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Personality and political postures: The case of the clerical rulers of Iran. (Volumes I and II)

Snare, Charles Edward, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1992

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PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL POSTURES: THE CASE OF
THE CLERICAL RULERS OF IRAN

Volume I

DISSertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Charles Edward Snare, B.A., M.A.

The Ohio State University
1992

Dissertation Committee:
Margaret Hermann
Donald Sylvan
Richard Herrmann

Approved by
Margaret Hermann
Advisor
Department of Political Science
To Karen
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VITA

21 April 1955 ............... Born - Tiffin, Ohio
1980 ....................... B.A., Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio

PUBLICATIONS


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Major Field: Political Science

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Political actors of a nation may vary widely in the general stance they desire their government to adopt. For instance, with respect to the international arena, should the government embrace an aggressive or accommodating posture in dealing with other nations? In regards to the domestic arena, should their nation gravitate toward the position of centralizing or decentralizing the locus of power? Such differences in views, at times, may cause heated debates, rifts, or even coup attempts. For example, Muhayshi, a former member of the Libyan ruling elite, and a few like-minded associates, had a showdown with Kaddafi over the allocation of funds. Muhayshi wanted the funds to go to internal policies rather than Kaddafi's foreign adventures (Hinnebusch 1982:209-212; Gutteridge 1984:24; Davis 1987:133). Another case is Castro and Che Guevara of Cuba. Harris (1970), a historian, proposes the separation of the two related to differences in foreign policy. Che was more inclined to foster indigenous revolutions.1

A closer examination of the Libyan case under Kaddafi merits attention. What is so striking is that Muhayshi was
recruited by Kaddafi six years prior to the successful 1969 Revolution which overthrew King Idris. The ruling Central Committee (later called the Revolution Command Council) consisted of twelve members, including Muhayshi. These members had similar motives, worldviews, and military backgrounds (Fathaly and Palmer 1980:49). Muhayshi had even entered a military career because Kaddafi ordered it (Bianco 1975:48). Furthermore, even after Muhayshi and his associates were no longer members of the core decisionmaking body, differences, at times, surfaced. Jalloud, Kaddafi's number two man, has disagreed with Kaddafi's aggressive foreign military actions. At one point, he left Libya in temporary protest (Arabia: The Islamic World Review May 1987:23). Jalloud's position on how Libya should deal with foreign entities is, at times, in direct contrast to Kaddafi's (Zartman and Berman 1982:26). This is somewhat startling considering Jalloud and Kaddafi possess similar motives, worldviews, and military training as well as having grown up together in the same sort of poor rural background. Thus, it is not unforeseen that many observers consider Jalloud and Kaddafi to possess quite different personalities (see Zartman and Berman 1982:26).

These examples suggest political leaders who have initiated the overthrow, and subsequently play a role in building a revolutionary authoritarian regime (e.g. Castro's Cuba, Kaddafi's Libya, or Nasser's Egypt), may have
fundamental differences in postures (i.e. the general inclination the political actor would like to see his government adopt). Furthermore, the Kaddafi anecdote implies, even with seemingly similar training and socialization experiences, differences among the ruling elite do occur. Such differences, while usually surprising to some observers, should not be unexpected. As Roche and Sachs (1955:249-255) so cogently presented a number of years ago, social movements -- whether political, social, or religious -- tend to display two major types of leaders: the Bureaucrat or Realist and the Enthusiast or Idealist (i.e. Fundamentalist). While both possess strong ideological convictions to the movement, the Idealist seeks to make the movement into a "living faith" whereas the Realist is concerned with growth and stability of the movement. The Idealist fervently pushes for a new world (or regional) order immediately while the Realist works within the existing world (regional) order, for the present. Fundamental differences in outlook will emerge even in the seemingly most radical movements.

In pondering over the above discussion, I became intrigued with the following questions: What differences should we expect to emerge? Who are the leaders who embrace the different stances or postures? Can personality help us understand which leaders will be Idealist or Realist? In attempting to grapple with such questions, I decided to pursue
the avenue of focusing on one regime which had overthrown the existing order as well as one espousing a single ideology.

This research endeavor, therefore, is a study of a revolutionary authoritarian regime -- Iran. It is a study of Iranian elites during the liberation struggle, the Khomeini decade, and now into the decade of reconstruction. How do the leaders of the Revolution want their country to relate to other nations? How do they want the government to be organized? Furthermore, this book is also an inquiry into political personality. Can such differences in a leader's political postures be explained by the actor's disposition?

Our vehicle of enquiry will be a study of four Iranian leaders -- Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani. As chapters three and four explain, these revolutionary leaders, who are among Khomeini's most ardent followers, have played a role in the revolutionary authoritarian regime and are likely to have an impact in the 1990's. They also represent a range of the different political postures which have begun to emerge in the last four or five years among the clerics despite their homogenous training.

Specifically, this research effort considers three sets of questions about Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani. First, who are these clerics? What are they like? What are the similarities and differences in their socialization processes? What roles do they play, or have they previously played, in the various stages of the
Revolution? The answer to this set of questions will be unearthed by a comprehensive analysis of the life, style, modus operandi, socialization process, disposition, and beliefs about these four clerics. To date, little has been published in this area about Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani.

Second, what are the nature of some of the postures in which these clerics are different? To what extent do these leaders differ on various political postures? In what direction are these clerics trying to push Iran, domestically and internationally, presently and for the coming decade? The answer to this second set of questions will be uncovered in a two step process. First, we will propose five political postures (i.e. aggressiveness, autonomy, involvement, freedom of expression, and centralization of power) based upon the previous works of researchers and analysts. This will be done by utilizing the insights of those who have been engaged in work related to postures as well as the observations of Iranian area specialists. The second step will reveal where the four clerics stand in regard to the various postures by employing test cases. These test cases represent incidents or issues which reflect the appropriate posture considered.

Third, how important are personality characteristics in determining these clerics' political postures? Do they predict the political figure's future postures? Do political actors who differ in personality structure also differ in
their receptiveness to particular beliefs regarding the appropriate general governmental strategies? The answer to this third set of questions will be unraveled by applying an embellished version of Margaret G. Hermann's (1987a; 1987b; 1987d) framework of political personality. As shown in figure one, four broad types of characteristics -- beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style -- are considered to influence the political postures an actor will endorse. The Hermann framework furnishes us with a means to explore the relationship between their personality and the general stances they want their government to adopt.

The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. First, I will outline why Iran was chosen as the case to study. Second is a discussion of why the Hermann personality framework is employed. Third, the contributions of this research project are presented. Fourth, an adumbration of each of the following chapters is provided.

Why Iran? The case of post-Shah Iran was chosen for four reasons. First, it is a Third World revolutionary authoritarian regime. Second, the Iranian political situation is one which offers a likelihood of personality affecting one's posture. Third, the clerical rulers differ in their general political stances (i.e. postures). Fourth, the Iranian leaders have often openly debated or espoused their differences.
FIGURE 1: Summary of Relationship Between Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders and Their Political Postures

Source: Adapted from Hermann 1987d:163.
With the fall of the Shah in 1979 and the subsequent consolidation of power and control by Khomeini and his followers, dramatic social and political changes were brought about. Ayatollah Khomeini and his associates attained absolute authority and supreme jurisdiction. They are in a position to impose their will on the rest of the country. Their opinion is beyond challenge. In other words, Iran is currently a revolutionary authoritarian regime.

The second reason the case of Iran was chosen is because the Iranian political situation is one in which a variety of political actors have had and still have the opportunity to influence the decisionmaking process. Even before the Ayatollah Khomeini died in June of 1989, he was unwilling to exercise close direction of policy (Cottam 1989:173). Khomeini's ideas were highly abstract (Cottam 1987:4) and he played the role of balancer (Ramazani 1989:211; Weinrauch 1989/90:22). Thus, this resulted in the appearance of a number of competing policy preferences and, also, others assumed greater decisional latitude (Cottam 1987:14). Additionally, since Khomeini's death no one person has been able to determine policy (Hunter 1989/1990:145). Even though, Rafsanjani has emerged as one of the most powerful figures in Iran, a variety of other political actors, albeit some without official positions, continue to have considerable influence (Hunter 1989/1990:137-138). In other words, as Cottam
(1989:172) states, "The Iranian regime is authoritarian but lacks an individual or collective dictator."

Such a political situation is important for this research effort because numerous scholars (e.g. Greenstein 1969; Lane 1969; Hermann 1976; Holsti 1977) have persuasively indicated that personality is more likely to be consequential to behavior, and therefore the posture an actor desires his government to adopt (i.e. verbal behavior), in certain circumstances or conditions. Some of these circumstances or conditions are during crisis, ambiguous or unstable environments, location of policymaker at the top of the hierarchy, and in a closed rather than open type of regime. The four Iranian leaders examined are at the top of the hierarchy and operate within a closed regime. Thus, their personalities should have an impact on their postures.

A third reason the case of Iran was chosen is that the Iranian ruling establishment is not a monolithic whole (Schahgaldian 1989:35; Hunter 1990:177,186-187; Kazemi and Hart 1990:60; Savory 1990:62; and Khalilzad 1990:237). Even though, a number of the major power wielders were taught by Ayatollah Khomeini, often spent time in the same jail together during the Shah's reign, and promulgate the virtues of Islam vociferously, these leaders differ, according to many area experts (see chapter four), on how they believe Iran should relate to other nations and how the government should be organized. Thus, with some diversity among the political
actors, it becomes possible for such differences to be explained by personality variables.

The fourth reason the case of Iran was selected is because these differences have been openly debated. Many of the Iranian leaders have voiced their opinions on a variety of issues. Thus, for the researcher, it provides a means to obtain a data set to ascertain the individuals' various postures.

Why employ Hermann's personality approach? To answer this question, we must first ask the broader question of why use personality in such an analysis over other potential influences on a leader's political posture? Researchers have shown some interest in the interrelations between content of political thought and personality traits. Evidence on relations between personality and policy preferences comes from a variety of methodological approaches such as laboratory experiments, content analysis, surveys, case studies, and expert rating of decisionmakers (Christiansen 1959; DiRenzo 1967b; McClosky 1967; Eckhardt and Lentz 1967; Terhune 1970; Etheredge 1978b; Hermann 1980; Eldersveld et al. 1981; Gibson 1981; Tetlock 1981; Walker 1983; Steinberg and Soriana 1984; Winter 1992; Sniderman 1975). Furthermore, there is both similarity in results across methodologies and the relationship holds across disparate subject populations.2 This research suggests political actors who differ in personality also differ in the general political views (i.e.
postures) they want their country to endorse. Political postures, presumably, do not exist in isolation from broader dimensions of individual differences.

Despite this, some are not convinced of its utility. As Greenstein (1992:106) recently stated: "The study of personality and politics sometimes appears to have more critics than practitioners" (see also footnote five in this chapter). These critics are not persuaded of the merits of using personality in political analysis because those who study international relations, by and large, are "situationists", in psychological jargon. The underlying assumption is that the political actor's postures, preferences, and actions are ultimately determined by the actor's political environment. Consequently, the study of personality and politics adds little, if anything, to what we already know.

Even though these critics look askance at any efforts to employ personality in such analysis, their reasons are quite different. One approach assumes that the political actors within a nation structure and interpret their environment in the same way. Thus, they all respond in the same manner. Such an approach is embraced by Realist (e.g. Morgenthau 1985), structural Realist (e.g. Waltz 1979), and rational choice proponents (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita 1981). For instance, Hveem's (1972) thesis is based on a structural-sociological approach which proposes the postures of elites
are a function of the position their nation enjoys in the international system.

On the other hand, the other approach does not subscribe to the notion that all actors interpret the environment in the same way. They would point out the potential influence of role (Rosenau 1968) or situational and informational processing factors (Suedfeld 1983). Rosenau (1968) concludes party and committee roles of American senators were the primary influence.3 Suedfeld (1983) takes a cognitive-interactionist view which maintains, for instance, that "authoritarianism" increases or decreases with environmental parameters such as information load, nature of decisionmaking structure, time available to process information and the like.4

The first approach would see efforts to use personality in political analysis as misguided since political figures possess postures, espouse preferences, and act according to an objective situation. This approach assumes individual leaders interpret the situation the same. Thus one should not find opposing postures or preferences among actors within a nation.

The second approach, however, does expect to find opposing postures or preferences among actors within a nation. The differences are not attributable to personality. Personality may be nothing more than an epiphenomena which is determined by their more fundamental factors.
Obviously, the personality analysis proposed in this study is incompatible with the first approach which suggests political actors within a regime possess the same postures and preferences. This is not necessarily the case with the second approach. For instance, one may become a foreign minister because one's personality fits the prescribed role. Nevertheless, the empirical results of this study will or will not support the contention that political actors have differing postures and preferences. As for which is more important, role or personality, my aim, however, it not to try to "prove" whether or not personality is the most important independent variable. My aim is to see how well personality can predict a policymaker's postures. Do the future postures they advocate run counter or in agreement with their dispositions? This is one of the central concerns of this research endeavor.

I have chosen in this research effort to employ one political personality typology -- M.G. Hermann's approach. While there are a number of other typologies (see chapter two), I utilize Hermann's typology for three reasons. First, it is considered one of the most well developed (Walker 1988). Second, it is one of the few frameworks which provides a means to assess personality characteristics at-a-distance. Typologies are abundant but ways to operationalize them are far from prevalent. Third, the Hermann approach furnishes a means to ascertain an orientation for the domestic and
international arena as well as a number of other distinctions. Some research has suggested how a leader acts in one domain may not be the same in another domain (Hermann 1987d; Snare 1992).

This study makes three major contributions and two secondary contributions. The major contributions are: 1) it extends our understanding of the ruling political leaders in Iran, 2) it assists in our understanding of revolutionary authoritarian regimes and, 3) it adds to our understanding of the relevance of personality to future postures. This endeavor also makes two secondary contributions. One secondary contribution relates to its implications for decisionmaking theories. The other secondary contribution is replicating and building upon an existing political personality framework.

One major contribution of this research endeavor is that it can assist in our understanding of Iran. While much has been written about the manner in which the clerics achieved political power in 1979 and the reasons for maintaining it, little has been written about the clerical leadership itself even though they often demonstrate contradictory and opposing viewpoints (Schahgaldian 1990:61-64). Schahgaldian (1989:3), in summarizing the state of the literature about the clerical rulers of Iran, indicates most works are too spotty and too general. Therefore, differences among the leaders have not been adequately outlined and consequently the Iranian leaders
remain an enigma. The present study directly addresses this by outlining the differences among four of these political actors both in terms of personality and the stances the four clerics desire their government to adopt. Consequently, this may help define the range of options these leaders are likely to consider viable, provide an understanding of how each one views the world, and may yield insight into how each will act among themselves as they grasp for, or seek to maintain, power.

Schahgaldian (1989:3) also suggests the need to examine the clerical rulers with new research methods in order to understand the regime. A systematic psychological analysis of the ruling clerics, to date, has not been explored. Furthermore, the use of test cases, the dependent variable, to indicate the political postures of the clerics has not been investigated. Assessments of how the various ruling clerics want Iran to relate to other nations and how the government should be organized is presently confined to intuitive analyses.

The results of this study can also shed light in areas in which the Iranian area specialists disagree. As chapter four discusses, Iranian analysts, at times, do not always see eye to eye on where a particular actor stands (i.e. his posture). Thus, this study can provide an empirical basis for stating the leader's stance he has urged on his government (for the time period covered in this study).
The second major contribution of this research effort is that it will assist in our understanding of revolutionary authoritarian regimes. The anecdotes at the beginning of this chapter suggest leaders of a revolutionary authoritarian regime (e.g. Castro's Cuba, Kaddafi's Libya, and Nasser's Egypt) differ in the political postures (i.e. the general inclination the political actor would like to see his government adopt) they espouse. Beyond such anecdotes, little has been written about the nature and extent of such differences in political postures of revolutionary authoritarian regimes. Our knowledge is usually limited to the lives, actions, beliefs, and modus operandi of the predominant figure of the revolution like Lenin, Castro, Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, and Nasser (e.g. Wolfenstein 1967; Daly 1972) or to an overview of a number of revolutionary leaders from various countries and different historical, demographic, and situational contexts (e.g. Rejai 1979). The few revolutionary elite studies which have been undertaken have been concerned with Soviet and Hitler regimes (Strauss 1973; Lasswell and Lerner 1965). Our understanding of the differences within Third World revolutionary authoritarian regimes is far from adequate. We know very little about those who help the predominant revolutionary leader struggle for liberation and then attempt to build a nation. As Adamolekun (1988) suggests in his study, during the nation building stage, some leaders failed in this period even though they
were giants in the nationalist struggle phase. Additionally, we lack an understanding of the extent and nature of the different political postures revolutionary leaders may embrace and why such differences occur.

The third major contribution of this study is that it furthers our understanding of the linkages between personality and a leader's political posture. Understanding this linkage is especially germane considering recent research indicates, as suggested by Chittick et al. (1990:386), that mass and elite foreign policy beliefs are structured around three or four postures (goals or values) and one of the key questions for future research is what are the sources of these postures. While Chittick's et al. comment is in reference to the U.S., the postures studied in this endeavor have been employed by a variety of researchers with respect to different nations and, at times, in cross-national studies (see chapter four). The Hermann framework provides the tie between traits and personality orientations (see chapter five). It furnishes an avenue to hypothesize how the characteristics interact to predispose one to a particular posture (see chapter six). Numerous scholars (e.g. Jervis 1980:98; Bem and Allen 1974) have asserted we must move beyond the one trait to behavior or posture linkage to the interaction of characteristics to behavior/posture linkage since personality can not be measured by one trait. Thus, this study can further our comprehension of how traits interact to influence political postures.
A secondary contribution of this research endeavor is it can aid in forming a theory of political decisionmaking. Decisionmaking theories, by and large, have overlooked individual differences. To some extent, this is understandable since the earliest decisionmaking theories attempted to correct the overly rationalistic notions of decisionmaking by focusing on the critical impact of the political process on policy outcome (Farnham 1988:4). The early decisionmaking theorists, such as Neustadt (1960), Huntington (1961), Allison (1971), and Halperin (1974), focused on political context (such as Neustadt or Halperin) or in terms of the operations of bureaucratic politics (see Farnham 1988; Art 1973; Hilsman 1959).

The emergence of various psychological approaches to decisionmaking began in the 1970's and 1980's (Farnham 1988:8). These researchers are interested in the influence of cognitive (e.g. Jervis 1976; Steinbruner 1974) or motivational (e.g. Janis and Mann 1977; Lebow 1981) factors, or both (e.g. George 1980; Lebow and Cohen 1987), on decisionmaking. Much of the research is directed at the cognitive and motivational constraints that effect decisionmaking performance (Holsti 1988:23). But these efforts leave out the issue of individual differences as Lebow and Cohen (1987:9) point out in remarking:

"motivational models down play personality differences even more than their cognitive counterparts. They ignore the fact that not everybody will respond the same way to external stimulus."
By leaving out the factor of individual differences an important piece of the puzzle is missing. This in no way minimizes these contributions; rather studies of individual differences can enhance our understanding of the decisionmaking process. This is particularly germane considering, as Jervis (1980:86) has indicated, we do not have a good theory of political decisionmaking at the individual level. A better understanding of the individual differences of political figures may aid in developing such a theory.

An example of how it could aid may illustrate this point. Lebow and Cohen (1987:35-44) in a study of President Carter, at one point, focus on the concept of cognitive consistency and its application to political decisionmaking. They conclude Carter's behavior violated the tenets of cognitive consistency with respect to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. While various explanations were conjectured, one potential possibility was the factor of individual differences. Scott (1965), in an earlier study, found that individuals with high "image complexity" (i.e. with multifaceted basis for their perceptions) exhibited less cognitive consistency. Such changes of one's beliefs is, also, a tendency of those with a high need for achievement (Winter and Carlson 1988:96). Therefore, if this is the case with Carter, as some have proposed, then it would appear that we should expect his behavior to violate the tenets of cognitive consistency. In other words, the tenets of
cognitive consistency may be more applicable to some leaders than others.7

Another secondary contribution of this research endeavor relates to the replication of a framework -- specifically M. G. Hermann's model. By using a different body of data, or in this case a different set of leaders, replication increases the confidence in earlier findings and may strengthen the generalizability of those findings (Babbie 1979). Such replication studies (e.g. Shepard 1988; Rasler et al. 1980; Snare 1992) are too often far and few between. Consequently, usually only the originator of the framework utilizes the model (see discussion in chapter two). In order to further develop frameworks, efforts of replication are needed.

Lastly, before jumping into the heart of this enterprise, I will briefly sketch out the contents of each chapter. The next chapter examines the various political personality typologies which have been proposed. This chapter provides a framework for understanding the various conceptualizations. Chapter three probes into the personality and socialization of Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani. It begins to grapple with who are these clerics? How did they grow up and what style and behavior characteristics do they manifest? Chapter four provides a discussion on how the dependent variables, postures, are conceptualized. In other words, what exactly is this study trying to explain? Along with this is an analysis of the areas of controversy and agreement among
what various Iranian area specialists assert are the political postures of the four clerics considered in this book. Chapter five discusses the research design and methodological issues. Chapter six describes how this study will utilize Margaret G. Hermann's framework and the extrapolations to the five postures. A preliminary theory of how the various political personality types (i.e. orientations) cognitively structure their political environment is presented. That is, chapter six specifies the independent variable, personality. Chapter seven examines the results of both the independent variable, personality, and the dependent variables, political postures. How well did personality do in predicting future postures of Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani? Chapter eight discusses the implications as well as some limitations of this endeavor. Along with this, further areas of potential research are outlined.

Furthermore, five appendices are provided for additional information for the reader. Appendix A is the code book for the test cases which were used to reflect the five policy postures -- aggressiveness, autonomy, involvement, freedom of expression, and centralization. Appendix B is a methodological supplement to chapter five. Appendix C is a chronology of events relevant to the Iranian context from 1979 to 1991. Appendix D is a glossary of terms which may be unfamiliar to the reader who does not follow the region closely. Appendix E reproduces a summary of the noteworthy
aspects of the six orientations of the Hermann political personality framework.
Footnotes

1. Other historians (e.g. Lockwood 1967; Mathews 1975) contend Che left Cuba once the revolution was consolidated in a preplanned move to bring victory to other countries. Even if one concurs with this assessment, a political figure's posture seems important. It was Che, not Castro, who left to export the revolution.

2. For a review of some of these in regard to foreign policy, see Tetlock and McGuire (1986:158-159) and Winter (1992).

3. Stassen (1972) reanalyzed the data used by Rosenau and concluded that the belief systems of the senators were the primary explanatory factor. It accounted for behavior that could not be explained by role variables. Falkowski (1978:298) suggests in his research within the U.S. context, that individuals who occupy the same role are quite different in their goals, preferences, styles and orientations. See also Holsti (1970b) and Snyder and Diesing (1977) for similar conclusions in that perceptions and attitudes of decision makers are not influenced by roles. Furthermore, Cummins (1973) in his analysis of Mao, Hsiao, and Churchill concludes cultural variables are of minimal significance.

4. While evidence for this does support this contention, it does not negate the importance of individual differences. For instance, as Trotter (1970:68-72) indicates in his study of the Cuban missile crisis, Dean Acheson and President Kennedy were provided with the same facts and were present in the same discussions, yet their choice of course of action were different. Acheson, unlike Kennedy, thought the air strike was the most rational choice. Another case is noted by Stein and Brecher (1976:52) who found under crisis, Dayan became more militant while Meir became less so. This was in regards to Israel's 1956 Sinai decision.

5. Many political studies and even psychopolitical studies have slighted individual differences. Jervis (1989:491) recently stated that "the study of individual personalities and personality types has fallen out of favor. . ." M. Brewster Smith (1989:509) concurs by noting that political personality is " . . . still cast down from earlier heights of esteem . . . ." However the state of affairs is aptly summarized by Jervis (1989:491) when he says, "In our drive to generalize and explore the cognitive dynamics which characterize many people's thinking processes we may have slighted individual differences and the patterns that are to be found within particular individuals. Thus, in many studies we concentrate on how most people react and pay little attention to why
different people react in different ways . . ." (added emphasis).

6. Ironically Farnham (1988:13) criticizes the present decisionmaking theorists for tending to see the political context as external to the decisionmaker.

7. Falkowski (1978:127-135) predicts Carter will exhibit flexible foreign policy behavior. See also Adler (1980). An example of a recent study which minimizes individual differences is Maoz and Shayer (1987).
CHAPTER II

A REVIEW AND FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING
POLITICAL PERSONALITY TYPOLOGIES

This chapter seeks to examine the various typologies which have been proposed for classifying political leaders. Within this discussion a framework for categorizing the typologies is delineated. Such an analysis is provided for three reasons. First, this has not been done. The theorists who have proposed typologies often work in isolation of one another and it may serve the purpose of cumulative research to pull them together under one framework. Second, since this book utilizes only one of the typologies, it is useful to understand where the Hermann typology fits within the scheme of political personality typologies. Third, the qualitative analyses of the four clerics of this study, in chapters three and four, makes use of some of these types. Thus, this review provides the reader with at least a taste of what these types encompass.
How Are Political Actors Like "Some" Other Political Actors

It has been recognized for a long time that not all political figures are alike (e.g. Munro 1924; Lasswell 1927). Lasswell (1927:162), for instance, states

"Political literature contains more political types than the agitator or the responsible leader . . . Conway has propounded his familiar trichotomy: crowd-compellers, crowd-exponents, and crowd-representatives. The possibility of defining types on the basis of their characteristically reactionary, conservative, liberal, or radical opinions has often been pointed out."

A few years earlier, Munro (1924) postulated three types of political leaders -- bosses, reformers, and leaders -- based on his observations. But it has only been within the last thirty years that this area of inquiry has really begun to develop.1

Before delving into a review of the literature, it is prudent to outline the area this review will encompass. As implied, this chapter endeavors to concentrate on the frameworks that evince different types of political leaders. Thus, we are focusing on elites and not the general population.2 Furthermore, since the focus is on political leaders, we are not concerned with groups or nations. Such writings on national character, or more precisely what Greenstein (1969:15) calls "aggregate analyses", are out of the purview of this endeavor.

As indicated, our focus is at the level of the individual political leader. Yet, we can further differentiate this with Kluckhohn and Murray's (1953:53) idea on people. They contend
every person, in certain respects, is: a) like "all" other persons, b) like "some" other persons, and c) like "no" other persons.

This trichotomy helps distinguish what aspects and tasks the analyst is concerned with and interested in describing. The first one, like "all" others, illustrates the notion that all of us share some things universally. The works of Jervis (1976), Janis and Mann (1977), George (1980) or Cottam (1977) suggest psychological features which pertain to all leaders.4 The second category, like "some" others, relates to how political leaders are similar to some other, not all, political leaders. The works previously noted by Lasswell (1927) and Munro (1924), differentiating between types, are considered here. The third category, like "no" other, is concerned with the unique characteristics of a particular leader which he shares with no one else. Biographies and psychobiographies, such as George and George (1956), Glad (1980), Edinger (1965), or Rogrow (1963), illustrate this sort of analysis, as do Bonham and Shapiro's (1982) cognitive processing model which reveals the structure of thinking about a particular problem for a leader.5

The focus of this review and a significant portion of this study is the psychological conception of how political leaders are like "some" other political leaders. Thus, we are concerned with the "personality and politics" literature as it relates to political leaders. Since the focus is on a subset
of the area of "personality and politics", reviews in this area, on a whole, are not useful for our review. Additionally, since psychological frameworks to international relations have no overarching framework, it is often difficult to compare analyses (Mandel 1986:252). Therefore, this review attempts to not only highlight what has been developed, but also in the process, create a little order out of the chaos.

A few scholars have ventured into summarizing how political figures have been studied. Frank (1973), for instance, divides the literature into four categories: need hierarchy, psychoanalytic, developmental typologies, and information processing. Hopple (1980:61-69), on the other hand, conceptualizes three categories: psychodynamic, personality traits, and belief systems. While these schemes are noteworthy, a more viable alternative would be to base a scheme on both the extant literature and the ways personality theories, in general, have been categorized. This is germane for two reasons. First, this covers both the state of the existing research and illuminates areas that have little or no emphasis. The scheme may be applicable even as further research develops. Second, personality has many definitions. Each personality theorist has his (her) own. How one defines personality depends on one's perspective. That is, what constitutes personality is linked to theory. Ergo, such a
scheme helps identify what constitutes personality for a particular theory.

Maddi (1989:41,534) has outlined four broad schemes of psychological theorizing. The four categories are: 1) conflict perspective, 2) fulfillment perspective, 3) consistency perspective, and 4) overt behavior perspective. These categories will be used to organize the extant literature and elements in the scheme and will be briefly described or noted.

Conflict Perspective

The "conflict perspective" assumes a person is continuously and inevitably caught in a clash between two great forces (Maddi 1989:41). Man's inner conflict is a tension that exist between what the individual would like to do and what the person realizes the world demands. Behavior is motivated by reality oriented considerations as well as inner impulses. Life, at best, must be a compromise and involves a dynamic balance of forces (Maddi 1989:41). Personality theorists such as Freud, Kohut, and Horney are examples of this approach.

To a large degree, this "conflict perspective" of personality has been applied to political figures at the level of "no" other person. That is, idiosyncratic or actor specific psychological dispositions have been its emphasis (Hopple 1980:64). Nevertheless, within this perspective a
number of frameworks have been proposed. The typologies generated by Lasswell (and subsequent expansion by Davies), Luck, Etheredge, Swansbrough, and Elms are presented first. Four other political personality syndromes -- Warfare, Belligerent, Phaeton complex, and Narcissistic -- are also discussed since these, at times, are referred to by various researchers.

One must start with the individual who gave the impetus to the study of political personality -- Harold Lasswell. He (1930:262) suggested,

"Political types may be distinguished according to the specialized or the composite character of the functions which they perform and which they are desirious of performing. There are political agitators, administrators, theorists, and various combinations thereof. There are significant differences in the developmental history of each type."

Lasswell postulated that although individual responses to particular situations accounted for the three types, the same general formulas explained why these people became political men. The political man is when private motives are displaced onto a public object and rationalized in terms of public interest.

Lasswell was not very explicit in elucidating his three types, especially the Theorist which is not described at length or even illustrated with an example. But Davies (1980) has resurrected Lasswell's typology and, to some extent, embellished and refined it.11 While the Lasswell/Davies typology of leaders has not been employed by many researchers
or tied to political figures extremely well, it does, unlike
many other types and typologies, enunciate the genesis of
political behavior.12

The Agitator (e.g. old testament prophets, Woodrow
Wilson) is marked by his need to win an emotional response
from the public. He lives to be noticed and to make a mark
and is often strongly narcissistic. Others are seen in terms
of what they can give. Agitators are demanding, mistrustful,
pessimistic, and are fixated in the oral stage.13 There are
two subtypes of Agitators -- the publicist and the orator.
The former avoids face-to-face contact with the audience while
the latter does not.14

The Administrator (e.g. Hoover, LBJ, Kissinger) is
proficient at manipulating things and situations. He strives
for power and control, and may be Machiavellian. The
Administrator is fixated in the anal stage of development.
There are three subtypes of Administrators: 1) hard driving -
- like the Agitator but displace his affects upon less
generalized objects, 2) cautious conscientious -- delight in
the routine and are very detail oriented, and 3) balanced --
display impersonal interest in the task.

The Theorist (e.g. Marx) does not provoke the environment
as Agitators do because he is more fearful of reprisals.
Instead, he strives for success by building and manipulating
words. The Theorist tends toward grandiosity and is very
competitive. He delights in judging other people and things.
But, the Theorist is unable to assert himself in interpersonal settings as the Administrator is able to do.15

One apparent observation of the Lasswell/Davies typology is its Freudian emphasis. Each type is linked to a developmental stage. Therefore, success for each type has a different meaning. Whereas success for the Agitator means "I get" and success for the Administrator means "I control", success for the Theorist means "I am big in the eyes of others".16 But even beyond this distinction, the three types vary in their emphasis on people or concepts. Davies (1980:19) contends that the Administrator tends to be tied to individuals and groups, the Agitator to the large public, and the Theorist to concepts.

Luck (1974;1978), like Lasswell and Davies, seeks to understand the behavior of political leaders utilizing Freudian theory. He enunciates three types of political leaders: Oral character or Charismatic, Anal character or Bureaucratic, and Genital character. The Oral type (e.g. Hitler) tends to be quite impulsive and narcissistic. Such a leader exhibits manic depressive behavior. The Anal type (e.g. Stalin) possesses relatively lower self esteem than the Oral type and displays obsessive-compulsive behavior. The Oral type is inclined to be aggressive against anyone while the Anal type only against weaker entities. The third type adumbrated by Luck is the Genital character type (e.g. Mao
Tse-Tung). Such a type is less destructive toward others and his behavior is neither compulsive or impulsive.

Along with the threefold typology, Luck proposed an elaborate coding scheme to classify leaders into the three types by utilizing verbal materials (i.e. speeches and interviews). He also advanced an index of leader aggression level. Unfortunately, it does not appear that his quantitative system of assessing leaders or his index level of aggression have been replicated or embellished by other researchers.

Another typology of political figures is one suggested by Etheredge (1978;1978b). In seeking to find out if behavioral differences in interpersonal situations produce similar behavioral differences in international situations (i.e. interpersonal generalization theory), he proposed a fourfold typology. Two personality dimensions, dominance over subordinates and extroversion, combine to form the typology. The high dominant leader intervenes and imposes his will, whereas the low dominant leader relinquishes power. The extrovert leader is inclined to cultivate contact with others during leisure time (and loves crowds), while the introvert leader spends leisure time away from others.

Etheredge's typology of orientations to the international system is as follows: 1) Bloc Leaders (e.g. Dulles, Wilson) are high dominant introverts. Such a leader divides the world into moral values that he thinks it ought to exhibit versus
forces opposed to his vision. In seeking to reshape the world into his vision, the Bloc Leader tends to use military force.

2) World Leaders (e.g. FDR, LBJ) are high dominant extroverts. This leader wants to be the leader for the entire world rather than just his bloc. While he has a tendency to use force, the World Leader is more flexible. A World Leader wants to lead rather than contain.

3) Maintainers (e.g. Coolidge, Rusk) are low dominant introverts. Such a leader seeks to keep the status quo. He is less inclined to use force or take on projects to reshape the world.

4) Conciliators (e.g. Harding) are low dominant extroverts. This leader advocates an accommodationist style and is more open to change than Maintainers. He is one who has very egalitarian relations with his subordinates.

Etheredge focuses on advocacy of a hard line policy by U.S. leaders in the international arena. Like Lasswell's or Luck's types, Etheredge does not consider beliefs to shape policy preference; rather both are a manifestation of underlying psychodynamics. However, his findings suggest high dominance personalities tend to advocate the use of force and extroverts tend to advocate cooperative policies (see also Shepard's 1988 study which does not support the latter).

Swansbrough (1990;1991) has recently suggested a framework which encompasses five types of political figures. They are the Compulsive (or Achiever), Paranoid (or Master), Schizoid (or Loner), Depressive (or Follower), and Dramatic
(or Performer). This political personality typology is a Kohut based model which also includes aspects of the work of Karen Horney. Two of the types Swansbrough proposes, the Compulsive and Paranoid, have been utilized by other political psychologists in order to explain the behavior and effectiveness of political figures. Howbeit, Swansbrough enumerates the symptoms and behaviors of these two types, along with three other types, in a comparative framework.

The Compulsive (e.g. Carter, Wilson, and Hoover), or Achiever in Swansbrough's terms (see also George's 1987 discussion of the Compulsive), is a perfectionist who is opinionated, if not dogmatic. Such a leader is principled in that he is inflexible about matters of morality and ethics. Nevertheless, such a leader lacks a unified belief system which would show a clear path.

The Compulsive leader has a strong need to be in control. He has difficulty delegating authority because he believes others will not do things correctly. Therefore, the Compulsive tends to impose order on others, often preferring a hierarchical organizational style. This ritualized way of doing things is attractive to him because he is intolerant of ambiguity, uncertainty, and surprises as well as it provides him with an elaborate information processing system. Concomitantly, people in the organization become secondary. The Compulsive does not encourage spontaneity or initiative but rather conformity and loyalty are emphasized. His
relations with others are formal and serious since he wants people to respect him.

The Compulsive is so concerned with details and efficiency that he has trouble considering the big picture. That is, he sees the trees but not the forest. Furthermore, his preoccupation with details, along with his risk averse nature, inclines him to continually search for that last piece of information (i.e. workaholic). In his quest to be thorough and complete, decisions are often postponed.

The Paranoid (e.g. Nixon and LBJ), exhibits an unwarranted suspiciousness and antagonism toward others. The world is a hostile place and others are the cause of his (or his group's) problems. Since one must vigilantly defend oneself and/or one's group against attack, such a leader yearns for information about what is happening. The efforts of subordinates are concentrated to stay on top of what is happening. The Paranoid demands unquestioning loyalty and lacks empathy toward others.

The Paranoid is a self centered leader who is extremely rational. His strategy may change according to the circumstances. While this leader avoids risks and tends to be reactive rather than taking the initiative, he ultimately seeks to control and dominate others.

Robins (1986) identified three types of Paranoids: egocentric (e.g. James Forrestal), interactive (e.g. Ida Amin), and charismatic (e.g. Hitler, Stalin, and Ayatollah
Khomeini). Robins and Post (1987:6) delineate the role of the Paranoid in the political system as a function of the scope of delusion and the effectiveness of his political skills. They contend, in contrast to the Authoritarian personality or Machiavellian personality, one can not place rigid boundaries on the Paranoid political personality. Thus, for instance, Volkan's (1980) Destructive Narcissistic personality, Tucker's (1965) Warfare personality, and Hermann's (1987e) Expansionist orientation exhibit paranoid tendencies.

The Schizoid or Loner type (e.g. Ike) is a leader who wants acceptance but since he fears rejection avoids social interaction. Such a leader withdraws and is indecisive. He delegates authority but without an overall plan. However, this leader will react strongly if others try to control him. The Loner has a negative outlook on life, viewing the world as an unhappy place.

The Depressive or Follower (e.g. Ford), in lacking self confidence, is searching to join others or their cause. Such a leader tends to react to events (i.e. passive) and has a pessimistic outlook on life. This leader is not inclined to use force and, generally, is indecisive in making decisions.

The Dramatic or Performer (e.g. Reagan, FDR, or JFK) is a mixture of histrionic and narcissistic personality types. While such a leader is superficially charming and humble, he craves attention and stimulation. This leader tends to be impulsive and a risktaker. Since policies and decisions are
often based on an intuitive feeling, there may be little consistency in policy. The Performer rarely concentrates on the minutia of a project, policy, or decision.

Elms (1976;1986) seeks to distinguish political actors utilizing three contrasting political personality types: Ego-idealism, Authoritarian, and Machiavellian. The latter type, Machiavellian, will be discussed later in this chapter under the Consistency perspective. Elms (1986), however, speculates on how this personality type is formed during childhood and adolescence.

The Ego-idealistic type (e.g. Dulles) is overly concerned with adhering to one's moral standards regardless of the outcome. That is, he is one who defends his ideological position without compromise. This leader judges one's own beliefs and actions, as well as others, in terms of one's standards of moral perfection. Thus, even politics is judged by his internalized moral criteria.

The Authoritarian personality, on the other hand, has an extreme concern with power, regardless of the substantive issues involved (see also Etheredge 1979 and Adorno et al. 1950). He craves power over others. Such a leader expects uncritical submission to ideological authorities and in-group values. The Authoritarian leader is dogmatically moral, rigid, ethnocentric, and nationalistic. He believes the world is very dangerous and sees people and things in simple stereotypes. Thus, the world is divided up into the "strong"
and the "weak". Furthermore, the Authoritarian leader can be exploitive and manipulative as well as having a tendency to blame others. Elms (1986) considers Al Haig to be a political figure who exhibits this personality type.18

The Lasswell/Davies, Luck, Etheredge, Swansbrough, and Elms typologies have employed three to five syndromes to understand political figures. The remaining types discussed within the "conflict perspective" are conceptualizations based on a single type. Even though these have not yet been employed in a comparative framework, these types are noteworthy because they have been used to describe political actors as well as having been referred to by other political psychologists. The four types we will adumbrate are: Warfare, Belligerent, Phaeton Complex, and Narcissistic.

Tucker (1977;1965) and Friedlander and Cohen (1975) have explicated types which have similarities to the Authoritarian personality.19 Tucker calls his the Warfare personality while Friedlander and Cohen call theirs the Belligerent type. As would be expected, the Warfare personality and the Belligerent type resemble each other in many aspects. There is, however, some distinctions between the two types.

Tucker (1977;1965) uses Karen Horney's theory of neurosis to sketch the Warfare personality (WP) type of leader (e.g. Hitler, Stalin) who have extreme paranoid tendencies. This type differs from the Authoritarian type in three ways (Etheredge 1979). First, he is very lonely which the
Authoritarian may not be. Second, the WP leader has an intense need for enemies while the Authoritarian just perceives them. Third, the WP leader undertakes an effort to transform the self to idealized self.

Friedlander and Cohen (1975) investigated fourteen leaders with a "reputation for toughness". The Belligerent personality (BP), like the WP and Authoritarian leaders, can be ruthless toward others and is very sensitive to criticism. However, the BP leader differs with the WP leader in that he does not exhibit the paranoid tendencies or the vanity, has no need for enemies, and is not a lonely leader like the WP (Etheredge 1979).

The Phaeton Complex type was developed by Iremonger (1970), who analyzed British Prime Ministers. This type of leader is narcissistic, lonely, likely to be unduly rigid, and intensely ambitious. Such a leader craves power so much that he is often unable to compromise. It is an egotistical resistance and not a commitment to principles that makes him unable to compromise. Nevertheless, this type of leader differs from the Authoritarian/WP/BP leader in three germane ways. The Phaeton Complex leader has a strong need for love, is anxious if failure threatens, and is much more manipulative in his interpersonal relations (Etheredge 1979).

The last type under discussion with the "conflict perspective" is the Narcissistic personality (NP). Etheredge (1979), building on Kohut, relates the narcissistic
personality (NP) to elite political behavior. De Gaulle, Nixon, Wilson, and LBJ are considered to be NP leaders. Zonis (1991) and Falk (1984) have employed the conceptualization of the NP to leaders outside the U.S. (the Shah of Iran and Moshe Dayan, respectively). The NP leader's overdeveloped grandiose image of self elicits both a drive for accomplishment and an intense need for the love, admiration, and respect from others. He will likely surround himself with "yes" men who do not criticize him in any fashion. Furthermore, his need for admiration may distract him from the central task. Thus, the NP's achievement related behaviors are employed in the service of recognition and admiration rather than an end in themselves (Emmons 1989:34).

The NP leader has an inner compulsion to win control, and punish challengers. In other words, he is a ruthless competitor who has little concern for others. This insensitivity to others also translates into superficial interpersonal relations. Moreover, the NP leader has a Hobbesian worldview. Yet, this leader is highly flexible with respect to tactics and, therefore, is seen as shrewd, crafty, and astute.

Volkan (1980:138-139) adumbrates two types of NP leaders. One type, the reparative NP (e.g. Ataturk) wants admiration from valued followers. The followers are elevated in becoming idealized objects so their representativeness can be fused into the grandiose self of their leader. The second type, the
destructive NP (e.g. Hitler), protects the cohesion of his grandiose self by devaluing others. Such a leader mobilizes hatred against an outside enemy. Thus, this leader often exhibits paranoid tendencies.

**Fulfillment Perspective**

The second broad scheme of theories of types of political figures is the "fulfillment perspective". The "fulfillment perspective" assumes only one great force. Life is seen as the progressively greater expression of this force within the individual. Conflict can occur, but it is a failure in living rather than an unavoidable condition.24 Personality theorists such as Rogers, Maslow, and Gordon Allport are representative of this model.

The "fulfillment perspective", along with the "overt behavior perspective", is the least developed with regard to political figures. The efforts made in this area have dealt with the mass population rather than leaders (e.g. Knutson 1972; Davies 1963; Renshon 1974; Simpson 1971). Nevertheless, two research efforts have enunciated, although not in great depth, types of political leaders. Both of these efforts -- Knutson and Burns/Bass share two common characteristics. First, they are both based on Maslow's work. Second, they each delineate two types of leaders -- one of which is the ideal type. This is noticeably different from the "conflict perspective" which proposes no ideal types.
Knutson (1972:64-65) identifies that Maslow divides political leaders into two types -- those who are high in self-esteem and secure, and those high in self-esteem and insecure. The former are interested in leadership only in fields in which they are interested and for the sake of getting the task done (e.g. FDR, JFK). The latter ones, who are insecure, are people who lack a sense of inner worth (e.g. Hoover, Taft, Wilson, LBJ).

James McGregor Burns (1978), on the other hand, has used Maslow's formulations to suggest "transformational" and "transactional" types of leadership. This notion focuses on the relationship between the leader and the led. The Transactional leader emphasizes giving rewards if subordinates meet agreed upon standards, while the Transformational leader attempts to alleviate the needs of the follower in line with the leader's goals and objectives. Burns sees the Transformational leader at the opposite end of the continuum from the Transactional leader (Bass 1985:26-27). For instance, De Gualle represents the extreme Transformationalist who has little time for "transactional" leadership; while LBJ was the more extreme Transactional leader. In the middle is FDR who did both (Bass 1985).

Bass (1985:176) further speculates that the Transactional leader is likely to find his satisfaction in affiliation while the Transformational leader finds his in power. Transactional leaders are much more subject to situational effects and are
concerned with conformity. The Transformational leader is empathetic and seeks to satisfy the needs of others (Bass et al. 1987:75). Last, Bass (1985:185) extrapolates that the Transformational leader may be either highly idealistic (e.g. De Gualle or Wilson) or pragmatic (e.g. FDR).

Consistency Perspective

The third broad scheme of theories of types of political figures fits under the rubric of the "consistency perspective". This perspective puts little emphasis on forces but rather the emphasis is on the formative influence of feedback from the external world. There is no inherent conflict between the person's needs for satisfaction and environmental demands. Individuals seek out rewards and avoid costs. Inconsistency between feedback and expectancies produce discomfort which the individual seeks to alleviate. Life is understood as an attempt to maintain consistency. Psychologists such as Kelly, Festinger, and McClelland fall into this perspective. Thus, this perspective focuses on both cognitive and motivational features.

With respect to the literature of political types of leaders, the approaches have taken some distinct directions which can be separated into three subsections. The first subsection of the "consistency perspective" relates to motivational approaches. The second focuses on the cognitive
features. The third subsection encompasses those approaches which consider both cognitive and motivational elements.

Motivational approaches posit motivations are learned rather than based on instincts. They rise out of childhood experiences which are learned rather than physiologically based needs. Via early experiences, individuals learn what kinds of behaviors lead to certain rewards (Barner-Barry and Rosenwein 1985:128). Furthermore, individuals may seek out situations where these can be gratified. Notwithstanding these common features, along with reference to similar motives and often concurring conclusions, the six conceptualizations -- Christie and Geis, Barber, Kirkpatrick, Payne and Woshinsky, Winter, and McClelland -- vary in breadth of implication, how they combine motives, and how many motives they choose to focus upon in describing political leaders.

Christie and Geis (1968) developed the idea of the Machiavellian personality. While most efforts with this type have related to the nonpolitical arena, Elms (1976;1986) has applied this type to a few political leaders. The Machiavellian political leader (e.g. Henry Kissinger or Colonel House according to Elm's 1986 analysis) does not allow ethical, ideological, or interpersonal concerns to distract him. He tends to mistrusts others and, therefore, maintains his psychological distance between himself and others (i.e. lacks affection in interpersonal relations). The Machiavellian, though, does not appear cold and unconcerned
but rather than taking others' concerns as his own, he uses it to his advantage. Such a political figure gets others to help him win in such a way that others feel grateful for the opportunity. He is a master manipulator and opportunist who is concerned with winning and not the end result. Thus, in unfavorable situations, this type will adopt a more participative style in order to win (Drory and Gluskinos 1980:85).

The Machiavellian leader is responsive to situational demands but less so to the group member's feelings. He is willing to compromise, even abandon, his ideological position in order to gain a competitive advantage. Yet, he is not one who blows with the wind. The Machiavellian, for instance, is one who will cheat for some perceived rational justification, but not because of peer pressure. Concomitantly, he changes his beliefs not because others influenced him but because it is to his advantage to do so.

James Barber (1965;1985) has classified U.S. legislators and presidents into four character patterns. These four types are: 1) Active-positive or Lawmaker (e.g. FDR, JFK, Carter), 2) Active-negative or Advertiser (e.g. Wilson, LBJ, Nixon), 3) Passive-positive or Spectator (e.g. Harding, Reagan, Taft), and 4) Passive-negative or Reluctant (e.g. Coolidge, Eisenhower). The leaders are categorized by two dimensions -- active/passive, which classifies one according to level of activity in the performance of his duties, and the
positive/negative dichotomy, which relates to his general outlook on life.28

The Advertiser is ambitious, dominant manipulator who is struggling to attain and hold power and, therefore, has an acute need for power. He seeks domination. Since such a leader is in a hurry to do this, his political activities take on a compulsive nature. The Advertiser can easily shift from one set of standards to another. This leader often uses this effectively to be responsive to those he is trying to influence. The Advertiser has a competitive orientation to the world. That is, the world is viewed as a highly uncertain and unharmonious place, if not dangerous.

The Spectator is other directed with an intense need for love and approval. Thus, unlike the Advertiser who has an aggressive stance toward the environment, the Spectator is a conflict avoider. Such a leader seek cooperation with others. Even though this leader feels unloved (i.e. low self esteem), the Spectator views the world with rosy optimism. He tends to be unambitious and apolitical (i.e. not likely to see himself as a politician). The Spectator is inclined to simplify the world into a few categories.

The Reluctant has a need to feel useful and has a moral sense of social obligation. This leader has an overdeveloped social conscious, but he is not a crusader since he sees himself as basically uninfluential. Consequently, he is concerned with means rather than ends. The Reluctant is an
inner directed actor who tends to be reactive. Such a leader admires workers not gladiators. Thus, the Reluctant is inclined to withdraw from the conflict and uncertainty of politics. He desires to get along with everybody. Like the Spectator, the Reluctant is unambitious and unlikely to view himself as a politician. However, unlike the Spectator, he sees himself as a moral man in an immoral world.

The Lawmaker is a policy oriented politician who wants to achieve results. Such a leader may be drawn to power to achieve results. The Lawmaker stresses rationality and presses for action. However, he is not an ideologue who is fanatically devoted to a narrow cause.

A further study utilizing Barber's typology was undertaken by Snare (1985). Embellishing the original types, Snare elucidated more clearly the dynamics of each type and the corresponding overt political behavior we should expect in the decisionmaking process and the foreign policy arena. The typology was applied to four middle eastern leaders -- Hafez Assad of Syria, the Lawmaker; Muammar Kaddafi, the Advertiser; King Hussein of Jordan, the Reluctant; and Anwar Sadat, the Spectator.29

Kirkpatrick (1974), undertook a most unique study by conducting interviews with women legislators. She identified four types: Leaders, Personalizers, Moralizers, and Problem Solvers. Essentially, the Problem Solver corresponds to Barber's Lawmaker and the Personalizer to the Spectator. The
Leader wants to have an impact on the total process. She derives satisfaction from achievement of the task. The Leader is flexible and sensitive to others. The Moralizer, on the other hand, is a Crusader with a cause and, therefore, is inflexible on issues as well as people's needs and desires.

Payne and Woshinsky have spent the last twenty years elucidating seven types of political figures. Their cross-cultural motivational typology focuses on what they call "incentive" types rather than on character patterns as Barber does. The seven types, which they ascertained via intensive interviews with politicians, are as follows. 1) The Adulation type is an egocentric leader who has an exaggerated need for praise. This type wants to hold center stage. Yet he is not sensitive to the concerns of others. Such a leader will use force, when necessary. 2) The Status type, like the Adulation type, is egocentric and forceful. However, he seeks prestige or respect. This leader rarely thinks in terms of close collaboration with others since he has a competitive orientation to the world. 3) The Program type gains satisfaction from devising and managing policy. Such a type is open minded since he wants to know what will work. Thus, he is favorably predisposed toward compromise and does not seek radical change. Howbeit, the Program type is not sensitive to the concerns of others. 4) The Mission type has a need to attach himself to a cause or group in order to achieve a sense of ultimate purpose. Such a type is a "true
believer" in that everything is considered in terms of his group's ideology. The Mission leader wants to "spread the word" so as to bring about a new social order. He is unwilling to wait for this change. It must be done now. 5) The Obligation type has a sense of inner rightness and is highly responsive to moral imperatives. He often becomes more concerned with style rather than the substantive policy outcomes. The Obligationist is often unresponsive to others and is unconcerned with approval. 6) The Game type seeks the satisfaction of demonstrating his prowess through winning. Such a leader adjusts his behavior to conform to the current role. This pragmatic leader's egotism is restrained by his recognition that one often needs to be a team player in order to win. Thus, the Game leader is willing to compromise and is not out to change the world. 7) The Conviviality type has an intense need to please others. Such a type is a reluctant leader. He tends to be a passive, self-effacing political figure who often does not express his opinion since he dislikes conflict.

Payne et al. (1984) links three of their types to Barber's typology. The Advertiser is similar to the Status, the Lawmaker to the Program, and the Spectator to the Conviviality type. Like Barber, Payne and Woshinsky posit one motive or incentive is dominant in a political leader.31

David Winter (1980;1976;1973), in viewing political leaders, concentrates on three motives -- achievement,
affiliation, and power. While Winter and his colleagues have assessed U.S. presidents and African leaders on these three motives, he has outlined a conceptualization of each motive and linked it to political behavior, he has not formally elucidated patterns. Thus, for instance, he indicates that the power oriented tends to be more aggressive in his relations with other nations while the affiliative oriented tends to avoid war and conclude arms limitation agreements (Winter 1976:48). However, he does indicate that the important aspect is the interaction or the relationship between the three motives.

While not formally outlining the patterns, five do seem identifiable. One is the Crusader type (e.g. Wilson) with low achievement, high power, and low affiliation. At the opposite end is the Entrepreneurial pattern (e.g. HHH) in which achievement is higher than power and with moderate affiliation. This is the ultimate pragmatist. The third type is the Pragmatic Crusader (e.g. Frank Church) who is between the first two. His power exceeds affiliation but his need for achievement exceeds the power drive so that he will approach a crusade in a pragmatic manner. The fourth type is low on power and achievement (e.g. Taft, Coolidge, Eisenhower, Ford) and may exhibit high or low affiliation. The fifth type is high on need to achieve but low in power (e.g. Nixon).

McClelland (1975) identifies three motive patterns. He focuses on the interaction of power and affiliation to obtain
his division of different types. The Conquistador motive pattern is a leader with a high need for power, a low need for affiliation, and low inhibition (i.e. motive to use power for social rather than personal objectives). Such a leader acts as a feudal lord who know what is right for his nation. The Conquistador has little concern for others and has no problem with using force to establish and maintain his authority.

The Imperial motive pattern (e.g. FDR) includes a need for power that is higher than a need for affiliation along with high inhibition. This type of leader works through the group to establish his authority. The Imperial leader wants to build, strengthen, and expand a strong organization. He seeks to develop loyalty to the group/cause and not to himself. In such circumstances, the Imperial leader uses rules to ensure conformity and, thus, relies less on loyalty of subordinates, since he is not one to be very trusting. People are rewarded for what they do for the cause/group. Furthermore, the Imperial leader has a strong concern for what is right and wrong as well as a passionate concern for justice. Thus, he is inclined to deal with people even handedly.

The Personal Enclave pattern type of leader exhibits both a high need for power and affiliation. He wants to maintain control and cultivate friendly relations with his followers at the same time. This leader wants the group/cause to become the fortress where he can feel safe from a potentially
dangerous world. His energies are focused on building up the group so he can feel strong rather than trying to influence external entities.

While each of the six conceptualizations have been briefly adumbrated, it is apparent that one motive is common to all the schemes -- power. While not every type of leader has a high need for power, each of the frameworks presented -- Barber, Payne and Woshinsky, Kirkpatrick, Winter, and McClelland -- explicate a type with a high need for power and low on other needs. Power is the dominant motive for that type. Concomitantly, affiliation plays an important role in these five schemes. For Barber, Payne and Woshinsky, and Kirkpatrick, one of their types exhibits a high need for affiliation and it is the dominant motive. Winter and McClelland, though, consider the level of affiliation as affecting the way power is expressed. For these researchers, affiliation does not dominate a particular type.

A second interesting feature is that Barber, Payne and Woshinsky, and Kirkpatrick (for the most part) view leaders as having one dominant motive. While Winter and McClelland may not argue that this may be the case, their emphasis is on the relationship between the motives. It is also interesting that Barber, Payne and Woshinsky, and Kirkpatrick extrapolated their types from interviews with political figures while Winter and McClelland types are theoretical conceptualizations applied to political leaders.
The second subset falling under the "consistency perspective" is various cognitive approaches to understanding different types of political leaders. The cognitive approaches focus on the realm of knowing and understanding the world. That is, how the leader handles information. Three different frameworks will be discussed. They are Ziller's Self-Other Orientation, D'Amato's Personalist and Systemic types, and the OPCODE.

Ziller (1973;1977) contends responsiveness is associated with two components of the self concept -- self-esteem and complexity. The intersection of these two variables results in the following four types. 1) The Apolitical demonstrates high self esteem and high complexity. Such a political actor is inner directed and shows little responsiveness to diverse others. 2) The Pragmatist exhibits low self-esteem but high complexity. This actor is other directed. Thus, he is more oriented toward interpersonal relations and seeks policy decisions which are responsive to the opinions of others. 3) The Ideologue is a political figure with high self-esteem and low complexity who is quite dogmatic. Such a leader is more issue oriented as he has a set of guiding principles which correspond to the dominant group in his constituency. 4) The Indeterminate actor is low on both dimensions and is somewhat difficult to characterize.

Ziller et al. (1977) found in his study of U.S. legislators that the most responsive leaders are characterized
by low self-esteem and high complexity -- the Pragmatic Self-Other Orientation. However, he also found that the Ideologue and the Pragmatist were more likely to be elected than the other two types. Ziller et al. (1977:193) also drew parallels with Barber's work. The Ideologue seems to correspond to the Lawmaker and the Pragmatist to the Advertiser. Additionally, his results suggested that the Pragmatist and Ideologue were more likely to use coercion in persuasion situations than the Apolitical.

D'Amato (1967) extrapolated a construct with regard to how one should view the operational environment. The Systemic leader (e.g. JFK) is less concerned with ideology and monitors the external environment. The Personalist (e.g. LBJ, Nixon) is more ideological, sees a "we-they" world, and is likely to act on his emotions. While D'Amato proposes three other constructs -- Hawk/Dove, Incremental/Avulsive, and Flexible/Rigid -- he does not indicate how they would intersect or suggest leaders which would fit into the various cells.

The last cognitive approach which has elicited disparate political figures is the OPCODE. The OPCODE is primarily devoted to the codification of cognitive rather than affective features of the individual's personality. The operational code approach, pioneered by Leites' (1951;1953) and George's (1969) refinement, spawned a generation of case studies.
Holsti (1977), by utilizing these case studies, was able to propose a typology of six types of belief systems.

The six OPCODES are constructed by the interaction of two fundamental beliefs the individual has about political life. These two beliefs -- fundamental sources of conflict (i.e. human nature, attributes of nations, and international system) and fundamental nature of the political universe (i.e. harmonious or conflictual) -- combine to provide the six types. Furthermore, Holsti extrapolates a series of hypotheses about other political beliefs which each type may possess.

Holsti's efforts are concentrated in conceptualizing the six ideal types. By and large, the OPCODE studies, which aided Holsti in his development of the types, did not attempt to establish systematic linkages between beliefs and behaviors. This, along with Walker's (1983) reanalysis of the Holsti typology, and the subsequent refinements (i.e. linkages to motivations and decisionmaking behavior), provide a more potent framework. Therefore, further explanation of the OPCODE will wait until we discuss Walker's contributions.

The third subsection of the "consistency model" encompasses those approaches which consider both cognitive and motivational elements. Two frameworks -- one by Walker (1983) and the other by Hermann (1987a;1987b) -- both discuss those elements of political personality but in differing ways. Walker proposes that beliefs may be derivatives of motives;
while this is not the case with Hermann's framework. Furthermore, a second salient difference between the two frameworks is that Hermann considers not only beliefs (i.e. the way a leader organizes information already in his mind) as relevant, but how a leader selects and organizes incoming information as important for understanding the different types of political leaders.42

Walker collapses Holsti's six ideal types of belief systems into four types by arguing they contain overlapping beliefs. He used a TAT scoring system to identify the motivational imagery in the Holsti typology. Walker (1983:190) found consistencies between the behavior prescribed by instrumental beliefs of the OPCODE and the different dominant motivations of achievement, power, and affiliation. He, therefore, proposes that beliefs are acquired as an extension of the relationship among the leader's power, achievement, and affiliation motives. The motivational OPCODE differs according to their combination for ranking power, achievement, and affiliation.

The A type (e.g. Eisenhower) exhibits a high need for affiliation but low needs for power and achievement. The B type (e.g. LBJ, Dulles) has a high need for power and achievement but a low need for affiliation. Moreover, they are high dominant introverts on Etheredge's (1978) scheme. Type C is not as clear but exhibits achievement and affiliative motives followed by a need for power. Finally,
Type DEF (e.g. Truman) has a high need for power but little need for achievement or affiliation. Additionally, this type is a low dominant introvert on Etheredge’s (1978) scheme.43

Walker and Falkowski (1984), in an investigation of U.S. presidents and secretaries of state, link the various types to bargaining strategies. Type A prefers an appeasement strategy, type B a bully strategy, and type DEF a reciprocal strategy. Nevertheless, Walker and Falkowski (1984:245) point out that not all the presidents (e.g. JFK) display one of the four patterns.44

Margaret G. Hermann's (1987a;1987b) framework of political figures distinguishes between six types. As shown in table six of chapter five, eight personality characteristics interrelate to form six orientations. The eight characteristics capture the leader's beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style (see appendix E). Since this framework is utilized later in this book, the reader is referred to chapters five and six along with Appendix E.

Overt Behavior Perspective

The fourth broad scheme of theories of types of political actors is the "overt behavior" perspective. The focus in this perspective is usually exclusively on behavior. It is not concerned with thought processes or feelings. Ergo, leaders are differentiated according to the way they act.
Three studies fit under the rubric of the "overt behavior" perspective. They are a study by Shepard (1988), Kotter and Lawrence's (1974) five types of mayors, and Weigele and Oots (1990) utilization of the Type A and Type B personalities. While these studies focus on overt behavior to differentiate political figures, each study does so with different personality characteristics, and different sets of political figures.

Shepard's (1988) research employs the framework developed by Etheredge (1978). However, Shepard's data set consisted of American political elite members who served during the period 1969 and 1984. While his study still basically elicits the same four categories hypothesized by Etheredge, Shepard, unlike Etheredge, does not suggest that decisions are manifestations of psychodynamics. Rather, he focuses on observable personality behavior when assessing personality and therefore, traits are not inferred entities but directly observable behaviors. While Shepard's study adds no new types; it does illustrate how the same framework can be applied from a different perspective -- the "overt behavior" rather than "conflict" perspective. While Shepard's replication study found high dominant actors tended to urge the use of force, Shepard did not find that extroverts are inclined to favor cooperative policies.

Kotter and Lawrence (1974) in studying twenty mayors ascertain five types of mayors -- Ceremonial, Caretaker,
Personality-Individualist, Executive, and Program-Entrepreneur. The most striking difference between these five types is their activity level. The five types could be placed on a continuum -- Ceremonial, Caretaker, Personality-Individualist, Executive, and Program-Entrepreneur. The Ceremonial type represents the reactive end and the Program-Entrepreneur represents the most active type of mayor.

While Kotter and Lawrence (1974:191,188) do indicate that each type of mayor is associated with a personality pattern, they emphasize that a mayor, the city, the network, the agenda, and three process variables (i.e. agenda setting, network building, and accomplishing tasks) are a dynamic relationship with no single cause and effect. Consequently, no one type is seen as better than another type. Nevertheless, while this study begins to bring forth some interesting aspects, no one has picked up on it to further develop it.

Weigele and Oots (1990) used the Type A and Type B distinction to distinguish between rural councilmen. The Type A personality tends to be aggressive (and hostile), excessively competitive, harddriving (see also Mathews 1982 and Madsen 1985). This type wants to achieve much in a short time while at the same time receiving approval from others. The Type A political actor will change his behavior to fit the situation. However, Bruch et al. (1991) suggest the Type A is unlikely to be empathetic, compromise on issues, or process
information in a cognitively complex manner. The Type B leader is easy going, relaxed, and displays a noncompetitive behavior style. This type is more trustful and conciliatory.

Discussion

Each of the four broad perspectives -- conflict, fulfillment, consistency, and overt behavior -- have been adumbrated along with the various approaches that fit under each. Table one slices the research of types of political leaders into a number of categories. This table evinces the major ways political figures have been distinguished and compared (see row one). While a variety of types have been advanced, some of these seem to overlap. At the same time, these similar types do describe important differences among political actors. Thus, this appears to indicate how complex and diverse political actors tend to be. Each of these typologies help the student of political psychology grapple with understanding the obvious differences among political actors as well as teasing out subtle nuances.

Row two of table one indicates the geographical area the researcher tended to focus his/her research upon. The U.S. is the dominant concentration of most of the researchers. European and Soviet elites are also a popular focus of many analysts.

Another differentiation of this table, as shown in row three, is that some of the researchers relate their types to
TABLE 1: Focus, Linkages, Methods, and Perspectives of Various Researchers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lasswell/Davies</th>
<th>Etheredge</th>
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* Etheredge proposes his framework from the Conflict perspective while Shepard utilizes the framework from the Overt Behavior perspective. Snare (1992), recently, applied Etheredge's model to Anwar Sadat and Muammar Kaddafi as well as proposing the sort of autonomy each type would prefer his nation to seek or maintain.

These researchers have only suggested political figures which may exemplify the various types proposed.

Note: Tucker's Warfare personality has not been listed above. It would, however, fit the same categories as Lasswell's. Tucker in describing the Warfare personality suggests Hitler and Stalin are examples.
TABLE 1: continued

<table>
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# These researchers have only suggested political figures which may exemplify the various types proposed.
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<th>Means to Distinguish Types</th>
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<th>Case study</th>
<th>Case study</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
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# These researchers have only suggested political figures which may exemplify the various types proposed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Personality Types</th>
<th>Burns &amp; Bass</th>
<th>Barber*</th>
<th>Kirkpatrick</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transformational</td>
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<td>Problem solver</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Reluctant</td>
<td>Moralizer</td>
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<tr>
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<th>Kirkpatrick</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>U.S. &amp; Middle East</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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# These researchers have only suggested political figures which may exemplify the various types proposed.
* Snare (1985) applied Barber's model to four Middle Eastern leaders to discern the relationship between their character type and the foreign policy behavior of the leader's nation.
TABLE 1: continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Personality Types</th>
<th>Payne &amp; Woshinsky</th>
<th>Winter</th>
<th>McClelland</th>
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<tr>
<td>Means to Distinguish Types</td>
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*These researchers have only suggested political figures which may exemplify the various types proposed.*
TABLE 1: continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Personality Types</th>
<th>Ziller</th>
<th>Walker &amp; Holsti</th>
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<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Active independent</td>
</tr>
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<td>C</td>
<td>DEF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>DEF</td>
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<td>Africa, Asia, Europe,</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These researchers have only suggested political figures which may exemplify the various types proposed.
* Walker's (1988) more recent work delves into linkages from the Conflict perspective.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Personality Types</th>
<th>Kotter &amp; Lawrence</th>
<th>Weigele &amp; Oots</th>
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<table>
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<table>
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<th>Questionnaire</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Behavior</th>
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</table>
foreign policy behavior. Cooperative or aggressive behavior is a primary focus of most of the researchers who seek to explain foreign policy behavior. Another area of focus is the degree of autonomy a particular political type is likely to prefer.

Row four of table one shows whether the researchers have elicited a formal method to distinguish the various types proposed. As indicated, a number of them have not. This should not be surprising since many of these studies were exploratory. The framework was proposed after examining a set of political elites. Unfortunately, neither the original researcher(s) or other researchers have applied the framework to another set of political actors.

Row five indicates how, to date, the researcher has distinguished one type from another. As shown, this may be accomplished by interviews with the political figures, content analysis of verbal materials, a case study, and/or questionnaires. This does point out a significant feature regarding the development of political personality types. Since, as Hermann (1977) has indicated, leaders often pose an assessment problem, it is important to be able to assess the leader's personality at a distance. However, of the models presented in this paper, only six of them -- Luck, Etheredge, Barber/Snare, Winter, Walker/Holsti, and Hermann -- provide a way to do this. Political psychologists need to develop at a distance ways of assessment for other types or typologies
of leaders. One avenue is to utilize the schemes of content analysis of verbal materials which have been developed (often by psychologists) and link it to the respective political personality type. For instance, Raskin and Shaw (1988) have suggested how a narcissistic individual can be distinguished via verbal materials. Their results indicate a relationship between narcissism and the use of first person pronouns. Another viable content analytic scheme is the one developed by Weintraub (1989).

The last row of table one denotes the perspective the researcher tends to employ with his/her typology. This illustrates a couple of interesting features. First, researchers tend to either take the "consistency" or "conflict" perspectives rather than the "overt behavior" or "fulfillment" perspectives. Second, the "conflict" perspective concentrates the most on unhealthy types, whereas the "fulfillment" perspective elicits an ideal type. On the other hand, the "consistency" perspective, by and large, like the "overt behavior" perspective, is not concerned with such distinctions.

One issue we have sidestepped to this point is the person-situation debate -- the role of internal and external forces in governing behavior. That is, which mainly influences behavior, the person or the situation? While the person-situation debate of the 1970's and 1980's can be linked to Mischel's (1968) *Personality and Assessment*, this is not a
new debate. The debate, in the most pristine sense, is best summarized by Bowers (1973:318). Succinctly, the "classical trait" view suggests that a person's behavior should be relatively constant from one situation to the next, while "situationism" suggests that a person's behavior should change from one situation to the next. To put it another way, are characteristics relatively stable over time and situations or do they vary? The perspective researchers choose is evident in the literature. Allport (1961), Lecky (1945), and Maslow (1970) all emphasize the need to maintain internal consistency within the self; while others such as Cooley (1902), Goffman (1959) and Schlenker (1980) argue that the context of the interaction determines what image is chosen. Some extreme "situationist" (e.g. Farber 1964:37) maintain personality theories will eventually be a thing of the past.

We have assumed up to this point that person and situation are clear, distinct, and separate entities. But the line is artificial and, therefore, the boundary is quite fuzzy. Raush (1977:290), in trying to grapple with this issue, asks if one's glasses, beard, cold, or a pain are part of the person or the situation. Where the person ends and the situation begins is by no means clearcut. Thus, it should be of no surprise that psychologist and political psychologist acknowledge the interaction of both.

So what significance does this debate have, if any at all? This internal-external debate is relevant for two
reasons. One relates from a theoretical standpoint and another from a practical standpoint.

The internal-external debate is an issue to be kept in mind when considering various theoretical points of view (Pervin 1989:16). In the previous literature review, although there are no extreme "situationists", the various theories do differ in matter of degree. Thus, for instance, Lasswell (1930;1948) or Davies (1980) focus our attention more on the internal factors; while the work by Kotter and Lawrence (1974) shift more toward the external environment. In other words, theories vary in where they place the emphasis.

Shifting from the theoretical to the practical standpoint, the person-situation debate should also be kept in mind. As pointed out earlier, the classical trait view suggested that a person's behavior should be relatively constant from one situation to the next. The move by some psychologists (e.g. Pervin 1989:318) and more so by political psychologists (e.g. Hermann 1987b; George 1969; Herrmann 1988) is an appreciation that consistency within certain domains of situations is a more useful and appropriate way of capturing a person's behavior. Ergo, both situation and person matter and to predict political behavior we need to know about both.51

Let us return us to the question posed at the beginning of chapter one. It was suggested that some political figures in revolutionary movements tend to be Idealist (those seeking
a new world order now) while others are Realist (those satisfied with working within the existing world order for the present). The former attempt to make the movement into a living faith while the latter are concerned with the stability and growth of the revolutionary movement (Roche and Sachs 1955:249-255). Can any of the various typologies we have reviewed help us discern whether a political actor is likely to be one or the other?

Table two provides a three category scheme so as to classify the types of the various frameworks considered in this chapter. Columns one and two of this table indicate the types which could be considered Idealists and Realists. The third column in that table, Idealist/Realist, indicates that the type may be either. Therefore, it is necessary to either know the preferences of the group the type is associated with, the preferences of the dominant group in the regime, and/or more about that particular type. Thus, for some of the types (e.g. Opportunist of Hermann's framework), if the group tends to be one or the other, then this type will likely follow suit. On the other hand, for other types (e.g. Ego-idealists of the Elms' system), some of such types are more inclined to be Idealist while others have a tendency to be Realist.

As shown in table two, a few of the frameworks are helpful for distinguishing the difference between the Idealist and the Realist. It would seem, however, the typologies are best at informing us which types would not be Idealist. That
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Researcher</th>
<th>Idealist</th>
<th>Realist</th>
<th>Idealist/Realist</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Maintainer</td>
<td>Conciliator</td>
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<td>Schizoid</td>
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<td>Depressive</td>
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<td>Personalizer</td>
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<td>Weigele &amp; Oots</td>
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</table>
is, the majority of types tend to be Realist. Therefore, we must either be satisfied with identifying who will be a Realist or know more about the specific significant groups within the regime as well as more about that particular type. In the latter case, with such added information, we may be able to predict whether those types in the third column of table two will be Idealist or Realist.

Now that we have surveyed the extant literature, the next step is to apply one of these frameworks to the four Iranian elites which are the concern of this book. This will be done in chapters five and six. However, first, the focus of the next chapter is to explore, in a qualitative manner, the personality and socialization process of Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani.
Footnotes

1. Lane (1968:20) notes that to study the interrelationship of personality qualities and political life is just beginning. Moreover, if one compares Raser's (1966) review with what has transpired since then, one will see how much this area has developed.

2. For studies delineating the differences between political figures and nonparticipants see Spranger (1928), McConaughy (1950), Di Renzo (1967), Constantini and Craik (1980), Costantini and Craik (1969), and Manheim (1959).

3. While the three categories of like "all", like "some", and like "no" other are an appropriate conceptual device for explicating the literature, in reality the distinction is not always so clear cut. For instance, Cottam (1977:320-321) suggests, at the end of his book, that leaders vary in their probable perceptual inclinations. If further research confirms this hunch and develops this area, then his analysis instead of relating to "all" persons moves also into the realm of like "some" other persons. Moreover, other researchers, like Walker and Falkowski (1984:243), posit that type of misperception depends on personality type. However, Vertzberger (1984:11) distinguishes between five variables that account for misperceptions and personality is one of the five.

4. Cottam (1977) and those who have continued to develop his approach [e.g. Herrmann (1988) and ElWarfally (1988)] differ from the others in that in their work, which focuses on perception, they typologize situations. They would contend with individuals and leaders, there is a strong relationship between perceived threats and opportunities and degree of simplification in foreign policy imagery (Herrmann 1988:184).

5. This area of analysis would fit under the rubric of what Greenstein (1969:14) calls single case psychological analyses. These areas are not synonymous since Greenstein includes in-depth studies of members of the general population.


7. Maddi (1989) is by no means the only psychologist who has categorized the psychological theories of personality. See for instance Mischel (1981), Pervin (1989), or Hall and Lindzey (1978). Each of these psychologists have categorized the theories in a different manner.
8. The fourth perspective, overt behavior, is this author's adaptation of Maddi's behavioristic alternative. The conceptualizations which fit under the rubric of this perspective are not openly linked to behaviorism but do share an emphasis on overt behavior.

9. The ensuing review does not list all efforts at developing types of political leaders. Some are not sufficiently developed to constitute a wholly satisfactory type or typology such as Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962) who suggest leaders fall into six categories -- communicator, innovator, traditionalist, literalist, power seeker, and career servant (see also Munro's 1924 typology of political actors). A more recent example is the four types -- wise, impulsive, megalomaniac, and messianic -- of leaders adumbrated by Zonis and Offer (1985). Other typologies are too idiosyncratic to be helpful in the present analysis, such as the anthropological study by Sahlins (1963). Some personality typologies, like C. G. Jung's framework, have been applied to one particular leader. For instance, Storr's (1969) study of Churchill or Orbovich's (1986) study of Eisenhower utilize Jung's framework.

10. This is evident of the psychodynamic approach from the beginning. For instance see Fearing (1927), Harlow (1922), and Clark (1921).

11. Since Davies (1980) explicates Lasswell's types to a greater extent, the discussion in the section comes from his work. It should also be mentioned Lasswell, in his book *Power and Personality*, proposed a Democratic Character type. However, this type is not included in a comparative framework. The individual with such a character would be suspicious of power, tolerant of others, optimistic, warm, caring, and value personal freedoms. Recently, Hamby (1991), has suggested Truman is an example of a leader with this character type. The interested reader should also see Sniderman (1975) and Lasswell (1951).

12. One early application of Lasswell's typology is by Hopper (1950) with regard to the stages of a revolutionary movement. But Hopper does not develop the types any further.

13. "Freud thought that the first five years of life were critical in the development of the individual. During these years, it is possible for a number of failures to occur in the development of the instincts. Such failures in the development are called fixations. If the individual receives so little gratification during a stage of development that they are afraid to go to the next stage, or if they receive so much gratification that there is no motivation to move on, a fixation will occur. If a fixation occurs, the individual
will try to obtain the same type of satisfaction that was appropriate for an earlier stage of development during later stages" (Pervin 1989:130).

14. Lasswell, in the "Afterthoughts" section of his second edition of Psychopathology and Politics (1960), distinguishes agitators by enthusiastic and persecutory subtypes. See also Swanson (1956;1957) discussion on publicists and orators and Duncan's (1987) more recent in-depth study of one agitator.


16. This analogy is adapted from Pervin (1989:132).

17. The interested reader should also examine the various types delineated by the American Psychiatric Association (1987) which, in some cases, parallel Swansbrough's types.

18. Most efforts with authoritarianism are concerned with followership rather than leadership. Sanford (1950:168) reports that authoritarians are not highly participant in political affairs. Milbrath and Klein (1962) and Milbrath (1965) concur with Sanford, but Di Renzo's (1967) study with Italian politicians suggests that the politicians of his study were more dogmatic than nonpoliticians. Additionally, with regard to those outside the realm of the legal political system, Kreml (1976:48) suggests the vigilante personality, in the broadest sense, is one who displays authoritarian characteristics. However, see Robins and Post (1987) discussion on the Paranoid political actor.

19. Barney-Barry and Rosenwein (1985:122) posit that the concept of narcissism is a reinterpretation of authoritarianism. See Etheredge (1979) for the similarities and differences between the two conceptualizations. Moreover, Eckhardt (1971) outlines two types similar to the authoritarian personality. They are the Military-Industrial and Fascist personality types. However, only the latter type is linked with political leaders.

20. For further differences of these types see Etheredge (1979).

21. See also Berrington's (1974) review.

22. Pervin (1989:158) points out that some NP political figures, because of their arrogance of power and that rules are made for others, come to believe that they are invulnerable which may lead to their downfall (e.g. Gary Hart).

24. The explanation of the "fulfillment perspective" is taken from Maddi (1989:42).

25. The transformational--transactional leadership notion as interpreted here as types of leaders is viewed as leaders not just being one or the other but both in varying degrees. See Bass (1985) for further discussion.


28. Barber originally defined the positive/negative dimension as affect toward his role but later changed it to general outlook on life (see Snare 1985:9).

29. A few other researchers have applied or expanded Barber's framework. Tulis (1981) applied the model to Lincoln, while Green and Pederson (1985) used the typology to classify nearly all the American presidents. Shank and Conant (1975:143-172), in applying the framework to mayors, suggest some possible subtypes.


31. Three of the four types evinced by Kirkpatrick also are leaders in which one motive dominates.

32. See also Winter and Carlson (1988), Winter (1982), Donley and Winter (1970), and Winter and Stewart (1977). Achievement oriented are concerned with excellence, prefer moderate risk, modify behavior on the basis of feedback, and prefer expert advice. Affiliative oriented seek security in friendship and surround themselves with people like themselves. The power oriented is concerned with having an impact on others, takes great risk, and picks advisors who know the political process.

33. Winter (1980:84), in assessing the U.S. presidents, found that the Advertiser in Barber's scheme is achievement oriented and the Lawmaker is power oriented. This is a reverse of what Barber posits. But Winter does concur with Barber that the Passive is high in need for affiliation.
34. Maddi (1989:522) puts four patterns together using Winter's scheme by focusing on achievement and power. While this is helpful, it misses the implication of affiliation.

35. See Winter and Stewart (1977), Winter and Stewart (1978), Winter (1976), and Maddi (1989) for the main sources in arriving at these five types.

36. While McClelland only in passing applies these motive patterns to political figures, M. G. Hermann (1987b:13) has refined these patterns with regard to leaders.

37. See also Ziller (1973) and Stone and Baril (1979). Stone and Baril (1979) apply the Self-Other Orientation to Maine legislators. Additionally, Ziller's work is put within the cognitive subset since self-esteem is related to how information is processed.

38. The OPCODE explains the characteristics of a leader's decisionmaking by focusing on his beliefs. These beliefs are classified as either philosophical or instrumental. The OPCODE does not assume a one-to-one correspondence with political behavior. Holsti (1977) outlines the various conditions in which it is likely to influence diagnosis and behavior. Holsti (1970:123) astutely recognizes that it is just as important to know when there is a lack of belief-behavior consistency. Additionally, George (1979) points out that a variety of actions may be compatible with an individual's belief system. That is, there may be a range of likely decisions or actions and not an exact choice.

39. While in this review, belief system is implied to be a well-agreed upon term, this is not the case. Consensus of definition is far from unanimous. There are a myriad of competing concepts. For instance, Brecher (1968) refers to worldview, George (1969) to OPCODE, Burgess (1968) examines elite images, and Axelrod (1972) discusses beliefs [see also Cobb's (1973) assessment of the belief system concept]. Furthermore, there is the work on values, such as Searing (1978) and Hopple (1982), which was spurred on by White (1951) and Rokeach (1973,1979,1980).

40. Hoagland and Walker (1979), Stuart (1980), and Walker (1977) in employing the OPCODE seek to make the linkage from beliefs to bargaining moves and rhetoric in statements.


42. It should be noted, as will be self evident shortly, that each of these researchers also focus on different sorts of beliefs.
43. It is also of interest that Types A, B, and C, unlike Type DEF, are more optimistic with regards to an individual's control over historical development (Walker 1983:191).

44. More recently, Walker (1988) hypothesizes that the motives power, achievement, and affiliation are manifestations of the basic needs ambition, ideals, and essential alikeness as outlined by the psychoanalyst Kohut. Therefore, power, achievement, and affiliation motives are relatively stable. Furthermore, diversity across leaders is due to the varying configurations of structural relationships between ambition, ideals, and essential alikeness which are established in the individual's development. The "ideal" structure is when no one pole is dominant. The "compensatory" structure is where one of the constituents of the nuclear self is underdeveloped. Thus, this is manifested for instance, in higher affiliation and power than achievement or higher power and achievement than affiliation. The "disabled" structure is when two of the three constituents of the nuclear self have serious developmental defects. Ergo, one motive is dominant in the leader.

45. Kotter and Lawrence (1974:199) suggest that there may be more than five types.

46. Two other researchers have adumbrated differences among mayors according to the way they act. Yates (1977:146-147, 165) identifies four types (crusader, broker, entrepreneur, and boss) with two dimensions (one of which is activity level). Lockhard (1963:417-427) sketches out four types also -- reformer, program-politician, evader, and stooge.

47. Coogan and Woshinsky (1982) have illustrated an example of how a couple of the types developed by Payne and Woshinsky may be distinguished at a distance. Furthermore, for the reader who is interested, Snare (1992) utilized Barber's and Etheredge's approaches to discern the relationship between the personalities of Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Muammar Kaddafi of Libya and their nations' foreign policy behaviors.


49. An analogy from the physical sciences may explicate this more fully. If we were going to study water, we would not study it without considering the temperature, (i.e. the situation). Water's form is not the same in all situations. Moreover, some elements may be fairly constant in form over a wide range of situations while other elements may be quite
sensitive to minute changes. The inference is that this is also the case with people.

50. Pervin (1989:15), with regard to personality theories in psychology, indicates that a Freudian view focuses our attention on internal aspects while a Skinnerian view focuses our attention on environmental variables.

51. While generally speaking this is the case, we should not forget that psychologists (e.g. Snyder 1987) and political psychologists (e.g. Hermann 1989) have found that some individuals/leaders are more consistent across situations/domains than others. Thus, to predict behavior for some individuals/leaders we may need to know more about the person and for others we may need to know more about the situation.
CHAPTER III

PERSONALITY AND SOCIALIZATION OF MOHTASHEMI, MONTAZERI, KHAMANEI, AND RAFSANJANI

Much has been written about the manner in which the clerics achieved power in the 1979 Revolution and how they have been able to keep it. However, not much has been written about the individual ruling clerics themselves. This gap is noteworthy considering the various factional cleavages among the clerics are related to personal and personality differences (Schahgaldian 1989:78-79; Akhavi 1987:199; Rubin 1987:7; Ghods 1989:225). Moreover, as Cottam (1990:24) states, while the Imam gave personal direction in the first decade, with his passing in 1989, the next decade will likely produce a major redefinition. Thus, an understanding of the various powerholders or contenders is imperative.

The following chapter is divided into three sections. Initially, a discussion of why Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani were chosen as the clerical leaders to study. The second section adumbrates the historical events which these clerics experienced. Appendix C furnishes a detailed chronology of events for the post-shah period. The third section provides an in-depth look at the personality and
socialization process of Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani.

While a number of political figures in Iran may affect policy, I have chosen to examine four prominent clerics who are, as Schahgaldian (1989:90) indicates, contenders for power. Ali Khamanei is presently the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Rafsanjani is President of Iran. Mohtashemi is a deputy of the Majlis and Montazeri has no official position at this time.

Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani are leading personalities who have different views of how the government should relate to foreign nations and how the government should be organized, even though they were Ruhollah Khomeini's disciples. Furthermore, these four clerics provide insights into the range of differences which exist regarding the contrasting political postures within the ruling clerics. Currently, those who follow the Iranian context closely propose two distinct factions. One is led by Rafsanjani while the other is led by Mohtashemi (Alavi 1989b:15; Bill 1989; Echo of Iran July 1990:5). Cottam (1991:22-23) contends Ali Khamanei occupies an intermediate position between the two and seems to be playing the late Imam Khomeini's role of giving support to the weaker faction. Montazeri's re-emergence on the political stage suggests that he should not be counted out (Middle East 1990 February:14) since he has many supporters (Alavi 1989c:7).
Iran's political historical context

Iran's contemporary history has been a continuous struggle to make Iran master of its own destiny. The discovery of oil in 1908 intensified the British-Russian rivalry that by 1907 had already divided Iran into spheres of influence. During World War One, Iran was occupied by the British and Russians. With Lenin's rise to power in Russia, the Russians troops were withdrawn since Lenin considered this an imperialistic policy. In 1919, Iran made an agreement with Britain for independence but it essentially made the nation a British protectorate.

With the help of foreign influence Reza Khan, founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, was placed on the throne in 1925 when Ruhollah Khomeini was twenty-five years old. Reza Khan's style of rule tolerated no opposition. He emphasized Iranian nationalism that was distinct from Islam. Reza Khan made considerable efforts to weaken the clergy. He allowed mosques to be bulldozed and women could jetison the veil. This, along with his dictatorial rule caused an uprising in 1935 which he crushed.

Reza Khan sought to forge ties with Germany during the 1930's. This was an effort to reduce the British sphere of influence. However, with the outbreak of World War Two, Reza Khan's flirtations with the Nazis (even though officially Iran was neutral in the conflict) resulted in an Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in 1941. Reza Khan was forced to abdicate
and his twenty year old son became the Shah of Iran. The same
year Khomeini wrote a book with a number of passages overtly
political and critical of the Pahlavi rule.

For the next twelve years the Shah of Iran wielded little
power. During the 1940's various social and political groups
with diverse ideological orientations were allowed to emerge
and develop. There was much disunity and the life span of a
government was no more than a year. As the decade continued,
Iran sank into growing social disorder and economic crisis.
Furthermore, Iran was left with the presence of the British,
specifically the Anglo-Iranian oil company, and a growing
dependence on the United States for protection against a
perceived Soviet threat. After the war, Stalin had initially
refused to withdraw Soviet forces in an effort to acquire some
oil concessions. Stalin withdrew and did not obtain the joint
Iranian-Soviet oil company he was seeking.

During this time, Shiism as a force for political and
social change was minimal. Borujedi, who in 1946 became the
acknowledged leader of the Iranian Shiite community, held that
clerics should not be involved in politics. They must concern
themselves with strictly religious affairs. Political protest
and activism were not acceptable. Shiism, therefore,
passively supported the Shah on a number of occasions,
particularly during Mossadegh's 1953 ouster. Borujedi's
silence on political issues was congruent with the two
previous acknowledged leaders of the Iranian Shiite community, Sheikh Abd Al-Karim Haeri and Abol Hasan Musavi Isfahani.

Khomeini during this time had become one of Borujedi's political advisors. In 1954 when Borujedi refused to intercede with the Shah on behalf of the condemned Devotees of Islam (Fedaiyan-e Islam), Khomeini reportedly broke with Borujedi (Arjomand 1988:94). In the late 1940's, the Devotees of Islam began assassinating pro-Western Iranian leaders.

Mossadegh emerged as a leading nationalist-reformer in the 1940's. He had opposed Reza Khan's accession to the throne and was later imprisoned in the 1930's. Mossadegh wanted to reduce the Shah's power and end Iran's dependence on foreign capital. The Shah sought, however, accommodation with the oil companies.

In March 1951, the Iranian parliament voted unanimously for nationalization and Mossadegh, the following month, became the premier. Although international opinion favored Mossadegh and the nationalization, the British rejected Iran's claim to a sovereign right to nationalize. The oil industry refused to cooperate with the Iranian government and oil production virtually stopped for the next several years.

A coup by the royalist with the backing of the British and Americans brought the Shah in complete power in 1953. The coup signalled the triumph of dictatorship and the end of the democratic process. Martial law remained in effect until 1957, the same year the Savak, the Shah's ruthless secret
police, was created. The Shah's first major challenge to his dictatorship occurred in the early 1960's. He was able to resolve the crisis by granting limited liberalization policies, dividing the opposition, gaining more support from the United States and sacrificing his close associates (i.e. sacking government officials). By 1963 the Shah was stronger than ever.

It was during this time, the clerics became active in the political arena. Shiite activism began to emerge in the 1960's in part due to the death of Borujedi in 1961 which left the Shiite community without one supreme leader. Additionally, the socio-cultural climate was changing. Inflation, corruption, and uneven distribution of the wealth brought a dissolution for Western ideas and ways.

While a number of progressive clergy sought reforms, by the early 1960's, Khomeini was emerging as a populist leader for the next generation. The events in 1963 and 1964 made Khomeini a national figure. Among the major religious scholars in Qom, he alone extended public support to the students at religious institutions who were demonstrating against some of the Shah's policies. By 1963 with the Shah's White Revolution initiated, Khomeini attacked and denounced the Shah's regime. Khomeini's subsequent arrest resulted in a major uprising which shook the regime. He was released and warned not to speak against the regime. However, in October 1964 the Shah granted immunity to American personnel for all
offenses committed in Iranian territory. Khomeini immediately denounced this. He was then arrested on 4 November 1964 and exiled to Turkey (and accompanied by agents of the Shah). The following year in October 1965 the Shah's regime allowed Khomeini to move his exile to Najaf, Iraq -- one of Shia's shrine cities. Khomeini established himself as a major presence in Najaf while at the same time maintaining popularity in Iran. By the late 1960's Khomeini ranked in importance alongside the six "models of imitation" who had emerged as leaders in 1961 after Borujedi's death (Mottahedeh 1985:246).

By the mid 1970's human rights organizations and the Western press started a campaign against the violation of human rights in Iran. Amnesty International announced Iran had one of worst records in this area. Domestically, the situation also started to heat up. In 1976 serious mass uprisings began to protest the Shah's replacement of the Islamic calendar. The unrest continued through 1977 and escalated into large scale riots in 1978 when apparently the government newspaper accused Khomeini of conspiring with the communists against the Shah. Demonstrations broke out everywhere and Khomeini issued directives encouraging the overthrow of the Shah's regime.

The Shah's regime in September 1978 requested the Baathist government in Iraq to exile Khomeini in hope of depriving him of a base of operation. Khomeini proceeded to
France since no other Muslim nation offered him refuge. This tactic was not effective and in mid December as many as eight million Iranians marched in support for the revolution. On 16 January 1979 the Shah ostensibly left Iran for a vacation. He had, however, installed a surrogate administrator, Shahpur Bakhtiar. The Bakhtiar government collapsed when Khomeini returned to Iran on 1 February 1979. Medhi Bazargan was installed to replace him. According to Ali Khamanei, Bazargan was made Prime Minister, "because we had no one else, and at that time we ourselves lacked the ability" (Bakhash 1984:65).

The Iranian revolution has been called one of the most popular and mass based upheavals in history. The opposition to the Shah was built from a coalition of groups that varied widely in ideology and base of support. Khomeini and his followers opposed the concept of monarchy and believed Islam was the basis of a new state. Other clergy like Shariatmadari were uneasy about clerical involvement in politics and did not reject the idea of a monarchy. The Liberals such as Bazargan were against anti-Americanism but felt Islam could be a basis for a new state. However, such a state would not be along the Khomeini line. The Mojahedin were opposed to direct clerical rule. The Tudeh advocated marxist social and political revolution.

Khomeini had a distinct advantage because throughout the Shah's reign he had developed organizational links to mosques and religious schools. Some ten thousand of Khomeini's
students were now preachers who were close to the people and spoke their language. Furthermore, Khomeini's immense prestige, incorruptibility, and record of opposition to the Shah made him generally popular.

Bazargan's Provisional government did not last long. Following the admission of the Shah to the United States and the takeover of the embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979, the Bazargan government collapsed. While the Bazargan government had control of the old government institutions it did not have control of the revolutionary institutions, such as the Guards and Komiteh, which had emerged after the revolution. These revolutionary organizations existed alongside the old government institutions and were completely independent. The revolutionary institutions were rallying points for those who opposed Bazargan and his policies.

With the collapse of the Bazargan government, the Revolutionary Council directed the affairs of state. In January 1980 Bani Sadr was elected President of the Republic. His foreign policy was basically the same as Bazargan except he was less trusting of the U.S. Nevertheless, just like Bazargan, he had no control over the revolutionary institutions and by the time of his impeachment had lost control of the formal institutions.

The dismissal of Bani Sadr and bombing of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) headquarters were a culmination of a series of incidents which changed the players of the game.
The Majlis voted to impeach President Bani Sadr on 21 June 1981. The Imam, the next day, formally removed Sadr from office. After Sadr's dismissal, the clerics undertook to put their revolutionary ideology into practice themselves (Menashri 1986:508; Simpson 1988:101; Milani 1988:294; Bill 1988:263). Furthermore, with the bombing of the IRP headquarters a week later, Beheshti was killed. Of the senior clerics, he was the only one with any experience in the non-Islamic world (Simpson 1988:99-100).

This dividing line denotes the change of players. Maziar Behrooz (1990:16) calls the time prior to the dismissal of Sadr, the liberal period. With the bombing of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) headquarters, the clerics cracked down on dissidents in order to solidify their rule. Sever repressive measures were taken against the opposition. Even figures like Ayatollah Shariatmadari were put under house arrest. First the Mojahedin were smashed and then the Tudeh party was attacked. There is a Persian proverb which says "If you want to smash a bunch of sticks, don't do it in one blow. Break them one by one". This is what Khomeini was able to do.

Maziar Behrooz (1990:20) calls the time after the IRP bombing the period of isolation. However, the tag of isolation period is somewhat of a misnomer according to Menashri's (1986:511) analysis. He points out that after Sadr's dismissal, Iran began to gradually increase its participation in international assemblies, strengthen
bilateral relations with Third World nations, and became involved in regional affairs. It was a shift away from total preoccupation with the domestic situation. Menashri (1986:511) indicates the number of Iranian ambassadors actually at their post abroad increased from eight to thirty-five by October 1982.

In September 1980 Iraq invaded Iran not only to gain the Shatt al-Arab waterway (a broad estuary that was of strategic importance to both countries) but to contain Khomeini's revolution which threatened the secular, Sunni dominated Iraqi government. About fifty to fifty-five percent of the Iraqi population are Shiites. Nevertheless, by May 1982 Iranian forces recaptured Khorramshahr, the only major city occupied by Iraq. This resulted in the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory. The Iranian leadership then decided to advance into Iraq and overthrow the Baath regime. By May 1982 Iranian forces were in Iraq for the first time. However, as Chubin (1989) indicates, Iran's military success between 1982 to 1986 were ephemeral. The February 1986 offensive, which resulted in a beach head on Fao (in Iraq), was the culminating point of Iran's success in the war. A year later the Iranians would lose Fao to Iraq. On 18 July 1988 Iran accepted U.N. Resolution 598 which called for a cease fire.

By late 1984 Iran sought to broaden its relations with other nations. In his 30 October 1984 declaration, the Imam summoned Iranian diplomats abroad and instructed them to take
a new approach and establish proper diplomatic relations with all other nations except for a few like the U.S. This incident is one in a series of incidents that indicate a change. Bill (1988:273) suggests that by 1984 the clerics had solidified their control of power. This seems to be the case in that the Butcher of Tehran was replaced in his role of Revolutionary Prosecutor on 4 February 1985. It appears, at this time, the rulers of Iran felt they had a handle on the domestic situation and were ready to adjust their international stance. The German foreign minister became the first high ranking Western official to visit Iran since the Revolution and by May 1985 the first high level diplomatic exchanges with Saudi Arabia took place. Also by April 1985 the four year alliance between the two major armed opposition groups had broken down. On 17 July 1985 Ali Khamanei called for the elimination of unnecessary security precautions.

Domestically, the governmental process was changing. The Imam ruled on 7 January 1988 that the government was the primary instrument of Islamic rule and could override certain aspects of Islam. On 6 February 1988 the Imam ruled that a special assembly would solve the differences between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians. Previously, under the constitution, the Council of Guardians had the ultimate right to review laws passed by the Majlis to ascertain whether they were in conformity with Islamic law and the constitution. It could veto the law if it believed the law deviated from these.
The new assembly was a mixture of political and theological members. On 31 August 1988, the Imam ordered the formation of a four man council to resolve disagreements over post-war reconstruction policies or ministerial appointments. As Menashri (1989:49) notes, these steps taken by the Imam resulted in the supremacy of the state over the philosophy of the Revolution. The prominent clerics had to consider more seriously the views of politicians and even lower ranking clerics. Additionally, this time is important because as Cottam (1990:11) indicates, the Imam, after the acceptance of the cease fire (U.N. Resolution 598), called for free debate rather than endorsing a view.

With the end of the Iran-Iraq war in the Summer of 1988, new prospects opened up internationally as the decade of reconstruction and construction began. The war had been a major obstacle in rapprochement with the East and West -- especially the West. The U.S. in particular had sided with Iraq in a number of Persian Gulf confrontations of 1987 and 1988. However, nine months later in February 1989 Khomeini issued a decree calling for Rushdie's death because of his "blasphemous book", The Satanic Verses. Iran severed diplomatic ties with Britain. Nevertheless, with the end of the Iran-Iraq war, psychologically the world had changed for some of the Iranian elites. As Rafsanjani commented, "As long as countries, such as the United States, Great Britain, France, and also Germany, supported Iraq and participated in the war against us, the situation could not change for us. Do not forget that all littoral states of the
Persian Gulf, and even the Soviet Union, turned against us. In this situation it was quite natural that our relations with these countries were not normal. But now, after the end of this war that was waged against us, the international situation has changed. Our policy corresponds to these changed conditions" (FBIS-NES 26 March 1991:65-66)

With the death of Ayatollah Khomeini on 3 June 1989, the post-Khomeini era began. Domestically, the constitution was modified in a 28 July 1989 referendum. One of the most significant changes gave the president more power and eliminated the position of prime minister. Internationally, important steps were being taken. On 28 September 1990 diplomatic relations were resumed with the United Kingdom which had been severed a year and a half earlier over the Rushdie edict. The following November, the Majlis gave the government the go ahead to borrow from abroad. In line with such involvement in the international community, in March 1991 diplomatic ties were restored with Saudi Arabia. In May the first group of Iranians left for Saudi Arabia to participate in hajj. During the same month Iran reestablished ties with Morocco which had been severed since 1979. Additionally, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the subsequent U.S. and allied invasion of Iraq in January 1991 did not affect Iran's expanding participation in world affairs. Iran remained neutral in the conflict since it considered both the U.S. and Iraq as aggressors.

Domestically, in the October 1990 election for the Assembly of Experts Rafsanjani was successful in preventing the
nominations of those, like Mohtashemi, who oppose his policies. The Radicals were, however, not only able to stop Rafsanjani's attempts to hold an early Majlis election but forced the resignation of his Minister of Health. Additionally, the Radicals have made their influence felt via the international arena. In June of 1990, the Japanese translator for Salmon Rushdie was assassinated as was Shapour Baktiar in August. The following year in October of 1991 when the Middle East Peace conference was held in Madrid, Mohtashemi, a Majlis deputy, and Ali Khamanei, the Supreme Leader, denounced the conference and advocated harming the participants. Rafsanjani, the President of Iran, opposed such tactics.

As the nineties continue to unfold, it is evident that many of the same questions which were heatedly debated in the 1980's never went away. Issues of how to relate to other nations or how the government should be arranged are continually argued. The rest of this chapter and the next chapter focus on four clerics -- Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani -- who were pupils of the late Imam Khomeini. We will ascertain who these individuals are and what sort of actions they urged upon Iran. Iran is tugged in two different directions.
Ali Akbar Mohtashemi -- the True Believer

Ruhollah Khomeini was in his mid forties when Ali Mohtashemi was born into a relatively affluent family of Tehran in 1946. Ahmad Khomeini, Ruhollah Khomeini's son, was one of Mohtashemi's childhood friends as well as Mohammad Khoeniha. Mohtashemi was only seven years old when Mossadeq was overthrown. By the time he was eleven the SAVAK had been formed. Mohtashemi entered Qom seminary after completing his schooling in 1961, the same year Borujedi died. The year before, Khomeini had become recognized as an Ayatollah.

This young seminary student wasted no time in actively promulgating Khomeini teachings and ideas. Mohtashemi was first arrested on 24 June 1962 and charged with disseminating materials opposing the Shah. Upon the arrest and exile of Ruhollah Khomeini to Turkey in November 1964, Mohtashemi was one of the main organizers of political religious sessions in Qom opposing the exile.

In 1966, Mohtashemi began his studies at Najaf Theological Seminary under the Khomeini. Khomeini had been given permission to move to Najaf, Iraq, in October 1965, where he resided for the next thirteen years. Mohtashemi was first a student and then an aide of Khomeini's inner circle. Insider's report that Khomeini called him his "third son".

Prior to the 1979 Revolution Mohtashemi was delegated the task of establishing ties with the Shia of the various Arab nations. Mohtashemi cultivated a close association with the
Palestinians and Shia in Lebanon. One by-product of these links was that he and other Iranians received military training.

But even beyond the appointed tasks, Mohtashemi often became involved in much more. For instance, in 1970 when Khomeini commanded his word be disseminated among the pilgrims to Mecca, Mohtashemi took this order as literally applying to him. Mohtashemi along with his pregnant wife welcomed the calling (Behrouz 1992:27).

By his own account Mohtashemi was arrested twice by the Iraqi Baath regime for publication and distribution of Khomeini's materials. The last time Mohtashemi was arrested by the Iraqis was in 1978 when Khomeini commissioned him the assignment of delivering a letter to Arafat, the PLO leader. This task resulted in his arrest and deportation from Iraq. This event has been etched in Mohtashemi's mind forever. In his memoirs, he states:

"When I went to say good by to the Imam, he said: 'This time your journey will be a long one'. I was surprised by his comment. When I was arrested and deported I was shaken by the prophecy of the Imam. He frequently predicted both political and non-political events" (Behrouz 1992:27).

A few months prior to the Revolution, Khomeini was also sent packing and landed in Paris, France. Mohtashemi quickly joined him and was privy to all of Khomeini's meetings. As a member of Khomeini's management office, Mohtashemi answered phones, fixed appointments, and performed other such activities. Mohtashemi was not regarded as a major player at
this time. Consequently, when Khomeini and his associates arrived in Tehran on February 1, 1979, Mohtashemi presence was barely noticed.

After the 1979 Revolution, Mohtashemi continued as a member of Khomeini's management office in Tehran and Qom. Additionally, Khomeini chose him as a member of the panel in charge of assessing the problems of the oppressed and as his representative to the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic. He also became involved in other activities like the occupation of the U.S. embassy in November 1979. Beginning 7 November 1980, Mohtashemi was member of the supervisory council of the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic for a short time.

Beginning in 1981 Mohtashemi became Iran's Ambassador to Syria and coordinated activities in Lebanon and Syria. At this time, he developed strong links with a number of Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine. Mohtashemi arranged and directed the Hezbollah. The manner in which he did this is quite revealing (see Behrouz 1992:28 for fuller detail). The leaders of the AMAL movement who did not bend to his wishes were one by one cut off. Nabih Berri, for instance was accused of colluding with the Israelis. Eventually when things were under his control, Mohtashemi officially formed the Hezbollah of Lebanon which resulted in a number of Iranians joining the cause. Mohtashemi considers the establishment of
the Hezbollah as one of his greatest achievements (Behrouz 1992:280).

The links with various groups and the formation of the Hezbollah were an effort to export the revolution. Mohtashemi is also accused of cooperating with the faction of the Syrian intelligence services who were accused of attacking the U.S. Marine base in Lebanon on October 1983. Apparently, by 1984 Mohtashemi was trying to turn the Hezbollah into an independent organization free of Syrian control as well as pledging, in at least Lebanon, allegiance would soon be accorded Khomeini in the mosques. The Syrians responded by warning Iranian leaders of Mohtashemi's behavior and by closing down one of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's barracks. Not long after, on 15 February 1984 in a letter bomb, he lost his left hand, an ear, and some of his fingers. Mohtashemi asserts the Israelis sent the letter bomb. Nevertheless, after Mohtashemi recovered from the assassination attempt and had returned to Syria, President Assad let it be known that Mohtashemi's presence would gravely damage relations between Iran and Syria (Behrouz 1992:29).

In any event, Mohtashemi, while Ambassador to Syria, is credited with playing a role in the development of relations with Syria as well as issues concerning Lebanon. His links to the Hezbollah continued after his return to Iran. However, in May 1991, Sobhi Tofeili, the Chief Secretary of the Hezbollah
Council (which is the highest decision-making body of Hezbollah) and close associate of Mohtashemi, was replaced.

Mohtashemi's stint in Syria seems to have made an impression on him. Mohammad Bahonar, a Tehran deputy, said of Mohtashemi, "Mr. Mohtashemi has gained his experience from the internal strife in Lebanon and in his own mind he has divided the entire country's officials into two groups: those who oppose and those who favour the regime. He has made himself the measuring stick for this definition and equates those who oppose or favour the regime with those who oppose or favour him" (Bulloch and Morris 1989:218). Mohtashemi ostensibly sees those who favor the regime as a close circle in which one can depend on members for support and whom he must protect from the outside world. To be a member of those in favor of the regime, loyalty to it and the leader is a mandatory. The outside world (i.e. those who oppose the regime) is hostile toward his circle (i.e. those who favor the regime) and he is ready to take them on.

From the above discussion it is not startling Mohtashemi has been called an ideologue who is an unquestioning follower of the late Imam Khomeini (Cottam 1991:22). He is one who hews the line of the Imam in regard to the debate of the faqih (Zonis 1990:1-6). Judgments and writings of the late Imam Khomeini can serve as guiding principles in the Islamic community even after his death. This view differs with Rafsanjani and Ali Khamanei who argue there must be a living
source of emulation to make religious judgments and that the faqih must retain the power to make judgments legally binding on all Iranians (Zonis 1990:1-2). It is of no shock that in late 1991, Mohtashemi, along with a few others, like Mehdi Karubi, Speaker of the Majlis, Hadi Khamanei, deputy from Meshed and brother of the Supreme Leader, and Hadi Ghaffari, leader of the Hezbollah in Tehran, established a group called the Seven Protectors of the Heritage of the Imam so as to preserve the tradition of the late Imam Khomeini.

Mohtashemi's appointment as Minister of Interior was approved by the Majlis on 28 October 1985 (163 Majlis voted for him, 32 voted against him and 63 abstained). The Imam subsequently appointed him supervisor of the Islamic Revolutionary Committees. Therefore, in this new capacity, he was in a powerful position because he controlled the Komitehs. The Komitehs were brought under the Interior Ministry's control in 1984. Nevertheless, when Mohtashemi became Interior Minister, he protected the Komitehs and did little to reduce the conflicts among the security forces. This is not surprising since Mohtashemi has stressed revolutionary dedication in the government bureaucracy over efficient administration (Ghods 1989:225).

After the dissolution of the Islamic Republican Party in 1987, Mohtashemi was given the responsibility of supervising the parliamentary elections. During this time, he has been accused of being involved in the 1988 bombing of the Pan Am
flight over Scotland (e.g. Frontline 28 November 1989 or R. Wright 1989:E10). When asked, during an interview, if he was personally the head of terrorist operations carried out abroad, Mohtashemi replied after prolong laughter, "Can I, the good guy, be that person?" (FBIS-NES 1 March 1989:60). While Mohtashemi considers himself the good guy, he regards the U.S. as the bad guy and, therefore, the appropriate scapegoat. He states, "All our misfortunes come from the U.S. and the duty of the Islamic Republic and revolutionary Muslims is to strike at the U.S..." (FBIS 19 July 1990:44). Mohtashemi best sums up his stance regarding the U.S. when he said in reference to the U.S., "A wolf is a wolf even if it dons sheep's clothing. A wolf's nature does not change" (FBIS 2 February 1989:60; see also FBIS 8 February 1989:48).

Mohtashemi tends to take an uncompromising position with adversaries. For instance, his response to the July 1987 U.N. Resolution 598, which called for a cease fire between Iran and Iraq, was one of advocating a twenty year war strategy. As Mohtashemi states, "A war that started with military action and occupation of our cities cannot have a political end" (JPRS 25 July 1988:27).

In the eight months leading up to the spring 1988 Majlis elections, Mohtashemi placed his own people in important provincial governorships and district administrations. This provoked conflict with the more traditional local clerics. Bahonar and others accused Mohtashemi of making such an issue
of the campaign that it overshadowed the war effort (Bulloch and Morris 1989:218-219). Bahonar denounced Mohtashemi in the Majlis by stating "The fact that we must have clean elections was so much stressed, it seemed that before Mr. Mohtashemi became minister there had been no clean elections held in Iran" (Bulloch and Morris 1989:218-219).

According to one of his former colleagues, "He wouldn't care whether he shot you in the back or the front" (London Times 10 August 1989:10). Another acquaintance said, "He is a gregarious little man, warm and friendly, at least to your face" (London Times 10 August 1989:10). One parliament member remarked that Mohtashemi is well known for his hiring and firing. He regards himself as the only power and neither consults the clergy nor does he pay attention to the deputies. This member went on to state that with regard to the law, Mohtashemi acts wherever he sees fit and in accordance with his own will (R. Wright 1989:194; see also Behrouz 1992:28). Thus, it is not surprising that Cottam (1991:22) indicates Mohtashemi, in lacking Rafsanjani's political skills and personal finesse, has been out maneuvered by Rafsanjani. A recent example of this relates to the hullabaloo which was created in Iran after a few Majlis deputies met with Montazeri in November of 1991. Mohtashemi, instead of indirectly supporting Montazeri, like other Radicals did (e.g. Khoeniha), remained silent on the matter (Echo of Iran December 1991:18). Thus, the opportunity to possibly gain a potential ally was
missed. Along with this, Mohtashemi's personal demeanor has subjected him to the charge of insincerity. As one source contends, Mohtashemi is ambitious and wants to be President (London Times 10 August 1989:10).

The above outlined behavior would suggest Mohtashemi is affiliative but not sincerely interested in others or their concerns. It would also indicate a high belief in his ability to control events. Such an individual wants to maintain control over what happens to ensure he has an effect. Furthermore, he does not want to delegate authority. Since he perceives he can influence events, there is less of an inclination to compromise with others.

In August 1989 Rafsanjani was elected President of Iran. Rafsanjani, in his first term as President, did not retain Mohtashemi in any capacity. From this point onward, Mohtashemi became openly critical of the government. Even with his election to the Majlis (from the Tehran constituency) on 16 December 1989, Mohtashemi continued playing the role of the critical opposition, especially to the policies and actions of Rafsanjani. The following year in October 1990, Mohtashemi was rejected as a nominee for the Assembly of Experts. He did not pass an exam which was supposedly, according to Rafsanjani, tested one's theological qualifications. Mohtashemi called on the people not to take part in the elections of the Assembly of Experts.
Through the Spring and Summer of 1991, Mohtashemi and other Radicals (e.g. Khoeniha, a childhood friend of Mohtashemi) have continued to criticize the government. They contend Rafsanjani’s policies are against the policies of the Revolution. Mohtashemi maintains the policies of the Revolution are timeless and unchangeable, as well as asserting the present circumstances are no different than the circumstances before Khomeini’s death. Ironically, Mohtashemi has recently grumbled about the lack of freedom. This was something that was beyond his consideration when he was Interior Minister.

Little is known of Mohtashemi’s personal life. He is married and has six children.

Hosein Ali Montazeri -- the Reluctant Leader

"He is the fruit of my life. My essence is in him, not once or twice but several times" Ayatollah Khomeini

In 1922, a year after Ruhollah Khomeini chose an Islamic career and went to study in Qom, Hosein Montazeri was born into a rural farming family in Najafabad. Najafabad’s economy centers around agriculture and the carpet industry (although in the last decade heavy industry has begun to move in). His father, while not a theologian, led the town in mass prayers. Montazeri’s father encouraged his son to become a cleric.
Montazeri began his formal education at the age of six, three years after the Pahlavi dynasty was created, in the sole school of the town. At the age of twelve he began his religious studies at Isfahan Theological School. Later Montazeri went to study in Qom with the great masters of theology and became a student of Ayatollah Borujedi and Khomeini (Borujedi led the Shia community at the time). Borujedi appointed Montazeri as the one to guide Najafabad. Additionally, Montazeri was given the job of a high ranking instructor at Qom where he taught science and philosophy. At the age of thirty, during Mossadeq's era as Prime Minister, he became a Hojatolislam (rank below an Ayatollah).

During this time, he was also a pupil of Khomeini. He not only became a life long disciple but the relationship developed into friendship. Montazeri was one of Khomeini's special students. Khomeini arranged for Montazeri to marry his widowed sister when Montazeri was about twenty years old. They had four daughters and three sons.

In late 1962 when the Ruhollah Khomeini started his campaigns against the Shah, Montazeri emerged as one of his staunchest supporters. Khomeini was arrested in June 1963 by the Shah. Clerics representing the various towns travelled to Qom to protest. Montazeri represented Najafabad. He persuaded the other clerics to stage a series of protest actions of which a general strike was organized. In that
In 1964, he secretly travelled to Iraq to converse with Khomeini as well as obtain Khomeini's guidelines on how to organize protests. He came to be regarded as Khomeini's representative in Iran. Montazeri's visit was uncovered and he was arrested for five months. He was subsequently exiled to Khuzestan for one hundred days. Upon completion of his exile he returned to Qom.

In the spring of 1966, the Shah's government, in an effort to purge Qom theological center, arrested a number of clerics including Montazeri and his son, Mohammad. Both were tortured. Montazeri was released after seven months due to public pressure. However, Montazeri continued his activities and was arrested again a few months later. He spent two years in prison.

In 1972, Montazeri was arrested again and was exiled to Tabas in Khorrassan province. He spent a year there and in October of 1973 he cabled various Arab leaders to congratulate them with regards to the Arab-Israeli war. This outraged the government. This action along with his other activities resulted in the government arresting him and sending him to prison in Mashad. The government then exiled Montazeri to Khalkhal in east Azarbaijan province in August 1974.

In the winter of 1974 the Shah's regime decided to exile Montazeri from Khalkhal to Saqqez in Kurdistan. Here the
Shias are a minority and the people speak Kurdish rather than Persian. After seven months, Montazeri was arrested and imprisoned at Tehran's Evin prison in July 1975. A number of other theologians were also arrested. Montazeri was sentenced to ten years for campaigning against the Shah. However, the mounting tide of the revolutionary movement forced the Shah to release him on 1 November 1978.

In December of 1978, Montazeri went to Paris to consult Ruhollah Khomeini. He returned to Iran with Khomeini's guidelines. When the Prime Minister banned all flights for Khomeini's return, Montazeri was one of those who staged a hunger strike at Tehran University to protest the act.

After the 1979 Revolution, Montazeri resided in Qom where he met foreign personalities who visited Khomeini. He was a member of the Revolutionary Council and on 3 August 1979 received close to two million votes when he was elected to the Council of Experts, which was convened to draft a constitution for the Islamic Republic of Iran. A few days later (18 August 1979), Montazeri was elected the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts. However, Montazeri was overshadowed by others and gave his authority to Ayatollah Beheshti, the Deputy Chairman. During these proceedings, which were televised, Montazeri became the subject of ridicule because he seemed to be napping during important debates or was making disrespectful comments. Also during this period, on 10 September 1979, Khomeini appointed Montazeri as Tehran's Friday Prayer Leader. The
position as Chairman was the only position he held in which he was elected or directly related to a government body.

In January 1980, Khomeini was hospitalized for a couple of months and was informed by doctors to curtail his activities. Montazeri moved to Qom and eventually became Khomeini's unofficial spokesman (Menashri 1990b:128). Montazeri concentrated on lecturing in Qom and carrying out Imam Khomeini's directives, such as setting up the revolutionary courts, organizing the Qom theological school, and encouraging coordination between the universities and the theological schools. On 22 May 1980, Imam Khomeini appointed him the Friday Prayer Leader of Qom. Also in that year, the Imam gave him the authority to guide the theological colleges. This enabled Montazeri to appoint representatives to the councils that operated the schools. Later, the Imam appointed him a member of the Supreme Judicial Council and placed him in charge of the Secretariat of the Friday Prayer Leaders. Montazeri had the authority to appoint judges and authorize the Friday Prayer topic for use nationwide. Furthermore, Montazeri supervised charitable organizations and a publishing house.

Upon Montazeri's move to Qom, a number of Radical clerics began to address him as a Grand Ayatollah and worked toward setting him up as the successor to Khomeini (Menashri 1990b:128,224). Montazeri was the highest ruling cleric to identify with Khomeini. Nevertheless, Khomeini did not
declare him the next leader. This was partially an effort not to create animosity with the other Grand Ayatollahs (Menashri 1990b:128).

The June 1981 bombing of the Islamic Republican Party Headquarters affected him personally. His son Mohammad was one of the many killed. Mohammad had achieved some publicity because of his hijacking operations and other exploits. He was known as "Ringo", owing to his predilection for use of guns in pursuit of the Islamic goals of Iran.

Since Mohammad had been involved in the control over Afghanistan policy in the early years of the Revolution, with his death, Ayatollah Montazeri and Mehdi Hashemi took control of Afghanistan policy (Khalilzad 1990:238). Montazeri and Hashemi chose to start their own groups rather than work with the existing groups of the Afghan resistance. Thus, there was no attempt to diversify Iran's ties with various Afghan resistance organizations. After Hashemi's arrest (see discussion below) and execution, Montazeri's grip on Afghanistan policy was considerably weakened.

During 1982 Khomeini continued to transfer much power to Montazeri by nominating him as his personal representative with the army, the Revolutionary Guards, and other revolutionary organizations. Khomeini made it known that Montazeri was being consulted as a supreme religious authority (Menashri 1990b:225). Furthermore, in April of 1982 Ahmad
Khomeini, the son of Ayatollah Khomeini, said Montazeri would be the future leader.

The Radical clerics who were the followers of Khomeini's line, endeavored to use their superior power position and Khomeini's support to have a successor named in Khomeini's lifetime (Menashri 1990b:224). These clerics worked at enhancing the public's perception of Montazeri, discrediting potential rivals, and pushing for the designation of a successor via the Council of Experts, which by the end of 1982 was preparing for elections (Menashri 1990b:224-225,348). Montazeri was being thrust into a position of leadership since he was the only Grand Ayatollah to totally side with Khomeini.

Until the autumn of 1986, Montazeri lived in Qom. Even though Montazeri had numerous duties, he was considered almost in isolation of the affairs of state. His move to Tehran to Khomeini's residence was conjectured to be either because of Imam Khomeini's health or the strong opposition to Montazeri in Qom and thus a threat to his security. Nevertheless, during this time one notable success was a reorganization of the prison system. This is interesting considering the amount of time he spent in prison and that his son Mohammad and father were also imprisoned and tortured under the Shah's regime. However, this is understandable considering his vision of the purpose of the Islamic Republic. As Montazeri has stated on several occasions,

"Justice, equality, protection of rights, serving mankind, keeping commitments, honesty, generosity, sacrifice, amnesty,
forgiveness, and things like these are always proper and desired by people ... Taking power was to realize these values and aims and in other words, the state is the means not the aim. The aim is the values" (FBIS 7 February 1989:56).

Furthermore, as Taheri (1985:30) contends, Montazeri is one who believes human nature tends to be good if given the chance. Thus, it is not unexpected that he has continuously urged tolerance toward others, at least on the domestic scene.

On 23 November 1985, Montazeri became the designated successor to the Imam. However, he received only fifty out of the eighty-three votes. There was dissatisfaction among the clergy with his nomination. The Chairman of the Assembly of Experts (this assembly deals with succession issues), Meshkini, did not make the official announcement; rather Rafsanjani, the Deputy Chair did. Even after the nomination prominent clerics challenged his nomination (Menashri 1990b:383). Nevertheless, the Radical clerics who had labored to strengthen Montazeri's image and position could chalk up a victory since this would take some of the wind out of opposing factions (Menashri 1990b:349). Additionally, the Hezbollah recognized Khomeini's choice. Montazeri had promoted Iranian involvement in Lebanon (Kramer 1990:117). Later, when disagreements surfaced among the Hezbollah, Montazeri's appeal for unity became the critical factor.

Upon Montazeri's selection, he asked the Council to change its decision arguing that "in view of the presence of other great religious leaders, [he did not] wish [his] name to be considered" (Menashri 1990b:349; see also FBIS-NES 29 March
1989:38). He was opposed to being the deputy leader from the beginning and accepted the nomination against his own wishes (see also Irfani 1986:34; M. Wright 1989:38). Furthermore, when Mehdi Hashemi (see below) and his associates were arrested in December of 1986, Montazeri offered to resign as successor but Khomeini refused to accept it (Menashri 1990b:381).

Montazeri's description of his feelings about being named designated successor is revealing. He stated,

"When my name was raised by the Assembly of Experts ... I felt psychologically apprehensive. Although, according to custom and etiquette, I should have responded to these letters and telegrams, expressing my gratitude, nevertheless, I said to myself: When a heavy responsibility is entrusted to an individual there is no need for any congratulations; rather condolences would be more appropriate" (FBIS 19 August 1986:11-2).

Subsequent statements by Montazeri indicate positions of authority are a "heavy burden" for an individual (e.g. FBIS 30 September 1987:38; FBIS 29 March 1989:38; FBIS 5 April 1988:45; FBIS 1 March 1989:72). Such statements disclose an important aspect of Montazeri's view of leadership positions.

Some have portrayed Montazeri as a simple hearted peasant with a weak or mediocre personality (Zabih 1982:231-232; see also JPRS-NEA January 1986:176-177). Others suggest his actions do not always imply this. Even though he has been a student of Khomeini's since the 1940's, Montazeri has often displayed his independent mind on a number of issues (Akhavi 1987:197). For instance, in May 1985 when Montazeri set up a special delegation of his own to mediate between the Arabs,
Syrians, and Palestinians, the Imam took a back seat and Montazeri called the shots (Irfani 1986:31). Another instance was when Montazeri pressured the Majlis to ratify the bill giving confiscated land to those who had worked on it (Echo of Iran, December 1991:17). One muslim diplomat described him as his own man (Menashri 1988:334). However, Montazeri is not politically shrewd (see Menashri 1990b:128). For example, his attempts to carve out a personal power base resulted in making more enemies for himself (Menashri 1990b:383). As will be pointed out at the end of this profile, Montazeri has, at times, alienated potential supporters. Consequently, rather than describing Montazeri as possessing a weak personality, he is one who has a relatively strong personality but with weak political skills.

Part of the difference between these assessments relates to how the analysts have chosen to interpret his style and behavior even though there is agreement on his characteristics. Additionally, the media has, at times, portrayed him as unintelligent. For instance, one joke prior to the end of the Iran-Iraq war was: a condition Iraq demanded of Iran was that Montazeri must learn the name of the secretary general of the U.N. (Simpson 1988:97). Additionally, he is not considered a good speaker (JPRS-NENA 3 November 1981:21) and lacks charisma (Bakhash 1984:250; Menashri 1990b:128).
By nature, Montazeri is not interested in absolute power (JPRS-NEA 8 June 1989:76; Irfani 1986:33-34; Fuller 1989:83). His self-effacing style (Irfani 1986:3) and politeness (Taheri 1985:299-300) are aspects first noted about him. His nickname is the "cat" because of his jovial round face (Simpson 1988:97). Montazeri prefers to remain an important opinion molder rather than the central controlling authority (Irfani 1986:34). He would rather issue general guidelines than be involved in the day to day affairs of the state (Iran Yearbook 88 1988:490). He has tended to stand outside the state apparatus and has not been inclined to be associated with any formal governmental institutions. As designated successor he remarked,

"I am not involved in the policies, decisions, and executive affairs of the country, and I stay aloof from them. However, whenever I have had a feeling of religious responsibility, I have reminded the officials and the dear nation of certain issues, or in some cases I have brought them to the notice of the esteemed leader" (FBIS-NES 14 October 1988:53; see also FBIS 28 February 1989:65).

A by-product of this style is that the public does not associate Montazeri with the failures of the government.

One domestic issue of concern has been his crusade against the growing opulence of the ruling elites (Irfani 1986:33; Iran Press Digest 10 December 1985:6; Echo of Iran December 1991:17). His modest life style and identification with the poor has resulted in making him a favorite among these people. In the international arena, Montazeri has
continually demanded that Mecca and Medina be administered by an international Muslim Court (Goldberg 1990:159).

In late 1986 a row developed between Montazeri and Rafsanjani. Montazeri drew a distinction between the state apparatus and the revolutionary organizations while Rafsanjani wanted to disband Mehdi Hashemi's office (Menashri 1990b:379). That is, Rafsanjani wanted the revolutionary organizations under government control while Montazeri sought the opposite. Montazeri, however, did not realize the supremacy of the government had been occurring and continued to occur.

In September 1987 Mehdi Hashemi, whose brother was married to the daughter of Montazeri, was executed for a long list of crimes. Mehdi ran Montazeri's office in Qom and was the director of the Global Islamic Movement which was a liaison organization that controlled many, but not all, of the relations between Iran and its sympathizers in the region. Mehdi was a radical supporter of the Revolution. Montazeri tried to intercede but was unsuccessful and eventually came out against Hashemi. It is very likely Montazeri was unaware of Hashemi's activities considering Montazeri's penchant for delegating responsibility and trusting subordinates. Nevertheless, this incident was a blow to Montazeri's position.

On 28 March 1989, Montazeri resigned as the designated successor to the Imam. Ahmad Khomeini, Imam Khomeini's son, in a letter to Montazeri after his resignation, remarked that
even though the Imam cried for several hours after the dismissal, the Imam felt Montazeri had accepted the thoughts of liberals, hypocrites, and associates of Mehdi Hashemi (see FBIS 6 July 1989:40). The Imam considered Montazeri to be a gullible person. Sheikh Sadeq Khalkhali, who has also commented on this incident, indicates Imam Khomeini did not consider Montazeri to be "politically suitable for the position" (FBIS 12 October 1990:68). Additionally, Imam Khomeini banned Montazeri from political activities.

Montazeri believes leaders should not only consult (Bakhash 1990:283) but also share power (Moin 1986:1). He criticized Rafsanjani for not delegating responsibility. Montazeri has no sense of organization or need to develop his bargaining position to the optimal level in pursuit of power (Cottam 1987:21; Menashri 1990b:128). He is often unaware of political in-fighting (Stanger 1987:35; see also Rubin 1987:8). Montazeri favors persuasion by example (Taheri 1985:300).

This description of Montazeri portrays a man who is affiliative as well as one seeking meaningful interpersonal relationships. His need for power or control does not seem be high. Moreover, Montazeri does not seem to be overly task oriented.

A little over two months later the Imam died and Ali Khamanei became the new Supreme Leader. On 14 August 1989 Ali Khamanei restored Montazeri's religious responsibilities even
though, reportedly, Montazeri opposed the selection of Khamanei as successor. Montazeri could now give lessons at the Qom Theological center and followers could attend his classes. In Montazeri's typical fashion he began expressing his opinions. In January 1990, Montazeri denounced the government for selling oil to Israel and lashed out against a visit by the late Romanian President Ceausescu. Montazeri's critical remarks did not stop there. In February 1990 Montazeri was temporarily detained over remarks he made rejecting Ali Khamanei as the Supreme Leader. Reportedly, Montazeri asserts that Ali lacks the qualifications and is somewhat unethical. It should be noted that the Iranian media has not published his sermons or speeches since he resigned as designated successor.

Reportedly, according to the Financial Times, in November 1990, Rafsanjani and Khamanei attempted to coopt Montazeri back into the political system. This was an effort to counter attacks on their leadership by those who were infuriated about the religious credentials requirement surrounding the Council of Experts election. On 3 October 1990, fighting broke out in the Majlis when the Radicals charged Ayatollah Khamanei and Rafsanjani of rigging the forthcoming Council of Expert elections.

By and large, Montazeri has remained silent on controversial issues and maintains his isolation in Qom. For instance, on 24 May 1991, Rafsanjani gave a speech in which he
sought assistance from the public for sorting out the government's problems as well as seeking to counteract the force of the opposition. While many came out in support of Rafsanjani, including Speaker of the Majlis Karubi, a number of Radicals (e.g. Mohtashemi and Khalkhali) along with Ahmad Khomeini criticized Rafsanjani. Nevertheless, Montazeri, reportedly, after some negotiation with Rafsanjani ordered his followers to remain nonpartisan in the dispute.

Rafsanjani's concern about Montazeri is not unwarranted since Montazeri still possesses noteworthy influence in a variety of different areas. Religiously, a number of groups consider Montazeri their source of emulation. Politically, it has been claimed that about eighty to one hundred Majlis Deputies are followers of Montazeri (Echo of Iran, December 1991:17). Sadeq Khalkhali, a deputy from Qom, declared in a session of the Majlis in December of 1991 that Montazeri must have a role in Iran's future political developments (Echo of Iran, December 1991:12). On the military front, many of the commanders of the revolutionary guard and revolutionary committees are from Montazeri's native town (Echo of Iran, December 1991:17). However, Montazeri has, at times, alienated potential supporters. Montazeri, prior to being stripped of his position as designated successor, publically found fault with Rafsanjani, Khamanei, and Mohtahemi as well as in a roundabout way criticized the Imam and those around him. Thus, in the recent discussion about Montazeri's
political role, it is of no surprise that Mohtashemi, unlike Khoiniha another Radical who indirectly supports Montazeri, has remained silent on this issue (Echo of Iran, December 1991:18).

Ali Khamanei -- the Imperial Leader
"the strong arm of Islam...a rare person who shines like the sun" Ayatollah Khomeini

Two years before Reza Khan abdicated in favor of his son, Ali Khamanei was born on 15 July 1939 in the city of Mashhad, the capital of Khorasan Province in northeast Iran. He was the second son of nine children in one of the city's most religiously active families. His father, a follower of Ali, named his son after him. His family was poor and Ali remembered nights when his mother had difficulty obtaining bread and raisins. The ripples of World War Two hit Iran during Khamanei's early years and many people lived in a deprived manner at this time.

At the age of four, Ali enrolled in the traditional school of Koran and then went to primary school at the age of seven. Ali obtained a high school diploma at the age of eighteen. However, during these years he studied theology with his father, who was a cleric, and other theologians such as Ayatollah Hadi Milani. His father encouraged and desired his son to pursue religious studies and become a cleric.
The year the Savak was formed, 1957, Ali went to Najaf, Iraq to study at the theological school. A year later, Ali returned to Iran to pursue his religious studies in Qom. His teachers included Grand Ayatollahs Borujedi, Haeri, and Khomeini along with Ayatollah Montazeri. Reportedly, one other fellow student, Rafsanjani, became his roommate. These two young theology students were also later to be together in many difficult situations during the pre-1979 Revolution struggle. They hid together in villages and worked together in planning the struggle. Reportedly, they were, at one time, imprisoned together. Nevertheless, by 1961-1962 Ali was chosen to be the youngest teacher at the theological center.

While Ali's political life began with Ayatollah Khomeini's campaigns against the Shah in 1962, the Khamanei family members were political activists. One of their close relatives, Mohammad Khiabani, was a political and religious leader in Azerbaijan in the early 1920's. He led an uprising against the Russians and the central government to free the province. Upon his death the Khamanei family was forced to leave its birthplace for Khorasan.

Ali Khamanei was considered a militant follower of Khomeini. Khomeini's campaign against the Shah centered its activities around Tehran and Qom. Ali was not as prominent as Beheshti or Montazeri. However, he was well known in Khorasan. His task, beginning in 1963, was to act as a liaison between theological schools at Qom and Mashhad. A few times
he was arrested carrying messages from Khomeini to Ayatollah Milani in Mashhad. Additionally, from 1963 to 1967, Ali taught at the Mashhad Theological School and continued his own advanced theological training. While in Mashhad along with other theology teachers, they organized an underground group. This group was later discovered by the security forces but most of the members escaped including Ali.

Between 1963 and 1978 Ali was arrested at least seven times. Ali learned some battle techniques of the Palestinians in 1973 when he took a trip to Syria and Lebanon. Within four months he went to Egypt to learn the use of heavy artillery. Before returning to Iran, Ali went to Germany where he acquired English and German. Upon his return he became a trilingual teacher of foreign languages.

In 1977, Khamanei and a number of other clergy, including Rafsanjani and Beheshti, drew up a plan to form a National Militant Clergy Association. This later led to the foundation of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP). With Khomeini’s movement gaining steam, Ali and Hojatolislam’s Tabassi and Hasheminejad organized massive demonstrations of several million people in Khorrasan. Ayatollah Khomeini sent him to Libya to have talks with Kaddafi. His activities resulted in his arrest and exile to Iranshahr in southeastern Iran. However, in 1978 he left due to the Savak’s relaxation and helped in Khomeini’s movement until the victory of the Revolution.
On the eve of the 1979 Revolution Khamanei took part in the street fighting. Upon the return of Khomeini to Iran, Ali assumed the directorship of the publicity office. This included publishing a journal in which he contributed several articles. In February 1979 he was one of the founders of the Islamic Republican Party. Ayatollah Beheshti delegated the job of forming it to Khamanei and Rafsanjani, both of whom were close associates. Beheshti was the de facto leader of the political disciples of Khomeini (Menashri 1990b:169). The publishing rights of the newspaper Islamic Republic, which promulgated the ideas of Islamic thought, were issued under Khamanei's name.

In March 1979, Khomeini assigned him the task of attending to the activities of the counterrevolutionaries. At the same time he became a member of the Revolutionary Council. In this capacity, he was commissioned to negotiate with the Army chiefs and the American authorities in Tehran. On 18 August 1979, Ali was appointed deputy minister of defense. He was the Revolutionary Council's representative to this post. Khamanei headed the political and ideological bureau of the military which was charged with inculcating the military with Islamic ideology and monitoring its activities. In late November of the same year, Ali was appointed by the Revolutionary Council to replace Rafsanjani as the commander of the Revolution Guard Corps. A little over a month later, on 19 January 1980, Khamanei replaced Montazeri, who had
decided to return to Qom, as the Friday Prayer Leader of Tehran. This position, then as now, has substantial political influence since the sermons are published in most major newspapers and are broadcast on radio and TV. Consequently, Khamanei was no longer in the shadows and this became evident as the media, in trying to characterize him, described him as the mullah with a rifle in his hand.

On 15 March 1980, Ali was elected as a Majlis Deputy from Tehran. He was assigned to the committees of foreign affairs and foreign policy and also chaired the committee on defense matters. Ruhollah Khomeini chose Khamanei to be his advisor to the Supreme Defense Council on 11 May 1980. The following September, after the Iran-Iraq war broke out, Ali was appointed Imam Khomeini's representative to the army. During the war he spent a great deal of time at the front.

Politically speaking, Ali came to the forefront in 1981. The deaths of some prominent actors (especially Beheshti) pushed him into the center arena. While preaching in Tehran on 27 June 1981, a bomb planted in a tape recorder exploded in front of him and nearly killed him. In regard to this attempt on his life, he stated, "I was at death's door and then recovered. It was a miracle; I was not expected to live, but I did get better ... I should have been killed, but that God had saved me. I felt then that I had a responsibility that I had to accept" (FBIS-NES 16 March 1989:61).
Ironically, this assassination attempt which kept him in the hospital for about a month also kept him from attending a meeting the next day at the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) headquarters. Another bomb explosion killed a number of leading politicians who were at the IRP headquarters. Six years later, in an interview in which he referred to the bombing, he recalled it as an unprecedented incident. Additionally, one reporter who later interviewed Khamanei as President, noticed Ali had pictures everywhere of the Imam and Beheshti. The latter died in the 1981 bombing of the IRP headquarters. One of his mentors had died, but his influence continued.

On 1 September 1981, Khamanei was chosen to replace Bahonar, who had been assassinated a few days earlier, as the Secretary General of the Islamic Republican Party. Khamanei, at this point, was one of three surviving founders of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP). Then on 5 October 1981 he was elected the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran by obtaining ninety-five percent of the vote. He was now a prominent figure in the Revolution. By 1982, some considered him the second most powerful man in Iran.

The Central Council of the Friday Congregational Imams was established in October 1982 and Khamanei was one of its members. This council was to formulate guidelines for all the Friday Prayer Leaders. In December of the same year, he was elected to the Council of Experts which dealt with the
succession issue. Internationally, in 1982, when Iran began to turn the tide of the war and regain Iran's land back, Khamanei was against continuing the war.

In the spring of 1984 Ayatollah Mehdi Ruhani, the highest ranking cleric in the West to work against Khomeini, was joined by Ali Tehrani, Khamanei's brother-in-law. Tehrani had worked closely with Imam Khomeini. Upon fleeing to Iraq, Tehrani verbally attacked Khomeini's regime (Menashri 1990b:321). The following year in May of 1985, Khamanei's sister also fled to Iraq to join her husband, Ali Tehrani.

On 11 December 1984, Ayatollah Khomeini appointed eight new members to the Council for Cultural Revolution. Among these new appointees were the heads of the three branches of government. Khamanei, therefore, not only became a member but was elected its Chairman one week later. Upon his election, Khamanei stated he opposed any intervention by Islamic councils in university affairs (Menashri 1990b:361). This position contrasted with the more extreme clerics who favored more intervention.

Khamanei was the first Islamic President to complete the four year term. Bani Sadr had been dismissed and Muhammad Ali Rajai had been assassinated. Khamanei considered not running for reelection but Khomeini told him his participation was essential and Khamanei interpreted this as a "religious decree" (Menashri 1990b:369). Khamanei's campaign speeches evince why Khamanei was hesitant about another term as
President. Khamanei advocated giving more power to the
President so that he could implement policy and have more
leverage over ministers who often refused to cooperate with
him (Menashri 1990b:345). In any event, on 20 August 1985, he
was reelected President by garnering eighty-eight percent of
the vote.

According to one reporter who interviewed him when he was
President, Khamanei is decisive (JPRS 26 February 1985:102-
103). After Montazeri resigned as designated successor,
Khamanei criticized him for not having the power to decide
(FBIS-NES 3 April 1989:50). Furthermore, he has stated one of
Khomeini's outstanding qualities is decisiveness (FBIS 3 April

Khamanei believes human nature is rebellious (FBIS 14
December 1987:61) and that justice is more important than
peace. In his September 1987 speech to the U.N. General
Assembly in New York, Khamanei stated, "However, in our view,
justice ... is greater and more important than peace."(FBIS 24
September 1987:38; see also JPRS-NEA 27 February 1987:82).
Furthermore, "World politics are based on force, on strength",
remarked Khamanei (FBIS-SAS 12 February 1987:12). Yet this
aggressive stance is tempered by his acute sense of reality.
Not long after he became the Supreme Leader, Khamanei
commented in a speech, regarding the handling of foreign
policy, "... the Islamic Republic must combine power with
delicacy and intelligence" (FBIS 28 December 1989:56).
Khamanei seems to view the world in black and white terms (i.e. tendency to view things in a simplified rather than complex manner). For instance, Khamanei stated, "It makes no difference, a nice person is nice under any circumstances, whether he agrees with us and decides to work with us, or not" (FBIS-NES 2 December 1988:31). The same black and white distinction is evident in the international arena. Khamanei asserts, "... the world has been divided into two camps of the dominant and the dominated ..." (FBIS 24 September 1987:41).

Additionally, it also appears he is concerned with practicing what he preaches. Khamanei refused treatment in the U.S. for his injuries because he said he could not say "Death to America" while enjoying its medical facilities (Jerusalem Post 6 June 1989; see also FBIS-NES 7 December 1988:33). In other words, as Khamanei said, "Of course, it is not good to make contradictory remarks" (FBIS-NES 7 December 1988:34).

His father died on 8 July 1986 at the age of ninety-three. As implied earlier, his father had a tremendous influence on his thinking, choice of career, and development. It is interesting that prior to his father's death when Ali visited Zimbabwe in January 1986, he refused to shake hands with female members of Mugabe's government and declined to attend the state banquet because wine was being served and women were seated. Not long after his father's death, at a
breakfast at the Waldorf, two American women were allowed to sit close to him.

The next couple of years relates to a time period in which institutional changes occurred and some Iranian analysts claim his influence was on the low side. In 1987, the IRP in which he was the secretary general, was disbanded. Then, in January 1988, he was publicly rebuked by the Ayatollah Khomeini. The Imam rejected Ali's interpretation of the role of government in the Islamic Republic (see appendix C). However, on 6 February 1988, the Imam formed a special assembly to solve the differences between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians. Ali became one of its members. Furthermore, in August of the same year, Khomeini established a four man council to formulate reconstruction policies and resolve disagreements over post-war reconstruction policies. As President, Khamanei, also became a member of this body.


Events took a course which soon propelled him to the top. With Montazeri no longer the designated leader and with the Imam's death on 3 June 1989, he was selected by four-fifths of the members of the Assembly as the Leader of the Islamic
Republic on 4 June 1989. In September 1989 he also took over the commander-in-chief duties which are part of the Supreme Leader's responsibilities.

Khamanei is considered an accomplished orator and is known for his rhetorical, fiery style (Hiro 1990:14; Cottam 1987:23; Pear 1989; Echo of Iran January 1990:21; JPRS 3 November 1981:21). While considered ambitious, he is also sociable by nature but with an intense manner (Pear 1989; Cottam 1987:23). Ali is an able political organizer and theoretician (FBIS 31 July 1985:13). Moreover, he is respected for his intelligence, sincerity, and loyalty to the late Imam (Cottam 1991:23). As leader of the Revolution, Khamanei has formed a twelve member advisory council which meets daily. Reportedly, he makes his decisions in light of these discussions (JPRS-NEA 10 October 1989:56). However, while he believes opinions of subordinates can not be ignored, Khamanei has stated that subordinates should not have completely different views from the one in charge, as such differences will cause friction (see FBIS 16 March 1989:58). Therefore, they should not work together. Furthermore, subordinates and coworkers are secondary to Islam. As Khamanei stated after Montazeri's resignation,

"In Islam, personal relations and feelings, and steadfastness, and so forth are irrelevant. In Islam, the interests of Islam and the system take precedence over all affairs and personal and collective issues. No consideration would come before the interests of the system" (FBIS 3 April 1989:49).
Along with his belief that those with completely different views should not work together, Khamanei has stated that the government should have one person in charge (Pear 1989:545). These beliefs may stem from his experience as President. During his reelection campaign (in 1985), he urged that the President should be given more authority since some of the cabinet ministers had refused to cooperate with him and Khamanei was powerless to impose his views (Menashri 1990b:345-346). However, more authority was not given to the President until 1989, and, therefore, Khamanei spent another four years with a Prime Minister, Musavi, and his cabinet choices who were at odds with Khamanei in their policy views.

Although Khamanei exhibits some authoritarian tendencies, such as black and white thinking and consolidated control of power, he works through the group to establish his authority and is very careful not to alienate any influential powerholders. This is evident during his term as President. For instance, in 1981, the Organization of the Struggler's for the Islamic Revolution threatened to leave the IRP (Menashri 1990b:222). Even though they had limited strength, Khamanei chose to offer them a number of cabinet positions. At this early stage of clerical control such a defection could have hurt the cause.

Another instance of working through the group to establish his authority occurs after his reelection to the post of President. The leadership was faced with a
constitutional dilemma of whether or not it was mandatory for the President to nominate a new government (Menashri 1990b:345-346). Khamanei and others desired a change so Musavi would no longer be the Prime Minister (since they had different views on how things should be accomplished) while others favored Musavi's renomination. Ali Khamanei hesitated in naming a nominee and consequently, a number of Majlis members asked Khomeini for his guidance. While Khomeini did not give decisive support to Musavi, he suggested under the present situation continuity was best. Khamanei not only nominated Musavi but, reportedly, agreed to twelve of Musavi's nominees for cabinet posts which Khamanei would have rather rejected.

A third example relates to Khamanei's power position after the 1985 presidential election. As indicated, he had a Prime Minister and many cabinet members who were difficult to work with, while Rafsanjani's position seems to have strengthened day by day (see profile on Rafsanjani). Even though, ostensibly, by 1984 Khamanei represented the Radicals in the IRP while Rafsanjani represented the Moderates, confrontation with Rafsanjani was avoided (Menashri 1990b:307,382). While Khamanei said their mutual friendship was too deep for anyone to sow discord (Menashri 1990b:307; see also later discussion at end of chapter), it would seem his support of Rafsanjani, as the most significant powerholder next to Khomeini, on many occasions was prudent politically.
Little is known of his personal life. Ali Khamanei was married in 1964 to the sister of Sheykh Ali Tehrani, a teacher in Mashhad Theological Center. Ali has six children and is known to like poetry and befriends writers and other such people. Khamanei has written eight books on religious and political components of Islam including one on the future of the Islamic government and another on the role of the Muslims in India's struggle for independence. Like his father, he has an infatuation with Sufi literature. Reportedly, he also wrote one book in collaboration with Rafsanjani, called Our Stand, which sets down the policies of the IRP. Furthermore, his half brother, Hossein Musavi, was the former Prime Minister of Iran.

Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani -- the Rationalist

By the time Ali Akbar Behramani was born on 25 August 1934 in Rafsanjan, a province near Kerman in Central Iran, Ruhollah Khomeini was married and had been a mullah for eight years.5 Rafsanjani (a clerical surname he adopted later) is the second of nine children of a moderately well-to-do pistachio nut farmer. As a boy, he was an avid soccer player and wrestler. Rafsanjani completed his primary education in Rafsanjan and then in 1949 went to Qom to study theology. This was not unexpected as reportedly his favorite pastime was to preach to his friends or even practice by himself if no one else was nearby.
At Qom theological seminary, Rafsanjani chose Ruhollah Khomeini as his mentor and guide. However, he also studied under Montazeri. As a young theologian, reportedly, his roommate was Ali Khamanei. Later, during the struggle against the Shah, they hid together and worked together. By the late 1950's he had achieved the clerical rank of hojatolislam, which is one step below an ayatollah. While in Qom, in collaboration with a number of other clerics, the Islamic magazine *Maktab Tashayvo* was published by them.

In the early 1960's, along with Beheshti and other clerics, revolutionary cells were constructed which were to form the seed of the Islamic Republican Party. In 1962 Rafsanjani organized anti-government demonstrations. A year later after the Shah had expelled Khomeini, Rafsanjani maintained links with influential clergy who had led protests against the Shah. He organized and promoted Khomeini's cause. Rafsanjani's mentor at this time was Montazeri since Khomeini was in exile.

Rafsanjani's political involvement resulted in numerous spells in prison and at one point was forcibly drafted into the army. The clergy were normally granted exemption but in his case it was punishment for his activism. He kept preaching to the other draftees. Consequently, the army decided Rafsanjani was less of a problem back in Qom.

He was arrested in 1964 but escaped two months later. While in hiding, he published and translated a version of the
book *Story of Palestine*. This book describes the atrocities of the Zionist and the struggles of the Palestinians. He is an admirer of the Palestinian cause, of which Rafsanjani is also a minor historian. His feeling for them was manifested most notably in a 1989 outburst urging the Palestinians to kill westerners for Arab deaths in the occupied territories.

At the same time, he collaborated with the Islamic Coalition Organization until he was rearrested in connection with the assassination of Prime Minister Hasan Ali Mansour in late 1964. He spent four and a half months in prison and was reportedly tortured. He went underground and set up a secret network but this network was exposed in 1967 and Rafsanjani was subsequently imprisoned for two and a half months.

Upon his release from prison, Rafsanjani wrote the book *Amir Kabir, The Champion Crusader Against Colonialism*. Amir Kabir, one of Rafsanjani's heroes, was a nineteenth century Iranian figure who sought to modernize and reform Iran. Kabir brought educational structures and other Western influences to Iran. Thus, despite his clerical education, Rafsanjani is also noted as a secular historian.

In 1971 Rafsanjani was arrested, but the authorities were unable to prove he was the author of a letter to Khomeini urging support of the Mojahedin. The following year he was jailed for seven months on the charge of cooperating with the Mojahedin. In 1975, Rafsanjani went secretly to Lebanon to meet with those who were opposing the regime. While in
Lebanon, Vahid Afrakhteh, a member of the Mojahedin, was interrogated by the Savak. Afrakhteh revealed his contacts with Rafsanjani. Upon Rafsanjani's return to Iran, he was arrested and treated badly. He was sentenced to six years in prison but served only three years owing to the Shah's capitulation to the revolutionary movement. Upon his release, he took part, although not a prominent role, in setting up the revolutionary Komitehs which helped establish Khomeini's influence in Iran.

To some extent, Rafsanjani is a self made millionaire. Before the Revolution he became wealthy by property speculation. Additionally, he was involved in the businesses of construction and import-export. Supposedly, he has forged numerous connections with the Bazaar merchants. Rafsanjani's personal fortune, presently, is believed to be considerable, with much of his money invested in land. In 1984 he bought a home in Brussels, Belgium. It is a luxurious home in the city and a few members of his family reside there. Furthermore, as part of his business, his son has established a commercial office in Belgium.

Little is known of Rafsanjani's family life. He has three daughters and two sons. A few days after the Revolution, his wife used her body as a shield to protect her husband from an assassin's bullets. Both were wounded but recovered. It is reported his wife, Efat Marashi, exercises considerable influence over him. Recently, she has begun to
travel with her husband and even wear western dress. Additionally, Schahgaldian (1989:59) indicates that supposedly Rafsanjani and the late Ayatollah Khomeini were half brothers.

Since the Revolution, Rafsanjani has reportedly survived at least four assassination attempts. One of the most noteworthy is the June 1981 bombing of the Iranian Republican Party. He escaped certain death by leaving the meeting a few minutes before the explosion. Two years earlier (25 May 1979), Rafsanjani was, supposedly, nearly assassinated in his home by the Forgham sect which did not consider him sufficiently Islamic. Rafsanjani who had acquired some military training in Lebanon from the Palestinians, jumped the attacker and sustained only moderate injuries. However, Kuzichkin (1990:274), a former KGB agent who defected in the early 1980's, contends reliable sources stated that Rafsanjani had been visited by two old friends and a scuffle erupted over political issues. A shot was accidentally fired and Rafsanjani was slightly wounded as well as receiving a black eye. In order to explain this to the people, the Forgham sect was used.6

On 11 January 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini announced the formation of the Revolutionary Council. This Council was to oversee the transition, but it effectively held the actual power in the first year. The government was there to execute the Council's policies (see Hussain 1985:136). Rafsanjani became one of the members of the Revolutionary Council. On 20
July 1979, the Revolutionary Council appointed Rafsanjani as deputy minister of Interior. As deputy minister under the provisional government, he played a role in ending the strike by oil workers. This was important for stabilizing the government. Later, as acting Interior Minister, he supervised the referendum on the constitution and the presidential elections.

Rafsanjani was one of the founders of the Islamic Republican Party which was officially formed in February 1979. Beheshti delegated the job of forming it to Rafsanjani and Ali Khamanei. Rafsanjani was one of Beheshti's closest associates (Menashri 1990b:131). On 22 July 1979, he was put in charge of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Rafsanjani took care of this duty until December of 1979 when Ali Khamanei replaced him. However, he was given another responsibility by the Revolutionary Council. On 13 November 1979 Rafsanjani was appointed the Supervisor of the Ministry of Interior and was the Revolutionary Council's representative to that ministry.

Rafsanjani resigned his position as Supervisor of the Ministry of Interior in order to run for the Majlis. On 14 March 1980 he was elected to the Majlis as a member from Tehran. He was a member of the committee of Petroleum affairs. Beginning in June 1980 Rafsanjani served as the leader of the Friday Prayers in Tehran. The following month, he became the Speaker of the Majlis and held this position until he became President in 1989. In the capacity of Speaker
of the Majlis, he became a pivotal player in the regime. This was evident in a statement made by Bani Sadr two months after he fled Iran in June 1981. Bani Sadr surmised the government would collapse if five men, one of which was Rafsanjani, were killed (Menashri 1990b:189).

With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the Imam appointed him as his representative to the Supreme Defense Council on 11 October 1980. His influence in this capacity became apparent on 9 July 1982 when he listed the conditions for a cease fire. It is interesting that the conditions were not issued by then President Ali Khamanei, who was also chairman of the Supreme Defense Council (see Hiro 1985:212 and Taheri 1985:296).

By February 1981, Rafsanjani, as well as other disciples of Khomeini (like Montazeri, Khamanei, and Beheshti), were openly attacking Bani Sadr, the President at the time (Menashri 1990b:169,177-178). While Khomeini tried to persuade the two sides to resolve their disagreements, in early June Rafsanjani and Montazeri urged Khomeini to withhold his backing from Bani Sadr (Menashri 1990b:180). Consequently, by mid June 1981, Bani Sadr was ousted as President. The following week on 28 June 1981, the day of the bombing of the Islamic Republican Party headquarters, Rafsanjani escaped certain death by leaving the meeting minutes before the explosion.
During these tumultuous times, Rafsanjani's presence was a stabilizing force. After Bani Sadr fled in June 1981, the authority of the President was given to a temporary council consisting of the Speaker of the Majlis, Prime Minister, and Head of the Supreme Court -- Rafsanjani, Rajai, and Beheshti respectively. Similarly, after Rajai and Bahonar, the newly elected President and Prime Minister, were killed in late August 1981, the two man council was composed of Ardebili, Head of the Supreme Court, and Rafsanjani.

In December 1982, Rafsanjani was elected to the Council of Experts. The following June (1983), Rafsanjani was elected its Deputy Chairman in its first meeting. It was, however, the Majlis election of 1984 which brought forth his popularity. Rafsanjani not only gained a half a million more votes (in Tehran) than the next closest candidate but also was reelected as Speaker of the Majlis by a vote of 181 out of 189. Later that year, Ayatollah Khomeini appointed Rafsanjani to the Council for Cultural Revolution since he was head of one of the three branches of the government.

During the Iran-Iraq war Rafsanjani worked for the purchases of (and obtained) U.S. arms which the hardliners opposed (see Menashri 1990b:375,380-381; Kazemi and Hart 1990:67). A few of the more extremist Majlis members, as well as Mehdi Hashemi and his associates, attempted to undermine Rafsanjani because of his involvement in this matter. However, Khomeini eventually intervened to let everyone know
he was content with Rafsanjani and his actions. Furthermore, those who were involved with dealing with the U.S. were never arrested or even criticized by Khomeini.

In 1988 Rafsanjani took on more responsibilities. The Imam ruled on 6 February 1988 that a special assembly would resolve the differences between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians. Rafsanjani became a member of this special assembly. On 2 June 1988, the Imam appointed Rafsanjani as Acting Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The Imam instructed him to restructure and coordinate the armed forces. Rafsanjani, as the Imam's representative to the Supreme Defense Council, had been involved in the planning and directing of the various operations. Thus, he was not stepping into an unknown area. Rafsanjani held this position until 2 September 1989. In August 1988, after the cease fire, Khomeini ordered the formation of a four man council to formulate reconstruction policies and resolve disagreements over post-war reconstruction policies. Rafsanjani became a member of this council as he was the Majlis Speaker.

Rafsanjani has the reputation of someone who does not make enemies. He cajoles and manipulates rather than using the stick or rule book (Simpson 1988:95-96). Rafsanjani relies on his political skills rather than forceful confrontation. He is both a master of compromise and a master of manipulation.
A popular told story about Rafsanjani illustrates how he is a master of compromise (see R. Wright 1989:E12). He is in a car with the President and the Prime Minister and they come to a fork in the road. The President tells the driver to turn right while the Prime Minister tells him to turn left. Rafsanjani informs the driver to signal left and turn right. He is skillful in steering conflicts and finds the appropriate devices for the situation.

Rafsanjani is also a master manipulator. According to Bani Sadr, the former President, Rafsanjani would often tell him the Imam's son, Ahmad, had revealed to Rafsanjani the manner in which things should be done (Fiske 1987:8). Sadr said for a long time he believed Rafsanjani. Another tactic he used was to present the Imam with fait accomplis. Rafsanjani would tell the Imam that things had happened as if they were unalterable from the start. Another instance is when he went to the USSR right after the Imam died in 1989. Rafsanjani declared that the Imam had told him that he should attempt to improve relations (Clines 1989:4; For other instances see Sunday London Times 14 August 1988:A14 and FBIS 7 April 1986:113).

In 1989 Rafsanjani became the Vice Chair on the Committee to review the Constitution. After the death of Imam Khomeini in June 1989, he was elected President of Iran (3 August 1989). He also proposed Ali Khamanei's name as the successor to Imam Khomeini. On becoming President, Rafsanjani was given
the rank of Ayatollah which enabled him to now interpret Islamic doctrine. Additionally, constitutional reforms at the time provided the President with much more power. Rafsanjani was the first Iranian President with the authority to dismiss a minister or veto a cabinet decision without parliamentary approval. Along with this position on 20 October 1989 he was elected as the head of the newly named Expediency and Discernment Council.

In October of 1990, Rafsanjani effectively manipulated the Council of Experts' election so as to exclude Radicals like Mohtashemi. He has courted Montazeri, when needed, to his benefit. This was evident, most recently, when Rafsanjani, in May 1991, requested the public to help the government sort out its problems. Rafsanjani obtained support from Khamanei, Speaker of the Majlis Karubi (a Radical), Council of Guardians, Qom seminaries, and the armed forces but not from the Radicals and Ahmad Khomeini. (However, in July, Ahmad ceased his criticism of Rafsanjani and came out in support of him -- at least for the time being.) During these tense times, Rafsanjani made an arrangement with Montazeri in which Montazeri agreed not to take sides (see discussion under Montazeri).

Rafsanjani is considered cautious, conservative, and not a risk taker (Echo of Iran October 1989:25-26). He selects advisors based on their obedience (Echo of Iran October 1989:25-26). Rafsanjani keeps himself well informed and is a
first class orator (Van England 1985:9; Hiro 1991:209). He is a master at establishing rapport with different stratas of society. His political skills and personal finesse have allowed him to out maneuver other clerics within the regime (Cottam 1991:22).

Rafsanjani has been labeled a moderate, a pragmatist, an opportunist, a wheeler-dealer, a manipulator, and a cunning fox. Some see him as an opportunist because he worked closely with the Liberals like Mehdi Bazargan, but when Bazargan fell into disfavor, Rafsanjani insulted him. Rafsanjani had good relations with the communist Tudeh party until their arrest, then he attacked them. However, other analysts see him as the consummate politician who is able to bridge the gap of two ideological divisions existing within the clerics (see Current Biography November 1989:36).

Rafsanjani places high value on regime consolidation (Cottam 1991:22). Therefore, he tries to place himself above factional discords and wants to project an image of being an objective problem solver (Schahgaldian 1989:59). Apparently, he has often been skillful at doing this. For instance, Rafsanjani remained above a quarrel between Khamanei and Musavi in which Rafsanjani indicated his willingness to cooperate with both sides (Menashri 1990b;352). Concomitantly, Rafsanjani will shift his stand to what is appropriate for the time (Schahgaldian 1989:57-58; Milani 1988:305-307; Van England 1988b:9). It is interesting, and
seemingly quite on target, that Rafsanjani calls himself a "rationalist" (Watson 1989:51; see also FBIS-NES 1 August 1989:51).

This rationalistic approach is apparent in an interview he gave in which Rafsanjani said Iran has not ignored Islamic principles by having relations with Germany and Turkey. Conditions of the world impose some limitations on Iran which means Iran can not always have the power to choose. He then remarked, "I believe our principles are obeyed, but in some cases we may be limited and we may have to forego some of these principles" (FBIS 17 April 1987 -- cited from Ramazani 1991:177). Such a view is in direct contrast to Mohtashemi and other similar Radicals. Another example of his rationalistic approach is indicated by Rafsanjani's concern to promote efficient administration within the bureaucracy over revolutionary dedication (Ghods 1989:225).

Discussion

This chapter provides an understanding into two aspects of the ruling clerics of Iran. First, in presenting the life of each cleric, along with the historical context, it becomes obvious their socialization processes were not the same. Second, the four clerics display different personality orientations.

Even though Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani had similar religious training under Khomeini, were
some of Khomeini's closest advisors, often had friendly ties with one another, struggled together for the Revolution, and survived numerous assassination attempts or other hostile acts against them, their socialization processes were not completely similar. This chapter illustrates at least four areas in which there are differences. Two relate to before the Revolution and two after it.

First, the childhood backgrounds of these four clerics are different. Mohtashemi was born in Tehran, a large city, while Montazeri was born in a rural area. Rafsanjani and Mohtashemi were born into well-to-do families while Khamanei grew up poor.

A second difference is the effect of generational or epoch experiences. Montazeri, for instance, who was born in 1922, experienced different world events than Mohtashemi who was born in 1946. Montazeri was student of both Khomeini and Borujedi. The latter believed religion and politics do not mix. Montazeri is the one who has essentially shied away from formal governmental positions. Mohtashemi, on the other hand, went to Qom seminary the year Borujedi died.

Khamanei's experience of growing up during World War Two when food was scarce seems to have influenced how he approached Iran's post Iran-Iraq war period. Khamanei remarked that some problems will exist but Iran was fortunate not to go hungry. He went on to state that those who think
there should be no problems after a war have no understanding of what war can do (see FBIS 3 May 1990:62).

With regard to after the Revolution, these four clerics have had different socialization experiences. First, Rafsanjani and Khamanei have held elected positions since 1981 along with a number of appointed positions. Mohtashemi has been in one elected position since 1989 and Montazeri held one in 1979. Thus Rafsanjani and Khamanei have had to deal with a variety of disparate constituents and individuals in the 1980's. Furthermore, both have served in the executive and legislative branches of the government. It is not surprising Mohtashemi and Montazeri have been the ones who are critical of the government while Rafsanjani and Khamanei have warned its critics that talking against the government is a crime (see FBIS 15 July 1991:62; FBIS 31 March 1989:50; FBIS 27 June 1991:36).

Another area of difference relates to the amount of exposure to both the domestic and international scenes. Montazeri, for a period of years (during the 1980's) had isolated himself and rarely traveled to foreign nations. Rafsanjani and Khamanei have traveled internationally more frequently and keep abreast of the domestic political milieu.

The second aspect this chapter has sought to unravel is the answer to the question of who are these four clerics. Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Rafsanjani, and Khamanei have different
personalities. The following section will discuss the sort of type or orientation each of the four clerics are like.

Mohtashemi seems to be a mixture of what Payne and Woshinsky (1972; see also Payne 1972; Woshinsky 1973; Payne et al. 1984) would call "Mission" and "Adulation" types (see chapter two). The latter infers he uses his position to deliver psychic and material benefits to his group and in return they repay him with praise. It is a gregarious orientation toward others to achieve this. Mohtashemi exhibits aspects of the "Mission" type in that his beliefs (i.e. Khomeini's views) provide him with the superstructure which gives meaning to his life. He needs converts, by force if necessary, to prove his doctrine is the correct one. Mohtashemi is the "true believer" in Eric Hoffer's (1966) terms in that he is an ardent believer who is passionately attached to the cause.

Montazeri exhibits Payne and Woshinsky's "Obligationist" and "Conviviality" types (see chapter two). The former has a sense of duty but a general aversion to politics. He is preoccupied with certain normative principles rather than the concrete outcome. The Conviviality type has an intense need to please others (i.e. self-effacing). Montazeri, to a large degree, fits Barber's (1965:145-149) conceptualization of the "Reluctant" who is an unambitious and inner directed leader seeking to perform his duty with modesty.
Khamanei seems to fit McClelland's (1975) Imperial Leader type (see chapter two). Such a leader works through the group to establish his authority. He embraces whole-heartedly his responsibility to the group and works at being considered as one who is fair, impartial, and just. Thus, while Khamanei is, generally, a man of principles, he is cognizant of the powerholders in the regime. There may be times when it is not prudent to push one's position too much. Nevertheless, as Supreme Leader, he can be somewhat less concerned about this. This role should fit him well since Khamanei can stay above the political debates and render a decision when needed -- just as Khomeini, one of his mentors, did.

Rafsanjani, like Mohtashemi and Montazeri, can be conceptualized in Payne and Woshinsky's (1972) terms (see chapter two). He is a Game (or Machiavellian) type who is preoccupied with strategy and tactics. Such an individual is sensitive to interpersonal cues as well as being very adaptive and shrewd. Rafsanjani probably enjoys political haggling and manipulation. For him, one fights over issues not over people. After the fight is over, one gets along with others. Furthermore, compromise is more than a practical necessity for transacting business among those with conflicting views. A good compromise is a process in which he defends his position, then conciliates with others, and ultimately ends up on the winning side.
Rafsanjani and Khamanei, as current President and Supreme Leader of Iran, respectively, hold the two highest political positions. These leaders are of particular importance. Khamanei and Rafsanjani have a long history of cooperation. As Rafsanjani commented a few months after Khamanei became the Supreme Leader, the two of them have spent most of their social life together and, at times, have been together "in the most difficult situations" (FBIS 4 August 1989:46). Even during times of differences, these two have been able to work together. For instance, in 1984-1985, within the IRP, two rival factions surfaced that were headed by Rafsanjani and Khamanei, according to most sources (Menashri 1990b:307,350-351). Nevertheless, both agreed on a strategy to define their respective positions in the hierarchy -- Rafsanjani as head of the most important institution and Khamanei as holder of the highest personal position (Menashri 1990b:307). Thus, no open split occurred. This is not surprising considering, according to Khamanei, they have a practice of consulting each other on any issue (Menashri 1990b:307).

Furthermore, during this time, each related how important the other one was to the revolution. Khamanei referred to Rafsanjani as the most "talented, wise and brave" man he had ever known. "His existence [was] essential for the [continuing] revolution". Khamanei further stated, "I pray to Allah that he will take [years] off my life and add them to the life of Rafsanjani" (Menashri 1990b:350-351). This vote
of confidence has continued into the nineties (see Echo of Iran, July 1991:13). In turn, Rafsanjani said of Khamanei, whom he had known since 1957, "We have been alongside each other in the struggles [against the Shah]. Now, as then, when I have no access to him, I feel weak. My faith in him increases as time goes by" (Menashri 1990b:351). While such praise may be politically judicious, this seems less likely the case for Khamanei. He was not one to give such approbation -- not even to Montazeri before his resignation. Therefore, it would seem likely, under the current conditions with Khamanei as the Supreme Leader, this relationship will continue.

Another observation worth mentioning relates to the fit between personality and the role of Supreme Leader. Montazeri, was at one time (until 1989), the designated successor to Imam Khomeini. Khamanei, with the Imam's death became the Supreme Leader. One can ask what differences in personality are there which may relate to Montazeri's lack of success in holding on to this position? Montazeri supposedly had little desire to be the Supreme Leader; nor is he seen as a dynamic leader (for instance he is considered a poor speaker). Along with this, he is not interested in power or good at developing his bargaining position. This self effacing personality, low desire, and average skills suggest he was not well suited for the position. Khamanei, on the
other hand, is considered a good speaker who moves his audience and an able political organizer.

One final point can be surmised. Etheredge (1979:3,13) has conceptualized the idea of "hardball politics" -- tough, ambitious, shrewdly calculating men vying for power. Such behavior, Etheredge conjectures, may arise from at least thirteen personality types. From our discussion of the four Iranian clerics, Mohtashemi, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani appear to exhibit such hardball political behavior. While hardball political behavior may be a subculture in many nations, in revolutionary regimes it is probably the dominant behavior. Therefore, it is not unexpected that Montazeri did not survive as the designated successor to Khomeini. As Beheshti, a close associate of Rafsanjani and Khamanei as well as the most prominent figure in the revolution (next to Khomeini) until his death in 1981, remarked to a group of schoolchildren, "In politics, it is not enough to be honest and simple. You must be honest and cunning" (Menashri 1990b:131). Montazeri was not sufficiently cunning and Mohtashemi has a formidable challenge against Rafsanjani and Khamanei.

In conclusion, this chapter has provided a detailed explication of the socialization and personality of Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani. Based upon the reports of various observers of Iranian politics, it is possible to suggest that these four clerics have different dispositions or orientations. That is, their personality
characteristics differ. In chapters five and six a systematic method is employed to assess and classify the four clerics of this study into orientations. Chapter four discusses the five policy postures considered in this research effort and how the various observers of Iranian politics have conceptualized Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani with respect to these political policy postures.
Footnotes

1. There are a number of good books about Iran's history and culture such as Cottam (1988), Cole and Keddie (1986), Keddie and Hooglund (1986), Mottahedeh (1985), Menashri (1990b), Ervand (1982), Arjomand (1988), and Rahnema and Farhad (1990). See also the list of references and the end of this book.


6. Kuzichkin (1990:273-274) indicates the Iranian authorities described the Forgham as an extreme left wing group with the goal of eliminating prominent clergy. Yet Kuzichkin discloses that among their contacts on the left, no one had heard of this organization. Furthermore, it was strange that Ayatollah Motakhari was allegedly murdered by them (on 1 May 1979). Motakhari was not a passionate supporter of Khomeini's policies and griped about the brutality used against the opposition.

7. Mottahedeh's (1985) book depicts the educational process of a modern ayatollah. Each model, like Khomeini, had a few of his former students who were intimate counselors.
CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL POLICY POSTURES

The previous chapter provided us with a qualitative analysis of the personalities of Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani. This chapter presents us with an intuitive analysis of these clerics' political postures by various analysts who follow the Iranian political context closely. While the analysts do have areas of agreement, there are points of disagreement which are substantial at times. This chapter, therefore, to a large extent, seeks to answer the question of what do we know about the political postures of Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani? However, prior to answering this question, it is necessary to define what is meant by political posture and what sort of postures this study will focus upon.

Conceptualization and Origination of Political Postures

The terms worldview, ideology, and belief system are all commonly used terms for the picture of the world. In the present study, I have chosen to use the concept "postures" (borrowed from Hurwitz and Peffley 1987) because it refers to the general stance the political actor would like to see
his/her government adopt. Political postures do not indicate the specific policies that should be employed (i.e. advocacy statements); rather they are beliefs regarding the general direction the government should take.

Five political postures will be considered in this research endeavor. Three of them refer to foreign policy postures -- degree of aggressiveness, degree of autonomy, and degree of involvement with the former imperialistic power. The other two relate to domestic policy postures -- degree of freedom of expression and degree of centralization. The following discussion elucidates each of the postures.

The degree of aggressiveness is concerned with the leader's stance toward the active use of violent action in dealing with external entities. A highly aggressive posture will often advocate dealing with external entities by means of aggression. That is, they will urge material support of liberation movements, use of terrorism, adoption of a belligerent stance toward opponents, the desire to support or initiate any other hostile activities abroad, primacy of revolutionary goals over state building, and/or desire to immediately retaliate against those entities which interfere in his nations affairs. On the other hand, the low aggressive individual has a willingness to abide by U.N. decisions and regulations, does not openly advocate the use of force or support of liberation movements, desires the export of revolution to mean the making of their nation as a model in
which others will follow their example, does not urge the taking of hostages or other similar terrorist actions, and/or supports the primacy of national interests over revolutionary goals. In other words, instead of urging the use of military action, he tends to embrace the idea of coexistence if not even a more flexible accommodating stance.

In between high and low is moderate aggressiveness. Such a stance may be one which supports a mixture of high and low depending upon the situation or issue. Alternatively, the moderate aggressive individual may be one who condemns actions of other nations which are hostile, emphasizes his nation's ability to defend themselves against belligerent acts without considering the possibility of diplomatic means to resolve the problem, and urges the export of one's revolutionary ideas to other nations. Such an individual is less prone to urge the support of liberation movements, use of terrorism, or the desire to support or initiate any hostile activities abroad.

The degree of autonomy refers to the unilateral-multilateral distinction. The high autonomy position has a willingness to go it alone rather than collaborate with others. He desires extreme self sufficiency, advocates agricultural development rather than industrialization, and has little regard for international institutions and rules. Concomitantly, such an individual is against reliance on foreign technology, investment, or foreign borrowing.
Relations with other nations are often restricted to other like-minded countries.

The low autonomy position has a willingness to work in concert with others rather than go it alone. This may be manifested by emphasizing the primacy of industrial development, showing a willingness to accept international institutions and regulations, and in urging open relations with almost any nation. Foreign borrowing and investment are definitely a viable alternative. Other nations and world organizations have much to offer his country.

A middle position between the high and low autonomy positions may be exhibited in two ways. One way is that the individual demonstrates high autonomy tendencies on some issues but shows low autonomy tendencies on other issues. A second way this may be manifested is the individual may advocate a moderate position on most issues. Thus, he is likely to consider the use of foreign investment, borrowing, and technology but in a controlled manner or advocate relations with only certain nations/blocs. Such an individual is concerned about world opinion and international regulations but neither accepts or rejects them.

The degree of involvement with the former imperialistic power relates to the willingness of the leader to interact with this adversary. The leader may take three general positions on this matter. He may recommend little involvement with the former imperialistic power. This would be reflected
in a desire to have no diplomatic exchanges and little trade, as well as against acting as a third party to help the former imperialistic power. Furthermore, any hostile or interfering actions by the former imperialistic power would call for retaliation.

The opposite position would embrace the position of considering some sort of relationship with this adversary (e.g. diplomatic exchanges, trade, and so forth) if they exhibit some sort of goodwill. There is a desire to keep options open with this actor even though the former imperialistic power may have to change its attitude. This stance is reflected in little or no response by the leader when the former imperialistic power engages in interfering or somewhat hostile actions.

An intermediate position may be manifested in two ways. One way, a leader may side with the political consensus of the time. Thus, at times, such an individual may exhibit a desire for no sort of involvement with the former imperialistic power while at other times consider normalization of relations if certain conditions are met. The second way this moderate position may be manifested is by soft criticism of the adversary. Thus, when the former imperialistic power engages in interfering acts, the leader will condemn the action and insist his nation will defend itself but he falls short of urging retaliatory acts. Furthermore, such a moderate
position could be exhibited in considering talks or relations if certain conditions are met.

The degree of freedom of expression posture refers to how much latitude should be given to the people, political parties, press, and internal offenders. This posture is anchored at one end by a desire to allow the people, press, and other organizations to express themselves. Such a posture not only encourages a multiparty system but desires the government to let people express their opinion. At the other end of this posture is one that embraces a limited amount of expression of opinions and little leniency with others. Thus, such a position urges harsh treatment of offenders, strict dress, censorship of the press, and little leeway for parties, if not outright rejection of other parties.

As with the other postures, an intermediate position may be espoused in two ways. One way, the individual wants limited freedom of expression on certain issues while on other issues he encourages freedom of expression. A second way takes a generally moderate approach to such issues. Thus, one is neither for extremely limiting or expanding amounts of freedom of expression.

The degree of centralization posture relates to the degree of control the government should possess. Should the distribution of power be centralized or more decentralized? A centralized view is prone to support nationalization, frowns on regional/local control, and believes others can not be
trusted to make prudent decisions. Thus, consolidation of control is in order by eliminating duplicate organizations, little delegation of control, and possibly even minimal amounts of consultation. The other end of this posture is anchored by a decentralized stance. This position emphasizes free enterprise, and the necessity to decrease the bureaucracy and the number of rules and regulations. Government control should be dispersed so that control is delegated to others. Furthermore, the people should always, at least, be consulted. Again as before, a leader may fall in the middle and support a mixed stance advocating some aspects of centralization and other aspects of decentralization. This may be manifested by urging centralization on some issues but decentralization on other issues or it may be exhibited by showing, generally, a mixed stance on such issues.

How were these five political postures derived? I approached this from two different perspectives. On one hand, the work of researchers who had intensely studied the postures, goals, and values of elites and masses in nations other than Iran were perused. On the other hand, an examination of the debates within the ruling Iranian establishment were compiled. Integrating these two, the five political postures were decided upon. Therefore, such postures are not only appropriate to the Iranian context but generalizable to other countries as well since, according to
various researchers, such postures have been employed in their studies.

The postures -- aggressiveness, autonomy, freedom of expression, and centralization -- are not new and have been employed by numerous researchers (see for instance Angell et al. 1964; Fernandez 1970; Eldersveld et al. 1981; Wilkenfeld et al. 1980; Hermann 1982; Hermann 1980b; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Chittick and Billingsley 1989; Chittick et al. 1990). These concepts have been employed with respect to a government's behavior and a leader's behavior, beliefs, and postures. Additionally, such concepts are used with elites and masses in a variety of different nations or, at times, in cross-national studies. Thus, the four political postures -- aggressiveness, autonomy, freedom of expression, and centralization -- employed in this chapter can be considered to be fairly well established concepts to employ in almost any country in order to understand differences of individuals in how they want their government to relate with other nations and how it should organize itself.

However, while the ideas of aggressiveness, autonomy, freedom of expression, and centralization are fairly common concepts in political science, this is not the case with the notion of involvement with the former imperialistic power. This posture is the only one of the five which has a specific target. Therefore, why has this been incorporated into this research effort? Hurwitz and Peffley's (1990;1987) work on
postures (although in reference to the U.S.) implies that how the individual wants to deal with the nation's main adversary is an important posture in its own right. This idea seems relevant to revolutionary authoritarian regimes. However, in this context, the main adversary is likely to be the former imperialistic power.

How appropriate are these five postures to the Iranian context? An examination of the extant literature by Iranian researchers about the differences within the post-Shah ruling elites suggests such differences in postures are likely. Moreover, these differences are not confined to the four clerics in this study. Such differences are also evident in other Iranian elites like Mohammad Reyshari, Behzad Nabavi, Abdol Karim Ardabili, Ali Meshkini, Ahmad Khomeini, Hosein Musavi, Mehdi Karubi, and Musavi Khoiniha.

Some of the ruling elites advocate a more aggressive stance (i.e. actively export the revolution) while others seem to be less inclined toward such belligerent acts (see R. Wright 1989:181-183; Cottam 1987:25; Metz 1989:222; Hunter 1989/1990:141; Schahgaldian 1989:50; Ramazani 1989:87; Muir 1988). With regard to autonomy, it is exemplified in the debate on how to finance Iran's development and reconstruction. Some of the elites want foreign assistance and others are against it (Hooglund 1989:11; Schahgaldian 1989; Cottam 1989:183). With respect to involvement with the former imperialistic power (in this study the U.S.), the
Iranians differ on how to relate to the U.S. Some oppose any renewal of ties while others do not (Schahgaldian 1989:50,51,76; Cottam 1989:183; Tamayo 1986; Alavi 1989:7; Echo of Iran 1989 November:4).

Moving to the domestic arena, the elites of Iran differ on the idea of freedom of expression. However, Iranian analysts have paid less attention to this probably because unlike the other postures, an incident(s) instigated a barrage of responses among the elites. Therefore, differences were readily apparent. With this posture, the Iranian elites voice their stance, from time to time, even though there is seemingly no incident which tends to promote a response. Additionally, with this posture, if a relevant incident happens (like the execution of political prisoners), a nonresponse can be very significant.

With regard to centralization, differences among the Iranian elites is also evident in the debates over nationalization and issue of amount of control for the regional ulama (Akhava 1986:67; Hooglund 1989:10; Schahgaldian 1989:49,52; Cottam 1987:21-22; Tamayo 1986). Additionally, some favor a system based on the participation of major political and religious institutions, while others want it to be dominated by a few religious leaders (Alavi 1989c:7; Cottam 1987:22).
Areas of Controversy and Little Understanding

The rest of this chapter concentrates on how those who follow the Iranian context closely have analyzed Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani with respect to the five political postures employed in this chapter. In other words, what do we know about these four clerics' stances toward relating to other nations and how they want the government arranged? To answer this question the following discussion is divided into two sections. First, I will summarize what the various Iranian experts have commented about Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani. Second, in a more systematic manner, the areas of disagreements among the experts and the areas where little has been said will be explored.

Mohtashemi's Political Postures: Iranian analysts consider Mohtashemi a hardliner, radical, and ultra revolutionary (e.g. R. Wright 1988:68; Fuller 1989:84; Zonis 1990:6; Moin 1989:74; Rezun 1990:209; JPRS-NEA 8 June 1989:75: Iran Times International 8 December 1989:15). Cottam (1991:22) calls him an ideologue who is an unquestioning follower of the late Imam. What these terms mean becomes more apparent when we look at the five political postures.

Iranian researchers seem to agree that Mohtashemi advocates the export of revolution by involvement in terrorism and financial support of liberation movements (Hunter 1989/1990:141; Cottam 1989:183; Ramazani 1989:87; Echo of Iran
February 1990:20; R. Wright 1988:68; Rezun 1990:209). Mohtashemi believes the chief issue is to smash the East and the West. Economic issues are peripheral to political issues (Iran Times International 22 December 1989:15; Iran Times International 30 March 1990:1). This is unlike Rafsanjani who believes men can not live without bread. Concomitantly, Mohtashemi insists that the holding of foreign hostages by the Lebanese is right because the Lebanese are the hostages of the Americans and the Israelis (Iran Times International 12 January 1990:15). Moreover, months before the Iran-Iraq cease fire, he still declared that weapons were the best answer to weapons (R. Wright 1988:68; Ramazani 1990b:51; see also JPRS 25 July 1988:27). Thus, it would appear, analysts would suggest that Mohtashemi advocates an aggressive foreign policy posture.

With regard to autonomy, Iranian analysts assert Mohtashemi advocates independence. He rejects friendly relations with the East or West, does not want Western technology or investment, and urges little reliance on foreign experts (Ramazani 1990:21; Alavi 1989b:15; Cottam 1989:183; Schahgaldian 1989:91; Alavi 1989:7; Echo of Iran March 1990:4; FBIS 19 April 1990:49; Rahnema and Nomani 1990:357-358; Ghods 1989:226). Mohtashemi believes Iran must base its economic policies on the improvement of traditional agriculture because industrialization will cause reliance on foreign technology and Iran's dependence on the West (Echo of Iran March 1990:4;
Mohtashemi insists an open door policy will result in the subjugation of Iran and the destruction of the revolutionary process (Alavi 1989b:15; R. Wright 1989:E12; Sciolino 1992:4).

Iranian researchers agree that Mohtashemi rejects relations with the United States (Cottam 1990:21; Cottam 1989:183; Bill 1989:67; Iran Times International 12 January 1990:15; Fazel 1990:12; Echo of Iran March 1990:4; Economist 16 June 1990:44-45; Rezun 1990:209). Such an act is a betrayal of the late Imam Khomeini's teachings and, therefore, would not keep the Revolution pure. Unlike Rafsanjani, Mohtashemi does not want Iran to take part as a mediator in the release of hostages in Lebanon (Echo of Iran February 1990:12).

Within the domestic arena, Iranian analysts indicate Mohtashemi would advocate little freedom of expression. Mohtashemi favors the suppression of the liberal opposition and takes a confrontational strategy (Cottam 1991). He is against the formation of political parties (Echo of Iran March 1990:4) and does not want those who fled the country during the Revolution to return (Alavi 1989b:15). Furthermore, Mohtashemi supports draconian methods of internal control (Bill 1989:67; Cottam 1991:24).

Iranian analysts concur that Mohtashemi advocates centralization of control and power (Schahgaldian 1989:91; Sareen 1988:37). Reconstruction should be in the hands of the
committed and the state should oversee and control foreign trade as well as exercise greater control and expansion of the public distribution system (Ramazani 1990:21; Cottam 1990:21; Sareen 1988:37). He has continually urged interventionist or statist economic policies (Rahnema and Nomani 1990:357-358; Ghods 1989:225-226). Mohtashemi urges tight government control. One analyst, Rezun (1990:209), however, asserts he is a longstanding capitalist in economic matters.

Montazeri's Political Postures: Most Iranian analysts seem to agree that Montazeri is a staunch believer on matters of Shia doctrine. The media and some analysts consider him a hardliner with respect to foreign policy. However, other researchers (e.g. Simpson 1988:101; Rezun 1990:209; Leeden 1988:234-235) question this stereotype. Nevertheless, the Iranian analysts seem to agree he is a liberal in the domestic arena.

Iranian analysts disagree about Montazeri's position on the use of aggressive means. One set of researchers believes Montazeri desires to export the revolution with violent acts, aid other liberation movements, support hostage taking in Lebanon, and challenge the existing world structure (e.g. Wright 1987:146; Irfani 1986:28-30; Zonis and Brumberg 1987:78; Sareen 1988:36; Schahgaldian 1989:50-51; Moin 1989:74; Iran Press Digest 10 December 1985:6; Middle East February 1990:14; Bakhash 1990:281; Ramazani 1988:255; Menashri 1990:44). Other analysts disagree with this
assessment. They assert Montazeri is opposed to the export of revolution by force and prefers Iran to be a model for other nations to follow (Taheri 1987:99,322; Simpson 1988:96-97). Montazeri, during the Iran-Iraq war, had reservations about pursuing it (Iran Yearbook 88 1988:490). He wants to spread Islam by cultural diffusion rather than by coercion (Akhavi 1987:201). Ramazani (1990:61) contends, Montazeri was a supporter of the export of revolution in the beginning, but this gave way to the view of building Iran as a model nation. Rezun (1990:209) asserts Montazeri is a "pragmatic revolutionary" who seeks to first consolidate the gains of the Revolution.

Iranian analysts have been relatively silent with regard to the amount of autonomy Montazeri wants Iran to have in the world. However, what little there is indicates that he desires Iran to remain independent. Montazeri opposes foreign borrowing and believes Iran is over dependent on foreign funds (Middle East 1990:14; FBIS 13 February 1990:54). He wants to achieve self sufficiency (Iran Press Digest 10 December 1985:6). Ramazani (1988:255) considers him an isolationist.

The Iranian researchers also disagree on how Montazeri perceives the relationship with the U.S. should be. Some analysts consider him to be extremely anti-American (Simpson 1988:101). Irfani (1986:29) indicates that this is a main tenant of his foreign policy outlook. However, other researchers suggest that Montazeri has often been silent or
soft on his criticism of the U.S. Schahgaldian (1989:50-54) suggests he is not as conciliatory as Rafsanjani but not as openly anti-U.S. as Khamanei. Van England (1988:9), a journalist who follows the Iranian political context, thinks that Montazeri may eventually want to restore relations with the U.S. Sciolino (1985:19) points out that Montazeri has said it is impractical to sever relations with the U.S. (see also Leeden 1988:234).

Within the domestic arena, the Iranian analysts agree on Montazeri's beliefs. In regard to the degree of freedom of expression, the Iranian researchers also are in agreement. Montazeri wants freedom of the press and political activities. This freedom of expression relates to tolerating others' views, encouraging the development of several parties, adopting a more lenient approach to political opponents, and greater liberalization in domestic affairs (Bakhash 1990:281-283; Cottam 1990:10; Simpson 1988:101; Iran Press Digest 10 December 1985:6; Gueyras 1986:108-109; Akhavi 1987:198; Van England 1988:9; Irfani 1986:29; Menashri 1988:339; Cottam 1987:21; Rezun 1990:210; Middle East 1990:14). Irfani (1986:29), in his analysis of Montazeri, suggests that Montazeri believes it is better to set an accused person free than have an innocent person punished. Along this same line, Akhavi (1987:198) notes that Montazeri does not believe force puts things right; rather charity and goodness attract more people. Montazeri also encourages those who fled Iran after


Khamanei's Political Postures: In the early years of the Revolution, Khamanei was considered a fundamentalist (e.g. Zabih 1982:70,170) or hardliner (Pear 1989:545). In the last few years many analysts have come to believe that he is now less radical (e.g. Pear 1989:545; R. Wright 1989:E11) or as Schahgaldian (1989) calls him, a "moderate" extremist. Some even suggest he is a pragmatist or moderate (e.g. Amjad 1989:153-156; Howaidi 1985:9; Rezun 1990:210; Ghods 1989:225). Cottam (1987:23) asserts Khamanei will modify his position to consolidate support. However, Bulloch (1990:13) still considers him a hardliner.

With regard to the active use of aggression, Iranian analysts do not agree. Milani (1988:305-306) contends he is
one who wants to actively export the Iranian Revolution. Taheri (1985:294) asserts the opposite. However, Schahgaldian (1989:52-55) and Cottam (1987:22-23) suggest Khamanei, while not rejecting the revolutionary qualities of the Revolution or the need to help the oppressed in the world, will seek an accommodation with others within Iran. That is, whatever policy advocated would be based on domestic utilitarian interests. Menashri (1990b:389) proposes that Khamanei's revolutionary ideals have not been abandoned rather postponed due to Iran's domestic situation.

With regard to autonomy, Khamanei appears to be prepared to borrow foreign funds and import from the West (Schahgaldian 1989; R. Wright 1989:E11; Menashri 1990b:392) Khamanei seems to favor Western involvement in Iran's postwar economic reconstruction (Ghods 1989:226). Domestic sources are not enough so Iran must use foreign assistance (Bakhash 1990:278). Additionally, he advocates closer ties with nonaligned and socialist nations (Taheri 1985:294; JPRS-NENA 3 November 1981:21).

On the issue of relations with the U.S., Khamanei advocates minimal relations with the U.S. (Milani 1988:305-307; Schahgaldian 1989:54; Current Biography Yearbook 1987:310; Echo of Iran January 1990:3). His rhetoric against the U.S. has been uncompromising. It would seem he would argue against any sort of friendly relations with the U.S.
Khamanei is not a proponent of freedom of expression. This was evident, most recently (4 July 1991), when Khamanei came out warning the opposition that creating rifts was a treasonable act. He desires to achieve monolithic unity and conformity (Akhavi 1986:67). Khamanei desires little freedom of expression (Tamayo 1986) and prefers adherents who are highly disciplined and prepared to carry out orders (Akhavi 1985:5-6). Unlike Montazeri, he does not like independent minded revolutionaries (Akhavi 1985:5-6) and is for harsh treatment of any opposition (Hiro 1985:198; see also Echo of Iran February 1992:15).

Some Iranian analysts propose Khamanei wants a government with strong authority, controlled planning, and nationalization of major industries (Milani 1988:305-307; Rubin 1987:7; Tamayo 1986:Cl-2; Cottam 1987:22; Taheri 1985:294; Hemmat and Marfleet 1985:52; Schahgaldian 1989:54; Hiro 1985:198). The government needs to be more centralized, with one person in charge (Pear 1989:545). While he is basically for state intervention and a centralized economy, Khamanei de-emphasizes control over commerce, land expropriation, and free enterprise. On the other hand, a number of other analysts, Rahnema and Nomani (1990:216,357), Menashri (1990b:392), and Ghods (1989:225-226), assert Khamanei desires an economic system in which there is less intervention by the government. Ghods (1989:225-226) proposes
that he even is in favor of a more limited role of the government in all aspects of society.

Rafsanjani's Political Postures: In the early years of the Revolution Rafsanjani was considered an uncompromising radical (e.g. Zabih 1982:170; Howaidi 1985:9) but in the past few years has been one who will alter his views (Cottam 1987:23) and, therefore, is unpredictable and enigmatic (Current Biography November 1989:36). He will shift his stand to what is appropriate for the time (Schahgaldian 1989:57-58; Milani 1988:305-307; Van England 1988b:9). Cottam (1991:22) posits, Rafsanjani places high value on regime consolidation.

The Iranian analysts seem to agree that Rafsanjani's primary goal is not to export the Revolution by force. Cottam (1991:37) asserts Rafsanjani has shown no interest in pursuing Khomeini's messianic goals and limits his attachment to these goals to the rhetorical level (see also Menashri 1990b:388; Ghods 1989:225). He wants to normalize relations with as many states as possible (Cottam 1989:182-183) and desires the benefits of trade which might be jeopardized if Iran appears to be involved in aggressive acts (Muir 1988:7-9; Zonis and Brumberg 1987:77; Kupchan 1990:248; Cottam 1989:182-183). This is evident during the TWA hijacking in June of 1985 when, at the height of the crisis, Rafsanjani flew to Damascus to help resolve the issue (Kazemi and Hart 1990:67). Another instance is when he led the way in proposing Iranian mediation in freeing the hostages held by the Hezbollah in Lebanon in
1989 (Rezun 1990:210). Bani Sadr, the former President of Iran who fled in 1981, contends Rafsanjani's focus is more on domestic development and survival of the Revolution than any sort of international aspirations (Fiske 1987:8; see also R. Wright 1989:181-183). Ramazani (1989:86) contends he supports revolution by example. However, Robin Wright (1989:182-183) asserts Rafsanjani has never abandon the idea of exporting the revolution but believes to survive is the first priority. One can win converts by example (R. Wright 1987:146).

Rafsanjani, according to most Iranian researchers, believes Iran can not be isolationistic (Wright 1991; Echo of Iran November 1989:4; JPRS-NEA 10 October 1989:56). He advocates free trade with friendly countries (Alavi 1989b:15), wants to bring in foreign experts and those who fled after the 1979 Revolution to help build the nation, and supports borrowing from abroad (Cottam 1989:182-183; Hooglund 1989:11; FBIS 19 April 1990:49). Rafsanjani favors Western involvement in the postwar economic reconstruction (Ghods 1989:226). While he is an internationalist (Ramazani 1988:255), Rafsanjani is vehemently against relinquishing Iran's political and economic independence (R. Wright 1989:181-183). He seeks ties to develop and to aid in the reconstruction of Iran (Cottam 1991; Echo of Iran September 1989:20-21). Rafsanjani has steadily moved toward expanding Iranian diplomatic contacts (Cottam 1991).
With regard to relations with the U.S., Rafsanjani is for restoring ties with the U.S. (Menashri 1988:333; Menashri 1990b:338; Bill 1989:66; Bulloch 1990; Akhavi 1987:200; Schahgaldian 1989:60). Supposedly, he has a willingness to work for the release of Western hostages. According to R. Wright 1989:131-132), Rafsanjani was influential in obtaining the release of thirty-nine American hostage after the TWA seizure in 1985.

Most Iranian analysts agree that Rafsanjani is not a moderate at home. He does not tolerate contrary opinions (Farhang 1989:562) and wants limits on freedom of expression (Cottam 1987:24). Akhavi (1985:5-6) contends Rafsanjani wants a regime of adherents who are highly disciplined and are prepared to carry out orders. He prefers obedience to creativity. Any liberalization policies are an instrument which do not reflect any value commitment (Cottam 1987:24). For instance, he seeks the return of Iranian specialists who fled at the beginning of the Revolution because they can help build the nation. Rafsanjani has no interest in broadening freedom for the people. However, Cottam (1991:24) contends Rafsanjani utilizes a strategy of co-opting the opposition and bringing critical elements of it into a working relationship with the regime. Furthermore, he has tried to recruit individuals with technical skills even though they have little loyalty to the regime. Cottam (1991:24) indicates Rafsanjani
is less confrontational than Mohtashemi who favors a coercive domestic policy.

As for the distribution of power, Rafsanjani evinces differing positions depending upon whether the issue is one of economic or political control. He advocates a major role for the state while encouraging the expansion of the private sector (Rubin 1987:8; Farhang 1989; Schahgaldian 1989:60; see also Menashri 1990b:392; Ghods 1989:226; Rezun 1990:211). He seems to favor a mixed approach. However, Rafsanjani is a strong supporter of centralization of control (Cottam 1989:182-183; JPRS-NEA 10 October 1989:56).

Summary and Further Analysis: Utilizing the observations of Iranian area specialists, I would propose that each of the four clerics could be placed into one of four categories -- high, moderate, low, or unknown -- within each of the five postures. With regard to the aggressiveness posture, Mohtashemi is high while Rafsanjani is low. Montazeri and Khamanei would be placed in the unknown category since Iranian analysts are in total disagreement. Some consider them high while others judge Montazeri and Khamanei as advocating minimal aggressiveness.

With respect to the autonomy posture, I would classify Mohtashemi and Montazeri as high while Rafsanjani is low. Khamanei would be in between these three, urging moderate autonomy. As for involvement with the U.S. posture, Rafsanjani is rated high while Mohtashemi and Khamanei are
 judging low. The latter two want no relations with the United States. Montazeri, however, is harder to discern on this posture since some Iranian analysts would regard him high on this posture while others would consider him low. Thus, I would place him in the unknown category.

With respect to the freedom of expression posture, I would place Mohtashemi and Khamanei as advancing minimal amounts. Montazeri is rated high since he is the most vigorous supporter of various types of freedoms. Rafsanjani falls is the middle (i.e. moderate). As for the centralization posture, the same sort of pattern seems to occur. Mohtashemi and Khamanei urge a high amount of centralization of power while Montazeri is the opposite (i.e. low). Again, Rafsanjani is in between these three advocating a moderate amount of centralization.

The above profiles present this author's interpretation of how various analysts seem to view the postures of the four clerics of this study. One way to check for bias is to have a coder, utilizing the same sources noted above, systematically, classify Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani on the five policy postures. Such a way of using secondary data is not new (e.g. Shepard 1988; Winter 1982:254-256). Winter, for instance, made use of judges to code sketches written about political candidates by experienced and knowledgeable staff writers. Similarly, in the following section, a coder is employed to use the assessments of
researchers who follow the Iranian scene closely to infer where the four leaders stand on the five policy postures. Method: In order to ascertain the postures of the four clerics by using the assessments of Iranian analysts, the first step was to search the various works by these analysts for passages describing their assessment of the five postures dealt with in this study. Thus, any passages relevant to the degree of aggressiveness, degree of autonomy, degree of involvement with the U.S., degree of centralization, and degree of centralization were excerpted from the sources mentioned in the above profiles of the four clerics. These excerpted passages were retyped from the original source.

Next, I made dossiers for each leader. That is, four dossiers were compiled for each posture. All references to the cleric or their positions were inked out. Each leader was then given a number. Furthermore, for each posture a leader was given a different number so the coder would not be influenced by the placement of a leader on one posture by his placement on another posture.

The third step was to have a coder rate the unidentifiable cleric based on the passages with respect to the conceptual definitions provided earlier in this chapter. The coder was instructed to place each cleric into one of four categories -- high, moderate, low, or unknown. The latter category denotes that there were dramatically conflicting
opinions between the various analysts, therefore placement into high, moderate, or low was not possible.

The fourth step was to have the coder rank these unidentifiable leaders on each of the five postures in relation to one another based on the assessments of the various researchers. Thus, for instance, the coder was asked to place the four clerics on a continuum in regard to the degree of aggressiveness. Subsequently, the same process was repeated for the other four posture variables.

However, prior to the placement into one of the four value categories and the ranking of the four leaders on each of the five postures, the coder was instructed to also note a confidence level (i.e. high, moderate, or low) for each ranking. A high confidence level indicated the coder was highly certain of the placement of the cleric on that posture variable. On the other hand, low confidence denoted that the coder found much disagreement among the researchers and therefore was not certain of the placement. A moderate level indicated some conflicting information or that the leader was on the edge of a value category.

Findings: Table three illustrates the results of classifying each cleric in the high, moderate, or low categories based on the assessments of various analysts. The ones with a question mark indicate the coder was not able to place the leader in one of the three categories. This was because the analysts' disagreements were so great that the coder could not place the
### TABLE 3: Assessment of Iranian Clerics' Policy Postures Utilizing Observations of Iranian Area Specialists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Posture</th>
<th>Mohtashemi</th>
<th>Montazeri</th>
<th>Khamanei</th>
<th>Rafsanjani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggressiveness</td>
<td>high(H)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>low(H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>high(H)</td>
<td>high(M)</td>
<td>mod(H)</td>
<td>low(H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement with U.S.</td>
<td>low(H)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>low(H)</td>
<td>high(H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of expression</td>
<td>low(H)</td>
<td>high(H)</td>
<td>low(M)</td>
<td>low(M)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>high(H)</td>
<td>low(H)</td>
<td>mod(M)*</td>
<td>mod(M)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The letters in parenthesis indicate whether the coder had high (H), moderate (M), or low (L) confidence in the classification. A question mark denotes the coder was unable to classify the leader for that posture because the various Iranian analysts placed them in all three value categories.

* These are the only two this author would have rated differently from the coder. Rafsanjani, under the freedom of expression posture, was rated moderate instead of low and Khamanei, under the centralization posture, was considered high instead of moderate. See the text for further discussion of this author's ratings.
### TABLE 4: Relational Placement of the Clerics on the Political Postures Utilizing Observations of Iranian Area Specialists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggressiveness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2(?) 3(?)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement with U.S.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2(??)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of expression</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** 1 = Mohtashemi, 2 = Montazeri, 3 = Khamanei, 4 = Rafsanjani.

? indicates the leader could be classified in any of the three value categories. While the placement of leader 3 (Khamanei) and leader 2 (Montazeri) could be interchanged, the coder was highly confident that these two leaders fell between leaders 1 and 4 on the aggressiveness posture.

?? denotes the coder had low confidence in the placement of leader 2 (Montazeri) and could have been placed in any of the three value categories but between leader 4 and leader 3.
leader in any of the three categories with any amount of certainty.

The coder was highly confident in her placement except on the following. With regard to the ones with a question mark, the coder had low confidence. She indicated these leaders could be classified in any of the three value categories depending upon which Iran analyst one chose to emphasize. With respect to Khamanei and Rafsanjani on the moderate value in centralization, the coder had moderate confidence. She noted in these cases one could have possibly coded them as falling into the high category, since the sources somewhat disagreed. Similarly, with the low value in freedom of expression for Rafsanjani, some Iranian analysts would probably have placed him in the moderate value category. The coder also had moderate confidence in the low value for Khamanei with respect to freedom of expression and moderate confidence in the high value for Montazeri with regard to autonomy. These were given moderate confidence levels by the coder because a placement was made on the basis of a few sources, even though the sources were consistent.

Table four provides a replication of the results of the coder's relational assessment. If a number representing one of the leaders in this study is followed by a question mark (or two), this indicates the cleric could be classified in any of the three value categories. Nevertheless, the coder was able to place some relational parameters on the ones with
question marks. With regard to aggressiveness, Montazeri and Khamanei could be switched. But, the coder was highly confident that Montazeri and Khamanei fell in between Mohtashemi and Rafsanjani. The coder also indicated low confidence in the placement of Montazeri with regard to involvement but indicated Montazeri could be placed between Rafsanjani and Khamanei.

Discussion: The results of table three are not surprising based on the summary provided earlier in this chapter. For instance, with regard to the autonomy posture of the four clerics, only Rafsanjani embraced a low autonomy stance (see earlier discussion in this chapter for the definition of autonomy as used in this book). Additionally, it is interesting that two of the three question marks appear within the aggressiveness posture. The various analysts disagree on one of the most important aspects of how they think Montazeri and Khamanei desire their government to relate to other nations.

According to table three, Mohtashemi is the only one of the four in which the coder was highly confident in her placement on all five postures. This is despite Mohtashemi is the latest of the four to arrive on the political scene. The other three have been prominent figures in Iran for the last ten years while Mohtashemi has not become noteworthy until the last few years.
Tables three and four are composed of twenty cells. For twelve of these cells the coder was highly confident that most of the Iranian experts agreed upon the stance of a particular cleric. That leaves eight cells which have less than high confidence because of two reasons. One reason is because there is disagreement among the Iranian area specialists while the second reason relates to sparsity of information. Six of the eight cells fit the former category.

Why is there disagreement among the close observers of Iranian politics? One initial possibility is that the various observations by the analysts cover a five year time period. Thus, the leader may have changed his position over time. For instance, in 1988 Ramazani asserted that Montazeri aggressively pursued the export of revolution by any means. By 1990, Ramazani contends Montazeri has modified his position to one in which Iran is considered a model for the export of revolution.

However, on closer inspection of the time differences between the various Iranian experts, this does not seem to be the case. Even during the same approximate time periods, the analysts still disagree and, at times, have different interpretations of the same event. For instance, Hooglund (1989:8) posits that by June 1988, Khamanei had become convinced that the continuation of the war posed a threat to the survival of Iran. On the other hand, J. Behrouz (1990:21) asserts that Khamanei found it difficult to accept the U.N.
Resolution to end the war because Iran could not concede to a resolution that did not condemn the aggressor and make mention of reparation.

The analyses by the various observers of Iranian politics are subjective judgments. These analysts, like anyone else, view the clerics with their own conceptual framework. Their analyses are from different frames of reference and with different anchor points. Thus, for instance, if a cleric calls for an attack on the U.S., one analyst may consider this to represent the aggressive nature of this cleric while another analyst may believe it depicts the cleric's stance toward the United States.2

Conclusion

In chapter one it was proposed that in revolutionary movements some leaders are Idealist (i.e. fundamentalist) while others are Realist. Of course, with any such distinction, it is a continuum in which some leaders may fall between these two. Nevertheless, can we suggest who among the four clerics of this study are Realist and who are Idealist?

Based on the information in this chapter, along with the last chapter, Mohtashemi is an Idealist while Rafsanjani is the Realist. Khamanei, while he has Idealist tendencies, seems to be between the two -- being neither a "true" Idealist nor Realist. This is also the case with Montazeri. He,
however, is often silent or noncommittal on issues which would identify him as one or the other.

What can one expect to happen as these four clerics try to maintain or grasp more power and control? With regard to Rafsanjani and Khamanei, one can conjecture that they will continue to cooperate with each other (see discussion in chapter three). Even though these two have differences about certain policies (e.g. whether to have relations with the U.S. or general amnesty for prisoners), both of these leaders are committed to ensuring Iran's survival above everything else (thus, usually extreme radicalism is opposed). Concomitantly, both are cognizant that the government's failure, especially economically, will bring forth further questions about their ability and qualifications to be in charge of the government.

As for the Radicals like Mohtashemi, although they are presently not in the drivers seat, they remain strong in several powerful institutions including the religious foundation and the Komitehs (Echo of Iran July 1991:28). Along with this, they have the ability to bring militants to the streets. Furthermore, as indicated in chapter three, the Radicals continue to make their presence felt in the international arena. Despite these factors, the recent first round Majlis elections in April 1992 is a major disappointment for the Radicals as well as a trenchant reversal. Until this time, the hardliners have dominated the Majlis (Echo of Iran April 1991:18). In the first round of elections in April
1992, sixty-five percent of the Majlis seats were won by supporters of Rafsanjani (Waldman 1992:A20). While this is a significant setback for the Radicals, they are not likely to disappear. As Mohtashemi remarked, "Those who are striking us now will someday be struck back by others" (Waldman 1992:A20).

What about Montazeri? It is unlikely he will rebound to the influence he possessed as the designated leader. However, as long as the Radicals continue to be a significant player, Rafsanjani and Khamanei will probably seek his support from time to time. Thus, he will continue to be an important player. Much will depend upon whether Rafsanjani and Khamanei can put the Iranian economy on track. As Sales (1972) and Padgett and Jorgenson (1982) suggest in their studies, declining economic conditions bring with it a rise in political influence of fundamental religious groups.3 Economic prosperity results in religious laxity and adoption of more liberal religious beliefs (Liebman 1983). Therefore, Mohtashemi and other Radicals will always, at a minimum, be in the shadows anxiously awaiting their time.

This chapter has outlined the postures considered in this research endeavor. Additionally, it has provided an understanding of the areas of agreement and disagreement among the various Iranian experts with regard to Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani on the five political postures -- aggressiveness, autonomy, involvement, freedom of expression, and centralization. In chapter five we propose
test cases to systematically examine the verbal materials of the four leaders in order to classify them on the five postures. In other words, instead of using secondary data, primary data is collected and dissected. Chapter seven provides the results of this effort.
Footnotes

1. While such concepts may be employed with political leaders and the general public there may be a difference between the two groups. Some analysts (e.g. McConaughy 1950; DiRenzo 1967; and Costantini and Craik 1980; Costantini and Craik 1969) suggest differences exist between political actors and the public. However, further research is needed to understand the areas of difference and the extent of the differences.

2. Additionally, the material they use to make such observations are, at times, different.

3. Sales (1972) examined rates of conversion to authoritarian and nonauthoritarian churches (in the U.S.) as a function of the economic conditions. The former demanded absolute obedience whereas the latter allowed more leeway in belief and behavior. Good economic conditions (based on per capita disposable income and unemployment statistics) brought increased conversion to nonauthoritarian churches while bad times increased conversion to authoritarian churches. Padgett and Jorgenson (1982) concluded when people's standard of living declines, the masses seem to retreat to authoritarian leadership.
CHAPTER V
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

How is this research effort designed? How do we measure personality characteristics and political postures without the help of a personality test or answers to a questionnaire? What are the methodological issues of importance when measuring traits and postures at a distance? The task of this chapter is to answer these questions.

Three aspects relevant to designing and operationalizing this research effort are considered in this chapter. The first concern is the research design. The second aspect deals with the use of content analysis which is employed in both the independent variable, personality, and the dependent variables, postures. The third aspect explicates the operationalization of the independent and dependent variables respectively.

Research Design

As presented in chapter one, a major interest of this research effort is whether personality types or orientations are predictive of future political postures. In order to test this proposition with the four clerics of this study, the
research design, as illustrated in figure two, is employed. Based on the leader's orientation, five political postures can be expected (see chapter six). These "expected" postures will be compared with their "exhibited" postures. How will these "expected" and "exhibited" postures be discovered?

The personality orientation, the independent variable, is ascertained by employing Margaret G. Hermann's (1987a;1987b) method of content analysis. This method assesses a political actor's characteristics (i.e. ethnocentrism or nationalism, belief in one's ability to control events, need for power, need for affiliation, conceptual complexity, self confidence, distrust of others, and task orientation) via analysis of interviews, speeches, and sermons. Table five furnishes a conceptual definition of each of the eight characteristics. Additionally, these eight traits represent the leader's beliefs (i.e. ethnocentrism and belief in ability to control events), motives (i.e. need for power and need for affiliation), decision style (i.e. conceptual complexity and self confidence), and interpersonal style (i.e. distrust of others and task tendency). These four broad characteristics were presented in figure one of chapter one (page 7).

As shown in table six, these characteristics interrelate to form the following six orientations: Expansionist, Active Independent, Influential, Mediator Integrator, Opportunist, and Developmental. In other words, for each leader, based on the eight defining characteristics (see figure two), an
FIGURE 2: Characteristics and Orientations Used to Predict Postures

* The first three postures are in regard to the international arena while the latter two relate to the domestic domain.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism (or ethnocentrism)</td>
<td>Extent to which one possesses strong emotional attachment to one's nation, group, or religion; perceives one's group as superior to others and emphasizes the importance of maintaining one's honor and identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in one's own ability to control events</td>
<td>Extent to which one perceives that what happens is contingent on one's own behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for power</td>
<td>Extent to which one is concerned with establishing, maintaining, or restoring one's impact, control, or influence over other actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for affiliation</td>
<td>Extent to which one is concerned with establishing, maintaining or restoring warm and friendly relationships with other actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual complexity</td>
<td>Extent to which one demonstrates a degree of differentiation when observing or contemplating the environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self confidence</td>
<td>Extent of one's self importance and image of one's ability to deal adequately with the environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust of others</td>
<td>Extent to which one is inclined to doubt the motives and actions of others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task orientation</td>
<td>Extent to which one emphasizes in interactions with others the completion of the task rather than the feelings and needs of others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Based on discussion in Hermann 1987d:167.*
TABLE 6: Basis for Determining Orientations -- The Hermann Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Independent</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Hi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Lo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator Integrator</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunist</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Lo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The abbreviations denote the following personal characteristics: N = Nationalism, B = Belief in one's ability to control events, P = Need for power, A = Need for Affiliation, C = Conceptual complexity, D = Distrust of others, S = Self confidence, and T = Task emphasis.

*Source: Hermann 1987d:172-173*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Operating Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>Interest in gaining control over more territory, resources, or people</td>
<td>Maintain self in office; further ideology or set of beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Independent</td>
<td>Interest in participating in the international community but on one's own terms and without engendering a dependent relationship with another country</td>
<td>Further ideology or set of beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>Commitment to the continued improvement of one's own nation through the development of useful relations with other entities in the international system; an interest in building up one's own nation with the best help available</td>
<td>Solve particular societal problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>Interest in having an impact on other nations' foreign policy behavior; in playing leadership role in international affairs</td>
<td>Maintain self in office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunist</td>
<td>Interest in taking advantage of present circumstances, in dealing effectively with the demands and opportunities of the moment</td>
<td>Seek public support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator integrator</td>
<td>Concern with reconciling differences between other nations, with resolving problems in the international arena</td>
<td>Solve societal problems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hermann 1987c:134; 1987d:168,170
orientation can be discerned. Table seven presents Hermann's conceptualizations and goals of each of the orientations. For the reader unfamiliar with Hermann's framework, Appendix E is also provided. This reproduces a number of facets (e.g. view of world, style, foreign policy behavior advocated, nature of advisory group, nature of information search, ability to tolerate disagreement, and nature of dealing with opposition) which describe each orientation. For even further explication of the six orientations the reader is directed to Hermann (1987e). Nonetheless, the next chapter proposes a way of building upon the Hermann framework. Therefore, chapter six delineates this author's extrapolations of the "expected" postures for each orientation.

The "exhibited" postures are ascertained from a content analysis of the leader's advocacy position on various test cases. These test cases reflect the leader's advocacy statements on various specific issues (e.g. adherence to Islamic dress) and incidents (e.g. how should Iran respond to the U.S. attack of an Iranian airbus). Combining the positions the leader espouses on various specific issues and incidents, a pattern of his advocacy positions emerge for each of the five postures. This pattern represents the leader's "exhibited" postures.

The "expected" political postures for each leader will be compared with the "exhibited" postures. In other words, does the pattern of his advocacy positions over a variety of issues
and incidents correspond to what we would expect based on his orientation? While this is the essence of the question we are seeking to answer, this study attempts not to discern whether personality is reflective but if it is predictive of future postures. Thus, the leader's orientation (which provides the leader's "expected" postures) is derived from verbal materials which precede the verbal materials used to ascertain the cleric's "expected" postures. Therefore, in the assessment of characteristics and postures, different sets of verbal materials will be utilized for each. That is, the independent variable and the dependent variable each have their own data set. Consequently, in this study, personality will be attempting to predict future postures.

This will be achieved by assigning a cut off date in which the verbal materials assessed for personality precedes the verbal materials employed for ascertaining postures. Since this endeavor is concerned with the ruling clerics of Iran, the time period covered is from February 1979 (the Shah leaves Iran) to May 1991. The cut off date decided upon is June 1986. Verbal materials prior to June 1986 were used to discern personality and verbal materials after that time were used to assess postures.

The dividing line is arguably appropriate, since as M. Behrooz (1990:25), an Iranian analyst, contends, from the time of Rafsanjani's 10 June 1986 news conference (FBIS-SAS, 11 June 1986) onward, factional differences began to surface on
a large range of issues. At the news conference, Rafsanjani stated two factions existed within the Majlis, government, clergy, and across society as a whole. Prior to June 1986, differences among the clerics were not openly voiced as often. Additionally, on 9 June 1986 (FBIS-SAS, 9 June 1986), Ayatollah Khomeini asserted:

"There was a time when the situation was chaotic and everything was in ruins, but - thank God - everything is now proper and right ... Domestic and international affairs are put right."

This suggests the clerics had reached the point where differences of views with regard to how the government should be organized and how Iran should relate with other nations could and would be openly debated. Therefore, the dividing line of 11 June 1986 suits the needs of this study as the three foreign political postures (i.e. aggressiveness, autonomy, and involvement with the U.S.) and two domestic political postures (freedom of expression and centralization) deal with relations with other nations and the arrangement of the government.

Why be concerned with predicting future postures? Why not be content with attempting to discover if personality is reflective of postures in the same time period? It could be contended that if one seeks to discover only whether one's disposition corresponds to postures of the same time period, assessment of personality adds an unneeded step. One should ascertain the postures and not bother with the personality
aspect. However, personality can offer insight into other areas beyond postures such as the leader's negotiation style or his likelihood of reform and change. It is also important in understanding why such postures are embraced. Nonetheless, prediction of future postures is germane if one wants to understand who in revolutionary movements is the Idealist and who is the Realist. As presented in the short vignettes at the beginning of chapter one, personality provides us with an avenue for such possible predictions.

The task of predicting future postures, like the scientist who predicts the trajectory of a missile, becomes directly relevant to the policymaker or analyst in Washington who is attempting to make foreign policy decisions or recommendations. If personality can predict postures, at least in some cases, then political science can become more applicable to governmental decisionmakers. Political science becomes less of a bundle of abstract jargon and more concrete with something to say about foreign policy decisions.

Is personality sufficiently stable to predict future postures? While some psychological studies indicate behaviors and beliefs can be predicted from measures of traits taken years previously (see Funder's 1991:37 discussion), other psychologists have come to appreciate consistency within certain domains of situations as a more useful and appropriate way of capturing a person's behavior and postures (Pervin 1989:318). The latter would suggest other distinctions may
need to be made before prediction is possible. Four distinctions seem relevant to this research endeavor.

One area of discrimination is connected with how the leader wants to deal with international entities as opposed to how the political actor wants to deal with domestic issues. The domestic arena is much more controllable, especially in a revolutionary authoritarian regime. Hermann suggests, particularly with Third World leaders, this is evident (personal conversation). Snare (1992) discovered in his psychological analysis of Anwar Sadat of Egypt that Sadat exhibited quite different orientations with regard to domestic and international arenas.

A second area of distinction relates to role. What is important in deciding political postures or behaviors depends on where you sit (see Allison 1969). Johnson's (1977) study of Frank Church illustrates how his operational code seemed to be changed by Church's experience in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

A third area of differentiation is associated with the phase of struggle. Suedfeld and Rank (1976) indicate, in their study of nineteen revolutionary leaders from a variety of nations, that during the revolutionary struggle these political actors took a single-minded approach to problems. However, during the poststruggle phase the leaders who retained power became more flexible. Hermann's (1987d) investigation into African leaders similarly suggests
political actors may change their orientation once power is consolidated.

A fourth area of distinction relates to the spontaneity of the verbal materials. As indicated later in this chapter, several studies propose that the link between personality characteristics and spontaneous material (i.e. interviews) is stronger than between characteristics and planned materials (i.e. speeches and sermons -- see Hermann 1974:210;1980b:15). In other words, with regard to assessing personality via content analysis, only those documents which are interviews should be used to ascertain the leader's orientation.

Based on the above discussion, this study will pursue five avenues in an attempt to predict the future postures. First, we will discern whether the leaders' overall orientations predict the "exhibited" postures. Next, are the predictions enhanced by concentrating on any of the following: 1) the distinction of domestic versus international topic domains, 2) the last role the cleric held, 3) the time after power was consolidated and the clerics were firmly in control, 4) the spontaneous material only. In other words, is the general orientation sufficient to predicting the clerics' future postures? Are the predictions enhanced (or diminished) by concentrating on certain domains, roles, event periods, or spontaneous materials? Does personality help us predict these four clerics' future postures? The answers to these questions are what this study seeks to uncover.
Content Analysis

Within the past twenty-five years, political psychologists have proposed a variety of methods for gaining insight about political leaders. Hermann (1977) classifies the various methods into six categories -- questionnaires, interviews, observations, simulations, biographical statistics, and content analysis. Each of these six methods have advantages and disadvantages. In other words, there is no magical method. Furthermore, even the field of personality research methods is unsettled in character and direction (Craik 1986:18). Nevertheless, headway can and has been made by these various methods.

This research endeavor employs the method of content analysis. As indicated, all methods have their advantages and disadvantages. The first part of this section discusses the benefits and problems the researcher is faced with when using content analysis. The second part of this section explores the inherent assumptions of content analysis as it relates to the schemes used in this study.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Content Analysis: Content analysis is the most frequently employed method for measuring psychological variables in international affairs. This is not surprising considering there are a number of advantages with content analysis. The most basic advantages are its: 1) centrality of communication, 2) unobtrusive nature, and 3) potential to tap subjective experiences. These advantages
provide the understanding of why content analysis is the preferred method for this study.

Human interaction is primarily verbal. Communication is a central aspect of social interaction and content analysis operates directly upon the text of human communication (Weber 1985:10). Language is the basic communication tool that makes social organization possible (Mallery 1988:48). This should not imply that verbal output can totally indicate political reality or political perceptions, but, like overt behavior, it can be used to infer future actions — verbal and overt behavior. Thus, verbal output is by no means trivial.

A second advantage of content analysis is its unobtrusive nature. Because of this, content analysis is not subject to some of the errors present in experiments, interviews, questionnaires, or simulations (Krippendorff 1980:24). Mischel (1977), a psychologist, suggests the future of personality assessment will be much brighter if we move beyond lab experiments and questionnaires, and place greater reliance on unobtrusive measures. With content analysis, the researcher can: 1) access populations that may not be approachable by any other means, 2) assess the same individuals over time since there is no influence of the measurement process, and 3) avoid the situation specificity which is inherent in such methods like questionnaires or simulations (Viney 1983:559).
The third advantage of content analysis is the potential to tap the subjective experience of an individual. Many methods are available for appraising observable behavior of others but few tap the less accessible experiences (Viney 1983:552). Furthermore, it may be more effective because observers not only have their own biases but do not have direct access to the same data that the people they observe have with their own experience (Viney 1983:553). Therefore, those researchers interested in schemas, scripts, beliefs, postures, motives, or the like may find content analysis the preferred method.

With advantages of any method, there are also disadvantages. The disadvantages that confront the content analyst are a result of no overarching framework. Content analysis is not an integrated endeavor. The researchers who employ content analysis must face at least two problems: 1) sampling procedures and, 2) public versus private documents.

The biggest problem with respect to sampling is selection bias since content analysis is dependent on what content is available (Brislin 1980:403). Random sampling is often out of the question because it is impossible to define the universe (Brislin 1980:401). This problem though, according to Holsti (1968) is not insurmountable. He suggests three ways to handle this problem. They are: 1) focus on materials that have been seen or heard by a large number of people, 2) select materials that have the explicit function of instilling norms,
and 3) compare general data sets. While these suggestions are useful, empirical studies are lacking and, therefore, sampling continues to be a problem.

The second problem in using content analysis relates to the reliance on either public (interview, speeches, and sermons) or private documents (minutes of meetings, letters, and dairies). Researchers disagree on the implications of relying on one over the other. Jervis (1969:193), for instance, contends interviews do not provide an adequate source of obtaining data because the communicator may be sending signals, projecting images, or espousing policy positions. Gilbert's study (cited from Wilkenfeld et al. 1980:232) of Secretary of State John Foster Dulle's perception of the People's Republic of China seems to support this. He found Dulle's statements to the general public gave a much higher assessment of Chinese hostility. Public or external documents are used to manipulate, or, as Rasler et al. (1980:52) posits, interviews may represent a policy position arrived at through collective assessment and/or governmental politics of the decision making elite. This would seem to suggest, as Larson (1988:253) implies, that private or internal documents are less manipulated.

On the other hand, other researchers are more cautious. Garraty (1959:187) suggests public figures reveal little of themselves in letters or autobiographies because they are held back by personal inhibitions or by ideas of conventionality.
Allport (1942:111-112) notes, individuals are biased in the content of their writings about personal experiences. Few would deny that human memory is fallible and selective.

Obviously, we are in need of more studies which compare public and private messages. The Gilbert study cited above suggests a difference between public and private statements. However, Huitl and Peabody (1969), in their study of the Morse Committee assignment controversy of 1952, did not find such differences. Until further studies are undertaken, the public/private issue will remain an irritating thorn.

With public or external messages another issue needs to be addressed. The more carefully and deliberately planned the message (i.e. speech or sermon), the more remote the link between the subject and the message content (Osgood and Anderson 1957; LeVine 1966). Interviews are less likely to be written by ghost writers (Hermann 1980c:69). Interviews would seem to have a decisive advantage over speeches and sermons.

Does this mean speeches and sermons are of little use to the content analyst? There are three reasons why speeches and sermons can not be overlooked or under utilized. First, a "staged interview" in which the press is controlled so that the leader can discuss a certain policy is less spontaneous than an interview on "Face the Nation" or an "impromptu" speech (Hermann 1980c:70). Second, if one rules out the use of sermons and speeches, then one loses an initial reaction to a situation of importance such as a crisis (Holsti 1976:44-
45). It is unlikely an interview will occur during a crisis, but a speech will often take place. Third, even if the speech or sermon is written by a ghost writer, such a writer is probably chosen for their ability to express what the leader wants to say (Winter et al. 1991:218).

**Some Assumptions of Content Analysis:** Having delineated the cogent advantages and disadvantages of employing content analysis, the following discussion presents the inherent assumptions, in general, of content analysis as it relates to the schemes of this study. Within content analysis there are a variety of techniques employed (e.g. Holsti 1970; Thordarson 1972; Axelrod 1976; Winter and Stewart 1977; Weintraub 1986, 1981; Stuart and Starr 1981/1982; White 1949; Stein and Brecher 1976; and Wedge 1968). Many of these various techniques incorporate different assumptions. Therefore, the assumptions inherent in these schemes should be specified.

Three assumptions are relevant for discussion with respect to both the content analysis schemes employed in this research effort. With regard to the procedure for assessing postures at a distance, which was developed by this author, the assumptions become decisional points. These three points or assumptions are set up as dichotomies. There is, however, at times, schemes which employ a combination. This results in the content analysis system incorporating both assumptions of the dichotomy. The three assumptions relate to: 1) qualitative versus quantitative, 2) theory driven theory
versus data driven theory, and 3) content versus the structure of communication.

Both of the content analysis schemes used in this study are quantitative in nature. The case for quantitative content analysis is a powerful one because as Holsti (1968:598-599) states, it does not rely on the researcher's subjectivity and permits accurate description of the covariation of two or more attributes. George (1959b:14-15) cautions us to remember that even with quantitative content analysis one may end up on a "fishing expedition" by coding irrelevant materials. Some qualitative analysts (e.g. Sepstrup 1981:138) criticize quantitative researchers for seeking a false sense of security in numbers. Therefore, it is judicious to cite the coding scheme utilized if it has been developed by some other researcher, as is the case with Margaret G. Hermann's (1987a; 1987b) coding procedure, or provide the coding scheme formulated, as is the case with the postures coding system (see appendix A), in one's endeavor. By doing this, other researchers can consider for themselves if the above concerns are applicable. Furthermore, in the end, as Holsti (1968:600) asserts, even the most rigorous quantitative studies use qualitative features at some stage of the research. Thus, other researchers can discern the points at which inferences are made.

The second assumption relates to "theory driven theory" (i.e. category system built from the top down) rather than
"data driven theory" (i.e. use of categories of those who produced the text) content analysis. The former is a theoretical scheme while the latter is atheoretical (see Mardsen 1965). The Hermann coding system utilizes "theory driven theory" content analysis. The coding system devised to assess the postures is "data driven theory" content analysis (see appendix A). The OPCODE (Holsti 1977) is an example of "theory driven theory", while the "associative group analysis" (AGA) method (Szalay and Kelly 1982) and the Stanford University Studies undertaken by North, Holsti, Zinnes, and others are "data driven theory" content analysis procedures.4

The use of "theory driven theory" content analysis is criticized for imposing an a priori scheme on the text (Weber 1983:140).5 However, the "data driven" systems are criticized because it is difficult, if not impossible, to compare results since the categories are developed on the basis of specific data (Viney 1983:554).6 The results can not be compared because the categories are idiosyncratic.

The discussion of "theory driven theory" versus "data driven theory" is particularly important in the use of content analysis cross-culturally. It can be argued that the language of a culture conveys meaning that is only discernable to its members. On the other hand, it may be argued that there are transcultural universals involving verbal expressions. Brislin (1980:393-395) indicates that some expressions may be culturally specific while others are not. Nevertheless,
Brislin (1980), in his summary of cross-cultural content analysis, and Gottschalk and Lolas (1989), utilizing Gottschalk-Gleser content analysis, assert there are transcultural universals involving verbal expression. However, more research is needed in this area to understand the extent to which content analysis can be used cross-culturally.

The third assumption relevant to the two content analysis procedures used in this study appertains to the issue of "content" versus "structure" of communication. As Hermann (1977:9) indicates, in using content analysis, the researcher can examine the content (what is said) or structure (how it is said) of communication. Researchers disagree on the appropriate use of the content of communication. Some contend the content of the message is shaped by the communicator's intent (e.g. Rasler et al. 1980; Larson 1988). Weintraub (1986:295) has asserted, according to research, people can and do manipulate content to a certain degree. This is especially relevant to planned materials which are calculated and crafted to produce a particular effect on the audience (Winter and Stewart 1977:50). Other analysts suggest evidence exists indicating the following: public expressions may have real attitude effects (Higgins and Rholes 1978:364), the use of a good coding system can get around the manipulative aspects (Schnurr et al. 1986:607), and a speaker cannot manipulate everything (Pool 1959:4).7 Furthermore, it is the verbal
behavior of politicians, and not what they "really" think, that has consequences for the conduct and formulation of policy.

With regard to the structure of communication, Weintraub (1986:295) argues people do not manipulate the structure of communication. Thus, while the researcher avoids the disagreement related to the content of communication, the face validity of the coding scheme may not be as self evident and, therefore, more open to question. Additionally, such schemes are more difficult to develop.

The Hermann coding system focuses on the structure rather than the content of the communication. On the other hand, the coding of the postures concentrates on the content of the communication (see appendix A). Hermann's (1987a;1987b) procedure for ascertaining the personality characteristics is based on her own innovations which have been applied to over one hundred world leaders.

In summary, both the Hermann and Snare coding systems are quantitative in nature. However, they differ on the other two assumptions. The Hermann method assumes a "theory driven theory" procedure is appropriate and focuses on the "structure" of the communication. The system for coding the postures assumes a "data driven theory" procedure is appropriate and concentrates on the "content" of the communication.
The differences between the assumptions of the two content analysis systems are not an issue of superiority, rather it is an issue of appropriateness. Are the assumptions inherent in each of the schemes suitable for what each is attempting to do? As should be evident by the end of this chapter, the schemes utilized in this study are reasonably appropriate. Nevertheless, it is necessary to lay out the assumptions decided upon in the development of this author's coding procedure and to present the assumptions inherent in Hermann's coding system. Then, the reader can judge for themselves. Furthermore, the assumptions which comprise the coding scheme will determine the nature of the issues on which the analyst must be cognizant. In other words, it may have implications on the results.

One additional comment is pertinent. Researchers wish to have hard indices, rather than what appears to be vague signals, to establish personality or postures. The analyst, however, must make the best of imperfect data. Still, the problem of validity is genuine and this is the case whether inferences are made from actual behavior or based on what the political actor says. It is a formidable task to infer personality, posture, or any other similar notion.

An important question in this research effort with regard to validity is, how do we know the content analysis schemes measure what they are designed to measure? With respect to the Hermann procedures, her studies, along with a number of
other psychological studies, are persuasive in suggesting her procedures measure what the scheme is designed to measure. However, Rasler et al. (1980:63), in their methodological study utilizing an earlier version of M. Hermann's coding procedures, questions if it is capable of measuring personality attributes. A more recent study by Snare (1992), again using Hermann's technique with respect to Kaddafi and Sadat, found the procedure useful in the prediction of their nations' foreign policy behaviors.

The political posture coding procedures are somewhat more problematic with regard to validity. Since it is an untested scheme, what reason is there to believe that it is measuring what it is designed to measure? In order to check the validity of the content measures, two analysts who follow the Iranian context closely were asked to comment on the validity of the scheme (to be explained in further detail later in this chapter). Based on their remarks, modifications were made. Thus, while this procedure enhances our confidence in the measure, nevertheless, the scheme relies on face validity.

Such a problem is not unique to this study. For instance, is church attendance a valid indicator of one's depth of spirituality? Or is it an indicator of conformity? Or is it something else? To some extent, then, not everyone will agree with the selection. It is not a matter of finding the perfect indicator but an adequate or reasonable one.
Method

The assessment of personality characteristics and political policy postures is by content analysis of verbal materials. The verbal materials were sought from the following sources: Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Report, Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS), U.S. weekly news magazines such as Time and Newsweek, and English language surveys of the Middle East such as Arabia and Echo of Iran. By using only English sources one faces the accuracy of translation issue (see Brislin 1980). At the forefront of using translated material is knowing how free the translator has been with the material and, if words are units of analysis, what word counts would be in the original when compared to the translation (Hermann 1977:239). While I am aware of the concern, Hermann (1980:352) indicates Stewart found high reliabilities between coders using similar Russian and English verbal materials in his study of Soviet Politburo members' attitudes. Other researchers have also reported where materials were scored both in the original language and in the English translation, the scores were found to be essentially equivalent (see Winter et al. 1991:228; Winter and Stewart 1977:61; Suedfeld et al. 1977:434). Moreover, a large portion of FBIS translators, who are now U.S. citizens, are natives or immigrants from the various countries whose materials they translate. The bulk of the verbal materials considered in this study are from FBIS. FBIS consists of
materials which are obtained through the U.S. monitoring of foreign broadcasts. Sick (1985:356), an Iranian analyst, contends FBIS is very comprehensive and accurate.

These available verbal materials do represent a nonrandom, and probably stratified, sample of all the documents of this type. However, one can not say because it is impossible to define the universe. The extent of the materials is simply not known, as is usually the case with most content analysis studies.

The available verbal materials provide a rich information base for making inferences about personality characteristics and political postures. To the extent there is a systematic bias in these verbal materials, I believe, there is an under representation with regard to domestic issues. It is more likely for materials to be translated if it is relevant to the West. However, I do not see this as debilitating since most Middle Eastern states receive an unusual amount of coverage in comparison to other states in the world.

Procedure for Assessing Personality Characteristics: The first step was to gather a list of verbatim transcripts of interviews, speeches, and sermons for each of the four Iranian clerics -- Rafsanjani, Khamanei, Montazeri, and Mohtashemi. Paraphrases and summaries of interviews, speeches, and sermons were excluded. The next step was to determine how much of the available material would utilized to assess the personality characteristics. Hermann (1987a) suggests that at least fifty
segments, each with a minimum of fifty words per segment, is advisable. A segment refers to a part of the total interview, speech, or sermon. For instance, with respect to an interview, the response by the political actor to a question is considered a segment if it has at least fifty words.8

In examining the verbal materials from 1979 to June 1986, the period utilized to assess personality, numerous published documents were available for Rafsanjani, Khamanei, and Montazeri. However, for Mohtashemi, only twenty segments were obtained for this time period. Mohtashemi did not play an influential role in the early part of the Revolution as did the other three. In any event, in order to obtain the fifty segments, I decided to take verbal materials for him until the fifty segments were obtained. This resulted in a cut off date of July 1987.

While the cut off date for Mohtashemi is different from the other three clerics, it still falls under the notion of using characteristics to predict future postures. Upon perusing the segments obtained for Mohtashemi from June 1986 to July 1987, it was evident that his statements were, generally, not ones of voicing his opinion. Furthermore, since many of the test cases are after the Iran-Iraq war, this had no effect on the final set of test cases utilized in this study. Therefore, although a different cut off date is utilized for Mohtashemi, it is still within the spirit of this research effort.
One additional comment about the data used to assess Mohtashemi's personality should be mentioned. A majority of the available (and collected) documents were partial speeches, sermons, or interviews. Usually the document consisted of only a response to one or two questions, or a few paragraphs of a speech or interview. Utilization of such data may be asking too much of any content analytic scheme. It may be unreasonable to assume that such data can be useful with regard to tapping a political actor's personality. Thus, I have less confidence in the data acquired for Mohtashemi than the data obtained for the other three clerics.

Table eight, which depicts the nature of the materials used in the content analysis of the characteristics, furnishes the number of segments content analyzed for each Iranian cleric, the number of different dated verbal documents from which the segments were drawn, and the years the documents covered. The segments for Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani were chosen with an effort to cover the various political roles and phases in regard to the political climate of the time. In other words, a general orientation of each cleric should be revealed rather than an orientation due to a specific role or phase of the development of the revolutionary authoritarian regime. The number of segments chosen to code and the sampling procedures are extensively outlined in Appendix B, a methodological supplement.
### TABLE 8: Nature of Material Used in Content Analysis of Personality -- Number of Segments, Documents, and Years Covered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Number of Segments</th>
<th>Number of Documents</th>
<th>Years Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rafsanjani</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11/79-6/86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khamanei</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2/80-5/86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montazeri</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6/79-6/86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohtashemi</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12/81-6/87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 9: Nature of Segments Used in Content Analysis of Personality -- Role and Event

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Last Political Role</th>
<th>Consolidation Phase</th>
<th>Post Consolidation Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohtashemi</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montazeri</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khamanei</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafsanjani</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Topic</td>
<td>Rafsanjani</td>
<td>Khamanei</td>
<td>Montazeri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Spontaneity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rafsanjani</th>
<th>Khamanei</th>
<th>Montazeri</th>
<th>Mohtashemi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned interview</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sermon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Audience**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rafsanjani</th>
<th>Khamanei</th>
<th>Montazeri</th>
<th>Mohtashemi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal characteristic</td>
<td>Coding procedure</td>
<td>Score used in analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>Focus on nouns/noun phrases referring to nation; coded for nationalism if noun refers to own nation and is modified by favorable term, term denoting strength, or phrase suggesting importance of national honor or identity; also coded for nationalism if noun refers to another nation and is modified by hostile term, term denoting weakness, or phrase suggesting meddlesomeness in affairs of others.</td>
<td>Percentage of references to own and other nations meeting criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in one's ability to control events</td>
<td>Focus on verbs (action verbs); coded for this characteristic if context of verb indicates speaker (or group speaker identifies with) is accepting responsibility for initiating or planning the action.</td>
<td>Percentage of verbs meeting criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for power</td>
<td>Focus on verbs; coded need power if verb context meets any of six conditions indicated in Winter's need power coding scheme (Winter 1973).</td>
<td>Percentage of verbs meeting criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for affiliation</td>
<td>Focus on verbs; coded need affiliation if verb context meets any of four conditions indicated in Atkinson's (1958) need affiliation coding scheme.</td>
<td>Percentage of verbs meeting criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual complexity</td>
<td>Focus on sets of high-complexity words (e.g., may, possibly, sometimes, tends) and sets of low-complexity words (e.g., always, only, without a doubt).</td>
<td>Percentage of complexity words that were high in complexity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Characteristic</td>
<td>Coding Procedure</td>
<td>Score Used in Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-confidence</td>
<td>Focus on pronouns referring to self -- myself, I, me, mine; coded for self-confidence if self is seen as instigator of activity, authority figure, or recipient of positive feedback.</td>
<td>Percentage of self references meeting criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust of others</td>
<td>Focus on nouns/noun phrases referring to groups speaker does not identify with; coded for distrust if context showed indications of doubts or misgivings or suggested particular group was going to harm speaker or group with which speaker identifies.</td>
<td>Percentage of nouns meeting criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task orientation</td>
<td>Focus on sets of task words (e.g., results, goal, solution, achievement) and sets of interpersonal words (e.g., sensitivity, understanding, appreciation, coordination).</td>
<td>Percentage of task plus interpersonal words that were task words</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated earlier in this chapter, certain domains of situations may be useful to predicting future postures. That is, we must not settle for only ascertaining whether the general orientation does or does not predict future postures. Therefore, orientations for each cleric will be discerned for the following: 1) A distinction is made between the domestic arena and the international arena. This will be done by focusing on the nature of the topic discussed by the leader. Those topics which refer to external entities are put in the international arena while those which relate to internal aspects are placed in the domestic arena. 2) An orientation based on the cleric's last role. For the four leaders of this study this results in ascertaining an orientation for when Mohtashemi was the Interior Minister (after 28 October 1985), Montazeri was the designated Supreme Leader (after 23 November 1985), Khamanei was President (after 2 October 1981), and Rafsanjani was Speaker of the Majlis (after 27 July 1980). 3) An orientation for each cleric for the post consolidation phase. As appendix B discusses in detail, prior to October 1984, the clerics were still consolidating their power. The internal threats that challenged them prior to and during the consolidation stage were quite different from those during the post consolidation phase. Since psychological research (e.g. Tetlock's et al. 1985:1235 discussion) suggests that threat promotes a single and dogmatic frame of thinking, the cleric's post consolidation orientation may be a better predictor of
future postures. 4) An orientation for each cleric based only on spontaneous materials (i.e. interviews). It is quite possible speeches and sermons were written by "ghost writers". Therefore, by focusing on interviews we may obtain a better reflection of the leader's "true" orientation(s).

Tables nine and ten provide the nature of the materials which will be used for the further discriminations into domain specific orientations for each cleric. Table nine shows the number of segments for the clerics' last roles versus earlier political roles and the consolidation versus post consolidation phase. Table ten notes the number of segments for international and domestic topics, international and domestic audience, and spontaneity of the materials.

With the segments chosen, all references to the clerics or their positions were inked out. Each leader was given a number. Eight copies of the documents were made and all four leaders' verbal segments were randomly compiled. For each of the eight personality characteristics, the segments were mixed in a different order. The materials were then given to this author and content analyzed for the eight characteristics using the rules enunciated by Hermann (1987a). Table eleven provides a summary of the coding procedures. (See table five, page 198, for a brief description of each of the characteristics.) Moreover, while the references to the leaders' names, roles, and other information which might give away the leader had been inked out, it could be argued the
mask may not be complete since this author is familiar with the Iranian context. However, in coding so many segments, the researcher does not consciously attribute the unit to any one particular leader especially since all the segments were mixed together before the coding began.

The following discussion summarizes how the data were analyzed. The actual results are provided in chapter seven. Following the instructions outlined by Hermann (1987a;1987b), a percentage is calculated (for each segment) by dividing the number of times the characteristic was exhibited by the sum of the number of times it was exhibited plus the number of times it could have been exhibited but was not. Once this is completed, scores for each trait are summed across all the segments. If nothing is coded for a segment for a characteristic, that segment is discarded. This raw score indicates the percentage of time the leader could have displayed a particular characteristic and did so (Hermann 1987a:22).

These raw scores have little meaning until they are put into perspective with other leaders. This, as Hermann (1987b:3) states, will tell you whether the leader is high, low, or average for each of the eight characteristics. Hermann (1987b:3-5) provides a variety of comparison groups. Most of the comparison groups Hermann has put together include leaders from a specific region of the world but they are, nonetheless, from various nations. This study, however,
will utilize the four leaders of this group as its own comparison group since none of the other comparison groups are appropriate.

Once the leaders' standard scores are obtained for each characteristic, then the cleric's general orientation (i.e. Expansionist, Active Independent, Influential, Mediator Integrator, Opportunist, and Developmental -- see table six, page 199) can be ascertained. Hermann (1987a:22-23) furnishes the formulae for performing this task. The next step repeats the same process except the leader's orientation is discerned for the domestic and international arena separately. This is done by separating the nature of the topic discussed into two categories. One set refers to domestic concerns within Iran while the other relates to international aspects. The same process is repeated for the post consolidation phase, last role held, and for spontaneous materials. Therefore, five sets of scores have been created for each cleric. One is an overall set of scores while the other four sets of scores focus on specific domains.

In determining a leader's orientation to the world, scores for each of the orientations are calculated (see footnote ten). These scores are standardized to a distribution with a mean of fifty and a standard deviation of ten. Thus, if a leader's score is high (sixty or above) on a particular orientation, this orientation is representative of this leader. On the other hand, if the leader's score is low
(forty or below) for a particular orientation, this orientation is probably not typical of this leader. A medium score (forty-one to fifty-nine) indicates the orientation is neither typical nor untypical of the leader.

How do we interpret and utilize the results for this study? Hermann (1987b:8, 22-23) has suggested at least three criteria. 1) Assume the orientation the leader scores the highest on is most typical of this leader. 2) The leader needs to score at least fifty-five or higher; otherwise it is difficult to suggest an orientation is characteristic of that leader. 3) If the leader scores high (sixty or above) on more than one orientation, check to see if these orientations are restricted to certain topics, time periods, roles, and so forth.

Procedure for Assessing Political Postures: As presented earlier in this book, political postures refer to the general stance the political figure would like to see his government adopt. Without the means of a questionnaire or personal interview with the clerics of this study, how do we ascertain their stances on how Iran should relate to other nations and organize its government? One way is to examine a variety of test cases, which fall under the rubric of a particular posture, to discover the leader's advocacy position or policy preference on each test case. The pattern which emerges from scrutinizing the advocacy positions on various test cases for
a posture can then be considered the cleric's "exhibited" political posture.

The following discussion delves into the area of the operationalization of the dependent variables -- postures. How were the test cases chosen for each posture? What sort of test cases were used and how was the material gathered? How was an advocacy position determined for a test case? What were the procedures for analyzing the data? These are the questions of concern in the following discussion.

An important initial question is how were these test cases chosen? Initially, a list of possible test cases were gathered with the idea of seeking to obtain at least four test cases per posture for each leader. Those where comparisons were directly possible were kept on the list. Moreover, in picking out the test cases, those in which the Supreme Leader declared a decree were generally avoided. In such situations, the rest of the elites would be expected to follow suit. Thus, in such a "strong" situation (i.e. highly constraining situation) it is unlikely that it would bring forth any differences. Psychological research supports this by indicating constraining situations are less conducive for personality to influence one's advocacy position or behavior (Blass 1991:406; Price and Bouffard 1974; Mischel et al. 1973; Monson et al. 1982).

Upon compiling a tentative list of test cases, a five point operational scale was constructed. In order to check
for bias, the test cases along with the five point scale were
given to two Iranian experts. These two experts checked for
bias in two areas. First, to see if the test cases for each
of the five postures were reasonable. Were any important
test cases overlooked or was bias introduced by selecting
certain test cases and not others? Second, did the
operational definitions correspond with the five point scale?

The above steps resulted in the test cases presented in
this chapter and the operational scales for each test case
which are furnished within Appendix A. Appendix A, also,
presents the coding instructions employed. Nevertheless, the
five point scale for each test case represents advocacy
positions. That is, specific policies that should be taken
for that incident or issue.

The test cases are comprised of two different kinds of
cases. Some are responses to specific incidents (e.g. United
States and Allied attack of Iraq in January 1991) while others
are in regards to certain issues (e.g. adherence to Islamic
dress). The latter cases, the test issues, unlike the test
incidents, are not related to a specific circumstance rather
they tend to be reoccurring differences among the leaders.
This distinction is important with respect to how the
materials were gathered for a particular test case.

For the test incidents, nonsummarized verbal documents
which occurred after the incident were gathered. If the
document did not discuss the incident then it was discarded.
Documents were gathered until another incident was taking precedence and, therefore, the incident of concern for this study was only referred to in passing with no indication of where the leader stood (i.e. his advocacy position) on this incident or the leader began to define the incident of concern in another manner. For instance, an example of the latter case is the test incident of the U.S. presence in the Gulf in 1990. Khamanei's position changed after the U.S. had been there for a month because they considered the circumstance to be different at this point. The new position was taken considering the U.S. had been in Saudi Arabia for a while. Clearly, their definition of the situation had changed.

In a few cases for a leader, no materials were found under the nonsummarized documents. When that occurred, summarized documents were obtained to ascertain if they noted the leader's position. If this step did not produce any advocacy position then the leader was not scored on this test incident.

Moving from the test incidents to the test issues, the procedure for gathering materials was different. For Mohtashemi and Montazeri all verbal documents from FBIS, JPRS, U.S. weekly news magazines, and English language surveys of the Middle East were gathered. However, for Khamanei and Rafsanjani a sampling procedure was necessary. For these two, all interviews were obtained since interviewers often ask questions relevant to the concerns of these test issues.
Furthermore, a number of sermons and speeches were gathered if the title suggested it may be relevant.

In gathering the materials for the various test issues, I initially obtained materials after the Iran-Iraq war. As indicated in our historical discussion of chapter three, the contextual situation after, as opposed to during, the war was probably different. Thus, the leaders' responses after the war were utilized. However, if no discussion of the test issue could be found after the war then responses were gathered from during the war period.

One concern should be mentioned at this point. This author coded the independent variable, personality. By picking out the material to be coded in the dependent variable, I have opened this study to the criticism of possibly biasing the material in some manner. While this is problematic, it is essentially a catch twenty-two situation. Unless one is familiar with the Iranian political context, it would be virtually impossible to ask a coder to reduce the material to a codeable level. However, I have minimized this bias by blindly coding the independent variable (see the earlier discussion in this chapter). Furthermore, my task was only to discard those documents or portions of the material which were irrelevant to the test case of concern.

Once the verbal documents were gathered, any references to the test cases were excerpted. At times, this was just a response to a question or responses to several questions
within the same document while at other times it was the whole document. With the materials gathered, I removed any items which identified the leaders. If the leader was not politically active at the time (which is relevant for Mohtashemi and Montazeri), then with regard to that particular test case, he was omitted from that test case. Thus, for each posture the leaders may, in the end, be coded on some different test cases. However, substantial overlap does occur because only those test cases in which three of the four leaders advocated a position were kept.

The coders coded the material by test cases. For each test case the order of the leaders was randomly changed. The coders utilized the five point scale which is provided in Appendix A. As explained in Appendix A, the coders searched for advocacy statements. Advocacy statements are sentences which indicate the course of action the speaker urges or recommends (Stein and Brecher 1976:41).

The test cases were randomly given to the coders. Thus the coders did not know which test cases had been associated with which political postures. This was done to curtail any bias which could occur if the coder knew the postures. This may be important if certain test cases do not fit under certain postures or, after the analyses, the test cases can be sorted in another manner that may be meaningful or insightful. For instance, under the centralization posture, the test case Role of Free Enterprise relates to economic matters while the
other test cases relate to political matters. It is plausible one may support political centralization and not economic centralization. This, however, is an empirical question and will be evident from the results of the coding.

Additionally, in order to check for reliability, a second coder rated one document for each leader in each test case. Once each of the independent coders were finished rating the materials, Scott's (1955) index of reliability (pi), which takes chance into consideration, was calculated (see also Holsti 1969:140 discussion). The intercoder reliability was .88. Thus, two coders working independently with the same instrument and sample data yielded similar results.

The leader's score for a particular test case is ascertained by averaging the coded documents for a leader to arrive at a score for that test case. In some of the cases, a leader may only have one advocacy response for that particular test case. In that situation, that score becomes the leader's score for that test case.

Finally, once all the test cases were coded, the test cases for each posture with respect to one leader were averaged (along with a standard deviation) to ascertain a composite score for that posture for that leader. Along with this score, the modal scores were noted as this provides the cleric's typical response with regard to the posture.

The thirty-four test cases employed in this study are as follows (see also Appendix A):
Degree of Aggressiveness

1) Meaning of the export of revolution (after the Iran-Iraq war): issue of whether Iran should intervene and support liberation movements (i.e. political aspects are more important that domestic economic issues) or Iran should not intervene (i.e. must solve domestic economic problems before revolution can be exported) and should be a model of success for other nations. It is the difference between an emphasis on the revolution or a priority of the state.

2) Response to 20 July 1987 U.N. Resolution 598: while the leadership supported continuation of the war, there were differences over political options leading to final victory. Some called for a twenty year war strategy and demanded the ouster of Saddam and the dissolution of the Bathist party while others accepted some parts of Resolution 598 but not other parts. The latter group was open to political solutions.

3) Response to the August 1987 Mecca incident in which 273 Iranian pilgrims were killed: some argued for immediate revenge while others advocated diplomatic means (i.e. petition). Others took a middle position by condemning the action as one which Iran would not tolerate.

4) Issue of accepting Resolution 598 to end the Iran-Iraq war (July 1988): for some it was "drinking poison" inferring reservation in its acceptance while for others it was something that should have been considered earlier. In between these two positions was one in which it was in Iran's interest since the continuation of the war was a threat to the survival of the nation.

5) What are the implications of the Imam's Rushdie edict (February 1989): some urged that it was time to get the nations to rise against the infidels (i.e. go to all their embassies and climb the walls) while others did not support such action. A third position indicated the edict showed Islam's strength and Iran must stand up to insults by the West by issuing such edicts.

6) Early 1990 debate over the holding of Western hostages in Lebanon: some urged hostages should not be released while others advocated Iran should possibly help to get the hostages released.

7) How should the Palestinians be supported during intifadah (post Iran-Iraq war through 1990): while the leadership was in agreement that force was the only way, there was disagreement over the extent of Iran's involvement. Some argued that Iran must ratify a law to regularly support the
Palestinians while others were not so willing to go to this extent; rather they urged all Islamic nations should support the Palestinians financially and politically.

8) U.S. and allied forces invade Iraq on 16 January 1991: should Iran fight against the allied forces or should Iran be neutral and abide by U.N. decision in regard to the conflict. A middle position condemned the coalition invasion but was against an attack on any of the coalition forces.

Degree of Autonomy

1) Issue of use of foreign experts and investments in Iran's post-war reconstruction effort (fall 1989 to 1991): some argued that Iran should not rely on foreign experts and investments while others urged that Iran should use such sources but under its control.

2) Issue of Iran using foreign loans in Iran's reconstruction effort (1989 to 1991): some strongly opposed the idea of Iran borrowing from abroad while others would consider using such loans.

3) Issue of whether to accept the five year plan (post Iran-Iraq war to early 1990): this plan became a debate as to whether there should be an emphasis on agriculture or industrial development. Some urged primacy of agricultural development while others agreed with the five year plan to emphasize industrial development. Naturally, some took an intermediate position.

4) Concern for world opinion, international institutions, and international conventions (1989-1990): some urged that Iran should accept international laws and institutions while others attacked international institutions. An intermediate position was concerned about world opinion but did not support international rules and regulations.

5) Roland Dumas' impending visit and arrival in Iran on 5 February 1989 sparked a debate as to whether Iran should reengage with the West: some opposed relations with France while other supported the notion of possibly having relations with France. In between these two positions was one which opposed relations with France but did not want Iran to be isolationistic.

6) Debate as to whether Iran should establish relations with Egypt, a nation who had signed a peace treaty with Israel (1989 to 1990): some opposed the idea of establishing relations while others accepted it.
7) Meaning of "neither East nor West" (1989 to early 1990): for some it meant no peace with either the East or West while for others it did not mean severance of relations with them.

Degree of Involvement With the United States

1) How should Iran deal with the U.S. escorting Kuwaiti tankers in March 1987: some advocated Iran should attack the U.S. while others indicated the U.S. had been dragged into the region by certain gulf states. A middle position condemned the U.S. hostile action but did not advocate an attack on the U.S.

2) Response to the U.S. attack and the destruction of two Iranian oil platforms (22 October 1987): some advocated Iran must deal blows to the U.S. while others indicated Iran could not be intimidated and condemned the action.

3) Response to the 18 April 1988 U.S. Naval ship attack which destroyed two Iranian oil platforms: some advocated Iran must retaliate while others suggested the matter should be reviewed before a decision was taken.

4) Response to the 3 July 1988 incident in which the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian airbus: debate of whether there should be an all out Jihad or support the policy of not retaliating. A middle position condemned the action and insisted Iran would defend itself.

5) Issue of whether to have talks with the U.S. This debate began after the Iran-Iraq war ended in August 1988 and picked up steam in late 1989 and early 1990: on one side some rejected any sort of talks or relations while others said talks and possible relations should be considered.

6) Response to the U.S. presence in the Gulf in August 1990: some stated they could tolerate a temporary U.S. presence while others were against it and advocated a holy war against the U.S.

7) Response to the U.S. presence in the Gulf in September/October 1990: some stated they could tolerate the U.S. presence while others were against it and advocated a holy war against the U.S.

Degree of Freedom of Expression

1) Adherence to Islamic dress (post Iran-Iraq war to early 1990): some argued that Iranians must adhere to Islamic dress (i.e. dress can not be unrestrained) while others insisted
people are different and may not wish to dress the same. A middle position was taken by others who indicated force should not be used in order to make people comply or that unveiling is not good.

2) Formation and role of political parties (1989 through early 1990): some insisted Iran does not need political parties because they exploit others while others argued political parties are necessary. In between these two positions was one which indicated parties by law could exist but must operate under certain conditions.

3) Role of the press (1989): some urged the press should, at a minimum, engage in self censorship and should only publish certain things while others advocated the press should not be censored and it should be allowed to publish what it wants.

4) Response to Imam Khomeini's pardon of minigroup members in February-March 1989: some indicated this was a good gesture and that the government needs to be tolerant and lenient while others contended law violators must be dealt with harshly. In between these two positions was one that warned these minigroup members should not take advantage of the situation.

5) Response to Imam Khomeini's decision to execute Mojahedin members in February 1989: some were in agreement with the decision or remained silent while others asked the Imam to reconsider.

6) How should the government treat those who fled the country if they return (post Iran-Iraq war to mid 1991): some insisted Iran needs to deal sternly with these individuals and they will never have dignity while others supported their return. The nation must not make them afraid and pave the way for them to return. In between these two positions was one which urged for overlooking those who had committed minor offenses but not the ones who had committed major offenses.

Degree of Centralization of Power

1) What is the proper role of free enterprise and private capital (post Iran-Iraq war to early 1990): some urged a statist system in which the government plays a major role while others contended direct intervention by the government creates problems. The latter view asserted nationalization, direct continuous intervention by the government, and the like does not work. Therefore, the government should decrease the number of rules and regulations and reduce the bureaucracy (i.e. give leeway but maintain order). In between these two positions is the middle road which does not want to concentrate too many affairs in the hands of the state but still have the state maintain control.
2) Issue of whether the executive and judicial branches should each consolidate their control and power (1989): in the executive branch the debate was about consolidating the powers of the Prime Minister and the President into one. Some indicated this was needed while others preferred to maintain the status of the President as a ceremonial leader. In the judiciary, its management was headed by a five man committee and the proposal was to have it operated by one man. Some were for this consolidation and others were not.

3) Issue of unification of the revolutionary guard and army (1988 through early 1991): continuing debate about the merging of these two duplicate organizations. Some wanted this to occur as well as creating a revolutionary institution in which all security forces were merged. Others urged that only certain units or areas should be merged, especially if they were engaged in duplicate tasks.

4) How should the government implement its plans and projects (post Iran-Iraq war through 1989): this is a debate of where control should lie. Some urged that it is necessary to delegate responsibility because the government should trust the people while others suggested the government should direct and supervise various activities such as reconstruction and normal business activities.

5) How should the government formulate its plans and projects (post Iran-Iraq war through 1989): some advocated that consultation was necessary so that everyone was not surprised to see a new law while others considered this as interference. The people do the work and the government does the planning.

6) Should the press be a monopoly in the hands of a few (early 1989): some urged it should not be a monopoly in the hands of a few while others disagreed with such a position.

In regard to the test cases outlined above, a few comments are necessary. Under the freedom of expression posture, numbers four and five (which relate to minigroup members and the Mojahedin) are a very stiff test of this posture. The Mojahedin have been and are in violent opposition to the government. Nevertheless, I have not deleted these test cases since the four clerics of concern in
this research effort espoused quite different advocacy positions on these two test cases.

Under the involvement with the U.S. posture, the test cases can be divided into two types. Numbers one, five, six, and seven relate to the kind of relations one wants with the U.S. while numbers two, three, and four, relate to how Iran should respond to U.S. attacks. With respect to the latter test cases, do these reflect the kind of relations one wants with the U.S. or is it a measure of aggressiveness? I am arguing for the former. These test cases do not relate to aggressiveness but to defensiveness. Furthermore, if the cleric finds reasons why not to retaliate to an overt act of aggression by the U.S., it would seem there is a willingness for some sort of involvement with the U.S.11

Tables twelve and thirteen provide a list of each test case along with the leaders who were coded for the test cases. As indicated in the coding procedure earlier, a leader may not be coded for a test case if the materials covered in this research effort did not find an advocacy response or the leader was not politically active at the time. In such cases the reader will note a blank spot under the leaders in tables twelve and thirteen.

This chapter has delineated the research design, dealt with a number of germane methodological issues, and described the way this study operationalized the independent variable, personality, and the dependent variables, political postures.
TABLE 12: Test Cases Coded for Each Cleric -- Foreign Policy Postures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Case</th>
<th>Leader*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aggressiveness</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Export Revolution</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) 1987 U.N. Resolution</td>
<td>MH K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Mecca incident</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Acceptance of U.N. Resolution</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Implications of Rushdie edict</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Western hostages</td>
<td>MH K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Support of Palestinians</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Allied invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>MH K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autonomy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Foreign experts/investments</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Foreign loans</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Five year plan</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) International rules/institutions</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Dumas visit</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Relations with Egypt</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Neither East nor West</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement with U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Escorting of Kuwaiti tankers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Oil platforms 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Oil platforms 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Airbus downing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Relations with U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>U.S. presence in Gulf, August 1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* MH = Mohtashemi, MN = Montazeri, K = Khamanei, and R = Rafsanjani."
### TABLE 13: Test Cases Coded for Each Cleric -- Domestic Policy Postures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Cases</th>
<th>Leaders*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Freedom of Expression</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Dress</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Parties</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Press</td>
<td>MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Pardon of minigroup members</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Execution of Mojahedin</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Treatment of those who fled</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centralization</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Free enterprise</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Consolidation of power</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Merging of security forces</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Implement plans</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Formulate plans</td>
<td>MH MN K R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Press</td>
<td>MH MN K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* MH = Mohtashemi, MN = Montazeri, K = Khamanei, and R = Rafsanjani.
The next chapter, chapter six, discusses the "expected" postures of each of the six orientations of the Hermann framework, the independent variable. How does this research endeavor conceptualize the six orientations of the Hermann model in regard to the five policy postures of concern? This will be addressed in chapter six.
Footnotes

1. The meaning of content analysis means different things to different researchers. Berelson (1952:18) and Wimmer (1983:138) emphasize the quantitative nature. Krippendorff (1980:21) focuses on the idea of making inferences. Brislin (1980:395) underscores the notion that content analysis includes any sort of communication such as bodily movement, pictorial representation, or vocal tone. Nevertheless, beyond these different emphases, there still remains the central idea of content analysis which is that some sort of communication is classified (coded) into fewer meaningful categories.

2. Although empirical inquiries into communication date back to the 1600's when the church was worried about the spread of nonreligious matter, contemporary content analysis emerged within the journalism schools circa 1890's (Krippendorff 1980:13-14). The journalism schools, in demands for ethical standards in newspapers, made extensive use of content analysis (Krippendorff 1980:14). But it was not until the 1930's that content analysis was adapted to sociological, historical, and political research in a formal manner (Holsti 1968:608). Content analysis received a major boost during World War Two in its first large scale application (Krippendorff 1980:16). Studies of propaganda became the dominating influence on political studies using content analysis (Holsti 1968:608). By the 1950's, the use of content analysis had not only expanded into numerous fields (McCormack 1982:144), such as psychology, sociology, history, political science, anthropology, psychiatry, literature, and linguistics, but was used beyond the traditional boundaries of written and spoken word (Holsti 1968:608). Content analysis also became the study of pictorial communication, bodily gestures, and vocal tone. Such expansion and proliferation of content analysis resulted in a loss of focus (Krippendorff 1980:19). Content analysis became fragmented and multidisciplinary rather than an integrated enterprise (McCormack 1982:144). It was used by all and claimed by none. For instance, Viney (1983:543) notes that the psychological abstracts had no entry for content analysis until 1978.

3. Additionally, at the stage of formulating a content analysis procedure, a formidable problem is the unit of analysis. Unlike survey research which studies alternative ways of wording questions, there has been little systematic attempt to study the consequences of alternative operation procedures for content classification and analysis (Weber 1983:129-130). Consequently, the researcher is left with an almost seemingly unlimited number of ways as to what the unit of analysis will be (see Berelson 1954:507; Weber 1985:22-23; Kassarjian 1977).
Weber (1983:141-142) found greater reliability is associated with smaller units. An earlier study by Geller, Kaplan, and Lasswell (1942) compared four recording units on the same sample and found there was agreement in direction but not extent -- the larger the recording unit the greater the extent. Another research effort by Schneider and Dornbusch (1958) compared the results of coding themes in each paragraph versus the entire book and found that little substantive information was lost with the latter approach. Nevertheless, while these three studies are interesting, no definitive answers, at this point, are available to guide the researcher. In other words, the analyst must rely on his own intuitive hunches.

4. The AGA scheme (Szalay et al. 1972:171) attempts to measure belief systems via free association. Judges content analyze the responses into categories based on their similarities of content. Furthermore, a coding system may be a combination of both "theory driven theory" and "data driven theory" content analysis. For an example of one related to the Iranian context, see Zonis and Offer (1985b).

5. See also Larson (1988) and Duffy (1988).

6. Krippendorff (1980:25) suggests there are not purely descriptive accounts. In trying to provide a representation of reality, an analyst makes inferences.

7. For further aspects of this discussion see Holsti (1970), Holsti (1976), George (1959a), Pool (1959), and Miller (1983).

8. With a speech or sermon, it is divided into segments by topic which is usually a paragraph or two.

9. One study by Hermann (1988) was an effort to analyze twelve post-Shah Iranian political figures. This group is not utilized as the comparison group for the four clerics because the materials for the twelve leaders usually covered a short span of time (often a year or two). Furthermore, the time period covered was somewhat different. Therefore, this comparison group was not considered appropriate.

10. Hermann's (1987a:22-23) formulae which are used to determine the orientations are as follows:
    \[
    \text{Expansionist} = 2(N+P+S+D)+B+T+(100-A)+(100-C); \\
    \text{Active Independent} = 2(N+B+C+T)+A+S+(100-P)+(100-D); \\
    \text{Influential} = 2(B+P)+A+C+S(100-N)+(100-D)+(100-T); \\
    \text{Opportunist} = 3(C)+(100-N)+(100-B)+(100-P)+(100-A)+(100-S)+(100-D)+(100-T); \\
    \text{Mediator Integrator} = 2(A+C)+B+(100-N)+(100-P)+(100-S)+(100-D)+(100-T); \\
    \]
Developmental = \(2(N+A+S)+C+(100-B)+(100-P)+(100-D)+(100-T)\);

The abbreviations in these formulae are: \(N\) = Nationalism, \(B\) = Belief in one's ability to control events, \(P\) = Need for power, \(A\) = Need for affiliation, \(C\) = Conceptual complexity, \(D\) = Distrust of others, \(S\) = Self confidence, and \(T\) = Task emphasis.

Once these scores are calculated for each leader, like the personal characteristics, the leader's scores on the orientations must be put into perspective with the other clerics (see Hermann 1987b:7-8 discussion). Thus, the average scores and standard deviations for each orientation are discerned. Next, we transform the leader's orientation scores into standard scores. These are calculated by the following formula (Hermann 1987b:8):

\[
\text{Standard Score} = \frac{10}{S} (X) - \frac{M}{S} (10) + 50.
\]

The \(S\) refers to the standard deviation for the comparison group while the \(M\) stands for the mean of the comparison group. The \(X\) is for the leader's score on a particular orientation.

Ideally, as shown in table six, each orientation is associated with a particular pattern of traits. These six patterns are ideal types and in the real world it is a matter of degree. The formula outlined by Hermann provide us with a means to ascertain which orientation is predominantly exhibited by the leader.

11. Furthermore, I do not claim that any of the test cases are of equal weight.
CHAPTER VI

THEORY IN CONTEXT: RELATING PERSONALITY ORIENTATIONS OF THE HERMANN FRAMEWORK TO POLITICAL POSTURES

As pointed out in chapter two, in the last sixty years, a variety of typologies have been proposed. In this study, we concentrate on one political personality typology -- Margaret G. Hermann's framework. Specifically, we seek to answer the question: how can we delineate the link between the six orientations of the Hermann framework and the five political postures (i.e. aggressiveness, autonomy, involvement, freedom of expression, and centralization) of concern in this study? In other words, specifically, what are the hypotheses of the independent variable, personality?

One way to tease out this linkage is to hypothesize the position each orientation would likely embrace with each of the test cases presented in the previous chapter. Utilizing the five point scale in Appendix A, a likely position can be proposed in each test case for the six orientations. Once these extrapolations are made, each of the orientation's five policy postures can be discerned. This way is particularly attractive for this endeavor since, as pointed out in chapter five, the test cases are not assumed to necessarily be of equal weight or equally representative of the posture.
This chapter, therefore, is divided into three sections. The first section adumbrates how this study proposes to use the Hermann framework. The second part discusses the positions each orientation is likely to embrace on the thirty-four test cases. The third section examines the political postures of each orientation. That is, what are the "expected" political postures for each orientation within the Iranian context?

Utilizing The Hermann Model

The Hermann framework proposes "what" characteristics one should focus upon and "how" the characteristics link to form an orientation. Utilizing eight traits (see table six in chapter five, page 199) the model proposes six types of orientations -- Expansionist, Active Independent, Developmental, Influential, Opportunist, and Mediator Integrator. The orientations reflect the personality as a whole (Hermann 1987d:163). Each orientation is suggestive of certain goals and ways of approaching the goals. Appendix E reproduces Hermann's summary of the view of the world, style, foreign policy behavior, nature of advisory group, nature of information search, ability to tolerate disagreement, and method of dealing with opposition for each of the six orientations. A full description of each orientation has also been presented in the public domain by Hermann (see 1987c:133-140;1987e:268-277).
As shown in table six of chapter five (page 199), the eight characteristics (i.e. nationalism or ethnocentrism, belief in own ability to control events, need for power, need for affiliation, conceptual complexity, self confidence, distrust of others, and task orientation) are the base of the model and interrelate to form the six orientations. The reader, upon examination of table six, may have noticed that with eight traits the Hermann framework could propose more than six orientations. Hermann has suggested these six orientations are the ones that have been found in research. Additionally, the Hermann (1987a;1987b) approach can be utilized without the use of the orientations. Thus, behaviors and postures could be extrapolated directly from the characteristics since she has extensively outlined their likely impact as well as how some of the various characteristics interact.

This raises an interesting issue which some personality studies do not clearly distinguish. That is, what is the relationship between personality characteristics and behaviors, or as in the case of this study, postures? One view (e.g. Block and Ozer 1982) holds that characteristics may form a unique gestalt. Such a configuration (i.e. orientation or type) may predict behaviors/postures in a way that the characteristics used to define the type cannot. A second view (e.g. Mendelsohn, Weiss, and Feimer 1982) suggests personality characteristics have effects on behaviors/postures that are
not likely to be dependent on the presence of some type (or orientation). Successful prediction from types is attributable to the effects of the individual characteristics or some subset of them (Mendelsohn et al. 1982:1169). In other words, typing can be used for descriptive purposes but it does not add to the prediction of behaviors or postures. This view implies the usefulness of personality typologies is, at best, questionable.

With regard to the Hermann framework, the latter view would concentrate on utilizing the characteristics which comprise each orientation to extrapolate the five policy postures of concern in this study. The former view would predict postures based upon the conceptualization of each orientation. This is the view taken in this study because prediction would be more difficult, inasmuch one would lack the understanding of the overall picture (i.e. personality) in which the characteristics operate. Otherwise, the researcher is left with a number of perplexing questions such as: Should each characteristic (or set of characteristics) be evaluated in isolation of the others with regard to its impact on a particular posture? If they are combined, in what manner should this be done? Is it in a summary manner or should it be weighted? Furthermore, typing allows for variation without lapsing into useless complexity (Barber 1974:455). Finally, as Block and his associates (1982:1180) cogently point out, personality psychologists, by and large, have sought to
predict from characteristics and, while there has been some success, the results are not exhilarating. They, also, suggest the scientific plateau psychologists have been meandering for some time may be attributed to this overemphasis of characteristics. Thus, this study embraces the assumption that characteristics form a pattern as a whole in which properties cannot be derived from its parts.

Considering this, this study utilizes the six orientations as the jumping off point. That is, the orientation's position on each of the test cases is hypothesized from the overall conceptualization of the orientation and not from certain characteristics which are associated with the orientation. The characteristics are the means to classify the leader into an orientation. Since the Hermann model does not explicitly refer to the political postures of concern in this study, how were the orientations' positions on the various test cases extrapolated? The next section of this chapter seeks to answer this question.

Test Cases And Orientations -- Likely Positions

How do people make sense of the world around them? How do people manage phenomena? How do individuals bring a sense of order to the vast amount of information (e.g. facts, figures, and images) which bombards them? Or, on the other hand, how do people deal with limited information about situations and other individuals? In order to function, we
make certain assumptions about others, situations, events, and objects. Without such assumptions, which simplify the complexity of the real world (whether it be because of too much information or too little), we would be extremely inefficient. Our efforts to interpret, remember, and make inferences about anything would be a monumental undertaking.

Consequently, the assumptions we make about situations and others, or what is formally called schemas, are mental representations of the world. Schemas are an "unarticulated theory about the nature of events, objects, or situations which we face. The total set of schemas we have available for interpreting our world in a sense constitutes our private theory of the nature of reality" (Rumelhart, cited from Goleman 1985:76). To put it in the words of Fiske and Taylor (1984:140), two leading social psychologists, the concept of schema refers to "a cognitive structure that represents organized knowledge about a given concept or type of stimulus". Schemata are theories about how people perceive, remember, and make inferences about types of people and events as a class (Fiske and Taylor 1984:140,179). Such snap-judgments of people, objects, and situations are an economical way for individuals to make sense of the world around them. Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor (1984:141), conclude, "The most fundamental principle suggested by schema research is that people simplify reality; they do so in part by interpreting specific instances in light of the general case". Thus, when
an individual or leader responds schematically, an entity or situation is treated as an instance of an already familiar category or schema.

I am proposing that just like you and me, political leaders also possess schemas about situations and others. Decisionmakers wrestle with issues and problems based on extraordinarily complicated, incomplete, and uncertain evidence. They operate in what Jervis (1976) appropriately calls a "fog". Henry Kissinger (1979), at one time a policymaker himself, asserts policymakers work in darkness.

Since political actors must make decisions in an ambiguous world, the course of action a leader generally advocates may often be determined by the actor's schemas. Two prevalent schemas relate to how situations and others are viewed in general. For instance, does the leader consider the situation at hand as an issue of autonomy, development, or domination? Similarly, does the political figure define others he is dealing with in terms of friends versus enemies, helpers versus exploiters, or those seeking to solve a problem versus those who are not.

What sort of schemas with respect to situations and others should we expect? I am proposing each of the six orientations can be associated with a particular schema of situations and a particular schema of others. As table fourteen indicates, each of the orientations has disparate schemas with regard to how situations and others are viewed in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Classification of Situations</th>
<th>Classification of Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>To preserve &amp; enhance one's power</td>
<td>Weak vs Strong &amp; Friend vs Enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Independent</td>
<td>To become &amp;/or maintain one's independence</td>
<td>Controllers (dominators) vs Nondependents (those who are self-reliant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>Betterment &amp; advancement of the nation or group</td>
<td>Helpers (contributors) vs Impeders (exploiters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>To develop &amp; exert leadership position</td>
<td>Sympathizers (backers) vs Rivals (adversaries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator Integrator</td>
<td>To bring about settlement or compromise between disputing parties</td>
<td>Those open to settling/solving differences vs Those who are not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunist</td>
<td>To take advantage of opportunities for gain &amp; avoid those situations that result in loss</td>
<td>Position of those to which the Opportunist is accountable vs Position of all others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
general. For instance, the Expansionist interprets situations according to a dominance framework while the Mediator Integrator operates from the framework of whether differences are resolvable.

I have suggested that a leader's schema of situations and schema of others is related to the political figure's personality. Each orientation is predisposed to trigger a certain schema which helps simplify reality about events and others in a particular manner as well as interpret specific instances in light of the manner of these simplifications. Thus, I plan to concentrate on the schemas for each orientation that organizes knowledge about situations and other entities.

How situations and others are viewed has particular importance for this endeavor since the orientation's likely position on various issues or circumstances (i.e. test cases) will depend upon the orientation's cognitive representation of events and others. Understanding the way each leader, depending upon his orientation, conceptually organizes his environment furnishes us with a basis for extrapolating the position or preference the leader is likely to embrace on the various test cases. The leader's schemas of others and situations, based on his orientation, provides an avenue for discerning how an event is generally viewed or framed.

Of equal importance, it also provides us with insight into those issues (i.e. test cases) which are of little
relevance to a certain orientation because the orientation's predisposed schemas do not fit. As Fiske and Taylor (1984:177) indicate, one effect of schemas is "that people tend to make the data fit the schema, rather than vice versa. However, when there is partial fit, the perceiver may not apply the schema with complete confidence... A salient lack-of-fit is likely to moderate usually-obtained schemata effects". In other words, unsuccessful categorization of the situation or other actor means the schema is not activated. It may be in such cases a leader with a particular orientation may respond in at least four different ways.

One way is for the leader not to respond with a preference. However, if the event, issue, or entity is one the political actor is expected to respond to, or the situation dictates the actor must show where he stands, then the last three ways become more likely. The second possibility is the leader, depending on his particular orientation, may respond with a preference that is consistent with the position of the group to which the orientation is accountable or identifies with. This may be a politically prudent choice, especially on important issues. Since the thirty-four test cases dealt with in this study are significant issues, the group each orientation is most likely to be influenced by has been delineated in table fifteen. A third possibility is the political actor responds on the basis
TABLE 15: Those Most Likely to Influence The Orientations' Advocacy Positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Who Potentially Influences the Orientation the Most</th>
<th>Who Influences the Orientation in the Iranian Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>Powerholders in regime</td>
<td>Moderates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Independent</td>
<td>Those who support the regime &amp; do not try to dominate other supporters</td>
<td>Moderates &amp; Radicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>Those who give primacy to national interests over revolutionary interests</td>
<td>Moderates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>Those who can put and keep him in a leadership position</td>
<td>Moderates &amp;/or Radicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator Integrator</td>
<td>Those who support the regime</td>
<td>Moderates &amp; those who support the regime (e.g. Freedom Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunists</td>
<td>All positions based on the preferences of those to which the Opportunists is accountable</td>
<td>Mohtashemi=Radicals; Montazeri=those who support the regime; Khamanei=Radicals &amp; Moderates; Rafsanjani=Moderates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of another schema which may or may not be linked to personality.

A fourth potential response would incorporate piecemeal processing. The issue, event, or entity is thought of as a unique instance without reference to prior knowledge about others of its type (see discussion by Fiske 1986:43-44; Fiske and Taylor 1984:143). Piecemeal processing relies solely on information provided (or observed) without reference to an overall organizing structure. It takes each feature or characteristic of the situation or of others and evaluates the features and characteristics in isolation from the others. Combining them into a summary judgement, an impression is formed of the situation or of the other actor. Nevertheless, when any of these four occur, the impact of one's prevalent schemas about situations and others (which are predisposed by one's orientation) on policy preferences should be minimal. Consequently, it is important to identify those test cases for each orientation which are hypothesized to possess lesser relevance (i.e. little meaningfulness).

The above discussion suggests political actors actively construct reality and create meaning. Political actors, like all people, are limited information processors and, therefore, embrace simplified images of the environment in order to deal with the world (George 1980; Jervis 1976; Fiske and Taylor 1984; Nisbett and Ross 1980). These subjective representations of reality provide a framework for the actor
to interpret and categorize specific issues, situations, and other entities according to one's schemas. Concomitantly, this becomes a guide for the leader in his/her attempt to grapple with policy choices or preferences. However, if the schemata do not fit the issue, situation, or entity very well, then such issues, situations, and entities become less relevant. Moreover, I have suggested, in this case the leader may respond in a manner consistent with those to which the actor is accountable (see table fifteen). While such an assumption is plausible, it is equally possible that another schema is triggered or that other processes are at work such as piecemeal processing (Fiske 1986) or analogical reasoning (see Newell and Simon 1972).

One additional comment is appropriate. As pointed out in chapter five, since each of the clerics in this study is given a quantitative score for each orientation, one can think of this as the extent to which the cleric exhibits a particular orientation. In turn, this indicates the relevance of the schemas of situations and others. The more dominate one orientation is over the others for a particular cleric, the more relevant the associated schemas of situations and others is likely to come into play. However, if the cleric displays more than one dominant orientation, it becomes more difficult to hypothesize the leader's postures since the cleric may possess a number of readily available schemata that may be triggered.
The ensuing discussion of each of the orientations is presented in the following manner. To begin, the way the orientation structures situations and others will be proposed. Next, those within the regime who may potentially influence the orientation's position are indicated. Once this is completed, the orientations' hypothesized positions on the thirty-four test cases are presented. In extrapolating these positions, it is conceivable the orientation would espouse more than one position within a test case. As shown in Appendix A, adjacent positions on some of the test cases are only slightly different. Ergo, the hypothesized position encompasses the range which most likely exemplifies the orientation.

**Expansionist Orientation**

The political actor who displays the Expansionist orientation classifies situations in terms of dominance. Such a leader is concerned with preserving and enhancing one's power. That is, to dominate and control others as well as not being dominated by others is the framework of how the Expansionist defines situations (see table fourteen, page 258). This orientation classifies others into the dichotomy of the "weak" and the "strong" as well as into the dichotomy of "friend" versus "enemy". Thus, the Expansionist's (or his nation's) relative power position vis-a-vis other entities and the nature of the relationship (i.e. ally or foe), to a large extent, determine how this orientation will deal with others.
This way of classifying others translates into the strategy of stepping on others or stepping over others, if necessary, as well as avoiding being stepped on by others.

The Expansionist, however, may not be oblivious to the influence of others. Such a leader with this orientation is cognizant of the position of the influential "powerholders" within the regime. As shown in table fifteen (page 261), in the Iranian context, the Moderates are the "powerholders". One could even suggest that since the Moderates were generally in the drivers seat during the time period of concern for these test cases, the Expansionist is most likely to lean in their direction. Thus, especially on those issues of unsuccessful categorization, the Expansionist's predisposed schemas are not likely to be activated. On such issues of little meaning or relevance, such an orientation is likely to espouse the position of the Moderates.

Relations With Other Nations. The political actor with an Expansionist orientation is usually the most exploitative and conflict prone of all the orientations. This is partially because the Expansionist wants to distend his control over others (and their resources) and partially because life is viewed as a struggle against others. Since conflict is inevitable, might makes right. Conciliatory action is a sign of weakness and, therefore, opponents must be dealt with in a firm, harsh manner. In other words, the Expansionist is a jingoist who often urges quick and punitive responses to
external threats. And since there are many external threats, use of force is a usual response.

What sort of advocacy positions would one expect the political figure who displays an Expansionist orientation to embrace with respect to the test cases chosen for this study (see appendix A for listing of the test cases and the scales)? Under the aggressiveness test cases, the Expansionist is inclined to take the most belligerent positions (see table sixteen, page 309). Thus, such a leader will likely urge the export of revolution by force, want the fall of Saddam, desire revenge for attacks against Iranians, encourage the rising up against the infidels in the world, favor Iran's active support of the Palestinians, and will not want the release of Western hostages. The test cases of export of revolution and the implications of the Rushdie edict may have little meaningfulness to this orientation. The Expansionist, in desiring Iran to be strong, may urge stepping over other entities, as well as avoiding being stepped on by others, rather than always stepping on others. In other words, the Expansionist's commitment to spreading the cause will probably mirror the position of the "powerholders" in the regime.

Since the Expansionist rarely thinks in terms of cooperation, it is uncommon for such a leader to desire to work in close collaboration with others as they are often the cause of problems. Hence, from this orientation's view, why
should anyone want to engage in multilateral acts? The best avenue is to go it alone -- that is, high autonomy.

With respect to the autonomy test cases, as shown in table seventeen (page 310), the political actor who exhibits the Expansionist orientation is often predisposed to the extreme of seeking to be able to act alone and remain independent. Therefore, the Expansionist is against loans, the use of foreign experts/investments, and emphasizes agricultural development in order to achieve and maintain Iran's independence. These are critical issues to the Expansionist since engaging in such activities could lead to someone's dominance of Iran. World opinion is of little concern. Relations with France, a main supporter of Iraq during the war, or Egypt, the nation who deals with Israel, are opposed. For the Expansionist, Iran must struggle against the East and West. Nevertheless, three of the test cases -- concern for international rules/institutions, relations with Egypt, and the meaning of neither East nor West -- have less relevance for this orientation. Relations with Egypt (unlike relations with France which is a superior power) do not threaten Iran's autonomy, especially since Egypt, at best, is an equal power. Furthermore, the Expansionist's position, on this test case like the other two, relates to this orientation's revolutionary zeal which has been proposed to likely mirror the preferences of the "powerholders" in the regime.
The leader with an Expansionist orientation has no desire to be involved with the former Imperialist Power. The Expansionist is hostile toward this superior enemy, who in the past and future, will continue to attempt to control Iran. Their moves are viewed as an attempt to stop the goals of this orientation’s nation. Under no conditions should his nation be involved with the former Imperialistic Power.

With regard to the test cases under involvement with the U. S., as displayed in table eighteen (page 311), the Expansionist will embrace a hostile attitude toward the United States. In cases of direct attacks against Iran (e.g. shooting of the airbus or attacks of oil platforms) or even perceived threatening situations (e.g. U.S. presence in the Gulf or escort of Kuwaiti tankers), the leader with the Expansionist orientation will feel the enemy is upon him and he has no choice but to confront the enemy. Concomitantly, the Expansionist will not want relations or talks with the U.S. The hostile actions by the U.S. make it quite clear that they are an enemy. Furthermore, each of the test cases of this posture are significant to the Expansionist since this orientation believes the U.S. only wants to dominate Iran.

Organization of the Government. The leader with an Expansionist orientation urges little freedom of expression. This orientation's willingness to tolerate disagreement and deviant points of view is low (Hermann 1987c:135). Since the Expansionist is convinced of the reality of social conflict,
conflicts will be exacerbated if one allows freedom of expression. Differences of opinion threaten this orientation's authority. Consequently, the Expansionist will quell any conflicting views and weed out opponents. With respect to the test cases under freedom of expression, as illustrated in table nineteen (page 312), the Expansionist favors proper Islamic dress to be worn, the desire to impart the correct thoughts into parties, encouragement of the press to only print certain things, and will be unwilling to forgive those who violate the law, as well as have little desire for those who fled Iran to return. All of these test cases are meaningful to the Expansionist because conformity and harsh treatment of offenders enhance this leader's authority.

The Expansionist advocates a tightly centralized government. The distribution of control in organizations and nations should be concentrated and hierarchical. The Expansionist's authoritarian tendencies incline this orientation to regularly intervene at lower levels and ignore subordinates completely. The leader with an Expansionist orientation is one to set policy himself and impose his will forcefully.

With regard to the test cases under centralization, as shown in table twenty (page 313), the political actor with this orientation will desire, at a minimum, that the government should plan and supervise the private sector. Along with such a nationalization tendency, the Expansionist
will urge for the consolidation/merger of organizations (i.e. executive branch, security forces, or the press) as well as believe the government should formulate and solve the nation's problems. However, three of these test cases -- role of free enterprise, merger of armed forces, and monopoly of the press -- are not as significant to the Expansionist because they may not enhance his control. Nationalization or the merger of the armed forces does not, in and of itself, necessarily centralize power. As for the monopoly of the press, this also may be an inconsequential issue to the Expansionist, since such an orientation is concerned with feeding them the correct thoughts (see discussion under freedom of expression). In that case, one already has control over them and the press does not have to be in the hands of a few.

**Active Independent Orientation**

The leader with an Active Independent orientation strives to be free of the influence and control of others. Such a leader wants to resist coercion and restriction that other entities may try to impose. Situations, therefore, are viewed in terms of whether it does or does not limit the Active Independent's sense of autonomy. Concomitantly, as shown in table fourteen (page 258), in viewing other entities, this orientation seeks to distinguish whether they are bent on controlling others or they are nondependent, like the Active Independent. The Active Independent wants to capitalize on (or even seek out) those problems (which this orientation
often sees as opportunities) which will increase independence.

The Active Independent's concern for maintaining or pursuing independence will incline such a leader to listen to disparate points of view. Within the Iranian context (see table fifteen, page 261), this will include both the Moderates and the Radicals. It will not include groups like the Freedom Movement since they are viewed as bent on controlling others within the regime. This orientation does not want to do anything which will jeopardize Iran's autonomy. Therefore, the leader with an Active Independent orientation may be persuaded to change his position if the alternative is better for reaching such a goal. More importantly, for this book, on those issues of unsuccessful categorization, the predisposed schemas of the leader with an Active Independent orientation are not likely to be activated. On such issues of little meaning, this orientation is likely to express the positions of the Moderates and Radicals.

Relations With Other Nations. Since the political actor with an Active Independent orientation seeks to have his nation remain independent by developing relations with as many nations as possible (Hermann 1987e:271), such a leader will not want to pursue the use of hostile means unless the target nation is intent on limiting his nation's sense of independence. In other words, this orientation sees both conflict of interests and cooperation of interests in the international arena, depending on the target. Therefore, the
degree of hostility advocated by the Active Independent depends on the target nation.

With regard to the test cases under aggressiveness (see table sixteen, page 309), the Active Independent will rule out the use of force with respect to the export of revolution. However, since the leader with this orientation wants to further his ideology, such a leader is unlikely to urge the position of national interest having primacy over revolutionary interests. As for the response to the July 1987 U.N. Resolution, the Active Independent will indicate continuation of the war is very likely to threaten Iran's independence. Similarly, this orientation will suggest the acceptance of the U.N. Resolution 598 is a necessary opportunity. With the Mecca incident, the Active Independent will take a more hostile tone since Iran has been attacked by usurpers. Iran should confront the Saudis, if not take revenge against them. The Active Independent, with regard to the Rushdie edict and the Western hostages, will want these issues resolved (and no demonstrations) because such circumstances inhibit cultivating relations with other nations. As for the Palestinians, this orientation will advocate helping them but only in concert with other Muslims nations. In response to the Allied invasion of Iraq, the Active Independent will condemn both sides as they are both usurpers. All of these test cases are relevant to the Active Independent because they all relate to how one should
participate in the international community. This is a central concern of the Active Independent.

What degree of autonomy does the leader with the Active Independent orientation wish to pursue? The Active Independent does not want to be part of anything that limits his nation's freedom of movement. At the same time, this orientation wants to build relations with as many nations as possible.

With regard to the test cases under autonomy, as shown in table seventeen (page 310), the following positions can be anticipated for the Active Independent. This orientation will urge the necessity of relying on Iran, if not also favoring outright rejection of the use of foreign experts/investments. The use of foreign loans will be emphatically discouraged. Agricultural development should take precedence over industrial development. The Active Independent is very resistant to the possibility of external influence. Nevertheless, this orientation is concerned about world public opinion and is likely to accept international institutions and rules. Full support of such institutions is unlikely since they may attempt to limit Iran's independence and maneuverability. The Active Independent wants relations his way but will not be inclined to do anything that hurts expanding relations with many others. Consequently, this orientation desires relations with France as long as France does not try to dominate Iran, encourages ties with Egypt, and
interprets the meaning of "neither East nor West" to mean developing relations with those who do not conspire against Iran. Again, as with the aggressiveness posture, the test cases under autonomy are all relevant. The nature and extent of participation in the international arena is a central concern for the Active Independent.

The political actor with the Active Independent orientation will advocate little involvement with the U.S. The U.S. is perceived as intent on expanding its influence. It is not interested in Iran becoming self reliant. This orientation is opposed to such usurpers. Therefore, with the test cases under involvement with the U.S. (see table eighteen, page 311) in which the U.S. made direct attacks on Iran (e.g. destruction of oil platforms and shooting of the airbus), the Active Independent will urge retaliation. Such actions by the U.S. can not go unanswered. As for the U.S. escorting the Kuwaiti tankers and the U.S. presence in the Gulf in 1990, the Active Independent will urge showing no self restraint. The U.S. is attempting to control the regional political arena and curtail Iran's independence. Even with the U.S. presence in the Gulf in 1990, this orientation maintains this is not a U.S. problem and the Muslim nations can take care of Saddam. As the U.S. presence continues in the Gulf, the Active Independent will become convinced a more aggressive position is necessary. Concomitantly, relations with the U.S should be rejected. Furthermore, all of these
test cases are relevant to the Active Independent because the United States is perceived as intent on restricting Iran's independence.

Organization of Government. The Active Independent, generally, advocates a high degree of freedom of expression. This offers such a leader one way not to be tied or obligated to anyone so that the actor with this orientation can maintain his independence. Thus, with regard to the test cases under freedom of expression, as shown in table nineteen (page 312), the Active Independent will encourage the positions that people should not have to dress the same, parties should have freedom of speech, the press should not be censored, and the nation should pave the way for the return of those who fled. While the Active Independent wants to win over opponents, such a leader will not laud an amnesty of the minigroup members. This orientation will not take a harsh position either, rather the Active Independent will favor a middle point of view. With the issue of the decision to execute the Mojahedin, since such groups were bent on controlling others, reconsideration is out of the question. All of these test cases are relevant to the Active Independent since the greater the freedom of expression, the less likely such a leader will need to be tied to anyone.

The political actor with an Active Independent orientation urges a mixed approach to control of power. Such an orientation desires sufficient control to maintain, or when
necessary increase, his independence as well as to monitor internal performance. While this orientation wants to be able to act, to be free to make decisions, the Active Independent is not averse to sharing power. With respect to the test cases under centralization (see table twenty, page 313), the Active Independent will urge that Iran should neither discourage the private sector nor condemn government intervention. This orientation will, however, advocate consolidation of the executive branch. As for the merger of the security forces, the Active Independent tends to avoid the extremes since in such cases his sense of independence could be potentially jeopardized. The Active Independent is not seeking to create one revolutionary organization, nor does this orientation favor the separation and unconnectedness of them. The Active Independent, with regard to the implementation of the government's plans, at a minimum, urges delegation of only minor responsibilities with extensive monitoring. Howbeit, in formulating the government's plans, the leader with an Active Independent orientation seeks to solicit the opinions of experts and the people. The Active Independent is interested in diverse views as long as this orientation can maintain his independence. The last test case of this posture is the monopoly of the press. As with the issue of merging the security forces, the Active Independent avoids the extremes. All of the test cases under centralization are relevant to this orientation as they
directly, or indirectly, relate to maintaining one's independence.

Developmental Orientation

The betterment and advancement of the Developmental's group (or nation) is the overriding concern of the political actor with this orientation. A situation is viewed according to whether it does or does not advance the Developmental's group or nation (see table fourteen, page 258). Such improvement and development, however, can only be attained with the help of others. Consequently, the Developmental views others as either those who will be contributors to or those who will impede one's group's progress (or even exploit one's group). In the world, there are the helpers and the impeders.

The Developmental is driven by the vision to build one's (group's or nation's) position in the world. Therefore, the leader with this orientation is not tolerant of those problems or people which take him away from achieving this goal. Alternative goals have little meaning to the Developmental. Nevertheless, this orientation can be influenced by those who give primacy to the national interests over the revolutionary interests. Within the Iranian context, as shown in table fifteen (page 261), this is represented by the Moderates who seek the development of Iran over Islamicization of the Gulf. Furthermore, the Developmental will not take a position on an issue that will kindle any sort of domestic opposition. Thus,
especially on those issues of unsuccessful categorization, the Developmental's predisposed schemas are not likely to be activated. On such issues of little meaning, this orientation is likely to espouse the positions of the Moderates.

**Relations With Other Nations.** Generally, the political actor with a Developmental orientation is nonconfrontational and is rationally cooperative because of his focus on the development of his nation. To engage in hostile acts may result in losing out on the benefits that some "helper" entity may provide. Howbeit, the Developmental may be hostile to a nation this orientation perceives as a "nonhelper" and does not hold a superior power position. If the "nonhelper" nation (and its allies) possess a superior power position, then the Developmental will use various international (or regional) organizations to register his complaints.

With regard to the test cases under aggressiveness (see table sixteen, page 309), one could anticipate the Developmental to urge the following positions. Since such an orientation is not interested in controlling others, the Developmental will interpret the meaning of "export of revolution" to not only exclude the use of force but to mean Iran should be a model for other nations. As for the response to the July 1987 U.N. Resolution, this orientation will urge, at a minimum, the acceptance of certain features, if not advocate Iran's compliance with the Resolution. This is not only because the war inhibits the betterment of Iran, but
because Iraq, with its allies, has a superior power position. Concomitantly, in accepting the U.N. Resolution to end the war, the Developmental will indicate it was definitely in Iran's best interest or even possibly that Iran should have accepted it earlier. With respect to the Mecca incident, this orientation will advocate not taking any militant action since Saudi Arabia has the potential to be a "helper" nation. The same reasoning applies to the Rushdie edict. The death sentence is not a basis for initiating militant action or even demonstrations. Similarly, the Developmental will want a settlement to the hostage problem. With the Palestinian issue, this orientation will favor the least hostile action. While the Developmental does not want Iran to lose or give away precious resources, this orientation is also overly aware of the domestic support the Palestinians possess. Therefore, this no-win issue is less relevant to the Developmental especially since the Palestinians are neither helpers nor impeders. For the last test case of this posture, the allied invasion of Iraq, the Developmental will want to remain neutral, if not express a willingness to abide by the U.N. Resolution.

The leader with a Developmental orientation will be willing to have his nation engage in multilateral acts and have his nation give up much of its autonomy if it results in the improvement of his nation. Such an orientation pursues and encourages useful and enriching relations with others who
can aid his nation. Thus, the helping entities are especially attractive to the Developmental who wants to use them for his nation's benefit.

With respect to the test cases under autonomy (see table seventeen, page 310), the following positions are expected for the Developmental. This orientation will advocate using foreign experts/investments because Iran can arrange an equitable relationship. Foreign loans even with non-Third World nations should be utilized. Concomitantly, emphasis should be placed on industrial production and development over agricultural development. The Developmental is not averse to Iran losing some of its autonomy if it bears the fruit of progress. This orientation will support international institutions and organizations because they are (or can potentially be) a "helper". Likewise, the Developmental wants relations with Western nations and the meaning of "neither East nor West" does not mean severance of relations with them. However, the Developmental is less inclined to desire ties with Egypt since it is not a likely "helper" nation. Ties should occur only if Egypt meets certain conditions. This issue is of little significance to the Developmental since relations neither hinder nor enhance Iran's development.

The political actor with a Developmental orientation is likely to want to use the former imperialistic power to help build his nation. Therefore, this orientation will seek high involvement with the U.S., a potential "helper" nation. With
regard to the test case under involvement with the U.S., as shown in table eighteen (page 311), one would anticipate the Developmental to urge nonretaliation for hostile acts by the U.S. In such cases, this orientation will push having the problem ironed out in the various international organizations. Since the Developmental does not want potentially useful relations with the U.S. squelched, such a leader may suggest, with respect to the U.S. escort of Kuwaiti tankers, others dragged the U.S. into the Gulf. The Developmental will want to pursue having talks and relations with the U.S. As for the U.S. presence in the Gulf in 1990, this orientation will welcome the U.S. presence especially since Iraq is an exploiter nation. Nevertheless, most of the test cases are not meaningful to the Developmental since they deal with hostile actions by the U.S., the potential helper nation. Such antagonistic behavior by the U.S. does not fit well with this orientation's cognitive representation of this nation.

Organization of Government. The political actor with a Developmental orientation wants to organize the government so that it can implement his goal of bettering and developing the nation. Since the Developmental has defined the goal, this orientation is not open to, or even tolerant of, alternative goals. Thus, the Developmental has little use for nonsupporters. Consequently, with his vision in hand, this orientation will desire little freedom of expression.
With regard to the test case under freedom of expression (see table nineteen, page 312), the leader with a Developmental orientation will urge that parties, if they exist, should be given the correct thoughts. Similarly, the press, if it is not censored, should publish only certain things. The Developmental is only interested in the opinions of supporters. However, with dress, this orientation is more lenient, favoring a minimum dress code. Some behavior cannot go unrestrained. As for law violators, such offenses are unforgivable. Such groups cause dissension. The Mojahedin and any similar groups, as well as those who have contacts with them, should be dealt with harshly. They are not contributors to the nation; rather they are impeders. As for those who fled, the Developmental will want the return of those who can help Iran and will not cause problems. Thus, this orientation will urge for the return of those who have not committed major offenses. All of the test cases are relevant for the Developmental because the press, parties, various groups, and others are either helping or hindering progress toward the betterment of Iran.

Even though the Developmental desires little freedom of expression, such a leader takes a mixed or moderate approach to centralization. The leader with this orientation is not averse to delegating or consulting on certain issues as long as it is with supporters of his goal. The Developmental does not want to alienate supporters and wants them to feel as if
they are part of the decisionmaking process. Furthermore, such supporters can help this orientation curtail any domestic opposition to policies.

With regard to the test cases under centralization, as shown in table twenty (page 313), the Developmental will urge the public and private sector to work together. Such an orientation avoids the extremes of either bashing the private sector or implying government intervention causes problems. Similarly, the Developmental avoids the extremes on the issues of the consolidation of the governmental positions, the merger of certain units within the armed forces, and the monopoly of the press. These issues must be discussed and consolidation may be needed in certain areas or at certain times. The Developmental, with regard to implementing the government's plans, will favor delegating responsibility according to one's capabilities as long as they are supporters of the regime. However, in formulating the government's plans, this orientation already has an agenda and, at most, will urge consultation of certain groups and/or experts.

**Influential Orientation**

The political actor with the Influential orientation desires to have the ability to affect the behaviors of others so as to shape the nature of events in the policy arena. Such a leader envisions himself as the "man at the wheel" -- the helmsman of the ship. As shown in table fourteen (page 258), the political figure with an Influential orientation views
situations according to their impact on the development or exertion of this orientation's position of leadership. In an effort to exercise influence, the Influential views others as sympathizers (and backers) or rivals (and even possible antagonists). The former may range from those who favor or are in agreement with the Influential to outright supporters of the Influential. On the other hand, rivals are those who are attempting to be the helmsman and/or those who are adversaries.

Since the leader with an Influential orientation has an acute desire to lead, such an actor is not overly committed to his own set of beliefs; rather this leader is responsive to those the Influential is trying to lead. In this orientation's preoccupation with political position, such a leader is more concerned about those who can propel him into or maintain him in a leadership position. Thus the preferences of those this orientation leads may become very important if such preferences can enhance his ability to develop and exert leadership. Furthermore, the Influential wants his group (or nation) to lead those groups (or nations) with which it (his group or nation) identifies. Ultimately, this leader seeks to lead certain groups or nations.

Within the Iranian context, as table fifteen (page 261) illustrates, the Moderates and Radicals are the two groups who can possibly thrust an actor into a position of leadership. Based on the intensive analysis delineated in chapters three
and four of the four clerics of this study, I propose that if they possess an Influential orientation, each of the four clerics will be linked to the Radicals, Moderates, or both in an attempt to achieve or maintain a position of leadership, in the following manner. Mohtashemi will desire to lead the Radicals and Rafsanjani the Moderates. As for Khamanei and Montazeri, they will seek to lead both groups. Thus each of the clerics will be responsive to these respective groups. Tables twenty-one through twenty-five (pages 314-318) furnish the expected positions of the Radicals and Moderates as well as the Radicals/Moderates (i.e. one who wants to be the leader of both). The discussion under the Opportunistic orientation further explains the different preferences of such distinctions. Nevertheless, no matter which group the clerics seek to lead, on those issues of unsuccessful categorization, the predisposed schemas of the leader with an Influential orientation are not likely to be activated. On such issues of little meaning, this orientation will espouse the positions of the group he is seeking to lead.

Relations With Other Nations. Generally, the political actor with an Influential orientation will shy away from the use of hostile acts since such a leader would lose some of his leadership capacity. Aggressive acts may inhibit collaborative activities with others which, at times, may be necessary, prudent, or even beneficial. Belligerent acts may alienate sympathizers and turn rivals into adversaries.
Nevertheless, the Influential, may act aggressively in those situations in which a partisan group (or nation) is threatened by an antagonist or by those this leader does not wish to influence.

With respect to the test cases under aggressiveness (see table sixteen, page 309), one would anticipate the following positions. The Influential will urge that the ideas of the revolution should be expressed worldwide. This leader is against using force but would like Iran's ideology to be more than a model for other nations to follow. As for the July 1987 U.N. Resolution, this orientation will favor a hostile response since Iran was attacked by Iraq. Such a leader will assert Iran has a right to defend itself. However, when Resolution 598 is accepted, the Influential sees it as in Iran's best interest or as a necessary opportunity. With respect to the Mecca incident, this orientation will advocate, at a minimum, that Iran can not tolerate such action. To urge anything less may threaten this leader's status or prestige as the one who is capable of being the helmsman for the regime. As for the Rushdie edict, the Influential will urge that it is not a basis for instigating belligerent actions or even demonstrations. Such action expands tensions with the West and the Influential wants to reduce the tension. Similarly, the Influential will want a settlement to the hostage crisis. This leader will not advocate unreciprocated assistance with the release of the hostages because of the domestic reaction
to this issue. The Influential will seek to champion the Palestinian cause since this will add to his prestige. Iran should send men and troops to fight Israel and Muslim nations should come together, under Iran's leadership, to wage war against Israel. As for the Allied invasion of Iraq, this leader will want to wait and see what happens. He would have preferred the Muslim nations of the world, under Iran's leadership, confront Saddam.

As shown in table sixteen (page 309) with five of the test cases (export revolution, acceptance of UN resolution, Rushdie edict, Western hostages, and invasion of Iraq by allied forces), the Influential's predisposed preferences may not be meaningful. If the group this leader is trying to lead considers them important, then the Influential will embrace their preferences wholeheartedly. This is because, as stated earlier, the Influential wants to be the helmsman, to take control, and, therefore, those who can keep him in a leadership position become overly important. Nonsupport of their preference may erode (or hurt the development of) his leadership position with those the Influential is trying to lead.

The Influential is inclined to undertake both unilateral and multilateral activities depending upon the target or situation. If conditions permit, the leader with this orientation will go it alone. Howbeit, at times, the cooperation of others is needed. The Influential will want to
join forces with sympathizers and be at the helm of the situation. Furthermore, this leader will not want to give too much control to others; otherwise his group's (or nation's) choices may become limited.

With regard to the test cases under autonomy (see table seventeen, page 310), the Influential will want foreign experts/investments and foreign loans only under controlled conditions, as well as a combination of agricultural and industrial development. This orientation does not want Iran's choices dictated by other nations. Yet the Influential is concerned about world opinion and will likely want to accept international laws and institutions as it offers the opportunity to influence others. Furthermore, the Influential will desire relations with France and other Western nations as well as with Egypt and other regional states. This leader seeks to have influence over such states and this can only occur if one has relations with them. The interpretation of "neither East nor West" means Iran should not be isolationistic or sever relations with the East or West.

All of the test cases under autonomy are meaningful except the five year plan and the issue of relations with Egypt (see table seventeen). As for the five year plan, since this is an issue with direct domestic political ramifications and, therefore, can impact his leadership position, the Influential becomes very responsive to those this leader is trying to lead. With the case of Egypt, the Influential wants
Iran to lead those nations with which Iran identifies. Egypt, as it is pro-Western and is the one who negotiated with Israel, is not one of those nations the Influential wants to have influence over. Consequently, this issue has little relevance to this orientation.

The leader with an Influential orientation takes a middle road approach to the involvement with the U.S. While this orientation would like the ability to affect U.S. policy, the belligerent acts of the U.S. makes too friendly of involvement unsuitable because of the domestic backlash. Therefore, the Influential usually responds to the test cases under consideration (see table eighteen, page 311) by indicating Iran will not announce what approach it will take and/or by suggesting Iran can not show self restraint. Such responses can be interpreted differently -- more cooperatively to some and less so to others. As for relations with the U.S., talks or relations are neither accepted nor rejected. Talks may be possible if the U.S. exhibits some sort of goodwill or meets certain conditions. Furthermore, with regard to the first three test cases (i.e. escort of Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq war, destruction of oil platforms 1987, and destruction of oil platforms 1988), the Influential's predisposed preferences may not be meaningful, if those this leader is trying to lead consider these incidents important. In that case, the Influential uses these issues to exert and/or develop his leadership position.
Organization of Government. The Influential will seek to alleviate tensions with competitors. They may not be sympathizers but they can indirectly help such a leader maintain his position. However, those who become hostile adversaries can not be tolerated. Thus, the Influential wants enough freedom of expression in those areas that keep everyone basically satisfied but not too much because it may threaten this leader's position.

With regard to the test cases under freedom of expression (see table nineteen, page 312), the actor with an Influential orientation will be more lenient in the areas of dress, role of parties, and the role of the press and less so with violators of the law and those who fled Iran. As for dress, it can not go unrestrained and some sort of dress code should be observed. Parties should be encouraged to develop. Yet this orientation is unlikely to be a proponent of freedom of speech. The press should not have to endorse the government position, although it should concentrate on the facts, as well as comply with self censorship in security related issues. With respect to those who fled, the Influential will indicate those who committed minor offenses may return. These four test cases are not especially meaningful to this orientation. If such issues can develop and/or enhance this leader's leadership position with those this actor leads, then this leader will clutch to their preferences. However, this is not the case with the other two test cases. The Influential
urges harsh action toward law violators. Minigroup members cause dissension and the Mojahedin are traitors. Anything less than a harsh reaction may call into question his leadership ability.

The political actor with an Influential orientation wants power centralized. Ultimately, such an orientation wants to take control. This inclines the Influential to maintain tight control over what is happening as well as not wanting to delegate too much authority. The Influential wants his group to be at the helm; otherwise they can not shape events. Consequently, with respect to the test cases under centralization (see table twenty, page 313), the Influential will urge the following positions. As for the role of free enterprise, which has little meaning to this orientation, the Influential will seek to placate both sides. Therefore, a middle position is taken -- public and private sectors need to work together. However, if this issue can enhance this leader's leadership position, then the Influential will espouse the position of those this leader leads (or would like to lead). With respect to the consolidation of the executive branch (or judicial), the Influential will desire centralization if this leader or his group gains by it. Otherwise the issue should be discussed. The armed forces should be merged, ideally into one great force under his control. In implementing its plans, the government should, at a minimum, only delegate ancillary responsibilities to the
people. Likewise in formulating the plans of the government, this orientation seeks, at most, to consult with certain groups -- those who can keep him in power. As for the last test case which represents the centralization posture the press should be consolidated.

**Mediator Integrator Orientation**

The political actor with the Mediator Integrator orientation wants himself (or his group) to be the "Grand Arbitrator". Attempts to bring about peaceful settlements or compromises between disputing parties through the interaction of a neutral party (i.e. his group or himself) is his overriding goal. Situations, therefore, are viewed as either resolvable or nonresolvable. In seeking to play this role, such a leader defines others by the situation of whether it is one which welcomes mediation or it is one with impenetrable conflict (see table fourteen, page 258). In other words, are those in the conflict ready and willing to receive an intermediary to reconcile differences or is the door still shut? If the door is open, then, the Mediator Integrator will, himself, or via a neutral organization, seek to intervene in the dispute with an intent to settle it equitably with favorable results. However, if the door is closed, then this orientation will not offer his services or seek to mediate the conflict.

The leader with a Mediator Integrator orientation allows others to define the agenda. Such a leader has a
predisposition to not take sides and not be overly vocal about his position on various issues or matters. Therefore, the Mediator Integrator seeks consensus through compromise among those groups to which this leader is accountable. The Mediator Integrator is not averse to changing his position if consensus has been attained. Within the Iranian context, as illustrated in table fifteen (page 261), the Mediator Integrator considers himself accountable to those who support the regime. This will include the Moderates and Radicals, as well as groups like the Freedom Movement. Thus, especially on those issues of unsuccessful categorization, the Mediator Integrator's predisposed schemas are not likely to be activated. On such issues of little meaning, this orientation is likely to express the positions of the Backers of the Revolution.

Relations With Other Nations. The political actor with a Mediator Integrator orientation is not inclined to employ hostile means in his relations with other nations. Such acts will inhibit this leader from playing the peacemaker role in the international arena. Cooperative behavior, not conflictual behavior, is the way to relate to other nations.

With regard to the test cases under aggressiveness (see table sixteen, page 309), we would generally expect the Mediator Integrator not to urge the use of force or even hostile action. The Mediator Integrator desires such a position because this orientation wants to be the peacemaker
and Iran will not be able to take on this role by initiating or responding in a hostile manner. With the test cases of response to the 1987 U.N. Resolution, Rushdie edict, Western hostages, Palestinians, and invasion of Iraq, these are incidents in which two unrelenting forces are at a standstill. With such a deadlock, settlement is not possible at this point. Such issues, therefore, are not very meaningful to the Mediator Integrator since it is not open to mediation among the conflicting parties. Thus, for instance with the Allied invasion of Iraq, the Mediator Integrator may condemn both sides as well as be content to wait and see what happens. The conflict is impenetrable and neither side wants negotiation.

Since the actor with a Mediator Integrator orientation wants to be the "Great Arbitrator" who does not take sides, such an orientation will generally favor moderate autonomy for his nation. Activities which may result in making this leader's nation too dependent on certain entities will be avoided. This is advocated because if this leader's nation becomes too dependent, his nation can no longer play the role of impartial mediator. Nevertheless, the Mediator Integrator will be willing to give up some autonomy so his government can work together with other entities to maintain and develop positive relations.

With regard to the test cases under autonomy (see table seventeen, page 310), the Mediator Integrator will not be willing to give up too much of Iran's independence.
Therefore, such an orientation will urge relying on Iranians instead of using foreign experts/investments. Foreign experts/investments may be used as long as there are no negative side effects. With foreign loans, the Mediator Integrator takes a harder stand. It depends on the circumstance, but generally, this orientation may reject them. Concomitantly, the Mediator Integrator will suggest the primacy of agricultural development over industrial development and possibly a combination of both. The Mediator Integrator, in order to develop and preserve relations with other nations, supports international laws/institutions. This orientation is concerned about world opinion and will not favor rejecting international institutions and laws. Likewise, this orientation desires relations with Western nations and wants ties with Egypt and most other regional states. However, with the case of Egypt, it is a less relevant issue for the Mediator Integrator. Since this orientation seeks to be even handed, pushing for relations may signal to others that Iran is no longer impartial.

The political actor with the Mediator Integrator orientation is not likely to be exceedingly vocal regarding his preference with respect to involvement with the U.S. since relations during this time were at a standstill. As for the U.S. escorting the Kuwaiti tankers (see table eighteen, page 311), the Mediator Integrator does not favor a reprisal and possibly may even suggest the U.S. was pulled into the
situation by others since Kuwait asked for such assistance. With the attack on the oil platforms, this orientation embraces a slightly harder position but not one of supporting retaliation. As for the airbus downing, the Mediator Integrator will urge showing no restraint. This leader takes a more hostile position in this case because the U.S. killed a number of innocent civilians and recently attacked Iranian oil platforms. As for relations with the U.S., the Mediator Integrator will not rule out talks or relations but may insist the U.S. should leave us alone or the U.S. will have to show some goodwill before relations become possible. With regard to the Gulf crisis, the Mediator Integrator condemns both sides since neither side desires mediation.

Three of the test cases (destruction of oil platforms in 1987, destruction of oil platforms in 1988, and airbus downing) are not meaningful to this orientation. In each case, blatantly belligerent acts by the United States make it quite apparent that the United States is not concerned with settling the problems between the United States and Iran. Thus, the Mediator Integrator has no reason to consider such cases as relevant.

Organisation of Government. The leader with a Mediator Integrator orientation strives to bring about settlement or compromise between those disputing parties who support the regime. Conflicts among the supporters of the regime are seemingly reconcilable. Ironically, this orientation has
little concern for those who do not support the regime. They cause conflict that is irreconcilable and the Mediator Integrator can not tolerate that sort of conflict. Thus, the Mediator Integrator wants sufficient freedom of expression so as to be aware of regime supporter's preferences. Therefore, this leader tends to take a moderate approach with respect to freedom of expression.

With regard to our test cases (see table nineteen, page 312), the Mediator Integrator within the Iranian context, in embracing a middle position between the various supporters of the regime, favors a high degree of freedom of expression. Inherently though, this orientation is not an extreme proponent of issues regarding freedom of expression. Thus, on all the test cases except Khomeini's decision to execute the Mojahedin, the Mediator Integrator urges freedom of expression. The decision to execute the Mojahedin, and even those who assist them, is encouraged. The Mojahedin have been at war with the supporters of the regime and their actions cannot be tolerated. However, this issue is not meaningful to the Mediator Integrator since the conflict between the Mojahedin and the supporters of the regime is unlikely to be resolved via mediation. If some of the supporters of the regime propose the differences can be resolved, then the Mediator Integrator, like these supporters, may desire a reconsideration of the decision to execute the Mojahedin.
The political actor with a Mediator Integrator orientation desires decentralization of control. The Mediator Integrator's view of a leadership position is one in which this leader does not have to be in the driver's seat. Such an orientation finds it relatively easy to delegate authority and power to others as long as they are regime supporters. This is because this leader's main job is to prevent conflict and disagreement from escalating. It is this main job that also results in the issues of centralization-decentralization of power as becoming less meaningful to this orientation. Nevertheless, as shown in table twenty (page 313), with the test cases under centralization, this orientation, of all the orientations, will advocate the greatest amount of decentralization.

Opportunist Orientation

The Opportunist is the ultimate rationalist. As indicated in tables fourteen (page 258) and fifteen (page 261), this orientation strives to take advantage of opportunities for gain and avoid situations that may result in loss. The leader with an Opportunist orientation views others according to whether they support the position of those to which the Opportunist is accountable or whether they support a different position. Thus, for each situation, other than those to which the Opportunist is accountable, those who fall into these two categories may change. In other words, the Opportunist seeks to promote the well-being of the group to
which this leader is accountable by discovering with each issue who supports his group's position and who does not.

Of all the orientations, the Opportunist is least likely to have a position on the various issues. The Opportunist's position mirrors that of the constituents to which this leader is accountable. If they have a position and there is no disagreement among them, then this orientation embraces the position. Preferably, the Opportunist wants extensive support from those this leader answers to before the Opportunist will act. If there is disagreement, such a leader will seek a compromise or, if need be, gloss over differences. Therefore, to extrapolate the positions the Opportunist is likely to embrace, it is necessary to know the positions of the constituents to which the leader is accountable. In other words, this orientation does not possess predisposed schemas like the other five orientations.

Based on the extensive background analysis of Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani in chapters three and four, I am proposing that each one is accountable to a certain group. Each can be linked to the following groups: Mohtashemi with the Radicals, Rafsanjani with the so called Moderates, Khamanei with both the Radicals and Moderates, and Montazeri with those who are Backers of the Revolution. Therefore, if any of these leaders are classified as an Opportunist, it is necessary to understand the positions of these various groups to ascertain the leaders' positions.
As can be ascertained from the discussion in chapters three and four, such a hypothesis puts one out on a limb. While most Iranian analysts would probably concur with Mohtashemi as a Radical and Rafsanjani as a Moderate, the classification of Khamanei and Montazeri may be questioned by some. However, one must remember that any hypothesis with these two is likely to be questioned by some. Furthermore, even if one assumes that the linkages of each cleric to a group is reasonable, other questions surface. Are some relationships stronger than others? Is it possible for a cleric to be linked to a different group according to the issue (i.e. test case) or even by posture? While these may be important questions (and only the results may shed some light on this), I am hypothesizing that if a leader is an Opportunist the relationship with the group this leader is accountable to is strong enough to predict this leader's preferences. Along with this, I am assuming the Opportunist is accountable to the same group, at least during the time of this study. Therefore, the following discussion outlines the likely positions each of the constituents (or groups) are likely to embrace.

The Radicals espouse no aversion to using hostile means, as well as advocate a high degree of autonomy, little involvement with the U.S., little freedom of expression, and centralization of power. Tables twenty-one through twenty-five (pages 314-318) outline the proposed positions the
Radicals are likely to favor on each of the test cases. Thus, the Opportunists who are accountable to the Radicals will advocate positions that are similar to the positions embraced by the Expansionist.

The so-called Moderates will espouse almost the opposite stance. The Moderates urge minimal use of aggressive acts, low autonomy, possible involvement with the U.S., moderate freedom of expression, and moderate centralization of power.

Tables twenty-one through twenty-five (pages 314-318) delineate the expected positions for each of the thirty-four test cases. The Moderates' positions for the foreign policy postures are similar to the Developmental.

The leader who is attempting to placate both the Moderates and Radicals is inclined to advocate a position in between the Moderates and Radicals. While this leader will propose a middle position, there is a tendency to lean toward the Moderates. This is because they are presently the significant powerholders. Nevertheless, the leader who is trying to please both the Moderates and Radicals espouses moderate aggressiveness, moderate autonomy, moderate involvement with the U.S., moderate-low freedom of expression, and moderate-high centralization of power. Tables twenty-one through twenty-five (pages 314-318) outline the expected positions on each of the test cases.

The Backers of the Revolution are comprised of not only the Radicals and Moderates but also the groups that have not
been deemed traitors of the state, such as the Freedom Movement. The Opportunist who is linked to this group desires to promote the well being of the Backers of the Revolution. In the international arena, this results in proposing low-moderate aggressiveness, moderate autonomy, and moderate involvement with the United States. However, in the domestic arena this leader will favor a high degree of freedom of expression and decentralization. Tables twenty-one through twenty-five (pages 314-318) depict the positions expected.

Political Postures of the Orientations

Tables sixteen through twenty-five (pages 309-318) provide the anticipated scores for each orientation on the thirty-four test cases utilizing the five point scale provided in Appendix A. The thirty-four test cases have been divided into the five postures. The test cases within each posture are proposed to be indicators of that political posture. Thus, tables sixteen through twenty (pages 309-313) depict the postures aggressiveness, autonomy, involvement with the U.S., freedom of expression, and centralization respectively for the Expansionist, Active Independent, Developmental, Influential, and Mediator Integrator. Tables twenty-one through twenty-five (pages 314-318) display the predicted postures for the Opportunist orientation in regard to the four associated groups (Radicals, Moderates, Radicals/Moderates, and Backers of the Revolution).
What do the numbers for each test case mean in the various tables sixteen through twenty-five? Appendix A specifies exactly, for each test case, what the numbers represent. As can be ascertained from glancing at Appendix A, in tables sixteen and twenty-one, which relate to the degree of aggressiveness posture, a score of one refers to a highly aggressive preference while a score of five reflects a less aggressive preference. In tables seventeen and twenty-two, which relate to the degree of autonomy posture, a score of one reflects a highly autonomous preference while a score of five refers to a less autonomous preference. In tables eighteen and twenty-three, which depict the degree of involvement with the United States posture, a score of one reflects a preference for little involvement and hostile action toward the U.S. while a score of five refers to possible involvement and less hostile action. These tables represent the foreign policy test cases. The last twelve test cases deal with domestic policy issues. In tables nineteen and twenty-four, which relate to the degree of freedom of expression posture, a score of one reflects a preference for little freedom of expression while a score of five refers to some degree of freedom of expression. In tables twenty and twenty-five, which relate to the degree of centralization posture, a score of one means a preference for centralization of power while a score of five prefers less centralization.
Within tables sixteen through twenty, the reader may notice after the expected score for an orientation on a test case a Y (yes) or N (no) is noted. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter each orientation is predisposed to a certain classification of situations and a particular classification of others. In some cases the issue is relevant and can be conceptualized by the orientation's cognitive structure. In that case, the test case is meaningful or relevant. This is denoted with the Y (yes). However, for some issues, this is not the case. Since the case does not fit the schemata to which the orientation is predisposed, it has been hypothesized the best predictor of the position taken is the position taken by those who influence the orientation (see table fifteen, page 261).

The exact point predictions of the Radicals, Moderates, Radicals/Moderates, and those who support the regime (i.e. Backers of the Revolution) are furnished in tables twenty-one to twenty-five. The same interpretation of the numbers in each of these tables is equally relevant to the Opportunist orientation. However, since the Opportunist's preferences are based on the preferences of the group to which this orientation is accountable, the meaningful distinction is not applicable.

Before further explanation of the tables, which represent each of the postures, is undertaken, we must deal with the question: why be concerned with postures at all, since the
above discussion predicted to specific test cases? Instead of comparing the "expected" postures with the "exhibited" postures, a comparison can be made on a point to point basis (i.e. "expected" response on a particular test case to the "exhibited" response on that test case). However, it is not reasonable to assume that any single "exhibited" policy preference can be predicted from the orientation since the orientation is a generalized tendency to behave in a certain manner. One may not demonstrate orientation relevant preferences in every situation or on different occasions in the same situation. That is, one can not anticipate that an orientation can predict to one particular test case. The test case may not be a valid indicator of that posture. Thus, as Epstein (1982; 1980; 1979) argues, and as his studies and Jaccard's (1974) research supports, behavior, or in the case of this study policy preferences, should be averaged over a sample of situations and/or occasions. This multiple-act criteria is an appropriate behavioral measure when attempting prediction on the basis of some general construct.

Within each of these tables, a mean, standard deviation, and mode for each orientation has been provided. For the lower the score the following is favored by the orientation: more aggression, higher autonomy, minimal involvement with as well as more hostile action toward the United States, little freedom of expression, and centralization of power. The mean and standard deviation indicate, in quantitative terms, the
position the orientation is generally expected to favor along with the amount of variability, based on the sample test cases utilized.

Within tables sixteen through twenty-five, below the mean and standard deviation scores, the mode is also furnished. This score is the value that occurs with the greatest frequency. It is the most probable value for that posture since it is the most numerous. The modal category is noteworthy since within each of the postures a small number of test cases have been employed to represent the posture. Thus, the mean score, which is very sensitive to extreme values, may be a less useful measure of the orientation's expected posture.

Within tables sixteen through twenty-two other aspects merit attention. One aspect relates to the standard deviation score for each orientation within each table. Such a score furnishes us with an indication of how sensitive the leader with such an orientation is expected to be to the context. The Active Independent orientation tends to exhibit a higher standard deviation than the other orientations in most of the five postures. In all the postures, except degree of involvement with the United States (see table eighteen), the standard deviation for the Active Independent is one or greater. In other words, a leader with such an orientation is expected to show the greatest range of variation in his
preferences or advocacy statements when compared to leaders with any of the other orientations.

A second aspect relates to the "meaningfulness" distinction. The Y (yes) or N (no) following each of the range numbers indicates whether the case is likely to be meaningful to the orientation. If the test case is not likely to be significant to the orientation, then the orientation may be influenced by others to urge a particular position. Table fifteen has outlined those who are most likely to influence the orientations. Therefore, it may be necessary to know the preferences of certain groups within the Iranian context. This has been worked out in the discussion of the Opportunist (see tables twenty-one through twenty-five). Of interest, nevertheless, the leaders with a Mediator Integrator or Influential orientation, as compared to the Expansionist, Active Independent, and Developmental, are hypothesized to consider a number of the cases of this study unmeaningful or inapplicable to their cognitive structure of the world. This would suggest that these two orientations are the most likely of the five to be influenced in their preferences by those who they identify with or to which they are associated.

Before concluding this chapter, one caveat should be mentioned. When I began formulating the hypothesis outlined in this chapter, I was not totally ignorant of the Iranian personalities, policies, and context. This knowledge may possibly contaminate the hypotheses. This concern relates not
only to this study but any retrospective study of events in
which the researcher has prior knowledge. I have, however, in
an effort to check for such taintedness, asked and received
feedback regarding the reasonableness of my extrapolations
from the originator of the personality typology used in this
endeavor, Margaret G. Hermann. While this does not make the
possible contamination concern disappear, it is an attempt to
grapple with this issue.

This chapter has focused upon explaining how the Hermann
framework has been utilized. In order to extrapolate the five
postures of concern for each of the orientations, a
preliminary step was taken. Utilizing the five point scale in
Appendix A, the orientation's most likely range of response
was proposed for each test case. Based on these results, the
five political postures for each orientation can be
ascertained.

With the linkage between orientation and "expected"
political postures, as well as the specific test cases,
defined, we are ready to ascertain the results of the
independent variable, personality, and the dependent
variables, postures. In other words, what are the
orientations of Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and
Rafsanjani and what postures have they embraced? This is the
concern of the next chapter.
**TABLE 16: Degree of Aggressiveness -- Expected Position for Each Orientation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test case</th>
<th>Orientation*</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exp</td>
<td>Inf</td>
<td>A/I</td>
<td>M/I</td>
<td>Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export revolution</td>
<td>1-2 N</td>
<td>3-4 N</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
<td>3-5 Y</td>
<td>3-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response to UN resolution</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>3-5 Y</td>
<td>4-5 N</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecca incident</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>3-5 Y</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of UN resolution</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>3-4 N</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rushdie edict</td>
<td>1-3 N</td>
<td>4-5 N</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
<td>3-5 N</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western hostages</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>3-4 N</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
<td>3-5 N</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
<td>5 N</td>
<td>5 N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>3-4 N</td>
<td>3 Y</td>
<td>3 N</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard deviation</strong></td>
<td><strong>.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mode</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,2</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** A score of 1 reflects a highly aggressive preference (see Appendix A) or posture while a score of 5 refers to a less aggressive preference or posture. For all the orientations with regard to the test cases under aggressiveness the grand mean is 3.27 and the standard deviation is 1.04. For the Opportunist orientation's scores see table 21.

* Exp = Expansionist, A/I = Active Independent, Dev = Developmental, Inf = Influential, and M/I = Mediator Integrator. The numbers under each orientation are the range that orientation is expected to prefer for the test case. The Y (yes) or N (no) following each of the range numbers indicates whether the case is likely to be meaningful to the orientation.
TABLE 17: Degree of Autonomy -- Expected Position for Each Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test case</th>
<th>Exp</th>
<th>A/I</th>
<th>M/I</th>
<th>Inf</th>
<th>Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign experts/ investments</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
<td>5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign loans</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five year plan</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>2-3 Y</td>
<td>3 N</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International rules</td>
<td>1-3 N</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
<td>3-5 Y</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumas visit</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
<td>3-5 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1-3 N</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
<td>4-5 N</td>
<td>3 N</td>
<td>3 N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither East nor West</td>
<td>1-2 N</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A score of 1 reflects a highly autonomous preference (see Appendix A) or posture while a score of 5 refers to a less autonomous preference or posture. For all the orientations with regard to the test cases under autonomy the mean is 3.30 and the standard deviation is 1.04. For the Opportunist orientation's scores see table 22.

* Exp = Expansionist, A/I = Active Independent, Dev = Developmental, Inf = Influential, and M/I = Mediator Integrator. The numbers under each orientation are the range that orientation is expected to prefer for the test case. The Y (yes) or N (no) following each of the range numbers indicates whether the case is likely to be meaningful to the orientation.
### TABLE 18: Degree of Involvement With the United States -- Expected Position for Each Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation*</th>
<th>Test case</th>
<th>Exp</th>
<th>A/I</th>
<th>Inf</th>
<th>M/I</th>
<th>Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Escort of Kuwaiti tankers</td>
<td>1-2 Y 2-3 Y 2-3 N 4-5 Y 4-5 N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of oil platform 1987</td>
<td>1-3 Y 2-3 Y 3-4 N 3-4 N 4-5 N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of oil platform 1988</td>
<td>1-3 Y 2-3 Y 3-4 N 3-4 N 4-5 N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airbus downing</td>
<td>1-2 Y 1-2 Y 2-3 Y 2-3 N 4-5 N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation with U.S.</td>
<td>1-2 Y 2-3 Y 3-4 Y 3-4 Y 4-5 Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. presence in the Gulf, August</td>
<td>1-2 Y 2-3 Y 3 Y 3 Y 4-5 Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. presence in the Gulf, Sept/Oct</td>
<td>1-2 Y 1-3 Y 2-3 Y 3 Y 4-5 N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1.6 2.3 3.0 3.4 4.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>.2 .4 .5 .6 .0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>1,2 2 3 3 4,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** A score of 1 reflects a preference (see Appendix A) or posture for little involvement with and hostile action toward the U.S. while a score of 5 refers to possible involvement with and less hostile action toward the U.S. For all the orientations with regard to the test cases under involvement the mean is 2.95 and the standard deviation is 1.02. For the Opportunist orientation's scores see table 23.

* See table 17 for explanation of abbreviations in this table.
TABLE 19: Degree of Freedom of Expression -- Expected Position for Each Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test case</th>
<th>Exp</th>
<th>Dev</th>
<th>Inf</th>
<th>A/I</th>
<th>M/I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic dress</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
<td>3-4 N</td>
<td>5 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation/role of parties</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>4 N</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of press</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>3-4 N</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khomeini's pardon of mini-group members</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khomeini's decision to execute Mojahedin</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>3 N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment of those who fled</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>2-3 Y</td>
<td>2-3 N</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard deviation</strong></td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mode</strong></td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** A score of 1 reflects a preference (see Appendix A) or posture for little freedom of expression while a score of 5 refers to some freedom of expression. For all the orientations with regard to the test cases under involvement the mean is 2.92 and the standard deviation is 1.18. For the Opportunist orientation's scores see table 24.

* Exp = Expansionist, A/I = Active Independent, Dev = Developmental, Inf = Influential, and M/I = Mediator Integrator. The numbers under each orientation are the range that orientation is expected to prefer for the test case. The Y (yes) or N (no) following each of the range numbers indicates whether the case is likely to be meaningful to the orientation.
TABLE 20: Degree of Centralization -- Expected Position for Each Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test case</th>
<th>Exp</th>
<th>Inf</th>
<th>A/I</th>
<th>Dev</th>
<th>M/I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of free enterprise</td>
<td>1-3 N</td>
<td>2-4 N</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
<td>3-4 Y</td>
<td>3-5 N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation of executive</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>3-4 N</td>
<td>4-5 N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merger of armed forces</td>
<td>1-2 N</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>2-4 Y</td>
<td>3-4 N</td>
<td>5 N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of government plans</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>4-5 N</td>
<td>5 N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulation of government plans</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>1-3 Y</td>
<td>4-5 Y</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>4-5 N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly of the press</td>
<td>1-2 N</td>
<td>1-2 Y</td>
<td>2-4 Y</td>
<td>3-4 N</td>
<td>4-5 N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average                               1.7  2.1  2.9  3.3  4.6
Standard deviation                      .3   .5  1.1  1.0  .4
Mode                                    1,2  2   2-4  4   5

Note: A score of 1 reflects a preference (see Appendix A) or posture for centralization of power while a score of 5 refers to less centralization or decentralization of power. For all the orientations with regard to the test cases under involvement the mean is 2.93 and the standard deviation is 1.13. For the Opportunist orientation's scores see table 25.

* Exp = Expansionist, A/I = Active Independent, Dev = Developmental, Inf = Influential, and M/I = Mediator Integrator. The numbers under each orientation are the range that orientation is expected to prefer for the test case. The Y (yes) or N (no) following each of the range numbers indicates whether the case is likely to be meaningful to the orientation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test case</th>
<th>Radicals</th>
<th>Moderates</th>
<th>Radicals/ Moderates</th>
<th>Backers of Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Export revolution</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response to UN resolution</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecca incident</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of UN resolution</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rushdie edict</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western hostages</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard deviation</strong></td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mode</strong></td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** A score of 1 reflects a highly aggressive preference (see Appendix A) or posture while a score of 5 refers to a less aggressive preference or posture. See table 16 for the scores for the other orientations with regard to the test cases under aggressiveness.

* The numbers under each group are the range that group is expected to prefer for the test case.
## TABLE 22: The Opportunist Orientation in the Iranian Context -- The Expected Position for Degree of Autonomy*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Case</th>
<th>Radicals</th>
<th>Moderates</th>
<th>Radicals/Moderates</th>
<th>Backers of Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign experts/investments</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign loans</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five year plan</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International rules</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumas visit</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither East nor West</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average**

Radicals: 1.6  
Moderates: 4.5  
Radicals/Moderates: 3.1  
Backers of Revolution: 4.1

**Standard Deviation**

Radicals: .2  
Moderates: .0  
Radicals/Moderates: .2  
Backers of Revolution: .2

**Mode**

Radicals: 1.2  
Moderates: 4.5  
Radicals/Moderates: 3  
Backers of Revolution: 4.5

**Note:** A score of 1 reflects a highly autonomous preference (see Appendix A) or posture while a score of 5 refers to a less autonomous preference or posture. See table 17 for the scores for the other orientations with regard to the test cases under autonomy.  
* The numbers under each group are the range that group is expected to prefer for the test case.
TABLE 23: The Opportunist Orientation in the Iranian Context --
The Expected Position for Degree of Involvement*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test case</th>
<th>Radicals</th>
<th>Moderates</th>
<th>Radicals/ Moderates</th>
<th>Backers of Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Escort of Kuwaiti tankers</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of oil platform</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of oil platform</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airbus downing</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation with U.S.</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. presence in the Gulf,</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. presence in the Gulf,</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept/Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A score of 1 reflects a preference (see Appendix A) or posture for little involvement with and hostile action toward the U.S. while a score of 5 refers to possible involvement with and less hostile action toward the U.S. See table 18 for the scores for the other orientations with regard to the test cases under involvement.

* The numbers under each group are the range that group is expected to prefer for the test case.
TABLE 24: The Opportunist Orientation in the Iranian Context --
The Expected Position for Degree of Freedom of Expression*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test case</th>
<th>Radicals</th>
<th>Moderates</th>
<th>Radicals/ Moderates</th>
<th>Backers of Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic dress</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation/ role of parties</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of press</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khomeini's pardon of mini-group members</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khomeini's decision to execute Mojahedin</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment of those who fled</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A score of 1 reflects a preference (see Appendix A) or posture for little freedom of expression while a score of 5 refers to some freedom of expression. See table 19 for the scores for the other orientations with regard to the test cases under freedom of expression.
* The numbers under each group are the range that group is expected to prefer for the test case.
### TABLE 25: The Opportunist Orientation in the Iranian Context -- The Expected Position for Degree of Centralization*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test case</th>
<th>Radicals</th>
<th>Moderates</th>
<th>Radicals/</th>
<th>Backers of Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of free enterprise</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation of executive</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merger of armed forces</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of government plans</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulation of government plans</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly of the press</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard deviation</strong></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mode</strong></td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** A score of 1 reflects a preference (see Appendix A) or posture for centralization of power while a score of 5 refers to less centralization or decentralization of power. See table 20 for the scores for the other orientations with regard to the test cases under centralization.

* The numbers under each group are the range that group is expected to prefer for the test case.
Footnotes

1. The hypotheses for each orientation are presented as a first order linear relationship. The relationship is expected to occur within the range specified. However, in certain circumstances, such as highly constraining situations (e.g. the Supreme Leader of Iran issues a decree), preferences are not expected to differ in substance, even though there is likely to be differences in style and manner. In other words, in highly constraining situations, personality is less likely to have an impact on the policy preferences.

2. Researchers have created a number of terms to describe the cognitive structures individuals rely upon such as stereotypes (Hamilton 1979), scripts (Schank and Abelson 1977), operational codes (Holsti 1977), cognitive maps (Axelrod 1976), prototypes (Cantor and Mischel 1979), or schemas. Such researchers consider individuals as cognitive misers. It should be noted, within social psychology, two other perspectives are prevalent. One considers individuals as consistency seekers while the other describes people as naive scientists (see discussion by Fiske and Taylor 1984; Lau and Sears 1986).


4. Jaccard (1974) found in his examination of the relationship between dominance and self report of dominant behavior that prediction of any single behavior from personality was poor. Yet the personality measure correlated in the .60 range with the multiple-act criteria. Epstein discovered evidence for predicting from characteristics using this criteria.
CHAPTER VII
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

What are the personality profiles Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani present in their public statements? What are the political postures exhibited by each of these clerics? How effective is personality in predicting future political postures? Is the personality framework employed in this study useful for predicting future postures of the Iranian clerics? What other observations can we make? The focus of this chapter is to answer these questions.

Results

The first and second part of this section examines the personality characteristics and orientation scores for the four Iranian leaders. The third portion of this section (results) presents the preference and posture scores. A complete discussion of how the scores were obtained are provided in chapter five and Appendix B. Within that discussion, the way in which the scores are interpreted is presented. The fourth part discusses the accuracy of the personality predictions.
Trait Scores: Table twenty-six reports the standard scores on each of the characteristics for the four clerics of this study. The raw scores are supplied in the parentheses following each of the standard scores. The scores are standardized to a distribution with a mean of fifty and a standard deviation of ten. Thus, a score of sixty or more indicates the leader is high on a particular trait while a score of forty or less signifies the actor is unlikely to demonstrate this characteristic. A score between forty and sixty means his score is similar to the other three leaders and, therefore, does not denote an area that is characteristic or uncharacteristic. Nonetheless, the standard scores for each characteristic were based on the mean score and standard deviation for that characteristic across the four leaders. These means and standard deviations are listed in the last two columns of table twenty-six.

How are Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani different from each other with regard to the eight characteristics assessed? An examination of table twenty-six shows Mohtashemi as exhibiting higher standard scores than any of the other three on the following characteristics: nationalism (ethnocentrism), belief in ability to control events, need for affiliation, conceptual complexity, self confidence, and interpersonal emphasis (i.e. opposite of task emphasis). Of these, the one that may be the most surprising to some is the high score on conceptual complexity (i.e.
TABLE 26: Standard Scores on Personal Characteristics for Iranian Clerics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Montazeri (N=74)</th>
<th>Rafsanjani (N=80)</th>
<th>Khamanei (N=80)</th>
<th>Mohtashemi (N=52)</th>
<th>Mean actual score*</th>
<th>Standard deviation actual score*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>37(.40)</td>
<td>47(.43)</td>
<td>53(.45)</td>
<td>57(.46)</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief can control events</td>
<td>41(.51)</td>
<td>50(.58)</td>
<td>46(.55)</td>
<td>64(.69)</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for Power</td>
<td>39(.46)</td>
<td>44(.51)</td>
<td>60(.65)</td>
<td>54(.60)</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for Affiliation</td>
<td>57(.27)</td>
<td>40(.17)</td>
<td>43(.19)</td>
<td>58(.28)</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual Complexity</td>
<td>40(.49)</td>
<td>56(.60)</td>
<td>44(.52)</td>
<td>60(.63)</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust of Others</td>
<td>53(.53)</td>
<td>37(.43)</td>
<td>58(.56)</td>
<td>50(.51)</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Confidence</td>
<td>38(.63)</td>
<td>50(.78)</td>
<td>52(.80)</td>
<td>61(.91)</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Orientation</td>
<td>40(.49)</td>
<td>60(.51)</td>
<td>60(.51)</td>
<td>30(.48)</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This is for the four leaders of this study.

Note: The N's listed below the clerics denote the number of segments coded for the leader. The number in the parenthesis following the standard score is the raw score of the cleric for that characteristic.
degree of differentiation an individual shows when perceiving and cogitating one's environment). For the moment, however, further discussion of this characteristic will be deferred until later in this chapter.

In comparison to the other three clerics, Montazeri is less ethnocentric (or nationalistic) as well as lower in need for power, conceptual complexity, and self confidence. Montazeri has the largest number of low and high scores (five) on the characteristics analyzed and, therefore, stands out on these particular traits from the other three clerics. Rafsanjani is low in distrust of others and need for affiliation but high in task emphasis (or low in interpersonal emphasis). Khamanei is high in need for power and task orientation. Of the four clerics, he exhibits the most distrust of others.

Orientation Scores: In table twenty-seven the scores from the characteristics are combined to ascertain the scores for each cleric on each of the six orientations. (The formulae used to combine the characteristics are discussed and provided in chapter five. See footnote ten in chapter five for the exact formulae.) This table depicts the clerics' general orientation scores. That is, all the segments content analyzed for the eight traits are used. Tables twenty-eight through thirty-two, however, calculated the clerics scores based upon the international topic domain, domestic topic domain, post consolidation period, last political role, and
TABLE 27: Standard Scores on the General Orientations for Iranian Clerics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Montazeri (N=74)</th>
<th>Rafsanjani (N=80)</th>
<th>Khamanei (N=80)</th>
<th>Mohtashemi (N=52)</th>
<th>Mean actual score*</th>
<th>Standard deviation actual score*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunist</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrator</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For the four clerics of this study.

Note: The N's listed below the clerics denote the number of segments coded for the leader.
## TABLE 28: Standard Orientation Scores Within the International Topic Domain for the Four Iranian Clerics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Montazeri (N=28)</th>
<th>Rafsanjani (N=47)</th>
<th>Khamanei (N=41)</th>
<th>Mohtashemi (N=25)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunistic</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrator</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The N's listed below the leaders denote the number of segments coded in the international domain for each cleric.
TABLE 29: Standard Orientation Scores Within the Domestic Topic Domain for the Four Iranian Clerics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Montazeri (N=46)</th>
<th>Rafsanjani (N=33)</th>
<th>Khamanei (N=39)</th>
<th>Mohtashemi (N=27)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunist</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrator</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The N's listed below the leaders denote the number of segments coded in the domestic domain.
TABLE 30: Standard Orientation Scores in the Post-Consolidation Period for the Four Iranian Clerics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Montazeri (N=19)*</th>
<th>Rafsanjani (N=26)</th>
<th>Khamanei (N=30)</th>
<th>Mohtashemi (N=36)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunist</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrator</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The segments used to obtain the scores for Montazeri and Mohtashemi are the same segments employed to acquire the scores for these two in table 31, orientations in last role.

Note: The N's listed below the leaders denote the number of segments coded in the post-consolidation period.
### TABLE 31: Standard Orientation Scores in the Last Political Role for the Four Iranian Clerics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Montazeri (N=19)*</th>
<th>Rafsanjani (N=55)</th>
<th>Khamanei (N=60)</th>
<th>Mohtashemi (N=36)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunistic</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrator</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The segments used to obtain the scores for Montazeri and Mohtashemi are the same segments employed to acquire the scores for these two in table 30, orientations in post-consolidation period.

**Note:** The N's listed below the leaders denote the number of segments coded in the leader's last role.
### TABLE 32: Standard Orientation Scores Utilizing Interviews for the Four Iranian Clerics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Montazeri (N=40)</th>
<th>Rafsanjani (N=80)*</th>
<th>Khamanei (N=71)</th>
<th>Mohtashemi (N=39)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunist</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrator</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The orientation scores are the same as the general orientation scores since only interview segments were used for assessing this leader's characteristics.

**Note:** The N's listed below the leaders denote the number of interview segments coded.
interviews. Thus, for these only those segments which fit under the relevant criteria were employed when the orientation scores were calculated. The "N" below the leader's name denotes the number of segments utilized in ascertaining the various slices. Within tables twenty-seven through thirty-two, once again, standard scores are reported with a mean of fifty and a standard deviation of ten. As before, low refers to at least one standard deviation below the mean while high indicates at least one standard deviation above the mean.

How are the scores in tables twenty-seven through thirty-two interpreted? Let's look at table twenty-seven. This table reveals for two of the clerics -- Rafsanjani and Khamanei -- their personal characteristics combine to form one fairly distinct general orientation for each of the two. That is, only one of the orientations has a high score. Rafsanjani exhibits the Opportunistic orientation while Khamanei displays the Expansionist orientation. Furthermore, table twenty-seven discloses Khamanei is unlikely to demonstrate either the Opportunistic or Mediator Integrator orientations since his scores on these orientations are below one standard deviation from the mean.

However, in perusing the scores for Mohtashemi, we notice two orientations have scores of sixty or above -- Influential and Developmental. Additionally, he is not low in any of the other orientations. Montazeri, on the other hand, has no orientation with a score of more than one standard deviation
above the mean (i.e. sixty or higher). Two of the orientations -- Expansionist and Active Independent -- are unlikely to be exhibited since these orientations are not characteristic of him (i.e. standard scores are forty or below).

How are we to decide which orientation (or orientations) to consider as the one(s) which should be employed to predict the clerics' postures? In other words, what are the criteria for deciding which orientations are characteristic of the Iranian leaders? As stated in chapter five, Hermann (1987b:8,22-23) has supplied a number of rules on which a decision can be based. Based on these rules the following criteria are employed. 1) For each leader, note all the orientations with a score that is more than one standard deviation above the mean (sixty or higher). If only one orientation for a particular leader has a score of sixty or above, then that orientation is most typical of the leader and, therefore, will be the one employed to make predictions about the leader's future postures. 2) If the leader is high on two or more orientations, then the researcher must check how close these scores are to each other. If one of the scores is substantially higher than the other(s), that orientation is considered most characteristic of the leader. However, if the standard scores are tied or close, then the analyst will use those orientations in an effort to predict the leader's future postures. Of course, one becomes less
confident in the predictions since the predictions, as outlined in chapter six, will not always parallel each other. If possible, the researcher should subdivide the segments further, such as into topics, to see if an orientation is restricted to a certain set of these. 3) If no orientation score for a leader is one standard deviation or more above the mean, the researcher should note any scores above fifty-five. That orientation is then considered the one most characteristic of the leader. Albeit, the analyst will have less confidence in the predictions. If there are no scores above fifty-five, one can not assume that any of the orientations are typical of the leader.

As discussed in chapter five, five different hypotheses have been identified in an effort to predict from personality to future political postures. These hypotheses require us to ascertain and utilize the leader's standard orientation scores based upon the: 1) leader's general verbal statements (see table twenty-seven for orientation scores), 2) leader's international topic domain verbal materials for predicting to the future foreign policy postures (see table twenty-eight for orientation scores); and the leader's domestic topic domain statements for predicting to the future domestic policy postures (see table twenty-nine for orientation scores), 3) post consolidation phase, which is verbal materials after October 1984 (see table thirty for orientation scores), 4) leader's last political role -- Mohtashemi, Interior Minister;
Montazeri, designated Supreme Leader; Khamanei, President; Rafsanjani, Speaker of the Majlis (see table thirty-one for orientation scores), and 5) leader's spontaneous (i.e. interviews) verbal statements (see table thirty-two for orientation scores). For a more detailed discussion of these distinctions the reader should return to chapter five.

Thus, utilizing the criteria outlined above with the scores shown in tables twenty-seven through thirty-two, we can suggest which orientations are typical of each of the four Iranian clerics. Table thirty-three summarizes the orientations which are considered characteristic for the five hypotheses. Rows two and three of table thirty-three -- international and domestic topic domains -- are related to the second hypothesis which proposes the leader's orientation may differ in these areas. Our results suggest with three of the clerics this is the case. Nevertheless, table thirty-three indicates which orientations will be considered for predicting to the clerics' future postures. The discussion in chapter six provides the "expected" preferences for each of the orientations.

In perusing tables twenty-seven through thirty-two Montazeri scores above fifty-five on three orientations. They are the Mediator Integrator, Opportunist, and Developmental orientations. The Active Independent, Expansionist, and Influential orientations are usually low or close to one standard deviation below the mean. As a result, these three
### TABLE 33: Orientations Most Typical of the Four Iranian Clerics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Montazeri</th>
<th>Rafsanjani</th>
<th>Khamanei</th>
<th>Mohtashemi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) General orientation</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Opp</td>
<td>Exp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) International topic domain</td>
<td>Opp</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Exp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Domestic topic domain</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Dev</td>
<td>Exp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Post consolidation phase</td>
<td>Dev</td>
<td>Opp</td>
<td>Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Last political role</td>
<td>Dev</td>
<td>Opp</td>
<td>Exp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Spontaneous statements</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Opp</td>
<td>Exp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Exp = Expansionist, Dev = Developmental, AI = Active Independent, Inf = Influential, MI = Mediator Integrator, and Opp = Opportunist.
orientations are not typical of him. Rafsanjani, in the six tables, usually exhibits an Opportunist orientation while Khamanei, with one exception (see table thirty), displays the Expansionist orientation. On the other hand, Mohtashemi is high on four of the six orientations. While the Opportunist and Expansionist orientations are never high, often they are close. Furthermore, Mohtashemi never demonstrates a low score on any of the six orientations. Consequently, we would expect it to be somewhat more difficult to predict Mohtashemi's future postures.

Another way to look at table thirty-three is to discern for each political actor which orientation is generally the most typical. That is, which orientation does each of the clerics most often display in the various slices we have considered? Rafsanjani and Khamanei demonstrate the Opportunistic and Expansionist orientations in five out of the six. Montazeri exhibits the Mediator Integrator pattern in four out of the six. Mohtashemi, though, is not as straightforward. He displays the Influential and Active Independent orientations in four out of the six. However, if we rank order the various orientations in table thirty-three, we discover the Influential orientation is slightly higher. Thus, we could propose this orientation may be the best overall representation of Mohtashemi. Therefore, we can add a sixth hypothesis which suggests that the actors' future preferences can be discerned by considering the orientation
that usually is typically demonstrated by the leader. We would expect orientations of Influential, Mediator Integrator, Expansionist, and Opportunist to be useful predictors of the preferences and postures of Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani, respectively.

Posture Scores: Now that the predictions for each of the clerics have been discerned, the next step is to inspect the results of the dependent variable. What are the "exhibited" preferences of Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Rafsanjani, and Khamanei with regard to the thirty-four test cases of this study? In other words, what are the policy recommendations these clerics have made and what political postures do they embrace?

Tables thirty-four through thirty-eight furnish the "exhibited" scores for the four clerics on each of the test cases. (The leaders are arranged on each of these five tables in a relational manner based upon their exhibited scores.) These five tables show the scores for each of the five policy postures — aggressiveness, autonomy, involvement with the United States, freedom of expression, and centralization, respectively. The scores in these tables can range from one to five. Appendix A delineates precisely what each number represents.

For the aggressiveness posture, table thirty-four, a score of one reflects a highly aggressive preference or posture while a score of five denotes a less aggressive preference or posture. Not unexpectedly (based upon the
TABLE 34: Exhibited Scores for the Four Clerics on Each of the Test Cases Under Aggressiveness*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Cases</th>
<th>Moht</th>
<th>Kham</th>
<th>Rafs</th>
<th>Mont</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Export Revolution</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) 1987 U.N. Resolution</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Mecca incident</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Acceptance of U.N Resolution</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Implications of Rushdie edict</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Western hostages</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Support of Palestinians</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Allied invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Moht</th>
<th>Kham</th>
<th>Rafs</th>
<th>Mont</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Moht = Mohtashemi, Kham = Khamanei, Rafs = Rafsanjani, and Mont = Montazeri.

Note: Tables 34 through 38 have arranged the clerics from lowest to highest in their exhibited scores.
TABLE 35: Exhibited Scores for the Four Clerics on Each of the Test Cases Under Autonomy*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Cases</th>
<th>Moht</th>
<th>Mont</th>
<th>Kham</th>
<th>Rafs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Foreign experts/investments</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Foreign loans</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Five year plan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) International rules/institutions</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Dumas visit</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Relations with Egypt</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Neither East nor West</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0**</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>4.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Moht = Mohtashemi, Kham = Khamanei, Rafs = Rafsanjani, and Mont = Montazeri.

** Montazeri's response was in June 1988, while the responses for the other leaders were from the period 1989 to early 1990. As stated in chapter five, the test cases which related to certain issues were often reoccurring differences among the elites. For Montazeri, after the war no discussion of this issue could be found, therefore, responses were used that were expressed during the war. Obviously, as indicated in chapter three, the contextual situation was quite different during, as opposed to after, the war. One could even argue this is the case on a month to month, if not day to day, basis. While we must be aware of such a concern, this is one of the limitations of content analysis. Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter five, I believe for this endeavor the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Furthermore, throughout this chapter, the data were analyzed with and without those responses which did not correspond to the other leaders. It did not effect the results in any meaningful way.
TABLE 36: Exhibited Scores for the Four Clerics on Each of the
Test Cases Under Involvement With the United States*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Cases</th>
<th>Moht</th>
<th>Kham</th>
<th>Mont</th>
<th>Rafs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Escorting of Kuwaiti tankers</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Oil platforms 1987</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Oil platforms 1988</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Airbus downing</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Relations with U.S.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0**</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) U.S. presence in Gulf, August 1990</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) U.S. presence in Gulf, Sept/Oct, 1990</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean 1.00 2.10 3.25 4.21
Standard Deviation .00 .64 1.71 .91
Mode 1 2 1-5 5

* Moht = Mohtashemi, Kham = Khamanei, Rafs = Rafsanjani, and Mont = Montazeri.

** Montazeri's response was in June 1988, while the responses for the other leaders were from the period following the Iran-Iraq war to early 1990. As stated in chapter five, the test cases which related to certain issues were often reoccurring differences among the elites. For Montazeri, after the war no discussion of this issue could be found, therefore, responses were used that were expressed during the war. Obviously, as indicated in chapter three, the contextual situation was quite different during, as opposed to after, the war. One could even argue this is the case on a month to month, if not day to day, basis. While we must be aware of such a concern, this is one of the limitations of content analysis. Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter five, I believe for this endeavor the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Furthermore, throughout this chapter, the data were analyzed with and without those responses which did not correspond to the other leaders. It did not effect the results in any meaningful way.
### TABLE 37: Exhibited Scores for the Four Clerics on Each of the Test Cases Under Freedom of Expression*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Cases</th>
<th>Moht</th>
<th>Kham</th>
<th>Rafs</th>
<th>Mont</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Dress</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.0**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Parties</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Press</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Pardon of minigroup members</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Execution of Mojahedin</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Treatment of those who fled</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Moht = Mohtashemi, Kham = Khamanei, Rafs = Rafsanjani, and Mont = Montazeri.

** Montazeri's response was in June 1986, while the responses for the other leaders were from the period following the Iran-Iraq war to early 1990. As stated in chapter five, the test cases which related to certain issues were often reoccurring differences among the elites. For Montazeri, after the war no discussion of this issue could be found, therefore, responses were used that were expressed during the war. Obviously, as indicated in chapter three, the contextual situation was quite different during, as opposed to after, the war. One could even argue this is the case on a month to month, if not day to day, basis. While we must be aware of such a concern, this is one of the limitations of content analysis. Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter five, I believe for this endeavor the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Furthermore, throughout this chapter, the data were analyzed with and without those responses which did not correspond to the other leaders. It did not effect the results in any meaningful way.
TABLE 38: Exhibited Scores for the Four Clerics on Each of the Test Cases Under Centralization*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Cases</th>
<th>Moht</th>
<th>Rafs</th>
<th>Kham</th>
<th>Mont</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Free enterprise</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Consolidation of power</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Merging of security forces</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0**</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Implement plans</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Formulate plans</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Press</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean: 1.38  2.30  2.50  4.67  
Standard Deviation: .80  1.20  1.18  .82  
Mode: 1  2  1-4  5  

* Moht = Mohtashemi, Kham = Khamanei, Rafs = Rafsanjani, and Mont = Montazeri.

** Rafsanjani's response was in the Summer 1988, while the responses for the other leaders were from the period following the Iran-Iraq war to early 1991. As stated in chapter five, the test cases which related to certain issues were often reoccurring differences among the elites. For Rafsanjani, after the war no discussion of this issue could be found, therefore, responses were used that were expressed during the war. Obviously, as indicated in chapter three, the contextual situation was quite different during, as opposed to after, the war. One could even argue this is the case on a month to month, if not day to day, basis. While we must be aware of such a concern, this is one of the limitations of content analysis. Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter five, I believe for this endeavor the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Furthermore, throughout this chapter, the data were analyzed with and without those responses which did not correspond to the other leaders. It did not effect the results in any meaningful way.
discussion in chapters three and four), Mohtashemi prefers the most aggressive foreign policies. His typical response of one, as shown in table thirty-four, denotes Mohtashemi advocates seeking revenge and attacking Iran's enemies. Of the four clerics studied, Montazeri espouses the least aggressive responses. Often Montazeri proposes settling the issue in a nonhostile manner.

As for the autonomy posture, table thirty-five, a score of one reflects a highly autonomous (i.e. unilateral, go it alone) preference or posture while a score of five refers to a less autonomous (i.e. somewhat multilateral) preference or posture. Again, Mohtashemi urges unilateral action and desires relations only with pro-Iranian nations while Rafsanjani pushes for some multilateral activities which may include Eastern and Western nations. While Montazeri and Khamanei are in between the two, they also differ. Montazeri leans more toward Mohtashemi's position, although without the aggressive overtones. But like Mohtashemi, he prefers a more isolationist policy. For instance, his position on the issue of the meaning of "neither East nor West" is one of wanting to be left alone and in turn Iran will leave them alone. Khamanei, on the other hand, leans more toward Rafsanjani's position, although he urges ties only under certain conditions. Khamanei, like Montazeri, wants Iran to maintain its economic independence. Both of them reject foreign loans and are hesitant to rely on foreign experts and investments.
because an equitable relationship will not occur (see test cases of foreign experts/investments and five year plan).

With respect to the involvement with the United States posture, table thirty-six, a score of one indicates a preference or posture for little involvement with the United States and hostile action toward it while a score of five denotes possible involvement and less hostile action toward the United States. Of no surprise (see chapter four) is Mohtashemi's extreme hostile stance toward the United States or Rafsanjani's desire for possible relations with the United States as well as preferring less belligerent actions toward U.S. acts. Khamanei, even though he rejects relations with the U.S. and wants to respond to U.S. aggression in kind, unlike Mohtashemi, Khamanei does not seek any sort of hostile conflict with the United States. Montazeri's preferences seem to vary. On some of the issues, he has been very hostile toward the U.S. while in other circumstances, he has espoused the opposite.

With regard to the freedom of expression posture, table thirty-seven, a score of one indicates a preference or posture for few, if any, individual rights and freedoms while a score of five reflects a preference or posture for more individual rights and freedoms. Mohtashemi urges little freedom of expression while Montazeri advocates more freedom of expression. Even though Khamanei and Rafsanjani fall between these two, neither of these clerics are proponents of
individual civil liberties nor are they tolerant of other groups.

As for centralization of power, table thirty-eight, a score of one refers to a preference or posture for concentration or centralization of power while a score of five reflects less concentration, and possibly decentralization of power. Again, Mohtashemi advocates extreme centralization of control while Montazeri is at the other end pushing for decentralization. Rafsanjani tilts more toward centralization of power. Khamanei, as indicated by his modal score, is the most inconsistent of the four clerics on this posture.

Predicting Future Postures From Personality: Having presented the results of the independent variable, personality, and the dependent variables, postures, we can now seek to answer the question of how well did the personality framework perform in predicting future postures? Furthermore, we can discover which, if any, of the six hypotheses are better at predicting future postures? The following discussion pursues the answers to these questions.

In order to discern how well the embellished Hermann model is able to predict future postures, three different sets of scores are utilized. One score depicts the number of test cases correctly predicted over the total number of test cases considered. A second score takes chance into consideration. It shows how much better (or worse) than chance the predictions were. A third score indicates how accurate (or
inaccurate) the predictions were. Let us look at our first table -- table thirty-nine (page 351) -- as an illustrative example.

The first three rows of table thirty-nine show the three foreign policy postures -- aggressiveness, autonomy, and involvement with the U.S. The fractions displayed in these rows as well as in rows four, six, seven, eight, and ten denote the number of test cases correctly predicted over the total cases for that posture or set of postures. It indicates the number of hits over the number of hits plus misses. Thus, for Mohtashemi with an Influential orientation under column one (i.e. all cases) of the aggressiveness posture, three out of eight were predicted within the range specified by the extrapolations presented in chapter six. In other words, if the reader checks Mohtashemi's exhibited scores as shown in table thirty-four of this chapter (page 337) and compares these preferences with the expected positions for the Influential as outlined in table sixteen of chapter six (page 309), one will note for the aggressiveness posture, three of the exhibited responses fall within the expected range.

Row four sums the total for the foreign policy postures. Rows six and seven present the domestic postures, freedom of expression and centralization, respectively. In turn, row eight sums these two domestic postures. Finally row ten furnishes the total hits over hits plus misses for all five
postures when Mohtashemi is considered to possess an Influential orientation.

Within each of these rows three columns of numbers are shown. The first column -- all cases -- presents the proportion of correct predictions when the expected positions for that orientation are utilized. In table thirty-nine, in which Mohtashemi is considered an Influential, the predictions in tables sixteen through twenty of chapter six (pages 309-313) are employed.

However, in column two of table thirty-nine -- meaningful cases -- only the meaningful (or relevant) test cases for the Influential orientation are calculated. (As postulated in chapter six, some situations and other actors may not fit the orientation's predisposed schemas. When such a lack of fit occurs, the predisposed cognitive representation of reality will not be accessed.) If we return to table sixteen in chapter six (page 309), one will note for the aggressiveness posture that the leader with the Influential orientation will consider only three of these test cases as relevant to his schemas or cognitive representations of reality. Returning to row one of table thirty-nine (page 351), with the aggressiveness posture, we note all three test cases were correctly predicted. In other words, the predictions in table sixteen correspond to the exhibited scores presented in table thirty-four (page 337).
Column three of table thirty-nine shows the proportion of correct predictions when the meaningful test cases plus the preferences of those the orientation identifies with or is accountable to for the nonmeaningful test cases are utilized. The hypotheses presented in chapter six proposes Mohtashemi, as an Influential, will identify with the Radicals. Tables twenty-one through twenty-five (pages 314-318) outline the expected positions the Influential would likely embrace on the test cases which are not meaningful or relevant to the leader with this orientation.

The proportions we have been discussing up to this point do not provide us with any indication of the chance factor. The hit over hit plus miss score does not take into account chance. By chance alone one should obtain a correct prediction on a few of the test cases. Hence in rows five, nine, and eleven a score is furnished to put this in perspective for the international, domestic, and both domestic and international test cases, respectively. This score has been designated the amount of error reduced by utilizing the orientation (or model). The formula used to ascertain this score is as follows:

\[
\text{Amount of error reduced by orientation} = \left[ \frac{\text{proportion of chance agreement}}{\left(1 - \text{proportion of chance}ight)} - \frac{\text{proportion of observed agreement}}{\left(1 - \text{proportion of observed agreement}\right)} \right] \times 100
\]

Proportion of chance agreement is the amount of chance for those particular postures in regard to a particular
orientation. By chance alone, agreement should somewhat increase if the expected position for an orientation (see tables sixteen through twenty-five, pages 309-318) encompasses a larger range. For instance, if the prediction on the five point scale includes categories one through three, there is sixty percent chance of obtaining a score which is on target. Therefore, in order to take chance into consideration, for each of the test cases the amount of chance was calculated and summed over the postures of concern. This was then divided by the number of test cases to produce an average.

Proportion of observed agreement refers to the proportion of test cases which were correctly predicted utilizing a particular orientation. If we look at row ten and column three of table thirty-nine, twenty-three out of thirty-one of the cases were correctly predicted by the Influential orientation for Mohtashemi. Dividing twenty-three by thirty-one furnishes us with the proportion of observed agreement.

This formula provides us with the amount of error reduced (or increased) by utilizing the personality model. A score of zero indicates the model does no better than chance. A positive score denotes the percentage of those cases which the model correctly predicts over and above those that would be predicted by chance. For instance, if we correctly predict seven out of ten cases and chance is forty percent, then the amount of error reduced by the model is fifty percent. If the
model's predictions are below chance, then a negative number results.

The third score employed in our results, the accuracy score, seeks to ascertain how well the model performed in its predictions. It takes into consideration how far off predictions were from the hypothesized optimum score. These accuracy scores are in parentheses following the fractions in each of the tables. The formula used for these accuracy scores is as follows:

\[
\text{Accuracy Score} = 1 - \left[ \frac{|A-P|}{GPIR_{\text{case 1}}} + \frac{|A-P|}{GPIR_{\text{case 2}}} + \ldots \right] / N \text{ cases}
\]

The "A" stands for the actual score while the "P" denotes the predicted score. The "N" indicates the number of test cases. The greatest possible inaccuracy range (GPIR) is calculated by subtracting the worst possible score from the best possible score. For example, suppose a score of four or five is the hypothesized score for a particular orientation on a specific test case. These two scores are recoded to four and one-half. The other three scores would remain the same. A score of one would not only be a miss but the worst possible score expected. For this example the GPIR would be three and one-half (four and one-half minus one).

The accuracy scores range from zero to one. A score of one indicates the predicted and actual scores were in agreement for the test cases under consideration. A score of zero refers to the lack of agreement between predicted and
actual scores. More importantly, the zero score indicates the misses were off by the greatest possible amount. Thus, in regard to our example above, if all the test case scores were one, this would result in an accuracy score of zero.

Now that we have outlined the three types of scores to be utilized, let us see which of the orientations for each cleric did the best at predicting. As table thirty-three (page 334) indicates, depending upon the hypotheses, a different orientation may be considered the typical one. In some cases, more than one orientation was to be considered. Tables thirty-nine through forty-three present the findings. Those orientations which had extremely low accuracy scores or did not perform better than chance in its predictions were not included.

As table thirty-three (page 334) shows, Mohtashemi was high on four orientations -- Active Independent, Mediator Integrator, Developmental, and Influential. Of these four orientations, only the Influential orientation, performed better than chance. However, as table thirty-nine indicates, this was only in certain areas. Within the meaningful cases, a major difference is noted in the international and domestic postures. The international predictions were less than chance (note negative score in the amount of error reduced by orientation) and the accuracy score was low (.32). On the other hand, the opposite occurred with regard to the domestic postures. Moving to column three of table thirty-nine, which
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 39: Mohtashemi with an Influential Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Aggressiveness*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Autonomy*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Involvement with the U.S.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) International postures*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Amount of error reduced by orientation -- international postures**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Freedom of expression*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Centralization*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Domestic postures*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Amount of error reduced by orientation -- domestic postures**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Domestic and international postures*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Amount of error reduced by orientation**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The fractions displayed in the rows indicating the postures are the number of hits over the number of hits plus misses. In the parentheses following the fractions are accuracy scores, ranging from zero to one, which depict the extent to which the predictions were on target. A score of zero indicates the predictions were off by the maximum possible while a score of one denotes the predictions were on target.

** A score of zero indicates the orientations do no better than chance. A positive score denotes the percentage of those cases which the orientations correctly predict over and above those that would be predicted by chance alone. A negative percentage denotes the orientations performed worse than chance.
**TABLE 40: Montazeri with a Mediator Integrator Orientation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1) Aggressiveness*</th>
<th>All cases</th>
<th>Meaningful cases</th>
<th>Meaningful &amp; Those identify with cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5/5 (1.00)</td>
<td>3/3 (1.00)</td>
<td>5/5 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Autonomy*</td>
<td>4/7 (.69)</td>
<td>4/6 (.76)</td>
<td>4/7 (.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Involvement with the U.S.*</td>
<td>3/4 (.86)</td>
<td>2/2 (1.00)</td>
<td>3/4 (.75)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 4) International postures* | 12/16 (.83) | 9/11 (.87) | 12/16 (.81) |

| 5) Amount of error reduced by orientation -- international postures** | 55.5% | 65.5% | 51.2% |

| 6) Freedom of expression* | 5/6 (.83) | 5/5 (1.00) | 6/6 (1.00) |

| 7) Centralization* | 5/6 (.92) | NA | 5/6 (.92) |

| 8) Domestic postures* | 10/12 (.88) | 5/5 (1.00) | 11/12 (.96) |

| 9) Amount of error reduced by orientation -- domestic postures** | 73.6% | 100% | 86.5% |

| 10) Domestic and international postures* | 22/28 (.85) | 14/16 (.91) | 23/28 (.87) |

| 11) Amount of error reduced by orientation** | 63.9% | 77.3% | 67.9% |

* The fractions displayed in the rows indicating the postures are the number of hits over the number of hits plus misses. In the parentheses following the fractions are accuracy scores, ranging from zero to one, which depict the extent to which the predictions were on target. A score of zero indicates the predictions were off by the maximum possible while a score of one denotes the predictions were on target. NA stands for not applicable.

** A score of zero indicates the orientations do no better than chance. A positive score denotes the percentage of those cases which the orientations correctly predict over and above those that would be predicted by chance alone. A negative percentage denotes the orientations performed worse than chance.
**TABLE 41: Montazeri with an Opportunist Orientation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Backers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1) Aggressiveness</strong></td>
<td>5/5 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2) Autonomy</strong></td>
<td>3/7 (.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3) Involvement with the U.S.</strong></td>
<td>3/4 (.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4) International postures</strong></td>
<td>11/16 (.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5) Amount of error reduced by orientation -- international postures</strong></td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6) Freedom of expression</strong></td>
<td>6/6 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7) Centralization</strong></td>
<td>5/6 (.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8) Domestic postures</strong></td>
<td>11/12 (.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9) Amount of error reduced by orientation -- domestic postures</strong></td>
<td>87.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10) Domestic and international postures</strong></td>
<td>21/28 (.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11) Amount of error reduced by orientation</strong></td>
<td>60.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The fractions displayed in the rows indicating the postures are the number of hits over the number of hits plus misses. In the parentheses following the fractions are accuracy scores, ranging from zero to one, which depict the extent to which the predictions were on target. A score of zero indicates the predictions were off by the maximum possible while a score of one denotes the predictions were on target.

** A score of zero indicates the orientations do no better than chance. A positive score denotes the percentage of those cases which the orientations correctly predict over and above those that would be predicted by chance alone. A negative percentage denotes the orientations performed worse than chance.
### TABLE 42: Khamanei with an Expansionist Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Posture Type</th>
<th>All cases</th>
<th>Meaningful cases</th>
<th>Meaningful &amp; those identify with cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Aggressiveness*</td>
<td>4/8 (.70)</td>
<td>4/6 (.86)</td>
<td>6/8 (.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Autonomy*</td>
<td>3/7 (.58)</td>
<td>3/4 (.86)</td>
<td>6/7 (.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Involvement with the U.S.*</td>
<td>6/7 (.94)</td>
<td>6/7 (.94)</td>
<td>6/7 (.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) International postures*</td>
<td>13/22 (.74)</td>
<td>13/17 (.89)</td>
<td>18/22 (.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Amount of error reduced by orientation -- international postures**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Freedom of expression*</td>
<td>5/6 (.93)</td>
<td>5/6 (.93)</td>
<td>5/6 (.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Centralization*</td>
<td>3/6 (.75)</td>
<td>3/3 (1.00)</td>
<td>6/6 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Domestic postures*</td>
<td>8/12 (.84)</td>
<td>8/9 (.95)</td>
<td>11/12 (.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Amount of error reduced by orientation -- domestic postures**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Domestic and international postures*</td>
<td>21/34 (.77)</td>
<td>21/26 (.91)</td>
<td>29/34 (.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Amount of error reduced by orientation**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The fractions displayed in the rows indicating the postures are the number of hits over the number of hits plus misses. In the parentheses following the fractions are accuracy scores, ranging from zero to one, which depict the extent to which the predictions were on target. A score of zero indicates the predictions were off by the maximum possible while a score of one denotes the predictions were on target.

** A score of zero indicates the orientations do no better than chance. A positive score denotes the percentage of those cases which the orientations correctly predict over and above those that would be predicted by chance alone. A negative percentage denotes the orientations performed worse than chance.
TABLE 43: Rafsanjani with an Opportunistic Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Posture</th>
<th>Moderates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Aggressiveness*</td>
<td>6/8 (.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Autonomy*</td>
<td>7/7 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Involvement with the U.S.*</td>
<td>6/7 (.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) International postures*</td>
<td>19/22 (.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Amount of error reduced by orientation -- international postures**</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Freedom of expression*</td>
<td>6/6 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Centralization*</td>
<td>3/5 (.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Domestic postures*</td>
<td>9/11 (.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Amount of error reduced by orientation -- domestic postures**</td>
<td>69.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Domestic and international postures*</td>
<td>28/33 (.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Amount of error reduced by orientation**</td>
<td>72.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The fractions displayed in the rows indicating the postures are the number of hits over the number of hits plus misses. In the parentheses following the fractions are accuracy scores, ranging from zero to one, which depict the extent to which the predictions were on target. A score of zero indicates the predictions were off by the maximum possible while a score of one denotes the predictions were on target.

** A score of zero indicates the orientations do no better than chance. A positive score denotes the percentage of those cases which the orientations correctly predict over and above those that would be predicted by chance alone. A negative percentage denotes the orientations performed worse than chance.
adjusts the nonmeaningful test cases to the preferences of those who can keep the Influential in a leadership position (see table fifteen, page 261), we note an increase in the accuracy score internationally from .32 to .63 as well an increase in the amount of error reduced by the orientation. However, as we shall see, the predictions for Mohtashemi were the poorest of the four clerics.

As displayed in table thirty-three (page 334), the orientation scores for Montazeri were above fifty-five on three of the orientations — Mediator Integrator, Developmental, and Opportunistic. Table forty shows the performance of the Mediator Integrator orientation in predicting while table forty-one indicates the same for the Opportunistic orientation. The scores for the Developmental orientation are not presented as they are less than chance and the accuracy scores are below .50.

In comparing tables forty and forty-one, it is evident for Montazeri, the Mediator Integrator orientation performs somewhat better than the Opportunistic orientation. The Mediator Integrator orientation scores better with the international postures than does the Opportunistic orientation. However, both were mediocre in their predictions with respect to the autonomy posture. The Opportunistic orientation correctly predicted only three out of seven with an accuracy score of .56 (see table forty-one). The Mediator Integrator orientation performed somewhat better predicting four out of
six of the meaningful test cases with an accuracy score of .76 (see table forty). Nevertheless, the Mediator Integrator orientation performed the best of the three orientations in predicting Montazeri's future postures.

As shown in table thirty-three (page 334), two orientations -- the Expansionist and the Developmental -- were above one standard deviation, for Khamanei. Table forty-two presents the scores which display the performance of the Expansionist orientation in predicting Khamanei's future postures. The figures for the Developmental orientation are not presented as they were worse than chance and the accuracy scores were below .50.

As shown in table forty-two the Expansionist orientation does very well in predicting Khamanei's futures postures and preferences. Even though the amount of error reduced by the orientation (see rows five, nine, and eleven) is greater in the domestic arena, the accuracy scores for the meaningful and those who this orientation identifies with cases (see columns two and three of rows four, eight, and ten) are quite close. Furthermore, with the postures themselves (see columns two and three of rows one, two, three, six, and seven) the accuracy scores are above .85.

Finally, for Rafsanjani, table thirty-three (page 334) indicates two of the orientations can be employed for predictive purposes. They are the Opportunist and Developmental orientations. However, since the Developmental
Orientation was one standard deviation above the mean for the Domestic topic domain (see Table twenty-nine, page 326), the hypothesis posits it would be applicable for the two domestic postures (i.e., freedom of expression and centralization). For the meaningful test cases, utilizing the Developmental orientation, only three out of eight cases were predicted correctly. This is less than chance. Albeit, the accuracy score was .72 which means the predictions were fairly close. When the preferences of those who the Developmental identifies with are taken into consideration for the cases which are not meaningful, the amount of error reduced by the orientation is 24.2%, but the accuracy score falls to .64. Nevertheless, if we look at Table forty-three, the Opportunist orientation is better in regard to the domestic arena.

From this analysis it would appear that Mohtashemi with an Influential, Montazeri with a Mediator Integrator, Khamanei with an Expansionist, and Rafsanjani with an Opportunist orientation are the best predictors of their future postures and preferences. Back in Chapter five we outline five potential hypotheses -- general orientation, international and domestic domains, post consolidation period, last political role, and spontaneous materials. Additionally, we added a sixth hypothesis in this chapter -- most often displayed orientation. Which of the six hypotheses did the best at identifying these orientations for the four clerics?
The first hypothesis focuses on the leaders' general orientations. If we look at the clerics' general orientation table (see table twenty-seven, page 324), the orientations listed above are the highest except for Mohtashemi. That is, for Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani, knowledge of their general orientation was sufficient. For Mohtashemi, as shown in table twenty-seven, it was not as straightforward (note a standard score of 65 on the Developmental orientation and 64 on the Influential orientation).

On one hand, such results are encouraging to those who study political personality. As presented in chapter two, most typologies conceptualize a leader as fitting into one overall type regardless of the context. On the other hand, there should be a sense of concern. Apparently, not all political actors can be represented in this manner.

The second hypothesis suggests ascertaining an orientation for each cleric in the international and domestic domains. The standard scores are displayed in tables twenty-eight and twenty-nine (pages 325-326), respectively. Again, in table twenty-eight, two orientations -- Opportunist and Mediator Integrator -- display identical scores for Montazeri. However, even more problematic is the domestic domain (table twenty-nine) where Rafsanjani has the highest score on the Developmental orientation.

These results are surprising. In an earlier study, this author (1992) discovered, in the analysis of Anwar Sadat of
Egypt, different orientations with respect to the international and domestic domains. At a minimum, I would have expected the international/domestic distinction to do just as well as the general orientation hypothesis. As we shall see later, further analysis provides some understanding why this did not occur.

The third hypothesis proposes concentrating on the post-consolidation period to assess these four clerics' personalities. As table thirty (page 327) indicates, only the Opportunistic orientation, for Rafsanjani, is useful in predicting future postures and preferences. For the other three clerics, the typical orientations perform no better than chance. These results suggest preferences and postures are not influenced by certain time periods. This context variable is of little value in predicting future postures and preferences.

The fourth hypothesis suggests the last political role should be employed for predicting future postures. As table thirty-one (page 328) displays, Montazeri and Mohtashemi's dominant orientations are not very predictive. One possibility considered was this may only be predictive for those test cases in which they were in the same political role. That is, the analysis was done in such a manner that only the test cases which occurred during the last political role for the cleric were considered. However, such an analysis did not improve the results.
These results lend support to the idea that postures and preferences do not depend upon where the actor sits. The political role aspect is not a useful predictor. It may be, in revolutionary regimes, since political institutions and roles are beginning to be established, their impact on preferences and postures is not likely to be very strong.

The fifth hypothesis posits the best predictor should be spontaneous materials (interviews), as this is more likely to reveal the true character of the individual. As shown in table thirty-two (page 329), this hypothesis seems plausible. The only glitch in this hypothesis is the scores for Mohtashemi are high in both the Influential and Developmental orientations. If one was attempting to forecast into the future and chose the Developmental orientation for Mohtashemi, one's predictions would have been substantially off. Nevertheless, the spontaneity hypothesis does the best of the five initial hypotheses. Consequently, as discussed in chapter five, this supports the notion that interviews provide a better means of disclosing the political personality of a particular political figure.

The sixth and last hypothesis was proposed earlier in this chapter. This hypothesis suggested that a viable predictor of postures and preferences may be the orientation the leader usually demonstrates when considering the various domains, times periods, roles, and so forth. That is, which orientation does the cleric most often display. It was
indicated earlier Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani exhibit the Influential, Mediator Integrator, Expansionist, and Opportunist orientations, respectively. This corresponds to the orientations which are the best predictors. Thus, the most often displayed orientation hypothesis is the best of the six hypotheses in predicting future postures and preferences.

The results of the sixth hypothesis intuitively make sense. By considering the orientation that is usually displayed, one gets a sense of who the leader tends to be as well as what preferences and postures the actor is likely to embrace. To some extent, these results are reassuring to those typologies, as presented in chapter two, which, for all intents and purposes, assume a political figure fits into one type. While this is comforting, we must not forget the results for Mohtashemi were only fair. Thus, one type (or orientation) does not capture Mohtashemi as well as it does for the other three clerics. Nonetheless, it would seem that those who employ one type to represent an actor need to capture the type that is most often displayed in order for the typing to be viable.

In pondering the results for the six hypotheses, two further avenues need to be explored. One, a further analysis of the domestic and international topics to discern whether this is helpful in predicting future postures is needed. It may be the domestic and international distinction is not
sufficient to capture the orientation the leader possesses for the postures of our concern. That is, we may need to further differentiate the international and domestic domains by considering only certain topics discussed by the leader. These topics would be limited to the ones which correspond to the postures of this research endeavor. A second avenue is to ascertain the clerics' orientations by dividing the verbal materials into domestic and foreign audiences. A segment was considered for foreign consumption if the foreign press interviewed the political figure, foreign correspondents were present, or the Iranian media intended it for external consumption (e.g. the materials were broadcast in English).

Tables fifty-nine through sixty-two in Appendix B provide a breakdown of the topics discussed by each of the four clerics. Since our test cases under the foreign policy postures deal with Imperialistic entities (or those not favorably predisposed to Iran), it would seem we may need to discern each of the leaders' orientations for those topics which are germane. This was done and the standard scores for the revised international domain is presented in table forty-four. The same sort of revision was also completed for the domestic domain except we were concerned with topics that related to the government process, structure, and administration as well as opposition groups or similar entities. The results of this analysis are furnished in table forty-five. If we take the highest score for each
TABLE 44: Standard Orientation Scores for Those International Topics Which Relate to Imperialistic Entities for the Four Iranian Clerics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Montazeri (N=28)</th>
<th>Rafsanjani (N=27)</th>
<th>Khamanei (N=31)</th>
<th>Mohtashemi (N=13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunist</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrator</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The N's listed below the leaders denote the number of segments coded for each cleric.
TABLE 45: Standard Orientation Scores for Those Domestic Topics Which Relate to the Government Process or Opponents for the Four Iranian Clerics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Montazeri (N=34)</th>
<th>Rafsanjani (N=19)</th>
<th>Khamanei (N=36)</th>
<th>Mohtashemi (N=22)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunistic</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrator</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The N's listed below the leaders denote the number of segments coded.
cleric in table forty-four and forty-five, we obtain the orientations that were indicated above as the best predictors for each of the clerics. That is, Mohtashemi displays an Influential, Montazeri a Mediator Integrator, Khamanei an Expansionist, and Rafsanjani an Opportunist orientations. It would seem then, at least for these four clerics, this further analysis was fruitful.

A second avenue worth pursuing is the distinction between domestic and foreign audiences. This analysis is somewhat curtailed since all of Mohtashemi's segments, except two, are with domestic audiences. Nevertheless, orientations were calculated for the four clerics for verbal materials presented to a domestic audience. Mohtashemi was high on two orientations -- Influential and Mediator Integrator. The Active Independent and Developmental orientations were close in standard score also. Montazeri was not high on any orientation and none of the scores were above fifty-five. Khamanei and Rafsanjani fit their typical pattern of exhibiting the Expansionist and Opportunist orientations, respectively. Thus, the avenue of audience did not shed any new light into our discussion.

Discussion

The ensuing discussion seeks to address three questions that immediately surface since we have now identified each of the four clerics' typical orientations. First, why were the
predictions for Mohtashemi the worst of the four clerics? Second, were there some postures which the model was better at predicting for all four? Third, how impressive are these predictions? After these questions are discussed four other areas are examined. First, we will explore certain underlying dynamics of the personality model. The second aspect discussed relates to investigating how the postures and preferences of the four clerics correspond to the preferences and postures of the various ideological groups noted in chapter six. Do the findings support the extrapolations regarding who each cleric is more likely to be associated with? Third, we will probe further into the Idealist/Realist distinction. The fourth area dealt with is an inquiry into the differentiation of economic conservatives and economic radicals.

**Personality Predictions Regarding Mohtashemi:** Why were the predictions for Mohtashemi the least predictive of the four? Four possibilities are plausible. First, as noted in chapter five, the data used to assess Mohtashemi's personality were the first fifty (chronological) segments found. Did this lead to some sort of systematic bias? Additionally, usually, only bits and parts of interviews, sermons, and speeches were obtainable. Thus, it was impossible to determine how typical these segments tended to be of Mohtashemi. Were these the topics he usually discussed? The bottom line is we may need
a better sample of materials — meaning full interviews, speeches, and sermons.

A second possibility is the hypothesized predictions in chapter six were incorrect. As indicated in table fourteen of chapter six (page 258), the Influential strives to develop and exert his leadership position. In a revolutionary authoritarian regime, like Iran, it may be that the Influential, in order to become influential, embraces the postures of little involvement with the United States, high belligerence, and high autonomy. Similarly, such a leader may advocate little freedom of expression and centralization of power.

A third possibility is, since the standard orientation scores for Mohtashemi (see tables twenty-seven through thirty-two, pages 324-329, and forty-four to forty-five, pages 364-365) were often high and never low, predicting for such a political figure is not easy. Such a leader may present many different faces (i.e. orientations) depending upon the circumstance or climate of the times. Thus, like the leader who is not dominant in any orientation, the future actions of this leader are unpredictable.

A fourth possibility relates to the opposition role Mohtashemi plays within the government. Tetlock (1981:742) speculates, in his analysis with U.S. senators, those who espoused isolationistic statements may reflect the attempt of those out-of-power, the opposition, to impress others with
their will. Such a distinction between those in-power and those out-of-power seems equally relevant to the Iranian context. Menashri (1990b:379), a prominent Iranian scholar, posits that those holding the executive power, which includes the Majlis Speaker, are the ones who run the state. These individuals are the ones in-power. Mohtashemi, unlike the other three clerics, has never been one of those in-power, rather he is one who is out-of-power, or in the role of opposition. Thus, in an attempt to capture this in-power position, Mohtashemi may espouse preferences and postures which are not reflective of his personality.

An indication of this seems to be the preference he espoused in the second test case of centralization of power (see table thirty-eight, page 341). This test case related to the consolidation of the political positions of President and Prime Minister. Mohtashemi did not unequivocally support consolidation of these two positions, which one would expect from his other preferences as well as from our discussion in chapter four regarding the Iranian area specialists' observations. Such a position, at this point, was not beneficial to him since Mohtashemi was not part of the in-power group.

**Personality Predictions and the Five Postures:** Another question our initial analysis presents is: was the model better at predicting certain postures for the four clerics as a whole? Table forty-six depicts the total scores by postures
TABLE 46: Total Scores by Posture of Mohtashemi with Influential, Montazeri with Mediator Integrator, Khamanei with Expansionist, and Rafsanjani with Opportunist (Moderates) Orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Posture</th>
<th>All cases</th>
<th>Meaningful cases</th>
<th>Meaningful &amp; those identify with cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Aggressiveness*</td>
<td>18/29 (.70)</td>
<td>10/12 (.93)</td>
<td>25/29 (.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Autonomy*</td>
<td>14/28 (.60)</td>
<td>7/15 (.57)</td>
<td>19/28 (.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Involvement with the U.S.*</td>
<td>15/23 (.72)</td>
<td>8/12 (.71)</td>
<td>17/23 (.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) International postures*</td>
<td>47/80 (.67)</td>
<td>25/39 (.73)</td>
<td>61/80 (.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Amount of error reduced by orientation -- international postures**</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Freedom of expression*</td>
<td>18/23 (.86)</td>
<td>12/13 (.97)</td>
<td>22/23 (.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Centralization*</td>
<td>16/23 (.84)</td>
<td>8/8 (1.00)</td>
<td>20/23 (.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Domestic postures*</td>
<td>34/46 (.85)</td>
<td>20/21 (.98)</td>
<td>42/46 (.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Amount of error reduced by orientation -- domestic postures**</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>91.3%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Domestic and international postures*</td>
<td>81/126 (.74)</td>
<td>45/60 (.81)</td>
<td>103/126 (.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Amount of error reduced by orientation**</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The fractions displayed in the rows indicating the postures are the number of hits over the number of hits plus misses. In the parentheses following the fractions are accuracy scores, ranging from zero to one, which depict the extent to which the predictions were on target. A score of zero indicates the predictions were off by the maximum possible while a score of one denotes the predictions were on target.

** A score of zero indicates the orientations do no better than chance. A positive score denotes the percentage of those cases which the orientations correctly predict over and above those that would be predicted by chance alone. A negative percentage denotes the orientations performed worse than chance.
of Mohtashemi with an Influential, Montazeri with a Mediator Integrator, Khamanei with an Expansionist, and Rafsanjani with an Opportunist orientation. As previously, the fractions denote the number of correct predictions (i.e. hits over hits plus misses) and the scores in the parentheses are the accuracy scores. While this table suggests the personality model was better at predicting domestic postures than international postures, much of this is related to the lower scores when Mohtashemi is considered to possess an Influential orientation (see table thirty-nine, page 351). Nevertheless, it is interesting that the Hermann political personality framework which was designed to focus on international foreign policy, seems equally appropriate to discerning a political actor's domestic policy preferences.

**Impressiveness of Personality Predictions:** Up to this point we have inundated the reader with a barrage of scores that indicate the extent to which the personality model is predictive. Generally, the model has done substantially better than chance. Yet, how valuable are these predictions? Or is it to our benefit to wait for the subjective assessments of various Iranian area specialists?

If the reader recalls back in chapter four, we gathered the assessments of various Iranian analysts with respect to the five postures of concern in this study. A coder, then, based on these various assessments, categorized each of the four clerics into high, moderate, low, or unknown on each of
the five postures. The results of this were provided in table three of chapter four (page 185). It should also be restated that the assessments gathered covered the time period from 1986 to 1991. Thus, unlike the personality model employed in this study, it could not have been employed in 1986 or 1987 to predict to future postures. Many of these observations made by the Iranian analysts came after some of the test cases utilized in this research endeavor had occurred.

How well would one do in identifying the clerics' postures utilizing the various assessments proposed by Iranian analysts? In order to ascertain this, the high, moderate, and low classification used in table three (see chapter four, page 185) must be translated to the scale utilized to discern the clerics' exhibited postures (see tables thirty-four to thirty-eight, pages 337-341). Or, of course, the reverse could be done and this was the avenue chosen in this study.

If one looks closely at the five point scale for each test case (see the codebook in Appendix A), it becomes noticeable that the three is the midpoint of the scale, at least in a relative sense. Thus, a score of one or two translates into high aggressiveness, high autonomy, little involvement, little freedom of expression, and centralization of power. Conversely, a score of four or five translates into low aggressiveness, low autonomy, high involvement, high freedom of expression, and decentralization of power. A score
of three denotes moderate aggressiveness, autonomy, involvement, freedom of expression, and centralization. Moderate may occur because that is generally the leader's preference or the leader's preferences vary substantially by test case within the posture.

Translating the numerical scores of tables thirty-four to thirty-eight (pages 337-341) into high, moderate, or low can be done in two different ways. At the bottom of these tables is a mean and modal score. If we use the modal score, thirteen out of the twenty categorizations of table three (page 185) fit with the exhibited scores in tables thirty-four through thirty-eight. However, utilizing the mean, we hit fourteen out of the twenty.

In order to compare with the personality model, we must take chance into account. Then, utilizing the formula provided earlier, we can calculate the amount of error reduced by employing the assessments of the Iranian analysts. The amount of error reduced is equal to 55%.

We can now compare this with the amount of error reduced by employing the personality model. As table forty-six (page 370) shows in the second column of row eleven, with respect to the meaningful test cases, the amount of error reduced was 53%. However, when we take into consideration the meaningful test cases along with the preferences of those who the orientations identify with for the nonmeaningful test cases, the amount of error reduced by the personality model is 67%.
In other words, at a minimum the personality model does as well as utilizing the assessments of various Iranian analysts. 

Underlying Dynamics of the Personality Model: We have discussed the extent to which the embellished Hermann political personality model has been helpful in predicting to future postures and preferences. The next step is to shed light on the underlying dynamics of the model. Can we say anything about the process which seems to account for the preferences observed?

If one reviews the discussion in chapters five and six, one possible hypothesis is: the higher the score for a particular orientation (see tables forty-four and forty-five, page 364-365) the closer the match should be between the exhibited preferences (see tables thirty-four to thirty-eight, pages 337-341) and the expected preferences (see tables sixteen through twenty-five, pages 309-318). In this test of the orientation construct, we should expect the higher the orientation score, the more likely the preferences hypothesized for that orientation are exhibited. Of course, the reverse, the lower the orientation score, the less likely the preferences hypothesized for that orientation are exhibited, is also anticipated.

To ascertain this, the orientation scores from tables forty-four and forty-five were correlated with the preferences displayed by the four clerics (see tables thirty-four to thirty-eight) using the Pearson product-moment correlation
First, however, it was necessary to recode the exhibited scores of tables thirty-four through thirty-eight for each of the six orientations. These exhibited scores were recoded in the same manner the actual scores were recoded in the accuracy score formula discussed earlier in this chapter. Suppose, for instance, a score of one or two is the hypothesized score for a particular orientation on a specific test case. The two scores are recoded to four and one-half. A score of three remains the same while the score of four and five are recoded to two and one, respectively. In other words, the scores are re-ranked with five denoting a best fit score while one indicates the worst fit score.

Once this was completed, the orientation scores were correlated with the recoded exhibited scores for all four clerics for all six orientations. The Pearson product-moment correlation or Pearson r is useful in evaluating the hypothesis since it is a measure of association. The Pearson r was ascertained for all three categories employed in this study -- for all cases, for only the meaningful cases, and for those including meaningful and the preferences of those associated with.

The results for all three categories are a correlation close to zero. Little association between the orientations and exhibited preferences was indicated. To some degree, this was not unexpected considering the earlier discussion. Often, a high orientation score for a particular leader was quite
poor at predicting future postures. For instance, in table forty-four, Mohtashemi's orientation score on the Active Independent was high, yet the predictions for this orientation were less than favorable.

If we look at the correlation for each orientation separately, the findings are interesting and somewhat surprising. With regard to the Expansionist orientation for the four clerics, the Pearson r equals .57 (p<.001). If we consider only the meaningful test cases, the correlation pushes up to .69 (p<.001). Thus, in this case, the higher the Expansionist orientation score, the more likely the leader exhibited preferences which correlated with the expected preferences of the Expansionist, at least for the test cases of this study. Why this occurred for only the Expansionist orientation is not especially clear.

The above analysis has assumed interval level scales. If one peruses Appendix A, the one to five point scale for the preferences is not interval but ordinal. Is it reasonable to treat these exhibited preferences as interval level data?

Blalock (1979:444-445) indicates there is no clearcut answer, even though he does present evidence to suggest it often makes little difference to one's findings. This seems to be the case for this study also. Utilizing measures of association like Gamma, Somer's d or Kendall's Tau C discloses essentially the same results (see Elifson et al. 1982:172-181 and Blalock 1979:442 for discussion of these ordinal measures
of association). Hence, using an interval measure of association did not seem to skew the results.7

What does all this mean? It could be suggested that it is important to know the typical orientation for a leader for a particular domain (whether it is international or domestic or possibly even a specific topic area). Once this is known, the schemas which are employed can be hypothesized. This cognitive structure of the world has a significant impact on how the political figure interprets the world and often has an impact on his preferences and postures. Concomitantly, the schemas of the other orientations for that leader are not important, no matter whether the leader has a high or low orientation score.

It may be as Fiske (1986:44-46) has hypothesized, people utilize the "most available schema" and if critical factors of the applicable schema do not fit, this categorization is unsuccessful and piecemeal processing results (i.e. instance is thought of as unique example without reference to prior knowledge about others of its type). In piecemeal processing, one relies solely on the information given without reference to an overall organizing structure. In reference to the work of this study, if the predisposed schemas are not employed then piecemeal processing takes over. That is, the features and characteristics of others and situations are evaluated in isolation of the characteristics and features one usually uses to evaluate others and situations. Obviously, further studies
are needed to explore this issue. Additionally, we must remember we are working with imperfect measurements that may influence our results.

**Ideological Groups and Postures:** In chapter six, it was extrapolated that each of the four clerics identified with or were accountable to different groups within Iran (see discussion under Opportunist orientation). The association of the cleric to the groups was not always obvious. While most observers of Iranian politics would concur that Mohtashemi is linked with the Radicals and Rafsanjani with the Moderates, the placement of Khamanei with the Radicals/Moderates and Montazeri with the Backers of the Revolution is open to debate.

The data provided in this chapter provides us with a means to ascertain whether these hypotheses were correct, at least for the time period covered in this study. Utilizing tables twenty-one to twenty-five of chapter six (pages 314-318) as the "expected" positions for the four groups -- Radicals, Moderates, Radicals/Moderates, and Backers of the Revolution -- we can compare with the "exhibited" preferences of the four clerics, which is furnished in tables thirty-four to thirty-eight (pages 337-341). Tables forty-seven through fifty outline the results for Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani, respectively. As before, the fractions denote the number of correct predictions (i.e. hits over hits plus misses) and the scores in the parentheses are the accuracy
TABLE 47: Mohtashemi and Various Groups in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Radicals</th>
<th>Moderates</th>
<th>Radicals/Moderates</th>
<th>Backers of Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Aggressiveness*</td>
<td>8/8 (1.0)</td>
<td>0/8 (.04)</td>
<td>0/8 (.07)</td>
<td>0/8 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Autonomy*</td>
<td>7/7 (1.0)</td>
<td>0/7 (.08)</td>
<td>0/7 (.15)</td>
<td>0/7 (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Involvement with the U.S.*</td>
<td>5/5 (1.0)</td>
<td>0/5 (.00)</td>
<td>0/5 (.11)</td>
<td>0/5 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) International postures*</td>
<td>20/20 (1.0)</td>
<td>0/20 (.05)</td>
<td>0/20 (.11)</td>
<td>0/20 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Amount of error reduced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by model</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- international postures**</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-92.3%</td>
<td>-42.9%</td>
<td>-96.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Freedom of expression*</td>
<td>5/5 (1.0)</td>
<td>0/5 (.17)</td>
<td>0/5 (.40)</td>
<td>0/5 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Centralization*</td>
<td>5/6 (.93)</td>
<td>1/6 (.38)</td>
<td>1/6 (.41)</td>
<td>0/6 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Domestic postures*</td>
<td>10/11 (.96)</td>
<td>1/11 (.29)</td>
<td>1/11 (.40)</td>
<td>0/11 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Amount of error reduced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by model</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- domestic postures**</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>-51.5%</td>
<td>-51.5%</td>
<td>-52.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Domestic and international postures*</td>
<td>30/31 (.99)</td>
<td>1/31 (.13)</td>
<td>1/31 (.22)</td>
<td>0/31 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Amount of error reduced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by model**</td>
<td>94.6%</td>
<td>-76.6%</td>
<td>-45.6%</td>
<td>-78.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The fractions displayed in the rows indicating the postures are the number of hits over the number of hits plus misses. In the parentheses following the fractions are accuracy scores, ranging from zero to one, which depict the extent to which the predictions were on target. A score of zero indicates the predictions were off by the maximum possible while a score of one denotes the predictions were on target.

** A score of zero indicates the model does no better than chance. A positive score denotes the percentage of those cases which the model correctly predicts over and above those that would be predicted by chance alone. A negative percentage denotes the model performed worse than chance.
TABLE 48: Montazeri and Various Groups in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Radicals</th>
<th>Moderates</th>
<th>Radicals/Moderates</th>
<th>Backers of Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Aggressiveness*</td>
<td>0/5 (.23)</td>
<td>4/5 (.89)</td>
<td>2/5 (.61)</td>
<td>5/5 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Autonomy*</td>
<td>4/7 (.82)</td>
<td>0/7 (.37)</td>
<td>4/7 (.65)</td>
<td>3/7 (.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Involvement</td>
<td>1/4 (.46)</td>
<td>2/4 (.89)</td>
<td>2/4 (.61)</td>
<td>3/4 (.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with the U.S.*</td>
<td>1/4 (.46)</td>
<td>2/4 (.89)</td>
<td>2/4 (.61)</td>
<td>3/4 (.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) International postures*</td>
<td>5/16 (.55)</td>
<td>6/16 (.60)</td>
<td>8/16 (.63)</td>
<td>11/16 (.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Amount of error reduced</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6/6 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by model</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- international</td>
<td>-17.0%</td>
<td>-16.4%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>postures**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Freedom of expression*</td>
<td>0/6 (.00)</td>
<td>0/6 (.00)</td>
<td>0/6 (.00)</td>
<td>6/6 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Centralization*</td>
<td>0/6 (.01)</td>
<td>1/6 (.17)</td>
<td>1/6 (.17)</td>
<td>5/6 (.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Domestic postures*</td>
<td>0/12 (.05)</td>
<td>1/12 (.08)</td>
<td>1/12 (.08)</td>
<td>11/12 (.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Amount of error reduced</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6/6 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by model</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- domestic postures**</td>
<td>-66.7%</td>
<td>-52.8%</td>
<td>-52.8%</td>
<td>87.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Domestic and international postures*</td>
<td>5/28 (.33)</td>
<td>7/28 (.38)</td>
<td>9/28 (.39)</td>
<td>21/28 (.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Amount of error reduced</td>
<td>-38.4%</td>
<td>-33.0%</td>
<td>-4.5%</td>
<td>60.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by model**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The fractions displayed in the rows indicating the postures are the number of hits over the number of hits plus misses. In the parentheses following the fractions are accuracy scores, ranging from zero to one, which depict the extent to which the predictions were on target. A score of zero indicates the predictions were off by the maximum possible while a score of one denotes the predictions were on target.

** A score of zero indicates the model does no better than chance. A positive score denotes the percentage of those cases which the model correctly predicts over and above those that would be predicted by chance alone. A negative percentage denotes the model performed worse than chance.
TABLE 49: Khamanei and Various Groups in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Radicals</th>
<th>Moderates</th>
<th>Radicals/ Moderates</th>
<th>Backers of Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Aggressiveness*</td>
<td>0/8 (.51)</td>
<td>6/8 (.88)</td>
<td>6/8 (.90)</td>
<td>6/8 (.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Autonomy*</td>
<td>1/7 (.44)</td>
<td>4/7 (.80)</td>
<td>3/7 (.59)</td>
<td>6/7 (.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Involvement with the U.S.*</td>
<td>5/7 (.90)</td>
<td>2/7 (.44)</td>
<td>5/7 (.81)</td>
<td>3/7 (.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) International postures*</td>
<td>6/22 (.61)</td>
<td>12/22 (.71)</td>
<td>14/22 (.78)</td>
<td>15/22 (.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Amount of error reduced by model -- international postures**</td>
<td>-23.0%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Freedom of expression*</td>
<td>5/6 (.93)</td>
<td>4/6 (.83)</td>
<td>6/6 (1.0)</td>
<td>0/6 (.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Centralization*</td>
<td>3/6 (.71)</td>
<td>3/6 (.74)</td>
<td>3/6 (.72)</td>
<td>2/6 (.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Domestic postures*</td>
<td>8/12 (.82)</td>
<td>7/12 (.79)</td>
<td>9/12 (.86)</td>
<td>2/12 (.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Amount of error reduced by model -- domestic postures**</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>-28.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Domestic and international postures*</td>
<td>14/34 (.68)</td>
<td>19/34 (.74)</td>
<td>23/34 (.81)</td>
<td>17/34 (.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Amount of error reduced by model**</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The fractions displayed in the rows indicating the postures are the number of hits over the number of hits plus misses. In the parentheses following the fractions are accuracy scores, ranging from zero to one, which depict the extent to which the predictions were on target. A score of zero indicates the predictions were off by the maximum possible while a score of one denotes the predictions were on target.

** A score of zero indicates the model does no better than chance. A positive score denotes the percentage of those cases which the model correctly predicts over and above those that would be predicted by chance alone. A negative percentage denotes the model performed worse than chance.
TABLE 50: Rafsanjani and Various Groups in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Radicals</th>
<th>Moderates</th>
<th>Radicals/ Moderates</th>
<th>Backers of Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Aggressiveness*</td>
<td>2/8 (.46)</td>
<td>6/8 (.80)</td>
<td>2/8 (.48)</td>
<td>6/8 (.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Autonomy*</td>
<td>0/7 (.27)</td>
<td>7/7 (1.0)</td>
<td>0/7 (.40)</td>
<td>7/7 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Involvement with the U.S.*</td>
<td>0/7 (.22)</td>
<td>6/7 (.94)</td>
<td>2/7 (.44)</td>
<td>2/7 (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) International postures*</td>
<td>2/22 (.32)</td>
<td>19/22 (.91)</td>
<td>4/22 (.44)</td>
<td>15/22 (.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Amount of error reduced by model -- international postures**</td>
<td>-53.8%</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>-18.4%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Freedom of expression*</td>
<td>0/6 (.52)</td>
<td>6/6 (1.0)</td>
<td>4/6 (.88)</td>
<td>1/6 (.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Centralization*</td>
<td>3/5 (.77)</td>
<td>3/5 (.74)</td>
<td>3/5 (.60)</td>
<td>1/5 (.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Domestic postures*</td>
<td>3/11 (.64)</td>
<td>9/11 (.88)</td>
<td>7/11 (.75)</td>
<td>2/11 (.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Amount of error reduced by model -- domestic postures**</td>
<td>-21.2%</td>
<td>69.7%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>-21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Domestic and international postures*</td>
<td>5/33 (.43)</td>
<td>28/33 (.90)</td>
<td>11/33 (.54)</td>
<td>17/33 (.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Amount of error reduced by model**</td>
<td>-42.8%</td>
<td>72.1%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The fractions displayed in the rows indicating the postures are the number of hits over the number of hits plus misses. In the parentheses following the fractions are accuracy scores, ranging from zero to one, which depict the extent to which the predictions were on target. A score of zero indicates the predictions were off by the maximum possible while a score of one denotes the predictions were on target.

** A score of zero indicates the model does no better than chance. A positive score denotes the percentage of those cases which the model correctly predicts over and above those that would be predicted by chance alone. A negative percentage denotes the model performed worse than chance.
scores. Also provided is the score for the amount of error reduced (see rows five, nine, and eleven).

The results for Mohtashemi, as shown in table forty-seven, are not unexpected. By far his postures and preferences correspond to the Radicals. Mohtashemi's preferences and postures are not even remotely close to the other three groups. The low accuracy scores, which are in parentheses, especially with the Backers of the Revolution (note the .06), indicate his stance is completely opposite of this group.

Table forty-eight which depicts the scores for Montazeri, reveals some interesting results. While, generally, his postures and preferences are in congruity with the positions of the Backers of the Revolution, it is less so with the foreign policy postures (see rows four and five). The amount of error reduced by utilizing the Radicals/Moderates is 27% while with the Backers of the Revolution it is 33%. Furthermore, the accuracy scores are somewhat close (.63 and .74, respectively).

Closer examination of the accuracy score for the international postures sheds some interesting light on Montazeri. For the aggressiveness posture, his position is synonymous with the Backers of the Revolution. As for the autonomy posture, Montazeri's preferences come closest to the Radicals (note the .82 accuracy score). With the involvement posture, his stance corresponds, according to the accuracy
score, with the Moderates, even though there were more hits (i.e. predictions that matched) with the Backers of the Revolution.

Turning to table forty-nine, the number of matching positions on the test cases, the overall accuracy score, and the overall amount of error reduced, all indicate the Radicals/Moderates best typifies Khamanei's stance. Albeit, important distinctions are noteworthy. For instance, the accuracy score for the posture involvement with the United States is highest with the Radicals (.90). Thus, in this area, he leans more toward the Radicals. This is not surprising considering our analysis in chapters three and four. With the aggressiveness posture, Khamanei moves away from the stance of the Radicals. As for autonomy, he tilts more toward the Moderates and the Backers of the Revolution, who prefer moderate to low autonomy. Within the domestic posture, though, Khamanei has little in common with the Backers of the Revolution.

Moving on to Rafsanjani, table fifty suggests that his postures and preferences best match the Moderates. The overall accuracy score is .90, while the amount of error reduced is 72% (see rows ten and eleven, respectively). To some extent, like Mohtashemi, one group stands out as corresponding to his exhibited preferences. The difference, though, is that for Mohtashemi it was the Radicals while for Rafsanjani it is the Moderates, at least for the data of this
study. Nevertheless, the difference between Rafsanjani's postures and the groups other than the Moderates is not as decisively disparate as it is for Mohtashemi's postures and the groups other than the Radicals.

The extrapolations made in chapter six about who each of the four clerics identifies with or is accountable to is supported by the data (i.e. test cases) in this study. The postures exhibited by Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani correspond to the Radicals, Backers of the Revolution, Radicals/Moderates, and Moderates, respectively. However, the match of Mohtashemi with the Radicals and Rafsanjani with the Moderates was much greater than the correspondence between Khamanei and the Radical/Moderates and Montazeri and the Backers of the Revolution. For both Mohtashemi and Rafsanjani the overall accuracy scores were above .90 and the amount of reduced error was above 70% (see table forty-seven and fifty). This was not the case for Montazeri or Khamanei (see tables forty-eight and forty-nine). In other words, as describe earlier, Khamanei and Montazeri, with certain postures, tended to embrace a posture that was not typical of the group they identify with. Why is this the case with these two leaders?

Some of Hermann's work may shed light on this. Hermann (1984:54) proposes that sensitivity to the environment is a crucial aspect to understanding leaders. According to Hermann, sensitivity refers to how important incoming
information, from the environment, is to the political actor. The less sensitive the leader, the more likely this individual's orientation is likely to impact one's preferences and postures; while the opposite is the case for the more sensitive leader. Therefore, the more sensitive leader may have his preferences driven more by the group he identifies with or to which he is accountable.

How can we determine which of our four clerics is more or less sensitive to the environment? Hermann (1984:61-62) uses the measure of conceptual complexity as an indicator of sensitivity. The more complex the leader, the more attention this actor pays to the environment. If the reader recalls, this was one of the eight characteristics used to determine each of the clerics' orientations. In this study, the clerics were classified into more or less sensitive by dividing the scores at the mean. Thus, if we return to table twenty-six (page 322), since the scores have been standardized to a distribution with a mean of fifty, a score above fifty denotes the more sensitive leader and a score of below fifty represents the less sensitive leader.

Rafsanjani and Mohtashemi, as shown in table twenty-six, exhibit standard scores of 56 and 60, respectively, with regard to conceptual complexity. On the other hand, Montazeri and Khamanei score 40 and 44, respectively, on this characteristic. Hence, it would seem we should expect Rafsanjani and Mohtashemi to demonstrate postures that are
more in agreement with the group they identify with while this
would be less so for Montazeri and Khamanei. The results in
tables forty-seven to fifty (page 379-382) support this.

Furthermore, our earlier analysis of these four clerics
in chapters three and four would also seem to suggest
Montazeri and Khamanei are less sensitive. For instance, one
could speculate that these four clerics would have monitored
the late Ayatollah Khomeini quite closely, or at least more so
than other groups or actors. It is interesting that Montazeri
was booted out of being the designated leader because his
preferences were not acceptable to Khomeini. Montazeri,
according to Khomeini, had fallen under the influence of the
Liberals and other similar groups. Khamanei, in 1988, was
reprimanded by Khomeini for voicing certain opinions.
According to the information available, Mohtashemi and
Rafsanjani did not blatantly overlook Khomeini's positions.
In other words, their behavior suggests they are more
sensitive to the environment.

Can we assume that the less sensitive leader of a
revolutionary authoritarian regime is an "ideologue" (or
idealist who wants a new world order now and, therefore,
advocates a confrontational policy) while the more sensitive
leader is "pragmatic" (or realist who wants a new world order
but comes to terms with working in the existing one for the
present and, therefore, urges a less confrontational policy)?
The data in this study does not seem to support this. As
indicated in the background profile of Mohtashemi in chapters three and four, he is considered a "true believer" or "ideologue" who fully embraces Khomeini's absolutist doctrine. Such a person should advocate the use of aggressive acts and have little concern for individual civil liberties as well as exhibit extreme rigidity of beliefs (i.e. dogmatic) and black and white thinking (see Tetlock 1983:118-119 and Dekmejian 1985:32-35). According to the data, Mohtashemi does not demonstrate black and white thinking. As shown in table twenty-six (page 322), Mohtashemi has the highest standard score (of the four) in regards to conceptual complexity. A low score would indicate black and white thinking. Nevertheless, Mohtashemi is an ideologue, in the sense, as Shils (1958:451) states, "politics should be conducted from the standpoint of a coherent comprehensive set of beliefs that must override every other consideration". This is evident from the results in tables thirty-four to thirty-eight (pages 337-341). His voiced preferences were the most consistent of the four clerics. Furthermore, Mohtashemi urges the use of force and is not tolerant of opposing viewpoints.

It would appear that black and white thinking (i.e. low conceptual complexity), alone, is not a sufficient factor to assume an actor is an ideologue. From our earlier discussion on sensitivity to the environment, in which complexity was employed as an indicator of it, we suggested the more sensitive leader may have his preferences driven more by the
group he identifies with or to which he is accountable. Thus, one type of ideologue may be more "other directed" rather than "inner directed". Such an actor conforms, in an extreme manner, to the preferences of the group the actor identifies with. If this is the case, then Roche and Sachs' (1955:252) hypothesis that the Idealist (ideologue) is inner directed and the Realist is other directed is not a hard and fast rule.

Idealist Realist Differentiation: Can we suggest who will be the Idealist (ideologue) and who will be the Realist (pragmatist) in revolutionary authoritarian regimes? In chapter two, which was the literature review of various personality typologies, it was hypothesized for the Hermann framework, that the Influential, Expansionist, and Opportunist orientations could be either a Realist or Idealist. The other orientations were assumed to be Realist. Nevertheless, how can one discern whether the political actor with an Influential, Expansionist, or Opportunist orientation is a Realist or Idealist?

One possible solution is to utilize the self-other (self confidence and conceptual complexity traits) combination as an indicator. Hermann (1987b:14-15) asserts if the leader exhibits complexity higher than self confidence, such an actor is more pragmatic and will prefer positions which are based upon what is acceptable under current conditions. On the other hand, if self confidence is higher than complexity, the leader tends to be an ideologue who fervently embraces a
cause. If we return to table twenty-six (page 322), we note that Mohtashemi and Khamanei have standard scores in which self confidence is higher than conceptual complexity while Rafsanjani is the reverse. Thus, Mohtashemi and Khamanei would be expected to possess a tendency to be Idealist while Rafsanjani and Montazeri have an inclination to be Realist.

While this corresponds with the conclusion in chapters three and four about these four clerics, we should reserve final judgment, as this is observing the data in light of what has been proposed earlier in this book. It may be as Barnett (1973:390) proposes that "Ideologues are not a consistent personality type". Depending upon the configuration of the personality type, each has the potential to be an Idealist or Realist. In other words, prediction of who is likely to be one or the other, just by knowing their type, is not possible.

Ideological Groups, Personality Model, and Prediction: Let us turn to another question. In the last few pages one query that may have come to mind is: why not use the ideological groups (Radicals, Moderates, Radicals/Moderates, and Backers of the Revolution) with which each of the clerics is most likely to identify with as the means to predict to future postures? There is one enormous obstacle in attempting to do this.

This obstacle is, as indicated earlier, that even among the Iranian analysts, there is no agreement on which groups Khamanei or Montazeri identify with. Some analysts would have
placed Khamanei, for instance, with the Radicals while others would have put him with the Moderates. Furthermore, if one is trying to predict to future postures in 1986 or 1987, it is unlikely Mohtashemi could have been placed with the Radicals. As an unknown quantity, at that time, he could have been associated with the Radicals or the Moderates.

Interestingly, if we calculate the number of hits over number of hits plus misses (i.e. number of test cases correctly predicted over total number of test cases) for the four clerics as being linked to their groups, we find the number of correct predictions is the same as when we used the personality model, as displayed in table forty-six (page 370). The amount of error reduced by the group model is 69% and the accuracy score is .88. This is comparable to the personality model with scores of 67% and .87, respectively (see table forty-six).

However, while the group model predicts well with Rafsanjani and Mohtashemi, the more sensitive leaders, it does somewhat less so with Khamanei and Montazeri, the less sensitive leaders. For the personality model, the reverse is the case. Thus, the value of the personality model is it can better predict those leaders who are less sensitive and can potentially inform us as to who are the more sensitive (or less sensitive) leaders.

Economic Radicals and Economic Conservatives: Another area worth delving into relates to the exhibited preferences for
each of the postures (see tables thirty-four to thirty-eight, pages 337-341). Kazemi and Hart (1990:61) speculated that "economic conservatives" -- those strongly committed to the ideas of free enterprise -- are more likely to possess a more positive predisposition toward the United States; while "economic radicals" -- those supporting state intervention, nationalization, and land reform -- are likely to have a less positive predisposition toward the United States. According to the data of this study, this does not seem to be the case for all four clerics.

As shown in table thirty-eight (page 341, see also Appendix A), it does fit for Mohtashemi who advocates state intervention and nationalization and rejects relations with the United States (see table thirty-six, page 339). It also fits for Rafsanjani except, he is the opposite of Mohtashemi. Yet, with regard to Montazeri, he is one who asserts the government creates problems when it intervenes (see table thirty-eight and Appendix A), but, at most, is lukewarm toward the United States (see table thirty-six). His position on relations with the U.S. is one of the U.S. leaving Iran alone and Iran leaving the U.S. alone. Furthermore, Khamanei, who rejects relations with the U.S. (see table thirty-six and Appendix A), leans toward private enterprise (see table thirty-eight and Appendix A).

Kazemi and Hart's (1990:61) notion of "economic conservatives" and "economic radicals" seems to fall under the
rubric of Rokeach's (1973) concept of the values of "freedom" and "equality". Those who are more concerned with freedom embrace beliefs and preferences about free will, benefits of free enterprise, and the cost of government intervention. Those more concerned with equality possess beliefs and preferences about the necessity of more government control. This would suggest the values of freedom and equality may be related to not only the free enterprise test case (see table thirty-eight, page 341) but also the test cases under the posture of freedom of expression (see table thirty-seven, page 340).

The data in this study somewhat fit this. Mohtashemi desires government intervention and favors a tough line on political dissent and censorship (i.e. little freedom of expression). On the other hand, Montazeri supports little government intervention and concomitantly, urges for a more flexible line on political dissent. Khamanei and Rafsanjani fall in between the two in the same order. However, Khamanei urges more freedom in the economic sphere than in the personal or political realm (e.g. dress, parties, and press). To a lesser extent, this is equally the case with Rafsanjani.

Conclusion

This chapter has described the empirical results for both the personality assessments and the exhibited postures for the four clerics. Our analysis of the six hypotheses -- general
orientation, international/domestic distinction, post consolidation period, last political role, spontaneous material, and most often displayed orientation -- indicate the most often displayed orientation hypothesis performed the best of the six. Although, the spontaneity hypothesis, and to a slightly lesser extent the general orientation hypothesis, were almost as valuable at identifying the orientations which were the best predictors for future postures and preferences. However, a predictor that was as equally effective as the most often displayed orientation hypothesis was one that utilized only those international topics which related to imperialistic entities to predict to the three foreign policy postures -- aggressiveness, autonomy, and involvement -- as well as employing domestic topics which related to the government process or opponents to the two domestic policy postures -- freedom of expression and centralization of power.

Analyses were presented on how well the personality model performed in predicting future postures. The results were extremely impressive for Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani. Four possibilities were suggested regarding why the predictions for Mohtashemi were only slightly better than chance. Nonetheless, the personality model does as well as utilizing the observations of various Iranian area specialists, even though their assessments are not predictions into the future.
This study also investigated the extent to which each cleric seems to identify with different ideological groups in Iran. The extrapolations presented in chapter six about who each cleric is likely to identify with was supported by the data. The postures exhibited by Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani correspond to the Radicals, Backers of the Revolution, Radicals/Moderates, and Moderates, respectively.

Finally, we discussed certain aspects of the exhibited preferences in light of the economic radical/economic conservative distinction. The data of this study do not fully fit this differentiation. A freedom/equality distinction was presented as an alternative. One could even suggest the free enterprise test case should fit under the freedom of expression posture.

The next chapter brings together numerous aspects that have been considered in this book. We will discuss the implications of this study as well as future endeavors. In other words, what have we learned about Iran, political personality models, and revolutionary authoritarian regimes?
Footnotes

1. Table thirty, the post consolidation period, shows the Opportunistic orientation for Rafsanjani with a score of 65 while a standard score of 60 for the Mediator Integrator orientation. Since the Opportunistic orientation was substantially a higher score, it was utilized for predictive purposes (see discussion earlier in this chapter). However, if one uses the Mediator Integrator orientation for Rafsanjani the predictions are less than chance.

2. Information used is shown in Appendix B. From table fifty-nine, for Mohtashemi, the fifth topic (enemies of Iran/Islam) was used. For Montazeri, this was topics six through eight (Iran's foreign policy, entities maintaining ties to imperialistic nations, and the West or Superpowers) in table sixty. With respect to Khamanei this was topics five, six, and eight (Iran's war policy, Iran's foreign policy, and anti-Iranian nations) in table sixty-one. With regard to Rafsanjani, this was topics four and six (anti-Iranian entities and war policy) in table sixty-two. Topic seven (current situation in Iran-Iraq war) was eliminated since it has little to do with the policy with other states.

3. Information used is shown in Appendix B. From table fifty-nine, for Mohtashemi, topics one and two (government laws/procedures and domestic opposition) were included. With respect to Montazeri, topics two through five (clergy, government organization, freedom and rights of people, and opposition) of table sixty were included. As for Khamanei, topics one through four (organization of the government, religious/political/economic aspects, internal control and stability, and organization of armed forces) of table sixty-one were included. With regard to Rafsanjani, topics one and three (political process/structure and domestic entities) of table sixty-two were included.

4. If the modal score contained four or five numbers such as the case in tables thirty-six and thirty-eight, then that cleric tended to fluctuate and was considered to display a moderate amount of that posture.

5. The mean scores in tables thirty-four to thirty-eight were rounded off to the nearest whole number. Also, it should be pointed out that whether the mean or modal score is used, the misses were on ones that the coder either had low or moderate confidence (see discussion in chapter four with respect to table three).

6. For the Active Independent orientation, the correlation was -.25 (p<.01) for all and meaningful cases while for the
Developmental orientation it was \(-.29\) (\(p<.001\)) and \(-.33\) (\(p<.001\)), respectively.

7. The eta coefficient was also calculated. This measure reflects the variance accounted for by the best-fitting line whether curved or straight (see Downie and Heath 1974:88,110-114). As expected after looking over a scatterplot, the eta coefficient was similarly low.

8. One could also use variability of the orientations over topic, time, role, and types of material (personal conversation with Hermann). Thus, as shown in table thirty-three, Rafsanjani and Khamanei tend to usually exhibit the Opportunist and Expansionist orientations, respectively. On the other hand, Montazeri and Mohtashemi demonstrate three or four different orientations. Therefore, we would expect Khamanei and Rafsanjani to be more predictable and Mohtashemi and Montazeri to be less predictable. However, this distinction does not fit the exhibited preferences.
PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL POSTURES: THE CASE OF
THE CLERICAL RULERS OF IRAN
Volume II

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Charles Edward Snare, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

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Dissertation Committee:
Margaret Hermann
Donald Sylvan
Richard Herrmann

Approved by

Department of Political Science
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We began this book with an observation that even in revolutionary authoritarian regimes, political actors vary in the general stance they desire their government to adopt. Out of this observation a number of questions surfaced, such as: Who are these leaders and what are they like? What is the nature and extent to which leaders in such regimes differ in postures and preferences? Do political figures who differ in their particular beliefs regarding appropriate governmental strategies also differ in their personality structure? Can we predict future postures from an actor's disposition?

To answer these questions, I enumerated five political postures -- aggressiveness, autonomy, involvement with former imperialistic power, freedom of expression, and centralization of power -- which were considered important to understanding the nature and extent to which leaders differ. Then, after reviewing a number of political personality frameworks, I built upon Margaret G. Hermann's model by proposing a preliminary theory of how various types of leaders construct a picture of the world. A leader's policy choices and postures are often guided by this construction of the
political environment, which is predisposed by his personality. The preliminary theory was then applied to four Iranian clerics -- Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani -- by examining thirty-four test cases in which the four clerics espoused differing preferences. These test cases were suggested as being reflective of the five postures. Concurrently, via a comprehensive analysis of the life and socialization process, as well as the insights gained from the Hermann personality framework, we were able to understand and describe what these four clerics are like.

The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the implications of this research endeavor. The second part deals with some of the limitations of this study. The third section presents a number of future areas of study that may prove fruitful.

**Implications of This Study**

This work has a number of implications for those who are interested in Iranian politics, revolutionary authoritarian regimes, political psychology, and international relations. The results of this research endeavor add insights that are useful for each of these areas. Ten different implications are discussed in the following section.

**Iranian Politics:** For those interested in Iranian politics, this study can shed light on the postures and preferences of four important clerics. As pointed out in chapter four (see
table three, page 185), there is some disagreement, even among Iranian area specialists, on the postures and preferences these four clerics espouse. This study helps fill in those gaps through the empirical results of tables thirty-four through thirty-eight (pages 337-341, see also Appendix A for specific interpretation of the numerical scores in those tables). These tables, which furnish the exhibited postures of the four clerics, can be compared with the expected postures based on the observations of Iranian area specialists (table three). 1 Utilizing the observations of Iranian area specialists, it was not possible to discern the stances of Montazeri and Khamanei on the aggressiveness posture (see table three, page 185). This is also the case with Montazeri in regard to the involvement posture.

Our results in tables thirty-four (page 337) and thirty-six (page 339) indicate the following. Montazeri tends to advocate low aggressive behaviors whereas Khamanei urges a more moderate stance. With respect to the involvement posture, Montazeri favors moderate involvement with the United States. He is moderate, though, in the sense that his preferences fluctuate. In some circumstances, Montazeri has been very hostile toward the U.S. (e.g. United States downing of airbus), while in other circumstances he has suggested the U.S. was not at fault (e.g. escorting of Kuwaiti tankers).

Another leader which can be better defined is Rafsanjani. As shown in table three (page 185), based on the observations
of Iranian area specialists, we would expect Rafsanjani to favor minimal (or low) use of aggressive acts and little freedom of expression, as well as support moderate amounts of centralization of power. However, the empirical results in tables thirty-four, thirty-seven, and thirty-eight (pages 337, 340 & 341) do not support this expectation. Rafsanjani urges moderate aggressiveness, moderate freedom of expression, and high centralization of power.

Beyond this direct comparison of table three with the empirical results of tables thirty-four through thirty-eight, the empirical results provide a greater understanding of the subtle differences within an individual cleric as well as among the preferences of these four Iranian leaders. For instance, in chapter four and five, I argued for the distinction between the involvement and aggressiveness postures. The data of tables thirty-four through thirty-eight support the idea this differentiation is important for some leaders.

As shown in table thirty-four (page 337), Khamanei urges moderate aggressiveness. He usually does not go to the extreme as does Mohtashemi. For instance, with regard to the Mecca incident, Khamanei did not call for a hostile response (or see implication of Rushdie edict). While he is not averse to using force, Khamanei tends to advocate a firm, but not overly hostile preference. However, if we move to the involvement with the United States posture (see table thirty-
six, page 339), Khamanei often calls for attack and retaliation.

Rafsanjani supports possible talks, and relations, with the U.S. (see table thirty-six, page 339). This is in direct contrast to Khamanei. Yet, with regard to the aggressiveness posture (table thirty-four, page 337), these two are not that far apart. However, there is an important distinction. Khamanei tends to favor moderate aggressiveness throughout the eight test cases whereas Rafsanjani's preferences oscillate (note standard deviations). Thus, at times (e.g. Mecca incident or support for Palestinians), Rafsanjani urged a much more belligerent and hostile position.

Montazeri favors a minimal amount of hostile behavior (see table thirty-four). Yet, with regard to the U.S., he vacillated according to the circumstance. Mohtashemi, on the other hand, was consistently advocating hostile behaviors whether it related to the U.S. or not (see tables thirty-four and thirty-six).

One last finding of this study is particularly germane to those interested in Iranian politics. In chapter six (tables twenty-one through twenty-five, pages 313-318), I proposed four different ideological groups -- Radicals, Moderates, Radicals/Moderates, and Backers of the Revolution. These tables outline the expected positions each of the four groups are expected to embrace regarding the thirty-four test cases of this study. These hypotheses can be compared to the
exhibited preferences of the four clerics (as presented in tables thirty-four to thirty-eight, pages 337-341). This has been done and is provided in tables forty-seven through fifty (pages 379-382).

Based on our discussion in chapters three and four, some of the results are not unexpected. Mohtashemi’s preferences overwhelmingly correspond to the preferences of the Radicals (see table forty-seven, page 379). Although not to the equivalent extent, the same is the case for Rafsanjani, except his positions mirror the Moderates (see table fifty, page 382). Montazeri’s advocacy positions are most similar to the Backers of the Revolution (see table forty-eight, page 380). However, with regard to the autonomy posture, he is more in agreement with the Radicals while with respect to the involvement posture, his preferences tend to match that of the Moderates. No wonder observers have had trouble deciding whether Montazeri is a Moderate, a Radical, or something else.

Khamanei’s preferences fit the Radicals/Moderates group (see table forty-nine, page 381). But, there are some notable distinctions. As for the aggressiveness and autonomy postures, Khamanei’s positions diverge from the preferences of the Radicals. However, in regard to involvement with the U.S., his preferences move toward the Radicals. Again, just like Montazeri, it is understandable why some observers have called him a Moderate, a Radical, or both (see chapters three and four).
Revolutionary Authoritarian Regimes: A second implication of this study has to do with revolutionary authoritarian regimes. There is no reason to believe that because we are in a post-cold war world that such regimes will disappear or no longer emerge. As discussed in chapter one, we need further understanding of those who are a part of such regimes. How can this study of one revolutionary authoritarian regime add to our understanding of revolutionary authoritarian regimes in general? This study might be useful to any analysis of revolutionary authoritarian regimes for two reasons. First, it proposes a way to define variables (i.e. the five postures, for instance) and clarify questions. Second, its comprehensiveness allows researchers of future studies of such regimes to determine the ways in which the results of their studies are similar or different.

Dukes (1965), in his review of a number of psychological studies, suggested there are many instances of pivotal research in which the observations were limited to one case. As Dukes asserts, a single case is appropriate for clarifying questions and defining variables. This study, at a minimum, does help to begin to unravel some variables.

Kennedy (1979) contends for a single case to be ultimately useful to generalizing, it must be comprehensive so future research can discern the similarities and differences. Kennedy (1979:675-677) proposes the single case method should include two aspects which (translated in regard to this
study) are: 1) longitudinal information which provides not only the individual background of each cleric but also the social context, and 2) assessment by more than one method as was done in this study with both personalities and postures of the clerics. In other words, the extensive analysis of these four clerics is an effort to work toward generalizations of political actors within revolutionary authoritarian regimes.

In discussing the issue of generalizability of the Iranian case, some of the attributes of the Iranian regime become pertinent as potential sources of scope conditions for a more comprehensive theory of revolutionary authoritarian regimes. First, the nation has experienced a multifaceted program of change in pursuit of a doctrinally-defined utopia. Second, those who are pursuing this program of change are in a position to, and do, impose their "utopia" on the rest of the nation. They wield authority so as to bring about the zealous reformation of human society in their nation. Third, the leaders of the revolution consider their utopia applicable to the rest of the world. The revolution is exportable -- by force and/or as a model nation. Fourth, the domestic opposition which challenges the basic legitimacy of this revolutionary regime is of minimal importance. That is, the revolutionary authoritarian regime has consolidated power.

This study is generalizable to those regimes that have attributes similar to the four above. It may bear fruitful insights for other realms. However, generalizing to other
regimes and providing insights for other domains are not the same.

Preliminary Theory: A third implication of this study relates to the propositions presented in chapter six regarding how the leaders exhibiting various orientations construct the world. Based upon the results of Mohtashemi's preferences, it may be that those leaders who possess an Influential orientation may be more belligerent, seek greater autonomy, and desire little involvement. Such an actor, as Mohtashemi, may be inclined to embrace an aggressive (or jingoistic) isolationistic position (see McClosky's 1967 work on isolationism). There is an extreme aversion to those outside Islam as well as advocating a punishing reply to external threats. Possibly, in the sociopolitical environment of the revolutionary authoritarian regime the Influential responds in this manner. Such responses are not incompatible with the conceptualization of the Influential (see chapter six) who is extremely responsive to those this political actor is trying to lead.

Montazeri, who exhibited a Mediator Integrator orientation according to the data of this study, did not fit the pattern expected in two cases under the autonomy posture. With regard to the Dumas visit and relations with Egypt test cases (see table thirty-four, page 337), Montazeri rejected relations. We could hypothesize, in revolutionary authoritarian regimes in which nations like France or Egypt are considered hostile, the leader with a Mediator Integrator
orientation sees no hope of resolving differences (see table fourteen, page 258) based upon their past actions. Thus, such a leader becomes somewhat of a "conciliatory isolationist" (see McClosky 1967).

Another orientation worth noting is the Expansionist. With Khamanei, who exhibits this orientation, it is interesting to point out, with respect to those test cases which were not relevant to his predisposed schemas of situations and others, his preferences deviated from the hypothesized pattern. However, his exhibited preferences were often consistent with the preferences of the powerholders (i.e. Moderates). This was the case with the export of revolution and Rushdie test cases (see table thirty-four, page 337, and Appendix A). Thus, even for the Expansionist orientation, the extent of his aggressiveness is influenced by the preferences of the powerholders. The Expansionist is keenly aware of where the powerholders within the regime stand.

**Personality Typologies:** A fourth implication of this study relates to how the Hermann political personality framework was embellished. As discussed in chapter six, typing (i.e. the use of orientations, types, or patterns), for some, is used for descriptive purposes and, therefore, does not add to the prediction of postures. For others, it is assumed that characteristics form a unique gestalt and such a configuration (i.e. orientation) is useful for predicting to postures in a
way that the characteristics used to define the type can not. This study embraced the latter position. That is, types (i.e. orientations) are considered as more than mere descriptors (i.e. in which traits, or sets or traits, are evaluated in isolation from the others). Each type is considered a unified whole which is made up of not only the traits but also the relationship between the traits.

This study supports the argument that typologies are more than mere descriptors. Characteristics form a unique gestalt which are useful in understanding, explaining, and predicting a political actor's postures. This is a very trenchant point because political psychologists, like psychologists, have often expended their time and efforts on one or two traits in an attempt to understand, explain, and predict the behaviors of actors. While there have been some notable findings, we are still far from the promised land. A couple of examples should illustrate this.

Sniderman (1975:305-315) suggests those with low self esteem will work against democratic values and urge little freedom of speech. This hypothesis is not in agreement with the results of this study. As table twenty-six (page 322) indicates, Montazeri exhibits low self confidence (standard score of 38) whereas Mohtashemi demonstrates high self confidence (standard score of 61). Yet, as presented in table thirty-seven (freedom of expression, page 340), Mohtashemi
urges little freedom of expression while Montazeri urges greater amounts of freedom of expression.

Another example can be illustrated by using Winter's (1992) recent summary of single variable research findings. He outlines some conclusions can be drawn from his literature review by grouping foreign policy behaviors into two broad categories: 1) War disposition -- war, hostility, advocacy of force and independent foreign policy, and 2) Peace disposition -- cooperation and interdependent foreign policy. The war disposition is related to the power motive, nationalism, distrust, and dominance while the peace disposition is linked with affiliation, self confidence, complexity, trust, and extraversion.

Two of the postures of this study, aggressiveness and autonomy, are relevant to the two dispositions outlined by Winter. One would expect the high aggressiveness and high autonomy postures to be associated the personality characteristics of the war disposition. On the other hand, we would anticipate low aggressiveness and low autonomy to be connected with the characteristics of the peace disposition. Thus, what would this tell us about Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani?

As shown in table twenty-six (page 322), Montazeri demonstrates one of the higher affiliation scores (compared to the other three clerics), as well as displaying a low need for power and low nationalism. These characteristics are linked
to the peace disposition. However, Montazeri exhibits low complexity and low self confidence which are associated with the war disposition. Would this knowledge have led us to the conclusions, as shown in tables thirty-four and thirty-five (pages 337-338), that Montazeri generally urges low aggressiveness and high-moderate autonomy in Iran's foreign policy? I think not. If one follows the same logic for the other three clerics, I think similar conclusions will generally be reached.5

Situational and Dispositional Moderators: The fifth implication of this study has to do with how the Hermann political personality framework was employed. Implicitly, I have embraced an interactional approach which suggests we need to examine both the actor's personality and the situation in order to discover the factors which account for one's postures and preferences. When we try to use personality or situational analysis to explain everything, it often results in explaining very little. Thus, the model I proposed in chapter six can not explain all situations. It indicates which preferences to expect by incorporating an "if-then" hypothesis.

Hermann ties traits to orientations and I have attempted to tie the six orientations to specific ways the environment is structured (i.e. schemas). This, in turn, guides an actor to embrace certain postures and ultimately certain preferences. However, the linkage to specific preferences
depends both on situational and dispositional moderators that are implied in several of the chapters. It is worthwhile to bring them together and explicitly state them.

Two situational moderators are important. One situational moderator is the differentiation between constraining versus nonconstraining situations. In the former there is much pressure to voice the same line. In the case of Iran, this often occurred when the late Ayatollah Khomeini issued a decree. The rest of the clerics followed suit. A second situational moderator may be the leader's power position within the regime. If the leader is at the top of the hierarchy, and possibly even part of those in-power rather than out-of-power (loyal opposition), then personality should have more of an impact on preferences and postures.

As for the dispositional moderators, there are at least two. As presented in chapter seven, one dispositional moderator is sensitivity to the environment which Hermann has so persuasively brought forth in her works. For the less sensitive leader, personality becomes more important for guiding preferences and posture; while for the more sensitive, it is the situation. The other dispositional moderator, presented in chapter six, is the distinction between meaningful versus nonmeaningful situations. If the event or issue is not relevant to the actor due to his orientation, then the actor's predisposed schemas (as delineated in chapter six) are not likely to affect his preferences.
Therefore, I think the Hermann framework of political personality (and other political personality typologies) may be less helpful in constraining situations, as well as when the political actor is not one of those in-power (i.e. out-of-power). Likewise, the impact of personality is likely to be dampened the more sensitive the leader is to the environment. This may have been the case for Mohtashemi, in which mediocre results were obtained. He is one out-of-power as well as a leader with an Influential personality, which as chapter six points out, is one of the more sensitive orientations.

**International Relations and Decisionmaking Theories:** The sixth implication of this study relates to international relations theories and decisionmaking theories. One dominant perspective in international relations is Realism. As Larson (1985:17) states, Realists are "situationists", in psychological jargon, and, therefore, all political actors interpret the environment, and its international and domestic constraints, in the same manner. Consequently, it is assumed political actors' preferences and postures are the same for all actors within a regime. The focus is on the external environment since variation in the domestic or international structure positions will change preferences and postures.

This research endeavor has proposed that actors within a regime structure their environment differently. Leaders with different types (i.e. orientations) define the world in different ways. How the actor defines his world is crucial to
understanding how the actor will respond. In other words, there is no "objective" situation in which all actors of a regime interpret the situation similarly. The results of this study support this contention as these four clerics do not have the same preferences or postures.

A corollary, of the notion of the inappropriateness of considering the existence of an accurate view of social phenomena, is that we can not assume people or leaders are ignoring or incorrectly interpreting the environment. Sylvan and Thorson (1992) have urged care in using the concept of "misperception" because of the existence of framing effects on problem representation. This study supports this.

Moving to the decisionmaking theories, the Rational choice model assumes a utility function can be inferred. To apply it, one must make assumptions about motives, perceptions, and the like. However, as Herrmann (1988:200) has cogently stated, "We cannot pretend that perceptions and worldviews, much less values and motives, are immediately obvious and easily identified". In other words, we need studies like this one in order to understand what assumptions can be made.

In chapter one we extensively discussed the importance of this research in regard to decisionmaking theories. Earlier decisionmaking theories concentrated on the political context while research in the 1970's and 1980's focused on the constraints that affect decisionmaking preferences. While the
work in these areas is far from finished, my recommendation for the 1990's, is to develop and pursue similar efforts in understanding the nature and extent of individual differences. As Simon (1985:302) has incisively expressed, "to understand political choices, we need to understand where the frame of reference for the actors' thinking comes from."

This study is in agreement with the view that individuals are cognitively limited decisionmakers. People are cognitive misers who often do not actively seek out (or even observe) all available information in order to make some rational, value maximizing decision. Instead people rely on shortcuts to make decisions which may occur whether there is too much information or too little. In other words, it is a "bounded rationality" view of human information processing (see Simon 1985; Simon 1979).

As I have done in this study, an interactional perspective which considers both the situation and personality needs to be embraced. I am not suggesting political actors are always inclined toward stereotypical thinking which is predisposed by their personality. To the contrary, as the preliminary theory in chapter six indicates, context matters. I have attempted to outline when it matters. In direct contrast to the rational choice model, this study supports the contention people make choices and decisions in context.

Concept of Change: The seventh implication of this study relates to the concept of change. It has long been recognized
that individuals and politicians shift their positions or preferences. The preliminary theory presented in chapter six offers some insight into this area. Implicit in the theory is the notion that change in preferences may occur in a number of ways. Two ways will be discussed.

A leader may easily change his position in those cases which are not relevant to his predisposed schemas. In those cases, unless he has another schema which is activated, his preferences may likely mirror the preferences of those he identifies with or possibly what is politically expedient. Thus if the group he identifies with changes or the situation changes, preferences will not be stable. For instance, as it was noted, in the Expansionist orientation, as exhibited by Khamanei, such a leader will, with regard to the nonmeaningful cases, follow the preferences of the powerholders, which in the Iranian case is the Moderates. However, if the Radicals become the powerholders we would expect the Expansionist to alter his preferences on those nonmeaningful test cases.

Another way change may occur relates to how the leader categorizes the issues and entities which confront him. For instance, Montazeri, who exhibits the Mediator Integrator orientation, defines others according to the following criteria (see table fourteen, page 258): Those who are open to settling/solving differences and those who are not. If an entity is no longer considered open to solving differences, the preferences of this actor toward the entity (or entities)
change. Either the entity is classified in the other category or a different schema may be activated. Nonetheless, some preferences (and possibly postures) can be expected to be open to change.6

Policy Ramifications: The eighth implication of this study relates to the policy ramifications. Part of this has already been described in regards to our discussion on change, in this chapter. Another part has been discussed with respect to the mapping out of the postures and preferences, in chapter seven. We can, albeit, make a few additional comments.

As for Khamanei and Rafsanjani, it was speculated in chapters three and four that they would continue to work together owing to a number of factors (political reasons, personal experiences together, and so forth). The personality analysis of chapter seven would suggests that their personalities are compatible. Khamanei, as an Expansionist, is power oriented, while Rafsanjani, as an Opportunist, is not. Rafsanjani has no problem sharing power with others and Khamanei is unlikely to see him as a threat. The old saying -- opposites attract -- has definite merit with these two. Furthermore, the preferences of Khamanei and Rafsanjani on the test cases of this study (see tables thirty-four through thirty-eight, pages 337-341) are not extremely different. The most notable relate to involvement with the United States. By and large, their positions are not at opposite ends of the spectrum.
In contrast, Khamanei will likely view Mohtashemi as a threat who desires to ultimately take control. These two clerics have conflicting personalities and will be at odds. Efforts to curtail Mohtashemi will be supported.

Mohtashemi, with the Influential orientation, fits the "true believer" notion. So as to become influential, Mohtashemi vociferously makes it known that he has not deviated from the late Ayatollah Khomeini's teachings. Thus, while he will have his ups and downs, there will be moments when raising the flag, or in this case raising Khomeini's teachings, will provide him with instant followership.

Montazeri, as suggested in chapters three and four, is not likely to be at the forefront. He is a reluctant leader who is not interested in being a leader. Furthermore, as the Mediator Integrator orientation indicates, if he does not see the possibility of differences being resolved, Montazeri is unlikely to speak up and possibly, at times, isolate himself which he has done in the past. He will be a player in those times when Khamanei and Rafsanjani need his support.

**Study of Lives:** The ninth implication of this study relates to those who study the lives of individuals (e.g. biography). This book has concentrated on four revolutionary Iranian elites who were right hand men of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. These four clerics participated in sowing the seeds of revolution, developing, and shaping it. They are still major players in the present Iranian political arena. This study
has sought to make sense of the lives of each of these clerics.

Throughout this book, we have characterized the four clerics in a number of different ways utilizing some of the personality frameworks in chapter two. Let us, however, cast the four in a more down-to-earth manner. Rafsanjani is like the fox who is endowed with manipulating men and affairs. He is the crafty wheeler-dealer who is masterful at compromise, bargaining, and negotiating. Khamanei resembles the lion who defends the territory as well as the interests of his group. He will return blow for blow to those who even threaten his group or territory. Montazeri is similar to the cat whose usual easy-going style can be dramatically changed if cornered. He prefers to sit back and watch -- deciding when and where to enter the scene. Mohtashemi is analogous to the wolf who is a rapacious, fierce predator. His extreme hunger for power makes force a usual option.

In terms of power the four clerics are different and can be characterized in the following manner. Khamanei is one who utilizes power whereas Rafsanjani is one who manipulates power. Mohtashemi is one who is on a never ending quest for power while Montazeri seeks the avoidance of power.

This study utilized both qualitative and quantitative methods to describe, explain, and predict. We have extensively delineated how these four are alike, how they are like other leaders, and how they are unique. In one sense,
this book is the story of the lives of Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani.

**Revolutionary Personalities:** The tenth and final implication of this study brings us full circle from where this book began. This book started out by presenting some vignettes about revolutionary leaders such as Castro, Che, and Kaddafi. What can we say about the notion of the "revolutionary personality"?

Recently, Walt (1992:329-330), in attempting to explain the strong association between revolution and war, deduced the approach of focusing on the personality of the revolutionary leader furnishes us with a very limited explanation. He is not alone in this supposition. Calvert (1990:65) concludes the role of revolutionary leaders is interesting, but in the end, gives us few answers. They almost echo Kautsky's (1969) inference (of over twenty years ago) that it may be hopeless to look for distinctions in revolutionaries.

These researchers presume this to be the case for a number of reasons. First, as Zimmermann (1983:307-308) points out, personality studies of revolutionaries are usually qualitative with questionable explanations. Second, very often there is a neglect of the context (Calvert 1984:89). Third, and one of the most damning, studies of revolutionaries usually lack strong theoretical construction between personality and policy preferences (Walt 1992:329).
The study in this book has addressed these issues head on. It is a systematic, rigorous research endeavor. Context has not been ignored and it has been an important feature in understanding the choices advocated. Furthermore, this study has painstakingly outlined the link between personality and preferences.

However, even when these issues are addressed, as Walt (1992:329) states, the analyses of the "revolutionary personality" has informed us little about the choices the revolutionary is likely to embrace in specific decisions. To some extent, Walt is expecting too much, considering the stage of development of revolutionary personality research. In all fairness, it should be recognized that previous studies of revolutionaries have been preoccupied in basically two areas: 1) why certain people become revolutionaries (e.g. Wolfenstein 1967; Rejai 1979) and 2) classifying revolutionaries by their social background (e.g. Greene 1984:60-74; Strauss 1973) or by the role they play in the revolution (e.g. Rejai 1979; see also Hagopian 1974:329). Thus, lacunas exist in a number of other areas in revolutionary personality research.

This study seeks to address the gap of understanding the influence personality has upon policy choices in regard to revolutionaries. As this study shows, the personalities of revolutionaries can inform us about their postures, preferences, and choices. As stated in chapter seven, we were
even able to predict future postures. Moreover, we stated where we thought the predictions would be most applicable.

In chapter one, we indicated we would explore the distinction between the Idealist (who seeks expansion of the movement by seeking a new world order) and the Realist (who is concerned with the stability of the movement so, for the present, seeks to work with the existing world order) in revolutionary authoritarian regimes. Some Iranian analysts would argue that it is not possible to distinguish between Idealists or Radicals and Realists or Pragmatists (Echo of Iran July 1990:16). Yet, this study suggests this characterization works for the most extreme political actors. Refinement is needed for those political actors who fall in the middle. For instance, in our Iranian study, Mohtashemi is an Idealist and Rafsanjani is a Realist. However, for the other two clerics who are in the middle, it is not as clear. In those cases, this is where the three foreign policy postures -- aggressiveness, autonomy, and involvement -- and the two domestic postures -- freedom of expression and centralization of power -- help delineate where the differences occur, as well as circumscribe the nature of the differences. In other words, these postures help define who is more of an Idealist in some respects and more of a Realist in other respects. For instance, these postures assist us in discerning whether Khamanei or Montazeri is an Idealist or
Realist, which as pointed out in chapters three and four, is a bone of contention among Iranian area specialists.

Let us move on to another point of concern that is relevant to this study and the "revolutionary personality". It is often assumed that revolutionaries exhibit one personality -- the "revolutionary personality". Such a syndrome usually includes the traits of suspiciousness, authoritarianism, stubbornness, narcissism, and extreme self confidence (e.g. Rejai 1979:180-182; Hagopian 1974:324-327; Kimmel 1990:72; Leiden and Schmitt 1968:81; Walt 1992:329). However, as this study indicates, none of the four clerics demonstrated all of these characteristics. Khamanei does show some authoritarian tendencies and Mohtashemi is somewhat narcissistic. Yet, Rafsanjani and Montazeri exhibit none of these traits. Revolutionary leaders demonstrate a number of different personalities. Consequently, it would seem that we should be discussing "revolutionary personalities" instead of a "revolutionary personality".

One final point that this study can help illuminate relates to a question Hagopian (1974:320) has raised. He asked the question of whether the distribution of personality types among revolutionaries is roughly similar to that for the broader class of political leaders. This study would suggest that the personalities of revolutionary leaders are quite similar to that of the broader class of political leaders. In utilizing Margaret Hermann's framework, which has been
employed with over one hundred political leaders, the Iranian revolutionary clerics fit fairly well into the six orientations typically seen among political leaders in general. Thus, successful (i.e. those who survive through the consolidation phase) revolutionaries do not seem much different than other world leaders in general.

Limitations of This Study

As with any study, there are a number of limitations. Some have already been noted in earlier chapters. Nevertheless, three limitations need to be explicitly stated.

First, clearly, more work is needed before we can acquire increased confidence in the theory proposed in chapter six. It should also be reiterated, the preferences exhibited by these four clerics covered a five year span within one nation. Thus, while the results are promising, one's enthusiasm must be tempered with reality.8

The second limitation is that we can not predict to behavior solely on the basis of knowledge about these actors' postures or preferences. Knowledge of postures will not necessarily enable us to predict because other factors, such as group dynamics, may play a role. Thus, for instance, it was indicated that Khamanei and Rafsanjani discuss issues between themselves as well as each having some advisors. Preferences which result from these discussions may be impacted by group factors. We can, however, knowing the
preferences Rafsanjani and Khamanei are likely to embrace, predict the range of alternatives considered.

The third limitation relates to predicting preferences with respect to certain issues, events, or entities. In chapter six, it was proposed that personality structures one's schemas about situations and others, which leads one to possess certain postures. This, in turn, guides one to embrace certain preferences. However, as stated in chapter six, we can not assume a one-to-one relationship. Various structural and idiosyncratic factors may be at work. For instance, due to experiences, one may develop other schemata. This seems to be the case with Rafsanjani in regard to the Palestinian issue. As table thirty-four shows, his response is harsh on this issue even though we would not have expected this based on the model in chapter six. Yet as pointed out in chapter three, he has an intense interest in this area and has studied it. Thus, we could speculate, that on this issue, Rafsanjani has an idiosyncratic schema.9

Future Areas of Study

A number of different studies can be undertaken in light of the results from this study. The exact nature of the study may vary depending upon what the analyst finds all-absorbing. But, any of these following suggestions, in whatever form, should prove useful to our future understanding.
One future study, which would prove useful, is to apply the preliminary theory in chapter six to another revolutionary authoritarian regime and attempt to predict to future postures. Within this study one may opt for a longer time period in regard to ascertaining the political actors' exhibited preferences. One could observe if preferences change and, if so, do they do so in a relative sense to one another? Also do changes in preferences occur in the way expected according to the preliminary theory? Are there any contrasting scope conditions which may account for differences between that study and the present one?

Another study might consider using another framework, such as one of those presented in chapter two. Does it add additional insights? Or do we attain essentially similar results?

Another study might develop more than the five postures presented in this analysis. Does this provide any additional insights? Such an analysis may prove useful if test cases are incorporated which relate to nations that are considered friends of the revolutionary regime. In this study, no such test cases were incorporated. This is an area which needs to be explored.

Another study might explore the similarities and differences between revolutionaries and those, who because of historical factors, are criminals, deviants, and outcasts. Wolfenstein (1967) has suggested that these latter roles are
the alternative setting for the revolutionary leader when the historical conditions for revolution are not present. Are criminals or outcasts more similar to revolutionaries than deviants? A number of such questions could be answered by such a study.

Conclusion

Political scientists are often divided into those who are engaged in area studies (who often do qualitative work) and those who are engaged in international relations theory or generalizers (who often do quantitative work). These different emphases are reflected in graduate training and professional publications. At times, there is an overlap, but efforts to integrate different approaches are far from the usual. This study makes a modest attempt to bridge these gaps so as to bring about further developments for theory but also to convey practical knowledge to the observer of Iranian politics.

This study may not satisfy the area specialist; nor may it satisfy the international relations theorist. For the area specialist, parts of this study, such as proposing certain test cases are an indicator of a particular posture, are likely unpalatable. The historical and situational aspects have been pushed under the rug. For some international relations theorists, the study of a particular case is at most a peripheral interest. The risk, however, for not seeking to
bridge these two will result in international relations theories having have little practical relevance to the area specialist and the practitioner as well as area studies continuing to be caught in the web of endless debate.

One purpose of this book was an attempt to contribute to efforts to adapt the study of international relations to political personality in light of the cognitive revolution (see Gardner 1985 and Herrmann 1988 on impact of cognitive revolution). I have sought to grasp who the four clerics are and what stances they prefer Iran to embrace. Similarly, I have endeavored to further our understanding of revolutionary authoritarian regimes and revolutionaries. For as T. E. Lawrence (or better known as Lawrence of Arabia) stated,

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All men dream; but not equally.
Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds
Awake to find that it was vanity;
But the dreamers of day are dangerous men,
That they may act their dreams with open eyes to make it possible.
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This book has been about four men who are dreamers by day.
Footnotes

1. As discussed in chapter seven, tables thirty-four through thirty-eight note both a mean and mode score. In this discussion, with respect to Rafsanjani, I have concentrated on the mean scores since they were better than the mode scores in representing the clerics' postures (see chapter seven for further discussion on this matter).

2. While we can not assume representativeness, it is more likely to be representative of revolutionary authoritarian regimes than other types of regimes.

3. We should keep in mind as Runyan (1983:420-428) asserts, the goal of social science is not solely to produce generalizations but also describe, explain, and predict.

4. One feature that may be unique of the Iranian regime is that it did not come to power via a military coup. The importance of this, if at all, is for future studies to disentangle.

5. With respect to Mohtashemi, as shown in table twenty-six (page 322), his score is the highest of the four on need for affiliation, complexity, and self confidence which are related to the peace disposition. However, he does exhibit the highest nationalism score which is linked to the war disposition. Would we have expected, as shown in tables thirty-four and thirty-five (pages 337-338), such a leader advocating aggressive acts and high autonomy? It is doubtful. Khamanei displays the highest scores of the four on the power and distrust characteristics. Along with this he demonstrates moderate-low affiliation and complexity. This would link him more to the war disposition. As tables thirty-four and thirty-five indicate, Khamanei, however, exhibits moderate aggressiveness and displays moderate-low autonomy.

Rafsanjani exhibits moderate-low need for power, low distrust, and moderate-high complexity which indicate the peace disposition. However, he does demonstrate low need for affiliation. As tables thirty-four and thirty-five show, Rafsanjani supports moderate aggressiveness (although on the low end) and low autonomy. Rafsanjani's postures, of the four clerics studied, come nearest to what we would anticipate by employing the characteristics in a summary manner.

6. With regard to the four clerics of this study, one such change in preferences, I believe, relates to Montazeri. Initially, after the Revolution of 1979, he seems to have believed settlement of the differences between Iran and the United States as well as the West was possible. However, after the American hostages and the bombing of the IRP
headquarters, a shift occurred. He seems to think that the West, and especially the United States, was not interested in solving the disagreements and conflicts.

7. This idea is taken form Kluckhohn and Murray's (1953:53) classic dictum that "Every man is in certain respects (a) like all other men, (b) like some other men, (c) like no other man".

8. Methodological caveats were presented in chapter five.

9. Larson (1985:350) in her analysis of Truman concludes that schemas may be highly idiosyncratic and derived from personal experience.

10. Keniston (1965:466) makes a useful distinction between "behavioral norms" and "cultural values" which may be applicable in such a study. The former are social expectations about behavior which are often sanctioned by law and coercive power whereas the latter refers to general conceptions of the desirable. Do some types reject both while other types do not?
APPENDIX A
CODING INSTRUCTIONS AND THE TEST CASES

The following outlines the coding instructions for the test cases utilized in this study. This instructional appendix contains the procedures for coding as well as a list of the test cases along with the five point scale utilized for each test case. The test cases and their respective five point scales will be given to the coder according to the rules stated below. However, first the coder needs to read the procedure instructions and then code some practice test cases, which will be provided.

Procedure: The coder will code one test case at a time. A five point scale is provided for each test case. For each test case, the coder will be given a number of documents. Each of these documents must be coded separately. Once all the documents of that test case are coded, the coder will randomly be given another test case and its five point scale as well as the documents for that test case. Thus, the coder is given one test case at a time and only the five point scale for that test case. This will be repeated until all the subsequent test cases are rated.

In rating each document within a test case, the coder is searching for advocacy statements. Advocacy statements (borrowed from Stein and Brecher 1976) are ones in which the speaker urges or recommends a course of action for his nation with regard to a specific incident or issue. Such statements usually contain the verbs "must", "should", "ought", and "has to" or phrases like "in my opinion", "I believe", and "I think". We are searching for what the speaker thinks should be done and not what the government did. Once the coder locates the advocacy statement(s), the significant words or phrases should be bracketed. It is possible a number of phrases may be bracketed. Therefore, based on the advocacy statement(s), the coder should rate the document on the five point scale provided. The coder should remember that we are coding the document as a whole and not certain portions. Thus, the advocacy statements must be considered within the context of the document. The coder should then write down his/her rationale for coding the document. Additionally, if the speaker does not give his position, then the coder should not code the document.
Test Cases*

Aggressiveness

1) Meaning of export of revolution (post Iran-Iraq war through 1990):
   1 = attack or deliver blows to others.
   2 = revolutionary goals have primacy over national interests; political aspects are more important than domestic economic issues.
   3 = explicitly rules out the use of force.
   4 = we must express our ideas worldwide and, therefore, the revolution is not limited to geographical boundaries.
   5 = the nation should be a model for other nations to follow; national interest has primacy over revolutionary goals.

2) Response to July 1987 U.N. Resolution 598:
   1 = must have fall of Saddam; must have 20 year war strategy.
   2 = Iraq must be declared the aggressor; justice more important than peace.
   3 = the nation must defend itself; one sided resolutions not acceptable to us; unlikely diplomatic procedures will work.
   4 = accept some parts but not other parts of Resolution.
   5 = willingness to abide by the Resolution.

3) Response to the 1987 Mecca incident in which a number of Iranian pilgrims were killed:
   1 = must take revenge and attack.
   2 = must confront the embassies; must protest and demonstrate and/or take control of holy shrines.
   3 = we can not tolerate such action; must investigate incident closely.
   4 = do not take any militant action.
   5 = put together a petition to change the situation.

4) Issue of accepting Resolution 598 to end the war:
   1 = acceptance is detrimental; like drinking goblet of poison.
   2 = acceptance is not prudent.
   3 = necessary opportunity.
   4 = acceptance was in our best interest; we gained by it.
   5 = should have accepted it earlier.
5) What are the implications of the Imam's Rushdie edict (February 1989):
   1 = must get the nations to rise up against the infidels.
   2 = must demonstrate and climb the embassy walls.
   3 = edict shows Islam's strength; must stand up to insults by the West.
   4 = do not hold demonstration near embassies.
   5 = Rushdie's death sentence is not a basis for instigating militant actions.

6) Issue of holding Western hostages in Lebanon (early 1990):
   1 = should not free hostages.
   2 = the Westerners are the real terrorist not the hostage takers.
   3 = we are willing to help but the West is trying to impose its will on us and we are not the hostage takers; we must not submit to the will of the West.
   4 = desire for settlement of problem but we should not use our influence until the West makes use of their influence to our benefit.
   5 = will help with release of hostages but the West is making it difficult.

7) How should the Palestinians be supported during intifadah (after Iran-Iraq war through 1990):
   1 = Iran should enact a law to finance them.
   2 = Iran should be willing to sent troops to fight along side them; should seek out and help Palestinians who fight Israel.
   3 = Muslim nations must back Palestinians by waging holy struggle against Israel.
   4 = Islamic nations should send military, financial, and political support.
   5 = all Islamic nations should provide political and financial support.

8) Allied invasion of Iraq, January 1991:
   1 = must attack any of allied forces.
   2 = must supply Iraq with material and financial help.
   3 = condemns both sides; must wait and see what happens.
   4 = must be neutral in conflict.
   5 = will abide by U.N. decisions.
Autonomy

   1 = absolutely not under no circumstances because leads to dependence.
   2 = presently against the use of them.
   3 = need to rely on our own people; stress need to use domestic resources.
   4 = take advantage of them as long as no negative side affects; domestic resources not enough and must meet the needs of the people.
   5 = use of them is to our benefit otherwise will be dependent; can arrange an equitable relationship.

   1 = absolutely not under any conditions/circumstances.
   2 = presently against foreign loans.
   3 = must discuss issue further; depends on circumstance.
   4 = use of foreign loans to cover our needs.
   5 = will use foreign loans even with non-Third World nations.

3) Issue of whether to accept five year plan which emphasized industrial production over agricultural development (1989-early 1990):
   1 = all energies channeled to agricultural development.
   2 = primacy of agricultural development over industrial development.
   3 = combination of agricultural and industrial development; allow one's capabilities to grow.
   4 = primacy of industrial development over agricultural development.
   5 = all energies channeled to industrial development.

4) Concern for world opinion, international institutions, and international conventions (1989-1990):
   1 = reject international laws and institutions or world opinion.
   2 = attack international laws and institutions.
   3 = concern about world opinion of Iran; neither accept or reject international laws and institutions.
   4 = accepts international institutions and laws.
   5 = supports international laws and institutions; seeks to abide by U.N. decisions.
5) Should Iran reengage with the West - the Dumas visit (February 1989):
1 = oppose relations with France because can only trust other Muslim or victimized nations.
2 = oppose relations with France because of their hostile actions toward us.
3 = cannot cooperate with France in certain ways such as with loans or investments.
4 = must have relations with France but must make sure it is not a relationship of domination; cannot be isolationistic.
5 = desires relations with France and other Western nations.

6) Should Iran establish relations with Egypt (1989-1990):
1 = opposed to relations with Egypt and any other nation not pro-Islam.
2 = opposed to relations with Egypt.
3 = ties only under certain conditions with Egypt; wait and see.
4 = desire for ties with Egypt.
5 = desire for ties with Egypt and most other regional states.

7) Meaning of "neither East nor West" (post Iran-Iraq war to early 1990):
1 = must take offensive against East and West to bring about their downfall.
2 = no peaceful coexistence.
3 = leave us alone and we will leave you alone.
4 = should have relations with those who do not conspire against us and some nations no relations under any circumstances; should not be isolationistic.
5 = does not mean severance of relations with East or West, rather means neither dominance by East or West (i.e. not establish any dependence on them); those who are bullies, if they change their ways, relations possible and those who engage in criminal actions we may have relations if it is to our benefit.

Involvement with the Unites States:

1) Response to U.S. escort of Kuwaiti tankers (1987):
1 = must attack or struggle against U.S.
2 = will not show self restraint.
3 = can not be intimidated and will not announce what approach we will take.
4 = we will not retaliate.
5 = others dragged the U.S. into it.
   1 = must mobilize our resources for possible war with the U.S.
   2 = must retaliate/attack; cannot leave action unanswered.
   3 = will not show self restraint; will respond to aggressive acts.
   4 = will not be intimidated; does not indicate mobilizing forces or retaliating.
   5 = we should not retaliate and/or should review matter before making a decision.

3) Response to 18 April 1988 U.S. attack of oil platforms:
   1 = must mobilize our resources for possible war with the U.S.
   2 = must retaliate/attack; cannot leave action unanswered.
   3 = will not show self restraint; will respond to aggressive acts.
   4 = will not be intimidated; does not indicate mobilizing forces or retaliating.
   5 = we should not retaliate and/or should review matter before making a decision.

4) Response to U.S. shooting of Iranian airbus (July 1988):
   1 = must retaliate.
   2 = must not show any self restraint; will respond to this action in same manner.
   3 = must not announce what action we will take.
   4 = we must not retaliate.
   5 = airbus may have been shot down by mistake.

5) Should Iran have talks/relations with the U.S. (early 1990):
   1 = must deal blows to them.
   2 = reject relations or talks
   3 = want to be left alone; neither accept or reject talks or relations.
   4 = should consider having talks with the U.S. if the U.S. shows goodwill or meets certain conditions.
   5 = should have talks with the U.S. and relations possible.
6) Response to U.S. presence in the Gulf 1990 (August):
1 = must have holy war against U.S.; government should lend support and provide facilities for resistance against the U.S.
2 = can not permit the U.S. to take a foothold so an Islamic struggle is justified; must confront the U.S.; must show no self restraint.
3 = will not announce what approach we will take; condemns aggression by Iraq and the U.S.
4 = no objection to anyone heading off Iraqi aggression but the U.S. must leave when the crisis is over.
5 = U.S. presence is presently acceptable since we accept U.N. Security Council decision; U.S. will leave when crisis is over.

7) Response to U.S. presence in the Gulf 1990 (September/October):
1 = must have holy war against U.S.; government should lend support and provide facilities for resistance against the U.S.
2 = can not permit the U.S. to take a foothold so an Islamic struggle is justified; must confront the U.S.; must show no self restraint.
3 = will not announce what approach we will take; condemns aggression by Iraq and the U.S.
4 = no objection to anyone heading off Iraqi aggression but the U.S. must leave when the crisis is over.
5 = U.S. presence is presently acceptable since we accept U.N. Security Council decision; U.S. will leave when crisis is over.

Freedom of Expression

1) Adherence to Islamic dress (post Iran-Iraq war to early 1990):
1 = must wear proper Islamic clothes, must wear veil; combat permissiveness; those who do not wear proper Islamic dress are socially corrupt.
2 = unveiling is unhealthy and not good as well as disgraceful.
3 = should not be forced to wear veil but must cover hair; while no unnecessary strictness one can not go unrestrained.
4 = must observe minimum form of dress; chador and veil are not compulsory.
5 = people are not all the same so must make allowance and, at times, look the other way.
2) Formation and role of parties (1989-1990):
1 = reject the idea of parties.
2 = constitution allows them but must be fed the correct thoughts.
3 = liberals, freedom movement, and Bazargan have no support from the people.
4 = encourage the development of various parties.
5 = must have parties and freedom of speech for them.

3) Role of press (1989):
1 = should be censored.
2 = press should engage in self censorship and should only publish certain things; differences only on certain issues.
3 = press should concentrate on facts instead of political considerations, although they do not have to endorse the government position.
4 = press should engage in self censorship only on security related issues.
5 = press should not be censored.

4) Response to Khomeini's pardon of minigroup members (Feb-March 1989):
1 = violating the law is unforgivable; purge those who hinder the revolution.
2 = such minigroups cause dissension.
3 = hope they do not take advantage of it.
4 = good to be tolerant in some cases.
5 = good to be tolerant; lauds amnesty; those released should be integrated into society.

5) Response to Khomeini's decision to execute Mojahedin (1989):
1 = should never forgive traitors or political prisoners no matter which group.
2 = Mojahedin and those who have relations with them are traitors and must be dealt with harshly.
3 = the Mojahedin and those who assist them are traitors and cannot be forgiven.
4 = should reconsider some cases in this decision.
5 = should reconsider the decision.

6) Treatment of those who fled Iran (1989 to mid 1991):
1 = they will never have dignity; do not need them.
2 = some may eventually be accepted.
3 = minor offenses ignored.
4 = they can return.
5 = pave way for them to return; do not try to pump information from them.
Centralization

1) Proper role of free enterprise (post Iran-Iraq war to early 1990):

1 = want to bring most things under public ownership (i.e. should nationalize), in such cases results are positive; use cooperatives rather than the private sector; government intervention necessary.

2 = while involvement of private sector may be helpful, it must be limited. The government will create most of the jobs; the government should not encourage the private sector since only a few would benefit.

3 = government must both plan and supervise the private sectors activities.

4 = government must supervise but private sector's activities are inherently healthy and needed. Fundamental sectors run by government while the bulk of activities are left to the people.

5 = nationalization of many activities does not work; best for government not to engage in producing, distributing and other such activities itself; while some supervision and control necessary the government creates problems when it intervenes too much.

2) Consolidation within the executive and judicial branches (1989):

1 = consolidate the powers into one position.

2 = consolidate but not into hands of one person.

3 = issue must be discussed and decided upon.

4 = consolidate the powers temporarily in times of extreme crisis.

5 = do not consolidate powers at all.

3) Issue of merger of revolutionary guard and army (1988-89):

1 = must create a revolutionary institution merging forces together including guard, army, and other forces.

2 = desire merger for better coordination and unification.

3 = desire merger to save money.

4 = merge certain units or areas but not all.

5 = should not merge them.
4) How should government implement its plans (post Iran-Iraq war through mid 1989):
   1 = the revolution's center will solve the problems.
   2 = people's participation must be organized and directed.
   3 = delegate some lesser important responsibilities to the people but monitor them extensively.
   4 = delegate the responsibility on some issues but all executive work should be in the hands of the clerics.
   5 = delegate responsibility to the people and experts; not necessary to give all executive work to the clerics (i.e. delegate according to one's capabilities) trust the people and/or experts.

5) How should government formulate its plans (post Iran-Iraq war to early 1989):
   1 = people do the work and the government does the planning.
   2 = the thoughts of the people reach the government via representatives.
   3 = consultation on certain issues but not others; consultation of certain groups/experts.
   4 = consultation on issues is good.
   5 = consultation necessary; solicit opinion of people and experts.

6) Should the press be a monopoly in the hands of a few (early 1989):
   1 = should be in the hands of a few.
   2 = consolidation but not into the hands of a few.
   3 = press should be neither dispersed nor centralized; issue needs to be discussed and decided upon.
   4 = should be in hands of a few only in times of extreme crisis.
   5 = should not be in hands of few.

* The order of the test cases provided in this appendix is not the order they were presented to the coders. The test cases were randomly given to the coders.
APPENDIX B
A METHODOLOGICAL SUPPLEMENT

This appendix deals exclusively with the independent variable, personality. It is a supplement to chapter five with regard to how the materials were gathered for the assessment of the personality characteristics of the four clerics. Specifically, this appendix answers three questions: How many segments would be coded? How was the sampling of the verbal documents completed? How was sampling within the verbal materials accomplished?

The initial step was to decide how many segments to code for Rafsanjani, Khamanei, and Montazeri. As stated in chapter five this was not an issue for Mohtashemi since due to the constraint of available materials, fifty-two segments were coded for him. Nevertheless, approximately eighty segments were decided upon for the other three clerics. This decision was based on two factors which may impact the cleric's personality. These factors are changes in the actor's role and changes in the general climate of the times often denoted by significant events. As the biography of each of the four clerics describes in chapter three and as appendix C illustrates with the chronology of events, these four Iranian leaders, at times, played different roles (e.g. president or designated supreme leader) and had numerous events impact their lives (e.g war or internal unrest).

The question becomes, what roles and events should the analyst consider? Roles were, by and large, fairly straightforward. While chapter three provides the significant roles played by each leader, the major roles considered for this study are illustrated in tables fifty-one through fifty-four (pages 445-447) for Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani respectively. Mohtashemi had two major roles during the time his personality was assessed. As shown in table fifty-one, they are: 1) ambassador to Syria and 2) Interior Minister. As shown in table fifty-two, Montazeri's four role periods are: 1) prior to his election as chairman of the Assembly of Experts. At this time he resided in Qom where foreign personalities who visited the Imam would be received by him. 2) after elected chairman of Assembly of Experts and appointed Tehran's Friday Prayer Leader, 3) after returning to Qom and becoming its Friday Prayer Leader, and 4) after becoming designated successor to the Imam. Khamanei's
roles are divided into the following four periods (see table fifty-three): 1) before becoming Chairman of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and President of Iran, 2) after elected President and appointed Chairman of the IRP, 3) after his election to the Council of Experts and 4) after his reelection as President. Rafsanjani's major roles for this time period are (see table fifty-four): 1) prior to being elected Speaker of the Majlis, 2) after he was elected Speaker of the Majlis and, 3) after he was elected Deputy Chairman of the Assembly of Experts.

Deciding upon which significant events to consider is not as clear cut. To begin with, the analyst must decide upon what areas one wants to focus upon -- i.e. personal significant events and/or events important for all clerics in general. Additionally, even within significant general events relevant to most of the leaders, it can be sliced in many different ways. For instance, some Iranian analysts divide events by phases of the Iran-Iraq war (e.g. Metz 1989:226-227), periods of Iran's relations with the Gulf states (Chubin 1990:73-74), phases of Iranian foreign policy (e.g. Halliday 1986:95-100), or general periods (e.g. M. Behrooz 1990).1

The significant events chosen for the four clerics studied in this endeavor are a combination of significant personal events (e.g. assassination attempts) and events important to the regime in a general way (e.g. dismissal of Bani Sadr as president). While some of the events overlap for all four of the clerics, they are not all the same. Furthermore, the reader may be initially taken aback by the seemingly arbitrary dates reflected in a single incident which is chosen. Usually significant events build over time and no one single incident can be singled out as a turning point. Consequently, rationale is provided for the less obvious choices.2

Two significant events cut across three of the four clerics (i.e. Rafsanjani, Khamanei, and Montazeri). While these events are probably important to all the regime's leaders in general, at times, these two events took on special significance for Rafsanjani, Khamanei, and Montazeri. The two events are: 1) the 22 June 1981 dismissal of Bani Sadr as president and the subsequent bombing of the Islamic Republican Party headquarters on 28 June 1981. At least seventy-one high ranking politicians and government officials were killed in the bombing. 2) the Imam's 30 October 1984 declaration which instructed Iran to establish proper relations with most of the nations of the world.

The dismissal of Bani Sadr and the ensuing bombing of the Islamic Republican Party headquarters within a week had an impact personally and politically for Rafsanjani, Khamanei, and Montazeri. Personally, the bombing was significant for Rafsanjani because he left only a few minutes before the bomb exploded. Khamanei who was injured in a bomb attack the day before, was scheduled to attend. Additionally, he lost his
Mentor Ayatollah Beheshti, in the bombing. Montazeri lost his son in the bomb explosion.

The week of the dismissal and bombing are a culmination of a series of incidents which changed the players of the game. The Majlis on 21 June 1981 voted to impeach President Bani Sadr. The Imam, the next day, formally removed Sadr from office. After Sadr's dismissal, the clerics undertook to put their revolutionary ideology into practice themselves (Menashri 1986:508; Simpson 1988:101; Milani 1988:294; Bill 1988:263). Furthermore, with the bombing of the IRP headquarters a week later, Beheshti and a number of other elites were killed. Of the senior clerics, Beheshti was the only one with any experience in the non-Islamic world (Simpson 1988:99-100; see also chapter three for Beheshti's significance to Rafsanjani and Khamanei). Thus, not only were Khomeini's followers in control but these clerics had little exposure with the outside world.

This dividing line denotes the change of players. Maziar Behrooz (1990:16) calls the time prior to the dismissal of Sadr, the liberal period. With the bombing of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) headquarters, the clerics cracked down on dissidents in order to solidify their rule. Maziar Behrooz (1990:20) calls this time the period of isolation. However, the tag of isolation period is somewhat of a misnomer according to Menashri's (1986:511) analysis. He points out that after Sadr's dismissal, Iran began to gradually increase its participation in international assemblies, strengthen bilateral relations with Third World nations, and became involved in regional affairs. It was a shift away from total preoccupation with the domestic situation.

The other significant event is the 30 October 1984 declaration by the Imam in which he summoned Iranian diplomats abroad and instructed them to take a new approach by establishing proper diplomatic relations with all other nations except for a few like the U.S. While this incident is used as a cut off date, it is one in a series of incidents that indicate a change. Bill (1988:273) suggests that by 1984 the clerics had solidified their control of power. This seems to be the case in that the Butcher of Tehran was replaced in his role of Revolutionary Prosecutor on 4 February 1985. It appears, at this time, the rulers of Iran felt they had a handle on the domestic situation and were ready to adjust their international stance. The German foreign minister became the first high ranking Western official to visit Iran since the Revolution and by May 1985 the first high level diplomatic exchanges with Saudi Arabia took place.

The remaining events as shown in tables fifty-five to fifty-eight (pages 448-450) are fairly straightforward. These tables also include some subcategories within the major periods. Footnotes within each table explain the rationale for considering such events.
Now, that the various roles and events have been defined for each leader, we can determine the number of segments to be coded. Roles are given priority over events since their impact is assumed to be greater than events. Of the four clerics in this study, two of them, Montazeri and Khamanei (see tables fifty-two and fifty-three) have been differentiated into four role periods for the time covered in assessing characteristics. From previous experience in using Hermann's system of content analysis, I decided fifteen segments per role period were adequate. I increased it to twenty with the intent that the various event periods would also each contain fifteen segments. In any case, this resulted in the target number of eighty segments per leader to be obtained and coded.

The next step was to sample from the available materials to acquire the approximately eighty segments. As stated early, this only applies to Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani, since for Mohtashemi, we took the first fifty segments available and sampling was not applicable. Nevertheless, the sampling decisions for the other three clerics' verbal materials were based on the following criteria: 1) priority was given to the most spontaneous material -- that is, interviews, then speeches, and lastly sermons. Interviews are the most desirable because they minimize the effects of "ghost" writing and planned communication.5 2) the longest verbal document for that time period was given priority. Consequently, based on these two criteria, if there were enough interviews for the time period, then the three longest were chosen.6 If interviews were not available for that time period, then, as criteria one outlines, the longest speech was taken or added to the pool of gathered interviews.

The sampling of the documents for Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani was performed according to the criteria outlined. Usually, there were many interviews for Rafsanjani and Khamanei to choose from for each time period. However, during two time periods for Montazeri the choice was more limited and resulted in only one or two documents chosen for the time period. Within tables fifty-one through fifty-eight, the third column specifies the number of different dated verbal materials within each period utilized to assess personality. Once the verbal materials were chosen, at times, it was necessary to sample within these documents. This was achieved by initially separating each document into segments. For instance, with an interview, the speaker's response to a question is considered a segment. For a speech or sermon it included those sentences, usually a paragraph or set of paragraphs, which focused around a particular topic or issue. Any segment less than fifty words was either incorporated with an appropriate adjacent segment, if the topic was the same, or it was deleted. The segments were then categorized into topics. If the number of segments for a time period was greater than needed, the segments were sampled on
the basis of the same percentage of the various topics discussed by the leader himself. For example, if for one leader, there were forty-five segments for a time period but only fifteen were needed, then the same percentage of each topic discussed by that leader in the forty-five was reflected in the fifteen.

Tables fifty-nine through sixty-two (pages 451-454), with respect to the material used to assess personality, outline the nature of the topic discussed by Mohtashemi, Montazeri, Khamanei, and Rafsanjani respectively. The second column in each of these tables shows the number of segments content analyzed for each characteristic. Furthermore, in tables fifty through fifty-eight, the second column indicates the number of segments utilized in the various time periods.

Once the segments were chosen, they were recorded. All references to the clerics or their positions were inked out. Each leader was given a number. Along with this, the following information was acquired about the segment and noted: 1) nature of the topic discussed, 2) spontaneity of the segment (i.e. interview, planned interview, speech, or sermon), 3) nature of the verbal statement -- whether it was for domestic or international consumption. This was determined by a variety of factors. It was considered an international audience if foreign correspondents were present, the foreign press interviewed the political figure, or the Iranian media was mainly for external consumption. 4) the role and event periods were given a number and marked on each of the segments.

The nature of the materials content analyzed is summarized in tables fifty-one through sixty-two. Tables fifty-one to fifty-four indicate the number of segments by role. Tables fifty-five to fifty-eight note the number of segments by event. Tables fifty-nine to sixty-two show the number of segments by topic. A more general summary of the materials is provided in tables eight, nine and ten of chapter five.
### TABLE 51: Roles Considered in Assessing Mohtashemi's Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Periods</th>
<th>Number of Segments</th>
<th>Number of Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Ambassador to Syria</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) After becoming Interior Minister (28 October 1985)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 52: Roles Considered in Assessing Montazari's Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Periods</th>
<th>Number of Segments</th>
<th>Number of Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Received foreign personalities in Qom who visited the Imam</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) After elected Chairman of the Assembly of Experts and appointed Tehran's Friday Prayer Leader (18 August and 10 Sept. 1979)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) After return to Qom and became its Friday Prayer Leader (22 August 1980)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) After becoming designated successor to the Imam (23 November 1985)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 53: Roles Considered in Assessing Khamanei's Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Periods</th>
<th>Number of Segments</th>
<th>Number of Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Before becoming Chairman of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and President of Iran (1 Sept. and 2 Oct. 1981)</td>
<td>20*</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) After elected President and appointed Chairman of IRP</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) After elected to Council of Experts (13 December 1982)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) After re-elected President of Iran (19 August 1985)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These twenty segments are also prior to the bombing of the IRP headquarters (see table 56). Also prior to becoming President and Chairman, Khamanei held a number of different political positions such as supervisory of the Guard Corps, representative of the Revolution Council in the Ministry of Defense, and later he was elected as a Majlis Deputy from Mashhad.
### TABLE 54: Roles Considered in Assessing Rafsanjani's Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Number of Segments</th>
<th>Number of Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Before election as Speaker to Majlis* &lt;br&gt; a) before elected to Majlis (March 1980) &lt;br&gt; b) after elected to Majlis</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) After elected Speaker of Majlis (27 July 1980) &lt;br&gt; a) before appointed Imam's representative to the Supreme Defense Council</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) after appointed as Imam's representative to the Supreme Defense Council (11 October 1981)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) After elected Deputy Chairman of the Assembly of Experts (14 July 1983)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* All the segments of this period are prior to the Iran-Iraq war.
### TABLE 55: Events Considered in Assessing Mohtashemi's Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Periods</th>
<th>Number of Segments</th>
<th>Number of Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) 1981 to 28 October 1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) before assassination attempt</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) after assassination attempt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) 29 October 1984 to 11 June 1986</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) 12 June 1986 to June 1987</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 56: Events Considered in Assessing Montazeri's Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Periods</th>
<th>Number of Segments</th>
<th>Number of Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Before U.S. hostages taken by Iranian students (4 November 1979)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Before Islamic Republican Party (IRP) bombing (28 June 1981)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) After bombing to 28 October 1984</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) 29 October 1984 to 11 June 1986</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Periods</td>
<td>Number of Segments</td>
<td>Number of Documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Before Islamic Republican Party (IRP) headquarter's bombing</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(28 September 1981)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) After IRP bombing to 28 October 1984</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) before Iranian forces invade Iraq</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(July 1982)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) after invasion into Iraq</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) 29 October 1984 to 11 June 1986</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 58: Events Considered in Assessing Rafsanjani's Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Periods</th>
<th>Number of Segments</th>
<th>Number of Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Before the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) headquarter's bombing (28 June 1981)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) After IRP bombing to 28 October 1984</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) before Rafsanjani established himself as one of Iran's most powerful men*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) after establishing his power base</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) 29 October 1984 to 11 June 1986</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) before Iran establishes a beachhead on Iraqi territory of Fao**</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Iran takes Fao (February 1986)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Taheri (1985) contends by the end of 1982 Rafsanjani became one of the most powerful men in Iran. It would seem he was building his power base. In February 1982 Rafsanjani's brother-in-law became the minister of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. The previous August, his brother had been appointed the managing Director of the Voice and Vision of Iran.

** Chubin (1989) indicates Iran's military success between 1982 to 1986 were ephemeral. The February offensive was the culminating point of Iran's success in the war. A year later the Iranians would lose Fao to Iraq.
TABLE 59: Mohtashemi - The Nature of the Topics Discussed in the Verbal Materials Used for Personality Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Number of Segments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Government laws/procedures and election process</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Domestic opposition and corruption</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Personal and domestic issues and events (floods, imam, assassination attempt)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Relations and issues with pro-Iranian Muslim nations/movements (e.g. Syria, PLO, and Libya)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Enemies of Iran/Islam (e.g. U.S., Israel, Superpowers, Saddam, and Arab reactionary states)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topics</td>
<td>Number of Segments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Islamic Revolution, Imam, and the Imam’s decrees</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Clergy: Its role, institutions and differences</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Government organizations: Its role, problems, control and responsiveness to the people</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Freedom and rights of parties, groups, minorities, and nationalities</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Domestic opposition (smugglers and counterrevolutionaries)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Iran's foreign policy and the nature of its relations with other nations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Nations/entities maintaining ties, supporting, or subservient to the U.S., West, or other imperialistic states</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) West/Superpowers: Its policies and actions</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Economic issues</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topics</td>
<td>Number of Segments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Organization of the Government (reorganization and administration</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the Majlis; cabinet proceedings, constitutional matters)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Domestic religious/political and economic aspects</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Internal control and stability (purges, censorship, freedom, and</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterrevolutionaries)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Organization, administration, moral of armed forces and war</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) War policy, conditions for peace, and Iraq's war aims/position</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Iran's foreign policy and its role in the region</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Non-reactionary Muslim entities (Libya, Syria, Algeria, India,</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan, and the PLO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Anti-Iranian nations (U.S., West, and reactionary Arab states)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Other (personal, celebration of the Revolution)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 62: Rafsanjani - The Nature of the Topics Discussed in the Verbal Materials Used for Personality Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Number of Segments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Political process/structure and proceedings/decisions</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Pro-Shah forces and their activities</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Domestic groups, parties and individuals</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Anti-Iranian nations/entities (U.S., West, Israel, reactionary Arab states)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Non-imperialistic entities (Lebanon, Syria, Libya, PLO, China, Japan, and some African nations)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) War policy/peace conditions and Iraqi war aims</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Current situation of Iran-Iraq war</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) General foreign policy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Footnotes

1. See also Menashri (1986:508-512) and Mostyn (1988) for other Iranian analysts who divide events into time periods. Additionally, research suggests dramatic events may alter preferences and postures (e.g. Hart 1976; Ben-Zvi 1978; Boulding 1969; and Lebow 1981).

2. The reader should also be aware that I worked within the realm of the verbal materials gathered as delineated in chapter five. Therefore, an event may be significant but if there were no available materials for that period, it was dropped from consideration.

3. Menashri (1986:511) indicates the number of Iranian ambassadors actually at their post abroad increased from eight to thirty-five by October 1982.

4. Also by April 1985 the four year alliance between the two major armed opposition groups had broken down. On 17 July 1985 Ali Khamanei called for the elimination of unnecessary security precautions.

5. For further discussion of this issue see Hermann (1987d:175-176), Hermann (1974:210), and the discussion earlier in chapter five.

6. Also if there was a choice between a Newsweek or Time interview and a FBIS or JPRS interview, the latter one was taken because the former, at times, are edited.
APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS -- IRAN*

1979

13 January  Khomeini announces the establishment of the Council of the Islamic Revolution.
6 February  Khomeini names Medhi Bazargan as Provisional Prime Minister.
12 February  U.S. and USSR recognize the new regime.
17 February  The Islamic Republican Party is formed by the supporters of Khomeini.
24 February  The Islamic People's Republican Party is established by followers of Shariatmadari.
1 April  Islamic Republic declared after a March referendum favors such a move.
5 May  Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) is formally established under a decree issued by the Imam.
25 May  Rafsanjani is wounded in Tehran.
20 July  Revolutionary Guard Corps is merged into the Interior Ministry and Rafsanjani becomes Deputy Minister in charge of the Revolutionary Guard Corps.
3 August  Council of Experts consisting of 73 members is elected.
19 August  Montazeri elected as Chairman of the Council of Experts while Beheshti is elected its Vice Chairman.
20 August  Twenty newspapers are ordered closed.
10 September  Montazeri is appointed by the Imam as Tehran's Friday Prayer Leader.
14 October  Council of Experts approves constitutional clause giving Khomeini power of veto over election of President and names him head of armed forces.
4 November  Iranian students seize American hostages in the U.S. embassy. By mid November Bazargan resigns.
5 November  Iran cancels 1957 Treaty of Military Cooperation with the U.S. and cancels 1921 Treaty with the USSR which granted it the right of military intervention.
12 November  Carter announces immediate suspension of oil imports from Iran.
13 November  Rafsanjani is appointed by the Revolutionary Council as supervisor of the Ministry of Interior and the Council's representative in that ministry.
14 November  Carter orders freeze on official Iranian Bank deposits and other assets in the U.S.
24 November  Ali Khamanei, member of the Revolutionary Council and representative of the Revolutionary Council at the Defense Ministry, is appointed the Supervisor of the government guards.
2/3 December  Khomeini formally designated in the adopted constitution as the religious leader.

1980

25 January  Presidential elections held and Bani Sadr wins.
20 February  Six clergy men appointed to Constitutional Guardian Council which will examine all legislation.
14 March  98 deputies elected to the Majlis in the first round of elections.
23 March  Bani Sadr sworn in as President.
7 April  Carter announces a series of sanctions against Iran.
20 April  Revolutionary Council orders universities to be closed.
22 April  Foreign Ministers of European Common Market vote unanimously to impose economic sanctions against Iran as of May 17 unless progress is made to free the hostages.
24 April  Iran concludes an agreement with the USSR permitting importation of goods in case of U.S. naval blockade.
25 April  U.S. hostage rescue attempt fails in the desert.
9 May  136 deputies elected to the Majlis in the second round of elections. Clerics held effective control of Majlis.
22 May  Imam appoints Montazeri as Friday Imam of Qom.
28 May  Majlis begins its first session.
17 July Revolutionary Council disbanded. Majlis elects the six men it was entitled to appoint to the Council of Guardians.

20 July Rafsanjani elected as Speaker of the Majlis by receiving 146 out of 196 votes.

27 July-28 August Khomeini issues a directive which indicates censorship would be tightened.

27 August Ali Khamanei is appointed by the Imam as his representative to the army.

2 September Clashes between Iraqi and Iranian forces take place along the border.

11 September Revolutionary Council formally dissolved.

17 September Saddam Hussein announces Iraq is terminating a 1975 border agreement with Iran and claims full sovereignty over the Shatt al Arab.

22 September Iraq invades Iran.

13 October Khomeini appoints President Bani Sadr as chairman of Iran's Supreme Defense Council.

7 November Rafsanjani begins visit to Algeria, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, and Tunisia.

7 November Prosecutor General appoints temporary supervisors of Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran -- Mohtashemi and Adollah Nuri.

10 November Khorramshahr taken by Iraqi forces.

1981

20 January American hostages released.

31 January Council of Ministers approves severance of political relations with Jordan and Morocco.

24 February Ali Khamanei visits India to participate in an All-Muslin conference.

10 March Montazeri visits Libya.

9 April The Information Ministry orders printing companies not to print newspapers that lack a valid license. The order came a day after the Interior Ministry told political parties they must have government permission before issuing a publication.

17-24 May Iranian delegation led by Rafsanjani arrives in Syria and then went to Paris to participate in the conference on sanctions against South Africa.

25 May Gulf Co-operation Council is formed.

7 June Revolutionary Prosecutor bans six newspapers.
Majlis approve legislation allowing "volunteers" to go and fight Israel in Southern Lebanon.

Khomeini dismisses Bani Sadr as Commander in Chief. The next day Bani Sadr goes into hiding.

Majlis decide to bring impeachment proceedings against Bani Sadr.

Clashes take place in Tehran between supporters and opponents of Bani Sadr. Riots occur in other cities. Revolutionary Guard Corps issues a statement putting its forces on 24 hour alert.

Majlis vote to impeach Bani Sadr. His arrest is ordered. The next day the Imam formally removes Bani Sadr from his office.

Ali Khamanei injured in bomb explosion as he was speaking at a mosque in Tehran.

A number of politicians (including Ayatollah Beheshti) are killed in bomb explosion at Islamic Republic Party (IRP) headquarters.

Imam appoints Ardabili who is the Prosecutor General to succeed Beheshti as Chief Justice.

Majlis approve the appointment of Hosein Musavi as Foreign Minister.

Relations with Korea are downgraded and the Ministry of Islamic Guidance closes down Reuter news bureau.

Majlis reelect Rafsanjani as its Speaker.

Presidential elections take place and Mohammad Ali Rejai wins.

Mohammad Hashemi Rafsanjani is appointed the managing director of the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Bomb kills President Rajai and Prime Minister Bahonar.

Ali Khamanei elected to replace Bahonar as head of the Islamic Republic Party.

Rafsanjani arrives in North Korea and then on the 18th visits Malaysia for four days.

Iranians regain Abadan. In November-December Iran regains territories around Abadan and north of Susangard.

Ali Khamanei wins presidential election.

Rafsanjani appointed by the Imam as his representative to the Supreme Defense Council.

Ayatollah Kazim Shariatmadari reportedly under house arrest. Some sources indicate he was under house arrest since January 1980.

The Imam delegates broad appointative powers to Montazeri.
1982

February
Rafsanjani's brother-in-law, Moshen Rafighdust, becomes the Minister of the Revolutionary Guard Corps.

February
Mojahedín leader in Iran, Musa Khiabani, is killed.

19-30 March
Iranians expel Iraqis from Dezful-Shush area.

10 April
Anti-government plot uncovered. Sadeg Ghotbzadeh, the former Foreign Minister, is arrested. Ayatollah Shariatmadari knew of plot. On the 20th Shariatmadari is stripped of his religious title by the faculty and the theological school in Qom.

10 April
Syria closes the pipeline carrying Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean ports.

29 April
Ahmad, the Imam's son, declares his father prefers Montazeri as his successor.

2 May
Shariatmadari appears on TV to ask for forgiveness for not reporting plot.

11 May
Majlis unanimously pass a bill nationalizing foreign trade.

24 May
Iranian forces break stalemate and recapture Khorramshahr and drive Iraqis back to the international borders.

16 June
Gunmen open fire on Ahmad Khomeini.

20 June
Saddam Hussein declares Iraq's voluntary withdrawal from Iran will be completed by June 30.

July
Iranian forces invade Iraq for first time. That is, all Iraqi forces have been driven out of Iran.

13 July
Iran rejects UN Resolution 514 calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal to the international borders.

August
Imam puts Minister of Interior in charge of Komitehs to bring them under more direct control of government.

10 August
Rafsanjani visits India.

16 September
Ghotbzadeh is executed.

9 December
Elections are held for a Council of Experts which has the task of choosing a successor to Imam Khomeini after his death. The Council consists of 83 members and is empowered to nominate as successor either an individual or a 3 to 5 member leadership council. Among the members elected are Rafsanjani, Ali Khamanei, Ardabili, and Meshkini.
1983

4 January  Oil ministry ends 3 years of gasoline rationing.
20 January Rafsanjani meets with Assad in Damascus.
16 April Legislation went into effect imposing prison terms of up to a year for women violating Islamic dress standards.

4 May  Iran dissolves the Tudeh Party. The Foreign Ministry expels 18 Soviet diplomats for interfering in Iran's internal affairs.
10 May One thousand members of the Tudeh Party are arrested. Islamic Republican party convenes its first congress.
22 May Imam warns clerics and Majlis members that opposition to the government will be dealt with harshly.
25 May USSR expels 3 Iranian diplomats.
18 June Sixteen Bahais executed.
  July Iranian forces 15 kilometers within Northern Iraq.
11 July Rafsanjani reelected as Speaker.
23 August Iran pays Import-Export Bank 419.5M to settle claims arising from the hostage crisis.
13 September Clashes in Mecca between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi police.
19 September Universities reopen for the first time since April 1980.
  October Iraq takes delivery of 5 French built Super Etendard fighter aircraft. In retaliation for sale to Iraq, Iran severs its economic ties with France.

1984

21 January Some 87 Tudeh Party members are given prison terms.
22 January Office of the General Prosecutor and the Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor are merged.
15 February Mohtashemi, Iran's ambassador to Syria, is wounded in letter bomb.
25 February Ten leading Tudeh Party members are executed.
21 March UN experts conclude chemical weapons were used against the Iranians.
  April Exiled anti-government leaders Bani Sadr and Masud Rajavi decide, while in Paris, to end their political alliance due to differences over the Iran-Iraq war.
16 April  National elections held for Iranian Majlis. In contrast to 1980, only groups loyal to Khomeini's line were permitted to run in the election. All other groups had either been eliminated or barred from participation.

17 May  Voting takes place for second round of Majlis elections--about half the seats had not produced clear winners earlier. While almost all Majlis members were professional clerics or their supporters, the number of clerics did not exceed 130 which was seven less than the first Majlis.

23 May  Majlis approve a bill concerning the sale and delivery of preferential oil supplies to Syria and reschedule Syria's debt of nearly one billion to Iran.

28 May  Second Majlis holds its first session and reelects Rafsanjani as Speaker (on June 17) by receiving 181 out of 189 votes.

30 May  Imam states the U. S. lacks the courage to intervene in the Gulf.

26 August  Ayatollah Khomeini breaks his silence in the issue of nationalization saying it contradicts the Islamic law and constitution. The government was free to import goods but it should concentrate on military and strategic items.

6 September  Ali Khamanei meets with Assad in Syria. First President of the Islamic Republic to visit abroad.

8 September  Ali Khamanei visits Kaddafi in Libya.

9 September  Iranian delegation led by Ali Khamanei arrives in Algeria.

30 October  Imam summons Iran's diplomatic representatives from abroad and instructs them to take a new approach which is to send ambassadors to all parts of the world and establish proper diplomatic relations with all except for a few nations such as the U.S.

22 December  Iran rejects a resolution of an Islamic Conference Organization foreign ministers meeting calling on Iran to accept Islamic mediation in its war with Iraq.

1985

4 February  Asad Allah Lajavardi, known as the Butcher of Tehran for his role as Revolutionary prosecutor in sentencing thousands of Iranians to death, is replaced. Reportedly Lajavardi's policy of refusing to release
prisoners until they had become Muslim fundamentalists led to his removal.

13 February Prime Minister Musavi announces the government decision to sell a number of state owned factories to the private sector.

14 February Iran announced it had agreed to sell oil to Nicaragua.

March Ali Khamanei visits Syria and concludes a secret economic agreement and military pact.

15 March A suicide bomber killed five worshipers at a Friday Prayer service in Tehran where Ali Khamanei is giving a sermon. He is not injured.

29 April Four year alliance of the two major armed Iranian opposition groups, the Mujahidin-i Khalq and the Kurdish Democratic Party, breaks down over the Kurdish group's refusal to renounce all contact with the Iranian government.

May Saudi Foreign Minister visits Tehran and Iran agrees to help reduce tension. In return Saudi Arabia will provide regular shipments of refined petroleum products to Iran. This is Iran's first high level diplomatic exchanges with Saudi Arabia.

2 May Ali Khamanei's sister arrives in Baghdad saying she has fled with her children in order to join her husband dissident, Shaykh Ali Tehrani.

20 May Majlis give peasants and squatters the right to keep parts of large estates which they took over after the 1979 Revolution but allows landowners who escaped redistribution to keep their lands.

June Imam issues orders that Iranian forces adopt the tactics of a "defensive jihad" and not use the earlier "human wave" tactic. He states Iran is fighting a defensive war.

25 June Rafsanjani returns from trip to Syria and Libya.

26 June Rafsanjani leads delegation to People's Republic of China.

1 July 39 American hostages freed from the TWA seizure.

2 July Rafsanjani meets with Japanese officials in Tokyo.

8 July USSR withdraws its technicians from Iran.

17 July Ali Khamanei calls for elimination of unnecessary security precautions that could be interpreted as pomp.

19 July Ali Khamanei announces he will run for a second term.
25 July  Iran opposes OPEC's decision to reduce prices of heavy crude.

29 July  Saudi Arabia turns back two flights of Iranian pilgrims.

13 August  Iran and Sudan agree to reestablish diplomatic relations--five years after Sudan severed them over the Iran-Iraq war.

16 August  Elections held and on the nineteenth it is announced that Ali Khamanei is reelected as President.

13 September  Iran receives 508 US made Tow missiles in a secret arms-for-hostages deal with the Reagan administration.

10 October  Ali Khamanei is sworn in for his second four year term and he asks the Majlis to reappoint Prime Minister Musavi.

17 October  Ali Khamanei appoints Musavi Prime Minister.

28 October  Mohtashami appointed Interior Minister.

1 November  Imam speaks out in favor of private enterprise but when members of Council of Guardians met with the Imam to complain that State Prosecutor-General Khoeniha was willing to call into question existing laws of protecting private property, the Imam refused to issue a fatwa (i.e. decree).

12 November  Imam appoints Mohtashemi as the supervisor of the Islamic Revolution Committees.

13 November  Imam appoints Mohtashemi Commander-in-Chief in the affairs of law and order.

23 November  Montazeri is selected by a special assembly as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's successor.

1986

13 January  Ali Khamanei visits Pakistan and then visits Tanzania and Mozambique.


21 January  Ali Khamanei arrives in Zimbabwe. Refuses to attend a banquet on the 22nd because women are present.

9-25 February  Iran successfully crosses the Shatt al-Arab waterway and establishes a beach head on Iraqi territory at Fao.

24 February  1000 US made Tow missiles are delivered to Iran via Israel.

14 March  U.N. Secretary General says Iraq has used chemical weapons.

3 April  Ayatollah Muhammad Kazim Shariatmadari dies. He has been under house arrest for the past five years.

25 May  Robert McFarlane, US National Security
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1</td>
<td>Imam speaks out in favor of private enterprise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 4</td>
<td>Rafsanjani reelected Speaker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 June</td>
<td>Rafsanjani notes two powerful factions, with differences of opinion on the role of the government and that of private enterprise, exist. He says it is like two parties but without names.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July</td>
<td>Ali Khamanei's father dies at the age of 93.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 July</td>
<td>Draft for a new pipeline between Khuzestan and Turkey is signed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 August</td>
<td>Iran states it will resume gas exports to the Soviet Union which was suspended in April 1980.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Reagan sends Rafsanjani a Bible via emissaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 October</td>
<td>Montazeri's grandson killed in war with Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 October</td>
<td>Montazeri denies stories he has resigned.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 February</td>
<td>Khomeini explains the waging of the war should be seen as a &quot;divine cause&quot; rather than a &quot;single final offensive&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 March</td>
<td>USSR agrees to lease three of its oil tankers to Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 March</td>
<td>U.S. informs Kuwait that it will escort its oil carriers once these have been put under U.S. flag.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Tunisia breaks off diplomatic relations with Iran and accuses Iran of recruiting Tunisians for terrorists operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 March</td>
<td>Mehdi Hashemi and his collaborators are charged with murder and kidnapping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April</td>
<td>Iran sentences American engineer John Pattis to ten years imprisonment on charges of spying. He was arrested in June 1986.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 April</td>
<td>Earthquake hits southern Iran.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 May  U.S. accepts request to reflag a Kuwaiti oil tanker and to guard it against Iranian attacks. The Soviets have already agreed to a similar request.

13 May  The U.S. returns to Iran $451 million in frozen assets after a decision by the Hague Tribunal.

2 June  Islamic Republican Party ceases all activities after Imam approves Rafsanjani proposal for disbanding IRP.

2 June  Iran announces the formation of a five member committee to study the hostage situation in Lebanon.

14 June  Rafsanjani reelected Speaker.

17 July  France and Iran sever diplomatic relations. In June, French authorities sought to interview Wahid Gordji who was officially listed as a translator at the Iranian embassy in Paris in connection with a 1986 bombing. Gordji did not have diplomatic status and the Iranians refused to give him up. The French police surrounded the Iranian embassy. The Iranian government responded by surrounding the French embassy in Tehran. The embassy siege ended when Gordji was permitted to leave France in November.

20 July  U.N. Security Council votes unanimously for Resolution 598 calling for a cease-fire.

24 July  U.S. Bridgeton, one of first Kuwaiti tankers to be re-registered under U.S. flag, hits mine.

30 July  Ayatollah Khomeini calls for hajj pilgrims to hold demonstrations of "disavowal".

31 July  Saudi security forces move in to halt forbidden political demonstrations by Iranian pilgrims in front of the Grand Mosque at the start of the hajj--275 Iranians are killed (Mehdi Karubi is head of Iran's hajj pilgrims).

August  Imam intervenes to override the Council of Guardians. This permits price control laws to go into effect.

1 August  Saudi and Kuwaiti embassies in Tehran ransacked.

10 August  U.S. sends mine sweepers to Gulf.

15 August  Trial of Mehdi Hashemi begins.

16 August  Saudi's arrest Karubi, supervisor of Iranian pilgrims, and put him on a plane to Tehran.

25 August  Mehdi Hashemi is convicted of treason and sentenced to death.
5 September    Kuwait expels Iranian diplomat after Iran fires missiles into Kuwaiti territory.
21 September    U.S. helicopter attacks Iranian boat which is allegedly laying mines in the Gulf.
22 September    Ali Khamanei addresses UN General Assembly.
7 October       US Congress votes to impose an embargo on all imports from Iran.
8 October       US destroys three Iranian patrol boats after claims that the Iranians fired on a US helicopter.
16 October      An Iranian Silkworm missile hits an American flagged supertanker in Kuwaiti waters and injures 18 crewman.
19 October      U.S. Naval vessels destroy Iran's Rostam and Rakhsh oil platforms in retaliation for the attack on the supertanker. The U.S. alleges the platforms were being used to launch military operations against shipping vessels.
11 November     Arab league unanimously condemns Iran for prolonging the war. Syria announces it has succeeded in blocking an Iraqi proposal for Arab states to sever diplomatic relations with Iran.

1988

7 January      Ayatollah Khomeini intervenes in a debate over the role of the government in the Islamic Republic. The Imam rejects a narrow interpretation as advocated by Ali Khamanei in which the government operates within the limits of Islamic law and Islamic principle. The Imam ruled that the government was the primary instrument of Islamic rule and was competent to override certain aspects of Islam even such practices as prayer, fasting, and Hajj (3 of the pillars of Islam) if it was in the interest if the State. Thus, in part Ali Khamanei is rebuked by Imam.
6 February     Ayatollah Khomeini rules that a special assembly will be called upon to solve differences between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians. The assembly (Committee to Determine the Expediency of the Islamic Council) comprises of 6 religious jurists from the Council of Guardians and 7 leading government officials which include Ali Khamanei, Ardabili, Prime Minister Musavi, and Rafsanjani.
16 April  Iraqi forces regain control of the Fao peninsula. In May Iraqis recapture the Shalamcheh area driving Iranian forces across the Shatt al-Arab into Iran.

12 April  Majlis elections held.

16-18 April  Iraqis recapture Fao using chemical weapons.

18 April  U.S. Navy destroys 2 Iranian platforms and a number of Iranian ships. On the 14th U.S. frigate runs into an Iranian mine.

26 April  Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic relations with Iran following Iranian attacks on Saudi ships in the Gulf.

23-25 May  Iraq retakes Shalamche using chemical weapons.

16 June  France restores diplomatic ties with Iran. This occurs five weeks after the release of the last three French hostages held in Lebanon. Relations were severed in July of 1987.

28 May  Third Majlis inaugurated.

2 June  Rafsanjani appointed Commander-in-Chief.

7 June  Rafsanjani reelected Speaker.

15 June  No Iranian pilgrims attend the hajj.

25 June  Iraqi forces recapture Majnum oil fields which Iran captured in 1985.

3 July  U.S. downs Iranian airbus.

11 July  The Reagan administration announces it will pay compensation to the families of people in the airbus.

13 July  Iraqi troops cross into Iranian territory for first time since 1986 and capture Iranian border town of Dehloran.

18 July  Iran accepts U.N. Resolution Security Council 598 which calls for a cease-fire. Canada and Iran restore diplomatic relations.

6 August  Saddam Hussein says he ready to accept cease-fire.

20 August  Cease-fire between Iran and Iraq goes into effect.

25 August  Iran and Iraq commence talks in Geneva.

5 September  Ayatollah Khomeini rejects Prime Minister Musavi's resignation.

16 October  Majlis approves its first five year development plan.

20 October  Consultative Council for Reconstruction holds its first session and is chaired by Ali Khamanei.

10 November  Britain and Iran restore diplomatic relations.

25 November  Resumption of diplomatic relations with Morocco.
28 November  Ayatollah Khomeini states the Majlis is to hold sole legislative powers.

7 December  Assassination attempt against Rafsanjani.

31 December  Ayatollah Khomeini orders Council of Expediency to relinquish its decree making powers since the war is over and concentrate on settling disputes between the Majlis and Council of Guardians.

1989

8 February  Ayatollah Khomeini approves amnesty for some members of minigrouplets.

14 February  Ayatollah Khomeini calls on Muslims to execute Rushdie.

20 February  Ali Khamanei goes to Belgrade for first visit to Europe by an Iranian president since the Revolution.

21 February  Tehran recalls EC ambassadors. Canada recalls its charge d'affaires and Sweden recalls its ambassador. West Germany cancels its cultural agreement with Iran which was signed in November of 1988.

23 February  Ali Khamanei visits Romania.

28 March  Montazeri submits his resignation as successor to Ayatollah Khomeini.

17 May  Ali Khamanei visits China and Rafsanjani is in Moscow.

21 May  Ali Khamanei visits North Korea.

3 June  Ayatollah Khomeini dies.

4 June  Ali Khamanei is chosen by the Council of Experts to succeed Ayatollah Khomeini.

13 June  Rafsanjani reelected Speaker.

20 June  Rafsanjani visits the USSR. A number of agreements are signed ranging from expansion and reopening of existing railway lines to plans for Iran to participate in joint space flights with the Soviets.

30 July  Rafsanjani declared winner of July 28 presidential election.

August  Ali Khamanei restores Montazeri's religious responsibilities. He can resume giving classes in Qom.

6 August  Council of Experts confirms the leadership of Ali Khamanei.

15 August  Rafsanjani resigns his post as Speaker. Karubi elected Speaker of Majlis.

2 September  Rafsanjani resigns as Commander-in-Chief of armed forces and Ali Khamanei assumes post.
6 November  U.S. officials announce the government has agreed to return $567 million to Iran which has been held since the 1979 revolution.

13 November  Ahmad Khomeini is appointed to National Security Council as personal representative of Ali Khamanei.

15 December  Mohtashemi wins seat in Majlis by-elections.

1990

5 January  Thousands of people protest in front of Montazeri's home supposedly because he criticized Rafsanjani's policy of facilitating foreign domination of the nation's economy and of the government's secret relation with Israel (Israel purchased oil from Iran in December of 1989).

11 January  Iran and Iraq agree to the Soviet foreign minister's offer to host a meeting between the two to break the deadlock in the Gulf peace talks.

25 January  Council of Guardians returns five year plan to Majlis after declaring parts of it are incompatible with Islamic law.

31 January  Council of Guardians ratifies a modified five year plan.

1 February  Montazeri is temporarily detained for his remarks questioning Ali Khamanei's qualifications as Supreme Leader.

30 April  US State Department releases its annual list of those nations supporting terrorism. The list includes Libya, PDRY, Syria, and Iran.

10 May  George Bush agrees to let Esso, Exxon, and Mobil obtain oil from Iran to collect on $5 billion owed to them.

13 May  Iran and the U.S. sign an agreement settling 2795 small claims and some U.S. claims against Iran.

19 June  Tehran Times reported that "Bayan" edited by Mohtashemi appeared on the newsstand the preceding week.

20 June  An earthquake in northern Iran destroys more than 100 towns and villages. The next day Rafsanjani accepts a U.S. offer for relief assistance. By the 26th a debate in the Iranian newspapers and among governmental officials over accepting relief aid from those considered Iran's enemies--Saudi Arabia, U.S., Egypt, and Iraq--breaks out.
30 June  Rafsanjani escapes an assassination attempt by avoiding a plane which later exploded in the air.

4 July  Mohtashemi is elected secretary-general of the interparliamentary group.

2 August  Iraqi troops invade Kuwait.

7 August  It is announced that Saudi Arabia has agreed to allow U.S. troops to land on its territory.

14 August  Iran's ambassador to the U.N. said his nation would obey the U.N. embargo against Iraq.

18 August  Iran releases first batch of Iraqi POW's.

22 August  Algeria, Iran, and Libya reportedly blocked efforts by Saudi Arabia and Venezuela to convene an emergency OPEC meeting. Iran, according to experts, was doubling and trebling its oil sales. With the embargo against Iraq, Iran was picking up a substantial part of the short fall.

23 August  The preceding week the Iranian government asked Japan for a $1.5 billion loan.

29 August  OPEC agreed to temporary production increases. Iran, Iraq, and Libya opposed the production increases.

Late August  At least 20 people were arrested in connection with the Iranian Freedom Movement led by former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan.

13 September  Munir Zahran, head of Egypt's Department of International Organization, visited Tehran. It was the first visit since the 1979 Revolution.

14 September  U.S. Department of State announces that 2 weeks earlier Iran released Erwin Rabhan, a U.S. businessman who had been jailed since October 1984 on charges of violating foreign currency regulations. He had served his sentence.

24 September  Tunisia and Iran reestablish diplomatic relations.

28 September  Diplomatic relations are resumed with the United Kingdom which had been severed over the Rushdie incident.

8 October  Elections are held for the 109 positions on the Council of Experts. Mohtashemi and Speaker of the Majlis Karubi were rejected as nominees for the elections to the Assembly of Experts because they failed an exam to test for their theological qualifications. Mohtashemi calls on people to not take part in the Assembly of Experts election.
Nevertheless, candidates allied with Rafsanjani were reported to have won most of the seats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 October</td>
<td>Iran and Iraq resume diplomatic relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 October</td>
<td>Mohtashemi heads Interparliamentary Union in Uruguay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 October</td>
<td>EC Foreign Ministers agree to lift sanctions against Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 November</td>
<td>Police had to subdue fighting between rival clerical factions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 November</td>
<td>The Majlis gives the government the go ahead to borrow from abroad which included sources such as the IMF or the World Bank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 November</td>
<td>Iraq turns over Khosravi to Iran. It was the last Iranian city under Iraqi occupation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 December</td>
<td>Foreign Minister Velayati visits France. It is the first official Iranian visit to France since the Revolution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**1991**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 January</td>
<td>Diplomatic ties with Jordan are restored. Relations had been broken since 1981.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February</td>
<td>Ayatollah Meshkini is elected Chairman of the Assembly of Experts while Rafsanjani is elected its first vice-chairman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 March</td>
<td>Iran releases Roger Cooper, a Briton held since 1985 on charges of spying.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March</td>
<td>World Bank approves a $250 million loan for earthquake relief. It is the first loan approved by the World Bank for Iran since 1978.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 March</td>
<td>Bayan, a monthly magazine edited by Mohtashemi, suspends publication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March</td>
<td>Diplomatic ties are restored with Saudi Arabia following an agreement on the issue of pilgrims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 April</td>
<td>Iran and Chile agree to resume diplomatic relations which have been severed since 1979.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 April</td>
<td>Rafsanjani departs for Syria and then Turkey. This is his first official trip since becoming President in 1989.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>Medhi Karubi reelected Majlis speaker.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Sources include The Middle East and North Africa 1989, pp. 409-451, London: Europa Publications; London Times; Middle East Journal; The Clerical Establishment of Iran (1989) by Nikola B. Schahgaldian; Menashri (1986); Menashri 1990b; Hiro (1991:287-296); Foreign Broadcast Information Service; and Joint Publication Research Service.*
APPENDIX D
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Ayatollah- means "sign of God". A mullah who has reached the stage of learning in which one can teach others and interpret the Islamic law along with having gained acceptance by a significant number of mullahs and others as a pattern to be imitated.

Bazaari- a person trading in the central bazaar of the major cities.

Council of Guardians- ensures all legislation conforms with the constitution and Islamic laws.

Council of Experts- appoints the Supreme Leader and in theory power to advise and dismiss the Leader. This assembly has no more than 83 members. During its first term (1979 to 1990) it held only eight sessions. It performed some important duties such as ratifying the constitution, nominating and dismissing Montazeri, and selecting Ali Khamanei as the Supreme Leader in June 1989.

Expediency Council- arbitrates between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians.

Fatwa- religious decree.

Grand Ayatollah- leaders of Shia faith; the 1979 Revolution made Ruhollah Khomeini the foremost.

Hadith- the record of the traditions of the Prophet Mohammed.

Hezbollah (Hizballahi)- the party of God. Within Iran it is an unstructured grouping of Shia who are supporters of the Islamic Revolution and engaged in street fighting for the clergy in the early days of the Revolution. In Lebanon, it is an Iranian backed militia which has been held responsible for the kidnapping of Westerners.
Hojat ol islam- means "proof of Islam". A mullah who has given evidence of his learning but has not achieved the status of ayatollah.

Imam- community leader, but Khomeini has altered the meaning to a person who rules over Muslims in the name of Allah.

Intifada- describes recent Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories.

Jihad- struggle conducted on behalf of the Islamic community.

Komitehs- local revolutionary committees which sprang up throughout Iran after the Revolution and served as a local security force to safeguard the Revolution. Many were neighborhood groups formed around mosques during the 1978 demonstrations.

Madresehs- theological colleges.

Majlis- the Iranian parliament which consists of 270 deputies.

Maktab- schools run by mullahs in which the Koran was the heart of the curriculum.

Mojahedin (Mujaheddin)- while it played a major role in opposing the Shah, by mid-1981 it clashed openly in an unsuccessful struggle against Khomeini and his followers.

Monafequen (Munafiqeen)- refers to hypocrites who claim to be Moslems but are not.

Mostaz'efin- refers to the disinheritied, weak, or anyone whose potential for development is suppressed.

Mujtahed- high mullah jurisconsults who could interpret right and wrong in matters.

Mullah- means the "guardian", a Muslim cleric who is religiously learned.

Pasdaran- the entire guard organization which was established by the Imam 5 May 1979 in order for the clerics to have their own army.

Quran (Koran)- holy book of the Moslems.

Savak- the Shah's secret police.

Seyyed- a direct descendant of the Prophet, Imam Ali, and the other eleven Imams.
**Shari'a**—Islamic law.

**Shiism**—the Shia broke away from a single Islamic movement because of a political dispute over who should lead after the prophet's death. Shia argued that God's representative should descend through the prophet's family. The Sunni advocated a leadership selected by the prophet's associates or by a court of religious scholars. Shiite clergy are empowered to interpret religious laws and duties for their followers. In theory, their word is law. However, the Sunni clergy serve mainly as advisors to the faithful. Today Shiites number only about ten percent of all Muslims but they are more than ninety percent of all Iranians.

**Talabeh**—student mullahs.

**Tudeh**—a communist party which welcomed the Islamic Revolution but by 1983 its leading activists were arrested and many of its leaders were executed.

**Ulema**—learned men of the religious law of Islam; collectively the mullahs form the ulema (ulama).

**Umma(h)**—the Muslim community throughout the world.

**Velayat e Faqih**—supreme religious and political leader of the nation. The doctrine of the Velayat e Faqih was conceived by Khomeini and became part of the constitution of the Islamic Republic. It established a hierarchical structure with the Faqih possessing absolute power over the government.

APPENDIX E
DESCRIPTION OF HERMANN'S SIX ORIENTATIONS

This appendix reproduces two tables (tables one and three), although not in table form, which Hermann (1987b) furnishes in her workbook for developing personality profiles. These two tables recapitulate the six orientations. A full description of each orientation has been presented in the public domain by Hermann (see 1987c:133-140; 1987e:268-277).

Expansionist
Definition: Interest in gaining control over more territory, resources, or people.
View of World: Perceive the world is divided into "us" and "them", each intent on improving its condition at the expense of the other; thus, conflict is inherent to functioning in the international system.
Style: A wariness of others' moves; attempt to keep one step ahead of those considered the enemy; directive and manipulative in dealing with others.
Foreign Policy: Generally focused on issues of security and status; behavior often hostile in tone and directed toward the "enemy"; favor use of low commitment actions unless perceived "backed into the wall"; not averse to using "enemy" as a scapegoat on which to blame problems; espouse short-term, immediate change in the international arena.
Nature of Advisory Group: Desires highly loyal staff whose primary purpose is seen as implementation; leader's preference prevail.
Nature of Information Search: Information is sought that highlights preferred alternative under consideration; goals of leader drive information search processes and what situations are perceived as causing problems.
Ability to Tolerate Disagreement: Low; has tendency to view disagreement as challenge to his power and authority.
Method of Dealing with Opposition: Seeks to eliminate opposition by coercive means.

Active Independent
Definition: Interest in participating in the international community but on one's own terms and without engendering a dependent relationship with another country.
View of World: Want to be self-reliant but perceive importance of other countries to one's own continued existence so are determined to maintain close control over interactions with other nations to avoid any kind of dependent relationship.  
Style: Seek a variety of information before making a decision; examine carefully the possible consequences of alternatives under consideration for dealing with a problem; cultivate relationships with a diverse group of nations.  
Foreign Policy: Generally focused on economic and security issues; behavior is nonaligned in nature, directed toward a wide variety of governments; behavior is usually positive in tone but involves little commitment since shun commitments that limit maneuverability and sense of independence; espouse need for long-term change in international arena.  
Nature of Advisory Group: Interested in having experts among staff; wants diverse range of opinion represented in advisors.  
Nature of Information Search: Wants to make sure all options are considered; also wants to consider consequences of actions--how others will respond; willing to take small steps if there is any uncertainty about the possible consequences of a larger initiative.  
Ability to Tolerate Disagreement: High; encourages disagreement on issue.  
Method of Dealing With Opposition: Will try to coopt opposition into policymaking process.  

Influential  
Definition: Interest in having an impact on other nations' foreign policy behavior, in playing a leadership role in regional or international affairs.  
View of World: Perceive inability of nations to act alone, importance of acting together but such activity demands a strong leader; think time is right for such leadership; may have a particular ideology wish other nations to adopt but usually this is secondary interest to gaining leadership role.  
Style: Show interest in and seek information on problems of countries wish to influence; initiate collaborative activities with such countries and meet frequently with their leaders.  
Foreign Policy: Foster friendly relations with nations wish to have influence over; make necessary commitments to secure a working relationship with such nations; act protectively toward such nations in their dealings with adversaries; behavior generally focused on status issues.  
Nature of Advisory Group: Will want supportive group around with members who will frankly appraise the situation; interested in advisors with ties to important constituencies that can be used in building consensus and in enhancing leader's authority.  
Nature of Information Search: Seeks information on what others view as best way of dealing with situation; interested in political implications of any options.
Ability to Tolerate Disagreement: Moderate; wants to know if influential persons disagree.
Method of Dealing With Opposition: Will seek to pacify opposition.

**Mediator Integrator**

**Definition:** Concern with reconciling differences between other nations, with resolving problems in the international arena.
**View of World:** Perceive some problems between other nations in international system can be resolved through third party politics and that one's nation (and one's self) can gain prestige by playing a "Good Samaritan" or peacemaker role.
**Style:** Good listeners; able to see both sides of issues and raise options where few were perceived earlier; willingness to "take a back seat" in the policymaking process, having an impact without seeming to control or to interfere with others; uses consensus-building and group maintenance techniques effectively.
**Foreign Policy:** Behavior is principally diplomatic in nature; have extensive activity in international and regional organizations which are used as practice arenas and places to develop a reputation for mediating skills; engage in collaborative activities with other nations to foster sense of mutual trust and understanding; behavior is generally positive in tone.
**Nature of Advisory Group:** Will want advisors that form a cohesive group and that have skills in negotiation and consensus building.
**Nature of Information Search:** Interested in dealing with problems through the use of compromise; seeks information on people's positions on issue and on how options can be modified to gain more support.
**Ability to Tolerate Disagreement:** Low; interested in mitigating disagreement and conflict; cannot tolerate disagreement for very long without seeking a solution.
**Method of Dealing with Opposition:** Will seek compromise with opposition.

**Opportunist**

**Definition:** Interested in taking advantage of present circumstances, in dealing effectively with the demands and opportunities of the moment, in being expedient.
**View of World:** Perceive foreign policy situations are generally unique--times change, goals change, and the views of other governments change; to be effective in the foreign policy arena one must deal with each situation according to its own merits.
**Style:** Seek out information from a variety of sources; try to ascertain early on what alternative will secure consensus; may use "trial balloons" to test others' responses; seek compromise if consensus is not possible.
Foreign Policy: Focus of much behavior is gaining information from the international arena, on keeping abreast of international events and atune to other governments' actions and intentions; political resources are committed to keeping contacts open; an attempt is made to maintain a low positive profile in order to keep as much as possible on everybody's good side; encourage face-to-face diplomacy to learn about a situation first hand.

Nature of Advisory Group: Will want major groups in society represented in advisors or to have advisors with links to such groups; will want to be hub of communication network that is broad and well-entrenched.

Nature of Information Search: Seeks information about public's opinion on situations and alternatives; wants to support options that will maximize public support; will consult widely on issues.

Ability to Tolerate Disagreement: Moderate; may encourage disagreement to learn what people's positions are and how much support they can generate.

Method of Dealing With Opposition: Will act to minimize likelihood of opposition forming on important issues.

Developmental

Definition: Commitment to the continued improvement of one's own nation through the development of useful and rewarding relations with other countries or organizations in the international system; an interest in building up one's own nation with the best help available.

View of World: Perceive nation has deficiency that can be improved with the aid of certain other countries or organizations in the international system; perceive it is important to seek out and establish relationships with other countries and organizations that can be helpful in dealing with one's deficiencies.

Style: Develop relationships with others based on what can gain from relationship; constantly seeking information in area of perceived deficiency--appear almost to have a "one track" mind; try to maintain controlled dependence in relationships with others, that is, getting what is desired while not becoming dominated by the others.

Foreign Policy: Behaviorally generally focused on economic or security issues; are quite friendly toward those seeking as benefactors; can be hostile, however, if others try to dominate or control the relationship; only those political resources are committed that are necessary to establishing a beneficial relationship; active in regional and international organizations in search of beneficial relationships.

Nature of Advisory Group: Will seek loyalty and a similar basic philosophy in advisors; can be harsh with advisors that do not "pull their weight" in working toward the goals of the regime; leader's preference prevails.
**Nature of Information Search:** Seeks options that can be implemented and will have some payoff in improving the nation's position; seeks information that supports position. 

**Ability to Tolerate Disagreement:** Low; disagreement will be seen as a challenge to authority and as disrupting movement toward goal. 

**Method of Dealing With Opposition:** Will try to coopt opposition; if unsuccessful, will highlight differences with the opposition.


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