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Multiculturalism and the arts: An analysis of conceptual foundations and policy issues. (Volumes I and II)

Pankratz, David Barclay, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1992
MULTICULTURALISM AND THE ARTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTUAL
FOUNDATIONS AND POLICY ISSUES
Volume I
DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

David Barclay Pankratz, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1992

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Adviser
Department of Art Education
To the Memory
of My Parents
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The evidence that American society is characterized by racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity, and increasingly so, is inescapable. During the 1980s, all population groups showed a numerical increase. But the percentage of whites in the total population of 248,709,873 declined from 83.1% to 80.3%, while the percentage of other populations have increased: Black (11.7 to 12.1%), American Indian (0.6 to 0.8%), Asian (1.5 to 2.9%), and Hispanic (6.4 to 9.0%). These trends were fueled by several factors: heavy immigration by Hispanic and Asian groups; higher birth rates among peoples of color than whites; and lower death rates among the relatively younger Hispanic, Asian, and American Indian populations than whites.¹

There is every reason to believe that these population trends will continue. It is estimated that by the year 2000 one out of every four Americans will be of Black, American Indian, Asian, or Hispanic descent; by 2030, it is predicted that the figure will grow to nearly one in three.²

But to demonstrate, even unarguably, that American society is racially, ethnically, and culturally diverse, is not a sufficient basis to conclude that the same society is multicultural. "Multiculturalism" is a normative term. It embodies a
vision of an ideal state of affairs in a society; in particular, it comprises concepts and value commitments concerning how the cultural, political, economic, and social relations of racial and ethnic groups ought to be in American society. Multiculturalism also entails value positions in many spheres of human experience, both individual and social.

**Integrating Study of Policy Spheres**

Whenever questions of value arise in a societal context, especially those with implications for the public at large, those questions are likely to become a matter of debate over public policy. Public policies involve action and allocation of resources to achieve individual, group, and societal purposes, purposes rooted in human values and ideals. Policy issues arise when there is some conflict of values. Choice among values is necessitated, most often, by scarcity of resources such as time, materials, finances, and personnel. In contemporary American society, the process of making choices among policy options is extremely complex and inevitably involves advocacy activities by groups with interests in securing public resources to support their value positions and goals for society.

Over the past decade, and with accelerated momentum during the past five years, multiculturalism as a societal ideal has taken a prominent place in the complex policy contexts of the arts and arts education. In the arts policy world, this increased attention has been generated by strong and visible advocates for increased public support for the production and distribution of the arts of diverse cultures. Multicultural concerns are on the agenda of numerous arts service organizations as
well and, most significantly, have become a focus for discussion, planning, and action by public arts agencies at national, state, and local levels. In turn, these activities have yielded numerous questions of public policy: what artists and organizations should have access to public funds?; on what criteria should funding decisions be based?; who should be involved in the making of such decisions? and what balance should be sought between equal opportunity and equal results in the distribution of funds? This trend also raises questions about the goals and purposes of public support of the arts.

In the arts education sphere, interest in multicultural concerns has been led to a significant degree by academic theorists, some of whom extend concepts and arguments articulated in the developing literature of multicultural education. Others have addressed multicultural issues in the course of developing and sharpening arguments which critique a new and influential conception of visual arts education -- discipline-based art education (DBAE). It is argued that DBAE not only neglects consideration of the arts of ethnic cultures as a potential focus of study in art education but that DBAE theory, which calls for instruction in four basic disciplines thought to be essential to inquiry into art -- art production, art history, criticism, and aesthetics -- is incompatible with concepts and values underlying multicultural art education. But interest in multicultural art education is by no means limited to conceptual disputes in the halls of academia. Explicit expressions of commitment and implicit expressions of support to educating students in the arts
of America's diverse cultures have begun to appear in the policy arena as well -- in National Endowment for the Arts-sponsored cooperative plans for reform of arts education by state departments of education and state arts agencies and in state department of education curriculum guides and policy statements. Questions of policy, to date, have centered on what elements of art should be taught, the art of whose cultures should be taught, and how rationales for multicultural art education complement more general rationales for art education.

There are, not surprisingly, many ways to seek an understanding of these phenomena, i.e., the rise of multicultural concerns in policy contexts of the arts and arts education. A traditional means often utilized by policy analysts would be to first view policy-makers, interest groups, and even academics primarily as advocates for a point of view or, in more technical jargon, "interest-maximizers." Utilizing such a method, one would go on to analyze the politics of policy formulation -- who has influence in a policy context, the nature of that influence, the means by which influence is exercised, the accommodation of diverse interest groups through bargaining, negotiation, and trade-offs, and the salesmanship and public relations techniques involved in selling a final policy proposal to ultimate decision-makers and, in some cases, those potentially affected by a policy proposal. In this mode of analysis, the researcher focuses almost exclusively on policy processes. He or she also stands above the policy fray, in a particularly crucial sense, by avoiding or remaining value-neutral on the policy issues involved. No attempt is made to clarify,
analyze, question, or affirm the values and theoretical concepts which inform choices made by participants in a policy process.

This dissertation, on the other hand, will illustrate an alternative approach to analyzing policies, in this case, those regarding multiculturalism, the arts, and arts education. It is squarely within an emerging tradition of policy analysis which confronts the explicit and implicit values of policy positions, the concepts which embody those values, and theoretical presuppositions underlying choices of policy goals and means. In so doing, this mode of policy analysis takes as a given that persons, including those in policy contexts, are not merely collections of behaviors acting to maximize individual or group interests, but interpreters and makers of meaning and choices.

This dissertation also represents an effort toward methodological innovation. It combines features of the newer modes of policy analysis, outlined in brief above, with a traditional method of philosophy -- conceptual analysis. In conceptual analysis, the researcher probes the meanings of concepts as used in the formulation of arguments to support statements of belief. It can yield insights into how usage of terms such as art, culture, aesthetic value, and justice in arguments surrounding multiculturalism, public arts policy, multicultural art education, and discipline-based art education can fall prey to the pitfalls of language -- ambiguity, equivocation, and vagueness. Policy analysis, in turn, can examine whether proposed policies' goals are worthwhile and whether selected means are likely to effect achievement of these goals in an equitable and efficient manner.
The subject matter of this two-fold analysis, as indicated earlier, are public policies in both the arts and in arts education. This, in itself, is an innovation. To date, research on public policy and the arts has proceeded to the virtual exclusion of consideration of arts education policy. Policy analysts, from the disciplines of political science, sociology, and economics, have focused on a wide range of topics, including rationales for public support of the arts, historical and cross-national trends in government arts policy, controversies in policy making, and interrelationships between public and private support for the arts. The implications of these issues have been traced, almost exclusively, for visual arts and performing arts organizations, individual artists, and public arts agencies themselves. On the other hand, arts education researchers with policy interests have given their greatest attention, by far, to analysis and criticism of arts education programs of public arts agencies, specifically, NEA and state arts council-supported artists in residency programs.

The causes of this division of labor or, perhaps more accurately, separation of powers between arts policy and arts education policy researchers, is a matter for speculation. But, for now, it remains to spell out why this dissertation, with multiculturalism as its subject, seeks to integrate the study of policy in arts education and the arts. There are several reasons. First, those key concepts that will be subjected to conceptual analysis in the dissertation -- art, culture, artistic value, and justice -- cut across both policy spheres. Each, in its own way, forms the basis for premises in arguments for the goals and means of policies in both the arts and arts
education. Additional reasons for this integrated approach center on the interrelationships, in some cases quite obvious, between arts education and the arts.

It must be conceded at the outset, however, that too much can be made of the overlapping relationships between the arts and arts education in policy matters. After all, by virtue of its position as an area of educational policy, policy-makers in arts education face different types of policy issues than those faced by arts policy-makers. Decisions must be made about what, how, and whom to teach, and who is to teach. These choices, and those involving the allocation of resources, must also be made within bureaucratic, budgeting, and demographic contexts that, while some overlap exists, differ significantly from those found in the arts world. This different context also includes six intersecting sectors that influence policy in arts education.15

1) The federal sector includes the U.S. Department of Education, the National Endowment for the Arts, and, to a limited extent, the National Endowment for the Humanities. 2) Federal agencies are tied, in various ways, to the regulatory and curricular sector -- to state boards and departments of education, school districts, and colleges and universities, whose varied responsibilities include: setting standards for the accreditation, certification, and hiring of arts teachers, the production of curriculum guides and adoption of textbooks, setting instructional goals and graduation requirements, and monitoring student learning and teacher effectiveness. 3) Arts education and educational service organizations comprise the professional association sector. Through journals, newsletters, monographs, books, and
professional meetings, they communicate to their memberships about current developments and research in arts education. 4) The arts advocacy sector, composed of trusts, foundations, and corporate donors, has assumed the task of promoting, in varying degrees, formal arts instruction, artist residencies, and exposure to the arts programs. 5) The publishers of textbooks and tests and manufacturers of instructional materials and resources make up the commercial sector.

It may be desirable, at some point, to have a body of policy studies of the many intricate relationships within and among these sectors. Such studies could focus on: 1) varieties of intra-and inter-sector influences; 2) whether those influences might be characterized as weak or strong, direct or indirect; 3) whether the effect of the influence can be attributed to the a) prestige of the agency or organization, b) financial leverage, c) regulation, d) effective leadership, e) the conscription or mobilization of the various sectors for joint actions, or f) public relations and advocacy efforts; and 4) whether inter-sector relationships are collegial, adversarial, or partisan. But, for now, this brief outline of different policy sectors and the issues that policy-makers in arts education face is sufficient to show that arts education is a unique and important area of public policy.

With that concession in mind, the case can still be made that a final sector of the arts education policy environment is of particular significance, namely, the arts sector. The relationship between the two is multi-dimensional and dynamic. In simplified economic terms, the arts sector shapes the nature of the supply of the arts and arts education affects the demand side. The arts sector includes public arts
agencies at the national, state, and local levels, arts institutions, museums, performance halls, artists, galleries, collectors, critics, and historians. Government support of the arts, through funds that it distributes to arts organizations and artists, influences the style and content of art that is preserved, exhibited, presented, and produced. If a purpose of arts education is to initiate students into the complexities of the art world, then the kinds of art and arts institutions that government policies support, and how such support is administered, is of paramount importance to arts educators. Arts organizations, for their part, function as gatekeepers -- they determine what kinds of art are publicly available and, with public arts agencies, influence who has accessibility to such art; and as educational institutions themselves, arts organizations can serve as supplementary resources to school-based arts education or as competitors for scarce private and public funds for education, and can promote lifelong learning in the arts or not.\textsuperscript{16}

As for the relationships between education and demand for the arts mentioned above, some evidence suggests that a positive relationship exists between these phenomena. Several empirical studies show that educational attainment is the most significant predictor of attendance at cultural events.\textsuperscript{17} Another study reveals that early experience with art and the expectation that a person will understand a performance or art object are the most significant factors affecting participation in the arts.\textsuperscript{18} Similarly, a recent study concludes that "people who reported more socialization experiences [in the arts] also reported higher attendance at ... arts events."\textsuperscript{19} This empirical work has limitations. The definition of "education" as a
variable usually refers to years of schooling. Social scientists have yet to study the nature of formal arts education experiences of active arts participants. Forms of socialization such as music lessons, family trips to museums or arts performances, and art appreciation classes, which have been studied, seem to correlate highly with arts participation; but the effects of curriculum content, the continuity of arts instruction, or arts teachers on later arts participation, the object of virtually no research attention, remains a mystery. Still, it seems reasonable to conclude, on the basis of available evidence, that those who receive education in the arts and the kinds of educational experiences such persons have will shape the socioeconomic characteristics and aesthetic tastes of future participants in the arts. It follows, then, that arts education will similarly affect future beneficiaries of and contributors to public arts policy -- artists, arts administrators, board members, volunteers, patrons, policy-makers, and the public at large.

A final dimension of the relationship between arts education and the arts can be found in the activities of public arts agencies themselves. Most public arts agencies at the federal, state, and local levels in the United States consider arts education as one of their policy priorities. They grant funds to arts education programs and initiatives, offer rhetoric in support of the value of arts education, and, in some instances, have lobbied for arts education reforms, such as increased graduation requirements in the arts. The effectiveness of at least some programs by public arts agencies, in particular, artist residencies, has been subjected to considerable critical analysis. But the broader institutional effects of such
programs have received little research attention. While government agencies have failed to document their claims that artist residency programs serve as "catalysts" for the development of K-12 school-based arts education programs, arts educators have not documented the degree to which artist residency programs have come to serve as replacements or supplements to arts education programs within state and local school systems. Additionally, the ways in which government support of artist residencies has served as an imprimatur to attract funds from corporate and foundation funders remains underexamined. Finally, there is no research either on the values, attitudes, and decision-making processes of arts policy-makers and how these shape their views of arts education and the priority placed on it in decisions of arts policy.

My point here, however, is not primarily to point out policy research gaps in arts education and the arts. These unanswered questions, when coupled with earlier discussions of the consequences of public support for the arts and the impact of arts education experiences on the characteristics and aesthetic tastes of future arts audiences and future beneficiaries of contributors to public arts policy, serve to illustrate the multi-dimensional, dynamic relationship between policies in the arts and those in arts education. These discussions also serve to justify, I believe, the stress in this dissertation on an integrated study of arts education policy and public policy and the arts.
Current Policy Controversies and Reform Agendas

This dissertation, with its integration of conceptual analysis and policy analysis in researching multiculturalism, arts education, and public arts policy, comes at a propitious time. It has been said that the literature of multicultural education is bereft of impartial analyses of issues, that most writings are largely advocacy statements on behalf of personal points of view.\(^2\) The same could be said of writings that have accompanied the flurry of activity surrounding multiculturalism and arts policy. This dissertation, by virtue of its impartial analysis of significant conceptual and policy issues, should make a contribution to the rational formulation of public arts policy.

Such an analysis is also needed at this time because public arts agencies, despite overall growth in number and budgets that has been dramatic over the past three decades, are facing the greatest crisis of purpose in their shared histories. This crisis was spawned in 1989 by National Endowment for the Arts funding, in some cases directly and in others indirectly, of controversial works by artists Robert Mapplethorpe, Andres Serrano, David Wojnarowicz, Karen Finley, and Holly Hughes. The content of these works, critics claimed, was deeply offensive to many Americans' moral values and religious beliefs. In the eyes of assorted columnists, commentators, religious organizations, and interest groups, the NEA was the captive of avant garde artists, purveyors of pornography, and infected with an anti-Christian bias.\(^25\) Arts advocates, initially at least, often dismissed these claims with ad hominem attacks arguing, for example, that NEA critics were merely "homophobic" and that their attacks on government funding of certain works were
motivated out of a disguised fear and hatred of lifestyles they find strange and threatening. Others viewed these attacks as attempts to further the conservative social agenda that the Reagan administration never implemented, as merely a fund-raising ploy for conservative political candidates, as a way of keeping busy in the absence of a Cold War, or as an effort to censor the free expression of divergent viewpoints and ideas under the guise of a populist taxpayer revolt. Congress, for its part, instituted content restrictions on the kinds of art that could receive NEA funding during the 1989 appropriations process.

The 1990 reauthorization process for the Endowment yielded one House proposal to eliminate the NEA entirely on grounds that decisions about support for the arts should be made solely by private individuals and organizations. Another proposal called for a long list of content restrictions. However, bolstered by the conclusions and recommendations of a Congressionally-appointed, bipartisan Independent Commission,26 the final reauthorization legislation avoided these extremes. While it stipulated that the NEA Chairman must consider "general standards of decency"27 in making final grant decisions, the final legislation did reject specific content restrictions on the kinds of art the NEA could fund, arguing that the courts are the most appropriate forum to resolve obscenity issues.

Despite the passage of this legislation, there is no reason to believe that the potential for controversy surrounding the NEA and the idea of public support for the arts itself has been eliminated. Conservative interest groups and politicians have promised continued vigilance over NEA funding policies, decision-making processes,
and granting decisions.\textsuperscript{28} The impact of this period of controversy on the public's perception of the NEA and public arts policy is less clear. Not surprisingly, there has been no shortage of commentators willing to appoint themselves as spokespersons for the "American people." But it is reasonable to assume, I think, that public arts agencies, as a result of this controversy, are in need of a renewal of purpose.

One consistent definition of purpose for public arts agencies was offered by many arts advocates during this period. It consisted of a reaffirmation of Constitutional protections afforded freedom of speech and artistic expression, called "among our most important and cherished rights."\textsuperscript{29} The significance of this right, it is argued, is rooted in the significance of the individual artist -- "all art and the work of arts organizations flow from the creativity of the individual artist -- in solitude, in collaboration, in community."\textsuperscript{30} As applied to arts policy, the argument went as follows: The Congress may decide or not to establish grant programs to fund artists and arts organizations with public funds. But once it decides to do so, it may not direct a public agency to administer programs in a way that would abridge the Constitutional rights of grant applicants or recipients, including freedom of speech. Thus, content restrictions on publicly-funded art are inappropriate and unconstitutional.

This argument is supported by a considerable body of legal opinion.\textsuperscript{31} Conservative critics of the NEA remain unpersuaded. But whatever one's conclusions on this Constitutional issue, it cannot be concluded with any logical force
that the protection of artistic freedom therefore constitutes an ultimate purpose of or goal for public arts agencies. This is so, I believe, because "protection of artistic freedom" is most accurately thought of as the means of a policy rather than a purpose or goal. It is a principle that applies to how decisions should be made -- perhaps, arguably, one without which the work of public arts agencies would be severely compromised -- rather that a purpose which decisions should serve.

It is in this context of public arts agencies' search for a defensible sense of purpose, borne of controversy, that this dissertation on the subject of multiculturalism, arts policy, and arts education takes on added significance. Multiculturalism is being proposed, in many circles, as an important, even necessary, goal for public arts policy. Indeed, recent NEA Chairman John Frohnmayer articulated five new policy priorities for the NEA designed to "rebuild" the bridge between the arts and public, a bridge damaged during the year-long controversy. Among them are a renewed emphasis on arts education and the promotion of access to the arts in multicultural communities. But until multiculturalism and its implications for arts policy are subjected to critical analysis and evaluation, it is not at all clear that this goal will reinvigorate public arts agencies' sense of purpose in a defensible way.

This dissertation also appears at a time of almost unparalleled interest in arts education. A notable feature of this activity is the numerous calls for arts education reform from diverse sectors of the arts education policy environment. A Congressionally-mandated report by the NEA, Toward Civilization, detailed a long
list of recommended reforms: institution of basic arts education comprising intellectually rigorous, sequential instruction in the creation/production/performance, history, and criticism of each of the arts; assessment of student learning at the local, state, and national levels and evaluation of local and district programs; increased rigor in arts teacher preparation programs; and testing of arts teacher competencies. The NEA has also created the Arts in Schools Basic Education Grants (AISBEG) to foster cooperative planning between state arts agencies and state departments of education in support of "basic arts education." The Getty Center for the Arts, a program of the J. Paul Getty Trust, as mentioned above, has advocated and sought to demonstrate the value of the study of visual art through the integration and sequential arrangement of content from the four disciplines of studio production, art criticism, art history, and aesthetics. It also advocates evaluation of student achievement and art programs and increased focus on the theories, principles, and practices of these four disciplines in art teacher preparation programs. Finally, a large coalition of arts service organizations and arts education service organizations -- the Ad Hoc National Arts Education Working Group, under the direction of the American Council for the Arts and the Music Educators National Conference -- produced two reform documents: "The Philadelphia Resolution" and "Concepts for Strengthening Arts Education in Schools." These documents called for commitment to the teaching of the arts as disciplines to all students, integration of school instruction and learning experiences in arts
organizations, and teacher training which stresses high levels of artistic skill and knowledge of the arts.

Two points can be made based on these brief sketches: 1) that diverse sectors of the arts education policy environment are advocating reform; and 2) that there are many points of agreement in the recommendations made by these many policy actors. As James Hutchens has said,

Foremost is the dissatisfaction with the place and conduct of the arts in education...There is dissatisfaction with instruction that emphasizes the development of narrow skills at the expense of content and understanding, and there is agreement on the need for a conceptual base for arts education that integrates content from the disciplines of arts history, arts criticism, performance/creation, and aesthetics. Each advocates renewed vigor in accountability on which instructional goals, teaching, and programs must be continually monitored, and in which students are held accountable for learning . . . . [Finally], each argues, in its own way, that multiple voices across sectors with arts education interests are strategically important to the success of reform initiatives . . . and seeks a process of consensus building to move toward broad policy formulation on key issues in the field.36

The possibility of large-scale reform in arts education, whatever the merits of reformers' views, is complicated by many factors. First, there is the problem of terminology. To many, the term "arts education" is a misnomer and at best simply a useful convenience for referring, collectively, to education in the individual arts of music, visual art, theater, dance, and creative writing.37 Each of these disciplines has its own history, theoretical bases, content, traditions of practice, and, significantly, status within the schools. Thus, while it may be true that reform in arts education is needed, it is more accurate to say that each arts discipline has its own challenges in effecting educational reform. Another factor is the relationship between arts
education reform and the broader excellence in education reform movement. The 1980s saw countless research analyses, panel reports, and personal expressions of opinion which indicted American schooling on counts such as curricular incoherence, low expectations of students, lack of teacher and administrator professionalism and general mediocrity. "Excellence," "substance," and "rigor" became the watchwords of educational reform, concepts which, it has been shown, are regularly found in the rhetoric of arts education reform advocates. But the "excellence in education" movement has not been characterized by a singular view of the state of American schooling and the changes that are needed. The diversity of views is illustrated, significantly, by the fact that some educational reformers value arts education, while others do not. Views in the 1980s ranged from concepts of the arts as nonacademic, extracurricular activities that are worthwhile only for selected students, to the arts as essential elements in the education of all students. A recent example of this potential for tension between educational reform and arts education reform is the fact that the National Education Goals Panel, created by the President, is lukewarm in its support for arts education.

The American value system, at least as revealed in opinion polls, complicates the prospects for change in arts education. A 1985 study noted that unlike arts education courses, "other traditionally elective subjects, such as vocational education and foreign languages, are often viewed by parents...as more practical for college or career preparation." In a more theoretical vein, some commentators contend that the majority of Americans view education as a means to secure competitive
advantages in a technological, materialistic society. Hence the arts are seen as ornamental background to other more important activities. In contrast, other opinion polls reveal that clear majorities of adult Americans "believe that the arts should be taught as regular, full-credit courses." Yet polls such as these usually ask questions in the abstract without due consideration for scenarios requiring difficult choices among educational priorities.

A final factor affecting the possibility of arts education reform is the complex array of individuals, institutions and organizations that can facilitate or inhibit change in arts education. This complexity highlights the need for broad-based policy development which takes holistic views of the roles that the many leadership sectors shaping arts education can exercise. Although there is no shortage of cooperative arts education program models, descriptive accounts of these models often focus largely on a few key program elements as they have been developed and implemented in local situations. There are very few models of policy development in arts education, either those which describe processes in local situations or models which attempt to generate basic principles by analyzing, comparing and contrasting policy development processes in diverse situations. Further, the relationship between policy development and advocacy in arts education is close. Arts education advocacy deals with strategies to implement desired policy changes. But without sound policy development at its base, arts education advocacy can easily lead to action for action's sake, whatever its good intentions, with an array of unanticipated consequences.
This listing of possible impediments to reform in arts education is not by itself meant as a commentary on the validity of reformers' ideas and recommendations, as a definitive prediction of their potential success, or as an evaluation of proposed change strategies. Instead, it is designed to locate one area of theoretical contention in arts education, the challenge posed to discipline-based art education by advocates of multicultural art education, within the larger context of prospects for change in arts education. It must be stressed that issues underlying this dispute are issues among many others and that some sort of rapprochement between these perspectives will not necessarily pave the way for arts education reform, and will certainly not ensure change -- there are simply too many factors at work. Indeed, some have questioned the idea that conceptual unity, among those with policy influence is essential for effective public policy. Samuel Hope, for example, argues that "the issues given the most importance in politics, the media, and in general discussion among the citizenry are precisely those issues that generate the most debate...The mere presence of disagreement does not diminish interest in a policy issue. Under the right conditions, it seems that the more intense the debate, the higher the level of attention." In considering arts education, though, there would seem to be more than enough disagreement within the field, and from without, to yield considerable public attention. But no one could say with honesty that anything but those arts education activities that can serve as media events receive much public attention. Hope offers one possible explanation for this anomaly. This explanation has to do with the fact that the arts education
community, in his view, "has no policy oriented efforts that can begin to match those that can begin to match those that are operating in more publicly controversial fields." In other words, without an effective policy studies enterprise, policy disputes in a field will not yield public attention or pave the way for reform, but degenerate into ad hominem attacks and the mere protection of resources and influence.

It is in this spirit that this policy analysis of multiculturalism, arts education, and the arts is written. My aim is not to seek a forced marriage between discipline-based and multicultural art education in hopes of contributing directly to a particular reform agenda. By probing underlying concepts which inform policy arguments, I hope, primarily, to contribute to the quality of the debate itself. If, in so doing, I can help to generate thoughtful public attention to policy options in the arts and arts education, that is all to the good.

Summary of Dissertation Chapters

It remains to summarize the contents of each of the dissertation’s remaining chapters. Chapter II, "Foundations of Policy Research Methodologies," explores the epistemological and logical foundations of different methodological approaches to policy research. This extended inquiry is necessitated, in part, I argue, by the lack of tradition of policy research in the arts and arts education, at least as compared with the amount of policy research in other fields. If this dissertation is going to contribute to the development of a policy research tradition in the arts and arts education, then one of its aims must be the establishment of a defensible
methodological basis for such research. Establishment of methodological foundations, it is argued, is not merely a matter of transferring or applying research techniques practiced in other fields. The task is further complicated by the fact that policy research itself is currently in a state of methodological turmoil. The paradigm of positivism has dominated the practice of policy research for several decades. During the past decade, positivism was critiqued from diverse disciplinary perspectives and on various grounds: its conception of reality, view of knowledge, and assumptions about research. As applied to policy research, the critique has focused on positivism's value-neutral stance, its systematic avoidance of questions of value in research on the formulation and implementation of public policies. This chapter, then, explores several possible alternatives to positivistic policy research. One approach is rooted in analysis of the logic of the term "policy." A proposed definition, which is also rooted in assumptions about human nature and human agency, has implications for the subject matter of policy research and the rational evaluation of policies. These specific implications are spelled out in Chapter II. But I also argue that this logical analysis only goes so far as a corrective to positivism. It leaves unanswered and even unaddressed key questions, most notably, is it possible, and if so, how, to decide whether some policy purposes and goals and purposes are more worthwhile than others? An answer to this question, I argue, involves attention to policy arguments and policy prescriptions, namely, questions of why policies ought to be undertaken. One means of resolving value questions underlying policy prescriptions is interpretive social science, which entails explication
of the perceptions, values, and arguments of advocates of policy prescriptions. It is a sophisticated method of understanding the point of view of actors in a policy process. Interpretive social science, and additional means of resolving value issues in policy disputes such as critical theory and political philosophy have made, I will argue, contributions to the methodology of policy research. But none, by themselves, yields criteria for deciding among alternative policy prescriptions. It is here that Chapter II explores the potential of conceptual analysis as a resource in policy research. Its potential, I argue, is rooted in a view of values not as mere expressions of emotion, taste, or preference, but as acts of cognition. What follows is a discussion of the tools of conceptual analysis, which seeks to clarify how discourse can fall prey to the pitfalls of language. Definitions constitute an effort to control the meanings of terms within discourse. Special attention is thus given to the role of definitions in premises and arguments, especially the sorts of definitions used in practical, including policy, contexts. In this way, I argue, conceptual analysis and policy analysis are complementary tools in an integrated methodology of policy research. Using policy analysis, the researcher analyzes the effectiveness and justness of means chosen to achieve a policy purpose; conceptual analysis helps to clarify the value assumptions, and the concepts which embody those assumptions, as found in arguments about policy purposes themselves. Chapter II concludes with an exposition of how this integrated research methodology will be applied to the topic of this dissertation: multiculturalism, the arts, and arts education.
Chapter III focuses on defining key terms used throughout the dissertation, most notably, multiculturalism. The chapter begins with an historical review of definitions of the concept of culture, including those by literary humanists and anthropologists. It is revealed that these definitions are not as different as some might assume. Still, it is argued, any hope for an essential definition of culture is misplaced, given the open-textured nature of the term. This definitional quandary is complicated by the current crisis in ethnography, which has thrown doubt onto the possibility of understanding the "essence" of a culture. But, I argue, as with the concept of art, it may be possible to list some nonneccessary and nonsufficient conditions which can guide use of the term culture. Explication of these conditions are yielded through analysis of the terms "cultural diversity" and "ethnicity." These analyses conclude with a descriptive definition of multiculturalism leading, in turn, to consideration of how multiculturalism as a social ideal is conditioned by the American social structure and, significantly, possible actions that government can undertake relative to multiculturalism. It is the role of the state, I argue, that has contributed to the current rise of interest in multiculturalism. Other factors are cited as well, including the loss of institutional authority and the perceived gap between the promise of equal opportunity for ethnic minorities and actual socio-economic conditions. These explanations apply to multicultural interests in arts policy as well. But several other explanations, unique to the arts policy sphere, are examined: the expansion of the non-profit arts sector, shifting aesthetic tastes, past policies of public arts agencies, and, most importantly, interest group politics in arts
policy. Research on public policy and the arts, to date, has not considered the rise of multicultural concerns. This literature, which has focused on questions of justifying and assessing the impacts of public arts policy, is analyzed in terms of its neglect of multicultural issues. In conclusion, this chapter outlines the key conceptual and policy issues that have emerged with the rise of interest in multiculturalism in the area of arts policy.

Chapter IV represents an effort to understand the explicit and implicit policies of public arts agencies regarding multiculturalism. This interpretation has as its subject, for a variety of reasons, the policy mechanisms of state arts agencies. Policy mechanisms are the means by which public arts funds are made available to potential grantees. A full-fledged evaluation of the impact of state arts agencies' policy mechanisms on multicultural constituencies would require the presence of comprehensive, reliable, trend data that does not exist. Instead, it is the purposes and likely effectiveness of these policy mechanisms that will be analyzed. Policy mechanisms consist of many elements, in various configurations. Based on information gleaned from a significant sample of state arts agencies' grant guidelines, annual reports, special research studies, and long-range planning documents, many elements of these policy mechanisms will be analyzed: agency goals, eligibility requirements, evaluative criteria, the composition of agency staffs, boards, and review panels, application guidelines, and terms of grants. In addition, special agency initiatives and affirmative action plans, as they address multicultural concerns, are also analyzed. Finally, the policy language of state arts agencies, as
revealed primarily in justifications of policies and program goals, is subjected to conceptual analysis. Out of this examination of current practice by state arts agencies, several issues that are fundamental to multiculturalism and arts policy emerge. These issues, which center on the ideal of cultural pluralism, the relation of art and culture, affirmative action, and determining artistic value, form the substance of the next chapter.

Chapter IV begins with an analysis of historical conceptions of "cultural pluralism," views of how the political, social, and economic relations of cultural and ethnic groups ought to be in society. This analysis is necessary because many public arts agencies justify their programs as means to promote cultural pluralism. Usage of the term is fairly described as a "pluralism of pluralisms," and is traced through political theory, culture theory, and the social sciences, and is contrasted with ideologies of assimilation and amalgamation. The ideal of cultural pluralism has been critiqued on many grounds and from diverse points of view. These are reviewed and their discourse analyzed in terms of their usage of "cultural pluralism" and related concepts. Some critiques raise questions about the relation between art and culture, in particular, whether production and consumption of the arts of diverse cultural and ethnic groups can and does foster cultural pluralism in the society at large. The subsequent argument revolves around the claim that art "reflects" a culture. This claim is analyzed in logical and sociological terms, starting with the production of art in diverse cultural traditions. But greater attention is paid to the utilization of this art, since an understanding of how ethnic art is utilized is
a pre-condition for assessing its relation to the development of cultural diversity in society. Several dimensions of the utilization question are explored: artistic perception, patterns of consumption of the arts, the role of the marketplace in the production and consumption of the arts, and the arts' social functions and cultural meanings. The picture that emerges is equivocal. I argue that if it is not clear that the production and consumption of the arts of diverse cultural traditions fosters the development of cultural diversity in society, then a stronger justification for arts policy-makers to address multicultural concerns must be found. The concepts of justice, in general, and affirmative action specifically, are thus analyzed as possible justifications for the formulation of public policies in the arts. Many policy mechanisms utilized by public arts agencies are justified in terms of affirmative action, which is the specific application of concepts of justice to public policy settings. To calculate the potential costs and benefits of specific affirmative action measures is extremely difficult. Thus, I focus on general arguments that have been formulated to justify affirmation policies. Based on conceptions of compensatory justice, distributive justice, human rights, utilitarian justice, and equal opportunity, these arguments are analyzed on conceptual grounds and in terms of their implications for arts policy. A final conceptual issue with ramifications for arts policy is artistic value. Artistic value is invoked by public arts agencies as a key criterion in making decisions among potential grantees. But, it will be shown, the concept of artistic value has been challenged on many grounds, including the claim that artistic value is relative to specific cultural traditions. Unfortunately, the
disciplines of anthropology and sociology have not focused on this claim as a research priority. Sociologists, for their part, have either avoided questions of artistic value or worked to expose claims of artistic value as socially constructed, arbitrary, and a means of maintaining power relations. Still, there is no shortage of claims about artistic value. The more extreme claims are critiqued on logical grounds. But a major philosophical question remains: is value in art best thought of as one thing or as many? After analyzing the views that artistic value resides in art objects and that it resides in responding individuals, various claims for the instrumental value of art are reviewed, including the aesthetic, cognitive, moral, and religious value of art. Further, claims that the value of art resides in its social and cultural functions are analyzed. My conclusions on this issue are traced for their relevance to the formulation of public arts policy. The chapter concludes with a review of additional policy options with potential impact on diverse cultural traditions in the arts. But, I argue, any consideration of long-term policy options must, for a variety of reasons, include arts education.

Chapter VI constitutes an effort to understand the current and developing arts education policies of public arts agencies and departments of education. This interpretation focuses on agencies at the state level, in part, as a complement to the previous analysis of the public arts policies of state arts agencies. Also, state departments of education merit policy analysis because of their many policy responsibilities -- setting instructional goals and graduation requirements, the production of curriculum guides and adoption of textbooks, and supervision of
district-level program effectiveness. Two state-level policy initiatives will be analyzed: Arts in Schools Basic Education Grants (AISBEG) programs and programs of state departments of education. AISBEG programs are funded by the National Endowment for the Arts to promote cooperative planning between state arts agencies and state departments of education in support of "basic" arts education. Documents produced by a significant sample of the states participating in the AISBEG program will be analyzed. These documents include surveys of the condition of arts education in individual states, task force reports, and state-wide plans. The information to be examined includes questions posed and findings from survey documents, issues that planning documents address, justifications of arts education, mission statements, goals and objectives, and curriculum prescriptions. Documents produced by state departments of education, including curriculum guidelines and policy statements, are also analyzed. The information examined includes justifications of arts education, mission statements, goals and objectives, and curriculum recommendations. All of this material will be analyzed in terms of definitions of concepts such as art, culture, and multiculturalism found in prescriptions of policy goals and means to achieve those goals. What emerges from this conceptual analysis is the assumption, found in many of these documents, of the compatibility between discipline-based art education and multicultural arts education. This assumption is somewhat surprising given the conflict between these perspectives outlined in brief above. Not surprising, however, is the fact that none of the policy documents analyzed, because of their orientation to educational
practice, develop a theoretical argument detailing how and why these perspectives are compatible. I treat this assumption as an open question -- it is the primary subject of the next chapter.

Chapter VII begins with a brief exposition of the theory of discipline-based art education (DBAE). DBAE has many interpreters and can serve as a label for diverse, even conflicting, educational practices. This chapter focuses on DBAE theory as articulated by its primary academic proponents. Criticisms that focus on practices done in the name of DBAE are set aside. But, that done, there remains the significant multicultural critique of DBAE, which claims that DBAE theory neglects consideration of the arts of ethnic cultures and is incompatible with concepts and values underlying multicultural art education. This critique draws both on the literature of multicultural education and interpretive ideologies of art and culture. Each of these sources of ideas for multicultural art education advocates is reviewed and subjected to conceptual analysis. The chapter then turns to more specific questions. 1) If, as advocates claim, DBAE is broadly inclusive of the arts of ethnic cultures, does DBAE theory contain a sufficient rationale for such inclusion? Alternative arguments, including political, moral, and aesthetic arguments are reviewed for their utility in addressing this question. 2) Even if an adequate argument for broad inclusion is devised, can the disciplines identified by DBAE theorists -- production, history, criticism, and aesthetics -- accommodate this broad content? After reviewing arguments that those disciplines are Western culture-bound and hence incompatible with multicultural content in art education, I argue
that socio-cultural inquiry in art, rooted in the concepts and methods of sociology and anthropology, is both a compatible and necessary supplement to inquiry in the four disciplines identified by DBAE theorists to date. 3) Does DBAE's stress on curricular sequence and initiation of students into adult modes of inquiry in art render it culturally insensitive to the cultural backgrounds of students? DBAE theory contends that while art content should be organized sequentially, it does not contend that any particular sequence is an essential condition of a DBAE curriculum. I argue that this position leaves the issue of cultural sensitivity unaddressed as well as approaches to pedagogy. Diverse approaches to "culturally sensitive" pedagogy are explored. This chapter concludes, based on the analysis of the three questions posed above, with the exposition of an expanded, compromise view of discipline-based art education and multicultural art education, followed by a discussion and assessment of conditions needed for conceptual change and policy development in arts education.

The concluding chapter, Chapter VIII, begins with a discussion of the limitations of this dissertation as a research study as a prelude to an extended assessment of the prospects for policy research in the arts and arts education. First, research gaps in our understanding of the policy environment of the arts and arts education are reviewed. Then, informational, methodological, institutional, and political barriers to the production of policy research are analyzed. A number of possible remedies to constraints on the production of policy research are reviewed. These include the idea of policy studies of the many factors that shape the production and utilization of research in the arts and arts education. Another
possible remedy, the establishment of policy research centers, is evaluated in terms of possible institution bases for such centers. Finally, this chapter concludes with schematic analysis of relationships between producers and "consumers" of policy research and brokers between the two and, in addition, with a discussion of reasonable expectations of and defensible criteria of effectiveness for the utilization of policy research in the arts and arts education.

NOTES


6. See, for example, James A. Banks, Multi-ethnic Education: Theory and Practice (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1981); James A. Banks and James Lynch, eds., Multicultural Education in Western Societies (New York: Praeger, 1986); Donna M. Gollnick and Philip Chinn, Multicultural Education, 3rd edition (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1989); and Christine E. Sleeter and Carl A. Grant, "An Analysis


8. Ibid.


12. See, for example, Margaret Jane Wyszomirski, "Controversies in Arts Policymaking," in Mulcahy and Swaim, eds., *Public Policy and the Arts*.


15. For a full exposition of this typology, see Brent Wilson, "Reformation and Responsibilities: A Memo to Members of the Arts Education Establishment," Design for Arts in Education 90 (May/June 1989): 27-35.

16. For discussions of lifelong learning in the arts, see Judith Huggins Balfe and Joni Cherbo Heine, eds., Arts Education Beyond the Classroom (New York: American Council for the Arts, 1989).


20. Ibid.


30. Ibid., p. 1.


40. This conclusion is based on an August 15, 1991, memorandum from Dr. Sandy Dilger, Chair of the Public Policy and Arts Administration Affiliate of the National Art Education Association.


44. For examples of these cooperative programs, see Jonathan Katz, Arts and Education Handbook; and Council of Chief State School Officers, Options and Opportunities in Arts Education (Washington, DC: Council of Chief State School Officers, 1985).

45. For discussions of arts education advocacy, see "Advocacy: Substance or Fluff?," special issue, Design for Arts in Education 87 (November/December 1985); and Stephen Kaagan and Sarah Chapman, "Adopting Strategies for Advocacy and Action in Arts Education," in John McLaughlin, ed., Toward a New Era in Arts Education.


48. Ibid., p. 75.
Chapter II

FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

Chapter I contained a brief description of the research methodology of this dissertation, a methodology which integrates features of policy analysis and conceptual analysis. In this chapter, my aim is to provide a rationale for the choice of this methodology and to spell it out in greater detail. Formulating such a rationale, it will be seen, involves consideration of a number of epistemological and logical questions.

Chapter I also described, in brief, the kinds of policy research on issues in the arts and arts education that have been conducted to date. I concluded that policy analysis as a research methodology has been underutilized in these areas. The reasons for this state of affairs will be the subject of Chapter VIII. But, for now, it can be said that the relative lack of use of policy research methodologies in the arts and arts education is a mixed blessing. This conclusion is based on a distinction between two broad approaches to policy research: 1) discipline-centered and 2) problem-centered.¹ ¹) Discipline-centered policy research is conducted by academic researchers in the social sciences of sociology, political science, economics, and anthropology and is rooted in the histories, concepts, theoretical frameworks, and research methods of their respective disciplines. These researchers
study the causes, consequences, processes, nature, and content of public policies. Such research is primarily addressed to fellow members of the discipline, using the subject matter of policies to serve the purpose of refining basic concepts and theories within the discipline. 2) The problem-centered approach, while drawing on the concepts, theories, and methods of the social science disciplines, stresses the instrumental value of knowledge as directed to complex issues faced by policymakers. Adopting a problem-centered approach, policy researchers seek to draw implications from research conclusions for policy development, interpret and apply research-generated concepts for use as terms in policy debates, and gather primary data or assemble existing data to fill in knowledge gaps about options in formulating and implementing policies.

This distinction between discipline-centered and problem-centered policy research can be related to a frequent criticism of existing arts education research. As D. Jack Davis has argued, arts education researchers have too often allowed fidelity to basic disciplines' research methods to "force them into research models that elude the real issues of the field." Vincent Lanier has levelled a similar charge against arts education researchers utilizing new methods from sociology and anthropology. Rephrasing these critiques in terms used above, it could be argued that arts education research has been too discipline-centered to the neglect of a problem-centered orientation. Whatever the merits of this critique, and it will not be examined here, it is fair to say, I believe, that the relative underutilization of policy analysis by arts education researchers can prove advantageous in one regard. Art education researchers, as potential uses of policy research are explored, may
well be in a position to achieve a defensible balance between discipline-centered and problem-centered approaches. Doing so, however, will be a difficult task.

While differing in purpose from discipline-centered policy research, even problem-centered policy research, as noted above, draws on the methods of basic social science disciplines. Formulating a methodological basis for policy research in the arts and arts education must also at least consider the methods of social science disciplines. But the difficulty in doing this is borne of methodological turmoil in these disciplines. In terms of policy research, this turmoil is characterized by challenges to the practice and theoretical underpinnings of positivism. Discussion of this controversy forms the first section of Chapter II.

**Epistomological Foundations: Challenges to Positivism**

The methodology of policy analysis as conceived of and practiced by the large majority of contemporary researchers in diverse fields such as health care, urban planning, crime, education, communications, and transportation, aspires to be "scientific." To be sure, the aspiration for policy analysis to become "policy science" has generated debates over the scientific standing of various techniques: univariate or multivariate causal models, cost-benefit analysis, or risk-benefit analysis, exhaustive or limited data sets, verificationist or falsificationist standards of assessment, among others. But whatever the merits of particular claims about these specific techniques, all of the participants in these debates share a basic commitment to "policy science" and its philosophical roots in positivism.

While the quest for systematic understanding of the nature, organization, and functioning of social systems and society at large can be traced back to Plato
and Aristotle, it is 19th-century intellectual activity that established the key premises of positivism and the modern social sciences. These developments are summarized well by Bruce Jennings.

During this period a new cultural ideal of knowledge emerged and was called simply science. This ideal was based on the empiricist doctrine that sense perception is the basis of all human knowledge and that through controlled observation general laws of cause and effect could be discovered that would mirror in human language and thought the true structure of external reality itself. So conceived, science was placed at the top of the intellectual hierarchy, supplanting religious revelation, aesthetic imagination, and practical common wisdom and relegating them, as it were, to the epistemological dustbin. Moreover, as it was widely held that the natural sciences--preeminently Newtonian physics--came closest to realizing this ideal of science, many thinkers concluded that other disciplines must henceforth adopt the methods and stance of the natural sciences if they were to achieve a sound footing and discover the truth about their objects of study.4

Positivism can be described in reference to three premises, premises which reveal its epistemological assumptions and stance on the role of the researcher vis-a-vis objects of knowledge. First, positivism is self-consciously modern in orientation. It is a deeply skeptical philosophy embodying the impulse to set aside all claims to truth and value based on the authority of posited belief systems or historical practice. It contends that if human knowledge could only free itself from accumulated belief in dogmas of all kinds, "it could dig down deep to some bedrock of certainty and then logically and methodically rebuild a body of knowledge, [and thus] know the truth."5 Second, scientific discovery, i.e., achievement of knowledge of the truth, places severe demands on the activities of the researcher. "Not only must scientists avoid sources of error coming from outside, they must also control or suppress sources of bias within themselves."6
Hence, the first obligation of the social science researcher, according to positivism, is to maintain objectivity, value neutrality, and an emotional distance from objects of study. Accordingly, "the cardinal sin is to allow judgments of value or preference to influence one's analysis of facts." Third, positivism externalizes the relationship between the researcher, that is, the knowing subject, and the objects of knowledge. Positivism assumes that there are facts, including social facts, with an objective reality apart from the beliefs and opinions of individuals. The scientific researcher, in the pursuit of knowledge, must systematically observe that reality but cannot, in any significant way, participate in it. As stated by Jennings, positivism, pushed to its limit, "takes the individual scientist, with all his or her multifaceted characteristics as a human being, out of the practice of science and substitutes the almost faceless figure of the scientist as vehicle for the application of method."8

Policy science is the application of the tenets of positivism to inquiry into public policies. It strives to serve as a bridge between verifiable laws of human behavior and the practical world of policy formulation and implementation. In this role, the policy analyst's credibility and hence usefulness are derived primarily from the scientific validity of the knowledge he or she presents to the policymaker. Thus, the work of the policy researcher, in this paradigm, is basically reactive to the data needs of policymakers and limited to questions of empirical fact. Policies are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness to achieve preset ends and in their efficiency in doing so. Not surprisingly, as a scientist, the policy scientist makes no claims to authoritative knowledge about the ends or purposes of policies. Indeed,
the work of the policy scientist involves little or no reference to values, either in
himself or in the social actors under study.

Two issues contained or implied in this description of policy analysis as
science merit closer attention. One is the theory of values adhered to by
positivism, a theory which underlies its value neutrality and the dichotomy of facts
and values in the process of policy inquiry. This theory is known as "value
noncognitivism," according to which, value judgments are basically emotional
responses to specific circumstances and general conditions of human existence. As
subjective commitments, therefore, value judgments contain no truth content
that can be verified by scientific inquiry. Thus, since values lie beyond the capacity
of scientists to investigate them, adherence to the fact-value dichotomy must
remain as the governing principle of policy analysis that aspires to the mantle of
"science."

Another issue surrounding the practice of policy analysis as science is its
place within democratic politics. Many theorists have portrayed the role of the
policy sciences in a democracy in almost visionary terms. Policy science, it is
believed, "enters politics on the basis of its authority--to discover 'facts,' to generate
useful hypotheses, to develop theoretical and data based statements, and to solve
the problems presented to it." This belief is often coupled with a conception of
the policy scientist as a 'social therapist' who shows "lively concern for the problem
of overcoming the divisive tendencies of modern life and of bringing into existence
a more thorough integration of the goals and methods of public and private
action." Taken together, these ideas express a vision of policy science as a force
for social betterment, in which enlightened decisions and hence more effective control over the social environment leads to increased rationality and efficiency in the delivery of public goods and services. Finally, policy science is also seen as an antidote to political power struggles, seen by some as a force that can retard social progress. By producing objective data and explanatory and predictive theories, it is hoped that policy science can counteract the special pleading of political interest groups, the self-seeking behavior of politicians, and unwieldy, inert bureaucracies.

Given the breadth and almost utopian character of its claims and its dominant place in the practice of policy researchers, it is not surprising that policy "science" has been the object of numerous criticisms and fundamental critiques. Some critiques are rooted in fundamental reexaminations of the philosophy of social science, while others stem from some policy analysts' dissatisfaction with the practice of policy research. These criticisms from diverse sources focus on the epistemological assumptions of positivism, the place of values in policy research, and the role of policy research in a democratic society.

One of the building blocks of positivism is the tenet that social science, if practiced with scientific rigor, can yield accurate descriptive accounts of phenomena, including social phenomena. This, again, is based on the view that reality is separate from human cognition. Objective reality is apprehended only through systematic observation of manifest behavior, which is amenable to corroboration by intense objective testing. But this conception of an objective social reality has been challenged on the grounds that social reality is a far more
complex phenomenon, that it is socially constructed through individual and collective definitions of the meanings of human situations. Thus, it is argued, that attempts to portray this complex social reality in empirical generalizations about relationships between discrete variables are selective, limited, and partial. As Jennings argues, the "facts" that positivistic examples of social science report "are inevitably artifacts of particular conceptual schemes and theoretical suppositions that are built into survey instruments, public records, and other sources of social information."\(^\text{13}\)

A final aspect of the epistomological critique of positivism, and related to debates over the nature of social reality, concerns conceptions of human nature. Positivism views human beings as configurations of behaviors, behaviors caused by external agents, forces, or events of which individuals are largely unaware. This conception of human nature is consistent with the deterministic outlook of science. In contrast to this conception, many social scientists have begun to reinterpret the behavior of human beings as actions. Human beings, in this view, are agents who perform actions for reasons and to achieve purposes. As summarized by Paris and Reynolds,

\begin{quote}
central to the agentistic perspective is the notion that the human individual is an agent, a doer, some of whose behaviors are voluntary actions, many of which are related to purposes and goals he has adopted and choices he has made. The individual is more than a cog in a causal process beyond his control. His voluntary actions are things that he does and not merely events of which he is a part or movements that happen to or through him.\(^\text{16}\)
\end{quote}
In sum, then, in light of these theoretical shifts, many social scientists are now coming to view their work not as a positivistic search for immutable laws of human behavior but as a process of cultural interpretation.\(^{15}\)

Another key element in the critique of positivism centers on the question of the role of values in social science. Positivism is based on a strict fact-value dichotomy. While policy scientists consider systematic control of values in the research process as an essential means of achieving bias-free research results, critics of positivism see this stance as one of neglect. Neglected are the values of the investigator herself and those of subjects under study. Critics of positivism are simply not convinced that values can be excised from any stage of a research process. Values of the researcher and, often, the research sponsor, exert influence in the setting of research problems, the interpretation of research results, choice of vehicles for the dissemination of research studies, and, most certainly, in the utilization of research findings.\(^{16}\) Further, by neglecting the values of subjects under study, critics contend, positivism fails to consider the most significant questions of human existence--questions of right and wrong, good and bad, and what ought or what ought not to be done. This neglect of values, it is argued, is especially egregious when the object of study is public policy, an enterprise suffused with competing value positions on questions of public purpose.

Finally, critics of positivism trace implications of the fact/value dichotomy for policy scientists' conception of their role in a democracy. Policy science, by its professed mission of producing reliable, technical knowledge about the means of achieving policy goals, leaves questions of value and policy goals for resolution by
decision-makers and politicians. The political underpinnings of policy science has been a focus of recent debate. Policy science, it is argued, implicitly accepts three premises: 1) interests in a democracy form spontaneously and naturally; 2) there is a natural balance of interests represented before government decision-makers; and 3) government acts as a neutral, mechanical referee of active interests in society. This view is branded as, at best, naive by policy science's critics. It fails, they say, to consider the reality of political influence and power, whereby policy-makers, politicians, and entire government agencies are co-opted by those groups and individuals best able to articulate and promote their interests. These powerful interests are in effect incorporated into the decision-making processes of government agencies and legislative bodies, and are thus essentially delegated public authority. Robert Bellah argues that this political naivete of the policy scientist has serious anti-democratic consequences. He contends that the value-free and purportedly "useful" technologies, practices, and concepts produced by policy scientists "turn out to be manipulative interests in the hands of political and economic power. It is precisely a science that imagines itself uninvolved in society, that sees itself as operating under no ethical norm other than the pursuit of knowledge, that will produce instruments of manipulation for anyone who can afford to put them into practice." 

To this point, I have catalogued essential elements of the growing critique of policy science and its underlying philosophy of positivism. These criticisms, made on epistomological, normative, and political grounds, are, I believe, a serious challenge to claims of dominance by policy scientists within the larger domain of
policy research. But this critique, however persuasive it is, does not by itself yield
a defensible conception of policy research methodology, in particular, one which
is appropriate to policy research in the arts and arts educations. The foundations
of such a conception will be explored in the next several sections starting with a
logical analysis of the term "policy." As will be seen, the concept of "policy" that
emerges from this analysis is consistent with one element of the critique of
positivism, namely, its failure to consider persons as purposeful agents of action.

Logical Foundations: Definitions and Criteria for Evaluation

To ask the question "what is a policy?" is a far different matter than asking
what a particular policy is or ought to be. The question is metaphilosophical in
nature and calls for an examination of conditions of usage of the term "policy."
The educational philosopher Donna H. Kerr, to my knowledge, has done the most
thorough work on explicating the logical conditions of policy analysis and
evaluation. The following discussion draws extensively on her thinking.

She begins with an example to clarify features of the term "policy."

On observing the behavior of bees, we might notice that bees do
what appears to be a complicated, highly structured dance. We might
further note that those bees that dance have just returned from
finding food and, further, the dance serves to indicate to the other
bees the general direction and approximate distance of the food from
the location of the dance. It would seem appropriate to remark that
this 'dance' is regular, patterned behavior. It would, however, be
most inappropriate to say that the bees have a policy of
communicating information on the location of food through the
medium of a particular dance. That is, while we would readily
attribute a communication function to the bees' behavior, we would
not, except in a figurative sense, say that it is the bees' policy to
communicate in that fashion.
This example could be interpreted as meaning that bees, or other nonhuman animals, cannot make policies. This is probably true. But the more important point is that policies are not just instinctive, reactive and determined behavior, things about which humans and animals could not do otherwise. To talk of a policy as a "pattern of response," "structure of behavior," or "process output," as is common in the literature of policy science, is to assume a deterministic model of explanation. In Kerr's terms, use of the term "policy" reflects action language, in that policies are a matter of doing, i.e., taking action in situations where we can always choose to do otherwise. Such choices are usually based on intentions, purposes, and plans. Admittedly, though, this distinction does not take us very far because many categories of actions can be described as planned and undertaken with purposes in mind. What, then, is distinctive about a policy?

While, as discussed above, policies entail choice and all persons can exercise choice to a greater or lesser degree, it does not follow that all persons can make policies. Anyone can make policy proposals, whether in private or in the public domain such as in a book or journal article. But a policy agent, whether a person, agency, or institution, must have some kind of authority to act on policy proposals and to make, enforce, and revise policies. Kerr argues that a policy-maker must usually have some kind of formal authority either by law or administrative decision. Policy-makers with such authority are called, in Kerr's terms, authorizing agents, and are authorized to decide under what conditions an implementing agent, including but not limited to herself, must take particular actions. (The idea of authority as a logical condition of the term policy, it must be stressed, does not
necessarily mean that all policies developed by those in authority to do so are therefore justifiable).

Not all "conditions for action," however, are consistent with the term policy, at least by Kerr's reasoning. Guidelines, for example, can be selectively applied, ignored, or judged irrelevant to particular cases. But policies are not arbitrary. By declaring a policy, a policy-maker undertakes an obligation to act in accordance with a conditional imperative. That is, she must do a specified something whenever specified conditions occur. Take for example university policies for the granting of degrees. When a university adopts a policy regarding the granting of degrees, it directs (based on its authority) certain university officials to do something specific, i.e., grant a degree, whenever specific conditions occur, i.e., a student completes all degree requirements. For these university officials to do otherwise would be to violate the policy. For them to claim that they are under no obligation to grant a degree when a student meets graduation requirements is to deny the fact that they have a policy.

But why do policy-makers assume conditional imperatives to act in a certain way? The answer to this question reveals another condition of the term "policy," namely, that policies (and their obligations) are undertaken in order to achieve purposes. Kerr identifies four categories of policy purposes. Unachievable purposes refer to utopian states of affairs. A policy with an unachievable purpose can be judged successful "if it is affecting states of affairs that progressively resemble more closely the ideal state of affairs to which the purpose refers." In contrast to once-achievable purposes, repeatedly-achievable purposes are achieved
only if an implementing agent's actions repeatedly bring about the specified state of affairs. Any of the above purposes can be embedded purposes which, if recognized, can work at cross purposes to stated purposes of policies. Kerr offers specific examples illustrating these categories of purposes. But for my purposes here, identification of policies' relation to purposes provides an additional condition for defining the term "policy." Based on this discussion so far, a policy can be defined as an obligation undertaken by an authorizing agent to direct an implementing agent to act in accord with a specified conditional imperative for the purpose of effecting a specified state of affairs.

A return to the topic of justifying policies is warranted here. Kerr acknowledges that since most policies are formulated in political environments, it is often contended that the attempt to justify policies on rational grounds is a futile enterprise of the politically naive. Under this view, the justification of a policy choice consists of sales pitches designed to persuade the potential "buyers" of a policy that the policy will bring them something they want. It is assumed that the pitch that "works"--i.e., survives the marketplace of policy ideas--determines the best policy choice. But Kerr argues that the practical difficulties involved in formulating rationally justifiable policies does not mean that the attempt to do so is unwarranted. She identifies four broad evaluative tests that any policy must pass if we are to say it is justifiable on rational grounds.

The desirability test of policies has a weak form and a strong form. The weak form holds that the purposes of, for example, an education policy must be desirable and defensible on educational grounds. The strong form holds that a
policy's purpose must promote the development of skills, values, or understandings that are in some sense constitutive of the good life.

The **effectiveness test** implies that a defensible policy must also specify the **means** that are likely to effect the policy's purposes. As stated above, the purposes of some policies are unachievable. In such cases a policy's means must be more likely to effect a state of affairs which resembles the unachievable goal more closely than other means.

The **justness test** holds that the means of a policy must be just. Kerr stresses that it is not enough for a policy's agent to abide by the conditional imperative and attendant rules with which it claims to abide. For example, an arts council may have a funding distribution policy according to which it discriminates between claimants for funds on irrelevant or unsupportable grounds. That is, while the agency's distributional policy may not violate the rules by which it claims to abide, those rules may themselves be unjust. Thus, for a policy to pass the justness test, the rules with which the means accord must themselves be just.

Finally, the **tolerability test** holds that the costs of a policy must satisfy three criteria: 1) the costs of carrying on a policy must not be out of proportion to the policy's purpose; 2) the costs of implementing a policy must be the least costly of the means that are available; and 3) any side effects of a policy's implementation must be tolerable when weighed against the value of the policy's purpose.

**Kerr** considers two final logical conditions for the formulation of rationally justifiable policy choices: 1) theoretical and empirical knowledge; 2) participation in decision-making. 1) Policy choices make under certainty, in which all possible
outcomes of a policy are known in advance, are extremely rare. Most choices are made with uncertainty (in Kerr's terms, under conditions of partial ignorance), where the exact possibilities of a policy's outcomes are unknown. But policy-makers have an obligation to generate and consider empirical evidence on and theoretical explanations of the policy's likely impact if the policy they choose is to be considered rationally justifiable. 2) Kerr argues that policy-makers are under no obligation to choose the best policy because not all logically possible choices are possible in practical contexts and because such policy choices might never be able to realize their purposes within certain contexts. But it does seem reasonable to expect that policy-makers must at least choose the best of the alternative and practically achievable policy options. But for such a choice to be rational, Kerr argues, it must be considered so by participants in the policy-making process—policy-makers themselves and those with input in the process. This condition is termed distributive rationality. Kerr notes that it is obviously unrealistic to expect that each policy choice be considered rational by all involved in the process. Thus, a final requirement for rational policy choices is the broadest possible representation of diverse perspectives in the decision-making process and the presence of procedures to reduce conflicts of interest and undue influence.

Based on Kerr's explication of the logic of the term "policy," it becomes clear that the subject matter of policy research can be quite broad. This will be shown with examples in the arts and arts education. Policy research can examine several kinds of policies in the arts and arts education. Direct policies are those that regulate and formalize explicit government support (channeled through public
agency grants, fellowships, and contracts) to individual artists, non-profit arts and arts education organizations, and public schools; another example of direct policies are those in which government agencies act as producers and presenters of the arts. **Indirect policies** include a broad range of government regulations, laws, and measures which indirectly affect production and distribution of education in the arts in significant ways. For example, tax laws accord the tax-exempt status of non-profit arts and arts education organizations; affect corporate, foundation, and individual giving to the arts, as well as donations of visual arts objects; exempt related business income of arts organizations from taxation, and accord individual artists business deductions. Other laws and regulations extend copyright protection, levy special consumer taxes that are allocated to the arts, extend discount postal privileges, mandate curricular and graduation requirements in public schools, provide unemployment compensation for artists, and affect zoning regulations.\(^{22}\) Both direct and indirect policies can either be **explicit**, i.e., formal and institutionalized, or **implicit**, where the absence of a specific policy, in effect, constitutes a policy, or where the behavior of decision-makers or administrators alters the state goals and implementation strategies of policies, resulting in de facto policies.

Policy research can focus on several elements of policies--goals, means, enforcement, and impacts--either separately, as they work in conjunction, or at cross purposes. **Policy goals** can be viewed in terms of their clarity, comprehensiveness, and worthwhileness, while the processes utilized to formulate goals can be interpreted in terms of concepts of justice and political participation. The
means to achieve policy goals can be analyzed in terms of effectiveness, their adequacy to meet policy goals, and justness, their fairness with respect to groups and individuals affected by a particular policy. The enforcement of policies can be imposed (stringent enforcement backed by sanctions or penalties), endorsed (compliance motivated by anticipated benefits), or implied (completely voluntary compliance).\textsuperscript{23} The impacts of policies can be direct or indirect, immediate or long-term, anticipated or unanticipated, primary or secondary (usually termed externalities), measurable or non-measurable. With specific regard to arts and arts education policies, impacts can be economic, social, political, administrative, educational, and aesthetic in nature, and those affected can range from artists, arts organizations, schools, and professional service organizations to government agencies, legislatures, a public audience, teachers and students, or the general citizenry.

Finally, policy research in the arts and arts education can examine decision-making policies and administrative processes involved in the formulation and implementation of policies. Policy-making decisions themselves can be directed to rationales for government support for arts education and the arts, legislative initiatives, authorization and reauthorization of public arts agencies, budget appropriations, and allocations, policy priorities, and decisions among those competing for grants, contracts, or fellowships. Any level or branch of government can make policy decisions in the arts and arts education, including executive and legislative branches, legislative committees, and the courts, as well as public departments and agencies, and appointed panels of artists, arts educators, scholars,
and arts organization representatives who provide policy oversight or make direct grants decisions. The responsibility for implementing policies lies largely with the staff of public education and arts agencies at the local, state, and federal levels. The administration of policy implementation can also be an important subject for policy research in the arts and arts education.

Policy formulation and implementation does not occur in a vacuum, but in a variety of contexts. Advocacy groups, in the tradition of interest group politics, work to exert pressure and influence on policy-makers. In the arts and arts education, advocacy groups address issues such as budget levels for public arts agencies and education departments, the implications of tax policies for arts organizations and artists, state requirements in arts education, and measures which affect the right and freedom of expression of artists and arts institutions. Arts critics, artists, and editorialists write about these issues and others, while individual citizens and elected representatives have increasingly spoken out on issues of community standards of artistic merit and acceptability, in particular, in cases where the religious, sexual, ethnic, and political content of government-subsidized art is at issue. Finally, influences from other policy spheres such as communications policy, educational policy, and policies on non-profit organizations make up the context of arts and arts education policy as well. All of these contextual influences, then, are included in the broad subject matter of policy research in the arts and arts education.

Finally, policy research can serve several aims: analysis, comparison, evaluation, and forecasting. Analysis involves systematic study of the content of the
goals, means, and intended impacts of arts education and arts policies, the processes of policy formulation, and factors such as leadership, contextual influences, terms of policy debates, points of contention, resolutions of conflicts, and the implementation of policies. **Comparative analysis** explores different policies--at the federal, state, and local levels, during different historical periods, or among nations—as well as relationships between different policy spheres. Comparative analysis also seeks to highlight and explain commonalities and differences in the content, formulation, and implementation of such policies. **Evaluation** focuses on the worthiness of policy goals, the potential effectiveness and justness of the means as formulated, and the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of means in achieving desired impacts or producing secondary consequences. Evaluative criteria utilized can be economic, social, political, educational, aesthetic, and administrative in nature, and can be those of policy-makers, the researchers, or those affected by the policy. Finally, **forecasting** entails inquiry into broad trends, including demographic, political, social, economic, educational, and aesthetic trends, whose future impacts may necessitate the revision of existing policies, the formulation of new policies, or changes in decision-making processes.

This extended description of the subject matter of policy research is clearly an elaboration on Kerr's logical conditions of the term policy; but it is also consistent with her thinking. Indeed, Kerr's logical analysis provides important elements of a corrective to policy science rooted in positivism. For example, it poses basic questions that can be asked of policies—whether something that is claimed to be a policy is indeed a policy; the authority of persons or institutions to
make, enforce, or revise policies; the purposes that policies are purported to serve; the political context of policy-making; the worthwhileness of policy goals; the effectiveness and justness of policies' means of implementation; the costs and side effects of policies; the use of empirical evidence and theoretical frameworks in making policy choices; the policy alternatives considered; and the breadth of participation in and fairness of policy-making processes. Her schema also represents a significant broadening of criteria for policy evaluation beyond those utilized in "policy-science"—effectiveness and efficiency. Finally, employment of Kerr's scheme can mean that the work of the policy researcher need not be reactive, instrumental to pre-determined ends, or limited to questions of fact and practical means.

But, for all of its merits, Kerr's logical analysis of the term "policy" takes us only so far toward the goal of constructing a defensible policy research methodology. On the one hand, her analysis does not address assumptions that critics of positivism have challenged. Notably, her account of the empirical knowledge necessary for rational policy development does not contain any discussion of the fact/value dichotomy or how values suffuse all phases of research (even empirical research) processes. In addition, Kerr does not address the political evaluation of policies, i.e., how a policy proposal is likely to be received by participants in a political process. But the most significant gap in Kerr's schema is found in her treatment of policy goals and the purposes which inform policy goals. She argues that for a policy to be rationally justifiable it must promote states of affairs that are in some sense constitutive of the good life. This
"test" of policies, however, is no substitute for the articulation of a means to determine whether some policy goals are more worthwhile, or simply better, than others. If policy research is to play a role in the formulation of policies that extends beyond the recommendation of policy means to achieve pre-determined ends, a method of choosing among alternative policy goals, therefore, must be found. That is the subject of the next section.

**Issues in Justifying Policy Goals and Means**

The entire enterprise of trying to forge a role for policy research in mediating between value positions underlying policy goals, it must be admitted from the outset, will be objected to on at least two grounds. Policy scientists, it will be recalled, contend that policy researchers' work should not include value considerations for two reasons: 1) because policy researchers have no special skill in analyzing value claims; and 2) because the presence of values in a research design primarily serve to undercut the empirical validity of research results. Values, at best, should only be a subject of empirical inquiry, according to policy scientists, to see the extent of support for value positions among policy actors in particular policy contexts. But other theorists contend that consideration of values in policy research, rather than a practice to be avoided as a matter of methodological principle, is, instead, a misdirected or even futile enterprise. This contention is made, it will be seen, from five distinct but related perspectives.

1) One such argument is based on the distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason. As educational philosopher Thomas F. Green outlines, theoretical reasoning is directed at answering the question "what can I
know?"; practical reasoning, on the other hand, is directed at an answer to the question "what should I do?". The responsibilities of policy making, Green contends, fall more heavily on the practical than the theoretical side. This is so because the policy maker works in the midst of uncertainty and inevitably makes choices under at least partial ignorance. Academic research, he argues, is inherently concerned to narrow the realm of uncertainty and present as results only those claims that can withstand intersubjective examination. The policy maker, however, can seldom afford the luxury of narrowing the bounds of uncertainty to the point where all the research data she or he needs are available. For these reasons, Green concludes that the utility of academic research for policy decisions is inversely related to its applicability as academic research and that policy research is invariably or even necessarily crude. In this conception of policy research as crude, undertaking the additional task of deciding among alternative value positions is deemed simply unrealistic. But Green's conception of policy research, and what is appropriate to expect from it, is clearly rooted in positivistic assumptions about the kinds of knowledge policy research can yield. To dismiss the possibility that policy research can play a part in mediating value positions in policy contexts, when the argument is based on a strict fact-value dichotomy, is, at best, premature.

2) There is another perspective on values and policy research which is rooted in positivism's fact-value dichotomy. Under the conception of applied pluralism, the fact-value dichotomy is extended to the political realm. Applied pluralists argue that since policy analysts have no expertise regarding the merit of
value positions in policy contexts, such determinations, in a democracy, are thus best left to popularly-elected representatives, i.e., politicians, and those bureaucratic and oversight personnel charged to make policy decisions. It is not argued that decision-makers should impose their own values on the political process. Rather, they are expected to reflect the value positions of those constituencies they are elected or charged to represent or serve, and through a process of "partisan mutual adjustment," reach a level of consensus among conflicting value positions sufficient for action. The role for policy research which follows from this conception is one in which researchers produce detailed knowledge of the political processes of interest accommodation, knowledge which can be of use to policy-makers in meeting their political objectives. Policy analysts who assume this role "accept the existing political system, replete with its unwritten rules, norms of operation, and casts of characters as given. Their task is to facilitate the system's operation and maintain its equilibrium." This perspective on policy research can be critiqued on several grounds, including its allegiance to the fact-value dichotomy, a critique reviewed above. More significant, at least for the current discussion, is the apparent assumption that any work by policy researchers to evaluate policy goals is anti-democratic, an attempt to supplant the role of authorized and elected officials in making determinations about the relative worth of policy goals. This assumption by "applied pluralism" policy analysts is, at best, ironic in that their evident lack of awareness that the "accommodation of interests" is not necessarily a just means to formulate policy, and can even serve to support undemocratic practices. In any case, as will be seen, attempts by policy
researchers to construct rationales for choices among policy goals is far from undemocratic. Indeed, as Charles W. Anderson argues, policy researchers can play a distinctive role by interpreting policy decisions in light of value perspectives neglected in democratic politics because of inequitable power relations, undue influence, established practice, or the mere striving for novelty.34

3) Raising the issue of access to and the exercise of power in democratic politics poses the possibility of another potential response to the notion that policy research can assist in choice among policy goals, namely, cynicism. Such a conclusion would be based on the view that the democratic ideal is just that, an ideal, and one always subject to subversion by forces far more potent than research -- power. The distribution of power within societies and institutions shapes to a significant degree, it is argued, whose research gets a hearing among policy-makers. At best, research is sponsored or used selectively to bolster the ideological positions of those with power. Obviously, on this view, the idea of a researcher or researchers attempting to offer grounds for choice among alternative policy goals is hopelessly naive. Such a cynical conclusion, however, posits a more rigid conception of power relations in contemporary society than most are willing to accept. But even if one were to accept this picture of power-driven democratic politics, cynicism would still not be warranted -- the attempt to explicate policy options, especially those reflecting value positions neglected within a polity, can be defended on moral grounds, whatever the ultimate utility of such work.

4) Another approach to the question of the role of values in policy research also seeks to address the problem of inequitable relations in democratic politics.
The ideal of procedural fairness dismisses the idea that defensible choice among policy goals on value grounds is possible. In lieu of this, proponents of procedural fairness contend that at least the process of selection of value-laden policy goals should be fair. To assure fairness, preferences of participants in a policy formulation process are to count equally and be amalgamated. Policy decisions are to be taken only on the basis of such amalgamated preferences. But there are problems with this view. It is difficult to imagine how an absolutely fair amalgamation of preferences could occur, unless unanimity is achieved. But if unanimity is a necessary condition of fairness, then the practice of amalgamating preferences would be beside the point. Further, as Paris and Reynolds argue, any decision rule short of unanimity could permit the preferences of the decisive set, however defined, to injure the vital interests or morally justifiable values of others. Without unanimity, any decision rule... may generate results which violate either the core idea of formal fairness (one person, one vote as the sole mechanism for setting goals) or substantive criteria of fairness (individual moral rights) or both.

5) A final response to the prospect of policy research providing criteria for choice among policy goals does not rely on maintenance of the fact-value dichotomy or a naive conception of democratic politics. Policy analysis as advocacy, as outlined by John L. Foster, is a more activist orientation to policy research. Consistent with positivism's critics, Foster questions whether it is possible for policy researchers to generate objective, value-neutral data and theories in that, as he argues, research designs are inevitably conditioned by the values of the researcher. Foster contends that policy researchers have an obligation to declare and make clear their value positions in presenting research results. He combines
this principle with a view of politics in which the rights of minorities are protected from the domination of government power by majority factions. This is achieved through an adversarial process among advocates in legislatures, bureaucracies, and the courts representing diverse value positions and social interests. The policy researcher, assuming the role of advocate in this adversarial process, generates findings and arguments that will bolster the prospects of the "client" he or she represents. While avoiding the pitfalls of the fact-value dichotomy, policy analysis as advocacy, however, fails to examine fairness and equity questions of who is to have a policy research "advocate" and who ultimately is to be involved in policy formulation, thus reinforcing a business-as-usual approach of interest-group give-and-take as the unavoidable context of policy making. Further, its conclusion that the only option for policy researchers is to advocate value positions is premature; it simply begs the question of whether policy research can play a constructive role in policy formulation by examining the merit of value positions inherent in policy goal alternatives.38

In summary, then, these five arguments which contend, either directly or indirectly, that consideration of values in evaluating policy goals is a misdirected or even futile enterprise, do not bear up under scrutiny. But to meet objections, of course, only takes us so far. What follows is an exploration of several perspectives on policy research, each of which holds that examination of the merit of value-laden policy goals is not misdirected or futile. Indeed, each seeks to define a method to explicate or evaluate value-laden policy goals and means.
These methods include: 1) critical theory; 2) political philosophy; and 3) interpretive policy analysis.

1) Critical theory, as developed primarily by Jurgen Habermas,\textsuperscript{39} has as one of its central tenets the belief that it can provide an objective basis for normative claims. This belief is rooted in the contention that traditional distinctions between theory and action are misguided and serve only to provide ideological support for fostering inequitable power relations in society. Critical theory, in contrast, seeks to unify theoretical understanding of contradictions inherent in a society with action in order to achieve a transformation of that society. "By painstaking criticism of both traditions of thinking about society and the institutions of society, critical theory hopes to provide a basis for transforming society. The appeal of critical theory lies in its claim to unite empirical and normative concerns--to be objective and relevant--in a way which will lead to social reform. Social science and policy inquiry are thus fused."\textsuperscript{40}

Central to Habermas' critical theory is the idea of cognitive interests, those viewpoints, in his terms, from which we apprehend reality. These include the technical, through which persons seek to maintain and further their material existence, and the practical, those shared meanings in a society which permit day-to-day communications among a society's members. These interests, Habermas argues, have spawned the empirical sciences and historical inquiry respectively. A third cognitive interest, the emancipatory, is the basis of critical theory. Empirical sciences and historical inquiry, it is argued, depend upon free, open communication if they are to serve societal interests in achieving technical control of the means of
material existence and mutual understanding of social and cultural interactions. The point of critical theory, rooted in the emancipatory interest, "is to probe, through philosophical reflection, the conditions of such free communication and to reflect upon the conditions which distort it. Philosophical inquiry and social criticism... are [thus also] fused."\textsuperscript{41}

This theory of cognitive interests, and especially the emancipatory interest, is the basis of a critique of positivism and its consequences. According to Habermas, positivism, by its reduction of all possible knowledge of the model of scientific knowledge, disavows philosophical reflection. Positivism thus, it is argued, fails to recognize the importance of other cognitive interests and thus negates the possibility of choice and rational action in political life. Critical theory also critiques positivism's conception of values, and its consequent view that rational action is limited to "the selection of efficient means to realize ends and not the selection of ends themselves."\textsuperscript{42} A view of politics follows from this conception--political problems are not matters of disputes over value positions but technical problems to be solved by policy scientists. These criticisms have been made by other critics cited above. But critical theory offers one additional criticism, namely, that this limited conception of politics as technical control ultimately debases political life and reinforces inequitable power relations in society.

As an antidote to positivism and avowed catalyst for social change, critical theory aims to restore critical self-reflection in "the search for the ground of all claims to knowledge...[and] involves the critical examination of all cognitive claims
and obstacles to rational consensus about them. The knowledge gained from this process, it is expected, will be emancipating and yield practical guidance and greater individual autonomy.

But a key question for critical theory is the requirements necessary to formulate a rational consensus on policy issues. The central idea in Habermas' answer to this question is that of communicative competence, an "ideal speech" situation "in which there is no domination or distorted communication and in which consensus is... achieved simply due to the force of the better argument." This idea has important implications for the place of values in policy inquiry in that Habermas argues that the discourse of ideal communication is a normative standard inherent in the structure of social action and language. This standard, in turn, can be used in critiques of distorted communication. "The ideal speech situation is thus the vehicle for bridging artificial gaps between theory and practice, "is" and "ought," and providing an objective basis for normative claims promoting human emancipation."

Despite its attention to the place of values and norms in policy inquiry, it is not clear that critical theory and its idea of an emancipatory interest attained through an ideal speech situation settles the issue of resolving value disputes in policy contexts. Critical theory validates the place of philosophical reflection in policy inquiry; but it also seems to assume that such reflection will necessarily yield a critique of society consistent with a Marxist or neo-Marxist perspective. The diversity of philosophical traditions would seem to undermine this assumption, unless one was also to assume that any non-Marxist philosophical perspective is an
example of "distorted communication." Few would be willing to do so. Thus, despite the claims of critical theory, it does not seem reasonable to assume that the mere act of philosophical reflection will yield any generally applicable normative criteria to settle value disputes in policy contexts or will yield any specific program for social change.

On the other hand, it could be argued that critical theory still could provide a general framework for dealing with value-laden policy issues. But, if this were claimed, then one could not also claim, as Habermas does, that critical theory is a specific and practical means of social reform. Further, the claim that critical theory collapses traditional divisions between theory and practice and between philosophy and ideology is thereby undermined. In sum, then, critical theory appears to lack the specificity needed to resolve policy debates; and as Paris and Reynolds argue, "far from lacking ideological content or removing ideological distortion, critical theory is actually an attempt to advance a certain ideological perspective by claiming that it has an objective philosophical basis, supportable in an ideal speech situation." 16

2) Unlike proponents of critical theory, policy analysts who draw on political philosophy in analyzing policy issues do not claim that their work results in an objective basis for resolving value questions in policy debates. Instead, political philosophers try to construct arguments to defend, on rational grounds, why certain values should be chosen over others in a society. Such argumentation, in most instances, entails a deductive method. First, political philosophers construct models of an ideal way of life, identifying ultimate values, such as freedom or equality, that
should underlie decisions in a polity. Often these social and political values are related to conceptions of human nature and the ideal person. Then, arguments are marshalled to try to demonstrate what would happen in an ideal society if a particular value or set of values were adopted. The case for value positions is often made in comparative fashion using interpretive tools such as imagination and speculation.

Through the imaginative creation of alternative sociopolitical systems, the political philosopher attempts to highlight the effects resulting from a surplus of one value (or value system) or the implications of the decline of another... Available empirical evidence about the instrumental or contributive value of particular values can be marshalled to support one conception over another... As the ideal model is necessarily speculative, empirical evidence is generally available only through insightful extrapolation and analogy based on existing systems.

The contemporary philosophers whose work has influenced many policy analysts are John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. Their work illustrates how the deductive methods of political philosophy have relevance to the establishment of value frameworks for policy decisions. Rawls has aimed to determine which type of society a rational person would choose to live in and the reasons such a person would offer for obeying the society's rules. He posits a methodological device, called the "original position," whereby the rational person, free of the distractions of everyday life, would be able to make rational choices about basic values. Rawls argues that persons in the original position would reject, on logical grounds, the principle of utility as an inadequate basis for reconciling value disputes in a just manner. Instead, he contends that the person would choose to enter into a social contract that guarantees the basic rights of all of a society's citizens. In this
conception of a good society, the utilitarian principle is subordinated to principles of justice. In a fashion similar to Rawls, Ronald Dworkin argues that the principle of utility -- the greatest good to the greatest number -- is insufficient as an organizing value for a good society because it does not protect key political rights. He contends that many decisions about public purpose cannot be defended solely on the basis of anticipated social consequences. Some especially difficult decisions require arguments based on statements of principle.

An evaluation of the specific arguments of Rawls and Dworkin will not be attempted here. Their work was cited at this point as examples of the potential impact of political philosophy on policy inquiry. Clearly, political philosophy can serve as a corrective to the narrow focus of positivistic policy science and broaden the questions that policy inquiry can address. Notably, political philosophy affirms that all aspects of rationality, including deductive reasoning, insight, imagination, and intuition, can be used as a resource in policy inquiry. Policy researchers need not be restricted to the empiricism and instrumental reasoning of positivism. Further, by its invocation of the concept of a good society, political philosophy moves policy inquiry beyond questions of means to consideration of the value of policy goals themselves; and by its invocation of key principles and rights, political philosophy offers criteria for the evaluation of policies beyond those utilitarian criteria found in policy science, i.e., effectiveness and efficiency.

Despite the value of these contributions to the conduct of policy inquiry, a significant question about political philosophy remains--can it help to resolve value disputes in specific policy contexts? A goal of political philosophy is to construct
a set of principles, rooted in fundamental values, that can be applied consistently across particular cases. Achievement of this goal primarily entails a process of deriving specific policy proposals from these principles. But, as Charles W. Anderson argues, "this effort frequently leads to disappointing results. Most principles do not yield unambiguous prescriptions." For example, it is not clear how a general principle of justice would facilitate a resolution of issues in public arts policy, such as--what artists and organizations should have access to public funds? on what criteria should funding decisions be based? who should be involved in the making of such decisions?, among others. On the other hand, advocates of quite specific policy proposals can invoke the same general principle in making a case for their favored proposal. For example, a utilitarian concept of justice--the greatest good to the greatest number--could be invoked in arts policy debates to justify anything from subsidy of large traditional arts organizations to redistribution of public dollars in support of individual folk artists. The generality of principles can not only lead to diverse uses in policy contexts, but misuse as well, by masking the political agendas of policy actors. Finally, the aim of political philosophy to yield principles that can be applied across cases can be challenged. In a differentiated pluralistic society, where policy issues take many forms in many areas of experience, it seems unreasonable to expect that all policy decisions can be reducible to a single set of principles. A more reasonable expectation is that the assessment of existing policies and the formulation of policies will turn on a variety of principles, such as individual rights, distributive justice, utility, and even, in some cases, efficiency. Thus, while the general principles of political philosophy
have potential utility in specific policy contexts, the hope that a general principle or set of principles can resolve value disputes in all policy contexts appears unfounded.

3) Interpretive policy analysis is rooted in interpretive social science, a primary source of the critique of positivism on epistemological and normative grounds. Interpretive social science is based on three key premises. First, "it construes human behaviors, social relationships, and cultural artifacts as texts... and then seeks to uncover the meaning that those texts have to the agents who constitute them and to others located spatially or temporally outside them." Stated in terms used previously, interpretive social science takes an agentistic perspective on human nature. Second, following the first premise, interpretive social science aims to elucidate or make sense of individuals’ actions in terms of agents’ reasons for given actions. Rather than seeking to explain or predict human behavior in reference to causal laws, interpretive social science attempts to reconstruct processes of practical reasoning utilized by social actors. These actors’ intentions’ are an important focus of analysis; they "are explicated in terms of the cultural context of conventions, rules, and norms within which they are formed... Intentions are not construed as internal mental events or private wants but rather as the purposes that an agent constructs or might in principle have constructed using the publicly available concepts and meanings of his or her culture." A final feature of interpretive social science is its attention to the complexity of the cultural contexts in which actions take place and its effort to demonstrate the interconnections between social actors’ values, intentions, and roles in these
contexts. "In the connections it looks for, positivistic social science moves from the specific to the general, the aim being to subsume particular events under general laws. In interpretive social science the analysis does not move up and down a ladder; it spins a web... [and] seeks to place a particular event in an ever-widening network of relationships."

Drawing on these premises, interpretive policy analysts aim to explicate and interpret the practical reasoning and intentions of policy actors in making policy choices and seek to place those choices in the complex cultural contexts in which they are argued for, enacted, and implemented. Special attention is given to the points of view of policy makers and those potentially affected by particular policy decisions. Interpretive policy analysis theorists acknowledge that the interpretations produced reflect, to a significant degree, the value positions of individual researchers. In contrast to positivism and policy science, interpretive policy analysis holds that the values of the researcher are and, indeed ought to be, prominent throughout any research process. As a result, and at times by design, the analyses that this methodology yields are contestable. The relative power of these diverse interpretations, not surprisingly given the previous point, depends on the insight and rhetorical skills of the researcher.

A common criticism of interpretive policy analysis, given its attention to explicating the value positions and intentions of policy actors, is that it too often becomes trapped in the "native's point of view" and, further, that this immersion merely serves to reinforce existing world views and conceptions. Most significantly, at least for the current discussion, critics charge that the practice of interpretive
policy analysis does not yield evaluative criteria that can mediate between conflicting policy proposals and, thus, "inevitably involves a circle of potentially conflicting accounts."54

These criticisms, while serious, can be addressed by supplementing the description of interpretive policy analysis offered to this point. First, immersion in the intentions and actions of policy actors does not mean that interpretive policy analysts necessarily will be unable to move beyond these actors' perspectives. Interpretive policy analysis is not merely a descriptive research method. It can and at times must seek to go beyond the necessarily limited understanding policy actors have of their own situations. This is done by "filling out and correcting that comprehension with a broader, more critical perspective,"55 a process involving two primary tasks: 1) an attempt to accurately describe the socio-political circumstances surrounding a policy's formulation and implementation; and 2) a focus on understanding the diverse norms and values that are operative in a policy context and how they can and do shape policy options.

But can interpretive policy analysis generate criteria needed to decide among value-laden policy options? The possibility of serving this function rests on particular conceptions of values and concepts. Proponents of interpretive policy analysis contend that a conception of values as arbitrary sentiments or irrational ventings of emotion, as found in positivism and policy science, is defective. They argue that values, "as assertions concerning what is right, what is good, or what ought to be done, represent far more than individual preferences . . . [and] as reasoned judgments concerning appropriate forms of behavior and desirable states
of affairs, individual value commitments are far from arbitrary choices." Value judgments, it is argued, are made through processes of critical reflection (in individuals) and deliberation (in groups), processes which yield reasons for value positions and calculations of the consequences likely to follow from the adoption of particular values.

This process of rationally assessing alternative value positions does not rely upon mysterious cognitive processes such as intuition, as is common in political philosophy. Instead, the concepts employed in this process are, as Jennings states, "'publicly available' concepts... drawn from a common, intersubjectively meaningful set of cultural norms, traditional values, and... commonsense understandings of what human beings need and how they react in various circumstances." Jennings acknowledges that these concepts are essentially contestable and that no single use of them can be reasonably prescribed or enforced. That concession, however, does not in any way preclude rational assessment of the different use of concepts.

While the discussion to this point has established key premises in justifying the practice of rationally assessing alternative value positions, advocates of interpretive policy analysis are less clear in stipulating how such assessment ought to proceed. It is one thing to say that value-laden concepts can be assessed on rational grounds, it is another thing to elucidate a method of how this can be done. It is in this regard that conceptual analysis as a method of explicating concepts can supplement policy analysis. The complementary value of these research methods is the subject of the next section.
The Potential of Conceptual Analysis in Policy Research

The practice of philosophy in the twentieth century, in a dramatic departure from practice in all previous times, does not aim to construct general world views. Instead, it tends to seek perspective on the world by analyzing the roots of knowledge -- the basic concepts, assumptions, and arguments characteristic of different domains of knowledge. In particular, it deals with how language is used in discourse in the formulation of arguments to support statements of belief.

Conceptual analysis seeks to probe the meanings of concepts that inform our everyday thinking and speech as well as more formal arguments. It does so by pointing out how discourse falls prey to the pitfalls of language -- ambiguity, equivocation, and vagueness. Ambiguity entails the use of a word in two distinct senses within a particular discourse; equivocation involves an unmarked shift of the meaning of a word in a specific context; and vagueness applies to words where understanding of their meaning leaves too much to interpretation.58

Definitions constitute an effort to control the meaning of terms within discourse. The educational philosopher Israel Scheffler identifies three sorts of definitions used in practical, including policy, contexts. Stipulative definitions are attempts to lay down conventions for the interpretation of terms within a certain context. While stipulative definitions may or may not be coherent and pragmatically well-chosen, they do not reflect conventional usage and can thus be considered arbitrary. Descriptive definitions, in order to resolve questions of meaning, give an account of a term's prior usage as it is ordinarily and most usually applied. Thus, descriptive definitions are not arbitrary. Programmatic definitions
are like stipulative definitions in that they are not bound by prior usage of a term and like descriptive definitions in that they attempt to go beyond matters of economy. Programmatic definitions are unique in that they imply a program of social practice. (The use of "implication" is not in the logically necessary sense. As Scheffler points out, definitions do not directly imply a particular practical program. They must be supplemented by principles of action. But definitions can be said to imply programs in the sense of being highly suggestive of them).

Scheffler emphasizes that the difference between these types of definitions is not formal in nature in that a definition with the same formal construction may be stipulative, descriptive, or programmatic. Identifying a definition by type can only be done by reference to the context of its use, i.e., within a series of arguments and/or in practical contexts and by determining the interest underlying each use. As Scheffler states, "the interest of stipulative definitions is communicatory, that is to say, they are offered in the hope of facilitating discourse; the interest of descriptive definitions is explanatory, that is, they purport to clarify the normal application of terms; the interest of programmatic definitions is purposeful and practical, that is, they are intended to embody programs of action."  

This feature of definitions has important implications for the conduct of conceptual analysis and evaluation. There is no point in pitting these sorts of definitions against each other. For example, there is nothing gained by critically evaluating a stipulative definition by revealing its divergences from prior usage. But use of each of these types of definitions, as Scheffler argues, is subject to
double evaluation. Individual terms can be analyzed in terms of vagueness, while the use of terms within discourse can be examples of ambiguity or equivocation. These pitfalls of language can befall the use of terms whatever the context. But this sort of analysis takes us only so far. The need for double evaluation is best illustrated by reference to programmatic definitions. A programmatic definition seeks to lay down conventions of usage in the interest of furthering a program of action. Such a definition may indeed be internally consistent in a formal sense. But it does not follow that the program of action it recommends is worthwhile. Thus the need for an additional step. A programmatic definition is to be evaluated in terms of the moral and practical consequences that could be reasonably be expected as a result of adoption of such a definition, an evaluation "in light of our commitments, of the practical alternatives open to us as well as alternative ways of putting desired actions into effect." The importance of this step is illustrated by the point that it does not follow that if a definition is vague, its recommended program is not worthwhile. These two steps, however, are not unrelated. Notably, vague terms or ambiguous discourse can, within specific contexts, undercut the force of an argument for a recommended program, thus threatening its prospects for adoption and implementation.

Scheffler's notion of double analysis and evaluation has important implications for the practice of policy analysis. Policy language, as discussed previously, is action language as distinct from behavior language. It contains many definitions that are programmatic in nature that embody value positions and imply programs of action. But if the language used to define policy goals and means to
achieve these goals is unclear and imprecise, implementation of the policy can be a source of confusion, arbitrariness, and controversy. Policy evaluation also requires an additional step, namely, analysis of whether a policy's goals are worthwhile and whether its means are likely to effect achievement of the goals in a fair, cost-effective manner with minimal negative side effects. These steps are well-captured in Scheffler's concept of the double evaluation of programmatic definitions. But most significantly for the argument in this chapter, the idea of analyzing programmatic definitions of key value-laden concepts as utilized in policy contexts fills a significant gap in the theory of interpretive policy analysis -- it provides a means of rationally assessing the value positions underlying policy options.

Conclusion: A Method for Analyzing Multiculturalism and the Arts

This chapter has covered a lot of ground. It started with an outline of positivism and policy science and traced a critique of each on epistemological, normative, and political grounds, explored the logical conditions of defining "policy" and described the subject matter of policy research based on a proposed definition of the term, countered arguments stemming from the perspectives of practical reason, applied pluralism, power politics, procedural fairness, and policy analysis as advocacy which questioned the utility of considering values in policy research, and reviewed various perspectives which affirmed a place for analysis of values in policy research, including critical theory, political philosophy, interpretive policy analysis, and conceptual analysis. The thread throughout these discussions has
been the attempt to define a method of explicating and evaluating value-laden policy goals and means.

The resulting methodology integrates features of logical analysis of the term "policy," interpretive policy analysis, and conceptual analysis. It is based on several key premises. First, it construes a policy as a matter of choice in which a policy agent obligates herself, himself, or others to act in accordance with a conditional imperative -- an obligation to do a specified something \textit{whenever} specified conditions occur -- in order to achieve purposes rooted in human values. This conception, in turn, is based on a conception of human nature in which human beings are not merely configurations of externally-caused behaviors but agents who perform actions for reasons and to achieve purposes.

Second, this integrated methodology, drawing on interpretive policy analysis, takes as its focus the explication and interpretation of the reasoning, intentions, and value positions of policy actors in making policy choices within a cultural context. At the same time, it seeks to round out and go beyond policy actors' understanding of their own choices.

The final feature of this methodology is its use of the tools of conceptual analysis to rationally assess alternative value positions which inform policy options. This step is premised on the view that values are not mere personal preferences or ventings of emotion but assertions of what is good, right, or ought to be done and judgments based on rational processes of critical reflection and deliberation. Conceptual analysis probes how the use of value concepts in discourse can fall prey to the pitfalls of ambiguity, equivocation, and vagueness. It also can analyze
definitions of terms, especially definitions which embody value positions and imply purposeful programs of action (programmatic definitions), in terms of the normative and practical consequences that can reasonably be expected from the adoption of such definitions. Thus, policy goals can be subjected to a double evaluation -- one which seeks to clarify the language used to express value positions and policy goals and the other which calculates the potential effects of programs implied in the definitions of key terms. Policies' means, in turn, can be analyzed in terms of whether they are likely to effect achievement of policy goals in a fair, cost-effective manner with minimal negative side effects.

This integrated methodology is, I believe, an appropriate and potentially powerful means of analyzing policy issues surrounding multiculturalism, art education, and public support of the arts. Policy debates in art education and arts policy too often do not explicitly acknowledge, let alone explicate, the value positions behind policy proposals. This tendency, as will be seen, is most evident in the policy documents of those public agencies whose policies can and do have significant effects on the practice of art education and the arts. Thus, considerable attention will be given to explicating, in the manner of interpretive policy analysis, the value positions of public arts agencies and state departments of education as expressed in their usage of terms such as art, culture, justice, and artistic value in premises and arguments in support of policy goals. But beyond merely understanding the point of view of these policy actors, the attempt will be made to rationally assess their use of these value-laden terms as well the theoretical assumptions which inform premises in their arguments for policy goals. This
rational assessment will be achieved through the double evaluation of key concepts on both formal, logical grounds and in terms of potential practical consequences of the programs implied in value-laden definitions of these terms.

While this multi-dimensional analysis will be the primary focus of the remainder of this dissertation, it remains to first examine the rise of multiculturalism in the policy contexts of the arts and art education and as a research concern by policy analysts in the arts and art education. These issues form the subject matter of the next chapter.

NOTES


7. Ibid., p. 137.

8. Ibid., p. 137.


17. See, for example, M.E. Hawkesworth, *Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis*.


21. Ibid., p. 29.


24. For discussion of interest group politics in the arts, see Margaret J. Wyszomirski, "Arts Policymaking and Interest Group Politics," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 14 (October 1980): 28-34.


29. For an extensive discussion of the political evaluation of policies, see Frank Fischer, *Politics, Values, and Public Policy: The Problem of Methodology*.


38. For an additional critique of policy analysis as advocacy, see Bruce Jennings, "Policy Analysis: Science, Advocacy, or Counsel?".


41. Ibid., p. 192.

42. Ibid., p. 193.

43. Ibid., p. 193.

44. Ibid., p. 193.

45. Ibid., p. 194.

46. Ibid., p. 195.

47. Frank Fischer, Politics, Values, and Public Policy, p. 169.


52. Bruce Jennings, "Interpretation and the Practice of Policy Analysis," pp. 143-144.

53. Ibid., p. 145.


60. Ibid., p. 33.
Chapter III
MULTICULTURALISM AND ARTS POLICY RESEARCH

The British cultural critic Raymond Williams, throughout his extensive writings, has explored the concept of culture in great depth. In doing so, he has examined the socio-cultural contexts that have shaped the formulation and usage of both normative and descriptive definitions of "culture." Rather than dismissing these definitions as merely historically-conditioned expressions of bias, he has attempted to understand each as yielding potential insights into the fashioning of a modern concept of culture. I propose to work in a similar manner in seeking a descriptive definition of the term "multiculturalism." This discussion draws on culture theory and criticism, ethnography, sociology of art, educational philosophy, and art education based on the belief that no single discipline or school of thought has a monopoly on insights into the concept of multiculturalism. But while these diverse sources contain many stipulative and programmatic definitions of "multiculturalism," "culture," and "ethnicity," the intent here, at least at this point, is not to seek some kind of rapprochement between different uses of these terms. Instead, my intent is to construct a descriptive definition of "multiculturalism," one which will serve to orient subsequent discussions in this chapter, specifically, discussions of the rise of interest in multiculturalism in policy contexts of the arts and art education.

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Definitions of Culture, Ethnicity, and Multiculturalism

A necessary first step in formulating a descriptive definition of "multiculturalism" is to examine the root term of "culture." Definitions of "culture," historically, have been proposed in two primary forms of discourse -- in the course of formulating explanatory, interpretive, or predictive theories of culture; and in critiques of the quality and character of culture and accounts of conditions which diminish a culture's quality. Obviously, given the diverse purposes of theorists from different disciplines, schools of thought, and historical periods, and the different assumptions and premises utilized in their arguments, the content and form of these definitions vary considerably. But each was formulated, directly or indirectly, in response to one or more basic questions: in what does a culture consist? is it a property of individuals, a group of persons, a society, and/or a nation? if culture is a property of an entity larger than the individual, what is the actual or ideal relation of the individual to the culture? is culture separable from the socio-economic structure of a society? what factors contribute to the continuation of culture, or cultural change? what are the factors which condition relations between cultures within a society and between cultures in different societies? is it possible to make qualitative judgments about the contents of different cultures? if so, are standards of evaluation universal in nature or, in some sense, best conceptualized as evolutionary or as stages in a developmental process?

Reflecting various responses to some or all of these questions, three categories of definitions of "culture" can be identified: 1) the use of "culture" as a synonym for a body of artistic and intellectual work; 2) a process of individual
cultivation leading to an ideal state of human perfection; and 3) the use of "culture" to refer to the whole way of life of a society, with varying emphases on meanings and values or the material organization of social life. These will be discussed in turn. Interestingly, while it is possible to distinguish these categories of definitions for heuristic purposes, subtle interrelationships between these definitions will also emerge.

1) Reference to culture as a body of artistic and intellectual work, according to Raymond Williams, "is still probably the most common popular meaning of the word 'culture'." ² Culture, in this definition, refers to ever-expanding sets of art works that can be presented, displayed, or performed in public settings. Such usage is regularly found in common parlance about the arts and even in research studies which equate public policy and the arts with "cultural" policy.

This concept of culture stands in uneasy relation to the other concepts of culture mentioned above. For example, it cannot be held with credibility that all artistic and intellectual work extant in a society is the product of an ideal or perfect state of mind, as might be deduced from the definition of culture as an ideal state of human perfection. Thus, proponents of this definition, of necessity, qualify the term "culture" with other value-laden terms, including the designations of mass culture, popular culture, and low culture. All of these terms are distinguished from the qualified term "high culture."

Popular culture is, in many contexts, a pejorative term referring to the products of commercial enterprises in a capitalistic society including, but not limited to, films, television, popular literature, popular music, social dancing, and,
more recently, videos. The "popular culture" designation is a key term in fundamental critiques of the quality of contemporary artistic production and consumption and the effects of such activities. The arguments in these critiques have taken several forms: a) that popular culture is largely inferior to high culture because it comprises merely standardized, simplistic products designed for a mass audience of consumers solely to generate profits for corporations and individual entrepreneurs; b) that the commercial attractiveness of popular culture depletes the reserve of talented individuals willing to create serious works of high culture; c) that consumption of popular culture produces either spurious effects on audiences or, in some cases, is emotionally harmful; and d) that popular culture, by directing audiences into passive uses of their leisure time, renders those same audiences vulnerable to mass persuasion, demagoguery, and political manipulation. These arguments, not surprisingly, have generated forceful counterarguments. I will not review them here. My intent has been to draw distinctions between popular culture and high culture within a particular concept of culture.

High culture, in contrast, is viewed as a body of artistic and intellectual work to which supreme value is attached. These are works which, it is argued, repay repeated individual attention and study and have been valued highly throughout multiple interpretations in different historical periods and cultural contexts. Such works, it is said, have stood the test of time. Expansive claims have been made for the inherent values of high culture, that the experience of these works serves to resolve conflicts within the self and helps to create an integrated, harmonious personality; refines perception and discrimination; develops the imaginative basis
of morality, i.e., the capacity to put oneself in the place of others; fosters mutual sympathy and understanding; and offers an ideal for human life, i.e., the reunion of means and ends in daily life.\textsuperscript{10} Finally, it is claimed that the works of high culture function as exemplars of complex human values and serve to counteract powerful stereotypical images of popular culture.\textsuperscript{11}

Despite the continued and frequent use of the terms "high culture" and "popular culture," the distinction is viewed as unsatisfactory from numerous perspectives. As alluded to above, some social scientists, most notably Herbert Gans, have argued that no empirical basis exists for claims that popular culture has deleterious effects on the production of high culture or on the audiences who consume it.\textsuperscript{12} Going even further, a recent study by the National Endowment for the Arts views what is usually termed popular culture and high culture as complementary rather than competitive, sharing, to their mutual benefit, modes of production and dissemination, audiences, training, and significantly, artistic styles, media, and themes.\textsuperscript{13} Other analysts reject the distinction on more theoretical grounds. For example, neo-Marxist sociologists such as Janet Wolff contend that invocation of the term "high culture" is primarily an attempt by those with upper-class privilege to mask the arbitrariness of their artistic preferences as natural and superior. This reification of value judgments as natural, Wolff argues, is a symbolic and powerful means of reproducing inequitable power relations in a society.\textsuperscript{14} In contrast, the conservative cultural critic Samuel Lipman is more interested in the precipitous decline of cultural standards in contemporary society. He argues that the attachment of "high" to "culture" has done little to stem what
he views as a loss of meaning of the older concept of culture, i.e., as effortful cultivation of mind and character and the results of such aspirations. Instead, high culture has come to mean, Lipman concludes with chagrin, as one among many "taste cultures," designating the tastes of social elites in an entertainment industry dominated by marketing, publicity, and manufactured glamor and "the matching of vulgar offerings with popular tastes."15

A recent attempt to sidestep problems associated the use of "culture" to refer to a body of artistic and intellectual work is invocation of a concept with a longer history than culture, namely, civilization. Rooted in the word "civis," the social condition of the citizen, civilization, in its early usage, was also contrasted with "barbarism," associated with the life of a foreign group. In later usage, "civilization," in contrast to anthropological definitions of culture as a "whole way of life," came to mean a high level of attainment, a final stage, in a process of social evolution. Thus, in this normative usage, some societies have a culture while others have a civilization. But this concept of civilization has been criticized as assuming a universal, linear process of evolution and as undervaluing the influence of the economic organization of a society on social life, meanings, and values.16

But the recent rejuvenation of the concept of civilization, largely in educational circles, does not assume a universal process of evolution and certainly does not have "barbarism" as its obverse. First, this usage of "civilization" is often paired with the modifier "American." "American civilization" comprises the indisputably great works of art from the diverse cultural traditions of American society. The building of American civilization historically, it is contended, has been
a cooperative venture among representatives of traditions from Europe, Africa, the
Far East, and the Northern Hemisphere. It could be said, therefore, that the
nature of American civilization is, in some sense, multicultural. But this conclusion
is softened by other premises associated with the use of "American civilization."
The value of great works of art from diverse cultural traditions apparently lies not
in their capacity to illuminate the particularity of the human condition but its
constancy. Also, proponents continually stress that while the concept of "American
civilization" is inclusive of diverse cultural traditions, it does not entail
disparagement of the great artistic achievements of Western Europe. Finally, it is
argued that without knowledge and understanding of the supreme achievements of
an inclusive American civilization, citizens are "culturally illiterate."¹⁷

It is these premises that have spawned critiques of the concept of American
civilization. Most notably, the stress on defense of achievements of Western
Europe suggests to some, despite the nod to diverse cultural traditions, is merely
a synonym for a class-based high culture. This critique can be debated pro and con
to the point of ideological impasse. But a more telling critique of "American
civilization," I think, can be made on purely conceptual grounds. The premise that
American civilization refers to the great artistic achievements of numerous cultures
begs the question of what "culture" means. Since "culture" is subsumed under the
concept of civilization in the definition of "American civilization," a minimal
obligation exists to at least stipulate a definition of "culture." Proponents of
"American civilization" have not done so. But even if such a definition were
stipulated, the replacement of "culture" with "civilization" to refer to a body of
artistic and intellectual work does not take us very far toward solving the problem of stipulating a definition of "multiculturalism" unless, of course, one wanted to speak of a "multicivilization." Thus, it seems best to explore additional, alternative definitions of the root term "culture."

2) The development of "culture" as a modern concept occurred in nineteenth century Europe. This new usage was based on the Latin root "cultura," itself derived from the act of cultivating the soil, and extended to the life of the mind. In this way, "the cultivation of the mind was seen as a process comparable to the cultivation of the soil. [Further, an] important development from this metaphorical use of "culture" was a description of certain men as 'cultural'."\(^{18}\) This adoption of a natural growth metaphor also represented a new way to think about the social, moral, and intellectual life of man in a time of profound change, a time of great debate over the social consequences of the industrial revolution. Culture, thus, came to be defined in contrast to the increasingly "mechanical" characteristics of nineteen century Europe.

It is clear that this conception of culture, in common with the definition of culture as a body of intellectual and artistic work, contains normative premises. It embodies a vision of what culture ought to be. But it also shifts the focus of vision from created objects publicly available for consumption to the internal development of the individual. The elaboration of this conception has been the province of numerous British literary intellectuals and cultural critics. However, as will be seen in a selective review of this effort, illustrated in brief expositions of the arguments of Matthew Arnold, T.S. Eliot, and F.R. Leavis, this normative focus on individual
development has not been uncontested. Indeed, as argued for, this conception of culture draws on other definitions of culture in significant ways.

The British poet and cultural critic Matthew Arnold, writing in the mid-nineteenth century, has argued more forcefully than anyone that the essence of culture lies in the inward operation of the individual. This inward operation is not to be confused with feelings of well-being, satisfaction of biological needs, or merely doing what one likes, activities of what Arnold terms man's "ordinary self." Culture, on the other hand, is the development of man's best self, the achievement of true human perfection through the harmonious development of all sides of his humanity. In Arnold's words, "it is in the endless expansion of its powers, in endless growth in wisdom and beauty, that the spirit of the human race finds its ideal." Arnold's idea of human perfection is rooted in a classical conception of the ideal of human nature -- to rid one's self of ignorance, to see things as they are and thus to see them in their beauty. This ideal is also characterized by spontaneity of consciousness, an unclouded clearness of mind and the unimpeded, flexible play of thought which engages the whole of the universal order. Culture thus demonstrates a single-minded love and pursuit of perfection and a desire to make reason prevail in human affairs.

Arnold urgently defended this conception of culture. This defense was his response to the conditions of nineteenth century society as he saw them -- its hideous industrial cities, its crass assertions of personal preference, its worship of size and numbers, and its numerous religious sects. Arnold saw such conditions not in material terms, but as a reflection of deep-seated spiritual anarchy of the
English people at the time. The ground of such anarchy, in Arnold's view, was a perversion of Judeo-Christian ideals -- its stress on action rather than thought, moral earnestness, and obligations to practice duty, self-control, and hard work. But this tradition, by its positing the achievement of human perfection in an afterlife, rendered the end of human perfection in social life meaningless. Thus, as Arnold saw his society, the practice of moral virtues in the Judeo-Christian tradition had become rigid and mechanical, seen as ends in themselves rather than means to the end of perfecting the human spirit.

Having identified causes and symptoms of what he viewed as the spiritual illness of his society, Arnold called for a virtual revolution with culture, as he defined it, serving as its primary weapon. He believed that the capacity for culture, and hence human perfection, is not the restricted property of one social group or class. Concomitantly, Arnold criticized members of the aristocracy as harshly as he did members of other classes as being mechanically-minded. As soldiers in his proposed revolution, Arnold enlisted the support of men of culture, "the true apostles of equality,"\textsuperscript{20} to fashion the state as an expression of man's best self. Specifically, such men were given an educational charge to humanize and diffuse knowledge, "the best which has been thought and said in the world,"\textsuperscript{21} throughout all classes of society. A person equipped with the flexibility of mind found in men of culture, Arnold contended, can wisely weigh alternatives in situations of choice and direct his action appropriately. Ultimately, though, Arnold believed that immersion in "the best that has been thought and said" would equip all persons in a society to live a life of culture and thus achieve human perfection and happiness.
Arnold’s conception of culture as the development of man’s best self through immersion in the best that has been thought and said continues to exert influence in contemporary thinking about culture and education. For example, a key premise in Samuel Lipman’s critique, outlined above, of the decline of cultural standards in modern America is the shift of meaning of the term culture “away from the formation of mind and character to a description of how individuals and peoples actually live.” Also, Ralph A. Smith, in his Excellence in Art Education, says of Arnold’s vision of education as development of man’s best self that “there can be no better ideal for democratic education,” because it emphasizes access to excellence and pays the majority of the population “the complement of believing them capable of attaining it.” But Arnold’s conception of culture, and the implications he draws from it, has been the subject of numerous criticisms. For example, it is contended that Arnold’s conception of culture and of education, rather than expressing trust in the capacities of the broad majority of a society’s population, betrays a distrust of democracy and constitutes an effort primarily to control the “masses” by humanizing them through tuition in “the best that has been thought and said.” Further, Arnold’s notion of “the best that has been thought and said,” in his view the essential means of culture, has been rigorously disputed. This conception, some argue, was borne of Arnold’s ignorance of and lack of respect for other societies and their achievements. Similarly, critics contend that Arnold did not acknowledge that content of “the best that has been thought and said,” and that the qualifications of the “apostles of culture” to define such content, could be disputed on reasonable grounds.
But apart from these criticisms, largely of the implications drawn from Arnold’s concept of culture, it seems clear that for the purposes set here, the concept of culture as the internal development of man’s best self is not usable in constructing a descriptive definition of “multiculturalism.” This is not to say that the normative assumptions underlying this definition have no place in analyzing multiculturalism, however defined, as argued for and against in policy contexts. But for the task of defining terms descriptively, normative assumptions only serve to complicate the process and confuse subsequent usage. Alternatively, one could perhaps talk of the presence of different levels or stages of internal development toward human perfection, i.e. different stages in the process of culture, as being “multiculturalism.” But such usage is value-laden from the start, rendering it unacceptable as a descriptive term, and largely leads to a reopening of many of the problematic issues raised by distinctions between “high” and “low” culture discussed above.

The conception of culture offered by another literary intellectual, T.S. Eliot, is also highly value-laden and hence not usable, at least at this stage, as a root term in a descriptive definition of “multiculturalism.” But Eliot’s perspective bears some scrutiny here for two reasons – it provides an interesting contrast to Arnold’s view and foreshadows later discussions of multiculturalism.

Eliot acknowledges that it is possible to speak of culture as a property of an individual, in much the same way as Arnold does. But in contrast to Arnold, Eliot sees such a conception as incomplete, arguing that to arrive at a conception of
culture one cannot speak of the individual in isolation or in abstraction from society as a whole.

In his major work on the subject of culture, *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*, Eliot does not propose a specific definition of culture. Instead, he focuses on the conditions of culture in a society. In doing so, Eliot is firm that these conditions are not translatable into directions, prescriptions, or plans that, if adopted and implemented, would ensure the presence of culture in a society. Still, Eliot contends that these conditions are necessary and indispensable, without which culture, however defined, is not possible.

There are two broad and encompassing conditions of culture in the view of Eliot: **unity** and **diversity** in society. Unity is to come from a common core of religious beliefs. Eliot contends that it is the higher, world religions that are most likely to stimulate the development of culture and that, historically speaking, there has been no significant culture without a dominant, if not common, religion in a society. In either case, Eliot concludes that without beliefs, symbols, and codes of conduct of religion, any other kind of unity in a society is an illusory condition of culture.

The other condition of culture that Eliot stipulates, diversity, refers to a society-wide diversity based on class. He envisions an organic structure, an ecology of diverse cultures rooted in class distinctions. Each individual is to take his place at the highest level for which his natural aptitudes equip him. Part of this vision is an interaction between different cultures. Eliot argues that there are many possible types of interaction between class-based cultures within society, including
additions to and defections from class memberships underlying class-based cultures, a phenomenon which, in Eliot's view, weakens the class boundaries necessary to an ecology of cultures. Other possible interactions include: complete absorption of one culture by another; isolation of a culture from the influences of other cultures; and piecemeal borrowing from a culture by another culture or others. All of these interactions, according to Eliot, upset the structural balance of cultures in a society. Yet conflict between cultures is exempted from this list. By Eliot's reasoning, such conflict can be part of a process of giving and receiving among cultures, a stimulus to creativity and progress for individual cultures, and, ultimately, a safeguard for the survival and health of high culture in society.

Eliot concludes that a structural balance of cultures cannot and should not be accomplished by means of formal education alone. He argues that a necessary condition of culture, in particular a high culture, is maintenance of an aristocratic class in a society. His claim is not that members of an aristocratic class necessarily have "more" culture than members of other classes, but that a high culture is more self-conscious and specialized. Eliot concludes that it is the family, in particular, the families of aristocratic classes, rather than any formal educational process, that is and must be the primary channel for the transmission of culture at its highest level.

The extent of influence exerted by Eliot's examination of the concept of culture, in contemporary thought about culture, has been limited. Raymond Williams, for one, is impressed with two of Eliot's arguments: 1) that one cannot speak of culture as the property of individuals in isolation from society as a whole;
and 2) that it is unreasonable to expect that the development of culture is a matter of following prescriptions, planning, or transmitting the products of culture, including the arts, through education. Critics of Eliot’s views tend to focus on his arguments, for a common religion and maintenance of class-based cultures in a society, as disrespectful of religious liberty and diversity and as non-democratic, respectively. But more than the merit of these criticisms of Eliot’s conditions of culture, the key question here is whether Eliot’s discussion of the term culture is helpful in constructing a descriptive definition of “multiculturalism.” Although his discussion of an “ecology of cultures” suggests a perspective on the relations of diverse cultures within a society, and hence multiculturalism, Eliot’s equivocation on use of the term “culture” is problematic. As discussed above, he never offers a formal definition of culture, preferring to concentrate on discussions of societal conditions which foster culture. But he still utilizes the term, his usage shifting from talk of culture as the internal development of the individual to the whole way of life as a society. This equivocation, when combined with the many value-laden premises surrounding his usage of “culture,” renders Eliot’s work inappropriate, at least for the immediate task at hand of defining “multiculturalism.”

The ideas of F.R. Leavis, another cultural critic in the tradition of literary intellectuals, stand somewhere between those of Matthew Arnold and T.S. Eliot. Following Arnold, Leavis, writing in the mid-20th century, is concerned with consequences of the spread of mass democracy for cultural development. In particular, his concern is with the lowering of cultural standards to a low common denominator in a society characterized by the mass production, dissemination, and
consumption of culture. Arnold saw objects, in his terms, "the best that has been thought and said," as only the means, however indispensable, of the process of culture. For Leavis, culture is the objects themselves, a conception virtually identical to that of "high culture." Leavis' concept of culture thus inherits the conceptual problems associated with "high culture," as discussed above. Also, consistent with Eliot, but without Eliot’s conception of an ecology of cultures, Leavis contends that the maintenance of high cultural standards is dependent on a cultivated minority. He bases this claim on the premise that only a minority of citizens in a society is capable of unprompted, first-hand judgment of the value of cultural objects.

A critical analysis of the premises underlying Leavis' concept of culture will not be attempted here. Suffice it to say, as with the conceptions of Arnold and Eliot, that Leavis' notion of culture is too value-laden to provide guidance in constructing a descriptive definition of "multiculturalism." As noted above, this does not negate the potential value of these conceptions in discussions of normative definitions of "multiculturalism." But, for now, it remains to explore one additional category of definitions of culture.

3) The final category of definitions of the term "culture" represents a radical shift in usage. It is a departure from reference to a singular "culture," whether defined as a body of intellectual and artistic work or as a process of developing man's best self, to talk of a plurality of "cultures." The term culture was extended (persons with differing views might say appropriated) by late 19th-century social scientists to refer to the whole way of life of given societies. Several factors
contributed to this shift. This first was European intellectuals’ growing awareness of and interest in folk life, those particular and distinctive customs and arts of different people within nations. Their accumulating knowledge of non-European societies such as India and China, among others, societies with different and complex social organizations and sophisticated artistic and intellectual traditions, also contributed to this conceptual shift. "Although many Europeans saw these societies as merely backward in comparison to their own, with its highly developed technology and politics, others saw them as distinctive shapings of the human mind that could not easily be assimilated to a simple, unilinear idea of civilization" or culture. Further, these observers were discovering significant connections between economic and social life and the styles and content of intellectual and artistic work. As Raymond Williams states, "the concept of a specific "culture" was an obvious way of expressing these relations." Finally, it can be argued that the concept of culture was important to the development of anthropology, providing this fledgling discipline, in the late 19th-century, with a needed and unique focus of analysis.

Anthropologist E.B. Tylor is credited with the first use of "culture" as a social scientific term. He defined culture, a definition of considerable influence even today, as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." But, historically, there has been considerable controversy in the social sciences over this concept of culture. These disputes have centered on the relations between the many elements in the "whole way of life" of a society. Notably, under
the influence of Marxian and neo-Marxist theories, many social scientists have posited "a definite relation between that "complex whole" of meanings and values "acquired by man as a member of society" and particular types of social and economic institutions. In general, types of organization of material life were held to determine systems of meaning and values... According to this view, "culture" inevitably includes the material organization of life and cannot be confined to the area of meanings and values."34

Raymond Williams, in his cultural criticism, is a major contemporary proponent of this view. He sees questions of culture not as matters of meanings and values, but as matters of social relations and political economy in a society. In particular, culture, he argues, is conditioned by inequitable social and economic relations. Those with economic and social power are able to achieve cultural hegemony in a society, with dominance over the production, dissemination, and consumption of culture. In turn, such cultural dominance, through a continual process of renewal within powerful classes, reinforces such classes' claims of legitimacy as well as actual power. Other social groups, as a result, Williams argues, exist in a condition of "lived dominance." Such groups have some degree of cultural autonomy, allowing them to create resistant or oppositional cultural forms. Yet Williams concludes that by incorporating alternative cultural forms under systems of cultural dominance, groups with economic and social power are able to maintain cultural dominance, even in the face of opposition.35

Although not in direct response to Williams' views, many social thinkers have rejected the primacy of socio-economic structures in Marxian and neo-
Marxian theories of culture. These thinkers are more impressed with the extraordinary cultural differences between societies, especially those between societies with comparable social and economic structures. The work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz exemplifies this point of view. It stresses the particularity of culture and the variety of lived experiences in different societies. Geertz calls for ethnographic study of individual cultures in their "thick particularity," study which examines those meanings which inform the actions of members of a particular culture. Such inquiry, for Geertz, is rooted in a view of culture as creative, inhering in the way people create and use symbols to construct new interpretations of social experience, both public and private. He formally defines culture as "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life."\(^3\)\(^6\) But neo-Marxian critics remain unpersuaded by arguments for a symbols-and-meanings conception of culture such as the one proposed by Geertz. These critics argue that Geertz "aestheticizes" the concept of culture through his neglect of the factors of socio-economic power and repression in conceiving "culture."\(^3\)\(^7\)

Dispute over the concept of culture as a "whole way of life" is not limited to arguments between neo-Marxists and proponents of the symbols-and-meanings perspective; there are numerous disputes within the latter perspective as well. Even so basic a term as "meaning" is contested. As Richard Shweder asks, "How is meaning in everyday language and thought similar to, or different from, meaning
in scientific language and thought? Should our concept of meaning include some of the non-referential functions of language?... Should the concept of meaning be broadened to include both what something means (externally and objectively) and what something means to someone (internally or subjectively)?

This issue is one among many unresolved issues within the symbols-and-meanings conception of culture, a perspective comprising a plurality of views of reality, mind, meaning, and symbols. This plurality of approaches to understanding the elements of cultures can be placed in three categories: universalism, developmentalism, and relativism.

A universalist approach is rooted in what Shweder terms "enlightenment" assumptions: "that the mind of man is intendedly rational and scientific, that the dictates of reason are equally binding regardless of time, place, culture, race, personal desire, or individual endowment, and that in reason can be found a universally applicable standard for judging validity and worth." From these assumptions flows an effort to uncover universals across cultures, "to induce the nature of man, and the dictates of reason, from practices common to humanity." Further, as Shweder argues, "to do this successfully, one must search for deeper and underlying agreements hidden behind surface differences." Recent enlightenment research has focused on everyday systems of cognitive classification, principles of inference, and language schema which influence persons' abilities to observe, remember, and predict. It is admittedly difficult to uncover similarities across cultures. This process entails the assumption that diversity among cultures and its members is more apparent than real. But critics argue that the results of
enlightenment research undercut this assumption. Too often, they argue, such inquiry yields accounts of similarities that are overly general and, in so doing, overlook significant differences between cases.\textsuperscript{45}

Developmentalists share the assumption of the enlightenment approach that the dictates of reason and evidence are the same for all persons regardless of culture, time, or place. But developmentalists, in contrast, argue that these same dictates of reason and evidence are not equally developed in all persons and cultures. Developmentalists stipulate normative standards or endpoints for thought or action in a particular sphere of human activity. In applying such standards, developmentalists take the diversity of human behavior as a given. They then interpret this diverse behavior on a continuum, as it approaches the stipulated endpoint or not. Thus, developmentalists see thought and action in different cultures as a matter of progress in steps and stages, involving adaptation and problem solving as individuals or whole cultures make progressively better adaptations to the demands of their environments. The developmental perspective has been utilized in study of the cognitive,\textsuperscript{46} moral,\textsuperscript{47} and aesthetic\textsuperscript{48} domains of individual experience, and has been extended to the history of ideas, seen as "a history of more and more adequate representations of reality."\textsuperscript{49} These widespread applications of developmentalism have, in turn, generated criticisms from numerous points of view. But a more general criticism of developmentalism is of greater interest here, a criticism which focuses on developmentalism's normative claims. The dispute centers on developmentalist theorists' efforts to establish endpoints toward which development progresses in domains of human experience. Critics are
not persuaded that, whatever the merits of their theories, it is possible for developmentalists to justify claims that one form of cognition, morality, or artistry is better or worse than another, let alone provide normative grounds for stipulating endpoints for development. By disputing these premises, critics thus call into question any attempts to rank thought and action on a continuum and, hence, the validity of stage theories of progress.

These criticisms of developmentalism are primarily the domain of theorists working within the perspective of relativism. A central tenet of this view "holds that ideas and practices have their foundation in neither logic nor empirical science, that ideas and practices fall beyond the scope of deductive and inductive reason, that ideas and practices are neither rational nor irrational but rather nonrational." Under the paradigm of relativism, cultures are seen as self-contained frameworks for understanding experience, each with its own rules and modes of interpretation. A relativistic perspective does not lend itself to comparative evaluation of cultures and their practices on normative grounds. Indeed, for a relativist, any choice between frameworks and practices, in the absence of normative grounds, must, of necessity, be an act of faith.

A recent and major development within the relativist paradigm is the addition of a significant premise to the symbols-and-meanings perspective on culture, namely, the conception of culture as an arbitrary code. Many influential, contemporary theorists "argue for a "symbolic" anthropology, an anthropology primarily concerned with nonrational ideas (presuppositions, cultural definitions, declarations, arbitrary classifications) and their verbal and nonverbal means of
expression. Indeed, the main idea of a symbolic anthropology is that much of our action "says something" about what we stand for and stands for our nonrational constructions of reality.\textsuperscript{52}

But these new developments in anthropological theory do not alter the primary thrust of relativism -- to defend the coequality of fundamentally different frames of thought and action characteristic of diverse cultures. Predictably, the notion of cultural relativism is problematic for many. It generally is conceded that relativism, from its origins in the early 20th century, was a worthwhile reaction to the prejudice of ethnocentrism. As Raymond Williams argues, "it was evidently wrong to interpret all cultural phenomena in terms of categories applicable to European societies, and it was arbitrary and dangerous to attempt to evaluate very diverse cultures by references to a fixed value system that was likewise derived from European tradition;"\textsuperscript{53} and relatively few would argue with the idea that "a particular complex whole should be studied as far as possible in its own terms, rather than assimilated to the observer's terms."\textsuperscript{54} Still, at the very least, the idea of cultural relativism seems to be tinged with irony. While the notion of cultural relativism may be extended to the study of other cultures, those cultures themselves, far from agreeing with premises of cultural relativism, many times are absolutist in defense of their own systems of thought, belief, and action. The idea of cultural relativism has also been critiqued on grounds of logical consistency. The defense of the co-equality of cultures, to some, seems to be an absolutist approach to understanding other cultures, thereby exempting such a defense from the idea of cultural relativism, resulting in a logical contradiction. Not surprisingly,
universalists are simply not willing to accept the idea that all forms of thought and action are equal in rational or normative terms; developmentalists are unwilling to forgo the idea of progress in the thought and actions of individuals and cultures. Still other critics focus on the consequences of a belief in cultural relativism, arguing that the emphasis on self-contained world views yields no common standards for rational criticism of diverse cultural practices. Without such standards, it is argued that when disputes arise between cultures the only available recourse for reconciliation is force, domination, or non-rational conversion.

To this point, I have summarized numerous conceptions of the term "culture" toward the goal of constructing a descriptive definition of "multiculturalism." Three basic categories of definitions were identified: 1) culture as a body of artistic and intellectual work; 2) culture as a process of individual cultivation; and 3) culture as the whole way of life of a society. Despite some subtle and interesting interrelationships between these categories of definitions, the most vivid image in this picture is one of great, perhaps irreconcilable, diversity.

In contrast, contemporary anthropologist James Clifford looks at this diversity and sees continuity between these many definitions, especially in the apparent shift from a singular concept of culture to a plural concept of cultures. He argues that in this shift "the 19th-century definitions were not entirely transformed. If they became less elitist (distinctions between "high" and "low" culture were erased) and less Eurocentric (every human society was fully "cultural"), nevertheless a certain body of assumptions were carried over from the older definitions ... directly into relativist anthropology. A powerful structure of feeling
continues to see culture, wherever it is found, as a coherent body that lives and
dies. Culture is enduring, traditional, structural (rather than contingent, syncretic,
historical). Culture is a process of ordering, not of disruption. It changes and
develops like a living organism."55 Clifford further contends that the confidence
that characterized past attempts to define culture has begun to erode. This doubt
is methodological in origin -- the crisis in ethnography -- as Clifford see it. He, and
others, argue that ethnography, a primary research method of anthropology, cannot
yield understanding of the "essence" of a culture, however defined. Too often
ethnographers, akin to plunderers of the arts of distant cultures, have gathered
information about a culture and constructed this information into an arbitrary
system of value, symbols, and meaning in their desire to discover a coherent whole.
The best that ethnographers can hope to do, according to Clifford, is construct
reasonable fictions about the way of life of a society. Another source of doubt
over the "culture" concept is observation of the effects on separate cultures of
cultural imperialism, colonialism, genocide, and worldwide communications, and the
effects on cultures within a particular society of assimilation, discrimination,
appropriation of elements from other cultures, and market pressures. Given the
influence of these factors, Clifford argues that cultures can no longer be viewed as
separate, stable, enduring, authentic, and insulated "whole ways of life." Instead,
all cultures are more accurately viewed as relational, transitional, emerging,
uncertain, and open.

Returning to the question of defining culture, it appears obvious that any
attempt to legislate a definition of culture is futile. In this sense, "culture" is quite
similar to the concept of art, in that no set of necessary and sufficient conditions can be identified for its uniform use, only a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing, or family resemblances. Yet, as with "art," it may be possible to list some nonnecessary and nonsufficient conditions which could at least guide our decisions about whether something can be called a "culture." The work of the educational philosopher Richard Pratte points to a solution to this dilemma. He explores the logical conditions of the term "cultural diversity." As will be seen, an understanding of "cultural diversity" can help make it possible to describe conditions for use of the term "culture," a necessary step in constructing a descriptive definition of "multiculturalism."

Pratte begins with the premise that human groups do not exist in nature, but are things that human beings decide to identify and distinguish. Every society is characterized by diversity of some sort. But when we say that a society is homogenous we have decided simply that the ways that different groups in a society differ are unimportant or irrelevant in a particular context. On the other hand, when we say that a society is diverse, we have decided that there is an important and relevant reason to identify and distinguish groups as different. This is not sufficient to establish the diversity of cultures, however, in that groups can be distinguished along noncultural lines such as occupation, neighborhood, club membership, and the like. Pratte argues that more is required. He suggests that the "differences between groups must be viewed as fundamental enough to be capable of producing values and dispositions that contribute to significantly different outlooks on the world." Further, and this question has been begged so
far, it is not enough to say that someone from an omniscient or powerful point of view merely decides that there is cultural diversity in a society. It must also be the case that a group considers itself different or unique in its outlook on the world. But even this goes only so far. Just because a group says it is different does not make it so -- for a group to say it is different only means that we have a group that says it is different. Pratte thus posits that differences among groups must be more than merely self-proclaimed. In particular, this diversity "must be made incarnate within the behaviors of the people ... and expressed in a concrete situation which bears on political, economic, and social policy."58 Pratte posits a final condition, an historical condition, that goes beyond identity within a present-day social system, i.e., that cultural diversity is a matter of cultural transmission across generations. He contends that without the transmission of values, dispositions, and outlooks on the world, it would be difficult to describe a society as culturally diverse. In summary, then, "cultural diversity" as a descriptive term "refers to the coexistence of unlike or variegated groups within a common social system."59

These conditions for the descriptive use of the term "cultural diversity" offer a way to talk about "cultures" that does not involve the heavily value-laden premises that inform concepts of culture such as "a process of individual cultivation" or a "whole way of life of a society." By the process of conceptual analysis, then, it can be said that a culture consists of a group that is seen and sees itself as having relatively unique shared and transmitted values, dispositions, and outlooks on the world made manifest in the group's behaviors within a common social system and with significant bearing on political, economic, and social policy.
The premises in this definition of culture that touch on social structure and political, economic, and social policy bear closer scrutiny. This will be done by examining the concept of "ethnicity," in particular, contemporary definitions of ethnicity as a new social form conditioned by political and economic structures. Consideration of the concept of ethnicity is also a necessary step, as will be seen, in constructing a descriptive definition of multiculturalism.

There seems to be general agreement on the premises, as Talcott Parsons argues, "that what we call ethnicity is a primary focus of group identity, that is, the organization of plural persons into distinctive groups and, second, of solidarity and the loyalties of individual members to such groups." But beyond these premises numerous reference points have been invoked in diverse definitions of ethnicity. These reference points have included: 1) national identity in which identification with a common culture and shared territory of residence is maintained across generations; 2) language, with identity rooted in an oral tradition and documents of written language; 3) religion, in which sets of beliefs and rituals form the basis of group identity; 4) cultural behaviors, such as norms and customs; 5) historical experience, in which identity is borne of experiences as a group historically, notably, colonization, enslavement, or exploitation; and 6) self-image, i.e., ideas about who a group is as a people, for example, hard-working, brave, or "chosen people," among others.

These points of reference for "ethnicity" are not mutually exclusive and they appear in various configurations in diverse definitions of the term. They are frequently invoked in definitions that tend to be backward-looking, reflecting the
belief that ethnicity is a basic, primordial feature of human nature that is inherited and will endure over time, even in the face of suppression. But these points of reference are also invoked in more dynamic theories of ethnicity, theories that see ethnic groups as "dynamic flexible mechanisms that grow and change and have integrity [and are] not necessarily threatened by the change." Such theories focus on interactions between ethnic groups within a common social structure. Through the influence of interaction and acculturation, it is argued, that while the commonalities between these groups increase, certain ethnic characteristics become more distinctive and are voluntarily emphasized and developed in the face of threats of homogenization.

These conceptions of ethnicity, as a basic, primordial reality and as a conscious reassertion of ethnic characteristics in a multi-ethnic society, stand in contrast to contemporary conceptions of ethnicity as a new social form. In part, this new conception consists in a shift from stress on identification with acquired or learned aspects of ethnic heritage such as language, national identity, religion, norms, customs, historical experience, or self-image, to biological differences such as race. Notably, in the American context, racial minorities of African, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American descent have asserted that their values, dispositions, behavior, and outlooks on the world are sufficiently distinct for them to be considered ethnic group cultures. By the logical conditions of "culture" stipulated by Pratte, as discussed above, this shift in meaning can be absorbed. But the new conception of "ethnicity" entails additional criteria for usage of the term, in particular, economic and political criteria. It is argued that modern ethnic groups
tend to feel a shared sense of economic fate, that the economic future of ethnic group members is intimately tied together, and that they respond to political issues collectively and attempt to promote public policies and programs that will serve the interests of the group. Pratte argues that ethnicity in modern America "is a strategy for asserting claims against the institutions of society, for any oppressed group has the best chance of changing the system if it raises the communal consciousness of its members." Thus, this view of "ethnic" culture rests on the quest for power to harness sources of discontent, rooted in deprivation, racial discrimination, and powerlessness, within a political system. And as Daniel Bell has argued, the modern efficacy of ethnicity rests on the combination of economic and political interests with the "affective ties" of cultural identity as a basis for social and political action, a force far more potent than class.

It is time to bring these strands together in a descriptive definition of multiculturalism. But first, a couple of final points. The discussion to this point has, to some degree, foreshadowed my conclusion that a descriptive definition of multiculturalism must include premises underlying concepts of both "culture" and "ethnicity." This conclusion is warranted, I believe, because contemporary conceptions of ethnicity, with their stress on political and economic structures, flesh out the premise in the definition of culture referring to political, economic, and social policy. Further, new conceptions of ethnicity seem to stress, as mentioned above, biological characteristics such as race. Thus a definition of multiculturalism which stresses characteristics and conditions of racial minorities within a social system could be said to be descriptive, in that it would reflect and summarize
previous usage. But it must be admitted that some would object to the focus on racial minorities in a definition of multiculturalism, in that such a focus would neglect other points of reference for the term, including the ethnicity of white Americans as well as group memberships based on age, sex, sexual preference, and physical capability, among others. Thus, those who would extend the term "multiculturalism" to cover these points of reference would likely argue that a definition of multiculturalism which stresses racial minorities, at the very least, is a stipulative definition, i.e., an attempt to lay down conditions for usage of the term within a certain context. But whether one considers it a descriptive or stipulative definition this focus is warranted, I think, because in the policy contexts of the arts and arts education, talk of multiculturalism tends to stress groups of African, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American descent. That said, subsequent discussions of multiculturalism will assume the following definition: Multiculturalism is the coexistence of groups of racial minorities within a common socio-political system, groups that, while continually undergoing change, are seen and see themselves as having relatively unique shared and transmitted values, dispositions, behaviors, and outlooks on the world as well as a shared economic future and that draw on the loyalty of group members to harness discontent in the face of racial discrimination and powerlessness as a basis for social and political action.

As stressed above, a descriptive or even stipulative definition of multiculturalism does not foreclose subsequent examination of programmatic definitions of multiculturalism. Indeed, this will be done in later chapters. But, for now, I will examine the rise of interest in multiculturalism in American society and in the policy contexts of the arts and arts education.
The Rise of Interest in Multiculturalism

To speak about the rise of interest in multiculturalism at this point in time would doubtless be surprising to many, especially those who, over the past several decades, predicted that such interest would inevitably wane. These predictions have taken numerous forms and are rooted in diverse theoretical perspectives. Milton Gordon, in his Assimilation in American Life,\textsuperscript{65} predicted that differences between ethnic groups, especially behavioral differences, would virtually wither away in the face of structural assimilation -- the integration of ethnic groups members into the institutions of the dominant group in a society, and in the face of cultural assimilation -- the acquisition, usually forced, of the cultural characteristics of one ethnic group by another group. Liberal social theorists, such as Glazer and Moynihan\textsuperscript{66} predicted that ethnic identification would continue as voluntary activity in private community organizations and families but would melt away in the public institutions of an open, democratic society emphasizing equality of opportunity, objective standards of performance, and rewards based on merit. Marxists such as Stephen Steinberg\textsuperscript{67} predicted that ethnicity, despite its power to combine interests with affective ties, would be increasingly viewed as reactionary and an ineffectual force which delays social and economic transformation in inequitable societies.

But many contemporary theorists have been impressed with the continued and growing salience of multiculturalism in American life and, in turn, have offered
explanations for this phenomenon. The sociologist Daniel Bell, for one, outlines broad social and political trends which, in his view, laid the groundwork for the reemergence of multiculturalism as a force in American society. He identifies four trends: 1) A shift from marketplace to political decisions. A market economy is one where the demands of consumers are made by individuals acting independently, and where supply decisions are made by an aggregate of competitive producers and distributors of goods and services. Thus, markets, at least in "pure" market economic theory, comprise countless uncoordinated decisions by individuals and corporate entities. But Bell contends that, increasingly, decisions previously left to the marketplace are coming under the purview of politics, i.e., government bodies at the local, state, and federal levels. A wide array of decisions are now negotiated in the political arena resulting in "the organization of persons into communal and interest groups, defensively to protect their places and privileges, or advantageously to gain place and privilege. The multiplication of groups increases community conflict, in self-protection, more and more persons are impelled to join one or another of the groups in order not to be excluded from the decisions." 68 Ethnic groups are among these groups seeking to achieve their purposes through political negotiation.

2) The redefinition of social values. This redefinition has occurred, Bell argues, around the concept of equality, in particular, in a shift from talk of "equality of opportunity" to enhance fair competition in society to "equality of result," entailing a redistribution of public resources. Concomitantly, the concept of "rights" has taken on new meanings beyond the 18th-century claim to liberty and full
protection of the law. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the meaning was extended to include political rights, especially voting rights; the major shift in recent years has been toward social rights, including rights in such diverse areas as privacy, self-determination, employment, adequate standards of living, and significantly, cultural identity, often demanded as entitlements.

3) The decline of authority. Bell contends that in many spheres of American life and its institutions, traditional authority structures and bases of authority are being challenged and eroding. He notes a growing defensiveness about unearned privilege and the appearance of elites, the jettisoning of one-person authority in organizational life in favor of communities, task forces, and consultative groups, increased skepticism about professionalism as a legitimate source of authority and resistance to distance between "experts" and those affected by "expert" decisions, and, in cultural life, the denial of standards of judgment rooted in expertise, age, or experience.

4) A shift in ideology. Bell argues that anti-imperialism is the chief ideological passion in contemporary thought and politics. If, as he argues, imperialism today has subsided as an economic fact, "it is clearly a political and symbolic reality and represents the perceived power hegemony, and feared cultural paramountcy, of the United States." Anti-imperialistic sentiment is also increasingly expressed in reference to American society, as a means of characterizing actions by the dominant culture, in particular, those by which ethnic groups are acculturated in Anglo-Saxon values.
In this increasingly politicized environment, according to Bell, the bases for group cohesion are decisive. Bell identifies two such bases for social and political action: "symbolic and expressive movements whose ties are primarily affective; and instrumental groups whose actions are bound by a set of common, usually material, interests." As he says, the problem with exclusively symbolic-expressive groups is that while they can be quickly mobilized during a time of crisis or stress, such groups can disappear without sustaining interest in tangible rewards and achievement of those rewards. For instrumental groups, once stated goals have been realized, it is difficult to readapt toward new purposes. In a highly politicized and competitive environment, those social units which can combine symbolic and instrumental purposes, tend to be most successful in political terms. Ethnic groups, by providing a sense of coherence, meaning, and identity and a leverage for material rewards from governmental bodies, have the potential of such success.

While Bell, in his analysis, concentrates on broad social, political, and economic conditions which have facilitated the rise of interest in multiculturalism, social scientist and educator James Banks offers explanatory hypotheses for the increase of interest in multiculturalism. Banks seeks explanation in the perceived gap between the promise of equality of opportunity, the cornerstone of liberal ideology, and the reality of institutionalized discrimination and racism in America. He contends that ethnic minority groups had internalized the egalitarian and democratic ideals of liberal ideology. Yet while they were expected to assimilate culturally, this concession to dominant forces in society was not met with increased opportunities for political participation or tangible rewards of economic and social
mobility. With the passage of government legislation in the past few decades, legislation designed to address blatant forms of racial discrimination as well as social and economic conditions, helped to create rising expectations among racial minorities. But, as Banks concludes, "rising expectations outpaced the improvement within the social, economic and political systems; [and] widespread discrimination, racism, and structural exclusion experienced by ethnic groups served as a vehicle for political mobilization."\(^7^1\)

These explanations offered for the increasing salience of ethnicity in society at large apply to the arts world as well. Notably, with the growth and institutionalization of public arts agencies at the national, state, and local levels over the last twenty-five years, numerous non-profit arts organizations have been formed and, in turn, have sought to procure public resources in the form of grants and fellowships.\(^7^2\) In an environment where applicants outstrip available funds, ethnicity has served as a mobilizing force in the competition for such funds. There is some evidence that for culturally diverse arts organizations, in the face of limited access to private funds, receipt of public funds is viewed as essential to organizational growth and development.\(^7^3\) Multiculturalism in the arts world is also rooted in the general cultural trend toward undermining claims of authority in defining aesthetic values. A growing consciousness has emerged of how concepts of aesthetic values are socially based, in particular, how economic and social interests have been able to reify a Eurocentric concept of the arts through the creation and expansion of high culture institutions.\(^7^4\)
There are also more specific explanations unique to the arts world that can be identified to account for the increasing salience of ethnicity. One is the rise of interest group politics in the arts. Groups of arts organizations, often organized by discipline (for example, the American Association of Museums and the American Symphony Orchestra League), have learned the lessons of interest group politics which they now practice with considerable skill in representing their interests to legislatures, bureaucracies, and public arts agencies. During the 1980s, an arts service organization, the Association of American Cultures (TAAC) has been an active voice in lobbying for the arts of ethnic cultures. By building coalitions among artists and arts organizations rooted in African, Asian, Hispanic, and Native American traditions, it has effectively placed a number of issues on the policy agendas of public arts agencies: the need for communities of color to establish "institutions to counterbalance the efforts of white institutions to define [entities] based on their concepts of reality;" the lack of enforcement of civil rights/affirmative action legislation and statutes by public arts agencies; the need for greater ethnic representation on arts agencies' staffs and grant review panels; and the need to raise funds from private sector funders while at the same time competing more effectively for a "redistribution of wealth" from public arts agencies. In an era of expansion of public dollars for the arts, these issues could be resolved and interests accommodated. But the heyday of public arts funding, the 1970s, is past. This constricting of resources has increased the competition for funds, and hence the activities of arts interest groups, including TAAC.
Despite this competitive environment, public arts agencies, at least via rhetoric, have been receptive to the policy issues raised on behalf of ethnic cultures. For example, the National Assembly of Local Arts Agencies (NALAA) is advocating the promotion of culturally diverse arts as part of NALAA professional standards for local arts agencies (LAAs) and has advocated the development of incentives to LAAs for increased support to culturally diverse constituencies. These activities are backed up by statements advocating cultural pluralism, for example, that "the major European arts are no longer the major culture in America. Ethnic arts are just as important as symphonies, because they are the basis of our culture and ... the strength of the United States lies in the mix of cultures." The NEA has also been affected by increased attention to cultural diversity in the arts. Recent Congressional documents re-authorizing the NEA have stipulated that the NEA must increase the availability of the Endowment's programs to emerging, rural, and culturally diverse artists, arts organizations, and communities. Despite these expressions of interest, the degree to which public arts agencies have instituted policies to promote cultural diversity in the arts is an open question, to be explored later in this dissertation.

It is interesting to speculate, at this point, as to why, increasingly, there is expressed interest in multiculturalism among public arts agencies. In exploring this question, it must be said that many theorists, notably, neo-Marxist theorists, would not have predicted such a phenomenon. By such thinking, representatives of the dominant culture are able to control the governance and decision-making of public arts agencies, ensuring that the vast majority of available funds are granted to
artists and arts organizations whose work reflects their Eurocentric tastes. Indeed, this argument has been made. But how then can we account for this rhetorical support of multiculturalism by public arts agencies?

One explanation was offered in a previous chapter, namely, that the NEA, in particular, has adopted multiculturalism as a goal for the agency amidst a crisis of purpose following recent political battles over NEA funding of "controversial" art. This discovery of a new purpose, it can be argued, is quite consistent with a larger strategy that the NEA has utilized historically to bolster its precarious political position as a young and not uniformly popular agency. This strategy, pluralism, entails the use of multiple sets of evaluative criteria in resolving questions of funding allocations to grants competitors. This strategy aims at a very broad distribution of funds to many kinds of art, artists, genres, and cultural traditions, and thus aims to increase the number of constituencies and potential arts advocates with interests in the growth of government arts support. The strategy of pluralism, clearly, is consistent with the promotion of multiculturalism in the arts.

Political considerations, however, only go so far in helping to explain the rise of interest in multiculturalism among public arts agencies. Legal matters have contributed to this trend as well, for example, employment laws and policies. Public arts agencies are just that -- public -- and are subject to federal, state, and local laws regarding affirmative action in the workplace. As a result (and this issue will be examined in greater depth in the next chapter), public arts agencies have been hiring more and more persons of color to fill staff positions and have been appointing persons of color to advisory and governing bodies. Consequently, these
persons have, to a growing extent, contributed to growing awareness of the arts of ethnic cultures within their agencies.

Just as importantly in explaining the rise of interest in multiculturalism are changes in arts organizations themselves. Arts organizations, after all, are primary constituents of public arts agencies. The most significant recent changes in the arts world, at least for the issue at hand, are those with audiences for the arts and arts administrators. Judith Balfe, for example, notes that despite their higher levels of education and more socialization experiences in the arts as compared with older cohorts (variables which are traditionally associated with high levels of participation in the arts), baby-boomers, on many measures, participate in the arts less frequently than their elders did at the same age. Balfe attributes this trend to two primary factors: the broadening of easily available arts offerings in American society to include the commercial arts, the arts of non-Western cultures, and traditional art forms, and the filtering of arts presentations through the mass media entailing, in her view, reduction of expectations for and effort toward the arts.81 Richard Peterson also points to growing eclecticism in the presentation of the arts as a source of change in audiences for the arts. For example, the wide-scale reproduction of visual art works, Peterson argues, "has altered the view of painting by bringing the works of all ages and all countries together at one place and on the same scale,"82 making it possible for persons to juxtapose works of art made in vastly different traditions because they happen to "look good" together. This phenomenon, Peterson contends, amounts to a break from a traditional supply-side aesthetic with focus on the artist and his or her tradition to a demand-side
aesthetic, where art, irrespective of its origins, can be looked at and even evaluated on the basis of its uses and effects.

This growing eclecticism in the behavior of audiences for the arts also has implications for the management of the arts. Contemporary arts administrators tend to mirror the aesthetic tastes of their audiences; thus the tastes of newer and younger arts administrators tend to be eclectic in nature. This relationship between "professional" arts administrators stands in contrast to the charismatic arts leaders of the nineteenth century who were, to a great extent, able and willing to lead audience tastes. But even when current arts administrators are able to do this, their training in marketing and grantsmanship leads them to be in a responsive mode to their audiences and patrons, including public arts agencies who make attention to the arts of ethnic cultures a condition of receiving grants.83

This section exploring possible explanations for the rise of interest in and rhetoric about multiculturalism among, specifically, public arts agencies, was admittedly speculative, yielding hypotheses for further study. For now, then, it is perhaps best to turn to a brief review of extant literature on arts policy, examining it as it relates to multiculturalism in the arts.

**Current Research on Arts Policy: A Critical Review**

In previous chapters, I have attempted to place the subject of this dissertation within two contexts. First, I discussed the topic of multiculturalism and the arts as a means of integrating study of issues in the distinct but related policy contexts of the arts and arts education. Secondly, examination of diverse methods of policy research and the possibility of integrating normative policy analysis with
conceptual analysis, placed the dissertation in its methodological context. But given the obvious rise of interest in the implications of multiculturalism, it remains to review extant arts policy literature in terms of its consideration of issues of multiculturalism and the arts.

Arts policy literature, as developed mostly by American researchers in the disciplines of political science, sociology, and economics, and in professional fields of arts administration and arts education, has tended to focus on three basic questions: 1) can public support of the arts be justified?; 2) what are defensible goals for public support of the arts?; and 3) what are the effects of public subsidy, as currently administered in the U.S. on the arts? This literature will be reviewed in terms of the logical conditions of analyzing, justifying, and evaluating policies, the knowledge conditions of making policy decisions, and consideration of multicultural issues in the arts.

1) Justifications of Public Support for the Arts. Given the relatively short history of public subsidy of the arts in the U.S., it is perhaps not surprising that the literature on this question is prodigious.\textsuperscript{84} To date, economic arguments have been dominant. For example, the economic impact argument holds that public subsidy has a multiplier effect, in that for every dollar spent on the arts, other dollars are generated which benefit local economies. But such claims, whether true or not - - and many have questioned their truth value\textsuperscript{85} -- can be easily turned against the arts "by those who would cut arts funds in favor of other expenditures with even greater economic impacts."\textsuperscript{86} But if taken seriously, this argument can justify funding policies in favor of organizations who can mount and present blockbuster
art exhibitions or performing arts festivals with mass appeal, to the neglect of organizations who are economically marginal and unattractive to private sector funders, in particular, arts organizations rooted in ethnic communities. This highlights the fact that all justification arguments for public support for the arts deal with arts as a whole, without due attention to unique characteristics, needs, or issues of individual art forms or cultural communities.

Neither does this literature include examinations of the justifiability of particular policies undertaken by public arts agents, for example, those whose purposes include the redistribution of agency funds to culturally diverse arts organizations. Related to this, this literature does not contain a theory of developing justifiable policies in the arts. First, except for frequent calls for more data on the arts, there has been little attempt to articulate the kinds of knowledge, both theoretical and empirical, needed for policy formulation in the arts. Nor have researchers begun to construct models of rational decision-making in arts policy. Finally, reliance on public opinion polls, which aim to demonstrate widespread public support for public spending on the arts, does not serve as a substitute for identification of those publics, including ethnic group members, who are or who ought to be consulted or involved in arts decision-making.

2) Goals of Public Arts Policy. Consistent with shortcomings identified in the justification literature, researchers have yet to explore means of articulating and placing priority value on goals and means of arts policies, in particular, with regard to questions of ultimate purpose, justness, and tolerability. Instead, analysts have
focused on effects of organizational structure and political processes on the formulation of policy purposes.

In the NEA, it has been argued, "each program [or discipline] area defines its "needs" in terms of the numbers and types of [funding] applications it receives." This administration by arts discipline rather than by "cultural objective" can lead, or so it is argued, to failure of the NEA and other public arts agencies to define their universe of support, set inter-program priorities, and set anything other than vague goals. However, the implications of this organizational structure by discipline for particular publics, for example, culturally-diverse arts organizations, have not been traced.

Shifts in political ideologies, for example, from the Carter to the Reagan administration, and corresponding shifts in aesthetic ideologies, have been the focus of descriptive research by policy researchers. The elitist-populist debate has received particular attention. Defenders of populism stress the need for wide public availability of the arts, a wide and pluralistic concept of artistic merit, and, since creativity and the production of aesthetic value are present in all cultures, the distribution of public funds to redress past injustices against selected cultural groups. Defenders of elitism stress that artistic quality should be the sole criterion in grants decisions and that artistic quality is most consistently found in established high culture institutions. One study has analyzed the shifting of goals in the NEA's Expansion Arts Program during the transition of presidential administrations cited above. Historically, the Expansion Arts Program has funded organizations "which are deeply rooted in and reflective of a minority, inner city, rural or tribal
community. In the transition, however, goals and funding categories moved away from community-based projects towards stabilization and institutionalization of the larger Expansion Arts organizations and the leveraging of private funding. This one research example notwithstanding, studies of policy goals of public arts agencies toward culturally diverse arts organizations in more recent periods and in different bureaucratic, geographic, and ideological contexts are not to be found.

Although rarely considered as such, proposals for goals of arts policy have been quite frequent. When framed, the proposals revolve around conceptions of the democratization of culture and cultural democracy. As an example of the first conception, Monroe Beardsley developed the concept of aesthetic welfare. He argues that it is desirable for experience to have a high aesthetic level. Certain art objects, in virtue of their aesthetic qualities, are peculiarly suited to induce aesthetic experience. This capacity is termed the aesthetic value of the arts object. Aesthetic wealth refers to the total set of objects of aesthetic value available to members of society. The concept of aesthetic justice refers to the equitable distribution of aesthetic wealth among the members of society. To achieve an equitable distribution of aesthetic wealth, it is essential that the society's members have ample opportunity to experience objects of high aesthetic value, whatever their geographic location or social stratum.

Herbert Gans, adopting functionalist and relativistic premises, argues that arts policy-makers have no right to make decisions based on a concept of aesthetic value. To do so is to fail to recognize that a wide variety of art forms, from popular culture to high culture, can and do meet different classes' needs for
meaning and diversion. Thus, to make widely available art objects and experiences of little potential meaning to various classes cannot be considered just. Instead, Gans argues for a policy of "sub-cultural programming" based on thorough needs assessments of peoples' tastes and preferences.

Cultural democracy, in its more sophisticated form, holds that the modern state serves largely to protect power relations and the status quo. As part of its program of ideological control, the dominant culture defines "good" art in terms of its own preferences by positing universal ahistorical categories of artistic merit, while at the same time denying opportunities for dominated groups to develop contending ideologies and articulated conceptions of artistic value. Advocates of cultural democracy demand opportunities for dominated groups to create and disseminate cultural products rooted in their communities' political and social problems, problems created by their contentious relationship to the dominant culture.

As different as these perspectives are, none specifically addresses goals of arts policy in terms of the arts of ethnic cultures. For example, artistic value is either considered universal across cultures or largely class-based, without attention to culturally-specific notions of value. Similarly, the term justice is invoked without reference to the unique historical circumstances of ethnic groups and their role in defining justice in the modern state.

3) Effect of Public Arts Policy. A comprehensive analysis of the effects of public arts policy ideally would be drawn on trend data that reveal how and to whom funds have been allocated over a period of years, including numbers of
grants and grant amounts awarded, types of arts disciplines and activities, and categories of individuals and organizations receiving public arts funds. Further, a comprehensive analysis would include attention to the impact of such funds on the financial health and program development of the individuals and organizations that received grants and, ultimately, would address the effects of public patronage on the nature of artistic production and presentations and subsequent effects on the social composition and aesthetic responses of arts audiences. But research on the effects of public subsidy to the arts have been limited by the lack of available data and attitudes toward evaluation among public arts agency personnel. Despite these constraints, some analysis has been undertaken. For example, Dick Netzer,98 using a case study approach, concluded that public subsidy seems to have made possible large increases in earnings of artistic and support personnel, mostly by increasing the number of performances and presentations of arts organizations. Also, an NEA study on public participation in the arts99 concluded that subsidized television presentations of arts performances have not diminished attendance at live performances and probably have had a positive influence. Policy research is just beginning to examine the artistic effects of public patronage, including one study that found that grants from public arts agencies allowed a sample of non-profit theatres to resist market pressures to present presentations of traditional repertoire with widespread appeal and to engage in artistic risk-taking.100 Finally, public arts agencies have shied away from evaluation research on the effectiveness of their programs. For example, an independent evaluation studied a state arts agency's grants program designed to leverage matching funds from private donors. When
the evaluation revealed that none of the program's stated objectives were being met, rather than acknowledge these difficulties, the agency strongly encouraged the researcher to destroy his findings.\textsuperscript{101}

Given the many problems in conducting evaluation research on policies of public arts agencies, it is not surprising that the effects of public subsidy of culturally diverse arts organizations nor the effectiveness of specific policies designed to benefit those organizations, has not to date been a focus of policy research in the arts.

**Emergent Conceptual Problems and Policy Issues**

Based on this brief review of current arts policy research, one can only conclude that despite the dramatic rise of interest in multiculturalism within the arts world, multiculturalism as a topic for research has been sorely neglected by arts policy analysts. This paucity of research, while a condition that does little to assist arts policymakers in assessing policy options, does present a wide-open field for researchers approaching the topic. Indeed, one could follow the lead of the arts policy research conducted to date and address questions such as: can a persuasive rationale for public support for the arts be constructed which focuses the arts in a multicultural society? or have current policies by public arts agencies been effective regarding the arts of those working in African, Asian, Hispanic, and Native American traditions? But to focus on these questions, I believe, would be to beg numerous conceptual, theoretical, and normative questions that are, by virtue of their significance, logically prior. After all, as will be recalled, a purpose of this dissertation is to explore whether it is possible to reconcile fundamental
value positions in the formulation of policy goals and means. It should be clear by now that multiculturalism, as applied to arts policy, yields numerous value questions.

To this point and for a variety of reasons, I have focused on descriptive tasks -- describing various conceptions of culture, ethnicity, and multiculturalism in an effort to construct a descriptive definition of multiculturalism. But it is now time to turn to value questions and the programmatic definitions through which diverse value positions are expressed.

As will be recalled, I will first, following the method of normative policy analysis, seek to understand and interpret current arts policies regarding multiculturalism. This attempt at understanding focuses on public arts agencies' stated goals, eligibility requirements, evaluative criteria, and staffing and advisory bodies, all factors which affect decision-making and administrative actions regarding the arts of ethnic cultures. But further, by examining public arts agencies' language as revealed in justifications of policies and goals, conceptual, normative, and theoretical issues emerge. Some of these questions can be directly linked to previous discussions in this chapter, e.g., the idea of multiculturalism. But in subsequent chapters I will explore normative definitions of multiculturalism and subject these definitions to conceptual analysis. Other emergent issues, which will be subjected to similar treatment, include the relations of art and culture, affirmative action in arts policy, and determining artistic value from diverse cultural perspectives. Arts policy-making is an inherently value-laden enterprise. Attention to these questions is unavoidable as a basis for rational assessment of policy options regarding multiculturalism and the arts.
NOTES


5. For detailed discussion of this argument, see Ernest van den Haag, "Of Happiness and Despair We Have No Measure," in Bernard Rosenberg and David M. White, eds., *Mass Culture: The Popular Arts in America*.

6. The essay cited above by Ernest van den Haag also contains a detailed discussion of this argument.

7. For detailed discussion of this argument, see Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

8. For counter-arguments to popular culture critiques, see Herbert J. Gans, *Popular Culture and High Culture*.

9. For a discussion of "the test of time" as an artistic standard, see Anthony Savile, *The Test of Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).


11. For detailed discussion of this argument, see Harry S. Brandy, *The Role of Imagery in Learning* (Los Angeles: The Getty Center for Education in the Arts, 1987).


16. For a discussion of distinctions between "culture" and "civilization" and histories of usage of the terms, see Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).


20. Ibid., p. 70.

21. Ibid., p. 70.


24. Ibid., p. 69.

25. For discussion of these and other criticisms of Arnold’s conception of culture, see Lesley Johnson, *The Cultural Critics: From Matthew Arnold to Raymond Williams* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).


27. See, for example, Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society, 1780-1950*.

28. For an extended discussion of criticisms of Eliot’s positions, see Lesley Johnson, *The Cultural Critics*. 


34. Raymond Williams, "Culture and Civilization," p. 274.

35. For an example of Williams' recent thought, and more extensive discussions of these ideas, see Raymond Williams, *The Sociology of Culture* (New York: Schocken Books, 1981).


40. Ibid., p. 32.

41. Ibid., p. 32.


43. See, for example, E. Hutchins, *Culture and Inference* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).

45. For a review of critiques of enlightenment research on culture, see Richard A. Shweder, "Anthropology's Romantic Rebellion Against the Enlightenment."


50. Ibid., p. 28.

51. See, for example, Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures; and M. Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).


54. Ibid., p. 275.


58. Ibid., p. 149.

59. Ibid., p. 150.


62. For a discussion of this theory, see Andrew Greeley, Ethnicity in the United States (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974).


69. Ibid., p. 150.

70. Ibid., p. 165.


75. For a discussion of interest group politics and the arts, see Margaret J. Wyszomirski, "Arts Policymaking and Interest Group Politics," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 14 (October 1980): 28-34.


88. For a discussion of needed arts data collection systems, see National Endowment for the Arts, *The Arts in America*.


92. For a discussion of elitism and populism in the arts, see Margaret J. Wyszomirski, "Controversies in Arts Policymaking," in Kevin V. Mulcahy and C. Richard Swaim, eds., *Public Policy and the Arts*.


96. See Herbert Gans, *Popular Culture and High Culture*. 


This chapter constitutes an effort to interpret the policies of public arts agencies regarding multiculturalism. It rests on the methodological assumptions of interpretive policy analysis and thus aims to explicate the actions of policy agents and how they understand such actions. This stress on action is intentional. It is consistent with the concept of a policy as a choice to act in accord with a stated imperative whenever specified conditions pertain. Further, such an emphasis counters the view that interpretive policy analysis can lose track of what policy agents actually do in trying to understand their intentions. Thus, this chapter will concentrate on what public arts agencies are doing and plan to do rather than what they say they do or plan to do. Of course, the language used in the documents of arts policy agents is not unimportant. Indeed, the language of arts policy agents is a primary focus of the current and subsequent chapters. But the focus here is on action language, the normative concepts of art, culture, justice, and aesthetic value by which arts policy agents make sense of or rationalize what they actually do. It is in the next chapter that we will go beyond this necessary first step of explicating arts policy agents’ understandings of what they do by clarifying assumptions in contestable value positions as revealed in their usage of normative concepts in policy contexts.
Rationale for Focus on State Arts Agencies

The decision in this dissertation to attend to the actions of public arts agencies regarding multiculturalism begs a question that has not been addressed to this point, namely, what is the significance of decisions by public agencies relative to those made in the private sector as they affect arts organizations of ethnic cultural traditions? The previous chapter cited the shift from marketplace to political decisions as a force in the reemergence of the salience of multiculturalism in American society. But the relationship between public and private decisions in the arts warrants closer scrutiny.

In contrast to Europe, the United States, rooted in its political history, has tended to leave to private and local institutions the determination of decisions that most overtly affect the conduct of cultural institutions -- by some accounts, a policy decision in itself.¹ Indeed, the establishment of the National Endowment for the Arts was resisted in the early 1960s on the grounds that government would inevitably supplant private funding sources, leading to the consequences of bureaucratic control and government censorship of the arts.² But the focus of critical discussion of government support of the arts has shifted since then. Edward Banfield, for example, argues that aesthetic experience, even at its best, is purely a private experience and, therefore, that government promotion of aesthetic experience is not in the public interest. Nor is support of the arts a legitimate function of a government whose sole purposes, in Banfield's view, are the
 protección de individuos' derechos y seguridad y la establecimiento de pre- condiciones para un ciudadano competente.3

En términos más prácticos, los críticos sostienen que el subsidio del gobierno a las artes no es necesario para el logro artístico argumentando, desde una perspectiva histórica, que las más notables logros culturales de América, y el expansion de sus instituciones de las artes ocurrió antes de los años 1960, sin la ayuda del subsidio del gobierno.4 Both the theoretical argument cited above and this more practical, historical argument are parts of a conceptual model of the ideal relationship between private and public sector funding of the arts, termed the private-sector-as-leader model.5

In response, los críticos de este modelo y sus partidarios en el modelo como líder del gobierno tienden a citar cifras que parecen mostrar cómo el paisaje cultural en América ha cambiado desde 1965, el año en que el National Endowment for the Art fue creado. In 1965, there were 22 theaters, 27 opera companies, 58 orchestras; by 1990, the figures were 420 theaters, 120 opera companies, 230 orchestras, and 250 dance companies. Non-profit arts organizations also now extend far beyond large, east and west coast cities to smaller cities, towns, and rural areas throughout the country. The size of audiences attending arts performances also increased during this period, from 1 million to 15 million for theater, from 3 million to 18 million for opera, from 9 million to 24 million for orchestras, and from 1 million to 16 million for dance, and the number of persons calling themselves professional artists has nearly tripled, to 1.5 million, during the same period. Finally, prior to 1965, financial support for the arts from the private sector and state governments was limited. At the time only seven states
had public arts agencies. Also, in the ten years prior to the creation of the Endowment, private funding of the arts had held relatively steady at approximately $250 million per year, of which $40 million came from corporate sources. Today, every state and territory has a public arts agency and private giving to the arts stands at about $6 billion annually.6

The significance of public arts funding was placed in dramatic relief for advocates of the government-as-leader model during recent events surrounding NEA funding of controversial contemporary art. The accompanying assaults on the decision-making processes of the NEA and on the idea of public support of the arts spawned numerous predictions that if the NEA were subject to content restrictions on the kinds of art it could fund or if its administrative structure were altered, the result would be a chilling effect on private sector funding of the arts.7

This contention was rooted in several premises. The government-as-leader model stresses that public arts agencies' decisions do and should guide philanthropic decisions in the private sector. It is argued that such guidance is and should be based on the expertise of public arts agencies' grants evaluation panels in identifying those arts organizations and activities that merit support, in that corporations and foundations who seek to fund the arts do not have the background and expertise to make the aesthetic judgments necessary for sound grants decisions. This guidance gains significance from the fact that many programs of public arts agencies are designed to leverage private funding for arts organizations and activities. At a minimum, public arts agencies also follow the principle of not funding the total or even majority of the cost of any project,
requiring a substantial private funding match to complement the arts agency grant. As a consequence of this relationship, it has become virtually axiomatic in the arts funding world that a grant from a public arts agency, especially the NEA, serves as an imprimatur that improves dramatically an organization's chances of securing private support. Defenders of the government-as-leader model view this as an effective and fair relationship between public and private sectors, a relationship consistent with the American tradition of private initiative and action.

But this model of private-public relations has been seen as problematic on diverse grounds. From an historical point of view, it is difficult to establish with certainty that a causal relationship exists between the growth of public arts funding and the increased numbers of arts organizations, artists, and audience members cited above. Other factors cited which seem to have contributed to what is often called the "arts boom" are increased levels of education, the use of the non-profit mechanism to establish arts organizations, tax laws which have encouraged private donations to non-profit organizations, mass communications, and the building of arts centers by cities and universities, frequently termed the "edifice complex," which have increased the "supply" of the arts. Thus, while few would argue that the impact of public arts funding has been negligible, it remains difficult to separate its effects from these other factors in spurring the "arts boom."

Conservative cultural critics, however, are less interested in the relative influence of public or private factors than in the nature of the "arts boom" itself. Rather than viewing it as a renaissance of artistic achievement and cultural participation, it was seen as a period, as Samuel Lipman contends, where "the cry
of pleasure was everywhere in the air, and forces of seriousness and reflection were in full flight, the consequence of [which] was a gathering tendency to see the arts as entertainment and artists as entertainers, lavishly paid to sing for their suppers."\textsuperscript{9} He further argues that "institutions were measured by their turnstile count; museum exhibitions were evaluated in terms of drawing power ... Everywhere the goal was to expand and enhance the arts' image as a bringer of pleasure. Everywhere the enemy was the dull image of the status quo."\textsuperscript{10} Thus, according to Lipman, the emergence of public arts funding spurred not a renaissance in the arts but contributed in many ways to the "debased idea of the marketability of art as entertainment."\textsuperscript{11}

Another potential criticism of the government-as-leader model does not rely upon critiques of the state of the arts in American society; instead, it has a more empirical focus which calls into question the capacity of government funds to the arts to leverage private funds. One feature of this relationship which advocates of the government-as-leader model seem to neglect is that private funding of the arts has a dynamic of its own, conditioned by factors unique to the private sector. Pat Clubb, for example, stresses that foundation behavior must be viewed in the context of reactions to the broader nonprofit community of which the arts are but one part. Her research suggests that foundations tend to make highly individualistic funding decisions and demonstrate strong concern for how the organizations they choose to fund reflect on their image.\textsuperscript{12} This orientation to funding specific organizations does not preclude the direction of funds to promote issues or solve community problems, but in most cases, foundation trustees seem to set their own funding
priorities rather than responding to the expressed needs of communities. Thus, foundations, with some notable exceptions, are unlikely to attempt to discern and address general field or discipline issues unless these are well-formulated and persuasively articulated by the arts community.

As for corporate funding of the arts, research by Michael Useem makes the perhaps obvious point that the total amount of funds available for possible support of the arts is very much dependent on the general state of the economy and the income capacity of the corporate sector. The unpredictability of this factor is complicated for the arts by increased competition for funds from nonprofit activities suffering from government cutbacks or increased service demand, such as health, education, and social services. Finally, in reviewing these many competitors for funds, corporations utilize specific criteria in making their decisions. Corporate patronage tends to focus on local concerns and organizations. Thus, as Useem's research demonstrates, "geographic location" and "impact on the local community" are the grant-awarding criteria used most frequently by corporate funders, along with "management capability.

These examples, while hardly a full discussion of the many dimensions of private philanthropy and the arts, do suggest that arts funding decisions in the private sector are more than a matter of mere responses to decisions of public arts agencies. That said, however, the actual relationship between public and private sector support of the arts remains an open question. Simply put, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which private funding sources follow the lead of public arts agencies without detailed empirical studies.
The only available study of this topic, by J. Mark Davidson Schuster, explores the primary tool public arts agencies use to leverage private sector support, the matching grant. Matching grant programs stipulate that a grant made by a public arts agency must be matched by funds raised in the private sector, at a ratio of 3 to 1, with the larger amount coming from the private sector. The frequent use of this mechanism attests to its popularity among public arts agencies, and their presumed belief in its effectiveness. Schuster acknowledges that matching grants are frequently effective tools for individual arts organizations to secure increased support to fund designated projects. But Schuster finds that rather than actually generating "new money," i.e., an increase in the total amount of private funds donated to the arts, matching grants seem to have the effect of moving existing private funds around from one matching grant recipient to another, thereby reducing the private resources available to other arts organizations in a specific community.\(^{16}\) Further, while not documented to date, it seems reasonable to assume that another consequence of the government-as-leader model is that private funding for otherwise worthy arts organizations or projects might be jeopardized if they do not receive a public arts agency matching grant.

Given the paucity of research on public-private relations in the arts, it is not surprising that research on government leverage of private funds for arts organizations rooted in ethnic cultural traditions is not extensive. The NEA cites a project of its Expansion Arts Program, the Community Foundation Initiative, as "providing a community vehicle for private support to artists and organizations that would have no other way of tapping private community resources."\(^{17}\) The
Community Foundation Initiative aims to assist local foundations in developing special endowments that can be directed to support minority artists and organizations. The initiative requires a 2 to 1 private to public match. As of 1990, 21 foundations throughout the country had raised $6.8 million to match $3.4 million from the Endowment.

Despite this example, the available evidence suggests that, for the most part, the success of multicultural arts organizations in securing private support has, to date, been limited. In its 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan, the NEA recognized the relative attractiveness of certain arts activities and private funders (Table I). This table suggests that the private sector tends to support major, established institutions who perpetuate traditional art forms, to the relative neglect of emerging art forms and smaller, younger institutions, including multicultural arts organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attractive to private sector</th>
<th>Less attractive to private sector</th>
<th>Unattractive to private sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major museum exhibitions</td>
<td>Classical theater</td>
<td>Avant garde and interdisciplinary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opera</td>
<td>Modern dance</td>
<td>Support of individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballet</td>
<td>Jazz</td>
<td>Visual artists' organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchestras</td>
<td>Design</td>
<td>Post-modern dance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larger presenters and performing Public radio</td>
<td>Film presentation</td>
<td>Video presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts centers</td>
<td>Folk arts</td>
<td>Museum maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions undertaking capital construction</td>
<td>New music</td>
<td>Minority organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public television</td>
<td>Media arts centers</td>
<td>Archives and libraries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts presentations</td>
<td>Chamber music</td>
<td>Service organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arts education</td>
<td>Dance notation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Choral music</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Museum conservation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium and small presenters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Artists' colonies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A recent survey of 252 culturally diverse arts organizations in the United States, conducted for the Association of American Cultures (TAAC), the only study of its kind done to date, sheds some light on these organizations' reliance on grants funds. These organizations span all regions of the country as well as a wide spectrum of art forms and disciplines. Table 2 provides information on the relative size of these organizations' budgets.¹⁹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Budget Size</th>
<th>Number of Organizations</th>
<th>% of Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$10,000 or less</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000 - 25,000</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000 - 50,000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,000 - 100,000</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,000 - 150,000</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$150,000 - 200,000</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$200,000 - 250,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$250,000 - 300,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$300,000 or more</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3, based on the sample of this same survey, reports the reliance of these organizations on grant monies.
Unfortunately, the survey did not address other key questions the answers to which would have yielded a fuller picture of the relationship between public and private funding as applied to multicultural arts organizations. The study, for example, did not contain comparative information on the relative reliance of other arts organizations, those not rooted in a specific cultural tradition, on grant monies. Other sources have yielded breakdowns of arts organizations' reliance on earned income, private funds, and public funds. For example, in 1985, of the $109 million in income budgets of non-profit theatres in the United States, the percentage of earned income was 65%, private 26%, and public 9%. These figures, on the face of it, are generally comparable to average figures in the TAAC survey on culturally diverse organizations' dependence on grant monies. But herein lies a problem with the TAAC survey -- for some reason it did not ask respondents to designate the percentages of grant monies coming from private and public sources, respectively.
Thus, it is impossible, on the basis of this study, unfortunately the only one of its kind, to gauge the relative importance of private funds to public funds for multicultural arts organizations.

Still, apparently based on the answers of survey respondents to open-ended questions, the TAAC study concludes that while many culturally diverse arts organizations rely heavily on grant monies, "it appears that only a small percentage of those grants are from the private sector." This conclusion is supported somewhat by TAAC survey respondents, who rated increased funding from private sources as their most pressing need. Thus, since private funding, for the most part, does not at this time seem to be a viable option for the multicultural community to foster stability, growth, and development in its organizations, the focus in this dissertation on the importance of public policies, especially in light of the uncertain degree to which public funds leverage private support for multicultural arts organizations, certainly seems justified.

To this point, the case has been made for the focus on public funding as it relates to multiculturalism and the arts. But public policy for the arts is formulated and implemented at the national, state, and local levels. This dissertation centers on the policies of state arts agencies. Thus, the final task in this section is to offer a rationale for the choice to focus on public arts agencies in the states.

A primary reason for attention to state arts agencies is rooted in the increased policy influence of these agencies within the tripartite public arts policy sector. For the past decade, the public arts policy sector has been undergoing a process of decentralization. The NEA's budget was at its zenith, in actual dollars
and relative to state appropriations, in 1979. From this figure of approximately $210 million, the NEA budget has declined nearly 40 percent after inflation. In 1989, Congress appropriated $169 million for the NEA, 20 percent of which, by law, was distributed in block grants to the states. During this same period, state legislative appropriations to the arts rose from an aggregate figure of $120 million to the current $268 million. Thus, through budget declines at the NEA and dramatic increases in state arts funding, "the outcome was a dramatic, if unplanned, de facto devolution of arts funds from the federal government to the states."22 The 1990 Congressional reauthorization of the Endowment yielded legislation that will surely accelerate this process. Notably, the 80 to 20 ratio of federal to state percentages of NEA program funds, in place for two decades, was revised so that by FY 1993 the ratio was to become 65 - 35.

The question, then, is to what extent will this decentralization of public arts funding affect the formulation, implementation, and impact of public arts policy? Critics of the recent Congressional action fear that as a result of shifting a larger share of NEA funds to the states, state legislatures will thereby reduce their allocations to the arts, thus diminishing the total amount of public funds available to the arts.23 Indeed, recent projections show that six state arts agencies expect to have budget declines of 40% or more for FY 92. But the reason for these declines is far more likely the depressed condition of state economies than the redistribution of NEA funds to the states. In either case, however, it is also predicted that twenty-three state arts agencies could well see budget increases in FY 92.24 Thus,
at least in the short term, it does not appear that aggregate size of public arts funds, considering both federal and state funds, will experience a decline.

Considering the relative stability of the total amount of public arts funds, other questions about the impact of decentralization emerge. As Paul J. DiMaggio asks,

does devolution influence the fortunes of large, established organizations that produce and exhibit Euro-American art to a wide middle class public? Does it help or hurt small organizations working in non-European traditions, or organizations (in any tradition) pushing the boundaries of innovation? How does it affect the generosity, scope, and political neutrality of grants to artists? How does it influence efforts to increase the number of Americans participating in the arts, either as audiences or producers?25

But DiMaggio's comparative research on how the Endowment and how state arts agencies allocate their funds to the arts reveals few major differences. State arts agencies tend to fund amateur groups, humanities organizations, and local arts agencies more than the Endowment, while the NEA places greater emphasis on media arts. But in looking at different types of public arts fund applicants -- artists, performing arts organizations, community and service oriented organizations within diverse discipline categories -- DiMaggio found little difference in how they fared at the federal and state levels. As evidence, a regional arts service organization, the Western States Arts Foundation, found that 89% of the arts organizations it serves have received NEA funding and also obtained grants from their state arts agency.26 These findings are somewhat surprising in that these agencies would seem to be equipped, by organizational design, with different capacities -- the Endowment, with potential to take a national perspective, consult with a wide array of leading professionals in making its decisions, and act with respect to arts
disciplines as a whole and national issues; and the states, with potential to serve smaller organizations within their states and to develop cooperative programs with local arts agencies. But based on the findings of DiMaggio's research, it seems reasonable to conclude that since the actions of the NEA and those of arts agencies do not diverge markedly in terms of the recipients of funds, the focus here on state arts agencies is justified, in part, because public arts agencies at the state level have and apparently will continue to have more funds to implement their policies.

Another reason to focus on state arts agencies is their apparent interest in policy analysis and development. It has been argued, not infrequently, that the NEA, throughout its history, has had an antianalytical predisposition, characterized by a commitment to "support all of the arts." Examining policy issues and setting those policy goals and objectives that are most worthy of a commitment of scarce public resources has not been central, over the years, to the NEA's operational style.27 State arts agencies, through the activities of their professional service organization, the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies (NASAA), at least attempt to analyze the effects of their policies. Notably, for the past several years, NASAA has issued an annual report which analyzes state arts agencies' grant activities in terms of grants awarded, disciplines and activities supported, and individuals and organizations benefitting.28

A final, perhaps the most important, reason that state arts agencies merit special attention in this dissertation is the fact that NASAA has, for many years, held that the promotion of cultural pluralism through arts policy is a key measure of state arts agency accomplishment.29 Understanding how state arts agencies have done so forms the remainder of this chapter.
Definition of Policy Mechanism Options

If the goal of this chapter is to understand the actions of state arts agencies regarding multiculturalism, then the object of this attempt at understanding must be further specified. This involves stipulating a definition of the term "policy mechanism" and outlining policy mechanism options adopted by public arts agencies at the state level.

A "policy mechanism" is defined here as the means by which grants funds are made available and allotted to potential grantees, including artists and organizations rooted in ethnic cultural traditions. In most cases, policy mechanisms were not devised solely, or even primarily, to address issues of multiculturalism; rather, policy mechanisms are the parameters under which all potential grantees must operate.

Policy mechanisms are multi-dimensional in nature and ultimately determine who does and does not receive funding from public arts agencies, as well as the amounts received. Yet, past studies of the actions of state arts agencies have not focused on policy mechanisms, despite their significance. For example, the 1989 Report of the NASAA Task Force on Cultural Pluralism, lists seventeen indicators that state arts agencies are encouraged to utilize as measures of their commitment to promoting cultural pluralism through arts policy. These indicators range from "staff and council technical assistance services provided," "council membership," "panel membership," and "staff membership," to "policy development resources," "publication and communication activities," and "information gathering activities," among others.30 This report, however, does not suggest ways in which these
isolated indicators can be integrated to analyze the actions of state arts agencies; in particular, it does not prescribe a method for assessing how these many factors, when taken as a whole, affect decisions and reveal patterns about funding by state arts agencies.

There is no reason to believe that state arts agencies' lack of use of "policy mechanism" as an analytical category means that they would object to its use; they simply have not utilized it to date. But some state arts agencies might resist the focus here on policy mechanisms as complex systems of funding, arguing that their agencies serve many other functions beyond that of the distribution of public funds. These include, for example, providing technical assistance to artists and arts organizations, offering information about the arts to the general public, lobbying for tax laws and postal rates favorable to the arts, and leveraging support for arts organizations and artists among other government agencies. But however important these functions are in the view of public arts agencies, the fact remains that the structures of public arts agencies and the large majority of their resources are centered on the allocation of public funds.

Since state arts agencies do not refer to their funding systems as policy mechanisms as such, identifying policy mechanism options for this study has involved considerable review, analysis, and interpretation, specifically, of the publicly available texts of forty-eight state arts agencies gathered during the first three months of 1991. These sources of information included current guides to agency programs; goals statements; eligibility requirements; grants categories; special programs directed to specific populations; evaluative criteria for funding
decisions; terms of grants; regulatory mechanisms; application form requirements; annual reports; long-range planning documents; terminology about multiculturalism; roles and criteria for selection of agency boards and grants review panels; policy statements on multiculturalism; and special studies on agency activities.

Through analysis of these published materials, three policy mechanisms with implications for multicultural issues were identified: open access to funding; special programs; and distributive pluralism. These will be defined briefly, for now, in turn.

The open-access-to-funding policy mechanism contains the premises that a wide variety of individuals and organizations are and should be free to apply for public arts agency funds and to participate in a fair and open process of competition for available funds. This approach further assumes that the most worthy grant applicants, as judged by consistently applied evaluative criteria, will be awarded funds (although perhaps not the full amounts requested by potential grantees due to extensive competition and the limited availability of funds) and that through this process, all individuals and groups will benefit in significant ways.

Special programs of state arts agencies, while diverse in intent and structure, each represents a policy decision that the artistic and organizational needs of ethnic cultural groups can best be met, to a significant degree, through a special funding and programming mechanism in which only representatives of such groups are eligible to participate.

Finally, the distributive pluralism policy mechanism is regulatory in nature, stipulating, in most cases, that public arts agency applicants and grantees must
proportionately include representatives of Native American, African, Hispanic, and Asian descent in their programs, staffs, boards, and audiences.

These three policy mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. For example, some state arts agencies utilize both the special programs and open-access-to-funding policy mechanisms. Thus, to some degree, they have been separated here for heuristic purposes. Still, as will be seen, these policy options do embody substantively different premises in goals for arts policy and multiculturalism, ranging from equal opportunity to equal results, and in means designed to achieve those goals, comprising incentives, requirements, or mandates.

Studying these policy mechanism options, once identified and defined, remains, however, problematic. Notably, a comprehensive evaluation of these policy mechanisms would require the presence of a number of conditions. Ideally, such an evaluation would be drawn on trend data that reveal how and to whom funds have been allocated over a period of years, including number of grants and grant amounts awarded, types of disciplines and activities, and the categories of individuals and organizations benefiting from SAA funds. Further, an evaluation would analyze the impacts of such funds on the financial health and program development of the individuals and organizations that receive grants. Finally, a comprehensive evaluation would address the effects of SAA patronage on the quality of artistic productions and presentations or its effects on the social composition and qualitative responses of arts audiences. The presence of these conditions would make possible a comparative evaluation of alternative policy mechanisms.
Unfortunately, these ideal conditions rarely exist in the arts research world. Significant strides have been made by SAAs, however, through use of the National Standard for Arts Information Exchange (NSAIE), which is administered by NASAA with support from the NEA. The NSAIE is a set of terms, definitions, and principles for organizing and reporting information used by SAAs in their information systems. Its terms include both necessary and optional information. Necessary information includes items such as applicant status, applicant institution, applicant arts discipline, grant amount requested, grant award, type of activity, number of artists participating, and number of individuals benefiting. These categories are subdivided extensively. Optional categories include, among many others, the racial, age, sex, disabled, and institutionalized characteristics for applicants, artists participating, and individuals benefiting. SAAs must collect all necessary information to be in compliance with the NSAIE and must use its definitions if they choose to collect information in the optional categories. Since 1983, the NEA has required SAA use of the NSAIE as part of its Basic State Grant Funds to SAAs (for many years approximately 20 percent of the NEA's budget), and NASAA annually gathers supplementary information, according to the NSAIE, on grants and services funded by other state, federal, and private funds. The NSAIE is amended every four years. The most recent changes were instituted in 1983-1984 and implemented in FY86.

Review of a NASAA study, State Arts Agency Funded Activities: Analysis of Final Descriptive Reports, Fiscal Year 1985 is instructive as a way to analyze the use of the NSAIE and the data it generates as a basis for policy development.
and its utility for the conduct of policy evaluation. This study was based on an analysis of forty-two states who provided information on 50 percent or more of their SAA legislative appropriations for FY85. The study contained both a discipline analysis and a type-of-activity analysis and examined measures such as numbers of grants, grant amounts awarded, types of activity within discipline, actual artists participating, and actual individuals benefiting, among others.

The focus here is on the type-of-activity analysis. Three activities received a major percentage of the SAA grants awarded; concert/performance (34 percent); institution/organization support (13 percent); and school residency (9 percent). Other activities and their percentages included instruction/class/lecture (6.4 percent); award/fellowship (6.6 percent); and other residency (4.4 percent). Eighteen additional activities received 4 percent or less of the total number of grants. These grants-awarded figures, however, do not serve as predictors of the grant amounts awarded by SAAs. Notably, institution/organization support received 48 percent of the grant funds awarded, almost four times the number of grants given to this activity, while concert/performance received 15.6 percent of the grant funds, despite receiving twice that percentage in number of grants. Eight other activities each received approximately 3 to 4 percent of the grant funds awarded, including award/fellowship (3.4 percent) and instruction/class/lecture (2.7 percent). Also, the other residency activity, which received 4.4 percent of the SAA grant awards, received less than half that percentage in grant amounts awarded. Finally, in terms of actual artists participating, 38 percent of the total artists participating were involved in institution/organization support, and 23 percent were
involved in concert/performance projects. Other figures include fair/festival (7 percent), and exhibition, other residency, and professional support/administrative, each with 5 percent of the total.

It is difficult to know what to make of these figures. The fact that institution/organization support receives such a large percentage of the grant amounts awarded raises the question of whether SAAs are largely recapitulating the funding patterns of private funders in funding large, established arts institutions. Members of ethnic groups undoubtedly benefit from institution/organization and concert/performance activities as well as from activities such as other residency, instruction/class/lecture, and award/fellowship (in terms of individual artists). The degree to which they benefit, at least proportionately, is not clear, however, because race/ethnicity characteristics of grants applicants, artists participating, and individuals benefiting are not required items in the NSAIE.

State arts agencies, as mentioned above, could utilize the optional race/ethnicity code in gathering information. But the extent to which they choose to utilize this code is not apparent from a review of state arts agencies' published materials. One type of publication that might seem to be a reliable source of information on the funding activities of SAAs is annual reports. But, unfortunately, their review for this dissertation was not very revealing, at least not by themselves, regarding the place of multiculturalism in the programs of state arts agencies. Information was presented in a fairly generic form in most cases. Items generally included were an opening narrative, often including descriptions of agency highlights and accomplishments for the fiscal year; total budget figures, including
amounts budgeted by program category; and a listing of grantees by program
category, including their grant award and their county or city location. Variations
on this basic format included information by one SAA on its financial allocations
per citizen and by county, and several SAAs that included short project descriptions
on each grantee. None of the SAAs presented information breakdowns on grant
award amounts by activity, number of artists participating, or individuals benefiting
by discipline or activity; hence, no information could be extracted on the cultural
background or similar characteristics of artists or individuals benefiting.34 This
relative emphasis on geographic measures of grants awards by city or county has
long been a matter of concern to those who charge that non-artistic criteria, such
as geographic distribution, too often govern grant decisions to the neglect of artistic
quality.35 Whether this charge is fair or whether it merely represents SAAs’
pragmatic recognition that they work within sensitive political contexts is an open
question. But, the presentation of grants and budget data by geographic locale
does suggest that while SAAs do place priority on some extra-artistic considerations
in presenting grants information, presentation of such information by demographic
characteristics, including race/ethnicity, either has not been possible or is not a
pressing priority.

SAAs require final project reports of virtually all grantees, both individuals
and organizations. A review of the information required on these final report
forms might have been revealing, but the forms were not made available for this
study. A review of the SAA grantee application forms themselves, about 50
percent of which were available, was interesting. While many application forms
require no information on the characteristics of the applicants or the audiences to be served, several ask for a narrative description of outreach efforts designed to benefit special populations, including ethnic cultural groups. One SAA application form asks whether and how grantee activities will be "accessible" to such populations; another requires applicants to identify the characteristics, including race/ethnicity of populations to be served to a significant degree by the applicant's proposed project; and another asks for narrative responses on who is to be served and how these populations will be involved in program development during the grant period. Finally, one SAA requires each grant applicant to provide estimated percentages of diverse populations, by racial/ethnic characteristics, to be involved as board, staff, consultants, volunteers, audiences, and in planning activities. But a major problem with these kinds of information is the fact that they are based on the intentions of SAA applicants. The degree to which these intentions are achieved or not and the extent to which SAAs monitor or are able to monitor their success or lack thereof is unclear.

The future of data collection on how and to what extent ethnic cultural groups are served by SAAs is somewhat more promising. In 1991, NASAA issued a plan to provide guidance to state arts agencies in gathering race/ethnicity information. Designed to expand definitions in the NSAIE, the plan is viewed as "not simply an attempt to determine which minority organizations receive grants, but rather a comprehensive coding plan in which all grantees, and all project characteristics, will be assigned a race or ethnic classification." It contains seven basic codes: American Indian/Alaskan Native; Asian/Pacific Islander; Black, not
Hispanic; Hispanic; White, not Hispanic; Multi-racial; and General (where no particular race predominates). The plan also contains principles for applying these codes to individual grantees, organizations receiving grants, and funded projects. It stipulates that coding should reflect the predominant racial characteristics of individual grantees. In the case of organizations, if at least half of an organization’s staff, board, or membership belongs to one of the identified racial/ethnic groups, then the corresponding code is to be applied. Finally, for projects, the plan states that the codes should be applied when projects are derived from, or reflective of the traditions, values, or cultures of particular races.

Implementation of this plan, NASAA acknowledges, will be complicated for individual state arts agencies by "various state laws, perceptions that the information will be misused, and legitimate privacy concerns." In response to the differing situations of individual states, NASAA therefore offers four options for states to collect such information: through application forms, grantees’ final reports, grantees’ grant approval letters, and through race/ethnicity estimations by SAA staff, although the final option is recommended only as a last resort.

But even if these definitions of race/ethnicity and the principles of utilizing these codes were consistently applied, the utility of this kind of data collection for policy mechanism analysis and evaluation is problematic. Notably, NASAA has not addressed the need to gather information on the characteristics of "individuals benefiting" from actual grants, a data-gathering effort stipulated in the NSAIE and one, on the face of it, that would seem to be important to issues of multiculturalism and arts policy. Yet past efforts to gather such data by state arts agencies is not
reassuring. For example, the figures for "number of individuals benefiting" from SAA grants, as cited in the NASAA study discussed above, would seem to be exaggerated. The study reports on 9,886 SAA grants in which 164 million individuals were reported as benefiting. This figure seems unrealistic in a country of approximately 250 million residents. The study does acknowledge, however, that many of the figures on which these reports were based were at most "best guesses" and, further, that a more reliable means of data collection is required if the "individuals benefiting" figures are to be meaningful. Given these problems, one can imagine the many potential difficulties that SAAs might incur if they were required to provide information on the racial/ethnic characteristics of individuals who benefit from programs of SAA grantees.

A final complication is the fact that while the NEA requires use of the NSAIE by SAAs, the NEA itself utilizes it in limited ways, such as in the application forms and supplementary information sheets of a few discipline programs. Many NEA programs claim that their discipline requires a unique data collection system. The NEA, however, has discussed possible Endowment-wide adoption of the NSAIE for many years. Apparently, there is no consensus not to utilize it, but the NEA has not yet decided how use of the NSAIE can fit within its overall mission to collect comprehensive baseline data on the arts. Until agreement between the NEA and SAAs on information systems is achieved, utilizing reliable arts data for purposes of systematic policy development on multiculturalism and the arts remains unlikely.
This discussion about the lack of available data sources on the arts and multiculturalism and the problematic nature of existing sources leads to one primary conclusion: that even minimal conditions necessary for the evaluation of the effectiveness of SAA policy mechanisms related to multiculturalism are not present, at least to conduct an evaluation in terms of the tangible results of diverse policy mechanisms. This is not to say that this dissertation will therefore forgo its declared focus on the actions, as opposed to the intentions, of state arts agencies. It does, however, mean that rather than the documented results of SAAs' policies, the focus of the following analysis will be on the actions of SAAs in organizing their funding activities as policy mechanisms -- open access to funding, special programs, and distributive pluralism -- and how policy agents ultimately rationalize what they do in terms of normative concepts such as art, culture, justice, and artistic value. Further, while ample justification was given above for a normative, interpretive analysis of the actions of public arts agencies, the deficient state of data collection in the arts policy world means that a normative, interpretive analysis is also a matter of necessity.

**Goals, Eligibility, Criteria, and Guidelines in Grant Programs**

As suggested above, the open-access-to-funding policy mechanism is a complex funding system utilized by state arts agencies. Many elements in a funding system function in conflict or in concert as logically and operationally related sets of assumptions, definitions, provisions, and criteria that mutually reinforce each other. A key assumption of this policy mechanism, for example, is that its many elements work together to assure a fair process of open competition for funds and
yields results to the significant benefit of all individuals and groups, including members of multicultural communities. This section and the next will analyze and interpret the following elements of the open-access-to-funding policy mechanism: goals; funding restrictions and eligibility requirements; evaluative criteria; qualifications and compositions of boards, review panels, and staff; non-discrimination regulations; guidelines and requirements; and special initiatives.

**Goals.** As Table 4 illustrates, the stated goals of state arts agencies, even when summarized and paraphrased as they are here, are numerous and diverse. Clearly, the goals statements of most SAAs include some degree of emphasis on opportunities in and access to the arts for all citizens, including members of ethnic cultures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To assist organizations to produce/spONSOR quality art</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To encourage individual artists to create new works</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To encourage community involvement/participation in the arts</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To make high-quality arts available/accessible to the public</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To stimulate study, awareness, and appreciation of the arts</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To encourage freedom of artistic expression</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To foster preservation and availability of ethnic and folk arts</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To enhance public and private support for the arts</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To preserve the state's cultural heritage</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To ensure opportunities and access to the arts for special populations</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the goal statements of some state arts agencies only implicitly touch on issues of multiculturalism, others are quite explicit. These statements, in turn,
differ considerably on several dimensions and reflect diverse value assumptions. As part of the interpretive nature of this study's approach, it is important to try to understand these goals in the terms utilized by SAAs.

The Illinois Arts Council (IAC), in its goals statements, "recognizes the importance of maintaining [the state's] rich heritage and supports the diverse art forms of all ethnic and racial groups within the state." But in stipulating its funding priorities, the IAC states "that while the social contributions that can be the result of arts experiences [are important], the Council places a greater priority on those programs that emphasize the professional presentation and production of the arts." One could conclude that the IAC is equating the "diverse arts forms of ethnic and racial groups" with the "social contributions of arts experiences," and thus does not consider ethnic arts groups as sufficiently "professional" for funding.

It is not clear that the IAC holds this view and acts upon it. But the lack of clarity in these goal statements suggests the possibility that value assumptions about multiculturalism and the arts, if unclarified, can lead to unintended policy actions.

A primary goal of the Georgia Council for the Arts (GCA) is "to make quality arts accessible to the citizens of Georgia, regardless of geographic isolation, race, income, age, handicap, or social barrier." This goal clearly embodies the value of equal opportunity, that no citizen should be subject to overt discrimination in any attempt to gain access to or benefit from GCA's programs to support the arts. This goal does not comprise providing equal benefits for social and cultural groups from GAC programs, only that equal access be provided, a common objective among public arts agencies. But what citizens are to have access to is not
clear. The term "quality art" begs a basic issues of aesthetics, namely, whether artistic standards of excellence are relative to specific cultural traditions or apply across cultures. Either of these meanings could be contained in use of the term "quality art." Thus, the policy goal of "making quality arts accessible" can justify a wide range of incompatible, even contradictory, funding decisions.

Another example of a policy goal that stresses accessibility to the arts can be found in goals statements of the Indiana Arts Commission (IAC). This goal, "to help assure that diversified, high-quality arts are accessible to Indiana citizens, regardless of geographic area, race, religion, income, age, sex, or disability" extends the Georgia Council for the Arts' list of groups to be free from discrimination in seeking to benefit from state-supported arts programs. More significantly, at least for this discussion, the IAC expands those arts "to be made accessible" to include "diversified, high-quality arts." While not defined, this term could be taken to mean the arts of diverse cultural traditions, including the arts of ethnic cultures. Still, this usage, as with the previous example, leaves open questions about the cultural relativity of artistic standards.

Two other state arts agencies move beyond the goal of making the arts accessible to their citizens to promoting the goal of participation in the arts. For example, the Mississippi Arts Commission aims "to stimulate awareness of and participation in the arts by all citizens, including minorities and special constituencies." Similarly, the South Dakota Arts Council states that it strives "to build active cultural participation with all ethnic and minority groups." But, as
with earlier goals statements, these goals are vague about what kind of art citizens are to participate in, as well as the nature of such participation.

A goal of the Arizona Commission on the Arts, to "foster the preservation, promotion and availability of [the state's] diverse ethnic arts," on the face of it, represents a return to the access to/availability of the arts policy goal discussed earlier. Unlike those above, however, this goal specifies that the kinds of art that are to be made available, presumably to all citizens, include ethnic arts. But it is only the New York State Council on the Arts (NYSCA) that addresses aesthetic issues within the context of an "availability to the arts" policy. The NYSCA states that it is committed "to the development of a cultural environment in which the general public may participate in and appreciate a great variety of artistic events representing different cultures and aesthetics and "have the opportunity to experience, first-hand, the varied and rich cultures of our people." In making available the arts of diverse cultural traditions to its citizens, NYSCA also seeks to accord "equal respect to the best of all artistic forms and traditions and "to recognize the integrity of arts experiences of all cultures." Admittedly, this value statement concerning the variability of artistic standards by culture does not address philosophical questions underlying such a position, but it at least recognizes that funding decisions are rooted in value assumptions.

To this point, policy goals rooted in the values of equal opportunity and access, non-discrimination, and the cultural relativity of artistic value have been explored. But several state arts agencies have goals which constitute a significant shift in the locus of value assumptions. These goals center on the issue of justice.
For example, the North Carolina Arts Council (NCAC) seeks "to uphold the principle of cultural equity by encouraging and supporting exemplary forms of artistic expression that reflect and sustain the diverse cultural identities of the people of North Carolina." In setting this goal, the NCAC holds that sustaining the arts of ethnic cultural traditions, and the cultures themselves, is a matter of justice. Building on this view, the NCAC aims "to provide more representative funding for the development and support of organizations and programs which primarily involve people of color." It is thereby held that funding of multicultural arts organizations in a representative manner is necessary to meet the requirements of justice. But in what way this funding is to be "representative" is not specified.

In a similar manner, the Michigan Council for the Arts, in setting a goal "to establish funding patterns that ensure equitable resources between diverse cultural traditions," does not clarify what constitutes "equity" in allocating resources to multicultural arts organizations.

Other state arts agencies, rather than appealing to concepts of equity or representation in setting policy goals rooted in principles of justice, have established goals that attempt to achieve justness through the redistribution of power and control. For example, the Oregon Arts Commission, as an agency policy, seeks "to include all populations in the Commission's policy making and program development." This goal, presumably, is inclusive of significant decision-making roles for representatives of ethnic cultural communities. A goal of the D.C. Commission on the Arts and Humanities spells this out more specifically -- "to increase the involvement of ethnic minorities in the planning and execution of arts
activities." But the New Mexico Arts Division (NMAD) extends the idea of a "just" policy goal beyond increased decision-making power in funding allocations to empowerment. In particular, the NMAD states that it "wants to reach beyond the dissemination of grant monies, offering technical assistance and programs that empower groups to attain their own goals" and to "develop methods and programs for recognition of culturally diverse arts."

This brief outline of those state arts agencies addressing issues of multiculturalism and the value positions underlying those goals reveals considerable diversity. In many ways, examination of these goals presages subsequent analyses of fundamental value disputes that surround the formulation of public policies in the arts. For now, however, additional elements of the open-access-to-funding policy mechanism must be interpreted.

**Funding Restrictions and Eligibility Requirements.** Most SAAs, in their granting guidelines, list specific activities or projects that they, as public agencies, will not fund. Table 5 does not include all such activities and projects; but it does suggest the relative emphasis of SAAs' funding restrictions. Clearly, the activities of multicultural arts organizations are not mentioned anywhere in this list. Restrictions against activities that are not "open to the public" in some cases could apply to arts organizations rooted in ethnic cultural traditions whose programs occur in private settings. But programs targeted to multicultural communities that take place in open public settings would likely not be formally restricted from potential funding.
TABLE 5—Percentage of SAAs That "Won't Fund" Specific Activities \( (N = 42 \text{ SAAs}) \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital expenditures/equipment purchases</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accumulated deficits</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities for academic credit</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitality functions</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed activities</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-state travel</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities not open to public</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacement funding</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel abroad</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition assistance</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating expenses</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the above analysis suggests that support for multicultural arts programs is at least implicit in most SAAs' goals statements and that funding is restricted in only a few cases, further analysis is required to answer the question of the degree of access that multicultural arts organizations have to SAA funds. The next step involves examining SAA funding categories and their eligibility requirements. Such an analysis will help to determine the nature of the grants for which different kinds of organizations are eligible to apply. These organizational types include: arts organizations; nonprofit, non-arts organizations that have arts activities as a primary organizational purpose; nonprofit, non-arts organizations; government agencies; colleges/universities; and schools (see Tables 6-8). The eligibility status of individual artists is presented in Table 9.
### TABLE 6—SAA Funding Categories and Rate of Eligibility of Arts Organizations \((N = 40\text{ SAA}s)\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding category</th>
<th>% of SAA offering eligibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project support</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General operating support</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touring grants</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artists in residence</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major institution support</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community arts</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge grants</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts presenters grants</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance support</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folk/traditional arts support</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary assistance</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are thirty additional grants categories through which 10 percent or less of the SAAs make funds available to arts organizations.

### TABLE 7—SAA Funding Categories and Rate of Eligibility of Nonprofit, Non-Arts Organizations with Arts as a Primary Purpose \((N = 40\text{ SAA}s)\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding category</th>
<th>% of SAA offering eligibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project support</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artists in residence</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touring grants</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General operating support</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community arts</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mini-grants</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts presenters grants</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance support</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folk/traditional arts support</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary assistance</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are twenty-four additional grants categories through which 5 percent or less of the SAAs make funds available to non-profit, non-arts organizations that have the arts as a primary purpose.
TABLE 8—SAA Funding Categories and Rate of Eligibility of Nonprofit, Non-Arts Organizations (N = 40 SAAs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding category</th>
<th>% of SAAs offering eligibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project support</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artists in residence</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touring grants</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community arts</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General operating support</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mini-grants</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts presenters grants</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folk/traditional arts support</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge grants</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are nineteen additional grants categories through which 5 percent or less of the SAAs make funds available to nonprofit, non-arts organizations.

TABLE 9—SAA Funding Categories and Rate of Eligibility of Individual Artists (N = 40 SAAs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding category</th>
<th>% of SAAs offering eligibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artists in residence</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fellowships</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual artist grants</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touring grants</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artist services</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eight percent of SAAs grant funds to individual artists only through organizational sponsors.
A few SAAs have charts that detail their grants categories and the different types of organizations that are eligible for funds under each category, but this is rare. This lack of specificity presents difficulties in assessing the eligibility of government agencies, local arts agencies, colleges and universities, and schools, causing me to have to make several assumptions. Colleges and universities are likely to have at least as much access to SAA funds as do nonprofit, non-arts organizations, and university-based arts organizations likely have almost as much access to SAA funds as do community-based arts organizations, as long as their activities are open to the public and are not exclusively for academic credit. The situation is much less clear with government agencies. Twenty percent of SAAs clearly stipulate that government agencies are eligible for project grants. There are twenty additional grants categories through which 5 percent or less of the SAAs make funds available to government agencies. In all SAAs, schools and school districts are eligible to apply under artist-in-residency categories and, in some cases, under special categories such as teacher incentive grants and educational service grants. Finally, some local arts agencies are government agencies, and others are nonprofit arts organizations. The latter likely have approximately as much access to SAA funds as do other arts organizations, while the situation for the former group is somewhat equivocal. Twenty-five percent of the SAAs do have special grants categories open only to local arts agencies, such as state-local partnership, arts decentralization, and community arts challenge grants.

How does this analysis help to answer the question of the degree of access multicultural arts programs have to SAA funds? An answer is contingent, to a
significant degree, on the answer to another question, namely, what is the organizational status of multicultural arts programs? Specifically, what percentage of these programs can be found in arts organizations, non-arts organizations that have arts activities as a primary organizational purpose, nonprofit, non-arts organizations, government agencies, colleges/universities, and schools?

A recent survey by the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies might have provided a picture of the status of organizations primarily serving African-American, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American populations. To be included in this survey, 51% or more of an organization's board of directors or its audiences had to be comprised of these population groups. The survey yielded responses from 103 Native American organizations, 132 Hispanic organizations, 244 African-American organizations, and 111 Asian organizations. While the survey results included information on the kinds of programs and services each organization provides, information on budgets, years of existence, and, significantly, their organizational status, was not.

In lieu of such information, a reliance on anecdote and observation is necessitated. Gerald Yoshitomi, for example, contends that "each of America's cultural and ethnic communities has persevered to maintain its own cultural traditions, often attempting to counteract the actions of the government or other public systems." Accordingly, these communities "have established their own internal structures without public assistance to support cultural preservation through churches, social centers, and fraternal organizations." Rooted in these informal structures, Yoshitomi contends that social service, educational, religious, and
fraternal groups, in the past two decades, have "developed arts projects as central elements in their cultural, community, and political mission."60

Of course, many organizations have evolved from ethnic communities which fit the predominant model of an arts institution as nonprofit organization, with the requisite board of directors, paid staff, and market orientation. As such, they would seem to have the same access to funds as any other arts organization, at least in terms of formal eligibility requirements. But if the portrayal by Yoshitomi is accurate, then many ethnic arts programs are found in nonprofit, non-arts organizations. Based on Tables 6-8, which outlined different organizational types' access to state arts agency funding, it appears therefore that many multicultural organizations are eligible in SAAs' funding categories at considerably lower rates than nonprofit arts organizations. Of particular note, programs in non-arts organizations have far less access to general operating support and challenge grants, as well as other categories, and have no access at all to major institution support, technical assistance support, or salary assistance.

Another issue is the types of SAA grants categories in which nonprofit, non-arts organizations are eligible. The two most frequently cited categories available to such organizations are project grants and artists-in-residence. Project grants tend to be short term, with relatively small dollar amounts, unlike the general operating support grants that are available primarily to arts organizations based in community or university settings. Project grants also are often the most competitive because, as this analysis shows, all types of organizations, including arts organizations, compete for funds in this category. Likewise, in most cases, nonprofit, non-arts
organizations must compete with schools for artist-in-residency grants, a difficult task given the number of schools as well as SAAs' increased emphasis on K-12 arts education, to be discussed later.

In conclusion, then, it would seem that many multicultural arts programs, given the nature of the organizations in which they take place, do not have equal access to funding. This is not an evaluative conclusion; it only points out that the claim of proponents of the open-access-to-funding model that all can and will benefit from this policy mechanism must be qualified. Nor does it pre-judge SAAs' apparent stress on rewarding programs under the umbrella of a non-profit arts organization. An overall assessment of this policy mechanism must await examination of additional elements, including evaluative criteria.

**Evaluative Criteria.** Evaluative criteria are published normative standards by which designated decision-making panels and boards are required to make judgments about the relative merit of potential grantees for SAA funds. It seems logical that these criteria would be measures of how grantees meet the stated goals of individual agencies. Such a relationship between goals and criteria can be found in many cases, though by no means all. In either case, these criteria embody numerous value assumptions, either explicitly or implicitly.

First, evaluative criteria can be examined in light of the grants categories for which nonprofit, non-arts organizations, sponsors of many ethnic arts programs, are most frequently eligible -- project grants and artist-in-residence categories. As shown in Table 10, criteria used to evaluate applicants in the project grants category such as "involvement of or outreach to special populations" appear in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluative Criteria</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artistic quality</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational capacity/management skill</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management capacity to complete project</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community financial support for project</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of/outreach to special populations</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need, unavailability of other service providers</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment of professional artists</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to artistic development in state</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial need</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional strength of organization</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of audiences served</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size and composition of audience</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SAAs' lists of evaluative criteria less often than criteria such as "artistic quality" and "organizational management capacity." Additional criteria such as "community outreach" and "size and composition of audience," which appear with 25 percent frequency in SAA lists of evaluative criteria, could, however, be interpreted as potentially benefiting ethnic arts programs in nonprofit, non-arts organizations.

In most cases, SAAs do not seem to designate special evaluative criteria for different grant categories. In such cases, the criteria utilized in the project grants category tend to apply to other categories as well. For example, few SAAs seem to designate special evaluative criteria for artist-in-residence programs (see Table 11). Those that do tend to stress planning, management, and implementation criteria.
TABLE 11---Artists-In-Residence Special Evaluative Criteria and Percentage of SAAs’ Utilizing Specific Criteria (N = 10 SAAs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluative Criteria</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective planning</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative skill/financial commitment</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for project</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective utilization of artist</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall quality of project</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective program design</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community commitment to project</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of space/materials for project</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation and dissemination plans</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead to ongoing arts programs</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Special evaluative criteria for community arts grants and touring programs, categories that are often open to nonprofit, non-arts organizations, are found in very few cases. Those SAAs that do utilize special criteria seem to stress “involving and serving underserved population sectors” at least as often as other criteria.

As cited above, the general operating support categories tend to be more open to arts organizations, and the major institution support categories are often open exclusively to large arts organizations. Since arts organizations could provide programs and services that benefit ethnic cultural communities, the special evaluative criteria used in these categories are of interest. Unfortunately, very few SAAs specify special evaluative criteria in these grants categories. Of the eight SAAs that do so in the general operating support category, “artistic quality” and “management capacity” appear most frequently. The “outreach to a broad population cross-section” criterion appears with some frequency, and two SAAs require grantees to provide outreach or public service activities as part of their
grants in this category. In the case of major institutional support, evaluative criteria such as "broad audience demographics" and "outreach" appear approximately as frequently as criteria such as "professionalism" and "history of artistic excellence." Only four SAAs, however, seemed to utilize special evaluative criteria in this category.

In analyzing the evaluative criteria utilized by SAAs in a variety of grants categories, it would seem overall that criteria such as "outreach to/involvement of special/underserved audiences" and "community outreach" are employed almost as frequently as "artistic quality" and "effective management" criteria. Yet, while several SAAs do require their applicants to describe, in narrative form, their outreach efforts intended to benefit "special populations," few SAAs require applicants to detail the characteristics of audiences to be served by their grants. With such limited information required of applicants, it is difficult to imagine how evaluative criteria such as "outreach" and "community involvement" could be applied in an informed and specific manner. (The matter of information asked for in grant applications is discussed in greater detail below).

In addition to examining evaluative criteria in light of eligibility requirements for grants categories, another approach to understanding the evaluative criteria SAAs utilize is to interpret the value positions those criteria embody. As in the analysis of SAAs' goals statements, this interpretation will reveal considerable diversity in the use of value-laden concepts regarding multiculturalism and the arts.
As an illustration of this diversity, the Maine Arts Commission's criteria for grant application review contain no standards which directly address multicultural concerns. They stress, instead, artistic quality, financial and organizational management, ability to raise private income, community involvement, and ability to serve areas with limited access to the arts and special constituencies (not including ethnic cultural communities). The "community involvement" criterion could be construed as applying to multiculturalism, but that is not at all clear.

The Vermont Council on the Arts' specific evaluative criteria for reviewing grants applicants are only slightly more clear than those of Maine's regarding multiculturalism. One criterion pertains to accessibility and outreach, calling for the "accessibility of program materials and facilities used for presenting, and outreach to new and underserved audiences." This criterion contains the concept of "underserved audiences," which can variously entail value assumptions about a "right" to participation in the arts or that for a policy to be just it must equally benefit all citizens. Apart from these thorny questions, it is not apparent that "new and underserved audiences" applies to ethnic cultural communities. A criterion of the Kansas Arts Commission, "evidence that the project/program/organization is serving the needs of traditionally under-served populations (e.g. racial minorities)," et al, is clearly more specific on who is to be considered "underserved." But, as with the previous example, the concept of "underserved" leaves unresolved basic value questions.

The Kansas Arts Commission criterion is phrased in terms of the "needs" of underserved populations. Similarly, the Nebraska Arts Council aims to reward
programs that "address the needs of ethnic minorities." In neither of these cases, however, is it made clear how the "needs" of ethnic minorities are identified and defined or, more basically, how needs are to be distinguished from preferences, wishes, expectations, or aspirations.

Moving beyond criteria which rely on concepts of "underserved populations" and "needs," other state arts agencies, consistent with goals statements discussed above, stress the involvement of representatives of ethnic cultural communities in planning activities. For example, the Alabama State Council on the Arts evaluates project grant applicants on the "degree to which the project would involve/benefit minorities." In a similar way, the Tennessee Arts Commission seeks evidence of "involvement by ... minority groups."

Some state arts agencies spell out an "involvement in planning" criterion in greater detail. Notably, the State Arts Council of Oklahoma, phrasing the criterion in question form, asks "does the applicant organization include representation of diverse cultural, ethnic and artistic plurality of its community in the planning, execution and evaluation of its programs and services?" Also, one of the review criteria utilized by the Arkansas Arts Council is as follows -- "minority involvement in the applicant's organizational structure, service areas and all aspects, levels and phases of the proposed project or program." Even with this greater detail, these evaluative criteria dealing with involvement or participation in the arts, as with goals statements, are somewhat vague about the nature of participation sought, especially when participation is paired with the concept of "representation."
Finally, two state arts agencies have criteria which suggest that the nature of participation by ethnic cultural communities should be a matter of civil rights or affirmative action. The Massachusetts Cultural Council uses some criteria which mirror criteria used elsewhere, such as "diverse community involvement," responsiveness to the "needs of a community," "willingness to collaborate with other cultural and community groups," and "evidence of accessibility to a broad audience." But it also seeks "evidence of affirmative action practices."69 Further, the D.C. Commission on the Arts and Humanities requires applicants to prepare an annual Civil and Human Rights Compliance Report. Then, in evaluating applicants, the agency conducts comparative analyses to assess applicants' progress in complying with civil and human rights directives "to strengthen and expand minority participation in the arts at all levels."70 Yet even these criteria beg questions about possible meanings of concepts of rights and affirmative action and, therefore, about the concept of justice and a "just" policy. In-depth analysis of these and other value-laden concepts will be saved for subsequent chapters.

For now, the evaluative criterion of "artistic quality," as used by SAAs, bears some scrutiny. Table 10 demonstrates that "artistic quality," or in some cases "artistic excellence" or "artistic merit," is used as a criterion by all state arts agencies in evaluating applicants for project grants. The same is true for other grants categories. But, as was found in the examination of SAAs' goals statements, the term "artistic quality," if left unclarified, could lead to an array of unintended assessments. This is so because "artistic quality," by itself, can mean either that
aesthetic standards of excellence are relative to specific cultural traditions or apply across cultures.

Most state arts agencies leave interpretations of the term "artistic quality" quite open. Some, however, have attempted to clarify it. For example, in defining the "quality" criterion, the Georgia Council for the Arts includes both absolute and relative standards. Absolute standards refer to "quality measured by generally accepted standards of excellence," relative standards refer to "quality measured on a relative scale, taking into account any special factors such as size and location of community, special nature of organization, etc." The way in which these standards relate to the arts of ethnic cultural traditions, however, is not made clear. A similar vagueness applies to the Missouri Arts Council’s policy statement that it recognizes no single standard of quality and that "artistic quality is situational." Finally, the Ohio Arts Council encourages its grants panelists to consider the "artistic quality of the work or project and its aesthetic or cultural impact on its audience." This could be read to mean that aesthetic standards are not only diverse but that their differences are a matter of the consequences they have for cultures. In any case, the views of artistic value which these criteria embody will be examined in far greater depth in a subsequent chapter.

This review of individual evaluative criteria geared to multicultural issues, criteria phrased in terms of accessibility, participation, needs of underserved populations, involvement in planning, representation, civil rights, affirmative action, and diverse sources of artistic quality revealed a number of value assumptions, many of them unclarified. But clarified or not, it must be remembered that state
arts agencies use multiple criteria in making decisions about grant applicants. Thus, an important issue associated with SAAs' grant evaluation criteria is the relative weight that the criteria are given during decision-making processes.

Many SAAs simply list the evaluative criteria utilized in their public documents, such as program guides. But some examples of weighted evaluative criteria can be found among those SAAs examined above who purport to address issues of multiculturalism. The Kansas Arts Commission evaluates applicants in terms of evidence that they have been or will serve the needs of traditionally underserved populations, including but not limited to racial minorities. But this criterion is but one of a list of 12 criteria. Similarly, the Alabama State Council on the Arts' criterion cited earlier, the "degree to which the project would involve/benefit minorities," is one out of 14 criteria utilized. Finally, the Georgia Council for the Arts (GAC) rates applicants on the accessibility of their programs for special populations, i.e., minorities and handicapped individuals. The GAC seeks "documentation of their involvement in planning, developing, presenting, and attending programming." But out of 150 possible rating points, the highest possible rating on this criterion is 5.

While they are relatively few in number, these examples suggest that evaluative criteria that stress potential involvement of and service to ethnic cultural communities, can easily get lost in the evaluation of grant applications. Still, the evaluation of grant applications according to established criteria is just one part, albeit an important part, of grant decision-making processes in SAAs. While some have criticized these processes as unwieldy, providing little time for decision
makers to review carefully a large number of grant applications, many SAAs make provisions for extensive on-site evaluations of potential grantees. It is not clear, however, whether consideration of the provision of opportunities for ethnic cultural communities, among others, receives greater attention in the on-site evaluation process.

**Terms of Grants.** As another element of the open-access-to-funding, terms of grants constitute the requirements that SAA grantees must fulfill throughout the course of a granting period. Some SAAs require grantees in general operating support categories to provide outreach or public service activities as part of their grants. Also, as noted above, the D.C. Commission on the Arts and Humanities requires all potential grantees to submit a Civil and Human Rights Compliance Report. Further, while rarely required to prepare such report, applicants to virtually all SAAs are required to pledge their compliance with federal and state non-discrimination laws and regulations. The language on non-discrimination available from 37 SAAs was examined for this study. Thirty-seven SAAs stipulated that all grantees must comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 barring discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin, Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972 regarding discrimination on the basis of sex, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 barring discrimination against physically handicapped individuals. Finally, fourteen required grantee compliance with the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 barring discrimination on the basis of age. These statutes stipulate that no member of the above groups, solely by the reason of membership in such a group, should be excluded from participation in, denied the
benefits of, or subjected to discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal assistance. Clearly, racial minorities are as well-protected from discrimination, at least in a legal sense, as other groups.

Such examples notwithstanding, the terms of grants of most SAAs are financial and procedural in nature. For example, in an effort to minimize grantees' dependence on public arts funds, SAAs require at least a one-to-one match for almost all grants, although they differ on the extent to which such a match must be made with cash or is possible through in-kind services. Also, most SAAs require all grantees to issue a final report on their grants activities. These examples, however, reinforce the point that SAAs utilize terms-of-grants requirements in relatively limited ways, in particular, as they might be used to address multicultural concerns.

Decision-Makers in Grant Programs

Evaluative criteria, whether specified or not, of necessity are interpreted and applied by individuals with diverse personal assumptions, values, and biases. Some have suggested that these individuals constitute "good-old-boy" networks that are over-balanced in terms of particular aesthetic ideologies, although such charges have rarely been documented in any systematic way.

SAA funding decisions are made primarily by groups of private citizens who constitute grants panels and boards. SAA grants panels are usually many in number and are arranged by arts disciplines. They review SAA grant applications, rate them according to evaluative criteria, and often make recommendations on funding levels. SAA boards are responsible for SAA policy development and
generally make all final decisions in awarding grants and the amounts of such grants.

These roles of SAA boards and panels are of interest in interpreting the open-access-to-funding model as it relates to arts programs of ethnic cultural communities. An assumption could be made that if members of ethnic groups are present on SAA boards and panels, they may increase SAAs' sensitivity to the needs of such groups in having access to the arts. This assumption can be challenged. Many ethnic group members would likely resist being thought of in this way. Specifically, those who might serve on SAA boards and panels could have greater allegiance to specific arts disciplines than to the specific cultural traditions. The possibility of increased sensitivity by ethnic group members to ethnic cultural traditions seems sufficient, however, to inquire into the roles of ethnic group members in the decision-making bodies of SAAs.

The criteria for the selection of SAAs' board members and panelists are also of interest. Of the thirty-five SAAs that provided information on their selection criteria for board members, twenty-three merely stipulate that potential members must be private citizens, sixteen mention professional expertise and/or long-time interest in the arts, and fifteen stipulate private citizen status or participation in the state legislature. Of those SAAs that have multiple criteria, seventeen mention geographic representation, while eleven mention cultural/ethnic representation as a criterion for the selection of board members.

Of the thirty-eight SAAs that have guidelines for the selection of grants review panelists, twenty-seven stress "specialized knowledge of and/or professional
experience in the arts." A number of SAAs stress multiple criteria, including twenty that stress "geographic representation" and another eighteen that mention "ethnic diversity."

Criteria utilized in the selection of SAAs' grant review panelists bear closer examination for two reasons -- first, because, while never documented, it is widely believed that the boards of public arts agencies, or whomever has final grants decisions, follow the recommendations of grant review panels in the large majority of cases, and, secondly, because panelist selection criteria embody diverse value assumptions. Special attention will be paid to those criteria that explicitly touch on issues of multiculturalism and the arts.

The Nevada State Council on the Arts states that its board members and panelists are "chosen for their knowledge of and experience in the arts."77 The Florida Arts Council adds numerous other criteria to their panelist selection process, giving "consideration to professional acumen, geographical representation and minority representation [as well as] diverse aesthetic, institutional, and cultural viewpoints."78 How "consideration" of these criteria can and does affect the make-up of panels is not clear.

Two state arts agencies, rather than publishing criteria for potential panelists, list those characteristics that their panel members exhibit. For example, the North Carolina Arts Council says that its board and panels include "citizens recognized for their accomplishments in the arts... [as well as] members from urban and rural areas... and from diverse racial, economic, and cultural backgrounds."79
Also, the Massachusetts Cultural Council claims that its grant advisory panels "represent diverse geographic, ethnic, philosophical, and aesthetic perspectives."

Rather than listing criteria or stating claims about the make-up of its panels, other SAAs pair their panel member selection criteria with principles or ideals for the composition of panels. The Virginia Commission for the Arts, for example, in addition to seeking panelists with expertise in the arts, "attempts to balance each panel with knowledge of the different arts disciplines and diverse cultural perspectives." In a similar manner, the Nebraska Arts Council (NAC) states that its "panelists are selected to represent a balance of geographic, artistic and ethnic interests." Interestingly, while the NAC, as with the Virginia Commission for the Arts, seeks to uphold a principle of balance in composing its panels, it is a balance not of experiences, expertise, or viewpoints, but of interests. But in both cases, the principle of "balance" is left undefined and open to diverse interpretations.

The Michigan Council for the Arts invokes two different principles of panelist selection. One is "inclusion," namely, that "every effort is made to include African-American, Asian, Hispanic, and Native American advisors and consultants as program panel members"; the other is that panels are to be reflective of the cultural and ethnic diversity of the state. But whether such "reflection" is to be strictly proportional, reflecting the distribution of ethnic populations in the state on a percentage basis, is not clear.

Two final examples warrant scrutiny. The California Arts Council, rather than merely seeking or making a strong effort to place ethnic group members on grant review panels, has a policy on panels, one with an explicit conditional
imperative. This policy "requires each panel to reflect artistic knowledge, geographic spread, and multi-cultural representation." This policy notwithstanding, the concept of "reflection," as with the previous example, remains vague. Finally, the Texas Commission on the Arts (TCA) moves beyond concepts of representation of ethnic groups or reflection of cultural diversity to require of all panel members that they have personal knowledge of the arts of ethnic cultures. In its own words, the TCA's policy holds that "a panel member's knowledge must relate not only to a given discipline or field but to the diversity and cultural, ethnic, aesthetic and artistic plurality of the arts in Texas."

The attention in this section on the diverse criteria used by state arts agencies to select grant review panelists, and in some cases board members, reflects the fact that SAA panels and boards have the ultimate responsibility for selecting SAA grantees and awarding funds. But two other types of participants in this process -- citizens and state arts agency staff -- merit attention.

As part of guidelines for the NEA's grants to SAAs, SAAs are required to maximize the number of state-wide or regional planning meetings designed to elicit needs statements and policy input from individual citizens and citizen groups. These meetings are open to the public and function as forums for exchanges of diverse points of view. While information of the characteristics of participants in these open meetings is not available, public documents of SAAs revealed that nearly half make special efforts to inform and even recruit special constituencies, including ethnic group members, for participation in their planning meetings.
It is often thought that public arts agencies’ staff members can be very influential in grants decision-making processes. This influence, it is said, can be exerted at various stages of these processes -- in formulating grant categories, in screening grant proposals, and by providing technical assistance to potential grantees. Also, as will be seen in the next section, some SAAs have special multicultural programs having their own staff.

To this point, the selection criteria of SAA boards and panels and the roles of panels, boards, staff, and citizens in grant-making processes have been examined. A final task in this section is to examine at least some of the characteristics of SAA panelists, board members, and staff.

Data on the ethnic characteristics of SAA panelists, board members, and staff were generated as part of a survey of SAA’s policies and operations conducted by the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies (NASAA) during late 1990 and early 1991. While not published in final form at the time of this writing, selected raw survey results were made available in advance of public release to this researcher, who then tabulated the data.86

Tables 12-14 contain tabulations of data based on two questions in the NASAA survey. One asked respondents to segment their board, panel members, and staff according to race/ethnicity. The primary race/ethnicity categories included Native American/Alaskan Native, Asian/Pacific Islander, Black, White, or Hispanic. The other question asked respondents for the total numbers of board members, panelists, and staff associated with their agency. It was found that the size of boards ranged from 9 to 23, with a mean and median of 15; that the number of panelists ranged from 9 to 326, with a mean of 85 and median of 74;
and that staff size ranged from 6 to 94, with a mean of 21 and median of 16. But it was the responses of individual state arts agencies to these two questions that were then correlated to arrive at figures reflecting the percentage of each SAAs' board members, panelists, and staff members that are Native American, Asian, African-American, Hispanic, or White. Thus, Tables 12-14 are tabulations of those percentages. (For example, Table 12 shows that in the case of 4 SAAs, 11% of their board members are African-American).

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TABLE 13—SAA Panels: Percentages of Ethnic Group Members on SAA's Panels (N = 48 SAA's)

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Table 12 reveals that the presence of Native American, Asians, and Hispanics on the boards of state arts agencies is a relative rarity. In the case of African-Americans, the picture is somewhat different, in that 22 of 48 SAAs have African-Americans on their boards at a rate higher than 10% including one at 61%. Still, except in very rare cases, the large majority of SAAs have boards whose membership is predominately white.

The race/ethnicity breakdown for panelists, as Table 13 shows, is somewhat different. Notably, in far fewer instances than with boards are there SAAs with no Native American, Asians, or Hispanics serving on panels. Indeed, the level of these groups' participation on panels surpasses 12% in a number of cases. On the other hand, the participation rates hover below 10% with the large majority of SAAs. African-Americans also serve on panels at higher rates than they do on panels. In 23 SAAs, African-Americans make up more than 10% of the panelists, reaching highs, in two instances, of 39% and 52%. However, these data can also be read in a different way, namely, that in 24 out of 48 state arts agencies, African-Americans make up 10% or less of the pool of panelists. Given the somewhat higher participation of ethnic minorities on panels, the proportional dominance of whites is accordingly less on panels than it is with boards. Still, whites make up 80% or more of the panelists in 23 out of 48 SAAs.

The percentage rates of ethnic minorities serving as SAA staff members lies between the rates found in boards and panels. With a few exceptions, the majority of SAAs have no Native American, Asian, or Hispanic staff members, while 21
have no African-American staff members. Further, in 20 of 48 SAAs, 90% or more of their staff members are white.

Another measure of interest revealed by the NASAA survey is the number of staff in state arts agencies whose responsibilities include "minority-ethnic arts." Twenty-one percent of the SAAs have no staff with these responsibilities, 69% have one such staff member, and 10% of the SAAs commit two staff to "minority-ethnic arts."

What, then, can be made of these data? Simply put, an answer depends on the questions one asks. There are two questions that will not be addressed at the interpretive phase of this study. First, one could ask whether the participation rates of ethnic group members on SAAs' boards, panels, and staffs are sufficient to uphold a principle of balance, adequately "reflect" the cultural diversity of American society, or distribute responsibility and decision-making power in a just manner. Whether it is possible to answer such a question is a matter for the subsequent chapter. Another question that, for now, will be deferred goes to a central assumption behind the above analysis of racial/ethnic characteristics of SAA board members, panelists, and staff, namely, that the presence of ethnic group members on agency decision-making bodies will increase agency sensitivity to the arts of ethnic cultural traditions. This assumption, however, is rooted in the further assumption, to be examined below, that an individual's racial/ethnic characteristics are a good predictor of the individual's knowledge of, experience in, and sensitivity to a culturally-specific arts tradition. An analysis of this assumption will be key
to interpreting the significance of the rates of members of ethnic groups in SAAs' decision-making bodies.

For now, however, one question of interest is what these data say about many SAAs stated intentions to seek increased representation of ethnic group members on boards and panels. An interesting feature of these data is that ethnic group members apparently tend to participate in SAAs' grants decision-making processes as panelists at higher rates than they do as board members. If it is true, as previously hypothesized, that the boards of SAAs follow the recommendations of panelists in the large majority of cases, then the proportionally greater presence of ethnic group members on panels might mean that African-Americans, Asians, Hispanics, and Native Americans have a considerable influence on many SAAs' grant-making decisions. But even if the hypothesis about the de facto power of panels is accurate, the fact remains that the boards of most SAAs retain the formal power to make all final grants decisions, including grant amounts, as well as the formal power to oversee policy development. Thus, what ethnic groups appear to gain in effective influence, they lose in formal control.

This difference between ethnic group participation on SAA boards and on panels can be traced, in part, to different selection processes. Board members are almost invariably, by law, appointed to designated terms by a state's governor; panelists are most often chosen by boards on the recommendations of SAAs' staff and current or past panelists. While never documented, conventional wisdom is that SAA boards, as with grants decisions, tend to follow the lead of others, in this case SAA staffs, in appointing panelists. If this is so, one can conclude that SAAs'
staffs have been more effective in achieving ethnic group participation in panels than governors have been in appointing ethnic group members to SAA boards. The underlying reasons for these differences are likely matters of the politics of state governorships, a topic that would require speculation at this point or another study in the future.

The attention in this section on the selection criteria for and characteristics of SAA board members and panelists was a necessary step toward understanding how grants decisions are made in an open-access-to-funding policy mechanism. But such an understanding, preliminary or otherwise, does not fully answer a final basic question -- on what information do decision-makers base their grants decisions? Some factors in grants decisions have been noted already, factors such as the experiences, biases, and perspectives panelists and board members bring to such decisions and the formal, published evaluative criteria they must apply in making decisions. But they must apply these criteria to something. In doing so, panelists and board members rely primarily, though not exclusively, on information contained in potential grantees' application forms. The kinds of information applicants are asked to supply by different SAAs bears examination.

Grant application forms for virtually all public arts agencies share a number of features in common. Organizational applicants, in particular, are asked to provide narrative and numerical information on their mission and goals, annual budgets, board and administrative personnel, project goals and budget, plans and time-lines for implementation, documentation, and evaluation, anticipated beneficiaries, additional sources of income, and funding history. Of course the
The Illinois Arts Council, as a matter of policy, does not ask its applicants to provide information of the racial/ethnic characteristics of their boards, staffs, or audiences, in that "many groups and individuals do not feel comfortable being required to provide that information." In contrast, the Nevada State Council on the Arts (NSCA) does ask organizational applicants to indicate the number and percentage of minorities (Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native American) on their boards and staffs. The NSCA also states, however, that "this information is for statistical purposes only." The Wyoming Arts Council does not, either as a requirement or for statistical purposes, ask applicants for race/ethnicity statistical information. But it does require applicants to address, in narrative form, this question -- "what
accommodations do you have to meet the needs of...special populations,"^{90}
including minorities?

The examples from these three states exemplify basic dimensions of
approaches used by SAAs toward race/ethnicity information -- not asking for it,
asking for it or requiring it, and asking for it in statistical terms or in narrative
form. Several other SAAs combine elements of these approaches in various ways.
For example, the Georgia Council for the Arts requires applicants to provide
statistical information on the race/ethnicity characteristics of applicant
organizations and their staffs, board members, volunteers, and audiences; to this
list, the Ohio Arts Council adds race/ethnicity information on applicant
organizations' participating artists as a requirement. The North Dakota Council
on the Arts (NDCA) and the Oregon Arts Commission (OAC) have similar
informational requirements; but both ask for narrative information as well.
Specifically, the NDCA asks of applicants, "what efforts will you make to address
the needs of the non-dominant culture of your community, including minorities
[and] under-served audiences?"^{91} The OAC requires applicants to describe "efforts
to include and serve underrepresented communities, i.e., ethnic minorities,"^{92}
among others.

Clearly, these two examples of application information requirements entail
value assumptions as evidenced by use of terms such as needs, non-dominant
culture, under-served, and underrepresented. The New York State Council on the
Arts (NYSCA), on the other hand, actually addresses, however implicitly, the
concept of distributive justice in discussing its information requirements of grant
applicants. As with other state arts agencies, the NYSCA, consistent with its goals, requires statistical information and narrative statements from applicants on efforts to increase the participation of traditionally underserved populations in their programs and services. Significantly, however, the Council states that in its review of grant applications "these questions do not presuppose a certain answer. Each organization's answers will vary depending on a number of factors such as: artistic mission, geographic location, nature of community, size and resources of the organization.... The Council is looking for an applicant's good faith in its efforts to fulfill these goals." Thus, the NYSCA is suggesting that while it is committed to a concept of distributive justice in its funding policy, it also seeks to apply the concept with consideration for a number of contingencies. Of course, this interpretation of the concept can be debated, a task undertaken in the next chapter. For now, this example serves to demonstrate that value assumptions are entailed in the information requirements of public arts agencies and can be clarified or not.

Even though a number of SAAs require applicants to provide race/ethnicity information on their boards, staffs, volunteers, and/or audiences and ask for narrative accounts on efforts to involve ethnic communities in their programs, it is not always clear whether and, if so, how this information is to be used in grants decisions. The North Carolina Arts Council's information requirements are illustrative. First, as a matter of policy, the Council "requires all organizations applying for funding to provide information on the inclusion of people of color in the governance, management and programming of the organization. The degree to which the organization demonstrates a commitment to involving people of color
will be taken into consideration in determining funding."94 Specifically, it requires organizational applicants to identify the racial/ethnic characteristics of their staff, volunteers, artists, and audiences and, in narrative form, to "describe how people of color are involved on the board, on the staff and in the programming of the organization."95 Finally, a basic criterion boards and panels use to evaluate applicants is the "involvement of people of color in governance, administration and programming."96 In this way, the goals, information requirements, and evaluative criteria of the North Carolina Arts Council are correlated in a systemic way to assist decision-makers in making grants decisions affecting, among others, organizations rooted in ethnic cultural traditions.

Finally, two SAAs, while utilizing the basic means of gathering information, have adopted additional measures to gauge applicant organizations' involvement of and response to ethnic communities. Notably, to gather information on grantees' compliance with local, state, and federal laws which prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, or age, the Texas Arts Commission conducts pre-award reviews "to determine whether the recipient is meeting compliance standards"97 and, in some cases, "may investigate on an informal basis any complaints concerning alleged violations."98 The Massachusetts Cultural Council, in a 1991 agreement with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, states that "the Commission will audit a selection of applicants to the Council...to evaluate their civil rights performance (non-discrimination and affirmative action) in order to determine their eligibility for state financial assistance."99 Subsequently, the Council and Commission will work with applicants
to develop a compliance plan and schedule. An additional audit is then conducted to gauge evidence of the applicant's good faith effort in complying, evidence which is forwarded by the Council's executive director to the grants review panel and eventually to the Council itself, which makes final funding decisions. Yet, how this information of compliance or non-compliance is to be weighted in funding decisions by the Massachusetts Cultural Council is not clear; nor is it clear in the case of the Texas Arts Commission.

This brief review of the information requirements of SAAs regarding issues of multiculturalism reveals considerable diversity in approaches and raises a number of issues. It is hard to imagine, for example, how SAAs who do not ask for or require race/ethnicity information and narrative accounts from their applicants could apply evaluative criteria such as "involvement of ethnic minorities" in an informed and specific manner. Also, it is not always clear how those SAAs who do require applicants to provide such information utilize it or make it available to grants decision-makers. But, significantly, both of these conclusions beg questions of whether race/ethnicity information should be gathered by public arts agencies and, if so, whether and how it should be used as a basis for funding decisions. Addressing those questions will ultimately involve analysis of value-laden concepts such as justice, a matter for the next chapter.

**Special Initiatives, Special Programs, and Distributive Pluralism**

The open-access-to-funding policy mechanism, it will be recalled, is a competitive funding system, one purported to be fair and open, designed to reward the most worthy applicants, and, ultimately, a system which will benefit many
individuals and groups in significant ways, including members of multicultural communities. Many state arts agencies, even those whose goals, evaluative criteria, and decision-maker selection criteria reflect a commitment to multiculturalism, seem to believe that multicultural organizations are, for a number of reasons, at a competitive disadvantage in the open-access-to-funding policy mechanism. Thus, in order to enhance the competitive capacity of multicultural organizations, a number of SAAs have undertaken special initiatives which complement and supplement the open-access-to-funding policy mechanism. These special initiatives, as well as the special programs and distributive pluralism policy mechanisms, form the subject of this section.

Special Initiatives. A primary means used by SAAs to enhance the competitiveness of multicultural organizations is technical assistance workshops. Data from the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies survey cited above reveal that 29 state arts agencies provide technical assistance. Such assistance can come in various forms. A notable example is the Rural/Minority Arts Project of the Florida Arts Council (FAC). Rooted in the goal "to help marginal organizations to become mainstream," the FAC first conducted a needs assessment of 212 organizations who met rural and/or minority criteria in order to discover their administrative problems and needs. Based on these responses, the FAC scheduled nine two-day technical assistance workshops covering the topics of: fundraising, grantsmanship, incorporation, tax exemption, marketing/public relations, and bookkeeping. Ultimately, the technical assistance workshops were designed to address an obstacle for rural/minority arts organizations which the FAC defined
as follows: "they lack the organizational capabilities required to apply for external sources of funding, and lack of funding prevents them from getting organized." Similarly, the Connecticut Arts Commission conducts training seminars for culturally diverse artists.

The Arizona Commission on the Arts (ACA) has undertaken several special initiatives. It has held workshops to assist organizations in developing culturally diverse governing boards and in preparing affirmative action plans, and plans additional workshops and conferences that address cultural diversity issues. The ACA also plans to identify individuals from ethnic communities who can serve as board members for ACA grantee arts organizations. Further, the agency plans to facilitate the attendance of ethnic arts administrators at arts management programs nationwide. Finally, the Arizona Commission on the Arts states that it actively seeks grant applications from arts and non-arts organizations rooted in ethnic cultural communities, a practice apparently replicated by numerous state arts agencies.

Many state arts agencies, 25 of the 49 surveyed in the NASAA study, indicate they have developed joint programs with other state agencies in their states to enhance the access multicultural organizations have to public funds. The Michigan Council for the Arts, for example, has identified or developed technical and financial resources from international, national, state, and local sources which, it suggests, "are diverse and are reflective of our multi-cultural global environment." The identification of these resources is designed "to assist communities throughout the state provide arts activities, to increase public
awareness and appreciation of the arts, to assure long-term viability of non-profit arts producing and presenting organizations, and to further promote the arts in Michigan."\textsuperscript{104} In turn, through cooperation with other state agencies such as the Commission on Spanish Speaking Affairs, Commission on Indian Affairs, Commission on Aging, the Department of Civil Rights, and the Department of Education, "the Council has made available these resources to African-American, Asian, Hispanic, Native American and non-minority communities."\textsuperscript{105} An additional example of a state arts agency cooperating with another state agency was cited above, namely, the cooperative agreement between the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination and the Massachusetts Cultural Council to develop and enforce non-discrimination and affirmative action policies.

A final, commonly-utilized special initiative is that of special committees designed to assist multicultural organizations. The Nebraska Arts Council has a People of Color Arts Advisory Committee and the Georgia Council for the Arts has an ad hoc minority committee which is charged to review the Council's existing programs and their responsiveness to the needs of minority constituents.

As diverse as these initiatives are in structure and intent, they share significant commonalities. First, just as with the basic elements of the open-access-to-funding policy mechanism, these initiatives are rooted, explicitly or implicitly, in value-laden concepts such as art, culture, and justice. Secondly, while intended to compensate for the perceived disadvantages of multicultural communities in an open-access-to-funding system, these special initiatives are consistent with the premises of the open-access-to-funding policy mechanism. The same cannot be
said, however, for SAAs' special programs. Indeed, certain features are sufficiently unique for special programs to be considered a separate policy mechanism.

Special Programs. Special programs of SAAs designed to benefit multicultural communities are diverse in intent, structure, and history. Some are exclusively for the benefit of ethnic minorities, while others serve a broad range of "special constituencies," some are designed to stimulate arts programs at community sites, while others attempt to mainstream "underserved" ethnic minorities into the ongoing activities of arts organizations. Despite the differences in these programs, each represents a policy decision on the part of its SAA sponsor that the needs of multicultural communities can best be met, to a significant degree, through a special funding and programmatic mechanism. A key element of special programs is that eligibility for them, in most cases, is restricted to individuals or organizations from African-American, Asian, Hispanic, or Native American communities. Given this eligibility requirement, SAAs can and do offer special programs for multicultural communities while at the same time operating the rest of their funding systems along the open-access-to-funding model.

According to the NASAA survey, 32 out of 49 state arts agencies say that they have a program that targets minority/ethnic arts organizations. This total would seem to include both special initiatives as well as special programs. In any case, the special programs policy mechanism is frequently utilized by SAAs. The list of special programs discussed below, while not exhaustive, represents the different types of programmatic approaches adopted by SAAs.
While the reasons some SAAs do not have special programs are diverse, several SAAs have made conscious decisions not to utilize the special programs policy mechanism. The case of the Arizona Commission on the Arts (ACA) is illustrative. Until 1984, the Commission had an Expansion Arts Program which existed as a separate funding category. The program "was established to support, encourage and assist artists, projects and organizations of high artistic quality that relate to culturally diverse, rural or tribal communities."106 In recent years, however, the ACA has opted to have applications from ethnic organizations reviewed by basic arts discipline panels, essentially a return to the open-access-to-funding policy mechanism. Accordingly, the ACA has sought greater ethnic representation on its grant panels and on the Arizona Arts Trust Fund, which also dispenses funds to arts organizations, including those rooted in ethnic communities. The reasons for the ACA's shift in policy mechanisms, however, are not made clear.

The special programs of some state arts agencies constitute special grants categories. These take many forms. The Delaware State Arts Council's Grants to Emerging Organizations category provides up to 50% of arts project budgets or administrative costs of organizations in the process of institutional development. Special consideration is "given to organizations that provide programming for an under-served constituency or are involved in experimental or innovative arts activities."107 Thus, eligibility for this grants program is not restricted to multicultural arts organizations or organizations who serve ethnic communities. But the grant guidelines do state that "emphasis on multi-cultural programming is
encouraged." As an example of another special grants category, the State Arts Council of Oklahoma offers grants for under $5,000 "to be used primarily for technical assistance (e.g. to minority arts organizations for board development, financial record-keeping, personnel training)" as part of its Minority Arts Funds program. Finally, Arts: Rural and Multicultural (A.R.M.), a special program of the Indiana Arts Commission, aims to identify, assist and develop a long-term commitment to "organizations and individuals in rural and multicultural communities that produce, present and promote the arts." The program offers small grants, ranging from $100 to $5,000, in three areas -- technical assistance, touring, and projects -- as part of the IAC's goal to make the arts accessible to all citizens in the state. Applicants may request 75% of an activity's cost from the IAC, with the remaining 25% made up of any combination of cash or in-kind contributions.

The special programs of several state arts agencies are designed to offer a broad range of services to organizations in ethnic cultural communities. The Minority Arts Program of the Pennsylvania Council on the Arts, in order "to develop a strong support system for the continued growth and expansion of the multi-cultural arts community... focuses on the development of multi-cultural organizations and the training of capable administrators to ensure their continued growth and development." The program offers Technical Assistance Programs and Services, including organizational development conferences, quarterly newsletters, technical assistance for organizations and individuals, and internships. In addition, the Minority Arts Program has three specific funding categories --
Basic Organizational Development, Intermediate Organizational Development, and Advanced Organizational Development. While these funding categories are directed to organizations of different sizes and histories, they all offer non-matching funds to enhance the administrative skills of administrators in multicultural organizations. Of special interest, the Basic Organizational Development, in part, focuses on non-arts organizations "interested in cultivating professionally staffed arts programs."\(^\text{112}\)

The Multicultural Arts Development Program of the South Carolina Arts Commission is also geared to the professional development of multicultural organizations through technical assistance, conferences, and consultancies. It is unique, however, in that it also provides "consultancy grants to established organizations seeking to develop innovative dialogue with underserved ethnic populations in their community."\(^\text{113}\)

The Ohio Arts Council's Minority Arts Program has two primary objectives: 1) to be an information resource on minority arts in the state; and 2) to provide "long- and short-term [management] assistance from arts advisors to strengthen African-American, Appalachian, Asian, Hispanic, and Native American Indian arts organizations and individual artists."\(^\text{114}\) While this program is somewhat different from those cited above given its use of advisors who work individually with ethnic arts organizations, it is similar in its stress on enhancing management capabilities. But the OAC also has a granting program, Traditional and Ethnic Arts, which aims to help nonprofit groups to document, preserve, present, and disseminate arts that "are created within groups that share the same ethnic heritage, language, work,
Finally, the OAC offers a grantmaking program for which all arts organizations are eligible. The Outreach Initiative Program makes funds available to encourage "the permanent inclusion of minorities and special constituents on boards, planning committees, and in administrative positions."116

The Tennessee Arts Commission has adopted a partnership strategy to achieve "access to the arts for traditionally underserved and underrepresented arts disciplines [and] increased appreciation and understanding of the arts."117 The program, Partnerships for Access and Appreciation, funds projects spanning numerous aspects of the production, presentation, dissemination, and administration of the arts. A key requirement of the program is that each funded project must involve a partnership between two non-profit organizations or artists and a non-profit organization. Desired partnerships include those between large and small organizations, a "mainstream" and an "alternative" organization, or a "majority" and a "minority" organization.

To this point, special programs of state arts agencies have been identified and distinguished on various grounds. Although in most cases eligibility for special programs is limited to organizations and individuals rooted in ethnic cultural communities, eligibility for some programs cited above extends to "special constituencies" or to major arts organizations, especially those whose aim is outreach or building partnerships. These special programs also vary on the forms of assistance they adopt -- technical assistance, consultancies, and grants funds for organizational development or partnership opportunities. But examination of
additional examples reveals another important distinction between special programs, namely, that some encourage work by multicultural organizations to serve their immediate communities, while others promote work by multicultural organizations to interact with audiences and institutions throughout society.

The first orientation can be illustrated by the special programs of three state arts agencies. For example, the North Carolina Arts Council's Organization of Color Development Program has three components -- Organizational Support for Established Organizations of Color, Organizational Support for Emerging Organizations of Color, and Organizations of Color Management/Technical Assistance. Respectively, these components fund long-term efforts to stabilize and expand the services of established arts organizations of color, support, over three years, the growth of artistic quality and scope of emerging organizations, and provide "expert" assistance to both established and emerging organizations to enhance their artistic quality and management skills. What is significant here is not the forms of assistance provided, which are similar to those of other special programs, but the nature of those organizations eligible for the program, namely, "nonprofit, tax-exempt professional arts organizations of color...based in and focused on the African-American, Asian-American, Hispanic or Native American Communities." As another example of this orientation, the Special Arts Services Program of the New York State Council on the Arts is designed to support "professional arts activities within African-American, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American communities." Notably, the program's guidelines state that "organizations whose projects are directed toward general audiences or
organizations whose artists do not represent those communities mentioned above are not eligible for support in the Special Arts Services Program."\textsuperscript{120} Finally, as a condition of receiving grants for organizational development from the New Mexico Arts Division's Culturally Diverse Arts Organizations programs, "organizations must be both by and for culturally specific ethnic groups, tribal communities or multicultural neighborhoods."\textsuperscript{121} Also, as with the previous two examples, this program's guidelines stipulate that "this category is not designed for mainstream organizations that offer outreach programs to culturally specific and multicultural communities as an aspect of their overall activities."\textsuperscript{122}

One of the two examples of special programs which have adopted the second orientation discussed above no longer exists; but it nonetheless warrants mention. The Heritage Program of the Massachusetts Cultural Council, in place through 1990, was intended "to strengthen Third World communities' ability to expand and deepen the public's awareness and appreciation of the contemporary art, culture, and history of Afro-American, Caribbean, Asian and Pacific Islander, Cape Verdean, Hispanic and Native American people."\textsuperscript{123} Another example of a special program designed to promote work of multicultural organizations to interact with audiences and institutions beyond their immediate communities is the California Arts Council's Multi-Cultural Entry and Advancement. The program is multi-dimensional involving technical assistance to assist with financial/administrative competence, audience development, outreach, administrative fellowship opportunities, and the development of coalitions for the production of cross-cultural work. The intent behind this program's provisions to
help produce artistic work that either is rooted in two or more cultural traditions or, in some sense, cuts across cultures is of special interest. This special program, reasons the California Arts Council, is part of "laying the groundwork for a California arts environment in which cross-cultural work is the norm, the mainstream."^{124}

Analysis of these different special programs can take two forms. The first form involves analysis of the value-laden assumptions underlying these programs. For example, some programs seem to assume that ethnic arts organizations should primarily or exclusively serve their immediate communities, while others seem to assume that they should reach out and interact with other populations throughout society. Also, one agency holds out the possibility that all arts organizations can be cross-cultural in nature. These diverse positions, in turn, are rooted in alternative views about actual and ideal relationships between ethnic groups in society. Exploration of these value positions is a matter for the next chapter.

The second means of analyzing these diverse special programs is to focus on their commonalities in exemplifying the special programs policy mechanism. On the one hand, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the special programs policy mechanism due in large part to the aforementioned lack of publicly available data on the race/ethnic characteristics of SAA grantees and individuals who benefit from such grants. Still, some degree of assessment is possible.

First, it is not difficult to imagine that some might reject in principle the notion of separate programs for specific population groups in public arts agencies, arguing that the only warranted categorical distinctions are those made on the basis
of arts disciplines or organizational forms. Indeed, some SAAs, at least implicitly, seem to take this position. Others clearly take an alternative view. In addition to programs geared to ethnic organizations, many SAAs have special programs which focus on other population groups, such as physically challenged individuals or older adults. But the mere existence of special programs does not constitute a justification for their use. For example, critics of special programs in other social and professional spheres argue that such programs tend to segregate and marginalize the intended beneficiaries away from mainstream institutions and practices of society. This critique would not seem to apply to several of the SAA special programs discussed above, such as those which aim to increase the society-wide awareness and appreciation of ethnic art traditions or the multicultural programming of all arts organizations. Critics of special programs might then argue that any form of special treatment for some groups will likely provoke a sense of resentment among applicants from other groups, thus triggering a backlash against ethnic groups as a drain on public arts funding. But whether such a drain and backlash effect might occur is largely an empirical question, the answer to which is complicated by limited SAA data. Anecdotal evidence could be a helpful indicator of whether these effects have indeed occurred. But while some anecdotal evidence exists, as will be seen, about backlash against examples of the distributive pluralism policy mechanism, no such evidence has yet surfaced about special programs in arts policy.

A final consideration in analyzing the effectiveness of the special programs policy mechanism centers on the purposes which these programs serve. Specifically,
many special programs aim to facilitate the development of multicultural arts organizations' acumen as effective, efficient non-profit organizations. But the merit of this aim is increasingly met with skepticism, even among advocates of multiculturalism. Notably, A.B. Spellman, director of the NEA's Expansion Arts program, argues that the traditional model of the non-profit organization is failing ethnic communities. He notes that few ethnic arts organizations are able to assemble a board of trustees which is sufficiently connected to the private philanthropic community to assure a stability in fund-raising. Without this established traditional structure, ethnic arts organizations would seem to be at a disadvantage. As Spellman argues, "funders looking for the traditional institutional model in reviewing those organizations will focus on their weakness and not on their strength." The strength of many ethnic arts organizations, contends Spellman, is in their programming; indeed, many are artist-run. Thus, in this scenario, "small staffs led by artists have to solve all of the myriad business problems of a small to mid-sized non-profit organization before they can do their creative work." This state of affairs is exacerbated by another factor which Spellman cites, namely, that "minority arts organizations used to be able to solicit money from agencies that supported community projects in education, crime prevention, mental health, recreation, public housing...But such funds are scarce today." All of this is not to say that ethnic artists cannot flourish under the non-profit umbrella. But Spellman’s analysis does suggest that the stress on support for development of non-profit management skills found in many SAAs’ special
programs may be a matter of over-emphasis, to the neglect of development of other organizational forms.

Ultimately, however, assessment of the special programs policy mechanism rests on examination of key value questions. First, however, it remains to interpret the third and final policy mechanism which addresses issues in multiculturalism and the arts -- distributive pluralism.

Distributive Pluralism. This policy mechanism is regulatory in nature. In some ways it resembles features of both the open-access-to-funding and special programs policy mechanisms. For example, as was seen earlier, SAAs utilize a number of regulations within the open-access-to-funding policy mechanism, such as required assurances of compliance with non-discrimination laws and statutes, or reports and audits to measure grantees' progress in implementing affirmative action policies. In some cases, failure to abide by these regulations can threaten organizations' continued eligibility for grant funds. Also, the distributive pluralism policy mechanism resembles some SAAs' special programs in its stress on special provisions designed to benefit ethnic cultural communities.

Despite these similarities, distributive pluralism is identifiably unique as a policy mechanism. Through the strength and broad application of specific regulations, distributive pluralism seeks not merely to affect who is eligible for funds or the manner of access to such funds but to ensure or virtually ensure that funds will be distributed to ethnic arts organizations and their communities in a proportional manner. The three examples of the distributive pluralism policy
mechanism to be discussed here, while they differ considerably in details, each shares these features.

The Colorado Council on the Arts and Humanities (CCAH) has instituted what it calls a new operational philosophy -- Creative Communities. CCAH considers Creative Communities a major focus of the agency and an integral part of all its programs and grant categories. It is consistent with the agency's recognition that barriers inhibit participation in the arts for many citizens. As such, an aim of the CCAH is to make "the arts accessible to physically, emotionally, and mentally disabled, older adults, culturally and economically deprived people, as well as Afro-American, Asian-American, Latino, Native American and other ethnic populations." A further aim of the agency is that "special consideration will be given to grant applications representing minorities, special constituencies and emerging organizations." It is through Creative Communities that the CCAH expresses its special consideration.

Creative Communities seeks to foster and support innovative aspects of cultural activities in small, rural, suburban, urban neighborhood, and resort communities. A vital element in promoting innovation and creativity toward cultural development and collaboration among these communities is, according to the CCAH, "sensitivity to local heritage, history and diverse cultures (ethnic, challenged individuals, racial, age, occupational, socio-economic, geographic)." Among the eight objectives of Creative Communities are the following three:

- to foster awareness and respect for diverse cultures;
- to increase accessibility to the arts among all segments of the population;
- to explore the power of the arts in addressing contemporary social issues.

These goals and objectives, admittedly, are no different from many found in the review of open-access-to-funding and special programs policy mechanisms. But what distinguishes Creative Communities as an instance of distributive pluralism is the CCAH's stipulation and weighting of evaluative criteria and their utilization with all individuals and organizations seeking CCAH funds. Specifically, project grant applications, for example, are reviewed according to three categories of criteria: 1) organization; 2) project; and 3) consistency with agency goals and objectives, in particular, with Creative Communities. One element of both the "organization" and "project" criteria is "recognition of the integrity of artistic expressions of all cultures." The "consistency with the goals of Creative Communities" criterion means that all applicants must seek to foster awareness of and respect for diverse cultures. In assessing fulfillment of these criteria, panelists review, among other kinds of information, applicants' responses to questions regarding their alliances/partnerships with key community organizations and Community Information Reports, which contain applicants' responses to numerous questions about the racial/ethnic and economic characteristics of their communities. Thus, the information requirements of applicants are closely correlated with CCAH evaluative criteria. The most important feature of CCAH's evaluation system is the weighting of the three categories of criteria outlined above -- they are weighted equally.

This considerable emphasis on all applicants' serving goals of Creative Communities would seem to have significant consequences for ethnic communities.
A definitive assessment of these consequences is not yet possible, since Creative Communities was instituted quite recently, in 1990. But given the weight of those evaluative criteria which reward support for the arts of diverse cultures and creative collaborations with ethnic communities, it seems reasonable to expect that a significant distribution of funds to ethnic communities will be virtually assured.

Clearly, Creative Communities, as an example of the distributive pluralism policy mechanism, can be analyzed from various points of view, including the perspective that whatever the strength and weight of certain evaluative criteria, a specific distribution of funds to representatives of ethnic communities is not mandated by law, and hence not absolutely assured. But development of this point, as well as other possible critiques of Creative Communities, awaits a review of two additional, and somewhat different, examples of distributive pluralism.

The core of the Kentucky Arts Council's policy efforts to address multicultural issues is its Civil Rights policy, a regulatory policy that applies to all potential KAC grantees. The KAC's civil rights policy is rooted in its belief that, as a recipient of assistance from state and federal agencies that have civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination in programs that receive such assistance, it "must certify that it does not discriminate in the delivery of programs and services and that its own grantees do not discriminate nor subgrant to organizations that discriminate." The policy is designed to ensure that all citizens should be able to benefit from the arts without regard to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, age, sex, or disability.
This feature of the KAC's civil rights policy is virtually identical with the terms of grants found in examples of the open-access-to-funding mechanism. Yet the KAC's civil rights policy is much more than a regulatory non-discrimination policy. While not defined as such by the KAC, it is also an example of distributive pluralism. Several elements of the civil rights policy confirm this interpretation, starting with the agency's goals. Of special note, the KAC seeks to "recognize and encourage the rich cultural diversity of our people by providing for the equitable distribution of the Commonwealth's cultural resources to individuals and groups representative of that diversity." Further, the KAC aims "to insure that all citizens benefit fully and equally from the arts without regard to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, age, sex, or disability." These goals are clearly distinguishable from a goal commonly found in other policy mechanisms, namely, to ensure access to the arts regardless of race, color, national origin, etc. Specifically, the KAC's goals, by embodying ideas such as "equitable distribution" and "equal benefit" move beyond the provision of equal opportunity to the provision of equal results for all citizens.

The KAC utilizes two primary means of attempting to achieve these goals. First, it gives special consideration to projects that address the concerns of individuals from racial/ethnic groups, including those of Native American, African, Latin, and Asian descent, as well as the concerns of older adults, women, and persons with disabilities. Secondly, the KAC stipulates that all its grantees must represent the diversity of these groups, as found in their communities, programs, staffs, boards, and audiences. The KAC withholds grants funds from grantees that
are not in compliance with these stipulations. The civil rights policy also applies to potential KAC grantees.

In order for both panels and the KAC’s Civil Rights committee to gauge their civil rights compliance, each organization applying for KAC funds is required to: 1) provide race/ethnicity information on its community, governing board, advisory groups, paid staff, volunteers, artists/consultants, and audiences; and 2) provide detailed responses on their plans to address multicultural issues, in particular, how they plan to develop a culturally diverse audience, to include diverse and underserved artists in their programs, and to include representatives of diverse populations on their boards, committees, and advisory groups. The KAC’s list of seven evaluative criteria for funding decisions include “inclusion of and outreach to, underserved populations” and “participation of a broad segment of the community being served.”137 Thus, the information KAC applicants are required to provide is correlated with both civil rights compliance and evaluative criteria.

By giving special consideration to projects that address concerns of ethnic cultural communities and by requiring all grant applicants to comply with civil rights statutes, it is virtually assured that the Kentucky Arts Council will distribute a significant portion of its funds to ethnic arts organization or other organizations who direct programs and services to ethnic cultural communities. Still, a specific distribution of grant funds is not mandated.

The program of the Michigan Council for the Arts shares many features with the Kentucky Arts Council’s civil rights policy. For example, the MCA stipulates
that all of the state's citizens "shall be provided full and equal enjoyment of the benefits provided by Council programs and services without discrimination based upon race, color, creed, national origin, age, gender, handicap, or cultural orientation." Thus, as with the KAC, the MCA is committed not only to equal opportunity, but to equal results for its beneficiaries. Further, as a prerequisite for funding, MCA grant applicants are required to submit an "Affirmation of Equal Opportunity" and a "Minority-Female-Handicapper Status Report" to the Council. Finally, the MCA states that it "has sought to maintain and increase the involvement of minorities in all programatic and service areas."

Despite these similarities with the other examples of distributive pluralism, the Michigan Council for the Arts has unique provisions for assuring "equal results." Specifically, the state of Michigan includes language within the MCA's appropriations statute which requires allocation of a minimum of 16% of MCA funds to minority artists and organizations, in particular, to African-American, Asian, Hispanic, and Native American artists and organizations. Thus, the MCA's distributive pluralism policy mechanism constitutes an affirmative action policy designed to ensure a specific distribution of its funds to individuals and organizations rooted in ethnic cultural communities.

The need for this orientation is justified, in part, in terms of compensatory justice, a concept by which groups are seen as deserving of redress for past injustices inflicted. According to the MCA, ethnic minorities "have been systematically excluded from participation in economic, educational and employment opportunities for hundreds of years, both by law and by private custom. As a result
of this history of exclusion, institutions almost automatically confer advantages on whites...and impose disadvantages on racial and ethnic minorities.”\textsuperscript{140} The MCA concludes that the affirmative remedial use of race consciousness in the distribution of its funds “is a temporary means of overcoming this institutional pattern of discrimination.”\textsuperscript{141}

As might be expected, the distributive pluralism policy mechanism, in the various forms discussed here, can be analyzed and critiqued from various points of view. For example, the institution of distributive pluralism has been met, in the case of the Colorado Council on the Arts and Humanities, with a backlash of criticism. A past grant recipient of the CCAH suggests that Creative Communities, as discussed above, is not an example of a policy to support the arts but a policy to effect social engineering through the arts without regard for aesthetic quality or the personal vision of the individual. He states that "either we are funding artists and finding criteria to evaluate artistic quality, or we're funding organizations that reflect and serve the community... Affirmative action is not art."\textsuperscript{142} It is also predicted that applicants “will try to find projects that fit into the guidelines and goals, rather than maintaining high artistic standards... It's very veiled, it's very insidious, but it's censorship nonetheless."\textsuperscript{143} The extent of the backlash against Creative Communities, and other forms of distributive pluralism, is not clear. Documentation of any kind of backlash, at least by public arts agencies, is relatively rare. But even if the backlash against distributive pluralism were widespread and deep, that would be significant only in a political sense -- it would hardly settle the
issue. A resolution would require critical analysis of the value assumptions underlying the concept of distributive pluralism, and those of counter-claims.

This perhaps obvious point can be applied to other latent or actual value conflicts surrounding each of the different policy mechanisms. Thus, the task of reviewing and clarifying key value issues is the subject of the next section.

**Policy Mechanisms and Values Issues**

To this point this chapter has focused on state arts agencies' choices of means by which grants funds are made available and allocated to potential grantees, with obvious emphasis on artists and organizations rooted in ethnic cultural traditions. In doing so, it has further concentrated on the actions of state arts agencies, not merely their intentions, in organizing their funding activities as policy mechanisms -- open access to funding, special programs, and distributive pluralism. Much was made in the early stages of the chapter about the problematic nature of existing sources of data on arts policy and multiculturalism leading to the conclusion that even minimal conditions necessary for the evaluation of the effectiveness of SAA policy mechanisms related to multiculturalism were not present, at least to conduct an evaluation in terms of the tangible results of diverse policy mechanisms.

Despite such constraints, some possible assessments of these policy mechanisms emerged during this interpretive phase. Several problems with the open-access-to-funding policy mechanism were identified. All grant categories have eligibility requirements. It was found, in many cases, that multicultural programs, especially those sponsored by non-arts organizations, have limited access to certain
kinds of funds, such as general operating support and challenge grants, and have no access at all to major institution support, technical assistance support, or salary assistance. This interpretive phase also revealed a difficulty with the weighting of evaluative criteria, namely, that evaluative criteria that stress potential involvement of and service to multicultural communities can easily get lost in the evaluation of grant applications. In addition, the lesser presence of members of ethnic cultural communities on SAA boards, relative to their presence on grant advisory panels would seem to mean that while African-Americans, Asians, Hispanics, and Native Americans may be able to exert considerable influence on many SAAs’ grant-making decisions, their formal power to make all final grants decisions and oversee policy development is considerably less. Finally, given the incomplete information requested of grant applicants by many SAAs and the unclear ways such information is made available to grants decision-makers, it is not at all clear that evaluative criteria such as “involvement of ethnic minorities” can be applied in an informed and specific manner.

A number of problematic issues also emerged in interpreting the special programs and distributive pluralism policy mechanisms. For example, a common argument against special programs in other social spheres, an argument that could be extended to special programs in public arts agencies, is that they tend to segregate and marginalize their intended beneficiaries away from mainstream institutions and practices of society. On the other hand, it was noted that the focus of many SAAs’ special programs on developing multicultural organizations’ administrative acumen as effective, efficient non-profit organizations has been
critiqued. The substance of this critique is that for a number of reasons the traditional model of the non-profit organization, with its heavy reliance on board members' leverage with the private philanthropic community, has failed small, artist-led ethnic arts organizations. Finally, critiques emerging from interpretation of the distributive pluralism policy mechanism included the perceived devaluation of aesthetic quality as a funding criterion relative to the promotion of affirmative action and the conclusion that as a consequence of the strength of certain evaluative criteria, grant applicants are subject to a veiled yet insidious form of censorship.

As interesting as these preliminary critiques of the different policy mechanisms may be, a consistent point made during this interpretive phase, a point fundamental to the methodology of this study, is that policy mechanisms are rooted in alternative and potentially conflicting value positions, the resolution of which is only possible through analysis of the value assumptions underlying these positions. Four basic areas of value conflict, I believe, have emerged from this interpretation of the policy mechanisms of state arts agencies -- perspectives on the ideal of cultural pluralism, conceptions of the relations between art and culture, arguments for the place of affirmative action in arts policy, and multiple meanings of the value of the arts.

The basic policy mechanisms of state arts agencies, and specific examples of those policy mechanisms, approach a fundamental issue in several different ways: some encourage work by multicultural arts organizations to serve, virtually exclusively, their immediate cultural communities, others promote work by
multicultural organizations to interact with audiences and institutions throughout society, while still others aim to facilitate the production and dissemination of cross-cultural art work in all arts organizations. These policy positions, in turn, are rooted in different historical conceptions of "cultural pluralism.” These views constitute ideals of how the political, social, and economic relations of cultural and ethnic groups ought to be in society, views which yield normative definitions of multiculturalism. Thus, a critical analysis of concepts of cultural pluralism is a necessary step toward resolving questions about the predominant approaches used by SAAs to support multicultural organizations.

A key assumption of many SAAs’ goals statements is that art is rooted in or "reflects" a culture. Yet some critiques of the concept of cultural pluralism question this assumption, and further question whether production and consumption of the arts of diverse ethnic groups can and does foster multiculturalism in the society at large. Therefore, assessment of these claims and counter-claims is essential to evaluating the merits of diverse policy mechanisms.

Concepts of justice suffuse numerous elements of the open-access-to-funding policy mechanism and provide the justifying rationale for the adoption of the special programs and distributive pluralism policy mechanisms. Specific concepts of equal opportunity, human rights, compensatory justice, distributive justice (which includes ideas of representation, participation, and equal results, among others), and social utility, when applied to public arts agencies, appear as various forms of affirmative action programs designed to benefit those of Native American, Asian, African-American, and Hispanic descent. The diverse conceptual foundations of
different affirmative action programs is a potent source of value conflict within arts policy, a state of affairs requiring considerable analysis.

A final conceptual issue which emerged from interpretation of the policy mechanisms of state arts agencies, especially the open-access-to-funding policy mechanism, is that of artistic value. In terms of a value conflict, claims and counter-claims were found surrounding the notion that artistic value is relative to specific cultural traditions. Resolution of this conflict through conceptual analysis is a matter of addressing a major philosophical question: is value in art best thought of as one thing or as many? Yet once this question is raised, other questions then must be considered: does artistic value reside in art objects or in responding individuals? what claims can be made for the aesthetic, cognitive, moral, and religious value of art? in what ways does the value of art reside in its social and cultural functions?

Analysis of the value conflicts surrounding concepts of cultural pluralism, the relations of art to culture, justice and affirmative action, and artistic value, and the implications of these concepts for choice among arts policy mechanism options, forms the subject for Chapter V.

NOTES


2. For an historical overview, see Livingston C. Biddle, Our Government and the Arts: A Perspective From the Inside (New York: American Council for the Arts, 1988).


5. For a discussion of this and other models of relations between private and public sectors in the arts, see Paul J. DiMaggio, "Can Culture Survive the Marketplace?," *Journal of Arts Management and Law* 13 (Spring 1983): 61-87.


7. See, for example, the testimony of Alberta Arthurs (Rockefeller Foundation), Karen Brosius (Philip Morris Companies, Inc.), Cynthia Mayeda (Dayton-Hudson Foundation), and Timothy McClimon (AT&T Foundation) before The Independent Commission, July 23, 1990, Washington, DC.


10. Ibid., p. 408.

11. Ibid., p. 407.


13. The interest of the J. Paul Getty Trust in furthering the theory and practice of discipline-based art education is one example, albeit isolated, of a member of the private sector addressing broad concerns within a domain of the arts.


23. For expressions of this point of view, stated prior to the final 1990 NEA reauthorization legislation, see the testimony of Ruth Mayleas (Independent Committee on Arts Policy) and Stephen Stamas (The American Assembly) before the Independent Commission, Washington, DC, on July 30, 1990, and August 1, 1990, respectively.


30. For a more extensive discussion of these indicators, see National Assembly of State Arts Agencies, *Report of the NASAA Task Force on Cultural Pluralism*.


34. Edward Arian, in *The Unfulfilled Promise: Public Subsidy of the Arts in America* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) relies to a very large extent on public arts agencies' annual reports in analyzing the state of public arts policy in America. But his research demonstrates the hazards in such a reliance. First, he utilizes annual gross line item budget figures as reflected in discipline categories such as Music, Dance, Theatre, Museums, etc. He then assumes, without analysis of specific arts organizations or other supporting data, that the vast majority of these funds are granted to the "performance culture," which Arian defines as professional established arts organizations that program conservatively, with few exceptions, to passive spectators who have far higher affluence and educational levels than the majority of the population. But in lieu of the lack of any supporting data, Arian's assumption seems unwarranted, thereby skewing his analysis.


37. Ibid., p. 4.


47. Ibid., p. 3.

48. Ibid., p. 3.

49. Ibid., p. 3.


51. Ibid., p. 3.


59. Ibid., p. 203.

60. Ibid., p. 204.


75. See, for example, David Cwi, "Arts Councils as Public Agencies."


86. I am indebted to Dr. Jeffrey Love, Director of Research for the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies, Washington, D.C., for making this data available.

87. For an example of this argument, see Gerald T. Yoshitomi, "Cultural Democracy."


95. Ibid., p. 80.

96. Ibid., p. 16.

98. Ibid., p. 9.


100. Florida Arts Council, Final Report: Rural/Minority Arts Project (Tallahassee, FL: Florida Arts Council, 1990), p. 3.

101. Ibid., p. 7.


103. Michigan Council for the Arts, Summary Overview, p. 3.

104. Ibid., p. 3.

105. Ibid., p. 3.


108. Ibid., p. 17.


112. Ibid., p. 40.


115. Ibid., p. 95.
116. Ibid., p. 97.


120. Ibid., p. 105.

121. New Mexico Arts Division, 1991-92 Program Guidelines, p. 41.

122. Ibid., p. 41.


128. Ibid., p. 4.

129. Ibid., p. 4.


131. Ibid., p. 1.


133. Ibid., p. 20.


141. Ibid., p. 1.


143. Ibid., p. 4.
Chapter V

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES, MULTICULTURALISM, AND ARTS POLICY MECHANISMS

In Chapter III, a descriptive definition of "multiculturalism" was offered -- multiculturalism is the coexistence of groups of racial minorities within a common socio-political system, groups that, while continually undergoing change, are seen and see themselves as having relatively unique shared and transmitted values, dispositions, behaviors, and outlooks on the world as well as a shared economic future and that draw on the loyalty of group members to harness discontent in the face of racial discrimination and powerlessness as a basis for social and political action. At the time I stressed that this or any other descriptive or stipulative definition of multiculturalism does not foreclose subsequent examination of value-laden, programmatic definitions of the term. Such an examination is clearly necessitated given the value assumptions about multiculturalism which public arts agencies bring to elements of their policy mechanisms. This analysis, in turn, recognizes that normative uses of the term "multiculturalism" draw on historical conceptions of the term "cultural pluralism," i.e., views of how the coexistence of ethnic groups and their cultural, economic, political, and social relations should ideally be in American society.
With the rise of interest in multiculturalism in the arts world and other sectors of society, as outlined above, one might assume that this movement has been informed by clear concepts of cultural pluralism and the relations of ethnic groups. But, as will be seen, there are many different interpretations of the term cultural pluralism, a pluralism of pluralisms according to one commentator. Indeed, there is even a pluralism of ways of characterizing this pluralism of pluralisms.

Perspectives on the Ideal of Cultural Pluralism

The diversity of concepts of cultural pluralism can be traced, in part, to the fact that cultural pluralism is a relatively recent ideal, at least in Western intellectual history. As Stephen Thernstrom has argued, the ideal of cultural pluralism has no great historic defenders. Political philosophers who have defended the idea of democracy against concepts of authoritarian government, such as Plato's vision of the state as ruled by philosopher-kings and guardians, start with the premise that cultural unity is a necessary antidote to authoritarianism and a pre-condition to free, participatory democracy. Thomas F. Green notes, for example, that French thinkers have long been wary of factions which could restore feudal-like privileges, while British political theory has traditionally stressed the value of individual liberty over group associations. Also, as was shown in Chapter III, the influential English cultural critic Matthew Arnold held that a broad, humanistic culture disseminated by a benevolent state and held in common across social classes was essential to curb sectarian interests and safeguard democracy.
Ideas that stand in contrast to the ideal of cultural pluralism are by no means limited in origin to 18th and 19th-century Europe. Ideologies of assimilation and amalgamation, for example, are rooted in 20th-century American social science and political philosophy. They each combine empirical and value premises.

Assimilation, on the one hand, is an empirical, predictive theory of ethnic group conformity to the dominant majority culture. Specifically, "it holds that through time, ethnic minority groups become more and more like the dominant majority until finally all are part of one common culture patterned after the dominant group." Since the dominant majority culture is viewed as derived from the Anglo-Saxon Protestant tradition, the theory of assimilation is often described as a theory of Anglo conformity. Assimilation of minority ethnic groups can occur on two different levels -- cultural assimilation (acculturation) and structural assimilation. Acculturation refers to the absorption of distinctive ethnic group cultural behavior into the patterns of the dominant culture; structural assimilation is a matter of the incorporation of minority group members as participants in the socio-economic organizations, institutional activities, and civic life of the dominant culture. While these two levels are closely related in many ways, acculturation of ethnic groups may occur without structural assimilation and vice versa. As Appleton argues, "a minority group may adopt the values and life style of the dominant culture but may choose not to, or not be allowed to, participate in the institutions and group associations of the mainstream society."

In the case of some ethnic groups, the theory of assimilation seems to accurately capture their experience in America. William Newman points out that
as "ethnic groups were able to obtain a higher social class position, their members often moved out of the old ethnic neighborhoods, changed or Anglicized their names, and generally established new patterns of social relationships breaking the old European pattern of extended families." But with racial minority groups, assimilationist theory is undercut by continuing evidence of the impact of prejudice and discrimination, which effectively limits their structural assimilation into and participation in mainstream, socio-economic institutions. Further, the apparent rise of many individuals' interest in reviving their ethnic group identity, as outlined in a previous chapter, obviously leaves the predictive power of the theory of assimilation in doubt.

The concept of assimilation as a societal ideal of ethnic group relations is only partially dependent on the veracity of empirical premises in the theory of assimilation. It rests, instead, on value premises. Specifically, the assimilationist position holds that all groups should share or conform to the values, dispositions, and outlooks of the dominant, Anglo-Saxon culture. This vision of ethnic group relations can, in turn, be based on three different sets of assumptions. First, it is sometimes held that since descendants of Anglo-Saxon culture form a majority of the American population and because many of the country's political, legal, and economic institutions are derived from Anglo-Saxon models, therefore, Anglo-Saxon values should be supported and transmitted through public institutions as the basis of a society-wide common culture. A second set of assumptions is rooted in the notion that the Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition is in some ways superior to the cultures of ethnic minorities. This notion is augmented, in a final position, by racist
assumptions of racial superiority which seek to justify discriminatory practices of the dominant, Anglo-Saxon culture against ethnic minority groups, demands that ethnic minority groups conform to dominant ways, or even exclusionary policies against "undesirable," "inferior" groups.

Another alternative to cultural pluralism, the amalgamation or "melting pot" theory, also contains empirical and value premises. As a theory, it "predicts the development of a unique new cultural group resulting from the amalgamation of synthesis of previously existing groups." Amalgamation does not refer to the "melting away" of ethnic group characteristics into Anglo conformity but, rather, the formation of a hybrid, common American culture through the combination of different ethnic group features. The resulting culture, drawing on Western European, Eastern European, Asian, Hispanic, African, and Native American traditions, is to be different from that of any one of these traditions.

While some manifestations of amalgamation can and do occur in culturally diverse societies like the United States, these are usually limited to areas of consumption such as food, dress, or holiday celebrations and rarely entail fundamental cultural values, outlooks, and dispositions. Several factors undercut the predictive power of amalgamation theory. Most notably, a dominant group must both share its socio-economic power with minority groups and willingly give up features of its cultural traditions if an amalgamation with minority groups is to take place. Evidence of such concessions by dominant groups is relatively rare in the American experience. Further, in societies where amalgamation has taken place, "it has usually been limited to a small number of groups and has involved long
periods of time and geographical isolation, conditions not found in pluralistic societies like the United States.⁹

But, as with the assimilationist point of view, the concept of amalgamation as a societal ideal is only partially dependent on the empirical premises of "melting pot" theory. This ideal was formulated in the early twentieth century as a minority response to the cultural uprootedness of new immigrants in America and represented an effort to infuse this uprootedness with positive meanings. Its core value premise is that all ethnic groups should eventually merge and synthesize into a new, American culture, a culture that will provide new sources of identity and meaning for recent and later generation immigrants severed from their past. But the ideology of amalgamation envisions a special process of synthesis among ethnic groups. A key premise is the notion "that the new culture will represent only the "best" qualities and attributes of the different cultures that contribute to it."¹⁰ Thus, as with assimilation, the amalgamation ideology assumes that different cultures have identifiable and distinguishable qualities, some positive and others negative. But, unlike the assimilationist position, amalgamation holds that all groups can and do make their own positive, unique contributions to this new culture and, thereby, become "American" without pressure to conform to a dominant culture.

This brief review of concepts of assimilation and amalgamation was primarily intended, through use of contrast, to help to place the concept of cultural pluralism in sharper relief. But the task remains to spell out the many possible meanings of the term, the pluralism of pluralisms referred to above.
Any concept of cultural pluralism as a societal ideal entails two basic conditions: 1) the presence of a multiplicity of identifiable ethnic groups within a common political and economic system; and 2) that such diversity and its continuation is a desirable, valued state of affairs. These two premises, however, only go so far in clarifying the concept and its many versions. Three typologies of the pluralism of pluralisms will be examined here, typologies by Thomas F. Green, Milton Gordon, and Nicholas Appleton, in order to better understand the range of value assumptions that policymakers bring to their policy prescriptions.

Thomas F. Green offers a typology of concepts of cultural pluralism that addresses the range of possible relationships that can exist between ethnic groups within a society. This typology is rooted in a fundamental distinction between primary and secondary relationships. Primary relationships are informal and intimate in nature, occur in social and family settings, and tend to involve individuals' full personalities. Secondary relationships are more formal, involve transactions in commercial, governance, or bureaucratic settings, are oriented to the accomplishment of tasks, and do not involve individuals' full personalities. Green then constructs three types of social organization, based on this distinction, which can occur among and between diverse ethnic groups -- insular pluralism, halfway pluralism, and structural assimilation.

In insular pluralism, both the primary and secondary relationships of ethnic group members are confined to other members of the same group, with little or no interaction with individuals in other ethnic groups. As with insular pluralism, halfway pluralism entails primary relationships confined within different ethnic
groups. On the other hand, in halfway pluralism, many ethnic group members regularly venture beyond their own group to pursue objectives in educational, commercial, economic, bureaucratic, and political settings. Finally, in the case of structural assimilation, members of specific ethnic groups routinely establish and maintain both primary and secondary relationships with members of other ethnic groups. Under this vision of social organization, persons interact on the basis of common interests and concerns with limited attention to the ethnicity or cultural background of individuals.

Green's typology, in effect, is a continuum of possible models of ethnic group relations within a society, models which can inform specific concepts of the ideal of cultural pluralism. But these models by no means cover the range of issues associated with the concept of cultural pluralism. For example, it can reasonably be argued that, historically, the dominant culture in America has been far from receptive in accepting cultural diversity, let alone ideal views of cultural pluralism, and that ethnic minority groups have been expected to undergo, in the face of discrimination, cultural assimilation with few rewards in terms of participation in political, social, and economic power.

This point suggests that if any form of the cultural pluralism ideal is to take hold in American society, government must play an active role. Milton Gordon offers a typology which distinguishes two positions of the state with regard to actions taken toward ethnic cultures: 1) liberal pluralism and 2) corporate pluralism. Liberal pluralism is characterized "by the absence, even prohibition, of any legal or governmental recognition of racial, religious, language, or national
origins groups as corporate entities with a standing in the legal or governmental process, and a prohibition of the use of ethnic criteria of any type for discriminatory purposes, or conversely, for special or favored treatment." Under liberal pluralism, members of ethnic groups benefit from government action only in relation to their eligibility as individuals, not as a function of their ethnic background. Cultural pluralism "would exist voluntarily as an unofficial societal reality," while equalitarian norms "would emphasize equality of opportunity and the evaluation of individuals on the basis of universalistic standards of performance." In contrast, corporate pluralism formally recognizes ethnic groups as legally constituted entities in society. Societal rewards, in both the public and private sectors, are allocated on the basis of some sort of formula, for example, based on relative numerical strengths in the population. "Equalitarian emphasis is on equality of condition rather than equality of opportunity, and universalistic criteria of rewards operate only in restricted spheres themselves determined in a particularistic manner."

The final pluralism of pluralisms typology, that of Nicholas Appleton, combines features of the first two typologies by stressing both possible interrelationships between ethnic groups as well as government options toward ethnic groups. Appleton identifies four meanings of the concept of cultural pluralism -- classical cultural pluralism, modified cultural pluralism, cultural pluralism as voluntary ethnic choice, and cultural pluralism as separation. Each is examined in turn.
The classical cultural pluralism position can be traced to the writings of Horace Kallen who, in the early to mid-20th century, rejected the primacy of assimilation and melting pot ideologies among government officials and intellectuals. In Kallen's view, cultural pluralism means that diverse ethnic groups should live in peaceful coexistence under the banner of American democracy while, at the same time, maintaining their unique ethnic identities. He envisioned America as a stable democracy of groups based on the preservation of ethnic inheritance -- a "federation" of nations. This vision of a stable future rooted in the past assumes that ethnicity is not voluntary but inherited, that ethnic identities will naturally endure over time, and, because all cultural traditions are of equal value, each ethnic group can make positive contributions to society. Finally, while the classical cultural pluralism position entails the view that maintenance and continuance of ethnic group identity is a "natural" process, it also entails the point that state action is necessary to cultural pluralism. In particular, as with the notion of corporate pluralism cited above, ethnic groups are to be seen as legally constituted entities entitled to economic and political rewards resting on their relative numerical strength within political processes.

Modified cultural pluralism, in contrast to classical cultural pluralism, envisions a substantial common culture shared by all of a society's members as well as considerable interaction between diverse ethnic groups. This interaction can occur in both informal, primary relationships and in formal secondary relationships. Thus, with modified cultural pluralism, it is expected that ethnic groups, through such interaction and adaptation to the experience of American society, will undergo
change. But, in many contexts, ethnic groups will still function as distinct groups. As Appleton states, embedded in the concept of modified cultural pluralism "is the belief that ethnicity, albeit in changed form, will continue to be important for individuals, and that attempts to eliminate it will prove ineffective." Finally, in modified cultural pluralism, the state's role toward ethnic groups lies between liberal pluralism and corporate pluralism, as cited above. On the one hand, citizen participation in politics is encouraged for individuals, while the "public interest" and the general welfare of society are generally seen as superseding the political claims of groups, including ethnic groups. Government, on the other hand, while not viewing ethnic groups as corporate, legal entities deserving of specified political and economic rewards, is at least obliged to recognize and be responsive to the claims and demands of ethnic groups and other societal groups.

Cultural pluralism as voluntary ethnic choice does not emphasize the preservation and maintenance of ethnic groups. Instead, it stresses "the opportunity for individuals to determine to what extent they wish to remain members of a group and partake of its cultural offerings or, alternatively, to venture out and participate in or adopt other cultural ways." Several assumptions underlie this concept of cultural pluralism. First, ethnicity is not viewed as inherited in a biological sense or as a stable set of values, outlooks, and dispositions that will necessarily endure over time. Rather, ethnicity is viewed as freely chosen based on broad familiarity with the beliefs, values, and outlooks characteristic of many cultural traditions. Accordingly, it is also held that social boundaries among diverse ethnic groups should be relaxed and fluid in nature, and that no individual should
be assigned an ethnic identity that he or she has not chosen. Clearly, the primary values held by advocates of the cultural pluralism as voluntary ethnic choice position are those of liberty and freedom. Ethnic cultural traditions are seen primarily as resources available to enhance the development and self-fulfillment of individuals. Indeed, the virtual dissolution of some ethnic groups as corporate, legal entities is not unwelcome under this view, so long as such change is not the result of one culture's domination over another or inhibiting of individuals' freedoms and range of cultural choices. Not surprisingly, then, this position does not envision an active role for the state in supporting ethnic groups as political or economic entities.\(^\text{18}\)

The final version of cultural pluralism in Appleton's typology, cultural pluralism as separation, is rooted in observations of imbalances in economic and political power between ethnic groups, especially minority groups, and the dominant culture. These inequalities, it is argued, are the result of years of ethnic groups' subjugation as colonized peoples and the contemporary salience of dominant culture racism which reinforces and legitimizes these inequalities. In response, proponents of this position contend that "minority groups must separate themselves from the dominant majority -- it not physically, at least socially and culturally -- to develop a strong sense of unity and autonomy and then return when they are able to negotiate from a position of strength."\(^\text{19}\) Without processes of developing a sense of peoplehood and group history, an economic base and mutual support systems, political mobilization, and political coalition-building, specific ethnic minority groups, advocates conclude, will not be able to neutralize the majority
culture's domination and exploitation. With these processes, individual ethnic minority groups, it is predicted, will be far more likely to exert control over their destiny. Finally, given this position's stress on the economic and political self-determination of ethnic groups, the role of government is envisioned as limited. Recourse to dependence on a benevolent state to mete out political opportunities and rewards is rejected as impossible in a racist society and ultimately self-defeating to the potential empowerment needed for effective competition in a democratic, capitalistic society.

Cultural pluralism as a societal ideal has spurred criticisms from a variety of perspectives. This is hardly surprising because this ideal, even in the many different forms cited above, is perceived as challenging to key interest groups in American society, especially among those who support the assimilation of ethnic groups. However, a different alternative to the ideal of cultural pluralism, the vision of an open society, is the source of many critiques of the concept of cultural pluralism.

The ideology of the open society envisions a social order where the individual person, regardless of his or her group association, is the center of the social order. "There is the belief that all individuals are capable of making a positive contribution to the well-being of society and that each person and the ideas of each person should be evaluated on the basis of individual merit and relevance to a particular situation." This stress on individual merit and individual rewards for accomplishments, it is argued, is an essential condition for professional development and achievement of excellence in many sectors as well as economic
competitiveness. A further claim is that this position, by seeking to reward individual achievement, also upholds the principle of justice that individuals should not be subjected to discrimination based on their ascribed, rather than earned, status. In an open society, ethnicity can still be an important factor in an individual's sense of ideality. But in political settings, membership in ethnic groups holds no weight. Instead, membership in groups is to be voluntary and based on the congealing of like interests and concerns. "When group goals are met or when individuals determine that the group no longer serves their best interests, they are free to dissociate themselves."\textsuperscript{21} In the political environment of an open society, ethnic group affiliations are seen as unsophisticated, reactionary, and inhibitory to the fair, effective functioning of a modern state.\textsuperscript{22}

Criticisms of the ideal of cultural pluralism, whether from the perspective of advocates of the "open society" or other perspectives, tend to focus on two broad issues -- 1) concepts of individual development and opportunity; and 2) concepts of the relationships between groups and the state and society's social structure. As will be seen, these criticisms almost exclusively focus on three versions of the concept of cultural pluralism -- insular pluralism, classical cultural pluralism, and cultural pluralism as separatism. The other versions of the cultural pluralism ideal cited above are rarely considered in these critiques.

Many critiques of cultural pluralism are based on the premise that the preservation and maintenance of ethnic groups can be and is restrictive to individuals' sense of identity and their opportunities for self-determination. For example, Francis Hsu, a psychological anthropologist, contends that in order to
maintain a strong sense of group cohesion, many ethnic groups demand conformity to values and outlooks from their own members and discriminate against and ostracize those who do not conform to these viewpoints. The philosopher Thomas F. Green argues that restrictions on individual self-determination are a result of the processes that ethnic groups utilize to transit values, outlooks, and dispositions across generations. He contends that such cultural transmission is most thorough and effective when groups are most insulated from intergroup associations. Green thus argues that maintenance of individual ethnic groups is assured only at the expense of individuals’ opportunities for interactions with individuals in different ethnic groups. He concludes that restrictions on individuals’ freedoms are an inevitable consequence of processes to solidify ethnic groups’ identities and social standing. Orlando Patterson, taking an historical point of view, contends that in modern societies which have a high degree of cultural diversity, ethnic groups tend toward becoming interest groups in order to enhance their competitiveness in seeking societal rewards and power. He argues, in turn, that ethnic groups’ effectiveness as interest groups is dependent on the level of group cohesiveness they are able to maintain. Patterson therefore concludes that a primary effect of the retention of ethnic group cohesiveness is constriction of individuals’ autonomy and freedom.

Other critics focus not only on the possible effects of cultural pluralism on individuals as political or economic actors but on the psycho-social effects of group cohesion. The philosopher John Wilson, taking a humanistic perspective, is skeptical of claims that individuals’ identities tend to reside in cultural traditions.
He calls for empirical inquiry to investigate the question. In lieu of such inquiry, however, Wilson poses the question of whether a person's identity must or ought to reside in her or his culture. His response is that features in a culture "may not be, in themselves, good enough to rely on. They may not be worthy." By this he means that some cultural practices may be unarguably wrong or unjust, may be trivial in comparison to the accomplishments of other cultures, or may be anti-rational and anti-democratic, in that some cultures prevent rational discussion of significant issues and problems. Nor is Wilson persuaded by a person who claims that a specific culture is "mine" and therefore above criticism, arguing that such a claim in no way shows that certain cultural practices are true, worthwhile, or valuable. In conclusion, Wilson envisions individuals not seeking their personal identities within a transmitted, stable culture but in a culture-free, personal search for truth and beauty.

Wilson's point about the pursuit of truth dovetails with a critique of cultural pluralism by educational historian Diane Ravitch. Ravitch, arguing from the "open society" perspective, contends that the insular pluralism she says is embedded in many contemporary versions of multiculturalism aims to raise the pride and self-esteem of ethnic group members and the expense of the truth. Specifically, she argues that advocates of cultural pluralism too often call for the transmission of an ethnic group's history that is only a record of heroes and accomplishments, without due regard to influences exerted by other cultures on the group or consideration of debatable actions and practices in the group's history. Ravitch concludes that
an individual's ethnic identity rooted in historical falsehoods or exaggerations is more a matter of self-deception than individual growth and development.27

A final issue regarding the potential psycho-social effects of cultural pluralism and ethnic group cohesion on individuals is raised by educational theorist Charles Tesconi. Tesconi contends that cultural pluralism rests on numerous untested assumptions. Among these is the assumption that attachment to a group, including an ethnic group, promotes an individual's sense of self and well-being. This assumption, Tesconi argues, is at best untested. But he concludes that even if it could be demonstrated that attachment to an ethnic group is conducive to an individual's development, it does not follow that such an individual would be able to feel respect and consideration for individual members of different ethnic groups. In other words, Tesconi contends that ethnic group cohesion does not necessarily lead to intergroup understanding and may therefore lead to conflict among individuals of diverse ethnic groups.28

This review of criticisms of the ideal of cultural pluralism now shifts to those which focus on relationships between ethnic groups, the state, and society's social structure. Some of these criticisms were foreshadowed in the discussion of the "open society" alternative to cultural pluralism. Glazer and Moynihan, for example, focus on the possible effects of state action on behalf of ethnic groups, i.e., corporate pluralism. They argue that such action, which they label "affirmative discrimination," would lead to reverse discrimination toward qualified individuals in both public and private sectors leading, in turn, to lowered performance standards in society as a whole and a backlash effect from those who perceive that
corporate pluralism discriminates against them. A final consequence of corporate pluralism envisioned by Glazer and Moynihan is the "Balkanization" of ethnic groups, i.e., a strengthening of group boundaries and the intensification of feelings of group loyalties, inevitably leading to intergroup conflicts over resources and rewards.29

R. Freeman Butts, an educational philosopher, contends that cultural pluralism reinforces the tendency in the modern state toward single-issue, interest-group politics. He argues that no single interest group or coalition of interest groups is or can be strong enough to set policy priorities to serve the overall public interest. Further, Butts claims that a contradiction embedded in the ideal of cultural pluralism, namely, that the societal conditions necessary to the development of cultural pluralism -- freedom, equality, and justice -- are not necessarily shared by those who promote the ideal of cultural pluralism. As an alternative to cultural pluralism, Butts recommends the promotion, through public institutions, of the knowledge and skills of participation needed for strengthening the values of freedom, equality, and justice characteristic of an open society.30

Tesconi further contends that increased ethnic group cohesion, found in the ideal of cultural pluralism, and the associated feelings of group loyalties, can threaten ethnic groups members' loyalties to the nation in which they are citizens.31

Finally, two theorists contend that cultural pluralism, whatever its psychosocial consequences for individual members of ethnic groups, restricts the social mobility of ethnic minority groups and reinforces an inequitable status quo in society. Patterson, for example, argues that the continued existence and
maintenance of ethnic groups is dependent upon often paternalistic gestures from
the state which treats ethnic groups as corporate entities. This treatment, he
contends, can limit, intentionally or not, opportunities for the social mobility of
individual ethnic group members by reinforcing stereotypes, i.e., the idea that all
members of an ethnic group think and act alike and share the same aspirations. 32

Stephen Steinberg argues that any assessment of cultural pluralism as a
societal ideal must be tempered with consideration of historical experience and the
American social structure. Taking a neo-Marxist perspective, Steinberg stresses
that ethnic pluralism has its origins in conquest, slavery, and the exploitation of
foreign labor and that it was the extreme segregation of racial minorities that
allowed for the evolution of distinctive ethnic cultures built upon vestiges of
traditional cultures. Given these historical roots, he contends that ethnic pluralism
in America has a weak structural basis, i.e., that continuation of distinct ethnic
cultures is achieved only at the cost of maintaining inequitable power relations in
society. Steinberg does not argue, as some have, that the values of some ethnic
groups are socially dysfunctional and that therefore retention of these values limits
ethnic group members' social and economic mobility. Instead, he concludes that
the effort required by minority ethnic groups to retain and transmit their cultural
values leaves them at the margins of social and economic power and diverts
attention away from the necessity of political mobilization to effect societal change
toward redress of fundamental inequities.33

The many criticisms of cultural pluralism cited above tend to be predictive
in nature, a necessary feature of such criticisms in that the cultural pluralism ideal
is just that, an ideal. As was seen, these criticisms focused on anticipated consequences of the realization of the cultural pluralism ideal on both individuals and society at large. Cultural pluralism, it was argued, can, for a number of reasons, restrict individuals' opportunities for autonomous self-determination and limit possibilities for intergroup understanding; the anticipated societal effects of cultural pluralism included increased intergroup conflict, undermining of basic democratic values, cultivation of competing loyalties for a nation's citizens, reinforcement of status quo inequitable relations, and diversion from the mobilization needed for ethnic minority groups to effect change in society's economic and power relations. But because these critiques are primarily predictions of possible consequences of the cultural pluralism ideal and because, after all, cultural pluralism is a yet-to-be-realized ideal, these critiques do not, by themselves, negate cultural pluralism as a guide to public policy prescriptions.

Deciding on the merit of cultural pluralism as a guide to public policy prescriptions is not merely a matter of calculating potential consequences on individuals and society at large. As stressed in earlier chapters, policy analysis, specifically, normative policy analysis, is a matter of clarifying the concepts in policy arguments and the value positions which underlie them. Here is where the critiques of the cultural pluralism ideal cited here are most vulnerable, in that they seem to assume particular meanings of the term "cultural pluralism," specifically, the meanings comprised by "insular pluralism" and "classical cultural pluralism," as discussed above.
That these critiques do not consider proposed meanings of "cultural pluralism" such as "modified cultural pluralism" or "cultural pluralism as voluntary ethnic choice" is a more significant point to make than any counterarguments that could be marshalled against specific criticisms of concepts of cultural pluralism dependent on the premise that ethnicity or group cohesion is necessarily restrictive to individuals or destructive to the broader public interest. As will be remembered, neither modified cultural pluralism nor cultural pluralism as voluntary ethnic choice holds that individual ethnic group members should be restricted, by design or in effect, in their exposure to and involvement with members of other ethnic groups. For its part, modified cultural pluralism envisions transmission of a substantial common culture rooted in commitment to basic democratic values of freedom, equality, and justice and, as well, considerable interaction between diverse ethnic group members in their primary and secondary relationships. Cultural pluralism as voluntary ethnic choice, far from advocating a restrictive sense of group cohesion, advocates a view of ethnic group traditions as broadly shared resources available for the development and self-fulfillment of all individuals in a society.

While exposing common misconceptions about the concept of cultural pluralism, this response to various critiques does not, by itself, constitute a full-fledged defense of or rationale for cultural pluralism as a societal ideal. Many open questions remain. Notably, a logical dilemma seems to be embedded in the concept of modified cultural pluralism. This position calls for both considerable interaction between members of diverse ethnic groups in their primary and secondary relationships, as well as the continued significance of ethnic group
identification. But it is not clear that these premises can be reconciled -- interaction between ethnic groups may, in some cases, lead to virtual dissolution of the ethnic group identification necessary for the continued salience and even existence of specific ethnic groups. This dilemma is not an issue for supporters of cultural pluralism as voluntary ethnic choice, who view ethnic group maintenance as secondary to individual development and self-fulfillment. With modified cultural pluralism, however, this dilemma remains unresolved.

But most of the key open questions surrounding the cultural pluralism ideal as a guide to public policy are not logical dilemmas, but fundamental value questions. Paramount among these is the potential role of the state in facilitating the continuation and growth of ethnic groups as corporate entities and the consequences of state action or inaction, a question on which supporters of various forms of cultural pluralism differ considerably. An associated question centers on the standards of merit that should apply to ethnic group members when the state or those acting on behalf of the state make decisions about the distribution of societal rewards and benefits. These questions, as they apply to the formulation of goals for public arts policy, are addressed in subsequent sections on affirmative action and artistic value.

First, however, a final criticism of the cultural pluralism ideal merits attention, a critique which places cultural pluralism in some historical perspective and questions the viability of the cultural pluralism ideal within the American social structure. Notably, Stephen Thernstrom contends that the rise of interest in multiculturalism and the associated concept of cultural pluralism is a class-based
phenomenon led primarily by ethnic group members of high social status who, in an effort to retain their groups' status as corporate entities meriting state support, deny the effects of past assimilationist policies and intergroup contact on ethnic group distinctiveness. Thernstrom argues that in the face of reduced ethnic group cohesion and distinctiveness, advocates of cultural pluralism do not base their claims for continued corporate entity status of ethnic groups on the retention and maintenance of cultural traditions which make behavioral demands on ethnic group members, but on the "symbolic" or "expressive" activities of ethnic group members.34 Similarly, Orlando Patterson interprets the rise of interest in multiculturalism and cultural pluralism as merely a function of the pursuit of economic claims against the state. He contends that without these economic interests, ethnicity would consist only of symbolic cultural activities based on idealized views of ethnic traditions or on the expression of group grievances.35

Whatever the merit of these arguments as commentaries on the current state of ethnicity in America, they do embody an assumption that bears significantly on multiculturalism and arts policy. This assumption is that symbolic cultural activities, not limited to but including artistic activities, are virtually autonomous in origin from those aspects of ethnic cultural traditions which make behavioral demands on ethnic group members. In other words, according to this view, artists can and do produce art works which draw on symbolic aspects of ethnic group traditions while not committing themselves to the retention of an ethnic group culture's behaviors, outlooks, and dispositions.
This assertion, in turn, raises a perennial question: what are the relationships between art and culture? The possible answers to this question have important implications for arts policy. One aspect of this question centers on the cultural origins of artistic production; another aspect of the question, one not addressed by critics of the cultural pluralism ideal, centers on the actual and potential impact of the development and transmission of artistic forms rooted in ethnic cultural traditions on the continuation and maintenance of ethnic group identities. These two aspects of the relationship between art and culture, the effects of culture on art and the effect of art on culture, form the substance of the next section.

**Relations Between Art and Culture**

Seeking an understanding of the multi-dimensional relationship between art and culture is complicated by the apparent fact that this question has either not been of paramount interest to social scientists or has been construed in limited or problematic ways. Sociologist Vera Zolberg, while not impugning anthropological inquiry or the work of individual anthropologists, makes the point that the traditional orientations of anthropology have limited applicability to modern, complex, culturally diverse societies such as American society. First, anthropologists, as discussed in an earlier chapter, tend to view culture as the whole way of life of a society, consisting of structures of thought which, in turn, structure ways of thinking and behavior, including symbol systems such as the arts. Zolberg contends that this holistic approach to understanding art as a part of culture is best and most often applied to smaller, relatively homogeneous societies.
Seeking such a holistic understanding of the art-culture relationship in a large, complex, heterogeneous society with its many cultural traditions and institutional arenas, she concludes, is a virtually impossible task.\textsuperscript{36}

Assessment of the limits of anthropological inquiry into relations between art and culture in a complex, culturally diverse society is not only the province of members of other social science disciplines like sociology. Anthropologist Alan P. Merriman contends that, historically, anthropologists have, for the most part, produced isolated, descriptive, micro-studies confined within the contexts of specific cultures. This orientation, Merriman argues, is not only problematic as applied to complex societies but also limits the possibility for studies on the similarities and differences in art/culture relations across cultures. Merriman concludes that without cross-cultural, comparative studies, studies which focus on artists' own concepts and evaluations of what they do and the contexts in which their work is produced and received, attempts to construct theoretical accounts of the relations between art and culture are premature.\textsuperscript{37}

For their part, sociologists with interests in the arts have tended to utilize data on the production, critical evaluation, distribution, and consumption of the arts as evidence in the construction of more general theories about social processes, institutions, and social structures. This "art as institution" orientation, as sociologist Milton Albrecht argues, has been premised on a strict separation of social factors from the cultural matrix of the arts, including the cultural meanings embedded in objects of art and the meanings and functions such objects have for individuals and groups.\textsuperscript{38} Given this orientation, sociology of art has not been fertile ground for
explanatory theories on relations between art and culture in culturally diverse societies.

Despite these assessments and self-assessments of social scientists' progress in understanding art/culture relations, the impression should not be left that the question has been of no interest to anthropologists, sociologists, or others. Indeed, various aspects of this question have received attention, as will be seen. But first, and perhaps more significantly, it is clear that assumptions about relations between art and culture are and can be operative in practical contexts including, as noted in the previous chapter, in arts policy contexts. A common such assumption, one expressed as a metaphor, is that art in some way "reflects" a culture. This assumption is prominent in language justifying public arts agencies' policies toward ethnic group cultures. While social scientists may not have progressed far on constructing theories of art/culture relations, many have critiqued the "art reflects culture" metaphor.

This metaphor has been critiqued from diverse perspectives. Culture theorist Raymond Williams and sociologist Vera Zolberg critique the "art reflects culture" metaphor as inadequate on theoretical and empirical grounds. Williams suggests that the "art reflects culture" metaphor can be found in both traditional Marxist and liberal models of explanation. In its simplest position, Marxism asserts that art reflects the socio-economic structure of the society in which it is produced, while traditional liberalism holds that artistic production reflects the conditions for individual expression in a society. These theories of art/culture relations, Williams concludes, reverse the process of constructing a theoretical framework rooted in
necessary empirical work by starting with the interpretive framework then searching for illustrations to support the framework, all without due consideration for the unique qualities of different societies, historical periods, or local conditions.\textsuperscript{39} Vera Zolberg, in a similar manner, contends that the assumption that art reflects culture is a virtual cliche providing little illumination of the complex relations between art and culture in diverse societies. She argues that coming to an understanding of art/culture relations "entails paying attention to micro and macro-levels of society; considering structure and agency; encompassing cultural values as well as material interests. Only then can production, dissemination, and reception of the arts be fruitfully observed over time and across societal boundaries."\textsuperscript{40}

Richard Wollheim's position on the "art reflects culture" metaphor in some ways mirrors those of Williams and Zolberg. He argues, for example, that no historian or social scientist has yet "produced any correlation between social conditions and art forms except on the most general, and therefore most trivial, level."\textsuperscript{41} This critique is directed to one kind of concept of the "art reflects culture" metaphor, one that makes claims that the relationship of culture of art is a matter of causation. But Wollheim notes that other theorists seem not to rely on a causation theory of art/culture relations but on a noncausal type of explanation, one holding that art is "expressive" of societal conditions. Wollheim acknowledges that in contradistinction to the causal explanations of art/culture relations, the noncausal conception "does not presuppose any general correlation between kinds of art and kinds of society."\textsuperscript{42} However, he does not absolve this position of the charge of bringing general presuppositions to the study of art, culture, and society.
Wollheim notes that the noncausal conception of the idea that art reflects culture presupposes "a general and consistent method of reading of social conditions from works of art so that every particular work tells us uniquely of one set of social conditions. Such a method most naturally takes the form of a general theory about the function of art in society, e.g., that art depicts society, or that it idealizes society, or that it is a compensation for society." Yet Wollheim’s critique of causal and noncausal conceptions of the "art reflects culture" metaphor is not limited to points about deficiencies in their explanatory value. Even if it could be shown that art in some sense is caused by or is expressive of a culture, this conclusion, in Wollheim’s view, would be less than satisfactory. This is so because any explanation of characteristics of art which relates them directly to social and cultural conditions necessarily leaves out other factors of potential explanatory value, including psychological factors.

Despite these critiques of the "art reflects culture" metaphor and critiques of social scientists’ orientations to understanding art/culture relations, there has been no shortage of theoretical explanations of various aspects of relations between art and culture. One subject of theoretical activity is of special significance to multiculturalism and the arts, namely, the degree to which the production of art by artists rooted in ethnic cultural traditions is conditioned by socio-economic relations in society. Theoretical accounts diverge significantly. For example, some neo-Marxists focus on the power of the modern state which, as they see it, serves to protect inequitable power relations and the status quo. As part of its program of ideological control and hegemony, the state-supported dominant culture defines
"good art" in terms of its own preferences and by positing ahistorical categories of artistic merit, while at the same time denying opportunities for dominated groups, especially ethnic minorities, to create and disseminate their own cultural products.44 Henry Giroux, while also a neo-Marxist, offers a divergent account of the socio-economic context of ethnic arts. He contends that the dominant culture’s systems of ideological control are far from cohesive in contemporary society. This relative lack of control opens up tensions within the dominant culture and generates, in Giroux’s terms, the possibilities for counter-hegemonic struggles. Among the possibilities he envisions are the production and dissemination of art rooted in ethnic cultures, ethnic cultures defined not in terms of traditional cultural values but redefined in relation to and in opposition to the dominant culture and power relations in society.45

The first two neo-Marxist accounts of contemporary socio-economic conditions portray them as either oppressive to ethnic arts or as fractured enough to permit artistic production that uses ethnic identification to challenge the dominant culture. Raymond Williams, also a neo-Marxist who construes socio-economic conditions as dominated by one culture over others, sees a range of possible responses by ethnic artists. On the one hand, Williams contends that ethnic arts may be sufficiently distanced from general socio-economic conditions and the concerns of the dominant culture that they can be produced and disseminated in virtual autonomy from dominant socio-economic interests. Williams, however, sees two additional responses in which ethnic groups engage the dominant culture, either implicitly or directly. Alternative cultural activity involves
"the provision of alternative facilities for the production and exhibition . . . of certain kinds of work, where it is believed that existing institutions exclude or tend to exclude these." Oppositional cultural activities "characteristically begin with attacks on prevailing art forms and cultural institutions, and often with further attacks on the general conditions which are believed to be sustaining them."

Other theoretical activity surrounding art/culture questions extends beyond the social-economic contexts of ethnic arts to the basic question of the relationship of art to culture. On this question, as well, there is no dearth of theoretical diversity. Arnold Hauser, a social historian of art, argues that ethnic culture is a virtually irrelevant factor in the development of elements of art. For ethnicity to exert an influence on the production of art, he argues, it would have to be a relatively static factor among other possible influences on artistic production. But Hauser contends that despite past evidence of ethnic group cohesion, contemporary ethnic groups, because of numerous socio-economic factors, are undergoing constant change and are thus rendered irrelevant as a factor in the production of art. Anthony Savile also holds that the influence of cultural factors on artistic production is negligible, arguing that there is no law-like connection between forms of cultural life and the content of art, i.e., the values espoused in art works. Savile makes this point because, in his view, any theory which views culture as determinative of the content of art necessarily assumes that individual artists have little or no freedom to create art that diverges from or challenges cultural influences, an assumption belied by the history of art.
These views of the relative lack of salience of ethnicity in shaping artistic production can be contrasted with views which arrive at opposite conclusions. For example, Edmund Barry Gaither contends that all art is, in fundamental ways, culture-specific. "Cultures generate aesthetic ideals according to their own history and beliefs. Cultures are validated by the authentic experience of a people as they understand it."50 But Gaither, unlike critics of theories which posit culture as a strong influence on artistic production, does not assume a law-like correspondence between art and culture. On the one hand, Gaither notes that "the creation of a particular work takes place within the context of technical and aesthetic traditions, whose canons govern the modes of presentation."51 But Gaither qualifies this point by stating that "this does not limit how an artist may change or expand the scope of these prior traditions; rather, prior traditions are a backdrop against which one can easily recognize new growth."52

David J. Elliott, while recognizing a strong relationship between art and culture, construes the relationship somewhat differently than other theorists. He begins with the premise that culture is more than something a group of people has; it is something they do, comprising shared beliefs, concepts, and intentional actions. The expressive dimension of a culture, including the arts, comprises the systems deployed to communicate concepts and beliefs. As rooted in these beliefs and concepts the arts are, Elliott argues that "to develop insight into the meaning and use of culture it is not sufficient to pick the fruits of a culture, one must also look to its roots and shoots."53 In other words, the arts are tangible results of action systems grounded in a culture's concepts and beliefs. "The roots of a culture lie in
the belief system that informs how . . . tangible aspects of culture [like the arts] are
generated, understood, evaluated, and categorized."^54

The previous paragraphs summarized a range of views on aspects of
relationships between art and culture. These views, for the most part, focused on
the influence of culture and socio-economic conditions on the production of art.
Clearly, though, theories which focus on the production of art only go so far in
addressing the original question of this chapter, namely, what role can art play in
the maintenance of group cohesion in a multicultural society? But before
examining this question, a few points on the production of art need to be made.

Whatever one's theoretical perspective, it must be conceded that many
artists in contemporary American society create work that is rooted in subject
matter inspired by the beliefs and concepts of ethnic cultural traditions. Such work
is created both by artists immersed in a specific cultural tradition and by artists
who self-consciously draw on the subject matter of ethnic cultural traditions in
creating contemporary work. Documentation of this activity is the province of
historians in various arts disciplines. But many of these historians make a
significant point about the production of ethnic arts in contemporary society. The
visual art historian Eugene Grigsby, for example, admits that in American society,
because of the effects of various forms of ethnic group interaction and subsequent
borrowing of cultural symbols, styles, and images, as well the effects of past
assimilationist policies, there are no "pure" traditions of ethnic art. As such, work
that is created represents in most cases an amalgam of cultural influences and
styles.^55 Ethnomusicologist Bruno Nettl makes a similar point, arguing that no
contemporary culture in America can fairly claim an artistic style completely as its own without acknowledging considerable influence from other cultural traditions. Finally, anthropologist Jacques Maquet argues that art works, whatever their cultural origins, embody dimensions that cut across cultures and dimensions that are culture-specific. Art works have aesthetic and symbolic dimensions which Maquet contends can be perceived directly by viewers regardless of their cultural background or identity. This universal quality to art works from diverse cultures, according to Maquet, is rooted in the fact that many symbols in art works spring from experiences common to all human beings and because many visual symbols in art works based in a particular culture have potential meaning and significance for persons outside the culture. Maquet concludes that even those aspects of art works that are specific to a culture, those referential features of art which shape its use and meanings within a culture, can be apprehended cognitively by outsiders.

The time has come to move beyond questions of the production of art in cultural contexts to other aspects of the relationship between art and culture. This is so because whatever the content, style, and origins of ethnic art in its production, to address the basic question of the actual and potential effects of art on ethnic group cohesion, it is necessary to seek an understanding of how ethnic art is utilized in a multicultural society. Seeking such an understanding is particularly important because, in complex, modern societies, relationships between artists and individuals and groups who may in some way utilize their art is not simple or direct. Indeed, an important line of inquiry among sociologists of art is "artists'
inability to control reception behavior of publics, either immediately at their creation, or later.\textsuperscript{58}

An initial aspect of the relationship between art, including ethnic art, and its publics is the matter of perception, i.e., how objects of art and their qualities and characteristics are perceived by individuals and groups. Of particular interest is the specific question of whether perception of art varies cross-culturally and, if so, how. This question has received some attention as it relates to the visual arts. For example, several empirical, cross-cultural studies conducted in past decades suggested that individuals from diverse cultural settings, when confronted with the same artistic phenomena, perceived artistic qualities in a similar fashion and even judged these qualities according to the same types of criteria.\textsuperscript{59} But these sorts of empirical studies of perception have been critiqued on the grounds that what is measured is not some universal, cross-cultural mode of artistic perception but the lingering effects of the broad dissemination and influence of Western art objects on the perceptions and preferences of persons in non-Western cultures.\textsuperscript{60}

More recent empirical studies also arrive at seemingly contradictory conclusions. A study by Adrienne Hoard yielded results which seem to support the hypothesis that the perceptual responses of African Americans demonstrate sensitivities to the visual attributes of images created by African artists which embody cultural or ethnic stylistic cues.\textsuperscript{61} A different study, one conducted by Neperud, Serlin, and Jenkins, examined the hypothesis that Blacks differ significantly from non-Blacks on the value and meaning perceived in the art of Blacks. The study, however, revealed no significant differences between Blacks and
non-Blacks in their perceptions of non-representational art works by Blacks. The authors conclude that ethnic identity alone is not a reliable predictor of perceptions and evaluations of ethnic art and that if certain perceptual and evaluative responses to ethnic art are to be attained and perpetuated, specific education and training are required.62

It would seem, after this brief review, that the results of empirical studies of cultural differences in the perception of art works are, at best, equivocal. But empirical studies such as those cited here utilize experimental or quasi-experimental methodologies. In other words, such studies are conducted in controlled situations. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that to understand the effects of art on ethnic groups in a multicultural society it is necessary to examine the nature of responses to art in non-controlled situations, i.e., in everyday life. Such an examination entails questions about the behavior of ethnic groups toward art, i.e., in the language of economics, the consumption of art. How best to measure consumption of the arts has been the subject of considerable debate among arts researchers. Some define consumption of the arts as time spent on attending arts events and institutions and participating in artistic activities, while others focus on money spent on such activities. A final option, one to be utilized here, centers on determining the rates of yearly participation in artistic activities by individuals and groups.63

While research into arts consumption patterns is usually a matter of empirical inquiry, some researchers have offered theoretical accounts of patterns of participation in the arts. The most notable of these is the theory of taste
cultures by Herbert Gans. Gans defines taste cultures not as organized societal or cultural groups but as "aggregates of people with usually but not always similar values making similar choices from the available offerings of culture." He identifies five primary taste publics and their cultures in contemporary American society -- high culture, upper-middle culture, lower-middle culture, low culture, and quasi-folk low culture. A review of these categories will not be attempted here. The point made by Gans that is most important for this discussion are his claims about factors shaping persons' choices among taste cultures. The determining factors he identifies include "class, age, religion, ethnic and racial background, regional origin, and place of residence, as well as personality factors which translate themselves into wants for specific types of cultural content." But Gans qualifies this view by stating that "because ethnic, religious, regional, and place differences are disappearing rapidly in American society, . . . the major source of differentiation between taste cultures and publics is socioeconomic level or class."

Gans' apparent deemphasis on race and ethnicity as a predictor of taste and consumption of the arts is also reflected in his view of the growth of Black culture in American society. He describes the content of contemporary Black culture and the arts as "directly or indirectly political, expressing, demanding, and justifying the legitimacy of a Black identity and a Black tradition in order to establish a cultural basis for racial equality." Yet despite the growing salience of Black culture, Gans refers to it as a partial culture in that for many aspects of everyday life, "Blacks share the taste cultures created by whites, and their aesthetic standards, leisure, and
consumption habits are little different from whites of similar socioeconomic level and age.\textsuperscript{68}

The account of participation in the arts provided by Gans, in that it is a theoretical construct, requires at least supplementation by more empirical types of research. A prominent example of such inquiry is a recent study by DiMaggio and Ostrower on participation in the arts by whites and African Americans. This study draws on data from a major National Endowment for the Arts study entitled \textit{Survey of Public Participation in the Arts}, published in 1982 and replicated in 1985.\textsuperscript{69} The surveys, with 13,675 responses yielded the most comprehensive and, arguably, most reliable national data base on arts participation in America to date.

Based on the SPPA data, DiMaggio and Ostrower document relatively small but persistent differences in the nature of arts participation by blacks and whites. For example, it was found that black attendance at live, traditional Euro-American performing-arts events in music, theatre, and dance as well as visual art exhibitions is lower than that of whites. It was also found, however, that the effects of race on these activities are far less than those of educational attainment and less than factors such as income, gender, or place of residence. In other words, blacks and whites of comparable educational attainment and income appear to attend Euro-American arts events at similar rates. In contrast, even when variables such as education, income, gender, or location are controlled, "blacks are substantially more likely than whites to attend jazz concerts, watch them on television, report enjoying jazz music, and report enjoying soul, blues, or rhythm and blues."\textsuperscript{70} Thus, as DiMaggio and Ostrower point out, it appears that "race plays a far more decisive
predictive role with respect to historically black forms than with respect to participation in Euro-American high culture. But what, then, is one to make of data showing that many African American participate at high levels in both Euro-American art forms and historically black forms? DiMaggio and Ostrower conclude that these data "suggest a pattern for blacks, especially middle-class blacks, of dual engagement, based on occupancy of multiple roles that provide incentives for involvement with both elite Euro-American and historically Afro-American artistic forms."

As revealing as the DiMaggio-Ostrower study is on the arts consumption patterns of African Americans and their apparent need for competencies in more than one cultural tradition, the authors caution against generalizing very far beyond these data. The reason for caution is based on the nature of Survey of Public Participation in the Arts, which yielded the data for the DiMaggio-Ostrower study. They argue that a national survey such as the SPPA, of necessity, focused on categories of arts participation that pretests indicated would be understood by all potential survey respondents. As a consequence, the survey did not ask about artistic styles and forms that might be of significance to many Americans, including some ethnic art forms. DiMaggio and Ostrower conclude that if ethnic arts groups are over-sampled in future replications of national surveys such as the SPPA, a better reading might be possible on questions of whether ethnic groups participate in the same art forms in similar of different ways and the degree of diversity both between and within ethnic groups.
The collection of data on the rates and nature of arts participation, even the comprehensive, fine-grained type of study proposed by DiMaggio and Ostrower, while a valuable line of inquiry, has its limitations. Examination of the types of arts events individuals choose to attend and how their participation is correlated with socio-economic and cultural variables leaves unresolved a number of questions about the origins and consequences of their choices. Arnold Hauser identifies several such questions. He notes that data collection on arts participation does not get at the role of the marketplace in shaping production of the arts and their dissemination, a factor which obviously conditions the nature of choices available. Hauser also argues that arts participation studies leave unexamined the quality, significance, and meaning of experiences in the arts for individuals and groups. These two issues, the role of the marketplace and the meaning of arts experience, will be addressed in turn.

A common conclusion among sociologists who study the contemporary marketplace of the arts, a point cited above, is that artists are relatively unable to control the reception or consumption of their art among diverse publics. A key reason for this state of affairs is the heterogeneity of the contemporary art world consisting, as Vera Zolberg puts it, of "a plethora of art forms and styles, representing societies, states, and peoples of the world with few or no barriers of space and time." As a consequence, then, many kinds of art work, including ethnic arts, find their own market of consumers whatever their origins or intended purposes.
These premises about relationships between the heterogeneity of art styles in contemporary society, their simultaneous availability through the marketplace, and how art is utilized by consumers are explored in recent analyses of the baby-boom generation's involvement with the arts. A National Endowment for the Arts Research Division analysis of its *Survey of Public Participation in the Arts* reveals two possible scenarios about baby-boomers and the arts: "if one assumes that baby boomers will adjust their attendance desires as they grow older and adopt attendance patterns similar to those reported by the older age groups, that implies a general expansion of audiences for the arts. . . . Alternatively, if one assumes that the baby boomers are inherently different and will maintain their current participation preferences as they age, this will have a very different effect on the art future."75 A number of contemporary sociologists concur with the second scenario, arguing that baby boomers are indeed inherently different in artistic terms.

Judith H. Balfe, for example, in drawing on data from the *Survey of Public Participation in the Arts*, notes that despite their higher levels of education, more extensive socialization in the arts than their elders, and the fact that they were reared during the "arts boom" fueled by their elders, baby boomers' "actual participation rates are lower than the national average for many arts forms."76 Balfe cites many reasons for this phenomenon, ranging from tax laws to decreased leisure time. But she also stresses that these findings only apply to participation in Euro-American art forms. Elsewhere, speaking in theoretical terms, Balfe argues that "the internationalized market, the expansion of higher education, the
democratization of the arts, and the availability of formerly elite culture through the mass media . . . [has fostered] cultural crossovers in all directions." Such cultural crossovers, not limited to but including the simultaneous consumption of multiple, eclectic styles in the arts, are key characteristics of the ideology of postmodernism, itself embodying the goal of liberation from traditional hierarchies and imposed "high culture" standards in the arts.

Sociologist Richard Peterson examines the effects of postmodernism, with its simultaneous availability of an eclectic mix of artistic styles through the marketplace, on the reception and consumption of the arts by baby-boomers. Peterson describes a new aesthetic for the arts among baby-boomers, one that challenges foundations of the aesthetics of Western art. Two features of this new aesthetic Peterson terms "transvaluation" and "collaging."

Transvaluation is a process by which certain art forms undergo changes in the way they are evaluated, a kind of aesthetic mobility. Historically, argues Peterson, many art works in the Western tradition initially "were created to meet the demands of a commercial market and have only since been transvalued as fine art." Peterson cites the traditionally African American musical form of jazz as a more recent example of transvaluation, an art form that was originally consumed as entertainment and later reinterpreted and patronized as fine art music. The transvaluation process in contemporary society extends to popular culture and ethnic arts with the consequence, as Peterson argues, that the Western fine art tradition, while sometimes part of the mix, "is not granted a privileged place in the emerging aesthetic."
Another feature of postmodernism examined by Peterson, collaging, refers to a kind of demand-side aesthetic in which all art, "irrespective of its aesthetic origins, can be scanned, combined, and evaluated on the basis of its uses and effects." In the case of visual arts, collaging has its roots in the wide-scale reproduction of visual arts of all ages, cultures, and nations and their presentation at one place, such as exhibitions or publications, and on the same scale; as another example, recorded music "makes it possible for people to juxtapose pieces of music created in vastly different traditions that nonetheless sound good together." Collaging has implications for possible responses to ethnic art works. On the one hand, collaging means that ethnic arts can be co-equal part of the range of aesthetic choices made by consumers; on the other hand, however, response without regard to origins or intended effects would seem to render ethnic arts ineffective as a means to maintaining ethnic group cohesion in a multicultural society.

Characteristics of the contemporary marketplace for the arts having implications for ethnic arts are not limited to the simultaneous availability of an eclectic mix of artistic styles from diverse traditions. Specifically, it must be noted that in many instances the relationship between the production of art and its consumption is not merely consumer-driven, or characterized by a demand-side aesthetic. The arts production/consumption relationship can be and often is interactive in nature, in which art is created and disseminated by artists with the intention of meeting the demands of specific market segments. This state of
affairs, however, does not usually enhance the salience of ethnic arts in ethnic communities themselves.

Nelson Graburn, an anthropologist, has developed a typology of the production/consumption of ethnic arts which have resulted from the conquered or dominated status of ethnic groups in international contexts or multicultural societies. Graburn's typology is based on a basic distinction between two major types of ethnic arts: 1) those arts that are directed inwardly toward a culture, arts "that are made for, appreciated, and used by peoples within their own society"; and 2) "those arts for an external, dominant world." As an example of the latter type of ethnic arts, an example consistent with an interactive production/consumption marketplace for ethnic arts, Graburn cites souvenir art. Graburn contends that in souvenir art, often termed "tourist art" or "airport art," "the symbolic content is so reduced, and conforms so entirely to the consumers' popular notions of the salient characteristics of the minority group, that we may call these items ethno-kitsch." As a consequence, souvenir art tends to bear only a superficial resemblance to the traditional art of the culture of its creators. Souvenir art works are created, according to Graburn, "when the profit motive or the economic competition of poverty override aesthetic standards [and when] satisfying the consumer becomes more important than pleasing the artist."

The types of ethnic arts identified in Graburn's typology are not limited to ethnic art created merely for consumption by the dominant culture in a multicultural society. For example, Graburn talks of commercial fine arts or pseudo-traditional arts. Such art works, "although they are made with eventual sale
in mind, adhere to culturally embedded aesthetic and formal standards. The production of two other types of ethnic art is contingent not so much on the marketplace but in response to the effects of cultural domination and assimilation. **Assimilated fine arts** are created by ethnic artists who have adopted the established art forms of a dominant culture. **Reintegrated arts** are new art forms or syntheses created by integrating the themes, materials, and techniques of the arts of the dominant culture with those of ethnic cultural traditions. Finally, Graburn identifies a type of ethnic art relatively autonomous from the effects of the marketplace and the dominant culture -- **traditional or functional fine arts**. This is not to say that such art may not reflect changes in technique and form from traditional styles or even incorporate stylistic elements from the dominant culture. But traditional or functional fine arts do, according to Graburn, facilitate the transmission of culturally-specific symbolic meanings.

The identification of traditional or functional fine arts, ethnic art which, as Graburn claims, retains a power to transmit culturally-specific symbolic meanings, raises a final question surrounding relations between art and culture or, more specifically, the effects of art on culture -- what meanings do ethnic arts have within ethnic groups? Unfortunately, inquiry into this significant question by social scientists, even among those with interests in the arts, has not been a priority. Anthropological inquiry, argues Edmund Feldman, would focus on the cultural and social functions and meanings of art and how "1) it influences the collective behavior of people; 2) it is created to be seen or used primarily in public situations; and 3) it expresses or describes collective aspects of life as opposed to personal
kinds of experience. For their part, sociologists are only beginning to study the social processes which shape how art works are interpreted and reinterpreted over time and the negotiations among and between cultural groups to establish the meaning of art works.

Despite the relative lack of research into the functions and meanings of art within ethnic group cultures, there has been no shortage of claims about what those functions and meanings might be. June King McFee, for example, summarizes historically identified functions which can operate individually or in combination and in varying degrees. Specifically, McFee claims that: 1) art can be used to objectify subjective values, emotions, ideas, and beliefs by making them sensuously tangible; 2) art can enhance and thereby enrich ritual and celebration in the life of a culture; 3) art can serve the purpose of communication by recording and transmitting a culture's meanings, qualities, and ideas; and 4) art can stabilize and contribute to a culture's stability by perpetuating its concepts of reality, identities, and accomplishments. But this typology of the functions of art can be critiqued on the same grounds identified above in discussing anthropological inquiry into art -- that it applies better to smaller, relatively homogenous societies than to large, complex, heterogenous societies with its diverse traditions and institutional arenas.

Some theorists, however, do consider the meaning and functions of art for ethnic groups in a multicultural society. Bruno Nettl, for example, contends that an important function of art is to symbolize the experiences and heritage of contemporary ethnic groups facing extinction, dissolution, or the effects of assimilationist policies. Further, Samella Lewis argues that the meaning of art
within an ethnic group is tied directly to the status and conditions of the group in a pluralistic society. In particular, she contends that the creation of ethnic art can lead to a cultural revival in the face of cultural oppression, celebrate the historical and contemporary experience of a people, and foster communication about political issues important to the survival and flourishing of ethnic groups. However, as persuasive and plausible as these accounts of the functions and meanings of art for ethnic group cultures may be, documentation of these phenomena is notably scant in the social scientific literature, leaving assessment of the effects of art on cultural maintenance and cohesion problematic.

At this point, then, it is time to review the primary points in this section on relations between art and culture. A basic conclusion is that while the art/culture question has not been of paramount interest to social scientists, the research that does exist reveals considerable theoretical diversity. One relatively rare point of agreement centers on the common claim that art in some sense "reflects" a culture. The claim, while critiqued from various perspectives, does not and can not specifically illuminate the complex relationships between art and culture in diverse societies. Among the many aspects of relationships between art and culture, one question that has received attention is the cultural context of production of the arts. Several neo-Marxist theories differ on the nature and extent of the effects of socio-economic conditions on the production of ethnic art, while theorists from diverse perspectives differ sharply on the salience of ethnicity in shaping artistic production. Despite this diversity, it seems apparent that many artists in contemporary American society create work that can be reasonably said to be rooted in subject
matter inspired by the beliefs and concepts of ethnic cultural traditions. At the same time, however, it also seems apparent that there are no "pure" traditions of ethnic art in American society and that no ethnic culture can claim an artistic style completely as its own without acknowledging considerable influence from other cultural traditions.

Yet, with those points made, it was further suggested that to address the question of the actual and potential effects of art on ethnic group cohesion it is necessary to examine how ethnic art is utilized in a contemporary, multicultural society. This question is addressed through review of available research on the perception, consumption, and meanings of art. It was found that the results of empirical studies of cultural differences in the perception of art works are, at best, equivocal. Further, the significance of race and ethnicity as a predictor of taste and consumption varied among researchers. Even those studies which show that race/ethnicity plays a decisive role in the consumption of traditionally ethnic art forms, race/ethnicity has little significant, independent effect on consumption patterns for Euro-American art forms. Another dimension to the consumption question is the role of the marketplace. A primary conclusion based on a review of recent research is that the heterogeneity of artistic styles available through the marketplace means that art, including ethnic art, can be utilized in ways that are autonomous from art's cultural origins or intended effects. But it was also found that the marketplace for ethnic art can be not merely consumer-driven but interactive between producers and consumers. This feature of the marketplace often means, however that "ethnic" art is created not out of a fidelity to a cultural
tradition but to meet the expectations and purchasing power of the dominant culture. Yet it was also found that some ethnic art is created predominantly to facilitate the transmission of culturally-specific symbolic meanings. A final question examined in this section centered on the meanings ethnic arts have within ethnic groups. Despite a plethora of claims about the functions and meanings of art for ethnic group cultures, documentation of these phenomena was notably thin.

These conclusions suggest that the effects of ethnic art on the maintenance and cohesion of ethnic groups are far from clear. On the one hand, it appears that such effects are not as negligible as critics of the ideal of cultural pluralism suggest, i.e., that ethnic art is virtually autonomous in origin from its cultural traditions and is tantamount, in its effects, to a middle-class diversion. Yet research also seems to indicate that the functions and meanings of ethnic art for ethnic groups in a multicultural society are complicated and potentially diminished by a wide range of factors. Therefore, it does seem clear that the creation and dissemination of ethnic art that has important meanings for ethnic groups in complex, heterogeneous societies does not occur naturally, and that if such phenomena are to occur they require some kind of support from the state as a matter of public policy.

This point leads to the topic of the next section -- affirmative action and arts policy. Consideration of this topic is important for several reasons. First, as was seen in the previous chapter, affirmative action is a prominent feature of the policy mechanisms of many public arts agencies. Further, the value-laden concept of affirmative action must be addressed in considering what role the state should have in promoting the art of ethnic cultures. Finally, it was concluded above that the
ideal of cultural pluralism, while often critiqued based on narrow conceptions of the term, was in some ways a problematic basis for justifying the formulation of public policy goals in the arts. Examination of the concept of affirmative action, then, can also serve the purpose of clarifying whether a justification other than cultural pluralism can be found for policies to support the production and dissemination of ethnic arts, namely, a justification rooted in the concept of justice.

Arguments for Affirmative Action in Arts Policy

The introduction of the concept of justice into discussions about public policy and the arts can be related to the premises of some culture theorists who view the promotion of justice in a society and the achievement of a "high culture" as incompatible. T.S. Eliot, for one, sees culture as an organic structure, whereby the tools of culture are fostered through hereditary transmission, a process essentially contingent upon the persistence of defined social classes. In Eliot's view, the ideals of culture and social equality fundamentally conflict. He argues that if one cannot accept this state of affairs, then one should not use the term "culture"; conversely, if one wishes justice to prevail in a society, then one must also accept the deterioration of culture. Culture theorist George Steiner similarly contends that the achievement of "high culture" is inevitably enmeshed with social injustice. To take this viewpoint to its logical conclusion would entail state action to maintain and solidify class privilege for the sake of the growth and development of culture and its products, the arts. But apart from the question of the veracity of empirical premises embedded in this viewpoint, i.e., that social inequality is necessary to the flourishing of culture and the arts, it is difficult to imagine a
persuasive defense of social policy with the aim of perpetuating inequitable social relations. Few would be willing to sacrifice a society's fundamental sense of justice and equality to enhance the standing and significance of culture and the arts.

The question to be explored here is not an either/or, societal-wide choice between justice and the arts, but the place of concepts of justice within a particular policy sphere -- the arts. Discussion of "justice" and related concepts by arts policy analysts has been rare except for the frequent invocation of the importance of "access to the arts." Yet even in these instances the concept of justice underlying this slogan is most often left unclarified. A notable exception of this apparent rule is the concept of aesthetic justice, as developed by Monroe Beardsley. Discussed in Chapter III, aesthetic justice refers to the equitable distribution of aesthetic wealth, the total set of objects of aesthetic value in a society, to members of that society.93

Affirmative action is the specific application of concepts of justice in a policy sphere such as arts policy. In general terms, affirmative action programs stipulate the conditions under which the state and its agencies make societal opportunities and rewards available to groups, groups usually identified by race, ethnicity, sex, handicap, or age. Beyond this basic feature, however, public programs instituted in the name of affirmative action vary dramatically in terms of purpose, rationale, design, and intended consequences.

A brief review of the affirmative action programs found in state arts agencies illustrates this point. Many state arts agencies make equal opportunity an organizing principle of their policy mechanisms, seeking to ensure that no applicant,
whatever their race, ethnicity, age, sex, handicap, or sexual preference, is subject to discrimination or other unfair practices in the competition for grant funds. Another feature common to state arts agencies' policy mechanisms are special initiatives designed primarily though not exclusively to enhance the competitiveness of ethnic group members of African-American, Asian, Hispanic, and Native American heritage in seeking grants. Special initiatives, which are usually integrated with the open-access-to-funding policy mechanism, take many forms that can be utilized singularly or in combination -- technical assistance workshops, leadership training, active recruitment of grant applicants from minority ethnic groups, special advisory committees on multicultural issues, and the identification of ethnic group members for potential service on state arts agency boards and grant advisory panels. Still other state agencies utilize a special programs policy mechanism. Special programs, in most cases, are in-depth efforts to enhance the competitiveness of minority ethnic group artists and arts organizations in seeking arts funds. What distinguishes special programs from special initiatives is their comprehensive nature and the fact that only ethnic group members of African-American, Asian, Hispanic, and Native American heritage are eligible to participate. Finally, the distributive pluralism policy mechanism is more regulative in nature, requiring either that state arts funds be distributed on a formula basis to representatives of minority ethnic groups or that all potential organizational grantees must reflect in their programming and governing bodies the racial/ethnic make-up in the communities of which they are a part.
These diverse approaches to affirmative action utilized by public arts agencies at the state level embody most of the strategies and, significantly, the value assumptions about concepts of justice that are found in other policy spheres that adopt affirmative action programs. As such, affirmative action programs in public arts agencies are subject to and inherit many of the same problems and controversies found frequently in other areas of public policy. Among these challenges are the common responses to the idea of affirmative action in public discussions and the political forums of legislative bodies. Robert Fullinwider describes well the nature of appeals made for and against affirmative action in these contexts.

Although appealing to widely accepted moral intuitions, the arguments constructed on these appeals are usually imprecise, indecisive, and incomplete even when they are moderate and careful. Opponents talk past one another, never coming to grips. Catch-phrases and slogans substitute for analysis and criticism. The issues remain unfocused, unrefined, and no progress is made toward bringing a full understanding of the moral and legal questions in dispute.94

This conceptual morass is simultaneously the result of and is exacerbated by two additional inherent problems in debates about affirmative action in public contexts. First, policy choices about affirmative action are inherently made under conditions of "partial ignorance," given "the incompleteness of our knowledge about the future effects of alternative social policies and, beyond that, the absence of a common and uniform way of weighing those effects."95 This complication clearly applies to the arts policy arena in which, as discussed in detail in previous chapters, data on the distribution and effects of arts funding on artists and arts organizations
rooted in ethnic cultural traditions is not uniformly defined, collected, or disseminated.

A further complication, one made more potent by the lack of information on the actual and potential effects of alternative affirmative action programs, "lies in the vagueness and indeterminacy inherent in the broad principles of justice to which we must appeal."96 Any argument used to marshall support for or against specific affirmative action programs of necessity draws on concepts and principles of justice in that, as stated above, affirmative action entails the application of concepts of justice to a particular policy problem, i.e., the condition of minority ethnic groups within a society. In the arts policy sphere, the use of concepts of justice in policy arguments is more often implicit than explicit, a phenomenon common to most other policy arenas. But because of the lack of other modes of analysis which could calculate the effects of affirmative action programs on the arts, analysis of the implicit use of concepts of justice is an essential means of evaluating the options available to and utilized by public arts agencies in formulating and implementing diverse affirmative action programs. Such an analysis will not likely settle the issue, but without clarification of the principles that can and do inform public policies, the possibility of resolving the seemingly intractable controversies surrounding affirmative action will be foreclosed.

In order to facilitate the analysis of implicit concepts of justice, it is possible to develop a typology of arguments that have been used historically to justify affirmative action programs in public policy settings.97 These arguments include the following: 1) compensatory justice - that those who have benefited from
injustices in a society acquire an obligation to compensate victims for their losses; 2) **rights** - that individuals or groups have an unabridgable entitlement to equal treatment or, in some cases, preferential treatment; 3) **utilitarian justice** - that positive actions toward minority ethnic groups will lead to social consequences that contribute to the overall well-being of society; 4) **distributive justice** - that governments have a positive duty to redistribute society's opportunities and resources and to improve the condition of those underserved by societal benefits; and 5) **equal opportunity** - that the opportunities of persons should be equal with respect to societal rewards and benefits and not subject to inappropriate forms of discrimination. These arguments will be analyzed in turn.

1) The idea of compensatory justice has a simple form about which few would argue in that it appeals to the widely felt intuition about making a victim of an injustice whole. In such instances, an individual is wronged by another in a specific situation, e.g., one individual appropriates the property, causes physical harm to, or abrogates the rights of another individual. According to the principle of compensatory justice, then, the injured party acquires a right to be compensated in some way for the injury incurred. The nature of compensation, though, is of special importance to the simple form of compensatory justice. The wronged individual does not have the right to seek or receive compensation in an arbitrary way. Rather, "that right lies against a specific party and encompasses what that party rightfully has as a means of payment."98

Arguments for affirmative action which invoke the concept of compensatory justice, however, do not rely upon a simple form of the concept. The difference
lies in the fact that affirmative action arguments hold that the obligation for compensation is incurred by a whole community, that it is a corporate responsibility. It is argued that the wrongs that have been visited upon minority ethnic groups historically, e.g., slavery, segregation, and discrimination," are not simply the sum of individual wrongs done by whites. They are corporate wrongs flowing from the legal practices and legislative policies of the state itself."99 Because so many of these wrongs were committed by groups of persons acting in official capacities and not merely by informal aggregates of individuals acting in private settings, the actions of these public officials, it is concluded, constitute the basis of a national debt inherited and incurred by living Americans.

This complex form of the concept of compensatory justice is rooted in the notion of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability entails the idea that an individual person "need not commit a particular act in order to be liable for obligations that arise from it."100 It follows, then, that an individual white person in contemporary society is liable to limitations on his or her rights to equal consideration and treatment, even if he never personally caused injury to an individual member of a minority ethnic group, because he or she must contribute to reduction of the inherited debt of white Americans. But the notion of vicarious liability extends further. This extension is based on a different interpretation of the debt inherited by white Americans. It is argued that the debt is incurred not only because the ancestors of contemporary white Americans acted in official capacities to enslave, segregate, or discriminate against minority ethnic groups, but because white Americans have benefited from and still enjoy benefits derived from these wrongs.
As such, even white Americans who claim they have not personally injured an individual ethnic group member, cannot persuasively make a case for their innocence. The argument for affirmative action based on this interpretation of vicarious liability due to wrongful benefits is as follows: "since these benefits derived from great wrongs, possession of them constitutes an unjust enrichment and the possessor is under an obligation to restore the benefits to their rightful recipients. Possession of illicit benefits undermines one’s claim to "innocence." Such possession makes one an accessory after the fact, so to speak. The wrongful possession serves the same function as personal fault; it makes one liable to pay appropriate compensation."\(^{101}\)

Use of the concept of compensatory justice in arguments justifying affirmative action has certain advantages. Notably, by focusing on making victims of past injustices whole, it does not depend on complicated means to calculate the future effects of affirmative action programs on minority ethnic groups. But the concept of compensatory justice, and its associated concept of vicarious liability, is problematic on several grounds. One critique challenges an empirical claim embedded in the notion of compensatory justice by arguing that the concept is rooted in a false premise. William Bradford Reynolds, for one, disputes the claim that inequitable racial and ethnic imbalances in contemporary public situations, such as workplaces, are explainable only as lingering effects of past discrimination or segregation. Instead, Reynolds asserts that the selection of occupations and securing of workplace positions is often determined by individual interest, industry, and ability.\(^{102}\) The persuasiveness of these different explanations of the persistence
of inequities in American society can, of course, be debated. But resolution of this
debate is ultimately a matter for empirical inquiry. The most telling critiques of
the concept of compensatory justice, on the other hand, can be made on logical
grounds.

Marshall Cohen and Thomas Nagel, for example, question whether it is
possible for affirmative action programs to meet the central goal of compensating
victims of past injustices by requiring concessions from the beneficiaries of these
injustices. They argue that even if affirmative action programs are defensible in
terms of compensatory justice, inevitably, in practical terms, such programs can
compensate only some of the victims of injustice and do not and cannot elicit
concessions from all beneficiaries of injustice. According to Cohen and Nagel,
then, affirmative action programs, because they cannot cover all aspects of society
where accrued benefits of injustice can be found, do not meet the requirement that
justice must be truly compensatory on a society-wide basis.103

This argument, that affirmative action programs are not fully just because
they do not go far enough, is a relative rarity. A more common form of argument
is one which contends that compensatory justice is an inadequate basis for public
policy on the grounds that, in its pursuit of justice, other injustices are permitted.
In its simplest form, the argument goes like this: under compensatory justice, non-
victims benefit and the non-guilty are made to pay. The first part of this argument
rests on an empirical claim that many of the minority group beneficiaries of
affirmative action programs in educational and workplace settings have middle- or
upper-middle class status and are hence, according to those who make this
argument, non-victims. But this claim requires empirical verification. The "non-guilty are made to pay" part of the above argument, however, entails basic questions about rights and responsibilities.

One premise in the notion of vicarious liability, where it is held that because of the past conduct of public officials all living white Americans incur a debt they must repay, can be reasonably argued to be based on an unwarranted inference. The premise involves a leap from the obligations of public officials to the obligations of individual citizens. By this logic, whites living in contemporary society must make restitution for the legal and legislative actions of past government officials in support of slavery, even though these individuals' ancestors may have been abolitionists or emigrated to America in the twentieth century. To hold that every individual acquires debts and liabilities merely because he or she is a member of a community defined by race seems unreasonable and threatening to important rights. The point can be made that any individual citizen has obligations to shoulder his or her fair share to the society of which she or he is a part. What constitutes a fair share? However one might define this term, it would be difficult to show that an individual's fair share "consists in his being deprived of his right to equal consideration."

The argument that a government policy such as affirmative action, no matter how worthy its aims may be, cannot abrogate fundamental rights such as equal consideration and equal treatment can be extended to the idea of vicarious liability due to wrongful benefits. Any perpetrator who can be proven to have wrongfully injured another can be fairly expected to make that victim whole through some
form of restitution. But can another individual, who may either not have received any unjust deserts as a result of past injustices, or who had no means of avoiding inherited benefits, be obligated to make restitution solely on the basis of his or her race? Before answering this question it should be pointed out that this same individual may well incur a personal loss in making restitution as a result of an affirmative action program, i.e., he or she may not have an equal opportunity to secure, e.g., placement in a university program, a job, or grants funds. Thus, in this scenario, an individual who may not have benefited from past injustices or has done so unknowingly or even unwillingly, both has his or her rights to equal opportunity abrogated and may indeed suffer a tangible loss of equal treatment in the pursuit of a position, job, or funds. Such a scenario, it seems to me, is not defensible.

It does not follow from this critique of the concept of compensatory justice that no one is personally responsible for discriminative practices against minority ethnic groups. It is the principle of vicarious liability, which makes persons liable for what they could not avoid or help, which cannot be defended. On the other hand, this critique in no way forecloses the possibility that a different justification of affirmative action programs within public policies can be found. Other possibilities will be examined.

2) A major impediment to the justification of affirmative action programs on the basis of compensatory justice was the idea that such programs violate the fundamental rights of individuals, most notably, the right to equal treatment. But depending on how one conceives of rights, the right to equal treatment may not be
an insuperable barrier to building a case for affirmative action programs. Indeed, the concept of rights can be at the core of such a justification.

One possible approach to citing rights in a justification of affirmative action programs is to contend that individuals have rights against the state that are prior to the rights created by explicit legislation. In this sense rights are an inherent part of human nature and thus cannot be superseded by public policies or legislation in a defensible way. This conception of rights has a long tradition and has regained currency among contemporary theorists. Based on this conception, then, it could be argued that some individuals have a fundamental right to special treatment due to the past deprivation of the group of which they are a member. But such an argument would hardly resolve the issue. Specifically, it can be asserted that the right to equal treatment is a fundamental right that is inviolate and cannot be dismissed with justification by a policy or legislation. Thus, these two rights are defined and asserted as fundamental and inviolate leading to a scenario of contending fundamental rights and arguments for and against affirmative action programs.

A primary means of resolving such a dilemma, whether the rights are viewed as fundamental or not, is to show that one right in some way supersedes another in specific contexts. Judith Thompson contends that some rights can override others if one right is more stringent than the other. Can it be said, then, that the right to special treatment for minority ethnic group members supersedes others' right to equal treatment? It is hard to conclude that this conflict of rights meets the criterion set by Thompson. This is so because merely stipulating that
affirmative action (and special treatment) is a fundamental right does not solve
problems associated with the idea of vicarious liability, i.e., that individuals who
may not have benefited from past injustices or have done so unknowingly or even
unwillingly suffer a tangible loss in the pursuit of a position, job, or funds. Under
these conditions, it is not clear that the right to equal treatment should be
superseded.

Another means of justifying affirmative action programs is to construe
conflicts of rights not as an issue of individual rights vs. individual compensation
but, rather, as a matter of group rights and group compensation. Such a
reconception could seemingly render moot difficulties that arose in discussions of
compensatory justice associated with the establishment of individual liability and
compensation. What, then, is meant by group rights? If one were to define group
rights only as an aggregate of the rights of all individuals in a group, then the
concept of group rights would be saddled with many of the same problems cited
above.

The question becomes, then, whether it is possible "to attribute to the group
a right which is distinct from and independent of the rights of its members."108 Or,
as the question applies to minority ethnic groups, is it possible to talk about a
group interest that is harmed when individual members of the group are victims of
discrimination? To talk in this way, however, seems to involve an equivocation.
It is plausible, for example, that a group, such as a minority ethnic group, can be
the object of an individual’s interest. An individual ethnic group member can
clearly desire the right of equal treatment for her entire group as well as for
herself. More specifically, she could desire a significant increase in the average annual income of the members of her group. But this example, and others like it, seem to represent a group-oriented interest on the part of an individual ethnic group member. The sum of these group-oriented interests, however, does not appear to satisfy a criterion of the concept of group rights, namely, that group rights are distinct from and independent of the rights of its members.

Using the concept of rights as the center of a defense of affirmative action programs is, to say the least, problematic. On the one hand, conceiving of affirmative action and special treatment as rights leads to the various problems with compensatory justice and vicarious liability cited above; and the concept of group rights seems to entail an equivocation. Clearly, other bases for justifying affirmative action must be explored, including utilitarian justice.

3) The concept of utilitarian justice does not depend on notions of compensation, vicarious liability, or group rights in justification arguments for affirmative action programs. Instead, utilitarian justice is a conception of how the consequences of a public policy can serve the public interest or the common good. The public policy of affirmative action, it is argued, can result in social, racial, and ethnic interaction contributing to the overall well-being of society.

A number of utilities or positive consequences are anticipated by proponents of the utilitarian justice justification of affirmative action. For example, it is argued that affirmative action programs in workplace settings can increase the representation of minority ethnic group members in more lucrative jobs, thereby increasing the average income of these persons and their families. This upward
economic mobility can, in turn, help to break down ethnic stereotypes born of the perceived association of ethnic minority status and poverty. This view is premised on the prediction that as more ethnic minority group members become owners, managers, executives, and supervisors in workplaces, psychological supports for ethnic stereotyping and even racism will be weakened. In turn, as more minority ethnic group members occupy decision-making roles, "the decisions made in these roles are less likely to reflect prejudice." Further, persons in these positions can serve as role models for young minority group members to aspire to. Finally, the anticipated positive consequences of utilitarian justice can be phrased in terms of arts policy as well. An argument of this sort could cite anticipated benefits such as increases in the production of artwork rooted in ethnic cultural traditions, art of potential meaning to ethnic groups themselves and a source of valuable experience to the entire citizenry.

Two primary criticisms of the utilitarian justice justification of affirmative action programs are often cited: 1) that it permits the rewarding of unqualified or under-qualified workers, applicants, or grant-seekers, and 2) that the hiring of unqualified workers will lead to reduced efficiency in the workplace. Meeting each of these criticisms turns on the concept of qualifications. Qualifications refer to the full range of capacities and talents that will help a person do what an employer seeks or a funder requires. Affirmative action programs can surely be designed where differences in qualifications between the best qualified and the minimally qualified are not very great and where any special treatment is extended only to those that are at least minimally qualified.
Further, it could be argued that the ethnicity of an applicant is a legitimate qualification for a job, position, or grant. Such an argument could assert that persons of a particular ethnic background will bring such valuable perspectives and life experiences to a workplace or program that such background can be considered a qualification or it could assert that ethnic background is so important to the performance of a specific kind of work that is a necessary qualification sought in any applicant. But this second type of argument with its ethnicity-as-a-qualification premise, taken to its logical conclusion, can be turned against proponents of affirmative action. If one is to count a particular ethnic background as a necessary qualification that must be met because applicants meeting it will satisfy a need that an employer or institution defines for itself, then it must be allowed that the same employer or institution can count ethnic background as a disqualification in meeting its goals. To not allow for this implication is to engage in equivocation. Fullinwider articulates the point about equivocation well, arguing that "persons receiving benefits justified solely by the social utility of their receiving them cannot complain when these benefits are taken away because new utility maximizing policies are adopted. Nor can they complain when they are called upon to make sacrifices for the public interest if their previous immunity from sacrifice derived only from the public interest. The public interest can change."\textsuperscript{110}

This point illustrates a basic problem with invoking utilitarian justice in justifying affirmative action programs. A central premise of utilitarian justice is that social policy is a matter of weighing the costs and benefits of proposed actions as they relate to the public interest or common good. As such, any policy, of
necessity, imposes sacrifices on some persons, in some cases, unevenly so. But such sacrifices are seen, according to utilitarian justice, as regrettable, but justified, in calculations for the collective good.

The idea of calculating costs and benefits of social policy is a key to critiquing the idea of utilitarian justice. To determine the collective good or collective welfare, one must be able to measure the welfare of an individual. But, as Ronald Dworkin asks, "how can the welfare of an individual be measured, even in principle, and how can gains in the welfare of different individuals be added and then compared with losses, so as to justify the claim that gains outweigh losses overall?" Theorists have tried to answer this question in two ways. One way argued for historically is to first calculate the pain or pleasure that a specific policy brings to an individual, add all affected individuals' pleasures together, and then subtract all of the pain the policy brings to the same individuals. The difference constitutes the collective welfare. This solution to the "calculation" problem, however, is hardly satisfactory. In Dworkin's words, "it is doubtful whether there exists a simple psychological state of pleasure common to all those who benefit from a policy or of pain common to all those who lose by it; in any case it would be impossible to identify, measure, and add the different pleasures and pains felt by vast numbers of people."

Another approach to solving the calculation problem is preference utilitarianism. Rather than calculating individuals' pains and pleasures, preference utilitarianism attempts to arrive at the collective welfare by calculating the preferences individuals have for the consequences of one policy decision over
another. It would seem that measuring preferences, e.g., through survey research, is at least feasible, unlike the measurement of pleasures and pains. But other problems remain with preference utilitarianism, most notably, that it can be contradictory to the utilitarian tenet of promoting the collective welfare. This is so because, first, preference utilitarianism is designed to give equal weight to all individuals' preferences and that policy makers are expected to satisfy people's preferences as much as possible. This expectation extends both to individuals' preferences for consequences of a policy that are personal and external. A personal preference refers to a person's own actual or anticipated enjoyment of opportunities, resources, and rewards; an external preference relates to the assignment of opportunities, resources, and rewards to others. External preferences, by this definition, can include preferences for the opportunities and rewards of minority ethnic groups that reflect racist ideologies. Therefore, because such preferences are to be given equal weight in preference utilitarianism, it is hard to imagine how the resulting calculation of preferences for policies' consequences can contribute to achievement of the ultimate goal of utilitarian justice, i.e., promotion of collective welfare.

In conclusion, this scenario concerning the accommodation of racism highlights an issue that was raised above in the ethnicity-as-a-qualification discussion. As will be recalled, utilitarian justice permits uneven sacrifices by some individuals for the sake of the collective good. It has been since shown that utilitarian justice permits calculations that clearly cannot contribute to the collective good. But this scenario suggests that utilitarian justice not only allows for unequal
sacrifice but unequal treatment as well. This premise would clearly be anathema to those who consider the right to equal treatment as inviolable in public policy formulation and implementation. But whatever value one places on the right to equal treatment, it seems clear that few persons would willingly phrase a justification of affirmative action programs in terms of utilitarian justice, considering that, if taken to its logical conclusion, utilitarian justice permits accommodation of racist ideologies.

4) The concept of distributive justice offers another possible basis for justifying affirmative action programs. It differs in substantive ways from the concepts of compensatory justice and utilitarian justice. Arguments rooted in distributive justice contend that affirmative action programs are justified regardless of whether individual minority ethnic group members merit or need compensation for past injustices and regardless of whether affirmative action maximizes social utilities. Distributive justice entails the distribution of resources and rewards to members of a society. Beyond this, however, there seems to be little agreement about the requirements of distributive justice. As Fullinwider asks, "does a just society assure that the rewards people receive are commensurate to their need? Or their contribution? Or their moral desert? All of these? None of these? Or, does a just society distribute and redistribute resources so as to make each person's income, wealth, or social position approximately equal to everyone else's?"113

This final version of the concept of distributive justice will be the focus of analysis here, largely because this concept appears to underlie the distributive pluralism policy mechanism adopted by several state arts agencies. As will be
recalled, the Kentucky Arts Council seeks to distribute its funds so that all of the state’s citizens will benefit fully and equally from the arts. The Michigan Council for the Arts, a somewhat different example of the distributive pluralism policy mechanism, requires a specific percentage distribution of its funds to African-American, Asian, Hispanic, and Native American artists and arts organizations. Even though these examples of the distributive pluralism policy mechanism differ in details, they both embody the assumption that a justifiable goal for public agencies is to distribute its resources in order to secure equal results and benefits among the citizenry.

The concept of distributive justice can be critiqued from a variety of perspectives. Thomas Nagel, for one, contends that the redistribution of a particular policy sphere’s resources and benefits to the citizenry does not go far enough. Nagel arrives at this conclusion based on the belief that economic inequality in contemporary society is not a matter of how rewards are distributed but a result of a reward system that justifies reward schedules that are vastly different even though, in his view, persons do not differ sufficiently in their efforts to warrant such different rewards. Thus, he reasons, affirmative action programs which aim to redistribute rewards and benefits on the basis of race and ethnicity do little to address the fundamental inequalities of a market economy that permits unwarranted economic rewards in the first place.\textsuperscript{114}

Other critiques that can be and have been marshalled against the concept of distributive pluralism for equal results are, in many ways, reminiscent of the critiques of compensatory justice, group rights, and utilitarian justice. Nathan
Glazer, for example, questions an underlying empirical premise of the distributive pluralism concept, that differential representation of minority ethnic groups in a variety of public settings is only the result of past discrimination or continuing institutional racism. Glazer contends that such an explanation neglects individual interest, industry, and ability as significant variables in explaining racial ethnic imbalances in contemporary society.\textsuperscript{115} It is also argued that under distributive justice non-victims benefit and the non-guilty are made to pay. The first claim rests on the conclusion that the minority group beneficiaries of a specific, pre-arranged distribution of resources are often of middle-or upper-class status and, hence, in no special need of receiving redistributed resources. The second claim recalls the above critique of vicarious liability, that persons who may not have benefited from past injustices or have done so knowingly or unwillingly should not have their resources redistributed through affirmative action.

An alternative critique of distributive justice is unique to arts policy. In particular, this critique centers on the regulation found in some versions of the distributive pluralism policy mechanism that all arts agency applicants and grantees must proportionately represent the ethnic diversity of their communities in their organizations' audiences. This application of the idea of distributive justice is difficult to defend. The DiMaggio-Ostrower study cited above demonstrated that while education and income are the most potent predictors of participation in the arts, race/ethnicity does exert an independent influence on consumption patterns for certain art forms, most notably, jazz, blues, and rhythm and blues. It was also found that rates of participation by blacks in forms such as classical music and
opera are significantly lower than those of whites. Finally, it will be remembered that DiMaggio and Ostrower pointed out that the Survey of Public Participation in the Arts, on which they based their study, did not collect data on participation rates for a wide variety of ethnic art forms; but it seems reasonable to assume that race/ethnicity is a significant factor in determining participation in ethnic arts.

This brief review of findings on arts participation illustrates a basic and perhaps obvious point, that many of the art forms and artistic styles that arts organizations seeking public arts agency funds present are not equally attractive to Euro-Americans, African-Americans, Asians, Hispanics, and Native Americans. As such, then, requiring that all arts organizations proportionately represent these communities among their audiences seems, at best, impractical and, at worst, unreasonable. On the other hand, another regulation used by public arts agencies who adopt the distributive pluralism policy mechanism, the requirement that grant funds be distributed proportionately to artists and arts organizations in ethnic communities, is not impractical. A policy with this regulation could be implemented. However, it can certainly be objected to on other than practical grounds. Some might say that such a regulation could potentially reward unqualified grant-seekers. But substantiating a prediction like this is an empirical matter and, as the discussion of qualifications indicated above, such a prediction may beg the question of what can count as qualifications. A more substantive critique of this type of regulation rests on the principles of equal opportunity and equal treatment. Such an argument would go something like this: by directing pre-arranged percentages
of an agency's available funds on the basis of race/ethnicity, those not included in these categories will be denied equality of opportunity and, hence, equal treatment.

To this point, the principles of equal opportunity and equal treatment have been cited in critiques of compensatory justice, utilitarian justice, and, now, distributive justice. The time has come to examine these principles more closely. A primary question to be explored is whether the principles of equal opportunity and equal treatment stand unalterably opposed to any justification of affirmative action programs and, if so, whether such opposition is decisive. But the discussion will also attempt to distinguish possible meanings of "equal opportunity" and "equal treatment." Indeed, depending on how one conceives of these terms, they might even constitute the basis for a defense of affirmative action programs.

5) The concepts of equal opportunity and equal treatment have a complex relationship. At times they are thought to be synonymous. But "equal treatment" is usually thought of as a more specific concept that can be subsumed under the general concept of equal opportunity. Yet, as will be seen, it is possible to draw very different conclusions about affirmative action based on these two concepts.

The concept of equal treatment refers to the right of all individuals who seek employment, a position, or funding to receive equal consideration. This right does not entail the notion that everyone is equally entitled to every job, position, or grant. This is so because the concept of equal treatment includes two qualifying premises: 1) that persons to which this right applies must be qualified for the job, position, or grant in question, and 2) that the candidate chosen be chosen solely on the basis of his or her best fulfilling the qualifications of the job, position, or
grant. The right of equal opportunity is consistent with these two premises. But it goes further by requiring that individuals not be subjected to inappropriate forms of distribution in competing for a job, position, or grant. Additionally, according to different interpretations, equal opportunity either entails equalizing qualified persons' obstacles in their pursuit of a job, position, or grant or entails taking positive steps to enhance the competitiveness of individuals and groups in this pursuit.

These different versions of the concept of equal opportunity will be explored below. First, however, it is important to see how implications for affirmative action are derived from the concept of equal treatment. Some interpret equal treatment as an inviolable, individual human right rooted in the principle "that it is wrong to treat two persons differently if there is no morally relevant difference between them. It does not proscribe treating people differently, only treating people differently who are not different." When applied to employment or grant-seeking situations, this principle holds that instances in which an otherwise qualified person's race or ethnicity counts against them are morally wrong; it also holds that instances in which a person's race or ethnicity counts in favor of them, especially where there is some question about the applicant's qualifications, are morally wrong. Affirmative action programs which take positive account of applicants' race and ethnicity are therefore unjustified because they permit the rights to equal treatment of persons not in these categories to be abrogated. As such, such persons are the victims of reverse discrimination and are at an unfair disadvantage in the competition for jobs, positions, or grants.
Proponents of the principle of equal opportunity, and anyone else not committed to a racist ideology, clearly contend that qualified persons should not suffer a competitive disadvantage in the pursuit of their personal employment or funding goals solely on the basis of race or ethnicity. But the question then becomes whether it is sufficient only to ensure that persons not be subject to unwarranted forms of discrimination, as "equal treatment" theorists contend, or whether it is necessary to actively make up competitive disadvantages so that all qualified persons or those who seek to be qualified can compete for jobs, positions, or grants on an equal basis. Policies which propose actions to equalize competitive opportunities, such as various versions of affirmative action, must address two fundamental questions: 1) what is the nature of obstacles to fair competition?; and 2) what sorts of remedies are permissible and consistent with principles of justice?

It is certainly possible to define obstacles to equal opportunity as the effects of past injustices visited upon ethnic groups. But this conception entails support for problematic notions of vicarious liability and group rights discussed above. It is also possible to define obstacles to equal opportunity extremely broadly to include everything from "natural" intelligence to family background to individual motivation and effort. But such definitions raise the spectre of eugenics and broad social engineering, both of which could virtually extinguish basic individual rights such as freedom and liberty, not to mention the right to equal treatment.\textsuperscript{118}

A more limited concept of obstacles, then, is required to use equal opportunity as a justification for affirmative action programs. Such a definition, it seems to me, must be related closely to the situation in which the idea of equal
opportunity applies, namely, situation in which individuals are competing in the pursuit of jobs or positions and where individuals or organizations are competing for grants funds. Implicit in any definition of this sort is the idea that effective competition for, e.g., grants funds requires knowledge, accomplishment, talent, and skills on the part of the applicant. In other words, the individual or organization must exhibit to a substantive degree the required knowledge, accomplishment, talent, and skills stipulated by public agencies to merit a grant award. Deficits in these areas are a necessary condition of a definition of obstacles within the concept of equal opportunity; but, by themselves, they are hardly sufficient. Otherwise, anyone or any organization, no matter how great the deficits in their qualifications, could claim to be subjected to obstacles in seeking a grant. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that applicants be at least minimally qualified, that they exhibit some of the knowledge, accomplishments, talent, and skills, before they can be said to face obstacles in pursuit of a grant.

That said, it could still be argued that any obstacles certain applicants face are the result of their own lack of interest, industry, or talent. Thus, a further necessary condition of the definition of obstacles is that they are impediments which individuals or organizations, through no lack of effort on their own, could not have avoided. Admittedly, this conception of the term "obstacles" casts a rather wide net. It could be further argued that if public agencies base their affirmative action programs on this concept of obstacles, then they commit themselves to an extensive effort to determine whether individuals' relative deficiencies in terms of qualifications could have been avoided or not, a virtually
impossible task. But this conclusion about implications of the conception of "obstacles" is not a necessary one; it depends on how one answers the second question referred to above, i.e., how one conceives of remedies to address obstacles to equal opportunity.

To be consistent with the definition of obstacles outlined here, any remedies for individuals' lack of opportunity must be directed to the qualifications necessary to compete effectively for jobs, positions, or grants, while not compromising others' rights to equal treatment. It also seems to me, as a matter of common sense, that any remedies should be directed to those factors within a policy sphere that can actually be affected by an agency's actions or requirements. Taking the arts policy sphere as an example, it seems clear that arts policy-makers, whatever their good intentions, cannot be effective if they devise remedies designed to address those basic socio-economic structures in society which condition opportunities for ethnic artists and arts organizations to produce and disseminate their work. Such policy activities are beyond the scope of what small public agencies, such as public arts agencies, directly can affect. There are other factors beyond the scope of public arts agencies to affect which bear more directly on the qualifications of grant-seekers. It was noted earlier that individuals or organizations, in order to both effectively compete for and merit a grant, must exhibit the required knowledge, accomplishments, talent, and skills stipulated by public agencies. The talents and accomplishments of applicants, clearly, are not factors which a public agency can directly control or affect. The development of knowledge and skills in potential and actual applicants, however, is within the scope of a public agency's activities.
If agency-sponsored activities take the form of training opportunities such as workshops or technical assistance designed to enhance the knowledge and skills, it seems reasonable to conclude that these sort of opportunities may help otherwise qualified applicants to compete effectively for grants. As such, these sorts of remedies would be consistent with the equal opportunity concept of justice by helping individuals and organizations to overcome obstacles they may face in situations where the principle of equal treatment pertains. These remedies also reward efforts to seek out and take advantage of opportunities available.\textsuperscript{119}

This description of justifiable remedies, however, begs a basic question -- to whom should these remedies be available? The problems with identifying individuals to whom compensatory justice applies and those problems associated with groups rights and vicarious liability have been discussed at length to this point. Bearing these problems in mind, it does not seem warranted, on practical grounds, to restrict remedies designed to equalize opportunity for grant seekers to members of ethnic groups. Further, and more substantively, such restrictions would be inconsistent with the definition of obstacles as defined above, that some applicants, whatever their racial or ethnic background, face impediments to effective competition that they could not have avoided. But can these remedies then be called examples of affirmative action? They can be, I believe, if making training opportunities available is supplemented by special initiatives to build awareness of these opportunities among artists and organizations rooted in ethnic cultural communities and actively recruiting applicants as well. There is nothing in the
concepts of equal treatment and equal opportunity that could prohibit these special initiatives.120

This concept of equal opportunity, and its associated concepts of obstacles to equal opportunity and remedies to promote fair competition, can serve as a justification for many types of affirmative action programs utilized currently by state arts agencies. These include technical assistance workshops, leadership training, and active recruitment of grant applicants from minority ethnic groups. But special programs in which eligibility is restricted to members of ethnic groups and the distributive pluralism policy mechanism requiring either formulaic distribution of arts funds or the "reflection" of the racial/ethnic make-up found in artists' and arts organizations' communities, in that they draw on concepts of compensatory justice and distributive justice, cannot be justified by the equal opportunity argument. It must be stressed, however, that because some types of affirmative action programs can be justified by clarifying underlying value assumptions which inform them, does not mean that any specific program is effective in neutralizing obstacles to equal opportunity among ethnic groups. Documentation of effectiveness is ultimately a matter of empirical inquiry.

But the equal opportunity argument outlined to this point leaves open one additional theoretical question that warrants close examination. It will be remembered that the remedies described and justified here are designed to facilitate fair competition for grants, competition to be decided by reference to qualifications and criteria designated by public agencies. The many criteria utilized by state arts agencies were outlined in the previous chapter. It is not difficult to
imagine affirmative action programs which can enhance the capacity of funding applicants from ethnic groups to better meet criteria such as skills in management, marketing, and fundraising. But such programs would not directly address the decision-making criteria cited most often and given the greatest weight by state arts agencies, namely, artistic excellence or artistic value. As was also seen in the previous chapter, views of what constitutes artistic value and whether it is a concept that varies by culture or can be applied cross-culturally, either vary or are left unclarified by state arts agencies. But if an argument justifying affirmative action programs based on an equal opportunity concept of justice is to be sustained, then the concept which is the most prominent of all criteria in arts funding decisions, artistic value, must be clarified. If decision-making policies are established and implemented which are founded on a concept of artistic value that is inapplicable to artists and arts organizations based in ethnic cultural traditions, then no matter what remedies are in place to equalize opportunities in the pursuit of arts agency funding, such policies cannot be said to be justified. An examination of the key concept of artistic value is the subject of the next section.

**Multiple Meanings of the Value of the Arts**

A rationale for exploring the nature and possible meanings of the concept of artistic value was offered in the previous section -- if equal opportunity is to be realized in the decision-making practices of public arts agencies, then the most important criterion used to evaluate grant applicants, artistic value, must be clarified as to its status, i.e., a criterion that can be applied cross-culturally or one that can reasonably said to vary by cultural tradition. In the literature of public
policy, this sort of question about the appropriateness of decision-making criteria is not unique. Much has been written about examinations and tests used in hiring decisions that are culturally-biased, reducing the opportunities of minority ethnic group members for employment. Conversely, many argue that universal criteria can and should be applied to hiring decisions as a necessary means of safeguarding equal treatment and ensuring that the most qualified candidates are hired, thus leading to considerable gains in workplace productivity and efficiency. Given this diversity of viewpoints, it seems clear that making public policy decisions merely on the basis of procedural fairness, a position reviewed in an earlier chapter, is not a replacement for clarifying the substance of evaluative criteria that are and must be utilized in making decisions of such import to those potentially affected.

As prominent as the criterion of artistic value is in the formal decision-making policies of public arts agencies, the meaning of this concept is usually unclarified and left undefined. There are several reasons for this apparent anomaly. For example, the arts organizations that seek funding from public arts agencies are extremely diverse along numerous lines and their "institutional aesthetic philosophies often are complex and collective and seldom explicitly articulated." Thus, arts policy-makers could argue that stipulating specific definitions of artistic value that could apply to these many and diverse organizations is a practical impossibility. Another, more common reason cited by public arts agencies for not defining artistic value is that the concept is inherently subjective, so that judgments made which make reference to artistic value are mere
statements of opinion. Finally, public arts agencies avoid stipulating definitions of artistic value by appealing to democratic values. The argument goes something like this: if a public arts agency were to stipulate a definition of artistic value and made decisions on the basis of it, the consequence would be the creation, dissemination, and legitimation of an official state culture such as those found in countries ruled by totalitarian governments. As a further consequence, freedom of artistic expression and the range of artistic forms and styles available to the citizenry would be unacceptably constrained. Public arts agencies are also sensitive to charges that they support "official culture" because of critiques of their funding practices which some would argue exhibit a Eurocentric bias. In other words, or so the argument goes, public arts agencies have a defacto policy of supporting a Eurocentric concept of artistic value which is unfairly imposed on all applicants to the detriment of artists and arts organizations of different cultural traditions. Thus, as a result of this thicket of issues surrounding the possible stipulation of an explicit definition of artistic value as a basis of its funding decisions, public arts agencies usually purport to have no aesthetic philosophy and, in some cases, seek to balance decision-making bodies such as boards and grant review panels with persons of diverse aesthetic viewpoints.

These explanations for arts agencies' reticence about defining a concept of artistic value may or may not be persuasive, but they are largely beside the point of the issue at hand. The point here is not to arrive at a stipulative definition in which conventions will be laid down for correct usage of "artistic value" by public arts agencies in funding contexts. Rather, in clarifying the possible meanings of the
term, the aim is to determine whether, to what extent, and in what ways assumptions about artistic value are variable from theoretical points of view, so that the funding policies of public arts agencies can be grounded in a clear sense of the assumptions behind their evaluative criteria. Ultimately, though, as the argument above makes clear, such evaluative criteria should be consistent with the premise of the equal opportunity argument that applicants be judged on appropriate standards of merit.

The issue at hand in this section, putting it in the most basic of terms, is this: are the artistic criteria used to evaluate the quality and merit of art works variable by culture and, if so, on what basis do they vary? Arriving at a definitive answer to this question is complicated by a number of factors. First, many cultures do not have a word for the concept of art, in that what can be called artistic activities are indistinguishably integrated with other aspects of life such as work, religion, and ritual. As such, formal theories of artistic value are not to be found in some cultures. This is not to say, however, that there is an absence of aesthetic concerns or implicit standards for what is valued or not. Coming to an understanding of the aesthetic dimension of cultures, whether those in small, homogenous societies or those in complex, heterogeneous societies, is a matter of delicate, empirical inquiry. But such inquiry among social scientists is relatively rare, despite frequent calls for it. Anthropologist Alan P. Merriman, for example, argues that without empirical inquiry into artists’ own concepts and evaluations of what they do, and how these activities are valued within and beyond the cultural
context of the art’s origin, then any theory of how aesthetic standards apply cross-culturally is premature.\(^{128}\)

Sociologists with interests in study of the arts would seem to be a valuable resource in at least coming to an understanding of how social processes condition the evaluation of art works. But in their quest to draw boundaries between themselves and more humanistic study of art and society, sociologists tend to consider question of artistic value as not within the province of a value-free, scientific discipline. On the other hand, sociologist Vera Zolberg contends that philosophers of art, who often treat art as a specialized activity divorced from social and cultural conditions, do not sufficiently consider how the concept of artistic value is formulated and conditioned by social processes.\(^{129}\)

Sociologists, however, have given considerable attention to undercutting claims that "great" art, art that has stood the test of time, speaks for all time and to all of humanity. Janet Wolff, among others, argues that any attempt to posit an independent, ahistorical meaning of aesthetic value obscures the contingent, historical, and ideological nature of such judgments.\(^{130}\) Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist, based on numerous empirical studies, posits a theory of the social foundations of aesthetic judgments. The theory is based on a distinction between pure taste and the popular aesthetic. Pure taste, as defined by Bourdieu, is rooted in the clear-cut separation between ordinary dispositions from specifically aesthetic dispositions and in the subordination of the functions of art to its formal aspects. Pure taste, according to Bourdieu, is the province of dominant classes in society who, as a result of their dominance, are able to posit a conception of artistic value
that views art as a timeless, autonomous, symbolic realm. To perpetuate this conception, dominant classes portray the popular aesthetic, which is based on the affirmation of continuity of art and life and the idea that art works are to be evaluated in terms of their content and capacity to serve functions, as barbarous. Bourdieu contends that in this way dominant classes are able to make arbitrary value distinctions seem natural and timeless. He terms this phenomenon "symbolic violence." As a consequence of symbolic violence, dominant classes are able to solidify inequitable social relations in their favor. Bourdieu further concludes that by limiting access to pure taste and the capacity to develop it, dominant classes are able to reproduce inequitable relations over time.131

Bourdieu's theory of how judgments of artistic value are arbitrary, used by dominant classes to negate the aesthetic values of dominated classes, and utilized as means to solidify and perpetuate their class standing, has had considerable influence with American social science. For example, DiMaggio and Ostrower suggest that Bourdieu's theory, while conducted in relatively unicultural France, has applicability to the multicultural United States. Based on their research on the arts consumption patterns of Black and white Americans, they arrive at the following conclusion: "the extent to which Black Americans share artistic-consumption patterns of white Americans, the absence of taste segmentation, and the fact that black participation in Euro-American high culture is predicted by the same status measures that influence white participation indicate that the Euro-American high-culture arts operate as a cultural standard for the United States as a whole."132 In other words, according to this view, dominant classes in America have effectively
made Euro-American concepts of artistic value as the benchmark of value of art produced and disseminated in America. But even DiMaggio and Ostrower acknowledge that traditionally African-American art forms are at least a supplementary source of consumption and, hence, artistic value for African-Americans.

Further, as will be recalled from the discussion of relations between art and culture, many neo-Marxist theorists who on the one hand accept Bourdieu’s general account of dominant-dominated social and cultural relations in complex societies, also conclude that ethnic groups can and do create artistic forms whose artistic value represents an alternative to the dominant culture or stands in opposition to it. The existence of these sources of artistic value is explained in two different ways: 1) the lack of cohesive ideological control by the dominant culture opens up the possibilities for the creation and dissemination of oppositional cultural forms;\footnote{133} and 2) ethnic groups experience sufficient distance from general socio-economic conditions and the concerns of the dominant culture so that ethnic arts can be produced and disseminated in virtual autonomy from dominant socio-economic interests.\footnote{134}

Apart from the considerable diversity in its theoretical explanations of the effects of dominant-dominated social relations on the possible creation of alternative sources of artistic value, the neo-Marxist position has further problems. Most notably, in directing their attention to socio-economic structures and their affects on artistic production and dissemination, proponents of the neo-Marxist position do not address the question of what is and can be meant by the term
"artistic value" except, perhaps, to dismiss stipulated definitions of "artistic value" as arbitrary conventions laid down by philosophers unable or unwilling to appreciate how social processes determine the use of concepts. This reductionist view can be critiqued on various grounds. But, for now, in more practical terms, such a view cannot be considered helpful in considering a policy context where some measure of clarity is needed for a concept that underlies the most prominent criterion utilized in funding decisions.

That said, however, the neo-Marxist position on artistic value does raise two important questions: 1) do the social origins of art works, e.g., art works created and disseminated through the influence and ideological power of a dominant culture in a society thereby negate their value?; 2) do the uses to which art works are put, e.g., as means to solidify the social status of members of the dominant culture, also negate their value? These questions will be dealt with below. But, first, there are a number of other questions surrounding the concept of artistic value that warrant examination. These will emerge through exploring a summary of diverse viewpoints, from philosophical and social scientific perspectives, on the origins, meaning, and implications of the concept of artistic value.

Arnold Hauser, as a social historian of art, rejects the view that art is an autonomous realm of value with its own distinct properties. In particular, he contends that the stature and value of works of art depends on the moral and social power of their subject matter. But he makes a further important point, namely, that values in moral or social realms do not transfer to the artistic realm
of necessity. Specifically, if art works are to serve any function within or beyond a culture, then they must exhibit a high level of artistic value defined in terms of formal properties.\textsuperscript{135} Philosophers of art Matthew Lipman and Anthony Saville similarly argue, respectively, that artistic value is no way dependent on the values of the non-aesthetic and that the aims and benefits of art have nothing to do with aesthetic excellence.\textsuperscript{136} For his part, anthropologist Jacques Macquet contends that criteria of artistic excellence are formal in nature and universally so, in that they are found in all cultures. Distinctions of artistic value, he argues, are based largely on preferences, most often the result of a correspondence between cultural values expressed in the art work and those values held by the individual viewer.\textsuperscript{137}

These points of view, which hold that artistic value is rooted in the formal properties of art works, can be contrasted with conceptions of artistic value which locate the value of art in its functions or consequences. June McFee, for example, argues that the value of art resides in its capacity to fulfill social functions such as: 1) objectification of subjective values and beliefs; 2) enrichment and celebration of ritual in human events; 3) communication of meanings and qualities; and 4) stabilization and perpetuation of cultures' identities and conceptions of reality.\textsuperscript{138} Nelson Graburn, an anthropologist, holds that judgments about the artistic value of art works is as much determined by the context of their production and use for social and cultural purposes as by features of the art works themselves.\textsuperscript{139} Finally, Robert Plant Armstrong rejects the applicability of Western concepts of artistic value which hold that the value of art is located in formal properties and argues that there are substantively different standards for evaluating the arts from culture
to culture. As an example, Armstrong contends that art works from many African cultures are not to be construed as symbols of something else, but works of what he calls "affecting presence." Works of art with "affecting presence" are treated in their culture of origin virtually as persons, and their value resides in their power, the power to command attention, rather than in beauty.140

These viewpoints clearly were reviewed here in brief, and many points in arguments used to support these views were not included. But, at this point, this summary was intended primarily to identify basic questions that must be addressed in clarifying the concept of artistic value. After reviewing neo-Marxist views and views on the locus of artistic value, several questions have emerged: 1) do the social origins of art works negate their value?; 2) do the uses to which art can be put negate their value?; and 3) does the value of art works reside in formal characteristics of art objects themselves, or the ideas and values expressed in art works, or in the consequences of interaction with art objects and, if so, what sorts of consequences? These will be addressed in turn.

The first two questions emerged from the review of neo-Marxist views of how art works are produced, disseminated, and utilized in societies characterized by inequitable socio-economic structures and dominant-dominated cultural relations. It is not difficult to imagine an argument being made that relates neo-Marxist theory to the arts of ethnic cultures. It could go something like this: the production, preservation, and dissemination of art rooted in Euro-American cultural traditions is facilitated by the socio-economic power of individuals and groups who, as a result of such power, can ensure that their tastes and preferences are met. It
is on these inequitable foundations that the dominant culture is able to define concepts of artistic value, concepts which are posited as universal criteria for evaluating art, but in reality merely reflect the preferences of privileged classes in society. As a result, then, opportunities for ethnic groups to produce and disseminate cultural products, such as the arts, as well as concepts of the value of ethnic arts are, at best, constrained. Therefore, or so it could be argued, the value of art works created in Euro-American traditions, because of their origins in equitable socio-economic relations, is negated, especially for persons most negatively affected by these relations, i.e., minority ethnic groups.

Such an argument, however, would be flawed on various grounds. As a previous discussion pointed out, it is not at all clear that the opportunities for the creation and dissemination of ethnic arts are as constrained as this argument assumes, even if one were to agree with neo-Marxists' portrayal of inequitable, dominant-dominated socio-economic relations in contemporary society. But the more significant flaw in such an argument is not empirical, but logical. The argument contains a false deduction, namely, that if the creation of certain kinds of art is founded on inequitable socio-economic, its value as art is therefore negated. Such a deduction does not necessarily follow in that involves a leap from a premise about one realm of human value to a conclusion about a different realm of value. Simply put, the argument confuses realms of human values -- justice and artistic value.

This is not to say that aesthetic considerations are totally removed from other realms of human value -- it can be and has been argued that art, while in
many ways a unique human activity, embodies values from the full range of human experience. Further, it can be reasonably conceded that when areas of human value conflict in specific contexts, certain areas of value do supersede others. For example, in considering whether to hold stock in companies than do business with South Africa, many universities have concluded that, in this instance, moral values should supersede economic values. Also, history is replete with examples of persons acting on a moral imperative, persons who have gone to jail rather than obey what they viewed as an unjust law of the state. But these two points, first, that art embodies human values and, secondly, that certain areas of value do supersede other areas of value, including artistic value, in specific contexts, do not undercut the above conclusion that the argument that the socio-economic foundations of Euro-American art negate its artistic value involves a confusion about realms of value. It is the generality of the argument that results in the confusion. If the argument were based on specific instances where certain art works were created and disseminated at the direct expense of the rights and opportunities of individual ethnic group members, then it could be said, with reason, that the value of justice should supersede whatever artistic value the arts works may have. But, even in such an instance, it does not follow that the value of these art works is negated, only superseded. And when the argument is extended to a general level, then the conclusion that the value of justice of necessity supersedes artistic value, let alone the conclusion that matters of justice of necessity negate the potential and actual value of art works, is not supported.
This discussion of justice and artistic value is in some ways reminiscent of the previous discussion of compensatory justice. It is as though proponents of the argument concerning the socio-economic foundations of Euro-American art conceive of the negation of the value of such art as a sort of compensation to minority ethnic groups for past injustices visited upon them as corporate entities. But the argument, as just shown, inherits the many problems associated with the concept of compensatory justice cited above.

The other question, "do the uses to which art can be put negate their value?", poses its own, different problems. It runs up against the social phenomenon discussed earlier, namely, that artists have little control over how their work is received at the time of its creation and, especially, over time. Clearly, then, whether one accepts the neo-Marxist portrayal of the dominant culture's power to use art that meets its preferences to legitimate and reproduce its social standing, it is plausible. But this acknowledgment hardly demonstrates that the way in which art works are used of necessity negates or even compromises their artistic value. The logic of the argument that if something is misused or utilized for indefensible purposes, if applied to other areas of human experience, would entail a commitment to absurdities. We do not say that if a child is abused her value as a person is therefore negated; we do not say that if a policy is implemented poorly, its value as a policy is negated; and we do not say that good intentions, if taken advantage of or even misdirected, are therefore rendered without value. Why we would then say that the value of Euro-American art is negated because some may use it to reinforce their social status is not clear. To
conclude so would be to fall prey to the is-ought conflation, whereby one makes value conclusions directly from observations, descriptions, or interpretations of how and why phenomena occur. Further, to arrive at such a conclusion borders on violation of a principle of justice, that an individual cannot be held liable or responsible for consequences which he or she could not avoid. Of course, this point depends on an analogy between art and human individuals, but, I believe, the point still holds.

Two final points about the two questions concerning the origins and consequences of art works and artistic value need to be made. Even though the viewpoint that the value of art if conditioned by its socio-economic origins and consequences has its roots in neo-Marxist theory, it should be stressed that this view is not shared by all neo-Marxists. Most notably, sociologist Janet Wolff makes two points: 1) that to comment on the origins of an assessment of artistic value is not necessarily a comment on the validity or defensibility of such an assessment; and 2) a sociological, historical analysis of the origins and consequences of judgments of artistic value need not lend inevitably to relativism or reductionism regarding criteria for aesthetic judgment. Finally, and this is a significant point, to put to rest the notion that art’s origins or consequences negate its artistic value only takes us so far, especially regarding interaction between Euro-American art works and minority ethnic groups. It does not follow from the above conclusion that Euro-American art works can and are perceived as objects of value and meaning by minority ethnic group members, and it certainly does not resolve
the basic question of whether artistic value can be said to vary from culture to culture or not.

In addition, and perhaps obviously, the above discussion, even though to an extent it saves the concept of artistic value from reduction to socio-economic conditions, does not even address another basic question -- in what does the value of art reside? There are numerous ways to approach this issue. One way that may prove fruitful, I believe, is to seek an answer to another question -- is the value of art one thing or many? Three answers have been offered historically, that the value of art resides in the art object itself, the response to objects, or in the effects of responses to art objects. These views will be reviewed in turn.

The view that the value of art resides in the art object itself is commonly termed by aestheticians the objective intrinsic theory of artistic value.¹⁴³ This theory is based on the idea of intrinsic goods, that something is wanted for its own sake with no reference to functions or means to further experiences. Works of art are considered valuable if they possess objective intrinsic value properties to a high degree. These intrinsic value properties have been defined in various ways historically. But such definitions will not be reviewed here because the objective intrinsic theory of artistic value is flawed from the outset. To evaluate a work of art by reference to intrinsic properties, one would have to be able to ascertain, recognize or know such properties. But how this is possible without some reference to the effects of such properties on the viewer either involves a curious theory of knowledge or is impossible. Further, the idea of valuing something, such as a work of art, for its intrinsic properties seems odd. This would mean that what
is valued is a physical object or thing. It seems more plausible to say that it is the experience of an object, such as an art work, that can be valued for its own sake. As R.A. Smith and C.M. Smith point out, "what is desired is not the object as such but the pleasure or satisfaction of possessing, using, or experiencing it."\textsuperscript{144}

These sorts of objections can also be applied to the idea that the value of art resides in the responses to art objects, often termed the subjective intrinsic theory of artistic value. Specifically, this theory holds that "works are valuable because they are intrinsically valued by some person or persons."\textsuperscript{145} Addition of the phrase "by some person or persons," however, does nothing to mitigate problems associated with the objective intrinsic theory of artistic value. It does not resolve or even address the issue of how it is possible to know objective intrinsic properties of art works or how one can value something without reference to the experience of it. Also, the phrase "by some person or persons" raises further problems. In particular, the phrase means that the locus of artistic value is in an individual person or persons. But this sort of valuing, without clarification, can easily be construed as referring to preferences for certain kinds of art work over others. Such a conception would mean that judgments of artistic value could be made with virtually no reference to properties or qualities of art works, and be based on phenomena like wish fulfillment, psychological projection, prejudice, and association with favored ideas and sentimentalities. If one were to trace the subjective intrinsic theory of artistic value to its logical conclusion, public arts agencies' practice of stipulating criteria of artistic merit for decision-making and giving these criteria such weight in making decisions would be pointless. A further
implication would be to render moot the question of whether artistic value is relative to a culture or universal in nature. Without some reference to artistic criteria rooted in properties of art works, aesthetic judgment would be relative only to the preferences of individuals and thereby could not be relative to a culture.\textsuperscript{146}

The final category of theories of artistic value, instrumental theories, avoid many of the problems identified with the objective intrinsic and subjective intrinsic theories. Instrumental theories reject the notion that something can have value without reference to the experience of it. Indeed, such theories locate the experience of art, and the consequences of these experiences, as the locus of artistic value. Further, as George Dickie contends, "even the most rudimentary reflection on the kinds of things that works of art are indicates that they are the kind of thing that are the source of and are used as a source of valuable experience and that they are created to serve this purpose."\textsuperscript{147} But these general features of instrumental theories do not, in themselves, address the issue of whether artistic values is one thing or many. To say that artistic value is located in the experience of art does not prejudge the issue. As will be seen, instrumental theories of artistic value vary considerably on this point. Three instrumental theories of artistic value will be explored here, those of Monroe Beardsley, Nelson Goodman, and Nicholas Wolterstorff.

Monroe Beardsley proposes that art works are to be evaluated in terms of how well they produce aesthetic experience, i.e., experience of art that is intrinsically satisfying. Art that is good is instrumental to aesthetic experience. Since it is so central to Beardsley's theory of artistic value, the concept aesthetic
experience bears close scrutiny. As his starting point, Beardsley states, "that it can be not only enjoyable, but also desirable, for experience to have a high aesthetic level."\(^{148}\) He does not include in his definition of the aesthetic dimension of experience sheer sensuous agreeableness or pleasure. Aesthetic quality refers to "the kind of pleasure or sense of satisfaction and fulfillment that comes from the awareness of the way elements of experience interrelate in order to bring about the formation of complex unities that are marked by emergent regional qualities."\(^{149}\)

Beardsley holds that experience of this nature, aesthetic experience, has five characteristics: 1) It involves attention to a portion of a phenomenally objective field, either sensuous (such as the colors in a painting) or intentional (such as events in a novel), and to its elements and internal relationships. 2) It involves an awareness of form, i.e., relationships among the elements of the phenomenal field, especially (but not exclusively) relationships of similarity/contrast and serial order. 3) It involves an awareness of regional quality, i.e., simple qualities of complexes, and especially (but not exclusively) those qualities that are described by words taken over metaphorically from human contexts. The class of regional qualities corresponds roughly to aesthetic concepts such as beauty, elegance, grace, dignity, and irony. 4) It is characterized by a fairly high degree of unity, in comparison with ordinary everyday experiences. Unity has two distinguishable parts: coherence and completeness. An aesthetic experience is unusually coherent, in that the various perceptions, feelings, inferences, recognitions, memories, desires, etc. that occur in the course of its development have a character of belonging or
fitting together or succeeding one another with continuity. An aesthetic experience is unusually complete, in that the experience marks itself off fairly definitely from other experiences. 5) It is intrinsically gratifying, or, in other words, brings with it both a continuing enjoyment that is felt as part of the development of the experience, and a final satisfaction or fulfillment that may linger after the experience has ended.150

Beardsley argues that it makes sense to say that objects themselves have the capacity to raise the level of aesthetic experience. Certain objects, in virtue of their aesthetic qualities, are peculiarly well-suited to reward repeated attention. Again, this capacity Beardsley terms the aesthetic value of the object.

Beardsley's apparent claim that the proper experience of art is the aesthetic experience of art, with its insulated character, seems unnecessarily limited in character. Beardsley, according to Dickie, "mistakes the absorption one experiences in attending to art for detachment from moral and cognitive concerns."151 It is one thing to say that the experience of some or even many works of art is detached in character, but the conclusion that connections to moral and cognitive concerns is irrelevant to the evaluation of art works does not follow. Numerous examples can be cited of art works the experience of which involves recognitions and realizations in dealing with moral and cognitive content. This is not to say that a more defensible moral idea in an art work therefore makes that art work better, only that richness of the experience of art can be and is enhanced by interaction with moral and cognitive content beyond the distinctively aesthetic properties. It would seem, then, that since his account of the experience of art is limited, Beardsley's theory
of art evaluation, which makes art's capacity to produce aesthetic experience the sole basis for the evaluation of art, is inadequate.

Another sort of instrumental theory of artistic value is proposed by Nelson Goodman. But apart from its similar formal features, that art is to be evaluated in terms of its capacity to achieve consequences, Goodman's theory could not be more different from the theory of Beardsley.

At the core of these differences are conceptions of the proper experience of art works. As will be recalled, Beardsley began with a theory of aesthetic experience that then served as a basis for his account of the evaluation of art. Because he maintained that aesthetic experience has a detached character, Beardsley claimed that works of art are most properly experienced as the focus of an experience insulated from any references outside the art work itself, including moral and cognitive issues. Thus, since such references have no place in the experience of art, works of art, according to Beardsley, must be evaluated on the basis of their nonreferential features and properties.

Goodman, on the other hand, begins with a theory of the nature of art which, in turn, is utilized to construct a theory of the evaluation of art. He maintains that works of art are symbols, i.e., that art works are essentially cognitive in nature. They are to be experienced, then, in terms of their cognitive relation to things outside of themselves. In distinguishing between aesthetic experiences and non-aesthetic experiences, Goodman holds that aesthetic experiences are those in which some attention is centered on the symbols themselves as well as on their references.$^{152}$
Goodman's evaluation theory can be summarized into the four following claims:  
1) every work of art is a symbol which refers to something outside of itself either through description, representation, or exemplification or in combination;  
2) symbols are a matter of cognition;  
3) the primary purpose of art is cognition -- the utility of art for functions like pleasure and communication are dependent on the cognitive nature of art; and  
4) art is ultimately to be evaluated not merely in terms of its capacity to foster pleasure or communication but by how well it serves its cognitive purpose.

Since Goodman's definition of artistic value is ultimately dependent on the concept of "cognitive efficacy," one might expect an explicit definition of this term. But what he offers is a general statement about cognitive efficacy:

Symbolization, then, is to be judged fundamentally by how well it serves the cognitive purpose: by the delicacy of its discriminations and the aptness of its allusions; by the way it works in grasping, exploring, and informing the world; by how it analyzes, sorts, orders, and organizes; by how it participates in the making, manipulation, retention, and transformation of knowledge. Considerations of simplicity and subtlety, power and precision, scope and selectivity, familiarity and freshness, are all relevant and often contend with one another; their weighting is relative to our interests, our information, and our inquiry.  

It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to evaluate Goodman's theory of artistic value on the basis of this general, rather obtuse, statement. But Goodman's concept of art provides the grounds for some degree of assessment of his artistic value theory. As Dickie says of Goodman, "underlying his claim about cognitive efficacy is the more basic claim that all art is referential: unless a work of art is referential in some way, the question of cognitive efficacy cannot arise for it. Thus, if there are nonreferential artworks, they cannot be evaluated according to
Goodman’s scheme. Goodman must show that there are no nonreferential works of art.  

Goodman attempts to make this case by arguing that, for example, a color in a nonobjective painting is referential because it exemplifies itself. Further, an art work with such a color has artistic value only because the color refers by means of exemplification. But what it is that color in a painting refers to or how it exemplifies itself is not at all clear. The following explanation by Goodman does little to clarify this point:

The properties that count in a purist [nonobjective] painting are those that the picture make manifest, selects, focuses upon, exhibits, heightens in our consciousness -- those that it shows forth -- in short, those properties that it does not merely possess but exemplifies, stands as a sample of.

Goodman’s theory does take an important step beyond Beardsley’s insulated theory of aesthetic experience and corollary theory of artistic value by arguing that value can accrue to the experience of art in virtue of its reference to cognitive issues. But, just as Beardsley’s theory was found inadequate by virtue of its limited notion of the experience of art, Goodman’s theory is inadequate by making cognitive efficacy the sole criterion of artistic value, even though many works of art could not be reasonably said to be symbolic or referential. As Dickie contends, “both Beardsley and Goodman suffer from the philosopher’s passion for theoretical neatness and simplicity. Each wants a theoretical explanation for the value of art that involves only one kind of feature.”

The two major theories of artistic value reviewed to this point have addressed a major question of this section -- is the value of art one thing or many?
While very different, the response by each was “one thing.” Though not merely because these theories identified artistic value as “one thing,” each was found inadequate. The philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff offers a different view. He holds that art works can have artistic value by virtue of their capacity to induce a detached kind of aesthetic experience focused solely on the aesthetic properties of art works; Wolterstorff also contends that cognitive characteristics of art works are important to their evaluation. But, unlike Beardsley and Goodman, Wolterstorff does not conclude that value of art is “one thing,” either exclusively aesthetic or cognitive in character. Instead, Wolterstorff offers an instrumental theory of artistic value whereby the value of art is many things and can be aesthetic, cognitive, moral, and religious in character.

In developing his theory of artistic value, Wolterstorff agrees that some works of art are instruments with a single purpose, while others are instruments with several purposes. By these purposes he means the purposes for which a work of art is made or distributed. Among the possible purposes of art works is the “purpose of contemplation for aesthetic delight.” Wolterstorff makes the idea of the purposes of art central to his concept of artistic value. For example, in the case of some art works, “an aesthetically excellent object is one that effectively serves the purpose of contemplation for aesthetic delight.” But, as noted above, Wolterstorff contends that art can serve many purposes besides aesthetic purposes, in particular, cognitive, moral, and religious purposes. Thus, his view of the nature of artistic value is phrased in more general terms to apply to many kinds of art:
"A work of art has *artistic excellence* if it serves well the purposes for which it was made or distributed."\(^{160}\)

On the face of it, phrasing a conception of artistic value in terms of the purposes it serves seems problematic. In many cases, one does not know and, in other cases, it is virtually impossible to know the purpose or purposes for which an art work was made. Moreover, it must be granted that a specific work of art may have an unintended feature or features that can be said to undercut its artistic value. Finally, speaking about the purposes behind an art work’s creation raises the perennial question of the relevance of an artist’s intention to the evaluation of an art work. These problems can be avoided, however, if Wolterstorff’s principle of artistic value is phrased not in terms of the purposes for which art works are created or distributed, but in terms of the variety of aspects of art works, aspects that can be aesthetic, cognitive, moral, or religious in nature.

With this slight amendment in mind, what then does Wolterstorff mean by, for example, the cognitive features of art works? He cites two meanings: "the fact that a proposition asserted by means of some work is *true* [or] the fact that the world of a work is *true to* actuality in some respect."\(^{161}\) Such cognitive features of art works, then, are considered grounds for positive judgments of artistic merit because, phrased in instrumental terms, persons can derive satisfaction from perceiving that elements of an art work are true or illuminate aspects of the world in a vividly accurate way.

If this view, however, committed Wolterstorff to the belief that an art work *must* be true in a propositional sense, uphold a defensible moral principle or
display, by some definition, only moral acts, or support a religious belief system, then this form of the instrumental theory of artistic evaluation would be difficult to defend. Such a view could surely be invoked to justify restrictions on artistic expression and even censorship if adopted by public arts agencies or those with oversight power over public arts agencies. Unfortunately, Wolterstorff does not address these possible implications or even clarify, in his view, whether the content of an art work must be true or morally acceptable to have artistic value. This question, therefore, must be resolved if this instrumental theory, with its concept of many sources of artistic value, is to be defended. Three theories, those developed by Beardsley, Dickie, and Rader and Jessup can be brought to bear on this question.

The concept of inherent value, as developed by Beardsley, could be helpful here. Beardsley holds that art can indeed have value beyond that found in immediate, qualitative experience by eliciting desirable effects. These effects can include: resolution of conflicts within the self; refinement of perception and discrimination; development of the imagination and the ability to put oneself in the place of others; and the fostering of mutual sympathy and understanding. Beardsley admits that while many of these claims have been persuasive to many at various times, “it will take much thorough and delicate psychological inquiry before they can be made good.” Art works which have the capacity to produce these effects, in Beardsley’s terms, can be said to have inherent value. What is of greater interest here, however, is the conditions that must be present for art works to have inherent value. Of inherent value, Beardsley says
first, it is produced by means of, or via, aesthetic enjoyment, and therefore it is produced to some degree (however small) by all works of art; second, the degree to which it is produced is correlated (at least roughly) with the aesthetic value of the work, so that, on the whole and generally speaking, the better the work of art the greater the effect is capable of producing.\textsuperscript{163}

It is clear, then, that capacity of art works to produce desirable effects is wholly dependent on their aesthetic value which, in turn, is dependent on their capacity to induce the detached kind of aesthetic experience described by Beardsley. But, since this conception of aesthetic experience previously was found inadequate, the notion of inherent value therefore is of little help here. If one does not accept that cognitive, moral, or religious features of art works bear on artistic evaluation, then the issue of whether these features must be true or right or believable is bypassed.

Dickie, as seen above, does not accept Beardsley's account of aesthetic experience, and hence his view of aesthetic value. He holds that the experience of cognitive, moral, and religious features of art works is relevant to their evaluation. But he also argues that most art works contain various combinations of these and aesthetic features. Based on this view, then, Dickie contends that the experience of art works is not a matter of focusing on one type of feature, but an integrated experience where the experience of aesthetic features is intertwined with the experience of cognitive, moral, or religious features.\textsuperscript{164} If this account is granted, implications for the question of whether an art work must be true or right or believable can be drawn. While not stated by Dickie in these terms, it seem reasonable to conclude that if art works' features are experienced in an integrated way, then the nature of one type of feature in an art work cannot be said to determine that work's artistic value. Thus, even if an art work's truth value or
defensibility according to moral principles can be challenged, the artistic value of the work would not necessarily be negated or even compromised.

This point, however, only establishes that questionable veracity or moral value in art works need not detract from their overall artistic value. But such a weak conclusion hardly provides a persuasive reply to someone who might say that an art work must be true or morally acceptable to have artistic value. Such a person could still say that an art work would have greater artistic value if its truth value or moral acceptability were not in dispute, a position consistent with constrictions on freedom of artistic expression and even censorship. A stronger position on the contributions of cognitive and moral characteristics of art works to artistic value is needed. A point by Melvin Rader and Bertram Jessup suggests such a position.\(^\text{165}\)

This position can be applied to the moral content of art works, even art works whose subject matter many might find foreign, shocking, disgusting, or morally repugnant. It seems clear that art, and the experience of art, has the capacity to convey the vivid qualities of the full range of human experience. Morality, for its part, requires a capacity to put ourselves in the place of others, to see the world and its predicaments from the point of view of the other. Without this capacity, persons are viewed as categories and morality becomes a matter of the application or rules in an impersonal way. Imagination affords persons the opportunity of going beyond the boundaries of their individual selves. But while imagination may be a capacity in all human beings, it can remain undeveloped or underdeveloped without experience. The concepts and abstractions of science and
philosophy are not good guides for developing human imagination. These premises about art, morality, and imagination can be combined to address the moral content of art works in this way: art, by its capacity to present the vivid qualities of the full range of human experience, including human experience many may find morally repugnant, has the unique capacity to develop persons' imaginative ability to put themselves in the place of other, an ability without which morality is narrow, rule-based, and devoid of passion. It seems to me that this argument, at least in the case of the moral content of art works, provides a sufficient and positive response to those who would hold that for art works to have moral efficacy they must present moral acts that all would find defensible according to a moral principle.

To this point, two premises in this argument in support of the instrumental theory of artistic value have been established: 1) the value of art is many things rather than one, and can be rooted in the integrated experience of aesthetic, cognitive, moral, and religious features of art works; and 2) the efficacy of cognitive, moral, and moral features of art works for artistic value is not a matter of their adherence to principles of propositional truth, morality, or religious orthodoxy but in their capacity to make vivid the qualities of the range of human experience.

To say that artistic value is multi-dimensional, variable, and inheres in art works' capacities to elicit different kinds of valuable experience, however, only takes us so far. Most instrumental theories contain the premise that art is valuable because it is a means to valuable experiences not just in isolated individuals but many individuals. To contend otherwise would leave the instrumental theory with
the same problems associated with the subjective intrinsic theory of artistic evaluation, and would foreclose the possibility of utilizing artistic criteria in decision-making about the merit of those seeking grants from public arts agencies. The question then becomes whether it is possible to say not only that the art is instrumental to valuable experiences in many individuals, but whether it is also permissible to conclude that the value of art works varies by culture, i.e., that the features of some art works are better able to elicit valuable experiences from members of one ethnic group culture than another.

Attempting to answer this question affirmatively involves a number of complications that must be first addressed. As will be recalled from a previous section of this chapter, research on the creation, perception, consumption, and meanings of art in complex, contemporary society painted an equivocal picture. On the one hand it was granted that many artists in contemporary American society create work rooted in subject matter inspired by the beliefs and concepts of ethnic cultural traditions; on the other hand, it was found that no ethnic culture in complex societies can claim an artistic style as its own without acknowledging at least some influence from other cultural traditions. It was also found that results of research on cultural differences in perception of art works were, at best, equivocal, while the weight given race and ethnicity as a predictor of arts consumption patterns varied among researchers. Further, contradictory effects of the contemporary marketplace on ethnic art were also found: the simultaneous availability of a heterogenous range of artistic styles, the utilization of ethnic art in ways autonomous from their cultural origins or intended effects, the creation and
dissemination of ethno-kitsch but, also, ethnic art created predominantly to facilitate the transmission of culturally-specific symbolic meanings. Finally, despite a plethora of claims about the functions and meanings of art for ethnic group cultures, documentation of these claims was found notably thin.

If one were to glean selectively from these diverse findings on the creation, perception, consumption, and meanings of ethnic art a case could probably be made that, at least in complex, multicultural societies, the value of art does not vary by culture. Such an argument could go something like this. Most ethnic art either draws on more than one cultural tradition in its creation or is made to satisfy the expectations of consumes from other traditions. Research reveals that race and ethnicity have minimal effects on perception and consumption of the arts. The meanings such art can and does have for ethnic groups is not clear. In any case, ethnic art, whatever its origins or intended effects, can be utilized to serve the many diverse purposes of consumers. Therefore, or so the argument could go, there seems little basis to conclude that art’s capacity to produce valuable experiences rooted in art works’ aesthetic, cognitive, moral, and religious features varies by culture.

But such an argument is surely flawed. Apart from the fact that it ignores evidence about the creation, consumption, and meaning of ethnic art that could challenge its premises, this argument contains flawed premises exposed earlier. In particular, this argument contains the premise that the origins of art and uses to which it is put can undercut or even negate its value. This premise was initially reviewed in considering neo-Marxist claims that the value of Euro-American art is
negated because of its origins in inequitable social relations and its use to reinforce class power and privilege. The arguments used to demonstrate the weaknesses of these claims will not be reviewed here. Suffice to say here that if the value of Euro-American art is not negated by its origins and uses to which can be put, then the same applies to the value of ethnic art, whatever its origins or uses.

Another question must be addressed, however, before a persuasive case can be made that the value of art varies by culture: if such a case can be made, does this consign us to relativism in setting evaluative criteria for the arts? Relativism is "the view that there is no way to adjudicate between differing evaluations of a work of art." One way to avoid the problem of relativism is to argue, as does Beardsley, that since there is only one instrumental value for art, its capacity to induce aesthetic experience, if there are differing evaluations of an art work, either one evaluator must be wrong or incapable of having an aesthetic experience. But this sort of argument, based on a singular notion of the value of art, cannot be used if one holds that the value of art is multi-faceted and rests in aesthetic, cognitive, moral, or religious features of art works which have the capacity to induce a range of valuable experiences. It can be argued that this considerable range of possible responses to art works makes the matter of the comparison of these responses and the consequent judgments about art works highly problematic.

This complication can be met, I believe, in two ways. First, even if it is granted that art works variously include aesthetic, cognitive, moral, or religious features, it does not follow that the experience of an art work and hence its evaluation is a matter of focusing on one type of feature. As noted above, the
experience of art works with multiple features is more accurately described as integrated in nature, where the experience of aesthetic features is intertwined with the experience of cognitive, moral, or religious features. As such, the artistic value of an art work can be said to reside in the integrated experience of its diverse features. Under this conception, it follows that if persons disagree in their evaluations of an art work, either one evaluator must be wrong or be incapable of having an integrated experience of multi-dimensional works of art.

This latter point highlights the other issue that must be addressed in order to show that this version of the instrumental theory of artistic evaluation need not lead to relativism. Implicit in the idea expressed above that some persons are incapable having an integrated experience of multi-dimensional works of art is the idea that some persons are in some sense qualified to do so. This question is particularly important to making a case that artistic value varies by culture. Admittedly, there are numerous practical problems associated with identifying individuals qualified to evaluate works of art. For example, how is it possible to distinguish pretenders from qualified individuals? A common response to such a question is to point to the model of the critic. Definitions of the characteristics and qualifications are quite diverse, too diverse to be debated here. Suffice to say that minimal qualifications of arts critics are the capacity to think reflectively about the features, qualities, and meanings of art works and to effectively verbalize their insights and judgments. But Dickie points out another significant feature of individuals qualified to evaluate art: "When someone can point out to me some feature of a work of art of which I was unaware but which I can then come to see,
hear, understand, and so on, then I have the best evidence I could possibly have that person is, if not a fully qualified judge, then at least more qualified than I am and someone to whom I ought to pay attention.\textsuperscript{167}

A final point needs to be made about the qualifications of individuals to have integrated experiences of multi-dimensional works of art and to therefore made defensible judgments about their artistic value. Throughout this section it has been stressed that the moral, religious, and cognitive (including symbolic) features of art works are important to their evaluation. As such, then, it seems reasonable to conclude that familiarity with the cognitive, moral, and religious beliefs and practices of a culture, while by no means a sufficient qualification for defensible artistic evaluation, is a necessary qualification. History is replete with examples of critical evaluation of art works from ethnic cultures based solely on aesthetic features and qualities. Indeed, the way ethnic arts are exhibited and displayed in museum settings often reflects this limited focus of evaluation.

The implications of this point can be summarized as follows: if defensible judgments are to be made about multi-dimensional works of art based on these works’ capacity to induce valuable, integrated, experiences, then familiarity with a culture’s cognitive, moral, and religious beliefs and practices is a necessary qualification of those making such judgments. This conclusion is important in two regards. First, it suggests that the value of art can vary by culture, because the cognitive, moral, and religious beliefs and practices embodied as features in art works, features of special relevance to the evaluation of art, can and do vary by culture. Secondly, this conception guards against the prospect of relativism,
whereby there is no means of resolving differences in the evaluation of art works. It does not follow, as some might suspect, that contending that the value of art varies by culture consigns one to relativism as defined here. This is so because this conception makes clear that some evaluations of art works are more reliable and defensible than others. More defensible evaluations are made by those persons who are capable of having integrated experiences of multi-dimensional art works whose features embody a culture’s cognitive, moral, and religious beliefs and practices, persons having, at minimum, a familiarity with those beliefs and practices. Such persons also evidence their qualifications to make defensible judgments by being able to point out and clarify features of art works with which other persons were at first unaware but could then come to see, hear, and understand.

It is now time to bring these various strands together in a summary of this instrumental conception of artistic value. It was granted that much ethnic art is multicultural in origin, is variously valued by ethnic group members, and can be utilized for purposes with little relation to its origins or intended effects. Still, it was found that these phenomena, in themselves, do not negate the potential value of such art. Further, it was also established that much art work has been and continues to be created that draws on the cultural traditions, beliefs, and practices of ethnic groups. This art is best and most fairly evaluated by persons capable of having integrated experiences based on their familiarity with the cognitive, moral, and religious beliefs and practices embodied in the features of such art works.
This conception of the variability of artistic value by culture has obvious implications for the practices of public arts agencies. As was stipulated earlier, if the equal opportunity concept of justice is to prevail in arts policy, then all grant applicants must be evaluated according to appropriate criteria. Since artistic value is the most prominent of all evaluative criteria utilized by public arts agencies, its clear definition and fair application is of utmost importance in maintaining the equal opportunities of those seeking funds. Then, when these conceptions of justice and artistic value are combined, it seems obvious that public arts agencies must rest considerable decision-making responsibility in persons qualified to make defensible judgments about the artistic value of art rooted in ethnic cultural traditions. Such an assertion does, admittedly, present practical problems. For example, identifying and recruiting such qualified individuals for service can take considerable effort on the part of public arts agencies. However, mere inclusion of a certain percentage of ethnic group members on arts agencies' grants decision-making panels and boards, some of whom may not by virtue of knowledge and experience be qualified to evaluate the merits of works of ethnic art, does not suffice. For equal opportunity to be upheld, public arts agencies must not only make the effort but in fact secure the service of individuals qualified to make defensible judgments about the artistic value of ethnic art.

Analysis and Evaluation of Arts Policy Mechanisms

This chapter began with the identification of four conceptual issues that emerged during the interpretation of the policy mechanisms utilized by state arts agencies. These issues included the following: conceptions of cultural pluralism,
i.e., normative definitions of how the political, social, and economic relations of cultural and ethnic groups ought to be in society; relations of art and culture in society and the effects of these relations; the place of concepts of justice and their applications to arts policy contexts; and questions surrounding the concept of artistic value, including in what does artistic value reside? is value in art best thought of as one thing or as many? and does value in art vary by culture? Analysis of these questions reflected the belief that policy mechanisms are rooted in alternative and potentially conflicting value positions, the resolution of which is only possible through analysis of the value assumptions underlying these positions.

Through conceptual analysis of the concepts in forming these positions a number of conclusions emerged, conclusions which I believe, can serve as the basis for the evaluation of public policy goals in the arts. The concept of "cultural pluralism," a pluralism of pluralisms as articulated and advocated for, was found to be a problematic basis for the formulation of arts policy goals. Certain definitions of cultural pluralism, it was found, could resist criticisms that the ideal of cultural pluralism inevitably leads to the constriction of individual development or threatens basic democratic values. Yet many open questions remained about the concept of "cultural pluralism," in particular, what is the proper role of the state in fostering cultural pluralism? It was also concluded that, by itself, the concept did not address the criticism that ethnic artistic activities involve little commitment to the retention of ethnic group cultures' behaviors, outlooks, and dispositions, a necessary condition of most ideals of cultural pluralism.
This open question led to consideration of two aspects of the relationship between art and culture, the effects of culture on art and the effects of art on culture. The review of research on the creation, perception, consumption, and meanings of ethnic art was equivocal, although it was acknowledged that many artists create art works rooted in the beliefs and practices and that these art works potentially serve functions and have meanings for ethnic groups. Still, it was concluded that support within the American social structure for the creation and dissemination of ethnic art that has important meanings for ethnic groups in complex, heterogeneous societies was limited at best and, therefore, that ethnic art activities, to serve important purposes, require some kind of support from the government as a matter of public policy.

This conclusion led to the exploration of concepts of justice, and its associated concept of affirmative action, in order to see if a justification of policies to support the production and dissemination of ethnic arts could be rooted in a concept of justice. Concepts of compensatory justice, rights, utilitarian justice, and distributive justice were found wanting on a variety of grounds. But the concept of justice as equal opportunity was found a sufficient justification for at least some forms of affirmative action programs within the arts policy sphere. This concept contained two basic principles: 1) that persons receive equal treatment and not be subjected to inappropriate forms of discrimination on the basis of factors such as race and ethnicity in the competition for, for example, grant funds; and 2) that for equal opportunity to be upheld, the state has an obligation to reduce the competitive obstacles individuals and organizations face, through no lack of effort
on their own, in seeking grant funds by offering remedies directed to enhance applicants' knowledge and skill, and hence their qualifications, so that they can more effectively meet the standards of merit stipulated for receipt of grant funds. This point led to a final conclusion, that if a standard of merit rooted in an inapplicable concept of artistic value is utilized in the evaluation of work produced and disseminated by artists and arts organizations based in ethnic cultural traditions, then the principle of equal opportunity is not upheld.

This point then led to exploration of a final conceptual issue -- whether artistic value can be said to vary by culture. After review of a wide range of theories of artistic value, including neo-Marxist views as well as the objective intrinsic, subjective intrinsic, and various versions of the instrumental theory of artistic evaluation, a definition of artistic value was stipulated. This definition holds that artistic value resides in the capacity of art works to induce, in qualified individuals, valuable, integrated experiences of the aesthetic, cognitive, moral, and religious features of art works. It was also concluded that a definition of qualified individuals must, of necessity, include familiarity with those cognitive, moral, and religious beliefs and practices that are embodied as features in art works rooted in ethnic cultural traditions. Finally, it was concluded that this conception of artistic value, on the one hand, supports the view that defensible judgments of artistic value can and do vary by culture and, on the other hand, guards against the prospect of relativism, by positing conditions for the possibility of resolving disputes over different evaluations of art works.
Out of all of this analysis, then, two basic criteria have emerged that can be utilized in the evaluation of the policy mechanisms of public arts agencies: 1) that the principles of equal opportunity, barring inappropriate discrimination and requiring positive remedies to equalize opportunities, must be upheld; and 2) that applicants must be evaluated using culturally appropriate standards of merit applied by individuals qualified to do so. These criteria clearly can justify many of the policies and practices of public arts agencies toward issues of multiculturalism and the arts. These include technical assistance workshops and leadership training opportunities, and active publicizing of these opportunities in ethnic cultural communities, as well as the active recruitment of grant applicants from minority ethnic groups and the retention of individuals qualified to make appropriate judgments about ethnic art on art agencies' grants decision-making bodies. Just as clearly, these two criteria can be invoked in critiquing other public arts agency policies and practices. These include: the selection of individuals to serve on grants decision-making bodies solely on the basis of their race and ethnicity without due consideration to their qualifications to make evaluative judgments according to culturally appropriate criteria; special programs restricted only to members of ethnic groups; and distributive pluralism policy mechanisms requiring either formulaic distribution of arts funds or "reflection" of the racial ethnic makeup of artists' and arts organizations' communities in their audiences. It is not difficult to imagine other policies and practices that can be justified or judged unjustified according to these two criteria. It must be stressed, however, that justifying the policy goals of public arts agencies does not mean that any specific program that
is adopted consistent with these criteria is therefore effective in meeting its goals or does so with a minimum of unanticipated, negative consequences. Documentation of the effectiveness and efficiency of specific programs is a matter for policy research of a more empirical nature.

It must also be acknowledged that the establishment of these criteria for the evaluation of policy mechanisms does not cover other possible policy options available to public arts agencies. For example, it can be argued that public arts agencies should broaden their eligibility requirements for applicants to open up the competitive process to smaller organizations, non-arts organizations such as social service agencies and religious organizations, and even amateur groups. These organizational types, it is said, are frequently the institutional home for the creation and dissemination of ethnic art. The merits of this policy option will not be debated here. Suffice it to say that, on the face of it, nothing in the two evaluative criteria identified above would prohibit the adoption of this policy option. As another example of a policy option public arts agencies could perhaps adopt, it has been argued that the most potentially effective means of supporting ethnic artists and arts organizations is not merely to revise or supplement arts policy mechanisms, but to devise and implement cultural policies, policies designed to support the maintenance and development of the foundations of ethnic arts, namely, ethnic cultures themselves. How cultural policies should be formulated and how they can be implemented fairly and effectively could surely be a topic for extensive debate. But whether they could be justified or not, issues implicit in the
adoption of cultural policies, while not irrelevant or unimportant here, are beyond the scope of the public policy sphere under consideration here, the arts.

The most important policy option available to public arts agencies yet to be considered here is arts education. The significance of this option is based on the many and dynamic interrelationships, cited above, between the policy spheres of arts education and the arts. For example, arts education policies can shape the qualities and characteristics of future potential beneficiaries of public arts policies - artists, audiences, and patrons. Arts policies clearly can affect the kinds of art that are created and made available in society. If an aim of arts education is to initiate students into participation in the art world, then the nature of the contemporary art world that public arts agencies can and do affect has significant implications for the formulation of arts education policy. In a more practical vein, most public arts agencies commit a considerable percentage of their resources to support arts education programs and initiatives. Given this, it seems reasonable to expect that the arts policies and arts education policies of public arts agencies be at least compatible and perhaps complementary regarding issues of multiculturalism.

But the most persuasive reason to focus on the policy option of arts education is rooted in the notion of individuals qualified to make evaluative judgments about the merits of ethnic art. It can be argued, certainly, that arts education programs can have a significant effect on the qualifications of future arts agencies decision-makers to evaluate ethnic art. But to phrase a rationale for certain kinds of arts education, in particular, multicultural arts education, in terms
of the impact on future arts grant decisions seems weak and, as a practical matter, would hardly convince most with interests in arts education and education. Thus, the challenge becomes to see whether a rationale for a specific concept of multicultural arts education can be constructed and defended on educational grounds. That will be the subject of Chapter VII. First, however, the current arts education policies in state education agencies and state arts agencies will be interpreted in terms of the value assumptions they reflect, with special attention to those concerning multiculturalism and multicultural arts education.

NOTES


3. For a full discussion of this point, see Thomas F. Green, Education and Pluralism: Idea and Reality (Syracuse, NY: School of Education, Syracuse University, 1966).


9. Ibid., p. 32.

10. Ibid., p. 69.

12. Ibid., p. 106.

13. Ibid., p. 106.


15. See, e.g., Horace Kallen, Culture and Democracy in the United States (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1924).


17. Ibid., p. 78.

18. For further discussion of cultural pluralism as voluntary ethnic choice, see William A. Newman, American Pluralism.

19. Nicholas Appleton, Cultural Pluralism in Education, p. 84.

20. Ibid., p. 70.

21. Ibid., p. 70.


31. Charles Tesconi, "Multicultural Education."

32. See Orlando Patterson, *Ethnic Chauvinism*.


35. Orlando Patterson, *Ethnic Chauvinism*.


37. For further discussion, see Alan P. Merriman, *The Anthropology of Music* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 1964).


39. This argument is made in greater detail in Raymond Williams, *The Sociology of Culture* (New York: Schocken Books, 1982).


42. Ibid., p. 576.

43. Ibid., p. 576.

44. For an example of this argument, see Another Standard, *Culture and Democracy: The Manifesto* (London: Comedia Publishing Group, 1986).


47. Ibid., p. 71.


49. This argument is made in Anthony Saville, *The Test of Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).


51. Ibid., p. 28.

52. Ibid., p. 28.


54. Ibid., pp. 149-150.

55. For a more complete articulation of this argument, see Eugene Grigsby, *Art and Ethnics* (Dubuque, IA: William C. Brown, 1977).


65. Ibid., p. 70.

66. Ibid., p. 70.


68. Ibid., p. 101.


71. Ibid., p. 130.

72. Ibid., p. 131.

73. This argument is made in Arnold Hauser, *The Sociology of Art*.


75. NEA Research Division Note 14, "Age, Desire and Barriers to Increased Attendance at Performing Arts Events and Museums," February 4, 1986, p. 2.


79. Ibid., p. 211.

80. Ibid., p. 212.

81. Ibid., p. 211.


83. Ibid., p. 5.

84. Ibid., p. 6.

85. Ibid., p. 6.

86. Ibid., p. 6.


88. For a discussion of this type of inquiry, see Vera L. Zolberg, Constructing a Sociology of the Arts.

89. This typology of the functions of art within a culture is found in June King McFee, "Cross-Cultural Inquiry Into the Social Meaning of Art: Implications for Art Education," Journal of Multi-cultural and Cross-cultural Research in Art Education 4 (Fall 1986): 6-16.


92. This argument is contained in George Steiner, In Bluebeard’s Castle: Some Notes Towards the Redefinition of Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).


95. Ibid., p. 8.

96. Ibid., p. 8.

97. This typology is based on one found in Robert K. Fullinwider, The Reverse Discrimination Controversy.

98. Ibid., p. 33.


100. Ibid., p. 33.

101. Ibid., p. 37.

102. This argument is contained in William Bradford Reynolds, Equal Opportunity, Not Equal Results (College Park, MD: Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland, 1985).


104. This argument can be found in William Bradford Reynolds, Equal Opportunity, Not Equal Results.


109. Ibid., p. 70.
110. Ibid., p. 91.


112. Ibid., p. 233.


115. These points are made in Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination.

116. Paul J. DiMaggio and Francie Ostrower, "Participation in the Arts by Black and White Americans."


118. Discussions of broad definitions of obstacles to equal opportunity and the problems associated with such definitions can be found in Alvin H. Goldman, Justice and Reverse Discrimination (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).

119. A version of this argument can be found in George Sher, "Justifying Reverse Discrimination in Employment," in Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds., Equality and Preferential Treatment.

120. This argument is made in Alvin H. Goldman, Justice and Reverse Discrimination.

121. A review of such arguments can be found in Robert K. Fullinwider, The Reverse Discrimination Controversy.


126. This point is made in Margaret J. Wyszomirski, "Philanthropy, the Arts, and Public Policy."

127. This point is made in Melvin Rader and Bertram Jessup, Art and Human Values (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976).


129. Vera L. Zolberg, Constructing a Sociology of the Arts.


133. This argument is made in Henry Giroux, Ideology, Culture, and the Process of Schooling.

134. This argument can be found in Raymond Williams, The Sociology of Culture.


136. For a full discussion of these arguments, see Matthew Lipman, "Can Non-Aesthetic Consequences Justify Aesthetic Values?", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 34 (Winter 1975): 117-123; and Anthony Saville, The Test of Time.


138. June King McFee, "Cross-cultural Inquiry Into the Social Meaning of Art: Implications for Art Education."


141. This view is fully developed in Melvin Rader and Bertram Jessup, *Art and Human Values*.


146. This argument can be found in David Best, "Concepts and Cultures," *Journal of Multi-cultural and Cross-cultural Research in Art Education* 3 (Fall 1985): 7-18.


149. Ibid., p. 49.


153. This summary is based on one found in George Dickie, *Evaluating Art*.


159. Ibid., p. 158.

160. Ibid., p. 157.

161. Ibid., p. 159.


164. See George Dickie, *Evaluating Art*.

165. See Melvin Rader and Bertram Jessup, *Art and Human Values*.


167. Ibid., p. 143.

MULTICULTURALISM AND THE ARTS:  
AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTUAL 
FOUNDATIONS AND POLICY ISSUES 
Volume II 
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By 

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Chapter VI

AN INTERPRETATION OF ARTS EDUCATION POLICIES

Previous chapters outlined a rationale for the integrated study, as exemplified here, of the two policy spheres of the arts and arts education. General features of this rationale focused on the potential influence of arts education policies and practices on the future beneficiaries of and contributors to public arts policy, as well as on how arts policies’ effects on the production and dissemination of the arts shape the kind of art world into which students are being initiated. Another general feature of this rationale centered on practical matters, specifically, on how arts education is the primary goal of public arts agencies and the recipient of agencies’ funding support and advocacy. Several features of this rationale were specific to the topic of this study, multiculturalism and the arts. In particular, many of the value-laden concepts underlying debates in arts policy, such as art, culture, artistic value, and justice inform debates in arts education policy as well. A final feature of this rationale, one stressed in Chapter V, is that arts education is a policy option that merits exploration by public arts agencies seeking qualified individuals to participate in decisions about the artistic value of ethnic arts.

As significant as these overlapping concerns and purposes of policy-makers in the arts and arts education are, it must be stressed here, as was done earlier,
that the arts and arts education are distinctive realms of public policy. Public arts agencies serve a variety of functions, including provision of technical assistance to artists and arts organizations, offering information about the arts to the general public, and leveraging support for arts organizations and artists from other government agencies and the private sector. But, as seen in Chapter IV, the primary function of public arts agencies, and the determinant of their structures, is the allocation of public funds. Policy-makers in arts education face different types of issues. Decisions must be made about what, how, whom, and, at times, whether to teach. These sorts of choices, and those involving the allocation of resources, are also conditioned by bureaucratic, budgetary, and demographic factors that differ significantly from those found in arts policy contexts.

A notable feature of the unique policy context of arts education is the many sectors of influence that can be identified. A review of these sectors, outlined initially in Chapter I, can be helpful here. The arts education policy context comprises six sectors of policy influence: 1) The federal sector includes the U.S. Department of Education, the National Endowment for the Arts, and, to a limited extent, the National Endowment for the Humanities. 2) Federal agencies are tied, in various ways, to the regulatory and curricular sector -- to state boards and departments of education, school districts, and colleges and universities. 3) Arts education and educational service organizations comprise the professional association sector. Through journals, newsletters, monographs, books, and professional meetings, they communicate to their memberships about current developments and research in arts education. 4) The arts advocacy sector,
composed of trusts, foundations, and corporate donors, has assumed the task of promoting, in varying degrees, formal arts instruction, artist residencies, and exposure to the arts programs. 5) The publishers of textbooks and tests and manufacturers of instructional materials and resources make up the **commercial sector**. 6) The **arts sector** includes public arts agencies at the national, state, and local levels, as well as arts institutions, museums, performance halls, artists, galleries, collectors, critics and historians.¹

The sectors of influence that will be the focus of analysis here are the regulatory and curricular sector and the arts sector, in particular, the policies of state departments of education and state arts agencies. Ideally, the choice to focus on these policy-making agencies would be based on a body of policy studies of the many intricate relationships between sectors of policy influence in arts education and assessments of the nature and strength of influence found in each. Such studies, however, are not to be found in the literature of arts education or, more generally, policy research. Still, I believe that a persuasive rationale for the importance of analyzing state departments of education and state arts agencies, regarding arts education, can be constructed.

First, since the focus of previous chapters has been the arts policies of state arts agencies, it seems reasonable to explore the arts education policies of departments of education and arts agencies at the state level if only to see if these different policies are in conflict, compatible, or complementary on issues of multiculturalism and the arts. Another reason to focus on state departments of education is the extensive nature of the formal responsibilities they have: setting
standards for the accreditation, certification, and hiring of arts teachers, the production of curriculum guides and adoption of textbooks, setting instructional goals and graduation requirements, and monitoring student learning and teacher effectiveness. State legislatures vary considerably in the oversight and regulatory responsibilities they give to state departments of education over local school districts; and, of course, state arts agencies have no regulatory responsibilities for public education. These qualifications notwithstanding, there is a final reason to focus here on departments of education and arts agencies at the state level, namely, that each sector is prominently involved in advocating reform initiatives in arts education, often cooperatively so. There are several themes that can be identified in these reform initiatives of which public agencies are a part: stress on a conceptual base for arts education integrating content from various arts disciplines, clearly defined instructional goals, renewed emphasis on the assessment of student achievement and teacher effectiveness, and the perceived necessity of consensus among the many arts education policy sectors as a basis for comprehensive policy development. The NEA-sponsored Arts in Education Basic Education Grants (AISBEG) program exemplifies these themes well. It aims to foster cooperative planning between state arts agencies and state departments of education in support of "basic arts education."

In focusing on state departments of education and state arts agencies as influential forces in the reform initiatives of arts education, an open question remains -- what role, if any, do concepts of art, culture, and multicultural arts education play in arguments and rationales for these state-level initiatives? To
answer this question, this chapter will explore a number of sources. Documents from AISBEG-participating state arts agencies include surveys of the condition of arts education in individual states, task force reports, and state-wide plans. The information of special interest from these documents are issues addressed, justifications of arts education, mission statements, goals and objectives, and curriculum prescriptions. The documents to be examined from state departments of education are curriculum guidelines and policy statements, which yield information such as justifications of arts education, mission statements, goals and objectives, curriculum recommendations, and teacher certification standards.

The goal here is not to critique the viewpoints expressed in these documents but to attempt to understand the value concepts, and assumptions underlying them, found in arguments, assertions, and proposals. The goal is interpretation and, as such, is to be realized through the method of interpretive policy analysis. As will be recalled from previous chapters, interpretive policy analysis entails explication and interpretation of the practical reasoning and intentions of policy actors in making policy choices. This method further entails clarification of the value-laden concepts that underlie policy positions. Of particular interest here are the value assumptions embodied in the documents of AISBEG participants and state departments of education as they regard concepts of multiculturalism and multicultural arts education.

The Arts in Schools Basic Education Grant Program

The National Endowment for the Arts established the Arts in Schools Basic Education Grant Program (AISBEG) in 1987. A competitive granting program for
which only state arts agencies are eligible, AISBEG has aimed to encourage collaboration between SAAs and state and local education agencies "in planning and developing a practical commitment to make the arts a basic and sequential part of education K-12." First defined in Toward Civilization, basic arts education is a comprehensive view of arts curriculum encompassing the arts disciplines of literature, visual arts and design, performing arts, and media arts. As outcomes of basic arts education, students are to understand diverse civilizations as guideposts to cultural literacy, develop creativity, learn tools of communication, and develop the capacity to make informed choices among the products of the arts and popular culture. The concept also entails increased intellectual rigor and accountability in arts education programs, arts teachers preparation programs that place more emphasis on education in history, aesthetics, and critical analysis of art forms, and assessment of student learning in the arts at state and local levels.

To meet the objective of fostering "basic arts education," the AISBEG program offers both planning and implementation grants. Planning grants are designed to afford state arts agencies the opportunity to plan, a process involving "broad consultation at state and local levels, with teachers, artists, arts administrators, representatives of arts institutions and education institutions, school officials, parents, and state and local officials." Implementation grants operate under a multi-year grants system and are designed to facilitate creation and completion of state-wide arts education plans. It is expected that such plans will contain: "1) specific objectives and competencies, in terms of knowledge and/or skills, for student accomplishment in the arts; 2) curricula and resources aimed at
sequential achievement of these objectives and competencies; and 3) methods for evaluating student progress toward achieving these objectives and competencies. The Endowment clearly hopes that these plans will be implemented on a statewide basis to effect "basic arts education."

The AISBEG program can be and has been analyzed from a variety of perspectives. Commentaries voiced to date center on the inherent limitations of the NEA and the constituencies with influence on the agency. Toward Civilization contains repeated claims that the NEA is not and should not be an educational agency. The reasoning behind this claim is a matter for speculation. One such speculation centers on the need of the Endowment to assuage its two primary constituencies, artists and arts institutions. As Charles Fowler argues, "artists and arts organizations think of the NEA as 'their' nest egg. They fear what would happen to the NEA if it came under the grip of education and educators and the voracious needs of education eclipsed their own." To others, the NEA's focus on artists and arts organizations is a matter of the agency's administrative division into numerous discipline programs. According to Kevin Mulcahy, this division means that even noteworthy arts education programs are hard-pressed to compete effectively for budgetary and policy attention with prestigious symphonies, operas, dance companies, theatres, and museums.

But it is not the reasons behind the NEA's characterization of itself as not an educational agency that interests some commentators but the consequences. The claim highlights the unarguable fact that the NEA has no regulatory and statutory authority over public education at any level. AISBEG funds, as pointed
out already, are only granted to state arts agencies, an infrastructure the NEA is charged by law to collaborate with. But SAAs, in turn, have no regulatory or statutory authority over public education at the state level. Only through state and local departments of education can arts curricula, evaluation, and graduation requirements be regulated. This state of affairs, when combined with the perception among some critics that SAAs would not be interested in "basic arts education" except for the incentive of NEA funds, undercuts the potential effectiveness of AISBEG programs, or so it can be argued. In any case, other critics contend that if the NEA were serious about basic arts education, it would revise its grant guidelines for artist residency programs to encourage the development of basic arts education programs, e.g., to make artist residency funding available only to school districts with developed arts education programs in place or to those which agree to undertake programs to remedy documented deficiencies. Otherwise, school districts can be tempted to utilize artist residencies to replace rather than supplement ongoing arts education programs.

Whatever the merits of these assessments of factors which could affect the potential effectiveness of AISBEG programs, they should be seen only as speculations. At this point, there is not a sufficient data base on AISBEG programs or sufficient history to conduct research of potential interest: 1) analyses of planning processes utilized by AISBEG participants, in particular, ways in which multiple policy sectors of arts education interact in developing state-wide plans; 2) analyses of how planning documents form the basis of policy adoption and implementation; and 3) evaluations of the short-term and long-term effects of the
policies adopted and implemented. Thus, as with analysis of the arts policies of state arts agencies, even though there are defensible reasons to adopt a methodology of interpretive policy analysis, the lack of available data on AISBEG programs virtually necessitates use of this methodology.

The subsequent interpretative analysis is both similar to and different from the interpretation of arts policies in Chapters IV. It is different in that there is no clear focus of interpretation as with state arts agencies' arts policies. AISBEG programs obviously cannot be analyzed in terms of policy mechanisms, i.e., means by which grants funds are made available and allotted to potential grantees. AISBEG programs, at this point, consist of plans to effect educational change in the arts. As such they are documents of the intentions of policy-makers. This focus on intentions, in turn, highlights a common criticism of the interpretive policy analysis methodology, that it can lose track of what policy agents actually do in trying to understand their intentions. But this is not a necessary consequence of utilizing the interpretive policy analysis methodology in that it is possible to focus on what policy agents say they plan to do. This can be done by construing AISBEG planning documents as examples of action language and normative concepts of art, culture, artistic value, and multicultural arts education as the means by which policy agents make sense of or rationalize what they plan to do.

This section consists of an interpretive analysis of basic concepts found in various aspects of AISBEG surveys and plans -- justifications of arts education, statements of goals and objectives, and proposals for curriculum development. The analysis is based on plans, surveys, and task force reports received from twenty-
eight state arts agencies, out of a possible thirty-seven, who have received AISBEG planning or implementation grants.

**Justifications of Arts Education.** The rationales invoked to justify the need for teaching and learning in the arts, as found in the documents produced by AISBEG participants, are diverse in form and content. They draw on numerous concepts of art and its value, and some rationales draw on various concepts simultaneously. But, as will be seen, the majority of those rationales contain some mention of the arts of diverse cultures and the value in teaching and learning about them.

A common form of justifying arts education is to portray learning in the arts as a significant means to either valuable experiences in other, non-arts realms of human experience or as tools to learning specific kinds of subject matter outside of the arts. This form of arts education justification has been critiqued on many grounds over the past two decades, often by claiming that conceiving of the value of arts education as residing in its consequences for learning and experiences beyond the arts devalues the artistic value of works of art themselves and can lead to arts education practices which neglect stress on understanding the complexities of works of art.12 Despite such criticisms, these kinds of justifications remain common in various contexts and can be found in the documents of states participating in the AISBEG program.

As an illustration, an AISBEG publication of the Florida Arts Council contains the following claims: 1) "a comprehensive education in the arts fosters and develops students' creativity, problem solving, critical thinking, and evaluation
and 2) "the arts give coherence, depth, and resonance to other subjects."\(^{14}\) But the Florida AISBEG program supplements these justification statements with other claims, notably, about the value of the arts of ethnic cultures. In particular, it is stated that "the rich and varied cultural resources and ethnic diversity of communities expand the walls of every classroom"\(^{15}\) and that arts education can "address cultural inclusiveness and cultural diversity and [thereby] assume preservation of our cultural heritage."\(^{16}\) How these claims can serve as the basis of arts education practices is not clear, but these claims do underscore the point that AISBEG programs, whatever other justifications they utilize, often phrase other justifications in terms of multiculturalism and the arts of ethnic cultures.

This phenomenon is also observable in justifications of arts education centered on the concept of cultural literacy. The concept of cultural literacy has many meanings, referring, in its most prominent meaning, to the skills and expertise of individuals to deal knowledgeably with the texts of the Western tradition that have, in some sense, stood the test of time.\(^{17}\) But the concept of cultural literacy is defined in various ways in the arts education rationales of AISBEG participants.

The Nebraska Arts Council, for one, while leaving the concept of cultural literacy undefined and unclarified, claims that if students in the state fail to become culturally literate, "they lack the tools to understand the influence of past civilizations upon Nebraska’s culture today."\(^{18}\) This claim seems to reveal an implicit definition of "cultural literacy" at least consistent with the prominent definition cited above. A Nebraska AISBEG document also contains an additional
claim for the importance of cultural literacy, calling it "an essential requirement for competing in the global marketplace." 

The Indiana Arts Commission seeks a rationale for arts education not in terms of "cultural literacy," but artistic literacy. Arguing that study of the arts is an essential component of education, the IAC contends that "arts literacy means knowing how to see, hear, and more as well read and write," a conception rooted in the belief that "the arts, more than any other language, provide ways to communicate thoughts, feelings and emotions." The IAC also stipulates means to the achievement of artistic literacy, including the integration of the arts into the teaching of academic subjects like history, mathematics, and social studies. A further means to artistic literacy, according to the IAC, is "multicultural arts studies which reflect the rich traditions of the arts in western and non-western cultures." The need for such studies, it is argued, is a function of changing racial/ethnic demographics in America and "the importance of understanding and appreciating the vast array of cultures in the world." Another means to artistic literacy cited by Indiana AISBEG documents is curricular attention not only to the performance and production of the arts but to content from art history, criticism, and aesthetics, an emphasis justified in these terms: "such discipline-based programs help children understand art better, draw inferences about art's historical and cultural contexts and analyze and interpret the meaning of artworks."

The New Jersey AISBEG program constructs a justification for arts education, with emphasis on the idea of "literacy in the arts," that, in many ways, mirrors rationales discussed to this point. Underlying its use of "literacy in the arts"
is the belief that "literacy, in its richest, fullest sense, means communicating not just verbally, but non-verbally as well" and entails the capacity "to send messages to one another and to communicate feelings and ideas that words cannot convey." It is claimed that "without the language of the arts, we could not give voice to the full range of thought and feeling, and the quality of our daily lives would be enormously diminished." It is further claimed that since "the arts teach self-discipline, problem-solving, and skills critical to achieving success -- not only in school, but in the workplace," that students with underdeveloped capacities for artistic literacy "are crippled, just as surely if they failed to read or write." But to these familiar premises in arts education justification arguments the New Jersey AISBEG program adds another, one of special interest here. This premise holds that understanding of the arts of ethnic cultures is not merely a means to artistic literacy, but that such understanding is an essential component of the definition of artistic literacy. This premise, in turn, is based on the belief that a broad, culturally diverse definition of artistic literacy is necessary if arts education is to give students "insights into themselves, help them to understand the heritage of other people, [and to enhance] global communication and human understanding."

A final example of a "literacy" justification to be cited here is one developed by AISBEG program participants in the state of Minnesota. Their publication, A Vision of Arts Education in Minnesota, posits artistic literacy as its primary goal for arts education and defines the term as "an understanding of the passion, design, and history of the arts." It further stipulates that artistic literacy, as a programmatic definition, entails a gender-fair, multi-cultural, global perspective and
attention to various ethnic backgrounds, "diverse cultural activities, history, and aesthetic standards, and the artistic contributions of all types of artists." The need for educational attention to the arts of diverse cultural traditions, it is argued, is necessitated by "our increasingly global community [which] demands that we prepare students to live with respect for natural resources, other generations, and diverse cultures." Finally, to achieve artistic literacy, according to the Minnesota AISBEG program, it is necessary to teach "the culture, aesthetics, history, and production/performance of an arts form."

To this point the justifications of arts education invoked by different AISBEG programs have taken two primary forms, those which portray the value of learning the arts as a matter of the consequences it produces and other which make claims for the significance of cultural literacy or artistic literacy. It was found that these justifications were often used in combination with other rationales and, in various ways, stressed the importance of learning the arts of diverse cultures and, in some cases, emphasized learning about various dimensions of the arts -- performance/production, history, criticism, and aesthetics. The final rationales to be examined here share many of these features as well, although none stresses one form of justification as predominant.

For example, the Missouri Arts Education Task Force, created and supported through an AISBEG grant, lists six claims that make up its rationale for arts education. It is contended that the arts: 1) integrate neurological functions and aid student learning and performance in other subject areas; 2) access a variety of human intelligences and develop higher-order thinking skills; 3) enhance the
learning environment; 4) generate self-esteem and a positive emotional response to learning; 5) engage a variety of learning styles; and 6) increase multi-cultural understanding, cooperation and tolerance of diverse values and viewpoints.35 This final claim is rooted in the belief that arts education can develop cultural competencies, defined as "sensibilities enabling individuals to become responsible and responsive world-oriented citizens, capable of intelligent and cross-cultural identifications and interaction."36 But the documents of Missouri AISBEG participants make clear that to fulfill this claim, arts education programs must "include the exploration of world cultures and the cultural diversity of this nation in order to develop multicultural understanding."37 In addition, the Missouri task force report calls for "a mixture of performance/production, aesthetics, history, and criticism . . . in the arts curricula."38

AISBEG documents generated in the state of Wisconsin, as with the Missouri example, outline a multi-faceted justification for arts education. Four elements of this rationale can be identified: 1) personal creativity, that "the arts provide an outlet for personal expression in a positive and informative manner";39 2) non-verbal thinking skills, that arts education "encourages pluralistic thinking in which divergent ideas come together to create altogether new solutions";40 3) self-discovery, that through the arts a student "begins to identify values and interests and learns to express them . . . [and] learns to value him or herself";41 4) aesthetic literacy, that "arts education provides tools for critical assessment of what one hears, reads, and sees . . . [and] the tools to make better, more informed choices, even to influence the marketplace of products and ideas."42 To this list the
Wisconsin AISBEG planners add one final rationale -- "that one purpose of arts educations to give young people a sense of civilization," in particular, American civilization, defined as a civilization comprised of many cultures: Eastern and Western European, Asian, African and Native American Indian. The report contends that the great art works of these cultural traditions "provide a basis which young people can draw upon in their own understanding of America and what it means to be an American. In a culturally diverse society such as ours, the arts can generate a core of respect and understanding, a common language full of beautiful and surprising variation." A primary means of achieving such a goal, according to Wisconsin AISBEG participants, is the opportunity for students to be directly involved in art making, art criticism, art heritage, and aesthetics.

The work of ASIBEG planners in Ohio represents an additional example of a rationale for arts education with numerous elements. Their document, A Vision for Arts Education in Ohio, expresses the belief that arts education should be an essential part of education because: 1) "the arts are basic symbol systems by which people communicate, express, and acquire understanding"; 2) the arts serve "as records of history, expressions, and beliefs, and represent the deepest expressions of our humanity"; 3) "the arts represent forms of thinking and ways of knowing and participating with the world through cognitive and sensory experiences"; and 4) "the arts are an integral part of the fabric of any society and assure our cultural future." It is expected, then, that arts education experiences can lead students to aesthetic literacy, creative artistic intelligence, an understanding of the role of the arts in society, and a cultural understanding, "in which they come to appreciate the
artistic achievements of their own and other societies, past and present." Keys to achieving these results, the Ohio AISBEG participants conclude, are the development and implementation of multicultural experiences in the arts and inclusion of arts performance/production, history, criticism, and aesthetics in curriculum planning.

These examples of multi-dimensional justifications of arts education share features of rationales phrased in terms of the effects of education in the arts and cultural or artistic literacy, namely, that there is an emphasis on the importance of learning the arts of diverse cultures and stress on acquiring capacities associated with various dimensions of the arts -- performance/production, history, criticism, and aesthetics. It can be reasonably said that this review of rationales and claims underlying these rationales raises more questions than it answers. Such questions could include the following: Are justifications which stress the impact of learning in the arts on cognitive skills or subject matter knowledge compatible with those emphasizing learning of the disciplines of art? This question turns on concepts of the nature of art and its value. Further, what concepts of culture, ethnicity, and multiculturalism inform these arts education justifications? For example, what place do programmatic definitions of these terms play in claims that skills in understanding ethnic arts are an essential component of artistic literacy or that such skills can increase inter-group cooperation, tolerance, and understanding? As might be expected, these planning documents, in that they are geared to action, do not contain clarifying explanations of their use of normative concepts. But a conceptual analysis of these terms, as used in educational arguments, will not be attempted
here. Such an analysis will occur in an extended consideration, in the next chapter, of a key question that has emerged in this interpretation of AISBEG plans—whether and in what ways are conceptions of multicultural arts education theoretically compatible with or complementary to discipline-based arts education, i.e., instruction in the arts disciplines of production, history, criticism, and aesthetics? First, however, the interpretation of AISBEG programs will continue through consideration of goals and objectives and curriculum plans found in AISBEG documents.

Goals and Objectives. The goals and objectives cited in AISBEG task force reports and plans are even more diverse than the rationales utilized to justify arts education. Despite this diversity, the form of many of these goals and objectives is similar. They constitute intentions or imperatives to establish criteria or set processes in motion for educational change. Several examples will serve to illustrate these characteristics.

The Florida AISBEG program, by its own account, has committed itself to the accomplishment of a variety of goals: 1) the adoption by legislative bodies, of policies to require arts instruction at all levels of education; 2) “the development, publication and promotion of a comprehensive arts curriculum plan as part of the core learning for all Florida students”; 50 3) ongoing professional development for arts teachers, from the initial recruitment process to pre-service and in-service education; 4) formation of collaborative relationships between schools and community arts organizations and artists; 5) collaborations between education agencies and arts agencies at state and local levels; 6) establishment of a broad-
based system of student achievement assessment and program evaluation in the
arts; and 7) implementation of "an advocacy program to build public, private, and
legislative support for the arts as a part of basic education."51

Other examples of AISBEG goals can be identified, goals which express
intentions to effect educational change according to specified criteria. Among the
goals of Louisiana's AISBEG program are a number which mirror the Florida
program, but several additional goals as well, including: 1) exploration of strategies
to provide adequate funding resources for arts education; 2) the identification and
assessment of existing arts education delivery programs and development of
alternative systems; 3) implementation of competency programs in the arts for arts
teachers and educational administrators; and 4) development of "sequential K-12
curriculum guides which will include the elements of production, history, aesthetics
and criticism for each arts area."52 The examples of arts education goals cited here
are found in the AISBEG plans of many participating states. This list can be
rounded out by citing two additional goals set by the Michigan AISBEG program:
1) "to influence decision-making by gathering and disseminating accurate
information about the condition of arts education",53 and 2) to develop a political
action plan to develop legislation which can aid arts education.

The impression should not be left, however, that all of the goals set in
AISBEG programs can be characterized as intentions to undertake future actions.
Goals can be identified which can accurately be called value-laden policy positions.
Many of these goals also take the form of statements of what is necessary to
achieve the values embedded in justifications for arts education. As was noted
above, the Missouri AISBEG program justified arts education, at least in part, in terms of its capacities to make individuals capable of responsive and intelligent cross-cultural identifications and interaction. To fulfill this claim, then, this program has stipulated two goals: 1) that arts education include study and exploration of the arts of world cultures and America's ethnic cultures, and 2) that arts curricula should contain a mixture of performance/production, aesthetics, history, and criticism. The Indiana AISBEG program provides another example of goals set to realize claims made in justifications of arts education. As outlined earlier, the Indiana AISBEG program's justification of arts education is centered on the concept of art as a language to communicate thoughts, feelings, and emotions. Based on this interpretation of "artistic literacy," two goals are set: 1) to include multicultural arts studies focused on the traditions of western and non-western cultures, and 2) to include curricular attention not only to the performance and production of the arts but to content from art history, criticism, and aesthetics. The Ohio AISBEG program provides a final illustration of substantive goal statements rooted in rationales for arts education. One rationale invoked in Ohio AISBEG documents is rooted in the belief that arts education can lead to aesthetic literacy, an understanding of the role of arts in society, and cultural understanding, in which students appreciate the artistic achievements of their own and other societies, both past and present. Based on these beliefs, then, Ohio AISBEG participants posit two goals: 1) to develop and implement multicultural experiences in the arts, and 2) to include arts performance/production, history, criticism, and aesthetics in curriculum planning.
Examples of goals set by AISBEG participants, goals which take the form of statements of what is necessary to achieve the value ends embodied in arts education rationales, could be multiplied. But the above examples would seem to suffice to make the point that the goals of AISBEG programs, as was found in the interpretation of justifications for teaching and learning in the arts, commonly assume the complementary value of conceptions of arts education as multicultural in nature and as discipline-based. But, as stated above, examination of this assumption will be done at a later point. Yet this interpretation of goal statements does suggest a final locus for interpretation of AISBEG programs. Many AISBEG goal statements, as was seen, center on conceptions of what is to be taught in arts education. In some AISBEG programs, either curriculum plans themselves or criteria for arts curriculum development and curricular inclusion are outlined quite specifically. Thus, AISBEG conceptions of arts education curricula, as they embody value assumptions about art, culture, and multiculturalism, appear to be a worthwhile locus of inquiry and interpretation.

Arts Education Curricula. The NEA, as will be recalled, initiated the AISBEG program in 1987 by offering planning and implementation grants to state arts agencies to work with state and local education agencies for the enhancement of arts education in their states. As a competitive grants process, only sixteen SAAs were awarded planning grants in 1987, and many have gone on to receive implementation grants, in some cases, multi-year grants. Thus, of the thirty-seven current AISBEG-participating SAAs, a significant percentage are still in the
planning phase. This distinction in the time spent on AISBEG activities is reflected in the specificity of SAAs' prescriptions on arts education curricula.

For example, the Alabama AISBEG program is just commencing the planning phase. As such, then, its work on curriculum development is limited to definitions and descriptions of content appropriate to arts education. Still, these definitions and descriptions are of interest here in that no mention is made of the arts of ethnic cultures. Alabama AISBEG participants base their conception of arts curricula on the definition of "basic arts education" found in the NEA report Toward Civilization: "Basic arts education includes the disciplines of literature, visual art and design, performing art, and media art. Like other school subjects, basic arts education must be taught sequentially by qualified teachers and must include the history, critical theory and ideas of the arts as well as creation, production and performance." This definition is then adapted to formulate premises about in what arts curricula should consist: "1) a sequential and comprehensive curriculum in all of the arts (performing, visual and literary) for grades K-12, taught by certified personnel . . . ; 2) the integration of the arts into other subject areas; 3) the inclusion of programs and experiences that offer additional enrichment and learning opportunities in the arts community artistic resources." These premises about an ideal arts curriculum clearly envision a place for discipline-based arts education, instruction in arts production/performance, history, criticism, and aesthetics, but the place of the arts of ethnic cultures is not clear. Whether this omission is based on a conclusion that discipline-based arts
education and multicultural arts education are not complementary or is a reflection of the early stages of the state's AISBEG planning is not apparent at this point.

The Florida AISBEG program is at the point of stipulating criteria for the development of arts curricula at the local level. It is expected that the state department of education will further the process of effecting curricular change by facilitating "the development, publication and promotion of sequential arts education curricula, teaching materials, methods and strategies for teaching the arts." Of greatest interest here, however, is the curricular content envisioned by the Florida AISBEG program participants. They stipulate that "within each arts discipline, outcomes will be formulated in creative expression (performance and production), perception and knowledge, and critical thinking. Study will include the arts of diverse cultures." Thus, this example illustrates the assumption of the complementary value of multicultural and discipline-based approaches to curriculum development in the arts.

Other AISBEG programs, unlike the two cited to this point, are well into their implementation processes and, therefore, have moved beyond steps of definition of terms, descriptions, and stipulating criteria for arts curriculum development. Notably, the New Jersey Literacy in the Arts Task Force, whose work in part preceded AISBEG support, has set a curricular framework for the arts. This framework, the task force insists, is not meant as a mandatory, statewide arts curriculum or guidelines to be rigidly followed, but suggestions about arts experiences and skills "that may be helpful to teachers and curriculum directors as they develop a curriculum framework of their own." Frameworks have been
The visual arts framework is illustrative. For example, among the experiences that should be introduced to students of all ages, according to the New Jersey Task Force, are opportunities to "look at and respond to works of art from the past and present, from Western and non-Western cultures" and, in the case of older students, opportunities to "study works of art and artists from past and present, and from Western and non-Western cultures and how they relate to political, cultural, and historical events." Throughout the visual arts framework there are numerous references to skill development in and opportunities to study history, critical judgment, and aesthetics.

The South Carolina AISBEG program has also entered an implementation phase, in part because of precedents set by the state department of education on issues of curriculum and teacher certification, among others. The focus of the South Carolina AISBEG program has been development of the Arts in Basic Curriculum (ABC) Plan, described as "a comprehensive plan which outlines specific strategies for making the arts basic within South Carolina school curricula." But the ABC Plan clearly emphasizes that "specified curriculum frameworks are not, however, mandated curriculum programs." Instead, the ABC Plan specifies expected educational outcomes under each of four components: 1) aesthetic perception; 2) performance/creative expression; 3) historical/cultural understanding; and 4) aesthetic valuing. These latter two components, respectively, are defined as follows: "knowledge about the historical and cultural milieu in which works of art are created, including socio-economic, political, intellectual,
ethnic, religious, or philosophical considerations,64 and "the development of critical
thinking skills and cultivating the ability to make intelligent and informed
judgements regarding excellence in the arts."65 These components of the ABC arts
curriculum framework, on the face of it, would seem to assume the complementary
value of at least some possible multicultural and discipline-based approaches to arts
education. This conclusion is bolstered by identifying two objectives of the
framework which state that students should be able to: 1) "understand that art
reflects, records, and shapes history and plays a role in every culture"66 and
2) "clarify their own aesthetic values and learn to appreciate differences in the
aesthetic values of others."67

Based on this review of curriculum prescriptions and plans, it seems clear
that, whatever their stage in planning and implementation processes, the majority
of AISBEG programs conceive of multicultural arts education and discipline-based
arts education, in some way, as compatible or even complementary. This
conclusion bears out conclusions in the interpretation of AISBEG programs'
justifications of arts education and goal statements. Further, as was found earlier,
AISBEG curriculum prescriptions, frameworks, and plans, in that they are geared
to action, results, and outcomes, do not contain clarifying explanations of use of
"multicultural" or discipline-based" arts education nor do they address the value-
laden concepts underlying these policy positions. Such an analysis, as stated above,
will be the focus of the next chapter. First, however, it remains to interpret the
policy positions of another prominent sector with arts education policy influence,
namely, state departments of education. Of special interest here, based on the
interpretation of AISBEG programs, are the assumptions found in state department of education documents regarding the complementary value of multicultural and discipline-based approaches to arts education.

**Policies and Programs of State Departments of Education**

The interpretation of the arts education policies and programs of state departments of education is both similar to and different from, in various ways, the interpretation of the arts policies and arts education programs of state arts agencies. First, the activities of state departments of education do not fall into a focus of analysis like the policy mechanisms to distribute arts funds utilized by state arts agencies. State department of education activities geared to arts education are more diffuse in nature and do not center on a single function, e.g., to distribute funds. These activities, as identified above, include: setting standards for the accreditation, certification, and hiring of arts teachers, the production of curriculum guides and adoption of textbooks, setting instructional goals and graduation requirements, and monitoring student learning and teacher effectiveness. The activities listed here reflect the formal responsibilities of state departments of education, in turn, a reflection of their legal and regulatory obligations. As such, then, state departments of education differ substantively from state arts agencies, who have no legal, formal or even oversight responsibilities for school-based arts education.

Of course, as was also pointed out earlier, state legislatures vary markedly in the authority they grant to state departments of education over local districts. In addition, it is sometimes argued that even in states where considerable formal
authority is vested in state departments of education, the reduction of staff members with subject matter specialization in the arts throughout the past two decades has reduced the likelihood that state education agencies will be able to implement or enforce arts education policies. These qualifications notwithstanding, state education departments, it can be fairly said of most cases, at least have the potential to influence arts education practice at the local level.

This conclusion has implications for the application of the interpretive policy analysis methodology. Documents produced by state education agencies, unlike the documents of AISBEG programs, are not just plans or intentions to act but actions themselves, actions with practical consequences. Therefore, this analysis of state education documents, by its focus on actions, avoids the common critique of interpretive policy analysis, i.e., that it can lose track of what policy agents actually do in trying to understand their intentions. The documents to be analyzed here are the curriculum guidelines and policy statements of thirty-nine, out of a possible fifty, state departments of education. The focus of this interpretative analysis, as with state arts agencies, is the normative concepts of art, culture, artistic value, and multicultural arts education by which policy agents make sense of or rationalize what they do. This sort of action language is best exemplified in justifications of arts education, statements of goals and objectives, curriculum standards, and teacher certification standards.

Justifications of Arts Education. As with AISBEG documents, justifications of arts education in state department of education documents are diverse in form and content and draw, sometimes simultaneously, on numerous concepts of art and
its value. But, unlike AISBEG programs, some of these justifications make little or no reference to the arts of ethnic cultures.

The justification of visual arts education offered by the Kansas State Board of Education combines assumptions about the symbolic nature of art as well as its value as a means to other kinds of worthwhile experiences. Key premises in this rationale are as follows: "Art symbols are a basic universal language; essential for communication. Since art serves to record and reflect social values, the quality of a civilization can be measured by the understanding, breadth, and use of visual symbols. The visual arts, as a means of communication, are necessary to give expression to the profound events of the human experience."\(^{69}\) It is then claimed that "a quality art education provides students with the means to participate in and appreciate art throughout their lives; to better understand themselves and others; to improve their knowledge and perceptual skills; to enhance their critical thinking abilities; and to increase their aptitude for problem solving."\(^{70}\)

Another rationale for arts education stressing the arts as a universal means of communication is presented by the North Dakota Department of Public Instruction. One premise in this rationale holds that "the arts are a universal phenomenon and a means of communication among dissimilar people."\(^{71}\) Also, similar to the Kansas example, this rationale also contains the premise that "the arts are useful tools for developing skills in perception, critical and creative thinking, problem solving and communication."\(^{72}\) Unlike the previous example, however, this state education agency's rationale does at least implicitly consider issues of multiculturalism, as evidenced by the premise that "the arts embody and
chronicle the cultural, aesthetic and social development of human beings in all world cultures."73

Other justifications of arts education found in state department of education documents, while drawing on a variety of claims about arts education, are more explicit about the importance of studying the arts of diverse cultures. For example, the Georgia Department of Education contends that the development of perceptual awareness through the arts, and the acquisition of knowledge of art production, art heritage, criticism, and aesthetics, will enable a student "to express his or her perceptions, needs and aspirations in socially recognized ways."74 It is further claimed that arts education can increase students' capacities for critical thinking, lead to competence in other disciplines, encourage diverse forms of thinking, and lead students "to appreciate the uniqueness of the individual and to develop tolerance for the ideas, expressions and interpretations of others."75 To these claims the following is added: "Concepts learned through art education help students develop aesthetic appreciation and understanding so that they become sensitive to aesthetic values and appreciate the meaning of art from other times and other places. Multicultural education is broadened as a result of art study."76 This multidimensional rationale thus locates the primary value of arts education in its cognitive learning consequences and stipulates that such consequences are to be achieved through study of disciplines of art as well as the arts of diverse cultures.

In a fashion similar to the Georgia example, the Washington Office of Public Instruction combines various claims for the arts in its justification of arts education. This rationale starts with the claim that arts education challenges
students "to be expressive, imaginative, creative, and self-motivated," a claim rooted in the belief that the arts are symbolic forms that "extend human experience ... a means of communication that goes beyond ordinary speaking and writing." These claims, rooted in views of the arts as symbol systems and their value as located in a variety of consequences, are supplemented by the claim that "the arts are an ideal vehicle for developing and enriching multicultural understanding." This conclusion is based on the belief that the arts "speak eloquently of emotions, values, and traditions, both past and present, of a particular way of life." As a result, then, educational experiences in the arts of various cultures can, it is contended, "contribute to students' respect for and value of the unique contributions each culture has made to our lives."

The rationale for arts education proposed by the California State Department of Education exemplifies the tendency, noted to this point, of invoking numerous claims for the value of the arts and arts education. As with justifications reviewed above, a number of claims are made, including that the arts "provide the sensory and perceptual input essential to the development of nonverbal and verbal communication" and that "the arts can be used to vitalize and clarify concepts and skills in all curriculum areas." But the California State Department of Education's justification of arts education, more explicitly than those discussed up to now, assumes the complementary value of multicultural arts education and discipline-based arts education. It is argued that through the study of aesthetic perception, creative expression, arts heritage, and aesthetic valuing students can acquire cultural literacy, entailing an understanding of art works "as part of the
body of knowledge defining every culture"84 and an awareness "that the arts cut across cultural boundaries to provide mutual understanding, appreciation, and respect."85 But this integrated view of discipline-based and multicultural arts education is not limited to study of the commonalities of art across cultures. In particular, it is held that "studying works of art from various world cultural groups provides students with an understanding of the important role that the visual arts play in communicating the values, beliefs, rituals, mores, desires, and hopes of a particular group of people."86

The State of Hawaii Department of Education also relies on a multidimensional rationale for arts education. But it makes more explicit than other justifications the view that art is a discipline with its own characteristics, features, and properties. Art, as a discipline, consists of: 1) a community of people with shared interests, values, and goals; 2) an expression of the human imagination; 3) a domain in the intellectual life; 4) a tradition with its own history of events and ideas; 5) a mode of inquiry; 6) a conceptual structure; 7) a specialized language and/or a set of symbols; 8) a heritage of artifacts, literature, and a communication network; 9) a valutative and affective stance with an implicit view of human beings and their place in the world; and 10) an instructive community with its own ways of drawing new members into the group.87 This view, according to the Hawaii State Department of Education, a "view of the field of art as an ongoing community of people (including learners) who create art and reflect on it, is infinitely livelier and more dynamic than the view of art as just an inert collection of works of art."88 To the knowledge gained from the study of art as a discipline,
the Hawaii justification adds claims that arts education offers opportunities for students to exercise their originality and creativity, develop aesthetic sensitivity, and express their ideas and feelings about life. For these results to be realized, the agency prescribes four components of teaching and learning in the arts -- art production, aesthetics, art criticism, and art history. As integral parts of these components, it is envisioned that students will "develop understanding of the major arts of other countries and cultures" and appreciate art works "in relation to ethnic and historical origins."

It appears that the arts education justifications of state departments of education, to a notable degree, mirror those found in AISBEG programs in that they rely on numerous claims for the arts and arts education, many of which are rooted in the view of the value of art as residing in its extrinsic consequences. It was also found that several of these rationales, although in diverse ways, assume the complementary value of multicultural arts education and discipline-based arts education. Yet this general conclusion must be qualified in the light of some justifications which make little or no reference to the arts of ethnic cultures and others that seem to assume that artistic value is universal across cultures. An examination of the goals and objectives and the curriculum plans of state education agencies may help to clarify the degree to which, and in what ways, multicultural and discipline-based approaches are assumed to be compatible as the basis of policy positions.

**Goals and Objectives.** As might be expected given the diverse rationales invoked to justify arts education, the goals and objectives for arts education set by
state departments of education are also diverse in nature. The nature of these goals and objectives differs in character from many of those identified in the review of AISBEG programs. As will be recalled, numerous AISBEG goals constituted intentions to establish criteria or to set processes in motion for educational change. But given the regulatory authority of state education agencies, the goals to be examined here are not merely intentions to undertake future actions but are viewed most accurately as statements of what is viewed as necessary to achieve the values embodied in justifications for arts education. Of special interest here are goal statements which address the necessity of multicultural and discipline-based approaches to arts education as means to achieve value ends embodied in justifications.

Some goals for arts education found in state education department documents seem to be informed by conceptions of works of art as aesthetic objects characterized by formal properties, attention to which can induce aesthetic experience. For example, a primary goal of the New Hampshire Department of Education is to "provide instruction which develops students' abilities to perceive, create, and appreciate messages communicated through visual elements . . . [and] increases their powers of visual discrimination and their ability to appreciate visual forms."91 Similarly, the goals posited by the North Dakota Department of Public Instruction stress skills associated with the aesthetic properties of works of art, for example, the development of aesthetic awareness, visual problem solving skills, and skills in visual and tactile perception.92
Goals for arts education set by other state departments of education stress the importance of instruction in art production, history, criticism, and aesthetics, i.e., discipline-based arts education. The degree of such emphasis, however, varies. The goals of the Rhode Island Department of Education are "to help every student develop abilities of self-expression as a form of symbolic expression, understand cultural heritage, form independent value judgments about art, recognize beauty, and build a lifelong relationship with art" and "to offer rich opportunities for creative invention and individual growth." To meet these goals, it is stipulated that arts education programs include opportunities for students to work with artistic media, and learning in the perception, appreciation, evaluation, and historical understanding of art. In other words, achievement of the stated goals of the Rhode Island Department of Education is viewed as conditional, at least implicitly, on instruction in the disciplines of art identified in the theory of discipline-based arts education. Another example of an implicit view that the development of knowledge in the arts is dependent on discipline-based approaches to arts education can be found with the Colorado Department of Education as evidenced by its list of goals: "1) expression, production, and performance of arts; 2) analysis, interpretation, and evaluation of arts; 3) personal, cultural, and historical understanding."" Two other state departments of education, the Texas Education Agency and the Utah State Office of Education, somewhat more explicitly define their goals rooted in anticipated benefits of discipline-based arts education. They respectively phrase goals in terms of learning outcomes and roles that students should assume.
Arts education goals in Texas are described as conceptually based, building on "universal art concepts developed over the centuries." Four learning goals are based on this view: 1) **perceiving** -- awareness and sensitivity to natural and human-made environments; 2) **expressing** -- inventive and imaginative expression through art materials and tools; 3) **knowing** -- appreciation of self and other through art, culture, and heritage; 4) **evaluating** -- aesthetic growth through visual discrimination and judgment." According to the Utah State Board of Education, "education in the arts should develop students' abilities in each of three roles -- participant, observer/listener, and critic." The participant role refers to active and direct interaction with the medium of an art form; the observer/listener role entails skillful response to works of art; and the critic role involves informed judgements about works of art. Both the learning outcomes and roles that students should assume as defined here, are to be achieved, according to these two state education agencies, through the study of art production/performance, history, criticism, and aesthetics.

To this point, none of the arts education goals found in state education agency documents explicitly focus on the arts of ethnic cultures. This is not to say that therefore programs based on these goals find no place for the study of ethnic art, only that such study is not specified in goal statements. But such goals can be identified, as will be seen, many of which assume the complementary value of multicultural and discipline-based approaches to arts education.

The Kansas State Board of Education outlines four basic goals for, in particular, visual arts education based on the view that "art in the schools is both
The goals center on four kinds of learning: 1) development of knowledge and appreciation of art and culture; 2) development of perceptual skills for aesthetic evaluation and artistic decision making; 3) development of and understanding of the artistic process and skills vital to visual expression; and 4) development of thinking skills which are utilized in visual art experience and extended to daily life. By themselves, these learning goals are not dissimilar to the stated goals of other state education agencies. But to these goals is added the imperative that "art education must become less ethnocentric and more pluralistic." This imperative, while not spelled out as such, is informed by concepts of cultural pluralism, justice, and artistic value. First, the Kansas State Board of Education calls for "a multicultural, nonsexist school curriculum which reflects all citizens," a kind of distributive justice argument. More explicitly it is contended that this goal is based on a view of the concept of cultural pluralism, one which "celebrates the cultural and sex role diversity as strengths that characterize and enrich our nation." A combined distributive justice and equal opportunity argument is also invoked -- "students should see themselves reflected positively in the school curriculum regardless of race [and] cultural heritage." A final element of the argument underlying the goal of pluralistic, multicultural arts education turns on a view of artistic value expressed as follows: "Art critics, art historians, aestheticians, artists and collectors have grown to value works of art by artists from different cultures, races, and sex . . . With these changes occurring throughout the art world, it is necessary that the teaching of art change to reflect current practices." Clearly, the value concepts
that inform this goal statement and its justification could be subjected to conceptual analysis. But, for now, this goal is best taken as an illustration of a concept of multicultural arts education being incorporated into a state education agency's list of goals.

Another goal statement of interest, one which assumes the integration of multicultural and discipline-based approaches to arts education, is put forward by the Michigan State Board of Education. Many of its stipulated goals mirror those cited above, referring to students' capacities to participate in the arts and make aesthetic judgments. Other goals, though, hold that students "should understand the role of the arts in the historical development of our culture and in the cultures of others . . . [and] be familiar with many forms of expression from many cultures." These goals are to be achieved through the inclusion of four content components in instructional programs: historical, cultural and social contexts; creating art and the art production process; art criticism/analysis; and aesthetics. Finally, it is claimed that through examining art works in historical, cultural, and social contexts "students gain understanding and learn to appreciate the differences and similarities between people of different times, cultures, regions, and ethnic origins."

Two final goal statements that assume the complementary value of multicultural arts education and discipline-based arts education are those found in the documents of the Maryland State Department of Education and the Oregon Department of Education. Each stipulates study in art production, history, criticism, and aesthetics as means to the achievement of arts education goals, but
supplement this view by explicitly addressing multicultural issues. Specifically, the Maryland State Board of Education holds that "through art, students can learn tolerance, respect, and concern for the beliefs, attitudes and values of other people both in historical and in present time." For this to occur it is held that schools must offer curricula "which will develop an appreciation for racial, ethnic, and cultural groups." They should also promote: "valuing the richness of American cultural diversity; respecting diverse racial, ethnic, and cultural groups throughout the world; being sensitive to individual traits of racial, ethnic, and cultural groups; and eliminating stereotypes related to racial, ethnic, and cultural groups." For its part, the Oregon Department of Education calls for "opportunity to learn about the art of other times and other cultures including those not historically recognized in resources emphasizing a European heritage." As an integral feature and result of such study, it is expected that students will be able to do the following: "recognize that an understanding of a specific art work depends on knowledge of its purpose(s), who made it, when and how it may be used," and "examine how social, political, gender and cultural heritage influence one's values and tastes in art."

The goal statements of state education agencies reviewed here, as was expected, are diverse in form and content. Some goals emphasize skills to appreciate art works as aesthetic objects, and many stress, sometimes implicitly and other times explicitly, the importance of study of art production, history, criticism, and aesthetics. Further, a number of these goals highlight the need for specific kinds of inquiry into aspects of the arts of ethnic cultures. Despite this diversity,
a common feature of many of these goals is attention to what is necessary to achieve arts education goals, in particular, what is to be taught. Thus, in order to understand more fully the value assumptions underlying the policy positions of state education agencies, it is necessary to examine views of what is to be taught and learned in the arts, i.e., their curriculum plans for the arts.

**Arts Curricula.** The content of arts curricula proposed by state education agencies is revealed in documents called curriculum guides. Such guides are usually just that, guides, in particular, guides to practice in arts education. As such, then, they rarely mandate learning goals and outcomes that all school districts and individual schools in a state must include. Rather, they function as expectations and sets of criteria for arts curriculum development and implementation at the local level.

It should also be noted that arts curriculum guides produced by state education agencies have received harsh criticism. One such critique has been voiced by Brent Wilson. He argues that:

Most curriculum guides created by committees at the state and local district levels are completed with a minimum of time and resources. Consequently they are frequently copied from other guides. . . . The elements and principles of design and music that found their way into guides in the early part of the century are still there. And the use of elements and principles draws attention away from what should probably be the principal content of art education: works of art and their themes, subjects, symbols, styles, expressive characteristics, societal contexts, histories, meanings and interpretations. These guides chop "content" into minute instructional objectives relating to discrete elements and skills while ignoring the most important need to understand works of art as whole entities. 113

This assessment of state education arts curricula is based on research conducted in the mid-1980s. Many curriculum guides have been produced since
then. Whether this critique fairly applies to guides created more recently is an open question, one that will not be pursued here. But however one assesses these curriculum guides, they do reveal assumptions about what is judged most valuable to teach. That will be the focus here, with special attention to content involving multicultural and discipline-based approaches to teaching and learning in the arts.

One curriculum guide exemplifies the tendency to gear curricular content to principles of design in the arts. The North Dakota Department of Public Instruction has as its goals developing aesthetic perception and skills in the production of art, art appreciation, and art criticism. To achieve these goals it is held that arts curricula must stress the basic elements of art and principles of design. Basic elements of arts include color, line, shape, space, texture, and value; principles of design include balance, contrast, emphasis, movement, proportion, repetition, rhythm, variety, and unity. Curricula are to be sequenced to enhance students' progressively sophisticated understanding of the elements of art and principles of design. This focus is to be maintained in the study of art history and appreciation.\textsuperscript{114}

Two other curriculum guides that can be identified call for considerable curricular attention to the art disciplines of art production, history, criticism, and aesthetics while providing for some inclusion of the arts of diverse cultures. For example, the Mississippi State Department of Education stipulates a sequential, discipline-based arts curriculum which seeks, in some part, to promote cultural understanding, "an understanding of the relationship between artifacts or works of art and the cultures or historic periods in which they are created."\textsuperscript{115} For its part,
the Maine Department of Education, as part of its prescribed discipline-based arts education curricula, calls for learning experiences that will "familiarize students with diverse cultural expression in a broad historical context" and will "provide an understanding and appreciation of different artistic styles and works from representative historical periods and cultures."

Analysis of curriculum guides from three other states reveals a more explicit and detailed blending of multicultural and discipline-based approaches to arts education curricula. The components of arts education, as defined by the Arizona Department of Education, are creative arts expression, aesthetic assessment, and art in cultural heritage, a typology not dissimilar to discipline-based arts education. The art in the cultural heritage component is "the study and appreciation of art and artists within the context of the past and present cultures," with attention paid to world cultures and the cultural diversity of the state. It is expected that through the study of the arts of diverse cultures, students will be able "to comprehend crosscultural influences and world cultural influence upon artists, to compare and contrast approaches used by artists in their creative expression, and to explain the different functions of art in historical context."

As discussed above, the Texas Education Agency identifies its learning goals for the arts as perceiving, expressing, appreciating, and evaluating. As part of learning to appreciate the arts, students "begin to recognize and value similarities and differences in art of diverse periods and cultures. They are also learning to view art as a visual history that reflects cultural beliefs, values, and social conditions." As part of learning to evaluate the arts, students, "develop attitudes
of respect and value for a variety of art forms. Their appreciative attitudes incorporate tolerance for diversity and help dispel bias and prejudice. Finally, it is held that arts students are to "develop a broad art vocabulary through which aesthetic qualities of a culture can be accurately stated."

The state education agency documents cited to this point, it can be fairly said, are suggestive of ways that multicultural and discipline-based approaches to curriculum development can be complementary although, admittedly, many concepts underlying this "complementary" view remain, at best, unclarified. But perhaps the most explicit conception of a combined multicultural/discipline-based arts curriculum, at least among state departments of education, is articulated by the Pennsylvania Department of Education. In a fashion similar to discipline-based arts education, the Pennsylvania Department of Education stipulates that the arts should be studied in the following ways: "1) through the processes of creation, recreation, and performance of works of art; 2) through historical inquiry into the antecedents and consequences of works of art; 3) through the critical interpretation and evaluation of works of art; and 4) through the application of aesthetics and the philosophy of art to the study of art." But to these familiar components of arts curricula is added another, a fifth component: "study of works from social, cultural, and psychological perspectives." Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Department of Education defines the content of arts education not in terms of skills or capacities to be developed. Instead, "the content of arts education is works of art and the themes, ideas, styles, expressive, formal, and sensory qualities associated with works of art; the content of arts education is the world of the arts and the historical and
cultural settings in which works of art are created and performed; the content of arts education is the means through which works of art are interpreted and evaluated."\textsuperscript{125}

Since works of art and their study are to be the primary curriculum content of arts education, those works of art that merit or warrant study are then defined. These include the following:

- "a core of works that carry universal ideas that have formed our civilization and our heritage. This core contains works created in all world cultures and societies as well as works created by males and females in all ethnic groups;
- the works that reveal the ideas, ideals, and values of the groups that have formed our American society;
- the works that presently define the ideas and value of the societies and communities in which our students live;
- less major works that inform students' understandings of themselves and their societies;
- works from popular culture;
- works from the communities in which our students live;
- works of art created by students that reflect personal and individual ideas and values."\textsuperscript{126}

A final element of the Pennsylvania Department of Education statement of arts curriculum principles is the issue of the organization of curricular content. It is prescribed that in a comprehensive curriculum, works of art may be organized for study in a variety of ways, including according to chronology, creative processes, or the lasting significance of individual art works. But it is also made clear that the content of arts education can be organized "according to culture, society, and country -- the organization of works of art by the places in which they were made,
the reasons why they were created, and the roles fulfilled then and they fulfill now."127

As was stated earlier, the principles embodied in Pennsylvania Department of Education documents constitute perhaps the most thoroughly articulated conception of an integrated multicultural/discipline-based approach to arts curriculum development, at least among state education agencies. Whether this conception bears up under scrutiny, and whether any sort of integration between these approaches can be maintained on defensible grounds, will be the focus the next chapter. First, however, a final element of state education agency policies that bears examination is the matter of arts teacher certification.

*Arts Teacher Certification.* State departments of education, as stressed earlier, have a number of unique, formal responsibilities among the many arts education sectors with policy influence. Included in these are the issuance of certification standards for the hiring of teachers of the arts usually phrased in terms of the kinds of professional preparation that future teachers of the arts must have to be certified to teach in public schools. This issue clearly dovetails with the issue of art curricula in that if any sort of curriculum policy recommended or mandated by a state education agency is to be implemented, then teachers working within local school districts must have the knowledge and skills to implement the policy. Of special interest here is whether the kinds of certification standards utilized by state departments of education are designed to produce teachers prepared to utilize multicultural, discipline-based or integrated approaches to arts curricula. This will be done by focusing not on the many kinds of coursework required of all
future teachers, such as psychological and historical foundations of education or student teaching, among many others, but coursework in the subject matter of art.

For example, the Rhode Island Department of Education stipulates that all candidates for teacher certification in art must complete two courses in art history and studio course work in at least seven of the following nine areas: drawing, painting, design, ceramics, sculpture, printmaking, crafts, photography, and metals.\textsuperscript{128} These sorts of requirements clearly are geared to produce arts teachers able to work with arts curricula predominantly centered on the production of art.

Other state education agencies' certification standards seem to require skills and knowledge in the arts consistent with discipline-based arts education. For example, the Tennessee State Board of Education requires that prospective visual arts teachers demonstrate extensive knowledge and skill development. Included in these requirements are the following: 1) "knowledge of sequentially developed art curricula to be used in the schools";\textsuperscript{129} 2) "ability to form and defend evaluative judgments about art";\textsuperscript{130} 3) "ability to conduct critiques of student work effectively";\textsuperscript{131} and 4) "advanced knowledge and skills in the production of art."\textsuperscript{132} This set of requirements, while it addresses some of the skills necessary for arts teachers utilizing a discipline-based approach, does not include attention to art history or aesthetics.

Two final examples of certification standards that more explicitly address future arts teachers' skills and knowledge needed to implement curriculum policies based on discipline-based arts education are those set by the Georgia Department of Education and the Colorado Department of Education. The Georgia education
agency, as a condition of granting certification to arts teachers, requires that all candidates demonstrate "knowledge of art criticism and art history,"133 "knowledge of basic concepts and skills in the visual arts studio areas,"134 "knowledge of current and historical philosophies of aesthetics,"135 and "the ability to develop visual arts curriculum continuum based upon scope and sequence of learning experiences in visual arts (criticism, history, production)."136 In Colorado, visual arts teacher certification applicants must have developed knowledge and skills in, among others, the following areas: art history; philosophical, aesthetic, evaluative components of visual arts; seven of the following areas of art production (drawing, painting, sculpture, photography, printmaking, fibers, ceramics, jewelry, crafts, graphic arts, and electronic media); and methods of teaching art which are distinctive to components of the visual arts discipline, including art history, aesthetic principles, and art theories.137

Both of these agencies, in addition to their lists of skills and knowledge that can be said to relate to preparation for discipline-based approaches to arts education, include some mention of knowledge and skills potentially related to multicultural arts education. The Colorado requirements stipulate that applicants' knowledge of art history span western and non-western cultures. In Georgia, applicants must demonstrate "knowledge of the relevance of art in society and its cultural implications,"138 "the ability to distinguish between and among styles of art of different cultures and times,"139 and "the ability to distinguish between and among the functions of art in different cultures and times."140
There are several questions that this brief review of state education agencies' arts teacher certification standards raises. Some are practical in nature, e.g., in what ways and to what degree are these standards enforced? Also, what is the relationship between arts teacher preparation and professional practice? It is certainly conceivable that teachers who receive training that stresses skills in, e.g., studio art can in their professional careers adopt a discipline-based approach. Other questions are more theoretical in nature. One such question centers on the Colorado and Georgia requirements for arts teacher certification. While it seems that those requirements address the kinds of skills and knowledge that would be necessary for an integrated, multicultural/discipline-based approach to arts curricula, it is not clear that these requirements would be sufficient to produce arts teachers capable of utilizing an integrated approach. At this point, however, posing a practical question such as this is premature in that it begs a basic theoretical question -- are multicultural arts education and discipline-based arts education compatible or perhaps complementary as a basis for the development and implementation of arts curriculum policy? This question will be the subject of the subsequent chapter.

Emergent Conceptual Problems and Policy Issues

This chapter was in part necessitated by a premise established in the previous chapter -- that if the principle of equal opportunity is to be upheld in arts policy, then decisions must be made by qualified individuals familiar with the concepts of artistic value used to evaluate the works of art of ethnic cultures. This premise then led to consideration of a policy arena whose policies can surely affect
the future capacities of persons to make evaluative judgements in the arts, i.e., arts education. But it was also established, for a variety of reasons, that any justification of arts education policy which seeks to enhance persons' skills to evaluate ethnic arts on defensible grounds must be phrased not merely in terms of arts policy but in educational terms. To this end, existing arts education policies at the state level were examined to determine whether and in what ways they address multicultural issues. The focus of this investigation was state arts agencies participating in the Arts in Schools Basic Education Grants program as well as state departments of education. These agencies' policy documents were analyzed in terms of the assumptions embodied in value-laden concepts used to justify arts education and set goals and curriculum standards.

The analysis of AISBEG programs revealed a plethora of justifications, goal statements, and curriculum prescriptions rooted in various concepts of art, artistic value, culture, multiculturalism, and even justice. The same can be said of the analysis of documents from state departments of education. But the primary finding of this chapter is that many AISBEG programs and state departments of education seem to assume that some form of multicultural arts education is compatible with or complimentary to discipline-based arts education, study rooted in four disciplines of art -- art production, history, criticism, and aesthetics.

But these policy documents, whether their origins can be found in educational reform agendas or regulatory responsibilities, primarily utilize action language geared to educational prescriptions, results, and outcomes. As such, then, they do not contain clarifying explanations of use of "multicultural" or "discipline-
based" arts education, nor do they address the value-laden concepts underlying these positions. In other words, these documents do not address the basic question of whether and, if so, how conceptions of multicultural arts education and discipline-based arts education can be reconciled on theoretical grounds.

In addressing this question in the next chapter, more questions will be raised than answers given. As stated in the introductory chapter, the aim here is not to seek a forced marriage between discipline-based and multicultural arts education in hopes of contributing directly to a particular reform agenda. Rather, the aim is to contribute to the quality of debates about policy positions in arts education. This will be done through an exposition of the theory of discipline-based arts education (DBAE) and what can be called the multicultural critique of DBAE. In exploring whether these two positions can be reconciled in a defensible way, a number of issues will be explored: 1) what place do the arts of ethnic cultures have in DBAE theory, and on what basis is such inclusion justified?; 2) do the four disciplines of art as identified within DBAE theory -- art production, history, criticism, and aesthetics -- accommodate the inclusion of the arts of ethnic cultures as curricular content?; and 3) in what ways do issues of curricular sequence and pedagogy affect the possible reconciliation of conceptions of DBAE and multicultural arts education? These questions will be addressed in turn.

NOTES

1. This typology of the sectors of arts education with policy influence is explicated in Brent Wilson, "Reformation and Responsibilities: A Memo to Members of the Arts Education Establishment," Design for Arts in Education 90 (May/June 1989): 27-35.


6. Ibid., p. 18.

7. Charles Fowler, "Arts Education and the NEA: Does the National Science Foundation Point the Way?", *Design for Arts in Education* 91 (March/April 1990): 9.


9. This argument is made in Brent Wilson, "Reformations and Responsibilities."

10. For an example of this argument, see Charles Fowler, *Can We Rescue the Arts for America's Children? Coming to Our Senses -- 104 Years Later* (New York: American Council for the Arts, 1988).

11. For a descriptive account of the planning processes involved in an AISBEG program, see Margaret Hess Johnson, "More than a Million for Arts Education in South Carolina: How Did it Happen?", in Betty Jo Troeger, ed., *Public Policy and Arts Administration, Biennial Proceedings Papers, Issue Number 4* (Tallahassee, FL: Public Policy and Arts Administration Affiliate of the National Art Education Association and the Florida State University Department of Art Education, 1991).


15. Ibid., p. 1.


19. Ibid., p. 4.


21. Ibid., p. 2.


23. Ibid., p. 13.


26. Ibid., p. 7.

27. Ibid., p. 8.

28. Ibid., p. 8.

29. Ibid., p. 9.

30. Ibid., p. 12.

32. Ibid., p. 10.

33. Ibid., p. 3.

34. Ibid., p. 11.

35. These claims for arts education are found in: Missouri Arts Education Task Force, *The Final Report of the Missouri Arts Education Task Force* (St. Louis, MO: Missouri Arts Education Task Force, 1990), pp. 4-8.

36. Ibid., p. 6.

37. Ibid., p. 9.

38. Ibid., p. 9.


40. Ibid., p. 5.

41. Ibid., p. 6.

42. Ibid., p. 6.

43. Ibid., p. 9.

44. Ibid., p. 9.


46. Ibid., p. 3.

47. Ibid., p. 3.

48. Ibid., p. 3.

49. Ibid., p. 3.

51. Ibid., p. 2.


55. Ibid., p. 4.


57. Ibid., p. 4.


59. Ibid., p. 18.

60. Ibid., p. 19.


63. Ibid., p. 16.

64. Ibid., p. 15.

65. Ibid., p. 15.

66. Ibid., p. 40.

67. Ibid., p. 40.
68. For an example of this assessment of the de facto authority of state education agencies regarding arts education, see Stanley S. Madeja, "Issues in State Educational Policy and the Arts," *Design for Arts in Education* 87 (January/February 1986): 17-21.


70. Ibid., p. i.


72. Ibid., p. 1.

73. Ibid., p. 2.


75. Ibid., p. 55.

76. Ibid., p. 54.


78. Ibid., p. xix.

79. Ibid., p. xix.

80. Ibid., p. xix.

81. Ibid., p. xix.


83. Ibid., p. 3.

84. Ibid., p. ix.

85. Ibid., p. ix.
86. Ibid., p. 114.


88. Ibid., p. 7.

89. Ibid., p. 63.

90. Ibid., p. 65.


94. Ibid., p. 23.


97. Ibid., p. 1.


100. Ibid., p. iii.

101. Ibid., p. iii.

102. Ibid., p. iii.

103. Ibid., p. iii.
104. Ibid., p. iii.


106. Ibid., p. 70.


109. Ibid., p. 112.


111. Ibid., p. 10.

112. Ibid., p. 15.


117. Ibid., p. 1.

119. Ibid., p. 49.


121. Ibid., p. 9.

122. Ibid., p. 77.


124. Ibid., p. 9.

125. Ibid., p. 8.

126. Ibid., p. 5.

127. Ibid., p. 9.


130. Ibid., p. 17-1.

131. Ibid., p. 17-1.

132. Ibid., p. 17-3.


134. Ibid., p. 102.

135. Ibid., p. 102.

136. Ibid., p. 102.


139. Ibid., p. 100.

140. Ibid., p. 100.
Chapter VII

MULTICULTURAL ISSUES AND DISCIPLINE-BASED ART EDUCATION

It was stressed throughout the preceding chapter that arts education policymakers and those with influence within the arts education policy environment, at least at the state level, either implicitly assume the complementary value of multicultural and discipline-based approaches to arts curricula or more explicitly advocate an integrated, multicultural/discipline-based curriculum in the arts. Such a conclusion, however, would be surprising to many, especially those who have formulated what can be called the multicultural critique of discipline-based art education. For such critics, it is at best an open question whether discipline-based art education, with its stress on art production, history, criticism, and aesthetics, is inclusive of or excludes other approaches to teaching and learning in the arts.1

At the outset, it must be acknowledged that the conception of discipline-based art education has been critiqued on a variety of grounds and from numerous perspectives. Several of these critiques will be noted here in brief. The Getty Center for Education for the Arts, a program of the J. Paul Getty Trust, has provided significant funding and logistical support to the development and dissemination of DBAE theory and its implementation in educational programs since the early 1980s. On the one hand, the concept of DBAE has its roots in
theoretical and curricular antecedents that date back several decades, and has been bolstered by more recent philosophical, empirical, curricular, and historical research. On the other hand, findings from an early 1980s study of school art programs led the Getty Center to conclude "that if art education is ever to become a meaningful part of the curriculum its content must be broadened and its requirements made more rigorous." This conclusion places DBAE squarely within the education reform movement of the eighties, a movement which indicted American schooling on counts such as curricular incoherence, lack of teacher and administrator professionalism, and general mediocrity, and sought remedies in "excellence," "substance," and "rigor." The Getty Center-sponsored study itself and conclusions about curricular rigor have spurred criticisms. It is charged that the Getty Center decided to support DBAE prior to its sponsored analysis of school art programs, thus rendering the research as a means to justify pre-determined conclusions. As for the aim of increased rigor, critics contend that this emphasis can have unwelcome consequences for teaching and learning in the arts -- the inculcation of "conformity to a preselected, unexamined standard that has its roots in the most restrictive aspects of general education and in the limiting world view of technocratic rationality."

Other critics focus on claims that DBAE, by its inclusion of history, criticism, and aesthetics, of necessity devalues the importance of creativity and self-expression in students' production of art works, or focus on the practical difficulties of implementing educational change in the arts by seeking to teach elementary-age students about the complexities of art history, criticism, and aesthetics, an aim
deemed more appropriate for older students. A final criticism of note is more theoretical in nature, that DBAE theorists do not define a concept basic to their position, namely, "discipline."12

Whatever the merits of these and other criticisms of DBAE that could be cited, they will not be the focus of analysis here. First, the theory of discipline-based art education will be explicated in brief. Next, critiques of DBAE from the perspective of advocates of concepts of multicultural art education will be reviewed, with special attention to the value-laden concepts underlying both positions. As will be seen, out of these reviews will emerge a number of issues that must be addressed if any kind of rapprochement between these positions is to be achieved.

**Discipline-Based Art Education: Theoretical Premises**

Any theory which aims to explain human phenomena or seeks to prescribe and justify actions for achievement of valued ends is subject to misinterpretation or misapplication. Indeed, the perceived gap between theoretical research and practice in arts education is a common locus of inquiry. The theory of discipline-based art education is clearly not exempt from misinterpretation or misapplication. Specifically, it would not be difficult to identify questionable educational practices justified in terms of DBAE and commence with a critique of a theory on this basis. But to proceed in this way would be to violate a basic premise of interpretive policy analysis, that an understanding of policy agents’ and proposals is best achieved by taking agents’ points of view and then reconstructing the concepts and practical reasoning they utilize. Therefore, an understanding of DBAE theory will be sought through review of a primary document in which the
theory's concepts and premises are most clearly and thoroughly articulated -- a paper by Gilbert A. Clark, Michael D. Day, and W. Dwaine Greer entitled "Discipline-based Art Education: Becoming Students of Art." It has been said of this paper that "more than anything else that has been written about DBAE, it clearly conveys a sense of what might be meant by teaching and learning in a discipline-based approach to art education."15

The genesis of the concept of discipline-based art education is not to be found in one reform movement of the 1960s, multicultural education, but another, the discipline-centered curriculum reform movement which emphasized the structure of academic disciplines in education.16 But Clark, Day, and Greer take pains to differentiate DBAE from this movement. Apart from the obvious distinction that the discipline-centered curriculum movement was geared to general education reform while DBAE is geared to change in art education, the authors note the following: 1) discipline-centered reform attempted to make "teacher-proof" curricula, while DBAE "recognizes essential roles of teachers and administrators in curriculum implementation";17 2) discipline-centered reform focused on the structure of disciplines as source of curricular content, while DBAE "focuses on [a] dynamic view of art disciplines including concepts, methods of inquiry, and communities of scholars";18 3) discipline-centered reform focused on the purity and abstraction of disciplined knowledge, while DBAE seeks integrated understandings of the disciplines of art; and 4) discipline-centered reform posited a model of learners as discipline specialists, while DBAE posits a model of learners as persons with a well-rounded education.
Clark, Day, and Greer also take pains to differentiate DBAE from a traditional rationale for art education, creative self-expression, the idea that art is means for developing a child’s inherent, creative, expressive capacities.\textsuperscript{19} Among the distinctions drawn center on matters of curriculum, teaching, learning, and works of art, as follows: 1) \textit{curriculum} -- creative self-expression views curriculum as developed by individual teachers and nonsequential in nature, with no articulation of its implementation, while DBAE entails a "written curriculum with sequential, cumulative, articulated, district-wide implementation";\textsuperscript{20} 2) \textit{teaching} -- creative self-expression holds that teachers are primarily to provide motivation and support and to take care not to inhibit a child’s self-expression, while DBAE sees teachers as helping children to understand concepts of art at their own level; 3) \textit{learning} -- under the creative, self-expression view, "learners are innately creative and expressive [and] need nurture rather than instruction,"\textsuperscript{21} while DBAE views learners as "students of art [who] need instruction to develop understandings of art";\textsuperscript{22} and 4) \textit{works of art} -- in the creative self-expression view, works of art created by adults are not to be studied because they "might negatively influence [a] child’s self-expression and creative development,"\textsuperscript{23} while, in DBAE, adult works of art are seen as central to the study of art, serving as the "focus for integrating learning from the four art disciplines."\textsuperscript{24}

Of course, to say what the theory of discipline-based art education is not, that it is not synonymous with the discipline-centered curriculum reform movement of the 1960s or a traditional view of the purpose and content of art education, is not to say what it is.\textsuperscript{25} Clark, Day, and Greer offer a summary of the key premises
Discipline-based art education is:

a contemporary orientation to art education that presents a broad view of art and emphasizes art in the general education of all students from kindergarten through high school. This approach integrates content from four art disciplines, namely, aesthetics, art criticism, art history, and art production, through a focus on works of art. The term discipline in this context refers to fields of study that are marked by recognized communities of scholars or practitioners, established conceptual structures, and accepted methods of inquiry. Decisions with respect to topics such as curriculum, instruction, learning, and evaluation are based upon the belief that art should be an integral part of general education. Art is viewed as a subject with content that can be taught and learned in ways that resemble how other subjects are taught in schools. Teachers are expected to teach their students by using written, sequentially organized curricula, and student progress is verified through use of appropriate evaluation methods. Goals, procedures, and evaluation are specific to the content of art but are consistent and compatible with those of general education.

The premises in this description of DBAE theory are more fully developed by Clark, Day, and Greer. Several of these warrant further exploration -- the goals of DBAE, its curricular content (art production, history, criticism, and aesthetics) and the concept of art "disciplines," works of art to be taught, curricular sequence, and learning in art. These premises will be explicated in turn.

**DBAE Goals.** The primary goal of discipline-based art education, as these theorists define it, "is to develop students' abilities to understand and appreciate art. This involves a knowledge of the contexts and theories of art and abilities to respond to as well as to create art." Clearly, DBAE theory stands apart from rationales and goal statements cited in the previous chapter which stress the extrinsic benefits of art education, i.e., its capacity to enhance general cognitive skills or learning of specific non-arts subject matter. Instead, its aim is "to develop mature students who are comfortable and familiar with major aspects of the
disciplines of art and who are able to express ideas with art media, who read about and criticize art, who are aware of art history, and who have a basic understanding of issues in aesthetics."

This statement of goals is premised on the belief that art is an intrinsically valuable domain of human experience, without which a person cannot be considered fully educated. But Clark, Day, and Greer also cite many anticipated benefits from discipline-based art education’s focus on understanding works of art - the development of a store of basic images in memory that are fundamental to language, thought, and feeling, a gain in access to the powerful meanings embodied in works of art, and increased understanding of visual metaphor, i.e., the capacity to understand how works of arts can portray complex, human ideals.

Art Disciplines. As noted earlier a number of times, the content of instruction in discipline-based art education is primarily to be derived from the disciplines of aesthetics, art criticism, art history, and art production. The concept of "discipline," given its prominent place in DBAE theory, bears scrutiny. Clark, Day, and Greer contend that the four disciplines of art, akin to other basic disciplines of knowledge and inquiry, can be construed as having: 1) a community of scholars and artists, 2) a distinctive method of inquiry, and 3) a conceptual structure.

1) The community of scholars and artists is defined as those persons who "contribute to the definition of a discipline [and] validate content and practices within the field." In the arts, such communities are artists, art critics, art historians, and aestheticians, all of whom are viewed by DBAE theorists as sources
learning about art. While participating in various institutional settings and formal and informal associations, communities of professionals are seen as "linked by their agreement to carry forward the work of the discipline, engage in mutual criticism of that work, and test the results of their inquiry." This point, according to Clark, Day, and Greer, highlights an important feature of the disciplines of art, i.e., that they are dynamic and flexible in their interests and pursuits. 2) Methods of inquiry refer to the characteristic ways that members of a community of scholars both seek to generate new knowledge or understandings and to assess claims or accomplishments. 3) The conceptual structure of a discipline is closely related and complementary to its methods of inquiry. "The conceptual structure of a discipline includes fundamental ideas, underlying principles, a recognized body of interrelated propositions, and a scheme of categories by which meanings are symbolized." Clark, Day, and Greer, stress that since influential new concepts and principles can and do emerge, the conceptual structure of disciplines is best thought of as dynamic and open-ended.

These authors make a final point about art disciplines and their status as resources for learning in art. It is not held that DBAE should involve the separate, distinct study of disciplines of art. Instead, they conclude, "it is the task of art educators to develop and implement ways to integrate learning from the four fields and allow each art discipline to complement the others as students engage in interrelated art learning activities." It remains here to describe in brief the conceptual structure and methods of inquiry of the four disciplines of art identified in DBAE theory -- aesthetics, art criticism, art history, and art production.
Aesthetics is defined as the philosophical activity involving critical reflection on the creation, experience, and evaluation of art. Its method of inquiry consists, at least in part, in the analysis and clarification of concepts as well as the formulation of basic principles of interpretation, critical reasoning, and evaluation. Elements of this discipline’s conceptual structure to which aestheticians direct attention include: 1) **the art object**, which yields issues of art’s existence, how it is identified, and its form, content, and meaning; 2) **appreciation and interpretation**, which comprises questions of the conditions necessary to aesthetic experience and the grounds for defensible interpretations of works of art; 3) **critical evaluation**, which entails questions of whether critical judgments about art works can be supported by good reasons in reference to artistic standards; 4) **artistic creation**, which involves issues of the conditions for the creation of art works, the nature and meaning of making art, and basic definitions of what it means to create works of art; and 5) **cultural context**. This element of aesthetic inquiry will be more specifically explicated. Such inquiry is premised on the view that art does not exist in a vacuum, that its origins, acceptance, meanings, and interpretations are intimately tied to numerous aspects of society and culture. For example, the meanings that are attributed to works of art “may be determined within a cultural setting by religious and ideological forces, and whether a work is viewed as primarily expressive or formal in nature may depend on the conditions of the time during which it was created or appreciated. Indeed, even whether something . . . is viewed as a work of art depends upon cultural conditions.”34 The cultural
context as a subject for aesthetic inquiry also includes relationships between art and human values and the social and political implications of such relationships.

Art criticism, within DBAE theory, is viewed as an activity which seeks "to inform and educate people . . . about art, by providing insights into its meaning so as to increase the understanding and appreciation of art and illuminate the cultural and societal values reflected in it."\textsuperscript{35} Methods utilized to achieve this goal have varied historically and continue to do so "because of the different and (constantly changing) social, political, economic, religious, and geographic influences . . . under which art is and has been made."\textsuperscript{36} Whatever methods and standards are utilized in criticism, it is held that "all critics must be able to 1) discuss works of art in terms of formal and descriptive (stylistic) aspects and 2) discuss works of art in terms of meaning."\textsuperscript{37} Discussions of an art work's meaning are of two types, internal and external. Discussions of internal qualities focus on art works' inherent qualities, while those of external qualities place art works within larger contexts such as art historical, historical, psychological, political, and ideological contexts.

Art history, taking works of art as its primary data, aspires "to describe, analyze, and interpret individual artworks by identifying their who, what, when, where, and why -- in short, their place in the scheme of history."\textsuperscript{38} There are two basic forms of art historical inquiry: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic inquiry focuses on: connoisseurship, the study of materials, techniques, authorship, and authenticity, among others; style, the study of works' formal qualities and motifs; iconography, the study of subject matter and themes of artworks; and function, the
study of the purposes for which art works are made. **Extrinsic inquiry** entails consideration of the conditions and contexts which shape the character of artworks. Such factors can include psychological, political, economic, patronage, scientific, religious, social, philosophical, cultural, and intellectual determinants.

Art production, according to DBAE theory, is seen as an avenue to a fuller understanding of all disciplines of art. Also, "learning about materials, acquiring techniques, gaining perceptual skills, and developing imagination through resolving the ambiguity inherent in the creative process give students insight into both their own work and the world as well." In that it involves a range of human processes, including thought, perception, feeling, imagination and, obviously, action, the production of art can lead to the development of empathy for others, the communication of sentiments such as joy, despair, love, outrage, and irony, and the sophisticated judgment and critical sensitivity needed to de-code and evaluate visual stimuli in many forms and contexts.

This summary of the disciplines of art as conceived by DBAE theorists, admittedly, was little more than a thumbnail sketch of complex concepts. But several elements in these descriptions will be returned to below when considering multicultural art education. But, first, additional premises of DBAE theory must be examined.

**Curricular Content -- Works of Art.** Clearly, a basic premise of DBAE theory is that the content of instruction in art education is to be drawn from four disciplines of art, disciplines with characteristic conceptual structures and methods of inquiry. But any method of inquiry must be directed to some sort of issue or
subject matter. With arts disciplines, that subject matter is works of art. Therefore, the kinds of works of art that DBAE theorists stipulate as worthy of study are of special interest.

Clark, Day, and Greer state that the range of art works that can be studied in discipline-based art education, works of art that are potentially useful for developing a mature understanding of art, is very broad. Specifically, curricular content is to be "derived from a broad range of the visual arts including folk, applied, and fine arts from Western and non-Western cultures and from ancient to contemporary times." The authors stress that students will not merely encounter this broad range of art works, "but learn how these works relate to the societies, religions, and technologies making up the contexts in which they were produced."

Given this extensive range of works of art deemed appropriate for instruction in art, and given the obvious fact that any curriculum specialist or teacher must make choices among these to accommodate the limited time in school settings available to them, then some sort of selection criteria must be utilized. Clark, Day, and Greer contend that deriving curriculum content from the four art disciplines assures that two selection criteria will be met: that content 1) must be significant to an organized field of knowledge and 2) must have, in some sense, stood the test of time. Other potential selection criteria identified by the authors are the subject matter's usefulness, its potential interest for learners, and its contribution to the growth and development of a democratic society. Determining the usefulness of potential curriculum content, it is argued, is a matter of "checking it against the educational goals within each school district's art program," a check
that "requires that curriculum content contribute to increased understanding of art." The authors also conclude that accommodating the interests of different individuals or groups of students is quite possible, given the broad range of art works, under DBAE theory, available for instructional purposes. Specifically, they hold that art works and inquiry methods can be found to meet students' interests, whatever their age. Finally, Clark, Day, and Greer also argue that DBAE contributes to the growth and development of society because "the DBAE orientation is based on the assumption that all members of society, not only the wealthy or elite, deserve access to the visual arts."

Curricular Sequence. Inherent in DBAE theory is the premise that curricula in visual arts, whatever works of art are to be studied or however content from the disciplines is to be studied, are to be sequentially organized with articulated content at all grade levels. According to Clark, Day, and Greer, a sequential visual arts curriculum consists of "a series of art lessons, actual written plans with objectives, motivation, and learning activities, and methods of evaluation. The series of lessons are organized sequentially for cumulative learning and articulated across grades and developmental levels to provide continuity for students as they progress from grade to grade."

The authors cite several reasons why the discipline-based approach to art education requires written, sequential curricula. First, they note that DBAE requires written plans because coordinating content from the four disciplines of art is a complex process and hence beyond the expertise of individual teachers. Also, it is argued that a written curriculum with specified objectives encourages effective
program implementation, evaluation, and increases the likelihood that art will be taught regularly in every classroom throughout a school district. Finally, the view that sequence, continuity, and articulation are fundamental to art education is premised on the belief that growth in understanding art is not a natural consequence of maturation but the result of formal instruction "that recognizes developmental stages and integrates what is known about them into curriculum planning.""6

**Learning in Art.** This final point in justifying the need for sequential curricula in art education leads to closer examination of another premise of DBAE, i.e., the character of learning in art. Within DBAE theory, children are seen as learners, in particular, learners of art. Learning outcomes are not phrased in terms of psychological growth, a common feature of the creative self-expression rationale for art education. Instead, learning outcomes are described in terms of students' progressive learning of a body of knowledge. This conception of learning, Clark, Day, and Greer conclude, "demands interventions by an art teacher in order for anything but rudimentary skills, abilities, values, or knowledge to be acquired or used."67

This description of the basic premises of DBAE theory, admittedly, neglects many theoretical subtleties and only touches on reasons justifying the holding of those premises. But this description does fairly represent the basic outlines of DBAE theory. Further, many points that were chosen for emphasis in this description foreshadow points of contention identified in the multicultural critique of discipline-based art education. But before considering these points of
contention, it is necessary to explicate the basic premises of multicultural art education.

Multicultural Art Education: Theoretical Antecedents

The task of explicating the theory of discipline-based art education was eased considerably by the presence of a recognized theoretical account which laid out DBAE's basic premises and justifications of those premises. No single document does the same for multicultural art education. In the absence of such a document, educational critics have taken the opportunity to attribute beliefs to advocates of multicultural approaches to art education. Ralph Smith, for one, infers a set of propositions that multiculturalists likely believe.

One proposition asserts that works of art are so totally the products of the conditions and prevailing ideologies of a certain time and place that they are both inaccessible and irrelevant to anyone whose outlook was not shaped by similar circumstances. Only works from one's own time, or better, from one's own social class have any meaning. This leads to a second proposition which asserts that those who stress the study of traditional exemplars of art commit acts of political oppression. They alienate people from their individual preferences, and deprive them of a sense of self-worth and pride. It should come as no surprise then that a third proposition accepts a thoroughgoing relativism in matters of artistic judgment. It holds that there are no defensible criteria by which one work of art can be judged superior to another. The fourth proposition follows from the others: people should be given the kind of culture they want and not what others think they should have.46

To say, on the one hand, that there is no single document which lays out the premises of a theory of multicultural art education does not mean, therefore, that this position is without theoretical foundations. There are in fact diverse theoretical underpinnings of the concept of multicultural art education. Given this, any attempt to attribute beliefs to persons thought to hold a theoretical position is,
at best, premature, and certainly inconsistent with the imperative of interpretive
policy analysis to understand policy agents' beliefs and outlooks form their point
of view.

What, then, constitutes the theoretical underpinnings of multicultural art
education? Two sources can be identified: 1) theories of multicultural education,
and 2) interpretive ideologies of art, culture, and education. These theoretical
antecedents of multicultural art education will be analyzed in turn.

Multicultural Education. It must be admitted, from the outset, that the
phrase "multicultural education" has been and is used by a wide variety of theorists
and practitioners in numerous ways. Akin to the concept of cultural pluralism
reviewed above, usage of "multicultural education" can be fairly called a pluralism
of pluralisms. The commonalities in diverse conceptions of multicultural education
are two-fold in nature: 1) each was spawned by the Civil Rights movements of the
1960s and early 1970s, which was in turn rooted in the belief that predominant
assimilationist policies, with the promise of social and economic mobility for racial
and ethnic groups in exchange for their cultural assimilation, had failed, a failure
exacerbated by the persistence of institutional racism and discrimination;^9 and
2) each calls for some kinds of change in education to make it more equitable to
the benefit of people of color.

Sleeter and Grant have developed a typology of conceptions of multicultural
education.50 This typology identifies five approaches to multicultural education,
each of which will be briefly reviewed. 1) The "Teaching the Culturally Different"
approach has the goal of helping minority students to build a positive cultural
group identity by increasing the knowledge of their own cultural background while, at the same time, developing their competencies in the dominant culture as a means to facilitate individual achievement and social mobility. 2) The “Human Relations” approach conceives of multicultural education as a means to help students from different cultural backgrounds to communicate with each other. 3) “Single Group Studies” refers to lessons or curriculum units that focus on the histories, experiences, and cultures of a specific group, most often, ethnic groups.

4) The most widespread multicultural approach to education is simply termed, by Sleeter and Grant, “multicultural education.” The goals of this conception of multicultural education center around five issues, the promotion of respect for the human rights of ethnic group members, development of respect for the value of continued cultural diversity in American society, presentation of alternative life choices for students, promotion of all persons’ rights to equal opportunity and treatment, and the equitable distribution of power among members of all ethnic groups. This approach to multicultural education focuses on the experiences of racial and ethnic groups because it is so argued, “the study of ethnic cultures, experiences, and issues, especially those of racial minorities, may be shortchanged” if the concept of multicultural education is extended to include the experiences and issues of groups identified by social class, gender, or handicap. Curricular writings utilizing this approach tend to critique existing materials for the lack of or biased attention to ethnic group cultures, recommend resources for teaching about ethnic groups, or offer suggestions for curriculum design and revision to promote inclusion of the histories and experiences of ethnic groups.
5) The final approach, termed "Education That is Multicultural and Social Reconstructionist" shares many goals with the approach outlined previously, most strongly the goals of promoting justice, reducing racism and ethnocentrism, and furthering the equitable distribution of power among members of all ethnic groups. It is stressed that education should assist students to "gain a better understanding of the causes of oppression and inequality and ways in which these social problems might be eliminated."52 This emphasis is rooted in the premise that class distinctions, rather than cultural identification, are the primary determinant of social inequalities in American society. Curriculum materials based on this perspective provide lessons designed to help students to analyze social stratification and take action against social inequality.

This brief review of various conceptions of multicultural education leaves open many questions about the grounds for justifying educational goals. These questions will be addressed more fully below. But Sleeter and Grant make some additional points about the theoretical literature of multicultural education that merit mention. First, they contend that in each of these approaches to multicultural education, "statements concerning goals are often vague, and clear connections between what they recommend as practices for educators are either ambiguous or missing altogether."53 Sleeter and Grant also note that the literature of multicultural education tends to view, explicitly or implicitly, the individual classroom teacher as the primary agent of educational change without due regard to how "other agents in the education system -- administrators, government policymakers, and teacher educators -- have more power than the teacher, can
provide help and support to her or him, and can help determine who will teach.”
Nor is attention "directed specifically to those community groups who may have a stake in school reform.”

These criticism of elements of approaches to multicultural education were made by researchers sympathetic to the notion of multicultural education. But critiques of multicultural education are by no means limited to those already supportive of the idea. Indeed, as will be seen, multicultural education, in its various incarnations, has been critiqued from a variety of perspectives. A review of these critiques and an exposition of assumptions underlying them can serve to clarify what the concept of multicultural education may mean by demonstrating what it is not.

As was noted in discussions of critiques of discipline-based art education, it is possible to focus on selected program elements of educational practice conducted in the name of a theory, in this case, multicultural education. Such a critique could center on practices like ethnic holiday celebrations, the making of multiethnic calendars, the adding of ethnic heroes to textbooks, or efforts to raise the "self-concepts" of ethnic group children. But to illustrate that educational practice often reflects the misinterpretation or misapplication of theoretical premises is an obvious point that does not take us very far. More substantive critiques can be cited.

Charles Tesconi argues that proponents of multicultural education have failed to carve out a unique theoretical foundation. In lieu of such a foundation, proponents, he contends, "have wittingly or unwittingly embroidered their advocacy
with the tenets of cultural pluralism ideology.\textsuperscript{56} To Tesconi this means that "multicultural education advocates are vulnerable to the limitations which inhere in cultural pluralism ideology."\textsuperscript{57} These limitations, in Tesconi's terms, are a matter of untested or unexamined assumptions underlying the concept of cultural pluralism and, hence, multicultural education. Further, because of its ties to the concept of cultural pluralism, critiques of multicultural education mirror those of cultural pluralism on many points. As with the cultural pluralism critique, criticisms of the concept of multicultural education tend to center on two broad issues: 1) its effects on individual development and opportunity; and 2) its impact on relationships between groups and between groups and the social structure.

1) One assumption of cultural pluralism and hence multicultural education, according to Tesconi, is that "an individual's membership in and attachment to primary ethnic or cultural group life . . . promote those characteristics in a person usually associated with a healthy personality type -- self-esteem, sense of belonging, respect for others, purposefulness, and critical thinking."\textsuperscript{58} But Tesconi wonders whether it is true that respect and consideration for others follows from primary ethnic group ties, especially if group ties entails limited opportunities to interact with a variety of culturally different others. On the other hand, if there is considerable interaction between ethnic group members and even fluidity of membership in groups, this could lead to the consequences of acculturation or assimilation. Thus, according to Tesconi, having cultural pluralism as an aim of multicultural education entails a dilemma -- if the goal of multicultural education is to assist students to maintain an ethnic group identification and thereby
perpetuate the group itself, then students' individual freedom and autonomy for self-determination is restricted; but if the education goal is to promote inter-cultural communication and understanding, then many unintended or unanticipated consequences can follow, including the loosening of students' ties to the primary group.

Other critiques cited in the discussion of cultural pluralism can be and are extended to multicultural education, including the claim that features of some cultures may not be worthy guides to self-identity in that these features, or practices based on them, may be unarguably wrong or unjust, trivial in comparison to the accomplishments of other cultures, or may be anti-rational and anti-democratic, in that some cultures, or so it is argued, de-value rational discussion of significant issues and problems. Continuing on this theme as it applies to the social structure, other critics say that multicultural education may not impart to students the knowledge and skills of participation needed for strengthening the values of freedom, equality, and justice necessary to maintenance of an open, democratic society.

Educational historian Diane Ravitch extends these critiques by special attention to theories and practices of multicultural education. She argues that advocates of multicultural education too often propose an ethnocentric curriculum to raise the self-esteem and academic achievement of children from racial and ethnic minority backgrounds. Without any evidence, they claim that "children from minority backgrounds do well in school only if they are immersed in a positive, prideful version of their ancestral culture." A corollary to this view, according to
Ravitch, is the notion "that children can learn only from the experiences of people from the same race."\(^6\) She further contends that proponents of this conception of multicultural education "have no interest in extending or revising American culture; they deny that a common culture exists . . . [and] reject any accommodations among groups, any interactions that blur the distinct lines between them."\(^6\)

Ravitch finds fault with a number of premises behind this view. First, it is based on a deterministic model by teaching "children that their identity is determined by their 'cultural genes,'"\(^6\) an unnecessarily restrictive conception of what persons are and can be to pass along to students. Ravitch further contends that if history is to be taught ethnocentrically, as only a record of a culture's heroes and accomplishments without due regard to inter-cultural influences or consideration of debatable practices in a culture's history, then students' identities will be rooted more in self-deception than critical understanding. Finally, the most invidious implication of this view of multicultural education, in Ravitch's terms, is that "racial and ethnic minorities are not and should not try to be part of American culture; it implies that American culture belongs only to those who are white and European; it implies that those who are neither white nor European are alienated from American culture by virtue of their race or ethnicity; it implies that the only culture they do belong to or can ever belong to is the culture of their ancestors."\(^6\)

But such a view, it is argued, can only lead to cultural isolation and inter-group conflict. Instead, concludes Ravitch, education should promote "a broader interpretation of the common American culture and seek due recognition for the
Multicultural education has been critiqued from perspectives other than what has been called a politically conservative point of view. A radical paradigm, a paradigm that is reproductionist or neo-Marxian in orientation, is a source of other multicultural education critiques. Critics within this paradigm work with the premise that social class stratification is the primary determinant of inequitable relations among cultural groups, stratification rooted in the interests and power of dominant classes to reproduce the social order by various means, including cultural domination. But given these premises, radical critics contend that multicultural education, with its stress on developing students' self-concepts and focus on the histories and characteristics of primary ethnic group traditions, diverts attention away from serious issues such as social class, institutional racism, power, and the social and cultural effects of capitalism. In this regard it is argued that by its emphasis on the value of individual cultural traditions and the relatively equal value of diverse traditions, multicultural education, in effect, masks how a capitalist system, structured to the benefit of dominant classes, creates hierarchies of value in portraying and treating diverse cultural traditions. Others contend that multicultural education, whatever its intentions, fails to recognize that schools, far from being an effective factor in eliminating societal racism and discrimination, reinforce social-class stratification in numerous ways. As such, then, radical critics conclude that "multicultural education is a palliative to keep excluded and oppressed groups such as blacks from rebelling against a system that promotes
structural inequality and institutionalized racism. It does not deal . . . with the real reasons for ethnic and racial groups being oppressed and victimized.  

The so-called conservative and radical critiques of multicultural education both make assumptions that are difficult to defend and ultimately undercut their criticisms. The conservative critique, in that it relies so heavily on the point that the concept of multicultural education is informed by the problematic ideal of cultural pluralism, falls prey to assumptions made in the critique of cultural pluralism discussed in Chapter V. First, as will be recalled, assessments of cultural pluralism as a societal ideal tend to be predictive in nature, focusing on anticipated consequences of the realization of the cultural pluralism ideal on both individuals and society. These consequences include restriction of individuals' opportunities for autonomous self-determination, limitation of possibilities for intergroup understanding, increased intergroup conflict, undermining of basic democratic values, and cultivation of competing loyalties for a nation's loyalties. But because these points are primarily predictions of possible consequences of the yet-to-be realized ideal of cultural pluralism, they do not, by themselves, negate cultural pluralism as a guide to educational policy, in this case, multicultural education.

More problematic is the fact that critiques of multicultural education, following those of cultural pluralism, assume particular meanings of "cultural pluralism," specifically, the meanings comprised by "insular pluralism," "classical cultural pluralism," or "cultural pluralism as separatism," in the process omitting potential meanings such as "modified cultural pluralism" or "cultural pluralism as voluntary ethnic choice." As will be remembered, neither modified cultural
pluralism nor cultural pluralism as voluntary ethnic choice holds that individual ethnic group members should be restricted, by design or in effect, in their exposure to and involvement with members of other ethnic groups. For its part, modified cultural pluralism envisions transmission of a substantial common culture rooted in commitment to basic democratic values of freedom, equality, and justice and, as well, considerable interaction between diverse ethnic group members. Cultural pluralism as voluntary ethnic choice, far from advocating a restrictive sense of group cohesion, advocates a view of ethnic group traditions as broadly shared resources available for the development and self-fulfillment of all individuals, including students.

Admittedly, this classification of the meaning of cultural pluralism as an aim for multicultural education leaves unresolved a dilemma embedded in the concept -- that interaction between ethnic group members, or learning about the values, dispositions, and outlooks of cultures other than one's own, may weaken individuals' ethnic group identification necessary for the continued salience of specific ethnic groups in a society. But, as with the concept of cultural pluralism as voluntary ethnic choice, if ethnic group maintenance is viewed as secondary to individual development and self-fulfillment, then the dilemma can be resolved, thereby clearing the way for cultural pluralism as a defensible goal for multicultural education.

The "radical" critique of multicultural education is subject to the same form of assessment as the "conservative" critique in that it is also premised on predictions, i.e., that the concept of multicultural education, as the ideal of cultural
pluralism on which it is based, will of necessity lead to reinforcement of status quo inequitable relations and diversion from the mobilization needed for ethnic minority groups to effect change in society's economic and power relations. But, again, a critique based on prediction of consequences cannot, by itself, undercut the potential value of a policy proposal, such as multicultural education. The radical critique also makes an unwarranted assumption about the concept of multicultural education, i.e., that its content necessarily consists only of histories of ethnic heroes, or socially disconnected accounts of beliefs, values, and outlooks of racial and ethnic groups. This point assumes that the meaning of multicultural education is limited to conceptions such as the "human relations" or "single group studies" approaches discussed above, without due consideration to the "multicultural/social reconstructionist" approach. This approach entails goals like the promotion of respect for the value of continued cultural diversity and, in addition, the goal of assisting students to gain a better understanding of causes for the inequality and racism faced by ethnic group members and how these problems can be addressed through social action. In this way, it can be fairly said that embedded in the concept of multicultural education is the premise that it can help students to become aware of the inconsistencies between democratic ideals and social practices, to develop a commitment to reflection and humane social change, and to acquire the skills needed to become efficacious in promoting social reform.70

To this point, various conceptions of multicultural education have been reviewed and critiques explicated and assessed in order to better understand a
prominent theoretical influence on the multicultural approach to art education. It remains, for now, to bring the various premises that have been explored together in a fully developed concept of multicultural education. Such a concept is offered by educator James A. Banks, a concept that seeks to integrate features from a number of approaches to multicultural education.

Banks posits a multi-factor paradigm of multicultural education that comprises seven premises. This paradigm reflects the notion that policy change in educational settings cannot be effected by reform in one area such as curriculum materials. Thus, seven factors in what Banks calls the school environment are addressed in the form of statements about what should be the case. These are as follows: 1) School staff have non-racist attitudes and respect for cultural differences. 2) The school itself has norms and values that reflect and legitimize cultural diversity. 3) Assessment and testing procedures are sensitive to culturally-based learning styles. 4) The curriculum and teaching materials present diverse cultural perspectives on concepts and issues. 5) Language diversity is valued and fostered. 6) Teaching styles and techniques are utilized that are sensitive to students from different social-class, racial, and ethnic groups. 7) Teachers and students acquire the skills to recognize forms of racism and the skills to seek to redress their causes and consequences.

This conception of multicultural education is geared "to help all students to develop ethnic literacy and cross-cultural competency."71 Banks further contends, in contrast to the premises that critics attribute to multicultural education advocates, that the aim of education is not to foster and perpetuate tight ethnic
boundaries, but to develop in all students "the knowledge, attitudes and skills needed to become successful citizens of their cultural communities, their nation-states and the global community." For these aims to be achieved, Banks argues that "ethnic minority students must develop competency in . . . and acquire the skills needed to participate in the national civic culture," but also that schools should seek to achieve this in a way that ethnic minority students will not need to surrender "the most important aspects of their first culture or become alienated from it." At the same time, the concept of multicultural education entails the premise that students from the mainstream culture should, through group interaction and formal instruction, assimilate some of the values and perspectives of ethnic minority students. Banks concludes that "only in this way . . . will educators be able to create a school culture that validates and legitimates the cultures of students from diverse ethnic and cultural groups."

Whether this integrated, holistic view of multicultural education would assuage critics from diverse perspectives is not clear. It is more clear that whatever the merits of this conception, other critics can fairly point to a notable dearth of research studies "on what happens when teachers work with multicultural education in their classrooms, what forms it takes and why, how students respond, and what barriers are encountered." And the lack of attention to the potential and actual influence of policy agents beyond individual schools and classrooms on the practice of multicultural education has already been noted.

Still, theoretical concepts of multicultural education, whatever their relationships to educational practice, are of interest here in that premises
associated with these concepts are embedded in approaches to multicultural art education. That said, however, the impression should not be left that concepts of multicultural education constitute the only theoretical antecedents for views of multicultural art education. An additional influence, to be reviewed here, are ideologies of art and culture.

**Ideologies of Art and Culture.** Three basic systems of ideas on art and culture exert influence on theories of art education and, specifically, multicultural art education -- classical humanism, liberal pluralism, and neo-Marxism. Many of the basic concepts and premises in these positions, while not identified as such, were explicated in earlier discussions of relations between art and culture. Thus, they will be reviewed only in brief.

Classical humanism assumes that art, while influenced by the values and beliefs of the culture of which it is a product, is an autonomous realm of value with its own distinct properties. The artist is able to step back from his culture and create works of art rooted in his individual sensibility and genius and often in rejection of his culture. Art works are considered aesthetic objects. Attention to the formal qualities of aesthetic objects yields aesthetic experience, experience characterized by self-sufficient detachment. The standards for artistic evaluation are to be set by experts, a consensus of the learned. The goal of education is to foster those critical and appreciative skills characteristic of the expert critic of art. The content for instruction is drawn from the great works or exemplars of Western culture and those works from other cultures that exhibit formal excellence. The appreciation of ethnic art or popular art does not require formal instruction, it is
argued, and inclusion of such works in a curriculum constitutes stress on the extrinsic effects as opposed to the intrinsic qualities of art. Ultimately, art education is to foster a democratic, common, high culture.

Liberal pluralism assumes the inter-relatedness of culture and art. Culture is seen as the whole way of life of a people and the arts as cultural products which reflect the ideas, beliefs, and ways of knowing of a people. The meaning of art, when it is distinguishable from art in a culture, is culture-specific and its value resides, in large part, in its capacity to serve a variety of functions. Art education, in this view, is the study of art in its cultural context in order to understand art's cultural origins, uses and meanings. Instructional methods are anthropological and culturally sensitive, out of respect for the cultural backgrounds students bring to the classroom and as a teaching resource. The goal of art education is to increase students' awareness of their own cultural biases and to develop skills for understanding and critically appraising the arts of many cultures.

Neo-Marxists view art as conditioned by power relations in a society and as a tool for economically powerful groups, the dominant culture, to maintain ideological control in a program of maintaining the societal status quo. The dominant culture defines "good art" in terms of its own preferences by positing universal, ahistorical categories of artistic merit, and has power to maintain hegemony over other cultures by denying them opportunities to develop contending ideologies of artistic value. But contradictions in the dominant culture's program of ideological control affords art education the possibility of assisting development
of contending ideologies, and to challenge the dominant culture. The dynamics of ethnicity are seen as a potent source of such contention. Art education also involves the study of how art serves and is conditioned by power.

Obviously, this typology obscures differences in emphasis among individual theorists in art education and the fact that some theorists draw on more than one perspective. Still, the typology does permit explication and critical evaluation of conceptual foundations of different notions of multicultural art education as well as their practical programs. These critiques will be described in summary.

Critiques of classical humanism focus on its assumption of the disconnectedness of art from culture. That art objects can be viewed as autonomous objects for contemplation and subsequent aesthetic experience, it is argued, does not constitute sufficient grounds for a theory of how culture and art interact, and leads to other errors, notably, that critics of art are themselves "above" or "beyond" culture and history and are able to make universal critical judgments across cultures. An educational program based on these assumptions, critics contend, would lead to students' partial understanding of art by focusing on the aesthetic elements of all art to the neglect of the cultural contexts of the production and use of art, and, as a consequence, potentially would restrict the subject matter for study in art classrooms.

Liberal pluralism, on the other hand, is subjected to the critique that it is vague on how it is that art "reflects" or "mirrors" a culture and, consequently, that it does not address how cultural products are shaped by power relations in a society or how the impact of these relations is felt in the culture of the art's origin.
or in the culture in which the art is displayed, critiqued, collected, and taught. Liberal pluralism is also seen as conceiving of cultures unrealistically, i.e., as stable, unique "authenticities," as if isolated from cultural domination and larger social and economic forces. In practical terms, critics conclude that these conceptual flaws could lead to teaching that misrepresents the diverse influences that can and do shape artistic production and use both within and across cultures.

Finally, neo-Marxists would seem to make the logical error that to expose the ideological context of artistic judgments necessarily negates their validity. Also, it can be said that a program based on neo-Marxist premises cuts off the possibility, because of emphasis on class relations, of fuller understanding of specifically cultural differences in the production, meaning, and use of art. Finally, such a program, it can be argued, would foreclose study of art as a basis for aesthetic experience, even though certain art works, given the historical context of their origins, are best understood with reference to aesthetic experience.

These arguments and counter-arguments could, of course, be probed further. For now, however, these perspectives serve as a prelude to consideration of the multicultural critique of discipline-based art education, a critique which, as will be seen, draws on premises both from conceptions of multicultural education and ideologies of art and culture.

The Multicultural Critique of Discipline-Based Art Education

To talk of a "multicultural critique of discipline-based art education" runs the risk of oversimplification. It must be acknowledged that the phrase was coined here for the purposes of analysis, and cannot be found as such in the literature of
art education. But it can be fairly argued that a number of criticisms of discipline-based art education, in that they draw on concepts from multicultural education, liberal pluralism, or neo-Marxism, form a set of interrelated premises constituting a critical position.

That said, however, the multicultural critique of DBAE also contains criticisms that have been made from diverse perspectives on art education. One such criticism has been cited above, i.e., that DBAE's stress on substance and rigor can lead to standardized curricula and content divided up into discrete units appropriate primarily for standardized testing. Another criticism of DBAE that cuts across the multicultural and other approaches to art education is more political in nature. It is charged that the Getty Center, as a private foundation that provides significant funding and logistical support for the development of DBAE theory and its implementation, exerts an inappropriately high level of influence, or "buying power," over educational policy-makers and professional associations in the arts and education. As a consequence, it is argued, alternative approaches, including multicultural education, are at a distinct disadvantage in capturing the attention of policy-makers and those with professional influence. In response to this criticism DBAE advocates make three points: that the theory of discipline-based art education and its application have antecedents prior to the involvement of the Getty Center; that rather than a result of "buying power" "much of the acceptance of DBAE is a consequence of its having been examined and approved by both art educators and education policy makers, who have found it to be a viable and substantive approach"; and that Getty Center activities have helped to
raise the visibility of art education in general, to the ultimate benefit of multiple approaches, including multicultural art education.

As interesting as this assessment of the influence of DBAE and the Getty Center and the response to it may be, the focus here will not be on the political context of art education but on those concepts and premises in the theory of discipline-based art education that are challenged by multicultural art education proponents. Four issues are addressed: 1) the status of the four disciplines of art as identified and described by DBAE theorists; 2) the range of works of art to be studied using the DBAE approach; 3) the place of social and political factors in DBAE theory; and 4) DBAE premises on curriculum design, pedagogy, and learning. These will be discussed in turn.

1) It is argued frequently that the theory of discipline-based art education has been variously conceptualized and interpreted. Whatever the merit of this assessment, even those who make this point as well as DBAE theorists themselves say that a defining feature of DBAE is its stress on the conceptual structures and methods of inquiry of four disciplines of art -- art production, art history, criticism, and aesthetics -- as the primary source of content for art education. That granted, however, the defensibility of this key premise of DBAE theory is not always similarly granted.

Blandy and Congdon make the point that "these disciplines are the product and persuasion of the Western scholastic imagination." They cite as evidence the historical origins of these disciplines in European universities centuries ago. But it is not the historical accuracy of these authors' claim that is of significance here,
but, rather the implications they draw from this claim. Blandy and Congdon state that "questions arise in our minds regarding the range of influence that representatives of these disciplines enjoy in terms of what they perceive as art, as well as the exclusive employment of their research methods and language in the study of art. We must recognize that proponents of the disciplines upon which DBAE is founded represent a minority population worldwide. It is also important to recognize that even within the United States, where such a world view dominates and where DBAE is most widely accepted, there are growing enclaves of . . . peoples who do not necessarily hold to the values inherent in the Western scholastic tradition in which discipline-based study in the arts is based."92 This argument, in essence, holds that the kinds of art on which disciplinary scholars conduct inquiry, and the terms in which such inquiry is conducted, do not speak to or are of little or no meaning to significant numbers of persons in contemporary American society. But Blandy and Congdon go further by warning of serious moral and ethical consequences of the adoption of the DBAE approach to art education, consequences for those who do not share the attitudes and values embodied in the four disciplines of art. They conclude this by arguing that since "DBAE is based upon scholastic traditions far removed from the everyday experience of most children and youth, we must ask . . . if this approach to the study of art will in some way contribute to the alienation of students from their cultures and society."93 Thus, DBAE, by its reliance on the disciplines of art, is both seen as irrelevant and potentially oppressive to students from minority ethnic groups by denying them access to or delegitimizing the arts of their primary cultural traditions.
2) The second element of the multicultural critique of discipline-based art education focuses on the issue of works of art deemed appropriate for study. At issue is the concern "that a discipline-based approach to art education will exclude the study of art which has not been adequately sanctioned by scholars as so-called 'masterpieces'." This point relates to the previous one, i.e., that the traditional disciplines of art either ignore or misconstrue the value and meaning of many forms of art, often by interpreting works only in reference to their aesthetic qualities or in terms of their influence on recognized masters of Western art. As a consequence, it is contended, there may be no place for the arts of ethnic cultures, folk arts, women, or dominated peoples worldwide in DBAE curricula. Further, so the argument goes, even if these kinds of arts were included in DBAE curricula, they would be marginalized or even trivialized within a DBAE framework.

3) The third element of the multicultural critique of discipline-based art education draws on premises in the neo-Marxist ideology of art, culture, and education. It is argued that the theory of DBAE ignores social and political concerns. This is demonstrated, at least implicitly, by discipline-based art education's presentation of itself "as being outside the social and political contexts in which art is created, viewed, and taught." As such, according to this critique, DBAE sees itself, the disciplines of art, and art itself as socially and politically neutral. This neutral position has implications for the teaching of all kinds of art. On the one hand, critics contend, it fails to give due recognition to how the creation of the arts of Western culture has been rooted in inequitable social and
political relations historically, how these same relations condition the dissemination and legitimation of examples of Western art, and finally, how the skilled consumption of these works becomes symbolic cultural capital in dominant classes' efforts to reinforce their social standing and reproduce inequitable class relations.

On the other hand, DBAE's politically neutral stance entails a failure to recognize the standing and potential of the arts ethnic cultures. This point is premised on the existence of an international art culture system\(^96\) "largely defined, shaped, and perpetuated by representatives of the disciplines associated with DBAE. This art culture system defines art and culture from a Western scholastic point of view and will determine definitions and understandings of all art, irrespective of its cultural origin, that comes in contact with the system. These definitions and understandings are articulated as art objects, curated in museums, sold in the art culture marketplace, written about in scholarly journals, and archived in assorted depositories."\(^97\) A further feature of the international art culture system is its capacity for the absorption of works from diverse cultures, objects brought into the system by disciplinary specialists "as a result of conquest, colonization, political alliances, chance encounters, marketplace strategies, immigration, and appropriation."\(^98\) Finally, it is argued that this system is prone to exclusiveness and marginalization, that "in establishing appropriate contexts, it will often strip an object of its original and potent context . . . . Objects will retain their original purpose and power only insofar as a discipline may share in that original meaning or can use that meaning to support arguments for the objects placed within the system."\(^99\)
This characterization of the international art system, according to critics, has important implications for the critique of discipline-based art education. The argument can be summarized as follows: Even if it were granted that the arts of ethnic cultures can be objects of study in a discipline-based approach to art education, DBAE's reliance on the disciplines of art, given the ways they function in the international art culture system, means that the arts of these cultures will almost inevitably be misconstrued. First, a discipline-based approach, by itself, would not teach students how institutions in the art world, through their political and social power, appropriate art objects from ethnic cultures and either strip them of their original meanings or place meanings on them consistent with Western, scholastic modes of thought. As such, then, students, whatever their cultural backgrounds, will not have the opportunity to understand many art objects in their original contexts, appreciate them according to their intended functions and meanings, or appraise them in reference to culturally-specific standards of quality. Finally, it could be argued that DBAE, through its reliance on art disciplines, will not comprise study of the arts of ethnic cultures as either creations existing outside of dominant socio-political relations in a society or as means to challenge those relations.

4) The final element of the multicultural critique focuses on the premise of DBAE that curricula in art, whatever works of art are to be studied, are to be sequentially organized as a series of art lessons, with written plans, goals, and objectives, and specified learning activities at all grade levels. Such curricula are to be geared to students' developmental levels and thereby provide continuity in
their learning as they progress from grade to grade. Further, such curricula are to be adopted and implemented on a district-wide level.

But these features of DBAE curricula lead critics to contend that the discipline-based approach may be ineffective with students of minority cultures or, in some contexts, culturally insensitive. This point is premised on the view that when art teaching emphasizes the content that is to be learned, important characteristics of learners are neglected. Attention only to students' age or maturational levels as they relate to learning, as prescribed by DBAE theory, is not sufficient. Attention must be paid, it is argued, to the characteristics of students of minority cultures, students "who possess traits, folkways, and learning styles that differ from the dominant culture in society." Therefore, these critics contend that the DBAE approaches cannot be effective unless "their advocates develop a unique delivery system based on these students' interests, preferences, abilities, cultural heritages, and learning and interaction styles."

Another feature of the criticism of DBAE's stress on the adoption of written, sequential art curricula at the district-wide level centers on the anticipated role for art teachers. Using a DBAE approach, teachers are to help students to understand the concepts of art through lessons detailed in the school district-adopted sequential curricula. But this conception is seen as de-valuing the authority and expertise of individual teachers. As Blandy and Congdon ask rhetorically, "have we forgotten that teachers are those who know their students best (as opposed to administrators, university educators, and other art scholars?)"
Do we no longer attempt to develop curriculum around the needs, readiness, and cultural and individual experiences of our students?"102

The time has come to review the elements of the multicultural critique of discipline-based art education. Four such elements were identified. It is argued: 1) that discipline-based art education, by its reliance on four disciplines of art conceived within the Western scholastic tradition, delegitimizes the arts of minority ethnic group cultures and, in effect, denies students access to these kinds of art; 2) that there is little place found for the study of the arts of ethnic cultures in DBAE curricula or, if they are included, marginalizes or even trivializes them; 3) that by positing art and education as politically and socially neutral, DBAE forecloses study of how the creation, dissemination, and use of art can reinforce inequitable socio-economic relations in society, and forecloses study of the arts of ethnic cultures which can help students to understand these objects in their original contexts, appreciate them according to their intended functions or meanings, appraise them using culturally-appropriate criteria, or see how creation and dissemination of ethnic arts can serve to challenge inequitable socio-economic relations; and 4) that the DBAE sequential curriculum approach does not stipulate sufficient attention to the learning styles of students from minority cultures and, further, de-values the authority of the individual teacher to develop curricula that are culturally sensitive and responsive to students' needs and interests.

What, then, is to be made of the multicultural critique of discipline-based art education? The value assumptions that inform this critique were explicated in the previous section. But does this critique expose basic conceptual flaws or
omissions, or is it based on misconceptions of DBAE theory or projections of intent to DBAE theorists? Also, does the multicultural critique accurately trace unanticipated consequences of the implementation of discipline-based art education, or does its identification of these consequences depend on misinterpretation of theoretical premises? These questions will be addressed by analyzing each of the four elements of the multicultural critique of DBAE in sequence.

1) A key claim in the multicultural critique is that the four disciplines of art that are to form the content of discipline-based art education -- art production, history, criticism, and aesthetics -- have their beginnings in Western culture and that they are rooted in scholastic traditions. Verification of this claim is a matter of inquiry for sociologists of knowledge or cultural historians. In any case, it is not so much the claim about the cultural and institutional origins of these four disciplines of art that is of interest here but, rather, what implications are drawn by proponents of the multicultural critique. As will be recalled, it was contended that these disciplines are limited in the kinds of art on which inquiry is conducted and, given their origins, are far removed from the experiences of most school students.

This argument, however, seems flawed on several grounds. It appears to assume, as one respondent to the multicultural critique has stated, "that disciplines are culturally static, inflexible, and non-changing throughout history." But contemporary practice in these disciplines belies this assumption. The practice of art history, in recent decades, has shifted, in many instances, from intrinsic inquiry,
the study of art works' materials, techniques, authenticity, formal qualities, and motifs, to extrinsic inquiry, the study of contexts and conditions, including political, cultural, social, and economic determinants, which shape the character of art works. Admittedly, as sociologist Vera Zolberg notes, "socially contextualized art history continues to be controversial. The most acceptable art historical study remains the . . . massive work tracing styles in chronological order according to national origins, or surveying the total oeuvre of a major artist. Despite pressure to conform to the older tradition, however, art historians have moved into social study in a variety of ways." As for art criticism, DBAE theorists address the changing character of art criticism directly, noting that its methods have varied historically and continue to do so, in part, because of the changing social, political, and cultural conditions under which art is made. No longer does art criticism focus exclusively on the internal qualities of art works as in formalistic criticism, itself a reaction against the tendency to evaluate an art work in terms of its moral content or fidelity to visual reality. Art criticism quite often today is oriented to placing the meanings of art works in social, political, and ideological contexts.

These examples would seem to suffice to counter the apparent assumption in the multicultural critique that the art disciplines on which DBAE is based are static or inflexible in nature or when viewed historically. If the argument had claimed that, in DBAE theory, definitions of the disciplines of art, such as art history or criticism, are so inclusive of diverse methods and theoretical assumptions that drawing content for art education from them would be extremely complex, that is one thing. Or it could rather have been argued, fairly, that by its inclusiveness
and hence relative lack of specificity on the methods of art history or art criticism to be included in art curricula, DBAE theory could be invoked to justify educational practices which treat art history as mere chronologies of art works or art criticism based on assessment of the formal properties of art works. But the multicultural critique does not phrase its criticism of DBAE's reliance on arts disciplines in this way.

A related point centers on the claim that the kinds of art on which these four disciplines conduct inquiry is limited. An examination of the practice of these disciplines also belies this assessment. For example, DBAE theorists note that "art historians study arts of all sorts, those of prehistoric and tribal groups as well as those of highly developed and traditional cultural centers." Further, numerous art historical studies of the arts of ethnic cultures, including studies conducted by members of the ethnic groups themselves, can be cited. Now if it was said that research within these disciplines has not sufficiently investigated the arts of ethnic cultures, that point could be reasonably debated. But there is nothing inherent in these disciplines or in their practice that compels the conclusion that they exclude inquiry into the arts of ethnic cultures.

A final feature of the multicultural critique of art disciplines is the claim that in their interests and terms of inquiry, these disciplines are too far removed from the everyday experiences of students. But if this argument were extended, then any initiation of students into adult modes of thought would be forbidden. This is not to say that content from these disciplines cannot be taught badly, i.e., in ways that are not related to the interests and capacities of students. This point,
however, does not by itself deny the potential import of content from art disciplines for students of diverse backgrounds. Rather, the point refers to questions of pedagogy and curriculum organization, questions which will be returned to below.

2) The second element of the multicultural critique identified above centers on the works of art prescribed for study in a discipline-based approach to art education. It is claimed that curricula based on DBAE theory may include for study only those works sanctioned as "masterpieces" by disciplinary scholars to the neglect of the arts of ethnic cultures, among others. Even if DBAE critics granted the premise argued for above, that the arts disciplines neither by definition nor practice exclude the arts of ethnic cultures from disciplined inquiry, they could still make the point that DBAE-based curricula could exclude them. Of course, DBAE theory, as with any theory, can be misinterpreted or misapplied. But it is clearly the intent of DBAE theorists for art curricula to be inclusive of many kinds of art. As Clark, Day, and Greer state, content in DBAE curricula is to be "derived from a broad range of the visual arts including folk, applied, and fine arts from Western and non-Western cultures and from ancient to contemporary times."106

The claim that DBAE theory excludes many kinds of art from study in schools, it has been argued, is based on an assumption embedded in the multicultural critique, namely, that DBAE is a specific curriculum.107 Whether this is a fair criticism or an unwarranted projection of ideological or other motives to DBAE critics is not clear, and could be debated. In any case, though, DBAE theorists take pains to distance themselves from this assumption. As Stephen Dobbs states, "discipline-based art education is an approach to teaching and
learning about art rather than a specific curriculum. DBAE can take many specific forms and therefore many different DBAE-inspired curricula can be developed for the nation's schools. No single or national curriculum would be consistent with the pluralism that characterizes American educational policy and the adoption of curricula in all subjects.\textsuperscript{108}

But, as with the portrayal of the breadth of methods inherent in the disciplines of art, the premise about the breadth of potential content, i.e., works of art, that can be incorporated into DBAE curricula seems problematic. The criterion for selection of art works to be studied in DBAE-inspired curricula is defined by Clark, Day, and Greer in very general terms, that such art works only be "useful for development of a mature understanding of art."\textsuperscript{109} The anticipated benefits of this mature understanding of art are also defined in quite general terms, benefits such as the development of a store of images basic to language, thought, and feeling, increased access to the meanings embodied in works of art, and increased understanding of how works of art can portray complex, human ideals. As such, then, there is nothing specific in the criteria of selection for art to be studied or in statements of the anticipated benefits of art instruction that speaks directly to the need for study of the arts of ethnic cultures. That is, there is no rationale or premise within DBAE theory that justifies and, hence, encourages the study of such art. Without such a rationale or theoretical premise, it is certainly conceivable that DBAE-inspired curricula could be developed and implemented with no reference, intentionally or not, to the arts of ethnic cultures. This point will be developed in greater detail below.
3) The third element of the multicultural critique centers on the claim that DBAE portrays itself as socially and politically neutral. This stance, it is argued, can lead to teaching of art that fails to address the socio-economic origins and consequences of the legitimized arts of Western culture or the contents, intended functions, meanings, or standards of appraisal of the arts of ethnic cultures. Thus, even if DBAE critics accept the premise that the arts of ethnic cultures are not necessarily excluded from study in a disciplined-based approach to art education, they could still say that such kinds of art would likely be misunderstood in a DBAE-based course of study.

This conclusion, in turn, is rooted in the premise that the four disciplines referred to in DBAE theory are either insufficient or distorted guides to the arts of ethnic cultures, by virtue of their place in the international art culture system. Evaluating this claim necessitates a return to the accounts of art disciplines found in DBAE theory. For example, aesthetics is defined as comprising, in part, inquiry into the cultural context of art. Such inquiry entails study of arts works' origins, acceptance, meanings, and interpretations, as well as study of the relationships between art and human values and the social and political implications of such relationships. Art criticism, as noted earlier in this section, can involve attention to the meanings of art within political and ideological contexts, while art history, also as noted previously, can entail consideration of the many determinants, including cultural and social determinants, which shape the character of art works.

The question, then, becomes whether these features of methodological inquiry in the four disciplines of art found in DBAE theory are sufficient to
encourage the kind of understanding of both the arts of Western cultures and the arts of ethnic cultures described and argued for in the multicultural critique. And however one answers this question, either conclusion leads to another question, namely, whether study of the socio-economic origins and consequences of Western art and study of the intended functions, meanings, and standards of appraisal in ethnic arts traditions is warranted as an approach to school-based art education. These questions will be explored below.

4) The final element of the multicultural critique focuses on questions of curriculum organization and pedagogy. It is contended that DBAE theory does not address the learning styles of students from minority cultures and de-values the authority of the individual teacher to develop a culturally sensitive curriculum in art.

The latter claim will be examined first by reviewing premises in DBAE theory about the role of teachers. As will be recalled, DBAE theorists attempt to draw a sharp distinction between conceptions of the role of teachers within the 1960s discipline-centered reform movement and DBAE. In the former, university-based scholar-curriculum specialists strove to develop and install "teacher-proof" curricula, in which a teacher was thought of primarily as a technician. DBAE is to use "a district-wide team effort by school board members, superintendents, principals, and teachers to bring about changes."¹¹0 Within this "team effort," roles are specified. School board members, superintendents, and principals are to provide support and oversight for the development and implementation of DBAE programs; curriculum specialists are to develop art curricula and teaching resource
materials; and "teachers of art should instruct learners about art."\textsuperscript{111} Specifically, in DBAE theory, "teachers of art should be expected to evaluate and adapt curricula according to their own art experience and . . . to extend and enrich their art curricula as specialist teachers do in other subjects."\textsuperscript{112}

The expertise expected of teachers of art using a discipline-based approach is that of art education expertise, rather than expertise in the disciplines of aesthetics, art production, art criticism, and history, an expectation deemed unrealistic. In discussing levels of expertise, DBAE theorists draw a distinction between arts specialists and regular classroom teachers. They acknowledge that in some districts art is taught primarily by general classroom teachers, an acknowledgment seen as a concession in some quarters.\textsuperscript{113} In any case, DBAE theorists define the different levels of expertise as follows: "the professional role of art education specialists within DBAE focuses on the educational tasks of instruction, curriculum implementation, enrichment and extension, [and] evaluation of student achievement and program effectiveness."\textsuperscript{114} On the other hand, general classroom teachers, it is expected, will "prepare and teach lessons from a curriculum. In these cases it is the curriculum that embodies art education expertise and expertise from the art disciplines."\textsuperscript{115}

Given this description of the roles and expected expertise levels of teachers of art in DBAE-based programs, it seems difficult to sustain the claim that DBAE theory, of necessity, de-values the authority of the individual teacher. Teachers, at least art specialists, are to be given the authority to evaluate and adapt written art curricula and extend these curricula in ways consistent with their interests and
expertise. Now if it is to be argued that individual teachers of art are to be given sole authority over curriculum content, then DBAE theory would be found wanting. But this conception of teacher authority is problematic on several grounds, primarily practical. School districts in American schools in most cases do not grant such authority to individual classroom teachers or specialists. Whether this should be so or not can be argued. But, clearly, if any proposal for educational change is to occur that affects actual teaching and learning, whether it be change toward a discipline-based or multicultural approach, for example, then a systemic strategy, one which envisions authoritative roles for numerous kinds of policy-makers and decision-makers working collaboratively, is a necessity. The focus on the authority of the individual teacher within the multicultural critique is, therefore, both flawed in the assumptions it makes and limited in its conception of how educational change can and does occur. This point recalls an assessment of the general multicultural education literature, voiced by proponents of this theory of education, that the literature focuses almost exclusively on the individual classroom teacher as the locus of change to the relative neglect of attention to the considerable and potentially positive influence of numerous policy-makers and decision-makers in the educational environment. Given its focus on individual teachers, the multicultural critique of DBAE is fairly subject to this assessment as well.

That said, however, one feature of the multicultural critique relating to curriculum and pedagogy is not clearly, and perhaps not sufficiently, addressed by DBAE theorists. One aspect of the authority envisioned for teachers of art within DBAE theory, an aspect heretofore unexamined, is the idea that teachers should
and be able to adapt written art curricula according to "the perceived needs of their students and the community." The meaning of this phrase, and its implications for the practice of teachers using a discipline-based approach to art education, is not spelled out.

DBAE theorists contend that the discipline-based approach "recognizes developmental stages and integrates what is known about them into curriculum planning." The implications of this premise are described as follows: "students should be assigned learning activities and tasks that acknowledge and accommodate their respective levels of cognitive, social, and physical maturity." But nowhere in this account is there mention of the importance of the cultural backgrounds students bring to learning situations, whether these characteristics should be considered in art instruction and, if so, how this is to be done. Thus, it appears that this theoretical omission, intentional or otherwise, leaves open the possibility that DBAE-based curricula, as developed and implemented in local school districts, schools, and classrooms may not be sensitive to the learning styles of many students. Of course, how this diversity in learning styles is to be accommodated in art curricula is an open question, one which will be addressed below.

This review and assessment of the multicultural critique of the theory of discipline-based art education has, I believe, undercut several of the critique's claims while exposing the vulnerability of DBAE theory on several points. Claims that the four disciplines of art are static or limited in the kinds of art on which they conduct inquiry, that DBAE necessarily entails a limited range of art works to be studied as part of art curricula, that the authority of individual teachers is
devalued within DBAE, and that the locus of educational change is the individual
classroom were revealed as flawed, misdirected, or ill-conceived. But this review
and assessment also revealed that while DBAE theory does not necessarily exclude
the study of the arts of ethnic cultures, it does not include a specific rationale or
promise to justify or encourage such study; that the four disciplines of art, as
conceived of within DBAE theory, may not be sufficient guides to a complete
understanding of the arts of both Western culture and ethnic cultures; and that
DBAE theory does not address the place of the cultural backgrounds students
bring to art learning situations, thus leaving open the question of whether and how
cultural-based learning styles are to be accommodated in teaching art.

These open questions surrounding DBAE theory form the locus of inquiry
in the next section. Coming to some sort of resolution on these issues, it seems
clear, is a necessary element in any possible resolution, at least a theoretical level,
of multicultural and discipline-based approaches to art education.

**Integrating Multicultural Perspectives and DBAE**

The previous section concluded that while flawed in many respects, the
multicultural critique presented some significant challenges to the theory of
discipline-based art education and, in some cases, raised questions left to be
addressed. In formal terms, these questions can be phrased as follows:

1) If DBAE theory does not provide a specific rationale for the inclusion of
the arts of ethnic cultures in art curricula, can such a rationale be developed? If
so, in what terms can it be formulated?
2) Do the four art disciplines that form the basis of the content selection in DBAE curriculum development provide a sufficient guide to the understanding of both the arts of Western culture and ethnic cultures?

3) Since DBAE theory does not specifically address the issue of whether teachers using a discipline-based approach should accommodate the interests and learning styles of students of minority cultures, how can such accommodation be accomplished?

These questions will be explored in turn.

1) Rationales for the Curricular Inclusion of the Arts of Ethnic Cultures. A rationale for the inclusion of the arts of ethnic cultures in art education can take many forms. These can be categorized as arguments from political, cultural pluralism, justice, and utilitarian perspectives.

A political rationale can be formulated which recognizes the changing demographic patterns of American society. In particular, it can be pointed out that "some previously denoted "minority" groups . . . have attained or are about to attain majority status in some parts of this country."119 This demographic shift, it is predicted, will lead to shifts in political power in many arenas of public policy, including education, the arts, and, by extension, art education. As a result, then, African-American and Hispanic-American communities will be in political positions to determine the content and direction of policy positions. Given this emergent political power and the consequent diminution of the former dominant culture's capacities to make and implement policy choices, it is asked "how will the former dominant ideological group be able to maintain its cultural heritage and values?
How can it, with conscience, ask for respect and understanding from the newly enfranchised? In this way, the inclusion of the arts of ethnic cultures in educational curricula is seen as a political necessity, a policy initiative without which the arts of Western culture are doomed to marginalization or virtual exclusion from future art curricula.

This rationale may be rooted in political realities, although shifts in the distribution of population by race and ethnicity are not, by themselves, reliable predictors of shifts in the distribution and exercise of political power. In any case, the argument from political necessity, if taken alone, only goes so far. A basic premise of this dissertation is that policy positions are rooted in values that embody and express human idea's and that, by implication, policy positions should be grounded as such. Therefore, a stronger rationale for the curricular inclusion of the arts of ethnic cultures, one rooted in values rather than political necessity, is needed.

An argument from the position of cultural pluralism would meet this point, in that "cultural pluralism" is a value-laden concept of ways social and cultural relations ought to be in a society. It could be argued, for example, that teaching students from minority ethnic groups about the arts of their primary cultures is part of the cultural transmission necessary to ethnic group maintenance. But such a stress on ethnic group maintenance could entail conceiving of "cultural pluralism" as "insular pluralism," with the consequent constrictions on individual self-determination discussed above. Also, although not necessarily, teaching art as a means to ethnic group maintenance could involve presenting art history as an
unqualified record of accomplishments of ethnic group members, with little attention to conditions shaping the production, dissemination, and use of ethnic arts.

A rationale for the inclusion of the arts of ethnic cultures in art curricula could also be constructed in terms of justice. For example, the point could be made that the study of ethnic arts has either been excluded, marginalized, or trivialized historically in the classrooms of American schools. Therefore, or so it could be argued, students from minority ethnic groups are entitled to compensation, and having the arts of their primary cultures prominently included in art teaching and learning would constitute an important element of such compensation. In addition to this compensatory justice argument, a rationale could be phrased in terms of distributive justice by arguing that a school district's or school's curricular attention to specific kinds of subject matter should be proportional to the ethnic and racial make-up of the communities in which schools reside. But these arguments are flawed in ways similar to those found in the analysis of justice arguments in arts policy. Specifically, curricular decisions made in this way could deny some students, students not from ethnic groups over-represented in particular schools, access to an understanding of their own cultural traditions. In other cases, if a curriculum is implemented which reflects the racial and ethnic makeup of schools with students from a single culture, then consequences could include the kind of insular ethnic group identification critiqued above.
A primary feature of several of the rationales examined to this point for the inclusion of the arts of ethnic cultures in art curricula is their stress on the importance of such inclusion for students from minority ethnic groups. But this emphasis seems unnecessarily limited in scope. A more persuasive rationale, it seems to me, must be posited in consideration of all potential students of art. One form of rationale that might meet this criterion is a utilitarian argument. Utilitarian arguments are constructed on the premise that the value of adopted means, means that can include anything from good deeds to curriculum plans, resides in their effectiveness in the achievement of valued ends or states of affairs. Such arguments are quite common in educational discourse. As will be recalled, one premise of multicultural education is that it is to their long-term benefit for ethnic minority students to develop competency in and acquire the skills necessary for participation in the national civic culture. As another example, E.D. Hirsch defends his concept of "cultural literacy" not in terms of the intrinsic value of the arts and humanities but in terms of utility, that it is beneficial for students to have specific knowledge of the primary works of a common culture, i.e., cultural literacy. Both Hirsch's utilitarian argument and the argument made by multicultural education proponents could be critiqued on a variety of grounds. But it is not so much the details of their arguments that is of interest here. Instead, it is the utilitarian form of their arguments that is of significance. The task becomes, then, to structure a utilitarian argument or rationale for the inclusion of the arts of ethnic cultures in curricula for all students.
Two basic factual premises must inform such a rationale. One is that American society is characterized by cultural diversity, and increasingly so. The other is that cultural traditions continue to exert some influence on the behavior, values, and outlooks of American ethnic groups, and that art works are preserved, presented, and created which draw on these traditions, sometimes self-consciously and at other times not. Given these premises, then, it seems reasonable to say that if students are to be able to intelligently participate in an art world and in a society at large that is culturally diverse, then they must receive instruction to enhance their understanding of the cultures of the nation’s ethnic groups, including their art works. Without such learning experiences, all students, whatever their cultural backgrounds, will be culturally insulated and, hence, educated in a way that limits their opportunities for individual development and self-determination.

But this utilitarian argument requires supplementation, i.e., that the valued ends to which instruction in ethnic arts is a means must be clarified. In other words, what is the specific value of learning about the arts of ethnic cultures? An answer could be posited by reference to how art "reflects" a culture and how understanding of ethnic arts therefore leads to understanding of a culture. Another answer could embody the premise that all ethnic art is the unique product of a specific culture, without acknowledgement of inter-cultural influences in the production and stylistic features of art. These answers would be problematic on the grounds reviewed in detail above. Instead, a defensible argument must be phrased in terms of artistic value. As will be recalled, artistic value was defined here as the capacity of art works to induce in qualified individuals an integrated
experience of the aesthetic, cognitive, moral, and religious features of art works. It was also contended that the value of art can and does vary by culture because the cognitive, moral, and religious beliefs and practices embodied as features in art works can and do vary by culture. Based on these premises it was concluded that familiarity with a culture's cognitive, moral, and religious beliefs and practices is a necessary, if not sufficient, qualification for the making of defensible evaluations of that culture's art works.

Given this conception of artistic value, it seems reasonable to conclude that if students do not receive instruction to achieve understanding of the arts of ethnic cultures, then their judgments of such art, art that is increasingly prominent in American society, will likely not be defensible. Further, such students will be foreclosed from having valuable experiences of certain kinds of art. Put more positively, by an increase in their capacities to understand and evaluate the arts of ethnic cultures, students will have sophisticated access to a fuller range of human experience made vivid by art.

This rationale, a utilitarian argument which posits instruction in the arts of ethnic cultures as a means to students' informal participation in an increasingly multicultural art world and as a means to sophisticated access to a fuller range of human experience made vivid by art, is not inconsistent with rationales for the study of art within DBAE theory, rationales which focus on the development of a store of images basic to language, thought, and feeling, access to the meanings in art works, and increased understanding of visual metaphor. Not only is this rationale not inconsistent with other DBAE rationales, it fills a significant gap in
DBAE theory and thus could serve as a foundation for an integration of multicultural and discipline-based approaches to art education.

But for such an integration to occur, other issues need to be addressed, including a question begged in the rationale constructed here. The rationale spoke of increased understanding of ethnic arts. But what is necessary to such understanding and in what does this consist? The question will center here on the issue of whether the four disciplines of art identified by DBAE theorists are sufficient to promote a sufficient understanding of the arts of ethnic cultures and, in addition, the arts of Western culture.

2) Disciplinary Understandings of Art. It was established, in previous sections, that the four disciplines for studying art which figure so prominently in the theory of discipline-based art education -- art production, art history, art criticism, and aesthetics -- are not, whether or not their roots are accurately described as being in the Western scholastic tradition, illegitimate modes of inquiry for gaining understanding the arts of ethnic cultures. The character and focus of each of these disciplines has changed dramatically over history, and the specific methods and general orientations of disciplinary scholars are pluralistic in nature in contemporary society. Concerns addressed are broad, including the cultural contexts which condition the production of art, how meanings of art works relate to ideological positions, and how changes in reception of art works vary historically by social, cultural, and economic factors. Further, the historical record suggests that some attention has been paid to the arts of ethnic cultures by these disciplines. Of course, a case can also be made that the practice of these methods of inquiry,
in too many cases, has proceeded without due regard for the cultural contexts, intended meanings, and standards for appraisal of the arts of ethnic cultures or that ethnic arts have been studied insufficiently. But if these disciplines are seen as evolving, open to induced or self-correction, potentially broad in the subject matter they study, and ultimately as methods of inquiry rather than a set of fixed conclusions, then claims about their illegitimacy are difficult to sustain.

This conclusion, however, does not answer the question of whether these disciplines are sufficient in their conceptual structures and methods of inquiry to gain a full understanding of the arts, including the arts of ethnic cultures. An aim of discipline-based art education seems to be the imparting of a sense of the kinds of inquiry utilized in the "adult world" to increase understanding of art. It would seem then, that if it can be shown that a discipline by virtue of its unique conceptual structure and methods of inquiry can make an important contribution to students' understanding of art, then it would seem to be at least a candidate for content in art education, including discipline-based art education.

June King McFee, for example, contends that in addition to the disciplines of art production, art history, art criticism, and aesthetics, a fifth discipline should be included as a basis for DBAE-inspired curricula -- "socio-cultural art." This fifth DBAE discipline would include explorations of:

- "how a given art expresses cultural concepts of reality, values and belief systems, and patterns of behavior;
- how design and artistry are developed in different cultures;
- how artists are motivated, conditioned, inspired, and rewarded by cultural mores;
• how art is used to transmit and maintain a culture . . . ;
• how art can be compared cross-culturally within and without the country; [and]
• how culture affects one's own art values.\textsuperscript{123}

McFee contends that the addition of "socio-cultural art" to DBAE as a fifth discipline is necessary for two reasons: 1) because "the disciplines already being used by DBAE have mainly been developed around the studio arts,"\textsuperscript{124} and 2) because to understand issues of history, criticism, and aesthetics relative to a culture, arts and artists "must be studied in terms of their specific cultural value system."\textsuperscript{125}

The adequacy of this conception of socio-cultural inquiry into art could be debated. But of greater interest here is whether the kinds of investigation prescribed by McFee are adequately covered by disciplines such as aesthetics, art history, or art criticism. Elliott Eisner, for one, argues that anthropological perspectives are and can increasingly be incorporated into the study of art history,\textsuperscript{126} while Clark, Day, and Greer suggest that such perspectives are found in aestheticians' inquiry into the cultural context of art.\textsuperscript{127} But to evaluate these claims and counterclaims about the relative inclusiveness of disciplines of art history, criticism, or aesthetics would require a historical review and analysis of the practice of these disciplines, a task beyond the scope of this.

In any case, the point here is not to assess the historical practices of these disciplines, but to decide whether sociology and anthropology have an important and unique contribution to make to the study of art and, hence, to the art education of students. To decide this requires a return to the original question of
whether the sociology and anthropology of art have a unique conceptual structure and methods of inquiry.

First, it must be noted that sociological inquiry into art and anthropological inquiry into art differ in several respects. Anthropologists take "culture" as their locus of inquiry. "They see culture as a whole, consisting of symbolic meanings or structures of thought, which in turn structure ideas and ways of thinking, including religious beliefs, ethical values, and symbol systems including language, as well as aesthetics and the arts." Possible topics for the anthropological study of art are broad and include: the functions of art in fulfilling human needs or as part of religious rituals, and in strengthening a culture's identity in the face of assimilationist pressures; the position of artists in a society, and how they are supported; and how artistic symbols and their use in rituals reveal a culture's structures of thought, world views, and societal structures.

Sociologists, for their part, take societies as their locus of study and the arts as contextualized within those societies. "Sociologists direct attention to the relation of the artist and art work to political institutions, ideologies, and other extraaesthetic considerations." They view the creation of art as a collective process involving many social actors and institutions, conceive of the distribution of art as conditioned by marketplace and ideological forces, view the value of art works not only as derived from their internal qualities but in terms of value attributed to them (including money), and interpret the critical reception and consumption of art works as correlated with general factors such as class and social standing and more specific variables such as income and educational attainment.
Finally, "although sociologists vary as to how much attention they pay to particular aspects of society, some preferring to cast their analytic net only a short distance, to take in small group interactions, whereas others try to encompass broad social structural patterns and historical tendencies, on the whole, the art object serves them as . . . an indicator or springboard for understanding extraaesthetic aspects of society."\textsuperscript{130}

It seems clear that the sociology of art and anthropology of art, in that they draw on the parent disciplines of sociology and anthropology, have distinctive conceptual structures rooted in basic concepts such as society, social structure, and class, and culture, and symbol systems, respectively. Further, they also share some basic methods of inquiry, although sociologists utilize critical theory and empirical analysis more extensively and anthropologists rely on ethnography to a far greater degree. That said, however, a basic difference exists between sociology and anthropology, a difference in the kinds of societies each studies. "Whereas anthropologists usually put their questions to small, homogenous, kinship-based societies, sociologists direct their attention to large, heterogenous societies, composed of different traditions, occupations, social statuses and world view."\textsuperscript{131}

This distinction is by no means hard and fast but indicative of tendencies and past practices.

It is certainly possible to continue to list distinctions between the sociology of art and anthropology of art. But given the self-imposed task of trying to demonstrate how these modes of inquiry can ultimately contribute to students' understanding of art, it is more important to distinguish these disciplines from the
disciplines of art production, art history, art criticism, and aesthetics. The latter
three of these disciplines can be described as attempts to understand the arts from
humanistic perspectives. For scholars in these disciplines, "what was and largely
continues to be central to their concerns is the work of art . . . they regard each
great work as a unique, meaningful expression of its creator's being." To social
scientists, understanding the creation of works of art cannot be understood apart
from its social context. Many other distinctions between these approaches follow
from this basic orientation to the understanding of the creation of art. But the
point has been, it would appear, that sociological and anthropological inquiry into
art offers a distinct way of conceptualizing numerous issues in the arts.

The question then becomes whether the humanistic and social scientific
modes of understanding art are in conflict or complementary. There is no point
in minimizing the differences between these approaches and the potential for
conflict among diverse practitioners. Social scientists often view humanists as
positing a purified, defunctionalized conception of art, while humanists often
charge social scientists with reductionism, that art is the mere outcome of social
and cultural processes and interactions. But these differences are best seen not as
irreconcilable but as strengths and weaknesses of these approaches that can serve
as the basis of complementary inquiries into art. As Vera L. Zolberg argues, "the
intellectual barrier between humanistic study of aesthetic objects on the one hand
and social scientific study of art on the other hand has stultifying effects on
understanding that need to be mitigated." Complementary inquiry, it is argued,
is conditioned on actions of both social scientists and humanists, "the former by
breaking away from an overly scientistic conception of sociology, the latter by recasting their scholarly work in a more sophisticated view of the social [and cultural] embeddedness of art."\(^{134}\)

Such a view of complementary inquiry guards against the tendency, in some quarters, to make the logical leap that understanding the social origins and uses of art works, even if those conditions are characterized by inequitable social relations, inevitably negates the value of such art works. Further, anthropology and sociology of art have important contributions to make to the understanding of the arts of ethnic cultures, the former through its exploration of the cultural origins, intended meanings, and standards of appraisal of ethnic arts, and the latter through its investigation of how societal institutions supported by inequitable power relations can appropriate art objects from ethnic cultures and either de-signify them or redefine them only in terms of formal properties. But for these approaches to the understanding of art to be transferred, in some way, to students of art in discipline-based programs, then DBAE theory must supplement its four disciplines of art -- art production, history, criticism, and aesthetics -- with a fifth, sociology/anthropology of art.

3) **Curriculum Sequence and Pedagogy.** DBAE theory discusses the role of teachers in implementing art curricula at length. While it stipulates a district-wide team approach to curriculum development and posits a prominent role for curriculum specialists in art, DBAE theorists also envision individual teachers will have authority to evaluate and adapt written art curricula and extend these curricula in ways consistent with their interests and expertise. In exercising this
authority, teachers are expected to acknowledge and accommodate students’ variable levels of cognitive, social, and physical maturity. They are also expected to be able to adapt curricula according to the perceived needs of their students and the community. But the meaning of this phrase is not spelled out and apparently, by design or omission, does not address whether the cultural backgrounds of students should be considered in art instruction and, if so, how.

It seems obvious that if students do possess distinctive traits or learning styles which they bring to classroom learning situations, then teachers should consider these in structuring learning activities. The practice of accommodating the culturally-based learning styles of students can be justified on two grounds: educational effectiveness and justice. It is a virtually unarguable principle of teaching that if students are to learn progressively more complex concepts, then the conceptual structures they possess and how they process and incorporate new information must be taken into consideration. This principle can surely be extended to ways of learning that may vary by culture. Without such consideration learning is at best slowed and unnecessarily complicated, rendering teaching that proceeds without acknowledgment of students’ learning capacities and styles as ineffective. A justification rooted in justice could be phrased in terms of equal opportunity. Specifically, the principle of equal opportunity refers to the right of different persons to receive equal treatment if no morally relevant differences exist between them. By implication, then, if significant differences do exist between individuals, differences over which individuals have little or no control, then consideration of these differences must be considered in treatment of them.
Differences in individuals, in this case individual students, can be cultural in nature. Thus if students' cultural differences are not considered in the treatment of them, i.e., the teaching of them, then their right to equal treatment is abridged.

But these sorts of general justifications, while not unimportant, go only so far. They do not specifically address the manner in which accommodation of students' learning styles or other cultural differences is to be achieved. This, then, becomes the primary issue in light of DBAE theorists' lack of attention to cultural differences in art learning settings: how are these differences to be accommodated and most effectively so?

Since this question is raised in the context of exploring whether and in what ways discipline-based and multicultural approaches to art education, and since DBAE theory is notably silent on the issue, it seems reasonable to explore responses to this question posed by proponents of various forms of multicultural education. Two responses to be explored, in brief, are those, respectively, of: Mary Stokrocki; and Robyn Wasson, Patricia Stuhr, and Lois Petrovich-Mwaniki.

Stokrocki identifies four factors that teachers can manipulate to facilitate the learning of, in particular, minority students: motivation, classroom behavior, interaction, and evaluation. Stokrocki defines motivation as "a process in which students are inspired to learn." Motivation is seen as varying by the cultural background of the student, i.e., her or his traits, folkways, and learning styles. For example, she contends that since in many cultures siblings teach each other, "art teachers may need to motivate more via peer teaching and cooperative learning strategies in contrast to an instructor-dominated approach." Further, Stokrocki
points out that "the learning of students from minority cultures is often shaped by real and immediate needs. The failure to respond enthusiastically to many learning tasks," is a function of this characteristic. As a result, then, "art teachers need to assess students' interests and abilities to determine their readiness, listen to their complaints, devise tasks to help them succeed, and read about and experience the values of minority communities."

The behavior of students in classrooms includes voluntary behaviors that are subject to control by teachers. According to Stokrocki, "one purpose of controlling behavior is the facilitation of dialogue than enhances learning via the establishment of regulations." She warns against moralizing about the behavior of minority students in that many such behaviors are extensions of students' families and value structures. More effective, claims Stokrocki, is a strategy in which teachers posit class rules, relate student behavior to those rules, and praise students for upholding the rules. Otherwise, without the discipline of self-control, learning is impaired.

Next, Stokrocki argues that "effective art teaching is related to the quality of verbal and nonverbal interaction between students and teachers." Conditions of quality interaction include teachers' allowance of minority students' spontaneous responses and avoidance of situations where some students are asked individually to speak. Further, nonverbal communication is, at times, seen as having greater impact on students of minority cultures than verbal communication. Stokrocki points out that some cultures are more tactile, gestural, and "closer-spaced" than others. She contends that teachers, to promote learning of content, including art, "may need to become more aware of these nonverbal signals."
The final instructional aspect which teachers can manipulate in their teaching is evaluation. Formal grading, according to Stokrocki, is not likely to be effective with many students from minority cultures. More effective methods are in-process or formative appraisal.

Stokrocki concludes with the following observation about the need for art teachers to accommodate the cultural differences of their students:

Teaching art is a process of human interaction based on communication to enhance art learning. When art teaching mainly emphasizes discipline or content, as in discipline-based art education, the human processes of interaction and socialization may be ignored. These processes can be vitally important to children of minority cultures.  

Stokrocki's prescriptions for accommodating the cultural differences of students focus on the general learning styles of minority students that must be considered if learning in art, including learning in DBAE curricula, is to be facilitated. The methods of accommodating cultural differences proposed by Wasson, Stuhr, and Petrovich-Mwaniki are directed to all students and assume a close relationship between curriculum, pedagogy, and learning. In considering the implications of multicultural education for the art classroom, these authors utilize a socio-anthropological perspective on human learning. Their prescriptions are phrased as position statements on multicultural art education. Most of these will be reviewed here, in varying detail, with special stress on issues of pedagogy and learning.

1. The authors "advocate a socio-anthropological basis for studying the aesthetic production and experiences of cultures, which means focusing on knowledge of the makers of art, as well as the sociocultural context in which art is
produced." This statement dovetails, in significant respects, with the sociological/anthropological study of art described above.

2. The authors "acknowledge teaching as cultural and social intervention and therefore, in any teaching endeavor, it is imperative that teachers not only confront, but also be consistently aware of their own cultural and social biases." The authors stress that teachers' unlocking of their own biases, attitudes that can be positive or negative toward specific cultural and social groups, requires their going beyond their own "deeply imbedded cultural and social ways of knowing . . . to being open to and nonjudgmental about diverse cultural experiences."

3. The authors also contend that teachers "must access and utilize . . . students' sociocultural values and beliefs and those of the cultures of the community, when planning art curricula." In this process, "student experiences are not only important, but become the basis for developing and presenting course content and activities."

4. The authors also support anthropologically-based, ethnographic methods of teaching and learning "to study the art making, using, viewing, and valuing processes of particular sociocultural groups." To implement these methods in classrooms, "students and teachers must assume the roles of active researchers in gathering information from their existing and dynamic cultural context."

5. The authors also advocate the use of culturally responsive pedagogy. This recommendation entails two key premises. First, it is held that students in multicultural classrooms "have become used to seeing and valuing certain kinds of art objects within their own family, sociocultural group, and environment."
These experiences are to be seen as resources in teaching art. Secondly, culturally responsive pedagogy entails "tapping into and utilizing the wealth of teaching/learning strategies and methods offered and preferred by . . . sociocultural groups."151

This brief summary of the ideas of Wesson, Stuhr, and Petrovich-Mwaniki admittedly omits many subtleties and background concepts in their work. But, for the purpose identified here, their ideas do illustrate a means of accommodating the cultural differences of students in art classrooms. This account could be critiqued on the grounds that it does not address the need for all students to gain an understanding of the arts of many cultures, including the dominant culture, in society, or it could be argued that this account replicates the tendency of multicultural education to focus on the individual classroom and classroom teacher to the neglect of other educational policy-makers and decision-makers with influence. But these points can be easily met -- Wesson, Stuhr, and Petrovich-Mwaniki explicitly argue that culturally responsive pedagogy does not entail the notion that students' cultural choices should be limited to the cultural background of their birth or that students are to uncritically adhere to their primary culture's myths and assumptions; and, that while the concept of culturally responsive pedagogy is defined in terms of individual classrooms, there is nothing inherent in the concept that would restrict its adoption as a policy mandate for, e.g., school districts.

Finally, there are many specific points about these prescriptions for accommodating the cultural differences of students of art that could be debated.
Such a discussion, however, would take us too far afield. But the models discussed here do provide ways for teachers to exercise their authority in meeting "the perceived needs of their students and the community," a requirement stipulated by DBAE theorists but not spelled out in detail.

**Conceptual Change in Art Education**

The explorations in this chapter were necessitated by the apparent assumption in the policy documents of state departments of education and state arts agencies that multicultural and discipline-based approaches to art education are compatible and perhaps complementary. This assumption was examined through an exposition of premises in the theory of discipline-based art education, multicultural education, multicultural art education, and the multicultural critique of DBAE. While it was found that the multicultural challenge to DBAE could be met on several points, several open questions remained. Out of this inquiry, three conclusions have emerged -- that if multicultural and discipline-based approaches to art education are to be complementary and thus serve as the basis of defensible policy positions, 1) DBAE theory must provide a rationale for the inclusion of the arts of ethnic cultures in DBAE-based curricular programs. Such a rationale could be a utilitarian argument rooted in the premise that without an understanding of the arts of ethnic cultures, students' access to uniquely valuable experiences will be foreclosed; 2) that the disciplines of art that are to form the content of art curricula must be extended beyond the production of art, art history, art criticism, and aesthetics, to include sociological/anthropology inquiry into the origins, meanings, and uses of art; and 3) that DBAE theory must specify the ways in which teachers
are to meet their responsibility to respond to the perceived needs of their students and accommodate students' cultural differences, e.g., by utilization of culturally responsive pedagogy.

For advocates of discipline-based art education to adopt this revised and expanded view of the purposes and practices of art education in hopes of achieving a more unified field of art education, then clearly they would need to alter several basic theoretical premises and recommendations for educational practice. But the following could then be asked, either cynically or for good reasons: why would DBAE advocates want to alter their theoretical premises or ideas about educational practice? After all, the Getty Center acknowledges the influence that the concept of DBAE has had and is increasingly having among decision-makers in education and the arts in public policy settings and even among private institutions. As another example of this influence, an independent study of 1,366 American public schools has recently demonstrated that "the concept of Discipline Based Art Education has had a dramatic effect on middle and secondary school art programs."\(^{152}\) The percentages of schools incorporating DBAE-based approaches to a great extent or to some extent are as follows: large middle schools (97.2%); small secondary schools (97.1%); and large secondary schools (99.0%).

Despite such evidence of the influence of current conceptions of DBAE, rather than giving in to cynicism about the prospects of conceptual change, DBAE theorists and advocates will be taken at their word, i.e., that DBAE theory is evolving and open to revision. The issue then becomes not predicting advocates'
likely response to a concept of theoretical revisions, but the process by which conceptual change can occur.

The Getty Center has described two methods of revising the theory of discipline-based art education. One means is the development of a community of scholars with interests in DBAE. If such a community is to meet the task of expanding the theory of discipline-based art education, then several conditions must be met. As Hermine Feinstein argues, "developing a mature scholarly community demands a spirited and focused vision. It demands inquiring minds, ego-strength, intellectual integrity, rigor, commitment, and a willingness to extend horizons." Another means adopted by the Getty Center to expand DBAE theory is the use of teacher institutes, whereby the research findings on teacher development programs and their effects are then used for theory revision. An effective theory-practice-theory loop is assumed. But whether these processes are sufficient to effect conceptual change within DBAE, or whether such change can be affected only through the scholarly and perhaps political efforts of those working within alternative art education paradigms, is not yet clear.

What is clear, however, is that a possible role for policy research in effecting change within art education, either policy research as conceived of and practiced in this dissertation or some other conception, is not addressed by DBAE advocates. The reasons for this omission are a matter for speculation. But the omission does raise questions that will be addressed in the concluding chapter of this dissertation: 1) what are the possible relations between research and policy formulation and implementation?
2) what are the current relations between research and policy in arts education, and in the arts?; and

3) what conditions are necessary for the maintenance or development of an effective relationship between research and policy in arts education and the arts?

NOTES


14. For a discussion of diverse interpretations of DBAE and how pedagogical, regional, and political considerations affect the application of these interpretations, see Brent Wilson, "Name Brand, Generic Brand, and Popular Brands: The Boundaries of Discipline-Based Art Education," in Hermine Feinstein, ed., Issues in Discipline-Based Art Education.


18. Ibid., p. 132.


22. Ibid., p. 134.

23. Ibid., p. 134.

24. Ibid., p. 134.

25. It should be noted that in discussing DBAE and creative-self expression views of art education, Clark, Day, and Greer stress that their comparison is based on extreme versions of these theoretical positions and that, in practice, there are few, if any, art education programs that exemplify in full either position.


27. Ibid., p. 136.


29. For a discussion of this claim, see Harry S. Broudy, The Role of Imagery in Learning (Los Angeles, CA: The J. Paul Getty Trust, 1987).


31. Ibid., p. 149.
32. Ibid., p. 150.

33. Ibid., p. 151.


36. Ibid., p. 220.

37. Ibid., p. 221.


41. Ibid., p. 163.

42. Ibid., p. 164.

43. Ibid., p. 165.

44. Ibid., p. 165.

45. Ibid., p. 165.

46. Ibid., p. 169.

47. Ibid., p. 175.


54. Ibid., p. 437.

55. Ibid., p. 437.


57. Ibid., p. 89.

58. Ibid., p. 89.

59. For an example of this argument, see John Wilson, "Art, Culture, and Identity," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 18 (Summer 1984): 89-97.


62. Ibid., p. 343.

63. Ibid., p. 341.

64. Ibid., p. 341.

65. Ibid., p. 341.

66. Ibid., p. 341.


70. This argument is made in James A. Banks, "Multicultural Education."


72. Ibid., p. 24.

73. Ibid., p. 24.

74. Ibid., p. 25.

75. Ibid., p. 25.


77. This typology is based on an article by Paul Duncum: "What, Even Dallas? Popular Culture Within the Art Curriculum," *Studies in Art Education* 29 (Fall 1987): 6-16.


79. For an example of this argument, see Lionel Trilling, *Beyond Culture* (New York: The Viking Press, 1965).

80. This point is made in Ralph A. Smith, *Excellence in Art Education: Ideas and Initiatives* (Reston, VA: National Art Education Association, 1986).


82. For an example of this view, see June King McFee, "Cross-Cultural Inquiry into the Social Meanings of Art: Implications for Art Education," *Journal of Multi-cultural and Cross-cultural Research in Art Education* 4 (Spring 1986): 6-16.

84. For an example of this view of pedagogy, see F. Graeme Chalmers, "Art Education as Ethnology," *Studies in Art Education* 23 (Spring 1981): 6-14.


92. Ibid., p. 5.

93. Ibid., p. 4.

94. Ibid., p. 4.


98. Ibid., p. 7.

99. Ibid., p. 7.

100. Mary Stokrocki, "Teaching Art to Students of Minority Culture," Journal of Multi-cultural and Cross-cultural Research in Art Education 6 (Fall 1988): 100.

101. Ibid., p. 99.


107. This argument is made in: Jessie Lovano-Kerr, "Cultural Pluralism and DBAE."


110. Ibid., p. 133.

111. Ibid., p. 176.

112. Ibid., p. 176.

113. For an example of a critique of the Getty Center's use and, it is argued by implication, endorsement of general classroom teachers as instructors of art, see Thomas A. Hatfield, "Who Teaches Art? What is Learned?" Design for Arts in Education 87 (July/August 1986): 47-48.

115. Ibid., p. 177.

116. Ibid., p. 176.

117. Ibid., p. 169.

118. Ibid., p. 169.


120. Ibid., p. 243.

121. This point is made in James A. Banks, "Multicultural Education."


124. Ibid., p. 110.

125. Ibid., p. 110.

126. This argument is made in Elliott W. Eisner, "The Role of Discipline-based Art Education in America's Schools," Art Education 40 (May 1987): 6-26, 43-45.

127. See Gilbert A. Clark, Michael D. Day, and W. Dwaine Greer, "Becoming Students of Art."


129. Ibid., p. 8.

130. Ibid., p. 9.

131. Ibid., p. 17.

132. Ibid., p. 5-6.
133. Ibid., p. 15.
134. Ibid., p. 15.
136. Ibid., p. 102.
137. Ibid., p. 103.
138. Ibid., p. 103.
139. Ibid., p. 104.
140. Ibid., p. 105.
141. Ibid., p. 106.
142. Ibid., p. 108.
144. Ibid., p. 236.
145. Ibid., p. 236-237.
146. Ibid., p. 237.
147. Ibid., p. 237.
148. Ibid., p. 238.
149. Ibid., p. 238.
150. Ibid., p. 240.
151. Ibid., p. 241.

Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR POLICY RESEARCH 
IN THE ARTS AND ARTS EDUCATION

This study of policy issues regarding multiculturalism and the arts has been rooted in two fundamental premises: 1) that an integrated methodology of interpretive policy analysis and conceptual analysis, in recognition of the value-laden nature of policy formulation, can clarify the conceptual grounds for the adoption of policy goals and means; and 2) that study of both policy spheres of the arts and arts education, in that these spheres are at the same time closely related and distinct, is necessary to an understanding of policy options toward issues raised by the emerging prominence of multiculturalism. Through an interpretative analysis of documents which revealed the policy goals and means currently in place in state arts agencies and state education agencies, and a subsequent analysis of the value-laden concepts which underlie these goals and means, two primary conclusions emerged: 1) that public arts policy should be rooted in the equal opportunity concept of justice and implemented through policies to ensure that the proposals of artists and arts organizations rooted in ethnic cultural traditions are reviewed by individuals qualified to make defensible judgments of the artistic value of these artists' work; and 2) that if multicultural art education and discipline-based art education are to be complementary bases for policy development and
implementation, as state departments of education and state arts agencies seem to assume, then DBAE theory must contain a rationale for inclusion of the study for the arts of ethnic cultures in DBAE-based curricula, must expand the disciplines which provide the content of art curricula to include sociological/anthropological inquiry into the origins, meanings, and uses of art, and stipulate that art teachers' pedagogy must be culturally responsive in accommodating students' interests and learning styles.

These conclusions are not rooted in the belief that research should always have direct effects on policy or that the aim of policy research is to reach some "scientifically best" solution to all policy problems. Instead, these conclusions are offered in the spirit of interpretive policy analysis. The aim here is not to contribute directly to any particular reform agenda but, instead, to generate thoughtful attention to the value assumptions that underlie debate about policy options in the arts and arts education, i.e., to contribute to the quality of such debate. But what is offered here are not fixed conclusions, in that this dissertation also reflects another value assumption of interpretive policy analysis, that the merits of policy prescriptions ultimately are to be debated through democratic processes involving those with interests in implementing a policy and those potentially affected by its adoption.

It was stressed at various points that an integrated interpretive policy analysis/conceptual analysis methodology to study policy issues has many potential benefits, most notably, that it can help to clarify the conceptual grounds for choices about policy goals and means. But another point was also emphasized, namely,
that the relative dearth of available data on numerous aspects of arts and arts education virtually necessitated use of this integrated methodology. As will be recalled, a key feature of the theory of interpretive policy analysis is the importance of data. It is argued that any policy analysis "must contain an empirically accurate description of the factual circumstances surrounding [an] action, and an understanding of the norms and values operating in the cultural context." Thus, it can be argued without the ongoing generation of reliable data in the arts and arts education, the possibility of conducting many kinds of policy research is, at best, inhibited.

This state of affairs sets the topic for this concluding chapter, a topic touched on in the previous chapter, namely, what are the conditions and prospects for the development of policy research in the arts and arts education? This basic question will be explored first by interpreting the limitations of this dissertation as a function of the conditions of policy research in the arts and arts education. Then, in turn, questions about the production, utilization, and future prospects of such research will be examined.

Limitations of This Dissertation Research

A point made earlier is that the relative dearth of available data on policy and practice in the arts and arts education constrains the kinds of policy research that can be conducted. Thus, a brief review of the subject matter and aims of policy research is in order here.

The subject matter of policy research is quite broad and can examine several kinds of policies in the arts and arts education. Direct policies are those that
regulate and formalize explicit government support (channeled through public agency grants, fellowships, and contracts) to individual artists, non-profit arts and arts education organizations, and public schools; another example of direct policies are those in which government agencies act as producers and presenters of the arts. **Indirect policies** include a broad range of government regulations, laws, and measures which indirectly affect production and distribution of education in the arts in significant ways. For example, tax laws accord the tax-exempt status of non-profit arts and arts education organizations, affect corporate, foundation, and individual giving to the arts, as well as donations of visual arts objects, exempt related business income of arts organizations from taxation, and accord individual artists business deductions. Other laws and regulations extend copyright protection, levy special consumer taxes that are allocated to the arts, extend discount postal privileges, mandate curricular and graduation requirements in public schools, provide unemployment compensation for artists, and affect zoning regulations.² Both direct and indirect policies can either be explicit, i.e., formal and institutionalized, or implicit, where the absence of a specific policy, in effect, constitutes a policy, or where the behavior of decision-makers or administrators alters the state goals and implementation strategies of policies, resulting in de facto policies.

Policy research can focus on several elements of policies--goals, means, enforcement, and impacts -- either separately, as they work in conjunction, or at cross purposes. **Policy goals** can be viewed in terms of their clarity, comprehensiveness, and worthwhileness, while the processes utilized to formulate
goals can be interpreted in terms of concepts of justice and political participation. The means to achieve policy goals can be analyzed in terms of effectiveness, their adequacy to meet policy goals, and justness, and their fairness with respect to groups and individuals affected by a particular policy. The enforcement of policies can be imposed (stringent enforcement backed by sanctions or penalties), endorsed (compliance motivated by anticipated benefits), or implied (completely voluntary compliance). The impacts of policies can be direct or indirect, immediate or long-term, anticipated or unanticipated, primary or secondary (usually termed externalities), measurable or non-measurable. With specific regard to arts and arts education policies, impacts can be economic, social, political, administrative, educational, and aesthetic in nature, and those affected can range from artists, arts organizations, schools, and professional service organizations to government agencies, legislatures, a public audience, teachers and students, or the general citizenry.

Finally, policy research in the arts and arts education can examine decision-making policies and administrative processes involved in the formulation and implementation of policies. Policy-making decisions themselves can be directed to rationales for government support for arts education and the arts, legislative initiatives, authorization and reauthorization of public arts agencies, budget appropriations, and allocations, policy priorities, and decisions among those competing for grants, contracts, of fellowships. Any level or branch of government can make policy decisions in the arts and arts education, including executive and legislative branches, legislative committees, and the courts, as well as public
departments and agencies, and appointed panels of artists, arts educators, scholars, and arts organization representatives who provide policy oversight or make direct grants decisions. The responsibility for implementing policies lies largely with the staff of public education and arts agencies at the local, state, and federal levels. The administration of policy implementation can also be an important subject for policy research in the arts and arts education.

Policy formulation and implementation does not occur in a vacuum, but in a variety of contexts. Advocacy groups, in the tradition of interest group politics, work to exert pressure and influence on policy-makers. In the arts and arts education, advocacy groups address issues such as budget levels for public arts agencies and education departments, the implications of tax policies for arts organizations and artists, state requirements in arts education, and measures which affect the right and freedom of expression of artists and arts institutions. Arts critics, artists, and editorialists write about these issues and others, while individual citizens and elected representatives have increasingly spoken out on issues of community standards of artistic merit and acceptability, in particular, in cases where the religious, sexual, ethnic, and political content of government-subsidized art is at issue. Finally, influences from other policy spheres such as communications policy, educational policy, and policies on non-profit organizations make up the context of arts and arts education policy as well. All of these contextual influences, then, are included in the broad subject matter of policy research in the arts and arts education.
Finally, policy research can serve several aims: analysis, comparison, evaluation, and forecasting. Analysis involves systematic study of the content of the goals, means, and intended impacts of arts education and arts policies, the processes of policy formulation, and factors such as leadership, contextual influences, terms of policy debates, points of contention, and resolutions of conflicts, and the implementation of policies. Comparative analysis explores different policies -- at the federal, state, and local levels, during different historical periods, or among nations -- as well as relationships between different policy spheres. Comparative analysis also seeks to highlight and explain commonalities and differences in the content, formulation, and implementation of such policies. Evaluation focuses on the worthiness of policy goals, the potential effectiveness and justness of the means as formulated, and the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of means in achieving desired impacts or producing secondary consequences. Evaluative criteria utilized can be economic, social, political, educational, aesthetic, and administrative in nature, and can be those of policy-makers, the researchers, or those affected by the policy. Finally, forecasting entails inquiry into broad trends, including demographic, political, social, economic, educational, and aesthetic trends, whose future impacts may necessitate the revision of existing policies, the formulation of new policies, or changes in decision-making processes.

The questions explored in this dissertation can be related to this policy research typology. The interpretive study of state agencies’ arts policies centered on an analysis and evaluation of the clarity of goals and justness of means of explicit and implicit direct policies in a comparative fashion. Similarly, the
interpretive study of the arts education policies of state arts agencies and state education agencies centered on an analysis of the clarity of goals of explicit and implicit direct policies in a comparative manner. And the dissertation is premised on the overlapping influence of policy spheres. But, again, in reference to the policy research typology cited above, this dissertation did not address a number of questions of potential interest. For example, the study of arts policies did not address how state arts agencies make and implement their policy decisions (apart from noting the racial/ethnic make-up of decision-making bodies), or their current, past, and future budgets to implement policies, or, most importantly, the impacts of policies, i.e., who is affected and in what ways by the implementation of policies. On the other hand, the study of the arts education policies of state arts and state education agencies likewise did not address how these agencies make and implement their decisions, the characteristics of decision-makers, budgetary issues, or, again, the impacts of these policies.

The reasons for these omissions, apart from the obvious one that not all questions of interest can be addressed in a single dissertation, can be related to the relative lack of development of policy research as an accepted methodology to study issues of the arts and arts education. In this dissertation, it was possible, in analyzing the value-laden concepts underlying policy positions, to draw on an extensive extant literature from culture theory, sociology, educational philosophy, philosophical aesthetics, anthropology, political science, and art education. The same cannot be said of policy studies of the arts and arts education. As such, then, without a background of research with which to work, the pursuit of many kinds
of policy questions would have been problematic at best. It is this lack of a body of research that highlights problems in the production of policy research in the arts and arts education. It is to this question that this study now turns.

**Constraints on the Production of Policy Research**

Various explanations have been offered for persistent problems in the production of policy research in the arts and arts education. For example, Paul DiMaggio has argued the "the more unanimously desired the good . . ., the more policy analysts have written about it." The arts, it could be argued, have not yet met this condition -- they are valued still by a relatively small minority of Americans. This explanation, however, is not sufficient. For example, even though claims were made throughout the 1980s that developments in Central America affect our national security, the American public demonstrated relative indifference to the whole topic. Still, academic and think tank research in this area of foreign policy proliferated. This example, and many others that could be cited, suggests that widespread public interest in a policy area is hardly a necessary condition for the development and improvement of a policy research capacity.

An alternative argument might hold that conflict or the emergence of new values, interests, or ideologies is necessary if policy research is to be strengthened. But policy in arts education and the arts is rife with potential and actual conflict. If the existence of conflict and uncertainty is a pre-requisite for the development of a strong policy research enterprise, then policy research in the arts and arts education should be thriving. Since that is not the case, other explanations need examination. Several factors will be explored: data collection and dissemination
in the arts; support systems for policy researchers; and training in policy research in arts education and the arts.

The current state of data collection in the arts and arts education places severe constraints on the production of policy research.\textsuperscript{10} There is no single entity or agency which has as its primary mission the systematic, ongoing collection of basic, reliable information on arts education and the arts. Most sources of data are the result of special surveys and information sweeps conducted by government agencies, non-profit organizations, private foundations, and membership-based arts and arts education service organizations. Such data collection efforts are inherently limited. For example, in large government data collection efforts (such as those by the Census Bureau and the IRS), many types of art organizations and artists are excluded. In addition, the terms used in surveys that arts service organizations conduct of their members have shifted over the years. Nor is there any standardization among the service organizations in what information is collected or how it is collected. These data, moreover, are aggregated in ways that obscure the raw data and are often kept confidential among organization members, and, thus, inaccessible to researchers.\textsuperscript{11} The most sophisticated data collection system devised by public arts agencies, the National Standard for Arts Information Exchange (NSAIE) (NASAA, 1985), gathers and analyzes data on the grants-making activities of state arts agencies. But this information covers a limited number of required variables. Furthermore, while the National Endowment for the Arts requires use of NSAIE by state arts agencies, it does not utilize NSAIE itself, thus limiting comparability of grants-making activities at the state and national
levels. Also, while public arts agencies require substantial data from their many grant applicants, none aggregate it in forms suitable for research purposes.

Examples such as these abound -- but the implications for policy research are clear. Without reliable, consistent, comparable and readily available data, including trend data, benchmark information, and contextual information, the testing and refinement of theories to explain and predict phenomena in the arts education and arts policy worlds is severely compromised. Special studies and surveys, while valuable, lose some of their potential value if they are not done against a background of theory based on comprehensive data sets. As a result, applied research often becomes a recitation of bare "facts," veiled assertions of institutional self-interest, or presentations based upon hidden ideological or aesthetic preferences.

The conditions under which researchers conduct their work also hinders inquiry into the arts and arts policy. Policy-oriented research is often labeled "public service" in university settings, and hence subject to minimal rewards within universities committed to basic research and publications. For example, a 1988 unpublished survey revealed some noteworthy findings about art policy researchers: that less than half are able to spend more than 50% of their research time on policy research; that while some have been able to secure external funding for their work, a large majority receive less than $1,000 in external support annually; that most tend to work in isolation with few opportunities of cooperative or teach research; and that despite the growth of professional conferences on arts policy research, many sought more opportunities for ongoing communication and
professional exchange.\textsuperscript{13} With regard to arts education, inquiry into policy issues is far less established than other arts education research concerns as developmental inquiry, child art, curriculum development, justifications of arts education, and others. As Elliott Eisner notes, research traditions and priorities in any field can become political in character, conferring legitimacy upon those who uphold those traditions.\textsuperscript{14} Within arts education, researchers who study policy issues have a way to go before they are rewarded with a mantle of legitimacy.

These constraints on the production of policy research are exacerbated by the structure and content of graduate degree programs. Within social science disciplines, few incentives exist for Ph.D. candidates to explore issues in the arts and culture. Additionally, while universities often give lip service to collaboration among diverse academic disciplines, their segmented organizational structures and competition for students and research funds, bolstered by years of tradition, make multi-disciplinary initiatives a challenge for the hardy few. Research and training programs in arts education are certainly subject to these constraints. Only recently, in recognition of the interdependency and overlapping policy contexts of schools, arts organizations, universities, professional associations, public arts agencies, private foundations, and community-based organizations, academic programs stressing "interprofessional education" have emerged.\textsuperscript{15} But academic programs such as these which support the training of policy researchers in the arts and arts education are rare.
The Utilization of Policy Research

Given the many problems cited above in the production of policy research in the arts and arts education, it is not surprising that arts policy-makers' utilization of research does not conform to a "knowledge-driven" model. This model, as described by Carol Weiss, "assumes that the sheer existence of knowledge presses it toward development and use." This model is common in the physical sciences, where "because of the fruits of basic research, new applications are developed and new policies emerge"; but it is non-existent in arts and arts education policy. Certainly, some research concepts have made their way into the language of discourse of policy-makers. Talk of "cost disease" in the performing arts and "sequential arts education" is omnipresent in the arguments and rhetoric of arts advocates as well as policy-makers. But these are exceptions that prove the rule that policy formulation in the arts and arts education is far from "knowledge-driven."

The fact of the matter is that arts and arts education policy decisions are made in the same way that most public policy decisions are made in a democracy, through politics. For example, arts policy in America is political in obvious ways: chairs of the NEA and state arts agencies are appointed by the President and by governors, respectively; public arts agencies are subject to reauthorization processes, legislative committee oversight, and budget appropriations. In addition, most indirect policies are set by legislative bodies. The way public arts agencies have responded to this environment constitutes a paradox -- they have tried to
insulate themselves from politics while, at the same time, working to broaden their political base of support.

Regarding insulation, the enabling legislation of the NEA and state arts agencies structured them as quasi-public foundations, which served to buffer decisions on direct support of the arts from the interference of politicians. This decision allayed the initial fears of artists and arts organizations that government support of the arts would lead to censorship by "un-cultured" politicians. Public arts agencies have also adopted a dissociation strategy, in which decisions are delegated to panels of "experts" in each arts discipline, who utilize their own expertise and formalized evaluative criteria to make decisions among competitors for direct government grants.

On the other side of the paradox, public arts agencies have adopted several strategies to increase their political base of support. Pluralism entails the use of multiple sets of evaluative criteria in resolving questions of funding allocations to grants competitors. This strategy ensures a very broad distribution of funds to many kinds of art, artists, genres, and cultural traditions, thus increasing the number of constituencies, and potential arts advocates, with interests in the growth of government arts support.

Decentralization was instituted as part of the enabling legislation for the NEA -- it is required to pass through 20 percent of its budget to the states. During the 1980s, the Reagan administration's decentralization philosophy accelerated state and local involvement in arts policy, leading to greater increased state and local budgets and new laws with wide-reaching implications for the arts. As a
consequence, decentralization serves not only to diffuse responsibility for arts policy, but also reduces the conspicuousness of the NEA as a political target.

Finally, public arts agencies at all levels of government have adopted partnership strategies with the private sector, pointing out that their role is minor in comparison with private support for the arts. When measured in terms of dollars, this claim is true -- less than ten percent of the income of arts organizations is from public sources. Indeed, among all the non-profit sub-sectors which receive public support, the arts are the least dependent upon direct government subsidy. In practice, however, receipt of public support by arts organizations constitutes an endorsement that is almost an absolute requirement for receipt of support from private funders. Thus, the importance of public dollars actually far outweigh the amounts involved. Yet, through rhetoric stressing "partnerships" and their own limited role, public arts agencies have succeeded for the most part, in deflecting political attention away from themselves while garnering new political supporters from the private sector.

Despite such elaborate strategies to insulate the arts from politics and to reduce potential conflicts, public arts agencies and their advocates have not been immune to criticism and conflict. The use of panels of experts to make grants decisions, for example, has been challenged on various grounds. Since decisions about grants to the arts are inevitably value-laden, who is to say that an expert panelist's sense of aesthetic value is superior to that of the average citizen, elected official, or government bureaucrat? Also, since panelists often nominate their own replacements, an in-breeding of taste can easily develop. More recently, critics
have charged that in-bred panels of art world experts are insufficiently sensitive to community standards when supporting controversial art.\textsuperscript{20} Others have criticized the formal criteria utilized in grants-making decisions, arguing that these criteria stress administrative, fund-raising, and marketing skills of arts organizations. As a result, granting decisions reward those who have adapted successfully to the marketplace, while neglecting of risk-taking, experimental organizations.\textsuperscript{21}

Finally, public arts agencies have in some ways become victims of their own political success. Their use of expansionist criteria, seeking to ameliorate conflicts over the evaluative bases of grants decision, has left them open to charges of awarding grants not on a rational, competitive basis, but on an entitlement basis.\textsuperscript{22} The result, critics argue, is a unique form of political patronage -- a de facto aesthetic entitlement program.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, as public arts agencies have built their constituency base, the number of claimants on public arts funds has increased dramatically. As a result, arts agencies feel constant pressure to maximize their budgets to meet these new demands. In times of increasing budgets, wide distribution strategies cause few problems. But when budgets constrict, public arts agencies face the dilemma of either diminishing the impact of public funding by spreading it very thinly or making difficult choices among policy priorities, thereby disappointing many segments of their political constituency.

Examples of the politics of paradox could be extended in many ways. Arts education has its own examples. But clearly, this complex policy environment, with its attendant pressures to maximize budgets and demonstrate the value of public arts support to many beneficiaries, has ultimately shaped the utilization of arts
policy research. Still, one more preliminary question needs to be examined, namely, what are the purposes for which research can be used?

Whatever the stated aims of policy research, e.g., those discussed above (analysis, comparison, evaluation, forecasting, and formulation), research can be used to serve many purposes, purposes which, in some instances, bear little relation to the researcher's intent. Research can be utilized to turn unrecognized or private problems into public policy issues, conceptualize the character of policy issues and sensitize decision-makers to those issues, identify policy options, and fill in knowledge gaps to facilitate rational policy formulation and implementation. But research can also be used to advance the self-interest of policy-makers in several ways: to delay policy choices and actions to avoid taking responsibility for a decision, to gain recognition for a favored program, to discredit a disliked policy or policy-maker, or to mask a policy choice based on ideological interests or value preferences behind a veil of scientific objectivity and technical expertise.

Uses of research such as these are relatively rare in the policy worlds of arts education and the arts. Not surprisingly, given the discussion above, arts policy research, when it is used, is used most frequently as political ammunition. This use of research occurs in those cases where "for reasons of ideology, intellect or interest, [decision makers] have taken a stand that research evidence is not likely to shake. [Research] becomes ammunition for whichever side finds its conclusions congenial and supportive. Partisans brandish the evidence in an attempt to neutralize opponents, convince waverers, and bolster supporters. Even if
conclusions have to be ripped out of context . . ., research becomes grist to the partisans' mill."24

Several kinds of research have been used as political ammunition in the arts policy sphere: opinion polls, economic impact studies, cross-national comparative studies, and audience studies. Opinion polls, such as those periodically conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, have solicited opinions and self-reports from sample populations on measures such as current art participation, opportunities and needs for arts participation, the importance of arts education, and willingness to pay more tax dollars if they are allocated to the arts.25 Researchers have criticized these polls on many grounds -- that opinions and self-reports of respondents are not accurate portrayals of actual behavior, that samples have been small an unscientific, and that the absence of statistical analysis obscures significant differences between sub-groups in the sample. Nevertheless, arts advocates and policy-makers have selected findings from these polls as good news about the arts, arguing that they demonstrate high rates of arts participation and an insatiable desire for more arts experiences, needs that public arts agencies can meet with increased budgets.

Economic impact studies have been widely utilized to "prove" that government support of the arts is a wise public investment with many ripple effects. Thirty-three of forty-seven state arts agencies have sponsored or participated in economic impact studies during the past ten years.26 In short, economic impact studies give numerical weights to artistic products whose impact value is calculated in terms of monetary contributions to a local's economy, in specific sectors and as a whole. The calculated benefits are direct (as a result of expenditure by cultural
organizations), and indirect (resulting from multiplier effects of spending by cultural organizations), and induced (as a result of consumer spending ancillary to art activities).

Many scholars are not impressed. Bruce Seaman, for example, argues that economic impact studies are methodologically flawed, in many cases, by overestimating multiplier effects, then trying to introduce cost-benefit analysis based on such overestimations to the rational discussion of arts policy issues.

Another example of research use as political ammunition is cross-national comparative research. In the early days of government support of the arts in the United States, arts advocates assumed that the grass was greener for the arts in Europe and that research was needed to prove this hypothesis. But as Mark Schuster argues, these exercises in many cases fail to consider the number of agencies in a country that support the arts, differences in definitions of the scope of the arts and arts policy, and the impacts of indirect policies, e.g., tax policies, on the arts.

This tendency to compare apples and oranges has not discouraged arts advocates from using the results of comparative research to justify higher government expenditures for the arts or to fend off budget cuts.

As a final example, public arts agencies, in their grants criteria, often encourage and reward arts organizations for conducting surveys of their audience and visitors. A study by DiMaggio, Useem, and Brown revealed widespread usage of the results of audience surveys, but rarely according to rational, decision-making models. Instead, even if particular audience studies were timely, well-crafted, collaboratively conducted, methodologically sound, and rich in recommendations, their most common use has been as ammunition in appeals for external funding,
as back-up for supporting preferred programming policies, or as rationalizations for doing nothing at all.\textsuperscript{30}

These examples serve to further illustrate the point that pressures to compete in a political environment shape the use of research in the arts policy world. In addition, these pressures shape the non-utilization of research. Research which does not provide good news about the arts or calls into question a pre-determined policy choice is often hidden or buried. For example, an independent evaluation of a state arts agency's matching grants program revealed that none of its stated objectives were being met. But rather than acknowledge these difficulties, the agency strongly encouraged the researcher to destroy his findings.\textsuperscript{31} In another case, a 1984 NEA-sponsored study of arts education\textsuperscript{32} was buried because its conclusions about multiple paths to excellence in art education did not reinforce the NEA's evolving view of basic arts education, articulated in the 1988 NEA report \textit{Toward Civilization}. Given these examples, it should not be surprising that arts agencies have shied away from evaluation research on the effectiveness and impact of its programs. They tend to feel that such research, if its conclusions are less than uniformly positive, would potentially weaken their advocacy case and budgetary position.

While the arts policy environment is the primary factor shaping utilization of policy research, broader factors are at work as well. These factors are historical, sociological, and political in nature. As noted above, policy research in the arts and arts education still has a relatively brief history. Without an established tradition, research that has been conducted has yet to gain the acceptance of policy
makers and practitioners that has come about in many other fields. Arts policy makers and arts managers tend to value organized knowledge and research far less than freedom to follow their own intuitions or to make decisions by trial and error. Man therefore feel that researchers address trivial questions or abstract issues often remote from concern that policy-makers must address, and produce isolated bits of knowledge that rarely build upon each other. Even research results with potential utility for policy-makers are often obscured by unnecessary jargon, hidden by complicated forms of presenting research findings, or buried in professional journals that function as reputation-building vehicles for university-based researchers. Finally, increasing political pressures for researchers in all fields to be held to higher accountability standards by government agencies, it is argued, distorts the purposes of basic research and exacerbates existing conflicts between researchers and policy-makers. Specifically, application of business techniques, such as cost-benefit analysis, has led to the mistaken view that research must yield a measurable return on its investment in the form of immediate applications or unequivocal research results. In addition, clearly, this conception of policy research and its utilization does not jibe with the methodology of interpretive policy analysis described here.

**Conditions for the Future Development and Utilization of Policy Research in the Arts and Arts Education**

Previous sections have outlined problems in the production and utilization of policy research in the arts and arts education. This section reviews three possible strategies to improve production and utilization of such research: policy
studies of the enterprise of arts and arts education policy research; establishment of independent policy research centers; and strengthening research brokerage functions of public and private agencies.

a. Policy studies of the enterprise of arts and arts education policy research.
To be sure, researchers have done occasional literature reviews and content analyses of arts and arts education policy research methods and topics. These activities have their value, but they are not a substitute for comprehensive policy studies of the many elements which make up the arts and arts education policy research enterprise. Of course, to suggest that policy studies of research are needed is one thing, to demonstrate the need for them is another. Thus, several questions must be addressed: What purposes could such policy studies serve? Are there available models policy studies of research systems? What problems and issues should these studies address?

Since the field of arts and arts education research has no experience in conducting policy studies of its research enterprise, it is necessary to examine the experience of other fields. The physical sciences can provide an instructive case study of rationales and methods for policy studies of a research system.

Research in the physical sciences underwent great change during the late 1970s and 1980s. Previously, a defacto, healthy research system had met the needs of research universities for basic research support and those of many government agencies for scientific and technological applications. This healthy research system was the result of a fortuitous combination of events including increasing government support for research and development in universities and for higher
education generally. But downward trends in these as well as other factors led many commentators to conclude that uncoordinated policy formulation on science research and development, a luxury in good times, could no longer be afforded in times of scarcity and faltering resources. This conclusion spawned calls for comprehensive policy studies of research in the sciences.

Existing research models proved inadequate, however. Some had assumed naively that research proceeds in a mechanistic, step-wise process: 1) the researcher has an idea; 2) the researcher secures funding to do research; 3) the researcher yields interesting conclusions or not; 4) the researcher shares results with the field and others; and 5) the research results have a positive impact on the state of knowledge or professional practice. Other methods had explored only the impact of isolated variables on the research process, e.g., how "being a big frog in a small pond," or vice-versa, affected the risk-taking and productivity of scientists. Thus, analysts of physical science research had to develop new approaches and methods of analysis.

Contemporary policy studies of science research have taken more holistic or "ecological" approaches, analyzing a broad range of factors affecting the science research enterprise, including: 1) institutional factors -- the presence or absence of institutional barriers to research, such as the number and quality of cooperating colleagues and their institution's track record in producing quality research; 2) entrepreneurial skills -- the experience and skill of researchers in securing external funding and their ability to plan, manage, evaluate, and disseminate research; and 3) external funding policies -- trends in government and private funding, the
relative emphasis on basic or applied research, and the strengths, weaknesses, and biases in funding decision processes. These many factors have then been related to variables such as the quality and quantity of completed research. Ultimately, then, these more holistic policy studies of science have sought to identify those factors which can be controlled or altered through policy mechanisms designed to foster high quality, effective research.35

This brief illustration suggests that the "ecological" policy studies developed by science researchers might have potential to inform research policy development. But if researchers are to conduct policy studies of arts and arts education policy research, reliance on the rationales and methods of the science community could be short-sighted. One obvious reason is that physical science research and arts research are very different enterprises. Physical science research has much greater scope, longer traditions, and far greater experience with external funding. It also holds the promise of spectacular breakthroughs in research applications that can capture the public imagination.

Rationales for policy studies of arts and arts education policy research could take many forms. An "efficiency argument" might point out that because of the limited incentives, rewards and financial support available to arts researchers (especially when compared to researchers in other fields), special plans must be devised to focus limited resources on significant questions of broad relevance to the field. A "competitiveness argument" might hold that the field requires policy studies to enhance its "marketing" position among disciplinary competitors for scarce university and external funds. But these arguments would seem to be
secondary to the primary rationale for any policy study: to assist in the consideration of alternatives in situations requiring choices -- among purposes, the relationship of means to ends, the fairness and equity of means, the efficiency of means adopted to implement choices, and the potential side effects of decision alternatives. The ultimate consequences of these policy studies, arguably, could be the development of sets of broad research agendas, effective divisions of labor, and reliable support systems.

A research design for policy studies of arts and arts education policy research should include inventories of both quantitative and qualitative information about current research, policy researchers, and consumers of arts policy research, including policy-makers and arts practitioners. A variety of methods could be utilized to gather these data including, content, analyses, surveys, secondary research analyses, and in some cases, ethnographic studies.

Research -- a) Content analyses of published research articles, books, monographs by arts and arts education policy researchers over the last fifteen years would need to be conducted. Such analyses might characterize research documents in terms of their theoretical bases, research methods utilized, issues examined, and means of dissemination. b) Also needed are detailed descriptions of research projects judged successful by researchers in terms of methods, issues examined, external funding, institutional or university support, dissemination, and impact on research, policy, and/or practice. c) Finally, descriptions of elements of training programs for future policy researchers in arts education and the arts are needed as well.
Researchers -- The following information should be gathered from arts and arts education policy researchers: a) researchers' assessments of the current policy research enterprise, including views of conceptual/theoretical influences, methods utilized, issues examined, institutional support systems, external support, dissemination opportunities, research brokers, and trends in policy research; b) researchers' views of needed change in relationships between researchers and policy-makers; c) data on researchers, including demographic characteristics, academic and research training, mentors, career patterns, percentages of time spent on research, teaching and administrative activities, publication records and methods of dissemination, experience with policy-makers as clients, institutional and external support of policy research, institutional tenure policies and reward systems, networking and cooperative research patterns with colleagues in other institutions, professional service activities, and pending research projects.

Correlational studies of relationships between these factors could increase understanding of how different factors shape current research. Of special interest would be studies of how opinion and activity variables such as researchers' assessments of current arts and arts education policy research, views of needed change, and researchers' productivity are affected by characteristics and contextual variables such as the backgrounds of researchers and their institutional and external support systems.

Consumers of research -- The following information should be gathered from a broad sample of policy-makers and administrators in the arts and arts education: a) their familiarity with published policy research and with individual researchers;
and b) opinions about research, including personal reports on the influences of research on professional practice and policy making, views of the quality, utility and dissemination of current research, and views of needed changes in these factors; c) their decision-making power; and d) their sources of information in making policy decisions.

These data sets can be the basis for a variety of correlational studies on the characteristics, ideologies, and decision-making power of potential of consumers of research. More importantly, this information can be used in comparative analyses of how the opinions, assessments, and views of needed change of arts policy researchers and research consumers converge or diverge.

There is also a need for interpretation and assessment of the significance of information gathered in any policy studies of the arts and arts education policy research enterprise. There are a number of ways that this "interpretative" step could proceed. As is often the case, a report detailing all of the gathered information could be issued, and individual readers, or interested groups, could formulate their own private conclusions, or issue a public opinion in the forum of their choice. But processes such as these often evoke cynical attitudes about reports which eventually gather dust, and thus rarely lead to concerted action in any particular direction. On the other hand, if a single public or private agency gathers information, interprets it, and then draws conclusions and implications either for its own operations or for broader policy purposes, public and private response generally focuses on the agency’s motivation for use, or selective use, of information to bolster its own favored purposes. While this consequence need not
necessarily occur in all cases, its possibility highlights the need for alternative approaches to the interpretative phase of policy studies of arts policy research.

For example, reports of the information gathered on arts policy research might be disseminated as widely as possible to researchers, administrators, and policy makers. Then, commentary on the reports' results could be solicited by a variety of means: panels at conferences of professional associations; editorial policies of journals (both research and general journals) formulated to solicit commentary; and special seminars. While solicited commentaries would likely focus on the meaning and implications of the research reports' results, more would be required. The means described above might also be structured to stimulate debate about the key problems and issues that emerged from the research reports.

Structured debates would not necessarily result in resolutions or even significant levels of agreement on how to resolve problems and issues in the arts and arts education policy research system. Such consensus, however, would not be necessary at this stage. But it is reasonable to expect that these debates might produce a high level of agreement about those issues whose investigation are significant for the future of the arts and arts education policy. If such agreement is achieved, it could further be possible to achieve the eventual goal structuring an agenda for policy research in the arts and arts education.

It is possible, however, to at least stipulate some basic logical conditions for formulating a research agenda. A research agenda should be rooted in identified weaknesses, strengths, and capacities in the current research system; consideration of vexing issues and persistent research problems; and aspirations for arts and arts
education policy and practice. The agenda should include sets of research issues, rationales for why these issues require research, statements of the logical relationships between the issues to be studied, clarification of the methodological bases of inquiry for each issue, and stipulated relationships between basic and applied research projects. Further, formulation of a research agenda would need to be based on a number of logistical considerations, including appropriate divisions of labor, administrative arrangements, advisory and independent review committees, time parameters, plans for dissemination of completed research, and ongoing evaluation plans. Finally, a research agenda should be accompanied by scenarios of possible unforeseen obstacles to and consequences of implementing the agenda and contingency plans to meet those obstacles and the consequences.

Arts education as a field has formulated numerous research agendas in its past, a tendency that continues to the present day. These agendas have been constructed by government agencies, individuals, special committees, and private foundations. Despite all of this activity, arts education research has proceeded in an essentially piecemeal fashion. It is tempting to conclude that past agendas failed because none were based on policy studies of the many elements of the arts education research system. It seems reasonable to assume that this was at least a contributing factor. But a brief analysis of both past and present research agendas is instructive in revealing possible reasons for the relative lack of success or probable failure of these agendas.

Coming To Our Senses contained a detailed research agenda and called for establishment of a National Institute for the Study of Arts, Aesthetics, and
Education. But the report unleashed an unprecedented tide of harsh criticism from the professional arts education community, based both on the report's conclusions and the fact that the committee that wrote and endorsed the report contained no professional arts educators and did not seek their input. Thus, the committee's lack of credibility doomed any implementation of the research agenda.

Individual researchers have also proposed arts education research agendas. Some, such as the proposal by Stanley Madeja, then of CEMREL, have focused on a few key issues. Others, like Elliott Eisner's 1977 proposal, have been quite detailed. Despite the prominence of the researchers making these proposals, the lack of participation by other researchers, not to mention teachers and administrators, in setting these agendas made implementation unlikely. This lack of an important first step was complicated by inattention to follow-up steps such as administration plans, divisions of labor, and other logistical considerations.

Basic research alone can often become bogged down in the lacunae of definitional disputes and methodological finery; applied research by itself can lead to isolated conclusions divorced from interpretive frameworks, resulting in an array of potentially damaging practical consequences. A balance between basic and applied research has not always been present in arts education research agendas. Notably, Toward Civilization offers a research agenda focused almost exclusively on applied research designed to improve what is done in arts education classrooms.

From 1962 to 1968, the Arts and Humanities Program (AHP) of the U.S. Office of Education sponsored many influential arts education research conferences and seminars, funded nearly 200 arts-in-education projects, and supported
individual researchers whose projects related to AHP's broad research and development priorities. But in 1968, political developments at the federal level led to the demise of AHP as an institutional support mechanism for research in arts education. The new administration adopted a policy of revenue sharing designed to return tax dollars, unencumbered by federal government mandates, to the states for their own use. This policy had the effect of dismantling many educational programs of national scope, especially those with short histories, such as AHP's program of educational research in the arts. This example suggests the need for diversity in sources of external funding in support of a research agenda. Further, and more significantly, this example demonstrates the need for anticipating contextual factors that can inhibit the formulation and implementation of a research agenda.

The factors identified through this analysis of past arts education research agendas, when stated in positive terms, could serve as guiding principles for the formulation of an agenda for policy research in the arts and arts education. These principles include: creditability of source; breadth of participation; balance of basic and applied research; and preparedness for shifts in external factors.

In summary, then, fidelity to these four principles, backed by policy studies of the arts and arts education policy research system, might mean that policy researchers would be able to orient their work to shared, explicit research priorities. This reorientation could, in turn, increase the value of policy research to policy-makers and administrators in the arts and arts education.
b. Establishment of Independent Policy Research Centers -- Many of the activities described above suggest the need for a coordinating organization to foster interactive networks and shared undertakings and to stimulate a collective research agenda for the arts and arts education policy. This conclusion is not new. In a variety of settings, impassioned calls have been heard for the establishment of an arts policy research center of centers. Statements such as "We need a Brookings Institution for the Arts," or "Foreign policy, economics, health, and education all have policy research centers, why don't the arts?" are common. But, heretofore, systematic consideration of what an arts research center might look like, what it could do, and how it should be constituted has been virtually nonexistent.

The first point to be made is that there are very few organizations whose activities foster arts policy research. A notable exception is the Research Center on Arts and Culture at Columbia University, which examines applied issues in arts management and law. But many other organizations focus largely on highly specialized topics, such as the International Association for Cultural Economics, and utilize a single disciplinary approach. Other initiatives offer no permanent professional association or research site, only the periodic convening of conferences and the subsequent publication of conference proceedings (the annual Conference on Social Theory, Politics, and the Arts is an example). At the same time, few government agencies at the federal, state, or local level commit significant resources to the conduct, sponsorship, or dissemination of arts research, although the NEA and U.S. Department of Education-sponsored National Arts Education
Research Center, in existence from 1987 to 1991, did represent a return to federal funding of arts education research after a two-decade hiatus.

Thus, as a relatively late-blooming enterprise, an arts and arts education policy research center would seem to have a distinct advantage, namely, that it can learn from the accomplishments and mistakes that investigators in other policy areas have made, especially with regard to the institutional form of policy research centers. But this seeming advantage is complicated by the fact that there has been little analysis of the costs and benefits of different institutional forms of policy centers such as think tanks, government agencies, or university-based research centers. These institutional bases for policy research, therefore, will be examined, in brief, as possible models for an arts and arts education policy research center.

**Think Tanks** -- Although they differ widely in structure, issue-orientation, disciplines, research methods, and ideological perspectives, think tanks tend to share a future orientation that anticipates and identifies complex problems from holistic points of view. Policy makers often do not expect think tanks to provide them with simple answers to complex questions of the future, "but to set in front of them sets of alternatives, background information and data that they can use as guidelines in arriving at the best possible solutions."40 Nothing is to be taken for granted in think tanks: all facts, theories, and interpretations are challenged. Instituted to enjoy independence from stockholders or funders, think tanks, at least ideally, are free to look at issues critically and to tell clients or the general public what they consider important, irrespective of whether their observations are welcome or not. But in many cases, think tanks, while cognizant of the value goals
that policies must address, are more interested in decision-making processes themselves. Think tanks are particularly well known for developing decision-making techniques such as systems analysis, think groups, the Delphi technique, and scenarios.

The many different forms and orientations of think tanks include the following: 1) independent contract research institutes that focus on applied research and development; 2) advisory corporations that provide governments with independent sources of analysis, evaluation, and advice; 3) institutes for interdisciplinary studies that do not take government or industry contracts; 4) institutes that investigate economic, political, and social trends and examine philosophical questions; 5) institutes that organize systematic and comprehensive studies of the long-range future; 6) small organizations that have a strong regional focus and carry out research in several fields to further the economy of their region; and 7) institutes devoted to the encouragement of scientific learning in a broad, undifferentiated sense.

Given this diversity, across-the-board criticism of think tanks would seem to be impossible. But think tanks have indeed been severely criticized on a number of counts. The existence of cadres of intellectual elites with the intellectual power to influence policy decisions is often perceived as a direct threat to democratic processes of government. Critics also point to the preoccupation of think tanks with military and defense issues to the relative neglect of social policy issues. Finally, while the remoteness of think tanks from everyday problems is often seen as a strength allowing them to systematically and independently appraise and
suggest policy alternatives, this characteristic also leads critics to argue that think tanks are out of touch with the values and aspirations of the people they set out to help.

Experience of the arts and arts education with think tanks has been extremely limited. In a notable exception, the Getty Center for Education in the Arts engaged the Rand Corporation to assist in the identification of school art programs that reflected a discipline-based art education approach. Rand researchers designed the study and completed a cross-site analysis of seven school districts while the Getty Center selected five arts-education researchers to write case studies about the selected sites.

The primary point here, despite the above example, is that the arts and arts education have been almost nonexistent as an area of concern for think tanks. Now whether an arts policy research center should be instituted on the think-tank model very much depends on whether such an institution could retain the strengths of think tanks, maintain its independence, and avoid public perceptions of it as an inordinate or inappropriate influence on policy formulation in the arts.

**Government Agencies.** The arts and arts education have far greater experience with government support of research. Such support has been subjected to criticisms on a number of grounds. But consideration of specific criticisms is not the aim here. Instead, discussion will center on whether the institutional form of a government agency "contracting out" projects to arts policy researchers is, from theoretical perspectives, an appropriate means of constituting a policy research capacity in the arts and arts education.
In the past two decades, federal government reliance on contracting out for a wide array of services and programs has increased. The Reagan administration made a major commitment to achieving public goals and implementing programs via private agents. The case for contracting out is based on the belief that such practice will lead to lower government costs, will produce better quality services for the prices paid, and will slow the rapid growth of government. But the question of whether these anticipated benefits of contracting out are realized in practice has been seriously underresearched. Three theoretical perspectives will be used to analyze the claims of proponents: the economics of market imperfections, the politics of co-optation, and the process of organizational decision making.

The main point of market imperfection theory is that the contracting-out model is built on an idealized economic foundation. The two conditions that are assumed to exist to produce effective contract out -- that is, market competition and adequate information -- rarely materialize in the real world. The market in many industries, including the marketplace of ideas and research skills, tends to be dominated by monopolies and ideological control and thus cannot be described as competitive in any ideal sense. Even more crucial (e.g., in the arts research world) is the fact that the private sector is underdeveloped precisely because demand is underexpressed. In such a state of affairs, without a developed store of alternative researchers to turn to, governments can hardly reap the benefits of competition through contracting out.

It is also often the case that government "purchasers" of services in the marketplace of ideas have imperfect information with which to assess the services
they wish to purchase. Information needed for such decisions is often so costly, in terms of time and money, that only a limited amount can be reasonably gathered. Additionally, "sellers" of research services have many incentives to mislead "consumers" about their research capabilities and even prices. "Since consumers depend to a large extent upon sellers' information, they may frequently make unwise decisions in the market place."13

While the theoretical perspective of market imperfections has focused on economic matters, the co-optation perspective focuses on political issues. Such a perspective does not accept the idea of pluralism in politics, which entails an idealized picture of competitive politics as a way of understanding the politics of interest groups and its relationships with governments. In particular, co-optation theorists challenge the pluralist assumptions that: 1) interests form spontaneously and naturally; 2) there is a natural balance of interests represented before the government; and 3) government acts as a neutral, mechanical referee of active interests in society. Further, these theorists argue that different levels of government tend to be co-opted by those groups and individuals that are most successful in organizing and articulating their interests. Theodore Lowi emphasizes that specialized interest groups have much to offer government administrative staff and that, in effect, they are incorporated into agency decision making and essentially delegated public authority.44 Ties of friendship and professional backgrounds mean that it is often difficult to distinguish between government officials and interest group representatives. These conditions suggest that
contracting out can lead not to increased efficiency and quality services but, rather, to maintenance of existing relationships to assure mutual advantages.

From the perspective of organizational decision making, governmental agency administrators, because of limited time, information, and intellectual background, cannot be expected to consider all alternatives and their potential consequences each time an issue arises. Instead, decision makers tend to rely on routine solutions designed to reduce risk and uncertainty, often conserving time and energy by choosing the first acceptable solution. Contracting out may, therefore, become more problematic simply because it takes place within an organizational setting. For example, government units, in contracting out, may well respond to artificial, organizational incentives or, under fiscal constraints, may fail to do a thorough search for information needed to make a sound contracting-out decision.

The government practice of contracting out research services may well be warranted in cases where a government agency does not have the requisite experience or expertise to provide needed services. But, on the whole, the problems associated with contracting out suggest that an arts and arts education policy research center located in a government agency committed to contracting out research services would likely not position policy research to help create and implement coherent public policy in the arts and arts education.

**University-Based Research Centers.** Universities might seem to be congenial settings for arts and arts education policy research centers. There are, however, many barriers to university and government cooperation on policy-oriented research. These include: 1) lack of compatibility between the
government's need for practical and applied solutions and universities' emphasis on basic research; 2) the segmented nature of university organization, making interdisciplinary research difficult; 3) mutual skepticism about whether effective relationships can be forged; 4) university faculty reward systems that undervalue applied and policy research; 5) conflict between the frequent need of government for confidentiality of study results and the priorities of universities to disseminate knowledge widely; 6) the difficulties universities face in identifying and assembling a team of researchers within the response time required by government; and 7) lack of both university funds and government funds to support ongoing, university-based activities direct to governments at federal, state, and local levels.

Other observers, however, have suggested that the magnitude of such barriers has been overestimated. Indeed, during the 1960s and 1970s, six basic types of models of university/government cooperation in research emerged: 1) informal, ongoing interaction between single units in each institution; 2) advisory task forces involving university and government personnel; 3) information brokerage mechanisms in universities; 4) government support of university-based research and development activities; 5) ongoing government support of university-based policy research activities; and 6) hiring professional staff of universities for consulting services.46

Despite these accomplishments, it still must be admitted that universities do have difficulties in establishing problem-focused, policy-focused interdisciplinary units. The rhythms and language of university settings do not converge easily. Furthermore, policy-oriented research in university settings in often labeled public
and hence is subject to minimal rewards within a university committed to basic research and publications. However, the impact of these constraints depends to a large degree on how one views policy-oriented research. If such research is merely project-based or of short-term duration in response to a government’s need to answer technical problems quickly, then the low status of such research within universities is quite understandable and perhaps warranted. Irwin Feller suggests a policy-analytical framework for university-based policy research comprising three kinds of inquiry: 1) the determination of goals and criteria; 2) the identification of policy alternatives; and 3) evaluation and comparison of alternatives. These kinds of inquiry, clearly, reflect those making up the scope of arts and arts education policy research, as discussed above. And they would also seem to be consistent with the emphasis placed by universities on basic research.

But a university-based arts and arts education policy research center might also serve other functions. It could seek to improve the production of policy research, as well as its dissemination, through the following activities: seeking publication of independent, critical analyses of contextual and policy issues facing the future of the arts in America; establishing a clearinghouse of data, research reports and special studies, and theses and dissertations, and offer bibliographical and data services to interested researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners; devising and disseminating taxonomies of current policy research methodologies and topics as a basis for development of a broad arts and arts education policy research agenda for academic and independent researchers and doctoral and master’s degree candidates; preparing an annotated guide to currently available
data sets on the arts, the contexts of the arts, and arts education; preparing a critical review of the definitions, sampling frames, and collection and aggregation methods of current arts and arts education data; engaging in public education efforts to improve current arts data collection systems in government, arts and arts education service organizations, and nonprofit organizations; and publishing abstracts on completed policy research and updates on research in progress.

c. **Improvement of Research Brokerage Functions.** In most public policy areas, research brokers function as conduits between researchers and policy-makers. Research brokers act as interpreters of existing research, initiate research projects, and bring the results of completed research from a variety of sources to the attention of policy-makers. The research brokerage function requires people who are conversant with decision-makers' needs and perceptions and have broad knowledge of and legitimacy with the research community. Most often, research brokers are government insiders, usually located in research, evaluation, or analysis offices. But even in those cases in which research brokers are located in the same government agency as the policy-makers they are intended to work with, the perhaps idealized conduit function breaks down. Research brokers are often used as handmaidens to the advocacy needs of policymakers and are required to put out fires created by legislative demands on policy-makers. Because of these real and perceived pressures, it is often easier for research staff members to reinforce policy-makers' official lines than to address significant policy issues. This tendency also results from research brokers' tenuous status within their agencies. They are often out of the policy-making loop and hence are sometimes poorly apprised of
the information needs of decision-makers. Thus, the research they sponsor, and the manner in which they interpret existing research, is apt to be wide of the mark, at least in the eyes of policy-makers.

The governmental entity closest to performing research brokerage functions in arts and arts education policy works is the Research Division of the NEA, established in the mid-1970s. The status of the Research Division within the NEA has always been tenuous, at least as reflected in budget figures and numbers of staff. In the late 1970s, the Research Division came under heavy fire. Although the division’s primary responsibility was supposed to be the collection and analysis of data that could aid in policy making, critics charged that “in reality its main function was putting out the fires that resulted from intense Congressional questions and hearings.” Further criticism have focused on the NEA’s unwillingness to create an advisory panel of outside experts from academia to help set research agendas and the fact that funds for basic research were rarely granted or were made available primarily to national arts service organizations.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Research Division sponsored twenty arts research reports through request for proposal (RFP) contracts. But critics of the RFP process argue, in general, that since the information required to make "contracting out" decisions is costly in terms of both time and money, government agencies often base their assessments of potential providers of research services on imperfect information and, specifically, that the limited time allotted on certain NEA RFPs has discouraged submission by qualified individuals and institutions. Finally, the Research Division has been charged with brokering only research it has
sponsored itself, to the neglect of independently-produced analyses of arts and arts education issues.

Research brokerage functions can also be performed by individuals or groups not affiliated with government agencies. In some policy spheres, these are termed policy entrepreneurs. Within the arts and arts education, professional service organizations often act as research brokers. For example, the National Art Education Association has initiated as a general membership benefit, "NAEA Advisory," an ongoing series of short publications tracing the implications of current research and ideas for education practice. However, far less has been done to broker arts education research to policy makers in the leadership sectors of arts education, education, and the arts.

Thus, strengthening the research brokerage functions of both public and private agencies would seem to be necessary if research is to inform the decision-making of policy-makers in the arts and art education in substantive ways. Several steps might be explored in this regard. Research planning in the arts and arts education might help to better identify emerging policy issues and to anticipate future issues. Too often, research follows rather than precedes policy-makers' recognition of an important policy issue. In such cases, policy-makers make demands for immediate action, leaving little time or funds for research to inform decisions. Research planning in the arts and arts education could help to rectify such situations.

Measures could also be initiated to involve policy-makers in the design and conduct of arts research projects, while at the same time ensuring the intellectual
independence of the researcher. This involvement can increase the stake that policy-makers hold in the completion and utilization of arts and arts education research. Contact between researchers and policy-makers need not be limited to collaboration on research projects. Special committees of arts researchers and policy makers can be formed by public agencies and service organizations in the arts and arts education. In addition to assessing research needs and anticipating future research issues, such committees could encourage leaders among policy-makers who can champion the completion of research and monitor its use. Finally, this ongoing contact could help to shape the work of arts and arts education policy researchers, making it more policy-relevant and sensitive to the problems that policy-makers face in making decisions and implementing those decisions.

A Normative Perspective on Policy Research Utilization

A basic conclusion of this chapter is that the promise of arts policy research has yet to be realized in the United States. But the complex environment of the arts is undergoing great change. The change portended by dramatic shifts in the demographic, aesthetic, technological, and educational contexts of the production and distribution of the arts has spawned uncertainty among policymakers. Furthermore, these challenges could well stimulate renewed calls for policy formulation based on a comprehensive base of research. For this to happen, however, the many tangible steps described in this chapter must be translated from the proposal stage into ongoing realities.

That said, however, a cautionary note is needed. It might seem from this discussion of the promise of policy research for the arts and arts education that
research should always have direct effects on policy. But such a view, a sort of technocratic view of policy research, would undermine the imperatives of democratic decision-making in which diverse interests are represented and have a voice. Thus, a normative criterion for the effectiveness of policy research is success in contributing to participatory decision-making.

Clearly, however, this democratic ideal is just that, an ideal. It is always subject to subversion by forces far more potent than research -- power. The distribution of power within societies and institutions shapes, to a significant degree, whose research, including policy research, gets a hearing. But a more serious consequence of inequitable power relations, at least for policy research, is the misuse of research to bolster ideological positions. This phenomenon raises questions about the ethical meaning of policy research. Policy researchers must ask of their work -- useful for whom and for what purpose?

The actual and potential misuse of research has spurred two responses from policy researchers. Some take the values underlying policy goals as the subject of research, and analyze these values through survey research to see the extent of their support among policy actors. The other response to the misuse of research is based on an acknowledgement on the part of policy researchers, namely, that all elements of research processes -- posing questions, gathering data, making inferences, and drawing conclusions -- are suffused with values, and that policy researchers cannot pretend to conduct value-free scientific inquiry. This point of view has led some to recommend that researchers have an obligation to make their philosophical value positions clear in presenting research results. Such an
acknowledgement, it can be argued, reduces the possibility of (although by no means eliminates) misapplication of research findings to bolster a favored ideology. But Charles W. Anderson contends that policy researchers do not have a unique wisdom in applying value criteria in public policy contexts. But, instead, academic policy researchers can play a distinctive role by interpreting policy decisions in light of value perspective neglected in policy debates because of inequitable power relations, undue influence, established practice, or the mere striving for novelty. This conclusion points to a final criterion in evaluating effectiveness of policy research -- the degree to which it explores and introduces neglected value perspectives into debates about the goals and means of public policies. "Utilization" is not the sole criterion.

NOTES


13. The results of this survey were presented in a panel presentation by Milton C. Cummings, Jr., David B. Pankratz, Monnie Peters, C. Richard Swaim, and Margaret J. Wyszomirski at the 14th Annual Conference on Social Theory, Politics, and the Arts, October 28-30, 1988, at The American University, Washington, DC.


17. Ibid., p. 29.

18. For further discussion, see Margaret Jane Wyszomirski, "Sources of Private Support for the Arts: An Overview," in Margaret Jane Wyszomirski and Pat Clubb,


20. See, e.g., Hilton Kramer, "Is Art Above the Laws of Decency?"


32. This unreleased report was prepared by Thomas Wolf in 1984.

33. This point is made in Laura H. Chapman, Instant Art, Instant Culture: The Unspoken Policy for American Schools (New York: Teachers College Press, 1982).


37. This point is made in Laura H. Chapman, Instant Art, Instant Culture.


46. See Irwin Feller, Universities and State Governments.


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