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Pleasure and illusion: False pleasure in Plato’s "Philebus"

Mooradian, Norman Arthur, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1992

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PLEASURE AND ILLUSION: FALSE PLEASURE IN PLATO'S PHILEBUS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Norman Arthur Mooradian, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University
1992

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Approved by
Adviser
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To my wife, Martha, and my daughter, Carmen:
"Es en ti la ilusion de cada día."
I gratefully acknowledge the help and guidance provided to me by my adviser, Dr. Allan Silverman, though these brief words cannot do justice for years of service in his role as teacher, mentor, and adviser. I am also indebted to the members of my advisory committee, Dr. Calvin Normore and Dr. Peter King, for their many contributions to the development of this dissertation. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my debt to Dr. Robert Turnbull from whose kind association I have benefitted in innumerable ways. It was a privilege to work with these scholars.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**DEDICATION** ................................................................. ii  
**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** .................................................... iii  
**VITA** ........................................................................... iv  
**INTRODUCTION** .......................................................... 1  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>FALSE PLEASURES OF ANTICIPATION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>FALSE PLEASURES OF ANTICIPATION</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Propositional View</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Picture View</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing the Mark: The Archer View</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>FALSE PLEASURES OF SELF-DELUSION, FANTASY AND HOPE</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fantasy and Wishful Thinking</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Textual Evidence</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>FALSE PLEASURES AND AKRASIA</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apparent Pleasures of Anticipation</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Desiderative View</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further Justification in the Protagoras</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further Justification in the Philebus</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>False Appearances as False Pleasures</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>FALSE PLEASURES OF REPUBLIC BOOK IX</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>False Pleasures of the Neutral State</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Up, Down and Middle State</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unreal Fillings and Unreal Pleasures</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>FALSE PLEASURES OF THE NEUTRAL STATE AND MIXED PLEASURES</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>False Pleasures of the Neutral State</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reinterpretation of the Argument</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Enemies of Philebus</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed Pleasures</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI CONCLUDING REMARKS</td>
<td>131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ......................................................... 142
INTRODUCTION

A casual survey of the Platonic dialogues will quickly reveal Plato's intense interest in the nature of pleasure and its relation to the good life. This will not come as a surprise, given the intellectual climate of his day. It is well known that conventional morality was viewed skeptically by many educated persons who were ready to see its dogmatic acceptance as a reflection of its artificiality. Locating happiness in the unfettered satisfaction of our natural desires, they identified the good for humans with a correlatively sybaritic hedonism. They thus rejected the ideal of the just and self-restrained person in favor of a person ready to throw off the shackles of law and convention and satisfy all those desires forbidden him by the masses. To anyone of Plato's social class conversant with educated opinion, it would have been tempting to regard even this somewhat uncivilized picture as falling on the liberated and enlightened side of societal prejudice.

The Philebus is Plato's last attempt to address the central issues concerning pleasure. Recognized as one of his latest dialogues, it is explicitly directed to the question of whether the good is to be identified with pleasure, joy and elation, or with intellection, belief and other, related cognitive states. Since this question was such an important preoccupation of the Protagoras, Gorgias, Pheado, and Republic, one can look to it for a resolution of old arguments and innovations as well. Foremost among the latter are his recognition that pleasures differ in kind in such a manner as to complicate the issue in crucial ways, and, supportive of this, his belief that pleasures can be evaluated in terms of truth and falsity.
It is this second point of doctrine that will form the topic of my dissertation, though the first will have to treated in order to understand it. The notion that pleasure can be false will no doubt seem odd to the contemporary philosopher. However, it was central to Plato's attack against Hedonism in the *Philebus*. An important aim of this dissertation is to make the idea seem less odd; even cogent and far-reaching.

One step in achieving this end is to bring some unity to the various types of false pleasure found by commentators in Plato's arguments. Basically, commentators\(^1\) have thought that Plato's conception of a false pleasure is ambiguous. One the one hand, his doctrine of false pleasures of anticipation has been held to attribute representational or doxic falsity to pleasures dependent upon belief. Hence, such pleasures share in the type of falsity relevant to the assessment of beliefs. On the other hand, the intense physical pleasures of the sybaritic hedonist are thought to be false in the sense of being ungenuine; i.e., less than real or full-fledged pleasures.

On my view, a single, encompassing sense of falsity is uncovered. The falsity of a pleasure consists in its existence or desirability being essentially tied to some sort of illusion, whether this be a dependence relation on a false belief or some physical condition which makes the pleasure seem more pleasurable or desirable than it really is. Though the illusion in question may differ with different kinds of pleasure, and the nature of the connection thus differ as well, it is sufficient for Plato that in every case the pleasure's claim to being a worthwhile pleasure depend on the illusion. Hence, the illusion or misrepresentation is not incidental to the pleasure, but an integral part of the experience of it as such and in this respect the pleasure can be plausibly evaluated in terms of truth and falsity.

The anticipatory pleasures mentioned above are the subject of the first two chapters. In Chapter I, I take up the question of the nature of the falsity ascribed to the false anticipatory pleasures. That their falsity is related, in some fashion, to false pleasures.

\(^1\) Gosling and Taylor 1982, and Gosling 1975.
anticipatory beliefs, is uncontroversial. However, there is considerable disagreement about the nature of this relation, and the reason it makes the pleasure false. The propositionalists (Penner, 1971, Frede 1985) as I call them, argue that Plato regarded anticipatory pleasures as propositional attitudes. From this they go on to conclude that the pleasure's falsity was no different from the sort attributable to belief. Hence, they identified the pleasure's falsity with the belief.

Other interpreters (e.g., Gosling, 1959, 1973), whom I call the picturists, hold that Plato identified the pleasure's falsity with the falsity of the mental imagery that is described as accompanying the beliefs upon which the anticipatory pleasures are based. In order for Plato to do this, they argue, he must have identified the pleasure with the picture, a conflation which renders the argument fallacious and unacceptable.

My interpretation departs from both. I argue that neither reading gives Plato a plausible position and that neither is borne out by the text. On my view, the pleasure's falsity is not representational, though it depends upon the representational falsity of the associated cognitive states. Rather, the falsity of an anticipatory pleasure consists in its lacking the object which gives it its point and its worth. I argue that in characterizing the nature of an anticipatory pleasure, Plato shows us that it will have a type of object which defines it as the kind of pleasure it is. Hence, the absence of the object cannot fail to have an effect on the pleasure, and thus it must be seen as tied to the world in such a way as to warrant an assessment of it in terms of truth and falsity.

The second chapter takes up the question of whether the anticipatory pleasures are meant to be restricted to anticipation of future events or whether they just serve as a model for all pleasures which depend upon and are grounded in belief. I argue that there is ample textual evidence in support of the latter interpretation.

Granting this, a more difficult question is whether such pleasures are restricted to those based upon full-fledged beliefs, or whether weaker forms of acceptance like that found in hope and even fantasy are also meant to be included. I give philosophical and
textual reasons to hold that Plato did mean to allow cases involving weaker forms of acceptance. The philosophical reasons center around considering how hope can be a pleasurable emotion which is based on the thinnest belief that the hoped for event will occur. Also, I consider a number of cases of fantasy in which it seems that some manipulation of our beliefs is necessary or at least useful for the enjoyment of the fantasy. Finally, I adduce textual evidence which shows that, though the account of anticipatory pleasure begins in an example of someone holding a firm belief, it ends with one in which it is plausible to think that the person is either engaging in wildly unrealistic hopes or simply fantasizing.

Chapter III is dedicated to the false pleasures of over-estimation. These are introduced directly after the anticipatory pleasures and are described as having the opposite origin from the anticipatory pleasure. Instead of having their falsity originate from false belief, their falsity actually results in false belief, being a kind of illusion concerning the size of a pleasure. This illusion is produced by the temporal differences between pleasures and pains relative to a time at which they are compared.

According to previous scholarship, Plato's characterization of these pleasures cannot be taken literally. The falsity must depend upon a belief in so far as at least one of the pleasures would not be experienced when the error is being made. Hence, Plato must mean to do no more than describe another type of false anticipatory pleasure, if he is not to be thought grossly confused.

My account defends a literal interpretation of the argument. To do so, I argue that the false pleasures in question are pleasurable or painful desires. They are false in so far as they, as desires, exceed or fall short of the hedonic merit of that which is desired. Hence, Plato thinks of these experiences as impressions or appearances of the hedonic quality of things anticipated, which appearances can be exaggerated or shrunken in comparison with the actual pleurability of what comes to pass. That they are pleasures
is accounted for by recognizing that, though they are desires, they are felt as pleasurable or painful.

Chapters IV and V discuss two, closely related types of false pleasure; false pleasures of the neutral state and intense pleasures of restoration. The accounts of both depend upon a restoration/depletion model of pleasure, according to which physical pleasure is the result of a restoration of some bodily imbalance, while physical pain is caused by that imbalance. For example, the pleasure of eating, on this theory, is caused by the restoration of the body's deficiency in nourishment. When one begins to right the imbalance, the process is felt as pleasurable. So long as the imbalance continues, it is felt as a pain.

An important consequence of this theory is that, when the balance has been restored (i.e., the restoration is complete) the body should not feel pleasure or pain. This provides the materials for another type of false pleasure. In both the Republic and Philebus, Plato describes people who seem to feel pleasure when they are in the neutral state. Since the above theory dictates that this is impossible, their experience must be illusory. To explain the illusion, Plato argues that the transition into the neutral state and its comparison with the previous pain make it seem to be a pleasure, though really it is not.

However, this immediately raises a question. If the restoration/depletion model is sufficient, then one cannot feel any pleasure at all, and hence, there should not seem to be a pleasure occurring if its seeming consists in its being qualitatively similar or identical to a real pleasure. If the model is insufficient, however, then the "seeming" pleasure should be countenanced as real, and if not, a denial of its status will have to be based on different grounds.

The account I offer shows that Plato answers this problem in the Philebus in a manner consistent with the restoration/depletion theory. Instead of allowing that an experience occurred which was a qualitative imposter of real pleasure, he could account
for the error in terms of its role in the person's psychological make-up. Given certain false beliefs and a somewhat healthy antipathy for the turbulent life of the sybaritic hedonist, the experience would play the role for him that pleasure ought to play. (I.e., it would be desired and pursued by him, valued by him, etc.) for reasons that should be reserved for pleasure and would be once he had corrected his false belief structure.

The restoration/depletion model is also employed to explain the falsity of intense physical pleasures. These occur when great and painful lacks are restored. Hence, the greater the lacks, the greater or more intense the pleasures. In the Republic, they are said to be unreal because, as processes of the filling of something by another, their reality depends upon that of the thing filled and that which fills it. Since such things belong to the sensible world, they will be less than fully real. Hence, the pleasure itself is implicated as unreal. Moreover, since such pleasures are prized above all others by some people, their choices must reflect some illusion, one that would seem to issue from a perspective lacking an adequate point of reference for comparison.

The falsity of these pleasures receives a different account in the Philebus. As in the Republic, their intensity is explained by the restoration/depletion model. Since the lacks are great, the movements reaching the soul will also be great or powerful. However, the reality of these pleasures is called into question by showing that they come mixed with pain. Hence, they are not pure, and are thus not genuine examples of pleasure.

As noted above, this is a quite different notion from that of a representationally false pleasure, and if it were the basis of Plato's ascription of falsity, it would be drastically ambiguous. It is not, however, in my view, the sole reason for calling them false, but simply an element of the argument. Rather, the over-riding project of the argument in question is to explain why the most intense pleasures are thought to be the most pleasurable. In arguing that they are mixed with pain, Plato has committed himself

2. Gorgias 492c4-e1.
to the claim that they must be based in illusion in some way, or it would be quite a paradox why these mixes would be elevated as they are. Hence, the remaining part of chapter V describes Plato's strategy of explanation. Falsity is attributed to the pleasure because its desirability and the actual experience of it involve illusion. For this reason it is false, and not simply because it is not genuine.

A word is in order about how the false pleasure arguments fit into the general context of the dialogue. As mentioned earlier, the dialogue is centered around the question of whether the good for humans is to be identified with pleasure or nous and its related states. It is quickly decided that neither pleasure nor mind could constitute a perfectly desirable life in that neither would be desired to the exclusion of the other. Hence, neither, alone, would be sufficient. The good life is then discovered to consist in a structured combination of two, i.e., a mixed life.

Since neither candidates secure first prize, it is decided that second prize will go to that which best approximates the good. It is decided that since mind is the cause of all structure and order, it will be the cause of the good for humans. Accordingly, it is given the consolation prize above pleasure. This is re-affirmed at the end of the dialogue, when the final prize giving is undertaken.

The false pleasure arguments play an enormously important role in the justification of these contentions. If it were not for them, one would wonder whether the mixed life, the life consisting of both pleasure and intelligence, would not favor pleasure. Intelligence, as the cause of the proper ordering, would play an instrumental role only, and if it contributed anything beyond that, would do so within a limited range of trivial and superficial curiosities. Far from being undermined, hedonism would be bolstered.

The false pleasure arguments provide a solution to this problem. They do so because they are targeted at the pleasures central to the hedonistic life. By showing that all such pleasures are illusory and unable to bear scrutiny, Plato is able to exclude them
from the mixed life. The product is a life where intellectual activity receives very little
c ompetition from the traditional litany of pleasures. Few pleasures are included. The
most prevalent are the intellectual and moral pleasures. Pleasures associated with the
healthy functioning of the body are included mainly because of their necessity. These
include pleasures of smell, for example, which are not preceded by pain, and even the
pleasure of eating, so long as it is conducted in accordance with the dictates of reason.
Hence, the mixed life lauded as the good for humans turns out to look very different from
anything the hedonist would have pictured.

The question will naturally arise as to what effect the doctrine of false pleasure
had on subsequent writers. At first glance, it does not seem to be much. Aristotle, for
example, does not speak of pleasures as false, nor does he consider seriously whether
enjoyment can lack its intended object, and if so, how this would effect it. Epicurus, to
take another example, actually builds the good life from pleasure and the absence of pain.
His good is a life of mild bodily pleasures, unaccompanied by pain and unmolested by
anxiety, fear and other mental disturbances.

The stoics alone seem to have some affinity with the doctrine in that they saw
pleasure as a kind of judgement.3 Hence, if pleasure can be a form of judgement, then it
can be evaluated accordingly. It would not be a very large step to speak of one as erring
in having a pleasure if one is willing to differentiate good from bad or worthwhile from
worthless pleasures as the stoics were ready to do. Hence, to the extent that pleasure was
thought of as evil or indifferent, having it would itself be a case of erring and not just a
reflection of an error made.

As for Aristotle, a closer look will reveal a view quite sympathetic to the doctrine
of false pleasure. His distinction between pleasure which is unqualified and natural, and
pleasure which is qualified and unnatural commits him to the position that the felt quality
of a pleasure is not the sole basis of its worth. The objects of pleasure for a person with a

corrupted nature seem pleasurable, though they really are not. They are felt as pleasurable only under the conditions constituting the bodily or psychic degeneration. They are not pleasurable by nature. Hence, their enjoyment is based on a faulty perspective, one from which the truth, as it were, is hidden.

Epicurus would seem to be a more recalcitrant case. However, his thought bears an important point of similarity to Plato's in respect of the emphasis both place on anticipation. It is not just the momentary physical pleasures and pains which determine the hedonic quality of a person's life, but the anticipations of future pleasures and pains. The reason for this is twofold, one would surmise. First, the duration of anticipation is usually greater than the duration of a physical pleasure. Second, hope and anxiety are not confined to circumstance and hence, a person can produce a disproportionately large number of anticipatory pleasures or pains, depending upon his or her emotional dispositions. Hence, anticipation contributes enormously to the hedonic quality of life. On this Plato and Epicurus agree.

Besides this, there is another important point of agreement. Epicurus, like Plato, thinks that the usual objects of anticipation are improperly valuated. For example, Epicurus holds that certain pleasures are over-rated, in large part because they are not worth the trouble and effort they enlist upon one or the pain and disturbance that tends to follow in their train. Similarly, the fearful anticipation of some things is based on the mistaken belief that they are evil. Chief among these misdirected anxieties is the fear of death. Since death is inevitable, the hedonic quality of life is marred and undermined by fear of it. When one comes to recognize that death is not evil, the bulk of one's worry and pain evaporates.

Whether Epicurus would be willing to continue in agreement with Plato and call the above anticipatory pleasures and pains false, he certainly shares the recognition that the greater part of our pleasure and pain depends upon cognitive states, and that the hedonic quality of life is likewise dependent upon the proper functioning of
the intellectual faculties. Hence, even in the case of Epicurus the false pleasure arguments have some influence.
CHAPTER I
FALSE PLEASURES OF ANTICIPATION

In this chapter, I will concern myself with Plato's discussion of false pleasures as it is presented at 36b2-41a6. A review of the secondary literature indicates that commentators still remain divided on the central points of interpretation. Despite differences among themselves, we can place these commentators into one of two groups. First, there are those who hold that Plato's false pleasures are propositional pleasures; they are pleasures that P, where P is false. For convenience, let us call them the propositionalists. (cf. Thalberg 1962; Penner 1970; Frede 1985) The second group of interpreters argue that false pleasures are enjoyments of false mental imagery. A person, believing that he will enjoy some object or situation, creates for himself the appropriate imagery or pictures and takes pleasure in their contemplation. These we will call the picturists. (cf. Gosling 1959; Kenny 1960) I will take up each interpretation in turn and assess its plausibility. It will be my contention that they are not sufficiently supported by the text. I will also argue that neither provides Plato with a defensible view. Both interpretations hold that Plato's false pleasures are put forth as being representationally false. My interpretation will depart from the general consensus by regarding the pleasure's erring and falsity as consisting in a failure to be directed at the right target as opposed to mis-representing it.

THE PROPOSITIONAL VIEW

In his paper, "False Pleasure," Irving Thalberg defends the thesis, which he attributes to Plato, that certain pleasures can be false. According to Thalberg, the
interchange between Protarchus and Socrates is intended to bring out the point that one, in being pleased that \( P \), where \( P \) is false, is falsely pleased. The idea that Socrates is getting at, as he puts the point, is that:

"When Jones is convinced that he is (or will be) the winner of the Irish Sweepstakes, but his number doesn't come up, we call his belief false. Therefore, if Jones declared, "I am delighted that I won," why shouldn't we say that he was mistaken-that his pleasure was false." (Thalberg 1962, 66)

Protarchus refuses to accept this thesis, however, claiming that it is only the belief that is false. This suggests, according to Thalberg, that Protarchus considers belief and pleasure to be "completely separable" states the relation of which is "merely causal". Socrates, on the other hand, is arguing that the relation between belief and pleasures is "intimate" or "inseparable." (Thalberg 1962, 66-67)

It is not clear exactly what position Thalberg means to attribute to Plato or defend himself. There are at least two theses that he could be asserting: (1) The relation of pleasure to belief is not coincidental. Some other description applies. For example, the pleasure may be said to be individuated according to the content of the proposition. (2) The state of being pleased that \( P \) is a propositional attitude. Like believing that \( P \), it is a propositional (or cognitive) attitude in its own right, though the ascription "X believes that \( P \)" will be entailed by "X is pleased that \( P \)". The essential point here is that being pleased or enjoying is treated as a simple cognitive state which can be described in terms of truth and falsity in just the same way that belief can.\(^1\) The importance of the

\(^1\) I take it that (2) is presupposed by Penner and Frede, though they make no attempt to clarify their thesis. Whether or not Plato intended (2) as his propositional pleasures, this notion needs consideration. Given that "believing \( P \)" entails "being pleased that \( P \)", one may wonder why the belief is not the propositional attitude and
difference between (1) and (2) will be evident when we come to consider exactly what view Protarchus intends to oppose to that of Socrates.

Penner and Frede argue for the stronger version, (2). Let us call this Strong Propositionalism, in contrast to (1), which we will call Weak Propositionalism. Penner and Frede both argue that Plato came to recognize the ambiguity in such terms as "belief" and "pleasure." That is to say, he recognized that "belief", for example, could refer to a certain mental act or the object of that act. Moreover, they characterize the objects of such mental states as communicable propositions to which the qualifications of truth and falsity apply in their primary sense. (Penner 1970, 168)^2 They differ, however, in one important respect. In their statements of what the false pleasures actually are, Frede claims that they are the false propositions themselves. (Frede 1985, 169-70)^3 Penner, pleasure just another component of the total mental state. If we are to think of pleasure as a propositional attitude in its own right, compelling reasons must be provided. Perhaps one might argue that "believing that P" is a generic propositional attitude ascription and that "being pleased that P", "hoping for P", "fearing that P", etc. are species of belief. I do not believe that this would constitute a plausible theory of the emotions, but I am not prepared to argue this here.

2. On the same page, Penner continues, ""Belief, like many other philosophically crucial words has a certain kind of activity known, somewhat misleadingly in this case, as "process product ambiguity." It may mean something I do or tend to do, namely, believing, or it may mean something believed by me, just as my cooking may be something I do (a process) or something cooked by me (a product)." "Truth and falsity apply primarily to the latter, but are also applied to the former."

3. Frede says, "In the scribe and author we have, thus, three things: (a) the author, (b) the writing or painting, and (c) what is written and painted, the subject matter. As I
however, is inclined to think that the false pleasures are the propositional attitudes. (Penner 1970, 176)

Since Frede rests her case, in part, on Penner's conclusions, we should begin with his arguments. According to Penner, Plato's distinction between propositional attitudes and propositions is first established through his articulation of the analogy between belief and pleasure. As he sees it, the crux of the analogy is that, just as one can believe that $p$ when $p$ is false, one can also take pleasure in $p$ or be pleased that $p$ when $p$ is false. (cf. 37a-c, 40d5-40e) As Penner puts the point: "This treatment of pleasure as a kind of perceiving is, if the perceiving is a perceiving that, a way of saying that "being pleased that..." is a propositional attitude. Plato was the first person in the history of philosophy to see this. . ." (Penner 1970, 171) Further, as the analogy develops, Plato draws a distinction between belief and what is believed. At 37a-b he introduces a pair of parallel dichotomies. First, he secures agreement on the point that there is in us something which believes (esti gar pou ti doxazein hemin). Next, he posits a thing which feels pleasure (kai hedesthai). For each capacity he posits a corresponding object, an object of belief (to doxazomenon) and an object through which or in which the pleased thing is pleased (hw to hedomenon hedetai). Having distinguished between the capacities and their objects, Plato is able to claim that either capacity may be fully realized, whether correctly (orthos) or incorrectly (me orthos). (37a8-b4)

want to claim, (c) is what Plato sees as constituting the true or false pleasure in the primary sense, while (b) the writing or painting, though no doubt pleasant too, is true or false only in the derivative sense of "erring" or painting falsity." Also, cf. 178-79 "... the pleasure in question (in the relevant sense) is not to be identified with the elation, the ripple that the soul undergoes, but with what the pleasure consists in. The experiencing itself, the being falsely pleased, when it refers to the process, is then indeed false in a derivative sense."
According to Penner, the above can be summarized in the following statement:
"There exists a phi-ing which I am doing and there exists a proposition which that phi-ing is in and that phi-ing is wrong." (Penner 1970, 173) Furthermore, he contends that at 37d7 it is the belief that errs, whereas what is believed (to doxazomenon) is what the error is about. (Penner 1970, 173) ("An de ge hamartanomenon to doxazomenon e, ten doxan tote hamarntanousan," which I read somewhat barbarously as "And if the thing being believed is being mistook, then the belief is mistaking (it)." The case of pleasure is parallel. Pain and pleasure err, yet they err with respect to that in which they are pleased or at which they are pained (To eph' ho luvetai he tou'nantion).

Frede is in agreement. She adds to Penner's claims a fuller account of how the scribe and painter metaphors bear out the distinction between propositions and propositional attitudes. According to Frede, the scribe and painter metaphors introduce three new elements into Plato's account of anticipatory pleasure: "(a) the author, (b) the writing or painting, and (c) what is written or painted, the subject matter." The terms referring to the writing and painting take over the function of referring to the active state of believing which, up until this point, had been assigned to "doxa". Hence, Plato is now able to make clear to Protarchus the theory of propositions and propositional attitudes that he is pressing. The latter are, like the activities of the scribe and painter, acts of some sort. The former, on the other hand, are symbolized by the writings and paintings produced by the scribe and painter.

According to this interpretation, then, Plato is arguing that certain pleasures and pains are cognitive states or propositional attitudes in their own right. Thus, anticipatory

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4. See footnote 1.
pleasures may be false in just the same manner as anticipatory belief, viz., their representational content may fail to depict the future correctly.

Despite its initial plausibility, I do not believe that this interpretation is borne out by the text. First, as Gosling and Taylor argue, Plato's only example of a person having a false pleasure is not of a person who is pleased that or happy that some state of affairs will occur. Rather, it is of a person who is picturing himself enjoying a great fortune. (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 441) The example concentrates on the activity of picturing. Thus, it seems that the pleasure is coterminous with it. At least, it takes place during the day-dreaming, and ends when the day-dreaming ends, or shortly thereafter. This suggests that Plato is identifying the activity with the pleasure, and not with the belief, for the joy consequent upon belief need not be coterminous with any picturing or even with an occurrent belief state. Hence, while Frede may be right to insist that the belief or conviction that the man will get from the fortune is necessary for the pleasure, Gosling and Taylor can argue that it is not sufficient.

Further substantiation of Gosling's and Taylor's point can be found at 36B4-6 where Socrates gets Protarchus to agree that one who is in a state of deprivation can take

5. It is one of the central points in Frede's essay that the anticipation be a matter of conviction or firm belief and not simply an episode of day dreaming. Frede also emphasizes that the belief be specific, rather than vague. What she has in mind, however, is that it be committal. Hence, she seems to think that only the belief that P will obtain at time t (where t is given a single value) is specific enough to count as an anticipatory pleasure. However, there is no evidence in the text that this type of specificity is relevant to Plato's concerns or that it should be. It is open to us to presume, if we want, that the man in Plato's example believes that his future acquisition of gold depends upon the imminent demise of a distant relative. Such demises, as inexorable as they may be, do not always occur on the date that one forecasts. (1985, 171)
pleasure in the memory of the process of restoration. (Mon oun ouchi elpidzon men
plerotheresthai to memnethai dokei soi chairein.) The use of the dative strongly
suggests that it is the activity of mentally representing the condition, which, when one is
confidently hopeful, constitutes the pleasure. Later, as we see, the operations of
perception join up with the memory to form the doxa. Hence, the memory retains its role
as the content to which one enjoys attending.

More importantly, in my estimation, (2) runs aground on one of the points which
the propositionalists use to support their view. In the initial development of his theory,
Socrates remarks that pleasure often arises with false belief. Protarchus agrees but insists
that the pleasure is to be called "false", not the belief. Why, then, does Socrates not point
out to Protarchus that he intends to identify them and that he only used the term "with"
("meta") to grab Protarchus' attention? What Socrates actually says in response is quite
the opposite. He asks Protarchus whether there is a difference between the pleasure
which comes with true belief and knowledge and that which comes with false belief and
ignorance. (38a5-9) Next, he says that pleasure and pain often follow true and false
belief (38b9-10). This is all said in the course of a serious attempt to explain the nature
of the falsity of a false pleasure. But Socrates' explanation implies that the belief's truth
or falsity will occur with the pleasures falsity, and, thus, the latter's falsity must be

6. This holds even if Plato's example suggests that one is imagining receiving the
gold as opposed to remembering a previous occurrence of this condition.

7. It is hard to understand why Penner and Frede maintain that the notion that
pleasure comes to be with (meta) the belief belongs only to Protarchus. They claim that
Socrates only talks in this manner so that he can "redirect" Protarchus' attention to the
insight that these pleasures are cognitive states. (Penner 1970, 174-75; Frede 1985, 168)
Why this is supposed to be accomplished through self-contradiction is unclear.
constituted by something other than the former's. Belief never loses its role as the representationally false mental state, though if Strong Propositionalism is correct, the anticipatory pleasure should take over this role. Hence, if Plato meant to advance Strong Propositionalism, his supporting arguments are pervaded by anomalous and conflicting remarks.

Though Strong Propositionalism is not well grounded in the text, supporters of the propositional view may still maintain that Weak Propositionalism is a defensible reading. It would escape the second objection advanced against Strong Propositionalism (that enjoyment is a complex state) and it could be amended to be consistent with the first objection, if that objection is to be thought compelling (that the activity of day-dreaming was the object of the pleasure). The initial problem, however, is that it does not tell us how or why the pleasure is to be thought false. While it may seem clear that Plato held Weak Propositionalism, the same evidence might suggest that Protarchus did as well. But, if Protarchus and Socrates still disagree about the existence of false pleasures, Weak Propositionalism cannot be an adequate interpretation of Socrates' statements concerning them. Hence, to argue that this is all the doctrine of false pleasures comes to, it is necessary to attribute a dissenting position to Protarchus.

As noted earlier, Thalberg characterized Protarchus' position as being contrary to Weak Propositionalism. Protarchus, it was claimed, thought pleasure a mere causal accompaniment of belief, one that was "completely separable." (Thalberg 1960, 67-68) Penner claimed that Protarchus originally thought pleasure to be "merely simultaneous" with belief, as would be, for example, the pleasure I get from a massage given to me by someone whom I believe to be a famous movie star, if the pleasure depended in no way upon the believed identification. (Penner 1970, 169) Hence, if the pleasure derived from or consisted in the tactile sensations caused by the pressure from the movie star's hands, it would be merely simultaneous. Hence, it would not cease upon discovering that the
masseuse was not the star. If it would cease, then the pleasure "depended upon" or was "based upon" the belief. Frede follows Penner and Thalberg in thus characterizing Protarchus' view. As she puts it, Protarchus held that pleasure is "an indistinct feeling of euphoria or elation that can arise on any occasion, an epiphenomenon." (Frede 1985, 172)

All three interpreters agree that Protarchus thought of pleasure as a feeling that had only the most tenuous connection with belief. The relationship, as far as Protarchus understands it, is accidental or coincidental. But the relationship between belief and pleasure will be coincidental only in certain cases, as, for example, when the bone crushing ache felt in my finger is joined by such occurrent beliefs as the belief that it was a Craftsman tool with which I struck myself. Such pains, however, are what we typically call "physical". Furthermore, part of what it means to call them physical seems to lie in the fact that the sensory mechanisms of which they are states are fairly well encapsulated from the cognitive mechanisms. Thus, according to the interpretation in question, Protarchus seems to be committed to the position that anticipatory pleasures and pains are physical sensations or qualitatively identical to such sensations.

If this is how Penner and Frede mean to characterize Protarchus' position on pleasure, they should find it odd that on their view Socrates' expostulation of Protarchus consists in his showing that some pleasures are cognitive states in their own right. It would suffice for Socrates to show that the connection between these pleasures and cognitive states is not merely simultaneous or that the pleasure taken in glimmering prospects is different from that pursued in eating or drinking. That is, Socrates need only argue that the salient cause of a pleasure or pain can be a cognitive state. This would not be a matter of "mere accompaniment", rather, the pains and pleasures would be based upon the cognitive states in the manner described above. Thus, if this characterization of Protarchus' position were correct, we might find ourselves satisfied with Weak Propositionalism. Indeed, this may be Thalberg's interpretation of the text, since, as
mentioned earlier, his discussion of the passage does not clearly distinguish Weak from Strong Propositionalism.

There does not seem to be much evidence, however, that Protarchus is interested in arguing in this passage that pleasures cannot be false because they are bodily sensations. Also, it is not likely that Socrates' insistence in the existence of false pleasures is primarily aimed at disabusing Protarchus of this view. The propositionalists rest their interpretation of Protarchus's position on the exchange between Socrates and Protarchus at 37e9-38a2 where Socrates remarks that pleasures often come to be with false belief. Protarchus replies by emphasizing that in such cases it is the belief which is false, not the pleasure. But this is completely consistent with Weak Propositionalism. Protarchus is not thereby committed to holding that the relationship between the belief and pleasure is accidental.

Moreover, earlier on, Protarchus had come to accept Socrates' pleasures and pains of the soul. These psychic pleasures and pains were caused by the soul itself without the body's help. The soul, remembering that condition which restores it, feels pleasure when it is confident of achieving that condition and pain when it does not. (35e7-36c1) Hence, after 36c1, Protarchus need not be told that beliefs can cause pleasure and pain. He has already accepted this.8

Finally, in the discussion following 36c1, Protarchus is willing to maintain that, although a man be dreaming or insane, his pleasure and pain will nonetheless be real. Whatever the moral of this suggestion the reference to insanity indicates that false belief is important to it. But, insanity will be relevant only when the pleasures and pains are

8. It is interesting to note that Plato's psychic pleasures would be regarded as emotions by many contemporary theorists. Indeed, it might be argued that he holds a cognitive theory of the emotions. (cf. Lyons, (1980), where he argues that Aristotle held a cognitive theory.)
caused by the irrational and false beliefs. Hence, again the text suggests that Protarchus did not regard pleasures and pains as sensations which could only form an accidental relationship with cognitive states.

Thus, if the weaker version of the propositionalist view is to be salvaged, it will have to give an account of false pleasure which explains why Socrates regards it as false. Before we consider the prospects of its doing so, let us turn to an alternative interpretation, the picture view offered by Gosling and Taylor.

THE PICTURE VIEW

As described earlier, advocates of the picture interpretation believe that Plato's false pleasures consist in the enjoyment of mentally representing states of affairs which one believes to be both advantageous and extremely probable. Instead of enjoying that P will obtain, one enjoys imagining P, believing consciously or unconsciously that P will occur. If one's belief that P will occur is false, the imagining will be false also. However, as the imagining consists in creating mental imagery which, as it were, illustrates the content of the belief, the falsity of the pleasure will not be identical to that of the belief. It will have its own kind of falsity. For Gosling and Taylor, this will be the kind of falsity which pertains to fictitious pictures. (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 438; Gosling 1959, 53) For Kenny, the pleasure's falsity will consist in its dependence upon these non-veridical images. (Kenny 1960, 52) Either way, this is in keeping with Socrates' inclination to look for some further error besides the mistaken belief. In addition to a false belief, we have a false picture. Enjoyment in the picture is false for the sole reason that the picture is false.

The principle support for this view lies in the passages adduced against the propositionalist interpretation. The passages cited suggested that the enjoyment in an anticipatory pleasure was in the actual activity of picturing what is anticipated. In
addition to this, Gosling can find support for his view in Plato's broader theoretical discussion of pleasure. In the Gorgias, Republic, Timaeus and Philebus, Plato offers a theory of pleasure according to which it is or involves the restoration of certain lacks or certain conditions of abnormality. While it is unlikely that this theory is intended to account for the psychic pleasures under discussion, it nevertheless underscores Plato's tendency to think of pleasures as involving the awareness of certain commotions or undergoings. Hence, when Plato describes the pleasures of anticipation as pleasures taken in remembering the process of restoration, the remembering or imagining can be seen to play the role of the activity enjoyed on analogy with the restorations or fillings appropriate to bodily pleasures. Hence, it suits Plato's general framework better to regard the pleasures of anticipation as states of enjoyment which have certain psychological processes as their objects as opposed to future states of affairs.

An additional point in favor of this interpretation is that it explains better the introduction of the painter simile. On the propositional view, the painter simile would seem adventitious. To have a pleasure of anticipation in regard to P, it is enough that one believe P (and, of course, view P as a good condition). But for this the scribe and his logoi suffice. Why then does Plato go to the trouble to introduce and work out the painter simile? Why does he describe the pleasures as "painted pleasures" as opposed to leaving open their medium of representation? The best the propositionalist can say is that the function of the pictures is supplementary. It may be that their inclusion is justified by the consideration that paradigm cases of pleasures of anticipation typically involve mental imagery. However, it is not clear that this really explains the painter's presence. Hence, the picture view gains a slight advantage since it rests more importance on the operations of the painter.

9. Gosling and Taylor argue this point at length. (1982, 438)
Still, the picture view is also met by some seemingly recalcitrant passages and it is these passages which have suggested the propositional view to its advocates. When Socrates asks Protarchus whether there are true and false pleasures and Protarchus denies this, Socrates asks how there can be true or false fears as well as true or false beliefs. (Pose de, o Protarche, phoboi an alethes e psudeis, e prosdokoi aletheis e me, e doxai aletheis e psudeis;) (36d9-11) It seems that Socrates is insisting that if beliefs can be false or true, then so can fears and pleasures, and, indeed, for the very same sorts of reasons. Hence, an account of the falsity of beliefs ought to yield substantially the same account of the falsity of pleasures. Moreover, since we are inclined to think that fears are fears that P, we should also be inclined to think of false fears as false fears that P. But, in light of this passage, we should be committed to regard anticipatory pleasures as pleasures that P or being pleased that P. Hence, it may be that one of the propositionalist's theses ought to be adopted.

Another difficulty with the picture theory interpretation is that it does not seem to allow Socrates much success in the realization of his aims. If the pleasure of anticipation consists in the enjoyment of picturing a certain state of affairs, then we should have no reason to think that we can attribute some substantial notion of falsity to the enjoyment. Rather, we should be able to reserve the falsity for the representation and not ascribe it to the joy taken in the representation. Since this was the structure of Protarchus' position, he need not be convinced in the end that there are false pleasures. As Gosling sees it, Socrates committed a serious fallacy in his attempt to convince Protarchus that false pleasures exist. He conflated the activity of picturing with the enjoyment of that activity. According to Gosling, it is this fallacy which bemused Protarchus, thus preventing him from re-asserting his position unscathed.

10. Gosling also argues that Plato conflates the activity of picturing with the content of the picture and that it is the latter to which the properties of truth and falsity
MISSING THE MARK: THE ARCHER VIEW

A review of the propositional view and the picture view indicates that they receive conflicting textual support. Further, each reconstruction of the argument deprives Plato of much success in his attempt to establish the existence of false pleasures. In regard to the propositional view, Weak Propositionalism does not establish that the pleasures themselves should be called false, while Strong Propositionalism can only do this by identifying the pleasure with the representationally false mental state and this, I have argued, conflicts with the text. The picture view, as we have just seen, attributes to Plato the fallacy of confusing the act of picturing a state of affairs with the pleasure taken in the picturing. It is thus incumbent upon us to find a new interpretation or supplement those considered.

To this end, I would like to suggest that we reconsider our view of the meaning of certain of the terms central to Plato's discussion of false pleasure. First, "false" or "psuedo" has been taken by all the commentators to signify our linguistic or representational notion of falsity in this context. This has seemed natural in light of the analogy between belief and pleasure and the claim that both can err ("amartanein") and adhere. Hence, Plato's argument is another step removed from the truth. For my part, I do not count this a flaw in Plato's argument. It is not clear that the content of a painting or proposition has the appropriate ontological status to have reserved for itself the primary application of these epistemological/linguistic properties. In this context, the "content" of the scribe's images ought to be regarded as an abstraction from the actual concrete painting. Hence, even if we are tempted to think of the abstraction as an object itself, it should be put alongside the concrete image as just another object, and hence, as not deserving the unqualified appellations of true and false exclusively. (1959, 52)
both can be incorrect (me orthos). Since it is said that belief can be incorrect, and likewise pleasure, and hence, the latter can also be false, it is tempting to conclude that Plato means to suggest that belief and pleasure can be false in the very same way, i.e., by virtue of failing to correctly represent states of affairs.

However, it is not entirely clear that this is what Plato had in mind in regard to the correctness or incorrectness of pleasure. It may be that the point of the analogy between belief and pleasure was simply that each could err in some way, but that the ways in which they err are different, though closely related. Each can literally miss the mark (‘amartanein), but what it is for each to miss the mark, and hence, be incorrect (me orthos), is unique to each. Belief and pleasure have different objectives and thus, their failure to meet these objectives is correspondingly distinct.

Moreover, in so far as each fails to meet its proper objective, it may turn out that there is an additional, but related, sense in which it can be called false. Socrates latter suggests that false pleasures are "caricatures" or "imitations" of true pleasures. The idea, perhaps, is that false belief and pleasure, when they occur, will be indiscernible from true belief and pleasure. When later it is discovered that the former lack the feature of success had by the latter, the former lose the appearance of their worth. Hence, these will turn out to be false in a manner similar to that in which a friend may be false. If these two points can be established, it would open the way to a more favorable reception of Plato's argument.

Is there any textual evidence for this interpretation? And in what sense, according to it, does the pleasure miss the mark? To begin with the first question, I believe that evidence can be found in two areas: First, the example of erroneous belief, and second, Socrates' descriptions of the relation between false belief and false pleasures.

At 38c4, Socrates begins his example of a case in which a person's belief errs. The example is of a man at a distance from some object, engaged in an attempt to identify the object. He is able to give a partial description of it, as being, for example, a
visible object, but, under the perceptual conditions, he has difficulty fully describing it. Consequently, the man might suppose that he is seeing an image made by shepherds, though in fact, what he is really seeing is another man. Hence, though he is aware of the thing, he is mislead with respect to its identity. He, as it were, misses the mark in his attempted identification of the distant thing.

In regard to Socrates' language concerning the relation between false belief and false pleasure, I have cited passages which suggest that Socrates thinks of the false pleasure as something distinct from the false belief, though contemporaneous with it. (Cf. 38a5-b10) Also, at 42a7-9, Socrates sums up the results of this argument for false pleasure by saying that, in the cases described, the false beliefs filled the false pleasures with their own condition. Thus, again, we see that Socrates will not allow the pleasures to err without the intermediary erring of the belief. While both err in so far as they are not based upon realities (40d7-10), the pleasure errs only when the belief does.

As remarked before, Socrates does not seem to be unifying the belief and the pleasure. But if not, why disagree with Protarchus who admits that pleasures can be based upon false belief? That is, why call the pleasure false?

The answer is that, though Protarchus had all along accepted the notion that false belief could generate false pleasure, he is now willing to accept the idea that this dependency justifies our saying of the pleasure that it is false also. What about this dependency is newly discovered to Protarchus? The language of "missing the mark" and the example of a mistaken identification under adverse perceptual conditions served to bring out the role belief plays in identifying the things in which we take pleasure. In so far as belief can misidentify objects, it can provide us with objects not suited for the pleasures in question. Hence, the state of being pleased can have as its object something which should not be an object of pleasure at all. One can take pleasure in something which does not have enjoyable properties because one believes that it has these properties.
Thus, if one takes the picture view, one can say that a person who believes that he will receive a fortune in gold may take pleasure in picturing his receiving the gold. In such a case, the object of his pleasure is the mental imagery that he is enjoying. He is enjoying it, however, only because of his false belief that it is an accurate depiction of his future. Likewise, if one takes the propositional view, one can say that pleasure is taken in a world that bears the modal property of promising some particular benefit. However, as the belief is false, this enjoyable property is not to be found. In either case, one's pleasure errs in so far as it is in something which is really not enjoyable to one (i.e., will not be enjoyed under a true, identifying description.), though one takes pleasure in it nonetheless.

Hence, if I am right, Protarchus' "conversion" comes through the recognition of the role belief plays in the identification of objects of enjoyment. If the ascription of enjoyable properties to an object is false, the object will not be enjoyable by virtue of having those properties. Hence, the pleasure taken in it will be just as badly based as the mistaken belief. It is open to similar objective criteria of assessment.

One must emphasize, however, that there should be criteria of assessment which are similar, not identical. Belief can be assessed by reference to mind independent states of affairs. Hence, the criteria of assessment are objective in the fullest sense. The pleasures in question, however, cannot admit of such strict criteria. If one finds some object or condition enjoyable, for example, wading in sewage, it is hard to imagine how one might make a case that the pleasure was objectively incorrect; that it was taken in a situation which lacked objectively enjoyable properties, having, in fact, the opposite properties. A different sense of "based upon" is needed for pleasure, if Socrates is ultimately to have a convincing reason to call some pleasures false.

For the argument at hand, however, Socrates does not need such a strong sense of "based upon" or "correct", nor does he employ one. His hedonist opponents rest their assessment of psychological states entirely on the way they feel. Hence, the point of the
argument is to convince them that there is more to it than that; that truth plays a part in
determining the value of the pleasure. Hence, Socrates needs to establish that pleasures
can be related to truth and that this relation can affect their value. Pleasures of
anticipation are introduced to bear out this point.

The case for false pleasures of anticipation shows that the way the world is does
matter for certain kinds of pleasure. That is not to say that it matters for all pleasures.
Nor is it to say that for anticipatory pleasure it should matter. Rather, we are given
examples of pleasures, states of enjoyments, in states of affairs that do not obtain. The
pleasures lack their proper objects. Hence, they are not properly connected with the
world and can be criticized for that reason.

The question we have to answer, of course, is what is it for a pleasure to have a
proper or suitable object. Socrates leaves two distinct, but mutually complimentary
options for us. According to the first, an object would be the proper object of a pleasure
because it causes the pleasure. More precisely, if awareness of it or an aspect of it causes
the pleasure and the pleasure would cease if it were to be realized that it did not exist,
then it is the proper object of the pleasure. In other words, if something in reality
answers to the intentional object, then it is the proper or suitable object.

The other option would be to hold that something is the proper object of a
pleasure if we would not want the pleasure if it could be generated without that object.
For example, suppose one could get false anticipatory pleasures by having a brain
scientist manipulate his beliefs. If he were to go in for that, asking the scientist to induce
false beliefs in him in order that he have such a pleasure, the actual, intended object
would not be the proper or suitable object. If he would not go in for that, it would be the
proper object. That is, if, looking at the pleasure from the "outside", so to speak, he
decided that he would not want it without the existence of the actual, intended object,
then that object would be the proper object.
Which of the two accounts is intended by Socrates? My hunch is that both are intended, or better, that they are not distinguished. Both explain the intuition at the heart of the argument that pleasure and feeling can be based on reasons. That is to say, when someone is asked, why are you happy or what are you happy about, it is typical to answer with an explanation that something good is the case. If one is told that such is not the case, one is likely to lose the reason for the pleasure. Both accounts specify conditions for the reason's defeat.

Secondly, the accounts will hold together in all but the most unusual cases. If one will feel pleasure or happiness when he believes a certain thing will happen to him, it is because that thing is good for or valuable to him. Hence, it will be the thing he wants. The pleasure or joy will be consequent upon believing that he has it. Thus, he will not want the experience of enjoying the thing without its existing. If he does, it will usually be in a situation of certain deprivation of the thing in question, in which case the experience without the intended object would be all he could get. He will not be indifferent as to whether the intended objects does or does not exist. Hence, even if one were to hold the first interpretation to the exclusion of the second, the first would still give us reason to describe such a pleasure as partially false in the majority of cases.

I conclude, then, that there is a plausible reading of the false pleasures passage in which Protarchus grants (however reservedly) that there are false pleasures for reasons that need not be regarded as confused. They are false because of their connection with unrealities. While this connection is different from that of belief, it is similar enough to warrant the ascription of falsity. Also, the inadequacy of false pleasures in this respect invites Socrates condemnation of them as "imitations" or "caricatures" of true pleasures. This strongly suggests that Socrates wants Protarchus to think of them as false in this added respect. After all, not only do these pleasures lack that feature which makes them worthwhile, i.e., a proper grounding, but this defect is concealed from the person enjoying the pleasure. Hence, these pleasures can be thought of as deceptions and this
provides Socrates with another sense in which one is justified in calling these pleasures false.

There are advantages to holding this view. First, it does not require that Plato commit any of the aforementioned fallacies. Second, as anticipatory pleasures are not considered to be representational states themselves, we can sidestep the textual difficulties that plagued the other two interpretations of false pleasures. I believe that the picture view and thesis of Weak Propositionalism are the two most plausible contenders, but on the present interpretation nothing rests on the adoption of one over the other. This, perhaps, explains why they both gain support from the text, despite the fact that they are distinguishable.

Finally, I think that this interpretation will lend more coherence to the entirety of Plato's discussion of false pleasure. In the following sections, Plato discusses both overestimated pleasures and mixed pleasures. All the commentators have agreed that the falsity of these latter pleasures (at least the third type) is not to be understood representationally, but rather, pertains to their authenticity or genuineness. Hence, Plato's general discussion of false pleasure involves a radical, unremarked switch in the notions of falsity under discussion. On the present interpretation, there is no such gap. Rather, we have two connected ways in which a pleasure of anticipation may be thought of as false, both of which involve the authenticity or reality of the pleasure. While it may be that neither sense revokes the pleasure's claim to being a pleasure, the claim to being a good or worthwhile pleasure is undermined. In light of this, I believe it an advantage of the present interpretation that it explain Plato's strategy in a more unified and coherent matter.
CHAPTER II
FALSE PLEASURES OF SELF-DELUSION, FANTASY AND HOPE

The previous chapter paid a great deal of attention to the nature of false pleasures of anticipation as they were introduced and explicated by Socrates. For the most part, these pleasures were confined to anticipation, expectation and hope. On the propositional view, the pleasures were anticipations or enjoyed anticipations. That is, they were beliefs or emotions causally dependent upon and logically related to belief. On the picture view, the pleasures consisted in the enjoyment of mental imagery. Belief played the role of inducing and enhancing that enjoyment. Still, in this latter case it was the activity of picturing the future pleasure that could be called the object of enjoyment. It was not an external object or state of affairs, as in the case of the propositional view.

While denying that false pleasures of anticipation were representations, and thus, representationally false, the archer view did not attempt to decide the issue of whether they were emotions taking states of affairs as their objects or whether they were merely enjoyed day-dreams. Rather, it seemed that Plato left the issue indeterminate, as textual evidence pointed in both directions. This is not surprising, however. A distinction between emotions and enjoyment of mental pictures would hinge upon the difference between their objects. As just said, day dreams are mental activities and thus as objects of enjoyment are quite distinct from those objects which are typical for emotions.1 But

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1 I say "typical" because it is possible that one could be happy that one would soon be having a good day dream.
Plato nowhere offers a fine tuned principle of distinction between enjoyment and emotion depending upon differences in intended objects or relations thereto. Indeed, emotions are simply described as pleasures that the soul is able to produce by itself.\(^2\)

One point that is not controversial is the importance of the future to these pleasures. On both views, the pleasures are primarily forward looking. Whether one is happy that one will win a state lottery or, given that belief, one enjoys daydreaming about how nice it will be, the content of the representational states involved are about the future. This point is brought up in a number of places: 36a9-c, 39c7-e6, 40a2-b, 41d5-e, 41e9-42b9, and 47c1d3.

However, despite this emphasis on the future, and despite the fact that these pleasures are introduced as pleasures of anticipation, Plato does not restrict them to anticipation.\(^3\) He hints at this when summing up the argument, saying that a false pleasure is not based on realities and that this is true for past, present and future realities, but especially in regard to the future.\(^4\) Hence, though the most typical cases of

\(^2\) One might say that to enjoy an object, it is necessary that some action be performed which is somehow connected with it. Hence, the enjoyment and the object must co-exist. This would imply a de re relation between enjoyers and their objects. If Crazy Jones is engaged in an imaginary tennis game, we are not inclined to say that he is enjoying some not existent event. Rather, we will say that he enjoys the psychotic activity which for him passes as a game of tennis. Emotion, on the other hand, would not seem to require the existence of its objects.

\(^3\) Penner is committed to this by his position that false pleasure is a propositional attitude, ascriptions of which entail belief ascriptions. Hence, this attitude ought to have the same flexibility as belief. Also, Frede's view is committed to this position for the same reason, and she explicitly endorses it. (Frede 1985, 175-177)
false pleasures may involve false hopes for or musings upon the future, they can also focus on the past and present.

It is not hard to think of examples of false pleasures about the past and present. In regard to the past, one can falsely believe that he has descended from nobility. This might fill one with pleasures of joy and pride, as the propositional view would have it. Or, in accordance with the picture view, one might daydream about the glorious deeds of one's fictional forefathers and take pleasure in these thoughts because of the supposed genetic and historical associations with them. Likewise, cases restricted to one's personal history are available in abundance. For example, one might suppose he had been well liked by a group of associates, though in fact he had only been tolerated. He might be filled with joy to know that he had been well esteemed. Also, he might enjoy daydreaming of situations that could have transpired, had the opportunities arisen. The daydream would be undergirded by the presupposition that such opportunities were possible, though in fact they were not.  

The same things could be said about the present. Interestingly, Plato himself lays out a taxonomy of just the sorts of states that would count as false pleasures pertaining to the present, though he does not indicate that they are to be taken as such. He does this in the discussion of mixed pleasures of the soul. These pleasures will be discussed in a later chapter. For now, it is sufficient to say that they are states of consciousness which are comprised of a pleasurable and painful element. Examples include love, anger, fear and sorrow. When the pleasurable element is predominant, the total state of consciousness is described as itself pleasurable.

Among these false pleasures is the pleasure of laughing at comedies or comical characters. One laughs because one feels malice toward a character or person who has

4 It is clear that the picture theory, though allowing backward looking daydreams, is more plausible in regard to forward looking ones.
just fallen into misfortune. But the misfortune that Plato seizes upon is the state of being ignorant of one's true condition. He lists three ways in which one might harbor false beliefs about oneself: (1) One might suppose that he is richer than he is. (2) He might suppose that he has greater physical attributes than he does, in particular, looks and strength. Finally, (3) he might think that he is wiser or smarter than he is. Plato suggests that these conditions are very common, especially the latter.

While nothing is made of this, it is hard not to notice that all these states are fecund sources of the sort of pleasure that was generated by hope and anticipation. People take great joy in believing that they are attractive and supposing that the force of their comeliness is not lost on those around them. Also, they take great pleasure in supposing themselves to be included in a higher socio-economic class, as the existence of country clubs and luxury cars testifies. Still, one's joy in non-existent intellectual abilities is more extensive, if only for the reason that it is harder to detect their presence or absence, when circumstance and idiosyncrasies are taken into account.

We can suppose that Plato noticed this, for the simple reason that his only example of a false pleasure of anticipation corresponds closely to the second form of self-ignorance. One imagines a fortune in gold coming into his possession and he imagines himself enjoying that fortune. (40a5-10) If one believes that the gold will come, one has a false belief about his future financial condition. But this false belief is not significantly different from the one which attends the person who thinks that he actually is wealthier than he is. The latter is even more egregious, since the person holds the belief when the

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5 Actually, there is more to the condition than self-ignorance. One has to be weak and thus unable to inflict injury upon others because of this weakness.

6 It might be observed that even the beliefs which we characterize as present beliefs are also about the future, since one's belief that he is presently wealthy depends
totality of the relevant evidence points against it. The false hoper could at least plead for pardon on the ground that the future is uncertain and full of surprises.

Thus, it is evident that Plato does not intend to restrict these false pleasures to anticipation or hope. The first case of false pleasures introduced (there are other cases or types that follow them) are meant to extend in all temporal directions. This is even signaled from the beginning of the discussion, when, to motivate the issue, Socrates asks Protarchus to consider whether dreamers or madmen have false pleasures. Their pleasures would not be exclusively or even predominantly anticipatory. If Plato was inclined to emphasize the relation of pleasures of the soul to anticipations, he himself seems to provide the reason why, namely, that our thinking is dominated by hopes for the future. We are, as this suggests, forward looking creatures. 39e2-5

FANTASY AND WISHFUL THINKING.

Having established the unrestricted temporal nature of false pleasures, it is now time to consider what sorts of restrictions Plato puts on the kinds of representational states which are able to produce pleasure and the falsity which "infects" the pleasure, causing it also to be false.

The strong propositionalist, as we saw, regarded the false pleasure as a false propositional attitude. Moreover, according to this position, the pleasure was false in the very same way the belief was; it misrepresented reality. Consequently, it seemed that upon tacitly presupposing that the currency or possessions he owns are not undergoing a process of devaluation. I think we can safely ignore such caveats, however, since the commonsensical distinction between the present and the future is more or less relevant and does not depend upon a crisp metaphysical dissection separating the two. At least, I do not see that it is relevant to the argument at hand.
false pleasure occurred only when false belief occurred. The picturists, on the other hand, held that the false pleasure was pleasure taken in the "mental viewing" of a false picture. Since belief or judgment did not seem crucial to such picturing, it is natural to think that the pleasures of anticipation might consist in day dreaming. Thus, this is the view the picturists took. If one believes that one's day dreams will be realized, that certainly will enhance one's enjoyment, but it is not necessary.

As discussed earlier, the archer view does not hold that the putative falsity of the pleasure should be understood in representational terms. Rather, according to this view, the pleasures of anticipation are false because they are in or about states of affairs that do not occur and further, because the failure of these states of affairs to occur denudes the pleasures of their ground or point. If one enjoys anticipating the inheritance of gold, this is because one believes that it will be inherited. This belief is the ground of the pleasure. Without it, the anticipation would not be pleasurable. Hence, insofar as the pleasure depends upon the way the world is (in one's view), this constitutes a criterion of its rightness. To enjoy rightly, one enjoys what is enjoyable (to one). If what is enjoyable does not actually exist, one is taking enjoyment in something that is not enjoyable to himself or herself. Hence, we can think of the point of pleasure as consisting in its being directed at an object proper to it. The point of my pleasure of anticipating riches is that I enjoy actual future riches. These constitute the proper object of this pleasure. Should they fail to materialize, my enjoyment would have been misdirected.

I summarize the archer view in order to consider what restrictions it puts on the representational states productive of false pleasure. Unlike the strong propositional view, it is not obvious that they must be judgements or beliefs. All that is necessary is that the non-existence of states of affairs rob the pleasure of its grounds. The question we must ask is whether this can take place only when one's enjoyment is caused by a full-fledged judgement that the state of affairs will occur. I think a case can be made to show that full-
fledged judgement or belief in the existence of the state of affairs is not necessary. Also, I think Plato recognizes this, as I will attempt to show.

One might think that it is necessary that one believe p in order to falsely enjoy p because of the following case. We can imagine someone who, at the end or his life, realizes that his aspirations have been left largely unfulfilled. The thought of this might give rise to considerable depression. Hence, he might fall into the habit of fantasizing about what might have been, picturing himself getting jobs and entering relationships that were always out of reach. Likewise, he might day dream about future successes, though he knows that their achievement, at this stage in life, is impossible.

The upshot of this example is that believing in the existence of the state of affairs does not seem to be necessary for one to feel pleasure when thinking about it. Even as one realizes that it will not occur, one enjoys day-dreaming about it anyway. Indeed, the reason why day-dreaming is pleasurable is that it offers an escape from the actual world and its disappointments. Hence, we seem to have a mental pleasure the rightness of which does not depend upon its being based in reality.

From this case, one would go on to claim that fantasizing or day-dreaming is not the only innocent mental pleasure. Hope is another source of pleasure that does not depend on reality for its rightness. Just as our hard luck fellow above enjoyed imagining the impossible, so one might enjoy contemplating the possible, though improbable realization of one's desires. But what is wrong with that? If it gives a person pleasure to think about winning the lottery, even when he knows that it is improbable, why should the pleasure be considered incorrect (given that he does not win)? Again, it does not seem that the pleasure is based upon reality and hence, its merit as a feeling does not depend upon the existence of the objects at which it is directed.

Moreover, to return to fantasizing and day dreaming, we can observe that there are other more striking cases of such pleasures. Some forms of fantasizing are enjoyed not only in the face of improbable or impossible realization, but, in part, because of the
improbability or impossibility. There are many things that people fantasize acquiring or doing, which, if realized, would not satisfy them and would not be desired by them. Sometimes people fantasize just to get away from reality, but not because they are unhappy with reality, but because they are curious about alternative courses that it might take.  

Hence, after considering these cases, one might be inclined to conclude that it is only judgements or beliefs that p that can yield false pleasure, since the criterion of falsity seems to lie in a pleasure's dependence on reality for its merit. Only pleasures generated by belief seem to exhibit this dependence. Nevertheless, I think this inference would be hasty. While there may be some pleasures of day-dreaming which do not seem to be susceptible to falsity, there may be some that are. Moreover, what may fail to hold for day-dreaming may still hold for hope. Let us start then with hope.

Propositionalists have made the assumption that when Plato speaks of false hopes, he is speaking about false beliefs that p about the future. They have also assumed as much about Plato's inclusion of fears in the list of bearers of truth and falsity. Latter I will try to show that this assumption is ungrounded. For now, independently of whether Plato thought it or not, let us consider whether false hopes and fears depend upon false beliefs.

Typically if I hope that I will encounter good fortune, I do this knowing that it is no sure thing. Most hopes seem to have this character. For example, if I hope that I will win a fellowship, I nonetheless know that the odds are slim. I believe that I won't, at least in the sense that I would be willing to bet money against my winning. Nonetheless, I hope, and the hope involves a kind of pleasure. Fearing takes the same structure. If I fear that I will be destitute because of the contingencies of the profession I am attempting

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7 I derive this point from Christopher Cherry. (1988, 117-120)
to enter, it is not because I believe that I will. Such a belief, were it to exist, would cause me to alter my career plans. Rather, it is the uncertainty about the future which causes my fear. It is not that I fear that p believing that p. Rather, I fear that p believing that it is possible that p. Moreover, I do this even if p is not highly probable. Hopes that p and fears that p are not always or usually based upon beliefs that p. They are based upon belief in the possibility that p.

Is Plato then correct in speaking about false fears and false hopes, assuming that he is using these terms in accordance with common usage? One thing is clear; if I hope that p, p may never be the case. Still, why should my pleasure, directed as it was to the possibility that p, be considered false? Strictly speaking, it may remain true that p could have been the case. Hence, in a sense, my pleasure was not based upon unrealities.

In a sense it may not have been, but in another sense it may be based upon unrealities. If hoping that p gives me pleasure, it is because of the importance of p to me. p is a good state of affairs, and hence, when p occurs, I am made happy. p is so important to me that recognizing that it is possible causes me, at times, to feel pleasure. But this, in turn, may encourage me to think about it, imagining how good it would be were it to materialize. Such thoughts may become the center of my attention. As a result, I begin to feel quite happy about p, almost as happy as one for whom p is quite probable.

Thus, even though we are inclined to say that one can take pleasure in the possibility of p, this does not seem to be what happens in a certain kind of pleasure derived from hope. We are not delighted because there is a chance that we may get what we want, for this chance may be slim and it may cause us to despair if we meditate upon its tenuousness. Rather, we allow ourselves to get excited about a state of affairs as if it really were going to occur and was not merely a possibility. Because p is possible, and

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8 This point is derived from Robert M. Gordon. (1987, 68-69)
because it is important to us, we slip into a kind or rejoicing that can only be merited when it is directed at the existing state of affairs. This is why we are said to catch ourselves in these flights of joy, and we are said to be in need of bringing ourselves down to earth.

Such anticipatory pleasures and pains, then, would seem not to require firm belief in what is anticipated, or more accurately, what is hoped for or feared. Rather, they involve some form of cognitive acceptance which falls well short of belief. We act as if we really believed that the future state of affairs were likely to occur. But this seems paradoxical, given that we really do not believe it will happen. What is happening is that we are not actualizing our contrary beliefs. Our desire that $p$ be true is suppressing our belief that it likely will not be true. This desire permits us a temporary acceptance that we do have a good chance at $p$, though this acceptance will usually not be fully conscious. This acceptance falls short of being full belief in that it is not produced by any kind of critical inquiry nor will it last in the face of such conscious consideration.\(^9\)

Hence, we have a pleasure about $p$ which is based in the accepted (future) existence of $p$. It is a fleeting pleasure, however, because the acceptance is quite temporary. Moreover, it will usually not be very intense or stirring. This is, in part, because its brief existence does not give it much time to develop. More importantly, since the acceptance of one's thoughts or mental images as true is weak and unstable, the pleasure will usually be checked and regulated by an under-current of sober belief and judgment that will not allow one to get too carried away. Still, the intensity and duration of such pleasures will vary with different persons. This is because people differ in their ability to reassert rational control over what they accept and reject.

\(^9\) See H.H. Price's discussion of "perceptual acceptance" in *Perceiving*. 
We have now to treat of fantasy. Fantasy seems to pose more problems than hope, since much fantasizing does not get its enjoyment from the value placed in its realization. Hence, though the state of affairs fantasized about is not real, we may prefer that it stay unreal. Thus, our enjoyment in the fantasy does not seem to borrow from pleasure that should be reserved for the real thing. We should not then think that the pleasure lacks the sort of object which makes it worth-while to us.

However, despite our inclination to connive at fantasy, it may sometimes share the kind of falsity that attaches to false pleasure of anticipation. By taking enjoyment in fantasies that will never come true, we indulge in the sort of enjoyment that will be had by one for whom they will come true. However, this person's enjoyment is in what is or will be the case. But, as in the case of our enjoying remote possibilities, our ability to imitate his enjoyment derives from our suspending, for the moment, thoughts and criticism that would burst our bubble. We repress reality-laden beliefs for the sake of creating the sorts of thoughts that the authentic enjoyer has. Were we to dwell on the fact that our fantasy was impossible, we might not be able to take pleasure in the pictures that we were producing.

For example, if one were inclined to fantasize about being a member of the Rolling Stones, he would have to put out of mind the obvious obstacles that would preclude this from happening. He would have to repress his knowledge that he is not musically inclined, afraid of the stage, unwilling to travel, averse to heavy drug use, not English, afraid of publicity, etc. Doing this, he might experience a fleeting pleasure in the thought of taking a guitar in hand and being heralded by a delirious audience, but, unlike the real performers, the pleasure would not be in its proper object, namely, the future performance.

All this momentary repression of interfering beliefs and criticism seems to bring about an even weaker form of acceptance than that described above. Having put out of mind the considerable improbability of the fantasy's being realized, one can accept,
momentarily, that the content of the fantasy depicts a real option, something it is under one's power to do. That this at least occurs in a large number of cases can be ascertained by considering whether it is important to the fantasizer that the fantasy be a live option for him or her. It may turn out that in many cases it is important. Hence, to enjoy the fantasizing, it will be necessary to repress the belief that the fantasized state of affairs is out of reach. Hence, we will expect the contrary belief to find a hold, though a slippery one.

If anyone is skeptical about the claim that it is important to many fantasies that the state of affairs be accepted as options to the fantasizer, it would be well to consider why it is that people tend to fantasize about situations involving friends, acquaintances, and associates. Such people are in the sphere of our influence. Hence, at least one obstacle to our ineffectuality is removed. Thus, it is easier to repress the hindering beliefs, since they are less vociferous in their negative verdict.

Having argued that a kind of acceptance undergirds our fantasies, thus allowing a continuum of cognitive attitudes from certitude to weak uncritical acceptance, we can allow that a wide variety of false representational states produce pleasures of the soul. However, on the archer view, a pleasure's falsity derived from the false representation, but it did not consist in it. The pleasure's falsity comes from its being misdirected when the belief is false. Can we impugn fantasizing with the charge that its pleasures are misdirected?

For a whole class of fantasies, it is a straightforward matter to extend this charge. Many fantasies are just extreme cases of pleasurable hoping. Plato's case of someone picturing himself receiving a fortune illustrates this through its ambiguity. The picture may have been aroused by some scheme of the person to acquire the money, say, through some shady commercial dealings. Or, it may be that the person, desirous of being rich, is just fantasizing about having the gold. In both cases the person wants money. Also, in both cases his desire for the money has succeeded in suppressing his better judgment.
concerning the likelihood of attaining it. In the case of fantasizing, his acceptance is simply weaker.

Another class of fantasies seems more recalcitrant. Such, as have been mentioned before, do not seem to arise from the same sort of belief(acceptance)/desire combinations. If I fantasize about being a member of the Rolling Stones, it is not because I really desire to be one. Hence, even if I accept my fantasy as a live option, it may be that I would not desire to realize that option. Hence, if my pleasure is directed at this accepted option, why should I say it is misdirected in a manner warranting its description as false?

First, it should be said that it is not necessary to give an answer inclusive of all cases. Even if we are only permitted to call the first class of fantasies false, that alone will allow considerable range to false pleasures. Hence, if even a single type of fantasy belonging to the second class can be included in Plato's account of false pleasures, that will be progress.

But let us continue considering the fantasy about the Rolling Stones. Why is it that I fantasize about being a member, when in fact, I would not really want to be? Many answers might be given to this question. Nothing bars one from saying that it is just pleasurable to pretend to be other things. The pleasure we take in this is in a kind of play. But this would not make the pleasure misdirected, even if it is based upon irrealities. The irrealities upon which it is based do not invalidate the pleasure.

However, another answer may be given to the above question. While I may have no desire to really be a member of the Rolling Stones, I may nonetheless desire some of the conditions which follow upon membership. I may desire the recreation, travel and attention they get. I may not desire these things in the same form, but, for the sake of fantasizing the fulfillment of these needs, I may repress my knowledge that they would not be satisfactorily met by the scenarios pictured. Or, I may repress my dislike for the unwanted features, just as one does in real life when it is necessary to strike a
compromise. In such a case then, I am accepting as true or under my control, the satisfaction of a desire. As the pleasure taken in this is directed toward irrealities, and the irrealities are half-wanted or wanted in an altered form, we can say that the pleasure is false.

TEXTUAL EVIDENCE

Having argued that, on the archer view, the scope of false pleasure extends beyond those generated by belief or judgement, it remains to consider whether this extension is grounded in the text, or at least not in conflict with it.

The first point to be noted in support of my interpretation is that Plato speaks of hopes and fears. Unless he is using his terms in a restricted sense, he cannot mean to rule out that what one fears or hopes for is not always what one believes most likely to happen. With regard to fear, at least, Plato does not make a point of this. (36c8-9) He never declares or intimates that fears are false only when they are generated by a false belief that one will be harmed.

The case of hope is a trickier matter. It will need lengthier discussion. This is because the false pleasures of anticipation are said to be made false because of their association with false doxa, normally translated as "appearance", "judgement" or "belief". This point is repeated throughout the entire discussion of pleasures of anticipation. Moreover, in the course of explaining the nature of a pleasure of anticipation, Socrates asks Protarchus to hold in contrast a person who has a "clear hope" of receiving a pleasure of restoration against one who is quite hopeless. (36b1-2) To Frede this remark is evidence that Socrates is talking about pleasure based upon firm commitment or belief.

So perhaps the archer view goes too far in ascribing false pleasures to such hopes and daydreams that come in the absence of firm belief. Or, it may just be that Plato did not work out the ramifications of his argument for false pleasure, though we can be
confident that he would accept them as they are drawn in the preceding paragraphs. I believe, however, that the textual evidence indicates that Plato was trying to implicate such hopes and daydreams as false pleasures.

To begin with, Frede's insistence that "clear hope", (or "sure hope", which is the translation she prefers) indicates that Plato will only allow firm belief in the future existence of what is hoped for is far from compelling. The use of the word "elpide" in Greek, like that of "hope" in English, allows for a wide range of associated cognitive states, ranging from expectation or anticipation to "vain hope". What all cases share is that one wishes for the hoped for state of affairs to occur. Hence, by using this term, Plato is giving himself a good deal of room in his delineation of a kind of false pleasure. If the addition of "clear" ("phaneros") to "hope" is meant to signal more than the realization that one has decent odds on one's side, then Plato is clarifying the sense of "hope" that he is presently employing. But this would indicate that he is fully aware of the degree of "hope's" ambiguity. Hence, if in other contexts "hope" does not seem to entail firm belief, and if Plato does not explicitly indicate that it ought to, then we should allow the term the kind of scope that it normally carries.

We should thus ask whether Plato maintains a close association between hope that \( p \) and belief that \( p \). If we look carefully at the text, it seems that the association between hope and strong belief is closest when the notion of a pleasure of anticipation is being introduced. As Plato continues, however, hope begins to take on its normal color of being associated with wishful thinking and with fixation on less than favorable probabilities.

In the first phase of the argument, Socrates is explaining how one might derive pleasure from anticipation. Being in a state of deprivation, the emptiness of hunger, one anticipates being filled.(36b7-10) Since our man in the example is not a hunter or a nomad, but a Athenian citizen or member of the lower class, we assume that his meals are regular, whether or not they are scanty and infrequent. Hence, his expectation or
hope that a meal is on the way seems to be one based on belief. Thus, at this stage of the argument, the pleasures are confined to anticipation, as they are called by commentators.

The argument continues, as described in an earlier section of this chapter, by developing an analogy between the faculty or ability to believe or judge and the faculty of pleasure. True and false pleasure are said to follow true and false opinion (doxa). Also, a good deal of attention is given to the manner in which doxa arises. The powers of sense perception and memory (and reasoning) give rise to a statement describing the identity of the object seen. This is nothing short of a judgment.

Despite its prominent role, judgment is by no means put forth as the sole cognitive state involved in the production of false pleasures. If we look carefully at the development of the entire argument for false pleasures, we should be able to see this. As just noted, false judgment plays a crucial role in Socrates' introduction of a pleasure of anticipation. The first step in the argument is that of a hungry person, in pain because of his emptiness, can also feel pleasure. Moreover, it is not just that he can feel a pleasure, for we can imagine that he might get a kick out of scratching an itch. Rather, he can feel pleasure about food.

This surprises Protarchus, who thinks that the mere thought of food will add another dimension of torment to the hungering man. Hence, Socrates must convince him that the man can derive pleasure from his memory of eating. He does this by arguing that one who has a clear hope or expectation of food can be cheered by this. Hence, in this context, it seems that a robust expectation is needed. We should not expect starving people to derive much delight in mere fantasizing about food or in hoping against hope that they will soon eat. The pain of deprivation is sufficiently intense to require a stronger pleasure to counter-balance it, if one is to even take note of the pleasure.

As the argument develops, the analogy is drawn between the power of judgment and the ability to feel pleasure. Further, the respective objects of these faculties are juxtaposed. The point of this is to demonstrate the manner in which taking pleasure in an
object depends upon judgment's proper relation to that object and hence, upon getting the right object. The discussion of the genesis of judgments or beliefs follows shortly after this. Its role is to show how belief can be false. (38b9-39ba1)

To finish the argument that pleasure can be false, Socrates introduces the painter. "Then accept also the presence of another workman in our souls at such a time." (Ba2) The images of the painter are true or false when the beliefs, generated from the senses, are true or false. However, it is now emphasized that the writings and paintings can refer to the future. It is further emphasized that they usually do. This is because we are filled with hopes. Moreover, the pictures are particularly wont to serve the function of being hopes. We are then given the example of the man picturing a fortune in gold and the pleasures therein.

Socrates brings the argument to a peculiar close. He claims that the pictures of pleasures, when painted in good people, will be true, for the most part. When painted in bad, they generally will be false. We would expect Socrates to say why this is so. He seems to assume that this will be clear from the preceding discussion.

An important transition in the argument has occurred, though it has not be fully appreciated by the numerous commentaries. It is signaled by Socrates declaration that all of us are filled with hopes throughout our lives. (39e7-10) It is further signaled by the lively role that the painter plays in giving us material for these hopes and their concomitant pleasures. Socrates has changed his example or paradigm of how the false doxa arises. Earlier, the false doxa was illustrated by the perception based mis-identification of a man for a scarecrow. (38c4-d3) The powers responsible for the doxa were memory and perception and, implicitly, reason.

The change does not consist solely in the fact that the representations are forward looking, and thus, not directly based upon perceptual evidence. Perception, memory and reason could all be used effectively for the purposes of prediction, though the story would be more complicated. Rather, by emphasizing the goodness or badness or a
person, and by emphasizing the pervasiveness of the pictures we call hopes, Socrates is bringing to the fore the important role that desire can play in the formation of the pictures or propositions that we believe or accept. He is suggesting that the typical false hope is not a well-justified belief that, for some reason, has failed to become true. On the contrary, the typical false pleasure is a product of wishful thinking and uncritical acceptance of the pictures that one indulges in creating.

If there is any question about this reading, consider the great disparity between the example of pleasure taken in anticipating eating and the example of picturing oneself receiving and enjoying an abundance of gold. As hopes go, the first is rather mundane and reliable, the second is quite thrilling, though improbable. Also, it is hard to see how the second would be the normal product of perception, reason and memory. If we just relied upon this cognitive triad, we would not be so full of hopes, especially as they pertain to the enjoyment of riches.

Thus, it seems that there is textual evidence in support of the claim that Plato did not intend to confine false pleasures to those arising from firm belief. The doxa that fill the pleasures with their falsity ought be given a fair amount of scope, beginning in firm commitment and ending in some weaker manner of acceptance. This, at least, seems to be the pattern of the argument.
CHAPTER III
FALSE PLEASURE AND AKRASIA

Having attained some success in convincing Protarchus of the existence of false pleasures of anticipation, Socrates immediately raises the issue of another type of false pleasure.¹ This type of false pleasure does not arise from false doxai. Rather, it contains its falsity intrinsically, and by virtue of its illusory nature, gives rise to its own false doxai. Hence, its manner of origin is, in a sense, the reverse of the former type of false pleasure. (42aa5-b) This false pleasure occurs in a manner analogous to the false pleasure.¹

¹ I follow Hackforth in treating "kat' allon tropon" as modifying the participle, and not Gosling and Fowler. Thus, it introduces another false pleasure, not an new manner of considering false pleasures. This is clear from the context of the discussion. Socrates has succeeded in convincing Protarchus of the existence of false pleasures of anticipation. He even extends the account to fear and anger, which, for the most part, ought to be false pains. To all of this Protarchus gives his hardy consent. (40e1-8) However, when it is said of this new type of false pleasure, that it may contain advantages for the latter issues, Protarchus somewhat skeptically quips, "if they exist". (41b2) He must be speaking of a distinct type of pleasure, as he has thoroughly agreed that the earlier type existed. Moreover, Socrates remarks also presuppose a new topic. He replies to Protarchus that these false pleasures do exist, in his view, at least but that the issue should be fully investigated before they accept his opinion. Again, they have just finished a very long discussion in which a particular type of false pleasure was carefully examined. (41b3-6) Hence, Socrates opinion, if it is in need of examination, must be of a new sort. (Hackforth 1945, 79)
appearances we find in viewing objects at various distances. Just as we over-estimate or underestimate the sizes of things as they are seen at varying distances, so do we overrate or underrate pleasure and pain when they are "seen" from near or far: (41e9-42a3)

But now, because they are seen at various and changing distances and are compared with one another, the pleasures themselves appear greater and more intense in comparison with the pains, and the pains in turn, through comparison with the pleasures, vary inversely as they. (42b2-6) (Fowler)²

Despite its familiar plausibility, the analogy with vision has raised a number of interpretive problems. On the face of it, it seems easy enough. When we consider alternative courses of action, time plays an important, often disastrous role, in the formation of our choices. We discount goods and evils when they are far removed in the future, and we overestimate them when they are near at hand, in the immediate or near future. Hence, the analogy that Plato is setting forth relates the distances in space which obscure spatial judgement with those in time which obscure value (in this case, hedonic) judgments.

The same analogy is presented in the Protagoras. Socrates, while attempting to show that Hedonism is not compatible with the view that akrasia is possible, finds himself faced with a powerful objection, one which he himself actually raises. Even on the assumption that pleasure is the good, there may be a difference between present pleasures and future pleasures. It would be this difference that would explain the existence of akrasia. Socrates, however, rules out such a difference, whatever it would

². Unless otherwise indicated, translated quotations are from Fowler.
be, saying that, in the consideration of attaining maximal pleasure, the only differences that could matter would pertain to quantity. (356a-c) ³

After denying that the temporal factor could be relevant to the issue, Socrates tries to explain away its effect. Thus he presents the same or a similar analogy as we find in the *Philebus*. He asks Protagoras to consider how spatial factors interfere with a whole host of judgements:

The same magnitudes seem greater to the eye from near at hand than they do from a distance. This is true of thickness and also of number, and sounds of equal loudness seem greater near at hand than at a distance.(356c3-d1)

He goes on to claim that all these errors can be remedied through the use of the relevant metric art, which, if any of these matters were of the utmost importance to us would be our "salvation". Thus he concludes, as pleasures and pains involve excess and defect, our "salvation", i.e., the relevant metric art, would be that which could determine the actual quantities of the them. Hence, it is implied that we suffer from illusions in the case of pleasure and pain in a manner akin to the above cases. The near or far affect our judgements in regard to the relative quantities of both pleasure and pain.(357a5-b5)

It seems clear enough, then, that the point of the analogy in this context is a straightforward comparison between judging objects seen at a distance and judging

³. His ruling out such a difference in this manner indicates that he is deliberately ignoring the purport of the challenge. He is ruling out the temporal factor as relevant to a strategy of maximizing pleasure. This strategy would be the fundamental principle of his opponents. However, the temporal factor is not supposed to be relevant to a rational calculation. Rather, it pertains to the irrational tendencies we have which cause us to depart from our rationally accepted strategies. Hence, Socrates is over rationalizing Psychological Hedonism.
pleasures and pains "seen" at a distance. However, the "seeing" involved in the case of pleasures is not visual. It is not even clear that it actually differs from the judging itself, though some other emotional factors must at least be involved. We will return to the analysis of the analogy as it appears in the *Protagoras* a little later. For now I am just interested in using it as a jumping off point for its interpretation in the *Philebus*.

For the reasons given above, commentators have felt compelled to interpret the *Philebus* passage in like fashion.⁴ But, among these, Gosling and Taylor have found this interpretation unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons. They have found the spatial analogy incoherent when applied to temporal relations in the context of this passage. They thus conclude that the only intelligible way to take the passage is to suppose that these false pleasures are a class of or a special case of the first type of false pleasure, i.e., anticipatory pleasure. But, they note, such an interpretation is inconsistent with Plato's claim that this type of false pleasure is a new one, distinct from the first. It would be well to examine these problems for the purposes of assessing either the merit of Plato's argument or the merit of the interpretation.

The first difficulty concerns how we are to understand the notion of a pleasure's "appearing" such that this appearance can be false. The problem has two elements. First, the analogy with vision implies a certain parallel. In the case of vision, we distinguish the act of seeing from the object seen, the latter being an external object. We measure the correctness or incorrectness of the seeing through independent assessments of the condition of the object (These need not exclude use of the same sense modalities.). Our concern is whether the object is (roughly) as it is seen. Hence, incorrectness consists in misrepresentation.

⁴. These include Hackforth, Gosling/Taylor and Hampton.
A similar dichotomy is implied for the case of pleasure. We must specify the object of pleasure as distinct from the act of being pleased or feeling pleasure. Moreover, we must describe the relations to it by virtue of which the pleasure is said to be apparent or real. This was the central problem of the first chapter on anticipatory pleasure. For the present case, we will have to decide whether this or some other account can be defended.

The second difficulty concerns how it is that the pleasures are said to appear, regardless of whether they are false or true. The analogy with vision (on the present interpretation) suggests a constraint on how we understand this. Just as two or more magnitudes were viewed simultaneously, so may two pleasures be "viewed". Hence, our account of the "appearing" (phainontai) of pleasures must take into account that the paradigm case of false appearances is found when a direct comparison is being made.

To begin with the second problem, we should note that the analogy immediately rules out an account according to which the appearing just consists in having bodily pleasures simultaneously, i.e., pleasure sensations. While it is common to have simultaneous sensations of pleasure and also possible to compare them, if one is so inclined, the cases we are interested in involve "future pleasures" which are compared to present pleasures or each other, assuming that they occupy different temporal locations. Hence, on this account, the gustatory sensations of sipping wine, for example, and the tactile sensations of a hot, bubbling bath must be "viewed" or "appear" at the same time if they are to be compared. But then this rules out the possibility of comparing future pleasures. However, as the illusory character of these false pleasures depended entirely on their being compared from "near" and "far", this account is inconsistent with the argument.
APPARENT PLEASURES AS PLEASURES OF ANTICIPATION.

For this reason, Gosling and Taylor conclude that the "seeing" and "appearing" must consist in anticipation. The plausibility of this view is increased, as noted before, when we take into account that this is precisely the scenario described in the Protagoras. However, given that this is so, we are compelled to ask what the nature of the false pleasure is? What is it, and how is it false? As mentioned earlier, Gosling and Taylor argue that the pleasure is a pleasure of anticipation.(445-448) Hackforth also held this view.(78) Hence, it is false because it is based upon an estimation of a future pleasure which turns out to be inaccurate.

However, this is a departure from the picture we find in the Protagoras as it is typically understood. There the issue is limited to the estimation of the quantities of pleasures and pains which is meant to be understood on a par with the estimation of geometric, arithmetic and auditory magnitudes. The over-estimation or under-estimation was nothing more than a mistaken calculation, that is, a judgement. Moreover, what was miscalculated was the pleasurableability or painfulness of at least one future state of affairs. Hence, at this stage in the history of the analogy, no mention is made of presently felt pleasures.

This is not satisfactory for the Philebus analogy for at least three reasons. First, Plato is quite insistent that he is introducing a new type of false pleasure. If the falsity of some pleasure, say, eating a steak, consisted in nothing more than its having been over-estimated, Plato would be hard put to say why it is false. Nor would it really make much sense for the discussion to proceed this way after the detailed analysis and consensus concerning the relation between the faculties of judgment and feeling and their objects.(37a-c2) The faculties are described as erring, in which case, their states (judgements, feelings) are false. Given this, it would be clear to Plato that calling the object false because there is a false judgement made concerning it would be absurd.
Secondly, in introducing a new type of false pleasure, Plato is interested in describing the characteristics which define a class of pleasures. This should be evident, not only from the language of its introduction (41a6-9), but also from the general context in which a plurality of types of pleasure are demarcated under the auspices of the divine method. Hence, we should expect to find such a class exposed in the present section. But if we take the pleasure of eating a steak, to use the same example, as such a pleasure, we will not be able to do this. Any pleasurable event may count as a false pleasure, whether it be eating steaks, going to the theater, or taking a bath. Their "falseness" would be extrinsic to them, and hence, not satisfactory for the purposes of defining a class of false pleasures.

Finally, in ending his discussion of this second kind of false pleasure, Socrates remarks that they might still discover a third type. Of this type he remarks that it may turn out to be more false than those of the second, which he describes as "appearing and existing in living creatures." (42c6-9) It would seem that Plato intends to establish the existence of a false pleasure and not simply draw attention to the possibility that we might make false judgements about pleasure.

As a result of the above considerations, there seems to be considerable pressure to consider the apparent pleasures to be nothing more than a case of false anticipatory pleasures. Nothing else seems to make sense of the notion of pleasures seen from near and far. However, the problems that arise from this interpretation are serious. I will consider them in what follows, arguing that they compel us to attempt an alternative interpretation. Let us then look at the Anticipatory Pleasure View (APV) in detail.

The first interpretive problem that arises on this view concerns the mechanism by which or manner in which the pleasures become exaggerated. The various commentators espousing APV have given different accounts about what is actually supposed to take place. According to Hackforth, the anticipatory pleasure is underrated because it is seen
from afar and the present feeling is exaggerated for the opposite reason. However, he notes, prior to making this claim, that the exaggeration occurs because we set a pain (provided by the body) with the anticipatory pleasure. Why this is important on his account he does not say.

Gosling’s and Taylor’s account seems similar, but it is substantially different. They begin by stating that the association between the pleasure and pain makes them hard to measure. The explanation as to why the misappraisals are committed involves both elements, namely, the temporal factors and the juxtaposition: "... the difficulty in this class of cases is a function of the temporal proximity or distance of pleasures and pains to the agent and their comparison to one another..." (444)

This latter factor plays a significant role in their account. The present pleasures or pains are said to have a “distorting influence” on the anticipatory pleasures or pains. A starving person, finally able or permitted to eat, anticipates the meal with exaggerated relish. Hence, suppose that he is to be served army rations, and he knows it. His present hunger causes him to over-estimate the future pleasure that such sub-par cuisine will actually provide. Hence, he experiences an anticipatory pleasure, one that will soon be falsified by the actual character of the anticipated event.

The upshot of this is that it is not simply seeing the anticipated pleasure from afar which induces the exaggeration. Rather, it is seeing it from "behind" the present feeling. Hence, the comparison is essential. Thus, if one were temporarily free of painful or pleasant feelings (a state which Socrates claims to be possible and calls the neutral "life"), a future pleasure or pain would not seem distorted, at least not for any reasons given by Gosling and Taylor’s account.

This is a dramatic departure from the picture found in the Protagoras. There, it was the futurity of a pleasure or pain that caused it to be underestimated. The closer the feeling was, the less its futurity affected one’s judgement. Hence, in a comparison between future and near feelings, the near ones appeared larger only because they were
not as far away. One could discount a pleasure or pain for the simple reason that it was far away, without reference to any closer pain. Hence, the comparison was inessential. As Hackforth's account made no essential reference to the comparison, we can assume that this is the view he inclined to.

We thus see that there are two distinct accounts of the psychological mechanisms that Plato appeals to in his explanation of the exaggeration. One view is that the mechanism is the well known tendency to discount the future. All of us experience this phenomenon in our own cases and find that it works for and against us. It works against us as a central source of akrasia and procrastination. It works for us in that it provides our emotional life with a certain practicable focus. If we were to worry about, say, aging and death as much in our twenties as in our sixties, those years would be plagued by useless fears and depressions.

The other mechanism is indicated in Gosling's and Taylor's account. The example they give suggests that the intensity of deprivation influences the degree of pleasure that one takes in an anticipation. The present pain resulting from the deprivation makes the future pleasure seem greater. As this seeming is simply anticipation, the present pain is seen to have an influence on our anticipations.

How the present pain affects our estimation of future events is not explicitly addressed in their account. The most plausible explanation, it would seem, is that the pain alters (if only temporarily) our values or desires. For example, while a rich person might find anything less than a Porsche or Mercedes Benz unworthy of his interest, a poor person would place high value on owning a Chevette. This would fit well with Plato's general account, according to which our pleasures and desires derive from our needs. When we are not in a state of painful deprivation, we have a different set of present needs. Since we value what we need, our tendencies in valuation would be relative to our changing state.
It is understandable that there are divergent views among advocates\(^5\) of APV about the psychological mechanism responsible for the illusory character. The text itself seems to present us with two, distinct explanations. The spatial/temporal perspective analogy suggests that absolute distance from the agent is a sufficient condition for misperception. However, the passage at 42b2-6 suggests that, perhaps, a comparison between feelings is essential:

But now, because they are seen at various and changing distances and are compared with one another, the pleasures themselves appear greater and more intense by comparison with the pains, and the pains in turn, through comparison with the pleasures, vary inversely as they.

The conjunction, "and" (kai) indicates that both conditions are typically present when pleasures obtain their illusory quality. However, it is unclear whether this is an essential condition or just a salient, concomitant condition.

\(^5\) Hampton takes a position which seems to contain elements of both interpretations. On the one hand, "the remoteness and abstractness" of the far removed pleasure or pain makes it seem less pleasurable. On the other hand, the present or near pleasure is exaggerated, not only because it is closer, but because it is the object of the (lower) appetites. The futurity of the pleasure or pain is insufficient to make it seem less pleasurable. The appetites must themselves distort the present pleasure if they are to drive a wedge between motivation and the ruling logistikon's indifference to the lesser pleasure's nearness. This is meant to explain why "forbidden fruit" tastes sweeter. Though the view is quite interesting, it does not have adequate textual basis. Though the passage admits of different interpretations, all must be centered on the notion that it is a difference of the agent's perspective which causes him to "misperceive" the various feelings. Hampton's view makes essential reference to the tripartite doctrine of the soul, while the agent's perspective becomes inessential. (Hampton 1990, 61)
Unfortunately whatever view one takes in regard to the psychological mechanism underlying illusory pleasures, APV faces some serious problems. The first and most obvious is that it regards Plato's introductory description of this second class of false pleasure as false or seriously misleading. As I have argued above, there are strong explicit and implicit textual indications that Plato wants his reader to expect a new class of false pleasures. And indeed, this is what is put forth. The genesis of these pleasures is described as the reverse of the first class.(42a5-b1)

However, if APV is correct, a new class of false pleasures is not brought up for consideration. Socrates is simply amplifying his earlier arguments, though he indicates otherwise. Moreover, his description of the origin of these illusory pleasures cannot, after all, be coherent. The illusory pleasures were said to give rise to false judgments, presumably about their size. This is in sharp contrast to the pleasures of anticipation, which arise from false judgement. However, APV identifies the illusion with the false judgement. Thus, the "illusory pleasure" must also derive from a false doxa. But then the initial description of their origin is grossly confused.6

Despite this wide departure from the stated intent of the argument, there does not seem to be any positive evidence for accepting the view. The only evidence even adduced by Gosling and Taylor relies upon an obscure and ambiguous passage:

They both, then, appear greater and less than the reality. But if you were to separate the unreal appearing from either of the two, you would not say that it appears correctly, nor again would you be so bold as to say that the part of the pleasure or pain which comes about on (or against) it was true or correct. 7


7. I translate the passage in this awkward fashion to avoid begging any questions.
It may seem that the point of contrasting the apparent part of the pleasure with a part of the pleasure which comes about in some relation to it is to isolate an anticipatory pleasure which is directed at a future event. (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 445) We would thus think that the apparent part of each feeling was its false appearance or the "part" of that appearance which was excessive or deficient. This we would identify as a false doxa. Thus, the feeling corresponding to it would be an anticipatory pleasure.

However, if this is the point, Plato has made it unnecessarily obscure. The focus of discussion, up until now, has been on pleasures and pains which appear greater or smaller than they are. If all this were preliminary to the introduction of another anticipatory pleasure, we should expect to see more by way of description than, "the part of the pleasure and pain which corresponds to this." (to epi touto tes hedones kai lupes) (42c2) Indeed, the very description of it as a part of the feeling indicates that the same kind of pleasure or pain which has been under discussion throughout the entire passage is to be thought of as divisible, in some sense. An anticipatory pleasure could not just be a part of it.

Moreover, even if we were to read the passage this way, it would not be enough to support APV. At best, we could only say that Plato is affixing, loosely and obscurely, a point about anticipatory pleasures to his account of illusory pleasures. Attempting to interpret the entire discussion on the basis of this passage would not seem advisable. Indeed, this would be to put things in the reverse of their proper order. We should use the clearer parts of the discussion to illuminate this passage, if that can be done.

8. Hackforth suggests that Plato slips into talking about the apparent part of the pleasure as belonging to an external object and not the feeling. He does not attribute much, if any, interpretive significance to it, as do Gosling and Taylor. (Hackforth 1945, 78; Gosling and Taylor 1982, 445-47)
Perhaps the passage admits of a more straightforward interpretation. We might say that the point that Socrates is making concerns a distinction that the Hedonist might exploit in his defense. He might say that, while part of the pleasure or pain is false or illusory, part of it is not. Hence, if we were to "shave away", so to speak, the illusory element, we would be left with the real pleasure. This, he would claim, should suggest that having such false pleasures is not such a bad thing. We may think of ourselves as experiencing a pleasure, which, while true for the most part, is just a bit sullied around the edges by an illusory part.

Given this, we can see that Socrates would be eager to point out that the Hedonist was abusing a metaphor. While we might "divide" or "separate" in thought the illusory from the real part of the pleasure, the pleasure, as it comes to be, must be experienced as a whole. Hence, if it is false, then one's experience is of a false pleasure, and nothing more. To attempt to squirm out of this, would, as Socrates says, take a bit of gall.

THE DESIDERATIVE VIEW

The problems which plagued the Anticipatory Pleasure View might be altogether avoided if we just reconsider how we want to frame the view in light of the passage. The central problem has been explaining how it is that a future pleasure might "appear" to one more pleasurable than it will be. To reiterate, defenders of APV have seen no alternative but to consider the appearance to be a judgment made by the agent. Consequently, they have thought that the false pleasure was the feeling of euphoria arising from the misjudgment, thus making this second pleasure a special case of the first.

I believe that we might find another way of understanding the future pleasure's appearance through considering the role that the analogy between vision and pleasure has in the Protagoras. If we recall, the point of the analogy was to explain how it is that we opt for the worst of two or more courses of action without appealing to any kind of force
which simply over-powers the determinations of reasons. Reason was not to be thought of as dragged by some blind desire, protesting as it goes.

Curiously, all that Socrates does to establish this claim is to assert that the different temporal situations of the pleasures and pains under comparison distort the appearance of the magnitudes, thus leading the agent to misjudge their real sizes. Socrates suggests that we could free ourselves from error in this situation if we only had a metric to place upon the pleasures. He never tells us what this metric is nor does he tell us what the appearances of the pleasures really are. If we could answer these questions, we would be in a better position to offer an interpretation of the second false pleasure of the Philebus.

What then, is the appearance of the pleasure? Is it just an estimation of the pleasure on the part of the deliberating agent? If so, we must explain why it is that the agent mis-estimates it. The most plausible account would be that the nearness of the pleasure causes the agent to desire it and the agent's desires influence his estimations. However, in the classic cases of akrasia, we find persons who have fully explored the possibilities, sometimes even admitting that they knew that it was the worse course of action but could not help themselves because they were over-powered. Hence, Socrates' account of these beguiling appearances would seem more a side show than a direct answer to those who hold that akrasia is possible.

At best, Plato might only be holding out an Aristotelian solution to the problem: Knowledge is temporarily forgotten by the agent because of his impatient desire for the pleasure. However, this does not sit well with the analogy with vision in which both objects are kept in sight. Hence, an Aristotelian interpretation would force us to revise the analogy. In addition to seeing two objects positioned at different distances, we will need to have the observer turning his attention away from the distant one, presumably because it is far away and looking at it strains his eyes. This, however, requires taking unjustifiable liberties with the text.
I believe that a more plausible interpretation would find in the appeal to false appearances a subtle move on the part of Socrates. Instead of allowing that the emotions of pain and desire can directly overcome a person's rational determination concerning a set of alternatives, Socrates would rather accord to pleasure and irrational emotions the power of trickery or deceit. Pleasure is a magician. Hence, Socrates explicitly forbids that the close proximity of the pleasure may simply pull the agent toward it, as if it had gravitational power against which the agent's rational volitions were helpless. Rather, he describes the pleasure as casting a false appearance, one that lures the unwitting, the one lacking the proper techne.

It seems, then, that Socrates just will not allow that turbulent emotions override decisions made by the rational agent. Rather, he treats these emotions themselves in such a way that, when one opts for the path they incline toward, one is considered to be making a decision of some sort. One's decision, however, is based on lack of knowledge. (Prot. 357c-358) The parallel with vision and judgement suggests that the emotions are to be taken as standing in relation to judgements of the good (pleasure) in the way that visual impressions stand to judgments concerning magnitudes. Hence, the emotional reactions of the agent constitute a kind of impression concerning the value or magnitudes of future pleasures. But, as impressions or appearances are always a tricky proposition, the agent must apply a metric if he or she is to achieve the good.

To explain the picture I have in mind, we might say that the soul of the agent can be moved to opt for various courses of actions in one of two ways: The agent can follow his emotional inclinations, treating his emotional responses as reflections of the true value of things, or, the agent can follow the determinations of his intellect, nous or the logistikón, deciding whether or not something is good or bad independently of how it feels to him.

The appearance of a pleasure, then, considered as something desirable (and in this context, the sole desirable thing) is the value that the emotion or desire accords to it. For
pleasure A to appear greater to the agent than pleasure B is simply for it to be more desired by the agent. Likewise, for pain A to appear greater than pain B to the agent involves nothing more than the agent's finding it more fearful.

Note that picture fits well with the description of akrasia presupposed in the discussion. The agent is not confused about how the course of events will play out in regard to his situation. He knows, for example, that if he goes on a drunk that he will later be afflicted with the usual sickness and misery. Still, he opts for it anyway. If one does not take the common view of this matter or the Aristotelian view, one will describe the situation as one in which the agent felt that the pleasure was worth the pain. Later, in the grips of the hangover, he feels that the pleasure was not even close to being worth the pain and he marvels at how he could have been so stupid as to put himself into that condition.

To corroborate this interpretation, consider how Socrates describes the instability that plagues our pursuits when we rely on impressions alone:

> If now our happiness consisted in doing, I mean in choosing, greater lengths and avoiding smaller, where would lie salvation? In the art of measurement or in the impressions made by appearances? Haven't we seen that the appearance leads us astray and throws us into confusion so that in our actions and our choices between great and small we are constantly accepting and rejecting the same things, whereas the metric art would have canceled the effect of the impression, and by revealing the true state of affairs would have caused the soul to live in peace and quiet, and abide in truth, thus saving our life?

I think it important to emphasize that Socrates draws attention to the peace and calm of spirit that will follow upon attainment of the metric art. Naturally, if we could be free of errors in the pursuit of the good, we could direct ourselves toward it with confidence. However, Socrates description of such a life's quietude and calm suggests something more radical, namely, a life without the turbulent emotions of fear, erotic attraction, anger, and all such intensely painful and pleasant feelings of the soul.
FURTHER JUSTIFICATION IN THE PROTAGORAS

The question will arise, besides this superficial textual justification for the interpretation that I am offering, what more can be offered to support the view? Why think that Socrates is treating the unrestrained desires that we have for certain pleasures as appearances of the pleasures' magnitudes? To answer this question I would appeal to further textual evidence which would indicate that his argument against akrasia presupposes such a treatment of the emotions. I would also appeal to what I believe are plausible philosophical considerations which would lead anyone worried about the weighing and comparing of pleasures to take seriously the idea that the notion of a pleasure's relative magnitude is only a metaphor, concealing, at bottom, a valuation of the pleasure based upon nothing more than our desire for it. Of course, these considerations alone would not lead one to think that the desires constituted mere appearances of the pleasures worth. That would be an additional thesis. Let us take up the textual considerations first.

At 354e-cl, Socrates offers his argument against the view of the many that one can be overcome by pleasure (the desire for pleasure). The attempted refutation consists of interchanging the terms "good" and "pleasure" in such a way as to make the description of the agent's choice absurd. The argument is as follows: Given two alternatives, A and B, where A is the worse or evil alternative and B the better or good, the person chooses A. The many explain this by saying that he was overcome by pleasure. However, given that pleasure has been identified with the good, we must say that the agent was attracted away from the better alternative because he was overcome by the good. However, the good in alternative A was smaller than that in B. Hence, the explanation of the many is absurd.
The same move is made from a different angle. Supposing again that the agent is confronted with A and B. Again, we say that he knowingly does evil in doing A. If A is evil, it is because it is painful. But that cannot be why he chose A. Rather, he chose A for its pleasure. Further, to be justified in calling A more painful, the balance of pain in A must be greater than that of pleasure, because it was the lesser pleasure. It came with more pain (a greater ratio of pain to pleasure) than the other alternative, B. B, since it was good, had a greater balance of pleasure than pain.

Hence, Socrates explains the meaning of "being overcome by the good" as "taking greater evil in exchange for lesser good." (355e1) "Being overcome by pleasure" in the second context is not explicitly translated, but the same point holds. One takes lesser pleasures for greater pains. One violates the maxims of the hedonistic calculus as it is set down in the same paragraph.

Socrates finds these results absurd. But why? The reason is that he supposes that anyone who knew the character of the alternatives between which he was choosing would not deliberately take the worse option. But this is just to beg the question.

What I would like to emphasize is that, on the face of it, Socrates' argument seems to be blatantly question begging and his explanation of the phenomenon under question seems to be beside the point. If persons, apprised of the consequences of the various courses of action presented to them nonetheless take the worse alternative, and they themselves say that they felt overcome by pleasure, why should we suppose that the issue will be completely resolved by the assertion that they had just mis-estimated the pleasure's sizes and that this error was the result of their distance from the pleasures?

The argument seems more to the point if we suppose that Socrates' contention is fundamental. His disagreement with the many is that their explanation eliminates choice as a spring or principle of the agents action, even though choice characterizes human action. They make it seem as if a person were acting against his choice, thus making the resultant behavior involuntary. Hence, unless they want to insist that the behavior is
involuntary (and it is hard to see how this would be established), they will have to accept
that the resultant behavior of the agent was a choice of some sort. But if they admit that
it was a choice, they will have to suppose that it was based upon reasons of some kind or
fail to explain the agent's behavior.

My suggestion, then, is that we read Socrates' argument as a challenge to a
fundamentally different model of human behavior, one that opposes dynamic, turbulent
forces against countervailing forces issued from or stirred up by the faculty of reason.
Socrates view is that human beings opt for the things they do because they believe that
they are good. Hence, he asks the many to consider what would happen if pleasure were
the good. The presumption is that they will be forced to see that, if one chooses pleasure,
it is only because he views it as a good thing. Hence, if there are other goods besides
pleasure, it will have to compete with them as one good among many.

If this is the case, we can see why Socrates regards his analogy with distorted
visual appearances as not beside the point. He is not simply planting his heels in the
ground and insisting, against all indications to the contrary, that the so called akratic
person is just ignorant. That is to say, he is not simply insisting that there must be some
information which the agent failed to acquire. Rather, he is drawing a distinction
between ways of assessing value, one depending upon the free play of emotional
reaction, and the other depending upon the determination of the reasoning part and its
mysterious "metric." Hence, if akrasia is really just ignorance, it bears greater similarity
to the ignorance of the person who depends upon perception in place of the use of the
relevant metrics than it does someone lacking a full picture of the story.

FURTHER JUSTIFICATION IN THE PHILEBUS

The use of the analogy in the Philebus raises some questions that the
interpretation under consideration goes far in explaining. As in the Protagoras, the
analogy concerns the comparing of magnitudes for the purpose of choosing those that are greater. But by comparing the estimation of the "sizes" of pleasures to the sizes of physical objects, the analogy suggests that measuring them must be a straightforward matter. Just as the objects of sight have determinate sizes which are misperceived, so must the pleasures (pleasurable events) as well. Like the things seen at a distance considered as spatial magnitudes, the pleasures lose any differences which could make the incommensurable. A uniform metric is placed upon them, though their diversity was established early on in the dialogue (12c-13b5) and evidenced as it proceeded.

Given that this is so, a fuller understanding of how a pleasure can seem greater than another is required. This may be out of our reach, but what seems clear, at least, is that the calibrating of pleasures on a uniform scale would presuppose that they were all feelings or sensations of a determinate sort. But this could not be accepted by Plato, not even in the case of pleasures which would be regarded as bodily sensations. As we find in the Timaeus, each bodily pleasure is *sui generis*, arising as it does from the particular sense modality with which it is associated. Hence, the gustatory pleasure of sweetness is a determinate sensation which is different from a pleasure of smell or touch. Each has its own chemical or mechanical account (Tim. 64a-69) Also, even apart from speculation concerning their physical basis, these pleasures seem quite different to the agent in whom they are had, who, after all, would be the one confronted with them.

Moreover, there are pleasures of hope, learning and virtue which are proper to the soul. At the very least, these must be different in their intrinsic character from those of the body. Hence, if these and bodily pleasures come in varying degrees of intensity or greatness, as Plato does seem to hold, it must be the case that it is an intensity unique to each or, at least, not common to all.

Given the diversity of experiences heaped under the rubric of "hedone", we should ask holders of APV how it is that the agent comes to form a false estimation of the relative sizes of future pleasures. We should also ask Plato about the promise of a techne
for pleasure, but note that, if Plato has an answer to that question, it is not one of which the holders of APV can avail themselves, for the use of that metric was guaranteed to eliminate errors. The one to whom the various pleasures cast their distorted appearances cannot be looking through the glasses of the metric art.

In the absence of a singular criterion for the weighing of pleasures, we can imagine that the manner in which the agent makes a choice between different pleasures is just as I have described it in the presentation of my interpretation of the "appearances" of the Protagoras. The agent just finds himself desiring one pleasure over another. There is nothing more that he can say or appeal to except to point out the features which make him desire it. Now, the agent can come to change his mind about the choices that he is making or has just made, but this will consist in nothing more than a change of his desires. If later he feels that the pleasure was not worth the pain, this can only be because he now desires avoiding the pain more than he desires the pleasure (or the fact of having had the pleasure).

Now, what I am describing as the situation of the agent attempting to compare pleasures will easily be recognized as a way of viewing the nature of values quite common place in the 20th century. However, I am not asserting that this is Plato's view of the nature of value with respect to pleasure or any other putative good. Indeed, I will attempt to develop a case to show that it is not. Rather, I am suggesting that he would think this the implicit value theory of the average person. If Plato thinks, as I will attempt to establish later, that this manner of evaluating pleasures cannot certify a true estimation of their worth as pleasures, then it would be open to him to consider certain desires as false appearances of the pleasures that are compared. They are false appearances of the pleasures' size in so far as the pleasures' sizes just consisted in their worth as pleasures.
In Republic, Book IX we find support for the claim that Plato thinks the average citizen ranks pleasure according to his preference, which preference is dictated by the structure of his desires. Thus, at 581c8-d3 Socrates makes the following suggestion:

Are you aware, then, said I, that if you should choose to ask men of these three classes, each in turn, which is the most pleasurable of these lives, each will chiefly commend his own? The financier will affirm that in comparison with profit the pleasures of honor or of learning are of no value except in so far as they produce money.

The lover of honor and the philosopher will also cast their vote in favor of those pleasures which are associated with the activities which characterize their lives. And their opinions will not be limited to the "value" of the pleasure, where this is considered separately from the quality of the pleasure as such. The dispute will concern the degree of pleasurable of the pleasures.

Hence, each type of person considers certain pleasures to be more pleasurable than others. But what is the basis of their opinion. The only indication that Plato gives is to be found in his assessment of the shortcomings of their point of view. Each lacks the experience of the full gamut of pleasures that the philosopher has. Neither the lover of money or the lover of honor has any experience of the pleasures of the philosopher.(582a-d) Also, these two types lack intelligence and the ability of dialectic, the only tools appropriate to the task of making a judgment. (582d-583) Thus, these two must be relying on nothing more than their experience of the pleasures with which they are acquainted. Their only criterion for the ranking of pleasures (qua pleasure) must lie in the desirability of the pleasures to them, i.e., the extent to which they desire them.
FALSE APPEARANCES AS FALSE PLEASURES:

It seems, then, that we have a considerable amount of evidence to support the contention that the analogy between vision and pleasure is meant to carry with it the view that the untrained or uninformed desires of the average citizen offer inadequate evidence as to the real pleurability of the pleasures which they enjoy. This offers us a sense of the notion of a false appearance which is both plausible and helpful in explaining the point of the analogy. The question remains to what extent this ought to be called a false pleasure or to what extent Plato could be employing a philosophically interesting thesis in calling such appearances false pleasures. Let us divide the question and take up its elements separately. First, we should ask how these appearances of future pleasures (desires for future pleasures) can be regarded as themselves pleasures. Next, we must address the question of how they may be false. Let us take the first question first.

It must be said at the outset that the notion of a pleasure "appearing and existing in living beings" (42c6-7) which is "seen" from afar, is incoherent. If we talk about a pleasure which exists in the future, we cannot say that it is also in the soul of the living beings. If the future pleasure is the illusory pleasure, it obviously cannot be an affection of the soul. Hence, the false experience, whatever it might be, would have to be something other than the future pleasure.

I believe that this can be conceded without much damage to the general bent of Plato's argument. The analogy, in the context of the argument, is rather loosely presented. As proponents of APV argued, we had two pleasures implicitly involved in the story, namely, the presently experienced pleasure of anticipation and the as yet unexperienced pleasure which is the object of anticipation. If, as I will argue, we can regard the desire for the future pleasure as itself a pleasure, we can appeal to the same dichotomy. However, the problem which I raised earlier remains. Plato talks about the future pleasure in such a way as to suggest that it, by being illusory, is a kind of false
pleasure. On what basis, then, can one assert that he could have anything else in mind than the future pleasure in his attempt to establish a second type of false pleasure.

The evidence, I believe, lies in the ambiguous nature of the analogy itself. The question we must ask ourselves is what the analogy is meant to compare, pleasures and objects of sight, or vision and pleasure, here considered as capacities or powers? The following passage (42b11-5), quoted many times above, describes the pleasures and pains as seen. Hence, it suggests that the analogy is about pleasures and spatial magnitudes as objects of judgment. But it is not inevitable that we should read this back into the analogy. But as just mentioned, the analogy itself is, at the very least, ambiguous and even seems to put emphasis on the relation between vision and pleasure as a capacity:

Well, then. In vision, seeing from far and near obscures the true sizes of magnitudes and makes one to judge falsely, while in pains and pleasures it is not the case that the same thing happens? (41e9-42a3)

In the above quotation, two grammatical parallelisms exist, each leading to different interpretations of the analogy. As the pains and pleasures are in the plural, they seem to compare with the misjudged magnitudes, since they are also plural. On the other hand, the words 'pains' (lupais) and 'pleasures' (hedonais) appear in the dative following the preposition, 'in'. This suggests a comparison with 'vision' (opsei) which also follows 'in'. Thus we would interpret the analogy as saying that, in pleasure and in pain, the distance of the things felt obscures their sizes.

Either way, emphasis is put on what happens in vision. As a certain kind of error is being located in the actualization of this capacity under a type of adverse condition, we should expect that the capacity of pleasure is thus being said to stand in an analogous relation. Hence, whether pains or pleasures are being described as mistakenly viewed,

9. This is my own translation.
the analogy suggests that the power of pleasure is, in some sense, that which mistakes them.

How does this help with the present problem. Well, it suggests that Plato's talk of "pleasures seen from afar" is not meant to describe the actual false or illusory pleasure. Rather, it is meant to describe the objects of that pleasure. The false pleasure is that which constitutes the actualization of the capacity. Its objects, described at 42b11-5 as distant and near pleasures and pains, are merely the conditions in which pleasure is taken. They are so described because of a lack of more external terminology, as that available to describe the objects of sight, for example, "magnitudes", "sizes", "shapes", "colors", etc. This should be no surprise, for if we think of pleasure as a power of feeling, the only quality it will be able to perceive is pleasurability. Seeing, on the other hand, has access to a wide variety of qualities, hence, their designation would not naturally fall under the scope of one property term.

So, we may suppose that Plato is taking about a kind of false pleasure which is parallel to a kind of false seeing. The objects "mis-seen" he describes as pleasures. But why should the false appearances of these future events or conditions be thought of as pleasures, if, as I have described them, they are the desires that such things evoke? I am attributing to Plato a conflation of some desires with pleasures. Can that be correct?

I think that this question can be confidently answered in the affirmative. If we go back and consider the kinds of pleasures and pains that Plato groups under the rubric of pleasures and pains had by the soul independently of the body, we will see that they often are types of desire, which, under certain conditions, can be regarded as pleasures or pains. At 47e Socrates asks:

Do we not regard anger, fear, yearning, mourning, love, jealousy, envy, and the like as pains of the soul and the soul only?
Clearly these emotions are or involve desires. Indeed, the word for yearning, "pothos" refers in general to longing, desiring and so forth, especially where these are felt as painful and burdensome because that which is longed for is out of reach.

Also, in Socrates' initial description of the pleasures of anticipation, he characterizes the pleasure as arising when one has a sure hope of acquiring the object desired and the pain as arising when one is hopeless.(36a-c)

It is unclear whether Socrates would have us understand that, from the lack of hope and the desire, a pain arises, one that should be thought of as a distinct affection, or rather, that the pain is a kind of desiring, desiring without hope. This we would call despair. From the manner in which he treats pains of the soul in the above quotation and from his willingness to treat the pleasure of anticipation as part of a mixed pleasure, I believe that we can infer that the later alternative is true.(47c-d3)

So, unless the above account has overlooked counter-vailing textual evidence, it would seem that Plato regards the desires we have for pleasures and the aversions we have for pains as themselves pleasures and pains under certain circumstances. Also, as these feelings direct the choices of the average citizen, they constitute a kind of veil of appearances regarding the pleasurability of pleasures and the value of things.

Standing behind all this is the promise of a true metric of value, one that the philosopher alone has access to. But this brings up the other question which we must address, namely, what in fact is the nature of the error in the case of this class of false pleasure? The interpretation which I am offering of the passage invokes a distinction between what merely seems pleasurable and what truly is pleasurable. If this is carried into the Philebus (as I believe it is and will argue later), does it explain the falsity or illusoriness of the second type of false pleasure? After all, the passage never explicitly invokes the kind of metaphysical distinction that I am bringing to bear on the passage.

I think that one has to give a yes and no answer to the question I am raising. On the surface, the illusion does not seem to be anything more interesting than the common
place mistake we recognize when we find ourselves disappointed in a eagerly awaited
gleasure. We feel that it is not as good as we thought, not worth the wait, the pain of
)sacrifice, or not even commensurate with the pleasure we had in awaiting it. We may
nder wonder why we were even preoccupied with it. None of this presupposes a metaphysical
view about the nature of pleasure nor a criterion for their objectively correct adjudication.
Hence, we can understand the illusion from the point of view of our own psychology,
rom an internal point of view, as it were. Thus, the false pleasure of this passage, as far
as it directly indicates, is just an overblown desire for a choice that we will repent. Plato
eed not, at this stage of the argument, avail himself of any objectivist thesis in order to
denounce certain of our desires as false.

That said, we should also note that the metrical art of the Protagoras was billed as
sure corrective of the false appearances and the dialectical art of Book IX was found to
validate the philosopher's ranking of pleasures. It would seem, then, that the use of
reason would converge on a proper estimation of future pleasures. Hence, with the
acquisition of the metrical art, the commonplace errors of the common person would be
eradicated. Thus, we can suppose that it would be perfectly consistent on Plato's part to
develop a type of false pleasure in this section of the dialogue using no more than what
his interlocutors, typical Athenian citizens, would accept, even though the nature of the
falsity could receive fuller, and deeper explication.

There only remains to consider the question of how it is that we come to
overestimate pleasures, understanding the notion of overestimation in the common place
way described above. We have already considered two accounts of the psychological
mechanisms behind the illusory pleasures. According to Hackforth, pleasures and pains
appeared to be less intense than they really are when they were viewed from a distance.
When viewed close at hand, their appearance was exaggerated. Gosling and Taylor, on
the other hand, argued that the juxtaposition of a present feeling with a future feeling
tended to exaggerated the future feeling. For example, if one were to be pained by hunger, one would exaggerate the degree of pleasure that eating would bring. The converse should also hold: Sated with food and drink, consideration of a future state of deprivation would tend to seem more painful.

On the whole, it seems that Hackforth's view is far more consistent with the text than Gosling's and Taylor's. The difficulty with Gosling's and Taylor's view is that it makes the futurity of the feeling irrelevant to the making of the illusion. What matters is the juxtaposition of different feelings. When in pain, a future pleasure has greater allure and, one would suppose, when feeling pleasure, an anticipated pain seems more painful. However, as they themselves observe, this should hold for present experiences as well. Thus, they say about the account that

\[ \ldots \text{it ought to apply to the case of the desert traveller who, parched with thirst, actually does find foul, brackish water delicious, rather than to the man who mistakenly expects to find it so.} \]

Moreover, the account should also apply to the person who looks back upon something that he or she is now bereaved of and finds the pleasure in the thing to have been greater than he or she then appreciated it to be. For example, a person who has owned a car all his life, upon losing it and the privilege of owning another, would find that the pleasures of freedom and convenience that it gave were far greater than he realized. Hence, if it was important to the account that the faculty of pleasure was lead astray because the pleasures were "seen" at varying distances, this interpretation does not do it justice.

Hackforth's view, then, would seem to fit the text better. Not only does it fit the analogy as it appears in the *Philebus*, it seems the only plausible rendering of that section of the *Protagoras* in which it appears. As far as my interpretation of the false pleasures is concerned, it is fair to say that either view of the psychological factors involved can be
held without inconsistency. Indeed, each additional account of the distortion of the perspective of the emotions adds to the plausibility of the general account and compounds the urgency of inquiring into the possibility of a corrective.
CHAPTER IV
THE FALSE PLEASURES OF REPUBLIC BOOK IX

The central focus of the next part of the dissertation will be false pleasures of the neutral state and the mixed pleasures. We cannot take up this topic, however, without paying some attention to Book IX of the Republic, as it contains what seem to be the materials from which the Philebus account was drawn. Hence, it will be profitable to consider what the Republic has to say on the topic of the reality of physical pleasures. Not only is it of interest in and of itself, it may provide us with clues as to the content and relation of the arguments for false pleasures of the neutral state and the mixed, less than real pleasures.

FALSE PLEASURES OF THE NEUTRAL STATE

At 583B, Socrates begins an argument which is intended to show that the pleasures of intelligence are superior to those of appetite and ambition. Its method of doing that is quite strong in that it attempts to show that these other pleasures are not real and pure. Thus, if this is taken at face value, all these pleasures lose even their right to be called pleasures and not just their claim to a superior position in the hedonic scale.

The argument begins by distinguishing a neutral state from that of either pain or pleasure. Being neither of these, it is an intermediate state that falls between them. Socrates describes it as a kind of calm or quietude of the soul in respect of these other states. (583c-d) The argument then proceeds by drawing attention to the fact that many people describe this state as the most pleasant state of all and many others describe it as painful. Moreover, it does not seem that Plato views this talk as inexplicable gibberish.
He supposes, at the very least, that the state does appear pleasurable or painful to the persons in question. Indeed, he goes so far as to describe the middle state as both a pain and a pleasure. (583e5-9)

The examples he gives of such persons are those who, being sick or in severe pain, look upon health or freedom from pain as the most pleasant of conditions. Also, there are those who, because they are in a state of enjoyment (charein), find its cessation painful. (583d-e) Now, the first case is described in such a way that it might lead one to think that these people only suppose that a future state will be pleasant, which, in fact, turns out to be neither pleasant nor unpleasant. However, the second case makes it clear that Socrates is also referring to present conditions which seem to be painful. Thus, we should expect the same to hold for pleasure as well. Moreover, as just mentioned above, Socrates describes this neutral state as both a pleasure and a pain. He does not hedge the claim by saying that it is prospective or anticipated pleasure and pain.

Socrates then concludes that these pleasures and pains cannot be real. His reason is not what a reader of the Republic might expect, i.e., that it is an instance of something that both is and is not. Though this general disqualification should apply to the pleasures and pains of the neutral state, Socrates is not interested in pursuing it.¹ Rather, his

¹. According to White, the claim that the neutral state is and is not painful is a crucial premise in the argument which finds its justification in the middle books. On the contrary, I hold that the neutral state is not a pleasure or a pain for the simple reason that it is the neutral state. The reason for denying its claim to be a pleasure (or a pain) issues from Plato's theory of pleasure (and pain). No doubt, it will not be insignificant to Plato that the neutral state appears pleasant and painful, but this is a different point. It may lead Plato to denounce the neutral state as another state which is and is not, but this is a categorical disqualification that pleasure would share with everything in the
reasoning is local, appealing only to what is presupposed in the outlines of the theory of pleasure. As it was stipulated that the neutral state was neither pleasure nor pain, anyone to whom it seems to be either is under an illusion.

The first question that this argument raises concerns Socrates right to assume that such a neutral or intermediate state exists. Perhaps he is just appealing to the intuition that, for example, having a headache feels different from not having one, and that not having one feels different from, say, the effect that relaxation and a glass of wine might have on one. As the case of having a headache is clearly painful and the case of having a slight wine high pleasant, the normal state must be neither. However, this line of reasoning would beg the question, for it is just these intuitions that are under contention. Those who find the "neutral state" pleasant have different intuitions as to how it should be compared with headaches and highs.

It is most likely the case that the depletion/restoration model of pain and pleasure is lurking behind the argument. Socrates alludes to the theory later in the discussion when he attempts to show that intellectual pleasures are more real than the physical because they are or come from more real fillings. As the reader of Plato would be familiar with the theory from its appearance in the Gorgias, it would seem likely that Socrates' remarks would indicate that it is still in play. This impression can only be strengthened by its continuance in the Philebus.

With the depletion/restoration theory in place, Socrates can give a non-question begging account of what it is to be in the neutral state. On the one hand, he could argue that there were times when the body was not undergoing a depletion or restoration, and hence, would feel no pleasure or pain. Or, he could accept the view that the process of restoration and depletion is constantly occurring, but still claim that a neutral state occurs perceptible world. This would argue for a distinction between pleasures and the form of pleasure, not bodily and intellectual pleasures. (White 1979, 229)
because some of these conditions are not intense enough to be felt by the soul. This, of course, is the account he arrives at in the Philebus. (42d-43d) Since Socrates does not explicitly use the depletion/restoration model in his delineation of the neutral state, we cannot be sure which of the two accounts he would have in mind.

The account that Socrates gives of the illusory pleasantness of the middle state appeals to the temporal juxtaposition of the neutral state with a pain or pleasure. When next to a pleasure, the neutral state seems painful. When next to a pain, it seems pleasant. We could ask what Plato means us to understand by "next to", since pains and pleasures may come before or after the neutral state. Most clearly, he means to say that they come before the neutral state, for it is the transition into the neutral state from the previous condition that makes it feel pleasant or painful. Hackforth brings the idea out nicely with the example of a person comparing waters at various temperatures. The transition from hot to tepid makes the tepid seem cool. The transition from cold to tepid makes it seem warm. (Hackforth 1945, 81-82)

One could ask, however, whether after the transition, say, from the painful to the neutral, one might come to think that the painful condition was more painful than one had thought. In contrast, if one went from a painful condition to an even more painful one, we might wonder if the one before would seem to have been neutral. There does not seem to be any reason why Plato could not have it both ways.

The next critical question that arises is how Socrates can offer an account of how a neutral state can be pleasant or painful without really being so, and not be giving a new or supplementary account of pleasure. In other words, it is not clear why Socrates would want to continue to maintain that a state is neutral when he has given an account of how it can be pleasant or painful. The helpful example of water clarifies the problem. One

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2. Gosling and Taylor criticize the argument in the Philebus: "Plato has used a type of case to support the false thesis that certain pleasures are false, when in fact that
would think that an account of the sensations of hot, warm, cold, and so on, would accommodate and explain how water at the same temperature could feel different. In so doing, we would not expect the theory to be viewed as explaining how it is that the water appeared, say, warm, when it was only tepid. To this question we will have to return, since the same problem arises for the Philebus argument.

After securing Glaucon's agreement on the matter of the neutral state, Socrates admonishes him not to suppose that all pleasures are merely releases from pain. He points to such pleasures as smell, which, by not following upon a pain, cannot owe their pleasantness to the juxtaposition. Interestingly, he does not at this stage feel any great need to point out that there are real pains, even though his account of the deceptive neutral state included unreal pains. The reason, one might say, is that it is necessary to posit pain if the appearance of pleasure is to be explained. However, one could reply that it would be just as necessary to posit pleasure to explain the appearance of pain.

Again, the answer would seem to lie in the nature of the depletion/restoration model. The bulk of physical pleasures do not come about unless some depletion is being restored. The depletion certainly exists, and, when felt, is felt to be painful. Only in the case where there is no depletion could we say that the felt pain is illusory. The same should hold for pleasures as well. Only when there is no restoration can we say that the felt pleasure is illusory. Thus, when Socrates appeals to a class of real pleasures which are not preceded by pains, the upshot ought not be that this is what makes them real. Rather, painless pleasures should be thought to offer the most obvious case of a real pleasure, but not the sole case.

type of case supports the true thesis that a certain account of pleasure is false." (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 451)
So far, nothing in the argument for false pleasures of the neutral state impugns physical pleasure in general. Not only are pleasures of smell and others like it spared condemnation, Socrates' account does not seem sufficiently general at this stage to extend to all physical pleasures. As I argued above, the distinction between the neutral state and a real pleasure rests on either of two distinctions: The distinction between a felt and unfelt restoration or the distinction between a restoration and a state of stasis. We are not given any reason to believe that a felt restoration is not a real pleasure. We do, however, have an argument for supposing that, real as it may be, it may appear more pleasurable than it is, but this does not constitute a categorical denial of its reality.

We seem to see the beginning of such an attempt at 584c-d. Having firmly concluded that it is not the case that "riddance of pain is pure pleasure", Socrates notes that most pleasures are like this. Indeed, he describes them as so called pleasures (legomenai hedonai) and says that they are releases from pain. So we seem to have an escalation in the hostility against physical pleasure, though it is not clear what we ought to make of it. All that Socrates has said about these pleasures is that they are riddances of pain. Of riddances of pain, he says that we ought not think that they are pure pleasures.

Thus, our assessment of the strength of the claim depends upon how we view the role of the word "pure" (katharan) in this context. We have two options: On the one hand, we can suppose that it is merely emphatic. Socrates is denying that these pleasures are real and in stating his claim he is ironically adopting the language of its votaries. One the other hand, the word may be making an essential contribution to the claim, in which case, Socrates is not concluding that the pleasures are unreal, but only that they are not pure. If this is so, Socrates has introduced a new claim, which, though it gains support from the preceding argument, has not been explicitly justified on those grounds.

It is not clear which way we should go. Either interpretation makes Socrates' reasoning seem loose. If we suppose that he is introducing a new point, then it does seem
curious that it is not clearly explained. However, Socrates' arguments do often move in this fashion, being pervaded with backward or forward looking nuances and remarks. If the claim is justified later, we might find the move less worrisome.

If we suppose that he really meant to deny the reality of all pleasures, we must suppose him extremely confused. His argument would take on the following structure:

Some pleasures are merely a neutral state. A neutral state is a condition of freedom from pain, and this, in turn, is a condition in which no restoration is occurring or felt. Therefore, any putative pleasure which is a restoration is a neutral state. Therefore, it is not really a pleasure.

Such an argument would rest upon a confusion between restorations and the state of being restored. The ambiguity of the key word "apallagen", which has a variety of meanings such as "fleeing" or "separation", could make the mistake somewhat easy to commit. However, appeal to the ambiguity of "apallagen" does not make it that much easier to understand how Plato could be embroiled in such a confusion. After all, the argument for the existence of a neutral state clearly presupposed the proper distinctions in question. Indeed, the argument presupposed a distinction between pleasure and pain and worked from that distinction to the conclusion that there was a neutral state. It described the neutral state as a quietude of the soul (hesukian). Hence, when Plato describes the restorative pleasures as "reaching through the body up to the soul" and says that they are releases from pain, it would require an extraordinary degree of

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3. Gosling and Taylor argue that this is one of the central confusions of the Book IX treatment of pleasure. (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 122-27)
befuddlement to think that they were the quiet, in-between state which has been the center of the argument.  

THE UP, DOWN AND MIDDLE STATE

A new line of argument begins at 584d which seems to be addressed to bodily pleasures in general. Socrates asserts that the nature of physical pleasures will be understood if one takes note of a certain resemblance they bear to the condition in nature of there being a true up, down and middle position. Socrates asks Glaucon to imagine how someone would feel if he were transported from the down to the middle, having never had any experience of the up. Glaucon readily agrees that he will mistake the middle for the up. Also, Socrates asks what the effect of moving from the middle to the down position will be. The conclusion he draws from this side of the thought experiment

4. Plato’s language in the passage is quite clear on this distinction. Just compare his description of the neutral state at 583e5-584a1 to his description of the restorative pleasures:

And further, both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion, are they not? Yes. And did we not just now see that to feel neither pain nor pleasure is a quietude of the soul and an intermediate state between the two? (583e5-584a1) (My italics)

Yet surely, said I, the affections that find their way through the body to the soul and are called pleasures are, we may say, the most and greatest of them, of this type, in some sort releases from pain. (584c2-6) (My italics)
is that the person will think he is moving down for the same reason, but this time he will be right.

The upshot of this analogy is quite clear. We are meant to suppose that a similar line flows through the realm of pleasure and pain. There is a true up, a true down, and a middle. The true up is clearly meant to be true pleasure. The lower part of the scale is meant to be real pain. The middle part is neither real pain or real pleasure, though determining precisely what it is will be a pivotal point in the interpretation of the entire argument. Socrates carries over the same account of illusion from the earlier argument, namely, that the movement from pain to the neutral state makes the latter seem pleasurable. It is important to note that, in this argument, the neutral state is not said to be found painful by someone moving to it from pleasure. The reason is simply that there is no such movement in the description of the metaphor. The persons in error are supposed never to have seen the upper part of the scale.

The first question to ask is whether the scale of this argument is the same as that in the last. If it is, this will not be a new argument or position. Rather we will have to conclude that the account of the neutral state is supposed to apply to bodily pleasures in general. Certainly, movement along the scales in both is meant to account for making the same kind of mistake. Is then the middle state (to metaxu) of this argument the same as that of the last?

This seems to be the implication of the following passage:

Would it surprise you, then, said I, if similarly men without experience of truth and reality hold unsound opinions about many other matters, and are so disposed towards pleasure and pain and the intermediate neutral condition that . . . when they move from pain to the middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that they are approaching fulfillment and pleasure, and, just as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing grey with black, so, being inexperienced in true pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness in its relation to pain. (584e5-585a6)
As strong as this implication seems to be, the middle states cannot really be the same. First, if we were to hold that the middle state was the same, we would be ascribing to Plato the confusion of collapsing the condition of being restored with the process of restoration. I have just argued that Plato's language would make such an attribution of confusion dubious. Second, in the last argument, the middle state appeared painful to those who were coming to the end of a pleasure. These are the very same persons who now are said not to know what real pleasure is. This suggests that the middle condition of the first argument falls between different states from that of the second argument.

The most important reason, however, is that the account of true pleasures that Socrates gives indicates that the scale is to be construed in terms of a difference in the reality of restorations, and not a distinction between freedom from pain, on the one hand, and pleasure, on the other. My suggestion, then, would be to take the passage as transitional. Having argued that a certain kind of illusion is possible, namely, mistaking a neutral state for a pain or pleasure, Socrates wants to argue that no physical pleasure is truly real. This claim will require a different argument and does indeed get one. However, it will still be important to explain why the physical pleasures are to be counted as illusory, and for this he will appeal to his juxtaposition theory of illusion. Hence, when Socrates says that the unexperienced think that they find true pleasure when viewing painlessness, we do not have to conclude that he means to identify all physical pleasures as illusory.

5. Nicholas White also reads the passage and surrounding context as transitional. All his remarks on the matter are contained in comment A, which I quote here in full:

This passage is a preliminary stage of the third argument, designed primarily to convince us that we can be mistaken about the nature of pleasure and therefore about what is really pleasant. By convincing us of this, he hopes to be able to convince us next that there are pleasures much greater than those we ordinarily experience, which are pleasures of the body and pleasures of anticipation. (584c) The greater pleasures are those gained by reason as the next paragraph shows. (White 1979, 229)
pleasures with painlessness. That would be inconsistent with his depletion/restoration theory of pleasure. Rather, he need only be saying that, given that these pleasures are at least not truly pains, they are mistaken for true pleasures. It is the painlessness of these states, when compared with pains, that makes even the scant pleasure they offer seem real. Hence, their painlessness is only an aspect of them, but one which helps to explain why they are valued.

UNREAL FILLINGS AND UNREAL PLEASURES

Let us turn, then, to the argument for the irreality of physical pleasures and the truth of the intellectual pleasures. It begins immediately after the last passage quoted. Socrates asks Glaucon to consider the matter in a certain way which his language leads us to believe will be distinct from what has gone before. (οδὲ γ'όην, εἴπων, εννοεῖ;) (585e10) The argument is in the metaphysical cast of the central books of the Republic, relying heavily on the distinction between true being and mere becoming. Socrates briefly lays out the outline of the restoration/depletion theory of pleasure. Hunger, and thirst are all conditions of emptiness or deprivation, the filling of which with food and drink is pleasure. Likewise, ignorance and lack of sense are conditions of emptiness, the filling of which with knowledge and wisdom is a kind of pleasure.

The next step in the argument is to compare the reality of the fillings. As they involve two aspects, the nature of the thing being filled and the nature of that which feels, both of these are to be compared in respect of their reality. It is easy enough to see how the comparison will go on Platonic grounds. Body and the substances which nourish it belong to the changeable world of becoming, while soul and its objects of nourishment belong to the stable, unchanging realm of forms. The latter, by the usual Platonic criteria, are thus more real. Hence, as both of the elements in the process of psychic
restoration are more real, the process itself must be more real. But, since this process is
the pleasure, the pleasures of the soul must be more real than those of the body.

As clear as the structure of the argument is, its soundness and its bearing on the
question of the pleasurable and desirability of pleasures are quite hard to discern. For
Gosling and Taylor, its chief fault is, as they allege, that it is based upon confusion about
the difference between a restoration as a process and a restoration as an end state. Their
argument is that being wise consists in having the inanition of ignorance and lack of
sense filled. Hence, the restoration that belongs to the wise person is not a process. Such
a process must have occurred, but at that time the person could not really be called wise.
Hence, on the depletion restoration model, the wise person can not be said to have
pleasure at all, let alone the truest sort. (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 122-27)

A more serious problem concerns how the argument moves from the premise that
the elements in one process are more real than those of another to the conclusion that the
process must be more real than the other. Generally speaking, this seems plausible
enough; the reality of the whole is judged by the reality of its ingredients. However, this
kind of part/whole reasoning must be justified in a particular context, since its claims
really will be empty until the nature of the parts and the whole are fully explored. But
that is just the problem that Plato faces here. One could put the point this way: Given
that the soul and its objects are more real, why can't it be the case that the soul's relation
to its parts be less than fully real? In particular, might it not be the case that the "filling"
of the soul with knowledge is not a real filling, or not as real a filling as the filling of the
stomach with meat?

To meet this difficulty, one would have to address the general problem of how the
soul is related to the forms and how the theory of forms could itself accommodate these
relations. For example, would the fillings in question be the same or similar or would it
turn out that, strictly speaking, a soul cannot be filled by anything, but rather, the
description of it as such is a metaphor for a related or analogous condition.
Unfortunately, these problems are far too great to be taken up here. We shall have to let them go and concentrate on the previous and following problem.

A third problem concerns the force that the argument ought to have against someone who maintains the superiority of physical pleasures over intellectual pleasures. The inferiority of physical pleasures is supposed to follow from their irreality. The reasoning, perhaps, is not a great mystery. If we are considering whether \( x \) is a greater \( F \) than \( y \), proving that \( y \) is not really an \( F \) answers the question in the strongest way. However, we can rephrase the question as follows: How does the distinction between genesis and being show that the pleasures of genesis are less pleasurable than those of being? Why think that, as Plato presupposes, those who taste of the intellectual pleasures will find them better, qua pleasures, than the physical ones and that this will be explainable in terms of the greater reality of the soul and the forms?

To begin with this last problem, we need to remind ourselves that the fundamental premise in the argument is that pleasure consists in the satisfaction of a lack. Plato does not refine the position here as he does in the *Philebus*, but it is safe to say that he assumes that the satisfaction is felt. Hence, the premise is that pleasure is the felt satisfaction of a lack of some sort. Conversely, pain is felt want. This immediately provides criteria for the adequacy of a pleasure. Given that a pleasure is just the felt satisfaction of a lack, its quality as a feeling must depend upon the quality of the satisfaction. How good a pleasure feels becomes a function of how satisfied one feels in and through a process.

Another element in the picture is a collapsing of the notion of a physical privation, say, of food, and a psychological privation, e.g., an unfulfilled desire to have food. Plato never specifically identifies the lack which he calls "hunger" in such a way as to make clear which of these notions he has in mind. Nevertheless, the ambiguity plays an important role in the argument. For, as we shall see, the main target of the argument
is not the physical pleasures of the temperate person, though these are included, but those of the profligate. The temperate person will feel the lack of nourishment, and, upon eating, the satisfaction of the physical lack. The profligate will feel the lack, not only of nourishment, but of culinary delicacies and spirits, etc. Such lacks are not entirely physical, and it is these that are most insatiable.

The second step in the argument attempts to show that, as satisfactions of lacks, the intellectual pleasures are superior to the physical. Given the above, the only question is why it is that Plato's distinction between being and becoming, i.e., between two distinct grades of reality, should bear on the question of which satisfaction is superior, qua satisfaction. I believe we will see its bearing if we are ready to view it as an explanation of the insatiability of the profligate. In being such an explanation, it lays bare the mistake at the heart of profligacy, and thus, makes it clear why the profligate's life is not even desirable on hedonistic grounds.6

Let us then look at the case of the profligate. Even the advocates of profligacy admit that his desires are insatiable. Indeed, to them this is an advantage, since on the

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6. Gosling and Taylor point out that an explanation of insatiability lurks in the passage. However, they do not connect it with the metaphysical argument. Rather, it is the cyclical nature of pleasure that explains insatiability. When the pleasure is sated, a new pain emerges, and then a pleasure, and so on. Clearly, this explanation is part of the restoration/depletion model, not the metaphysics of the central books. As such, it suffers from a general problem, namely, the collapse of psychological and physical lacks. The reason for a cycle of pain and pleasure is clear enough for physical pleasures. The insatiability of the profligate is a different matter. (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 119)
depletion/restoration model, this allows an unmitigated inflow of pleasure.7 We can see Plato as attempting to explain this insatiability by drawing attention to the nature of the objects that the profligate desires as well as those desires themselves. The profligate has an intense desire for, say, wine. However, wine, as the object of such desires, is problematic. One can only have so much of it before one becomes unconscious, and even before that point, it begins to have a different, undesirable affect, making a person nauseous and headachy.

Hence, if the profligate desires an unstopped inflow of wine, he will find that this desire cannot be satisfied. The part of him that is filled with the wine, and the wine itself, are involved in a cycle of change. They cannot constitute the object of an enduring desire, since they themselves do not endure in the condition desired. Hence, the desires of the profligate will not meet with satisfaction, and, thus, his pleasures cannot be real, since they cannot reach fruition.

We can contrast the profligate with the philosopher. Like the profligate, the philosopher has his or her dominating desire(s), the desire for knowledge. As a desire, however, the philosopher's will fare better. The object of desire is not something caught in any cycle of change. Rather, as Plato is wont to insist, it is timeless and unchanging. Assuming that the philosopher desires it in that condition, the attainment of his or her desire will not be incomplete. On the other side of the coin, the part of the soul which attains knowledge, will not, like the part that receives the wine, be subject to the changes in the body. There will not come a point in which the philosopher's soul has had too much knowledge or is unable to receive what the soul is desiring. As long as the desire is

7. In the Gorgias (492b-e5), Callicles is quite ready to accept the constant state of need of the profligate as a necessary condition for his happiness. Only if he has the maximal degree of neediness can his pleasures be of the sort fit for the worthy man.
being exercised, the soul will be capable of the reception of that desired. The soul's capacity to be filled is, in potentiality at least, eternal, since the soul is eternal.

The point of interest that emerges from a comparison of the profligate and the philosopher is that their pleasures are not thought to be constituted only by particular desires that come and go. The philosopher does not desire to have knowledge at time \( t \) for some duration \( d \). Rather, the desire for knowledge is continuous and is for a continuous object. The same is true of the profligate. He does not simply want a good bottle of wine for an occasion. The profligate wants to be in a constant state of inebriation and sexual gratification. More than anything, these desires and their concomitant pleasures are the distinctive marks of the different lives, and it is in respect of these desires especially that the philosopher finds real satisfaction, and thus, real pleasure.

The question arises, however, how this account applies to the case of moderate physical pleasures. Such pleasures would be those that satisfy limited desires or lacks, as, for example, that of nourishing oneself at some particular time. Unlike the case of the profligate, such a lack or desire does not outstrip its ability to find gratification. Even though it and its objects are caught in the cycle of change, it does not require any more than it asks for to be sated. Also, there are the physical pleasures such as smell, and the perception of beautiful objects. How does the above account call into question their reality as pleasures?

The answer is that it does not apply to them with its full force. In particular, the negative part of the argument does not apply to them. These pleasures are not associated with desires that are insatiable, and hence, they are not for that reason incomplete as pleasures. Hence, they can not be criticized as the profligate's desires were above attacked.
However, the positive side of the argument does have a direct bearing on them. The examination of the philosopher's pleasures brings out what is advantageous about them. Being pleasures of the soul, consisting in the satisfaction of an enduring desire for communion with enduring objects, we have, as it were, a very great desire, as pervasive and compelling as that of the profligate. But these desires can be gratified, while the profligate's could not. Hence, while it may be possible to satisfy certain particular desires for physical pleasure, these desires do not have the magnitude and importance of the desire(s) which characterize the philosopher. They are the true pleasures, those in the upper region. By contrast, all bodily pleasures belong in the middle region.

Does that make the moderate bodily pleasures unreal? Well, Plato is not exactly sure what to say. In a sense, it does, in so far as we see that the body cannot sustain its pleasures as the soul does its own. On the other hand, these pleasures are complete. They do not fall short of being pleasures by virtue of the satisfactions falling short of being complete. At the very least, then, Socrates can claim that they are inferior to the intellectual pleasures, which, of course, is his general aim. He need not consider them unreal. This explains why he ends the discussion on what commentators have found an anomalous note:

Then, said I, may we not confidently declare that in both the gain-loving and the contentious part of our nature all the desires that wait upon knowledge and reason, and, pursuing their pleasures in conjunction with them, take only those pleasures which reason approves, will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truest pleasures, so far as that is possible for them, and also pleasures that are proper to them and their own, if for everything that which is best may be said to be most its own.(586d2-e)(Shorey)

8. All quotations from the Republic are from Shorey's translation, unless otherwise indicated.
It is striking that, after arguing that physical pleasures are not fully real, Socrates seems to accord them a certain degree of reality if they are situated in a soul governed by reason. The account offered here, however, should make it clear why this is so. By paying attention to the different kinds of desires involved in physical pleasure, we see that Socrates' main aim is those of the profligate. The moderate desires for physical pleasure are a secondary matter for him. The result of the discussion is not only a critique of the profligate. A theory emerges which specifies how a lack or desire must be shaped if it is to be adequately satisfied and thus, bring real pleasure. This will be important when we arrive at the mixed and moderate pleasures of the Philebus.

Before leaving off Book IX, we should take a look at Gosling and Taylor's criticism of the argument. They are quite right to insist that Plato is not separating the notion of a restoration as a process from that of a restoration as a completed state. The implication they draw from this is far-reaching. If the intellectual pleasures are not restorations, how can they be said to be pleasures at all. If the answer is that a different theory must be devised for these pleasures, the question will arise how they can be compared to the physical pleasures. The model of restoration and depletion will no longer serve to determine a ranking of the pleasures in terms of real and unreal fillings. (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 122-26)

However, having argued that having and exercising knowledge is not a process of restoration, they conclude that it is a state of being filled. Hence, they too are taking elements appropriate to the model of physical pleasures and applying them to the intellectual ones. However, having and exercising knowledge could be thought of as themselves processes, which, unlike the physical processes, can continue in a state of actualization. Hence, the filling up that takes place in the case of knowledge, is not like that of food. It is more like, to use a physical metaphor, the restoration of oxygen carried
by blood to a body in constant need of a certain amount. The process of restoration is continual, and its materials recyclable.

While this might give us pause before we accuse Plato of rank equivocation, it is still a tall task to explain how any intellectual process could count as a restoration in the sense required by the medically inspired restoration/depletion model. We would have to address the second problem I raised, i.e., the relation of the forms to the soul and the nature of the interaction.

However, we can give a more direct response by concentrating on another conflation that we find in the argument, i.e., the conflation of psychological lacks with physical lacks. If the characteristic pleasures of the profligate do not lie in the satisfaction of, say, hunger, but in the satisfaction of the desire to receive the stimulation of good tasting food, then the philosopher as well can gain his pleasures from the satisfaction of certain enduring desires. Since he can keep satisfying this desire through the process of thinking, he may continue having pleasure even after his intellectual inanity is "filled".

The objection will be raised, though, that the conflation of desire and physical lack is itself a problem and that it undermines the argument. But, while it may be a problem, I do not believe that it undermines the argument. The argument concerns the lives of the philosopher, the money-lover and the honor-lover. Their lives are distinguished by their dominating desires. Hence, a desire-satisfaction model of pleasure would suit this case perfectly, allowing for a ranking of the lives in terms of pleasure.
CHAPTER V
FALSE PLEASURE OF THE NEUTRAL STATE AND MIXED PLEASURES

We find the discussion of Republic IX carried over to the Philebus. After Socrates has argued for the existence of the second type of false pleasure, false pleasure of overestimation, he turns to an account of a third type of false pleasure, which he declares to be falser than the one preceding. (42c-d) This false pleasure consists in mistaking a neutral state for a pleasure. This is clearly a return to the argument of the Republic, though we should not be surprised to find revision.

Plato also returns to the issue of the grading of pleasures. As in the Republic's account, he is interested in comparing pleasures in respect of their quality as fillings or replenishments. The aim of his argument is to show that the bodily pleasures so coveted by hedonists are really unsatisfactory when their nature is revealed. They are just mixtures of pain and pleasure, which, because of the juxtaposition of conflicting sensations, seem better than they are.

In this chapter I will take up the accounts of the third false pleasure and the mixed pleasures. As in the previous chapter, I will be concerned with the relation of the two accounts. I will argue that the discussion of false pleasures of the neutral state has a different role in the larger argument. I will also argue that Plato approaches the question of the reality of pleasures with greater sophistication. The main points of improvement are that he gives a more complete account of insatiability in general and he addresses a broader spectrum of psychological pleasures.
FALSE PLEASURES OF THE NEUTRAL STATE

As mentioned before, Plato returns to Book IX's argument to establish his third type of false pleasure. The account he gives seems substantially the same, though it is more complete in some respects and weaker in others. It is also less clear in the Philebus' account as to what is taken to be the false pleasure. The Republic's account seems more committal on that matter.

The argument starts with a detailed review of the depletion/restoration theory. The purpose of this review is to make clear how it is that a neutral state is possible. As pains and pleasures are produced by the motions resulting from depletions and restorations, the neutral state will exist when these motions are absent. However, as Protarchus objects, wise men have long held that there will always be some process taking place. This forces Socrates to modify the depletion/restoration model. Instead of describing pains and pleasures as depletions or restorations (or the results of these), Socrates adds the requirement that the motions reach the soul. But only the big alterations of this sort will reach the cognizance of the soul, the little or moderate ones will go unfelt. Hence, they can agree that there are states involving no pain or pleasure without violating the Heracleitean doctrine of continual flux. (42d-43d)

1. Before he sophisticates the theory, Socrates points out that the question that he is pressing is not in any way hindered by Protarchus's objection. Even if there was no cessation or respite in the processes of depletion and restoration, he could still raise the issue as a hypothetical question. He could ask, what would happen were there to be no depletion or restoration, to which question he would expect to hear that there would be no pain or pleasure. But, he says, he will sidestep the issue by modifying the theory. (42d-43b4) It seems, however, that he is doing more than merely sidestepping the problem. First, the modification is important and improves the theory. Secondly, and more importantly, the issue at hand depends upon the actual existence of a neutral state. If no such state actually existed, there would be no false pleasure.
Having given more attention to the nature of the neutral state in this account, Socrates can insist that its nature and the natures of bodily pleasure and pain are all distinct. (43d2) With such a clear distinction in place, it is easy enough to secure agreement that anyone identifying them in speech or thought would be making an error. But, it was claimed earlier that this is just what certain people do, for they claim that living one's entire life without pain is the greatest of all pleasures. (43d6-10) Further, Socrates says that we see people who believe that they are having pleasure when they are merely not having pain. Presumably, these are the same persons. Hence, they are making the mistake just described. (43e10-44a10)

Establishing that such a mistake is made, the argument ends. We are left wondering whether the persons in the middle state are suffering under the grips of false pleasure or simply making an intellectual mistake about the condition they are in. Commentators have been unanimous in holding that it is the latter. (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 451-52; Hackforth 1945, 81; Taylor 1960, 423) This would imply something of a retreat on Plato's part. The Book IX account treated the mistaking of the neutral state as an experience. For example, the cessation of pleasure will be a pain, though an illusory one. (583e1-5) Hence, the Book IX account would seem more committed to a false pleasure than the account of the Philebus.

There are some very strong reasons to suppose that Plato backed off from attempting to establish an actual false pleasure on the basis of some misidentification of the neutral state. If we consider his language, we see that he is careful not to allow Socrates to describe the neutral state as pleasant or painful, as Socrates did in the Republic account. In his brief description of the error, Plato has Socrates say no more than that the people in question say and think that the neutral state is pleasant. He does not say that it feels that way to them.

Secondly, there is no mention in the Philebus' account of the psychological mechanism which underlay the illusion as it was described in the Republic's account.
There the transition from a painful to a neutral state made the neutral state feel pleasurable. In the Philebus account, the error is simply documented, with no attempt made to explain how it occurs. This leaves us to speculate whether we are meant to fill in the gap with the fuller, earlier discussion or whether we are meant to see the Philebus' account as a new development.

Finally, the later alternative gains some support when we consider the difficulties that the argument in Book IX faced. The problem raised in the last chapter was how the existence of the illusory pleasure could be compatible with the depletion/restoration theory. In both accounts, the conditions under which bodily pleasure or pain occur are absent when one is in the neutral state. That is precisely what makes it a neutral state. As the Republic account puts it, the motions that are constitutive of pain or pleasure are absent when one is in the neutral state; it is a quietude of the soul. As for the Philebus' account, we have just seen how it modifies the depletion/restoration theory in order to allow for the existence of such a quietude. Hence, the question must be how this quietude could be felt as a pleasure or a pain?

Perhaps Book IX's description of the illusion could be developed to offer a satisfactory answer to this question. While the motions that constitute pain or pleasure have ceased, the transition into the state of quietude is marked by the soul as either pleasant or painful. Hence, along with the bodily changes that the motions themselves represent, the soul receives impressions caused by the patterns in which the motions take place. When there are abrupt changes in the patterns of the motions, the soul registers this as a feeling as well as the motion. Hence, we find the impression of the motions augmented or diminished, depending upon changes in their pattern of occurrence.

While this account might be a promising way to adapt the depletion/restoration theory for the purpose of explaining the affect that one's previous condition has on the experience of a subsequent condition, it is not clear that its employment in the context of this argument will be helpful. The first difficulty that arises pertains to the grounds one
would have for calling a pleasure false. The reason the neutral state was called a false pleasure in the Republic was that it really was not a pleasure, though it was mistaken for one. If the account of the psychological phenomenon responsible for the mistake succeeds in explaining why the neutral state would feel pleasurable by positing a new kind of motion, it would seem that there should be no mistake at all. The above explanation of the mistake seems to constitute an extension of the theory of pleasure, not an argument based upon that theory for the existence of a neutral state.²

The only way in which Plato could continue to maintain that the neutral state was an illusion would be to identify a real pleasure with the motions arising solely from a restoration. The motions caused by abrupt changes in the pattern of, say, a depletion's sudden end, would be an unreal pleasure by virtue of their improper relation to the depletion. For example, we might imagine that the sudden cessation of, say, hunger, causes the motions arising from hunger to suddenly stop. The very abruptness of the cessation would cause some other kind of motion in the soul that it feels as pleasurable, though this motion does not come from the restoration. This latter motion might be treated as an illusion, since, though it constitutes a pleasurable feeling, it is not caused by the restoration.

It is hard to tell whether Plato would think this position feasible. To the modern reader, it will immediately appear indefensible, since the Cartesian demarcation of the mental is drawn around the intrinsic features of conscious states. Hence, whatever it is that differentiates a feeling of pleasure from another feeling, this must be given in

². Footnote (1) in Chapter 4 notes that Gosling and Taylor make the point that Plato has really shown that his theory is false, not that a putative pleasure is false. They suggest that Plato is taking the enjoyment of, say, a formerly sick person, as the appearance of a physical pleasure, when, in fact, it is an actual psychological pleasure, viz, enjoyment. What I am suggesting, is that, even if Plato can legitimately treat the putative pleasure as physical, he would, in effect, be offering a theory which countenanced it.
consciousness. The above distinction of motions would not respect this condition. But the extent to which Plato would be guided by these intuitions is unclear. It might seem perfectly legitimate to him to distinguish between actual and non-actual pleasure on the basis of features not given in consciousness. So the above account might be an option. Unfortunately, this text and others offer no clear indication of how Plato would treat this issue.

A second problem with this interpretation is that it does not give a complete account of the pleasurable of neutral state. It only accounts for how entry into the neutral state could be pleasurable or painful. It does not explain how the continuation of the neutral state could be felt as pleasant or painful. Yet, the description of the condition of error in no way restricts it to the inception of the neutral state. Indeed, it seems that the people in question conceive the neutral state as one that could have an indefinite duration; they hold the most pleasant life would be one lived entirely without pain. (43d6-8)

Finally, it is difficult to get around Socrates description of the state as a quietude of the soul in respect of bodily pains and pleasures. The above account requires the neutral state be pervaded by some kind of motion which ultimately has its source in the changes of the body. This would have to give Socrates pause before he described it as a state of calm.

Given the above, we can see why commentators consider the third false pleasure to be no more than a convenient and loose representation of an error of opinion. As Hackforth sees it, the neutral state is called false for no other reason than that it contributes to the error of the faculty of opinion. (Hackforth 82, 1945) Since the description of the "false pleasure" mentions nothing more than a mistake in opinion and speech, and since a bona fide false pleasure of this sort would be difficult to establish, the general view presents a strong case.
However, as strong a case as this deflationary view has behind it, it raises puzzles that detract from the success it might have in explaining the text. The first problem is that, as before, Plato introduced the error as a false pleasure. Indeed, he was emphatic in his use of language, making Socrates describe it as still more false than the previous feelings that arose in living beings. (42c5-7) It would be peculiar that he would complete the description of it in terms quite neutral as to whether it really was a false pleasure. Moreover, after the theoretical work that Plato laid down in order to establish the false pleasures of anticipation, we cannot help but be surprised that he would later ignore the distinction between feeling pleasure and having opinion.

Another problem for the deflationary view concerns the relation between the neutral state and the false opinion that arises in regard to it. If we are inclined to suppose that Plato is no longer willing and able to account for the error in terms of a feeling that arises through the transition, what can we say to explain the origin of the false opinion. After all, as Socrates emphasizes, the people who make the mistake really do think that they are having pleasure, or, as he puts it, "they would not say so." (445) This is not just a puzzle about the incorrigibility of first person ascriptions. As noted above, we cannot expect Plato to speak to every post-Cartesian issue. Whether we allow corrigibility or not, it seems quite odd that people could be entangled in such radical and pervasive error about their experience.

Gosling and Taylor implicitly suggest a different reading in their criticism of the argument. As noted before, they argue that Plato has not located a false pleasure. He has merely shown that a different account of pleasure ought to be applied to the case in question, though of course, this is not Plato's intention. As they suggest, the best way to explain the situation of those in the neutral state is to describe their pleasure as a state of enjoyment, i.e., a pleasure of the soul. This has a plausible ring to it. People who are freed from pain may be jubilant simply because the pain has ceased. That would seem to
be as sufficient a ground for such emotion as would be the anticipation of the pleasures of riches. (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 449-50)

Taking this as an interpretation, however, would be problematic. First, it is leveled at Plato as a criticism. The main point of the criticism is that there would be no reason to consider such a pleasure a false pleasure. Indeed, such a pleasure would be closer to the kinds of pleasures which Plato considers true. One reason for this is that they could occur without pain. One could be happy, contented, and be filled with enjoyment, simply because one is living free from pain. Another reason is that this kind of enjoyment would go well with the ideal life as Plato conceives it. Such a life would include only those pleasures consistent with self-control. The life of someone who took enjoyment in freedom from disturbance and distress would have quite a different form from that of the person who took enjoyment from the maximal inflow of pleasure and who regarded the former person's life as comparable to a stone.

Finally, since enjoyment is not a bodily state, it cannot be the neutral state. However, the neutral state is supposed to be the false pleasure. Since the account of the neutral state is purely in bodily terms, Socrates' argument ought to leave open the possibility that a person could experience a pleasure of the soul even at the moment he is experiencing the neutral state in respect of the body. This could be a pleasure of anticipation, or it could be a pleasure directed at the fact of being in the neutral state. Thus, even if such a pleasure were to be false, it could not be so by virtue of being merely a respite from pain.

Socrates' account then, lands us in a dilemma. On the one horn, we can treat the mistaking of a neutral state for a pleasure as involving nothing more than the faculty of opinion. Hence, pleasure is in no way implicated as false; for it cannot be identified with either of the elements of the error, i.e., belief or the neutral state. On the other horn, if we would like to implicate a pleasure, we find that the grounds upon which we are allowed to do that make the endeavor self-defeating. This is because the grounds are nothing less
than that the putative pleasure be identified with a state that, by its very nature, is not a
pleasure.

REINTERPRETATION OF THE ARGUMENT

It would be a curious matter if the argument should turn out to be entirely without
point. Plato seems intent upon delivering a powerful critique of certain persons, and to
that extent, he is willing to review and revise his original theory of pleasure. We should,
then, change our bearings and ask what position Plato is identifying and what he
considers wrong with it. From this we may be able to extract an interpretation of the
false pleasure, or, at least, a reasonable facsimile.

We should begin by noting the peculiarity, in this context, of the outlook of those
in question. They hold that the most pleasurable life would be one lived in perfect
freedom from pain. They also are described as mistaking the state of being free from
pain with the state of experiencing pleasure. Clearly, the persons in question are not
Calliclean hedonists. Indeed, as mentioned before, they seem closer in affiliation to
Plato.

The question that needs to be raised is why these people should feel this way
about the state of painlessness. The hard core hedonist would certainly not take their
position. First, it is clear that the Calliclean hedonist would not think a life devoid of
pain, ipso facto, the most pleasant life. Such a hedonist would be expected to have a list
of positive pleasures, such as eating, drinking, and sexual stimulation. Also, that person
might be partially or fully aware that pain is a necessary precursor of pleasure. So we
should not expect the above statement from him. Also, for the same reasons, we would
not expect that the Calliclean hedonist would find any particular state of freedom from
pain all that interesting. It might be a relief, and preferable in comparison to a particular pain, but it is hard to see why he would think that it is a pleasure. Sybaritic hedonists should be expected to know their trade better than that.

The persons in question seem to have little inclination to seek after the intense pleasures of the full-blooded hedonist. To do so would cause them to forfeit the life they consider most pleasant, since they could not expect to pursue pleasure without some concomitant pain. Also, if they are willing to consider the absence of pain a pleasure, it seems plausible to suppose that they either are not acquainted with any positive pleasures, or, as is more likely, they do not hold these positive pleasures in the same regard as the hedonist. The position described is reminiscent of that elicited from Cephalus in the opening pages of the Republic.

For in very truth there comes to old age a great tranquillity in such matters and a blessed release. When the fierce tensions of the passions and desires relax, then is the word of Sophocles approved, and we are rid of many and mad masters. (329c4-d)

From Cephalus's remarks we understand that, in retrospect, at least, he regards the pleasures of the hedonist as a nuisance. They are described in such a way as to suggest that they are more of a strain than they are worth. The pain of deprivation and the desperate efforts required to satisfy the lacks strike Cephalus as a painful affliction. Hence, he is not inclined to find them desirable now that he is able to compare them with the tranquility that age brings.

If we suppose that Socrates' argument is aimed at persons who share the view of Cephalus, we will have the basis of an explanation of why they view neutral states as pleasure and why they view a life maximally constituted by such states the most pleasant life. They find all or a large class of bodily pleasures to be painful. Because these pleasures are pains to them, they desire to avoid them. Hence, they desire the condition of their absence; the neutral state is desirable for them.
The question remains why they view such a state as a pleasure, since, on a theory of pain and pleasure such as that given by Plato, they are neither. The answer, I believe, is that, apart from any general theory of pleasure, one thinks of a pleasure as a feeling which is good qua being a feeling. That is to say, it is at least a necessary requirement for being a pleasure that something be desirable as a feeling, and for no other reason. Now, if one does not have a general theory of pleasure, this necessary condition may also become a sufficient condition by default. This would likely be the case for people like Cephalus, i.e., those that we assume Socrates is criticizing. Not having a theory of pleasure, they implicitly equate desirability as a feeling with pleasurability. Thus, they think they are feeling pleasure when they are in a neutral state.

Given that this is a plausible explanation of their mistake, how do we describe the nature of the mistake? Is it a false pleasure, or simply a matter of false opinion? Well, certainly a false opinion is involved. But, more importantly, there is an experience that can be considered false. It is the feeling of stasis which prompts the persons to say that they are feeling pleasure. This feeling is deceptive. It seems pleasurable to the person's accused of the mistake. Thus, in addition to an error of opinion, there is a feeling which also can be impugned.

Of course, this brings us back to the question of how the middle state can feel pleasurable. But now we see that it need not be a pleasure or feel as a pleasure would feel (which may likely be the same thing for Plato). Rather, it must simply be found highly desirable or acceptable as a feeling. The persons who experience the stasis in this way do so because they are unacquainted with real pleasure (the intellectual pleasures). To them it is a pleasure because it is the most agreeable and desirable feeling that they know. Hence, while it may seem odd to call this a false pleasure, and while Plato is probably doing so only in the inverted commas sense of the word, it may be thought of as a false or deceptive experience.
We find textual evidence for this view in the language of the *Republic*. When Socrates introduces the mistake, he tells us that people find the neutral state, as a state of peace, *pleasurable* (hedu) and *acceptable* (agapeton). (583d9) He quickly follows by saying that it is *not possible* that it be either a pleasure or a pain. (583e5-584a9) Its being felt as a pleasure is described as a kind of jugglery (goeteia). The upshot of the argument seems to be that an feeling's being a pleasure will involve its being acceptable and desirable as a feeling. But this is not a sufficient condition for being a pleasure. For a feeling to be a pleasure, it must share in the nature of pleasure, whether that is given in the depletion/restoration model or in the intrinsic character of a pleasure). Hence, the experience of peace passes itself off as a pleasure by meeting the condition of acceptability for those who have never experienced real pleasure.

The argument would appear, then, to have two steps. The first part of his argument is fairly straightforward. The reason why pleasures of the neutral state are false is that they are not really pleasures. They are not pleasures because they do not meet the conditions laid down by the theory of bodily pleasure and, given their nature as bodily states, this rules out any possibility of rightly considering them to be pleasures.

The second part of the argument is implicit, and needs to be reconstructed on the basis of what has been laid out and what will follow. The main point to consider is that the neutral state was considered pleasurable on the ground that it was desirable as a feeling and on the further, implicit ground, that this was a sufficient condition for a feeling to be a pleasure.

Moreover, if the argument is right, the desirability of the state must be reevaluated. To find out that what you thought was a pleasure is actually an absence of pleasure will very likely make the state less desirable. This ought to be the case for the reason that the realization implies that there are positive pleasures and that you have forgone them for a state of their absence.
Thus, in showing that the neutral state is not a bodily pleasure, Socrates draws into the light of examination its presumption of being a desirable bodily state as well. While it may be open to someone to say that, as a bodily state, it is more desirable than pain, it is not open to them to accord the state much value on its own. If it is valuable as a bodily state, it is only as a negation of a positively evil state. In and of itself, it is not desirable. Thus, if it is possible to identify the features that make life good, the neutral state will not be among them. It can make life neither good nor bad. Hence, the experience of a neutral state, unlike pleasure, cannot be considered desirable in a sense strong enough to warrant that appellation.

Read in this manner, we have a better idea of why Plato argues that the neutral state is a false pleasure for certain persons. He attacks its claim to satisfy the conditions of being a pleasure and he attacks its claim to satisfy even a minimal condition of pleasurehood. Though not a pleasure on his view, the neutral state is put forward as pleasure, which implies that it meets the criteria of being a pleasure. The argument shows, not only that it fails to meet some of these criteria, but that it fails to meet any.

That is why it is described by Socrates as the falsest false pleasure. In a general argument in which various kinds of pleasure are being assailed on the grounds that they fail to meet all the conditions that a pleasure of their kind must meet, this third argument for false pleasure can be seen a culmination of the strategy pursued. The other false pleasures had their worth as feelings challenged by examining the kinds of feelings they were and eliciting from this analysis grounds for their evaluation. They were never denied the status of pleasures, in some sense of that term and hence, it remained possible that pleasures with the same nature could be good. However, the third false pleasure is even deprived of its right to be called a pleasure. An analysis of its nature showed that it did not meet any of the conditions of pleasurability.
The treatment of the false pleasures of the neutral state is followed by an abrupt and surprising point of inquiry. Socrates asks Protarchus if they should be content to hold that besides pains and releases from pain, there actually are pleasures. Protarchus is rightly surprised by this, since the entirety of the treatment of pleasure has supposed that there must be actual pleasures and has even offered accounts of their nature and causal origin. Socrates brings this question up, he says, because there are certain hard-nosed thinkers who deny the existence of pleasure altogether. Hence, their view is to be brought up for consideration.

Besides their blanket denial of the existence of pleasure, these thinkers also espouse a methodology for inquiring into the nature of things. Where things of a certain kind, K, admit of degrees with respect to being K, e.g., hard things, the correct manner of determining their nature is to analyze those of the class which are K to the greatest degree. Hence, to determine the nature of pleasure, one must do the same.

The introduction of the view of these thinkers serves as a transition into an account of mixed pleasures. Socrates will use their position to show that the pleasures most prized by hedonists are really mixtures of pleasure and pain. While the intense bodily pleasures offer clear examples of this condition, Plato will show that examples abound in the case of pleasures of the soul as well. (It will be important for my interpretation to emphasize the extent to which this latter claim is true for Plato.) In establishing that these pleasures are mixed, Socrates takes himself to be showing that they cannot be considered worthwhile as pleasures, hence, the doctrine of mixed pleasures leads to a sweeping critique of the life of the hedonist.

Since the transition into the account of mixed pleasures is preceded by a characterization of these thinkers, it will be profitable to attempt an interpretation of their position before we look at the mixed pleasures themselves. There are at least three
important questions we must ask. First, in what sense do they deny that pleasure exists and why do they deny that it exists? Second, to what extent does Socrates agree with their denial? Finally, what role does their denial and their methodology play in Socrates' argument against mixed pleasures?

The description of their position makes it clear enough that they are denying that there are any pleasures, and not just a sub-class of pleasures. Their position is introduced as denying that there are three states, pain, freedom from pain, and pleasure. (44a9-b3) They only accept the first two, thus eliminating the entire class of pleasures. A few lines down Socrates says that "they deny the existence of pleasure altogether."(44b6-c) This strong version of their view is repeated at 45c8-d when Socrates describes the task before them as discovering the nature of pleasure and "how those who deny its existence altogether say that its nature is."

Still, there is one description of their position which suggests that it might be restricted. At 44c1-3 Socrates characterizes the view as holding that the conditions which those affiliated with Philebus call pleasures are nothing more than refuges from pain. This, according to Gosling and Taylor, suggests that perhaps the thinkers mean to deny only the existence of physical pleasures. (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 150-51) However, they argue that even if they do limit their attention to these pleasures, it is likely because they do not know that there are other kinds and hence, they, at least, take their denial to be categorical.

While this move might eliminate the putative inconsistency between this passage and those quoted above, it seems entirely unnecessary. There does not seem to be any reason to restrict the description "what those affiliated with Philebus call pleasures" to physical pleasures in the first place. Even though, as seems plausible, the physical pleasures loom large in the hearts and minds of such hedonists, these need not be the only experiences that they denominate pleasures. If so, Plato's concern with false pleasures of anticipation would have to be considered irrelevant to the position that Socrates is
supposedly attacking. So also would Socrates' inclusion of purely psychological pleasures into the class of mixed pleasures fall beside the point. Hence, we should be able to suppose that the thinkers' position is meant to be directed at both physical and psychological pleasures.

The next question to consider is why they hold the position they do? We should expect to find part of the answer, at least, in their methodology and its results. As Socrates explains to Protarchus, by employing their methodology, one finds that the pleasures that hold the secret of pleasure in general are those found in physical and spiritual degeneracy. Though these conditions are not the most fecund sources of pleasure, they produce the greatest individual pleasures by virtue of the great lacks which they create or of which they consist. As these lacks are the most intense that one will experience, their satisfaction will likewise be the most intense. Thus the nature of pleasure will be most clearly revealed in illness and mental depravity. This, at least, offers some reason to suppose that they would loath pleasure, though it does not make it entirely clear why they contend it does not exist.

An answer to this question is suggested by Gosling and Taylor. Their answer draws on Socrates' characterization of the intense pleasures as forming a class of mixed pleasures (tas en mixei koinwnousas). (46b6) It is easy enough to see why this would be so, since the intense lacks will presumably be painful and recurrent. All it takes is an example of such a pleasure, an extreme itch, to elicit from Protarchus the statement that the experience is a mixed one and that it would seem to be something bad. (Summikton touto g'ar, w Swkrates, eoike gignesthai ti kakon.) (46a9) Since the thinker's methodology has led to the discovery of the character of these pleasures and since it treats them as mirrors of all other pleasures, the argument will conclude that it is the condition of mixedness which disqualifies the claim of any putative pleasure to be a pleasure. This conclusion, they argue, rests logically on the general principle that if
something is to be an F, it cannot also be the opposite of F. (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 150-51)

The above interpretation implies an answer to another of the questions listed above, namely, how does Socrates' position compare with that of the thinkers. The answer would be that they both agree that the mixedness of the putative pleasures diminishes them in some respect. They differ simply in the extent to which they take this condition to mitigate against the experiences' claim to pleasurehood. Plato just does not go so far as the thinkers, but rather, is content to hold that the mixedness diminishes the reality or pleasurability of the experience to such an extent that it does not merit inclusion in the good life. He does not categorically deny that the experiences are pleasures.

Though consistent with the text, this view imports too much of Socrates position into the construction of that of the thinkers. Given that Socrates develops his account through the use of their methodology, this is easy to do. Nonetheless, the appeal to the above general principle seems to anticipate a criterion of purity that Socrates will later use against the mixed pleasures, and transfers it to the thinkers account. Socrates will later argue that the purity of a quality is the measure of its being that quality, and that any intermingling with its opposite detracts from its being that quality, no matter how intense it is. Such reasoning is never explicitly associated with the view of the thinkers. Hence, if their position really were supposed to rely on an analogous principle, its role is entirely suppressed.

Indeed, it is not even clear that the thinkers drew the conclusion that the pleasures in question are mixtures of pleasure and pain. This view comes out of the mouth of Protarchus in the course of investigating, with Socrates, the nature of the intense pleasures. While it is true that the thinker's methodology directed them to these pleasures, it does appear necessary to their case that they come to the determination that the pleasures are mixtures. This could be exclusively Plato's view at this stage in the argument. Moreover, the initial characterization of their view has them denying the
existence of pleasure and claiming that only pain and relief or relievings from pain exist. To rest this view on the premise that the experiences are combinations of pleasure and pain seems to commit them to the very thing they deny. Nor would it help to translate their position into the obscure metaphysical claim that something is not an F unless it is free from the opposite of F. Far from explaining the denial of pleasure, the application of this principle to the case of pleasure itself needs to be explained.3

A clearer explanation of the thinkers' view can be given if we address the question of why it is they are introduced directly after the account of the third false pleasure. Hackforth makes the remark that such a position might be appropriately introduced by virtue of the pessimistic strain of the preceding discussion. After three sustained arguments for three types of false pleasure, the question might arise whether there actually were any true pleasures at all. (Hackforth 1945, 85) But the question of whether or not to take up the position is directed at the specific content of the preceding discussion, which relied on maintaining the existence of three states, the very thing that the thinkers deny. Hence, it would be a safer bet to look for the answer in the connection between these two discussions.

3. Gosling's and Taylor's explanation of the principle and its application are as follows. According to them, the thinkers hold that "for any F, if there are any Fs there must be things that are F and not also the opposite of F. This is not a totally unattractive view. One may admit that some men are wise sometimes, but hold that there are no wise men on the ground that all men are sometimes foolish. . ." (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 150) However, adducing this justification for the case of pleasures is incoherent for a number of reasons. First, the pleasures are individual events and thus cannot spoil their claim to pleasurehood by some future departure from their tendency. Second, unlike the men who can act wisely and foolishly, we cannot describe the contaminated entity independently from the pleasure, and hence, we admit the existence of pleasure, in some substantive sense of the term.
As we characterized the votaries of the third false pleasure, they turned out to be quite different from those who in Book IX were subject to the illusory pleasures of the neutral state. In Book IX, the persons were of a hedonistic bent, and, it is reasonable to suppose, were little inclined to moderation and self-control. In contrast, those in the Philebus, on our interpretation, found the sweetest, most pleasant life in the absence of physical and emotional distress. It seemed that we could find an example of their sort in Cephalus and his celebration of the tranquility of old age.

Having shown that such pleasures as represent their ideal of good living are really not pleasures at all, and that, given that they have no positive value as experiences and thus were neither desirable nor undesirable, one could raise the question of whether there was any pleasure to be found in life. After all, on our interpretation, those who take pleasure in the neutral state do not do so on their way to gobbling up more pleasures, as those in the Republic account. They do so because they find the usual litany of pleasures to be painful disturbances. Hence, if freedom from these disturbances is not pleasure, it would seem that we had exhausted the list of the usual suspects, thus leaving us nothing to call a pleasure.

My suspicion, then, is that the thinkers are closely related to those who are associated with the third false pleasure. The difference is that they do not make this mistake, but recognize on theoretical grounds that the neutral state is not, properly speaking, a pleasure. They recognize that it is just the absence of pain. As for the pleasures of the hedonist, they agree in their dislike of them, finding them turbulent and painful. Their methodology undergirds this irascibility by making the most disturbing and painful conditions paradigmatic of the so called pleasures. It is because they want to emphasize the pain and discomfort of pleasure that they center their investigation in the intense pleasures. It is these that they most associate with "pleasure" and these that most disturb their ease.
On this interpretation, the difference between Plato's account and the thinkers' view is more pronounced. Instead of holding that the thinkers and Plato agree that the intense pleasures are mixed with pain but disagree about the significance of this fact, this view holds that the thinkers do not see that, even in the intense and turbulent desires and satisfactions of the hedonist, there is an element of pleasure. Why they do not see this is a matter for speculation, but it is likely because they do not find the "pleasures" desirable that they refuse them that designation. Plato, on the other hand, not only can account for how such an element of pleasure can coexist with pain, and in varying degrees, he can use this account to explain why the hedonist mistakenly finds the intense pleasures to be pleasurable. That, I will contend, is his principle interest in the thinkers' view and accompanying methodology. Though he admires their noble disdain for pleasure, he recognizes that its existence cannot be denied if its witchcraft is to be explained.

MIXED PLEASURES

The account of mixed pleasures which Plato develops from his joint investigation with the enemies of Philebus will constitute the most extensive argument so far for the existence of false pleasures. It will take as its subject the entire class of pleasures enjoyed by the sybaritic hedonist. It will emerge from this account that all such pleasures share one feature in common, namely that they are all associated with strong desires. These "pleasures of desire," as I will call them, include a great many different types, including the pleasures of anticipation that went before. They will range from the most shameful sexual perversions to the amusements of a comedy. In the end, it will be shown that they are, in some sense, false. Our present task, then, is to explicate the argument for this claim and to clarify the sense in which the pleasures of desire are false.
The first point to note concerning Plato's strategy is that he, unlike the thinkers, does not have the extreme cases serve as an example for all the others. The thinkers rest their case against pleasure in an analysis of the intense pleasures. They suppose, without argumentation, that what obtains for these pleasures obtains for all others. Plato, however, though equally ambitious in respect of the scope of his account of mixed pleasures, will actually base his argument on a variety of cases, not all of them being obvious examples of intense pleasures. Indeed, some of the pleasures, e.g., laughing at a comedy, seem quite mild, as pleasures go.

Another matter of interest that arises in the introduction of the account has to do with Socrates' division of the mixed pleasures into three exhaustive classes; mixed pleasures of the body, mixed pleasures of the body and soul, and mixed pleasures had by the soul alone. The prime example of the first will be itching, where the body produces pains and pleasures side by side. The second kind will only be discussed in passing, since its nature was made manifest in the account of pleasures of anticipation.

Finally, the mixed pleasures of the soul will be illustrated by reference to a variety of emotions, even malicious laughter, all of which are combinations of psychic distress and elation.

This threefold classification comes on the heels of a twofold classification, established by or in conjunction with the thinkers. Their methodology led us to see that the most intense pleasures arose from two sources, the depravity of the body and the depravity of the soul. Such depravity was constituted by the greatest lacks. Hence, according to the replenishment model, they must be seen as giving rise to the greatest pleasure. The question that we must ask, then, is how the threefold classification relates to the earlier twofold classification? Presumably, they should line up symmetrically; the mixed pleasures of the body should be found, at least in their most intense form, in disease, starvation, dehydration, etc. The mixed pleasures of the soul, on the other hand, should find their representation in those pleasures that result from mental
depravity, e.g., folly or madness. To account for the middle class, i.e., mixed pleasures of the soul and body, we might suppose that it found its paradigm in the combined conditions of physical and mental sickness.

While it may be easy to suppose that this is, in fact, the way in which the different classifications are meant to be related, if we look closely at the actual account of the various mixed pleasures, we will discover that this view is hard to sustain. The chief obstacle lies in the close association that folly has to the bodily pleasures. As is typical, we will find in Plato a certain indecisiveness about the matter of treating physical pleasures. The prime examples are the pleasures of eating, drinking, and sex. But the intense lacks which make the pleasures intense are not simply bodily lacks. Hence, as we proceed with an interpretation of the main argument, it will be crucial to keep this tension in mind.

Let us turn, then, to the account of the mixed pleasures. The account begins in earnest as an attempt to understand why it is that the intense pleasures are said to be the greatest. (45e8-10) However, Socrates has just given an argument to establish this conclusion, which should explain sufficiently why it is so; the pleasures in question are intense because they consist of restorations of the greatest lacks. What, then, needs to be explained? I believe that this question can best be answered by considering another question, namely, why, in the first place, did Socrates agree with the thinkers and argue on their behalf that these pleasures were the greatest? After all, this claim is part of an argument which will show that such pleasures are not the truest or best pleasures.

The answer, it would seem, is that Socrates agrees that the pleasures are great in some sense, viz, intense, but does not agree that they really are the most pleasurable of pleasures. Hence, when Socrates suggests that he and Protarchus "select some of these pleasures and see what there is about them which made us say that they are the greatest," this can be taken as an invitation to consider critically the popular identification of
intensity and pleasurability. The goal of the following arguments will be to drive a wedge between these two conditions. Hence, the project at hand is to explain how these two conditions are confused, and thus, to establish the illusory character of the sybaritic pleasures.

Socrates offers two examples of mixed bodily pleasures. In the first case, a person suffering from extreme cold or heat begins to grow warm or cold and persists in the process. Though the restoration brings pleasure, the pain of the extreme condition continues and causes the person to feel frustration and distress. (45c4-d) In the second example, a person suffers from an itch, the source of which is deep enough below the skin so that scratching will not suffice to satisfy it. Only when he brings the affected part near a fire or ice does he get relief, and the transition out of this vexatious condition (aporiais) brings rapturous pleasure.

What is common to both cases is that Plato highlights the fact that the affliction is prolonged. As it continues, the sufferer becomes more and more desperate to be freed from it. This suggests that the distress that he is feeling does not consist only in the type of sensation he is having, for that remains the same and even weakens as relief draws near. The distress is also related to the fact that the condition persists and the fact that, though near, relief is slow in coming. While the physical lacks produced unpleasant sensations, they also activated the desire for relief. But such a desire is for immediate relief, which, in this case, one does not get. Hence, with every passing moment the desire becomes more intense and more distressing, until finally, the person is ready to jump and scream.

Hence, the language describing the mixed pleasures, and the nature of their origins, suggests that the great misery that one feels is in part psychological. If this is so, then it would be plausible to assume that the rapturous pleasures (amechanas hedonas) that follow are also, to a large extent, psychological. The fact that Plato uses "hedone" to describe them does not in the least detract from this inference, since this term and
"chairein" are used interchangeably though the dialogue for bodily and psychological pleasures. Thus, when the person has finally freed himself from the diseased state or gotten temporary relief, his pleasure will consist, in large part, in the joy of satisfying the intense desire to be rid of the condition. The more intense the desire, the more intense will the gratification be. Until the desire is gratified, however, the person will be frustrated and disturbed.

If this interpretation of the cases is right, it makes some sense of the connection Plato makes between these pleasures and the life of the profligate. At the end of the account of mixed bodily pleasures, Socrates describes the untoward behavior of those who go in for the mixed bodily pleasures, saying that, when the mixed experience has a high degree of pleasure in it, it makes the person having it "leap for joy; it produces in him all sorts of colors, attitudes, and pantings, and even causes great amazement and foolish shouting..."(47a3-b) He goes on to say that such a person will claim that "he is pleased to death with these delights, and the more unrestrained and foolish he is, the more he always gives himself up to the pursuit of these pleasure..."

As noted earlier, the thinkers and Socrates held that the intense pleasures came from two different forms of depravity, bodily depravity and mental depravity. If we were to assume that the cases above were strictly bodily experiences, we would have to assume that they only originated in states of disease and bodily imbalances. But that makes their relation to the life of folly less clear. The reason is that the profligate's pleasures do not issue from diseases of the body. While one can find intense, though infrequent, pleasure in a life plagued by disease, hunger, thirst, exposure to extreme temperatures, etc, this is not a life that anyone would actually want to live, least of all the profligate. His life, however, is the second source of intense pleasure, and its pleasures, e.g., sex, drunkenness, riotous parties, etc. do not stem from disease or physical deprivation, but, rather, a lack of self-control.
The reason the mixed pleasures, which stem from bodily imbalances of the sort described above, can be considered paradigm pleasures for the life of the profligate is that they share with the carnal, lascivious pleasures an element of impatient desire. Just as a prolonged itch brings the desire to be rid of it to a boil, so also the desire for sexual stimulation, once it has been aroused, intensifies until a person is almost frantic to have it satisfied. Thus, in the *Gorgias*, Socrates treats the scratching of an itch and sexual stimulation on a continuum, asking whether, on Callicles' view, a person given over to scratching might live a pleasant, and thus, happy, life. He then asks Callicles to consider whether the zenith of such pleasure will be found in the life of catamites. The catamite's desire for stimulation issues from a form of desire that seeks immediate gratification and which intensifies when it does not get it. Like those desires issuing from imbalances in the body, the desire feeds itself, as it were, until the person completely loses self-control.

We can see, then, that the two sources of intense pleasures, physical and mental depravity, do not mark a distinction between purely physical and purely emotional pleasures. Indeed, folly, i.e., mental depravity, is the actual source of the sybaritic pleasures, which, by and large, are considered bodily pleasures. What our analysis reveals, however, is that an account of their pleasurability cannot confine itself to bodily sensations. The reason these pleasures are considered pleasures of the body, is that the desires which in large part constitute these pleasures have bodily sensations as their object.

Before going on to discuss the issue of falsity, we should first consider the two other kinds of mixed pleasure. Let us start with the mixed emotional pleasures. The case for mixed pleasures of the soul begins by listing the majority of such experiences, all of which are taken as uncontroversial. Anger, love, fear, longing, mourning, jealousy and envy are all introduced as painful experiences which do or can contain an element of pleasure. No explanation of this is given, except reference to a popular adage,
represented by a line from Homer, that anger is sweet. The explanation to be given will come from the argument for a more controversial case of mixed pleasure, namely, mixed pleasure derived from comedies.

Socrates' strategy for establishing this pleasure is to show that it is really a case of a pleasure of envy (phthonos), which already appears in the list of the uncontroversial cases. First, Socrates secures agreement that envy is painful to the soul. He then attempts to establish the contention that when we laugh at a character on the stage, this laughter emanates from our envy of the character. To do this he must lay out the essential characteristics of this emotion and show that they are satisfied in the case in question. Hence, he describes the envious person as one who rejoices in his neighbor's misfortunes. The implication is that envy consists in wishing that the happiness of someone be diminished in some way. Hence, envy will be a painful emotion when one cannot discern any ill fortune in the life of a neighbor.

Another characteristic of envy is that it is not necessarily directed at persons with whom we are engaged in competition. This is made clear when Socrates describes it as "a kind of unrighteous pain and also a pleasure."(49c9) He describes it this way because it involves rejoicing at the misfortune of friends, as opposed to enemies. However, if we suppose that those with whom we compete for, say, money, honors or the romantic love of another person, can all be thought of as enemies, we see that envy requires only that others have good fortune, not that they have it at the expense of the envious person.

Given that our envy is quite general in respect of its objects, Socrates argues that an actor on the stage, by representing other people, can incite in us resentment at his good fortune. Thus, when some ill fortune befalls him, we may feel good about it. Though we do not realize it, this is just what is happening when we laugh at a comic character when any of his pretenses or airs are exploded in the course of the production. Since his
ignorance is a bad thing for him, our delight in its revelation must spring from our envy of anyone who lays claim to any of the qualities we esteem.⁴

Having secured agreement that our laughter in these cases springs from envy, Socrates indicates his view of its role in the formation of the mixed feeling. He says:

Then our argument declares that when we laugh at the ridiculous qualities of our friends, we mix pleasure with pain, since we mix it with envy; for we have agreed all along that envy is a pain of the soul, and that laughter is a pleasure, yet these two are present at the same time on such occasions. (50a4-10)

As the case of malicious laughter is the only mixed feeling explained, we must assume that the above explanation will be similar for the other cases, e.g., love, anger, and fear. Thus, just as the envy was the source of laughter, a pleasure, under certain conditions, so will love, anger and fear be. They will, under the right conditions, produce certain pleasures. For example, the longing and pining of the lover will give rise to flights of elation at the sight of his beloved; and if that will not do it, at least at the touch. Or, to take the case of anger, the seething, gnawing pain of having received some slight or actual harm will make attacking and maiming a person a delightful experience, though it is usually something at which we are filled with horror and repulsion.

This explanation seems incomplete, however. The problem is that it makes the pleasures in question seem to be distinct feelings which come about as a consequence of having certain other feelings. If this is true, then its not clear that the argument will have

⁴ If Plato has this case right, one may wonder why the fate of tragic heroes does not likewise incite a gleeful response in the audience. The answer may lie in the manner in which we are drawn to identify with a character. It may be that the tragic hero evokes an identification with each viewer, while the comic character, in his arrogant display, seems like other people. It is just as likely, however, that the difference lies in the way comedy is presented and in our presuppositions about what constitutes an appropriate response.
established a mixed pleasure; the best we will be able to say for it is that, in a loose sense, it gives us such an experience; since the pleasure in question is bought at the price of antecedent discomfort, the whole event might be taken as constituting one experience. This, no doubt, would have normative significance, but it is certainly not as strong a case as a full-blown mixed pleasure.

To rectify this difficulty, we need first observe that Plato emphasizes that the pleasures are simultaneous, saying that "they occur together at the same time." (...'ama gignethai de toutw en toutois tois chronois.) This suggests that the pleasures cannot be merely consequent upon the pains, but rather that the pains endure along side of the pleasures. Moreover, the reason for this should be evident from considering the nature of causation involved. The state of anger, for example, does not just bring about the pleasure of attacking someone. It, in some sense, grounds the pleasure. Only while one is angry, and to the extent that one is angry, will anger be the cause of enjoying an attack. If we ask why the angry person enjoys his aggression, saying that he is angry will count as an explanation.

But why should it count as an explanation? Why should being angry allow normally loathsome acts to be enjoyable? The depletion/restoration model offers a plausible answer to this question, namely, that the violent behavior spawned by anger constitutes a release from its pain. When one is unable to act on the impulse to injure, anger is at its peak of painfulness. Hence, succumbing to the impulse satisfies it to some extent, thus bringing about the pleasure of release, according to the model. Likewise, the state of being envious waits in mounting frustration until some evil befalls those envied. When it does, the powerful desire to see the world turn against one's "friends" finds some respite, and one can rejoice in the released tension of the partially sated desire. Thus, far from being accidentally associated to the painful emotions, the pleasures of envy, anger, etc. are actually manifestations of these emotions under certain conditions and at various stages.
There remains only the mixed pleasures produced jointly by both body and soul. These turn out to be the pleasures of anticipation the nature of which Socrates has already explicated. To establish their status as mixed pleasures, he says nothing more than the following:

... concerning the pleasures in which the soul and body contribute opposite elements, each adding pain or pleasure to the other's pleasure or pain, so that both unite in a single mixture—concerning these I said before that when a man is empty he desires to be filled, and rejoices in his expectation, but is pained at his emptiness, and now I add what I did not say at that time, that in all these cases, which are innumerable, of opposition between soul and body, there is one single mixture of pain and pleasure. (47c1-d3)

Socrates describes well what he is now doing; i.e., he is just adding the claim that the pleasures of anticipation form one experience in combination with the pains of hunger. No argumentation is given to support this claim. Hence, if it is reasonable to accept it, it must be on the basis of a loose interpretation of the notion "mixedness". As mentioned above, this would not be an uninteresting sense, since it would have substantial normative significance. We can certainly think of the total gestalt of any moment of consciousness as our experience, and accord to the various pains and pleasures the role of constituent elements. Moreover, if certain pains and pleasures must come together, then we can plausibly hold that they will always make up a mixed experience, which we will denominate pleasant or painful depending upon the preponderance of one over the other.

There is, however, a possibility that these pleasures can be mixed in stronger way, as those above. Though we cannot deny that Socrates considers the painful element in the mixture to be a physical sensation, and the pleasurable to be a mental one, it may be that he is willing to admit that there is also psychological pain involved as well, and it may be this which, in part, accounts for the pleasure's being mixed. To see how this could be so, consider the first case of a mixed pleasure which was presented earlier. A
person wanting to change his state from extreme cold to warmth feels frustration at the continuance of the cold, even as he approaches the state of warmth. We noted that he was likely to be experiencing building frustration at not entirely reaching the desired state. As his desire was in between satisfaction and frustration, as it were, we could plausibly consider him to be experiencing a mixed psychological pleasure, though it was called bodily because its object was a bodily sensation.

The case of anticipation is similar to this. One has a desire, say the desire for sexual relations. Anticipating that the desire will be satisfied, one already begins to feel that joy that comes from such satisfaction. However, as the desire has not fully come to fruition, one may experience some frustration and impatience. It is as if the desire were in a middle stage between satisfaction and frustration. The extent to which it will partake of either will depend upon the temporal proximity and certainty of that which is anticipated. Hence, if the event is about to occur, the element of pain will be minimal. If it is unlikely to occur, the painfulness will likely predominate.

Hence, when Socrates says that the person "rejoices in his expectation, but is pained at his emptiness," (καὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν χαίρει, κενούμενος δὲ αλγεῖ,) we might suppose that "pained" could bear a psychological interpretation as well.

Now, finally, we should turn to discussing how all these mixed pleasures, the bodily, psychological, and the combinations of both, can be plausibly called false. That this is what Plato intends us to believe is clear from his later introduction of pure pleasures, which, for reasons having to do with their purity, he calls true. (51b-52c) The consensus among scholars is that the mixed pleasures are called false because, by being mixed, they do not exemplify the essential nature of pleasure. Hence, they are held to be false because they are not genuine pleasures; they are untrue because, as Hackforth (Hackforth 1945, 102) puts it, they do not fully participate in the form, Pleasure, or as
Gosling (Gosling 1975, 121) puts it, because they cannot be called pleasures without qualification.

While the equation of impurity with falsity is no doubt a central factor in the falsity of the mixed pleasures, I do not believe that it is all that there is to it. There are several reasons for this. First, if the falsity of mixed pleasures consists in their being spurious pleasures in the sense given above, then the earlier arguments for false pleasures, e.g., false pleasures of anticipation, dealt with a different notion of falsity, an epistemic notion associated with error or illusion. Though Plato may likely be using different notions of falsity, any interpretation ought to be able to make clear their connections in such a way that it is at least understandable why Plato would not need to distinguish them.

The second reason has to do with the lack of persuasive force that such an account would have in this dialectical context if left on its own. After all, Socrates is addressing his argument to a none too philosophical lover of pleasure; a person whose name means "love boy." If the conclusion of the main argument of the dialogue is that the sybaritic pleasures do not fully instantiate the form of pleasure or do not do so without qualification, it would be hard to see it as anything but a disappointment. Why should the conclusion undermine the position of Philebus? Why can't he just bite the bullet and accept that best pleasures are only qualified pleasures?

These difficulties can be resolved if we place the criterion of purity in a broader context. As I began the discussion of mixed pleasure, I argued that the primary aim of the account was to show that the sybaritic pleasures were not as pleasurable as they seemed. Hence, the point of the argument was to show that the intensity of the pleasures presents an illusion of pleasurable. That this is what Socrates thinks he has accomplished is made clear by the words which he uses to summarize the argument:

... for I do not in the least agree with those who say that all pleasures are merely surcease from pain, but, as I said, I use them as witnesses to prove
that some pleasures are apparent, but not in any way real, and that there are others which appear to be both great and numerous, but are really mixed up with pains and with cessations of the greatest pains and distresses of body and soul. (51a-b)

Socrates' main task was to show that the intense pleasures seem more pleasurable than they are because of their intensity. Presumably, the pleasures that were shown to in no way exist are those of the neutral state. Like the account of the second false pleasure, the false pleasures of over-estimation, the mixed pleasures are over-estimated. But their over-estimation does not occur only in advance of having them. Rather, it typically occurs when they are being experienced, and it is because of the manner in which they are experienced that they continue to be over-estimated. Hence, there is no reason why we should not be able to read the account of mixed pleasures as an argument which aims to establish their falsity along the same lines as those of the earlier arguments.

The question remains as to why Socrates thinks that he has adequately deflated them. Here I believe that part of the answer is given in the criterion of purity, but not in so far as it is taken as a metaphysical criterion, but rather, to the extent that it is meant to reflect facts of experience. Instead of looking to the criterion for the answer, we should look to the arguments that lead to its establishment. Plato has, in detail, shown that the mixed pleasures involve pain. He has shown this by asking his interlocutors to reflect on their experience of the pleasures. Hence, if they are going to accept his claim that these are not worthwhile pleasures, it will more likely be on the basis of how they feel to them, not how they meet an abstract, metaphysical criterion.

In arguing that these pleasures do not feel as good as they may seem, Plato has not only attempted to established that they are deceptive, he also has tried to explain why. The explanation lies in the account of why the pleasures are intense. They are intense because of the dynamism between the pleasure and pain. The longer the pain persists, the greater will be the desire to sate the lack that causes it. Hence, the desire will becoming increasingly intense as long as it is not fully sated. Because it will bring some
pleasure, when, and to the extent that it is satisfied, people might feel the desire as pleasurable, although at the same time it feels painful. When the pleasure predominates, even momentarily, they will be apt to call the partially filled desire a pleasure. But, because they feel that the desire is intense, they assume that the pleasure is intense, not recognizing the intensity has its source in the deprivation, not in the pleasure of satisfaction. Also, as it is painful not to sate the desire, once it has been excited, they feel that sating it is the most pleasurable thing to do, not recognizing that its pleasurability is completely relative to their present psychological condition.

Also, another, related point can be drawn out of the account. In the Book IX argument and in the present argument, Plato draws our attention to a desire which issues from a defective state. While in the defective state, and while looking "through the eyes" of the desire, we take a feeling or condition as worthwhile. The implication is that, in the absence of the desire, we would not do so. Hence, if we combine this point with that above, we see that, as the desire becomes more intense, our tendency to prize that which is desired becomes more intense. Hence, we have to impulses driving us to over-value the pleasure; our confusing its intensity with its pleasurability and our finding it more and more desirable and we let our deprivation build.

We can conclude, then, that the account of mixed pleasures, like the earlier accounts of the various false pleasures, is aimed at establishing that they have an illusory character and that they can only gain a following through deception. When this deception is exposed, one sees that they really are disturbing and painful experiences, though they are thought to be pleasant because they involve the satisfaction of intense desires. This helps us understand the role of the criterion of purity. It is not meant to constitute a metaphysical ground upon which to measure the mixed pleasures. Rather, it is meant to bring out the problem with the pleasures as it is found in the experience of
them. Such a deficiency is detectable by anyone who cares to pay attention to the pleasures, like, for example, Cephalus, and not only the metaphysician.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUDING REMARKS

After a detailed examination of the arguments for false pleasures, a more unified picture of their relations emerges. As briefly mentioned earlier (26, 148), commentators have believed that the various false pleasures fell into two, distinct categories. On the one hand, there were pleasures the putative falsity of which could be understood in representational terms. Such were the pleasures of anticipation and over-estimation. For both, the notion of falsity applicable was the same as that for belief or pictures; i.e., failure to represent reality. On the other hand, the pleasures of the neutral state and the mixed pleasures were thought to be false because they were not genuine. The latter, by being mixed with pain, failed to be unqualifiedly pleasures. The former were not pleasures at all. Hence, they were false in the sense that they were not real pleasures.

It thus seemed as if Plato had strung together a hodgepodge of arguments under the ambiguous rubric of false pleasure. While this might not undermine any particular argument standing alone, it certainly cast doubt upon the intelligibility of Plato's general

1. The case of the neutral state is problematic. Gosling and Taylor treat it as an (alleged) unreal pleasure, though Hackforth is less clear on this question. He points out that such a pleasure cannot logically be called false, but suggests that:

"Plato does not care about this sort of objection; he is concerned to analyze the different kinds of falsity or unreality that attach to anything that men call, rightly or wrongly, pleasure and pain."
(Hackforth, 1958, 82)

It is hard to judge on the basis of this passage whether Hackforth is in agreement with Gosling or Taylor, or whether he thinks that the only thing false is the belief that the neutral state is a pleasure, by virtue of which belief the pleasure is to be loosely called false.
project of connecting pleasure with falsity, if only because it would make it seem that Plato was really unsure of what this connection amounted to.²

In contrast, my analysis shows that Plato does operate with a unified and coherent conception of falsity of which the representational and authenticity models are mutually complimentary parts. All the false pleasures are illusory, appearing to be what they are not. There is a gap between perception or belief on the one hand, and reality on the other and it is ignorance of this gap which makes the pleasure attractive to its proponents. Let us look at each false pleasure, taking the last first.

The falsity of the mixed false pleasures was thought to consist in their being qualified or not genuine. They were not fully real pleasures because they were mixed with pain. But this, it was supposed, had nothing to do with false belief, nor was Plato concerned to find a false representation in the pleasure as a constituent. On my analysis, however, this is not true. I argued that Plato's concern was to show how carnal pleasures appear to be the most pleasurable, when if fact they are not. He was concerned to explain an illusion, one that was part of having the experience, and not just impugn the pleasure on the ground that it was impure. He saw the pleasure as false, not simply because it was not genuine or pure, but because it had the power to appear so. Hence, a strong connection was found between the epistemic and metaphysical issues and it was on the basis of this connection that Plato applied the concept of falsity.

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² To quote Gosling:

"It seems impossible to acquit Plato of the charge of rank equivocation. Briefly, the difficulty is that sometimes (e.g., 37 seq.) 'true' and 'false' seem to operate as with belief, so that falsity of pleasures carries no suggestion that the pleasure is not genuine. At other times (e.g. 52d seq.) calling pleasures false (not true) is tantamount to questioning whether they really are pleasures." (1975, 212)
The false pleasures of the neutral state bear a similar analysis. They clearly are
not genuine pleasures because they are not pleasures at all. But they are introduced as a
third false pleasure, following and being grouped with the false pleasures of anticipation
and over-estimation. This gives them something of a transitional status. But this should
not be a surprise. They bore a resemblance to the earlier false pleasures in that their
experience as "pleasures" was based in false belief. They appeared pleasurable to
persons ignorant of the nature of pleasure, and were valued for that reason. In Book IX, a
more extensive account was given of how they could appear to be pleasures when they
clearly were not. Hence, both accounts were concerned to establish and explain an
illusion, and not just document that a pleasure was unreal. They explained the illusory
experience of that pseudo pleasure.

Of course, in the case of false pleasures of anticipation and over-estimation, there
was no question about whether they were connected with false representation in some
way. However, their falsity was supposed to have nothing to do with genuineness or
authenticity. This is what Socrates was supposed to be advertising when he said "the
thing feeling pleasure, whether correctly or incorrectly, never ceases to really feel
pleasure." (37b2-4)

But this is an artificial separation. On anyone's account, their should be a place
for genuineness, namely, in the objects of the pleasures. Since the pleasure is in them, and
they do not exist, the pleasure's falsity is connected with something's being unreal.
Hence, at the very least, one can discern a similar structure in the arguments. In each
case, a pleasure arises in connection with a misrepresentation of a reality, whether that be
a separate thing or itself.

However, on my interpretation, there is an even stronger connection with the
authenticity model of falsity. According to the account, an anticipatory pleasure is not
false simply because it lacks its intentional object. It is false because the pleasure could
not exist or would not be desirable as an experience without that object. Hence, though
one really has a real pleasure when one has a false anticipatory pleasure, it is not clear that it is authentic. Since the intentional object of the pleasure defines it, the absence of that object must have some bearing on the pleasure's authenticity. Thus, in concluding the argument for false anticipatory pleasures, Socrates remarks that they are "imitations or caricatures" ('memimemenai' and 'geloiotera') of true pleasures. (40C4-7)

Finally, the false pleasures of over-estimation can also be criticized in terms of their authenticity, but for different reasons from those that pertained to the anticipatory pleasures. On my account, their misrepresentation of the size of future pleasures and pains consisted in the way these were desired. When they were desired or feared more than they deserved to be, the pleasure or pain, respectively, was over-estimated. However, if we assume that the function of desire is to desire the right things and to desire them in the proportion in which they ought to be desired, then these misdirected desires would stray from their proper function. They would not be unreal, but they would be imperfect. Hence, even in this case, Plato can be seen to be pursuing both kinds of falsity in tandem.

The dissertation also shows the large extent to which desire plays a role in Plato's account of pleasure. In Chapters 5 and 6, it was argued that Plato conflated physical lacks and deprivations with unfulfilled desires. As pain consisted in or resulted from the awareness of such lacks, and pleasure in the process of their correction, so also did pain and pleasure arise from unfulfilled desires and their satisfaction. In light of this conflation, the depletion/restoration model of pleasure had to be seen as an account of psychological pleasures as well as bodily pleasures.

Instead of regarding this conflation as a logical slip, it was used to help interpret the argument for the falsity of mixed pleasure and the argument against physical pleasures in the *Republic*. In the *Philebus*, the extension of the model was used to explain the intensity of mixed pleasures and the place of these pleasures in the life of the
profligate. As the intensity of a pleasure, its greatness, was often mistaken for its quality as a pleasure, Plato's explanation of the illusory character of these pleasures was seen to depend upon this extension.

In the Republic, we saw that it was not so much the reality of bodily pleasures such as eating and drinking that was under attack, as it was the reality of the pleasures of the profligate, which, though they were partly constituted by bodily sensations, were also states of enjoyment resulting from the satisfaction of excessive, perdurable desires for physical pleasure. Hence, it was possible to get a better idea about how the stability of forms could conduce to the stability and purity of the pleasures of the intellect. The stable and satisfiable desires of the philosopher formed a link.

In chapter 3 desire played a prominent role in Plato's account of the false pleasures of over-estimation. Since the "perceived size" of the anticipated pleasure or pain was understood in terms of its being desired, the over-estimations turned out to be misdirected desires; cases of desiring something too much or too little. Hence, the interplay in this argument between pleasure and desire was in full force.

Even in the account of pleasures of anticipation we see that desire is part of the story. As Plato emphasizes, the anticipatory pleasures are produced by the soul alone. Presumably, this should rule out the use of the depletion/restoration model in explaining them. Still, it is clear from the account and examples given, that the pleasure is caused by or constituted by the desire for some state of affairs, usually in the future, and the belief that it is the case or will be the case. Hence, the enjoyment springs from the satisfaction of a desire, which, in the case in which the belief is false, can be thought of as false satisfaction. This, in turn, makes it a false pleasure. Hence, appealing to desire is crucial in explaining both the anticipatory pleasure and its falsity.

This close connection between desire and pleasure brings to light the basis of Plato's evaluation of the various pleasures. Since, on the general theory, pleasures consisted in the awareness of processes of restoration, the quality of the pleasure
depended upon the quality of the restoration. Hence, in extending the model to include desires, a method of evaluating a whole new range of pleasure emerges. Assessing the pleasurable feeling of such a feeling is identified with or closely allied to assessing its quality as a satisfaction.

This point is most clear in the argument of Book IX. Plato explicitly identifies the reality of a pleasure with the reality of the process of satisfaction. The same point is implicit in the account of mixed pleasures, where a partial process of restoration is responsible for simultaneous feelings of pleasure and distress. As was observed in chapter 6, much of the distress is to be accounted for by reference to an unfulfilled, impatient desire. Hence, as much of the pleasurable feeling should be found to derive from its partial satisfaction. The portrait of this half satisfied, half unsatisfied desire was as much a picture of the pleasure itself.

As hinted above, the evaluation of a desire is at the heart of the critique of false anticipatory pleasures. The anatomy of such a pleasure, consisting of a desire and the belief that it is being filled, gives us a pleasure which consists in the satisfying of our wishes or desires. The problem is not that a partial satisfaction produces a partial, mixed pleasure. Rather, the nature of the satisfaction is such that it depends upon how the world is. Lacking its proper objects, the satisfaction must be seen as defunct.

Likewise, the pleasures of over-estimation, being excessive desires in relation to their objects, will be evaluated with reference to desire; indeed, as desires. Being pleasurable, but excessive desires, they cannot be faulted for not feeling good. Rather, they are criticized because their objects do not merit the proportions which they take on.

Perhaps the most important general point that we can draw from the particular interpretations of the false pleasure arguments concerns their bearing on the central issue of contention in the dialogue, namely, the problem of hedonism. So far, commentators have not credited them with having much affect on the plausibility of hedonism as a
philosophical view. They hold that, at best, the various arguments whittle away at it, showing that fewer pleasures than expected would be sanctioned by a hedonist. But the more abstract question whether pleasure is the criterion of value and the ultimate ground for rational choice is left undamaged.3

One reason for this view is that it is easy to see this stretch of arguments as meant to discredit a form of life typically associated with the philosophical position of hedonism, but not the inevitable consequence of it. This is the life of the Sybarite, the person who pursues the carnal and worldly pleasures of drink, sex, riotous parties, and so on. Since certain intellectually minded Sybarites would likely have cast a defense of their lives in the terms of philosophical hedonism, an attack on them in particular would not seem out of place. Contented with finding what surely is much of the purport of the drift of these arguments, one is not disposed to seek any further ramifications.

Another reason is that it seems that Plato has taken care of hedonism earlier on. First, we have his four categories argument in which intelligence (nous), as the source of goodness in the world, is placed a couple of rungs above pleasure, with the good being the combination of limit and the unlimited which intelligence effects.

Second, there is the concession extracted from Protarchus at -- that pleasures constitute a diversity of feelings, unified by a shared genus. This thesis is thought to have the effect of making hedonism an unusable criterion of choice and a formless, elusive doctrine to defend. If pushed to its extremes, it raises suspicions about the unity

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3. For example, Gosling and Taylor see the real assault on pleasure as resulting from its inability to support the use of the hedonic calculus and from its passive role as a kind of raw material that intelligence uses in its construction of a well lived life. They see the false pleasure arguments as simply bolstering Plato's pessimism about the importance of pleasure to a rational agent. (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 133)
of the genus, thus casting doubt on the intelligibility of arguing for the supremacy of pleasure as such.  

Nonetheless, the connection between desire and pleasure discussed above offers the promise of a direct attack of hedonism. To begin with, we have the false anticipatory pleasures. The establishment of such a pleasure proceeds through a painstaking analysis of the relation of belief and feeling. First and foremost, the analysis shows that a certain kind of pleasure can be in things; i.e., that it can have intentional objects. This class is by no means small, encompassing all the emotions which we are inclined to think of as pleasurable.

By showing that a pleasure can be in something, Plato brings to light its dependence on something of antecedent value. It is only because we desire that a certain state of affairs obtain that we are pleased by or take joy in its coming about. Unless we already valued that state of affairs, there would be no pleasure in the knowledge that it existed. Hence, anyone who cites such pleasures as an example of the pre-eminent value of pleasure would have to admit that they constitute a counter example to his or her claim.

Interestingly, this point seems to have been carefully hidden by Plato in the course of the argument. He draws attention away from it (whether deliberately is hard to say) by making the anticipated object in both cases a future pleasure. In the first case, it is the pleasure of eating to satisfy hunger. In the second, it is the reception of a fortune in gold and all the pleasures that would follow. Still, he remarks that we are filled with hopes and makes the general point that pleasure can fail to be properly connected with realities. Hence, it is up to the reader to draw the requisite conclusions.

A similar consequence for hedonism can be drawn from the analysis of Plato's treatment of the unreal pleasures of Book IX and the mixed pleasures of the Philebus. As

4. In his book, The Case for Hedonism, Gosling sees this point, articulated by Ryle, as the fundamental reason behind hedonism's fall from grace among contemporary philosophers.
noted above, in so far as these were psychological pleasures, like joy, they resulted from or consisted in the satisfaction of desires. This cleared the way for an assessment of such pleasure in terms of the quality of the satisfaction of the associated desire. In Book IX, for example, carnal pleasures were criticized on the grounds that they sprang from lacks the satisfaction of which was inferior to that of the intellectual pleasures. The mixed pleasures of the *Philebus* suffered a similar fate. As incomplete or partial satisfactions of deprivations and desires, Plato found it plausible to argue that they could not be desirable as experiences.

We can go a step beyond this, however. As in the case of anticipatory pleasures, we see that attaining the goal of a desire brings about a state of joy or elation in a person. Hence, that which is desired must already have value for the agent. The structure of the psychological pleasures requires the existence of antecedent values upon which they depend.

Again, the full significance of this is somewhat obscured by Plato's choice of examples of the objects of desire. The profligates of the *Philebus* and the worldly folk of Book IX harbor intense desires for the sybaritic pleasures. Still, in the *Philebus*, these pleasures are contrasted with intellectual and moral pleasures. The same is true in the account of Book IX, with the addition that the honor lover's pleasures are also to be borne in mind. Hence, on the account of Chapters 5 and 6, we have pleasures which consist in states of enjoyment, which in turn consist in the satisfaction of certain desires. These pleasures, at least, presuppose antecedently valued objects, the value of which cannot be accounted for in terms of pleasure. The reason is that, the only pleasures they yield are of the sort that must derive from their being valued.

That this is a point Plato wants his readers to pick up is made clear by the argument which ends the part of the dialogue dedicated to examining pleasure. After giving an account of true pleasures (a subject not falling within the scope of the dissertation), he launches an attack on ethical hedonism. The argument is that pleasure
cannot be good because it is (or comes from) a process of generation. Only the ends of such processes can be rightly called good. Hence, pleasure falls away as a mere means (or something associated with a means as an epiphenomenon)\(^5\) to an end, but not an end in itself. Not being an end, it cannot be a good, least of all, the good.\(^6\)

The argument seems to be about bodily pleasures, since it takes about generations (genesis) and their end states (ousia). We can speculate about why this is so,\(^7\) but the important point is that Plato recognized the goal directedness of even physical pleasures, according value to the ends only. It is reasonable to suppose that he was aware that his analyses of pleasure had brought to light their goal directedness. Hence, we can see him as summing up this point in the strongest terms in the concluding remarks of the argument.

Is it not absurd to say that there is nothing good in the body or many other things, but only in the soul, and that in the soul, the only good is pleasure, and that courage and self-restraint and understanding and all the other good things of the soul are nothing of the sort; and beyond all this to be obliged to say that he who is not feeling pleasure, and is feeling pain, is bad when he feels pain, though he be the best of men, and that he who feels pleasure is, when he feels pleasure, the more excellent in virtue the greater pleasure he feels.

All that needs to be noted is that these remarks are made in the context in which such qualities of the soul were the greatest source of pleasure precisely because they could satisfy their associated desires better than other pleasures could satisfy theirs. As this implied that the intellectual and moral pleasures presupposed things of independent

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5. Treated as an epiphenomenon, or state of the soul arising from the process, the argument looses much of its force.
6. This argument is not new. It was also put forth in the Gorgias:

Do some of these produce health in the body, or strength, or some other bodily excellence, and are these pleasures good, while those that produce the opposites of these things are bad? (499d7-10)

7. It may be that he thought the analogous conclusion was clear enough in the case of the psychological pleasures.
value, Plato would expect his readers to agree with the comments above that knowledge and virtue, not pleasure, were the good for humans.
WORKS CONSULTED


