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Financing the presidential general elections in Ohio: A study of state party contributors and soft money

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The Ohio State University, 1992
Financing the Presidential General Elections in Ohio:
A Study of State Party Contributors and Soft Money

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School
of The Ohio State University

By
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The Ohio State University
1992

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To The Memory of My Mother
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Chapter I

Introduction

A. Overview

The principal thesis of this dissertation is that there are significant differences among political contributors as differentiated by the amounts of their contributions, and that these differences go beyond the obvious demographic ones. There are differences in patterns of contributing, in motivation, in life style, in the very nature of the relationship between the contributor and the object of the contribution. Further, these differences help explain why campaign finance reforms, especially those affecting the presidential elections, have seldom successfully limited the influence of those who give large amounts of money and why similar reforms may fail to achieve their intended goals in the future.

In this study, the nature of the differences among political contributors is illuminated using as a universe the contributors to the Ohio Democratic Party (ODP) and Ohio Republican Party (ORP) in a presidential election year, 1988. The choice of this universe allows exploration of the differences among contributors as well as exploration of large contributors' use of soft money, the most recent device that allows them to circumvent restrictions on contributions to presidential campaigns. It also allows exploration of the state parties' current role in the presidential campaigns.

The ultimate goal of the research is to suggest policy directions for campaign finance reform in the future. It is the hope that these suggestions, because they will be based on the
reality of past experience with attempted reforms and present knowledge about differences among contributors, may assist in the creation of campaign finance laws more likely to achieve their goals than many of those in the past.

B. Democracy, Money and Elections

Like a slow-moving tide, concern with the role of money in elections for public office in the United States ebbs and flows over time but is always present. As of this writing, the concern, like a spring tide, is running high. In Congress and in many statehouses around the nation, legislative proposals designed to correct real or perceived abuses caused by political contributions are being hotly debated. Interested parties, which include the political parties, elected officials, campaign contributors, citizens' groups, journalists and many others, are mustering forces to support one proposal or another. There are many criticisms of the campaign finance system in general, and many proposals designed to correct its faults. These criticisms and proposals are almost as old as democracy itself. Louise Overacker, one of the first political scientists to research the role of money in elections in America, reminds us that:

Since the days when Athenian candidates curried favor with voters by dinners and banquets, the problem of who pays our political bills, and why, has risen to plague statesmen, politicians and political scientists. Sooner or later in every age and type of civilization in which elections have been held the question crops up and every modern democracy has attempted some form of regulation of campaign funds. One modern writer has gone so far as to characterize the financing of political campaigns as "the great unsolved problem of democracy" (1946, p. 3).

The importance of the role of elections in a western democracy is explained by the concept of individualism, as expressed ideologically in classical liberalism, which began to change the western world's thinking as Europe emerged from the Middle Ages. Prior to the rise of individualism, the masses were clearly in a servile position to clergy and aristocracy, who saw them as unable to read, rule or worship without guidance. As the result of many
events, including Martin Luther's reformation, Gutenberg's invention of moveable type, the
French Enlightenment, to name a few, the thinking of the western world shifted, elevating the
common man as never before. After the shift, common men were increasingly free not only
to enjoy a direct relationship with their God, but, to one degree or another, to participate in
affairs of state as equals under the law, a law that they now helped create, agreed to abide by,
and could change when they chose.

No one expresses this new relationship among men better than John Locke (and, for
Locke, it was among men exclusively), when he describes the only legitimate source of
government as a social contract among equals, a contract that is, essentially, an agreement to
agree on a form of government. The agreed-upon government then responds to majority rule,
and restrains itself as much as possible in its sphere of influence in order to preserve as much
individual liberty as possible. (Locke, 1965).

Thus did the twin tenets of classical liberalism—liberty and equality—form the
foundations of the type of government that would express this new way of believing:
democracy. Elections are the device used in a democracy to create and re-create the role of
government. It is through these elections that the majority expresses its will and imposes its
will upon the others who have agreed, tacitly or explicitly, to follow. It is no small matter in
a democracy when the legitimacy of elections or the accountability of those who have been
elected is subject to question. The very fabric that holds a Lockean society like ours together
is threatened. It is this threat, real or perceived, that repeatedly brings concerns with the
financing of campaigns to the public attention.

Thus, the problems associated with who pays the election bills in a democracy are
deeply rooted. Uncontrolled financing of campaigns threatens the principle of equality.
Controlled financing of campaigns threatens the principle of liberty. Our two most cherished
democratic values are pitted against each other in a process that embodies the soul of
democracy—the process through which the popular will is supposedly expressed.

C. Research on Campaign Finance

While few political scientists would doubt the importance of the financing of
campaigns in a democracy, the difficulty of collecting data has discouraged work in the field,
as data on campaign finance have been either unavailable, incomplete or very difficult to use.
The analyses that have been done tend to be descriptive, with few models or theories
equivalent to those found in studies of voting behavior or legislative decision making. In spite
of this, a significant body of research has accumulated over the years, accelerating since
disclosure requirements of the 1970s were coupled with enforcement, computerization and
increasing availability of data. What follows is a review of campaign finance literature most
relevant to this study. It is patterned after a literature review on money and elections by
Bedlington and Powell (1986). It first addresses campaign finance in the presidential
elections, then discusses research on individual contributors, political parties and soft money.
This last subject is a relative newcomer in the world of campaign finance, and will be defined
later.

**Campaign finance in presidential elections.** Among political scientists, the subject of
who pays the election bills has been of interest since the discipline's infancy. Pollock (1926)
led the way with research in party campaign funds in the days when presidential campaigns
were still party affairs. He also developed a state-by-state comparison of campaign finance
laws in the 1920s. Following in his footsteps were Overacker (1932, 1946), Heard (1960),
among them analyzed the financing of the presidential elections from 1928 through the present. There is little theory in this literature; rather, these works are rich with raw data, descriptive analysis, and normative discussion.

Individual Contributors. Perhaps the most undeveloped area in campaign finance is that which focuses on the behavior of individual contributors, due undoubtedly to the difficulty of acquiring good information. Because political contributors comprise only 9 to 11% of the adult population of the United States (Jones, 1989), national studies such as the American National Election Studies (ANES) conducted by the Center for Political Research at the University of Michigan or the General Social Survey (GSS) conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, contain too few contributors for much meaningful study. In addition, the questions devoted to political contributions on these surveys (appropriately, it would seem, because of the few contributors involved) are few in number, and do not differentiate well among contributors.

Still, a body of research on contributors is accumulating. It started in the 1920s and 1930s with Pollock (1926) and Overacker (1932, 1946) and their anecdotal accounts of motivations and contribution amounts. More recently, Verba and Nie's (1972) work on political participation clearly established the elite nature and political activism of political contributors, both of which are confirmed by more recent studies (Brown, Hedges & Powell, 1980a, 1980b; Jones & Hopkins, 1985; Jones & Miller, 1985; Jones, 1989; Berg, Eastland and Jeffe, 1981; Green & Guth, 1986; McAdams and Green, 1990). Few researchers, however, focus on contributors' motivations, attitudes and behaviors in a manner that parallels studies in other electoral arenas (Dunn, 1974:228), but rather relegate political contributors to a level of secondary concern (Brown, Hedges & Powell, 1980a). Among those who do make contributors and contributions a central concern are Russell (1980), Brown, Hedges and
Powell (1980a), Jones and Miller (1985) and Jones (1989). Cumulatively, these studies tell us much about political contributors in general or a subgroup of political contributors in particular. What they cannot do because of data limitations is systematically explore differences among contributors as differentiated by the amount of the contribution. Yet, much campaign finance legislation and criticism (see Chapter II) is aimed at those who give large amounts to candidates, parties and other political groups. The assumption underlying the criticism is that the larger the contribution, the more it threatens the equality, legitimacy, accountability and even the quality of the government in a democracy. Somehow, somewhere between the uncriticized small contribution and much criticized large contribution is an imaginary line which, once crossed, makes a campaign contribution unsavory and subject to suspicions of corruption.

Campaign finance and political parties. Several researchers explore the relationship between the parties and their individual contributors (Adamany, 1984; Arterton, 1982; Jacobson 1984; Longley, 1980; McDevitt, 1979a, 1979b; Ellwood and Spitzer, 1979; Kayden, 1979, 1980, 1982), enriching a more general body of literature on parties and the differences in their participation in campaigns (see Bedlington and Powell, 1986). The concern here is not exclusively with the campaign finance aspect of political parties, but is also with parties and their role in the presidential elections, a role that has changed dramatically over the years.

Once feared by our founding fathers as instruments of faction (Madison, 1887-88) political parties rose in importance during the 19th century to become the dominant electoral mechanism (Price, 1984, p. 3). Throughout the 1800s and the first half of the 1900s, parties were what Epstein refers to as the "principal presidential campaign agencies" (1986, p. 319-320). He characterized the battle for the presidency during that period as a battle
between parties. Between 1950 and 1970, party dominance of the presidential campaign
process gradually was replaced by the candidate-centered campaign now so familiar to
political scientists. Much evidence exists of the parties' decline in importance in the American
presidential electoral process, as well as much evidence of the rising centrality of the
candidate and his/her campaign. Many reasons are given for the changes over the years, one
being that the seeds for potential party weakness are planted in our constitutional structure and
national temperament. The reasoning goes like this: the fragmentation found in the structure
of American government—i.e., the separation of the office of the executive from the
legislative, the different constituencies and different powers of different offices—this
fragmentation, combined with what Tocqueville (1956) saw as the peculiarly individualistic
national temperament, provides poor soil for the steady growth of party cohesiveness
(Epstein, 1986; Adamany and Agree, 1975). Other scholars cite other reasons and
manifestations of the decline, most if not all of them intertwined: the Australian ballot,
elimination of much patronage because of the creation of a civil service system, the direct
primary, decline of party voting cues, decline of partisan identification in the electorate (Nie,
Verba and Petrocik. 1979); a decline in favorable evaluation of parties (Wattenberg, 1984); an
increase in split-ticket voting and the volatility of the electorate (Nie, Verba and Petrocik,
1979; Mann and Wolfinger, 1980); the rise of multi-media forms of communication, the
increasing use of campaign funds other than those filtered through the party, and the declining
role of parties in registering and mobilizing voters (Herronson, 1988). Salmore and Salmore
broaden the reasons for party decline even more, to deep changes in the social fabric of
America such as the rise of industrialization and heterogeneous urban centers and the
expanding role of the federal government. These social changes, they assert, were not
compatible with political parties in America, which had thrived
on "face-to-face local campaigns to a limited electorate living in stable communities" (1985, p. 18). Further, they say, these changes were first evident in presidential campaigns.

Political scientists who find all the foregoing to be evidence of continuing party decline form one school of thought, according to Herrnson (1988). They include Broder (1971), Wattenberg (1984), and, to a lesser degree, Epstein (1986). (Epstein doubts both the extensiveness of party decline, as well as the "earlier glories of American parties" [p. 3].) In contrast, a second school of thought advocates that the political parties are in transition. These include Sabato (1988) and Gibson, Cotter, Bibby and Hucksorn (1983, 1984), who argue that the parties in some ways are stronger or are assuming new roles to compensate for diminished status in other areas.

Moreover, these organizations are supplying more campaign services to candidates, including training sessions, survey data, and media assistance. These findings challenge the claim that parties are in decline. They suggest instead that parties are finally beginning to make the transition to the modern, cash-based campaign economy (Herrnson, 1988, p. 2-6).

The use of soft money (to be described below and in detail in Chapters II and VI) has the potential of making the parties key players once again in the presidential general elections by providing the only unlimited and relatively unfettered source of campaign funds in these elections. Presidential candidates wanting to tap this funding source once again may be forced to structure their campaigns around the national, state and local political parties.

**Soft money in elections.** Spanning the subjects of individual contributors, political parties and federal elections are concerns with "soft money" (see Chapter II for a legal definition and Chapter VI for a discussion of other definitions), money which is "raised outside the restraints of federal law but spent on activities intended to affect federal election outcomes" (Alexander, 1986, p. 4-5). While many aspects of soft money usage are legal, its usage is criticized by many, including citizens' groups such as Common Cause and The
Center for Responsive Politics, newspapers (The Washington Post, April 21, 1986, p. A10; The New York Times, October 21, 1988, p. 24), authors such as Brooks Jackson and Elizabeth Drew, and at least one political scientist (Adamany, 1990). Its usage, they contend, undercuts more than the federal campaign finance law; it undercuts the legitimacy of federal elections, particularly the presidential elections. Others see soft money as a possible cure for some of our ailing political institutions, particularly the political parties (Alexander, 1986; Sabato, 1988). Data on soft money, however, is notably lacking. That which is published is very incomplete and is made available voluntarily by the very entities who most profit from its use—the major national political parties, as discussed in Chapter VI. Alexander calls the information available "anecdotal" and says that to go beyond what the parties have supplied is "very sticky" (1989a; 1989b).

D. Research areas in need of development

In spite of substantial research on campaign finance, several areas need immediate attention. One such area is individual contributors, whose money accounts for the majority of funds used in almost every political campaign. The lion's share of funds supplied by individual contributors comes from large contributors—i.e., those who give large contributions (who for brevity's sake will be referred to as large contributors, while those who give small amounts will be referred to as small contributors and so forth.) As such, large contributors always are suspected of seeking undue political influence, making them perennial targets of campaign finance reform proposals at both the federal and state levels. As shall be seen in Chapter II, these reforms historically have not accomplished their intended goals. Why this is so is not obvious from current research on political contributors, but may be obvious to many who have dealt with political contributors in the real world of politics. It is in that real world
that my interest in campaign finance began years ago when I raised money for citizens' groups and political candidates, including myself.

In this real world I discovered, as thousands of political fund raisers and candidates had before me, that it was more productive to solicit large contributions from a few than small contributions from many. Experience and intuition told me that those who gave thousands of dollars to political causes and campaigns were very different from those who gave modest amounts. Out of necessity, the differences were learned: many large contributors give to a political cause only when they're solicited by a friend or acquaintance or know that a friend or acquaintance has already contributed; large contributors give to many different candidates, and frequently those candidates are opposing each other; large contributors enjoy the intrigue, the "sport" of political campaigns, whether or not their preferred candidate wins.

Small contributors seem to have different attributes: they contribute less frequently; they respond to ideological appeals; they are less likely to give to opposing candidates. Existing research and data cannot explain these differences, as political contributors (and especially large contributors) are too few in number among respondents to the typical political survey. Combined with their rarity is their atypicalness as political creatures; hence differences among them are not tapped by survey instruments geared toward the general population.

The current vehicle used by large contributors to influence the presidential general elections is soft money, which is the second area of campaign finance in need of more research. In an age of federally funded presidential general elections and limits on individual contributions during the nomination contests, the soft money mechanism is considered an outrage by many, as it allows unlimited funds once again to flow into the presidential
campaigns, with most of those funds coming from a wealthy few. As this is being written, cries for reform are being published in national newspapers and considered in Congress. Action needs to be taken, many say, before the next presidential election.

The connecting links between large contributors and soft money are the state political parties. By studying individual contributors and soft money, there is also an opportunity to gain insight into the state parties and their relationships with their contributors, as well as the state parties and their roles in the presidential campaigns.

E. Research Questions

What is the nature of the differences among political contributors, as differentiated by the amounts of their contributions, and the party to which those contributions are given? Are those who give larger political contributions just a wealthier version of those who give smaller contributions or are they significantly different attitudinally and behaviorally from their more modestly contributing counterparts? Are Republican contributors different from their Democratic counterparts? Are these different groups of contributors guided by significantly different motivations when they contribute to political causes? Why do some of them contribute thousands and thousands of dollars to the presidential general election campaign, using the obscure device known as soft money? Do they understand the soft money mechanism they are using? How much soft money do they give—is it more or less than current research would lead us to believe? Is the soft money achieving its intended goal of encouraging grass roots participation in the presidential campaigns via the state political parties, or is it just another conduit allowing the "undue influence" of the large contributor to prevail? It is the hope that answering these questions will help us understand why large contributors have been so difficult to discourage and small contributors so difficult to
encourage. In addition, we may be able to address the policy questions—i.e., what kind of campaign finance reforms aimed at individual contributors are apt to achieve their goals?

F. Chapter Descriptions

Problems with large contributors and campaign finance reforms are not new. Rather, they have been part of the political scene for about 100 years and their history provides important policy implications for the future. For these reasons, Chapter II gives a brief history of campaign finance legislation in the United States and Ohio, focusing particularly on attempts to control large contributors and the maddening cycle of abuse—reform—circumvention—abuse that has plagued campaign finance reform from the outset. It also provides a legal definition of soft money, which can be considered the most recent abuse in the maddening cycle.

Chapter III carves out a universe in which the research questions will be addressed and describes a multi-faceted research approach that includes meshing archival data with data from survey research and key informant interviews.

Chapter IV discusses how the political parties treat those who give different amounts and begins the exploration of demographic, attitudinal and behavioral differences among political contributors, as differentiated by the amounts of their contributions, using bivariate analysis of the survey data.

Chapter V provides a theoretical framework for exploring the motivational structure behind political contributing, then utilizes factor analysis to identify the dimensions behind the dollars contributed by individuals to the state political parties. Finally, differences in motivations among the contributors, as differentiated by contribution amount and party of contribution, are explored.
Chapter VI focuses on the most current circumvention of campaign finance reform by contributors—especially large contributors—in the presidential general election. This circumvention, of course, is soft money. A unique measure of contributors’ intentions to contribute to the presidential general election is created—a soft money score—that can help predict how much soft money may have been utilized in one state during the 1988 presidential general election. It also addresses the role of the state parties in that election.

Returning to the differences among contributors, as differentiated by the amounts of their contributions, Chapter VII addresses the policy questions of why campaign finance reforms in the past have not successfully limited the influence of large contributors nor encouraged the participation of small contributors—and why additional reforms may fail to achieve their intended goals in the future.
Chapter II

Legal Background and Environment

Currently, large contributors, especially those who give soft money to influence the presidential general elections, are the scourge of campaign finance. It has not always been so. Rather, large contributors emerged as unintended consequences of early political reforms. Once they emerged, they have proved difficult--some would say impossible--to control. In spite of laws that have limited and prohibited, their money always has found its way into political campaigns, especially the campaigns for the presidency. Soft money is simply large contributors' most recent contribution vehicle of choice. A review of campaign finance legislation at both the federal and state levels illuminates the incredible determination over the years of large contributors to contribute to the presidential campaigns.

A. National Campaign Finance Reform—The Early Years

Mutch (1988) describes early political campaigns in the United States as being very unlike the high-profile, high-cost political campaigns of today. In the late eighteenth century, gentlemen of the upper class did not campaign but "stood" for office, incurring few campaign expenses. "Candidates were supposed to attract support by virtue of their reputations, not by actually mingling with voters" (Mutch, p. xv). When there were expenses, they were paid by the candidate himself and were likely to be for food and drink for voters on election day.
Questions about candidates' sources of money seldom arose as the typical candidate wasn't supported by wealthy individuals, but was the wealthy individual.

The gentlemanly nature of gaining public office changed early in the nineteenth century with the rise of the professional politician in the north. Compared to his wealthier, more aristocratic predecessor, this new politician was a man of no independent means. His livelihood depended on his salary as an elected official. Concomitant with the changing nature of candidates was a basic change in the political system—the rise of two-party politics (Sorauf, 1984; pp 18-23) and the spoils system that supported it. Effects of the spoils system became evident during Andrew Jackson's presidency when many federal employees were dismissed and replaced with new ones who had been supportive of Jackson (Mutch, p. xvi). These new employees were assessed a fixed percentage of their salaries to support their party's elections.

The opposition party, the Whigs, reacted by introducing legislation prohibiting federal employees from contributing to elections, thus setting a precedent that would continue to this day—i.e., campaign finance reform legislation usually being proposed by the party not benefitting from the criticized practice. The Whigs' bill did not pass and federal employees were called upon increasingly to finance parties and campaigns. From 1860 to 1880, Overacker (1932, p. 106) reported, most of the money to finance the campaigns of Republican congressional candidates came from federal employees.

The Pendleton Act of 1883. In spite of calls for reform of the spoils system, none was heeded until a national catastrophe occurred in 1881 when President Garfield was assassinated by a man described as a disappointed office seeker. Suddenly, civil service reformers were listened to and a precursor of campaign finance legislation was passed in 1883, The Pendleton Act. It created a class of federal employees who were awarded
employment not for their political affiliations but for their performance on competitive exams. By law, they could not be solicited for political contributions. With access now prohibited to what had become the primary source of political funds, candidates and parties began to look elsewhere for money. An unintended consequence of the Pendleton Act was to increase the importance of other funding sources.

One of these sources was corporate money which previously played a minor role in the financing of campaigns and political parties. Evidence of the growth of its importance is documented by events of 1896. In that year, the national chairman of the Republican Party "assessed" banks and corporations 1/4 of 1% of their capital for the party coffers. The chairman's assessment methods worked well as a way of raising both money for the party and new cries for federal campaign finance reform.

The Maddening Cycle Begins. Thus, elements of controversy that plague the system today emerged early on, creating a maddening cycle of abuse, reform, unintended consequences, and so forth. The first step in the cycle is abuse or perceived abuse, such as occurred in the nineteenth century with the assessment of federal employees. This leads to the second element—attempts at reform, frequently led by the party not benefitting from the abuse. Reform attempts continue, off and on, until a public catastrophe or outcry occurs, for instance, the Garfield assassination. Then come campaign finance laws like the Pendleton Act, designed to eliminate the abuse, followed by unintended consequences (such as the shifting in importance of sources of election funds from federal employees to other sources) or circumventions, which undercut the ability of the laws to achieve their goals. These unintended consequences and circumventions become the new abuses. This cyclic nature of campaign finance laws and their consequences should be borne in mind throughout this study.
The Tillman Act, 1907. The growing role of corporations in federal elections came
to the public’s attention during an investigation of alleged corruption among private businesses
in New York in 1905. That investigation uncovered a $48,000 corporate contribution to
Roosevelt’s 1904 campaign fund as well as previous contributions of similar magnitude to the
Republicans for the 1896 and 1900 presidential elections. (Separate investigations years later
revealed that one-fourth of Roosevelt’s 1904 campaign fund had come from just four
contributors, all with large corporate connections. The Democrats received most of their
1904 campaign funds, which totalled half that of the Republicans, from just two men.) These
revelations, in addition to other events, culminated in the Tillman Act of 1907, which
prohibited contributions from corporations in federal elections. By eliminating one source of
funds, the act unintentionally elevated in importance another source of funds—large
contributions from individuals. Since 1907, most campaign finance reforms have attempted to
control these large contributors through disclosure or limitations. As current critics of soft
money attest, the attempts have been unsuccessful.

NPBO Bill, 1910 and 1911. By the early 1900s, additional demands were being made
for disclosure of the sources of campaign funds, especially those for the presidency. Reacting
to public pressure exerted by the National Publicity Bill Organization and its allies, Congress
considered but failed to pass publicity legislation in 1906 and 1907 (Overacker, 1946, p. 21).
Also reacting to public pressure, both national political parties voluntarily published the
sources of funds during the 1908 presidential election (as the national political parties now
voluntarily publish lists of $100,000 soft money donors). The Democratic party published
contributions of $100 or more before the election; the Republicans published receipts and
expenditures after the election.

Encouraged by President Taft’s support of publicity legislation in his message of
December, 1909, the National Publicity Bill Organization renewed its efforts in the
Sixty-First Congress, and a bill finally became law on June 25, 1910. Its enactment was not secured without one very important compromise, however; post-election publicity was substituted for pre-election publicity. Pre-election publicity was achieved ultimately by the amendments of 1911" (Overacker, 1946, p. 22).

One very important loophole was left in the law, however: only election year contributions were required to be reported (Mutch, 1988, p. 24). This loophole quickly became a circumvention device for the Republican party.

The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. The Republican Party was $1,500,000 in debt following the presidential campaign of 1920, and the debt was subsequently retired. A Senate investigation led many to suspect that the debt retirement was connected to the leasing of Wyoming’s Teapot Dome oil reserve without benefit of competitive bidding to Sinclair Oil Corporation by President Warren G. Harding’s secretary of the interior. Simultaneously with the debt retirement, Harry F. Sinclair had given large amounts of unreported money to the Republican party—unreported, because the contributions occurred in a nonelection year.

Supposedly to prevent future occurrences of such practices, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) required political committees active in two or more states to file quarterly financial reports in nonelection years.... (However,) it did not mandate publication of the reports or public access to them; it did not ensure that the reports would be accurate, or even that they would be filed at all (Mutch, 1988, p. 25).

Essentially, the FCPA codified and revised relevant federal legislation, requiring "disclosure of receipts and expenditures by candidates for the Senate and House (not for president or vice president) and by political committees that sought to influence elections in two or more states. The law also imposed ceilings on expenditures by candidates for federal office, but by establishing multiple committees...candidates were able to circumvent the limit" (Alexander, 1984, pp. 32-33). There were no standardized forms to make reports comparable, and enforcement provisions were not part of the law. As such, the reports were almost valueless,
and no one was ever prosecuted for violating the provisions of the act (Overacker, 1932, p. 270; Dollar Politics, vol. 2, p. 1).

These early regulations of presidential campaign funds were "firmly grounded upon the principle of publicity, although without adequate machinery for carrying out that principle" (Overacker, 1946, p. 25). In 1940, what Overacker criticizes as the influence of Puritan doctrine raised its head in the form of the Hatch Act II.

**The Hatch Act II, 1940.** The first Hatch Act, passed in 1939 and supported by a conservative coalition between Republicans and anti-New Deal Democrats, was not an attempt to ensure a clean, uncompromising federal work force, but an attempt to limit Roosevelt’s political power. It forbid participation in elections by federal employees who were not covered by the Pendleton Act of 1883. That former act applied only to classified, or Civil Service employees. But sixty-eight percent of Roosevelt’s New Deal work force were unclassified! The first Hatch Act, therefore, was meant to curtail Roosevelt’s ability to profit electorally from this expanded work force (Mutch, 1988, p. 32-33).

The Hatch Act II followed on the heels of the 1939 Hatch Act, and had similar political motivations. It had three basic provisions: 1) a $5,000 limitation on contributions from any individual, committee or association in a calendar year to any candidate for federal office, applicable to both the nomination and general election periods; 2) a $3,000,000 limitation on expenditures of national political committees in any one calendar year; and 3) prohibitions against persons or corporations aiding candidates for federal elective offices by purchasing goods, commodities, advertising or articles (Overacker, 1936, p. 26-29). The limitations on contributions did not apply to contributions to state and local committees, and therein lay much of its undoing.
While both the Democratic and Republican National Committees more or less stayed within the specified guidelines of the Hatch Act, the monies spent by various state finance committees and "independent" non-party associations, when aggregated with the $3,000,000 allowed the national committees under the Hatch Act, pushed spending on the 1940 presidential campaigns to an all-time high. The $5,000 limitation of individual contributions changed the situation little if at all. Gifts were hung on more branches of the family tree and routed through a variety of committees, but they came from the same old Santa Claus (Overacker, 1946, pp. 33-48).

Multiple family members or friends could and did give to multiple committees. Political parties, presidential candidates and political contributors were barely affected by the law. Thus, in addition to being arbitrary and inflexible, the limitations were irrelevant.

The Taft-Hartley Act, 1947. The 1907 ban on corporate giving was extended to include labor unions.

The Years of Little Legislation, 1948-1971. While a series of proposals for campaign finance reform sprang up between 1948 and 1971, most were no more than committee reports, some of which included endorsements for publicly funded presidential and congressional campaigns (Mutch, p. 36-37). Alexander called such activity "congressional gestures" (1984, p. 33). President Kennedy was especially aware of the cynicism surrounding campaign finance and the influence of wealth, and created a Commission of Campaign Costs, which "presented a comprehensive program for reforming the financing of the political system, covering not only federal legislative remedies but also bipartisan activities, certain party practices, and state actions" (Alexander, 1984, p. 33). No action resulted, but groundwork was laid.

The roots of the present system of funding presidential campaigns originated in 1966 with Senator Long's (D-LA) introduction of a bill to fund presidential elections out of the
federal treasury. Long had designed his bill to address concerns about the influence of large contributors. He opened committee hearings on it with the comment that the candidate

who must hustle large sums of money to run for his office...is not always free to vote his own conscience. He owes certain obligations to those who put up the money (Mutch, p. 37).

Particularly targeted by the bill were "large contributions from only a few rich people" (ibid.). Somewhat altered, Long's proposal emerged as the Presidential Campaign Fund Act of 1966. Among the act's provisions was a tax checkoff scheme to finance presidential elections through allocations to the political parties. The act passed on the last day of the 89th Congress as one of 23 riders on a tax bill, was signed into law by President Johnson, but never was acted upon. Rather, the controversy that had surrounded it from the beginning resurfaced with the opening of the 90th Congress. Opponents were unable to have the law repealed, but were successful in having Congress vote to make the act inoperative after May, 1967. Thus the Long Act, though never implemented, helped pave the way for the reform measures of the 1970s (Alexander, 1984, p. 34; Mutch, p. 37-40).

Another parent of the 1970s' legislation was the Ashmore-Goodell Bill of 1966. While it never received the support of both houses, it "called for creation of a bipartisan Federal Election Commission to receive, analyze, audit, and publicize spending reports by all candidates and committees in federal elections" (Alexander, 1984, p. 34-35).

B. National Campaign Finance Reform—the 1970s

More than any other period in our history, the late 1960s and early 1970s brought concern with the financing of federal elections to the forefront and with it, new laws, court challenges to those laws, and amendments galore. This period of reform was set in motion by "an unprecedented drop in popular confidence in our political leaders" set off by the "catalytic
event" of the Vietnam War. It was an environment ready to respond to public opinion and to
the influence of John Gardner and his citizens' group, Common Cause, which lobbied for
legislation to limit the effect of special interests in government. And it was an environment
conducive to giving power to such a group. Public opinion polling had become a "trusted
guide" to popular sentiment, and more and more effective direct-mail techniques assured
Common Cause a base of strong support, financial and otherwise, among well-to-do middle
class citizens. "For the first time in history it became possible to build a nationwide
membership organization without ever leaving Washington, D.C." (Mutch, 1988, 42-45).
Thus, even before Watergate, the time was ripe for campaign finance reform. Using
pre-1970s existing laws, Common Cause challenged the parties' creation of multiple
committees to evade contribution and expenditure limitations.

The centerpiece of campaign finance reform in the 1970s was the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 and its 1974 amendments, which called for contribution and
expenditure limits, public financing of presidential elections, and the Federal Election
Commission, all of which had roots in previous legislation. Also important was the Revenue

The Revenue Act of 1971 and the Federal Election Campaign Act. The Revenue Act
of 1971 was designed to do two things simultaneously: provide incentives to individuals to
make political contributions and subsidize the general elections for the presidency. The
incentives to individuals were in the form of either tax credits or tax deductions for political
contributions to candidates at the federal, state or local level and to some political committees,
and were easily passed by Congress. The choice of tax credits or deductions was offered to
allow more people to take advantage of the situation—i.e., deductions were applicable only in
situations where income tax filers itemized deductions, while even those who didn't itemize
could take tax credits for their contributions. The deduction was increased in the 1974 FECA amendments, then subsequently repealed in 1978 by the same law that increased tax credits (P.L. 95-600). All federal credits for political contributions were eliminated during Reagan’s tax reforms of 1986, not because of campaign-related issues, but as a result of revenue issues that culminated in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514). The repeal was effective as of 1987. (Alexander, 1984, pp. 36-37; Swillinger, March 11, 1991; Cooper, March 11, 1991; Cantor, 1989.)

In contrast to the incentives provided by tax credits and deductions, which were passed easily, the federal financing of presidential elections was controversial. Ultimately, a voluntary tax checkoff system that provided money directly to the presidential candidates, not the parties, was approved.

The checkoff provided that every individual whose tax liability for any calendar year was $1 or more could designate on his or her federal income tax form that $1 of this tax money be paid to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund; married couples filing jointly could designate $2. This provision has remained in force ever since. (Alexander, 1984, p. 37).

The major portion of campaign finance reform was not contained in the Revenue Act of 1971, however, but in the extensive Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, passed in January, 1972, a month after the Revenue Act. It attempted to accomplish reform in federal elections in three main areas, with much of the reform aimed at limiting and/or disclosing the influence of large contributions from individuals:

**Disclosure requirements.** 1) Required full disclosure of name, address, occupation and place of business of each person whose aggregate contributions or loans to a political committee or candidate exceeded $100 for a calendar year; required reporting of total expenditures, as well as similarly detailed identification of persons to whom more than $100 was paid in a calendar year. ($100 raised to $200 by 1979 amendments in both cases.) 2) Required four reports to be filed each year, plus two pre-election reports, if applicable. Contributions of $5,000 or more received after the final pre-election report were required to be reported within 48 hours. (Changes made in this area in both 1974 and 1979.) 3) Names the Clerk of the House for House candidates and the Secretary of the Senate for Senate candidates, and the Comptroller
General for presidential candidates and other committees as the supervisory officers to oversee campaign practices, reporting and disclosure. (The Federal Election Commission assumed many of these duties with the 1974 amendments.) 4) Required House and Senate candidates to file duplicate reports with the appropriate officer at the state level to help provide information to local voters. 5) Required full disclosure of the costs of a presidential nominating convention within 60 days of the convention.

**Limitations on media expenditures** for candidates for federal office during primary, runoff, special or general elections campaigns. (Replaced in the 1974 Amendments with limitations on total spending by candidates. These limitations subsequently were found unconstitutional under certain circumstances by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976.)

**Contribution limitations** on the amount a candidate or his/her immediate family could contribute to the candidate's campaign, in an effort to decrease the advantage of very wealthy candidates. These ceilings were $50,000 for president or vice president; $35,000 for senator; $25,000 for representative, delegate or resident commissioner. (Ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. $50,000 limit reinstated by the 1976 Amendments for presidential campaigns in which the candidate accepts public funding.) (Patterned after Alexander, 1984, p.35-36; Mutch, 1988, p. 70.)

The FECA of 1971 was enacted without knowledge of the Watergate scandal that was to occur. That scandal began during the presidential campaigns of 1972 with the discovery of the break-in at the Democratic headquarters in the Watergate complex in Washington. Simultaneously, the FECA of 1971 was criticized for inadequacy, particularly with regard to its enforcement provisions. Spurred on by reactions to Watergate and criticisms of the FECA legislation in general, Congress set about amending the FECA in 1974.

**The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.** These amendments addressed concerns about excessive campaign expenditures and excessively large campaign contributions. There were five basic changes affecting large contributors and the presidential campaigns:

**Expenditure limitations** on political campaigns for the presidency: $10 million per candidate for the primary elections and $20 million for the general election, plus cost-of-living increases (COLA), using 1974 as a base year. Major parties limited to $2 million each for their nominating conventions.
Optional public funding for the presidential elections in three different ways: matching funds for the prenomination period, with provisions that encouraged a broad base of funding from many individuals from many states; flat grants to the political parties for their national nominating conventions; and larger grants to the major party nominees for their general election campaigns.

Contribution limitations of $1,000 per individual to any one candidate for any one election, with an annual limit of $25,000 for all federal elections; $5,000 per organization or political committee per candidate per election.

Federal Election Commission was created to perform the administrative and enforcement functions previously performed by the Comptroller General, the Secretary of the Senate, and the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

Additional disclosure requirements were included, as well as requirements that all contributions go through one central committee which would be responsible for reporting all contributions of $100 or more.


Buckley v. Valeo. Objections to the 1974 Amendments were immediate. Many citizens and groups who frequently found themselves on opposite sides of most issues banded together as plaintiffs in a court challenge known as Buckley v. Valeo. These plaintiffs asserted that the 1974 amendments violated rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution (Asher, 1980, p. 283). The United States Supreme Court sided with the plaintiffs on many issues in a decision issued on January 30, 1976, just over a year after initiation of the case:

It upheld the contribution limits on individuals and organizations and the public financing of presidential campaigns. It struck down all expenditure limits, except for presidential candidates who accepted public funding, and invalidated the restriction on independent contributions made on behalf of a candidate so long as the donors were giving without the knowledge and encouragement of the candidate. The Court also declared the Federal Elections (sic) Commission (FEC) to be improperly constituted (Asher, 1980, p. 284).

The central question addressed during oral arguments of the case was posed by Justice Stewart Potter: "Is money speech and speech money?"
The decision resolved the conflict by asserting the broadest protection of First Amendment rights to assure the unrestrained interchange of ideas for bringing about popular political and social change (Alexander, 1984, p. 4).

The Supreme Court found that expenditure limitations, unless accompanied by public funding, limited free speech. On the other hand, contribution limitations were constitutional because quality of speech does not increase perceptibly with the size of the contribution. In addition, contribution limitations serve to "mute the voices of affluent persons and group," thus controlling corruption or the appearance of corruption (Alexander, 1984, p. 42). Disclosure requirements were also sustained by the court. As a result of Buckley v. Valeo, it seemed as if the era of large contributions to the presidential general elections was at an end. As we shall see, a renaissance occurred several years later.

The FECA Amendments of 1976. These amendments were necessary to change the method used to appoint the six commissioners of the Federal Election Commission, due to the prior method having been found unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo. As originally created, the FEC's six commissioners, three from each party, would be appointed as such: two by the president, one Republican and one Democrat; one by the Speaker of the House; one by the Senate majority leader; and one each by the House and Senate minority leaders. Both houses of Congress were then to confirm all six (Mutch, 1988, p. 87). The Supreme Court, however, ruled that "the commission's powers were judicial and executive in nature and could thus be exercised only by presidential appointees" (Mutch, 1988, p. 91). The 1976 amendments addressed this needed change. In addition, they added provisions beneficial to the national party committees, pertaining to the individual and committee contribution limits...set an overall $5,000 per candidate per election contribution limit for all separate-segregated political action committees (PACs) established by the same corporation or union and restricted PACs' solicitations of contributions. They also tightened and refined disclosure and enforcement provisions (Bedlington and Powell, 1986, p. 163).
The first application of many of the new campaign finance laws took place during the presidential campaigns of 1976 during the Ford-Carter competition. One consequence of these laws is of particular importance in relation to political parties and the funding of the presidential campaigns.

Perhaps the most dramatic difference made by the campaign finance laws was in the overall structure of the campaigns for the presidency. Previously, the candidate's national organization often had sufficient money, which enabled it to contribute to the state and local organizations, thereby creating a common electoral bond by promoting the entire party ticket and providing the national ticket some leverage over the state and local efforts (Asher, 1980, p. 266).

In contrast, the 1976 campaigns for the presidency were nationally-coordinated, media-centered affairs with little evidence of grass-roots participation such as campaign buttons, bumper stickers and yard signs. Political parties, whose role became smaller than ever in presidential elections under the new laws, were weakened further. (Alexander, 1984, p. 43; Kayden, 1982) The new laws caused another significant change: the large contributor to previous presidential general elections was nowhere in sight as there were few places to contribute beyond the $20,000 limit established for donations to national parties.

The FECA Amendments of 1979 and the rise of "soft money". The amendments of 1979 addressed several problems caused by the previous regulations, including reporting and procedural requirements that were too strict to be practical for some committees and candidates. By far the most important problem addressed by these amendments, however, was that of the declining role of political parties in presidential elections. Clearly, Congress was concerned about the media affairs the presidential campaigns had become in 1976 and wished "to encourage volunteers to work for and with local and State political party organizations" (House of Representatives, Report No. 96-422, p. 9).

To do this, new provisions pertaining to political parties allow a State or local committee of a political party to purchase, without limit, campaign materials used in connection with volunteer activities on behalf of a candidate (such as buttons, bumper
stickers, and yard signs)... In addition, a similar exemption would be created to allow State and local party committees to engage in certain voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities on behalf of the nominees of such party for President and Vice President (ibid, p. 2).

Media advertising was to be excluded from the new exemptions. Originally, mass mailings were also to be excluded, but the law, as enacted, finally allowed distribution by direct mail of "slate cards, sample ballots, palm cards or other printed listings of three or more candidates for any public office for which an election is held in the state" (Alexander, 1986, p. 10). While technically some of the expenses incurred by these allowable activities were to be allocated to and paid for by "federal" money, the "comfortable breadth of FEC advisory opinions on the matter of permissible allocation formulas" (Alexander, 1986, p. 13) encouraged parties to take advantage of the possibilities now presented them.

Previously, Alexander tells us, national parties left their state and local counterparts on their own to raise funds. Now, both the national parties and their presidential candidates had a vested interest in the wealth of the grass roots parties as pertains to federal elections. With Republicans leading the way and the Democrats not far behind, the parties and presidential candidates began channelling money to the state and local parties, starting with the 1980 presidential elections. Channelling took one of three forms, one direct and two indirect. The direct method consisted of the national parties' collecting money in "non-federal" accounts, then transferring this money as needed to state and/or local parties during the campaigns. Money so transferred is one form of "soft money." (For a more complete definition of soft money, as used in this study, please see Chapter VI.) One of the indirect methods consisted of the national parties' requesting that contributors' checks be sent to the state or local parties. The other indirect method consisted of national parties and presidential campaign committees helping to coordinate fund-raising within the state, usually by scheduling appearances of either the presidential or vice presidential candidate at major
fund raising affairs. These latter two methods, for purposes of this study, are also considered "soft money."

Sorauf reminds us that the parties are one of the more creative and persistent political entities when it comes to seeking freedom to spend and are among those who push forward more firmly than the regulatory system is able to push back (Sorauf, 1988, p. 325). By the time of the 1984 presidential elections, both parties had become more adept at raising soft money and by 1988 both were professional at it. (Soft money comparisons for the presidential elections of 1980, 1984 and 1988 are discussed in Chapter VI.) The major source of soft money was big contributors, who had found themselves closed out of the presidential election in 1976. Clearly, they were back in the game with individual contributions of up to $100,000 and more, the result of unintended consequences of the 1979 amendments.

Recent Legislation and Concerns. The 1979 amendments to the FECA were the last major revisions to date. One minor campaign finance law enacted since then closed a loophole that allowed House members to convert unused campaign finance funds to personal use when they retire, but created another loophole simultaneously: "the rules allow those who were eligible--House members in office as of January 8, 1980--to hang onto their campaign funds...as long as they leave office by January, 1993" (Washington Post, January 6, 1990).

The current major concern at the federal level is soft money in federal elections, because it has permitted "fat cat" contributors to return to the scene in full force, destroying what many had seen as our "most successful political reform of the past two decades: public financing of presidential elections" (The Washington Post, November 20, 1988). A related concern is that the Presidential Election Campaign Fund itself, fueled by the federal income tax check-off, is not being replenished quickly enough. Alexander states that

Based on estimates of future spending and revenue collection, the FEC projects that the 1992 campaign will have to use more than half of the surplus funds available in
order to meet its costs, and that by 1996 the system will be unable to meet costs, resulting in a $71 million deficit (Alexander and Bauer, 1991, p.44).

Looking at the history of campaign finance reform at the federal level, one must concede that since the Pendleton Act became law in 1883, it is a history full of limited successes. Each time one problem was solved, another was created that became as onerous as its predecessor. With the exception of 1976, legislation has been unsuccessful in limiting the influence of the large contributor in the presidential general elections. Since he arrived on the scene full force in the early 1900s, the attempts to control his influence through disclosure or contribution limitations have been the focus of much of the legislation enacted: the NPBO Bill, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, the Hatch Act II, and the FECA and its amendments. As the soft money disclosures and criticisms pertaining to the 1988 presidential general election show, the fat cat is back—indeed he ever left. It is the hope that analysis in this dissertation will help explain his Cheshire-like appearances.

C. Ohio Campaign Finance Reform—The Early Years

While much literature describes in detail the history of campaign finance legislation and laws at the federal level, no comparable body of research exists for Ohio. Rather, one must track Ohio's history on this subject as a lawyer would track legal precedent, i.e. by tracing the laws back through the Ohio Revised Code (Ohio's codified laws from 1953 to present) and the Ohio General Code (Ohio's codified laws prior to 1953). Ohio's laws on campaign finance seem to be responding to some of the same tensions that created the federal laws, as there is a parallel between the dates and content of the major federal and Ohio state laws.
Ohio's Corrupt Practices Act. Campaign finance legislation first appeared in Ohio in 1911 during the progressive era, with the passage of House Bill 200, "An act to prevent corrupt practices at elections" (Laws of Ohio, 79th General Assembly, Regular Session, 1911). As with its federal counterpart which passed in 1910, this law required post-election reporting of contributions to and expenditures by candidates and committees, with each report required to list the name and address of each contributor, as well as the amount contributed and the purpose for which it was contributed. For electoral districts larger than counties, the reports were to be filed with the secretary of state. For county or smaller electoral districts, the reports were to be filed with the county board of elections. All reports were to be open for public inspection. Stiff penalties for noncompliance with reporting regulations included inability of the elected official to be certified as elected, to assume the duties of office or to receive compensation for the office until proper statements were filed. In addition, no campaign payments were to be made in the name of another, and any coercion of voters whatsoever was defined as a corrupt practice subject to punishment.

Unlike the federal legislation enacted during the same era, this first Ohio campaign finance legislation also set expenditure limitations for candidates for state office as well as those for lower-level offices in Ohio. The limitations were as arbitrary and inflexible as the federal limits (which were created much later—in 1940—by the Hatch Act II). They were as follows per election:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Limitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other elected state offices</td>
<td>$2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. House of Representatives</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential elector</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Senator</td>
<td>$300 per county in district</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Probably, the Ohio laws suffered from many of the shortcomings of their federal counterparts, such as circumvention via multiple committees. Unfortunately, Ohio's campaign finance reports prior to the 1980s have been destroyed (Peters, 1991), and verification of the circumventions, and other unintended consequences is impossible.

Until the 1970s, the Corrupt Practices Act remained the mainstay of Ohio's campaign finance laws, with minor additions, deletions, reorganizations and wording changes in the interim. The first few minor additions were made in 1913, 1915 and 1917. The 1913 additions included expenditure limitations for judicial elections, which had not been included in the original act. The 1913 laws added the first contribution limitations, whether for direct expenditures by an individual or for contributions to a committee for a candidate or an issue. These individual contributions or expenditures were not to exceed 10% of the annual salary of the candidate and were not to exceed $100 per person for issues in smaller subdivisions (5000 or fewer votes in the last gubernatorial election) plus an extra $1 per 100 per person per election in larger subdivisions (more than 5000 votes in the last gubernatorial election) (Laws of Ohio, House Bill 211, 1913). Additions in 1915 expanded allowable campaign practices to transporting infirm electors to the polls (Laws of Ohio, 1915, vol. 105-106). In 1917, a brief bill, House Bill 159, was passed that prohibited employers from interfering with the political

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Representative</td>
<td>$ 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected office for county, city, town or village with less than 5000 votes in last gubernatorial election</td>
<td>$ 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected office for county, city, town or village with more than 5000 votes in last gubernatorial election</td>
<td>$ 5 more per 100 votes over 5000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
activities of their employees and established penalties for the same (Laws of Ohio, 1917, vol. 107). The above laws were still called the Corrupt Practices Act when they appeared together in Page's Annotated General Code, 1926.

**Election Laws of the State of Ohio, 1929.** In 1929, all of the election laws of the State of Ohio were rewritten in a massive act known as Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 2 and officially referred to as "Election Laws of the State of Ohio" (Laws of Ohio, 1929, vol. 113). While the new law boasted simpler and clearer wording than the old Corrupt Practices Act, it incorporated the same ideas, including expenditure limitations per election for candidates, with the limitations having the same arbitrary and inflexible dollar limits the law had set in 1911 and 1913. Contribution limitations disappeared in the re-writing, as did expenditure limitations by a committee or person other than a candidate.

In 1947, Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 3 re-specified where statements of campaign contributions and expenditures were to be filed and added back a stiff penalty for noncompliance that seems to have disappeared when the Corrupt Practices Act became part of the Election Laws in 1929. The newly reinstated penalty forbid a certificate of nomination or election to be issued to a person not in compliance with the disclosure requirements, and further forbid that person from assuming the duties of the elected office or position until having fully complied (Laws of Ohio, 1947, vol. 122).

**The Ohio General Code Becomes The Ohio Revised Code.** The heart of the Corrupt Practices Act, now part of the Election Laws of the State of Ohio, stayed intact through the massive revision of Ohio's General Code in 1953, a revision designed to re-organize and re-codify all of the existing laws. The new set of laws, now known as the Ohio Revised Code, still contained the expenditure limitations that had been set in 1911 and 1913, with no allowances for inflation. Contribution limitations were nowhere in evidence.
Revision of Expenditure Limits, 1963. In 1963, the expenditure limits were revised for the first time since 1911, but the new limits were almost as unrealistic as the old. Now, expenditure limits per election for the office of Governor, United States Senator, and congressman-at-large became $5,000; limits for other state elective offices, $4,000; for U.S. Representative, $4,000 or $.03 per voter in his district voting for a candidate for presidential elector in the last presidential election, whichever was greater. Expenditure limits for other elected offices received similarly insignificant boosts. Filing requirements were tightened for all candidates (Laws of Ohio, 1963, vol. 130).

D. Ohio Campaign Finance Reform—The 1970s

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the same events that brought a flurry of activity in campaign finance legislation in Congress also brought it to the statehouse in Ohio. After a series of proposals were considered, Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 46 passed both houses and became law during the 100th General Assembly, 1973-1974. It brought two major changes to Ohio campaign finance law: a new commission to oversee implementation of campaign procedures and practices and radically different expenditure limitations.

For the first time since 1911, campaign expenditure limitations were significantly boosted in regard to "the total amount expended by or on behalf of a candidate or his campaign committee for election to a public office at a general election" (Sec. 3517.08). The new limits, though not tied to inflation, were flexible as far as population was concerned, and were not to exceed the following:

(1) A CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR, UNITED STATES SENATOR OR CONGRESSMAN-AT-LARGE, TEN CENTS TIMES THE POPULATION OF THE STATE;
(2) A CANDIDATE FOR OTHER STATE ELECTIVE OFFICES, ONE AND
ONE-HALF CENTS TIMES THE POPULATION OF THE STATE;

(3) A CANDIDATE FOR OFFICE OF UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN,
OTHER THAN A CONGRESSMAN-AT-LARGE, EIGHTEEN CENTS TIMES THE
POPULATION OF THE STATE DIVIDED BY THE NUMBER OF
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS IN THE STATE,(sic) (Am. Sub. S.B. No. 46,

Fixed limits were set for candidates for Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, while limits
tied to population were in effect for other judicial offices, state senators and state
representatives. Candidates for local legislative and administrative offices usually had two
limits specified, one fixed and one tied to population and were allowed to use the higher of
the two.

The same senate bill also created an Ohio Elections Commission consisting of five
members, four of whom were to be appointed by the Ohio Secretary of State with the advice
and consent of the Ohio Senate. The fifth member of the Commission was to be appointed by
a majority vote of the other four, and the fifth member was to serve both as a member of the
Commission and its Chairman. The Commission was assigned the task of investigating any
alleged violations of sections 3517.08 to 3517.13 of the Ohio Revised Code, the sections
pertaining to campaign finances and practices and, should any violations be found, refer its
findings and evidence to the appropriate authority for prosecution.

The same Senate bill established specific fines for violations of the law. Obviously,
the Ohio legislature attempted to design a campaign finance bill that was more realistic, more
strict, and more enforceable than its predecessors. Unlike in the past, an appropriate
enforcement agency was created and staffed.

The parallels between this Ohio bill and its federal counterparts are obvious—i.e., the
Ohio Elections Commission parallels the Federal Election Commission, and the expenditure
limitations parallel those attempted at the federal level. Like their federal counterparts, the
expenditure limitations fell victim to the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo.

Amended Substitute House Bill 1379, passed in 1976, brought Ohio law into compliance with the Buckley decision. All the expenditure limitations were removed. The Ohio Elections Commission, however, remained intact.

Revisions of the 1980s. In the 1980s, several adjustments and additions were made to Ohio's campaign finance laws. Among them were requirements that every contributor, whether person, party, committee or PAC, provide its full name and address to the recipient at the time of the contribution; additional filing clarifications (Am. Sub. House Bill 639, Laws of Ohio, 1985-86, vol. 141); wording clarifications such as one that allows "candidate" to refer to two candidates running in tandem, such as the governor and lieutenant governor; prohibitions on the use of campaign funds for personal or business use (Am. Sub. House Bill No. 300, Laws of Ohio, 1985-86, vol. 141); and additions allowing corporations to establish and administer PACs and solicit contributions, with restrictions (Substitute House Bill No. 354, Laws of Ohio, 1987-88, vol. 142).

Perhaps the most noteworthy laws added in the 1980s were those affecting political parties. In 1988, an Ohio Political Party Fund was created, to be "comprised of all moneys received as a result of individuals exercising the checkoff option on their state income tax returns" (Cumulative Supplement to vol. 37, Ohio Jurisprudence 3rd, June 1990), clearly giving the two major political parties a privileged status in the state. The fund money must be used for non-campaign purposes. (Money from the Ohio Political Party Fund is not included in subsequent analyses of sources of party funds, as discussed in Chapter III, as both parties receive the same amount and must spend it in equivalent ways, hence there is no variation to be analyzed.) In 1989, the parties received two more bonuses. Senate Bill No. 6 allowed persons or corporations (except public utilities) to contribute money to "building
funds" for the parties (Laws of Ohio, 1989, vol. 143). The same bill allowed parties to sell their mailing lists for credit card promotion now so common among special interest groups.

In the area of disclosure, Ohio's laws are fairly stringent. (It is this stringency that makes this research project possible.) Who must submit statements of contributions and expenditures include:

every campaign committee, political action committee, and political party which made or received a contribution or made an expenditure in connection with the nomination or election of any candidate or in connection with any ballot issue or question at any election held or to be held in this state.... (Ohio Revised Code, sec. 3517.10)

When the statements must be filed is equally clear—twelve days before an election and the thirty-eighth day after the election, with an optional year-end report for the previous year due the last day in January. The reporting periods covered in each statement are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, allowing no gaps in time to occur.

What the statements must include is well specified: the full name and address of each reporting entity, including that of its treasurer; the candidate's full name and address, if applicable; the date and nature of the election; a detailed statement of contributions which must include the month, day, year and amount of the contribution, as well as the full name and address of each contributing entity, whether it be a person, party, committee, or PAC (political parties are exempted from including addresses); a comparable statement detailing all expenditures plus the object or purpose of the expenditure; explanations for any anonymous contributions; and, should a candidate hold a public office, designation of each contributor who is an employee directly supervised by the candidate and affirmation that the contribution was voluntary.

Where the disclosure statements are to be filed is determined by the scope of the election in question. If the election or political action is state wide, disclosure statements are to be filed with the secretary of state. If the election or action is more limited in scope,
disclosure statements are to be filed at the boards of elections of the appropriate counties. The exception to this pertains to members of the general assembly. They, and any of those contributing to them, must file their statements with the secretary of state.

One ethics provision in the law is worth noting because of its implications for contributors to state political parties. Contributors giving in excess of $1,000 to holders of public office are ineligible to receive contracts from that office, other than those let by competitive bidding, for two years after the contribution was made (Ohio Revised Code, sec. 3517.13). Conceivably, contributions to political parties allow circumvention of this regulation.

Like their federal counterparts, the campaign finance laws of Ohio have had as one of their main concerns the undue influence of large contributors and have attempted to control their influence with both contribution limitations and strict disclosure requirements. Also like their federal counterparts, the Ohio laws have given the political parties special treatment, first with minor disclosures waivers, and more recently with public funding for their on-going operations. Recent legislative actions, unsuccessful to date, have attempted to reinstate contribution limitations and encourage expenditure limitations.

It should be noted that Ohio's relatively strict disclosure laws make this dissertation possible, as it relies heavily on contribution and contributor data from the campaign finance reports the ODP and ORP are required to file at least four times a year with the Secretary of State.

E. Ohio's Political Environment in 1988

Before proceeding with the research design, two additional background considerations should be reviewed. Since the universe of political contributors who will be examined in this
study are drawn from those who have contributed to the state political parties in Ohio in 1988, we should look at both the Ohio political environment during that period, as well as the fund raising environment in regard to the political parties, both of which have implications that may affect the research questions being addressed.

In 1988, the political environment of the government of Ohio was predominantly Democratic. Richard Celeste, a Democrat, had been governor for six years, with two years left to go in his second (and last) term. Of the non-judicial top elected officials in the state, all were Democratic—i.e., attorney general, auditor of state, secretary of state and treasurer. The Ohio House of Representatives was under the control of the Democrats, 60 to 39, and had been strongly Democratic for years. The only state institution under the control of the Republicans was the Ohio Senate. There, Republicans enjoyed a weak majority, 18 to 15. The Democrats, therefore, were in control of all administrative aspects of government, including the soliciting of bids for state government work and the letting of state contracts. They also wielded much influence legislatively because of the strength of leadership exhibited by the Speaker of the House, Vernal Riffe. One might expect aspects of this political environment to be reflected in the attitudes and motivations of contributors to the Ohio Democratic Party.

F. Party Fundraising Practices

For years there has been marked differences between the parties in their fund-raising practices at the national level, and we would expect this to be true at the state level, too.

Under executive director William S. Warner in the early 1960s (Kessel, 1989), the Republican National Committee (RNC) began developing a direct-mail solicitation program aimed at small contributors and turned it into an extremely successful, professional operation.
by the 1970s. Then, the RNC began sharing their techniques with the state party organizations (Herrnson, 1988; Sabato, 1988).

The Democrats were slow to follow suit. Thus, one might expect to find among donors to the Republican party a cadre of people contributing small amounts whose main relationship with the party is through the mail.

G. Conclusion

Over the years, campaign finance reform has fraught with more ineffectiveness than effectiveness. A recurring theme of reform has been the discouragement of large contributors but, until relatively recently, the efforts have been less than sincere. Contribution limitations were unrealistically low and easily circumvented, as were expenditure ceilings. Disclosure laws were seldom enforced, and the records kept were seldom comparable and easily accessible. This is documented at the federal level and, because of similarities between the national and state reforms, we may infer that similar ineffectiveness characterized Ohio’s laws as well.

Few legislative attempts have been made to encourage the small contributor, other than the tax credits and deductions that existed for a short time in the 1970s and early 1980s, as well as the income tax checkoffs at both the national and state levels. In spite of this, the number and nature of political contributors have stayed about the same (Jones, 1989). We turn now to a research design that allows us to examine the differences among contributors, as differentiated by the amount of their contribution, in the hope of better understanding the tenacity and determination of large contributors, the relative rarity of small contributors, and the effect of soft money on the role of the parties in the presidential general election.
Chapter III

A Multi-faceted Research Design

As a brief history of campaign finance legislation and laws has shown, large contributors have remained indomitable since they emerged on the political scene, while small contributors, beyond participation in the income tax checkoff, have been difficult to encourage. Meanwhile, large contributors, media reports indicate, have been doing "business as usual," especially during the presidential general elections. The political parties have served as their conduits for virtually unlimited contributions of soft money.

What is attempted here is an exploration of the differences among contributors, as differentiated by the amounts of their contributions, in an attempt to explain why the above is so. What follows is a research design that allows simultaneous exploration of the research questions posed in Chapter I.

A. The Multi-faceted Research Approach

The social sciences are heavily dependent on interviews and questionnaires as data collection methods, with their usual benefits of allowing the gathering of specific data from a target population very quickly. There are well-known drawbacks to relying solely on these sources, however, not the least of which is the reactive measurement effect which can produce substantial error from the respondent. To overcome this reactive effect to some degree, to validate when possible the respondent’s answers, and to enrich the overall research design
with multiple sources of data that can be compared to each other, a multi-faceted research design utilizing both reactive and non-reactive data (Webb et al, 1981) is used to study the research questions. Two reactive measures are used. The first consists of personal interviewing of key informants from the state political parties in Ohio and from the presidential campaigns. The second consists of survey data from a sample of contributors to the ODP and ORP in 1988 (made slightly less reactive by the fact that the survey was administered through the mail). The nonreactive measures used are archival data, primarily from campaign finance reports.

B. The Universe

The first step in any research design is to identify and justify the use of a particular universe for study. The particular universe chosen here is Ohio in 1988, and that universe is further refined to data available from the campaign finance reports for the Ohio Democratic Party and Ohio Republican Party, both of which are on file with the Ohio Secretary of State, plus supporting data from personal interviews. There are several reasons for the choice of this universe.

Ohio is and has always been a key electoral state in the presidential elections, therefore it can supply the ingredients necessary to probe all the research questions: a large and diverse pool of individual political contributors, substantial transfers of soft money from the national to the state parties, and concerted efforts by the state parties to raise additional soft money on their own. In addition, it is seen as a microcosm of American values and diversity, making generalizations to a larger universe outside Ohio more credible.

Also, while the Democrats dominated the state government during the 1980s, Ohio has been and is a competitive state from the standpoint of the parties. Both are strong and
well financed. In fact, their total receipts for 1988 were almost identical, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. (The sources of those funds, however, were very different.) Also, because both state parties are housed in the state capital, Columbus, both their personnel and their records were readily accessible.

Finally, Ohio’s campaign finance disclosure laws are fairly stringent, as described in Chapter II, thus assuring that the data for both the parties and the individual contributors would be available, accessible and usable. These reports form the backbone of the nonreactive data used in this study. Using this universe then, the research design draws together information from three different sources: personal interviews, archival data and survey research, each of which is discussed in more detail below.

C. Personal Interviews

This study starts and finishes with one-on-one interviews with key state party personnel, key personnel in the presidential campaigns, and researchers and lawyers who specialize in federal campaign finance law. The purpose of the interviews with party and campaign personnel are twofold: 1) to gather information about each person’s viewpoint about fundraising and the role of soft money in the 1988 presidential campaigns and 2) to establish credibility with the parties to assure their cooperation should I need it (and I did!) for access to contributor records. The conversations with researchers and lawyers who specialize in campaign finance law were to clarify confusing aspects of the law. A list of names and interview dates appears in Appendix A.
D. Archival Data

Archival data used were primarily from one source: the 1988 campaign finance reports for the ODP and ORP, as filed with the Elections Division of the office of the Secretary of State of Ohio. As required by law, each of the two parties filed four reports—pre-primary, post-primary, pre-general and post-general—which covered four time periods that were mutually exclusive and exhaustive. The campaign finance reports were supplemented with additional information from both parties, mostly to confirm names and addresses of contributors. This confirmation was necessary because the ODP does not list addresses of contributors on reports (parties are exempted from this requirement, as reported in Chapter II) and the names and addresses of the ORP's contributors were frequently difficult to read.

The data from the campaign finance reports are used in two ways: first, to identify the timing and amounts of soft money transferred from the national political parties to the state parties and second, to identify a population from which to draw a sample of individual contributors with whom to address the research questions. The data from these reports were treated as follows in preparation for the drawing of the survey sample:

Using the four 1988 campaign finance reports from the Ohio Republican Party, and the four similar reports from the Ohio Democratic Party, all party contributions listed were assigned to one of five categories: 1) contributions from individuals; 2) federal or "hard" money from the national parties—i.e., money which met the regulations established by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and its amendments and could therefore be used for specified federal campaigns; 3) transfers of non-federal or "soft" money from the national

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1Soft money used in Ohio in the 1988 presidential elections is analyzed in Chapter VI. Of interest here is that the Republicans transferred little from the federal level to the state level, but raised their soft money within the state. The Democrats transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars in soft money from the federal level to the Ohio Democratic Party. As a result of these two very different techniques, many large and major donors appear among
parties—i.e., money which circumvented the federal regulations, as per the FECA
amendments of 1979, and could be spent on volunteer-related activities; 4) contributions by
political action committees; and 5) miscellaneous contributions which included
reimbursements from vendors for overpayments and deposits, interest paid on deposits,
intrastate party transfers of funds, consisting mostly of donations by the county parties to the
state party, and other intraparty transfers of funds which could be neither labeled "federal" or
"soft" money. The distribution of income for the state parties from these five sources is
displayed in Tables 1 and 2.

The individual contributors mentioned in #1 above comprised the population from
which the sample of potential respondents was drawn. They were separated into four
contributor categories, depending on the size of their total party contribution during 1988:
small contributors, defined as those who gave less than $100; medium contributors, defined as
those who gave $100 to less than $1000; large contributors, defined as those who gave $1000
to less than $5000; and major contributors, defined as those who gave $5000 or more.

Distribution of contributions from these individual contributors to the Ohio Democratic Party
and Ohio Republican Party in 1988 are shown in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.

the Republican contributors, while few appear among the Democrats. This is because the
large and major contributors to the Ohio Democratic Party may be shrouded by the transfer
technique and the fungibility of money. Both state parties, it should be noted, ended up with

Some "individual contributions were from partnerships—i.e., law, accounting, engineering
and architectural firms. Since no individual contributor can be identified from a partnership
source, hence there can be no single potential respondent, these contributions were dropped
from the analysis.
### Table 1

**1988 Contributions to the Ohio Democratic Party**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre- primary</th>
<th>Post- primary</th>
<th>Pre- general</th>
<th>Post- general</th>
<th>1988 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contr.</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Amount</td>
<td>$111,890</td>
<td>$24,900</td>
<td>$106,602</td>
<td>$63,177</td>
<td>$306,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Contr.</td>
<td>$948</td>
<td>$519</td>
<td>$297</td>
<td>$392</td>
<td>$447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total $</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-federal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contr.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Amount</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$3,600</td>
<td>$76,239</td>
<td>$93,767</td>
<td>$859,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Contr.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$3,600</td>
<td>$84,711</td>
<td>$31,256</td>
<td>$661,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total $</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contr.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Amount</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$45,207</td>
<td>$151,091</td>
<td>$196,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Contr.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$7,535</td>
<td>$25,182</td>
<td>$163,58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total $</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PAC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contr.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Amount</td>
<td>$245,750</td>
<td>$3,800</td>
<td>$164,875</td>
<td>$137,366</td>
<td>$551,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Contr.</td>
<td>$8192</td>
<td>$380</td>
<td>$4711</td>
<td>$10,567</td>
<td>$6270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total $</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Miscellaneous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Amount</td>
<td>$148,660</td>
<td>$170,243**</td>
<td>$97,206</td>
<td>$48,7715</td>
<td>$903,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total $</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total $ at Period</td>
<td>$506,300</td>
<td>$202,543</td>
<td>$117,6286</td>
<td>$933,116</td>
<td>$281,8245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of 1988 Total</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes intra-party transfers, refunds, interest, partnership dollars.

** Includes 76 transfers from county affiliates.
## Table 2

### 1988 Contributions to the Ohio Republican Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-primary</th>
<th>Post-primary</th>
<th>Pre-general</th>
<th>Post-Total</th>
<th>1988 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Contributions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contr.</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>2153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Amount</td>
<td>$142230</td>
<td>$58298</td>
<td>$409537</td>
<td>$241161</td>
<td>$851226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Contr.</td>
<td>$162</td>
<td>$140</td>
<td>$718</td>
<td>$832</td>
<td>$395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total $</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-federal Contributions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contr.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Amount</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$218000</td>
<td>$218000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Contr.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$54500</td>
<td>$54500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total $</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal Contributions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contr.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Amount</td>
<td>$35000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$50000</td>
<td>$175000</td>
<td>$260000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Contr.</td>
<td>$35000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$50000</td>
<td>$35000</td>
<td>$37143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total $</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PAC Contributions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contr.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Amount</td>
<td>$6000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$8500</td>
<td>$21250</td>
<td>$35750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Contr.</td>
<td>$3000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$2125</td>
<td>$1635</td>
<td>$1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total $</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Miscellaneous Contributions</strong></td>
<td>$63321&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$98938&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$445705&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$597507*</td>
<td>$1205471*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total $</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total $ at Period</td>
<td>$246551</td>
<td>$157236</td>
<td>$913742</td>
<td>$1252918</td>
<td>$2570447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of 1988 Total</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Includes intra-party transfers, refunds, interest, partnership dollars

<sup>b</sup>Includes $10,000 from the Republican National Committee on 12/18/87

<sup>c</sup>Includes $50,000 from Hamilton Committee Republican Party; $45,000 from Republican Senate Campaign Committee

<sup>d</sup>Includes $70,000 from the Republican National Committee

*Includes $170,000 from Republican National Committee
Referring to those two tables, striking differences between the two parties are immediately apparent. The Republicans have over 3 1/2 times as many contributions from individuals as the Democrats, with 74% of the Republican contributors as compared to 46% of the Democrats being "small." This parallels the findings of Jones and Miller for the nation (1985). There are many other significant differences between the parties, which are addressed throughout this dissertation.

E. The Sample

Individual contributors from the campaign finance reports, as stratified into contributor categories, formed the universe from which the survey sample was to be drawn. What follows is a description of the preparation of the universe for sampling, followed by a description of the sampling technique used.

In Ohio, which currently has no individual contribution limitations for individuals and therefore does not require that contributions be compiled by contributor, campaign finance reports consist of chronological lists of contributions, two or more of which may have been made by a single contributor. Indeed, this happened occasionally, and sometimes more than one contribution was given on the same day. For purposes of sample selection, multiple contributions on the same day from one contributor were totalled and considered to be one contribution. Then, each contribution was categorized as small, medium, large or major, as previously defined.

Within each contributor category for each party, the contributions as defined were numbered consecutively, and, using these numbers, a random sample was drawn. Sample size for small and medium contributors to both parties was determined by selecting the number within each category that would yield a sampling error of no greater than + or - 5.5
to 6%, should a 100% return rate occur. A census was done of all large and major
contributors to both parties, due to their limited numbers.

Even though contributions from a single contributor had been consolidated by
collection date, there still was a chance that multiple contributions had been made on
different days, even reported in different reports by a single contributor, thereby increasing
that donor’s chances of being selected in the sample. This was not compensated for, other
than to list all contributors within each party alphabetically, check for duplicates, and replace
duplicates with a newly drawn name. All contributions from one contributor thus identified
were consolidated, and that contributor was placed in the contributor category appropriate for
the totalled contributions. Population and sample sizes were adjusted to reflect this
consolidation. Final population and sample sizes for both parties are shown in Table 5.

The next step was confirmation of the names and addresses of those drawn into the
sample. Because the Ohio Democratic Party only reports contributor names, not addresses,
and because the addresses on the Ohio Republican Party’s finance reports were not entirely
legible and no completely legible copies could be found, all contributor names and addresses
were confirmed using each party’s on-line computerized record of contributors.

F. The Questionnaire

Meanwhile, a questionnaire was designed that would allow in-depth collection of data
on the demographic characteristics and political attitudes, behaviors and motivations of the
party contributors, including: amounts contributed, recipients of contributions, motivations
behind party and candidate contributions; respondent’s integration into political contributing as
a way of life; typical ideology, party identification and campaign activity information;
respondent’s interest in and attitude toward the government and the presidential candidates;
Table 3
Ohio Democratic Party — 1988 Individual Contributions

Distribution by Amount

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Amounts Contributed</th>
<th>Pre Primary</th>
<th>Post Primary</th>
<th>Pre General</th>
<th>Post General</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1-99</td>
<td></td>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-199</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-299</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-399</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-499</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-599</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600-699</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700-799</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-2499</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500-4999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5000-9999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000-19999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20000-29999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Distribution Summary

Small contributions (<$100) = 269 (46%)
Medium contributions (>or=$100<$1000) = 207 (36%)
Large contributions (>or=$1000<$5000) = 98 (17%)
Major contributions (>or=$5000) = 9 (2%)

583 101%
**Table 4**

Ohio Republican Party — 1988 Individual Contributions

Distribution by Amount

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Amounts Contributed</th>
<th>Pre Primary</th>
<th>Post Primary</th>
<th>Pre General</th>
<th>Post General</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1-99</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-199</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-299</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-399</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-499</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-599</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600-699</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700-799</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-2499</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500-4999</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5000-9999</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000-19999</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20000-29999</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30000-39999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Distribution Summary**

- Small contributions (<$100) = 1558 (74%)
- Medium contributions (>or=$100<$1000) = 383 (18%)
- Large contributions (>or=$1000<$5000) = 129 (6%)
- Major contributions (>or=$5000) = 45 (2%)

Total = 2115 100%
Table 5
Population, Sample Size and Response Rate of Individual Contributors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population Size</th>
<th>Original Sample Size</th>
<th>% Population in Sample</th>
<th># Removed from Sample</th>
<th>Adjusted Sample Size</th>
<th>Refusals etc.</th>
<th>Usable Returns</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>1570</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>2118</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERALL TOTALS</td>
<td>2731</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sampling error for entire population = ± 4% at .95 confidence level. Sampling error varies within subgroups.
respondent’s attitude toward federal programs and issues; and voting behavior. Care was taken to measure new concepts—soft money, for instance—in several different ways, as will be discussed in Chapter VI. When possible, questions paralleled those of the 1988 ANES so that meaningful comparisons could be made among respondents in different contributor categories, between contributors to the two parties, and between the Ohio party contributors and the respondents to the 1986 and 1988 American National Election Studies. The questions and their format are shown in Appendix B.

G. Data Collection and Management

The mail survey was designed to conform with the recommendations of Dillman (1977), with changes tailored to this specific audience. Changes included a professionally designed and typeset questionnaire and a personalized letter (see Appendix C) to each respondent on university letterhead. These were mailed in mid April, 1990. A post-card follow-up was sent out 1 week after the letter and questionnaire were mailed, and a duplicate questionnaire with personalized letter (see Appendix C) were mailed to nonrespondents three weeks after the first mailing. Major contributors received a second post card follow up, hand written, a week after the duplicate questionnaire was mailed. Large, medium and small contributors received no second follow up. Thus, all mailings were completed by the end of May, 1990.

Questionnaires were returned in the business reply envelopes that had been provided, and were scanned as soon as possible for completeness. When it seemed that pages or questions were inadvertently skipped by a respondent, the original questionnaire was returned with a note asking him or her to complete the skipped sections and return the questionnaire.
once more. All but one respondent so instructed willingly complied. In this manner, some of the limitations of mail surveys were overcome.

H. Response Rate

In all, 494 valid responses were received. The distribution of responses across contributor categories is shown in Table 5. In general, Republicans were more likely to respond than Democrats (54% and 48% respectively) and smaller contributors to both parties were more likely to respond than larger ones. Table 5 also summarizes the sampling and response results.3,4 The overall response rate is 52%. The sampling error for the overall survey is + or - 4% at the 95% confidence level, with the sampling error varying within subgroups. For both of these calculations, an adjusted sample size was used—undeliverables, deceased, etc., were removed.

3Response rates for the Democrats were significantly lower than those for the Republicans in all categories except that of "small" contributor. Only 1 of 9 major contributors to the Democratic party responded to the mailings, hence the extremely low response rate for that category.

4Among the Democrats, 5 returned their questionnaire with a note saying they would not participate in the study. Seventeen of the Republicans did likewise. It is interesting to note that in a mail survey, unlike in a telephone survey, an active refusal takes effort beyond hanging up. To refuse actively, a respondent must read the letter, look over the questionnaire, decide not to participate, write that on a note, insert the note into the reply envelope and mail it back to the researcher. At least five refusals were converted into completed responses when respondent's objections were handled. In several instances, converts' original refusals were motivated by fear of lack of anonymity. When reassured, they responded willingly and completely. Also of interest, at least 10 phone calls from respondents were received. Some needed reassurance. Others just wanted to say they couldn't reply immediately but would do so as soon as they had the time to review their financial records from 1988. A sense of civic duty toward research sanctioned by The Ohio State University was evident in these contacts. One duty-bound contributor returned a meticulously filled-out questionnaire but commented in the space provided that he deeply resented this intrusion into his time. It was as if he had no choice but to comply.
A computerized data record was created for each respondent that included the respondent's responses to the mail survey plus the respondent's 1988 state party contribution record (dates, amounts, party) as taken from the campaign finance reports. Cumulatively, the 494 cases thus created form the major data base on contributors, to be analyzed in Chapters IV, V and VI. We turn now to the analysis.
Chapter IV

Political Contributors: A Hierarchy Among the Elite

Alexander Heard begins his classic book on campaign finance, *The Costs of Democracy*, as follows:

In one of his stories on Continental intrigue, Eric Ambler has a character say that the thing to know about an assassination is not who fired the shot, but who paid for the bullet. Happily, American politics does not normally include assassination; it embraces more complicated and intricate relationships among people. These people are sometimes connected with each other by financial linkages, however, and one way to study American politics is to analyze these connections (Heard, 1960, p.3).

Political scientists who have analyzed these connections have expressed concerns about the steadily increasing costs of campaigns, the sources of the funds that pay for them, the methods by which the money is raised, the way the money is disclosed, the way the money is spent, and the effects of all the foregoing on a democratic system of government (Pollock, 1926; Overacker, 1932, 1946; Heard, 1960; Alexander, 1972; Nichols, 1974; Adamany and Agree, 1975; Pennock, 1979; Manus, 1990; Adamany, 1990; Wilcox, 1990). Due to state and federal campaign finance disclosure laws of the 1970s, we sometimes (but not always) know the names and addresses (and, in the case of federal contributions, the occupations) of those who "pay for the bullets," but we don't know why they pay. We also do not understand the financial linkages between contributors and the objects of their contributions, nor among contributors, though we know these linkages exist. To address those connections, we must understand the demographics, attitudes and behavior of individual contributors, as ultimately most campaign money comes from them.
From existing research, we know some things about individual contributors. We know they are a demographic and political elite (Verba and Nie, 1972; Brown, Hedges and Powell, 1980a, 1980b; Jones & Hopkins, 1985; Jones & Miller, 1985; Berg, Eastland and Jeffe, 1981; Green and Guth, 1986; McAdams and Green, 1990), especially when compared to noncontributors and income-tax-check-off-only contributors (Jones, 1989). We know something of the motivations underlying some political contributions (Brown, Hedges and Powell, 1980a; McAdams and Green, 1990). We know that there is congruence between the attitudes of contributors and the candidates to whom they contribute (Russell, 1980). Yet, we know little about how contributors differ among themselves, though there is some evidence that a distinct hierarchy exists. Those at the top of the hierarchy, according to Jones’ research on ANES contributors, appear to be those who use multiple modes of contributing—i.e., they give to candidates, political parties and other political organizations like PACs and such (Jones, 1989). No study, however, probes the nature and extent of this hierarchy in a fashion that allows us to understand political contributing behavior as we understand voting behavior.

Political parties, however, know that all contributors, like all voters, are not alike. While the parties may nurture all contributors to some extent, the methods of interacting with contributors vary greatly, depending on the size of the contribution. Small contributors, for instance, have a much less personal relationship with others in the party. In 1988, many of them received and responded to one or more lengthy ideological direct mail appeals for funds, designed to elicit a response with little further contact, except perhaps phone calls from typical party workers as a follow up. The amounts requested ranged from $25 to $50 to $75. In-person contact seldom occurred. Both state parties used such methods with small contributors in 1988 (McManus, 1989). Large contributors also received appeals in the mail
and follow-up calls from the state parties. For large contributors, however, the direct-mail invitation may have been a mere formality, a social gesture or reminder, behind which lay an intricate web of personal contacts among peers. Consider the following example.

In 1988, one Republican appeal was a simple engraved invitation to a private home to have cocktails and dinner with Senator Quayle, the vice presidential candidate. The cost was $5,000 per couple. Included with the invitation was an insert with a direct referral to the soft money mechanism:

Federal law prohibits an individual from contributing more than $1,000 to any candidate for the President. Furthermore, after he becomes the Republican nominee, George Bush cannot accept direct contributions from anyone. The only way to assist his campaign from this point onward, is to help fund the Ohio Victory '88 program (ORP fundraising piece, October 10, 1988).

Further, the invitation insert stated, the money contributed would be under the control of the state party, and it listed the names of two well-known men who would be responsible for its use. One was the Chair of the ORP, the other was its Finance Chairman. Both were successful, socially prominent businessmen. The invitation contained no ideological appeal, no pleading. Rather, based on its simplicity, its factual approach to soft money, and the high price of the "ticket," one could assume it was a mere formality. The real fundraising mechanism--i.e., the network of mutuality--lay hidden.

Like the Republicans, the Democrats sponsored similar costly affairs for their presidential candidate. One fundraising affair in Cleveland, Ohio, was reported to have raised about $1.2 million, the amount of soft money the Democrats felt was needed to wage a competitive presidential campaign in Ohio (Ruvolo, 1990).

My own experience and that of many other candidates in Ohio confirms this treatment of smaller contributors vs. larger contributors in many political arenas, whether it is raising funds for ballot issues, for candidates or for other political causes. Smaller contributors
receive more impersonal requests, usually by mail. When a phone follow-up is done, it is usually from a campaign worker. Larger contributors, however, receive more personalized contact, often in the form of a personal call or visit from a peer or from the candidate soliciting funds, or both. In fact, there are established "networks" of large contributors who frequently contribute to candidates, organizations or causes as an informally orchestrated group.

Considering this, we should expect to find that, among large contributors, the act of contributing is more than a political act. It is a social statement, a social activity, a status symbol and is associated with a special set of attributes. In contrast, among the smaller contributors, we expect to find the act of contributing to be a more solitary act associated with other attributes. It is this structure of differences among contributors that this chapter proposes to uncover, first by exploring demographic differences, then by exploring political attitudinal and behavioral differences.

A. The Contributor Categories

Turning now to the data, we must begin with a definition of contributor categories. Somehow, lines must be drawn to allow differentiation of large contributors from small ones. There is a puzzlement as to where to draw the line. Small contributors could remain as defined in Chapter III—i.e., donors of less than $100—as both parties treat these donors similarly. But surely it would not be wise to lump together all contributors of over $100. Party fundraising appeals and common sense indicate that it may be wise to retain the contributor categories described in Chapter III, with the exception that the major and large be combined, due to the limited numbers of respondents in those categories. This leaves a tripartite of contributors to analyze: small (total contributions of <$100); medium (total
contributions of $100 to < $1,000); and large (total contributions of $1,000 and over). If significant variation among contributor categories does occur, these divisions should be able to tap the differences.

Here, using the data described in the research design presented in Chapter III, we are able to explore for the first time the characteristics and motivations of a large group of political contributors whose contributions range from $2 to over $60,000. Because they are contributors to the political parties, we are also able to explore differences among contributors to the two major state political parties as well to see whether or not the parties' traditional differences in "class base, structure and issue positions" (Adamany, 1984) are reflected in the characteristics and preferences of their contributors.

I expect to find significant differences among these political contributors, as differentiated by the party to which the contribution was made and the amount of the contribution. The differences to be explored include: demographics; attitudes toward the parties; political contribution patterns; attitudes toward the political campaigns of 1988; and motivations behind the contributions.

While the respondents will be stratified in the tables as described above, they frequently will be referred to in the text as "larger" or "smaller," to indicate trends among them. This is done because most of the relationships between the dependent variables and the independent variables are indicative of underlying monotonicity. Evidence of these basically monotonic relationships will be discussed later.

B. Definition of terms

Before beginning this exploration, two terms must be defined. The first term is "party." The simplest definition, of course, is to give each respondent a party identification
consistent with the campaign finance report from which his or her name was drawn. But the complexity of the survey data requires that alternative methods be discussed briefly. Many are available: self-reported party or parties of contribution; party of the majority of candidates to whom contributions were made; party worked for during the 1988 campaigns; party of self identification; party of the presidential candidate for whom the respondent voted; party that supported the respondent if he/she ran for public office; or party seen as closest to respondent's stand on issues.

The party of officially-recorded contribution on the campaign finance reports is the most logical measure for comparing campaign contributors in Ohio, but it gives us cause to pause for several reasons: 1) some respondents did not report a contribution to the party of record, though they identify with it; 2) other respondents report having given to the party of record and identify with it, but also report contributions, sometimes of significant amounts, to the other party or its candidates; 3) some respondents report having contributed to the party of record, but identify themselves with the other party; and 4) some respondents seem to disavow contributions to or identification with the party of record. The first two situations just mentioned cause little concern, as they do not indicate inconsistency. Aspects of these situations will be discussed later in this paper. The third and fourth situations, however, are puzzlements that require attention. Twenty-three respondents fall into these latter two categories, and 21 of them are large or medium contributors to the Ohio Democratic Party.

That contributors of such substantial amounts could forget their contributions is counterintuitive, as logic would lead us to expect that, the greater the contribution, the more likely would be its recall. Of the 21 Democratic maverick contributors, who comprise 11% of all the Democratic contributors, one said he gave no party contributions, six list contributions to the Republicans only, and 14 list their Democratic (as well as their
Republican contributions. All 21, however, identify themselves as Republicans. Contributions to the ODP for these 21 mavericks ranged from a low of $200 to a high of $4,500. Nineteen of the 21 had an additional commonality—the occupations they gave might put them in positions to bid on government contracts—i.e., they were managing partners of accounting, engineering and architectural firms; high-ranking officers of banking firms; management consultants and such. Of the other two, one was retired and one was a college student. As will be presently shown, there are special reasons these 21 Republicans gave to the ODP.

In comparison to the Democratic contributors, those to the Ohio Republican Party suffered little ambivalence, as only two identified with the Democratic Party, and both of them listed contributions to both parties. Like their 19 Democratic counterparts, both of these respondents listed occupations that might entail bidding on government contracts.

Despite the puzzlement with the 21 mavericks, for purposes of data analysis, each contributor will be assigned to his or her party of record on the campaign finance reports, as we wish to determine how contributors to the two parties differ. Regardless of how our puzzling contributors identify themselves, they are still contributors to the party of record.

"Contribution" must also be defined. First, there is the contribution of record, comprised of an individual's totaled contributions to one of the two major parties in Ohio in 1988. Then, there is each respondent's self-reported contribution to the state parties. These frequently didn't match. In fact, an interesting anomaly occurs that can be summarized by taking the means of contributions, controlling for party and contributor group.

Because our data include both the actual contributions from the campaign finance reports as well as the self-reported contribution from the respondents, we can compare the general accuracy of the latter with the former, as shown by their means in Table 6.
Among contributors to both parties, it is the small contributor who is likely to greatly exaggerate the amount of the party contribution. Among Democrats, the medium contributors also exaggerate their contributions, but much less so. In contrast, the large Democratic and medium and large Republican contributors report their contributions with near accuracy. At this point, we can only speculate why this is so. Perhaps the greater accuracy of the larger contributor to both parties is due to the logical likelihood of a larger amount being remembered correctly. On the other hand, the smaller contributor might be embarrassed by the actual amount of the contribution, and thus be prone to exaggeration. But what could explain the difference in accuracy between the Republican small contributors and their Democratic counterparts? There may be reasons for the Democrats’ exaggerations. If many are state employees perhaps they mentally position themselves as more strongly supportive of the party than their wallets allow. Respondents had not been informed from which campaign finance report their names had been drawn, nor had they been told that the exact amounts of their contributions would be recorded for analysis, so we can assume there

Table 6

Average Contribution by Contributor Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual State Contribution</th>
<th>Self-reported Contribution</th>
<th>% Deviation</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>$18</td>
<td>$99</td>
<td>+450%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>+36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>1493</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>$21</td>
<td>$34</td>
<td>+62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>2913</td>
<td>2837</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
was no fear of discovery restraining their exaggerations. For now, however, "contribution"
will refer to the actual state party contribution, as taken from the campaign finance reports,
not that reported by each respondent. All division of contributors into categories will be
based on this actual figure.

C. Demographic Differences

Based on previous research, expectations are that political contributors will have a more
elite demographic profile than the adult population at large, and that there will be additional
differences among contributors, based on the type of contribution. Using ANES data from
respondents into three categories: noncontributors, check-off only contributors (e.g., those
who reported using the federal income-tax check-off to contribute to the presidential campaign
fund), and organizational contributors (e.g., those who reported giving to a political party or
other organization that supported candidates). Jones' information for 1986 is shown in
Appendix D, along with comparable ANES data for 1988 and data on the Ohio contributors.
The Ohio contributors have an even more elite profile than ANES organizational contributors-
they are older, wealthier, more interested in elections, care more about who won the
presidential election, and demonstrate higher internal efficacy.5 They also are more likely to

5 Why are the Ohio party contributors so much more elite than their ANES counterparts? The
major reason is differences in the method of sample selection. Ohio contributors' names were
drawn from actual campaign finance reports, hence are known to be actual contributors in the
year for which data were collected. Also, the sample for Ohio contributors was stratified
according to the amount contributed, as explained in Chapter III, while ANES contributors are
drawn from the adult population at large. Hence, larger contributors are greatly overrepresented
in the Ohio sample. In addition, ANES contributors may exaggerate or overreport contributing,
similar to ANES respondents' known tendency to overreport voting. This, plus the differences
in sample selection methods, should be kept in mind when the two groups are compared. (To
my knowledge, no contribution validation studies of ANES contributors have been done.)
vote and perform a variety of campaign activities. They are also slightly more likely to be moderate, rather than liberal or conservative. The main interest here, however, is not in how they differ from the general population, but in how they differ from each other when we control for size of contribution and political party.

First, looking at age, we would expect large contributors to be older than small contributors and, in general, they are, among both the Democrats and Republicans. The average age of all contributors combined is 57. Democratic contributors are younger than their Republican counterparts by about 10 years across all the contributor categories. The average age of the Democrats is 50; the Republicans, 61.

Looking at gender, 72% of all contributors are male, with the likelihood of the contributor being male increasing with the amount of the contribution. When party controls are added, the picture shifts. Among the Democrats, females outnumber males among small contributors, but their numbers decline rapidly as the contribution amount increases. Among Republicans, females remain in the minority in all the contributor groups, but are more evenly dispersed among groups. Of special interest are seven females among the Republican large contributors who gave their occupation as "housewife," causing speculation that many of them, all of whose 1988 family incomes exceeded $90,000, might be responding to family appeals when they contribute. We will return to this speculation later.

With regard to race, there is little variation available for examination. Among all contributors reporting their race, 97% are white and 3% are black. Controlling for party, all the blacks are contributors to the Democratic party, but still comprise only 9% of that group and are found exclusively among the small and medium contributors. All Republican respondents who reported their race are white.
With regard to education, Ohio's political party contributors are unusually well educated, the Democrats more so than the Republicans. Aggregating all contributors, 63% have at least a college degree, with over one half of those (32% of the entire sample) having a graduate degree. Size of contribution and level of education are positively correlated for all contributors combined, as well as when controlling on party.

With regard to religion, the vast majority are Protestant (76%); a minority are non-protestant (24%), a category which includes Catholics, Jews, Unitarians and others. When party controls are added, Democrats show more heterogeneity, while Republicans are more homogeneous.

A demographic characteristic of particular interest is the executive status of the respondent. A respondent's executive status could be related to larger contributions to state parties either because those kinds of work are frequently contracted by state government or because those kinds of work involve their participants in political arenas due to regulatory considerations. Such kinds of work would include architecture, engineering, banking, insurance, accounting, the legal professions, and some public sector work. Also, because Ohio law prohibits corporate contributions, one would expect the top officers of such organizations to be found among the larger contributors. In this case, the political contribution could be seen as a way of gaining access to important people or, at least, a way of not cutting off access. Contributions to gain access might explain the behavior of the 21 Democratic anomalies we met earlier in this chapter.

There is an alternate explanation. The executive status of the respondent could also be consistent with social motivations, the status inclinations that the parties seem to be tapping with their fundraising techniques used among their wealthier patrons, as discussed previously.
For both of these reasons, we would expect to find executive status strongly correlated with the size of the party contribution.

The survey questionnaire allows an examination of executive status by asking a two-part open-ended question: "What kind of work do you do?" and "What is your specific job title?" (See question H7 in Appendix B.) Responses were coded as follows: those listing an occupation and job title indicative of being a top officer of a major organization (chairman of the board, chief executive officer, president, managing partner, director, some supervisors) were assigned an executive status designation of "3." Those listing the next lower level of responsibility (vice president, partner, manager, assistant director, assistant supervisor) were given an executive status designation of "2." Among the Democrats, 31% of all contributors fell into these top two categories; among Republicans, the percentage was 39%. The rest of the respondents were coded into one category, "1," since no specific executive status relative to political contributing could be assigned to their occupation. Executive status was then crosstabulated with contributor categories, as shown in Table 7.

Clearly, for both the Democrats and Republicans, there is a strong relationship between executive status and amount of contribution. When the 21 maverick contributors are removed, the relationship between executive status and amount of contribution weakens slightly among the Democrats but is still evident. This raises the following question: will we find evidence that upper-level officers of major organizations have, as part of their organizational responsibility, the maintenance of political and social clout through political contributions? If so, their contributing may be strategic—i.e., a business strategy to help assure access to government contracts, legislators, regulators and other political entities whose actions can have an influence on business health and wealth.
Table 7

Executive Status by Contributor Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Undetermined Status</td>
<td>Next-to-top Executives</td>
<td>Top Executives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson’s r = .40, \( \text{Tau b} = .36, p < .000 \)

My own experience in politics confirms that strategic giving occurs. As political candidates, I and others who found themselves being regarded as very competitive candidates received unsolicited contributions near the time of the election from businessmen who regularly did business with the government. The general wisdom was that strategic givers "paid their dues" by contributing to incumbents or candidates who looked like they might win. In a state environment, "paying dues" to political parties, especially the party that

---

6 Throughout the presentation of results two different measures of association will be presented: 1) Pearson’s \( r \) and 2) \( \text{Tau b} \) or \( \text{Tau c} \), depending on whether the table being discussed is square or rectangular. Unless otherwise indicated, the significance for the two measures is the same. Two measures are used because of the nature of the data. Much of it is ordinal or interval level, but some of it exists in the twilight zone between. The dependent variable—e.g., amount of contribution—is obviously interval level, but to facilitate visual examination in crosstabulations with the independent variables, it has been collapsed into three contributor categories. Hence, it becomes an ordinal measure.
controls so much of state government, may be a more efficient way of accruing political credit than attempting to give to many different state elected officials.

It is possible another mechanism may be operating, one that taps the networking we suspect may exist among large contributors. In this instance, executive status, social status, and political networking are meshed together in certain types of contributors. We will return to this subject many times.

With regard to income, these political contributors are an exceptionally wealthy lot. Of those who reported income (N=483), over 37% earn $90,000 or more per year. When broken down by party, the Democratic contributors are less affluent than their Republican counterparts. When looked at by contributor category, there is a strong positive relationship in both parties between income and amount contributed, as expected. It is much stronger for the Republicans than for the Democrats.

To summarize the demographic differences among our aggregated contributors (i.e., Democrats and Republicans combined), we find that there is a positive and significant correlation between the size of the contribution and all of the following: age, the likelihood of the contributor being male, level of education, executive status and, of course, level of income. These differences hold when party controls are added, but vary in their strength among the Democrats and the Republicans, as noted. Looking specifically at differences between the parties, we find that Republicans tend to be older, male, Protestant, wealthier, hold fewer graduate degrees and more high-status jobs. Their Democratic counterparts tend toward these qualities in lower frequencies. Demographically our party contributors reflect the stereotypes we would expect. As a group they are elite, but some evidence of class-based party differences is still apparent.
D. Attitude toward the parties

All of our respondents have a political activity in common—they have contributed to one of the major political parties at the state level. This immediately places them among the political elite and we should therefore expect a good deal of political sophistication from them as a group. As political sophisticates, we would anticipate their having no difficulty aligning themselves with a political party and choosing an ideology that is relatively consistent with that alignment. These expectations are fulfilled, as shown in Tables 8 and 9.

Looking first at party self-identification, there are initial differences between contributors to the two parties. Among the Democratic contributors, the smaller the contribution to the state party in 1988, the more likely one is to self-identify as a Democrat. When "defections" occur (a defection is self identifying with the other major party) they occur among the large and medium contributors. When the 21 mavericks are removed, however, the differences among the Democratic contributor categories become insignificant. Among Republican contributors, 99% self-identify with the party of contribution. Except for the mavericks, then, most contributors self-identify with their party of contribution, displaying consistency of attitude and behavior. The mavericks' behavior seems more consistent with strategic contributing, as discussed earlier.

Turning to ideology, there more substantial differences between the Democrats and the Republicans. As shown in Table 9, it is the small Democratic contributor who is the dominant carrier of the liberal creed. As the contribution amount increases, so does the moderateness and/or conservatism of the Democratic contributor. Overall, the majority—61%—of Democrats label themselves liberal. Still, the differences among the contributor categories are significant. Twenty-three percent call themselves moderate and 17% call themselves conservative. When the 21 mavericks are removed, the ideological
differences among Democratic contributor categories weaken but are still evident. It is the smaller Democratic contributor, then, who associates with the traditional Democratic ideology, while approximately half of the larger Democratic contributors label themselves as moderate or conservative.

Among Republicans, there is more ideological purity. Overall, 79% of this group label themselves conservative, leaving little room for variation. Only 17% call themselves moderate and only 4% call themselves liberal. It is not surprising, therefore, that there is no significant difference among contributor categories.

**Table 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Identification by Contributor Category</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson's $r = -0.34$, Tau b = -0.34, $p < 0.000$

| **Republicans**                            |            |             |          |   |
| Small                                       | 98%        | 1%          | 1%       | 127|
| Medium                                      | 99         | 1           | 0        | 100|
| Large                                       | 99         | 0           | 1        | 71 |

Pearson's $r = 0.00$, Tau b = -0.01, not significant

Next, examining respondents’ perceptions of themselves as party members and party activists as measured by an index created from questions C2 and CD on the questionnaire (see Appendix B), there is an interesting difference between the parties. For the Democrats, it is the smaller contributor who is slightly more likely to report a feeling of party closeness, as measured by membership and activism. The differences among contributor categories
weakens when the 21 mavericks are removed, but is still evident. Among the Republicans it is the larger contributor who is more likely to report closeness to the party.

To summarize our respondents' attitudes toward the parties with which they identify, we find opposite tendencies among the Democratic and Republican contributors. The Democratic contributors are more heterogeneous, as shown by the greater differences among those contributor groups in relation to party identification and ideology. Also, among Democrats it is the smaller contributor who is more prone to self-identify as a liberal and to report feelings of closeness to the party. The Republican contributors, in contrast, are more homogeneous, but the larger ones are more likely to report feelings of closeness to the party, as measured by the index described above. Defections are few among the Republicans, and

Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology by Contributor Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of all Dem Contributors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of all Dem Contributors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson's r=.29, Tau b=.25, p < .000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of all Rep Contributors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson's r=-.03, Tau b=-.03, not significant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>15%</th>
<th>80%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>17%</th>
<th>77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>79%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
all groups share an equally strong conservative stance. In many ways, these differences between the parties hint of the stereotypical differences we historically associate with the Democrats and the Republicans—i.e., that the Democratic Party is the party for "the common man", as evidenced by the attributes associated with the smaller Democratic contributor. In contrast, the Republican party is the party of the wealthy, as evidenced by the stronger feelings of party closeness associated with the larger ones.

E. Patterns of political contributing

Once again, expectations are that our larger contributors will display more sophisticated patterns of giving. They will be more likely to give to both political parties; have multiple geographic foci for their party contributions; give to a greater number of candidates than smaller contributors; and make political contributions through more than one channel. (A channel is defined as one of the following: party; candidate; or other political group, including political action committees, [PACs] [Jones, 1989].) The evidence suggests larger contributors are more fully integrated into the political system, behaving as elitist versions of Verba & Nie's complete activists. We could call them "complete contributors" or "sophisticated contributors"—i.e., people who utilize many contributing mechanisms, and utilize them frequently.

One indication of contributing sophistication could be "switch hitting," defined as giving to both political parties. While party switch-hitting is not all that common among our contributors (only 8% of our sample engaged in it), it does occur and, when it does, it is more likely to occur among the medium and large contributors to both parties, with the Democratic large contributors being the most likely of all to engage in it. Even when the 21 mavericks are removed, the differences among the Democrats remain.
Why would any party self-identifier choose to support the other party, too? On the surface, switch-hitting seems counterproductive if the objective of political contributing is to further a certain candidate, cause or ideology. There are explanations that make switch-hitting very productive, however. If the objective of the contribution is strategic—for example as "insurance" to assure access—then it makes sense to contribute to opposing candidates and parties. One would want to assure access under a variety of circumstances and with a variety of people. Or, if the objective is social, then switch-hitting makes sense, as being solicited by friends, candidates and party personnel, as well as soliciting friends, attending high-priced fundraisers, and being privy to inside political information reserved for the select few, becomes a reward of a different kind. This will be discussed more in the following chapter.

Though we have been dealing primarily with contributors' contributions to the state parties, each contributor could also give to one or both major political parties at the local level as well as the national level. These levels will be referred to as geographic foci, as the term "levels of contribution" can be confused with "amount of contribution". The survey instrument allows for collection of information on all these geographic foci of party contributions for 1988. One respondent, therefore, could have focused his contributions on the local party, the state party, the national party, or any combination thereof. He could have focused similar contributions on the opposing party at the local, state or national levels.\(^7\) If larger contributors are more fully integrated politically they should be more likely to have

---

\(^7\)Self-reported levels of contribution were used to calculate this variable. While we know that all respondents were contributors to at least one level (state level) since some respondents failed to report their party contributions for 1988 and others failed to enumerate the specifics of contributions made, the response category of "none" becomes valid.
Table 10

Geographic Foci of Contributions to Party of Record by Contributor Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None</th>
<th>1 focus</th>
<th>2 foci</th>
<th>3 foci</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson's r=-.05, Tau c=-.05, not significant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson's r=.25, Tau c=.21, p&lt;.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

multiple foci for their party of record, indicating a broad range of political contacts and concerns. Table 10 shows these levels of giving for the party of record.

Among the Democratic contributors, there is no significant difference in the number of levels to which they contribute, with or without the 21 mavericks. For the Republicans, the chance of having multiple foci increases with the size of contribution.

A related question is, which contributor categories are more likely to have multiple foci for contributing to the opposing party? As noted earlier, party loyalty is strong, as only 12% of the Democrats and 8% of the Republicans contribute to the opposition. When it does occur, however, it is more likely to occur among the medium and large contributors of both parties, especially the large contributors. The results hold for the Democrats, with or without the mavericks.
With regard to respondents’ contributions to candidates, expectations are that larger contributors would be more likely to support a greater number of candidates. After all, larger contributors are more apt to live in a daily world that is full of political contacts and conversation. Because of this, they would get many requests, to which they have both the means and the interest to respond. If their political contributing habits are long term, as we suspect, then they may have accumulated a growing number of candidates to whom they regularly contribute. They may have also accumulated a growing number of political "buddies" with whom they’re mutually supportive with regard to political causes and candidates. Confounding the above reasons may be strategic explanations. Their executive status may make it wise for them to spread their support among all those to whom they may need access. To test whether or not larger contributors support more candidates, the number of candidates each respondent reported contributing to is counted (see questions A4 through A12 in Appendix B) and crosstabulated with contributor groups, as shown in Table 11.

Medium and large contributors to both parties tend to give to more candidates than small contributors, with the Democrats, with or without the 21 mavericks, having a slightly more even distribution across contributor categories. Of interest among the Republicans is the large percentage of small contributors (46%) who make no candidate contributions and the small percentage of large contributors (6%) who do the same. This supports both the "direct mail contributor" notion with regard to the small contributor and the "complete" or "sophisticated" contributor notion with regard to large contributors.

Another measurement of political sophistication might be the number of channels through which a respondent contributes to political causes. We define channels as per Jones (1989), as a way of funneling money. It can be through candidates, parties or groups that support or oppose issues or candidates. (A political action committee—PAC—would be such a
We would expect a more sophisticated contributor to use a greater number of different channels than a less sophisticated one, much for the same reasons he or she would give to a greater number of candidates.

This concept is operationalized by counting the number of different channels each respondent reported using. Republican contributors follow the expected pattern. The larger the contribution to the Ohio Republican Party, the more likely the respondent is to have used multiple channels in 1988. Among the Democratic contributors, however, there is no significant difference among contributor groups. This presents a puzzlement. Could it be evidence of "strategic" giving, as discussed earlier? The logic would be something like this: those who give to political causes, hoping for material gains in return, might expect those gains from candidate and party contributions, but might not expect them from PAC contributions, where the contributor is less or not at all identifiable to those in decision-making capacities.

Table 11
Number of Candidate Contributions by Contributor Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11+</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson's $r = .17$, Tau $c = .16$, $p < .05$

<p>| | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republicans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson's $r = .46$, Tau $c = .39$, $p < .000$
Why would identification as a contributor be important to a strategic giver? Because the party or candidate from whom access is being sought must be able to identify the contributor in order to provide access. Therefore, the strategic givers among the medium and large Democratic contributors would seldom score a "3" on the channels variable, as they would only use two of the channels—parties and candidates. This might be enough to keep differences among the contributor groups from being evident. There is support for this idea when we remove the 21 mavericks from the Democratic group. Differences among contributor groups become significant (though weakly so).

To investigate further, additional crosstabs were done with contributor categories as the dependent variable, contributions to PACs, etc. as the independent variable, with controls for contribution motivation (discussed in depth later) dichotomized into 1) ideological motivations and 2) business or personal motivations. It becomes evident that the Democratic medium contributor who donates to parties and/or candidates for business or personal reasons is extremely unlikely to donate to PACs or similar groups! Eighty to 85% of this group gave no PAC contribution in 1988. No such clear differences exist among the other contributors.

This supports the idea that giving to PACs promises few strategic rewards, as the contributor's identity is "shrouded" by aggregation with other contributors. When the PAC in turn makes a contribution to organizations and candidates, the name (and sometimes the address) of the PAC appears on the receiving entity's report, but not the names of the individuals who contributed to the PACs. Those only appear on separate filings each PAC must make (in the case of Ohio). Thus, it is a two-step process to identify individuals who contribute to parties or candidates through PACs. Identity of individual contributors is lost. An individual contributor to a PAC also loses control of the contribution, as many PACs have a board that decides which contributions will go to what organization or candidate.
Undoubtedly, the contributor’s influence would be greatly "diluted" by such a process. In addition, most PACs have an ideological purpose. Strategic giving, on the other hand, has a material motivation behind it, hence could be incompatible with the goals of most PACs.

Another way of assessing political sophistication among contributors is to ask, "How often do you contribute to political candidates or groups?" (See question A17, Appendix B). Based on our previous data, we would expect larger contributors to be more frequent contributors, and not just in a presidential election year. This notion is tapped by a variable that attempts to expand the measurement beyond 1988 to include general patterns across the years. Table 12 depicts the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Political Contributions by Contributor Category</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Less than once a year</th>
<th>1 to 4 times a year</th>
<th>5 or more times a year</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson’s r = .15, P < .05; Tau b = .11, p = .05

|                |                       |                     |                        |    |
| **Republicans**|                       |                     |                        |    |
| Small          | 22%                   | 68%                 | 10%                    | 126|
| Medium         | 7                     | 78                  | 15                     | 100|
| Large          | 7                     | 53                  | 40                     | 70 |

Pearson’s r = .31, Tau b = .28, p < .000

Larger contributors contribute more frequently, as expected. The differences among the contributor groups are less among the Democrats, with or without the mavericks, than among the Republicans. This is consistent with what we know about our larger contributors to this point. They give to more parties, more candidates, use more channels and more
geographic party foci. It isn’t just that they can and do contribute generously to the state political parties. It’s that they can and do contribute frequently to a variety of political causes.

Finally, we would expect larger contributors to belong to what Ogden (1968, p. 279) calls a giving circle. We expect them to have friends, relatives and/or associates who make political contributions and who engage in mutual solicitation and mutual contributing. Certainly, this is consistent with how large donations are solicited in other arenas, as well as consistent with the discussion earlier about the different techniques parties use for different contributors. Further, we would expect this mutuality to decrease among smaller contributors, suspecting that their contribution is a more isolated act, rather than an expression of sociability and status. We especially would expect Republican small contributors to show little evidence of integration in a giving circle if their contribution is indeed a response to a direct mail appeal, rather than evidence of political activism.

The concept of a giving circle is operationalized by a series of questions (A20, A21, A22 in Appendix B) that simply ask each respondent: 1) Do any of your friends, relatives or associates make political contributions? 2) Have any of your friends, relatives or associates ever solicited you for political contributions? And 3) have you ever solicited any of your friends, relatives or associates for political contributions?

Each respondent was assigned a score from 0 to 3 on the giving circle scale. A score of 0 indicated no integration—i.e., neither the respondents’ friends, nor relatives nor associates made political contributions. A score of 1 indicated that friends, etc., gave, but no mutual solicitation occurred. A score of 2 indicated that friends gave and solicited the respondent, or that friends gave and were solicited by the respondent. In neither case was mutual solicitation
Table 13

Giving Circle Scores by Contributor Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson’s r = .18, Tau c = .15, p < .05

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson’s r = .48, Tau c = .44, p < .000

Respondents’ scores on the giving circle variable are then crosstabulated with contributor categories, as shown in Table 13.

For both the Democrats and the Republicans, a larger contribution is indicative of more integration in the giving circle. The differences between the two parties is striking, however. For the Democrats, with or without the mavericks, the relationship between level of integration and size of contribution is weak, due to the Democratic small contributors exhibiting more integration than their Republican counterparts. Overall, the Democrats are slightly more integrated than the Republicans, as 75% of all Democrats score either a 2 or 3 on this variable, while 63% of the Republicans do. This might be consistent with the Democratic state environment in the 1980s, mentioned earlier. State employees, many of whom would have been both Democrats and modestly paid, would find themselves immersed
in a daily job environment conducive to mutual solicitation, hence the higher scores among smaller contributors. Unfortunately, the survey questionnaire did not ask specifically if respondents or their spouses worked for the state government, though a few volunteered that information in their job description. Hence, the numbers of those employed by the state are too few to explore this hypothesis further. The Republicans, however, show the strong and expected pattern—small contributors are weakly integrated while larger contributors are very integrated. This supports the "direct mail contributor" as well as the "hierarchy" notion.

What does it mean to have a high level of integration in the giving circle? It may be indicative of a highly political lifestyle, one in which the respondent frequently talks politics with friends, relatives and associates. During these talks there may be an exchange of political contributing plans as well as mutual requests for support of parties and/or candidates that are appealing. A well-integrated respondent would be more likely to receive multiple requests, many of those occurring in person. Since friendships might override ideology, especially if there are expectations of a quid-pro-quo relationship with another—that is, you give to my party or candidate and I will give to yours—we would expect to find more party switch-hitting, multiple candidate contributions and more frequent contributing among the well integrated. That is indeed what we do find, with variations within the two parties.

By now it is clear that larger contributors are in general much more integrated into the political arena, giving more frequently, through more channels, to multiple recipients within those channels, and engaging in mutual solicitation with others in their family, social and business circles. We would expect this contributing and soliciting activity not to be just an occasional "spurt" in their political year brought on by the heat of the political campaigns near election time, but to be a way of life. Indeed, larger contributors do give earlier, as well as more often in the year. While the timing of these contributions is heavily influenced by
when the parties solicit their different contributors, the point here is that early financial participation, when coupled with the other trends we have examined so far, could be considered indicative of political contributing as a style of life.

F. Attitudes toward the campaigns of 1988

Do those who have more of a vested interest in the political campaigns, in terms of money contributed, display more activism, interest and caring? Logic as well as previous research on political activists would expect us to believe they would. These issues are explored using a set of questions that parallel those used by the ANES, so that comparisons to the general population are possible. As shown in Appendix D, there is a hierarchy evident. Interest, caring, and internal efficacy increase as we move from ANES noncontributors, to ANES check-off-only contributors, to ANES organizational contributors. Our Ohio contributors, technically, would be comparable to the ANES organizational contributors, but they appear to constitute an even more elite version of typical ANES contributors, as they tend to be even more likely to display high levels of interest, caring and internal efficacy.

But, there is also a hierarchy among the Ohio contributors, and our expectations are that position in the hierarchy is related to contribution amount. First, we might expect larger contributors to perform more of the campaign acts typically asked about—i.e. trying to persuade others how to vote; displaying a political button, sticker or sign; attending political meetings of some sort; or doing other work for the parties or candidates (see questions D3 through D7 in Appendix B). To see if this is so, we simply count the number of campaign acts each respondent reported performing, creating scores for each respondent that ranged from 0 to 4.
Once again, the Republican contributors match our expectations. The larger the contribution, the greater the number of campaign acts performed. The Democrats, once again, show a weaker but opposite trend. The smaller the contribution, the greater the number of campaign acts performed. When the 21 mavericks are removed, however, there are no significant differences among the contributor groups. This indicates that our mavericks are very unlikely to be actively engaged with their party of contribution, further supporting the idea that theirs were strategic contributions, indicative of no underlying party commitment.

Next, we might expect the larger contributor to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs more regularly than the smaller contributor. One reason, of course, is his/her integration in the giving circle. People who ask each other for political contributions would be more inclined to talk politics with each other and be stimulated to keep abreast of current affairs. This concept was tapped using the typical ANES format. Not surprisingly, the majority of all our respondents (79%) fall in the most active category. Variation among contributor groups, when it does occur, is among the Republicans. It is in the expected direction—i.e., larger contributors tend to follow government and public affairs most of the time. There is no significant difference among the Democrats, with or without the 21 mavericks.

As with the preceding question, the results of the question asking respondents how interested they were in the campaigns of 1988 (see question E3 in Appendix B) showed little variation. By and large, Ohio contributors are a politically interested lot. Differences among contributor groups are small with regard to interest in the 1988 campaigns, but they are in opposite directions for the Democrats and Republicans. Democratic small contributors show
more interest, as do Republican large contributors. For the Democrats, the differences hold when the 21 mavericks are removed.

We move now to those questions that tap attitudes toward the 1988 presidential election in particular. Respondents were asked, "In the 1988 Presidential election, how much did you care about who won?" (See question E4 in Appendix B.) As with some of the other questions adopted from the ANES, there is little variation. The overwhelming majority (89%) cared a good deal who won. Still, the variation that does occur is of interest. Among Democrats, both with and without the mavericks, the tendency is for smaller contributors to care more. Among Republicans, the opposite tendency is true.

The next variable, presidential vote, sheds more light on the differences found in "caring." Defections—i.e., voting for the candidate of the opposite party—were common among Democrats, with or without the mavericks. The larger the contribution, the more likely the contributor was to defect. Republicans from all contributor categories, however, stayed with the party's candidate.

One way of explaining these differences utilizes the strategic explanation referred to before—i.e., that many of the Democratic defectors are really strategic givers with questionable party loyalties in a Democratic political environment. This explanation is consistent with previous data.

Another explanation takes into account the environment of the 1988 presidential elections in which many Democrats found themselves increasingly dissatisfied with the party's nominee, Dukakis, while Republicans found themselves fairly satisfied with their party's nominee, Bush. While this second explanation might have some validity, it does not explain the few defections among the Democratic small contributors, who remained steadfastly loyal to Dukakis. Ninety-seven percent of them voted for him! If this
second explanation is to be regarded as important, one would expect to find noticeable
defections among all contributor groups. We do not.

G. Motives behind the contributions

The final dimension on which to compare contributors is contribution motivations. We
expect to find smaller contributors more motivated by ideological concerns. They lack the
personal political networks and reasons for strategic giving we find among the larger
contributors. Their contributions, therefore, are be more likely to be in response to the
appeals reserved for the general public: ideological appeals, candidate qualifications, issue or
platform considerations. Larger contributors, on the other hand, are more likely to be
surrounded by friends, relatives and associates who engage in mutual solicitation, hence
would respond more frequently to friendship motivations. We would also expect them to
respond to business motivations, as larger contributors, as shown by their executive status, are
more likely to be in positions where political favors, contracts and contacts are important.

Respondents were asked to identify their first, second and third most important
motivation for contributing to political parties and political candidates. In each instance, they
were given a list of motivations from which to select, as well as an opportunity to provide an
open-ended answer. (See questions A3 and A14 in Appendix B.) We will deal only with
their most important motivation here, reserving further exploration of motivations for another
study. Most important motivations were dichotimized thusly: the following responses to
question A3 were collapsed into one category called "ideological motivations"—to support
party’s presidential candidate; to support party’s other candidates; and to support party’s
policies and platforms. Collapsed into the category labeled "business or personal motivations"
were: desire to support a friend, associate or family member who requested contribution; and for job or business reasons, as shown in Table 14.

Overall, the vast majority of all contributors (83%) give what might be called ideological or politically substantive reasons as their first motivation for contributing to political parties. When party controls are added, however, an interesting deviation is found among the larger Democratic contributors. Here, the larger the contribution, the more likely the contributor is to give business or personal reasons as the primary motive. Surprisingly, this difference holds even when the 21 mavericks are removed. Among Republicans, however, there is no significant difference among contributor groups. All are heavily and almost uniformly ideological.

The same pattern, but more exaggerated, appears when we look at motivations behind candidate contributions, as ascertained by question A14 and shown in Table 15. In this
instance, the following responses were collapsed into "ideological motivations": support of
candidate’s stand on the issues; candidate’s background and qualifications; candidate’s
political party affiliation. Collapsed into "business or personal motivations" were: friendship
with the candidate; friend, associate or family member asked you to contribute; assure access
to candidate if he/she is elected; and job or business reasons. Many of our small contributors
are not represented in this data, as they made no candidate contributions. Among those who
are represented, however, a substantial majority (77%) gave ideological reasons as the most
important motivation behind their candidate contributions. In a way, this is surprising.
Parties are more impersonal entities than candidates. We might expect candidate contributions
to be at least equally motivated by job or personal considerations. Because they are not, we
might infer that, for most contributors, there must be some substantive alignment with the
candidate—i.e., approval of stance on issues, qualifications, etc.—before more personal
motivations can take effect. Referring again to Table 15, we find that significant differences
exist among the Democratic contributors. The larger the contribution, the more likely the
contributor is to be motivated by business or personal reasons. Once again, the differences
remain when the 21 mavericks are removed. Republican contributors, on the other hand, are
almost uniformly ideologically motivated across all contributor groups. The slight deviations
that do occur are among the medium contributors who, for both party and candidate
contributions, are slightly more motivated by business and personal reasons than
their smaller and larger counterparts. If strategic contributing is occurring among the
Republicans, this suggests that this might be the group doing it.
Table 15
Candidate Contributions
Most Important Motivation by Contributor Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideological</th>
<th>Business or Personal</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson’s r = .33, Tau c = .33, p < .000

|                |              |                      |    |
| **Republicans**|              |                      |    |
| Small          | 90%          | 10%                  | 61 |
| Medium         | 77           | 23                   | 73 |
| Large          | 85           | 15                   | 69 |

Pearson’s r = .06, Tau c = .05, not significant

To be certain 1) that all the relationships just presented were not an artifact of the contributor categories and 2) that the relationships were basically monotonic as implied by the foregoing analysis, alternate computations were performed. In general, these alternate methods of exploring the data confirm the previous results.8

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8Would the correlations just discussed have the same values when the dependent variable, the actual contribution amount, was allowed to run its full range instead of being collapsed into contributor categories? To see if it would, additional correlations were computed for all the independent variables, with the dependent variable being the log of the actual contribution amount. As was done with similar calculations for demographic variables, the log was used to correct for the effect of a few extreme cases.

When this was done correlations generally were the same as with contributor categories, or were strengthened slightly. Appendix D shows the comparison of the correlations computed these two ways.

Another methodological consideration was the implied monotonicity of the relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables. Were basically monotonic relationships occurring, or were important "glitches" in the data being hidden by the crosstabulations and correlations? To determine this, contributor categories were collapsed two additional ways and crosstabulations and correlations computed again for all the independent variables. The two additional collapsing and recoding of contributor categories were as follows: 1) major and large contributors were collapsed, as before, and medium and
H. Conclusion

We turn now to summarize the differences and explore the implications of the data presented. First we look at differences between our contributors and the general population, then at differences among those in the different contributor categories. Finally, we examine differences between parties.

Compared to the general population, contributors to the Ohio Democratic Party and the Ohio Republican Party in 1988 are older, more predominantly male, wealthier, more educated, and extremely more politically integrated and involved. Clearly, those in our Ohio sample are among the political elite, to be classed, as a group, as complete activists. They are more elite than even the organizational contributors identified by Jones (1989) in her study of ANES contributors.

All Ohio contributors, however, are not equal. Among contributor groups, as differentiated by the actual amount of the state party contribution, we find many expected small contributors were collapsed into one category, forming a dichotomous dependent variable with the categories being "larger" and "smaller"; 2) major and large contributors were assigned to missing data and "medium" and "small" contributors became the new dichotomies. These new correlations confirmed the previous findings and the basically monotonic relationships between the dependent and independent variables. There are a few differences worth noting.

Democratic small contributors, for instance, appear to associate themselves even more strongly with the party than previously indicated in terms of feelings of membership and party activism. Their positions as intensely interested citizens and campaign activists are also strengthened in comparison to their medium and large counterparts. Could this explain their tendency to greatly exaggerate the amount of their contribution? Perhaps they name a figure consistent with their enthusiasm, not their wallets.

Among Republicans, it becomes even clearer that the large contributor is a breed apart from the medium and small contributor in terms of sophistication. The correlations discussed previously strengthen for this group when computed these new ways, but a basic monotonicity still exists. We do find two deviations from monotonicity, both concerning motives behind the contributions. It is the medium Republican contributor who is more likely to list business or personal motives as reasons for both party and candidate contributions. Thus, when strategic giving appears among Republicans, it is most likely to be associated with this group.

In general, these alternative methods of exploring the data confirm the previous results. Please see Appendix E for these data.
differences. Many of those differences are the same as exist between our contributors and the general population. That is, larger contributors tend to be older, male, wealthier, more educated, Protestant and more politically interested and involved than smaller contributors. In addition, they tend to hold executive-status jobs that entail a good deal of decision-making responsibility. They tend to be well integrated in giving circles. Not only do their friends, relatives and associates make political contributions, but their friends, etc., engage in mutual solicitation with them for political causes. The evidence of this integration is apparent not only in higher giving circle scores, but in other contributing patterns. These patterns include more frequent switch hitting—i.e., giving to both political parties simultaneously; having multiple geographic foci for their party contributions—state, local and national; a greater likelihood of using multiple channels for political contributing—i.e., parties, candidates and other political groups; and giving to a greater number of candidates. Larger contributors also have more deeply ingrained habits of contributing, giving more frequently to political causes. In general, they engage in more campaign acts and show more interest in public affairs, politics and campaigns. As a group, they are the elite among the elite, displaying what might be called "inner circle" attributes and operating close to the heart of political power.

In comparison, their smaller contributing counterparts are on the political periphery. They look like elites when compared to the population at large, but look more like novices when compared to larger contributors.

When we look at our Democratic contributors separately from our Republican contributors, however, there is a striking difference. The typical Democratic small contributor and the typical Republican large contributor have much in common. True to the concept of class-based party differences, they are the most likely to consider themselves active members of their respective parties; perform the greatest number of campaign acts; show the
most interest in government and public affairs in general and the 1988 campaigns in particular; and care most intensely who won the 1988 presidential election. More than their fellow party contributors, they are the carriers of their parties’ creeds.

In contrast to their smaller counterparts, medium and large Democratic contributors show more tendencies to be strategic givers than party faithful. Their ideology is as likely to be moderate and/or conservative as it is to be liberal. They have only a weak tendency to exhibit more inner circle attributes than their smaller counterparts—i.e., higher giving circle scores, more switch hitting, more frequent political contributing, etc.—yet they display less activism and a lot more self interest, as measured by the fewer number of campaign acts performed and the business and personal motives behind their contributions.

The explanation for these differences among Democrats, alluded to many times before, may be environmental. Certainly, the effects of the 21 mavericks on the data support this explanation. The 1980s were predominantly Democratic years in the state of Ohio. There was time, by 1988, for strong strategic patterns of contributing to the Democratic Party to develop. While the environmental explanation seems to be a plausible one for patterns of contributing among the Ohio Democrats, it would take similar studies in other states to confirm whether or not strategic contributing is associated with the dominant state party, or whether strategic giving is more associated with the Democratic party, regardless of the political environment.

Ohio itself may provide its own test of the idea, as the Republicans took control of two key state offices in the 1990 election—governor and secretary of state. With more evenly divided party control of state government now in effect, one would expect strategic giving to appear more frequently among both the parties if the environmental explanation holds true.
What about other differences between the parties? The Democrats, as pointed out earlier, have not been as aggressive as the Republicans in developing direct mail contributors. This may account for their contributors being fewer and the ideology and activism of their smaller contributors not being "diluted" by direct-mail Democrats.

The Republican contributors show the expected patterns among the contributor groups, with small contributors consistently displaying peripheral attributes as compared to their medium and large counterparts, whose reported attitudes and behavior place them in the political "inner circle." The smaller contributor identifies himself/herself as a Republican and as a conservative, but shows weaker feelings of party activism and membership, gives to fewer levels of the Republican party, fewer (or no) candidates, uses fewer channels, contributes less frequently, and performs fewer campaign acts. Certainly, these contributors are "party faithful," but display the attributes we'd expect of a group whose members may be more likely to have a direct-mail relationship with the political party.

The medium Republican contributor falls in the mid-range of the spectrum between the small and the large, with one exception. This is the group that shows more signs of strategic giving, as discussed under "motives." The larger Republican contributors are classic examples of Republican "good old boys." They are likely to be presidents, chief executive officers or managing partners in the business world, have annual incomes in excess of $100,000, hold graduate degrees, and profess strong party identity. They also display a variety of political activism. They are involved in political campaigns and are deeply integrated in political giving circles, which may explain their tendency to donate to the Democrats—i.e., friendship and ethics of mutuality may override partisan concerns. We might speculate that the seven "housewives" discussed earlier who gave large contributions, listed large incomes, yet were unemployed outside the home, were their wives or widows, who
participated in the giving circles along with their husband and associates.

There is clear evidence of a distinct hierarchy among our Ohio contributors, as differentiated by the amount of contribution and the party to which it was made. Identifying many attributes on which political party contributors differ, however, is only a first step. To be able to suggest policy directions that may make campaign finance laws more effective, we need to understand the deeper motives which account for the observed variations discussed in this chapter. Ultimately, we need to know why large contributors are so incorrigible and why small contributors are so difficult to encourage. To explore the motivational structure behind the correlates of contributing, we need a more powerful analytical tool, one that will allow us to use the explanatory power of all our attitudinal and behavioral variables simultaneously.

The next chapter deals with this subject.
Chapter V
Factors Behind the Finances

If, as some have argued, political parties are in decline, and if campaigns for office are getting progressively more candidate centered, why does anyone still contribute to a political party at all, especially a state political party? It has neither the grandeur of a national party, nor the hominess of a county party. If political access is the goal of the political contributor, wouldn’t it make more sense to give money directly to candidates? If an issue or issues are the burning concern, wouldn’t PACs provide a more direct conversion of political funds into political persuasion? If social status or friendship is the goal, aren’t there other environments more conducive to mutuality among contributors than the state political party environment? And if one wishes to influence the presidential general election, there are others ways to do so. One can, for instance, use independent expenditures, which would keep the contributor in control of his/her own money, rather than turning over sums that range up to $60,000 to a state party to manage. It is surprising, therefore, that many contribute to a state political party at all. Yet, about 2,700 individuals did make a direct contribution to one of the state parties in Ohio in 1988, and an undetermined number did so indirectly, through PACs, partnerships, and local and national parties.

Why did they do it? Are the reasons as diverse as the contributors? Are some reasons more important to some, less important to others? Is there a structure to political
contributing that can help us understand the motives for contributing, as well as the relationship between the contributor and the object of the contribution?

Using exploratory factor analysis as the technique and a wide range of attitudinal and behavioral variables as the objects of analysis, this chapter attempts to identify motives behind political contributing. It then explores differences among contributor categories with regard to those motives. Finally, it starts the exploration of the policy questions that were posed in the first part of this dissertation.

Like other studies of contributors, this one has been descriptive, measuring differences among contributors as differentiated by the amount of their contributions and the parties to which they were given. Description, however, is only an intermediate goal. The ultimate goal is to generalize, to develop or confirm theory. "Facts or data are meaningless in themselves. They must be illuminated by a conceptual scheme or theory. By their shadows, facts will then be known" (Rummel, 1979, p. 27). In this chapter, a theoretical framework helps to identify broader dimensions underlying the differences among the contributors. First, factor analysis is presented as the appropriate tool to assist in the theoretical development, then the literature relevant to the dimensions behind the act of political contributing is discussed, and finally the results of the factor analysis are presented.

A. The Appropriateness of Factor Analysis

In discussing factors as formal concepts, Rummel (1979) uses a "black box" analogy, imagining a set of buttons (input) at one end of the black box, and a set of lights (output) at the other end, but not the intervening mechanism that connects the buttons to the lights. With political contributors, the buttons might be seen as information about the
contributors from the survey data (input), and the lights as the timing and amount of their contributions to the state political parties in 1988 (output). "If the input and output observations for the box are factor-analyzed together, the resulting dimensions will define a model of the box's inner mechanism" (ibid, p. 20). The inner dimensions we seek are the causal ones behind the contributions to the state political parties. While it is satisfying and illuminating to know how our contributors differ on the many variables discussed so far, it is also cumbersome to think about, apply, and relate to existing concepts of political participation. Of more utility would be a concise method that allows us to tap the essence of their differences, a method that allows our understanding to move from the data overload of the inductively descriptive and move to the simplicity, elegance and deeper understanding of what may become a deductive approach for future research. We want to look for the sources from which our observed variations spring.

In factor analysis, these sources are "factors" or latent variables, ones that cannot be measured directly, just as we cannot see the inside of our black box. But, by analyzing the co-variation in variables we can measure directly, the nature of the factors can be known. Ultimately, the goal of factor analysis is to account for as much of the variation in the data as we can with as few factors as possible in an attempt to account for the major causes of the variation we're observing (MacCallum, 1987).

There are basically two types of factor analysis—exploratory and confirmatory. Exploratory is the correct approach when we are analyzing with no prior hypotheses and want to investigate the data to see what factors might be there. To test the hypotheses so developed a new data set and confirmatory factor analysis is required. Confirmatory factor analysis, then, requires that we suspect the nature and number of the factors and test this prior hypothesis with data. Technically, the method that will be used in this study is
exploratory, as we will be analyzing as if there were no definitive idea as to the nature and number of the main dimensions influencing our data. There are theoretical expectations, however, based on previous research work and on the results of the analysis to this point. Hence, this factor analysis has elements of both the exploratory and the confirmatory, but the technique used will be that of the exploratory, as the expectations are tentative.

B. Previous Research on Dimensions Among Contributors

In 1961, Clark and Wilson published a theory of incentive systems offered by organizations, a theory that has been applied to political contributors by several scholars. It captures the essence of organizations and members’ relationships to them. This theory will be central to our discussion.

"Organizations," say Clark and Wilson, "distribute incentive systems to individuals in order to induce them to contribute activity" (1961, p. 139). Clark and Wilson distinguish three types of incentives: purposive, solidary and material. Purpose incentives are intangible, but they derive in the main from the stated ends of the association rather than from the simple act of associating. These inducements are to be found in the suprapersonal goals of the organization: the demand for the enactment of certain laws or the adoption of certain practices (which do not benefit the members in any direct or tangible way)....The end system is deeply implicated in the incentive system of the association. The members are brought together to seek some change in the status quo, not simply to enjoy one another’s presence. The latter may be rewarding, but it is insufficient to maintain the group (ibid, p. 135-136).

Like purposive incentives, solidary incentives are also intangible. That is, ...the reward has no monetary value and cannot easily be translated into one that has. These inducements vary widely. They derive in the main from the act of associating and include such rewards as socializing, congeniality, the sense of group membership and identification, the status resulting from membership, fun and conviviality, the maintenance of social distinctions, and so on. Their common characteristic is that they tend to be independent of the precise ends of the association. Groups held together
by solidary incentives are relatively flexible about the stated goals of the group. Of course, in practice, no group is utterly indifferent to its ends. What is stressed here is only the analytic nature of the incentives and their logical separability from ends (ibid, p. 135).

In contrast to the intangible rewards offered by the purposive and solidary incentives, material incentives are tangible rewards:

...that is, rewards that have a monetary value or can easily be translated into ones that have. These include money in the form of wages and salaries, the tangible benefits of a taxpayers' association to its members, the improvement in property values for a neighborhood redevelopment association or the increase in wages and other "fringe" benefits obtained by a labor union (ibid, p. 134).

Brown, Hedges and Powell (1980a) apply the Clark-Wilson framework to an analysis of a sample of individuals who contributed or loaned over $100 to a variety of committees that helped finance the 1972 presidential campaigns. They assigned each of thirteen motives for political activity to one of the Clark-Wilson incentive systems and, using multiple regression, found that in general the Clark-Wilson motivations predicted the modes of participation that had been identified: i.e., campaigning for candidates and parties, contributing, using their position or office to help others who requested it, voting, and mobilizing others. They expected to find solidary incentives predicting a wide range of political activity, including campaigning, mobilizing and "using good office", based on the social nature of these modes of participation. They expected it to be unrelated to contributing and voting, as "these activities are individualistic in character and do not require cooperation with others" (ibid, p. 279).

They also expected the purposive incentive to predict a wide range of activities, and had tentative expectations regarding the material motivation. Four of their five modes
of participation are indeed well predicted by the three Clark-Wilson motivations. Only the voting mode eludes good prediction.

Hedges (1984) finds purposive motivations, particularly the desire to affect public policy, dominant among the same contributors to the 1972 presidential campaigns. In a study of contributors to House campaigns in 1978, Powell (1980) also finds purposive incentives, but finds more evidence of solidary and material motivations.

Green and Guth (1986) pull these separate findings together during a study of 1982 contributors to parties and PACs. They find that "the less access donors have to recipient organizations, the more important purposive incentives seem to be, and contrariwise, more access is available to donors, the greater the incidence of solidary and material incentives" (p. 5). In a subsequent study of contributors to House and Senate campaigns in 1988, McAdams and Green (1990) find, in their preliminary analysis, that purposive incentives are the most important to their donors, followed by solidary and material. However, these congressional donors differ from other donors that have been studied, they say, because they "report the least incidence of purposive incentives and the highest incidence of solidary and material incentives, to produce the richest mixture of motivations of all donor groups" (p. 29). McAdams and Green characterize this last group of donors as more elite than other donors that have been studied.

Based on work by these scholars, as well as the analysis of state party contributors to this point, there should be evidence of purposive motivations among most of the state party contributors, and solidary and material motivations among the higher-status, larger contributors to both parties. It is these larger contributors who are more likely to belong to the kinds of social, professional and family networks where mutuality in contributing is a way of life. In addition, their executive status may require that they protect their
business interests by making strategic political contributions. Many of our smaller contributors do not belong to such networks. Material incentives are likely to be the driving force behind medium Democratic contributors, though there should some evidence of it among our larger contributors to both parties. Also, based on our prior analysis, we expect purposive incentives among our contributors to have several variations: those who give because they wish to support the party's presidential candidate in the general election, and those who give out of other purposive incentives, as yet unidentified. We would expect no fewer than three factors—one for each of the Clark-Wilson incentive systems, plus variations on the purposive. We turn now to a factor analysis of our relevant variables, looking for the dimensions just discussed.

C. Selection of Input and Output: the Observed Variables

To return to Rummel's black box analogy, our understanding of the mechanism within the black box can be no better than the quality of the variables we choose to observe at both ends of the box. The choice of these variables is made on several criteria:

1. Only contributors' attitudinal and behavioral variables, or indices built from these variables, are included, as motivations are attitudinal and behaviorally based. Demographics variables have been excluded. (Demographic variables are often used as surrogates for attitudinal and behavioral measures. Because of the richness of the latter, there is no need for the former in this portion of the analysis.)

2. Demonstrated ability of the variable to tap differences among contributor groups and/or the parties of contribution, as discussed in other chapters.

3. No variable has a perfect linear relationship to any other variable.

4. The missing data on the variables are minimized as much as possible in order to allow estimation of factor scores for the contributor categories.

Because of the exploratory nature of this analysis, more rather than fewer variables have been included, sacrificing some parsimony for comprehensiveness. Most of the
variables used in the factor analysis are the same as the ones described in Chapters IV and VI, with a few exceptions. The included variables are:

Log of party contribution: logarithm of each respondent's total state party contribution for 1988, as recorded on the campaign finance reports. As previously mentioned, because of the tremendous disparities between the smallest and largest contributions, the logarithm gives more consistent results than the actual contributions.

Time of contribution: this variable is coded 1 to 4, depending on the campaign finance report from which each respondent's first party contribution for 1988 was drawn. 1 = pre primary; 2 = post primary; 3 = pre general; 4 = post general.

Strength of intention to contribute to presidential general election campaign: this is the soft money variable, coded 0 to 3, as will be discussed in depth in the next chapter.

Affinity for Bush: respondent's mean affinity for Bush, as created from the ratings on five different qualities--compassion, morality, leadership, caring and knowledge. Explained in more detail in the next chapter.

Affinity for Dukakis: scored similarly to affinity for Bush.

Issue agreement with Dukakis: proximity of respondent's issue position to that of Dukakis, as used in Chapter VI.

Issue agreement with Bush: similar to the immediately preceding variable.

Federal spending attitude: this is a new measure, created from question F1 of the questionnaire (See Appendix B). It is each respondent's mean response to spending preferences for up to 14 federal programs. Responses ran the gamut from 1 to 5, with many decimal positions between. (Note: Before creating this index, the 14 federal programs were factored separately to be sure they constituted a single dimension. They did.)

Presidential vote in 1988: dichotomized into 1 = Bush, 2 = Dukakis.

Number of Democratic Party contribution foci: as used in Chapter IV. Scored 0 to 3, depending on how many levels respondent reported contributing to. (Levels = none, local, state, national.)

Number of Republican Party contribution foci: Similar to the preceding variable.

Party of contribution: each respondent's party of record on the campaign finance reports, as explained in Chapter IV.
Giving circle integration: an index created by multiplying each respondent's giving circle score (recoded 1 to 4) his/her frequency of political contributing (scored 1 to 3) by his/her number of years of political contributing (scored 1 to 3) Scores range from 1 to 36. In this way, one variable incorporated several contributor "life style" variables of significance.

Number of different channels used: as used in Chapter IV, this is a measure of how many different channels each contributor reported using for political contributions in 1988. Possible channels=parties, candidates, PACs. Scored 1 to 3.

Number of candidate contributions: number of candidates, if any, respondent reported contributing to in 1988.

Strength of party identification: scored 1 to 4, with 1=none and 4=strong.

Strength of ideology: scored identically to "strength of party identification." Scored 1 to 4 with 1=none, 4=strong.

Number of campaign activities: this is the number of different campaign activities the respondent reported performing during 1988.

Closeness to party: this composite variable measures the strength of each respondent's feeling of party membership plus whether or not respondent was ever active in party affairs. As discussed in Chapter IV.

Motivation—party contribution: dichotomizes each respondent's most important motivation for his/her party contributions into 1=ideologically related reasons; 2=business or personal reasons.

Number parties contributed to: as in Chapter IV, measures each respondent's "switch-hitting"—i.e., giving to more than one party. 1=gave to one party only; 2=gave to both parties.

The above 21 variables are associated with the differences among contributors identified to this point. One variable that would have been relevant to include—motivation for candidate contributions—had to be excluded, as its inclusion caused too many cases to drop out during creation of factor scores, as many of our contributors had missing data on this variable.
D. The Five-factor Solution

The factoring technique in the factor analysis program provided in SPSS-X, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. Principal axis factoring is chosen over components analysis because of its approach to the amount of variance available for explanation—i.e., principal axis factoring removes from each variable that portion of the variance that is unique to that variable, and analyzes only the variance each variable has in common with the others. In principal axis factoring then, squared multiple correlations become the entries on the diagonal of the correlation matrix (MacCallum, 1987).

The first task is selection of the factors, using three criteria for selection: initial eigenvalues; the scree plotting of those eigenvalues; and theoretically substantive considerations. As shown in Table 16, there are five initial eigenvalues scoring above 1, the usual minimally acceptable value for a factor. Visual inspection of the scree plot (not shown) shows three of the factors as being clearly delineated from the others, with factors 4, 5, 6 and 7 descending gradually to the remaining factors. Information from the scree plot and eigenvalues, taken together, is fairly conclusive that a five-factor solution may fit best. The five-factor matrix is easy to interpret and offers the most parsimony and consistency with previous information.

The initial communalities verify that these data lend themselves well to factor analysis, as there is much shared variation among the variables. The variables with the highest communalities are those relating to the presidential candidates and the parties—not surprising considering the nature of the data. This is totally consistent with analysis to this point. Among them, our five selected factors initially explain 65% of the common variance. Because there was a possibility that some of the factors were correlated, both Varimax (orthogonal) and Oblimin (oblique) rotations were performed, and the results
Table 16

Factor Analysis - Initial Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Communality</th>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cum. %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of party contribution</td>
<td>.34915</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.15459</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of contribution</td>
<td>.24820</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.95189</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention to contribute to presidential campaign</td>
<td>.40664</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.10408</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity for Bush</td>
<td>.62785</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.34840</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity for Dukakis</td>
<td>.42840</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.06564</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue agreement—Dukakis</td>
<td>.74743</td>
<td></td>
<td>.92543</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue agreement—Bush</td>
<td>.78549</td>
<td></td>
<td>.81943</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving circle integration</td>
<td>.44272</td>
<td></td>
<td>.73101</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal spending attitude</td>
<td>.34894</td>
<td></td>
<td>.67913</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of ideology</td>
<td>.16575</td>
<td></td>
<td>.60570</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of party ID</td>
<td>.36282</td>
<td></td>
<td>.54255</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of channels used</td>
<td>.32552</td>
<td></td>
<td>.52300</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of campaign acts</td>
<td>.44507</td>
<td></td>
<td>.48336</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>90.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness to party</td>
<td>.45769</td>
<td></td>
<td>.46051</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>92.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential vote</td>
<td>.88430</td>
<td></td>
<td>.40498</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of parties contributed to</td>
<td>.48291</td>
<td></td>
<td>.35359</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>96.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Democratic party contribution foci</td>
<td>.76265</td>
<td></td>
<td>.24772</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>97.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Republican party contribution foci</td>
<td>.72725</td>
<td></td>
<td>.19591</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of candidate contributions</td>
<td>.38914</td>
<td></td>
<td>.16156</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation for party contribution</td>
<td>.30980</td>
<td></td>
<td>.15413</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of contribution</td>
<td>.82220</td>
<td></td>
<td>.08740</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
compared. With both rotations, the factors were identical, but the oblique rotation was chosen for discussion because of the slightly higher loadings and the significance of the interfactor correlations. These correlations were between the anticipated factors, and their use enriches our interpretation. Among them, these five final factors explain 54.5% of the variance, with the explained variance distributed among the factors as shown at the bottom of Table 17. Normally, in an oblique factor rotation, it is not possible to say which factors account for what percentage of the variance explained, as the factors are correlated and the variance cannot be pulled apart this way. Since the percentage of variance explained by each factor was identical for both the orthogonal and the oblique rotations, however, the percent variance explained by each factor will be discussed as it would for an orthogonal rotation. Please refer to the Factor Pattern Matrix shown in Table 17.

Factor One: Ideological Contributing

The first factor contains variables historically associated with models of voting behavior: vote choice, issue attitudes, candidate evaluations and party identification. The variables are highly interrelated, as evidenced by their communalities. The factor loadings on most of these variables are relatively high, and among them they explain 27.9% of the variance, making it a strong factor indeed. This factor suggests that most of our respondents perceive themselves as being consistent in their thinking with regard to all of the following: their perceptions of issue agreement between themselves and their party's presidential candidate; their presidential vote choice; their affinity for the presidential candidate of choice; and their federal spending attitude. Quite clearly, this factor taps a dimension that involves ideology. For this reason, it is called "ideological contributing." The strength of this factor is confirmed by the frequency of ideological reasons given for party contributions, as
Table 17

Factor Pattern Matrix—Oblique Rotation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Comm. 1</th>
<th>Comm. 2</th>
<th>Comm. 3</th>
<th>Comm. 4</th>
<th>Comm. 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential vote</td>
<td>0.94015</td>
<td>0.06522</td>
<td>-0.04026</td>
<td>0.00080</td>
<td>0.08423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue agreement—Bush</td>
<td>-0.88193</td>
<td>-0.01891</td>
<td>0.15250</td>
<td>-0.05666</td>
<td>0.00686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of contribution</td>
<td>-0.87744</td>
<td>-0.15069</td>
<td>-0.03585</td>
<td>0.17140</td>
<td>-0.01179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue agreement—Dukakis</td>
<td>0.83960</td>
<td>-0.06516</td>
<td>0.05787</td>
<td>0.01375</td>
<td>0.04475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity for Bush</td>
<td>-0.76253</td>
<td>0.1270</td>
<td>0.11817</td>
<td>-0.01370</td>
<td>0.12060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Republican party contribution foci</td>
<td>-0.74492</td>
<td>0.04580</td>
<td>0.19383</td>
<td>0.38772</td>
<td>0.01477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Democratic Party contribution foci</td>
<td>0.70784</td>
<td>0.24323</td>
<td>0.32433</td>
<td>-0.07975</td>
<td>0.13104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity for Dukakis</td>
<td>0.57146</td>
<td>-0.05408</td>
<td>0.06867</td>
<td>0.01041</td>
<td>0.12338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal spending attitude</td>
<td>0.56075</td>
<td>-0.08886</td>
<td>0.12526</td>
<td>0.19270</td>
<td>-0.00515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of contribution</td>
<td>0.44202</td>
<td>-0.05064</td>
<td>-0.04501</td>
<td>0.01913</td>
<td>-0.10408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of candidate contributions</td>
<td>0.06424</td>
<td>0.66025</td>
<td>0.04407</td>
<td>0.06763</td>
<td>0.01916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving circle integration</td>
<td>0.01312</td>
<td>0.64872</td>
<td>0.01501</td>
<td>-0.04785</td>
<td>0.22661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of party contribution</td>
<td>-0.24809</td>
<td>0.56095</td>
<td>0.00551</td>
<td>-0.10912</td>
<td>-0.09853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of channels used</td>
<td>0.07938</td>
<td>0.49439</td>
<td>0.04600</td>
<td>0.24541</td>
<td>0.03756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of parties contributed to</td>
<td>-0.07196</td>
<td>0.11375</td>
<td>0.68785</td>
<td>0.15825</td>
<td>-0.00319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of ideology</td>
<td>0.00042</td>
<td>0.01990</td>
<td>-0.33365</td>
<td>0.11356</td>
<td>0.02869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention to contribute to presidential campaign</td>
<td>0.03261</td>
<td>0.18401</td>
<td>0.00573</td>
<td>0.81482</td>
<td>0.00968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation for party contribution</td>
<td>0.08895</td>
<td>0.18725</td>
<td>0.24829</td>
<td>-0.40882</td>
<td>-0.08991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness to party</td>
<td>-0.07661</td>
<td>-0.07916</td>
<td>0.11819</td>
<td>-0.02815</td>
<td>0.96926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of campaign acts</td>
<td>0.17967</td>
<td>0.24859</td>
<td>-0.12931</td>
<td>-0.02257</td>
<td>0.52635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of party ID</td>
<td>-0.06097</td>
<td>0.04764</td>
<td>-0.28389</td>
<td>0.11445</td>
<td>0.44530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent variance explained</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Variance explained = 54.4%
discussed in the previous chapter. Relating this factor to the Clark-Wilson framework, it is clearly purposive in nature, indicative of incentives derived from "the stated ends of the association rather than from the simple act of associating" (Clark and Wilson, 1961, pp. 135-6).

Factor Two: The Fat Cat Factor

This factor is composed of the variables we have come to associate with contributors who belong to the political "inner circles"--i.e., large and/or major contributions to the state political parties, a high level of integration in the giving circle; frequency and longevity as political contributors; contributing to many candidates and using many channels through which to funnel money to political causes; high level of education and executive status. It is consistent with previous data that indicates that some contributors belong to networks where mutuality of soliciting and contributing for political causes is commonplace. When this factor is related to the Clark-Wilson framework, it is clearly an example of solidary incentives at work, which derive their motivation from "the act of associating and include such rewards as socializing, congeniality, the sense of group membership and identification, the status resulting from membership, fun and conviviality, the maintenance of social distinctions, and so on" (ibid, p. 135). This factor is relatively strong, having factor loadings of about .5 or above, and accounts for 11.9% of the total variance explained. It is called the "fat cat factor" because it taps the kind of political contributing behavior that journalists have labeled "fat cat contributing."
Factor Three: Strategic Contributing

We might tend to disregard this factor because of the simplicity of its structure were it not for analysis in the previous chapter that clearly indicates strong strategic considerations may underlie some of the political party contributing, especially among medium and large contributors to the Ohio Democratic Party. This factor is associated with just two variables: number of parties contributed to and strength of ideology. The high loading on number of parties is indicative of switchhitting—i.e., giving to both parties. The weaker but negative loading on strength of ideology (remembering that a folded strength of ideology scale was used—e.g., 1 = middle of the road; 2 = slightly liberal or conservative; 3 = liberal or conservative; and 4 = strong liberal or conservative) tells us that there is little ideology—either liberal or conservative—behind the party contributions that may be strongly associated with this factor. For these reasons, this factor is called "strategic contributing." When we relate it to the Clark-Wilson framework, it is indicative of material incentives, "that is, rewards that have a monetary value or can easily be translated into ones that have" (ibid, p. 134). This factor accounts for 7.5% of the total variance, and as such is the third strongest factor.

Among them, the first three factors account for 47.3% of the total variance among the 21 variables, and clearly account for the lion's share of the variance explained by this factor analysis. Together, they are strong examples of the three types of incentive systems described by Clark and Wilson, and provide us with a clear motivational structure with which to compare our state party contributors. There are two additional factors, however, that also need discussion. While they are weaker than the first three factors, they nonetheless are distinct and, as shall be seen, provide additional measures of differences among our contributors.
Factor Four: Presidential "Soft Money" Contributing

This factor, like Factor Three, has a simple structure. It is composed of just two variables—intention to contribute to the presidential campaign and motivation for party contribution. It derives its name from the first variable mentioned, due to the strength of its factor loading. Its nature is reinforced by the inclusion of the second variable in this factor—i.e., motivation for party contribution, as the negative factor loading on this variable indicates an ideological primary reason for the party contribution. ("Ideological," it should be remembered, included "to support party's candidates," etc. Thus a score of "1" on motivation indicated ideological contributing, while a score of "2" indicated contributing for business or personal reasons.) It is indicative of very targeted contributing to achieve a specific political goal: to further the election of the presidential candidate of choice. This factor explains 4.5% of the total variance. When it is related to the Clark-Wilson framework, a puzzlement occurs. On the surface, it seems to be a variation of a purpose incentive, but other incentives may be involved. Further exploration of its nature will be taken up again when the correlations among the factors are discussed below.

Factor Five: Party Activism

Last and of least strength among our factors is one composed of three variables strongly associated with party identification: feelings of closeness to the party of self-identification by considering one's self a member of it and/or having held a party position; engaging in campaign activities, many likely to have been associated with the party; and identifying strongly with the party of choice. Because of these strong feelings of association with the party, and because of the activism displayed by the number of campaign acts performed and/or being a party officer at some point, we call this factor
"party activism." Clearly, fitting this factor to the Clark-Wilson typology causes a puzzlement. Some aspects of this factor are clearly solidary. The performance of campaign activities, for instance, is seldom a solitary act—especially when done in conjunction with a political party. Campaign activities are often organized affairs involving many people. They frequently include social occasions before, during or after the campaign activity. Yet, because of the strength of the party identification, there surely must be purposive incentives operating, too. Thus, Factor 5 may be a hybrid between the solidary and purposive. It accounts for only 2.6% of the total variance.

Thus, five distinct factors seem to underlie political contributing by individuals to the state political parties. For a variety of reasons already discussed, it seems clear that an individual contributor may be responding to more than one motive in the act of contributing, and that some of these motives may be related—strategic and solidary contributing, for instance. For this reason, we next explore the relationships among the factors.

E. Relationships Among the Contributing Factors

By now it is apparent that ideology plays an important role in political contributing—a more important role, perhaps, than was suspected. Examining the inter-factor correlations shown in Table 18, we find ideological contributing to be uncorrelated (defined as no correlations above .05) with all the contributing motivations with the exception of party activism. That correlation, however, is weak (.10). Because of the "stand alone" nature of this factor, as well as its relative strength, we might conclude that ideological motivations provide a base to which other motivations are added. That is, in general, ideological motivations must be present to some extent for contributing to occur.
Table 18

Factor Correlation Matrix for Five Modes of Contributing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Ideological Contributing</th>
<th>Fat Cat Contributing</th>
<th>Strategic Contributing</th>
<th>Presidential Contributing</th>
<th>Party Activism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.00000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.01321</td>
<td>1.00000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.01639</td>
<td>0.25671</td>
<td>1.00000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0.04104</td>
<td>0.04066</td>
<td>-0.12514</td>
<td>1.00000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.10427</td>
<td>0.27227</td>
<td>-0.15304</td>
<td>0.20610</td>
<td>1.00000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We will examine this idea more in depth when we discuss factor scores, above.

Fat cat contributing, on the other hand, is correlated both with strategic contributing (.26) and party activism (.27). This is certainly what we should be expecting by now. Many solidary motives, as represented in fat cat contributing, are associated with strategic motives, due undoubtedly to the executive status of the large contributors. Not only do they enjoy the social and status aspects of fat cat contributing, but they may find it good for business. Fat cat contributing is also associated with party activism—undoubtedly an elite sort of activism, as characterized by the invitation to the $5,000 fundraiser for Senator Quayle discussed in Chapter IV. Thus, there is a complex or sophisticated motivational structure connected with fat cat contributing.

In comparison, strategic giving is uncomplicated. It is related positively only to fat cat contributing, as discussed above. Interestingly, it is also related to both presidential contributing and party activism, but with negative correlations (-.13 and -.15 respectively), indicating that the more likely one is to be motivated by strategic contributing, the less likely one is to contribute for presidential campaign purposes, and the less likely one is to be
contributing due to party activism. This is consistent with what we might suspect of those contributors who seem to be purely strategically motivated—the 21 maverick Democrats, for instance. They display little connection to political party.

Presidential contributing shares a meaningful correlation (.21) with party activism only. This is logical, since it is the parties who must now be the collecting mechanism for presidential general election campaign funds—i.e., soft money. Now, instead of giving directly to a candidate, one must give to the party and trust the party to spend the funds appropriately on the candidate’s behalf. One would expect party activists to be among those most likely to have that trust. Because of its correlation with party activism, we speculate that this factor is related to both purposive and solidary incentives.

F. Differentiating Contributors by Motivations

In Chapter IV, the Democratic small contributors and the Republican large contributors were labeled as the carriers of their respective parties’ creeds, when compared to the other party contributors. Now, by examine the mean factor scores for ideological contributing, as shown in Table 19, there is even more support for this idea. There is less difference among the Republican contributor categories with regard to factor scores on ideological contributing than the among the Democrats, however, and these differences hold even when an additional factor analysis is performed, removing the 21 mavericks. The most ideological contributors of all are the small Democrats. This explains their steadfastness to Dukakis, even when their medium and large counterparts tended to defect. Supporting the notion that an ideological base is beneath much political party contributing are the fairly strong factor scores across all contributor categories of both parties. Among the medium and
### Table 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Factor 4</th>
<th>Factor 5</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>1.0951</td>
<td>.2597</td>
<td>.2957</td>
<td>-.2211</td>
<td>.1692</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fat Cat</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>-.1123</td>
<td>-.0169</td>
<td>.1276</td>
<td>.3901</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>.8743</td>
<td>.3278</td>
<td>.4587</td>
<td>-.5022</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>.5544</td>
<td>1.4087</td>
<td>.9641</td>
<td>-.6901</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republicans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.7266</td>
<td>-.0045</td>
<td>-.0134</td>
<td>.2755</td>
<td>.0503</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>-.6395</td>
<td>-.5968</td>
<td>-.1213</td>
<td>.3328</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>-.7295</td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td>.0052</td>
<td>.1092</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>-.8591</td>
<td>.9564</td>
<td>.1294</td>
<td>.4260</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>373</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Cases</td>
<td>122 or 25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

small Democrats, the factor scores rise when the 21 mavericks are removed, giving further evidence of the purely strategic motivations behind the contributions of these 21.

Only the large contributors to both parties have substantial mean factor scores on the fat cat factor, clearly identifying the members of these two groups as the ones who participate in the kind of sophisticated contributing behavior described previously. Medium Democratic contributors show weak evidence of fat cat contributing. When the 21 mavericks are removed, the mean factor scores for fat cat contributing remain approximately the same. This lends strength to the idea that purely strategic givers are not the fat cats.
Fat cat contributors, however, do engage in some strategic giving, as shown by the mean factor scores related to that variable. Strategic giving factor scores are strongest for the Democratic medium and large contributors, even when the 21 mavericks are removed. As before, the Democratic state environment undoubtedly contributed to this situation. Republican large contributors, in comparison, have only a weak mean strategic giving factor score. There are strategic motivations present, but they are weak compared to the strength of their other motivations.

One of those stronger motivations for Republican large contributors is their intention to contribute to the presidential general election in 1988. Surprisingly, Republican small contributors also show a strong presidential contribution motivation, due undoubtedly to the ORP’s approach to fundraising in 1988, to be discussed in Chapter VI. In comparison, small Democratic contributors exhibit weak presidential contributing motivations, and medium and large Democratic contributors exhibit none at all, as shown by their high, negative factor scores. When the 21 mavericks are removed, the relative mean factor scores are unchanged, indicating that the maverick contributors were relatively unassociated with this factor.

The mean factor scores for party activism also support earlier conclusions—i.e., that it is the smaller Democratic contributor and the larger Republican contributor who are most apt to report feelings of closeness to, and activism in party affairs, including campaigns. Among the Democrats, the differences among contributor groups weaken considerably, however, when the 21 mavericks are removed, indicating that party activism is more evenly distributed among contributor groups among the usual Democrats (i.e., those who are not purely strategically motivated). Among the Republicans, the medium and large contributors score highest, with the medium showing more motivation due to party activism than the large. Small Republican contributors, as has been said before, show few signs of party activism as a
motivation. Theirs does look like a direct-mail relationship with the party. And part of that
direct-mail relationship in 1988 was to support George Bush by donating to the ORP.

G. Conclusion

Contributors give to the state political parties for very different reasons, as shown by
the variation in their motivational structures. For the small Democratic contributor, the
carrier of that party's creed, the act of giving was motivated by ideology and party activism.
For some of the medium and large Democratic contributors, the act of giving was purely
strategic or material, with virtually no ideological underpinnings. For the remainder of the
Democratic medium and large contributors, the act of giving was the result of complex
interactions among motives that were purposive, solidary, strategic and, to a much less extent,
activist.

For the small Republican contributors, the act of giving is ideologically motivated—a
desire to support the party's platform and candidates. This is consistent with what Green and
Guth found, as discussed earlier—that the less access a contributor has, the more likely the
motivation behind the contribution is purposive. A variation on that ideological theme is
presidential general election or "soft money" contributing, evidence of the advantage the
Republicans were able to take of the unique "window of opportunity" that presented itself in
1988. (This "window" will be discussed more in Chapter VI.) Unlike their Democratic
counterparts, there is little evidence of party activism motivating the gifts of small
Republicans. For the Republican medium contributors, the act of giving is a motivational
interplay between ideology and activism, with some presidential contributing evident. For the
Republican large contributors, the act of giving is motivated by a sophisticated interplay
among many motives: purposive, solidary, presidential, plus activism and strategic.
To explore this idea further, let us think of our contributors, not as divided into contributor categories of small, medium and large, but as arrayed on a continuum by the size of their state party contribution. Those at the left end of the continuum would be the contributors who gave a few dollars to the state political parties in 1988. Those at the right end of the continuum would be those who gave $30,000, $40,000 or even $60,000 to the parties in 1988. Assuming positions between these two extremes would be those who gave varying amounts, with their positions on the continuum corresponding to the amounts they contributed. As one moves from left to right on the continuum, the amount of the state party contribution increases, as does the complexity of the motivational structure underlying the contribution. The motivational structure for the smallest contributors, for instance, is fairly uncomplicated: it is basically purposive, or ideological. The motivational structure for the largest contributors, however, is multi-faceted. It is purposive, solidary and material, plus variations on those themes. It is not so much that the purposive underpinnings weaken as the contribution amount increases. Rather, it is that other motivations are added. Thus, contributing motivations accumulate as one's position shifts from left to right on the continuum. When all motivations are combined, strength of underlying motivation for any particular political contributor is likely to increase with the contribution amount. The policy implications of differences among political contributors, then, is based on the increasing complexity and strength of motivations.

Thus, as the electorate varies in its dedication to voting, so contributors may vary in their dedication to contributing. There appear to be some who, come hell or high water, would make every attempt to contribute as much as they please to whatever political cause or candidate they choose. We predict they would look much like our larger contributors in demographic, attitudinal and behavioral attributes. There may be others who, like their
"presidential year only" voting counterparts, contribute only during high-profile campaigns such as that for the presidency. We predict they would look much like our smaller contributors, particularly the Republicans. As differences in motivations to vote cause differences in turnout, so differences in motivations to contribute have public policy implications.

General wisdom and the all-American principle of equality say that small contributors should be encouraged. Certainly, that was the goal of many of the campaign finance reforms of the 1970s. The weaker motivational structure of smaller contributors tells us, however, that they simply have less reason to give to political causes than their larger counterparts. The basic rewards for them are few.

That same general wisdom and all-American principle of equality say that larger contributors should be discouraged. Again, that has been the goal of campaign finance reforms since the early 1900s. The stronger, more complex motivational structure of larger contributors, however, means that they have many reasons to contribute, and derive many rewards, intrinsic and otherwise from the act. No wonder they are so difficult to discourage.

There are many policy implications that can be derived from differences among political contributors with regard to complexity and strength of motivation. These will be discussed in Chapter VII. Meanwhile, we turn to a discussion of our contributors with regard to the state political parties and the role of soft money in the presidential general election of 1988.
Chapter VI
Soft Money In The Presidential General Election

Soft money is the most recent device used by large contributors to circumvent restrictions on contributions to presidential campaigns. In the soft money arena, more than any other, we see their incredible determination in action. With the campaign finance reforms of 1974 and the availability of federal funding, the presidential general elections were to be free from their influence, and for one electoral cycle this happened. In 1976, when Gerald Ford ran against Jimmy Carter, would-be large contributors had nowhere to contribute. By 1980, however, things had changed. The FECA amendments of 1979, as discussed in Chapter II, created a mechanism that allowed large contributors to return to the presidential contributing game—and they have returned to play the game in increasing numbers ever since, regularly contributing amounts of $100,000 and more. Once again, circumvention is occurring, and the presidential elections as well as the office of the presidency are subject to the undue influence of the wealthy few (Alexander, 1986; Alexander and Bauer, 1991; Sorauf, 1988; Nelson, 1990; Bedlington, 1989; Drew, 1983; Center for Responsive Politics, 1985, 1989; and journalists writing for The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, The New York Times, The National Journal, etc.). The mechanism that has allowed this to happen is soft money, an elusive contributing mechanism that has many definitions and is difficult to trace and measure. Yet, within a confined environment, that is exactly what will be done in this chapter.
In this exploration of soft money, recent research on the subject is reviewed, then information gathered in personal interviews with 1988 presidential campaign personnel and Ohio political party personnel is discussed. Finally, data from two additional sources—the Ohio campaign finance reports and the Ohio party contributor survey—are analyzed to estimate the amount of soft money used in Ohio in the 1988 presidential general election. Using this information, I speculate as to whether or not the differences between the two parties with regard to the raising and use of soft money in Ohio are indicative of different roles for the state parties in the presidential general election. This leads to discussion of whether or not the intentions of the FECA amendments of 1979 are fulfilled by the use of soft money. The creation of soft money was, after all, a legislative attempt to strengthen the role of the state and local political parties in the presidential general election. Is there any evidence, based on this Ohio case study, that this strengthening has occurred? Also, because soft money has become the most recent vehicle that our indomitable large contributors use to influence the presidential general election, there is an additional opportunity to explore how they differ from their smaller counterparts with regard to the soft money mechanism.

A. Definitions and criticisms of soft money

The term "soft money" was first popularized by Elizabeth Drew, and it means different things to different people.

For Drew and Common Cause, it refers to contributions that would be illegal under federal law (e.g., they come from illegal union or corporate sources or they would exceed a statutory limit) but that are diverted to safe financial havens in the states. Those "havens" may, too, be safe for a number of reasons. They may be candidates in states permitting contributions directly from corporate or union treasuries or having no limits on the size of contributions. Or they may be state party committees engaged in voter registration and turnout activities or other "party-building" activities excluded from the limitations of the FECA by a specific
amendment to the law....Other commentators have broadened the concept of soft money to include the diversion of funds by national committees directly to the committees of congressional or state candidates (Sorauf, 1988, p. 320-321).

Alexander broadens Sorauf's definition even more to include the following: some corporate activities; union soft money used for voter registration, administration of political activities and the like; contributions the state or national parties may make to tax-deductible organizations for voter registration and turnout drives; party building funds (e.g., for buildings in which party headquarters are housed); state-level presidential PACs that may have been used in pre-primary periods; tax-exempt research and education foundations established by federal candidates; administration and fund-raising costs of connected PACs; independent activities carried on by non-connected PACs; partisan political communications among stockholders and their families as well as top corporate personnel and their families by corporations; partisan political communications among personnel and their families by labor unions and certain other organizations; and money donated to help pay for the national parties' nominating conventions (Alexander, 1986).

The definition of soft money that will be used in this chapter is narrower than Alexander's yet broader than Sorauf's. Included as soft money in Ohio's 1988 presidential general election will be all non-federal transfers from the national parties to the state parties, as shown in Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter III. These transfers are the ones alluded to in Sorauf's definition above. However, because some state parties, including the ORP, have turned to raising much soft money themselves, the definition will also include all money contributed directly to the state parties by individual contributors for the purpose of helping the presidential ticket. While the other forms of soft money noted above are important and interesting, they are being excluded for several reasons. There is little uproar about them from citizens' groups or the press. They have an even more indirect impact on the vote than
the forms under study. Some of these forms have no effect on the presidential general elections. Finally, most records for these other types are unavailable.

Soft money has received much attention in national publications such as The New York Times, Washington Post, and National Journal, and has been focused upon by citizens' groups such as Common Cause and The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), yet has received limited study by political scientists. In fact, with the exception of Herbert Alexander, few scholars have spent much time analyzing the use of soft money because of difficulties with data. Soft money lingers in the shadows, defying direct detection because of the very laws that created it. Harkening back to earlier times and practices (for instance, the presidential campaigns of 1908, discussed earlier in this dissertation) the disclosure of soft money in the presidential campaigns has not been legally required and information is available only when the major political parties voluntarily release it due to public pressure. The parties, however, have their own agendas to fulfill when they make voluntary disclosures, hence their figures are subject to question. Also, the fund-raising practices of the parties add to the "shadow" nature of soft money. That is, parties frequently raise money for candidates across the entire ticket--i.e., local, state and national--and spend money to help the entire ticket, making it difficult to separate money intended to help the party's presidential candidate from money intended to help other candidates or causes. Hence, in spite of its importance from the standpoint of democratic theory and public policy, soft money has been too elusive to receive much scholarly attention.

While acknowledging these difficulties with regard to research on soft money, the purpose here is to make inroads, exploring the sources, amounts and uses of soft money in the presidential general election in Ohio. The subject is worthy of attention. As Alexander reminds us, the campaign finance reforms of the 1970s "were intended to control large
donations with their potential for corruption, to minimize financial disparities among candidates, and to reduce opportunities for abuse" (Alexander, 1989a, p. 2). Soft money may be doing increasing violence to these intentions, especially in 1988, when it was "raised centrally at a frantic pace as if no public funding or expenditure limits existed" (ibid, p. 27).

B. Research on Soft Money in the 1988 Presidential General Election

Most information about soft money in the 1988 election comes from two sources— noted campaign finance researcher Herbert Alexander and a Washington-based citizen's group, The Center for Responsive Politics. Alexander's information comes from the voluntary disclosures made by the national parties and his figures on soft money for 1980, 1984 and 1988 provide a longitudinal perspective on its growth. Soft money, says Alexander, was "sanctioned by the 1979 Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act. It was raised and spent in the 1980 and 1984 presidential campaigns, but the money was raised in low-key efforts, not the high-visibility competitive ways as in 1988, and in smaller amounts...." (Alexander, 1989, p. 26). Soft money comparisons for 1980, 1984 and 1988 are shown in Table 20. Using Alexander's figures, soft money is not only on the rise in actual numbers, but increases as a percentage of total presidential spending and dramatically increases as a percentage of presidential general election spending, as shown in Table 21.

During the 1988 campaigns, the presidential candidates for both major parties established special national committees whose job was the raising of soft money and distributing it to the states. Dukakis' soft money effort, called Campaign 88, was spearheaded by Robert Farmer, Treasurer of the Dukakis-Bentsen campaign, who raised it in contributions of up to $100,000 each. Ohio contributors supposedly were among the top ten soft money contributors to the Dukakis campaign, credited with giving $1,042,918 from
Table 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Total Soft Money</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>$4.0</td>
<td>$15.1</td>
<td>$19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Alexander, 1989, p. 27)

Table 21

Soft Money as a Percentage of Presidential Spending (in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Presidential Spending (TPS)</th>
<th>Soft Money as Percentage of TPS</th>
<th>Total General Election Spending* (TGES)</th>
<th>Soft Money as Percentage of TGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>$275</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>$68.0 + 19.1 = $87.1</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>94.6 + 21.6 = 116.2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>108.8 + 45.0 = 153.8</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Includes public treasury grants to major party candidates, allowable national party spending, and soft money in the amounts given in the preceding table.

Adapted from Alexander, 1989 (p. 6-7)
people not solicited by direct mail. (Direct mail donors from Ohio were not credited with a specific amount.) Overall, the Dukakis campaign seems to have been "the best financed the Democrats have put on in years" (Alexander, 1989, p. 29).

The comparable Bush soft money effort, called Victory 88, was spearheaded by Robert Mosbacher Sr., Farmer's Republican counterpart. The centerpiece of Mosbacher's efforts was an elite group of donors, called Team 100, who supposedly raised or gave $100,000 each in soft money to the Republican presidential effort. Disclosure of amounts and contributors by both parties was voluntary, as all the money was deposited in and distributed out of "non-federal" accounts at the national level or state party accounts around the nation. Neither type of account is subject to federal disclosure regulation or uniform state disclosure laws, hence verification of Alexander's figures is not possible.

An heroic attempt at a partial independent measure of soft money in the 1988 campaigns was undertaken by the CRP. Defining soft money as "any funds not regulated by federal election law," the CRP assessed major sources of it in nine different states, including money contributed by corporations, labor union treasuries, individuals, and intra-party transfers. CRP considered all contributions over $500 to be potential soft money contributions. In all, up to $28.5 million in funds from the nine states were identified as potential soft money. There are obvious faults with CRP's methodology. It ignores small contributions and undoubtedly overestimates the "soft" nature of large contributions. Still, the CRP makes a good case for much of the money being meant to influence federal campaigns (Center for Responsive Politics, 1989). Though there are serious problems with both Alexander's figures and the figures put together by the CRP with regard to soft money in 1988, their research represents the present state of knowledge. This study hopes to overcome some of the shortcomings of previous research by taking a new measurement approach.
As mentioned previously, only two sources of soft money will be considered—that given by individuals and that contributed to the state by the national party affiliates, under the assumption that these two sources will capture the vast majority of soft money used to influence the presidential general election in Ohio in 1988. That this is a reasonable assumption is validated by the CRP study just mentioned. In that study, three sources of soft money—national parties, individuals and corporations—account for 95% of all soft money found. In Ohio, a state as electorally important in presidential politics as most of those studied by the Center for Responsive Politics, corporate contributions are illegal. Hence, the assumption that about 95% of the soft money will be captured by measuring just two sources is not unreasonable. Sources that will not be included are labor unions, PACs and unincorporated businesses such as partnerships—the same groups eliminated by the research design discussed in Chapter III.

C. Personal Interviews with Party and Campaign Personnel

Soft money is an elusive entity, leaving only traces of its existence on campaign finance reports. Hence, to probe the depth of its collection and uses, one must rely on the candor of party and campaign personnel. Because of this, the data collection phase of this study started and was interspersed with interviews, in person and by phone, of personnel from the state parties, the Bush and Dukakis campaigns, as well as several lawyers who specialize in federal campaign finance legislation. A list of those interviewed appears in Appendix A. These personal contacts were necessary for many reasons. First, the information on the campaign finance reports was sometimes ambiguous, making it difficult to differentiate some partnership, PAC and individual contributions. Also, a few intra-party transfers needed to be explained. Second, while the methodology allowed identification of the amounts and sources
of soft money, it did not allow identification of its uses. I could not assume that soft money spent in Ohio was targeted primarily toward influencing the presidential campaigns rather than other federal elections in 1988 or state and local elections. I needed the party principals to tell me what their spending priorities were. Third, the relationship between the state parties and the presidential campaign committees could only be ascertained, if at all, by interviewing those involved. Interview data, as shall be seen, was more definitive for the Republicans than for the Democrats.

Looking first at information pertaining to the ODP, an argument could be made for the ODP's soft money being spent on a variety of state races—judicial, senatorial, as well as others. The Chairman of the Ohio Democratic Party, Jim Ruvolo, who served in that capacity from 1982 to 1990, stated that, "We consider all our money to be soft money…it's impossible to pull out the supreme court from presidential from senatorial. We told the DNC Ohio needed $1.2 million. Raised that in a Cleveland fundraiser. Dukakis was there for the event" (Ruvolo, 1989). Ruvolo said the ODP worked closely with the DNC, not Dukakis' campaign people, raising the needed money. Thus, according to Ruvolo, the soft money raised was to support the entire slate.

On the other hand, Don Sweitzer, who served as Finance Director of the DNC from 1984-1988, indicated that the operations of the finance staffs of the DNC and the Dukakis campaign merged at the time of Dukakis' nomination for the purpose of raising both the federal and non-federal money needed for the presidential campaigns. "The focus," he said, "was on $100,000 donors" who were the "centerpiece" of the fundraising. "Yes," he said, unconsciously agreeing with Ruvolo this time, "donors did give to have Dukakis elected president, but the money went to state parties to support the entire ticket—and the law allows that" (Sweitzer, 1989). For the party with the most obvious large non-federal transfers to
their state affiliate, the personnel concerned with the raising and spending of the money emphasized the importance of the entire ticket.

The Republicans were quick to admit that soft money was raised to affect the presidential campaign. Robert Bennett, Chairman of the Ohio Republican Party from early 1988 to present, confirmed this with the picture he painted of the situation in 1988 in Ohio. The party entered the 1988 general election campaign with their incumbent congressmen "in good shape," as ascertained from a meeting with them in the spring of 1988. The only candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives who required "loose monitoring by the ORP" was Paul Gillmor. In the race for the U.S. Senate, which paired George Voinovich against the incumbent Howard Metzenbaum, Bennett said that Voinovich "was not a drain on the party," and neither were the races for Supreme Court or county offices throughout Ohio. Rather, any expenses the ORP might incur on behalf of these candidates were allocated accordingly and charged back to their respective campaigns (Bennett, 1989). Bennett called the 1988 presidential campaign a "window of opportunity" to really build the party for the future, especially for the 1990 gubernatorial race, and to put the once in-debt party in a really solid financial position. Jim Nathanson, who directed the Bush campaign in Ohio in 1988, substantiated the use of soft money in Ohio primarily to influence the presidential election. Ohio, he indicated, was one of the 3rd or 4th top targeted states for the Republicans—no Republican ever won the presidency without Ohio's electoral votes—and soft money made up most of the $1.8 million presidential general election campaign budget for the state (Nathanson, 1990).

In addition to differing on the role of soft money in the state in 1988, the state parties may have differed in their relationships with the campaign committees of their respective presidential candidates. Nathanson described Bush as totally integrated into the party system,
and his Ohio campaign as one that was a reflection of that integration. Bush, he said, was a party insider, one who had served as the National Chairman for eight years, who recognized "80% of the party chairs" in Ohio, and knew every campaign leader in the state. In addition, Bush's Ohio campaign was staffed with local people. Independently of Nathanson, Bennett expressed many of the same opinions, saying that Bush conducted a "gubernatorial campaign" in Ohio—one that took the different natures of the different regions in Ohio into account (Nathanson, 1990; Bennett, 1989).

Information about the Dukakis campaign's relationship with the ODP is not as complete or consistent. Ruvolo indicated he worked with the DNC to raise money, not with Dukakis' campaign personnel; Sweitzer indicated these two entities merged at the time of Dukakis' nomination; yet another source from another state (Kahn, 1989) indicated that Campaign 88 was but a way for the Dukakis people to do an "end run" around the DNC. Herrnson indicated that Dukakis' campaign was in frequent conflict with the Campaign 88 staff as well as the DNC (Herrnson, September 1, 1989). Ruvolo mentioned no conflict. Rather, he indicated general agreement among the state party, the candidate's campaign staff, and donors. Republican sources, with one exception, indicated there was much alignment among donors, state party personnel, the RNC and the Bush campaign people, and alignment was maintained by weekly meetings of the Budget Oversight Committee. It is safe to characterize the Bush campaign in Ohio as more integrated into the state party system; the Dukakis campaign as considerably less so.

Next, we must address an assumption that measuring soft money as a function of the finances of the two major parties at the state level will capture most of the soft money that was used in Ohio during the presidential campaigns. After all, there are 88 counties in Ohio, and all of them have more or less structured political parties which are capable of both
accepting and expending soft money to influence the presidential general election. Might not
the exclusion of data from campaign finance reports from these county parties cause the
amount of soft money used in the 1988 presidential campaigns to be greatly understated?
According to Terry Casey, Executive Director of the Franklin County Republican Party, one
of the two largest and most prosperous county-level parties in Ohio, there are no reasons for
the national parties or the candidates' campaign committees to send money directly to the
county parties. The state parties in Ohio are better organized, have privileges that the local
parties do not enjoy (such as less expensive postage rates), and can take better advantage of
economies of scale (Casey, March 5, 1989). There are good reasons, therefore, to assume
that most soft money in Ohio was managed at the state party level.

While these data from interviews are somewhat definitive for the ORP and its
relationship to the presidential general election in 1988, they are less so for the ODP. From
other sources, however, we know that nationally Dukakis ran a much more centrally
controlled, less party-cooperative campaign than Bush for a variety of reasons, and we would
expect this to be somewhat true of the Ohio campaign, especially when compared to that of
the Republicans (Alexander, 1989; Herrnson, May 1, 1989; Center for Responsive Politics,
1989; etc.).

D. Soft Money and the Campaign Finance Reports

We turn now to measure the amount of soft money used in Ohio in 1988 to influence
the presidential campaigns. Basically, there are two sources as defined for this study: money
transferred to Ohio from the national parties (out-of-state soft money) and money contributed
directly to the state parties (in-state soft money). The most easily accessible measures of soft
money in the presidential general election should come from the campaign finance reports of
the two state parties, where the out-of-state transfers from the national parties are recorded as contributions. According to Dan Swillinger, a Washington, D.C.-based attorney who specializes in federal campaign finance legislation, the national parties may transfer soft money funds into the state parties from their non-federal accounts. The transfers are considered contributions to the state parties and are to be designated "Republican non-federal" or "Democratic non-federal" on the reports of the receiving state party. The 1988 campaign finance reports for the Ohio Democratic Party show a total of $859,762 of such transfers, as shown in Table 1. These funds would have been collected through the Campaign '88 efforts described earlier. For The Ohio Republican Party, no non-federal transfers of money from the Republican National Committee are listed. There are, however, "expenditures" to the Ohio Republican Party listed in the campaign finance report of the Republican National State Elections Committee (RNSEC), the Republican's national "soft money" account, a copy of which was on file with the Secretary of State of Ohio. That this is the account of big soft money donors is confirmed by the appearance on it of twenty-eight names that match those of $100,000 presidential soft money donors published by The New York Times on January 24, 1989, p. 13. For purposes of calculating Republican soft money, the Ohio expenditures shown on this report (filed by the RNSEC) will be considered soft money donations to the ORP. These donations total $218,000, as shown in Table 2. For both parties, these non-federal transfers from the national parties represent soft money collected at the national level, either due to efforts of the national party, the presidential candidate's soft money campaign effort (e.g., Campaign 88 or Victory 88) or both. Obviously, the Democrats transferred about four times as much soft money to Ohio as the Republicans. (Admittedly, some of the other money transferred by the national parties to their Ohio affiliates (e.g., money not specifically labeled "federal") may have been intended to influence the presidential
campaigns. Technically, this would have been illegal. Regardless, there is no way to address this as an issue.) For now, only the non-federal transfers will be assigned to the presidential soft money category. We turn now to consider a very different approach to measuring soft money raised at the state level.

E. Soft Money and State Party Contributors

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that existing measures of soft money are inadequate and that a new measure of soft money is desirable. The figures cited by Alexander and many journalists come from the national parties, who, to ward off criticism, undoubtedly have a vested interest in making the amount of soft money used in the presidential campaign appear to be 1) substantially less than that provided by public financing and 2) approximately equivalent to the amount supposedly raised by the other major party and its presidential candidate, to give the appearance of fairness. The soft money figures cited by the CRP, while the result of extensive data collection, are fraught with assumptions. The soft money data shown in Tables 1 and 2, the result of transfers from the national to the state parties, are obviously incomplete, as no state-level contributions are included. Thus, no existing measures are adequate. Even if the parties were fully cooperative and opened their financial books to researchers, records are unlikely to reveal the answers. The fungibility of money, the complicated nature of campaigns, and the motivations and complexities of political parties would interfere. Yet, there may be much value in attempting to estimate more accurately how much soft money was given and spent in a key electoral state like Ohio to influence the presidential campaigns. In the course of the estimation, we are likely to learn a lot about the parties, their methods of financing themselves, their contributors, and their relationships with the campaigns of their respective presidential candidates.
This analysis attempts a new estimation of soft money by using a new measure dependent on the motivations of the contributors to ascertain the in-state soft money raised by both parties. This in-state estimate is then combined with the out-of-state soft money to yield a total measure of soft money used in Ohio in 1988. The operationalization of this new in-state measure will be explained below.

F. Identifying soft money contributors

This study uses a different approach from previous ones to measure the amount of soft money intended to influence the presidential campaigns. Here, the measurement is a function of the intention of the contributor. If the contributor intended his or her money to influence the presidential campaigns, then some portion of that contribution is considered "soft money." The stronger the intent, the larger the portion we consider to be soft money.

This is an unusual measure, and will need both conceptual and empirical validation. The empirical validation will be done later. Conceptually, this measure has some strengths. If the parties emphasize the importance of the presidential election in their fundraising endeavors (and they do!) then our respondents will be giving to the parties with the intention of having all or part of their money support the presidential ticket. Smaller contributors may be inadvertent soft money donors—i.e., they may have responded to a general ideological appeal that showcased the presidential election. Larger soft money contributors, however, undoubtedly understand the soft money mechanism, if the directness with which the Republicans raised money for Bush and Quayle was any indication. But, whether or not the contribution was given with an understanding of the mechanism used, if the intention was to help the presidential ticket, the money donated deserves to be labeled "soft" to the extent it was meant to support the presidential general election.
This method of assessing in-state soft money has both advantages and drawbacks over the previous methods discussed. It has the potential of capturing soft money contributions of all amounts and differentiating them from contributions given for other purposes. It has the potential of providing information about the soft money contributors themselves and how they differ from other party contributors. It has the drawback of being difficult to collect data for more than one state.

In this study here is how soft money is operationalized. By design, the mail questionnaire sent to the sample of political contributors included two measures to facilitate determination of soft money contributions. The first determination is made on the basis of motivation—i.e., respondents were asked to identify up to three motivations behind their contributions to political parties—a most important, second most important and third most important motivation (see question A3 in Appendix B). As shown in Table 22, 315 out of 494 respondents indicated that one of their motivations was "to support party's presidential candidate." Thus, 64% of all respondents indicated some degree of presidential motivation behind their party contributions, having given that reason as either their first most important, second most important or third most important motivation for their party contributions. Still, this motivation was not the dominant one given by the state party contributors. In fact, two other motivations received more mentions: "to support party's policies and platform" and "to support party's other candidates." Still, the majority of contributions are backed by an intention to support the party's presidential candidate. In spite of this, it would be inappropriate to label as soft money the full amount of all contributions indicating some presidential motive. Rather, it makes sense to combine the motivational measure just discussed with a second measure to construct a "soft money" score for each of our contributors.
Table 22
Motivations To Contribute to Political Parties
Frequencies of Mentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Most Important Motivation</th>
<th>Second Most Important</th>
<th>Third Most Important</th>
<th>Total Mentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dems</td>
<td>Reps</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Dems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To support party's presidential candidate</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To support party's other candidates</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To support party's policies and platforms</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To support a friend, associate, family member</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For job or business reasons</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

64% of all respondents (315/494) mentioned a presidential motivation. No one mentioned it more than once.

"Other" motivations not included in above table.
The second measure of soft money, on the surface at least, appears deceptive. It is a question asking respondents if they contributed to the presidential candidates in 1988, and if so, how much and when. (See questions A4 through A6 in Appendix B.) Respondents were asked to check the appropriate box if they contributed to either Bush or Dukakis in the general election. As has been discussed, general election contributions to presidential candidates are illegal, once those candidates accept public funding. The only allowable contributions individuals may make are limited ones to the national parties to help them meet their formula-determined spending goal, unlimited ones to the national parties' non-federal accounts, and virtually unlimited ones to the local and/or state parties for soft money expenditures, state and local laws permitting. The question asked respondents was not meant to be deceptive, but rather to help measure the extent to which respondents may have preferred to support their chosen candidate for president. It was assumed that few respondents understood the details of financing the presidential election enough to know that the question, technically, was inappropriate. Indeed, few did. As shown in Table 23, 252 respondents, or 51% of the total sample, reported giving to either Bush or Dukakis in the general election. Only six respondents, all of whom had reasons to be more aware of current campaign finance laws (e.g., they were major contributors or key fundraisers), wrote comments on their questionnaires indicating a good understanding of the nature of financing the presidential general elections.

As we might suspect, there was some overlap between those who gave a presidential motivation as the reason for their party contribution, and those who reported contributing to Bush or Dukakis in the general election. In all, 375 of the 494 contributors showed some intention of desiring to affect the presidential campaign, either through their party contributions, their "direct" general election contributions to the candidates, or both. This
Table 23

1988 Contributions to Bush or Dukakis in General Election

Reported Contributions to Bush in General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reported Contribution to Dukakis in General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total = 252 or 51% of all respondents

means that 76% of all respondents had some degree of intention to contribute to the presidential general election campaigns. (The breakdown by party is Democrats, 70%; Republicans 80%)

Using these two indicators of soft money—i.e., the motivational and the "behavioral"—each respondent was assigned a soft money score as follows:

Score=0: No intent to influence presidential general election. Respondent did not indicate a presidential motivation for his/her party contribution nor a contribution to support one of the major presidential candidates in the general election.

Score=1: Weak intention to influence the presidential general election. Respondent reported a presidential motivation for his/her party contribution as the second most important or third most important motivation. No general election contribution reported.

Score=2: Strong intent to influence presidential general election. Respondent reported presidential motivation for his/her party contribution as "most important" OR reported a contribution to one (or more) of the presidential candidates in the general election.

Score=3: Very strong, clear intent to influence the presidential general election. Respondent reported presidential motivation for his/her party contribution as "most important" AND reported a contribution to one (or more) of the presidential candidates in the general election.
The higher the soft money score, the more the respondent is assumed to have intended to influence the presidential campaign with his or her contribution. Because this is a new measure of soft money—i.e., by intent—and because we will using it as the key variable with which we assign contributions or portions of them to the soft money category, it is important to validate it by testing it against our expectations of how it should perform.

G. Empirical Validation of the Soft Money Score

Soft money, it will be remembered, was created by the FECA of 1979 to allow the state and local parties to once again be grass-roots players in the presidential elections. For this reason, it makes sense to label as soft money all party contributions given with a strong, clear intent to influence the presidential general election. It also makes sense to discard from the soft money category all contributions made with no stated intention of influencing the presidential general elections. It is the categories between these two polar positions, then, that are a puzzle. Can we logically assign some portion of these contributions to soft money, as implied by the scoring technique described above? Let’s assume we can, if the gradations of our soft money score reflect attitudinal gradations toward the presidential candidates and the parties. First, let’s discuss some logical expectations.

Based on previous research, for instance that by Kinder and Abelson (1981) and Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk (1986), we would expect those contributors who were intentionally making a soft money contribution to their state party to evaluate their party’s presidential candidate more highly, using criteria such as competence and integrity. We would also expect them to express more affinity for that presidential candidate than those
whose contributions were meant to support the general party agenda. This idea was tested by creating a composite "affinity score" for each presidential candidate. This score was a mean rating of each candidate on 5 attributes related to competence, integrity and empathy. Respondents were asked to say how well (not well at all, not too well, quite well and extremely well, with responses ranging from 1 to 4 in the order given) each of the following words or phrases described each of the presidential candidates: compassionate; moral; provides strong leadership; really cares about people like you; and knowledgeable (as shown in questions E5 and E6 in Appendix B). Each respondent was then given a mean affinity score for each candidate, using a composite of these five variables. These affinity scores for the presidential candidate of the party of contribution were then related to respondents' soft money scores, as shown in Table 24. Indeed, mean affinity for the presidential candidate of the party of contribution tends to rise with the soft money score. The correlation between mean affinity and soft money score was significant for the Democrats (r=.19, p < .01) and very significant for the Republicans (r=.27; p < .000).

A second and third validation consist of measures of issue proximity to the presidential candidate of the party of contribution, as well as to the party of contribution. Again, if our soft money score is valid, we would expect those scoring higher on "soft money" to show more issue proximity to both their party's presidential candidate, as well as the party itself. These measures were ascertained by simply asking each respondent to rate both of these entities as "very distant from my position on issues," "somewhat distant from my position on issues" or "close to my position on issues," with responses recoded from 1 to 3 so that a higher number indicated more proximity (see question F2 in Appendix B). Again, as shown in Table 24, mean proximity on issues to both the presidential candidate of the party of contribution as well as the party of contribution
increased with the soft money score. Mean proximity on issues to those of the presidential candidate were significantly correlated with soft money score for both the Democrats and the Republicans ($r = .25; p < .000$ and $r = .29, p < .000$ respectively), as was mean proximity on issues to the party of contribution (Democrats: $r = .34; p < .000$; Republicans: $r = .12, p < .05$).

An additional validation measure was to use the factor scores for each respondent, as created in the preceding chapter, to predict the soft money score. Naturally, the factor called "Presidential Contributing" had to be dropped, as it was a composite of the same variables used to create the soft money score. The information gathered from the parties, as well as the information to date on our contributors, would indicate that, because the ODP did not seem to make a concerted effort to raise large amounts soft money at the state level independent of the Dukakis Campaign 88 effort, ideological contributing (Factor 1) might be the strongest predictor of the Democrats' soft money score. Why is this? Because the Democratic party faithful—the small contributors—were the only Democrats to score positively on the presidential contributing factor, as shown in Table 19, and their basic drive to contribute was ideological. The medium and large Democratic contributors, as discussed earlier, show little motivation as a group for presidential contributing. Rather, they scored highest on the strategic and fat cat factors, and the evidence indicated that many of them may have contributed to the ODP to assure access to state officials and contracts. It is unlikely that contributing to the ODP to help Dukakis would help them to achieve this goal. Hence, we would expect the small Democratic contributor's ideological motivation to be the driving one behind prediction of soft money scores.

Among the Republicans, we would expect Factor 2, the fat cat factor, to be the best predictor of respondents' soft money scores, due to the nature of the fund raising
events similar to the $5,000 per couple event described in Chapter IV. These events attracted fat cat donors who assembled to enjoy the company of and contribute to Bush and Quayle. Because all Republican contributors scored relatively highly on the ideological factor, we would not expect this factor to differentiate well among Republicans based on their intention to contribute to the general election campaign.

Referring to Table 25, we see that ideological contributing is indeed the best predictor for Democratic soft money, whereas it is fat cat contributing for the Republicans. Still, we must be careful not to push this data too far, as the total variance explained is not that great. The differences, however, do meet our expectations, and, along with the affinity and proximity measure described above, lend credence to the soft money score.

Another measure of the validity of our soft money score is to compare average contributions of those in our different contributor categories, controlling for soft money score. If notions thus far are correct, we should see little increase in contributions among Ohio Democratic large contributors when amounts are controlled by soft money score, as their soft money activities seem to have taken place on the federal level, and we should see dramatic differences among their Republican counterparts, with contributions increasing with soft money scores, indicative of the tremendous in-state fundraising effort among party "fat cats" conducted on behalf of Bush. Referring to Table 26, this is exactly what we do find. The largest of the average Democratic contributions occurs in the cell that indicates the contributors had only a weak intent to influence the presidential campaign ($4,750, soft money score=1). Among the Republican large contributors, it is clearly those with the strongest presidential motivations who gave the largest average contributions
Table 24

Empirical Validation of the Soft Money Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Affinity for Party's Presidential Candidate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Ds</td>
<td>2.81 (55)</td>
<td>3.08 (28)</td>
<td>3.03 (79)</td>
<td>3.12 (24)</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>2.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Removed</td>
<td>2.94 (41)</td>
<td>3.12 (26)</td>
<td>3.06 (76)</td>
<td>3.20 (22)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Rs</td>
<td>3.21 (41)</td>
<td>3.40 (59)</td>
<td>3.49 (130)</td>
<td>3.56 (48)</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Issue Proximity to Party's Presidential Candidate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Ds</td>
<td>2.31 (55)</td>
<td>2.66 (29)</td>
<td>2.71 (78)</td>
<td>2.75 (24)</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Removed</td>
<td>2.63 (41)</td>
<td>2.78 (27)</td>
<td>2.76 (75)</td>
<td>2.91 (22)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Rs</td>
<td>2.83 (60)</td>
<td>2.88 (57)</td>
<td>2.94 (128)</td>
<td>2.96 (49)</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Issue Proximity to Party of Contribution</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Ds</td>
<td>2.11 (56)</td>
<td>2.66 (29)</td>
<td>2.62 (77)</td>
<td>2.70 (23)</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Removed</td>
<td>2.33 (42)</td>
<td>2.78 (27)</td>
<td>2.64 (74)</td>
<td>2.73 (22)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Rs</td>
<td>2.67 (58)</td>
<td>2.78 (54)</td>
<td>2.79 (127)</td>
<td>2.85 (48)</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 25

Predicting the Soft Money Score Using the Contributing Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>All Contributors</th>
<th>Democrats Only</th>
<th>Republicans Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2</td>
<td>.351</td>
<td>.310</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 3</td>
<td>-.380</td>
<td>-.279</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 5</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted $R^2 = .11$  
$DF = 368$

Adjusted $R^2 = .25$  
$DF = 143$

Adjusted $R^2 = .14$  
$DF = 220$

($4090$ for soft money score $= 2$ and $5337$ for soft money score $= 3$). And, the Republicans had the sheer numbers among their in-state contributors to make the differences all the more dramatic. Fifty-six contributors fall into these two categories, while for the Democrats, only 14 do.

Also, if our soft money score is valid, we would expect the largest of the soft money contributions to have been given after the primary, in the heat of the presidential general election campaigns. This would be consistent with what the Center for Responsive Politics found in its nine-state study (1989). Republican large contributors who scored 2 or 3 on the soft money variable did in fact give their huge contributions after the primary, during the general election season. Their contributions are heavily clustered on the pre-general and post-general campaign finance reports. This is what we would expect of
those who gave generously to support a particular candidate rather than a party. In fact, for those among this group scoring 2 on the soft money score, their pre- and post-general contributions average $9115 each, while those scoring 3 on the soft money score average $21,667 during the same period. The names of three of these Ohio contributors also appear on the contributor list of the Republican National State Elections Committee due to their having contributed up to $100,000 each to this national non-federal campaign fund, the voluntarily disclosed soft money fund mentioned earlier.

It is clear that many contributors meant to influence the presidential general election campaigns with their contributions to the ODP and ORP, that they varied in the extent to which they hoped to do so, and that our soft money scoring is able to differentiate among the contributors on this basis. We turn now to apply these soft money scores to the amounts contributed by our respondents, then to attempt to generalize to the broader population.

H. Estimating presidential soft money in Ohio in 1988

Based on previous discussion, we expect to find that the Ohio Democratic Party had few in-state sources of soft money, with non-federal transfers from the national party accounting for most of the soft money spent in Ohio to benefit Dukakis. This would be consistent with a centrally-controlled candidate campaign that was not well integrated into the party structure. We expect the opposite to be true for the Ohio Republican Party,
### Table 26

Average Contribution of Contributors by Soft Money Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Soft Money Score</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>$22 (16)</td>
<td>$14 (18)</td>
<td>$19 (52)</td>
<td>$20 (13)</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>295 (29)</td>
<td>273 (9)</td>
<td>274 (18)</td>
<td>244 (8)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>1225 (12)</td>
<td>4750 (2)</td>
<td>1786 (11)</td>
<td>1083 (3)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total $</td>
<td>$23,607</td>
<td>$12,209</td>
<td>$25,566</td>
<td>$5,461</td>
<td>$66,808*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>57 (30%)</td>
<td>29 (15%)</td>
<td>81 (42%)</td>
<td>24 (13%)</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Republicans      |        |        |        |        |    |
| Small            | $22 (29) | $21 (30) | $23 (51) | $16 (19) | 129 |
| Medium           | 188 (25) | 143 (23) | 160 (42) | 169 (13) | 103 |
| Large            | 1250 (8) | 1157 (7) | 4090 (39) | 5337 (17) | 71 |
| Total $          | $15,338 | $12,018 | $167,403 | $93,230 | $288,026* |
| Total N          | 62 (20%) | 60 (20%) | 132 (44%) | 49 (16%) | 303 |

*Due to rounding error in calculating the means, these figures are a few dollars different from those one would get by calculating them using the figures in the cells.
where comparatively less soft money was transferred from the national party, and much was raised from in-state sources.

If these differences hold, we would expect to find many more contributors among the Republicans than among the Democrats who indicate that their state party contribution was wholly or in part meant to influence the presidential campaign. Given the huge amounts of money the ORP would have to raise within the state to be competitive with the ODP and its out-of-state sources, we might expect to find much of the soft money coming from the larger Republican contributors. It is simply not practical (and maybe not possible) to raise hundreds of thousands of dollars in a short period of time—from nominating convention to general election—from smaller contributors. Once we are able to identify our soft money contributors in our sample and the strength of their motivation to influence the presidential campaign of the candidate of choice, we can estimate the amount of soft money they gave to both the ODP and ORP in 1988. From there, we can generalize to the universe of contributors from which the sample was drawn, and estimate the total amounts of soft money contributed directly to the state parties by individuals in 1988. Finally, combining the data from the state party contributors with information gathered during the personal interviews with party and campaign personnel, we can discuss the merits of the two methods of raising soft money (e.g., at the federal level versus the state level) and their influence on the state parties’ roles in the presidential general elections.

What percentage of a contribution to a political party should be designated as "soft money meant to influence the presidential general election"? The following method of calculating percentages will be used, for the reasons given:
If soft money score = 0, none of the contributor’s state party contribution will be designated as soft. From the information on hand, there is no evidence of any intent to influence the presidential general election.

If soft money score = 1, one third (33%) of the contributor’s state party contribution will be designated as soft, as there is only a weak indication that the contribution was meant to influence the presidential general election.

If soft money score = 2, two thirds (67%) of the contributor’s state party contribution will be designated as soft, as these contributors indicated either that their primary motivation for party contributions was to influence the presidential campaign or that they had given a contribution to Bush or Dukakis in the general election.

If soft money score = 3, all (100%) of the contributor’s state party contribution will be designated as soft because these contributors gave a presidential motivation as their primary reason for contributing to political parties and indicated that they gave to Bush or Dukakis in the general election. Their intent is unmistakably clear.

While other percentages could be justified, these seem to be logical and defensible. These percentages as described above are applied to each respondent’s actual state party contribution, yielding the estimations shown in Table 27. As with contributions in general, most of the money (and few of the contributors) are found in the groups we label large. Among Democrats, large contributors account for 74% of the soft money among our respondents; among Republicans, 96%. Among the Democrats, there is relatively little money given by individuals at the state level that can be labeled soft—only $26,555. Among the Republicans, there is almost eight times that amount—$208,860.
Table 27

Estimation of Soft Money Contributed by Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>$ 0 (16)</td>
<td>$ 5 (18)</td>
<td>$ 12 (52)</td>
<td>$ 20 (13)</td>
<td>$ 985 (99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0 (29)</td>
<td>91 (9)</td>
<td>182 (18)</td>
<td>244 (8)</td>
<td>6052 (64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>0 (12)</td>
<td>1584 (2)</td>
<td>1191 (1)</td>
<td>1083 (2)</td>
<td>19518 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$ 0 (57)</td>
<td>$ 4,069 (29)</td>
<td>$ 17,026 (81)</td>
<td>$ 5,460 (24)</td>
<td>$ 26,555 (191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republicans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>$ 0 (29)</td>
<td>$ 7 (30)</td>
<td>$ 15 (51)</td>
<td>$ 16 (19)</td>
<td>1305 (129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0 (25)</td>
<td>48 (23)</td>
<td>107 (42)</td>
<td>169 (13)</td>
<td>7790 (103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>0 (8)</td>
<td>386 (6)</td>
<td>2727 (39)</td>
<td>5337 (17)</td>
<td>199,764 (71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>0 (62)</td>
<td>$ 4,010 (60)</td>
<td>$111,612 (132)</td>
<td>$ 93,238 (49)</td>
<td>$ 208,860 (303)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At this point we need to remember that our Ohio contributors, as discussed so far, are a sample of contributors drawn from a larger universe. That larger universe consists of all individual contributors to the ODP and ORP in 1988, as discussed in Chapter III. The soft money estimates to this point are only for those in this sample. Now, we wish to estimate the soft money contributions for the universe of contributors. To do so, we must make the assumption that our respondents in the sample are representative of the sub-populations from which they were drawn—e.g., our small Republican contributors in the sample are representative of small contributors to the ORP in 1988, and so forth for all contributor categories. Making this assumption, we estimate the soft money contributions for all individual contributors to the ODP and ORP by multiplying the average soft money contribution for each of our contributor categories by the number of contributors in its corresponding universe, as shown in Table 28. Among the contributors to the Ohio Democratic party, then, they gave $90,204 to help finance the Dukakis presidential general election campaign. Seventy percent of that money came from large contributors. Among the contributors to the ORP, $500,877 was given to help finance the Bush general election campaign, with 91% of that money coming from large contributors.

Combined with the non-federal transfers from their national affiliates, the soft money totals for the state parties, as shown in Table 29, are as follows: ODP, $949,966; ORP, $718,877.
Table 28
Estimation of Total Soft Money from Individual Contributors
To Both Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>$9.95</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>$2,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>94.56</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>24,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>697.07</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>63,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$90,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republicans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>$10.12</td>
<td>1570</td>
<td>$15,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>75.63</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>29,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>2513.58</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>455,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$500,877</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 29
Estimation of Soft Money from Individual Contributors and Non-Federal Transfers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ohio Democratic Party</th>
<th>Individual Contributors</th>
<th>$90,204</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Federal Transfers</td>
<td>859,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$949,966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ohio Republican Party</th>
<th>Individual Contributors</th>
<th>$500,877</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Federal Transfers</td>
<td>218,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$718,877</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above estimations of soft money in the presidential general election in Ohio do not include other possible sources of soft money—for instance, from PACs (including those affiliated with labor unions), partnerships, and intra-party transfers we have been unable to label accurately. Nor do they include any intra-party transfers which we were unable to label non-federal, which, for the Republicans at least, may have been substantial. These, then, are partial estimates which we must assume capture the majority of the soft dollars in Ohio in 1988.

I. Discussion

Even with partial estimates, distinct differences are apparent between the parties and among the contributors with regard to soft money in 1988. Let us look at the party differences first. The Democrats exhibit the centralized fund distributing behavior we expected. There are clear indications that most soft money in Ohio meant to influence the presidential general election reached Ohio via Washington and the non-federal account of the Democratic National Party. Even soft money that was raised in Ohio, for instance the $1.1 million Ruvolo spoke of that was raised at the Cleveland fundraiser, must have been filtered through Washington before returning to its home state. Nowhere among the Democratic state party contributors do we find large enough numbers of big soft money contributors to account for this money having gone directly to the coffers of the ODP. This raises some questions about what Ruvolo and Sweitzer said. They both indicated that Ohio’s soft money was meant to support the entire ticket, yet it isn’t logical that Dukakis, the DNC and the Campaign 88 fundraisers would send about $1 million to Ohio for this
purpose unless "supporting the entire ticket" was guaranteed to be done in such a way that it maximized the Dukakis vote. Electorally, Ohio was just too important and Dukakis was never in a favorable enough position to afford spending money for the benefit of other candidates. Perhaps Ruvolo and Sweitzer were just overly sensitive to soft money criticisms and framed their answers accordingly.

Among the Republicans, we find strong support for most soft money having been raised and kept in the state. The number of big soft money supporters, coupled with the amounts they gave, account for a large portion of what we label presidential soft money in the ORP. Undoubtedly, some soft money travelled the circuitous route from Ohio to Washington then back to Ohio. William R. Timken, the Finance Chairman for the Ohio Republican Party was also a member of Bush’s Finance Committee in 1988, and his overlapping duties seem to reflect the overlapping mechanisms used by the Republicans to raise funds—overlapping, but with the emphasis on the state level.

There is also evidence that the Dukakis campaign was less integrated into the Democratic party system than the Bush campaign was into the Republican party system, and clear reasons for the differences. In spite of these differences, personnel from both state parties say they played a central planning role in the presidential contests conducted in Ohio. Without extensive additional research, it may not be possible to measure the extent to which the parties differ in this regard, hence impossible to say whether or not state-level fundraising of soft money is more apt to lead to the state parties’ integration into the presidential general election campaigns. Certainly, it is possible to say that the ORP has more of the characteristics we’d expect to find in a state where localized fundraising is leading to a more key role in the presidential campaign, but the causal link
between fundraising and campaign decision making is confounded by the nature of the presidential candidates. Does the ORP exhibit more integration in decision making regarding the presidential campaign because of fund raising procedures or because of the party-integrated nature of the presidential candidate? And is the opposite true of the ODP?

Whether or not there are links between fundraising techniques and election roles, the potential is there for the state parties to be re-integrated in federal campaigns due to the existence of soft money, and the parties are recognizing the opportunity it provides. Matlack (1990) reported that "the influx of cash in 1988 left many state parties hungry for another dose this year. The 1988 election is what turned the state Democratic party on to the coordinated campaign." Among the activities that are benefitting are the all-American ones we treasure: voter registration, get-out-of-the-vote drives, and other election-related grass-roots activities. Soft money is the driving force behind it all. Matlack indicated that the Democratic party in particular is turning its attention to using it to build the state parties. Over ten years after the passage of the 1979 FECA amendments which created soft money, we may be seeing a slow but steady shift in state parties from centralized fundraising of soft money at the national level to de-centralized raising at the state level, with the Republicans having led the way and the Democrats pursuing rapidly. If so, the intentions of the 1979 amendments may be on the road to fulfillment.

Looking now at our contributors who gave large amounts of soft money primarily to influence the presidential campaigns, we find them to be a breed apart from other contributors. Who are they? Among Ohio contributors, they are Republicans and they resemble the "fat cats" of yesteryear--i.e., extremely wealthy people who can afford to give enormous political contributions, have undoubtedly done it for years, do it frequently,
and live, work and play among others with similar inclinations. The sheer magnitude of
their cumulative contributions overwhelms soft money from their smaller counterparts.
Their intentions to influence the presidential campaigns were clear: their affinity for Bush
was high; they held issue positions similar to him and to the Republican party; and they
wanted their contribution to help him get elected, so they gave generously—sometimes
frequently—during the general election season in 1988.

Smaller contributors among both parties who indicated that they were financially
supporting the presidential candidates may be "inadvertent" presidential contributors,
having responded to a direct mail appeal that mentioned the presidential candidate, among
others. Their combined contributions are but a drop in the bucket for both parties when
compared to sources from large in-state contributors for the Republicans and large
Washington contributors for the Democrats. Ironically, it may be the money from party
fat cats that has the potential of bringing grass roots participation back to the state and
local political parties.

There is one additional consideration relating to Dukakis and the Democrats. It is
odd that so little soft money from big contributors appears on the campaign finance reports
of the ODP. Were the Democrats that thorough in routing soft money through
Washington? Or is there another explanation—one concerned with political positioning and
accomplished through "spin doctoring"? Let us consider this alternative explanation.
Early in the general election campaign Farmer announced that Campaign 88 would raise
$50 million in soft money to aid Dukakis' presidential general election effort. Farmer's
announcement triggered a similar announcement by Republican counterparts. Unable to
achieve his target, Farmer revised his goal downward (Alexander, 1991). Perhaps Farmer
never met his revised goal, either, and rather than risk embarrassment a second time revealed a soft money figure that looked comparable to that being released by the Republicans. After all, with no disclosure regulations, who could argue? The unpopularity of Dukakis among the Democratic larger contributors in Ohio, as shown in Chapter IV, may have been indicative of attitudes toward Dukakis among large Democratic contributors across the nation. If so, the Dukakis campaign might have had severe problems raising competitive amounts of soft money. It would be questionable whether the Democrats' traditional big money sources in New York and California could make up the difference. Perhaps to keep as much control as possible over a soft money "pot" that could not meet expectations, all Dukakis' soft money was routed through Washington. The Republicans, meanwhile, may have been able to achieve their national goal and raise considerably more in many states. If there is much truth in these speculations, then the Republicans may have enjoyed a substantial soft money advantage over the Democrats in 1988, in spite of the comparability of the released figures.

The true situation may never be known because there were so many "ways to play with the money," according to Nathanson (1989). He also indicated that most of Bush's Ohio presidential budget came from soft money. Among the grass-roots activities it purchased were the services of 14 or 15 regional phone bank coordinators, as well as five additional staffers. In fact, campaign personnel paid for with soft money outnumbered those paid for with hard money. The hard money, according to Nathanson, was used for just three things: media; national staff and overhead; and "pushing the candidate around the country."
There is additional evidence in the presidential campaign expenditure figures published by Alexander and Bauer that a Republican soft money advantage may have existed. According to these figures, Bush-Quayle media expenditures for the general election campaign totalled $31,458,300, while similar expenses for Dukakis-Bentsen were $23,550,000 (Alexander and Bauer, 1991, p. 36). Considering that both campaigns may have had similar financial goals—e.g., use as much hard money as possible for media expenditures, and pay for as many other expenses as possible with soft money—the fact that the Dukakis-Bentsen campaign spent about $8,000,000 less on media supports the idea that soft money may have been in shorter supply for the Democrats than their released figures would indicate. There is a possibility that the "level playing field" may have been more fiction than fact. If so, then soft money has truly done violence to financial equity between the presidential general election campaigns in 1988.

The campaign finance reforms of the 70s were designed to provide a level playing field between the presidential candidates of the major political parties. They were also designed to provide accountability by the parties and the candidates to the public—accountability in the form of publicity about amounts and sources of money that could affect the presidential general election. Considering this, it is ironic that all of the following are subject to question: the financial equity between the presidential general election campaigns; the sources of the money used to help finance them; and the total amounts actually spent.

Can we retain some of the benefits of the 1979 FECA amendments—e.g., the greater participation by the grass roots in the presidential campaigns—while removing the mystery surrounding soft money? One giant step in that direction has already been taken:
After fits and starts, years of deliberation, and some judicial prodding, the FEC moved. On June 21, 1990, it announced new regulations pertaining to soft money and sent them to Congress for review as required by law. They were then promulgated in September 1990 and went into effect on January 1, 1991.

The new rules and allocation formulas, which relate to the disclosure of soft money, are complex. They apply to the national, senatorial, and congressional party committees, as well as to state and local party committees. During a presidential election year, the national parties must allocate at least 65 percent of the costs of generic voter drives and administrative expenses to their hard money accounts; the allocation is 60 percent in nonpresidential election years. Using a two-year election cycle for Senate and House campaigns, the allocation must be the greater of 65 percent or a ratio based on actual money spent for federal and nonfederal candidates.

Communication and phone bank costs are allocated differently, based on the relative benefit that each candidate receives from space in a publication or time on the air. Fund-raising costs are allocated according to the relative amounts of federal and nonfederal candidates on the ticket. And the identities of contributors who give to either soft money or building fund accounts in amounts of more than $200 must be disclosed (Alexander and Bauer, 1991, p. 81-2).

Will the new rules provide the equity and accountability the FECA and its amendments were meant to provide? Or will new loopholes and circumventions arise, as they have so predictably in the past? Certainly, there is much latitude to allow circumvention in the new rules, especially as they pertain to federal campaigns and the state parties. Under the new rules, for instance, the money that the ORP collected in Ohio to benefit the Bush campaign would go unlabeled as money intended to influence the presidential general election. The donors of $50,000 and more would remain relatively anonymous, as pertains to the presidential campaigns. And many activities performed with this money would be outside the allocation formulas, as specified by federal law, because they would appear to be generic state party activities.

What can be done to assure more accountability of soft money, yet foster grass roots participation? These, as well as other policy matters pertaining to soft money will be
discussed in Chapter VII, which attempts to apply the major research findings of this dissertation to campaign finance reforms of the future.
Chapter VII

Carriers of the Creed

What have we learned about those who pay our political bills? What are the implications of it all? This chapter summarizes the research results, draws conclusions based on those results, suggests directions for future research and, finally, recommends public policy changes consistent with the findings. Overall, this last chapter reads like a "good news, bad news" story, reflective perhaps of the fact that the financing of campaigns can never approach the uncomplicated status of an unadulterated good or an unmitigated evil. Rather, campaign finance in America is a complex system in which people with complex motives and relationships participate. In many cases, these people also have complex resources.

It is also a system complicated by the struggle between the two most sacred tenets of democracy—liberty and equality. In what is perhaps best characterized as a "zero sum" game—e.g., as liberty increases, equality decreases, and vice versa—the battle between the tenets is likely to continue. Only total public financing of campaigns would allow equality its full expression. As Sorauf reminds us, however, there is no compelling mandate for expanding the public financing of campaigns (1990), and with the Buckley v Valeo Supreme Court decision still in effect, no way to achieve total public funding. Only an unregulated system of privately financed campaigns would allow liberty its full expression. That is equally unlikely to occur, for all the obvious reasons. We are left, then, with a complex campaign finance
system caught between two powerful forces that continually pull in opposite directions, much like Dr. Doolittle’s legendary two-headed llama, the pushmi-pullyu. It is the hope that the research results from this dissertation will help us reconcile the forces somewhat.

A. Summary of Research Results

This dissertation proposed to explore several aspects of campaign finance simultaneously, showing that: 1) all political contributors are not alike, but differ systematically when differentiated by the amounts of their contributions and the political parties to which those contributions were made; 2) examination of one of the current vehicles used by larger contributors to influence the presidential general election campaigns—e.g., soft money—allows us not only to understand better the differences among contributors, but also to understand better the roles of the state political parties in those campaigns; and 3) soft money in the presidential elections, as presently measured, is both inaccurate and misleading. The results of the research will be summarized below. We begin with a discussion of individual contributors, focusing first on their similarities, then exploring their differences.

First, some good news. It is reassuring in a world where political contributing is often seen as quid-pro-quo behavior to be able to say that most of the contributing done by our state party contributors does not have strong material motivations behind it. Further, when material motivations are involved, they are seldom the dominant motive. For the vast majority of contributors, contributing is first and foremost an ideological act. In a time when phrases like "undue influence" and "buying legislation" are frequently used in the same sentence with "political contributors," it is refreshing to report that most contributors believe in what they support. Yes, other motivations (sometimes very strong ones) may be added to the ideological base. Still, the political contributions made to parties and candidates generally
reflect issue agreement with the object of the contribution. This supports the findings of other researchers, and flies in the face of the generally held wisdom that contributors are purchasing personal or business favors. Indeed, most are not. (There are a few who think they are, however, and they will be discussed later.) We turn now to summarize the differences among political contributors, as differentiated by the amounts of their contributions.

As this research has shown, the differences are many and dramatic. Let’s look at larger contributors again. While all contributors generally display more elite characteristics than the general population with regard to education and income, larger contributors are an elite among the elite when compared to their smaller counterparts. They tend to be older, male, wealthier, more educated, Protestant, and hold executive-status jobs with much decision-making responsibility. The differences between the larger and smaller contributors go well beyond demographic ones, however. As discussed in Chapter V, the larger contributor is driven by a complex and strong motivational system with many rewards. The strength and nature of these motivations explains the determination of larger contributors. In contrast to contributors in general, their dominant reward is not ideological, but is solidary. By contributing thousands—even hundreds of thousands—of dollars to political causes, the larger contributor positions himself as a member of a very elite group of movers and shakers. The group is so exclusive that even a person who is well to do by most standards cannot afford membership. These larger contributors enjoy “the socializing, the congeniality, the sense of group membership and identification, the status resulting from membership, fun and conviviality, the maintenance of social distinctions” that come from being involved financially in political campaigns (Clark and Wilson, 1961, p. 135). The campaign that is apt to provide the most rewards for participation is the one for the presidency. For larger contributors, new regulations and restrictions, then, may be nothing but interesting obstacles to be overcome.
Solving the problem of contributing under restrictive circumstances may become a solidary reward of its own, an additional reason to participate on a challenging project with those with whom the larger contributor most enjoys collaborating—politicos and other large contributors.

Consider the social position of larger contributors: they are well integrated into giving circles of family, associates and friends who enjoy the political game, too, and who solicit each other for contributions. Add to that the professional position of larger contributors—their executive job status assures them easy access to the best legal advice that money and influence can buy. Add to that their political sophistication as contributors: they obviously know about and frequently use many channels and many geographic foci to contribute to multiple candidates, organizations and causes.

The solidary incentives of larger contributors, as strong as they are, do not stand alone. Rather, they are reinforced by strong purposive and material incentives, as discussed in Chapter V. With strong and aggregated motivations propelling them, it is no wonder that larger contributors can become large solicitors (Alexander and Bauer, 1991), or employ any number of circumventing techniques such as PACs, soft money, contributions to parties, independent expenditures, and others, and still reap all the solidary, purposive and material rewards the system can offer. The strong motivational structure and seemingly limitless resources of larger contributors is reinforced by the motivations of the political parties, which are attuned to pushing any campaign finance law to the limit to gain electoral advantage.

Finally, the motivations and resources of larger contributors are reinforced by those of elected officials and candidates, who value the influence of larger contributors—an influence that extends well beyond their ability to finance campaigns—and who are adept at working with larger contributors to achieve their mutual goals. Is it any wonder that the motivations behind campaign finance legislation are always suspect? Sorauf reminds us that reform
directly and personally touches those who define political realities, making the politics of campaign finance virtually the politics of politics (1988). Together, larger contributors and the objects of their contributions form a formidable team, an "inner circle" that is capable of circumventing the most stringent campaign finance laws and may even enjoy the challenge of doing so. Given all this, the bad news is that is unlikely that larger contributors can be discouraged.

Not all larger contributors are motivated by the same factors, however. There is clear evidence in this research that a minority are motivated primarily by strategic considerations—e.g., for material gain or quid-pro-quo incentives. (Whether or not their contributions actually do purchase influence is another matter, one beyond the scope of this research.) Somehow, when political contributing is consistent with the ideological conviction of the contributor, it becomes an expression of one's political freedom of speech and the negative aspects are mitigated by the ideological involvement. On the other hand, when political contributing is materially motivated, many would call it unpalatable or clearly corrupt. We will return to this subject when we discuss differences among contributors, as differentiated by the party of contribution.

Another bad news item is that it will continue to be difficult to encourage smaller contributors, due to the weakness and simplicity of their motivational structure. Their motivation to contribute is primarily ideological, and is weakly or not at all unreinforced by material and solidary incentives. Because their motivations are primarily ideological, they may be more subject to the tenor of the times—i.e., when ideological debate is in the forefront, as during the Reagan years, ideological motivations may be high. When ideological debate is more subdued, ideological motivations may be weak. Thus, for smaller contributors, there are not only fewer and weaker motivations overall, but the motivations that
do exist may be subject to considerably more fluctuation. This weaker motivational structure may be more susceptible to systemic influences, too, such as those that are causing declining trust and participation in government. The good news is that, in spite of this weaker motivational structure, many do contribute, especially to the ORP, and they outnumber by many magnitudes the larger contributors, though their cumulative contributions are modest when compared to the cumulative contributions of their larger counterparts. There may be additional good news with regard to smaller contributors, especially the Democratic ones. This will be discussed below, when contributors are differentiated according to their party of contribution.

There exists, then, a distinct hierarchy among political contributors which on the surface seems to favor the Republicans with their historic alliance with big business and the wealthy, and seems to work against the Democrats, with their historic alliance with "the little guy." While there is some support for these conclusions, the matter is not that simple. More subtle and important differences become apparent when the contributors to the two parties are looked at separately.

When party controls are added to the contributor data, the stereotypical class bases of the two parties are indeed evident. That is, it is the larger contributor to the ORP and the smaller contributor to the ODP who are the carriers of their parties' creeds, the "true believers," if you will. As shown in preceding chapters, these two groups are the most likely to consider themselves active members of their respective parties; perform the greatest number of campaign acts; show the most interest in government and public affairs in general and the 1988 campaigns in particular; and care most intensely who wins the presidential general election. In raising campaign funds, these differences greatly favor the Republicans for the obvious reason. It's easier to raise more money from a richer "true believer" than it
is from a poorer one, and richer true believers in Ohio are associated with the ORP. As can be discerned from Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter III, the ORP raised almost three times as much money in 1988 from individual contributors as the ODP, and the large and major contributors to the ORP outnumbered their counterparts to the ODP by 1.6 to 1. Among major contributors only (e.g., those giving in excess of $5,000), the Republican advantage was 5 to 1 (see Tables 3 and 4 in Chapter III). Given that, one would expect the ORP to be much better financed than the ODP, yet the data from this study indicate the two state parties enjoyed comparable levels of financing in 1988. In fact, the ODP had about $250,000 more to spend than the ORP. One could attribute the ODP advantage to soft money transfers from the federal level, as, aside from intraparty in-state transfers of money, that was the ODP's largest source of funds in 1988. This deserves some discussion.

If one assumes that Alexander's soft money data for 1988 are accurate, then on a national scale, the traditional class-based contributor differences between the two parties appear to break down. That is, the Democrats do have a significant base of larger contributors, else how could one explain their ability to match the Republicans, dollar for dollar, in the raising of soft money for the presidential general elections? That base of larger contributors, however, may exist primarily on the national scale, drawing its support from the wealthy, more liberal, coastal regions. If so, then there may be a lack of congruence between the financing of state Democratic parties, particularly in the nation's heartland, and the fundraising that the Democrats do at the national level. That is, the major funders of the DNC and its non-federal accounts may have little in common with the Democratic "true believer" we find at the state level. Let's explore this idea further.

Let us assume that many of the aggregated contributions to the ODP—e.g., PAC contributions, intraparty transfers from in-state affiliates—as well as the individual
contributions, are made by smaller contributors who have very strong liberal ideology and tend to be party activists, as discussed previously. (This is not an unreasonable assumption, considering that most of the in-state aggregated money comes from labor union members via PACs or county party affiliates whose contributor bases should parallel that of the ODP.) And let us assume that many of the larger contributions to the Democrats' federal and non-federal accounts at the national level are made by individuals with less ideological attachment and less activism than their smaller Democratic counterparts, as would be reasonable to infer from the data relating to the attributes of larger Democratic contributors discussed in previous chapters. What would be the ramification? The very different funding bases of the two Democratic entities could be a source of conflict between them. That is, the ODP relies heavily on the traditional Democratic party class base; the national affiliates play the game like Republicans, thriving on enormous contributions from contributors whose demographic profile resembles that of Republican fat cats, and whose ideology may be much more conservative than that of the typical Democratic smaller contributor and whose party activism may be weak. Because the Democratic party and campaign officials at different geographic foci may be garnering their financial support from very different sources, they may have different policy allegiances. This lack of congruence among the geographic foci could result in ideological conflicts, weakening the party’s ability to be a national force. In fact, the new cash-based politics could be inconsistent with the traditional position of the Democratic party—e.g., little guys at the local and state levels and fat cats at the national level may not mix very well.

The differences among Democratic contributors has an interesting variation at the state level, as evidenced by the 21 mavericks discussed throughout this dissertation. As has been clearly shown, their contributions were devoid of ideological underpinnings and were
examples of quid-pro-quo strategy. This type of contributing, most Americans would say, is clearly obnoxious and is what campaign finance regulation is meant to prohibit. But how? It would not only be impossible to do, but the data in this study (limited though it is) indicate that it may be unnecessary. Consider these facts. In the case of Ohio in 1988, strategic contributors were clearly in the minority. And, the amounts of their contributions were modest compared to others made to the ODP, ORP and the non-federal accounts of the national parties. Also, there is no method of telling if the strategic necessity of the contribution was in the eye of the contributor alone, or both the contributor and the recipient. It makes sense to assume that, for a strategic contribution to have its strategic effect, there must be an agreement of sorts between both the contributor and the recipient that this is a quid-pro-quo relationship. No such evidence is available. And finally, how, without surveying all political contributors, can one distinguish the strategic contributor? Strategic contributors may be a tremendous threat to democracy, but these data do not indicate it.

One final point about strategic giving: there exists a strong possibility that strategic giving to the ODP may have been environmental—e.g., due to the Democratic control of so many state offices throughout the 1980s. If so, strategic giving comparable to that among the ODR contributors surveyed for this study should begin to appear among contributors to the ORP, due to that party’s recent ascendancy to state political power.

The Republicans, meanwhile, do not suffer from the same lack of congruence as the Democrats. The largest amounts of money, the greatest ideological attachment and the strongest party activism all come from one source—the larger contributors. We could assume that this is true for both the state and national level, due to many similarities between the larger state party contributors and their national soft money counterparts. This congruence, when combined with a presidential candidate who was well integrated into the political party
at all geographic foci, as George Bush was in 1988, may help account for the Republicans' better presidential record in the past four decades.

Remnants of the old class-, gender- and race-based politics of yesteryear are well and alive, as evidenced by the distinct hierarchy among our political contributors and the differences between the parties. Still, because of the increasing importance of cash-based politics, the party differences may be weakening. One could estimate that about half of the ODP's 1988 money may have come from fat cats, when all sources are considered—e.g., federal and non-federal transfers plus large donations raised in state. On the other hand, because of the large number of small contributors to both the ODP and ORP, the average contributor to both parties can be characterized as solidly middle class. This middle class profile limits the dominance of the very wealthy (Sorauf, 1988). Should the parties continue to expand their contributor bases, this trend will continue. To remember how far campaign finance has come from total dominance by the fat cats of yesteryear, it may be necessary to recall the situation of the 1920s and 1930s, when only the very wealthy appeared to have participated. Overall, then, equality may be gaining on liberty, even in environments with no contribution limitations. The parties can nurture this trend with continuing efforts to expand their contributor bases. There are some indications that sizeable expansion is within the realm of the possible.

Favorable signs include the Republican's direct-mail successes, and the Democrats' successes in closing the direct-mail gap. There is an additional bright spot for the Democrats, if what is true for the ODP is true for Democratic parties in general—e.g., Democratic small contributors display more ideological attachment to their party, more involvement in party affairs, and are more integrated in giving circles. These characteristics, to the best of my knowledge, have yet to be fully exploited by the Democrats and may present an opportunity.
To date, the Democratic party has been trying to close the gap on the Republicans using the same techniques the Republicans employ. This may be too limiting. Democratic small contributors, this study shows, are different from Republican small contributors, and the differences, if used strategically, could bode well for the Democrats, both with regard to raising money and encouraging party activism. For instance, the giving circles among smaller Democratic contributors could be exploited by designing personalized direct mail and/or phone fundraising campaigns in which current contributors solicit members of their giving circles for money or time. This technique would have little effect among the more detached Republican small contributors, and may represent an exclusive Democratic opportunity.

Soft money, too, may provide opportunities to both parties to expand their contributor bases. Many contributors, the soft money data reveal, are like many voters—they are more likely to participate in a presidential election year. This points out the importance of each party’s presidential candidate in encouraging contributing at all geographic foci. Indeed, there is almost a "trickle down" fundraising opportunity created in those years when the highest office in the land is being contested. It is what Bennett called a "window of opportunity" in 1988. While the presidential campaigns can create windows of opportunity, it is up to the political parties to take advantage of them. The ORP obviously did, based on the strength of their presidential "soft money" contributing, as discussed in Chapter V. The Democrats either didn’t or couldn’t. Considering the steadfast loyalty of the smaller ODP contributors, it is may be more of the former. This leads to several conclusions. First, it is easier for a party to expand its contributor base, particularly its base of smaller contributors, during a presidential election year, when coverage of, interest in and participation in politics is highest. Second, the particular presidential candidate chosen may have an influence on the party’s ability to build that base among individual contributors—e.g., Bush’s popularity and Dukakis’
unpopularity may help account for the ORP's success in encouraging individual contributions in 1988 and the ODP's relatively poor showing. Third, the party must utilize tactics consistent with the make-up of their contributor base. For the Republicans, that may mean continuing to use ideological appeals. For the Democrats, it may mean better utilization of the giving circle integration and party activism of its smaller contributors. And fourth, soft money (and the ability to use the presidential candidate's name during solicitation) may be an important ingredient in the expansion of that base. We turn now to consider more general aspects of soft money.

With regard to soft money, the evidence is compelling: current measurements and disclosure methods of soft money in the presidential general election campaigns are inadequate, leaving us with no clear idea of how much money is being spent to influence the contests, or what the sources of that money may be. This raises two serious concerns—one of equity and one of publicity.

The Presidential Election Campaign Fund was established to assure equitable spending between the two major party candidates, and it did for one year. With the advent of soft money, especially as raised, used and disclosed in 1988, we now have the appearance of equity without the substance. And, the sources of the money are shrouded by multitudes of transfers and inadequate disclosure regulations—many of the same practices Overacker severely criticized decades ago.

On the positive side, there is equally compelling evidence that soft money is having the desired effect. It is helping reintegrate the state and local parties in the presidential campaigns. The extent of the reintegration seems to be subject to many factors, the most important of which may be the state party's ability to raise its own soft money. In the case of Ohio, the ORP did a superb job of raising and retaining soft money in the state. There is
some evidence that this gave the ORP a very real decision making role in Bush’s Ohio campaign. The ODP was dependent on its national affiliates for soft money handouts, and there is some evidence that this may have restricted its role in Dukakis’ campaign. For both parties, evidence indicates that the soft money was used to foster turnout and grass-roots participation. Soft money, then, is a mixed blessing. It combines the best and the worst of our campaign finance system, giving us both beauty and irony—e.g., it uses fat cat money in unpalatable amounts from shrouded sources to promote grass-roots participation among ordinary citizens in a democracy. In addition, soft money provides a more accountable outlet for fat cat presidential contributing than the alternatives, specifically independent expenditures. The challenge is to retain its good points while mitigating its bad ones. Methods to do so will be discussed in the policy section of this chapter.

B. Conclusions

In a perfect world, perhaps we could have it all. People would participate in politics not because of solicitations they receive, but because it’s the right thing to do. They would pay attention to issues, form considered opinions and act in accordance with them. Every adult would contribute to political causes according to his or her means, and the large number of small contributions would balance the small number of large contributions, giving us equal measures of liberty and equality with regard to the financing of our political campaigns. It is unlikely that the American electorate will ever approach this ideal. It is possible, however, that a subset of the electorate will come close. And that subset would look much like the political contributors that are the subject of this study.

We forget, amidst all the criticisms and concerns with regard to campaign finance, just how special contributors are. They are not only among the carriers of their parties’
creeds. They are among the carriers of the creed of democracy. They do what democratic theory says the ideal citizen should. They have clear ideological positions and generally act in accordance with them. They are interested, informed, educated, and active. They associate with equally involved citizens, enriching their circle with discussions about many aspects of politics. They turn out to vote in record numbers. They express their opinions to others by means of their contributions. And these contributors in particular play the political game through group politics, supporting their party of choice and its candidates on many geographic foci. If we were to array them on a spectrum according to the amounts of their state party contributions, as we arrayed them with regard to their contributing motivations at the end of Chapter V, we would find that, in general, evidence of their citizenship also increases with the amount of their contribution. John Stuart Mill would have given each of them several votes in every election! Could it be that maybe, just maybe, political contributors are the real heroes and heroines of American politics?

This is in sharp contrast to the generally held belief about the harmful ways of campaign money (Sorauf, 1988), a belief that seems to be unjustified by the attributes of most (but not all) of our contributors. The intention is not to understate the problems inherent in our campaign finance system. They are well documented, and require constant attention. The intention is, rather, to shift the focus from what's wrong with our campaign finance system to what's right about it. As public funding proposals are debated, as contribution limitations are considered, the positive citizenship aspects of most political contributing should be remembered.

Throughout the 1900s, the focus of campaign finance reform has been on discouraging large contributors, not on encouraging smaller ones. That has been left to the parties, candidates and PACs to do. If the same efforts had gone into encouraging
participation—particularly contributing—perhaps campaign finance reform would be less of an issue than it has been. Our system might be closer to approaching the democratic ideal of broader participation. The reforms recommended at the end of this chapter have that goal in mind.

With regard to political parties and soft money, there are two conclusions. First, these data indicate that soft money does what it was meant to do, and should be retained as a mechanism to foster political participation. The trade-off is palatable. Here, the "liberty" of larger contributors should be permitted in the interest of promoting more electoral "equality" among the masses and discouraging less desirable outlets for fat cat contributing in the presidential campaigns. What suffers, of course, is the level playing field for the presidential contenders. Second, there is absolutely no reason that soft money amounts, sources and uses should linger in the shadows. Rather, much more accountability can be brought to this mechanism, as will be discussed under the policy recommendations section of this chapter, where some first steps are proposed.

C. Directions for Future Research

In considering directions for future research with regard to campaign finance, let us consider for a moment the source of political funds. Almost all political money originates with an individual making a contribution to a political party, candidate or organization. These entities, in turn, make contributions to each other, making it appear that they are an important source of campaign funds. They are, of course—an important secondary source. The fact remains—most political money originates with individual contributors, and few realize it. No wonder individual contributors are the best kept secret in campaign finance (Sorauf, 1988)!

Why do we, as political scientists, seldom study them? Most would agree that they are worth
studying. Good data, however, are difficult to obtain. The ANES/CPS studies contain only a few questions regarding political contributing, and too few cases for much meaningful study. Studying them, then, means collecting original data, using campaign finance reports full of faults and complexities. Is it worth the effort? I would maintain it is. As this study has shown, there is much to be learned about our political system by focusing on those who finance it. There is an additional reward, too. Campaign contributors generally leave behind a paper trail that documents an important aspect of their political activity—i.e., campaign finance contributions as reported on campaign finance reports. Thus, we can combine archival data and public opinion data into a multi-faceted research design, using one source of information to enrich and confirm the other. What can we hope to learn?

First, we can learn how to encourage political participation in general by focusing on the carriers of the creed, asking questions like the following. How did they first become contributors? What motivates them to continue to contribute? Under what circumstances would they stop? We can use this information to help develop methods of encouraging participation among different segments of the citizenry.

We can learn much about the transmittal of political information, power and mores through the operation of giving circles, which, this study has shown, are powerful political mechanisms used by the elite among the elite. How do they operate? What determines their membership? How do giving circles among smaller Democratic contributors differ from those that exist among their larger Republican counterparts? How do they influence parties, candidates, political organization and their own members? Under what circumstances do the solidary motivations of their members override ideological ones? Under what circumstances is strategic giving important? What alternatives would be pursued, should political contributing to campaigns become very restricted?
One of those alternatives, of course, is soft money. It, too deserves further exploration, in ways that are parallel with methods used in this study. How was soft money raised and used in other states? What were the impacts on the roles of the state parties in the presidential general election? Does the way it is raised affect those roles, as we speculate it does, based on the Ohio data? How are its uses fostering political participation?

Finally, this study suggests the need for further exploration of strategic contributing in other environments, to answer the following questions. How prevalent is it? Is it in the mind of the contributor, the recipient or both? How much of a factor are environmental constraints—i.e., is strategic contributing predominantly associated with the party "in power," as the Ohio data would suggest? What happens when control of government is about equally divided?

D. Implications for Public Policy

This dissertation began with the thesis that there are significant differences among political contributors, as differentiated by the amounts of their contributions, and that these differences help explain why campaign finance reforms, especially those affecting the presidential elections, have seldom successfully limited the influence of those who give large amounts of money. It also questioned the validity of the available data regarding soft money in the presidential general election campaigns. We return now to those discussions, focusing on the implications of the research results for campaign finance reform.

There is no attempt here to address the full range of reforms available, as that is beyond the scope of the data contained in this dissertation. Nor is there an attempt to draft specific legislation at either the state or federal level. There is, rather, a discussion of how the research findings apply to campaign finance reform in general. The purpose here is to
suggest public policy considerations that may make campaign finance reform more likely to
achieve its goals without encouraging the kinds of circumventions that have plagued it in the
past. We begin with a discussion of what these goals should be, then proceed to discussions
of achieving them through reforms affecting contributors, the political parties and the use of
soft money in the presidential general election.

Many political scientists have given us criteria against which we can measure
campaign finance reforms, but for succinctness, completeness and clarity, those used here are
Frank Sorauf's. "If one sat a group of experts and informed citizens down to design a system
of campaign finance from scratch," says Sorauf, "there would be considerable agreement on a
list of desiderata for that system. Ideally, the funding of campaigns should:

1. promote competitive choice in elections;
2. support (or at least not harm) the two-party system;
3. encourage a broad base of voluntary contributors;
4. limit the burdens of fund-raising;
5. provide enough resources for campaigns to communicate fully with voters;
6. protect freedoms of political speech, activity and association;
7. ensure the accountability of sources and spenders;
8. limit the influence of contributors (of all or some kinds) on the candidates
   receiving their money; and
9. limit the amounts of money spent in the system. (This last criterion would be
   harder to frame and certainly would be more controversial.) (Sorauf, 1988,
p. 361-2).

Unfortunately, Sorauf does not give us a way to rank these criteria, nor to resolve the
conflicts among them, which are many. The goal of limiting the burden of fundraising, for
instance, is compatible with a system favoring large contributions from a few sources. But
that goal is in conflict with the goal of expanding the contributor base, which is compatible
with a system favoring small contributions from a multitude of sources.

In spite of all the criticisms aimed at large contributors, the financing of political
campaigns with large contributions is not without its benefits. In fact, doing so is consistent
with achieving many of Sorauf's desiderata. If a candidate or cause can gain the support of a
few wealthy and generous contributors, large contributions can help limit the burdens of fund-
raising. If large contributors decide to use their "giving circle" to expand the financial 
support for the favored candidate or cause, fund raising can be simpler and quicker. In 
addition, large contributions can help provide enough resources for campaigns to 
communicate fully with voters and help protect freedoms of political speech, activity and 
association. They can also help promote competitive choice in elections, especially by 
providing financing for an unknown candidate or unpopular idea. And, as the soft money 
data in this study have shown, large contributors can be very beneficial for the two-party 
system, helping to keep presidential general election campaigns in particular from becoming 
candidate-driven affairs exclusively.

Since large contributors became the most important source of campaign funds in 
the early 1900s, however, much of the campaign finance legislation proposed or enacted has 
attempted to control their influence, especially in presidential elections. In spite of helping to 
achieve some of Sorauf’s desiderata, they are inconsistent with others: ensuring the 
accountability of sources and spenders; limiting the influence of contributors; and encouraging 
a broad base of contributions. As the history of campaign finance reform has shown, the 
attempts to control their influence have been driven by these last three goals. As also has 
been shown, these attempts have not been successful. Rather, unintended consequences, 
loopholes or, in some cases, general disregard for the law, coupled with lack of enforcement, 
have afforded almost limitless opportunities for those with both the resources and the 
inclinations to give to political causes as they please. As evidenced by the role of soft money 
in the 1988 presidential general elections, the practice continues. Why? Primarily because 
there is no effective way to stop them that does not severely limit personal freedom. Let us 
consider the available legislative options and their various shortcomings:
Restrictions on the sources of money. Federal law as well as law in the state of Ohio bans funds from certain sources. Among the sources banned in some environments are gifts from corporations, labor unions, and individuals and firms having contractual relationships with the government. Some of these restrictions are easily thwarted, as shown by our study of large contributors. What cannot be given by the corporation can be given by its president or CEO. What cannot be given to an elected official or a candidate, can be given to his or her political party. The conclusion is clear enough that limitations on group giving have limited effectiveness.

Restrictions on the sizes of contributions. These restrictions are often thought to be an antidote to the dangerous influence of large contributors and are included in most campaign finance reform packages at both the federal and state levels. Yet the enforcement of restrictions on the sizes of contributions has seldom been successful, as has been shown in the history of campaign finance reform in Chapter II. The reasons are reinforced by the data discussed in this study: strong motivations and many alternatives. The circumventions and loopholes have been limitless.

Restrictions on expenditures. A moot point, since the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Buckley v Valeo. Without public funding, only voluntary restrictions on expenditures are possible. Essentially, not an option at this time.

Control by publicity. A method that consists of two parts: reporting requirements and publicity requirements. The federal government and, to some extent, all 50 of the states, have reporting regulations. Publicity requirements, however, vary greatly.

Public subsidy. At the federal level, only the presidential campaigns are publicly subsidized. There is no subsidy for House or Senate candidates. At the state level, about one-third of the states provide some level of public funding for the state political parties or state-level candidates. With public subsidies, most—but not all—restrictions, prohibitions and limits can be applied. But, one circumvention would still be available, and it may be the most wicked of all, as shall be discussed below. (Patterned after Adamany [1973] and Sorauf [1988].)

None of the five methods, then, offers adequate control.

Even if Congress and state legislatures were to decide to act in ways that ran counter to their unspoken alliance with large contributors, they must now confront "the problem of having legislative authority over only part of the system" (Sorauf, 1988, p. 379), due to the decisions rendered in Buckley v Valeo. All attempts to equalize by prohibiting, limiting, and subsidizing are to little avail because of the avenues fostering liberty that cannot
be closed. Even if PACs, individual contributions, and contributions from the parties are severely curtailed, there is still an avenue available. It is, of course, independent expenditures.

We can speculate that independent expenditures have remained relatively unimportant on the political scene (see Alexander and Bauer, 1991) because other methods better linked to the mainstream of politics, and therefore offering more rewards, have been open—for instance, soft money. Should restrictions tighten, historical precedent indicates that independent expenditures would become a force to be reckoned with. Their influence has already been felt in the most recent presidential campaign.

A group of Californians created an independent expenditure campaign to help George Bush, and their television spot, featuring a felon named Willie Horton, became the most controversial element of the 1988 campaign for many journalists. The group, the Committee for the Presidency, spent only $92,000 to attack Michael Dukakis' record on crime (Alexander and Bauer, 1991, p. 86).

The group was able to leverage much public relations coverage out of the Willie Horton spot, amplifying the effects of their investment, confusing both journalists and the public, who thought the ad was sponsored by the Bush campaign, and aiding the Bush election effort at no cost to his campaign.

If the status quo changes, increasing problems raised by independent expenditures may become painfully evident. These problems would include "skewed representation, decreased political equality, reinforcement of incumbency, unaccountability and questionable independence" (Nelson, 1990, p. 86). With avenues still open to them, then, it is unlikely that large contributors, such as those who gave soft money to the ODP and ORP (and, we may surmise, those who gave soft money to the non-federal accounts of the DNC and RNC) can be discouraged from contributing. Their motivations are simply too strong. What is to be done? I endorse two of the recommendations made by a group of campaign practitioners following the presidential campaigns of 1988, some of which are applicable to large
contributors with regard to both party and candidate campaigns (Alexander and Bauer, 1991).

They are that:

1. Individual campaign contribution limits, if any, must be set high and;

2. Campaign contribution limits must be tied to inflation indices.

This allows large contributors to achieve their contributing goals without encouraging them to engage in less accountable activities such as independent expenditures. It also does not encourage replacing the large contributor with the "large solicitor" (though it does not discourage the operation of the "giving circle"). In keeping with the above recommendations, both cumulative and specific campaign contribution limits, such as that now exist for federal elections, should be set higher and indexed to inflation. Combined with good publicity requirements, the public will know the sources of funds and potential influence in a manner that is straightforward, and contributors will know that they will be allowed to contribute a stable amount—stable, that is, with regard to inflation. These recommendations run counter to current federal law as well as some proposals being considered in the 119th Ohio General Assembly. These Ohio proposals place severe limitations on the ability of individuals to contribute to candidates and parties in Ohio.

With regard to soft money, the mechanism should be retained as "the lesser evil," but with modifications that improve its accountability. The parties, then, can continue to use soft money to encourage grass roots participation, especially in the presidential general election, which somewhat mitigates the undue influence of large contributors. The subject of soft money will be discussed again later, under proposals designed to strengthen the political parties.

With regard to strategic contributors, as this study has shown, there are some contributors who may be driven primarily by material motivations or quid-pro-quo incentives.
In this study, they are represented by the "21 mavericks" whose medium and large contributions to the ODP seemed to lack ideological underpinnings. While the motivations of these contributors seem to be similar to those of major contributors who have been associated with political scandals over the years (Sinclair in the early 1900s; Keating in the late 1990s; etc.) their numbers in the sample drawn for this study, as well as the size of their contributions to the state parties in 1988, are small enough that there is not much data upon which to base reform recommendations, and not much cause for alarm. This group, then, is bypassed with regard to reform recommendations, with the assumption being that what controls large contributors will limit strategic contributing.

Expanding the contributor base of political campaigns is consistent with many of Sorauf's desiderata. First, it helps establish a broad base of voluntary contributions, which encourages citizen participation in a democracy. Second, if the contributions are channeled through the parties, it supports the two-party system by encouraging feelings of party membership, contributing to political awareness, as well as profiting the parties financially. Third, it helps limit the influence of large contributors by dispersing the sources of funds. In fact, if there is any campaign finance goal everyone seems to agree with, it is that small contributors should be encouraged. As Jones has shown, however, new structures and processes of contributing "that may appear to include more and different publics may in reality scarcely change the character of the contributing public and may actually reinforce the status quo" (Jones, 1990, p. 27). The data in this dissertation help explain why this is so.

What can be done to encourage more citizens to become political contributors? Ideally, of course, we would like to encourage small contributors by strengthening the trust, interest and participation in government of the citizenry in general, as the factors that limit their political contributing may be the same as those that hinder their general political
participation: declining trust in government; declining turnout; lack of integrity of office holders; issues of special interest and fairness. "These issues transcend the particulars of campaign financing for they are the heart and soul of a viable democratic campaign and electoral system" (Jones, 1990, p. 42). The prospects for changing so many aspects of the system are bleak. And, the prospects for encouraging small contributors may be as dismal as the prospects for discouraging large contributors. Still, in a democracy, the reasons for attempting to do so are compelling. I recommend five reforms:

1. Reinstate tax credits and tax deductions for modest political contributions to political candidates, causes and parties, and display the credits and deductions prominently on the income-tax forms, along with language that encourages their use. It may take several years for the impact to be achieved, as credits and deductions must be made long before taxes are filed. However, with patience and the reinforcements suggested below, the tax credits and deductions should have more impact than they have had in the past.

2. Retain the federal income tax checkoff to provide public funds for the presidential campaigns, and increase the amount that can be contributed from $1 to $3 on individual returns and from $2 to $6 on joint returns, as recommended by campaign professionals (Alexander and Bauer, 1991, p. 147). Index these amounts to inflation so that increases occur over time in increments of no less than $1. Change the wording and position of the checkoff option on the tax form so that tax filers are encouraged to contribute. If necessary, raise the tax checkoff amount to fund the proposals mentioned in #4 and 5, below.

3. Retain the Ohio income tax checkoff for the public funding of party operations. Again, index the amount to be contributed to inflation, and change the wording and position of the checkoff to encourage contributing.

4. Create incentives for the political parties—national, state and local—to develop a broader, more numerous contributor base that includes more women, minorities, and small contributors. Both parties have assets they can build on. The Republicans have more successful experience with direct mail contributors, while the Democrats should be able to take advantage of their more committed small contributors and the giving circles that exist among them. Also, the Democrats may be able to do better than suspected with regard to direct mail solicitations, even though they may not reach absolute parity with the GOP (Price, 1984, p. 248). As Jones points out, "those who are asked are more likely to give. In fact, contributors attribute their contributions to having received particular solicitations" (1990, p. 38). One of the reasons for not giving, then, is not having been asked. No entities are in a better position to ask, ask again, and build a diverse contributor base than the political parties. (Candidates, after all, can come and
The parties remain.) The parties should be encouraged to do so with legislated incentives.

5. Support the above reforms and greater electoral participation in general with a federally-funded national educational advertising program that encourages political participation in general and political contributing in particular. Costs could be covered by increasing the tax checkoff amount on federal income tax forms (Alexander and Bauer, 1991, p. 149). During tax filing time, the campaign should be especially visible to encourage taking advantage of the tax credits, deductions and checkoff opportunities. Also, the campaign could escalate during presidential general election years.

By aggressively encouraging small contributors, the influence of large contributors can be mitigated, and participation overall increased. Surely the goal warrants the effort.

If there is a generally agreed upon desideratum among political scientists, it is that the political parties should be strengthened. The FECA amendments of 1979 and the Ohio political party fund tax checkoff are evidence that many legislators agree. And the data discussed in Chapter VI indicate that soft money, in spite of its shortcomings, may be important in helping achieve this goal. Accepting, then, that it is very desirable to strengthen the political parties, the following suggestions should be considered as means to help accomplish it:

1. Allow two categories of federal tax credits and deductions for political contributions, as discussed earlier: one for political parties; and a second for candidates/other political causes. This encourages contributions to parties over and above other political contributions.

2. If contribution limits are deemed desirable in Ohio, the ones for political parties should be set much higher than those for candidates and other political organizations, as is now the case with federal elections. (An individual can contribute only $1000 per election to a federal candidate. He may, however, contribute up to $20,000 per year to the national political parties.) All contribution limits, but especially those to parties, should be indexed to inflation.

3. Spending limits for parties in the presidential general election campaigns should be raised beyond the current limits, while leaving the amounts to be received by the candidates from the public treasury at their present levels.
4. Explore more ways to publicly subsidize the basic operations of the political parties at both the federal and state levels, in addition to encouraging them to expand their contributor bases.

5. As mentioned above, create incentives for the parties to broaden their contributor bases.

6. Retain the mechanism of soft money but increase its accountability. This will allow large contributors to achieve their contributing goals with regard to the presidential general election campaigns, will provide a mechanism through which the state and local parties can be reintegrated into these campaigns, as well as promote grass roots political participation. In order to increase the accountability of soft money, the following measures should be considered:

   a. Allow soft money to be collected at the national level in non-federal accounts in unlimited amounts, as is now the case, but require that all transfers to state or local party accounts be done by transferring individual contributions, aggregated by contributor. (This could be done via lists, not necessarily by transferring the actual checks.) The contributions transferred, of course, would have to meet all the requirements of the state to which they were being transferred. This would remove the "shroud" of anonymity caused by intra-party transfers of soft money. Also, it allows differentiation between in-state and out-of-state money. As such, it would encourage the raising of in-state money, to avoid the stigma attached to that which has been raised out of state. This would further strengthen the state and local parties with regard to the presidential general election campaigns by increasing their importance as funding sources.

   b. Require that all non-federal contributions be aggregated by contributor at the federal level and disbursements to states disclosed by contributor.

   c. Allow the states to continue to raise soft money within the state, as the ORP did in Ohio in 1988, but aggregate and report all state party contributions by contributor to date for the calendar year. This would be a simple matter for the ODP and ORP, both of which maintain computerized records.

   d. Consider eliminating some (but not all) of the expenditure restrictions on soft money, as the mechanisms are so abused, unclear and cumbersome that they are valueless.

As was shown in Chapter VI, the use of soft money can have many positive results. It can reintegrate the state and local political parties in the presidential campaigns. It can be used to register, inform and turn out voters. It can be used to encourage people to participate in campaigns. The above changes with regard to soft money could help retain
some of these positive aspects, while helping eliminate some of the negative ones—most notably, its lack of accountability.

As Mutch reminds us, there is little prospect for driving interested money out of politics. "Partly this is because law can be evaded: lawyers, accountants, and fund raisers are paid to devise imaginative schemes for getting money past the law. But the deeper reason is that no law can weaken the resolve of the powerful forces behind that money to influence federal elections" (Mutch, 1988, p. 191). This dissertation has identified and measured those powerful forces among political contributors, and has helped explain why the influence of large contributors is impossible to prevent, while the influence of small contributors is difficult to encourage. Any attempt to accomplish either of the above goals by legislation—i.e., discourage large contributors or encourage small contributors—must be done with the realities of the motivations of these contributor groups in mind, as well as the motives of the political entities with which they interact—e.g., the political parties, the candidates and miscellaneous political organizations. If not, the result is likely to be more circumventions and loopholes, in keeping with the long-standing tradition that characterizes campaign finance reform. No reform is better than reform that, because it is certain to be circumvented, will undercut further the public confidence in the system of government.
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_______. 1989. "National and State Party Organizations' Relations with the Campaign Organizations." Presentation made at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, August 31-September 3.


MacCallum, Robert. 1987. Class notes from Factor Analysis, Psychology 820, as taught at The Ohio State University, Autumn, 1987.


Nathanson, Jim. 1989. "The View from the Presidential Campaign Organizations and the Party Organizations in the States." Presentation made at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Atlanta Georgia, August 31-September 3. Also, personal interview following the presentation.


Campaign, Party and Other Personnel Interviewed

Bennett, Robert

Casey, Terry
Executive Director, Franklin County Republican Party. In-person interviews on December 5, 1988, May 5, 1989 and May 21, 1989.

Cooper, Kent

McManus, Jody

Nathanson, Jim
Director of the Bush presidential campaign in Ohio in 1988. Currently with the Republican national Committee. In-person interview at the American Political Science Association meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, September 1, 1989.

Peters, Stephanie

Ruvolo, Jim

Sweitzer, Don

Swillinger, Daniel
Attorney in Washington, DC. Specializes in campaign finance law. Has worked for many candidates, including DuPont when he sought the Republican presidential nomination. Phone interviews on July 14, 1989 and March 11, 1991.

In addition to the formal interviews above, many informal conversations with party and campaign personnel occurred.
The Ohio State University, Department of Political Science
223 Derby Hall, 154 North Oval Mall, Columbus, Ohio 43210

POLITICAL CONTRIBUTORS IN OHIO
A Statewide Survey of Attitudes and Behaviors

The Political Science Department at Ohio State University conducts surveys regularly to help us understand important political issues. One of our interests is people like you—people who have contributed money to political parties, candidates or groups.

Using public records of campaign finance reports from 1988, we have randomly selected a sample of political contributors. You are among those selected. We need your help if our survey is to be truly representative. Please, will you take the fifteen minutes necessary to complete this survey?

Answer all of the questions that apply to you. If you'd like to comment on any of the questions or to qualify your answers, use the space in the margins or on the back cover. We'll read all of your comments and take them into account.

Remember, all replies are strictly confidential. Your name and your answers will never be recorded together. Thank you for your time and assistance.

If you have any questions, please call Karen C. Snyder, (614) 292-2880.

DIRECTIONS:
Unless otherwise stated, select one answer for each question and indicate it by circling the number beside your answer.
Throughout this survey, the term "contribution" means a contribution of money, not of services, goods or time.

Thank you for your help. Please mail this questionnaire in the enclosed business reply envelope. No postage is necessary.
This survey focuses on your political activities and attitudes during the general election of 1988 in which the following contests were held:
• National (Federal)—President, U.S. Senator, and U.S. House of Representatives
• State—some State Senators, all State Representatives, and some Justices
• County (Local)—County Commissioners plus many other county officers, including Judges

YOUR POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 1988

Citizens may contribute to political parties, candidates for elected office, or issue oriented groups such as Political Action Committees (PACs). First, we’d like to ask about parties.

A1. Did you contribute to the Democratic Party and/or Republican Party during 1988?
1 NO (If no, skip to question A4.)
2 YES (If yes, continue.)

A2. Check (+) as many answers as apply and fill in amount of contribution.

To which political party did you contribute?

At each level what method was used to solicit your contribution?

What total amount did you contribute?

☐ Democratic
☐ LOCAL
☐ STATE
☐ NATIONAL

☐ Republican
☐ LOCAL
☐ STATE
☐ NATIONAL

A3. People are motivated to contribute to political parties for different reasons:
1 TO SUPPORT PARTY’S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
2 TO SUPPORT PARTY’S OTHER CANDIDATES
3 DESIRE TO SUPPORT PARTY’S POLICIES AND PLATFORM
4 DESIRE TO SUPPORT A FRIEND, ASSOCIATE OR FAMILY MEMBER WHO REQUESTED YOUR CONTRIBUTION
5 FOR JOB OR BUSINESS REASONS
6 OTHER Specify.

Which of the above reasons was most important to you? (Put number of reason beside each statement.)

☐ MOST IMPORTANT
☐ SECOND MOST IMPORTANT
☐ THIRD MOST IMPORTANT

Next, we’d like to ask about candidates.

A4. Did you contribute to any political candidates during 1988?
1 NO (If no, skip to question A15.)
2 YES (If yes, continue.)

A5. Did you contribute to George Bush and/or Michael Dukakis during the 1988 presidential campaign?
1 NO (If no, skip to question A7.)
2 YES (If yes, continue.)

A6. Check (+) as many answers as apply to each question below, and fill in amount.

To which candidate did you contribute?

When was your contribution given?

What method was used to solicit your contribution?

What amount did you contribute?

☐ BUSH
☐ PRIMARY CAMPAIGN
☐ GENERAL ELECTION

☐ DUKAKIS
☐ PRIMARY CAMPAIGN
☐ GENERAL ELECTION

A7. Did you contribute to any other candidate for President during 1988?
1 NO (If no, skip to question A9.)
2 YES (If yes, continue.)

A8. Write the name of any other candidate for President to whom you contributed. Then check (+) as many answers as apply and fill in amount.

To which candidate did you contribute?

When was your contribution given?

What method was used to solicit your contribution?

What amount did you contribute?

Name:
☐ PRIMARY CAMPAIGN
☐ GENERAL ELECTION

A9. Did you contribute to any candidates other than those for President?
1 NO (If no, skip to question A14.)
2 YES (If yes, continue.)
A10. Write the names, party affiliations and amounts contributed of up to two of these non-presidential candidates. If you contributed to more than two, list the two to whom you contributed the greatest amount. And check (✓) as many answers as apply.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To which candidate did you contribute?</th>
<th>When was your contribution given?</th>
<th>What method was used to solicit your contribution?</th>
<th>To which candidate did you contribute?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A11. Did you contribute to candidates other than those listed above?
1. NO (If no, skip to question A14.)
2. YES (If yes, continue)

A12. Please estimate the number of additional candidates to whom you contributed in 1988. (Write that number in the space below.)
NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL CANDIDATES TO WHOM YOU CONTRIBUTED IN 1988.

A13. Please estimate the average amount you contributed to each of these additional candidates.
1. UNDER $25
2. $25 TO $99
3. $100 TO $499
4. $500 AND OVER
5. DO NOT KNOW

A14. People are motivated to contribute to political candidates for different reasons:
1. FRIENDSHIP WITH THE CANDIDATE
2. SUPPORT OF CANDIDATE'S STAND ON THE ISSUES
3. CANDIDATE'S BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS
4. CANDIDATE'S POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION
5. FRIEND, ASSOCIATE OR FAMILY MEMBER ASKED YOU TO CONTRIBUTE
6. ASSURE ACCESS TO CANDIDATE IF HE/SHE IS ELECTED
7. JOB OR BUSINESS REASONS
8. OTHER Specify:
Which of the above reasons was most important to you? (Put number of reason beside each statement.)

- MOST IMPORTANT
- SECOND MOST IMPORTANT
- THIRD MOST IMPORTANT

A15. Did you contribute to any groups that supported or opposed candidates or issues? Political Action Committees (PACs) would be included in this category.
1. NO
2. YES

A16. How many years ago did you make your first contribution to a political party, candidate or group?
1. LESS THAN 5 YEARS AGO
2. 5 TO 10 YEARS AGO
3. MORE THAN 10 YEARS AGO
4. DO NOT KNOW

A17. How often do you contribute to political parties, candidates or groups?
1. LESS THAN ONCE A YEAR
2. ABOUT 1 TO 4 TIMES A YEAR
3. 5 OR MORE TIMES A YEAR

A18. Did you use the one dollar check-off option on your 1988 Federal Income Tax Return to make a political contribution to the Presidential Election Campaign?
1. NO
2. YES

A19. Did you use the one dollar check-off option on your 1988 Ohio Income Tax Return to make a contribution to the Ohio Political Party Fund?
1. NO
2. YES

A20. Do any of your friends, relatives or associates make political contributions?
1. NO (If no, skip to question B1.)
2. YES (If yes, continue.)

A21. Have any of your friends, relatives or associates ever solicited you for political contributions?
1. NO
2. YES

A22. Have you ever solicited any of your friends, relatives or associates for political contributions?
1. NO
2. YES
YOUR LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE IDENTIFICATION

B1. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Below is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are displayed. Use this scale to answer the following questions.

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Extremely Liberal  Liberal  Slightly Liberal  Moderately Liberal  Moderately Conservative  Slightly Conservative  Extremely Conservative

Referring to the scale, where would you place the following people and groups? (Fill in one number from 1 to 7 for each.)

- GEORGE BUSH
- MICHAEL DUKAKIS
- JESSE JACKSON
- RONALD REAGAN
- THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
- THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
- WHERE WOULD YOU PLACE YOURSELF?

YOUR PARTY IDENTIFICATION

We'd like to know if you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat or an Independent. Look at this chart:

1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
Strong Republican  Not very strong Republican  Independent who leans Republican  Independent  Independent who leans Democrat  Not very strong Democrat  Strong Democrat  Do not know Republican

C1. Fill in one number from the chart that best describes you.

C2. Do you consider yourself a member of this party?

1. NO
2. YES

C3. Are you now, or have you ever been, active in party affairs?

1. NO
2. YES

YOUR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN 1988

D1. The political parties try to talk to as many people as they can to get them to vote for their candidate. Did anyone from a political party call you or come around and talk to you about the campaign in 1988?

1. NO (If no, skip to question D3.)
2. YES (If yes, continue.)

D2. Which party was it?

1. DEMOCRATIC
2. REPUBLICAN
3. BOTH
4. OTHER Specify:

D3. During the campaigns of 1988, did you do any of the following?

1. NO
2. YES

D4. Talked to people and tried to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates.

1. NO
2. YES

D5. Went to political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular candidate.

1. NO
2. YES

D6. Did you do any other work for one of the parties or candidates?

1. NO (If no, skip to question E1.)
2. YES (If yes, continue.)

D7. List party or candidate you worked for: List activity you performed:

YOUR INTEREST IN AND ATTITUDE TOWARD GOVERNMENT AND CANDIDATES

E1. Some people follow what is going on in government and public affairs whether there is an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. How often would you say you follow these activities?

1. MOST OF THE TIME
2. SOME OF THE TIME
3. ONLY NOW AND THEN
4. HARDLY AT ALL
5. DO NOT KNOW
E2. Below is a 5-point scale describing how much you might agree or disagree with any particular statement. Use this scale to describe how you feel about each statement below. (Fill in one number from 1 to 5 beside each statement.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- "People like me don't have any say about what the government does."
- "I don't think public officials care much about what people like me think."
- "I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country."
- "I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics."
- "I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people."
- "I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people."

E3. How interested were you in the political campaigns of 1988?
1. VERY INTERESTED
2. SOMEWHAT INTERESTED
3. NOT VERY INTERESTED
4. DO NOT KNOW

E4. In the 1988 Presidential Election, how much did you care about who won?
1. CARED A GOOD DEAL
2. CARED SOMEWHAT
3. DID NOT CARE VERY MUCH
4. DO NOT KNOW

E5. How well do you feel each of these words or phrases describes George Bush?
- COMPASSIONATE
- MORAL
- PROVIDES STRONG LEADERSHIP
- REALLY CARES ABOUT PEOPLE LIKE YOU
- KNOWLEDGEABLE

E6. How well do you feel each of these words or phrases describes Michael Dukakis?
- COMPASSIONATE
- MORAL
- PROVIDES STRONG LEADERSHIP
- REALLY CARES ABOUT PEOPLE LIKE YOU
- KNOWLEDGEABLE

YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD PROGRAMS AND ISSUES

F1. If you had a say in making up the federal budget, how would you change spending for the following federal programs? (Using this scale, fill in one number from 1 to 4 beside each program.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decrease</th>
<th>Keep Spending</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>Do Not Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- SOCIAL SECURITY
- FOOD STAMPS
- IMPROVING AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT
- FINANCIAL AID FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS
- ASSISTANCE FOR THE UNEMPLOYED
- SPACE AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
- PROGRAMS THAT ASSIST BLACKS
- CHILDCARE
- PUBLIC SCHOOLS
- CARE FOR THE ELDERLY
- THE HOMELESS
- THE WAR ON DRUGS
- NATIONAL DEFENSE
- HEALTH INSURANCE

F2. In general, how would you rate the following people and groups on the issues that were important to you in 1988? (Using this scale, fill in one number for each.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was close to my</th>
<th>Was somewhat distant</th>
<th>Was very distant from</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>positions on issues</td>
<td>from my positions on issues</td>
<td>my positions on issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- MICHAEL DUKAKIS
- GEORGE BUSH
- JESSE JACKSON
- WHAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS DOING IN 1988
- THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
- THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
- RONALD REAGAN

YOUR VOTING BEHAVIOR, ETC.

G1. Did you vote in the 1988 general election?
1. NO (If no, skip to question G3).
2. YES (If yes, continue.)
3. DO NOT KNOW

G2. Which presidential candidate did you vote for?
1. BUSH
2. DUKAKIS
3. OTHER Specify: ________________________________
G3. How strong was your preference for this candidate?
1 STRONG
2 NOT STRONG
3 DO NOT KNOW

G4. How long before the 1988 general election did you decide that you were going to vote the way you did?
1 BEFORE 1988
2 DURING THE PRIMARIES
3 AROUND THE TIME OF THE POLITICAL CONVENTIONS
4 AFTER THE CONVENTIONS BUT BEFORE NOVEMBER
5 JUST BEFORE THE ELECTION

If you did vote, skip to question G7.

G5. If you did not vote in the general election of 1988, why not?
1 WAS NOT REGISTERED
2 WAS SICK
3 OTHER Specify: ____________________________________________________________

G6. If you had been able to vote, which candidate would you have voted for?
1 BUSH
2 DUKAKIS
3 OTHER Specify: ____________________________________________________________

G7. Have you ever run for or held an elective public office?
1 NO (If no, skip to question G10.)
2 YES (If yes, continue.)

G8. Which elective public office have you run for or held most recently?

G9. In your race for this office, did you have the active support of the party?
1 YES, SUPPORTED BY REPUBLICANS
2 YES, SUPPORTED BY DEMOCRATS
3 NO, DID NOT HAVE PARTY SUPPORT

G10. Have you ever been appointed to a governmental position by an elected official?
1 NO
2 YES

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
To compare political contributors like you with others, it is important to have information about you and your family. Remember, all answers are strictly confidential.

H1. What is your year of birth? 19_____
April 17, 1990

Thomas M. Quinn  
7121 Hollywyck  
Maumee, Ohio 43537

I am writing to ask you to participate in a study of political contributors in Ohio. Using public records on file with the Secretary of State of Ohio, and using scientific sampling techniques, The Ohio State University has randomly selected a sample of 975 people who made at least one political contribution during 1988. Your name was among those selected.

For the results of the study to be valid, it is important that all those selected be surveyed. Please, will you complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it as soon as possible. A business reply envelope has been provided. No postage is needed.

You may be assured of complete confidentiality. The questionnaire has an identification number for mailing purposes only. This is so that we may check your name off the list when your questionnaire is returned. Your name will never be placed on the questionnaire. Nor will The Ohio State University ever allow your name to be released to anyone.

It is important that the questionnaire be completed by you personally and not by any other member of the household. Yours was the name selected, and it is your answer that we need.

To receive a summary copy of the research results, write "Report Requested" on the back of the return envelope and print your name and address below it. Please do not put this information on the questionnaire itself, as we prefer that all questionnaires remain anonymous.

Thank you in advance for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Karen C. Snyder  
Political Science Department

P.S. To preserve the scientific validity of the study, it is important that the questionnaire be completed by you and not by anyone else.
May 21, 1990

James A. Cook, Jr.
554 Hopocan Avenue, E.
Barberton, Ohio 44203

About four weeks ago you received a letter and questionnaire asking you to take part in a study of political contributors in Ohio. As of today, I have not received your reply. I apologize for being so persistent, but your participation is extremely important.

Only a fraction of political contributors in Ohio were selected to participate. The selection was done randomly, using names from public records--i.e., campaign finance reports on file with the Ohio Secretary of State. For our study to be scientifically valid, it is important that those selected participate in the study.

Enclosed is a duplicate questionnaire and business reply envelope. Please, will you take the 15 minutes necessary to complete the questionnaire and return it? You are assured of complete confidentiality. The questionnaire has an identification number for mailing purposes only. This is so that I may check your name off the list when your questionnaire is returned. Your name will never be placed on the questionnaire. Nor will The Ohio State University release your name to anyone.

It is important that the questionnaire be completed by you and not by any other member of your household. Yours was the name selected and it is your answer that we need.

To receive a summary copy of the research results, write "Report Requested" on the back of the return envelope and print your name and address below it. To preserve the anonymity of your answers, please do not put your name on the questionnaire.

Thank you in advance for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Karen G. Snyder

P.S. I know how busy you must be, but I must "nag" you a bit. The validity of the study depends on your cooperation.
Table 30
Comparisons of NES Contributors and Noncontributors with Ohio Contributors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of cases</th>
<th>Non Contributors</th>
<th>Check-off Only Contributors</th>
<th>Organizational Contributors</th>
<th>Percent of Total Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>36%</td>
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<tr>
<td>35-54</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 and over</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade School</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under $20,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20-39,999</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$40,000+</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Respondents who received no post-election interview not included.
2 Number respondents' cases entered as of 7/90.
3 For comparability, age of respondents in 1988 was used here, though survey was conducted in 1990.
4 Categories for Ohio Data started with "High School or less."
5 Recoded differently from Jones' data for comparability with Ohio Data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non Contributors</th>
<th>Check-off Only Contributors</th>
<th>Organizational Contributors</th>
<th>Percent of Total Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I of cases</td>
<td>(1427)</td>
<td>(1213)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>(538)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTISANSHIP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY⁶</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undeclared</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYCHOLOGICAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care a lot</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>57%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal efficacy⁸</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>53%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARTICIPATION</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Voted</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>64%</td>
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<td>58%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persuaded</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>22%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wore Button</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<td>7%</td>
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<td>Attended Rally</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<td>Campaign Work</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Contact</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Party Contact</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>9%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

⁶Categories are different from those used by Jones, but are consistent over all data.

⁷Or 99% if recoded to include "Cared good deal" and "Cared Somewhat."

⁸Differs somewhat from Jones due to Jones registering LO efficacy.
Table 31
Correlation Comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Contributor Categories</th>
<th>Log of Actual Contribution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r*</td>
<td>Sign.**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>Republicans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious Preference</td>
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<td>Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Job Status</td>
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<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>Strength of Party ID</td>
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<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness to Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
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<td>.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of Parties Contributed To</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Levels of Giving/Party of Record</td>
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<td>Levels of Giving/Other Party</td>
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<td>Republicans</td>
<td>.16</td>
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</table>
Table 31 (continued)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Contributor Categories r*</th>
<th>Sign.**</th>
<th>Log of Actual Contribution r</th>
<th>Sign.</th>
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<tr>
<td>No. of Candidate Contributions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
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<td>.17</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>No. of Different Channels Used</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>NS</td>
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<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<td>Frequency of Political Contributions</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>NS</td>
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<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<td>Giving Circle Scores</td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>Time of First State Party Contribution</td>
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<td>No. of Campaign Acts Performed</td>
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<td>-.15</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.001</td>
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<td>Republicans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frequency of Following Gov’t/Public Affairs</td>
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<td>Caring About 1988 Presidential Outcome</td>
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<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>.11</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>Presidential Vote</td>
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<td>Democrats</td>
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<td>-.26</td>
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<td>Party Contribution Motive</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* r = Pearson’s r  
** NS = Not significant