comparison to its rather robust state during the course of the war. Most significant economic indicators illustrated this reduction in U.S. economic performance. The Gross National Product (GNP) of the U.S. declined from $212.4 billion in 1945 to only $208.5 billion in 1946, before it began to recover in 1947 with a growth to $231.3 billion. Other measures of production also declined. The Federal Reserve Board’s Index of Manufacturing Production dropped from 51 in 1944 to 45 in 1945, and continued its decline, dropping to 35 in 1946, until it began to recover in 1947 with a rise to 39.

Other measures of economic health also illustrated poor economic performance. Unemployment, as a percentage of the labor force, rose from 1.9 percent in 1945 to 3.9 percent in 1946 and 1947. The consumer price index climbed 8.5
percent from 1945 to 1946, and climbed an even greater 14 percent from 1946 to 1947.\textsuperscript{52} Finally, the business failure index soared over 250 percent from 1945 to 1947.\textsuperscript{53} All of these figures reflect an economy reacting negatively to the end of the war and the booming production and employment which characterized the war years. In 1946, the future of the U.S. economy was uncertain.

The Perceived Trend in the Domestic Economy

At the close of World War II the general perception was that the U.S. economy would decline in the future. Many felt that the economy would likely revert to an unhealthy state circa the 1930s. Some were even predicting a depression even worse than the Great Depression of the late 1920s and 1930s.\textsuperscript{54} These perceptions were supported by the series of difficulties the Truman administration encountered in attempting to deal with the economic problems. Truman's efforts to control wages and prices so as to control inflation were opposed by the labor unions on the one hand and by conservative Congressmen and business interests on the other. At one point, during a lapse in price control legislation, prices on most goods rose over twenty five percent in three weeks. Eventually, the 1946 Congressional elections saw the opponents of price controls gain control of both Houses of Congress and price controls were suspended. The result was, according to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, the greatest increase in prices since World War I.\textsuperscript{55}

Labor unrest and numerous strikes by the United Mine Workers exacerbated concerns over an uncertain economic future. The combined effect of all of these factors was to produce a profound concern on the part of President Truman for the future economic health of the country. The economy was gripped by an odd mixture of depressionary and inflationary factors. As Treasury Secretary Fred Vinson observed, "During the coming year we shall find ourselves in a somewhat paradoxical situation. ... Millions of workers will be laid off and forced to seek new jobs. .... the worker's total income will decline. ... All of these are deflationary factors. They do not result, however, from any fundamental deflationary situation. ... So long as we remain in this period of physical transition, we shall continue to be faced with inflationary pressures."\textsuperscript{56} Clearly, in such a confused situation, concerns over the future of the economy were great.

Reports on Administrative Performance

From 1945 to 1947, a significant increase in the number of accounts of poor administrative performance within the defense establishment found their way into print. An examination of the New York Times (NYT) for this period illustrates this point. In 1945 there were 27 reports in
the NYT dealing with poor administrative performance within the U.S. defense establishment. By 1946 this number had skyrocketed to 157 reports. In 1947, the number of reports fell to the still large number of 128. Most of these reports dealt with two areas of poor administrative performance. First, there were numerous cases in which contract fraud was revealed at the close of the war. Second, and more frequent, were the reports of war profiteering and the inquiries conducted on the level of profits paid to wartime contractors. In both of these cases, the poor administrative performance in question could be traced back to procurement and contracting practices. In addition, there were isolated reports of inadequate production, poor production standards, graft, and waste.

THE DEBATES DURING THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The Debates and Economy

Achieving economy was one of the more consistent themes in the debates on the 1947 National Security Act. Those desiring economy can be classified into two groups, those who wished economy for its own sake, and those who saw economy as the only way of ensuring an adequate military in the post-war era.

This latter group, led by General Marshall, based their desire for economy on the assessment that the post-war
environment would be one characterized by tight budgetary restraints, even on the military. Secretary of War Stimson, in his testimony before the Woodrum Committee, noted that modern warfare had demonstrated that the U.S. was susceptible to resource and manpower constraints which could only be overcome via reorganization which created economy. Stimson based his adoption of the Richardson Committee plan on the belief that the U.S. armed forces needed to get full value, in terms of national defense, for every dollar spent in the post-war period (particularly in light of U.S. global commitments).

President Truman could also be lumped into this group of economy advocates. In his letter to Congress on unification in 1945, President Truman noted that, "This war has demonstrated completely that the resources of this nation in manpower and in raw materials are not unlimited. To realize this is to comprehend the urgent need for finding a way to allocate these resources intelligently among the competing services." Later, in 1946, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal noted that President Truman was again concerned over how to provide an adequate budget for the military given the existing budgetary restrictions. As Forrestal noted, "what he [Truman] wanted was a balanced system of national defense with particular reference to the integration of the budget. He said that about $6 billion a year of our national income would have to go to the service
of the national debt and that, of the balance remaining, not more than one-third could be allocated to national defense and this would mean the most careful screening of requirements. With such budgetary constraints governing resource allocations to the military, it is little wonder that achieving economies via defense reorganization would appeal to the President.

The second group of advocates for defense reorganization sought such economies for their own sake. They were less concerned with the salutary effects that economy could bring to a defense establishment operating in a tight post-war budgetary world, and more interested in the sheer savings associated with such economies. These reform supporters didn’t propose what the effects of such economies would be other than that they would be good for all concerned. For these supporters, economy was a rallying cry which all could understand; a result which was inherently beneficial.

Practically every War Department witness during the Woodrum Committee Hearings, as well as the Senate Military Affairs Committee Hearings of 1945 and the Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearings of 1947 testified in favor of unification and/or defense reorganization based on the alleged economies which would result. Many contended that the current system, which fostered duplication of administrative function, encouraged excess expenses
associated with such duplication. In his message in favor of unification in 1945, President Truman noted that "If we can attain as much coordination among all the services as now exists within each department, we shall realize extensive savings." General Eisenhower went so far as to argue that unification would cut the necessary fighting force by 25% allowing the armed forces to buy more security with less money. Secretary of War Patterson, during the Senate Military Affairs Committee Hearings of 1945, stated that the U.S. could have saved billions of dollars during the war if a form of unification had been in place.

The Debates and Administrative Performance

The debates on the 1947 National Security Act focused considerable attention on the need to improve administrative performance. The case for improved administrative performance was based upon a large number of horror stories told by War Department witnesses with respect to the functioning of a variety of military support activities. Perhaps the most frequent complaints registered against the administrative performance of the armed forces were once again related to administrative duplication and, in the case of administrative performance, the lack of coordination which resulted. Duplication referred to the duplication of activities, functions, training, logistics, and procurement then existing between the Army and the Navy. The War
Department began its campaign against inefficiency in the Woodrum Committee Hearings of 1944. Secretary of War Stimson began by noting the loss of effectiveness and delay associated with duplication. Assistant Secretary of War Patterson pointed out that procurement was inefficient due to the lack of coordination. General Sommerville, Commander of Army Service Forces, noted that duplication and the resultant inefficiency extended into supply, transport, communications, and a number of other areas. The coup de grace was administered by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget who stated that maximum efficiency and effective administrative performance could only be achieved via a single department of defense.67

In terms of sheer volume of comments, efficiency ranked close behind economy as the word on most supporters’ tongues.68 The call for improved administrative performance and the proposed means of bringing such improved performance about had the virtue of being inherently logical to its supporters. In addition, those pointing to the inefficiency of the wartime defense structure could point to a multitude of lurid examples of inane duplication in procurement, communications, transportation, training, etc. In a debate surprisingly devoid of substantive evidence, the administrative performance advocates did have that advantage.
THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

There were many links between the 1947 reorganization legislation and the issues of economy and administrative performance. The legislation attempted to bring about economies in the defense establishment in two ways. First, economies could be achieved by a reduction in duplication within the defense establishment. The National Security Act of 1947 authorized the new Secretary of Defense to "take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research." Insofar as duplication in these areas was responsible for excessive spending, this step, if carried out, would bring some economies to the military establishment.

Second, the Act encouraged coordination and consultation between the Secretary of Defense and the service chiefs with respect to the budget process and the process of matching procurement to strategy. The Act authorized the Secretary of Defense to "supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the departments and agencies comprising the National Military Establishment," as well as submit these estimates to the Bureau of the budget and oversee the budget programs eventually authorized.

Three aspects of the 1947 Act attempted to enhance the administrative performance of the defense establishment.
First, insofar as duplication created performance problems, the authority granted to the Secretary to eliminate duplications would work towards improving administrative performance as well as providing economies.

Second, the 1947 Act created the Munitions Board to consolidate and coordinate many of the aspects of industrial mobilization and procurement. The Munitions Board was given the responsibility to, among other things, plan for industrial mobilization, allocate procurement responsibilities among the services, consolidate inter-service groups then working on procurement, and consult with other agencies on the best ways to utilize the civilian economy. All of these tasks, if performed, would signal an improvement over existing administrative procedures and would enhance administrative performance.

Finally, the 1947 Act created the Research and Development Board in order to consolidate research and development functions for more efficient performance. The Board was charged with preparing integrated research and development programs, making recommendations on coordinated research among the services, and reaching out to other research and development organizations outside of the military establishment. Once again, if successful, these changes would enhance administrative performance in the areas of research and development.
THE CIVILIAN/EXECUTIVE CONSOLIDATION EXPLANATION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

Civilian Executive Tenure

No civilian executive associated with defense assumed office at the outset of the reorganization process which culminated in the 1947 National Security Act. The most significant civilian executive involved in the reorganization process of 1947 was President Harry S. Truman. There was no Secretary of Defense prior to the passage of the 1947 Act, however there were separate Secretaries of War and of the Navy. President Truman took office after the death of President Roosevelt on April 12, 1945. This was two-and-one-half years after the first steps towards defense reorganization were taken by General Marshall in November, 1943. President Truman took office nearly one year after the first round of hearings were held on the issue before the House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy.

Robert P. Patterson became Secretary of War in September, 1945 after an extended period as Assistant Secretary of War. James Forrestal became Secretary of the Navy in April 1944 after an extended period as Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
Origins of the Move to Reorganize

The origins of the reorganization process which culminated in the 1947 Act were not with civilian executives within the defense establishment. As mentioned earlier, the move towards reorganization commenced in 1943 upon the initiative of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General George Marshall. The idea moved from consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to more formal Congressional consideration before the Woodrum Committee (House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy) in 1944. President Roosevelt never became involved in the controversy during his life, however, there are indications that he opposed the notion of defense reorganization.73 The War Department, and then Secretary of War Stimson, supported Marshall's Plans, but the vast majority of the presentations on reorganization were made by military personnel within the Army.

The civilians in the Department of the Navy were much more actively involved in the reorganization process, but only in opposition to the proposition. James Forrestal actively campaigned against the proposed reorganizations, and publicly opposed them as early as June, 1945. The first indications of strong, high level civilian executive support for defense reorganization came with President Truman's message to Congress in December, 1945 - over two years after the debates on reorganization began.
Civilian/Executive Perceptions of Civilian Control

There were concerns held by the civilian/executives that civilian control at the end of World War II was inadequate. As Huntington observed, "the United States came out of World War II with an organized military unit at this level [the level above the individual military services but below the highest political authority in government], the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which, in addition to performing professional military functions, discharged policy-strategy and administrative-fiscal functions. The absence of any significant civilian institution at this level left no effective restraints on the Joint Chiefs. They were, as Admiral Leahy remarked, 'under no civilian control whatever.'" President Truman reflected this concern in his first message to Congress on the issue of reorganization. He noted that:

During and since the war, the need for joint action by the Services and for objective recommendations on military matters has led inevitably to increasing the authority of the only joint organization and the most nearly objective organization that exists - the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff are a strictly military body. Responsibility for civilian control should be clearly fixed in a single full-time civilian below the President. This requires a Secretary for the entire military establishment, aided by a strong staff of civilian assistants.

Truman's attitude was reflective of his inherent concern over too much military authority. In calling for unification, Truman wanted to diminish the authority of the
services, and particularly the service "establishment" as represented by the cliques of officers who had attended the service academies.\textsuperscript{76}

The experience of World War II also placed in question the efficacy of civilian control below the level of Commander-in-Chief. In particular, the war had revealed the apparent lack of civilian control at the level of the service secretaries. In the case of both Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Knox, the Joint Chiefs of Staff effectively excluded them from strategic debates. By executive order the civilian secretaries were not consulted on matters of strategy, were left out of high level military discussions, and were not even included on the regular distribution list for JCS papers.\textsuperscript{77}

Clearly, there was a perception that some of the techniques and administrative structures adopted during the war had undermined civilian control, and that this effect would be detrimental in peacetime. Many of these ad hoc organizational structures were a direct result of President Roosevelt's administrative style coupled with the extenuating circumstances of the war.

Civilian/Executive Perceptions of Centralization

From 1943 to 1945 civilian/executives perceived that the existing level of centralization within the military establishment was inadequate. President Truman, in his 1945
message to Congress, noted that in 1941 there was a decentralized structure to the defense establishment with coordination between the services on an ad hoc basis. While some of these ad hoc measures had been successful during the war, the time had come for more formal steps to be taken to foster service unity. Truman noted that the cooperation which characterized the JCS during the war would not likely continue in peacetime and called for centralization in budget decision making, strategic planning, and a variety of support functions including supply, training, and research. The Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, observed the everpresent divisions between the services, noting:

The war was fought successfully without any important revision of the separated status of the two services from which all these troubles grew. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and a number of other boards and committees were bridges across the gap. Sometimes in the operating theaters these bridges became so numerous and solid that the gap almost disappeared - and then incautiously someone would assume that it did not exist and learn his mistake from a new outburst of feeling.

Stimson wished for reorganization to permanently overcome this "gap".

On the other hand, the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, was of the opinion that the military establishment was adequately centralized at the end of the war. Forrestal argued that the lack of rigid centralization within the military establishment was one of its prime virtues. When testifying before the Senate Military Affairs
Committee in 1945, Forrestal noted that the existing military structure had, "in less time than was thought possible, attained complete victory in the greatest war of history." Clearly Forrestal did not perceive the level of centralization as inadequate.

THE DEBATES DURING THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The Debates and Civilian Control

Throughout the debates leading up to the passage of the 1947 Act, the issue of civilian control was a frequently mentioned, but ancillary issue to the main discussion. President Truman expressed his support for increasing civil control via the creation of a single Secretary of Defense. The real question, with respect to civilian control, centered around the extent of the authority to be given to the Secretary.

In the McNarney Plan, submitted by the War Department in 1944, the Secretary of the Armed Forces was to act as an administrative officer with little impact, even on issues such as the budget. The Navy capitalized on the issue of civilian control as a means of opposing the reorganization process in general, noting that the McNarney Plan undermined civilian control. After the presentation of the Richardson Committee's report, Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, announced his opposition citing the negative
effect the proposed plan would have on civilian control. King argued that unification would create a "man on horseback" who would eviscerate civilian control of the military.

In the Eberstadt Report, sponsored by the Navy, concern was expressed over the negative effects the War Department plans for reorganization would have on the free flow of civilian control. Once again, in the latter part of 1945, the Navy opposed the War Department sponsored Collins Plan, on the grounds that it would undermine civilian control by limiting the authority of the Secretary of Defense.

Despite the apparent concern of the Navy for civilian control, it must be noted that the Navy's support was selective. The Navy supported civilian control at the service secretary level. It strongly opposed the creation of a single Secretary of Defense, above the level of the service secretaries. In 1946 Navy Secretary Forrestal specifically criticized the notion of a single secretary, and supported the concept of service secretary control with all-inclusive authority over the budgetary process.

Finally, it should be noted that within the Navy there were divisions between civilians and military personnel on the issue of civilian control. In particular, the civilians within the Navy Department were intent on preventing the World War II methods of operation, in which the service secretaries were cut out of the decision making process,
from becoming permanent. The military within the Navy were willing to support a JCS responsible only to the President, with no intervening layers of civilian control.

The Debates and Centralization

Centralization was a consistent theme during the 1947 reorganization debates. It should first be noted that "centralization" as a term rarely appeared within the debates surrounding the 1947 Act. Rather, discussions on centralization were usually couched in terms of "unification" and those aspects of unification which would involve a consolidation of activities and procedures. As early as 1943, with General Marshall's original suggestions for reorganization, the need for reorganization was framed in terms of the desirability of institutionalizing wartime cooperation. Marshall argued that coordination committees caused delay and that compromise was too cumbersome a method for directing the armed forces.

During the Woodrum Committee Hearings in 1944, Secretary of War Stimson testified that voluntary cooperation could not replace combined concentrated authority at the top, particularly in the areas of planning, supervision, and control. In the 1945 unification hearings, Marshall and other Army officers pointed out again that cooperation as a basis for decision-making would not be effective in peacetime. Yet, it must be kept in mind that
the Army’s unification plans, while calling for increased centralization, did so at the expense of civilian control. The Collins Plan called for a unified budget process and unified planning. However, under that plan the Secretary would deal only with administrative matters, could not influence strategy, operations, or appropriations, and would not be involved in the budgetary process.

The primary opposition to the concept of centralization was, once again, the Navy. After the conclusions of the Richardson Committee were released, Admiral Richardson came out against the concept of a single department of national defense, arguing that such a configuration would actually cut down on effectiveness. Admiral King argued that unification would undermine healthy competition and autonomy. Finally, during the Woodrum Committee hearings, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, A. Gates, noted that centralization did not create effectiveness; rather, as shown in business, the real trend in obtaining effectiveness was to move towards decentralization.

THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The legislation which effected the 1947 Act only marginally addressed the issues of civilian control and centralization. The 1947 Act strengthened civilian control to the extent that it created one significant new civilian position, the Secretary of Defense. The powers given to the
Secretary of Defense were potentially great, but were couched in somewhat vague language. The Secretary was given the authority to exercise "general" direction, control, and authority over the national military establishment and was authorized to supervise and coordinate the preparation of preliminary budget estimates by the departments and supervise the budget programs of the departments and agencies of the National Military Establishment.  

In addition, the Secretaries of the individual services had their authority confirmed, if not enhanced. The 1947 Act gave them direct access to the President and proclaimed that the Secretaries should administer the services as separate executive departments with the service secretaries retaining all authority relating to their departments not granted to the Secretary of Defense.

Finally, in terms of civilian control, the heads of both the newly created agencies, the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board, were to be civilians.

In terms of centralization of authority, the 1947 Act was less than successful. The primary step toward centralization was the creation of the National Military Establishment headed by the Secretary of Defense. This Establishment, however, was merely a loose collection of the three separate executive service departments. The creation of the Department of the Air Force, in fact, actually led to a decentralization of authority.
The JCS was formally created, thus taking another step towards centralization. However, it was a primarily collegial body including representatives of each of the services as well as the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief. No decision-making procedures for the JCS were included in the 1947 Act, thus detracting from any centralization of the decision-making process within the JCS.

Finally, in terms of centralization, the 1947 Act created the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board, both of which represented a centralization of authority with respect to the issues of munitions and research and development.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, I will first assess each of the explanations in its own right, and then compare them in terms of explanatory power.

EXTERNAL EXPLANATION

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the external explanation was answered. A + indicates an answer supporting the external explanation. A - indicates an answer which does not support the external explanation. A * indicates an ambiguous answer
which in and of itself does not support or undermine the external explanation.

1. The change in the Soviet threat. +
2. The existence of potential new threats. -
3. The level of operational activity. +
4. References to operational lessons. *
5. References to the external threat. -
6. Links between legislation and the issues. -

As a whole, the external explanation does not appear persuasive given the lack of a linkage between the legislation and the issues of the external threat and operational lessons. Even though the objective circumstances support this explanation, the debates themselves fail to connect these objective conditions to the need for defense reorganization.

DOMESTIC EXPLANATION

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the domestic explanation was answered.

1. The current state of the economy. +
2. The perceived trend in the economy. +
4. References to economy and administrative performance. +
5. Links between legislation and the issues. +

As a whole, the domestic explanation seems quite relevant in explaining the 1947 reorganization process. The 1947 case answers each important question posed by the domestic explanation in a supportive manner.

CIVILIAN/EXECUTIVE CONSOLIDATION EXPLANATION

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the civilian/executive consolidation explanation was answered.

1. Tenure in office. -
2. Origins of the reorganization movement. -
3. Perceptions of civilian control. +
4. Perceptions of centralization. +
5. References to civilian control and centralization. +
6. Links between legislation and the issues. *

As a whole, the civilian/executive consolidation explanation is plausible, but suspect. The actual legislation does not directly link the issues of civilian control and centralization to the reorganization process. The objective circumstances posited by the civilian/executive consolidation explanation are not present
Even though civilian executive perceptions of civilian control and levels of centralization point to a defense reorganization based on this explanation and the debates surrounding the 1947 act refer to these issues, the fact remains that concern with these issues was never effectively translated into legislation.

CONCLUSIONS

In the final assessment, the domestic explanation appears to be the most persuasive, given the objective circumstances, the character of the reorganization debates, and the eventual legislation. While one may argue that the 1947 Act produced little in the way of actual economic savings and improved administrative performance, it is still the case that the proponents of this reorganization thought that these domestic concerns would be addressed.

The external explanation, while somewhat persuasive with respect to operational lessons, fails in the issue of the external threat. Concern about the external threat confronting the U.S. after World War II was really a non-issue in the entire reorganization process - an assessment which must doom this "external" explanation.

Finally, the civilian/executive consolidation explanation is not persuasive for two reasons. First, the objectives of defense reorganizations according to this explanation are centralized defense decision-making under
strong civilian control. Yet, the 1947 Act does not achieve these dual goals, and in fact pursues one goal (civilian authority) at the expense of the other (centralization). Other aspects of the legislation (such as the creation of the Air Force) directly undermined enhanced centralization. Second, civilian executives did not inspire the reorganization movement. The extent of civilian executive participation was to react to the proposals of others, either in support or in opposition.

The 1947 reorganization process was probably the most complex of all of the post-World War II reorganizations due to its comprehensive nature. It can confuse the observer because a single organizational proposal can be viewed as being inspired by a variety of factors. However, when one assesses each of these three explanations for the reorganization process in terms of the expectations contained in the explanation, versus the reality of the process, and when comparing these assessments, the domestic explanation appears the most convincing.
NOTES


8. Ibid., 15-16.


13. Ibid., 328-329.


18. In fact, the Iranian parliament later rescinded the oil agreement which had been the basis of the Soviet withdraw.

19. This perception proved to be incorrect insofar was the Yugoslav government undertook support of the Greek Communists without Soviet prompting, and in fact against the wishes of Stalin. Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, 288-289; Isaacson and Thomas, *The Wise Men*, 401-402.

20. *Soviet Budgets for 1946 and 1947*, Department of State - Division of Research for Europe office of Intelligence Research, 7/7/47. OIR Report No. 4352.

21. Ibid.; *National Income, All-Union Budget, and Defense Expenditures in the USSR from 1926-27 to 1946*, Department of State Intelligence Memorandum, 10/23/46. OCL - 3443.12, p. 11.


24. Ibid., 15.


34. Ibid., 239.


36. It should be noted that Paul Hammond and Lawrence Korb both dispute the notion that the JCS performed admirably in World War II. Hammond contends that the post-war costs created by the structure of the JCS outweighed any successes in performance that can be attributed to it during the war. Korb contends that the JCS worked as an effective body only with respect to the European theater from mid-1943 until May 1944, when it was superseded by Eisenhower’s Supreme Headquarters in Europe. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, 159-185; Lawrence Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976), 15.


40. Ibid., 265.


47. Ibid., 197.

48. Ibid., 19.


50. 1967 = 100; Ibid., 912.


52. Ibid., 210.


55. William Frank Zornow, America at Mid-Century (Cleveland: Howard Allen, Inc, 1959), 34.


60. Legere, Unification of the Armed Forces, 273.

61. Ibid., 295.


64. Department of Defense, 12.


66. Ibid., 44-45.


68. Yet, it should not be forgotten that the Navy had a legitimate argument when they claimed that the proposed reforms would not address the efficiency problem. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal was willing to acknowledge that there was a problem with efficiency in the existing arrangement, yet he would not accept the idea that mere consolidation would produce efficiency. Thus, while the Navy did entirely support the methods used to improve efficiency, they may have concurred with the underlying motivation for change driving the War Department - the notion that efficiency in administration could be improved. As noted by Walter Millis, "Later history was to go far in justifying Forrestal's and the Navy's stand on this controversy." Forrestal and Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 153.


70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., 46.
72. Ibid., 47.


76. McCullough, *Truman*, 476.


79. Ibid., 10.

80. Ibid., 11, 14-15.


84. Ibid., 296-298.


88. Ibid., 118.
89. Ibid.; it should also be noted that there was some friction within the War Department with respect to the need for intervening layers of civilian control within the overall defense establishment.

90. Ibid., 24.


92. Ibid., 304-305.


95. *Hearings on Single Dept. of Armed Forces*, 222.

...experience over the eighteen months since my office was created has revealed certain weaknesses and inconsistencies in the legislation which were not foreseen at the outset and which have, in fact, prevented full realization of the authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control which is called for in the declaration of policy.

James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense

The National Security Act of 1947 was seen as a milestone for the unification movement, a movement which had begun as early as 1943. However, as is often the case with complex legislation, many soon complained that the spirit of the law was not reflected in the practice found within the national defense establishment. These critics focused on the role of the Secretary of Defense within the National Military Establishment as well as the working relationship within the JCS.

BACKGROUND OF THE LEGISLATION

By 1948, a variety of sources were calling for change. On May 21, 1948, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (hereafter referred to as
the Hoover Commission after its Chairman Herbert Hoover) established a Committee on the National Security Organization (hereafter referred to as the Eberstadt Task Force after its Chairman, Ferdinand Eberstadt). The Hoover Commission was created as part of an overall Congressional effort to "seek ways of improving executive branch efficiency and eliminating wasteful methods of operation."²

The Eberstadt Task Force was charged, under the law establishing the Hoover Commission, with seeking, "economy, efficiency, and improved service in the transaction of the public business."³ Specifically, the Task Force stated that its "task was to explore how the products of our national security establishment could be improved and, at the same time, the costs reduced - how to obtain the maximum security at the minimum cost in terms of our resources and liberties."⁴ Over the course of the next five months, from May 21, 1948 through November 15, 1948 the Task Force interviewed a number of defense establishment officials and observed the operations of the various components of the defense establishment.

The Task Force identified six areas which needed attention, three of some significance: "I. Central authority in the National Military Establishment must be clarified and strengthened. II. Military budget organizations and procedures must be improved, clarified, and regularized. ... IV. Scientific research and development must be placed on a
sounder basis and related more closely to military policy and strategic plans. The concerns of the Task Force seemed to focus in on the difficulties facing the Secretary of Defense in the National Military Establishment as well as the poor budgetary procedures followed by the services.

Noting the inherent difficulties facing the Secretary of Defense, the Task Force commented that, "A Committee study of the Secretaries' schedule over a period of 30 days shows him working intolerable hours under an inordinate press of all kinds of matters." In order to partially address this problem, the Task Force recommended that, "the Secretary be provided with an Under Secretary of Defense, who shall be his full deputy and act for him in his absence, and three assistant secretaries; and that the Secretary of Defense be empowered to set up such personal assistants to himself as he shall require to relieve him of day-to-day detail, to advise and assist him in planning and carrying out programs, and to organize this staff as he sees fit."

The difficulties encountered by the Secretary, aside from the burden of work, were to be addressed by other of the Task Force's recommendations. In their report to Congress, the Task Force suggested that the Secretary be given more authority over the defense establishment by amending the 1947 Act, which gave the Secretary "general direction, authority, and control" over the services and military establishment departments, so as to remove the
"general" nature of that authority. As stated in the report, "the Secretary shall have full authority, subject only to the President and the Congress, to establish policies and programs."

In addition to strengthening the authority of the Secretary, the Task Force proposed restricting the authority and autonomy of the services by cutting the number of service assistant secretaries as well as eliminating the right of a service secretary to appeal to the President or the Director of the Bureau of the Budget over the head of the Secretary of Defense.

With respect to the budgetary process, the Task Force was even more explicit. The Task Force pointed to five areas which were deficient in the budgetary process. These included, "(a) some degree of vagueness in the budgetary authority of the Secretary of Defense; (b) inadequate (though improving) administrative machinery in the Secretary's office and in the three military departments; (c) wide dissimilarity among the three services in budgetary organization; (d) lack of reasonable uniformity in budgetary accounting, terminology and classification...; (e) inadequate break-downs within the budget for each service...."

The Task Force offered a variety of suggestions to remedy these problems. They suggested to Congress that, "full power over preparation of the budget and over expendi-
tures as authorized by the Congress be vested in the Secretary of Defense, under the authority of the President." Additionally, the Task Force advocated a "major overhaul of the entire budget system" intended to stress uniform practices and terminology throughout all of the services." Finally, to assist in the budgetary process, the Secretary of Defense was to appoint a controller whose duties were "tantamount in his field to those of a similar official in a large industrial enterprise.""

Finally, with respect to the problems associated with scientific research and development, the Task Force advocated strengthening the authority of the Chairmen of the Research and Development Board and the Munitions Board as well as encouraging the JCS and the Research and Development Board to work more closely together so as to more effectively link scientific research, development, and strategic priorities." This criticism of the efforts of the JCS leads to a more general examination of the Task Force’s comments on JCS operations.

Although not singled out as a major deficiency of the existing National Military Establishment, the Eberstadt Task Force left no doubt as to their views of the operations of the JCS in the months since the passage of the 1947 Act. According to the Task Force, the JCS were failing to perform their essential mission, strategic planning. As stated in their initial report, "The Joint Chiefs have not yet
mastered the art of formulating effective, integrated strategic plans or of converting them into economical assignments of logistic responsibilities of the three military services." In addition, the JCS were unable to reach agreement among themselves, and no other responsible official (aside from the President) seemed to have the authority to settle their disputes. As the Task Force noted, "Although the Secretary's authority over the Joint Chiefs is clear, the means available to him for expediting their business and, above all, for resolving differences among them, are presently inadequate."

In light of these problems, the Task Force recommended two measures. First, to free the Joint Chiefs up from the many less vital duties associated with their jobs, the Task Force recommended an enlargement of the Joint Staff to provide additional support for the Joint Chiefs. Secondly, the Task Force recommended the appointment of a Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff who would "preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ...represent, and report to, the Secretary of Defense." The Chairman was not to have command authority, but rather was to expedite business within the JCS and to move the Chiefs along in keeping with their complex and overcrowded agenda.

In December 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal distributed his First Report of the Secretary of Defense in which he summarized the operations of the National Defense
Establishment over the previous fifteen months. The Secretary’s report was strikingly similar to the report of the Eberstadt Task Force in terms of both assessment of deficiencies and recommendations for change.\textsuperscript{17} The Secretary admitted, as did the Eberstadt Task Force, that the short period of time since the enactment of the 1947 Act did not allow for much time for implementation of the reforms, yet he argued that "based on the heavy workload of problems which have required attention and...based on our general experience to date," he advocated significant legislative changes.\textsuperscript{18}

Forrestal proposed five areas of reform. First, he called for the creation of the position of Under Secretary of State. Second, he called for the removal of the restrictive language attached to the clause defining his authority within the National Military Establishment, and found in the 1947 Act. Third, he advocated the abolition of the position of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief (heretofore a JCS position) and called for the creation of a Chairman of the JCS. Fourth, he called for an increase in the size of the Joint Staff which assisted the JCS. Fifth, he called for more authority to be given to the Secretary of Defense with respect to personnel issues. Finally, he called for a restriction of the power of the service secretaries by removing them from the National Security Council.
Following the release of Forrestal's report and the report of the Eberstadt Task Force, President Truman entered into the debate and set forth his opinions on the need for further reform of the National Military Establishment. Truman reviewed the two reports over the winter of 1948-49, and on March 7, 1949 sent a message to Congress calling for reform of a specific type.

President Truman disregarded the contentions of some that the 1947 Act had not been given enough time to operate properly, and stated that, "We have now had sufficient experience under the Act to be able to identify and correct the weaknesses, without impairing the advantages we have obtained from its strengths." 19

The President suggested six specific reforms which, he argued, would address the problems confronted by the national military establishment to date. First, he advocated converting the National Military Establishment into an executive department to be known as the Defense Department while simultaneously reclassifying the individual services as military departments. Secondly, he called for the removal of all restrictions placed upon the Secretary of Defense which impaired his ability to perform his duties. Along this same line he encouraged the creation of the position of Under Secretary of Defense. He called for the creation of a Chairman of the JCS and the transfer of much of the duties of the Munitions Board and the Research and
Development Board to the Secretary of Defense. Finally, the President asked that the JCS, the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board be considered staff units of the Secretary of Defense. These recommendations formed the foundations of the eventual amendments to the 1947 Act.

The legislative process of amending the 1947 Act was relatively uneventful. The Congress first tackled the issue of creating an Under Secretary of Defense, and quickly passed the legislation necessary for the creation of such a position on April 2, 1949.

Procedurally, the remainder of the amendments were passed after only a slightly more lengthy examination. Senate consideration of the proposed amendments lasted a little over two months, and House consideration took only a little under one month. The final conference report came out on July 28, 1949 and the bill was passed by both bodies on August 2, 1949. The debate over the amendments was rather tame, even with the presence of most of the major players in U.S. defense policy at the time. Few legislators were particularly eager to fight the unification fight once again. On August 10, 1949, President Truman signed the bill into law.\textsuperscript{20}
THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

The Soviet Threat

In the two years from 1947 to 1949 the Soviet threat seemed to increase. From late 1947 to early 1949, the Soviet Union and its allies undertook a variety of activities which illustrated, to the U.S., their aggressive and expansionist nature. In Czechoslovakia, the Communists, with strong Soviet backing, displaced the democratic Benes government. In response to this development, President Truman stated on March 17, 1948 in an address to Congress, that:

The situation in the world today is not primarily the result of natural difficulties which follow a great war. It is chiefly due to the fact that one nation has not only refused to cooperate in the establishment of a just and honorable peace, but - even worse - has actively sought to prevent it. ... Since the close of hostilities, the Soviet Union and its agents have destroyed the independence and democratic character of a whole series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe. It is this ruthless course of action, and the clear design to extend it to the remaining free nations of Europe, that have brought about the critical situation in Europe today.21

Of even greater concern, in terms of the Soviet threat, were the Soviet activities in Germany. On March 20, 1948, the U.S.S.R. walked out of the Allied Control Council for Germany, the body charged with administering the occupied territories of Germany. On March 30, 1948, the Soviets
began imposing restrictions on travel from the Western occupied zones to Berlin. Finally, on June 24, 1948, the Soviets imposed a complete ban on travel from the Western zones to Berlin, a move which led to the allied airlift of supplies into Berlin for a period of eleven months.

In addition to the Berlin Blockade, the U.S. had to contemplate the complete communist takeover in Hungary, from the previously communist-dominated coalition government and the creation of an independent East Berlin municipal government. All of these events tended to reenforce the conclusions reached by 1947 that the U.S.S.R. was the primary threat to the U.S., and that, in fact, this threat was increasing. Perhaps the best indication of the increased Soviet threat was the statement by President Truman that, during the course of the Berlin Crisis, he feared a war with the Soviets was imminent.22

This heightened sense of the Soviet threat was enhanced by the assessments of the trends in the Soviet military threat. In 1947, the State Department estimated Soviet military expenditures at a level of 67.1 billion rubles.23 By 1948, the CIA estimated that Soviet defense expenditures for 1948 would exceed 134 billion rubles.24 By 1949, CIA estimates of Soviet defense expenditures had risen again to 165 billion rubles for 1949.25

Estimates of Soviet military strength downgraded the size of the Soviet military in 1948 from the previously
predicted 4.5 million troops to 4 million troops.\textsuperscript{26} However, JCS estimates reflect a revision in U.S. attitudes towards how the Soviets might use their forces in Europe. Prior to 1948, Soviet forces in Eastern Europe were seen as occupation forces only. By 1948, they were viewed as offensive forces. As the JCS noted, "They are so disposed as to provide a highly mobile and armored spearhead for an offensive in Western Europe in the event of war."\textsuperscript{27}

Other Security Threats

In the years 1947 to 1949 no new security threats were posed to the U.S. The only other potential security threat was that of the eventual Chinese Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. As mentioned in Chapter Three, a significant caveat to considering the Chinese Communists an additional security threat is the fact that many view the CCP as merely an extension of the Soviet Union, and thus, not a distinct threat to U.S. security. In the event, by October 1949, the CCP had defeated the Nationalists in the civil war and had set up the new government of the People's Republic of China.

U.S. attitudes towards the Chinese as a threat to security were mixed. Senators such as Arthur Vandenberg felt that it was intolerable to allow the Communists to seize China, given the history of Communist expansionism in Europe and the likelihood of a similar pattern in Asia.\textsuperscript{28}
In December 1948, Life magazine headlined, "MACARTHUR SAYS FALL OF CHINA IMPERILS U.S." However, Truman administration officials, such as Acheson and Kennan, were not nearly as concerned - noting that the Communist victory in the civil war was nearly inevitable. Truman was relatively sanguine on the entire affair, noting only that the U.S. had "picked a bad horse" in the civil war.

Operational Activity

There was little in the way of significant U.S. operational activity form 1947 to 1949. The only significant U.S. operational activity undertaken in the period was that associated with the Berlin Airlift. In the Berlin Airlift approximately 395 U.S. aircraft, including C-54 transport planes, B-29 bombers, and F-80 fighters were involved. Starting at a level of 2500 tons of cargo a day, by February 1949, the airlift provided between 7000 and 8000 tons of cargo a day. The success of the airlift was said to be largely responsible for the lifting of the blockade in May 1949.

THE DEBATES DURING THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The Debates and the External Threat

Discussion of the external threat during the course of the debates surrounding the 1949 Amendments was practically
nonexistent. No claim was made that the changes would enable the U.S. military to better deal with any challenges posed by the Soviet threat or any other external threat. At best, the changing nature of the threat motivated the 1949 Amendments in only the most remote and vague ways. For example, in justifying the need for changes in the 1947 Act, the Eberstadt Task Force broadly commented that, "in terms of maintaining peace or winning a future war, ... the present product of the system can be substantially improved."\textsuperscript{33}

The Debates and Operational Lessons

Just as was the case with respect to the nature of the external threat, operational lessons were not discussed in the debates leading up to the 1949 Amendments to the 1947 Act. The only significant operational activity to occur since the passage of the 1947 Act - the Berlin Airlift - never came up during the debates on this reorganization. In addition, no recurrent references were made to lessons uncovered from the World War II experience.\textsuperscript{34} The only passing reference to operational issues during the entire process was found in the Eberstadt Task Force Report, which assured its readers that the changes suggested would not undermine future operational performance.\textsuperscript{35}
THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

There is nothing within the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 which concerned the changing external threat or the operational lessons learned over the years. Because there were no references to the external threat in the debates on reorganization in 1949 it should not be surprising that nothing in the legislation can be directly linked with external threats posed to U.S. security. The 1949 Amendments could be viewed as addressing the nature of the external threat but only insofar as all defense reorganizations are indirectly intended to enhance the ability of the military to protect U.S. security against external threats. Such an indirect affect is a far cry from the direct linkage postulated by the external explanation.

Similarly, there is little in the 1949 Amendments which seem, directly or indirectly, to deal with operational conduct. While it can be argued that the consolidation of the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the creation of a Chairman of the JCS have some operational implications, it is not clear that these aspects of the Amendments were at all inspired by previous U.S. operational activity or the lessons learned from such activity. Due to the lack of reference to such a linkage in the debates, it is fair to conclude that such a linkage between motivations and legislation did not exist.
THE DOMESTIC EXPLANATION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

The Domestic Economy

The domestic economy in the years 1947-1949 was in a decline once again, after a short respite in 1947. U.S. GNP rose from $231.3 billion in 1947 to $257.6 billion in 1948, only to decline once again in 1949 to $256.5 billion.36 Unemployment as a percentage of the civilian labor force declined from 3.9% in 1947 to 3.8% in 1948, only to rise in 1949 to 5.9%.37 The consumer price index rose from 66.9 in 1947 to 72.1 in 1948, only to decline in 1949 to 71.4.38 Such a decline would be indicative of a recession in the economy. The Federal Reserve Board’s Index of Manufacturing Production rose from 39 in 1947 to 41 in 1948, only to decline in 1949 to 39 once again.39 Finally, the business failure rate rose consistently from 14 in 1947 to 20 in 1948 to 34 in 1949.

The Perceived Trend in the Domestic Economy

The perceived trend in the domestic economy cannot be clearly established. Though the economy faced a recession in the early part of 1949, significant sectors of the economy still remained strong. Basic construction, the automobile industry, and the steel industry maintained
growth and prosperity despite the overall downswing. By the beginning of 1950 the economy resumed its post-war growth.

President Truman was cognizant of the recession, but expressed optimism that it could be easily overcome. In his State of the Union address in January 1949 he noted that the progress in the U.S. economy since the end of the war "has confounded the gloomy profits - at home and abroad - who predicted the downfall of American capitalism. The people of the United States, going their own way, confident in their own powers, have achieved the greatest prosperity the world had ever seen." Truman acknowledged that the economy was in decline, and warned that "We cannot afford to float along ceaselessly on a postwar boom until it collapses. It is not enough merely to prepare to weather recession if it comes. Instead, government and business must work together constantly to achieve more and more jobs and more and more production..." Truman went on to express his greatest optimism by arguing that, "The business cycle is man-made; and men of good will, working together, can smooth it out."

However, one possible indication of concern with the economy can be found in the cost cutting efforts of the Truman administration in the area of defense. Secretary Forrestal's replacement, Louis Johnson, was given the job of drastically cutting spending within the military
establishment. Johnson’s zeal with respect to the job of cutting was almost notorious, with some noting that he “was making two enemies for every dollar he saved.” It seems reasonable to assume that, if Truman wasn’t concerned with the economic trends, he would not have sanctioned the drastic forms of military cuts which Johnson pursued. Thus, one may concluded that the administration perceived the economy to still be unsound enough to demand significant savings within the existing budgets.

Such actions would be consistent with an awareness of the existing economic difficulties and an expressed willingness to tackle the problems - coupled with an optimism that with concerted effort the problems could be overcome.

Reports on Administrative Performance

Reported instances of poor administrative performance increased slightly in the period 1947 to 1949. Specifically (as reported in the NYT) the number of reports of poor administrative performance in the defense establishment declined from 128 in 1947 to only 24 in 1948, only to rise to 49 in 1949. Many of the reports in 1949 dealt with the influence peddling scandal known as the "five-percenters" scandal for the five percent commission some individuals received for using their influence to secure contracts for clients. In particular, the scandal pointed to improper
influence peddling in association with contracts with the Army Chemical Corps and the Quartermaster General. Thus, while in comparison to the huge numbers reported in 1946 and 1947, the numbers for 1949 were small, they still showed an increase and may have been perceived as indicative of a trend.

THE DEBATES DURING THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The Debates and the Economy

Concern with the economy was a prevalent area of discussion in the debates surrounding the 1949 reorganization. The original mandate for the 1947 Act called for substantial savings within the U.S. military establishment as a means of balancing overall resource allocations. Many of the features of the Act were designed to eliminate costly military practices and thereby cut the level of resources necessary for the military. By 1949, some advocates of the amendments were arguing that changes in the 1947 Act were necessary simply to bring about the savings originally promised. These critics asserted that the original intentions of the 1947 Act were being undermined by the ability of the services to exploit its vagueness to their advantage and to the disadvantage of the economy. The Eberstadt Task Force noted that they had, "failed to find in the military establishment a sense of
cost consciousness or a general realization of the vital importance to our national security of utmost conservation of our resources."\(^46\)

This sense of unfulfilled promises is illustrated by the exchange between Secretary of Defense Forrestal and Senator Byrd in the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings on the amendments in 1949. Senator Byrd pressed Forrestal for an accounting of the savings brought about by the 1947 Act. When told of the closing of duplicate bases and facilities, Byrd responded that they would likely have been closed after the war anyway. Eventually, Forrestal had to concede that the new amendments would bring about the savings promised in 1947. As he stated, "I think that the procedures that we can set up, that will be provided for in this measure, will greatly accelerate the methods and possibilities of getting economies."\(^47\)

Perhaps the best illustration of the unfulfilled expectations of the 1947 Act and the frustrations associated with it is that of the budgetary process. The 1947 Act was intended to streamline the budgetary process with the Secretary of Defense to coordinate the budgets submitted by the services in order get a handle on the level of defense expenditures requested by the services. The reality of the budgetary process was far different. The Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, was incapable of reconciling the diverse attitudes towards not only the composition of a
given budget, but also the budgetary formation process in general. Forrestal’s budgetary authority was immediately restricted by President Truman’s imposition of somewhat arbitrary budgetary ceilings. This problem was compounded by the JCS’s attempts to keep Forrestal out of the entire budgetary process. As noted by Hammond, "Although he [Forrestal] played a prominent role in the fiscal 1949 budget supplement and the fiscal 1950 budget, the significance of what he did for the establishment or review of military programs was minimal because in the development of both budgets, the Joint Chiefs held him at arm’s length." 48

Eventually, Forrestal attempted to force the JCS to work with him in cutting their huge budgetary requests so as to fit within the ceilings imposed by the President. Forrestal argued that the budgetary process must include the JCS and that the JCS must share responsibility for the budgets ultimately recommended. 49 Unfortunately, the JCS refused to cooperate. As noted by Millis, "On October 7 [1948] they replied through Fleet Admiral Leahy that they could agree on no program within the $14.4 billion limit; they simply transmitted the separate and non-correlated budget requests of the three services – totally, of course, very much large sums – thus dumping the whole problem on Forrestal’s desk." 50 James Webb, Director of the Bureau of
the Budget, elaborated on the problem, noting on May 25, 1948:

Forrestal has lost control completely. The President gave directions to the services, but it turns out that Forrestal is so bulldozed that he wouldn't even distribute the President's directions to the services. Instead of Forrestal calling the Chiefs in and demanding that they indoctrinate the lower echelons, the President today had to deal directly with them, and gave them letters which contain the severest reprimand I have ever seen delivered, and in writing. It is a sad situation, and very disturbing... The idea of turning over custody of atomic bombs to these competing, jealous, insubordinate services, fighting for position with each other, is a terrible prospect. 51

Beyond unmet expectations, concerns over resource allocation became a significant motivation for the 1949 amendments insofar as observers and insiders noted the economic pinch which the nation was facing. Time and again, in all of the reports, statements, and testimony, one finds observers noting that the military was spending too much in light of the existing economic situation. The Eberstadt Task Force pointed to the enormous cost of military hardware to make the point that economy must be a consideration for all. 52 As the Task Force stated, "The costs of the military establishment...appear to be unduly high, in terms both of the ability of the economy to sustain them and of the actual return in military strength and effective national security." 53 Secretary Forrestal noted that constraining resource allocations for the military was part and parcel of an overall strategy:
At the present time we are keeping our military expenditures below the levels which our military leaders must in good conscience estimate as the minimum which would in themselves ensure national security. By so doing we are able to increase our expenditures to assist European recovery. In other words we are taking a calculated risk....

The Hoover Task force argued that the existing organizational structure did not encourage the levels of economy required for such a strategy. It noted that, "Presently, national policy is not emanating, clearly and firmly, from above and descending effectively through the chain of agencies for translation into an efficient and economical military establishment measured against our national needs." Even President Truman echoed the calls for increased economy, noting that the 1947 Act failed to "provide the basis for an organization and a staff adequate to achieve the most efficient and economical defense program."  

Finally, there were some who argued that failure to pass the amendments would not only fail to save money, but would actually cost money. Secretary of Defense Johnson, in a debate with Senator Vinson during the Senate hearings on the Amendments in 1949, argued that "huge" costs would occur without passage of the Amendments.

The Debates and Administrative Performance

Administrative performance featured prominently in the 1949 reorganization debates. By 1949, few were satisfied
with the administrative performance of the National Military Establishment. Yet, acknowledging instances of poor administrative performance created problems for the supporters of the 1947 Act. To claim poor administrative performance, one had to point to their source, and no one wanted to blame the 1947 Act, which was created to eliminate the problem of poor administrative performance. The result was that the sources of the poor administrative performance were viewed as ones of omission (failing to include necessary language) and spirit (failing to act in support of teamwork) rather than of commission. Individuals were not blamed, but services were. It was a very touchy process, but soon, standard sources of poor administrative performance were found.

The sources of poor administrative performance broke down into two main areas; (1) inadequate language defining civilian authority, and (2) failure of all within the military establishment to operate within the spirit of the 1947 Act. With respect to the authority of civilians, President Truman pointed out the difficulty in his letter to Congress. "The duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as now set forth in the act are of too limited a character, and are restricted to specified items."

According to former Secretary of War Patterson, the problem was that the authority granted to the Secretary of Defense was deficient in terms of accepted organizational theory.
As he noted, "The principles of sound organization in any executive agency of the government are simple. One of the basic principles is comprehensive control by the man at the head of the agency."59

Many of the critics contended that the existing structures within the National Military Establishment were contrary to sound organizational principles (which, in many cases were established within a business context). The promise of more "business like operations" convinced many within Congress to support the 1949 amendments.60 As promised by Budget Director Pace, "The purpose of this suggested revision is to permit an operation in the Armed Services that will be both simpler for all concerned and will provide a basis for better administration in the organization."61 Thus, the 1949 amendments were to correct the organizational mistakes that were not foreseen in the original 1947 Act.

The second line of thought contended that the administrative performance problem was more likely the result of a failure to abide by the spirit of the law than a failure of the law itself. Advocates of this reasoning felt that the 1947 Act would be adequate if all involved were to act in accordance with the spirit of the law. The Eberstadt Task Force report supported this contention when it stated that, "Present deficiencies...are not primarily due to organizational defects in the structure itself; they are due to the failure of the several parts of the structure, as
yet, to operate entirely in the manner that was intended. The Eberstadt Task Force report went on to assert that this failure to "operate entirely in the manner that was intended" was essentially a failure of the services to utilize teamwork. In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Eberstadt reenforced his position by doubting the ability of structural reform to correct all of the problems. He noted that, "organization, in and of itself, however perfectly conceived, will not automatically assure either efficiency or economy."

THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

Several aspects of the 1949 Amendments can be linked to a concerns for economy and improved administrative performance. Perhaps most interestingly, the 1949 Amendments removed the specific aspects of the 1947 Act which called for the Secretary of Defense to take steps to eliminate duplication in the military establishment and substituted a more general grant of authority to the Secretary. Now, the Secretary would have the "direction, authority, and control over the [newly created] Department of Defense." The 1949 Amendments also required the Secretary of Defense to submit semiannual reports containing "itemized statements showing the savings of public funds..."
Perhaps most importantly, in terms of economy, was the creation of Title IV to the National Security Act. This section of the 1949 Amendments was entitled "Promotion of Economy and Efficiency Through Establishment of Uniform Budgetary and Fiscal Procedures and Organizations." Specifically, this title created the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, Comptrollers for each of the service departments, the performance budget within the Department of Defense, and a variety of other accounting and auditing procedures - all intended to enhance the economy of the Department of Defense.

In terms of administrative performance, many of the aspects of Title IV also had implications for administrative procedures, particularly in that they required a stricter control on finance and the administration of money. In addition, the 1949 Amendments required the Secretary of Defense to report semiannually on the elimination of duplication within the defense establishment. The Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board were placed under the control of the Secretary of Defense, which would presumably encourage administrative efficiency. Finally, the three service departments were placed under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, once again with the potential result being tighter administrative procedures.
THE CIVILIAN/EXECUTIVE CONSOLIDATION EXPLANATION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

Civilian Executive Tenure

In the years prior to the 1949 reorganization some civilian executives within the administration could be considered new. At the time of the enactment of the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, President Truman had been President for four years, and had been recently elected in 1948 to his first full term as President. At the time of the commencement of the debates on the 1949 Amendments, in the fall of 1948, Truman had been President for over three years.

The Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, had been Secretary only since the creation of the position on September 17, 1947. Thus, he had been Secretary only a little over one year before the movement for reorganization began, and left the job of Secretary of Defense in March 1949, a few days before President Truman formally proposed changes to the 1947 Act, and five months before the signing into law of these amendments.

Louis Johnson became Secretary of Defense on March 28, 1949, five months after the move for reorganization began, nearly one month after Truman proposed the specifics of the
Amendments to Congress, and a little over four months before these proposals became law.

Origins of the Move to Reorganize

The process of reorganization which culminated in the 1949 Amendments to the 1947 National Security Act did not originate with civilian executives. The move towards reorganization in 1949 had its roots in the congressionally established Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government (also known as the Hoover Commission) and its subcommittee, the Committee on the National Security Organization (also known as the Eberstadt Task Force). The Eberstadt Task Force commenced its investigations on May 21, 1948 and submitted its recommendations to the Hoover Commission on November 15, 1948. Soon thereafter, in December 1948, Secretary Forrestal distributed his First Report of the Secretary of Defense which echoed many of the criticisms of the Eberstadt Task Force.

On February 15, 1949, the Hoover Commission accepted the major proposals of the Eberstadt Task Force and made these recommendations formally to Congress. Finally, on March 5, 1949, President Truman became involved in the process by suggesting changes to the 1947 Act in a message to Congress.
Civilian Executive Perceptions of Civilian Control

There was, after the brief experience of the 1947 Act, an almost uniform perception by civilian executives that civilian control within the National Military Establishment was not adequate. This inadequacy was clearly exposed in the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS in the budget procedures undertaken from 1947-1949. Forrestal never seemed to have the clout to force the services to submit budgets which complied with President Truman's restrictions on allocations. President Truman complained that Forrestal wouldn't take hold of the authority granted him. When Forrestal asked for Presidential assistance in forcing the services to comply, Truman responded, "The proper thing for you to do is to get the Army, Navy, and Air people together, and establish a program within the budget limits which have been allowed. It seems to me that is your responsibility."^67^  

In can be argued that this concern over civilian control of the services was more a concern with an individual than with the institutional authority granted the Secretary of Defense. As noted earlier, Budget Director Webb argued that Forrestal had lost control of the situation and couldn't face down the services as necessary. Forrestal, however, asserted that the problem really was one of authority. In his First Report of the Secretary of Defense, Forrestal called for a strengthening of the
authority of the Secretary of Defense away from the "general" authority granted to him in the 1947 Act.™ As the editor of Forrestal’s diaries, Walter Millis, noted, "fairly bitter experience" had convinced Forrestal that the Secretary of Defense needed greater power to control the disparate elements in his charge.™

Civilian Executive Perceptions of Centralization

Civilian executive attitudes about the need for further centralization were ambiguous during this period. Secretary Forrestal consistently opposed further centralization of the military establishment, while calling for some additional powers to vest in the office he held. Forrestal’s opposition to centralization is illustrated early on in a September 2, 1947 letter in which he stated, "My chief misgivings about unification derived from my fear that there would be a tendency towards over-centralization and reliance on one man or one group direction. In other words, too much central control - which, I know you will agree, is one of the troubles with the world today."™ Later, on November 12, 1947 he noted that, "My own personal desire is to keep it [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] as small as possible, not only for reasons of economy, but because my own concept of this office is that it will be a coordinating, a planning, and an integrating rather than an operating office."™
Later, in testifying before the Eberstadt Task Force on July 22, 1948, Forrestal once again opposed the idea of increased centralization, noting "the Departments should retain autonomy, and with that, prestige, not merely in order to increase the position and prestige of individual secretaries, but ... to spread the burden of work which would fall upon this office."^74

President Truman's attitude seemed to be distinctly different. In his message to Congress on March 5, 1949 he went to great pains to point out the need for centralization in command, supply, training, and doctrine - all goals which were ostensibly achieved by the 1947 Act. He went on to point out the need for a number of other changes, all of which were directed to enhancing centralization. Some have argued that Truman's attitude was clearly to increase centralization of authority.75 It has been argued, however, that Truman's attitude towards centralization was not that of looking for more centralization, but rather of looking to firm up the levels of centralization which were assumed in the 1947 Act.76

THE DEBATES DURING THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The Debates and Civilian Control

Civilian control was an issue discussed in the reorganization debates of 1949. In each of the public
documents associated with the 1949 Amendments, reference was made to increasing civilian control, but civilian control in the person of the Secretary of Defense. Secretary Forrestal called for such increased authority in his First Report of the Secretary of State. The Eberstadt Task Force specifically called for a number of measures designed to increase civilian control via increasing the authority of the Secretary. The Task Force called for a clarification and strengthening of the authority of the Secretary of Defense, the "freeing" of the Secretary from routine tasks via the creation of civilian Under Secretaries of Defense, and the creation of other "organizational mechanisms" to assist the Secretary in implementing his authority, such as the creation of the Comptroller.77

The Hoover Commission as a whole reenforced the judgements of the Eberstadt Task Force, calling for an enhancement of the authority of the Secretary of Defense. One of the specific Hoover Commission recommendations was, "That the principle of unified civilian control and accountability be the guiding rule for all legislation concerned with the National Military Establishment and that full authority and accountability be centered in the Secretary of Defense, subject only to the President and the Congress."78

President Truman, acknowledging the concerns of the then Secretary of Defense and of the Eberstadt and Hoover
Commission Reports, called for steps to enhance the authority of the Secretary of Defense, cut back on the authority of the service secretaries, and to consolidate the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board under the control of the Secretary of Defense.

It is interesting to note that the actions called for as a means of strengthening civilian control, did so with respect to the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the service secretaries. Thus, civilian control seemed to have been a zero sum game in the debates surrounding the 1949 Amendments.

The Debates and Centralization

Concern with centralization was also a topic of discussion during the 1949 reorganization process. Because much of the appeal of the proposals for increased authority for the Secretary of Defense was due to its centralizing tendencies, many of the remarks noted above apply equally to the topic of centralization. Those advocating an enhanced role for the Secretary of Defense did so, not just because they felt that civilian control over the military was eroding, but also because they felt that centralized control over the military was suffering under the existing practices. A strong Secretary of Defense, it was felt, would effectively combat decentralization within the military establishment.
Even strong opponents of centralization, such as then Secretary of Defense Forrestal, eventually supported the notion of increased centralization. Forrestal contended that the 1949 Amendments would strengthen central authority without doing violence to the federal principle applying to the services.\textsuperscript{79} Forrestal contended that his previous concern about a too powerful Secretary of Defense had been allayed by the overwhelming need for more authority coupled with a newfound belief that the existing system of checks and balances would adequately prevent a too powerful Secretary.\textsuperscript{80}

Others argued that the issue of centralization was being inadequately addressed by the 1949 Amendments, and that even greater centralization was necessary. Former Secretary of War Patterson rejected the Eberstadt Task Force's recommendations and argued that an entirely new law, drafted along the lines of the pre-1947 Collins Plan, was necessary. As will be recalled, it was the War Department which actively advocated a much greater centralization of authority, at both the civilian and military level, within the defense establishment. Secretary of the Air Force Symington argued that it was common knowledge that the problem with the existing laws was too little centralization, not too much.\textsuperscript{81}
The linkage between the issues of civilian control and centralization and the legislation of the 1949 reorganization is not clear. In terms of civilian control, the 1949 Amendments had both positive and negative implications. Clearly, those aspects of the legislation which strengthened and clarified the authority of the Secretary of Defense had the effect of strengthening civilian control through that office. Additionally, the creation of Under Secretaries of Defense not only enhanced the authority of the Secretary, but also, due to sheer numbers, increased civilian control of the defense establishment. Finally, creation of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense and the separate comptrollers for each of the services enhanced civilian control over budgetary issues.

On the other hand, much of the authority granted the Secretary of Defense was at the expense of other civilians within the National Military Establishment. Each of the civilian service secretaries had their authority diminished as a result of the efforts to strengthen the Secretary, as did the civilian heads of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board. What this indicates is that the legislative concern with respect to civilian authority was really vested in concern about a weak Secretary of
Defense as opposed to a uniform concern with civilian control over the military.

This being said, the concern over civilian authority at the level of Secretary of Defense could very well be seen as merely an issue of centralization. The legislation of the 1949 Amendments evidences a clear attempt to localize authority in the hands of the Secretary. The Department of Defense was created and each of the individual services fell under the control of the DoD. No longer were the services separate executive departments, even though they were still separately administered. Similarly, the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board were placed under the authority of the Department of Defense and the Secretary. Finally, much of Title IV, dealing with budgetary procedures, was a centralizing move to consolidate the authority for formulating the budget under the control of the Secretary of Defense.

CONCLUSIONS

I will once again assess each of these proposed explanations in isolation, and then evaluate them in a comparative manner.

The External Explanation

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the external explanation was
answered. A + indicates an answer supporting the external explanation. A - indicates an answer which does not support the external explanation. A * indicates an ambiguous answer which in and of itself does not support or undermine the external explanation.

1. The change in the Soviet threat. +
2. The existence of potential new threats. -
3. The level of operational activity. -
4. References to operational lessons. -
5. References to the external threat. -
6. Links between legislation and the issues. -

Given the almost uniformly negative responses to the questions posed, the external explanation cannot be considered relevant in explaining the 1949 defense reorganization.

The Domestic Explanation

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the domestic explanation was answered.

1. The current state of the economy. +
2. The perceived trend in the economy. *
4. References to economy and administrative performance. +
5. Links between legislation and the issues. +

Due to the overwhelmingly positive responses to the questions posed, the domestic explanation seems clearly relevant in explaining the 1949 defense reorganization process.

The Civilian/Executive Consolidation Explanation

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the civilian/executive consolidation explanation was answered.

1. Tenure in office. +
2. Origins of the reorganization movement. -
3. Perceptions of civilian control. +
4. Perceptions of centralization. *
5. References to civilian control and centralization. +
6. Links between legislation and the issues. *

The civilian/executive consolidation explanation is suspect for several reasons. First, the linkage between concern with civilian control and centralization and the actual legislation is not clear. Second, one of the objective conditions of the explanation - a reorganization process inspired by civilian executives - is not present.
Finally, it is not clear that civilian executives perceived the existing levels of centralization as inadequate. All in all, one must question the relevance of this explanation.

Conclusions

It is tempting to dismiss the external explanation for the 1949 Amendments; clearly, the evidence fails to meet the standards of the explanation. It is more difficult to choose between the domestic and the civilian/executive explanations however. The evidence seems to support both explanations. While the debates tend to support the civilian/executive explanation better than the domestic explanation, the legislation seems to more clearly support the domestic explanation. It is significant that a large part of the legislation (Title IV) is clearly designed to enhance administrative procedures with respect to the budget and saving money.

One consideration should be the extent to which concerns with inadequate civilian control and centralization in the person of the Secretary of Defense were really disguised economic concerns rather than concerns with the inability of the Secretary to take control of the National Military Establishment. In nearly every instance in which the inadequate authority of the Secretary is discussed a reference is made to the budget process and the inability of the Secretary to compel the JCS to submit budgets within the
Presidential spending caps. This failure of the Secretary has the effect of negating the promised economies of the 1947 Act. Rarely do you find comment to the effect that the impaired authority of the Secretary led to a diminution of civilian control over strategic planning and the formation of national strategy, or that lack of centralization led to fragmented strategic planning or failed service cooperation. One could argue that every time concern was expressed over the lack of centralized civilian authority vested in the Secretary of Defense, the real underlying concern was with the failure to achieve economies and improved administrative performance.

This argument is significant when considering the very nature of the civilian/executive consolidation explanation. As argued in Chapter One, the explanation contends that neither external nor domestic factors influenced the decisions to reorganize, but rather that the desire for enhanced civilian control and centralization in their own right drove the reorganization process. Clearly, if the calls for centralization and enhanced civilian control in the 1949 reorganization debates were actually disguised calls for improving economy and administrative performance, then the civilian/executive consolidation explanation cannot hold up. If there were no other support for the domestic explanation than the claims that enhancing civilian control and centralization would likely result in economy and
improved administrative performance, then the domestic explanation would have to fail. This is not the case here, however. Substantial support already exists for the domestic explanation. This being the case, one must conclude that the references to civilian control and centralization in the 1949 reorganization debates were in fact veiled references to the means necessary to achieve the ends of the domestic explanation, rather than references to the ends desired by the civilian/executive consolidation explanation.
Notes


4. Ibid., 2.

5. Ibid., 51.

6. Ibid., 55.


8. Ibid., 16.


11. Ibid., 13.


13. Ibid., 87.

15. Ibid., 53.


17. The similarities between the First Report of the Secretary of Defense and the Eberstadt Task Force report were highlighted by Victor Krulak, who noted that "The tenor of his [Forrestal's] report suggests that Mr. Forrestal had been in close communication with Mr. Eberstadt. Victor Krulak, Organization for National Security, p. 55. This comment conforms to Krulak's overall judgement that the amendments to the 1947 Act were orchestrated from the start.


19. Ibid., 79.

20. Perhaps the most tragic aspect of the period of 1947-1949 was the impact the unification process had on one man; James Forrestal. The burdens of the vague office of Secretary of Defense were apparently too much for Forrestal. Never a political man, he was nudged out of public office following the 1948 election, to a large extent as part of a deal to reward one of Truman's political allies. Forrestal's mental health rapidly deteriorated and on May 22, 1949, he committed suicide. One cannot help but wonder if the reforms contained in the amendments of 1949 would have spared Forrestal the anguishs of office which may well have led to his death.


24. "R.H. Hillenkoetter to Executive Secretary of NSC," CIA Memo, March 15, 1948, enclosure II.
25. Military Budgets of Selected Countries, CIA, ORE-59-49, May 2, 1949; it should be noted that this CIA estimate revised downward the estimates of 1948 Soviet defense spending from 134.950 billion rubles to 125.3 billion rubles.


27. Ibid., 115.


30. McCullough, Truman, 744.

31. Feis, From Trust to Terror, 345, 356.

32. Ibid., 356.


34. It is interesting to note that there is an extensive reference to the lessons of World War II contained in President Truman's message to Congress of March 5, 1949. However, these references were used to justify the need for the 1947 Act and were not tied in to any of the changes which Truman proposed in 1949. See Cole, et al., Department of Defense, 78.

35. Specifically, the Task Force noted that "substantial savings, without diminution of the services' combat efficiency, are possible." Task Force Report, 6.


38. Ibid., 210.


42. Ibid., 155.

43. Ibid.

44. McCullough, *Truman*, 741.


47. *Armed Services Hearings, 1949*, 12.


50. Ibid., 501.


52. "The awful cost of reasonable safety - $1,000,000-$4,000,000 for a modern bomber, over $250,000 for a tank, $10,000,000 to $150,000,000 for a ship - has put a high premium upon military economy." *Task Force Report*, 5.

53. Ibid., 3.


57. Reardon, *The Formative Years*, 52.


60. Reardon, *The Formative Years*, 52.


63. Ibid., 42.

64. *Armed Services Hearings, 1949*, 49.


66. Ibid., 89.


69. See above.


72. Forrestal and Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, 300-301.

73. Reardon, *The Formative Years*, 32.

74. Ibid., 465.


78. Ibid., 75.


80. Ibid., 8, 9.

81. Ibid., 132.

82. The exceptions to this are the concerns expressed by Budget director Webb, previously discussed, which centered on inter-service rivalry and the possession of nuclear weapons and the comments of Senator Hart during the hearings on the 1949 Amendments when he noted, "I should like to say that certainly we should like to see economies effected, but I think everybody was considerably more interested in effective defense and in the establishment of more striking power than we were primarily in the savings." *Armed Services Hearings, 1949*, 23.
CHAPTER V
REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 6

Since 'unification' is necessarily evolutionary, improvements should be made as experience is gained. Neither the framers of the National Security Act nor any of the Secretaries of Defense can see very far into the future, and while much has been accomplished, much remains to be done in order to provide a more efficient and economical form of national security."

Robert Lovett

BACKGROUND OF THE LEGISLATION

The debates on organization in the early 1950s have a variety of origins. The earliest criticisms of the existing Defense Department organizational structure came from a number of individuals with first hand knowledge of the operations of the Department. Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley, and scientist and governmental advisor Dr. Vannevar Bush all pointed to serious deficiencies within the existing structure and suggested ways to remedy these deficiencies.

On February 11, 1953, the new Eisenhower administration appointed a Committee on Department of Defense Organization, thereafter known as the Rockefeller Committee after its chairman Nelson A. Rockefeller. The Committee set out to investigate the criticisms contained in the writings of
Bush, Bradley and Lovett as well as criticisms from other quarters. On April 11, 1953, the Committee submitted its findings in the form of a letter to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson.

The Rockefeller Committee saw three areas in which organizational change was necessary. The first related to the existing lines of authority within the Department of Defense. The Committee noted that there was a dispute within the Department over the authority of the Secretary. The service secretaries clung to the belief that they retained a large measure of autonomy from the Secretary based on the clause in the 1947 Act which stated that the services would be "separately administrated."

Secondly, the Committee focused on the performance of the JCS. The Committee strongly highlighted the planning functions to be performed by the JCS. The Committee felt that the JCS was not adequately fulfilling its planning function, in part due to its assuming some command responsibilities which detracted from planning. A third area of concern for the Rockefeller Committee was the efficiency with which the Defense Department was performing its assigned duties. In particular, the Committee felt that a number of statutory agencies within the Department were inefficient and duplicative and should therefore be eliminated, with their duties consolidated into the other areas.
On April 30, 1953, after examining the Rockefeller Committee report, President Eisenhower sent a letter to Congress advocating reorganization within the Department of Defense (known as Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953). In addition, the Eisenhower letter stated that several administrative changes were to be undertaken so as to, in tandem with the legislation, achieve the desired ends. Two highly significant changes were achieved administratively. First, the letter and the legal opinion appended to the Rockefeller Committee Report finally resolved the dispute between the Secretary of Defense and the service secretaries. The opinion, supported by Eisenhower, concluded that 'separate administration' did not mean administration outside of the scope of the Secretary of Defence’s control. Secondly, Eisenhower informed the Congress that he had instructed the Secretary of Defense to amend the Key West agreement, which pertained to service roles and missions, so as to remove the remaining elements of operational authority from the JCS. No longer would any JCS member act as an executive agent for a unified command. This command component would, however, still vest in the military (in a designated military department).

The reorganization plan submitted by Eisenhower to Congress substantially conformed to the recommendations contained in his letter of April 30. Section one transferred the functions of the Munitions Board, Research
and Development Board, Defense Supply Management Agency, and Director of Installations to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It also transferred the functions of the JCS with respect to management of the Joint Staff and the Director of the Joint Staff to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and also gave the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs approval authority over the selection of the Director of the Joint Staff and the other members of the Joint Staff.

Section two formally abolished the boards and agencies which had their functions consolidated into the Office of the Secretary of Defense in section one. Section three authorized the Secretary to appoint six additional Assistant Secretaries of Defense who would perform functions designated by the Secretary. Section four authorized the President to appoint a general counsel for the Defense Department to act as chief legal officer. Section five authorized the Secretary of Defense to delegate some of his functions to other officers, agencies or employees of the Defense Department. Finally, section six authorized the Secretary to transfer, within the Department, records, property, and personnel affected by the reorganization.²

Reorganization Plan No. 6 had a relatively uneventful trip through the legislative branch. Four days of hearings were held on the plan in the House Governmental Operations Committee and was favorably reported out of the committee.
with the exception of those aspects of the plan which granted the Chairman of the JCS the power over selection and management of the Joint Staff. When the House Rules Committee failed to pass a rule allowing consideration of the modified Governmental Operations Committee bill, the Governmental Operations Committee subsequently rejected the reorganization plan in toto. The entire House then voted on this rejection and defeated it by a considerable margin. When neither the House nor the Senate took unfavorable action on the plan within 60 days, it passed into law and became effective on June 30, 1953.¹

THE EXTERNAL EXPLANATION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

The Soviet Threat

The U.S. received ambiguous signals as to the trend in the Soviet threat from 1949-1953. The Soviets continued to consolidate their power in Eastern Europe, with massive purges of the Communist party in Romania and Albania, and the assertion of control by Stalinist party leaders. In October 1949, the German Democratic Republic came into existence, thus completing the division of Germany into two separate sovereign states. U.S. concerns over the Soviet threat were also heightened by Soviet involvement in the
Korean War, in which the Soviet Union provided active assistance and support to the North Koreans and to China.

Soviet foreign policy actions from 1949 to 1953 were not the only source of U.S. concern over the trend in the Soviet threat. In October 1949, the U.S. confirmed that the Soviets had detonated an atomic device, thus eliminating the U.S. nuclear monopoly. Balancing off this evidence were CIA estimates of Soviet defense expenditures which indicated a decline in Soviet spending from 33 billion to 30 billion rubles (1970 rubles) from 1952 to 1953.

The manner in which the U.S. interpreted this evidence, however, indicates a clear perception of an increased Soviet threat. The Truman administration produced the now famous NSC-68 in which the State Department Policy Planning Staff concluded that because of the "probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying struggle requires us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting abatement of the crisis unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system." The assessment of Soviet strength in comparison to U.S. strength was indeed grim: "any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled." Based on these assessments, the Truman administration concluded that the year of maximum
danger would be 1954, and that the Soviets could be expected to risk a surprise nuclear attack in 1954, secure in the knowledge that -absent U.S. steps to prevent it - they could devastate the United States.®

In 1953, the new Eisenhower Administration agreed that the Soviets posed the primary threat to the U.S. and also agreed that the Soviets were bent on world domination. However, it failed to view the situation with the same sense of urgency as had the Truman administration. This point is borne out by the Eisenhower Administration’s rejection of NCS-68’s argument that 1954 was the year of maximum danger for U.S. security interests. Eisenhower refused to attempt to estimate when war would take place, but rather contended that the Soviet threat was of indefinite duration and would need to be addressed as such.7 Such an attitude would not be possible if one accepted the dire assessments of NSC-68 with respect to the intentions of the Soviet military. Thus, the Eisenhower administration saw a perpetual Soviet threat, not one that was growing towards maximum strength in any given year. In addition, a JCS paper formally presented in December 1953, argued that there was no significant increase in the existing level of international tension and that there was no significant changes in the ratio of Soviet to American power.8
Other Security Threats

A significant new security threat during this period was that posed by the Korean crisis. One must, at the outset, qualify this discussion by noting that many in both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations viewed the North Koreans and the Chinese as pawns of the Soviet Union, and thus viewed the threat posed to the U.S. by the Korean War as merely an extension of the Soviet threat. However, it can be argued that the nature of this regional threat was so different from the global threat posed by the U.S.S.R. as to require separate consideration.

The Korean crisis represented a departure for the U.S. from the type of external threat it thought it would face. Primarily, in the immediate post-war years, the U.S. concentrated on the geographic regions of Western Europe and Japan. The U.S. anticipated that a crisis in either of these regions would soon escalate beyond their respective geographic boundaries and result in total war. Prior to, and during the first few months of, the Korean War, the likelihood of total war was the primary focus of strategic planning. As Robert Osgood has noted, "although limited war was implicit in the conception of containment, American military policies were designed almost exclusively to meet the contingency of total war. To bridge the gap between these military policies and America's general strategic
objective, the government relied on improvisation and luck."\(^9\)

The Korean War illustrated the weakness of previous assumptions about the type of threat faced by the U.S. The geographic expanse of the potential areas of conflict was expanded to become essentially global. The U.S. could no longer expect future threats to U.S. security to be centered in Europe or Japan.\(^10\) In addition, the vision of the type of conflict had to be expanded to include limited warfare. No longer could the U.S. anticipate that any regional crisis would necessarily escalate into total war with the Soviet Union.

Operational Activity

From 1949 to 1953 the only significant engagement of U.S. military forces was in the Korean War. The U.S., at its peak level, committed over 300,000 ground forces to Korea as well as numerous air and sea forces. U.S. troops were engaged in a variety of air, ground, and sea operations including the famous, and highly successful, Inchon amphibious landing in September 1950. In all, over 54,000 U.S. troops died in the Korean War.

In general, the operational activity undertaken during the Korean War was favorably assessed after the war and there appeared to be few operational problems which could be directly tied to the existing organizational structure. One
exception, however, was the effect problems with supply had upon strategic and tactical choices. Beginning in May, 1951, General James A. Van Fleet undertook direction of the Eighth Army in Korea and adopted a different strategy for dealing with the combined North Korean and Chinese forces. Van Fleet intended to utilize the U.S. advantage in artillery to reduce U.S. casualties and yet attain the same ends. He planned on increasing the daily expenditure of artillery ammunition five times, thus increasing fire power without exposing U.S. infantry to direct fire."

The problem was that the defense supply organizations could not assure Van Fleet the ammunition necessary to pursue such a strategy. The ammunition used by the United States in Korea was predominantly left over from World War II. The result was that the stocks were, "large but unbalanced - plentiful for some rounds and short for others." Based on the difficulty of getting ammunition of particular types, Van Fleet was forced to cut certain uses of artillery to conserve stocks. The result was a cut in fire "which constituted two-thirds of all Eighth Army fire," even though Van Fleet and Commanding General Ridgeway "agreed that heavy use of ammunition helped to keep down the ... casualty rate." Hence, the ability of the U.S. military to perform in the way it desired and to maintain its effectiveness with respect to that particular strategy was undermined by inadequate supply of ammunition.
Secretary Lovett attempted to trace the root of the problem to Secretary of the Army Pace, yet Pace asserted that he was told the problem with the stocks could only be corrected with more money. Lovett wasn't satisfied and asserted that money was adequate, with the real failure being within the Ordnance Corps. What this really illustrates is the level of disrepute to which the Munitions Board had fallen. Ordnance and supply questions had to be directed to individual services rather than to the statutory board which ostensibly had the responsibility for such procurement.

THE DEBATES DURING THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The Debates and the External Threat

The reorganization debates of 1953 rarely, if ever, evoked any linkage between concern with an enhanced Soviet threat and the proposed changes in the organization of the Department of Defense. In his message to Congress on reorganization in April 1953, President Eisenhower acknowledges the Soviet threat, noting "Today we live in a perilous period of international affairs. Soviet Russia and her allies have it within their power to join with us in the establishment of true peace or to plunge the world into global war. To date they have chosen to conduct themselves in such a way that these are years neither of total war nor
Despite this acknowledgement, Eisenhower does not tie this state of threat into a need for specific types of reorganization. The clearest linkage which these debates establish between the Soviet threat and reorganization is the need to have a strong defense establishment in order to ensure our security—hardly ringing support for the external explanation’s contention of the direct link between the level of the external threat and reorganization.

In terms of other threats, such as the threats of limited war in peripheral geographic areas, this aspect of the debates can best be understood in the context of operational lessons.

The Debates and Operational Lessons

The references to operational lessons during the 1953 reorganization debates were limited. In the reorganization debates of 1949-1953, the primary linkage between calls for reform and prior U.S. operational activity was best expressed by President Eisenhower, in his April 1953 message to Congress. In that message, Eisenhower made a pointed reference to both the World War II experience and the Korean War experience when he noted that, "we have sometimes failed to give proper thought to the problems of organization and adequacy of our Armed Forces. Past periods of international stress and the actual outbreak of wars have found us poorly
prepared. On such occasions we have had to commit to battle insufficient and improperly organized military forces..."\textsuperscript{16}
While parts of this statement reflect an attempt to link operational failures at the outset of wars with poor organization, one can also view this statement as a criticism of the overall preparedness of the U.S. not only for World War II, but also for Korea.

Insofar as Eisenhower was criticizing U.S. military preparedness at the outset of the Korean War, he was reflecting the conventional wisdom of those who observed the way that the U.S. responded to the initial crisis. Many observers have contended that the primary operational lesson to be learned from the Korean War was that the then existing strategic plans and force structures were inadequate to deal with the limited nature of the war. In particular, the evidence does indicate that the JCS did not properly react to the Korean situation, and did not have the plans and force structure necessary to properly react.

Harold Kintner sets forth the first proposition in this argument by noting that, "The most serious weakness in the Defense Department exposed by the reverses suffered in the Korean War was the lack of ready army and tactical air forces."\textsuperscript{17} The most evident reason for this lack of forces was the JCS's inability to foresee the possibility of anything but a total war. As Robert Osgood observed, "Perhaps the clearest lesson of the Korean War was this:
America’s capacity to retaliate directly upon the Soviet Union could not deter communist aggression in the gray areas but that the United States was inadequately prepared to contain communist aggression by any other means.18

This tendency was illustrated by the JCS’s early response to the Korean crisis. The JCS initially, and for a considerable period after the invasion, viewed Korea as merely a sideshow to the main axis of perceived Soviet threat, Western Europe. On July 8, 1950 the JCS noted that "it is believed that a series of piecemeal attacks from the periphery of the USSR should be taken as a warning that the Soviets may wish to initiate a third world war."19 Subsequently, as late as January, 1951, the JCS issued a memo in which they asserted that, "The Korean War could be the first phase of a global war between the United States and the USSR."20 Clearly, such a perspective indicates a reluctance on the part of the JCS to engage in more complex strategic planning in which regional conflicts were not seen as merely the opening salvos of a global war.

During all of the debates surrounding the 1953 reorganization, no one specifically contended that the JCS had failed to plan effectively, yet it was a constant theme among all of those involved in the discussions that the JCS’s planning function needed to be enhanced by removing other distracting work responsibilities. The Rockefeller Committee argued that the planning functions undertaken by
the JCS were inadequately fulfilled, due in part to the
distractions associated with some command functions.\textsuperscript{21} President Eisenhower also stated that one of the key goals of the 1953 reorganization was to, "provide mechanisms for better strategic planning."\textsuperscript{22} It is fair to assume that the calls for enhanced JCS planning as an objective of the 1953 reorganization may have been linked to the then unstated concerns over poor JCS planning prior to the Korean War. While there is an element of speculation in this assessment, one must recognize that no other reasons were given for the overall negative assessments of JCS planning. Only Eisenhower's veiled reference and the information which came to light later indicate that the lessons of Korea may have been behind these aspects of the debate.

It could also be argued that there were links between the ammunition supply problem experienced during the war and the eventual calls for the elimination of the Munitions Board. However, it must be pointed out that there were no references to this shortcoming during the reorganization debates. One must conclude that the reorganization proposals dealing with the Munitions Board were based on other concerns.

THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

Once again, in Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 and the administrative changes associated with this
reorganization, there is little to be found in the legislation which can be directly tied to a concern with the external threat or with operational lessons. Perhaps the only reasonable linkage is between those aspects of the reorganization which attempt to enhance the JCS’s planning ability and the concerns about the new type of external threat facing the U.S. - limited warfare in geographically peripheral areas. In Reorganization Plan No. 6, the Chairman of the JCS was given authority over the Joint Staff as a means of alleviating other burdens from the JCS and encouraging them to engage in their primary function of planning. In addition, Eisenhower called for administrative changes which would encourage broadened participation in strategic planning, incorporating other sections of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the planning process.

It is, however, just as easy to argue that these changes undertaken to enhance strategic planning by the JCS reflect an operational lesson learned from the Korean War, rather than an anticipated organizational problem in dealing with the existing external threat. There is some evidence to suggest that the President was not satisfied with the manner in which the U.S. first responded to the Korean crisis, and that this perceived operational problem could be traced to organizational inadequacies in the JCS planning process. One must admit, however, that - as is the case with the external threat - the linkage between the actual
reorganization plan and operational lessons learned from Korea is somewhat speculative.

Aside from this, however, no clear links exist between either the nature of the external threat or operational lessons learned in Korea and the contents of the 1953 reorganization. The Korean War may have been too recent a memory to draw many lessons from, but there did seem to be at least more discussion of operational lessons in 1945 and 1946 than there were in 1953.

THE DOMESTIC EXPLANATION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

The Domestic Economy

The domestic economy in the years 1949-1953 saw a marked growth and favorable development in most categories. GNP was up from $256.5 billion in 1949 to $364.6 billion in 1953, over a $100 billion increase in only four years. Unemployment declined from a ten year high of 5.9% in 1949 to only 2.9% in 1953. The consumer price index recorded only a slight increase from 79.5 in 1952 to 80.1 in 1953. The Federal Reserve Board Index of Manufacturing Production increased from 39 in 1949 to 51 in 1952 to 55 in 1953. Finally, the business failure rate rose from 29 in 1952 to 33 in 1953, after the decline from 31 in 1951.
The Perceived Trend in the Domestic Economy

The perceptions of the trend in the economy were confused. At best the perception was of no change, at worst, it was of decline. As 1953 progressed, the Eisenhower administration began to sense that an economic downturn could be approaching. By the third quarter of 1953, GNP declined from the previous quarter and by January 1954, unemployment was up. Eisenhower was warned in 1953, by Dr. Arthur Burns, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, that there was a need for "further precautionary planning against a downturn which seemed to have already begun."28

These trends combined with Eisenhower’s own personal beliefs about a healthy economy. Eisenhower believed that if defense spending could not be cut drastically, that the U.S. economy would suffer considerably. During the Presidential campaign Eisenhower ran on the promise of lowering defense expenditures and thereby improving overall domestic health. Eisenhower argued that excessive expenditures on national security could lead to the unintended consequence of national insolvency and the overthrow of democratic government.29 Eisenhower went so far as to link economics to the underlying strategy of the Soviet Union. He claimed that, "by their military threat they have hoped to force upon America and the free world an unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster."
They have plainly said that free people cannot preserve their way of life and at the same time provide enormous military establishments."^{10}

From this perspective, Eisenhower must have been concerned with U.S. economic prospects because he had yet in 1953 to reduce U.S. military spending to a level at which he felt comfortable. This reduction would only come with the promulgation of a new defense strategy - the "New Look" - which would be adopted in 1954. Thus, in 1953, the Administration was likely concerned with the health of the U.S. economy, because of both negative economic indicators and idiosyncratic perceptions of the proper balance between military and domestic spending.

Reports on Administrative Performance

From 1950-1953 there was a dramatic increase in the number of reported instances of poor administrative performance in the New York Times. In 1950, there were only 29 reports. In 1951 the number skyrocketed to 158, and increased again in 1952 to 178. By 1953 the number had "declined" to the still high number of 137 reports of poor administrative performance.

Many of these reports were associated with the performance of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board during the Korean War. The Senate Armed Services Committee created a Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee to look at the performance of these two boards in 1951 and 1952. The conclusions were not heartening. Waste, duplication, procurement of inadequate supplies and a number of other administrative ills were found to be the norm in the functioning of the boards. In 1952 seven separate reports were issued by the Subcommittee criticizing the Department of Defense for waste in manpower utilization, shortages in ammunition, and a variety of other failures. In the Secretary of Defense’s Semiannual Report for the period ending June 30, 1952, the Secretary complained about the poor procedures associated with mobilization, procurement, and supply. In many ways the Korean War was a test of the two most important administrative bodies in the Department of Defense; the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board. In both cases the boards failed the test.

THE DEBATES DURING THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The Debates and Economy

There were a significant number of references to the potential economies which would result from reorganization during the 1953 reorganization debates. While Secretary Lovett, in his letter to the outgoing President Truman, observed that, "much remains to be done to provide a more efficient and economical form of national security", none
of his proposed changes are specifically intended to bring about this desired economy. The Rockefeller Committee was more explicit in its beliefs concerning economy, noting at the outset of their report one of the four "compelling objectives" that needed to be obtained within the Department of Defense: "The organization of the Department must be able to effect maximum economies without injuring military strength and its necessary productive support." In the introduction of its report, the Committee argued that, if adopted, its recommendations would enable the President to "provide the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost, and without danger to our free institutions."

Since the campaign in the fall of 1952, Eisenhower had been linking efforts to achieve economy in defense with defense reorganization. He stated that:

I believe that we have got to bring into the Pentagon the might of businessmen of the United States, properly organized and set up in a commission - businessmen, professional engineers, fine personnel directors, and that sort of thing, and efficiency experts - to find the waste first. I am not talking about the quantity and the type of defense units we have. But I am talking about the waste in procurement, the waste in storage, the waste in distribution, the waste in everything we do through duplication. Until we get business brains in a 60 billion-dollar business - and I mean business brains that will be respected by the Congress - we are not going to save the money that we can....

In a general sense, Eisenhower argued that reorganization would bring about economy. In his message to Congress in April 1953, he noted that, "Our second major objective is
effectiveness with economy....This need for immediate preparedness makes it all the more imperative to see that the Nation maintains effective military forces in the manner imposing the minimum burden on the national economy."

"Effectiveness with economy," Eisenhower claimed, "must be the watchwords of our defense effort." In conjunction with this general call for economy, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson justified the Eisenhower Administration's defense budget cuts by observing that reorganization would create economies which would offset these cuts.

More specifically, Eisenhower argued - as had those in 1945-1947 - that real economies would only be achieved by eliminating duplication and the waste that resulted from it. Eisenhower claimed, in his autobiography, that he "knew from experience that there was much duplication among the three services in research and development, in procurement, and even in roles and missions." He goes on to assert that the reorganization of 1953 was effected in order to eliminate these duplications: "To aid in the elimination of waste and duplication in the armed services, I felt that some reorganization of the Pentagon was desirable."

The Debates and Administrative Performance

Concern with the administrative performance of the Department of Defense was also expressed in the debates preceding the reorganization of 1953. In general, this
concern was most frequently expressed within evaluations of the performance of the Munitions and Research and Development Boards. Secretary Lovett, in his letter to President Truman advocating a variety of reorganizational steps, expressed his concern with the performance of these Boards. He argued that the Boards would not be able to adequately perform their jobs in wartime, due in large part to the excessive rigidity and over-specificity inherent with the Boards. The Rockefeller Committee concurred in Lovett's negative assessment of these Boards, arguing that they must be abolished, and their functions transmitted to the authority of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These steps were necessary in order to, "attain the most efficient organization possible, to clarify the assignment of responsibilities, and to avoid duplication of effort." Eisenhower also disparaged the performance of the Boards, and in fact argued that improving administrative performance was one of the "three basic objectives" of the 1953 reorganizations. Eisenhower asserted that the reorganization process would, "improve administrative procedure in the Department of Defense by eliminating unwieldy boards and committees and substituting instead responsible executive officials." In his message to Congress, Eisenhower claimed that the abolition of the Boards was part of a "reorganization plan which is designed to provide the Secretary of Defense with a more efficient
staff organization." The existing administrative arrangements were "too slow and too clumsy to serve as effective management tools for the Secretary," and needed to be changed.  

Aside from this, one could argue that another oft repeated concern in the 1953 reorganization debates could be viewed as an administrative performance concern. Specifically, many argued that changes were needed so as to improve the planning function of the JCS. Insofar as the impediments to this planning were poor time management and inefficient work allocation, which are typically administrative tasks, it can be observed that many advocating changes within the JCS were calling for changes to correct administrative procedures within that body.

Secretary Lovett, in his letter to President Truman, set forth how poor administrative procedures impaired the functioning of the JCS as a planning body. He observed that:

In over-simplified form, one of the major difficulties with the present Joint Chiefs of Staff organization is that they are grievously over-worked as a result of the great volume of papers referred to them for their views. In consequence, they are too deeply immersed in day-to-day operations, frequently of an administrative character, to have adequate time to devote to their major responsibilities - preparation of overall, joint and combined strategic plans, the development of logistic plans, the review of such plans in the light of the material and personnel situation and the effect of new weapons....The problem ... is aggravated by the fact that the Secretary of Defense has no military staff. In consequence, he must refer to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff a vast amount of administrative and policy matters unrelated to their main functions....

Dr. Vannevar Bush concurred in this observation, contending that the JCS was too burdened with inconsequential matters and unable to consult experts in a variety of fields when attempting to deal with all of the material forwarded to them.

The Rockefeller Committee saw similar problems. The Committee observed in its report that, "The heavy administrative pressure on the chiefs within the military services seriously restricts the time and thought that they can devote as individuals to their deliberations in the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The Committee recommended, among other legislative reforms, that the chiefs delegate more of their responsibilities. Eisenhower also empathized with the duties of the Joint Chiefs. In his message to Congress he observed that, "These officers are clearly overworked, and steps must be devised to relieve them of time-consuming details of minor importance." Thus, if one believes that poor time management and delegation of work are in fact examples of poor administrative performance, then the discussions of the JCS and its inability to plan fall into the category of discussions on poor administrative performance.
THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The legislation, and administrative directives, which resulted from these reorganization debates did reflect a degree of linkage between the desire for reorganization and the desire to achieve economies and improve administrative performance. The primary piece of legislation which seems to reenforce this linkage was the abolition of the Munitions and Research and Development Boards and the consolidation of their functions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense under the oversight of several newly created Assistant Secretaries. In addition, President Eisenhower, via executive order, required studies to be conducted in each of the service departments in an attempt to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness as well as attaining economies where possible.\footnote{51}

Beyond this, the only legislation, or executive orders, which may have been inspired by the desire to improve administrative performance were those associated with improving the planning capabilities of the JCS. As mentioned earlier, many of the planning difficulties plaguing the JCS were directly related to overwork and inadequate delegation of responsibilities. These could be considered administrative functions which were poorly executed - due primarily to the existing organizational structure. In order to erase these problems, Reorganization Plan No. 6 and its accompanying executive orders attempted
to lift the burden from the JCS by relieving them of their command responsibilities, placing the administration of the Joint Staff into the hands of the Chairman of the JCS, and encouraging them to delegate more of their service-related responsibilities to subordinates. All of these steps were designed to remove the barriers to good planning imposed by the administrative duties of the members of the JCS.

THE CIVILIAN/EXECUTIVE CONSOLIDATION EXPLANATION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

Civilian Executive Tenure

New civilian executives were present in the defense establishment during the 1953 reorganization process. It is necessary to look at two different groups of civilian executives which were involved in the processes leading up to the 1953 reorganization. First are those in the latter years of the Truman administration. More specifically, at the time that reorganization was first broached in Secretary of Defense Lovett's letter of November 1952, Lovett had been Secretary of Defense since September 1951, some fifteen months. Truman had been President, at the time of Lovett's letter, for over seven years.
The second group of influential civilian executives were those who assumed power in January 1953 - President Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson. Eisenhower began investigating the potential for defense reorganization even before he took the oath of office, and the actual reorganization came into effect five months after Eisenhower and Wilson took control.

Origins of the Move to Reorganize

The inspiration for the 1953 defense reorganization came from civilian executives within the defense establishment. As previously noted, the first stirring of a potential reorganization occurred in November 1953 with Secretary of Defense Lovett's letter to President Truman. Others, including Dr. Vannevar Bush and General Omar Bradley were calling for some form of reorganization within the Defense Department. Eisenhower advocated reorganization as early as his presidential campaign, in which he claimed he would reorganize the Defense Department first, before cutting defense expenditures. After the election, Eisenhower created a three-man committee to investigate defense reorganization, which was eventually expanded in February 1953 into the Rockefeller Committee.

Based on the findings of the Rockefeller Committee in early April 1953, Eisenhower forwarded his own proposals for reorganization to Congress on April 30. These proposals
came into effect one month later without any Congressional significant action taken.

Civilian/Executive Perceptions of Civilian Control

The perceptions of the civilian executives, prior to the reorganization of 1953, as to the existing level of civilian control of the military is difficult to uncover. Little was said by executives within the Truman or Eisenhower administration about whether they felt civilian control was adequate or inadequate.

Secretary Lovett’s attitude is particularly murky. While it is true that he called for a clarification and a strengthening of the authority of the Secretary of Defense - a position which might suggest dissatisfaction with the existing levels of civilian control - mention of civilian control in a broader context is not made. One can, therefore, argue whether Lovett was concerned with civilian control in general, or merely with the authority of his own office. If the latter is true, then the implications of Lovett’s suggestions on civilian control would be simply incidental.

Eisenhower’s position with respect to civilian control is only somewhat clearer. He specifically stated that he wished to improve civilian control, thereby implying that some aspects of the existing levels of civilian control were inadequate. However, he never specifically pointed to any
of these inadequacies in public, in latter reflections, or in reported private conversations. Given his own background as a high ranking military officer familiar with the relationship between civilians and the military (and the potential allegation that with Eisenhower’s election the "military" had gotten control of the civilian levers of government) it is not surprising that Eisenhower would support the concept of civilian control. However, it would be surprising to discover that Eisenhower felt that civilian control within the Defense Department was inadequate at that time given that this would imply that he personally (and many of his friends and colleagues) had excessive power within the government in recent years.

Civilian/Executive Perceptions of Centralization

It is even more difficult to discover civilian executive attitudes towards the levels of centralization that existed within the Defense Department prior to the 1953 reorganization. Secretary Lovett, while calling for greater authority for the Secretary of Defense, did not base this call upon a more general notion of increasing centralization. In fact, while making a number of criticisms of the overall functioning of the Defense Department, he did not tie these criticisms together in terms of a basic lack of centralization.
Eisenhower's attitude is even more perplexing. He faithfully supported the opinions of Lovett and the Rockefeller Committee with respect to clarifying and enhancing the authority of the Secretary of Defense - actions which appear to indicate a dissatisfaction with the level of centralization within the Defense Department. However, in his message to Congress, he seems to argue that there is too much centralization within the defense establishment. He notes that, "In an organization the size of the Department of Defense, true effectiveness with economy can only be attained by decentralization of operations. . . ." These mixed signals make it very difficult to assess Eisenhower's perceptions of the existing level of centralization within the Department of Defense.

THE DEBATES DURING THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The Debates and Civilian Control

There were a significant number of references to the issue of civilian control in the debates surrounding the 1953 reorganization. At the outset it should be noted that the "debates" as such consisted of a handful of semi-formal proposals for change in the Defense Department's organizational structure. The presentation of Reorganization Plan No. 6 was designed to limit Congressional debate, with the result that actual testimony
within Congress, with few exceptions, failed to address the substance of the reorganization plan. Thus, the debates which will be focused on here are those semi-formal proposals for change submitted from 1952-1953.

The first of these was the Lovett letter of November 1952. As discussed above, Lovett seemed to be concerned with civilian control because he did advocate a significant clarification and enhancement of the Secretary of State’s authority over the Department of Defense. In particular, Lovett called for the creation of a military staff to assist the Secretary of Defense, and thus no longer make him dependent upon the services for information. Additionally, he called for the Secretary of Defense to be named the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, one step below the President in the chain of command.

Clearly these proposals would enhance the authority of the Secretary of Defense, and thus would increase civilian control. One must be careful in claiming this letter as a call for increased civilian control, however. Lovett may very well have been only calling for a more effective Secretary of Defense. He does not discuss civilian control in general, and offers no other recommendations which would affect civilian control.

Dr. Vannevar Bush, however, expressed more clear-cut concern with the existing levels of civilian control. In his article in Colliers, Bush noted that the existing
system, in which the JCS had command authority (ie. the
individual members of the JCS were designated executive
agents for specific theater commands), was detrimental to
civilian control.53

As was the case with Secretary Lovett, the Rockefeller
Committee advocated clarifying and enhancing the authority
of the Secretary of Defense so as to give him, "Clear and
effective authority over the entire defense organization,
and control over the principle personnel, civilian and
military, in the Department of Defense."54 In addition, in
calling for the individual Joint Chiefs to no longer be
designated executive agents for the unified commands, the
Rockefeller Committee argued that the existing arrangement
was, "undesirable in that it permits the assignment of
important executive functions within the Department of
Defense independently of the Secretary, confuses the lines
of command and responsibility, and thereby weakens the
traditional principle of civilian control."55

Eisenhower concurred with these judgements, arguing
that the changes with respect to the Secretary of Defense
would, "strengthen civilian control by establishing clearer
lines of responsibility."56 In addition, in advocating the
individual members of the JCS no longer act as executive
agents for the unified commands, Eisenhower argued that this
change would "fix responsibility along a definite channel of
accountable civilian officials as intended by the National Security Act."^57

What little opposition to the 1953 reorganization plans that existed focused part of their criticism on the issue of civilian control. In particular, they argued that the steps taken within the JCS to improve the planning function - specifically giving the Chairman of the JCS control over the operation of the Joint Staff and giving the Chairman the authority to approve those officers selected for the Joint Staff - undermined civilian control and were in fact an attempt to create a "German-type general staff."^58 All in all, however, civilian control was a phrase without a great deal of meaning in the 1953 debates.

The Debates and Centralization

In general, it can be asserted that the need for greater centralization was a significant topic of debate during the 1953 reorganization process. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the issue itself was rather confused during these debates. Many of the proposals presented by participants in the debates can only be characterized as attempts to centralize authority, either in the hands of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Yet, no specific calls for centralization were made and, in fact, some of the proposals
were justified as efforts to **decentralize** the operations of the nation's defense establishment.

One strain of the centralization tendency focused on the Secretary of Defense. Secretary Lovett, Dr. Bush, the Rockefeller Committee, and President Eisenhower all advocated consolidating power in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. Implicit in this was a diminution of the power of the service secretaries, with some of their authority flowing to the Secretary of Defense. This desire for centralization of authority in the hands of the Secretary of Defense is perhaps most forcefully demanded by Dr. Bush. He observed that, "Any healthy organization - especially one involving military operations - must have absolutely clear lines of command, without duplication and without parallel paths. Authority must go with responsibility."\(^{59}\) He went on to advocate that all command and authority should center on one person, presumably the Secretary of Defense.

Beyond the centralization inherent in consolidating the authority of the Secretary of Defense, others called for a more centralized approach within the services. General Bradley noted, in his call for reorganization of the JCS, that one of the primary problems confronting the JCS was the fact that the existing structure did nothing to discourage the kinds of inter-service rivalries which were present at all levels of command throughout the military.\(^{60}\) Dr. Bush also focused on this point, going so far as to call for the
establishment of a distinct "service" of JCS planners with uniforms different from the other services.  

Beyond this general advocacy of some sort of centralization of the services, there were specific calls for change within the JCS which, in effect, centralized some authority in the hands of the Chairman of the JCS. The Rockefeller Committee, and President Eisenhower, called for giving the Chairman of the JCS control over the operations of the Joint Staff and the JCS Committees as well as giving him the ability to appoint outside experts to JCS Committees and to approve all members of the Joint Staff and JCS Committees. All of these proposals, in effect, centralized the operations of the JCS in the hands of the Chairman, and thus gave him the ability to affect policy through the daily functions of the JCS.

The few opponents to the 1953 reorganization pointed to these aspects of centralization as part of the basis for their opposition. The Navy in particular argued that such centralization as was occurring undermined the spirit of the 1947 Act in which the service autonomy was guaranteed. Beyond this, one rather odd complaint was that the reorganization represented over-centralization of powers to the Secretary of Defense, and was an improper delegation of these powers from the President.

The oddest aspect of this issue was the extent to which many claimed that the 1953 reorganization, and in particular
the consolidation of the functions of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board into the Office of the Secretary of Defense, were actually instances of decentralization. The Rockefeller Committee argued at the outset that the National Security Act of 1947 was intended to, "set up a decentralized organization for administration through the three military departments." President Eisenhower argued that this decentralization of administration was being undermined by the inflexibility of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board, which attempted to consolidate these issue areas into a single group composed of service representatives and a civilian head. Eisenhower claimed that:

In an organization the size of the Department of Defense, true effectiveness with economy can be attained only by decentralization of operations, under flexible and effective direction and control from the center. . . . Such a system of decentralized operations, however, requires, for sound management, flexible machinery at the top. Unfortunately, this is not wholly possible in the Department of Defense as now established by law. Two principle fields of activity are rigidly assigned by law to unwieldy boards which - no matter how much authority may be centralized in their respective chairmen - provide organizational arrangements too slow and too clumsy to serve as effective management tools for the Secretary.6

Thus, from Eisenhower's perspective, consolidating these issue areas within the Office of the Secretary of Defense served as a guarantee of decentralization, rather than centralization because there would be less restraint on individual service administration.
THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

There was a clear link between the issues of enhanced civilian control and centralization and the legislation of the reorganization itself. As may be inferred from the discussions above, the two main aspects of the 1953 Reorganizations (both legislation and executive orders) which could be viewed as linked to a desire to enhance civilian control and centralization were the steps taken to definitively establish the Secretary of Defense's authority over the Defense Department and the steps taken to create a level of authority in the position of Chairman of the JCS. In the case of the Secretary of Defense, both civilian control and centralization were enhanced in the person of the Secretary, although they came at the expense of the services and the civilian control which was exerted by the individual service secretaries.

In the case of the Chairman of the JCS, centralization of operating authority within the JCS may have been the immediate aim, with improved planning being the long term goal. In addition, those aspects of the 1953 reorganization which removed the individual members of the JCS from their positions as executive agents of the unified commands and transferred the executive agent to the services enhanced civilian control insofar as the previous arrangement cut the Secretary of Defense out of the process. Finally, it must be acknowledged that the Rockefeller Committee and President
Eisenhower saw those aspects of the 1953 reorganization which eliminated the Munitions and Research and Development Boards as effecting decentralization of operations, a supposed goal of the 1947 National Security Act.

CONCLUSIONS

As in the cases of the reorganizations of 1947 and 1949, I will now assess this 1953 reorganization process in terms of the flow of events as anticipated by each of the three posited explanations.

THE EXTERNAL EXPLANATION

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the external explanation was answered. A + indicates an answer supporting the external explanation. A - indicates an answer which does not support the external explanation. A * indicates an ambiguous answer which in and of itself does not support or undermine the external explanation.

1. The change in the Soviet threat. *
2. The existence of potential new threats. +
3. The level of operational activity. +
4. References to operational lessons. -
5. References to the external threat. -
6. Links between legislation and the issues. -
In general, the large number of negative responses, particularly to question six, undercut the relevance of the external explanation.

THE DOMESTIC EXPLANATION

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the domestic explanation was answered.

1. The current state of the economy. -
2. The perceived trend in the economy. *
4. References to economy and administrative performance. +
5. Links between legislation and the issues. +

The domestic explanation could be considered relevant for explaining the 1953 defense reorganization process. There was a degree of linkage between the issues of economy and administrative performance and the actual reorganization legislation. The objective condition of a poor economy does not appear to have existed, but there were increasing numbers of reported incidents of poor administrative performance. Finally, the debates focused on both issues deemed significant by the domestic explanation.
THE CIVILIAN/EXECUTIVE CONSOLIDATION EXPLANATION

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the civilian/executive consolidation explanation was answered.

1. Tenure in office. +
2. Origins of the reorganization movement. +
3. Perceptions of civilian control. *
4. Perceptions of centralization. *
5. References to civilian control and centralization. +
6. Links between legislation and the issues. +

The civilian/executive consolidation explanation also appears somewhat persuasive. There was a strong linkage between the legislation and the issues of civilian control and centralization. The objective circumstances were present as well. The perceptions of civilian executives about the existing levels of civilian control and centralization were ambiguous, but these same issues were dwelled upon during the debates.

CONCLUSIONS

It may be said with some confidence that the external explanation falters due to its inability to account for very much of the overall reorganization. Aside from the changes within the JCS, the external explanation does not account
for the vast majority of the changes which took place. In addition, the issues of the external threat and operational lessons were not considerations in the debates during the reorganization process.

The domestic explanation poses a more difficult problem. Essentially, one can construct somewhat persuasive arguments for the domestic explanation, particularly given Eisenhower's repeated statements that economies were needed within the defense establishment and that they could be achieved via reorganization. The main difficulty with this explanation is twofold. First, as far as the actual legislation is concerned, it still seems that only two of the three major aspects of the 1953 reorganization process could possibly be accounted for by the domestic explanation. Specifically, while the domestic explanation may account for the elimination of the Boards, and may (with some strain) explain the changes within the JCS, it does not account for the changes in the authority of the Secretary of Defense. This is a major flaw in this explanation.

Secondly, the objective conditions posited for the domestic explanation, i.e. a failing economy, were not present from 1950-1953. While one can argue that Eisenhower's own attitudes may have colored his assessment of U.S. economic health, it still seems clear that there were no objectively poor economic circumstances driving the 1953 reorganization process.
The civilian/executive explanation, with some reservations, appears the most persuasive in the case of the 1953 reorganizations. All three of the major aspects of the 1953 reorganization witness an increase in civilian control or a measure of centralization. The changes in the authority of the Secretary of Defense exhibit both centralization and increased civilian control, the consolidation of the functions of the Munitions and Research and Development Boards brought about centralization of these functions into the civilian led OSD, and the changes in the functioning of the JCS brought about a degree of centralization in the operating authority of that body into the hands of the Chairman of the JCS. In addition, the circumstances in which this explanation predicts reorganizations (civilian executives with short tenures inspiring the legislation) are present and the debates themselves evidence a trend towards the objectives of centralization and enhanced civilian control. The references to decentralization can be redefined to be consistent with this explanation. Given these factors, and the poorer showing of the other two explanations, the civilian/executive explanation seems to do the best job of explaining the 1953 reorganization process.
Notes


2. Ibid., 157-158.

3. Ibid., 158.


6. Ibid., 97.


10. In fact, beyond the crisis in Korea, the U.S. had, by 1953, become actively involved in the other significant Asian crisis area - Vietnam.


13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 159.


16. Ibid., 149.


20. Ibid., 79.


27. Ibid., 912.


32. Ibid.


34. Ibid., 128.

35. Ibid., 127.


38. Ibid., 150.


41. Ibid.


43. Ibid., 137.


46. Ibid., 152.

47. Ibid., 120.


49. Ibid., 133.

50. Ibid., 155.

51. Ibid., 153.

52. Ibid., 152.


55. Ibid., 136.


57. Ibid., 152.


60. Hammond, Organizing for Defense, 258-259.


63. Ibid.


65. Ibid., 152.
Here is a Secretary, Mr. Johnson; he hardly gets the chair warm; comes up here in 1949 and tells the Congress, "I need these powers," and we gave it to him. In 1953, Mr. Wilson, just out of General Motors, wanted new assistant secretaries; ... we gave him six more - before he knew what it was all about. Now you, with only six month’s experience come up and say, "We need all these powers," and, as evidenced by your own testimony, some of the most important questions you couldn’t answer....

Rep. F. Edward Hebert, 1958

By the spring of 1958, the issue of Defense Department reorganization was once again in the Washington spotlight. A variety of complaints and maladies were discussed, with many observers pointing to the need for another reorganization to correct them. Not all observers, however, were convinced that reorganization was the solution. Representative Hebert, in the introductory quotation, expressed the sense of frustration experienced by many on Capital Hill who felt that the reorganization process was never-ending, and that reorganization had become a substitute for strategic thinking and personal leadership within the Defense Department. Many in Congress also became suspicious of what appeared to be a creeping usurpation, by
the executive, of Congressional duties with respect to financing and maintaining the nation's military force. As with the previous reorganizations, the 1958 reorganization was preceded by a considerable period of investigation.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE LEGISLATION

On July 10, 1953, the Commission on Organization in the Executive Branch of the Government was established by Congress and placed under the leadership of former President Hoover. This "New Hoover Commission" set out to examine the organizational functioning of all aspects of the executive branch, including the Defense Department. The subcommittee dealing with the Department of Defense submitted a "Report on Business Organization of the Department of Defense" to Congress in 1955.

As the title of the report implies, the Hoover Commission subcommittee focused on the management aspects of the Defense Department, and its recommendations related to enhancing its managerial performance. The subcommittee noted that there were essentially four managerial tasks to be performed in the Department: logistics, research and development, personnel, and finance. The subcommittee recommended that the Secretary pay more attention to these managerial functions and that coordination within the Department with respect to these functions should be encouraged.
Secondly, the subcommittee recommended the creation of a Defense Supply and Service Agency, headed and managed by civilians, to oversee common supply and service activities which were previously performed by the individual services (and thus were at times duplicative). Finally, the subcommittee recommended that a clear line be drawn between civilian and military functions, at least in the area of support activities. The subcommittee recommended that "Military personnel will be limited primarily to posts in tactical organizations, and civilian personnel will be utilized increasingly in management and technical positions in support activities." The subcommittee called for creating criteria for establishing which tasks were to be performed by military personnel and which by civilians.

The Defense Department, through Secretary Wilson, responded to the Hoover Commission recommendations in an official comment released in 1956. With respect to those aspects of the Hoover Commission Report discussed above, Secretary Wilson was not particularly impressed. While concurring with the desired ends of the Commission, Secretary Wilson did not accept the means suggested. Wilson rejected the idea of placing a civilian in charge of coordination of planning and liaison with the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noting that changes enacted by Reorganization Plan No. 6 (1953) would likely address the problems alleged by the Commission.
Wilson also rejected the need for a Defense Supply and Service Agency. He contended that the last thing needed was another level of bureaucracy and the paperwork associated with it.

President Eisenhower, in early 1958, began giving hints that the administration's attitude toward defense reorganization was changing. In his State of the Union address, Eisenhower noted that the Department of Defense would be substantially affected by new technological developments, namely the launching of Sputnik. His statements served as a preview of a likely structural reform of the Defense Department. Later, in his budget message of January 11, 1958, the President proposed large increases in military expenditures and cautioned that such expenditures would only be acceptable if they were to be administered by an efficient and economical Department of Defense. Again, the implicit message was that some form of reorganization was on the way.

At about this time, a report was released by a panel of experts under the auspices of the Rockefeller Brother's Fund. The report, entitled *International Security: The Military Aspect* was the result of efforts undertaken since 1956 to examine the Department of Defense and its operations. According to the Panel, the Department of Defense was plagued by three organizational defects:

1. The roles and missions assigned to the
individual military services have become competitive rather than complementary because they are out of accord with both weapons technology and the principal military threats to our national safety.

2. The present organization and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff preclude the development of a comprehensive and coherent strategic doctrine for the United States.

3. The Secretary of Defense is so burdened with the negative tasks of trying to arbitrate and control inter-service disputes that he cannot play his full part in the initiation and development of high military policy.

The Panel went on to note that rectifying these problems was no small matter. As they stated in the report, "...the difficulties described are inherent in the present organization of the Defense Department, and ... they cannot be removed merely by adjustments of the existing structure." The recommendations made by the Panel were numerous, including:

1. removal of military departments from the chain of operational command.

2. creation of unified commands for all operational forces.

3. designation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the chief military advisor to the president.

4. unifying the staff of the Joint Chiefs and placing them under the control of the Chairman.

5. placing the decision for promotion of officers above the rank of Brigadier General or the equivalent in the hands of the Department of Defense.

6. adjusting the line of operational command to go from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
7. adjusting the line of logistical command to go from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the military departments.

8. giving the Secretary of Defense authority over all research and development, as well as procurement. Additionally, the Secretary would have the authority to transfer or cancel certain service programs.*

On April 3, 1958, President Eisenhower fulfilled the pledge he made in his State of the Union message and formally proposed to Congress a plan of defense reorganization. The President called for six broad steps to be taken so as to alleviate the problems in the Defense Department associated with organization and structure. First, he proposed that all U.S. armed forces should be organized into unified operational commands. The second proposed reform called for the establishment of a clearer chain of command running from the Commander-in-Chief through the Secretary of Defense to the unified commanders.

The third reform proposed by the President would have strengthened the staff functions to be performed for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and, thus, the Secretary of Defense and the Commander in Chief. In order to do this, the President proposed an increase in the size of the Joint Staff. Additionally, he called for a diminution of the responsibilities attached to the individual Joint Chiefs by allowing the Chiefs to delegate portions of their service responsibilities to their vice chiefs.10
The President's fourth proposed reform called for a reduction in the operational responsibility of the service secretaries. The integrity of the service secretaries would be retained, yet their responsibilities would be restricted to administrative chores. The fifth proposed reform called for an extensive reorganization of the military establishment's research and development sector. Specifically, Eisenhower called for the establishment of the post of Director of Defense Research and Engineering, which would rank "immediately after the service Secretaries and above the Defense Assistant Secretaries." 11

Finally, Eisenhower proposed to further clarify the authority of the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, the President called for enhanced Secretarial authority in the allocation of funds, the elimination of "separately administered" service departments, enhanced Secretarial authority over the organization and allocation of functions, restrictions on the number of officers engaged in legislative liaison with Congress and a heightened level of Secretarial control over such functions, and a new measure of Secretarial input into the military personnel evaluation process. 12

Substantial portions of Eisenhower's reorganization proposals required Congressional action to come into effect. The tenor of the Congressional debate surrounding these proposals was decidedly wary, yet in the end Congress gave
the President most of what he wanted. In its final form, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 looked very similar to the proposals made by the President. Substantively, the only major deviations included placing conditions on the ability of the Secretary to transfer or abolish functions, specific prohibition on the creation of an "Armed Forces General Staff," and the retention of some level of control on the part of the service secretaries. Eventually, the bill left the Congressional conference committee on July 24, 1958 and was signed into law on August 6, 1958.

THE EXTERNAL EXPLANATION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

The Soviet Threat

From 1953 to 1958 the primary U.S. security threat - the Soviet threat - solidified and perhaps slightly increased. The solidification of the Soviet security threat was represented by two events. First, in May 1955, the Warsaw Pact was formed as a counter to the Western NATO alliance. Second, in October and November of 1956, the Soviet Union brutally suppressed an uprising in Hungary. Both of these actions tended to reinforce the notion of the solid Soviet bloc, and firm up the threat posed by the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to Western Europe and U.S. security interests.

This Soviet threat increased in 1957. In August 1957, the Soviets conducted the first successful space flight of an intercontinental range missile, an SS-6. Two months later, the Soviets used this new missile to launch Sputnik I, the first space satellite. This event cast into doubt the U.S. nuclear position and the strategy of massive retaliation. Essentially, all of the foundations upon which U.S. defense policy were grounded were threatened by the technological lead acquired by the U.S.S.R. The concern with Sputnik and the Soviet missile developments were potentially reenforced within the executive branch by a report submitted by the Security Resources Panel of the Office of Defense Mobilization Science Advisory Committee, otherwise known as the Gaither Committee. The Gaither Committee report was astoundingly pessimistic in its assessment of U.S. versus Soviet weapons capabilities. As Stephen Ambrose noted, "Gaither practically predicted the end of Western civilization."\(^{13}\)

The Gaither Committee report began by asserting that the U.S.S.R. was spending far more on defense than the U.S. and that they were pursuing with single-minded determination the creation of an invincible military force.\(^{14}\) They asserted that, "The evidence clearly indicates an increasing threat which may become critical in 1959 or early 1960."\(^{15}\)
In concluding its assessments, the report stated the following conclusions on future U.S. security in case of a Soviet nuclear attack:

1. Active defense programs now in being and programmed for the future will not give adequate assurance of protection to the civil population.

2. Passive defense programs now in being and programmed for the future will afford no significant protection to the civil population.16

This gloomy assessment was supplemented by equally gloomy policy recommendations. The committee as a whole recommended a $44 billion increase in defense expenditures over the following five years, $22.5 billion of which would be earmarked for the construction of civilian fallout shelters for all U.S. citizens.17 Three members of the committee were apparently so disturbed by U.S. defense prospects for the future that they advocated preventative war being waged against the U.S.S.R.18

Soviet missile developments and the Gaither Committee report may not have heightened the Eisenhower administration’s perceptions of the Soviet threat, however. CIA estimates of Soviet defense expenditures showed a decline in Soviet defense spending from 34 billion rubles (1970 rubles) in 1956 to 30 billion in 1957, with spending for 1958 holding at 30 billion rubles.19

Perhaps more interesting was Eisenhower’s own read on the threat posed by the Soviet Union. For President Eisenhower, the launching of Sputnik was not nearly as
alarming as for the country as a whole. In fact, it was rather mystifying to the President that the nation expressed such shock and fear over Sputnik. As Eisenhower noted in his autobiography, "Most surprising of all ... was the intensity of the public concern. Soviet space ambitions had been no secret." From Eisenhower's perspective, the Sputnik launch, while reflective of Soviet achievements in the technology race, was not of strategic concern.

Eisenhower was asked at a news conference on October 9, 1958 - five days after the launching of Sputnik - "are you saying at this time that with the Russian satellite whirling about the world, you are not more concerned nor overly concerned about our nation's security?" Eisenhower replied, "As far as the satellite itself is concerned, that does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota. I see nothing at this moment, at this stage of development, that is significant in that development as far as security is concerned."

This attitude was not unique to Eisenhower, however. According to Eisenhower, Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, of the National Science Foundation, held similar views. According to Eisenhower, when Bronk was asked if there was anything about the Sputnik launch which would make the U.S. change its research and development programs, he responded, "No, in my opinion, there is not. We can't always go changing our program in reaction to everything the Russians do." In effect, Dr. Bronk saw nothing in the Soviet developments
which demanded a drastic change in the course of the U.S. research and development efforts. Rather, Bronk and Eisenhower both seemed to feel that the Soviet successes were significant, but not catastrophic.

Eisenhower's attitude towards the Gaither Report is even more telling. Eisenhower, when first notified that the committee wished to brief the President in full on the extensive programs it was calling for, "said he was beginning to wonder whether such groups should be established. The danger he saw was that the group would put out a lot of alarmist talk." Eisenhower's attitude towards the report in general was dismissive. As he remarked in his autobiography, "I did not agree with all of the panel's hypothetical figures; moreover, the panel had failed to take into account certain vital information and other considerations." Eisenhower opposed the measures the Gaither Report called for, telling the committee that "All military strength is relative to what a possible adversary has," and later stating that he "thought our strategic forces are stronger than the group may have indicated." It is significant to note the manner in which Eisenhower summed up the Gaither Report in his autobiography - "it acted as a gadfly on any in the administration given to complacency..."

Eisenhower's attitude toward the report was not unique within the administration. He contends that the National
Security Council agreed with his estimations, and in particular Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that the report failed to consider the unfavorable implications of the defense expenditures for which it called.28

Finally, it must be noted that Eisenhower's rather sanguine assessment of the Soviet threat was, in fact, based on some additional information. John Lewis Gaddis contends that the President was likely privy to intelligence which supported his position. Gaddis notes that Eisenhower had:

reasonably reliable information, on the basis of a major but unpublicized intelligence coup, regarding the unexpectedly slow pace of Soviet ICBM construction. Details of the CIA's U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, which began in 1956, are still sketchy, but they presumably provided enough evidence of the absence of any large-scale ICBM program for the President to be able to assert with some confidence that the United States did not need one either.29

Eisenhower reenforces Gaddis' conclusion by noting in his autobiography that, "I had made as strong a case for confidence and sane direction as I could. I was hampered, of course, by the fact that I could not reveal secrets which in themselves would have reassured our people."30 He goes on to discuss his decision not to reveal the U-2 flight capability at that time.

The significance of the U-2s for the question at hand is that this, coupled with the other information cited, leads one to believe that, from the perspective of President Eisenhower and many within his administration, no "new"
Soviet threat existed. Intelligence information argued against a "new" threat, and the existing U.S. strategy did not perceive Soviet nuclear advances as "new threats" until they threatened U.S. deterrent capabilities. Clearly, in 1958, such a threat did not exist. Based on this, as well as Eisenhower's own assessments of Sputnik and the Gaither Report, it is reasonable to conclude that the Eisenhower administration did not see a significant increase in the nature of the Soviet threat at that time.

Other Security Threats

There was a slight increase in new security threats to the U.S. during this period. The potential for limited war in a geographically peripheral area seemed to decline after the end of the Korean War. Aside from brief involvement in the Suez Crisis and a small scale commitment to Vietnam, by 1958 the primary external threat, aside from the Soviet Union, clearly appeared to be China.31

At the outset, one must remember that during this period of time most government officials still saw China as a member of the Soviet bloc, and thus may have objected to separating China from the overall threat posed by the Soviet Union. In the event, from 1953 to 1958 the U.S. and China nearly came to blows three times; once in 1954 over Quemoy and Matsue, once in 1955 during the Taiwan Straits Crisis, and again in 1957 over Quemoy and Matsue. Eisenhower
reportedly considered using nuclear weapons against the Chinese, illustrating that the threat posed by the Chinese was not of a limited war, but of total war. By 1958, however, U.S. attention was focused again on the Soviet Union, and concern over China may well have subsided.

Operational Activity

There was little truly significant operational activity from 1954-1957. During this period, all of the significant operational activity was single service naval activity. The only use of ground or air forces was the use of a small number (less than 90) of Marines to assist in evacuating foreigners from threatened areas during the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the ongoing presence in Indochina of a relatively small number of U.S. military advisors (less than 1000). Thus, little in the way of cross service activity took place. Additionally, no significant air or ground forces activity occurred during the first few months of 1958 - those months during which the 1958 reorganization was still under discussion.

Hence, given the nature of the operational activity engaged in during the period prior to the reorganization, it would be unlikely to discover many significant lessons learned - particularly lessons with implications for the overall structure of the military or the relationship of the services to one another.
THE DEBATES SURROUNDING THE REORGANIZATION

The Debates and the External Threat

There were few references to the external threat during the 1958 defense reorganization debates. While some linkage was implicit, given the overwhelming level of public concern with Soviet missile developments and the moves to reorganize the Department of Defense rather soon thereafter, no explicit linkage was developed by Eisenhower or other members of his administration. This very well may have reflected Eisenhower's skepticism of the extent of the external threat.

Perhaps the only clear linking of the external threat with the 1958 reorganization took place in Congress, with Senator Henry Jackson noting in the hearings on the 1958 reorganization legislation that:

I think that the reason we are meeting here today is very simple. Sputnik occurred. People got worked up. It all grew out of the missile hassle. ... In all candor the reason why people are stirred up about this issue [reorganization] is the set back this country suffered last fall. Immediately, Mr. Chairman, the attitude was, "Well, there is duplication and waste in the Pentagon and we have to get rid of it."32

Beyond Jackson's rather bold statement, however, few were willing to attribute the desire to reorganize the nation's military to fear over the security threat posed by the Soviets and their missile program. In addition, no one attributed the reorganization effort to the external threat
posed by China or argued that the implications of the Chinese threat demanded a reorganization process.

The Debates and Operational Lessons

Throughout the debates surrounding this reorganization, practically no mention is made of any previous operational activity or the lessons learned from these activities. In fact, the reorganization of 1958 seems to have been motivated by anticipated operational necessities more than past operational lessons.

The failure to consider operational lessons is first illustrated by the omission of this subject from President Eisenhower's speeches and letters advocating the 1958 reforms. To the extent that Eisenhower referred to operational lessons at all, he referred to lessons he learned as a commander during WW II. He argued that the need for truly unified commands was one, "taught by World War II," and "learned from firsthand experience." Such personal observations are also made with respect to the "evils of diluted command" and the inadequacy of the existing chain of command.

The references to the requirements of future wars were far more prevalent in Eisenhower's speeches, however. Eisenhower, in his State of the Union message of January 10, 1958, pointed to the advent of new military technology as a source of concern. Given these new weapons, new problems
would arise demanding new organizational solutions. In other words, reorganization was mandated by the future needs of warfare in a world of high technology weapons.

Similarly, in his April 3, 1958 message to Congress, in which he proposes the bulk of the reorganizations of 1958, Eisenhower further comments on the operational necessities of future warfare. He states that, "separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact."

The inconsequential impact of past operational lessons on the 1958 reorganizations is perhaps best illustrated by noting the absence, within Eisenhower's justifications for the reorganizations, of the operational lessons which could have been learned. Eisenhower goes to great lengths to argue that future warfare will not tolerate separate service involvement — rather, all future warfare will demand integration of all services in the effort. The operational activity in the years prior to the 1958 reorganization illustrate that this may not necessarily have been true. All of these operations, save one, involved single service participation — specifically, naval operational activity. Thus, one group of operational lessons seems to contradict
the prophecies of Eisenhower, and this may account for the
President's failure to consider them.

Even more interesting is the failure of Eisenhower to
refer to operational lessons which would, in fact, bolster
his position on the need for service integration. The last
major operational activity engaging all of the military
services was the Korean War. Whether the lessons learned
from that conflict were that more service integration was
necessary or not, the point is that this most recent
significant engagement of large numbers of U.S. military
forces was not even mentioned by President Eisenhower. Such
an omission is indicative of the insignificance of
operational lessons in the debates surrounding the 1958
reorganizations.

During the course of the debates surrounding the
reorganization legislation, if military operations were
referred to, it was only in an abstract nature, with no
reference to actual operational activities of the past.
Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy argued in favor of those
aspects of the 1958 reorganization which shortened the chain
of command between the President and the unified or
specified commanders, stating that these changes would
improve combat effectiveness. Yet, he never gives
specific examples of cases in which the existing chain of
command detracted from combat effectiveness. Similarly
vague, Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations,
testified in support of the reorganization and noted that, "combat effectiveness cannot be legislated, but an organization can be set up that fosters it." Implicit in this statement was the contention that existing combat effectiveness was inadequate, yet no evidence was given to support this position.

THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

Little in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 can clearly be linked to concerns with an enhanced Soviet external threat. Many of the changes in the reorganization legislation would significantly affect the chain of command and the function of the operational aspects of the Department of Defense, and as such they would surely be seen as enhancing the ability of the U.S. military to address the threats posed by the Soviets. However, these changes were not directly linked to any overt concern with a changing Soviet threat by any during the course of the reorganization debates. Thus, as was the case in 1947 and 1953, the salutary effects this legislation had on the ability of the U.S. to confront its external threat was not a direct result of any linkage of threat perception and reorganization impulse.

Perhaps the only aspect of the 1958 reorganization which could be directly tied to the changing Soviet threat was the creation of the Director of Research and
Engineering. This new director would rank above the service secretaries and was charged with supervising all research efforts and coordinating all programs requiring central management. It can be argued that the fear generated by the advent of the Soviet missile program was directly responsible for focusing debate on the U.S. research effort and was responsible for this aspect of the 1958 reorganization.

THE DOMESTIC EXPLANATION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

The Domestic Economy

The U.S. domestic economy was once again in a period of contraction by 1958. All of the major indicators of economic health pointed to a serious situation. GNP, while increasing from 1955-1958, was doing so at a much slower rate. In fact, as seen below, the percentage increase in U.S. GNP had fallen to single digits by 1958.

Percentage Increase in U.S. GNP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, unemployment as a percentage of the civilian labor force had jumped from 4.3% in 1957 to 6.8% in 1958.
The consumer price index increased by 8% from 1954 to 1958.\textsuperscript{40} The Federal Reserve Board Index of Manufacturing Production fell from 61 in 1957 to 57 in 1958, the lowest number since 1954.\textsuperscript{41} Finally, the business failure rate jumped 33% from 1954 to 1958.\textsuperscript{42}

The Perceived Trend in the Domestic Economy

On the whole, perceptions of the economic trends were positive. Early on in the economic downturn, the perceptions of the recession of 1957-58 were exceedingly bleak. Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, at a press conference in 1957, stated that if the government couldn't reduce spending and taxes, that over the long term there was the possibility of a depression that would "curl your hair."\textsuperscript{43} The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, Dr. Arthur F. Burns, commented on the "gloom of the academic fraternity about our economic prospects. If there was an optimist in the crowd, he kept his council to himself."\textsuperscript{44} By 1958, however, Eisenhower's own estimations of the strength of the recession significantly differed from these dire predictions.

At the outset of 1958, Eisenhower resisted the moves to take rapid and drastic action on the economy, noting that, "You know, the same thing happened in the war. Whenever a crisis occurred, some interested but excitable people began screaming for action. And when they did, I had only one
answer, 'I guess I'm just too stubborn to act fast until all of the facts are in.' The clearest indication of Eisenhower's optimistic assessment of the economic trends was his statement of February 12, 1958. He commented:

From the best advice I can get, and on my own study of the facts regularly placed before me, I believe that we have had most of our bad news on the unemployment front. I am convinced that we are not facing a prolonged downswing in activity. Every indication is that March will commence to see the start of a pickup in job opportunities. That should mark the beginning of the end of the downturn in our economy, provided we apply ourselves with confidence to the job ahead.

Eisenhower consistently refused to support tax cuts in 1958 as a means of spurring the economic recovery, firmly convinced that the economy was on an upswing.

Reports on Administrative Performance

Reported incidents of poor administrative performance were below average in the years immediately preceding the 1958 reorganizations. In fact, the numbers of incidents reported from 1954-1958 were far below the numbers found during the Korean War. Most telling, the number of reported incidents of poor administrative performance declined in 1957 and 1958 from higher numbers in 1956. The New York Times reported 45 incidents of poor administrative performance in the Department of Defense in 1956, 35 in 1957, and 39 in 1958. No specific administrative scandals occurred within the Defense Department during these years.
The Debates and the Economy

There were limited references to the economy during the 1958 defense reorganization debates. The first hint of a linkage between defense reorganization and the efforts to achieve economies was found in the Rockefeller Brother's report. In it, the committee concluded by stating, "Implementation of the recommendations in this section would provide a unity and coherence now absent from our defense reorganization. They are the primary means to achieve economies in our defense structure because they will permit a better utilization of resources and eliminate the present duplication of functions." In his January 14, 1958 budget message, Eisenhower publicly set the tone of linking defense reorganization with the goal of economy. Eisenhower noted that, "In the interest of the taxpayer, improved operating and fiscal controls must accompany larger appropriations."

In his formal letter to Congress on April 3, 1958, Eisenhower clearly stated, as one of the objectives of the reorganization, the need to save money by creating a more efficient military. He stated, "the new weapons and other defense undertakings are so costly as to heavily burden our entire economy. We must achieve the utmost military efficiency in order to generate maximum power from the resources we have available." However, the
reorganizations were not only necessary in order to generate surplus funds from other areas to be applied to the demands of the new weapons. Eisenhower also asserted that the reorganization would save money on the new weapons as well. He stated that, "we must find more efficient and economical means of developing new devices and fitting them into our defense establishment."\textsuperscript{51}

After the formal proposal for the reorganization, Eisenhower took it to the people, attempting to sell the reorganization as a necessity for the economic health of the overall economy, and for the economic well-being of the individual taxpayer. At a news conference on April 9, 1958, he vowed to go on television as many times as the networks would have him in order to explain to the American people the need for another defense reorganization. In response to a question asking for the reasons why the public should support the reorganization, Eisenhower responded, "it is their pocketbooks first of all ..."\textsuperscript{52}

Eisenhower's theme of saving money was also sounded by members of the administration who testified before Congress. For example, Secretary of Defense McElroy, testifying in support of the portion of the reorganization creating centralized direction of research and engineering, argued that, "this kind of unified direction of the research and development programs of all of the services and of the advanced research projects agency ... should [result in] ...
savings that can be made through avoiding some duplication that could very well run into the hundreds of millions of dollars."^53

The Debates and Administrative Performance

There were a very few references to administrative performance during the defense reorganization debates in 1958. One expressed concern with the poor administrative performance within the DoD dealt with the extent to which the Secretary of Defense was bogged down in administrative and quasi-administrative functions to the exclusion of other, more desirable tasks. As the Rockefeller Brother's report noted, "a principle objective of any reorganization plan should be to create conditions in which the Secretary of Defense can give a more effective lead to the initiation and formulation of broad military policy, while delegating to the substructures of the defense organization a substantial portion of his present administrative burden."^54 Yet, the report went on to note that in the existing organizational system, "The Secretary of Defense is so burdened with the negative tasks of trying to arbitrate and control inter-service disputes that he cannot play his full part in the initiation and development of high military policy."^55 Contributing to the administrative problems confronting the Secretary of Defense was the supposed autonomy of the service departments. As Secretary of
Defense McElroy observed, "As long as there is any unclear language in the law on which the military departments can predicate a claim to autonomy or to the right to block normal and efficient staff procedure, then to that extent the clear and direct authority of the Secretary of Defense is obscured, and Defense efficiency is impaired." 56

Other comments dwelled on the need to improve administrative performance within the service departments themselves. As noted by President Eisenhower, in his April 3, 1958 letter to Congress, "the Secretaries of the military departments will be relieved of direct responsibility for military operations ... under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense, they will be better able to perform their primary functions of managing the vast administration, training, and logistics functions of the Defense Department." 57 He went on to note that, "These secretaries should concern themselves with such vital tasks as bringing greater economy and efficiency to activities which support operational commands rather than with military operations themselves." 58

Other discussions focused on the poor administrative practices within the research and development community. More specifically, the Soviet successes with Sputnik and their ICBM program starkly illustrated the shortcomings of the U.S. missile development program. The controversy centered around the fact that the U.S. had missile research
and development programs underway in each of the military services as well as a non-military satellite orbiting program. President Eisenhower, in his autobiography, asserted that the duplication of efforts between the military and the civilians was intentional. As he stated:

In the United States we were careful to keep the earth satellite program separated from the Defense Department’s work on long-range ballistic missiles. Though the Navy would supply the launching facilities for the satellite, it was to go into orbit strictly as a peaceful scientific experiment, and was not to interfere with our top priority work on missiles. No secret missile information would be involved in the satellite program; our scientists deliberately planned to share all information acquired with participating scientists all over the world.\(^9\)

Despite this rather calm assessment of the missile development process by the President, most others in and outside of government were not quite so sanguine in their assessment of U.S. missile research and development. Questions of why the Soviets "beat" the U.S. into space were soon superseded by more informed questions about duplication of research and development in the military in general. The missile situation was a stark example of duplicated effort. As Secretary of Defense McElroy admitted in testimony before the House, "In the case of the Thor and the Jupiter [missiles], which are the principle cases in point, I think we have 2 services each 1 of them working on the development of a missile which would have the same mission."\(^{50}\) Such admissions merely fed a preexisting concern with the
administrative procedures utilized within the research and development community.

THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

Eisenhower's assertions to the contrary, it is very difficult to discover clear linkages between the demands for economy during the reorganization debates of 1958 and the actual legislation and executive orders associated with the reorganization. Few linkages can be found between the concern with economy and administrative performance and the actual reorganization legislation. Essentially, only three aspects of the 1958 reorganization appear to be likely to affect economy. First, the reorganization authorized the Secretary of Defense to assign common supply and service activities to single departments or agencies within the Department of Defense. Such action, if chosen, could cut back on uneconomical duplication of effort.

Second, the 1958 reorganization authorized the creation of the Director of Research and Defense Engineering. Such a post would consolidate the research and development function into a single office, and could also result in economies via elimination of duplications. Finally, the aspects of the reorganization which clarified the responsibilities of the services may have acted so as to achieve economies. By removing the services from the chain of command and restricting their functions to the "administrative" tasks of
administering and supporting the forces assigned to the unified commands, economies might be achieved via more concerted service department effort in these areas.

The legislative links between the desire to improve administrative performance and the 1958 reorganizations were not very substantial either. First, as a means of addressing the administrative problems confronting the overworked Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Defense's authority over the service departments was strengthened and he was given the ability to delegate decision-making authority to his Assistant Secretaries. Many felt that merely increasing the Secretary's power would resolve many of the administrative problems. It was felt that this greater power would undermine the independent inclinations of the service secretaries and would speed the flow of administrative work.

In addition, the service secretaries were taken out of the chain of command and were delegated, as their primary responsibility, the duty of administering the service in their charge. Finally, the commonly noted problem of poor administration in research and development was addressed by giving the Secretary of Defense greater authority to coordinate and distribute research and by creating a Director of Research and Defense Engineering.
THE CIVILIAN/EXECUTIVE CONSOLIDATION EXPLANATION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

Civilian Executive Tenure

There were new civilian executives in the defense establishment during the period leading up to the 1958 defense reorganizations. At the time of the reorganization debates of 1958, Eisenhower had been president for a little over five years. Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy had only been Secretary since October 9, 1957, giving him a tenure of only about four months prior to the onset of the reorganization debates. McElroy took over for Charles Wilson, who served as Secretary of Defense from 1953 until the fall of 1957, over four years.

Origins of the Move to Reorganize

In general, the impetus for the 1958 defense reorganization came from civilian executives within the defense establishment. While the first calls for reorganization were made in 1955 by the Congressionally-convened Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government (the Second Hoover Commission), they were rather soundly rejected by the administration via Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson. Eisenhower contends that serious consideration and work on reorganization didn't begin until
November, 1957. Much of the inspiration for the 1958 reorganization proposals came from the Rockefeller Fund’s advisory report, issued in November 1957. Eisenhower claimed that this report was an extension of the work done by the Advisory Committee on Government Organization, chaired by Rockefeller, and first established in 1953. In addition, Eisenhower noted that another executive branch advisory committee, consisting of a number of retired military officers and former Defense Department officials was created to examine defense reorganization. It appears, however, that the vast majority of the 1958 reorganization was the product of the work of the Rockefeller Fund and of President Eisenhower himself.

Civilian Executive Perceptions of Civil Control

There is little evidence of excessive concern with the existing levels of civilian control among the civilian executives of the Eisenhower administration. While there were many calls made for a final resolution of the question of the authority held by the Secretary of Defense, the concern over the Secretary’s authority does not seem to be predicated on a concern over a diminution of civilian control. In fact, the problems experienced by the Secretary of Defense were in dealing with other civilians within the Defense Department - namely, the service secretaries. Thus, the perceived problems associated with the Secretary were
the result of conflicts between civilians, not between civilians and the military.

Nevertheless, civilian control seems to be something of which no administration can get enough, so brief references are made to the effect that the existing levers of civilian control could be strengthened. As Eisenhower noted in his letter to Congress of April 1953, previous reorganizations had not achieved optimal civilian control. "As a result of well meaning attempts to protect traditional concepts and prerogatives, we have impaired civilian authority and denied ourselves a fully effective defense. We must cling no longer to statutory barriers that weaken executive action and civilian authority."64

Civilian Executive Perceptions of Centralization

The existing level of centralization within the Department of Defense was of much greater concern to the Eisenhower administration than the extent of civilian control. The administration felt that inadequate centralization was primarily a problem linked to inter-service rivalry and a lack of service unification. In particular, inadequate centralization was to be found in two areas: command and research and development.

The Eisenhower administration was primarily concerned with inadequate centralization and its impact on command relationships and operational conduct. Eisenhower was
convinced that inter-service rivalry undermined effective defense in the current era of combined military operations. In fact, as he states in his autobiography, "As far back as 1945 . . . I told the cadets at West Point that I would like to see all the services, one day, in one uniform. . . . I have always believed that a nation's defense would be most efficiently conducted by a single administrative service, comprising elements of land, sea, and air. I did not (and do not) join those who insist that a system of 'checks and balances' among services contributes to a nation's security. Successful defense cannot be conducted under a debating society." In August 1956, in a letter to Everett Hazlett, Eisenhower observed that, "I should say that my most frustrating domestic problem is that of attempting to achieve any real coordination among the Services."

The second centralization concern was based on the apparent inability of the existing organizational structure to adequately conduct research and development or to deploy new weapons technologies. As Eisenhower noted in his State of the Union Address for 1958, "The defense establishment must therefore plan for a better integration of its defense resources, particularly with respect to the newer weapons now building and under development. These obviously require full coordination in their development, production, and use. Good organization can help such coordination."
The clear perception was that those centralization problems that did exist were of an organizational nature and could only be addressed by reorganization. Eisenhower contended that, "the truth is that most of the service rivalries that have troubled us in recent years have been made inevitable by the laws that govern our defense organization." He contended that the problems produced by service rivalries were "inherent in any such fragmented organization."

THE DEBATES DURING THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The Debates and Civilian Control

There were several references to the concept of civilian control during the course of the 1958 defense reorganization debates. Often, however, the concern for civilian control was expressed as a concern for the powers of the Secretary of Defense. As mentioned above, these concerns may not have been motivated exclusively by a general desire to improve civilian control. Nevertheless, it is worth looking at these insofar as they may have been partially motivated by the civilian control issue.

In large part, these broad calls for increasing the power and authority of the Secretary of Defense came from Eisenhower himself. He called for the JCS to act only as a body providing advice and assistance to the Secretary of
Defense and he called for an increase in the size of the Joint Staff so as to more effectively assist the Secretary. The Secretary was to have absolute control over all the organization and funds of the Department of Defense as well. Finally, Eisenhower went so far as to, "recommend eliminating from the National Security Act such provisions as those prescribing separate administration of the military departments and the other needless and injurious restraints on the authority of the Secretary of Defense."  

Aside from Eisenhower's veiled calls for increased civilian control, there were other more direct references to civilian control in the 1958 reorganization debates. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, observed that the administrative control exerted by the service secretaries was important for civilian control, an argument advanced, in all probability, as a means of supporting the service secretaries in the reorganization battle. He noted that, "lines of administrative control run to the military departments through the principle civilian assistants - the departmental secretaries. These are the lines that develop, prepare, and support the fighting forces. These should and do strengthen civilian control."  

The question of civilian control also arose in an exchange between Senator Symington and Secretary of Defense McElroy during the Senate hearings on the proposed reorganization. Symington contended that, as opposed to
increasing civilian control, the reorganization plan actually led to a diminution of civilian control in exchange for greater centralization in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. McElroy agreed that, with respect to command authority, there was greater centralization. However, he argued that, in general, he supported decentralization in the Defense Department with the service secretaries exercising more authority.

All in all, the references to civilian control, as such, were few. One can argue that any reference to increasing the authority of the Secretary of Defense was actually a veiled call for increased civilian control, but, as noted by Senator Symington, it could be argued that increasing the authority of the Secretary of Defense actually undermined civilian control and was only a case of centralizing authority within the Department.

The Debates and Centralization

The issue of centralization was of some greater significance during the 1958 reorganization debates. As noted above, some contended that the entire reorganization process was an attempt at centralization which was undermining the existing structure of civilian control. Most within the administration, however, contended that increased centralization was necessary for effective defense.
The first call for centralization came in the report released by the Rockefeller Committee. The Rockefeller Committee contended that the existing level of service division led to poor strategy and planning. As the report stated, "The present organization and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff preclude the development of a comprehensive and coherent strategic doctrine for the United States." The report went on to observe that fragmented construction of the JCS also produced incoherent planning and strategy. It claimed that, "our military plans for meeting foreseeable threats tend to be a patchwork of compromise between conflicting strategic concepts or simply the uncoordinated war plans of the several services."

Eisenhower concurred with the estimate that service division and fragmentation within the Defense Department could no longer be tolerated. In perhaps the most famous phrase to emerge from the reorganization debates, Eisenhower wrote Congress that, "separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can
develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service."^76

The comments on the issue of centralization were not all positive however. Ferdinand Eberstadt, an old hand at defense reorganizations and an early ally of the Navy in its efforts to block unification, testified to the negative nature of the centralization process. Eberstadt first noted the trends evident in past reorganization efforts.

Over the past decade, culminating in present requests, there has, in the name of unification, been a disturbing trend toward centralization of administration. Undue emphasis on centralization, far from producing increased efficiency and economy, is likely to have the opposite result. If this tendency continues unabated, it may wreck the present system of administration, resulting in an unmanageable conglomeration of men and materials, and in Maginot line type of military thinking, whose effect could be even more serious.^77

Eberstadt further criticized the claim that centralization was necessary in order to give adequate authority to the Secretary of Defense. He noted that, "There seems to be some confusion between centralization of operations and adequacy of authority. What is really being sought is not increased authority for the Secretary of Defense. Words are incapable of conveying to the Secretary of Defense greater authority than he presently possesses. It has never been challenged. What is in fact desired is removal of barriers to greater centralization of operations. . . ."^78

Clearly, Eberstadt viewed centralization as an evil in and of itself. He claimed that calls for greater authority
for the Secretary of Defense were in fact veiled calls for centralization. It is not clear that Eisenhower would dispute the latter point, but it is clear that he would contest the first. The issue of centralization seems to have been debated as a matter of faith in 1958 - either it was inherently good, or inherently evil. Little discussion was directed towards materially establishing either position.

THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

Much of the legislation and executive orders which form the basis of the 1958 defense reorganizations seem to have significant links to the desires for enhanced civilian control or centralization. In terms of civilian control, we once again run into the question of whether the steps taken to enhance the authority of the Secretary of Defense may qualify as designed to enhance civilian control. The primary step taken in this regard was to further restrict the authority of the service secretaries to primarily administrative functions. In this case, if civilian control is enhanced in the person of the Secretary of Defense, it is diminished in the persons of the service secretaries. The steps which do seem to fundamentally enhance civilian authority were those which gave the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the JCS, the authority to establish the unified and specialized commands and to assign
missions and forces to these commands. The Secretary was
given greater authority over the delegation of research and
development to appropriate agencies. The Secretary, subject
to rather significant Congressional oversight constraints,
also had the ability to transfer or abolish combat
functions. In addition, the Secretary could consolidate
supply and service activities as well as assign new weapons
to particular services. Finally, the Joint Staff was
increased so as to provide more assistance to the Secretary
of Defense. All in all, in the person of the Secretary of
Defense, civilian authority over the military was
significantly enhanced by the 1958 reorganizations.

On the flip side, centralization was also increased.
Each of the measures listed above not only increased
civilian control, but led to a further centralization of
authority in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. Beyond
this, those actions taken which reduced the authority of the
service secretaries led to a further centralization of
authority to the benefit of the Secretary. Within the JCS
the Chairman was given additional influence insofar as he
was given a "vote" within the JCS. Beyond this step,
however, the progress towards more centralization within the
highest military body was minimal. The 1958 reorganizations
advocated more unification in commands and a more coherent
and centralized chain of command. However, these steps were
accomplished mainly via centralization of authority to the
benefit of the Secretary of Defense, rather that any degree of military centralization.

CONCLUSIONS

The 1958 defense reorganizations were the last major defense reorganizations for twenty eight years. As such, they are the final step taken in a eleven year period in which four major reorganizations took place. Evaluating the 1958 reorganization will give some insight into the entire period of defense reorganizations.

The External Explanation

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the external explanation was answered. A + indicates an answer supporting the external explanation. A - indicates an answer which does not support the external explanation. A * indicates an ambiguous answer which in and of itself does not support or undermine the external explanation.

1. The change in the Soviet threat. *
2. The existence of potential new threats. +
3. The level of operational activity. -
4. References to operational lessons. -
5. References to the external threat. -
6. Links between legislation and the issues. -
Due to the lack of any real linkage between the issues of the external threat and operational lessons and the actual reorganization legislation, as well as the numerous other negative responses, the external explanation is not persuasive in explaining the 1958 defense reorganization.

The Domestic Explanation

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the domestic explanation was answered.

1. The current state of the economy. +
2. The perceived trend in the economy. -
3. Reports on poor administrative performance. -
4. References to economy and administrative performance. +
5. Links between legislation and the issues. -

The domestic explanation is not persuasive in explaining the 1958 defense reorganization due to the lack of a significant link between the issues of economy and administrative performance, and the actual reorganization legislation. In addition, the objective circumstances in 1958 do not correspond with the domestic explanations posited need for a poor and declining economy and increasingly poor administrative performance.
The Civilian/Executive Consolidation Explanation

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the civilian/executive consolidation explanation was answered.

1. Tenure in office. +
2. Origins of the reorganization movement. +
3. Perceptions of civilian control. -
4. Perceptions of centralization. +
5. References to civilian control and centralization. +
6. Links between legislation and the issues. +

As a whole, the civilian/executive consolidation explanation is quite persuasive as an explanation for the 1958 defense reorganizations given the overwhelmingly supportive responses gathered for the questions posed.

Conclusions

All in all, the 1958 reorganization appears to clearly be a case of civilian executive consolidation. While the economy was bad and the external threat was apparently increasing, the center of focus for the proposals and the debates was an attempt to end service divisions and unify the direction of the armed forces via a heavy dose of centralization of power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense. Those who were perceptive, like Eberstadt, clearly
saw that this was the true goal of these reorganizations, not the rather lamely argued need for economy and efficiency. In 1958, reliance upon these buzz words was at its lowest ebb. In many ways Eisenhower seemed determined to achieve, as closely as possible, the single military establishment that he desired, and he apparently did not need to rely on the old standby promises of saving money and improving efficiency to get it.
Notes


3. Ibid., 165.


7. Ibid., 27.

8. Ibid., 30.

9. Ibid., 31-33.

10. Ibid., 181.

11. Ibid., 183.

12. Ibid., 184.


15. Ibid., 78.

16. Ibid., 81.

17. Ibid., 98-99.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.


28. Ibid., 221.


31. During the Suez crisis of November 1956 the U.S. Marines engaged in a brief humanitarian rescue operation in order to evacuate civilians. From 1954-1958 the U.S. Navy maintained a presence in the waters off of Vietnam, and small numbers of U.S. Army personnel acted as military advisors in Vietnam and Cambodia.


33. Ibid., 179.


37. Ibid., 113.

38. Based on figures from Historical Statistics of the United States, Part II, 224.


40. Ibid., 210.

42. Ibid., 912.


44. Ibid., 306.

45. Ibid., 306.

46. Ibid., 307.


51. Ibid.


55. Ibid., 27.


58. Ibid.


62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.


72. Ibid., 303-317.

73. Ibid.


75. Ibid., 29-30.


78. Ibid., 139.
It's the only goddamn thing I've done in the Senate that's worth a damn. I can go home happy, sit on my hill, and shoot jackrabbits.

Sen. Barry Goldwater¹

The reorganizations of 1986 were somewhat unique in the history of post-war U.S. defense reorganizations. First of all, as noted by Vincent Davis, there was a "relatively low level of publicly visible controversy" associated with the reorganization process.² This oddity could no doubt be related to the second unique aspect of the 1986 reorganization process noted by Davis, "the absence of major media attention," to the process.³ The 1986 reorganizations were the only comprehensive reorganizations of the U.S. military establishment since 1958. Furthermore, it can be argued that these reforms were the most significant since the dramatic reforms brought about by the National Security Act of 1947.

BACKGROUND OF THE LEGISLATION

One can trace the legislative background of the 1986 defense reorganization back a number of years. Some would
argue that serious thought about the need for reorganization began as early as 1960, with a series of Congressional Hearings on organization in the Department of Defense. In 1970, a panel chaired by Gilbert W. Fitzhugh submitted the Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. In 1978, Richard C. Steadman directed the National Military Command Structure Study, the so-called "Steadman Report." In addition, a number of privately sponsored groups and authors undertook studies of defense management, organization, and reform.

Despite all of these reports, the most likely source of much of the discussions about defense reform in the early 1980s was the opinions of General David C. Jones. Air Force General Jones was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1982, and his opinions were first aired in a closed door session of the House Armed Services Committee in February of that year. Eventually, Jones authored a report summarizing those views for public consumption. Perhaps the best known statement to come from General Jones' writing was his contention that, "the corporate advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very useful, or very influential. And that advice is often watered down and issues are papered over in the interest of achieving unanimity. . . ."

Noting a variety of problems including fragmented and deferred authority within the Defense Department as well as a destructive level of inter-service rivalry, Jones proposed
solutions which would have entailed a significant restructuring of the then existing military framework. Among Jones' recommendations were: (1) centralizing the operational advice function, and placing that function solely within the hands of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); (2) increasing the access of combat commanders to operational deliberations; (3) creating a deputy CJCS; (4) assigning the Joint Staff to the sole control of the CJCS; (5) decentralizing administrative functions back to the individual services; and (6) encouraging "jointness" - an attitude intended to combat inter-service rivalry.6

General Jones' concerns were seconded by Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer. Meyer argued that the existing JCS system did a poor job of providing military advice to the civilian leadership due to the constraints placed on the JCS due to "duel-hatting" as well as due to the problems of inter-service rivalry.

In response to these concerns, Congress began a series of hearings on JCS reform in 1983. The end result was rather mild legislation, contained in the Fiscal Year 1985 Defense Budget Authorization Bill, which made the Chairman of the JCS the "spokesman" for the JCS on operational issues, extended the tour of duty of Joint Staff officers by one year, and gave the Chairman the authority to decide when issues on the joint agenda would be decided. Senator John
Tower, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, effectively blocked any more ambitious legislation.

Simultaneous with the beginning of the hearings in 1983, the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee was charged with preparing a comprehensive study of defense reorganization. In the first weeks of October, 1985, Senators Goldwater and Nunn appeared on the Senate floor and gave a series of speeches setting forth the fruits of this examination. In these speeches each senator examined the various problems associated with the existing defense structure and attempted to trace the roots of these problems. In fact, these speeches were the verbal manifestation of the 645 page report written by the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee entitled Defense Organization: The Need For Change.

The staff report of the Senate Armed Services Committee was a extremely detailed examination of the past attempts at defense reorganization as well as an examination of the variety of proposals and reports offered since the last significant defense reorganization of 1958. From this examination, the staff report distilled the major problems facing various aspects of Defense Department operation and made extensive recommendations to remedy these problems. Of these major problem areas, this study will focus on those which, subsequently, comprised the bulk of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986:
problems associated with (1) the Office of the Secretary of Defense, (2) the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (3) the unified and specified commands, and (4) the military departments.

The staff report's examination of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) offered perhaps the least damning criticisms and, consequently, the least significant recommendations for change. Primarily, the staff report was concerned with the lack of mission integration within the DoD. As a remedy for this failing, the staff report suggested a variety of alternative plans to encourage mission integration including creating under secretaries of defense to deal with clusters of missions or creating an Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Program Integration. Another more significant concern was with the lack of supervision exercised over many within the OSD, due to the broad expanse of control granted the SecDef. The staff report suggested, as one possible solution, the creation of the position of Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness, Sustainability, and Support) to act as a coordinator for the OSD.

With respect to the functioning of the JCS, the staff report was more sharply critical and offered some of the more dramatic reorganization proposals. A principle concern expressed by the staff report was the inability of the members of the JCS to overcome the conflict of interest
inherent in the dual role of Chief of Staff of a given service and a member of a "joint" body. Among the suggestions to combat this problems were the abolition of the JCS, thereby allowing the service chiefs to focus primarily on their individual services, or the creation of a Joint Military Advisory Council composed of the CJCS and four star generals from each service serving in their last tour of duty. Additionally, other problems identified within the JCS were allegedly "solved" by the staff report by utilizing this proposed Joint Military Advisory Council. For example, the complaint that members of the JCS did not usually have an adequate joint service background was remedied in the staff report by requiring the members of the Joint Military Advisory Council to have such a joint background.

A second major problem underlying all of the minor problems within the JCS, according to the staff report, was the aversion most military officers had to joint service. In particular, they did not want to be assigned to joint service duty, had little background to allow them to excel in such duty, and left as soon as possible thus precluding any long term benefit from their acquired joint duty skills. In response to this problem, the staff suggested a variety of remedies including establishing joint duty as a career specialty and making performance of joint duty a prerequisite for further advancement.
The staff report also focused on the problems within the unified and specified commands. Among those problems identified by the report were a confused chain of command, a failure to truly unify the commands, inadequate authority of the unified commanders over the Service components within his command, and inadequate unified commander input into the resource allocation process. In response to these problems, the staff report suggested that the CJCS be made the chief military advisor to the President, while not falling within the chain of operational command. Additionally, the report suggested that the unified commanders be given the authority to select and replace their Service component commanders, and that OSD mission officers should represent the interests of the unified commanders for resource allocation purposes.

Finally, the staff report commented on the roles of the military departments themselves. The primary problems with the military departments, according to the report, were the confusion with respect to the roles of the departments as well as the excessive layers of bureaucracy within the departments and the inadequate competence of the civilian political appointees serving within the departments. Additionally, there was a clear conflict between the services over the roles and missions to be performed by each service. The solution to the first of these problems was a more clear and comprehensive statutory expression of
service department functions. In response to the problem of over bureaucratization, the report suggested consolidation of the secretariats and military headquarters staffs of the services. To address the personnel problem, the staff report urged that civilian political appointees demonstrate adequate credentials before being appointed. Finally, with respect to roles and missions, the staff report urged the CJCS to submit yearly reports on service roles and missions to the Secretary of Defense.

At about the same time as the Congressional investigations of organization within the Department of Defense, the executive branch also began limited inquiries into the issue of defense structure and organization. On July 15, 1985 President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12526 creating the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. Informally known as the Packard Commission, after its chairman David Packard, the Commission was to "study the issues surrounding defense management and organization." In particular, the Commission was asked to examine the adequacy of the acquisition process, the levels of authority given the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the unified and specified command/commander in chief (CINC) system, the research and development process, the JCS's ability to provide military advice, the existing command and control system, the congressional oversight process, and the resource allocation process. While calling on the
Commission to focus on both administrative and operational aspects of the Department of Defense, the Executive Order specifically requested the Commission to devote its attention first to the issues of procurement of military equipment and materials.\textsuperscript{22}

Based on this charge, the Packard Commission submitted an interim report to the President on February 28, 1986. In it, the Commission called for far reaching reforms and reorganizations within the Department of Defense. While focusing on the issue of procurement, the Commission went ahead and made recommendations with respect to operational issues as well.

Specifically, the Commission made recommendations in four areas: (1) national security planning and budgeting, (2) military organization and command, (3) acquisition organization and procedures, and (4) government-industry accountability. With respect to national security planning and budgeting, the Commission called for an integrated budgetary process in which the CJCS would be given direction in his preparation of strategy alternatives and program requirements by a Presidential report establishing five year budget levels. The CJCS would have to work within these budgetary restraints in creating strategic plans, as opposed to the open ended process currently in existence. After formulating the strategy and the program requirements for the strategy, the CJCS along with the JCS and the Director
of Central Intelligence would make net assessments of the effectiveness of the U.S. military in comparison with its enemies. The President would then select the strategy and programs based on the net assessments. The intention of this process was to have strategy formation restrained by budgetary realities and have strategic selection restrained by military realities.

In terms of military organization, the Commission made several dramatic suggestions. The Commission recommended that the CJCS should become the principle military advisor to the President, as opposed to then existing collegial advisory role played by the entire JCS. In addition, the Joint Staff would be under the sole direction of the CJCS, and the CJCS would act as the conduit between the CINCs and the SecDef, thus pushing the JCS as a whole even further from the chain of command. The Commission recommended the creation of a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and also recommended that the CINCs be given broader authority over their commands. In large part, these recommendations corresponded with those proposed by General Jones in 1982, and would substantially enhance the authority of the CJCS to the detriment of the JCS as a whole. In addition, such changes would significantly increase the role of the CINCs in the planning process and would increase their ability to exercise control over their commands.
Acquisition organization and procedures were intended to be the dominant area for the Commissions study, as illustrated by the President's specific request that these issues be examined first. After surveying a variety of problems associated with acquisition and procurement, the Commission offered numerous solutions. Primary among these solutions was the recommendation for the creation of an Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) who's sole purpose would be to act as a "full-time Defense Acquisition Executive." Additionally, within each service a politically appointed civilian would act as an acquisition executive whose would oversee service acquisition and procurement as well as appoint program executive officers for various service sponsored procurement programs.

Aside from these personnel oriented proposals, the Packard Commission recommended: (1) consolidation of governmental statutes to eliminate undue legislative constraints on procurement, (2) greater reliance on "off the shelf" components and services rather specially producing or creating them, (3) a greater focus on testing of prototype equipment as well as earlier operational testing so as to correct problems early on in the procurement cycle, (4) increased use of commercial style competition, with a greater focus on quality in bidding rather than just price, 5) establishing baseline costs for major weapons systems, and (6) utilization of multi-year procurement. Many of
these recommendations could be enacted without the need for formal legislation, with the key exception of the creation of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), which was legislatively created via the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 and the Defense Acquisition Improvement Act of 1986.

The final area covered by the Packard Commission Report was that of government-industry accountability. The primary concern expressed by the Commission with respect to this issue was the declining public confidence in defense contractors, given the spate of reported incidents of defense contractor fraud. The Commission primarily recommended enhanced and aggressive enforcement of existing criminal and civil laws with respect to contracting fraud and abuse.\(^{28}\) Beyond this, the committee called for contractor self-regulation, coordination of Congressional and DoD oversight of defense contractors, and coordination of private and governmental ethics regulations.\(^{29}\) Interestingly, however, the Commission also recommended that suspension of contractors should not be utilized "punitively", thereby indicating that the ongoing relationship between the contractors and the DoD was, in the long run, more important that satisfying public calls for punitive justice.\(^{30}\)

Accepting these interim recommendations of the Packard Commission (which were nearly identical to those contained in the final report issued in June 1986) President Reagan
implemented those which he could via executive order on April 1, 1986. In a press release following the issuing of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219, it was noted that, "The President has signed a directive to implement virtually all of the recommendations presented to him in the interim report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. The Presidential directive and separate instructions issued by Secretary of Defense Weinberger include all of the Commission’s recommendations that can be implemented by executive order." In reality, most of the Packard Commission’s recommendations called for changes in style rather than for actual organizational changes. The only truly structural change to be found in the Packard Commission’s recommendations dealt with the creation of the position of an Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition). With respect to the operational aspects of the Packard Commission report, the President’s NSDD 219 accomplished only two things: it encouraged communication between the CINCs and the Secretary of Defense and it encouraged the CINCs to structure their commands more effectively and to shorten the chain of command. Ultimately, the only legislative action stemming from the Packard Commission report was the creation of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition).

Following the issuance of NSDD 219, President Reagan sent a letter to Congress on April 24, 1986 dealing with the
issues of defense reorganization. The President gave qualified support to the initiatives proposed by some in Congress, but noted that, "changes in statute must not infringe on the constitutionally protected responsibilities of the President as Commander-in-Chief. Any legislation in which the issues of Legislative and Executive responsibilities are confused would be constitutionally suspect and would not meet with my approval." The President’s attitude was that some of changes proposed by some in Congress were useful (especially those changes which coincided with the recommendations of the Packard Commission), and some were simply not needed. However, he stated that, with respect to the latter, "if such changes are recommended by the Congress, I will carefully consider them, provided they are consistent with current policy and practice and do not infringe upon the authority or reduce the flexibility of the President or the Secretary of Defense."

The Senate Armed Services Committee, as well as the House Armed Services Committee, took the recommendations of their respective staff reports, as well as the letter from President Reagan, under advisement. Exhaustive hearings were held on the proposed reorganizations, and by mid-September 1986, the House and Senate had reached agreement on a compromise bill which was accepted by both houses of
Congress and was eventually signed into law by President Reagan on October 1, 1986.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act had a number of significant elements. With respect to the Secretary of Defense, Goldwater-Nichols imposed upon the Secretary the requirement of preparing written policy guidances for program recommendations, budget proposals, and contingency plans as a means of restraining the proposals prepared by the services. Goldwater-Nichols also reemphasized the chain of command as running from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the CINC.

With respect to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Goldwater-Nichols made the CJCS the sole military advisor to the Secretary of Defense and placed the Joint Staff under his sole supervision. The Act also created the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act in the place of the CJCS when he is absent. Additionally, the CJCS was made the spokesman for the CINC in JCS deliberations, particularly with respect to the operational requirements of their command. The CJCS was to provide oversight of the CINC when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense, but was not to be granted any command authority. Finally, the CJCS was also to assist the Secretary of Defense in the preparation of the policy guidances mentioned above.
The unified and specified commanders, or CINCs, were given greater authority by Goldwater-Nichols. The CINCS were given the authority to:

1. direct subordinate commands and forces, including direction over military operations, joint training and logistics
2. prescribe the chain of command within the unified or specified command
3. organize commands and forces within the unified or specified command
4. employ forces within the command as deemed necessary
5. assign command functions to subordinates
6. coordinating administrative and support functions in such areas as resources and equipment, internal organization, and training
7. select subordinates.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments were included in Goldwater-Nichols to the extent that their administrative functions were reiterated by the Act. Specifically, the Secretaries are noted as being responsible for the administration and support of those forces assigned to the various combat commands. However, the Secretary of Defense was given the authority to reassign the administrative and support functions of combat command
forces away from the service secretaries and to others (most notably the CINCs themselves).

Finally, a variety of miscellaneous requirements were imposed by Goldwater-Nichols. First, the Act required the Secretary of Defense, the service secretaries, and the CJCS to prepare management studies on their respective organizations. The Act required the President to submit an annual national security strategy report. In addition, the Secretary of Defense was given additional items to include in his annual Secretary of Defense Report. A number of other reporting requirements were eliminated or consolidated by Goldwater-Nichols.

Perhaps most significant, from a long term perspective, were those aspects of Goldwater-Nichols which affected personnel policy. A number of steps were taken to encourage "jointness" or a joint perspective within the military services, particularly within those officers serving in the Joint Staff. It was hoped that such policies as requiring truly joint assignments as prerequisites for promotion would address the problems of inter-service rivalry which had historically plagued the JCS. Finally, the Act substantially reduced the number of military personnel assigned to management headquarters duty so as to overcome the glut of officers found in desk jobs.
THE EXTERNAL EXPLANATION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

The Soviet Threat

U.S. estimates of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, in the period from 1981-1986 underwent substantial change. From 1981 to early 1985, the Reagan administration assessed the Soviets as an increasing threat to U.S. security, based on their perceptions of Soviet military capabilities coupled with the Soviet’s perceived international ambitions. The Soviets had, from 1981 to 1984, undertaken a number of provocative actions. In December 1981, martial law was imposed in Poland and the Solidarity trade union was suppressed. In the fall of 1983, the Soviets had shot down a Korean KAL jetliner which had strayed into Soviet airspace, killing all on board. In the field of arms control, the Soviets had vigorously rejected the U.S. position on both long range and intermediate range nuclear weapons, and eventually walked out of the negotiations in November 1983.

The Reagan administration perceived the Soviets as quite aggressive at this time. While CIA estimates of Soviet defense expenditures indicated that growth in Soviet defense spending was small, averaging only a 2-3% growth (part of which could be accounted for by inflation) from
1981 to 1986, President Reagan was still speaking about the "evil empire" and discounting the proposals for a nuclear freeze which would, "reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup." The Reagan administration believed that the Soviets had attained superiority over the U.S. in practically every measure of military strength - with the consequence being increased Soviet aggressiveness. Despite all of this, however, Reagan contended that the poor state of U.S.-Soviet relations did not necessarily mean a greater likelihood of U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

By 1984/85, the U.S. perceived the Soviet threat to have essentially stabilized. Part of the change reflected changed circumstances affecting the Soviet Union. Soviet military action in Afghanistan was unsuccessful. By 1985, foreign observers estimated that the Soviet Union had suffered between 20,000 and 25,000 casualties, of which one third were estimated to have been killed. In 1985 there seemed to be little hope of a military solution to the conflict, or even some sort of compromise solution. Thus, the Soviets were experiencing a foreign policy set back akin to that experienced by the U.S. in Vietnam, and, like the U.S. after Vietnam, the estimation of the strength of the Soviet Union suffered.

Estimates of the threat posed by the Soviet Union also stabilized due to several internal events within the Soviet
Union. Most obvious was the change in leadership. The new President, Mikhail Gorbachev, was of a new generation who seemed committed to ending the hostility between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and to improving the conditions within the Soviet Union. Clearly, Gorbachev and the policies he promoted led many in the U.S. to downgrade the Soviet threat. In addition, the condition of the Soviet economy was such as to lead many to conclude that Soviet economic weaknesses precluded a substantial Soviet threat to the U.S.

As James Schlesinger noted in 1985:

> By 1984 the Administration had altered its original stance. The worldwide Soviet geopolitical momentum had become a thing of the past. Indeed, the Soviet Union might actually be an "economic basket case." Despite basically unchanged force ratios, the Administration, which at first had exaggerated Soviet military power, was now down playing it. The window of vulnerability was forgotten.

In sum, by 1986, the U.S. had a much more healthy relationship with the U.S.S.R., involving discussions on arms control and high level contacts between President Reagan and President Gorbachev. If, in 1984, many were arguing that the U.S. and the Soviets had their worst relations for twenty years, by 1986 the assessment was less apocalyptic.

Other Security Threats
Apart from the Soviet threat, the U.S., from 1981 to 1986, witnessed the rise of a number of potential new threats to U.S. security. In general, these additional external threats can be classified as regional threats of two types: regional threats posed by small communist states, and regional threats posed by aspiring regional dictators. Of the first type, the most prominent in this period was Nicaragua. The history of U.S.-Nicaraguan relations from 1981 to 1986 is far too complicated to elaborate here, but the key point to be noted is the fact that President Reagan actively attempted to portray Nicaragua as a catalyst for instability within Central America. Nicaragua, and the U.S.'s perennial foe Cuba, were seen as undertaking a concerted effort to undermine the governments of their neighbors, particularly El Salvador and Guatemala. This was the first significant threat posed to Latin America since the Cuban revolution of 1959-1960, and represented a potentially serious problem for the U.S.

Of the second type of threat, the regional dictator, the most obvious case was Libya. Beginning in 1981 the U.S. had an ongoing conflict with Colonel Quaddafi and Libya over such diverse issues as Libyan sponsorship of terrorism and the right of navigation in international waters. The U.S. viewed Libya, and other non-communist dictators such as President Asad of Syria and Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, as threats for three reasons. First, they were all vigorous
opponents of Israel, a major U.S. ally in the Middle East. Second, they actively supported terrorism, some of which had been directed against U.S. citizens. Third, they posed a potential threat to the free flow of oil from the Middle East. The U.S. spared no effort to attempt to control these sorts of regional threats, even resorting to the use of force when necessary.

The threat of international terrorism merits some additional discussion. Unlike any threat posed to the U.S. since the end of World War II, international terrorism seemed to hamstring the traditional sources of U.S. strength. It was difficult, if not impossible, to identify those responsible for terrorist actions, thus precluding either preemptive action or retaliatory strikes. The types of precautions which needed to be taken to avoid terrorism seemed to undercut the very soul of American democracy - i.e. travel prohibitions and intensive security measures. From hostage taking to hijacking to suicide bombing, the U.S. faced a constant terrorist threat to its civilians and military personnel from 1981 to 1986.

Operational Lessons

From 1981 to 1986 the U.S. engaged in a wide range of operational activities of varying intensities and with varying missions. Of the more significant operations, in 1981 the U.S. engaged in air combat with Libya, in 1982 the
U.S. sent a major Marine force into Lebanon, in 1983 the U.S. conducted a joint service invasion of Grenada, in 1984 the U.S. Navy began to patrol the Persian Gulf, in 1985 the U.S. air forces intercepted terrorists flying in a commercial airline, and in 1986 the U.S. undertook a bombing raid on Libya.

The lessons drawn from these operational were many, and in the case of Lebanon and Grenada, the lessons were extremely negative. After Lebanon and Grenada, both official and independent assessments concluded that the missions were poorly planned and executed. Insofar as Grenada represented the only truly joint service operation, the lessons to be drawn from it were particularly important. The particular problem alleged in the case of the Grenada invasion was the inability of the services to work together, combined with hardware problems which prohibited cooperation even if the services had desired it. In particular, the communications systems used by the various services were incompatible, the intelligence available to the troops was inadequate, and planning in general seemed to be motivated more by a desire to give every service a "slice of the pie" than to ensure a successful operation.
The Debates and the External Threat

There were some explicit references to the external threat during the 1986 reorganization debates. One of the earliest proponents of defense reorganization, General Edward C. Meyer, drew a clear linkage between the Soviet threat and the need for defense reorganization. Meyer noted that:

Grave new dimensions to the problems of national security have occurred since the creation of the Joint system by the National Security Act of 1947 and the changes to that law developed by President Eisenhower in 1958. The shift in the "correlation of forces" between the United States and the Soviet Union has been dramatic. The Soviets' nuclear prowess, combined with radically improved Soviet military capabilities in other -- indeed in most -- areas, lend them new confidence in their ability to mount and sustain a rapid offensive, be it nuclear or conventional. . . . The West has not responded firmly, or in a united fashion, to this challenge. . . . circumstances have changed. The situation is different. If we are to be secure, we must provide for our security in a way which can adapt to this change. It is therefore necessary that we review and repair the way we organize for war -- so that if we go to war, we shall be prepared. In short, we must reassess the JCS as a method of military organization, in light of new circumstances."

Beyond Meyer's rather direct linkage of reorganization with the Soviet threat, there were few other direct references to such a link. The linkage which was voiced was more indirect. A connection was made between the adequacy of JCS and Joint Staff planning and advice and the need for reorganization. We can view planning and advice as of two
types -- crisis planning and advice, and long range planning and advice. With respect to crisis planning and advice, in the abstract, there were few negative comments made. It was likely to be this type of planning and advice that would most likely affect the U.S. ability to address security threats other than the Soviet Union.

With respect to long range planning and advice, the type of planning and advice most likely to affect the U.S. ability to address the primary security threat -- that of the Soviet Union -- the assessments were almost uniformly negative. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence Korb stated that the JCS was indisputably unable to provide good and timely advice from the deliberative planning process. The Senate staff report cited comments by former Defense Secretaries and JCS members to the effect that long range planning and advice was poor, late, and vapid. The breadth of the problem extended to an alleged inability to formulate military strategy, settle roles and missions disputes, formulate joint doctrine, or to adequately provide for the unified commands. Thus, if we accept that poor long range advice and planning undercuts the ability of the U.S. to adequately deal with the Soviet threat, then we can argue that those comments linking poor planning and advice to the need for reorganization were implicitly motivated by the primary threat posed by the Soviet Union.
The Reagan administration did not accept these criticisms as valid. The overall perception, within the executive branch, was that, "selection of good, well-trained and experienced staff personnel is the key method for improving the functions of the Joint Staff and, in turn, improving planning for joint operations. Better people, not organizational changes, are viewed as critical for continued improvements." Secretary Weinberger repeatedly stated that he had no criticisms with the type of advice he received from the JCS. In fact, Weinberger argued that the overall quality of JCS advice was improving.

Beyond this, the references to the external threat are few. The Senate Armed Services Committee staff report of 1985 noted that, "They [observers] firmly believe that the current organizational structure is an obstacle to performance of the national security mission." The Packard Commission Interim Report linked organizational concerns with the non-Soviet threats posed to the U.S. The Commission noted that, "However well the layers of the present command structure suit the contingency of general war, they are not always well-suited to the regional crises, tensions, and conflicts that are commonplace today."

Once again, as was the case with previous reorganizations, the nature of the external threat is linked to the need for reorganization when the call for reorganization is made as a means of countering future
contingencies. No specific threat is given, but rather, the reorganizations are deemed necessary to deal with all potentialities. As the Senate Armed Services Committee staff report contends, "the international security environment has become much more complex and troubling. In response, the missions currently assigned to the Department of Defense are more varied and demanding. Given these changes and increased complexity, a comprehensive review of organizational structures and relationships appears warranted."^51

All in all, the linkage between external threats and reorganization in the 1986 debates was somewhat weak, but it was based on a number of legitimate concerns with DoD and JCS performance.

The Debates and Operational Lessons

Operational lessons played a predominant role in the 1986 reorganization debates. Specifically, there was a linkage between the need for reorganization and the recent U.S. operational activity in Iran (1980), the Grenada invasion (1983), and the U.S. Marine disaster in Beirut (1983). The first source identifying operational lessons as motivations for reorganization was the Senate Armed Services Committee staff report. In the section entitled "Unified and Specified Commands," the staff report goes into some detail in specifying six operational activities from which
lessons affecting organization could be learned. These six activities were: (1) the Spanish American War, (2) Pearl Harbor, (3) the Battle of Leyte Gulf, (4) the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo, (5) the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission, and (6) the Grenada operation. While the staff report linked these operational lessons only to those aspects of the proposed reorganization dealing with unified commands (CINCs), eventually, these operational lessons served as motivations for the entire reorganization package proposed by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Senator Barry Goldwater, in his autobiography, goes to great lengths to highlight the operational lessons contained in the staff report. Yet, while originally introducing these operational lessons in the context of a discussion of chains of command and the lack of a unified command structure, Goldwater soon segues into a more general discussion of JCS reform, relying in part on these previously mentioned operational lessons to justify such reorganizations.

The opinion of the Senate Armed Services Committee sponsors, Senators Goldwater and Nunn, that operational lessons learned in the past demanded reorganization, was reenforced in a series of speeches Goldwater and Nunn gave on the floor of the Senate in October, 1985. Repeating the list of operational failures recounted in the forthcoming staff report, Goldwater and Nunn used this evidence of past
failure to demand reorganization to address the inherent problems. Recalling these speeches in his September 19, 1986 speech in support of the Goldwater-Nichols Bill, Senator Goldwater noted:

Almost 1 year ago ... Senator Nunn and I gave a series of speeches on the floor of the Senate that identified the serious problems in the organization of the U.S. Military Establishment. We cited problems that have existed, at least in part, since the Spanish-American War and that have caused serious operational failures or deficiencies during the Second World War, the Vietnam War, and more recent operations, including the tragic bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut and the incursion into Grenada.\textsuperscript{55}

The Goldwater-Nichols Act would, according to Goldwater, alleviate these problems, and improve U.S. operational activity in the future.

This same linkage between operational lessons and the Goldwater-Nichols act was also found within the House of Representatives. In the House Committee on Armed Services staff report, it was noted that, "Increasingly, criticism has focused on structure as the key problem behind such 'newsy' failures as ... the failure of the Desert I attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran."\textsuperscript{56}

Senator Nunn, in the hearings held on the 1986 reorganizations used one particular example of operational failure to illustrate the need for reorganization. He observed that, during the Grenada invasion, inter-service cooperation was clearly inadequate. He noted that radio communications equipment used by the U.S. ground forces in
Grenada was not compatible with the equipment used by the Navy off shore. The result was that one U.S. officer in Grenada used his A.T.&T. calling card to call his office back in Washington in an attempt to call in Navy fire support for his troops.

The administration responded negatively to most of the calls for reorganization based on operational lessons learned in past conflicts. In letters sent from the executive branch in response to early Congressional calls for reorganization in April 1985, Admiral Wesley L. McDonald cited Grenada as proof that the services could cooperate. McDonald stated that Grenada was an, "excellent example of sufficient unification." Secretary Weinberger also denied that Grenada illustrated the need for reorganization in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Most of the military leaders who testified argued that, while there may have been problems in Grenada, that the ultimate success of the mission negated the occasional organizational concerns. In addition, they also stated that the ability of the military to overcome these problems illustrated the satisfactory nature of the existing organizational structure which allowed for flexibility.

One other tactic taken by those opposing reorganization within the administration was to point to a recent operational success. On October 10, 1985, the U.S. military was able to force the landing of a civilian airline carrying
the terrorists who had hijacked the cruise liner Achilli Lauro and seize the terrorists. The result was numerous statements referencing this event to the reorganization debate. Pentagon spokesman Robert Simms, citing the Achilli Lauro incident, noted that, "It puzzles us that people would say that something is terribly, drastically wrong with our military forces when they've just achieved such a success as this." Even Representative Charles Bennet, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, argued that the Achilli Lauro success dispelled criticisms of operational performance.

Interestingly, no discussion of operational lessons and reorganization is not found in the Packard Commission report, not even those proposed reforms dealing with military operations and command. Furthermore, in President Reagan's special message to Congress in April, 1986 (anticipating Congressional action on reorganization) no reference to operational lessons as a source of motivation for military reorganization was made. Reagan acknowledged that operational lessons formed the basis for prior reorganizations, yet made no reference to them when discussing the current structural changes he supported.

THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

When looking at the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it seems clear that much, if not all, of this reorganization
legislation is linked to external considerations. With respect to the external threat, the specific aspects of the legislation which were linked to this concern were those dealing with JCS planning and advice. In particular, the legislation enacted a series of measures to invest more authority in the Chairman of the JCS, thus hoping to overcome the weaknesses of the existing planning and advice process. The Chairman was made sole military advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff was placed under his sole supervision.

Even more legislation was linked to operational lessons. All of the changes to the authority of the CINCs was based on the operational lessons discussed during the reorganization process. As a result the CINCs were given greater authority to direct and organize their individual commands. In addition, the clarification of the chain-of-command was intended to improve operational capabilities in an era of fast breaking conflict and rapid communications. Finally, operational performance was presumed to improve if the CINCs had greater access to the JCS via the Chairman.

All in all, much of the legislation relating to the CINCs and the JCS was based on specific operational lessons learned over the years or based on problems associated with long range operational planning and advice directed towards the primary Soviet threat.
THE DOMESTIC EXPLANATION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

The Domestic Economy

The overall assessment of the U.S. economy from 1983 to 1986 was favorable. GNP increased from $3.4 trillion in 1983 to $3.77 trillion in 1984 to $4.01 trillion in 1985 to $4.23 trillion in 1986 — however, the percentage increase in the GNP was declining from a 10.7% increase from 1983 to 1984 to a 6.4% increase from 1984 to 1985 to only a 5.1% increase from 1985 to 1986. Other indicators of economic health were more positive.

Unemployment as a percentage of the labor force steadily declined from 9.6% in 1983 to 7.5% in 1984, 7.2% in 1985, and 7% in 1986. The Industrial Production Index steadily rose from 1983 to 1986, increasing by 15% during the period. The rate of business failure showed only a small increase of 5 per 10,000 from 1985 to 1986. Finally, the consumer price index, while increasing, had increased at a declining rate. From 1983 to 1984 the consumer price index increased 4.3%, from 1984 to 1985 it had increased 3.6%, and from 1985 to 1986 it had only increased 1.9%

Yet, the economic picture was not all positive. At the end of FY 1985 the U.S. budget deficit had reached a new record of $185 billion, 5.5 percent of GNP. Congress and
the President agreed that a serious attempt needed to be made to reduce the deficit. Such actions as the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction act attempted to get a handle on the deficit by 1991 by strictly limiting the levels of governmental spending.

The Perceived Trend in the Domestic Economy

In general, the assessment of the trend in the U.S. economy was qualifiedly positive. Assessing executive perceptions of the economic trend in 1986 is difficult for two reasons. First, there have been only a few comprehensive accounts of the inner workings of the Reagan administration in this period. The former President's own accounts have been rather short on details. Of the other two top officials dealing with economics - Donald Regan and James Baker, only Regan has written an account of these years, and his account is also rather superficial.

The second difficulty is sorting out the truth among those who have written on the issue. At one end of the spectrum is David Stockman. As Director of the Office of Management and Budget during the early years of the Reagan Administration, Stockman was one of the architects of the "Reagan Revolution." However, by 1986, Stockman was aware of the profound problems associated with the growing budget deficits. In his autobiography, Stockman notes that in 1986, "We were not headed toward a brave new world as I had
thought in February. . . . Where we were headed was toward fiscal catastrophe." This assessment was reinforced by statements made by Ed Rollins, White House Political Director from 1981 to 1985. Rollins observed that, in 1984 "Stockman, Darman [then a White House staffer and aid to Baker] and Baker [Secretary of the Treasury] all realized that the budget numbers didn’t add up and that the second term was going to be terrible." These negative assessments are counterbalanced by the pervasive optimism claimed by former Attorney General Ed Meese. Meese claims, in his memoirs, that the Reagan economic policy was a cohesive plan which extended across both terms in office and produced nearly unqualified success. Meese goes on to criticize Stockman as being negative and incorrectly understanding the scope of the Reagan economics plan. Aside from Meese, others were also demonstrably optimistic in 1985 and 1986. Martin Feldstein, Chairman of the Reagan Administration’s Council of Economic Advisors from 1982 to 1984 noted in the spring of 1985 that, "I continue to talk frequently with my old colleagues in the Reagan Administration and with leading members of Congress in both parties. On the basis of those conversations, I am actually quite optimistic that we will see legislative action this year that will substantially reduce future budget deficits."
Perhaps the best way of reconciling these disparate viewpoints is to look at Reagan himself, and to observe that his personal handle on the economic issues was not strong. In his election campaign of 1984 he stated that, "The United States of America was never meant to be a second-rate nation. . . . America's best days are yet to come."\textsuperscript{70} Lou Cannon's assessment of Reagan was that he truly believed that the economy would be all right. The budget deficit problem had been around before, so he didn't view it as a problem in the future.\textsuperscript{71} That said, it is also likely that many in Reagan's administration, particularly those involved with the economy, were aware of the problems which lay ahead -- they were just never able to transfer that concern to Reagan himself.

Reports on Administrative Performance

By 1986 the U.S. public had been informed of huge numbers of incidents indicative of egregiously poor administrative performance. In 1983, 50 such events were reported, in 1984 there were 78 reports, in 1985 there were 153 reported incidents, with the number declining to 58 in 1986.\textsuperscript{72} The incidents included a number of cases in which common items, such as hammers, wrenches, ashtrays, coffee pots, and toilet seats, were purchased for exorbitant prices. These incidents, while not only raising concern about resource allocation, obviously raised concerns over
the administrative performance of those charged with acquisitions and procurement. In addition, the public was informed of numerous cases of defense contractor fraud and abuse, waste in procurement, and an inability of those responsible to police themselves. All of this pointed to an administrative system which was seriously dysfunctional.

THE DEBATES DURING THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The Debates and the Economy

There were few references to economy in the debates surrounding the 1986 reorganization. The primary focus of concern with the economy and with defense reorganizations as a means of achieving economy was found in the debates associated with the Packard Commission. In establishing the commission, the President, in Executive Order 12526, called for it to recommend improvements on effectiveness and stability of resource allocation for defense. In the Commission's Interim Report, issued February 28, 1986, it noted a variety of purely economic problems which resulted from the existing structure and practices of the DoD. The Commission noted that there was no system by which decisions on strategy, force requirements, and levels of funding could be integrated. The result was increased costs in procuring equipment. In addition, due to existing organization and procedures with respect to defense acquisition, there was an
instability in top-line funding for programs, resulting in no economies of scale. Finally, the Commission noted that there was a lack of economy due to poor cost estimates at the outset of weapons development programs.

The Commission offered a variety of proposals to deal with all of the problems discussed in its Interim Report. With respect to its recommendations, the Commission contended that, "The prescription we offer... will, we believe, result in savings on major weapons systems and minor spare parts alike." The Commission can also be seen linking reorganization with the economy in the report of the Acquisition Task Force of the Packard Committee. In that report they noted that:

The President established the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management in part because public confidence in the effectiveness of the defense acquisition system has been shaken by a spate of "horror stories" - overpriced spare parts, test deficiencies, and cost and schedule overruns. Unwelcome at any time, such stories are particularly unsettling when the administration and Congress are seeking ways to deal with record budget deficits.

References to economy in the 1986 reorganization debates were not restricted to the Packard Commission. However, in the debates on the Goldwater-Nichols Bill, some argued that the legislation was specifically not intended to deal with economic issues. For example, in his speech on the Senate floor in October 1985, Senator Nunn stated that:

We are not talking here about how to prevent $500 hammers from being purchased and $600 monkey wrenches and $10,000 toilet seats, and that sort
of thing. We are talking about the survival of our nation. . . . We are talking about here whether this country indeed can fight and fight effectively and, therefore, whether we can prevent war, whether we can deter war.\textsuperscript{78}

Rather, Nunn contended the issue was of far greater importance - the very security of the United States.\textsuperscript{79} Yet, a closer examination reveals some supporters of Goldwater-Nichols that were concerned with achieving economies as well other more lofty goals. The Senate Armed Services Committee staff report evidenced some concern with economies. Given the failure to link strategy formation and program recommendations with resources available, the Senate Armed Services Committee staff report pointed to the attendant resource allocation problems when it noted:

If the fiscal guidance is well above the levels attainable by in the Presidential budget review and/or the levels approved by the Congress, the PPB [Planning, Programming and Budgeting] system will have allowed too many programs to enter or to be expanded during the programming phase, not just in the budget year, but also through the Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP). Year-end budget adjustments, combined with congressional reductions, turn into major policy and programming problems - problems frequently unresolved and pushed further into the out-years of the FYDP.\textsuperscript{80}

This staff report, in fact, included entire sections on defense acquisition and planning, programming, and budgeting - beyond the more famous sections on the JCS, the CINCs, and the Secretary of Defense. One rather specific way in which the recommendations of the staff report were seen to encourage economy was in respect to encouraging more "jointness." A variety of personnel measures were advocated
to encourage the military to assume a more joint perspective, thus overcoming service rivalries and inter-service competition. Such attempts were partially motivated by concerns with achieving economies. By creating a "joint" perspective, it would be possible to cut down on duplicative research and development, procurement and acquisition. As noted by Senator Goldwater, "Considerable savings may be made through joint purchases and other means."\(^{31}\)

Senator Goldwater reemphasized the economic problem when he commented that, "We have failed to coordinate the efficient use of resources with clear military strategy. With large federal deficits and growing reluctance in Congress to accept higher defense outlays, its obvious that defense spending must be more effective and more efficient."\(^{32}\) Further stressing economics, Senator Goldwater in April, 1986 upon the passage by the Senate Armed Services Committee of their version of the Goldwater-Nichols Act made a rather interesting linkage between the Goldwater-Nichols Bill and the economic issue. Goldwater commented that, "the public interest aroused by "$600 toilet seats and $3000 coffee grinders' will help force swift passage of the bill."\(^{33}\) It may very well have been the case that many who supported the Goldwater-Nichols bill did so based on their concerns over the economy and their misperception that the Act dealt, substantially, with this problem. This perception is reenforced by some editorial
reactions to Goldwater-Nichols. For instance, the Washington Post tended to disparage the significance of Goldwater-Nichols insofar as it did nothing to constrain the levels of defense expenditures undertaken by the Reagan administration in prior years.\textsuperscript{84}

The Debates and Administrative Performance

A frequent topic in the debates surrounding the 1986 reorganizations was that of administrative performance. Many commented on the procurement scandals and the contractor fraud scandals of the previous years. The conclusions of many were that these problems were the result of, "gross mismanagement, grossly poor performance, and grossly bad results in the Pentagon's buying practices."\textsuperscript{85} However, the reorganization debates of 1986 focused on aspects of poor administrative performance beyond procurement. Comments also focused on poor performance within the Joint Staff due to service rivalry as well as too much bureaucracy, too many unqualified civilian officials, and simply too many military personnel in staff positions.

From the perspective of many, the most serious of the problems dealt with the issue of procurement and the procurement scandals. The Acquisition Task Force noted that, "Given this pernicious set of underlying problems, it is a tribute to the dedication of many professionals in the system, both in and out of DoD, that more programs do not
end up in serious trouble." In its *Interim Report*, the Packard Commission gave the acquisition and procurement system this rather backhanded compliment: "The nation's defense programs loose far more to inefficient procedures than to fraud and dishonesty."\(^6\)

Finally, perhaps as a good summary of the administrative problems facing the DoD, the Packard Commission noted that there were many characteristics of good management in private industry, "These characteristics should be hallmarks of defense acquisition. They are, unfortunately, antithetical to the process the Congress and the Department of Defense have created to conduct much of defense acquisition over the years. ... weapons systems take too long and cost too much to produce. ... they do not perform as promised or expected."\(^7\) President Reagan was cognizant of the administrative problems as well as the implications such problems had for public opinion. In charging the Packard Commission in 1985, Reagan stated that, "Waste and fraud by corporate contractors are more that a ripoff of the taxpayer - they're a blow to the security of our nation. And this the American people cannot and should not tolerate."\(^8\) Reagan observed in his message to Congress in April, 1986, that the changes he envisioned would improve not only military effectiveness but also efficiency within the military establishment.\(^9\)
Some of those commenting on the specifics of the Goldwater-Nichols Act also addressed the poor administrative performance in the DoD. Concerns were expressed with excessive military bureaucracy, duplication of effort between the services, and poor planning in acquisition. These concerns were voiced by the major proponents of the Act. Senator Nunn noted that, "there are too many layers of bureaucracy in and around various commands," and that the failures of integration within the DoD led to, "inefficiencies and encourages individual services to buy and equip their forces with little regard for joint operations and inter-operability with each other and our allies." He argued that the Act would, "reduce additional layers of bureaucracy in the Pentagon and elsewhere," which was, "an attempt, simply put, to shift 'writers' into 'fighters'." Finally, Nunn commented that the Goldwater-Nichols Act would make the Department of Defense, "more efficient in peacetime."

Senator Goldwater argued that, "One of the central reasons for our reorganization was to renew the military's financial and functional integrity." This integrity had been partially undermined by the poor administrative performance of the Department of Defense. One final insight into Goldwater's thinking is provided by an editorial in the Washington Post. There, the columnists Evans and Novak contended that Goldwater's motivations for reorganizing
defense were based on concern with administrative problems. They note that, "When Goldwater finally became Armed Services chairman in January, 1985, he was sickened by Pentagon waste and inefficiency." 96

THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The legislation (and executive orders) which followed from the 1986 defense reorganization debates had some limited links with the desire to achieve economy. To a large extent, the creation of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), a result of the Packard Commission recommendations, was viewed as means of enhancing economy within the Defense Department. 97 Because the acquisition process was viewed as rife with corruption and waste, it was hoped that consolidating the acquisition process under one individual would save money by cutting down on these ills.

Several aspects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act could be seen as encouraging economy as well. Part of the Act required the Secretary of Defense to submit written policy guidelines to the JCS when requesting program recommendations or budgetary recommendations. It was felt that this civilian check would mitigate the tendency of the military to inflate costs. The Act also required the Chairman of the JCS to assist in the resource allocation process by requiring him to submit a fiscally constrained strategic assessment to the Secretary of Defense. Such a
requirement forced the Chairman to match resources with strategic objectives. Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols Act also inserted the CINCs into the resource allocation process, primarily via the requirement that the Chairman of the JCS represent the interests of the CINCs in JCS deliberations on resource allocations. Such an allowance, it was believed, could achieve economies by allowing the CINCs to state what they truly needed, rather than leaving such determinations up to the JCS and the Joint Staff.

In terms of administrative performance, the primary piece of legislation which reflected a concern with prior poor performance was that which created the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition). Beyond whatever economies such a post could create, the main benefit of such a post was to improve the entire acquisition process within the Department of Defense and to eliminate all of the embarrassing administrative failures of the past few years. The other recommendations of the Packard Commission, while designed to improve administrative performance, attempted to do so by "encouraging" various elements of the defense establishment to behave more responsibly or to coordinate their behavior.

Within the Goldwater-Nichols Act, several sections could be viewed as linked to concern with administrative performance. Primary among these that part of the legislation which gave the CINCs more authority to coordinate administrative and support functions within their
command. Such a step would allow the officer on the scene to undertake the measures necessary to improve administrative performance within a particular unified command. Secondly, the legislation gave the Secretary of Defense the authority to transfer support functions from the service secretaries to the CINCs, thus again eliminating layers of Washington bureaucracy. Finally, as advocated by Senator Nunn, writers would be turned into fighters by cutting down on the large number of military personnel in staff position, and thereby cutting down on some of the administrative bureaucracy.

THE CIVILIAN/EXECUTIVE CONSOLIDATION EXPLANATION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEBATES

Civilian Executive Tenure

There were no new civilian executives within the defense establishment during the period of the 1986 reorganization process. At the time of the earliest stirrings of the reorganization debates that would culminate in the 1986 reorganization, the 1983 statements by General Jones, President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger had both been in office two years. At the time of the eventual legislation they both had served for over five years.
Origins of the Move to Reorganize

The impetus for the 1986 reorganization did not come from civilian executives within the defense establishment. The initial calls for reorganization came from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jones, in 1983. These calls were soon picked up by the Congress, with some minor legislation coming in 1984. The Senate Armed Services Committee continued to explore the issue and made their proposals in 1985. Also in 1985, the President created the Packard Commission to investigate Department of Defense organization. In 1986 Congress fleshed out its legislative recommendations, which were signed into law October. Also in 1986 legislation was enacted which passed the primary organizational recommendation of the Packard Commission. Although the President did play a part in the reorganization process, via the creation of the Packard Commission, most of what became the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was strictly a product of Congressional staff work and compromise.

Civilian Executive Perceptions of Civilian Control

The key civilian executives in the 1986 reorganization process evidenced little concern about defense organization or the level of civilian control within the defense establishment. According to Jeffrey McKintrick, during Reagan's first term of office, "White House thinking seemed to be that reform was 'Cap's problem' and should remain so,
leaving the presidential image untarnished." Eventually, the administration did reflect on the issue of civilian control, however. Secretary of Defense Weinberger's attitude was, essentially, that everything was o.k., including the existing level of civilian control. When questioned about a 1985 Center for Strategic and International Studies report calling for a reorganization of the relationship between the JCS and the Secretary of Defense and President, Weinberger responded, "I don't see anything that's broken in the relationship. I usually try to follow the practice of not going around and fixing things that aren't broken." Much of Weinberger's attitude, according to one interpretation, was due to his lack of interest in defense reform. Weinberger was apparently more interested in the people who filled the boxes than the arrangement of the boxes themselves.

President Reagan, as mentioned above, was also disinterested in defense organization until 1985, when events forced the creation of the Packard Commission. In his special message to Congress in April 1986, Reagan did reveal a degree of concern about civilian control, but this concern was predicated on the fear that Congress would attempt to change the existing relationship. He observed that he would oppose any reorganization proposals which would infringe upon his authority as Commander-in-Chief. In addition, Reagan noted that the Secretary of Defense,
"embodies the concept of civilian control." Reagan went on to note that he would oppose any Congressional reorganization attempt that would impinge on the authority of the Secretary of Defense. As he stated, "The strengthening of other offices or components of the defense establishment should never be at the expense of the Secretary of Defense." From this we can deduce that Reagan was well satisfied with the existing level of civilian control, and would oppose any attempts to change its existing configuration.

Civilian Executive Perceptions of Centralization

The attitude of the civilian executives towards centralization is somewhat ambiguous. Given Weinberger's attitude that "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" it would seem that he had no real problems with the existing level of centralization within the defense establishment. It is interesting to note that some lower ranking civilians within the Pentagon felt there was too much centralization in 1986. Assistant Air Force Secretary Tidal McCoy argued that the service secretaries should be given more autonomy and authority, a clear move away from the existing centralized Department of Defense. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman was even more outspoken, arguing in a Washington Post op-ed that "What Defense Needs is De-Organization." Lehman argued that there was a bureaucratic glut within the defense
establishment which undermined its performance. He claimed that, "This vast bloat in Congress and the Executive Branch has all been done over the past 30 years in the name of reformation at the altar of the false idols of centralization and unification." 

Reagan appeared to be less categorical in his attitudes towards centralization. While opposed to Congressionally mandated reorganizations in general, he was willing to entertain a move to centralize more authority in the hands of the Chairman of the JCS. In his message to Congress, he stated he would support legislation which would make the Chairman the sole military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, would place the Joint Staff under the Chairman’s exclusive direction, and would create a Vice Chairman. All of these measures were of a centralizing nature, indicating that - at least with respect to the Chairman of the JCS - Reagan was not completely satisfied with the existing level of centralization.

THE DEBATES DURING THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The Debates and Civilian Control

Civilian control was a significant issue in the 1986 reorganization debates. Those advocating their 1986 reorganizations were cognizant of the implications changes might have for civilian control, and were very careful to go
on record in support of continuing the existing levels of civilian control. The Senate Armed Services Committee staff report first cites favorably a conclusion reached by the Steadman Committee in 1978:

> We find that the concept of civilian control over the military is unquestioned throughout the Department. It is a non-issue. Our military forces are fully responsive to the command and control of the duly constituted civilian authorities; the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary.¹⁰⁸

The report goes on to conclude that, "No changes can be accepted which diminish civilian control over the military; the recommendations of this study either strengthen civilian control over the military or leave the balance as it currently exists."¹⁰⁹

Opponents of the reorganization process were not convinced. A primary basis for opposition to the suggestions of the staff report and other Congressional reorganization proposals was that they would undermine civilian control. The service secretaries in particular contended that most of the reorganization proposals further undercut their authority, thereby hampering civilian control. Perhaps the most vocal advocate of this position was Secretary of the Navy John Lehman. Lehman argued the proposals circulated in 1985 were, "a very foolish way to organize a democracy’s decision making," and contended that the proposals were attempts at centralization which would undermine civilian control."¹¹⁰ Many perceived these
arguments as self-serving. As one observer noted, "former Defense Secretaries Laird, Richardson, Schlesinger, and Brown characterize such arguments as 'bugaboos raised by the Secretary of the Navy' and as a 'red herring.'"

Secretary Weinberger also based some of his opposition to the reorganization process on the issue of civilian control. Weinberger believed, "that changes within the structure of the Office of the Secretary of Defense should be evolutionary and responsive to the direct needs of the Secretary of Defense if the overarching principle of civilian control is to be preserved." Furthermore, Weinberger found it, "inconsistent with the concept of civilian control [for Congress] to expand the responsibilities of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the expense of the Secretary of Defense." From Weinberger's perspective, the principle of civilian control meant that changes in the organization of the Defense Department should originate with the Secretary of Defense.

Other observers, outside of the Administration, were also concerned with civilian control. A Hudson Institute scholar, Thomas D. Bell Jr., argued that making the Chairman of the JCS the sole military advisor to the Secretary of Defense and placing the Joint Staff under the Chairman's exclusive direction would undermine civilian control of the military by limiting the Secretary's information. He argued that, "This would ensure that no other officer would possess
either the staff resources or the access necessary to provide civilian leaders with credible alternatives to the Chairman's views. It would also guarantee eventual conflict between the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{114}

Eventually, as passage of the reorganization became more likely, comments on civilian control evolved from alarm to caution. As Senator John Warner observed, "The time-tested formula to maintain civilian control is being readjusted."\textsuperscript{115} Warner went on to caution that no erosion of civilian control could be permitted within the reorganization process.\textsuperscript{116}

The Debates and Centralization

In the debates on the 1986 reorganization, the advocates of change did not represent the proposed changes as steps towards greater centralization within the Defense Department. While obviously some of the changes proposed did increase centralization, particularly with respect to the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, centralization was not seen as an end as much as a means towards other ends.

Opponents of the reorganization process, however, vigorously argued that these measures were moves toward centralization and that further centralization would be detrimental.
Secretary Weinberger, in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, argued that centralization was inherently a problem. He noted that, "While policy direction must be centralized, operations should be decentralized. We should continue to reverse the 40-year trend in the Department towards operational centralization which has been the source of many problems we face today."117

Secretary of the Navy Lehman was even more vigorously opposed to centralization. In April 1985, Lehman argued that centralization was an ill which the nation could not afford. He stated that, "the inefficiencies brought about by overcentralization . . . cost the American taxpayers on the order of a 10 percent premium on their defense budget."118 In May of 1985 he claimed that, "We need no more centralization and unification; we need more decentralization and accountability through which the strong Secretary of Defense can unify all efforts to a central policy."119

The service chiefs were particularly opposed to the assessment that they were too service oriented - thus necessitating the increase in the Chairman's authority in order to provide the civilian leadership better advice. General P.X. Kelly, Commandant of the Marine Corps, argued that allegations of "logrolling" were unfounded and that he had never "logrolled" as a member of the JCS. General John
Wickham, Army Chief of Staff, testified that, "Based on my experience, I can find little basis for the [Senate Armed Service Committee staff] report's sweeping generalizations about service parochialism or log rolling, which allegedly undermines the authority of the Secretary of Defense." 120

Interestingly, the only group within the executive branch which supported additional centralization was the CINCs of the unified commands. General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander in Chief, U.S. Readiness Command, argued that the existing system was "too federated." 121 In 1985, then Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command Admiral William Crowe observed that, "We have now had considerable experience with the unified command system and . . . I am not convinced that a federated system is as necessary as it once appeared." 122

Many outside of the executive branch argued that by consolidating authority in the hands of the Chairman of the JCS centralization was in effect undermining the salutary effects of joint military advice. In the long run the services would suffer as well as the quality of advice given to the civilian leadership. This position was clearly articulated by an op-ed piece in the New York Times by Dr. Allan Millett. 123 Millett argued that the existing military system had several advantages which would likely be undermined by reorganization. Among these were the airing of different service points of view before Congress, overall
better advice, and the utility of inter-service competition insofar as it helps to outline strategic choices. All of these advantages led, according to Millet, to a range of advice for the President. Robert J. Murray, former Under Secretary of the Navy, argued this point, noting, "the present JCS system enables - 'encourages' would be too strong a word - diverse military points of view to come forward. Some people think this a demerit, and in fact the Chiefs themselves work hard, perhaps too hard, to overcome disagreement; but, for my part, I count diversity a strength of the system for it allow informed debate on major questions of strategy. . . . diversity of advice is preferable."  

THE LEGISLATION RESULTING FROM THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

There were only rather limited linkages between the issues of enhancing civilian control and centralization and the reorganization legislation of 1986. While enhancing civilian control did not seem to be a prime motivation for the 1986 defense reorganizations, there were aspects of the legislation which did "affect" civilian control. The most obvious legislative impact on civilian control was achieved via the creation of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition). Quite clearly, by consolidating the acquisition process in the hands of one civilian, it was
hoped that the myriad of problems associated with defense procurement and acquisition could be overcome.

Aside from this, the effect on civilian control was rather minimal. While the authority of the civilian service secretaries was somewhat diminished by granting the Secretary of Defense the authority to transfer administrative and support functions from the services secretaries to the CINCs, overall civilian control was not affected. In addition, it is hard to see how civilian control was undermined by consolidating authority within the JCS into the hands of the Chairman. The only losers in this process were the service chiefs, not civilians.

Similarly, several aspects of the 1986 reorganization legislation did effect a degree of centralization, however, as mentioned before these results were more means towards other ends than ends in and of themselves. The creation of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) obviously centralized the procurement and acquisition process within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The new authority given the Chairman of the JCS was, in effect, a centralization of authority within the JCS as a whole. The Chairman became the most important military official, just as (aside from the President) the Secretary of Defense was the most important civilian official within the defense establishment. Finally, some centralization was also achieved in the person of the Secretary of Defense.
Granting the Secretary the authority to transfer administrative and support functions away from the service secretaries enhanced and consolidated the Secretary’s authority over administration within the overall Defense Department. Finally, some degree of centralization was achieved in terms of the unified commands. By facilitating CINC access to the deliberations of the JCS, particularly with respect to funding and procurement, a centralization of force planning and procurement was effected.

CONCLUSIONS

The 1986 defense reorganizations were the most comprehensive, some argued, since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Beyond this, they were indisputably the first significant defense reorganizations since 1958. It is interesting to observe the extent to which, after this long period of time, the competing explanations held up in providing clues to the reasons for defense reorganization.

THE EXTERNAL EXPLANATION

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the external explanation was answered. A + indicates an answer supporting the external explanation. A - indicates an answer which does not support the external explanation. A * indicates an ambiguous answer
which in and of itself does not support or undermine the external explanation.

1. The change in the Soviet threat.  +
2. The existence of potential new threats.  +
3. The level of operational activity.  +
4. References to operational lessons.  +
5. References to the external threat.  +
6. Links between legislation and the issues.  +

Clearly, given the uniformly positive responses given, the external explanation is quite persuasive in accounting for the defense reorganization of 1986.

THE DOMESTIC EXPLANATION

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the domestic explanation was answered.

1. The current state of the economy.  -
2. The perceived trend in the economy.  *
4. References to economy and administrative performance.  +
5. Links between legislation and the issues.  *
The domestic explanation is not particularly persuasive in accounting for the 1986 defense reorganization. There are few aspects of the legislation which relate to the domestic concerns of economy and administrative performance. The state of the economy was not poor in 1986, and the trend in the economy was open to different interpretations. This clearly does not support the domestic explanation either.

THE CIVILIAN/EXECUTIVE CONSOLIDATION EXPLANATION

The following assesses the manner in which each question associated with the civilian/executive consolidation explanation was answered.

1. Tenure in office. -
2. Origins of the reorganization movement. -
3. Perceptions of civilian control. -
4. Perceptions of centralization. -
5. References to civilian control and centralization. *
6. Links between legislation and the issues. *

Due to the large number of negative responses, particularly those linked to the objective circumstances required by the civilian/executive consolidation explanation, this explanation fails to adequately explain the 1986 defense reorganization.
CONCLUSIONS

I would conclude that the external explanation best accounts for the totality of the 1986 reorganization process. Congress was clearly responding to the poor operational performance of the U.S. military in prior missions. While there were some aspects of the 1986 reorganization which did address domestic concerns, they were a minor part of the totality of the legislation. The domestic explanation is undermined by the health of the U.S. economy and the poor linkage between legislation and the desire to achieve domestic ends. Finally, the civilian/executive consolidation explanation is completely inadequate. The civilian executives were the opposition in much of the 1986 reorganization process, rather than the source of the reorganization movement. Any aspects of the legislation which did result in a consolidation of authority in the hands of the civilian executives was a byproduct, and was an end pursued by the Reagan administration.
Notes


3. Ibid.


8. By "lack of mission integration" the staff report was arguing that the DoD did not effectively integrate, at the level of planning and policymaking, the six missions of the U.S. military: (1) nuclear deterrence, (2) maritime superiority, (3) power projection superiority, (4) defense of NATO Europe, (5) defense of East Asia, and (6) defense of Southwest Asia. Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 77, 81.

10. Ibid., 136.

11. Ibid., 240.

12. Ibid., 176-177.

13. Ibid., 242.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., 479-481.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 481.


22. Ibid., 28.


24. Ibid., 10-12.
25. Ibid., 16.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 16-18.


29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.


33. Ibid., 43-44.

34. Ibid.


38. Ibid., 7.


40. Ibid., 264.


42. James Schlesinger, "The Eagle and the Bear: Ruminations on Forty Years of Superpower Relations," Foreign Affairs, 63, no. 5 (Summer 1985), 958.


45. Obviously, specific examples of crisis planning, such as in the case of Grenada, did illustrate a problems with respect to crisis planning.

46. Lawrence Korb cited in Jeffrey S. McKinrick, "The JCS: Evolutionary or Revolutionary Reform," Parameters, 16, no. 1 (Spring 1986), 64.


50. An Interim Report to the President, 10.


53. Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater, 342-351.

54. Ibid., 351.


60. "President’s Special Message to Congress," April 24, 1986 in A Quest for Excellence, 44.

62. Ibid., 381.

63. Ibid., 712.

64. Ibid., 500.

65. Ibid., 450.


71. Ibid.


73. An Interim Report to the President, 15.

74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., 14.

76. Ibid., 15.


78. *Armed Forces Journal International*, 123, no. 4 - extra issue (October 1985), 15.

79. Ibid.


81. Ibid., 357.


86. *A Formula For Action*, 9.

87. *An Interim Report to the President*, 15.

88. Ibid., 13.

89. Ronald Reagan quoted in *An Interim Report to the President*, 19.
90. "President’s Special Message to Congress," A Quest for Excellence, 43.

91. Armed Forces Journal International, 123, no. 4 - extra issue (October 1986), 35.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Congressional Record, 23540.

95. Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater, 357.


97. Legislatively, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) was created via the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 and the Defense Acquisition Improvement Act of 1986.

98. McKitrick, "The JCS: Evolutionary or Revolutionary Reform?", 70.


100. McKintrick, "The JCS: Evolutionary or Revolutionary Reform?," 70-71.


102. Ibid., 4.
103. Ibid.

104. McKintrick, "The JCS: Evolutionary or Revolutionary Reform?," 71.


106. Ibid.


109. Ibid., 45.


113. Ibid.


116. Ibid.


120. Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, 495.

121. Tangredi, "The Insiders' View," 92.

122. Ibid.


124. Ibid.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

The following chart illustrates graphically the comparative relevance of the three posited explanations for each of the five major defense reorganizations since World War II.

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H = High, M = Medium, L = Low

Figure 2: Relevance of Explanation for Each Case

As a means of fleshing out this chart and providing some further insights and conclusions on the process of defense reorganization from 1945 to 1986, I will now briefly discuss my conclusions for each of the five reorganizations.
The Reorganization of 1947

The 1947 reorganization, as illustrated above, can best be explained as a reorganization motivated by domestic political concerns; primarily concerns with the economy and with the manner in which administrative tasks were performed within the defense establishment. The U.S. economy at the end of World War II was not particularly strong, and many felt that it was destined to decline to the pre-war levels of depression. The war itself illustrated numerous cases of administrative failure within the overall defense establishment. Concern with economy was not restricted only to the civilians in the reorganization debates, however. The prime mover of the concept of "unification" in the early years of the process, General Marshall, foresaw that the military would be drastically reduced at the close of the war as a means of saving money. His desire to see reorganization was motivated by the belief that without a more efficient and economical military, the necessary budget cuts would gut the military establishment and undermine U.S. military capabilities.

Truman attempted to address some of the economic problems facing the U.S. via reductions in military spending, but he recognized that the existing organizational structure within the military provided few levers to effect economies and efficiencies without wholesale cutting of troop numbers and procurement programs. The 1947
reorganization can be seen as an attempt to create organizational structures by which economies and efficiencies could be achieved. A primary step in this effort was the creation of the Secretary of Defense as a civilian who could get the services to agree on a budget as well as deal with inefficiencies in administration throughout the defense establishment.

The external explanation is not very useful in analyzing the 1947 defense reorganization. While the Soviet threat was seen as increasing, no significant new, non-Soviet, threats had arisen. Operational activity was obviously extremely high prior to the reorganization, given World War II. However, it is not clear that many operational lessons learned during that war found their way into the reorganization debates. Ironically, the vast majority of references to operational lessons during the reorganization process were made by the Navy to undercut the process of reorganization. The Navy argued that the primary operational lesson of World War II was that the existing organizational structure worked and, thus, no changes needed to be made.

The reorganization legislation reflects the inadequacy of the external explanation insofar as it is not primarily directed to the issues of the external threat or operational lessons learned during World War II. Some aspects of the legislation may be consistent with this explanation,
primarily the creation of the Air Force, but as a whole, the external explanation is not persuasive.

The civilian/executive consolidation explanation is the most intriguing of the three possible explanations for the 1947 reorganization. At the very outset, the background of the legislation is at odds with the conditions which the civilian/executive explanation posits. The 1947 reorganization was not the effort of relatively new civilian executives who, upon discovering how the existing system worked, undertook efforts to reform it. Rather, the civilian executives in office during the process had been around for a while, and they did not originate the reorganization process. At most, the civilian executives signed on to a reorganization movement that had acquired a degree of momentum outside of the civilian executive community.

Despite this, there is overwhelming evidence that the civilian executives who were involved in the reorganization process perceived the existing system in just the manner in which the explanation predicted. They were concerned with inadequate civilian control of the military and with inadequate centralization. Furthermore, these concerns were openly voiced during the course of the reorganization debates from 1945 to 1947.

In the end, the legislation resulting from the 1947 reorganization process falls short of addressing these
concerns with civilian control and centralization. One can argue that the National Security Act of 1947 only played lip service to the goal of centralization, and only marginally enhanced civilian control of the military. How can this be explained? One must not forget that there was substantial opposition to the prospect of reorganization in 1947 on the part of the Navy and some members of Congress. Given this fact, the supporters of reorganization had to make compromises. The primary concern was with achieving economy and improved administrative performance. Improved centralization and civilian control may have been desired, but they would not be pursued to the extent that it would jeopardize the entire reorganization process and the important domestic goals associated with it. The 1947 reorganization represents a victory of domestic interests over the interests of civilian/executives when it was impossible to pursue both.

The Reorganization of 1949

As with 1947, the 1949 reorganization can best be explained by the domestic explanation. The domestic economy was not healthy in 1949 and there were no signals of an upturn in the near future. There were also increasing numbers of reports of poor administrative performance. The debates focused on the issues of "economy and efficiency"
and the legislation itself clearly reflects a desire to promote the goals of improved economy and efficiency.

1949 saw the Truman administration face up to the fact that the measures it put in place in 1947 were not adequate to achieve the domestic goals it had set for itself. In particular, the creation of the position of Secretary of Defense did not relieve the problems associated with the military budget, nor did it seem to curb the military's desire for more spending. The 1949 reorganization seems to have been one more attempt to use legislation to create structures which would address the serious domestic problems confronting the nation as a whole, and the military as a part of that whole.

Once again, the external explanation fails to persuade. While the Soviet threat increased again, there were no other significant new threats posed to U.S. security from 1947 to 1949. Little operational activity had occurred, and even fewer references to operational lessons were made in 1949 than in 1947. The reorganization debates in general failed to address the concerns of the external explanation, as did the actual legislation in question. There seems little doubt that the 1949 reorganization was not influenced by any external circumstances.

The civilian/executive consolidation explanation once again is the most interesting to examine. As in 1947, the civilian executives were not the prime movers of this
reorganization process. Nevertheless, the actual legislation seems to point to a marginal increase in civilian control and a centralization of authority within the defense establishment in the person of the Secretary of Defense. Even if true, however, this does not make the this explanation more plausible.

This is because, from Truman's point of view, the inability of the Secretary of Defense to perform as hoped was not a reflection on the position itself, but on the person in that position. As mention in the case study, Truman placed most of the blame for the inability of the Secretary of Defense to perform as expected on the shoulders of James Forrestal. Truman was quite willing to accept a structural revision that would correct this problem and that was advocated by the Congress. However, the enhanced authority of the Secretary of Defense was not the result of a civilian/executive attempt to further centralize civilian authority, but rather a case of the president going along with legislation which he hoped would further his primary domestic goals.

The Reorganization of 1953

The civilian executive consolidation explanation is the most persuasive in explaining the 1953 defense reorganization. New civilian executives initiated a reorganization process soon after their assumption of
office. While the perceptions of the civilian executives on the issues of civilian control and centralization are somewhat ambiguous prior to the reorganization, it is clear that they vocally proclaimed these issues as inspiring the reorganization effort during the debates which led up to the actual reorganization. Most importantly, the legislation associated with the 1953 reorganization is clearly advances the goals in enhanced civilian control of the military and increased centralization.

The external explanation, once again, is far from compelling. The Eisenhower administration did not see an increasing Soviet threat in 1953, but rather a stabilized Soviet threat. While non-Soviet external threats increased, primarily in the form of a limited regional conflict such as Korea, and the U.S. engaged in a great deal of significant operational activity in the Korean War, the debates leading up to the reorganization do not reflect concern with the issues of the external threat or operational lessons. It is indeed significant to note the almost total absence of references to Korea during the 1953 reorganization process. The external explanation finally falls down in the inability to trace concern with these issues to the actual legislation leading to the reorganization.

The domestic explanation proves to be most difficult to assess in 1953. The state of the U.S. economy in 1953 was healthy. Some were pointing to a potential
decline in the economy in the future, but it was by no means a universal judgement. The reports of poor administrative performance were huge and growing during the Korean War years. The debates during the reorganization process made pointed references to the need to reorganize so as to advance the twin goals of economy and efficiency. The links between these issues and the legislation, while present, are far less direct than was the case with the civilian/executive consolidation explanation. It is fair to argue that, by 1953, the competing goals of domestic politics and civilian executive consolidation of authority had switched in order of preference.

The lessons about defense reorganization which were learned by the Eisenhower administration by 1953 pointed to one significant conclusion. Defense reorganizations could not achieve significant economies or necessarily improve administrative performance. The work of the public administration scholars cited in Chapters I and II was correct: no big savings arose from the 1947 or 1949 reorganizations. Even more importantly, many of the steps taken to address these domestic concerns, such as creating the Munitions and the Research and Development Boards, actually led to more waste and inefficiency than had existed before.

Even more importantly, the concessions made to the services and the Congress, with respect to maintaining the
"autonomy" of the services had become, in Eisenhower's opinion, the primary problem within the Department of Defense by 1953. Not only had the 1947 and 1949 reorganizations not achieved the ends they desired, but they had undermined the end Eisenhower deemed important - centralized civilian control of the military.

It is also possible to conclude that Eisenhower no longer viewed reorganization as a necessary tool for achieving economies within the Department of Defense because, after the 1949 reorganization, the Secretary of Defense had been vested with just enough authority over the budget to achieve the economic ends he desired. Support for this argument comes from the behavior of Secretary of Defense Johnson. It is clear that Eisenhower wanted to save money within the military, particularly given the economic declines of 1954. The manner in which he did it was to turn Johnson loose on the defense budget. Johnson canceled so many programs as to become known as the "Mack the knife" of the Defense Department. This experience illustrates that Eisenhower realized that true savings could now be achieved without resorting to the reorganization process.

The 1953 reorganization can best be understood as an attempt to overcome the legacy of inter-service problems handed down by Truman by consolidating civilian control over the defense establishment. The civilian/executive
consolidation explanation, as illustrated by the case studies, best accounts for this reorganization process.

The Reorganization of 1958

For the 1958 reorganization, the efficacy of the civilian/executive consolidation explanation is even more pronounced. A new Secretary of Defense was in place and a decidedly civilian executive inspired reorganization proposal was put forth. There was ample evidence of concern by the leading civilian executives in the defense establishment about the inadequate level of centralization, although concern with civilian control does not seem to have been significant. The debates centered on the need to address civilian control and centralization problems, and the legislation clearly reflected these concerns in the solutions chosen.

One can question why a two reorganizations, premised on the civilian/executive consolidation explanation, came so close together. This was largely due to the apprehension on the part of Eisenhower and the civilian executives that Congress and the military would join together in opposition as they had in 1947. Every attempt to improve centralization of civilian authority within the military establishment implicitly undercut the authority of Congress and undermined the autonomy of the individual services. Eisenhower knew that such steps could not be taken too
rapidly, because a fine line needed to be walked in order to obtain Congressional support.

The external explanation proves to be rather interesting in the case of the 1958 reorganization. At first blush, one would suspect that external factors were prime motivations for the reorganization process, given the apparently increasing Soviet threat (as illustrated by the Soviet missile program) and the increasing number of U.S. operational activities since 1953. In reality, however, these factors are misleading. The Eisenhower administration pointedly did not perceive the Soviet threat to have significantly increased by 1958. In addition, the large number of operational activities were of a single service type, and thus did not provide the opportunity for the kinds of joint service operational lessons which might have been important in a future defense reorganization process.

Even more significant is the fact that no references were made to either the issue of the external threat or operational lessons during the course of the reorganization debates. The irrelevance of these factors is illustrated in the lack of a clear link between these issues and the reorganization legislation itself. The public (and Senator Jackson) may have perceived the 1958 reorganization as a response to the Soviet launching of Sputnik, but the facts indicate that external factors were not important as inspiration for the reorganization process.
Finally, the domestic explanation assumes the position of least relevant in 1958. While the current economy was in decline, the trend for the future was favorable. In addition, there was not a rise in the numbers of reported administrative failures in the years prior to the 1958 reorganization. While the debates did almost ritualistically refer to the manner in which "economy and efficiency" would be advanced by another reorganization, it is vital to recognize that there were practically no domestic aspects to the 1958 legislation. One would be hard pressed indeed to uncover any aspects of the 1958 reorganization which would achieve greater economies or enhance administrative performance.

The Reorganization of 1986

The 1986 reorganization is the only case of the five considered here to be adequately explained by the external explanation. Every aspect of the external explanation which was probed by the questions posed in Chapter I was present in 1986. The Soviet threat was viewed as increasing at the outset of the reorganization process. There were other new security threats posed to the U.S., including the cases of Nicaragua and Libya. The U.S. had been heavily involved in significant operational activity in the few years preceding the reorganization. Many lessons learned from these operations found their way into the reorganization debates,
and if fact were the prevailing explanation given for the need for reorganization. Finally, it is clear that the legislation of the 1986 reorganization attempts to address the problems associated with the external explanation.

The civilian/executive consolidation explanation is not useful in describing the 1986 Act. No new civilian executives initiated the reorganization process. In fact, the civilian executives actively opposed reorganization from the very start. They did not believe that civilian control or centralization were necessarily inadequate at the time, and in fact felt that the 1986 reorganization jeopardized the existing levels of civilian control and centralization. The debates surrounding the reorganizations did focus on the issues of civilian control and centralization, but only to the extent that civilian executives argued that the reorganization proposed undermined existing civilian control and centralization. Finally, there were no manifestations of the desire to increase civilian control or centralization within the actual reorganization legislation.

The domestic explanation is rather intriguing for 1986. The domestic economy was quite healthy in 1986, but there were conflicting reports as to the likely trend in the economy. President Reagan felt that the economy would continue to improve, whereas others noted the growing budget deficit as a clear sign of impending economic difficulty. Poor administrative performance within the defense
establishment was an overwhelmingly important issue in the years prior to the 1986 reorganization, with the reported cases of administrative failure ballooning and debate focusing on the issue. Similarly, the debates did focus on the issue of economy to some degree.

All of this said, it must be pointed out that much of the debate about domestic issues occurred in the context of the Packard Commission reforms - reforms which were, by and large, effected via executive order. The legislative aspects of the 1986 reorganization had practically no linkage at all with the domestic issues of economy and administrative performance. The domestic explanation fails to account for the 1986 reorganization legislation, and is only useful in accounting for the executive orders which ensued from the Packard Commission report.

The 1986 reorganization is significant in that we witness a totally different type of reorganization process - one inspired and driven by Congress. From 1947 to 1958 Congress saw their influence with the services slowly whittled away by organizational changes. The services became increasingly dependent upon the Secretary of Defense and the executive branch in general. In addition, from 1947 to 1986 there was a steady decline in the overall influence of Congress on military issues. In 1986, Congressional action represents Congressional frustration with an executive branch unwilling to utilize the vehicle of defense
reorganization to address the accumulating problems within the Department of Defense. Senator Goldwater addressed the responsibilities of Congress with respect to the military and argued that the 1986 reorganization was an attempt to reclaim the Constitutional duty of regulating the military.

In particular, Congress was attempting to deal with what they contended were rather obvious problems with U.S. military operational performance. The Congress has always served the function of overseeing the performance of the military in wartime. In some cases, as with the Committee on the Conduct of the War during the Civil War, their oversight was rather stifling. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress had been intensifying their role of operational watchdog. They had conducted extensive hearings on the Iran Rescue Mission and the Beirut bombings, and individual Senators had undertaken investigations of the performance of the military in Grenada. The conclusions they reached were that the military was performing inadequately, due in large part, to a defective organizational structure. Congress became frustrated when, confronted with these investigative conclusions, the executive branch failed to instigate a defense reorganization of its own.
Theoretical Conclusions

I will begin this section on the theoretical conclusions to be drawn from this study by first reflecting back on the questions posed at the beginning of Chapter I. These questions were:

Question One. What inspired United States defense reorganizations since the end of World War II?

Question Two. Are the explanations for United States defense reorganizations the same throughout the post-World War II era?

Clearly, the answer to question one is that it depends upon the reorganization. The case studies indicate that, at various times, each of the three postulated explanations for defense reorganization best explained the reorganization that took place. Given this fact, question two must also be answered in the negative. No single explanation can best account for all of the post-World War II defense reorganizations.

Despite the answers provided to the above questions, we must not give up on the prospects of a generalizable theory accounting for U.S. defense reorganizations in the post-war era. We can argue that the reorganization process in the U.S. has been a linear one, in which each reorganization builds upon the previous reorganization processes. As such, learning occurs with respect to the concerns which defense reorganization can best address. Except for the 1947
reorganization, no other post-war U.S. defense reorganization has been approached as a blank slate. Rather, we must look to the past reorganizations to understand the possibilities of the future.

The most persistent motivation for defense reorganization appears to concerns with the domestic politics issues of economy and administrative performance. Even in years in which the economy is performing satisfactorily and administrative performance is adequate, the issues of economy and efficiency appear in the reorganization debates. This is not surprising. These issues seem to dominate most aspects of the national political debate at some level. The reality is, however, that a domestic explanation for defense reorganization has limited utility.

It is only marginally useful to effect defense reorganizations as a means of achieving domestic political goals. This is due to two factors. First, and perhaps most importantly, defense reorganizations do not save very much money and do not often improve administrative performance. This assertion is born out by the lessons of the 1947 and 1949 reorganizations in which administrative performance was in fact undermined to some extent and very limited economies were achieved. Secondly, explaining all defense reorganizations as attempts to advance the goals of economy and improved administrative performance ignores the fact
that many of these ends can be achieved with very rudimentary organizational structures. As 1947 and 1949 illustrated, the simple step of creating a Secretary of Defense with authority over the military establishment created enough executive authority to address many economic and administrative issues without needing to resort to legislation which required Congressional approval.

I would argue that since 1949, it is very likelihood that any future defense reorganization would be undertaken to improve economy and administrative performance. The executive branch recognized the weakness of the reorganization tool as a means of achieving these ends, and also recognized that the existing organizational structures were adequate to allow for internal changes pursuant to these goals without legislative interference. One may wonder if a "1986 style" reorganization, initiated and pushed by Congress, and pursuing the domestic goals of economy and efficiency is still be likely. I would contend not, for two reasons. First, when confronted with economic constraints, Congress is far more likely to simply cut programs as opposed to undertaking the complex task of defense reorganization as a means of saving money. Second, if improving administrative performance is the desired goal, Congress would likely be reluctant to usurp the authority of the executive branch in dealing with administrative issues.
Once reorganizations could no longer be viewed as domestic politics tools, one needs to look at the next level of motivation for reorganizations. These motivations are those contained within the civilian/executive consolidation explanation. This explanation contends that reorganizations are undertaken to enhance civilian authority over the military and increase centralization within the defense establishment. To a large extent, these desires are always present within the executive branch, but rarely come to the forefront given the constraints of legislative reality. Executives realize that the goals of the civilian/executive consolidation explanation have natural opposition within the military and the Congress. Both groups are inherently opposed to overpowerful civilian executives. Thus, the willingness of the executive branch to push these goals is limited by the reality that opposition will need to be overcome.

In 1947 and 1949, the opposition was too great and the domestic goals (which were of primary importance) pursued were threatened by opposition to the reorganization process as a whole. The result was the sacrifice of civilian/executive consolidation in exchange for a reorganization which attempted to address domestic problems. The 1953 and 1958 reorganizations were, however, driven by these civilian executive goals, given that domestic goals could no longer be achieved by the reorganization process.
The utility of this explanation to explain all defense reorganizations is as constrained as the domestic explanation, however.

Since 1958 it has been unlikely that any future reorganization would be undertaken to advance civilian control and centralization. This is due to two factors. First, it is difficult to imagine how the defense establishment could be further reorganized to achieve greater civilian executive authority. Absent a radical change in the very nature of the armed forces, such an outcome is unforeseeable. This assertion is supported by the fact that some of the strongest Secretaries of Defense did not see the need to increase their own power any further. An excellent case in point is Robert McNamara, who achieved all of his changes via executive order. Secondly, it can be argued that the executive branch has pushed the boundaries of acceptable civilian/executive consolidation as far as possible. It is very unlikely that Congress would consent to any additional enhancement of civilian authority or centralization, much less propose it on its own initiative.

Thus, by 1958, defense reorganizations of the future would only likely occur in response to external motivations. In fact, the 1986 reorganization was just such a reorganization. One may ask, however, why no reorganization premised on the goals of the external explanation occurred
in the early to mid 1970s. Clearly the U.S. had just concluded major operational activities in Vietnam and had presumably learned a number of operational lessons from that war. I believe their are two reasons for the lack of a defense reorganization at this time. First, there is little consensus on the lesson which were learned from Vietnam. Second, and more importantly, those lessons which were learned pointed to political failures as opposed to purely military ones. It can be argued that such problems could not be adequately addressed by the reorganization process.

The 1986 reorganization illustrates one additional point about reorganizations driven by concern with external factors. Congress is quite willing to tackle these sorts of reorganizations without a great deal of executive branch support. Unlike domestic reorganizations or civilian/executive consolidation reorganizations, external reorganizations can be a product of Congress.

The Future of Defense Reorganizations

Given my conclusion that the only externally motivated defense reorganizations will occur in the future, I can also concluded that such a reorganization is very likely to take place within the next few years. This is due, primarily, to the fact that one of the reasons for an externally motivated defense reorganization, a significant change in the Soviet threat, has occurred. In fact, the Soviet threat, and the
Soviet Union, have collapsed. Such a dramatic change in the external threat will demand a reorganization of some sort. The kind of defense establishment geared to global confrontation with a superpower enemy is no longer needed. In order to bring about a defense establishment geared to the problems of the 1990s, some significant changes in defense organizational structure will likely be necessary. Whether promoted by Congress or the Executive, significant defense reorganization will result from the collapse of the Soviet threat.

However, it should be noted that, at this point, very few defense reorganizations require legislative support. Few changes which can be envisioned in defense reorganization require formal legislative approval. Most actions can be taken via executive order. The only future changes which would require a legislatively enacted reorganization would be changes affecting the combat functions of the services or changes which would require the creation of new assistant or deputy secretaries of defense. Changes with respect to support functions, logistics, and supply can be effected via executive order.

All of this leads to my final conclusion; that the days of the legislatively enacted defense reorganization may be over. With every new reorganization, more doors to future change are closed. Reorganizations undertaken to address domestic political and civilian executive issues are things
of the past. After the next externally inspired defense reorganization, the very concept of legislatively enacted reorganizations may be a dead issue. So much authority for the conduct of defense has passed into the hands of the executive branch that future changes may be effected via executive orders and internal reorganizations. The manner in which these sorts of changes are made and the factors which motivate them have yet to be discovered.
NOTES

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