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Plato's argument from relatives: The role of the distinction between *kath hauto* and *pros ti* in the theory of Forms

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The Ohio State University, 1992
PLATO'S ARGUMENT FROM RELATIVES:
THE ROLE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN *kath hauto*
AND *pros ti* IN THE THEORY OF FORMS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

by

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1992

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1992
Dedicated to two of my earliest teachers:

Iva Knight
&
Merle Baltzly.

From them I learned nothing about Plato, but a great deal about the value of hard work.
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INTRODUCTION

In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle complains that some of his teacher’s arguments for the existence of the Forms produce Forms of relatives. This he takes to be a defect. As is frequently the case with Aristotle’s remarks about Plato, when one turns to the Platonic corpus it is not clear where (or even if) there are such arguments. But, unlike many of Aristotle’s comments, this one has something of the ring of truth to it, for, in many of the places where the Forms figure into Plato’s dialogues, one finds examples which concern relative predicates. The question poses itself, "What role do relative predicates play in motivating Plato’s theory of Forms?"

In order to begin to answer this question, we must first determine what distinguishes καθ' αὐτά and πρός τι predicates. Further, some classification of the latter is also desirable, since they differ from one another in many important respects. This task is complicated by the fact that Plato never tells his readers much about the distinction per se. In the *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger simply assumes that Theaetetus understands and accepts such a distinction. Likewise, in

1 *Metaph.* 990b16-18, ἐτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν τῶν πρὸς τι ποιοῦσιν ἰδέας, δὲν οὐ φάμεν εἴναι καθ' αὐτά γένος. The claim is repeated again in N. 4.

2 *Sph.* 255c, "Ἀλλ' ὅμοια σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν δυτιών τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα δὲι λέγεσθαι.
the *Parmenides*, Plato does not attempt to explain the distinction carefully. Instead, he simply mobilizes examples of πρός τι predicates into an argument against the possibility of separated Forms for Master/Slave and Knowledge/Knowable. Thus, in reconstructing the distinction, Plato's examples of relative predicates provide more clues to what falls under the heading of πρός τι than do his comments on the distinction itself. In addition, I help myself to some of the details found in *Categories 7* about what terms are relative. While it is true that this is not Plato's work, the consensus seems to be that it is one of Aristotle's very early works and that, as a result, it is likely to reflect, more or less accurately, the logical distinctions drawn by members of the Academy. So long as we confine ourselves to the general outline of what distinguishes relatives from other predicates, I don't think that this interpretive strategy is likely to yield an account that is not really Platonic. The upshot of this investigation is that relatives are distinguished from καθ' αὐτά predicates by two related facts. The *things* to which a relative term, R, applies are what they are only by virtue of some other thing being such that the correlative, C, applies to it. So, the correct application of a relative predicate carries existential import *beyond* the subject of the predication. This is what it means for a thing to *be* in relation to another. Related to this ontic condition is the fact that, generally, relative terms are explained or defined by terms that are not prior to them--their correlatives. These correlatives enter into the definitions of τὰ πρός ἀλλὰ ὄντα in a different way than genus and differentia enter into the definitions of καθ' αὐτά beings.
Once we have arrived at a taxonomy of relatives, we can turn to the logical grammar of these predicates. In the early dialogues there are several principles about relative predicates that we can extract from the examples that Plato uses. These principles include:

1. All relatives have distinct correlatives.

2. Many relatives are \( \pi\rho\delta\zeta \) their opposites.

3. Many relative predicates are such that they cannot be had by a thing in relation to itself. So, there is something like the notion of an asymmetrical relation.

4. If a thing is such that a relative term holds for it, then it has the potentiality or power to be of or than something.

5. Qualified relatives have correspondingly qualified correlatives.

6. A formulation of the law of non-contrariety which allows for a subject to be qualified by opposites so long as these opposites are not in relation to the same thing.

The other thing that becomes clear from surveying Plato's use of relatives is that he really does see a unified kind, the relatives, where we moderns would be inclined to draw important distinctions. So, for instance, 'larger than' is treated right alongside 'knowledge of.' This helps to confirm the tentative taxonomy reached in the first part of chapter one.

In Chapter Two I begin from the assumption that the theory of Forms as it emerges in the middle dialogues is, in some fashion, responsive to the problems
raised by the dialogues of search. I further assume that the theory of Forms is not present in those dialogues per se. The question then becomes, "What is the connection between the sort of thing that Socrates is looking for in the dialogues of search and the ontology of Forms?" In an attempt to answer this question I try to determine what the constraints are on any adequate answer to a Socratic, "what is F?" question. What Socrates is looking for, I think, is the "because" which explains why all F things are F. This "F-maker" I call the "logical cause." Logical causes have two distinguishing features. First, they are unitary. That is, Plato thinks that there should be one and only one explanation or "thing" that makes all F things F. Second, they are self-predicating. The reason that Plato accepts this condition is, I think, twofold. First, he inherits a picture from the pre-Socratics according to which the "because" of F must be itself F. Barnes calls this the Synonymy Principle. But, Plato does not, I think, accept it in any simple minded way which might lead to the so-called "Third Man" argument. Rather, he thinks that the Synonymy Principle applies to the logical cause because of F because this is what F really is. This has the implication that, whatever the logical cause of F might be, it in no way fails to be F. The idea, I think, is that if the "F-maker" were in any way not-F, it would hold the potential to make the other things in which it was present not-F as well. But, if this were to happen, the very same thing would

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3 I owe this term and the general outline of the notion of a logical cause to Paul Woodruff. Woodruff, I believe, finds the roots of this notion in Vlastos' work.

4 Barnes (1975) I pp. 86, 119. He claims to find this as suppressed premise in Xenophanes (A12, 28, 31, 32) and in Alcmaeon of Croton. This principle, with some qualifications, can be found in Aristotle too; see GC. 324a20, Metaph. 993b24-31, 1034a34, 1070a4-9,
explain both F-ness and its opposite. As we shall see when we turn to the *Phaedo*
Plato thinks that this is incompatible with the possibility of coherent explanation.

The constraints on answers to "What is F?" questions will prove to be problematic when the F in question is a relative predicate. In the latter part of
the second chapter, I turn to a fairly detailed analysis of the candidates for the logical cause of the fine and of a friend that are examined and rejected in the *Hippias Major* and *Lysis*. τὸ καλόν is doubly slippery because it is a relative whose use cuts across several of the sub-categories of relatives discussed above. It can be used comparatively (implicitly or explicitly) and also attributively. Hippias' attempts to answer the question fill out the picture of a logical cause and illustrate one of the problems that arises when the predicate in question is a relative. Roughly, the problem is that Hippias' candidates are fine only πρὸς τὸ. Beauty is not a beautiful girl because even beautiful girls are not beautiful in relation to goddesses.⁵ (Here it is the capacity that beauty has to serve as a implicit comparative that creates the problem.) Neither can the logical cause of the fine be gold, since, after all, gold cookware is not fine at all. (Here, of course, it is the attributive use of καλόν that generates the problem. A gold spoon can be a fine ornament but a bad piece of cookware.) When Socrates takes over and starts suggesting answers to the question, his attempts all mirror the πρὸς τὸ character of the definiendum in the definiens. This, however, does not solve the problem.

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⁵ Much more needs to be said about how, exactly, one ought to take Hippias' "definitions." Even if we take him to mean that (part of) what it is be fine is to be a beautiful girl (so Irwin and Nehamas) relativity still creates a problem. Being a beautiful girl is only fine for girls. The gambit only moves the problem from comparative relativity to attributive relativity. An interlocutor could, of course, take this in stride by denying the unity requirement.
Take, for instance the suggestion that the fine is the useful. This latter, in turn, is understood as ability or capacity. But, when a person does things that are not fine, it is clear that he or she had the capacity for this. So, capacity is, like the beautiful girl, both fine and not fine. It depends on what the capacity is a capacity for.

Because of these sorts of considerations, I shall argue that the theory of Forms as it is presented in the *Phaedo* is a calculated response to the problems that arise from trying to find coherent explanations for certain sorts of relative predicates. Before I can undertake this task, however, I must investigate some alternative explanations of the role that relatives play in the *Phaedo*. Hector-Neri Castañeda has argued that, in the *Phaedo*, Plato presents a full-blown theory of relations. Mohan Matthen purports to find yet another theory of relations there. Detailed examination of the disputed texts does not, I think, rule either theory out absolutely. Neither do I think that the texts that Castanneda and Matthen cite go very far toward establishing their interpretations. This is because they focus quite narrowly on some selected passages from Socrates’ intellectual history (esp. 96d-97b) and the beginning of the second sailing (esp. 100e-101c and 102b-103a). What is needed to decide the matter one way or another is a more a synoptic view of the role these passages play in the final argument. Since one of these passages ostensibly concerns Socrates’ motivations for adopting the theory of Forms we need to ask about the impetus for the theory of Forms. What can we infer about Plato’s reasons for introducing the Forms based on what Socrates is made to say in *Phaedo* 96a-100b? This is critical for the interpretation of what
comes later since 100e-101c refers back to 96d-97b and 102b-103a builds upon 100e-101c.

Much has been said about the reasons that Plato has for supposing that there must be Forms. We now find ourselves seeking insight into this matter for two reasons. First, it seems critical to the interpretation of the role that relatives play in the final argument of the Phaedo. Further, independently of this, we are pursuing the question of whether this theory of Forms is a response to problems that relatives raise for Socratic questions.

The mistake that I think many interpreters make when reading the Phaedo is to suppose that Plato is more sure about what the διόθεσις really amounts to than he, in fact, is. Plato, I believe, never loses sight of the fact that the immortality of the soul is the issue and he puts only as much of the theory on the table as he thinks is necessary for him to establish his conclusion. Accordingly, my interpretation of the disputed passages about taller and shorter will not have Plato committed to exact doctrines in spite of his inexact language. I don't think that such a reading is uncharitable. Charity includes seeing systematicity and completeness where ever the text permits it. It does not require that we foist some theory of relatives off on Plato because it is merely consistent with what he says and because we think that he should have one.

As I see it, the general impetus for the separation of the Forms is linked directly with the difficulties that relatives pose for what is F questions. The singularity requirement has it that there is a single λόγος that answers the question,
"What is F?" This ἔγος is of a "being" that is likewise a unity. Where F is an incomplete relative, this unity could not be a sensible thing, else the ἔγος would be of what is ὃ μᾶλλον F than not F, as is the case with Hippias' beautiful girl. As a result, Plato comes, quite naturally, to think of the logical cause as something separate from sensibles. If we understand F or F-ness when we understand its logical cause, then this separated thing must be eminently knowable (*Phdo.* 79d). Because of this, and perhaps because of Plato's moral realist convictions, such things must also be unchanging (*Phdo.* 78d).

The notion that sensible things participate in the Forms and are named eponymously gains part of its impetus from the self-predication requirement. If one had a view according to which the logical cause of F had to be completely or strictly F, then the following principle would look plausible:

Explanatory Constraint 2: where F and G are opposites: if x is the αἰτία in virtue of which a is F, then x cannot itself be G.

So, in the *Phaedo*, Socrates denies that "a head" can be the αἰτία of one man being taller than another. The reason is clear: αἰτίαι are "explaners" or "becauses" and the constraints on adequate answers to Socratic questions dictate that these "becauses" must have a certain character.

The singularity requirement suggests another explanatory constraint:

Explanatory Constraint 1: if x is the αἰτία by virtue of which a if F, then x cannot be the αἰτία by virtue of which a (or anything else) is G.
The thought is that the unified explanations for various features of the world do not overlap. The logical cause of F-ness is distinct from the logical cause of anything else. This is especially true when the "anything else" is an opposite. The reason is clear: the logical cause of F must be completely F. Were it also to be the logical cause of G it would have to be completely G. This, of course, is incompatible with its being completely F, for what it means to be completely F is to not be not-F in any way. But being G just is being not-F.

When the logical causes in question correspond to comparative and attributive predicates, the problem of finding a suitable alêia is particularly problematic. Even if we forego the frivolous suggestion that one man is taller than another by a head in favor of an explanation like "the overhanging," the very same thing will be the "because" of shortness in the thing that is overtopped. Similarly, in the case of attributives, some feature of a sensible thing may explain why it is a fine F, but, at the same time, be the alêia by virtue of which another thing is alêia. What is needed is a "pure" tallness present to the one thing that makes it taller than the other thing, while not making the other thing shorter than it. Similarly, attributives require some one thing present to all fine things which brings with it fineness in any and all cases. The shares of Forms in the Phaedo, I think, are introduced precisely to fulfill this requirement. The world must contain something like this if coherent explanation is to be possible.

The constraints on answers to Socratic questions prompt the hypothesis of Forms and shares. The presence of homoiomeros "stuffs" in things, I think, provides the analogy by reference to which we are to understand how this is possible.
It is not necessary, I think, to read the *Phaedo* argument in such a way that it requires Forms for the mass terms like fire and snow. They are present, not only to facilitate the argument, but also to serve as model αἰτωλία. Pre-Socratic physical theories frequently cite the presence of such things in substances to explain why they have some of the qualities that they have. These explanations meet the explanatory constraints sketched above. The presence of fire in a thing never makes it cold. Further, this fire is itself hot. Indeed, it is strictly hot, for there is no respect in which it is cold. Plato, I believe, thinks that the presence of Form shares in things is analogous. But he is well aware that the analogy cannot be pushed too far. When the analogy is pushed too far, certain problems arise. First, unlike the entirety of fire, of which little "shares" are present in things, Largeness or Beauty Itself is not simply the totality of beauty or largeness. So, the relationship between Form and share cannot simply be that of having a localized piece. Second, the sense in which the Form of F or the shares of F are F cannot be the same as the sense in which fire is hot. After all, the notion of a supremely large super-sensible thing is odd, at best. This difficulty, I believe, eventually gives rise to the distinction between two kinds of "being" in Plato—*I*-predication and *H*-predication. Such a distinction is easily read back into the *Phaedo* doctrine, but I do not think that this dialogue itself was written with Parmenidean

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6 It might well be that Eudoxus reached his quite literal understanding of participation by pushing the analogy too far. See Alex. Aphr. in *Metaph.* 97. 27-98. 24, "it is not, as Eudoxus and some other thought, by the intermixture of Ideas that other things exist . . ." (trans. Ross (1957) p. 132). Curiously enough the argument that Alexander attributes to Aristotle against this view parallels the argument of *Prm.* 131a-c. If you think that the arguments of the first part of the *Parmenides* are directed against the theory of Forms as Plato himself once understood it, or as one might plausibly understand it, then this fact is telling.
puzzles in mind. Finally, there is the fact that a share of Largeness makes x taller than y while a "share of fire" just makes an object hot ἄνθετοι αὐτότητος. Unlike the first two difficulties, Plato tries to solve this problem in the Phaedo itself. The difficult stretch of text from 102b-d points up the "other-directed" character of shares of comparative relatives. Of course, it also prepares us for the contrast between shares and individuals in 102d-e. Does Plato have a theory of how it is that shares of such relatives are "other-directed" (Form-chains, as Castañeda would have it, or participation πρός an individual, as Matthen claims)? No, like much of the theory of Forms in the Phaedo, he simply has reason to think that something like this must be the case.

With this prolegomenon in place, we shall turn to the details of the argument from equals and the final argument in the Phaedo. I reconstruct the arguments in a way that is consistent with my hypothesis about Plato's motives and the lack of determinacy about the details of his "theory." Further, I attempt to confirm my view by showing that Plato is vague or ambiguous in just the places that one would expect if my hypothesis were correct.

I conclude the search for a Platonic "argument from relatives" with the Republic. It seems to me that there are two candidates for such an argument in Republic: the argument concerning the objects of knowledge in V. 475e-480a and the remarks about the role that relatives play in "turning the soul around" in VII. 523a-525c. The arguments in these sections seem to me to have much in common with the motives and principles that underlie the theory of Forms in Phaedo.
The images of Sun, Line and Cave in the middle books are often thought to provide support for the claim that the theory of Forms is purely general and includes Forms for every common term. In Chapter Four I examine these images in detail and consider why they might seem to suggest this conclusion. I go on to argue that, in fact, when we see them in their proper context, these passages do not commit Plato to an ontology of Forms for καθότατα terms.

Though I cannot provide a detailed defense of this claim, I think that we need not look at any of the later dialogues in an effort to find an argument for the separation and existence of the Forms which is "from relatives" in some sense. It seems to me that, in the later dialogues, Plato becomes rather more interested in another branch of the family of relatives. He invokes principles relating to these predicates to explain relations between the Forms and the nature of knowledge and perception. These are different tasks from arguing for the existence of Forms. In Chapter Five, I examine the first part of the Parmenides in order to outline the nature of this new problem. It, unlike the problems of the Phaedo, is such that it provides Plato with a motive for Forms of καθότατα terms. Thus, the Parmenides ushers out one phase of Plato's philosophical development and introduces another. Apart from its intrinsic interest, the project of looking for a genuinely Platonic argument from relatives allows us a new perspective from which to see the different problematic that occupies Plato in the early and middle dialogues.
§1. The problem of defining a class of relatives

Earlier in this century, when Russell's and Frege's views were newer, it was fashionable to blame, or perhaps to pity, Plato and the ancients in general for failing to have a proper appreciation of what relations are. Russell, perhaps, put it most succinctly in his *History of Western Philosophy*: "Plato is perpetually getting into trouble through not understanding relational terms."¹ One can find similar views in Whitehead² and Santayana³. Even Cornford, who is typically a very sympathetic reader of Plato, glumly admits in his 1935 work on *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* that "it was reserved for still living logicians to discover that a proposition like 'Socrates is shorter than Phaedo' has two subjects with a relation between them and no predicate at all."⁴ As is frequently the case in these matters, the pendulum has swung back the other way. Some commentators have found full blown "theories of relations" in Plato—particularly in some short passages from the

¹ pp. 129 and 150, as well as (1914) pp. 45-47, 50.
² (1941) p. 424.
³ (1942) p. 30.
⁴ (1935) p. 28. Castañeda catalogues even more philosophers who accuse Plato of missing something important about relations in the appendix to his "Plato's Phaedo Theory of Relations."
Phaedo and from the Parmenides. The most widely known of these accounts is that of Hector-Neri Castañeda. He claims that in the Phaedo Plato presents an account of relations which, though not Russelian, is still intuitively and formally satisfactory.

It is not clear to me that either party to this debate is right. The reason I balk at putting the matter this way is because I suspect that the distinctions with which Plato is working may cut orthogonal to the distinction between monadic predicates and relational ones on the standard Principia account of them. What Plato is concerned with is a distinction "among the beings." Some are always said "themselves in themselves" while others are said "in relation to another." In what follows, I propose to explore the role that the $\kappa\alpha\vartheta \alpha\delta\tau\omega$ and $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma \tau\iota$ distinction plays in Plato's thought without attempting to assimilate it immediately to modern categories. Perhaps once we see what role this dichotomy plays, we will be in a better position to have something sensible to say about whether Plato understood or failed to understand the nature of relations.

The litmus test for my interpretation of Plato's treatment of the distinction must be the Phaedo. There are several reasons why any investigation of the role that the $\kappa\alpha\vartheta \alpha\delta\tau\omega / \pi\rho\delta\varsigma \tau\iota$ distinction plays in Plato's theory of Forms must cast some light on the Phaedo. First, it is in the Phaedo that Plato gives an argument for the separation of the Forms that many have thought involves critically the features of $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma \tau\iota$ predicates. This is the celebrated argument from equals (74b-c5). It is in all likelihood no accident that Aristotle used $\tau\delta \iota\sigma\omega\nu \alpha\delta\tau\omega$ in
the argument that "produces Forms of relatives." He may well have been trying to capture what he fancied was the real import of the Phaedo 74b-c5 argument. Second, of the examples that Plato uses of Forms in the Phaedo, the vast majority are Forms of relatives. Indeed, I think that the only possible exceptions to this may be the use of snow and fire in the final argument. Part of what I will be concerned with is whether these really are exceptions to the generalization. That is, are there really Forms for these things?

That the majority of examples of references to Forms in Phaedo are to Forms of relatives is not immediately obvious. After all, nowhere in the dialogue does Plato distinguish between relatives and non-relatives. However, he does give us something quite like a definition of the distinction in Sophist. In order to get started we must explore this definition and some related general facts about relatives. Only then can we turn to the question of what role, if any, relative predicates play in motivating the theory of Forms as it is found in Phaedo.

Hayduck (1891) 82ff. Also, Ross (1957) pp. 124-5. There is a manuscript question about whether Aristotle (or Alexander) supposed this argument to produce Forms from relatives (ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τι) or even of relatives (καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι). Hayduck prints ἐκ and Ross καί. It is easy to see how the problem might have arisen. The use of τὸ ἴσον suggests that the relative character of the term is somehow essential to the argument for the Form. Thus, the argument produces a Form "out of" relatives. On the other hand, Alexander is commenting on 990b16-18 where Aristotle claims that there is no καὶ τῶν ἴσον γένος of relative terms. Thus, the argument from relatives is at fault because it produces Forms "even of" relatives.

At 65d4-e5, where the theory of Forms is introduced, Socrates gives as examples justice, beauty, goodness, health, and strength. Later there is clear indication that there is τὸ ἴσον (74b), large and small (100e5), and hot and cold (103c10).

Odd and even (104) may also present some problem. The evidence is stronger for treating the numbers as Forms, or quite like Forms anyway, than it is for treating fire and snow as Forms. It may be that there are reasons for according the odd and the even the same status in virtue of their connection with numbers.
In *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger gets Theaetetus to accept a certain dichotomy among the things that are or "the beings."

\[\text{"Αλλ' οίμαί σε συγκωρείν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι. 255c8-10}\]

But, I think you will agree, some of the beings are always said themselves in themselves while others are in relation to another.

Pre-theoretically at least, anything that is a "being." Thus, biological individuals, like this cat, and artifacts, like this desk, are beings. Further, Greek allows one to create referring expressions simply by adding a definite neuter article to adjectives and participles. So, τὸ λευκόν is a being too, since "the white (thing)" just names this cat. The same applies to τὸ κυκλοῦς, since the one who is scratching himself is my cat too. We could try to spell out some order of dependence among the beings by considering the way in which they are addressed. This, I take it, is at least part of the project undertaken in Aristotle's *Categories*. Aristotle thinks that, though "the white" and "the cat" find the same denotation, the latter term is, somehow, more basic. Its application does not leave the door open to further questions as "the white" does. For we can always...

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8 Τ ἄλληλα, B, W ἄλλα. A confusion in transcription is entirely understandable here. Some of Plato's πρὸς τι predicates clearly stand in a reciprocal relation to one another as 'father' and 'son' do. Predicates like 'large' are clearly πρὸς something else, but it is hardly clear what that is. In all likelihood it is a comparison class. Yet it seems odd to think of the comparison class having its being in relation to the predicate 'large.' Hilda is large for a flea but that hardly implies that 'flea' is what it is πρὸς 'large.' Cf. below §4.

9 Unless otherwise noted, the translations of Greek texts that appear herein are mine.
ask, "The white what?" But, it makes no sense to ask "The cat what?" Plato, however, does not spell out any system of categories and we should be wary about seeing his talk of "the beings" as conditioned by any schema like Aristotle's categories. Aristotle, of course, thought that any application of a πρός τε predicate presupposed the applicability of some κατά το αότο predicate from the category of substance. One of the questions that we shall be faced with in Plato is whether there could be a being such that only some πρός τε predicate held for it.

The other odd stumbling block in understanding the way the distinction is drawn in *Sophist* is this odd notion of "saying a being." We have just considered the wide range of things that can be "beings." I can, of course, do many things with my cat: feed him, curse him, throw him out a window, and so on, but I cannot say him. Words about cats can be said, but cats cannot. Even if we suppose that Plato must mean something like "saying things about the things that are," there are difficulties here. Notoriously, this manner of speaking fails to distinguish between naming a thing (and so speaking of it) and speaking of a thing by making some statement about it. So, when a few pages later (263b), Plato tells

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10 Specifying just what this dependence comes to is no easy matter. It isn't simply ontological priority, since extended things, such as cats, must have some color or other. So, though a thing must be a substance in order to have a color, it must likewise have a color given that it is a substance. Aristotle, I think, sees the dependency as both ontic and epistemic. One gets at what a thing really is by bringing it under terms in the category of substance.

11 This distinction is, I think, critical to the understanding of Plato's later philosophy. I am inclined to agree with those who find that such a distinction is the hard won victory of the Parmenides. See, for instance, Ryle (1939) and Turnbull (1989). My point here is that the λέγει τά διότα formula encourages such a confusion and that, out of context, we are hard pressed to figure out whether the *Sophist* criterion is aiming at a distinction between names, statements containing names, or things.
us λόγοι are true when they λέγει τὰ δυνα ὡς ἦστιν (say the beings as they are), it is fairly clear that, in this context at least, the λόγος is a statement, as opposed to a word. But, even so, one is inclined to give λέγει the sense of "describe" or, perhaps, to translate τὰ δυνα as "facts." This, however, makes it unclear how we are to take it when, as in 255c8-10, it is being used to make a distinction between terms. So, when we are told that some of the beings are "said in relation to another" ought we infer that the terms that say them are, somehow, descriptive? On such an understanding the καθ᾽ αὐτό and πρὸς τι distinction would be one drawn at the level of terms, between those that describe their subjects simply and those that describe them in relation to some other thing. So, understanding of such terms would require an explanation of what the co-relative term indicates. This way of understanding the distinction makes it a semantic one. As we shall see below, this is the way that some ancient authors explained the distinction between καθ᾽ αὐτό and πρὸς τι. Alternately, we might suppose that some of the beings are always said in relation to another because the beings, and not merely the terms by which we pick them out, always are in relation to another. It is, as yet, unclear what it would mean for a being to be in relation to another, but it is clear that it is a subtly different thing than its being described or explained in relation to another. Such an interpretation of the distinction would make it an ontological one.

Thus far, it seems that Plato’s description of the distinction in the Sophist does not make his meaning utterly transparent. When we look for other places in the dialogues where it seems pretty clear that Plato is contrasting things that are
καθ' αὐτό with those that are πρὸς τι, the situation does not improve dramatically. Though Plato's remarks at *Parmenides* 133c8-d5 complicate the picture by introducing a distinction between what Forms are relative to and what sensibles named after them are relative to, it does not really illuminate more fully the nature of the distinction itself.\(^\text{12}\) However, the illustrations that follow each passage are revealing. The *Sophist* quote, of course, comes from the context of the discussion of sameness and difference. The *Parmenides* passage precedes discussion of master and slave and the pair ἐπιστήμηα αὐτή and ἀλήθεια αὐτή.

In the next section I shall take the examples of πρὸς τι predicates that are given in the *Sophist* and the pairs knowledge/knowable and master/slave as guides for finding relative predicates. We know that we are looking for terms that are πρὸς ἀλλα in a sense somewhat like these terms are. Once we start looking through the dialogues, other examples are not hard to find.

\section*{§2. Scavenger Hunt in the Early Dialogues.}

\textbf{A. Charmides}

In the *Charmides*, Socrates considers Critias' suggestion that moderation (σωφροσύνη) is a special kind of knowledge. The first move in Socrates' inquiry

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\(^{12}\) Indeed, given the dialectical context of all of the remarks at the beginning of the *Parmenides*, it is unclear how seriously we should take the claim that sensible masters are masters πρὸς sensible slaves and not the Forms. This is because it isn't clear how much of what the young Socrates agrees to in the beginning of this dialogue is anything to which Plato himself would agree. I discuss this argument in more detail in the concluding chapter.
is to establish that knowledge is a relative; it is knowledge of something. Further, different knowledges are related to different things. So, for instance, medicine is of health. Some have a distinctive function or result (ἐργον) though the result of others is more difficult to isolate. But in each and every case, Socrates would like to argue, a science is of or related to a thing distinct from the science itself. So, numeration is of the odd and even and how they stand in respect of numerousness in relation to themselves and to one another, but λογιστική is not the same as odd and even.

The sticking point between Critias and Socrates turns on whether moderation might be a science that does not fit this pattern. By 166c, Critias is ready to maintain that it differs from other kinds of knowledge precisely by being of them as well as of itself (ἡ δὲ μόνη τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτῇ ἐπιστήμης). Socrates attempts to break the deadlock by considering whether the analogous case is possible with other things that are of something. These other things must be thought by Plato to be relatives in the same way that

13 Chrm. 165c, δῆλου ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τις ἂν εἶη καὶ τινὸς.

14 Just how Critias moves from his original proposal that moderation is knowledge of one's own self (165b, σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ γεγονότερα αὑτῶν ἐαυτῶν) to the idea that it is a knowledge of knowledges and of itself is a bit hard to figure. The remarks about the temple at Delphi suggest that we ought to take αὑτῶν ἐαυτῶν as a masculine accusative object of γεγονότερα; literally, "moderation is to know you yourself." This implies that you have a certain kind of knowledge, but that knowledge is of you, not of itself. 167a suggests that the idea is related to the Apology conception of Socratic wisdom. Socrates' peculiar wisdom is his knowledge of just how little he knows. Thus, his knowledge of himself is a knowledge of knowledges (or at least of their absence). Presumably, his knowledge of his own epistemic condition as regards knowledge of what moderation really is is included in this. Thus, it might be thought to be a knowledge of itself as well.
knowledge and knowable are or his argument is no good. The examples are very revealing.

Vision is of color. The possibility of a kind of vision whose object was itself and other visions is hard to fathom. It is hard to see how it could be vision without seeing any color. Likewise for a kind of hearing that heard only itself and other hearings, but without hearing the objects of these other hearings—sounds. Alongside these perceptual terms, Plato lists other cognitive and emotive states. Desire is of pleasure, wish is of the good, love is of the fine, and fear is of what is dreadful. Equally puzzling is an opinion of opinions and of itself which opines nothing of the things that the other opinions opine.

In all of these cases, says Socrates, things are of something else in virtue of having a certain power or ability. Without missing a beat, Socrates shifts to a quite different use of the genitive construction. That which is larger has a certain potentiality whereby it is larger than something. This something is always a thing that is smaller. If it were possible for there to be a great thing analogous to the science of sciences, it would have to be greater than the other great things and greater than itself. But, to be greater than itself it would also have to be smaller than itself, since a greater is always greater προς a smaller. The same

15 Chrm. 168b, ἔχει τινὰ τοιαύτην δύναμιν διὸντε τινὸς εἶναι.

16 It seems clear from the text that both parties to the debate think that this is clearly a condition on anything being called ‘larger.’ οὐκόσιν ἐλάττωσιν τινος, εἶπερ ἐσται μεῖζον; αἱνάγκη.

17 In what follows I shall use expressions like "a greater" or "likes" and "sames" to represent the substantival use of Greek adjectives. Though somewhat barbaric as English, I think that this makes clearer how Plato is handling such terms. Cf. supra on ἄντα.
reasoning is then applied to other comparative predicates: double and half, more and less, heavier and lighter, older and younger.

Such comparatives indicate asymmetric relations in which one thing bears the converse relation to the thing qualified by the relative predicate. No thing can stand in an asymmetric relation to itself. Plato brings this home by means of a principle about δύναμις and σώσια. In order for a thing to have a certain potentiality in relation to itself, it must also have the σώσια in relation to which that potentiality holds. At the very least, in this context, σώσια must bear the sense of 'property' or 'feature.' That is, in order for something to have the potentiality for being larger than itself, it must have the feature or quality in relation to which "a larger" is larger—it must be "a smaller." Since comparatives are always in relation to an opposite (πρὸς ἐναυτίος), they can never have their power in relation to themselves. So, for a certain portion of the cases that are regarded as analogous to the possibility of a science of sciences, the supposition is impossible (παντάπασιν ἄδύνατον, 168e). Other cases are merely doubtful (ἀπιστεῖται.

18 In the second hypothesis of the Parmenides, τὸ ἐν is both equal to itself and greater and smaller than itself. The argument for its self-equality parallels the argument implied in the Charmides. The One cannot be greater than itself because, for other reasons, it was revealed as having no smallness in it. A greater is always πρὸς a smaller, so the One cannot be greater than itself. 150c, καὶ μή καὶ αὐτὸ γε τὸ ἐν πρὸς ἐαυτὸ ὦτος ἢ ἔχει· μήτε μέγεθος ἢν ἐαυτῷ μήτε σμικρόττητα ἔχον ὀφτ' ἢ ὑπερέχει ὀφτ' ἢ ὑπερέχοι ἐαυτόν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὦτον ἢ ὦτων ἢ ἔχει ἐαυτῷ. There is a sense in which the One manages to be both greater and smaller than itself, but this, I think, is a result of the peculiar nature of the subject of the second hypothesis. It does not "fall out" of the logical grammar of 'larger' and 'smaller' in quite the same way that the Charmides conclusion does.

19 Charm. 168d, δὲ τι περ ἀν τὴν ἐαυτοῦ δύναμιν πρὸς ἐαυτὸ ἔχει· οὐ καὶ ἐκεῖνην ἔξει τὴν σώσιαν, πρὸς ἢν ἢ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἢν;
σφόδρα). If there were to be a comparable kind of vision or hearing, its would have to be the case that there was a kind of sight that was itself colored.20

Ranked alongside these doubtful instances is the potential that motion has to move itself and heat to burn itself.21 This suggests something new. In the previous cases ‘of’ or ‘than’ has provided the link between the faculty and its object. We have been concerned with sight’s capacity to be of color and the capacity of the larger to be larger than a smaller. Are we to suppose that the transition to heat and motion is prompted by the notion of a capacity, or are we to suppose that Plato thinks of such things as πρός τι, as vision and larger are? Or are we to think of the very notion of δύναμις as somehow πρός τι, perhaps in virtue of the fact that a capacity or power is always a capacity to affect something else? The answer is not clear from the text of the Charmides. Having cast doubt on the possibility of Critias’ science of sciences, Socrates proceeds to attack the identification of it with moderation on the ground that the latter, but not the former, is of great benefit. The Charmides passage, however, serves to alert us to the fact that many apparently different sorts of predicates might turn out to be relatives.

20 Obviously there are puzzles here about consciousness and the unity of apperception. I do not think that Plato intends that we rescue this definition of moderation (Platonic-sounding though it might be) by seeing for ourselves what is wrong with this line of reasoning. "Complex irony" (see Vlastos, 1987) does play a role in many of the early dialogues, I think, but I don’t think that there is any reason to invoke it here. Personally, I suspect that Plato was genuinely puzzled about our awareness of our own perceptual awareness. If it were a topic of discussion in the Academy, it might explain the peculiar connections between the Theaetetus and Aristotle's psychological works. Cp. Thit. 185a and 191c with de An. III,1 and Mem. 450a23 ff.

21 Charm. 168c-169a, ἄκοη δ' αὖ καὶ ὄψις καὶ ἐτι γε κίνησις αὐτή ἐαυτήν κινεῖν, καὶ ψεφμότης καλεῖν, . . .
The argument of *Euthyphro* 10a-11b deepens the suspicion, raised by *Charmides* 168e-169a, that things that act on something else are πρός the things upon which they act. This passage in *Euthyphro* is concerned with nominalized participles like τὸ φέρον (the carrying [thing]) and τὸ φερόμενον (the carried [thing]). In what follows, I shall call such pairs "action and passion pairs" since in each case there is a thing that acts, denoted by the active participle, and a thing that is acted upon, denoted by the passive participle.

Plato first makes the point that these two things are different from one another. I take this to mean that each member of such a pair is conceptually distinct; to be carried or loved is not the same thing as to carry or to love. The distinction must be interpreted as a conceptual one, else what Plato says is simply false. If I love myself, then I am both φιλοῦν and φιλούμενον. Even so, these are different in the sense that it does not follow from the mere fact that I am a lover that I am loved.

In such cases, the passion half of the pair is what it is on account of being the object of the active participle. The principle is stated generally at 10c. If a thing becomes or undergoes, it is not because it is a thing that is becoming that it becomes but because it becomes it is a thing that is becoming; nor is it because it is a thing that undergoes that something is undergoing; rather it is a thing that

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22 *Euthphr.* 10a, οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενον τί ἔστιν καὶ τούτον ἑτέρου τὸ φιλοῦν;
undergoes because it is undergoing.\textsuperscript{23} This suggests that in these pairs, the passive element is \( \pi\rho\dot{o}\varsigma \) the active element. The passive half of such a pair is what it is on account of (\( \delta\iota\dot{\alpha} \) or \( \delta\iota\dot{\omicron}\tau\iota \)) something that is, conceptually at least, different from it. Thus, it "has its being" or is what it is \( \pi\rho\dot{o}\varsigma \) \( \dot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\dot{\alpha} \), just as the \textit{Sophist} 255c formula suggests.

Though Plato does not make the point in the \textit{Euthyphro}, it is fairly clear that the same thing holds true of the active side of such pairs. Just as a carried thing is not carried because it is carried, but because of the thing that carries it, so too a thing that carries is not what it is in and of itself. If \( x \) is to carry, there must be a \( y \) which is carried.

If the \textit{Charmides} 168b principle is intended to be generalized, we can conclude that Plato thinks that there must be active and passive potentials or \( \delta\nu\dot{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\varsigma \) that permit things to love or be loved, carry or be carried. These potencies are, like the action and passion pairs, \( \pi\rho\dot{o}\varsigma \) one another. Thus, even if the notion of \( \delta\nu\dot{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\varsigma \) in general is not relative, the capacities to act and undergo are what they are in relation to one another. It is more difficult to determine what ought to be said about terms like motion or heat, which are, somehow, connected with acting and undergoing. In fact, we shall see shortly what difficulties Plato gets into when he tries to determine the relation between 'friend' and 'lover' and 'beloved.' Like the case of 'heat,' 'heating' and 'being heated' there is some

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Euthyphr.} 10c, \( \epsilon\tau \; \gamma\iota\nu\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha \; \nu \; \tau \; \pi\alpha\chi\varepsilon \iota \), \( \sigma\dot{\omicron}\dot{\chi} \; \delta\tau\iota \; \gamma\iota\nu\mu\mu\epsilon\mu\nu\nu \; \dot{\epsilon}\tau\iota \; \gamma\iota\nu\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha \), \( \dot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda \) \( \delta\tau\iota \; \gamma\iota\nu\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha \), \( \gamma\iota\nu\mu\mu\epsilon\mu\nu\nu \; \dot{\epsilon}\tau\iota \), \( \pi\alpha\chi\varepsilon \iota \), \( \dot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda \) \( \delta\tau\iota \; \pi\alpha\chi\varepsilon \iota \).
connection between these terms. It remains to be seen whether Plato has any sys-
tematic way of sorting out these connections.

C. Republic IV, 436b-441c

The argument for the distinctness of the three parts of the soul in Republic IV exhibits the same principles of organization that we saw in the Charmides: so-called "intentional states" are lumped in with comparatives as if they formed a single kind. In addition, the Republic passage gives us logical principles which are supposed to govern the whole category of πρός τε predicates. Insofar as these principles are true and important, they suggest that Plato has seized upon a distinc-
tion between predicates that "carves nature at its joints."

The context of the argument, of course, is the first transition from justice in the state to justice in the individual person. In order for the analogy to pro-
ceed, Plato must make it plausible that there are three distinct parts of the soul that correspond in some interesting way to the distinctions drawn between the parts of the population in the ideal πόλις. In order to do this, Plato invokes a version of the principle of non-contrariety as a test of non-identity. It is obvious, he says, that the same thing will not do or suffer opposites in the same way and in relation to the same thing simultaneously.24 Plato seems willing to accept three kinds of qualifications to his principle of non-contrariety. The first, temporal

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24 R. 436b, δὴ λοῦν ὅτι ταὐτὸν τάναντια ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταὐτὸν γε καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸν αὐτὴ ἐξελθεῖσαι ἁμα. The second formulation at 437a adds that the same thing will not be, as opposed to become, opposites. ποτὲ τι ἡν τὸ αὐτὸ ἡν αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τάναντια πάνω ἡ καὶ εἶτη ἡ καὶ ποιῆσειν.
dimension, is obvious enough. There is nothing logically or metaphysically un-to-ward in the idea that the very same thing is at one time moving and, at another time, at rest. The other two qualifications are somewhat difficult to sort out. I take the *κατὰ ταῦτόν* condition to govern the manner in which something acts or undergoes.\(^{25}\) This hypothesis gains support from the manner in which Plato dissolves the only one of his two examples of apparent objections to the principle of non-contrariety which specifies which of the two conditions is being met. The spinning top is not a case in which a thing is both in motion and at rest. Its motion and rest are not *κατὰ ταῦτόν*. The manner in which it moves has to do with the movement of the circumference. The manner in which it stands still is that it does not wobble on its axis. I take the *πρὸς ταῦτον* to indicate, not the manner in which a thing acts or undergoes, but the thing in relation to which it acts or undergoes. The general idea seems to be this: even if Achilles and Diomedes are struck by the same spear in the same place and with the same force, they may not undergo this blow *πρὸς ταῦτον*. If Hector strikes one blow and then hands the spear to Paris, they do not undergo in relation to the same thing. This distinction between *κατὰ ταῦτόν* and *πρὸς ταῦτόν* will not, I suspect, bear too much

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\(^{25}\) s.v. LSJ *κατά*, B.IV.2 and Shorey (1930) *ad loc*. Cf. Sph. 230b, ἐμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τά αὐτά κατά ταῦτα ἐνειλημένα. The passage appears in the discussion of *καταρτικὴ* and concerns the gathering of contradictory opinions. The point, I take it, is that, unbeknownst to the subject of the purification, he thinks contradictory things concerning the same matters and thinks these contradictory things in the same way (that is, he holds both beliefs with the same degree of conviction) and holds these opinions in relation to the very same thing (though he may well be ignorant of the identity of things that he thinks about under two different descriptions).
weight. After all, one might reasonably argue that one way in which two actings or undergoings can differ in manner is by virtue of being in relation to different agents or patients. The distinction makes far more sense in the case envisioned in the second formulation. When we think of states of being, as opposed to kinds of becoming, it makes more sense to distinguish between πρός and κατά. Even if the manner in which Helen is and remains beautiful does not change (say, her beauty derives from the placement of her nose in the middle of her face) she may still be not beautiful in relation to goddesses.

At 437b, Plato assimilates some of what we would call intentional states to the class of opposite actions and affections. These include assent and dissent, to want to have something and to deny oneself, to take something to yourself and to reject it, desiring and not desiring, willing and not willing, and, finally, consenting and not consenting. No commitment is made with respect to whether these things are doings or undergoings. His aim, of course, is to show that there must be distinct faculties in the soul when a person both wants to drink and refuses a drink. In order to do this, he must first forestall a possible objection. One might think that the very same thing in the soul can both thirst and yet reject a warm glass of Burger beer. It might be the case that the thirst is for a good drink or a cold drink. In order to meet this objection, Plato attempts to show that the correlative objects of a simple thirst and thirst for a good, cold drink are different. If this is so and if it is possible for someone who merely thirsts to reject some...

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26 Plato himself varies the formula even in the context of this argument. See R. 439b, τὸ γέ αὐτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐκπνοῦ περὶ τὸ αὐτο ἀμα τάναντα πράττειν, "the same thing simultaneously acts concerning the same thing with the same [part] of itself."
particular drink, then there must be distinct parts of the soul which are responsible for these contrary impulses.

438b introduces a principle of modified correlatives: "among the things which are such as to be of or than something, the ones which are qualified in some way are of or than something qualified, but the others that are just themselves are of things that are just themselves only."27 This has the result that an unqualified desire, like thirst *simpliciter*, is simply of whatever thirst is of—drink.28 It is only when heat is added (437e, πρόσευμε) to the desire for drink that it becomes a desire of cold drink. The examples that Plato uses in support of his principle confirm the wide range of things that are of or than something else. Larger is related to smaller, but *much* larger is than what is much smaller. The same applies to the comparatives ‘one times greater’ and ‘one times less,’ ‘more’ and ‘fewer,’ ‘heavier’ and ‘lighter,’ and ‘the swifter’ and ‘the slower.’ In a different vein (438c καὶ ἐτί γε), the hot things are πρός the cold in the same way. Note that these are not explicit comparatives. Plato writes τὰ ψερμαὶ and not the comparative forms that would parallel the cases that immediately precede it. The same principle is now applied to the various kinds of knowledge. Knowledge itself is of learning itself (438c, μαθηματὸς αὐτὸς though Plato hedges a bit

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27 R. 438b, δόσα γ' ἦστι τωιαῦτα οἷα εἰλαί του, τὰ μὲν ποια ἄττα ποιοῦ τινὸς ἔστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ἐκαστα αὐτοῦ ἐκάστοτι μόνω. *The principle is restated at 438d-e.*

28 R. 437e, αὖτί γε ἡ ἐπιθεμία ἐκάστη αὐτοῦ μόνων ἐκάστοι ν ὀδ πέρυκε.
the individual sciences are the sciences that they are by virtue of being of something of a certain kind.

Plato wards off a potential confusion concerning this principle after the second summary at 438e. In case the example of thirst for something cold had escaped the reader, Plato makes the point that the qualifications of correlatives are coordinated, but not necessarily identical. It does not follow from the fact that it is of health and disease that medicine is healthy and diseased. Rather, some learning "becomes" medical science by virtue of being of health and disease. Thus, we are not to confuse this principle with a similar one found in the Gorgias. At Gorgias 476b, Plato introduces what I shall call the principle of adverbial transfer: for any agent and patient pair, if x acts F-ly upon y, then y is affected F-ly. As I shall categorize things, x's doing is πρὸς y's undergoing. Thus, the Republic principle of qualified correlatives should apply and it does. If Diomedes strikes Achilles because he thinks Achilles is Hector, then Achilles is struck because Diomedes thinks that Achilles is Hector; not because Achilles thinks that Achilles is Hector. On one side there is a thinking that x is Hector, on the other side there is the passive voice correlate of being thought by x to be Hector. The qualifications are coordinated, but need not be identical. The point of the Gorgias principle is that when the qualifications are adverbial, they will be identical.

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29 ἢ ὅτου δὴ δὲι δεῖνοι τὴν ἔπιστήμην. This may be because of the distinctions between noetic states that will be introduced in the middle books. Alternately, it may be an echo of the knowledge argument of the Parmenides.

30 R. 438d, οὖκοδὲν ἐπειδὴ ποιοῦ τινός, καὶ ἀντὶ ποιὰ τις ἔγένετο.
D. *Hippias Major* 288e

We shall be looking much more closely at the text of the *Hippias Major* in the next chapter, but for the moment I want to look at a few passages in isolation. Above we noted the apparent anomaly of hot and cold being listed alongside comparatives like larger and smaller that are clearly προς τι. In the *Hippias*, Hippias is trying to say what "the fine" or "the beautiful" is. His first response to Socrates is that beauty is a beautiful maiden. Socrates first points out to Hippias that there other things besides fine girls that he would be willing to call fine. He even grudgingly admits that a well made pot is fine, but, on the whole, it is not beautiful in relation to fine horses and beautiful girls and other beautiful objects. Socrates buttresses Hippias' reasoning for him by adverting to Heraclitus: "the finest of monkeys is ugly compared with another race." Though this is initially stated with reference to a superlative, it seems clear that, if the finest of monkeys is ugly in relation to the race of men, then any fine monkey is ugly in relation to humans. The implication is that the term 'fine' holds for Bonzo only προς a certain comparison class. The upshot is that 'fine' is implicitly comparative and, therefore, προς τι. The difference is that it is much more difficult to say what the correlative term is in these cases. The fact that Bonzo is not fine in relation to the race of men, suggests that the respect in which he is fine is *for a monkey*. This

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31 The motives behind Hippias' peculiar response and the correct interpretation of his "account" (παρθένος καλή κολών) are matters of considerable controversy. I shall try to defend the rather minimal claims that I make about these issues in Chapter 2 when we turn to *Hp.Ma.* in more detail.

‘for a’ locution suggests the attributive use of the adjective. After all, a fine monkey may still be a poor brain surgeon.

So, it would appear that the class of relatives contains implicit comparatives and adjectives that are used attributively in addition to what we would call explicit comparatives and intentional predicates. Moreover, it is not clear just what things Plato thinks of as implicit comparatives. After all, it is not merely in respect of beauty that the finest of humans will appear to be a monkey (and so not beautiful?) alongside the gods (289b). The wisest of men will appear this way too and likewise with all the others. We are left to wonder just what all these others are.

E. Laches 191d, Republic I, 331e and Protagoras 333e

We have just seen how terms which are not syntactically comparative can still sit comfortably alongside explicit comparatives in the class of relative predicates. The passages that we shall consider in this section suggest that ‘brave,’ ‘just’ and ‘good’ should fit in somewhere among the πρός τι predicates too.

In response to Socrates’ question, Laches first decides that courage is willingness to stay at one’s post and face the enemy without fleeing (190e). Socrates’ response is to point out that, first, cavalry don’t fight this way and, secondly, it is not even a good account of courage for a foot soldier. After all, the Spartans at Plataea first retreated and, when the enemy pursued, defeated them

33 Hp.Ma. 289b, ἀνθρώπων δ’ σοφώτατος πρός θεῶν πίστης φανείται καὶ σοφία καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσιν.
in hand to hand combat (Hdt. ix, 61-5). At 191d-e, Socrates attempts to make it clearer Laches what, exactly, he is seeking. He wants Laches' view not only of the brave in the hoplite, but in the warrior class in general. He also wants to know about those who are brave in other dangers too: in relation to the sea, disease and poverty. Others are brave in the affairs of the city and in relation to pain and fear and, again, in relation to desire and pleasure.

Socrates' response suggests that courage, like beauty, displays a certain relativity. First, the very same action which, in one context, is cowardly is courageous in another context. Of course, there is one important difference: Helen, the very same woman, is both beautiful in relation other women but ugly in relation to goddesses. However, in this situation, it is a type of action that can be both cowardly and courageous. Further, Socrates' response to Laches suggests that courage is exercised in or among different dangers. Sometimes, these dangers are, in turn, in relation to different things: e.g. τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τοῖς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπτυξίαν ἄνδρειον ὄντας. In other instances, it appears that

34 La. 191d, βουλόμενος γὰρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ μονον τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὑπελεκτῷ ἀνδρείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἑπταεὶ καὶ ἐν ὑπεπαντί τῷ πολεμικῷ εἶδεν, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπτυξίαν καὶ τοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀπολείπεσιν ἄνδρειον ὄντας, καὶ δοσὶ γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ δοσὶ πρὸς πενίης ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσί, καὶ ἐτί αὐτὸ μὴ μόνον δοὺς πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρείας ὀιεῖσιν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονᾶς δεινοὶ μάχεσθαι

35 If Socrates' counterexample is to work against Laches, it must be the case that the Spartans are to be counted as brave, and not merely as not cowardly even when they ὁδὲ ἔδειλεν μένοντας πρὸς ἀδύνατας μάχεσθαι. Laches has just claimed that if a person is willing to stay at his post and fight and not flee, then he is courageous. Socrates' counterexample presupposes a person who meets the exact opposite of this sufficient condition and yet is brave.
people are courageous simply in relation to different things; e.g. ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἄνδρεῖοι.

The opening engagement with Cephalus in Republic I concerning the nature of justice argues that the very same things can be at one time just and, at another time, unjust. Here again, the "very same things" must be action types, though Plato has no vocabulary to mark this distinction. Symposium 180e-181a puts the point in a more general way and with respect to actions (πρᾶξεις).

For with all actions the case stands like this: the things that are done themselves by themselves are neither fine nor disgraceful. For instance, what we do now, whether we drink or sing or hold conversation, none of these things is fine itself, but in the doing each turns out to be such as it was done. For when the action is done finely and well, then it becomes fine. But if it is not done correctly, it becomes disgraceful.

While it is important to the overall interpretation of the passage that it is spoken by Pausanias, the fact that Plato was its immediate author shows that he was at least aware of some reasons for thinking that action types might be, in themselves, neither fine or base, just or unjust, etc. Pausanias’ view seems to be that the correctness of an action is relative to the manner in which it is performed. Ultimately, of course, we shall have to decide whether Pausanias speaks for Plato on this matter. For the time being, however, we are simply taking note of places in

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36 R. 331c, αὕτα ταῦτα ἐστὶν ἐνίοτε μὲν δικαίας, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἁδίκως ποιεῖν.

37 πᾶσα γὰρ πράξεις δέ ἔχει· αὐτῇ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς πραττομένη οὐτε καλή οὔτε αἰσχρά. ὅλον δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν, ἢ πίνειν οἷον ἢ διέλεγον, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδὲν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ πράξει, ὡς ἂν πραξῇ, τουτεύον ἀπέβη· καλὸς μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενον καὶ ἁρδῆς καλὸν γίγνεται, μὴ ἁρδῆς δὲ αἰσχρῶς.
the dialogues where a predicate is "said in relation to another." Dramatic consid­
erations may bring us round to the conclusion that Plato himself does not think
that all of the predicates which his literary creations seem inclined to regard as
πρὸς τι should really be so regarded. Tentatively, we can conclude that certain
kinds of actions have a prima facie claim to being πρὸς ἄλλῳ from Plato's point
of view.

Much the same can be said about Protagoras' speech on the relativity of
"good."

I know of many things which to men are not beneficial, like foods
and drinks and drugs and myriad others, and others that are bene-
ficial. Some are neither to men, but [are one or the other] to
horses, some things that are only [beneficial or not] to cows and
others to dogs. Still others [are beneficial] to none of these, but to
trees, and some of these, while good to the roots of plants are bad
for the shoots. For instance, the application of dung is good for
the roots of all plants, but if one should choose to cast it about on the
new twigs and branches, all would be ruined. Again oil too is en-
tirely bad for all plants and it is most opposed to the fur of all ani-
imals except to that of man, but to the hair of men and to other
parts of the body it is good. What is the good is so complex and of
so many kinds that in this case the very same thing that is good for
the exterior of the body of man is supremely bad for the interior. It
is on account of this that all doctors forbid the sick to take oil (Prt.
334a-c).38

38 ἄλλα ἔχει γενόμενον ποιλὰ ὀδα & ἀνθρώπως μὲν ἀνωφελῆ ἔστι καὶ, οἰκία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ
φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δὲ γε ὑφέλιμα. τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώπως μὲν οὐδέτερα,
ἐπὶ οὐκ οὐκ, τὰ δὲ βοῶς μοῦνον, τὰ δὲ κυνίτι. τὰ δὲ γε τούτων μὲν οὐδένι, δεύορις
δὲ. τὰ δὲ τοῦ δεύορου ταῖς μὲν βίοις ἀγαθά, ταῖς δὲ βλάστασις ποιημα, ὀλον καὶ
ἡ κόρος, πάντων τῶν φυτῶν ταῖς μὲν βίοις ἀγαθῶν παραβαλλομένη, ei δ' ἐθέλους
ἐπὶ τοῖς πτέρυγοι καὶ τοῖς νέοις κλώαισ ἐπιβάλλει, πάντα ἀπόδηλου. ἔπει καὶ
τὸ ἔλαιον ταῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἄπασιν ἔστι πάχακον καὶ ταῖς θρείνει πολεμῶντασ ταῖς
τῶν ἄλλων ἐφ' ἐπὶ πλήρως ταῖς δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποι, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἄργιαν καί τῷ
ἄλλῳ σώματι. οיוני δὲ ποικίλον τι ἔστι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ παντοτελόν, ὡστε καὶ
ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν ἐξωθεὶν τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθῶν ἔστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῖς δ' ἐντός
The speech itself shows the relativity of 'good' and 'beneficial' to species and to the parts of organisms. In contrast to Socrates, who seems to maintain that what is good is beneficial to men, Protagoras wants to allow that many things are good by virtue of being beneficial to some sort of organism. What is difficult is to determine the relation between Protagoras' speech and Plato's view about the relativity of 'good' and 'beneficial.' Protagoras' speech halts the consideration of the popular theory that unjust action is temperate (333c). Immediately after his speech is the long digression on how the conversation is to be carried out (334c-338e) and the ἐπανώρθωμα of Simonides (339a-348a). When the question of the unity of the virtues is taken up again at 349b-c, the discussion of the moderation of unjust action does not come up again perse.

The relationship between Protagoras' speech and Plato's own view about the πρὸς τι character of these predicates is further complicated by the fact that elsewhere in the early dialogues Plato fails to attend to these details when he should. In the argument with Polus, Socrates needs to establish the conclusion that doing injustice is worse for the author of that injustice than suffering injustice is for his victim. To argue for this conclusion he uses Polus' admission that doing injustice is more shameful together with a principle of comparison for shameful actions: if x is more shameful than y, then it is either because it is more harmful or more painful or both. This, in turn, is derived from an account of the shameful

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ταυτὸ τοῦτο κάκιστον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ ἱερεῖ πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσι ταῖς ἀθένοις. μὴ χρῆσθαι ἁλαίφ...
according to which what is shameful is either harmful or painful or both.\(^{39}\) There is no specification in either the account or the comparative principle of who or what is harmed or pained by shameful things. The principle only looks somewhat plausible and non-question begging if it is interpreted as claiming that shameful things are harmful or painful or both to \textit{someone or other}. But, the principle so qualified is not strong enough to establish the conclusion that Socrates is aiming for.\(^{40}\)

As with Pausanias’ speech, the limited conclusion that I would like to draw is that Plato is aware of some considerations in favor of classifying ‘good’ and ‘beneficial’ as predicates that are said in relation to something else. It may finally emerge that Plato himself has reservations about this matter. Perhaps Socrates’ apparent oversights in the \textit{Gorgias} turn out to be justified against a metaphysical backdrop that includes provision for \textit{καλὸν \alpha\sigmaτά} applications of ‘beneficial’ or ‘good.’ But, if we are to start from a pre-theoretical background in our division of the beings into relative and absolute, it should not surprise us to find these predicates among those like ‘large’ and ‘master.’

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\(^{39}\) I use ‘account’ very loosely here. It is not clear that what Socrates intends is a definition. So, at 474c, he asks Polus whether there is nothing that he pays attention to in calling all the fine things fine (\textit{εἷς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλάι}). Polus, however, takes him to be offering a definition. See 475a, \textit{καὶ καλὰς γε νῦν ὑπεύθυνοι}. . . . The question of whether this is a definition looms large when we turn, in Chapter Two, to the constraints on answers to Socratic \textit{what is X} questions.

\(^{40}\) See Irwin (1979) \textit{ad loc}. Though he spots the ambiguity he does not connect it with the \textit{Protagoras} speech.
3. Classification of the Kinds of Relative Terms.

Our survey in §2 reveals that quite a wide variety of terms are treated by Plato as logically and semantically on a par with paradigm cases of \( \tau \rho \dot{o} \zeta \tau \) predicates. I believe that this warrants the conclusion that they are regarded by him as among \( \tau \dot{a} \tau \omega \nu \tau \rho \dot{o} \zeta \tau \). This diversity prompts the question, "What makes all these terms instances of one unified kind?" It was claimed by G. E. L. Owen that the unifying feature of the category of \( \tau \rho \dot{o} \zeta \tau \) in Plato is that all relative terms are "incomplete predicates." Owen defines and illustrates incomplete predicates in the following way:

In *Republic* VII (523a-525a) numbers are classed with such characteristics as *light* and *heavy*, *large* and *small*, on the score that our senses can never discover any of them \( \kappa \alpha \dot{\delta} \zeta \alpha \dot{\delta} \tau \dot{a} \zeta \), in isolation (525d10): in perceptible things they are inseparable from their opposites. For, as Socrates argues in the *Parmenides* (129c-d), what is one of something is any number of something else—one man is many members. We may say, for convenience, that 'one' as we ordinarily apply it to things is an incomplete predicate and that, accordingly as we complete it in this way or that, it will be true or false of the thing to which it is applied.\(^{41}\)

There seem to be two closely related criteria for incompleteness. On the one hand, such terms are always found with their opposites. This is most obviously true of comparatives and, perhaps, attributives. Granite is hard in relation to talc but soft in relation to diamond. Since no object fulfills all functions, it seems that there must always be contrary attributive predications. So, though Jones is a good friend, he may also be a bad scholar. But, other examples of

\(^{41}\) Owen (1957) in Allen (1965) p. 305.
relatives are not so obviously instances in which opposites coincide. We would have to extend the notion of "opposites" rather far in order to say the same of number predicates. 42 And Plato expressly says that numbers are not opposite to one another (Phdo.104b2-4, c2). ‘Knowledge’ and ‘vision’ are even trickier cases. Knowledge of mathematics, I suppose, is knowledge of mathematics and yet is not knowledge of rhetoric. So, the person who knows mathematics both knows and is ignorant. He knows mathematics but not rhetoric. Similar remarks apply for ‘vision’ and ‘sees’ (cf. Tht. 165c-d).

The other criterion is that an incomplete predicate is true or false of a subject depending upon how it is completed. With comparatives and attributives, the conditions are intimately related. It is precisely because an incomplete predicate is true of a subject when it is completed one way and false of a subject when it is completed another way that they are always found with their opposites. Other cases are not so easy. ‘Vision’ and ‘color’ are supposed to be correlative. We can easily imagine cases in which ‘looks white’ is true of a subject when the subject is seen under normal conditions but false of the same subject seen under a red light. But this does not imply the compresence of opposites (even in an extended sense of ‘opposite’) unless more is said about the relationship between appearing to be a certain color and being that color. Thus, Owen’s notion of incompleteness cannot serve as a definition as it stands. We shall consider a

42 Aristotle was obviously unwilling to extend the notion of a contrary in this way. He therefore abandons one branch of Owen’s criterion. Cf. Cat. 6b17-19, σῶ τε δέ τοίς πρός τι οὐπάρχει τὸ ἑναυμίῳ τῷ γὰρ διπλασίῳ οὐδὲν ἐστιν ἑναυμίον, οὐδὲ τῷ τριπλασίῳ, οὐδὲ τῶν τουλοὶν οὐδειν.
refined version of it in the next section. Nonetheless, it does provide a rough and ready criterion for distinguishing among different varieties of relative terms.

There is one more important distinction that, I think, needs to be drawn here. We must be careful in speaking of "incomplete predicates." It might be better to speak of predicates that are typically predicated incompletely. To be incompletely predicated is to fail to be-completely. F is completely predicated of x if and only if there are no qualifications that could be added to or subtracted from the sentences that attribute F to x so as to change their truth values. So, 'Helen is beautiful' is not a complete predication because when we add 'in relation to Aphrodite' to the sentence its truth value switches to false. In 'Vladimir is a cat,' 'cat' is completely predicated. There is no qualification which makes the sentence false; intuitively, because there is no respect in which Vlad fails to be a cat. We can speak intelligibly of incomplete predicates if all that we mean is that they are predicates that almost always fail to be completely predicated. However, we should leave open the possibility that there might be subjects of which even these can be completely predicated.

The way in which a predication can fail to be complete gives us a way of dividing up the uses of members of the incomplete branch of relative terms. Because some terms can be used in a variety of ways, and because we are speaking of incomplete predications (and not predicates), the very same term might appear in several of the following categories depending upon its use.
A. Determinate relatives: Some relatives are such that it is quite clear what their correlatives are. Indeed, it is so clear that it is part of the "logical grammar" of such predicates that they are προς a particular kind of relative. Some ancient commentators were so struck by this fact that examples of these kinds of predicates dominate their discussion of the entire καθενα αυτον προς τι distinction. Such is the case with Diogenes Laertius in his account of the Platonic distinction (I, iii, 108-9). According to Diogenes, Plato distinguished relatives from absolute terms on the grounds that the former, but not the latter, stand in need of some explanation (ἐρμηνεύει). His examples include that which is greater than something, that which is faster than something and that which is more beautiful. This "explanation" may well be a thing: "the greater is greater than a smaller."

1. Explicit comparatives that are relative to opposites: These relatives have clearly demarcated correlatives which are inevitably their opposites. So, if x is larger, then x is larger than a thing that is smaller. Such terms were thought by Aristotle to constitute an exception to the general principle that there can be no definition by opposites (Top. VI, 4, 142a28-33). In general, he thinks, it is a bad idea to attempt to define one opposite in terms of another, as, for instance, good by means of evil. The problem is said to be that such opposites are simultaneous (ἂμα γὰρ τῇ φύσει τὰ ἀντικείμενα). As a result, the definition fails to define by means of prior terms. However, terms like double and half stand as an exception to this general prohibition. This is true of so many as are said in themselves in relation to something (καθενα αυτον προς τι). In all such things the essence (τὸ
eînai) is the same as that in relation to which a thing is (τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν). As a result it is impossible to understand (γνωρίζειν) one without the other.\footnote{Top. 142a28-32, καὶ δακ καθ’ αὐτὰ πρὸς τί λέγεται· πᾶσι γάρ τοῖς τοιούτοις ταῦτα εἶναι τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν, διότε ἀδώνατον ἄνευ θατέρου θάτερον γνωρίζειν, διόπερ ἄναγκαιόν ἐν τῷ τοῦ ἔτέρου λόγῳ συμπεριελήφθαι καὶ θάτερον.}

Here, again, the suggestion seems to be that the hallmark of relatives is somehow epistemic. Those of the ὁντα as are λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄλλα are understood through the relation that they stand in to another thing.

2. **Explicit comparatives that are relative to "likes."** Examples of this kind include 'like,' 'same,' 'different' and 'equal.' In all these cases, the correlatives are the same. So, "a different" is different from "another different" and "a like" is like "a like." (Though this is awkward English, it is perfectly good Greek. See above on the use of the neuter definite article.) Obviously, predications involving these terms are typically incomplete. 'AB is equal' may be true when completed by 'to CD' but not when completed by 'to EF.'

3. **Intentional Relatives** are terms like knowledge or perception which are of something distinct from themselves. We saw above in sections 2.a and b how willing Plato is to treat vision or knowledge right alongside relative terms like 'larger' or 'master.' This suggests that he does not distinguish sharply between the "of" that connects perception and its object from the "of" implicit in the notion of a slave. As a result, this category includes both terms that we would say pick out intentional states as well as predicates like 'master' and 'slave.'
It is not clear whether we ought to include parts and wholes and terms connected with parts and wholes in this category. In *Categories* VII, Aristotle initially includes examples such as 'wing,' 'head,' and 'rudder' on the grounds that these are *of* a winged thing, a ruddered thing and a headed thing respectively.\(^{44}\) The first criterion that Aristotle provides for distinguishing relatives is, of course, very similar to the way in which Plato puts the matter in the *Sophist*.\(^{45}\) We, of course, are concerned with what Plato, not Aristotle, would include in the category of *πρὸς τι*. Two things suggest that Plato might find his student's division appropriate. First, it is part of the orthodoxy that Aristotle's *Categories* is an early work and reflects logical distinctions that were used in the Academy. Thus, insofar as members of the Academy argued within the logical framework that was Platonic, Aristotle's division reflects Plato's views on the matter. Secondly, and more convincingly, in the *Parmenides* Plato treats the part/whole relationship as a case of *πρὸς τι*. Parts are always parts *of* a whole, while a whole is always a whole *of* parts. Thus, at 137c, Parmenides asks, "But what is the whole? Would not the whole be that from which no part is missing?"\(^{46}\) The connection is particularly tight when it is parts of a whole in the sense of *μόρια*, and not merely *μέρη*, that is at issue. So, at 157c, Parmenides asks, "But then is it not necessary

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\(^{44}\) See *Cat.* 6b37-7b15. The point of Aristotle's examples is to show that, in all instances of *πρὸς τι* predications, there is a correlative. This correlative will not be obvious if the case is not stated in the proper way. Thus, we cannot say that a wing is a wing of a bird. We must use the proper correlative which makes the relationship obvious—winged. Sometimes, when the language is inadequate in some way, we must coin a new term like "of a ruddered" (*πηδαλιωτὸν*).

\(^{45}\) *Cat.* 6a36, *πρὸς τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, δὲ δὲ τὰ ἄπερ ἡστὶν ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὅπως ἄλλως πρὸς ἐτέρων.

\(^{46}\) *τὸ δὲ δὴ τὸν ὅστις ἢν μέρος μηδὲν ἀπῆ, δὴν ἢν ἐλη;*
that the whole be one composed out of many of which the parts will be parts? For each of the parts must be not of a many, but of a whole."\(^{47}\) If the part/whole relationship generally conceived is \(\pi\rho\delta\varsigma\ \tau\iota\), then it stands to reason that individual instances of the relationship are likewise \(\pi\rho\delta\varsigma\ \tau\iota\). Aristotle’s examples suggest that in this instance the move from kind to individuals does not commit the fallacy of division. A wing, thought of as part of a bird, really is of the bird thought of as a winged thing. The only question that remains is whether we may safely conclude that Plato followed through this line of reasoning and would have recognized Aristotle’s examples as genuine cases of \(\pi\rho\delta\varsigma\ \tau\iota\). I think that there is no reason to think that he would not, but, on the other hand, he never uses such examples or mentions them in proximity to paradigm cases of \(\pi\rho\delta\varsigma\ \tau\iota\) terms. Indeed, Aristotle even waffles on the question of parts and wholes. *Categories* 8a36 provides a different criterion for being a relative than the one that opened Chapter 7. Though the condition itself is far from clear, it does seem to be the case that it excludes parts like heads or hands from being relatives.\(^{48}\) If Aristotle (who spends *much* more time over the actual extension of \(\tau\alpha\ \tau\omega\nu\ \pi\rho\delta\varsigma\ \tau\iota\) than Plato does) sends us mixed signals, it is unlikely that we shall arrive at a definitive answer about Plato’s view of the matter.

\(^{47}\) ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε ὅλον ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὐ δέσαι μόρια τὰ μόρια. ἐκείνου γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριων χρὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὅλον.

\(^{48}\) *Cat.* 8b20-23, ὡστε οὐκ ἀν εἶη ταῦτα [head and hands] τῶν προς τί. εἰ δὲ μὴ δέσι ταῦτα τῶν προς τι, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἶη λέγειν ὅτι συνεμία συνία τῶν προς τί δέσιν. See Ackrill (1963) *ad loc.*
4. **Action and Passion Pairs** pick out the agent and the direct object of the agent's action. Thus, the pair τὸ φέρων and τὸ φερόμενον from the *Euthyphro* are said in relation to one another just as 'master' and 'slave' are. The same reasoning applies to the potentialities for acting and undergoing. That which can carry is what it is only πρός that which can be carried.

B. **Indeterminate incomplete relatives.** In contrast to cases where the correlative is clearly delineated, there are predicates that involve some sort of relativization. Including such predicates alongside those that are πρός some more determinate correlative is, I think, justified by the fact that Plato handles them similarly.

1. **Attributives and terms whose use presupposes relativization to a context.** These could also be called the "for a . . ." category of relatives. Attributive uses of predicates like 'good' are incomplete, since the very same thing can be a good paperweight but a poor dissertation. Much the same is true of predicates like 'healthy.' A cold, wet nose is healthy for a dog, but not for a child. In both kinds of cases, I think, the terms are πρός ἀλλό in some important sense. Unlike

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49 The variety of ways in which the relative terms in these categories can be incompletely predicated is illustrated in the *Dissoi Logoi* (Robinson [1979] pp. 98-143). The first three chapters explore ways in which the same things can be (i) good and bad for different person or at different times, (ii) fine and shameful in different social contexts and (iii) just and unjust in different circumstances. The fourth chapter explores the "relativity" of truth and falsity. These examples, however, turn not on the πρός τὸ character of 'true' and 'false' but on the difficulties that indexicals create for the assignment of truth values to propositions.
the cases discussed under A, however, the "other" is a comparison class or a kind and not a determinate individual.

2. **Incomplete predicates relative to event descriptions.** These predicates can be true or false of a subject depending upon the detail with which the circumstances are described. So, it is true to say that Euthyphro's action is pious (insofar as it is the prosecution of a killer) but impious (insofar as it is the prosecution of one's own father). The example of the cache of arms in *Republic* I suggests that the same incompleteness attends attributions of justice to actions. Examples are not restricted to the descriptions of actions or events. This vase might well be beautiful on the mantel, but not in the middle of the room.\(^{50}\)

3. **Number predicates.** Such predicates are true or false of a subject depending upon the count noun that is used. If the notion of "opposites" is extended to cover the incompatibilities between different numbers, then, like comparatives, numbers are always predicated of things along with their "opposites."

The connection of these last two categories of incomplete predicates with the classic examples of double and half and larger and smaller is, admittedly, not as clear as it might be. The "other" that 'three' and 'just' things are \(\pi\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\) keeps

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\(^{50}\) In "Degrees of Reality," Vlastos (1973, p. 66, ff) illustrates four ways in which a thing can be both beautiful and not beautiful. The relativity of beauty to setting and circumstance (4), I subsume under this case. His case (3), the relativity to a comparison class, I classify as implicit comparison which is relative to a comparison class. It belongs with 'healthy' in B.1. In his case (1) a thing is beautiful in one respect, like its color, but not in another, say its shape. Here I think we see another case of implicit comparison, but to separate comparison classes. The thing is beautiful \(\pi\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\) colored things, but ugly \(\pi\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\) things with shape. Vlastos' case (2) involves change over time; as when Paris is beautiful at twenty but not beautiful at seventy. This, I think, is not a problem about relatives at all.
getting more and more abstract. In what follows, I shall try to formulate a more
precise definition of προς τι than Owen's incompleteness criterion by means of
which I can argue for their inclusion in the category.

4. The Hallmark of Relative Predicates

The question we must ask now is whether Plato has isolated a meaningful
and important distinction among "the beings" by dividing them into those that are
καθ' αδότοι and those that are προς τι. One might suspect that Plato has simply
been misled by Greek grammar into collecting a hodgepodge of predicates under
one heading. If Jones is a slave who belongs to Smith, then one might, in either
Greek or English, say that Jones is the slave of Smith. This genitive construction
is, of course, the same that would be used to say, in Greek, that Jones is taller
than Smith. Yet the former construction hardly seems to have the incomplete
sense that the latter has. Both can stand alone and be quite sensible. One can
say that "Jones is a slave" and that "Jones is tall." However, the latter proposition
seems to require an unstated context for its sense, in much the same way that in-
dexical expressions do. One expects the context to reveal some individual or
comparison class in relation to which Jones is tall. It is part of the logical grammar
(as Wittgenstein would say) of 'slave' that it follows from the fact that Jones is a
slave that there exists some x such that x is the master of Jones. This, however,
seems much more like an implication of the truth of the claim that Jones is a mas-
ter than it is a pre-supposition for its meaningfulness, in the way in which an im-
plicit comparison class is a pre-supposition for the meaningfulness of 'Jones is
Something like this, I take it, accounts for why we say that 'large' is a comparative, while 'slave' is not. Nonetheless, it seems that both are $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma$ $\tau\iota$ according to Plato.

I do not think that we should jump to the conclusion that Plato has been seduced by the surface grammar of Greek and has lumped together under the heading of $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma$ $\tau\iota$ two entirely disparate classes of predicates. What links both 'slave' and 'knowledge' with 'large' and 'beautiful' is the existential import that the predicates carry beyond their subjects. If Jones is a slave, then Jones is a thing that is. Likewise if Jones is large. But both of these sentences are such that, if they are true, they imply more about the inventory of the world than that Jones is included in it. Their truth requires that other things exist too—a master to whom Jones belongs, a thing or things in relation to which he is large. This stands in marked contrast to $\kappa\alpha\nu\theta^{2}$ $\alpha\delta\tau\acute{o}$ expressions. That Jones is a man is quite consistent with Jones being the only thing in the universe. This is why $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma$ $\tau\iota$ terms, but not $\kappa\alpha\nu\theta^{2}$ $\alpha\delta\tau\acute{o}$, terms are $\lambda\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\sigma\nu\theta\alpha\iota$ $\delta\epsilon\iota$ $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma$ $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$, where $\tau\acute{a}$ $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$ are unquestionably other things.

Recall that in §1 we worried over the proper interpretation of "saying a being" and the question of whether the $\kappa\alpha\nu\theta^{2}$ $\alpha\delta\tau\acute{o}$ and $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma$ $\tau\iota$ distinction, as it is drawn in the *Sophist*, should be interpreted ontologically or semantically. Diogenes Laertius, in his report of the Platonic distinction, seems to suggest the latter. The distinctive mark of relative predicates is that they require *explanation* in

51 Ackrill raises the very same point in his discussion of Cat. 6a36.
terms of another thing. This has the advantage of clarity: we can easily distinguish terms that, of necessity, are mutually interdefined from those that are not (cf. Aristotle Top. 142a28-32). The ontic version of the distinction was less clear since it involved the problematic notion of one thing being in relation to another. I now want to suggest that, in spite of this, the ontic interpretation is more foundational. This is what we should expect. Plato, like other realists, thinks that, ideally, the distinctions of our language should mirror and be underwritten by distinctions among things that are. In addition, we now have a way to understand x having being in relation to y. It isn’t that x has being tout court in relation to y. Rather with relative predicates, x is the sort of thing that it is only when there is a y of a certain character to which x stands in some relation. This suggests the following criterion:

\[(R) \text{ If } F \text{ is such that if } F(x), \text{ then there exists some } y \text{ and some } G \text{ such that } G(y) \text{ and } x \text{ is } \pi\rho\delta\varsigma y \text{ and } y \text{ is } \pi\rho\delta\varsigma x, \text{ then } F \text{ is a relative predicate.}^{52}\]

This criterion is not, of course, a definition. It contains the idea that x and y are what they are Trpôç one another. Moreover, this element is essential to the criterion. Without it, ‘animal’ and ‘man’ could be counted as relative terms. After all, if x is a man, then there exists some y (which in this case happens to be identical to x) which is an animal. But, nonetheless, it works passably well in isolating relative terms which have determinate correlatives; that is, those in group A

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52 This is essentially just Aristotle’s observation about correlatives. Cf. Cat. 6b29, πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρός ἀυτιστέρεωνα λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος λέγεται καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δοῦλου δεσπότης.
above. Moreover, the ways in which x and y are προς one another in such cases are fairly uniform. The explicit comparatives (A.1 and 2) and intentional relatives (A.3) have the kind of "other directedness" that we express with a narrow range of terms like 'of,' 'compared with' or 'than.'

The problems with criterion (R) arise in connection with those relatives that do not have determinate correlatives, and it arises in two different ways. First, 'beautiful' or 'healthy' is treated as a relative term because it can be used as an explicit comparative; e.g. George is healthier than Fred. But, it can also be used attributively; e.g. George is healthy for someone who uses heroin. Some of these uses conform to condition (R). In such a case, we must say that not only that George is what he is προς heroin users, but also that the other heroin users are what they are—unhealthy—in relation to George. Other "for a . . ." uses do not conform to (R) so neatly. Consider, 'A cold, wet nose is healthy for a dog.' What is the correlative in this case? What is it that dogs are in relation to noses? Cases from the B.2 category are equally problematic. Euthyphro's action is pious insofar as it is a prosecution of a murderer, but impious insofar as it is the prosecution of one's own father. 'Pious' behaves like a relative here because the event is said to be pious in relation to something else—an event description, perhaps. But it is not the case that some term holds for the event description in relation to the prosecution. Finally, consider number predicates. When we say that the Stooges are three (men) and one (comedy team), what are men or comedy teams in relation to the Stooges?
In §1, I noted that there are two manuscript traditions concerning Plato's most explicit statement of the \( \pi\rho\dot{o}\varsigma\ \tau\varsigma / \kappa\alpha\theta'\ \alpha\dot{o}\tau\dot{o} \) distinction. *Sophist* 255c says in one version that relatives are \( \pi\rho\dot{o}\varsigma\ \dddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha \), in another that they are \( \pi\rho\dot{o}\varsigma\ \dddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\eta\lambda\alpha \). It is now easy to see how such a mistake could have been made and why it is unlikely that we shall resolve the difficulty. Relatives that are \( \pi\rho\dot{o}\varsigma \) determinate correlatives, like 'master' or 'larger,' have a certain reciprocity with their correlatives. In other cases, we see that the predication of some terms to a subject has a kind of "other directedness" to it. But, there is an absence of this kind of reciprocity. The subject's being what it is does not require that \( \tau\dot{o}\ \pi\rho\dot{o}\varsigma \ \dddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha \) have any particular characteristic.

The other problem which relatives with indeterminate correlatives raises for criterion (R) concerns, not *what* such terms are \( \pi\rho\dot{o}\varsigma \), but the *ways* in which they are \( \pi\rho\dot{o}\varsigma \). Unlike 'larger' or 'knowledge,' the way in which these terms are "other directed" cannot be described by simply saying that they are "of" or "than" something.

We can begin to solve some of these difficulties by multiplying criteria. We can, first, eliminate the reciprocity between \( x \) and \( y \) in (R). Further, we can begin to remove some of the ambiguity from the \( \pi\rho\dot{o}\varsigma \) condition by specifying more clearly the nature of the relation. That is, we can tailor (R) to fit various members of the B group.

\((R_{B1})\) If \( F \) is such that if \( F(x) \), then there exists some \( y \) such that \( y \) is a kind and \( x \) is \( F \) *for a* \( y \), then \( F \) is a relative predicate.
(R_{B2}) If F is such that if F(x) then, there exists some y such that y is an event description or specification of the context and x is F insofar as it is an instance of y, then F is a relative predicate.

(R_{B3}) If F is such that if F(x), then there exists some y such that y is a count noun and x is N y's, then F is a relative predicate.

These variations on the (R) criterion do not constitute a definition. Rather, they are independently sufficient conditions which we can use to nail down the extension of the category of \( \pi \rho \delta \_ \tau \_. \) In spite of the messiness of this approach, I think it is the best alternative available. We could attempt to refine Owen's incompleteness criterion by dismissing the problematic notion that relative terms always have opposites present in the same subject. We might simply say that:

(R_1) F is a relative term if and only for all x, if 'x is F' is true, then there exists some \( \pi \rho \delta \_ \varphi \) qualifier such that 'x is not \( \pi \rho \delta \_ \varphi \)' is true.

But this will have the effect of adding terms like 'walks' to the category of \( \pi \rho \delta \_ \tau \_. \) Because though it may be true that Jones is walking in the Lyceum, it is also true by virtue of that fact that Jones is not walking in the Academy. Later commentators did, in fact, argue that all of Aristotle's categories save that of substance were simply Plato's category of \( \pi \rho \delta \_ \tau \_. \)\textsuperscript{53} But, nothing in Plato's dialogues suggests that Plato even gave much thought to the sorts of terms that Aristotle put into the category of Place or Position. If we adopt a definition of \( \pi \rho \delta \_ \tau \_ \) which commits Plato on this question, then our grounds can only be that this is the logical extension of what he does, in fact, say. But, throughout this study, I shall argue that we ought to see the dialogues as far more exploratory and

\textsuperscript{53} Cf. Albinus, Didaskalikos chapters 5 and 6.
tentative than many interpreters are inclined to do. It is, I believe, not uncharitable to simply say in some instances, "Based on the text, it seems likely that Plato has not thought through this problem." Great innovators often leave the details to be worked out by others. Because of this interpretive strategy, I shall not recommend R₁ as a definition of relative terms. It may well be true that all relative terms are incompletely predicated in this sense. But, to suppose that all incompletely predicated terms are relatives may saddle Plato with more of a theory of this distinction than he, in fact, has.

5. Some Other Principles of Classification

Not only does the use of a πρὸς τι predicate imply that there is some thing other than the subject to which the πρὸς predicate is attributed, it frequently implies that the other thing is of such and such a character. In some cases, but not all, this second thing must be ἐναντίων the first.⁵⁴ Thus, if Jones is tall then not only must there exist some thing or things in relation to which Jones is tall, but this thing or these things must be short in relation to Jones. Let us call such predicates πρὸς ἐναντίων, for that in relationship to which they are is an opposite. This holds true of some of Owen’s paradigms of incomplete predicates, like ‘beautiful,’ ‘large,’ ‘light,’ ‘heavy’ and ‘strong,’ but not of ‘just’ or number predicates. If ‘two’ is predicated of Bessie and Susie it is true when completed by

⁵⁴ It is far from clear that Plato ever distinguished between what Aristotle later called contraries and contradictories, (Cat. X). In order not to confuse the matter by bringing in these technical terms with their modern associations, I shall leave ἐναντίων untranslated or translate it loosely as "opposite."
'oxen,' but false if completed by 'teams of oxen.' Thus, 'two' is incomplete. But this does not imply that there is some τὸ ἐναντίον in relation to which this pair of oxen is two. Whether 'double' and 'half,' 'master' and 'slave' should be counted in with the πρὸς ἐναντίον depends on the propriety of extending to these pairs the same notion of opposition as obtains between 'large' and 'small.' It seems even less plausible to suppose that any relation of opposition obtains between pairs like "the one who carries" and "the thing that is carried."

'Beautiful,' 'large' and their ilk not only imply the existence of things that are ἐναντίου to them, but they are also the sorts of predicates that are always found with their opposites, at least in sensible things. Thus, if Helen is beautiful, this implies the existence of other things which are ugly in relation to her. That is just to say that 'beautiful' is a πρὸς ἐναντίον predicate. But, she is also such that there exist things in relation to which she is not beautiful. Consequently, Plato says, in the Hippias Major even a beautiful maiden is οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὴ ἤ αἰσχρὸν. Instances like this, Plato seems to think, should prompt us to think long and hard about what beauty really is. Just why this is so will be the question of the next two chapters. For the moment I simply want to point out that these predicates stand in marked contrast to καθ' αὖτό terms. Consider his example of the extended fingers in Republic VII.

Each of these fingers appears equally to be a finger, and it makes no difference whether it is viewed in the middle or at the end or whether it is white or dark or whether it is thick or thin or any other

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55 cf. R. VII, 524d, τὰ μὲν παρακλητικὰ τῆς διάνοιας ἦστι, τά δὲ οὐ, ἐὰν εἰς τὴν αἰσθήσεων ἀμα ταῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστοῖς ἐμπίπτει, παρακλητικὰ ὄριζόμενος.
thing of this kind. For in all such cases the soul of the multitude is not made to ask mind what a finger is, since sight never simultaneously signifies to it that a finger is the opposite of a finger. (R. 523d)\(^56\)

Following Plato (Rep. VII 524d), let us call any predicate which prompts us to reflection on account of the fact that our apprehension or classification of the things to which these predicates apply is confused in some manner παρακλητικῶν or "hortatory." This class includes not only all of the πρὸς ἐναυτία, like beautiful, but also predicates that are not in this class, like number predicates and justice, (cf. Rep. VII, 524e-525b).

The reasons why τὰ παρακλητικά prompt us to think about what παρακλητικῶν predicates really are are varied. ‘Beautiful’ and ‘strong’ fall into this class because of the apparent comprosence of beautiful and not beautiful or strong and not strong in a sensible like Helen or Milo. Plato thinks that this should be sufficient to provoke thought about what strong is. We shall see in the next chapter why this is so. It will turn out that ‘equal’ too is παρακλητικών, though it is not, strictly speaking, πρὸς ἐναυτίαν.\(^57\) ‘Same’ and ‘different’ fall into this category too, though in Republic and Phaedo they do not receive as much attention as ‘equal.’

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\(^56\) Δάκτυλος μὲν αὐτῶν φαίνεται δομὼς ἐκαστος, καὶ ταῦτη γε οὐδέν διαφέρει, ἐὰν τε ἐν μέσῳ δράται ἕαν τ’ ἐν ἑαρτῳ, ἕαν τε λευκὸς ἕαν τε μέλας, ἕαν τε παχύς ἕαν τε λεπτός, καὶ πᾶν ὁ τι οὐοθον. ἐν πάσι γὰρ τούτως οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἢ ψυχή τῆς νόησει ἐπερέσθαι τι ποτ’ ἐστὶ δάκτυλος. οὐδ’ ομοιόν γὰρ ὢσις αὐτῆς ἄμα διήμενη τῶν δάκτυλων τὸν αὐτικοὺς ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι.

\(^57\) The reason, of course, is that sensible equals will also appear unequal. Exactly why this is so depends upon how we take the τῶν in the problematic line at Phdo 74b8: ἐμοστε ταῦτα διατ τῷ μὲν ἢσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ’ οὐ.
We are driven to ask the question, "What is one or one-ness?" not because of any apparent compresence of opposites. Numbers, after all, are not opposite to one another (Phdo. 104b2-4 and c2). Nonetheless, our apprehension of things which bear number predicates is confused, for a variety of different numbers answer the question, "How many are there?" This is because, when faced with any group of things, there is no obviously correct candidate for the privileged description under which we should count them. THIS (followed by the act of ostending Flopsy) really is one rabbit, but also four legs, and indefinitely many undetached rabbit parts. Thus, neither "Flopsy" nor even the less specific "a rabbit" is a good starting place for answering the question, "What is one or one-ness?" After all, Flopsy is no more one than he is four.

Finally, some πρός τι παρακλητικάν predicates prompt us to reflection, not simply because no particular thing or no non-specific member of a kind bears that predicate without qualification, but because no description of a kind at all adequately answers the question, "What is F?" This is the case with justice. In Republic I, Socrates criticizes Cephalus' account of justice on the grounds that telling the truth and paying back what one owes to another can be unjust (αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἦστιν ἐνίοτε μὲν δικαίως, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἀδικῶς ποιεῖν. Rep. I 331c3) No action type (save, perhaps, doing that which is just) can be what justice is, for each type is such that some tokens of that type are, in some context or other, unjust.

Not all πρός τι predicates, however, are clearly παρακλητικάν. 'Master' and 'slave' are clearly πρός τι, but it seems unlikely that we will be moved to ask,
"τι ποτ' ἡστι δουλως," because our classification of Jones as a slave is confused in the same way that, for instance, our assignment of a number to Jones is confused. After all, Jones cannot be both master and slave. Other πρός τι pairs might be considered παρακλητικῶν. 'Father' and 'son' and 'double' and 'half' are such that the very same object can be classified as both. If segment AC is double AB and half AD then AC is not what either double or half is. Yet Plato makes far less of these puzzles with respect to answering "what is X" questions.58 In the next chapters we shall see in more detail just why these παρακλητικά can serve to "turn the soul around" to the Forms.

58 This is not to say that he pays no attention to pairs like 'double' and 'half.' The discussion in Theaetetus relies on these examples, but the question at issue there is not what double or half really are or how they are to be defined, but, rather, whether sensible things like dice really have qualities like many-ness or few-ness in themselves.
Chapter II

Socratic Questions

I shall start from the position that the explicit ontology of Forms as it is stated in *Phaedo* and *Republic* is a response to inquiries that take place in the so-called "dialogues of search." These dialogues are usually thought to include the *Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Euthyphro, Meno* and *Hippias Major*. Such dialogues present Socrates, with some interlocutor, seeking unsuccessfully for an answer to a question of the form, "What is F?" In what follows I shall first examine the constraints that Socrates (usually implicitly) makes on answers to questions of this form. We shall then ask how these constraints might motivate an ontological move like the one made in the *Phaedo*. In particular, we shall be concerned with the question of whether Plato has some particular motivation to suppose that there are Forms that correspond to \( \pi \rho \varphi \\tau \lambda \) predicates that is lacking for \( \kappa \alpha \nu \theta \) \( \alpha \nu \tau \varphi \) predicates.

My starting point, of course, is not uncontroversial. Where I urge a picture according to which the ontology of the middle dialogues *develops out of* the puzzles of the early dialogues, others see the theory of Forms as *already present* in the early dialogues, but not explicitly stated until the *Phaedo*.\(^1\) There is something different people hold such a view for different reasons. Taylor, for instance, thought that the *Phaedo* was a more or less accurate account of Socrates' final conversation. Since the theory of Forms is Socrates' view, it is legitimate to see it hovering in the background of the earlier dia-

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to be said for such an interpretation. Terms like \( \alpha\nu\tau\alpha\; \tau\; \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\nu \) and \( \epsilon\lambdadas \) do appear in these dialogues in roles somewhat akin to the Forms in the middle dialogues. Further, Socrates' interlocutors in the *Phaedo* seem to regard the theory as an old friend. Still, I do not think that we should rush to the conclusion that the full blown theory of Forms is to be found in the dialogues of search. The specific reasons for thinking that particular passages from the dialogues of search do not involve an ontology of Forms will emerge in §2 and §3 below. The following general remarks will thus be buttressed by the more detailed exegesis of the last two thirds of the chapter.

Two of the most obvious elements of the theory of Forms as it is found in *Republic* and *Phaedo* are absent from the dialogues of search. One of the distinctive features of the theory of Forms as it is found in the *Republic* and in the *Phaedo* is that the Forms are separated from ordinary things. Minimally, this means that no sensible thing is identical to a Form (cf. *Phdo.* 74c). In addition, there seems to be the suggestion that we have no contact with the Forms through the senses at all. Thus, they are not merely non-identical with sensible things, but

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2 *Cf. Phdo.* 76d, \( \epsilon\iota \; \mu\epsilon\nu \; \varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\upsilon \; \varphi\rho\upsilon\alpha\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\mu\epsilon\upsilon \; \delta\epsilon\iota \) ... as well as 100b, \( \kappa\alpha\iota \; \epsilon\lambdadas \; \pi\alpha\lambda\upsilon \) \( \epsilon\kappa\epsilon\iota\alpha\nu \; \tau\alpha \; \pi\omicron\lambda\nu\theta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\tau\alpha\kappa\alpha \) \( \kappa\alpha\iota \; \delta\rho\chi\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\iota \) \( \delta\pi\eta\iota \; \epsilon\kappa\epsilon\iota\alpha\nu \) ....

3 This seems clearly to be the implication of the argument at *Phdo.* 74b-c and is one way, at least, of interpreting the analogy of the cave in *Republic*.
not present in them either.\(^4\) But, in several of the dialogues of search, Plato de-
scribes beauty and courage and such things as "present in" or "added to" sensible
things.\(^5\) This suggests that, however he might be thinking of beauty, courage, etc.
in these dialogues, it is not in terms of separated Forms. One might object that,
when he uses such language, Plato is referring only to the "immanent character" or
the shares of Forms which are, by the *Phaedo* account, distinct from the Forms
themselves. This explanation would, of course, square these passages with the
middle period theory of Forms. We should note, however, that this interpretation
has some drawbacks for the person who thinks that the theory of Forms is quietly
present in the dialogues of search. Were this the case, we would have to suppose
that in these dialogues Socrates thinks that there are separated Forms but isn't
saying that they are separated. In addition, we would have to claim that he also
has an account of the relationship between fine things and the Fine Itself. The
latter "has a share" of the former. Of course, he isn't saying much about this ei-
ther. Second, we do not find one of the other most prominent features of the
theory as it is presented in *Republic* and, especially, *Phaedo*. This is the notion
that the Forms are the objects of knowledge and that sensible things are not.\(^6\) I

\(^4\) Cf. *Phdo.* 65d, ἀλλ' ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῷ διὰ τῶν σώματος ἐφήσι αὐτῶι; along with
79c. In addition, in the analogy of the cave in *Republic* no part of the real animals and objects
that exist outside the cave exists within it—only models which project the shadows upon the wall.

\(^5\) Cf. *Hp.Ma.* 289d, ἐτι δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ σοι αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, ζ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα κοιμεῖται
καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὰν τῷ πραγμάτῳ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ἔλεος ... as well as 294a, the ob-
ject of the search is ὁ παραγενόμενον ποιεί ἐκαστὰ φαίνεσθαι καλὰ τῶν ὅλων οἷς ἀν
παρῇ. In Lys. 217b bad things are bad διά κακοῦ παρουσίαν. Likewise for virtue in *La.*
189c-190b; it is what, by being added to the boys (παραγένετο), would make them better.

\(^6\) *Phdo.* 79c-d as well as *R.* 479d, ff. The so-called "two worlds thesis" is, of course, not the only
possible interpretation of the latter passage. See, for instance, Fine (1977). The *Phaedo*
do not want to argue that Plato could not have had these ideas when he wrote the dialogues of search. My only point is that these dialogues themselves do not provide compelling reasons to think that he did.?

Arguments from silence are by no means the best sorts of arguments in doing the history of philosophy. We can do better, I think, if we consider the purpose of the dialogues of search in relation to their contents. In Plato’s later works we get at least one picture of what Socrates was really accomplishing. In the Theaetetus he is presented as the midwife of philosophical activity. Thus, if Plato wrote the dialogues of search in a Socratic spirit (in this sense of Socratic), we should expect him to want the works to engage their readers in such a way as to make them reflect on their own answers to the questions asked therein. This requires that the reader place himself in the position of answering Socrates. If, however, Socrates’ questions presuppose a peculiarly Platonic ontology, then Socrates is not being particularly fair to his interlocutors by failing to apprise them of this little detail. Socrates asks for "that by virtue of which all F things are F." If Plato thinks that this is a Form, but isn’t willing to portray Socrates as making this clear to the persons with whom he talks, then Plato has stacked the deck against Socrates’ opponents. If the reader is supposed to put himself or herself into the position of answerer, then the dialogues are equally unfair to the

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Woodruff (1982) pp.163-75 argues at length that the Hippias Major is innocent of the ontology of the middle period. He also draws evidence from other early dialogues.

7 Woodruff (1982) pp.163-75 argues at length that the Hippias Major is innocent of the ontology of the middle period. He also draws evidence from other early dialogues.
the question are not clear. Thus, if the dialogues of search are supposed to be attempts at mid-wifery in this sense, and if the theory of Forms is required to answer "What is F?" questions and if Plato believed this to be true even as he wrote these dialogues, then they would have failed in their purpose because Plato wasn’t sufficiently forthcoming about his ontological views. Worse, Plato would have known that his own works were deficient in this respect and persisted in writing several of them anyway.

§1. Constraints on Answers to Socrates’ Questions

A. The Logical Cause of F

Socratic "What is F?" questions require answers which can be substituted for F so as to give a deeper understanding of what F really is. Usually F is a predicate that can be turned into a substantive by the addition of a neuter definite article. So, for instance, *Hippias Major* is an inquiry into "the fine," while *Euthyphro* is concerned with "the holy." Other times F is the name of the quality that corresponds to the predicate. So, for instance, in *Laches* 190d, Socrates puts the question as ἄνδρεία τι ποτε ἔστιν. Plato seems to regard these formulations as equivalent. They are both requests for some account of the F in question that is more informative about the real nature of that thing than the mere phrase, "the F" or "F-ness."

Answers to questions of this kind typically take the form "the F is the G" where G is another substantive or a description of something substantive. Thus,
in Hippias Major, Socrates considers the suggestion that the fine is the fitting,8 and elsewhere there is the notion that bravery or manliness is knowledge of what is to be feared and what is to be dared.9 These answers attempt to specify *that in virtue of which all F things are F*. This rather vague specification most nearly translates Plato's use of ὑδ, though we shall find that he refers to it in other ways as well. Alternately, one might say that these answers attempt to specify the "because" of F-ness (or perhaps even the "becauses:" see below on the Singularity Requirement). So, if the F really was the G, then all F things would be F because they were G. In what follows I shall refer to that in virtue of which all F things are F as "the logical cause" or "the because" of F.10

Plato indicates the logical cause by a number of means. Sometimes he will use the instrumental dative, as in Euthyphro 6d where he asks for "that by which all the holy things are holy" (ὁ πάντα τὰ ὑδικὰ ὑδικὰ ἐστὶν).11 Other times Plato expresses the idea of a logical cause by talking about what makes something

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8 *Hp. Ma.* 293e, σοὶ ὑδ ὑδικὴ δὲ τὸ πρέπου καλὸν εἶναι;


10 I am indebted to Paul Woodruff for this terminology and for helping me to see more clearly what sort of thing it is that the dialogues of search are searching for.

11 The object of ὑδ in this instance is ἔκεινο ἀὑτὸ τὸ ἐἴδος. I do not think that we should make too much of this vocabulary in this context for the reasons that I cite above. For further uses of the instrumental dative compare *Hp. Ma.* 287c-d and *Prt.* 332b with *Phdo.* 100d, τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλὰ. In the latter passage, Plato is clearly discussing Forms. In the former, it seems to me, there is simply a commitment to the notion that it is "by the F" (whatever it might turn out to be) that F things are F. We need not interpret the Euthyphro passage as doing more than acknowledging that the F is itself a *kind*. A kind can be the same as itself and have a single look (*Euthphr.* 5d, ἀὑτῷ ὑμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τιμᾶ ἴδεαι πάν) without being a Platonic Form.
F. We use the same sort of locution in English when we ask questions like, "What makes a whale a mammal instead of a fish?" This sense of "making" needs to be distinguished from the productive cause of something. It is the birth of live young and so on that makes a whale a mammal, but it is whale sex that makes whales in the productive sense. In yet other places, Plato describes the logical cause simply as the \( \alpha\iota\tau\iota\omega \) by which F things are F. Finally, Plato sometimes makes reference to the logical cause of F by the \( \delta\iota\alpha \) construction. So, at Protagoras 360c Socrates asks, "This thing by which the cowards are cowards, do you call this cowardice or courage?" It turns out that, in this instance, the \( \delta\iota\alpha \) is ignorance of what is really dreadful.

Nothing in the conception of a logical cause, as it has been elaborated so far, requires that it be a Platonic Form. Indeed, so far there is nothing that

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12 For instance, \textit{Hp. Ma.} 300a, \( \varepsilon\chi\omicron\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\nu \ \hat{o} \tau\iota \ \tau\omicron \ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\delta \ \hat{o} \ \pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon \ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \ \kappa\alpha\lambda\alpha\varsigma \ \epsilon\lambda\nu\alpha\iota, \ \tau\omicron \ \kappau\nu\delta \ \tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\alpha. \\

13 In what follows I shall translate \( \alpha\iota\tau\iota\alpha \) as 'reason' or 'cause' depending upon the context (or leave it untranslated entirely where either of these seems potentially misleading). It is a commonplace now in the wake of Vlastos' (1969) paper that the Greeks' use of \( \alpha\iota\tau\iota\alpha \) does not always correspond comfortably to our word 'cause.' Though it can mean that, it can just as easily mean 'reason' in the sense of an agent's purpose or motive or even a sufficient condition. Thus, Aristotle's concern for his health is the \( \alpha\iota\tau\iota\alpha \) for his walking after dinner and the final premise is the \( \alpha\iota\tau\iota\alpha \) of the conclusion of a geometrical demonstration. G can also be cited as the \( \alpha\iota\tau\iota\alpha \) of x's being F, though G does not cause x to be F, if there are general causal statements from which it follows from x's being G that x is also F. Cf. \textit{Post. An.} II, 11 and \textit{Phys.} II, 3.

14 Cf. \textit{Hp. Ma.} 299e, \( \tau\omicron \ \alpha\iota\tau\iota\iota \ \kappa\alpha\lambda\eta \ \epsilon\lambda\nu\alpha\iota; \) with \textit{Phdo.} 100b, ff. Socrates rejects color and shape and \( \tau\acute{\alpha}\ \delta\lambda\lambda\varsigma \ \alpha\iota\tau\iota\alpha \) in favor of participation in \( \tau\omicron \ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\delta \ \kappa\alpha\lambda\delta\nu \). Such things as color and shape are candidates for the logical cause of beauty and, even if they are ultimately unsuccessful candidates, this shows that when Plato is looking for the thing that makes all beautiful things beautiful, he sometimes expresses himself by saying that he is looking for an \( \alpha\iota\tau\iota\alpha \). \\

15 \( \tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron \ \hat{o} \ \delta\epsilon\iota\lambda\iota \ \epsilon\lambda\nu\iota \ \hat{o} \ \delta\epsilon\iota\lambda\iota, \ \delta\epsilon\iota\lambda\iota \ \hat{\eta} \ \alpha\nu\nu\rho\epsilon\iota\iota\varsigma \ \kappa\alpha\lambda\epsilon\varsigma; \) Cf. \textit{Men.} 72c, \( \epsilon\nu \ \gamma\epsilon\ \tau\omicron \ \epsilon\lambda\delta\varsigma \ \tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron \ \acute{\alpha}\pi\sigma\alpha\iota \ \varepsilon\chi\omicron\omicron\upsilon\iota, \ \hat{o} \ \delta\epsilon\iota \ \epsilon\lambda\nu\iota \ \acute{\rho}\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}i. \)
requires that we ask any ontological questions about it at all. When one seeks the logical cause of F, one only seeks "the reason" or "that by virtue of which" F things are F. That there should be a single "reason" or a "cause" distributed among all the F things is no more or less perplexing than that there should be a multitude of F things. It takes a fairly sophisticated semantical and/or metaphysical eye to discern a problem with the statements 'a is F' and 'b is F'—a problem that needs to be solved by supposing that a thing called a universal, which can be had by many, answers to the common term 'F' in both of these sentences. Plato sees no such problem with his search for logical causes in these early dialogues. We noted above how he cavalierly talks about these "things" being present to or in things. When he does finally make the ontological move of identifying logical causes with Forms in the Phaedo, he is evasive about the relationship between the logical cause of F and the F things.16

B. The Singularity Requirement

There are, however, two features of logical causes about which Socrates is insistent. First, the logical cause of F is a single thing.17 That is, there is one thing

16 Phdo. 100d, ... ἡ ἐκείνη τοῦ καλὸν εἶτε παρονοια εἴτε κοινωνία δὴ δὴ καὶ ὁποὶς προσγειομένην ὀὐ γὰρ ἐτι τοῦτο διαχειρίζομαι...

17 It might be thought that the Grg. 475a "definitions" of the fine and the shameful violate this condition. These are disjunctive and allow that a thing can be fine by being either pleasant or beneficial or both. Worse yet, they are actually proposed by Socrates and their adequacy is essential to his argument. Accordingly, Santas (1979, pp. 98-100) lists them as among the examples of the sort of definition that Socrates is looking for and, further, among those that Socrates finds satisfactory. Two comments are in order. First, only Polus suggests that this is a definition, and a fine one at that. Socrates regards it only as a guide. See supra p. 36, n. 39. Second, Plato may only be using a principle which he thinks someone like Polus would accept for the purposes of
by virtue of which all F things are F. Call this the Singularity Requirement or SR. It is important to see that the Singularity Requirement is an additional constraint on the notion of a logical cause. Thus far we have simply described a logical cause as "that by virtue of which F things are F." The use of 'that' in this formulation is merely for the sake of convenience. ("That or those by virtue of which" is awkward.) One might well think that, in some cases at least, there is reason to think that various F things are F for various reasons. Gorgias is presented in the *Meno* as someone who held such a view. But, at 71e-72d, Socrates resists this notion that virtue in a man is one thing, but virtue in a woman or a child quite another. To put this into the vocabulary of logical causes, Socrates sees a single thing to be explained—virtuous people—and supposes that there must be a single explanation that fits all cases. Meno is, perhaps understandably, skeptical about such a unifying element in all cases of human virtue and Socrates attempts to convince him by recourse to several analogies. Meno does not deny that there is a single phenomenon called strength. We say that strong men or strong women are strong by virtue of the same thing, strength (72e, τῷ αὐτῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἵσχυς ἵσχυρα ἔσται). It remains to determine what strength really is. This, I take it, is the logical cause of strength. This logical cause would provide some explanation of what kind of thing strength is or what the εἶδος of strength. The way that Socrates phrases the next line is revealing. He says that "the strong doesn't differ in any way in relation to the to-be-strong" and that this is what he

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the argument. He might regard fine things as being either pleasant or beneficial or both but still deny that either or both of these are "the because" which explains why they are fine.
means by saying that men and women are strong by the same thing. His point, I think, is this. If we could arrive at the logical cause of strength, this would be an account of "the to be strong;" that is, an account of what the condition of being strong really consists in. This account would suffice to explain why any strong person is strong. He or she is strong because the G, the logical cause of strength, is present in the subject. What he does not want is a fragmented account of being strong. So, if someone said that to be strong is to have well developed upper arms, the account would violate the Singularity Requirement. Perhaps it is by the presence of big biceps that some strong people are said to be strong, but the aitia of strength in other cases might be different.

Plato uses the Singularity Requirement to show the inadequacy of some candidates for the logical cause of F. According to a recent interpretation of Euthyphro's first attempt to answer the question, "What is the pious?" he offers the suggestion that it is "prosecuting anyone who is in the wrong in questions of murder or of sacrilegious theft or fails to do the right thing in any situation of this sort." In general, the pious is to prosecute anyone who has wronged the religious order. But there are clearly pious acts that are not matters of prosecuting

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18 Men. 72e, το γάρ τη αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω: οπδέν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἴσχυς εἶναι ἡ ἴσχυς

Nehamas (1975) points out that interpreters have fixed upon the first few words of Euthyphro’s answer, ἐπερ ἔγω νῦν ποιῶ to the exclusion of what follows. What he does now in prosecuting his father is an instance of the more general "because" of piety—prosecuting those that wrong the gods. He cites as evidence of this the fact that Plato uses the participle, and not the exegetical infinitive, when Socrates begins his objection to Euthyphro at 6d, ἀλλὰ μοι εἶπες, ὅτι τοῦτο τυγχάνει δειον δι, δ ὅ νῦν ποιεῖς, φώνον ἐπεζών τῷ πατρί. The proper sense is not, "what you are now doing, prosecuting your father," but rather, "what you are now doing in prosecuting your father."
anyone, like sacrificing before a journey. Thus, after Euthyphro's self-righteous digression, Socrates brings him up short by asking him whether he thinks that there are other things that are pious. Euthyphro concedes that this is so, and Socrates clarifies his earlier request. It was not for "one or two of the many holies" but for the $e\delta_ος$ by which all pious things are pious. If Nehamas is right in his interpretation of Euthyphro's failure, he has not confused particular acts with the universal for which Socrates is seeking. Rather, he has violated what I call the Singularity Requirement. He has given a suggestion for what the logical cause of piety is that fails to explain why all pious actions are pious.

There are, of course, less controversial instances in which a proposed answer to a what is $F$ question runs afoul of the Singularity Requirement. In the Laches, for instance, Socrates does not deny that a person who is willing to stay at his post and fight the enemy is courageous. This willingness, when it is present in a subject, does make him or her courageous. The point of Socrates' objection at 191a is that other things can make a person's actions courageous as well. Another point where Socrates uses the Singularity Requirement to reject a possible candidate for the logical cause of something is Hippias Major 297e-299b. He there considers a disjunctive account of the fine: it is what is pleasant through

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20 Immediately following 6d3, ET- και ἀλήθη γε ἔλεγον, ὁ Σωκράτης. ΣΩ- ἓσως. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ φης εἶναι ὄσια.

21 Nehamas calls this the unity requirement. "Socrates remarks and Euthyphro agrees (6d8), as well he might, that avenging religious wrongs is not the only explanation of why actions are pious. . . . And this is what Socrates objects to, as he in fact goes on to say at 6d9-e1: it is the unity, and not the universality, of the pious that Euthyphro has failed to capture." p. 293. Cf. Woodruff (1982) p. 150.
sight or pleasant through hearing. We shall examine this passage in more detail in §3 when we consider the question of whether πρός τι predicates raise special problems for the constraints on answers to Socratic questions.

C. The Self-Predication Requirement

The second constraint on logical causes is much more difficult to fathom. The logical cause of F is itself F and so it is said to be self-predicating. Notoriously, Plato writes as if the Forms are self-predicating (Phdo. 100c, Pm. 128e-129b, and Smp. 211b for instance). But the objects for which Socrates is seeking in the dialogues of search are also said to be self-predicating or are discussed in ways that imply this. And, as I have been trying to argue, it is not at all clear that the objects of these inquiries are properly described as Platonic Forms. Perhaps the most direct statement of the self-predication requirement occurs in Protagoras 330c. The context results from Socrates' query at 329c concerning whether the virtues are one thing or many. Protagoras replies that the individual virtues are distinct and unlike, though parts of a whole, like the parts of a face. Socrates then supposes an imaginary interlocutor who asks of him and of Protagoras whether justice is itself just or unjust and whether holiness is holy or unholy.22 Socrates claims that, if he even deigned to answer such a question, it would be in the

22 Prt. 330c, τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα, οὐκ οὖσατε ἄρτι, ἢ δικαιοσύνη, αὕτῳ τοῦτο δικαίον ἔστιν ἢ ἄδικον, with 330d, πότερον δὲ τούτο αὕτῳ τὸ πράγμα φατε τοιοῦτον πε-γικέναι οἶλος ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἶλον δίκοιν.
affirmative. Protagoras concurs. Socrates now attempts to get Protagoras to concede that justice is holy and holiness just. After all, we should hardly regard justice as unholy! Protagoras, though uncomfortable with this suggestion, allows it. But he also sees where Socrates' line of reasoning is leading. If both justice and holiness are holy, then they are alike after all. But, Protagoras claims, this is not to be wondered at given the ubiquity of similarity in some respect or other.

The question, of course, is what to make of this passage. One might think that it is merely an opportunity to portray Protagoras as a clear thinker. However unflattering one might think Plato's portrait of him in the *Theaetetus* is, in the dialogue that bears his name Protagoras is shown to be quite perceptive. This argument is not the only Socratic sally upon his position that he cuts short. At 350c, ff., he calls Socrates down for interpreting what he offered as a sufficient condition for the possession of courage as necessary as well. We must ask the question: from a dramatic point of view, what purpose is served by showing these interchanges between Socrates and Protagoras? One possibility is that Plato the dramatist wants to show his audience how not to argue for the unity of the virtues or the thesis that courage is a kind of knowing. But, even if this were so, it need not cast doubt upon Plato's commitment to the notion that justice is just and holiness holy. The premise to which Protagoras objects in the 330c argument is not the Self-Predication Requirement. Though he raises doubts about the propriety of saying that justice is holy in the same sense that holiness is, this is still not really

23 See especially *Prt.* 330e σχόλη μέντ' ἀν τι ἄλλο ἄσιον εἴη, καὶ μὴ αὐτῇ γε ἢ δαιότης ἄσιον ἔσται.
the focus of his objection. His point is that it does not follow from the fact that justice is holy and that holiness is holy that justice and holiness are similar in any way that implies that they are just one thing, instead of distinct parts of a whole.

This in itself does not show that Plato held the Self-Predication Requirement for logical causes in the early dialogues. It only shows that the context of his most direct statement of that thesis does not show that he didn’t hold it. There are other passages in the dialogues of search, however, that imply that he did think that the Self-Predication Requirement was a legitimate constraint on answers to "what is F" questions. In *Hippias Major* 291d, Hippias attempts to clarify what it is that Socrates’ imaginary questioner is seeking.

Hippias: I will answer you. You seem to me to be seeking an answer according to which the beautiful is the sort of thing which never appears ugly to anyone at any time in any way.

Socrates: Certainly, Hippias. Now you understand beautifully.

This does not say that the fine must itself be fine; only that it must not in any way appear to be base. But, in context, the requirement amounts to this. Hippias’ two candidates for the fine—a beautiful girl and gold—have just been

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24 *Prt.* 331b-c, ὁδ' πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὧ δ' ᾠκρατεῖς, οὕτως ἀπλοῦν εἶναι, ὅτε συγκωρήσαι τὴν τε δικαιοσύνην διόν εἶναι καὶ τὴν δαιότητα δίκαιον, ἄλλα τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι.

25 *Prt.* 331d-e, ὅτε τούτῳ γε τῇ τρόπῳ κἀν ταῦτα ἐξέγορο, εἰ βούλοιο, ὡς ἀπαίτω ἀστὶν ὑμοίοι ἀλλήλοιος.

26 *Hp.Ma.* 291d, ἦγοι σοι ἔρω. ἐγείρειν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τοιούτων τι τὸ καλὸν ἀποκρίνοσθαι, ὡς μεθέποτε αἰσχρὸν μηθαμοῦ μηθεὶν φανεῖται. ΣΩ- πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὧ Ιηπία: καὶ καλὸς γε νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.
shown to be no more fine than base (οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἡ ἁλομόν). This is because the beautiful girl, though beautiful in relation to other women, is not beautiful in relation to goddesses. So, what is needed is something that does not suffer from this latter defect. It will be, like the gold and the maiden, fine, but, unlike gold and beautiful maidens, it will not be base or ugly in relation to anything.27

D. The Interpretation of Self-Predication

Few issues in Plato scholarship have been more vexing than the question of how to interpret the claim that the F itself is F. The problem is particularly acute since Plato himself subjected the theory of Forms to a criticism in which the requirement of self-predication was a crucial premise. (Or so it has been thought.)28 I should like to leave aside the question of the proper way to interpret the claim that the F itself is F when 'the F itself' refers pretty clearly to a Platonic

27 It might be the case that self-predication is hinted at in Euthyphro 5d. Socrates asks whether holiness in not the same as itself in every action. (ἡ οὖ ταυτὸν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ) What he might have in mind is the Singularity Requirement—in all instances of pious action, there is one "because" in virtue of which they are pious. Alternately, he might have in mind the idea that τὸ ὅσιον is qualitatively the same as itself, that is, that it itself is ὅσιον.

28 Vlastos' 1954 paper raised the question of whether the first part of the Parmenides is Plato's own critique of the theory of Forms in a way that generated a flurry of secondary literature. The question of the proper interpretation of this difficult stretch of text is beyond the scope of this dissertation. I am inclined to the view that the argument offered in Prm. 132a-b is not the famous Third Man Argument of Vlastos' paper. Instead, the argument that Plato formulates is better understood as what Turnbull (1989) calls the Looks Regress. It is not directed at the notion of Forms per se so much as it is directed at a particular way of understanding the relation of participation. Nonetheless, in what follows I shall conform to the prevalent view and take it as a desideratum for interpreting Plato that he be shown to have an account which avoids Vlastos-style third man arguments.
Form, as it does in *Phaedo* 100c. For the moment I am interested only in the notion of a logical cause as it appears in the dialogues of search. I have argued that there is no reason to rush to the conclusion that logical causes in these dialogues are the same things as Platonic Forms as they appear in *Phaedo* and *Republic*. The claim for which I shall argue is that the Forms of the middle dialogues are an ontologized version of the these logical causes. Accordingly, if we can understand the sense in which the latter self-predicate, we might be in a better position to understand the self-predication of Platonic Forms.

Plato does not merely claim that the logical cause of F is F for the purpose of describing it. The SP requirement, like the Singularity Requirement, serves as a test to weed out candidates for the logical cause of F. As we shall see in the next section of this chapter, the following is a standard *elenchtic* tactic: Consider a candidate for the logical cause of F. Call it the G. If some sentence of the form ‘The G is not F (in some way or other)’ is true, then it is concluded that the G is not the logical cause of the F. For illustration let us take the case from *Hippias Major* 295c and suppose that the fine is the useful (τὸ ἄρσιμον). At 295e, the capable (τὸ δυνατόν) is identified with what is useful on the grounds that what is useful for x must be capable of x. Socrates concludes that power is the fine and powerlessness is the shameful. The problem, of course, is that persons who do

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29 *Hp.Ma.* 295c, οδικοῦ τὸ δυνατόν ἐκατον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, εἰς ὅπερ δυνατόν, εἰς τὸ ἄρσιμον, τὸ ἀδύνατον ἄχρηστον; ... ἀδύναμες μὲν ἀρα καλὸν, ἀδύναμια δὲ λαχρόνι. The moral implications of such an account of what is fine are played out in the *Gorgias*. Callicles’ view is roughly that the most shameful thing by nature is to be incapable of defending yourself and your friends, while the finest thing is to be able to gratify each and every desire.
things that are quite shameful obviously have the power to do these things. This leads Socrates to the conclusion that the useful and power are not the fine. His pattern of reasoning may be represented in this way:

1. Suppose the x is the logical cause of F; e.g. power is the fine.

2. x is not F πρός ψ; power to do evil is not fine.

3. If a sentence of the form 'x is not F πρός ψ' is true, then x is not the logical cause of F.

So, the x is not the F.

Thus, the SP requirement forms a schema for testing substitution instances for 'the F.' We can call premise 3 'SPT' for "Self Predication Test."

30 Hp.Ma. 296c, δύνασαι δε γε πάντες ποιεῖν οἱ ποιευόμενοι καὶ ποιοῦμεν ἄνθρωποι, διὸ πολλὸν καὶ πολλὰ ποιοῦμεν οὐκ ἀσυνήθηντα καὶ πολλοὶ ποιεῖν τᾶτα ἐλέναι καλά τοῦ πολλοῦ δή; Πολλὸν ἐμοὶς δοκεῖ οὐκ ἔσχατην. Λυθεῖς δὲ ἄρα, τοῦ μενενημονίου καὶ τοῦ θρήσμου ήμῖν, οὐκ ἔσκειν, ἢτι τὸ καλὸν. Though Hippias willingly accepts the conclusion that the useful is not the fine based on this line of reasoning, he is not yet willing to give up on the idea entirely. He qualifies the suggestion by adding that what is useful and power for the good is the fine. This, however, is distinguished from the claim that the useful and power ἀπλῶς is the fine. It is essential to Socrates' argument strategy that such qualified hypotheses be distinguished from their unqualified cousins. Cf. the idea that qualified relatives are πρός qualified correlatives in R. IV, 436b, ff.

31 Hp.Ma. 296c-d, τί σοι; ταῦτα τίνῳ δύνασαι καὶ ταῦτα τὰ χρήσιμα, δὲ δὲν ἐπὶ τὸ κακὸν τὰ ἀργάτερα διὰ τῆς ἐλένει καλὰ καὶ πολλὸν δὴ; Πολλὸν ἐμοὶς δοκεῖ δὲ Ἒσχάτην. Λυθεῖς δὲ ἄρα, δὴ Ἑπίδει, τὸ δυνατόν ταύτα καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν, όμως ἔσκειν, ἢτι τὸ καλὸν. Though Hippias willingly accepts the conclusion that the useful is not the fine based on this line of reasoning, he is not yet willing to give up on the idea entirely. He qualifies the suggestion by adding that what is useful and power for the good is the fine. This, however, is distinguished from the claim that the useful and power ἀπλῶς is the fine. It is essential to Socrates' argument strategy that such qualified hypotheses be distinguished from their unqualified cousins. Cf. the idea that qualified relatives are πρός qualified correlatives in R. IV, 436b, ff.

32 For a fuller explanation of the πρός ψ qualifier, see below p. 77.
A number of things are puzzling about this kind of test and part of the puzzlement stems from the absence of any view about the ontological status of logical causes. When we say that the useful is not fine, we can take this extensionally. It is not the case that all of the useful things are fine things. If we were to remain at the level of things, this might lead us to believe that all Plato means by the SP requirement is that, when we find the logical cause of F (say, the x), things will be $F \text{ insofar as they are } x$. That is, the fact that a thing is x gives us every reason in the world to think that it will be F. And, in fact, if being x is a matter of degree (as being useful is), then a thing will be more F insofar as it is more x. But this cannot be all that Plato means. The "F insofar as it is x" formula does nothing to ensure any order of explanatory precedence that seems implicit in the idea of that "on account of which" ($\delta t \cdot \delta$) all F things are F.\footnote{For such an interpretation, see Woodruff p. 155. To avoid the problem that I raise, Woodruff adds another condition that something must meet in order to be the logical cause: the explanation requirement. I think such a requirement is too vague and would like to have the explanatory power of a logical cause be a direct result of its character as a self-predicating unity of a particular kind.} Certainly it is true that figures are triangles insofar as they have interior angles equal to one hundred and eighty degrees. But, "having interior angles equal to one hundred and eighty degrees" isn't "that on account of which" they are triangles. Indeed, it is because they are triangles that they have such interior angles.

On the other hand, we can take the non-identity of the extensions of 'F' and 'x' as evidence of a non-identity between something distinct from the extensions themselves. The question is, "What are these distinct things?" Nowadays we say these things are properties and then proceed to disagree about their
ontological status. Is the property anything over and above the totality of its instances? If so, what is it and where does it live? How, we might wonder, could Plato use SPT and not raise such questions? The answer, I think, is that Greek's capacity to use nominalized adjectives as subject terms helps obscure the importance of such questions. The object of the search is called "that by virtue of which" or "on account of which" F things are F. It is also characterized as that which "makes" F things F by being "present to them." In the passage from Hippias Major 295ε the referent of τὸ χρήσιμον can float between a useful thing and some less well defined "thing"—the useful. Thus, when we find a useful, but thoroughly shameful thing, we can justifiably say τὸ χρήσιμον ὁδὲ ἔστι τὸ καλόν and it is not clear whether we mean by this that this useful thing is not fine or that "the useful"—that which is present to all useful things—is not fine.

If this is so, then we can see one thing that the SP requirement clearly implies, though it may not mean this.

(SP1) The F is-completely F.

'Is-completely' is a relation between subject and predicate terms in a sentence which is defined in the following way:

CMP: x is-completely F =df no sentence of the form 'x is not F πρὸς ὑ' is true

. . . . πρὸς ὑ' ranges over qualifications or additions that can be represented in a natural language like 'in relation to a goddess.' Modern notation does not include
any way to say that Helen is beautiful in relation to women but not goddesses except by resorting to relations like 'aFb' but '¬aFc.' Though this probably gets the logical grammar of 'beauty' right, it probably also misrepresents Plato's view of the matter. When I say that the SP requirement implies SP1 I mean only that Plato's use of the SP requirement as a schema to test candidates for the logical cause of F flunks substitution instances that do not meet the condition of SP1. We are still left with the vexing question of why anyone should think that this is a suitable test. SP1 also leaves the ontological status of the F very much up for grabs.

i. self-predication as complete-being

One line of reasoning might be that SP1 does more than I intend. It is not only an implication of the Self-Predication Requirement; it is the very meaning of it. According to this line of reasoning, Plato thought of the very relation that we have defined and thought of it as somehow the kind of being most appropriate to logical causes. I shall sketch two lines of reasoning by means of which Plato might have arrived at this conclusion.

a. PRM → SP1

Plato might have come to such a view by considering the following constraint on "being:"

(PRM) if x is F, then there is no respect in which x is not F.
As the letters suggest, (PRM) gives one possible interpretation of the Parmenidean formula that "it is and cannot not be" (ἐστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν μὴ ἐἶναι DK 2.3) If, in addition, Plato thought that understanding was limited to things that are, he also might think that logical causes, insofar as they are principles of explanation, would have to be things that are, in this sense.34 If (PRM) tells how it must be with real being, then anything of which the οὐ μᾶλλον formula holds true is not really F. Clearly sensibles of which relatives are predicated incompletely could immediately be ruled out as potential logical causes. According to this interpretation, Plato would then have been forced to suppose that the logical causes of such incomplete relatives were, in some way, distinct from sensible things. Moreover, unless he was willing to consign these sensibles to utter non-being, he would have had to formulate an account of an alternative way of being. This he did by introducing the idea of Forms and shares which sensibles "have." This alternative way of being he regarded as deficient and derivative on the primary way of being because the shares by which sensible F things get the name 'F' are ontologically derivative from the Forms.35

b. SYN + SR → SP1

Reflections on the problems that Parmenides raised about being are not the only thing that might prompt someone writing in this period to embrace SP1.

34 Cf. DK.3, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστιν τε καὶ ἐἶναι.

35 For attempts to isolate two fundamental kinds of predication relations in Plato, see Code (1983) and Silverman (1991b). It is not clear to me, however, that either of Code’s relations is the same as being-completely. For a somewhat similar evolutionary story about how Plato came to have two ways of being F, see Nehamas (1975a and b) and Turnbull (1985).
Another reason might be that such a principle was found in earlier philosophical writings. Jonathon Barnes, in his work on the Pre-Socratics, has christened it the "Synonymy Principle." A first approximation of this principle might be stated as:

\[(\text{SYN}) \text{ The } \alpha\iota\rarepsilon\iota\alpha \text{ of } x's \text{ being } F, \text{ is itself } F.\]

It can allegedly be found as a suppressed premise in Xenophanes' argument that god is ungenerated.\(^{36}\) It may also underlie Alcmaeon's reasons for supposing that the soul is in perpetual motion and deathless.\(^{37}\) Even if the presence of the Synonymy Principle in the works of the Pre-Socratics is questionable, it can undoubtedly be found in the work of Plato's most famous student. Thus, in *Metaphysics* \(\Lambda\) 1070a4 he writes that "every substance comes to be from a synonymous thing."\(^{38}\) *Gen. et Corr.* 324a20 suggests that, in one sense, this is true not merely of the generation of entire substantial individuals, but also of alterations as well. In this instance, he is considering the nature of an agent or maker. (Recall that Plato

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\(^{36}\) Barnes (1979) v.I, pp. 86 and 119.

\(^{37}\) Cf. DK 24a12 (= Ar. de An. 405a29) ψηφι γάρ αὐτήν (soul) ἀδάνατον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἔουσαι τοῖς ἀδιανάτοις, τοῦτο δὲ ὑπάρχον αὐτή ὡς ἀεὶ κινούμενη· κινεῖται γάρ καὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα συνεχῶς ἀεὶ, σελήνην, ἡμέραν, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον with de An. 403b28, φασὶ γάρ ἐνοι καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτος ψυχήν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν, οἰδήθεντες δὲ τὸ μὴ κινούμενον αὐτὸ μὴ ἑδησαθάνει κινεῖν ἔτερον. Alcmaeon may well be included with those who say that soul is first and most especially a mover. The reason these people hold such a view is a version of the synonymy principle: what is not itself in motion cannot produce movement. It may not be unreasonable to suppose that the same sort of premise underlies the *Phaedrus* argument for the soul's immortality. See Phdr. 245c-d, μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν, ἄτε σοὶ ἀπολέσω ἔαυτό, οὐ δ' ἂν γειν κινούμενον, ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις διὰ κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγή καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.

\(^{38}\) *Metaph.* 7 1034a34 qualifies this generalization by pointing out that heat can cause health without being health in virtue of the fact that it is part of health and accompanies it. In a slightly different context, see *Metaph.* a 993b24.
sometimes indicates the notion of a logical cause by talking about ὁ ποιέω.) He writes, "at one time we say that it is the man that heats and at another time the hot. In one sense it is the matter that undergoes, in another it is the contrary." When we speak ὃς τοῦναυτίον it is the hot that heats the cold and makes it hot. Thus, it turns out that the thing by virtue of which the hot becomes hot is itself hot.

One way to understand the motivation behind (SYN) is to see it as a requirement on explanation. When we say that x is the aitia for y, then it ought to be obvious what it is in the nature of x that explains why y is as it is. Thus, if we seek an explanation of why y exists, we are seeking the reasons or causes of y's generation. It would be utterly baffling if the aitia for y's being was itself something that was not. From this observation on the nature of being tout court, one might plausibly proceed to treat this 'is' as a place holder for 'is F' and suppose that it would be equally baffling if the explanation for why y is F were something that was not itself F. This, in itself, would not require that the aitia which explains why y is F be-completely F, as SP1 does. As it has been interpreted thus far, (SYN) requires only that the aitia of F be itself F and leaves open the possibility that the aitia might also be not F or G (the opposite of F) in some respect. How might Plato, or anyone else, have bridged the gap between being F and being-completely F?

39 GC. 324a20, ὅτε μὲν γὰρ τὸν ἀνθρώπον γαμεῖν θερμαίνειν, ὅτε δὲ τὸ θερμων. ἦστι μὲν γὰρ ὃς ἢ ὦλη πάσχει, ἦστι δὲ ὃς τοῦναυτίον.

40 cf. Parmenides fr. 8, esp. 12-14.
The answer is that SYN and SR together imply SP1. The Singularity Requirement demands that there is one logical cause which explains why all the F things are F. In essence, it is a demand for a complete account. An answer to a "What is F?" question which met SR would preclude the possibility of any other thing being the ατρία by virtue of which anything was F. Once we realize this, the path from SR and SYN to SP1 is clear.

1. Suppose x is the ατρία by virtue of which y is F.

2. Then x is itself F. (by SYN)

3. Suppose for reductio that it is also the case that a sentence of the form 'x is not F προτο ρε' is true.

4. It is at least possible that x is the ατρία by which something is not F. (meets the necessary condition in SYN)

5. Case 1: Suppose there exists a z such that z is not F because of x.

5a. Then there must be some additional element present in the case of z—call it w—whereby x and w make z not F. (Principle of Sufficient Reason: otherwise the different "becausal efficacy" of x in relation to y and in relation to z would be unexplained.)

5b. It is not merely on account of x that y is F. It is on account of x and the absence of w.

5c. But x is, by supposition, the logical cause of y's being F. As such it is a complete account of why F things are F.
6. **Case 2:** suppose there is no actual case in which any existing thing is not F because of x, but it is nonetheless possible that there should be such a case.

6a. As the logical cause of F, x explains not merely why all actual F things are F, but why any possible F thing is F.

6b. As in Case 1, it is possible that there exists a w, such that all actual and possible F's are F because of x and the absence of w.

6c. If it were even possible that there existed an element, w, such x's becausal efficacy depended upon its absence, then x would not be the logical cause of F.

7. So, it is not the case that it is at least possible that x is the ατία by virtue of which something is not F; i.e. not 4.

8. If not 4, then not 3; i.e. the logical cause of F must be-completely F.

One way to see the point behind the Singularity Requirement and the notion of a logical cause in general is that logical causes are indefeasible explainers. Wherever the logical cause is, there is its explanandum. If x is the logical cause of F, then its ability to be that on account of which something is F cannot be preempted by the presence or absence of any additional factors. What the above argument shows is that, given SYN, it is impossible to meet this condition unless the logical cause of F is-completely F.

There is, in addition, an analogical path from SYN to SP1. Above I noted that the primary motive behind SYN is to require that the explanatory credentials of an ατία be adequate to its appointed task. If x is to explain the fact that y exists, x must itself exist. If it is to explain why y is F, then nothing could make it
more apparent that x has the capacity to do this than that x is likewise F and has F-ness to "pass along."41 If it were the case that, in some respect, x were not F, then x would also meet a necessary condition for explaining why something was not F. Thus, x would be both an "F-explainer" and, potentially at least, a "not-F-explainer." The problem is that paradigms of apparently good explanations don't seem to have this potency. When we ask, "Why is this newborn human?" we can answer that it is because its parents are human. These human parents will never be the reason which explains why some newborn is a sheep. Suppose fire is what makes the bronze hot. Fire does not have the potential to explain why the bronze, or anything else, is cold. Analogy with other αἰτία might therefore lead one to conclude that the thing which explains why y is F must not only be itself F but completely so.

Here then we have two lines of reasoning which might have carried Plato to the conclusion that the Self-Predication Requirement amounts to no more than SP1. This sort of strategy is very appealing, but it has some drawbacks. The primary way of being—the is-completely relation—is defined in terms of the ordinary copula. x is-completely F if and only if no sentence of the form 'x is not F πρός φ' is true. Does it follow from this that the logical cause of beauty is beautiful in the same way or, at least, in a similar way to Helen? If it does then two problems emerge.

41 Cf. Woodruff (1982) p. 155, "The fine is not foul under any qualification (c. 291d2). Otherwise it could not be trusted to make things fine, but being in part fine and in part foul, it would bring both qualities as a logical cause. But the fine must be a dependable cause, and make things only fine, if it is to be what the expert on fineness knows."
First, unless some other fairly significant metaphysical assumptions are brought to bear, then Socrates is completely a man. So, SP1 requires that there be something which is large or fine in just the same way that Socrates is a man—not in relation or comparison to anything, just \( \kappa\alpha\delta\alpha\gamma\ \alpha\delta\tau\sigma\) large or fine. This in itself is a peculiar thing to imagine. Unless we can either (a) isolate some factors which pressure Plato into making such an odd hypothesis or (b) discover something that might hide the oddness of such an hypothesis from him, it seems uncharitable to attribute such a view to him.

This, however, is not the only difficulty. The examples of the Synonymy Principle in both Aristotle and Alcmaeon are cases in which the \( \alpha\tau\iota\alpha \) of F is literally F. So, for instance, Alcmaeon (and the others who are lumped in with him in *De Anima*) seem to think that the soul is able to put the body in motion because it itself is constantly in motion. Following Aristotle's statement of this principle, he uses the famous example "man begets man." If we suppose that Plato accepts the self-predication of logical causes because of the Synonymy Principle, then we would have to suppose that the logical cause of F is F in just the same sense that ordinary F things are F. I shall go on to argue that the concept of a Form, as it is found in the middle dialogues, is a natural outgrowth of the idea of a logical cause. When the Self-Predication requirement is interpreted in this way and joined with other premises that Plato pretty clearly holds and applied to the Forms, it generates what has come to be called the Third Man Argument (hereafter TMA). Charity requires that, if the texts permit it, we find an interpretation of Plato's metaphysical view that does not involve the vicious, infinite
recess of the TMA. If the interpretation of self-predication that gives rise to the TMA is found in the notion of a logical cause, and if the concept of the logical cause is the chrysalis from which the fully winged and separated Platonic Forms emerge, then it is hard to see how we can avoid the conclusion that the Forms fall victim to the TMA.

Both of the difficulties that I have raised for the SP1 interpretation of self-predication depend on the assumption that it is legitimate to move from the claim that no sentence of the form ‘the logical cause of F is not F’ is true to the claim that the logical cause of is F in just the same way that ordinary F things are. It is not clear from anything that has been said thus far that it must. In fact, I have defined the complete-being relation by appeal to the truth of sentences of a certain form precisely in order not to answer this question in either way. The blunt truth of the matter, I believe, is that Plato himself has not thought through the implications of self-predication statements and the proper interpretation of "being" in them. In Chapter 5, I shall argue that he gives the matter very careful consideration in the Parmenides. Up until that time, however, we may find ourselves forced to conclude that he has allowed 'is' to slip back and forth between predication and identity.42 I shall argue in Chapter Three that SYN, in fact,

42 I noted above that the Dissoi Logoi illustrates ways in which terms like 'good,' 'bad,' 'fine' and 'shameful' can be incompletely predicated. The other thing that one sees in DL is a slide between identity and predication. Each section opens with a sketch of two opposing positions. One position is that the good and the bad are different things (τοι μὲν γὰρ λέγοντι ός ἄλλο μὲν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακῶν). The other view is ambiguous. It first sounds like an identity statement: τοι δὲ ός τὸ αὐτό ἐστι. But it is clarified in terms of what is most naturally understood as a predicative statement: καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθῶν εἶν, τοῖς δὲ κακῶν, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοτε μὲν ἀγαθῶν τοτε δὲ κακῶν (DL I, 1-7). The
provides the best explanation of the SP requirement and provides an impetus for the separation of logical causes and their reification into Platonic Forms. But, sliding 'is' between identity and predication provides other interesting interpretations of the SP requirement. I shall now examine these in more detail.

ii. self-predication as predication of essence

Above we noted that the extensional interpretation of the Self-Predication Requirement was inadequate. Things can be F insofar as they are G even when G is not "that on account of which" F things are F. The example involved a kind term and one of its necessary accidents or propria. One can have every confidence that insofar as a figure has interior angles equal to one hundred and eighty degrees it is a triangle. But, this doesn't explain why the figure is a triangle because it doesn't give the essence of triangle. When we discover the logical cause of F, we answer the question, "What is F?" This answer is a λόγος. The essence evidence that the writer adduces in support of the latter view all turns on the incompleteness of 'good' and 'bad.'

One way to understand this is to suppose that in the latter account, the reference of τὸ ἀγαθὸν is being allowed to shift between some good thing and an abstraction—the good. For example, we can call the victory, which is good for the winner, a good thing, i.e. τὸ ἀγαθὸν. But this victory is also bad for the loser. But, the victory (a.k.a. τὸ ἀγαθὸν [τῷ νικῶν]) is also κακὸν [τῷ ηδομένον]. So, the same thing is both good and bad. But, if in addition, one conflates identity and predication, this might suggest that the good and the bad are themselves the same thing. When the author of the Dissoi Logoi turns to criticize the view that good and bad are the same (1.10-14), he does so by supposing that this is indeed an identity claim. For instance, by doing for one's parents what is good, one would also be doing for them what is very bad.

The Dissoi Logoi has been given various dates, but the consensus seems to be that it was composed between 403 and 395. Its authorship is likewise uncertain, but scholars have argued for Pythagorean influences (hence the Doric), as well as Hippias, Gorgias and Protagoras. If (and this is very conjectural) the Dissoi Logoi or some similar work formed part of the intellectual backdrop of Plato's early years, it would not be at all suprising if he interpreted the SP requirement as SP1 precisely because he thought that the alternative was a relativistic position which violated SR.
is simply the thing that this λόγος is of or about. Perhaps the explanation for the self-predication test is that Plato thought that self-predication amounted to the claim that

(SP2) The logical cause of F is the essence of F; that is, the essence can be predicated of the logical cause.

The connection between SP2 and SPT concerns the kind of learning that takes place when we figure out what something is. Sometimes we answer "what is F" questions without a λόγος. For instance, the apprentice potter learns what good clay is, not by learning its chemical formula, but by being shown good clay. "Look," says the master, "this is what good clay is." What the pupil is shown in no way fails to be good clay. It is not "no more good clay than not good clay." What he is shown answers the question, "What is F?" Thus, as I have defined essence, what he is shown is something of which the essence is predicable—it is what good clay is. Further, what he is shown is completely F. This suggests that anything of which the essence is predicable will be such that no sentence of the form 'x is not F πρός ϕ' is true of it. Hence the connection between SPT and SP2.

This explanation of the SP requirement is also very appealing, since it too provides an explanation for why Plato might have been moved, upon proper reflection, to the doctrine of the Phaedo. SP2 says that the essence of F is predicable of the logical cause of F. The dialogues of search characterize the logical cause as present to or immanent in sensible things. So, essences ought to be present to them as well. Further, since the λόγος is of the essence and the essence is present in the senibles, the λόγος ought to be of or about them. But, where F is
an incomplete relative predicate, any sensible will be both F and not F in some respect or other. As a result, the λόγος of F will be of what is no more F than not F. This suggests that the essence is not present in the sensibles after all. But, the logical cause must be present in them—it is what makes them F by virtue of its presence. So, one might be driven to distinguish between a proximate and ultimate logical cause of the beauty of Helen. The latter is the Form of which the essence is predicable. The former is the share of the Beautiful that Helen has on account of which she is beautiful.43

iii. self-predication as identity with essence

Yet another gambit for understanding self-predications has been to view them as identity statements. Not only is this an obvious way to understand sentences of the form 'x is y,' but it is also alleged to avert the problem of the Third Man Argument. Thus, in his reply to Vlastos' statement of the TMA, Cherniss writes:

Such statements as these quoted by Vlastos [Prt. 330c-d, Phd. 100c, Lys. 217d and Smp. 211a, ff.] and taken by him to imply that Justice and Beauty were assumed to have the characters indicated may also mean, however, the 'Justice' and 'just' or 'Beauty' and 'beautiful' are identical; and it can be shown that Plato was well aware of the difference between such an assertion of identity and an attribution and in this awareness consciously denied what

43 One might even suppose that the essence is predicable of the shares. Once the shares are distinguished from the individual, then the λόγος of the essence is no longer of what is no more F than not F. Such a strategy does raise the question of what distinguishes Forms from shares. On this question, see Silverman (1991b). We shall see in Chapter Five how the issue of the kind of being that shares have raises special problems for "young Socrates' answer" to Zeno.
Vlastos believes he unconsciously assumed without understanding its implications.44

Presumably this suggestion can be applied to the logical causes out of which, I think, fully fledged Platonic Forms develop. Such a suggestion would nip the TMA objection in the bud by placing a harmless interpretation of the self-predication requirement into the notion of a logical cause from which the idea of separated Forms develops.

The difficulty with this suggestion is determining what kind of identity statement is expressed in a self-predication statement like ‘the beautiful itself is beautiful.’ Clearly, the identity is not of the same form as the tautology ‘A is A.’ Not only does the syntax suggest otherwise, but such an interpretation would fail to show how the SP requirement can be turned into any kind of interesting test. One might hold that ‘the (logical cause of) F is the G’ asserts an identity between two synonymous expressions, like ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man.’ This, however, would imply that claims like ‘courage is knowledge of what is to be feared’ or ‘justice is doing one’s own’ are analytic.45 But, in the dialogues, neither

44 Cherniss (1957) reprinted in Allen (1965) p. 370. Cf. Cherniss ACPA, p. 298, “Plato, then, believed that since the idea is that which the particular has as an attribute, the “third man” is illegitimate as an argument against the ideas because idea and particular cannot be treated as homogeneous members of a multiplicity.”

45 For the connection between synonymy and analytic truths appealed to here see Quine (1953) p. 23. “The characteristic of such a statement [an analytic truth that is not merely a logical truth] is that it can be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms.”

Analyticity and synonymy are notoriously difficult notions. The point of Quine’s attack on the former and on meaning, the close cousin of synonymy, is to show that these concepts cannot bear the weight that logical positivism placed upon them by making them foundational concepts. What I propose here is merely a rough and ready argument from elimination. If self-predications are identity statements, they must be a particular kind of identity statement. The other kinds of identity statements just won’t do. If the reliance that this argument places on the
Socrates nor his interlocutors are presented as regarding these statements as obvious truths which can be verified simply by adverting to the meanings of the terms involved. This, of course, leaves open the possibility that, for all that, they might be analytic. Plato might simply have lacked the appropriate concepts and, hence, portrayed the activity of engaging in meaning analyses in a rather odd way. But, unbeknownst to him, that is what he was really doing because the 'is' in the Self-Predication Requirement is that of identity between synonymous expressions. But this line of reasoning wouldn't help explain why Plato thought that the SP requirement was a reasonable constraint on answers to "what is F" questions. The best that could be said is that, in spite of his lack of a well worked out philosophy of language, he intuited that synonymy is a good test for any proposed analysis of the term 'the F.' This, it seems to me, is a bad instance of anachronism in the history of philosophy. The task is to find some set of presumptions that Plato could plausibly have held against the backdrop of which SP is a reasonable requirement for logical causes.

If the identity in 'the F is the G' is not a case of synonymy, then it remains that it might be on the same par with identity statements like 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' or 'water is H_2O.' Unlike 'Aristotle is Aristotle,' such identity statements tell us something informative. Unlike 'a bachelor is an unmarried man,' these identities tell us something that we wouldn't have come to know simply by reflecting on the meanings of the words.

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concepts of analyticity and synonymy is not commensurate with our rather rough understanding of these concepts, an analogy follows to buttress the argument from elimination.
If the statement 'the logical cause of beauty is beautiful' is supposed to be the same sort of identity statement as 'Hesperus is Phosphorus,' then this implies that the thing picked out by 'the logical cause of beauty' and the referent of 'beautiful' are identical. But even if we treat 'beautiful' as a name of all the beautiful things, it is unlikely that this is what Plato means. After all, the logical cause of beauty is that which makes all the beautiful things beautiful. It is not merely the aggregate of them, unless their beauty is self-explanatory. Obviously, Plato thought that it was not.

It remains that self-predication statements might be like the identity statement 'water is H\textsubscript{2}O.' Such an identity statement asserts the identity of a natural kind with its essence. It is plausible to think that such truths are necessary since they express what Locke called "real definitions." This is promising since it seems that Plato regards whatever is expressed by substitution instances in the SP schema as a very durable, if not necessary, truth. In *Hippias Major* 291d, Socrates is looking for something that "will never appear ugly in any way at any time to anybody." I take it that, whatever τὸ καλὸν might turn out to be, the reason that

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46 I say that this is implied if the self-predication claim is on a par with the previous identity statement. Just what such identity statements mean is a tough question. We need not go as far as a meaning analysis to see that self-predications are not like these puzzling kinds of identity statements.

47 See Locke's *Essay* III.i.15, ff. For a defense of the necessity of such claims, see Kripke (1972). His argument turns on a particular view about reference, though he needs more than simply this in order to generate the conclusions that he wants. See Salmon (1981). Nonetheless, he summarizes very nicely the intuition that supports the belief that identity statements between natural kind terms and their essences are necessary. "Any world in which we imagine a substance which does not have these properties is a world in which we imagine substance which is not gold, provided these properties form the basis of what the substance is." (p. 125, my italics)
it will never appear to anyone to be ugly, is that it never in any way is ugly under any circumstances (cf. *Smp.* 211a, ff). Further, one might well think that what we mean by "giving the essence" is exactly what Plato is after. The self-predication schema, 'the F itself is F,' awaits the substitution of some other term or terms for the second occurrence of F. These terms "give the essence" of the F or say what it really is to be F. We can have identities which are necessary but which do not display the essence as one of the terms in the identity statement. So, given God's perfect nature, 'what is good = what God loves' is both true and necessary. But, if the divine command theory is false, God's love is not the explanation for the goodness of things. If we seek the grounds for the necessity, they do not lie in the nature of good, but rather in the nature of God's omniscience and omnibenevolence. The situation is quite different in the case of "water is H₂O." It is because the nature of water just is to be H₂O that water could not fail to be H₂O. We can also have statements of the form 'the F is the G' which are necessarily true and non-trivial and, perhaps, not analytic. I am thinking of necessary accidents or propria. Some of these look like analytic truths, such as "A triangle is a figure the sum of whose interior angles is 180 degrees." Others, like "An organism with sensitive soul is an organism with nutritive soul" look less analytic. But, what sets such sentences (analytic or no) apart from claims like "water is H₂O" is the fact that in the latter, but not the former, the 'is' is that of identity, not predication. Thus, this identity interpretation preserves what I called above the order of explanatory precedence.

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48 I am indebted to Michael Watkins for this charming example.
These considerations suggest the following line of reasoning: in the dialogues of search, Plato is interested in finding what I have called the logical cause of F. This is "that by virtue of which all F things are F." Further, the logical cause of F is said by Plato to be, in some unspecified sense, F. In practice, this Self-Predication Requirement serves as a schema to test substitution instances for F. So, Socratic interlocutors, or Socrates himself, suggests substitutions like, "the F is the G." These sentences are discussed as if they were candidates for identity statements. These identities are not treated as if they were either trivial or analytic. Further, Socrates seems to be striving for identities that are necessary. But, we know of a kind of identity statement that fits this bill exactly: identity statements between natural kind terms and their essences are necessary, non-trivial and synthetic. This suggests the hypothesis that the Self-Predication Requirement really amounts to the following:

\[
\text{SP3: The logical cause of } F \text{ is identical to the essence of } F.
\]

Moreover, it is easy to see why SP3 would make the is-completely test implicit in SPT plausible.\(^4\) Identity is a complete relation. If \(a = b\), then no

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\(^4\) Nehamas' (1979) seems to have an identity reading of the Self-Predication Requirement in his analysis. The F is F means that the F, whatever it turns out to be, is what it is to be F. This seems to assert an identity between non-synonymous expressions. See Silverman (1991). However, his version of the self-predication test turns out to be much stronger because of his One Name Principle.

If \(w\) is the name of \(a\), then \(w\) is the only name that \(a\) has and \(a\) is the only object named by \(w\).

He alleges that Plato initially held such a principle and fought hard in the Parmenides and the Sophist to overcome it. If this were so, then if any sentence of the form 'x is G' were true, then x could not be the F. Things with real being are named by only one name.
sentence of the form \(a \neq b \pi_{\rho_\omega} \psi\) can be true. It takes only a bit of slippage to transform this observation into SPT. We noted above that a term like 'the capable' can slide between being a vague name of some useful thing and indicating some distinct abstraction whose ontological status is far from clear. In the *Hippias Major* example, Socrates finds a case in which a person's capacity is not fine. From this he concludes that "the capable" is not the fine. On the interpretation that we are considering now this amounts to the claim that the essence of the fine is not identical to the capable.

Such an argument, it seems to me, trades on an ambiguity between being identical to \(x\) and being \(x\). The argument requires that if there is any respect in which \(x\) fails to be \(y\), then \(x\) isn't \(y\). The first 'is' is one of predication, the second the 'is' of identity. The variables disguise the fact that 'y' is functioning as a name in the latter case and as a predicate in the former. But, to someone who runs together predicates and names, the inference is likely to appear to be a good one. Consider the matter in this light: Names or definite descriptions like 'a' and 'b' or 'the abc' flank identity signs. We think that such an identity does not obtain when we find a sentence of the form 'a is not b.' But the 'is' in such a sentence functions as an identity sign, not as the copula. Hence it is no wonder that we think the statements are incompatible. One is just the simple denial of the other. But the sentence '¬(Ab)' is not the simple denial of \(a = b\). In fact, as the modern notation makes obvious, they share only one term. We can better see the problem if we utilize modern notation throughout. Let 'î' be the symbol for is-completely.
This operator attaches to complete sentences of the form ‘Fa’ or ‘a = b’ to form a new sentence.

\[ \dagger(Fa) \leftrightarrow df - [E(\pi \rho \circ \circ \varphi) (\neg (Fa) \pi \rho \circ \circ \varphi)]^{50} \]

\[ \dagger(a = b) \leftrightarrow df - [E(\pi \rho \circ \circ \varphi)(a \neq b) \pi \rho \circ \circ \varphi)] \]

The conditional upon which Plato depends can then be re-written as

1. \[ - (\dagger(\text{Ab})) \rightarrow (a \neq b) \]

But (1) is not obviously true unless much more is said about the relation between the predicate ‘A’ and the name ‘a.’ Unless (Aa), the fact that \( \neg A \) \( \pi \rho \circ \circ \varphi \) does not constitute proof that a is not identical to b.

Like the predication interpretation, the identity interpretation of the self-predication constraint is pregnant with possibilities. Since, in the dialogues of search, logical causes are present in sensible things, SP3 implies that essences are too. Since the \( \lambda \rho \varphi \circ \circ \gamma \circ \circ \) of F is of or about the essence, this \( \lambda \rho \varphi \circ \circ \gamma \circ \circ \) should be of or about the sensible F things. But, as noted above, where F is incomplete, these sensibles will be both F and not F. This suggests that the essence of F must be non-identical with them.

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50 'E' functions here in lieu of the ordinary existential symbol due to the limitations of my printer.
§2. Incomplete Relatives and Socratic Questions

Thus far we have distinguished two conditions that any candidate for the logical cause of F must meet: it must be a single thing and it must be self-predicating. We also have three alternative interpretations of what this last condition means. I propose to turn now to a dialogue that concerns itself with an incomplete relative predicate. An examination of the way that candidates for the logical cause of the fine in the *Hippias Major* will accomplish two ends. First, we can see quite specifically what sorts of special problems incomplete relatives pose for Socratic questions. Second, we may find something that will help us decide which interpretation of the self-predication requirement is the correct one.

A. Hippias' Answers

The preliminaries to the dialogue suggest that incomplete relatives and the problems that they pose will be its focus. Hippias is barred by Spartan law from educating the young men of that city. Socrates purports to find this odd, since that which is genuinely lawful is really beneficial. So, the Spartans are actually lawbreakers by virtue of adhering to their laws. We should note a few things about this passage for future reference. First, this very pattern of explanation comes in for criticism in the *Phaedo*. In his "intellectual history" Socrates says that he came to reject explanations of the form 'x is F on account of some y which is G' (where F and G are opposites). This paradoxical situation is averted, in this

51 *Hp.Ma.* 284e, τὸ ἀφελιμώτερον τοῦ ἀνωφελεστέρου νομιμώτερον ἥγονται τῇ ἀθετεῖα πάσιν ἀνθρώποις.
instance, because of the distinction between what really is lawful and what merely seems to be lawful to those who do not know. Thus the foundation is laid for the distinction between the \( \alpha i\tau i\alpha \) of the fine and the \( \alpha i\tau i\alpha \) of the appearance of fineness which will be introduced later at 293d.

At 287c-e, Socrates begins the search for the logical cause of the fine. He first establishes that the object of the search "is something"(\( \varepsilon \sigma \tau i\, \tau i\, \tau \sigma \tau o\), cf. Phdo. 65d) Not only is the fine something, but there is also justice, wisdom and the good. This is an immediate consequence of the "becausal power" of these things, for it is by the fine that all fine things are fine (\( \tau \alpha\, \kappa \alpha \lambda \alpha\, \pi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha\, \tau \phi\, \kappa \alpha \lambda \phi\,\varepsilon \sigma ti\, \kappa \alpha \lambda \alpha\)). At least initially there is a clearly conceptual distinction between the fine things and "the fine." The latter is distinct from the former on the grounds that it is that by which they are what they are. The point is reinforced when Socrates distinguishes between the questions \( \tau i\, \varepsilon \sigma ti\, \kappa \alpha \lambda \nu\); and \( \delta\, \tau i\, \varepsilon \sigma ti\, \tau \delta\, \kappa \alpha \lambda \delta\nu\);

Hippias' answers to this question are themselves a source of great controversy. His first response is that "a fine girl is a fine thing" (\( \pi \alpha r \beta e no\,\zeta\, \kappa \alpha \lambda \eta\,\kappa \alpha \lambda \lambda \nu\), 287e). Some suppose that he is presented as simply mistaking the force of Socrates' question. Nehamas (1975b) suggests that he not mistaken about what

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52 cf. La. 190e and Euthyrhr. 5d-e. Many commentators locate the confusion as one between particulars and universals. What Socrates is allegedly looking for is a universal. What his interlocutors give him are particular instances. Among the adherents of this view Nehamas (1975b) lists Burnet (1924), Allen (1970), Crombie (1964) and Geach (1966). One might also add Taylor (1926) and Shorey (1933). If this interpretation is correct, Hippias is presented as such a dunce that he mistakes the point of Socrates' question no less than three times. Some scholars have found this portrayal of a noted sophist so vicious as to be unworthy of Plato and take it as grounds for atheorizing the Hippias Major. So Schleiermacher (1836) and Wilamowitz (1919).
Socrates wants but is offering a "Gorgian" definition. We ought to read the Greek as "being a fine girl is what it is to be fine." Of course, since the definition is Gorgian—that is, doesn't meet the singularity requirement—there are a variety of other parts to what it is to be fine. Socrates' first question to Hippias concerning the answer that he has given suggests that Hippias has somehow misunderstood the question. He claims that it is not clear how it is that he is supposed to respond to his fictional questioner. "Shall I say that if a fine girl is a fine thing, then these things are fine on account of this?" The problem, I take it, is that it is unclear how this could be the reason for the beauty of the multitude of beautiful things. But, instead of pursuing the question of how a fine girl might be the reason that fine things are fine, Socrates takes another tack. The fine girl cannot pass the self-predication test because she fails to be-completely fine. In relation to a goddess, even a fine girl will not appear fine. Since this is so, she is said to be no more fine than not fine. But if this is so, Hippias' answer is not responsive to the question αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὁ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν. The nature of Socrates' reply

53 These are not the only alternatives, of course. Woodruff (1982) p. 125 argues that Hippias is using humor and embarrassment as a means of evading a difficult question. cf. Gorgias DK82B12 = Aristotle Rhet. 1419b3, "Gorgias said that you should kill your opponents' earnestness with jesting and their jesting with earnestness." My observations on this passage do not decide the question between Woodruff and Nehamas. On the whole, I am inclined to Woodruff's view simply because Hippias himself does not take what he has given as an answer very seriously (286e). The important point for our purposes is that both the developed and implied attacks that Socrates makes on these positions involve just the adequacy conditions on answers to "what is F" questions that I have identified. Nehamas' analysis also gives something like a complete-being requirement only it is much stronger.

54 288a, ἐγὼ δὲ ἡ ἐρῶ δὴ εἰ παράνοια καλὴ καλῶν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ νοῦν ὁ ἐν εἰς καλὰ. T W give δὲ which Burnet sensibly emends to δὲ. Schanz and other editors supply τι after ἔστι. This seems to me to be unnecessary. Socrates has already secured the premise that there is a logical cause—a δὲ—of the fine. What this passage tries to convey is Socrates' puzzlement about how a fine girl can be such a δὲ.
illuminates a number of points. First, if Socrates' question demanded an answer with a certain ontological status, we should expect him to make more of the fact that, for instance, a fine girl cannot be 'had by many.' This tends to confirm my claim that 'what is F' questions have no specific ontological pre-suppositions. It also suggests that Nehamas is correct in his claim that Hippias is not guilty of confusing universal and particulars. Second, it shows the use that Socrates makes of the self-predication requirement and the singularity requirement. Though the former occupies center stage, the latter is at least hinted at in 288a.

Hippias' two other candidates for the fine receive similar treatment. At 289d, Socrates gives an additional specification of what the beautiful is. It is "that by which all the other things are adorned and appear beautiful, whenever this form is added to them." Hippias takes this guideline too far and suggests that the fine is that which is immanent in some fine things at least—gold. This time Socrates' objection relies upon the Singularity Requirement with the suggestion that gold fails to be-completely fine. Gold added to things makes them fine only when it is fitting. Since sometimes other things are more fitting than gold, like fig wood for cooking utensils, gold is no more fine than fig wood. The explicit point seems to be that other things apart from gold can explain why a thing is fine. But there is also the suggestion that gold is not fine in some respect. If 'in relation to

55 ὃ καὶ τάλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὰν τῷ προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τῷ ἐλδός. cf. 292d, προσγένηταί. It will turn out that this needs to be qualified. The fine cannot be that by virtue of which all fine things appear fine as well as that by which they are fine. After all, not all fine things appear to be fine (see below pp. 101-3).
soup spoons' counts as an adequate \( \pi\rho\sigma_\epsilon \ \psi \) qualifier, then a sentence of the form 'gold is not fine \( \pi\rho\sigma_\epsilon \ \psi \)' is true. Hence, gold fails to be completely fine.

Hippias finally seems to appreciate the strictness of the being-completely test. Socrates' questioner, he surmises, is looking for an answer which shows that the fine is the sort of thing that will never appear to be foul for anyone, anywhere, at any time.\(^{56}\) I take that in this context 'appear' means to appear correctly.\(^{57}\) Hippias' last attempt to isolate the fine is a plurality of qualities that the Greek in the street would associate with the good life. It is to be rich and healthy, honored by the Greeks, to reach old age and, having provided a fine burial for one's parents, to be buried in turn by one's children. This, surely, could not seem to anyone to be anything other than fine. Socrates, of course, finds a situation where a statement of the form 'x is not fine \( \pi\rho\sigma_\epsilon \ \psi \)' is true. The qualifying phrase in this case is 'for Achilles' (\( \tau\phi^*A\chi\varepsilon\lambda\llambda\epsilon\iota \)).

In Hippias' last suggestion, as in the other two cases, it is the capacity that 'fine' has to be used attributively or as an implicit comparative that causes the trouble. In addition, Socrates does not make an issue of the ontological status of the things that Hippias offers as candidates for the fine. And, we must note, these candidates are of varied ontological orders. One seems to be either a particular or a kind of particular, another is a homoiomerous substance and the last is

\(^{56}\) \textit{Hp.Ma.} 291d, \( \zeta\eta\eta\epsilon\iota\upsilon \ \gamma\alpha\rho \ \mu\omicron \ \delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\alpha\varsigma \ \tau\omicron\omega\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon \ \tau\upsilon \ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron \ \alpha\pi\omicron\kappa\rho\iota\nu\alpha\sigma\theta\upsilon\iota \), \( \delta \ \mu\nu\delta\epsilon\sigma\iota\tau\omicron\nu \ \alpha\iota\chi\rho\omicron \ \mu\nu\delta\alpha\omicron\mu \ \mu\nu\delta\epsilon\iota \ \phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\iota\tau\omicron \). \( \text{cf.} \ 292e, \ \epsilon\omicron \ \tau\alpha\chi\varsigma \varsigma \ \epsilon\iota\nu\epsilon\lambda \). \\

\(^{57}\) When the conditions are recapitulated at 292d all things to which the fine is added come to be fine. \( \delta \ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\iota. \ \phi \ \epsilon\upsilon \ \pi\rho\omicron\gamma\epsilon\nu\epsilon\iota\eta\tau\omicron\upsilon, \ \upsilon\pi\acute{\alpha} \chi\epsilon\iota \ \kappa\alpha\lambda\iota \ \epsilon\iota \nu\iota \).
perhaps best characterized as a complex universal. In all three cases, what disqualifies the candidates is not their ontological status, but the fact that they fail to be-completely fine or fail to meet the Singularity Requirement. This suggests that the constraints on answers to Socratic questions are simply those that we have isolated. If Plato thought that these constraints made it necessary to think that the logical cause of the fine was a separated, super-sensible form, he certainly does nothing in this part of the *Hippias* to indicate this fact.

B. The Fitting, The Capable and The Beneficial

The next phase of the dialogue shows Socrates hard at work on some things that are rather less familiar then fine girls, gold and burying one's parents. The ontological status of these abstractions is never made entirely clear. What is clear is that all the candidates that Socrates brings forth for consideration are themselves incomplete relatives. The thought, perhaps, is that mirroring the incompleteness of the definiendum in the definiens will solve the problem.

At 293e, Socrates picks up a suggestion from the discussion of gold. It was agreed that the addition of gold made a thing fine, but only when it was appropriate or fitting. So, he concludes, perhaps the fine is the fitting (τὸ πρέπον). But now Socrates is careful to distinguish between two things that the fitting might be the logical cause of—being fine or the appearance of being fine. Hippias is convinced that the fitting (construed quite literally) can account for a thing's appearing fine when, in fact, it is far from fine. Because he is unwilling to give up
this assumption, he supposes that the fitting is the explanation for both why things are fine and why they appear to be fine. But, fine things do not always appear fine. So, one of two things must be the case: either the fitting is what makes things to be fine, but does not make them appear fine or the fitting simply makes things appear fine. If the latter is the case, then the fitting is definitely not the object of our search. If the former, then it may be. Hippias agrees that the fitting is that by which things appear fine. After all, he has been given no reason to think that it is not the case that fine clothes can make a not so fine person look fine.

The argument here turns on the Singularity Requirement alone. We have two distinct things to be explained—fineness and the appearance of fineness. They are distinct, of course; one can occur without the other. The Singularity Requirement states that there is only one logical cause which explains why all F things are F, likewise for all H things (where F and H are not opposites). Could it be that there could be a single "because," the K, for both F things and H things? Recall that the logical cause of the F is that which, being present to F things, makes them F. If this very same thing can be present to something that is not F, as must be the case if F-ness and H-ness are distinct and the K is the logical cause of both, then it is not really the logical cause of the F. Where the explananda can occur independently of one another, the explanans must be distinct. So, Plato writes at 294e:

So the fitting, if it makes things to be fine, would be the fine which we seek, but it would not be what makes them seem fine. But if, on the other hand, the fitting makes the appearance, it would not be the fine which we seek. Because that makes things be; but by itself
it could not make things to be and to seem, nor could anything else.\textsuperscript{58}

The singularity requirement generates a very odd consequence when it is applied to appearances. We are inclined to say that things seem to be, or are thought to be, F precisely because they are F, at least in many cases. Indeed, on some causal accounts, this is precisely what makes our belief that x is F an instance of knowledge.\textsuperscript{59} But, given that the appearance of F-ness and F-ness can part company with one another, the Singularity Requirement implies that the logical cause of being F must be distinct from the logical cause of appearing to be F. If this is taken seriously, it means that the appearance of F things are utterly irrelevant to the question of what the logical cause of F-ness is. One could investigate the appearance of F-ness and isolate the "because" behind it without discovering the logical cause of being F. Thus, the Singularity Requirement may

\textsuperscript{58} 294d-e, ἦσε τὸ πρέπον, εἰ μὲν τὸ καλὰ ποιοῦν ἐστὶν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἄν εἰθ ὁ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, σὺ μὲντοι τὸ γε ποιοῦν φαίνεσθαι. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ πρέπον, σὺκ ἄν εἰθ τὸ καλὸν ὁ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν. εἶναι γὰρ ἄκεινό γε ποιεῖ, φαίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ εἶναι ποιεῖν οὐ μόνον καλὰ οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύνατο [τὸ] αὐτό, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἄλλο ὑπερν. Clearly there are problems with the text here. Burnet brackets ποιεῖν in the last line. It is not clear to me how this helps matters. I follow Woodruff in translating this passage. He drops the τὸ and takes αὐτὸ as "by itself."

\textsuperscript{59} See, for instance, Goldman’s early causal account of knowledge. (Goldman (1967) in Pappas and Swain (1978)) On this view, "S knows that p if and only if the fact that p is causally connected in an 'appropriate' way with S's believing that p," p. 82. One of the appropriate knowledge producing causal processes is perception. It is presumably because the fact that x is F makes it appear that x is F that the belief we form based on the appearance of x constitutes knowledge.
explain, in part at least, Plato's attitude toward the role of sense perception in attaining knowledge in the *Phaedo*.  

This passage also has one other interesting ramification for the *Phaedo*. Socrates provides Hippias with an example of that by which all F things are F, even if they do not appear to be. It is because of the overtopping that all large things are large. However, *Phaedo* 102 lists "the large" as the logical cause of largeness. Worse yet, it is largeness that is invoked at 102b to explain why Simmias overtops Socrates. It looks as if there is a circularity here: largeness is the "because" of overtopping and overtopping is the "because" of largeness. In the next chapter I shall argue that Plato derives additional constraints on explanations which rule out the overtopping as a logical cause of largeness. It is by the overtopping that A is larger than B and also by the same thing that B is smaller than A. We shall have to see how it is that Plato moves to this additional requirement and the ontology that comes with it. After all, the overtopping is a perfectly ordinary physical thing. Indeed, it is simply a part of the larger object. Understanding the motives for this addition will, I believe, help decide between the competing interpretations of the Self-Predication Requirement that we considered in §1 of this chapter.

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60 See Chapter 3. In the *Theaetetus*, I think, Plato gives up the notion that there is a single "because" behind the way things seem to us. The world as it seems to us is the net result of the conditions of the objects that we perceive and our sense organs. At best, sense perception can provide us with clues on the basis of which we can tell an *eikós μένος* about their causes. See Turnbull (1988).

61 294b, διαπερ φάντα τα μεγάλα ἐστι μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχουτι τούτῳ γάρ πάντα μεγάλα ἐστι. By "the overtopping" I suppose Plato means the part of a thing that extends beyond the thing with which it is compared.
We have already considered the way in which Socrates uses the self-predication test to reject the capable and power as the logical cause of the fine (supra pp. 73-4). At 296d, Hippias proposes a modification of this suggestion: the fine is the useful and power for doing something good. Because the self-predication test requires careful attention to qualifiers like ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὰ ποιήσας, Socrates quickly distinguishes this candidate from the preceding one and identifies it with "the beneficial" (τὸ ἀῤῥελλιμόν). This, in turn, is the cause of the good (αὕτιον τοῦ ἄγαθον).

The argument against this candidate for the logical cause of the fine is very compressed and has been regarded by many scholars as fallacious. At first glance, it seems to have this structure:

1. The fine is the cause of the good.
2. The cause is not that which comes into being, nor is that which comes into being the cause.
3. So, the fine is not good and the good is not fine.

The mistake can be cast as either an equivocation on 'is not' or on 'is other than.' The second premise points out rightly that a cause and its effect are non-identical. To put it another way, the one is other than the other. What the conclusion

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asserts is that the good is *not predicated* of the fine nor the fine of the good. The fine is other than the good in the sense that it has some quality other than being good and vice versa.

There is an equivocation here but it is exactly the kind of equivocation that we should expect from the person who accepts the is-completely interpretation of the SP requirement. *x* fails to be-completely *F* when any sentence of the form ‘*x* is not *F* προς *ψ.*’ Since, in some sense, ‘*x* is other than *F*’ implies ‘*x* is not *F,*’ the proposed logical cause of the fine fails the self-predication test.

We might also explain the rejection of "the cause of the good" as the logical cause of the fine by way of the Singularity Requirement. As we saw above, SR requires that there be two distinct logical causes for *F* and *G* where these two things can be found apart from one another. But, it is unlikely that Plato thought that anything could be καλόν without being ἀγαθόν. Instead, here our supposition is that the reason why things are fine is not distinct from the explanation of why some things, at least, are good. That by virtue of which good things are good is the αἰτίον of the good. If the fine is likewise the αἰτίον of the good, then

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63 cp. 297a, ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε αἰτίον, Ἔπειτα, καὶ οὐ ἄν αἰτίον ἦ τὸ αἰτίον, ἄλλο ἔστιν with 297c, οὐδὲ ἁρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλὸν.

64 This inference appears more defensible once we remember that Plato's analysis of negative sentences is in terms of otherness. The *Sophist* is, of course, much later than *Hippias Major,* but perhaps it is not too speculative to see the kernel of the idea here.

65 Cf. *Grg.* 474c.

66 We are not explicitly told that the fine is the only cause of the good, though this is certainly suggested by 297b.
the explanation of why something is fine coincides exactly with the explanation of why some distinct thing, its \( \gamma \gamma \nu \omicron \mu \epsilon \nu \omicron \nu \), is good.

1. The fine is the cause of the good.

2. That by virtue of which \( x \) is a cause is distinct from that by virtue of which \( y \) is an effect.

3. So, that by virtue of which \( x \) is fine is distinct from what makes \( y \) good. (1 & 2)

4. What makes \( x \) fine is that \( y \), its \( \gamma \gamma \nu \omicron \mu \epsilon \nu \omicron \nu \), is good. (by 1)

5. What makes \( y \) good is the \( \alpha \iota \tau \omicron \omicron \nu \) of the good. (by notion of logical cause)

6. So, the \( \alpha \iota \tau \omicron \omicron \nu \) of the good is distinct from the logical cause of the fine. (3, 4 & 5)

This would explain why Plato would reject the notion that the fine is the \( \alpha \iota \tau \omicron \omicron \nu \xi \omicron \tau \omicron \delta \omicron \omicron \omicron \). It would not yet explain why he rejects it by drawing the conclusion that the good is not fine and the fine is not good.\(^{67} \) After all,

\(^{67}\) Woodruff's interpretation of the argument seems to me to be a curious mix of these two lines of reasoning. He introduces a notion called 'strict predication' which is relevantly similar to what I call complete predication. He then interprets the father and son example as showing that whatever a productive cause is strictly is distinct from what its effect is strictly. This seems right. He then claims that the effect of the fine must be strictly good. Hence the fine cannot be strictly good. It is not clear to me, however, why that which comes to be, the \( \gamma \gamma \nu \omicron \mu \epsilon \nu \omicron \nu \) of the fine, must be strictly good. Clearly the logical cause of the good must be strictly good, but why must the \( \alpha \gamma \alpha \theta \omicron \nu \gamma \nu \omicron \mu \epsilon \nu \omicron \nu \) be strictly good?

Further, he also claims that in this situation "one logical cause would be related to two different things, which is impossible." His reasons are much the same as mine. He approaches the gap between what the argument shows on this interpretation and what Socrates seems to be claiming in the following way: either Hippias understands the actual, more conservative conclusion and has reasons for finding it repugnant or Hippias simply misses the slide between the two
something can be fine without being the logical cause of the fine—witness Hippias' fine girl. Yet, it is the shocking conclusion that the good is not fine and the fine is not good that makes the reductio argument work. How is it that Socrates moves from the non-identity of the logical causes of the fine and the good to the conclusion that the fine is not good and vice versa? This interpretation of the argument leaves us with no clear answer.

We could remove the equivocation by resorting to the identity reading of the Self-Predication Requirement. Indeed, this would make good sense of Socrates' example at 297b. 'The father is not the son' would not simply illustrate the non-identity of the two individuals. It would indicate the fact that the essence of each is distinct. What it is to be a father is not identical to what it is to be a son.

1. The essence of the fine is to be the cause of the good and the fine is identical to this.

2. The essence of the cause is not identical to the essence of the thing that comes to be.

3. So, the essence of the fine is not identical to the essence of the good.

claims. In the latter case, Plato's point is said to be to show Hippias falling victim to his own brand of verbal chicanery. I am not sure that this does enough to bridge the gap.  

68 It might also explain the Greek better. If Plato had simply wanted to make the point that a father and his son are non-identical, he might well have used a definite article before οἶδας and πατήρ. What he writes instead is οὖν δ' οἶδας πατήρ, οὖν δ' οἶδας πατήρ.
But (3') is not an intolerable result at all. While we might think that all good things are fine and all fine things are good, we might yet believe that their essences are distinct. However, when we attempted to discover the connection between the complete-being test in SPT and SP3, we noted that Plato slides from the truth of ‘the G is not F πρός ϕ’ to the conclusion that the F is not identical to the G. That is, the G is not the essence of the F. Thus, the move from non-identity of essence to the claim that the G is not F is just the other side of the coin. The self-predication as identity of essence interpretation doesn't make the argument a good one, but it does exhibit it as of a piece with a systematic equivocation in Plato.

The self-predication as predication of essence interpretation handles this argument even less well. If this interpretation were correct, then the fully expanded schema for testing candidates for the logical cause of the fine would look like this:

1. The essence of the fine is the cause of the good and this can be predicated of the fine.

Premise 2 would get a different reading entirely. The point of the illustration of father and son would be that the essence of a cause is not predicatable of what comes to be, nor is the essence of that which comes to be predicable of its cause. So, the essence of the good would not be predicatable of the fine, nor would the essence of fine be predicatable of the good. In order to reach the conclusion that the good is not fine and the fine is not good, Plato would have to rely on the premise that if x is such that the essence of F is not predicatable of it, then it is not
F. It is certainly possible to imagine a backdrop of Parmenidean principles about being which might make such a premise look inevitable. In fact, in Chapter Five, I shall argue that in the *Parmenides* Plato considers a sense of 'is' which is such that only when the essence of F is predicable of x is x F in this sense of 'is.' But, in the early dialogues, we see nothing that suggests the problem that Socrates confronts in the *Parmenides*. For this reason, I think it unlikely that the self-predication as predication of essence interpretation is helpful for understanding the argument of *Hippias Major* 296d, ff.

The best interpretation of the argument, I think, illustrates an important point about relative predicates but it does not help us to decide among these three competing accounts of the meaning of the Self-Predication Requirement. The point of the father and son illustration is that the logical causes of ζόνη and γυνόμενα are distinct. The father is the αἰτία of the son in two ways. First, the father is the productive cause of the son. In the second sense, part of what it is to be a son is to have a father (and mother). Likewise, part of what it is to be a father, or part of what makes one a father, is the having of a son (or daughter). The notion of a son enters into the definition or logical cause of a father, but not by way of being. Rather, these elements enter the definitions of their correlatives by way of being of. It is not part of the definition of 'father' that all fathers are sons. But, the definition does require that all fathers are fathers of sons (or daughters).

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69 Ideally 'parent' and 'child' should be used to illustrate this point so as to avoid a messy disjunctive essence. I suspect that the pair 'father' and 'son' came most naturally to Plato's mind because mothers and daughters were probably largely absent from the social circles in which he moved.
Constrast this situation with the way that a καθετονοστο νοσονοσο term like plane figure enters into the definition of triangle. Part of what it is to be a triangle is to be a plane figure. In another sense, part of what it is to be a plane figure is to be a triangle. That is, being a triangle is one of the many ways of being a plane figure. It is a further specification of the genus.

If the good enters into the account of the fine by way of being of, or πρός τον being, like son enters into the account of father, the fine need not be good. It may, in fact, be good, but it does not follow from the fact that it is the fine that it is good any more than it follows from the fact that x is a father that he is a son. Yet, one might plausibly think, it ought to follow from the very nature of the fine that it is good. If this is Plato's point, then we ought to read the conclusion that he draws at 297c as the claim that the fine is not, by its very nature, good. Nor is the good, by its very nature, fine. If the fine is the αἰτίου τοῦ διὰ γένους it is, by its very nature, πρός τον the good. But this does nothing to guarantee that it is good. This is what is monstrous. If this is the right interpretation of the argument, then it does rely on more than merely SP, SR and what Hippias has admitted. It makes it an adequacy condition that the proper account of the fine be able to show why the fine is, by its very nature, good. But this would not be unusual. Recall that in Charmides 169c ff. a candidate for moderation is dismissed from consideration because it fails to show how moderation can be the great benefit that it clearly is.

70 I take it that it is a contingent fact that all mortal fathers are sons as well. The Hebrew Javch is a father but not a son insofar as he is a father. It took the New Testament to make Him into a son as well. Χασον, or, perhaps, Xaovos likewise seem to be thought of as fatherless fathers.
C. The Pleasant Through Sight or Hearing

At 297e-299b, Socrates entertains a Gorgian definition of the fine. For visual objects, to be fine is to be pleasant through sight. For things that are heard, it is to be pleasant through hearing. The definition is Gorgian because it violates the Singularity Requirement. The δ of objects which look fine is distinct from that on account of which fine sounding things are fine. Moreover, the possibility that this account of the fine might only serve to explain why some fine things are fine is raised and dropped without settling the matter.71

The first phase of the argument clears away a potential misunderstanding. The fine is not the entirety of the pleasant. That is, being pleasant tout court is not what makes fine things fine. This allows Socrates the opportunity to restate and clarify the proposed account.

This is what we say is fine, the part of the pleasant which comes to be through sight and hearing. . . . Then if the pleasant through sight and hearing is fine, that among the pleasant things which does not happen to be this way would clearly not be fine.72

It is in the next stage of the argument that Socrates begs the question against the proponent of such a Gorgian definition. As Socrates makes clear, the

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71 At 298b Socrates suggests that it might not be appropriate to say that fine laws and fine customs are fine because they are pleasing through sight and hearing. Hippias comes to agree that these matters may be something different (δοκεῖ τι ἄλλο εἶναι, 298c). Socrates thinks that these things might appear not to be outside perception. But, he will remain with the examples that best suit the proposed logical cause.

72 299b-c, τοῦθ᾽ ἥμεις γέ φαμεν τὸ μέρος τοῦ ἡδος, τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ δύναται τε καὶ ἀκοὴ γεγυμνομενον, καλὰν ἔλειναι. . . . οὐδὲν εἰπερ τὸ δὲ δύνατο καὶ ἀκοὴν ἡδον καλὰν ἐστιν, ἢ μὴ τοῦτο τυχάει ὁν τῶν ἡδῶν, δῆλον ὃτι οὐκ ἄν καλὰν εἶν.
intent of the definition is that what is pleasant through sight alone or through hearing alone or through both is fine. What is it that makes these things the logical cause of the fine? It cannot be their pleasant character, as has been agreed. Socrates insists that there must be some "something" (τὸ λογικὸ τὸν τι, 299e) in both pleasure through sight and pleasure through hearing that makes them fine. This can't be "being through sight" or "being through hearing" because this is not common to each of them. But this common element is precisely what the person who rejects the Singularity Requirement denies! There are a variety of explanations for why the multitude of fine objects are fine. Some are fine because they are pleasant through hearing, others because they are pleasant through sight, still others because they are pleasing to both the eyes and ears.

The same sort of mistake occurs in Aristotle's *Topics*. In a passage that seems to be a clear allusion to this part of the *Hippias Major*, Aristotle argues in the following way:\(^{73}\)

1. Suppose the fine is the pleasant through sight or through hearing.

2. The pleasant through hearing is the fine. (from 1)

3. The opposites of sames are sames.

4. The opposite of pleasant through hearing is not pleasant through hearing and the opposite of fine is not fine.

5. The not pleasant through hearing is not fine. (3 & 4)

\[^{73}\text{Top. 146a21-33}\]
6. An object which is pleasant through sight but not pleasant through hearing will be fine (by 1) and not fine (by 5).

Obviously (2) begs the question. A clever proponent of such a definition would never say that a partial account gives the full explanation of the nature of the fine. Plato likewise assumes that there must be some common element in all of the logical causes of the fine which is the one real logical cause of the fine. It cannot be the pleasant, nor can it be because it is pleasure through sight or through hearing. However, unlike Aristotle, he at least provides some argument for thinking that this must be so. 'Fine' is a predicate governed by the "both and each principle:"

\[ \text{B&E } \text{if both } x \text{ and } y \text{ are } F, \text{ then each is } F \text{ and if } x \text{ and } y \text{ each are } F, \text{ then both are } F. \]

But this is irrelevant to the question at hand. What is pleasant through hearing is, of course, fine but being pleasant through hearing is part of what it is to be fine. B&E does not say that if x and y are both part of what it is to be fine, then each is what it is to be fine. To put the matter another way, the fact that B&E covers applications of the term 'fine' to things does not guarantee that the same reasoning applies to what are alleged to be the logical causes of the fine.\(^{74}\)

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\(^{74}\) Woodruff similarly sees this passage as an attempt to defend the Singularity Requirement. However, he locates the failure in the B&E principle itself. It is not simply the case that some predicates are governed by it while others are not. Rather, some uses of predicates are covered by it while others are not. This strikes me as basically right. I think that it may be more important to recognize that, even if B&E held true of 'fine,' this is a quite different matter than whether it holds true of 'is the logical cause of the fine.'
D. Conclusion

The pursuit of the logical cause of the fine in the *Hippias* illustrates the problems that arise when we attempt to isolate the logical cause of an incomplete relative term within the limits that Socrates places on answers to "what is F" questions. SPT requires that a winning candidate is-completely fine. This rules out sensible things or, perhaps better, being an instance of a certain kind of sensible thing as candidates for the logical cause of the fine. Further, it guarantees that mirroring the incompleteness of 'fine' in the *definiens*, e.g. "the beneficial," will not be a winning strategy. When we find a candidate that is completely fine, like what is pleasant through sight, the singularity requirement steps in and rules it out on the grounds that it is not the one thing by virtue of which all fine things are fine.

§3. Intentional Relatives and Socratic Questions.

In Chapter One we raised the question of the relationship between action and passion pairs, like that which heats and that which is heated, and terms that are connected with them in some manner, like 'heat' and 'hot.' The *Lysis* explores the connections between 'lover,' 'beloved' and 'friend.' 'Friend' falls into the category that I have called 'intentional relatives.' Like 'master' or 'vision,' 'friend' is always of someone. Unlike 'fine,' however, 'friend' does not have attributive or comparative uses. Nonetheless, it is difficult to isolate the logical cause of friendship for much the same reason that it is difficult to name that by virtue of which all fine things are fine. This shows that the constraints on Socratic
questions pose special problems for all relative predicates, and not merely the ones which are used as comparatives or attributives.

_Lysis_ 207e-210e exhibits some of the conceptual connections between those who are dear to someone or liked by someone and those who are useful. Persons who fail to have the requisite knowledge are not permitted the liberty of taking charge of others’ property and doing as they wish. Insofar as being dear to someone demands this kind of trust, it too is a relationship that can only obtain when a person has the requisite knowledge and so is useful to those who value him or her. There is no suggestion that being useful is that by which all friends are friends. It may well be a necessary condition for friendship, or at least for being a valued person, but it is not the _δι_ of friendship. If we fail to be

75 In the _Lysis_, it is frequently difficult to distinguish between a friend or loved one and someone or something which is merely valued or liked for some reason or other. The sense of the word shifts between an adjective used to describe a friend and or family member (cf. LSJ, Ia and b: _δ ὀικία γνωστική dear wife, E.Alc.420; _φ ὕψιστος greatest friend, S.Aj.1331) an object of love (LSJ Ic: _τ ὀ. οἰκεθή to reverence what the city loves, S.OC.187) and that which is pleasant or welcome (LSJ 2: _δύσις ἀλάγη τε _φ. _τε, Od.6.208). I shall try to disambiguate things in my summary or translation where it seems clear to me that we must. In an extended translation and commentary it would, perhaps, be better to simply stick to a single translation and allow the reader to decide what is at issue by reference to the context. (Cf. Bolotin (1979) p. 55 n. 26).

76 _Ly. 210b_, _εἰς μὲν τάπτα, δ ἀν ὀρόσιμοι γενόμεθα, ὀπαντεῖ ἡμῶν ἐπιτρέψεις, . . . ποιήσομεν τε _ἐν τούτοις _δ _τι _δι βουλομέθα._

77 _Ly. 210c_, _Ἀριστοκλῆς ὁ _φίλος ἡμῶν καὶ τις ἡμῶν φιλήσει _ἐν _τούτοις, _ἐν _οἷς _ἀν ἄνωφεις; _Ο _ἄρτιτα, ἐφη. _Νῦν ἄρα οὐδὲ _ἀν πατήρ _οὐδὲ _ἄλλος _ἄλλον _οὐδένα _φιλεῖ, _καὶ _διὸν _ἀν _ἢ _ἄχρηστος._

78 Much turns on what we take this chunk of the _Lysis_ to be about—valued persons and things or friends. Vlastos (IOLP, pp. 6-11) takes it to be a discussion of friendship. As a result, he concludes that in the _Lysis_ Plato mistakes what Aristotle would later call mere _φιλία διὰ τοῦ_ _χρήσμου_ (EN. 1156a5, ff.) for real friendship. This evaluation might be changed if it could be shown that Plato explores different senses of _φιλέος_ and that what he has to say in one regard
knowledgeable, and hence useful, it is not merely friends who will not allow us to
do as we please. No one, father or mere acquaintance, will allow us to whip the
mules or drive the chariot unless we know what we are doing. If you are useful,
presumably these \( \alpha \lambda \lambda \delta \tau \rho \iota \omega \) do not automatically become your friends, though
you may become dear to them or liked by them.\(^7\)

212b begins the investigation of the logical cause of friendship in earnest.
Socrates wants to know, when one person loves another, which of the two be­
comes a friend. Does the lover become the friend of the beloved or does the
beloved become the friend of the lover?\(^8\) Strictly speaking, the question con­
cerns the conditions under which a friend comes to be. But any such investiga­
tion, by virtue of its generality, raises the question of what it is that makes all
friends friends.

Menexenus' first suggestion is equivalent to the notion that there are two
distinct logical causes of being a friend.\(^9\) If both \( x \) and \( y \) become friends of one
another when \( x \) loves \( y \), then a person becomes a friend by virtue of being either a

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\(^7\) That the point of this discussion is not to find the logical cause of friend is apparent from
Socrates' concluding remarks to Lysis. He points out that Lysis cannot "think big" concerning
that about which he doesn't think at all. His point, I believe, is to show Lysis that he does not
have all the friends that he needs. He really does need a new friend to continue to teach
him—Hippothales, for example. See Phdr. 253a on the role of the older lover in the education
and improvement of his \( \pi a \iota \).  

\(^8\) Ly. 212a-b, \( \epsilon \pi e i d \alpha \nu \tau i e s \ t i n a \ \varphi \iota \lambda \zeta \), \( \pi \tau \rho \epsilon \tau \rho o s \ \pi \tau \tau \epsilon \rho o u \ \varphi \iota \lambda \zeta o s \ \gamma \iota \gamma \iota \mu e t \tau a i \), \( \delta \ \varphi \iota \lambda \omega \nu \ \tau o \ \varphi \iota \lambda \theta \iota \mu \varepsilon \mu \epsilon \nu \) \( \tilde{\eta} \) \( \delta \ \varphi \iota \nu \oeta \mu \nu e \mu o s \ \tau o \ \varphi \iota \lambda \theta \iota \mu \tau o s \) \( \tilde{\eta} \ \varphi \iota \lambda \theta \iota \mu \varepsilon \mu \varphi e r a i \), \( \tilde{\eta} \ \varphi \iota \lambda \varepsilon \mu e \mu o s \ \delta \ \varphi \iota \lambda \theta \iota \mu \varepsilon \mu \varphi e r a i \); 

\(^9\) 212b, \( \alpha \mu \iota \rho \omega \tau \rho \iota \omega \) \( \delta \rho o \ \alpha \lambda \lambda \lambda \lambda o s \ \varphi \iota \lambda \zeta \) \( \gamma \iota \gamma \iota \mu e t \tau a i \), \( \lambda e a \ \mu \delta \iota \nu o s \ \delta \ \epsilon \iota \tau \rho o s \ \tau \iota w \ \epsilon \iota \tau \rho o u \ \varphi \iota \lambda \zeta . \)
lover or a beloved. But, this leaves open the possibility that x is a friend because he loves y, who, for his part, dislikes x intensely. It seems odd to say that in such a case x is a friend to y. Unrequited love is not friendship.

A conjunctive account is not successful either.\(^2\) The poets speak of certain φιλούμενοι as friends though they cannot love in return. So, if we insist that reciprocity of love is required for friendship we will find that there really are no horselovers or, worse, φιλόσοφοι unless horses and wisdom return the affection of those who love them.

Socrates and Menexenus then investigate one of the conjuncts alone. It is the beloved that becomes a friend to the lover, regardless of whether the beloved returns this love or not.\(^3\) A parallel account shows that it is the object of hatred that is the enemy, not the person who hates. But if this is so, then persons can be loved by their enemies and hated by their friends. All that need happen is that x loves y. This makes y the friend of x, even if y hates x. Worse, people can be enemies to their friends and friends to their enemies. The same sort of reasoning will dispose of the hypothesis that the lover becomes the friend of the beloved by virtue of loving him or her.

The most plausible of these four accounts, the conjunctive one, falls prey to the singularity requirement. Because Socrates insists on treating φιλοπόι and

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\(^2\) 212c, νυν δὲ, ἀν μὴ ἄμφότεροι φιλῶσιν, οὐδὲτερος φίλος.

\(^3\) 212d, τὸ φιλούμενον ἀρα τῷ φιλοῦντι φίλον ἔστιν, ὡς έσεικεν, ὅ Μενέξεω, εἶδον τε φιλῇ εἶσεν τε καὶ μοδῇ.
as instances that must be explained by the same account that covers relationships between people, reciprocal love cannot be the logical cause of friendship. As with "the beneficial" or "the capable" in the Hippias, the proposed *definiens* mirrors the \( \pi\rho\delta\zeta\ \tau\iota \) character of the *definiendum* and, as in the Hippias, this is ultimately the root of the problem. The account requires that each of the correlatives have the capacity to act in relation to the other in the same way. This capacity, which is itself a relative since it is a capacity for something, is not had by all of the things that the poets say can be friends.

The other three hypotheses are defective because they mix inappropriate correlatives. Being a lover or being a beloved are ruled out as the logical cause of friendship because, if this were so, friends could be friends of enemies and vice versa. From a pre-theoretical standpoint, a friend is of another friend. Likewise for enemies. They are logical cogeners of "likes," "sames," "differents" and all the other \( \pi\rho\delta\zeta\ \tau\iota \) pairs where the correlatives are denoted by the same terms (See Chapter One, §3.A.2). Such an argument, I believe, is closely related to the self-predication test. In its simplest form, this test says that if any sentence of the form ‘x is not F \( \pi\rho\delta\zeta\ \psi \)’ is true, then x is not the F. Where it is in the nature of that which is F to be of or than a G, then if any sentence of the form ‘x is not of G \( \pi\rho\delta\zeta\ \psi \)’ is true, then x is not the F.

At 214b, Socrates takes up the quest again with Lysis as interlocutor. Once again, the suggestion is that the logical cause of friendship is a relative
term—‘like.’ On this account, friends are friends because they are "likes." The problem, of course, is that even evil persons are like one another and it is impossible that such persons should be friends. Even if the notion of "likes" is restricted to those who are good, the suggestion faces other difficulties. Socrates claims that things which are like one another are incapable of acting or undergoing in relation to each other in any way distinct from the way in which they can act or undergo in relation to themselves. As a result, likes cannot confer benefits upon one another and cannot, therefore, be cherished on account of these benefits. For instance, if Jones and Smith are both wealthy men, then Jones is as capable of settling his own gambling debts as Smith is of doing it for him. So, Jones will not cherish Smith on account of this benefit. It is pretty clear that Plato must have such cases in mind, but his principle about the potentialities of likes is not universally true. What is important for our purposes is that yet another candidate for the logical cause of a relative term has been rejected

84 Ly. 214b, ὧτ τῷ ὤμοιῳ τῷ ὀμοίῳ ἀνάγκη ἄει φίλων εἶναι.

85 Socrates’ reasoning is that wicked people injure those that they associate with. Since friendship is impossible between those who mistreat one another, the wicked cannot be friends. This is just the other side of the argument that follows in 215a. Those who are alike in their goodness are not in a position to help or benefit one another.

86 214c, ὁτιοῦν ὤμοιον ὄμοιον ὄμοιος τίν’ ὑψέλειον ἔχειν ἢ τίνα βλαβήν ἄν ποιήσαι δύναιτο, ὦ μή καὶ αὐτὸ αὔτῷ; ἢ τί ἄν παντεῖν, ὦ μή καὶ ὁρ’ αὐτοῦ πάνω;

87 215a, τά δὴ τοιαῦτα πᾶς ἄν ὁπ’ ἄλληλοις ἀγαπηθεῖν, μηθὲμάν ἐπικοινώνιαν ἄλληλοις ἔχοντα;

88 Two eggs are as like as can be and each has the capacity to break an egg and to be broken. Yet, an egg cannot exercise this capacity in relation to itself. In order for an egg to exercise its capacity to break another egg, two of them must be struck against one another. Charmides 168d corrects this oversight. Supra, Chapter One §2.
because it is enmeshed in the notion of potency for acting and undergoing. These, in turn, are themselves always in relation to something. The proliferation of προς τι terms on the side of the definiens does not help to nail down the logical cause of a relative term.

Much the same sorts of problems beset the discussion of "unlikes" and "opposites" as the because of friendship. At the risk of multiplying examples beyond necessity, the argument of 216c-221d deserves our attention. This passage has often been cited as an instance in which the ontology of the middle dialogues shows up in what is alleged to be a very early work.\(^89\) By the process of elimination, Socrates arrives at the notion that what is neither good nor bad is friend to what is good.\(^90\) This account is then complicated to introduce "something on account of which" (διά τι) and "for the sake of which" (οὖν ἐνεκά) the intermediate is the friend of the good.\(^91\) Since Socrates wants to preserve the value neutral character of the intermediate, and yet thinks that the διά τι is itself something bad and is present to the intermediate, this requires that he introduce the concept of that which has bad present to it but is not itself bad. Just as hair may be colored white with lead, which is itself white, without being white hair, so a body may have disease, which is bad, present in it without being itself bad. We can put this

\(^89\) Proponents of this view include Shorey (1933) p.117, Taylor (1926) p. 70, Glaser (1934) pp. 56-7 and, perhaps, even Cherniss (1936) p. 3, n. 3. For additional arguments against this view, see Vlastos' Appendix I to IOLP.

\(^90\) 216c, τὸ ἀγαθόν ὅρα τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν μόνω μόνω συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι φίλου.

\(^91\) Lys. 218d, Ἐνιος ὡς ὃν ἔχει, ποτέρων ἔστι τῷ φίλος ἡ οὐ; Ἄναγκη, ἑρη. Πότερον οὖν ὅπως ἐνεκά καὶ δὲ ὅπως, ἡ ἐνεκά τοῦ καὶ διὰ τι.
in the terms of the *Hippias Major* 294b discussion by saying that in such a case the white lead is the "because" of appearing to have white hair, but without being the "because" of having white hair. The latter is reserved for old age. It is important to note in passing that nothing in any of this requires the backdrop of the theory of Forms and the doctrine of participation. Though Plato uses the language of "presence," e.g. λευκόδ παρουσία λευκαί, he is making a fairly simple point that the Greek in the street could surely comprehend. We should also note in passing that Socrates and his audience regard the following sort of explanation schema as quite adequate: the F-ness of x is explained by the presence of y, which is F, in x.

This problem does not arise for the ὁ ἔνεκα. It is not present to the intermediate and so does not run the risk of "infecting it" with its value. Indeed, the reason that the ὁ ἔνεκα can serve its function is precisely because it is not present to the intermediate. It is something of positive value and the condition of its absence, e.g. disease, ignorance, serves as the διὰ τό.

The explanatory power of this schema is illustrated by its application to some examples. The body which is ill is a friend of medicine on account of illness and for the sake of health. The illness is a thing that is bad and present to the body, but not in such a way as to make the body itself bad. Health is some good which is not present to the body and for whose sake medicine is dear to it. The

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92 See Vlastos *ibid* for evidence that the language of presence in does not itself require any kind of ontological commitment. This way of expressing the claim that x is F is as old as Homer, as Vlastos points out. Cf. Od. 17, 347.
body which has no disease, by contrast, has no reason to befriend medicine. Further, this pattern of explanation makes it clear why we who are intermediate between wisdom and complete ignorance are friends to those who can teach us. There is some evil present to us, which has not yet made us totally ignorant, and some good that we wish to have in its place. Because of the evil and for the sake of the good we befriend the teacher, who also is good. The same is not true of those who are not intermediate. Those who are already wise have no need of the teacher and those who are utterly ignorant, and so bad, fail to appreciate their need.

In these examples we approach an expanded notion of the logical cause. Instead of merely "that on account of which" all friends are friends, we have a distinction between what Aristotle might call a final cause and a condition which is the absence of the completed or perfected state that is represented by the final cause. If we want to understand what makes x a friend to y, on this analysis, we need to grasp more than some something which is present to x, or even present to both x and y. This is necessary, but more is needed in addition. There is something that "causes" x to be a friend to y precisely because it is absent from x—the

93 In this example, Plato seems to run together τὸ φίλου and the οὗ ἔνεκα. 218a, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ φαίνειν ἃν καὶ τοῦς ἢδη σοφοὺς μπέρτι φιλοσοφεῖν. This is understandable. What the would-be learner lacks is wisdom, so it is for the sake of this that he or she acts. Wisdom would remedy this lack, just as medicine would remedy the lack of health. However, just as you can't make friends with medicine in the abstract, but only with doctors, so you can't befriend wisdom by itself, but only wise people. In my gloss, I specify that it is the teacher that the student befriends. Insofar as the teacher partakes of wisdom, the φίλου and οὗ ἔνεκα do collapse, just as in the case of medicine and the actual person of the doctor. Cf. the slide in 217a-b between οὐδεὶς λατρεύει φίλος διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν and ἀναγκάζεται δὲ γε σῶμα διὰ νόσου ιατρείαν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν.
In the argument that follows, Plato rejects this pattern of explanation and insists that the real "because" of friendship lacks the additional element of the oδ ἐνεκα.

Health, that for the sake of which the doctor is our friend, is not merely good. It is itself a "friend" or a valued thing. Thus, if the analysis is correct, then there must be some further thing for the sake of which health is our friend. Unless this regress is to be endless, there must be "first friend" which is not for the sake of anything at all. This first is described as δ ἀληθῶς ἔστι φίλον, while things like health are mere εἰδωλα (219d). Such a conditional transmission of value is aptly illustrated by the man who, upon learning that his son has been poisoned, values the three κοτῦλας of wine that may cure him as much as his own son. However, were it not for the oδ ἐνεκα of his beloved son or the διὰ τι of the poison, he might well regard the wine as next to nothing. The point is not merely that instrumental value presupposes an intrinsically valuable terminus. Rather, the point is that all of the oδ ἐνεκα elements mentioned in these individual explanations of why x is a friend to y tell us nothing about the nature of friendship per se. The pattern of explanation presupposes the concept of a friend.

Could that in which all instrumental values terminate be this first friend? That is, is "the good" τὸ πρῶτον φίλον? Socrates first establishes that the good is a friend. But, it seems to be a friend because of (διὰ) that which is bad. The
good is a φάρµακον τοῦ κακοῦ and without the latter, the good would be of no value to us. This suggests that, in some sense, our friendship for the good is for the sake of what is bad. After all, our friendship for it has the conditional dependency on the existence of the bad that characterizes the ὀδ ἔνεκα relation. Since that which is bad is an enemy, the first friend appears to be a very different sort of thing from all the other derivative friends. It is because of the bad and for the sake of an enemy.

Far from confusing the διὰ τι and the ὀδ ἔνεκα, Socrates has collapsed the one into the other. Once we give up the idea that the thing for the sake of which we act is some absent good, we are merely left with the condition of the subject as the explanation of his action. To put it another way, the requirement that the ὀδ ἔνεκα of the first friend not be itself a friend dictates that it not be good. Anything that is good is, potentially at least, such as to be valued. Anything that is such as to be valued is a "friend." If the ὀδ ἔνεκα is not good, then it loses its explanatory value. Even people who act for the sake of what turns out to be bad do not think of it as bad; unless, of course, it is a case of ἀκρασία. Indeed, part of what makes ἀκρασία so puzzling is that we can't understand how the person's goal, which she recognizes to be bad or involve bad consequences, could possibly explain her action. The only way that one can act "for the sake of the bad" is when we act for the purpose of avoiding or ridding ourselves of something bad. Thus, Socrates collapses the bad for the sake of which we act (to avoid or rid ourselves of) into the bad that is present to us or likely to be present to us.

95 Lamb alleges that he does confuse the two and finds this confusion "strange" (220c, ad loc).
The point of this, I take it, is to insist upon a unified explanation of friendship. The "because" which explains why all things that are friends are friends ought not to have separate and distinct elements each of which provides only a partial explanation. The effect is to further increase the difficulty of finding a single logical cause for terms, like friend, which have the internal complexity of relations.

Conclusion

Our investigation strongly suggests that the constraints on answers to "what is F?" questions might give Plato particular reason to make a radical hypothesis about what it might be that answers such questions in the case of relative predicates. It has long been argued that this is the case for obviously incomplete relatives like 'fine' or 'just.' This, it is thought, would explain several things. First, until Republic X, it is not clear that Plato ever cites an example of a Form that corresponds to a $καξιον$ $απασχολούσαμενον$ predicate. Further, the youthful Socrates is made to balk at the idea of Forms for terms like 'man' in the Parmenides. Commentators have not made as much of the fact that the first part of the Parmenides seems to acknowledge Forms for 'master,' 'slave' and 'knowledge.' Our examination of the Lysis shows that the same sorts of difficulties attendant upon the question, "What is the fine?" are present in the examination of a term like 'friend.'

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96 See Owen (1957) followed by Irwin, Fine and Nehamas.

97 This claim itself is the center of much controversy. It will be examined much more closely in the next chapter.
The latter, of course, is an intentional relative like 'master of' or 'knowledge of.' This suggests that, if Plato has reasoning for positing Forms in the case of incomplete relatives, those same reasons may well hold good for the entirety of the category of πρός τι, and not merely for those terms, like καλὸν, that have been the focus of attention in much of the secondary literature.
Chapter III

Relatives in the Phaedo

Our investigation of relatives in Phaedo will focus on the role that puzzles about πρός τι predicates and the constraints on answers to Socratic questions play in motivating the theory of Forms. This will require addressing rather large questions like: "What is the nature of the Forms as they are discussed in Phaedo?" "Why are they said to be separate from sensible things?" and "What problem or problems does Plato intend to solve by introducing them?" Since we have not yet settled the interpretation of one of the constraints on answers to Socratic questions—the SP requirement—we shall have to be concerned with the question of whether Plato thinks of the Forms as "perfect exemplars" of features like largeness or equality or whether he has something else in mind. We shall also ask to what extent the argument for their separation in Phaedo depends upon the fact that equality is a πρός τι predicate. If the argument cannot be made completely general (that is, if it cannot be used to show the separateness of Forms corresponding to καθ' αὐτό predicate) we shall be forced to consider

1 As SP1 might suggest, if being-completely implies being in the way that sensibles are large or beautiful. See above, p. 83. The passage at Phdo. 74d4 suggests this too. There it is said that sensible equals βούλεται εἶναι ὁλον ἄλλο τι τῶν ἄλλων (presumably the Form Equality), but fall short and are μαλλότερον.

2 As Socrates' reticence about the nature of the participation relation (100d and ff.) suggests. After all, were the Forms simply exemplars he need not have hedged round with παρανομία or κωμονία. The relationship would be simply that of μίμησις.
the further question of whether anything in the argument of the \textit{Phaedo} commits Plato to an ontology which includes Forms for anything other than $\tau_1 \delta_b \tau_3$ predicates. The answers to these questions will come more easily if we can first formulate some thesis about the problem or problems that Plato intended to solve by means of the theory of Forms. Since the story of how Socrates allegedly came to believe this theory is told in the section from 96a-102a, it might be profitable to start there, rather than at the beginning.

The use of this section of the text as a starting point is complicated by the fact that several commentators have purported to find a theory of relations in the \textit{Phaedo} discussion of the large and small in Simmias. If this is correct, then my claim in Chapter One that Plato does not have a theory of relations, but rather of something else, must be mistaken. Thus, before we can begin, we must clear some of the ground and rebut the claims of these commentators.

\textbf{§1. A "Theory of Relations" in the Phaedo?}

The major impetus for the view that the \textit{Phaedo} articulates a theory of relations is the claim at 102d7-9 that "[the statement] that Simmias overtops Socrates is not true as said with these words." The problem, of course, is that 'Simmias overtops (or is taller than) Socrates' is perfectly true. If one were to say this, one would not be saying something false. Neither would one be saying anything that is ungrammatical either in Greek or in English. Consequently, it is claimed that Plato's point must be that this manner of expressing the way things
are between Socrates and Simmias is not ontologically perspicuous. It does not reveal the grounds on which the statement is true. Why is this so?

A. Castañeda's Account and the Arguments For It

According to Hector-Neri Castañeda, what is wrong with 'Simmias overtops Socrates' is that it mentions only one part of what is, on Plato's analysis, a "two pronged fact." The reason that Simmias is portrayed as accepting, without puzzlement, Socrates' claim that there is something wrong with the statement under discussion has to do with what has gone before. On Castañeda's reading, we, like Simmias, should not find it surprising that 'Simmias overtops Socrates' is not true in those words, if we keep in mind what has been said at 100e5-6. There it is claimed that, "by largeness large things are large and larger things larger and by smallness the smaller things are smaller." Castañeda wants us to take the conjunction in this claim quite seriously. We are to suppose that the fact of Simmias being larger than Socrates involves both Simmias' being taller and Socrates' being smaller. These apparently distinct facts are, in actuality, one fact. Yet, we are to suppose that this one fact must involve two Forms because of the stricture laid down at Phaedo 101a5-b. The upshot of this passage is, according to Castañeda, that if x is taller and y is shorter, one ought not to explain this by appeal to the same thing. So, if Simmias is taller than Socrates by a head, and also shorter than Phaedo by a head, then one might be led to think that "a head" is the explanation for Simmias' possession of two contraries—tallness and shortness. Since

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3 It is this puzzle that Castañeda uses to motivate his solution.
Simmias' tallerness (than Socrates) is the same fact as Socrates' shorterness (than Simmias), on Castañeda's reading, and since one ought not suppose that the very same thing explains the one as explains the other, Castañeda concludes that there must be two Forms involved. Presumably this is because appeal to a single Form would be objectionable for the same reasons that citing a single thing like "the head" would be. It would open you up to the ἐναντίος λόγος that x is smaller and y is larger by the very same thing. These two Forms will have a feature that some other Forms (specifically, Forms that do not correspond to relational predicates) do not have. They will be governed by "laws of factual enchainment." That is to say, the instantiation of Tallness by an individual thing does not itself constitute a fact. This instantiation requires that some other thing participate in the Form of Smallness. The instantiation of the Tall by x and the instantiation of the Short by y together constitute a single fact. Though other Forms are similar in that their instantiation by a single thing requires that another Form be instantiated, these two instantiations each constitute a fact.

According to Castañeda, *Phaedo* 102b9-d1 repeats the point that x's being taller involves y's being shorter and adds to that what he calls the element of "prepositional aspect." For x to be taller requires that y be smaller. It also requires that x have its share of the tall "towards" or πρὸς y. This prepositional aspect is not itself a Form. Rather, it is an additional feature of the world which is not further explicated.

Castañeda's reading requires that something other than what is usually supposed is taking place in 102b7-c4. Accordingly, he argues that the more
common interpretation of this passage is mistaken. This interpretation, which goes back as far as Burnet's 1911 text of the *Phaedo*, is that the passage marks the introduction of the distinction between essential and accidental predication. This distinction is marked by Plato's contrast of *peρικέναι* and *τυγχάνει*.

"Αλλά γάρ, ἡ δ' ὡς, διμόλογεις τὸ τῶν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους σύχ ὡς τοῖς ὑμμαίη λέγεται σοτω καὶ τὸ ἀλήθες ἔχειν. ὥσ γάρ πον περικέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτω τῇ Σιμμίαν ἐλαιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μεγέθει ὅ τυγχάνει ἔχων. ὥσδε σοι Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν, ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι αμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρός τὸ ἀλήθες μέγεθος;"

Burnet comments on this passage that:

The notion here formulated is that of an essential attribute. We say, indeed, as *façon de parler* (τοῖς ὑμμαίη) that Simmias is greater than Socrates; but not *qua* Simmias or *qua* Socrates that they stand in this relation, but only insofar as greatness or smallness can be predicated of them. The emphatic words are *peρικέναι* and *τυγχάνει*. The first expresses participation in an *εἶδός* which belongs *φόσοι* to the subject, the latter participation in an *εἶδός* which belongs to the subject *as a matter of fact*, but not essentially. The sentence is anacoluthic; for the subject *τὸ... ὑπερέχειν* is dropped and a new subject *τὸ ἀλήθες* is substituted.

Of course, one need not hold that the sentence is anacoluthic in order to see the essence/accident distinction being made. Gallop does not; but, rather, takes *τὸ ἀλήθες* adverbially (cf. 69b8 with Loriaux and Verdenius). The more important grammatical point is the scope of the negation and the related question concerning whether one ought to supply *peρικέναι* after *ἀλλά*. Castañeda does this and accordingly reads the passage as:
For surely, it is not the case that (περικέναι [Simmias overtops] because of this: that he is Simmias), but ([περικέναι (Simmias overtops)]) because of the tallness which he happens to have.

Here οὐ negates the because-relationship, not what precedes τοῦτο. The crucial syntactical form of the sentence is: "not (p, because of a), but because of b"; obviously this implies p. Hence the logical form with ellipses supplied is: "Not (p, because of a), but ([p] because of b)."⁴

Gallop, by contrast, does bring περικέναι within the scope of the negation and reads:

Because it isn't, surely, by nature that Simmias overtops him by virtue, that is, of his being Simmias, but by virtue of the tallness that he happens to have.

Gallop acknowledges that if the scope of the negation is as Castañeda says, then his translation is incorrect.⁵ However, he appeals to other passages in which it seems clear that περικέναι must bear some sense like "by nature" or "of necessity." In 104a, the point is made that three is always called odd, as well as by it own name, because it is of such a nature (διὰ τὸ οὖν περικέναι, a3) that it is never separate from the odd. Again, at 104a9, three and five and half the numbers are πως πέρικε always odd, though not identical with the odd. That this is some sort of necessity is indicated by the use of ἀναγκάζει and ἀνάγκη in 104d. Further, Gallop alleges that the essence/accident distinction is vital to the final argument for the immortality of the soul. This is, perhaps, the more important consideration, for we shall have to see what role the discussion of the Tall and the

⁴ Castañeda (1978) p. 49.
⁵ Gallop (1978) p. 56.
Short in Simmias have to play in the final argument in order to make a decision about whether Plato is, at this juncture, giving us a theory of relations. This will be done in the very next section. However, at this point, we may tentatively conclude that this passage does not clearly and unequivocally make the point that Castañeda thinks it makes. There are other alternatives about what this discussion is doing in the context of the final argument which deserve to be considered. Before we do that, however, we should turn to the other passage which Castañeda cites as a clear indication that Plato is putting forward his account of relations in the *Phaedo*.

It is part of Castañeda’s thesis that Plato builds up to the analysis of ‘Simmias is taller than Socrates and shorter than Phaedo’ at 102b. This, on his reading, is a case in which two relational facts "overlap at Simmias;" that is, he is a constituent in two distinct facts. The reason that Cebes has no difficulty in grasping what Socrates is up to, according to Castañeda, is that this case has been preceded by an analysis of a single relational fact in 100e8-101b2. As a result, Castañeda translates this passage as if Plato is discussing two men, one of whom is taller than the other by the length of the taller man’s head.

*Οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρα ἀποδέχοισθα τίς τινα φαίνει ἐτέρον ἐτέρον τῇ κεφαλῇ μειώειν εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ ἐλάττω, . . . 100e8-10*

Then you wouldn’t accept anyone's saying that one man [ἐτέρον] was larger than another [ἐτέρον] by the [τῇ] head, and that the smaller was smaller by the SAME THING, . . .

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6 Casteneda (1978) p. 45
You would, I think, fear that someone may confront you with the retort, if you said that a man was taller THAN ANOTHER, and THIS shorter, by a head, first that by the same thing the taller is taller and the shorter shorter and...

Gallop objects that the capitalized expressions in Castañeda’s translation of the 101a6-10 do not correspond to anything in the text. Gallop, of course, thinks that the passage can bear either the two man or three man reading, but that the latter is preferable because it 1) connects the discussion with the illustration of the sizes of Phaedo, Simmias and Socrates at 102b-d and 2) makes the familiar Platonic point that sensibles have opposite qualities when viewed in relation to one another.

Castañeda, however, argues that the words that he supplies are required by the opposition between ἐτεροῦ and ἐτέρου in 100e8-10. He notes that if one takes the feared ἐναυτίος λόγος to involve three men, then it is not relevant to the hypothesis which opened the passage, which clearly involves two men. Gallop agrees but thinks that this warrants our re-reading the hypothesis to make it relevant to the ἐναυτίος λόγος. This requires that we take the taller and the shorter at 100e9-101a1 as referring to one man and not identify τὸν ἑλάττω and τὸ ἑλαττων with ἐτέρου.

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While Gallop's reading seems grammatically possible, it is certainly not the most simple and obvious way to take these words. Second, and more importantly, the case of eight and ten, which has been used as an additional example at 96d8-e5, involves two items and not three. And it exactly parallels this case in the ἐναυτίος λόγος that is to be feared.\(^8\) If it is by two that ten is more than eight and by two that eight is fewer than ten, then the more numerous will be more numerous by the very same thing by which the fewer is fewer. Moreover, ten will be more numerous on account of two which is itself fewer.

Even if the two man reading is the one that we ought to adopt, it isn't clear that this passage does what Castañeda wants it to. According to him it is because of the claim at 100e5-6 that Simmias immediately recognizes that the claim that "Simmias is taller than Socrates" isn't true in just those words when Socrates questions him about it at 102b5. But all 100e says is that it is by tallness that tall things are tall and taller things are taller and that it is by smallness that smaller things are smaller. Were things as Castañeda says, then we would have to accept the conclusion that Plato means us to see, on the basis of this remark, that 'x is large' actually means that 'x is large in relation to y and y is small in relation to x' and that these truths are one and the same—two sides of the same coin as it were. This is far from obvious.

\(^8\) 101b8, ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ που φάσει.
B. Objections to the Castañeda Account

Thus far we have been examining those passages in the *Phaedo* that Castañeda thinks show that Plato is putting forth a certain account of relations. These passages, I have suggested, do not make an entirely convincing case. I now want to turn to the question of whether there are passages in the *Phaedo* that tell against Castañeda's reading.

Socrates reiterates, in the introduction of his hypothesis, that it is by Beauty alone that beautiful things are beautiful. Matthen takes Castañeda to task on this very point. He reads 100e3 as claiming that it is by tallness *alone* that tall things are tall and taller things taller. Castañeda’s analysis yields an *explanans* which involves *both* tallness and shortness. This move, Castañeda thinks, is justified because this very passage suggests that the *explanandum* in relational facts has a complexity that is lacking in the case where a thing has a monadic predicate.

Plato’s prior example surely suggests that x’s being beautiful is properly explicable only in terms of x’s participation in a single Form—Beauty. It is possible, I suppose, that Plato introduces the discussion of larger and smaller to ward off any confusion that might arise about the 100c principle. That is, he might demonstrate that the *explanandum* ‘x is large or larger’ does not really require

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9 see 100c4-7, "If there is anything beautiful other than the Beautiful Itself, it is beautiful for no other reason (οὐδὲ δι’ ἐν ἄλλω καλῷ εἶναι) than that it participates in this the Beautiful." Also, 100d5 "nothing else makes it beautiful (οὐκ ἄλλο τὶ ποιεῖι ἀὑτῷ καλῷ) except the presence or communion (call it what you will) of this the Beautiful."

more than one explanans by 1) showing that x is large or larger is only half of the real explanandum and 2) by introducing the concept of a Form-chain which is such that, though it contains more than one Form, is really unitary (and so not an exception to his principle that a "single thing" explains the possession of an attribute by a sensible) because it is always instantiated by pairs. Were this the case, 100e4 and the example of Simmias at 102b would modify the principle announced with respect to beauty at 100c3.

It seems that what is needed is some account of the role that the 102b passage is playing in the structure of the final argument. If Plato is modifying the "by one Form alone" principle which seems to emerge from the example of the Beautiful at 100c3, why is he doing this? What point does it serve in the overall strategy for proving the immortality of the soul? Thus, a full resolution of the force of Matthen's objection may wait on some account of the structure of the final argument.

Yet, Castañeda might be able to resist this objection even without supposing that the 100c3 principle is modified or superseded. Rather, he might say, the example in 102b serves only to clarify what is important about the example in 100c3. If what is to be explained warrants it, it is appropriate to cite more than one Form. What would be objectionable would be to cite a particular sensible thing or an aspect of that sensible thing. Thus, one might claim that the point of 100d5 ff. was that a Form (or a plurality of Forms, perhaps) ought to be cited as an explanation of why a thing is beautiful or tall or whatever. What ought not be cited are things like colour, or shape, or other aspects of the sensible thing itself.
While this is initially appealing, it is not entirely clear that Castañeda can completely evade Matthen's objection in this way. For it seems that, in some sense, a sensible does enter into the explanation of why Simmias is taller (than Socrates). Recall that, on Castañeda's reading, the canonical form of this fact is Tallness(Simmias)-Shortness(Socrates); that is, Simmias has a share of the Tall in relation to, or toward, Socrates who has a share of the Short toward Simmias. Thus, ultimately, the explanation of why Simmias is taller involves not only two Forms, but also Socrates, toward whom Simmias has his share of the Tall. Thus, if the point of the passage at 100d5 is to deny that sensibles or their features are the proper ατη to which we should appeal in our explanations, then it seems that it should ban Socrates from the explanation of why Simmias is taller, as well as excluding Phaedo's hair from the explanation of why he is beautiful.

Matthen\textsuperscript{11} goes on to charge Castañeda's account with violating the conditions of adequacy on explanations that Plato has laid down. On Castañeda's account the very same thing explains Simmias's being taller as explains Socrates's being shorter—the Form Chain Tall and Short. There may be some difficulty with the text which introduces the discussion at 101a. Nonetheless, whether we take the problem to concern two men, one of whom is taller and the other shorter by a head, or three men, the intermediate one being both taller and shorter by a head, one thing is clear. If one answers the question, "On account of what ατη is Simmias taller than Socrates?" with "τη Κεφαλη," then two objectionable

\textsuperscript{11} Matthen (1982) p. 92. Gallop (1976) makes substantially the same point in his explication of the role of the puzzles about "a head" as the explanation for why one man is taller than another. Matthen makes use of some of Gallop's objections but makes them more explicitly.
consequences follow. First, it is by the *same thing* that Simmias is taller and Socrates is shorter. Call this the First Explanatory Constraint:

EC1: where F and G are opposites, if x is that by which a is F, then x cannot be that by which a, or anything else, is G.

The second consequence is that Simmias will be taller by virtue of something which is itself short. Call this the Second Explanatory Constraint:

EC2: where F and G are opposites, if x is that by virtue of which a is F, x cannot itself be G.

Thus, Matthen's objection is that, were Castañeda's account correct, Plato would be violating his own constraints on explanation. This is because the same Form-chain explains why x is F(er than y) as explains why y is G(er than x).

McPherran replies on Castañeda's behalf that relational facts are not covered by the First Explanatory Constraint. It concerns only the possession of properties where a single "safe *ἀτία*" can be given. Relational facts, because they are double sided, require a conjunction of two safe *ἀτίαι* for their explanation. It isn't clear to me what in the text—apart from need to establish the consistency of Castañeda's interpretation—implies this restriction of the first explanatory constraint to non-relational facts. Indeed, it seems to me that both explanatory constraints are supposed to apply even after the safe and stupid *ἀτία* is

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12 . . . τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἔλαττον, . . . 101a9-10

13 McPherran p. 299-300
The new and better safe αἰτία by virtue of which this is hot is not heat, but rather, fire. Nonetheless, fire is not that in virtue of which anything is cold. Neither is fire itself snow, nor even cold. McPherran, however, claims that Plato himself violates the First Explanatory Constraint in the 102c passage. I don’t see how this is so, unless one simply assumes Castañeda’s analysis of the aitia which are given in this passage. If one did, then it would be the same Form-chain, Tall()-Short(), that explained why Phaedo was taller than Simmias and why Socrates was shorter than Simmias. It is Simmias that is both tall and short. Were there an aitia lurking around that sinned as ‘a head’ does then it would have to explain both Simmias’ tallness and his shortness. But it is the tallness that he has (in relation to Socrates’s shortness) that explains his being tall. And it is the shortness that he has (in relation to Phaedo’s tallness) that explains his being short. Unless we assume that the sensibles and the Forms that appear in the parentheses are really imported into the aitia, then we have no reason to suppose that Plato himself violates the (EC1) in this passage. But to assume that the items in parentheses really are part of the explanation, just is to suppose that the facts in question have the structure that Castañeda’s view requires. Thus,

14 105b6 and ff. ἐκ τῶν νῦν λέγομενων ἀλλήν ὅρων ἀσφάλειον

15 McPherran p. 301 n. 9.

16 It is important to put the example in this way rather than to say that the same Form-chain explains why Phaedo is taller (than Simmias) and why Simmias is shorter (than Phaedo). On Castañeda’s analysis these apparently distinct facts are one and the same. Phaedo’s being taller than Simmias is not the same fact as Socrates’ being shorter than Simmias. Thus, (EC1) applies to the second case but not the first. For, in this case, we have a situation where one thing explains both why x is F and y is G. (EC1) allows that x may be identical to y. What is needed, however, is a non-identity between the aitia of x’s being F and the aitia of y’s being G.
McPherrran’s reply to the objection against Castañeda’s account is no more convincing than the positive argument for that account. Of course, if one holds the Castañeda view, Matthen’s objection will dissolve. The view ramifies in such a way as to render harmless certain passages which, on the face of it, look problematic for one who defends the Castañeda reading.

In order to try to break this deadlock, we must assume a broader perspective. How likely is it that Plato sees a distinction between the explanation of Phaedo’s being taller than Simmias and Phaedo’s being beautiful, such that the latter, but not the former, falls under the scope of the First Explanatory Constraint? Chapter One has shown that ‘beautiful’ is closely kindred, logically and/or semantically, to ‘larger’ in Plato’s mind. If this is so, then it seems less likely that there is the marked difference between these ἄξια λόγα that McPherran would like to see. Thus, all of the puzzles raised in the section from 96d8-97b8 involve incomplete predicates—‘taller’ and ‘shorter,’ ‘greater’ and ‘fewer,’ ‘a half,’ and the number predicates. The introduction of the theory of Forms as a solution to these puzzles begins with the example of the Beautiful, which is both incomplete and πρός τι. The Beautiful, of course, conforms to the First Explanatory Constraint. It will never be the explanation for why anything is ugly, as "a head" might explain both why someone was taller and shorter. So, if one πρός τι predicate conforms to the First Explanatory Constraint, why should not all of them? That is, given that ‘beautiful’ and ‘larger than’ are so similar, what reason could Plato possibly have for treating explanations which involve them differently?
This sort of objection emerges in another manner in the literature on Castañeda’s interpretation. If ‘beautiful’ is a relational predicate, on the same footing with ‘larger than,’ how does ‘Helen is beautiful’ go into a Castañeda style analysis? Gallop presses this problem with respect to diachronic relational facts. He also raises the question for symmetrical relations. Answers can be constructed to these questions. Castañeda has done so for some of them and McPherran has replied on his behalf to others. The analyses are complex and they invite a whole host of controversial moves. First there is the possibility that the features of sensibles can participate in Forms, as well as sensibles themselves. Thus, Helen’s legs can have a share of the Beautiful in relation to the Ugliness in which her nose shares. Second, in order to account for the fact that Helen could be more beautiful now than she used to be, Castañeda requires the notion that Helen might have time-indexed and coordinated shares of Beauty and Ugliness. Thus, "Helen at t₁ possesses beauty, a beauty towards (across time) the ugliness which was possessed by Helen at t₀." At this degree of complexity, it is not even clear to me how this goes into Castañeda’s standard formula for expressing Platonic relations. In the simple case that was, of course,

17 Matthen (1982) questions the ability of Castañeda’s account to deal with the many aspects in which ‘Helen is beautiful’ is relational. Helen is beautiful a) in some respects but not in others, b) beautiful at some times and in some places but not at other times or in other places, c) beautiful in relation to some things but not to in relation to others. Cf. Vlastos’ remarks on Sym. 211 in "Degrees of Reality," (1973) p. 66 ff.

18 Gallop (1976), p. 156.

19 Gallop ibid and also White (1979) p. 79, n.16.

Tallness(Simmias) — Shortness(Socrates). Here it appears that it may be Helen’s beauty, and not the woman who possesses that beauty, that shares in a Form in relation to another share of a Form had by Helen at another time. Alternately, it may be that beauty is a specification of how Helen participates in Beauty. It is still Helen that is beautiful πρός Helen, but the introduction of the coordinated and temporally indexed shares simply explains how this is possible. Symmetrical relations (at least synchronic ones) are somewhat easier. They have the form $E_1(a) - E_2(b)$ where, for instance, $E_1$ is one Form of Equality and $E_2$ is another. 

Castañeda takes it as a mark in favor of his reading that Plato occasionally uses the expression "the equals themselves." The analysis, however, raises many other questions. Is $E_2(a) - E_1(b)$ the same fact or a different one? If equality is that by virtue of which $a$ is equal to $b$, what is it by virtue of which $a$ participates in one of the pair and not the other? If this is a legitimate question, then participation in a Form is not explanatorily ultimate, as Plato seems to want it to be.

At this juncture, I feel that we can justifiably dismiss Castañeda’s interpretation. The textual support for the view seems to be slender. Moreover, it raises a host of problems and questions. Not the least of these is that it seems to require a distinction between the way that (EC1) applies in cases where a thing is large and in cases where a thing is beautiful or fine. We have reason to believe that Plato sees these predicates as parts of a single family. The application of Castañeda’s account to the case of things that are fine requires resources that it would be anachronistic to attribute to Plato.
C. Matthen’s Account

Castañeda is not the only commentator to claim to find a theory of relations in the Phaedo. Matthen focuses his attention upon the 102c-d passage.

So Simmias is called both tall and short when he is in the middle of the two; submitting his smallness to the large of the one to be exceeded and presenting the large to exceed the other’s smallness.21

Socrates is the first to admit that this is a strange way of expressing himself, but he seems to regard it as essential for getting his point across. Matthen hypothesizes that Plato thinks of the difference between Phaedo being taller than Simmias and Phaedo being taller than Socrates in terms of different participation relations. In the first case Phaedo participates-in-the-Tall-in-relation-to-Simmias. This is a very different matter from participation-in-relation-to-Socrates. Thus, according to Matthen, Plato’s analysis of x is taller than y is:

(1) x participates in the tall in relation to y.

The awkwardness of the 102cd passage results from Plato’s ontology of Form-shares. Given this ontology, Matthen claims, (1) implies

(2) Some characteristic present in x participates in tallness in relation to y.22

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21 οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπιωνυμίων ἔχει σμερός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ δὲν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπέρεχεν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχου, τῷ δὲ τῷ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχειν ὑπερέχου.

Such a view is, I believe, consistent with what Plato says in the *Phaedo*. But, of course, this does not imply that it is Plato's view. For confirmation of his interpretation, Matthen looks beyond the *Phaedo*. If this is what Plato had in mind, he says, we are in a better position to understand why Plato qualifies the law of opposites in *Republic* 436b and to see why he thinks that sensible things are less real than Forms.

Matthen finds it strange that Plato qualifies the law of opposites in *Republic* IV in the way that he does. Why, after all, is it necessary to say that the same thing will not do or suffer opposites *in the same respect, in relation to the same thing* and *at the same time*? According to Matthen, Plato has already explained the semantic import of sentences like 'Simmias is tall' and 'Simmias is short' in the *Phaedo* by the expansions 'Simmias is taller than Socrates and shorter than Phaedo.' These are obviously not opposites. So, the qualification of the law of opposites in the *Republic* is superfluous. The fact that Plato does so modify the law of opposites shows that he is not looking at the relationship between Simmias and the Tall in this way. He does not see a multiplicity of relational predicates—"taller than x," "taller than y"—some of which are compatible with the predicate "shorter than z" and some of which are not. Rather, says Matthen, Plato sees a single Form, the Tall, in which sensibles can participate in a variety of ways. The importance behind the qualifications to the law of opposites is that no sensible can participate-in-relation-to-Socrates in the Tall and simultaneously participate-in-relation-to-Socrates in the Short.
I do not think we should find Matthen's puzzle sufficiently puzzling to motivate his solution. Plato might have qualified the law of opposites in *Republic* IV in order to ward off potential counterexamples from critics who would not have accepted, or were unaware of, his *Phaedo* analysis of comparative statements. The law of opposites is introduced in the context of an argument for the plurality of the parts of the soul. There is every reason to think that Plato wants the argument to be compelling to the reader and may have presented his premises in the most intuitively appealing fashion.23

The other evidence that Matthen assembles in support of his view is even less compelling. According to him, we can unravel the problematic notion of degrees of reality in the *Republic* by supposing that Plato is playing on the dual sense of "unqualified" (ἀπλός). Because Simmias participates-in-relation-to-Socrates in the Tall, his being is qualified. Because Forms do not admit contradictory predicates in any way whatsoever, their being is unqualified. Thus, they are more purely. Matthen has other views about the relationship between being and intelligibility by means of which he explains the superior "knowability" of Forms. We need only point out that it is not necessary to suppose that there are a plurality of participation relations (participation-in-relation-to-Socrates, etc.) in order to explain the deficient status of sensibles. They might well be thought to

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23 So Shorey *ad loc*: "Sophistical objections are anticipated here and below (436e) by attaching to it nearly all the qualifying distinctions of the categories which Aristotle wearily observes are necessary πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις (De Int. 17a36-37)."
be deficient simply because they participate in the Tall rather than being the Tall in whatever way the Tall is tall.\textsuperscript{24}

\section*{D. Conclusion}

Neither of the accounts which attribute to Plato a theory of relations based on the final argument of the \textit{Phaedo} is compelling. If this is so, then this section of the text must serve some other function than introducing a special wrinkle into the theory of Forms to accommodate relative predicates. Thus, we can legitimately scrutinize the final argument for the immortality of the soul for clues concerning the role that the $\kappa\alpha\nu\theta$ $\alpha\delta\tau\alpha$ and $\pi\rho\omicron\zeta$ $\tau$ distinction plays in motivating the theory of Forms.

\section*{§2. The Theory of Forms in \textit{Phaedo} and Its Motivation}

Though the Forms themselves are mentioned much sooner in \textit{Phaedo} (65d4), the theory of the Forms \textit{per se} is not spelled out until the final argument. That is to say that, though the role that the Forms play as the proper objects of knowledge is made quite clear, the doctrine that things are what they are in virtue participation in the Forms is not announced until 100c.

If anything other than the Beautiful itself is beautiful, it is so for no other reason than that it participates in that Beautiful; and this I say is surely so in all cases.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{24} See, for instance, Nehamas (1975a).

\textsuperscript{25} $\epsiloni$ $\taui$ $\ekstw$ $\allos$ $\kalan$ $\pi\lambdah$ $\alw$ $\tau\kalan$, $\o\thi$ $\deltai$ $\ev$ $\allos$ $\kalan$ $\ekwai$ $\eta$ $\di\thi$ $\muet\ekh\i$ $\ekwiv$ $\tau\thi$ $\kalan$: $\kai$ $\pa\nu$ $\thi$ $\o$ $\o\uw$ $\lgrw$. 
The doctrine has at least three parts:

1. The Forms exist.

2. Each Form is itself, that is, in some sense, the Form F is itself F.\(^\text{26}\)

3. If anything other than the Form F is F, then the sole αἰτία for this is its participation in the Form F (or in some other Form which brings F-ness with it).

Moreover, based on what we have been told in the argument from recollection, we can add a fourth part.

4. Forms are not the same things as sensibles.

\(^{26}\) πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν in the above passage is omitted in B but present in T and W. Burnet accepts this reading though Archer-Hind does not. Nonetheless, τί ἄλλο as well as other passages confirm that each Form is predicable of itself, cf. 74d5 ἄφα γοινέται ἡμῖν αὐτὸς ίσα εἶναι ὅσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅ ἔστιν, . . . where ἴσον clearly must be understood. Later at 102e5, where Plato makes the point that the large in us, like the Large itself, will not admit smallness, he writes, ἐκεῖνῳ (the large in us) δὲ οὐ τετάληκτον μέγα ὅν σμικρῶν εἶναι. One can take μέγα ὅν as a condition as Archer-Hind and Gallop do, in which case one should read "while remaining large." Alternately one may take it as an explanatory phrase, "but the large in us, being large (or since it is large), has never submitted to being small." Tredennick takes it in this latter way. In either case the large in us must, at some point, be itself large. If it is like the Large Itself in not admitting the Small, and if the reason for this is the same in both cases, then it seems that the Large Itself must be large. Finally, it seems clear that the young Socrates in Parmenides (who holds a theory quite like the theory in the Phaedo, for τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν make their only other appearance in the dialogues here) accepts (or at least allows to be foisted upon him) the claim that the Large Itself is large. τί δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τάλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὄσατος τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃ, οὐχὶ ἐν τινι αὐτον μέγα φανεῖται, ὁ τούτω πάντα ἀνάγκη μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι; Prm. 132a. On this point see Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides" in Allen (1965), 237. In spite of what Vlastos says, Taylor ((1915) pp. 253-5, 286-9 and (1934) pp. 20-21 and 26) does acknowledge in his own way that Plato accepts a certain form of self-predication. What he denies, along with Cherniss ((1944) p. 298 and ff.) is that Large Itself has largeness predicated of it in the same way in which large is predicated of Milo. Thus, αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα do not form a single homogeneous group beyond which any distinct Form of Largeness must appear.
Needless to say, the meaning of (2) is problematic. What we must say about it depends on what we say about the nature of the Forms and that depends, in a large measure, on what work the Forms are supposed to be doing in Plato's philosophy. (3) is complicated by the fact that Socrates later transcends the safe and stupid cause and introduces Form pairs which always travel together (104d). By this I mean that whenever a thing is such that it can be called after one Form and has its character it can also be called after another. Thus, whatever participates in Two also can be called after, and so participates in, The Even. Plato makes it clear that, "Because it participates in Two" is a better answer to the question, "Why is this pair even?" than "Because it participates in The Even" (105c). What is not made clear is whether the latter statement is still a legitimate αἰτία of the pairs' even-ness much less the sole αἰτία. We may be able to clear up some of these difficulties if we can determine what problems Plato intends the introduction of this theory to solve.

The passage quoted above follows hard on the heels of the story of Socrates' intellectual development and some puzzles which are intended to bring to light the nature of his dissatisfaction with the current state of φύσεως ἰστορία. There is nothing in Socrates' story to suggest that we ought to read it

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27 I shall continue to speak of "Socrates' theory" or "Socrates' dissatisfaction with Anaxagorian physical theory." The question of how much of what Plato puts in Socrates' mouth in this dialogue is genuinely in keeping with what the historical Socrates thought is beyond the scope of this inquiry.

28 This is a difficult term. What exactly falls within the province of φύσεως ἰστορία is difficult to say. If we can judge from Socrates' puzzles it would include questions about mathematics (or, perhaps better, philosophy of mathematics) as well as questions that we moderns would place under the heading of physics or chemistry as well as biology. As a result, 'natural science' or
ironically or as some kind of joke. I shall proceed on the assumption that Plato’s Socrates here says something which is genuinely informative about Plato’s reasons for holding such a theory.

A. Socrates’ Story and Constraints on Explanations

At 96d8, Socrates introduces three things that he thought that he once understood. Having become acquainted with natural philosophy, he was forced to give up these views because they lead to conceptual difficulties. These difficulties are, in turn, dissolved by applying the hypothesis by which he now explains coming to be and passing away—that is, the theory of Forms.

The first thing that Socrates claims that he once thought, but has since given up, was that one man might be taller than another by virtue of a head. The second is that ten is more than eight because two has been added to it, or by virtue of two. The third is that two cubits are longer than one cubit by a half (96d-e). We find out later exactly what perplexities caused Socrates to give up these views. These perplexities yield two constraints which any adequate explanation must meet. First, since one man is taller by a head than another, and this latter is shorter by a head, it will be by the same thing that the taller is taller and the shorter shorter (101a-b). Thus, we have what I called above the First Explanatory Constraint: where F and G are opposites, if x is the reason that a is F, x cannot be the reason why a, or any other thing is G. Second, if one man is taller by a head, then he is tall by virtue of something which is itself short. This is the Second

'physics' would be a misleading translation. In what follows, I shall either leave it untranslated or else use the rather vague term 'natural philosophy.'
Explanatory Constraint: where F and G are opposites, if x is the aitia in virtue of which a is F, x cannot itself be G.

One can see easily that the problem of eight and ten and the problem of two cubits and one cubit follow the same pattern. The puzzles which come after these at 96e6 do not obviously make the same point. The implication seems to be that Socrates once believed that one, which is added to another, was the aitia whereby two came to be (έγεντο, 97a2). There is an additional element here which was not present in the cases in 96d8-e5. There one could simply say that one man was taller than another "by a head" or that ten was greater "by two." Here things are phrased differently. Two is not simply in virtue of one. Rather, two comes to be from one by the addition of another one. Socrates thus raises an additional point. Which one is it that becomes two? The one which is added or the one that was already present?

This, however, should not blind us to the fact that these elements were potentially present in the earlier cases as well. We can cast these in terms of coming to be also, and the same problems will emerge. When a one cubit line is extended to two cubits, we can ask, "By which half of the extended line is the line longer than a one cubit line?" Perhaps, because of these cases, we ought to formulate a Third Explanatory Constraint:

EC3: whenever a comes to be F, then there ought to be some reason for saying that x, rather than y, is that in virtue of which a is F.
Another element which seems to be different in the case of addition is the confusion of physical with logical or conceptual explanations. Socrates now claims to fail to understand how the juxtaposition of things which were, when separate, individually one, could bring about two. This seems to manifest a confusion between explanations of physical facts and conceptual explanation. The physical addition of more pebbles to a pile makes the pile bigger and heavier. However, the operation of addition, considered in and of itself, is not a matter of juxtaposing more units or bringing them into closer proximity.

I think that one must tread carefully here, however. For it isn’t clear that Plato himself consistently distinguishes between the addition and subtraction of elements to particular groups of things and the mathematical operations which describe, but are, nonetheless, non-identical with what happens to these groups of things. If this is so, then we can see echoes of the problem raised with respect to the addition of one to one in the earlier puzzles. Suppose that Theaetetus eats healthy food and comes to be taller than Socrates by a head. Very naively, we might ask, "How can the addition of a head, which is not itself a large thing, make Theaetetus larger?" Alternately, if we take the common-sense view of growth

29 Vlastos sees this confusion at the root of all of the puzzles raised in this section. "All four of the puzzles in 96d8-e4 will yield to the same treatment on the hypothesis that all of them crop up because in this benighted phase of his philosophical evolution Socrates was confusing physical aitiai with logical ones." (DR p. 99)

30 See, for instance, Thet. 155a ff. He is aided in this confusion by the general tendency in Greek mathematics to assimilate arithmetic operations to geometry and the latter to physical comparisons or measurings. Thus in Euclid’s Common Notion 4 we find equality explained in terms of "coincidence," καὶ τὰ ἐφαρμόζοντα ἐπ’ ἄλληλα ἵσα ἄλληλους ἑστίν. See Heath (1956) ad loc. This notion is not altered in the arithmetical books VII-IX.
that Socrates gives prior to the puzzles at 96d8, we can ask how, even if food is itself flesh and bone, the addition of flesh to flesh can bring about largeness. Neither the boy nor the food, prior to their "juxtaposition," was large. How can the bringing together of two things which are not themselves large bring about something which is large? If this is a legitimate way of understanding the passage about growth and if we do not jump to the conclusion that in 97c2-7 Plato is lampooning those who fail to distinguish between physical and conceptual explanations, then we can see that he is pursuing the same themes throughout all of these examples. We can formulate another of these common themes in the following way:

EC4: if $x$ is that in virtue of which $a$ is $F$, then there must be some connection between the nature of $x$ and the state of being $F$, such that it is clear why $x$ brings about the state of being $F$.

The passage at 96e6-97b8 produces one more condition. Socrates claims to be unable to believe that the division of one is the $al\tau\alpha$ of two (halves, presumably). For it was an opposite process, that of juxtaposition, which produced two before. This suggests another constraint, closely related to (EC2):

EC5: where $x$ and $y$ are opposites, if $a$ comes to be $F$ in virtue of $x$, then it cannot be the case that anything comes to be $F$ in virtue of $y$.

Nothing in the Phaedo suggests that we ought to suppose that the considerations that Socrates advances in support of his new theory do not bear some relation to Plato's reasons for formulating the theory of Forms. Though one must always be careful about "Socratic (or, perhaps, Platonic) irony," there is no hint of
it here. If we suppose that *Phaedo* 96a-100c reveals something of Plato's motives in formulating the theory of Forms, then we can answer the question that was raised concerning self-predication in Chapter Two. These constraints on explanations strongly suggest that the Synonymy Principle is the motive behind the self-predication requirement and that when Plato says that the logical cause of F is itself F this means that it is completely F.

In Chapter Two §1, I argued that the best and most charitable interpretation of the Synonymy Principle was that it was an attempt to make explanations systematically and genuinely informative. EC4 echoes this sentiment with its insistence that the connection between *explanans* and *explanandum* be intuitively clear. One way in which this connection could be made clear is by supposing that the two share the feature which is to be explained and that the one "passes it along" to the other. But if our basic pattern of explanation is to be the passing along of a feature that the logical cause has to the *explanandum*, then it is not enough that it merely has the feature itself. After all, it might have the contrary of this feature as well. It might even, on some occasions, be the explanation for

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31 The model of "passing along" is not the only pattern of explanation that Socrates considers. He would like to be able to answer the question, "Why is x F?" with some account of why it is better that x should be F than otherwise. Because the nature of "the Good" is insufficiently clear to us, we are frequently not in a position to say why it is better that x should be F rather than G. As a result, Socrates is forced back to the pattern of explanation associated with the Synonymy Principle. The problem with Anaxagoras is that he promises answers in terms of the former, but (in Socrates' examples at least) does not even manage to deliver on the second, more modest, pattern of explanation. Whether Anaxagoras actually failed to provide explanations that conformed to the Synonymy Principle in his writings is another matter. He certainly seems to be committed to it in fr. 10: πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκ μὴ τριχὸς γένοιτο θρίς καὶ σάρξ ἐκ μὴ σαρκός;
why some things come to have this contrary. So, if the coherence of explanations really is what is at stake with the Synonymy Principle, then

SYN: The \( a\tau i\alpha \) of x's being F is itself F.

really needs to be interpreted as

SP1: The \( a\tau i\alpha \) of x's being F is-completely F.

EC2 is a natural consequence of the self-predication requirement interpreted in this way. It simply says that the \( a\tau i\alpha \) of x's being F cannot itself be G (where G is the opposite of F). This, of course, would be incompatible with the \( a\tau i\alpha \) being-completely F. Thus, if Plato held the being-completely interpretation of the self-predication requirement for logical causes and if this requirement was prompted by the idea behind the Synonymy Principle, then it is quite clear why he would have felt that two of the five explanatory constraints propounded in this section of the \textit{Phaedo} were reasonable.

The other three explanatory constraints spring naturally from the singularity requirement. According to this requirement, there is a single thing by virtue of which all F things are F. Let us call it x. Could it be that x is the explanation for why some things are G as well? The singularity requirement itself does not rule out this possibility. But when it is combined with the self-predication requirement, it is clear that the answer must be that such a dual \( a\tau i\alpha \) is not possible. If x were to be the \( a\tau i\alpha \) by which G things are G, it would have to be-completely G. But if it is the \( a\tau i\alpha \) of F-ness it would have to be-completely F as
well. When F and G are opposites, this is impossible. EC5, by contrast, prohibits opposite $\alpha\tau\iota\alpha\iota$ from being the explanation for a single phenomenon. This is just the singularity requirement stated specifically with respect to opposites. EC3 similarly insists that there be a single explanation for why some F thing is F. Like EC4 and the Synonymy Principle, it requires that there be something in the nature of this single $\alpha\tau\iota\iota$ which makes it clear why it, and no other thing, is that by virtue of which x is F.

The puzzles raised by Socrates' intellectual history issue in conditions of adequacy for explanations that are perfectly intelligible within the framework of the constraints on answers to Socratic questions that we isolated in Chapter Two. Relative predicates, we noted, raised problems within this framework and it is relatives that Plato uses to generate the puzzles in *Phaedo* 96a-100c. We must now turn to the final argument to see how the theory of Forms is supposed to solve these problems.

B. Forms, Shares and the $\alpha\tau\iota\alpha\iota$ of Relatives

In Chapter Two we explored some of the problems attendant upon finding logical causes for relative predicates. Because the logical cause of F is the thing that we cite when we attempt to explain why something is F, it is correspondingly difficult to explain why things are F when F is a relative predicate. Having shown how some fairly ordinary things fail to really explain why F things are F, at 100c Socrates turns to a rather out of the ordinary explanation for the fineness of things—the Fine Itself.
Socrates’ method is hypothetical precisely because he has good reason to believe that there must be something that serves as the logical cause of the Fine and he also has reason to think that ordinary candidates like gold or the fitting will not do the job. So, he assumes the existence of something that will serve to explain why fine things are fine and large things are large.\textsuperscript{32} Such a method investigates the beings by means of λόγος, and not in act, because it takes as the criterion of truth what we have reason to believe must be the case given other well-founded beliefs and not what we perceive.\textsuperscript{33} We have reason to think that there are Forms not because we see them or see shares of Forms entering or departing things, but because we recognize that something of this nature is a necessary assumption if coherent explanation is to be possible.

The examples that follow \textsuperscript{34} apply the supposition that things are as they are by way of participation in Forms to the relative predicates which were shown to be explanatorily difficult in the previous section. The synonymous αίτια of largeness is The Large. In addition, there is The Small and The Many. Unlike ‘fine,’ all these predicates are relatives which function only as explicit or implicit comparatives. Finally, the application of the corresponding number predicates to things is explained by the introduction of δός and μονάς. We are to

\textsuperscript{32} Phdo. 100a3-7, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ἃν ἄν κρίνω ἐκρομενέσσατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἃν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ δυτά, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἃντων], ἃ δ' ἄν μη, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ.

\textsuperscript{33} Phdo. 99c5-100a3, ἐδοξε δὴ μοι χρὴναί εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν δυτῶν τὴν ἀληθείαν. Ἡας μὲν οὖν ἂν εἰκάζῃ πρὸ ἡθνικὰ οὐκ ἔσσε ἔνδεικνον γάρ πάνυ συγχρωμὸ τὸν ἐν λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ δυτα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν ἔργοις.
believe that there are Forms corresponding to these predicates because of the
difficulties we encountered in explaining how sensibles are larger, smaller, more
numerous and how it is that they are one or two in number.34

With this groundwork in place, the section from 102b3-103a2 adds three
elements. First, it expands on the notion of the share of the Form in the thing.
Not only can we talk about things sharing in a Form, we can also speak intelligibly
about the share of the Form present in the thing. Though the term τὸ ἐν ημῖν is
not introduced until 102d8, 102b5 makes it clear that largeness and smallness are
in Simmias. Prior to this, Plato has talked only of things being large by Largeness
and he has expressed this by the dative case or by the use of διὰ. Now, however,
we have some insight into how this is possible. When Simmias participates in the
Large, there is a share of the Large in Simmias.

What Simmias is or comes to be as a result of the share of the Large in
him is a complex affair. The Large in him and the Small in Socrates are somehow
coordinated in such a way that Simmias is taller than Socrates but not taller than
Phaedo by virtue of its presence. As Castañeda and Matthen have shown, we can
speculate a great deal about the nature of this coordination and the relations

34 The question of whether there are Forms that answer to the other number predicates is another
matter. See below. I take it that there are Forms for ‘one’ and ‘two’ because Plato has things
participating in them (cf. 101c5, δὲν τοῦτον μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ
μονάδος δὲν μέλλῃ ἔν ἔσεσθαι). The unit and the dyad may be unique in this respect. But
there would be nothing especially surprising in that. Simmias and Cebes were students of
Philolaus, the Pythagorean. The Pythagoreans did not regard either as numbers. See Heath
(1963) pp. 38-41. Given the Pythagorean tone of much of the dialogue (Cp. DK,14 8a), this may
be an assumption that Plato either accepts or is willing to make in order to facilitate the argu-
ment.
between Forms, individuals and shares. None of these speculations is conclusively supported by the text because Plato does no more than nod in the direction of the problem. When, at 102d2, Plato has Socrates joke about the artificial grammar of what he has just said (καὶ συγγραφικῶς ἔρειν), he as much as admits that this is a sticky business. "ἄλλο οὖν ἐι γέ που, ὡς λέγω" acknowledges some of the rough and ready character of this account. Though we may find it frustrating, the "theory" is elaborated, consciously I think, only far enough to serve the role that it must play in the final argument for immortality. The remarks about the relation between the shares in Phaedo, Simmias and Socrates serve only to forestall a possible confusion and Socrates says as much.

I am speaking in this fashion because I want for you to believe as I do. For it seems to me that it is not only the Large Itself that will never admit to be at the same time both large and small, but also the large in us will never receive the small nor admit to be overtopped.35

Someone might mistakenly think that, since there is a share of the Large in Simmias and Simmias is shorter than Phaedo, the share, as well as Simmias, in some way admits its own opposite. Socrates' rough and ready characterization of the relationship of the shares of Forms in Socrates, Simmias and Phaedo does not make it clear whether the share of the Large in Simmias flees or perishes when Simmias is compared with Phaedo. One thing, however, is clear—the large in him

35 Phdo. 102d5-8, λέγω δὴ τοῦτο ἑνεκά, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοι ἀπερ ἐμοί, ἐμοὶ γάρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὕτο τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτε ἐπέλειν ἡμι μέγα καὶ σμικράν εἶναι, ἄλλα καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικράν οὐδ' ἐπέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι.
is in no way small. The point of the illustration involving the three men is to show that the theory can accommodate this fact.

With this important point in place, Plato takes the first step toward transcending the safe but stupid αίτια. It is not only shares of Forms and Forms that will not be or become the other of a pair of opposites. Fire stands in the same relation to cold as the Large and the Large in Simmias stand to smallness. The question arises: Are we to suppose that there is a Form that corresponds to either heat or to fire? In the case of heat and cold, I think the answer is clearly, "Yes." The reasons for this are twofold. First, though 'heat' and 'cold' considered as abstract terms are not obviously πρόχρονον, they are closely related to terms that are. 'Hot' and 'cold' are implicit comparatives. I have argued that special problems arise when one tries to determine the logical cause of such a relative term within the constraints placed on explanations by Plato. Heat might be described as that by which hot things are hot. Thus, there is a prima facie reason for thinking that Plato has as much reason to suppose that there is a Form for heat as for any other troublesome relative predicate. Second, when this example is glossed by a general principle, the position that heat falls into is covered by the term that Plato has been using for Forms.

It is therefore the case, he said, that with some such things not only is the Form itself entitled to the same name throughout all time, but

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36 Thus, in some measure, Gallop, Burnet, et al are in the right and Castañeda is in the wrong. Part of Plato's point in this section is to contrast a thing that can be or become one of a pair of opposites, like Socrates, and remain what and where it is and a thing that cannot, like the large in Simmias. This is something like the essence-accident distinction.
also something else which is not this, but which has always has this character whenever it exists.37

If all that Plato meant in this passage was that a share of the F was entitled to the name ‘F’ as well as the Form, then it would add nothing to what has already been established with respect to the tall in Simmias. Rather, his point is this: it is not only the Form, F, and all the F shares that are entitled to the name F. There is something else, in this case Fire, which is entitled to the name ‘hot’ as well as the Form and its shares. So, there must be Forms for heat and cold.

The same sorts of considerations seem to apply to the Odd and the Even.38 It is not so clear that they apply equally well to fire and snow. First, these terms are not relatives, nor are they connected with relatives in the way that heat is. Thus, if Plato has reasons for thinking that there are Forms that correspond to these terms, they are not the reasons that we have uncovered in Socrates’ story. These reasons seem relevant only to πρός τι terms. Second, and more importantly, Plato chooses his language carefully and writes in a way that carefully avoids using the vocabulary of Forms in relation to fire and snow. So, in the passage above, he uses only ἄλλο τι. Clearly this "something else" cannot be a Form of fire, since it has the name 'hot' whenever it exists. It might be thought that the ἄλλο τι refers to the individual shares of such a Form. While these

37 Phdo. 103e2-5, ἔστιν ἀρα, ἦ δ’ ὥς, περὶ ἕνα τῶν τοιούτων, ὡστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦναι τὸν αὐτοῦ δύναμας εἰς τῶν ἀεί χρόνων, ἄλλα καί ἄλλο τι ὃ ἐστὶ μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκεῖνον μορφὴν ἀεὶ, ὑποστέρ ἦ.

38 Phdo. 104a8-b1, ἄλλα ὃν τε χωρὶς πέφυκε καὶ ἢ τριάς καὶ ἢ περιπτάς καὶ ὃ ἡμιός τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἄποι, ὡστε οὐκ ἐν ὑπο τὸ περιττόν ἀεὶ ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν ἐστιν περιττός. And similarly for τὸ ἀρτιοῦ.
shares are not shares of the Form of Heat, nonetheless they are always entitled to the name of this Form, as well as the name 'fire,' whenever they exist. This reading is certainly possible. But nothing in the text forces us to accept it either.39 Plato continues to use such ambiguous language up to the definition at 104d1.40

These things will be those which are such that, whatever they occupy, they not only force it to possess their own form, but also always that of some opposite to it.41

The use of ἰδέα here need not indicate that these "things" are Forms.42 In fact, the talk of "having" may suggest that this is merely a non-technical way of saying that they must have some opposite in addition to their own character or aspect. After all, sensible things don’t have Forms. They are whatever they are because they participate in, and so have a share of, a Form.

39 Nehamas (1973, p. 483-4) tries to reach the conclusion that Plato must be talking about simple fire and snow by an argument from elimination. He cannot intend to describe shares of a Form of fire because then he would not have distinguished a sub-class of shares (π.δ. ἐίναι τῶν τοιούτων in el). All shares are entitled to another name apart from that of the Form that they correspond to. For instance, a share of justice is always entitled to be called a virtue as well as justice. Context should make it clear that what is at issue is whether a share of some Form can bear the name of one of a pair of opposites with which it is non-identical (as 104b6-8 makes clear). Such a characterization would specify a sub-class of shares.

40 Phdo. 104b7, δὴ φαίνεται ὁδὸν μόνων ἐκείνα τὰ ἐναυτία ἄλλα ὀφθαλμέα, ἄλλα καὶ δὰ . . . and 104c7, ὁδὸν ἄρα μόνων τὰ εἴδη τὰ ἐναυτία ὀνὴ ὑπομένει ἐπιάυτη ἄλληλα, ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλη ἄττα . . .

41 104d1-3, τάδε εἴη ἂν, ἀν τι ἂν κατάσχη μῆ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰδέαν αὐτῷ ἵππευ, ἄλλα καὶ ἐναυτίον αὐτῷ δεῖ τιμος.

42 Cf. Burnet ad loc, "We are not defining a class of εἶδη, but a class of things (ἐ 8 ἄλλη ἄττα) which are not αὐτῷ ἐναυτία to the 'attacking' form. It has not been suggested in any way that fire and snow are εἶδη and it seems improbable that they are so regarded."
There is similar hedging concerning Forms for number predicates. On the one hand, Plato uses the term 'the Form of Three,' but he does so in a way that parallels the use of ἰδέα that we just decided was indeterminate between 'character' and the technical use of the term. But, on the other hand, Plato also writes as if three were susceptible to destruction. He might mean by this only that the share of the Form of Three in the Kingston Trio is destroyed if they add another member, though the Form itself is indestructible. We are not given enough detail to decide one way or the other.

What ought we say about all this indeterminacy concerning the range of Forms? Part of the problem is that Plato must be cagey about the range of Forms in order for the final argument to work. Soul, of course, will be likened to fire and to three. It brings with it one of a pair of opposites and excludes the other. Yet, it is not clear that soul ought to be thought of as a kind of Form. Ugly questions arise. If the body and soul are separable, what is it that has a share of Soul? If individual persons all have shares of the Form of Soul, in what respect do they differ? If our souls know the Forms, why is only this one Form cognizant of its fellows? Plato’s argument is far less controversial if the truth of the premise concerning things that always brings one of a pair of opposites does not commit him to any particular ontological views about the nature of soul. The examples that

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43 Phdo. 104d5, ὅτι καὶ ἢ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχει, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τριὰν εἶναι ἄλλα καὶ περιττοῖς.

44 104c1-3, ἢ οὐ πῆμοι τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολεῖσθαι πρῶτον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι ὅτι ἀπιστᾶν, πρὶν ὑπομένω ἐτι πρὶν ἕνα ἄρτια γενέσθαι; The odd, which would guarantee the imperishability of three, is not imperishable, 106c3.
precede the case of soul and life, I believe, are purposely vague in order to accomplish this very thing. As was the case with the 102b-d passage, Plato never loses sight of the conclusion that needs to be established. He elaborates his ontology only far enough to motivate the premises that he needs to reach that conclusion. We can, however, make some estimations of probability. Socrates' story gives us some insight into Plato's reasons for thinking that there must be a Form that corresponds to 'fine' and 'large' and their brethren. I have argued that these reasons have to do with the difficulties that arise when we try to isolate the logical causes of relative predicates. Number predicates are relatives, while 'fire' and 'snow' are not. If my hypothesis about the motivation behind the Forms of Largeness and Beauty is correct, then Plato has reasons for thinking that there are Forms for numbers which do not generalize to substances like fire and snow. This does not exclude the possibility that Plato has other reasons for thinking that there must be such Forms. But, if he has such reasons, they are not in the forefront of the argument in the Phaedo. If this is correct, then we have answered one of the questions with which we began: "Why does Plato suppose that there are Forms?" I now wish to turn to the question of what Forms are like.

C. The Clever αἰτία and the Paradigm of Substances

We have seen how some explanations violate the adequacy conditions that Socrates has adumbrated. If we are to follow Socrates' example, we ought no longer find them intelligible for this reason, or at the very least, we ought not rest content with them. The explanation which appeals to a thing's participation in the Form of F to explain its F-ness conforms to these adequacy conditions, but is
\( \dot{\alpha} \mu o \dot{\alpha} \dot{\eta} \) (105c). At 105c, Socrates introduces us to a better answer. It is still safe, but it is more refined. If we ask, "In virtue of what is this body hot?," then one answer which is safe is that it is in virtue of having heat in it. A better answer, however, is that it is in virtue of the presence of fire in it. Likewise, if we ask why this person is ill, one safe and informative answer is because fever is present in him. Finally, if we ask why this body is alive, the best answer is that because soul is present in it.\(^45\)

Fire is a kind of "stuff" or substance (in the modern sense of the term). Stuffs like fire have certain features essentially. Whatever has some fire present in it is also correctly called "hot." Given these connections, explanations by appeal to the presence of a certain stuff in a subject will not run afoul of the five explanatory constraints laid down above.

1. Given the essential connection between fire and hotness, the presence of fire in a thing will never be the \( a i r i a \) in virtue of which that thing is cold.

2. Because fire will not ever be cold, it cannot explain why a thing is hot while being itself cold.

3. The fire \( in \) a particular thing explains why \( it \) is hot. The fire in some other thing does not.

\(^{45}\) There is some question about whether the safe and informative answers proposed differ from the safe and stupid \( a i r i a \) in virtue of giving only a sufficient condition, and not one that is both necessary and sufficient. This would be so if Plato thought that a thing might be hot in some other manner than by virtue of having fire in it, or that there were illnesses which were caused by something other than fever. I want to leave this question open, for I think that the argument can be rendered intelligible however we choose to answer it.
4. Because fire itself is always hot, it is clear why the presence of fire in a thing makes it hot.

5. Stuffs themselves do not have opposites. Thus, there can be no situation in which the opposite of a stuff brings about the same effect as the stuff itself.\textsuperscript{46}

It isn’t clear whether Plato thinks that fever or soul are like fire. Yet, it seems just possible that he might want to liken them to homoeomorous stuffs, like fire or snow, because of the virtues that explanations by reference to the presence of stuffs possess. Let us pursue this hypothesis and see if the final argument makes sense on the assumption that it is this paradigm that Plato has in mind.

If soul is a stuff and if it is such that the things in which it is present are alive, then, just as something in which fire is present will not become cold, while the fire is present in it, so too that in which soul is present cannot become dead while the soul is present. That is to say that soul will not admit its opposite into the subject that it occupies while it is present. In this respect, it is exactly similar to stuffs like fire and snow which always bring certain features with them. This is what justifies the conclusion at 105d2-3: "The soul, whatever it occupies, always comes to that thing bringing life."\textsuperscript{47}

The argument now appeals to a somewhat different example. At 105c5 Plato introduced, alongside the examples of fire/heat, and illness/fever, the pair \textit{μονάς} and \textit{περιττός}. Plato’s point, I believe, is that if one thinks of a single

\textsuperscript{46} Even if we speak loosely and say that snow (which is always accompanied by the opposite of what fire brings with it) is the "opposite" of fire, it is still true that fire meets EC5.

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{η ψυχή ἀρά ὅτι ἐν αὐτῇ κατάσχε, ἀδεὶ Ἦκει ἐπ' ἑκείνῳ φέρονσα ζωήν}. 
thing, one can explain why it is one thing by saying that it has a share of \( \mu \nu \alpha \zeta. \) Because of the nature of one, it must also be odd.

For the sake of seeing how the argument might be continued, let us take the parallel that I suggested earlier seriously and suppose that \( \mu \nu \alpha \zeta \) is, like fire, something that can be present in something. So, for instance, the Lone Ranger is one because of the presence of \( \mu \nu \alpha \zeta \) in him. Because of the connection between having \( \mu \nu \alpha \zeta \) and being odd, the Lone Ranger will not admit the even while the \( \mu \nu \alpha \zeta \) in him remains. However, unlike the hot baked potato which will later admit the cold, the Lone Ranger will never admit the even and remain

\[ \text{Cp. Philo 101c, καὶ δὲν τὸ τὸν μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δόο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ \( \mu \nu \alpha \zeta \) δὲν μέλλη ἐν ἔσεσθαι with Euclid, Bk VII, Def. 1: \( \mu \nu \alpha \zeta \) ἔστιν, καθ' ἣν ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἔντων ἐν λέγεται.} \]

\[ \text{Socrates cites only \( \mu \nu \alpha \zeta \) as the a\( \alpha \iota \iota \iota \_\iota \) of oddness. Yet, one might think that three could equally well be that on account of which the Stooges are odd numbered. I think the text does not definitively settle the matter. (See above p. 158 n. 34 on the question of whether Plato even envisions Forms for numbers other than the unit and the dyad.) I myself am inclined to think that \( \mu \nu \alpha \zeta \) is the only "because" of oddness because of the Singularity Requirement. For any odd numbered set of things, there will be one left over when the set is evenly divided. So, \( \mu \nu \alpha \zeta \) is the a\( \alpha \iota \iota \iota \_\iota \) of oddness in all cases in virtue of this fact. So Hackforth p.158, n.2 and Nehamas (1973) p.489, n.33.} \]

Such a response must, of course, contend with Plato's claim that half of the numbers are, by their nature, entitled to the name of odd (104a). But this need not make them a\( \alpha \iota \iota \iota \_\iota \) of oddness. They are merely such as to have \( \mu \nu \alpha \zeta \) present to them by their nature. As a result they are equally odd by nature, though not the logical cause of oddness. Burnet argues that the case of \( \mu \nu \alpha \zeta \) is intended to parallel that of fire and fever. Since, according to Burnet, there can be other causes of heat and disease, the other numbers can equally well be causes of oddness. All these cases would seemingly violate the singularity requirement. In addition, if Plato were thinking of fire as the elemental source of heat, as it clearly is in Timaeus and as it sometimes is thought of in Pre-Socratic philosophy, it is not so clear that there are other a\( \alpha \iota \iota \iota \_\iota \) of hotness.

\[ \text{At least while 'man' remains the count noun which completes 'one.' The Lone Ranger can be numbered by 'two' if the count noun is 'hands.' The situation exactly parallels that of Simmias who is taller than Socrates. He cannot also be said to be short while the \( π \rho \delta \zeta \) qualifier remains "than Socrates."} \]
lone. He can no more be even than \( \mu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \) can. Whatever will not admit the even into that which it occupies while it occupies it, is such that it can be called by the alpha-privative of even—\( \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \n
doesn’t matter which way we answer this question. Granted, it would be nice to know whether Plato thought that the only cause of heat was fire, but that seems to be underdetermined by the text. Because I think that Plato is working within the framework established in Chapter Two, I think we should suppose that each of these things is a unique sufficient condition of heat, disease, etc. Second, we wondered specifically whether all things that are odd-numbered are so in virtue of $\mu o n \alpha s$ or whether it was only single things that were odd-numbered on account of it. What is important about this example is that it makes the following principle plausible: where $F$ and $G$ are opposites, if $x$ is present in $y$ and brings $F$ to $y$ in such a way that $y$ will not admit $G$, then $x$ is entitled to be called by the alpha privative of $G$. Either way of interpreting the relationship between $\mu o n \alpha s$ and $p e r i t t o \zeta s$ will suffice to illustrate this principle. As before, however, I prefer one answer over the other. Nonetheless, the text of the *Phaedo* itself does not definitively settle the matter.

If the final argument for the immortality of the soul can be understood in this fashion, what does this imply for the theory of Forms? I do not want to suggest that Plato thinks of, say, the Form of the Just as a homoeomerous stuff, akin *in every way* to fire or snow. Rather, I want to claim that Plato’s view about the nature and character of the Forms is profoundly influenced by the paradigm of homoeomerous substances. This paradigm, however, only partially determines what Forms there are, what they are like, and what the nature of the relation of participation is.
I have already sketched one reason that the paradigm of stuffs is appealing. It provides a model for explanation which is immune to certain conceptual puzzles. It also holds out promise for future development. Given the principle that opposites come to be out of opposites (70e), and given that some stuffs are such that they bring certain opposites with them, then we may be able to explain a change from one opposite to another by appealing to some new stuff which comes to be present. What is needed is investigation of what stuffs bring with them what opposites. Thus, there is a general methodology for ascertaining the causes of things. What sorts of stuff (or stuffs) bring illness with them when they are present in a subject? At the approach of what sort of stuff will that which brings illness with it flee or perish? This methodology is not limited to empirical questions either. One might well ask, "What brings with it the opposite of injustice?" Does this very same thing bring with it happiness and pleasure? The right ordering in one's soul is not quite like fire. That is, it isn't obviously perceptible in quite the same way that a campfire is. However, there are certain important similarities. The fire in my campfire is the same as, and indistinguishable from, the fire in Nick Adams' campfire. If both Nick and I are capable of being fully just, then the ordering in his soul is the same as (in the generic sense) as the ordering in my soul. They are indistinguishable. One might even say that they differ only in their spatial location.

D. Conclusion

Because of the adequacy conditions on answers to "what is F" questions, Plato sees certain explanatory constraints as perfectly reasonable. These
constraints make it very difficult to find an adequate \( \alpha \tau \iota \alpha \nu \) to explain relative predicates. Explanations of the character of things which appeal to the presence of substances within those things do not run afoul of these explanatory constraints. Plato's bold hypothesis is that there are Forms which answer to the problematic relative predicates. These stand in a relation to sensible things that is *somewhat analogous* to the presence of substances in things. Their presence serves to explain why these things are as they are. Unfortunately for the interpretation of Plato's thought, this theory is elaborated only far enough to make plausible certain principles about opposites and things which conform to the substance paradigm.

§3. Forms and the Answers to "What is F?" Questions

Another consideration which might suggest the paradigm of homoeomerous stuffs to Plato has to do with questions of the form, "What is F?" In the previous section we saw how explanations which appeal to the presence of such substances within things meet the conditions of adequacy that constraints on answers to Socratic questions suggest. It should come as no surprise then that such substances fit very neatly into the framework of logical causes. The search for a logical cause is a search for a certain sort of answer to the question, "What is F?" One can truly say, of any sample of fire, that *this is what fire is*. No sample of fire is, in any respect, not fire. So, substances like fire or snow pass the being-completely test in SPT. The same does not hold true of any beautiful sensible thing or, perhaps more plausibly, repeatable features of sensible things. One
cannot point to Helen and say, "This is what beauty is." For there are respects in
which Helen is not beautiful. The same is true of any feature of Helen that we
might suppose is responsible for making her beautiful. Her fine features and pale
complexion might not make a man beautiful at all. Thus, neither Helen nor a fine
complexion is what beauty is. Yet beauty is something—else it would make no
sense to ask the question, "What is beauty?" Plato, I believe, proceeded from ob­
servations of this sort to the supposition that there is something analogous to fire,
save that it is not sensible, that is what Beauty is. Various things are beautiful be­
cause of the presence in them of the Beautiful. Further, their shares of the Beau­
tiful, unlike the things themselves, cannot fail to be beautiful.

Nearly all of the passages in the Phaedo about the Forms besides the final
argument involve the Forms in their role as the objects of knowledge. They are
the ὄντα that correspond to the λόγου which answer "what is F" questions.
Detailed examination of the other passages will, I think, bear out the hypothesis
that Plato is thinking about Forms in terms of logical causes. Further, because
homoeomerous substances are such exemplary logical causes, Plato thinks of the
Forms as analogous in certain ways to them.

A. The Form as The What-It-Is

The Forms are first introduced at 65d4-e5. They appear in the context of
Socrates' defense of the claim that philosophical life is preparation for death.
Given that the Forms are what they are and given that our means of coming to
know them is, in some sense, distinct from the bodily senses, then the philosopher
should welcome the separation of soul from body. The latter only impedes his
pursuit of that which he really loves: knowledge.

"Now, what about things such as this, Simmias? Do we say that Just
is something or nothing?"
"Yes, by God, we do say so."
"And again beauty is something and good?"
"Of course."
"Well, did you ever see anything of that sort with your eyes?"
"Certainly not."
"Well, did you grasp them with any of the other senses of the body?
And I speak concerning all such things, about largeness, health,
strength and, in short, about the being (οὐσίας) of all other such
things, what each happens to be . . .\footnote{Phd. 65d-c, Τί δὲ ὃ ἡ τὰ τοιάδε, ὥ Σμμία: ψαμέν τι ἐλναι δίκαιον αὐτό ἢ οὐδέν; Φαμέν μέντοι ἔστη Δία. Καὶ καλὸν γέ τι καὶ ἄγαθον; Πῶς δὲ οὖ; Ὢ ὦν πάποτέ τι τῶν τούτων τῶν ἁθαλαμίων ἔλεις; Ὀδαμίδας, ἢ δὲ δε. Ἀλλὰ ἄλλα τινί αἰσθήσει τῶν ἀδά τοῦ σώματος ἐφήσει αὐτῶι; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντως, οἷον μεγάλους πέρι
ὕγειας, ὑγιεῖας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνι λόγῳ ἀπάντω τῆς οὐσίας, δὲ τυγχάνει ἐκαστῶν
διν.}

This passage makes it clear that the answer to questions of the form, "what
is F?" are "somethings." To put it another way, there must be something of which
one can say, "This is what justice is." This consequence seems to follow regardless
of how we translate τι ἐλναι δίκαιον αὐτό. One can take it as the subject, as in
the translation above. But, even if we take αὐτό as the complement of ἐλναι,
then we get, "there is something just" or, as Burnet writes, "there is such a thing."\footnote{Burnet (1911) ad loc.}
In order to reinforce the point that the answer to a τι ἔστι question is something,
and not nothing, I shall call such things what-F-is. We noted in Chapter Two that
Socrates secures agreement from his interlocutors that the object of their search
is a "something" in just the same way. In these dialogues, I have argued, the
object of the search is a logical cause—an item whose ontological status is never made clear. In the *Phaedo* logical causes become Forms. What-F-is is nothing other than the logical cause of F and the argument for its separation from sensible things presupposes the conditions that logical causes must meet in the dialogues of search.

We should further note that all of the examples that are given at 65d-e are πρῶτα τύποι predicates. Accordingly, there will be a variety of ways in which they are and are not. We have already seen why an *individual sensible*, like Helen, is not what-beauty-is. No *type of action*, like returning what is owed, can be what-justice-is; for the very same action type can in some contexts be unjust. Further, no *kind* of characteristic can be what-health-is. Having a wet, cold nose is not what-health-is, for though in a dog this is healthy, it is not healthy in a human being. Simmias readily accepts the distinctness of what-just-is from things that are grasped through the senses because the earlier dialogues are full of arguments to show that suggested accounts of such predicates in terms of individuals, action types and kinds of features are unworkable. These kinds of arguments will be, all too briefly, summarized in the argument from the sensible equals. This brevity, I believe, has caused commentators to find this argument more problematic than it really is.

53 It might be thought that this argument is thwarted by the fact that in 65d5-e5 Plato contrasts the Forms with sensibles. However, action types are not grasped by the senses—only tokens of those types are. This objection will not suffice. It is not at all clear that Plato himself makes the type/token distinction when it comes to actions, cf. *Rep*. I. As a result, it seems likely that he would say that we do grasp "paying back what is owed" with the senses.
B. The Separation Argument

The next point in the *Phaedo* where Plato discusses the Forms is 74a5-c5; the notorious argument from equals. The point of this argument seems to be to show that τὸ ἴσον αὐτό is distinct from any pair of sensible equals.

"Now, consider whether this is the case," I said. "We say, don't we, that equal is something, I don't mean a log to a log nor a stone to a stone nor anything else of that sort, but some different thing beyond all these, the equal itself. Shall we say that it is something or nothing?"

And do we know it, what it is?" Of course," said he. "Where did we get knowledge of it? Was it not from the things of which we just
spoke, seeing a log, a stone, or some other equal things, was it not from these things that we thought of this, it being different from them?

"Or does it not seem different to you? Look at it this way. Don’t equal stones and logs, while remaining the same, sometimes seem to be equal to one but not to another?" "Certainly."

"But did the equals themselves ever appear to you unequal or equality inequality?" "No, Socrates, never." "So, those equals are not the same as the equal itself."

The structure of the argument is apparently quite simple. No sensible equals are the same as the Equal Itself because they all have a feature that the Equal Itself lacks. The problem lies in ascertaining exactly what that feature is. The premise that introduces this feature is notoriously vague, however.

If the pair τῷ μὲν . . . τῷ δ' in 74b8-9 is masculine then it would be governed by φαίνεται and the sense would be that two objects can seem to be equal to one person but not to another. This, perhaps, is a result of perspective.
In addition, Plato fails to supply either a complementary participle or an infinitive with \( \varphi αινεται \). The former construction typically carries the implication that what appears to be the case is, in fact, the case. The latter very frequently implies that what seems to be so is not really so.\(^{57}\) So, Plato in effect declines to tell us whether we ought to conclude that equal sticks and stones merely \emph{appear} to be equal to some people and unequal to others or whether both parties are, in fact, correct. The sticks and stones appear to them to be both equal and unequal because they \emph{are}. This raises some difficult problems about the soundness of the argument. If sticks and stones merely appear to be unequal to one another and the Equals Themselves do not so appear, this is no proof of their non-identity. After all, we would not conclude that Cicero and Tully are non-identical merely because Cicero seems to John to be a great philosopher while Tully does not so appear to him.\(^{58}\)

If, however, the \( το\)'s are neuter, then they would go with \( \varepsilon \sigma\alpha \) and the sense would be that they seem to be equal to one thing but not to another.\(^{59}\) But, if this is the intended sense, then why does Plato use \( \varphi αινεται \)? One of a pair of equals does not simply \emph{seem} to be unequal when compared with something of a different size than its mate; it \emph{really is} unequal. Moreover, if the Equal Itself is to differ

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\(^{57}\) Cf. Smyth §2143.

\(^{58}\) See Murphy (1951) p. 111, n.1.

\(^{59}\) Murphy takes it in this way as does Loriaux (1955).
from the sensible equals in this respect, this seems to imply that it (or they—see below) is equal to everything. Surely this is impossible.\(^{60}\)

One might also take Plato to mean that sensible equals are equal in some respects and not in others.\(^{61}\) So, for instance, two sticks might be the same length but differ in weight or diameter. Such an interpretation has been criticized on grammatical grounds.\(^{62}\) Were this Plato's point, the criticism goes, we would expect him to use the feminine, \(\tau\eta\) \(\mu\epsilon\nu\) . . . \(\tau\eta\) \(\delta\varepsilon.\)^{63} But, at least one commentator thinks it possible to see the \(\tau\varphi\) as \(\tau\varphi\)—the indefinite article. The accent would have come when Plato's text was re-copied in the Hellenistic period. Whatever the philological merits of such a suggestion, it does not seem to make Plato's second premise possible. In order for the argument to show that no sensible equals are \(\tau\alpha\alpha\begin{array}{l} \alpha\end{array}\tau\alpha\) \(\iota\sigma\alpha\) it must be the case that all of the sensibles have the features that the Form is alleged to lack. But some sensible equals are equal in all respects. Consider two statues from the same mold or a set of dominoes. Unless additional premises concerning non-observable variations in dimensions and weights are added, the argument is not a good one. This, I believe, is good grounds for dismissing this interpretation.

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\(^{60}\) Hackforth (1952, p. 159) raises this objection to Murphy's interpretation.

\(^{61}\) Haynes argues for such an interpretation. He seems to think that Owen (1957) sides with him in this matter on the basis of his remarks on p. 75, n. 35. It seems to me that Owen is not committed to anything more grammatically adventuresome than Murphy's interpretation.

\(^{62}\) Mills, p. 58.

\(^{63}\) cf. LSJ \(\delta\) \(\eta\) \(\tau\varphi\) VIII, i, d and VIII, 4.
Other manuscripts (T,W) give τότε μὲν . . . τότε δὲ. This suggests that, while remaining the same, at one time they seem equal and another time unequal (perhaps to the same observer, perhaps to different observers). Various commentators have pointed out that this is awkward after ἐνίοτε. The line would read, "Don't equal stones and logs, while remaining the same, sometimes seem to be sometimes equal but sometimes not?" But the mere fact that it is awkward is not enough to disqualify a textual variant. If there is some thought that can only be expressed in such an awkward fashion, but which makes the argument clear and cogent, its inelegance is no mark against its authenticity. The problem with this variant is that it is not clear what τότε adds to the argument that ἐνιοτε does not already provide.

In order to unravel these difficulties, let us first turn to the problem of Plato's use of φαίνεται. The argument might be thought to somehow turn on facts about perspective since Plato has repeatedly disparaged the reliability of sense perception in the Phaedo. It might be thought that he avoids the use of either participle or complementary infinitive in order to simply set aside the question of whether sensible equals really are both equal and unequal. What matters is that they are objects of sense. Because they are related to the deceptive faculty of sense perception, they cannot be what it is that we know when we know what-equality-is.

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64 Tarrant (1957, p.125) adopts such a reading.
This line of reasoning will not do. First, in 74c1 Plato uses the same verb in connection with the Form (σοι ἐφάνη). His point cannot be to contrast the kind of awareness that we have of sensibles with the special awareness that we have of Forms. Second, if we suppose that what disqualifies all sensible equals from being what-equality-is is the mere fact that they are sensible, then the argument is simply question-begging. Neither can we suppose that we ought to supply a complementary infinitive to reflect the unreliable and distorting character of sense perception. Not only do these same considerations apply, but such a supposition makes Plato's argument unsound. Charity seems to require that we suppose that sensible equals sometimes appear to be equal to one but not to another precisely because they are both equal and unequal. The Form, by contrast, is such that no sentence of the form 'Equality Itself is unequal' is true.

Given the requirements that have been laid down for logical causes, this is exactly what we should expect Plato to say if he had reached the conclusion that the logical cause of equality was a separated Form. What prevents any sensible equal from being what-equality-is is the fact that for any of them, some sentence of the form 'x is unequal  \( \pi\rho\delta\varsigma \psi \) ' is true. This may be because x is equal to y in one respect but not in another, or it may be because x is equal to y but not equal to z. Our survey of the early dialogues in Chapter Two revealed that the range of \( \pi\rho\delta\varsigma \psi \) qualifiers was very wide. Suppose Plato had wanted to remind his readers of the myriad ways in which the various candidates for the logical cause of the fine or the pious had failed the self-predication test in the early dialogues. It is
not unreasonable to think that he might well have done so by writing the very vague line at 74c9.

C. Change and Forms for \( \kappa \alpha \delta \) \( \alpha \bar{\delta} \tau \delta \) Terms

The presence of \( \delta \nu \iota \sigma \tau e \) in this vague formulation raises another difficult question. Does the range of \( \pi \rho \delta \varsigma \ \vartheta \) qualifiers include times? That is, if \( x \) is not \( F \) at time \( t \), is this sufficient ground for concluding that \( x \) fails to be-completely \( F \) and can be ruled out as the logical cause of \( F \)? If it were, then it might seem plausible that no sensible could be-completely rectangular or be-completely a man. Since rectangular things and men come into being and pass out of existence, it would be possible to construct parallel arguments for a separated Form of Man or Rectangularity.

This opposition between that which is capable of coming to be and passing away and that which timelessly \( is \) is one that has come to be regarded as almost essential to the theory of Forms. Frequently, when Plato wants to contrast the Forms with the world of sensible things, he will do so in terms of the distinction between being and becoming.\(^{65}\) This is not entirely a development of Plato's later thought either. There are passages in the \textit{Phaedo} which embody this opposition. Is there any reason to think that they embody the distinction in such a way as to suggest that, at the time at which he wrote the \textit{Phaedo}, Plato accepted the notion that, because of the phenomenon of change, no sensible \( is \)-completely?

\(^{65}\) \textit{Tm.} \ 28a is perhaps the most famous statement of this opposition.
The place in which the changelessness of the Forms features most crucially in the *Phaedo* is in the argument from affinity (78b3-79e10). At 78c9, Socrates asks Cebes and Simmias to reconsider the beings which they turned to in the earlier argument. What follows makes it clear that it is the Forms that are under discussion. When queried, Cebes agrees that each of these must be the same and unvarying.

Let us turn then, I said, to the things about which we spoke in the earlier discussion. The being itself of which we give the account of what it is to be in asking and answering questions—is it always constantly according to the same, or otherwise at other times? The equal itself, the beautiful itself, the being which each thing itself is—does this at any time admit change and alteration? Or what each of them is always, having a single form, itself by itself? Is it constantly according to the same and does it not at any time in any respect admit of change to anything?

The contrast with the Forms, however, presents certain textual difficulties.

66 *Phd*o. 78c9-d9, ἱδί, ἔρη, ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἐφ’ ἀπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν λόγῳ, αὕτη ἡ σοσία ἤς λόγον διδομεν τὸ εὖ καὶ ἐρωτώντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως ὡς ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτα ἢ ἄλλως ἢ ἄλλως; ἀντέ τό ἱδίον, αὕτη τό καλῶν, αὕτη ἐκαστον ὡ ἔστι, τό ἐν, μὴ ποτε μεταβαλλόν καὶ ἤτυπον ἐνδέχεται; ὡς ἔχει αὕτης ἐκαστον ὡ ἔστι, μονοειδῆς ὡν ἀντί καθ’ αὐτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμοῖς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμιᾶν ἐνδέχεται;
Both instances of καλόν cannot stay. Archer-Hind brackets the first and commits Plato to Forms for man, horse and cloak, as well as for equal and beautiful. His ground for this is that the later dialogues clearly indicate that there are such Forms. However, whether Plato held that view at the time at which he wrote the *Phaedo* is just what is at issue here. Burnet, Hackforth, Bluck and Gallop all bracket ἦ καλόν. Burnet thinks that τοιούτων may have caused the interpolation, and points out, rightly, that nothing in the dialogue thus far has suggested that there are Forms for natural kind terms like 'man' or 'horse,' much less for artifacts like cloaks.

What, then, is at issue in this passage? All of the predicates that Socrates mentions in his examples are ones that lend themselves to a special kind of change. So-called Cambridge changes are those in which a subject loses or acquires a new property without undergoing what we intuitively think of as a real process of change. Thus, if my neighbors move away, then I lose one property and gain another. It used to be true that I stood in the "lives next door to" relation to Al and Michael, but now I do not. Yet, intuitively, we are inclined to say that Al and Michael have undergone real change in changing residence. If I seldom spoke to them when they did live next to me, it seems even more implausible that I have really undergone a process of change. The terms that Socrates mentions in this section lead to even more puzzles about change than does a term like...

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67 "καλόν is an obvious interpolation: we are not concerned merely with the beautiful particulars; and presently we have ἦ λος ἦ καλόν ἦ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνων ὁμοιώματι, 'all the particulars which share the name of the ideas.' The particulars are ὁμοιώματα as being copies of the ideas: see Sophist 234 B μεμήκατα καὶ ὁμοίωμα τῶν ὀντων ἀπεργαζόμενον τῇ γραφή ἐπεξεργασίᾳ τῆς ὁμοιωσιν. Cf. Timaeus 41 C." Archer-Hind *ad loc.*
"lives next door to." When I cease to stand in the "lives next door" relation to Al and Michael, at least something undergoes a real change. Al and Michael undergo real changes even if I do not. Beauty and equality, however, are different. Helen "goes from" being beautiful when we think of her in relation to other women to being not beautiful when we think of her in relation to goddesses. Call such "changes" "even stranger than Cambridge changes." To say that this is a change is an inaccurate way of putting the matter. Helen doesn't really change, in the way that Al and Michael do when they move. She is, at one and the same moment, beautiful πρός women but not beautiful πρός goddesses. The impression of change results when we think of considering the question, "Is she beautiful?" in different contexts. When we discuss her in one context, it appears that she is, but when, in the next moment of conversation, we discuss her in another context it appears that she is not. Socrates has explicitly invoked this conversational picture in the 78d. We give the λόγος of a Form in ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀπορκημόμενοι and this λόγος is constant. A correct account is not susceptible to the kind of qualification or re-evaluation to which the question "Is Helen beautiful?" is open. The problem is not that Helen is a kind of logical monstrosity that violates the Law of Opposites. She is beautiful and not beautiful πρός different things. Rather, the problem is that there is no authoritative context for deciding whether Helen is or is not beautiful. As a result, our judgments in such matters must constantly go back and forth.

Even if a predicate like "lives in Clintonville" is really a disguised relation, other undoubtedly monadic predicates are, as a matter of empirical fact, involved in the change. So, Al and Michael lose the property of paying a monthly rent of $500 and gain the property of making a mortgage payment of $650.
We might well think that a question like "Is Helen beautiful?" is not well-formed. There is no metaphysical fault with Helen because such a question cannot be answered in her case. But Plato's view of the matter may have been quite different. We know that in the final argument, he will ultimately explain the way in which Helen is beautiful and not beautiful by saying that she has within her shares of both the beautiful and the ugly. Like Simmias who is both taller and shorter, presumably she "presents her share of the beautiful toward other women to be more beautiful and submits her share of the ugly toward goddesses to be outshone by their beauty." In the previous section, I argued that suppositions about the deep logical structure of such a "theory" must remain just that—suppositions. Plato is nodding in the direction of a problem. His point in introducing the case of Simmias is to show that, in spite of the fact that he is both tall and short, neither the Tall nor the Tall in him is ever short. One way to visualize this metaphysical picture is to suppose that the shares of the beautiful or the ugly in Helen move to the forefront as she enters into different comparisons. This dynamic picture is reinforced by Plato's military metaphors of advance and retreat. One can also picture it statically. The shares in Helen are like faces that look different ways. In either case, one can see why it might be natural to say that she is ὀ Γνωτίζων and cannot be "grasped" by reason. In the first case, the reasons for this are obvious. In the second, it must be that the face or aspect which Helen presents to us depends upon which way we grasp or consider her in thought. Somehow, we cannot grasp her in thought "from the side" as it were. We cannot think of her as Helen who is both beautiful and not beautiful. This stipulation upon the way in which reason can grasp Helen in thought is not utterly
ad hoc. In Chapter 5, I shall argue that, in the early and middle dialogues, Plato has not yet sorted out predication from naming. One implication of this confusion is to think of the most fundamental linguistic or mental act as that of applying a name to something. Given the way in which substantival adjectives can function as referring terms in Greek, one can think of three separate and distinct acts of naming Helen: "Helen," "the beautiful," "the ugly." Of the latter two, neither is more authoritative. When we affirm one, the other is waiting in the wings to be spoken or thought of Helen. Change, Plato tells us in *Phaedo* 70e, is from one opposite to another. When, in thinking of Helen first as beautiful and then, inevitably, as ugly, we think of her as if she were in a constant state of change. When, however, we think of her first as a woman and then as the wife of Menelaus, she does not exchange one opposite for another.

When, in the *Phaedo* at least, Plato claims that sensibles are *óv kαtά tαοντά* and contrasts them with Forms which are *dēi kαtά tαοντά* and *μονοειδές*, his examples involve such *πρός τι* terms as ‘beauty’ and ‘equality.’ Such terms are always predicated incompletely. Plato says of sensibles that bear these terms that they are no more one than the other (e.g. *óv μάλλον καλόν ἤ αληξρον*). I have offered two suggestions for why Plato might have thought that things which are no more F than not F are constantly in a state of change. Admittedly, these reasons are speculative. Yet, I think we must concede that, somehow, the peculiarities of relative terms are at issue. The alternative is to suppose that Plato really holds a Heraclitean view of sensible things—they are always changing.
in all ways all the time—and that his choice of exclusively \( \pi\rho\omicron\omicron\varsigma \tau \) terms to illustrate this is \textit{purely accidental}. This, it seems to me, is not credible.

But it is possible to cite evidence from sources external to the \textit{Phaedo} to suggest that Plato thought that the unstable nature of sensible objects was ground for assuming that there were Forms corresponding to all general terms. In the "history of philosophy" in \textit{Metaphysics} A, Aristotle writes

For, having in his youth become familiar with Cratylus and the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he held even in later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted this teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sensible things but to entities of another kind—for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing. Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were all named after these, and in virtue of a relation to these, for the many existed by participation in the Ideas that have the same name as they. (987a33-b7, Ross' translation)

Though Aristotle's accuracy as an historian is open to criticism, one can find, in the Platonic corpus, support for Aristotle's claim that Plato supposed that the Forms were separate from sensible things because definitions are unchanging while all sensibles are in a state of flux. Such an argument is given in Cherniss' paper, "The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas." Here Cherniss argues that considerations from epistemology led Plato to posit the existence of the

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69 Probably justly in many instances; see Cherniss (1935) and (1944).
Forms. These considerations intimately involve the problem of constantly changing sensibles.

Theaetetus, Republic, Timaeus and Sophist form the backbone of the epistemic argument for the existence of the Forms. According to Cherniss, Timaeus 51d-e and Republic 477e-478b2 show that if knowledge is distinct from other cognitive states, it must have distinct objects. In Theaetetus, a definition of knowledge in terms of sensation or right opinion concerning the objects of sensation is sought but none is found. This tentatively confirms the hypothesis that the objects of knowledge are not sensible things at all, but, rather, super-sensible Forms. Sophist 258d-264b shows that this hypothesis is adequate to account for the possibility of both knowledge and of error.

The role that the doctrine of flux plays in this epistemic argument is clearest, perhaps, in Theaetetus. Here Theaetetus' suggestion that knowledge might be \( \alpha\sigma\tau\theta\sigma\varsigma \) is immediately identified with Protagoras and his claim that man

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70 Cherniss argues that the theory of Forms also deals with problems that arise in ethics and ontology. This is what makes it so philosophically economical. Since in this section we are concerned with the role that the Forms play as the objects of knowledge, I shall set aside these other considerations.

71 Allen (1965), p. 7

72 The translation of \( \alpha\sigma\tau\theta\sigma\varsigma \) as 'perception' is known to be problematic, for there are contexts in which the connotation of success or veracity, as well as the element of judging, that goes with 'perceives' is unwanted. (Scrooge cannot perceive Marley's ghost, or perceive that it is present, unless it really is, though it might seem to him that Marley is present when he isn't.) 'Sensation' might do better. Yet 'sensation' frequently carries the sense of 'raw feel' and implies a state devoid of judgement. This too is sometimes undesirable. With these caveats in mind I shall continue to translate \( \alpha\sigma\tau\theta\sigma\varsigma \) as 'perception.' Where this proves to be misleading I shall simply leave it untranslated.
is the measure. This, in turn, is identified with the Heraclitean doctrine of flux. Plato gives several versions of the kernel of this idea. First, it is said that nothing is one in and of itself and that you cannot ascribe correctly to any thing any quality. The reason for this, I take it, is that nothing is at any time, but everything is always in the process of becoming. Plato does not make it clear at the time why these doctrines come to the same thing nor does he make it clear whether he holds the doctrine of flux himself. Plato’s first serious argument against the identification of knowledge with perception is therefore an attack on the idea that nothing is and that everything is in the process of becoming. The details of this

73 Theaetetus’ suggestion comes at 151c. At 152a Socrates compliments his definition and notes that ἀλλ’ ὤν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπου δὲ των ἄλλων εἶρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

74 Th. 152d2, ἀρα ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ συνέχει ἑστίν, συν’ ἐν τι προσείπουσ ἀρθώς συν’ ὀποιανοῦν τι.

75 Th. 152d9, ἐστὶ μὲν γάρ συνέποιν συνέχει, ἃς δὲ γίνεται.

76 Cornford (1935) and Cherniss (see below n. 80) both take the view that Plato himself accepts the doctrine of flux. What the argument of Theaetetus shows is not that this doctrine is untenable, but rather, that it must be restricted. All sensibles are, in fact, in a constant state of total change, but knowledge is of the Forms which are changeless. One alternative to this picture is that Plato takes Protagorean relativism and a Heraclitean metaphysics to be necessary for the truth of the claim that knowledge is perception. The Theaetetus argument is therefore a reduc-tio: not Heraclitus, so not Protagoras, so knowledge is not perception. For this line of argument, see Burnyeat (1982).

On the whole, I think that Burnyeat’s view of the matter may be right. But my concern is not whether Plato held the doctrine of flux when he wrote the Theaetetus, but rather, if he held that view when he wrote the Phaedo. It would, I suppose, strengthen my case if it could be shown that Plato thought Heracliteanism was not true of things in the sensible realm even when he wrote the Theaetetus. But, even if Cornford is correct about the overall structure of this dialogue, I think that we have good reasons not to rush to attribute the doctrine of flux to Plato in earlier dialogues.

77 That is, I think that the eristic arguments concerning seeing and not seeing one and the same thing (163d-164c) are merely stage setting for the further elaboration of "Protagoras" views (170 ff.).
argument are a matter of much controversy. Here I simply want to note that, when this argument is concluded, Socrates announces that this refutation tells against the claim that knowledge is perception, when that claim is understood as motivated by the doctrine of flux.\(^7\) The upshot is that one cannot have only a world of constantly changing sensibles and knowledge as well by identifying knowledge with perception.\(^7\) Thus, if Plato himself believed some version of the Heraclitean doctrine of flux, he would have been motivated by his own arguments to suppose that knowledge is either some form of opinion or that it concerns things other than continually changing sensibles.\(^8\) The latter half of the

\(^7\) _Thet._ 183c, ἐπιστήμην τε αἰθήσιν οὐ συγχωρησόμεθα κατὰ γε τήν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον.

\(^7\) Much the same point is made in _Cratylus_ 439d-440e. Here, however, Plato does not consider the possibility that, somehow, perception might provide a place for knowledge in a Heraclitean world. Rather, he simply points out the prima facie difficulty involved in reconciling such an ontology with the existence of knowledge.

_Cra._ 440a, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖν δὲν γνωσθεῖται γε ὅπερ οὐδενός. ἀμα φάρ δὲν ἐπιστῆτο τοῦ γνωσμένου ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλοι τοῖς γίγνοιτο, δι' αὐτὲν οὐκ ἄν γνωσθεῖται ἐν ὑπάρχου γέ τί ἐστὶν ἢ πῶς ἔχουν. γνώσις δὲ δὴν ποτὲ οὐδεμία γνωστή ἢ γνωσθεῖ τις μεθοδίας ἔχου.

But neither could it be known by anyone. For when someone who seeks to know it approached, it would become another thing and different, so that its nature and state could not still be known; and no sort of knowledge knows that which knows no state.

\(^8\) This is indeed Cherniss’ view of the matter. He says of the passage by Aristotle quoted above that it is “a simple account of Plato’s theory and the origins from which it sprang” (up until the mention of participation), (1944) p. 179. He also argues against E. Weerts’ claim ("Plato und der Heraklitismus," _Philologus_, Suppl. XXIII, 1931, p.1) that Plato himself did not hold the doctrine of continuous flux. Cherniss cites _Sym._ 207d-e, _Phil._ 59a-b and _Tim._ 52a-c as evidence that Plato accepted the continuous flux of sensible objects as "a datum of his philosophy." Weerts argued that if Plato had accepted this view this would in effect make the sensible world μὴ δὲν, thus destroying the possibility that one could give any sense to the relation of participation. Cherniss responds that "this Plato saw too, and the hypothesis of χώρα is the answer which
Theaetetus rules out the first of these possibilities and confirms that the objects of knowledge must be the Forms.

Of course, not all of the arguments for the distinctness of knowledge from either perception or opinion involve in any obvious way the claim that sensible things are continually changing. Following the criticism of Protagoras' doctrine, there is an argument that knowledge must be distinct from perception because one cannot have knowledge without attaining truth. The latter cannot be had without grasping the being (οὐσία) of a thing. However, being, together with likeness, unlikeness, identity, difference, etc., are all things that are apprehended by the soul itself and not through perception functioning through any of the organs of the body. Thus, the faculty of perception, as delineated by Plato, does not possess the concepts whose application is required for genuine knowing. Neither can opinion, even with the addition of some account, be what knowledge is. For the only likely explication of δόξα ἀληθή μετὰ λόγον itself involves reference to knowledge (209d-210b). If this is so, then opinion cannot in any way be identical with knowledge. If this is correct, then not all of the arguments for the non-identity of knowledge and its objects with other faculties and their objects in the Theaetetus turn on the premise that sensible things are continually changing.

in itself is proof that he tried to maintain the doctrine of continuous process for the nature of the physical world (Timaeus 48e-52c). (1944) n. 129, p. 219.

81 Th. 186c9, οὗ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων ἔσται;

82 Th. 186c8, οἷών τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ζ μηδὲ ὀυσίας;

83 Th. 185d9, αὕτη δὲ αὕτη ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.
This distinction between knowledge and opinion is, in the *Republic*, a critical part of an inquiry into who the genuine philosopher is (475e-480). What is less clear is whether, like the argument of *Theaetetus* 181b-183c, it involves the view that sensible things are in a state of constant flux or whether, like the argument just discussed (*Thet* 184b-186e), it remains neutral about the condition of sensible things. On one reconstruction, it shows that Plato himself accepts the doctrine of flux.

There are those who take delight in sensible things and reckon that it is by seeing more of them that one partakes in wisdom. These are the so-called lovers of sights and sounds. Then there are those who think that the many beautiful things, for instance, are but dim reflections of the Beautiful Itself and identify knowledge of that one thing with wisdom. What follows is an argument that only the latter are truly denominated as philosophers, that is, lovers of wisdom. For, although the lovers of sights and sounds are as enamoured of spectacles as the others are of the Forms (and so are genuinely φιλοί), only the latter are enamoured of those things which are appropriate objects of ἐπιστήμη and so are lovers of σοφος. In this inquiry it is agreed that different faculties have different objects. Since knowledge and opinion are distinct, they must be in relation to different things. Socrates and his audience also accept the premise that whatever is τὸ παντελῶς ὃν is entirely knowable and a fit object of knowledge—that is, ἐπιστήμη; knowledge in its highest form. Likewise, what in no way is (τὸ μὴ ὃν) is in every sense unknowable and can, therefore, only be the object of complete ignorance. If a thing is such that it both is and is not, this is the sort of thing
to which a faculty that lies between knowledge and ignorance would be related. This description fits the faculty of opinion, which is neither as reliable as knowledge nor as useless as ignorance. Not unexpectedly, it is then revealed that the many beautiful things of which the φιλοθεάμους are enamoured both are and are not. So, these things are neither the objects of knowledge nor the objects of ignorance. They must then be the objects of mere opinion. It may be the case that the doctrine of flux enters into this argument at this point, for it is not clear exactly why the many beautiful things, for instance, both are and are not. What Plato says is simply:

Is there any one of the many beautifuls that will not appear ugly? Or any of the many just things that will not appear unjust? Or of the pious things that will not appear impious?
No, he said, rather it is necessary that the many beautiful things also appear ugly in some manner, and similarly for the other things that you asked about.
What about this? Do the many doubles appear to be any more halves than doubles?
None.
And do large and small things and heavy and light admit these predicates any more than their opposites?
No, each of these always partakes of both.
Is it the case that any of the many things is rather than is not that which we say it to be?\(^{84}\) R. 479a8-b8

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\(^{84}\) τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μὴν τι ἔστιν, δὲ οὐκ αἰσχρῶν φανήσεται; καὶ τῶν δικαίων, δὲ οὐκ ἄδικων; καὶ τῶν δαιμών, δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπων; 
Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ καλά πως αὐτά καὶ αἰσχρά φανήσαι, καὶ διὰ ἄλλα ἔρωτές.
Τί δαί; τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια ἤπτον τι ήμισει ἢ διπλάσια φαίνεται;
Οὔδεν.
Καὶ μεγάλα ὡς καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μὴ τι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἕφεσιν,
ταῦτα προσηρθήσεται ἢ τάναυσια;
Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ἔστι, ἔφη, ἐκαστον ἀμφοτέρων ἔσται.
Πότερον οὖν ἐστι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκαστον τῶν πολλῶν τοῦτο, ὡς τις φη ἀυτῶ ἐλεύη;
One line of interpretation explains the fact that any of the many beautiful things is οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἂν αἰσχρὸν because beautiful is a πρῶς τι predicate. We have already observed that certain of these predicates are such that where one is applicable, so is its opposite. Yet one could also blame it upon the fact that sensible things are constantly in motion. Recall the passage from Theaetetus where Socrates describes the consequences of Protagoras’ secret doctrine:

Nothing is one in and of itself and one could not correctly attribute any quality whatsoever to any thing, but, if you call a thing large, it will also appear small and if heavy, light, and everything else similarly, since nothing is one, neither any thing or any quality. But it is out of movement and motion and mixture with one another that all things become, though we say incorrectly that they are instead; for nothing is one but is always becoming.\textsuperscript{85} Th. 152d2-e

Large and small, heavy and light are also πρῶς τι predicates, but, again, the choice of such examples might be purely accidental. Support for this line of reasoning is often found in the Timaeus, where Plato seems to indicate that things which fall under καθ’ ἀστό predicates are likewise in a constant state of becoming.

. . . rather, the safest strategy is to speak of them in the following terms: That which we see always changing from one thing to another, for instance fire, we should not on any occasion call ‘this’ but rather ‘such, . . .’. \textsuperscript{85} For it flees and does not remain to be called by

\textsuperscript{85} ἢ πάντα καθ’ ἀστό οὐδὲν ἐστιν, οὐδ’ ἢ τι προσεῖποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ’ ὑποσυνόν τι, ἀλλ’, ἢ λ’ ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύης, καὶ συμκρῶν φανεῖται, καὶ ἢ λ’ βαρό, καθ’ παλὴν, ἔξωπατ τε ὑπ’ ἀστόκτις, ὡς μηδὲν ἢ δυστὸς ἢ δύος ἢ μήτε ὑποσυνόν. \εκ δὲ δὴ φοράδες τε καὶ δικήσεις καὶ κράσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλα γίγνεται πάντα καὶ δὴ φάμεν εὐνή, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύουσες. ἢστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ’ οὐδέν, ἢκι δὲ γίγνεται.
'this' or 'that' or any such name which picks them out as being stable.\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Tim.} 49d7 ff.

On this reading, the reason that the lover of sights and sounds has only opinion is because the objects which he claims to know to be of a certain character cannot be known to be so. The reason, of course, is that they are not, strictly speaking, this way (\textit{tou\,tou}), but, rather, suchlike (\textit{to\,lo\,tou}) for they are always in a state of coming to be one thing from another. \textit{This} is the reason that they both are and are not, and clearly such things cannot be known (cf. \textit{Crat.} 439d, ff and \textit{Thet.} 183).

This, however, is merely one reconstruction of this argument. In Chapter Four I shall offer a different one that does not involve the premise that all sensibles are in a constant state of flux. Among other things, this interpretation has the virtue of making the occurrence of all the \textit{pi\,ro\,s} \textit{ti} examples in \textit{Republic} 479a

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\textsuperscript{86} ἀλλ' ἀσφαλέστατον μακρὸ περὶ τούτων τιθεμένοις δδὲ λέγειν· ἀεὶ ὁ καθορίζειν ἅλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον, ὡς πῷρ, μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιούτον ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν [πῷρ]. . . . φεύγει γὰρ οὐκ ὑπομένου τὴν τὸδ τάδε καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τὴ τρόπε καὶ πάσαν διὰ μόνιμα ὡς δυτα αὐτὰ ἐνδεικνυται φασις.

See also in this context \textit{Tim.} 27d5-28a4

"What is that which is always being and has no becoming and what is that which is always becoming and at no time is? The one is surely apprehensible by mind together with reason, since it is always the same, but the other is always grasped by opinion together with unreasoning sensation since it is always coming to be and passing away and at no time is."

tι τὸ δὲ ἄει, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχου, καὶ τι τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἄει, δυν δὲ οὐδέποτε· τὸ μὲν δὴ νοησεί μετὰ λόγου περιπληστῷ ἄει κατὰ ταὐτά δυν, τὸ δ' σε δήθεν· καὶ παθήσεσιν ἀλάγου δοξαστῷ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δυτωσο δὲ οὐδέποτε δυν.
non-accidental. Thus, the interpretation of the Republic passage does not necessitate ascribing to Plato the doctrine of flux.

Not only is it not necessary to ascribe to Plato the doctrine of flux and Forms of \( \kappa \alpha \nu \delta \alpha \) \( \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \) predicates on the basis of this argument or on the basis of the Phaedo 78d-e passage, but there are reasons to think that Plato did not think that there were such Forms. In the first part of the Parmenides, Socrates describes a position that is very like the view that is put forward in the Phaedo. Indeed, only in this part of the Parmenides are the \( \tau \alpha \) \( \varepsilon \nu \) \( \eta \mu \nu \nu \) of Phaedo 103b explicitly mentioned again. When Socrates is asked about Forms for man, fire and water, he responds that he has often been \( \varepsilon \nu \) \( \alpha \pi \alpha \rho \iota \alpha \) about whether there are such things or not. The grounds for Socrates' hesitation about such Forms may be hinted at in the way in which Parmenides puts the question to him. The question is whether there is a Form of Man "separate from us and all those such as we are." It is we (repeated twice in this line) that would have a share of such a Form "in us." This suggests a dilemma one might call the problem of the particular. Either (a) if we men are men by having such a share, what is the point of introducing this third man?\(^{87}\) or (b) but if it is not a man that comes to have a share and so be called a man, what is it that has the share? It may be possible to answer the

\(^{87}\) cf. Polyxenus ap Alexander Aphrodisias in Metaph. 84.15-21.

If it is both by sharing and participating in the Idea, i.e. in Man-himself, that man exists, there must be some man who will have his being by reference to the Idea. But neither Man-himself, which is an Idea, [exists] by sharing in an Idea, nor does any individual man. It remains that there is some other man, a third man, who has his being in reference to the Idea. (trans. Dooley)
question in (b) by reference to the doctrine of the ὁποδοχή in the Timaeus. But the Timaeus is in all likelihood a late work. We have no hint of such a doctrine in any of the dialogues that date from the same period as the Phaedo. It is not unreasonable to suppose that such a problem might have held Plato back from positing such Forms in the absence of some powerful reason to suppose that there had to be such Forms.

If Plato thought that the susceptibility of individual men to change required a separate Form of Man when he wrote the Phaedo, then, in the argument from affinity, he passed up a golden opportunity to say so. Later it seems clear that he does accept temporal change as a good reason for positing a separate Form. So we must ask, "Why does he not see this in the Phaedo?" My rather speculative answer to this question is, again, that he has the paradigm of homoeomerous stuffs like fire in mind. There is a certain sense in which fire meets the description that Plato gives of the Forms in this argument. They are μονοεидής ὅν αὐτό καθ' αὐτό, ὡςαυτως κατά ταυτά ἔχει καὶ ὁδέποτε ὁδαμη ὁδαμῶς ἄλλωσιν ὁδημίων ἐνδέχεται (78d7-9). Fire, by itself, is one in kind. That is to say that, when we don't consider it in relation to the action of the bellows or sodium, it is the very same kind of stuff in all cases. Though individual fires may be kindled and quenched, fire, the stuff, does not admit of change. It is the same in every single instance and does not admit of alteration in

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88 See supra n. 80.

89 See Cherniss' (1957) criticisms of Owen's (1953) article which attempted to place the Timaeus in the same group with the Republic.
any way or respect at all. Likewise, individual men may come and go but the kind, man, does not. Moreover, each member of the kind is-completely man for as long as it exists. Thus, if the λόγος that answers the question, "What is man?" is about all the men, then it is not a formula of what is no more man than not man. The same is not true of the λόγος of large, since each individual large thing is also not large in some respect.

D. The Structure of Relative Forms

Yet another interpretive difficulty is raised by the argument from equals. Plato is not consistent in the way in which he refers to whatever it is that is to be contrasted with the sensible equals. He concludes (74c5) that the sensible equals are not the same as αὕτω τὰ ἴσα. But, in the crucial second premise (74c1-2), it is claimed that αὕτω τὰ ἴσα have never appeared to be unequal or that ἡ ἴσοτης has appeared to be inequality. In order for the argument to be valid, the equal itself must be the same thing as the equals themselves. This raises the question of why Plato would choose to express himself this way. We are also left with the problem of whether ἡ ἴσοτης ἀνυσότης presents a genuine alternative to what precedes the ἡ or whether this phrase merely explicates the meaning of αὕτω τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνυσα.

These seemingly innocent questions have led interpreters back into the problem of self-predication statements, the deficiency of the sensible world and the very nature of the Forms.
On one interpretation, the common referent of τὸ αὐτὸ ἴσον, ἴσοτης and τὰ ἀὐτὰ ἴσα is simply the Form. The fact that Plato refers to it in the plural is thought to imply that the Form has a certain internal complexity. It is (at least) a pair of equals. There is much controversy, however, over what this implies about the nature of the Forms.

One might additionally think that these super-sensible equals stand to sensible equals as the standard meter stands to other meter sticks. This has consequences for our understanding of what Forms are. If they are to stand in this relation to sensibles, they must be παράδειγματα in a quite literal sense. Such a view also suggests a certain interpretation of self-predication statements. The standard meter is not a meter long in quite the same sense that ordinary meter sticks are a meter long. It must be a meter long no matter how long it is. This suggests that there might be a difference in the manner of "being" appropriate to each. In like manner, on this view, the Form of F is F in quite a different sense than the sensible F things. Such a distinction between the way that sensibles

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90 Geach (1956), Loriaux, Tarrant (1957), and Mills all accept the view that the Form is the referent in all three instances. Vlastos also accepts the idea that the referent must be the same. In his 1956 article he agreed with Geach on the explanation for the use of the plural. By the time this article appeared in Allen (1965) he changed his mind about this.

91 Geach (1956), Vlastos (1956), and Mills all hold that the Form has a certain internal complexity and is itself, at least, a pair of equals. Geach, but not all the others, accepts in addition certain other theses that such a view suggests but does not, strictly speaking, entail. In what follows I shall be chiefly interested in Geach's version of this position.

92 Geach credits Wittgenstein for this suggestion.

93 Geach calls this "being analogously F" and suggests that there may both conceptual and historical connections between this approach to self-predication and the medieval doctrine of de divinis nominibus. The point of such a move is to forestall the infinite regress of Vlastos' Third
and Forms have being might explain why Plato regards the former as somehow deficient.  

But this is not the only view of self-predication and the deficiency of the sensible world that one could append to the thesis that the Form of equality is a pair of equals. The plural reference to the "equals themselves" has led some commentators to the αὐτὰ τὰ δίαμοι in Parmenides 129b and, hence, to the passage on Forms of relatives at 133d-e. In this passage, Parmenides gains Socrates' assent to the view that Forms of relatives like Master and Slave are πρὸς one another and are not πρὸς sensible things. One might hold the same sort of view about the Equals themselves. They are equal to one another, but since they are not πρὸς sensible things they are neither equal nor unequal to them. This explains how they manage not to appear unequal to anyone at any time or in any way without supposing that the equals themselves must be equal to all things.

How, it might well be asked, can the Form be such as to be neither equal nor unequal to sensible things? In other words, what does it mean to say that the

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94 There is another, more traditional, line of interpretation put forward by some interpreters who, like Geach, see the Forms as paradigms of the things that they correspond to but who, unlike Geach, explain the deficiency of the sensible world without supposing that model and copy are F in different ways. Commentators like Ross, Shorey, Burnet and Taylor argue that the sensibles only approximate the quality in question, while the Forms exhibit it perfectly. Thus, no sensible things ever manage to be perfectly equal. Such a view seems to me to be prey to overwhelming objections. See Allen (1971) and Nehamas (1975a).

95 So, for instance, Mills p. 52.
Equals themselves are only πρὸς one another? Here, again, it might be useful to distinguish between two predication relations or ways of being. Forms have one kind and sensibles another. Because they are equal in quite different ways, the question of their equality or inequality to one another simply never arises.

Another interpretive tradition explains Plato's use of the plural τὰ ἀντὶ τὰ ἵσα not by supposing that the Form is a set of equals, but by supposing that Plato means to refer to "the mathematicals" which Aristotle claims Plato thought of as "between" the Forms and sensible things.

Besides the sensibles and the Forms of things he says there are the mathematicals in between, differing from the sensibles by being eternal and unmoving and from the ideas by being many alike but each Form is itself one only. Metaph. 987b15-18

So, the equals themselves might be all those things among the mathematicals that are equal. If geometric figures are among these beings, then the equals themselves might include the angles at the bases of all the supersensible isosceles

96 This is a question that Mills never satisfactorily answers. His view about the deficiency of the sensible world attempts to deal with this objection, but it is not a convincing solution. Even qualification by relative contraries "convicts sensibles of less than full reality." As a result, they do not really possess either equality or inequality. As Mills puts it, "not all ἵσα really are ἵσα; some have only a shakey (sic) and incomplete possession of equality." (p. 57) Unless he means to take the "approximation view" discussed above, I do not understand how this can be possible.

97 Ετι δὲ παρὰ τὰ ἁἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ ἐίδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι φηι μεταξὺ, διαφέρουσα τῶν μὲν ἁἰσθητῶν τῷ αἴδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δὲ εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πολλ' ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἐν έκαστον μόνων.
triangles. If, as the passage suggests, there are many fives, these too are among the equals themselves.

Surely one shortcoming of such an interpretation is that it drags us into the notorious problem of Aristotle's accuracy as an historian of philosophy. The "Forms as numbers" passages in the *Metaphysics* are terribly difficult to interpret in and of themselves without attempting to locate the source of such a view in Plato's extant writings. But the real problem with this reading is not merely that it is evidentially tendentious. It makes Plato's argument a bad argument. Strictly speaking, what Plato has shown is that the intermediates are distinct from the sensibles. But there is no suggestion by Aristotle or anyone else that Plato thought that there was an intermediate justice or goodness. At 75c-d Plato applies the separation conclusion to the Beautiful Itself, the Good, the Just, the Holy and all the things which we stamp with the seal "the what it is" (*τὸ ὁ ἔστιν*). So, on this reading Plato owes us an argument for the premise that the Forms are separate because the intermediates are. This may not be trivial, though. After all, the intermediates are alleged to differ from the Forms in some important way.

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98 Rist's argument (1964, p.34) that the mathematicals do not include geometrical figures is unconvincing. He cites *Metaph.* 992b17 where Aristotle complains that οὐδὲν ὀξεῖ λόγον οὐδὲ τὰ μετὰ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς μέχρι τῆς καὶ ἐπίπεδα καὶ στερεά, οὐτὲ ὅπως ἔστω ἢ ἔσται, οὐτὲ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν· ταῦτα γὰρ οὔτε εἶδος οἷον τε ἔλον τε ἐλοι (οὐ γὰρ εἰσάγει ἄριστοι) ὀὔτε τὰ μεταξύ (μαθηματικά γὰρ ἔχειν) οὔτε τὰ φύσεως. The context, however, makes it difficult to determine whether this is directed at Plato or modern thinkers who have turned philosophy into mathematics (992b1), perhaps Speussippus, cf *Metaph.* 1028b20. Moreover, the argument at 997b13 explicitly includes geometrical entities like lines among the intermediates. This is not surprising. Because of the geometrical bent that Greek mathematics takes, Plato thinks that a proof of the existence of all of the numbers shows that geometrical objects exist. Cf. *Prm.* 144a-145b, because all the numbers exist, the one has indefinitely many parts and yet has limits. Because of this it has shape.
Worse yet, the interpretation of the premise that τὰ αὖτὰ ἰοὐκᾳ have never appeared unequal becomes even more problematic than it was on the view that this was a bi-partite Form. No story that we can tell about different orders of being would seem to explain why two super-sensible angles or fives could not appear unequal to other super-sensible angles or fours. By hypothesis, all of the intermediates have the same kind of being—they exist "between" the way that Forms are and the way that sensibles are.

Yet another ploy for dealing with the troublesome plural has been to suppose that Plato means that the shares of the Form equality which are in things have never appeared to be unequal. In this respect, they would exactly parallel the large in Socrates which will never admit the small or allow itself to be overtopped (102d). Since Forms and shares are alike in what they will and will not admit, if the shares of equality are such that they never appear unequal, then the Form will never appear unequal either. So, it lacks the feature that all sensible equals have, thus showing that the two are not the same.

Such an interpretation requires that we make certain substantive assumptions about the intended audience for the Phaedo or about the reading strategy that Plato must have intended for his audience. We are not introduced to the notion of shares of Forms in things until 102b. If they are to play a role in the argument in Phaedo 74b-c, then either Plato assumed that his readership was sufficiently attuned to the details of Platonic vocabulary and ontology that they would

99 See Bluck (1957) and (1959) as well as Wedin (1978).
immediately realize that \( \tau\alpha \ \alpha\nu\tau\alpha \ \iota\sigma\alpha \) referred to shares of the Form; or he intended that the premises of the argument not be clear until (at least) the second reading of his work.\(^{100}\) This, of course, does not rule out such a reading. It just shows that it has ramifying consequences for the interpretation of Plato’s dialogues. The more serious problem involves the second half of the crucial premise—\( \eta \ \iota\sigma\omicron\tau\omicron\kappa \ \alpha\omicron\nu\omicron\sigma\omicron\tau\omicron\kappa. \) In the \textit{Phaedo}, Plato reserves the use of the abstract noun for Forms. There is no instance in which it is used to include the shares of a Form in things. Since this is so, Socrates must be asking Simmias whether the shares of the Form equality have ever appeared to be unequal or whether the Form has appeared to be unequal. If the \( \eta \) is genuinely disjunctive, then the first part of the premise is utterly superfluous. If it is expository, then the premise is false. The shares’ never appearing to be unequal is not explained by the Form’s never appearing so. Rather, on this interpretation at least, the Form’s failure to appear unequal is a consequence of the inability of the shares ever to appear to be unequal. For these and other reasons it seems sensible to reject this view.\(^{101}\)

Finally, there is the view that Plato’s use of the plural in this line licenses no speculation about the nature of the Form. It is a familiar fact that Greek allows the use of the neuter plural together with the article to form a

\(^{100}\) We could also suppose that Plato was so inept with the concept of narrative that he didn’t realize that his argument would only be intelligible in retrospect. Not only does the principle of charity advise against this course of action, but it also seems to me that, whatever shortcomings Plato might have had as a philosopher, he was a master dramatist.

\(^{101}\) For related and further criticisms, see Haynes (1964), Rist (1964) and Smith.
The presence of \( \alpha\nu\tau\alpha \) as an intensifier in such a context is unusual, but Plato must somehow distinguish the many sensible equals, which are called \( \tau\alpha \ \lambda\sigma\alpha \), from the Form with which they are being contrasted.

Such a deflationary reading is, of course, nice. It plucks the feathers which enable some of the more extreme flights of interpretative fancy. Nonetheless, one wonders whether we cannot engage in some less fanciful speculation about Plato’s choice of words. The ”collection of equal things” reading is helpful because it focuses attention on the passage in the Parmenides where the structure of \( \pi\rho\delta\varsigma \ \tau\nu \) Forms and their relations to sensibles is clearly an issue. But commentators have generally failed to appreciate the role that the logical features of \( \pi\rho\delta\varsigma \ \tau\nu \) predicates play in shaping this issue. Plato’s language is very revealing.

Such of the Forms as are what they are (or are the ones they are) in relation to one another, they have their being in relation to themselves and not in relation to the things in us.\(^{103}\) \textit{Pm.} 133c-d

... if one of us is a master or a slave, he is not the slave of Master Itself, what master is, nor is the master master of Slave Itself, what slave is, but instead, being a man, both are these things of a man.\(^{104}\) \textit{Pm.} 133d-e

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\(^{102}\) Vlastos (1956, p. 289, n. 2) raises this possibility, but finds it compatible with Geach’s view \( \tau\alpha \ \alpha\nu\tau\alpha \ \lambda\sigma\alpha \). Plato, he suggests, might have found it easy to think of the Form of Equality as two equal things because Greek enabled him to speak of it that way. In his additional note for the Allen volume (p. 291), he rejects the Geach view and accepts the grammatical solution alone.

\(^{103}\) οδοκούν καὶ διει πῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐλαι ὡς ἐλαι, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὐτάς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν.

\(^{104}\) ... εἴ τις ἡμῶν τοῦ δεσπότης ἡ δούλως ἔστιν, οὐκ ἀνθρώποι δεσπότην ὡ ἐνο, ὃ ἔστι δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δούλως ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπος ὡ δούλου, ὃ ἔστι δοῦλος, δεσπότης ὃ δε- σπότης, ἀλλ’ ἀνθρώπος ὃν ἀνθρώποι ἀμφότερα ταὐτά ἔστιν.
slave is, but instead, being a man, both are these things of a man.  
*Prm.* 133d-e

But Mastery Itself is what it is of Slavery Itself and Slavery Itself likewise is Slavery of Mastership Itself.  
*Prm.* 133e

Plato does not say that Slavery is the slave of Master Itself. Rather, his point is that Slavery is the very Form that it is only because it is πρὸς the appropriate correlate. Each Form, as he reminds us parenthetically in the first passage, is what-it-is. The difference between sensibles and Forms is that Jones is what he is (a master), not in relation to Slavery, but in relation to his slave—Smith. Jones, of course, is not what-Master-is. Mastership, by contrast, is what it is, not in relation to Smith or any other slave but only by virtue of being of its proper correlative. The claim that relative Forms are πρὸς one another and not πρὸς the things in us is not so much a claim that is motivated by a view about the nature of Forms qua Forms. Rather, it is a claim that is based in the logical principles that govern relative predicates. The bearer of such a predicate is what it is only in relation to its proper correlative. The proper correlative in the case of Mastership is not any particular slave. The continued existence of any of these persons is irrelevant to the Form’s being what it is. For it does not bear the name ‘master’ because it is of any of these slaves. It is what-master-is and, as a result, it is of what-slave-is.

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104. . . ἐὰν τις ἦμων τοῦ δεσπότης ἢ δοῦλος ἔστιν, οὐκ αὐτὸς δεσπότου ἢ ποι, δὲ ἐστι δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δοῦλος ἔστιν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦ δούλου, δὲ ἐστι δοῦλος, δεσπότης δ ἰ δεσπότης, ἄλλ' ἀνθρώπων ἢν ἀνθρώπου ἀμφότερα ταῦτα ἔστιν.

105. αὕτη δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἔστιν δ ἐστι, καὶ δουλεία ἡσυχίας αὐτῆς δουλεία αὐτῆς δεσποτείας . . .
My speculation about Plato's use of \( \tau \alpha \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \iota \sigma \alpha \) is simply this: Whatever the nature of the Forms may be—universals, paradigms or whatever—an equal is always equal to. That which an equal is equal to may be itself or some other thing. If Plato were genuinely undecided (or simply did not want to commit himself) about the nature of the Forms, it would have been perfectly natural for him to vacillate between expressions like \( \tau \alpha \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \iota \sigma \omega \) and \( \tau \alpha \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \iota \sigma \alpha \). The variation is justified by reference to the logical nature of \( \pi \rho \dot{\omega} \tau \nu \) predicates, not in the ontological nature of Forms.

E. Conclusion

In Chapter Two we asked why Plato might have thought that the logical cause of \( F \) had to be-completely \( F \). Of the three motives that we considered it seemed that the first, the Synonymy Principle, was in the forefront of Plato's mind when he wrote the final argument of the \textit{Phaedo}. This, of course, does not rule out the possibility that other concerns might be behind the argument at 74b-c. In fact, none of the considerations about the coherence of explanations that appear in the final argument and which underlie the requirement of the Synonymy Principle appear in this part of the \textit{Phaedo}. But, on the other hand, none of the considerations about essences and accounts that SP2 and SP3 involve to explain the requirement of complete-being appear either. Based on what Plato reveals to us in the argument from recollection, the most that we can say is that what separates the Forms from the sensibles is that the latter fail the test of complete-being. The argument of Phaedo 74b-c gives us no further insight into why this is an appropriate test for being the logical cause of a relative predicate.
Nonetheless, we might gain some ground in understanding Plato's use of complete-being as a test for logical causes if we suppose that a common thread links *Phaedo* 74b-c with the final argument for the immortality of the soul. There Plato made the hypothesis that there was something analogous to substances like fire in the case of \( \pi\rho\sigma \tau \) terms like large or odd. Such a supposition attempts to provide a framework for the explanation of why things are large or odd that has the same virtues that substance inherence explanations have. Perhaps, in *Phaedo* 74b-c and in the requirement of complete-being for logical causes, Plato is again thinking in terms of such substances.

If we agree that justice and beauty and so forth are "somethings" and if we accept the requirement of complete-being, then we are left with the conclusion that what-beauty-is, for instance, is not any of the "things" with which we are familiar. Consequently, we must suppose that if we know what these things are, we must have made this discovery in some context other than that with which we are familiar. Plato believes that in some sense we do know what these things are. He does, after all, represent Socrates and those with whom he converses as being able to agree that certain specific actions are brave, given the circumstances, or that someone is really beautiful. However, what Socrates himself does not do, in the early dialogues, and what his victims are unable to do is to say, *in words*, what courage is or what beauty is. Though both know, in a rough and ready way, how to spot courageous acts or beautiful boys, they do not know \( \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu \) what-courage-is or what-beauty-is. The result of this is that they cannot teach anyone what these things are. Insofar as having a \( \tau\epsilon\chi\nu\omicron\delta \) presupposes having knowledge
that one could communicate to a student, they are both artless and without knowledge. Socrates does not question ordinary craftspersons about the things with which their crafts are concerned. As a result, we do not know for certain whether they would, when faced with the Socratic ἔλεγχος be shown to be artless too. I suspect, given the way that Plato continually contrasts ordinary craftsman with sophists and other pretenders, that he thinks that they do have an art.¹⁰⁶ Now we might suppose that this is because he thinks that they could give an account, κατὰ λόγον, of the objects of their crafts. The potter, for instance, could say what clay is and what fire is. This, I think, is unlikely. Rather, I suspect Socrates recognizes that they teach their students to grasp the natures of these things by means of ostension. This is possible, I want to suggest, because, in a certain sense, clay is just what it seems to be. You can show a student samples of it and say, without error, "This is what clay is." Because the objects that serve as the most basic principles of such ἔκχωναι are completely what they are and, as a result, are such that the understanding of them can be had ostensively, Plato generalizes this model to all instances of what-F-is. Hence the requirement of complete-being for logical causes.

Granted, we can and do ostensively teach people how to use 'equal' or 'courageous' but the process is complicated by the fact that a particular stick, which could be used in such a lesson, might also be used in the teaching of 'unequal.' It depends on what the particular stick is paired with. Likewise, we might use a certain kind of an action in trying to teach someone how to use the

¹⁰⁶ cf. Apol. 22d.
word 'courageous,' but then use the very same action set in a different context to illustrate 'cowardly.'

It is only where we cannot point out what-F-is that we must resort to teaching by words. With respect to things like courage, justice, beauty and the other πρὸς τοῦ Platonic examples, we cannot do this, for none of the things to which we can point is what-F-is. Because of the separation of what-courage-is from all sensible things, the person who is to teach others what it is would have to be able to give an account of courage κατὰ λόγου. He cannot indicate it or show it in any other way.

These facts, I believe, give rise to two themes in Plato's work. First, since we can never point to a thing and say, "This is what-courage-is," our ability to make even rough and ready classifications is something that needs explanation. His explanation is the doctrine of ἀναμνήσις. We are able, when sensible things remind us, to recall a period prior to this life in which we had experience of what-courage-is or what-beauty-is. In the rich metaphor of the Phaedrus the gods provide a rather hurried guided tour of τὰ ὁρῶν which τὰ ἡμεῖς ἠδέουν, τὰ δ' ὅν (248a-b). Here, as in other places where Plato discusses our interaction with the Forms, the vocabulary suggests something like vision. This, I think, is because he takes as a paradigm our learning about things that are-completely. Just as we can be shown what-fire-is, in a prior existence the gods showed us what-beauty-is. This explains how we are able to gain what ability we do have for categorizing things as beautiful—it is in virtue of recalling, albeit vaguely, our "vision" of what-
beauty-is.107 This ability to identify beautiful things or courageous acts is not expert knowledge of what-beauty-is or what-courage-is, analogous to the kind of knowledge that a craftsman has. Recall that the potter has an advantage over the would-be teacher of virtue because the latter, but not the former can literally show his student what-clay-is. What cannot be shown must, instead, be said. As the elenchtic dialogues show, this is not an easy task. This may be because it is difficult to recall our pre-natal glimpses of the Forms with much accuracy or because it is not easy to put what we say into words or, perhaps, both. Whatever the case may be, this theme finds expression in Plato in several ways. First, it is suggested that the one who can give accounts of what the non-sensible beings are has achieved something like vision of them.108 After all, how else should we explain his remarkable capacity to give an account of them? Further, there is a marked preference for some state in which we have direct κοινωνία with what these things are.109 The account of them κατὰ λόγοι is a poor substitute for having them present to you—as a description of what clay or fire is like is a poor substitute for someone who wants to learn what the real thing is.

107 This explanation is not, I think, Plato's final word on the subject. The doctrine of recollection is not mentioned or even alluded to in the later dialogues. This is because Plato has developed a new conception of the relation of language to the Forms which "naturalizes" the epistemology of ἀναμνήσεως. See Turnbull (1978).

108 cf. Phaedo 83b.

109 cf. Phaedo 80e and ff.
Chapter IV

Relatives in the Republic

In the previous chapter, I argued that the *Phaedo* is in many ways a tentative dialogue. Its hypothesis is advanced to allow for the possibility of what Plato antecedently believes to be the case: there can be both answers to "What is F?" questions and adequate explanations for why sensible are F. The ontology of Forms and the doctrine of participation allow for both of these things within the framework of inquiry employed in the dialogues of search. The nature of the Forms that the *Phaedo* posits is not revealed beyond their role in allowing for these possibilities and insofar as detail about them and their relation to souls and sensibles is needed to advance the arguments for immortality. This is unfortunate for the interpreter, but it is honest philosophy. Plato is working the view out as he goes and he is sufficiently astute not to commit himself on questions that the context does not require that he yet answer.

The *Republic*, by contrast, gives us a great deal of information about the Forms. The difficulty is that often the information is presented metaphorically and, where there is argument, it is often not clear at whom the argument is directed or exactly what the premises are. The result is that the vision of the Forms presented in the middle books of the *Republic* outruns the argument. It is perhaps not even right to say that this outcome is regrettable. *Republic* is principally
a work about how we ought to live. Because the nature of the world in which we live is important to the way in which we ought to structure the conditions of our existence, both communally and individually, Plato must spell out enough of his world view to justify the normative claims that he wants to make. But the epistemology and metaphysics are in the spotlight in the middle books only so that the argument can be renewed in Book VIII with some justification for why the philosopher-kings and the faculty of reason must have the complete hegemony that Plato claims for them.

In what follows, I shall discuss the two arguments in Republic that most obviously involve Forms for relative terms: the argument from opposites that closes Book V (§1) and the claim in Book VII that certain experiences can turn the soul around (§3). These arguments, I believe, rely heavily on the Phaedo and the framework of inquiry implicit in the dialogues of search. In between these two arguments are the famous images of the sun, the doubly divided line and the cave. These have often been invoked to support the claim that Plato held a "one over many" principle; that is, that there are Forms for every common predicate—καθαρός αὐτό as well as πρός τε. In §2, I argue that these images do not support this inference when they are seen in their proper context. Finally, I defend the thesis that, in the middle period dialogues, Plato has only Forms for πρός τε terms by examining the peculiar notion of a Form for 'bed' and 'table' in Book X (§4).
§1. The Argument of Republic V, 475e-480a

These four Stephanus pages have generated a volume of secondary literature that is wildly disproportionate to the space that Plato allots to the argument itself. Plato dedicates four times as much of the text to the question of what content must be included or excluded from the stories that are to be told to the guardians as children. This is not to say that the argument of Book V is not important or that Plato did not regard it as important. But, before we leap into the metaphysical and epistemological implications of these four pages, it seems appropriate to consider the role that they play in the overall structure of the Republic. What is it that Plato wants this argument to show and why is this important?

A. Who are the lovers of sights and sounds?

At 473d, Socrates announces the arrival of the third and greatest wave in the sea of argument into which Polemarchus’ question has plunged them. It concerns how it might be possible to establish the kind of community that has been described. The famous answer is that philosophers must become kings or kings must become philosophers. These lovers of wisdom are described in the next few pages so that the import of this radical claim can be made clear and so that it can be defended. These two tasks go hand in hand because Plato thinks that an analysis of the true nature of the philosopher will reveal that she is also the person best suited to rule.¹ Plato first recalls the principle about relatives used at 438b:

¹ R. 474b-c, εἰ μέλλομεν τὴν ἐκφράσεαν οὕς λέγεις, διαφιλοσοφήσαται πρὸς αὐτούς, τοὺς φιλοσόφους τίνας λέγοντες τολμῶμεν φάναι δεῖν ἄρχειν, ἵνα διαδῆλων γενομένων
an unqualified relative term has an unqualified correlative (cf. supra Ch. 1, §2, a). Since our rulers are to be lovers of wisdom tout court, as opposed to lovers of mathematics or lovers of astronomy, they must love wisdom of every sort. This, Glaunon points out, raises a puzzle. It would seem to include within the group that he and Socrates obviously antecedently accept as philosophers another group—the ϕιλοθεάμονες and the ϕιλήκοοι. These, Glaunon thinks, are a most odd (ἀποτότατοι, 475d) addition to the philosophers. The four pages that have generated so much controversy are, at least ostensibly, provided to distinguish the genuine philosophers from this numerous and strange band. Who are these people and why does Plato think it so important that they not be mistaken for philosophers?

We are told that the lovers of spectacles have a certain similarity to philosophers, but we are not told in what that similarity consists. However, Plato's description of them is tantalizing. Such people frequent all sorts of theatre and public festivals with a passion that Plato describes in the most unflattering terms. It is as if they had rented out their ears to every chorus in the land and so had to run about to see them all. The implication is that they are passive in their receptiveness since their ears have been hired out, as one might hire out

\[ \text{δόνηται τις ἄμυνεσθαι ἐνδεικνύμενος, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν προσήκει φύσει ἀπεσθαί τε φιλοσοφίας ἱγμομουνεύει τ' ἐν πόλει.} \]

2 At 475c, Glaunon also mentions the people who have petty crafts (τοῖς τῶν τεχνιτῶν) and raises the question of whether these too are lovers of wisdom. Though Socrates includes them in his division at 476a, they seem to receive no more consideration in the argument that follows.

3 R. 475d, ὃς πρὸς μὲν λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην διατριβὴν ἐκώστες οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλων ἔλθειν, ὀπερ δὲ ἀπομεμοιωκότες τὰ ἄτα ἐπακοδοι πάντων χορῶν περιβεόσου τοῖς Διονυσίοις, οὕτε τῶν κατὰ πόλεις οὕτε τῶν κατὰ κάμας ἀπολειπόμενοι.
land or tools. They are at the disposal of the choruses to have their ears used, just as the wage earner’s strength is used by someone else once he has hired it out. Further, Plato’s attitude toward crass commercialism colors the comparison in other ways. Perhaps it is implied that, whatever it is that these cultured wage earners fancy that they will get in return, it is not something which is genuinely valuable. It seems that what they derive from their activity is delight. They gladly welcome (ἀσπάζονται, 476b) all the beautiful sounds and shapes and colors and the things that can be devised out of these. We are also told that these lovers of spectacles will not be drawn into serious discussion. But, on the other hand, they are neither willing to acknowledge that the Forms exist nor able to follow arguments that lead to that conclusion. The upshot of all this is that the lover of sights and sounds lives in a kind of dream state in which she fails to recognize likenesses as likenesses and, instead, mistakes them for the thing which they resemble. As a result, she has opinion and not knowledge.

Plato says all this in 476b-d5 before he begins to argue for it in 476d5. Before we begin to examine the argument, it seems appropriate to ask who these

4 cf. R. 371d-e, ἐπὶ δὴ τινες, ὃς ἐγάμαι, εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλοι διάκοιοι, οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν τῆς διανοιᾶς μὴ πάνω ἀξιοκοινώνητοι δεί, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σῶματος ἰασάνην ἐπὶ τοὺς πάνους ἑξωσάν ὃς ἐς πολυπτητες τήν τῆς ἴασαν χρείαν, τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην μορφὰν καλοῦντας, κέκλησαι, ὃς ἐγάμαι, μυθητοὶ. The poor wage earner is a pretty pathetic fellow whose only virtue is his strength which he allows others to use for a price. The lover of sights and sounds is, I believe, supposed to be portrayed as equally pathetic. The τὰ μὲν τῆς διανοιᾶς in which they are deficient is not raw intelligence, but, as we shall see, a certain kind of philosophical sensibility. The result of their particular defect is that they rent out, not their strength, but their attention to another to use.

5 On the surface, these things seem to be at odds. I would call any discussion serious in which one must declare either for or against the existence of the Form of Beautiful or accept or reject reasoning which is supposed to lead to it. I propose a way to reconcile this tension in what follows.
lovers of sights and sounds are and why it is so important to distinguish them from philosophers and, finally, why this is done in terms of the distinction between knowledge and opinion.

One of the things that makes Plato's *Republic* worth reading two thousand years later is the fact that it is a penetrating analysis of common character types. We are all acquainted with democratic men and women—often perfectly nice people who simply cannot manage to decide what they really believe or really value. They flit from project to project as their passing enthusiasms dictate and seldom take satisfaction in even those that they do complete since these projects now pale in the light of a new system of priorities. Let us suppose for a moment that the lover of sights and sounds in Book V is, likewise, a recurrent character type. If this is so, we ought to be able to follow Plato's clues and find a few lovers of sights and sounds in our own communities. The supposition that there are still people of the sort that Plato had in mind and the further identification of these people within our own community on the basis of what little Plato has to say about them is going to be controversial. Nonetheless, I believe these suppositions may be justified by the fruit that they bear.

One often finds people who have an insatiable appetite for the arts. After the gallery opening or the performance or the film, they settle down over espresso with their friends and explore their feelings about what they have just seen and heard. Frequently, the conversation turns to questions in aesthetics and ethics. What is it that makes Kandinsky's works so beautiful? Ought the character in the latest Woody Allen film have betrayed that confidence? It is not that
the conversation fails to attain some level of generality or sophistication. Rather, the person that I am identifying as the lover of sights and sounds is unwilling to discuss, say, aesthetic value considered universally. Such attempts to isolate the common element shared by both Kandinskys and Rembrandts repel them. They may consider it a violation of art's special mystique to examine it in this way. They sometimes feel that the aesthete who pursues this line of inquiry too doggedly would "murder to dissect." Or they may simply find it uninteresting because such an inquiry requires that we dispassionately examine the object of this evening's enthusiasm in its relations to other objects. The lover of sights and sounds may prefer not to think about counterexamples to the generalization that he has fastened on this evening. He may prefer to rest content, for this evening at least, with the claim that beauty is the harmony of form and colour that one sees in a Kandinsky. It is an insightful claim, and it may be even be true that many things that are beautiful do have this harmony of color and form. What this person lacks is what might be called "a philosophical sensibility"—the desire to get to the bottom of the nature of aesthetic value or moral goodness in a way that is universal, systematic and final.6

6 Gosling (1960) claims that the lovers of sights and sounds are people who are attempting to provide an practical, empirical science of how to bring about fine things, especially works of art.

"When Socrates describes them at 476a10 he calls them φιλοτέχνοι καὶ πρακτικοὶ: they think in terms of skill, art, technique, of finding out how things are done; but they find out, for instance, about τὸ καλὸν just by going to theatres and festivals: these are the things they are enthusiastic about, and so they become authorities in criticism, people who could set up to teach the principles of composition and so forth." (p. 121)

Perhaps some of the lovers of sights and sounds might fall into this category, but it may be that the τὸ in φιλοπεδεέμονας τὸ καὶ φιλοτέχνοι καὶ πρακτικοὶ (479a) answers to the distinction in 475e between the sight lovers proper and πάντας καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτων των ὁμοίων
We can explain the nature of this character type by supposing that such a person rejects, or would reject if he or she thought about it, the constraints on answers to "What is F?" questions that we have isolated. Why, the sight-lover might object, ought we suppose that there is any single thing whereby all artworks (let alone all καλὸν things) are beautiful? A certain harmony of color and form are what make Kandinskys beautiful, but it is something else entirely for Rembrandts. If there are many such reasons why things are beautiful, then each of these reasons will fail to be-completely beautiful. Color employed in a certain way is beautiful in a Kandinsky but it would spoil a Rembrandt. Thus, color employed in this way is not beautiful πρὸς such a work. This is not to suggest that the lovers of sights and sounds, either the ones with whom we are acquainted or the ones that Plato himself knew, actually go through this line of reasoning. Rather, their lack of enthusiasm for philosophy as Plato understands it makes it as if they rejected these pre-theoretical starting points for Socratic questions. They themselves may have no real understanding of why they regard the enjoyment of art as the end of life instead of as the first step in the ascent to the Beautiful.

μαθητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν τεχνουρίων. I imagine that one of the ways in which the sight lovers might resemble the philosopher is in their disengagement from production and business. They, like Socrates and his companions, value their leisure too much to give it up for a career as a teacher of composition.

This counterfactual element explains the apparent tension in Plato's description of the lover of sights and sounds. On the one hand, he won't enter into a serious discussion, where "serious" is understood as an attempt to reach a universal account and an ontology that allows for the existence of such an account. But, on the other hand, he rejects the existence of the Form of the Beautiful in the sense that, if you could get him to declare himself on the issue of whether the adequacy conditions on "What is F?" questions were legitimate, he would respond negatively.
Suppose that this is, in fact, how the philosopher really differs from the lover of sights and sounds. Why is it then important that we include the former in the class of philosopher kings and exclude the latter? The singularity requirement, which the lovers of sights and sounds implicitly reject, reflects Plato's desire for a unitary and systematic understanding of recurrent features of our world. Just as there is one account of what a triangle is, regardless of whether it is large or small, drawn in the sand or considered only in the mind, so too there ought to be a single account of what beauty is, whether it is beauty in a horse, a painting or a sunset. A person who rejects the singularity requirement with respect to the beautiful thus rejects the possibility of systematic, scientific understanding of beauty (at least by Plato's lights). Such a person cannot formulate long term plans in accordance with universal accounts of the nature of value. He may well be a flighty person since he thinks and acts on the basis of beliefs about the nature of the good and the beautiful which are, at best, incomplete or true only within a certain domain and with certain qualifications. Plato wants to distinguish such a person from the genuine philosopher, not merely because he wants to reserve that honorific for himself and the people who pursue inquiry in the way that he thinks is appropriate, but because he thinks that the lover of sights and sounds would be a poor ruler. In many ways his behavior would resemble that of the democratic man. The democratic man's flighty and erratic behavior stems from the fact that no virtues remain to prevent him from acting on the desire du jour. The lover of sights and sounds may exhibit the same kind of behavior, but not because of the role that his desires play in determining his actions. His understanding of the nature of value is a collection of beliefs which are only true within
a certain range or with certain qualifications. When he attempts to act on this information in any given situation, he will have to decide which of his many accounts of beauty is appropriate to the present case. If his understanding is sufficiently unsystematic, he may well change his mind about this in mid-stream and, as a result, change his course of action. If this is the sort of person that Plato had in mind when he described the lover of sights and sounds, then he might regard it as no accident that the cultural and artistic center of Greece was democratic Athens. The intellectual malaise of the lover of sights and sounds and the character flaws of democratic man complement one another.

If this is Plato's view about the nature and character of the lover of sights and sounds, then the underlying structure of his argument is this:

1. Because of the nature of knowledge, a real lover of wisdom would recognize that the constraints on answers to "What is F?" questions are legitimate.

2. In order for these constraints to be satisfied in the case where F is a relative, it is necessary to posit the existence of a Form.

So, a lover of wisdom is the person who accepts the hypothesis that there are Forms and strives to know them.

In order to defend this argument, it would be necessary for Plato to articulate both the singularity requirement and the self-predication requirement and to argue for them. A defense of the second premise would have to exhibit all the difficulties that were encountered trying to find the logical causes of relatives in the dialogues of search and to repeat the arguments of the Phaedo that we examined
in Chapter Three. In light of the enormity of this task, it would not be at all surprising if he sought some shorter path. When Socrates remarks to Glaucon that it will be easier to explain this to him, Plato as much as tells us that he will be taking a short cut.\(^8\) We are to assume as a background the conditions that logical causes must meet and the hypothesis that there are Forms which can meet these conditions in addition to the sensible things which cannot. Once these assumptions have been granted, it will be possible to show that knowledge is such that it must be of Forms. As a result, the lover of knowledge and wisdom must be different from the lover of sights and sounds.

476b-e gives a defense of the distinction between the genuine philosopher and the lover of sights and sounds which relies upon the acceptance of a Platonic metaphysics. Since Glaucon accepts the existence of the Forms and regards them as the proper objects of knowledge, it follows immediately that the person who loves anything other than the Forms first and foremost is not a lover of wisdom. Plato recognizes that this quick summary is unlikely to convince anyone not already predisposed to Platonic ontology and metaphysics. Accordingly, he writes:

But what if the one whom we say opines but does not know is annoyed with us and disputes the truth of what we have said? Do we have some way to pacify him and to gently persuade him while concealing that he is not in his right mind?\(^9\)

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\(^8\) R. 475c, ὁδέμος, ἃν ὡ ἐγώ, ῥαίως πρὸς γε ἄλλων σὲ δὲ ὁμοι ἀμοιγήσειν μοι τὸ τοιώδε. There immediately follows an affirmation of the singularity and, by implication, the separateness of the Forms.

\(^9\) R. 476d-e, τι σῶν, ἄν ἴημι χαλεπαίνη σῶτος, δι' ὑμεῖς δοξάζειν ἄλλ' ὁδ' ἀγαθάκειν, καὶ ἀμφασητῇ ἡς ὁδ' ἀληθή λέγουμε, ἐξακόμεν τι παραπρεπέισθαι αὐτῶν καὶ πείθεις ἦρεμα ἐπικρυπτόμενοι, ὅτε σῶν ὅμαίνει;
In this passage Plato does not promise the lover of sights and sounds a fair fight or a good argument. It is not a commitment to provide an argument all of whose premises are acceptable to a person who does not accept either a Platonic metaphysics or ontology. Rather, Plato proposes a strategy for "pacifying and persuading" someone of something. This could, of course, be accomplished by such an argument if the audience were capable of following it. But, this particular program of pacification and persuasion is directed at an audience that is oðX ὑγιαίνει. We already know that they are unwilling to attend to serious discussion and are incapable of following arguments for the existence of the Forms. What follows then is not a fair fight with the anti-Platonist. Rather, it is the sugar coating of the bitter pill for people who can't see why Socratic questions lead one inevitably to Platonic Forms.

B. Relatives and the Objects of Knowledge and Opinion

The passage from 476d-477e provides an overview of Plato's strategy. It argues from some observations about knowledge, opinion and ignorance, as well as from the requirements that logical causes must meet, to the conclusion that opinion is of "what is and is not" while knowledge is of "what entirely is." Seeing just how these observations and constraints interact in the overview may help clear the way for the examination of the more rigorous argument concerning δινάμεις that follows.

10 Both Fine (1978) and Gosling (1960) mistakenly think that it is is. Fine in particular wields this passage as a club against readings that suppose that Plato incorporates any Platonic theses about knowledge or being in the premises of the argument that follows. I am indebted to Allan Silverman for pointing out just how little this passage commits Plato to.
"Does the person who knows know something or nothing? You answer me as if you were this person." "I answer," he said, "that he knows something." "Is it something which is or something which is not?" "What is. For how could something which is not be known?" (R. 476e)

It is a truism that someone who knows knows something. Like most truisms, however, it is not clear just what truth it states. On the one hand, the person who knows knows some content or proposition. As we would say, there is something that she believes. But, in this sense of "knows something," it is also true that she who opines, opines something. But, what is distinctive about the person who knows is that it follows from the fact that she knows that she believes something that is true. Opinion, of course, can be of something which is false. So, the truism can be expanded to the claim that the person who knows knows something that is—in the sense that what she knows is the case or is true. But, so stated, the truism can also serve as a vehicle for the expression of a deep philosophical view about being and not being. Plato was acquainted with

11 ὃ γιγνώσκων γιγνώσκει τι ἢ οὐδέν; σὺ σὺν μοι ὑπὲρ ἑκείνου ἀποκρίνον. Ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἐφη, ὅτι γιγνώσκει τι. Πότερον δὲ ἢ σύκ δὲν; ὃν· πώς γὰρ δὲν μὴ διὶ γέ τι γιγνώσκειν.

12 And thereby hangs a tale about the disagreement over this passage. Fine (1978) provides a rather useful classification of the interpretative moves that have been made here. On the one hand, there are people who take what she calls "the content reading." To say that someone who knows something means that she is related to some "content" (Fine) or "internal accusative" (Crombie) or "formal object" (Gosling). On the other side, there are those who take Plato to mean that the knowing agent is related to some (presumably non-semantical) object. These include Allen (1961), Cross and Woozely (1964), Brentlinger (1972) and Vlastos (1965). In what follows, I shall try to provide an interpretation that does not require us to choose.

13 Again, Fine's taxonomy is helpful in sorting out the secondary literature. There are three main alternatives for interpreting ἔστιν in this premise:

2) "Whoever knows something knows something that is.
   a) something that exists (existential reading)
   b) something that is F (predicative reading)
Parmenides’ view that only that which is can be or be thought and that what is not neither is nor can be thought. We know that it was a cause of concern to him since it is taken up in no fewer than three of his later dialogues. But, we need not suppose that it is what facilitates his move beyond these truisms to the rather startling claim which immediately follows.

In however many ways we might examine it, we may hold this to be sufficient: that which entirely is is entirely knowable and what in no way is is in all ways unknowable. *(R. 477a)*

This, I believe, is not because Plato is making use of the Parmenidean principles about being and not being. Rather, it reflects the requirement of complete-being for logical causes. What we know when we know what F is is the logical cause of F. It is that on account of which all things are F. For a multiplicity of reasons, Plato thinks that no sentence of the form ‘x is not F’ πρὸς φ’ can be true if x is the logical cause of F. Here he expresses this condition by saying that the thing that is entirely knowable (the logical cause of F) is *entirely*. The thought is that it

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c) something that is true.

The previous premise, (1) "Whoever knows knows something," admitted of two readings: a) the content reading and b) the object reading.

These two premises combine to yield a variety of ways of interpreting Plato’s claim that the Forms, as objects of knowledge, are more real than sensibles.

1b + 2a = degrees of existence (DE)
1b + 2b = degrees of reality or being (DR)
1a + 2c = degrees of truth; Fine’s reading (T), if Plato is characterizing the objects of belief and knowledge as a *whole* or Gosling’s reading (DT) if Plato is characterizing tokens of the objects of knowledge and belief.

Supporters of (DE) include Cross and Woozley as well as Brentlinger. (DR) is championed by Vlastos.

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14 ἰκανὸς ὁ δὲ τοῦτο ἔχομεν, κἀν εἰ πλεονασθῇ αἰτίαμεν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν παυτελῶς δὲν παυτελῶς γνωστῶν, μὴ δὲ μπροστὶ πᾶντι ἐγνωστόν.
wouldn’t be F entirely or through and through if such a qualifying statement were true.

Why, if it is the complete-being of logical causes that is at issue, would Plato think that the objects of ignorance are in no way and the objects of opinion both are and are not? Suppose Jones mistakenly thinks that y is the logical cause of F. Suppose further that not only is y not that by virtue of which all F things are F, but no F things are in fact y at all. Jones is completely ignorant of what F is because no sentence of the Form ‘that which is y is F’ is true.

Suppose Smith, however, has fastened on another candidate for the logical cause of F: the z. Let us suppose, in addition, that some F things are z, but that it is not because they are z that they are F. Suppose instead that things are z because they are w and that being w is the logical cause of being F. The Hippias Major suggests an example of two logical causes related like this. Socrates first considers the suggestion that the beautiful is the useful and capable (τὸ δυνατόν τε καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον, 295c). When this possibility is ruled out, he examines "the useful and capable for good" (τὸ χρήσιμον τε καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, 296d).15 If this really were the nature of the beautiful, then some beautiful things would be capable or useful. But, they would not be beautiful simply because they are capable. The person who identified the beautiful with the capable would believe something that is, in some sense, true. The sense is just this: When

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15 Socrates distinguishes these as quite distinct cases. Ὅρ.Μα. 296d, ἐκεῖνο μὲν τοῖνυν οἴχεται, τὸ δυνατόν τε καὶ χρήσιμον ἀπλῶς εἶναι καλῶν· ἀλλ’ ἄρα τοῦτ’ ὃν ἐκεῖνο, Ἔρ.Επίλ. β, ἐπούλευο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ εἰσεῖν, ὅτι τὸ χρήσιμον τε καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τι ποιήσαι, τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὸ καλὸν;
we treat 'the z' as an indefinite name for a z thing or some or all the z things, then it is true that "the z is F." So, to take the Hippias example, we can truly say that τὸ δύνατον ἐστὶ καλὸν. But, in another sense, Smith's view about the nature of the beautiful is false. Because the capacity to do evil is not fine, we find a qualifying phrase which makes true a sentence of the form 'the capable is not beautiful πρὸς θ.'

The sense of this denial is not the same as the sense of the affirmation "the capable is beautiful" because of the subtle shift in the meaning of 'capable' and 'beautiful.' In the negative sentence 'the capable' refers to the nature of the capable and what is asserted is that the nature of the capable is not the real nature of the beautiful. The πρὸς θ qualifier gives the grounds for denying their equivalence. But, in the affirmative sentence, 'the capable' refers to some (though not all) capable things. Because it is true that some of these are beautiful, the sentence is true.

We have already seen that Plato is not inclined to distinguish between these two senses of "the z" in the dialogues of search. Thus, he would regard "the capable is the beautiful" as a single unit for the purposes of evaluating its truth or falsity. It is true when 'the capable' means a certain capable (and beautiful) thing or things. But 'the capable is the beautiful' is false when it means that

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16 Though "the white runs" is pretty barbaric English, τὸ λευκὸν τρέχει is perfectly good Greek. Even "the not white runs" is acceptable Greek, though it does not manage to say much at all. Cf. Prm. 157b, ff and Aristotle De Int. 16a30.

17 e.g. the shift between ταῦτα τὰ χρήσιμα which are not καλὰ in Hp.Ma. 296c to the conclusion in 296d that τὸ δύνατὸν τε καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ καλὸν.
the capable is the logical cause of the beautiful, precisely because the negation is true when the \( \pi\rho\sigma\varsigma\ \phi \) qualifier is added. When a sensible thing, like a beautiful girl, turns out to be beautiful in one sense (\( \pi\rho\sigma\varsigma \) other girls) but not beautiful in another sense (\( \pi\rho\sigma\varsigma \) goddesses), Plato says that she is no more beautiful than ugly by means of the \( \omicron\upsilon\ \mu\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\upsilon \) formula. So, things that are F but fail to be- completely F are no more F than not F. Plato will extend the same treatment to statements about such things. 'The capable is the beautiful' is no more true than not true and the person who thinks this thinks what both is and is not.\(^1\)

In general then, there is a correlation between statements and objects in matters of knowledge and opinion.\(^2\) When it comes to knowledge of the nature

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\(^1\) Thus, my view is closest to Gosling's. According to him:

\[ \delta\omicron\xi\acute{\omicron}\acute{\omicron}\upsilon \] something to be (say) \( \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\upsilon \), which sometimes is and sometimes is not; what is 'judged' is what sometimes is, sometimes is not \( \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\upsilon \), i.e. a partial truth. (1968, p. 130)

But we disagree about why Plato holds such a view. I connect it with the conditions that govern answers to Socratic questions. According to Gosling, part of what underlies Plato's insistence that the objects of opinion are separate is a certain confusion over the notion of \( \delta\acute{\omicron}\xi\alpha \). He fails to appreciate that what we merely opine, but do not know, may nonetheless be true.

Judgements and beliefs are fallible. But equally they can be true. A person who recognizes this distinction between \( \epsilon\pi\sigma\tau\nu\mu\eta \) and \( \delta\acute{\omicron}\xi\alpha \) could hold that some \( \delta\acute{\omicron}\xi\alpha \) are \( \acute{\alpha}\gamma\iota\nu\gamma\epsilon\varsigma\varsigma \), but it is not by virtue of being \( \delta\acute{\omicron}\xi\alpha \) that they are so. Plato, however, seems to have been influenced by a common feeling that there is some incompatibility between \( \delta\acute{\omicron}\xi\alpha \) and \( \epsilon\pi\sigma\tau\nu\mu\eta \), a feeling still found though not succumbed to in Aristotle. This leads him to deny that \( \delta\acute{\omicron}\xi\alpha \) can be \( \tau\omicron\upsilon \ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma \ldots \) (1968, p.126).

\(^2\) This is why it is so difficult to determine what Plato means by \( \tau\omicron\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma \ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\upsilon \), cf. Gosling (1968). He means both objects and the accounts that are about them. Gosling and Fine are right to point out to proponents of the object reading of "he who knows knows something" that there must be some explanation for why this argument culminates in 479d in a claim about the \( \nu\omicron\mu\mu\omicron\upsilon \) of the sight lovers and not merely about the things that they love. But, on the other hand, we cannot dismiss the role that objects play in the argument. When she turns to the discussion of the many beautifuls at 479e5, Fine has a much harder time trying to read 'is' as 'is
of the $F$, there is the logical cause of the $F$, the $w$, which is completely $F$. Corresponding to it is a statement, 'The $w$ is the $F$', which is completely true, because no sentence of the form, 'The $w$ is not $F$ $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma \ \emptyset$' is true. With respect to something that is not the logical cause of the $F$, call it the $z$, two things are possible. Either (1) some of the $F$ things are $z$ and so that which is $z$ is $F$ (in part, at least) but it fails to be completely $F$. In such a case, 'The $z$ is the $F$' is no more true than false. Alternately, (2) no $F$ thing may turn out to be $z$. In this case the $z$ is in no way $F$ and the statement 'the $z$ is the $F$' is only false. In case (1) the statement/thing is the object of opinion and in case (2) the statement/thing complex is the object of ignorance.

This shows us several things about the relationship between Plato's use of $\delta\delta\zeta\alpha$ and our concept of belief. First, knowledge, opinion and ignorance concerning, say, beauty are all defined by their relationship to the nature of the beautiful—that is, its logical cause. Knowledge of the beautiful gets it exactly right in the sense that its content is completely true. Opinion has as its content what is no more true than false concerning $\tau\delta \ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\nu$. Ignorance is utterly wrong about the true' (is-$v$). She acknowledges that Plato here shifts to a predicative sense of $\iota\sigma\tau\iota$, (is-$p$), as Vlastos suggests. But, this is now permissible, she thinks, because it meets her condition of uncontroversiality, since the sight lover would surely acknowledge that the sensible features which he identifies with beauty both are and are not beautiful. It is their variation through many contexts that requires that we posit many accounts of the beautiful. She concludes:

The connection between is-$p$ and is-$v$ is then this: reliance on observable properties that are $F$ and not $F$ (is-$p$) issues in unsatisfactory nomima (is-$v$); the nomima are based on observable properties, and that basis prevents them from being knowledgeable accounts. (p. 136)

This, I believe, is right as far as it goes. But many of the failed candidates for logical causes in the dialogues of search are not exactly observable; e.g. the capable. I prefer to locate the problem in the fact that the incomplete being of such candidates is mirrored in the incomplete truth of the $\nu\delta\mu\mu\omicron\alpha$ about them.
beautiful because its content is-completely false. By contrast, post-Cartesian epistemology defines knowledge and ignorance by their relation to belief. Beliefs that are true and justified are knowledge.\textsuperscript{20} Ignorance is false and unjustified belief.\textsuperscript{21} So, on the modern account, knowledge and ignorance are kinds of belief. On Plato's view, however, all three are independent and distinct capacities of our souls.\textsuperscript{22} Second, in Plato's account of these three propositional attitudes, the truth values of the contents that are known or opined mirror a certain distinction in the ways in which the objects that correspond to those contents have being. Knowledge about the F is related to a content that is-completely true and whose object is-completely F. Opinion about the nature of the F latches on to a content that is no more true than false. This content is about what is F without being-completely F.\textsuperscript{23} In what follows, Plato will exploit this correlation in such a way as to relate knowledge and opinion to different ontological orders.

\textsuperscript{20} The difficulties that the Gettier problems pose for an account of knowledge as justified, true belief are well known. It is possible, I believe, to save the basic insight behind such accounts by requiring that the agent's justification be indefeasible (Swain, 1974) or by tinkering with the notion of justification in some other way (perhaps as Dretske, 1971, does). But, even if we decide that proper causal ancestry (e.g. Goldman, 1967) and not justification is the third element involved in the definition of knowledge, it remains that it is not \textit{simply} true belief.

\textsuperscript{21} It is hard to know exactly what one should equate \textit{δύναμις} with in modern taxonomies. Discussions of the nature of knowledge distinguish between false beliefs which, nonetheless, have some degree of justification for an agent and true beliefs which fail to be sufficiently justified to count as knowledge. False beliefs with little or no justification do not get much of the limelight. The important point for my purposes is that, however we might choose to analyze ignorance, it will almost undoubtedly be a kind of belief.

\textsuperscript{22} Plato finds some support for this manner of carving up intentional states in the meaning of 'opine' and 'opinion.' Cf. LSJ sv. \textit{δόξα}, II, 2.

\textsuperscript{23} The objects which relate to the completely false content of ignorance are more difficult. What we think about when we think what is not and how exactly we think it are problems that exercise Plato greatly in the later dialogues. In the \textit{Republic}, Plato uses some of the problems involved
In an effort to provide some argument for the manner in which he carves up the propositional attitudes, Socrates leads the conversation into the digression at 477c. Knowledge and opinion are capacities (δύναμεις). As we noted in Chapter One, passive and active capacities are πρός one another. The capacity to carry or to burn is the very capacity that it is only by virtue of the relation that it stands in to what has the capacity to be carried or to be burned. But, knowledge and opinion are special capacities. Not only do they each have a characteristic effect, but they are also intentional relatives. Knowledge, like master, is always knowledge of something. Accordingly, when Socrates gives the principle for distinguishing capacities from one another he wraps these two conditions into a conjunctive principle. One power or capacity is distinguished from another by virtue of what it is related to and by virtue of what it brings about (ἐφ’ ὁ τε ἔστι καὶ ὁ ἀπεργᾶται, 477d). Knowledge and opinion are clearly different powers, since they have different effects. Knowledge is infallible, while opinion is not.

24 Because of his fondness for visual metaphors for knowing, it might seem that Plato has a view about knowledge and opinion whereby each is a 'sense-like' faculty with its own distinct objects. So, when Plato introduces the discussion of δύναμεις at 477c it might be thought that he is talking about "faculties" of knowing and opining. Gosling (1968) argues that this cannot be the case because this argument is directed toward the φιλοδέξμενοι and is supposed to proceed from premises acceptable to them. No premise which smuggled in a peculiarly Platonic epistemology would meet this condition.

I have already argued that this pattern of argumentation proceeds from a rather dubious premise. It turns out, I think, that Gosling is right in his conclusion. We ought to treat δύναμις is this argument in a non-technical sense which puts it on a par with any other power. The reason, however, is not that we must because Plato has promised to be fair to the sight lovers. Rather, we should because we can and seeing the powers of belief and knowledge as of a piece with other action-passion δύναμεις facilitates our understanding of the argument.
So, it follows from the principle of individuation that each must have a distinct thing to which it is related.

It has been alleged that this principle of individuation begs the question against the lover of sights and sounds. Why is it not possible that both the faculty of opinion and of knowledge be related to the very same objects, but in different ways; just as husbandry and butchery are related to the same things but in different ways? Indeed, the different ways in which they are related to these common objects could explain why they bring about different effects.

What makes this conjunctive principle of capacity individuation seem plausible to Plato's eyes, I think, is the logical grammar of relative terms. A relative is always $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma$ a particular correlative. As Aristotle goes to some lengths to point out, the proper correlative for a particular $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma \tau\nu$ term may be difficult to isolate. Being in relation to this particular correlative makes the relative term the very thing that it is. If a master were not a master of a slave, he would not be the very thing that he is—a master. So, if two ostensibly different terms, say master and schmaster, are both of a slave, then the two terms are, at root, one.

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25 Fine (1978, p. 128) raises this problem against those who take Plato to be talking about objects when he claims that the person who knows knows something. The fact that knowledge and belief are different capacities which accomplish different things does not guarantee that they have different objects. Thus, the objects interpretation, which naturally gives rise to the Two Worlds thesis (see below), saddles Plato with a question begging argument. Fine's solution is to claim that knowledge is set over certain contents and belief over other contents and that these contents may be about the very same objects. She further relativizes the status of contents to persons, so that what my capacity for belief ranges over may be what your capacity for knowledge ranges over.

26 Cf. Cat. 6b37, ff.
The argument is not, of course, airtight. After all, even though vision is of color and hearing is of sound, it does not follow that the very same object cannot be both seen and heard. We see its color and hear the noise that it makes. This is so even if what it is to be visible is distinct from what it is to be audible. It is not the mere fact that knowledge and opinion are distinct faculties that requires that they be πρός distinct things. Unlike color and sound, the very same objects cannot have the features that are distinctive of the knowable and the opinable. That which is knowable—the logical cause—passes the test of complete-being. That which is opinable does not. Plato does not rehearse all this at this point in the argument, but it follows from the admission that what is known is-completely.

The next stage of the argument from 478e to 479d correlates the faculty of opinion with the sensible things which fail to be-completely the relative terms that they bear. The lover of sights and sounds is described again and this time it is his insistence that there is no single and unchanging account of the beautiful to be had which is stressed. If he rejects the singularity requirement, then he must face the fact that his many logical causes will both be and not be. If the use of color and form that makes a Kandinsky beautiful is different from what makes a Rembrandt beautiful, then such color and form will not be beautiful πρός the latter work. Since the accounts by means of which the lover of sights and sounds tries to identify the logical causes of beauty fail to be-completely, they must belong to the same ontological order as the other things that fail to be-completely—sensibles. This makes sense, since these spectacles are the things that he enjoys seeing and the basis for the generalizations that he makes. As yet it is not clear that there is
anything in this that should make the lover of sights and sounds retreat. The problem which will make him admit that he has only opinion arises, I believe, when we move from the incomplete-being of the thing which he cites as the logical cause to the "no more true than false" character of the statement by means of which he identifies it as the logical cause. Like the riddle about the eunuch, these statements equivocate and, subsequently, cannot be grasped firmly in thought. Thus, their accounts of the nature of the beautiful are not merely non-systematic or non-unified, they are not genuinely intelligible. This is why Plato moves without comment between observations about the way in which sensible beautiful things both are and are not to a conclusion about τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ at 479d. The incomplete-being of the many sensible beautifuls gets reflected in the "no more true than false" nature of the νόμιμα about them. Since what is "no more true than false" concerning the nature of the beautiful does not get the nature of the beautiful right, it can only be opinion and not knowledge.

C. The Two Worlds Thesis

The argument from opposites in Republic V is frequently cited as evidence that Plato held the view that one could only know Forms and could only have beliefs about sensibles. This is an especially tempting conclusion to draw if you think that in 477c ff. Plato is treating knowledge and opinion as "faculties" which, like sight and hearing, are directed upon different objects. The problem with the Two Worlds thesis (hereafter TW) is that Plato says several things in the pages which follow shortly after this argument which seem incompatible with it. Moreover, TW itself is a very bizarre view. Though this in no way precludes the
possibility that it was Plato’s view, charity requires that we have very good reasons for attributing it to him.

In the figure of the cave at 520c, Plato claims that the philosophers "will know each image, whatever it is and of what it is, since you have seen the truth concerning the fine, the just and the good." The images on the wall in the cave, of course, are supposed to be analogous to sensible things. It makes a certain amount of sense to suppose that the philosopher-kings are able to have knowledge of these sensible things. Otherwise, what would be the practical point of having knowledge of the Forms if it did not improve one’s ability to operate within the shadow world? The only question is whether this improvement in ability requires the assumption that the philosopher knows (rather than has grounded opinion) concerning the sensibles. The text does not provide a conclusive reason to deny that Plato held TW, but it does require that the proponent of such a view have an account of how knowledge of the Forms makes the guardians better able to rule.

The other half of TW is difficult to reconcile with 505a-507b. There it appears that people have different beliefs about the nature of the good; cf. 505b ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸδε γε οἶδα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἥδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν, τοῖς δὲ κοιμητέρως φρόνησις. That τὸ ἀγαθὸν refers to a Form in this context is strongly suggested by the introduction of ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ

27 καὶ γνώσεσθε ἐκαστα τὰ εἴδωλα ἀττα ἀστὶ καὶ δν, διὰ τὸ τάληθθ ἐωρακέναι καλῶν τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν πέρι.
that those who believe that pleasure or knowledge is the good actually fail to have an opinion about the nature of the good. Instead, they believe something about sensibles.28

The more difficult problem seems to be that the images of the sun, line and cave are intended to reveal something about the Form of the Good and its brethren. Socrates says that he intends to dismiss for now the question of the nature of the good29 and to talk about its "offspring"—the sun—in its relation to the visible. But the image is undoubtedly supposed to reveal something about the relation of the Good to the other Forms and it is not presented as knowledge that Socrates has about the Form. The most natural thing, it seems to me, is to suppose that it reveals something of the content of Socrates' beliefs about the nature of the good—the beliefs that he seems so unwilling to divulge to Glaucon in any straightforward way.

As before, it is possible to resist this interpretation and to read the images of sun, line and cave in such a way as to save TW. One might argue that the images are supposed to be some sort of \( \varepsilon i k o \varsigma \ \mu \nu \theta o \varsigma \), like the views put forward in the Timaeus. They are stories about something other than the Forms which,

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28 Among the most ingenious (and arcane) of such strategies is Brentlinger's. On his view, since belief is a special faculty set over sensibles (which he apparently regards as collections of sense data), there can be absolutely no belief about Forms. He attempts to allow for mistaken beliefs about the Form of the Good by supposing that a person who believes that "the Good is pleasure" really only exhibits a disposition to believe of any individual pleasant thing that it is good. When the lover of sights and sounds "utters a general statement he expresses a singular idea (in the Berkeleyan or Humean sense)." (1972, p. 132)

29 \( R. 506 e, \alpha \nu \tau o \ \mu e n \ ti \ \pi o t \ \varepsilon o s i \ \tau \alpha \gamma a d o \nu \), \( \varepsilon i s o w m e n \ \tau o \ \nu \nu n \ \varepsilon i n a u \).
the *Timaeus*. They are stories about something other than the Forms which, nonetheless, tell us something important. More persuasively, I think, one can point to the apparent separation of the objects and states of mind in the doubly divided line. Whatever problems there might be about distinguishing between the objects of νοήσις and διάνοια, it seems quite clear that the objects of διάταξις are distinct from both of them.

In order to resolve these difficulties I propose to look at the context for the argument from opposites and to arrive at a more modest version of TW. It is possible, I believe, to keep some version of TW and still allow that Socrates and Glaucon can believe that the Form of the Good makes the other Forms intelligible as the sun makes visible objects visible. Further, it is compatible with a certain reading of TW that they know some things about sensibles. In addition to keeping what Plato has to say consistent (without the use of complex interpretive machinations), this more modest version of TW is not even terribly counterintuitive.

A degrees of truth interpretation can accommodate a limited form of TW. The contents of belief and knowledge, on such a reading, are irreducibly different. Knowledge ranges over what is-completely true, while belief ranges over what is no more true than false.\(^{30}\) But, on the view that I propose the complete and incomplete truth of these contents is mirrored by the complete and incomplete being of the διάταξις that the contents are about. This would seem to re-intro-

\(^{30}\) Gosling's view turns out to do this too. Fine takes it as a defect of his account that it still preserves even this much of TW.
duce TW in its strongest sense. This is why I think it is necessary to think carefully about the role that the argument from opposites is supposed to play. Plato is concerned that the sight-lovers might be mistaken for philosophers because they have some interesting and even true things to say about what beauty is. As usual, Socratic "What is F?" questions occupy center stage. The danger is that the sight-lovers might mistakenly be thought to be providing adequate answers to these questions. Accordingly, in the argument from opposites it is reasonable to think that Plato is discussing only a certain limited range of beliefs and knowledge: beliefs and knowledge about answers to "What is F?" questions. Because what he wants to establish concerns the issue of who is capable of answering such questions, he can leave aside beliefs and knowledge which do not address the question of what a thing's nature is. Thus, Socrates can have beliefs about what the Good is like in its relations to the sensibles and the other Forms. This is something quite different from the question of what the Good is. His point is that knowledge of what the Good is would have to be knowledge of a Form. The content of such a state of knowing would be true simpliciter and the content would have to be about a thing that was good without qualification.

The other half of TW is more complicated. The lover of sights and sounds gets his ideas about the nature of beauty from theatre performances and trips to the gallery. He comes to hold the view that, for instance, a certain use of color is what makes this Kandinsky beautiful. But, since this use of color would not make a Rembrandt beautiful, color used in this way fails to be-completely beautiful. Since knowledge of what beauty is, or the logical cause of beauty, is of something
beautiful. Nothing in this precludes the possibility that I can know that this use of color is what makes my wife like Kandinsky’s work so much. Such contents are not the focus of Plato’s disagreement with the lover of sights and sounds.

This pared down version of TW can be stated more exactly in this way.

TW Where C is a content which is alleged to answer a "what is F?" question and O is the object or objects which correspond to C: (a) if C is no more true than false, then C can only be the object of belief and O cannot be a Form and (b) if C is completely true because O is the logical cause of F, then C can only be known and O may be a Form.

TW(b) says that O may be a Form because it is not yet clear that Plato thinks that the logical cause for each and every value of F must be a separated Form. The Phaedo provided reasons for thinking only that there are Forms for πρός τι terms. This question arises again in the next section because the three famous images that Plato presents in Republic VI and VII strongly suggest Forms for καὶ υπ’ αὐτά as well as πρός τι terms.

2. The Images of Sun, Line and Cave

When the construction of the ideal city is completed in Book IV, Socrates announces that a city such as this is completely good. On the basis of this assumption, he begins the process of elimination which culminates in the identification of justice with "each doing his own." The argument is not entirely convincing because the reader is left with certain doubts about the first premise. In particular, one wonders how the education in culture and the physical training that the guardians receive in Books II-IV guarantees that they always know what ought to
be done? Moreover, what guarantees that they will want to do what is best for the city as a whole even if they do, in fact, have this knowledge?

Plato, I believe, was aware of this difficulty. These two nagging doubts are supposed to be put to rest by the "digression" that begins Book V. The arrangements for marriages and child-bearing lay the groundwork for the production of a group of people whose priorities are at least very different from those of the ordinary person. They also require Socrates to lay his cards on the table: the guardians must be philosophers. The argument from opposites at the end of Book V separates these people from pretenders to philosophy by appeal to the framework that governs inquiry in the dialogues of search. Since the constraints on answers to Socratic questions necessitate the hypothesis of Forms, the real philosopher can be distinguished by reference to her ontology.

In the section from 485b to 504b Socrates elaborates the character traits of the person with a talent for philosophy. He also endeavors to explain why, as things are, philosophers are regarded as practically incompetent at best and immoral at worst. At 504b he is finally ready to return to the uncompleted task of Book IV. It is the study of the nature of the good that has been omitted from the description of the guardians' education. This, I believe, is Plato's solution to both of the difficulties mentioned above. Knowledge of the Good guarantees that the guardians will both know what is best for the city as a whole and will, in addition, transform their values in such a way as to make it certain that they will act in the appropriate manner.
What sort of thing is the Form of the Good that it can have this power? Plato tells us that it is the Form of the Good is that by which just things and all the others become useful and beneficial (505a). Since it makes these things useful and beneficial, other kinds of knowledge in isolation from knowledge of the Good are of no benefit to us (505b). The same is, of course, true of ordinary possessions. Own as many things as you like, but without the possession of that which is genuinely good they are of no real benefit to you. Perhaps for this reason, no one is satisfied with the mere semblance of what is good. Even the misguided person who prefers only to appear, rather than to be, just wants to have what is good, and not what merely appears to be so (505d). Thus, the good is that for the sake of which we pursue all other things (505e). Of course, we do not pursue what is good unerringly. But, neither is it reasonable to think that all of the things which we judge to be good are mistakenly thought to be so. Plato claims that we have an intimation of the Form of the Good (ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, 505e), but that we do not grasp its nature adequately.

What Plato is describing, I think, is an ultimate source of value. The Good is what makes the things that are genuinely worth having—just actions, fine things—worth having. Knowledge of what makes something worth having, together with sufficient practical experience in sorting out the things that meet the relevant conditions, would be an infallible guide to action. Thus, it should come as no surprise that this is precisely the sort of knowledge that Socrates thinks the guardians must acquire. It would be shocking to give any group of people the complete hegemony that the guardians have without the expectation that they
have the requisite knowledge to sort out what is really valuable from what merely appears to be so.

Plato's constraints on answers to "What is F?" questions and the notion of a logical cause determine the way in which he conceives of this knowledge. Since 'good' is a relative term, it is never predicated completely of any sensible thing. A good sensible thing is always good ἐπὶ the kind of thing that it is. Though a good paperweight, this may be a poor dissertation. The features of sensible things exhibit a certain relativity to context too. Though Theaetetus' knowledge of mathematics may be good insofar as it prepares him to study philosophy, it may not be good in respect of making him a better horseman. This merits several observations. First, none of the beings to which we apply the term 'good' can be that which corresponds to the formula of the logical cause of the good. All sensibles fail to meet the self-predication test. Thus, Plato's reasons for thinking that the Good is a Form are exactly parallel to his reasons for supposing that the Large is a Form. But, secondly, the Form of the Good is different in an important way from other Forms. The manner in which a sensible thing is good is intimately related to that thing's function. This dissertation is good a paperweight precisely because it does just the thing that a paperweight needs to do. The case of Theaetetus' knowledge of mathematics is more complicated but similar. If Theaetetus' is the sort of person who is capable of becoming a philosopher, then his mathematical knowledge is good insofar as it contributes to his becoming the kind of person that his nature dictates. But, if Theaetetus is the sort of fellow who has only bronze in his soul and is not able to become a philosopher, then
mathematical knowledge beyond a certain point does not contribute to fulfillment of his \( \varepsilon \rho \gamma o\nu \). Thus, the question of whether a thing, or a feature of a thing, is good is intimately connected with the question of what that thing is and what its function is. This is so even if the nature of the Good meets the Singularity Requirement. Suppose that there is a single thing by virtue of which all good things are good. It is consistent with this that the unitary \( \alpha i \tau i \alpha \) of goodness appears to be a plurality by virtue of the ways in which things with different functions manifest it. So, that by virtue of which all the good things are good will be even more difficult to grasp than other logical causes. Given the many different kinds of things that can be good and the apparent variety of ways in which this happens, the nature of the Good will be a very abstract principle indeed. Moreover, the practical application of the understanding of the Good will be more difficult than with other Forms. The person who understands the nature of equality can use this knowledge to determine when things have a share of equality in some respect or other. Of course, people who can see can accomplish this in a rough and ready way. But the person who understands what equality is can apply this concept even to things that cannot be seen or measured; for instance, in geometrical proofs. If the nature of the Good is sufficiently abstract and difficult to grasp, then the ability to determine whether a thing has a share of the Good and in what respect it has it may not be separable from the understanding of the nature and function of the kind of thing in question. This is not to say that there is a different kind of goodness that is exemplified in different kinds of things. Rather, the recognition of the unitary phenomenon of goodness may require this previous understanding of the nature of things and their functions.
In order for the ideal city to be completely good its leaders must have the requisite knowledge to make choices about what is of value and what is not. Plato thinks that the possibility of knowledge of F implies that the adequacy conditions on Socratic questions be fulfilled. Where F is a relative, this requires the hypothesis of a Form. Since the knowledge which the guardians must have in order to fulfill their role must be, by Plato's lights, knowledge of a Form, Plato owes his readers some account of the nature of Forms. Moreover, since the guardians' knowledge is supposed to be relevant to their practical conduct, Plato also owes the reader an account of the relation of Forms to sensibles. In the *Phaedo*, the Forms were introduced as hypotheses which could account for the possibility of knowledge and coherent explanation. Their natures and their relations to sensibles were not described beyond these roles. Because the guardians' knowledge of the Good is critical to the argument of *Republic*, Plato must now try to give more content to the "theory" of Forms.

Even if all this could be done, there is still the other nagging doubt about the guardians' role in the ideal city. Suppose that there can be the kind of expert knowledge of the nature of value that would allow these rulers to make all the right choices. What reason have we been given to think that they will prefer to make the choices that are good for everyone rather than the choices that are good for them? Earlier we were told that the guardians would be selected on the basis of their ability to retain the belief that their interests and the interests of the city always coincide (412b, ff). But, if we imagine them to have expert knowledge of the nature of the good, we must suppose that they would be the very persons
most capable of realizing that what was good for them might diverge from what
was good for the city (if in fact it does diverge). What is needed is an argument to
the effect that either (1) the interests of the guardians and the interests of the city
are never really divergent or (2) that knowledge of the good transforms one’s val-
ues in such a way that they cannot come into conflict with the interests of the city.
Plato will, I believe, pursue both strategies. In the ninth book, he introduces
pleasures which are unique to different parts of the soul (580d, ff). The pleasures
of intellectual inquiry are revealed to be the very best pleasures. Though each
guardian must take his or her turn with the relatively uninteresting tasks of ad-
ministration, nonetheless, the system is one that allows them to pursue learning
quite a bit of the time. They can do so in the ideal city unhindered by daily con-
cerns that even persons of wealth must pay some heed to in ordinary cities, e.g.
the administration of one’s estates, the well being of one’s spouse and children,
etc. The pursuit of the knowledge of the Good transforms the guardians’ values
so that their real interests do coincide with the interests of the city. When the city
prospers and things run smoothly, they have more time to pursue the life of
learning which, they come to realize, is the highest pleasure and the best life.

The images of sun, line and cave seek to accomplish both these tasks.
First, they provide pictures for understanding the relationship between Forms
and sensibles which make it possible to see how, in spite of the way that it might

31 The precise reasons why the pleasures of learning are superior are difficult to interpret. That
they are so regarded is clear enough.

32 cf. R. 540b. They will spend the greater part of their time philosophizing.
seem, there could be a single source of all value. Second, these images devalue the world of sensible things and the kind of life that most people lead. This paves the way for the idea that the life which regards the possession and enjoyment of sensible baubles is trivial and unimportant in comparison with the understanding of super-sensible objects of knowledge.

The means by which Plato attempts to accomplish these two goals present certain complications for my thesis that there are Forms only for \( \pi\rho\delta\zeta \tau \) terms, at least at this stage in Plato’s thought. The images of sun, line and cave seem to imply that there are Forms for \( \kappa\alpha\nu\varphi \alpha\nu\tau\alpha \) terms as well. In what follows, I shall argue that we need not take these metaphors to imply any change in Plato’s conception of the range of Forms. Rather, I shall argue, the impression that there are Forms for sortal terms, for instance, is an artifact of Plato’s metaphor for understanding the relations between Forms and sensibles. Because he wishes to devalue the possession of sensible, good things in relation to the understanding of the Form of the Good (and the other Forms as well) he makes use of the idea of the relation between originals and images, things and shadows. But shadows preserve only certain features of their originals. A good cat does not cast a shadow which we call the shadow of a good thing. A cat, good or bad, casts the shadow of a cat. That is, we typically understand the relation of copies to originals or shadows to the things that cast them in terms of the sortal that classifies the kind of thing in question. Sortal terms are, by and large, \( \kappa\alpha\nu\varphi \alpha\nu\tau\alpha \). Nonetheless, the metaphor does serve to make some of the points that Plato wants to make. One does not come to understand what a cat is by studying the shadows of cats.
Though this may preserve the outlines of their shape, it provides very little evidence about the complexities of feline life. Moreover, if your favorite nephew wants a kitten for Christmas, he will be understandably disappointed if you provide him with a picture of a cat, or make cat shadows on the wall for him. The possession of the copy fails to have the value that the original has.

A. The Sun

The image of the sun is prefaced by another thumbnail sketch of the theory of Forms.

We say that the many beautiful things and the many good things are each so and define them by words. We do. Also the beautiful itself and good itself and in this manner concerning all things, what we set down then as many, now we name again according to a single idea of each, laying down what each is as a single being.\textsuperscript{33}

This much at least sounds familiar. We find an opposition between the many bearers of relative terms which are named in this manner (\textit{oútως εἶναι φαμέν}) and the Forms which are what each is (\textit{δ ἐστιν ἐκαστός}). The idea, I believe, is that the many beautifuls are named eponymously after the Form (cf. \textit{Phdo.} 103b, ff). The hypothesis of the Form is required since no sensible can be what beauty or goodness is. All of them fail the test of complete-being. The image of the sun, however, goes on to introduce elements that, at least, sound unfamiliar.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{R. 507b}, Πολλά καλά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολλά ἀγαθά καὶ ἐκαστά οὕτως εἶναι φαμέν τε καὶ διαρίζομεν τῷ λόγῳ. Φαμέν γάρ. Καὶ αὐτὸ δ' καλάν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθάν καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων, δὲ τότε ὡς πολλά ἐπιθέμεν, πάλιν αὖ κατ' ἑδέαν μίᾶν ἐκαστοῦ ὡς μᾶς οὕτης τυθέντες δ ἐστιν ἐκαστόν προσαγορεύμεν.
Just as eyes have a capacity for sight and objects for being seen, so minds have a capacity for knowing and Forms have a capacity for being known. The sun/Good provides a necessary condition for the actualization of these potentialities. The Good does this by providing (παρέχω, 508c) the objects with truth and the potential knower with the power to know. In virtue of this, the sun/Good is potentially an object of vision/knowledge. Though knowledge and truth are "boniform" (ἀγαθοειδής, 509a), they are not identical with the Good. The Good, as the αἰτία of these things, is superior to them. Finally, Plato pursues another aspect of the sun's power; it is that which provides for generation while not being generation itself. The analogous claim for The Good is difficult; "And likewise with respect to the things that are known it is to be said not only that they are known things by the presence of the good, but the to be and the being are present to them by this, though the good is not being, but superior to and beyond being in power and dignity."

Though Plato began at 507b with an opposition between the many beautifuls and the one Form, the image of the sun goes on to develop an opposition between the intelligible and the visible realm.

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34 R. 509b, καὶ τοῖς γεγνωσκομένοις τοῖς μὴ μονοτὸ γεγνωσκάκεσθαι γέναι οἷδο τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ παρέίναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνον αὐτοῖς προσείναι, οὐδὲ οὐσίας ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.
And we say that the many are the objects of vision, but are not the
objects of thought, while the Forms are the objects of thought but
not of sight.  

Nothing requires that we suppose that "the many" here are anything other than
the many beautifuls or the many good things. The same can be said of Plato's use
of the opposition between being and becoming.

So too understand the eye of the soul in this way: whenever it is fo­
cused upon the things upon which truth and being shine, it under­
stands and knows and appears to have intelligence. But, whenever
it is focused upon what is mixed with darkness—the coming to be
and passing away—it opines only and is dimmed and changes
opinions this way and that and seems to have no intelligence.

Though Plato contrasted the changeless Forms with things that are both
οὐδὰμῶς κατὰ τὰ ὑπότα and visible in the Phaedo (78e), these things were the
many beautifuls or equals or other bearers of relative predicates. These, I ar­
gued, are condemned as objects of knowledge because, depending upon the rela­
tions of comparision, they are beautiful and not beautiful. These kinds of
"stranger than Cambridge changes" are the focus of the problems that the theory
of Forms is introduced to resolve in the final argument.

We could, however, read the image of the sun in a wider way. On this
wider interpretation all things are unknowable insofar as they come to be and pass

35 R. 507b-c, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὧν ὄρασθαι φανεροὶ, νοεῖσθαι δὲ σε, τὰς δὲ σε ἵδας νοεῖσθαι
μὲν, ὄρασθαι δὲ σε.

36 R. 508d, οὕτω τοῖς καὶ τῷ τῇς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει. ὅταν μὲν, σε καταλάμπειν
ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τῷ ὑν εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησε τε καὶ ἔγγον ὑντό καὶ νοῆν
ἔχειν φαίνεται. ὅταν δὲ εἰς τῷ σκόπῳ κεκραμένου, τῷ γεγυμενον τε καὶ
ἀπολλαμένον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς ὅδας μεταβάλλου καὶ
ἔσκεπεν σε νοῆν σε ἐκουτή.
away. Likewise, nothing that is visible is, on this reading, intelligible. It's not hard to find a reason to interpret the metaphor in this way. The sun shines equally upon things that are beautiful or equal as well as upon men and water. If the Good plays the same role as the sun in relation to the Forms, then there ought to be Forms of Man and Water.

One way to explain this implication is to suppose that Plato has changed his mind about the range of Forms. He now includes Forms for all common terms. One might even suggest a route by which he came to this conclusion. Because individual men come to be and pass away, there is no sensible thing which bears the predicate 'man' completely. Thus, there must be a separated Form for the very same reason that there must be a separated Form for 'large.' But the principle of charity ought to make this conclusion less attractive. Nothing in the argument from opposites in Book V prepares us for the introduction of Forms for sortal and mass terms. It is critical to that argument that the many F's recognized by the sight lovers both are and are not F. This is not especially problematic when F is a relative term, but it is difficult to see why anyone should accept the claim that Socrates both is and is not a man on the surface of things. There might be perfectly good reasons to think that this is so, but we have not been given these reasons yet. There is also the prima facie difficulty of saying what it is that both is and is not a man in such a case. Even if we give up the notion that the argument from opposites ought to contain premises which are acceptable to the lover of

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37 Above (pp. 196-7) I called this the problem of the particular and suggested that Plato may have this very problem in mind in the first part of the Parmenides.
sights and sounds, the expansion of the value of F to include sortals and mass terms in this premise does sound a jarring note.

Not only can the image of the sun be read in such a way as to bring it into line with the range of Forms that one finds in the *Phaedo*, but there are other similarities as well. The image of the sun conforms with Plato's views about the role of teleology in explanation (cf. *Phdo*. 97c ff). According to the image of the sun, the Form of the Good makes possible the understanding of all other things. In the prelude to the final argument of the *Phaedo*, Socrates is concerned with why sensibles are as they are; e.g. why this man is taller than another, how growth takes place. He hopes to understand all these by reference to what is best. "If anyone wants to seek the cause of each thing—in what manner it comes to be, passes away or is—it is necessary for him to seek this concerning it: in what manner it is best for it to be or what sort of other thing it is best for it to suffer or to do" (*Phdo*. 97c). The method of explaining the features of sensible things by reference to the Forms in which they participate is only a second best. At least this method provides a pattern of explanation which avoids incoherence. Plato's ideal, however, is a kind of understanding which involves the Good in a special way. To understand what it is to be F is to understand that by virtue of which all F things are F—the logical cause. But some F things are better F's than others. So, we can speak of a teleological cause. This is that by virtue of which good F's are good. I suspect that Plato's view is that good F's are better because they
better fulfill the function of a thing of that kind. They do better what a thing of that kind is supposed to do. Plato's point in both the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* is that a complete account of the nature of F must include both knowledge of what makes F things F and what makes a good F good. He can forego this latter element in the final argument of the *Phaedo* because what is at issue is not knowledge of how best to live, but whether the soul is such that it must always be alive. Because of the role that the guardians' knowledge must play in arranging things within the ideal city for the best, this additional element is critically important.

B. The Doubly Divided Line

Like the image of the sun, the doubly divided line *can* be read in such a way as to imply that there are Forms for χάρις ἀξιότραγά terms, but it need not be. It opens with a distinction between the visible and the intelligible. As before, this may amount to no more than a distinction between the sensibles which participate in Forms like Beauty and Largeness and the Forms themselves. Alternately, Plato may mean to contrast the world of sense as a whole with the world of Forms. It becomes clear in what follows that it is the second possibility that he has in mind. The first and lowest division of the visible half consists of images. Examples include, in the first instance, shadows and then reflections in water and those on smooth, bright surfaces. These are to be contrasted with the other half.

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38 Cf. R. 352e, ff. Excellences are those features by which a thing performs its function well. Excellences are also those things that make a fine specimen of a certain kind fine. This suggests that the excellences appropriate to a certain kind of thing are qualities which make it a good thing of its kind precisely because they make it better able to fulfill its function.
serve as the originals for the images in the lower half. Nothing that has been said so far gives us any reason to expect that there are supposed to be Forms in either half of the intelligible portion of the line that correspond to these things.

The description of the division of the visible culminates in a claim about proportion. With regard to truth and untruth, as the opinable is to the knowable, so the image is to the model. In the previous section I argued that Plato identifies opinion with what is true in one sense but not true in another, while knowledge is of what is-completely true. Likewise, an image of a horse is, in one sense, a horse and in another it is not. When one sees an image of a horse and says, "That's a horse," one means that it is an image of a horse, as opposed to a penguin or cow. Yet, the image is not a horse in the same sense in which a flesh and blood horse is. Plato does not tell us immediately what to make of his remark about the proportion of truth and untruth in images and originals. It cannot be that this proportion justifies the identification of the upper half of the visible with the objects of opinion. These things, after all, are *models*. So, they have the proper proportion of truth to correspond to *knowledge* and not opinion.

The discussion of the nature of διάνοια makes the claim about proportionality somewhat clearer. In this kind of mental activity, actual circles and squares, which might serve as models or originals for reflections in water and other ψευδάμυστα, are used by geometers as images for the investigation of non-sensible things—the square itself and the circle itself. It is possible for sensible
figures to serve in this role because they are, in turn, images of the intelligible square and circle.  

One way to understand Plato's metaphor is to suppose that he identifies the realm of πίστις with the sensible world in its entirety because he regards the examples mentioned at 510a (τῶν καὶ πάν ὁ πυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαζόν ὅλον γένος) as likewise images of the Horse Itself, the Petunia Itself and the Letterbox Itself. But this is not the only way in which to explain this passage. Plato uses the language of image and original in these metaphors to do, at least, two things. First, he wants to devalue the things within the sensible realm in order to show that the guardians will have every reason to prefer a sabbatical leave from watching over the public treasury to the looting of it. Second, he wants to convey the idea that sensible things are ultimately to be explained in terms of something else and that the study of them alone is insufficient to answer questions about goodness, beauty, etc. In order to use this metaphor of image and original he must resort to examples of καθ' αὐτά terms. There are two reasons for this. First, at least with shadows, the way in which we classify the image is in terms of the sortal kind of the original. We identify a particular shadow as the shadow of a horse, and not of a fine thing or a good thing. Fine things qua fine things don't cast a distinctive kind of shadow. Second, when we advance to the image and original relation in reflections another complication arises. When one sees the

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39 R, 510d, ὁδόν καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὄρωμένοις ἐδείκνυται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦσιν, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοοῦμενοι, ἄλλο ἐκείνοι πέρι ὧν ταῦτα ἔχουμε, τῷ τεταραγμὸν αὐτόν ἔνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμενοι καὶ διαμέτρουν αὐτής, ἄλλο οὐ ταῦτής ἢ γράφοντωι . . .
reflection of a beautiful painting, the reflection is itself beautiful. The reflections of two equal sticks are likewise themselves equal. The problem is that, though images bear the sortal terms which belong to their originals only in a derivative or inferior way, they seem to bear many qualifying terms in the very same way. There are a multitude of special cases to be considered here. With respect to the value of images of beautiful things, on the one hand, a beautiful print of a beautiful artwork can still give one aesthetic pleasure, though it may not be worth what the original is monetarily. We can also consider the degree to which the image preserves the features of the original. The photos that one takes on a holiday to the sea shore can't capture the full experience of the sunrise replete with the sounds of gulls and the smell of the sea. But, a recording of a symphony seems to preserve all that is of aesthetic value in the experience. The same complications emerge with respect to the issue of understanding. One might learn what is distinctive about Kandinsky's style having seen only reproductions. In other cases, the only way to understand is to experience the original. Plato is trying to illustrate something that is already very difficult and these complications would only make things worse. Because of Plato's purpose, he resorts to examples of sortal terms to illustrate his point.

The fact that Plato uses geometrical terms as his examples is revealing. He may well have thought of Square Itself and Diameter Itself as Forms or as what Aristotle would call the intermediates. But, he does not sharply distinguish the objects of διάμορφος from the objects of νόμος as he does with divisions within
the visible part of the line. When we focus on what Plato does spell out in detail, we find that the differences which he discusses involve issues of method.

the soul, using as images what before were models, is made to investigate from hypotheses, not proceeding toward a first principle, but to conclusion. But in the other section, the soul proceeds toward an unhypothetical first principle from an hypothesis without the use of the images of the former section, working to the Forms themselves through the method of them. R. 510b

In the upper half of the line, the things that served as models for the images of the bottom fourth are now used as images for the investigation of something else. This investigation proceeds from hypotheses (which are not acknowledged as such) downward to hypothetical conclusions. In the upper half, investigation proceeds from genuine hypotheses upwards toward an αὐτόποθετη ἀρχή. This investigation does not make use of images at all.

Plato’s remarks about the use of hypotheses are intended to show something about the understanding of the Form of the Good. Recall the ways in which understanding of the Form of F and the Form of the Good are intertwined in the analogy of the sun. On the one hand, we understand the nature of what it is to be F only when we understand the conditions under which that which is F is good or beneficial. But, because the Good is manifested in so many ways by so many things, it is a difficult thing to grasp in and of itself. In understanding the ways in which F things are good and G things, etc. we see the effects of the Form of the

40 ὡς εἰδόσι χρωμένη ψυχή ζητεῖν ἀναγκαζέται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπὶ ἀρχήν πορευομένη, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτήν, τὸ δ' αὖ ἐτερον ἐπὶ ἀρχήν ἀνυπόθετον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λοιπά καὶ ἀνευ διώπερ ἐκείνο εἰκόνων αὐτοῖς εἶδος δὲ αὐτῶν τῆς μέθοδος πολομένη.
Good, just as one sees the effects of the sun by seeing the things which it illuminates. Thus, the process of understanding the Forms and understanding the Good must be rather like the geometric method of analysis and synthesis. In the back-and-forth movement between what it is to be a good F and what it is to be good, one makes progress in both directions. Plato’s point is that complete understanding of the Form of F requires the understanding of the $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ of all Forms—the Form of the Good. This $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ is, in some sense, unhypothetical. Geometry and mathematics are deficient as sciences precisely because they cannot trace their first principles back to a single, unhypothetical starting point. Geometers and mathematicians assume without further argument or explanation both the existence of their subject matter and certain essential features of it.\(^{41}\) They regard their definitions and postulates as self-evident. Plato apparently thinks that there ought to be some deduction of these hypothetical starting points from an $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ that is beyond hypothesis (cf. 511b). This starting point would play the same role for these sciences that knowledge of the Good plays for understanding of the Forms.

The other reason that geometry is less than satisfactory as a model for understanding knowledge of the Forms is the use that geometry makes of diagrams. The geometer uses these diagrams as an aid in reasoning. Plato, I believe, wants to understand the many beautiful things or the many equals as images of Forms.

\(^{41}\) R. 510c, ύποθέμενοι τὸ τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνίων τριγών δεδομένη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφά καθ’ ἐκάστην μέθοδον, ταύτα μὲν ὡς εἰς ἐλέες, ποιησάμενοι ύποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγου οὔτε αὐτῶς οὔτε ἄλλους ἐτὶ ἀξιοθεὶ περὶ αὐτῶν διδάσκαλος ὡς ποιητή φανερῶν.
But these can be misleading guides in the quest to understand what beauty is. If one relies too heavily upon opinions about the nature of the beautiful which are suggested by seeing many beautiful things, it will seem that the beautiful is not one but many. Like the lover of sights and sounds, the investigator who allows his reasoning about the beautiful to be guided by experience is likely to conclude that there are many αἰτίας by virtue of which the many beautifuls are beautiful. What is needed, according to Plato, is not the collection of more examples of beauty, but some abstract reasoning about what it is that makes a thing beautiful. If the tradition according to which Plato opposed proof by construction is accurate, there may be another side to this criticism. The analogous situation with respect to the investigation of beauty would be the attempt to understand what makes things beautiful by the making of beautiful things. But this would not be philosophy, but some other τέχνη.

The image of the doubly divided line does imply the existence of supersensible correlates of geometrical objects. We are not, however, told whether these are Forms or something apart from Forms. Nothing in the image necessitates that we suppose that there are Forms for other κόσμος αἰτία terms in order for Plato's metaphor to convey the points that he needs to make.

C. The Cave

Of the three images which dominate the middle books of the Republic, the cave is the one that most strongly suggests Forms corresponding to κόσμος αἰτία terms. It is expressly related to the image of the sun. The world inside the cave
represents the visible realm. Since the image of the sun was, in turn, related to the doubly divided line, it is not difficult to see the way in which the latter applies to at least part of the cave. The prisoners who observe the shadows on the wall have their thought directed upon the objects of \textit{eikasia}. The escaped prisoner who sees the models by means of which these shadows are cast has advanced, presumably, to \textit{piostis} and its objects. In the image of the doubly divided line, some of the objects of \textit{piostis}—sensible squares, etc.—were said to be themselves images of super-sensible originals. In the cave, the models which cast the shadows are models of artifacts, men and animals. We know that in the world outside the cave, there are real counterparts to these models. So, since the prisoner's journey into the world outside the cave is analogous to the soul's journey \textit{eis ton vnothton topou} (517b), it seems natural to conclude that the intelligible world includes Forms for artifacts, animals and a Form of Man.

A close reading of the text, however, casts some doubt on whether Plato really intends that we should draw such a conclusion. First, there is no clear way to map the distinction between \textit{dianoia} and \textit{nothes} onto the prisoner's activities outside the cave. This is relevant to the question of the range of Forms, since it is the doubly divided line that invites us to think of sensible objects as themselves images of Forms. We are told that, until his eyes become accustomed to the light, he will not be able to see any of the things now said to be true or real. Instead, he would have to content himself with seeing the reflections of men and other

\footnote{R. 516a, \textit{ovghis de ekouita ta dymata meata dorn odo\ oun ev dynasthai ton vno legomienon althai;}}
things in water. Is this period of studying reflections the counterpart of διάνοια? If this is so, and if one holds that the objects of διάνοια are mathematical objects, then one needs to make sense of the idea that the Forms are such as to cast shades of this sort. Are the Forms then themselves mathematical in nature? Is this what allows us to speak of τὰ μαθηματικά as shadows of them? Nothing that has been said thus far prepares the reader for this implication. Alternately, one could hold that this phase of the prisoner’s progress corresponds to διάνοια because of the difference in method between seeing a thing by way of its shadow and seeing a thing directly. In either case, Plato spends very little time on this stage of the prisoner’s journey. Because his purpose is to describe our relation to the Form of the Good, he quickly progresses to the way in which the prisoner will begin his study of the objects in the heavens. At first he will be able to see the stars and the other heavenly bodies at night. Then his eyes will allow him to see the image of the sun in water. (We should note in passing that this study of an image seems to be temporally and/or conceptually disconnected from the previous study of shadows and reflections. This makes it even more difficult to pin down the correlates of διάνοια and νόησις in the image of the cave.) The final step of his education consists in that glorious day when he can see the sun itself in its own place and is able to study it. This, in turn, brings about the recognition of the dependency of the entire world upon the power of the sun. Thus, the image of the cave reinforces the point made in the metaphor of the sun that the world of Forms depends upon the Form of the Good for the actualization of its potential to be known and, more fundamentally, for its very being. Thus, the imagery and
point of the cave lines up much more neatly with that of the sun, to which Plato expressly relates it, than it does to the doubly divided line.

We still must face the fact that Plato mentions the reflections of men and other things in the world outside the cave. Since this is expressly identified as the counterpart to the intelligible realm, we still have the implication that there is a Form for Man. What is curious, however, is the fact that Plato himself completely neglects this in his further discussion of the metaphor. Most of this discussion centers on people's attitudes toward learning and learned people. Plato uses the image of the cave to undermine the two kinds of doubts we discussed earlier.

He first describes what passes for wisdom among ordinary people. It is nothing more than the ability to predict the sequence of shadows on the wall of the cave. People who acquire this ability are highly regarded because, among the prisoners, the shadows are the focus of their discussion—metaphorically, their lives. They internalize a system of value as a result of their exposure to the shadow world. What happens to the shadows becomes important to them, just as the fates of certain characters become a matter of importance to those who follow soap operas with unhealthy regularity. People resent being dragged away from the kind of values and pseudo-knowledge with which they are familiar and compelled to examine the real truth. People who have accomplished this transition are very likely to not take what ordinary people fancy to be matters of great importance very seriously. This aspect of the image of the cave is intended to put to rest one of the two nagging doubts. One of the worries that we have at the end of Book IV is that the guardians will not be satisfied with their lot in life and will
set themselves up as dictators of the city that they are to protect. The reason we harbor this suspicion is that we ourselves may have systems of value which make this option attractive to us, or at least suppose that many people are such as to find this attractive. Nothing in the program of education in the arts or gymnastic set our minds at ease about whether the guardians might not share this system of values with us. The image of the sun, however, suggests in a very powerful way that Plato’s guardians would regard such a scenario as ridiculous and beneath them. Our values are rooted in the passing picture show on the wall of the cave. They, however, see through this and recognize it for the cheap and trivial thing that it is. Because of the relationship between image and original, the cave succeeds in devaluing the sensible world and the system of values that arises from a life which regards it as the final word on reality.

The other nagging doubt concerns, not the guardians’ trustworthiness, but their ability to consistently choose the right course of action for the city as a whole. This worry becomes particularly acute when Plato identifies the guardians as philosophers. Such people already have a reputation within ordinary cities for being useless in practical affairs. The story of the sailors and the true navigator gives one explanation for this. People regard lovers of wisdom as useless and incompetent because our social structures do not emphasize real competence but only persuasive ability. In the image of the cave, Plato does concede something to the familiar criticism of learned people. It is not just the way that we treat them. When they come in from the sunlight of the outside world, they really are blind to the trivialities of our world. But, if such a person were made to descend
into the cave until such a time as his eyes become acclimated to the dim light, he would surpass all of the prisoners in seeing the shadows for what they are. He, after all, knows the nature of the originals. Plato’s examples in both cases are illuminating. In the first case he writes:

Do you think it at all remarkable that anyone coming from the contemplation of divine things to the evils of human life is graceless and appears to be exceedingly foolish while his eyes are dazzled and before he has adequately adjusted to his surroundings, if he is made to contend in court or elsewhere about the shadows of justice or the images of which they are shadows and to carry through a contest about these things in the manner in which they are grasped by those who have never seen justice itself? (R. 517d-e)\(^43\)

What is at issue here are shadows of justice and the images of which they are shadows. This leads us to ask what Plato’s point is in distinguishing ῥᾷ ἁγιμᾶτα τὸ δικαίου from the ἁγιμᾶτα δὲ αἱ σκιαί. The prisoners who can see only the shadows, I think, are regarded by Plato as having the most superficial understanding of justice. These are people who would be swayed by that master of appearances, the rhetorician. People who can transcend this ordinary level of appearance, but who fail to recognize the existence of Forms, still manage to grasp only models or imitations of full fledged justice. Their understanding, though better than that of most of the prisoners, would be analogous to someone who had

\(^{43}\) τόδε οἶει τι ἑαυτοῦσιν, εἰ ἀπὸ χείων, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, θεωροῦν ἐπὶ τὰ αἰνήρωπεα τῆς ἐλευθερίας κακὰ ἀσχημονεῖ τε καὶ φαίνεται σφόδρα γελοῖος ἐτὶ ἀμβλυνώτων καὶ πρὶν ἱκανῶς συνίησι γενέσθαι τῷ παρόντι σκότῳ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἐν δικαστηρίῳς ἦ ἀλλού ποὺ ἄγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἁγιμάτων δὲ αἱ σκιαί, καὶ διαμελλᾶνται περὶ τούτων, δὴ τοτὲ ὑπολογίζεται τὸ ἄγα καὶ ἁγιασμόν ἐν ἑαυτῷ πᾶσι πᾶσιν ἱδάντων;
escaped far enough to recognize the puppet show which is the source of the shadows.

Only the relative terms which Plato finds problematic figure into the description of the guardians’ activity within the cave following the period in which they become accustomed to the dark.

When you are used to it, you will see them infinitely better than the cave dwellers, and you will know what each image is and what it is of, because you have seen the truth of beautiful, just and good things ... (R. 520c)  

It is no accident, I believe, that Plato nowhere mentions the shadows of men, plants, animals and artifacts that were used to graphically illustrate the prisoners’ condition. It is not merely that he thinks that knowledge of the Forms of such things is unimportant. Rather, he does not think that there are Forms for these things. Their easily recognizable shapes are used for illustrative purposes. The "shadows" of justice which one finds in our world bear the same relation to the shapeless, non-spatial original that shadows of horses bear to real horses. They are both less valuable and inadequate to allow us to understand in the fullest sense what a horse is.

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44 ἔμνευσάμενοι γὰρ μνήμη βελτίων δύσεως τῶν ἔκει, καὶ γνώσεσθε ἑκαστὰ τὰ εἴδωλα ἄττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὅν, διὰ τὰ πάλιν ἔσχατα καλῶν τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπερ...
§3. Turning the Soul Around

Now that the condition of knowing the Good has been described, at least metaphorically, and the natural abilities of the would-be philosopher kings have been enumerated, Plato turns to the question of how such persons might be trained so as to attain knowledge of the Forms. In accordance with the metaphor of the cave, this education is characterized as a turning around of the soul. Moreover, what the soul turns from is becoming and what it turns to is being. Thus, the argument opens with the opposition that was introduced only at the end of the argument of Book V. That argument works with an opposition between a "many" that both are and are not and a single "one" that only is. Yet, when summarizing the results of this argument, Plato supplants this opposition with one between the changeless and the changing (R. V, 479e). The argument of Republic VII announces as its intention the turning of the soul from becoming to being and concludes by proclaiming that the study of τὰ παρακλήτικα will achieve this. But, as was the case in Book V, the argument itself turns on the existence of things to which "opposite" relative terms can be applied at one and the same time.

A. τὰ παρακλήτικα

What is sought is a kind of experience that will begin to move the young guardian from the mind set of the prisoners watching the shadow display to some quite different cognitive state. What is characteristic of the prisoners’ state of

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45 Ρ. 525b, φιλοσόφω δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτέου εἶναι γενέσεως ἔξωναντι, ἡ μηδέποτε λογιστικὰ γενέσθαι.
mind is that they take what sight reveals to them as a complete account of the nature of things. Accordingly, Plato focuses on a kind of experience in which sensation is not an altogether adequate guide.

If you will observe: some things in our perception do not summon the intellect into consideration because the judgement of them by sensation is sufficient, but others summon it to consideration because the the judgement of sensation produces nothing sound. . . . The ones that do not provoke consideration are those that do not result in simultaneous opposite sensation. The ones that do produce these results, I set down as provocatives, since the sensation shows no more this than its opposite. R. 523b-c.46

The sorts of experiences that are described here are of the objects described in the Book V argument.

And do large and small things and heavy and light admit to be called these any more than their opposites? No, each of these always partakes of both. Is it the case that any of the many things is rather than is not that which we say it to be? R. 479b.47

This qualification by opposites occurs regardless of whether the object in question is seen at some distance or not. It is simply a function of the fact that these are terms that are always, implicitly or explicitly, predicated πρός some other thing. Καὶ ὁ ἀδὲ τά terms, like ‘finger,’ do not have this feature.

46 εἷς καθόρσε, τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀισθήσεσιν οὐ παρακλαούντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν, δὴ ἴκανος ὑπὸ τῆς ἀισθήσεως κρινόμενα, τὰ δὲ παυτάπασι διακελεύμενα ἐκείνην ἐπισκεφασθαι, δὺς τῆς ἀισθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ποιότητοι.

47 καὶ μεγάλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κόψα καὶ βαρέα μὴ τί μᾶλλον, ὅ ἐν φήσιμῳ, ταῦτα προσφησθήσεται ἢ τάνοιται; οὐκ, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ, ἐφ’ ἐκαστοῦ ἀμφίτερων ἔξεται. πότερον οὖν ἔστι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκαστοῦ τῶν παλλῶν τούτο, δ’ ἐν τίς φη σι ἀδέτο εἶναι;
What is not so easy is to determine exactly why these experiences are provocative. Plato claims that vision's view of the smallness and largeness of the middle finger is not sufficient (ἴκανώς, 523e) and that the other senses are also deficient or needful in making such things clear (οὐκ ἐνδεῶς δηλοῦσιν). But this is certainly puzzling. In what way is the sensation of a finger which is both larger than one but smaller than another not sufficient? After all, no one concludes from the fact that segment AB is smaller than BC and larger than DE that it is an impossible object, like a segment that is both larger and smaller than itself.

The nature of the problem has to do, I believe, with the usefulness of sensation in answering "What is F?" questions about πρός τι terms.

The sense which has been set over the hard is necessarily also set over the soft, and it reports to the soul that it perceives the hard and the soft to be the same. Therefore is it not necessary that in these cases the soul again has no way forward. What does the sensation of the hard signify to it if it also says the same is soft? R. 524a

As I pointed out in Chapter 3, ostensive teaching can use sensation without the fear of confusing the learner with the presentation of opposites in the case of καθ' αὐτὰ terms. You can teach a child what a finger is by showing her fingers. "This," you say to her holding up a finger, "is what a finger is." She might make the wrong induction and latch on to the concept of fingernail or, perhaps, hand.

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48 πρῶτον μὲν ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τεταγμένη αἰσθήσις ἡμᾶς ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μαλακῷ τετάχθαι, καὶ παραγγέλλει τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς ταύτῳ σκληρῷ τε καὶ μαλακῷ αἰσθησισμένη, οὐκόντιν, ἤ τ' ἐγώ, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις αὐτῷ τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπορεῖν, τί ποτε σημαίνει αὐτῇ ἢ αἰσθήσις τὸ σκληρών, ἐξερε τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μαλακῷ λέγει...
But, it is not possible for the same episode of sensation to provide the basis for answering the question, "What is that which is ἐναντίος to a finger?" Sensation can play a role in answering the question, "What is a finger?" because a finger is completely a finger.

This much sounds familiar from the Phaedo. No sensible equal can be "what equal is" or provide the answer to the question, "What is equality?" precisely because no sensible equal passes the self-predication test. Thus, the value of τᾶ παρακάτησις is that they prompt us to ask "What is F?" questions. Since these questions require a λόγος which is of a being that is completely F and since no sensible bearer of a πρός τι term can pass the complete-being test, the asking of such questions leads to the recognition of the distinction between the visible and the intelligible.

In the Republic VII argument, Plato fills in some of the premises that were missing in the Phaedo 74c-d argument. When confronted with some experience that is παρακάτησις the soul "attempts to determine whether each of the things reported to it is one or two" (524b). If they are, in fact, two, then each is completely a finger.

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49 Part of the reason for this, of course, is that κοινὸς αὐτά terms like 'finger' have no opposites. But, the sensation involved in the ostensive learning of a what a finger is could not be used in explaining a concept which is roughly "opposed" to that of finger—like 'toe' perhaps.

50 Throughout this argument Plato uses language which suggests different parts within the soul which are capable of judgement. He says that sensation "reports" something to the soul or that the soul calls upon calculation and intelligence to aid it in making a determination. By all this he need not mean anything more than that the human soul has a variety of capacities and that we are inclined to judge one way or another depending upon which of these capacities is actualized in some episode of thinking. Thus, for the judgement of sensation to be sufficient with respect to judging that x is a finger is for it to be the case that the judgement that a person makes concerning the finger to not require the actualization of the capacity for abstract thinking.
different than the other and itself one. Moreover, they must be separable from one another or else they would not be thought of as two but, instead, would be thought of as one. The most immediate result of this line of reasoning is that it leads to the non-identification of the hard and the soft with what is visible. In the case of hard things which can be seen, soft is not separate from hard, but the two are commingled. This forces ἡ νόησις to consider the hard and the soft in a way opposite from the way in which sight presents this quality. This leads us to formulate the question, "What is hardness?" which, in turn, leads to the introduction of the distinction between the intelligible and the visible. So, this line of reasoning leads to the same conclusion established in the Phaedo: there must be separate, non-sensible Forms for such terms.

B. The Propaedicutic Studies

Mathematics and calculation constitute the first step in the studies that will prepare the young guardian to reason about the Forms. Mathematics and calculation concern themselves with numbers, and numbers, like 'hard' and 'soft,' are predicated incompletely of sensible things. One and the same object is both one (a single object) and an indefinite multitude (of, say, parts). For this reason, nothing in our experience can be identified with what numbers are.

It [mathematics] strongly leads the soul upward and forces it to discuss the numbers themselves, nor does it in any way allow it if

Whether the account of the tripartite soul in the Republic requires that we think of each part as a "sub-personal person" or not is a vexing question. My own view is that Plato's description of the five character types is an "as if it were" explanation. The behavior of the person as a whole is as if there were a certain power relationship between three sub-personal persons within him or her.
someone in discussion offers up visible things or such bodies as numbers. \((R. 525d)\)

The numbers that mathematicians are discussing are "things which can be grasped only in thought" \((526a)\) and because of this affinity with Forms, they make an excellent starting point for the would-be dialectician.

The rest of the propaedutic studies are, likewise, mathematical in nature. Plato is careful to point out that these studies cannot serve their purpose if they allow the student to identify his subject matter too closely with any objects of the senses. It is a shame that the vocabulary of geometry makes it sound as if one is engaged in the physical manipulation of things; squaring them or adding them and what not. Solid geometry has other dangers associated with it. It is difficult to read Plato’s remarks on the state of solid geometry in \textit{Republic} without thinking of the mathematical research taking place within the Academy. The first thing that comes to mind is the Delian problem of the doubling of the cube.\(^{52}\) Plato allegedly referred the Delians to Eudoxus and to Helicon of Cyzicus. We know further that work was done on the problem within the Academy since solutions are attributed to both Eudoxus and Menaechmus.\(^{53}\) The solution to this

\(^{51}\) \(\delta\varepsilon\varphi\hat{o}\delta\varepsilon\ \dot{\alpha}\nu\omega\ \pi\hat{o}i\ \acute{\alpha}\acute{\gamma}i\ \tau\acute{\iota}n\ \varphi\acute{\iota}\chi\hat{\eta}n\ \kappa\acute{a}i\ \pi\acute{e}ri\ \sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\acute{o}\nu\ \tau\acute{\iota}n\ \dot{\alpha}\nu\acute{\iota}m\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \alpha\acute{\nu}a\gamma\acute{\omicron}\acute{\alpha}\acute{\zeta}e\iota\ \dot{\delta}i\acute{\alpha}\lambda\acute{e}\gamma\acute{e}\sigma\acute{\tau}h\acute{a}i,\ \acute{o}\ddot{o}\delta\acute{\alpha}m\acute{\eta}i\ \acute{\alpha}\acute{p}o\acute{d}e\acute{x}\acute{\omicron}m\acute{e}m\acute{e}n\acute{o}n\ \acute{\e}\acute{n}\ \tau\acute{\iota}s\ \sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\acute{\eta} \dot{\acute{\iota}}\acute{\r\acute{a}}\tau\acute{\alpha} \ \acute{\acute{\eta}}\acute{p}\acute{t}\acute{\acute{a}}\ \sigma\acute{\omega}m\acute{\omega}\acute{t}a\ \acute{\acute{e}}\acute{\kappa}o\acute{u}t\acute{a}\varsigma\ \dot{\alpha}\nu\dot{\alpha}m\dot{\omega}\varsigma\ \pro\acute{t}e\acute{\iota}m\acute{\omega}m\acute{e}n\acute{o}ς\ \dot{d}i\acute{\alpha}\lambda\acute{e}\gamma\acute{e}\eta\varsigma.\)

\(^{52}\) See Eutocius \textit{Commentarii in Archimedem et Apollonium Pergaeum} for the history of this problem. For the story of Plato’s contribution, see Plutarch. Heath (1963) pp. 154-170 provides a detailed discussion of the range of solutions recorded in Eutocius.

\(^{53}\) There is even a solution attributed to Plato himself. Heath (1963) p. 151 rejects this on the grounds that "Plato objected on principle to solutions by mechanical means."
problem was a matter of considerable competition. Perhaps much of Plato's animosity is directed at this competitive spirit. It is *guardians* that these studies are supposed to help produce—not timocratic men and women.

Plato's astronomy "lets go the things in the heavens" (530c) in preference for a study of "the movement which real speed is and real slowness is among the things of true number and true figure, both as they move in relation to one another and to the things moved in them." There is some reason to think that what Plato has in mind is something quite like a science of regular bodies in motion. After all, the progression between plane and solid geometry involves the assumption of another dimension: depth. What would be more natural then that we now introduce another simple variable into this science of body in three dimension: that of movement? Finally, he insists that his version of harmonics will have nothing to do with the practice of the making of music. His intervals are to be distinguished mathematically and not by ear.

The final phase of the propaedutic studies is a kind of grand unification theory that shows how all of these sciences are related to one another. We are

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54 By the time of Eratosthenes, the competition had reached such a level that he allegedly set up a monument which included a bronze representation of his contrivance for solving the problem and which included an epigram which counsels that one "not to seek to do the difficult business of Archytas' cylinders, or to cut the cone in the triads of Menaechmus, or to compass such a curved form of lines as is described by the god-like Eudoxus," Heath (1963) p. 164. If the business culminated in such grandstanding, it is reasonable to believe that a fair level of competitiveness was present even in Plato's day.

55 *R.* 529d, ἀς τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ἢ οὐσα βραδυτῆς ἐν τῷ ἄληθινῳ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πάσι τοῖς ἄληθεσι σχῆματα φοράς τε πρὸς ἄληθαι φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνώτα φέρει.

56 *R.* 528d, μετὰ γεωμετρίαν ἀστρονομίαν Ἐλεγον, φοράν οὖσαν βάσονς.
told even less about it, but it may be that the possibility of such a work was also suggested to Plato by the work of his contemporaries.

The anonymous author of a scholium to Book V. (Euclid, ed. Heiberg, Vol. v. p. 280), who is perhaps Proclus, tells us that "some say" this Book, containing the general theory of proportion which is equally applicable to geometry, arithmetic, music and all mathematical science, "is the discovery of Eudoxus, the teacher of Plato."57

Such a unification theory would not only have achieved the results that I have suggested the other propaedutic studies aim at, but it might do more. The concepts of harmony and proportion are connected, especially in Plato’s later writing, with the well lived life. But, even in the Republic, the good of the soul consists in each part of the soul contributing to the behavior of the person in the proper proportion. The just person is not, of course, without desires or devoid of the feelings characteristic of the spirited part. Rather, because these parts are disciplined and guided by reason, they each contribute to the internal economy of the soul in the proper proportion.

Apart from these final, very speculative connections, it seems that the sole purpose of the propaedutic studies is to accustom the student to thinking about what cannot be seen in a very rigorous way. In addition, as Plato points out, good mathematicians are generally pretty sharp at other things too. Perhaps it is too much to expect that these studies should be too directly connected with the practice of dialectic. But, on the other hand, a quick survey of the famous

57 Heath (1956) ii, 112.
philosophers who have also been fine mathematicians or mathematical logicians suggests that Plato's preparatory school may not be irrelevant to the study of philosophy.

§4. Book X and the One Over Many

In the same passage in which Aristotle tells us that Plato had a special argument for Forms corresponding to relative terms, he also mentions an argument called "the one over many." Alexander's description of this argument shows that this argument would generate Forms for \( \kappa \alpha \nu \theta \alpha \) terms.

They also use the following argument to establish the existence of the Ideas. If each of the many men is a man, and each of the many animals an animal, and so too in all other cases, and these are not instances of a thing being predicated of itself, but there is something predicated of all men, etc., but identical with none of them, there must be something belonging to all of them, which is separate from the particular things and eternal; for in every case it is predicated alike of all the numerically different examples. But that which is one over many, separated from the many and eternal, is an Idea; therefore there are Ideas. (Ross (1957) p. 126 = in Metaph. 80.8)

Indeed, Aristotle objects that this argument multiplies the world of Forms to such a degree that there are no fewer Forms than things which are allegedly explained by the introduction of Forms. Though we have found no hint of such an argument in the Phaedo or Republic I-IX, Book X seems to contain an allusion to just such a procedure.

58 Meta. 990b6-8 = 1079a2-4, 1040b29-30, Anal. Post. 77a5-9, 85b15-22.
Do you want us to start looking in our usual way? We are accustomed to setting down a Form in each case for the many things to which we give the same name.\(^59\) Let us take whichever one of the many you like.\(^60\) For instance, there are many beds and tables. . . . The Forms concerning these things are but two—one for bed and one for table.

But things are not as simple as they seem. We cannot immediately move to the conclusion that Plato, in the Republic, thinks that there are Forms for every common term. The problem is that Book X provides a very odd context for this seemingly straightforward statement of Plato's view.

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\(^59\) I follow most translators in rendering this as a general clause. This has been contested by J. A. Smith. Had Plato wished to make this clause general, Smith argues, he would have used the subjunctive and \(\alpha\nu\) (cf. 479b10), and not the indicative. Or, if he had used the indicative, \(\delta\sigma\sigma\varsigma\) or \(\delta\varsigma\) instead of \(\delta\varsigma\) (cf. 426d4-6). See also, Goodwin §532-4.

If Smith were right, then the clause 'to which we give the same name' would not define the range of \(\tau\alpha\) \(\piολλ\alpha\). Instead, the manys in question would be previously understood and the clause would say something additional about them. Smith would have us see 'to which we give the same name' as elliptical for 'to which we give the same name as the Form.' In this case, Plato is referring back to the Phaedo doctrine of homonymous naming.

I would, of course, like to see Smith's claims vindicated. But, as Nehamas points out (1984 n. 32, there needs to be a more complete study of relative clauses and Plato's use of them. I am uncomfortable resting so much of philosophical moment on grammatical grounds alone. In what follows, I shall argue as if Plato meant to say just what my translation says.

\(^60\) There are other possibilities here too. I follow Shorey (1930) and Grube (1974) in taking \(\tau\omega\nu\) \(\piολλ\omega\nu\) as a partitive genitive. Nehamas (1984) points out that one could also take it as a genitive of the whole. If this were so, the line would read: "Let us now set whatever you want as among the manys (that is, among those groups to which Forms correspond)." In this case, the introduction of Forms for artifacts would be an explicit extension of the familiar theory.
A. Difficulties With Book X

There are a number of reasons why one might be tempted not to take the 596a passage and the argument that follows it about the three beds literally. The context itself is peculiar. Book X begins with what sounds like a re-affirmation of the ban against imitative poetry. This, in itself, is confusing. Book III divided poetic writing into three kinds of style: that which is purely narrative, that in which narrative is interspersed with direct speech, as in epic, and forms like comedy and tragedy in which the poet hides behind the characters whose dialogue he writes. The program of education admits only poetry which is purely narrative and a sub-section of the mixed style. In this purified form, only the good man at his best moments is represented in direct speech (396d). But, in a more general sense, even narrative poetry is mimetic. Homer and Hesiod are condemned in Book II and III because they represent the gods badly. Should we then say that, because Book X condemns all imitative art, it is inconsistent with the conclusion of Book III? Moreover, at the end of the Book X discussion, Plato concludes by saying that all poetry save hymns to the gods and encomia to good men shall be excluded. But these too will presumably be, in some sense, representational. They will represent the lives of the good men that they praise and describe their

\[61\] Indeed, Book X as a whole is so odd that many writers have supposed that it must have been a later addition to Republic. See Nettleship (1901) pp. 340-1, Annas (1981) p. 335, and Else (1958) passim. The evidence for a later date is critically discussed in Halliwell (1988) pp. 194-5. Others who are unwilling to set the composition of Book X apart from the rest of Republic nonetheless see it as conceptually distinct from the preceding books. Shorey (1930) p. ixi calls it an "appendix" to the rest of Republic. Similarly, see Adam (1938) ii on 595a and Crombie (1963) vol. i, p. 334. Among those who attempt to argue that Book X is intimately connected to the argument of the rest of Republic are Reeve (1989) p. 221 and Nehamas (1982) pp. 53-54.
deeds. Thus, the claim that introduces the Book X discussion of art muddies the waters quite considerably.\textsuperscript{62}

Whatever mimetic poetry might amount to, Socrates proposes knowledge of its nature as a \textit{φάρμακον} against its effects. It should not escape our notice that Plato describes beneficial lies as \textit{φάρμακα} (389b-c) and allows his guardians the use of them for the public good. The one over many principle and the example of the Form of Bed which follows are introduced to help answer the question about what \textit{μίμησις} \textit{δὲ} is. We should be on our guard lest it prove to be the kind of \textit{φάρμακα} discussed in Book III.\textsuperscript{63}

The first thing that is striking is that what Socrates calls "our customary method" is really very different from the way in which he usually indicates the range of Forms.\textsuperscript{64} Typically, of course, he only lists some \textit{πρῶτος τι} terms as examples and adds "and the others." Not only has Socrates' previous manner of speaking about the Forms not prepared us for this, but the arguments of Book V

\textsuperscript{62} Much ink has been spilled over whether \textit{Republic} X is consistent with either \textit{Republic} III or even with itself. Perhaps the most famous contribution to this debate is the series of articles by Tate in which he attempts to sharply distinguish two different senses of imitative art. In a similar vein, Shorey (1930) \textit{vol. i}, p. 224, n. c and \textit{vol. ii}, p. 419, n. c and Cross and Woozley (1964) p. 279. Grube (1974) fails to find two senses of the word \textit{mimesis} in \textit{Republic} but instead supposes that Plato means in both III and X to exclude impersonation.

\textsuperscript{63} In the concluding section at 608a, Plato describes the reasons that have been given for banishing the poets as an \textit{ἐντολή}. An enchantment does not aim at truth. It suffices if it works.

\textsuperscript{64} This fact is not lost on those who think that Plato has a much wider range of Forms. Adam (1938) attempts to explain it by appeal to the needs of the argument: "On previous occasions he confined himself to Ideas of virtue because they only were relevant to his purpose . . . and it is exactly the same reason which makes him cite Ideas of concrete and artificial objects in Bk. X." on 595a5. For a similar view, see Ross (1961) p. 79.
and Book VII look much less plausible if they are taken to apply to Forms for καθ' αὐτά terms like 'bed.' I have argued that, although the intervening images of sun, line and cave can be read in such a way as to imply Forms for such terms, they need not be. We can integrate these images into the overall structure of Republic, understand their function and see them as fairly successful without supposing that there were Forms for terms like 'man' or 'bed.'

Were this the only difficulty with 596a-598d, my attempt to take this passage in something other than the literal way might constitute question-begging. But it is not. At 596b we are told that the craftsperson looks to the Form in the course of his creative endeavors. But a κλινοτολός is not a philosopher-king! He has not undergone the extensive educational program that culminates in dialectic—the distinctive way in which one reasons about the Forms. Coming on the heels of the images of the doubly divided line and, especially, the cave, this is a startling claim. Plato, I believe, intends it to be. Its purpose is to tip us off to the fact that we ought not take him to really be discussing the Forms here. Instead, I shall argue, we are to read this in terms of the kinds of souls that have just been discussed in Books VIII and IX. Indeed, Plato tells us as much in 596b: ἔπειδη χώρις ἑκαστα διήρητα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδη.

But, it will be objected, there is nothing so shocking in the claim that the carpenter is aware of the Forms. It is simply a restatement of Plato's views about the activity of craftspersons. He says the very same thing in Cratylus 389a-b. Though it is not what εἰώθαμεν λέγεων in the Republic, it is nevertheless what Plato is accustomed to say elsewhere.
The question of whether Plato ever recognized Forms for artifacts is a vexed one. The Republic and Cratylus passages are inevitably weighed against the passage from Parmenides where Socrates expresses dismay over whether there are Forms for sortal terms like man, fire and water. He is even less inclined to assert that there are Forms for hair, dirt, mud and other undignified or trivial objects. Beds and tables might be thought to be just such trivial objects. But the appeal to the Cratylus is not decisive for other reasons as well. Though Plato there uses the terminology which he sometimes uses in connection with the Forms (τὸ ἐλέος, αὔτο ὀ ἐστιν κερκίς) we must not forget that he also used this vocabulary to talk about logical causes in the dialogues of search. These, I

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65 I will discuss the Cratylus in what follows. Other ancient sources for Plato’s view on the matter of Forms for artifacts only cloud the issue. Aristotle, in one of the “we Platonists” passages, claims that we do not recognize Forms for such things as ring or house (Meta. 991b6. In 1070a18 he writes that διὸ δὴ οὗ κακῶς Πλάτων ἔρρη ὅτι εἶδος ἔστιν ὑπόθεν ρύσει. One way to take "such things as are according to nature" is to suppose that it is precisely meant to exclude Forms of artifacts. This testimony is complicated, as usual, by considerations about Aristotle’s accuracy as a reporter of Plato’s views. In addition, Averroes reports Alexander’s text of Aristotle differently. Instead of Πλάτων he had ο一件事情 τιθέμενοι ἔρουσαν, which could mean simply other members of the Academy. But, unfortunately for the anti-artifact camp, all other manuscripts except Themistius’ paraphrase have Πλάτων or δ Πλάτων. The anti-artifact view also gains some support from Proclus in Prm. 691 (Stallbaum). Here Proclus reports that Xenocrates placed on record a definition of an Idea which Plato found satisfactory. It is αὐτία παραδειγματικῆ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν δέι συνεστῶτων . . . χωριστῇ καὶ δεία αἰτία. Presumably this is why Proclus took Republic 596a to be humorously intended (in Tim. 29c, i. 344.5-14, Diehl). But, on the other hand, Diogenes Laertius (6.2.53) relates a story about Plato which necessitates Forms for artifacts. Plato, according to the story, was engaged in conversation with Diogenes the Cynic. The latter said to him, "I see a table and a cup, but certainly not tableness and cupness." Plato allegedly replied, "Naturally, for you have eyes, by which a cup or a table is perceived, but not reason, by which tableness and cupness are seen."

Cherniss (1944) pp. 235-60 and Robin (1908) p. 177, n. 175 are the most prominent modern commentators on this issue. Both reconcile the "according to nature" aspects of Aristotle’s and Xenocrates’ reports by supposing that it is meant to exclude Forms of the objects of the imitative arts and to stress that the fit between ordinary language and world of Forms may be inexact. Hence the admonition in the Phaedrus to divide nature at its joints and the worries in Statesman about false dichotomy.
have argued, ought not be thought of as separated Platonic Forms. What is cru­
cial to Plato's use of the example from *Cratylus* is that the craftsperson is guided
in his creative activity by the function of the object which he is creating. He pro­
ceeds οὐχ ὄλον ἀν αὐτὸς βουληθῇ, ἀλλ' ὃλον πέφυκε (389c). The vocabu­
lary used in the *Cratylus* suggests that he guides his creative activity by virtue of
his understanding of the logical cause of shuttle. But, we are not given any reason
in this passage to think that this logical cause is a non-sensible, separated Form.
He looks πρὸς τοιοῦτον τι ὅ ἐπεφύκει κερκίζειν, but this need not be any­
thing more than those features which make something a shuttle—a common ele­
ment in all shuttles. Though we might think that this could only be a separated
universal, *Plato*, I believe, is not yet a victim of that philosophical puzzle. He will
come to grips with a related perplexity about the possibility of predication and
this perplexity necessitates Forms for καθ' αὐτὰ as well as πρὸς τι terms. But
that is as late as the *Parmenides* (see Chapter 5). This, of course, raises the ques­
tion of the date of the *Cratylus*. Suppose my attempt to de-ontologize ἐδοξ and
αὐτὸ δ ἐστὶν κεκρίς in 389a-b proves unsatisfying to the proponent of Forms
for artifacts. In order for the *Cratylus* to confirm the literal statement of *Republic
Χ*, *Cratylus* must be earlier or roughly contemporaneous with *Republic*. Only then
can the hypothesis of Forms for such things be "the accustomed method." But,
the only thing which it seems safe to say about the date of the *Cratylus* is that
there seems to be *very little* that we can be confident about.66

66 Ritter, von Arnim and Wilamowitz all put the *Cratylus* earlier than *Republic*. So did Schlier­
macher and Grote, but, then again, they put the *Republic* quite late too. More recently, Luce
has argued for an early date. Gomperez, Shorey and Guthrie all argued that *Cratylus* was late.
McKenzie is the most recent champion of a late date. For a sensitive discussion of the
But the difficulties of the Republic X argument are not confined to the, perhaps, anomalous elements of Forms for artifacts and epistemic access to the Forms by non-philosophers. Having told us that the craftsperson looks to the Forms in making beds and tables and so on, Socrates goes on to point out in no uncertain terms that no one makes the Form. This, at least, is familiar. The Forms are eternal and have no connection with generation and corruption. Obviously they are not made by anyone. As Socrates says, πῶς γαρ; Yet, less than one Stephanus page later we are told that God makes the Bed Itself (597b).

If we allow ourselves to look (presumably forward) to the Timaeus, we know that this is not Plato's view of the relationship between God and the Forms. There the demiurge, like the craftsman in Republic X, guides his creative activity by reference to the Forms which exist independently of him. But, even if we confine ourselves to the Republic and the Phaedo, what Plato says at 596b is consistent with what we have been told about the Forms and the claim at 597b is not.

The advocate of the literal reading can bend a bit here. He can claim that Plato really does mean that there is a Form of Bed, but that God's creation of it is a fiction which facilitates the argument. Plato's language is a bit hypothetical (ἡν φανερὸν ἀν, ὡς ἔγραμαι, ὑπὸν ἐργάσασθαι. ἦ τίνα ἀλλοτριοῦ). One might claim that this fiction is taken up in order to preserve the symmetry of the picture that Plato is laying out. As genuine δεμυνοργοῖ, both God and the craftsperson...

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difficulties of dating the Cratylus, see Thesleff (1982) pp. 167-71. He cautiously places it later than at least the "draft version" of the Republic.

really make something. Indeed, a something that is—τὰ ὄν. The poor artist is alone in this schema in merely imitating. Were Plato to have said what he really thought—that God imitates the Forms in the making of the world—he would have been forced into a lengthy discussion of the differences between divine and artistic imitation. In order to preserve the unity of his argument, he simply glosses over this point by claiming that God makes Forms.

This, I think, puts us close to the heart of the matter. Read literally, or even mostly literally, the argument from 596a to 598d is a bad argument for a silly conclusion. Whether God’s creation of the Forms is a fiction or not, the claim that the visual artist imitates only the appearance of the sensible object is utterly unmotivated. In the first instance, if there really is a Form περὶ ἐκαστὰ τὰ πολλὰ, why ought we not say that there is a Form of Bed-Representation? Just as the κλινοποιὸς looks to the Form of Bed in the production of the object of his craft, so too the artist looks to the variety of Representation Forms. Even if we give up the notion that there are Representation Forms, why ought we not say that the visual artist too looks to the Form in the act of creation, but in a rather different way. After all, the visual appearance of a bed does bear some rational relation to the ἐργαντικοῦ of a bed.

68 Cherniss and Robin, of course, interpret Proclus’ report in such a way as to exclude the very possibility of this objection; supra n. 64.

69 Many interpreters of Plato who are also friends of art have said exactly this. See Tate (1928) pp. 21-22 and (1932) pp. 164-5 and Murdoch (1977).
To this Plato can reply that the carpenter’s bed fulfills the function of a bed, while the painter’s representation does not. For this reason, perhaps, he can claim that the latter produces φαίνομένα, οὐ μέντοι ὄντα γε ποιο τὴν ἀληθεία (596e). But this is true only insofar as we are interested in having something to sleep on. If I want something to hang on the wall, then the visual artist does produce something real and true. Plato can hardly claim that the first perspective is validated by genuine human needs while the latter is not. His first and pure city does not include such niceties as beds.

Because of the nature of what he produces, Plato demotes the visual artist from δημοσιογός to μύητης. No one can therefore believe that he has the very same craft and knowledge as the carpenter. Since he is not a δημοσιογός, we apparently are to conclude that he has no knowledge of anything at all. His "wondrous power" which might have been thought to have its source is some kind of knowledge is now revealed as witchcraft or, more likely, sleight of hand. 70

What does this peculiar argument gain us? Those poor benighted fools who might have thought that painters know carpentry and bridle making and all the other crafts can now be shown the clear truth of the matter. In addition,

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70 cf. 598d, the person who reports that he has met someone who is all wise has ἐνυχωὸν γόητι τινι καὶ μύητη ἔτηπατήθη, ὡστε ἐδοξεῖν αὐτῷ πάσοντος εἶναι, διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς μὴ οἶδος τοῦ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην καὶ μύησιν ἐξετάσαι. I take it that ἀνεπιστημοσύνην and μύησιν go together in the opposition to ἐπιστήμην and that they refer to the state of the artist, not his victim. Notice the way we have shifted from the claim that the artist knows none of the other crafts, (598c περὶ οὐδενὸς τοῦτων ἐπηλῶν τῶν τεχνῶν) to the claim that he knows nothing. Plato qualifies this at 601a (οὐκ ἐπηλώτα ἀλλ’ ἢ μυησιοθαί), but this is cool comfort if imitation itself is a kind of mindless activity that any idiot with a mirror can engage in.
because Plato proposes to ban all imitative art from his city, we can rest assured that παιδες τε καὶ ἄφρονει ἄνδρωποι (598c) will not be taken in by cleverly constructed carpenter paintings. But, really, what person ever thought that painters know the arts associated with the objects that they depict? Moreover, why should the elimination of this one potential source of sense deception contribute significantly to the well being of the just polity? The bottom line is simply this: a literal or semi-literal interpretation of this passage gives Plato a bad argument for a silly conclusion. Charity demands that we explore alternatives to a literal reading of the 596a-598d argument.

B. Alternatives to a Literal Reading

Though the argument from 596a-598d seems to be directed against visual art, and painting in particular, in fact it is only a prelude. It sets the stage for Plato's criticisms of his real target—tragedy. Book X opens with Socrates' concern that Glaucon will betray him to the tragic poets for what he is about to say. Though Homer is the named target of the arguments that follow, he is characterized as the first of the tragedians. At 597e, in the midst of the account of the painter as imitator, Plato reminds us that the same will apply to the tragedian. Homer—again, the leader of tragedians—is the focus of the argument from 598e-601c. The passage concerning the user, the maker and the imitator opens with a discussion of the painter who paints the picture of the reins, but by the time he reaches the conclusion of this section Plato reverts to discussing "tragic poets" whether they compose in iambics or hexameter. 602c-603b genuinely concerns
visual art, but, I shall argue, its primary function is to set up the analogy that follows concerning poetry (603c-605c). The greatest accusation (605c-607b) concerns Homer, who is again labeled the first of the tragedians, and comedy. Thus, Plato's repeated emphasis on what he calls tragedy should lead us to suspect that his remarks which seem to be about visual art need to be interpreted in light of his overall program.

What does Plato mean by "tragic poetry" and why does he identify Homer as the first of the tragedians? Epic and tragedy are, of course, stylistically very different and Plato is well aware of this fact. What tragedy and epic have in common is that they share Plato's description of mimetic poetry. Such poetry "depicts men acting either voluntarily or from necessity and as a result of their actions thinking themselves to fare well or fare badly and in all this feeling joy or grief (603c)." Thus, what is at issue is the way in which human actions are to be presented in poetry. In particular, the question concerns the commentary that poetry makes on the world of value by presenting a character who takes himself to have fared well or badly by virtue of experiencing something. Where the character is presented sympathetically, the poet as much as endorses his valuations and offers them to the audience as correct. This, of course, raises the question of the poet's state of knowledge with respect to what is genuinely valuable. We are inclined to regard the claim that a painter knows all the crafts because he is able to visually represent their objects as ridiculous. But, it might not be so far-fetched
to think that a tragic poet has knowledge that is important to "the conduct and refinement of human life."\textsuperscript{71}

It should come as no surprise that Plato treats this topic at the beginning of Book X. The discussion of the content of poetry in Book II and III determined what it was appropriate to say about the gods and about such things as death, moderation and so on. But, it left open the question of how human beings were to be portrayed until the nature of justice was made clear (392e). That task is completed with the description of the five kinds of souls in Books VIII and IX. But, there is already a well established tradition concerning the depiction of human beings and their actions—the tradition of Greek tragedy and epic. Plato's answer to the question, "How ought human beings be depicted in the poetry of the ideal city?" is implicit in the grounds for his rejection of the current practices of portraying human actions.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{71} cf. 606c-607a, οὐκοῦν, ἢπει, ὅ πλαύκων, ὅταν ὁμήρου ἐποίητας ἐντύχεις λέγοντων, ὥς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαλαίκειν ὅθτος ὁ ποιητής, καὶ πρὸς διοίκησιν τε καὶ παιδείαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πραγμάτων άξιος ἀναλαβώμενοι μανίδαις τε καὶ κατὰ τόσον τῶν ποιητῶν πάντα τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατασκευασάμενον ξήραν, ... 

\textsuperscript{72} In what follows I shall concentrate on Plato's arguments against the view that the poets are a source of wisdom about proper conduct and matters of value, since it is in this context that he has been thought to acknowledge the existence of Forms for κατασκευασάμενοι ξήραν terms. But the analogy with painting is equally important to Plato's analysis of what is wrong with tragedy in particular. Roughly, there are two salient points. First, we judge a realistic painting (and this seems to be Plato's focus) to be successful precisely when it deceives us into seeing a two-dimensional object as three-dimensional. Likewise, we judge a tragedy to be successful when it makes us feel the very emotions that the reasoning part of the soul attempts to suppress in our everyday life (cf. 605d). Second, even though we realize that a painting is a two dimensional illusion of three dimensional space, we are powerless to see it as anything other than three dimensional. Likewise, when viewing tragedy or comedy, we have only a limited ability to disengage from the spectacle and consider the harm that we may be doing to our internal polis by viewing it (cf. 606b).
Plato does not move immediately to the reasons why tragic poetry must be banned. He first attempts to undermine the tradition by casting doubt on the extent to which poets know anything about the world of value and human excellence. This is the point of the 596a-598d passage. In it, Plato is telling a very far-fetched story about visual art. The purpose of this story is to say something which he regards as deep and important about tragic poetry. As with the images of sun, line and cave, we must not confuse Plato's point with the literal means by virtue of which he attempts to make that point.

It is not only the context and the content that suggests that the 596a-598d argument is really directed at tragic poetry. Another clue which is, perhaps, less obvious to us than it would have been to Plato's contemporaries is contained in his very vocabulary. Prior to Plato's use of these terms in Book X, words from the μιμος family were almost invariably used to indicate some kind of enactment. There are only eight surviving instances in which terms from this group are

\[\text{This thesis was originally propounded by Koller. It has subsequently been modified and defended by Keuls. She draws two generalizations about the meaning of 'mimesis' prior to Plato:}\]

A. The mimesis conception is invariably dramatic; i.e. it always contains a connotation of impersonation, reembodiment, disguise or one phenomenon posing as another. Even in its most weakened metaphorical extensions, a mimema cannot be a copy, only a substitute.

B. Most often the mimesis notion is kinetic rather than static; i.e. the emphasis is on the act of impersonation, especially by means of mimic gestures or other movements. (p. 22)

Koller's views have been disputed by Else (1958). Nehamas (1982) pp. 55-58 discusses these criticisms and concludes that Else does not entirely succeed. Nehamas concludes that mimesis "meant primarily acting like someone else. It did not carry with it the connotation of imitating only the appearance as opposed to the reality of the object imitated, or the connected notion of deceiving and counterfeiting" (p. 58).
applied to static images. These uses in no way suggest that a mimema is a copy which reproduces the appearance of the object imitated like a photograph does. But it is precisely this sense of photographic reproduction (even including the notion of perspective) that Plato gives to 'imitation' in 596a-598d. If this is so, then Plato's use of μιμητής in connection with the person who carries about the mirror would have been quite striking. He has carried a term out of a dramatic context and extended its meaning. His purpose is not to better explain the nature of painting. Rather, he wants to point out that some of the things which are true of painting are equally true of poetry and especially of drama.

How, specifically, ought we to take the introduction of the Form of Bed and the argument of 596a-598d? Plato's introductory remarks provide the first clue. At 595b, he notes that the conclusion that imitative poetry is to be banned is even more obvious since we have distinguished the individual parts of the soul. We are to interpret the claims which seem to be about God and the Forms in terms of the tri-partite division of the soul. God represents the guardians. He creates the "Form" of Bed and that of Table. These implements provide the physical locus for the exercise of vice and virtue in relation to sexual conduct and moderation in food and drink. They also distinguish the healthy city, which is simply a natural response to natural human needs, from the luxurious city in 372d-e. The healthy city apparently has no need of guardians. So long as its inhabitants confine themselves to the simple pleasures that their productive activity allows them, they live ἐν ἐλπίδι μετὰ ὑγείας (372d). Plato describes the Form, first, as made by no one and then as made by God. In one sense, proper
conduct in bed and at the table is an objective matter, stipulated by no man nor a product of convention. But, in another sense, the right course in matters of sexual propriety and moderation is legislated both for themselves and for others by the guardians. This tension is metaphorically resolved by the claim that God can make only one Form of Bed. Since they are guided in their actions by the Form of the Good, the guardians will do what is genuinely in the best interest of the whole city. Presumably, there is only one policy that serves this end. The identification of God in this story with the guardians is further confirmed by Socrates peculiar remark at 597e that, if the tragedian is like the painter, he will be at three removes from the truth and the king.

The identity of the craftsman in this image is best gleaned from his contrast with God and with the argument that follows at 598e. God is the φυτουργός of the Bed Itself, while the craftsman is merely the δεμουργός of a product which is ἀμυνόρον πρὸς ἀληθείαν (597a). The guardian’s policy decisions with respect to moderation in food and drink and sexual morality are the result of his φύσις as a knower and lover of the good. The craftsman in this metaphor looks to the product of the God’s handiwork as a guide in his own creative act. Since the city described in the Republic exists only in theory, no one can look to the individual conduct or public policy of actual guardians as a benchmark for his own actions. Plato’s point, I think, is that individuals who attempt to govern or counsel

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74 cf 445d, ἐγγενούνοι μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἕνας ἐν τοῖς ἀρχοντι διαφέροντος βασιλεία δὴ κληθείση, πλειόνων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία and 543a, βασιλείας δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον γεγονότος ἀρίστους. For a history of the problem of identifying the king of 497e, see Adam (1938) vol. ii, Appendix I to Book X, pp. 464-5.
others about right conduct attempt to emulate the actions that the guardians would engage in as a result of their nature. At 598e ff, Plato takes up explicitly the issue that I claim is implicitly treated here—whether the poets’ creativity is due to their knowledge of all things. He replies that Homer has not left behind πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα as have Aesclepius, Lycurgus and Solon. Even Protagoras and Prodicus have managed to convince many people that they can impart to them knowledge about how best to run their cities and homes. This strikes us as odd, since we know that Plato has no especially high opinion of these individuals. It is such people of action that I think he means to identify with the craftsman in the 596a-598d passage. Unlike the poet, such persons actually attempt to put into practice their thoughts about how human beings ought to live. However epistemically deficient they might be, they attempt to bring about right conduct on the part of themselves and, especially, of others. In doing this, they at least have the benefit of experience. The poets, however, do not attempt to cross over from theory into practice. Even in their own works, they do not represent themselves as men of action. Instead, they stand on the sidelines telling tales and singing the praises of others.

75 598d-e τιμῶν ἀκούσομεν, ὅτι οὗτοι πάσας μὲν τέχνας ἔπιστανται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τὰ πρὸς ἀρετήν καὶ κακίαν, καὶ τὰ γε θεῖα· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήτων, εἰ μέλλει περὶ δὲ ἀν ποιῇ καλὸς ποιήσεις, εἰδότα ἀρα ποιεῖν, ἡ μὴ ολῶν τε εἶναι ποιεῖν.

76 Though for somewhat different reasons, Griswold (1981) agrees in the identification of the craftsmen as men of action who lead others. He, however, sees the schema of God-artisan-artist as a representation of the poets’ own view of the whole of the cosmos. It is the world as seen through poetry. He notes (n. 28) that a poet cannot praise himself within the context of his own work, though he could, of course, exalt another poet. Griswold considers the case of Demodocus in Od. 8.73-4. The poet’s fame derives not from his actions but from his praise of the actions of others.
The craftsperson, as I have interpreted him, attempts to bring it about that people behave in certain ways with respect to sexual conduct and food and drink, say. The poet is an imitator because he does not draft legislation or give lectures in which he advises in favor of some conduct and against other kinds. Rather, he produces a representation of people acting in various ways. He may implicitly condone some and condemn others, but this is all in the context of a limited representation of the lives of men. Sophocles may intimate certain things about the value of family and of obedience to the state in Antigone, but he does not follow through and suggest ways in which members of a community can arrange their lives in such a way as to minimize conflicts of these values. Like the painter, he captures a snapshot of peoples' lives, a moment in their development. He makes us feel the problem but without providing a solution that is tested against the practical, day to day needs of a community. The problem is not merely that the poet leaves behind άδηγος and not ἐργα. The ideal state also exists only in word and not in deed. The difference is that the latter is a conscious effort to reason through a plan whereby people ought to live. It does not hide its practical suggestions or claims about truth and value. Euripides may have meant to hint that the gods are not as legend portrays them. The Republic says this explicitly and argues for it.

How is it then that the poets have acquired such a reputation for wisdom? In addition to calling into question this reputation, Plato's example of visual art is supposed to help provide an answer. The painter gives the impression of three-dimensional space by the careful use of color and shadow. Likewise, the poet
gives the impression that he is providing us with more wisdom than he in fact is because of the skillful use of poetic language. Moreover, as Aristotle points out in the *Poetics* (ch. 7), the tragic poet depicts a single πράγμα which is whole and complete. It takes a certain special ability to do this, since the events that constitute a single play may not, considered in themselves, have this kind of interconnectedness. Aristotle likens the construction of such a complete whole to *painting*. In order to succeed, the painter must work with the proper scale. This telescoping of many events into a single unified πράγμα is a kind of illusion. The poet is able to carry it off because he does not follow all the actions of his characters. We do not see or even hear it narrated how Jocasta first looks for a rope and then attempts to locate a sturdy rafter from which to suspend it, finds a chair to stand on, etc. The poet's mimema, like that of the painter, captures parts of a life and only from a certain angle.

At 601c, Plato provides another triad which, like the first, seems to involve visual art. We find that the horseman really has knowledge of the excellence and defect of the reins by virtue of his experience. The maker of bridles has correct opinion because the horseman tells him what makes tack good and bad. The poor painter makes visual representations of bridles but knows nothing of their characteristic excellence. There is a fair amount of agreement that we are to read it in light of the triad of God, the craftsman and the imitator, but much disagreement about how to connect them. Those who take the 596a-598d passage

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77 cf. 601a ff, where the poet's use of language is expressly compared with the painter's use of color.
literally are immediately confronted by the fact that God, unlike the horseman, does not use the Forms. If, however, we read the first passage in the way in which I suggest, this problem vanishes. The guardians are the people who have the requisite knowledge to control the beast of the body politic and to guide it and train it in such a way as to make it good. Legislators like Solon and Lycurgus, or sophists like Protagoras, concentrate on the production of the means of controlling it—whether or not they themselves are good riders who know how to train the animal. Poets, however, only provide two dimensional representations of, say, Agamemnon commanding his troops or Kreon attempting to lead his city.

The entire section from 596a-602c, which seems to contain so many anomalies from the metaphysics and epistemology of the preceding nine books, is not to be read literally. Its purpose is to call into question the epistemic authority of "tragic poets"—to deny that they are well placed to make any suggestions, however vague, about the world of value. It opens a remark about the many beauties of tragedy. At 602b, Plato concludes with the claim that the thing which the poet will imitate will be what appears to be fine to the ignorant multitudes. This should recall the argument of Book V. Like the lover of sights and sounds, the poet trafficks in the superficial. But, on close analysis, he fails to have the systematic and scientific understanding of the nature of the Good that is essential for directing the affairs of human beings.
C. Why Plato Doesn't Say What He Means

In §4 of this chapter I have first assembled some reasons, internal to the Republic, for thinking that Plato does not mean what he literally says in Book X about Forms of Bed and Table. I have now offered an analysis of what he does mean by saying that there are Forms of Bed and Table. In this final section, I want to round out the picture by considering why Plato might have resorted to telling us this story in order to make his point about tragic poetry. This question draws us into some very difficult issues and I cannot do justice to them here. At best, I shall gesture in the direction of what I think is the right answer.

I begin with a bald assertion: Poetry does not endeavor to command our attention by impressing the reader with its truthfulness. Poetry is not argumentation. A good poem does not attempt to lead the reader to a conclusion by systematically presenting evidence that supports it. Poetry does not get us to see that P is true. Rather, poetry commands our attention when it allows us to see X as Y. It can, of course, succeed in this even when X and Y are not alike at all. The mixing of the blood of Donne's two lovers within the body of the flea is not really like the bond that intimacy brings to a relationship. Unlike their blood, each of the lovers retains his or her own identity, consciousness and physical separateness. What is important is that Donne allows us to see lovemaking in a way that we have not seen it before.

If this is at least part of what makes poetry important to us, then Plato is exactly right when he says that there is an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry. It is not merely that poetry could recommend false value judgements.
Rather, the quarrel concerns the very notions of evidence and truth. Poetry can safely ignore arguments that it fails to provide adequate grounds for its truth claims. After all, what is at issue is not truth but seeing as and poems don’t offer evidence for the utility or correctness of seeing X as Y. They simply provide the language which enables the seeing to take place. But, though philosophy and poetry do not connect on the issues of truth and evidence, they cannot always coexist peacefully either. Seeing X as Y may lead us to believe all kinds of things about X. When a poem enables us to see X as Y, we often say that it "works." When we think that seeing X as Y facilitates certain revelations about X, then we say things like, "The poem rings true."

Plato, I believe, was shrewd enough to recognize the extent of philosophy's quarrel with poetry. He does not make the mistake of presenting a philosophical argument against the value of poetry. Instead, he takes up the poet's own tools and uses language in such a way as to enable us to see poetry as unimportant—a trivial exercise in imitation, as transient and unreal as the image in a mirror. Republic 596a-602c does not present a metaphysical and epistemological position that Plato held. It subverts the normal use of terms like μὲν ἐστιν in order to allow us to see poetry as painting with words. In the remainder of the section, Plato explores the implications of seeing it in that way.
Chapter V

The Parmenides’ New Puzzle

The Republic and the Phaedo are both works in which Plato discusses the Forms in the context of some larger philosophical project: in one case, the nature of the just life and in the other the immortality of the soul. In both dialogues, we get glimpses of Plato’s reasons for thinking that there must be separated, non-sensible Forms. He thinks that problems arise when we try to answer a "What is F?" within a certain framework of inquiry. These problems necessitate the ontological hypothesis that there are Forms. But, these problems, I have argued, arise only when F is a relative term. Insofar as the problems which Plato thinks necessitate the ontological hypothesis provide a justification for that move, he has an argument only for Forms for relative terms. I have also urged that the arguments of the Republic and the Phaedo require only that there be such a limited range of Forms.

The Parmenides marks a departure from Phaedo and Republic with respect to all of these points. First, Plato expressly formulates the problem to which the hypothesis of the Forms is an answer. He also provides a straight-forward account of how the theory of Forms is to answer it. Moreover, this problem, unlike the ones that motivate the theory of Forms in Republic and Phaedo, is such that it requires Forms for every common term—both πρός τι and κατ’ οὐτά. The
thing that makes the *Parmenides* a difficult dialogue is that Plato subjects the straight-forward application of the theory of Forms to the problem to a serious criticism. The theory of Forms cannot do the work that it needs to do unless participation in Forms can be adequately explained. In this concluding chapter, I want to sketch very briefly the nature of the problem which the theory of Forms is invoked to solve so that we can see why it requires a wider range of Forms. It will become obvious that this problem is quite new and quite different from anything that we have thus far encountered in the *Phaedo* or the *Republic*. I will not attempt to say, in any great detail, how Plato tries to make good sense out of the notion of participation. My concern is "Plato's argument from relatives"—that is, the reasons that Plato had for thinking that there were Forms for προς τε terms which did not also constitute reasons for thinking that there were Forms for other kinds of terms. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to contrast these reasons with a quite different philosophical problem which might provide the impetus for a "one over many" principle. To effect this contrast will not require that I give a complete account of the latter. This is fortunate. To tell the whole story of how the latter part of the *Parmenides* constitutes an answer to the difficulties that Plato raises in the first part would require a book, and it is not a book which I am in a position to write.
A. Zeno's Stricture\(^1\) and the Problem of Predication

The narrative structure of the *Parmenides* gives us some hints about what we can expect from it. The narrator is Antiphon, an associate of Pythadorus. Pythadorus, in turn, is supposed to be a friend of Zeno. Antiphon has learned the content of the entire conversation between Zeno, Socrates and Parmenides, which he relates by heart, as a result of long study (126c), presumably under the tutelage of Pythadorus. If *Alcibiades* I (119a) is to be trusted, Pythadorus paid Zeno one hundred *minae* for his instruction. It may not be too speculative to conjecture that Plato means to make several points by adopting this peculiar narrative structure. First, both persons who have had instruction in Eleatic philosophy have now turned to careers outside philosophy. We are expressly told about Antiphon's new vocation. Pythadorus, we know, had a military career. He was one of the generals sent to Sicily in 427. The implication, I believe, is that Eleaticism is regarded by Plato as a philosophical dead-end. If one simply absorbs it, as Antiphon has simply memorized the content of this conversation, there is nothing left but to turn to other activities. Second, it has frequently been observed that at the time at which this conversation supposedly took place, Socrates would have been in his early twenties. It seems implausible to think that he had the theory of Forms, as it is presented in the *Phaedo*, as fully worked out as it seems to be in

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\(^1\) I borrow this term from Turnbull (1985). My understanding of the puzzles that open the *Parmenides* is deeply indebted to the views of Robert Turnbull. See, in particular, Turnbull (1989).
the opening to the *Parmenides*. In fact, the story of Socrates' disillusionment with natural philosophy and his eventual development of the second best method in the *Phaedo* itself tells against this. It is therefore likely that this conversation between a very young Socrates and the Eleatics is Plato's own invention. It also seems plausible to think that his contemporaries would surely have known this too. Thus, the conversation between Socrates and Zeno and Parmenides advertises itself in the very dialogue as an invention. Plato's point, I believe, is to show how one might attempt to turn the *Phaedo* theory of Forms to a new task—the defeat of Parmenidean monism. Plato has a very young Socrates attempt this because the theory cannot successfully be used for this purpose unless something can be said to justify a distinction between the relations of being and participating. Recall that in the *Phaedo*, Socrates is very reticent to describe the latter relation. I argued that this is because, in that dialogue, the Forms and the relation of participation are posits which are tailor-made to fulfill certain tasks. Plato has not yet worked out all of the details. He is convinced that *something like this* must be the case if it is possible to have answers to "What is F?" questions and coherent explanations. Thus, the young Socrates represents the younger Plato: he has a theory that is not yet worked out in detail, but he also has reason to think that the basic outlines of the theory must be correct. When Parmenides criticizes the theory of the younger Socrates, Plato makes clear just which details need to be ironed out if the theory is to be adequate to the task of defeating Eleaticism. In

2 Cornford (1939) p. 64. Even Taylor (1926), who thinks that such a conversation actually took place, notes that Plato's use of Antiphon "frees [him] from responsibility for the strict accuracy of his narrative." p. 352
the eight hypotheses, the character of Parmenides does two further things. First, he shows that Parmenidean monism is not merely false, but self-refuting. Second, he provides an analogy for understanding the relation of participation. This, in turn, allows him to defuse the systematic equivocation that leads to Eleaticism. Plato has Parmenides, and not Socrates, do this precisely because the tools that make both tasks possible are Parmenides' own—the careful attention to the semantic implications of various hypotheses.

Antiphon does not relate the entirety of Zeno's treatise. But the first hypothesis of the first argument is repeated and it is to this that Socrates responds.

1. If the beings are many it is necessary that they be both likes and unlikes.

2. But this is impossible, since unlikes cannot be likes nor likes unlikes.

So, it is not the case that the beings are many.

The argument is supposed to buttress Parmenides' arguments for monism by showing that, whatever absurdities monism seems to involve, pluralism has many more. There has been much disagreement, however, about what sort of pluralistic philosophy Zeno's arguments are directed against. According to Cornford and Lee, Zeno's arguments were directed specifically against the Pythagoreans, who thought not only that there were a plurality of sensible things, but that each sensible thing was a number or plurality of units. Others, like Ross, have denied this.

They think that Zeno's arguments are intended to oppose any philosophical system which recognizes the existence of more than one thing. Zeno reportedly had forty such arguments. Only two of these survive.

Fr. 1, Simplicius Phys. 141, 1 and Fr. 2, ibid. 139, 8. If there is a plurality, things will be both great and small; so great as to be infinite in size and so small as to have no size at all.

If what is had no size, it would not even be. For if it were added to something else that is, it would make it no larger; for being no size at all, it could not, on being added, cause any increase in size. And so what was added would clearly be nothing. Again if, when it is taken away, the other thing is no smaller, just as when it is added it is not increased, obviously what was added or taken away was nothing.

But if it is, each thing must have a certain size and bulk, and one part of it must be at a certain distance from another part; and the same argument holds about the part in front of it—it too will have some size, and same part of it will be in front. And it is the same thing to say this once and to go on saying it indefinitely; for no such part of it will be the last, nor will one part ever be unrelated to another.

So, if there is a plurality, things must be both small and great; so small as to have no size at all, so great as to be infinite.

Fr. 3, Simplicius Phys. 140, 29. If there is a plurality, things must be just as many as they are, no more and no less. And if they are just as many as they are, they must be limited.

If there is a plurality, the things that are are infinite; for there will always be other things between the things that are, and yet others between those others. And so the things that are are infinite.

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4 Ross (1936), pp. 71-85.
5 Proclus in Prm. 694, 23.
The issue of whom Zeno is attacking is relevant for our purposes only insofar as it bears on the question of whom the young Socrates is attempting to defend by employing the *Phaedo* theory of Forms. The premise that sounds most likely to help the cause of a specifically anti-Pythagorean interpretation is the claim in Fr. 3 that "there will always be other things between the things that are." This seems to be most obviously true of points on a line. Since the Pythagoreans allegedly thought that bodies were composed of lines and lines of points, they would presumably have to hold such a premise. It is not clear that any old pluralism needs to though. One could hold that there are a number of principles, as, say, Empedocles did, but deny the mathematical conception of body that the Pythagoreans held. One could then simply deny that, between any two of the beings, there must always be a third. Thus, it seems that Zeno's arguments are directed primarily against Pythagoreanism. If this is so, then we should expect Socrates to be defending the Pythagoreans by using the theory of Forms to deny the force of Zeno's argument in the *Parmenides*. But, a close look reveals that what Socrates actually says to Zeno in 129-130a does not bear out this expectation.

Socrates first secures the admission that there are opposite Forms of Likeness and Unlikeness. The things which we call many partake in these Forms. The things which come to partake of Likeness come to be likes both in the re-

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7 Zeno's arguments against the possibility of motion make most sense against the backdrop of a theory which holds that both space and time are infinitely divisible into discrete, non-divisible units. Cf. Aristotle on the flying arrow (*Phys.* 239b30); συμβαίνει δὲ παρὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν τῶν χρόνων συγκείσας ἐκ τῶν νῦν.
spect and according to the extent to which they participate in that Form. Things which are both like and unlike participate in both Forms. This result Socrates regards as benign. His concern is with the Forms and not the sensibles which participate in them. Socrates says that he would be amazed if it could be shown that the Forms a) undergo these opposite affections in themselves and/or b) are capable of being mingled and separated. These two conditions may not actually be distinct. If one could show that there was a complete interweaving of the Forms, this would be the same puzzle that Zeno has demonstrated among the sensibles.

One way to understand Zeno’s argument would be to suppose that, if there are a plurality of things, x will be like y and unlike z simply because of the ubiquity of similarity and dissimilarity. But this is not a puzzle which requires the theory of Forms and the participation of sensibles for its unraveling. All one need do is to point out that these opposites do not hold for x in relation to the same

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8 Prm. 128c-129a, οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό εἶδός τι ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῇ τοιούτῳ ἀδ ἄλλο τι ἑννοεῖν, ἡ ἦστιν ἀνάμομοιαν τοῦτον δὲ δυνάμεν ἀυτοῦ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλα ἡ ἑπὶ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν μεταλαμβάνειν, καὶ τά μὲν τῆς ὁμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὁμοία γίγνεσθαι τάστη τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀν μεταλαμβάνῃ, τά δὲ τῆς ἁναμοιοετοῦς ἀνόμοια, τά δὲ ἀμφότεροι ἀμφότερα.

9 Prm. 129c, εἰ μὲν αὐτά τά γένη τε καὶ εἶδη· ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀποφαίνοις τάναντια ταῦτα πάθη πάσχουσα, δέιον νόημαξειν·

10 129c, εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνη ἀγαίμην ἂν ἠγογ.

11 129c-130a, εἰ τις ἔχει τὴν αὑτὴν ταύτην ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἴδει παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, ἐσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις διήλθετε, αὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισµῷ λαµ¬βανοµένους ἐπιδίδειαν.
thing. Plato’s version of the Law of Opposites in Republic makes it quite clear that he appreciated this fact.

We can get a better idea of the real force of Zeno’s puzzle if we take the time to note that Plato uses μεταλαμβανέω and μετέχειν no fewer than ten times in the single Stephanus page which gives his answer to Zeno. Here, unlike in Phaedo 100d, he betrays no reservations about the nature of this relation. Moreover, the question of what participation might amount to is the focus of Parmenides’ criticisms of young Socrates’ answer in the following section. So what does participation allow Plato to accomplish? Because they merely participate in the Forms of Likeness and Un likeness, there is nothing surprising or metaphysically untoward in the qualification of sensibles by both members of this pair of opposites. But, as we noted, so long as x is like y and unlike z, there would be nothing metaphysically untoward in x being like and unlike, and not merely participating in Likeness and Unlikeness. The situation of sensibles is to be contrasted with that of Forms. While the former can be qualified by opposites by virtue of participating in both, Socrates thinks that the Forms cannot be so mingled or interwoven. Thus, if Socrates’ answer is to fit the problem, the problem must be one which involves a genuine contradiction on the assumption that the beings are many. Moreover, this contradiction must be one that can be resolved by distinguishing between the way that Forms are what they are and the way that sensibles are what they are.

The problem of the Parmenides is one about the possibility of predication—how it is possible to say that A is B when ‘A’ and ‘B’ are not one and the
same thing. Zeno's puzzle contains the argument against the possibility of predication in a very condensed form. The argument is intended to show that one must embrace Parmenidean monism, or, if one is to have a plurality, each of the many must be its own Parmenidean one which admits of no relations to any of the others. That is to say, that if there are a plurality of "things" no one of them can be predicated of any of the others. Thus, the argument proceeds, naturally enough, from considerations about "being" (understood as predication) to a conclusion about "what is" (understood as ontology). The secret to understanding the argument is arriving at some way of looking at things so that Zeno's conditional, "If the beings are many, then they are both likes and unlikes," looks at least initially plausible. This is done by conflating the 'is' of identity with the 'is' of predication. The following is, I believe, an accurate reconstruction of the argument:  

1. Take a plurality of two things, A and B. Suppose further that each is not "itself by itself," but instead that one can be predicated of the other.

2. Conflating identity with predication yields the result that A and B are the same or "sames."

3. Things that are the same are like one another. So, A and B are "likes."

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12 I do not wish to claim that this argument presents the real force of the historical Eleatic position. Rather, it is the way in which Plato saw the real import of Parmenides' arguments. I am greatly indebted to Prof. Alex Mourelatos for discussing this matter with me. He agrees that this is not Parmenides' or Zeno's view, but he also thinks that it may be a plausible interpretation of the way in which Plato took their arguments.
4. But since the supposition is that A and B are distinct, they are also not the same and so "unlikes." Thus, A is both like [B] and unlike [B].

5. The same kind of reasoning can be used to show that A is both like and unlike itself. It is like itself in being the same as itself. However, since it is B, it is like B. But, since B is not the same as A, in being like B, it is unlike itself.

The result of the conflation of identity and predication is what has come to be called "Zeno's Stricture:"13

ZS For any two terms replacing A and B, if A is B then B cannot be different from A.

Quite possibly, Zeno's Stricture is related to Parmenides' rejection of the way of not being. When one predicates B of A and the two are not terms for the same thing, then one says of A that which is not [A]. One can also reach a principle like Zeno's Stricture by insisting upon the primacy of the relation of proper naming. All saying must conform to the model of proper names. One cannot say 'Zeno' in relation to Parmenides. Zeno can only be addressed by the name proper to him, 'Zeno,' or perhaps some other co-referring name. But this co-refering name cannot be common to anything else. If it were, then by virtue of being named by a name that was equally a name of something else, Zeno would be both like and unlike himself and the other. Statements, if such there can be, would have to be derivative from the relation of proper naming and conform to its rules.

The principle of non-contradiction stated in *Republic* V does nothing to remove the problem since, in both cases, the correlatives of the opposites 'like' and 'unlike' are the same. Further, it does no good to protest that the untoward conclusions were reached by equivocating on 'is,' for this is precisely the challenge of the puzzle. This seems to leave the proponent of a non-Parmenidean ontology with two choices. On the one hand, he can accept Zeno's Stricture. The question then becomes whether one must also accept the ontological consequences that flow from this semantic principle; either there is "no many" or if there are "others" they have no relation to the one—that is, they cannot be predicated of the one or it of they. Alternately, he can try to find some means of forcing a distinction between the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication and find some new paradigm for understanding predication other than the relation of proper names to their referents.

In the first part of the *Parmenides*, the young Socrates is portrayed as attempting to pursue the first strategy. He employs the distinction between Forms and sensibles and the doctrine that the latter are "called after" the former by virtue of participating in them. So, the only time a sentence of the form 'A is B' is really true is in the context of a self-predication statement where the subject is a Form. All of the sensibles which we say "are" B are really only called after the Form. The true form of these alleged predications is not 'A is B' but rather 'A has a share of B.' So, the surface grammar of our ordinary way of speaking is misleading. We use the same word, 'is,' to indicate two quite different relations between terms. When we say that Jones is beautiful, we mean by 'is' that Jones
stands in a certain relation to Beauty Itself: he has a share of it. But, when we say that The Beautiful Itself is beautiful, we use 'is' to indicate a relation between two terms which conforms with Zeno's Stricture. Following Grice, Code and Silverman, we can syntactically mark this difference by distinguishing between Being (Izing) and Having (Hazing) beautiful.\textsuperscript{14}

It is easy to see that if this strategy worked, it would provide every reason to think that there are Forms which correspond to all common nouns. We want to be able to say not only that Jones is just or large, but also that he is a man. Unfortunately, there are other men besides Jones. So, Jones is not the same as man since Jones is not the same as Smith. But, if Jones is not the same as man, then Zeno's Stricture requires that we deny that 'man' can be predicated of Jones. We could soften the blow quite a bit if we could claim that, although 'Jones Iz man' is not true, nonetheless Jones has a share of the Form of Man and so is called after that which really Iz man. Our ordinary ways of speaking could be vindicated to an extent. When we properly interpret the 'is' in 'Jones is a man,' the sentence is true after all.

\textsuperscript{14} Code (1983) and Silverman (1991) explore ways in which the distinction between the relations of being (which they call Izing) and participation (Hazing) might be used to provide an account of the way in which both sensibles and Forms "are." Silverman's account, in particular, provides a way of understanding the relation between the way that Forms are (Izing) and identity which preserves the intimate connection between identity and Being that Zeno's Stricture insists upon. Identity is, on his account, a defined relation. $x=y$ if and only if $x$ Iz $y$ and $y$ Iz $x$. His interpretation of a self-predication statement like 'The F Itself is F' is that it is a schema which awaits a substitution of the essence of F for the term 'F' in the predicate place. Thus, what self-predication statements assert is that each Form is identical with its essence.
Zeno's Stricture poses a problem for statements about Forms as well as ones about sensibles. In the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, Plato has made claims about the Forms that do not meet Zeno's Stricture. The Forms are, for instance, eternal and unchanging. Each one is presumably the same as itself and different from all the others. Yet, Largeness is not [identical to] Eternality or to Sameness. One could attempt the same solution with respect to all of the Forms which, like Eternality, are predicated of Forms *qua* Forms as was used for sensibles. Though Largeness fails to be Eternality, nonetheless it has a share of Eternality. The only time that 'F' falls in the predicate place where the relation between subject and predicate is that of Being is in a self-predication statement. There may be some reason to think that Plato thought of Forms participating in Forms even when he wrote the *Republic*. But, at any event, the distinction between Being and Having a share is capable of meeting Zeno's Stricture.

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15 Much ink has been spilled over 476a4-7 where Plato writes καὶ περὶ δικαίον καὶ ἀδίκον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἑκατόν εἶναι τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνία πανταχοῦ φαν- ταζόμενα πολλὰ φαινονται ἑκατόν. Κοινωνία is, of course, one of the words that Plato uses to describe participation. One can, however, avoid the implication that the Forms participate in one another by supposing that καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνία explains how Good and Evil have commerce with one another by association with actions and bodies which are, under one description, good but under another evil (cf. Owen, p. 305, n.5). The best point in favor of such a reading, I think, is that even on the *Sophist* doctrine of the blending of the Forms, Good and Evil will not have κοινωνία with one another. But, an additional part of the subject is καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν. If we pay more attention to it than to the pairs of opposites we might suppose that what Plato has in mind is the predication of one Form of another; e.g. the Good is beautiful (cf. Adam ad loc). Still others amend the text, in spite of the facts that all manuscripts give καὶ ἀλλήλων: Badham, ἄλλη ἄλλως; Bywater ἄλλοἱ ἄλλως.
B. Young Socrates and the Range of Forms

After Socrates announces his solution to Zeno's argument, Parmenides asks him some further questions about his theory. In particular, Parmenides is interested in the very question that concerns us: What is the range of Forms? Socrates confidently asserts that there are Forms for Likeness, Unlikeness, One, Many, Rest and Motion as well as Justice, Beauty and Goodness. These are all πρός τι terms. If Plato portrays a young Socrates being questioned by Parmenides (the "author" of the puzzle which will put the theory of Forms to a new use) because he, Plato, wants to see how his own earlier work stands up to this brand new problem, this is exactly what we should expect. Plato's earlier view, I have argued, contains only Forms for these terms. When Parmenides asks him whether he thinks that there is a Form for 'man' or 'fire' and 'water' we may get some small hint at one of the reasons that discouraged the hypothesis of Forms for sortal and mass terms. Parmenides asks, "What about a Form of Man, separate from us and from all others such as us?" The "us" in question are all men, of course. Parmenides has already made a point of stressing the fact that the Forms are separate from sensible things and that the sensibles come to be called what they are by virtue of participating in the Forms. And he will lay the same stress on the opposition between sensibles and Forms when he discusses the ridiculous.

16 Actually, Rest and Motion are not reiterated at 130b, but Parmenides does ask about πάντα διὰ νῦν δὴ ᾽Εἴμωνος ἡκονεῖς.

17 One might have doubts about 'motion' or 'rest' but recall Plato's example of the top from Republic IV that is moving in relation to its circumference but standing still in relation to its axis. Further, he goes on to define motion and rest by reference to terms that are obviously πρός τι. To be in motion is to be always in a different. 'Different' is one of Plato's two explicit examples of relative term. Cf. Sph. 255c.
things—hair, mud and dirt. Perhaps his point is this: What, in such cases, participates in the Form? If it is a man who participates in the Form of Man, then why do we need the Form? The identification of the subject as a man is conceptually prior to the participation in the Form, so in what sense is the Form explanatory? But, on the other hand, if it is not Jones, the man, who is a man by participating in Man Itself, what could the participant possibly be? It is not for nothing that one might fear falling into an abyss of nonsense with respect to these issues.

When Plato confronts the puzzles about predication that arise from Eleaticism, he realizes that he needs Forms for every common term. But, if there are such Forms, he must answer the problem about the nature of the participant. The answer to this problem, I believe, is the \( \Delta \tau \rho \delta \chi \eta \) of the Timaeus. Just how it constitutes an answer to this problem is well beyond the scope of this study. It is likely no accident that Parmenides tells the young Socrates that he will eventually be able to overcome these doubts. Perhaps Plato already has an idea how he will deal with the ultimate subjects of participation or perhaps he merely has confidence that he will find an answer.

C. Participation and the Singleness of the Form

The section from 131a-133b contains three different attempts to understand the relation of participation. It is obvious that if Socrates' answer to Zeno's argument is to work, he must be able to make sense of the central concept which allows him to say that, in some sense, a plurality of things can correctly be said to be (but not, of course, to Be!) F. I shall not attempt to interpret these accounts of
participation in detail. I think that it can be shown that all, save the \( \nu \omicron \omicron \mu \alpha \) account of 132b-c, try to argue that if this is what participation consists in, then the Form will be a plurality and not one. This is a damning conclusion because the Form of F alone is F. Zeno's Stricture precisely precludes the possibility that more than one thing might be F. If there were a plurality of Forms of F, then, by virtue of violating Zeno's Stricture, each could be shown to be both like and unlike itself.

I shall confine my remarks on this part of the text to 131d-e. This is not merely playful eristic, as a casual reading of the text might suppose. The supposition that participation consists in having a part of the Form gives rise to the same explanatory puzzles that motivated the theory of Forms in the final argument of the Phaedo. The arguments from 131d-e even work with the familiar examples from Phaedo: Largeness, Smallness and Equality.

Suppose that having a share of a Form means having a part of that Form. Since the share is a part, it is less than the whole and, as a result, smaller or a small thing. But, Jones is allegedly made large by his participation in Largeness. If participation is the having of a part, then it is by virtue of the share of Large that he is large. But the share has on analysis been revealed as a thing that is itself small. Thus, the share of the large falls prey to the same difficulty that "a head" did in the Phaedo. We have an instance in which something not F is the \( \alpha \eta \tau \iota \alpha \) by virtue of which something is F.
Moreover, if shares are parts, then the participation of things in the Equal violates Explanatory Constraint 4: there must be some connection between the nature of explanans and explanandum which makes it clear why the former is an explanation of the latter. A share of equality *qua* part is something smaller than Equality Itself. What connection could obtain between the nature of that which is *smaller* and that which is *equal*, such that a smaller thing constitutes the explanation for why something is equal?

Finally when a share or portion of Smallness is taken from the Form, then the share is the *alēria* of contrary conditions. The Form is larger than its part by just that much. Thus, by the removal of the share the Form becomes in this sense larger. But, by having the share of the small, Jones becomes small. The share thus violates EC1 just as "a head" did in *Phaedo*. When it was invoked to explain why Simmias was taller than Socrates, it explained both why Simmias was shorter and why Socrates taller.

The problems that Parmenides raises about the nature of participation are not only critical if the theory of Forms is to meet the challenge that Zeno has raised. These puzzles show that unless some better account of participation can be given, then the theory may not be able to do the work for which it was originally devised—that is, to provide a metaphysical framework which allows for the possibility of coherent explanations.
The section of the *Parmenides* from 131a-133a focuses on the relation of participation because that relation is critical to Socrates' response to Zeno. In his response, Socrates attempts to show how it can be possible that there are many things that are F, even if Zeno's Stricture is observed. To reiterate: his point is that many things "are" F by having a share of the F itself, but only the F itself is F. Thus, Socrates' solution accepts the Eleatic constraints on "being," but tries to work within those constraints in order to make room for pluralism by introducing a new relation midway between the Eleatic "being" (Izing) and "not being" (whatever that might turn out to be). The last criticisms in 133a-135b, however, pave the way for the rejection of Zeno's Stricture and the Eleatic constraints on being.

Zeno's Stricture requires that the Form of F be αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτῷ αὐτό in a very strong sense; nothing other than the Form of F can be F. Other things may have F, but none can be F. This really sharpens the problem about participation. There is every reason to think that the τὰ ἐν ἦμι must be F. Recall that in the *Phaedo* shares of Forms sustain the same relations of "fleeing or perishing" and "bringing along" as the Forms. The previous attempts to understand participation also suggest this. If the share is a "piece" or "the whole" of the Form, then the share is F as surely as the Form is. These attempts to explain participation have all foundered because they are unable to preserve the singularity of the Form.

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18 cf. *Phdo.* 102d, ἔμοι γὰρ φαίνεται ὅτι μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτε ἐξέλειν ἀμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἦμι μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ’ ἐξέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι . . .
Thus, the arguments of 131a-133a form one half of a dilemma: pending a further explanation of participation, the share of the F in us cannot be F. The "greatest perplexity" argument of 133a-135b forms the other half of the dilemma. It shows why we cannot simply give up the claim that the shares of the Forms are F.

Socrates agrees that there is an essence (οὐσία) of each thing itself by itself and that this implies that none of these things are "in us." We know that the shares of Forms are in us, so to deny that καθ’ ὅτι ἐκάστου οὐσίαν are in us is to deny that the shares of the Forms are their essences. In the absence of any way of understanding the relation of participation which does not make it clear that 'the F itself' and 'the F in us' are terms for the same thing, Socrates must concede to this demand if he is to preserve Zeno's Stricture. But this raises a special difficulty for Forms of πρὸς τὰ terms.

Such of the Forms as are what they are in relation to one another, have their being in relation to themselves and not in relation to the things in us; likenesses or whatever they turn out to be, having shares of which we are named whatever each is. But the things in us which bear the same names as the Forms, these again are in relation to them [the things in us] but not in relation to the Forms and are of themselves and not of such things as they are called after. 

Prm. 133c-d

We have already discussed briefly Plato's treatment of Master Itself and Slave Itself.19 These Forms are πρὸς one another simply because it is part of the logical grammar of relative terms that they are always in relation to their proper correlatives. Master Itself is the very thing that it is by virtue of being of or in relation to

19 Supra pp. 205-7.
Slave Itself. This is just to say that the proper account of what a master is includes the fact that he or she is master of a slave. The accounts of ‘master’ and ‘slave’ are interwoven in the order of understanding. Accordingly, Plato insists that the δυνα to which these λόγοι correspond are πρός ἀλλήλα. The intuition is that, if the Form of F is of the Form of G, then anything which is F—has the kind of being that the Form has—must likewise be of the G itself.

Master Itself is not in relation to Jones, the slave. Jones’ existence is utterly irrelevant to what the proper account of slave is. Because Jones is a slave and not the ontological correlate of the proper account of ‘slave,’ he is not the slave of Master Itself. Rather, on the Phaedo account, he is the slave of Smith by virtue of having a share of Slave Itself. This share is, somehow, directed upon Smith and not Brown, just as the share of the large in Simmias is somehow directed at Cebes and not at Phaedo. As we have seen, Plato has no fully developed account of exactly how this is possible. What we were told in the Phaedo was consistent with several different interpretations. Plato now, in the Parmenides, exploits this incomplete part of the Phaedo theory of Forms.

In most cases, a share of a relative Form is πρός another share of its correlative Form. If these shares fail to be their respective Forms, they will also fail to be of or in relation to the Forms in question. But this is just the result that we want. Simmias is not taller than the Small Itself by having a certain share of the Large. He is taller than Cebes, who has a coordinate share of the Small. The problem is that there are at least two cases in which it must be the case that having a share of the Form of F makes the participant of or in relation to the
corelative *Form*, not of or in relation to a *share* of the correlative Form in a sensible. By having a share of Knowledge Itself, a person ought to know the Form which is the proper object of that part of Knowledge. But, this proves to be impossible if the Forms are αὐτό καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ in the sense that they and only they Are and so are πρὸς correlative Forms. Only αὐτή ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη which is τῆς ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς (134a). We have ἡ παρὰ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη which is τῆς παρὰ ἡμῖν ἀλήθειας. This results from the admission that we do not have the Forms and they are not in us. If, as I have suggested, we take this to mean that a share of the Form itself fails to be F, then it is possible to see *Parmenides* 131a-135a as posing a dilemma for the theory of Forms. No analysis of participation has yet shown how the shares of the Form itself can be F, yet there are clear cases in which shares must be F. If not, then there is no knowledge of the Forms.

To further sharpen the point, Parmenides asks us to consider the gods. Just supposing that it were possible that anyone has a share of Knowledge Itself which really is knowledge, surely it is the gods. But, if they have a share which is in the same way that the Form is, then their knowledge is of the proper correlative of the Form and not of the *things in us*. Thus, the gods can have no knowledge of us. Parallel arguments concerning Master and Slave show that we cannot be their slaves nor they our masters.

E. Conclusion

We have now come full circle. Some of the πρὸς τῆς terms which posed the problems which first lead Plato to the hypothesis of the Forms are now the
key to part of a damning objection to that very theory. But, as Parmenides reminds us at 135b-c, we cannot abandon the Forms either. The latter half of the Parmenides does, in a way, deal with the dilemma of 131a-135a. It does so by first showing that Zeno's Stricture is self-refuting. It is precisely because the One of the first supposition can have nothing—not even 'being'—predicated of it that it fails to be all of the things that Parmenides said it was in his poem. In the second supposition, Plato systematically illustrates different senses of 'same,' 'different,' 'like' and 'unlike' which allow him to take the other way around Zeno's puzzle. Rather than attempting to make room for pluralism within the confines of a system that conflates predication with identity, Plato teases apart these notions and so refutes the very basis of Zeno's argument. The logical and semantical peculiarities of relative terms are instrumental in drawing these distinctions. Thus, one phase in Plato's attention to relative terms ends and another begins. From the Parmenides on, he no longer resorts to considerations solely about relatives to argue for the existence and separation of the Forms. In later dialogues, like the Sophist, he is far more interested in the way in which these Forms in particular mediate the relations that obtain among the totality of Forms. Thus, Plato's argument from relatives becomes an analysis of the way in which relatives contribute to the structure of the world of Forms.
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