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Summit diplomacy: The consequences of Cold War summits. (Volumes I and II)

McCollister, Robert Jarrett, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1992
SUMMIT DIPLOMACY:
THE CONSEQUENCES OF COLD WAR SUMMITS
VOLUME I
DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Robert Jarrett McCollister, B.S., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1992

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union met at the summit during the Cold War, much of the world paused in anticipation of the results of their encounter. The concentration of power which these two men embodied naturally drew the attention of national leaders, members of the news media, and private citizens around the planet. At the Washington summit between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in December, 1987 there were over 5,000 members of the news media present to cover their meeting and the signing of the INF Treaty.¹ When these same two leaders encountered each other for the first time at Geneva in November, 1985 there were 2,500 accredited journalists in attendance, even though there were no arms control agreements to be signed. Just before this meeting began there were over 10,000 protesters in the streets of Geneva; some were demonstrating against American policy in Central America; some objected to Soviet behavior in Afghanistan; others marched to protest the arms race in general.² Members of the press and the general public considered summits to be important events.
The leaders and their advisors who attended these meetings also believed that summits were momentous occasions. President Reagan reportedly told General Secretary Gorbachev at their first meeting, "Here we are, between us, we could bring peace for years to come." In an address to the American people before he departed for Geneva in 1955 President Eisenhower said, "a President goes to engage in a conference with the heads of other governments in order to prevent wars, in order to see whether in this time of stress and strain we cannot devise measures that will keep from us this terrible scourge that afflicts mankind." At the Moscow summit in 1972 Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev agreed heartily on the importance of their meeting, with Nixon claiming, "If we leave all the decisions to the bureaucrats, we will never achieve any progress," and Brezhnev replying, "They would simply bury us in paper." This idea, that summits were useful tools to break logjams in negotiations that have arisen at lower levels, is only one of several that one finds in reading the accounts of leaders and their aides to justify the importance of summit meetings. To these participants U.S.-Soviet summits are among the most important events of their years in office.

Given the importance that political leaders, journalists, and the public attach to these meetings, it is surprising that there has been so little scholarly research on the topic of summit diplomacy by students of international relations. Those who have studied summits have generally been historians who focus on individual conferences, or on one leader and his trips to the summit. Only a few scholars have looked at all
U.S.-Soviet summits in the postwar era, and even fewer at summit diplomacy in general, and once again these efforts have focused on recording the history of these events, rather than systematically studying their effects.

The purpose of this dissertation is to fill this gap in the scholarly literature by systematically examining several lines of inquiry regarding the outcomes of meetings between heads of government to see if summits are the significant events which the public and participants seem to think. The questions to be addressed have been drawn from the memoirs of summit participants and the writings of scholars who have speculated on the advantages and disadvantages of this form of diplomacy. This dissertation hopes to take these intuitive judgments about the outcomes of summits and examine them in detail. It is hoped that this analysis will yield sets of hypotheses, as well as a general framework, to stimulate further research. It is hoped that the findings of such a study will be of value to those in both the academic and the policymaking arenas and that it may further develop our understanding of this increasingly popular forum for conducting relations between states.

Scholarly Research on Summit Diplomacy

The most dedicated scholar of American summit diplomacy has been Elmer Plischke, who has written a great deal about modern diplomacy in general, and specifically about personal contacts between heads of state. In a number of articles and his major work, Diplomat-In-Chief: The President at the
Summit, he examines not only summit conferences and meetings, but also presidential communications with other leaders and the activities of special emissaries appointed by the President to deal with particular issues. Keith Eubank is another academic who has shown a great deal of interest in this area of study. His book, *The Summit Conferences, 1919-1960*, focuses on formal, multi-lateral meetings from the Versailles Conferences in 1919 to the Paris Conference in 1960. In recent years Gordon R. Weihmiller and Dusko Doder collaborated on a project entitled, *U.S.-Soviet Summits: An Account of East-West Diplomacy at the Top, 1955-1985*.

While each of these studies is an excellent account of the events leading up to the summit and the discussions which took place, they are not a rigorous examination of the outcomes of meetings between the two superpowers. Plischcke’s book is an impressive account of the details of summit conferences, meetings, special emissaries, and other forms of presidential communication but only in the last chapter does he attempt to assess the risks, advantages, and disadvantages of summit diplomacy. The conclusions he reaches are quite interesting, and several form the bases for the hypotheses to be tested in this study, but he does not attempt to systematically test these conclusions using the wealth of data he has collected. Plischke’s judgments about the outcomes of summits are largely impressionistic, based on his extensive knowledge of the subject. They seem to cry out for more careful testing and evaluation.

Eubank’s study is more limited in scope since only formal, multilateral conferences in the 1919-1960 period are
examined. His methodology, like Plischke's, is historiographical. He paints a vivid picture of each conference as a unique event with only a brief concluding chapter which speculates on the important determinants of the outcomes of summit conferences and their value. Gordon Weihmiller's focus is on U.S.-Soviet summits in the post-war era, including a chapter by Dusko Doder on the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva in November, 1985. Weihmiller's primary purpose is to understand the process by which summits are arranged and their agendas determined. To do so he examines six factors including the timing of the meeting, the political circumstances in which the summit took place, how the date was set, how the location was chosen, whether either leader placed preconditions on his agreement to meet with his counterpart, and how the agenda was established. While this framework does allow the author to examine the data more carefully, his focus is on the factors leading up to the summit, not the outcomes of these meetings, as this dissertation hopes to do. In addition, his methodology, just as with the authors previously discussed, is to examine each summit as a brief case study and then glean from the data generalizations which seem to be valid, rather than offering hypotheses and then gathering the evidence necessary to determine their accuracy.

Arthur Marsden Sears' "The Search for Peace Through Summit Conferences," is very much in the same vein as Plischke and Eubank's works. His dissertation examines the World War II conferences, as well as Geneva in 1955 and Paris in 1960. The approach is essentially that of the historian
and Sears has gathered an impressive amount of data on the context and negotiations before, during, and after each summit. Once again, however, the author makes no attempt to systematically explore the results of these meetings beyond general impressions drawn from his research.

There has been one attempt to study the impact of superpower summits in the Cold War era using statistical techniques. Thomas Bernauer's *Superpower Summits: When Are They Successful* develops a complex model of the important variables which affect the outcome of U.S.-Soviet summits. The model integrates the preparation process, the existing state of relations between the superpowers, perceptual factors, personality traits of the leaders, and the leaders' political status at home, into a framework to explain when summits are successful. Only the first three variables listed above are actually tested for Bernauer's study and no final attempt was made to put the model together into a coherent theory of summit diplomacy. Instead, the author develops a technique for defining successful summits and then compares each independent variable to those which are defined as successful. A summit is said to be successful if both sides characterize it as a success, if there are a large number of concrete verbal commitments made at the summit, and if several agreements are signed. Using this definition, Bernauer compares variables such as the length of preparation time, the number of prenegotiated agreements, the number of high-level officials on the summit delegation, the current state of relations, and the similarity of payoff structures to summits defined as successful. Perhaps the most important
result of this study was that summits are most likely to produce good results when the overall state of relations between the superpowers is positive. Still, Bernauer's effort does not focus on the central question that this study will attempt to answer. What has been the function and effect of superpower summits in the Cold War era? Bernauer's comparisons of variables such as preparation time or the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations to successful summits does not seem to have produced much information that is new or useful. This dissertation will attempt to probe more deeply into the impact of superpower summits on the Cold War.\(^{10}\)

As a part of the study of modern diplomacy in general, several authors have written of the role of summitry within current diplomatic practices. Maurice Hankey, who was a participant at Versailles and many other conferences between the two world wars, in his book, *Diplomacy by Conference: Studies in Public Affairs, 1920-1946*, describes the development of summit meetings both as a way to coordinate allied efforts during the First World War and as a way to conclude the peace treaty which ended it. Hankey was a strong advocate of summit diplomacy as a way for heads of government to conduct their business.\(^{11}\)

Others who have described the evolution from traditional to modern methods of managing affairs between states have been less enthusiastic. Harold Nicholson, in *The Old Diplomacy and the New*, and in a series of speeches, saw great dangers in the more hurried way in which diplomacy was conducted at summit conferences, especially since political
leaders were not experts in the areas in which they were conducting negotiations. Fred C. Ikle, who has been a top official in several American administrations including Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for Richard Nixon and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Ronald Reagan, expressed similar sentiments in his book, *How Nations Negotiate.* While devoting only a few pages to direct contact between leaders at the summit, Ikle warned of the possible dangers of this form of diplomacy. Likewise Dean Rusk, before he became Secretary of State, in an article about the role of the President in the making of foreign policy, warned in the strongest terms of the pitfalls of negotiating at summits. The fears of Ikle, Rusk, and Nicholson will be discussed more fully in the conclusion of this dissertation.

A review of the scholarly literature reveals only a handful of academic articles devoted to the subject of summit diplomacy. Charles Fairbanks has written a brief pamphlet entitled "The Allure of Summits," in which he describes what he believes to be the factors which drive leaders to turn to summit diplomacy and the potential dangers of meetings between heads of government. The four factors which encourage leaders to turn to summitry are: a belief that dialogue can influence the foreign policy of another state, a desire for publicity on the part of the leaders involved, faith in the idea that human contact can alleviate misunderstandings that lie beneath conflicts between states, and frustration on the part of heads of government with the bureaucratic setting. Fairbanks argues that each of these
factors has potential pitfalls and ultimately he remains very skeptical of the value of summit diplomacy. Next, he carefully describes four weaknesses of the summit process. First, dramatic, public diplomacy raises public expectations and makes delicate negotiations difficult. Second, the need for success at the summit leads to the tendency of leaders to proclaim fictitious results. Third, as Ikle argues, the collapsing of the process strips leaders of the luxury of time to consider proposals by the other government and forces snap judgments that sometimes must be reversed. Finally, Fairbanks agrees with Rusk that the presence of the President at the summit means that the diplomat can no longer delay the process by saying that he must refer to his home office for guidance, thus speeding the process up even more and leading to hasty decisions.\(^1\)

Coit Blacker has described what he considered to be the four conditions for success at the summit. First, there must be strong, effective leadership in both states, and he argued that this had existed only in 1972 and 1973 in summits between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. Groundwork must be carefully prepared and agreements ready to sign, so that nations can use the summit to commit themselves to a course of action. Third, to be successful, summits must be part of a larger framework of cooperative relations in order to have any real positive effect. Finally, Blacker cautions that relations must at least be correct, if not cooperative, and that leaders should not meet during a crisis because it would make the calm consideration
of political differences and alternative courses of action even more difficult.16

Gwyn Prins was far more positive in the evaluation of Cold War summitry. Prins divides Cold War summits into three eras: from Geneva, 1955 to Vienna, 1961, from Glassboro through Vienna in 1979, and finally the summits of the Reagan years. The author believes that summit diplomacy has value for the very reasons that Fairbanks, Ikle, and Rusk find it disquieting. Freed from the restraints of their bureaucracies at the summit, heads of government have the power to take dramatic steps toward better relations. For this reason, Prins sees the Reykjavik summit in 1986 as historic and a very positive development since it signaled that both Reagan and Gorbachev had come to the conclusion that military power no longer had much utility in international relations.17

Johan Galtung focused on the periods in which East-West summitry was most active. Galtung examined not only meetings between heads of government, but also meetings between heads of government and foreign ministers and foreign ministers alone. He examined the period from 1941-1964, and hypothesized that there would be fewer summits in years between 1949-1955. Galtung believed this to be so since in this era East and West were moving from a period of alliance to one of bipolar, bloc-to-bloc relations and that in this uncertain era summitry would decline. The author tested a number of hypotheses related to this proposition and found each to be true, in that the number of high level contacts did decline in the period between 1949-1955.18
J. Robert Schaetzl and H.B. Malmgren studied not Cold War summits between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, but instead on the annual Group of Seven economic summits. In the final section of this dissertation, when the future of summit diplomacy is discussed, these summits and their ideas will be examined in greater detail."

The final category of literature on summit diplomacy is the memoirs of those who have themselves participated in summit conferences between leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. This is a rich source of material for the generation of hypotheses on the value of summit meetings as a means of conducting diplomacy. Personal recollections of these events often include judgments about the advantages and disadvantages of meeting directly with the leader of the Soviet Union. This study will use several of these generalizations as the basis for the hypotheses to be presented later. The President who has been most prolific in writing on this subject has been Richard Nixon. Several of his observations have been used as the foundation for hypotheses to be tested by this dissertation. Prominent presidential advisors, such as Henry Kissinger, have also written on this topic and each of these accounts have been consulted. Nixon has written a number of books and articles, including an article for *Foreign Affairs* entitled "Superpower Summitry," in which he examines the advantages and disadvantages of this form of diplomacy."
especially concerning the negotiation of arms control agreements at U.S.-Soviet summits. Adelman, in the summer of 1986, wrote an article for in which he discussed the advantages and disadvantages of summit diplomacy. These ideas were later expanded, after Adelman had left office, into a book called, The Great Universal Embrace, in which he discussed not only his version of the Reagan-Gorbachev summits, but also the role of summitry in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Adelman's ideas will be more fully discussed in later chapters.

U.S.-Soviet Summitry: Roosevelt through Carter, a book edited by John W. McDonald Jr., combines brief commentaries on the summit process by important participants in each U.S.-Soviet summit from the World War II meetings between Roosevelt and Stalin to the Carter-Brezhnev summit at Vienna in 1979. The volume also contains concluding chapters by Raymond Garthoff and Gordon Weihmiller which analyze both the trends in this form of diplomacy and its role in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In sum, there have been very few attempts to systematically explore the consequences of summit diplomacy. Studies done to this date have largely used historiographical techniques, and the conclusions reached by the authors on the consequences of summitry are often impresionistic. This study hopes to fill this gap in the scholarly literature by subjecting the history of Cold War summits to a more systematic analysis.
Evolution of Summit Diplomacy

Direct, face-to-face negotiations between heads of government were a very rare occurrence during the period of classical diplomacy. European monarchs met frequently during the Middle Ages to conduct diplomatic affairs but the increasing complexity brought on by the emergence of the nation-state system gradually led to the evolution of a new system built around the skills of the professional diplomat. Sir Harold Nicholson terms the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries the French period of diplomatic history and argues that it was characterized by bilateral negotiation, conducted by professional diplomats. These ambassadors exercised a great deal of independence due to the limits of transportation and communication technology in this period of history and they were limited only by instructions they received from their home office. The negotiations themselves were generally conducted secretly, without the glare of publicity, because foreign policy and security matters were the province of kings and professional envoys in this age when kings ruled by divine right, rather than by popular will.

There were several spectacular conferences held in this period when major upheavals led heads of state to take a more direct role in foreign policy. The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 met following the Napoleonic Wars to deal with the difficult problems created by the French Revolution and Napoleon’s onslaught. Later in the nineteenth century the Congress of Berlin brought the British, German, and Russian
heads of government, Disraeli and Bismarck and Gorchakov, together as well as high officials from the rest of Europe to discuss growing rivalries in the Balkans. These conferences were, however, exceptions to the rule during the traditional period of European diplomacy.

In the period before World War I, the summit between Kaiser Wilhelm II and Tsar Nicholas II at B’yorkyo in 1905 nearly changed the face of European politics. At this meeting, Nicholas agreed to ally Russia with Germany and thus abandon its alliance with France. Upon the Tsar’s return to St. Petersburg, his advisers quickly convinced him that Russia could not take so drastic a step and the B’yorkyo accords were repudiated.

It was the catastrophic events of the First World War, along with other political and technological changes which led to the emergence of new diplomatic forms, of which summit diplomacy was one. The marriage of mass mobilization and industrial might had created carnage in Europe beyond anyone’s wildest dreams and created the emergency which necessitated the development of new diplomatic forums to coordinate war on such a vast scale. The transportation and communication revolutions had made it possible for heads of government to confer much more rapidly and still keep in contact with their governments at home. In addition, the leading allies were now representative democracies, not monarchies ruled by kings who claimed their thrones by divine right. This required elected political leaders to take the lead in dealing with this crisis in order that they not be seen as inactive while millions were dying at the front.
These and other forces led to the development of the Supreme War Council where the Prime Ministers of the Allies could meet to coordinate wartime policy. At the war's end the Supreme War Council became the Council of Ten which later was narrowed to the Council of Four and directed the peace conference at Versailles. Woodrow Wilson led the attack on traditional diplomacy calling for an open diplomatic system which would avoid the behind-the-scenes negotiations and secret agreements which he and many others saw as a principle cause of World War I.

In the years between the First and Second World Wars, high level conferences were commonplace and even dictators began to adopt summit diplomacy as a preferred way of conducting foreign policy. Hitler and Mussolini alone met on thirty occasions. Of course, the most famous summit of the interwar period was the Munich Conference of September, 1938 when the fate of Czechoslovakia, and perhaps the rest of Europe, was sealed.

During the Second World War, as in the First, Allied leaders felt it necessary to discuss strategy and the shape of the world political system after the war at a series of conferences. Indeed, the conferences between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, as well as Truman, Atlee, DeGaulle and others who attended were the forums for negotiations which set in place much of the postwar international system.

The heat of the Cold War during Truman's tenure in office and early in Eisenhower's term made meeting with Stalin too risky in the eyes of Western leaders. Following Stalin's death in March, 1953, however, Winston Churchill
began the push for a new summit conference, and in fact it was in a speech to Parliament on May 11, 1953, that Churchill first coined the term when he called for a meeting at the "summit". President Eisenhower, having only been in office a few months, at first resisted the pressure which soon began to increase as the leaders of other NATO countries called for such a meeting. It was only with the thaw in the Cold War in 1955, brought on by the signing of the Austrian State Treaty and the subsequent Soviet withdrawal from Austria, that Eisenhower was willing to consider a new four power conference. Eventually negotiations brought about the first postwar summit conference at Geneva in July, 1955. Since this initial meeting, every American president has met at least once with his Soviet counterpart. Eisenhower would meet with Khrushchev once again at Camp David in 1959 and briefly at the ill-fated Paris Conference of 1960. The aborted meeting at Paris in 1960 was the last of the four-power conferences and henceforth all U.S.-Soviet summits would be bilateral. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson would meet once each with the Soviet leader, Kennedy with Khrushchev at Vienna in 1961 and Johnson with Prime Minister Kosygin at Glassboro in 1967. The era of detente in the early 1970s saw President Nixon meet with General Secretary Brezhnev three times in three years and Gerald Ford travel to Vladivostok to confer with Brezhnev a little more than three months after taking office. Five years separated the Vladivostok summit from Jimmy Carter's encounter with Brezhnev at Vienna in 1979, excluding Ford's brief meeting with Brezhnev at Helsinki in 1975. Finally, the most intense
period of summit activity began in November, 1985 with Ronald Reagan's initial meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, which was followed by four full summits and one brief meeting in New York between these two leaders. By the late 1980s summit diplomacy had become an important mechanism for the management of the superpower rivalry.

Framework of Analysis

The purpose of this study is to investigate the outcomes of negotiations at summit meetings between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. To do this, four research areas associated with summits are investigated. The focus is on the observations of Presidents, their advisors, and scholars who have studied summit diplomacy. These propositions, implicitly generalizable, but rarely put in the form of testable propositions, will be offered and evaluated.

Research Area One: Impact of Impending Summit on Positions of U.S. Bureaucracies

The first area of inquiry relates to the impact of an impending summit on the positions of the key bureaucracies within the United States government on the major issues to be discussed at the meeting. As an impending summit draws nearer, reluctant bureaucracies come under increasing pressure to move away from inflexible negotiating positions in order that the President may have a successful trip. The pressure to compromise increases as the meeting approaches
and common ground appears where there had been none before. Impending summits can thus have a considerable impact on the internal negotiations that go on within the U.S. government before American representatives meet with their Soviet counterparts. This is especially true because as the meeting date draws nearer the President himself focuses more carefully on the issues to be discussed, and can pressure the various agencies to settle their internal differences so that he may take a flexible position to the summit. Richard Nixon argues,

A summit meeting is also a very useful tool to get a bureaucracy moving. The Soviet bureaucracy is notoriously and maddeningly slow, rigid, and inflexible. The United States' bureaucracy is not free of such faults. There is nothing like the deadline of a summit to knock heads together and to shape-up a bureaucracy.29

Presidential scholar Richard Neustadt has observed that skillful presidents, particularly Franklin Roosevelt, have used the creation of artificial deadlines as a way to get reluctant bureaucracies to take action, and as a way to force important information to his desk in time for him to make critical decisions. In essence, it may be the case that presidents can use summits as action-forcing deadlines which require warring bureaucracies to bring policy debates to some conclusion and reach a compromise position that the President can take with him to the summit.30

If this is true, one would expect to find the positions of relevant bureaucracies moving to a more negotiable posture as the summit draws nearer. Major actors who had previously
taken a hard line stance should be more willing to compromise in order to facilitate the possibility of a successful summit. Thus our first research question to be addressed, stated in proposition form, is:

\[ P1: \text{The approach of the summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision makers, and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes.} \]

To investigate this proposition, data will be collected on the positions of major bureaucratic actors well before the summit on the important issues in each of the four areas discussed previously: regional issues, arms control, trade-bilateral, and human rights. This will then be compared to positions taken in the deliberations of the administration as the President prepares to leave for the summit. Many times, especially in the arms control and regional issues areas, the positions which the President will take at the summit are decided upon at National Security Council meetings just prior to his departure. For example, as the summit approached, in the arms control arena how had the positions of the Joint Chiefs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, and the President’s National Security Advisor changed?

Research Area Two: Impact of Summits on Stalled Negotiations

The second area of inquiry maintains that summits provide an opportunity for leaders to get stalled negotiations moving
by resolving issues that had reached an impasse at lower levels. Political concessions which negotiators or even foreign ministers cannot make can be made quickly at a summit. Issues which have been mired in the bureaucracy for months can be resolved in a matter of hours. Delegates to regular arms control talks must carefully check back with their home office before making any major concession and each proposal must travel through channels before a final decision is made. Bureaucratic infighting often results, thus delaying final action on even minor points. Leaders at the summit can cut through this red tape and decide such issues very quickly. As the head of his party, leader of the executive branch, and due to his close contacts with Congress, the President is best able to judge whether or not a particular concession will be acceptable to the other powers in Washington. As Maurice Hankey has argued:

"Such questions can only be settled in conferences by persons who have their hands on the pulse of political conditions in their respective countries; who have at immediate disposal all of the technical knowledge which governments possess; who know how far they can persuade their countrymen to go in the direction of compromise; and who, insomuch as they have to defend their policy before their respective parliaments, are alone in a position to make real concessions."

The second area of inquiry, expressed in proposition form is:

\[ P2: \text{The President and General Secretary have resolved issues at the summit which were unable to be resolved at lower levels.} \]
The second proposition will be investigated in much the same way as the first. This time a comparison will be made between the President's initial negotiating position as he began the summit with the final position of the United States as the summit concludes. If significant movement is evident on critical issues delaying progress in negotiations, then the proposition will be assumed to have merit.

Research Area Three: Ability of Summits to Craft Framework Agreements

The final advantage to conducting diplomacy at summits between the leaders of the superpowers, as seen by those who have written on this subject, is that this forum can be useful in the construction of the outline or framework of an agreement whose details can be worked out at lower levels. This claim forms the basis for our third area of inquiry. The gathering of the principals can settle the major issues of real political import while more technical concerns can be worked out by those who are more knowledgeable of the consequences of seemingly minor changes in language or procedure. Elmer Plischke in his study of presidential diplomacy has stated:

"Often diplomacy at the summit may result in broad agreement on basic principles respecting critical problems or formulas to initiate diplomatic actions or to resolve differences, paving the way for more definitive negotiation in other diplomatic forums."^2

This argument is the mirror image of the preceding one. Instead of breaking deadlocks to further stalled negotiations, summits are seen as a forum in which leaders
can build a framework for an agreement which will guide later negotiations and give them a conceptual focus for their deliberations. Combining these two justifications, we see that summits can serve to give direction to future negotiations and to prod those negotiations along when they break down.

Together the leaders can build a conceptual framework which deals with the major problems and provides guidance or even a formula for the solution of more technical questions. In the area of arms control, for example, were the leaders able to reach agreement on the major weapons to be limited under the treaty and their individual ceilings? If so, later negotiations can work out the details on more technical issues such as verification. If a real breakthrough were achieved at the summit one would expect rapid progress to follow since major issues had been cleared up, and a framework to guide the deliberations of the formal negotiating teams had been established. Thus, stated in proposition form:

P3: Framework agreements made at U.S.-Soviet summits pave the way for rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal agreement.

This proposition will be examined in two ways. The final summit position of the United States will be compared to the state of affairs approximately six months after the conclusion of the summit. This comparison of the data at these two points should show if significant progress has been made since the summit's end. If the pace of negotiation and
agreement has increased since the summit, this will be considered confirmation of the ability of summit deliberations to pave the way for later agreement. In our second type of analysis we will simply examine any final agreement which deals with issues which were discussed at a U.S.-Soviet summit. If a final treaty has major elements which were agreed to at a summit, this will lead credence to the third proposition.

Research Area Four: Summits as Forums to Educate One's Counterpart

One of the most commonly offered advantages of summit diplomacy has been that it allows the leaders of states to explore the attitudes and positions of opposing leaders and thereby gain a deeper understanding of the goals and motivations that lay behind their counterpart’s actions. Maurice Hankey, who participated in the Versailles Conference at the end of World War I, considered this to be the most positive attribute of summit diplomacy. Hankey maintained, “Perhaps the most important result of conducting diplomacy by conference is the knowledge responsible statesmen acquire of one another.” The fourth and final proposition of this dissertation will explore one aspect of these kinds of discussions. Proposition four is inspired by the encounter between Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin at Glassboro in 1967. McNamara’s passionate exposition on the destabilizing effects of strategic defenses was in reality an attempt to educate the Soviet leadership about an entirely new strategic concept.
developed by American scholars. This discussion went far beyond the exchange of views which one normally associates with summitry and saw America’s Secretary of Defense try to enlighten the Soviet leadership on the emerging strategic environment, and thus hopefully change their behavior.

This encounter raises two important questions. First, how often have leaders from either side used the summit as a forum in which to tutor their counterpart on the dangers or opportunities of the current situation? Secondly, how often have these attempts been successful?

Our fourth area of inquiry will therefore in reality be two closely related, but separate propositions.

P4: Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterparts on their concerns and interests on the important issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted in changes in the behavior of the superpowers following the conclusion of the summit.

The first part will only assume to hold true when the discussions at the summit go well beyond the normal exchange of views between the two leaders. A simple tour d' horizon on the important regional or arms control issues of the day will not be sufficient. For the first part of the fourth proposition to be relevant, the discussion must go well beyond such an exchange. There must be an attempt by either leader to not only introduce some new strategic concept into the superpower dialogue, but also to convince his adversary that his nation’s policies must somehow be changed. For the second part of the proposition to hold true, the attempt must
have been successful in producing some change in the other nation's behavior within six months of the summit.

An overview of this dissertation reveals that data will be collected on four different points in time for each summit under consideration. The first collection point will be months before each summit. The second collection point will be just prior to the President's leaving for his meeting. The third will be immediately following the summit's conclusion and the fourth will involve collecting data several months after the meeting ends. Once having collected this data, the first three propositions will be examined by comparing data from one period with the one which follows it. The first proposition will be investigated by a comparison of the data collected in the first and second periods. The second proposition will be evaluated based on a comparison of the second and third periods. The third proposition will be examined by juxtaposing the third and fourth collection points. The data collected will simply be the negotiating position of major actors in the United States government, in the case of the first proposition, or the official U.S. government negotiating position, in the case of the second and third propositions. In each instance, the comparison will be attempting to find significant changes from the earlier period to the later one.

The final two chapters will attempt to combine the knowledge gained by the study of each individual summit and draw conclusions regarding the validity of the four areas of inquiry and other trends which become apparent. Have summits, on the whole, served the purposes which leaders and
experts argued that they can accomplish? Have summits been able to move reluctant bureaucracies, remove roadblocks to agreement, or build conceptual frameworks which later led to formal treaties? What role have America's allies played in this process? Final judgments on these questions will be made when the data from all of the summits has been aggregated.

The final question that this dissertation proposes to explore will be addressed in the concluding chapter. In cases where significant negotiations have taken place at U.S.-Soviet summits, have the fears expressed by Ikle, Rusk, Nicholson, and others come to pass? Has the President, due to the lack of time for careful consideration, his isolation from critical sources of expertise, or because of surprise proposals, agreed to anything which later created foreign policy problems for the United States? The Reykjavik summit between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev is an obvious example of this problem with summit negotiations, but this study hopes to explore whether this tendency has been evidenced at other summits in less spectacular ways.

Methodology

Research Technique

The methodology for this exercise is the focused comparison technique used by Alexander George and Richard Smoke in their work, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy. George and Smoke examine eleven cases from the Berlin
Blockade of 1948-1949 to the Cuban Missile Crisis, and in each case the authors seek to answer seven fundamental questions related to the assumptions of deterrence theory. They then use the knowledge gained in this process to develop a typology of deterrence failures and theories of how commitment and response can be used to successfully implement a policy of deterrence. As they argue, this approach offers several advantages over traditional case studies of events in international relations while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of more mathematically oriented techniques. While case studies offer a great deal of detail and insight into one case, their narrow focus on one case does not give political scientists the ability to generalize that mathematical approaches do. Their conclusions, no matter how valid or well documented, apply only to the case in question.

Those who choose to use mathematical techniques, because of the problems of generalization and cumulation that traditional techniques present, run into different problems. The principle is that in attempting to convert a non-numerical concept into an indicator which can be manipulated in mathematical operations much of the meaning of the original concept is lost.

The focused comparison method provides an alternative to the problems that these other approaches encounter. Using this methodology a significant number of cases is used, in this case eleven, which avoids the weaknesses that the case study approach encounters. The researcher takes a limited number of variables and examines the impact of changes in their value on the dependent variable. Because the number of
cases studied and the number of variables involved is far less than is typical in a mathematical approach there is no need to convert non-numerical concepts into a form that can be manipulated mathematically. Thus there is far less loss of information and more ability to consider unique aspects of each situation.

The small number of cases involved in this study means the findings of this effort will not be statistically significant. The results will be, however, suggestive of the areas in which future researchers ought to invest their time and effort. The ultimate intention of this study is to lay out in the final chapter a series of formal hypotheses for future investigation.

One criticism of this technique is that there are often difficulties with questions of reliability and validity. The evidence used to investigate the propositions contained in this study will come from subjective sources such as the memoirs of important participants. Memoirs are always personal recollections and often self-serving, and therefore difficult judgments must sometimes be made as to whether a proposition has been supported. In this study the first three propositions will be evaluated based on changes in the position of either the major bureaucracies prior to the summit, as with proposition one, or by looking for changes in the official negotiating position of the United States, as with propositions two and three. On proposition one, difficulties may arise in determining if it was the approach of the summit which forced the bureaucracies to agree on a common position, or if some other factor caused this change.
On proposition two, questions may arise as to whether a summit agreement constitutes the removal of a significant obstacle to agreement. On proposition three, difficult judgments may be required to determine if a summit agreement truly qualifies as the framework for a formal agreement which follows later. Finally, on proposition four, questions may arise as to whether a discussion at the summit can legitimately be categorized as an attempt to educate the adversary. Ultimately the questions of reliability will be addressed by providing a rich historical background to each of these changes, drawn from as many sources as possible, in order to document that the change fulfills the requirements of the proposition.

Questions of validity are concerned with making sure that the indicators chosen accurately reflect the process being examined. For proposition one, does change in the position of the major bureaucratic actors really reflect the approach of the summit or is some other third variable the actual cause of this change? For proposition two, does change in the negotiating position of the United States' government between the beginning and end of the summit mean that a significant obstacle to progress has been removed? For proposition three, does the change in position constitute a framework for a later agreement? Once again each of these judgments will be based on the providing of a detailed history of the preceding and subsequent events, from a variety of sources, to substantiate that the change in the indicator is a valid representation of the concept the proposition is attempting to explore.
The Cases

This dissertation will investigate eleven Cold War summits involving the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. These summits, covering the years 1955 to 1986, are given in Table One.

Table 1
Cold War Superpower Summits 1955-1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Major Issue Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geneva *</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>regional issues, arms control,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp David</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>regional issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>regional issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glassboro</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>regional issues, arms control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>regional issues, arms control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>regional issues, arms control,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>trade, human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>regional issues, arms control,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>trade, human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladivostok</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>arms control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>regional issues, arms control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>regional issues, arms control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reykjavik</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>arms control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Geneva was a four-power summit with the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France attending. All other summits studied were bilateral U.S.-Soviet meetings.*
The Geneva summit in June, 1955 was the first post-war meeting between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. The summit came just as the ice of the Cold War seemed to be beginning to thaw with the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. Geneva is the only multilateral summit to be investigated by this study with President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Eden of Great Britain, Premier Faure of France, and Premier Bulganin and First Secretary Khrushchev of the Soviet Union attending. The primary topic of discussion at this meeting was the fate of Germany.

Khrushchev and Eisenhower met again for the first bilateral U.S.-Soviet summit in history at Camp David in September, 1959. Khrushchev had initiated a crisis over Berlin in November, 1958 when he gave the West six months to sign a peace treaty ending the Second World War, or else the Soviet Union would sign one independently with East Germany, thus threatening the Western position in West Berlin. The summit came following the failure of a Foreign Minister’s Conference to resolve this issue, and the two leaders spent much of their time discussing Berlin.

President Kennedy met with Khrushchev at Vienna in June, 1961 in what was to become one of the most controversial summits of the Cold War era. The two met after Khrushchev had resurrected his ultimatum over Berlin in January, 1961, and following the summit a serious confrontation developed over this divided city, ultimately leading to the building of the Berlin wall and a showdown of U.S. and Soviet tanks at Checkpoint Charlie. Berlin obviously dominated the discussion, but the Laotian crisis was addressed as well.
In June, 1967 President Johnson met with Premier Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey. The summit took place just after the Six-Day War in the Middle East, and was hastily arranged during the Premier's trip to the United Nations to address the General Assembly on the crisis in the wake of the war. President Johnson attempted to engage Kosygin on not only the Middle East, but also guidelines for regional competition between the superpowers, and the destabilizing effects of ballistic missile defenses.

Richard Nixon became the first American President to visit the Soviet Union in May, 1972 when he met with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The summit took place in the wake of a failed offensive by North Vietnam, and this war was the major regional issue addressed. This summit also saw the completion of the SALT I Treaty and the Basic Principles Agreement, as well as a host of other subsidiary agreements.

In June, 1973 Leonid Brezhnev came to Washington for his second summit with Richard Nixon. Detente was in full flower, although Nixon's growing weakness due to the Watergate scandal and a budding controversy over U.S.-Soviet trade and Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union cast a pall over the summit. The leaders addressed the SALT II negotiations, regional concerns in the Middle East and China, and the problems created by the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

The final summit between Nixon and Brezhnev took place in Moscow and Yalta in June, 1974. The Watergate scandal would soon end Nixon's Presidency and his authority was nearly gone by the time the summit convened. The leaders did address SALT II and dangerous trends in the strategic
arsenals of the two sides, as well as the now linked issues of trade and human rights.

Five months later, Gerald Ford had succeeded Richard Nixon as President, and he traveled to Vladivostok in November to discuss SALT II with Leonid Brezhnev. This was the first summit totally devoted to arms control with only brief discussions of other issues.

Five years later, in June, 1979, President Jimmy Carter traveled to Vienna to meet with Brezhnev and sign the virtually complete SALT II Treaty. The leaders discussed growing regional tensions between the superpowers as well and their goals for SALT III, but the summit’s effectiveness was limited by Brezhnev’s by now very poor health.

Six years would pass before the Soviet and American leaders, this time Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, would meet again at the summit in November, 1985. Arms control and the effects of ballistic missile defense were the principle topics addressed, as well as the war in Afghanistan and other regional hot spots.

The final summit to be discussed by this study is the Reykjavik meeting of October, 1986. Reagan and Gorbachev met at this hastily arranged meeting, and focused all of their time on discussions of arms control. The results of this meeting led many to categorize this summit, along with Vienna in 1961, as a failure because of the sloppy way the negotiations were handled.
**Types of Issues**

Each of the four propositions will be examined for each summit on four different types of issues. First, we will explore each proposition as it applies to the discussions on regional issues at the summit. Several regions of the world have been discussed prominently at a number of summits beginning including Germany and its former capital Berlin, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. Events in Africa were only an important topic at the Vienna summit in 1979. Arms control issues have obviously played an important role at U.S.-Soviet summits as the superpowers engaged in a series of exceedingly complex negotiations throughout the Cold War. Trade issues have at times become an item on the summit agenda and the propositions will be applied to these discussions. Finally, ideological differences between the superpowers have sometimes elevated human rights issues to the attention of the leaders at the summit meetings.

Table Two explains how the relative importance of these issues has evolved over time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site/Year</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Arms Control</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geneva 1955</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. Asia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Camp David 1959</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vienna 1961</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 (continued)
Issues Discussed at Superpower Summits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site/Year</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Arms Control</th>
<th>Trade Rights</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>S.E. Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glassboro 1967</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moscow 1972</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington 1973</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moscow 1974</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vladivostok 1974</td>
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<td>Vienna 1979</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geneva 1985</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reykjavik 1986</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

X = Major issue discussed
Y = Minor issue discussed

As Table Two shows, in the first three summits between the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union, the status of Germany and its former capital Berlin was the dominant issue. Beginning with the Glassboro summit in 1967, the primary regional concerns discussed by the President and the General Secretary began to change and now dealt with the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia and Africa. The stabilization of the European situation after the Berlin crisis of 1961 allowed greater attention to be focused on the third world by the leaders, even though there were discussions on Southeast Asia and other trouble spots in the summits before Glassboro.

The Glassboro summit in 1967 marks an even more important boundary in the content of summit deliberations than just a
shift in regional concerns. Beginning with the Johnson-Kosygin meeting, arms control issues moved to the very top of the agenda when the two heads of government met. As time has passed, each successive summit seems to have been more and more dominated by arms control issues, especially in the Reagan administration. Key elements of the SALT I, SALT II, INF, and the proposed START treaty were negotiated at summit meetings, and the SALT I, SALT II, and INF accords were signed at these gatherings. It is no coincidence that this shift in the focus of discussion came just as the Soviet Union was attaining rough parity in nuclear weapons. Parity made arms control agreements more attractive to both superpowers since the alternative was an expensive offensive-defensive arms race which would not have purchased additional security for either side. Arms control was an area in which mutually beneficial, negotiable treaties were possible, unlike the more difficult regional issues where common ground was more elusive since important political interests were at stake."

The final two baskets of issues, trade and human rights became more prominent in the era of the Nixon-Brezhnev conferences. The gradual decline of the Soviet economy began in the late 1960s, and created a demand on their part for Western technology, farm products, and consumer goods, as the Soviets attempted to switch from extensive to intensive economic growth. The Nixon-Kissinger policy of linkage saw this need as a vital tool in forcing Soviet concessions on regional issues and arms control, thus trade became a prominent topic at the summits of the Nixon administration.
Human rights also became an important issue, although President Nixon was forced by Congress to deal with these concerns at least more openly than he would have wished. At the Carter and Reagan summits, human rights violations in the Soviet Union were moved closer to the top of the summit agenda, reflecting the preferences of those two leaders.

In sum, each proposition will be investigated while controlling for the type of issue. For example, at the Geneva summit in 1955 questions of Germany's fate, arms control, trade, and human rights were discussed. However, issues regarding Germany dominated the agenda. Each proposition will be applied to the four issues to determine if the proposition is supported by the evidence on each issue for every summit.

Chapters Two through Twelve will focus on the eleven case studies, from Geneva in 1955 to Reykjavik in 1986. Each proposition will be investigated on all four issue areas. Chapter Thirteen will explore various trends in summit diplomacy, as well as the influence of Congress, and America's allies on Cold War summit meetings between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. In Chapter Fourteen we will examine each proposition for every summit to determine if the evidence supports this statement. We will also carefully note the conditions under which the proposition is not found to hold and then use the knowledge gained from these exercises to attempt to generate a set of hypotheses and perhaps a general framework that can serve to guide future research. This study will also examine the warnings that skeptics of summit diplomacy have issued in the
past, and explore how often, and under what conditions, they have come to pass. Lastly, it is hoped that some valuable lessons can be gleaned from this study to guide future presidents and their advisors when they travel to the summit.
NOTES - CHAPTER I


33. Hankey, p. 35.


CHAPTER II

GENEVA, 1955

In the spring of 1955 the unending hostility of the Cold War seemed, at least on the surface, to be giving way to a more hopeful period in U.S.-Soviet relations. A series of events culminating with a four power summit in Geneva from July 18-23 held out the hope that if the Cold War was not ending it might at least be ebbing. The death of Joseph Stalin in March, 1953 led many to believe that perhaps a window of opportunity had opened in which it might be possible to lessen East-West tension and address the problems created by the Second World War and its aftermath. Winston Churchill, on May 11, 1953 issued the call for the first postwar heads of government meeting. President Eisenhower, however, did not share the Prime Minister's enthusiasm for such a meeting:

I developed a stock answer to any question of a possible summit. I would not go to a summit merely because of friendly words and plausible promises by the men in the Kremlin; actual deeds giving some indication of a Communist readiness to negotiate constructively will have to be produced before I would agree to such a meeting.1

This would change in the next two years because several very important developments took place in the last half of 1954
and the first half of 1955 which led the President to change his mind on the desirability of a four power conference between the heads of government.

Setting

Within NATO the 1954-1955 period saw West Germany fully integrated into the alliance through the Paris Accords negotiated in September and October 1954, with the Federal Republic becoming an official member of NATO on May 9, 1955. The addition of an armed West Germany to the alliance strengthened the position of the West in spite of a massive Soviet propaganda campaign against West Germany’s entrance into NATO. The Soviet Union countered this with the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization on May 14, 1955 thus establishing the rival alliance structures which began to unravel in the late 1980s.

Having failed to stop West Germany’s inclusion into NATO, the USSR changed its tactics from confrontation to a more conciliatory stance. The most dramatic example of its changed line was the agreement by the Soviet leadership to conclude the negotiations on Austria on terms acceptable to the West. The conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty, and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet forces from its zone of occupation, was the principle deed which convinced President Eisenhower that a summit conference with the leaders of the USSR might be productive. In addition, the Soviet Union introduced on May 10 a new arms reduction plan at the United
Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament, which contained major elements of an earlier French-British proposal that had been praised by the United States, although the Eisenhower administration had never formally adopted it. The Soviet spring peace offensive also included an invitation on May 5 to West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to visit the Soviet Union, which he accepted, and a visit by First Secretary Khrushchev to Yugoslavia to mend the strained relations which had existed between these two communist states since Stalin's split with Tito.

These dramatic events led President Eisenhower to authorize Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to consult with Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and France on the possibility of an East-West summit. During a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers on May 10, 1955, Dulles, Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan, and Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay sent a message to the USSR inviting the leaders of the Soviet Union to a summit. Four days later when the Foreign Ministers gathered on the eve of the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, Molotov indicated that the Soviet Union would accept the invitation, and the four agreed to meet again before the summit, at the tenth anniversary celebration of the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco on June 20 to discuss the agenda and procedural details. An exchange of notes following the Vienna meeting soon set the summit's site as Geneva and July 18 as its opening date. The stage was now set for President Eisenhower's debut in direct negotiations with the Soviet leadership.
Summit Preparation

Within the government of the United States preparation for the Geneva Conference was largely coordinated by the Department of State. Douglas MacArthur II, the Counselor of the Department of State, was placed in charge of coordinating this activity, with Jacob Beam serving as his deputy with special responsibility for maintaining contacts with the British, German, and French working groups who were preparing their governments' summit positions. There was considerable consultation between the three Western powers in the two months prior to the conference with the Foreign Ministers meeting not only in Vienna and San Francisco, as described above, but also in Washington June 15-17 with Chancellor Adenauer present on June 17 after he had met with President Eisenhower. Finally, just prior to the opening of the conference, the Foreign Ministers attended a North Atlantic Council meeting to consult with the other members of the alliance before traveling to Geneva.

In fact, even though Chancellor Adenauer was not present at the conference table his presence was very much felt due not only to his personal contact prior to the summit with President Eisenhower, or to the coordination with the West German working group, but also to the fact that during the summit itself Dulles kept in close contact by phone with Adenauer who was stationed in a villa in Switzerland.

Preparation of the United States' positions were developed by a dozen subcommittees led by a committee of assistant secretaries from the Departments of State and
Defense, headed up by MacArthur. Once positions were decided upon they were sent on to Secretary Dulles for possible changes and then on to the National Security Council for final decision by the President. Thus the summit preparation was very much dominated by Secretary Dulles and, as will be seen later, the positions which emerged from this process very much reflected his supremacy. There was, however, one alternative forum, led by Nelson A. Rockefeller, which would compete with the Department of State as a source for ideas on how President Eisenhower should conduct himself at Geneva, and this group would produce the most memorable concept to emerge from this conference.

After the announcement that a summit would be held Rockefeller began to make plans for a conference of experts to be held at the Marine base in Quantico, Virginia. The conference, which lasted from June 5-10, assembled a small group of experts on international security affairs, most of them from outside the government. The State Department, which was very suspicious of the exercise, sent only Walworth Barbour, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and he came for only the initial session on June 5. Allen Dulles, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, attended the first and last sessions of the gathering, while President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Disarmament, Harold Stassen, was present at the concluding meeting. In fact not only did the State Department avoid sending representatives to Quantico, Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover II and Secretary Dulles tried unsuccessfully
to get President Eisenhower to prevent it from being held at all. To prevent cancellation of the exercise, Rockefeller had to promise to the President that Quantico's purpose would not be to become a rival to the State Department's preparation for the Geneva Summit. Once the Quantico meetings began, however, they immediately focused upon the positions the President should take on the major issues at Geneva.

These then were the two main forums within which preparation for the summit was conducted. Given the stature of Secretary Dulles within the administration it was he and his Department which dominated the process, but on the issue of arms control the Quantico panel did make a substantial contribution.

For the Secretary of State, Geneva was not seen as a forum for negotiation as much as it was a place where the heads of government could identify the critical problems to be addressed and to set a tone for East-West relations which would facilitate progress at a Foreign Minister's meeting to be held several months following the summit. Thus Geneva would not be an end but rather a beginning of a process of negotiating the differences between East and West. Adopting this view of the summit's purpose would severely limit the actual amount of negotiation which would take place at the summit. Instead the President's role would be to identify major Western concerns and perhaps to suggest possible solutions, but leaving real negotiations for the Foreign Ministers. President Eisenhower came largely to agree with
Dulles' conception of the summit's purpose. According to Eisenhower:

I expressed the conviction that earlier international conferences had paid too much attention to details, or to exploring nationalistic goals, without enough attention to the spirit in which differences of ambition and ideology might be resolved.7

Thus as he prepared to embark for Geneva, the President was looking to create a tone in U.S.-Soviet relations rather than to engage in serious bargaining on specific issues. This is not to say, however, that the President would not offer specific proposals on major issues. How these positions evolved will now be considered.

In the area of regional issues, the fate of Germany was the most important question to be discussed at Geneva. The supposedly temporary division of Germany was now threatening to become permanent, contrary to the long stated Western position that it should be reunified. The most recent Western proposal prior to the summit, for the reunification of Germany had been offered at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers in January 1954. The so-called Eden Plan was endorsed by Great Britain, France, and the United States, and it proposed that Germany be reunified based on free elections supervised by the four occupying powers. Once a new democratically elected German government was in place it would be up to the people of Germany to determine which security bloc they would prefer to join. Of course, it was assumed by the West that given a free choice Germany would choose to enter NATO. In the extensive consultations which
took place prior to the summit between Western working groups, Foreign Ministers, and between Chancellor Adenauer and President Eisenhower in mid-June, the Eden Plan remained the basis on which the West would propose German reunification. For the West, solution of the division of Germany would be the key to any progress in the area of European security. In fact, of the three major issue areas to be considered at Geneva this would be the only one in which the West would present a united front.

The Eisenhower administration had been searching for a unified position on the question of arms control since the President had taken office in January, 1953. President Eisenhower had on September 9, 1953 ordered a joint State and Defense Department review of the U.S. arms control proposal in order to determine what the new administration's position should be. By the end of 1954, after 15 months of study the group was still unable to develop a unified recommendation on a new U.S. arms control proposal. The State Department members of the group were in favor of a phased plan of control on nuclear material which would require the gradual reduction of these stockpiles. The State Department officials on the committee argued that conventional reductions should be sought but not as a precondition to progress on nuclear arms control. Defense Department members of the group objected to the State Department proposal on several grounds, principally because they feared that the closed nature of Soviet society would allow them to cheat on any treaty without fear of exposure while the West would comply with the
agreement. Moreover, the Defense officials argued that Soviet global ambitions would not allow them to agree with any arms control accord which could be truly enforced and that continuing to negotiate would create public pressure on Western governments to reach compromise agreements which would not be in their interests. Finally the Defense Department insisted that if arms talks were to continue, conventional arms reduction must proceed concurrently with nuclear arms limitations because of Soviet superiority in conventional forces.*

The scheduling of the summit meeting gave more urgency to the arms control review which had been underway for almost two years, but it did not bring consensus on a new initiative which the President could propose at Geneva. When Harold Stassen took over as the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament in March, 1955 he assumed direction of the review process, but he had no more success than had been experienced before he assumed this mantle. Once again the central issue remained the construction of a system of control which would allow the United States to monitor Soviet compliance with any treaty. At a meeting of the National Security Council on June 30, 1955 the issue of disarmament and the stance the President would take at Geneva were under consideration. The same arguments which had prevented consensus on the joint State-Defense committee were offered once again. The focus of the meeting was on the difficulty of verifying any agreement whether it be on nuclear or conventional forces. President Eisenhower concluded the
meeting by ordering Stassen to concentrate on a control and inspection regime which could be implemented as part of a disarmament treaty with the Soviet Union. Given the length of time necessary to complete such a study, the President did not expect it to be done before the Geneva summit, now less than three weeks away. Thus, President Eisenhower would go to the summit without a firm position on arms control and without a clear idea on how such a treaty could be verified. It was decided at the June 30 meeting that the President would emphasize the need to have a reliable system of inspection in place before an arms control treaty could go into force, and also to serve as a hedge against surprise attack, but he would not have any specific proposals along these lines. This would later change through the intervention of Nelson Rockefeller who was out of Washington on June 30 and unable to attend the NSC meeting.*

The real difficulty in the situation was that the United States was in danger of appearing completely out of step with developments in the field of arms control. The Soviet Union had on May 10, 1955 offered an arms control proposal on both nuclear and conventional forces which was similar in many respects to a joint British-French proposal that had been offered on June 11, 1954 and had been praised by the United States. The plan, presented at a London meeting of the United Nations Subcommitteee on Disarmament, would go into effect in several phases. It would begin by freezing the forces of the United States, Great Britain, France, Soviet Union, and China at December 31, 1954 levels and then
gradually reduce military manpower to 1-1.5 million men for the U.S., USSR and China, and 650,000 for France and Great Britain. This goal was to have been halfway accomplished on January 1, 1957 at which time nuclear forces would be frozen. When the five powers had reduced to within 75 percent of their goal all nuclear weapons would be prohibited. Verification of this agreement would be accomplished by control posts within the territory of the signatories at important rail and road junctions, harbors, airports, and other critical areas. The Soviet plan implied some limited inspection rights but they were not clarified in the May 10 proposal.¹⁰

On the substantive issues of reducing armament levels the Soviet proposal had gone a long way toward meeting the British-French plan of one year earlier. Thus it was received very warmly by the allies and to many it seemed that there was a real possibility of agreement. The United States representative to the London talks, James J. Wadsworth, praised the Soviet proposal, but called attention to the weak safeguards against cheating within the document. Still, however, the division within the United States government prevented the U.S. from presenting an alternative vision to the plan the Soviet Union had offered. Under these circumstances Nelson Rockefeller and his staff felt the President could not go to Geneva without concrete proposals to lay on the table. Rockefeller feared that for President Eisenhower to merely call for the development of an effective control system without offering any concrete plan for
lessening the possibility of war would be a potential disaster in public opinion. Something concrete which protected American interests and projected American values must be offered by the President at the summit. The Quantico meetings would provide the idea he sought.11

Those who attended the Quantico meeting began their deliberation on a very different premise than Dulles' vision that the Geneva summit should identify the major problems and set the tone for future negotiations. Walt Rostow, who chaired the deliberations, Rockefeller, and the others in attendance saw Geneva as an opportunity to test the sincerity of the Soviet peace offensive in the spring of 1955 by offering them a series of tough choices which, if accepted, would drastically reduce tension in Europe. The tests which the Soviets must pass began with Germany. The Quantico Panel recommended that the West stick to its support for the Eden Plan calling for a Germany unified by free elections and able to choose of which alliance it would be a member. The scholars gathered at Quantico assumed, as had the State Department, that a unified Germany would choose to join NATO.

The next test of Soviet intentions was to ascertain their willingness to reduce conventional and nuclear weapons, but, more importantly, to determine if the USSR would submit itself to the kind of control regime necessary to monitor compliance, in a meaningful way, with an arms control agreement. It was for this purpose that the Open Skies proposal was offered. Max Millikan, of the Center for International Studies at MIT, introduced the idea at Quantico
of a system of mutual aerial inspections which not only could be used to monitor disarmament agreements but also to allay fears of a surprise attack. The proposal was received very warmly by those in attendance and was featured prominently in the final report.\textsuperscript{12} The purpose of the Open Skies plan was to deal with the very asymmetry which so concerned the Defense Department and also Secretary Dulles; the asymmetry between an open society, the U.S., and a closed one, the USSR, had long worried American leaders who were worried not only about the difficulty of monitoring arms control agreements but also about the possibility of a surprise attack. Open Skies would give each side what would later come to be called transparency and therefore would lessen fear of a preemptive strike which had long been a primary concern for American leaders.

In the days prior to the Geneva summit, two competing sources of ideas on how the President should conduct himself had emerged. The bureaucracy led by Secretary of State Dulles envisioned the summit as a way to set the agenda and tone for a later Foreign Ministers meeting where the real negotiation would take place. The Quantico panel saw Geneva as a test of Soviet intentions. On the question of Germany, however, there was very little difference in the approach of the two competitors since both called for a Germany united by free elections. While the Quantico report pushed for specific proposals on trade and human rights, each essentially was calling for an opening of the Soviet system to Western influence and products without compromising the
Western blockade of military useful goods to the USSR. The issue of arms control, however, saw a fundamental difference which the President would have to decide upon before he discussed the matter with the Soviet leadership.

The final decision to present the Open Skies proposal was not made until the third day of the Conference, July 20, on the eve of the arms control discussions at Geneva. While Rockefeller had not accompanied the President to Geneva, he had been brought to Paris, along with Stassen and other top officials so that they would be near if the President felt the need to consult with them. During this period Stassen, Admiral Arthur Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Robert B. Anderson, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, were briefed by Rockefeller on the details and the purpose of the Open Skies proposal. While Stassen remained reluctant to endorse the idea, Radford and Anderson were won over by Rockefeller. Contacts between those in Paris and Geneva eventually led to a meeting being called in President Eisenhower's villa on the evening of July 20. In attendance were Eisenhower, Dulles, Anderson, Radford, Stassen, Rockefeller, Livingston Merchant, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Dillon Anderson, Eisenhower's national security advisor, Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House staff secretary, and Alfred M. Gruenther, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. While Stassen and Dulles expressed some reluctance toward the President presenting the Open Skies proposal the next day, the fact that the military leaders present and the representative of the Defense Department,
Robert Anderson, were enthusiastic proponents of the plan seemed to carry the day. The other decisive factor which led to acceptance of the plan was obviously that the President himself was drawn to Open Skies and in fact had already sounded out Anthony Eden on mutual aerial inspection at a breakfast meeting earlier that day. These deliberations led to the formal presentation of the Open Skies plan on July 21, 1955.13

The Summit

When President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Premier Edgar Faure, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, and Premier Nikolai Bulganin sat together for the first time on July 18, 1955 the agenda for their conference had not been completely determined, even though the Foreign Ministers had met twice before the summit to discuss the issues which would be discussed at the summit. The leaders, with the exception of President Eisenhower, used their speeches on the opening day of the conference to outline the proposals which they would formally offer in later meetings. The only issue on which the three Western powers fully agreed was on the question of Germany. President Eisenhower, Premier Faure of France, and Prime Minister Eden of Great Britain were united in their support for the reunification of Germany and the right of the German people to defend themselves and to determine their security arrangements. Eden and Faure in their opening statements specifically endorsed the Eden Plan as the basis for uniting Germany and determining to which
security bloc it would adhere, while Eisenhower was more
general in his support for free elections as the mechanism
for German unification.

Eden went on to introduce further proposals to deal with
European security including a five power security pact,
involving the four states present and Germany, in which each
would guarantee to come to the defense of another who was
under attack. He also proposed an arms limitation zone in
Central Europe following unification which would specifically
limit troop levels in Germany and in the countries
neighboring Germany. Faure also offered a specific
disarmament proposal which involved the limitation of defense
budgets of the four powers present, to be supervised by an
international body which would use money saved by disarmament
to create a fund whose proceeds would be used to help
underdeveloped countries.

Soviet Premier Bulganin in his opening statement and in
subsequent planning sessions introduced several very specific
proposals. On European security he called for the creation
of a collective security pact which would replace the
opposing alliances that had developed, and would also require
the removal of foreign troops from the soil of European
countries. Bulganin reintroduced the Soviets' May 10 arms
control proposal with the additional clause that states other
than the United States, Soviet Union, China, France, and
Great Britain would be limited to no more than 150-200
thousand men. This addition to the May 10 plan was obviously
aimed at limiting the size of West Germany's new army. On
German unification Bulganin made it clear that the main obstacles to this process were West German militarization and membership in NATO. It soon became clear that the Soviets would only consider German unification within the context of the withering away of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and their replacement by a European collective security system."

After the opening statements on July 18, the Foreign Ministers met to finally determine the agenda for the conference. July 19 and 20 were devoted to the consideration of the various proposals on European security and German unification. There was a brief glimmer of hope that the Soviets had agreed during the morning session on July 20 to permit unification based on free elections but Bulganin made clear in the afternoon meeting the stringent conditions under which this was possible, dissolution of NATO and perhaps the demilitarization of Germany. President Eisenhower considered walking out of the conference to protest Soviet intransigence on Germany but rejected the idea. The July 21 session was devoted to an explanation of each leader of his plan for disarmament, Faure’s budgetary limits, Eden’s zones of reduction in central Europe, Bulganin’s phased reduction plan, and Eisenhower’s Open Skies proposal.

Eisenhower’s proposal of Open Skies clearly electrified the conference and became the most memorable moment of the summit. The plan which he offered went beyond the Quantico vision of mutual aerial inspection to include an exchange of blueprints of military installations. Following the President’s speech, both Eden, who had been informed in
advance of the proposal, and Faure expressed unqualified support for the idea, and Bulganin offered that there seemed to be merit in the concept. This expression of interest by the nominal head of the Soviet delegation created hope that this proposal had a chance of being accepted, but his hope was soon dashed when immediately after the session Khrushchev told Eisenhower that he did not agree with Bulganin and later went on to say that Open Skies was nothing more than an espionage plot against the USSR. Eisenhower continued to try to persuade Khrushchev of the merits of the plan but he did so without success.\footnote{5}

The fifth day of the conference, July 22, saw the discussion move to the last item on the agenda, East-West contacts. On this issue the debate was more general than the previous day's discussion of arms control. The sessions were devoted to speeches by Eden and Eisenhower calling for expanding East-West contacts, and a freer flow of information and people between the two blocs. No real negotiation on these issues took place and the leaders did not go beyond general pleas for more contact between East and West.

The final substantive act of the conference involved the composition of a communiqué written in the form of a directive to the Foreign Ministers which would serve as a guide to their meeting in October and November. The communiqué was divided into three sections, European Security and Germany, Disarmament, and East-West contacts, and in each section the document simply listed the alternative proposals which each leader had made regarding that particular problem.
It was expected that the Foreign Minister's Conference would then take up the concrete negotiations.

Summit Aftermath

The Dulles view of the role of the Geneva Conference was that it should lay the groundwork for a later meeting of Foreign Ministers by identifying the critical problems and pointing toward possible solutions, while setting a positive tone in which these later negotiations could be conducted. Given this view one must take into account what was accomplished at the Foreign Ministers meeting and the related United Nations disarmament negotiations before making a final judgment on the contributions of the Geneva summit. Unfortunately, the Foreign Ministers Conference turned out to be a rather sterile affair which very much resembled the summit in that little real negotiation took place. Instead, once again, previously announced positions were introduced without any attempt to search for common ground or a mutually advantageous position.

The Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers was held from October 27 to November 16, 1955 and took place in a period of considerable uncertainty for the United States' government due to President Eisenhower's heart attack on September 23. Even during the President's illness and recovery period, preparations for the Foreign Ministers meeting continued. When the Foreign Ministers convened on October 27 they had an ambitious agenda set before them by the final communique
which was issued at the close of the Geneva Summit. The three Western allies were far more in sync in October than they had been during the heads of government meeting in July. On the issues of Germany and European security, disarmament, and East-West contacts, France, Great Britain and the United States were able to submit tripartite proposals to the Soviet negotiators. On the issue of Germany and European security the unified Western proposal was based on the Eden Plan for German unification and also the security and arms control proposals Anthony Eden had offered at Geneva. The arms control provisions of the tripartite offer included a zone of reduced armaments in Central Europe, as Eden had proposed in Geneva, near the border of the newly unified Germany and its neighbors.

The Soviet counter proposal was to establish a more limited collective security pact in Europe than the one they had offered at Geneva. Within the plan were also provisions for a limitation of armaments in Central Europe, but the restrictions would be enforced on either side of the border between East and West Germany, not between a unified Germany and her neighbors, as the Western plan established.

Once again this meeting, as had the Geneva Summit, deadlocked over the issue of German unification. The Soviets would still only consider German unity after a collective security pact went into effect, Germany was neutralized, and limitations were placed on German armament. This fundamental disagreement could not be resolved and eventually the Foreign Ministers moved on to discuss arms control.  

Disarmament negotiations had been going on in the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament since late August and had made little, if any, progress. Harold Stassen had formally proposed President Eisenhower's Open Skies plan on August 30 to the subcommittee, but he did not offer any plan for the reduction of armaments because the United States' policy on disarmament was still under review. The Eisenhower administration remained deadlocked over the proper course to follow in the disarmament negotiations. The Open Skies plan had been modified to include the establishment of control posts at key places to monitor any agreement, as the Soviet May 10 proposal had called for, but American negotiators were still not authorized to make a counterproposal on actual arms reductions. Thus the United States was insisting upon the establishment of an inspection system prior to the conclusion of an arms reduction agreement while the Soviets were proposing sweeping arms cuts in armaments with only very minimal verification provisions. This impasse would prevent progress at either the U.N. talks in London or at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' meeting.

The actual rejection of Open Skies came before either the subcommittee or the Foreign Ministers, meeting were held. In a speech before the Supreme Soviet on August 4, and then directly in a letter to Eisenhower on August 17 Bulganin rejected Open Skies because it did not deal with actual arms reductions, there was no provision in the original plan for aerial reconnaissance over bases on foreign territory, and
because the data gathered could be used to plan a surprise attack."

By the time the Foreign Ministers' meeting opened there was little doubt that the Soviets would reject Open Skies, and Molotov immediately rejected the proposal after its submission by the three Western Ministers. Instead the Soviets reintroduced their May 10 proposal. Foreign Minister Macmillan spoke for the West praising parts of the proposal for their similarity to Western proposals in 1952 and 1954, but condemned the control provisions as inadequate. The Western powers were simply not willing to negotiate until a verification regime could be established and the Soviets were unwilling to allow the kind of intrusive measures such a regime would require.

The final issue on the Foreign Ministers' agenda regarded the opening of contacts between East and West. Proposals in this area were tabled on October 31 by both the Soviet Union and the three Western powers, and a working group of experts was established to consider the issues contained in these documents. The Soviet plan focused on the granting of Most Favored Nation trading status to the USSR by the West and the end of the embargo on strategic goods which was managed through the Coordinating Committee (COCOM). Molotov's proposal also called for broader contacts in industrial, agricultural, and cultural relations, as well as greater scientific cooperation in fields like the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Finally the Soviets pushed for access to straits near China which had been part of the
confrontation between the United States and the Chinese over the offshore islands earlier in 1955.  

The Western proposal, offered by French Foreign Minister Antonine Pinay on October 31, went straight to the heart of the ideological conflict between East and West. This plan outlined seventeen separate initiatives which would not only transform relations between the Soviet Union and the West, but also would transform the Soviet Union itself. The initiatives fell into three categories based on the communique which ended the Geneva summit, creating a free flow of information, eliminating barriers to travel and other contacts, and increasing trade between East and West.

Once again very little progress was made on this agenda item. Again the impasse resulted, as had the question of free elections for Germany, because even though the four heads of government agreed to seek freer contacts between East and West at Geneva they had a very different definition of what the phrase meant. The Soviet leadership sought greater contact but wished to keep it tightly controlled and limited to technical fields from which they could gain economic benefit without exposing their population to alien ideas. The West sought to progressively open the USSR to Western thought, people, and goods and in many ways change fundamental relationships within the Soviet Union. While many scholars have accused other proposals of the four powers to be merely exercises in propaganda, the Open Skies plan is often described in this light, the discussion on East-West contacts seems clearly to have all of the earmarks of a
battle for the hearts and minds of the general public, not serious proposals for real negotiations.

Evaluation of the Propositions

Proposition One

Having now described the events surrounding the Geneva summit of 1955 we will now turn to an evaluation of the propositions presented earlier. The first proposition regarding the effects of summits is:

P1: The approach of a summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision makers, and the Congress to reach a common position and settle longstanding disputes.

The issue area most salient at Geneva was the regional question of the fate of Germany. This proposition was not upheld for the simple reason that the United States and its Western allies had for many years held to a common position on the most important regional dispute in the Cold War, the fate of Germany. The West had insisted since the end of World War II that Germany be reunified by free elections and that the people of Germany be allowed to determine to which bloc they would adhere. The Eden Plan, offered at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers in January 1954, was the most recent attempt to gain Soviet acceptance of this objective and in the joint planning for the Heads of Government meeting it remained the basic blueprint. In fact this was the only issue on which the three Western leaders showed complete agreement at the summit. There was no division among the
allies on the question of Germany. This was a summit in which joint planning, among not only the three western participants but also with West Germany, was carefully orchestrated throughout the two months from the announcement of the conference until it convened. Working groups from the United States, France, Great Britain, and Germany met frequently from June 13 until July 18 and the Western Foreign Ministers themselves met on four occasions, including a North Atlantic Council meeting just prior to the summit. Chancellor Adenauer himself was heavily involved in the planning for the conference meeting with President Eisenhower on June 13, the Foreign Ministers on June 17, and by actually taking up residence in a Swiss villa during the summit where he could more easily confer with Dulles as the meetings were held. Thus the traditional Western position on Germany, the need to develop a common Western position which protected NATO's strategic interests on the most vital question of the Cold War, and especially the desire to reconcile the American position with that of West Germany made it unlikely that anyone within the United States government would push to change American policy. No division existed within the government on Germany prior to the summit and therefore the approach of the conference did not help bring the major actors together on a unified position. While the first proposition was not upheld on this issue, since a previously arranged position already existed, it does demonstrate the lengths to which the allied governments went to insure that the common position was maintained and that there would be no
compromise if the Soviets were to offer German unity in exchange for neutrality and disarmament as they had done for Austria.

Human rights and trade issues, although not important, were discussed at Geneva. Once again there was very little division within the government on the American position at Geneva for two primary reasons. First, it had been longstanding United States' policy to push for greater personal contacts between East and West, freer travel, less censorship of all kinds of communication, and increased trade. The only exception to this basic policy was the West's blockade of strategic goods to the Soviet Union organized by CoCom. Because these positions were so basic to Western values and had such obvious propaganda benefits there was little doubt the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and France would push for Soviet acceptance of these principles. Secondly, the President's acceptance of Dulles' view that the summit should only identify problems and set the tone for later negotiations meant that few specific policy positions had to be identified on these issues. The President would go to the summit and push for the Soviets to be more open to Western ideas and allow freer contacts, such a policy is unlikely to create much opposition within the government.

One clear reason for the lack of difficulty in reaching common positions on regional issues, human rights, and trade was the dominance of the State Department, and especially Secretary Dulles, in the summit planning process and in the
making of foreign policy in general during the Eisenhower Administration. The presummit planning was coordinated by Douglas MacArthur II of the State Department, the subcommittees which prepared position papers were dominated by assistant secretaries of state. Jacob Bean of the State Department carried out liaison with the allies. Other departments had representatives on committees which dealt with issues which concerned them, but this was clearly a State Department show. Most important though was Dulles' close relationship with Eisenhower which Dulles jealously guarded. The President clearly agreed with Dulles' vision of the summit's purpose and, with the exception of arms control, he clearly followed the Secretary's game plan while at Geneva. The President's speeches were far more general than his Western counterparts, with Open Skies being the only specific proposal offered by Eisenhower in his six days at the summit.

It is on the issue of arms control which the first proposition is most clearly substantiated. The Eisenhower Administration had been divided on this question since its initial NSC meeting on the subject in February 1953, through the President's order to develop a new proposal in September 1953, and up until the presummit preparation in 1955. The arms control review had seemingly become unalterably deadlocked with the State Department pushing for a new proposal to limit nuclear stockpiles and the Defense Department opposing even negotiating arms control on the grounds that no agreement could be verified and the Soviets
could not be trusted to live up to any treaty which limited them in militarily significant ways. Secretary Dulles was more skeptical of arms control than his State Department colleagues due to his doubts that a conventional arms control treaty could be verified and his belief that nuclear arms control could not proceed without conventional arms reductions. Harold Stassen had been ordered to continue the review when he became Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament in March 1955, and indeed many in the State Department hoped that the creation of this post would break the deadlock within the administration. This ploy failed, however, because the NSC meeting of June 30 could reach no common position for the President to take at the summit beyond a general call for the development of a control system which would monitor an arms control agreement. Stassen was ordered to continue the review but not to attempt to develop a plan to be presented at Geneva.

NSC meetings, special interdepartmental review committees, and the appointment of a special assistant had not been able to force a common administration position on arms control, but the need to offer something concrete at the summit did force a resolution of at least one aspect of the issue. Rockefeller's belief that the President could not go empty handed to Geneva, as Dulles was proposing, led to the convening of the Quantico Panel and the development of the Open Skies proposal. Dulles opposed even the holding of this forum fearing that it would become a rival to his department's preparation for Geneva, which it did. Dulles
then proceeded to ignore the Panel's recommendations and it was only when Rockefeller directly brought Open Skies to the President's attention on July 6 that the debate within the administration began. Once the summit got underway the pressures for the President to be specific on something began to build and Goodpaster in Geneva, Rockefeller, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Anderson, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Arthur Radford began to push for Open Skies. The fact that the Defense Department and the armed forces had finally found an inspection plan which they could support gave great weight to this proposal and allowed the President to overrule the objections of Stassen and Dulles and present the plan to the other Heads of Government on July 21, 1955.

The approach of the Geneva summit and the need for President Eisenhower to make a concrete proposal while he occupied the center stage of world attention had forced the administration to adopt a formal position on at least one aspect of an issue on which it had been seriously divided from the outset. The impending summit, the first in the Cold War period, had encouraged officials to think in new ways about an old problem and a creative proposal resulted. Thus on the issue of arms control the first proposition holds true.

In sum, proposition one, that summits can serve as a deadline which forces the major actors to reach a consensus on major issues, was not found to have merit on the issues of Germany, human rights, or trade, but it did hold true for arms control.
Proposition Two

P2: The President and General Secretary have resolved important issues which were not able to be solved at lower levels.

The second proposition does not seem to hold merit for any of the issues considered by this study. Essentially, with one possible exception, there was very little real negotiation at Geneva. The sessions consisted of public speeches made by each leader, followed by reactions from his counterparts, but with no serious attempts to search for accommodations, compromises, or concessions, which generally characterizes negotiations. On the issue of arms control each leader offered detailed proposals for an arms control agreement, but aside from outright rejection of each alternative there was no attempt to negotiate or find common ground. The Soviets rejected each of the proposals by the three Western leaders. Eden’s plan for a thinning out of the armed forces in Central Europe in concert with a five power security pact was turned down by Bulganin. The Soviets seemed a bit more interested in Faure’s budget reduction plan but Eisenhower and Eden opposed it privately on the grounds that such an arrangement would be unverifiable. While Eisenhower’s Open Skies initiative received a warm reception from Eden, Faure, and the public, Khrushchev made it clear that he would oppose the offer. President Eisenhower spent the rest of the summit trying without success to convince Khrushchev of the plan’s merits. Formal rejection did not come until Bulganin’s August letter and speech to the Supreme
Soviet, but Eisenhower clearly felt at the end of the summit that there was little chance of Soviet acceptance. Many had hoped that the Soviet May 10 proposal might form the basis of an agreement since it so closely resembled British and French proposals from 1952 and 1954, but the West was unwilling to enter real arms reduction negotiations until a workable control system could be constructed.

In the final communique each of these proposals was listed to be considered by the Foreign Ministers in their conference, but nowhere was there a hint that a consensus might be developing on a promising alternative. Open Skies was the initial American negotiating position and it remained the position at the end of the conference. The Americans had not moved toward acceptance of any of the Soviet ideas on the reduction of armaments, and the Soviets had not made any concessions on verification. The conference ended with this impasse on arms control.

Human rights and trade issues were not given much attention at Geneva since they were not discussed until the final full day of the Conference, July 22. As with arms control there was very little, if any, negotiation on specific issues, only speeches by Eden and Eisenhower pushing for greater contacts between East and West. This comes as little surprise since the United States had not come to Geneva with a specific proposal in either of these areas, largely because of Dulles' view of the summit's purpose. In the final communique the Foreign Ministers were instructed to find ways to lower barriers to trade and communication as
well as exploring the possibility of freer contacts and exchanges between the people of East and West. The language of this directive was so general that it represented no concession from either side to the positions of the others and the guidance was so vague that the three Western allies came to the Foreign Ministers meeting with very different proposals from the Soviet ones. Nothing had been conceded or settled by the Geneva Conference on the issues of human rights or trade. Therefore the second proposition is not sustained on these issues.

There was brief hope during the summit that on the most critical issue of the summit, the fate of Germany, there had been an agreement that Germany would be reunified based on free elections, and this phrase does appear in the final communiqué. This agreement had actually been hammered out in a meeting of the Foreign Ministers on July 20 but in the plenary session which followed that afternoon, Bulganin made it clear that Germany must first be made neutral and probably demilitarized. Accordingly, what seemed to have been a remarkable concession on the Soviet part turned out to be of minor importance. Eisenhower’s consideration of walking out of the conference because of this turn of events demonstrates clearly the difference of opinion on the question of Germany. Therefore on this issue as well the second proposition is not upheld.

Several reasons have been offered by scholars of summit diplomacy for this lack of real negotiation at the Geneva summit of 1955. Most have focused on the fact that this
summit was a very public affair with leaders speaking more to influence public opinion than they were to each other. One thousand reporters attended the Conference and separate press briefings were held each day by all four delegations. There was very little occasion for private conversation between the leaders, except for brief dinner meetings following each day’s activities, and the conference was dominated by large plenary sessions with hundreds of people attending. According to Keith Eubank:

Quiet, tough-minded talks might have counted for more. The four leaders, seated at large tables, addressed each other as if they were speaking on a panel at a convention. The series of statements read to the assembled delegations and the multitude of onlookers made the conference a public meeting. Such an atmosphere weakened the urgent feeling that the problems and dangers of the past decade required serious study and discussion. Before an audience there was no opportunity for negotiating.20

Finally when evaluating the lack of progress at Geneva one must also consider Dulles’ views on the summit’s purpose which were also shared by British Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan.21 By defining the summit as only a beginning of a process and setting its goals as identifying problems and establishing a tone for later negotiations, Eisenhower and Dulles had virtually guaranteed that very little in the way of concrete agreements would emerge from the summit. This is not meant as a criticism of Eisenhower or Dulles, but one cannot be surprised that so little emerged from Geneva given their definition of its purpose. Instead the Foreign Ministers were saddled with a very heavy agenda for their meeting in late October.
In sum, the second proposition was not found to have merit on any of the issues considered by this study.

Proposition Three

The third proposition addresses the ability of the leaders to craft an agreement that could provide the conceptual framework to guide negotiators at lower levels.

P3 Framework agreements made at U.S.-Soviet summits pave the way for rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal treaty.

To determine whether this proposition holds true in this case one needs only to examine the fruitless results of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers. On each issue the participants reintroduced proposals which had been offered at Geneva and, as at the summit, very little common ground was to be found. On the issue of Germany the United States' position had been modified to accommodate Eden's security plan for Central Europe. The United States and France endorsed the Prime Minister's call for arms control zones on each side of the border of a unified Germany, obviously assuming that a unified Germany would choose to be a member of NATO. In one sense, therefore, the American position had changed significantly on both the issue of European Security and arms control. The five power security pact was aimed at easing Soviet fears of a united Germany, and the acceptance of Eden's plan for arms limitation zones in Central Europe was the first substantive arms control proposal to which the
Eisenhower administration had agreed. Determined to avoid the situation that had developed at Geneva where each Western head of government offered a different proposal on disarmament the Foreign Ministers were able to work out common plans for each of three agenda items. Thus it would seem, at least in this case, that multilateral East-West diplomacy at the highest levels forces not only each government to hammer out a unified position on the critical issues, but also within each alliance there is pressure for the member governments to agree on a common position. One must admit, however, that it was fairly safe for the Eisenhower Administration to agree to Eden's proposals on European security and arms control because there was little danger the Soviets would accept it since they had already rejected this offer at the summit meeting in July. As the West must have expected, the Soviets did reject any plan built around the reunification of a Germany rearmed and firmly within the NATO alliance. Instead the Soviets once again proposed their European collective security pact which would replace the two existing alliance systems, and an all-German council which could coordinate security arrangements and contacts between the two Germanies and perhaps prepare for unification, once Soviet conditions were met. Without agreement on Germany no progress was possible and the Foreign Ministers moved on to other issues without resolving this fundamental question. Thus on the question of European security and Germany, proposition three is somewhat sustained in that the Geneva summit did lay the groundwork for the
development of Western consensus on security arrangements following the unification of Germany. However, on the larger question of building a framework with the Soviet Union for the settlement of disputes nothing of real value was accomplished, therefore one must conclude that the third proposition was not upheld by the aftermath of the Geneva summit.

On the issue of arms control, as was described above, the United States did accept the notion of partially disengaging the forces in Central Europe after German unification. This was the first real arms reduction plan on which the Eisenhower administration had been able to agree. Since it was only to go into effect once Germany was unified, the Soviets saw no merit in the proposal. The Open Skies plan had already been rejected before the conference began, still the Western Foreign Ministers proposed it, including the Soviet proposals for fixed control posts in critical locations, and as expected Molotov turned thumbs down on the proposal. Open Skies had been altered somewhat to include Soviet verification ideas from their May 10 proposal but this alteration was not sufficient to gain the acceptance of the Soviet leadership. Accordingly the Open Skies proposal did not serve as a framework to guide the negotiations of the Foreign Ministers and therefore proposition three is not upheld on the issue of arms control.

Finally, the negotiations on East-West contacts were as fruitless as the discussions on the other agenda items. The West’s seventeen point agenda focused on fundamentally
altering the Soviet system while the Soviet leadership pushed for a lifting of the embargo on strategic goods, and both sides must have realized before the meeting that these were unattainable goals. One is clearly struck by the propagandistic tone in the positions of both sides on this issue, each seems to be playing more to public opinion rather than seeking to negotiate a serious agreement. The summit and the Foreign Ministers meetings' greatest contribution to increased contact was not because official Soviet restrictions were abandoned, but rather because the decreased tension between East and West must have convinced the Soviets that it was safe to allow more Western delegations to visit the USSR. Still increased contact remained clearly on Soviet terms, not through the free movement of people, goods, and ideas, but instead through easily controlled official delegations which allowed the leadership to control the degree to which their people were contaminated by Western ideas. Since no framework for the expansion of contacts was agreed upon, the third proposition does not hold true on this issue.

**In sum, proposition three was not found to have merit on any of the issues considered by this study.**

**Proposition Four**

We now turn to the fourth proposition, the extent to which the leaders use the summit as an opportunity to educate their counterpart.

**P4:** Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterpart on
the concerns and interests on the important
issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted
in changes in the behavior of the superpowers
following the summit.

Once again it is on the issue of arms control that at
least the first part of the fourth proposition is strongly
upheld. One of the President's primary purposes at this
summit was to convince the Soviets of the instability created
by mutual fears of surprise attack. In his opening statement
at the conference he argued:

Perhaps, therefore, we should consider whether
this problem of limitation of armament may not be
best approached by seeking—as a first step—
dependable ways to supervise and inspect military
establishments, so that there can be no frightful
surprises, whether by sudden attack or secret
violation of agreed restrictions."

The President, at Geneva, went beyond traditional American
insistence that agreements must be verifiable and attempted
to educate his Soviet counterparts on the dangers created by
a lack of transparency. Eisenhower had long been concerned
that open, Western societies were at a great disadvantage in
their competition with closed Eastern counterparts. The
inability to discern the level of Soviet readiness required
higher states of alert in Western armed forces and thus
created increased dangers of war. He attempted to
communicate these concepts to Khrushchev and Bulganin when he
presented the Open Skies plan on July 21. While Open Skies
was more than just an attempt to educate the Soviet
leadership, Eisenhower's presentation of it did give him the
opportunity to describe one of the great fears of America's
leadership during the Cold War. Unfortunately he was not
successful. Khrushchev quickly rejected Open Skies and while a surprise attack conference did convene in November, 1958, it adjourned after one day, and there was no attempt to systematically explore these issues until much later. Therefore the first part of proposition four is found to have merit since an attempt to educate the Soviet leadership on the dangers created by the fear of surprise attack and the need to enhance the transparency of the military forces of both sides was made. The second part is not upheld, however, since this attempt failed to change Soviet policy.

On regional issues one cannot consider the discussions on Germany unification and European security to have been real attempts to educate the adversary on some new strategic concept. The issues considered at this conference were not new and the proposals offered on Germany had been under discussion for some time. While there was a brief glimmer of hope during the summit that the Soviets might agree to unification based on free elections, this was quickly sniffed out by Bulganin. By the end of the conference, it was becoming clear that Germany would not be unified in the near future. At Geneva the same arguments which had been made for years were rehashed with no progress. The proposition is not supported in this case.

One might consider, at first glance, the discussions on human rights and trade as attempts to educate the opponent in crucial concerns. In reality the public speeches made by the leaders at Geneva and the specific proposals made by the Foreign Ministers in their conference were little more than
propaganda aimed more at the public than each other. The seventeen point proposals offered by the Western Foreign Ministers in the fall would have required the virtual dismantling of the Soviet system and thus was more seriously considered.

Conclusion

President Eisenhower judged the Geneva Summit of 1955 to have been a limited success. Following this meeting, he felt the tone of U.S.-Soviet relations never again returned to the level of harshness which had characterized superpower relations in the period before the summit. Eisenhower also felt that he had gained insight into the structure of power within the Soviet leadership and his encounter with Khrushchev after the Open Skies speech convinced him that the First Secretary was the one really in charge of the Soviet delegation. But if one compares the results of this summit with those which followed it is clear that little occurred in the way of direct negotiation or even frank give and take on the major issues dividing the adversaries. Geneva did not remove roadblocks in the stalled arms control negotiations or provide a framework for the settlement of the German question or the expansion of East-West contacts.
TABLE 3

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 1</th>
<th>Proposition 2</th>
<th>Proposition 3</th>
<th>Proposition 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>action-forcing</td>
<td>roadblock</td>
<td>framework</td>
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<td>deadline</td>
<td>remover</td>
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Geneva       arms control       none       none       arms control
1955

As Table 3 clearly shows, the Geneva summit accomplished nothing in the way of concrete agreements. Propositions two and three, which maintain that summits can be used either as a forum to remove roadblocks to agreement, or to build the framework for a later pact, were not found to have merit on any of the issues under consideration in this study. The primary impact of the Geneva summit was that it did force top officials of the Eisenhower administration to reach a common position on arms control, thus ending nearly two years of bureaucratic infighting. The summit also gave President Eisenhower the opportunity to educate First Secretary Khrushchev and Premier Bulganin on the danger of surprise attack and the instability that fears of a first strike created.
NOTES - CHAPTER II


19. Geneva Foreign Ministers, pp. 239.

20. Eubank, p. 156.


CHAPTER III

CAMP DAVID

More than four years passed before the Soviet and American leaders would meet again at the summit. The chain of events which culminated with the Camp David meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev began in November, 1958 when the Soviet First Secretary issued the first of several ultimatums to the West over the status of Germany and its former capital Berlin. This confrontation would reveal splits and strains within the Western alliance as the leadership of each state involved sought to protect its interests in the face of the Soviet ultimatum. The next year would see an extraordinary level of diplomatic activity including several meetings between Western heads of state, a foreign ministers conference, a bilateral US-Soviet summit, and preparation for another four power conference. This Berlin crisis would not approach the seriousness of the confrontation in 1961 but it is still instructive to study a summit held under these circumstances and its consequences.

Setting

On November 27, 1958 Nikita Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union could no longer tolerate the status quo that
had existed since the end of World War II. He proposed that West Berlin should become a free city with access routes to it controlled by the East Germans, and greater economic ties to the east. If these measures were not agreed to within six months, the Soviet Union would take unilateral action and sign a peace treaty with East Germany and turn over control of corridors into West Berlin to them. It was several months before the West could coordinate its procedural response to this challenge and even then great differences remained over substance. On one side British Prime Minister Macmillan saw danger in the situation and pushed for an early four power summit to discuss these issues. Macmillan was not troubled by the idea of dealing with the East Germans as agents of the Soviet Union in the control of access to West Berlin, and he was also interested in discussing with Khrushchev a thinning of forces in Central Europe. The Prime Minister traveled to Moscow in early March to meet with the First Secretary and specifically discussed his arms control plans. Khrushchev did remove the May 27 deadline during his talks with Macmillan, but he did not withdraw the ultimatum entirely.¹

De Gaulle and Adenauer were far more skeptical of negotiations and changes in the status quo, especially as long as the May 27 deadline remained in force. Once Khrushchev removed this impediment a Foreign Minister's Conference was arranged but neither wished to change the current situation in any major way. France continued to support the Eden Plan of 1955 and wished to avoid changes in
the status quo unless Germany was to be unified and closely linked to the West. De Gaulle also rejected all calls for a four power summit and opposed Macmillan's trip to Moscow in March before the deadline was removed. Adenauer, due to his dependence on the United States, was more willing to discuss these issues with the Soviet leadership but he insisted that no concessions be made without counter-concessions. Like de Gaulle, he was skeptical of Macmillan's arms control measures in Central Europe and feared the singularization of Germany.

Eisenhower and Dulles were closer to the views of de Gaulle and Adenauer in this situation, but they were more willing to negotiate and explore the Soviet position. Dulles and Eisenhower rejected the agent theory and were dubious of Macmillan's arms control proposals, but they did believe that negotiations might yield more secure access rights to West Berlin. Therefore, they pushed for the opening of negotiations and on February 16, following a trip by Dulles to Europe a joint note called for a Foreign Ministers Conference on Germany. Eventually Khrushchev accepted the invitation during Macmillan's visit and the conference was set for May 11.

The Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference ran from May 11-August 4 with a recess in June and a brief interruption for the funeral of John Foster Dulles in late May. Dulles had been hospitalized shortly before the February 16 note proposing the conference, and was replaced by Christian Herter. The conference went through two distinct phases. From May 11 through May 27 the talks focused on an overall
settlement of the German question. The allies proposed a three stage plan in which first Berlin would be integrated, then political and economic ties between the Germanies would be strengthened, and finally unification would take place. These steps would proceed according to a rigid timetable, and would be accompanied by force reductions in Central Europe, measures to prevent surprise attack, and a test ban. The Soviets immediately rejected any thought of German unification and soon this phase of negotiations stalled.

From May 28 through August 4 the discussions focused more narrowly on Berlin with the Western allies seeking to gain more secure access rights into West Berlin in exchange for reduced garrisons and other assurances. A June 3 proposal by the Western Ministers calling for such measures was rejected by Gromyko and on June 10 the Soviets offered a plan of their own. The Soviet proposal called for only token contingents of forces in Berlin, a ban on propaganda emanating from the Western sectors, and a ban on nuclear weapons in Berlin. According to this plan once the Berlin settlement was in place, talks would continue on the rest of Germany for one year at which time if no solution had been agreed to the USSR would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Following a brief recess the negotiators returned in July and little progress, beyond an agreement not to deploy nuclear weapons in the city, was made toward accepting either plan. The conference ended on August 4. In the meantime another avenue for diplomatic discourse had
developed with the arrangement of the first bilateral US-Soviet summit in history.

Summit Preparations

The first bilateral summit in the history of the US-Soviet relations was actually the result of a misunderstanding between President Eisenhower and his Assistant Secretary of State Robert Murphy. In July, the President was made aware during a press conference that Khrushchev had expressed interest in visiting the United States. Intrigued by the idea of the First Secretary seeing America first hand, Eisenhower decided to invite the Soviet leader to visit the United States on the condition that real progress be made in the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference. This condition was not made clear to Murphy, however, when he was instructed to deliver the offer to Presidium member Frol Kozlov who was about to leave New York at the end of a trip to the United States. The offer to visit was made to Kozlov without the conditions attached and when Khrushchev quickly accepted, without mentioning the strings Eisenhower had imposed on the invitation, the President could not withdraw the offer. The summit would take place without prior progress in Geneva much to the chagrin of Eisenhower and de Gaulle.

To prepare for the summit and to coordinate allied positions President Eisenhower left for Bonn, Paris, and London on August 26. He found the allies were once again
divided on their preferred course of action. Macmillan was an enthusiastic proponent of the Camp David meeting, but wished to couple it with a four power conference and a presummit meeting of Eisenhower, de Gaulle, Adenauer, and himself. De Gaulle and Adenauer were more concerned about Khrushchev's visit and the French President flatly vetoed any four power conference as long as there was any hint of ultimatum. He and Eisenhower agreed that before a conference there must be some reason to believe that progress would be possible. Adenauer concurred with the French and American leaders on these summit preconditions.

The agenda for the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting was hammered out by Herter and Gromyko in a meeting on September 16. The two Foreign Ministers agreed on discussions on Germany, Berlin, arms control, a test ban, problems in Laos and Iran, East-West contacts, and the sharing of information on nuclear reactors. Privately, Eisenhower had far more limited goals than his Secretary of State. He hoped to press the First Secretary on Berlin, on the need for movement on disarmament, and on regional questions before the four power conference could be held. The President also saw the summit as an chance to convince Khrushchev that an historic opportunity for peace existed, and as leader of the Soviet Union he could play a pivotal role in its coming to pass.

While not totally forgotten, arms control was a secondary issue at Camp David, having been dwarfed by the negotiations on Berlin and Germany. In March, Macmillan had discussed with Khrushchev the possibility of thinning the
forces in Central Europe, but Adenauer and de Gaulle's refusal to consider this without German unification meant there would be little Soviet interest in this scheme. The major arms control negotiations underway dealt with a test ban; little real progress had been made by September 1954. The hope kindled in the summer of 1958 by the recommendations of the committee of experts finding that a test ban could be adequately verified had been dashed later in the year by the discovery by American scientists that the proposed verification measures could be circumvented by exploding weapons in underground caverns. The United States and Great Britain had been adhering to a test moratorium since October 31, 1958, with the Soviets joining in after a November 3 test, while the negotiations proceeded. American doubts about verification had stalled the talks after these doubts were presented at the discussions in the later part of 1958. To get the discussions moving again President Eisenhower had offered on April 20, 1959 a limited test ban prohibiting above ground nuclear tests below a predetermined height. Khrushchev rejected this approach on April 23 and the Soviets continued to insist on a complete test ban with limited verification provisions. The Soviets pushed for the right to veto inspection of suspected violations and on the staffing of control posts by host country personnel with only a handful (4-5) of foreign specialists present. By September, 1959 these discussions, which had been continuing under the auspices of the UN's London Subcommittee on Disarmament, were at an impasse.
The nature of the Camp David summit was largely shaped by two forces. First division within the allied camp pushed and pulled Eisenhower in different directions. Adenauer and de Gaulle were skeptical of the meeting's value, afraid the President would make concessions on Berlin without Soviet counterconcessions, and generally wary of any solution short of unification. Macmillan pressured Eisenhower from the other direction seeking an immediate four power conference after Camp David, and he was far more open to compromise on Berlin and arms control in Central Europe. Eisenhower agreed with Adenauer and de Gaulle on preconditions for a four power summit, but the American side had been far more willing than the French or Germans to enter into negotiations on Berlin. Thus Eisenhower was very much caught in the middle as his meeting with Khrushchev approached.

The other factor which dictated the nature of the summit was the President's reluctance to engage in detailed negotiations at a head of government meeting. He had previously avoided this kind of discussion at Geneva and continued to do so at Camp David. Eisenhower quickly decided the agenda established by the Foreign Ministers was too ambitious, and instead focused on a much more narrow range of topics but never delved into the complex details of specific issues. The talks remained on a general plane with very little structure."

The Summit

Nikita Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959 was unlike any other that later Soviet leaders would make.
His discussions with the President, first in Washington and then two weeks later at Camp David, were interrupted by the First Secretary's boisterous tour of the United States in which he seemed to alternately charm, frighten, and mystify the American public. Khrushchev arrived on September 15 and immediately went to the White House for an afternoon of talks with the President. This day's discussions saw rather large delegations and a wide ranging discussion of many topics with the agenda largely ignored. The two leaders discussed Stalin's role in World War II and his relationship to Khrushchev, the naval building programs of each country, propaganda, automobiles and various other subjects with topics coming up in the normal flow of conversation rather than according a rigid agenda. There was a brief exchange of positions on Berlin with each side sticking to its presummit position and the President was able to lay out his preconditions for a four power conference. Neither of these topics, however, was considered in any real detail. Those talks would come later in the more private atmosphere at Camp David. Khrushchev then left Washington for his tour of the United States. Khrushchev ended his whirlwind tour after twelve days, and traveled to Camp David for serious discussions with Eisenhower on Friday, September 25. The talks took place over the weekend with Khrushchev leaving for Moscow on Sunday, September 27. This time the two met largely in private with only interpreters present, and once again the topics were wide-ranging and without a rigid agenda. The leaders took a brief side trip to Eisenhower's
Gettysburg farm on Saturday, but spent much of this weekend together without advisors.

Camp David was in the truest sense of the phrase a "get-acquainted" summit. There was never an attempt to engage in detailed negotiations by the heads of state or their advisors. The principal aides did not meet separately during this weekend, and no working groups were set up to negotiate on specific issues. Eisenhower used these three days to get to know Khrushchev:

During the sessions the Chairman and I seized several opportunities for strictly private conversations, some at Camp David, others while sight-seeing around the countryside. Because my purposes in these man-to-man talks was to learn about his intentions, objectives, and personal characteristics, we used a single interpreter--his own."

Despite the free-flowing nature of the talks, Berlin quite naturally remained the focus of much of their deliberations with Eisenhower particularly pressing the Soviets on their ultimatum most recently renewed in June by Gromyko at the Foreign Ministers Conference. The President continued to stress that there was no hope for a four power summit as long as any hint of an ultimatum existed. The exchanges on Berlin continued throughout Saturday, September 26 without any movement. Other topics were addressed, including the Far East but when Khrushchev brought up China, Eisenhower refused to be drawn into any conversation saying that China was "beyond the pale," Khrushchev then relented saying that he had been asked to bring up this subject, but he did not say who had made the request.
The only substantive accomplishment of the Camp David summit came on its last day, September 27, just before Khrushchev was to leave for Moscow. With only the Soviet interpreter Oleg Troyanovski present, the First Secretary agreed to remove any hint of an ultimatum or deadline, thus removing the threat of unilateral action and easing the tension created by his November ultimatum. The way had been cleared for a four power summit and Eisenhower committed himself to push for a meeting of East and West in the near future and also to make a trip to the Soviet Union sometime in 1960. There was a brief snag when Khrushchev asked that the withdrawal of the ultimatum not be placed in the communique. Eisenhower replied that without a public repudiation of the ultimatum there would be no four power conference. Khrushchev explained that he only wanted a 48 hour delay before announcement of the breakthrough so that he could inform his Presidium colleagues of the change before the rest of the world would learn of it. Eisenhower agreed to this arrangement, and the summit ended on amicable terms.

When the agreed language regarding negotiations on Berlin was announced on September 29 it was obviously a compromise between the American and Soviet position. The formula called for negotiations which did not take place under duress but that would not be prolonged indefinitely. While the ultimatum was rescinded, Khrushchev clearly could reinstate his deadline at some later date by arguing the talks had dragged on too long. Still, Eisenhower believed the summit to have been a success because:
At least it now seemed we should have a better atmosphere in which to approach such questions as expanding exchanges of visitors and information between East and West, finding an acceptable solution to the problem of a divided Germany, and developing mutual trust through satisfactorily enforced disarmament treaties, even though limited at first in scope.14

Aftermath

The months following Camp David were very active ones in East-West diplomacy as each leader began to prepare for the forthcoming four power conference. Eisenhower originally sought a December summit, but this was rejected by de Gaulle who argued that there was not enough time to prepare. Macmillan sided with Eisenhower but neither could convince the French leader to move up the date. De Gaulle's real concern was the emerging two power nature of the discussions, and he wished more time to actively pursue French interests on these questions, especially any possibility of new concessions on Berlin. Delaying the summit until the spring of 1960 allowed de Gaulle to schedule a trip by Khrushchev to Paris in March prior to the four power conference.15

Eisenhower, de Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan met from December 19-21 to set the agenda for the upcoming Paris summit. Together the allies offered April 27 as the opening date, and May 16 was eventually agreed upon by all four parties. The Western leaders decided to focus on three topics at the conference: the future of Germany and Berlin, arms control, and East-West contacts. On substantive
questions they agreed to repropose their May 11, 1959 offer linking the unification of Berlin, and eventually Germany itself, to the thinning of forces in Central Europe and a test ban.16

As the summit approached, the atmosphere grew more tense as the Soviet position seemed to harden, although the signals were somewhat mixed. Khrushchev’s January 14, 1960 speech did call for a one-third cut in Soviet military forces, but at the same time revived the possibility of a separate peace treaty between the Soviet Union and East Germany. In addition, in a series of speeches and at his March meeting with de Gaulle, Khrushchev launched blistering attacks on Adenauer even stating while in Paris that France and the Soviet Union had a common enemy in Germany. American rhetoric also escalated with an especially tough speech on Berlin by Secretary of the Treasury Dillon on April 20. Of course, the final death knell for the Paris summit was sounded by the downing of the American U-2 spy plane inside the Soviet Union on May 1. Khrushchev did come to Paris, and on May 16 the conference convened only to have Khrushchev demand a suspension of flights and a direct apology. When neither was forthcoming, he abruptly stormed out ending the summit before it really began.17

Evaluation of the Propositions

Proposition One

We will now examine the first proposition regarding the impact of the impending summit on the internal deliberations of the United States’ government.
Pl: The approach of a summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision-makers, and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle long-standing disputes.

Eisenhower's designation of this meeting as an opportunity to explore the views, attitudes, and motives of his counterpart, rather than to engage in detailed negotiation prevented the bureaucratic infighting which had characterized the Geneva summit in 1955. By defining this as a "get-acquainted" meeting, there was no need to develop detailed positions and prepare responses to likely Soviet offers because no such negotiations were envisioned. Herter and Gromyko did construct an ambitious agenda on August 5, but the President immediately discarded it as too lengthy and decided to focus the discussions on a more general plane.

There is no evidence of any attempts to revise the most recent offers on Berlin, Germany, or arms control as the summit approached. The allied offer of June 3 and 16 on Berlin would eventually be dropped, but this came after Camp David at the December summit of Western leaders when it was decided to resubmit the May 11, 1959 plan for the reunification of Germany and the thinning of forces in central Europe. Eisenhower's April, 1959 offer of a limited test ban, already rejected by Khrushchev, was not replaced by any new proposal. The approach of the Camp David summit simply did not set off debate within the administration the way Geneva had done in 1955 because none of the major actors believed detailed negotiations would take place.
There is danger in such an approach, since the President entered the summit unprepared, if he would have been drawn into the detailed talks he hoped to avoid. Eisenhower did not allow this to happen, and Khrushchev seems to have had the same purpose for the summit in mind since he never attempted to lure the President into reopening the issues from the Foreign Ministers Conference or from any other substantive forum. At Camp David the summit proceeded as the President conceived it, later Presidents would not be so careful.

In sum, because this summit was defined by the President as a "get-acquainted" meeting, the first proposition was not found to be true on any of the issues examined by this study.

Proposition Two

The second proposition, that the leaders can quickly settle issues that had been deadlocked at lower levels, will now be explored.

P2: The President and General Secretary have resolved important issues which were not able to be solved at lower levels.

The most important result of the Camp David summit was the removal of the Soviet ultimatum regarding the status of Berlin and Germany. The six months deadline had been introduced by Khrushchev explicitly for the first time on November 27, 1958 and had created strains within the Western alliance over how to respond to this confrontational stance.
While Macmillan pressured from the beginning for a four power summit, de Gaulle refused to consider any such meeting or any negotiations as long as the deadline remained. Khrushchev's decision to let the May 27 deadline slip had allowed the Foreign Ministers Conference to begin on May 11, but the threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany remained in effect unless the status of Berlin was settled. In fact, on June 10, the threat had been renewed and a deadline of sorts reestablished when Gromyko coupled the new Soviet plan for Berlin with the demand that further negotiations on the status of Germany could take only one year after the conclusion of an agreement on Berlin. If the one year limit expired without agreement, the Soviet Union would sign a separate peace with East Germany. While the situation was not as tense as immediately after the November 27, 1958 threat, this ultimatum continued to hover in the background. During Eisenhower's August trip to Europe, he and de Gaulle agreed that the ultimatum must be withdrawn before a four power conference could proceed.

In September, 1959, as Camp David was about to convene, Khrushchev's ultimatum remained the chief obstacle to an East-West summit and further negotiations on the status of Germany and Berlin. Three months of talks at Geneva had failed to remove the ultimatum and indeed it had in some ways been renewed on June 16. When Khrushchev decided on September 27 to withdraw the threat to sign a separate peace, it cleared the way for the opening of the four power summit Macmillan and others had sought for so long. With this
obstacle removed, planning began for the ill-fated Paris Conference and the date was set for May 16, 1960. Months of negotiations had failed to do what was done by the leaders in three days. Therefore, there is merit in the second proposition on this regional question.

In sum, the second proposition was found to hold on the regional question of Germany and its former capital Berlin, but it was not found to be true on the issues of arms control, trade, or human rights.

Proposition Three

We will now explore the third proposition.

P3: Framework agreements at US-Soviet summits pave the way for more rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal treaty.

The Camp David summit did not see the kind of negotiations envisioned by proposition three. The discussions, as described previously, were so general in nature that there was never a serious attempt to forge a framework agreement. On the surface, several issues would seem to be ripe for the development of an outline to a formal accord. In the field of arms control, considerable work had been done by the committee of experts on the contentious issue of verification. When doubts about verifiability of a total test ban had been raised, President Eisenhower had proposed a limited test ban in April, 1959. Much discussed proposals also existed on the reduction of forces in Central Europe and the reduction of nuclear weapons in this critical area. While many offers had been placed on the table at the
London Subcommittee on Disarmament and in other forums, the political will to seriously negotiate had not yet developed. Without the unification of Germany, Eisenhower, de Gaulle, and Adenauer opposed the reduction of forces in Europe fearing Germany would be singled out. On the test ban, the Soviets refused to consider measures which would make the ban verifiable and rejected a ban on atmospheric tests. Under these conditions a framework was impossible.

This was even more true on the related issues of Berlin and Germany. De Gaulle, and Adenauer rejected any change in the status quo regarding Berlin, including any attempt to allow East German control of access to West Berlin by designating them as agents of the Soviet Union. Eisenhower, Dulles, and Herter were willing to consider security guarantees for Soviet interests in Berlin, but they rejected the agent theory as well. Macmillan was the most open to compromise, but even he did not wish to go as far as the Soviets were demanding. On Germany, it was Khrushchev and the Soviet negotiators who were happy with the status quo and rejected every Western plan, including the Western one of May 11, 1959. With one side clinging to the status quo on Berlin and the other on Germany, no framework was possible at Camp David.

In sum, the third proposition was not found to have merit on any of the issues under consideration in this study.
Proposition Four

We will now consider proposition four, whether either leader used the Camp David meeting to tutor his counterpart on any of the issues discussed.

P4: Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterpart on their concerns and interests on the important issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted in changes in the behavior of the superpowers following the summit.

Eisenhower and Khrushchev each spent many hours over the weekend at Camp David trying to convince his adversary of the correctness of his vision for Berlin. None of the ideas were being offered for the first time; each leader had heard these arguments before. Perhaps they were more meaningful coming from the leader of the opposing bloc, or maybe they were uttered with more force, but these were not new ideas. Neither leader broke new ground on regional concerns or arms control by discussing some new strategic concept or attempted to get his opponent to see the world in a new light.

In sum, proposition four was not sustained on any of the issues under consideration in this study.

Conclusion

Camp David was the first time in postwar history that Soviet and American leaders had an extended opportunity privately to measure and take stock of his adversary. Unlike Geneva in 1955, the meetings were private and one-on-one, thus allowing for extraordinarily free-flowing conversations
on the issues at hand. The major accomplishment of Camp David, the retraction of the ultimatum on Berlin, could perhaps only have been done in such a setting. The public nature of the four power conference in 1955 would have made such a retreat far more painful. President Eisenhower clearly saw the limits of a "get-acquainted" summit and did not allow himself to be drawn into detailed negotiations, especially on issues which affected the vital security of America’s allies. To engage in negotiations on critical issues with such little time to prepare would have been dangerous. Wisely, the President did not allow this to happen. This would not always be the case.

Table 4

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<th>Proposition 1</th>
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| Camp David | none | regional issues | none | none |

As Table 4 shows, the only tangible accomplishment of the Camp David summit was Khrushchev’s withdrawal of the ultimatum on Berlin. President Eisenhower’s designation of this summit as a "get-acquainted" meeting meant that there was no need for the government to arrive at compromise positions on key issues before the summit took place. Thus, proposition one did not hold for this summit. The complete absence of detailed negotiation, once again because the President saw no need for any, also meant that proposition three would not be found to have merit. Finally, the general
nature of the discussions on Berlin, and the fact that these were issues considered many times before, led us to conclude that proposition four was not upheld in this case as well.
NOTES - CHAPTER III


2. Schick, pp. 54-55.

3. Schick, pp. 54-55.


5. Schick, pp. 74-86.


15. Shick, pp. 105-106.


CHAPTER IV

VIENNA 1961

The meeting between John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev in June, 1961 is one of the most controversial of the entire Cold War era. Along with Reykjavik in 1986, it is cited as an example of the dangers of summit diplomacy by many scholars and practitioners alike. The summit took place in the midst of another crisis over Berlin or at least in the second phase of the tension created by Khrushchev’s ultimatum of November, 1958. Khrushchev began to reescalate the pressure on this exposed outpost of the West in January 1961, just before Kennedy took office, and by October American and Soviet tanks were involved in a face off at Checkpoint Charlie. The Vienna meeting took place in the midst of this and many observers argue that this encounter was crucial in encouraging Khrushchev to push the West to the brink. This chapter will examine the Vienna summit to explore the propositions to see if there were any positive results of this encounter, and to lay the groundwork for a serious examination of the criticism of the meeting in the conclusion.

Setting

The new administration came to power in January and instantly began a sweeping reevaluation of government policy.
in almost every aspect of American life. In the fields of national security and foreign affairs the new president and his advisers had been vocal critics of Eisenhower administration policy and set out quickly to chart a new course. Fears of growing Soviet nuclear capability would soon lead to a massive buildup of American nuclear might. Kennedy was also concerned that the neglect of American conventional capabilities endangered not only Western Europe, but also limited the United States' ability to respond to challenges in the third world. For this reason, conventional forces began to grow as well. In foreign affairs task forces were set up to study major issues and areas where challenges were expected, including Berlin, so that the administration could chart a new path for American foreign policy.

Presummit Events

The four and one-half months between the inauguration of John F. Kennedy and the Vienna Summit were ones of extraordinary activity. The new administration faced an immediate crisis in Laos as Phoumi Nosavan's government seemed ready to fall to the Pathet Lao. Kennedy never saw Laos as vital to American interests, but he feared that with Eisenhower's commitment to prevent a communist take-over in Laos America's prestige was at stake and the United States could not tolerate a communist victory aided by the Soviet Union. Kennedy sought to communicate to the Soviet Union that the United States would not permit a Pathet Lao victory
but neither did it seek an anti-communist ally in Laos. A neutral, coalition government would serve American interests. The critical decisions regarding Laos came at a March 20 NSC meeting. Walt Rostow argued for a token contingent of American troops to demonstrate American commitment, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed for 60,000 troops, air cover, and tactical nuclear weapons. Eventually, the President resisted even a token commitment for fear of widening America's involvement in Laos at a time in which other challenges to America's vital interests were beginning to surface, notably in Berlin.

Several actions were taken after the NSC meeting of March 20. The Seventh Fleet was moved into the South China Sea, troops in Okinawa were placed on alert, and 500 Marines in Thailand were moved to the Mekong River across from Vientiane. In addition, the President got Prime Minister Nehru of India to support a cease-fire, and Prime Minister Macmillan to support limited intervention if necessary. On March 23 Kennedy held a news conference with maps of southeast Asia in the background in which he called for a truly neutral Laos. The United States, he said, could not tolerate a military victory by the Pathet Lao backed by the massive arms and effort of the Soviet Union, but the United States would support the British plan for reintroduction of the International Control Commission to monitor a cease-fire.¹

Throughout April, the crisis atmosphere continued as the United States pushed for a cease-fire and the opening of the Geneva Conference, while at the same time threatening
intervention. On April 24 the Soviets agreed to a cease-fire and it took effect on May 3, but the attacks continued. The Geneva Conference on Laos convened on May 12, but through the end of the month the cease-fire remained shaky and success was not assured. In their opening speeches, both Gromyko and Rusk called for a neutral Laos with Rusk emphasizing an end to military aid to both sides.2

Just as the Laotian crisis seemed to be abating, the ill-fated Bay of Pigs operation was beginning. Since this was not a major topic of discussion at Vienna, this chapter will not describe the events in great detail, but this crisis obviously contributed to the sense of danger in the air in early 1961. The operation itself began on April 14 when the invasion flotilla left Central America bound for Cuba. The failure of the invasion placed great pressure on the new administration, and created grave doubts about the President's ability to lead American foreign policy at such a delicate time. Arkady Schevchenko reports that in Moscow the reaction was quite different.

The failure of the Cuban operation gave Khrushchev and the other leaders the impression that Kennedy was indecisive. This had far reaching consequences and inspired future crises, not only in the Caribbean but in Europe as well.3

Lurking in the shadows while each of these emergencies occupied the President's time was the threat of an even more serious challenge in Berlin. A speech by Nikila Khrushchev on January 6 had reintroduced the ultimatum which had been withdrawn at Camp David in 1959. Planning for another Berlin crisis began in March when Dean Acheson was chosen to head
the task force to study America's possible responses to Soviet pressure on West Berlin. Acheson's final report was not delivered until June, but at a preliminary meeting in April, with Prime Minister Macmillan present, the former Secretary of State advocated a very hard line versus any Soviet challenge to this city. Acheson saw any threat to Berlin as an attempt to weaken or even destroy NATO by calling into question America's commitment to defend Western Europe and, thus through a test of wills destroy American influence around the world. Since there was no negotiable solution acceptable to the West, Acheson dismissed diplomatic responses to Soviet escalation of the crisis and called for military action, preferably sending a division down the Autobahn to West Berlin. Macmillan and Foreign Minister Lord Home objected that the West must first have a diplomatic response to the Soviet call for a peace treaty; the right of conquest was wearing thin. Adlai Stevenson agreed that military action should be taken only as a last resort rather than as a first step as Acheson suggested.4

Therefore in the period prior to the Vienna summit, the Kennedy administration and key American allies were divided on the course to take in response to renewed Soviet pressure on Berlin. The State Department itself was divided. Rusk saw little hope for negotiation but wanted the West to negotiate nevertheless, hoping that prolonged negotiations would force the Soviets to break off their ultimatum. Foy Kohler, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, sided with Acheson. Llewellyn Thompson, the US Ambassador to the
Soviet goals in more limited terms, and advocated negotiations backed by a quiet military buildup.  

The final issue which would receive considerable attention at the Vienna summit was the test ban. John Kennedy ordered a review of the United States' position on the test ban negotiations in his first days in office. This review led to a new American offer by Ambassador Arthur Dean at the tripartite talks in Geneva on March 21. This new plan reduced the number of annual inspection visits, and called for parity on the control commission with a neutral chairman. The Soviet response obliterated years of negotiation by demanding that the control commission be composed of a trioka of representatives from the West, the Communist world, and the neutrals. Inspection teams would be dominated by the host country, and no inspection could be undertaken without the host country's approval on the control commission. These proposals would obviously make verification of a test ban impossible, and the negotiations were at an impasse for the next two months before Vienna.  

President Kennedy had begun to explore the possibility of a summit very early in his administration. At a February 22 meeting with Ambassadors Thompson, Harriman, George Kennan, and Charles Bohlen, all former US Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, the President decided, with their concurrence, to seek such a meeting. Despite his Secretary of State's well-known opposition to such encounters, John Kennedy felt
that it was important for him to learn as much as possible about his adversary.

It is my duty to make decisions that no adviser and no ally can make for me, to see that those decisions are as informed as possible, that they are based on a much direct, first-hand knowledge as possible."

Rusk remained far more skeptical of the summit's value. "I saw the glare of publicity that accompanies a summit as something that could not help our position in Berlin."*

The February 22 meeting produced a letter which Ambassador Thompson carried with him to Moscow. The Soviets formally accepted the offer on May 12 and Vienna was quickly set as the site. In an exchange of letters prior to their meeting, Khrushchev and Kennedy agreed that this would not be a formal conference at which there would be detailed negotiations.

While such a conference, in Kennedy's long held view, might be necessary when war was threatened, or useful as a place where agreements...achieved at lower levels could be finally, officially approved...a summit is not a place to carry on negotiations which involve details."

Kennedy hoped to define a framework to guide future US-Soviet relations that could allow the superpowers to pull back from confrontation and explore areas of mutual interest."

The President was especially worried about the dangers of miscalculation during a crisis leading to a nuclear war which no one wanted. He had recently read, and been very much affected by, Barbara Tuchman's book, The Guns of August, in which the author details the complex chain of events and misperceptions which led to World War I. He was especially
struck by one quote in which a diplomat was asked how the war had begun and replied, "Ah, if only we knew." Kennedy hoped that a summit would allow him to make America's vital interests very clear and thus avoid miscalculation if a crisis did occur.

The President was essentially seeking, in Schlesinger's words, "a framework to guide future American-Soviet relations." With change coming at breakneck speed due to the dissolution of the old colonial empires, Kennedy feared a confrontation in which the vital interests of one of the superpowers was threatened. To avoid this, the President hoped to establish ground rules at Vienna which would avoid direct clashes between the United States and the Soviet Union.

On the way to Vienna, Kennedy stopped in Paris to discuss the upcoming summit with President de Gaulle. De Gaulle insisted that it was the Soviets who were seeking a change in the status quo and that there was little for the West to negotiate. Changes in the current situation were unacceptable, and Khrushchev must be made to understand that attempts to change the status quo by force would lead to nuclear war. On Laos, de Gaulle discounted military intervention but agreed not to publicly oppose American threats to send troops if this was required to further the negotiations.
Summit Discussions

The talks between John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev spanned two days, June 3-4, 1961. The delegations at this meeting were quite small including Rusk, Thompson, Bohlen and Kohler on the American side, and Gromyko, Mikhail Menshekov, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, and Anatoly Dobrynin on the Soviet side. The first day's discussions saw a philosophical exchange between the two heads of government over the role of the superpowers in conflicts around the world. Kennedy immediately pressed his point that in an era of great change the two superpowers had to carefully avoid direct challenges to the vital interests of the other. Kennedy repeatedly stressed the danger of miscalculation in the nuclear era and the need to avoid direct clashes in which misperception could lead to war. Khrushchev took offense at the term miscalculation, apparently there was not an adequate way to translate it into Russian, saying that the Soviet Union would defend its interests and that he did not understand this new idea of what the Soviet Union had to do to keep the peace. ¹⁴

Khrushchev stressed the Soviet duty to aid wars of national liberation in the third world, and accused the United States of supporting corrupt regimes merely to defend its strategic interests. Kennedy responded that he realized that change was inevitable, but the Soviet Union was instigating revolution in the third world, and the United States could not sit idly by while its vital interests were
challenged. The President argued that the superpowers should refrain from intervening in the process of change in the third world, and thereby avoid a serious confrontation that might increase the chances of miscalculation and escalation to a nuclear conflict. The First Secretary consistently denied that the Soviet Union was creating revolutionary situations; they were merely aidly progressive forces fighting against imperialism.

Near the end of the first day's talks, Kennedy shifted the focus to Laos. The discussion carried over into the early part of the next day's session, and surprisingly rapid agreement was reached on a framework for a Laotian settlement. Khrushchev agreed to Kennedy's proposal that both countries should pressure their clients to cooperate with the ICC to make the cease fire effective. Early in the talks the next day Khrushchev also agreed on the goal of a truly neutral government in Laos, and suggested that the Foreign Ministers be locked in a room until agreement could be reached.  

The two leaders turned next to the Test Ban, and quickly ran into the same roadblocks which had stalled the Geneva negotiations. Khrushchev continued to insist on a troika for the control commission and only three inspection visits per year, with the host country retaining a veto over requests for inspection. Kennedy maintained that the test ban would be a good first step in the path toward arms control and would help stop proliferation. Khrushchev refused to relent,
offering to change his requirements only if the test ban was part of a package on general and complete disarmament."

Berlin and Germany were the final, and most important, topics discussed by the two men. Khrushchev reiterated his view that sixteen years after World War II's end the current situation was unnatural and while the Soviet Union preferred to negotiate a peace treaty with the West, it would act unilaterally if none was possible. All existing agreements would be cancelled and access to West Berlin would be controlled by East Germany.

President Kennedy replied that Berlin was not Laos. America's vital interests were engaged in this case. The United States had rights in West Berlin that could not be unilaterally altered by the Soviet Union, and an abandonment of this commitment would lead to a real change in the balance of power. America could not allow this to happen. On this subject, the exchanges were blunt and often brutal. In their final meeting after lunch on June 4, Kennedy sought once again to make it clear that protection of the status quo in Berlin was in America's vital interest. Khrushchev responded by threatening war if the West did not respect a Soviet-East German peace treaty which would be signed in December. Kennedy's parting words were: "It will be a cold winter."17

Aftermath

The months following the Vienna summit saw progress on Laos, stalemate on test ban negotiations, a resumption of
nuclear testing, and a serious escalation of the Berlin crisis. As far as Laos was concerned, the agreement reached at Vienna had a significant impact. The cease fire, which had been shaky prior to Vienna, now began to take hold. Progress on a Laotian settlement was slow and at times each side had difficulty in delivering its allies. On the American side Phoumi held out for major posts within the proposed coalition government believing the United States would back him in his demands. Fighting did resume in May, 1962 with an offensive by the Pathet Lao, but eventually agreement was reached and the Geneva accords were signed on July 23, 1962. The agreements established a neutral, coalition government and required all foreign troops to be removed in seventy-five days. The Pathet Lao troops were to remain in the north, while government troops retained control of the Mekong River Valley, and the cease fire was to be supervised by the ICC. The test ban negotiations remained bogged down after the Vienna summit, and by early August the President was coming under increasing pressure to resume testing. A special panel, headed by Wolfgang Panofsky, which had been set up after the Soviet rebuff of the American offer in March, reported to the President in early August. It found that the United States could not be sure if the Soviets had or had not been testing during the moratorium. It did not, however, call for immediate resumption of tests. A Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) study delivered at the same meeting likewise did not call for immediate resumption of atmospheric testing, but argued
testing for smaller yield weapons would soon be necessary. Dissenting scientists on the Panofsky panel also argued for testing to build the neutron bomb.

The Soviets made President Kennedy's decision much easier when on September 1 they announced their decision to resume testing. The President and Prime Minister Macmillan offered a limited test ban prohibiting above ground explosions on September 3, but Khrushchev rejected it on September 9. In total the Soviets conducted thirty tests between September 1 and November 4, including a monster explosion of over fifty megatons, all in the midst of the Berlin Crisis. On September 5, Kennedy ordered the resumption of underground testing, and on April 25, 1962 the United States resumed atmospheric testing.  

The most important and controversial events in the aftermath of the Vienna summit dealt with Berlin. The crisis which developed in August, 1961 was among the most serious in the Cold War era. President Kennedy returned from Vienna shaken by Khrushchev's blunt language and, given his experience in Cuba, determined to develop alternative courses of action if the Soviets continued their pressure on Berlin. Acheson's final report was delivered to the President in late June and called for a staunch American response to a Soviet challenge on Berlin, just as the former Secretary had described in April. Many in the administration including Rusk, Stevenson, and Schlesinger argued for diplomatic alternatives. A crucial NSC meeting was held on July 7-8 in Hyannis Port and the President embarked on a two track
course. First, he decided to boost defense spending by $3.25 billion, increase the size of American armed forces by 217,000, and to call up some reserve units. At the same time he ordered his advisers to prepare diplomatic alternatives to military confrontation. This second track was quickly negated when at an August 4-5 meeting of American, British, French, and West German Foreign Ministers the French vetoed any negotiations on Berlin. De Gaulle continued to believe that the West had nothing to negotiate on Berlin and that Khrushchev would eventually back down when confronted with Western resolve.

Soviet pressure on Berlin began to heat up after Vienna. A series of aggressive speeches by Khrushchev in June and July culminated with a July 8 speech increasing Soviet defense spending by one-third. One month later, on August 13, in one of the most dramatic events of the Cold War, the border was sealed and the Berlin Wall began to go up. As September began, the Soviets resumed nuclear testing in a blatant move to increase the pressure on the West. The crisis atmosphere continued to grow through September until finally, at the opening of the Twenty-Second Party Congress on October 17, Khrushchev once again dropped his deadline for a peace treaty. Berlin had nearly become the spark that set off World War III since at one point in October, 1961 American and Soviet tanks faced each other at Checkpoint Charlie. Khrushchev had increased the pressure on the West each month after Vienna leading many at the time, and now, to look back at the summit as one cause of the crisis. Whether
or not this is the case will be examined briefly by this chapter and at greater length in the conclusion.

Evaluation of the Propositions

Proposition One

We will now explore the first proposition and attempt to ascertain the impact of the impending summit on the internal deliberations of the United States' government.

P1: The approach of a summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision-makers, and Congress to reach a common position and settle longstanding disputes.

As with Camp David this proposition does not hold, both due to the haste with which the summit was prepared, and also to its purpose as seen by Kennedy and Khrushchev. By setting the summit's date at June 3-4, after Soviet acceptance on May 12, only three weeks were left for actual preparation making any reappraisal of the basic positions of the United States on issues like Berlin, Laos, or the test ban almost impossible. Enough time simply did not exist for new negotiating positions to be generated.

Most importantly, however, neither Kennedy or Khrushchev wanted to use the summit as a forum for detailed, complex negotiations. As Sorenson and Armitage pointed out, the President did not see the summit as the proper forum for such deliberations. Instead Kennedy wished to use the meeting not only to size up his adversary but also to express his concerns on the increasing danger of superpower confrontation.
in a period of rapid changes. Summits for Kennedy were a place to clarify American interests and educate his counterpart not negotiate details. Proposition one is not found to have merit because as in the previous chapter these "get-acquainted" summits do not engender bureaucratic competition since it is not anticipated that there will be negotiations that require new proposals.

In sum, once again the definition of the Vienna summit by President Kennedy as a "get-acquainted" meeting means that proposition one was not found to be true on any of the issues under consideration in this study.

Proposition Two

Whether or not the Vienna summit was able to remove roadblocks to agreement will now be considered by an examination of proposition two.

P2: The President and General Secretary have resolved important issues which were not able to be solved at lower levels.

The chief roadblock to progress at the Geneva Conference on Laos was the lack of an effective cease fire. The parties involved had agreed to a cease fire on May 1, but there had been numerous violations in the period after it began. Many in the United States government were concerned that the Pathet Lao would try to duplicate the Viet Minh's success at Dien Bien Phu during the Geneva Conference of 1954 by winning a decisive military victory in the midst of negotiations."
Khrushchev initially took the position at Vienna that negotiations not be contingent on an effective cease fire, but Kennedy insisted that there could not be serious talks at Geneva without a halt to the fighting. Eventually, early in the second day's discussions the First Secretary relented and agreed to make the cease fire a priority matter, and each pledged to pressure their allies to cooperate with the ICC. With this agreement by the two superpowers, the cease fire gradually became more effective and the Geneva Conference was then able to focus on the formation of a neutral, coalition government in Laos rather than merely focusing on trying to stop the fighting." Thus progress at Geneva was facilitated by the consensus reached at the Vienna summit. The second proposition is upheld by this case.

On the test ban, the two leaders were unsuccessful in removing any of the roadblocks which stymied progress in the negotiations. The Soviet proposal of March, 1961 insisting on a troika on the control commission, very limited powers for the inspection teams, and veto power for each country before an inspection could be held, had halted the slow progress that was being made on a test ban treaty prior to March, 1961. At Vienna, Khrushchev refused to remove any of these obstacles if there was to be a separate test ban treaty. Only if the test ban were part of an overall process of general and complete disarmament could these conditions be relaxed. Kennedy sought to convince Khrushchev to remove these obstacles by arguing that the test ban could be the first step toward disarmament but the First Secretary would
not relent. No progress was made on the test ban at Vienna. On arms control issues, proposition two is not upheld by the data.

The Camp David summit in 1959 had been able to remove Khrushchev's ultimatum on Berlin and thus clear the way for a four power summit and further discussions on these issues. Kennedy was not able to achieve the same result at Vienna. Khrushchev's resurrection of the ultimatum in January, 1961 had once again placed the West in the position of being forced to negotiate under duress. Not only did Kennedy not get Khrushchev to remove the ultimatum, the Soviet leader again put a deadline on his demands by vowing to sign a peace treaty with East Germany by December 31 if no deal with the West was forthcoming. Under these conditions further negotiations were impossible. The second proposition is not found to have merit in this case.

In sum, proposition two was found to be true on the issue of Laos since Khrushchev and Kennedy were able to agree on an effective cease-fire, but on the issues of arms control and Berlin the proposition was not upheld.

Proposition Three

The third proposition postulates that leaders can build the conceptual framework for a later agreement, and it states:

P3: Framework agreements at US-Soviet summits pave the way for rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a final treaty.
The agreement reached on Laos at the Vienna summit can be regarded as the framework for Geneva accords signed one year later on July 23, 1962. Kennedy and Khrushchev were able to reach consensus on a neutral, coalition government headed by Souvanna. The President had sent clear signals in both March and April by alerting US military forces in the region that he would not allow the Pathet Lao to win a military victory without American intervention. Going into Vienna, the Soviet leader was faced with the choice of having to escalate the level of Soviet aid to achieve a victory by the Pathet Lao, and risking a confrontation with the United States, or reaching a political solution. Kennedy and Khrushchev thus entered their summit talks at a crucial time. Both sides were facing a juncture at which they would decide whether or not to escalate their military efforts or seek compromise. With the Geneva talks underway there already existed a forum in which the details of any agreement could be worked out. With diplomatic alternatives available, and the dangers of escalation looming ahead, Kennedy and Khrushchev were able to agree on a framework for the Geneva accords. The United States and the Soviet Union did have to work hard to deliver their allies at Geneva, but eventually in July, 1962 the treaty was signed. Proposition three is supported in the case.

On the issues of Berlin and the test ban, the two sides entered the negotiations so far apart that there was no real hope for a framework agreement at Vienna. Khrushchev's insistence on sticking to the Soviet proposals of March, 1961
regarding verification of a test ban made any compromise impossible.

On Berlin, the situation was very different than it was for Laos. While the First Secretary's options in Laos had been carefully limited prior to the summit by the action of the United States government, Khrushchev could still easily escalate the pressure on the West regarding Berlin. He was not yet at the point where hard choices had to be made. Khrushchev escalated the crisis in July by increasing military spending, in August by building the wall, and in early September by resuming nuclear tests. It was not until October that he was forced to back down, with these measures exhausted and Western resolve to protect the status quo still in evidence, dramatically demonstrated by the confrontation of American and Soviet tanks at Checkpoint Charlie. At Vienna in June, the chances of reaching a framework agreement on Berlin were far less than on Laos because the timing was not propitious. The Soviet leader wished to alter the status quo, and he had not yet been convinced of Western resolve, as Kennedy had succeeded in doing in Laos. The third proposition is not supported by the discussions on the test ban or Berlin.

President Kennedy also had a more ambitious goal in mind when he left for Vienna than just discussions of the issues considered thus far. According to both Schlesinger and Rostow he sought to establish a framework to guide Soviet-American relations in the future. The President considered there to be essentially an equilibrium of power between East
and West in 1961, but feared that in a rapidly changing world the Soviet Union would be tempted to act to overturn this balance. In effect, Kennedy was proposing that each side refrain from intervening as the old colonial empires collapsed and allow the process of change to evolve without superpower interference. While the President was not proposing a formal agreement, he was attempting to establish rules of the game which would guide future actions by the two nations. If Khrushchev had agreed, later confrontations could have been avoided and proposition three would have been upheld. Unfortunately, Khrushchev’s own ideological commitment to the national liberation struggle prevented any agreement. It was the Soviet duty, he maintained, to support revolutionary forces around the world as they struggle to overthrow their oppressors and this principle could not be compromised to gain better relations between the superpowers. No agreement could be reached on the rules of the game since essentially the two sides were not even playing the same game.

In sum, Kennedy and Khrushchev were able to craft the outline of an agreement to end the hostilities in Laos, thus upholding the third proposition in this case. On neither the issue of Berlin nor the Test Ban, was it possible to reach such a conceptual breakthrough. Therefore, proposition three is not found to be true on those questions.
Proposition Four

Next, we will examine the Vienna discussions to see if any qualify as an attempt to educate one’s counterpart.

P4: Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterparts on their concerns and interests on the important issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted in changes in the behavior of the superpowers following the summit.

The fourth proposition clearly applies to the President and First Secretary’s attempts to establish rules of the game for regional competition. John Kennedy spent much of the first day of the Vienna summit trying to convince Khrushchev of the dangers of miscalculation during a superpower confrontation. Kennedy was concerned that a nuclear war could result from an unpredictable series of events as the two superpowers were drawn into a conflict somewhere in the world. World War III would begin just as World War I had in August, 1914 by a series of mistakes, misperceptions, and miscalculations. Kennedy’s reading of Tuchman’s account apparently had affected him profoundly, and he was determined not to repeat this episode of history. The President tried to convince the First Secretary that aiding revolutionary groups in regions which affected America’s interests could lead to a confrontation that might have unforseen, and potentially disastrous consequences.

Khrushchev seemed insulted by Kennedy’s use of the term miscalculation, and asked if the President wished the Soviet Union would act as a schoolboy who must keep his hands on his desk at all times. He openly admitted he did not understand
this new theory of what the USSR must do to avoid war. Khrushchev rejected Kennedy’s fears of miscalculation, and responded by saying the Soviet Union would support wars of national liberation as a sacred duty. It was the United States which was threatening war by supporting repressive regimes and trying to hold back the tides of history.

Sorenson, Rostow and others have argued that this debate was important because it demonstrated to Khrushchev that Kennedy could articulate his views of world politics with force, and that he had strongly held beliefs on these subjects. Still, Kennedy failed in his primary purpose of enlightening Khrushchev of the dangers of brinkmanship and confrontation in the nuclear era. It failed because Kennedy viewed the struggle in balance of power terms while Khrushchev’s arguments were based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. But more than this the debate at Vienna demonstrates the difficulty of trying to educate an adversary about a new strategic concept. A great deal of Western scholarship in the late 1950s had been devoted to ideas like crisis stability and the study of how World War III might begin. Kennedy was presenting these concepts for the first time at a US-Soviet summit to a Soviet leader. The term miscalculation which Kennedy used many times did not even have an adequate Russian equivalent, and had to be translated as, “an inability to count.” Khrushchev’s admission that he did not understand what Kennedy was trying to convince him of is clear evidence that the President was unsuccessful in his efforts to tutor the Soviet leader.
Vienna is by far the most complex case on which to judge proposition four's validity. President Kennedy set out to explain to Khrushchev the dangers of confrontation and brinkmanship in the nuclear era, and he obviously failed given the events which followed in the summer and fall of 1961. Khrushchev apparently set out to intimidate the young President even going so far as to threaten war if Soviet actions were thwarted. If Khrushchev's purpose was to intimidate, he also failed since Kennedy upon his return to Washington began to make plans to meet a Soviet move against West Berlin, ultimately leading to increases in American defense spending, the calling-up of reserve units, and finally to the confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie in October. In fact, this is the only case in the history of Cold War summitry in which an effort to educate an adversary had the opposite effect of that which was intended. Khrushchev did not intimidate Kennedy, he instead convinced the President that decisive action had to be taken to defend western interests. Thus in an unexpected way, both parts of proposition four are supported by the discussions on Berlin at Vienna.

In sum, John Kennedy's long debate with Khrushchev on the rules of the game in regional competition satisfies the first part of proposition four, but not the second since it was not successful in changing Soviet behavior. Khrushchev's attempt to intimidate Kennedy on Berlin satisfies the first and second parts of proposition four, although in an
unusual way since it had the opposite effect that was intended.

Conclusion

Vienna remains one of the most controversial summits in the Cold War era. Kennedy’s demeanor after the meeting and the juxtaposition of it to the Berlin Crisis which soon followed has led many to charge that the inexperienced President was intimidated by the Soviet leader, and that Khrushchev was tempted by Kennedy’s reaction to subject him to a test of wills over Berlin. These issues will be examined in greater detail in the conclusion when the question of the dangers of summitry is addressed.

Table 5

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<th>Proposition 1</th>
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<th>Proposition 3</th>
<th>Proposition 4</th>
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<td>action-forcing deadline</td>
<td>roadblock remover</td>
<td>framework builder</td>
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Examining Table 5 shows that Kennedy and Khrushchev were able to achieve tangible results at Vienna, a fact that is often overlooked, since they were able to put together the outline of an agreement to end the hostilities in Laos, thus lending support to the third proposition. By agreeing to work to make the cease-fire in Laos effective, the leaders also removed the biggest roadblock to progress in the Geneva negotiations. Once again, the “get-acquainted” nature of
this summit and the limited preparation time available before
the meeting meant that this summit, as was the case with Camp
David, did not force the major actors in the Kennedy
administration to reach a consensus position of the key
issues in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.
NOTES - CHAPTER IV


10. Armitage, p. 47.


Schlesinger, pp. 368-369.


Sorenson, p. 620.
Schlesinger, pp. 455-461.

Schlesinger, pp. 388-400.


23. Rostow, p. 228.
Schlesinger, pp. 363-368.
Hilsman, p. 136.
The meeting between President Lyndon Johnson and Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin in late June, 1967 was a transitional event bridging two different eras of Cold War summitry. The old concerns of Germany and Berlin which had dominated Geneva, Camp David, and Vienna had gradually receded in importance since the building of the Berlin Wall. The wall had stabilized East Germany and thereby created a situation which East and West could tolerate even though it was neither's optimum solution. The focus of superpower geopolitical conflict was now shifting away from Europe and toward the third world as the new nations of Asia and Africa were gaining independence and seeking to establish their place in the world. Indochina and the Middle East had been peripheral issues at the summits of the 1950s and 1960s, but at Glassboro they occupied center stage since it now seemed more likely that a superpower confrontation would result from conflict in these areas, rather than in Central Europe.

In addition, the Soviet Union was beginning to approach parity in nuclear weapons as its massive buildup of ballistic missiles would by the end of the decade produce an arsenal nearly equal to that of the United States. Both countries
were also facing costly decisions regarding the deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles, which could in turn escalate the offensive arms race even further. These conditions, along with the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons to other states were finally beginning to create serious interest in arms control. Several halting steps in this area had already been taken with the signing of the Limited Test Ban and the Outer Space Treaty, but serious negotiations on the arsenals themselves had not yet begun.

In the midst of these problems both the United States and the Soviet Union were suffering weakened executive authority. In America by June, 1967, the turmoil and division over the war in Vietnam had begun to take its toll on the Johnson Administration. In the Soviet Union, the power struggle which followed the palace coup that removed Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 continued. In the summer of 1967, Kosygin as Prime Minister still acted as the spokesman for Soviet foreign policy, but he could by no means act alone. This uncertain situation would have a great impact on the outcome of the Glassboro summit.

Presummit Events

The agenda at Glassboro was limited to three specific topics, Vietnam, the Middle East, and arms control. On the subject of Vietnam there had been several attempts early in 1967 to initiate negotiations to end the war. Lyndon Johnson had written Ho Chi Minh directly on February 8 and offered a way out of the current impasse blocking the start of peace
talks. The North Vietnamese insisted that a conference could not begin until the bombing of North Vietnam had ceased. The United States rejected this precondition fearing that the North would use the bombing pause to escalate its infiltration of forces into the South and merely pretend to negotiate without any real intention of reaching a political settlement of the conflict. Instead Johnson offered in the February 8 letter a variation of an earlier proposal called the Phase A-Phase B plan. Under this arrangement the bombing would cease in the first phase in exchange for an end to North Vietnamese infiltration into the South. Following this deescalation negotiations could begin in the second phase of the deal. As this letter was being delivered to North Vietnam, Prime Minister Kosygin was in London for a summit with British Prime Minister Wilson. Wilson hoped that he and Kosygin could act as mediators between the United States and North Vietnam. Despite some transatlantic confusion as to what the American position actually was, Kosygin transmitted the proposal to Hanoi. The leaders of North Vietnam made no response to this plan.¹

Johnson tried again in April to engage Ho Chi Minh in a dialogue regarding the opening of negotiations. In a letter sent on April 6 the President restated his Phase A-Phase B proposal, but also offered the option of beginning negotiation without any deescalation of the war effort by either side. The letter was returned the same day, opened, but the North Vietnamese once again did not even offer a response to the proposal. Much to Johnson’s frustration in
the period before the Glassboro summit all of his efforts to establish negotiations were frustrated by North Vietnam.2

The most immediate problem on the minds of the two leaders as they gathered at Glassboro on June 23 was the aftermath of the Six Day War which had taken place earlier that month. Throughout May the crisis escalated with Egyptian mobilization on May 14, Nasser's expulsion of the United Nations peacekeeping force on May 16, and the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba on May 22.3 On this same day, President Johnson wrote Prime Minister Kosygin and called for maximum efforts by the superpowers to encourage moderation by their clients in the region and emphasized the dangers of confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union because of their close ties to the potential combatants. Also according to Rostow:

But there was more to the message than that. Johnson spoke of dangers in Southeast Asia and Latin America which could also get out of hand and underlined the urgency of creating an environment in which movement forward on the nonproliferation treaty could take place. The message of May 22 was, in a sense, the prelude not merely to the Hot Line exchanges, but to the Glassboro meeting later in June.4

The war itself saw a great deal of consultation over the Hot Line between Johnson and the Soviet leadership primarily related to attempts to arrange a cease-fire and end the hostilities. The messages relayed between the two capitals by the Hot Line generally dealt with attempts to arrange a cease-fire and its conditions, but near the end of the war the possibility of superpower confrontation did become more real. Cease-fire arrangements had been worked out on the
Egyptian and Jordanian fronts, but fighting continued between Israel and Syria. As the situation deteriorated for the Syrians the Soviet leadership sent a message over the Hot Line on June 10 warning that it might have to intervene if the fighting did not end immediately. To warn the Soviets that intervention was unacceptable, Johnson ordered the Sixth Fleet to close to fifty miles of the Syrian coast. Eventually the crisis passed, and the ceasefire took effect, but Johnson was deeply concerned that such confrontation should be avoided in the future. The President also saw great value, and danger, in the Hot Line since it did allow rapid communication during a crisis, but in such a volatile situation each word in a message had to be weighed very carefully before being transmitted.

On June 19 in a public speech, Johnson put forth his ideas for a just peace in the Middle East. He called for justice for the refugees, guarantee of the rights of innocent passage, limits on arms sales to the region, recognition for the right of national life, and political independence and territorial integrity for all.

On arms control issues momentum was building on two separate fronts; one to stop the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states, and the other to stop the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the superpowers. An important breakthrough had been made by Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in September, 1966 on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The Soviet Union dropped its objections to dual-key arrangements within NATO and consultations on nuclear weapons within the alliance.
Instead a much narrower ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons was agreed to, and on December 5 specific treaty language was accepted by both countries. Except for the inspection provisions this agreement formed the heart of what would later become the NPT. Given the multilateral nature of the NPT negotiations US-Soviet agreement did not equal final acceptance of the treaty. In early October, Johnson and his advisors met at Camp David and decided to move carefully on NPT with the State Department leading the way to make sure that allied concerns were taken into account.

Arms control negotiations on the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union were in a far more embryonic stage than NPT. The real pressure to seek negotiations in 1967 was coming from critical budgetary decisions facing the Johnson administration. A December, 1966 NSC meeting held in Austin, Texas, saw a clash between top executive branch officials that gave real urgency to American government's desire for arms control talks. The time had come for the administration to decide whether or not to deploy an antiballistic missile (ABM) system. In 1966 Congress had appropriated $167.9 billion for a Nike ABM system which Johnson refused to spend, but pressure to deploy ballistic missile defenses was growing. At the December 6 meeting the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), joined by Walt Rostow, pushed hard for funds for the production of an ABM system to be included in the next budget. Robert McNamara and his Assistant Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, strongly opposed including money for production of strategic defenses. To lessen Johnson's obvious dilemma, McNamara offered a
compromise to include a small amount of funds for ABM in the budget, but hold off a deployment decision until the possibility of arms control talks with the Soviet Union had been explored."

Johnson soon began to press the Soviets to open arms control negotiations. A January 21, 1967 letter to Kosygin called for talks before the deployment of defenses encouraged the further growth of offensive arsenals. Kosygin replied in a generally positive way on February 27 but without really committing the USSR to negotiations. At first Johnson and the administration believed the Soviets had agreed to talk, but it soon became clear that they were divided and not yet ready to take this step."

The actual arrangement of the Glassboro meeting was the most frantic of any other US-Soviet summit. Kosygin would be traveling to New York in late June to address the General Assembly on the aftermath of the Six Day War, and Soviet officials began to drop hints that he would be willing to meet with the President. After extraordinary confusion, Glassboro, New Jersey was chosen since it was almost exactly halfway between Washington and Moscow. The meeting and site were not finally agreed to until June 22, less than one day before the summit would begin. Never before, or since, had a President and General Secretary met on such short notice.

As Johnson prepared on the evening of June 22 he called Rostow to discuss his intentions the next day. The President hoped to focus on arms control and working for restraint in the Middle East. He had no intention of bringing up Vietnam. On regional issues he wished to compare the United States and
Soviet Union to elder brothers in a large family who had responsibilities to keep the peace. They could do so by first setting an example in their own relations, by working with others to create a peaceful environment, and finally by making sure if war came that it was not fought with advanced weapons. Rostow agreed that this analogy expressed American goals very well.  

Summit Discussions

The talks at Glassboro took place over a three day span from June 23 to June 25. On June 24 President Johnson flew to Los Angeles for a previously scheduled speaking engagement and then returned to New Jersey to continue his discussions with Prime Minister Kosygin. The meetings were almost entirely private encounters with only the two principals and their interpreters present. Advisers were brought in for the talks over lunch on Friday, June 23, but for much of the time they sat together just outside the room where the leaders were conferring.

Kosygin came to Glassboro determined to discuss with Johnson Soviet plans for a Middle East settlement. Whenever the President would attempt to shift the focus to other issues, especially arms control, Kosygin would immediately return to the Arab-Israeli crisis. Kosygin insisted upon a settlement based on a return to the prewar borders, he accused the United States of supporting Israeli aggression, and he called for the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to be put before the World Court. Johnson rejected Kosygin's
proposals, and presented his eldest brother's analogy. He pressed hard for superpower restraint in the region, especially on arms sales to their allies. Johnson expressed the desire that the United States and Soviet Union could prevent future conflict in the region, but if war were to come again it should be fought with sticks and stones and not advanced weapons. He seemed to make little progress.\(^\text{11}\)

On Vietnam, Kosygin relayed to Johnson, as he had to Wilson in February, the North Vietnamese offer to open negotiations if the bombing stopped. Johnson replied that American air power was holding five North Vietnamese divisions in check above the demilitarized zone and the United States could not make such a unilateral move. The President repeated his offer of February and April to halt bombing in exchange for a stop in infiltration of the South by North Vietnamese troops. Negotiations could begin following this deescalation. Kosygin did express interest in this offer and said it looked reasonable to him "on the whole".\(^\text{12}\)

The arms control discussions at Glassboro dealt with both NPT and the possibility of strategic weapons talks. On NPT Johnson argued that a great deal of progress had already been made and that the only critical issues remaining to be considered were those related to verification of the agreement. He suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union jointly offer a draft treaty minus Article Three which would contain the inspection provisions. This would allow the participants at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference to see the progress that had been made and focus
attention on the remaining issues. Kosygin's response was positive but noncommittal.13

On strategic arms control, Kosygin was far more evasive. Johnson pressed him on both Friday and Sunday to set a date and place for negotiations to begin. The Prime Minister each time attempted to change the subject back to the Middle East. Johnson's frustration at his inability to get Kosygin to focus on arms control led him to turn to his Secretary of Defense as the leaders and their advisers met over lunch on June 23. Their exchange is one of the most famous in the history of US-Soviet summits.

Mr. Prime Minister, you must understand that the proper US response to your ABM system is an expansion of our offensive force. If we had the right number of weapons to maintain a deterrent before you put your defenses in, then to maintain the same degree of deterrence, in the face of your defense, we must strengthen our offense. Deployment of a Soviet ABM system will lead to an escalation of the arms race. That is not good for either of us. Kosygin was furious. The blood rushed to his face, he pounded on the table, and he said, 'Defense is moral; offense is immoral!'14

No agreement was reached at Glassboro to begin strategic arms control negotiations and the summit ended on June 25 without a communique, although joint press releases were issued which termed the talks constructive. Kosygin went on to address the United Nations and then returned to Moscow. Upon his arrival he confided "We agreed on next to nothing."15
In the aftermath of the Glassboro summit, no real progress was made in convening negotiations to end the war in Vietnam. Just as with the February and April initiatives the United States never received a reply to its peace overtures, either positive or negative, from the North Vietnamese leadership. There were back channel attempts to arrange secret negotiations through Henry Kissinger, but none of these efforts was related in any way to the Glassboro discussions. If Kosygin did convey the American offer to Hanoi they certainly were not interested in Johnson’s conditions for opening negotiations.16

President Johnson was equally disappointed in the Soviet response to his calls at Glassboro for restraint in the Middle East. The Soviets quickly began to massively rebuild the Arab armed forces destroyed by Israel in the Six Day War. The President had hoped to restrain arms sales to the region and for a period of time withheld the sale of F-4 Phantom jets to Israel in hopes the Soviets would do likewise. In fact, with Arab states now even more dependent on the Soviet Union, Moscow began to ship vast quantities of arms to Egypt and Syria including advanced aircraft. Under these conditions Johnson was forced to go ahead with the sale of the Phantoms in September.17

In November, 1967 the United Nations was finally able to put together a compromise resolution to guide peace efforts in the Middle East. Security Council Resolution 242 was the result of diligent efforts by British Ambassador to the UN
Lord Caradon, American Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetzov. It was not, however, in any way related the discussions at Glassboro. Nothing in the leaders’ talks in June seems to have laid the groundwork for this resolution."

There was progress following Glassboro on the NPT. On August 24, 1967 the United States and the Soviet Union submitted identical drafts of the NPT, minus Article III, the controversial safeguards provision. Difficulties still remained over the status of peaceful nuclear explosions and the power of the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect the facilities of the European Atomic Energy Agency. Lurking behind the willingness of many American allies to accept the NPT was their desire for assurances on the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This was especially true for West Germany. Eventually Article III was agreed to and an identical draft including this provision were tabled on January 18, 1968, and the NPT was formally accepted on July 1, 1968."

The inability of President Johnson to get a commitment from Kosygin to begin talks of strategic arms limitations forced the administration to implement the other half of its December 6, 1966 compromise. On September 18, 1967 in a famous speech in San Francisco, McNamara clearly expressed the dangers of pursuing ballistic missile defenses but then called for the deployment of a “thin” area defense of the United States against ballistic missile attack from lesser nuclear powers such as the People’s Republic of China. Diplomatic exchanges did continue between Moscow and
Washington on the possibility of opening talks on strategic weapons, and on July 1, 1968, on the day the NPT was signed, the Soviets agreed to open negotiations. Unfortunately, however, on the day before the opening of the SALT talks and a trip to Leningrad by President Johnson was to be announced the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, thus delaying the opening of negotiations for another year while a new administration got its feet on the ground.20

Evaluation of the Propositions

Proposition One

We will now examine the first proposition to see if the approach of the summit helped forge a consensus within the bureaucracy.

P1: The approach of a summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision makers, and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes.

With only one day between the agreement to hold a meeting and the summit itself there was obviously not enough time to conduct an elaborate reevaluation of American positions on key issues related to the US-Soviet relationship. The President’s preparation largely consisted of personal reflection and calls to his closest advisors, principally Rostow. Rostow argues that Johnson did not need a great deal of preparation on many of these issues because he had been brooding about the dangers of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation since the end of the Six Day War.21
Nevertheless the hasty manner in which the summit was prepared virtually guaranteed that Glassboro would serve as another "get-acquainted" summit, much like Vienna and Camp David.

In sum, as with Camp David and Vienna before, Glassboro was a hastily arranged, "get-acquainted" meeting and therefore did not create the need to reach compromise positions on important issues before the summit. Thus the first proposition does not hold on any of the issues discussed by this dissertation.

Proposition Two

Let us now turn to an exploration of the second proposition.

P2: The President and General Secretary have resolved important issues which were not able to be resolved at lower levels.

The roadblock to the opening of negotiations on an end to the war in Vietnam was the North Vietnamese insistence that American bombing of the North stop before the talks began. Johnson's Phase A-Phase B plan was an attempt to get mutual restraint and deescalation of the conflict before negotiations opened, rather than imposing only unilateral preconditions on the United States." This same offer had been made on two previous occasions, Johnson's letter's of February 8 and April 6, and in each case the North Vietnamese had never even bothered to reply to the proposal. The
Glassboro overture once again elicited the same response. The second proposition is not upheld in this case.

Discussions on the aftermath of the Six Day War cannot be characterized as attempts to remove impediments to agreement. With the conflict so recently ended and the results so one-sided both superpowers were just beginning to face the realities of the situation and what a political settlement might look like. Johnson's five points and Kosygin's insistence on a return to the status quo ante were so far apart the two sides could not even agree on the outline of a settlement, let alone identify the roadblocks to a solution. Johnson's efforts were focused on developing a consensus on the need for superpower restraint in the region, and will be more fully discussed under both Proposition three and four.

On arms control issues, the President did attempt to remove obstacles to progress on the NPT and to the opening of strategic arms negotiations. Johnson's suggestion that the United States and the Soviet Union submit identical drafts on the proposed NPT minus the safeguards provisions allowed the participants in the ENDC to see how much progress had already been made and focused attention on the remaining issues. Following the summit, the drafts were offered in late August, and by January, 1968, even Article III had been agreed upon. While this action may not have been a milestone in the history of the NPT negotiations, Rostow argues that it did help move the process forward. Proposition two is supported by the data in this case.
President Johnson endeavored mightily to get Kosygin to set a date for the opening of arms control talks on limiting strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Kosygin refused to agree to open talks and seemed very uncomfortable with the entire topic since almost every time Johnson brought up the subject, Kosygin would attempt to refocus the talks on the Middle East. At one point the President even offered to fly McNamara to Moscow to arrange the details for the talks but to no avail, Kosygin would not accept.

Johnson clearly was frustrated because Kosygin did not seem to have the authority to negotiate given the current political arrangements within the Soviet Union. According to Shevchenko, the President's impression was correct. While Kosygin was still the Politburo's spokesman on foreign policy, his power in that area had been weakened by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. This was in fact the only summit in the Cold War era that the American President met solely with the Prime Minister and not the General Secretary. Kosygin came to the United States on a very short leash and had very little authority to make commitments, especially on something as momentous as the opening of arms control negotiations. Kosygin even hoped the difficulty of choosing a site would prevent the summit from ever taking place and thus allow him to avoid having to accept blame for a failed meeting. The second proposition is not upheld by the evidence in this case.

In sum, proposition two was supported by the discussions at Glassboro regarding the NPT. The
agreement to circulate the accord, minus Article III, did move the NPT process forward. On the regional questions of Vietnam and the Middle East, as well as on other arms control issues, however, proposition two is not supported by the evidence.

Proposition Three

Whether or not Johnson and Kosygin achieved a conceptual breakthrough at Geneva on any of the issues discussed will now be considered.

P3: Framework agreements at U.S.-Soviet summits pave the way for more rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal treaty.

On both of the regional issues discussed at Glassboro, President Johnson attempted to build a framework of agreement which would have guided further negotiations in the case of Vietnam, or in the Middle East would have established the ground rules for future U.S.-Soviet activity in the region. In Vietnam the Phase A-Phase B plan would have done more than just create the conditions under which negotiations could begin. The first phase of the plan would have deescalated the conflict, and could have provided a precedent for future steps toward peace. Once the process of mutual deescalation had begun it could have been applied to perhaps mutual withdrawals or other coordinated steps away from conflict. Of course this was not to be since North Vietnam rejected the offer for the third time. Johnson had not even planned to bring up Vietnam, but when Kosygin brought up the topic Johnson reintroduced the Phase A-Phase B proposal. This plan
was not new, even to Kosygin, since Wilson had presented it to him with some confusion in London in February. Perhaps a more carefully prepared meeting would have encouraged the development of a new American proposal, but in the brief time before Glassboro there was no time to develop a new framework for a settlement in Vietnam.

Johnson went far beyond a solution to the chaos created by the Six Day War in his reply to Kosygin's constant calls for a return to the prewar status quo. The President's ideas were very reminiscent of John Kennedy's pleas for a standstill in the Cold War at Vienna in 1961, although they were wrapped in a homespun analogy. Johnson essentially sought reduced Soviet-American competition in the third world, especially the Middle East, and in particular wanted to reduce the shipment of advanced weapons to the combatants in regional conflicts. He also pushed for better superpower relations to serve as an example to the rest of the world on conflict resolution and greater superpower cooperation to create an environment of peace. The danger of superpower confrontation in a world of rapid change worried him, as it did John Kennedy, and he sought Kosygin's agreement on this cooperative framework, but the Soviet leader did not agree. The Soviets resumed their shipment of advanced weaponry to their Arab allies at the conclusion of the war and Johnson's plans for restraint went unheeded. By Rostow's account:

He hoped to find in Kosygin at Glassboro the representative of a government which had concluded that the Middle East was an area of greater danger than opportunity. But he did not. Despite its immediate setback, Moscow evidently believed the Arab defeat had its advantages. Cairo was even more dependent
than before for arms and diplomatic support, so long as Nasser sought something short of stable peace.... In any case, Moscow refused to join Washington in limiting the postwar flow of arms into the area and, with some reluctance Johnson turned to assure Israel of an adequate supply of military equipment, including the relatively long-range Phantom jet fighter-bomber."

Johnson had failed, as Kennedy did before him, to establish the ground rules for superpower activity in the third world. Proposition three is not supported by the cases of Vietnam or the Middle East.

Neither the negotiations on the NPT or strategic arms control could be characterized as attempts to direct the framework of an accord. The framework of much of the NPT was worked out by Rusk and Gromyko in the fall of 1966. The discussions on strategic arms control were at such an early stage no such agreement was really feasible at the time of the Glassboro summit. The third proposition is not upheld by either case.

In sum, on none of the issues under consideration in this study was there a successful effort to build a framework agreement at Glassboro. Johnson did pursue such an agreement on Vietnam, but he ultimately failed. Therefore, proposition three is not found to be true on any of the issues under consideration.

Proposition Four

Could any of the discussions at Glassboro be considered attempts to educate one's counterpart, and if so were they successful? We now turn to these issues.
P4: Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterpart on their concerns and interests on the important issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted in changes in the behavior of the superpowers following the summit.

Johnson's analogy comparing the United States and the Soviet Union to the eldest brothers in a large family with the responsibility for keeping the peace was very much an attempt to communicate to Kosygin American fears of a superpower confrontation in a complex world. As was mentioned in proposition three, however, the Soviet leadership in 1967, as it had in 1961, seemed to see the balance of threat and opportunity in third world conflict much differently. Twice now the President of the United States, the world's greatest status quo power, had attempted to convince the leaders of the world's greatest revolutionary power that restraint must be shown in regional conflicts or else these local wars could escalate to something far more dangerous. Johnson failed, as Kennedy had six years earlier, since Soviet policy in the Middle East and Southeast Asia remained unchanged after the summit. The Soviets continued to transfer military equipment to their allies in these regions. The United States was forced to do likewise and the President reluctantly approved the sale of Phantoms to Israel. The first part of proposition four is upheld since Johnson made a determined effort to educate Kosygin on the dangers of superpower competition in the third world, but the second part of the proposition is not supported since the effort was not successful. The failures of Kennedy in 1961
and Johnson in 1967 highlight the difficulties of negotiating the ground rules for a conflict in which the two participants are actually playing a very different game, one to protect the status quo, the other to overturn it.

The most interesting, and perhaps important, attempt at educating the adversary in the history of U.S.-Soviet summitry came at Glassboro when Robert McNamara lectured the Soviet Prime Minister on the strange logic of nuclear deterrence. These were not entirely new concepts for the Soviets since administration officials had been making this argument publicly for some time. In fact when Kosygin made a public statement endorsing ballistic missile defense at his February summit with Prime Minister Wilson, Secretary of State Rusk answered him the next day with a press release arguing that strategic defenses would merely add fuel to the offensive arms race.26 This was the first time, however, that Kosygin could hear these arguments directly from the President and his Secretary of Defense and see the intensity with which they were held. McNamara’s impassioned plea that defenses would merely exacerbate the arms race was met by an equally impassioned defense of ABM systems.

Ultimately, the question is, was McNamara successful? There is no clear evidence for either side. One year later the Soviet Union did agree to the first strategic arms control talks, and their first proposal in late 1969 when SALT finally got underway did call for severe limits on ABM systems, but we do not know if McNamara’s tutorial had any impact on these decisions. The consensus view among scholars and experts is that it was the threat of a technologically
superior American ABM system about to be deployed which convinced the Soviet Union to seek limits, not the force of McNamara's logic. John Newhouse and Dean Rusk disagree. Newhouse argues that the Soviets were surprised and even impressed by the intensity of McNamara's presentation and that it may have moved the leadership to look hard at the question of stable deterrence. He argues Glassboro may have been the start of SALT. Rusk is even less equivocal in his claims for the impact that the Secretary of Defense had on Kosygin and the other Soviets present.

The Russians went home, did their staff work, and eventually came to the same conclusion we did. ABMs would simply accelerate an arms race in offensive weapons. Finally, the Soviets appeared interested in some type of treaty, but a year had already passed since Glassboro, and time was running out on the Johnson administration.

Rostow also has argued:

...I am inclined to believe that McNamara's role in forcing America, its allies, and the Soviet Union to view the nuclear problem in roughly similar terms may well be his greatest contribution as a public servant in the 1960s.

Unfortunately there simply is no evidence, either positive or negative, that McNamara's logic struck home. Perhaps with the end of the Cold War, answers to this question may emerge. Therefore the first part of proposition four is found to be true, but the final judgment on the second remains unanswered.

In sum, Glassboro was a summit devoted to education. President Johnson made a concerted effort to engage Kosygin in a discussion of rules for
regional competition, and Robert McNamara did the same on strategic defenses. Johnson was clearly unsuccessful, while the evidence on McNamara's tutorial remains unclear. Thus, the first part of proposition four is upheld on both regional issues and arms control. The second part of the proposition is not supported by the Glassboro discussions on regional questions, but a final judgment cannot be made on arms control.

Conclusion

The Glassboro summit came at a turning point in the history of the Cold War. Old concerns over Berlin and Germany were giving way to new rivalries in the third world. The approach of nuclear parity and the prospect of a new round of spending on strategic defenses which would not yield additional security and could lead to greater instability were creating powerful incentives to begin arms control negotiations. Glassboro did not succeed in lessening superpower rivalries in the third world as the war in Vietnam would continue to rage for six more years, and both sides stepped up the level of aid to their allies in the Middle East. It did, however, begin a dialogue on arms control which would come to dominate superpower relations for the remainder of the Cold War. Arms control had always taken a back seat at U.S.-Soviet summits to regional issues and the geopolitical rivalry between the superpowers, but after Glassboro the limitation of nuclear weapons became agenda
item number one when the leaders sat down to talk face-to-face. The next summit, at Moscow in 1972, would take place in a much different atmosphere and Glassboro may have helped lay the groundwork for that.

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Glassboro: none  arms control: none  regional issues, arms control

As Table 6 demonstrates, Glassboro was a summit devoted to education, not negotiation. Sincere attempts to change Soviet thinking on the ground rules for regional competition, and the instability created by strategic defenses were made by the President and the Secretary of Defense at Glassboro. There are many who argue that McNamara’s tutorial had an important effect on Soviet policy, but this is by no means certain. There was some progress in moving the NPT process forward, thus supporting the second proposition, but no other roadblocks were removed on arms control or regional questions. Finally, the hurried nature of this gathering virtually guaranteed that the first proposition would not be found to be true.
NOTES - CHAPTER V


2. Johnson, p. 256.


4. Rostow, p. 418.


12. McNamara, p. 57.

    Epstein, pp. 71-77.
22. Rusk, p. 468.
26. Newhouse, pp. 89-90
27. Rusk, 350.
CHAPTER VI

MOSCOW 1972

The summit between Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon in 1972 took place in the most complex atmosphere of negotiation and conflict of any Cold War U.S.-Soviet summit. President Nixon and his chief foreign policy aide, Henry Kissinger, were simultaneously pursuing a policy of detente with the Soviet Union, an opening to China, competition with the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East, and war with an ally of the Soviet Union in Vietnam. The summit itself was nearly cancelled just before it was to convene because of an offensive by the North Vietnamese and a stiff American military response designed to blunt the attack. And yet, the summit did take place and witnessed the signing of the first Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) Treaty, the Basic Principles Agreement (BPA), and a breakthrough toward ending America's involvement in Vietnam.

These complex negotiations were also being conducted at two levels. Normal bureaucratic avenues were often superseded by secret negotiations run by the White House and the National Security Council (NSC) staff. The wisdom of these dual-track negotiations is one of the most hotly debated issues in studies of Nixon-era foreign policy. To
add another layer of complexity to policymaking in this period, Nixon and Kissinger pursued a policy of linkage in which progress in areas of interest to the Soviet Union, such as trade, was linked to issues of concern to America, especially Vietnam. It was in this hectic procedural and substantive atmosphere that perhaps the most significant postwar summit was held.

Setting

While not major issues at the summit, several other regional questions would provide the background against which Nixon’s Moscow trip took place. The most important was the President’s trip to China in February, 1972 and the possibility of closer American-Chinese relations. Within a little more than a month of the announcement of Nixon’s trip on July 15, 1971, there was dramatic progress in the slow moving Berlin talks and the quadrapartite agreement on Berlin was signed on September 3, 1971. Nixon also received a formal invitation to come to Moscow on August 10 and accepted on August 17.

In Europe, many of the issues which had plagued American-Soviet relations during the Cold War were, if not being solved, at least moving toward a status quo with which both sides could live. Besides the quadrapartite agreement on Berlin, West Germany had negotiated a series of treaties with the nations of Eastern Europe including a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union on August 12, 1970, and a treaty
with Poland recognizing the Oder-Neisse border on December 7, 1970.¹

The distribution of power in the international system which had served as the backdrop for the earlier U.S.-Soviet summits had changed dramatically in the five years since Glassboro. The split between the Soviet Union and China had nearly come to war in 1968-1969, and now the United States and the People’s Republic were moving toward closer relations, with the threat of an anti-Soviet alliance between these two great powers creating great unease among the leaders in Moscow. In the West, several NATO countries, especially West Germany and France, were pursuing detente policies of their own thus making a confrontational stance toward the Soviet Union more difficult to maintain. Combined with the arrival of parity in strategic nuclear weapons and the possibility of an accelerated arms race if ABM systems were deployed, these factors were creating strong incentives for both the United States and the Soviet Union to seek a lessening in Cold War tensions. The Moscow summit would be a critical step in this process.

Summit Preparations

Unlike the three summits which preceeded Moscow, this meeting had quite detailed advanced preparations. The Soviet invitation had been accepted on August 17 and announced to the public on October 12. Discussions on the agenda began on January 21 when Dobrynin presented a letter to Nixon proposing topics for the leaders to consider. On March 17
Nixon informed the Ambassador that Kissinger would handle all major summit preparations with the State Department coordinating issues related to economic ties, scientific, or cultural exchanges. Kissinger was thus in control of preparations on SALT and regional questions.2

As was stated earlier, by the end of the sixth round of SALT negotiations in February, several major issues remained to be settled. On the ABM Treaty, the only major question unresolved was the number of permitted ABM sites. At an NSC meeting on March 17, President Nixon decided to offer that the treaty allow either one site to protect the National Command Authority (NCA) and one to protect an ICBM field, or two sites defending ICBM fields. This proposal would be tied to Soviet acceptance of an SLBM freeze. The March 17 meeting also instructed SALT Delegation Chairman Gerard Smith and the delegation to seek strict limits on the modernization of heavy missiles and missile silos. Smith was to seek a definition of heavy missiles which would categorize any missile larger than the Soviet SS-11 as heavy.3

The most difficult issue discussed in the early months of 1972, was how to include SLBMs in the emerging SALT agreement. In a memo to the President on January 18, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had proposed that the Soviet Union could agree to an SLBM freeze but then continue to build SLBMs and submarines if they retired older ICBMs as these new weapons came on line. Exactly how this proposal was put to the Soviets is not clear. Kissinger claims that the trade-in was briefly sketched to Dobrynin in a meeting on
March 9 and then in detail during Kissinger's secret trip to Moscow on April 12. Garthoff argues that Kissinger's March 9 offer was far more specific than this, with the national Security Advisor proposing a ceiling of 950 SLBMs on 62 submarines, if the Soviets accepted the concept of trading in older ICBMs. Whichever account is correct the basic outline of a deal on SLBMs was worked out during Kissinger's extraordinary secret trip to Moscow during April 20-23.

The meeting between Kissinger and the Soviet leadership in late April saw great progress on SALT and some on Vietnam. On the ABM Treaty Brezhnev offered that each side be able to protect its NCA and one ICBM field, and while Kissinger did not formally accept the proposal in Moscow this became the backbone of the treaty. Final acceptance of this proposal was made by the SALT delegations in early May. Brezhnev also put forward the outline of the eventual deal on SLBMs. He proposed that the Soviets be allowed 950 SLBMs on 62 submarines, and that to build to these levels, beyond their current inventory, when the freeze went into effect they would trade in older ICBMs. The Soviets made one last ditch effort to limit NATO systems in Europe by offering a limit of 800 SLBMs on 50 submarines which would include not only American systems but also British and French as well.

The secret Kissinger-Brezhnev talks were revealed to the rest of the government upon the National Security Advisor's return to Washington, and resulted in emotional Verification Panel meetings on April 28 and 29 and a key NSC meeting on May 1. Some issues were settled easily with the Soviet
proposal on ABM sites accepted and their 800/50 limits on SLBMs/SSBNs rejected. The critical debate came over the limits on Soviet SLBMs. Kissinger was able to win approval for the 950/62 ceilings from both Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Thomas Moorer and Laird at least in part because the National Security Adviser linked the President's support for the Trident program to their support for SALT I. Much to the surprise of Kissinger, the April 28-29 meetings saw Smith and Rogers express grave doubts about the unequal nature of the SLBM deal worked out in Moscow. Ultimately the 950/62 ceiling for the USSR was approved provided they trade in older ICBMs if they were to build beyond current levels.5

With the outline of the ABM Treaty and the ceilings on SLBMs in place, each was formally negotiated by the delegations in early May, only two major issues remained to be settled as the summit approached. The first related to the freeze on SLBMs in that it had yet to be determined when the Soviets would have to begin trading in older ICBMs in order to build new SLBMs. This issue was not settled before the summit. The other issue was missile modernization. Both sides wished to continue to modernize their systems after the freeze began, but the United States sought to prevent the Soviets from using modernization as a loophole to replace their light ICBMs with much larger ones, and thereby circumvent the freeze on heavy missiles. The Soviets had agreed on February 4 not to replace light ICBMs with heavy ones, but had consistently refused to define a heavy missile. The United States' delegation first attempted to define a
heavy missile as any one larger than the Soviet SS-11, their largest light ICBM. When this proposal was rejected, Smith and his colleagues pushed for a seventy cubic meter volume limit for light ICBMs, but the Soviets rejected this as well. Neither of these issues had been settled by the time Nixon landed in Moscow. Both the point at which the ICBM/SLBM trade in would have to begin and limits on missile modernization would be decided by the President and Kissinger at the summit.

All other regional issues were overshadowed by Vietnam since Kissinger's visit to Moscow, and the summit itself, took place in the midst of a crisis brought on a large-scale spring offensive by the North Vietnamese beginning March 30. The attacks were initially very successful, and President Nixon responded with a series of strong measures to stem the attacks. American air power was rushed to the region on April 4, including both 20 additional B-52s and four squadrons of F-4s, and air attacks were allowed up to the eighteenth parallel. On April 9 and 10, these forces were augmented, and air operations were permitted to the nineteenth parallel. Eventually on April 15, the President permitted the bombing of oil facilities in Hanoi and Haiphong, and four Soviet merchant ships were damaged. The United States also began to press the North Vietnamese and their Soviet allies diplomatically. The United States cancelled the plenary sessions of the Paris Peace negotiations scheduled for April 13 and 20 and on several occasions in April, prior to his secret trip to Moscow,
Kissinger warned Dobrynin that the offensive jeopardized larger American-Soviet interests.  

Nixon seriously considered cancelling Kissinger's secret trip to Moscow because of the situation in Vietnam, and when he finally approved the visit he ordered his National Security Adviser to refuse to discuss SALT on any other summit preparations until there was "some sort of understanding" on Vietnam. The importance of Kissinger's discussions on Vietnam with Brezhnev and Gromyko have become a hotly debated topic. Kissinger argues that the administration had long ago dropped its insistence on mutual withdrawal and had been at least since May, 1971 seeking only a standstill cease-fire in which North Vietnamese troops could remain in the areas which they controlled when the fighting stopped. At the April 22 meeting between Kissinger and Brezhnev the American side proposed that only the three divisions of North Vietnamese troops that had entered South Vietnam since the offensive began on March 30 would have to be withdrawn as part of a peace settlement. Tad Szulc, and others, maintain that this was the first time that the mutual withdrawal requirement had been explicitly discarded, and that Brezhnev was stunned by this concession. The General Secretary immediately dispatched the head of the International Department Konstantin Katushev to Hanoi to convey the latest American proposal. Whether or not this was a stunning concession as Szulc argues, or a tough proposal, as Kissinger maintains, is not completely clear. Stanley Karnow claims that even after Kissinger's trip the North
Vietnamese were not certain that the mutual withdrawal requirement had been explicitly dropped, and wanted more convincing evidence, but they felt confident that eventually it would be abandoned.'

This remarkable meeting between Kissinger and the Soviet leadership also included discussions on the Middle East. Brezhnev and Gromyko pushed for the summit to produce a statement of shared, general principles which could guide negotiations in the Middle East. Kissinger stalled Gromyko on this subject because a tentative, but significant, signal had been received from Sadat. On April 5, a top Egyptian official had contacted the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, and discretely suggested that a secret high-level channel be opened between the United States and Egypt. When Kissinger first heard of this request on April 8, it seemed to be confirmation that the administration's strategy was working. Kissinger and Nixon had seen very little incentive for the United States as a part of detente, to pressure Israel to settle the outstanding issues in the conflict as long as Cairo was a client of the Soviet Union. This would merely demonstrate to Sadat that his alliance with the USSR was profitable since the Soviets could deliver American pressure on Israel. Instead the administration sought to demonstrate Soviet impotence on this issue by delaying any serious talks until Sadat realized the path to peace lay through Washington, not Moscow. Because of this, Kissinger stalled Brezhnev and Gromyko's overtures on the Middle East during the hectic Moscow presummit meeting in late April.10
The final item relating to regional problems discussed during Kissinger's April 20-24 stay in Moscow was the completing of the Basic Principles Agreement which was to be signed by Nixon and Brezhnev at the summit. The possibility of such a document had been raised by Dobrynin in January while they were working on the final communique to be issued at the summit's close. Nixon and Kissinger agreed that such a document was probably inevitable, and they might be able to use it to spell out American principles of international restraint. If the Soviets ignored the principles contained in the document they could at least use it to rally world opinion against Soviet behavior. Kissinger gave Dobrynin his first draft on March 17, and nothing was heard of the project until the secret trip to Moscow. During Kissinger's visit, Brezhnev presented him with a Soviet draft which he invited the Americans to "strengthen". After several new drafts had passed between Kissinger and Gromyko, the Basic Principles Agreement was completed on April 23, and needed only to be signed by Nixon and Brezhnev at the summit.

In the period just before the Moscow summit in 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union were also moving closer to an expanded trade relationship. Secretary of the Treasury Maurice Stans visited Moscow in November, 1971, and the Soviet Minister of Agriculture Vladimir Matskevich came to the United States in December. There were a series of small trade deals signed in November, 1971, including a $500 million sale of equipment for the Kama River truck plant, a $136 million grain sale, and a $125 million purchase of oil
exploration equipment by the Soviets. President Nixon had ordered the Treasury Department in NSDM 151 to develop a position on the negotiation of a settlement of the Soviet Union’s Lend-Lease debts. Talks to settle this longstanding issue began shortly thereafter. In April, just before Kissinger traveled to Moscow, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz journeyed to the Soviet capital to discuss grain sales. During Kissinger’s secret talks with the Soviet leadership, he made it clear that the culmination of these various negotiations would depend on progress on political issues, especially Vietnam. Thus, trade was always seen as a point of leverage the United States could use to influence Moscow’s policy in other areas. Expanded trade relations were never sought as an end in themselves by the United States.¹²

In the interim between Kissinger’s preparatory visit to Moscow April 20–24, and the summit which began on May 22, the United States and the Soviet Union were focused on the crisis in Vietnam. On the day of Kissinger’s return to Washington, April 24, North Vietnam agreed to a resumption of the plenary talks on April 27, and private talks on May 2, just as Kissinger had proposed to Brezhnev on April 22. Neither proved to be of any value, not surprisingly given the success of North Vietnam’s offensive up to that point. With Kissinger’s return to Washington, and his dismal report to Nixon, the President soon came to the conclusion that swift and decisive action had to be taken to prevent the collapse of South Vietnam. After several days of deliberation, the President on May 8, announced that the United States would
mine the harbor in Haiphong, and step up the bombing campaign in the North. Nixon also seriously considered cancelling the summit for fear that the Soviets would cancel first, or even worse stage a walk out as Khrushchev had done at Paris in 1960. Eventually, the President decided against a preemptive cancellation, and instead waited for the Soviet reply to his actions. It came the next day as the SALT negotiations continued, and Soviet Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev showed up on schedule for a meeting with Nixon. On May 10 Dobrynin delivered a note protesting the damage to Soviet ships by the bombing campaign, but not cancelling the summit. The President had weathered the crisis, and would travel to Moscow having demonstrated his own willingness to forego a summit to save South Vietnam. On the other hand, the Soviets clearly appeared to want the summit, and better relations with the United States so badly that they would risk damaging the interests of their North Vietnamese allies. Thus the President would meeting Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership for the first time in a very strong negotiating position.13

Summit Discussions

President Nixon and his entourage arrived in Moscow on May 22, and the President immediately met with Brezhnev. Nixon arranged for Kissinger to take the lead on negotiations relating to SALT, Vietnam, and the Middle East, while Rogers would handle economic issues and Europe. The two leaders agreed that their first meeting had taken too long to arrange.
The SALT discussions at the Moscow summit turned out to be very confusing from the first meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev on this subject. This was largely because the delegations were left in Helsinki, and secure communication with them was quite difficult. Kissinger negotiated on two very complex issues with only his own staff in Moscow, the SALT team in Helsinki, and American military leaders back in Washington. These arrangements would lead to a series of heated telephone calls and messages, and great confusion. The ABM Treaty was essentially complete with only the need to decide if the two permitted ABM sites would be required to be 1300 or 1500 kilometers apart. Brezhnev accepted 1500 km, in what he assumed was a concession to the American position, while the U.S. delegation in Helsinki had already accepted 1300 km earlier that day. While this points up the awkwardness of the arrangements, the 200 km difference had absolutely no significance since there were no Soviet ICBM fields between 1300 and 1500 km from Moscow.

Regarding the offensive freeze, two very complex issues remained. After Kissinger's April visit the Soviets had consistently refused to agree to any definition for a heavy missile. They had agreed to language which prohibited the substitution of heavy for light missiles, and also not to significantly increase the size of their silos, but they would not go further than this in the talks at Helsinki prior to the summit. According to Kissinger, in the first day of talks Brezhnev made a remarkable concession by offering that the Soviet Union would not increase the volume of Soviet
missiles in the course of modernization. Garthoff maintains that Brezhnev must have been misunderstood by Nixon and Kissinger because this would have prohibited the deployment of their first generation of MIRVed ICBMs. Confusion continued to reign as the Soviets backed off this proposal, if it was in fact made, and Kissinger continued to try to place limits on the modernization process. The American delegation in May had considered and then rejected, defining a significant increase in the dimensions of ICBM silos as 10-15 percent. This 10-15 percent figure was applied by Kissinger and Brezhnev to missile volume and for a time there was agreement on this provision. Once the military leaders of both states were consulted, the agreement evaporated since it would have banned further deployment of the Minuteman III and the SS-19 and 17. Again Kissinger and the Soviet leadership went back to the drawing board on this issue, and finally agreed to apply the 10-15 percent increase figure to silo dimensions, not missile volume. The American delegation was also instructed to issue a unilateral, non-binding declaration that the United States considered a heavy missile to be any missile larger than the largest light ICBM currently in existence. No one expected the unilateral declaration to have much effect.

A more difficult, and equally complex issue was the threshold at which the Soviet Union would have to begin trading in older ICBMs in order to build new SLBMs and SSBNs. U.S. intelligence estimates were that the Soviet Union had 41-43 SSBNs completed or under construction, therefore
Kissinger's opening proposal was that the trade in begin with any submarines beyond this level. Brezhnev and Gromyko argued that the USSR had 48 in service or being built and that the trade in should not begin until the 49th SSBN was commissioned. Unable to set a limit using submarines as the measure, Kissinger and his staff turned to SLBMs. They chose to set the threshold at 740 SLBMs, a number the delegation had experimented with earlier. The Soviets accepted 740 as the limit, but they refused to include older Golf and Hotel class submarines under the treaty. Eventually a compromise was reached which included the thirty SLBMs on the nuclear powered Hotel class, but excluded the diesel Golf SSBs. This agreement settled the last of the remaining issues on SALT, and allowed President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev to sign the treaty on May 26.17

Vietnam clearly dominated the discussions of regional issues at the Moscow summit. The first extended talks on this subject came during a stormy session at Brezhnev's dacha on the evening of May 24. Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny were all present, and each took turns berating Nixon for his recent actions in Vietnam. For several hours Nixon was almost unable to get a word in because of the lambasting he was taking from the Soviet leaders. When this session concluded, however, the atmosphere once again became cordial, and the two sides ate a late supper. The abrupt change in atmosphere indicated to both Nixon and Kissinger that the Soviet troika was merely speaking for the record, and little real conviction lay behind their bombard.
Tad Szulc argues that one of the key moments in the long history of Vietnam peace negotiations came on the next day, May 25. While neither Kissinger or Nixon describe the specifics of their discussions on Vietnam during the summit, Szulc and others argue that it was here that Kissinger first began to discuss the possibility of a tripartite election commission, which would later be called the Committee on National Reconciliation. The commission would have members from the North and South, as well as neutrals. This was the first time the United States had agreed to consider political as well as military elements in a Vietnam settlement. This proposal, it was hoped, could be a compromise solution that would allow North Vietnam to drop its demands that Thieu resign as a part of a settlement and be replaced by a coalition government. According to Szulc, Gromyko was shocked by this concession, and on the summit's last day, May 30, Brezhnev offered to send Soviet President Podgorny to Hanoi to convey the latest American proposal. Nixon promised to halt the bombing of the North while Podgorny was in Hanoi.19

On the Middle East, the Soviets made another effort to get a general statement on principles to guide future negotiations. Kissinger, unable to stall anymore, finally agreed to a very bland document which went little beyond endorsing negotiations and the Jarring mission. On the whole, Kissinger felt the statement was even weaker than U.N. Resolution 242, and would not damage his efforts to maximize Egyptian impatience with the Soviet leadership.20
Nixon and Brezhnev also signed the Basic Principles Agreement (BPA) at the Moscow summit. The text was completed during Kissinger's secret trip, and was very much a compromise document. It included references to peaceful coexistence, a phrase used first by Khrushchev, as well as wording used by Nixon in an address to the United Nations in October, 1970. Essentially, Article One of the agreement called for peaceful coexistence between the two superpowers and the need to prevent the escalation of local conflicts into direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation, while Article Two called for each side to refrain from seeking unilateral advantage in regional trouble spots. Originally, Nixon had instructed Kissinger to prevent the inclusion of the term peaceful coexistence, since for the Soviet leadership it had always meant a relaxation of tension between the superpowers, but a continuation of support for the national liberation struggle. While on the secret trip Kissinger decided not to push too hard on BPA because he wanted Soviet help in restraining Hanoi. Nixon eventually came to agree and there was never an attempt to expunge the offensive term. Indeed BPA was treated by both the President and Kissinger as an afterthought which would have little real influence on Soviet behavior.

The American bureaucracy also used the approach of the summit as a pretext to pursue agreements which they had sought for a long time. A number of these were signed at the Moscow summit including documents on cooperation in space, public health, the environment, and on scientific-technical
issues. Perhaps the most significant of these subsidiary pacts was the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement which had been negotiated by Under Secretary of the Navy John Warner and Admiral Vladimir Kasatanov and was finalized during negotiations in Moscow from May 3-7."

Aftermath

The Moscow summit set in motion forces which would influence American foreign policy for years to come. Detente was now a central theme in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and although competition would continue between the two superpowers in the military and political arenas the level of tension between them declined dramatically. On regional issues in particular the talks at the summit had important consequences. In Vietnam, the meeting between Brezhnev and Nixon, along with the failure of the North Vietnamese offensive, began the chain of events which led to the peace accords in January, 1973. In the Middle East, the summit also led to a dramatic move by Anwar Sadat.

SALT II formally began in November but it got off to a very slow start due to a lack of focus within the Nixon administration. As a part of the wholesale housecleaning made following his reelection, Nixon completely revamped his national security and arms control teams. This meant that SALT II would drift for the first months of the second term until the new players were able to get their bearings and decide on goals for the next round of arms control negotiations.
In addition, much of the summer was spent answering charges that SALT I's restrictions on offensive forces were flawed, and that the unequal nature of the ceilings gave the Soviet Union a strategic edge. Senator Henry Jackson led the charge, and one focus of his queries were the last minute deals made in Moscow, particularly on the definition of a heavy missile. Kissinger assured him that the combination of the 10-15 percent limit on silo modernization, the Soviet pledge not to substitute heavy for light missiles, and the American unilateral statement would prevent the Soviets from using modernization as a loophole to build much larger ICBMs. Jackson also sponsored, and Nixon approved the Senator's famous amendment requiring equality between the superpowers in SALT II. On the whole, however, SALT I met with nearly unanimous approval throughout the country and passed the Senate by a vote of 88-2.

The complex events of the first five months of 1972, including the Moscow summit, finally broke the logjam which had characterized the Vietnamese negotiations for four years, and dramatic progress was made in the last half of 1972. North Vietnam came under increasing pressure to settle the conflict in the days after the Moscow summit. On June 13 Soviet President Podgorny visited Hanoi and took with him the American proposals put forth at the summit. This added to the pressure that North Vietnam was feeling from China as Sino-American relations grew closer. Leaders in Hanoi feared the Chinese would abandon them as they had in 1954 when the Shanghai communiqué seemed to link American withdrawal from
Taiwan to peace in Vietnam. Thus the twin summits of early 1972 and the rapidly emerging triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China was robbing the North Vietnamese of their ability to play Moscow against Beijing. With the possibility that aid may not be as forthcoming as it had been, Hanoi had a great deal of incentive to end the war with the United States as soon as possible.  

The combination of triangular pressure, stalemate on the battlefield, and new American proposals which moved further toward North Vietnam's goals than any had before, was enough to bring about the first serious effort to end the war by Hanoi. A June 22 letter from Brezhnev to Nixon reporting on Podgorny's visit implied that a settlement was now possible, and soon a resumption of the secret negotiations between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho was arranged for July 19. Kissinger found the atmosphere to have completely changed since the last private meeting in early May. Both sides made only tentative concessions at this meeting; Kissinger did not present his election tripartite commission on July 19, but progress was made. Le Duc Tho did drop his insistence that there be a firm timetable for the withdrawal of American troops unrelated to the rest of the settlement, and he offered changes in the proposed coalition government which would allow more South Vietnamese control over its members. The crucial meetings came in September and October. On September 15 Kissinger proposed the Committee of National Reconciliation, and his September 26 and October 8 meetings
with Le Duc Tho hammered out the essential details of the agreement. The Committee was accepted by North Vietnam as a substitute for a coalition government, Thieu would not have to resign, and the United States explicitly dropped the mutual withdrawal requirement. The April and May proposals of the United States were clearly critical to the agreement.

The real roadblock was now in Saigon, not Hanoi. Thieu objected to the new American proposals when Kissinger traveled to Saigon to brief him in August, but Kissinger believed that Thieu would eventually agree. In October the depth of Thieu's objections became clear when he rejected the virtually complete accords after Nixon had already approved, along with Hanoi, a timetable for signing the agreement by the end of October. Thieu's reluctance led to an unraveling of the agreement and ultimately to the Christmas bombing of North Vietnam. President Nixon was eventually able to gain Thieu's acceptance. The Christmas bombing campaign was aimed as much at bolstering Theiu's resolve as breaking North Vietnam's, and on January 23, 1973, the accords were signed ending America's combat role in Vietnam. The final treaty was virtually the same as the agreement worked out in October and thus owed much to the Moscow summit earlier in the year.3

According to Sadat, the publication of the mild statement on the Middle East at the end of the Moscow summit came as a "violent shock" to him. For Sadat, such a timid communique could only mean that the Soviet Union would not provide Egypt with the military equipment necessary to close the gap on Israel for fear that it would damage its new
detente relationship with the United States. When the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt finally came to Sadat on July 6, to describe the results of the summit, the Egyptian leader in the Ambassador's presence, ordered the expulsion of the 15,000 Soviet advisors within the next week. This stunning reversal nearly severed Soviet ties to one of its oldest clients, and while links would later be restored, it was the harbinger of the more permanent divorce which was to come. In the meantime, back channel contacts between Washington and Cairo continued and finally culminated with a visit to Washington by Sadat's security adviser, Hafiz Ismail, in February, 1973. Sadat had begun the journey which would eventually lead him to Camp David, although there would be many bumps along the way.

In the aftermath of the Moscow summit, several extremely important trade deals were negotiated. In late June, Agriculture Secretary Butz and Treasury Secretary Peterson had begun negotiations on a credit agreement which would allow the Soviet Union to purchase American grain. Announced on July 8, the Soviets were given $750 million in credits to purchase U.S. grain of which no more than $500 million could be outstanding at any time. In return, the USSR agreed to purchase $750 million worth of grain over three years with at least $200 million to be bought in the first year.

As these agreements were being negotiated the Soviets were quietly, without the American governments knowledge, buying far more grain than these contracts called for from private U.S. companies. By the end of 1972, they had
purchased $1 billion worth of grain, almost the entire grain reserve of the United States."

On October 18, 1972 Secretary Peterson and Soviet Trade Minister Patolichev concluded a trade agreement which settled many of the issues which had slowed the development of U.S.-Soviet trade for decades. Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status would be granted to the Soviet Union, dependent on Congressional approval, commercial offices would be opened in each capital, provisions were agreed to that would prevent disruptions of the market, and trade credits were provided. At the same time, the Lend-Lease issue left unsettled since World War II was resolved by a pact in which the Soviets promised to pay $722 million over thirty years, conditioned upon the granting of MFN by the United States. On October 14 the U.S. and USSR signed a Maritime Agreement opening American and Soviet ports and affording equal participation of both nations' ships in carrying cargo. President Nixon also signed a presidential directive making the credit facilities of the Export-Import bank available to the Soviet Union."

Evaluation of the Propositions

**Proposition One**

Given the fact that Moscow was not a hastily arranged, "get-acquainted" summit, it will be interesting to contrast with the three previous meetings the effort of the 1972 summit on the major actors within the government.

P1: The approach of the summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision makers, and the Congress to
reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes.

The approach of the first Nixon-Brezhnev meeting did force the administration to reach a common position on two key issues involved in the SALT negotiations. On the ABM Treaty, the United States position regarding the number of ABM sites had gone through a number of changes largely because of the battle with Congress over the Safeguard system. After initial agreement on one ABM site to protect the NCA, the United States in March, 1971, had called for the U.S. to be allowed four sites to protect ICBM fields while the Soviets would be limited to their current system protecting Moscow. While this may have been much closer to the Safeguard system as approved by Congress, it was not negotiable with the Soviet delegation. By late 1971, the United States had backed down to only two ICBM protection sites versus one NCA site for the USSR but the inequality still remained. The NSC meeting of March 17 authorized a new proposal of two sites for both sides, either both to protect ICBM or one to defend on ICBM field and the other to protect the NCA. Eventually, the Soviets would accept the one NCA and one ICBM protection formula with the final details worked out at the so-called "Tundra Talks" by the delegation, and by Kissinger during his secret trip one week later.

The best example of the approaching summit forcing a break in the bureaucratic deadlock was the deal on SLBMs. The United States government had struggled over just how SLBMs should be included since Kissinger had nearly excluded
them during his back channel negotiations leading to the May, 1971 announcement that there would be offensive limits coupled with the ABM Treaty. With the summit approaching, SALT was again inserted into the back channel discussions between Kissinger and Dobrynin. The outline of a deal acceptable to the Soviets began to emerge in January when Laird endorsed the idea of an ICBM-SLBM trade in, and Kissinger in March broached the subject to Dobrynin. Whether or not the specific numbers were worked out by Kissinger and offered to Dobrynin in March, as Garthoff maintains, or first offered by Brezhnev on Kissinger’s secret trip, as Kissinger claims, the final American offer was approved by Verification Panel meetings on April 28 and 29 and an NSC meeting on May 1.

Heated exchanges and strange alliances developed at these meetings as Kissinger essentially presented the new offer largely completed in Moscow as a fait accompli to Smith and Rogers. While Laird, Moorer, and the rest of the JCS were uncomfortable with the unequal nature of the SLBM deal they endorsed it for two reasons. First, Kissinger made it clear that the President’s support for the Trident program and other elements of the strategic modernization plan were contingent upon the JCS’ support for SALT. Secondly, Kissinger’s staff was able to produce, using the Defense Department’s own projections, an intelligence estimate which placed the 950 SLBM figure agreed to in Moscow well below what the Soviets could produce without SALT. Using these numbers, Moorer argued at the Verification Panel meetings
that the Soviets could have 1,050-1,170 SLBMs on 80 submarines by 1977 without the SALT restraints. Thus Laird and Moorer endorsed the SLBM deal. Ironically, the most strenuous objections came from Smith and Laird who feared the unequal nature of the SLBM limits would undermine future support for the SALT process.” The 950/62 v. 41/656 limits were finally approved, along with the trade in provision at the May 1 NSC meeting thus bringing to an end one year of bureaucratic infighting, just in time for the Moscow summit.

On the important regional issues which were discussed at Moscow, Vietnam, the Middle East, and the Basic Principles Agreement, the bureaucracy was almost completely shut out of preparations. Dobrynin was informed by Nixon in January that Kissinger would handle the preparations on almost all important matters, and the State Department would prepare for discussions on trade and technical matters. As the crisis over Vietnam deepened in the spring of 1972 the White House kept tight control over the negotiations, with the new proposals presented by Kissinger during his secret trip to Moscow. The new back channel opening to Sadat which, was first offered in April by the Egyptians, was also a closely guarded secret within the White House. Rogers did not even learn of the Basic Principles Agreement until the summit had actually begun, even though it had already been completed during Kissinger’s secret trip. Nixon even suggested privately to Brezhnev when they met for the first time that the General Secretary first offer that such a declaration be drafted so that the American bureaucracy would not be
Nixon did not use the approach of the summit to settle longstanding bureaucratic disputes on regional issues simply because on the major issues discussed at Moscow the bureaucracy was almost totally excluded from the preparation process.

On trade, for the first time thus far, the approach of a summit did stimulate the need to develop coherent positions on the major economic issues between the two nations. NSDM 151 ordered the State Department to develop an opening American position on the nearly thirty year old Lend-Lease dispute, and the Agriculture Department to prepare a policy on grain sales to the USSR. While trade issues were always peripheral to Nixon and Kissinger, if the United States was to take advantage of the Soviet desire for greater trade and really implement the policy of linkage, the carrots they would offer had to be prepared. The approach of the summit stimulated that process.

In sum, especially on SALT, but also to a lesser degree on trade, the impending summit helped stimulate the development of common government positions on key issues thereby supporting the first proposition. On regional issues the proposition does not hold true since the White House excluded the bureaucracy from summit preparations and from negotiations in this period in general. However, it should be noted that there was movement in the negotiating position of the United States on Vietnam as the summit approached. While the White House may have monopolized the
process, the American position did move to one which helped engage the Soviet Union in the process and was more acceptable to the North Vietnamese. In that sense there is merit in proposition one on Vietnam.

Proposition Two

We will now examine to what degree the leaders at Moscow were able to remove important obstacles to agreement on the issues under consideration.

P2: The President and General Secretary have resolved important issues which were unable to be resolved at the summit.

The Moscow summit saw proposition two upheld in several areas. In arms control, the negotiating teams were able to resolve the remaining issues and sign the SALT I Treaty on May 26, but not without great confusion. The issue of missile modernization had largely been worked out by the two delegations before Nixon arrived in Moscow, but the United States decided to seek more limiting definitions of what constituted a heavy missile and allowable silo modernization. The Soviets had already agreed not to substitute heavy ICBMs for light ones in the modernization process and not to significantly increase the size of their missile silos. In the course of trying to tighten these terms, Kissinger and his staff, and even at one point Nixon and Brezhnev, delved into very detailed, technical matters and several blunders were nearly committed. Kissinger, although Garthoff has his doubts, maintains that Brezhnev at first committed that the
Soviet Union would not increase the volume of its missiles, thus banning much of their next generation of MIRVed ICBMs. After this had been dropped, both sides agreed not to increase the volume of their missiles by more than 10-15%, which again would have banned the SS-17 and SS-19 as well as further deployment of the Minuteman III. The negotiators in Moscow had mistakenly applied an American delegation proposal of a 10-15 percent limit on increases in silo volume to missile volume, and nearly backed into a partial MIRV ban. Numerous phone calls between Moscow, Helsinki, and Washington got this proposal dropped as well. Eventually, the 10-15 percent limit was applied to silos and put a somewhat stricter definition on the phrase "no significant increase", even though the delegation had already rejected the insertion of this amendment in earlier negotiations. Ironically, the mistaken use of the term dimensions instead of depth in the agreement actually allowed a 32 percent increase in the volume of Soviet missile silos if they were modified by 10-15 percent in width as well as depth.31

The other major roadblock to agreement cleared at Moscow was the point at which the trade in of old ICBMs for new SLBMs would begin. Once again there were heated exchanges between the delegation in Helsinki, military leaders in Washington, and the President’s party in Moscow. When the Soviets refused to agree with American intelligence estimates of their SSBNs completed or under construction, Kissinger was able to gain their acceptance of 740 as a baseline thus forcing the USSR to trade in 209 SS-7s and SS-8s in order to
build up to the 950/62 limits allowed in the treaty. The great debate between Moscow, Helsinki, and Washington was over the inclusion of very old Soviet G and H class submarines, each of which only carried three short range SLBMs. After much discussion, the nuclear powered Hs were included and diesel powered Gs were left out of the limits.

The principle mistake made on SALT at the Moscow summit was leaving the delegations in Helsinki, while Kissinger and his staff attempted to negotiate very complex issues on which they were often not well informed. Apparently the President's desire to gain political credit for hammering out the final planks in the agreement led to this state of affairs, but it should never be repeated. While there was often just as much confusion on the Soviet side, they were in a far more advantageous situation since the summit was held in their capital, and therefore military expertise was readily available. Indeed, in the last days of SALT discussions in Moscow, Gromyko was accompanied by Leonid Smirnov, the head of the Central Committee's Military-Industrial Commission, while Kissinger had no such ally in his entourage. Simply bringing the delegations to Moscow would have alleviated much of this problem and eliminated the cumbersome communication problems which developed. Kissinger himself acknowledges this need in his memoirs."

Of the issues discussed at Moscow, the missile-silo modernization question clearly should have been resolved at the delegation level, and in fact it largely was until the President's party decided to work for stricter limits. These
questions were completely technical in nature and Kissinger's team was not really qualified to discuss these issues. The additional constraint agreed to at Moscow, the 10-15 percent limit on silo modernization, did not add significantly to the treaty restraints on Soviet modernization efforts. On the other hand the SLBM trade in question was a political level issue, and thus the leaders were probably more able to bring it to a speedy resolution. Whether or not the Gs and Hs should be included was of no real strategic importance, but it was just the kind of sticking point that often delayed agreement. The deadline that the summit imposed helped bring this to a quick resolution, and overcame opposition of the JCS and even Smith. The second proposition is strongly supported by the evidence obtained from the Moscow summit."

On regional issues there has been great debate on just how significant the negotiations were during both Kissinger's presummit secret trip, and the summit itself. While Kissinger argues that the mutual withdrawal condition had been scrapped as early as October, 1970, others claim that it was really only discarded in April, 1972 while Kissinger was in Moscow. Karnow's revelation that even after the secret trip, the North Vietnamese were not sure that this requirement had been completely dropped seems to imply that Kissinger's most important audience needed a clear statement that this condition had been discarded. Apparently the April proposal that only the three divisions that had entered South Vietnam in the spring 1972 invasion would have to be withdrawn, and the further proposals made at Moscow convinced
the North Vietnamese that mutual withdrawal had finally been dropped, because the negotiations soon took on a completely different tone.

The second concession, offered during the summit itself, was the tripartite election commission, which while not meeting the North Vietnamese demand for Thieu’s resignation and a coalition government, did present a compromise position which the Hanoi government could accept. When it was formally presented by Kissinger in September, Le Duc Tho quickly accepted it and their longstanding call for a coalition government was dropped.

Since 1970, the most important roadblock to agreement had been North Vietnam’s insistence on Thieu’s resignation, and his replacement by a coalition government, and Hanoi’s desire that the mutual withdrawal formula clearly be dropped by the Americans. The Moscow summit, and its preparatory meetings, saw proposals by the United States which began to break the logjam which had prevented success in the past. Undoubtedly, the critical factor which convinced the North Vietnamese that it was time to negotiate was the blunting of their spring offensive by the American reaction, and this clearly enhanced the receptiveness of North Vietnam’s leaders to the proposals made in Moscow.

In a more subtle way, the twin summits held in the first half of 1972 removed one other roadblock to peace in Vietnam. By skillfully engaging in triangular diplomacy, President Nixon had been able to gain the help of both Beijing and Moscow in the peace process. While he was Secretary of
State, Dean Rusk observed North Vietnam had always been able to obtain "wiggle room" by playing the Communist giants against each other. In their competition with each other for influence in the socialist world, neither the Soviet Union or China could afford to pressure Vietnam too heavily to seek peace with the United States. In 1972 the Soviet Union and China were now each seeking better relations with the United States and each began to pressure North Vietnam to seek peace. Twice in the spring of 1972, Brezhnev dispatched high level envoys to convey American proposals to Hanoi. After the secret trip in April, it was International Department Head Katushev, and in June following the summit Soviet President Podgorny was the messenger. The Soviets and the Chinese were now both clearly engaged in the peace process and this had a real impact on the leaders of North Vietnam. The combination of stalemate on the battlefield, triangular diplomacy, and new American proposals finally ended the years of fruitless exchanges between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, and rapid progress would follow. Once again the second proposition is shown to have merit by the history of the Moscow negotiations.

In the Middle East the administration's strategy of showing Moscow's impotence in the peace process meant that there would be little in the way of serious discussions at the summit. Kissinger intentionally kept the communiqué's section on the region as bland and weak as possible to show the Arabs that Moscow could not pressure the United States to bring Israel to the table. The result was a document which
merely praised 242 and the Jarring mission, and did little else. The results undoubtedly exceeded Kissinger's wildest expectations.

On trade, no significant roadblocks were removed at Moscow since there were no detailed negotiations on this issue. Indeed, the President's chief economic and trade advisors were not even part of the Moscow delegation. The talks on trade were instead aimed at setting the agenda for later more detailed negotiations on commercial relations. Proposition two is not supported in this case.

In sum, the Moscow summit saw more obstacles to agreement removed than any other summit yet studied. On arms control, significant issues related to missile modernization and the SLBM freeze were resolved. On regional issues the clarification of America's abandonment of the mutual withdrawal requirement in Vietnam began to break the ice in the negotiations. Therefore, on both regional issues and arms control, although not on trade and human rights, proposition two is strongly supported by this case.

**Proposition Three**

Next, we will examine the leaders' success or failure in crafting a framework agreement.

P3: Framework agreements at U.S.-Soviet summits pave the way for more rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal treaty.

The American proposals of April and May, along with the factors mentioned already, did create a great deal of
movement in the months following the Moscow summit. The private Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations resumed on July 19, and all participants reported a tremendous change in the atmosphere of the talks. While concessions were only suggested during the July 19 meeting, they came very rapidly in the September and October sessions. After three years of fruitless give and take between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho the movement was so rapid that by early October the deal was nearly complete. Only Thieu's recalcitrance prevented a preelection signing and a cease-fire.

The concessions first made to the Soviets before and during the summit formed the backbone of the final peace accords signed in January. The North Vietnamese accepted the tripartite election commission as a substitute for the coaltion government which they had always demanded, and dropped their insistence on Thieu's resignation. The key concession, however, was the willingness of the United States to explicitly abandon its call for mutual withdrawal, and allow that in areas controlled by the North Vietnamese Army a Provisional Revolutionary Government would be recognized by Washington and Saigon, until nationwide elections could be held. While American willingness to drop the mutual withdrawal clause had been hinted at since October, 1970, it was not made concrete until the American proposal of April, 1972, while Kissinger was on his secret trip. Whether or not mutual withdrawal had been dropped years before the summit, the combination of proposals made at the summit did form the heart of the peace accords which ended America's combat role
in Vietnam in January, 1973. North Vietnam got a figleaf, the election commission, which allowed them to abandon their call for Thieu's resignation, but most importantly they received the element which was key to their strategy of unifying Vietnam by force, allowing their troops to remain in South Vietnam after the cease-fire. The third proposition is shown to have merit in this case.

Rapid progress toward negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors did not follow the Moscow summit since the Soviets continued to back radical Arab demands thereby leading Kissinger and Nixon to continue to play their delaying strategy in hopes of convincing Egypt and the moderate Arab states that only Washington could broker a Mideast peace settlement. The first major indication that this strategy was indeed beginning to work came in July when Sadat expelled all 15,000 Soviet advisers. As the year passed, Sadat continued his back channel efforts to open communications with the administration that would eventually lead to fundamental shifts in the politics of the region.

It could be argued that the Basic Principles Agreement was an attempt to develop a framework to guide U.S.-Soviet behavior in areas of potential conflict. John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson had pushed for such an understanding at Vienna and Glassboro respectively, without much luck. One must conclude, however, that the quick manner in which this document was constructed, the little or no time spent discussing it at Moscow, and the contradictory phrases placed in the agreement by both sides make the BPA a poor candidate
to be a framework to guide U.S.-Soviet relations in the world's trouble spots. Much more will be said about the BPA under proposition four.

As was stated earlier, the trade and economic talks at Moscow were on a very general level and were not aimed at hammering out the framework to the trade agreements which would follow the summit in July and October. With the administration’s key economic ministers and experts back home in Washington one could not expect any such agreements to be negotiated. The agenda set by the Nixon-Kosygin talks, the Premier took the lead for the Soviets on economic issues, conforms very closely to the commercial pacts signed after the summit, but the details were not worked out in Moscow.

In sum, in the case of Vietnam, this proposition is upheld, while on the Middle East, BPA, and trade it is not shown to have merit. In the area of arms control with SALT I completed by feverish negotiation at the summit, there was no time to even begin to think about the next round of negotiations, therefore the proposition is not supported in this case.

**Proposition Four**

Did Nixon or Brezhnev use the Moscow summit as a forum in which they could educate their counterpart? We will now explore this question.

P4: Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterpart on their concerns and interests on the important issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted in changes in the behavior of the superpowers following the summit.
Given Richard Nixon's fondness for geopolitics, the leaders spent a great deal of time exploring each other's attitudes about trouble spots around the world and the vital interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in those areas. This proposition, as explained in the introduction and in previous chapters seeks much more than the usual tour d'horizon and instead looks for concerted attempts to educate the adversary on some new concept or developing situation. On neither SALT, Vietnam, trade, or the Middle East, could the discussions be characterized in such a fashion. The most interesting case, however, is that of the Basic Principles Agreement. Nixon, Kissinger, and the Soviet leadership could have used the BPA as a vehicle for establishing the ground rules for superpower competition in the world arena. One often hears the BPA characterized in just those terms, but it never truly functioned as such a guide to behavior.

Instead the BPA was very much forced into the background by the momentous events of the spring of 1972. The crisis in Vietnam, the opening to China, and the completion of the first treaty limiting the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union understandably took precedence over the negotiations of this document. Nixon sent Kissinger off to Moscow with instructions to resist Soviet efforts to include loaded phrases like peaceful coexistence. Kissinger's desire to elicit Soviet aid in bringing North Vietnam to the table led him to avoid a fight over BPA, and the document became a compromise in which both sides inserted their favorite phrases, which were often contradictory. The
Soviet formulation of peaceful coexistence as it had been used since Khrushchev’s time implied the right of the USSR to aid national liberation movements. This clearly conflicts with the Nixon-Kissinger concept of refraining from attempts to gain “unilateral advantage” and showing restraint in dealings with other countries. Never was there a serious discussion in April or May as to the kinds of behavior the BPA prohibited or the possible sanctions for violation of the pact. The BPA became what Alexander George called a “pseudo-agreement” which would have little if any impact on future behavior by either country. Perhaps the greatest effect of the BPA was within the Soviet leadership since according to Arkady Shevchenko it allowed Brezhnev to silence the critics of detente within the Politburo. American acceptance of terms such as peaceful coexistence was very important to the Soviet leadership as was the equality of international status which the BPA implied.

In sum, one must conclude that this proposition is not supported by any of the discussions at Moscow. There was no serious attempt to communicate the Nixon administration’s view of proper and improper behavior in geopolitical competition during the discussions over the BPA and therefore Soviet behavior remained unchanged after the document was signed. There also were no discussions which could be characterized as education attempts on the issues of trade, human rights, or arms control; therefore the proposition does not hold for these issues as well.
Conclusion

The Moscow summit is by far the most complex and ambitious studied up to this point. It was held in the midst of a crisis in Vietnam, an opening to China, Soviet-Western European detente, and at the conclusion of the first SALT negotiations. The Moscow summit ushered in an era of detente in U.S.-Soviet relations and saw the signing of SALT I, progress toward a cease-fire in Vietnam, and it created an atmosphere in which East-West trade could expand. Moscow was also the first in a series of summits which would see the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union meet four times in the span of two and one-half years.

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 1</th>
<th>Proposition 2</th>
<th>Proposition 3</th>
<th>Proposition 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>action-forcing</td>
<td>roadblock</td>
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Moscow 1972  arms control, arms control, regional none
            trade regional issues

As Table 7 demonstrates, the Moscow summit is the most productive in terms of concrete agreement yet studied. The approach of the summit forced the administration to settle internal disputes regarding key issues of SALT I and trade, thus supporting the first proposition. The summit discussions themselves removed obstacles to agreement on SALT I and Vietnam, and a framework for the cease-fire agreement on Vietnam was initiated. Therefore, both propositions
two and three have merit in this case. Only proposition four was not supported by the Moscow summit.
NOTES - CHAPTER VI


Smith, pp. 370-377.

Garthoff, pp. 162-165.

6. Garthoff, pp. 169-170

Smith, pp. 387-391.


Kissinger, pp. 1134-1152.


15. Garthoff, pp. 171.


203

Smith, pp. 415-432.


Garthoff, pp. 166-168.

Smith, pp. 420-426.


24. Karnow, p. 638.

Kissinger, pp. 1302.


Kissinger, pp. 1269-1272.


32. Kissinger, p. 1230.


CHAPTER VII

WASHINGTON - 1973

Setting

The Moscow summit in 1972 opened an era of improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and this resulted in a flurry of summits in 1973 and 1974. Even with the flowering of detente, however, the Washington summit took place in far different circumstances than Nixon's triumphal journey to Moscow the year before. The Nixon-Brezhnev meeting of June, 1973 was conducted in the midst of growing political turmoil in the United States created by the Watergate scandal. The ebbing of Nixon's executive authority, which would soon turn into a flood, had already begun when Brezhnev arrived in the United States, although this fact was only beginning to dawn on the Soviet leadership. In fact, the summit and events in the meeting's aftermath coincide with critical milestones in the unfolding Watergate scandal. Kissinger's presummit trip to Moscow was preceded by four days by the resignation of top Nixon aides Robert Haldeman and John Ehrlichman. John Dean was scheduled to begin his testimony to the Senate Watergate Committee the day Brezhnev was to arrive in the United States, but Dean's
appearance was delayed until June 25, the day the General Secretary departed for home. Finally, President Nixon's "Saturday Night Massacre" took place in the midst of the Yom Kippur War and only days before the American alert of its strategic forces.

The dominant regional issue of the Moscow summit, Vietnam, was now quickly falling on the agenda of the superpowers with the signing of the truce on January 24, 1973. At the Washington summit, it was only a peripheral issue. The dominant regional concern at Washington was the Middle East. Ominous events were beginning to take shape, but the Nixon administration did not clearly perceive the storm clouds gathering on the horizon.

SALT II negotiations opened in November, 1972 following Nixon's reelection. The attempt to arrive at goals for the next round of arms control talks were disrupted by the President's decision to completely revamp the arms control and national security bureaucracy. Melvin Laird was replaced by Elliot Richardson as Secretary of Defense, and U. Alexis Johnson succeeded Gerard Smith as the head of the SALT delegation. While these and later changes were underway, the SALT deliberations within the administration were in disarray. In addition, back channel interventions in the SALT I negotiations and the resulting tendency of the White House and Kissinger to present the rest of the administration with fait accomplis made the rest of the administration very wary as the SALT II deliberations began. At the same time, preliminary talks had begun in January on conventional arms
control in Europe, and plans were made for the opening of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) to open in October. Finally, the Soviet strategic buildup continued at full force after SALT I was signed, and in early 1973 they were preparing to test their first MIRVed ICBM in July.

Nixon’s policy of linkage, along with the Soviet desire to buy American products and technology, had elevated trade to a more important position on the U.S.-Soviet agenda, but in late 1972 trade talks became far more complex as they were linked by the Congress to human rights policy in the Soviet Union. There was some expansion of trade in the period between the Moscow and Washington summits including a $202 million loan from the Export-Import Bank to the Soviet Union to fund the purchase of industrial equipment and two multi-billion dollar deals between the Soviet government and American industrialist Armand Hammer.¹ Real expansion was delayed, however, by the disagreement between the Nixon administration and the Congress over the extension of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status to the Soviet Union.

The problems began on August 3, 1973 when the Soviet leadership imposed an exit tax on Jews who wished to emigrate from the USSR. In response on October 4, 1972, Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wa.) introduced an amendment to a trade bill that would deny MFN status to any country with restrictive emigration policies. Six days later, Rep. Charles Vanik (R-Oh) presented a similar amendment in the House of Representatives. The administration was at the time preoccupied with the Vietnam negotiations, and candidly saw
the Jackson-Vanik amendment as a tool that could be used to extract concessions from the Soviet leadership. As the summit approached and congressional, especially Jackson’s, intentions were better understood, this attitude would change.

Summit Preparations

As in 1972, the principle preparations for the summit were handled by Henry Kissinger in a trip to Moscow on May 4-9. This time the discussions took place in a far more informal atmosphere, the Politburo’s private hunting reserve. The administration’s deliberations on SALT II leading up to Kissinger’s trip were acrimonious. By May, 1973 the SALT II negotiations had been in progress for nearly six months and the administration had yet to decide on a coherent negotiating position or even what a good SALT II Treaty would look like. Several Verification Panel meetings and full NSC discussions had been unable to bridge the gulf between the major actors involved. The Department of Defense, unhappy with the unequal ceilings in SALT I, insisted on equal aggregates in all categories of delivery vehicles and was adamantly against limits on MIRVs. On the other side of the issue the State Department was pushing for a moratorium on MIRV testing. The differences were papered over in order that the United States have an opening position when the negotiations resumed on March 13. The first American SALT II proposal called for 2350 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) for each side and an equal ceiling on ICBMs and ICBM
throwweight. This would clearly be a tough sell to the Soviets since an equal ICBM ceiling would require the USSR to dismantle 300 ICBMs or allow the United States to build 300, and the throwweight limits would require these reductions to come from the Soviet's heaviest missiles, the SS-9.

The Soviet offer was no more acceptable to the United States. The plan called for a continuation of the SALT I ceilings on ICBMs and SLBMs while requiring the inclusion of American forward-based systems (FBS) and the abandonment of the United States' forward ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) bases. Both of these proposals were quickly rejected.

As Kissinger prepared to fly to Moscow in early May, another round of Verification Panel and NSC meetings were held to develop a new SALT II position that the National Security Adviser could take with him to present to the Soviet leadership. The level of dissension is shown by the fact that National Security Decision Memorandums (NSDMs) 213 and 216 were not completed until Kissinger had already left for Moscow. The new plan dropped the throwweight limits, but in their place added a freeze on the testing and deployment of MIRVed ICBMs. This proposal would have stopped the American Minuteman III program at 350, but it would have prevented the deployment of any Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, since their first flight tests did not begin until July, 1973. In addition, the offer placed no limits on MIRVed SLBMs where the United States had an even greater technological lead on the USSR. One possible concession added to make the deal more palatable to the Soviets was the offer to consider a ban on
intercontinental cruise missiles if the rest of the proposal was accepted. Kissinger offered this package to Brezhnev while at Zavidovo, and the General Secretary agreed to study it, but no final reply was made.  

Concurrently, negotiations on a set of basic principles to guide the SALT II process began on April 6 in Geneva. Most of the work drafting the agreement was done by Kissinger and Dobrynin in the back channel. On April 25 Dobrynin presented Kissinger with a draft of the basic principles that closely paralleled the Soviet negotiating position. It called for making the SALT I ceilings permanent, including American FBS in SALT II, and would have banned nuclear cooperation between the Western allies. The administration’s reply, presented by Kissinger while he was in Moscow, was far less specific. It responded to Soviet concerns about FBS by continuing the SALT I language banning circumvention of the agreement by transferring weapons to other countries, but it did not attempt to set overall force levels as the Soviet draft had done. Instead, Kissinger’s draft called for SALT II to limit qualitative improvements in strategic weaponry, which translated to mean some kind of MIRV limitations. Finally, the American version called for SALT II to be concluded by the end of 1974. The agreement was not finalized while Kissinger was in Moscow, with Brezhnev clearly being uncomfortable with the idea of placing a time limit on SALT II.  

Of far greater interest to the Soviet leadership was the negotiation of a document that would eventually become the
Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (PNW). This proposal had a long and torturous history. Brezhnev had first proposed what essentially was a no first use agreement while Kissinger was in Moscow in April, 1972 preparing for the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit. While such a document had little appeal to the United States, Kissinger did not wish to reject the General Secretary outright since the Moscow summit was already in jeopardy due to the crisis in Vietnam. Instead he stalled the Soviets until he left Moscow, but on May 12 Dobrynin presented a first draft of the pact to Kissinger. At the summit in May, Nixon presented Brezhnev with a counter proposal which called for avoiding the use of any kind of force in international relations, and suggested that Kissinger and Dobrynin work on the document in the back channel after the summit. PNW stayed alive through the fall and winter of 1972-73 despite American reluctance largely because SALT and MFN were stalled and the United States still hoped that Moscow would help persuade Hanoi to come to terms. Since NATO defense strategy relied on the American nuclear umbrella, Kissinger began to consult with the leaders of France, West Germany, and Great Britain on the emerging document with the British directly involved in its drafting. Sir Thomas Brimelow, the top British Foreign Service expert on the Soviet Union was intimately involved in writing subsequent drafts of the PNW.

Throughout the rest of 1972, Dobrynin submitted amended Soviet drafts which essentially sought to limit the ability of the United States to use nuclear weapons in the defense of
third parties, especially China and Israel. Despite the wide
gulf between the competing drafts in late 1972 and early
1973, the Soviets insisted that this was agenda item number
one for the coming summit, and with progress stalled in
almost every other area, Kissinger and Nixon felt compelled
to give Moscow something. The final draft submitted to the
Soviet leadership was written largely by Brimelow in March,
1973 and basically prohibited the use of nuclear weapons only
if other weapons were banned as well, it upheld the right of
collective self-defense, and the ability of states to come to
the aid of allies and third parties. What had begun as a no-
first-use agreement had become a no-first-use of force pact.
The final text was worked out on May 5 while Kissinger was on
his presummit trip. The language adopted was based largely
on Brimelow's draft and called for immediate consultation in
the event that the use of force had become possible.
Brezhnev did make a final attempt to negotiate loopholes that
were obviously aimed at China, but to no avail. The document
which was now in Kissinger's terms "little more than an
elaboration of the Basic Principles Agreement," was ready for
Nixon and Brezhnev's signature at the summit.  

The Soviets were far more wary in 1973 in their summit
preparations regarding the Middle East than they had been in
1972, given Sadat's actions in the wake of the Moscow summit.
On February 18, following a visit by Sadat's aide Hafiz
Ismail to Moscow, Dobrynin delivered a back channel message
which corresponded closely to what Ismail told Kissinger one
week later in Washington. The Soviets called for any interim
settlement to be linked closely to a comprehensive peace, no separate peace between Egypt and Israel, and the message warned that without significant progress the Arabs might turn to other means to settle the dispute.' At Zavidovo, Brezhnev and Gromyko presented Kissinger with a set of nine basic principles to guide the Middle East negotiations which called for a return to the 1967 borders and "legitimate rights" for the Palestinians. Kissinger sought to explain to Brezhnev why Israel had no incentive to negotiate on these terms, but the General Secretary only grew more frustrated. When it became clear there would be no agreement at this presummit meeting, Brezhnev warned that war was a distinct possibility if real progress was not forthcoming in the very near future.'

The budding U.S.-Chinese relationship seemed to have been far more disturbing for the Soviet leadership in 1973 than it were in 1972. At the Moscow summit, triangular politics was a powerful background presence, but it was not a major item on the agenda. In 1973, however this was not the case. During Kissinger's stay at Zavidovo, Brezhnev made a long impassioned speech to his American visitor on the dangers that China presented to international stability. While the two were alone on a hunting trip, the General Secretary was especially concerned about the growth of the Chinese strategic arsenal, predicting that it would reach current U.S.-Soviet levels within a decade. He then warned that any U.S.-Chinese military alliance could have grave consequences for the future. Kissinger replied that he felt that Brezhnev was fishing for tacit American acquiescence in
a Soviet attack on China, and carefully explained that the
United States could not stand idly by under such
circumstances."

As the Washington summit approached, the administration
increased its efforts to change Soviet emigration policy so
that Congress would approve the trade package agreed to in
October, 1972. President Nixon had attempted quietly on
October 2, before Jackson-Vanik was introduced, to convince
Gromyko that the exit tax must be lifted. This was very much
in line with administration policy in 1970-71 when Kissinger
presented Dobrynin and Gromyko on several occasions with
lists of hardship cases of Jews who hoped to emigrate but had
been denied permission. With Jackson-Vanik bringing Jewish
emigration into the spotlight by tying it to the expansion of
U.S.-Soviet trade, and the summit growing near, the efforts
to change Soviet policy increased in early 1973. Trade
missions in February and March, the March visit was headed by
Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz, attempted to
convince the Soviets to remove the exit tax, and on March 30,
Dobrynin delivered a note to Kissinger pledging that the tax
would be lifted. On April 16, Dobrynin agreed to put this
pledge in a formal statement, and Nixon then informed the
Ambassador that he saw no more obstacles to passage of the
trade package. Unfortunately for the administration, Senator
Jackson saw things differently.

The President had included the October trade agreements
in an overall Trade Reform Act which he formally presented to
Congress on April 10. Jackson and 67 co-sponsors
reintroduced their amendment placing conditions on the extension of MFN that day. President Nixon called Jackson, Senator Abraham Ribikoff (D-Ct.), and other key supporters of the amendment to the White House on April 18 believing that with Dobrynin's pledge in hand the matter could be dismissed and the Trade Reform Act passed. Jackson surprised Nixon by rejecting Dobrynin's promise and insisted that the Soviets guarantee a minimum number of exit visas for Jews each year and ease emigration for all other nationalities. The United States government was now deadlocked with the executive branch ready to proceed with an expansion of trade relations, but the Congress still seeking to attach more strings to the extension of MFN.

Kissinger's trip to Moscow came soon after the meeting with congressional leaders, and he took with him not only Jackson's demands but a list of 1,000 hardship cases provided by Jewish leaders in the United States. Brezhnev at the meeting went well beyond the April 16 pledge and guaranteed that 36,000-40,000 Jews would emigrate each year from the Soviet Union. He also accepted the list of hardship cases, and the General Secretary must have felt that he had done all that the Congress required. None of these events had yet taken on the urgency that they would have in 1974 since both sides felt that the process had just begun and that there was still room for compromise. It would make it more difficult, however, to discuss further expansion of trade at the summit with the October, 1972 agreements still in the balance.
The Summit

The Nixon-Brezhnev summit in 1973 took place from June 18-25 with the initial meetings in Washington and the talks later moved first to Camp David and then for the last days to the President’s home in San Clemente. A number of agreements were signed by Nixon and Brezhnev including PNW, the Basic Principles of SALT II, an agreement on cooperation in the field of atomic energy, and a communications pact, but none had the importance of the SALT Treaty signed the year before. Additional pacts were concluded and signed by others related to the expansion of passenger air service, enlarging the commercial offices set up the year before, and establishing a joint Chamber of Commerce.

The arms control agenda was virtually precooked before the summit began. The Basic Principles of SALT II had been essentially agreed to while Kissinger was at Zavidovo. All that remained was to convince Brezhnev to agree to set the deadline for conclusion of the treaty as the end of 1974. Although he was reluctant, Brezhnev finally assented and the document was complete. The PNW had been finalized while Kissinger was in Moscow on May 5 and it was signed by Nixon and Brezhnev on June 22. On the actual substance of SALT II, there was little if any movement. Brezhnev officially rejected the proposal put forward by Kissinger at Zavidovo and since no new American plan had been developed in the interim, there was little left to discuss. The Washington summit was held so early in the negotiating process that
little common ground had yet emerged between two proposals that differed so greatly.12

While at Camp David, the leaders discussed a number of regional and arms control issues including MBFR and the upcoming European Security Conference but no significant agreements or understandings were reached. The most important discussions on geopolitical matters came on the last day of the summit while Nixon and Brezhnev were staying at the President's home in San Clemente. Near noon, the two leaders set down for their first serious discussion of the triangular relationship between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. Brezhnev again in emotional terms and repeating much of what he had told Kissinger on their hunting trip in May, attacked Chinese policy and warned that their arsenal would soon reach current American and Soviet levels. Brezhnev assured Nixon that the Soviet Union would never attack China and revealed that the USSR would soon offer a non-aggression pact to the Chinese, which he expected them to reject. The General Secretary then warned in somber terms of the dangers of an American-Chinese military alliance, and that such an action would "confuse the situation." Apparently to make sure that Brezhnev's warnings were not too subtle, Gromyko later that day told Kissinger that such an alliance would lead to war. The President and Kissinger assured the Soviet leaders that the United States had not had any military discussions with the People's Republic, but neither made any promises about future behavior.13
The most significant talks of the summit, given later events, took place later that same evening when Brezhnev demanded to see Nixon at 10:30 p.m., after it was assumed the day’s talks were over. Brezhnev wanted to discuss the Middle East, and Nixon would compare the next few hours in emotional intensity to the dacha session of the previous year on Vietnam. Brezhnev proceeded to apply heavy-handed pressure on Nixon to agree to the nine general principles offered to Kissinger at Zavidovo, and he argued that the superpowers must agree to pressure the local parties to the conflict to reach a comprehensive peace. Once again, the Soviet leader insisted that Israel must first return to the 1967 borders in return for which the state of belligerency would end, but final peace would only come after negotiations with the Palestinians. Nixon’s response was that nothing would be done at such a late hour, although he did offer to have Kissinger attempt to rework the basic principles and then continue the discussions through the back channel. Ultimately, however, the United States could never agree to the principles in their current form without prejudicing Israel’s rights. Talks should begin, but to agree to such controversial terms beforehand would simply lead the parties to refuse to negotiate at all. Finally, Brezhnev warned that without these principles he would leave the United States empty handed, and that he could not guarantee that war would not resume. In the final communique there were only four sentences on the Middle East which called for a peaceful
resolution of the conflict and noted that there had been an exchange of views in the subject."

Summit Aftermath

SALT II moved at a snail’s pace in the months following the Washington summit. Perhaps the most important reason for this was the disarray within the United States government. The negotiations resumed on June 25 after both sides had already rejected each other’s latest proposals at the summit and without anything new to offer. Johnson in particular found the U.S. military unwilling to consider any agreement that the Soviets might accept. The JCS were apparently unhappy about the May proposal’s MIRV limits, even as one-sided as they were, and tried to delay negotiations by refusing to agree on the language for an ICBM-MIRV freeze. On October 9 the Soviets presented their first draft treaty, and it was even more acceptable than their earlier proposals. The interim numbers would be continued from SALT I, American bombers would be limited, and not only would FBS be part of the ceilings but forward-deployed aircraft carriers would be considered FBS. When the U.S. SALT II delegation attempted to answer with a draft treaty of their own based on the May proposals the Joint Staff rejected the draft before delegation member Ralph Earle could even arrive to explain it.

There was at least the appearance of progress on some regional issues in the aftermath of the summit. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe began its
deliberations on July 3, 1973, and the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations opened on October 30. However, in neither case was there significant progress before the year was out. Relations with the People's Republic of China continued to grow as Kissinger stopped to brief the Chinese leadership on the discussions at the Washington summit in November, and he assured Zhou and Mao that there had been no secret understandings. Kissinger had a long conversation with Mao generally focusing on the dangers of Soviet expansionism, however little in the way of concrete action came out of the meeting.  

Of course the major geopolitical event in the wake of the Washington summit was the October Arab-Israeli war which Brezhnev had warned of in June. The war began on October 6, 1973 with an Egyptian strike across the Suez Canal and a simultaneous Syrian attack on the Golan Heights. Throughout the war, Nixon and now Secretary of State, Kissinger remained in contact with the Soviet leadership. Given the detailed analysis of the Yom Kippur War by so many scholars on exhaustive review will not be conducted here. Early in the war, as the Soviet's allies were performing well and America's ally Israel was doing poorly, both sides waited for events on the battlefield before committing themselves to a course of action. In less than a week, each superpower had began to resupply its allies by air and sea, with the Soviet airlift beginning on October 10 and America's on October 12. As Arab forces began to falter and Israeli victory seemed certain, Kissinger traveled to Moscow to arrange the cease-
fire, which was accomplished by October 22. The failure of this first cease-fire was the event which led to Brezhnev's threat to intervene and thereby to the decision by the administration to declare a DecCon 3 alert. Further escalation was avoided when on October 25 the cease-fire finally began to hold.16

As had been the case in 1972, in August following the 1973 summit, the Soviet leadership chose to crack down on internal dissent. This time the targets were high profile dissenters like Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and once again internal repression in the USSR made the Nixon administration's task of convincing Congress to pass the October, 1972 trade measures more difficult. Secretary of State Kissinger went beyond lobbying Congress itself in the fall and winter of 1973, and turned to American Jewish leaders and to Israel itself in an effort to defeat Jackson-Vanik. Neither would take a public position against the amendment. Soviet leaders did ease emigration restrictions on Jews in the wake of the summit, as Brezhnev had promised at Zavidovo, and in October alone, 3,660 Jews were allowed to leave. In all 32,000 Jews were permitted to emigrate from the Soviet Union in 1973. Nevertheless, the Jackson-Vanik amendment gathered more support and on December 11 it passed the House by a vote of 319-80.17
Evaluation of the Propositions

Proposition One

Did the Washington summit act as an action-forcing deadline requiring the major actors to reach a common position on key issues? We will now consider this question.

Pl: The approach of the summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision makers, and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes.

President Nixon had used the impending Moscow summit in 1972 to help bring the various actors in his administration together behind key provisions of the SALT I agreement. He was not able to do so in 1973. The PNW and the Basic Principles of SALT II document were all negotiated in the backchannel by Kissinger, Dobrynin, Brezhnev, and Gromyko and thus there was no real chance for bureaucratic infighting. The SALT delegation was consulted about the Basic Principles, but Kissinger was able to remove the objectional phrases without creating controversies within the administration.

The negotiations on SALT II are a clear example of a case in which bureaucratic disputes could not be completely settled in the deliberations preceding the summit. Kissinger was sent off on his presummit trip, partially to negotiate on SALT II, without a negotiating position. Divisions within the administration were so great that when his plane left Washington the proposals he was to present to Brezhnev were not yet complete. The national security machinery was finally able to put together a proposal, but not one that had
any chance of being accepted by the Soviets. The freeze on MIRVed ICBMs would have given the United States a monopoly in these weapons, and equal ICBM ceilings would have required significant Soviet reductions while the U.S. arsenal was untouched. Even after the proposal was made, the Joint Chiefs' opposition to MIRV limits was so strong that they refused to approve specific language that would allow the proposal to be included in a draft treaty. Obviously the May, 1973 American offer merely papered over the divisions within the government without defining the goals of the administration for SALT II. The Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were particularly wary of the SALT II negotiations, and Johnson argued that in 1973 the military was not interested in any agreement the Soviets might accept.

Nixon's extraordinary reshuffling of the national security bureaucracy as his second term began undoubtedly had an impact in this phase of negotiations. People just settling into their jobs were still acquiring their bearings when the preparations for the second Nixon-Brezhnev summit began. Kissinger also argues that the success of his backchannel diplomacy during SALT I made the major actors who felt wounded by these procedures far more suspicious during SALT II. Each agency would now stake out its maximum position during Verification Panel and NSC meetings early on so that any compromise could be blamed on the backchannel discussions. The Department of Defense and the JCS, with Senator Jackson's powerful presence always in the background, insisted on equal aggregates for all categories of strategic
delivery vehicles and no limits on MIRVs. State and ACDA were intent on MIRV limits and were interested in negotiable proposals, ones the Soviets would accept. Under these conditions and thus early in the negotiating cycle agreement was impossible.

The most important reason for this disarray, however, was the growing weakness of the President himself due to the ever-growing Watergate scandal. As power slowly began to ebb from the Oval Office and with Nixon's increasing distraction by these events, there was no central figure within the administration who could impose discipline on the SALT process. Real progress on SALT II was stalled for more than a year as the nation watched the Nixon administration slowly fade into history. Proposition one is not supported by the discussions on arms control.

None of the regional issues discussed at the Washington summit had really been the subject of fierce bureaucratic disagreement, with the possible exception of the Middle East. In January the State Department did attempt to revive the search for an interim disengagement agreement, but the quick Egyptian rejection and Israeli unwillingness to seek a comprehensive agreement doomed it to failure. This made Kissinger's backchannel contacts with Ismail and Dobrynin the center of action, and left the White House firmly in control, and the State Department on the sidelines. Kissinger and Nixon were therefore able to continue to stall the Soviets as long as they insisted on supporting maximum Arab demands and Egypt's alliance with the Soviet Union continued.
The White House also dominated America's contacts with China, and the discussions with the Soviet Union about the United States' relationship with China. Kissinger personally handled the contacts with the Chinese leaders, and in 1973 he traveled to China before and after the Washington summit. The first proposition is not found to be true on any of the discussions on regional issues.

As with arms control trade was another case in which the approach of a summit was not able to heal the rifts within the government of the United States, although this time it was a struggle between the President and Congress, and not within the executive branch. The administration made a number of efforts to get the Soviet Union to comply with Senator Jackson and his allies' wishes, but Nixon was unable to satisfy his opponents. The controversy, begun by the August, 1972 exit tax, seemed to have been solved by Dobrynin's April 16 pledge that the Soviet Union would lift the tax, and Kissinger even informed the Ambassador that there were no further impediments to passage of the trade bill. Two days later Jackson raised the stakes by rejecting the pledge and calling for the Soviet leadership to set an annual target for Jewish emigration. Brezhnev did agree to the 36,000-40,000 annual figure for Jewish emigres while Kissinger was at Zavidovo, but there was no resolution of the dispute with Jackson before the General Secretary landed in the United States. Brezhnev even met with members of Congress during the summit to plead the Soviet case for expanded trade, but he received no commitment to drop
Jackson-Vanik. This dispute would continue through two more U.S.-Soviet summits and never be resolved to the satisfaction of the Soviet Union, but in 1973 it had not yet acquired a sense of urgency since there still seemed to be plenty of time to work out a compromise. This would change by the next Nixon-Brezhnev summit. Proposition one is not supported by this case.

In sum, the first proposition is not supported by the evidence gathered by an examination of the data from the Washington summit on any of the issues under consideration. On arms control and the linked issues of trade and human rights, the growing weakness of the President brought on by Watergate made it nearly impossible for him to forge a consensus on the key issues.

Proposition Two

The extent to which the leaders could eliminate obstacles to agreement will now be examined.

P2: The President and General Secretary have resolved important issues which were unable to be resolved at lower levels.

Much of the arms control agenda at the Washington summit in 1973 was prenegotiated by Kissinger in the backchannel and during his presummit visit to Zavidovo. The PNW was completed at this meeting, and the only thing left to decide at the summit on the Basic Principles of SALT II was whether or not Brezhnev would consent to include the end of 1974 as a
deadline to conclude the treaty. Essentially, there were no real roadblocks for the leaders to remove on these two agreements.

On the substance of SALT II, the onesidedness of the positions taken by the United States and the Soviet Union made compromise difficult, if not impossible. No middle ground had yet emerged between two clearly unacceptable, non-negotiable proposals. Most of all it is difficult to conduct negotiations with another sovereign state when the negotiations within one's own bureaucracy have not yet been resolved. Until the administration could agree on what a good SALT II Treaty would look like there was little chance there would be progress at any level of negotiation. The second proposition is not found to be true for the arms control discussions at the 1973 summit.

The deliberations between Nixon and Brezhnev on the emerging triangular relationship between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union were discussions, not negotiations, therefore there was no attempt to remove roadblocks to better relations. What each leader sought in their talks at San Clemente was to clarify the dangers that lie ahead in this complex relationship. Brezhnev focused on the tension an American-Chinese military alliance would create, while Nixon explained America's interest in preventing a Soviet attack on China. These talks will be more fully examined under the fourth proposition.

Regarding the Middle East, Brezhnev did seek to gain American acceptance of a set of general principles to guide
the negotiations. The principles were no different than those the Soviets had advocated at Zavidovo, in the February 18 backchannel message, or even the ones offered at the Moscow summit the year before. The Soviets, to protect their relations with the frontline Arab states, especially Egypt, were forced to back the maximum Arab demands while at the same time they would not provide the Arabs with the means to defeat Israel for fear of provoking a confrontation with the United States. Israel would never accept these demands and there was little incentive for the United States to pressure them to make such concessions, therefore Brezhnev's attempts were doomed to failure. Nixon and Kissinger continued their policy of stalling U.S.-Soviet cooperation through the Washington summit, especially since the contacts with Ismail showed Egypt was indeed beginning to look to Washington. Proposition two is not supported by the discussions in this case.

On the linked issues of trade and human rights the roadblocks to agreement were not between the United States and the Soviet Union, but between the executive and legislative branches of the United States government. At one point after the House defeated the trade pact on December 11 Nixon even expressed, "my profound contempt for the alliance that had combined to defeat MFN." Throughout this dispute the White House and Kissinger rather than conducting traditional negotiations with the Soviet Union actually performed as mediators between the Soviet leadership and its
opponents in Congress. The second proposition is not supported in this case.

In sum, the Washington summit of 1973 saw no significant obstacles to agreement removed by the discussion on arms control, regional issues, or on the linked issues of trade and human rights. The President's weakness obviously played a large role in this failure, since on arms control and Jewish emigration and MFN, the American government was still divided as to what course it should take.

Proposition Three

We will now explore the President's ability to negotiate a conceptual breakthrough at this summit.

P3: Framework agreements at U.S.-Soviet summits pave the way for more rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal treaty.

The Basic Principles of SALT II would seem on the surface to be a perfect candidate for this proposition. At the outset the Soviets sought to make it a framework for SALT II by offering a number of specific proposals which could have formed the backbone of the treaty. These proposals, making permanent the SALT I ceilings, including American FBS and forbidding nuclear cooperation among the Western allies, were so onesided that Kissinger and the delegation quickly rejected the Soviet draft. Given the gulf between the negotiating positions in May, 1973 what emerged from Kissinger's presummit trip was a document long on vague
phrases such as "equal security" but short on specific content. The only significant provision in the document was the agreement that qualitative limits would be a part of the treaty. This implied that MIRVs would somehow be dealt with in SALT II. In the end there was little here to guide the SALT delegations, and therefore the Basic Principles of SALT II does not qualify as a framework agreement as this proposition defines the concept. On the specifics of SALT II itself there was no real movement by either side at the summit.

PNW is a far more interesting case. This agreement, just as the Basic Principles Agreement (BPA) of the previous year, had the potential to serve as a framework to guide superpower behavior in crisis situations. As with the BPA, however, PNW was far more form than substance. The American government had never been enthusiastic about the PNW, and had gone along simply because it wanted Soviet cooperation in other areas, and given the stalemate on the rest of the summit agenda it might be the only major agreement the leaders could sign. Ultimately, the PNW was another "pseudo agreement" which would do little to actually alter the behavior of the superpowers.

In both cases, it was the Soviets who sought these agreements, and each began as attempts to isolate China and create a sense of superpower condominium which would alienate America's allies. They were also important to the Soviet leadership since both implied equal status with the United States, and might curb what they considered to be America's
willingness to resort to force in critical situations." Sensing the danger, Kissinger defanged both proposals. On the PNW he turned a no-first-use pact into a no-first-use of force agreement that did nothing to limit the ability of the United States to use its nuclear weapons in defense of its allies or third countries. As with BPA, however, never did the United States or the Soviet Union discuss how these agreements would limit their options when confronted with a crisis situation. There was never any serious consideration of just what these agreements required. In fact in the years after the 1973 summit neither was ever seriously invoked, although the PNW was briefly mentioned by the United States in a message to the Soviet leadership during the Yom Kippur War. The third proposition is not supported by this case.

On regional issues only Soviet efforts to get the American side to accept their nine basic principles would justify as an attempt to build a framework for a later agreement. This initiative was unsuccessful because the Soviets could not compromise without risking the loss of their Arab allies. Their attempts to compromise in 1972 had been rewarded by Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet advisers in Egypt. With the United States maneuvering to take control of the peace process itself, and the inability of the Soviets to compromise, there was no chance of success. Proposition three is not sound to hold in this case.

Since the critical negotiations on the Jackson-Vanik amendment were within the United States government, agreement between Nixon and Brezhnev on a framework to settle the
dispute was impossible. Brezhnev did confer briefly with congressional leaders on the subject of trade, but at such a brief meeting a resolution of the Jewish emigration problem was not forthcoming. The third proposition is not supported in this case.

In sum, the third proposition is not supported on any of the issues considered in this study by the data gathered from the Washington summit. Neither the PNW, the Basic Principles of SALT II, or any of the other discussions on regional issues, trade, or human rights can be characterized as having crafted a framework agreement to guide negotiations at lower levels.

Proposition Four

Can any of the discussions at Washington or San Clemente be categorized as an attempt to educate one's counterpart? This question will now be explored.

P4: Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterpart on their concerns and interests on the important issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted in changes in the behavior of the superpowers following the summit.

Unlike most of the previous summits, the attempts to educate the adversary at the Washington summit in 1973 were made by the Soviet leader, not the American. Brezhnev at Zavidovo with Kissinger, and Nixon at San Clemente, sought to explain in emotional terms just how dangerous the Soviet Union felt the People's Republic of China was. Both attempts were made in private and the General Secretary was very blunt
in his language with Kissinger and Nixon. His primary message was that a military alliance between the United States and China was unacceptable and would create a very dangerous situation. Gromyko went so far as to say in a conversation with Kissinger at San Clemente that such an alliance would lead to war. While the Soviets were obviously concerned in 1972 following Nixon's trip to China, the American-Chinese relationship had not been a major topic on the agenda at the Moscow summit. In 1973, however, with the establishment of liaison offices and the growth of the U.S.-Chinese trade, the Soviet leadership apparently felt it was time to lay their cards on the table and to warn the President not to get too cozy with Beijing. Brezhnev's emotional pleas to both Kissinger at Zavidovo and Nixon in San Clemente had little effect on American policy. Kissinger returned to Beijing in November to inform the Chinese leadership about the nature of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks and to discuss world politics in general. U.S.-Chinese relations did not grow significantly closer in the months following the Washington summit but this had more to do with an upheaval in Chinese politics than with Brezhnev's appeals.

Perhaps the most interesting question of the 1973 summit was whether or not Brezhnev was attempting to warn Nixon of an impending attack by the Arabs on Israel. Again the General Secretary spoke in emotional terms of the need for the superpowers to pressure their allies to settle the conflict on terms that he and Nixon could agree on at the summit. Without this he warned, war was a real possibility.
The President and Kissinger disregarded the warning largely because they did not believe Egypt and Syria had a viable military option against Israel. Nixon refused to agree to Brezhnev's terms, and little was said of the Middle East in the communique.

Did Brezhnev have advanced knowledge of Sadat's plans and was he trying to warn the President that the Arabs were preparing to attack? This does not seem to be the case since by Sadat's account he did not tell the Soviets of his plan until he warned the Ambassador on October 3. Nevertheless, Brezhnev through his frequent meetings with Sadat, Ismail, Assad and other Arab leaders was well aware of their growing frustration, and this is apparently what he tried to convey to Nixon in their late night session on June 24. Once again his appeals fell on deaf ears since American policy continued to avoid cooperation with the Soviets on the Middle East in hope of dividing the Soviet Union from its Arab allies. On regional issues, both China and the Middle East, the first part of proposition four is supported, but the second is not since neither tutorial by Brehnev was successful.

On arms control issues there was no concerted attempt to educate the adversary by either side. There were discussions of the first-strike dangers presented by large MIRVed Soviet ICBMs, but they were not concerted enough to be considered an attempt to tutor the Soviets on strategic stability. Again, both superpowers missed an opportunity to explore crisis prevention and consultation in periods of crisis during the negotiation of the PNW. This would have been a perfect
occasion to discuss such matters but neither side made the attempt. The United States was focused on turning a document that could create fissures within NATO and elsewhere into something harmless, while the Soviet Union was intent on gaining equal status and limiting America's willingness to use force in international conflicts. Once again both superpowers missed an opportunity to discuss exactly how detente affected their actions in the political struggle around the world. Proposition four is not found to be true in this case.

There was an attempt by President Nixon to educate Brezhnev on the complexity of the American constitutional system as the President tried to push his trade bill through the Congress, but the Soviets seemed from the beginning to have understood the power of Congress to block the President's initiatives. The Soviet leaders might have appreciated even more an attempt to explain the unfolding Watergate scandal and how it would affect U.S.-Soviet relations. None was forthcoming.

In sum, on the regional questions of China and especially the Middle East, General Secretary Brezhnev did attempt to tutor Richard Nixon on the dangers of the current situation, thus supporting the first part of proposition four. However, the lack of success in changing American policy means that the second part of the proposition is not upheld. The discussions on PNW or the Basic Principles of SALT II could have been used as occasions to consider the dangers of the arms
race or regional competition, but in neither case was this done. None of the talks in the Jackson-Vanik controversy could be characterized as efforts to educate the Soviets. Therefore, proposition four is not found to hold for arms control, trade, or human rights.

Conclusion

The Washington summit in 1973 sought to strengthen the policy of detente which had been initiated with such a splash the year before in Moscow. In many ways it succeeded, but there were storm clouds on the horizon. The summit accomplished little in the way of concrete agreements, only the PNW had any real import, and it would soon fade into history. In fact, none of the first three propositions was upheld by this summit. A great deal of this can be explained by the turmoil within the executive branch in the first months of Nixon's second term, and even more importantly by the corrosive effects of the ever-widening Watergate scandal. The summit largely served as a forum in which the leaders could explore the current geopolitical situation, and it was especially used by Brezhnev as an opportunity to warn the President of dangers that lie ahead.

The gathering storms would soon bring external and internal crises to the United States. In the Middle East the fourth Arab-Israeli war would highlight the dangers of superpower confrontation in that volatile area. Most of all it would gradually become clear to the Soviet leadership that
the Watergate scandal would not soon fade away, and that Richard Nixon’s ability to deliver on his commitments, such as MFN, was quickly being eroded.

Table 8

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Table 8 clearly shows that little in the way of concrete negotiations took place at the Washington summit. Neither proposition two or three was found to hold for this summit, thereby showing that no obstacles to agreement were removed by the Nixon-Brezhnev talks, nor was there a framework constructed to guide negotiations at lower levels. The principle reason for this was the disarray within the Nixon administration and the inability of the American government to arrive at coherent negotiating positions on the key issues of arms control, trade, and human rights, thereby dooming proposition one in this case. Only proposition four was found to have some merit at the Washington summit in 1973 and in neither case was Brezhnev’s attempt to tutor Nixon successful, thus the second part of proposition four is not upheld.
NOTES - CHAPTER VII


   Stern, pp. 41-48.


   Garthoff, p. 328.


   Johnson, pp. 589-590.

   Garthoff, pp. 328-329.


   Garthoff, pp. 334-338.


   Kissinger, p. 296.


   Kissinger, pp. 248-254.


Kissinger, pp. 296-298.
Garthoff, p. 331.


Garthoff, pp. 357.

Garthoff, pp. 356-357.

George, pp. 110-114.


The 1974 summit held in Moscow and Yalta is unique among the history of the Cold War meetings between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. Richard Nixon, whose first visit to Moscow in 1972 was masterfully timed and ended in triumph, would now travel to the Soviet Union weakened by political scandal and only weeks away from resignation. The President’s closest aides and cabinet members from his first term had been indicted, the House Judiciary Committee had completed its impeachment hearings only days before the summit, and Nixon’s own cabinet was in open rebellion as he prepared to leave for Moscow. Indeed, President Nixon has remarked that the negotiations in Washington were far tougher than those in Moscow. Never before or since has a President in such a weakened state met with a leader of the Soviet Union.

Setting

In the midst of this constitutional crisis the administration was still able to score impressive diplomatic victories in the Middle East. The aftermath of the October War saw Secretary of State Henry Kissinger engage in two arduous sets of disengagement negotiations, first between
Israel and Egypt, and finally between Israel and Syria. The Sinai disengagement pact, signed in January, and the Golan plan, signed in May, had come ostensibly under the auspices of the United States and the Soviet Union as cosponsors of the Geneva Conference which convened in December, 1973. In reality, Kissinger had been able to exclude the Soviets from his now famous shuttle diplomacy, and while Gromyko was frequently consulted during this period, the USSR had no real influence on the process. Needless to say, by the time the summit drew near, the Soviet leaders had become increasingly irritated at their exclusion. Finally, the summit in Moscow followed by two weeks a whirlwind tour of the Middle East by the President, with Nixon visiting Egypt, Saudia Arabia, Syria, Israel, and Jordan. His rousing reception in Cairo and this last round of summit diplomacy were, as Kissinger terms it, Nixon's "last hurrah."

Despite this success, through much of this period the United States economy was in the midst of an oil price shock created first by the Arab oil embargo that ran from October 20, 1973 to March 18, 1974, and by the price increases which accompanied the embargo increasing the cost of crude oil from $3.01 per barrel in October to $11.65 by December 23. The massive transfer of wealth created by this change sent shock waves through the world economy for years to come.

Presummit Preparations

At the Brezhnev-Nixon summit in 1974 the Middle East would far outweigh all other regional issues. The Geneva
Conference had convened on December 11, 1973 and after one day of speeches had devolved into a series of bilateral negotiations between Israel, Egypt, and Syria with the United States serving as the sole mediator. Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy began with Israel and Egypt as the Secretary of State traveled from Cairo to Tel Aviv numerous times between January 11-18, 1974 eventually concluded the first Sinai disengagement agreement. The separation of the forces on the Golan turned out to be a far more difficult proposition given the tiny geographic distances involved and took the Secretary nearly a month to arrange as he shuttled between Damascus and Tel Aviv from April 29 to May 31.4

Much of the preparation for this summit, as with the two previous, was handled personally by Kissinger in another trip to Moscow. This meeting, which lasted from March 24-27, seemed noticeably cooler than his reception the previous year at the Politburo’s private hunting reserve at Zavidovo. Undoubtedly one reason for this change of venue was Soviet irritation at their exclusion from the disengagement negotiations. At this meeting Brezhnev and Gromyko berated Kissinger for America’s unilateral diplomacy, and demanded that the United States live up to their agreement at the end of the October War to conduct peace negotiations under the joint auspices of the two superpowers. There was actually little else the Soviet leaders could do since the regional actors, Egypt and Syria, had chosen the United States as the sole intermediary and had no desire to see the Soviet Union included. Just as he had done in February, while Gromyko was in Washington, Kissinger promised consultation when the
Syrian negotiations began, but he made no concrete proposals as to what the Soviet role should be.

In the period between Kissinger's presummit trip to Moscow and the summit at the end of June, Gromyko and the Secretary met several times, with the Middle East at the top of their agenda. The Soviet Foreign Minister came to Washington on April 12 and he met with Kissinger in Geneva April 28-29, just before the Syrian shuttle began. At both meetings Gromyko pushed for a larger Soviet role and for Kissinger to meet with him in Damascus during the negotiations. Nixon and Kissinger, with Asad's quiet support, resisted these requests in Washington and when the ministers met in Geneva. Once again Nixon held out the hope to Gromyko that after the United States concluded these disengagement agreements a more comprehensive peace would be negotiated at Geneva where the Soviets would have a much larger role. During the shuttle itself, Kissinger met with Gromyko on May 7 in Nicosia, Cyprus, and on May 27 in Damascus when the agreement was nearly complete. The last meeting must have been particularly galling since with the disengagement process now complete it was clear the United States had moved to shut the Soviet Union out of the peace process.

The Middle East overwhelmed all other regional issues as the Moscow summit of 1974 approached. It had absorbed much of Kissinger's time and energy since the October War. This coupled with the political transitions underway in Western Europe and China and the relative quiet elsewhere meant that there were few other urgent issues for the leaders to discuss.
at the summit. The interalliance strains within the West created by the October War and the oil price shock had begun to subside, and the Soviets were largely bystanders in the oil politics of 1973-1974. There was also a move toward holding a multilateral summit conference at the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and this would make its way onto the summit agenda, although it was not a major item.

SALT II was overshadowed by American attempts to begin a peace process in the Middle East in the last months of 1973, but as the new year dawned, and another summit drew near, arms control moved back near the top of the U.S.-Soviet agenda. Unfortunately the gradual decline of executive authority as the Watergate crisis deepened made it impossible to heal the rift within the administration on arms control. The primary split saw Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and the JCS supporting equal aggregates of strategic delivery systems, severe limits on throwweight, and little or no limits on MIRVs, while Kissinger and the State Department sought to offset Soviet advantages in the number of launchers against a greater number of MIRVed systems for the United States. A January 24 NSC meeting began the process of reappraising America’s SALT II negotiating positions which had remained unchanged since May, 1973. Kissinger pushed for a proposal which would extend the SALT I ceilings for two to three years, but would limit the Soviets to 300 fewer MIRVed ICBMs than the United States. The Joint Chiefs advocated 2350 SNDVs and throwweight limits which would severely limit the ability of the Soviet Union to build MIRVed ICBMs.
According to Kissinger, under the JCS proposal the Soviets could only field 100 SS-19s while the United States could build 1000 Minuteman IIIs and 240 Trident SLBMs, thereby guaranteeing Soviet rejection. Eventually, a new proposal emerged which called for 2350 SNDVs and an equal ceiling on MIRVed throwweight which could not exceed the level of the U.S. Minuteman III force.  

SALT II quickly deadlocked when it resumed on February 19 as both sides rejected the other's proposals. As Kissinger's trip approached, he made another attempt to get Schlesinger and the JCS to buy into his concept of counterbalancing asymmetries. He called for a limit of 270 on Soviet MIRVed ICBMs with the United States retaining its 550 Minuteman IIIs. This time Schlesinger endorsed the approach as a part of an interim, but not a permanent, agreement. Since the Soviets could not exploit its throwweight advantages before 1980 such ceilings were acceptable in the short run to him.

At the March presumbmit meeting between Kissinger and the Soviet leadership, Brezhnev opened with a proposal to extend the SALT I ceilings through 1980 and to allow each side 1000 MIRVed systems. Kissinger explained that such high levels of MIRVs would be unacceptable in the United States because the Soviet Union would be able under such circumstances to threaten a first strike against America's retaliatory forces. Brezhnev responded to this scenario by arguing that the Soviet Union would never contemplate such an attack, and then proceeded to brief the Secretary of State on the first strike potential of the United States' strategic forces. The
briefing included a map of America's forward based forces and how these weapons would be an integral part of such an attack.

Kissinger then introduced his concept of counterbalancing asymmetries by offering the plan which Schlesinger and the NSC had approved before the Secretary departed for Moscow. Brezhnev rejected the exact numbers, but agreed to study the concept and discuss it further two days later. Following a six hour Politburo meeting on March 27 Brezhnev reported that the Soviet leadership could accept a MIRV differential of 1100 for the United States and 1000 for the Soviet Union. While pleased that the Soviets had accepted the concept of an American advantage in MIRVed systems, Kissinger argued that 1000 was still too high a figure and that agreement at the summit would require a wider MIRV gap between the two sides and a separate sublimit on MIRVed ICBMs.

As the summit drew nearer the shaky consensus that had been reached within the executive branch fell apart, aided by the intervention of Senator Jackson who feared Nixon would make a bad deal on SALT II in an effort to save his Presidency. On June 3, Schlesinger wrote a letter to Jackson praising a proposal the Senator had made on SALT II in March calling for 1760 SNDVs and equal ceilings on throwweight. This action signaled that Schlesinger was about to abandon his earlier position of supporting Kissinger's March proposals. Less than two weeks later on June 14 Paul Nitze resigned as the Defense Department's representative to SALT
and warned that in Nixon's weakened state he could not take the firm position necessary on SALT II.

These actions led to a series of meetings as the summit preparations were being finalized which destroyed whatever was left of Nixon's freedom to negotiate on SALT II at the summit. On June 6 Schlesinger was called to the Oval Office to discuss his blatant attempts to undermine the administration's position, but Nixon no longer had the authority to discipline his Secretary of Defense. Instead, Schlesinger virtually returned to the Defense Department's position before March and called for 2500 SNDVs and 360-450 MIRVed ICBMs for the Soviet Union. With the President unable to impose order on his fractious administration, the June 20 NSC meeting to prepare the SALT II proposal Nixon would take to the summit accomplished very little. Schlesinger and the JCS elaborated the Secretary of Defense's June 6 position and rejected Kissinger's attempt to structure a deal that the Soviets might accept. Schlesinger's MIRV differential was so large, 360 MIRVed ICBMs for the Soviets, 660 Minuteman IIIs for the United States and no limits on MIRVed SLBMs, that it was clearly unacceptable to the Soviet leadership. The President's ability to negotiate on SALT II had effectively been eliminated by members of his own government."

Two subsidiary agreements were negotiated in the period before the 1974 Nixon-Brezhnev summit. The Protocol to the ABM Treaty of 1972 reduced the permitted number of ballistic missile defense sites from two to one. The Soviets proposed the Protocol while Kissinger was in Moscow, and since neither side had moved beyond their one original site the details
were quickly worked out by the delegations in Geneva. The Threshold Test Ban (TTB) was a more complicated matter because it engendered real bureaucratic opposition.

The process which led to the TTB began with a proposal by Dobrynin in early February that the United States and the Soviet Union sign a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) at the upcoming summit. Gromyko reiterated the offer when he visited the White House on February 4. The President and Kissinger declined the Soviet offer for a variety of reasons including verification problems, the need to modernize the deterrent, and because to sign such an agreement would place the French and Chinese in a very awkward position since they would come under pressure to halt their own testing programs. During Kissinger's March trip to Moscow, Brezhnev countered with the idea of a TTB that would in reality serve as an amendment to the 1963 Limited Test Ban by eliminating underground explosions above a particular threshold. Eventually, the threshold was set at 150 kilotons thus solving many of the verification problems associated with a CTB. The Soviet Union also agreed to a number of relatively intrusive measures including on-site inspection of any peaceful nuclear explosions, testing only at agreed upon sites, and providing information on the geological structure of their test sites.

When Kissinger returned to Washington the JCS immediately objected to the treaty. Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt led the charge complaining that the United States had not yet completed its testing of Trident missile warheads, which would exceed the 150 kiloton level,
but the Soviets had completed the testing of warheads for their MIRVed ICBMs. At a Verification panel meeting June 4 and the previously described NSC meeting of June 20, Schlesinger and the JCS protested the President's plans to sign the TTB. Finally, on June 30, in the middle of the summit, Zumwalt announced his retirement from the Navy, and gave a defiant interview on the television program "Meet the Press". The administration was clearly beginning to disintegrate.

The presummit attempts to work out a deal on Jackson-Vanik and the extension of MFN were perhaps even more complex than the bureaucratic infighting over SALT II. Kissinger began his negotiations with Senator Jackson, Senator Abraham Ribikoff, and Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY) on March 6. The Secretary opened the negotiations by offering a compromise which would grant MFN immediately, but allow it to be reviewed every year or two based on Soviet emigration policy. Jackson's response was that such a deal would only be acceptable if the Soviets provided a written guarantee and the of numbers of emigres were greatly expanded. Just what greatly expanded meant was answered in another meeting on March 15, one week before Kissinger was to leave for Moscow, when Jackson offered that 100,000 Jewish emigrants annually would be satisfactory to him.

In Moscow Kissinger floated a compromise procedure which he hoped would satisfy both Jackson and the Soviet leadership. He asked that the Soviet leadership given to the United States a letter which contained the assurances on emigration that Brezhnev had made at the 1973 summit and
elsewhere. Kissinger would then issue a letter to Jackson that included these assurances, and the administration would stand behind this message. Gromyko did not object to this procedure.

On April 26, just before he was departing for the Syrian shuttle and the meeting with Gromyko on April 28 in Geneva, Kissinger met again with Jackson and presented his exchange of letters proposal. Jackson tentatively approved the procedure, but added another complaint. The Senator maintained that at present only Jews from rural areas were being allowed to emigrate, and that educated urban Jews were being denied the right to leave. This had to change if MFN was to be extended. Kissinger relayed this demand to Gromyko in Geneva along with a request that the Soviets agree to a target figure of 40,000-45,000 emigres a year. Gromyko accepted the target figure, but made no comment on the geographic distribution demand, other than to say he would check with the leadership.

Believing that Jackson would accept the compromise procedures, Nixon asked Senator Russell Long (D-La) to begin mark-up on the Trade Reform bill. But another roadblock soon emerged. The President’s authority to extend credits through the Export-Import Bank was due to expire on June 30. Senator Adlai Stevenson (D-Ill) introduced on June 17 an amendment to the bill renewing the authority that would require a review of any loan in excess of $50 million to the Soviet Union and a ceiling of $300 million for all loans to the USSR. The final blow to Nixon’s hopes that a deal could be finalized at the summit came two days before Nixon was to leave. Senator
Jackson held a press conference during which he stated that concessions on emigration were unnecessary, and that he would introduce new, unspecified conditions on the extension of MFN after the summit. As with SALT, any leeway to negotiate at the Moscow summit on trade and emigration had been taken away.\(^{19}\)

As Richard Nixon landed in Moscow on June 27 he found himself in charge of an administration in open rebellion. On arms control issues, he was hamstrung by a defiant Secretary of Defense and military leadership. On trade and human rights, the Congress had effectively denied every carrot that the President and Kissinger hoped to use in their strategy of linkage. The President retained the freedom to negotiate only on regional issues and here the dominant concern was the Middle East where the Soviets were very upset with American unilateral diplomacy. All of the President’s domestic troubles were, of course, linked to the Watergate scandal and therefore were of his own doing. Never before had a President gone to the summit in such a weakened condition.

The Summit

The 1974 Nixon-Brezhnev summit took place from June 27-July 3 both in Moscow and at Brezhnev’s summer home on the Black Sea at Yalta. To prevent comparisons with the infamous three power summit of 1945, Nixon’s staff referred to the Black Sea site as Oreanda which was nearby to the General Secretary’s dacha.\(^{11}\) The discussions on the Middle East were much less unpleasant than Nixon and Kissinger may have
expected. Unlike the March presummit meeting with Kissinger in Moscow, or Gromyko's February 4 visit to the White House, the Soviets did not strenuously protest American diplomacy in the disengagement process. Brezhnev even offered that unilateral diplomacy had its place. According to Kissinger, the Soviets seemed resigned to allow the American initiative to play itself out, and then be ready to step in when it had failed. 12

The only concrete proposal on regional issues came during a private Nixon-Brezhnev meeting at Yalta. There Brezhnev offered that the United States and the Soviet Union sign a non-aggression pact. During a joint dinner on July 2, Nixon instructed Kissinger to pursue the proposal in the channel. Kissinger felt immediately that this was another in a long string of Soviet attempts to isolate China, and he later told his assistant Brent Scowcroft that he would resign rather than carry out the order. After the summit, when Dobrynin broached the subject the Secretary told him it was not worth pursuing. 13

There was some discussion of a summit to conclude the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Nixon did agree to attend, largely because most other European leaders had already made such a commitment. There were also talks on issues that would later be incorporated into the Helsinki Final Act, but nothing was done of great importance. 14

Detailed discussions of SALT II began after the delegations traveled to Brezhnev's Black Sea dacha. Kissinger presented to Brezhnev and Gromyko Schlesinger's
June 20 proposal calling for 2500 SNDVs, severe limits on Soviet MIRVed ICBMs while American MIRVed ICBMs could actually expand, and no limits at all on MIRVed SLBMs. Brezhnev quickly rejected the offer. During the stay at Yalta, Nixon was treated to an even more elaborate version of the briefing Secretary Kissinger had heard in March on the first-strike capability of America's strategic and forward-based nuclear forces. The briefing was conducted by Brezhnev, Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, and Colonel General Mikhail Kozlov, First Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff. Brezhnev and his military leaders painted a grim picture of what a coordinated first strike by American forces could do.

The next day while Nixon visited Minsk, Kissinger returned to Moscow with Brezhnev, and more serious discussions on SALT II took place. They were joined this time by Central Committee Secretary Dimitri Ustinov. The General Secretary asked Kissinger to repeat for Ustinov not only the proposal offered at Yalta, but also his ideas on counterbalancing asymmetries. Following this, Brezhnev ordered a Politburo meeting and arranged for Kissinger to meet with Gromyko one more time on SALT II.

At this final meeting on SALT II, Kissinger and Gromyko agreed on several points. The Secretary proposed, and Gromyko accepted, that SALT II should have a ten year duration. This would eliminate some of the American military's fears that if the agreement only ran until 1980, or thereabouts, the Soviets could MIRV only ICBMs until then remaining within any SALT II ceiling, and when the agreement
expired begin to MIRV their SLBMs. Kissinger also suggested that they agree that SALT II should be built around either the concept of equal aggregates or counterbalancing asymmetries. Gromyko agreed to this as well. On the summit's last day, Nixon and Brezhnev agreed to a mini-summit during the winter to continue the discussions on SALT II.15

Despite the Pentagon's opposition, the TTB was essentially complete when the summit began. During the second day of this summit, June 28, the leaders became embroiled in a long, confusing discussion of test bans in general. Kosygin in particular stressed the need for a CTB, and that a TTB was of little significance. To Kissinger it seemed for a time that the leaders had forgotten that the TTB was completed and ready to sign. Eventually, they came back to the TTB and the agreement was signed at the summit.16

The Protocol to the ABM Treaty was also signed in Moscow, as was a ban on environmental warfare. Neither was particularly controversial, especially the ban on modifications to the environment for offensive military purposes since neither side had any plans to do so anyway.17

Nixon's ability to broker a deal on trade and Jewish emigration was effectively stripped by Jackson's actions before the summit began. The Soviets could not in good faith negotiate without knowing what other shoe the Senator was preparing to drop when the President returned to Washington. Nixon did ask Brezhnev for a gesture that would "pull the rug from under Jackson." The Soviet leader replied by pointing to a folder of statistics that he would soon give to Dobrynin that would do just that.18
Aftermath

Richard Nixon left the Soviet Union on July 3, 1974 and returned to a capital gearing up for the final act of the Watergate scandal. The decision by the Supreme Court to force the President to release the White House tapes spelled political doom for Richard Nixon, and on August 9, 1974 he resigned from the office of President of the United States. American foreign policy remained on hold in the months after the Moscow summit as Nixon's Presidency ended and Gerald Ford's began. The new President began the process of restoring executive authority as America's constitutional crisis passed, and soon progress was made in several key areas, especially SALT II. These developments, however, seem more properly to fit as a prelude to Vladivostok and will be considered at length in the next chapter.

Evaluation of the Propositions

Proposition One

We will now examine the effect of the approach of the Moscow summit on the internal bargaining within the administration.

P1: The approach of the summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision-makers, and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes.

The decay of Nixon's executive authority brought on by the Watergate crisis meant that even the approach of a summit could not force the various factions within the
administration to adopt a common position on important issues related to arms control. The division between Schlesinger, the JCS, and Kissinger grew even greater as the summit drew near and some began to fear that the President would make a bad deal to save his Presidency. The deliberations before Kissinger's March trip to Moscow seemed to indicate that the gap was closing between the military's insistence on equal aggregates and very strict throwweight limits, and Kissinger's concept of counterbalancing asymmetries. Schlesinger's endorsement of this concept at the March 21 NSC meeting allowed Kissinger to present a proposal to Brezhnev whose specific numbers would be rejected, but that would begin the process of structuring a deal based on this concept. Schlesinger's about-face on June 3 when he publicly endorsed Senator Jackson's SALT II plan, and his return on June 6 and 20 to virtually the same proposal that the JCS had offered in January doomed any hope that the administration could come to a consensus. The demise of Nixon's executive authority meant that he could no longer discipline cabinet members with powerful political backing. Schlesinger was not only able to get away with endorsing Jackson's plan; he was able to force the administration to present his June 6 proposal as its own at the summit. The very public resignations of Nitze and Zumwalt merely reinforced the deep divisions within the administration.

The debate over the wisdom of the TTB witnessed the same divisions, with the JCS and Admiral Zumwalt leading the attack on the treaty. This time the military was unable to head off the already completed document, but they were able
to place on the record, the public record in Zumwalt's case, their opposition to this agreement. This presents an interesting contrast with the SALT I SLBM package worked out by Kissinger and the Soviet leadership during Kissinger's secret trip to Moscow. In both cases, the specifics of the deal were worked out in secret, without the knowledge of the major bureaucratic actors, and both encountered significant bureaucratic opposition when they were presented to the rest of the government. In 1972 the President was able to win over the JCS by stressing that his support for strategic modernization hinged on the JCS's support for SALT, and Nixon was powerful enough to dismiss the objections that Secretary of State Rogers and Gerard Smith voiced. In 1974 the President did not have the authority to bring reluctant members of his administration into line on a treaty which was far less important than the SLBM portion of the SALT I Interim Agreement.

The administration was able to come together on the ABM Treaty Protocol, but only because the government had no intention of building a second site anyway. Proposition one is not supported on SALT II and TTB, but it is upheld, although not in a very significant way, on the ABM Treaty Protocol.

The results on the linked issues of trade and human rights are virtually the same as on arms control. For a time it seemed that Kissinger had been able to work out a process that would satisfy Jackson and allow MFN to be extended, and the rest of the October, 1972 trade agreements to be enacted. The exchange of letters worked out in Moscow in March, and in
discussions between Kissinger and the three key Senators on April 26, seemed promising enough that the President asked Senator Long to begin mark up on the trade bill. Looking back, however, it seems that Jackson wanted an issue more than a compromise. At each meeting with Kissinger after the initial March 6 negotiations the Senator's demands escalated until by April 26 he wanted to dictate to the Soviet leadership the geographic distribution of the emigres. The final blow to any chance to reach a compromise at the summit was Jackson's press conference two days before Nixon was to leave. While at one time in April it seemed that the approach of the summit might bring a compromise, on further examination a deal may never have been possible. The first proposition is not upheld in this case.

The Middle East overwhelmed all other regional issues in the period before the summit as Kissinger devoted the entire month of May to the Syrian shuttle. With the Secretary of State completely dominating the formation of policy in this region, there was not much room for bureaucratic debate. Proposition one is not supported in this case.

In sum, the first proposition is not supported in any significant way on any of the issues under consideration in this study. The administration was able to adopt a common position on the ABM Protocol, but since there was no hope of the United States ever building a second ABM site, the consensus reached on this part does not seem significant enough to consider it as supportive of the first proposition. Overall, President Nixon simply was so weakened by Watergate
that he could not heal the divisions within his fractious administration.

**Proposition Two**

Could Richard Nixon overcome these divisions and still achieve some success at the 1974 summit? Proposition two will explore this question.

P2: The President and General Secretary have resolved important issues which were unable to be resolved at lower levels.

The traditional view of the 1974 summit was that it produced very little in the way of arms control progress. While it did not produce the conceptual breakthrough that Kissinger had predicted before he departed for Moscow in March, there were several roadblocks removed by the summit discussions. The decision to give SALT II a ten year duration eliminated fears that a short term or a permanent agreement engendered. A short term agreement, lasting for only five years or so, would have allowed the Soviets to MIRV their ICBMs at a normal pace, build up to the SALT II ceilings, and then exceed them after the agreement expired by shifting to MIRV their SLBM's. A permanent agreement made compromise difficult because the strategic forces of the two sides were so different that each side feared being frozen into a permanent state of inferiority in one measure or another. Ten years was long enough to give the ceilings meaning, but not so long as to require an agreement that radically restructured one or both sides' strategic forces.
Secondly, while Kissinger seems to go too far in calling it a framework, the agreement that SALT II should be based on equal aggregates or counterbalancing asymmetries at least got the superpowers speaking the same language. The first one and one-half years of SALT II had seen both sides offer proposals that were so different there was no middle ground between them. Since 1972, the Soviets had sought an extension of the Interim Agreement ceilings and inclusion of American FBS, while the United States sought equal numbers of delivery vehicles and to radically restructure Soviet forces through strict throwweight limits. The summit agreement meant that new proposals from each side would be similar enough that the middle ground could begin to emerge and compromise made possible.

The TTB is the first case in this study of an arms control agreement which was almost entirely negotiated at the summit and the preparatory meetings beforehand. Therefore it actually goes beyond proposition two and even proposition three. However, there is an important sense in which a significant roadblock to progress on a Test Ban and arms control in general was made by Kissinger in March and accepted by Nixon at the summit. For the first time as a part of TTB, the Soviets agreed to on site inspection as part of the verification process. They also agreed to data exchanges which in the past the Soviets had always resisted. This long sought goal of arms control had been realized and while this was not a significant agreement, the one site inspection provision would have served as a precedent for later, more important agreements. The slow death of the TTB
after the summit meant that this experiment would never be undertaken.”

The ABM Protocol had been completed by the delegations before the summit began and thereafter there were no roadblocks to remove. Proposition two is upheld in the SALT II and the TTB cases.

On the twin issues of trade and human rights once again, as in 1973, the roadblocks were in Washington within the United States’ government, not between the two superpowers. Nothing illustrates this better than Nixon’s call for Brezhnev to make a move that would “pull the rug from under Jackson.” Here was the President of the United States and the Soviet General Secretary cooperating to outmaneuver the Congress of the United States. To remove the roadblocks to expanded trade, Brezhnev would have had to meet Jackson at the summit, not the President. The second proposition is not supported in this case.

There were no real negotiations on regional issues at this summit. The discussions took on the characteristics of a tour d’horizon, rather than complex negotiations. No roadblocks to agreement were removed because no potential agreements were in the offing. On the major regional issue discussed at the summit, the Middle East, the Soviets were not willing to let the United States play its hand and wait for an impasse to be reached. Proposition two is not upheld in this case.

In sum, several important obstacles were removed on arms control issues at the Moscow summit. On SALT II the United States and the Soviet Union were slowly
moving closer to a conceptual breakthrough based on the progress made at this summit. Additionally, the TTB included a provision providing for on-site inspection, a long sought goal of the arms control community. On the linked issues of trade and human rights, and on regional issues, no obstacles to agreement were removed. Therefore, proposition two is supported by the talks on arms control at the Moscow summit, but not on the other issues under consideration.

Proposition Three

We will now consider whether or not any framework agreements emerged from this summit.

P3: Framework agreements at U.S.-Soviet summits pave the way for more rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal agreement.

In his memoirs, Kissinger uses the term framework to describe the agreements on SALT II negotiated at the Moscow summit of 1974. There is some justification for that since the Vladivostok accords followed by six months the Nixon-Brezhnev summit, but overall the general nature of the common ground found at this summit does not seem to fit this study's definition of a framework for agreement. Important roadblocks were removed thus supporting proposition two, but the agreements reached did not put in place major elements of the SALT II Treaty, even though they did make more rapid progress possible. The decisions to seek a ten year treaty
built on either equal aggregates or counterbalancing asymmetries got both sides thinking in the same terms and in the same negotiating ballpark, but they did not form the outline for a formal agreement. Proposition three is supported by the evidence on this issue.

For a time, it appeared that Kissinger had been able to construct a procedure which would have allowed Congressional approval of the Trade Reform Act, and facilitated the emigration of Soviet Jews. Kissinger, just as he had done with the Arabs and Israelis, played a mediating role as he put forward proposed solutions first to one side, then to the other in a series of meetings in March and April. A procedure had emerged, the exchange of letters, which both sides had endorsed, and there was some hope that compromise ground could be found on the number of annual Jewish emigres. These hopes were dashed as Jackson once again escalated his demands, this time at a press conference, by saying he would soon attach new strings to the extension of MFN. The introduction of the Stevenson amendment on June 17, a little more than one week before the summit, made a solution to the problem even more difficult. Nixon and Kissinger's hopes that this conflict with Congress could be settled in time for the summit were dashed again. Proposition three is not upheld in this case. The negotiations on TTB go beyond even proposition three since it qualifies as the only agreement in the history of the Cold War U.S.-Soviet summits that was wholly negotiated at the summit and the preparatory meetings beforehand. While it does not qualify as a major arms control agreement, especially since it was never ratified by
the Congress, it is significant enough to be considered supportive of the third proposition.

On regional issues, only Brezhnev's offer that the United States and the Soviet Union sign a nonaggression pact presented any opportunity to conclude a framework for future agreement. To Kissinger's chagrin, the President agreed to discuss the issue in the backchannel but Nixon's demise and Kissinger's opposition caused this proposal to go nowhere. Proposition three is not supported in this case.

In sum, the only framework agreement produced by this summit came in the arms control arena, the TTB. On SALT II, trade, human rights, and regional issues, no other framework agreements were produced by this summit. Thus, proposition three is supported by the conclusion of the TTB, but not on any other issues.

Proposition Four

We will now explore the discussions at Moscow to see if any can be categorized as an attempt to educate the leader of the other country.

P4: Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterpart on their concerns and interests on the important issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted in changes in the behavior of the superpowers following the summit.

The Soviet Union and the United States both attempted to use the summit discussions in 1974 to explain to their adversary the dangerous trends in the other's nuclear arsenal. The primary attempt made by the United States came
during Kissinger's presummit visit to Moscow when Brezhnev proposed that each side be allowed to build 1000 MIRVed systems under SALT II. The Secretary then painstakingly explained how this many MIRVed systems, especially MIRVed ICBMs, when loaded with an average of six warheads could theoretically destroy much of the United States' nuclear forces in a first strike. Brezhnev of course denied the Soviets ever had such an intention, but this was the first time at a U.S.-Soviet summit that a top administration official had described for the Soviet leadership, America's fears of the power of the Soviet Union's large ICBMs. This scenario, later known as the "window of vulnerability," may have seemed fantastic to the Soviets, but they had nightmares of their own to present.

After Kissinger's presentation, Brezhnev produced a map showing America's nuclear forces and proceeded to demonstrate how the United States could launch a first strike on the Soviet Union using both its strategic weapons and forward based systems, including pilots flying their planes loaded with nuclear weapons on one-way missions. This briefing was repeated and even enhanced for the President during the summit since it was not only Brezhnev, but also Defense Minister Grechko, and First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Kozlov that presented this worst-case scenario.

These briefings may have been firsts in world history. It is hard to think of another example in which the leaders of the world's greatest military powers gathered and briefed each other on how a successful first strike might be launched on themselves. Of course, neither side was revealing any
great secret and these calculations could have been made by anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of each side's nuclear forces. What was happening was a discussion of the dangerous trends as each side continued to add thousands of nuclear warheads to their arsenals. The development of MIRVed weapons and greater accuracy was now making a nuclear Pearl Harbor at least conceivable, and it was useful for the leaders of both countries to see how their arsenals could be seen as threatening by the adversary. Both countries were clearly attempting to tutor their counterparts on the dangerous trends in the nuclear arms race. Neither was able, however, to bring about a change in the strategic force posture of the other superpower or in its SALT negotiating position. The United States continued to seek the exclusion of its FBS from the SALT II ceilings and the Soviet Union continued with the deployment of large, heavily MIRVed ICBMs. Once again the first part of proposition four is supported since education attempts were made, but the second is not since neither side was able to bring about a change in the behavior of the other.

None of the discussions on regional issues or trade and human rights could be characterized as efforts to educate the other side. Proposition four is not upheld in these cases.

In sum, proposition four was upheld on the issue of arms control at this summit. Both sides tried to brief their counterparts on the dangers of the emerging strategic situation, although neither was successful in changing the behavior of the other. Thus, this proposition sustained.
Conclusion

Richard Nixon had already been mortally wounded by the time he arrived in Moscow for the third, and final meeting between himself and Leonid Brezhnev. The hemorrhaging of executive authority brought on by Watergate meant that the summit was doomed beforehand to accomplish very little. Bureaucratic stalemate at home made significant progress difficult on SALT, trade, and human rights, and there was little reason for the Soviet leaders to engage in detailed discussions of the future of world politics with a leader who would soon be out of office. Also, as Kissinger points out, as summits had become annual affairs each one could not be expected to deliver major agreements. The issues between the two rivals were simply too complex to solve a new one each year in time for a summit.20

Table 9

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<th>Proposition 1</th>
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<td>action-forcing</td>
<td>roadblock remover</td>
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Moscow 1974

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As the Table 9 shows, there was some progress made on arms control issues at the Moscow summit. On SALT II the United States and the Soviet Union were now committed to a ten-year agreement built around the concept of either equal aggregates or offsetting assymetries, thus laying the
groundwork for a breakthrough at the Vladivostok summit. The TTB was wholly negotiated at this summit and its preparatory meetings. An important dialogue was opened on destabilizing trends in the strategic weaponry of both superpowers. What the table does not show, however, is that SALT II and the controversy created by the Jackson-Vanik amendment were ripe for breakthroughs, but the weakness of the President made such progress impossible. More will be said of this in the conclusion.
NOTES - CHAPTER VIII


Garthoff, p. 414.


Johnson, pp. 598-600.

Garthoff, pp. 418-419.


Garthoff, pp. 416-423.

Nixon, pp. 1024-1026.

Johnson, pp. 600-601.


Kissinger, pp. 1165-1168.

Garthoff, pp. 426-427.

Kissinger, pp. 991-998.


Nixon, pp. 1034-1035.


CHAPTER IX

VLADIVOSTOK - 1974

Setting

Only five months separated the Vladivostok and Moscow summits in 1974, but a great deal had changed in that short period. Richard Nixon’s resignation on August 9, and his replacement by Gerald Ford, had ended the constitutional crisis created by the Watergate scandal, and the new President had begun the process of restoring the Presidency and America’s faith in its government. Just how quickly Gerald Ford was able to restore Presidential authority is demonstrated by the results of the Vladivostok summit held in November. SALT II had been mired in bureaucratic rivalries for nearly two years without a president who could impose order on his own government, but this now began to change. Even the bitter divisions over Jewish emigration and trade would give way to a compromise solution, although in a form that the Soviets found impossible to accept.

President Ford established continuity in policy and personnel from the beginning by quickly reaffirming the policy of detente, and by keeping Richard Nixon’s national security team together. In the aftermath of Nixon’s
resignation Ford made U.S.-Soviet relations and the continuation of the policy of detente a top priority, especially getting SALT II moving again. Ambassador Dobrynin was invited to the White House on August 14 to discuss SALT, trade, and human rights, and Foreign Minister Gromyko also came to Washington on September 20 to discuss the same agenda. In the brief period between Ford's ascension to the Presidency and the Vladivostok summit other regional issues took a back seat to healing the wound of Watergate, and improving Soviet-American relations.

Presummit Preparations

The resumption of SALT II negotiations on September 17 forced President Ford and his advisors to begin to consider what its position would be soon after coming into office. Since the cast of characters was the same, except of course for Ford's promotion, there was not the usual need for reevaluation of the previous administration's policy, and in September the principals merely picked up where they left off in June when they were preparing for President Nixon's trip to Moscow. SALT negotiator U. Alexis Johnson recalls that Schlesinger and the JCS were torn between placing strict limits on the Soviet Union and leaving room for their own strategic modernization plans. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Johnson both pushed for a proposal which would place limits on the growth of Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, although the Director of Central Intelligence William Colby expressed doubts about the United States' ability to verify MIRV
limits. With no consensus emerging, Johnson was forced to return to Geneva without instructions, something which he had been forced to do almost every time the negotiations resumed because of the disagreements with the executive branch.

The instructions which finally did arrive one week later seemed to show that the ice was beginning to break in Washington. While there were no specific numbers included, Johnson was empowered to talk about several interesting concepts. The new instructions called for aggregates of delivery vehicles to gradually be reduced over the ten year life of the treaty until equality was reached in 1985. Also for the first time the United States allowed bombers to be included in calculations of throwweight at fifty percent of their payload, thus making the two sides essentially equivalent in current throwweight. Finally, the message gave Johnson permission to explore limits on present and future MIRVed systems. For perhaps the first time, Johnson was pleased with the instructions he received from Washington.¹

Brezhnev and Nixon made arrangements to meet again the following winter to discuss SALT II on the last day of the Moscow summit. Nixon’s resignation threw some uncertainty into these plans, but Gerald Ford told Secretary Kissinger to continue with preparation for the mini-summit on August 8, the day before President Nixon stepped down. When Gromyko traveled to the White House on September 20 for his first meeting with Ford as President, it was decided that Kissinger would travel to Moscow at the end of his Middle East trip to prepare for a summit. A National Security Council meeting was held on October 18 to consider a new proposal for
Kissinger to take with him to Moscow. This plan was sent to Moscow ahead of the Secretary of State to give the Soviet leadership a chance to consider its reaction to the offer. Overall, it called for 2200 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV), 1320 MIRVed missiles, and a ceiling of 250 heavy systems which would for the first time include heavy bombers. Other provisions would ban air-to-surface missiles (ASM) and allow the modernization of no more than 175 launchers per year.2

For virtually the first time since SALT II had begun, the government had been able to produce an arms control proposal which had some chance of success. The meeting had seen the same debates as the last two years with Schlesinger calling for either a SALT II Treaty with very low ceilings on Soviet MIRVed missiles, or for the United States to buckle down and engage in an all-out arms race for five years that would put the United States in a better strategic and negotiating position. Kissinger argued that neither choice was realistic since Congress would not approve the latter and the Soviets would not accept the former. The United States should seek more moderate goals in SALT II, he insisted, and then go after reductions and controls on modernization in a later agreement. This time the JCS agreed with Kissinger, but more importantly President Ford did as well.3 Thus the meeting produced a proposal far more moderate than any before it. The critical difference between this NSC meeting and all those that preceded it during the SALT II negotiations, was that finally the United States had a chief executive who had
the authority to bring his administration together and make tough decisions.

Kissinger’s trip to Moscow lasted from October 23-27, and was very successful in narrowing the differences on SALT II. Brezhnev offered to structure the SALT II treaty based either on the concept of equal aggregates or counterbalancing asymmetries. If the United States preferred equal aggregates, the Soviet Union could accept an agreement allowing either 2400 SNDVs and 1320 MIRVed missiles or 2200 SNDVs with 1200 MIRVed missiles. If the United States wanted a treaty based on counterbalancing asymmetries, the Soviet leadership was prepared to offer 2400 SNDVs for themselves versus 2200 for the United States, and 1300 MIRVed missiles for America and 1100 or 1200 for the Soviet Union. Brezhnev did reject the portion of the United States proposal calling for limits on heavy systems, but it was hinted that Soviet insistence on the inclusion of FBS would be dropped. The groundwork was nearly complete for a real breakthrough on SALT II at the summit and Kissinger’s optimistic report allowed Ford to approve the scheduling and announcement of a summit for November 23-24.

According to Raymond Garthoff, Kissinger did not reveal, perhaps not even to Ford himself, just how much progress had been made at the Moscow presummit meeting. In the deliberations before Ford was to leave for the Far East, Secretary Schlesinger and the JCS urged the President to hold out for equal aggregates, not believing that the Soviets would agree. Kissinger, knowing just how close the two
positions were, told the President that when it came to equal aggregates to "hang tough they'll come around."\footnote{5}

The complex negotiations which had characterized the issues of trade and human rights since the introduction of the Jackson-Vanik amendment in October, 1972 were now nearing a final decision as the summit approached, a mid-term election neared, and this Congress was about to come to a close. President Ford met with Dobrynin on August 14, and Senators Jackson, Ribikoff, and Javits the next day, as well as with Gromyko on September 20-21. These meetings finalized plans, which Kissinger had been working on since March, that would have the Soviets provide the administration with assurances of their emigration policy, following which these assurances would be conveyed by letter to Senator Jackson. In exchange, Jackson-Vanik would be waived for one and one half years. In these meetings Jackson insisted on a target figure of 60,000 Jewish emigres each year. Secretary Kissinger never refuted these figures even though he knew that Gromyko had never committed himself to more than 40-45,000, which had been agreed upon when the two met at Nicosia on May 7. Gromyko gave his tacit assent to the process while he was at the White House in September.\footnote{7}

The stage was set for the exchange of letters on October 18 at the White House. After what the administration hoped would be a private ceremony, Jackson held a news conference and boasted of Soviet concessions, and called 60,000 annual emigres a benchmark for evaluating Soviet compliance. Since this figure was not in the letters, the President tried to limit the damage by issuing a press release stating that no
firm number existed, but Jackson quickly countered that he believed 60,000 was a minimum figure.

The Soviet leadership was outraged by Jackson's behavior and during Kissinger's trip to Moscow one week later Gromyko handed him a letter denying that any firm number had been agreed to, objecting to the public airing of the Soviet Union's internal practices, and claiming that there had been a decline in the number of requests for Jewish emigration. Brezhnev expressed his anger at Jackson's behavior to Kissinger, especially the idea that the Soviet government had agreed to 60,000 as a floor for annual Jewish emigration. The trip to Moscow came at the end of a tour of the Middle East by Kissinger, but nothing concrete came of these visits. As was stated before, this was a relatively quiet period for regional issues that had a direct bearing on the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The Summit

The Vladivostok summit lasted only two days, November 23-24, 1974, and was largely devoted to arms control. The first day of the meeting was consumed by a discussion of SALT II and the careful groundwork prepared by Kissinger and Brezhnev the month before paid off in a breakthrough which broke the conceptual logjam which had plagued the negotiations for two years. President Ford traveled to Vladivostok intent on reaching agreement on a framework built around the concept of equal aggregates in delivery vehicles. Ford opened the bargaining by proposing 2100 SNDVs as a
ceiling for both sides, and Brezhnev countered with 2500. They quickly compromised on 2400 SNDVs as the upper limit for each side. Next the ceiling for MIRVed missiles was set at 1320. These numbers were very close to those discussed by Kissinger and Brezhnev in October and the agreement that had eluded the superpowers for years was arrived at relatively quickly.

A number of other critical issues were discussed and settled satisfactorily on this first day of the summit. The Soviets had hinted during Kissinger's October trip that they would drop their insistence that American FBS be included in the treaty, and at Vladivostok it was. Both sides agreed that ASM with a range of greater than 600 km would be banned. The leaders also continued SALT I's ban on new silos, and the prohibition against converting the silos of light ICBMs into silos for heavy ICBMs. Finally they agreed that the treaty would be in force form 1975-1985, and a commitment was made to seek reductions in strategic nuclear weapons in SALT III.9

The second day of the Vladivostok summit was partially devoted to regional issues. Ford's memoirs identify the Middle East as the primary area discussed, but the talks seem to have been very general in nature and apparently no real negotiations took place. Other areas discussed included Cyprus, the CSCE process, and MBFR. The final communique said little beyond the fact that these issues were reviewed and no detailed account of the deliberations exists.10

The exchanges on trade and human rights continued to reflect the anger of the Soviet leadership at the behavior of Senator Jackson in October. Brezhnev stated that Soviet
emigration policy would continue to be based on the assurances given by Gromyko and the General Secretary himself earlier in the year. He made it very clear, however, that he did not like the way the process had been handled in Washington. In reality there was little for the leaders to negotiate at Vladivostok on this issue since Soviet guarantees had been given months earlier, and the deal with Jackson had already been struck. They were now merely waiting for Congress to act and pass the legislation approving the October, 1972 trade package."

Summit Aftermath

President Ford was elated when he returned to Washington following his first summit meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev believing that after the delegations had cleared up a few remaining technical details SALT II could be signed. It turned out that the issues left over after Vladivostok were far more important than just technical details, especially how the treaty would deal with cruise missiles and the Soviet Union's Backfire bomber. The specifics of the Vladivostok agreement were to be formally written into an aide-memoire, but these unresolved issues prevented the completion of the document until December 10.

The disagreement over cruise missiles did not surface until both sides submitted their drafts of the aide-memoire. The Soviet draft called for counting any bomber-loaded ASM with range of over 600 km against the 2400 SNDV ceiling. The American side had one simple, yet very significant,
difference in that it inserted the word ballistic into the formulation. The Soviet draft would require cruise missiles with a range over 600 km carried by bombers to be counted under SALT II, while the United States would exempt them. To allow the aide-memoire to be completed the United States agreed to drop the word ballistic, but made it clear to the Soviets that the administration had no intention of allowing cruise missiles to be counted against the 2400 ceiling.¹³

The other issue not settled by the Vladivostok negotiations which would plague SALT II was the status of the Backfire bomber. At the summit, Brezhnev had made it clear that the Soviet Union did not believe that the Backfire should be included in SALT II, and President Ford did not press him on this issue. In an off-the-record press briefing on the summit discussions on December 3, Kissinger stated that based on the negotiating record he did not believe that the Backfire would be included in SALT II. Soon it became clear that the American military would insist on the Backfire's inclusion. The controversy was finessed in the aide-memoire by simply using the term heavy bombers without defining which weapons would be included.¹⁴

When the administration met to consider its next SALT II proposal as the negotiations were set to resume on January 31 these two issues would dominate the discussions. Johnson maintains that the cruise missile had never been a favorite in the Pentagon, but it now suddenly became vital to continue the program without limits. He also claims that the Backfire bomber had never been included in any Pentagon count of Soviet strategic bombers, yet now the Defense Department
insisted that it must be part of the 2400 limit. The first instructions given to the delegation after Vladivostok were contained in NSDM 285, and they called for the inclusion of the Backfire and the exclusion of cruise missiles from SALT II.\textsuperscript{15}

Once the delegations returned to Geneva the importance of the breakthrough at Vladivostok became apparent. The two sides after years of stalemate were now able to work from a joint draft treaty with differing proposals and interpretations contained in brackets. Gradually they were able to remove the brackets as each issue was resolved and by mid-May only a few major issues remained. These included as well as the Backfire bomber and cruise missile issues, disagreements over methods for verifying MIRV limits, the definition of a heavy missile, and the nature of limits on mobile ICBMs.\textsuperscript{16}

To break the stalemate on the remaining issues, another series of high level discussions was held including a brief meeting between Ford and Brezhnev at Helsinki while the two leaders were there for the CSCE summit and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. In meetings between Kissinger and Gromyko in mid-May in Vienna and July 10-11 in Geneva, the Secretary of State proposed that cruise missiles with a range of more than 3000 km could be included in SALT II, and that this range was negotiable. He also called for MIRVed missiles to be stationed at specific complexes with special MIRV handling equipment kept visible nearby, and that there be limits on mobile ICBMs.\textsuperscript{17}
The two brief meetings between Ford and Brezhnev at the Helsinki Conference do not seem to qualify as a separate summit given that they were merely taking advantage of their joint presence in Helsinki to clear up the problems which Vladivostok had not solved. It was agreed that if one MIRVed missile was placed in an ICBM field all other missiles at that complex would likewise be counted as MIRVed. There was also progress on setting a range for cruise missiles with the President agreeing to 1850 miles for air-launched cruise missiles and 375 for the sea-launched variety, but verification measures were not yet complete.

Most of the time, however, was spent discussing the Backfire bomber and whether or not it was a strategic weapon. President Ford presented the American case that the Backfire had strategic capabilities, especially if it was given the capability to engage in mid-air refueling. Brezhnev responded angrily that the American figures were misleading and that the Backfire had no such potential. Neither man would budge, and even with much of their second meeting on August 2 devoted to this controversy it was not resolved. Several more attempts were made to resolve the remaining issues in SALT II in time for another summit before the American election season began in 1976, but they were unsuccessful. SALT II had to be placed on the back burner until America had chosen its new leader.¹

December 1974 and January 1975 saw the climax of the two year struggle over the Jackson-Vanik amendment. In December the Congress passed both the Trade Reform Act with Jackson-Vanik attached, and the Export-Import Bank Bill with the
Stevenson amendment tacked on. A Central Committee meeting held on December 16 seems to have decided that the Soviet Union had tolerated too much interference in its internal affairs,, and on December 18 the Soviet government released the text of the letter Gromyko had given Kissinger during his October visit. President Ford signed both bills into law on January 3, 1975, despite a warning from Dobrynin that it would trigger a Soviet repudiation of the October, 1972 trade agreements. True to their word, on January 10 Dobrynin delivered a letter from the Soviet leadership which stated the USSR would not abide by the terms of the October, 1972 pacts, thus ending the whole affair."

Evaluation of the Propositions

Proposition One

We will now explore whether President Ford’s ascension to the Oval Office quieted the bitter disputes within the government that had characterized the last two presummit periods.

\textbf{P1:} The approach of the summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision makers and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes.

Gerald Ford’s assumption of the Presidency ended the hemorrhaging of executive authority that had characterized the two years since the Watergate scandal began to break. In the three months which preceded the Vladivostok summit the disarray which had plagued the preparations for the Moscow
summit five months earlier had ended, and the administration was able to put together the first negotiable SALT II proposal. The October 18 NSC meeting clearly shows not only the importance of the summit deadline, but also that the restoration of the Presidency allowed SALT II to move forward. Schlesinger made another appeal for an arms control treaty which would strictly limit the ability of the Soviets to MIRV their ICBMs, or for a greatly expanded American strategic building program, just as he had done so often in the past. Once again Kissinger provided the opposition by calling for a proposal which would limit the growth of Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, but at least had some chance of being the basis for an agreement. The difference between this and so many other NSC meetings on SALT II in the past two years was that President Ford overruled Schlesinger, and made a clear decision that allowed the development of a proposal which set the stage for the conceptual breakthrough at Vladivostok.

Upon Kissinger's return from his Moscow trip in late October when told that the Soviets would accept a treaty based on equal aggregates or counterbalancing asymmetries, Gerald Ford opted for equal aggregates. This decision was based on the unanimous advice of both Schlesinger and the JCS, and it would also be more acceptable to conservatives in Congress such as Senator Jackson who was the author of the amendment requiring SALT II to have equal ceilings. The approach of the Vladivostok summit did indeed force the major actors in the administration to develop a new SALT II proposal. Proposition one is strongly supported on this issue.
In the months just before Vladivostok it seemed that the impasse over the Jackson-Vanik amendment had finally been broken. The September 20–21 meetings in which Ford and Kissinger met both with Jackson and with Gromyko seemed to put together a compromise that would allow MFN to be extended to the Soviet Union, along with the other benefits signed in the October, 1972 trade pacts. A common position had been reached that both Jackson and the President could accept, although the figure of 60,000 annual emigres had never been approved by the Soviet Union. Jackson’s behavior at the press conference on October 18, and the passage of the Stevenson amendment were apparently the last straws for the Soviet leadership and the deal fell through. Nevertheless, the approach of the summit, as well as the approach of the mid term elections and the end of the current Congress, finally brought this long-running series of negotiations to a conclusion. Proposition one is supported in this case.

In sum, the restoration of executive authority meant that the deliberations before this summit would differ greatly from the two previous. President Ford was able to bring the warring departments together and craft the United States’ first negotiable SALT II proposal. He was also able to gain Senator Jackson’s agreement to a compromise solution to the controversy over Jewish emigration and the extension of MFN. Thus, proposition one is supported on the issues of arms control and the linked issues of trade and human rights.
Proposition Two

Did the Vladivostok accords remove significant obstacles to progress on SALT II? We will now explore this question.

P2: The President and General Secretary have resolved important issues which were unable to be resolved at lower levels.

The discussions at Vladivostok removed two key roadblocks to agreement which had delayed progress on SALT II from its inception in November, 1972. Since the onset of the negotiations the Soviet Union had insisted that the American FBS be included in the SALT II ceilings. No American administration could ever agree to such a proposition since those systems were not aimed at deterring a strategic strike on the United States, but rather their purpose was to deter a Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe given the USSR's superiority in conventional weapons. To do so would send a shock through the alliance and lead many to question America's willingness protect Western Europe with its nuclear umbrella. When the Soviets officially agreed to postpone limits on American FBS until SALT III, a huge hurdle to agreement had been removed.

The key compromise on the American side was an end to the attempt to severely limit the MIRVed throwweight of Soviet ICBMs. Every American proposal since SALT II began had called for throwweight limits so strict that the Soviet Union would be unable to MIRV more than a few hundred of their ICBMs, while the limits would actually allow an expansion of the American MIRVed ICBM forces due to the
smaller size of the Minuteman missile. As late as Kissinger's October trip to Moscow the United States was calling for reductions in the number of heavy missiles on the Soviet side down to 250. Once again Brezhnev rejected this plank in the American proposal. The Vladivostok agreement marked the end of attempts to severely limit throwweight in SALT II; the American side dropped this portion of the October proposal. In fact the SALT I restrictions on the conversion of silos for light ICBMs to launchers for heavies were merely carried over to SALT II. A potential deal-breaker for the Soviet Union had been dropped by the American side.

Proposition two is supported by the evidence in the case of SALT II.

The discussions on the linked issues of trade and human rights were not negotiations, but rather a forum in which Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership could register their protests regarding the behavior of Senator Jackson and the Congress in general. No roadblocks were removed even though Brezhnev did confirm to President Ford that Soviet assurances would be carried out despite their disdain for the public airing of the agreements. The second proposition is not upheld on this issue.

In sum, the Vladivostok summit removed a number of significant obstacles to progress on SALT II, especially on the issues of American FBS and Soviet heavy missiles. On the question of Jewish emigration and MFN there were no negotiations since the administration had finally agreed with Senator Jackson
on a compromise solution. Therefore, proposition two is supported on arms control, but not on trade and human rights.

Proposition Three

We will now explore whether the agreement negotiated at Vladivostok satisfies the requirements of the third proposition.

P3: Framework agreements at U.S.-Soviet summits pave the way for more rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal agreement.

The negotiations at Vladivostok established the outline of the SALT II Treaty. The heart of the treaty as signed in 1979 was a set of ceilings and subceilings beginning with the 2400 limit on SNDVs of which only 1320 could be MIRVed missiles. This conceptual breakthrough, based on equal aggregates for both sides, set a pattern which would later be used to solve problems the Vladivostok accords did not fully deal with. The cruise missile controversy was eventually settled in the Carter years by defining bombers carrying cruise missiles as MIRVed weapons falling under the 1320 category, and creating a separate subceiling of 1200 MIRVed missiles. American concerns on the number of Soviet MIRVed ICBMs were partially addressed by a ceiling of 820 in the final version of the treaty. Thus a concept had been agreed to around which the rest of the treaty could be structured.

In the months following the summit, the delegations in Geneva were able to work from a joint draft of the treaty and
steady progress was made in settling the remaining issues. By the middle of May, when Kissinger and Gromyko met in Vienna, only a relatively small number of issues remained to be solved. Unfortunately, the two major bones of contention, the cruise missile and the Backfire bomber, were questions that had been glossed over at Vladivostok.

The greatest failure of the summit between Ford and Brezhnev was that it did not settle the status of these two weapons. The controversy over the cruise missile seems to at first been brought on by a genuine misunderstanding. In the discussions on the status of ASMs in October, and at the summit, the American side believed this to mean only ballistic missiles while the Soviets thought that cruise missiles were included. This led to the great difficulty in completing the aide-memoire after the summit. This points up one of the great disadvantages of negotiating at summits when time constraints can sometimes lead to misunderstandings that would have been clarified if the negotiations had taken place at a more normal pace.

The assumption that the Backfire would not be included in SALT II is a far different story. In this case, the President and Secretary Kissinger made a calculation that they could overcome the military's insistence that the bomber fall within the 2400 ceiling. They were obviously wrong. The JCS, and conservatives in Congress made the Backfire the principle stumbling block to the conclusion of SALT II by their insistence that it be included in the face of Soviet rejection. These two issues, neither of which seemed vital before the summit, would largely be responsible for the
nearly five year delay in completing SALT II. But while the Vladivostok accords were not perfect, the heart of the SALT II Treaty was agreed to there. It remains an excellent example of how the leaders can settle large issues and clear a path for lower level negotiations. Proposition three is strongly supported by the evidence in this case.

Proposition three is not upheld in the case of the discussions on trade and human rights since the talks were not aimed at creating a new agreement, but rather on rescuing an old one.

In sum, the Vladivostok accords are the clearest example yet of a framework agreement negotiated at a U.S.-Soviet summit. The heart of the SALT II Treaty was agreed to at Vladivostok, and while the accords were not complete, the conceptual breakthrough achieved at this meeting created a guide for the resolution of the outstanding issues. On no other issues did the discussions even approach the level of detail. Thus, proposition three is supported by the evidence on arms control gathered from this summit. but not on the other issues considered in this study.

**Proposition Four**

We will now examine whether or not any of the discussions at Vladivostok could be considered as educational attempts.

P4: Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterpart on their concerns and interests on the important issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted
in changes in the behavior of the superpowers following the summit.

The Soviet letter of October 26 and Brezhnev’s anger at Jackson in October and at Vladivostok were clearly attempts to communicate to Ford and Kissinger that the Congress and Senator Jackson in particular had gone too far in their meddling in Soviet internal affairs. They were trying to communicate to the American leadership that the Soviet Union could not tolerate this kind of blatant, public interference in a domestic matter. There is substantial evidence that Brezhnev himself was under fire for the way in which the Jackson-Vanik amendment was dealt with since the Gromyko letter was published on December 18, only two days after the convening of a Central Committee plenum. In short, Brezhnev and Gromyko use the Vladivostok meeting as an opportunity to communicate to President Ford that there were limits in their willingness to tolerate congressional interference in their internal affairs. Still, there was no attempt to describe for Ford the inner workings of the Soviet political system and powerful groups who were offended by the actions of Jackson and the Congress, or in any other way explain why such interference was intolerable. There was no real attempt to educate the American leadership, only clear statements that such behavior was unacceptable. Because of this, proposition four is not upheld.

The arms control discussions at Vladivostok were aimed at negotiating a framework for SALT II, not tutoring the other side on some new strategic concept or the dangers of
the emerging situation. Therefore proposition four is not supported on this issue.

In sum, Vladivostok was a summit devoted to negotiation, not education. None of the discussions could be described as attempts to educate the adversary. Therefore, proposition four is not supported by any of the discussions at Vladivostok.

Conclusion

The Vladivostok summit demonstrates that summit diplomacy can be used to construct the conceptual framework around which an agreement can be built. The accords were not perfect since the failure to deal with the cruise missile and the Backfire bomber would haunt SALT II for years to come. Raymond Garthoff blames Kissinger's practice of excluding other actors from the summit preparation process for this failure.20 There does seem to be merit in this claim in that the Secretary of State had no idea that the military felt so strongly that the Backfire should be included. Yet, in Kissinger's defense, Johnson points out that neither of these issues seemed important to the Pentagon before the summit.

The summit also points out the importance of presidential authority in controlling bureaucratic disputes over issues such as arms control. One of the critical factors that allowed Vladivostok to succeed was President Ford's ability to forge consensus among the major actors in the internal SALT deliberations within the executive branch. For years SALT II had been stalled due to President Nixon's
weakness created by the Watergate affair. Unfortunately, the momentum could not be maintained because of the disputes over the Backfire and the cruise missile, and because of the approach of the 1976 election. SALT II would then have to suffer another long delay while a new administration got its arms control bearings.

Table 10

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<th>Proposition 1</th>
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<td>action-forcing</td>
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Vladivostok arms arms arms none
control, control control
trade, human rights

The preceding table demonstrates how different the Vladivostok summit was from the Moscow summit just five months earlier. The administration was able to put together its first negotiable SALT II proposal, and to reach a compromise solution with key members of Congress on the thorny issue of Jewish emigration and MFN for the Soviet Union, thus upholding proposition one. At the summit, important roadblocks to progress on SALT II were removed, and a framework which settled many of the critical issues was hammered out, thereby supporting the second and third propositions. Only the fourth proposition was not sustained by the evidence gathered from this summit.


2. Garthoff, pp. 442-443.


Wolfe cites different numbers for this proposal than Garthoff. According to Wolfe, the plan called for 2000 SNDVs, 1000 MIRVed missiles, and sublimits on heavy systems and ASMs.


Wolfe, pp. 174-178.


Garthoff, p. 450.


Johnson, pp. 610-613.

Wolfe, pp. 200-201.

18. Ford, pp. 303-305.

Johnson, pp. 612-613.


Garthoff, pp. 458-459.

Ford, p. 224.

CHAPTER X

VIENNA 1979

Setting

Nearly five years elapsed between Gerald Ford's trip to Vladivostok in November 1974 and the next full summit between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. By the time Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev met for the first time, the general atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations had changed dramatically, and the policy of detente was now under heavy fire. The long sought completion of SALT II was the primary reason for a summit in the summer of 1979, and there were other signs of life in detente, such as increased trade between the United States and the Soviet Union, the possibility that MFN might finally be extended to the U.S.S.R., and record levels of Jewish emigration. On the whole, however, detente was being eroded by greater superpower competition in regional disputes in Africa and Asia. The rate of increase in Soviet defense spending slowed after 1976, but the Politburo was still devoting extraordinary resources to the building of their nuclear and conventional forces. Together these developments weakened support for detente in the United States as the Carter administration came under increasing pressure to take a more
assertive stance regarding the Soviet Union. By the end of the year, this era of detente would have come to an end.

The Vienna summit took place in a complex atmosphere of competition and cooperation. Trade was expanding, but disagreements over Soviet human rights policy caused it to move in fits and starts. SALT II was nearly completed, but Soviet activity in Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia was rapidly eroding domestic support for detente in the United States. America's growing ties to China were no doubt having a similar effect in Moscow. In fact, in the United States, SALT II was already under attack, even before it had been concluded, by conservative groups like the Committee for the Present Danger. This summit would clearly differ from the four detente-era meetings that preceded it.

Presummit Preparations

The desire to complete SALT II in time for a summit in mid-1979 led intense negotiations between January and May, largely between Vance and Dobrynin. In this period the Secretary and the Ambassador met almost weekly to solve the remaining issues, principally telemetry encryption and limits on missile modernization, so that a summit could be announced. The encryption issue had become very controversial within the administration with the Director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield Turner pushing for strict limits on the Soviet ability to encode missile telemetry during tests. During the meeting between Secretary of State Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko in December, Turner,
Brown, and Brzezinski had called the Secretary of State in the middle of the meeting and insisted that current Soviet language was too vague. They wanted Vance to get Soviet agreement that the level of encoding practiced on tests of the SS-18 on December 21 and July 29 would be unacceptable under SALT II. Vance disagreed, but was unable to change their minds over the phone. This and Soviet anger at the sudden normalization of relations with China, prevented the announcement of a Carter-Brezhnev summit in December.¹

Eventually, the problem was settled by a letter to Brezhnev drafted on March 29, accompanied by a note to Dobrynin stating that the United States would consider the July 29 and December 21 tests a violation of SALT II if tests such as this were practiced in the future. Agreement came on April 7, and essentially banned the encryption of telemetry that was necessary to verification of the treaty. In the meantime the Soviets agreed to a five percent limit on missile modernization, and on April 7 this issue was closed when the United States agreed to allow downsizing adjustments to this limit for testing practices. The final technical issue of any consequence was settled on May 1, and on May 8 Vance informed the President that SALT II was complete. On May 11 it was announced that Carter and Brezhnev would meet in Vienna June 15-18 to sign SALT II.²

In a related action, President Carter decided on June 7 to go ahead with production of the MX missile. This step was supported by all of Carter's advisers on foreign and security policy. Brzezinski saw it as one of two important actions the President had to take before he went to the summit in
order to position himself correctly for his meeting with Brezhnev. Vance saw the military necessity of the MX, but more important believed the MX was critical to win Senate approval for SALT II.\textsuperscript{3}

The months just before the Carter-Brezhnev summit in 1979 provided several topics on regional issues for the leaders to discuss during their meeting in Vienna. The Ogaden conflict had quieted down by early 1979 due largely to the Ethiopian victory in the previous year and their decision not to invade Somalia. Despite the signature of the Camp David Treaty on March 26, the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asian regions were beginning to draw attention away from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Carter’s spectacular diplomatic coup in which he personally shuttled between Cairo and Tel Aviv to save the agreement when it seemed it was about to fail once again had excluded the Soviets from the peace process. As in 1974, the Soviet Union could not complain too loudly without highlighting its own impotence in the area, and therefore the Arab-Israeli dispute did not occupy a great deal of the leaders’ time at the summit.

The return of Ayatollah Khomeini on January 31 to Iran created a great deal of uncertainty as to America’s future relations with what had once been the bulwark of United States’ foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. While Iran’s status had great implications for the Cold War balance of power in the region, this was only a potential problem between the superpowers since the Soviets were largely bystanders in the events of 1978-1979, even though they stood to benefit a great deal if Iran changed camps. The only
official U.S.-Soviet clash over Iran in this period came in February when the United States officially protested a clandestine Farsi language radio station in the Soviet Union which was beaming anti-American propaganda into Iran. Nevertheless, the loss of Iran greatly increased American anxiety about the shifting balance of power in the region.4

This anxiety was heightened when in the same month, February, 1979, Soviet-backed North Yemen attacked South Yemen. Primarily to reassure the Saudis, to whom the growing instability in the region seemed increasingly threatening, the United States rushed a $390 million aid package of armored vehicles and warplanes to South Yemen. In addition, the U.S.S. Constellation and her battle group was sent to the area along with two AWACs aircraft to Saudi Arabia.5

On Iran’s eastern border, the Soviet role in Afghanistan was beginning to grow as the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul became increasingly threatened by the mujahadeen. On February 14, rebels seized the American Ambassador Adolph Dubs, and he was killed in a botched rescue attempt. Mutinies in the Afghan army at Herat in March and Jalalabad in April saw entire divisions turn to the rebel cause, and resulted in the deaths of many Soviet advisers. The Soviet leadership immediately stepped up the level of aid to the Afghan government, increased the number of advisers, and sent a number of high level emissaries including the head of the Main Political Administration, General Aleksei Yepishev.6 This stepped up Soviet activity began to concern Brzezinski, and he asked Turner to generate more intelligence on the situation in Afghanistan. In April, Brzezinski was able to
convince the administration at a meeting of the Special Coordinating Committee to be more sympathetic to the mujahadeen, although his memoirs do not make clear the nature of this sympathy. Finally, sometime in this period, Brzezinski also expressed to Dobrynin the administration's growing concern about the level of Soviet activity in Afghanistan. 7

The divisions within the administration over regional issues which had begun over the war in the Ogaden were carried over into the administration's deliberations over how to approach events in the so-called arc of crisis. At a meeting held just before the summit, Brzezinski, Brown, and Schlesinger pushed for a wider security arrangement in the area. Brzezinski went as far as to call for a preponderance of power in the region for the United States, not just a balance of power as Brown and Schlesinger had suggested. Vance and Assistant Secretary of State Warren Christopher disagreed, and called for greater restraint in the region. The National Security Adviser also advocated throughout this period an expanded naval presence in the area, joint exercises with allies in the region, and the propositioning of equipment. 1

America and its NATO allies were also moving toward decisions to respond to the threat presented by the continuing buildup of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces in Europe. On January 4-5, President Carter met with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, Prime Minister James Callaghan of Great Britain, and President Valery Giscard d'Estaing of France to discuss increased levels of
western defense spending and the possible deployment of new American intermediate range missiles in Western Europe. Carter pressed his counterparts to allow the deployment of these missiles, and was joined by Callaghan, and Giscard, although Callaghan argued that intermediate range weapons in Europe needed to be included in SALT III. Schmidt was more reluctant, and insisted that West Germany would only accept the weapons if another continental ally did as well. President Carter responded that this position was ironic given that it was Schmidt who first raised the issue in his speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 1977. In May, NATO's Defense Planning Committee agreed to a target of a three percent annual real increase in defense spending by each member, and it was also roughly at this time that NATO's High Level Group, studying the issue of INF deployment, recommended 200-600 Pershing II and ground launched cruise missile (GLCM) be stationed in Western Europe.

The final regional issue to be discussed at the upcoming summit was the increasingly complex triangular relationship between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. Deng's arrival in the United States on January 28 began a spectacular summit in which the Chinese leaders used every opportunity to emphasize the need for a joint Western-Chinese stand against attempts by any party to seek hegemony, the Chinese code word for Soviet expansion. This transparent reference to the Soviet Union also appeared in the communique at the end of the summit. While in Washington, Deng informed Carter that China would soon be forced to teach Vietnam a
lesson for its invasion of Cambodia. The President tried to
dissuade the Chinese from taking such action, but Carter
issued no threats, nor did he predict negative consequences
for Chinese-American relations if this step were taken."

On February 16, very soon after Deng's return from
America, China launched its invasion of Vietnam and occupied
Vietnamese territory for three weeks before withdrawing. The
Soviet Union immediately protested the apparent Sino-American
collusion and Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a speech to the
United Nations, warned the United States of the dangers of
playing the "China Card." Throughout the conflict, the
administration refrained from harsh criticism of the Chinese
action and instead called for mutual withdrawals, the Chinese
from Vietnam and the Vietnamese from Cambodia. The
normalization of relations continued to go forward throughout
the conflict with Treasury Secretary Blumenthal traveling to
Beijing on February 27, and the American and Chinese
embassies opening on March 1."}

In the final preparations for the summit, the split
between Vance and Brzezinski over how to counter Soviet
gеopolitical moves continued and led each to see the summit's
purpose in very different terms. Vance believed that the
meeting between Carter and Brezhnev should be used to confirm
the basic structure of detente, and the substantial interest
both superpowers had in strategic stability and avoiding
confrontations in the third world. Brzezinski sought to use
the summit to directly engage the Soviet leadership in a
discussion of the dangers of their activity in the Indian
Ocean area and the threat that this presented to America's
vital interests. He hoped to set up a procedure in which top Soviet and United States' officials could meet regularly to discuss regional trouble spots. Brzezinski believed that for the summit to be a success the United States must at least begin to engage the Soviets on these issues and to convince them of the dangers their actions presented.13

In the period before the Vienna summit hope began to grow that the impediments which had slowed the growth of U.S.-Soviet trade could be removed. Chief among these impediments was, of course, the Jackson-Vanik amendment. In 1978, Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R. had grown to 30,000, far above the level of the years immediately after the passage of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments, and two of the three authors of these amendments, Vanik and Stevenson, began to sound conciliatory to the idea of extending MFN to the Soviet Union. On January 5 Vanik said that he might be willing to support the removal of trade restrictions on the U.S.S.R., and later in the year Stevenson proposed raising the credit limit from $300 million to $2 billion and extending MFN in exchange a Presidential certification that Soviet emigration practices were acceptable.14

In March, Vance and Blumenthal proposed that the administration go to the Congress to gain approval of MFN for both the Soviet Union and China, but no final decision was made at the March 31 meeting of the NSC. The opposition, as usual, came from Brzezinski, but also from Vice-President Mondale who wished to avoid a fight over Jewish emigration with Jackson since the Senator from Washington remained a
firm opponent of trade liberalization with the Soviet Union. Brzezinski successfully maneuvered to keep trade off of the summit agenda in the days just before the summit by convincing the President that allowing Blumenthal and Commerce Secretary Kreps to travel to Vienna would create unfounded expectations of a trade deal at the summit.  

There was progress on several other human rights fronts in the first half of 1979. In addition to Jewish emigration, which was well on its way to topping the 50,000 mark for the year, five prominent dissidents were released just before the summit, including Aleksandr Ginzburg and Georgy Vins. The release and emigration of these dissidents was seen as crucial by Brzezinski, along with the MX decision, to position the President before the summit.  

The Summit  

The erosion of public and congressional support for the Carter Presidency was exemplified by the discord in Washington just as the President was about to leave for Vienna. Senator Henry Jackson made a speech on the eve of the President's departure comparing Carter to Neville Chamberlain and calling the Carter foreign policy appeasement. The President was so upset by this charge that he ordered that no umbrellas be used by his entourage, no matter what the weather conditions were when they landed in Vienna, to avoid comparisons to Munich.  

Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev met for the first time on June 15 at the palace of Austrian President Rudolf
Kirchschlaeger, and paid a courtesy call to the President and Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. The formal summit discussions began the next day, and sessions were held alternately at the American and Soviet embassies. The meetings tended to be formal with the two leaders meeting alone only once on the last day of the summit. Brezhnev's ability to engage in extended, free-flowing discussion was limited by his poor health, and Dobrynin had sought since January to limit the scope of the summit to SALT and little else. Throughout the conference almost everything Brezhnev said was prescripted and read by the General Secretary from note cards with Gromyko often pointing out the proper passages.

The only major business left to be conducted on SALT II was an exchange of understandings on the Backfire bomber. Brezhnev, as Vance and Dobrynin had arranged before the summit, was to state that the Soviet Union would not produce more than 30 Backfires per year during the life of SALT II, and this then would be entered into the record. The General Secretary at first was reluctant to make a specific commitment on the bomber, but when pressed by Carter at a later meeting, he gave the proper assurance. The President then asserted the right of the United States to build a comparable system and SALT II was closed.

By far the most interesting arms control discussions at Vienna concerned future negotiations on SALT III. Carter consulted extensively with Brown, Vance, Brzezinski, Chairman of the JCS David Jones, and ACDA Director George Seignious on the flight to Vienna and on the night before formal negotiations began. The discussions centered around
America's goals in the next round of arms control talks. General Jones argued for five percent annual reductions in the SALT II ceilings through 1985, and that the United States and the Soviet Union should implement each provision of SALT III as it was agreed to, rather than waiting for the whole treaty to be completed. Carter and his advisers also decided to seek a freeze on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons while SALT III was being negotiated.

The President presented these ideas and other goals for SALT III to Brezhnev in detail on the second day of the summit, Sunday, June 17. The list of ideas was extensive and included a commitment to deep reductions in SALT III, a ban on the encryption of telemetry, a freeze on the production of warheads and launchers, safe havens for ballistic missile submarines, no depressed trajectory SLBM tests, a comprehensive test ban, prenotification of missile tests and bomber exercises, a ban on antisatellite weapons, regular consultation between military leaders, the inclusion of medium range systems in SALT III, immediate implementation of SALT III provisions without waiting for final ratification, five percent annual reductions while SALT III was being negotiated, and a ban on the sale of nuclear fuel to non-NPT states. Brezhnev was so impressed with these ideas that he asked for a copy of the proposals which the President provided for him in longhand.

The Soviets responded to one of these ideas the next day. Brezhnev rejected the five percent reduction proposal as too simplistic, and he insisted that the other nuclear powers be included in arms control negotiations before deep
reductions were possible. This was the dominant theme in Soviet statements regarding their goals for SALT III. The next round must include not only American FBS but also French, British, and especially Chinese systems must somehow be accounted for. The Soviets were clearly disturbed by the idea of deep reductions in their nuclear arsenal that created permanent equivalence with the United States while China and other states were free to build without arms control restraints.

One interesting, and potentially significant, innovation at the Vienna summit was a meeting between the Defense Ministers and top military officers of the United States and the Soviet Union. Dobrynin was informed before the summit that Brown and Jones would accompany the President to Vienna and that they would like to meet with their counterparts, Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov. The Ambassador was also informed that the Americans wished to discuss MBFR at this meeting. When the four men actually met during the summit, little of substance was actually accomplished beyond a brief discussion of SALT II and a few exchanges on MBFR. Ustinov also used this as a forum to complain that current plans to deploy the MX ICBM in multiple protective shelters was a violation of SALT II. Brown and Jones emerged from the meeting disappointed that the primary agenda item they hoped to discuss, MBFR, had received only a few minutes of attention. The Soviets apparently did not understand that the American military leaders hoped to address this topic alone.
Primarily because of Brezhnev's poor health the exchanges on regional issues were very formal, and never took on the wide ranging and candid exploration of each others' views which Carter and Brzezinski had hoped for. Carter began these discussions by registering strong objections to Soviet activity in Africa and Asia. The Soviets had not sought, he claimed, peaceful resolutions of conflicts in Africa, but had instead sent 40,000 Cuban troops and billions of dollars in equipment to establish or aid allies in the region. In Southwest Asia, Carter issued a warning that the United States had not intervened in Iran and Afghanistan, and expected that the Soviet Union would do the same. On the Arab-Israeli dispute the President maintained that the United States had not deliberately sought to exclude the Soviet Union from the negotiations, and had only pursued the separate Egyptian-Israeli talks because Syria had refused to go to Geneva in 1977. Carter still expressed hope that the Soviets would participate in the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping force in the Siani. Lastly, the President sought to reassure Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership that the normalization of relations between the United States and China was not aimed at threatening the Soviet Union, and that America would not seek to expand the relationship at the U.S.S.R.'s expense."

The vast majority of Brezhnev's reply was devoted to China and the dangers of a Sino-American alliance. The General Secretary stressed China's aggressive nature, he accused them of seeking a world war, and while the normalization of relations between the United States and
China was natural, any further steps in the security area could have serious consequences. Regarding Africa and Asia, Brezhnev denied that the Soviet Union had created instability in any state in those regions. In Africa, the Soviet Union had only sought to end colonialism and racism and sought no strategic advantage for itself. He assured the president that the Soviet leadership had not encouraged the coup in Afghanistan, and ironically, given what would happen in December, Brezhnev sought a pledge that neither side would attack the regime in Kabul. On the Middle East, Brezhnev called the Egyptian-Israeli treaty a failure, and argued that it had encouraged Israel to attack Lebanon. He rejected Soviet help in the establishment of a United Nations force in the Siani, and pledged to counter any attempts in the United Nations to bolster the Camp David treaty.

By the time Brezhnev finished his formal reply it was so late that Carter only had enough time remaining to tell the Soviet leader to study his words carefully because a clash was possible if the Soviet Union acted in a way which threatened America's vital interests.

The next day during the only private session between the two leaders Brezhnev returned to China and proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union sign a treaty pledging to come to each other's defense if a third country attacked either superpower. He expressed concern that China's attack on Vietnam had come after Deng's trip to the United States, although he did not make accusations of Sino-American collusion. The General Secretary went on in great detail
about China's territorial claims, its nuclear ambitions, and the threat it posed to world peace.

At the conclusion of the talks on regional issues Carter and Brzezinski were clearly disappointed in their inability to engage the Soviets in a frank discussion of geopolitical issues. The President had carefully explained America's concerns with Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa and Southwest Asia, but Brezhnev's response had been standard Soviet boilerplate, unchanged since Khrushchev's summit with Kennedy in 1961. Nearly all of Brezhnev's reply to the President had been prescripted in advance, and was carefully read by the General Secretary with Gromyko's guidance. The free-flowing discussion of regional concerns that Brzezinski sought never materialized, and the Soviets also rebuffed his efforts to establish routine high-level consultations on regional troublespots. Carter returned to Washington feeling that little had been done to clarify superpower interests in regional disputes."

Brzezinski's careful presumit maneuvers had guaranteed that trade talks at Vienna would be limited. Human rights did receive somewhat more attention, although it did not come up until the last day of the summit. During their private session, Brezhnev insisted that human rights issues were internal matters and not a legitimate subject for discussion at a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting. He called for expanded trade between the superpowers, but maintained the Soviet leadership would not tolerate linking commercial ties to human rights practices. Given President Carter's devotion to the protection of the human rights of Soviet dissidents his
response was surprisingly moderate. He tried to convey to Brezhnev that these issues were important to the American people, and that he would continue to press the Soviet leadership on these matters. The President praised liberalized Soviet emigration policy and the recent release of the five dissidents, but he also called for the release of Anatoly Shchranisky, which Brezhnev rejected.  

Summit Aftermath

Upon his return to Washington, President Carter began the job of selling SALT II to the Senate by addressing a joint session of Congress. Opposition to the treaty had been gathering for quite some time and it was obvious that the vote would be close. At the end of August a new controversy erupted over the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. While not related to the discussions this event did preoccupy Washington for the month of September before it was resolved. This delayed the beginning of hearings on SALT II at a crucial time, perhaps long enough for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December to doom the treaty. On November 9, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee voted 9-6 in favor of the treaty, but the Armed Services Committee voted 10-0 against SALT II with seven abstentions. Interagency preparations for SALT III were begun, but most of the work was put on hold until SALT II was ratified. Unfortunately, the events of late December, 1979 made this impossible.  

Conflict in the Indian Ocean region reached new heights after the summit. In Iran the situation continued to
deteriorate for the United States resulting with the seizure of the American Embassy and the taking of its personnel hostage on November 4. The situation in the Yemens took an even stranger turn when in November the Defense Minister of North Yemen turned up in Moscow to sign a military aid deal only months after it had received the emergency aid package from the United States. Together with the instability in Afghanistan, the turmoil in Iran made Southwest Asia the primary focus of American foreign policy for the next few years.

Summer and fall 1979 saw NATO move closer to a decision to deploy American intermediate range missiles in Europe, and this led the Soviet Union to begin to apply pressure to prevent this step from being taken. The Soviet campaign against deployment escalated on October 6 when Brezhnev made a speech in which he offered to reduce Soviet medium range missile forces, without specifying the weapons or numbers to be limited in exchange for a decision by NATO not to deploy missiles in Western Europe." President Carter rejected the proposal three days later, and on December 12, 1979 the North Atlantic Council decided to deploy 572 Pershing II and GLCMs in five NATO nations. The Soviet reaction was swift, harsh, and very negative.

Upset by what he considered to be Soviet stonewalling at Vienna, President Carter took several steps after the summit to strengthen ties between the United States and China. On July 11 the President directed Brown, Brzezinski and Vance to work out a sale of items to China which were banned to the Soviet Union. Two weeks later on July 27, Carter decided to
proceed with the granting of MFN to China, without linking this to a similar extension to the Soviet Union, as Vance and Blumenthal had recommended before the summit. In August Vice President Mondale visited the People’s Republic of China, and secretly arranged for Defense Secretary Brown to visit later in the year. Brown’s visit came in October and his presence in Beijing was leaked to the press in a report which claimed his purpose was to bolster China’s defense in the event that the United States needed assistance in a war against the Soviet Union. Finally, on October 23 President Carter presented the American-Chinese trade agreement to the Congress. Together these events tilted the United States much further toward Beijing than at any previous time in the era of triangular politics that Nixon had inaugurated in 1972. 30

Trade with the Soviet Union was also growing in the last half of 1979, despite Carter’s decision not to seek MFN for the Soviet Union until SALT II was further along. On August 1 the Soviets contracted to buy twenty million tons of corn and wheat, and on October 3 this figure was raised to twenty-five million tons. In fact, 1979 was a record year in U.S.-Soviet trade with $4.5 billion in goods changing hands, including $2.4 in American grain sales to the Soviet Union. Jewish emigration figures also reached an all time high by the end of 1979 with 50,000 people leaving the U.S.S.R. This all came to an end with the events of December 27. 31

The months after Vienna saw increasing concern within the Soviet leadership regarding events in Afghanistan. In June the Politburo dispatched high-level emissary Vasily
Safronchuk to Kabul to assess the situation and to get the regime back on track. Just following the summit he conveyed to the American Charge d’Affairs Bruce Amstutz that Moscow was very unhappy with Prime Minister Amin and that a change might be in the works, but he reiterated Brezhnev’s assurances at Vienna that Soviet goals in Afghanistan were limited. Events began to move far more rapidly in September when on the 14th of that month President Taraki was ousted in a coup and then executed on October 8. The Carter administration became increasingly concerned in the fall of 1979 over events in Afghanistan, but there was little the United States’ government could do beyond warnings on November 19 and December 19. The invasion, which began on December 27, closed the period of detente begun by Nixon’s trip to Moscow in May, 1972, and ushered in a new period of greater tension between the superpowers.32

Evaluation of the Propositions

Proposition One

We will now examine if the approach of the Vienna summit forced the Carter administration to reach a consensus on important issues.

P1: The approach of the summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision makers and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes.

The desire to conclude SALT II and set a firm date for the summit did help provide pressure to settle a dispute
within the United States government over the encryption of telemetry. In Vance's December 21-23 meeting with Gromyko, the two sides were very close to reaching an agreement on this issue. In the middle of the conference, Vance was called away to receive a phone call in which Turner, Brown and Brzezinski insisted that a more precise definition of unacceptable encryption be negotiated. The issue remained unresolved until March when an exchange of letters, and a message to Dobrynin, bridged the gap, but this formulation required a compromise between Vance and Turner. The disputed Soviet tests of July 29 and December 21 were not mentioned in the letter to Brezhnev, but they were addressed in the message to Dobrynin which stated that such encryption as it was practiced in these tests would be considered a violation of SALT II by the United States. Turner's concerns were thereby addressed in a fashion acceptable to the Soviet Union. This kind of bureaucratic dispute can often drag on for years without the pressure of a deadline to force its resolution. Carter's desire for a summit in the summer of 1979 to sign SALT II provided the deadline which brought this issue to a successful conclusion. Proposition one is upheld in the issue of arms control.

On regional issues, the approach of the summit did not have the same positive effects that it had on SALT II. The deep philosophical divisions within the administration could not so easily be healed. Vance and Brzezinski were the principal opponents, and each saw the nature of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in very different terms. In the period before Vienna, Vance
saw events in the Horn of Africa and Southwest Asia far more in local terms than Brzezinski did, who tended to see each conflict within a Cold War framework. Brzezinski pushed for strong action during the war in the Ogaden while Vance counseled restraint. The arc of crisis was itself a concept that originated with Brzezinski, and he pushed strenuously in the spring of 1979 in the presummit deliberations for a greater American presence in the region. Vance wanted the summit to reaffirm the basic structure of detente, while the National Security Adviser wanted to engage the Soviets in a strategic dialogue that would clarify American interests in the region.

The divisions over policy in the Indian Ocean region were carried over into the debate over the proper relationship between the United States and China. Vance consistently sought a more evenhanded American approach to the Soviet Union and China, as exemplified by his March proposal for the joint extension of MFN to both countries. Brzezinski, on the other hand, was always the leading proponent of closer relations with the People's Republic, and began to push for it soon after he lost the policy debate over the response to the war in the Horn of Africa. An impending summit could never be sufficient to heal divisions that run so deep and that are rooted in such fundamental differences over the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The first proposition is not supported by the evidence on regional issues.

The same divisions within the administration existed over trade policy. As was mentioned above in March, Vance
sought to extend MFN to the Soviet Union as well as to China. Brzezinski, along with Mondale this time, once again led the opposition to closer ties to the U.S.S.R. When President Carter decided on July 27 to seek MFN for China alone, Brzezinski quickly called in the Chinese Ambassador to give him the news, and also to make certain that the decision could not be reversed. There had been some momentum building behind the extension of MFN to the Soviet Union, including positive statements by both Senator Stevenson and Representative Vanik, but Brzezinski's opposition, and the fear of another fight with Senator Jackson were enough to see the move postponed until after the summit. This delay meant that MFN would once again be caught up in larger issues in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and any hopes for it were dashed in December when Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan. Proposition one is not shown to have merit in this case.

Despite some unease on Vance's part on the impact of President Carter's very public pressure on the Soviet leadership on the issue of human rights, this was not an overly divisive issue within the administration. Proposition one is not upheld in this case.

In sum, proposition one is supported by evidence on the issue of arms control. The pressure to complete SALT II so that a Carter-Brezhnev summit could be held, forced a divided administration to reach a compromise solution on the issue of telemetry encryption. On regional issues and trade, however, the divisions were so great that the approach of the summit did not bring consensus, while on human rights
a general consensus already existed. Therefore proposition one is supported on the issue of arms control, but not on the other issues considered by the study.

Proposition Two

Were obstacles to agreement removed at Vienna? We will now explore this question.

P2: The President and General Secretary have resolved important issues which were unable to be resolved at lower levels.

SALT II had been completed before the Vienna summit, therefore there were no roadblocks to remove. The only piece of unfinished business was the Soviet assurances on the Backfire bomber, but this exchange had been carefully scripted in advance by Vance and Dobrynin. There was a brief mix-up when Brezhnev in his original statement did not state that the Soviet Union would not produce more than thirty Backfires per year, and President Carter pressed him on the issue at their next meeting. Brezhnev, somewhat in exasperation, made the pledge and SALT II was concluded. This does not legitimately seem to qualify as removing an important obstacle to agreement. Proposition two is not upheld in this case.

On regional issues, the talks were not aimed at solving particular problems as much as they were an attempt to engage the Soviets in a broad strategic dialogue on geopolitical matters. The only issue on which there was a discussion
about concrete action was the American request that the Soviets participate in the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai. Brezhnev immediately rejected the offer because to do so would imply Soviet support for the Camp David Treaty, and the Soviet leadership had no intention of giving its blessing to this pact. The second proposition is not supported on this issue.

Brzezinski's successful efforts to delay the extension of MFN until after the summit, and to have Blumenthal and Kreps left off the summit delegation, insured that there would not be any serious, detailed trade negotiations at Vienna. In the conversations between Carter and Brezhnev trade did not occupy a great deal of the leaders' time. It was brought up by Brezhnev on the last day of the summit in their private meeting when the General Secretary insisted that increased trade should not be linked to internal human rights policies, but he made no progress with the President on this question. The traditional roadblock to the granting of MFN, Jewish emigration, was in fact improving in 1979, and a record number of emigres left the Soviet Union that year. President Carter thanked Brezhnev for this state of affairs, but there was no negotiation on this topic. The second proposition is not supported in this case.

President Carter did specifically press the General Secretary on another human rights issue, the imprisonment of Anatoly Shchransky. Brezhnev's reply was swift and negative. Shchransky had broken laws and Brezhnev was bound to uphold his duty and enforce those laws. Shchransky would not be released. Proposition two is not upheld in this case.
In sum, on none of the issues examined in this dissertation were there significant roadblocks to progress removed by the discussion. Brezinsinki saw to it that there would be no serious talk on trade, and the character of the discussions on arms control and regional issues guaranteed that no roadblocks would be cleared away in these areas as well. Finally, Brezhnev rejected the only attempt by Carter to settle an obstacle in the human rights arena. Therefore, proposition two is not supported on any issue by this summit.

Proposition Three
 Were any framework agreements negotiated at Vienna? This issue will now be considered.

P3: Framework agreements at U.S.-Soviet summits pave the way for more rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal treaty.

Jimmy Carter's detailed attempt to lay out his goals for SALT III might be viewed as an attempt to develop a framework for the next step in arms control. Neither he nor his advisers, however, expected the Soviets to respond to these proposals at Vienna. When General Jones proposed that the superpowers reduce their arsenals by five percent annually in each category of SALT II accountable weapons, and that SALT III provisions be implemented as they were negotiated rather than waiting for ratification of the complete accord, he stated that he did not expect Brezhnev to agree right away.
It would have been remarkable if such a sweeping proposal would have been accepted immediately. Arms control talks have historically moved very slowly at first as each side carefully explores its own options, and its counterparts' proposals, searching for middle ground. At any rate Brezhnev rejected the annual five percent reductions the following day. Proposition three is not found to be true in this case.

The only proposal that could have possibly functioned as a framework for an agreement on regional issues was Brezhnev's suggestion that the United States and the Soviet Union sign an agreement in which both would promise to come to the other's aid if there was an attack by a third country. This was another in a long series of attempts by Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership to entice the President to agree at a summit to a pact which would have the effect of isolating China. In the PNW negotiations in 1973, at Yalta in 1974, and now at Vienna, the Soviets had sought this goal. The offer in 1979 was by far the most blatant, and the least likely to succeed, given the speed at which Sino-American relations were improving. Each of these offers was rejected or rendered harmless in the past, and Brezhnev's 1979 proposal soon joined them on the ashheap of history. Proposition three is not supported on this issue.

None of the discussions on trade or human rights could be characterized as an attempt to build a framework for a future agreement. Proposition three is not supported on this issue.

**In sum, no framework agreements were completed at Vienna. Since SALT III talks had not yet even begun,**
one could not expect a breakthrough in this area, and none of the regional issues discussed were ripe for any kind of settlement. The discussions on trade and human rights were not detailed enough to achieve this kind of breakthrough. Therefore, proposition three is not found to have merit for the Vienna summit on any of the issues considered by this study.

**Proposition Four**

We will now examine whether the Vienna summit, which saw little real negotiation, was more devoted to education.

P4: Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterpart on their concerns and interests on the important issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted in changes in the behavior of the superpowers following the summit.

The most interesting discussion of the Vienna summit meeting between Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev was the President’s attempt to describe for the General Secretary his goals for SALT III. The sweeping and detailed plans which he explained to Brezhnev could have had an important impact on the course of SALT III, if it had ever convened. Some of the proposals had been considered in other forums, such as the ASAT ban, or even in SALT II, but several of these concepts were entirely new, and had never been offered to Soviet negotiators previously.” The total package was a comprehensive outline of what the President hoped to accomplish in the next round of arms control discussions. The presentation was so detailed that at one point Brown and
Brzezinski became concerned that perhaps the President had gone too far and revealed too much before the negotiations even began."

The exact impact that this presentation had on Soviet thinking is not clear because SALT III never got underway, and the START negotiations would not begin for three years. We do know, however, that at the onset of the two previous rounds of SALT talks it had taken years for the Nixon administration to define its own goals, and to determine what the important elements of a good treaty would be. President Carter's thoughtful consideration of these issues before the Vienna summit and prior to the beginning of SALT III, and his careful coordination with the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the head of ACDA could well have avoided many of the problems that were encountered in previous administrations. The presentation could potentially have allowed both sides to move more quickly beyond the early stages of arms control talks that had characterized SALT I and SALT II in which the first proposals were so far apart that it was literally years before the middle ground began to emerge.

The meeting between the military leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union was an attempt to establish communication links between the defense establishments of the two superpowers. Brown and Jones hoped to discuss the importance of MBFR at Vienna, but the establishment of this precedent could have allowed more wide-ranging discussions in the future on issues such as strategic stability and other important areas of concern. Due to miscommunication this
initial meeting accomplished very little, and the end of detente with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made future meetings impossible for some time to come. Still, these efforts at communication and education on arms control and security policy by the President and his military advisers were potentially the most significant events at the Vienna summit. Jimmy Carter's exposition on American goals for SALT III was the most carefully thought out attempt to educate the Soviet leadership in the entire period covered by this study. Its ultimate failure was not due to a poor performance by the President or because of a lack of follow-up after the summit, but rather to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, proposition four's first part is upheld. The second part is more difficult to judge because before SALT III resumed the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and destroyed the SALT process.

The President and Brzezinski had hoped to use this summit as a forum in which they could engage Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership in a strategic dialogue that would clarify the interests of the United States in the Indian Ocean region and on regional issues in general. Brezhnev's poor health made this impossible, and he relied on reading statements prepared beforehand with Gromyko's guidance. Brzezinski was also rebuffed in his attempts to establish a regular forum in which top officials in both governments could meet for several days at a time to exchange views on geopolitical matters. These failures left the President and his National Security Adviser very disappointed at the conclusion of the summit and led to perhaps the most significant direct result
of the meeting itself. Upon returning to Washington, President Carter immediately began to take a series of steps which would move the United States even closer to China in the complex web of triangular politics. The President was eager to try to educate his counterpart, but the pupil was unable, or unwilling to be tutored. The fourth proposition is not supported in this case, although this was the first time that the failure of an attempt to educate the Soviet leadership had such an important impact on American policy.

One would have expected that President Carter would have set as one of his primary goals to explain to Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership why he considered the issue of human rights to be so vital. Instead the topic was saved for the last day, and was brought up near the end of the private session between the two leaders. The President's presentation was brief and sought to justify his human rights policy by the fact that it was important to the American people, not because of some overriding moral consideration or based on Western conceptions of justice. Perhaps the President was brief because of Brezhnev's poor health, or because he did not wish to end the summit on a sour note, but nevertheless he did pass up an opportunity to explore an issue on which he had based much of his foreign policy. Proposition four is not found to have merit in this case.

In sum, Jimmy Carter clearly sought to use this summit as a tool to educate the Soviet leadership on the issues of arms control and regional problems. He did engage Brezhnev in a discussion on the goals for SALT III, but the final impact of this tutorial on
Soviet behavior cannot be judged since the invasion of Afghanistan ended these negotiations before they began. Therefore proposition four's first part is found to have merit on arms control, but the second cannot be finally ruled upon. Proposition four was not found to be true on any of the other issues under consideration.

Conclusion

Despite careful planning by President Carter, little in the way of serious negotiation took place thus leaving propositions two and three unconfirmed. The approach of the summit did force compromise within the administration on the final issues of SALT II, and the summit did see an impressive effort by Carter to put forth his goals for SALT III, but not much else was accomplished.

The 1979 summit was a meeting between two weakened leaders, one ravaged by age and the other by political opponents. Detente was now under attack by leaders not only of the loyal opposition in the United States, but also by prominent members of the President's own party. This pressure and the Soviet activity in Africa and Southwest Asia made this the most confrontational summit since Glassboro. Detente was clearly at a crossroads if it was to survive. SALT now carried nearly the entire burden for better relations between the superpowers given the United States and the Soviet Union were not at loggerheads on most other
issues. SALT could not long carry this burden alone, and soon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would end the SALT process and make the next few years very tense ones in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Table 11

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 1</th>
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<tr>
<td>action-forcing</td>
<td>roadblock</td>
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<td>deadline</td>
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Vienna 1979  
arms          
control

none          
none          
arms *
control

* final judgment on the tutorials impact cannot be fully judged.

As Table 11 demonstrates, little in the way of concrete negotiation took place at the Vienna summit. Neither proposition two or three was found to hold on any of the issues considered by this study. The primary impact of the Vienna summit was on the internal deliberations of the American government. The desire for a summit to conclude SALT II forced the major actors to reach a compromise position on issues such as telemetry encryption, thus supporting proposition one. The most important discussions at Vienna were on the future of arms control and goals for SALT III. President Carter clearly impressed the Soviet leadership with his presentation, but the final impact of his tutorial cannot be judged since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and killed the SALT process before SALT III could begin.
NOTES - CHAPTER 10


Talbott, pp. 258-268.


Vance, p. 138.


5. Garthoff, pp. 653-670.


Brzezinski, pp. 346-427.


Carter, pp. 206, 208-209.

Garthoff, pp. 718-722.


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Garthoff, pp. 730-731.


Carter, pp. 146-147.


22. Carter, pp. 252-255.

23. Garthoff, p. 734.


Brzezinski, p. 344.


Garthoff, p. 743.


Garthoff, pp. 749-752.


32. Garthoff, pp. 902-912.

Vance, pp. 385-387.

33. Garthoff, p. 735.

34. Brzezinski, p. 342.
CHAPTER XI

GENEVA - 1985

Setting

The Geneva summit in 1985 between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev echoed in many ways the Johnson-Kosygin meeting at Glassboro in 1967. Both took place as a period of Cold War was gradually giving way to better U.S.-Soviet relations. At Glassboro and Geneva the chief focus of the discussions was on the impact of defenses against ballistic missiles on strategic stability. Finally, both took place in a period of transition in the leadership of the Soviet Union. When Johnson met with Kosygin in 1967 the Soviet Union was still in the midst of its post-Khrushchev power struggle and it would be several more years before Brezhnev emerged as the dominant figure in Soviet politics. Herein lies the greatest difference between Glassboro and Geneva because the men who succeeded Khrushchev, while they differed on some issues, were cut from the same Stalinist mold. Mikhail Gorbachev, educated and promoted in the same system, would soon begin to lead the Soviet down a path which would destroy this system entirely. For Ronald Reagan, the first glimpse that Gorbachev was indeed different from his predecessors came at Geneva in November, 1985.

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Presummit Preparations

When George Bush traveled to Chernenko’s funeral in March, he took with him an invitation for new General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to meet with Ronald Reagan. Initially the Soviets were cautious, but after some maneuvering the summit, the first for Ronald Reagan with a Soviet leader, was announced on July 2. Even more stunning news came from Moscow on the same day when it was announced that long time Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko would be promoted to the largely ceremonial role of President and that his replacement as Foreign Minister would be Eduard Shevardnadze. Several preparatory sessions are held before the summit including a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in late July, Shevardnadze’s first visit to the White House on October 24, and a November 5-6 trip by the Secretary of State Moscow. Reagan and Gorbachev also exchanged a series of letters in this period in which each attempted to establish an agenda for their meeting and previewed the issues they hoped to discuss.

When the NST negotiations began on March 12, 1985 the United States essentially reintroduced the proposals that were left on the table when the talks were broken off by the Soviet Union in December, 1983. On START the United States still clung to its 5000 warhead ceiling with a subceiling of 2500 for ICBM warheads, while in the INF talks the Americans continued to seek an agreement based on the global zero option. As head of the overall delegation and chief negotiator in the space/strategic defense forum Max Kampelman
was empowered to engage the Soviets in a dialogue on a negotiated transition from a period of offensive dominance to one of defensive dominance. In the first two rounds of negotiations the Soviet delegation sought a ban on "space strike arms" as a precondition to serious discussions on START. As a part of this ban, the Soviets sought to forbid all "purposeful" research, which they defined as research specifically aimed at designing weapons systems. On INF the Soviet Union continued to propose that they have a monopoly on intermediate range missiles, and that they be compensated for British and French systems. They did hint for a time in March and April that for an interim period some American INF missiles might be tolerated, but by the second round of the talks which ran from May 30 - July 11 Soviet negotiators returned to the demand that the United States have zero INF missiles.

The official negotiations remained stalemated at these positions until October, but there was movement at other levels. Spearheaded by Paul Nitze, who was now serving as an arms control adviser to the President and the Secretary of State, an effort was made to develop a new strategic concept for arms control that would guide the administration in the negotiations. In May Nitze put together what became known within the administration as the Monday Package. This proposal called for a gradual reduction in the superpowers' arsenals in the ten years from 1986-1995 down to an eventual level of 6000 warheads for each side, approximately a fifty percent reduction from levels at the time. The ratios of launchers to warheads would gradually increase over this
period thus encouraging both sides to move toward single warhead systems and away from heavily MIRVed missiles that made a first strike conceivable. These reductions would be tied to continued adherence to the ABM Treaty, and largely for this reason the existence of the Monday Package was a closely guarded secret known only by Nitze, Shultz, and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane. It had to be kept secret because elements of it, especially adherence to the ABM Treaty for ten years, would be certain to draw attack from Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle.

Nitze, McFarlane, and Shultz then received President Reagan’s permission to quietly approach the Soviets on the possibility of opening a secret back-channel in which these ideas and the offense-defense tradeoff they contained could be discussed in hopes of reaching an agreement that could be presented as a fait accompli to those who would oppose it in the Defense Department. On June 17 they approached Dobrynin, but to their chagrin he did not seem interested in the opening of the back channel. Two months later in August, Nitze tried this proposal on his old INF negotiating counterpart Yuli Kvitsinsky, but he too seemed uninterested. The attempt to open a back channel to the Kremlin leadership that could lead to an agreement had run into a dead end.5

Mikhail Gorbachev began to breathe life back into Soviet foreign policy soon after assuming the office of General Secretary. In the spring and summer of 1985 he mixed strident attacks on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) with the hope of deep reductions in offensive weapons if SDI
was limited. He also began to drop hints, such as in an August *Time* interview, that laboratory research on strategic defenses would be acceptable, and that only when systems reached the prototype stage must they be banned. He had escalated his public diplomacy earlier on July 29 when he announced that the Soviet Union would not test nuclear weapons through the end of 1985 and called for the United States to join them. Gorbachev had earlier that month proposed a test moratorium to Reagan in a private letter.

As the November summit approached there was a great deal of activity. On October 25, the Soviet Union presented its first comprehensive proposal since the NST negotiations began in March. The new plan called for 6000 nuclear “charges” including gravity bombs and short range attack missiles (SRAMs) carried by bombers. Of these 6000 warheads no more than 60 percent, 3600, could be placed on any one type launcher, thus addressing the American desire for sublimits on ICBM warheads. On the negative side, the offer included American FBS, banned long range ALCMs and SLCMs, and would ban all new delivery systems, thus halting the United States’ modernization program without slowing the Soviet Union’s. This was also linked to a ban on space-strike arms. In the plan, the Soviets continued to seek a prohibition of “purposeful” research only, thereby limiting only America’s SDI since Soviet research did not have the publicly stated aim of developing deployable defenses. The Soviets were not specific on their INF proposal, but they did offer an interim agreement in which some American missiles could remain in Europe. This offer had been previewed, although in less
detail, by Gorbachev in a letter to President Reagan delivered by Shevardnadze on his visit to the White House on October 24.\footnote{7}

The American response came one week later on November 1, just as the third round of the NST negotiations was ending, and less than three weeks before the summit. It called for 6000 ballistic and cruise missile warheads, a subceiling of 4500 ballistic missile warheads, 3000 ICBM warheads, and 1500 heavy ICBM warheads. These weapons would be limited to 1600-1800 delivery systems, including 350 heavy bombers. The plan also called for a ban on mobile ICBMs, much to the chagrin of many members of Congress and Nitze. On INF the proposal called for 140 launchers for both sides with 420-450 warheads, and no more than 50 Pershing IIs for the United States.\footnote{9}

As all of this was happening, the administration opened a new debate by questioning the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The new "broad" interpretation would allow testing and development of ABM systems based on what the treaty called "other physical principles," technologies not in existence when the treaty was signed in 1972. Some in the Defense Department, especially Richard Perle, even went so far as to advocate that legally the treaty would allow even deployment of systems based on these technologies. The broad interpretation surfaced publicly for the first time when McFarlane was interviewed on "Meet the Press" on October 6, and immediately aroused the Congress and America's NATO allies. Eventually, on October 11, Shultz convinced the President to adopt a compromise course and issue a public
statement claiming that while the broad interpretation was legally valid the United States would continue to adhere to the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty.  

Another initiative the President would present on arms control was developed at a meeting in September in which the President was focusing on an address he would make to the United Nations in a few days. Director of Central Intelligence William Casey suggested that the President offer to Gorbachev during their Geneva meeting a plan based on Eisenhower's Open Skies proposal of 1955. This time it would be "Open Labs" in which the United States would offer to share its SDI research with the Soviet Union to prove that its search for strategic defenses was not based on aggressive intentions. ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman suggested that the offer be made reciprocal, guaranteeing American access to Soviet labs as well, and assuring as he and Casey realized, that it would be rejected. The president agreed to the "Open Labs" proposal and it was added to his summit agenda.

The November 4-5 presummit visit by Shultz and McFarlane to Moscow dashed any hopes that on arms control framework could be agreed to at the summit. While both sides had now adopted the goal of 50 percent reductions, there were still vast areas of disagreement.

Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981 determined to resist Soviet expansion in the third world. At the outset of his second term in 1985 he began to increase pressure on the Congress to restore aid to the contras in Nicaragua, and to extend it to other groups fighting Marxist governments. Aid to the Afghan mujahadeen had begun under the Carter
administration, and had always enjoyed bipartisan support. Because of this, military assistance to the rebels in Afghanistan continued at high levels through 1985 and the New York Times reported in October that the House and Senate Intelligence Committees had approved $250 million in aid to the mujahadeen for the coming year.\textsuperscript{12}

In 1985, through the United Nations, efforts continued to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Indirect negotiations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan were conducted by a UN mediator, and by June the negotiations had resolved three of four proposed accords to end the conflict. The three already agreed to dealt with Afghan refugees, noninterference in Afghan affairs, and a package of international guarantees of the settlement. The heart of the matter, a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, was the subject of the final accord which was still unresolved by the time of the summit in November.\textsuperscript{13}

On October 25, in a speech to the United Nations, President Reagan called for the settlement of regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and Angola. Reagan’s Regional Initiative, as it was called, proposed that as a first step the parties to the conflict settle their differences following which the United States and the Soviet Union would meet to discuss the elimination of foreign military presence, assuring peace, and restraining the flow of arms into the area. The initiative was a deliberate attempt to broaden the summit agenda beyond arms control alone, and was the brainchild of NSC staffer Dan Fortier.\textsuperscript{14}
Throughout 1985 the Reagan administration was involved in a protracted struggle with the Congress to restore aid to the contras in Nicaragua which had been cut off by the House of Representatives in 1983. In April, attempts by Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) to get a package of nonlethal aid to the contras passed the Senate, but was defeated by the House. President Daniel Ortega then snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by traveling to Moscow within days of the House vote, and thereby nearly guaranteeing that the aid package would be brought up again. This time in June, thanks largely to Ortega’s actions, the House and Senate passed bills providing nonmilitary aid to the contras. In the midst of the struggle on Capital Hill, on May 1, President Reagan announced that MFN was being revoked and that the United States was embargoing trade to Nicaragua."

In Europe the protest movement that had divided Western Europe throughout the early 1980s had largely run out of steam by 1985. On November 1 the Dutch government approved the deployment of GLCMs in their country, and by the fall of 1985 there were 140 American intermediate range missiles in Western Europe. European leaders feared by October that Mikhail Gorbachev had seized the momentum in East-West politics, and that the Reagan administration needed to make some gesture on arms control to respond to Gorbachev’s testing moratorium and his various arms control proposals. At a meeting just before Reagan’s address to the United Nations on October 25 the leaders of Western Europe, gathered for the 40th Anniversary of the United Nations, expressed concern not only over this but also over the administration’s
reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty. Diplomats from West Germany and Great Britain had been pressuring for a response for some time and allied leaders were hoping progress in Geneva would dampen growing anti-American feeling in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{16}

In the first Reagan administration the chilly relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had pushed expanding trade and serious discussions of human rights far down on the agenda in superpower relations. In fact, during the first term the most important trade issue had been how to make the strategic embargo against trade with the Soviet Union more effective, especially the administration's attempt to stop the building of the natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge did visit Moscow in May, 1985, but nothing of importance was decided at the meeting, principally because the Reagan administration still linked expanded trade relations to human rights and Soviet activity in Central America.\textsuperscript{17}

Despite the administration's "evil empire" rhetoric human rights had never been a major topic of discussion at meetings between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko. This changed, to some degree, at their January, 1985 conference which organized the NST negotiations. Over objections of many in his own department, Shultz decided to address this topic on the second day of the meeting. Thereafter it became a regular item on his agenda when meeting with Soviet leaders.\textsuperscript{18}

The new Soviet team was more assertive in its defense of Soviet human rights policy than its predecessors had been.
In several meetings, including the November presummit trip to Moscow by Shultz, Gorbachev answered American attacks with charges of his own regarding racism and sexism in the United States. Gorbachev did make a gesture in this area just before the summit by allowing Russian spouses of American citizens to emigrate, and by permitting the wife of dissident Andrei Sakharov to travel to the West for medical treatment.

The Summit

The Geneva summit took place November 19-21 with the meetings alternating between Ronald Reagan’s temporary residence and the Soviet mission. This summit was characterized by private meetings between the leaders than perhaps any summit since Glassboro. Because this was a very private, personal summit and neither leader was well versed in the specifics on the issues, almost no real negotiations took place. This made Geneva far more similar to Camp David in 1959, Vienna in 1961, or Glassboro in 1967, than it was to the detente-era summits of Nixon, Ford and Carter. The President’s goals going into Geneva were to continue the dialogue which he and Gorbachev had recently established, to arrange another summit, but most importantly to build a personal relationship with the new General Secretary.

The first day of the summit was mostly devoted to questions of arms control in both plenary and private sessions. In an initial plenary meeting which was to last only fifteen minutes and instead went on for over an hour Reagan began his effort to persuade Gorbachev of his peaceful
intentions regarding SDI. The President called for a move away from the immoral doctrine of assured destruction by a negotiated transition to an era of defensive dominance. He then offered Casey's Open Labs proposal as evidence that he was serious about sharing the technology of strategic defense. Gorbachev responded with predictable skepticism leading Reagan to remind him that America had not used its atomic monopoly in the late 1940s.

When the plenary session turned to more technical aspects of the arms control question, Reagan and Gorbachev left the main house, and walked to a nearby poolhouse where their now famous "fireside chat" took place. The President presented Gorbachev with a document, prepared by Nitze but altered by Weinberger and the Defense Department, containing proposed guidelines for future arms control negotiations. The document called for 50 percent reductions in the START Treaty, and continued compliance with the ABM Treaty, although it did not mention which interpretation the treaty would follow. It also endorsed SDI and called for a negotiated transition to an era in which strategic defenses dominated. Gorbachev immediately pointed out that these guidelines would allow SDI to continue, and when Reagan agreed that it would, the General Secretary answered that the two men simply disagreed. This fireside discussion saw both leaders attempt to convert his counterpart to his own vision of the relationship between offenses and defenses in the nuclear age. Neither was successful. As they returned from the poolhouse, Reagan extended and Gorbachev accepted an invitation to come to America in 1986, and the General
Secretary likewise invited the President to the Soviet Union the next year to which Reagan agreed."

By the summit's end, the two sides had agreed that START would encompass 50 percent reductions in the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Language was also inserted in the communique which maintained that a "nuclear war could never be won and must never be fought." The communique also called for an interim INF agreement, and the Soviets seemed to hint that negotiations could proceed in the three forums at the NST negotiations without a prior agreement banning research on SDI. Beyond these general platitudes nothing concrete was agreed to at the summit."

The discussions on regional issues took place largely in the afternoon of the first day of the summit. In the first plenary session that morning, the President lectured his counterpart on Soviet aggression since 1917 and argued that the key to regional difficulties between the United States and the Soviet Union was Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet support for revolution in the third world. Gorbachev responded with rhetoric that had been used by Soviet leaders at each summit since Kennedy met Khrushchev in 1961. Revolutions could not be imposed by the U.S.S.R., he said, but had deep roots in world history. The Soviet Union was merely aiding progressive forces in their struggle for liberation, and it did not have the power to create revolution in any country.

In the afternoon session, Afghanistan was the principle topic with Reagan accusing the Soviet Union of attempting genocide in this conflict. While they did not discuss
specific plans to end the war, Gorbachev did seem to attempt to communicate that this was not his war, and that he was searching for an exit from this protracted struggle. Gorbachev's most interesting, but extremely dubious, comment on this issue was his claim that he was not involved in the decision to invade Afghanistan, and that he first learned of the invasion over his car radio."

The discussions on human rights and trade took up only a very brief portion of the summit talks. Reagan did raise the issue of human rights with Gorbachev in their private meetings on the second day of the summit, and he presented the General Secretary with a list of individuals who wished to emigrate but who had been denied permission by the Soviet government. Much to Adelman's chagrin, Reagan followed the presummit advice of Richard Nixon who told the President not to seek a confrontation over human rights, but instead to rely on quiet diplomacy. Thus the issue was raised in a private, not a plenary session, and Reagan did not couch the discussion in ideological terms. Rather he argued, much as Jimmy Carter had at Vienna in 1979, that these issues were very important to the American people, and if the Soviet Union really sought expanded trade and better relations in general, their human rights record would have to improve. In this case, unlike arms control on the previous day, the President closely followed the State Department's talking points prepared for him in advance of the summit. Trade issues were only considered in the most general sense since once again economic ministers were not included on the summit delegation. Each leader said he hoped for freer trade, but
Reagan continued to tie expanded trade to Soviet human rights improvements."

The communique for this summit was actually negotiated on the spot, mostly because Defense Department objections had prevented the conclusion of a prearranged communique, rather than the precooked documents that almost all of the recent summits had produced. The drafting of the communique took much of the time of Reagan and Gorbachev's aides during the summit, and it went on until early in the morning of November 21, the summit's last day. Little of consequence was contained in the communique beyond a pledge to restore air service between the two countries, and an agreement to open consulates in New York and Kiev."

The Summit Aftermath

The Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva did at least improve the atmospherics of U.S.-Soviet relations. The two leaders exchanged New Years Day greetings on national television broadcasts, and the summit seemed to clear the air of some of the tension of the previous five years. But in concrete terms little changed in the next few months, although there were signs of movement due principally to an extraordinary campaign of public diplomacy by Mikhail Gorbachev.

Perhaps because Geneva had been such a media triumph for Ronald Reagan the months after Geneva saw Gorbachev launch a public campaign on arms control unlike any seen before. The centerpiece of the effort was his January 15, 1986 plan for
the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The proposal envisioned three stages. In the first the superpowers would reduce their arsenals by 50 percent, American FBS were still included in this total, long range INF in Europe would be eliminated, a U.S.-Soviet nuclear testing moratorium would be put in place, British and French arsenals would be frozen, and the United States would agree not to transfer weapons to other countries. In stage two all other nuclear arsenals would be frozen, all long range INF would be eliminated, all tactical nuclear weapons disposed of, and a CTB agreed to. The final stage would be completed by the year 2000 and would involve the elimination of all nuclear weapons.27

The next six months saw the administration scrambling to come up with a proposal which could match the public appeal of Gorbachev's plan. Paul Nitze began to work on a plan based on his Monday Package and the administration's November 1 START proposal, and calling for adherence to the ABM Treaty for 5-8 years, but the President was looking for something more dramatic. Nitze learned in late May that Weinberger and Perle had submitted to the President, and he has essentially accepted, a plan with defensive and offensive elements. It called for abiding by the ABM Treaty for five years, following which the two sides would have two additional years to negotiate a treaty requiring the sharing of defensive technology to replace the ABM Treaty. In return for this all ballistic missiles would be eliminated, including those of France, Great Britain, and China. Nitze did get the proposal redrafted to include these countries in the proposed
negotiations, and in late May he traveled to Europe to consult with allied leaders on this proposal. Appalled that the President would even consider this plan, they insisted that their countries not be mentioned in the proposal. With this revision the letter containing the offer was sent to Gorbachev on July 25.2

In the meantime the Soviets made new proposals on offense and defense at the NST negotiations. On defense they called for "strengthening" the ABM Treaty by including a non-withdrawal clause of 15-20 years, working out agreed definitions for terms left fuzzy by the treaty such as component and development, and the banning of all prototypes of defensive weapons not permitted by the treaty. These limits would apply to ASATs and all space-to-earth weapons, as well as ABM defenses. Two weeks later on June 11 the Soviets made a new offensive proposal in the START negotiations calling for 8,000 warheads, and retaining the 60 percent maximum ceiling for warheads on one type of delivery system. The plan dropped American FBS from the START ceilings, and allowed long-range ALCMs and SLCMs, thus the increase from 6,000-8,000 total warheads." The two START positions did seem to be moving closer.

The most encouraging part of Gorbachev's January 15 disarmament plan to administration officials was the way it dealt with INF. Gorbachev's call for zero LRINF in Europe and a freeze on SS-20s in Asia during the plan's first stage was seen as a positive sign that an interim agreement was possible. Even better news came on February 6 when the General Secretary told Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Ma), while
the Senator was on a trip to the Kremlin, that an interim agreement on INF was possible without a deal on strategic defenses, thus delinking the two for the first time. The United States was also under pressure from West German leaders in February to include short range INF (SRINF) in the negotiations, and from its Asian allies who worried that the Soviet Union's SS-20s east of the Urals would be exempted. Together these events led the administration to drop its November 1 proposal for 140 INF systems, and return to the global zero option in the INF talks, zero LRINF in Europe, zero in Asia, and a freeze on SRINF.30

In addition to these developments, in late May Reagan decided that the United States would exceed the SALT II ceiling on the number of MIRVed weapons in October in response to Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty and SALT II. The decision immediately brought outrage from the Congress, and created great consternation among America's NATO allies.31 The first half of 1986 had been an extraordinary time in arms control politics, and the Reagan administration seemed to be very much on the defensive as Gorbachev's proposals piled up and his peace offensive picked up support in Western Europe. The General Secretary extended his nuclear testing moratorium three months through March 1986, and following the Chernobyl disaster in May he extended it again until August 6, the 41st Anniversary of Hiroshima.32 Pressure on the Reagan administration for dramatic steps on arms control continued to grow.

After Geneva there was increased optimism that a deal to end the war in Afghanistan might be possible. Shultz and
McFarlane in public appearances after the summit both commented that the Soviets seemed committed to a political solution, and the Secretary offered that Gorbachev might soon offer a plan for withdrawal."

On December 13, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead announced that the United States would act as a guarantor of a United Nations settlement to the Afghan war, and he endorsed the three agreements reached thus far in the U.N. mediated negotiations."

Ultimately the negotiations stalled because the United States continued to insist on the removal of the Soviet backed government in Kabul as a precondition for a U.N. settlement while the Soviet Union wished to assure its survival."

In the period following the summit there was some evidence of an improving human rights atmosphere in the Soviet Union. The most dramatic evidence of this was the release of Anatoly Shchransky on February 11.

Evaluation of the Propositions

**Proposition One**

We will now consider whether the approach of the Geneva summit produced a consensus on the key issues in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

P1: The approach of the summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision makers, and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes.
The approach of the Geneva summit did provide a deadline which seemed to get the stalled NST negotiations moving. The Soviet Union had not produced a concrete proposal in the first two rounds of negotiations, instead they had insisted a ban on "space-strike arms" must be agreed to before offensive reductions could be considered. On October 25, with the summit less than one month away, they offered their first detailed plan for deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. While the offer had obvious flaws from the American perspective, it was at least a legitimate proposal.

On the American side things were complex. In public, and at the negotiations through much of 1985, the United States stuck with its 1983 START proposal, while Nitze, McFarlane, and Shultz were quietly working behind the scenes to put together a new proposal which encompassed an offensive-defensive tradeoff. They were also seeking to open a back-channel to Moscow where the Monday Package could be presented, and the framework for a treaty agreed to without the knowledge of Weinberger and his civilian aides in the Pentagon, until it was too late for them to block the agreement. The divisions within the administration over how to handle SDI were so great that McFarlane could not have a potential offensive-defense tradeoff studied within the government, and he had to secretly contract experts at the RAND Corporation to examine how such a deal might be structured. The split was exacerbated even further by the discovery of the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which gave the civilians in the Department of Defense another weapon they could use to prevent an agreement which would
limit SDI. The approach of the summit did not heal these divisions.

On another level, however, the administration did coalesce to produce its first new arms control proposal since the NST negotiations began in March. The November 1 plan was built largely on Nitze's Monday Package, and it would serve as the basis for serious negotiations. In fact several of its elements were present in the Reykjavik agreement one year later. It was more acceptable to the Soviets than the old proposal since it allowed more warheads, and the subceiling on ICBM warheads was nearly twice that of the 1983 plan. It also limited the United States to only 1,500 ALCMs, far less than the 4,000 some American plans called for, and vastly less than the 8,000 some Soviets predicted the United States might build without an agreement.

The issue which the coming summit could not completely heal in the administration was how to handle SDI. The guidelines Reagan gave to Gorbachev did, however, call for adherence to the ABM Treaty, although the period for this adherence was not specified, and whether or not this meant abiding by the broad or narrow interpretation was not clarified either. Still the Soviets saw this as promising, as Kvitsinky pointed out after the summit, and it did begin a discussion over the acceptable length of a non-withdrawal clause to the Treaty. Thus the divisions may not have been healed, but the two sides within the administration were at least close enough that talks could go on with the Soviets. Overall, the first proposition is supported by the evidence gathered on the issue of arms control.
The relative unity within the administration on regional issues and the previous lack of a U.S.-Soviet dialogue on these questions meant that there were few divisions for the summit to heal on geopolitical questions. The approach of the summit did inspire a new initiative in an effort to broaden the summit's agenda, however. The Reagan Initiative, offered by the President during his speech to the United Nations was a deliberate attempt to move these issues onto the front burner, and widen the scope of the upcoming summit between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev beyond arms control alone. It also presaged administration endorsement of United Nations mediation efforts in the Afghan war since it called for negotiations between the local parties followed by U.S.-Soviet negotiations to guarantee the peace in the region. On December 13 the United States endorsed the Pakistani-Afghan negotiations and offered to be a guarantor of a U.N. mediated peace. Thus the approach of the summit did increase the administration's activity on these questions and led to a new American initiative. The first proposition is found to have merit in this case.

The presummit period brought no significant changes or new initiatives in the areas of human rights or trade. Proposition one is not found to be true in these cases.

In sum, the first proposition is supported on the issue of arms control, since the Reagan administration produced its first new START proposal since 1982 less than three weeks before the summit. The summit's approach also produced a new initiative on regional issues as an attempt to broaden the summit agenda.
Therefore, proposition one is found to have merit on arms control and regional issues, but not on trade or human rights.

Proposition Two

Were Reagan and Gorbachev able to remove obstacles to progress in key issues at Geneva? We will now address this question.

P2: The President and General Secretary have resolved important issues which were unable to be resolved at lower levels. The arms control discussions at Geneva were not the kind of detailed negotiations on which this proposition is focused. Both Reagan and Gorbachev concentrated their efforts on a strategic, not a tactical plane. Each man worked to change the other's view of strategic defenses, not to find solutions to technical hurdles that had developed in negotiations. If either had been articulate enough to convert the other to his vision of strategic defense it would obviously have removed the largest roadblock to agreement, but this was far too much to ask for a three day meeting.

The only concrete agreement at the summit was that START should seek 50 percent reductions, but this had essentially already been established by the October 25 proposal of the Soviet Union and the November 1 START offer made by the United States. The communique and the discussions did contain some hints that the linking of progress on an INF Treaty to progress on SDI might soon be dropped, but there were no clear indications that this was being done.
Proposition two is not supported by the evidence in this case.

As with arms control, the general nature of the discussions on regional issues at Geneva could not be characterized as detailed negotiations aimed at removing roadblocks to agreement. The President put forth his philosophical objections to Soviet foreign policy in the third world, and the General Secretary responded in much the same terms that Khrushchev had to Kennedy twenty-four years earlier at Vienna. Reagan was much harsher in tone than any President had ever been and far more ideological, thus there was no attempt to find compromise formulas which would end Soviet involvement in any of the areas which the administration found threatening. The second proposition is not upheld on regional issues.

No issues of importance on trade or human rights were resolved at Geneva. Proposition two is not upheld in these cases.

In sum, on none of the issues examined in this dissertation were significant roadblocks removed by the summit discussions. Therefore, proposition two is not substantiated by the evidence from the Geneva summit of 1985.

**Proposition Three**

We will now examine the summit to see if any framework agreements emerged from the summit.

P3: Framework agreements at U.S.-Soviet summits pave the way for more rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal treaty.
The period just before the Geneva summit did see both the American and Soviet positions on START and INF move closer together, and increased the possibility of a Vladivostok-type accord at the summit. Both sides were now calling for 6,000 warheads to be allowed under START, and the Soviet 60 percent rule began to address the problem of subceilings within that total. However, there were still great differences between the two proposals. The Soviets sought to include American FBS, count all bomber weapons individually against the total, and ban long range SLCMs and GLCMs. The American proposal would leave bomber weapons outside the total, and would put very tight subceilings on the number of ICBM warheads. The middle ground in START was beginning to emerge, but too much was still hidden to make a framework agreement possible at the summit.

Despite this progress the real obstacles to a framework accord was the difference over strategic defenses. Nitze's guidelines which the President offered to Gorbachev in front of the fire could have been the framework for a treaty, but Gorbachev immediately rejected the document when he saw that it would allow SDI to continue. In addition while the Soviets were pleased that the guidelines called for abiding by the ABM Treaty, they could not be certain to which version of the ABM Treaty the document was referring. The controversy over the broad and traditional interpretation of the treaty made negotiating a framework accord nearly impossible since the uncertainty created by the debate meant that no one could be sure exactly what the guidelines
entailed. Proposition three is not found to be true on the issue of arms control.

Reagan's Regional Initiative if seriously pursued could have established a framework for the solution of regional conflicts. Its most obvious flaw was that the plan was aimed only at states backed by the Soviet Union, and ignored conflicts such as in the Philippines where the American stake was much higher. Perhaps this could have been addressed at the summit if the administration had really seen the Regional Initiative as a framework for the settlement of geopolitical conflicts involving the superpowers. Instead the initiative's real purpose was to broaden the summit agenda to include these questions, and to focus public attention away from questions of arms control alone. The evidence for this is that neither the President, or any of his advisers, made a serious attempt to get Gorbachev to consider this initiative in any detailed way. Instead the discussions on regional issues were general and very ideological in nature, and never really got down to specific ideas about ways to lessen the geopolitical competition between the superpowers. The third proposition is not supported by the evidence on this issue.

Once again no specific negotiations took place on trade or human rights. Proposition three is not upheld on these issues.

In sum, there were no framework agreements negotiated at the Geneva summit in 1985. Divisions on arms control and regional issues were still too great to be bridged, and trade and human rights were not
Proposition Four

We will now explore attempts to educate the adversary by both Reagan and Gorbachev.

P4: Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterpart on their concerns and interests on the important issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted in changes in the behavior of the superpowers following the summit.

Geneva was a summit much more devoted to education than to negotiation. The superpowers were just emerging from a period of hostility that had begun with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and only recently reopened a serious dialogue in arms control and regional issues. This meant that the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union were still so far apart on issues of weapons and geopolitics that there was little chance of serious negotiation at the summit. It would take months before the outlines of a possible compromise would begin to emerge. The confident, expressive nature of the two leaders also contributed to the sense that they could convert their counterpart to their own way of thinking.

The primary focus of both men was on their differing visions of strategic defense. On each of the two full days of discussion the strategic impact of ballistic missile defense was the overriding topic of discussion. The President did his best to convince Gorbachev that the United
States did not mean for SDI to threaten the Soviet Union, and that Reagan truly wanted a peaceful, negotiated transition to mutually assured survival, rather than mutually assured destruction. Gorbachev was openly skeptical of the President's offer to share defensive technology, and while he did not question the President's motives, SDI offered the United States a possible first-strike potential and that as leader of the Soviet Union he must take capabilities into account. Therefore SDI must stop.

The parallels with Glassboro are striking, and ironic, since now the roles of the two leaders were reversed with Reagan playing Kosygin to Gorbachev's portrayal of McNamara's role at Glassboro. Neither leader was able to convince the other of his position and SDI would continue to be a stumbling block when they met again at Reykjavik. Therefore the second part of proposition four is not upheld, but the first is supported by the evidence since each leader devoted much of his time to educating his counterpart on the value, or danger, of strategic defenses.

On these issues something deeper may have taken place, however. Adelman credits Geneva as the turning point in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Reagan era. Before Geneva, for Ronald Reagan the Soviet Union was the enemy; afterwards it was nuclear weapons. Within months the President who had come into office advocating the largest peacetime buildup of military forces in American history would be engaged in a dialogue on a timetable for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Gorbachev's January 15 disarmament plan was followed in July
by an American plan calling for the elimination of all ballistic missiles. While there was more propaganda than real arms control going on here, one is struck by how much the debate had changed after Geneva. For Reagan human contact was always more important than esoteric discussions of strategic stability or other technical arms control concerns, and he was apparently convinced that this was, in the words of Margaret Thatcher, a man they could do business with.

On regional concerns, the evidence is a bit more difficult to judge, but nevertheless it does appear that Gorbachev made a concerted effort to convince the American side that Afghanistan was not his war, and that he was looking for a way out. The most interesting discussion was Gorbachev's claim that he had first learned of the war on his car radio. While it is difficult to believe a Politburo member would learn of such an event in this manner, it is clear that he was trying to disassociate himself from the decision to invade Afghanistan. Reagan and his advisers came away from Geneva with the clear impression that Gorbachev was looking for a way to end the war. This led very quickly to an endorsement by the administration of the U.N. mediation effort, which it had refused to do before, and increased activity in this search for a peaceful end to the war.

On arms control issues, other than strategic defenses, and on Afghanistan attempts by the leaders of the two superpowers to alter his counterpart's attitudes seems to have had a significant impact. Following Geneva, the Reagan administration began to more actively pursue a peaceful
settlement to the war in Afghanistan because the President and his advisers were convinced that Gorbachev was looking for a way out of this quagmire. The pace of arms control negotiations increased following the Geneva summit in both the INF and START talks after years of minimal progress. As Adelman has pointed out, today the Geneva summit seems clearly to be a great watershed in Ronald Reagan's administration. The President who had come into office dedicated to resisting the evil empire would devote much of the last three years of his administration opening a new era of detente and seeking significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. The months between Geneva and Reykjavik saw several setbacks in U.S.-Soviet relations, and the Cold War did not suddenly come to an end, but overall things began to improve after the first meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev. This clearly supports both the first and second parts of proposition four since the efforts to educate by both leaders had a significant impact on the foreign policies of both countries."

Just as with President Carter at Vienna in 1979, one would have expected Reagan to take a more confrontational stand on human rights in his first meeting with a Soviet leader. He had not backed away from a confrontation on regional issues, but here he listened to the advice of the State Department and Richard Nixon and couched his discussion of these issues in practical, not ideological terms. Human rights were discussed but not in the forceful way that they were addressed three years later in Moscow. The fourth proposition is not upheld in this case.
In sum, the first part of proposition four is supported by the discussions on arms control and regional issues. Neither leader was able to win the other to his view of strategic defenses, thus the second part of proposition four is not found to have merit in this issue. However, on regional issues and on the overall relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, it seems Gorbachev did greatly influence American foreign policy. Therefore, the second part of proposition four is supported by the evidence on regional issues. No serious attempts were made by either leader on trade or human rights.

Conclusion

Geneva more closely paralleled the summits of the 1950s and 1960s than it did in the detente-era summits of the 1970s. Just as with Glassboro it took place in a transitional period when the era of the Cold War was beginning to crack. Indeed it would seem that the summit was a pivotal event in the move away from confrontation that had existed since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Reagan's second term soon developed in a way that few of us could have imagined before November, 1985. Granted, with Gorbachev's new directions in the Soviet Union, and the failure of the Soviet economy, these trends were perhaps inevitable. But the first Reagan-Gorbachev meeting seems to have convinced both men that progress was possible, thus perhaps
accelerating events, and by opening a dialogue channeling them in a positive direction.

Table 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 1</th>
<th>Proposition 2</th>
<th>Proposition 3</th>
<th>Proposition 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>action-forcing</td>
<td>roadblock</td>
<td>framework</td>
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<td>deadline</td>
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Geneva 1985 arms control none none arms control
regional issues none
regional issues

* The education attempt resulted in changes in the foreign policy of the other nation.

Table 12 demonstrates the principal results of the Geneva summit. The approach of the summit did force the administration to develop its first new START proposal since 1982, and to offer a new initiative on regional conflicts in an effort to broaden the summit's agenda. Therefore proposition one was found to have merit in this case. There were no concrete negotiations at this summit, thus propositions two and three were not supported by the evidence. Most of all, Geneva was dominated by attempts by both leaders to win the other to his view of strategic defenses and regional issues, thereby confirming the first part of proposition four. In fact, Mikhail Gorbachev seems to have had an important impact on Ronald Reagan's foreign policy, thus giving support to the second part of proposition four. In retrospect, this may have been the most successful attempt to educate one's counterpart in the history of U.S.-Soviet summits in the Cold War era.
NOTES - CHAPTER XI


Nitze, p. 416.


4. Talbott, p. 274.


Talbott, pp. 261-268.


Reagan, pp. 617-618.


Talbott, pp. 273-274.


Talbott, pp. 275-276.


Talbott, pp. 243-245.


Adelman, p. 123.


Talbott, pp. 285-287.

Reagan, pp. 635-637.


Nitze, pp. 418-419.

25. Adelman, pp. 143-144.
   Talbott, pp. 287-288.
27. Nitze, pp. 421-422.
   Talbott, pp. 289-290.
   Reagan, p. 650.
   Talbott, pp. 300-302.
   Talbott, pp. 291-294.
37. Talbott, p. 275.
CHAPTER XII

REYKJAVIK - 1986

The Reykjavik summit of October 11-12, 1986 came near the end of a year in which the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a dual set of negotiations. On the public stage each presented ambitious programs aimed at radically restructuring, or even eliminating, their nuclear arsenals. The real purpose of these plans was not to offer practical proposals that could break the deadlock in the negotiations and lead to stabilizing arms control agreements, but to portray to the world one's own country as the peaceful one and their opponent's as the obstacle to "real" arms control. Simultaneously, and more quietly, negotiators at Geneva and at experts meetings in Moscow and Washington were narrowing the differences between the two sides on START, INF, and to a lesser extent on strategic defenses.

The Reagan administration was kept on the defensive throughout much of 1986 by Gorbachev's constant string of propaganda initiatives on arms control, and it scrambled throughout the year to find a response which could match the public appeal of the Soviet leader's testing moratorium and his January 15 letter calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. This "image gap" was further exacerbated by Reagan's dogged pursuit of SDI, the
controversy over the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and the May 27 decision to breach the SALT II limits on MIRVed systems. Reagan began to feel increasing pressure from allies and the public, and this led him to believe that he needed another summit to make progress on arms control and to put SDI on course. These two negotiating tracks, the practical and the millennial, clashed spectacularly at Reykjavik and resulted in potentially the most dangerous talks ever held at a U.S.-Soviet summit.

Presummit Preparations

Mikhail Gorbachev began 1986 with a bang when on January 15 he presented his three phase plan to rid the world of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The real evidence that this offer had far more to do with the battle for the hearts and minds of the public in the West was that Soviet negotiators in Geneva were never given serious instructions on how this proposal could be converted into a legally binding treaty. Soviet negotiators through the early part of 1986 spent much of their time unleashing rhetorical attacks on the American position since they had no real instructions, and very little was accomplished until the end of May and early June when the Soviets offered new proposals on offensive and defensive weapons. The Soviet proposal on strategic defenses called for a 15-20 year non-withdrawal pledge on the ABM Treaty, the limiting of SDI testing to the laboratory, and filling in the gray areas of the treaty by defining terms such as component, development, and by banning
prototypes of defensive systems. The June 11 offensive proposal made by Soviet negotiators called for 8,000 warheads for each side of which no more than 60 percent could be deployed on any single type of delivery system. The plan continued Soviet calls for bomber weapons, gravity bombs and SRAMs, to be counted against the 8,000 ceiling, but it did allow long range ALCMs and SLCMs, hence the increase from 6,000 total warheads in their October 25 proposal. Even more significantly, the Soviets excluded, for the first time in START, American FBS.³

Paul Nitze began immediately after Gorbachev's January 15 proposal to put together a response based on his Monday Package and the November 1 American START proposal. At the same time, civilian aides to Caspar Weinberger, principally Richard Perle, constructed a more dramatic offer which attempted to match the public appeal of Gorbachev's disarmament plan. This plan called for the elimination of all ballistic missiles, in exchange the United States would agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for five years, followed by a two year period in which the superpowers would negotiate a plan to share research on strategic defenses. If no pact could be agreed to either side could give six months notice, and would then be free to deploy strategic defenses. When he finally learned of the plan, Nitze was appalled that the zero ballistic missile plan (ZBM) applied to the British, French, and Chinese even though they had not been consulted. Consequently, he was sent in late May to inform the British and French of the offer. Both governments were stupefied at
the proposal and insisted that they not be mentioned in the ZBM plan. With this omission, a letter containing the ZBM proposal was sent to Gorbachev on July 25."

Three days later, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh came to Washington and suggested that to get the NST discussions moving again each side appoint a panel of experts and that these experts meet in Moscow to discuss ways around the impasse. The first experts meeting took place in the Soviet capital in August, but very little was accomplished. The second, held in Washington in September, saw a narrowing of the gap between the two positions on START and INF. The United States tabled a new START proposal that was more in line with the Soviet plan of June 11. It called for a ceiling of 7,500 ballistic and cruise missile warheads, and subceilings of 5,500 warheads on ballistic missiles, 3,300 on ICBMs, of which only 50 percent could be on the 10 warhead SS-18 and SS-24 missiles.

Differences over strategic defenses were slightly narrowed in this period by a letter from Gorbachev delivered by Shevardnadze during a September 19 visit to the White House. The letter reduced the period in which the United States and the Soviet Union would have to abide by the ABM Treaty to 15 years, down from the 15-20 the Soviets had insisted upon in their May proposal on strategic defenses."

Progress on an INF Treaty was more tangible in 1986 and by September significant headway had been made toward an agreement. The first important change came on February 6 when during a meeting with Senator Edward Kennedy, Gorbachev
delinked the INF Treaty from the negotiations on START and strategic defenses. Administration officials had been very encouraged by the INF portion of Gorbachev's disarmament proposal since it called for the elimination of LRINF forces in Europe as part of the plan's first phase. This, coupled with pressure from America's European and Asian allies, led the United States to alter its INF proposal once again. The West German government increased the pressure on the Reagan administration to include SRINF in the negotiations, and in the same period the Japanese and Chinese governments began to express their fears that an INF Treaty would do nothing about the SS-20s in Asia aimed at their countries. For these reasons, the United States in February, 1986 returned to its global zero proposal in the INF talks and added a freeze on SRINF as part of the package.¹

At the September experts meeting in Washington, real progress was reported on INF. The United States submitted a compromise proposal, once again backing away from the zero option, which called for 100 INF warheads for the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe, and 100 in Asia. The United States would station its 100 warheads to be targeted on the Asian part of the Soviet Union in Alaska. The Soviets had abandoned their longstanding insistence that they be somehow compensated for the existence of the French and British arsenals, and it seemed that the two sides were very near agreement on a framework for an INF Treaty.⁷

Only the Johnson-Kosygin summit at Glassboro in 1967 compares to the Reykjavik meeting in terms of the haste and
confusion with which it was arranged. September, 1986 saw the U.S.-Soviet relationship change from cooperation and progress at the experts meeting to confrontation because of the Daniloff affair, and it finally culminated with President Reagan deciding to accept Gorbachev's invitation to meet at Reykjavik. It was no secret in the summer of 1986 that Reagan and Gorbachev were working toward another summit near the end of the year since it was announced on August 4 that Shevardnadze would come to the White House on September 19 to prepare for a second summit between the two leaders. These plans were sidetracked when on August 30 American journalist Nicholas Daniloff was arrested by the KGB in retaliation for the arrest in New York of Soviet agent Gennadi Zakharov. For the next month, Washington and Moscow were locked in a confrontation, with the Reagan administration demanding that Daniloff be released before any summit plans could go forward. Shevardnadze and Shultz spent much of September trying to arrange Daniloff's freedom in a way which would allow the Soviet Union to gain Zakharov's release without a direct exchange of the American journalist for the Soviet spy. In the midst of this confrontation, Shevardnadze made his scheduled trip to the White House to discuss summit preparations. He carried with him a letter from Mikhail Gorbachev proposing a brief Reagan-Gorbachev meeting halfway between Moscow and Washington, London or Reykjavik were suggested, that could give momentum to the arms control process so that a full blown summit could be held at the end of the year. Reagan made it clear that nothing was possible
until Daniloff was released, but he was clearly intrigued by
the proposal. With Daniloff's release, on September 29, and
Zakharov's exchange for Soviet dissident Yuri Orlov, the path
was now clear for Reagan to accept Gorbachev's invitation.
On September 30 Reagan agreed to meet the General Secretary
at Reykjavik on October 11, less than two weeks away.'

Just as Reykjavik was about to begin, Reagan had to
reach a quick compromise with Congress on several arms
control issues. The House had passed, as part of the Defense
Appropriations bill, an amendment which would have prohibited
nuclear tests above one kiloton. It also agreed to an
amendment that would have required adherence to SALT II.
Congressional negotiators, pressured by administration claims
that Congress was tying the President's hands as he was about
to meet Gorbachev, dropped both amendments. Reagan did,
however, agree to submit the PNE and TTB agreements to the
Senate, and to discuss with the Soviets CTB negotiations.'

In the brief time between the summit's arrangement and
the President's arrival in Reykjavik Soviet diplomats seemed
to make it clear that the only area in which they believed
real progress was possible was on INF. Therefore the
administration prepared carefully in case the Soviets were
ready to reach agreement on a framework for the INF Treaty.
Only days before the summit the State Department received
word that Dobrynin, while on a trip through South Asia, had
important new proposals that he hoped to spring on the
President in hopes of forcing an agreement. Nitze's reaction
to this news was:
My view was so much the better. I thought we were fairly clear as to the needs of the West, and the further Gorbachev moved to meet those needs, the better off we would be. Despite public opinion pressure created by initial successes in the negotiation, we could then stand firm against going further than we wanted to go; we could pocket what we wished to pocket.10

Ronald Reagan was walking into a trap, one that involved the most intense, high stakes negotiations in the history of U.S.-Soviet summit meetings.

The Summit

Reykjavik was the only summit between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union entirely devoted to arms control. After some very brief discussions in which Reagan brought up Afghanistan, Soviet support for revolution in the third world, and Soviet emigration, Gorbachev startled Reagan and his advisers with a whole series of proposals on START, INF, and strategic defenses, including some important concessions. The biggest surprise was the General Secretary's acceptance of zero LRINF in Europe, the administration had expected him to accept their September proposal for 100 warheads in Europe, and some unspecified accommodation in Asia. On START, Gorbachev returned to the Soviet and American position of a year earlier by offering a 6,000 warhead ceiling, and he further reduced the non-withdrawal period on the ABM Treaty to 10-15 years, but all tests on strategic defensive technology would have to be confined to the laboratory.11
Reagan and Gorbachev continued to meet through the afternoon and each man stuck to his vision of strategic defenses. Reagan pushed for a new treaty to supersede the ABM Treaty, that would require the sharing of defensive technology. Gorbachev was no warmer to this idea than he had been the year before, and he called for the ABM Treaty to be strengthened, not discarded. After several hours of meetings by the principals, working groups were established to see if Gorbachev's proposals could be fleshed out. Nitze headed the American delegation and Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, headed the Soviet working group. Their meetings ran from 8:00 P.M. Saturday evening until 6:30 A.M. Sunday morning, with only one brief break to consult with their bosses. Much of the first six hours was spent trying to sketch a framework for a START accord. Nitze proposed a 6,000 missile warhead ceiling on 1,600 delivery vehicles with subceilings on ballistic missile and heavy ICBM warheads. Akhromeyev agreed to the 6,000 ceiling but wanted the 50 percent reductions to apply to each subcategory as well. The American side protested that this would merely perpetuate and make even more destabilizing current assymetries in their force postures. At 2:00 A.M. with the two sides at an impasse, the meeting adjourned to allow consultation with each side's superiors. Nitze met with Shultz, and complained of the obstinacy of some of the American delegation's more conservative members, who at one time had forced him to return to the American proposal put
forward at the September experts meeting. Shultz sided with Nitze and allowed him to return to the 6,000/1,600 proposal.

One hour later the two sides reconvened and real progress was made. Akhromeyev accepted the 6000/1600 proposal, and dropped Soviet insistence that the fifty percent reductions apply to all subcategories. The Soviets and Americans then compromised on the issue of bombers and their weapons. Akhromeyev withdrew the requirement that individual bombs and SRAMs be counted against the 6,000 ceiling, and Nitze agreed that each bomber so loaded would count both as one warhead and one delivery system against the 1,600 SNDV ceiling. Nitze continued to press on subceilings but to no avail. At this point he reserved the right to return to subceilings in later negotiations, to which Akhromeyev agreed that the United States was free to bring up anything it wished in future talks.

Nitze and Akhromeyev then turned to INF and strategic defenses. The American side pressured the Soviets to make concessions on the number of SS-20s in Asia, but none were forthcoming. Progress was made on verification and SRINF, however. In the morning Nitze advised the President to hang tough on the Asian systems since the Soviets had seemed to accept 100 warheads in Asia in September. Little progress was made on SDI, with the Soviets continuing to insist that tests be confined to the laboratory. The two sides were unable to conclude limits for SLCMs as well. Although they did agree that they would seek a satisfactory solution to this question in the future. In ten and one-half hours the
working groups had agreed to the heart of the INF and START treaties. This session would have gone down in history as the most spectacular meeting in the history of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations if it had not been overshadowed by the events of the next twelve hours.1 2

As October 12 dawned the working groups adjourned to brief the principals on the progress overnight. Reagan and Gorbachev met for what was supposed to be their final meeting at 10:00 A.M. At this meeting, Gorbachev made another concession on INF by agreeing to reduce to 100 LRINF warheads in Asia with the United States also deploying 100 within its own boundaries. Disagreement still remained on SRINF, however. SDI remained the great roadblock with Gorbachev insisting that the whole package hinged on American acceptance of his demands on strategic defenses. With success within reach and strategic defenses the only remaining major hurdle, the President and General Secretary decided to send the summit into overtime and meet again in the afternoon, after a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting at 2:00 P.M.

It was at this point that what had been a remarkable meeting began to deteriorate. At the meeting of the two foreign ministers and their aides Shevardnadze insisted that all agreements were off unless the United States agreed to a ten year non-withdrawal pledge on the ABM Treaty. Prompted by Robert Linhard of the NSC staff, Perle, and National Security Adviser John Poindexter, Shultz offered the proposal that took this summit through the looking glass. Shultz
suggested that the two sides agree to a ten year non-withdrawal pledge, but couple this with a two phase agreement on offensive reductions. In the first five years the superpowers would agree to reduce their arsenals by fifty percent, based on the progress the working groups had made, and in the second five year phase the United States and the Soviet Union would eliminate all of their ballistic missiles. During this ten year period, research and development could continue on strategic defenses, and deployment of those weapons would be allowed after the period expired. Shevardnadze expressed interest, but asked that he be allowed to consult with Gorbachev.\textsuperscript{13}

The final exchange of this unprecedented day was between the two leaders themselves. Gorbachev rejected the American ZBM proposal, but he trumped the President, and his aides, by proposing that all strategic nuclear weapons be eliminated in the second five year phase. Exactly what the President said in response still is not clear, although Strobe Talbott quotes him as saying, "suits me fine." Reagan aides argue that this was merely an endorsement of the general goal of nuclear disarmament, not Gorbachev's specific proposal.\textsuperscript{14} A confusing exchange followed and one more attempt by the rest of the delegation to redraft the General Secretary's proposal was attempted, but in the end Gorbachev's insistence that all SDI testing be confined to the laboratory prevented any chance of agreement. The two leaders walked to Gorbachev's car sullen faced to bid each other goodbye in one of the most
memorable scenes in recent history. The most incredible, and the most dangerous, Cold War summit had come to a close.\textsuperscript{15}

The Summit Aftermath

In the immediate aftermath of the acrimonious end of the Reykjavik summit both sides began a frantic attempt to blame the other for the failure to reach agreement. As Reagan, Gorbachev and their aides discussed the final, frantic hours of the summit it soon became clear that no one was really certain exactly what had nearly been agreed to at Reykjavik. It was certain, however, that the President and his men had been willing to consider fundamental changes in the system of nuclear deterrence and with the very foundations of Western security. When more detailed accounts of the discussion reached the rest of the United States government, and the governments of the Western allies, officials were universally shocked at what the leaders had considered, and in some cases even accepted.

The first Reykjavik proposal to be discarded in the weeks after the summit was the plan to eliminate ballistic missiles in ten years. One week later at a NSC meeting held to consider where the administration would go after the summit the chairman of the JCS, Admiral William Crowe, argued forcefully, based on a JCS study done after Reykjavik, that ZBM would endanger American security, weakened the credibility of United States' commitments to defend Western Europe with its nuclear weapons, and would require at least a twelve percent real increase in defense spending to
implement. Adelman and others joined in the chorus of those who wished to see ZBM fall by the wayside, although Shultz continued to defend the proposal. Margaret Thatcher traveled to Washington in mid-November to convey the tremendous unease that Reykjavik had created among the allies. The potential of an INF Treaty based on the zero option was bad enough for the European members of NATO, but the serious consideration of ZBM, and even zero strategic nuclear weapons, was nearly beyond belief. The communique when Thatcher left endorsed fifty percent reductions in START, but made no mention of ZBM. The proposal was dead.

The first meeting between top level American and Soviet negotiators on issues related to START and SDI after the summit took place three weeks later in Vienna. Here Shultz and Shevardnadze attempted to salvage something from the wreckage of Reykjavik. The Soviet side continued to call for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by 1996, and they reaffirmed that there could be no separate agreement in any area until all had been resolved. When Shultz and Nitze tried to reopen the question of subceilings within START. The chief Soviet negotiator, Victor Karpov, denied that Akhromeyev had consented to leave the question of subceilings within the 6000/1600 framework open to later discussion. Nitze responded by calling him a liar. This exchange characterized much of Soviet-American relations after Reykjavik, with charges and countercharges flying between Washington and Moscow, as each attempted to fix blame for the summit’s failure on its adversary.
START remained bogged down for the next six months not only because of the tumultuous relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also because of continued division within the United States' government over SDI. In December, 1986 Weinberger and the director of the SDI Organization Lt. General James Abrahamson, briefed the President on the program's progress, and proposed a series of tests which would violate even the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and the deployment of a first phase strategic defensive system in 1994. February National Security Planning Group Meetings saw opposition to this proposal from Crowe, Shultz, Nitze, and the new National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci, all of whom felt the move toward deployment in the mid-1990s was premature.

At roughly the same time, Nitze began to advocate negotiations with the Soviets which could define what kinds of activities were permitted and prohibited regarding the testing and development of systems based on other physical principles under the ABM Treaty. In April, 1987, it seemed such talks might be taking shape when Shevardnadze proposed a meeting of the Standing Consultative Committee attended by each countries' defense ministers that could clear up the issues of what was permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty. Weinberger immediately opposed the permitted-prohibited talks, and this time he was joined by Carlucci. Together they convinced the President to reject the offer."

Disagreement over SDI was not limited to the executive branch in the first month of 1987 as the Congress tried to
head off any plans to implement the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. In March, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga), the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, completed a review of the negotiating record of the ABM Treaty and found that the broad interpretation was not fully justified, and on March 5 the Committee voted to prohibit any test of SDI technology which would violate the traditional interpretation. Attempts by Shultz and Nitze to negotiate a compromise with influential Senators failed, and it was this stalemate which gave further impetus to Nitze's attempts to establish permitted-prohibited negotiations. This effort failed as well."

In mid-April, the first glimmer of a compromise on SDI began to emerge. During a trip to Moscow by Shultz, Gorbachev offered that each side agree to a ten year non-withdrawal pledge with negotiations on a follow-on regime to begin 2-3 years before the pledge expired. If one side chose to deploy defenses at the end of the ten year period the other would no longer be bound by the offensive restraints negotiated in START. For the first time, the Soviet fear of SDI seemed to be abating, and gradually SDI would cease to be the roadblock to the achievement of a START Treaty that it was at Reykjavik. Movement on strategic offense did not come until eleven months after the summit when in September the Soviets began to propose subceilings within the 6,000 warhead limit."

The great worry in the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit was that the Soviet acceptance of zero LRINF in Europe, which
was first proposed by the Reagan administration in 1981, would lead to an immediate split within the alliance. American INF missiles were deployed to counter Soviet conventional forces, and to recouple the defense of the United States to the defense of Europe, much more than they were deployed to counter the SS-20s. NATO leaders feared that the withdrawal of the GLCMs and Pershing IIs would leave them more vulnerable to a Soviet conventional attack because an American nuclear response would be less certain. European leaders all breathed a sigh of relief after Reykjavik failed, even though publicly they endorsed the President's efforts. A few weeks after the summit Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany and President Francios Mitterand of France tried to tie zero LRINF in Europe to the conventional balance, but this effort came too late. Once the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to zero at Reykjavik it would only be a matter of time before the Soviets would return to it.21

Once the fallout created by the failure of the Reykjavik summit had begun to subside, progress on INF came quickly. The ice began to break on February 28 when TASS released a statement by Mikhail Gorbachev once again delinking INF from the negotiations on START and strategic defenses. Immediately the delegations put together a joint draft treaty and went about the business of settling the remaining disputes. The United States had two major objectives regarding the Soviet position on INF. The administration, with heavy pressure from the West Germans, began to insist on zero SRINF as well as LRINF. This required a significant
Soviet concession since they had a monopoly on those systems, and the United States had no missiles in the 500-1000 kilometer range. The only western missiles in this range were the West German Pershing IA missiles which would be coupled with an American warhead if war actually came. The United States also began to insist that the Soviets agree to dismantle all of their SS-20s in Asia as well.

These issues were resolved in the spring and summer of 1987. During Secretary Shultz’s trip to Moscow in mid-April, Gorbachev removed one of the hurdles by agreeing to dismantle the SS-12, 22, and 23 missiles that made up the Soviet monopoly on SRINF. The two sides moved even closer to agreement, despite Western reluctance, when on July 22 Gorbachev agreed to zero LRINF in Asia. The Soviet Union had now accepted Ronald Reagan's original INF proposal made in the fall of 1981, and many NATO leaders were quite unnerved at this prospect. The only remaining hurdle, the West German Pershing IAs, was a much stickier proposition since West Germany was not a party to the negotiations, but the Soviets continued to insist that these missiles be dismantled because their range placed them in the SRINF category. Chancellor Kohl hesitated for nearly a month, but the West German government could not withstand the public pressure created by its being the only remaining obstacle to an INF agreement. On August 26, Kohl agreed to destroy West Germany’s Pershing IA missiles once the INF Treaty had been implemented. Verification arrangements now became the only obstacle to agreement and with Soviet acceptance of on-site inspection
the two sides soon adopted the most comprehensive verification provisions ever negotiated. Tentative agreement on the INF Treaty was announced on September 18, and the treaty itself was signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan on December 7.²²

Evaluation of the Propositions

Proposition One

Let us now explore whether or not the hastily convened Reykjavik summit forced the administration to reach a common position on any important issues.

P1: The approach of the summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision-makers, and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes.

As was the case with the Geneva summit in 1985 this proposition is validated on some arms control issues facing the Reagan administration, but not on others. Bessmertnykh's trip to Washington began the formal preparation for a summit in 1986, although the final date was not set until September 30 after the conclusion of the Daniloff affair. The experts meetings arranged by Bessmertnykh were to explore possible compromises that might make a summit successful. At these meetings the United States made new proposals on INF and START that it was believed would be more acceptable to the Soviet negotiators. In the INF discussions at the September experts meeting, the United States came off zero again by proposing 100 LRINF in
Europe and 100 in Asia, and the Soviets seemed ready to accept this proposal. On START at the same conference the United States offered a 7,500 warhead ceiling, up from 6,000 in the previous proposal, and other subceilings that were less difficult for the Soviets to accept. This START offer was similar in many respects to the Soviet proposal of June 11, and thus the two sides seemed to be clarifying where the middle ground in the negotiations was.

The administration was not able to heal its own divisions over SDI, however. The State and Defense Department which had been able to put together the new proposals for the September experts meeting in START and INF remained quite far apart on strategic defenses. The July 25 ZBM proposal had reached a sort of compromise by proposing to adhere to the ABM Treaty for at least seven and one-half years, but there were still great differences over whether the United States should move to implement the broad interpretation of the treaty, and just how negotiable these issues were.

Reykjavik was unique in that less than two weeks time passed between the announcement of the summit and Reagan's departure for Iceland. In addition, the expectation was that there would not be serious negotiations at Reykjavik on START and SDI. A potential framework for an INF treaty was expected to be the only detailed business discussed as the two sides prepared for a full scale summit later in the year. This was not a major problem related to the START negotiations since the administration had just submitted a
detailed new proposal on this issue just weeks earlier at the experts meeting. Regarding strategic defenses, however, the administration did not have time to explore possible areas of compromise, especially if the Soviets were to offer significant cuts in offensive forces in exchange for limits on SDI. Going into Reykjavik the administration had simply not considered how they would respond where they might compromise if Gorbachev made new offensive initiatives, but conditioned them on acceptance of his position on strategic defenses. The divisions were so great within the administration, the time for preparation was so short, and expectations were that these issues would not be discussed in detail, therefore there was little if any preparation on how to respond to these kinds of overtures.

The ZBM proposal is an even more curious case of a lack of preparation in advance of a superpower summit. The proposal originated in the Defense Department in the spring of 1986, was considered by Reagan’s key aides throughout May and June, and was offered to Gorbachev in a letter on July 25; Yet never in this period of time or in the interval prior to the summit on October 11 was it ever studied as to its impact on the national security of the United States. In fact, the first serious study of the consequences of an agreement based on ZBM was not undertaken until National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 250, issued on November 20, more than one month after the summit. While Crowe and the JCS opposed ZBM they simply dismissed the plan as another shot in the propaganda war over arms control that dominated
U.S.-Soviet relations in 1986. The plan was seen as a non-negotiable answer to Gorbachev’s public relations campaign that would never be heard of again. Much to the chagrin of the JCS it was revived at Reykjavik, and if it had been accepted, the entire force posture of the United States would have been radically altered without any serious study of its consequences.\footnote{2}

Reykjavik also showed how a President can use an upcoming summit to force Congress to support his position on an issue in foreign or defense policy. Fearing that they would weaken, or at least be seen to weaken by the public, the President’s hand at Reykjavik. Congress agreed to drop amendments forcing adherence to SALT II and requiring a nuclear test moratorium.

In sum, proposition one is found to hold in the cases of START and INF, but not on SDI and ZBM. The approach of the summit created the incentive for the Reagan administration to develop new proposals on START and INF. It did not, however, heal the deep divisions on the issue of strategic defenses or force a closer look at the ZBM proposal.

**Proposition Two**

Did the Reykjavik negotiators remove important roadblocks to success on START and INF? We now turn to this question.

P2: The President and General Secretary have resolved important issues which were unable to be resolved at lower levels.
The number of issues discussed and resolved during the first day of the Reykjavik summit was breathtaking. Gorbachev told the President in their first meeting that he had come to break the deadlock on arms control, and he proceeded to offer a series of proposals which removed impediments to agreements on INF and START. In the START discussions the Soviets proposed and the Americans accepted the 6,000 warhead ceiling, and during the working group session the first night Akhromeyev agreed to couple this with a limit of 1,600 delivery systems. The Soviets and Americans both compromised on the issue of weapons carried by heavy bombers. The Soviets dropped their demands that individual bombs and SRAMs be counted against the 6,000 ceiling, and the United States agreed to count all bombers carrying these weapons against the 6,000 warhead ceiling and the 1,600 ceiling on delivery systems. While Akhromeyev did not accept subceilings within the 6,000 warhead limit he did suggest that in principle the Soviet Union was ready to make significant cuts in their force of heavy missiles.

None of these issues had been resolved by negotiations at the delegation level or even at the experts meeting. The overall warhead ceiling had been set by both sides at 6,000 just before the Geneva summit, but had been raised to the 7,500-8,000 level by the Soviet June proposal and the American plan offered at the experts meeting in September. The Soviet acceptance of the counting rules for bomber weapons not only simplified verification problems, but it also removed a Soviet proposal that would probably never have
been accepted. Agreeing in principle to the idea of deep cuts in Soviet heavy missiles was also significant since it began the process of reducing the threat posed by the monstrous SS-18, a long sought goal of the American arms control and military communities.

On INF several important roadblocks were removed. Soviet acceptance of the zero option in Europe brought to fruition Reagan's five year push for the elimination of LRINF from that continent, although many in the administration, and in the governments of the NATO allies, were far from happy about this outcome. At Reykjavik, Gorbachev also accepted the principle of significant reductions in the Asian SS-20 force, thus allowing the United States to address the fears of China, Japan and its other allies in Asia who feared that INF would not deal with the threat to their security posed by the SS-20. The Soviets also agreed to cooperative verification measures in an INF treaty, thus laying the groundwork for eventual Soviet acceptance of on-site inspection. Each of these issues had eluded negotiators at lower levels since the INF talks began, and were settled in the matter of a few hours in the early morning of October 12.

There was movement toward agreement on the issue of strategic defenses at Reykjavik, although not enough to save the summit. When Shevardnadze visited the White House on September 19 he brought with him a proposal which reduced the non-withdrawal period on the ABM Treaty to 15 years, previously it had been 15-20. At the summit, Gorbachev further reduced the period to ten, and there was some chance
for agreement on these terms, albeit only in the context of Soviet acceptance of the ZBM proposal. The question that could not be compromised was not the duration of agreement, but by which ABM Treaty they were agreeing to abide. Soviet insistence on limiting tests of strategic defensive technology to the laboratory turned out to be the issue on which the whole agreement foundered. While there was a narrowing of the two sides' positions on strategic defenses ultimately the issue could not be resolved and throughout the discussion American acceptance of the ten year period was so conditioned on radical changes in the strategic equation it is doubtful that any agreement was really ever possible.

In sum, the second proposition is supported in the issues of START and INF. The Soviets agreed for the first time to reduce their heavy missile forces and not to insist on the counting of individual bombs and SRAMs against the 6000 warhead ceiling and the United States agreed to include heavy bombers against the 1600 SNDV limit. Each of these were important issues that had to be resolved for the framework to be concluded and thus were important obstacles to agreement. Therefore, the evidence supports proposition two.

Proposition Three

Can the Rykjavik agreements in START and INF be considered framework? This question will now be considered.

P3: Framework agreements at U.S.-Soviet summits pave the way for more rapid progress at lower
levels and form the outline for a formal agreement.

Reykjavik, like Vladivostok, demonstrates how leaders can use summit diplomacy to craft the framework of an agreement that sets the stage for rapid progress at lower levels ultimately leading to a formal treaty. The INF negotiations had languished since they began in the spring of 1982 with the Soviets clinging to the notion that they must be compensated for French and British forces, and the United States unable to decide if it really desired an agreement based on the global zero option as President Reagan had proposed in the fall of 1981. The September experts meeting had seen a significant narrowing of the divisions between the two sides with the Soviets abandoning the principle that they must be compensated for French and British nuclear forces, and the Americans once again moving away from the zero option. It seemed going into the summit that a deal of 100 INF warheads in Europe and 100 in Asia could be the basis for a framework agreement.

Gorbachev, of course, crossed up the American experts by accepting zero LRINF in Europe and eventually agreeing to limit the Soviet SS-20 force in the Asian part of the U.S.S.R. to 100 warheads. While eventually the treaty signed on December 7, 1987 went much further than the 0/100 framework negotiated at Reykjavik, the summit agreement remains the heart of the INF Treaty. Once the concept of zero was accepted in Europe it was gradually extended not only to Asian SS-20s but also to SRINF, much in the way that
the Vladivostok ceilings acted as a guide to the solution of problems solved in later negotiations on SALT II. In other words, once the leaders had solved the thorniest problems using a particular formula it was natural that this formula be applied to the remaining issues.

The agreement on START was not as complete as the INF accord, largely because the strategic weapons negotiations were infinitely more complex. Still, however, Reykjavik also laid the groundwork for the START Treaty that eventually emerged in the Bush administration. The establishment of the 6,000 warhead ceiling and the 1,600 limit on delivery vehicles became the backbone for later additions to the treaty. The Soviets were able to gain the inclusion of heavy bombers in both of these categories while the United States was able to convince the Soviets that bomber weapons should not be counted. There were omissions, subceilings within the 6,000 warhead limit could not be agreed to, as could not limits on SLCMs. The negotiators did agree that somehow SLCMs would be accounted for, and the Soviet concession that they would for the first time consider significant cuts in their heavy missile force implied that subceilings were possible. While much work was left to be done, the START delegations now worked in a much more well-defined universe, and a pattern had been created which could be used to guide later agreements.

On strategic defenses the ten year non-withdrawal period could have served as the framework of an agreement if it had not been tied to such radical changes in the strategic
offensive arsenals of the two superpowers, and if they could have agreed to what kinds of tests were permitted in this period. The ZBM proposals and Gorbachev's plan for the elimination of strategic offensive weapons could also have been framework agreements if they had been accepted, but fortunately neither was. If Gorbachev had said yes to ZBM it would have set off a firestorm within the United States government, and the NATO alliance, whose ultimate outcome cannot be estimated. The Reagan administration could have been trapped by what began as a public relations gimmick, as it was to a lesser extent by the global zero option and the INF Treaty. In this case the Soviets did accept an American offer that had originally been made to quiet the protest movement in Western Europe and with which no Western government, including the United States, had ever been entirely comfortable. In the next months the West continued to add conditions after the Soviets had accepted the essence of the American position until finally the West had no choice but to accept its own proposal. In the end the damage done by the INF was only marginal, and the Western alliance survived, although perhaps a bit shaken. If this same scenario had taken place on the ZBM proposal the fallout would have been much more severe and the consequences far more long-lasting.

In sum, proposition three is found to hold in the cases of START and INF. The agreements negotiated at Reykjavik form the heart of these two arms control
agreements and made greater progress possible at lower levels.

Proposition Four

We will now consider if any of these discussions in Iceland can be categorized as education attempts.

P4: Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterpart on their concerns and interests on the important issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted in changes in the behavior of the superpowers following the summit.

Unlike Geneva there were real negotiations at Reykjavik, the most extensive and far-reaching arms control talks ever attempted at a U.S.-Soviet summit. Geneva had been dominated by Reagan and Gorbachev's attempts to convert his counterpart to his own vision of the role of strategic defenses. While there were a few attempts by the President to do this at Reykjavik this summit was devoted to negotiation, not education.

In sum, none of the talks at Reykjavik can be characterized as an attempt to educate one's counterpart. Therefore, proposition four is not supported by the evidence gathered from this summit.

Conclusion

Reykjavik, while it unnerved America's allies for a time, as well as many in Washington, turned out to have few long-lasting side effects. Most of the participants,
especially Reagan, Nitze, and Shultz, argue that the dangers of the Reykjavik negotiations have been overblown and that much was actually achieved. Without question the first day of negotiations at Reykjavik accomplished a great deal including the crafting of the frameworks for both the INF and START Treaties. At no time, before had so much arms control progress come in 24 hours. Nevertheless the careless and unprepared way in which the central tenets of the defense of the West were dealt with cannot help but lead one to the conclusion that Reykjavik could have been a far greater disaster than it turned out to be. Confidence in American leadership was shaken and it can only be imagined what the consequences would have been if Gorbachev had been more willing to compromise on SDI. The dangers of Reykjavik will be more fully considered in the last chapter.

Table 13

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The table above shows that there were a number of concrete accomplishments achieved at the Reykjavik summit. The approach of the meeting did encourage the development of new proposals on START and INF, thus supporting proposition one. The settling of key questions which could have prevented progress on START and INF give weight to the second proposition. Most importantly, the Reykjavik discussions
brought agreement on frameworks for both the INF and START treaties, and paved the way for progress in the negotiations, thus supporting proposition three. Only proposition four was not found to have merit in this case. What the table does not show, however, are the dangers created by the careless way in which the Reykjavik negotiations were conducted. This issue will be addressed in the final chapter of this study.
NOTES - CHAPTER XII


   Talbott, p. 302.


   Talbott, pp. 306-309.


   Talbott, pp. 313-315.


   Talbott, pp. 291-295.


   Talbott, p. 313.

   Warner, p. 212.


   Nitze, p. 428.


Adelman, p. 45.
Talbott, pp. 316-317.
Reagan, pp. 675-676.
Adelman, pp. 49-56.
Talbott, pp. 318-322.
Adelman, pp. 57-62.
Talbott, pp. 323-324.
Adelman, pp. 71-75.
Talbott, pp. 324-326.
17. Talbott, p. 327.


Talbott, pp. 329-335.
Talbott, pp. 333-335.

Adelman, pp. 83-84.

Talbott, p. 337.

22. Nitze, pp. 441-443.

Talbott, pp. 337-342.


SUMMIT DIPLOMACY:
THE CONSEQUENCES OF COLD WAR SUMMITS
VOLUME II

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Robert Jarrett McCollister, B.S., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
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CHAPTER XIII

ALLIES, CONGRESS, AND TRENDS IN SUMMITRY

Before moving on to a final analysis of the four research areas contained in this study, it is useful to examine some of the characteristics of summit diplomacy that have been uncovered. The main focus will be on the role of Congress and especially the role of Allies in summit diplomacy. We will also consider various trends and the changing nature of summitry.

Trends in Summitry

An examination of the time intervals between summits involving the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar period reveals an interesting pattern. While the average interval between scheduled summits, this includes the aborted Paris summit of 1960, but not Ford's meeting with Brezhnev at Helsinki in 1975, is almost exactly three years, this era has been characterized by periods in which there was a flurry of summit activity followed by relatively long stretches without a meeting between the leaders of the superpowers. It took ten years following the Second World War for the first postwar summit conference to
take place at Geneva in 1955 and four years after that for the Camp David meeting in 1959. This was followed very rapidly, however, by the Paris summit scheduled for May, 1960 and the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting at Vienna in June, 1961. Once again there was a relatively long stretch without a summit between the superpowers which ended with the Glassboro meeting between Johnson and Prime Minister Kosygin in 1967. Five years separated this meeting from the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow in 1972. The Moscow summit, however, was the first of a series of detente-era meetings with the Washington summit in 1973, Moscow again in 1974, and Vladivostok five months later in November, 1974. Excluding the brief Ford-Brezhnev meeting at the Helsinki Conference in 1975, the next U.S.-Soviet summit would not come until June, 1979 when President Carter met with General Secretary Brezhnev at Vienna. Once again, a long stretch separates Vienna from the next encounter at Geneva between Reagan and Gorbachev. Following the November, 1985 Geneva summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met three times in two and one-half years at Reykjavik in 1986, Washington in 1987, and Moscow in May, 1988.

There have been three periods of increased U.S.-Soviet summit activity in the post war era, 1959-1961, 1972-1974, and 1985-1989. While these periods include only ten years in the postwar era, only the Geneva, 1955, Glassboro in 1967, and Vienna, 1979 summits were conducted outside of these time frames. Following each of these bursts of activity relatively long periods developed in which summits were
infrequent. The 11 years between the Vienna summit in 1961 and the Moscow summit of 1972 were interrupted only by Glassboro in 1967. Almost exactly 11 years elapsed between Gerald Ford's Vladivostok summit meeting with Leonid Brezhnev and Ronald Reagan's first encounter with Mikhail Gorbachev at Geneva, with only the Carter-Brezhnev meeting at Vienna taking place in this period. Thus a clear cycle of spurts of activity and relatively long periods of inactivity characterize U.S.-Soviet summit diplomacy.

The frequency of U.S.-Soviet summits in the Cold War reflected the overall state of superpower relations. The periods 1972-1974 were not only eras of increased summit activity, they also could be characterized as periods of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. Summits, in the Cold War era, were far more frequent in periods of good relations than bad, and the frequency of summits also reinforced these good relations. The 1959-1961 period is a bit more complex, but Khrushchev was pursuing his policy of peaceful coexistence during these years, although his policy was far less consistent.

Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon hold the American record for U.S.-Soviet summit appearances. Reagan met with Mikhail Gorbachev four times at the summit and once, more briefly, when the General Secretary visited the United Nations in December, 1988. Richard Nixon held three summits with Leonid Brezhnev during the heyday of detente from 1972-1974. Thus two presidents represented the United States at one-half of the postwar superpower summits. Eisenhower met twice with
his Soviet counterpart excluding Paris, while Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, and Carter were involved in one summit each.

One the Soviet side, in the years covered in this study, Leonid Brezhnev participated in five superpower summits; Mikhail Gorbachev met with the American President four times through 1988. Nikita Khrushchev attended three such meetings, and Alexsi Kosygin represented the U.S.S.R. at Glassboro, the only time that the Prime Minister was the lone top level Soviet representative. Nikolai Bulganin, however, was present along with Khrushchev at the Geneva summit in 1955, due to the unsettled nature of the Soviet power structure following Stalin's death in 1953. Two Soviet General Secretaries in the postwar era, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, did not attend a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting during their tenure as General Secretary.

Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met four times in full summit meetings and one other time on following Gorbachev's address to the United Nations in December, 1988. Their fourth meeting at Moscow in 1988 eclipsed the old standard of three summits between Nixon and Brezhnev set from 1972-1974. Eisenhower and Khrushchev actually met three times for summit encounters, but the Paris Conference broke up before any serious negotiation or discussion could take place. Ford met once with Brezhnev excluding Helsinki, as did Carter while Johnson and Kosygin also met on only one occasion. The Bush-Gorbachev meetings, they met four times between 1989-1991, have not been included here since they now
seem to be transitional meetings, rather than true Cold War summits.

Thus one-half of the Cold War U.S.-Soviet summit meetings have been attended by two dyads of leaders, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, and Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev. It would seem from this evidence that two pairs of leaders, Reagan-Gorbachev, and Nixon-Brezhnev, met often enough to establish the personal relationships and knowledge of each other’s attitudes that advocates of summit diplomacy see as one of its greatest virtues. In Nixon’s case, it is difficult to determine how much of an impact this had on the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship since the second and third meetings between these two leaders were marred by the President’s growing weakness due to Watergate. Brezhnev’s understanding of Nixon, and vice-versa, may have affected Soviet actions during the Yom Kippur War, but there is no direct evidence to support this conclusion. With Ronald Reagan, however, the personal relationship which developed with Mikhail Gorbachev at Geneva seems to have brought about a profound change in his attitude toward relations between the two countries. The “evil empire” rhetoric and emphasis on support for anticommmunist insurgences that characterized the Reagan Presidency before Geneva was replaced by an almost naive hope that the superpowers could rid the world of nuclear weapons. The image of Ronald Reagan walking arm in arm through Red Square with the leader of the Soviet Union would have been unimaginable in 1981, and yet it took place at the Moscow summit in 1988. While this would not have
happened without concrete changes in Soviet foreign policy, the personal relationship that developed between these two men did aid in changing the focus of American foreign policy.¹

The Role of Congress

As time passed during the Cold War, Congress became more assertive and on several occasions acted to limit the President's freedom to maneuver at the summit. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy encountered very few problems with the Congress as they prepared to meet Khrushchev. There was still a great deal of bipartisan support for the broad outlines of American foreign policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s, especially on the fundamental issues which were discussed at these early summits. American support for West Germany, and for the freedom of West Berlin, were the primary topics addressed at Geneva, Camp David, and Vienna, and neither of these was the kind of issue on which either President Eisenhower or Kennedy could expect a major challenge. As a result congressional opposition to the positions the President would take at the summit was not a major concern for either President as the meeting approached.

This had begun to change somewhat by the time Johnson was preparing to meet Kosygin at the Glassboro summit in 1967. Johnson's main problem with the Congress, as well as the JCS, was that they were far more adamant about the need to deploy strategic defenses than he and his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara were. In 1966, the Congress had
appropriated $167.9 million more than the President had requested for strategic defenses, and Johnson was under considerable pressure from the Congress and the military to proceed with deployment in 1967. McNamara's compromise, to seek arms control talks, and if these failed to proceed with deployment of an ABM system, temporarily delayed when the final decision would have to be made on the Sentinel system, but arrangements for those talks had to be made fairly soon if deployment was to be avoided all together. With these conflicting pressures, Johnson went to the summit hoping that he could convince Kosygin to open negotiations on strategic arms control and thereby solve his dilemma. The Premier did not oblige and in September, McNamara was forced to announce the deployment of a thin area defense against ballistic missile attacks from China or accidental launches.

The erosion of executive authority and the withering of bipartisanship in foreign policy brought on by Vietnam and Watergate made Congress far more willing to limit the President's freedom to negotiate at the summit. The outstanding example of this was Senator Jackson's running battle with Richard Nixon over Jewish emigration, trade, and SALT. Prior to the Washington summit, the Soviets had agreed to remove the exit tax on Jewish emigrants, but Jackson would not accept this alone as sufficient to drop his amendment, and he pushed for greater Soviet assurances on the level of emigration. This effectively ended any chance of serious discussions on trade at the summit. In 1974 Jackson continued his demands for Soviet assurances on not only the
level, but even the geographic distribution of Jewish emigration. Just as Nixon was about to depart for Moscow the Senator announced that he would seek further unspecified links between trade and Soviet emigration policy, thus once again precluding any trade negotiations at the summit.

On SALT II, Jackson became nearly as big an impediment to progress as he was on trade, as he worked with those in the administration who were skeptical of the government’s arms control policy. Jackson’s amendment which required SALT II to equally limit both superpowers had a great impact on the internal debate within the administration as they prepared for the Washington and Moscow summits in 1973 and 1974. It clearly limited Kissinger’s ability to structure an agreement based on anything other than equal aggregates, including the Secretary’s preferred approach of counterbalancing asymmetries. In 1974 Jackson’s attempts to limit the President’s flexibility reached new heights when his close cooperation with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger sabotaged Kissinger’s attempt to put together a negotiable SALT II proposal for presentation at the summit. Just days before Nixon left for Moscow, Jackson charged that the President had made a secret deal with the Soviet leadership in 1972 at the Moscow summit regarding the United States willingness to trade in older Titan II missiles for newer SLBMs. Once again Jackson had been able to prevent any detailed negotiation at the summit.2

Gerald Ford’s ascension to the Presidency and the restoration of executive authority after Watergate did bring
solutions to the stalemates over SALT II and the extension of MFN, although the Soviets could not accept Jackson's public statements about the nature of the agreement on Jewish emigration and voided the 1972 trade pact. The desire for a full summit in 1974 no doubt gave impetus to the negotiations over Jackson-Vanik and helped bring a resolution of the confrontation between the executive and legislative branches. Jackson's opposition to detente would haunt another president, however, this time one of his own party, Jimmy Carter. On the eve of Carter's departure for Vienna, Jackson made a speech accusing the President of appeasement, and comparing Carter to Neville Chamberlain. This episode did not effectively limit the President's flexibility at Vienna, given that SALT II was already complete and Brezhnev's poor health made negotiations on any other topic nearly impossible, but it does exemplify that Congress was still willing to challenge even a President of its own party as he prepared for the summit. Carter was also having a great deal of difficulty getting Congress to approve the implementing legislation for the Panama Canal Treaties in the days just before Vienna. The argument that such a defeat would weaken the President at the summit seemed to carry little weight.

Ronald Reagan had a contentious relationship with Congress in 1986 over issues relating to arms control, and these disagreements carried on up until just before the Reykjavik summit. The Defense Appropriation bill in the House was nearing passage in October, 1986, and it contained amendments which would have required the administration to
continue to adhere to SALT II, and would have banned nuclear tests above one kiloton. The President and his advisers maintained that Reagan could not be allowed to travel to Reykjavik hamstrung by such conditions, and on this occasion the argument worked and the amendments were dropped. The President was still enormously popular and Congress did not wish to be seen as weakening Ronald Reagan as he was about to meet with Mikhail Gorbachev. In fact, fall summits might be wise for Presidents in the future since it might give them addition leverage over the Congress as the annual battle over the budget reaches its conclusion.

Congress has been more assertive in challenging the President as he prepares for a summit since the 1970s, as it has been more assertive in the overall executive-legislative relationship since Vietnam and Watergate. Due to Reagan's popularity and public stature he was more effective in blunting this assertiveness than his predecessors, but even he had far more problems in this regard than Eisenhower or Kennedy. This is undoubtedly related as well to the existence of divided government in Washington with Republican control of the executive branch and Democratic control of the legislature. Presidents may in the future attempt to use the approach of a summit to gain congressional approval of an initiative or to block legislation which they oppose, but they should keep in mind that this tactic has not been terribly effective in the past.
The Role of America's Allies

How much influence have America's allies had on the behavior of the President of the United States as he prepared for, and engaged in, direct negotiations with the leader of the Soviet Union? In the previous chapters the actions of allied leaders before and after U.S.-Soviet summits has been explored, and several interesting trends seem to have emerged as to the nature of the constraints imposed by the allies on regional issues and arms control. The constraints were the most severe on regional issues because the superpowers were often directly negotiating on the fate of states allied to them. As has been stated previously, the great regional issue at U.S.-Soviet summits through Vienna in 1961 was the fate of Germany and its former capital Berlin. On this issue, America's three most important NATO allies, West Germany, France, and Great Britain were extraordinarily concerned about the stance the President would take at the summit. Consultation before the Geneva, Camp David, and Vienna summits was far more extensive than it would be prior to the later summits, when the questions discussed were not so fundamental to European security as the future of Germany. Before Geneva working groups were set up to coordinate Western positions at the summit, and the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and France met several times from June 13-20, including a June 17 conference with Adenauer himself. The West German Chancellor had arrived in the United States June 13 to discuss the upcoming four-power summit with Eisenhower. While West Germany was not at the
Geneva conference table, they were part of the working groups, most of the presummit consultation, and Adenauer even took up residence at a villa in Switzerland so that he could more easily communicate his concerns to Eisenhower. In advance of Camp David, Eisenhower traveled to London, Bonn, and Paris in August to confer with allied leaders, while John Kennedy stopped off in Paris to discuss his plans for the upcoming U.S.-Soviet summit with de Gaulle.

Due to the multilateral nature of the meeting, the reason for the extensive consultations before Geneva was to develop a common position on the future of Germany. Prior to Camp David and Vienna the purpose was different because the summit was now to be bilateral, not a four power conference. Now the President must not only represent an absent Germany, but also the interests of Great Britain and France as well. Allied leaders needed reassurance that their vital interests would not be disregarded in pursuit of detente, or a policy that was too confrontational. Before Geneva there was consensus on the Eden Plan calling for unification of Germany by free elections. The constraints and pressures on the President were far greater in 1959 and 1961, because this allied unity had begun to break down. In the period before the Camp David summit, Adenauer and de Gaulle's insistence on "no concessions without counter concessions" was opposed by Macmillan's steady pressure for another four power summit and compromise on Berlin. Eisenhower was able to bring these two sides together in agreement on summit in 1960 by getting
Khrushchev to remove his ultimatum on Berlin, but his options and room to maneuver were limited by these divisions.

John Kennedy faced very similar pressures in his preparation to meet Khrushchev in 1961. Adenauer came to Washington in April one month before the summit was announced, and the President stopped in Paris to meet De Gaulle on the way to Vienna. Both leaders impressed upon the President the need to avoid any concessions on Berlin and that the West must be ready to fight to prevent changes in the status quo. Kennedy stopped in London after meeting the Soviet leader. In June, Macmillan opposed negotiations, but by early August the British and Americans were supporting another four power Foreign Ministers Conference on Berlin. While the West Germans were more forthcoming than expected, in August de Gaulle vetoed any negotiations on Berlin.

During this period in which Berlin and Germany occupied center stage in the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, American Presidents, first Eisenhower and then Kennedy, were limited in their ability to negotiate on these issues, particularly by France and West Germany. Further, they were generally pressed by Great Britain, in the form of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, to be more forthcoming on Berlin, and not to risk World War III over the nationality of the man who stamped visas at border checkpoints.

As time passed and the areas under discussion at the summit shifted from Europe to Africa and Asia, Presidents began to feel more freedom to maneuver on regional issues. While there was impasse on Berlin at Vienna in 1961, the two
leaders were able to reach a framework for a settlement on Laos. In 1972 Nixon and Kissinger presented, through the Soviets, the key concessions which brought about an end to the American combat role in Vietnam. A different problem developed in both of these cases, however, because the United States had great difficulty in convincing its ally in the regional conflict that the terms worked out at the summit and in its aftermath were truly in their interest. In Laos, Phoumi prolonged the negotiations and threatened to wreck them altogether by pressing for powerful positions in the new cabinet because he did not believe America wanted a truly neutral government. In Vietnam, President Thieu was distraught at American concessions in Moscow and in Paris, and refused to allow North Vietnamese troops to remain in South Vietnam, or North Vietnamese representation on the election commission. It took months of persuasion, and the Christmas bombing of North Vietnam, to convince Thieu to accept the settlement.

On the other major regional concerns at the summits in the 1970s, the Middle East and China, the United States found itself rejecting or at least blunting Soviet efforts to reach agreement. The Nixon administration had a conscious policy of frustrating joint U.S.-Soviet peace efforts to show Egypt and the other moderate Arab states that only Washington held the key to peace in the Middle East. Soviet insistence on backing maximum Arab demands made cooperative initiatives difficult given United States support for Israel. The Nixon administration had no desire to go to a Geneva Conference
where continued negotiations would pit the United States and Israel, against the Soviet Union and Arab states pushing for unacceptable withdrawals by Israel before peace could even be discussed. These allied limitations led the United States to reject Gromyko's efforts to negotiate principles for Middle East peace at the 1972 and 1973 summits. In 1972 the innocuous statement in the summit communique led directly to Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisers, and in 1973 the lack of progress, despite Brezhnev's late night harangue against American policy in the region, convinced Sadat war was necessary to force real peace discussions. By the time the summits were held in 1974 and 1979 the Soviet Union had been completely cut out of regional negotiations for peace, first by Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, and then by Sadat and the Camp David process.

Throughout the 1970s at summit meetings and in other forums the Soviet Union tried on several occasions to draw the United States into a quasi-alliance against China. Each time these transparent attempts were rebuffed as the U.S.-Chinese relationship developed gradually from a complex triangular arrangement in 1972, to a quasi-alliance against the Soviet Union by 1979. In 1974 Brezhnev tried to convince the weakened Nixon of the need for an American-Soviet non-aggression pact, but while Nixon seemed receptive Kissinger killed the proposal after Nixon's resignation. In 1979 Brezhnev offered to President Carter a pact requiring the United States or the Soviet Union to come to the aid of the other if it were attacked by a third country. President
Carter quickly rebuffed this proposal, since by now America was moving much closer to China in response to Soviet actions in Africa, Southwest, and Southeast Asia.

The two Reagan summits discussed in this study saw no significant allied limitations in regional talks at the summit. At Geneva the level of the conversation was very general with no real negotiations conducted, and at Reykjavik regional issues were not discussed in any detail.

On arms control the same general pattern seems to apply with some slight difference in the 1980s. The greatest limits placed on American arms control efforts came in the 1950s and early 1960s, and as time passed, while still real, allied restraints were less severe. In 1955 and 1959 the great arms control issue was the level of conventional forces in Central Europe and the relationship of nuclear weapons to those forces. At Geneva, allied unity did not exist on this issue with each Western leader offering a different plan; Eisenhower, Open Skies; Faure budget limitations; and Eden, the thinning of forces in Central Europe tied to the unification of Germany. By the time of the Foreign Ministers Conference in October the West had come to combine Eden's proposal with Open Skies. Soviet plans called for reductions in troop levels, similar to a joint French-British plan offered in 1954, but without the link to a unified Germany. By 1959 these proposals were still on the table with little progress having been made. Macmillan in his own summit trip to the U.S.S.R. in 1959 had seemed to imply a willingness to consider a thinning of forces in Central Europe without the
link to German unification. This was rejected by Adenauer, de Gaulle, and even Eisenhower. Behind the rejection of these plans was Adenauer's fear of the singularization of Germany and the creation of a special status for it. For France, such a course would lead to a weakening of West Germany's ties to the West, which reawakened old fears of a neutral Germany playing East against West and vice versa. These factors forced any Western proposal to be built on the basis of first German unification, and then limits which applied to several other states, not just Germany and her immediate neighbors.

From Glassboro through Geneva, real negotiations on arms control were limited to nuclear weapons, mostly at the strategic level, and thus they were bilateral. The Europeans did limit Johnson and Kosygin's efforts to reach agreement on NPT at Glassboro, and they were more involved in the INF discussions at the end of this period, but largely America's NATO allies played a peripheral role at best. The constraints they imposed on arms control negotiations were much less stringent than in the 1950s. The arms control issues of the 1970s were more esoteric and remote than the debates of the 1950s. The United States and the Soviet Union were now trying to channel the arms race in stabilizing directions, rather than addressing critical issues such as the distribution of forces in Central Europe, a question which went to the heart of the Western alliance. The key issues on which European leaders expressed concern during the Nixon and Ford summits was the relationship of the United
States' forward-based systems to America's central strategic weapons. Soviet insistence that these be included or compensation be given for French and British nuclear weapons must be rejected. This was never really an issue on which the American leadership wished to compromise, however, and consultation, while it did exist, never approached the level of the 1950s. There was a brief attempt to link the Backfire bomber to the U.S. FB-111 at Helsinki in 1975, which might have created problems within the alliance, but since it was rejected this never came to pass. The only real European objection to American arms control efforts in this period was the loud, but short-lived criticism of the PNW agreement as too clearly stigmatizing nuclear weapons. These complaints, just as the agreement itself, faded quickly as the PNW agreement was soon forgotten.

European concerns on arms control were more intense in the 1980s than at any time since Glassboro due to the political turmoil created by the deployment of new American intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe, and by the relationship of these missiles to NATO's defense policy. The zero option, offered by Ronald Reagan in November, 1981 had always made Western European leaders uneasy since these weapons were actually deployed to counter Soviet conventional superiority, rather than the SS-20, but at least it seemed to have no chance of ever being accepted.

At the same time, the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev in March, 1985, and the flurry of proposals and peaceful rhetoric coming from Moscow, led Western leaders to pressure
Reagan to counter the new General Secretary. The President could not ignore arms control and keep European public support. While these issues and START were discussed at the Geneva summit in 1985, the "get acquainted" nature of the summit, and the lack of concrete negotiations meant that there were no significant allied constraints on the President's actions beyond their concern that he somehow counter Gorbachev's peace offensive.

Reykjavik was a very different case. The Reagan administration both before and during the summit violated cardinal principles that had guided American negotiators in their bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union on issues which affected all of NATO. The July 25, 1986 proposal calling for zero ballistic missiles at first included British, French, and Chinese weapons, even though these governments had never been consulted. When Paul Nitze was finally sent, at his insistence, to brief the allies they were justifiably shocked at this proposal and insisted their nations be dropped from the plan. The second shock came with Soviet acceptance of zero INF missiles in Europe and 100 warheads in Asia. Asian allies pressured the United States to remove the 100 warheads aimed at them, while the Western Europeans insisted on a ban on short range INF missiles. When Gorbachev accepted these limits as well, the INF treaty was unstoppable, no matter how nervous it made the European members of NATO.

For the first time since Glassboro, Reykjavik had made U.S.-Soviet arms control discussions at the summit and
elsewhere a vital concern within NATO. The ZBM and zero INF proposals directly affected Western security in a way that SALT or even the mainstream START negotiations never had. NATO’s reliance on nuclear weapons to counter Soviet conventional forces was brought into question, even America’s willingness to use its central strategic systems to defend Europe became doubtful. Never had a summit so clearly considered such radical changes in NATO defense policy. Margaret Thatcher immediately got Reagan to drop ZBM, and the even more fantastic discussions of zero strategic weapons were never seriously considered again. European leaders clearly limited the President’s options before and after the summit.

Overall, on both regional issues and arms control, one is struck by the fact that the greatest restraints on the President’s freedom to negotiate, and the period of the most extensive consultations with America’s allies before a summit, was in the 1950s and 1960s when the relative power of the United States was greatest. Several reasons seem to explain this. First, the NATO allies in the Cold War, except for West Germany, had been allies in World War II and the habit of consultation was still strong among men who 10 years earlier had been responsible for coordinating efforts to defeat Nazi Germany. Second, when the great issues dividing the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were over Germany and Berlin NATO’s institutionalized pattern of consultation and consensus building made this approach natural. As the focus shifted away from Europe, and the allies most concerned about summit
discussions were Israel, Egypt, China, Vietnam, or Laos, these factors do not apply. No institutions for consultation existed, and the habit of consultation was not as strong, although one may wish to except Israel from this.

The most important reason, however, for the influence of America's European allies on presidential summit diplomacy in the 1950s and early 1960s was the nature of the issues under consideration. The fate of Germany was vital to the interests of the United States, in fact this was the most important question of the Cold War. The United States needed a Western Europe united behind its leadership to protect these interests. America needed bases in Western Europe, European manpower to help confront enormous Soviet conventional forces, and European economic power to keep the military burdens from becoming overwhelming. The Eisenhower administration had no desire to bankrupt the United States by attempting to confront the Soviet Union alone. This meant that when the President ascended to the summit, the interests of all vital allies had to be taken into account, and a policy based on consensus adopted and offered at the summit.

When the interests were less vital, and the allies involved less important, the President was more free to negotiate. On Laos, Kennedy could compromise, on Berlin he could not. Even in Vietnam, where nearly 60,000 Americans had died, concessions were offered which the South Vietnamese government had to be forced to accept. Israel does seem to be an exception here since its strategic importance is not as great as Europe's, and yet American leaders have always been
careful to protect Israel's interests at the summit. Cultural, religious, and emotional ties between the United States and Israel must be brought into any explanation of this, but that is really not the subject of this paper.

Trade and human rights have never been contentious issues between the United States and its allies in preparation for, or in the aftermath of, a summit with the Soviet leaders. During the Cold War period, there were trade issues which created divisions within the alliance, such as the flap over the Siberian natural gas pipelines in the early 1980s, but none of these were raging at a time when a U.S.-Soviet summit was near. Israel was careful to remain completely neutral during the debate over the Jackson-Vanik amendment in 1973-1974, no doubt realizing that taking a position on either side would alienate powerful leaders in the other camp.
NOTES - CHAPTER XIII


CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined eleven summits between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union from Geneva in 1955 to Reykjavik in 1986. It will now turn to an examination of the propositions explored in previous chapters. In addition to reviewing each proposition in detail, an evaluation will be made of the warnings that Rusk, Ikle, and others have issued about the dangers of summit diplomacy. Together these judgments should enable us to assess the lessons learned from superpower summits in the Cold War period. Finally, an attempt will be made to generate testable hypotheses, based on the evidence gathered in this study, to guide future research in the area.

Chronology of Issue Salience

As one looks back over the history of these encounters and the major issues discussed at each one, a clear pattern emerges. From Geneva through Vienna in 1961, the dominant issues were the fate of Germany and its former capital Berlin. These issues were the core of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, since Germany’s ultimate orientation was a critical element in the balance of
power between the two nations. These summits were destined to be more contentious since the stakes were so high, and the price of compromise so dear. Ultimately, little was accomplished on these issues because Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership were content with the status quo on Germany, and the West was not willing to go to war to unify this divided state. On Berlin, it was the West, led by the United States, which sought to protect the current state of affairs and the Soviets who were unwilling to initiate a third world war to remove this irritant. Khrushchev was willing to go to the brink of war over Berlin in 1961, but he did back down when confronted with Western resolve. It was, however, Khrushchev's solution to the Soviet problem in Berlin, the building of the Berlin Wall, which stabilized the situation in Europe and profoundly changed the nature of the US-Soviet summits.

As the 1960s progressed, the focus of superpower rivalry began to shift from Europe to the third world, and regional discussions at summits reflected this shift. Laos was an important issue at Vienna, but it was clearly overshadowed by the Kennedy-Khrushchev confrontation over Berlin. The next time the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union met at Glassboro in 1967 the major regional concerns were Vietnam and the Middle East. Europe was no longer the most likely place for a direct superpower confrontation. Through the 1970s and into the 1980s, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East dominated geopolitical consultations at the summit. From Vietnam in 1972, to the Horn of Africa at Vienna in 1979, and
the Middle East throughout, Presidents and General Secretaries sought to clarify their interests and avoid miscalculation in the third world.

Glassboro saw another transition in the nature of summit discussions. It was here that arms control moved to the forefront of Soviet-American relations. While Glassboro saw no agreements, it did lay the groundwork for the start of the SALT negotiations and helped usher in an era in which the regulation of nuclear weapons became agenda item number one at virtually every summit thereafter.¹ There are several reasons for the elevation of arms control to its preeminent position in US-Soviet relations. The approach of parity in strategic nuclear weapons made the Soviets more willing to consider limitations, since they could not now be frozen into a permanent position of inferiority. Secondly, by 1967 the superpowers were facing crucial decisions on the deployment of defensive weaponry which would vastly increase the cost of maintaining parity, but because of the incredible destructiveness of nuclear weapons would not add significantly to their nation's power or security. Particularly for the President of the United States, who led not only a democratic country, but who also spoke for an alliance of democratic states when he traveled to the summit, he could not afford to be seen as irresponsible on nuclear issues. Arms control talks were a way of demonstrating that the West was searching for a peaceful resolution of the East-West conflict. Finally, arms control was an area where progress was at least possible. On the complex geopolitical
questions of regional conflicts the clash of interests between the United States and Soviet Union seldom led to any final solutions. Progress was made on Laos and Vietnam at summits, but quickly new issues rose to take their place. Regional conflicts between the superpowers were often zero-sum games in which a gain by one superpower meant that the other must lose. Arms control can be a positive sum-game in which both sides benefit from an agreement which enhances strategic stability and makes nuclear war less likely. On arms control at least, for all of the reasons listed above, agreements were possible, and in the interests of both countries. Tangible, although often limited, progress could be made and thus leaders could demonstrate that East and West could cooperate and that war was not inevitable. Arms control would continue to dominate the summit agenda until the very foundations of the Cold War were destroyed by the events of the late 1980s, when the fate of Europe and even the Soviet Union itself would move once again to the forefront.

Not surprisingly, given the geopolitical and ideological competition between the superpowers, trade and human rights have always been peripheral at US-Soviet summits. Through the Glassboro meeting, they received very little attention, although at Geneva in 1955 each was discussed without any result. During the Nixon-Kissinger years, trade was seen as a way to moderate Soviet behavior, and the Moscow meeting did establish the agenda for major agreements later in the year. These two issues would reach their greatest prominence at the
next three summits due to their being linked by the Congress. As has been demonstrated, the real negotiations on trade and human rights in 1973-74 were not between Washington and Moscow, but within Washington itself. Kissinger became a mediator between Jackson and the Soviet leadership, carrying demands from one party to another and trying to find middle ground between the two opponents. Eventually this process would break down with the Soviet rejection of the 1972 trade agreements after the passage of Jackson-Vanik in December, 1974. Trade would never again be a dominant issue at the summit. There was a brief revival of hope in 1979 that the Soviets would be granted MFN, but Brzezinski saw to it that there would be no substantive negotiations on trade at Vienna. By the end of the year, Soviet tanks had crushed any remaining possibility when they rolled into Afghanistan. Human rights were discussed at Vienna in 1979, and Geneva in 1985, but on neither occasion was a great deal of time or effort devoted to either subject.

What Have Summits Accomplished?

To answer this question we will now explore each of the propositions discussed in the previous case.

Proposition One

P1: The approach of the summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision makers, and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes.
This proposition would seem to be so intuitive that it would almost be universally true, and yet in the history of US-Soviet summits, there were seven summits in which this proposition was at least partially invalidated. The summits for which the proposition was not found to hold fall into two general categories. First for summits called on short notice, the “get-acquainted” meetings, there simply was not time for the major bureaucracies and decision makers within the executive branch, not to mention Congress, to come to a unified position. Thus proposition one was not supported by these summits. With only a few hours between the scheduling of the summit and the first meeting between the leaders, Glassboro is the prototype of this kind of encounter. Vienna in 1961 would also fall into this category as would, although to a lesser extent, Camp David. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson having defined as their principal goal to explore the views of their counterpart, carefully avoided detailed negotiation. Only once in the period examined did a President attempt to engage in detailed negotiation when there had not been adequate time for preparation. This, of course, was at Reykjavik in 1986.

Reykjavik does differ from Glassboro, Vienna, and Camp David in that the summit at the end of 1986 was a clear possibility and experts meetings were held in August and September to see if sufficient progress could be made to justify such a meeting. The Reagan administration had offered new offensive proposals on INF and START, and some common ground had been found on INF. Still, the surprise
announcement of the Reykjavik meeting as a "base-camp" before a full summit found the administration in disarray on its position on strategic defenses and the controversial zero-ballistic-missiles (ZBM) proposal of July 25, 1986. Less than two weeks was not enough time to bring the fractious administration together on these issues, and the negotiating team left for Iceland unprepared.

Johnson, Kennedy, and Eisenhower with limited time to prepare, and expecting a "get-acquainted meeting", did not attempt detailed negotiations. Reagan and his advisers, however, allowed themselves to be drawn into the most complex series of arms control discussions ever attempted at a summit. On issues like START and INF, where carefully prepared, government supported positions existed, extraordinary progress was made. On issues where such careful preparation and consensus did not exist, strategic defenses and the ZBM proposal, a catastrophe was narrowly avoided. A key lesson to be drawn from this experience is that if a summit is hastily arranged, and little time exists for preparation, leaders cannot allow themselves to be drawn into detailed negotiations. In other words, if one prepares for a "get-acquainted" meeting make sure the discussions do not stray beyond these limited bounds.

The other two summits in which the approach of the meeting did not force government consensus were the Watergate era meetings in Washington in 1973 and Moscow in 1974. In these cases, executive authority had eroded to the point that the President could not force a consensus within the
executive branch. In fact, before the 1974 Moscow summit, the Defense Department was in open rebellion fearing Nixon would attempt to save his Presidency by signing a bad SALT II deal. It is instructive to note that in the period just prior to the Moscow summit in 1972, Nixon and Kissinger were able to spring a controversial deal on SLBMs on the bureaucracy and still gain the acceptance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and other key players. Rogers and Smith objected but the President was powerful enough to quiet their complaints. In 1974 on a far less significant issue, the Threshold Test Ban, Nixon and Kissinger tried the same tactic but could not gain the support of the JCS or the rest of the Defense Department.

The common characteristic which Reykjavik and the Watergate summits share is a lack of strong executive direction. Nixon attempted but was unable to control the summit preparation process due to his weakened political state. Reagan's management style had led to the introduction of a program, SDI, without a distinct purpose, and whose relationship to arms control had never been clearly defined. In Nixon's case at least the President was so battered he could not really negotiate on behalf of the United States, thus the summit could do little harm as well as little good. At Reykjavik the situation was different since Reagan had the authority to say yes to a proposal by Gorbachev, but the negotiating team was unprepared in critical areas.

Generally, however, the approach of a summit has helped to bring the government to the common position on arms
control issues. In 1955 the Eisenhower administration was able for the first time in over two years to agree to a real arms control proposal, Open Skies. In 1985 before the second Geneva summit, the impending meeting led to the first new START proposal, offered on November 1, since the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) had opened in March. Likewise before Reykjavik new START and INF proposals were developed. In the case of Vienna in 1979 and Moscow in 1972, the administration was able to use the summit deadline to gain agreement on the telemetry encryption and SLBM issues respectively, thus removing the last major hurdles to agreement. The approach of Vladivostok perhaps had the most important effect, since in October 1974 the Ford administration was finally able to put together the United States' first negotiable SALT II proposal after two years of paralysis due largely to the Watergate crisis.

On regional issues, summits have not been nearly as important in forcing bureaucratic consensus as they have on arms control. There are several reasons for this. In the Eisenhower years consensus already existed within the government on the key goals of a unification of Germany through democratic elections and the maintenance of allied rights in West Berlin. At Vienna in 1961, the Kennedy administration was still in the midst of a review of its policy on Berlin when Kennedy went to the summit, and this review would not be complete until several weeks later. At Glassboro once again the short notice did not give time for the administration to prepare new positions on the Middle
East and Vietnam. In the Nixon era summits on regional issues, the bureaucracy was largely shut out as the President and Kissinger controlled the preparation process. At Vladivostok and Reykjavik regional issues were clearly subordinate to arms control questions. Finally, the Carter administration was so divided on its approach to the Soviet Union on geopolitical matters that not even the approach of a summit could bring the executive branch to a common position.

Only Ronald Reagan's Regional Initiative in 1985 clearly qualifies as a new government position developed in response to an impending summit. This was really an attempt to broaden the agenda at Geneva to include discussions of regional issues, rather than a serious attempt to develop a negotiating position that would serve as a basis for settling disputes in the third world. It does not seem to have been seriously considered at Geneva.

The only other case in which the approach of a summit has caused the administration to rethink its position on a critical geopolitical issue was on Vietnam just prior to the Moscow summit in 1972. Since Nixon and Kissinger kept this change in the United States' position within the White House, this episode does not confirm proposition one. It was, however, an example where the President felt that the summit provided a forum in which a new initiative might break a regional deadlock.

It seems relatively clear why this proposition should hold so strongly on arms control, and almost never apply to regional issues. As was noted earlier, beyond a particular
point the addition of nuclear weapons to one's arsenal does not increase one's usable military power the way addition of conventional weapons does. This, coupled with nuclear parity, makes these issues far more negotiable than the geopolitical rivalries which actually created the Cold War. On arms control, common ground existed and thus policy makers could develop new ways to bridge the gap as a summit approached. On regional issues, often common ground was hard to find, if it existed at all, thus new positions would be difficult to generate.

On trade, it was not until Moscow in 1972, with the exception of Geneva in 1955, that this became a serious summit issue. Nixon and Kissinger's hope to use trade to entice the Soviet Union to become a status quo power led them to order the reevaluation of American policy on Lend-Lease debts, credits, and trade in general. Trade would be prominent in the next two summits, but more because of its linkage by prominent members of Congress to human rights policies in the Soviet Union. Proposition one was clearly not upheld before Washington and Moscow in 1973 and 1974 due to the inability of Nixon and Kissinger to negotiate an acceptable compromise between Jackson and the Soviet leadership. In the period just prior to Vladivostok the executive and legislative branches finally worked out a compromise over Jackson-Vanik, but Jackson's public claims were apparently too much for the Soviets to take. As on regional issues, the approach of the Vienna summit was not enough to bring Vance and Brzezinski together on trade policy
toward the Soviet Union in 1979. Finally, trade was not a major issue at either Geneva or Reykjavik and thus no common position was agreed upon prior to the summit.

In the eleven summits studied human rights was never a major item on the agenda, except in the previously noted case of Jackson-Vanik, or was it particularly controversial within the administration. Therefore summits never really provided an occasion for the adoption of a new policy.

One final question related to the first proposition is whether or not these summits' deadlines have sometimes led to the acceptance of a less than advantageous position by an administration out to insure a successful summit. An examination of each case in which proposition one was upheld reveals that this has generally not happened. The only instance in which informed observers came to question a position adopted prior to a US-Soviet summit was the SLBM deal Nixon and Kissinger accepted just before Moscow in 1972. Secretary of State Rogers and ACDA Director Smith both objected to the unequal nature of the SLBM deal worked out during Kissinger's presummit trip to Moscow. After the summit, the Congress also passed an amendment sponsored by Henry Jackson requiring that the next SALT agreement have equal levels. Still one must question whether protracted negotiation would have produced a better result. The deal did force the retirement of 209 older, heavy throw-weight ICBMs which might later have been modernized. While the deal did not limit the growth of the Soviet SLBM force as much as Kissinger would have us believe, it did at least put a cap on
its growth. Overall it does not seem that a rush to finish SALT I so that it could be signed at Moscow produced a significantly worse deal than could have been worked out by the delegations.

In sum, summits can serve as an action forcing deadline, particularly on issues related to arms control. Presidents have used the approach of a meeting to shakeup the bureaucracy and force the resolution of longstanding conflicts. This was the most consistently supported proposition in this study, and policymakers in the future should be aware of the internal, as well as the external, effects of summit diplomacy.

**Proposition Two**

P2: The President and General Secretary have resolved important issues which were unable to be resolved at lower levels.

This proposition examined the ability of the leaders to cut through the red tape and settle issues which had been bogged down at lower levels of negotiation, and which were delaying progress toward final agreement. On issues related to arms control this proposition was not confirmed for the first three postwar summits due to the fact that very little real negotiation took place at these meetings. At Geneva in 1955 the Open Skies Plan received a quick, favorable reaction from Bulganin, but was swiftly rejected by Khrushchev, thus revealing to Eisenhower who was the real leader of the Soviet delegation. The other arms control proposals were so tied to
the fate of Germany that progress could not be made on arms control without a resolution of this fundamental disagreement. At Camp David, Berlin was the major focus of the talks, and at Vienna progress on the test ban was blocked by Khrushchev's insistence that a troika head the control commission, and that severe limits be placed on the number of on-site inspections.

Glassboro did see some progress on NPT. President Johnson's suggestion that the US and USSR circulate a draft of the NPT containing all of the settled positions, but minus the still-controversial safeguards article, was agreed to shortly after the summit. This allowed the participants to see just how much progress had been made and focused attention on the verification provisions. Walt Rostow argues that this action did indeed move the NPT process forward.3

The most significant examples of roadblocks being removed came with Moscow in 1972 and the meetings which followed. At Moscow two major issues were decided which allowed the treaty to be signed during the visit. The precise point at which the SLBM freeze would go into effect, and when the Soviets would have to begin trading in older ICBMs for new SLBMs were the most important roadblocks removed. The leaders and their advisers also struggled through attempts to limit modernization of ICBMs and their silos. At the Washington summit in 1973, little progress was made due to the administration's inability to decide exactly what it wanted from SALT II. The next year in Moscow, even while Nixon was nearing the end of his tenure, Kissinger and
Gromyko were able to set a ten year limit on SALT II. They agreed the treaty would be based on equal aggregates or counterbalancing asymmetries, thus laying the groundwork for the real breakthrough later in the year at Vladivostok.

At Vladivostok great progress was made, due largely to the careful preparation as the summit approached. Not only were the 2400/1320 ceilings set, but also the Soviets agreed to drop their insistence on the inclusion of American forward-based systems (FBS). The United States dropped its strict throw-weight limits, and some progress was made on MIRV counting rules. These were each breakthroughs and for a while it seemed SALT II could be signed in the spring of 1975; unfortunately this was not to be.

The next two summits, Vienna and Geneva saw no real breakthroughs. At Vienna SALT II had just been finished and negotiations on SALT III had not yet begun. The Geneva summit in 1985 was a classic "get acquainted" summit, and no serious bargaining on arms control took place.

Reykjavik remains the summit at which more difficult issues were decided than any other. The 6000/1600 framework was established for START, the Soviets agreed to US counting rules for bombs and SRAMs, and the US agreed to count heavy bombers against the 6000 warhead ceiling and the 1600 limit on delivery vehicles. The Soviet delegation also pledged that there would be significant cuts in heavy missiles, although specific subceilings were left until later. On INF it was agreed that no intermediate range missiles would remain in Europe, and only 100 in Asia. Never before had
such progress been made in one day on two separate arms control treaties. It should be recalled that none of these numbers was pulled out of thin air, each had been part of previous proposals and thus had been carefully studied. These decisions at Reykjavik were not plagued by poor preparation.

At the four summits in which significant roadblocks were removed, Moscow in 1972 and 1974, Vladivostok, and Reykjavik, the issues decided were political, rather than technical in nature. The only exception was the discussion dealing with missile modernization at the 1972 summit. Each of the others dealt with fundamental elements of SALT I, SALT II, START, and INF and thus each required choices by the President himself and would affect the structure of America's nuclear forces into the future. Summits can make rapid progress possible if the ground ahead is carefully prepared, the choices clearly defined, and the tradeoffs explored. Under these conditions obstacles which have hindered agreements for considerable periods can quickly be removed.

Only at Moscow in 1972 were there discussions on issues so technical that the leaders and their closest advisers clearly became confused. Uncertainty developed on both the SLBM freeze and missile modernization leading to frantic discussions between Moscow, Helsinki, and Washington. This confusion was exacerbated because that the delegation had been ordered to remain in Helsinki, and therefore the real experts were excluded from these often quite technical negotiations. All of this was compounded by the fact that
both sides wished to sign SALT I before the Moscow summit ended. The dangers of negotiating against a deadline will be more fully explored later in this chapter.

On regional issues, few summits have seen important roadblocks removed that blocked the peaceful settlement of conflicts. At Glassboro, Washington in 1973, Moscow in 1974, and Geneva in 1985, the discussions can be characterized as *tours d’horizon*, in which the leaders explored each other’s attitudes on geopolitical questions, or tutorials in which one or the other tried to instruct his counterpart on the dangers of a particular situation. The Reykjavik and Vladivostok meetings were devoted to arms control and regional issues got little attention, and Brezhnev’s health was so poor at Vienna in 1979 that no real negotiation or even education was possible. Finally, Geneva in 1955 saw real proposals offered, but the public setting and multilateral nature of the summit made quiet negotiation impossible.

The three summits which witnessed the removal of real obstacles to agreement were Camp David, Vienna in 1961, and Moscow in 1972. The withdrawal of the deadline for negotiations on Berlin by Khrushchev at Camp David cleared the way for another four power summit, eventually set for Paris in May, 1960. Eisenhower had always maintained he would not go to the summit unless there was some chance of success and the removal of the ultimatum satisfied his precondition. At Vienna, Kennedy and Khrushchev reached quick agreement that there should be a real ceasefire in Laos.
so that negotiations on a political solution to the conflict could continue. The United States government had maintained that no political solution could come until the May 1 ceasefire became effective. Following US-Soviet agreement at Vienna the ceasefire began to hold and one year later an agreement was reached to set up a neutral government in Laos.

By far the most important breakthrough on geopolitical concerns at a US-Soviet summit was on Vietnam in 1972. In Kissinger's April presummit meeting with Brezhnev and Gromyko and at the summit itself in May, two important obstacles to reaching a negotiated end to the war were removed. In April Kissinger offered the first concession, or at least made this commitment explicit for the first time, when he told Brezhnev North Vietnam could keep some of its troops in South Vietnam after a ceasefire was reached. At the summit itself the second overture, which was aimed at mollifying North Vietnam's demand for a coalition government, was the offer to establish an election commission with representatives from the North and South Vietnamese governments, as well as neutral parties. The USSR's leadership was apparently so impressed with these proposals that on each occasion high level envoys were dispatched to Hanoi to deliver the new offers. International Department Head Katushev and President Podgorny's trips must have had some impact because at Kissinger's next meeting with Le Duc Tho rapid progress was made, and by October an agreement in principle had been reached.
Whether or not a summit can contribute to the settlement of a particular regional dispute relates very much to the timing of the meeting. Each of the three meetings which were successful in removing obstacles to an agreement came at critical junctures when leaders would soon have to make a choice on the future course of the conflict. Just before Camp David the Foreign Minister’s Conference had ended and the Soviet Union had been unable to extort real concessions on Berlin through the use of Khrushchev’s deadline. Therefore, he would soon have to decide if he would carry out his threats to sign a peace treaty with East Germany. On Laos, President Kennedy had made a number of highly publicized statements about the United States’ unhappiness with Soviet aid to the Pathet Lao, and US marines in Okinawa had been placed on alert. In addition, with a crisis looming over Berlin it seemed neither side wanted a confrontation in Southeast Asia. In Vietnam in 1972 the North Vietnamese’ spring offensive had been destroyed and the US bombing campaign was doing great damage to the North. North Vietnamese leaders were facing a choice of political settlement or extending the war against America for several more years.

In each case not only was escalation a real possibility, but diplomatic alternatives existed in the form of ongoing negotiations that would offer the hope of a peaceful solution. Camp David cleared the way for another round of summit diplomacy. On Laos negotiations for a political settlement had begun in May, and on Vietnam Kissinger and
Tho's meetings could provide a forum for finding a solution to the conflict.

These cases vividly show that if summit diplomacy is to have a real impact on regional conflict the context in which the summit takes place is extremely important. If the meeting is held at a time when difficult choices must soon be made and diplomatic alternatives to escalation or continuation of the conflict exist, there is a real chance the summit can make a significant contribution to the resolution of the struggle. The importance of timing in summit diplomacy, and the elements which constitute good and bad timing will be more fully discussed at the end of this chapter.

Once again in none of the eleven summits considered by this study were significant obstacles to agreement removed in the area of trade or human rights. As was discussed earlier, the most important trade talks at US-Soviet summits came at Moscow in 1972, but specific detailed negotiations do not seem to have taken place at this meeting. An agenda for future negotiations was developed and real progress did come on the heels of the Moscow meeting of Nixon and Brezhnev, but these breakthroughs did not take place at the summit.

Despite the sometimes impassioned pleas dealing with human rights in the Soviet Union by American Presidents, this topic has not been a major agenda item at any of the summits examined. The Jackson-Vanik episode did bring trade and human rights issues to the forefront in 1973-1974, but the negotiations were largely within the United States government.
itself, and they never became a major bone of contention at the summit.

In sum, summit diplomacy in the Cold War period did on several occasions remove important obstacles to agreement in arms control negotiations, and on occasion regional issues. The timing of the summit and the diplomatic context in which it takes place are critical to the leader's ability to remove these obstacles, and we will more fully explore these ideas later in this chapter.

Proposition Three

This proposition examined the extent to which the leaders were able to achieve a conceptual breakthrough at the summit.

P3: Framework agreements at US-Soviet summits pave the way for more rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal treaty.

The successful negotiation of a framework to an agreement while at a US-Soviet summit is a difficult prospect, but it has been accomplished on three occasions in arms control, and twice on regional issues. In the field of arms control, the SALT II, INF, and START agreements each saw major elements of their structure agreed to at a summit. One decidedly less important pact, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTB), was negotiated in its entirety at the summit and the preparatory meetings held just before the conference.

It was not until serious arms control discussions began after Glassboro that summits could perform such a function.
In the meetings up to and including Glassboro, negotiations were not advanced enough for such a dramatic breakthrough to occur. Vienna perhaps could have seen essential agreement on a test ban, but the Soviet proposal of March, 1961, and Khrushchev's adherence to it at the summit, obliterated the progress that had been made up to then and made the achievement of a framework impossible at Vienna. The outline of SALT I was essentially agreed to through the back-channel negotiations and announced in May, 1971. Since then, however, the backbone of every major arms control agreement between the United States and Soviet Union on nuclear weapons has been adopted at summit meetings between the President and General Secretary.

At Vladivostok the heart of the SALT II agreement was adopted including the 2400/1320 ceilings on delivery vehicles and MIRVed weapons; the Soviets concluded that the United States' FBS would not have to be included, and progress was made toward counting rules for MIRVed weapons. As discussed earlier the misunderstanding over cruise missiles, the Soviets felt they were included in the ceilings while the United States did not, and the insistence that the Backfire bomber be included by the military and some members of Congress was to be largely responsible for the delay of SALT II until 1979. In the subsequent negotiations, other provisions were added including ceilings on MIRVed ballistic missiles, and MIRVed ICBMs, fractionation limits, and a ban on more than one new type ICBM. Nevertheless, Vladivostok established the outline of SALT II.
Reykjavik performed the same mission for both INF and START. The elimination of intermediate range missiles from Europe and their limitation to 100 in Asia, and a freeze on SRINF. While several of these positions were altered in later negotiations, the summit talks provided the framework for the treaty. On START the establishment of the 6000/1600 ceilings, counting rules for bomber weapons, Soviet agreement to significant cuts in their heavy missiles, and separate treatment for SLCMs make up the heart of the recently adopted treaty. For INF the Reykjavik negotiations made possible the signing of a treaty by December, 1987 and while the progress on START has been slower success was finally achieved in 1991.

The other framework agreement achieved at a summit was the TTB. It was offered by Brezhnev while Kissinger was in Moscow preparing for the summit and almost wholly negotiated there. The final 150 kiloton threshold was agreed to by Nixon in Moscow and along with the ABM protocol was signed by the two leaders at the meeting. It was then submitted to the Senate where it languished from a combination of conservative opposition and simple apathy. Ronald Reagan resubmitted TTB in 1988, but the treaty has never been ratified.

The reason these kinds of dramatic breakthroughs in arms control are relatively rare, only two of eleven summits (excluding TTB) were able to reach such accords, is that there are limited windows in which such rapid progress is possible. Arms control negotiations go through a cycle in which the talks open with each side very far apart and making
maximum demands. Gradually this changes as both sides begin
to see what is desirable and most of all what is possible.
As the differences begin to narrow, a well-timed summit can
break the bureaucracies out of their lethargy, produce new
proposals, and allow the leaders to settle many of the
political level issues at once. Summits held in the initial
stages of the negotiations, such as Washington in 1973,
Vienna in 1979, Geneva in 1985, or Glassboro in 1967, are at
best more likely to be devoted to educating one’s adversary
or at worst produce only glittering generalities about the
goals for the negotiations. Meetings held after a
breakthrough has occurred, but before the treaty has been
concluded, such as Helsinki in 1975 and Washington in 1987,
will focus on obstacles to agreement that have developed in
the course of negotiations. In the words of Henry Kissinger
just as he was about to travel to Moscow to prepare for the
1974 Nixon-Brezhnev summit:

All of the SALT negotiations and, indeed, all
the disarmament negotiations have gone through
three phases. There is an initial phase of an
exchange of technical information which usually
takes place during a stalemate in the negotiating
process; that is to say, the negotiating positions
do not approach each other, but the technical
comprehension of the issues is clarified.

Then—this is essentially what has been going on
in Geneva up to now—then a point is reached where
there has to be a conceptual breakthrough; that is
to say, where the two sides have to agree on what
it is they are trying to accomplish. And after
that there has to be the hard negotiation on giving
concrete content to this conceptual breakthrough.‘

Regional frameworks have been even more rare due to the
difficult nature of the topics under consideration. At
Vienna in 1961, the acceptance by Khrushchev of the need for
a real ceasefire and his and Kennedy's agreement that Laos should have a neutral government, formed the basic structure of the agreement signed in July, 1962. In Moscow in 1972 the two concessions offered by Nixon and Kissinger would form the basis for the agreement which allowed American combat troops to withdraw. Allowing North Vietnamese soldiers to stay within South Vietnam, and allowing North Vietnamese presence on the election commission broke the diplomatic logjam. Their participation in the election commission allowed North Vietnam to drop its demands that Thieu resign, and in subsequent negotiations the United States conceded that the Provisional Revolutionary Government would be recognized in areas controlled by the North Vietnamese Army. Much of what became the Paris Peace Accords was initiated at the Moscow summit and Kissinger's presummit meeting with Brezhnev.

As was the case in the previous two propositions, there are no examples of framework agreements on trade or human rights being negotiated at US-Soviet summit meetings. The Moscow 1972 discussions which set the agenda for the trade talks in the second half of the year are the nearest example, but as has been previously stated, the discussions on trade at this summit remained at a very general level. The principal reason for this is that the United States delegation did not include President Nixon's key economic and trade advisers. Apparently a conscious choice was made to defer detailed negotiations in trade until after the summit. This was the case in 1979 where Zbignew Brzezinski admits he convinced President Carter not to include Treasury Secretary
Blumenthal or Commerce Secretary Kreps on the summit delegation so that hopes would not be raised that a trade agreement was likely. Brzezinski, along with Vice-President Mondale had already helped block a proposal by Vance and Blumenthal that most favored nation trading status be conferred on both the Soviet Union and China. Thus in neither case was there a major trade agreement signed at the summit.

There have been several instances of issues, both in arms control and geopolitical conflicts, which were ripe for the negotiation of a framework agreement but the opportunity was missed. SALT II was ripe for the development of a framework at Moscow in 1974, and Henry Kissinger went so far as to predict just such an outcome in his press conference before his pre-summit trip to Moscow. Near-mutiny within the administration and the overall weakness of the Nixon Presidency due to Watergate, prevented the materialization of this prediction. On regional issues, the Soviets pushed hard in both 1972 and particularly 1973 for an agreement on a joint approach to negotiations in the Middle East. Nixon and Kissinger turned aside both of these overtures because of their desire to convince moderate Arabs, particularly Egypt, that only the United States could broker peace in this region.

Alexander George has characterized the Basic Principles Agreement signed at Moscow in 1972 and the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement signed in Washington in 1973 as missed opportunities as well. He calls them pseudoagreements which
appear on the surface to establish ground rules for superpower behavior in regional conflicts and during crisis, but instead are compromise documents which contain contradictory ideas about proper conduct that were never sufficiently thrashed out. John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson had also tried to establish ground rules for American and Soviet behavior in their geopolitical struggles at Vienna and Glassboro, but each failed to weaken Soviet support for national liberation struggles. The fact is that in a bipolar international system, especially one reinforced by deep ideological divisions, it is very unlikely that the superpowers would ever be able to arrive at such a code of conduct. The bloc leaders enhance their own position by adding allies to their coalition, particularly if the additions occupy some important strategic position in the world. The United States was essentially trying to freeze the status quo in each of the above mentioned discussions, and the Soviets as a revolutionary power, had no interest in doing so; in the Middle East the roles were reversed. Under these conditions a framework establishing a code of conduct is unlikely.

Even though they signed the BPA and PNW agreements, Nixon and Kissinger actually approached the problem of Soviet behavior quite differently than Kennedy or Johnson had. Rather than trying to establish a code of conduct they envisioned a system of trade, arms control, and other incentives which would entice the Soviets to give up their revolutionary activity by giving them a stake in maintaining
good relations with the United States and the West in general. Overall the Nixon-Kissinger approach seemed to have promise, but they were denied some of their most powerful inducements by Jackson-Vanik and the Stevenson amendments.

There is value in attempts to clarify interests in regional conflicts at the summit, as will be more carefully discussed under proposition four, but it is doubtful one could go so far as to gain agreement on rules of the game when the game has stakes as high as the geopolitical contest between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

There are other problems with negotiating framework agreements at summit meetings. In particular the pressure of time can lead to accords which are incomplete due to differing interpretations of phrases within the document which there simply was not time to explore. This is exacerbated by the fact that at the summit the President does not always have the expertise available which he would in a regular diplomatic exchange. The cruise missile and Backfire bomber omissions in the Vladivostok accords are a primary example of this problem. This difficulty will be more thoroughly examined in the last section of this chapter.

In sum, the summit is perhaps the best forum for carrying on negotiations designed to construct the framework for an agreement. The questions to be decided at this level are political, not technical in nature and can be grasped by the President without requiring him to become an expert in complex issues such as arms control. The direct injection of
the President into the process at this point provides the impetus needed to bring the bureaucracies together and move the discussions forward beyond the sparring which characterizes the initial stages of negotiation.

**Proposition Four**

This proposition's purpose is to examine the extent to which Soviet and American leaders have used summits as an opportunity to tutor their counterpart, and how successful these tutorials have been.

**P4:** Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterpart on their concerns and interests on the important issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted in changes in the behavior of the superpowers following the summit.

To satisfy the first part of this proposition, Presidents have had to go beyond a simple exchange of views on important issues of arms control or regional rivalry. Instead there must have been a real attempt to tutor his adversary on the dangers or possibilities of the current situation. Examining the record of summit diplomacy shows this to have been generally an American practice since only on four occasions on both arms control and regional issues have the Soviets made such an effort. Khrushchev at Vienna in 1961 countered Kennedy's discourse on miscalculation with an equally impassioned defense of Soviet support for the national liberation struggle. In fact this became the standard Soviet line and was repeated by Kosygin, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev at later summits. Another example of Soviet
tutorials at the summit came in 1974 when Nixon visited the Soviet Union. While at Yalta the Soviets put on an impressive briefing, conducted by some of the highest ranking members of the Soviet military, on the first strike potential of American strategic and forward-based nuclear forces. Probably the real purpose was to educate the President on just why the Soviets wanted the United States' FBS included in SALT II. This briefing was very similar to one, this time conducted by Brezhnev, given to Kissinger during his presummit preparation trip. Neither of these efforts had much affect since the United States continued to protest Soviet support for revolutionary activity, and insisted on the exclusion of American FBS from SALT II.

Perhaps the most interesting attempt by a Soviet leader to tutor the President was Brezhnev's midnight session with Nixon on the dangers of war in the Middle East in 1973. The discussion saw Brezhnev in very emotional terms warn of the dangers of war if real progress was not made toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but he did not offer any new ideas for a solution beyond standard Soviet support for maximum Arab demands. The real question was whether or not Brezhnev was attempting to warn Nixon that Sadat was planning for war. This does not seem to be the case since Brezhnev himself probably did not know the extent of Sadat's plans due to the strain in Egyptian-Soviet relations after Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisors in July, 1972. Sadat did not officially inform the Soviets of his intentions until days before the war in October, 1973. Even if it was not an
explicit warning based on concrete knowledge of plans to attack, the Soviet’s relationship with the Arabs, particularly Sadat, had convinced Brezhnev that Arab frustration had built to the point where an explosion was imminent. The Nixon administration was not swayed by his pleas and continued with plans for a fall initiative after the Israeli elections in October.5

The only other effort made by a General Secretary to educate his adversary was Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts at Geneva in 1985 to distance himself from his predecessors’ policy on Afghanistan and to hint at changes in Soviet foreign policy in general. Gorbachev did not renounce Soviet support for the national liberation struggle, in fact he echoed Khrushchev’s discourse on this subject at Vienna, but he did seem to be searching for a way out of the war in Afghanistan. His comment that he first heard about the war on the radio is doubtful, but it did imply that this was not his war. Ronald Reagan and his advisers were convinced at Geneva that Gorbachev was looking for a way out and efforts to find a peaceful solution to this conflict increased after the summit. Reagan also left Geneva with the impression that the new General Secretary was a very different kind of Soviet leader, and that real change in the Soviet-American relationship was possible. The creation of this impression by Gorbachev was perhaps the most successful example of summit discussion altering the view of an opposing leader. More will be said about this shortly.
While Soviet leaders have focused in three of the four previous examples on regional conflicts, American Presidents and their advisers have been far more likely to discuss new ideas related to arms control and strategic stability. Four summits have seen extended discussions on these matters initiated by the Americans. Three of these have been related to strategic stability in the nuclear age and one on goals for arms control. The first attempt to educate the adversary on the dangers of the nuclear age came at Geneva in 1955 when President Eisenhower used the summit and his Open Skies proposal to lecture the Soviet leadership on the dangers of surprise attack. With Pearl Harbor clear in the memories of that generation of American leaders, and the closed nature of Soviet society, surprise attack was a real fear that led to high states of readiness for American nuclear forces and the danger of escalation in a crisis. Eisenhower set out at Geneva to establish Soviet understanding of these dangers in hopes that greater transparency could be obtained. Open Skies was as much an educational effort as it was an arms control measure.

Two other education attempts were related to the effects of strategic defense on stability and the arms race. At Glassboro the US Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, attempted to convince the Soviets of the dangers of strategic defense, while at Geneva in 1985 Ronald Reagan sought to win Mikhail Gorbachev over to his vision of a world made safe from nuclear attack by strategic defenses.
Jimmy Carter's presentation on goals for SALT III to Brezhnev is the final arms control related education effort. Carter seized upon the summit which brought SALT II to a close as a forum to establish the agenda for SALT III. Working closely with his defense and foreign policy advisers he worked out a plan of action for the next round and then presented it to the Soviet leadership. If SALT III had ever begun it would have been the first time the United States government had entered strategic nuclear arms negotiations with such a clear idea of where it wanted to go. Moreover, since the Soviets have usually been reactive in the arms control process this discussion might have short circuited what usually were unproductive early rounds in the talks and led to serious bargaining right away. Unfortunately the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prevented SALT III from ever materializing.

On regional issues American leaders early on sought to establish ground rules for competition between the superpowers. At Vienna, John Kennedy sought to convince the Soviets of the dangers of miscalculation in a crisis, to avoid a repeat of what the leaders of Europe had done in July, 1914. Lyndon Johnson tried to convince Premier Kosygin that the United States and the Soviet Union should seek restraint in regional crises and not arm the adversaries with advanced weapons. As was discussed under proposition three neither of these attempts were successful because the two countries had very different interests in regional conflicts. The United States as the greatest status quo power sought to
restrain third world conflict while the Soviet Union as a revolutionary power sought to encourage it. While this does oversimplify a complex reality, it nevertheless was largely true, at least until the Reagan administration when the United States began to actively seek to rollback communist gains.

Opportunities to discuss the rules of the game were missed in both 1972 and 1973 by the way the BPA and PNW agreements were negotiated, as was seen under proposition three, and because of Brezhnev's poor health in 1979.

As has generally been true of and human rights there was no case in which a serious attempt to educate the Soviets on American concerns took place in the cases studied here. This is particularly surprising given the strong feelings both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan had on this subject. Each had on many occasions lectured the Soviets from afar on human rights, but in private sessions with the Soviet leader each pulled his punches. Both Carter and Reagan argued human rights violations in the USSR angered the American public and made better relations difficult, but neither exhibited the moral outrage they had shown at other times. This is most likely a function of trying to avoid a blowup which would mar the summit. In both cases it was the State Department that pushed for modernization in the tenor of criticism of Soviet human rights practices. Reagan's presentation at Geneva followed the talking points prepared by the State Department, much to the chagrin of Kenneth Adelman who sought a more assertive statement on human rights.
On the whole, attempts to tutor the adversary have generally not been able to produce observable change in the foreign policy of the other superpower, thereby making the second part of proposition four unconfirmed in most cases. While the first part of proposition four was upheld nine times, only twice did these attempts to educate cause a shift in the foreign policy of the other state within six months of the summit. Perhaps the most successful attempt to educate the opposite leader came at the Geneva summit in 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev convinced the President, Secretary of State Shultz and other key members of the administration that he was seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. Within a month, the State Department endorsed a U.N. sponsored mediation effort between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and pledged that the United States would act as a guarantor of a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Progress eventually stalled because the United States insisted the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul be removed as a precondition to agreement, but for awhile following Geneva progress was made.

As was stated in Chapter Eleven, Gorbachev also seems to have convinced President Reagan that he was a different kind of Soviet leader and that better U.S.-Soviet relations were possible. In the months following the Geneva summit, the icy relations that had characterized Reagan's first term began to thaw and progress, at first in tone and later in substance, began to develop. As 1986 passed, differences narrowed in the INF negotiations until by September the outline of a treaty was beginning to emerge. There were still bumps in
the road toward a new detente, but as was described earlier, Kenneth Adelman considers the Geneva summit to be the turning point of the Reagan administration.

The only other time an attempt to educate the adversary seems to have had a demonstrable impact on the behavior of the other superpower came at the Vienna summit in 1961. Khrushchev’s attempt to intimidate Kennedy and force Western concessions in Berlin backfired and instead galvanized the President to prepare a stiff Western response to a Soviet challenge over this divided city. Thus this tutorial had exactly the opposite effect intended.

Two other cases cannot be definitively judged either failures or successes. Jimmy Carter’s careful presentation of America’s goals for SALT III clearly impressed Brezhnev and the other Soviet leaders at Vienna, so much so that the General Secretary requested a copy of the President’s proposals. In a different geopolitical atmosphere this presentation may well have short-circuited the usual negotiating process and avoided the usually tentative early rounds that had characterized SALT I and II. A final judgment on the impact of Carter’s tutorial may never be known since the chill in U.S.-Soviet relations in the fall of 1979 delayed the ratification of SALT II and the beginning of SALT III, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan killed the SALT process altogether.

The final case in which the impact of an attempt to educate the Soviet leadership cannot be finally judged was McNamara’s effort to convince Kosygin that the deployment of
strategic defenses would be destabilizing. As we saw in Chapter Five, there is no clear evidence, either for or against, on which to judge if the Secretary of Defense changed Soviet thinking. In a year Soviet behavior had begun to change somewhat since they agreed in the summer of 1968 to begin the SALT negotiations, but these were derailed by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. When SALT did get underway in the fall of 1969, the Soviets did agree to severely limit ABM systems soon after the negotiations began, but there is no evidence that McNamara's tutorial played an important role in this change.

Fundamental fears about the emerging strategic situation, or ideas about possible opportunities must be discussed, and there is no better forum than the summit to initiate an exploration of these concepts. Why then have there been so few successes? The real problem is that in few of the cases described does there seem to have been any attempt to follow up the summit talks with more detailed deliberations at a lower level. Three years after Eisenhower's lecture on the dangers of surprise attack at Geneva a conference on this subject convened, but it met only once. After Glassboro and the exchange between McNamara and Kosygin the two sides did move to begin SALT, only to have the invasion of Czechoslovakia delay it for another year. Carter's discussion with Brezhnev of goals for SALT III had little effect since another Soviet invasion, this time in Afghanistan, prevented the talks from beginning. The only effort which had any real followup was Reagan's discourse on
strategic defenses at Geneva. The United States and the Soviet Union continued to discuss strategic defenses at the NST negotiations but neither side was able to win the other to its view of strategic defenses. Finally, there was no real follow up on guidelines for regional competition after Vienna or Glassboro, although the Carter administration sought Soviet agreement to meetings on this topic at Vienna but was rebuffed.

In sum, Presidents and General Secretaries alike at seven different summits sought to use this forum to enlighten their counterpart on the dangers or opportunities of the current situation, and yet they were seldom ever successful. For education attempts to be successful in the future they must be seen not as one-shot opportunities, but rather as the beginning of a process of exploration that should continue at lower levels and at the summit. Issues which make it to the agenda are always complex and not easily solved. If simple solutions existed the problem would have been dealt with by officials before the summit was convened. It would be nearly miraculous for the President to engage the Soviet leader on such complex matters, especially if they began with opposing viewpoints, and expect that in the course of a few days he could win his counterpart over to the American view of a delicate question. If, however, summit deliberations were followed up by meetings at the expert level to build upon the dialogue begun by the leaders more progress would be possible. Admittedly this would have been more difficult given the depth of the Cold War after Geneva in 1955, Vienna
in 1961, or even Glassboro in 1967, but the basic principle remains valid.

Table 14 summarizes the issues on which the four propositions explored in this study were found to hold true. The number of empty cells implies that there are other conditions which affect when these propositions will hold. These questions will be addressed in the final sections of this study.

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Table 14 (continued)
Propositions with Promise

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Geneva 1985
arms control, regional issues

Reykjavik 1986
arms control arms control arms control none

Issues areas listed are those for which the proposition was found to have merit.

The Dangers of Summit Diplomacy

In April, 1960, one year before he became Secretary of State, Dean Rusk warned:

"... I conclude that summit diplomacy is to be approached with the wariness with which a prudent physician prescribes a habit forming drug--a technique to be employed rarely and under the most exceptional circumstances, with rigorous safeguards against its becoming a debilitating or dangerous habit."

Rusk and Fred Ikle have written the most persuasive arguments against summit diplomacy. Their warnings of the dangers involved should be carefully heeded each time the President ascends to the summit. In fact, Kenneth Adelman made sure a copy of Rusk's article from Foreign Affairs was included in Ronald Reagan's briefing materials each time he prepared to meet the leader of the Soviet Union.

Rusk's first critique of summit negotiations was that any chief negotiator, including the President, must know his
country's position inside and out, he must be aware of the interests of allied states, and he must be aware of his adversary's probable position and how he should respond to such an offer. Because of the extraordinary demands on his time, it is difficult for the President to become such an expert on any single issue. Therefore the delegation may be headed by someone ill-prepared to engage in serious negotiations.

One of Rusk's most compelling arguments is that it is dangerous to bring together in the same room the two most powerful men in the world where quirks of personality could lead to a serious confrontation. When two leaders with very different principles, motivations, responsibilities and personal characteristics meet there is always the potential for a clash which could have very dangerous consequences. This turns the traditional argument in favor of summits, that leaders can establish a working relationship which will facilitate better relations between the two states, on its head by pointing out that there is another alternative. There is always the possibility that personalities could be incompatible or the perceptions gained of the other leader's views could be mistaken.

Ikle and Rusk both discuss the unique way in which summits unfold. Ikle points out that normal negotiating practices are collapsed at the summit, and talks which may have taken months are conducted in a matter of hours. Proposals are exchanged, supporting arguments given, compromises considered, and final decisions made in a very
brief time. The normal time for reflection and study which characterizes other negotiations does not exist at the summit. The slow pace of traditional diplomacy does prevent mistakes made in haste. With the President present at the table one cannot delay by claiming the proposal must be forwarded to his government. As Rusk has aptly put it, "the court of last resort is in session."

In a related point, Ikle observes that when the President travels to the summit the decentralized nature of the United States government does not work to his advantage. Isolated and far from home he may not have the access to expert opinions which would be available were he in Washington. Ikle admits that modern communications mitigate these circumstances, but a President caught in rapid fire negotiations at the summit can still miss out on critical advice. Using the data collected by this study it is now possible to assess how often these dire warnings about the potential dangers of summits between East and West have come to pass. Looking back over the eleven summits examined, only three have experienced at least one of the pitfalls predicted by Rusk and Ikle in any significant way.

Accounts by Gerard Smith, Raymond Garthoff, and Henry Kissinger have gone into great detail on the confusion which ensued when President Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to finalize SALT I in order that it could be signed before the President left Moscow in May, 1972. The issue of when the SLBM freeze would begin and limits on the modernization of ICBMs and their silos, discussed in Chapter Five, were
extremely complex and yet the President and Kissinger delved into them with the negotiating teams left in Helsinki and without the benefit of senior military advisers. The result was an extraordinary set of messages and phone calls between Moscow, Helsinki, and Washington on both issues. On the SLBM freeze the essential question was whether one category of diesel submarines carrying three missiles each should be included in the freeze. While there were protests from Smith and the JCS these submarines were excluded. The real confusion came over the limits on ICBM modernization during the freeze. Brezhnev made a concession which would have banned the first generation of Soviet MIRVed missiles and then was forced to retract it. Both sides agreed to a 10-15\% limit on missile modernization, but a frantic message from Washington revealed that this would have banned the Minuteman III, as well as Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, and this provision was quickly dropped. Frantic messages, midnight negotiating sessions: it was clear that confusion reigned, and that this was not the way to negotiate any agreement as important as SALT I. The delegation and senior military advisers should have been present if negotiations were to take place, and even more importantly, these kinds of issues should have been settled before the summit ever convened. Clearly neither of these issues would have a significant impact on the national security of the United States, but the confusion of SALT I's last hours did help to undermine the treaty and confidence in the SALT process.
The two summits most often mentioned as disasters are Vienna in 1961 and Reykjavik in 1986. Vienna is the clearest example of Rusk's warnings of the danger of a clash of personalities between the two most powerful men in the world. In his article Rusk wrote:

"Picture two men sitting down together to talk about matters affecting the very survival of the systems they represent, each in position to unleash unbelievably destructive power. Note that the one is impulsive in manner, supremely confident as only a closed mind can be, tempted to play for dramatic effect, motivated by forces only partially perceived by the other, possibly subject to high blood pressure; the other deeply committed to principles for which his adversary has only contempt, weighted down by a sense of responsibility for the hundreds of millions who have freely given him their confidence and whose fates are largely in his hands, a man limited by conscience and policy in his choice of tactics and argument, a man with a quick temper and a weak heart. Is it wise to gamble so heavily; are not these two men who should be kept apart until others have found a sure meeting ground of accommodation between them? Is there not much to be said for institutionalizing their relationship?"

While in the spring of 1960 Rusk was undoubtedly describing another Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting, the scene he paints came to pass one year later in Vienna, this time with Kennedy and Khrushchev at the summit and Rusk himself as Secretary of State.

Did John Kennedy give Khrushchev the mistaken impression that the President's inexperience might allow Soviet pressure to bring a successful outcome in Berlin and thus contribute to the crisis which followed? The majority view of Vienna is that Khrushchev was emboldened by the summit. According to Jean Edward Smith:
"Khrushchev simply had assessed the tide to be running in his favor and had used the Vienna Conference to pursue his advantage. Like Hitler at Munich he had used it to impress on the West the risks of opposing his policy and the dangers of total war. Indeed he had imparted a caution to Western policy where previously none had existed—a caution unfortunately reminiscent of Neville Chamberlain in 1938. The only results of the so-called, "resumption of contacts at the highest level," were in fact a decided worsening of US-Soviet relations, or concomitant increase in defense expenditures, and an accelerated deterioration of the situation in Berlin."

Arkady Shevchenko’s memoirs also argue that the Bay of Pigs disaster and the Vienna summit together convinced Khrushchev that Kennedy was "a boy" and that it was time for "a test of strength."

The memoirs of those in the Kennedy administration take a very different position. They emphasize Kennedy’s resoluteness on Berlin and his strong responses to Khrushchev’s pressure tactics. Theodore Sorenson has written:

"There was no progress toward ending the Cold War and neither had expected any. But each made a deep and lasting impression on the other. Each was unyielding on his nation’s interests. Each had seen for himself, as a leader must, the nature of his adversary and his arguments; and both realized more than ever the steadfastness of the other’s stand and the difficulty of reaching agreement."

John Armitage argues that the consensus view of Vienna is wrong for three reasons. First, Khrushchev, in his memoirs, does not claim that Kennedy’s performance had convinced him to test the President. Secondly, Ambassador Thompson, who among all Americans present at Vienna knew the First Secretary best, did not feel Kennedy had given the
impression of weakness. Finally, it was Khrushchev who eventually backed down in the fall of 1961.14

Sovietologists have offered other potential explanations for Khrushchev's behavior in 1961, rather than just the feeling he could pressure a young President into an error. Michel Tatu, Carl Linden, and Robert Slusser have each written extensively on the pressure on Khrushchev within the Soviet leadership from the Stalinist opposition to his reform program. According to these scholars, Khrushchev under increasing pressure after the downing of the U-2 in May, 1960 sought a foreign policy victory in 1961-1962 to silence his critics. Slusser in particular links the Berlin crisis of 1961 to these motivations.15

Ultimately it is impossible to answer whether or not the impression John Kennedy conveyed to Khrushchev contributed to the Berlin crisis of 1961. It is clear that the summit did not prevent the escalation of the confrontation since this process began within a month of the summit's end. To say, as Smith has, that Vienna "imparted a caution to Western policy where none had existed before" seems far too critical in the face of Kennedy's action strengthening American armed forces on July 25 and his support for the rights of the West in the events after the building of the wall. Still, however, the juxtaposition of the two events makes one question the value of holding summits in the midst of a crisis. Rusk's warning of the possibility of a clash of personalities is even more applicable in a period of tension when a confrontation is
already likely. In such a case misperceptions created at a summit could lead to an escalation that might have been avoided.

Many have argued that a summit held in July, 1914 could have avoided the calamity which followed, but the July crisis in that year was far different from Berlin in 1961. A summit held in the month preceding World War I could perhaps have clarified the interests involved and avoided the escalation brought on by the fear of the enemy's mobilization. In June, 1961 misperception was not the problem as much as a clear difference of interests between East and West over Berlin. There was actually little to clarify when the two leaders met, beyond the resolve to defend West Berlin, which could have been communicated in many other ways. Therefore the risks associated with holding a summit in the midst of a crisis were not balanced by the meetings' potential benefits. Holding a summit in June, 1961 was a mistake.

No other summit more clearly demonstrates the potential, and dangers, of summit diplomacy than Reykjavik in October, 1986. While extraordinary progress was made on START and INF, almost every pitfall that Rusk and Ikle warned about came to pass. Again it is ironic, just as with Vienna, that one of those who warned of the dangers of summit diplomacy, this time Fred Ikle, was a member of the administration that engaged in ill-conceived summit negotiations.
The talks at Reykjavik took place without significant senior military advice, and no member of the JCS was present. The United States presented proposals which had not been carefully studied by the Defense Department as to their ramifications for the national security of the United States. The administration had not settled upon the kinds of offensive-defensive tradeoffs which were acceptable. The ZBM proposal on the summit's second day had already been rejected by America's closest allies, but it was presented nevertheless. In other words in the span of six hours the President allowed himself to be drawn into negotiations for which he was ill-prepared, and that called into question the basic tenets of Western security policy. The collapsing of the process of negotiation observed by Ikle, and which allowed the rapid movement on Saturday night, brought great danger on Sunday afternoon. Without the time to consult senior military advisers or allied leaders who relied on America's nuclear umbrella for their nation's defense, Ronald Reagan shook the foundations of decades of NATO defense policy. In no other summit studied was there a clearer example of the dangers of negotiating with a deadline looming just ahead. This had created problems before at Moscow in 1972, but Reykjavik was far more serious. Gorbachev's insistence that all, including strategic defenses, be settled before the summit ended led Reagan and the American delegation into those last frenzied hours of negotiation. With the summit clock ticking, extraordinary proposals were floated to prevent the meeting from failing. The pressure of
the deadline gave no time to consult senior military officials or America's European allies thus leading to complete shock when the contents of the Reykjavik discussions became known. In the long run the effects were overwhelmed by the events which led to the end of the Cold War, but one must wonder what would have happened had Gorbachev simply agreed to the President's offer.

To sum, the dangers warned of by Rusk, Ikle, Nicholson, and the other critics of summit diplomacy came to pass in only three of the eleven summits studied. The Moscow negotiations on SALT I resulted in a great deal of confusion, but no long-term damage to American national interests was done. The Vienna summit of 1961 remains extremely controversial as to whether or not it emboldened Khrushchev to pressure the West in Berlin. The Reykjavik meeting is still regarded by most as a disaster, but progress was made on the START and INF Treaties. Presidents and statemen should heed the warnings of Rusk, Ikle and Nicholson and learn from these past mistakes, but when balanced against the accomplishments of Cold War summits, it seems that this form of diplomacy can make important contributions.

Lessons Learned

Raymond Garthoff has called summits a specific diplomatic tool and this study echoes his assessment. But to use this tool correctly, Presidents must understand the history of summits past. One of the key lessons to be drawn from the meetings analyzed in previous chapters is that
Timing is the critical variable which makes it possible for a summit to accomplish important results. Good timing in summitry depends on three critical factors. First summits should not be held until the President and his advisers have clearly identified their objectives on the issues they hope to discuss with the leader of another nation. This was the critical failing of the Reykjavik summit. The administration was still so divided over how to structure the tradeoff between offenses and defenses in the START negotiations that when Gorbachev conditioned everything on the limiting of SDI the only response that could be offered was the disastrous proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles.

Summits should never be held when administrations are still divided on the important issues which will be negotiated at the meeting. At best, division leads to summits which accomplish little if anything, as the Watergate-era meetings attest. It can also lead to intramural squabbling within the American delegation, recall that Nitze was forced to appeal to Shultz to quiet the more conservative members of the negotiating team on that hectic Saturday night in Reykjavik. At worst division can lead to the kind of ill-conceived proposals that paper over differences as was seen on the disastrous second day of the Reykjavik summit. This requires strong executive leadership from the President. As this study has shown, summits can be used as a deadline to force the major decision-makers within the government to come to a common position on important issues, but only if the
President is willing at the proper time to make a forceful decision and set a course for his administration.

When regional conflict has provoked a crisis or confrontation in the relations between the United States and another nation, a second important factor affects the timing of a summit. Summits should only be held after traditional diplomacy has carefully narrowed the adversary's options, made clear the resolve of the United States to protect its vital interests, and most importantly, not until after the crisis has begun to ebb. In the early stages of a summit might help to clarify the interests of the states involved if there is some reason to believe that one's counterpart does not correctly perceive what is at stake, but as a general rule summits should come after both sides have begun to descend the escalation ladder, not when painless steps up the ladder still remain. A summit held too early in a confrontation can serve as a forum in which an adversary can pressure his opponent and escalate rather than deescalate tension. A summit in the midst of crisis risks the clash of personalities described in the previous section. By waiting until the adversary's options has been limited, America's resolve to protect its vital interests has been made clear, and the crisis has begun to deescalate, the President can go to the summit in a far stronger position. What is at stake is now clear and the possibility of a settlement enhanced because the alternatives are so costly. Both of the summits which have achieved frameworks for regional settlements,
Vienna for the Laotian conflict and Moscow for Vietnam, have taken place in just such circumstances.

In a crisis, timing is critical because the stakes can be extremely high. If talks on arms control at the summit break down the arms race may continue, but the chances of war are not greatly increased. On regional questions, this may not be the case. Vienna in 1961 is the prime example of how summits can help solve or can exacerbate regional tensions. Successful summits on regional conflicts came when there were few options available to the Soviets or their ally. A summit held when tension has begun to subside, and the choice is either to reescalate tension or settle peacefully, can provide a forum for the resolution of the conflict.

Regarding the Laotian conflict in June, 1961 both sides were nearing critical decisions on escalation or compromise. President Kennedy had already signaled his resolve by placing Marines on alert in Okinawa, and would soon have to decide whether or not military force was necessary. Khrushchev had to decide if he wished to provoke American intervention by continuing massive aid to the Pathet Lao. In the month just before the summit, however, the crisis had seemed to ebb and diplomatic alternatives emerged, with the convening of the Geneva Conference on Laos. Under these circumstances both leaders chose to compromise, and at Vienna they agreed to a framework for a solution to the Laotian conflict. On the other hand, in June, 1961 on Berlin, Khrushchev still had several options available to him and could increase the
pressure on the West without risking immediate war. The most
difficult choices still lay down the road. In May, 1972 the
situation was quite different. The timing was propitious for
a settlement because the North Vietnamese offensive had been
blunted by American military action and the crisis atmosphere
had begun to pass. The North and its ally the Soviet Union
were now faced with several more years of war or agreeing to
the terms Nixon and Kissinger had brought with them to Moscow
in April and May.

In the Berlin Crisis, a summit in November or December,
1961, when the crisis had begun to ebb, would have been more
advisable than one in June. Khrushchev had played all of his
easy cards. Nuclear testing had been resumed, and the United
States had responded with explosions of its own. The Soviets
had harassed American military personnel traveling into East
Berlin and President Kennedy had moved tanks to Checkpoint
Charlie. In addition, the building of the wall had halted
the flow of refugees into West Berlin and solved Khrushchev's
immediate problem by stabilizing East Germany. Khrushchev
now had to choose either further escalation, and risk war, or
seek a peaceful solution. After demonstrating his resolve,
and having forced Khrushchev to again abandon his ultimatum,
John Kennedy would have been in a far better position to
negotiate than he was in the early summer.

The third important factor in the timing of a summit
relates to the diplomatic context in which they take place.
This factor especially applies to technical issues such as
arms control or trade. Summits held early in the process
should seek to educate the leadership of the other nation on how the United States views its interests on the problem under consideration, especially if American officials see an important new threat to the security of the United States emerging in the near future. After the initial phase of negotiations has passed summits are best held only when areas of agreement have begun to emerge. Meetings held soon after a new set of negotiations has begun are unlikely to achieve concrete results, because the differences are too great for the leaders to bridge, but a summit held as the outline of a deal has begun to take shape can energize the bureaucracy and allow the leaders to construct the framework around which a formal agreement can be built. Summits held after the outline of an accord is already in place should focus on remaining roadblocks to agreement. Especially on subjects like arms control, however, summits can be held when the only remaining issues are so technical that they are beyond the expertise of the leaders and their political level advisers.

Vladivostok is the prototype of a successful summit on arms control. After two years of stalemate, brought on by tough issues and executive weakness in the United States, the approach of a summit produced America's first negotiable SALT II proposal. Middle ground had begun to emerge earlier in the year at the Moscow summit when Kissinger and Gromyko agreed to seek an accord based on equal aggregates or counterbalancing asymmetries. Kissinger's successful trip to Moscow in October, 1974 further clarified the possible outline for an accord, and allowed President Ford to agree to
a summit one month later. At Vladivostok the United States dropped its previous insistence on severe throw-weight limits, and the Soviets agreed to exclude US FBS from SALT II. Vladivostok was not perfect because the issues of cruise missiles, and the Backfire bomber were not settled, but nonetheless the backbone of SALT II was agreed to. The leaders did not attempt to settle technical questions beyond their level of expertise, as Nixon and Brezhnev had at Moscow in 1972, but instead focused on questions that required political-level decisions. It should be noted that the first day at Reykjavik achieved very similar results and would have gone down in history as a significant accomplishment had it not been for the second day’s discussions.

Obviously the conjunction of the elements involved in negotiating a successful framework agreement are relatively rare, but summits held in other circumstances can have positive effects as well, although they will be more limited in scope. If the framework for an accord is already in place a well-timed summit can remove roadblocks to agreement that have developed in lower level negotiations. The SLBM deal before Moscow in 1972, although it was controversial for some, is an example in the field of arms control.

Summits which take place at the end of one round of negotiation or just as a new round is beginning should aim to clarify the goals for the talks and perhaps establish a common agenda. The stellar example of this use for summits was the 1979 Carter-Brezhnev summit in Vienna. The President having concluded SALT II used the summit as a forum for
engaging the Soviets in a discussion of goals for SALT III. Carter consulted each of his principal national security aides and fashioned a work program for SALT III which might have begun the process of serious negotiation much earlier had the talks ever begun.

Summits devoted to education, which have generally come at the beginning or end of a particular negotiation, must be followed up by more detailed discussions at lower levels. The military-to-military contacts begun at the end of the Reagan years provide an opportunity for experts to explore potential dangers which the leaders have discussed at the summit. During the Reagan administration, similar contacts were held at irregular intervals on a variety of regional conflicts and these could provide a forum where summit discussions could be followed up.

The other variable critical to a summit's success is preparation. It has become a cliche that summits must be well prepared, but as has been noted, Presidents have embarked for the summit with little preparation on several occasions, or they have delved into issues on which they did not have the expertise to negotiate. If the President chooses to attend a hastily arranged meeting, he must be careful not to be drawn into serious negotiation for which he is not prepared, or the mistakes of Reykjavik may be repeated. Technical issues such as the missile modernization issue at Moscow in 1972, should be settled before the summit is held.
Dean Rusk's advice still holds true. If the President is to become chief negotiator he must understand not only his country's position but also that of those allied to the United States. In addition he must anticipate his adversary's proposals and how he will respond. If the President is thus prepared, and he chooses the moment for the summit carefully, real accomplishments are possible. Summits can go beyond being simply a forum for the mutual exploration of views on various issues and can achieve important results.

The Consequences of Cold War Summits and the Future of Summitry

Summits between the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union provided a mechanism for the moderation of the most dangerous aspects of the superpower relationship during the cold war. This study has shown that, contrary to the belief of many, summits can play an important role in modern diplomacy. Summits provide a forum in which leaders can do more than just exchange views on current problems by using their face-to-face meeting to educate their counterpart on the dangers, or opportunities that lie ahead. Presidents and General Secretaries have used summits to discuss the stabilizing or destabilizing effects of strategic defenses, their goals for the next round of arms control talks, the dangerous trends in strategic weaponry, their fears of a
first strike, and the role that the superpowers could and should play in conflicts around the world.

Presidents, and perhaps General Secretaries, have used summits consciously or unconsciously to bring unity to their administrations and to unite their governments behind a particular policy. The deadline that the summit imposes forces the major bureaucratic actors to make choices and eventually compromise on a course of action rather than allowing policy debates to go on incessantly within the administration. Once at the summit, Presidents and their advisers have used the meetings to build the framework of SALT II, the INF Treaty, START, and peace accords in Laos and Vietnam. The meetings at Camp David, Vienna, Glassboro, Moscow in 1972, Vladivostok, and Reykjavik all removed significant roadblocks to agreement in important issues relating to arms control or regional issues. To say that summits have accomplished little beyond boosting the President's public image ignores the real accomplishments that they have produced.

Superpower summits were an important mechanism in the moderation of conflict during the Cold War, but now that the era has come to a close, and the world has passed from a bipolar to a multipolar system, what will the role of summit diplomacy be? In the past, superpower summitry sought to mitigate the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union by focusing on arms control and regional issues. In the future it is certain that economic issues will move to
The top of the agenda as economic power becomes more important in a less militarized world.

The leaders of the world's developed countries have been meeting to discuss economic issues each year since 1975, with very mixed results. The Group of Seven economic summits began in 1975 when French President Giscard d'Estaing invited his counterparts to come to Rambouillet, just outside Paris, to discuss a coordinated Western response to the economic problems created by the oil price shock of the early 1970s. The G7 summits became annual affairs, and the summits have grown from what was to be a fireside chat, into an enormous undertaking with hundreds of participants, and thousands of reporters present. Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne carefully studied the first nine summits, through the Williamsburg meeting in 1983, and they reached several conclusions regarding the consequences of these conferences. First, they argue that these summits provide mutual reinforcement for the leaders of the G7 countries, and help them to pursue desirable economic policy despite domestic resistance. A President or Prime Minister's position is strengthened at home if he or she can claim that the world's leading industrial states have agreed on a particular course of action. Putnam and Bayne also maintain that these summits force the leaders and their national bureaucracies to focus on international economic issues and perhaps to reexamine economic policies which have international consequences. The authors quote a former American official responsible for summit preparations as saying:
the certainty that there is going to be a
summit meeting up ahead, where the head of
government is going to be confronted with tough
questions from peers, compels the internationally
oriented section of the bureaucracy to consider
domestic needs, exposes the domestic bureaucracy
to international factors, and forces the
government as a whole to resolve internal splits
on the relevant issues."

Thus, Putnam and Bayne claim that one of the principal
effects of the seven power economic summits is the same as
proposition one found to be true for Cold War U.S.-Soviet
summits.

Putnam and Bayne also conclude that summits allow
cooperation in the form of what they call mutual adjustment
and mutual concession. Mutual adjustment is defined as a
leader modifying his or her position to avoid isolation and
permit the summiteers to present a unified front to the
world. The authors cite several examples in which individual
leaders have compromised their positions to allow agreement
among the group. This proposition seems to conform very
closely with proposition two in this study since by offering
concessions the leaders are essentially removing roadblocks
to agreement. The G7 process has on occasion seen mutual
concessions where the leaders trade compromises on a variety
of issues in order to put together a comprehensive agreement
on a course of action. The Bonn summit in 1978 is cited as
the principle example of the process of mutual concession
since the G7 leaders were able to put together an agreement
which involved tradeoffs in fiscal, energy, and trade policy.
Thus, the economic summits have on occasion permitted leaders
to fashion framework agreements which would guide later
action, much as proposition three has found to be the case at several U.S.-Soviet summits.

Finally, economic summits have allowed leaders to educate their counterparts on the negative effects that domestic economic policy can have on the international economic system. Putnam and Bayne argue that leaders have occasionally been able to affect the policy of another state through these frank discussions. This conclusion echoes the findings of proposition four. In short, Putnam and Bayne's work seems to offer evidence that the propositions tested by this study could be applied to all summits, not just bilateral U.S.-Soviet meetings. The authors did not, however, test these propositions as systematically as the study has attempted to do. The conclusions drawn are impressionistic, based on the authors' musings about the first nine economic summits. Further research is needed to test these propositions more rigorously and to see if they apply to the summits that have followed."

Despite this evidence, it does not seem that the Group of Seven summits have produced as much in the way of concrete action as the bilateral meetings between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. Many experts feel that these conferences have accomplished little, and have become not much more than "photo opportunities," in the words of Ambassador Robert Strauss. Several reasons are offered for the lack of concrete agreements at these meetings. In 1990 and 1991, cooperation has become even more difficult with the end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet threat,
which previously helped to unify the participants. At the Houston summit in 1990, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher observed that three distinct groups were emerging, one dominated by the dollar, one by the yen, and the other by the deutsche mark. Secondly, attempts to coordinate monetary and trade policy are far more complex than traditional diplomacy because of the number of actors involved, and due to the fact that the international economy is a dynamic system, not easily manipulated by leaders at an annual summit. The issues facing Presidents at Cold War summits were not nearly so complex. Finally, economic summits deal with issues that affect powerful domestic constituencies that leaders must take into consideration as they enter negotiations. Once again, few issues at Cold War summits were so powerfully influenced by domestic interest groups. Together these factors make progress at economic summits more difficult than at meetings between Presidents and General Secretaries during the Cold War.

President Bush's trip to Japan in early 1992 could typify future summits between leaders of the industrialized world. It should not be surprising that the first post-Cold War summit trip by the President was to Japan. What had been planned as a meeting to discuss security concerns quickly became one devoted almost entirely to trade disputes, especially automobiles, largely because of domestic political pressure in a presidential election year. The link between domestic interest groups and international economic issues will lead to more summits devoted to addressing specific
trade problems between countries. In fact, bilateral trade issues, unlike issues related to GATT and multilateral concerns, could in some ways resemble the arms control talks at U.S.-Soviet summits. These bilateral barriers to trade are discreet problems on which the approach of a summit might force bureaucratic compromise in order to bring about a successful trip. Presidents could also use summits to address specific roadblocks to expanded trade relations, build a framework agreement on trade, or educate the opposing leader on emerging economic issues facing the two countries. In short, bilateral summits on issues like trade could serve the same purposes as Cold War summits. Unlike the multilateral G7 process, bilateral meetings on economic issues could yield far more concrete results.

It is very likely that summit diplomacy will become more important in the near future for two reasons. First, the spread of democracy to formerly authoritarian, or even totalitarian, states will bring leaders into office who have come to power based on their ability to persuade their citizens to adopt the leader’s vision of the future. This kind of leader is likely to seek out summits, not only to enhance his political standing at home, but also because the leader firmly believes he can win over his counterpart to his vision of the world.

Summit meetings will also allow leaders to explore with each other the dynamics of a rapidly changing world situation. Bipolar politics, as we experienced in the Cold War, has the virtue of being relatively simple with
interests, threats, and friends remaining reasonably stable over time. Once the two blocs solidified at the end of World War II there were few major changes in the balance of power in the Cold War era. Multipolar systems are far more fluid, however, and interests, threats, and friends not so easily defined. One can expect great uncertainty in the next decade and beyond as the world makes the transition from a bipolar to a more uncertain multipolar system. This will increase the need for leaders to meet with each other to explore this evolving system and their place in it. Summits devoted to education will become very important as new alliances are formed and old friends find themselves at odds more frequently.

In the future, American Presidents will have to clarify the role of the United States in Asia, Europe, and the rest of the world now that the Cold War has passed. The unifying strategic vision that the Cold War and bipolar international system imposed on the United States and its allies has been replaced by a far more uncertain future. Leaders will need to be now more than ever men with strategic vision and summits will provide a forum in which they can meet to explore the opportunities and dangers the new system presents.

Toward Testable Hypotheses

The final task of this study is to use the knowledge gained through this exercise to attempt to develop testable hypotheses that can be used to guide future research on
Proposition One

We will now consider several hypotheses that can be generated from the first proposition.

P1: The approach of the summit forces the major bureaucracies, decision-makers, and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes.

Recall from the analysis of this proposition earlier in this chapter that there were two conditions under which this proposition did not hold. First, for summits which were defined by the leaders as "get-acquainted" beforehand, there was no incentive within the United States' government for the major actors to put together a negotiating position on the critical issues to be decided at the summit. Expectations were that the President and General Secretary would merely exchange views on important questions, and that no serious negotiating would be done. Therefore, the summit did not act as a deadline before which compromise positions had to be reached. The second category of summits in which the approach of the summit failed to yield common positions on key issues were the Watergate-era meetings, in which President Nixon did not have the political authority to pull his divided government and the Congress together. Given these two conditions, two related hypotheses can be generated.

H1: If a summit is defined as a "get-acquainted" meeting it will not force the major bureaucracies,
decision-makers, and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes.

H2: If the President's executive authority is seriously weakened, then summits will not force the major bureaucracies, decision-makers, and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes.

Putting these two generalizations together, and casting them in positive light:

H3: The approach of a summit will act as a deadline which forces the major bureaucracies, decision-makers, and the Congress to reach a common position on key issues and settle longstanding disputes, if and only if the meeting is not defined beforehand as a "get-acquainted" summit, and if the President does not suffer from seriously weakened authority.

Propositions Two and Three

We will now examine hypotheses that can be generated from the findings gathered in the exploration of propositions two and three. Recall that proposition two stated:

P2: The President and General Secretary have resolved important issues which were unable to be resolved at lower levels.

And proposition three maintained:

P3: Framework agreements at U.S.-Soviet summits pave the way for more rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal treaty.

One of the lessons learned from this study was that the consequences of summits depended greatly upon the diplomatic context in which they took place. If a summit was arranged at a time when the positions of the two superpowers in arms control talks had begun to narrow, and the middle ground
between the two positions had begun to emerge, then it was likely that the leaders would be able to hammer out the framework of an agreement. Since serious arms control talks began in 1969, through the Reykjavik summit in 1986, six summits were held, and only two achieved the kind of conceptual framework proposition then envisioned. At Washington in 1973 and Geneva in 1985, there were still great differences between the two sides, so great that areas of compromise had not yet begun to emerge. At Vienna in 1979 SALT II had just been completed and neither side was ready for such a breakthrough on SALT III. Only the Moscow summit in 1974 saw an opportunity to develop a framework missed, and this came because of the divisions within the American government due to Watergate. Differences between the two positions did begin to narrow with the agreements negotiated at Moscow and through the fall the American position continued to move closer to something the Soviets could accept, thus setting the stage for the Vladivostok accords. The same holds for the months before the Reykjavik meeting. The September experts' meeting produced a new American proposal, the Soviets had offered a more moderate START proposal in June, and significant progress on INF. Based on this evidence, a fourth hypothesis can be generated.

H4: If a summit is convened after the positions of the parties on important issues within a negotiation have begun to converge, then the summit talks will focus on the building of a framework agreement that will lead to rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal treaty.
To state this hypothesis in an even stronger fashion, attempting to predict the consequences of the summit, and not just the area on which the talks would focus:

H5: If a summit is convened after the positions of the parties on important issues within a negotiation have begun to converge, then the summit talks will produce a framework agreement that will lead to rapid progress at lower levels and form the outline for a formal treaty.

The conditions under which proposition two were found to hold are closely related to the negotiation of framework agreements. If one examines the five cases of summits where significant obstacles to agreement have been removed. Four of the five have come either at the summit where a framework agreement was achieved or at a summit which followed the crafting of such a framework. Although it is beyond the focus of this study, the Washington summit in December, 1987, which followed the achievement of a framework for START at Reykjavik, was able to agree to a 4900 ceiling for warheads on ballistic missiles, one of the subceilings within the 6000 warhead limit that the administration had sought for over a year. Thus leading even more credence to the hypothesis to follow.

H6: If a summit is convened after a framework agreement has already been achieved, then it will focus on the removal of obstacles to agreement which could not be settled at lower levels.

The brief meeting at Helsinki between Ford and Brezhnev not considered by this study because of its brevity, also supports this hypothesis since the major focus of the meeting
was attempts by both sides to convince the other to change its position on the Backfire bomber.

**Proposition Four**

We will now consider hypotheses which have been generated by our exploration of proposition four.

P4: Cold War summits have served as a forum in which leaders have educated their counterparts on their concerns and interests on the important issues of the day. These tutorials have resulted in changes in the behavior of the superpowers following the summit.

Five Summits, of the eleven considered by this study, could be considered to have taken place during periods of very strained relations between the superpowers, Geneva 1955, Camp David 1959, Vienna 1961, Glassboro 1967, and Geneva 1985. The others took place either in the 1970s era of detente or in the detente which began to flower after the Geneva summit in 1985. At four of the five meetings held during chilly relations, even by Cold War standards, there were significant attempts made to tutor the adversary on some critical issue facing the two superpowers. At Vienna 1961 and Glassboro there were extended discussions of rules for regional competition. At Glassboro and Geneva 1985 there were long tutorials by both leaders on the impact of ballistic missile defenses on strategic stability, and at Geneva 1955 Eisenhower discussed at length the dangers created by fears of surprise attack. At three of these four meetings there were no significant agreements negotiated,
only Vienna witnessed any real agreement, the framework for peace in Laos. Therefore hypothesis seven states:

H7: If two nations involved in a summit are currently experiencing poor relations, then a summit between the leaders of these nations will be devoted to education.

While the evidence is not quite as strong for hypothesis seven, the data suggests an eighth hypothesis. Two of the remaining three summits which saw significant attempts to educate the other leader took place just as either one set of arms control talks were ending, or early in a new set of negotiations. The most significant discussions at the Washington summit in 1973 were Brezhnev's warnings on the Middle East and China. At Vienna in 1979 Carter put a great deal of effort into describing for Brezhnev his goals for SALT III, and he also sought to draw him into a discussion of regional competition, although this failed, largely because of the General Secretary's poor health. It seems that summits which take place as one set of negotiations has concluded, or as another has just begun, are devoted to education. Therefore hypothesis eight states:

H8: If a summit takes place as a set of negotiations is successfully concluded, or very early in the negotiating process, then that summit will be devoted to attempts to educate the other leader.

Issues

Another way to generate testable hypotheses to guide future research is to examine the observed differences among
the issues discussed at each summit. Recall that one of the important lessons learned from this study was that timing was critical if summits were to reach important agreements on regional issues. Based on the evidence gathered from the Vienna 1961 discussions of Berlin and Laos and the Moscow 1972 talks on Vietnam, it was argued that summits held too early in a crisis period can heighten the possibility of confrontation. While summits which take place when tension has begun to subside are more likely to reach a settlement of the conflict. From this hypothesis nine can be generated.

H9: Summits which take place after a crisis has begun to ebb are more likely to achieve the peaceful settlement of a dispute than those that take place early in the escalation process.

The findings of a test of this hypothesis over a number of cases could be very significant since it could give policymakers crucial information about whether or not to schedule a summit as a serious confrontation seems to be developing. This has been a much debated point in the past, as has been stated earlier, since some have argued that a summit in July, 1914 could have avoided World War I, while others warn strongly against summits held in a crisis period.

The final hypothesis to be generated by this study relates to the relatively minor role played by the issues of trade and human rights at superpower summits during the Cold War. The only summits at which these issues played a prominent role were the detente-era summits of 1972-1974. There were trade discussions at Moscow in 1972 and although no agreements were signed the leaders did establish a
negotiating agenda for their bureaucracies and a number of agreements followed in the next six months. Trade and human rights issues became even more prominent at the summits of 1973-1974 because of the Jackson-Vanik controversy. As U.S.-Soviet relations became even more strained in the late 1970s and through the mid-1980s both of these issues virtually dropped off the summit agendas. Thus hypothesis ten states:

H10: Trade and human rights issues will become important topics at summit meetings if and only if tensions over regional issues and military competition are at a relatively low level.

The evidence for this hypothesis is even further bolstered by the prominence of human rights issues at the Moscow summit of 1988, although this summit falls outside the scope of this study. An examination of this hypothesis could be valuable for the future given the likely importance of trade issues at future summits.

The hypotheses generated by this study can be applied as easily to summits involving countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union and in situations other than the Cold War. The propositions from which the hypotheses were drawn were tested by applying them to an adversarial relationship, but they could just as easily be studied by examining summits between allies or between leaders of nations whose relationship is more complex. Ironically while summits attract an extraordinary amount of media attention they are among the least studied events in international politics. Far more research needs to be done in this area since it would seem that summit diplomacy will become more
important in the future as technology makes direct discussions between leaders easier and a more fluid international system makes face-to-face meetings more desirable.
NOTES - CHAPTER XIV


