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Party integration: Toward a theory of U.S. political parties

Trish, Barbara Ann, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1992
PARTY INTEGRATION:
TOWARD A THEORY OF U.S. POLITICAL PARTIES

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Barbara Ann Trish, B.A.

* * * *

The Ohio State University
1992

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1992
To My Mother, Sylvia Trish
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When I initially began this research, I was faced with two observations about electoral politics in the U.S. First was the fact that politics is now largely candidate-centered. Not only do scholarly works point to this, but even the most basic examinations of politics show this as well. The second observation is that party organizations are alive and well. By some accounts they are even stronger now than they were in the recent past.

At first these observations struck me as somewhat paradoxical. If candidates control their own fates, then why don’t the party organizations simply slip away? Likewise, how is it that candidate-run campaigns continue to hold their own when party organizations are vital? The solution to the paradox is simple. It lies in the fact that party politics is not a zero-sum game. Clearly candidates and the formal party organizations do not each prosper at the expense of the other. But this says nothing about how they coexist.

With this in mind, my research was initially intended to be a broad study of political parties, with an emphasis
on the formal party organizations and the campaigns. With time, however, it evolved into one with a narrow and intensive focus on party integration. The first chapter depicts this transformation as it moves from a general discussion of the approaches to parties found in political science to a more refined focus on my own approach and research. The remainder of the dissertation converges on the topic of party integration.
CHAPTER I

SIX IMAGES OF POLITICAL PARTIES

There is a large and diverse body of literature in the area of political parties. Contemporary works alone run the gamut from the largely descriptive studies of party organizational structures to sophisticated mathematical analyses of the rational choice school. In each of these there is, either manifest or latent, a conceptualization or image of the political party. This chapter emphasizes these conceptualizations because they lay the groundwork for my own research. However, I find that these images do little to aid, and possibly even limit, investigation of the questions that guide my research on political parties.

The issue of party conceptualization gets thin treatment in political science. A monograph by Frank Sorauf (1964), devoted largely to it is infrequently cited in the literature. Likewise, Neil A. McDonald, who Austin Ranney credits with "[the] most comprehensive analysis of modern concepts of party (Ranney 1968 p. 147)" has been forgotten. Ranney notes that but four of the eleven
principal studies of U.S. parties published between 1957 and 1966 even cite the book.

Even though little attention has been given to party conceptualization, the literature of political parties does display an interesting pattern. A large portion of the scholarship can be subsumed under a relatively simple organizational structure. This consists of what I consider to be three pure and three hybrid conceptualizations of political parties. I use this pure and hybrid classification scheme as an organizing device. The words of Charles Jones capture my intent. He notes that classification is a way of ordering a universe of discourse with a set of concepts so as to state one's own best understanding of that subject matter and to be able to communicate with others about it (1984 p. 53).

Organizing this chapter around the six-fold classification of party conceptualizations allows me to order scholarship on parties in a manner that is functional for my own research and, as a byproduct, to review the literature. Some of the works described may not on face value fit into a given category. At the same time they do reveal latent connections to given conceptual approaches.

In examining the six images of the party and the literature in this light, I will point to the merits of each conceptualization. I will also place my own work
within this larger context of past scholarship on political parties.

Conceptual Approaches to Political Parties

In the scholarship on political parties I find two types of conceptual approaches: pure and hybrid. The first type of approach is pure because, in the mathematical sense of the word, the images in it constitute components of the combination approaches. The literature has advanced three distinct approaches to parties that I categorize as pure. The political party has been variously conceived of as: 1) a readily identifiable structure, largely dictated by formal, institutional arrangements and even legal stipulations; 2) an amorphous body that seeks to fill a variety of functions for the polity; and 3) a social organization or an organic system operating within the larger environment of politics.

Each of the hybrid approaches reflects combinations of the pure conceptualizations. These are hybrids only insofar as they appear to meld each of the three pairs of the pure. While there is this connection, I have no reason to believe that those I credit with advancing the hybrids consciously or subconsciously drew from the pure approaches. In fact, it would be inappropriate to project the logic that underlies my classification onto the scholars who happen to fit into it. With this in mind, the
following describes each of the three hybrid classifications.

The political party is seen in the hybrid approaches as: 1) a tripartite structure with constituent components that constitute the whole of the party yet are analytically distinct; 2) a social structure reflecting the functional needs of the polity; and 3) a social organization, itself structured by the formal and legal dictates of the electoral environment.

In this chapter I will describe each of these six images of the political party, with particular attention to the progression from the pure to the hybrid approaches. I will then examine each in more detail by drawing from selected examples in the body of literature. My goal is not to provide an exhaustive review of the research on parties. Rather, I have selected those works that are representative of each approach, but among these are included many of the better known scholarly contributions. The discussion of these works stresses their conceptual dimension. As a consequence, I consider substantive issues only as they illustrate and relate to party conceptualizations.
Structural Parties

The approach that I label structural envisions political parties as distinct structures, themselves with readily defined components. Of all of the approaches, this one evokes an image of the party that can be easily diagramed. The structure is the result of either formal arrangements and institutions in the political and social world or legal specifications. These would include legislative institutions, and constitutional and legal codes. Conceiving of parties as such is characteristic of some of the very early scholarly works on parties. But the approach, having been particularly widespread in the first half of the century, has only recently reappeared in unadulterated form in the scholarship of one prominent political scientist.

The seminal two volume set on political parties in the U.S. and England by Ostrogorski, originally published in 1902, projects a largely structural commitment to parties. On one level Ostrogorski is mostly descriptive in documenting party structures and processes therein. Of U.S. parties, the author identifies the three essential organs: the primary assembly of members, the committee of the party, and the conventions of the delegates. More generally, however, he isolates the structural attributes of mass democratic parties. To the extent that Ostrogorski focuses on the precise structural arrangements of the
party, he is pursuing a structural conceptualization of parties.

Seymour Martin Lipset, as editor of the abridged *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, credits Ostrogorski with initiating this framework that approaches parties in light of their organizational structure (Ostrogorski 1964 p. 115). But if Ostrogorski proved pathbreaking, Maurice Duverger provides the textbook example of structuralism.

The oft-cited *Political Parties* by Duverger proceeds inductively from 19th century U.S. and European political parties to arrive at what is largely a structural theory of political parties. It is structural in the sense that Duverger identifies the variation in internal and external arrangements across different types of parties. For example, in the bureaucratic party cadres or agents serve as local elites, while local politicians fill the same role in the coalitional party. I, however, am particularly interested in Duverger’s isolation of the "basic" element of the party, that unit from which the entire party springs.

The basic element in the case of U.S. parties is the "caucus." It is a small group of notables and its expanse corresponds to the chief electoral divisions of the political system. Duverger’s observation was that the county or municipality, given its centrality to U.S.
politics when he was writing, would be the electoral division in question. As such, Duverger's parties are marked explicitly by the electoral realm.

Providing a contemporary twist to structuralism, Leon Epstein emphasizes the impact of statute and constitutional law on parties. Epstein's *Political Parties in the American Mold* (1986) is a comprehensive treatment of U.S. parties. Throughout the book, Epstein provides an excellent review of research on political parties. But in addition to this he introduces a new notion of "parties as public utilities"; U.S. parties are treated as quasi-governmental agencies. In emphasizing the truly distinctive nature of U.S. parties, *Political Parties in the American Mold* depicts the regulatory quality of statutory law as well as judicial decisions in relation to parties. These impinge markedly on party structures and processes, dictating the unique placement of parties in the U.S. political system compared to other systems.²

Functional Parties

In contrast to the tangible image of the party that the structuralists offer, functionalism sees the party as an amorphous entity, but one that performs a variety of social and political functions. This prevails in much of the text-book coverage of political parties, though it is based in scholarship. I will note at the outset, however,
that this is not precisely the same functionalism that is found in sociology.

Sociology advanced "functional analysis", operating under the assumption that the activities performed by the social configurations satisfy social needs. One of sociology's preeminent scholars, Robert K. Merton, placed the origin of this treatment in the biological sciences. He writes that the term function is understood to refer to the "vital or organic processes considered in the respects in which they contribute to the maintenance and growth of the organism (Merton 1949 p. 23) [emphasis added]." This implies that the function is essential to the life of the organism, but to my knowledge functionalism as a conceptual approach to parties makes no such assumption. Functional analysis of political parties did not call for functional requirements, functional equivalents or other components of a true functional analysis. Instead, analysts were content simply to list functions, tasks they thought parties ought to carry out.

As a conceptual approach to parties, functionalism is straightforward. No portrait of the party is necessary beyond the understanding that it performs a number of functions for the polity. Anthony King argued that this sort of functional approach is central in order to truly understand political parties. Even to the neglect of examining parties as parties, political science should
emphasize the functions parties serve in politics (King, 1969).

A wide array of activities have been relegated to political parties in the literature over the years. In the context of analyzing the importance of parties, King reviews those functions that are generally recognized. He lists functions that bear directly on the electorate: structuring the vote, integration and mobilization. Others deal more directly with the operation of the government: leadership recruitment and organizing the government. And finally there are the policy-related functions: policy formation and interest aggregation. King's is a typical list of party functions; still much of the functional approach has been reduced to the relationship of "linkage." Notably, this is found in V.O. Key (1961) who recognized the primary link between public opinion and governmental policies. Although there are many deviations from this model in real politics, "parties are basic institutions for the translation of mass preference into public policy (p. 432)." Still the role of the party in accomplishing this connection is vague.

More recently Kay Lawson ventures beyond the conceptual murkiness of this functional tradition and portrays the party as a "vehicle" or and "agent" through which citizens and government connect with each other (Lawson 1980). In stating this, Lawson introduces a more
precisely defined image of party than does simple functionalism. She extends her conceptualization to include the mechanics by which the linkage relationship is achieved. In this as well, Lawson expands the function of party beyond the traditional and primary link between public opinion and governmental policies, described notably by Key but also by others.

Parties as Social Organizations

The third of the pure conceptualizations is of the party as a social organization. In his major work on U.S. parties published in 1964, Eldersveld envisions the party as a social group, with members populating specified roles and behaving as if they are bounded by an identifiable social unit. I propose that this party is an adaptable social unit.

The approach that presents parties as social organizations uses the vocabulary of sociology to delimit those critical concepts such as goals, power, and communications for examination. This approach does resemble functionalism in emphasizing the importance of the party as a decision-making structure. But the distinguishing characteristic is that a concern with context or the larger system is intrinsically important for functionalism. When dealing with parties as social
organizations, however, one can focus to a large extent on the party in relative isolation.⁴

Eldersveld provides a vivid image of this party in his writing. Contrasting it to the bureaucratic organization, the political party is an arrangement of layers, each with its own structure and function. This social organization is described as a "strataarchy", a unique party arrangement in which there is diffuse party control throughout the entire structure. As with the structural approach, Eldersveld's conceptualization of parties is concerned with structure, but structural identification is only an antecedent of parties as social organizations. The primary focus in this approach is on the relationships within the structure.⁵

Writing much earlier than Eldersveld, Robert Michels advances a similar conceptualization. Although his work predates the language of social organizations, Michels describes the party as just that. When he logically depicts the transition of the party elites from the directed to the directors, Michels employs exactly those concepts articulated by Eldersveld and he is in fact exemplary of parties as social organizations. Michels' analysis leads up to the now famous "iron law of oligarchy", a pathological tendency of socialist parties to pervert the natural relationship between the masses and
their delegates. Treating the party as a social organization, he is completely in line with this approach.

With the foundation established by the pure conceptualizations in place, I will next demonstrate how combinations of these pure approaches form the hybrid conceptualizations. Figure 1 illustrates the basic pattern of this classification scheme. The pure approaches are depicted at the center of the diagram while the hybrids, each an offshoot of two pure approaches, are shaded and depicted at the periphery.

Figure 1

Six Conceptualizations of the Political Party

Tripartite Parties

The approach that has dominated recent scholarship on political parties sees parties as three-sided entities consisting of elements within the electorate, in the governing arrangements and in the party organization. (In
this, the party organization is essentially the formal party apparatus.) The precision of pure structuralism is present yet diluted by this approach. In confining the focus to three areas of the party, tripartite parties do not suggest the amorphous quality of the functionalists' party. Tripartite parties do, however, implicitly invoke functionalism by projecting a governing framework on parties. It is not by accident that the three components comprise the critical elements in any governing relationship: the elected, the governed and an intermediary organization. While only implied in most of the applications, the role of parties in governing is explicit in V.O. Key (1964 pp. 199-210), who displays a tripartite as well as on overtly functional approach in his writing.

Schattschneider (1948) first envisioned the political party as a body composed of the three distinct parts: the party organization, the party in government and the party in the electorate. In the period since 1948, evidence of this approach to political parties is ubiquitous; it has largely dominated the research agenda regarding U.S. parties in political science.

The tripartite scheme has found its way into a diverse lot of scholarship. Most works, however, do not examine the party as a whole but isolate one or two of the parts. In the area of political science that has become known as
voting behavior, for example, there is an inherent emphasis on the party in the electorate. Beginning with The American Voter (1960) and spanning the decades that have followed, voting behavior has embraced parties in the electorate, typically operationalized as self-announced party identification. While specific findings vary across studies, one in particular seems to have redirected the emphasis within the tripartite approach.

The consistent findings of party decline, as seen in partisan ties among the electorate, have driven political science to examine the formal apparatus of the party. With the desire to reconcile lessening partisanship with the maintenance (and even growth) of the party in government, many turned to the formal party apparatus. A number of studies attest to the strength of the formal party. Kayden and Mahe (1985) document the enhanced capacity of the national party entities of the Democratic and Republican parties alongside the demise of the grass-root efforts of the local parties in the 1980s. In reporting research on formal party input in congressional elections, Paul Herrnson (1988) draws conclusions about the changing character of the national party structures and their role in electoral politics. Herrnson is exemplary of a set of works over the last decade that seeks to explain the dynamic character of the formal parties. Some of these extend their consideration to the very emergence of the
parties in the U.S. The explanations provided are remarkably similar: parties respond to environmental changes.

The works that have had a significant guiding impact on the agenda of scholarship on formal party entities are the various efforts of Gibson and his colleagues (1983; 1985) who introduce both a new set of concepts marking the formal party apparatus and explicit operational measures of these. The data set gathered by Gibson et al. from a survey of state and county party officials, known as the Party Transformation Study (PTS), is used by the principal investigators together, separately and in combination with others. An extensive body of research has reported, replicated and supplemented the PTS. All of these emphasize the formal party component of the tripartite image.

In a different way, the party of Anthony Downs also displays the tripartite analytical scheme. Downs defines a party as "a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in duly constituted elections (Downs 1957 p. 25). Taken on face value, Downs is simply defining the party. But I stress the difference between definition, which is simply nominal identification, and conceptualization. Taken in the larger context of his writing, the conceptualization comes through. The party is the formal party or, in other words, the party organization
of the tripartite approach. However in his analysis, Downs explains how the actions of the formal party, in an effort to become the party in government, are contingent upon the party in the electorate. In this, Downs emphasizes the linkage between parties and governing which illustrates the functional component of tripartite parties.

Structural-Functional Parties

The various efforts that can be subsumed under parties as tripartite structures virtually monopolize scholarship on political parties. Compared to this, the second combination approach was abandoned in its infancy. Essentially the "structural-functionalism" of sociology and political sociology, this combination melds together parties as social organizations and functional parties. It is seen perhaps exclusively in Robert Merton's (1949) treatment of urban political machines.11

Structural-functional parties adopt the focus of the approach I label functionalism. Yet they move beyond this in depicting a set of relationships between the party and the electorate. Although I have named this approach structural-functional (to be consistent with the description of Merton in sociology), the structural component is not the same as my structuralism. Rather, it is closer to the party as a social organization in which the political milieu is marked by a set of interacting
components. In the case of Merton, these components are the machine, the elected, and the voters. While his consideration of parties does pull together the telling qualities of these two images, it is at the same time narrow and brief.

Merton examines political parties in a small section of his major treatise in sociology, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (1949). He describes the urban political machine of the first half of the twentieth century as a social structure responding to the functional needs of society. On a substantive level, Merton casts a positive light on municipal parties which were frequently known for their corruption. But conceptually he sees the party as a social organization, intertwined with the voters, providing a functional response to social and governmental deficiencies.

Electoral-Organizational Parties

The third of the combination approaches projects much the same party as does parties as social organizations. The difference is in the extent to which this party is marked by electoral arrangements. This is the tie that I see to the structural approach; the electoral-organizational party is directly affected by electoral structures. Joseph Schlesinger (1965; 1984; 1985) illustrates this conceptualization. He sees the party as
aligned about the array of elective offices in the political system.

In Schlesinger, the party is an organization that is an arrangement of "nuclei". The nucleus is the basic element of the party, and each nucleus is centered about an elective office. The party organization, then, is the collection of nuclei, each of which includes all of the efforts of the various candidates directed toward gaining or maintaining control of elective offices.

Schlesinger's party is especially attractive to me because it captures the distinctive quality of U.S. political parties: they are electorally oriented organizations. But there seems to be no room for the formal party apparatus in this conceptualization. Parties are built around candidate efforts. I see this as a deficiency of Schlesinger. To exclude the formal party organization from a conceptualization of political parties is unnecessarily restrictive. Certainly its involvement may differ from that of the candidate-centered organizations, but that does not negate the presence of the formal party.

My own research works from the foundation laid by Schlesinger but introduces a new idea. Like Schlesinger I see parties as organizations that are built around efforts to capture elective offices. But whereas Schlesinger's political party is void of any formal party component, I
envision both the candidate organizations and the formal party arrangements as key elements in the political party. This is a conceptualization that the next chapter develops. But first I take another look at all six of the party images, emphasizing the virtues of each.

Assessing the Approaches

The value of any conceptualization is in its instrumental worth. Whether the image generates research questions or whether it simply facilitates the examination of research questions, a conceptualization will ideally have analytical potential. With this in mind I have evaluated the six conceptual approaches, remarking about the merits and drawbacks of each and their applications. I consider them in the same order in which they were introduced.

Structural parties, as seen in Duverger and Epstein, rigidly connect the political party to formal and legal stipulations. This extends naturally into an appealing line of inquiry: How does the party relate to the legal and formal dictates of the polity? Or taking it one step further, what effect does the political world have on party structure? These are both crucial questions and the accompanying answers tend to be descriptively rich. Vivid accounts of party structures and arrangements are included in many of the structural works. Duverger, for example,
describes specific cases -- including the U.S. -- in intimate detail while also alluding to the factors that contribute to the structure. Epstein's account is not as descriptively oriented, but he moves further into the realm of explanation by tracking the legal dictates that impinge upon the structure of parties in the U.S.

The availability of data makes the structural approach particularly appealing. With access to documentary evidence in the U.S. and other western democracies, structural research has a distinct advantage over efforts that require more burdensome data generation. Another asset of this approach is in its comparative potential. While dealing with specific cases, Duverger takes his structural party to a level of abstraction that allows comparison across different types of parties. This is not only important for cross-national research, it can also be applied to state and local parties in the U.S. case.

Functional parties are also well suited to comparative analysis. Applying the notion of functional equivalence makes it possible to assess both the role of parties across different political systems and to compare parties with other social structures within a nation and across nations. Two difficulties, however, do stand in the way. First, identifying the functions performed by parties threatens to be biased in favor of the status quo. Merton, in discussing the functional approach in sociology, allays
this concern to some degree by emphasizing that a given arrangement may well be dysfunctional (1949 p. 29). But beyond this, problems associated with operational measures still remain. There are no ready operationalizations of the functions. This, in turn, opens the door for a wide array of operationalizations and data types.

In addition to holding comparative potential, functional parties have advanced the discipline in terms of conceptualization. Although the conceptual scheme of functionalism is loose, its advocates have given conceptualization serious, explicit consideration. The various functions that are proposed posit some relevance for parties and, by extension, give inherent relevance to the research questions. Of course this is subject to the same bias trap mentioned in the previous paragraph; parties tend to be seen as important and beneficial political institutions.

Parties as social organizations move inquiry quite smoothly into the behavioral realm. In doing so, the study of parties adopts the questions and methods of behavioral political science. A major problem, however, in conducting research in this approach is generating systematic information to study. It is difficult to provide evidence that addresses the operational measures provided in organizational analysis. Problems associated with access to individuals, the isolation of the activity of party
organizations and the delicacy of the information required all contribute to this difficulty. Even with these roadblocks the approach that sees parties as social organizations has given political science a vivid and unique conceptualization that lays the foundation for future study.

Tripartite political parties hold intuitive appeal. Narrowing the focus to three party entities, each of which has identifiable elements, simplifies the concept of party. It does not provide what would be called a distinct conceptualization, but it is an inclusive approach. Cotter and Bibby (1986) in fact highlight this comprehensive quality as holding the true potential of the approach. At the same time Joseph Schlesinger remarks that tripartite parties, at least as seen in Key, are potentially "piecemeal" (1984 p. 371).

It seems to me that this piecemeal quality is not as much intrinsic to the approach as it is true of the applications. In fact, the very notion of tripartite parties holds tremendous analytical potential. The relationships among the three party components are certainly valid avenues of inquiry, as is the arrangement of the three into the whole party unit. Largely, however, the studies that I classify into this general camp isolate one of the parts of the party and only peripherally deal with the others.
To some extent much of the deluge of party studies proposing the theme of party reinvigoration does display a comprehensive treatment of tripartite parties. Largely these are studies of the formal party apparatus that consistently employ a stimulus-response logic to the explanations of formal party change. In doing so, they draw in the electorate and party in government as factors affecting formal party changes over time.

As I mentioned earlier, Kayden and Mahe (1985), and Herrnson (1988) are just two examples of the scholarship that explains recent strengthening of formal party capacity by isolating a variety of stimuli. Clearly the longitudinal focus of the research question facilitates this type of explanation. But it is difficult to accept many of the conclusions with confidence in the absence of systematic longitudinal data for support. If political science continues to consider this question, suitable data sources must be compiled.

The strides made by Gibson and his colleagues in developing the Party Transformation Study (PTS) are in a positive direction. This research has developed a set of explicit concepts of party organization and the PTS generates the data to examine these concepts. This line of inquiry is especially focused, possibly to a fault as its interest is almost exclusively the formal apparatus. But this should not be viewed as a shortcoming of the studies
themselves because the authors do not aspire to a comprehensive treatment of tripartite parties. They do, however, fall short of the ideal of inclusiveness that Cotter and Bibby (1986), who are themselves part of the PTS team, attach to the approach.

The remarkable presence of tripartite parties in political science is a stark comparison to structural-functional parties. With the Merton example now more than forty years dated, it is clear that party studies have not gone in this direction. In the abstract, this approach to parties holds tremendous analytical potential. However there is inevitable difficulty in isolating the functions that parties perform. Merton argues that the designation of functions need not be a normative task, but it is still somewhat out-of-step with the spirit of behavioralism. This in fact may have hindered the structural-functional image of parties. In the 1960s structural-functionalism picked up steam in the study of other political subjects, but its inability to isolate the political from the many non-political factors was instrumental in its general demise in political science. It would seem, however, that this would not pose an insurmountable problem looking at a relatively isolated subject -- political parties -- at the outset.

Clearly I am drawn to the electoral-organizational approach. It has intuitive appeal, but more importantly it
holds the greatest potential for responding to the anomaly of active parties and active candidates. This is particularly true with the inclusion of both party and candidate elements under the same party umbrella as I propose. Those conceptualizations that do not distinguish candidate and formal party efforts and those that exclude one or the other do not serve my purposes. Structural and tripartite parties, as well as parties as social organizations fall into this category. In fact, the tripartite parties may actually accentuate the original paradox. Analyses have juxtaposed a decreased role for party in the electorate with a strengthened party apparatus. This same logic suggests that there is also a zero-sum relationship between candidate efforts and the official party.

Likewise neither the functional nor structural-functional parties meets my needs. The functional image does not explicitly draw the official party and candidate into the party. Merton, as the prototype of structural-functional parties includes both, but the candidate is little more than an agent of the formal party.

I see, then, the greatest potential lying in the orientation of Schlesinger. It is somewhat disappointing that Schlesinger's conceptualization has not been tested in light of systematic evidence. I do this implicitly when I
analyze my own conceptualization of parties. This conceptualization is what I develop in the next chapter.
NOTES

1. The term organizational in this description does not capture what I will shortly describe as organizational parties. In this instance, organizational is synonymous with structural. Likewise, Ostrogorski's explanation of the emergence of party machines -- characteristic of a structural-functional approach -- is not what I see as his main contribution.

2. Parties as utilities does carry with it the connotation that the political parties serve a particular function in politics. Even though a fine line divides the classifications within my typology, I see Epstein as clearly structural because he isolates this peculiar quality of U.S. parties, tying it closely to the legal restrictions and governmental structures. The position, for example, that the federal arrangement of the U.S. government is mirrored in the parties comes through clearly in Epstein's recent (1986) and earlier works (1967).

3. Lawson describes four types of party linkages: 1) participation linkages in which parties are agents through which citizens participate in politics; 2) policy linkages involving parties that ensure governmental responsiveness; 3) reward linkages in which parties are conduits for the exchange of political support and rewards; and 4) directive linkages which hold parties as instruments by which government maintains its coercive control of the citizenry (Lawson 1980 pp. 13-14).

4. As I suggested in the first note, the term organization is especially troublesome when examining the literature of political parties. It has two distinct meanings that are frequently, and I argue incorrectly, used interchangeably. The first coincides with Eldersveld's use but the second is synonymous with formal party apparatus. In this chapter I will substitute formal apparatus for organization in the latter case when possible. But I also try to use the same terminology found in the studies I examine.

Beyond language-related difficulties, differences in perceptions may contribute to confusion. Bernard Hennessy, displaying a notion of parties as social organizations that is similar to my own, characterizes Duverger as
organizational. This illustrates that it is possible to arrive at different classifications of the same work. Not necessarily a drawback, I believe it is inevitable given variation in perceptions and emphasis across the discipline.

"While Eldersveld displays parties as social organizational, he demonstrates a functional emphasis in his 1982 volume. In this he describes the way in which he places parties in U.S. politics. The inference that I take from it is that the party is primarily a linkage structure. I do believe, however, that this functional concern is secondary to the foundation he lays in his earlier works (1964; 1971).

Note the similarity between the components identified by Schattschneider and those of Ostrogorski.

See for example Wattenberg (1984) for the "party in decline" thesis.

See also Cotter and Bibby (1980); Crotty (1980); Pomper (1980); Sorauf (1988).

See for example Smith 1988, Frendreis et al. 1984 and Gibson et al. 1983 and 1985 which I report in the following chapter.

I will emphasize that this conceptualization is only latent in Downs.

While Merton's party is the sole example provided for the structural-functional party, my basic description of this conceptualization of party is grounded more in Talcott Parsons (1949) than in Merton. Parsons' explanation of structural-functionalism is better suited to this than is Merton's own functionalism.
CHAPTER II
CONCEPTUALIZATION AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN

Political parties in the U.S. are complex social organizations that cannot be considered in isolation from electoral politics. The conceptual approach that I use to study them is what I have previously referred to as the electoral-organizational approach; it synthesizes components of both structural parties and parties as social organizations. The party is an organization with a variety of components and my critical analytical concern is with the relationship among these components. With this in mind, my conceptualization runs parallel to the approach that sees parties as social organizations. However, the political environment encroaches heavily on the party organization, similar to what is found with structural parties. Among an array of possible electoral factors, it is electoral competition that most significantly structures the party organization.

This chapter describes my conceptual approach to political parties in detail, highlighting the ways in which it resembles Joseph Schlesinger's, a conceptualization that
I use as a model. It also emphasizes the unique contribution that I make. Once done this chapter describes how I move from the conceptual realm to an empirical investigation of parties, and then delineates that empirical plan.

This material lays the foundation for the analysis of party integration contained in Chapter 4 through Chapter 7. There I show that integration varies in a manner that corresponds to party, state, office and county characteristics. On one level these findings support my general conceptualization of parties. These explanatory variables are all ones that have affected many political phenomena. And, as I will explain, the relationship between these and party integration gives me confidence that this theory is useful in explaining politics in the U.S.. The empirical analysis serves a second purpose as well. It points to ways in which I should ultimately refine my conceptualization and measure of party integration.

Party Organization Conceptualized

The party itself is simply an arrangement of party units; each of these units is (at least theoretically) connected to the others. Included in this arrangement are units that represent the formal party organization and those that represent candidate’s organizations. They are
both part of the political party. Figure 2 depicts the general structure of this organization.

![Diagram of Basic Party Organization]

**Figure 2**

**Basic Party Organization**

For the sake of simplicity, I have included only two campaign units in Figure 2. However, in reality there would be as many campaign units within an organization as there are elected offices being contested by the party.

The importance of the electoral system for my political parties is indisputable; I cannot separate parties from electoral politics. The message of V.O. Key emphasizes this same tie. In *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (1964), Key notes the importance of considering parties in the broader context of electoral politics. He writes that parties serve an important role in the governing relationship. They are the means by which "governments are replaced by other rulers preferred by the people (p. 219)." With this role in mind, political
science should avoid the misleading comfort of contemplating a "two sentence definition" of parties. It should take care to appreciate the party's role in the selection of rulers. If Key is correct, to concentrate on parties in an electoral context is not only justifiable, but it also the appropriate strategy.

Amid the backdrop of this electoral focus, I use the term unit to refer to the fundamental component of the party. Each unit is office-driven. There is a difference, however, between candidate and formal party units. Whereas a campaign-unit is oriented towards one elective office, the formal party unit is directed towards many. In terms of vocabulary, I identify the campaign unit by the office it seeks and the party label under which it operates or simply by the name of the candidate. (In a finite time frame the candidate's name implies both an office and party label.) The formal party unit is identified by a Democratic or Republican label combined with the term party. In this, the word party actually represents the more precise phrase formal party. I have chosen to take the risk that accompanies the less-awkward terminology: confusing the formal party unit with the entire party organization. Thus I emphasize that the formal party is only one part of the whole party.

In addition to party and campaign units, the party organization is composed of ties; these are critical
components of this conceptualization. The beginning of this chapter refers to the tie in passing, describing it as a connection between party units. While I specify this relationship later, it is difficult -- and I believe unnecessary -- to delineate the tie in more detail in the absence of a specific empirical focus. The party tie is represented in Figure 2 by the shaded areas that connect two party units.

The tie is visualized in terms of the relationship between two party units, rather than any more concrete image. For while there are many ways to identify for example a campaign unit -- a candidate, a set of people in the campaign organization, a headquarters to name a few -- there is not a singular real-world referent or set of referents for ties. Instead, the tie conveys the basic notion of a link between units. The language used to talk about ties identifies them by the units at each end. For example, a tie between a presidential campaign unit and the Democratic Party would be a Democratic presidential tie.

The similarities between my conceptualization and that proposed by Joseph Schlesinger are obvious. Like mine, Schlesinger's party is ordered around elective offices; and the basic units, or "nuclei" as Schlesinger calls them, are directed towards winning a single elective office. My conceptualization proposes a similar unit: the candidate unit whose primary emphasis is to capture a given office.
However, when I suggest that there is an analytically distinct formal party component to the party organization, I depart from Schlesinger. Mine differs in another way as well. Like Schlesinger's nuclei, both of the units in my conceptualization -- formal party and campaign -- are office driven. However the formal party unit differs from the campaign unit in that it is oriented towards a number of elective offices, whereas the focus of the campaign units is only one office.

Schlesinger's conceptualization of parties is pathbreaking, but mine has much to offer. First, I believe it is critical to include the formal party. To be fair, Schlesinger does consider the formal party, but its role in the party organization is, at best, ambiguous. Consider the following:

To equate the party organization with [the] official apparatus ... is to thrust into a never-never land of dis-organization much if not most of the efforts put into winning office in the United States (Schlesinger 1984 p. 379).

Statements of this nature, combined with an emphasis throughout his writing on the role of the candidate, lead me to the conclusion that Schlesinger does not provide for an explicit placement of the formal party apparatus in his conceptualization.¹

My second contribution is in including a formal party that is directed towards many offices. In recognizing
this, my approach effectively mandates that the party be studied as an organization, rather than as a set of isolated units. To study the campaign unit in isolation from the formal party is meaningless, just as is to consider the formal party in isolation from the campaigns. Here again Schlesinger does recognize the "multi-nuclear" character of the political party. He discusses specific linkages that connect the nuclei, for example the transfer of money and endorsements (1985 p. 1153). Schlesinger also begins to analyze the multi-nuclear relationships in the context of competition within different political environments, but my focus on the relationship between the candidate units and the formal party units is not captured in this. Schlesinger's conceptualization facilitates multi-nuclear analysis; mine mandates it.

Finally, by necessity my conceptualization of parties is more refined than Schlesinger's. Because of the empirical research based on this conceptualization, I am forced to develop it, taking into full consideration real-world political structures. With this in mind, I will note that even though Figure 2 is a sound depiction of the basic way I conceptualize parties, it is grossly simplified in terms of party structures found in reality. A more accurate depiction of parties requires the recognition of the design of parties and campaigns in the U.S. Figure 3 moves in this direction. It presents the conceptual party
that includes the hierarchical arrangements typical of the structures of formal parties and campaigns.

For purposes of illustration, I have included only one campaign unit in Figure 3, but have diagrammed the hierarchy of both that unit and the formal party unit.

Refining the conceptualization as such means that the party contains many more ties than the basic organization displayed in Figure 2. There are ties connecting the party and campaign units at a similar geographic level; these are horizontal ties. Others connect the campaign or party at one level with the campaign or party at another -- vertical ties. Still others, although not depicted in Figure 3, link the party and campaign units at different levels. In light of this complexity, I have presented Table 1 to
summarize the language with which the party organization is described.

Table 1
The Language of Party Organizations

Unit:
- basic component of the party
- candidate- or formal-party directed
  - if candidate-directed, goal is one office;
  - if party-directed, goal is many (all) offices
- geographical distinctions within units
  (e.g., state gubernatorial unit; county gubernatorial unit)

Ties:
- the linkage between units
- characterized by relationships present between units at the same geographic level (horizontal ties) and units at different levels (vertical ties)
- named for units bounding the tie
  (e.g., county presidential-party tie, simplified to county presidential tie)

This language lets me talk clearly about complex party organizations. And it is important to recognize the complex and comprehensive quality of this conceptualization when applied to party organizations in the U.S. Given the proliferation of elective offices, and likewise of campaign units, there is an astounding number of party ties in the conceptual structure. With this complexity in mind, I have chosen to focus on just two of the ties. While this strategy does not capture the party in all of its intricacy, it is sensible.

By emphasizing two party ties, I am able to give a thorough treatment to what is a narrow component of the
party organization. This is a sound first step because it is impossible to understand the party organization without first understanding the party ties. This strategy also has the merits of a heuristic case study, replete with theory-building opportunities, as delineated by Harry Eckstein (1975).

The terminology used by Eckstein to describe heuristic case studies resembles my goals in selecting two party ties out of a complex party structure. Eckstein notes that the heuristic case study, as a component of theory building, seeks out generalizable relations among all cases; it begins, however, with a single case (or for my purposes, two cases). Eventually the researcher refines constructs that she has identified in the first case by the analysis of subsequent cases.

This technique is quite simple in principle. One studies a case in order to arrive at a preliminary theoretical construct. That construct, being based on a single case, is unlikely to constitute more than a clue to a valid general model. One therefore confronts it with another case that may suggest ways of amending and improving the construct to achieve better case interpretation; and this process is continued until the construct seems sufficiently refined to require no other major amendment or at least to warrant testing by large-scale comparative study (Eckstein 1975 p. 104).

Narrowing the focus from the entire party organization to just two cases affords the benefits laid out by Eckstein. As the succeeding chapters will demonstrate, the
dynamics that mark my analysis are similar to those described by Eckstein. Indeed I do seek out and investigate a construct which may (with even further refinement than I undertake in this study) prove to be a building block of a broader theory of parties. This construct is integration. It follows directly from my conceptualization of parties, especially party ties. But my observations of political reality lead me to it as well.

Previously I have established that the substantive issue that drives my research is the puzzling situation of active and vital candidate and party organizations in U.S. politics. Intellectually it is difficult to explain that each can be present without diminishing the role of the other. Again, the scholarship on political parties does not adequately explain this. It is true that campaigns and formal party organizations have distinct structures, however they do not work in isolation. They must at times work with each other. The construct of integration captures this working relationship. Because of my particular interest in integration between the formal party and the campaigns, I have opted to study integration between those two types of units rather than integration between two party or two campaign units. So for both substantive and analytical reasons this study isolates two party ties out of the entire complex party organization,
and it concentrates on the relationship of integration that marks those ties.

Determining an Empirical Focus

My research looks at contemporary party organizations. The political environment of the late 20th century makes integration a timely focus, even though the concept of integration is not time-bound. In fact, the distinction within parties between those activities and structures primarily oriented towards the election of candidates and those directed towards other goals is found in even the earliest scholarship on political parties.

Ostrogorski writing in 1902, for example, described the party structures that had developed by 1800 in the U.S. Congress.

For some time past the Federalist members of Congress, and the Senators in the first place, had been in the habit of holding semi-official meetings, to which the familiar name of caucus was applied, to settle their line of conduct beforehand on the most important questions coming before Congress (1902 p. 13).

This deliberative function of the Federalist caucus stands in contrast to its activity as an electoral device into which it eventually evolved. First operating in secret in 1800 and later publicly, the caucus settled "candidatures." The party ventured into the electoral realm.
The Ostrogorski example points to the early functional differentiation of activities within U.S. parties. (It also illustrates the recognition of this by one of the first scholars to study U.S. parties.) With parties involved in electoral activities, in a few cases the electoral campaigns showed a candidate emphasis. The Whig slogans in the 1840 presidential contest between William Henry Harrison and Martin Van Buren depict this focus. "Tippecanoe and Tyler, Too." "Van, Van, is a used up man." These slogans, in fact, were the legacies of the 1840 campaign (Thomas 1987 p. 22.) It was not until the 20th century, however, that there was candidate control with campaign organizations in place outside of the party machinery. Salmore and Salmore (1989) document this growth.

The change in emphasis had congealed in 1896. Salmore and Salmore (1989) state that the notable Populist and Democratic presidential nominee William Jennings Bryan ran what was essentially "the first candidate-centered campaign (p. 30)." The structural change came in 1934. In the California gubernatorial contest that year, campaign structures developed outside of the control of the formal parties. Upton Sinclair, the Democratic nominee, used his organization End Poverty in California (EPIC) to wage his campaign for governor. The Republican party, whose business constituency was threatened by EPIC's reform
agenda, responded by placing its fate in the hands of the public relations firm of Whitaker and Baxter. Authors Salmore and Salmore note the significance of this 1934 campaign:

It was the first time a neophyte attempted to launch a political career ... with the help of a personal organization and the first time that business interests, usually dependent on party machines, struck back with their own nonparty-based effort.

This set the precedent for the development and involvement of campaign structures external to the formal party organization. But precedent-setting as this case is, it does not adequately foreshadow the separation of the campaign organizations and the formal parties that we see today. 4

The formal separation of the campaign the formal party units today, suggests to me that the present is the appropriate time frame in which to first inquire about the relationship between the formal parties and the campaign organizations. The line that separates the candidates and the formal parties is as clear as it has ever been. And the elections of 1988 provided the ideal opportunity to examine parties at the pinnacle of their activity. Because party activity is driven by the electoral calendar, with the impending November elections, the parties in 1988 were in a state of motion. Even though George Bush and Michael Dukakis were assured nomination well before their
respective conventions, early in the season the presidential nomination race was in fact a contest. Discounting Lyndon Johnson's short-lived candidacy in 1968, it was the first year since 1960 that an incumbent president did not seek or get his party's nomination. Serious Bush and Dukakis efforts marked the fall campaign season. In addition to the presidential race, 33 senate seats were being contested. In February of 1988 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report characterized nine of these thirty-three senate incumbents as either "highly vulnerable" or "vulnerable." With the Democrats holding a slim majority in the Senate and the prospect of a number of competitive races, party activity was intensive.

With this atmosphere in mind, I decided that two party ties in particular would work well as heuristic case studies: 1) horizontal ties between the presidential campaign unit and the formal party, and 2) horizontal ties between the senate campaign unit and the formal party. In many respects, Indiana and Ohio constituted a pair of states ideal for this focus on presidential and senate ties in 1988 because they let me approximate the experimental method.

Methods texts in the study of politics point to the importance of comparison in order to explain social and political phenomena. But comparison is only a substitute for what would be an ideal method of political inquiry:
experimentation. Political phenomena, however, do not lend themselves to the experimental approach typical of the hard sciences. Consequently, political scientists tend to rely on research designs with an explicit comparative component or on comparisons inherent in their analysis (Dogan and Pelassey 1984 pp. 13-14).

This logic of comparison prompted me to study parties in two states, rather than just one state. I selected a state arena -- rather than a national or local -- for three reasons. First, there are formal party structures at the state (and sub-state) level, largely a function of state law and party bylaw. Campaign organizations typically use similar structures. Second, given that the ties in party organizations revolve around each elective office, the array of offices at the state level gives me the luxury of choosing from a variety of party units and ties. Even the national office of the presidency is contested within states. Finally, at the state level, there are ready arenas -- fifty to be precise -- for comparison.

The specific two states that I chose to compare -- Ohio and Indiana -- let me approximate the experimental method because they are alike on many general counts as well as some unique to the 1988 election contests and calendars. These similarities are akin to what is embedded in the classical experimental design: identical experimental and control groups.
Extending this analogy further, the differences between the two states represent, in the language of experimental research, the experimental treatment which distinguishes the experimental group from the control group. In the sense that any variation between the two groups is credited to the experimental treatment, I see the qualities that differentiate Ohio and Indiana as a pool of likely variables to explain variance between the party organizations in the two states.¹

In light of this, Indiana and Ohio are an ideal pair of states for comparison because of the remarkable similarities between the two. First, they are both states with competitive political parties. Jewell and Olson (1988) classify Indiana and Ohio as "competitive two-party" states over the period from 1966 to 1988. This is the ranking that denotes the greatest party competition within states. Updating their data through 1992, I find that both states would still be considered competitive, although gubernatorial competition has been slightly more pronounced in Ohio than Indiana. By the end of 1992, Ohio will have had Democratic control of the governorship for ten of the past twenty-eight years, compared to eight in Indiana. The results are similar regarding partisan control of the U.S. senate delegation from each state, with Ohio being somewhat more competitive than Indiana.
The general competitiveness of the contemporary parties in Indiana and Ohio is typical of the pattern established historically. Fenton, writing in 1966, remarks that the political parties in these two states are competitive and attributes this similarity to parallel patterns of population settlement and traditional job-oriented politics in each (Fenton 1966 pp. 1-5). Indeed the effects of early settlement patterns are seen in later politics. Both Indiana and Ohio provide excellent examples of this permanence.

Comparing parties at different junctures in time, Key and Munger (1959) find that in Indiana there is consistency in party characteristics across relatively long time periods. The authors compare the distribution of the county two-party vote in presidential elections, which they describe as a measure of party strength, between 1868 and 1900. This comparison points to "an astonishing parallelism" across their two data points. "Thirty-six of the state's ninety-two counties were over 50 percent Democratic at both elections; forty-five were under 50 percent Democratic at both elections (p. 283)." The comparison of two elections in a later time frame exhibits the same pattern. Although the consistency is not as pronounced between 1920 and 1948 as it was between 1868 and 1900, county two-party vote is highly correlated in both
elections. The authors credit the crystallization of the sectional and religious origins of the settlers of Indiana.

The situation in Ohio is similar. Thomas Flinn (1960; 1962) finds that settlement patterns prior to the 1850s not only structured the Whig and Democratic vote of their own time, but they also had an impact on party competition well into the future. Writing in the early 1960s, Flinn notes that there had been a marked continuity in the structure of party competition in Ohio through 1960 with very few departures from earlier party patterns.

The major anomaly is Northeastern Ohio which was originally populated by settlers from New England and was considered a Whig area. This section of the state departed from the typical pattern of Whig support congealing behind the Republican party label; now Northeastern Ohio is a Democratic stronghold. Flinn attributes this to the growth of manufacturing in this region and the entrance of a large foreign-born population that allied itself with the Democratic Party. A similar explanation accounts for Democratic strength in the northwestern corner of Indiana, especially Gary and Lake County.

The findings of Key and Munger, taken in conjunction with Fenton's pronouncement of early similarities between Indiana and Ohio, underlay the Jewell and Olson finding that these states are similar today. Contemporary research promotes this as well. The findings of Gibson et al.
(1985) emphasize the strength of the Democratic and Republican county parties in both Ohio and Indiana. The local parties are very strong in Indiana and Ohio and rank exceptionally close in terms of the authors' measure of party organizational strength, which considers organizational structure and programmatic activity. On the Democratic side, the county parties in Indiana are the fifth strongest in the nation; in Ohio they are the seventh. The Republican county parties in Indiana rank third and in Ohio they rank, again, seventh. This shows both similarity in general party strength between the states and similarity between the parties within each state.

Mayhew (1986) also describes comparable party environments in the two states. Ohio and Indiana are similarly marked by "traditional party organizations (TPO)"; they have autonomous and durable parties, instrumental in electoral and nomination politics. Both states have high scores on Mayhew's measure of TPO — Indiana at 5 and Ohio at 4. However Indiana, with its intra-party factionalism, differs from Ohio whose parties have monopolistic power. But this is only a marginal distinction amid general similarity.

In a related vein, Charles Johnson (1976) investigating political culture in the states finds that Indiana and Ohio both have individualistic political
Drawing from Elazar, Johnson highlights the role of the political parties in the individualistic culture. [The] party is held to be important, party regularity is held as an important norm, and gratuitous manipulation of political power is an accepted goal; hence ... interparty competition is high (Johnson 1976 p. 501).

There is a central role for the political party in Ohio and Indiana which both have individualistic cultures. The strength of the formal party organization and competition between parties become critical when considering the usefulness of an analysis based on just two states. Given my focus on party integration between elements of the formal party and the campaigns, selecting Indiana and Ohio means that I look at cases in which I expect party integration to exist if it ever does exit. To the extent that a formal party marked by some minimal degree of strength is necessary for an integrated relationship, I have selected cases that are most likely to display integration.

Harry Eckstein explains this strategy in addition to the heuristic strategy in his discussion of case studies. Focusing on the "most likely" case is a way to invalidate theories. These are "crucial cases" in the sense that they are tailored to the test of a theory. If a theory cannot be validated under even the most favorable circumstances, then it likely does not hold much power. Although my goal is not theory-testing, I apply a similar logic to testing
the usefulness of my conceptualization of political parties. If I do not find insightful results in an analysis of integration in these two states, then I need to reconsider my basic focus on integration and my conceptualization of parties.

Beyond the general similarities in party strength and party competition that I have described, the contests in 1988 as well as the electoral calendar in Indiana and Ohio sustain my selection of those two states. Regarding the presidential race, Ohio and Indiana used similar institutional mechanisms and calendars.

Although there is consistency across all states in the presidential general election, the processes and timing of the presidential nomination vary. And to the extent that presidential general election politics cannot be dissociated from nomination politics, I considered the nomination season in the selection of my states even though my own emphasis is on the presidential general election. With this in mind, the fact that the parties in Indiana and Ohio both use closed primaries to select delegates to the national nominating conventions bolstered my selection of those two states. The 1988 nomination calendar also provided support for a comparison of Ohio and Indiana. Both states held their presidential primaries on the same day -- May 3, 1988. What this means for my research is that the competitive situation within the Democratic and
Republican parties across the two states was not marked by different fields of presidential candidates.'

Recent Republican dominance in the general election also characterizes both states. The pattern established in Ohio and Indiana from 1968 to 1988 is of Republican success. In those six elections, the Republican candidate prevailed in every presidential contest in Indiana and five of the six in Ohio. But focusing on a longer expanse of time, it is clear that there is a slight Democratic edge in Ohio.

The 1988 senate contests in Indiana and Ohio were also similar. In both states, long-standing incumbents defended their seats. Republican Senator Richard G. Lugar of Indiana and Democrat Howard M. Metzenbaum of Ohio had received comparable levels of support in their last senate elections with 54% and 57% of the vote respectively. Neither faced serious primary opponents in 1988; Lugar ran unopposed while Metzenbaum, with 83.5% of the vote, easily defeated his challenger. And in the general election, both incumbents faced challengers who had run unopposed ultimately in the primaries: Jack Wickes in Indiana and George V. Voinovich in Ohio.

A comparison of the senate races, however, also highlights variation. When I was planning my research, it was clear that Metzenbaum’s seat was vulnerable compared to the security of Lugar’s. Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report predicted that the Ohio "faceoff [would] be one of the most hotly contested, close and, probably, bitter elections of 1988 (February 27, 1988 p. 448)." Meanwhile, in Indiana Lugar was "an all-but-certain-bet (p. 415)."

While a basic partisan difference -- a Republican incumbent in Indiana and a Democratic incumbent in Ohio -- distinguished the senate races, there was a striking disparity in the ideological orientation of the incumbent candidates; Metzenbaum's pattern as a liberal and Lugar's as a conservative were equally pronounced. Metzenbaum's 1988 scores from Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the American Conservative Union (ACU) at 80 and 4 respectively contrast with Lugar's ADA score of 10 and ACU score of 88. I believe that the partisan and ideological variation between the incumbent candidates and the difference in the competitive nature of the contests interjected interesting and perhaps instructive variation into the senate cases.

Thus, starting with a general framework that envisioned parties in terms of ties, and selecting cases for analysis based on 1) a general comparative emphasis and 2) a similar case criteria, I selected presidential and senate ties in Indiana and Ohio. Table 2 shows these ties and the constituent units of each.
Table 2
Party Ties and Units

INDIANA TIES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CONSTITUENT PARTY UNITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Democratic</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic       Republican Party</td>
<td>Republican Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican       Democratic Party</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate           Republican Party</td>
<td>Republican Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OHIO TIES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CONSTITUENT PARTY UNITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Democratic</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic       Republican Party</td>
<td>Republican Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican       Democratic Party</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate           Republican Party</td>
<td>Republican Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ties that I have isolated are all horizontal ties at the county level. My decision to focus on the county and not some other geographic level is based on substantive as well as analytical concerns. Substantively, I know that the formal party and the campaigns -- senate and presidential -- tend to have vital county organizations. Even the 1988 Dukakis presidential organization, which purposely organized in states around the major metropolitan areas, had a county structure. So in terms of mere presence of party and campaign structures, the county was an acceptable empirical focus.

On analytical grounds, however, the county is the best of the various choices. Collecting data at the county level lets me, in effect, multiply the number of cases on which my analysis based. Absent a longitudinal analysis, a
focus at the state level, for example, would generate only
eight cases for analysis (i.e., Indiana and Ohio
presidential and senate ties in each of the two parties.)
But in looking at each of the ties at the county level, I
multiply the number of cases in my study by a factor equal
to the number of counties in Indiana (92) and Ohio (88).
Although I can still aggregate to the state level, this
strategy facilitates a county analysis as well.

Data Collection

My data collection strategy was to solicit information
from individuals who could speak in an authoritative,
informed fashion about the party ties, especially the
relationship between the formal party and the campaign. To
do this I administered a mail questionnaire to all of the
county party chairmen in Indiana and Ohio and all of the
local campaign directors for the 1988 presidential and
senate campaigns in those same states.

The data that I report are actually part of a larger
data set that looks at a variety of party ties, including
presidential general election and senate, but also
extending to presidential nomination ties. I mailed a
total of 1001 questionnaires, and after a follow-up mailing
I achieved a response rate of 55%. This response rate
reflects questionnaires completed as I had intended with
information about the formal parties and the campaigns --
presidential general election, senate general election and presidential nomination. It does not include those questionnaires returned but not completed or those clearly completed inappropriately. An example of the questionnaire and cover letter that accompanied it are presented in the Appendix.

The numbers of presidential general election, senate general election and formal party units at the county level represented in the data set is shown in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal Party Units</th>
<th>Presidential Units</th>
<th>Senate Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total N = 429*

*This total does not include presidential nomination units.

Although the questionnaires were sent to individuals, I approached them as informants about either the formal party organization or about the campaigns. I took care to convey that I wanted the respondents to reply from the perspective of the county party or campaign, rather than from their own perspective as activists in party politics. In the questionnaire, however, I included a section that requested personal information about the respondent as an activist in politics. My county level data set is
complemented by information from personal interviews with state party and state campaign leaders in Indiana and Ohio. I interviewed leaders from the presidential nomination, presidential general election and U.S. senate campaigns in 1988. The format of these interviews was semi-structured and they ranged in length from 45 minutes to two and one-half hours. I conducted a total of 28 interviews. In addition to providing background information, these interviews generated information about party ties at the state level and vertical ties between state and local levels. But because my analysis focuses on the horizontal relationship among county ties, I use the state information primarily for understanding the dynamics at the county level. Taken together, the data from the interviews and questionnaires let me characterize and explain an important aspect of the political party.
NOTES

1See for example Schlesinger's brief discussion of party nominations (1985 p. 1153) in which he notes that ambitious politicians can create many different nuclei for the purpose of capturing the party's nomination for one office. Then through the process of nomination the party reduces the efforts to a single nucleus. His choice of the term politician implies that these nuclei are candidate structures.


3Eldersveld who embodies parties as social organizations uses language similar to this. When he advocates examining the party as a social group to determine the way in which it is a unique social collectivity, he suggests the following. "[It] is necessary to develop and test empirical theory about the perspectives and behavior of individuals holding positions at all major levels of the hierarchy, their vertical and horizontal relationships with others in the group, and the meaning of this behavior (Eldersveld 1971 p. 74) [emphasis added]." Because different approaches to parties have used terminology similar to mine but with different meaning, I have taken care to be precise about the vernacular of my conceptualization.

4From campaigns for local offices to campaigns for the presidency, campaign structures are distinct from the formal party organization. Consider for example the structure of the George Bush for President campaign in 1988. At the national level alone it was a large organization; senior staff numbered 25 according to documents distributed by the Republican National Committee (RNC) in June 1988. There was also differentiation among positions in the structure. While many of the individuals serving in the national Bush campaign did have ties to the national party, put bluntly the campaign signed the paychecks. Furthermore, though there were similarities in the structure of the party-led and campaign-led efforts in support of George Bush (e.g., a comparable regional field structure in the Bush campaign and the RNC), the two were distinct entities.
I will emphasize that while I have used the logic of experimental design to select my cases, I do not pursue it overtly in my analysis.

*For Indiana and Ohio, Johnson's classification, which uses discriminant analysis, arrives at the same results as Elazar's original classification of state political culture.

As I have already demonstrated, local parties in Indiana and Ohio are strong. The findings of Gibson et al. (1983) suggest that the state parties are strong as well. Although the authors aggregate their findings to a regional level, state parties in the Midwest (for which both Indiana and Ohio are included in the sample) are generally strong. Through 1960 to 1980 the Republican state parties in the Midwest were consistently strong compared to parties in other regions. And even though their strength declined during the late 1970s, the state Democratic parties were measured to be stronger than Democratic parties in other regions.

Although there are alternative definitions of closed primaries, the one I employ points to the fact that the voter must publicly declare her party affiliation to vote in the primary. This is necessary in both of the states. In addition, on election day voters in both Indiana and Ohio are able to select the party in whose primary they will vote.

Mechanisms for the nomination of candidates also factored into a senate and presidential emphasis rather than one on other offices. In addition to presidential primaries, Ohio uses primaries to select nominees to all state offices. Indiana, however, holds primary elections only for gubernatorial and senate nominations. To avoid contamination of my study by different nomination mechanisms, I confined my study to senate and presidential ties in Indiana and Ohio. While gubernatorial ties would have been an appropriate cross-state comparison, there were no state executive contests in Ohio in 1988.

In some cases, a given individual would respond on one hand as a party chairman, and on the other hand as a campaign leader. That is, one respondent would respond from two or more different perspective.
CHAPTER III

MEASURING INTEGRATION

My research emphasizes the ties within the complex party organization and the relationships that mark these ties. But because there are many different relationships that potentially characterize ties I have decided to hone in on one general relationship as a first step in understanding the ties and the entire party. Integration is the name that I gave to this relationship. An integrated party, recalling the conceptualization presented in the previous chapter, is one in which the separate party units operate as the functional equivalent of a single unit. In the typical case this requires that the formal party and the campaigns have some sort of contact in the course of the association. It also demands a positive working relationship to sustain the combined effort.

Contact and cooperation are both important dimensions of party integration. Each taken separately tells significant information about the relationship between party units. But in conjunction they tell additional information. Assessing contact and cooperation at the same
time lets me consider a wide array of scenarios in which the formal party and campaigns do or do not operate as if they constitute a single unit.

In this chapter I will describe the instrument that I developed to measure integration and then test the instrument and the measurements that it produced.

Some General Considerations

The substantive questions that drive my research as well as pragmatic concerns lead me to a focus on integration, rather than other possible relationships. At the heart of my research is a concern with how the formal party and the campaign units work together, but I am unable to identify in advance specific dimensions of that relationship that are critical in politics and in my analysis. Consequently, I define integration in a manner that is general enough so that it does not require a prior judgment about what is important in the link between party units.

Additional practical concerns prescribe my focus. Studying integration is not subject to some of the traps that might accompany the study of specific relationships. This general quality is important for my own analysis but also in anticipation of extending the analysis to other political offices and geographic areas. I have taken care to identify a relationship that I can reasonably examine
over different party ties (i.e., those associated with different elective offices) and different political environments (i.e., states). It is only with difficulty that I could examine some of the other relevant relationships over these same domains. For instance, a financial relationship such as the transfer of funds from party unit to party unit, is complicated by the fact that there are different regulations regarding campaign finance for senate and presidential efforts. Similarly, a concern with a symbolic relationship such as endorsements, might be affected by differences across states. While it would not be statutory restrictions that affect the relationship, it might well be the political culture and traditions of the state that impede or encourage formal endorsements of one party unit by another.

The difficulty that I anticipated in analyzing party ties with a focus on other specific relationships confirmed my selection of integration as a focus. As a result, the concept and measure of integration are general. They capture to what extent and how well the intraparty units -- the formal party organization and the campaign -- operate together. Future research may lead to more specific aspects of that relationships, but this is the logical first step. Furthermore, I believe that integration, in and of itself, may provide lessons in terms of the functional and dysfunctional arrangements within a party, a
topic that I address in the conclusion of this dissertation.

Measuring Integration

I measure the integrated quality of party ties using an instrument that I constructed from variables that were generated by the mail questionnaire. In the questionnaire administered to informants from the campaigns and the formal parties, I made pointed inquiries about the relationship between the formal party and the campaign, in the context of working towards the election of a specific candidate. I asked about both the extent of contact between the two units and the degree of cooperation that characterized this contact. The prototype of this question was developed by Kessel and Jacoby for their national study of parties and campaigns in 1988. The questions are closed-ended; examples of the questions and the responses
follow. In this case they are of inquiries made of an informant from a county party organization about the relationship with the Bush campaign.

About how much contact would you say your county party organization had or will have with the county Bush campaign? 

A Great Deal
Some
Little
None

How would you describe the cooperation between your county party organization and the county Bush campaign?

Excellent
Good
So-So
Not So Good
Poor
No Contact

The integration measure looks at paired responses to the questions and, on the basis of these, distinguishes three levels of integration: high, medium and low. The ties marked by high integration have extensive contact and typically cooperative exchanges within. Those cases falling into the category of low integration have generally less extensive contact that is not quite as positive.

Figure 4 shows how the answers to the two questions combine to form the foundation of the measure of integration.
The method by which I created this measure starts with the proposition that a fully integrated party would involve ties that work well together. Accordingly, I established a rank order for the combinations of responses based on my own images and expectations of a well integrated party. I then refined the measure using the empirical patterns in the data. This process of refinement relies largely on techniques presented by Lazarsfeld and Barton (1951) and by Rudermacher and Smith (1955) which I explain and illustrate in documenting the creation of the measure.

It is clear given the three categories of integration in my final measure and the arrangement in Figure 4 that I have made a tradeoff. I have sacrificed the advantages of
what might have been a discrete measure with many gradients for the utility of a less discrete measure. It is precisely this utility that underlies the construction of the measure. The twenty-four divisions shown in Figure 4 are too many for my measurement and analytical goals. Furthermore, while the two variables that contribute to the measure -- contact and cooperation -- are ordinal, I could not easily order the twenty-four categories when I combined the two. For example, it was impossible for me to determine whether the combination that pairs a great deal of contact with good cooperation reflected a greater or lesser degree of integration than the combination that pairs some contact and excellent cooperation. I wanted an ordinal measure, and I also wanted a measure that facilitates analysis. With twenty-four categories and working with counties from two states, I would find too few cases falling into any given category to do meaningful analysis based on the original measure. Hence, I reduced the twenty-four categories.

The first step that I followed to do this was "functional reduction." While this strikes me as a commonsense approach, it is documented by Lazarsfeld and Barton (1951). Functional reduction is the initial technique in a process used to "reduce an attribute space" -- to combine specific categories in a typology into larger classes. This first technique eliminates combinations that cannot
occur. Following this, I found that the combinations that pair "A Great Deal" and "Some" contact to the "No Contact" response on the cooperation question are not logically possible. A respondent who combines these is being inconsistent. While this response may be interesting and worthy of further study, it should not be included in the measure. I chose not to eliminate the possibility that a "Little" response on the contact question can be paired with "No Contact" for the cooperation question. Although at some point the debate becomes one of semantics, I pictured a situation in which the respondent perceived a little contact but not enough to assess the cooperative quality of that contact. In a similar vein, I felt strongly that an informant could assess cooperation even if there was no contact or minimal contact. (This refers to most of the cells in rows 3 and 4 of Figure 4.) Afterall, the absence of contact may itself be the result of a cooperative effort.

After the process of functional reduction what remained were the twenty-two individual cells, still comprising an unwieldy measure. I further reduced the twenty-two categories by using the second stage of Lazarsfeld and Barton: "pragmatic reduction." This considers both the research question and, according to the authors, "numerical factors." In other words, I used patterns in the data to help me make decisions. The
following logic describes the pragmatic reduction of my integration measure.

I stated before that I found it impossible to establish a rank to each of the twenty-two cells. I could, however, tell that certain loose groups of cells were more or less integrated than other groups. In doing this, I envisioned ranks of a completely integrated system and a system lacking entirely in integration. With confidence I expected cells in the former category to fall generally in the upper left portion of Figure 4. Likewise, I assumed that those in the latter category would fall in the lower right portion. But beyond those broad strokes, I neither could determine which exact cells would combine nor could I identify gradients in between the extremes. I resolved these questions with the data; consequently the rationale for my measure is both theoretical and empirical.

These data used in the construction of the measure show the responses from the perspective of the county party units. I included only those responses that dealt with the county party's view of its relationships with the presidential campaign unit and the senate campaign unit, both at the local level. The decision about which data to use to construct the measure is an important one, and while I simply note the decision that I made now, later in this chapter I will explain why I use data taken from the perspective of the county party organization.
The technique that I followed to refine the measure based on the empirical patterns in the data is one reported by Rudermacher and Smith (1955). They describe a method to identify a pattern in a contingency table that compares the actual cell values with those expected given the marginal distributions. On the basis of these, one determines what type of "affinity", if any, there is among the combinations of responses that mark each cell. By analyzing affinity across the entire table, one can group certain cells together.

Following the suggestions of Rudermacher and Smith, I determined affinity with the following logic:

When \( a \) is the observed cell value and \( e \) is the expected cell value

affinity is positive (+) if \( a - e > 0 \)
affinity is negative (-) if \( a - e < 0 \) and
affinity is neutral (0) if \( a = e \).

Affinity values are statistically significant if, on the basis of the following formula, the significance level \( s \) is \( >2.5 \):

\[
s = \frac{(a-e)}{\sqrt{e}} > 2.5.
\]

In comparing the expected and observed cell values in this manner, I identified patterns across cells and then ultimately groups of individual cells that go together. The logic of affinity is similar to the Chi-square statistic which also compares observed to expected cell
values. But unlike the Chi-square test which helps determine whether two variables are independent (using the logic of the null hypothesis), affinity tells about the independence (or lack thereof) of categories of two variables. Thus the groupings established by affinity combine cells on the basis of an underlying dimension of statistical independence of categories. Using this to assess the general pattern of the table lets me identify definitive cut-off points for the integration measure. In other words, the data make decisions that I could not make with the broad strokes mentioned earlier.

Figure 5 displays the result of these affinity groupings, with the number presented in each cell representing the ranking of each on an intermediary nine-category integration measure. Each rank subsumes cells that should be grouped together on the basis of their affinity designations and logical considerations.
I gave special attention to the cells in rank nine which represented consistent responses that the party unit had no contact with the campaign unit. The problem with these two cells was that they, in essence, violated the order of cooperation, which is an ordinal variable. In reality I was not sure whether the correct placement on the grid was on the far right or somewhere else along the left-right spectrum of columns. I decided that the placement would more likely be towards the right portion of the grid than the left. This general placement sufficed because when I reduced the measure from nine to three categories, as I will shortly describe, these two cells clearly fell into

---

**Figure 5**

Affinity Rankings in Creation of Integration Measure
one of the categories and not either of the other two. Still, in this respect the visual display of these cells in the grids is imprecise.

To group into the final three-category measure, I combined cells on the basis of the frequency distributions, setting the large group in Rank 1 on its own as high integration, the moderately sized Ranks 2 and 3 together, and the remainder into the low category. What I lost in precision in collapsing from a nine- to a three-category measure, I gained in analytical potential with a reasonable number of cases falling into each of the categories of the measure. Figure 6 shows the final measure. Included in parentheses within the groupings is the number of cases that falls into each.

According to the final measure, high integration has stringent requirements of contact and cooperation. But even with these strong demands, a number of cases fit the criteria. These are party ties in which the formal party and campaign units are in very close contact in an atmosphere conducive to integration. This scenario closely resembles the typical situation of integration that I described earlier in this chapter.

Medium integration subsumes not only the ties that approach but do not yet meet the standards of high integration, it also picks up those cases for which there likely had been an arrangement to divide up the tasks of
the campaign effort. This could either be by tradition or
by some explicit agreement of the formal party and the
campaign to operate independently. The arrangement might
also call for one party unit --- likely the formal party ---
to take a secondary position. In either case, the plan
that results in minimal contact can lead to integration.
It is under this logic that the cells that pair Little and
No Contact with Excellent Cooperation are logically
possible alternatives and reflect some moderate degree of
integration.

The category of low integration contains of number of
combinations that generally indicate a lesser degree of
contact and cooperation. It also includes those cases for
which there is extreme contact that is rather negative. In
this case it is unlikely that contact alone would lead to
true integration. The lack of cooperation functionally
removes any of the structures and opportunities that
extreme contact can provide for a party tie.
Testing the Measure

In constructing the measure of integration I was forced to make a number of choices, and to the extent that the choices affect the measure, they also affect my findings. Because of this, I made decisions with care and followed a well-documented strategy. But I also have concerns regarding the data that I use in my analysis. There are two ways that I can deal with these issues intellectually. First, I might say that the choices and the results are sound if ultimately the measure does a good job of discriminating. What is especially important is discrimination on the basis of the variables that I expect to be important in an analysis of political parties. In
fact, I used logic similar to this in the process of selecting my cases for analysis. Recall that in the previous chapter I noted that the party- and office-related differences inherent in the selection of Indiana and Ohio senate and presidential races in 1988 interjected interesting variation into my analysis. It was that variation that my measure -- using a quasi-experimental logic -- would seek to explain. Indeed, as I will show in the following chapter, my measure does have explanatory power.

A justification of this nature, however, is not sufficient. Therefore, I propose two tests of the measure to confirm my choices. The first test addresses the choice that I made to rely on responses from just one perspective when given the choice of two. The second test addresses the choice that I made to select the formal party perspective, rather than the campaign perspective. The upshot of both of these decisions is that I have opted to use data that are in some senses incomplete in exchange for analytical potential. I will explain this trade-off in the context of data grades in the following section.
Data Grades

As I have already described, the party-based integration measure that I use requires indicators of cooperation and conflict from the perspective of the formal party within each county. Composite county integration, the measure that I rely upon most strongly, is constructed from measures of presidential and senate integration in the county. Both need to be present in order to obtain a composite score of integration for the county. In this sense my measure is demanding; I lose those cases for which only one of the integration measurements -- presidential or senate -- is present. At the same time, the composite measure of county integration does not access all of the available and perhaps relevant integration data in a county. In this sense the measure relies on partial data. But as we will see, the use of partial data is justifiable.

Although I feature the measure from the perspective of the formal party, I am able to construct measures of county party integration, following the same logic that I have documented in the previous section, using each of four different categories of data. These range from the most exacting data demands, where the cases available for analysis are few, to the least challenging demands. I refer to the former as data grade 1, the latter as data grade 4. Each grade has its own unique analytical advantages.
The measure of county party integration based on the most complete data available, data grade 1, requires integration information from as many as three different informants. I asked questions about contact and cooperation to the formal party, the presidential campaign and the senate campaign in each county. Naturally the presence of data from all of these perspectives depends upon the pattern of responses to the questionnaire within a county. When I can calculate an integration score from each of these perspectives in a county, I have the most complete integration data possible. With these data I can determine composite party integration from both the formal party and the campaign perspectives and compare these reciprocal measures of integration within a county.

Data grade 2, with the second most demanding set of data requirements, calls for both party- and campaign-based integration scores for the presidential units or for the senate units. These would allow comparison of either presidential or senate integration from the party and campaign viewpoints. There are no composite integration scores since these requirements do not demand information about both presidential and senate integration. Still, there are reciprocal measures of integration within a county, but only for either the presidential or senate ties. Separating the presidential from the senate units is desirable because it allows an office comparison that the
measure of composite integration -- which combines the two -- does not.

Integration based solely on formal party responses about both the presidential and the senate units is generated by the third most demanding set of requirements, data grade 3. This measure of composite party integration, which is the leading measure in my substantive analysis of Ohio and Indiana, combines indicators of integration within the presidential and the senate ties, both taken from the party perspective. Because data from the campaign perspective need not be present in these data, I do not have reciprocal integration information. The composite county score, however, is attractive because it lets me deal with counties in which presidential and senate integration may be different, allowing characterization of these counties with one score. This same advantage accompanies the measure in data grade 1, but there are few counties that fit its criteria.

Finally, the least restrictive integration analyses use data grade 4 which has party-based integration scores for either the presidential or the senate units. If both are available within a county, then both integration scores are analyzed. But if only one is available, then only that score is taken. Like the analyses available with the second most restrictive data requirements, there is no summary score available for a county, since it does not
require the presence of both presidential and senate integration scores. And similar to data grade 3, reciprocal integration scores are not available for each county. There are in this category, however, a number of cases. This is the primary reason that I use these data to construct the initial measure of party integration.

I have summarized these data requirements and the merits of each grade in Table 4.
### Table 4

Data Grades, Requirements and Merits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>County Data Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **complete** 1 | Needs party-based presidential integration and party-based senate integration and campaign-based presidential integration and campaign-based senate integration  
+ Most complete data  
+ Allows comparison of formal party and campaign perceptions  
+ Permits calculation of county composite integration score  
- Very few cases fit criteria |
| 2 | party-based presidential integration and campaign-based presidential integration or party-based senate integration and campaign-based senate integration  
+ Allows comparison of formal party and campaign perceptions  
+ Readily facilitates office comparisons  
- Few cases fit criteria |
| 3 | party-based presidential integration and party-based senate integration  
+ Permits calculation of county composite integration score  
+ Substantial number of cases fit the criteria  
- Does not readily facilitate office comparison |
| **partial** 4 | party-based presidential integration or party-based senate integration  
+ Many cases fit the criteria  
+ Readily facilitates office comparison  
- Does not permit calculation of county composite integration score |

Advantages indicated by +, disadvantages by −.
Working with the most complete data available is usually an attractive proposition. The first two data grades are especially rich data that, combined, permit a number of different kinds of analyses. However, under the stringent constraints for both of these grades, the cases available for analysis are limited to the extent that I could have very little confidence in my findings. There are simply not enough counties represented. But beyond this, the third and fourth data grades suit my analytical purposes as well as the first two.

My primary analytical goal is to explain county party integration. To do this I need a standard measure of county integration that takes into account both presidential and senate integration. With the third data grade I get precisely this. I also need to analytically separate the presidential from the senate ties and I can accomplish this with the fourth data grade. These two grades suit my purposes perfectly and generate enough cases to draw meaningful conclusions.

The analytical possibilities using the first two data grades intrigue me and, as I will demonstrate later in this chapter, generate provocative questions about perceptions - a possible avenue of future research. But using partial data compensates for the distribution problems found in the more complete data grades. As the first set of tests will reveal, the findings using data grades 3 and 4 are similar
to what an analysis of more complete data -- grades 1 and 2 -- would show. The second set of tests suggests that the findings likely would be consistent had I used a measure working from the campaign perspective rather than the formal party perspective.

Test One: Complete versus Partial Data

I have created my measure of integration using the fourth grade of data. My analysis relies primarily on these data when I consider offices separately and relies on those from the third grade when I examine composite county integration. The composite measurement of county integration combines indicators of presidential and senate integration within a county, both of them from the viewpoint of the formal party. One hundred and seventy-six county cases fit this requirement. County cases from the data grade with the most stringent requirements -- grade 1 -- have composite measures of county integration from the formal party and the campaign perspectives. There are 42 cases that fit this demanding requirement.

The first test of my measure examines the aggregate distributions of the partial data. There are two ways in which I can justify the use of partial data rather than complete data. First, with confidence that the cases taken from partial data are representative of the more complete data, I can expect that the results generated by complete
and partial data would be similar. One limit of the results of this test is that, compared to complete data, there is not a representative quality to the data that I use. But the cases available using partial data are much more evenly distributed across Ohio and Indiana as well as Democratic and Republican settings. This, in fact, is the important reason that I opt for partial data when more complete data are available. It satisfies the second justification: the data are representative of the universe of counties and party units in Indiana and Ohio.

The distributions of the two data grades are displayed in Table 5.

**Table 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Complete Data (Grade 1)</th>
<th>Partial Data (Grade 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
<td><strong>Party</strong></td>
<td><strong>Party</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Dem.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rep.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH</td>
<td>8 (19%)</td>
<td>28 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>6 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Total 101%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table values refer to the number of county cases that fill data grade requirements. Cell percentages are based on total number of cases in the data grade.

With only 42 complete cases in the first data grade, I naturally expect few cases to fall into each cell. Still, it is clearly a problem that there are no Indiana Democratic counties represented in grade 1, the most
complete data grade. With active senate, presidential and county party elements in the Indiana Democratic party in 1988, the Indiana Democrats should have been represented. The reason that they were not lies in the pattern of responses to my questionnaire.

The Indiana Democrats as a group responded adequately to the mail questionnaire. Their rate of response was 49%, only slightly lower than the 55% rate for the entire sample. However, the representation of Dukakis’s campaign at the county level in Indiana was poor. My data include only four Indiana Democratic presidential units.7 The missing data problem associated with a poor representation of Indiana Dukakis campaign is magnified in the first, most complete data grade. Recall that this grade requires integration scores from the presidential campaign, the senate campaign and a composite indication of county integration from the formal party. Systematically removing one of the pieces of information from this already demanding structure means that few counties will have complete data. Conversely, the response rate from Ohio Republicans in all domains -- formal party, presidential campaign and senate campaign -- is strong. A sizeable number of Ohio Republican cases fit the stringent requirements for cases in grade 1. Twenty-eight of the 42 cases with the most exacting data requirements are Ohio Republican counties.
The cases taken from third data grade do not have the same problem. With these data integration is measured from the standpoint of the formal party, so the poor representation of the Indiana Dukakis campaign does not limit the cases available for analysis. In fact, incomplete data more likely represent the true distribution in the universe of cases in Ohio and Indiana political parties. And just as the incomplete data that I use to get a composite measure of county party integration is more representative of political reality than the complete, data grade 4 turns out to be more representative than its complete counterpart, data grade 2.

In order to measure differences across senate and presidential units, I use data from grade 4 which distinguishes integration scores for the two. The composite county integration score can mask variation within a county between senate and presidential integration. Because I do not need to assess composite county integration, my data guidelines are less demanding. I need either a presidential integration score or a senate integration score. Naturally, many more cases fit this criterion than the one for composite county integration. There are 356 cases in this set.

The cases from grade two constitute the relevant comparison group for these 356 cases. Grade two is the more complete because the cases in that grade have
integration readings from the perspectives of both the formal party and the campaign. One hundred and fifty eight cases fall into this category, split equally between senate and presidential units. I present the partisan and state distributions within the two groupings in Table 6.

Table 6
Partisan and State Breakdown of Complete and Partial Data (Data Grades 2 and 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Complete Data (Grade 2)</th>
<th>Partial Data (Grade 4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH</td>
<td>46 (29%)</td>
<td>74 (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>8 (5%)</td>
<td>30 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cell values refer to the number of party cases that fill data grade requirements. Cell percentages are based on total number of cases in the data grade. For the complete data, cases are counties; this is consistent with the information presented in Table 5. But for data grade 4, the cases are party ties rather than counties.

The distribution of cases in grade 2 is similar to that in the most complete grade: there is poor representation of Indiana Democrats. Again, the absence of data from the Indiana Dukakis campaigns affects the cases available for integration analysis. Because the data in grade 2 work with integration from the formal party and campaign viewpoints, a score cannot be calculated without an indicator of integration taken from the Dukakis campaign. While the cases that I use in data grade 4 do not facilitate the comparison of the campaign and the party
perspectives, they are a more evenly distributed collection of cases.

In using partial data that may not be representative of complete data, I have made an implicit choice -- a choice that emphasizes the representative quality of the sample versus the universe, as opposed to the sample versus another sample. As Tables 5 and 6 have shown, the distributions of the partial data do not necessarily represent those of the more complete data.

The partial data, grades 3 and 4, are equally representative of the universe of cases. This is shown in Table 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Percent of Universe Represented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data Grade 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Democratic</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Republican</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana Democratic</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana Republican</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I am unable to calculate comparable figures for data grades 1 and 2 because I have no precise count of the universe of Dukakis county units. With this in mind, I can only provide the most liberal estimate of representation for data grade 2. This estimate places Indiana Democratic ties at twenty-four percent of the universe, well below the
levels for all of the state/party combinations in data
grades 3 and 4. For data grade 1 I cannot estimate, but do
assume that there are at least some Indiana Democratic
cases in the universe. With data grade 1 reflecting none
of these, the complete data are likely unrepresentative of
the universe.¹

While I am comfortable with the decision to work with
the partial data, I do address the issue again in the next
chapter. There I analyze integration using the partial
data, but include references to results using more complete
data. The findings are similar, further confirming my
selection of what might be considered incomplete data.

Test Two: Party-based versus Campaign-based Integration

The next choice that I will address is the use of a
party-based measure of integration rather than a campaign-
based one. The two are compared in the second set of
tests. I have chosen to use a measure of integration based
on responses from representatives of the county parties for
a number of reasons. First, it is essential that I select
a measure based on the observations of either the formal
party or the campaign. Working with one exclusively is
critical, even if I limit the number of cases for which I
have information by not adding data from the other
perspective. Second, I have chosen to base my measure on
the responses from the formal party because of an
underlying supposition of my research question. Implicitly there is a notion that it is the formal party apparatus, as the relatively permanent component of the complex party organization, that can accommodate that presence of active and influential campaign organizations. As it turns out, my data are also most complete at the county party level.

In order to confirm the wisdom of selecting a party-based measure and analysis, I conducted both aggregate and county-level tests. I will briefly describe the results of the aggregate test and then focus on the county level test which is the more stringent of the two. What I find is encouraging. To a large extent integration measured with responses from the formal party is consistent with integration measured from the perspective of the campaigns.

Table 8 presents the results of a test of aggregate consistency in composite party integration. It compares two measures -- one from the campaign and one from the formal party viewpoint -- across all cases. The party-based measurement shown in this table uses data grade 3. The campaign-based measurement uses data with the specification of data grade 3 with one exception. Rather than from the formal party perspective, the data are taken from the campaign perspective.

The situation of few cases available from the campaign viewpoint (N=62) compared to the party perspective (N=176) is due largely to the requirements that are de facto more
demanding for the campaigns than for the formal party organization. Unless an individual serves as an informant for both the senate and presidential campaigns in a county, two different respondents are needed to have complete information from the campaign perspective. On the other hand, one respondent -- typically the county party chairperson -- provides information about integration within both the senate and the presidential ties.

Table 8 shows the similarity between the campaign- and party-based measurements of integration in terms of basic aggregate distributions. According to both, a small majority of cases falls into the category of high integration, while roughly similar percentages of cases across both measurements fall into the medium and low categories.¹⁰

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>Party-based</th>
<th>Campaign-based</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=176)</td>
<td>(n=62)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Composite integration combines integration scores of presidential and senate ties within a county.

These results are important, but the county-level test is more rigorous because aggregate consistency might mask
variation within the counties. To deal with this I have devised a concept of symmetry. This compares the integration measurement that uses the formal party perspective with that from the campaign perspective in the same county. In this regard, a county is symmetric if the formal party and the campaigns have similar perceptions of integration.

Symmetric counties are those with identical measures of integration (e.g., high/high) or ones that pair medium and low readings. This is a liberal coding strategy in so far as it classifies pairs that are close, but not necessarily identical, as symmetric. The foundation for this strategy reverts to the creation of the original integration measure. Of the three categories of integration, I have the greatest confidence in my identification of the high category. (Recall the affinity patterns shown in Figures 5 and 6.) So in accepting close as well as identical matches for medium and low integration, I expose my lesser degree of confidence in identifying the cells that fall into those categories of integration.11

The analysis of symmetry tells the degree to which my measure of party integration is consistent -- on a county by county basis -- with one working from the campaign perspective. If symmetry dominates, I have added confidence that the results would not be vastly different
using the campaign-based measure. Because the requirements for data grade 2 used in this test are stringent, the number of cases is limited. In any event, the pattern that emerges is of symmetry. Table 9 shows that in a full 70% of the county cases on which I base this test, the party- and the campaign-based measurements are consistent.

Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symmetry of Party- and Campaign-based Integration</th>
<th>Symmetric</th>
<th>Asymmetric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential integration</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate integration</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total (155)</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The level of symmetry that the totals indicate are generally supported within partisan and state groupings as well. For the Democratic party, 42 (79%) of 53 counties were symmetric while there were 66 (65%) symmetric out of 102 counties in the Republican party. The pattern is similar across the states where I find that 72% (85) of the 118 Ohio cases are symmetric. In Indiana, 68% (25) of the 37 total cases for which there is data are symmetric. But while the general pattern is one of symmetry, there is a sizable block (30%) of counties that are asymmetric. The issue that I must address, then, is whether there is a
systematic difference between symmetric and asymmetric counties. If there is, then I have to determine if that difference also is related to the level of integration within a county. The way that I proceed in this is to start with that same pool of possible explanatory variables used to structure this general study: party, state, and office.

Previously I have described how my research implicitly betrays my expectations about integration. The design of my research itself suggests that I foresaw the possibility that variation in integration would occur due to state characteristics. I expected that party differences would also account for variation. With this in mind, I have looked at whether the symmetric quality of a county is sensitive to those same variables. Additional characteristics of counties that might affect symmetry are also examined.

On the basis of this analysis I determine whether my results about integration would be systematically different had I taken into consideration both the formal party and campaign perspectives. The question is what, beyond the reality of inconsistent perceptions, distinguishes the symmetric from the asymmetric counties? If there is a systematic difference, then I need to reevaluate my decision to use data only from the party perspective. Although the findings are not conclusive they suggest that
symmetry is not affected by the major factors likely to be associated with variation.

Neither party, state nor office as variables discriminates well on the basis of symmetry. Table 10 shows that the pattern of symmetry and asymmetry exhibited for all counties persists across subgroups as well.

Table 10

Ratio of Symmetric to Asymmetric Counties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Counties:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subgroups:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These ratios are based on totals of 118 Ohio, 37 Indiana, 53 Democratic, 102 Republican, 40 presidential and 95 senate cases.

The ratios are consistent, in order the of 2:1, across the categories of party, state and office. Working with few cases, I interpret these results cautiously. Still there appears to be no pronounced pattern that indicates that symmetry is related to these variables. Likewise, my examination of demographic factors -- including county population, region, and urban/rural designation -- points to no systematic difference between the symmetric and the asymmetric groups.
There may of course be other explanations. One likely candidate is variation among informants. This may explain why two individuals, when describing the same reality, perceive things differently. My cursory review of the evidence does suggest that characteristics of individuals who act as informants may affect their perceptions of intra-party relationships. For my purposes here, however, removing state, party, office, and county demographic characteristics from the pool of explanatory variables suffices. It confirms my selection of a party-based measure when I might have used information from the campaign-perspective as well.

The series of tests that I have described in this chapter gives me confidence in the measure and measurements of party integration. In the next two chapters, I will present the results of my examination of integration in Ohio and Indiana. These findings also support the method that I used to create the measure of party integration.
NOTES

1 Including "had or will have" in the wording of the question was necessary given the time frame over which the questionnaires were administered in the initial and follow-up mailings. This period was from October 1988 to February 1989. Different versions of these questions were presented to informants based on their particular party or campaign affiliation.

2 At this point I will emphasize that this has no necessary bearing on the success of the tie or on the functional quality of the tie for the entire party organization.

3 By including the "None" category in the cooperation variable I jeopardized its own ordinal status. I am sensitive to this and, as explained shortly, took the unique quality of this category into consideration when constructing the final measure.

4 As it turns out, no cases used in constructing the measure fell into either of these two cells.

5 The following example is of the calculation of affinity, corresponding to the instructions included in the text, for the upper left cell of Figure 4. The number of cases in that cell -- the observed cell value (a) -- is 172. The corresponding row (r) and column (c) marginals are 206 and 198 respectively. I work with a total (t) of 356 cases. These determine the expected cell value (e). On the basis of these values, I calculate a positive affinity score for the cell in question.
The expected cell value is 114.6:

\[ e = \frac{(rc)}{t} = \frac{(206 \times 198)}{356} = 114.6 \]

Affinity \((a-e)\) then is positive (i.e., \(> 0\)):

\[ a-e = 172 - 114.6 = 57.4 \]

And the affinity value is significant (i.e., \(s > 2.5\)):

\[ s = \frac{(a-e)}{\sqrt{e}} \]

\[ = \frac{(172 - 114.6)}{\sqrt{114.6}} \]

\[ = \frac{57.4}{10.71} \]

\[ = 5.4 \]

Similar calculations were made for each cell.

'In constructing a composite measure of integration I follow the same process of functional and pragmatic reduction that I use to reduce twenty-two to three categories of integration. In combining the two variables -- county presidential and senate integration -- into a combined measure, I start with an attribute space with nine cells.'

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Senate Integration} \\
\hline
\text{High} & \text{Med} & \text{Low} \\
\hline
\text{Presidential Integration} & & \\
\text{High} & & \\
\text{Med} & & \\
\text{Low} & & \\
\end{array}
\]

I reduce this to the three categories of the composite measure of county integration by calculating affinity ratings for each cell and by combining cells on the basis of these. As a result, composite integration follows the pattern that follows.
This data problem is due to the combination of the structure of the Dukakis campaign and the strategy that I used in collecting data. While each of the other presidential and senate campaigns in Indiana and Ohio had an overt county structure, the Dukakis organization was unique. According to information provided by the state Dukakis campaigns, the structure had divisions that corresponded roughly to a mix of major metropolitan areas and congressional districts. There were eight such divisions in Ohio and ten in Indiana.

In terms of personnel, the Dukakis campaign was also unique compared with the Bush campaign. It staffed this state-wide structure with people from outside of the state -- mostly young individuals from the Boston area. The Bush campaign as well as the four senate campaigns relied on individuals from Indiana and Ohio for their local leadership positions.

Because the Dukakis campaign itself identified this atypical arrangement as its local campaign structure, the eight individuals in Ohio and ten in Indiana were the informants to whom I sent the questionnaire asking about the local organization. As it turns out, however, there was some semblance of a county structure even though the campaign did not offer a description of it. I found that among my total pool of respondents there were individuals who identified themselves as county campaign coordinators for Dukakis. I used these as my county informants.

Because of the strategy that I used to identify campaign units (i.e., asking the campaign itself), I pick up the county Dukakis perspective only from informants who happened to receive the questionnaire in some other capacity.

The cases are not counties, but are senate and presidential ties. If scores are present for the senate or
presidential integration, then there are two cases for that county.

9Refer again to Note 7 of this chapter for an explanation the difficulty distinguishing the universe of cases for data grades 1 and 2. Because I cannot identify all of the county-level Dukakis campaign units, it is impossible to determine the representative quality of those data grades that require information from the Dukakis campaign (i.e., data grades 1 and 2). I can determine a minimum universe for data grade 2, which requires information from the formal parties and the campaigns about either the presidential or senate ties. The twenty-four percent, then, that I cite in the text is a liberal estimate of representation because it only counts the senate ties. Including the presidential ties would have the effect of inflating the universe, the base on which I calculate the percentage. Therefore, the percentage itself would necessarily be lower.

10While the distribution across state and party domains is also relevant, the scant cases prevent meaningful comparisons.

11On the other hand, the reason that I don’t simply combine the categories of medium and low integration to form a dichotomous variable is that it is premature to tamper with the basic measure of integration before I determine, based on my analysis, whether the two categories are or are not distinguishable.
CHAPTER IV

INTEGRATION IN OHIO AND INDIANA:
AN AGGREGATE ANALYSIS

The formal party organizations and the candidate-centered campaigns are now givens that mark the terrain of contemporary U.S. electoral politics. Having developed and tested a measure, in this chapter I will examine the integration of these two units of the political party. Understanding the nature and extent of integration is a critical block in understanding electoral politics and the party organization. As I will show, integration can be explained by some of the basic patterns that persist in U.S. politics.

Partisan Patterns

The organizational differences between the Democratic and Republican parties are familiar to students of U.S. politics. I have found that the Democratic and Republican parties also differ with respect to integration. The Republican party is more highly integrated than the Democratic party. Table 11 presents this relationship as shown by composite integration scores in Indiana and Ohio.
There is a pronounced difference between the parties; twenty-two percentage points separate the highly integrated Democratic counties from the Republican. And a full 62% of the counties in the Republican party are highly integrated.

Table 11
Integration within Democratic and Republican Ties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ties</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>18 (101%)</td>
<td>9 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Integration reported is composite integration which combines integration scores of presidential and senate ties in counties.

Although this Republican dominance in integration does not follow directly from other recognized characteristics of the parties, it is consistent with what we know about the formal party organizations, especially on the Republican side.

The GOP has established for itself an instrumental role in politics. More so than its Democratic counterpart, the Republican National Committee (RNC) has been the source of services and material for the state and local parties. This instrumental function of the national Republican party with respect to state party organizations is well documented. The role is logically consistent with a well
integrated party and may to some extent account for the
stronger integration in the Republican than in the
Democratic party.

On the state level the formal party organizations,
working with money channelled from the national committees,
provide services for the campaigns by means of their party-
building operations. In 1988 on the Republican side, this
party-building arm was known as 'Victory '88.' It was run
by the party, but the candidates were the immediate
beneficiaries through programs dealing with voter
identification, absentee ballots, and get-out-the-vote.
These programs all depend on the use of a computerized data
base, and this data base is "what drives the campaign",
according to the Ohio Republican chairman. In Ohio it is
updated biennially, enhanced with tapes of election results
provided by the state and tapes from outside vendors. The
result is a complete portrait of the Ohio voter. From the
age of the voter to, in some counties, the value of his
house, according to the state chairman the data base
contains "probably more information than the voter thinks I
know about him." Clearly an invaluable resource for a
party, the RNC paid for the Ohio's 1988 tape enhancement --
"a big cost [for the RNC]" -- which was used extensively in
Victory '88 efforts.

Although utilized for a variety of purposes, the tape
was used for a sophisticated phone and mail operation. In
order to mobilize the Republican vote in November, the
party aimed to call each Ohio Republican household in
September to convey an "advocacy message" urging support of
the Bush/Quayle ticket and Voinovich for the U.S. Senate.
According to the figures of the state party chairman, this
would have been a monumental task; he reported that the
party had phone numbers for 73% of the 850,000 Republican
homes. In addition to calling some 620,000 homes, the
party used mailings to respond to questions posed by
Republican voters in the course of the telephone exchanges.
Then, the party did a second calling within four days of
the election reminding the Republican supporters to vote.

This strategy is not unique to the Ohio Republican
party. Neither is formal party support of party-building.
The Democratic National Committee oversaw Campaign '88, a
similar program to assist the state Democratic parties in
party-building efforts. In actuality this meant active
support for the Dukakis/Bentsen ticket as well. It is
interesting that Campaign '88 seems to have been equally as
well funded as Victory '88, departing from typical partisan
funding patterns. But given the Republican edge in terms
of the infrastructure in place, I think that the
instrumental worth of the Republican program probably
exceeded that of Campaign '88.

What both Victory '88 and Campaign '88 did was to
provide a service to the campaigns, thus freeing the
candidates' resources for other uses. The Republican party generally does a better job than the Democratic party in this regard. But the instrumental bond established among the RNC, the state parties and the campaigns, as illustrated in the previous case, is even more far-reaching than the telephone and mail operation suggests. It extends into the realm of employment as well.

The RNC is especially good at providing job opportunities for campaign personnel. This point was first articulated to me by a Democratic campaign consultant with both national and Ohio experience. He commented that the success of the national Republican party lies not only in its capability to provide material benefits to the state parties and campaigns, it also is in its ability to employ campaign practitioners at the RNC in the off-season. He urged the Democratic party to

find bright and talented people and take care of them between elections so that they don't go off and do other things -- get other kinds of jobs and get out of the political environment ... [In this] the Republicans are way ahead of the Democrats. The Republican National Committee basically nurtures and cares for dozens and dozens and dozens of pretty skillful campaign specialists between elections. 'The Democrats don't do that ... They sort of say 'Hey you guys are off on your own.' They lose a lot.

In this respect, the RNC came through for the Indiana Bush campaign director. A recent college graduate, this individual ran Bush's nomination effort in Indiana but was
then under the employ of the RNC/Victory '88 until he could receive a paycheck from the Bush general election campaign fund. This route from the Bush nomination campaign, to Victory '88, then back to the Bush/Quayle campaign was typical in the Republican party. On the Democratic side, the Dukakis organizations in the states tended to fold immediately after the nomination contests. This meant that there were a few months of what amounted to downtime for the campaign and the personnel.

It seems that the Democrats have begun to emulate the Republicans in providing a safe haven within the national committee and, in essence, a permanent mission control within party headquarters. The New York Times describes Ron Brown, chairman of the DNC, as saying in 1991 that he planned a greater role for the national committee, seeing the party organization as an agent for the presidential nominee. During the nomination season, the DNC should raise money, plot strategy and conduct research for the November election. But once the fall campaign begins, the
campaign and the party should be integrated. As quoted in *The New York Times*,

If I were going to use a model, I'd use the Republican model ... They've got some skilled professionals who run campaign after campaign, and the folks involved in everybody's primary then meld in [to the presidential campaign]. (May 18, 1991)

Corresponding to this instrumental role that the Republican party has and the Democratic party seems to want is an enhanced degree of party control over the campaigns. This is illustrated by the Republican party in Indiana. The state Republican chairman reported to me that he assisted the various national campaigns in the selection of their nomination personnel in Indiana. He said that he had input in the selection of "each and every one" of the chairpersons and campaign directors. The Chairman believed that party involvement of this nature would foster a positive climate within the party.

We try to make sure in Indiana that the leaders of the presidential campaigns are party people first, whose first responsibility is to the Indiana Republican Party. The reason for that is so that we don't get into conflicts. In other states you still have people referring to the 'Reagan people' and the 'party people'. That's never happened here.

Because the candidates recognize what the party does as a provider, the party can in theory have a greater say in the operation of a campaign.
The importance of the formal party input, however, may sometimes be overestimated. One operative told me that a successful campaign organization does what it needs to do to appease the party apparatus. If this means that the campaign makes the party feel more important than it really is, then this is what the campaign should do. Certainly the campaign must exploit the resources of the organizational people, but more importantly it should "make sure that they don’t become harmful because of feeling ignored, feeling left out and therefore [they] start carping [emphasis added]."

If the formal party is manipulated to think that it has an important role in the campaign, then one cannot credit it with true management. But my evidence, confirmed by both the formal party and the campaigns, says that the formal party does have a routine say in the operation of Republican campaigns. This is especially true at the state level in Indiana. I found no evidence of similar management within the Democratic party. In fact, the Ohio Democratic chair described what I see as active neutrality. In nomination politics, for example, he saw the party as a "referee". This is consistent with the prominent ethic that I encountered in the Democratic party -- one of a referee, rather than provider and manager.

Like the sports referee, the state Democratic organizations seem concerned with maintaining fair
competition. In the nomination season, this translates into neutrality regarding those vying for the party's nomination. In the general election, this is shown in what amounts to almost a preoccupation with rules. And the party is concerned with not only the rules that affect its own candidates, but -- also like the referee -- with the rules that affect the other team as well. Juxtaposing examples of Republican and Democratic coordination makes this apparent.

During the fall of 1988 the Ohio Republican chairman met in his office on a weekly basis with representatives of the Bush/Quayle campaign and the Voinovich campaign. These meetings, which were also attended by representatives of various local campaigns, were for the stated purpose of coordinating the efforts within the party. This was in an effort to expend resources efficiently and, while doing so, to stay within the boundaries of federal campaign law. But the words of the chairman reveal where the importance of the meeting laid: coordination.

In contrast consider what was in effect a coordinated effort by the Ohio Democratic Party (ODP) and the Metzenbaum campaign, yet the stated motivation was different. The state party chairman talked about a joint fundraiser, sponsored by the ODP and the Metzenbaum campaign -- the first such effort ever between the party and a candidate -- which yielded $230,000 for Metzenbaum's
campaign. The chairman's words betray the goal of the fundraiser. He said that it was the only way the party could help Metzenbaum since he was a federal candidate and the party's contribution to his campaign was limited by law to $5,000. What is important is the chairman's emphasis on the rules. The impression that I took away was that the goal was not to facilitate a coordinated effort, but to stay within the confines of the law. The difference between these two cases is subtle, but nonetheless present. The parties are similar in the result of their activities, that being coordination. It would be incorrect to suggest that the Republicans are not concerned with the rules, but the Democrats stress a rule-oriented explanation or justification for what they do.

The Democrats also emphasized the rules in dealing with the Republicans; the ODP refereed the intra-party presidential contest. Along with three other state Democratic chairmen, the Ohio chairman charged before the Federal Election Commission (FEC) that Bush had exceeded his nomination spending limits in a handful of states, including Ohio. The Republicans had made comparable charges to the FEC about the Dukakis campaign, but what is important is the direct involvement of the Ohio Democratic chair in the conflict. It illustrates the party's overt referee role in Ohio.
The partisan differences that I have described point to an environment in which Republican integration is more likely than Democratic. The standard operating procedures of the GOP and its emphasis on coordination and management mean that the party is likely to have an important role in the operation of campaigns. The lower levels of Democratic integration make sense given that the formal parties do not provide or manage as extensively.

Office Patterns

In addition to partisan differences, integration varies across party ties that are organized around different elective offices. Senate ties are more highly integrated than presidential. Table 12 displays integration within Ohio and Indiana (combined) across both domains. I report and interpret these findings despite their lack of statistical significance. Because these office patterns constitute an important building block in my analysis of integration they should be noted.
Table 12
Integration within Senate and Presidential Ties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Integration</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>Presidential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(n=179) (n=177)

The difference in levels of integration between these two types of party ties, presidential and senate, is in the expected direction in view of the basic differences between the two contests. Senate elections are truly statewide contests. And even though the presidential campaigns and the election itself are ordered on the basis of states, these contests are still national events that focus largely on national issues. For this reason, the state focus of the senate contest binds the formal party and the campaign elements together far more than does the presidential contest.

The permanence of senate campaign organizations for the incumbent candidates may also contribute to this difference. My study included two such incumbent campaigns: Lugar in Indiana and Metzenbaum in Ohio. These candidates were able to ease into campaign organizations that had been in place. Both Lugar and Metzenbaum had the
luxury of returning to campaign structures from six years earlier. In fact, a county party activist explained that there had been an ongoing Metzenbaum mechanism in place with which the formal party interacted.

While this permanence may have enhanced integration in the incumbent ties, it may not be typical of senate campaigns in general. Fenno writes that there is little talk of "the last time" in senate campaigns. This is quite different from the experience of house incumbents who are closely tuned in to their prior electoral contests and wage essentially a continuous campaign. But for the typical senate incumbent, "[six years] is long enough to render the last campaign irrelevant, even if it could be remembered (1982 p. 28)."

This does not accurately describe the 1988 incumbent campaigns in Ohio and Indiana. And it is likely that in this context of relative permanence, experience and exposure within the incumbent senate ties did breed integration. Selective exit by individuals dissatisfied with past party relationships functionally removes barriers to future integration. Since entrance to and exit from a campaign or party organization is at the discretion of the individual, and because negative experiences may be a motivation to exit, then those who remain will likely engage in productive relationships.
With these factors in mind, the integrated quality of the senate ties vis-a-vis the presidential tie is not surprising. What is perplexing is that senate and presidential ties are not more distinct as measured by integration. I will offer some possible explanations.

I have argued that given the individual’s opportunity to exit from political activity, one could expect an older organization to be composed of individuals who are satisfied with their experiences in the campaign and who have learned to work within the party. However, one must also consider turnover in the formal party apparatus. Changes over time in the county party organization could disrupt a tie, even if there is relative constancy in the makeup of the campaign. This is especially important given the span of a full six years between senate contests. Even a relatively permanent senate organization can be paired with a county party structure that has changed significantly over a six year period.

The marginal distinction in integration between presidential and senate ties in this study may also be a function of factors unique to the cases I examined. Indiana’s own Dan Quayle provides an interesting twist. There is reason to expect that the presence of Quayle on the Republican ticket would have enhanced integration within presidential ties in Indiana by providing a unifying force for Republicans. If this is true, then presidential
integration would have been closer to senate integration in 1988 than under normal circumstances. Responses to the mail questionnaires do confirm that Quayle's candidacy was a unifying force for Indiana Republicans. But at the same time, a dynamic working in the opposite direction may have depressed Republican presidential integration in Indiana ties. The change in the Bush campaign organization due to Quayle's vice-presidential candidacy is one of the important factors in this reverse dynamic.

When creating a campaign organization in a state for the general election, presidential candidates will typically turn to the organization that had been in place for the nomination contest. The Indiana Bush campaign did just this, but also drew in the entirety of the Quayle organization from his senate campaign in 1986. I think that this ultimately worked against integration. It would be interesting to know conclusively the impact of Quayle on integration in 1988, but absent comparisons of integration before and after the selection of Quayle, I turn to a comparison across states to support this claim.

Indeed there is a difference in integration between the Bush/Quayle Indiana campaign and its Ohio counterpart. While there are too few cases to make strong claims, it appears that Republican presidential integration is more pronounced in Ohio than Indiana. Thirty-two (62%) the 52 Republican presidential ties in Ohio were characterized by
high integration while 19 (43%) of 44 presidential ties in Indiana fell into the same category. Admittedly, as I will demonstrate shortly, Ohio is generally more integrated than Indiana. But at first glance it is curious that the addition of Quayle would not propel the integration of Indiana’s Republican presidential ties to higher levels. Two explanations come immediately to mind. The first deals with the impact of the Quayle activists on integration.

The Bush campaign’s Indiana coordinator noted that there were some small conflicts between the Quayle additions and the regular Bush organization. While not specifying the nature of these, he attributed them to the fact that the Quayle people had a very large personal investment in the race, but a part that was diminished from their typical role in Quayle’s senate campaigns. Dealing with this reality may have been difficult for the senator’s activists -- "The people who helped lay the foundation didn’t get to decorate the house."

The second explanation deals with the general impact on electoral politics of the addition of Quayle to the ticket. The presence of Quayle may have depressed integration due to his effect on the competitive situation in the state. Always a Republican stronghold, the promise of Indiana support for a Republican presidential ticket was even stronger in 1988. Bush’s choice of Quayle as a running-mate all but guaranteed an Indiana victory for the
GOP. As evidence of Bush's strength, the Republican National Committee withdrew funds earmarked for Indiana immediately upon Quayle's selection as the vice-presidential running mate. This was a sure sign that the competitive situation in the state overwhelmingly favored the Republican ticket. The resources that were still important elsewhere would have been wasted in Indiana. The confidence of the RNC may have been filtered down to the state and local party organization, making an intense and combined effort for the presidential ticket less critical than it might have been under other conditions.

The integrated quality of the Bush ties in Ohio surpassed those in Indiana. But just as conditions unique to Indiana may have affected integration, there may also be an explanation unique to Ohio. The Ohio Bush organization was intrinsically tied to the formal party. The Bush nomination chairman described to me the process he followed to create the initial organization in Ohio, which eventually evolved into the general election campaign. He followed a plan that was written for and approved by the Bush national campaign. In this he described the construction of the organization based on "coalitions of constituencies." To form this the campaign chairperson contacted "every major [Republican] player in the state of Ohio." He approached each state legislator, each member of the Ohio congressional delegation, the county chairpersons,
state party officers, and the state committeemen and women. As the chairperson explained, each of these individuals represented a constituency that could be drawn into the campaign. What strikes me about this collection of contacts is the dominance of the formal party apparatus. In fact, even the various legislators likely had ties to their own local Republican organizations. The Bush chairman himself was the assistant Republican leader in the Ohio senate.

The result of this strategy was a state-wide organization that was well suited to integration with, if not part and parcel of, the formal party. But beyond this state-wide structure, the leadership of the Bush general election campaign had deep ties to the Ohio Republican Party. The national field director, the regional director and the executive director of the Ohio campaign all had hands-on experience with Ohio. The executive director described the path that he had taken to Ohio in 1988. He started with a long career in Ohio electoral politics, moved to the Bush national campaign, then finally arrived at the head of the state effort. This route was consistent with the stated goal of the Bush people. They wanted to have key states "run by people who knew the local organizations." And of equal importance, the Ohio director was recognized as an insider in Ohio Republican politics.
The Democratic establishment did not perceive the Dukakis operatives as insiders. This was seen as a clear strength of the Bush organization when compared to Dukakis's. The Ohio director pointed to the handicap of his counterpart in the Dukakis campaign. She had worked Ohio for Mondale in 1984 so "it wasn't so much that she was unfamiliar with Ohio, as that she wasn't considered an Ohioan." This impression of the Dukakis campaign, both in and out of Ohio, was dominant in the media and general political discourse in 1988. To a large extent it was warranted. Although my data do not let me separate the effect of Dukakis from the general pattern of Democratic weakness in integration, the Dukakis ties are not very highly integrated. In Ohio, there are eighteen percent more cases of low integration among Dukakis ties than among Bush ties. In Indiana the difference is twenty-one percent. These Dukakis cases have exceedingly low levels of integration. The tension is seen in the comments of some of the respondents from the county parties. A respondent from Indiana who had been active in the party organization as well as the Dukakis nomination effort included a type-written note with his completed questionnaire. "I was more than willing to become involved in the general election effort but I never heard from the Dukakis people again after [the Indiana primary]."
Certain factors, however, worked in the reverse direction, perhaps keeping the ties from reaching such lows. In Ohio, for example, although the state coordinator was not a native, the state Democratic chairman described her as a "friend" with whom he had past political ties. And the Dukakis Indiana organization may have side-stepped some potential problems. The state coordinator noted how easy it would have been for the young Dukakis organizers coming from the outside to offend the party regulars. To guard against this a renowned political operative in Indiana ran interference so that the campaign "didn't step on toes." Still these effects were not enough to generate integration; the Bush edge prevailed.

More impressionistically, I sensed that the Ohio Bush operatives compared to those for Dukakis were on the same wavelength as the party organization. They seemed to speak the same language, and more than any of the other personnel that I interviewed, demonstrated a ready control of the
political landscape of the state. The Plain Dealer confirms this impression of the "Bushmen". Their action reflects a polished Ohio campaign that has waltzed gracefully with the national campaign. The campaign knows geography and how to work it and wisely relies on the expertise of key Ohio Republicans ... The Bush campaign has rolled smooth as a limousine in comparison to the jerkiness of Democrat Michael Dukakis' campaign here (October 16, 1988).

The difference between Dukakis and Bush ties is evident, especially considering Ohio. The combination of a particularly close relationship between the formal party and the Bush campaign in Ohio, combined with one interpretation of Quayle's vice-presidential candidacy in Indiana, may explain why presidential integration is not a great deal lower than senate integration. It remains, however, that integration within senate ties generally exceeds integration within the presidential ties. With this finding, I begin to picture the complex party organization containing ties between the formal party and all different office units, each displaying different levels of integration.

State Patterns

I have argued that the Ohio Bush campaign may have pushed integration in Ohio to a very high level, but it is consistent with the general pattern that prevailed across Indiana and Ohio. Both the Republican and Democratic
parties register at higher levels of integration in Ohio than in Indiana. This is shown in Table 13 which compares integration for both parties across the two states.

Table 13
Integration in Ohio and Indiana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Integration</th>
<th>Ohio</th>
<th>Indiana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n=99)</td>
<td>(n=77)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Integration reported is composite integration which combines integration scores of presidential and senate ties in counties.

Equally as pronounced as the relationship between party and integration, a full 59% of the Ohio ties are highly integrated compared with 43% for Indiana. This difference is again shown by the cases that fall into the lowest level of integration: a remarkable 5% in Ohio compared to 23% in Indiana.

When I move beyond the factors unique to 1988 that explain integration, I find that this state difference is especially important. First, it tells me that party strength and competition, although likely related to integration, are not the sole determinants of it. Afterall, as I described in Chapter 2, both Indiana and Ohio are states with strong and competitive political parties; still Ohio is generally more integrated than
Indiana. I believe that two distinctive factors relating to the political culture in Ohio may help account for this difference.

While Ohio and Indiana parties are similar in some basic respects, both of the parties in Ohio today show the lingering effect of unique circumstances. On the Democratic side, one must factor in the strength and autonomy of the party organizations in Ohio’s many metropolitan areas. For two reasons these independent power bases in Ohio may promote integration. First, they functionally remove one of the rungs in the ladder of party hierarchy (i.e., the state party). A state-level campaign in Ohio can cultivate relationships directly with the numerous urban formal party organizations. In this respect Indiana differs from Ohio. The independent Democratic party bases are especially strong in Cleveland, Toledo, Akron and Youngstown. These combined with the Ohio’s other urban areas -- Columbus, Cincinnati, Dayton, and Canton -- provide for a state much different from Indiana with its more or less epicentral Indianapolis. Second, there tends to be a wealth of campaign experience in these large urban organizations. This provides a foundation for an integrated relationship.

A personalized explanation, namely Ray C. Bliss, may help account for the generally high integration within the Ohio Republican Party (ORP). Bliss from Akron served as
state party chairman from 1949 to 1965, before moving on to the chairmanship of the Republican National Committee. During his tenure with the ORP, Bliss created a strong party organization, especially well suited for campaign activity. Bliss constantly urged county party leaders to identify and back competent candidates. He oversaw the organization of the state party headquarters into special campaign functions, and marshaled the party in 1960 when it helped Richard Nixon carry Ohio despite predictions of a Kennedy win (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 15, 1965).

The Republican party in Ohio shows the legacy of Ray Bliss’s leadership and emphasis on campaign activity. Both the state and the county Republican organizations are vital participants in Ohio electoral politics. The Republican party in Indiana still registers as strong and active, however the party in Ohio stands alone in terms of campaign activity. This basic difference on the Republican side combined with the unique quality of the Ohio Democratic party may partially account for what are generally higher levels of integration in Ohio compared to Indiana. But there may also be an explanation in the campaigns of 1988.

There is reason to expect that the importance of Ohio for both Dukakis and Bush actually pushed integration to levels higher in Ohio than Indiana. The key to this lies in the visits to the state made by each of the presidential
candidates. Ohio was a frequent campaign stop for both the Republican and Democratic tickets. *The New York Times* (November 9, 1988) estimated that Bush spent one day and Dukakis none in Indiana. On the other hand, Bush was in Ohio somewhere between six and ten days, and Dukakis spent over ten days there. These stops congealed the efforts of the presidential and senate campaigns and the formal party organizations in Ohio.

Metzenbaum’s campaign manager remarked that the circumstance under which the senate campaign had the most contact with the party organization in Ohio was when there was a national event -- like an appearance by Dukakis -- in the state. The scale and importance of such an event naturally dictated involvement by the party apparatus via Campaign ’88 and the Dukakis organization, the two elements of a presidential tie. But an event of such consequence would also draw in the senate campaign organization. Under normal circumstances a senate candidate would not miss such an opportunity. Thus the dynamics of an appearance by a presidential candidate are unifying. In this respect, the emphasis placed on Ohio by both the Bush and Dukakis campaigns may have strengthened integration.
The Deviant Cases

From the previous analysis, it is clear that party, state and office are closely related to levels of county party integration. But these bivariate relationships obscure some important characteristics of electoral races and the political environment that bear upon integration as well. In this regard, the relationship between party and integration (established previously in Table 11) is especially interesting. In Ohio the relationship that is present when examining all ties is attenuated when focusing on only the senate ties. Party as a variable does little to distinguish the levels of integration in the Ohio senate races. The Indiana senate ties deviate from the general pattern as well. But unlike the Ohio case, the relationship between party and integration is not diminished; it is even a stronger association in the Indiana senate cases than when considering all cases. As few as 8 (24%) of the 34 Democratic senate ties in Indiana cases are marked by levels of high integration while 25 of the 45 Republican cases (56%) fall into that same category. Table 14 gives an overview of this partisan pattern within senate ties. It first shows the bivariate relationship between party and integration. It then shows the results when state is introduced as a control variable.
Table 14
The Relationship between Party and Integration in Senate Ties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bivariate Relationship</th>
<th>Senate Ties</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Relationship</th>
<th>Ohio Senate</th>
<th>Indiana Senate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages for the bivariate table are based on the following numbers of cases: 81 Democratic and 99 Republican. The relationship is summarized by gamma=.18 (p<.38). Percentages for the control tables are based on these numbers of cases: 47 Ohio Democrats, 53 Ohio Republicans, 34 Indiana Democrats and 48 Indiana Republicans. In the Ohio relationship, gamma=.14 (p<.01) In the Indiana relationship, gamma=.86 (p<.01).

Adding state as a control variable creates an interesting pair of relationships. The simple bivariate distribution, although not statistically significant, had concealed a relatively strong relationship between party and integration in Indiana and a slightly weaker one in Ohio. The dynamics present the Indiana and Ohio senate races precipitate the departure from the simple bivariate relationship. I credit the two Democratic candidates, Wickes and Metzenbaum. The campaign of the former was very poorly integrated with the Indiana Democratic Party, while the latter was well integrated with the Ohio Democratic Party.
The Wickes senate candidacy in Indiana accounted for the strength of the relationship in Indiana. Jack Wickes, in challenging Lugar in Indiana, was a Democratic outsider and his chances were a longshot. Wickes was propelled into the senate race because of his tie with former presidential candidate Gary Hart, but partially because of this same connection he never became a party insider. As described by Wickes' campaign manager, Gary Hart's success in the 1984 Indiana primary and strong support in his ill-fated 1988 presidential bid launched Wickes into the political spotlight. Gary Hart was the "darling of the state party and Jack Wickes was his person in Indiana." As a result, "Wickes had gone from being a no one -- a precinct worker in 1984 -- to being a player." But apparently Wickes the player never garnered insider status. Despite Hart's success in Indiana in 1984, the party regulars were still Mondale people. Paradoxically, because of Gary Hart "Wickes was perceived to be powerful within the party but still outside the party structure."

The Wickes campaign itself did little to draw its candidate into the Democratic mainstream. In speaking to me, the campaign manager routinely described the organization as a collection of "Yuppies." Like the Hart activists, they were "mostly young, Ivy League lawyers, doctors and college professors", a group clearly removed from rank-and-file Indiana Democrats. The strategy that
they followed was largely an issue-based one. At the same time that it made Wickes the outsider a credible candidate, it reinforced the distance that separated him from the formal party.

Wickes' strategy was to get his issue positions published and to use his publication record to exploit Washington money; it was initially successful. The campaign worked to get stories about Wickes' issue stances -- a broad array of the "typical liberal positions" -- published in newspapers across Indiana. Once done, the campaign would photocopy, package them and "mail Washington." They bombarded sympathetic interest groups and political action committees in Washington with evidence that Jack Wickes advocated liberal positions and indeed he took these positions publicly. In the early months of 1988, this strategy brought in enough money to demonstrate Wickes' viability as a candidate who was challenging a widely popular incumbent. And it effectively circumvented the formal party apparatus. However, the campaign's preoccupation with newspaper clippings did not sustain the candidacy. Measured in dollars alone, the Wickes effort had failed by summer. In June, while Lugar had 1.4 million dollars on hand, Wickes had only 17,000 dollars (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report August 20, 1988).

The distance that separated Wickes from the Democratic party is understandable given the characteristics of the
candidate and his organization. But further distancing Wickes from the Democrats was gubernatorial candidate Evan Bayh. In 1988 all Democratic hopes in Indiana were pinned to the candidacy of Bayh, at the time Secretary of State, who was running against Republican Lt. Governor John Mutz. As one campaign operative stated, Evan Bayh was to the Democrats the "second coming". He had a "messianic" quality that promised to catapult the Democratic Party into the forefront of Indiana politics. With Bayh's chances of success promising from the time he formally announced in the winter of 1988, Indiana Democrats rallied around his candidacy which was ultimately successful.

For a while Bayh's promise seemed threatened by the entrance of Quayle into the presidential race. His selection, as The Indianapolis Star reported, "reinvigorated Hoosier Republicans and sent shock waves through their Democratic counterparts (August 17, 1988)." But once the dust settled, the campaign proceeded along the same course. The prospects for Democratic senate candidate Wickes being dismal and political resources finite, active support of Bayh for Democrats promised the highest returns. This distanced the Democratic organization from the Wickes campaign.

It is also likely that the Bayh candidacy affected presidential integration. The tenuous nature of the presidential ties in Indiana compared to Ohio may have been
due partially to Bayh's potential. The number of cases is small, but Democratic presidential ties in Indiana are less integrated than in Ohio. Fifteen (44%) of 34 have low integration in Indiana compared to fifteen (32%) of 47 in Ohio. Dukakis's Indiana general election coordinator felt that Bayh had made a point of dissociating himself from the Dukakis ticket; this resulted in general tension within the Indiana Democratic camp. The coordinator noted also that she felt "let down" by the state party chairman, whom she perceived to devote inordinate attention to the Bayh effort.

While Indiana Republicans valued the gubernatorial seat, it did not eclipse all of the other contests. Neither the Lugar campaign nor the Republican party organization went out of its way to fortify the Mutz gubernatorial effort. And Lugar maintained a strong and well-financed organization. I suspect that in Lugar's case integration with the formal party was facilitated by his perfect record of electoral success, extending back as far as 1967 when he was elected mayor of Indianapolis. His integration was solid, so the low levels of Democratic integration in the Indiana senate ties accounted for the wide gulf between the parties.

Table 13 showed a strong relationship between party and integration in Indiana. In Ohio, on the other hand, there was very little difference between Republican and
Democratic integration in the senate ties. As seen again in Table 13, the relationship between party and integration in these cases is relatively weak.

Integration within the Ohio Democratic senate ties reached abnormally high levels, given the party pattern. Sixty-four percent of the 47 Metzenbaum ties were highly integrated. This even surpassed the integration for the Voinovich ties, which were themselves well integrated. Just as factors unique to the senate race in Indiana may account for the strong relationship between party and integration in these ties, the Metzenbaum candidacy in 1988 might explain the weak relationship in Ohio.

The early projections had George Voinovich waging a forceful challenge against Metzenbaum. Voinovich was a strong candidate, with solid state-wide name recognition and a history of defeating credible opponents. He topped the list of his strengths with his current status: the Republican mayor of Cleveland, the Democratic stronghold. The challenger's potential initially invigorated the Metzenbaum campaign. In 1982 the senator had easily defeated three challengers, with a wide margin -- 58% to 42% -- separating him from his closest challenger. With Metzenbaum dominating the field in 1982, according to his campaign manager "there wasn't much of a campaign". But in 1988 the challenge was real. In fact, there was actually competition -- sometimes between three or four individuals
-- in some of the larger counties to fill coordinator positions because "it was considered such a hot race."

The Metzenbaum organization was energized by the challenge. Ironically, perceptions of Voinovich missteps early in the general election campaign further invigorated the Democratic campaign. What were seen as tactical errors by Voinovich catalyzed the Metzenbaum organization. These errors included a charge that Metzenbaum was soft on the issue of child pornography. Apparently the public agreed with Metzenbaum's analysis. A poll in The Plain Dealer showed that 51% of the respondents thought that Voinovich had been hurt by making the charge. Only 12% thought he had been helped (October 16, 1988). In either case, the exchange on child pornography helped set the agenda for a campaign marked by much mudslinging. But for my purposes in analyzing integration, Voinovich's actions were a ray of light for Metzenbaum and prompted the campaign to fortify its statewide organization. The campaign wanted to use its organization as a way to project an aura of competence and ability that it wanted voters to associate with the incumbent candidate. It is likely that the absence of an Ohio gubernatorial race in 1988 helped the campaign to do this. It did not have to compete with a Democratic gubernatorial organization for able and competent individuals.
The Metzenbaum campaign viewed the field organization in the state as a way to underscore the differences between the two senate candidates. In the words of the campaign manager, "[We made] a deliberate effort to project what we felt was an accurate image of an experienced, strong political organization." More so than usual, this was an energized organization around the entire state. Because of Voinovich's base in Cleveland and Cuyahoga County, Metzenbaum could not count on customary Democratic support from that area. The old adage is that a Democrat must win Cuyahoga County by 100,000 votes in order to compensate for the Republican advantage downstate. Such support uncertain, the campaign organized in parts of the state that it would normally have written off as Voinovich strongholds.

Voinovich also had to establish a strong state-wide organization. In addition to dealing with the Metzenbaum challenge, Voinovich needed to recoup conservative Republican voters in southern Ohio. He had alienated this constituency with harsh criticism of Ronald Reagan. A likely primary challenge by conservative congressman Bob McEwen forced the campaign to organize and raise money sufficient to recover this support. Although McEwen withdrew before the primary, it is likely that the threat of his candidacy catalyzed the campaign organization. Once it was clear that Voinovich would be the nominee, the
senate prize was enough to integrate the formal party with the Voinovich structure.

As far as integration is concerned, the presence of the energized candidate-organizations gave the state parties something to integrate with. Metzenbaum's campaign manager noted that since there was no campaign to speak of in 1982, there was really no need for the Ohio Democratic party to play a role. With this in mind, there is reason to believe that integration within the Democratic senate ties in Ohio was higher in 1988 than it was in 1982. The Republican ties were at high levels, although not abnormal given the office and partisan patterns. These facts help explain why there is a weak correlation between party and integration in Ohio senate ties as compared to Indiana. And the results of this control analysis tell in general that factors beyond the three variables around which my study is designed -- party, state and office -- may also account for variation in integration.

Conclusion

Clearly it is difficult to separate the various explanations of integration. Techniques that would normally be helpful to do so are not appropriate in this situation. Because of the number of cases that I work with, the use of control procedures results in distributions with so few cases that one's confidence in
the resulting relationships is necessarily limited. Furthermore, as they are now structured my data are not amenable to multiple regression techniques that could isolate the independent effect of party, state and office on integration. But this does not lessen the value of the findings that I have reported in this chapter. Beyond their substantive relevance, they serve two important purposes, one methodological and one conceptual. First, they help confirm the strategy I used to create a measure of integration that works from and analyzes data that can be considered incomplete, an issue I addressed in Chapter 3. The findings that I have just reported are generally consistent with those using the more complete data.

The second purpose served refers back to my original conceptualization of the political party. I suggested that political science should contemplate what it means by the concept of parties; my proposal was to conceptualize the party in terms of ties that subsume both the formal party and the campaign. The ultimate success of a conceptualization lies in its instrumental value. Although it is only with time and use that an assessment on the value can be made, I take these aggregate integration patterns as a positive sign. In the real world there are differences in states, parties and contests for different elective offices. Aggregate patterns that fall along these
very lines support my conceptualization as a useful approach to parties.
NOTES

1See for example Steven Frantzich, 1989, *Political Parties in the Technological Age*, and Paul Herrnson, 1990 "National Party Organizations".

2Victory '88 was a program anointed by the RNC to channel money to state parties for the purpose of assisting the Republican campaigns. As long as the money was not spent directly on the campaigns, the party effectively side-stepped the 55.4 million dollar spending limit that governed the presidential campaign organizations. The program also provided a loophole for contributors who could contribute unlimited sums to Victory '88, but who would have been bound by federal contribution limits to presidential candidates who receive public funding.

By law separated from the campaigns of the presidential candidates, both Victory '88 and its Democratic analogue Campaign '88 seemed indistinguishable from the campaign organizations. (For a description of this see Richard L. Berke, "In Election Spending: Watch the Ceiling, Use a Loophole", *The New York Times*, October 3, 1988.) The "soft money" used to fund these party-building operations has become a favorite target of *The New York Times* editorial staff. They refer to it as "sewer money" because of the way it helps effectively circumvent campaign-finance regulations.

3Mildred Schwartz's (1990) analysis of the Republican party in Illinois provides insight into the connection between the roles of provider and manager. In the course of her network analysis of the Illinois Republican Party, she notes that services are one important source of contact among party actors. This is the nature of the contact that I have just described in the Republican party; the party is a provider. But in the context of Schwartz, the management role makes a great deal of sense. Schwartz cites Howard Aldrich's concept of "critical uncertainties."

The power advantage ... rests with those who have control over 'critical uncertainties'... [those who] engage in activities and decisions that prevent what would otherwise be serious problems for the organization (p. 122).

The RNC by employing campaign operatives and the ORP by running a phone operation solve two critical uncertainties
for Republicans: employment and votes. For this reason, the Republican party organization can legitimately adopt a management role.

'This is consistent with analyses of party centralization among formal party units. The emphasis is on Democratic centralization by way of rules and Republican by way of instrumental control, namely in campaign finance. See for example William Keefe, 1991, Parties, Politics and Public Policy in America, chapter 2.


'Soliciting and receiving contributions from outside of the state is a practice that is not unique to the Wickes campaign. The candidates in the 1988 senate race in Ohio received large sums from not only Washington, D.C. but also New York and Los Angeles. And the campaigns traded jabs about this funding. The Voinovich campaign charged, "Nettzenbaum says he's on Ohio's side. But he's got money coming in from sea to shining sea." The Metzenbaum campaign rejoined, "Voinovich has a vacuum cleaner sucking PAC money out of Washington." (The Plain Dealer, July 23, 1988)

It was the Wickes method that was unique, according to his coordinator. He said that the campaign actually developed this process of photocopying and mailing Washington. After Wickes' success with this method, the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee began to include instructions for such efforts in their "how to" material distributed to candidates. The coordinator sees this as the legacy of the Wickes senate campaign.

'The integration patterns using the more complete data (especially data grade 1) are difficult to interpret because there are very few cases. But the pattern that senate ties are more integrated than presidential ties is supported and statistically significant at p < .10. The same is true for the partisan differences; Republicans are more integrated than Democrats with p < .2. The state pattern in the complete data departs some from that of the incomplete. Twenty-two of the 36 Ohio cases are highly integrated compared to four of the six in Indiana. Although this gives Indiana the upper hand in terms of percentages, it is not appropriate to interpret the figures in terms of these. And even though there is not solid support for consistency in the state pattern across the two types of data, I take these findings as generally
encouraging evidence that complete and incomplete data show similar aggregate patterns.
CHAPTER V
INTEGRATION IN OHIO AND INDIANA:
A COUNTY-LEVEL ANALYSIS

Even though the aggregate patterns are instructive, they largely disregard the county, the level on which I have collected data. Because there are records of integration for individual counties, the data allow me to study party integration at that less inclusive level as well. This chapter highlights a county-level explanation. The analysis begins to examine the process of integration. It looks at what is actually happening in the counties that correspond to varying levels of integration. I have examined whether each of a number of different variables is important. In this regard, two stand out as being closely related to integration. The first of these is population.

Population Patterns

The readings of low party integration are concentrated in the less populated counties. Using indications from the 1980 census data, I constructed a three-category measure of population. This measure distinguishes population levels
among those counties included in this analysis. Each of the levels has roughly sixty cases. Since county population is highly correlated with population density, I use the population and the urban/rural character of the counties interchangeably in the text.

There is a positive relationship between composite party integration and county size. Three-fifths of the 61 largest counties are marked by high integration. And as few as three of that same size have low party integration. A gamma of .31 summarizes the relationship between integration and the three-category measure of population; the distribution is statistically significant at $p < .01$. It appears that there is something about urban areas that encourages integration.

The finding that integration varies with county size is also shown in an analysis of the median population scores. Table 15 reports these across the three levels of integration.

Table 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of County Integration</th>
<th>Median Population Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>61,600 (N=97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>50,100 (N=61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>24,900 (N=24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Integration categories refer to composite integration which combines scores for presidential and senate ties in a county.
The general pattern again displayed is that county population and integration are positively related. However, the population intervals that separate the three levels of integration are not consistent. There is a substantial drop-off (50,100 to 24,900) from the middle level of integration to the lowest, pointing to the unique quality of the less integrated counties. This leads me to question why population is related to integration and, in particular, why the poorly integrated counties are distinctively rural. I also ask why there are so few instances of low and so many of high integration in the urban counties.

The answers to these questions reflect a mix of measurement and empirical concerns. On one level, the logic of the measure of integration itself stacks the deck in the favor of the larger counties. By definition contact between the formal party and the campaign organizations, one of the dimensions of integration, likely is facilitated in more densely populated areas. This is due to the reality that both of the units necessary for integration -- the formal party and the campaign -- are more apt to be present in urban counties than in rural ones.

While on paper a campaign may encompass the entire state, it may only exist nominally (if at all) in some of the counties. Typically these are the rural ones. The 1988 Metzenbaum organization reflected this arrangement.
The campaign did blanket Ohio; however, in actuality it was a three-tier structure. In the largest eight counties, the coordinator was a person who was expected to work full-time for the campaign from spring until election day. The second and third tiers -- the next twenty counties and the remaining sixty -- were staffed by coordinators whose full attention was not expected. This Metzenbaum plan betrays an accent on the population centers even within an organization that covers the entire state.

Urban areas are attractive to candidates for a number of reasons. If the ultimate goal is garnering votes, they generally offer the highest return for the candidate's investment. Certainly some of the monetary costs of involvement in urban areas exceed those in rural settings; but other costs are virtually fixed across all areas. While rental expenses in a metropolitan area surpass those in smaller cities, the cost of a candidate's time is equally as oppressive in rural as in urban areas. With the greatest possible rewards, both senatorial and presidential campaigns quite naturally exploit urban areas.

There are other alluring qualities. An assortment of facilities, services and constituencies are all there for the choosing. Dukakis's first post-convention trip to Cleveland illustrates this. The candidate capitalized on a rush-hour crowd in downtown Cleveland's Public Square. As the sub-head in The Plain Dealer read, "Die-hards, blase
bystanders, even Republicans turned out (July 29, 1988). With the downtown workers and the shoppers largely a captured audience during rush hour, the Dukakis campaign exploited what the city had to offer.

Included in the audience that Dukakis addressed in Cleveland were several hundred members of the United Auto Workers, a natural Democratic constituency. And even before his Public Square appearance, Dukakis had taken advantage of the state-of-the-art media facilities in Cleveland. On his way to the appearance he had been whisked to a local television station where he did an interview through a satellite hookup with eight different stations in five cities. So in the course of just a few hours, the candidate was able to utilize those things that only a large city has to offer. In a different way, George Bush did the same.

The Vice-President’s first Ohio appearance after the Republican convention was at the home of Art Modell, the owner of a Cleveland sports franchise. This was a fundraising event for the Ohio Republican Party which took in $5,000 per couple. The venue for such an event, as well as patrons with that magnitude of money are generally found in urban and not rural areas.

Likewise, the state-wide party organizations have a metropolitan emphasis. The county chairperson in a larger county is likely to be in routine contact with the state.
Both her profile and the party's are typically higher than in the rural counties. And because the party constituency is apt to be large, the potential -- both electoral and financial -- is present in these areas to an extent that it is not in the rural counties. What this means in the urban counties is that both the campaign and party units are liable to be present in reality as well as on paper. Since integration assumes the presence of both, in effect the demands of integration are more rigorous in rural than urban areas.

What may also underlie the relationship between population and integration is an intervening variable: organizational strength of the parties. I approach this in much the same way as Gibson et al., asking questions of party structure and activity. Specifically, I consider whether a permanent presence in the county and level of campaign activity affect integration. Indeed, the presence of permanent party facilities in the urban areas provides a locus for party activity.

In Indiana, for example, the state Bush/Quayle offices in Indianapolis (Marion County) were, by address, indistinguishable from those of the formal party. The Bush campaign was located in the headquarters of the Marion County Republican Party. They shared the space with and rented it from Victory '88, which in turn had rented from the county Republicans. Apart from its location in
Indiana's largest metropolitan area, this arrangement shows the typical proximity of campaign and party space in larger cities. I found that in the metropolitan areas of both Indiana and Ohio the party apparatus and the campaigns tended to operate within a few block radius. Frequently state campaign organizations rent space from the state party, as was the case with the Metzenbaum campaign and the Ohio Democratic Party. Cases, however, deviate from this pattern.

Given the strength of the Metzenbaum and Bush candidacies, their physical proximity to the formal party is not surprising. The Wickes senate operation, on the other hand, was removed both figuratively and literally from the Democratic party. As I described in chapter 4, the candidate was estranged from the party. The campaign itself was actually waged from the basement -- not a big one, "one with a furnace and water" -- of the candidate's Indianapolis home. So despite the presence of both in Indianapolis, the two party units were effectively detached.

Just as urban areas need not indicate permanence or proximity, parties in rural areas are able to approximate the characteristics of structurally strong parties without meeting their formal requirements. A telephone and an approachable chairperson can substitute for permanent headquarters and full-time, paid personnel. A GOP district
party organization in Indiana illustrates this well. The chairman in this rural area effectively ran the district party out of his grain elevator office. While I interviewed him, he received a steady stream of telephone calls clearly related to party business. He was undoubtedly the point man for the party in the area. Even without the amenities often found in urban areas and with the physical distance separating actors, this formal party organization had to be considered structurally strong.

The campaigns also took on rural dimensions. Dan Quayle, for example, staked out rural Ohio as his territory. At county court houses and shopping centers, the vice-presidential nominee emphasized his own rural roots and values. In an account of his visit to McConnelsville Ohio published in The Indianapolis Star, Quayle invoked his own hometown of Huntington, Indiana. He described it as "a small community that understands the Midwest, that understands where we get our strength from -- our family and our faith (October 21, 1988)." Even with few voters in such towns, the campaign saw value in creating a presence -- one that their opponent would likely not create -- in small-town Ohio. Quayle as a vice-presidential candidate was particularly well-suited to minister to these areas.

Even Bush and Dukakis abandoned the allure of urban Ohio at the very end of their campaigns. On the day before
the election, the Dukakis schedule had him addressing night
shift workers from the Ford Motor Company at 6:30 a.m. in a
suburban United Auto Workers facility. Bush rejected the
city for Ashland College, the political core of a
traditionally conservative Ohio region. In this last-ditch
effort to persuade voters in Ohio, each candidate forfeited
numbers in exchange for symbolism. Dukakis’ appeal to
labor and Bush’s to the conservative elements of the
Republican party were both at the expense of the votes each
might have attracted with appearances in urban areas.
Still, all things being equal, the appeal of the urban
areas dominates and the complexity of events in these
settings almost requires integration between the campaign
and formal party. Indeed, this notion of complexity is the
key to understanding the connection between population and
integration.

In their seminal analysis of local government The
Labyrinths of Democracy (1973), Heinz Eulau and Kenneth
Prewitt find that characteristics of city councils vary
according to the complexity of the environment. One of the
components of that complexity is city size. It goes
without saying that parties are not deliberative bodies
like city councils, but they probably do respond to their
environments. Paul Beck (1974) reminded political
scientists that parties are adaptive organizations and
should be analyzed as responses to environmental factors.
I think that party integration is one way that the formal parties and campaigns adapt to the urban environment which is marked by complexity. A party that is essentially run out of a grain elevator is possible when political life is relatively predictable for all actors. But urban politics is complex and unpredictable. Consider alone the logistics of the Dukakis appearance in downtown Cleveland. The urban area offered a variety of opportunities, but required sophisticated advance work and top-notch execution in order to be successful. The complexity of urban campaign politics and government, not to mention the magnitude of the rewards for political success, create a charged atmosphere. At the same time, this atmosphere is filled with uncertainty. In response to this, the parties adapt through integration.

This analysis emphasizes that the local environment affects party integration. However, it is not the case that rival parties in a county respond identically. Whether due to basic party differences or to other overriding effects on integration, there is not pronounced symmetry in integration between Democratic and Republican parties in the same county. This runs contrary to other findings about competing parties.

Dwaine Marvick (1980) found that rival parties in Los Angeles were marked by "performance symmetry." The Democratic and Republican parties were similar especially
regarding the class structure of the activist pool from which each drew. Gibson and his colleagues (1985) found that the organizational strength of Democratic and Republican parties within a county were highly correlated. The data from Ohio and Indiana do not confirm comparable symmetry regarding integration. Using a lenient standard of performance symmetry, in only about one-half of the cases do competing parties in a county register similar integration scores.

In assessing symmetry in this regard I accepted two types of integration matches as symmetric. First are those cases in which the competing parties in a county have identical integration readings. Second are those that match medium or low readings in the Democratic party with medium or low readings in the Republican party. I report the findings even though they are not statistically significant.

In only 18 (42%) of the 43 counties are there symmetric composite integration scores for the two parties. The association between Democratic and Republican composite integration is summarized by a gamma of .32. The situation is similar regarding senate and presidential ties separately. Twenty-four (56%) of the 43 counties with both Democratic and Republican presidential integration scores are symmetric (gamma=.35). And 22 (50%) of 44 counties are symmetric regarding senate integration (gamma=.07). In
light of the lenient standard of symmetry used in this analysis, these figures do not suggest that integration in one party encourages a similar level of integration in its rival.

Activity Patterns

Beyond the basic relationship involving population and integration, my data show that integration is also related to the level of activity undertaken by a county party unit. This is a positive relationship; however, contrary to what I expected, the formal parties in the rural counties engage in no fewer activities on behalf of the presidential and senate candidates than do the urban parties. Population and activity patterns appear to be independent of each other.

My questionnaire asked the party informants to indicate whether or not their organizations participated in a variety of different activities. The following made up the list: gathering petition signatures, recruiting volunteers/campaign workers, telephoning, door-to-door canvassing, distributing campaign literature, contributing money, registering voters, fund raising, organizing campaign events, and providing surrogate speakers. The formal party respondents also had the opportunity to specify activities beyond those listed.
Comparing activity and integration, the results show that the most extensive formal party activity is found in the most integrated counties. Table 16 displays this relationship by reporting activity means associated with integration levels for both presidential and senatorial ties.

Table 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County Integration</th>
<th>Party's Mean Presidential Activities</th>
<th>Party's Mean Senate Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>6.6 (2.49)</td>
<td>6.6 (3.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>5.6 (2.72)</td>
<td>5.7 (2.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>4.8 (2.41)</td>
<td>4.4 (2.81)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Integration categories refer to composite integration which combines scores for presidential and senatorial activities in a county. Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. Means for both presidential and senatorial activities are based on the following numbers of cases: 70 with high integration, 46 with medium integration and 10 with low integration.

The activity means for the highly integrated counties of 6.6 in both the presidential and senate realms contrast with those of the least integrated counties that are about 4.5. This is not a profound difference, but the formal parties in the more integrated counties are doing more for the candidates. On a substantive level, these findings confirm what I expect of integrated parties. They are, in fact, active parties that work with the campaigns. But on a methodological level, these findings are important because they support my measure of integration. The measure is sensitive to differences in activity levels, an assumption that I could not make when creating the measure.
That the same pattern is present across both senate and presidential ties is also encouraging, although as I will explain shortly, it is somewhat puzzling in the 1988 electoral context.

The relationship between population and integration placed the question of process on the agenda. This relationship between activities and integration prompts me to think about the question of causality. To this point, causality has been largely a moot issue. With the aggregate relationships and with population, I had to consider integration exclusively as a dependent variable. But when considering activities, integration could theoretically act as an independent variable as well. My data do not permit a thorough examination of the impact of integration on a party's activities. Furthermore, it is likely that the relationship between the two is reciprocal. But I will demonstrate the way that the data allow one to start exploring the relationship between integration and activity.

Recall first that the measure of integration does not assume that active parties are necessary for integration. The formal party and campaign can have minimal contact and still register as moderately integrated. However, it would be only in extreme scenarios that the ties would achieve high levels of integration in the absence of activities. The questionnaires do provide specifics of a few such
atypical relationships. Under one such scenario the formal party and campaign collaborate to the extent that they agree that activities will be undertaken by the campaign and not the county party. Under another, formal party support of the campaign translates into support exclusively through what would be considered party-building efforts like voter registration. A handful of my county cases do fit these patterns. Generally, however, evidence of scenarios in which a high level of integration is associated with few activities is scarce.

It is also rare that integration is low, yet the party is very active. The cases that deviate from this rule display fervent responses. One county Democratic chair noted seven activities that the organization performed for the presidential ticket, but repeatedly emphasized the distance between the Dukakis campaign and the party. Of the candidate’s campaign, "They don’t care. They are strictly independent." These data lead to a notion of politics in which integrated and active qualities tend to go together. This is consistent with the findings presented in Table 16. But my data also lend some insight to the mechanics of the relationship.

With the following question I asked the party informant to indicate the motivation for his party’s
involvement in the campaigns. The example provided was used for Democrats, asking them about presidential activity.

If your county party organization was active in the Dukakis general election campaign, please tell how, in general, your county party organization happened to become involved.

I used parallel wording for Republicans to ask about involvement in Bush’s campaign and the relevant senate campaign. Although not conclusive, the answers are illuminating.

In some cases the personnel from the county party are actually recruited by the campaign organization. A retired farmer from a county in rural Indiana remarks that he as Democratic county chairman was contacted to be the coordinator of the Dukakis campaign and to assist the coordinator of the Wickes senate campaign. This shows a strong link in that county between the party apparatus and the two campaigns. It takes the form of common personnel. With the respondent’s involvement in both the county party and campaigns, it is not surprising that cooperation is deemed excellent in the presidential and senate ties. And consistent with the general relationship between activities and integration, these ties were highly integrated and very active, performing nine and eight activities for the presidential and senate campaigns. Because the party chairman was recruited by the campaigns, it is difficult to
tell whether the integration preceded activity or the reverse in this case. But other responses are more certain.

The most common reply indicated that involvement in campaigns is the normal role of the county party. "It is part of my job as a county chairman to get people involved." There were a number of similar responses.

[Dukakis] was our party nominee. Support is expected.

We always support our party candidates.

We are automatically in support of all Republican nominees.

I think it is fair to interpret these answers in terms of integration, even though they do not deal explicitly with it. They signify a working relationship in place between the formal party and the candidates. As a result, the party tends to be active.

I offer this explanation with some caution. The data here are not as strong as I would like them to be. Because the format was open-ended, a number of people did not respond to the question. Many offered information about specific activities the county party executed, obviously interpreting the question differently than I had intended. Having said this, notably there is also a small partisan difference. The Republicans seem more willing than the Democrats to offer that it is part of their official job to become involved in the campaign. If future research should
show that there is indeed a difference in this direction, then it would follow that accepting campaign involvement as an intrinsic part of the county party's role would facilitate integration. This would be consistent with the aggregate patterns that show a Republican edge in integration.

Still, representatives of both parties stressed this role, sometimes indignantly. When asked about how the party became involved in the campaigns one Ohio respondent said, "We're Democrats, what else?" Another Democrat was even more vehement: "In my opinion this is a stupid question." There were other of similar responses. The answers are instructive because they show that for some there is a deeply-held belief that the formal parties should be involved in campaigns. However this, contrary to what the tone of the responses suggests, is not obvious to everyone. Many of the respondents described a path to campaign involvement that did not take county party involvement as a certainty.

In examining the route to and reasons given for formal party involvement in campaigns I have begun to think about the mechanics of the relationship between activities and integration. Over a long time frame this is likely to be a reciprocal one, as with most political phenomena. The data do not facilitate the type of analysis needed to come to a conclusion about this. They do show no relationship
between integration and the type of activity performed, whether it is for the benefit of a single candidate or for the entire party. But it is clear that further investigation of the issue is warranted.

Beyond the basic connection between activities and integration, there is a second finding displayed in Table 16. This is a pattern of consistency across presidential and senate ties in terms of the relationship between activity and integration. In the highly integrated counties there is no difference at all in activity levels across the two office ties. For the other levels of integration, the difference is negligible. The figures shown are summaries and could still disguise inconsistencies on the individual county level. In this case it appears that they do not.

In a full 54% of the total counties (136) there is absolutely no difference in the extent of party activity on behalf of the senate and the presidential candidates. Eighty-four percent of the counties saw a difference of two or fewer in the extent of party activity over presidential and senate domains. The pattern suggests a formal party that does not discriminate in its involvement in different races. This is a crucial finding because it eliminates one of the likely causes of party activity, namely the competitive situation of the political environment.
Since this analysis deals with formal party activity at the county level, ideally one would have indications of competition at that same level. I have to rely on a less-than-perfect indicator of competition, namely that at the state level. Still, it is remarkable that the county parties were equally as involved in senate and presidential races, contests that in 1988 held different opportunities for overall party success. The situation in Ohio demonstrates this well. The results of the early polls pointed to slim leads by George Bush in the Ohio presidential contest and Howard Metzenbaum, the senate incumbent. In *The Columbus Dispatch* poll taken in early September of 1988, among registered voters in Ohio the Republican presidential ticket held a five percentage point advantage over the Democratic ticket. That same poll showed Metzenbaum leading Voinovich by ten percentage points. Considering the slim margin separating the candidates in each contest, the margin of error of the poll (plus or minus 4.5%), and a sizable proportion of undecided respondents, both races appeared competitive at this early date (September 11, 1988).

In the following month, however, the margin separating the senate candidates widened; Metzenbaum established a substantial lead. A poll conducted by *The Cleveland Plain Dealer* in mid-October found Metzenbaum leading Voinovich by twenty-six percentage points, with fifteen percent still
undecided or refusing to respond (October 16, 1988). The climate would be equally ominous for Voinovich immediately before the election. Even the county party chairman from his home base of Cleveland forewarned sure defeat. The Plain Dealer reported that the Cuyahoga County Republican chairman said "it appears that Voinovich's only chance is if Bush runs up a large margin against Dukakis and Voinovich is tugged into office on Bush's coattails (November 6, 1988)."

Perhaps the most telling development was the GOP's change in focus from Voinovich's senate candidacy to his likely 1990 gubernatorial bid. Speculation about Voinovich running for governor of Ohio in 1990 was a matter of public record as early as September, two months before the 1988 general election. The Plain Dealer headline on September 16 read, "Voinovich eyes statehouse: says a Senate loss could lead to the governor's office." Neither Voinovich nor other notables in the party would concede the senate race, but early discussion of 1990 betrayed the predictions of a Republican loss.

Like the situation for Voinovich, the prospects for a Democratic presidential victory werewaning across the nation over the course of the fall. Polls in Ohio, however, had Dukakis trailing Bush by only single digits from September through November. So in this race, despite signals of a likely national loss, the Democrats held out
hope until the end of the campaign. The grim overall situation for Dukakis revitalized an Ohio campaign that would otherwise be dwindling. The Plain Dealer reported that

Dukakis' Ohio campaign is undergoing rapid growth in its staff as Dukakis places increasing emphasis on the state. While his campaign is struggling in much of the South and the Mountain West, Dukakis in enlarging his staff in Ohio -- now guaranteed to be one of the biggest battlegrounds during the final months of the presidential campaign (October 12, 1988).

The campaign added seasoned personnel to Ohio, among these Don Sweitzer as political director, a longtime and well-respected Ohio operative. The reaction to Sweitzer among Ohio Democrats was positive. As the election approached, the situation for the Democrats was one in which the Dukakis efforts harbored hope while Metzenbaum was virtually assured victory. The Republicans admitted the grim prospects for their senate candidate while they held an adequate lead in the race for the presidency. With this situation in mind, it is clear that there were conflicting incentives for party activity. If the formal party involvement were to be channeled into races where it stood a chance of influencing the outcome, then in Ohio both of the parties would have concentrated on the presidential contest. In Indiana, with Lugar leading Wickes by as much as 55 percentage points and Bush maintaining a 20 percentage point lead over Dukakis, there
were few incentives for formal party activity in either race. Thus it is telling that the formal parties were equally active in senate and presidential campaigns in Indiana and Ohio. This speaks to remarkable impartiality and suggests that formal party activity is subject to incentives beyond short-term political gain.

Beyond the consistency across different office ties, there is another puzzling aspect to the formal party activity. The bivariate relationship between party and activity, namely that the Democratic activity surpassed the Republican, is perplexing. Across Indiana and Ohio, the Democratic activity means for senate and presidential ties are at 6.0 and 6.2 respectively. They stand at 5.9 and 5.8 for the Republicans. This is curious given the Republican advantage in integration and the relationship between integration and activity. Logically, the Republican formal parties should be more active than the Democratic ones. And if not more active, the expectation is that they are equally active as past studies have shown. Although I cannot explain this, my measure of activity may be suspect. Counting is not the ideal way to measure activity.

The activity data say nothing about the depth or quality of the party’s involvement in a campaign. A well-organized and staffed phone bank might be vastly more important than an ineffective one. Likewise, one charismatic surrogate speaker could produce better results
in raising funds than a small-scale mailing. My analysis does not account for differences in scale or effectiveness of activities. This may be important and also help explain why, as I noted earlier in this chapter, activity does not vary positively with population. It is likely that the activities of the urban party are indeed more extensive than the rural party’s.

There is another drawback to this activity analysis. My conclusions speak to party involvement in campaigns for two of the most prominent and visible offices, the presidency and the U.S. senate. The stakes are high in both races. Some of the responses to the questionnaire implicitly reflected the importance of the presidential campaign. Explaining involvement in the presidential contest, one said succinctly, "Bush is at the top of the ticket." The importance of the presidential nominee notwithstanding, U.S. senate contests are especially important to the state parties. As a Republican operative explained, the main interest of the party organization lies at the state level, despite the attention given to the presidential race. In either case, the senate and presidential contests typically overshadow races for lower offices. Because of this, my cases are probably not representative of party ties centered about lower political offices. On the other hand, they provide a baseline for a more comprehensive analysis of party organization. The
presidential and senate ties unfold an interesting dynamic among integration, population and level of party activity that demands further study.

Conclusion

It is not entirely clear how and why integration happens. Nor is the complete effect that it has known. It is likely that the integrated quality of parties in Ohio and Indiana has some bearing on the political environment of those two states. And party integration is probably due to some combination of the variables that I have identified. These include population and activities, as well as some of the larger-scale contextual factors like state and party. The analysis in this chapter has highlighted some of the questions that remain if one is to get a tight handle on integration. In the next chapter I consider whether the findings that pertain to Indiana and Ohio can be extended to a comprehensive appraisal of integration in U.S. parties as a whole.
I use the median as a summary statistic rather than the mean to guard against the population extremes disproportionately affecting the measure. With these data the populations of the larger counties do constitute extremes. Still, the means show a pattern similar to the medians with counties of low integration being marked by relatively low population (Mean=34,983). However the mean population of the counties with middle-range integration (160,891) is slightly higher than that of those with high integration (151,469).

See for example Gibson et al. 1983, "Assessing Party Organizational Strength."

This is the same coding strategy used in Chapter 3 to measure symmetry between party-based and campaign-based integration readings.

I included gathering petition signatures, although not applicable to the presidential and senate general election campaigns, because the survey also asked the formal party about its involvement in nomination campaigns. It was important provide a congruent list in both domains.

The format of the questionnaire may have contributed somewhat to this consistency. The county party respondent was asked to check off in two columns of boxes activities that the party performed on behalf of the presidential (column 1) and the senate (column 2) candidates. The activities were listed in the same sequence in each column. Given the proximity of the questions and the alignment of the activities, with relative ease the respondent could check-off an identical set of activities in each column. It remains, however, that even this requires the realization -- conscious or not -- that the party engaged in the same activities for the presidential and the senate candidates.

See Norrander, 1986, "Determinants of Local Party Campaign Activity."
CHAPTER VI
INTEGRATION ACROSS THE UNITED STATES

The results reported thus far are based on the data set that I created. It provides comprehensive information about counties in Ohio and Indiana. Having closely studied the 1988 campaigns in those two states, and with the benefit of personal interviews, I have abundant and useful evidence for Ohio and Indiana. But even with all of the advantages of an intensive study, the data still yield a two-state analysis. This prompts me to question the relevance of my findings for parties nationally.

One would question the national significance of results from any two states. But conclusions based on Ohio and Indiana should be exceptionally suspect because of the unique qualities of those cases. In fact, the very rationale used to focus the intensive analysis on these cases is the same one that prescribes caution in extending the findings to the national level. Initially the fact that Ohio and Indiana, compared to other states, have some of the strongest political parties made an analysis of integration in these states especially attractive. When
designing the research holding only rudimentary expectations about integration, I reasoned that Ohio and Indiana would be sensible choices due to, among a host of other reasons, the strength of their parties. As described in Chapter 2, this crucial case strategy isolates cases where integration is most likely to occur. And I believed that with strong formal party organizations, the circumstances in those two states would foster party integration. But now having concluded my two-state analysis, I must question whether the extent of integration and my explanations for it are simply unique to Ohio and Indiana, both marked by strong parties and other characteristics that render them similar cases.

As Verba warns, "[When] the cases are few in number, we end up with an explanation tailored to each case (1967 p. 113)." That my explanations fit Ohio and Indiana is not sufficient. Therefore I return to the question of whether the findings are generally applicable to parties in the U.S. or whether the clinical approach has generated findings that are particular and unique to Ohio and Indiana. The answer to this lies in an analysis of data on party integration from a national sample of counties. These data are taken from a study of 1988 campaign and party activists conducted by principal investigators John H. Kessel and William Jacoby."
There are two purposes behind the analysis of national data. The first is validation. This analysis will let me determine whether the findings in the previous two chapters have relevance nationally or whether Ohio and Indiana are deviant cases. The second purpose is to explore new analytical territory. The national data allow the examination of patterns across groups of states, moving beyond the fruitful yet confined two-state comparison in Chapters 4 and 5.

**Presidential Data**

The national data set has a presidential focus; it contains questions that allow measurement of presidential integration at the county level in a manner identical to the one used for Ohio and Indiana. It does not provide information about other offices. Although the definitive validation of the two-state findings would involve both the senate and presidential ties, I am more than satisfied with the availability of comparable national data for presidential ties. In fact, national data on presidential integration are inherently more valuable than data on senate integration. In 1988, as in any presidential year, there was a presidential contest in every state, while relevant senate information would have been available for only one-third of the states. And in looking exclusively at Dukakis and Bush ties across states, the analysis is
able to hold constant variables such as incumbency and party experience. Both of these would vary across states in a national study of senatorial ties. So although only national presidential data are available, they are far more important than senate data for my analysis.

As in the previous chapters, the focus in this one is on the extent and nature of party integration, only this time at the national level. Once again it uses a party-based measure of integration. In the national data set there are questions about contact and cooperation between the formal party and the campaign that are virtually identical to those included in the Ohio/Indiana study. From these I construct a three-category measure of integration using the same coding strategy developed from my own data.

The cases analyzed from the national data set have the same specifications as data grade 4, as described in Chapter 3. That is, the requirement for inclusion is a party-based score of presidential integration for the county. There are 121 such cases nationally, 68 Democratic and 53 Republican. The cases presented for the sake of comparison from the Ohio/Indiana data are from data grade 4. There are 177 cases of which 81 are Democratic and 96 are Republican.
Aggregate Consistency

I have previously reported that about one-half of the county cases in Ohio and Indiana, when assessing both senate and presidential integration together within a county, are highly integrated. Isolating only the presidential ties in those two states, the pattern is similar although the distribution is not identical. Forty-five percent of the ties are highly integrated, with still smaller proportions of cases falling into the categories of medium and low integration. As shown in Figure 7, the national data on presidential integration confirm this.

![Diagram showing presidential integration across Ohio/Indiana and National Data]

Percentages are based on 177 cases in the Ohio/Indiana data set and 181 in the national.

Figure 7

Presidential Integration across Ohio/Indiana and National Data

The similarity of the distributions is a basic yet encouraging sign for the national significance of the two-state findings. Had the distributions differed
considerably, I would have immediately questioned the inferential value of the two cases. However, a like distribution is not a sufficient condition for generalizing the results. The levels of integration tell only the partial picture. They do not speak to the patterns associated with integration, which are at the heart of Chapters 4 and 5.

The prior analysis demonstrated that the Democratic party differs from the Republican in Ohio and Indiana with respect to level of integration. The GOP is the more integrated of the two. The national data, as displayed in Table 17, also reveal this same general pattern. However, Democrats and Republicans are much less distinctive nationally than they are in Ohio and Indiana.

The figures in Table 17 refer to the percentage difference between Democrats and Republicans within each level of integration. The larger the value, the more dissimilar are the distributions. The partisan advantage in each category is indicated by an R or D to the right of the value. 21% R, for example, means that there is a twenty-one percent difference in the percentage of Republican and Democratic cases of high integration in the Ohio/Indiana data. And in this there is a higher percentage of Republican than Democratic cases.
Table 17
Partisan Differences in Party Integration: Indiana/Ohio and National Comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of County Integration</th>
<th>Percentage Difference Between Democratic and Republican Presidential Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ohio/Indiana Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>21.0% R (N=77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>1.7% D (N=53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>19.3% D (N=47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scores marked with an R mean that there is a higher percentage of Republican than Democratic cases in the given category of integration. Those with a D represent a Democratic dominance.

In both samples, the Republican ties are more highly integrated than the Democratic ones. The Republican dominance in counties with high integration and the Democratic dominance in the least integrated counties plainly show the direction of the relationship. The explanation used in Chapter 4 to explain the Republican dominance in integration in the two-state study -- the divergent roles played by the formal parties -- applies nationally as well. The Republican organization serves an instrumental role for its campaign, while the Democratic organization operates more under the guise of a referee. However, there is an intriguing difference in the magnitude of the relationship between party and integration across the two samples. While approximately six percentage points separate the parties in the categories of high and low
integration in the national data, the difference is closer to 20% in the Ohio/Indiana data. Indeed this difference is substantial, but I resist rejecting my findings from Ohio and Indiana on this basis alone. Instead, my attention turns to another possible explanation of integration. This deals with the way past electoral performances affect integration.

A basic reality of recent U.S. presidential contests is the success of the GOP. The reasons for and the consequences of Republican victories have been debated extensively. But I believe that there is one potential consequence of this success, and the corresponding Democratic failure, that has not been thoroughly considered: the psychological impact of an environment marked by repeated success or failure on the political party.

Starting with the premise that the parties respond to past electoral results, there are at least two forms that this response takes. One type of response is learning, wherein the party realizes what does and does not work in a campaign. For instance, as described previously, the Voinovich charge that Metzenbaum was soft on child pornography was an apparent failure. In retrospect, Republicans would likely agree that a similar appeal would also be ineffective in future elections under similar circumstances. This is learning. The second form the
response takes is rationalization. In this the party projects responsibility for given political outcomes. It is the dynamic associated with this rationalization that encourages or discourages party integration.

Through a process of projection, the party and the individuals who constitute the party are able to lay blame or give credit for electoral results. Party integration is facilitated by the process of crediting successes but hindered in the course of assigning blame. This is based on the assumption that organizations and individuals will readily take personal credit but will also share credit for successes. At the same time all actors will tend to resist personal responsibility for losses.

In many respects these dynamics are analogous to the logic of campaigning as identified by Marjorie Randon Hershey (1984). Hershey says that a winning candidate can never be completely sure about exactly which tactics worked in her campaign. She just knows that something worked. In subsequent campaigns, the candidate will follow the same strategy so as to not run the risk of changing something that had been instrumental in her past success. In a similar fashion, party actors, unable to completely isolate factors contributing to the successful outcome, will acknowledge the positive effect of all involved. For the formal party apparatus, this includes the campaign. The campaign will likewise credit the formal party. In GOP
presidential politics of 1988, then, the formal party saw a legacy of success extending back twenty years with only one interruption. Following this logic, the formal party and the presidential campaign each accept the constructive role of the other.

The dynamics of repeated failure, on the other hand, involve an exclusive focus in assigning blame. The Democratic presidential campaign elements will cast blame on the one constant in all elections: The Democratic Party. And the formal party will find it easy to, in an effort to reconcile repeated failure, divert blame from itself to the campaign organizations. With the recent history of failure in the presidential arena, then, the task for both the Democratic formal party and the campaign organizations became winning despite the involvement of the other.

Complementing this argument is the fact that Dukakis campaign leaders were significantly less likely than Bush campaign leaders to have held party positions (Kessel 1992 p. 84). This means that there was an inherent tie for the Republicans. And in this context, the willingness to credit widely on the Republican side and not on the Democratic makes sense.

Past electoral performances and the accompanying rationalization create environments that either encourage or discourage integration. The net result for Republican
presidential ties is one that enhances integration; the reverse is true for Democrats. This logic explains the pattern of relatively high Republican presidential integration nationally. The deviance of Ohio and Indiana — namely that the Republicans surpass the Democrats in integration by a much wider margin in the two states than they do nationally — can also be explained using this same process of rationalization.

For the Democratic parties in Ohio and Indiana, the recent record of presidential outcomes at the state level is one of failure. The context of each state, however, would suggest a more competitive environment. Both states have strong Democratic parties. In 1988 in Ohio the state executive establishment and the two U.S. senate seats were controlled exclusively by the Democrats. There was also a Democratic majority in the congressional delegation and the general assembly. Among the population, there were sizable pockets of robust Democratic support in segments of the state, most notably the urban areas of northeastern Ohio. Taken alone these factors would forecast Democratic success.

Aspects of the political environment in Indiana would have raised Democratic hopes for victory as well. Although not as pronounced as in Ohio, there were elements of Democratic strength in Indiana. The congressional delegation was Democratically controlled while the GOP held
the state House by only a small margin. And the first congressional district, demographically black and industrial, always holds particular promise for Democratic support. These factors taken in conjunction with the general strength of the Democratic Party in Indiana suggest that the party should be more competitive in presidential contests than it is.

In both Ohio and Indiana, then, the situation for Democrats was of hopes being perennially dashed because the environment encouraged expectations of some success. With this, the dynamics of blame would dominate for the campaign and the party organizations, each projecting responsibility for the losses on the other. This alone would sustain a poorly integrated party environment, but factors specific to the presidential contests in 1988 compounded the problem.

The Democrats in Ohio witnessed a divisive primary season. The Ohio primary on May 3 was on a relatively late date, yet there was still some suspense. In the weeks immediately prior to the election, only Dukakis and Jackson remained as viable candidates, but there had been months of primary activity assuming an open field. The party in Ohio was split. The allegiances of the state executive establishment alone were divided among the Democratic nomination field. The Governor, Richard Celeste, who had close ties to the state party organization failed to
endorse any candidate. And in the fall, there was a substantial distance between Celeste and the presidential ticket.

There were also some unpleasant skirmishes among the Democratic ranks in the early stages of the nomination season. For a time the Gephardt campaign pursued a legal suit to remove all of the other Democratic presidential candidates from the primary ballot in Hamilton County (Cincinnati). The Gephardt campaign had not met the filing deadline and reasoned that erasing the competition from the ballot would be a way to level the field. The Gephardt director in Ohio acknowledged that, as expected, this strategy caused a number of "tense moments."

In the fall the various Democratic nomination organizations were at least nominally drawn into the Dukakis campaign. But the impact of such early divisions is not easily overcome. They may have depressed Democratic integration in Ohio. Likewise, circumstances specific to the presidential contest also may have impaired integration in Indiana. As I described in Chapter 4, the Indiana Democrats converged around the promising candidacy of Evan Bayh and, as perceived by the Dukakis organization, neglected the presidential effort.

If the conditions inhibited party integration for the Democrats, the contrary held for the Republicans. In Indiana the selection of Quayle was a coup for the party.
Before the Republican national convention in New Orleans, and in the absence of speculation in the national media about his selection, there was serious talk in Indiana of Quayle as Bush’s running-mate. Weeks before the convention one Indiana delegate described for me his strategy of vice-presidential support, including one scenario that had Quayle paired with Bush. At the time it was easy to dismiss a possible Quayle candidacy. This is all the more reason that it should be perceived as a weighty accomplishment for Indiana Republicans. The dynamics of credit prevailing, Indiana compared to the national scene would have been ripe for integration.

In Ohio, the absence of any true competition and the early support for Bush as a nomination candidate may have reinforced presidential integration. Organizations never materialized in Ohio for Kemp, Haig or DuPont. And the Dole operation folded early. What remained were the Robertson and Bush campaigns, with the party regulars falling in line behind Bush, the heir apparent. Thus factors peculiar to Ohio and Indiana, as well as the logic of credit and blame may have exaggerated the gulf between Democrats and Republicans in these two states compared to the national setting.

In addition to partisan differences, I previously reported that counties in Ohio were more highly integrated than counties in Indiana. Using the national data I cannot
examine whether differences comparable to this one exist between Ohio and Indiana or other states because there are too few cases from any given state in the national sample. But I am able to do what is not possible with the Ohio/Indiana data, that is inspect regional patterns.

Given the contemporary questions of U.S. politics, a regional analysis is inherently worthwhile. There are enduring questions of the partisan status of the South. And there is political uncertainty created by a population that has shifted geographically. Both steer one towards a geographic analysis. But my interest runs still deeper. In addition to other similarities, Ohio and Indiana are geographically proximate states. One needs to determine the extent to which the results reported in Chapter 4 and 5 are characteristic of a portion of the Midwest or whether they can be generalized to other regions. While I do not arrive at a conclusive answer to this question, the results do clarify the nature of party integration.

In presidential ties integration displays a regional pattern. This pattern shows that the Democratic and the Republican parties are dissimilar. Dividing the national sample into four regions (East, South, Midwest and West) I find that there is a regional difference in integration across parties. Table 18 presents the results. It rank orders the four regions based on the percentage of highly integrated county cases in each region.
Table 18
Regional Differences in Presidential Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>South (58% 19)</td>
<td>East (57% 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>East (43% 14)</td>
<td>Midwest (36% 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>West (27% 11)</td>
<td>West (33% 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Midwest (22% 9)</td>
<td>South (20% 20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ranks reflect percentage of cases in each region that are highly integrated. This percentage is the first figure shown in parentheses. The second figure is the total number of cases in the region. A rank of 1 denotes the most integrated region and 4 the least integrated.

In separating both regional and partisan groupings, there are relatively few cases in each region. Because of this I will note only the most pronounced patterns: the differences in integration between the parties in the South and the Midwest. Although other partisan differences may be important, I will focus on this one to illustrate how the general political environment of a region as well as campaign strategies may affect presidential integration.

Table 18 shows that the most integrated region in the Republican party -- the South -- is the least integrated Democratic region. The situation in the Midwest is also variable. The Republicans in the Midwest among all regions are the least integrated. At the same time the Midwest ranks as one of the more integrated regions for the Democrats.

These partisan differences within these two regions are distinct. Eleven of the nineteen Republican cases in the South are highly integrated while only four of the twenty southern Democratic cases are the same. This lack
of Democratic presidential integration in the South can be explained by both general explanations and those specific to the 1988 contest.

In terms of the general political environment of the South, the Democrats face conditions that are unfavorable towards party integration. The formal party presence is weaker there than in the rest of the country. Gibson et al. (1983; 1985) found that despite the electoral success of Democrats in the South, the party apparatus tends to be the weakest in the South among all regions at both the state and local levels. This frail Democratic infrastructure probably influences integration, but the conservative character of southern Democratic politics is another likely suspect.

Ideologically, southern Democrats are more conservative than the party is nationally. There is evidence of this in the national data. Compared to the rest of the nation, the South has 7% more formal party respondents who consider themselves conservative. It has 17% fewer who describe themselves as liberal. Add to this a Democratic Party that consistently offers the nation a presidential nominee who is more liberal than Democrats in the South. Especially disconcerting to this region is that in spite of its monumental efforts to select a moderate Democrat through a regional primary, like Super Tuesday in
1988, the party still failed to select an ideologically acceptable candidate.

Democratic candidates Dukakis, Gore and Jackson split the delegates chosen on March 9 -- Super Tuesday. In the contests, most of which were in southern states, those three candidates each received roughly equal numbers of delegates. The total delegate count after Super Tuesday did show Dukakis with a slim lead in the Democratic field. But what is important is that Super Tuesday did not have the intended effect of propelling an ideologically moderate/conservative Democrat like Gore into the lead. The vocal proponents of a southern regional contest rationalized that still Super Tuesday drew candidates to the South, which in turn provided a good opportunity for southern voters (Germond and Witcover 1989 pp. 290-291). The candidates were forced to tailor an appeal to southern voters and to campaign in the region. However for many Democrats in the South, Michael Dukakis was a candidate too liberal to support.

Even when the South was more solidly Democratic than it is today, the Republicans were successful in presidential contests. Jimmy Carter carried the South handily in 1976. But with that exception, from 1952 forward the GOP did very well in the South in presidential elections. It is possible that this legacy of failure for the Democrats might have affected integration in much the
same way that it did in Ohio and Indiana. Amid signs that
would normally signal some success, the Democrats
continually failed to meet the expectation. The results
would be a distance between the formal party and the
campaigns in the South along with depressed integration.

The situation in 1988 also did nothing to enhance the
likelihood of Democratic integration in the South. Despite
Dukakis's strong showing on Super Tuesday, the battleground
in these states was embittered. The accounts of the
Democratic Super Tuesday battle are rife with conflict.
Gore and Dukakis repeatedly charged that Gephardt was
inconsistent and disingenuous, especially regarding his
claim that the U.S. had been subjected to unfair
international trading practices (The New York Times, March
9, 1988). And Germond and Witcover describe the Super
Tuesday campaign as marked by "three-way bickering" between
Gore, Dukakis and Gephardt (p. 287)

The problems in the South extended even beyond this
rift. The black and liberal support of Jackson was
alienated by the selection of Lloyd Bentsen, not Jackson,
as Dukakis' running mate. But probably more troubling were
the events surrounding the announcement of the selection.
Jackson felt that he had not been appropriately informed
beforehand by Dukakis and this created a strained
relationship. Even though Jackson technically gave his
blessing to the ticket, there was tension. The New York
The Dukakis general election campaign did little to offset these barriers to party integration in the South; despite early reports to the contrary, the region was not an integral part of the campaign strategy. Immediately after the Democratic convention, accounts appeared of a "50-state strategy" that the Dukakis campaign would use to win the November election. The candidate himself had pushed for this, but his staff prevailed with a more restricted focus later in the general election season. In the final weeks of the contest, the campaign conceded the real status of the South and told The Washington Post about the "18-state strategy". Of these states that the campaign considered important and promising for an electoral college victory, only two -- Maryland and West Virginia -- were southern states.

The Dukakis organization was also ill-suited for the South. The campaign was short on experience, especially in this region. Very few of the personnel had prior training in presidential campaigns, and most of those with experience were seasoned in races in the Northeast (Gergen...
and Dionne 1991 p. 202). If experience indeed enhances integration, then this also helps explain the peak of Democratic presidential integration in the North.

The general strength of the state Republican parties in the South creates the flipside of the situation facing the Democrats. The GOP has built a formidable state presence. This began with the strong showing in the South of Eisenhower in 1952. More recently it has been bolstered by the "southern strategies" of the Republican National Committee.

The tradition of Republican presidential successes, with the absence of a divisive nomination campaign in the South, also created an favorable environment for integration. On Super Tuesday, George Bush overwhelmed the remaining Republican hopefuls, whose chances for the nomination had already looked bleak. Bush used his Super Tuesday campaign to emphasize his ties to Ronald Reagan and to the southern Republican establishment. In doing this, he effectively avoided jumping into the fray with Dole, his nearest rival. But perhaps more importantly, he catered to the formal party apparatus, clearing the path to integration in the fall. The South also served Bush particularly well by stopping the efforts of Pat Robertson, who was expected to do well in that region.

The partisan differences in midwestern integration may also be a function of general factors and those specific to
1988. The urban centers of the Midwest -- especially Chicago, Milwaukee, and Detroit -- are Democratic strongholds. Their activists are experienced and the conditions are suitable for party integration. Unique to 1988 in Michigan, for instance, the formal party leaders made an all-out effort to actually control the campaign, rather than following their past strategy of distancing themselves from the candidate's organization. The less populated areas of the Midwest may also have promoted Democratic integration.

The Democratic remnants of populist parties, especially in North Dakota, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Iowa demonstrate a vitality not generally present in the rural areas. At the same time there had never been much support for Reagan's policies in the Upper Midwest; in this same area the reception to Bush's economic message was tepid. This combination of Democratic strength and perceived opportunities for Dukakis may have hindered Republican integration in much of the Midwest. On the other hand, the Dukakis campaign had the advantage of an atmosphere friendly to integration in both the rural and urban areas.

On face value this midwestern regional pattern violates the lesson gleaned from Ohio and Indiana. It is puzzling that while in Ohio and Indiana the Republicans are highly integrated, the Midwest is the least integrated region for the Republicans. This, however, may be an
artifact of the national sample. There are no Ohio Republican cases and only one Indiana Republican case for which there are integration scores in the national data set. Thus midwestern integration as seen in the national data does not necessarily reflect the levels of integration in Ohio and Indiana. Because of this, the regional pattern need not contradict the two-state findings.

Beyond the substantive relevance of the regional patterns, they are important for my general conceptualization of integration. The regional rankings do not follow those for party strength as measured by Gibson, et al. Nor do they correspond to other classification schemes like Elazar's or Johnson's state political culture. I take this as confirmation that the concept of party integration is not simply a surrogate for some other known and measured characteristic of political parties.

Thus far the data have shown that to a large extent national presidential integration is similar to that in Ohio and Indiana. In particular, the basic dominance of the Republican party in integration is consistent across both samples. But as I have just displayed, there are regional differences. The problem that this creates is that the two states analyzed are both from the Midwest, a region with distinctive integration patterns that challenge some of the findings of the Ohio/Indiana analysis. So as a
final check on the two-state results, I use the national data to look at the county-level dynamics of integration.

County-Level Agreement

Recall that in Ohio and Indiana total party integration was related to county population. Using my measure that combined presidential and senate integration in a county, I found that the cases of high integration were clustered in the urban counties. Presidential integration in the national sample displays the same association. This is shown in the analysis of county population rank and the three-category measure of presidential integration.

In order to compare the national data with those from Ohio and Indiana, I first measure population in terms of rank, as opposed to raw population figures. Doing so provides for a meaningful visual display of the patterns in the data. Population rank is calculated in the national data by ordering all counties in the sample, without concern for state designations. It does not control for discrepancies across states generally. But this is not a concern because in this chapter my primary interest is in the comparison of county parties in Ohio and Indiana to county parties nationally.

To compare the populations of the two samples, in each data set separately I have ranked all of the counties for
which there is a presidential integration score. The largest county is given the rank of one. Table 19 summarizes the relationship between integration and population over national and state domains. The numbers reported in the table are standardized scores reflecting the median population rank within each level of party integration. What comes through clearly in this table is that the pattern in Ohio and Indiana persists on a national level.

Table 19
Population and Party Integration:
National and State Comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Presidential Integration</th>
<th>County Population Rank</th>
<th>National Data</th>
<th>Ohio/Indiana Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>41.2 (N=82)</td>
<td>40.2 (N=46)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>55.2 (N=53)</td>
<td>53.8 (N=43)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>58.8 (N=48)</td>
<td>54.6 (N=32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scores presented are median population ranks which have been standardized to account for differences in the number of population ranks across the two samples. There are 108 ranks in the national sample and 125 in the Ohio/Indiana sample. In both samples the ranks are ordered from largest to smallest, with the largest county being given a score of 1.

Nationally, as well as in Ohio and Indiana, the highly integrated counties tend to also be the larger counties, while the counties with low presidential integration are generally smaller.

The pattern is consistent in both data sets. The median population ranks in each show that there is a progression from the larger to the smaller counties moving from levels of high to low integration. In addition, the
scores across the two samples are remarkably similar. Note for example the agreement in population rank between the two samples in counties of high presidential integration (41 and 40 for the Ohio/Indiana and national data respectively). This agreement gives me further confidence that Ohio and Indiana are not simply two anomalous cases.

The similarity between the two-state and national patterns is also seen with the raw population scores. To exploit the precision of the raw population figures contained in each data set, I calculated the correlation between raw population and integration. This analysis uses an eight-category integration measure. The correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) is -.02 for the Ohio/Indiana data and .02 for the national data. These coefficients do not show the same relationship that was indicated in the examination of population rank and integration (three-category). They do, however, demonstrate once again consistency across the two data sets. This agreement is also born out in an analysis of activity.

Just as in the two-case study, the formal party organizations in the urban areas tend to be vital. And both of the 1988 presidential campaigns blanketed the urban areas in the largest states. Both candidates campaigned frequently in California, Texas, Illinois, and Ohio. Additionally, Bush spent much time in New Jersey, with Dukakis in New York, Pennsylvania and Michigan. With an
emphasis on these large states, a campaign focus on the urban areas of each suffices. They provide, in essence, the greatest return for the dollar when the candidate need not concern himself with geographic balance within the state.

In Chapter 5 I found no support for the reasonable notion that relatively high levels of activities in the urban areas may account for the relationship between population and integration. Consistent with this, the national data show that there is little difference between the urban and rural areas with respect to activity level. I display this in Table 20.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Mean Activity Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest</td>
<td>10.8 (1.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallest</td>
<td>11.1 (1.96)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20
Activity Levels for Counties of Different Populations (National Data)

Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. Means are based on the total number of cases of 40, 41 and 40, ordered from the urban to the rural areas.

Counties of all sizes are similar to a striking degree. Parties in the smaller counties perform virtually the same number of activities as do parties in the larger ones. Again, what this measure of activity misses is the complexity and effectiveness of the activities in the urban areas. But there is no direct relationship between
population and activity level in a county, yet further evidence that Ohio and Indiana are not idiosyncratic cases in terms of party integration.

The national data set permits the examination of another question not covered by the two-state analysis. This question is of the relationship between competition within a county and party integration. In Chapter 5 I noted that the analysis of competition in Ohio and Indiana was lacking in that it relied on state-level, rather than county-level, indicators of competition. The national data set measures the competitive nature of counties.

The measure of county party competition is subjective and is taken from the perspective of the county party respondent. Respondents were asked the following closed-ended question:

How would you describe party competition within your county? Is it:

Non-competitive -- Republican Party dominant
Somewhat competitive -- favoring Republican Party
Very competitive -- balance between parties
Somewhat competitive -- favoring Democratic Party
Non-competitive -- Democratic Party dominant

On the basis of this measurement of competition, there does not appear to be a relationship between county party competition and party integration. This is true when assessing simply whether the county is competitive or not. It also holds when considering competition in terms of
partisan dominance. Thus neither the level of competition nor the partisan balance of a county appears to affect integration.

Conclusion

The findings reported in this chapter have encouraging implications for understanding party integration. On one level, they substantiate the results that my two-state study generated. In this sense, I bolster my confidence that the concept of integration and my measure of it are critical elements in grasping the nature of U.S. parties.

But the breadth of the national perspective augments the original findings. Especially as they relate to regional patterns, the national data move one to think about explanations for apparent inconsistencies between the results of the regional analysis and the results from Ohio and Indiana. In this respect, the exercise of extending the analysis to the national level has been successful. It not only supports most of the earlier findings, but it also forces one to consider refining the conceptualization of and explanations for integration. Such a process looks much like what Eckstein had envisioned when he described the usefulness of heuristic case studies.
NOTES


²There is one minor difference in both the contact and cooperation questions involving the Bush campaign. The two-state study asks about the formal party's relationship with the county Bush campaign, while the national study refers to the local Bush campaign. I am confident that the formal party response in both cases alludes to the county campaign. The rigid county structure of the Bush organization makes this a reasonable assumption.

³I collapse the 24 cells that are possible in the crosstabulation of the contact and cooperation questions for the national data based on the results of the reduction/affinity analysis of the data from Ohio and Indiana. This capitalizes on the richness of the data from Ohio and Indiana and relies on the standard measure used before. Refer to Chapter 3 for documentation.


This classification includes only states that are contained in the national sample and have at least one county for which there is an integration score.
Taken from the national data, the ideological distribution comparing the South to the remainder of the nation looks like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Non-South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < .01

The New York Times reported both the Associated Press (AP) and CBS News delegate counts. AP had Dukakis at 454, Jackson 397 and Gore 346. The CBS News figures showed Dukakis at 539, Jackson 466 and Gore 404 (March 10, 1988).


This integration measure essentially reflects the population ranks determined in the creation of the three-category integration measure. These were shown in Figure 5. I have eliminated rank 9 for this analysis because, as explained in Chapter 3, it potentially violates the order of the cooperation variable.

The pattern of agreement in level of activity persists across the Indiana/Ohio and national data. The magnitude of the activity means, however, differs because the national data provides fourteen activity variables compared to eleven in the Ohio/Indiana data.
Chapter VII
CONCLUSION

An understanding of the integration between the formal parties and campaigns is important in order to grasp how these two components coexist in contemporary U.S. politics. This dissertation has offered some basic explanations of the integrated quality of parties. Clearly, however, issues remain to be addressed.

I am generally satisfied with the application of the concept of party integration to Ohio/Indiana and national settings. If indeed the value of a conceptualization is in providing a framework for the analysis of political phenomena, then my general approach to parties along with the specific concept of party integration are useful. But the analysis of integration compels me to look at some additional questions. The first of these asks about the independent effect on party integration of the various explanatory variables incorporated into this study. To this end, the results of a preliminary multivariate analysis show that party, state and activity level are important predictors of party integration.

198
Table 21 displays the results of two regression analyses, one for presidential integration and one for senate integration. The data used to test these models are from Indiana and Ohio. The dependent variables are the eight-category measures of integration that correspond to ranks 1 through 8 in Figure 5. The independent variables include in the equations are party and state (both dummy variables), level of activity (number of acts) and county population (raw figure).
Table 21

OLS Regression Estimates of the Effects of Party, State, Activity Level and County Population on Party Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Presidential Integration</th>
<th>Senate Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regression Coefficient</td>
<td>T-ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party (Dummy)</td>
<td>-.86** (.24)</td>
<td>-3.36 (-2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State (Dummy)</td>
<td>-.70** (.19)</td>
<td>-2.80 (-1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Level</td>
<td>-.12** (.22)</td>
<td>-3.08 (-2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 177 179  
R² .09 .10  
Adjusted R² .08 .09

Standardized regression coefficients are listed in parentheses. Coefficients do not appear when variables were discarded for the model on statistical criteria.  
*p<.05 (two-tail)  **p<.01 (two-tail)

As the R² values suggest, neither the presidential nor the senate model fits the data very well. Still, the coefficients indicate that party, activity level and state are all determinants of presidential integration. For senate integration, activity level and party have strong effects. Noticeably absent from the estimates for both presidential and senate integration are coefficients for
county population. As the model is specified, it has no independent impact on party integration.

There appear to be considerable similarity between presidential and senate integration in terms of explanatory variables, with only party distinguishing the two significantly. Party is a more important predictor of presidential than senate integration. This finding is consistent with the results of the bivariate treatment of party and integration across different office ties in Ohio and Indiana.

The analyses reported in this dissertation oblige me to look even beyond a multivariate approach to integration. Some of the results require that I broaden the concept and measure of party integration. Consistently the analysis has turned to the importance of short-term forces in explaining the general integration patterns and the deviations from these. The significance of these election-specific factors is especially important in the analysis of Indiana in 1988 as well as the regional patterns shown in the national data.

It appears that some of the precursors of integration are unique to a particular election and some are long-standing. In either case, if party units consciously set out to integrate -- that is integration does not just happen -- then one particular piece of information would be
useful. It would be valuable to know for what purpose formal parties and campaigns integrate.

Taken narrowly, this question would lend insight into the integrated relationship itself. If the contact and cooperation were, for example, for the stated purpose of coordinating the campaigns of all of the party's candidates, then that would begin to tell something about the relationship between integration and activities. Such information would also move one to consider more specific dimensions of integration, in addition to the general notion measured in this dissertation. Taken in a broader sense this question would approach why formal parties and campaigns integrate. Knowing why integration happens would likely tell something about the relative importance of an election-specific context. If, for instance, a party tie was integrated because of the lure of likely victory in the election and not the general complexity urban politics, then that would help develop the mechanics of integration.

The information that I have just described would be useful to refine the concept and measurement of integration. But in the absence of definitive data, one basic piece of information would be a suitable substitute. Namely, if one knew whether the integrated relationship was typical, then one could infer the importance of election-specific and long-term factors. This would be relatively
easy to ascertain and would provide a first step toward building from the foundation laid in this study.

In addition to refining integration, it is important to begin to think about a more comprehensive view of the party organization. Given that the party is a complex structure that includes a myriad of party units and ties, I have provided a view of only the tip of the iceberg. This research does accomplish the goals of a heuristic case study. In analyzing the integrated quality of senate and presidential ties, its findings are instructive but also point to further aspects of integration that need to be addressed. The next logical step would be to extend the study to different party ties. Through systematic examination of ties centered around different offices, as well as ties connecting units at different geographical levels, one could begin to consider the party as a complex organization, rather than as isolated units. With this, the usefulness of this general approach to political parties could be assessed.

Especially compelling are the ties between two candidate units, particularly in the context of Joseph Schlesinger's work. Earlier I mentioned that my own empirical study implicitly tested Schlesinger's conceptualization of parties. This is true in that sense that my conceptualization owes much to Schlesinger. But an examination of party ties between two candidate units would
be a more direct test. I, however, would resist leaving the formal party apparatus entirely out of the equation. The results showed that the formal party can take an active role in coordination, thereby enhancing candidate-candidate integration. It can also be instrumental in creating an environment hostile towards integration. Still, highlighting ties between two candidate units is crucial to Schlesinger's conceptualization as well as my own. This candidate focus is also significant for understanding integration between the formal party and the campaigns. Because candidates compete with other candidates for the resources of the formal party, even the tie between the party apparatus and the campaign cannot be considered in isolation.

At some point, I would also like to extend my focus beyond the confines of just two types of party units, the formal party and the campaign. In particular, it would make sense to identify a separate unit that may be tied to both the formal parties and the campaigns -- the cluster of paid political professionals. My sense is that isolating such a unit would be fruitful especially for the visible electoral domains of the presidency and congress.

Including paid professionals in the calculus of parties responds to the reality of contemporary electoral politics. That, also, is precisely what is compelling about this general conceptualization of political parties.
It allows one to examine parties as they act in actuality. And in doing so it addresses inherently meaningful questions.

The primary question in this regard is one of functionalism and it stems from the current environment of electoral politics. It is impossible to ignore the fact that candidates have bases of power independent of political parties. This dissertation began by placing this fact in the context of a paradox, juxtaposing vital candidate organizations with strong formal parties. I argued that this situation need not be paradoxical if intra-party politics does not operate under zero-sum rules. But ultimately the solution is more complex than that. Political resources are finite and organizations risk ruin if they cannot demonstrate an ability to win elective office. With this in mind, I believe that an integrated relationship is a functional relationship for the political party. Typically it would be in the interest of both the campaign and the party apparatus to be integrated.

The formal party has much to gain by creating and nurturing an integrated relationship. In an environment of entrepreneurial electoral politics, the party organization survives by creating a bond between itself and its candidates. Without it, the party apparatus runs the risk of forfeiting its reason for existence -- placing its identifiers in office. This is equally important for the
campaigns because some of the greatest damage to a candidacy can come from within the ranks of its own party.

There is, however, another functional dimension to party integration. This one moves beyond the relevance of integration for the parties themselves and considers the importance of party integration for the entire political system. Integrated political parties may be a way to approximate some semblance of party responsibility in a system that takes candidate-centered politics as a given. To the extent that the formal party apparatus is a constant in politics, voters may be able to hold elected officials accountable by means of their authority over political parties. This bond would not resemble the traditional model of responsibility in which formal parties control their candidates and elected officials. But it would be one that comes as close as possible given the realities of contemporary politics. A bond between the formal party and the candidates' campaigns might provide the link, albeit delicate, that ultimately connects the electorate to governmental officials who are largely responsible for their own electoral success.
NOTES

1 This eight-category variable approximates an interval-level measure of integration which is important in order to meet the assumptions of these regression analyses.
APPENDIX

The following pages show the text of the letter accompanying the mail questionnaire and the questionnaire itself. The letter was printed on the letterhead of The Ohio State University. The questionnaire was printed on white, legal-size paper and folded (with a half-sheet insert) to create a six page booklet. This appendix shows the complete text of the questionnaire (Ohio Democratic version) and the general format of the document. However, due to the marginal requirements of this dissertation, the formatting is not exactly as it was in the original questionnaire. This reproduction also abbreviates words that were spelled out in the original document.

The letter, the questionnaire and a return envelope with (metered) postage provided were mailed to the local campaign and formal party informants.
November 7, 1988

Dear Political Activist:

I am conducting a research project at Ohio State that focuses on politics in Indiana and Ohio. I am interested in your observations, as a person who has been involved in politics, and your own personal activity during 1988. I hope you will take a few minutes to respond to my questions.

There are five sections to the enclosed questionnaire, but you need answer only the sections that apply to you. Please follow these guidelines to determine which sections you should complete.

If you were active in any candidate's presidential nomination campaign organization, answer the questions on Page 1.

If you were active in a presidential general election campaign organization, answer the questions on Page 2.

If you were active in a US Senate general election campaign organization, answer the questions on Page 3.

If you are a county party leader (county party chairman or other), answer the questions on Pages 4 and 5.

Everyone should answer the questions on Page 6.

The answers you give will be kept confidential. The number in the upper left corner of Page 1 of the questionnaire is only a mechanical device that will be used to determine the rate of response and to send follow-up letters to people who have not returned the questionnaire by November 18.

If you would like to see a summary of the results, indicate this on the bottom of Page 6. I will mail these to you as soon as they are available.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation in this project. When you have completed the questionnaire, simply place it in the reply envelope and drop it in the mail.

Sincerely,

Barbara Trish
IF YOU WERE ACTIVE IN THE CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION OF ANY OF THE CANDIDATES IN THE 1988 PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION CONTEST, ANSWER THE QUESTIONS ON THIS PAGE. IF YOU WERE NOT ACTIVE, SKIP AHEAD TO PAGE 2.

1. Which candidate did you work for in the 1988 presidential nomination race?

2. What was your position in that campaign?

3. Was this a paid or a volunteer position?
   [ ] Paid    [ ] Volunteer

4. On approximately what date did you start in this position? Month _______ Year _______

5. How did you initially become involved in the campaign?
   [ ] I was contacted about working for the campaign (answer 5a)
   [ ] I contacted somebody about working for the campaign (answer 5b)
   [ ] Both (answer 5a and 5b)
   [ ] Other (please specify then go to 6)

5a. Who contacted you and what was his or her position?
   Name _____________________
   Position ___________________

5b. Who did you contact and what was his or her position?
   Name _____________________
   Position ___________________

6. Other than yourself, about how many people worked in the campaign organization you were active in? ______

7. If there were others working in your organization, how many had paid positions and how many volunteered?
   Paid _________    Volunteer ________
8. Which of the following activities, if any, did your campaign organization perform before the Democratic national convention? (mark all that apply)

- [] gathering petition signatures
- [] recruiting volunteers/campaign workers
- [] telephoning
- [] door-to-door canvassing
- [] distributing campaign literature
- [] contributing money
- [] registering voters
- [] fundraising
- [] organizing campaign events
- [] providing surrogate speakers
- [] others (please specify)

9. About how much contact would you say your campaign organization had with the following units during the nomination campaign?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A Great</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>None</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cnty Democratic Comm</td>
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<td>Ohio Democratic Comm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Nat’l Comm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Candidate’s Ohio Cpgn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Candidate’s Nat’l Cpgn</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. How would you describe the cooperation between your campaign organization and these other units?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>So-So</th>
<th>Not so</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>No Contact</th>
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</thead>
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</table>

PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY

IF YOU WERE OR STILL ARE ACTIVE IN THE GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION OF MICHAEL DUKAKIS, ANSWER THE QUESTIONS ON THIS PAGE. IF YOU WERE NOT ACTIVE, SKIP AHEAD TO PAGE 3.

1. What position did you hold or do you still hold in the general election campaign of Michael Dukakis?
2. Was this a paid or a volunteer position?
   [ ] Paid  [ ] Volunteer

3. On approximately what date did you start in this position? Month _______ Year _______

4. How did you initially become involved in the campaign organization?
   [ ] I was contacted about working for the campaign (answer 4a)
   [ ] I contacted somebody about working for the campaign (answer 4b)
   [ ] Both (answer 4a and 4b)
   [ ] Other (please specify then go to 5)

4a. Who contacted you and what was his or her position?
   Name ______________________
   Position ______________________

4b. Who did you contact and what was his or her position?
   Name ______________________
   Position ______________________

5. Other than yourself, about how many people worked in the campaign organization you were active in? ______

6. If there were others working in your organization, how many had paid positions and how many volunteered?
   Paid _______  Volunteer _______

7. Which of the following activities, if any, did your campaign organization perform on behalf of Michael Dukakis during the general election campaign? (mark all that apply)
   [ ] gathering petition signatures
   [ ] recruiting volunteers/campaign workers
   [ ] telephoning
   [ ] door-to-door canvassing
   [ ] distributing campaign literature
   [ ] contributing money
   [ ] registering voters
   [ ] fundraising
   [ ] organizing campaign events
   [ ] providing surrogate speakers
   [ ] others (please specify)
8. About how much contact would you say your campaign organization had or will have with the following units during the presidential election campaign?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>A Great</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cnty Democratic Comm</td>
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<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Democratic Comm</td>
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<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Nat’l Comm</td>
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<td>[ ]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dukakis’s Ohio Cpgn</td>
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<td>[ ]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dukakis’s Nat’l Cpgn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metzenbaum’s State Cpgn</td>
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<td>[ ]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metzenbaum’s Cnty Cpgn</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

9. How would you describe the cooperation between your campaign organization and these other units?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>So-So</th>
<th>Not so Good</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Ohio Democratic Comm</td>
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<td>Democratic Nat’l Comm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dukakis’s Ohio Cpgn</td>
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<td>Dukakis’s Nat’l Cpgn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metzenbaum’s State Cpgn</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

***US SENATE GENERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY***

IF YOU WERE OR STILL ARE ACTIVE IN THE GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION OF HOWARD METZENBAUM, PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS ON THIS PAGE. IF YOU WERE NOT ACTIVE, SKIP AHEAD TO PAGE 4.

1. What position did you hold or do you still hold in the general election campaign of Howard Metzenbaum?

2. Was this a paid or a volunteer position?

   [ ] Paid      [ ] Volunteer

3. On approximately what date did you start in this position?
   Month ____________ Year ____________
4. How did you initially become involved in the campaign organization?
   [ ] I was contacted about working for the campaign (answer 4a)
   [ ] I contacted somebody about working for the campaign (answer 4b)
   [ ] Both (answer 4a and 4b)
   [ ] Other (please specify then go to 5)

4a. Who contacted you and what was his or her position?
   Name ____________________
   Position ____________________

4b. Who did you contact and what was his or her position?
   Name ____________________
   Position ____________________

5. Other than yourself, about how many people worked in the campaign organization you were active in? ______

6. If there were others working in your organization, how many had paid positions and how many volunteered?
   Paid _______  Volunteer _______

7. Which of the following activities, if any, did your campaign organization perform or will perform on behalf of Howard Metzenbaum during the general election campaign? (mark all that apply)
   [ ] gathering petition signatures
   [ ] recruiting volunteers/campaign workers
   [ ] telephoning
   [ ] door-to-door canvassing
   [ ] distributing campaign literature
   [ ] contributing money
   [ ] registering voters
   [ ] fundraising
   [ ] organizing campaign events
   [ ] providing surrogate speakers
   [ ] others (please specify)
8. About how much contact would you say your campaign organization had or will have with the following units during the US Senate election campaign?

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<th>Unit</th>
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<td>Metzenbaum’s State Cpgn</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

9. How would you describe the cooperation between your campaign organization and these other units?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>So-So</th>
<th>Not so</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>No</th>
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<td>Ohio Democratic Comm</td>
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<td>Dukakis’s local Cpgn</td>
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COUNTY PARTY ACTIVITY Page 4

IF YOU HELD IN 1988 OR STILL HOLD A LEADERSHIP POSITION IN YOUR COUNTY DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ANSWER THE QUESTIONS ON THIS PAGE AND THE NEXT. IF YOU HAVE NOT HELD A COUNTY PARTY LEADERSHIP POSITION, SKIP AHEAD TO PAGE 6.

1. What position did you hold or do you still hold in your county Democratic party?

2. On approximately what date did you start in this position?
   Month ___________ Year ___________
3. Which of the following activities, if any, did your county party organization perform on behalf of the various candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination before the Democratic national convention? (mark all that apply)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Babbitt</th>
<th>Dukakis</th>
<th>Gephardt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gathering petition signatures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recruiting vol/campaign workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Telephoning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Door-to-door canvassing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distributing campaign literature</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contributing money</td>
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<tr>
<td>Registering voters</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing campaign events</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing surrogate speakers</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Gore</th>
<th>Hart</th>
<th>Jackson</th>
<th>Simon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Other (please specify activity and candidate)</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. If your county party organization was active in any of the nomination campaigns, please tell how, in general, your county party organization happened to become involved.
5. **About how much contact would you say your county party organization had with the following units during the presidential nomination campaign?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>A Great</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Cnty Democratic Comm</td>
<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Democratic Comm</td>
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<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Nat’l Comm</td>
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<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babbitt’s Cpgn</td>
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<td>[]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dukakis’s Cpgn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gephardt’s Cpgn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simon’s Cpgn</td>
<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. **How would you describe the cooperation between your county party organization and these other units?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>So-So</th>
<th>Not so Good</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Cnty Democratic Comm</td>
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<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
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<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
<td>[]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. **Which of the following activities, if any, did your county party organization perform or will it perform on behalf of Michael Dukakis and Howard Metzenbaum during the general election campaign? (mark all that apply)**

- gathering petition signatures [ ] [ ]
- recruiting vol/cpgn workers [ ] [ ]
- telephoning [ ] [ ]
- door-to-door canvassing [ ] [ ]
- distributing cpgn literature [ ] [ ]
- contributing money [ ] [ ]
- registering voters [ ] [ ]
- fundraising [ ] [ ]
- organizing cpgn events [ ] [ ]
- providing surrogate speakers [ ] [ ]
- [ ] others (please specify activity and candidate) [ ] [ ]
8. If your county party organization was active in the Dukakis general election campaign, please tell how, in general, your county party organization happened to become involved. ____________________________________

9. If your county party organization was active in the Metzenbaum general election campaign, please tell how, in general, your county party organization happened to become involved. ____________________________________

10. About how much contact would you say your county party organization had or will have with the following units during the general election campaign?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>A Great</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Deal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Cnty Democratic Comm</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dukakis’s Local Cpgn</td>
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<td>Dukakis’s Nat’l Cpgn</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

PERSONAL INFORMATION Page 6

EVERYONE SHOULD ANSWER THE QUESTIONS ON THIS PAGE.

1. In which county have you been politically active this year? _______
2. Besides political work, what is your principal occupation and who is your employer?
   Occupation ___________________
   Employer ___________________

3. During 1988 would you say you spent more time on political work than you did on your principal occupation, the same amount of time on both, or less time on political work than on your principal occupation?
   [ ] more time on political work
   [ ] same time on both
   [ ] less time on political work

4. During a non-campaign year would you spend more time on political work than on your principal occupation, the same amount of time on both, or less time on political work than on your principal occupation?
   [ ] more time on political work
   [ ] same time on both
   [ ] less time on political work

5. Would you characterize yourself as someone who (check only one):
   [ ] works for the party year after year, win or lose, whether or not you like the candidates or issues
   [ ] works for the party only when there is a particularly worthwhile candidate or issue
   [ ] other (please specify) __________________________

6. In general, how strongly do you support the Democratic party?
   [ ] extremely strongly
   [ ] very strongly
   [ ] moderately strongly
   [ ] not strongly

7. What was the year in which you first became involved in a campaign and what office was your candidate seeking?
   Year _____________ Office ___________________

8. Are you male or female? [ ] male [ ] female

9. What is your age? _______

10. What is your race? ___________
What is your permanent address and your permanent phone number?
Address __________________ Phone number (___)_____


LIST OF REFERENCES


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Lane, Mary Beth. 1988. "Ohio Bushmen punch all the right buttons." *The Plain Dealer*. October 16.


Sharkey, Mary Anne. 1988. "Voinovich eyes statehouse: Says a Senate race loss could lead to governor's office." The Plain Dealer. August 16.


