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Beyond the limits of humanistic and technocratic ideologies in education: A critique of the Greek and American models

Konstantellou, Eudokia, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1992

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BEYOND THE LIMITS OF HUMANISTIC AND TECHNOCRATIC IDEOLOGIES IN EDUCATION:
A CRITIQUE OF THE GREEK AND AMERICAN MODELS

DISSertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Eudokia Konstantellou, B.A., M.A.

****

The Ohio State University

1992

Dissertation Committee: Approved By

Dr. Philip L. Smith

Dr. William D. Taylor

Dr. Vassilios Lambropoulos

Dr. Gregory Jusdanis

Advisor

College of Education
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VITA

October 27, 1954 ..................................... Born - Athens, Greece

1977 .................................................. B.A. (Philosophy), National University of Athens, Greece

1977-1979 ......................................... Resident Tutor, INTERALP, Cultural Study Programs, Kalymnos, Greece

1979-1981 ......................................... Fulbright Grant for Graduate Study in Education in the United States

1981 .................................................. M.A. (Education), The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1981-82 .............................................. Academic Advisor, University College, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1982-1986 ........................................... Teaching Associate, College of Education, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1987-1988 ........................................... Program Director, ITHAKA, Cultural Study Programs, Kalymnos, Greece
1988-1989 ..............................................Teaching Associate,  
College of Education,  
The Ohio State University,  
Columbus, Ohio

1989-1990 ...............................................Teaching Associate,  
Department of Judaic and  
Near Eastern Languages and  
Literatures,  
The Ohio State University,  
Columbus, Ohio

1991-Present ................................. Assistant Professor and  
Director,  
Department of Education  
Hellenic College,  
Brookline, Massachusetts

PUBLICATIONS

1991 "Education as a Means of Empowerment for Minority  
Cultures: Strategies for the Greek American Community,"  
Journal of Modern Hellenism, 7.


FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Education

Studies in Foundations of Education: Dr. Philip L. Smith
Studies in Technology and Education: Dr. William D. Taylor
Studies in Modern Greek Culture: Dr. V. Lambropoulos  
Dr. G. Jusdanis
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INTRODUCTION

The process of the development of national educational systems has been marked by struggles between opposing ideological forces for the domination of the centers of the production and dissemination of knowledge. The formation of national educational systems, in the first place, reflected the desire of the bourgeois class that emerged victorious from the national revolutions of the eighteenth century, to solidify its power through the creation of the mechanisms that would control and reproduce the knowledge necessary for sustaining the modern social order.

In this sense, educational institutions not only mirror a society's political, social, economic, and cultural makeup, but also function as the apparatus that legitimizes it and reproduces it. As Michel Foucault has succinctly stated,

Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault 1980:131).
Thus modern societies have elevated education into a powerful mechanism through which individuals gain access to the discourses that structure their social relations. In this regard, educational institutions are entrusted with not merely teaching the basics, but more importantly with socializing or "disciplining," according to Foucault, the social body:

But we know very well that, in its distribution, in what it [education] permits and what it prevents, it follows the lines laid down by social differences, conflicts and struggles. Every educational system is a political means of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, with the knowledge and power they bring with them (Qtd in Sheridan 1980:127).

The role of educational institutions in the transmission and reproduction of the "truths" of particular cultures has been amply documented in recent decades in the works of philosophers, historians, and sociologists of education. From functionalist to structuralist and post-structuralist analyses, the role of education in sustaining or challenging the basic assumptions of a culture has been widely discussed. My own research interests also lie in investigating the role educational institutions have historically played in producing and legitimizing forms of knowledge that sustain the social order. More specifically I have focused on the comparative study of the philosophical and historical forces that have shaped the modern educational systems of Greece and the United States of America. In
this dissertation I engage in a critical analysis of the humanistic and
the technocratic/utilitarian ideals, which have dominated the
educational systems of Greece and the United States respectively. I
am intrigued by the fact that the two systems have been structured
on the basis of two opposing philosophical traditions (idealism and
empiricism) due to the different cultural and socio-political realities
surrounding educational institutions in each country. The former
promotes a general, liberal arts education that conceives of learning
as the transmission of perennial truths, the latter advocates a
utilitarian curriculum as a means of adjusting individuals to the
realities of a changing world.

The educational philosophies that correspond to the conflicting
philosophical traditions of idealism and empiricism have their
proponents in every country's educational institutions. The common
perception is that the more industrialized a society, the more
utilitarian/technocratic the orientation of its educational system is
likely to be. Without ignoring the complexity and relative autonomy
of educational institutions, one could indeed suggest that, to the
extent that in modern societies educational institutions are
interrelated with other societal institutions, there is a correlation
between the degree of economic and industrial development of a
country and the increasing utilitarian function of education. This
relationship between educational institutions and socio-economic structures suggests that the age-long conflict between a humanistic and a technocratic education continues to inform decisions over educational policy not only in the Western world but also in developing countries that have embarked on the path of modernization. It seems that developing countries as a rule are willing to emulate the experience of the advanced capitalist countries, especially that of the United States, in the restructuring of their educational systems. The importing of technocratic models that rely on the close connection between education and economic development is welcomed and their implementation is entrusted in the hands of experts who have usually been educated at the country where these models originated. The concepts of modernization, progress, economic development and the like are transferred thus from the center (of economic, political, social, and cultural developments) to the periphery which aspires to partake in the promises of modernity.

A phenomenon worthy of attention is that, whereas developing countries are usually eager to adopt a technocratic model, sometimes even uncritically, the developed center brings the technocratic model under scrutiny with critics demanding its replacement with a humanistic model which will restore emphasis on a general as
opposed to a specialized education. At the same time that developing countries opt for modernization in their educational systems which are seen as antiquated and captive of the forces of tradition, industrialized nations which have reaped the fruits of modernization embark on a quest for tradition and stress the superior value of humanistic learning.

The cases of the educational systems of the United States and Greece exemplify this clash over the desirability of the one over the other model. Within the last decade this clash has informed measures taken in both countries toward questioning and reforming the structure of their educational institutions. The United States has witnessed in the past decade the resurgence of a very vocal group of critics who, utilizing their power within political and academic establishments, have launched an effort to reshape education away from what they claim is a relativistic, overspecialized direction toward a unified curriculum (a core curriculum based on a liberal arts/Great Books humanistic tradition). In Greece the trend has been toward slowly abandoning the traditional idealistic model which relied on the teaching of the classical tradition and toward modernizing the educational system as a means to the economic development of the country and the full integration of Greece into the European Economic Community.
The two systems, technocratic and humanistic, and the philosophical traditions they represent are generally seen by their supporters and critics as clearly incompatible and as the only two alternatives one has to choose from in order to construct educational policy. In my dissertation the examination of the structuring process of the Greek and American educational systems aims to show that a) humanistic and technocratic education, in so far as they are both constructs of the culture of modernity, do not constitute "two cultures" (according to C. P. Snow's dualistic schema) but two conflicting discourses on Truth and b) that in so far as they both function as "regimes of truth," they offer totalizing views of social reality and aim at suppression and exclusion of difference within their confines. If this is indeed the case, then the question is how we move beyond humanistic and technocratic ideologies in education, escaping thus the either/or trap which assumes that our choices are confined to placing either Allan Bloom or the president of General Motors in charge of educational decision-making.

In Chapter 1 I will map the history of the idealist and empiricist traditions in education as they took shape in the nineteenth-century European context. Their roots will be traced to the conflict between the tenets of Enlightenment and Romanticism as are exemplified in the work of two major European thinkers, Herbert Spencer and
Wilhelm von Humboldt. Spencer, whose essay "What Knowledge is of Most Worth?" appeared in 1861, put forth the call for a "useful education" which influenced greatly much of European education and dominated twentieth-century American education. Wilhelm von Humboldt, the architect of the Prussian educational reforms of 1809-1810, articulated a humanistic educational ideal centered on the concept of Bildung (individual cultivation and self-formation) which rejected utilitarian principles in favor of a disinterested pursuit of knowledge. The writings of both Spencer and Humboldt will be situated within their specific cultural and sociopolitical contexts and read in conjunction with other texts that support the basic premises of the two positions.

In Chapters II and III I look at two case studies -- the formation of the Greek and the American educational systems -- in order to document the conflict between the idealist and empiricist traditions which led to the construction of a predominantly humanistic model in Greece and a predominantly technocratic model in the United States. I will trace the conflict between the two positions from the establishment of national educational systems in both countries (in the 1830s in the case of Greece with the institutionalization of public education and in the 1840s in the United States with the rise of the common school movement) to current developments. The
comparative analysis will demonstrate how the United States, a new country, without a long historical past, without the burden of tradition and clearly delineated boundaries between social classes, most readily accepted the Spencerian argument for a utilitarian education, whereas European countries steeped in humanistic traditions incorporated utilitarian ideals into their educational systems with greater reluctance. Greece is a model case for studying the dominance of the humanistic tradition in education. Because of its precarious position between East and West, Greece as a newly independent nation in the nineteenth century used education primarily as the tool for forging a national identity and heavily relied on German idealist and nationalist ideas for the shaping of its educational system. Similarly, the United States is a model case for studying the triumph of a technocratic model. Whereas Greek education stressed continuity with Europe and its traditions, American education emphasized discontinuity by rejecting European ways as aristocratic and corrupt. The American school was concerned not with the transmission of venerable traditions but with the dissemination of skills that would facilitate social adjustment.

In Chapter IV I investigate the question of the incompatibility of the two educational models emanating from the idealist and empiricist philosophical traditions. In particular I will review
critically C.P. Snow's claim of the existence of "two cultures," the literary and the scientific, which give rise to the humanistic and the technocratic educational models respectively. I hypothesize that in so far as both cultures or models constitute parts of the culture of modernity, both aim at constructing grand narratives that capture the world in its totality. Relying on Foucault's concept of "panopticism," and other philosophical and educational critiques of modernity, I argue that educational institutions serve "panoptic" aims. That is they have a disciplinary function over society regardless of who the supervisory gaze that structures these institutions belongs to: the scientist/expert of the Enlightenment or the humanist scholar of Romantic idealism. The preceding historical and philosophical analysis of the educational systems of Greece and the United States will illustrate how both systems have functioned as "regimes of truth" in different cultural and socioeconomic contexts.

Finally, in the Postscript I discuss possible future directions for educational theory that take us beyond the confines of humanistic and technocratic educational models toward the construction of what I call pragmatic/activist educational positions. I will survey educational theories critical of the authoritarianism of pure reason and tradition inherent on the humanistic model, on the one hand, and of the authoritarianism of scientific reason/technical rationality
inherent in the positivistic model, on the other. Such writings have helped shape various positions in the field of education that come together under the broad category of "critical pedagogy." These positions are informed by various theories, such as critical pragmatism, which can be traced to the philosophical and educational ideas of John Dewey, or current post-Marxist and post-structuralist thought as developed in Europe and the United States, much of it informed by the educational work of Paulo Freire. These positions will not be considered in the interest of constructing a new "regime of truth." Their presentation rather constitutes a comment on the plurality of interests within the field of educational theory and practice today. Several educational statements made by participants in the educative process (teachers, students, parents) in Greece and in the United States will accompany the postscript as examples of resistance to humanistic and technocratic authoritarianism.
CHAPTER I

THE HUMBOLDTIAN AND SPENCERIAN PROJECTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EDUCATION: THE HUMANISTIC VS. THE UTILITARIAN IDEAL

Nineteenth-Century European Culture: Enlightenment vs. Romanticism

The formation of educational systems in nineteenth-century Europe was influenced by two intellectual movements, Romanticism and Enlightenment. Both movements are part of the culture of modernity which radically altered the static, premodern conceptions of human nature and the world. Thelma Z. Lavine suggests that "modernism exists not in isolation but dialectically in the form of counter-mentalities or oppositional mentalities which are constitutive of it" (Lavine 1984:2).¹ She distinguishes between Enlightenment Modernism and Romantic Modernism. "Modernism."

¹ Lavine uses the term "modernism" as synonymous with "modernity." For my purposes I prefer the use of the term "modernity" to denote what Lavine means by "modernism," namely the culture that emerges in the post-Enlightenment era. "Modernity" is used in current academic discourse, instead of "modernism," a term of a narrower scope, commonly used to describe the artistic, cultural movements that grew within the culture of modernity in early twentieth-century.
according to Lavine, "begins as Enlightenment Modernism. . . . Its goal is a world of truth in which reason is the ground of science, morality, and politics, and politics is the law of history. Scientific, instrumental reason survives as the exclusive arbiter of truth for Enlightenment Modernism" (2). In opposition to it, Romantic Modernism develops its own cognitive style:

Opposing the scientist and his instrumental reason as the arbiter of truth there are for Romantic Modernism two sources of truth: the artist and his expressive, poetic-symbolic truth and the truths of culture embedded in and relative to the vital ongoing life of a people in its organic historicity. . . . For Romantic Modernism, liberation is felt to be freedom from the oppressive modern world of bureaucratized government, industry, mass education, mass politics (Lavine 4-5).

The opposition between the two styles, however, should not conceal the fact that the two emerge from a subject-centered and reason-oriented conceptual framework. Enlightenment Modernism extols the autonomous rational individual; Romantic Modernism celebrates the authentically expressive individual. To the scientific, instrumental reason of the Enlightenment, the Romantic juxtaposes substantive reason with a component of intuition, depth and transcendence. Both display a belief in changing things through human effort.
The two movements, Enlightenment and Romanticism, also constructed opposing educational ideals. Originally, the culture of modernity and the kind of education that emerged out of it were based on a conception of "humanism" which implied both the acquisition of knowledge as an end in itself and the use of knowledge as a means of mastery over nature. Individual cultivation, on the one hand, and development of science, of productive forces and of technique, on the other, were but two complementary poles that united together the subjective and objective elements in culture. Gradually, however, as is suggested by Lavine's analysis, the two poles became autonomous, to the point that intellectual cultivation and acquisition of practical or technical knowledge came to stand in sharp opposition. I propose that we situate the rival educational projects that appeared in nineteenth-century Europe within this

---

1 Theodor Adorno has elaborated this point in his essay *Theorie die Halbbildung (Theory of Semi-education)* (1979): "In the use of German language by 'culture' is meant only the cultivation of the intellect in an increasingly sharper opposition to practice. Here is reflected the fact that the complete emancipation of the bourgeois class did not materialize, or when it did, the bourgeois society could not identify itself with humanity... Culture became self-sufficient, until ultimately, in the language of whitewashed philosophy, it became a "value"(27-28) [This is my translation from the Greek. See, Adorno (1989)]. Adorno's essay is a bitter statement on the fate of the Enlightenment and the class which was the carrier of its legacy. The promise of liberation underlying the educational project of the bourgeois class, Adorno claims, failed and education turned into "socialized semi-education." Semi-education manifests itself either as intellectual cultivation, conceived as an end in itself existing in isolation from the world of human affairs, or as blind adjustment to a world where the fittest survive. It is precisely this polarization between the two conflicting functions of education that shapes the nineteenth-century debates over a humanistic vs. a utilitarian curriculum.
framework. The spirit of Romantic Modernism, with its emphasis on individual cultivation and spiritual regeneration, dominated the reforms of the educational system in Germany under the guidance of Wilhelm von Humboldt. In opposition to it, the mandates of Enlightenment Modernism were felt in the changes of the educational system in England under the influence of utilitarian philosophers, among whom Spencer best articulated the rationale for a "useful education" guided by the scientific advances of the era.

Both educational positions emerged from the aspirations of the bourgeois class that came to power after the revolutions of the eighteenth century and engaged in the process of nation-building. This class incorporated different factions that perceived their social and educational needs differently. Its more conservative faction sought to consolidate its power and in alliance with the established churches supported schools that prepared bourgeois boys for leadership positions. The nineteenth-century bourgeois attitude concerning education was preoccupied by the question: "how little could be conceded to the working classes to keep them assuaged, yet quiescent in the condition of servitude to which providence had properly ordained them?" (Bowen 1972:283). As a result, "a grammar school background became as essential as belonging to the established church as a mark of social and political legitimacy; for a
bourgeois boy to receive a technical or scientific schooling was to confer the stigma of cultural bastardy" (285). However, this attitude of the bourgeoisie was challenged from within its own ranks by radical reformers who with the wider social good in mind advocated mass schooling and pressured for a modification in the curriculum to reflect the rapid technological and scientific changes of the era. These reformers espoused the philosophy of utilitarianism and managed to influence schooling in England, France and the United States. In Prussia where the culture was dominated by the philosophies of Fichte and Hegel, utilitarianism was not welcome. Humboldt was also a liberal reformer when it came to expansion of schooling to the population at large, but his liberalism was irrevocably influenced by the German intellectual tradition of idealism which advocated a humanistic orientation of the curriculum. The two models were subsequently exported to other countries, where in some instances they were more enthusiastically received and applied than in their places of origin, as the study of the Greek and the American cases will show.
The Idealist Philosophical Tradition as the Foundation of Humanistic Education

In the western world the roots of idealism, upon which the humanistic ideal of education is founded, can be traced to Platonic philosophy. Plato introduced the distinction between true knowledge (episteme) that is possible through the employment of reason and false knowledge (doxa) which is knowledge we derive from our everyday experience. Reason was conceived by Plato as independent of experience and capable of grasping ideas that are located in a transcendent, immutable reality removed from the constantly changing, unstable reality of the world of phenomena. Plato's allegory of the cave in the Republic illustrates the distinction between true and false knowledge. People are prisoners in a cave and reality presents itself to them through its reflections on the walls of the cave. They have the illusion of knowing reality, but what they perceive as reality is only its shadow on the walls. Only a few among these prisoners will free themselves from their chains, ascend to the real world and be able to grasp reality through the powers of their reason. Then they can go back into the cave and instruct others as to the illusionary nature of their opinions. Apart from the elevation of reason into a higher sphere compared to experience, Plato's allegory

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Sources for the material in this section are: J. Donald Butler (1966); John Dewey (1984); James Bowen (1972).
also carries social and political ramifications in that it confines the ability to understand and comprehend the true nature of things to a select few, the aristocracy of the mind so to speak.

In modern philosophy Descartes, faithful to Plato's legacy, drove a wedge between pure reason and an independently existing objective reality of natural phenomena amenable to explanation by mechanical laws. Through his motto *Cogito, ergo sum* Descartes accepted the existence of universal, general principles that are innate and can only be disclosed by reason. The starting point from which thought emanates lies in the human subject, the self, that is capable of grasping the idea of a perfect being, i.e. God.

But it was in the long tradition of German idealism that the primacy of reason over experience reigned supreme, beginning with the work of Leibniz, followed by Kant and culminating in Hegelian philosophy. Leibniz challenged the empiricist theory of knowledge by rejecting Locke's theory of the mind as a *tabula rasa* and reasserting with Descartes the Platonic doctrine of innate ideas. Kant following in his steps also asserted the power of human reason and proposed a dualism which separates between a natural world of *phenomena*, perceived by man's senses and providing the basis for empirical knowledge and a world of *noumena*, a transcendental reality inaccessible to experience. Knowledge concerning ideas can be
achieved by pure reason, independently of sense experience. On the basis of this dualism Kant constructed an absolute moral theory, which rests on the existence of a realm of values independently from the determinate world and as a corrective to it. This higher realm cannot be known but we can by a priori reasoning conclude that it must exist. Human beings have a sense of duty that compels them to act in obedience to these moral laws.

Hegel asserted Kant's formulation of the mind's power, but was critical of Kant's dualism which failed to conceive reality as a unified totality. Hegel's system of absolute idealism conceives of the natural order not as a separate entity existing independently from mind but as a finite and temporal aspect of the Absolute Mind (Geist), which is infinite and permanent. Every aspect of the natural world constitutes the creative evolution of Mind in imperfect form toward the Absolute End. This process toward the ultimate ideal, the unity with the Geist which represents the attainment of freedom as the ideal of all human action, is not devoid of conflict. Conflict between a situation and its contradiction leads toward a resolution (synthesis) and consequently toward the achievement of harmony.

From this brief survey of the philosophical roots of idealism we can derive the epistemological assumptions that constitute the basis of a humanistic philosophy of education. Human beings, according to
idealism, are unique because they are rational animals with the ability to reason being an inherent element of their nature. The human mind is equipped with the ability to systematize the information it receives from various sources and make it correspond to first principles or ideas which represent ultimate truth. In a traditional humanities curriculum, then, the individual is the origin of signification. The student is perceived as a self, in the process of achieving true knowledge, hence reaching the ultimate goal of perfection/freedom. However, the self in the process of maturation does not exist in isolation but as part of a larger whole, one's community or nation. The role of tradition and authority are central in this respect, in so far as the immature, incomplete being partakes in the higher truths that the teacher and the culture represent, the former as the one entrusted with the role of transmitting those truths, the latter as the organic whole through which these truths are refined and perfected.

Most idealist philosophers have written treatises on education. Plato's Republic defines education as the process of taking "fitting souls" and assisting them to "see" the truth, thus creating rational men, the philosopher-kings, destined to rule society. Here Plato offers a clear description of the idealist position in education:

... we must conclude that education is not what it is said to be
by some, who profess to put knowledge into a soul which does not possess it, as if they could put sight into blind eyes. On the contrary, our own account signifies that the soul of every man does possess the power of learning the truth and the organ to see it with; and that, just as one might have to turn the whole body round in order that the eye should see light instead of darkness, so the entire soul must be turned away from this changing world, until its eye can bear to contemplate reality and that supreme splendour which we have called the Good (Plato 1941:232).

Similarly, Kant proposes an education that has morality and virtue as its most important purposes. Human beings need an education that consists of nurture, discipline, but most importantly of cultivation of their cognitive and moral aspects (Bildung).

But it was Hegel's ideas that dominated educational theory in nineteenth-century Germany and provided a justification for the importance of a humanistic education. Hegel attested to the progress of the human mind toward perfection, a progress he saw taking place in the context of an organized state. The state represents the larger whole, within which the individual can attain the goal of personal freedom: "In world history, only those peoples that form states can come to our notice...; the state is the divine Idea as it exists on earth... the State is the definite object of world history proper (Bowen 1981:265).
Hegel's idea of the state as an instrument of divine purpose helped form the concept of the corporate Prussian state and of the proper education that would sustain it. The architect of the Prussian educational system was Wilhelm von Humboldt, himself a proponent of education whose ultimate aim is the cultivation of morality. Humboldt was influenced by the classical revival of the late eighteenth century spurred by some of Germany's greatest intellectuals such as Herder, Lessing, Goethe, Schiller. Through Humboldt's efforts humanism (making a comeback as Neohumanism) regained its status and the classics were given a leading position in the curricula of secondary schools and universities.

Since then the mantle of humanism has been picked up by a number of theorists and scholars who defend the inherent superiority of an education that allows for the "disinterested exercise of Reason" and inculcates into students the desire to know with no practical purpose, following Aristotle's definition of learning as an activity that is undertaken for its own sake. The value of a type of education firmly grounded in the conception of rationality espoused by idealism has been extolled by thinkers like E. Burke, S. Coleridge, Alexis deToqueville, C.S. Lewis, T.S. Eliot, Ortega Y Gasset, Michael Oakeshott, to name a few.
Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Educational ideas: Education as Bildung

Humboldt’s philosophical and educational position can be condensed in his comment: “The ancients sought virtue; the moderns seek happiness” (Humboldt 1963:37). He never concealed his preference for the acquisition of virtue. His thinking was profoundly affected by his admiration for classical antiquity. Along with his friend Friedrich-August Wolf, the renowned classical scholar, he was responsible for the elevation of classical studies at the center of the general education curriculum he instituted during his appointment as director of the section for ecclesiastical affairs and education in the Ministry of the Interior in Prussia in 1809-1810. Together they are credited with the creation of the Philologie or Altertumswissenschaft (Study of the Antiquity) as a prestigious field of scholarship. For Humboldt the study of the Greeks would serve as an important lesson for the cultivation of the German character. In his words,

For us, the Greeks step out of the circle of history. Even if their destinies belong to the general chain of events, yet in this respect they matter least to us. We fail entirely to recognize our relationship to them if we dare apply the standards to them that we apply to the rest of world history. Knowledge of the Greeks is not merely pleasant, useful or necessary for us--no, in the Greeks alone we find the ideal of that which we ourselves should like to be and produce. If every other part of history enriches us with its human wisdom and human experience then from the Greek we take something more than earthly--something almost god-like
This idealized and ahistorical view of the antiquity, along with his conception of the ancient Greek as the archetypal human being unfolding his essence toward perfection, helped Humboldt formulate his concept of Bildung, upon which his educational philosophy was founded. Bildung which can be translated as self-cultivation, formation, attainment of virtue, was a central concept of humanistic education and can be taken as synonymous to the Greek paideia. The concept suggests an active process which originates within the individual and leads him toward moral perfection. In Humboldt’s words,

In order for an individual to extend and individuate his character (and this is what all character building comes down to), he must first know himself, in the fullest sense of the word. . . . For it is only our own self that we may work on, only our own present situation that we may learn to know and to let such knowledge bear fruit in us (125-126).

We are reminded of the Platonic soul turned away from the ephemeral and the deceptive, contemplating knowledge and truth that reside within its own self. It is not external intervention that shapes the individual, but the internal powers of his very being. To turn to Humboldt again, “For all educational development has its sole origin in the inner psychological constitution of human beings, and
can only be stimulated, never produced by external institutions" (126).

When Humboldt was entrusted with the organization of the Prussian educational system, he made Bildung the primary aim of education at all levels of the educational ladder. Furthermore, upholding one of the tenets of a humanistic education, he asserted in the Platonic vein that the right to Bildung should be reserved not only for the most well-off person, but also for the most ordinary day laborer. According to Paul Sweet, Bildung had become "the bond that tied well educated nobles and commoners together and established them as a proud and self-reliant aristocratic fraternity transcending the boundaries of birth, status, profession, rank and wealth" (Sweet 1978:33).

According to Humboldt an elementary education centered on Bildung should provide the opportunity to young children to realize their full potential. In this respect Pestalozzian pedagogy was introduced which celebrated the spiritual essence of the child and guided her to maturity and perfection. Secondary education, or the gymnasium, should offer a general education, with humanistic studies as the core of the curriculum (meaning primarily literary studies, since Humboldt believed that empirical natural sciences were not true fields of scholarly learning), and should stand in an
integral relationship to the university. Humboldt did not dismiss technical, vocational education, but he placed as a supplement to general education. This was hardly surprising, given that Bildung was not a utilitarian enterprise to fit persons for particular ways of earning a living, it was a lifelong process distinct from vocational or professional training, whereby each person sought to realize the human potentialities that he possessed as a unique individual (Sweet 1978:14).

Toward the Institutionalization of Bildung: The University of Berlin

Humboldt's major contribution to the institutionalization of knowledge and the crowning achievement of his administration was the creation of the University of Berlin. The philosophy that was to guide university education under Humboldt's plan merits discussion, since historically the Prussian university is considered the model for contemporary higher education. Humboldt along with many prominent intellectuals of his time such as Fichte, Wolf, and Schleiermacher, established a rationale for a higher education that posited pure Wissenschaft (Science) and personal Bildung as the aims of learning. The French model of higher education, as exemplified in the Ecole Polytechnique was rejected on the basis that it offered a specialized professional knowledge which, according to their view, obstructed the pursuit of "disinterested" knowledge. The
University was not to be just a more advanced gymnasium either. Its essence ought to be the creative activity of teachers and students who should be given the freedom to pursue learning according to their inclinations.

The Prussian University is considered the precursor of the contemporary research university, yet it is debatable whether Humboldt's original vision for university education bears much similarity to the epistemological assumptions that have shaped the modern university. Sweet has remarked that

in the course of the nineteenth century the notion of Wissenschaft as the central concern of the University became clouded with ambiguity. The word commonly became synonymous with specialized knowledge rather than with the wholeness of knowledge; and the university was correspondingly seen as a place for advanced professional training rather than as the final stage in a general education. Thus the great influence that the University of Berlin came to exert as a model beyond Germany, not least of all in the United States, was in substantial measure not a Humboldtian influence (Sweet 1978: 70).4

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4 Sweet reports that at a conference organized in 1973 to appraise Humboldt's contribution to education, the staunchest supporters of the Humboldtian philosophy were not the West Germans but the Americans, especially Alexander M. Bickel and Edward Shils (101). This is not surprising, since the American university in the eyes of its critics has removed itself even more than the European university from the pursuit of truth for its own sake and has become subservient to industrial and business interests. Of course the notion of "the pursuit of truth for its own sake" is also rather problematic and has to be subjected to criticism to be determined whether a seemingly non-utilitarian, disinterested inquiry has itself a hidden agenda. More on this when I review Humboldt's project, and especially in Chapter IV where such claims of a humanistic education are scrutinized.
Many scholars have indeed suggested that what Humboldt meant by “Wissenschaft” was something very different from the conception of science as empirical science. Ralph Dahrendorf remarks that “the German who speaks of Wissenschaft usually means something quite different from the Englishman or American speaking of science. For the latter a notion of ‘empirical science’ is characteristic” (Dahrendorf 1965:152). Humboldt had in mind an anti-experimental conception of science, one which called for the active pursuit of integrated, meaningful, and pure knowledge, an essentially Platonic conception: “Humboldt wants speculation, as he calls it himself, that is classical metaphysics” (155). Indeed the German thinkers who conceived of Wissenschaft, did so as a reaction to the Enlightenment view of science: “. . .they criticized the Enlightenment exactly for its preference for ‘collecting’ facts as though knowledge were a mechanical mosaic instead of an organic whole” (McClelland 1980:124).

Perhaps a way of interpreting the “vulgarization” of the Humboldtian project is by attributing it to the institutionalization of knowledge within the state-supported university. Bildung was, of course, what inspired the creation of the university, but the university, once created, acquired a life of its own. It was a state institution and as a result the state became the custodian of culture,
of *Bildung* and replaced the ideal of personal cultivation with the pursuit of specialized knowledge more in concert with the demands of a socially differentiated society³. Humboldt himself was aware of this problem when he observed that the freedom of the scholar to pursue his work “is threatened not only by the state itself but by the very nature of institutional organization which, as soon as it is under way, takes on a certain color and spirit and likes to choke out anything not in keeping with it” (Humboldt 1963:135).

Humboldt’s views on the role of the state concerning education were ambivalent. A confirmed opponent of the interventionist state (one of his early works was *The Limits of the State Action*), he nevertheless accepted many governmental posts, the most prestigious being the one as Education Minister. His critics charge that his commitment to personal freedom and limitless cultivation of the self was tainted by his action as Minister which included many restrictive measures on the activities of teachers and students.

According to a perceptive analysis of the relationship between state and university in Germany, “the central weakness in

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³ The term “social differentiation” refers to the process that modern societies underwent during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whereby social life was organized in autonomous spheres of activity be they politics, economics, science, law, religion, education, etc. The shift from the stratified societies of the premodern era, when activities were integrated into the communal life of the court, or the church, to the modern society which requires a specialization of roles, and hence an educational system that serves this need, is discussed in depth in Luhmann (1982).
Humboldt's own thought was the assumption that the state is a moral force, rather than merely the expression of the will of the king and a few hundred arbitrary central bureaucrats" (McClelland 1980:141).

And, despite Humboldt's declared intentions that Bildung was not the privilege of an elite,

given the expectation of thorough training in the classics before arrival at the university, the absence of an extensive scholarship program, and the failure to do away with the preprofessional aspects of university training, the university that emerged from the neo-humanists' plans was an elite institution in more that an intellectual sense (119).

This is because, inevitably, Humboldt's educational philosophy was, despite its universalist, egalitarian principles, a product of the specific social conditions of early nineteenth-century Germany.

David Sorkin provides us with a thorough interpretation of this ideal that shaped nineteenth-century German society and education, attributing its emergence to the needs of a particular social stratum in the German society of that time:

Bildung was created by philosophers and belletrists who aestheticized religious and philosophical notions under the aegis of the Hellenic revival. It emerged with neo-humanism in the 1790s and became Protestant Germany's secular social ideal. Bildung corresponded to the needs and experiences of those segments of the bourgeoisie and enlightened aristocracy that had superseded the estate structure, providing an alternative social ideal to the otherworldly Christian, on the one side, and the courtly galant-homme, on the other. The gebildeter Mensch was held to have achieved individual perfection through self-
cultivation and refinement that was tantamount to virtue if not salvation itself (Sorkin 1983:66).

In the same vein, McClelland has observed, "one can much more readily seek the social grounding of neo-humanist thought in a stratum, rather than a class: the sizable bureaucratic-professional elite, recruited from both the bourgeoisie and the nobility" (McClelland 1980:113). In the end, the institutionalization of knowledge in a powerful state institution undermined the aims of Wissenschaft and, ironically, situated Humboldt's project within the framework of the utilitarian project of the Enlightenment which he had vehemently criticized throughout his career.

The bottom line was, as McClelland pointed out, that "Fichte and even Humboldt intended to produce, if not philosopher-kings, philosopher-bureaucrats to rule Prussia" (120). The recruitment of these philosopher-bureaucrats from both the bourgeoisie and the nobility also signified that the neo-humanist project was directed against the values of a rising commercial bourgeoisie, which as in the case of England where its rise occurred more rapidly would demand a

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McClelland informs us that Fichte had proposed that students wear uniforms because he believed that this way the external, pre-university social distinctions would be erased (118). Again, here the intentions might have been noble, but the proposal also betrays a certain political naivety. A similar critique is directed toward Humboldt's educational philosophy, as Paul Sweet has noted: "In idealizing culture and the universal man, the gymnasium [and by extension, the university], promoted the belief, perhaps inadvertently, that personal culture could be perfected 'quite independently of political conditions'" (Sweet 1978:53).
more utilitarian education. In McClelland's words,

The insistence of the neo-humanists on education and self-development as the primary marks of a true *Mensch* tended toward a form of elitism that excluded the values of a majority of normal burghers. The pursuit of wealth or other mundane sign of fortune characterized the values of these burghers, in the eyes of the neo-humanists, and they rejected such values out of hand. Thus, in important respects, neo-humanism was an elite bourgeois ideology, directed against a common bourgeois value system. It appealed across class lines to men who posessed the precondition of a certain leisure and the will to self-development and cultivation (114).

Ultimately, the aristocratic, Platonic conception of the education of “the best and the brightest” who are destined to rule society qualifies *Bildung* as “the doctrine that legitimized the alliance of the intelligentsia and the state through the university” (Sorkin 1983:55-56).7

**Neo-humanism and the Quest for a Harmonious Order**

The emphasis the neo-humanists placed on personal cultivation and development can also be interpreted as an attempt to escape the influence of the French Revolution and its challenges toward reform of social and political institutions. As Sorkin remarks, “Humboldt

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7 Dahrendorf has referred to the Humboldtian conception of education derisively as “the elite theory of manifest truth” : "There may be certainty; but there cannot be certainty for all. In historical fact at least some are called upon to discover and communicate such certainty; thus some acquire an especially intimate relation to truth” (Dahrendorf 1965:160).
embraces the ideals of political freedom but rejects revolution in favor of a stable model of organic development, anticipating Burke in fearing the unforeseen consequences of actions that depart from that model" (Sorkin 1983:58). This is why Humboldt’s response to "the battle of the Ancients and the Moderns" was the unequivocal support of the Ancients, whose society he considered the ideal of perfection and order. To this end, Martin Bernal has also commented that the purpose of Bildung "was to reform Prussia within German culture, avoiding the horrors of the French Revolution" (Bernal 1987:285).

Bernal maintains that the discipline of Classics which appears between 1815-1830 was created precisely because intellectuals saw the study of the Greeks as a way of reintegrating people alienated by modern life; and even of re-establishing harmony in the face of the French Revolution. . . . Despite its scholarly trappings, its role in the ideological formation of the ruling class has continued to be more important than historical or linguistic enquiry" (440).®

® Bernal sees classical scholarship as it appeared in Germany and then spread to the educational institutions of Western countries as an essentially conservative undertaking which attempted an ahistorical, sanitized reading of the classical texts based on a positivistic, philological approach to the study of Classical antiquity. The philological approach to the study of the classical world was attacked fiercely by Nietzsche who, to the pedantic analysis of Ancient texts by his philologist colleagues, juxtaposed a rich interpretation of Ancient Greek culture in an attempt to "humanize" and "modernize" the Ancients. His interpretation was shunned by the academic establishment of his time, and in general his commentary on the Ancients has occupied marginal status within classical scholarship. For a spirited account of the quarrel between Nietzsche and the philologists, see the introduction by William Arrowsmith to Nietzsche's "We Classicists," in Nietzsche (1990).
Humboldt's scepticism toward the French revolutionary upheaval has to be discussed within the context of German society and culture. If his belief in the potential of the individual to achieve self-realization qualifies him as a liberal, his administrative work which legitimized the role of the state as the guarantor of individual development, gave his liberalism a conservative twist. As Ralph Dahrendorf in his scathing critique of German society has reminded us, "there is a conception of liberty that holds that man can be free only where there is an experimental attitude to knowledge, the competition of social forces, and liberal political institutions are combined. This conception never really gained a hold in Germany" (Dahrendorf 1967:17). Dahrendorf proceeds to explain this lack of liberalism in terms of the famous dichotomy in German thought of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft and the privileging of the former over the latter. "Gemeinschaft, community, is founded on an essential sympathy and provides a "natural" union of men in which force and civilization are equally absent" (128). This adherence to the notion of Gemeinschaft manifested itself as hostility to the idea of Gesellschaft, the civil society of citizens and social classes contractually bound to one another. German thought has indeed glorified the idea of the nation perceived as the unity of the people in one harmonious whole. The Hegelian idea of the state as a moral
force, in essence conflates the notion of nation with that of state, in so far as it envisions a state suspended above the struggles of classes and political parties. Humboldt, exemplifying the attitude which abstracts individuals from their role as citizens, declared his preference for an education which aims not at the civic person, but at the human being (Humboldt 1963:142). Historian Leonard Krieger described Humboldt's sociopolitical position quite eloquently:

for him... society was a stratified organic unit in which an aristocratic elite of cultured individuals and the mass of people stood in intimate connection, the one giving direction and the other giving vital force, but each maintaining its respective position. ... Germany was "One Nation, One People, One State," by the authority of the natural order of things which made the nation the fundamental entity where the "individual who is nothing in himself and the species which has validity only in the individual" met and penetrated each other and which made the state the guarantor of the national development... (Krieger 1957:209).

Humboldt furthermore envisioned the university as the foundation of the spiritual regeneration of the nation. He argued for "the concept of higher institutions of learning as the summit where everything that happens directly in the interest of the moral culture of the nation comes together" (Humboldt 1963:132).

Humboldt's conception of the university as the force that shapes the destiny of the nation resurfaces in the twentieth century in the writings of another illustrious German, Martin Heidegger, who in his
rectorship address in 1933 at the University of Freiburg also elevated the role of the university into one of great significance for the spiritual sustenance of the German nation: "We understand the German university as the "high" school that, grounded in science, by means of science educates and disciplines the leaders and guardians of the fate of the German people" (Heidegger 1985:471). Heidegger articulated the humanistic essence of education by admonishing that the role of the university should be "to recover the primordial living unity that joins those who question and those who know" (482). The pursuit of Truth, the perennial quest of knowledge, the "theoretical attitude," should be at the core of a university education according to Heidegger.

To summarize, it is not accidental that a humanistic ideal of education was formulated so forcefully in Germany, sustained by the philosophical tradition of idealism. This is an ideal that extols the

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* The similarities in the thinking of Humboldt and Heidegger regarding the mission of the German university are indeed striking. For instance, Heidegger’s conception of science as pure contemplation (Beschleunigung), pursued for its own sake, invokes Humboldt’s Wissenschaft. And the bonding of students and teachers in the realization of the spiritual mission of the nation is a common theme as well.

* It is significant that Heidegger’s rectorship address was delivered at a time when the university and society as a whole in Germany were falling under the grip of National Socialism. The address was perceived then, and continues to be nowadays, as a capitulation by Heidegger to Nazism and a glorification of all its central themes, namely the spiritual superiority of the German people, the idea of the nation as the embodiment of the truths of the German culture, etc.
timeless essence of human beings and the perennial evolution of the human spirit toward perfection. This process takes place within an organic community, the nation, which also exists in an idealized state as the ultimate culmination of spirit, to use the Hegelian terminology. This eternal quest is not dependent on or determined by actual social and political realities. As John Dewey argued in his criticism of German philosophy and politics, the idea of the evolution of human beings within the protective arms of the national state which is at the core of German idealistic philosophy "was set in sharp antithesis to the conception of 'making' or manufacturing institutions and constitutions, which was treated as one of the fallacies of the French philosophy of the Enlightenment" (Dewey 1915:131). It is within this idealistic, essentially romantic, framework that we have to situate the uneasy alliance of individual self-cultivation and authoritarian political regimes in Germany, which neither Humboldt nor Heidegger perceived as problematic.

The Empiricist Philosophical Tradition as the Foundation of Utilitarian Education

If Plato's Republic represents the foremost statement on philosophical idealism in education, Francis Bacon's the New Atlantis

"Sources for the material in this section are: Bantock (1984); Bowen (1972); Dewey (1984).
was the first treatise to ground education firmly in the philosophical
tradition of empiricism. Influenced by the socio-political and
scientific developments which were altering the European continent
in the 16th and early 17th centuries, Bacon constructed an
epistemology based on the primacy of first-hand sense experience
with the intellect simply acting as a mirror that reflects "the genuine
light of nature." Bacon arrived at a practical philosophy according to
which we achieve knowledge through observing facts and then
utilizing reason in the organization and analysis of facts. Like the
idealists, he also subscribed to the maxim that "knowledge is power,"
but he understood knowledge not in the Socratic sense as knowledge
of the self, but as knowledge of the world, the kind that would allow
man to control nature and make it serve his ends.

Under the influence of Baconian epistemology John Locke
emerged as the foremost philosopher of the empiricist tradition
arguing that sense perception is the basis of our knowledge of the
laws of nature. He rejected the doctrine of innate knowledge and
proposed instead the **tabula rasa** theory of the mind, perceiving thus
the mind as an empty vessel ready to be filled with observations
of the outside world. His epistemology denied the existence of
universals to be found in traditional reasoning and treated
knowledge as an objective representation of an independently
existing reality.

In France the philosophical tenets of empiricism found its strongest supporters in the writings of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Diderot whose ideas ushered in the age of revolution supportive of new conceptions of man and society.

The difference between dealing with the world "as it is" (empiricist and positivist attitude) and dealing with the world "as it ought to be" (the idealist position) points to differing conceptions of the nature of knowledge and the role of the learner in attaining it. To the substantive reason of the idealist in search of transcendental, universal truths which comprise an ideal world, the positivist juxtaposes instrumental or scientific reason which is tied to experience and aims at calculating the most efficient means for adjusting the individual to an objective world. Furthermore, the tenet of empiricist epistemology that all human beings have the ability to derive knowledge through their direct contact with the world dealt a severe blow to traditional beliefs which made knowledge the monopoly of a minority by proclaiming the philosopher-kings as mediators between true knowledge and the ignorance of the masses.

It is not surprising then that demands for the schooling of the masses were advanced in the first half of the nineteenth century in
England by the Utilitarian philosophers who espoused the tenets of philosophical empiricism. Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill accepted the Lockean doctrine of the mind as tabula rasa, and became vigorous opponents of bourgeois privilege, advocating social arrangements that would secure "the greatest good for the greatest number." Even though the classical curriculum was well-entrenched in the British schools, in the second half of the century things started to change. According to historian James Bowen,

...pressures were coming from many quarters, not only the liberal parliamentarians but from established scholars who urged the entry of the schools into the scientific era. Pressure for change came also from trades and professional associations and, most importantly, from within the schools themselves by a growing number of thoughtful reformers dedicated to the improvement of the schools and, significantly, to the professionalization of the vocation of teaching (Bowen 1972:305).

In the meantime, in 1859, Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species* was published. His evolutionary theory affected the work of numerous scholars, not only in the natural sciences, but also in the social sciences, as the popularity of the doctrine of Social Darwinism demonstrated. One of his most enthusiastic supporters was Herbert Spencer, who along with T. H. Huxley, became the staunchest defenders of science education. Still, at the end of the century, a royal commission that was set up to study curricula, and progress
made toward reform, reported that things had not changed drastically:

The secondary schools, it confirmed, remained the privileged preserve of the middle class and 'the classical languages are taught more extensively than ever,' although there was some improvement: they were now taught 'less as if they were dead, and more as if they still lived.' (Quoted in Bowen 1972:307).

Old traditions are hard to break and, as a matter of fact, all societies provide evidence of cultural lag, especially in institutions such as schools which are entrusted with conserving and transmitting the "truths" of the culture. Still even these institutions are not immune to the demands of a rapidly changing socio-economic order, as developments in twentieth-century education suggest.

**Herbert Spencer's Educational Ideas: Education as Useful Knowledge**

- If Humboldt's writings on education provide us with a most eloquent defense of education as "disinterested inquiry," it was Herbert Spencer's educational ideas that emerged in defense of the new education based on the tenets of empiricism. Actually Spencer's essay "What Knowledge is of Most Worth," where he attacks the prevailing classical education model as "the badge marking a certain social position" (Spencer 1860:7-8), has to be read with (or rather
against) Humboldt's educational philosophy, as the two are a reflection of the power struggle than was taking place in Europe in the latter part of the nineteenth century over the control of educational institutions. To Humboldt's admonition that the moderns, unduly preoccupied with happiness, should seek the attainment of virtue, Spencer retorts that the problem with the type of education that Humboldt champions is that "it neglects the plant for the sake of the flower" (66-67). He reverses Humboldt's hierarchy of values, placing the need for the acquisition of practical knowledge way above the need for aesthetic and literary culture.

In his seminal essay "What Knowledge if of Most Worth" Spencer extols the importance of science in shaping human affairs and supports a curriculum focusing on the teaching of sciences. Furthermore, he intents to make education itself "a science" which determines desirable ends and devises the means to attain them. His empiricism is evident in his delineation of the features of an ideal education: it must proceed from the simple to complex, from the indefinite to the definite, from the empirical to the rational, it should encourage 'self-development,' it must be pleasurable, and must evoke the interest of the learner (Spencer 1966:31).

Having only sheer contempt for an education in which the "ornamental override[s] the useful," a distinction that Benjamin
Franklin also made in devising his curriculum for the American academies, Spencer finds value only in an education that prepares the individual for self-preservation by providing him/her with the means of livelihood:

Accomplishments, the fine arts, belles lettres, and all those things which, as we say, constitute the efflorescence of civilization, should be wholly subordinate to that knowledge and discipline in which civilization rests. *As they occupy the leisure part of life, so should they occupy the leisure part of education* (Spencer 1860:68)

Therefore, Spencer further argues, before there can be a curriculum, we must take Bacon's advice and determine "the relative values of knowledges." To this end he classified the activities which constitute human life from the most to the least important as follows: the biological, the social and political, and the cultural, with the fine arts and belles-lettres at the bottom of the ladder.

In reply to the question, "Of what use is it?" the mathematician, linguist, naturalist, or philosopher, explains the way in which his learning beneficially influences action—saves from evil or secures good—conduces to happiness. When the teacher of writing has pointed out how great an aid writing is to success in business—that is to the obtaining of sustenance—that is, to satisfactory living; he is held to have proved his case (15)

As has been stated "not even Spencer, let alone his contemporary scientific spokesmen envisaged 'usefulness' in education as 'narrow utility,' meaning direct preparation for a specific employment"
(Spencer 1966:33). There is no doubt that Spencer wanted science to become part of a broadly conceived general education, so he did not identify scientific education with training for a specific profession. However, his conception of education as preparation for life, and his classification of life activities on the basis of their usefulness, more or less anticipated the doctrine of “life-adjustment” education, which became popular in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s.

Spencer’s essay is essentially a paean to the powers of the scientific mind and to its contribution to the betterment of human life. It contains all the classic ingredients of laissez-faire liberalism, an unshakable belief in the perfectibility of human nature, in unmitigated progress, in freedom from restraint. As Richard Hofstadter aptly remarked, “Spencer’s was a system conceived in and dedicated to an age of steel and steam engines, competition, exploitation, and struggle” (Hofstadter 1955:35).

The Impact of Humanistic and Utilitarian Philosophies on Modern Education

Boyd Bode, philosopher of progressive education, once observed that the clash of the two ideals, humanistic and utilitarian, has been the dominant issue in the history of modern education:

It might be argued that all the perplexing problems which beset the path of the curriculum builder are merely special phases or
variations of one fundamental issue. In one way or another they all perpetuate the ancient conflict between the Aristotelian ideal of culture and crass vocationalism (Bode 1930:291)

The humanistic ideal calls for a uniform curriculum, whereas the utilitarian for a differentiated one. Bode comments on the different elements that each one promotes and values (292-293). Whereas the humanistic ideal puts forward the notion of duty towards one's culture, nation, or community and, therefore the need for a shared quest for truth, the utilitarian juxtaposes the concept of interest which moves each individual toward the pursuit of his own dreams and desires (hence a differentiated curriculum which is meant to suit individual tastes and preferences). To the value of discipline, which allows one to be exposed to the best that has been said and written in the history of civilization, the utilitarian philosophy of education juxtaposes the value of information, namely the dynamic confrontation of the individual with the realities surrounding him which he manipulates and controls for his future well-being.

Humanistic education promotes the ideal of culture, that is the acquisition of the refined tastes and ideas that make people better human beings; utilitarian education centers on the ideal of utility, i.e. acquisition of skills and information that will allow people to master
their environment and become better off.12

The study of contemporary educational systems shows that the influence of Spencer's ideas on educational theory and practice has been pervasive, especially in industrialized Western countries. Regarding his influence on American education, Andreas Kazamias has noted that "... many of his ideas have been 'thoroughly absorbed' in the evolving pedagogical language, theory and practice. Spencer has become part of 'conventional educational wisdom'...[he] had so much entered the pedagogical vocabulary that his identity was lost" (Spencer 1966:56-57). There is a direct linkage from Spencer's argument for the utility of knowledge to proposals for scientific curriculum-making in the United States in early twentieth-century. The notion that we must establish clear objectives and then identify those curricular activities that will allow us to achieve these objectives most efficiently has dominated curriculum making in the United States for the most part of the twentieth century. Furthermore these objectives are established on the basis of whether they facilitate successful adjustment of students to society. The tenet of empiricism that there is an outside world existing independently...

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12 I am indebted to Professor Philip Smith for this perceptive insight into the conflicting claims of humanistic vs. utilitarian educational ideals. Mortimer Adler has also discussed the conflict between an educational ideal that aims at teaching people to "make a living" and another that teaches them to "live well." Adler claims that we should opt for a kind of education that unites both ideals. If fact, he has proposed such an education, based on the concept of "paideia." See, Adler (1962).
of the knower, who is simply asked to discover its truths and model his/her behavior accordingly in order to conform to this world, found its glorification in positivistic conceptions of curriculum making.

The claims of educational utilitarianism have not remained unanswered, however. Proponents of humanistic education have claimed that the fragmentation of social life in modern society is a direct outcome of utilitarianism which glorifies rampant individualism and economic advancement. To the utilitarian conception they juxtapose the aims of a humanistic education, i.e. cultivation of the self and participation in the shared knowledge of a common culture. Schools, in their view, should seek those of natural talent (Jefferson's "natural aristocracy of talent") and educate them to the best of their ability. These "best and brightest" are destined to become society's ruling class, a class that rules not by merit of its wealth and birthright, but by merit of its wisdom and virtue. From Plato to Humboldt to Matthew Arnold to Jefferson and Allan Bloom, an ideal of educational excellence is articulated which places immense value on education as the means of creating a harmonious society in which individuals pursue their human potential in accordance with the moral imperatives of their culture. Humanistic education is disseminated and strengthened through the teaching of a canon of important books in which the collective wisdom of the
To Spencerian philosophy, which threatened to turn the whole of society into a huge laboratory of scientific experimentation that would result into a democratization of culture of unknown consequences, reaction was swift and forceful. At the time Spencer was extolling the advantages of a scientific education for the progress of the human race, one of his compatriots, Matthew Arnold, from his post as one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools, unleashed his critique against utilitarianism in favor of a humanistic education that would serve as a safe haven against the unpredictability of the new education advocated by Spencer. Arnold, a member himself of the middle class, saw in humanistic education the possibility of creating a culture that would function as a corrective of both the aristocratic privilege of the upper classes and the vulgarity of the lower classes. He was an admirer of Humboldt’s work, and under his capacity as Inspector of Schools had travelled to Germany and wrote extensively on the Prussian educational system (Arnold 1964). Actually, his collection of essays titled “Schools and Universities on the Continent” has as its motto a quotation from Humboldt: “The thing is not, to let the schools and universities go on in a drowsy and impotent routine; the thing is, to raise the culture of the nation ever higher and higher by their means” (Arnold 1964:14)
Arnold had even fewer reservations than Humboldt as to the positive role of the state in supporting a humanistic educational ideal. For him the state was needed as a centre of authority. He placed his faith in the state "for it is the state alone that can replace a declining aristocracy and inhibit a possible 'Americanisation' of the developing English democratic social order" (Bantock 1984:200). His defense of a humanistic ideal was articulated in his by now famous lines from *Culture and Anarchy*:

> The whole scope of the essay is to recommend culture as the great help out of our present difficulties; culture being a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world (Arnold 1971:5).

England was, of course, no stranger to humanistic education. As Bernal writes, "...the first use of Classics--the study of all aspects of Antiquity as moral and intellectual training for the elite--emerged only in the first half of the 19th century, directly or indirectly following the German pattern" (Bernal 1987:320). Furthermore, the most prominent individual in the promotion of this humanistic ideal was Thomas Arnold, Matthew's father. Matthew Arnold's attachment to the Hellenic tradition, Bernal claims, was a manifestation of his anti-semitism: "[Arnold's] Hellenism was explicitly linked to the vision of the Indo-European or Aryan race in a perpetual struggle
with the Semitic one, or to the conflict between 'cultivated' and 'bourgeois' values" (348).13

In opposition to the Spencerian argument that education should equip people with useful knowledge, Arnold insisted on the primarily civilizing mission of schools: "the schools would assist in the protection of society by inducing in the lowest class 'an orderly, decent and human behaviour'" (Bantock 1984:207). Even though he had no hostility to science, he still declared the superiority of a literary education and charged the proponents of a science education, like Spencer and Huxley, "with an ignorance of the 'constitution of human nature'--and, especially, a lack of concern for moral conduct and a sense of beauty" (211).

A much more radical critique of bourgeois philistinism and educational utilitarianism than Arnold's--after all Arnold only wanted to rescue the bourgeoisie from its excesses and have it

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13 For an alternative reading of Arnold's treatment of the Hebraic and Hellenic elements in culture, see Lambropoulos (1989). Lambropoulos suggests that Arnold did not treat the two elements as antithetical but as complementary to one another. Arnold, certainly, like Humboldt, prized the Hellenic element in culture, but he also felt that in the interests of stability and order in society the potential threat that this element represented had to be checked by the Hebraic element: "...the Hellenic is not only what generates culture, but also what makes anarchy possible. If the Hebraic is order and the Hellenic play; if order requires faith and play facilitates inquiry; if the faith in order produces obedience and the play of inquiry advances knowledge (whose consequence is sin)--then the power of the Hellenic is truly ambiguous and ambivalent: it may lead to either renewed or to overturned order, it may strengthen authority or engineer anarchy, it may release either the beneficial or the eruptive power of culture. Anarchy, then, is part of the Hellenic potential--it is the uncontrolled, untamed, free, skeptical, and irreverent Hellenic" (189).
become a worthy successor of the aristocracy—came from Nietzsche.14

Nietzsche's reaction to the education of his time indicated that the Spencerian conception of education as life-adjustment had penetrated not only countries which due to greater liberalization and industrialization were fertile grounds for its reception, but even countries like Germany which had traditionally been strongholds of humanistic education. Actually, Nietzsche's critique is consistent with our claim that the Humboldtian project failed after the idea of Bildung was institutionalized.

Nietzsche, in a series of five lectures given at Basel University in 1872 and published under the title The Future of our Educational Institutions, launched a devastating critique of the education of his time. As a matter of fact, his critique is as relevant today as it was then, since it applies to modern schooling in general, not only that of nineteenth-century Germany. Nietzsche's attack on modern schooling is essentially an attack on the Enlightenment's reliance on scientific reason and the modern culture that it has produced. His discontent with education is seen in the following statement which is worth quoting at length:

It seemed to me that I must recognise two main directions in the

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14 The intensity of the intellectual battles over education in the latter part of the nineteenth century is manifested in the chronological proximity of the works under consideration: Spencer's treatise on education was published in 1860, Arnold's Culture and Anarchy in 1869, and Nietzsche's series of lectures on education were delivered in 1872.
forces at work [in our educational institutions]—two seemingly antagonistic tendencies, equally deleterious in their action, and ultimately combining to produce their results: a striving to achieve the greatest possible expansion of education on the one hand, and a tendency to minimise and weaken it on the other. The first-named would, for various reasons, spread learning among the greatest number of people; the second would compel education to renounce its highest, noblest and sublimest claims in order to subordinate itself to some other department of life—such as the service of the State (Nietzsche 1964:35-36).

According to Nietzsche, education loses sight of its mission which is the selection and education of the talented few in the highest ideals of the culture, as opposed to training the masses toward narrow specialization. The following could indeed be read as an answer to the democratization of culture advocated by the utilitarians:

those blatant heralds of educational needs, when examined at close quarters, are suddenly seen to be transformed into zealous, yea, fanatical opponents of true culture, i.e. all those who hold fast to the aristocratic nature of the mind; for, at bottom, they regard as their goal the emancipation of the masses from the mastery of the great few; they seek to overthrow the most sacred hierarchy in the kingdom of the intellect—the servitude of the masses, their submissive obedience, their instinct to the rule of genius. . . The education of the masses cannot, therefore, be our aim; but rather the education of a few picked men for great and lasting works (74).

Educational institutions have fallen prey to what Nietzsche calls “the curse of modernity” (92). Lest we forget, according to Nietzsche, modernity has forced upon education the dichotomy between a
humanistic and a utilitarian function:

I for my own part know of only two exact contraries: institutions for teaching culture and institutions for teaching how to succeed in life. All our present institutions belong to the second class (98).

There is ample material in these five lectures that reveals Nietzsche's views on education and culture. What makes the text so intriguing is that it can be read from different angles. One might be made quite uneasy by Nietzsche's aristocratic conception of education and utter contempt for the common man, and still appreciate his indictment of the modern conception of knowledge as a commodity which has merely exchange value and is nothing more than an economic investment.

The debate raging in the second part of the nineteenth century over what knowledge is of most worth was carried into the twentieth and is still a major preoccupation of educational theorists, policymakers, parents, students, and the general public. A close look at the educational systems of Greece and the United States will illustrate how specific cultures have come to terms with this issue. The choice of the two cases is far from arbitrary. After all, Romantic Modernism

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*In an ingenious discussion of Nietzsche's text, Jacques Derrida points to the possibility of multiple readings (Derrida 1985). For instance, Nietzsche's plea for an aristocratic education, the need for a Fuhrer, for obedience, and discipline might prompt the reading of the text as an anti-democratic tract that played right into the hands of National Socialism; or, it can be read as a pertinent critique of the system of modern education which under the pretext of academic freedom conceals repressive mechanisms of control and the dependence of teaching on state prerogatives.*
and Enlightenment Modernism, to remember Lavine’s categories, left their mark indelibly on the two countries. Greece as a modern nation was to a large extent a creation of Romantic Hellenism while the United States emerged in the twentieth century as the boldest experiment of the scientific reason of Enlightenment Modernism.
CHAPTER II

EDUCATION IN THE SERVICE OF NATION-BUILDING:
THE CASE OF GREECE

Overview

[Wouldn't young men derive little benefit] from algebra and cubes and cube roots, and triangles and triangulated tetragons, and logarithms and symbolic logic, and elliptical projections, and atoms and vacuums, and whirlpools, and power and attraction and gravity. . . and myriad of such kind and other monstrous things. . . if, as a consequence, in speech they are barbarians, if they are ungrammatical in their writings, ignorant in the things of religion, degenerate and frenzied in morals, injurious to the state, obscure patriots and unworthy of their ancestral calling. . .?

Encyclical issued by the Synod of the Oecumenical Patriarchate (1819)

The Enlightenment in Western Europe found in the use of the ancient (Greek and Roman) traditions the tools for challenging the certainties of the premodern era and paved the way to the scientific revolution. This process, despite attempts of westernizing elements in Greek society, did not take root in Greece, largely due to the
absence of those economic and political structures that would allow for the creation of a modern industrial state following the declaration of Greece as an independent state in 1830.

The tension in Greek education between a didactic use and a liberal use of the classical tradition has always been resolved in favor of the former. In its urgency to show the continuity in Greek history and culture, the new state created—under the guidance of German administrators who were entrusted with building the institutions of the independent state—an educational system characterized by the idealization of the ancient tradition, moralism, absence of a critical spirit in dealing with history and a curriculum which emphasized the teaching of the humanities at the expense of the sciences. The formalistic approach to the study of the classical tradition (didactic use) meant that language and texts were treated as ends in themselves, depositories of eternal value. The past was not used as a guide for shaping the future (as Enlightenment thinkers such as Adamantios Korais had envisioned) but was raised on a pedestal transcending historical and social realities. Overall, it was the spirit of idealism which triumphed over the empiricist philosophical tradition in the shaping of Greek culture and education. Even when modernisers challenged the classical orientation of Greek education (an example is the demoticists' battles against the purists),
their liberalism was also informed by nationalistic and romantic claims and the need to assert the continuity of Greek culture, despite the shift of their attention from the past glory of illustrious ancestors to the achievements of the common folk (Ἀνάστασις) of modern Greece.

In Greece the battle for the appropriation of the curriculum was not fought between humanists and positivists, as both conservatives and modernisers were arguing from within the humanist tradition. At issue was neither the balancing of the humanities and the sciences in the curriculum, nor the merits of ornamental vs. useful knowledge -- familiar conflicts in the shaping of modern educational systems -- but the definition of the national educational ideal.

It has only been in the last fifteen years that positivism in the form of modernization theory has seriously challenged the humanistic philosophy underlying Greek education. Even though traces of positivistic approaches are to be found in reform proposals of the 1950s and 1960s, only with the reforms of the 1970s and 1980s is there a consistent effort to depart from the classical-theoretical orientation of the past and articulate utilitarian goals that education should serve. The role of education in economic development has only recently overshadowed its role in upholding the national and religious ideals of Greek culture.
The Cultural and Political Context

The Making of Greece and the Struggle Over Greek Identity: Between East and West

France and Britain can spend their treasure, sail all over the Archipelago with their fleets, unfurl their flags on the Parthenon and Hagia Sophia. The Greek will never cease being Orthodox and considering Russia as his brother. Russia may cross the Danube with its innumerable armies, the Cossack might tether his steed to the columns of the temple of Olympian Zeus. The Greek, though, will never cease being a friend of freedom and of the Science of the West and will look to the West and to its civilization with admiration and love.¹

Any attempts toward an understanding of modern Greece have to take into account the precarious position of Greece between East and West. Up to the present day, debates rage as to whether modern Greek identity is shaped primarily by contacts with the Eastern elements in the Greek experience (which include the Byzantine and Ottoman past, and the Orthodox ecclesiastical tradition), or by ties with a Western European heritage. Indeed, as has been perceptively remarked, "modern Greek culture may appear incomprehensible unless grasped as a struggle for identity" (Chouliaras 1986:134).

Long before Greece became an independent state, Western influences appeared in the work of Greek intellectuals of the

diaspora who fled to the West as early as the fifteenth century, after
the fall of the Byzantine Empire to the Ottomans. There, they
actively participated in the revival of Classicism during the
Renaissance. Later, others influenced by the ideas of the
Enlightenment and the revolutionary fervor that was sweeping
Europe in the eighteenth century ushered the Age of the Greek
Enlightenment and solicited support among philhellenes for the
Greek War of Independence.3

On the other hand, the influence of the politicoreligious
institutions of the Orthodox Christian millet3 of the Ottoman Empire
was also very strong. The Patriarchate, which was granted by the
Ottoman authorities the power to rule over the Orthodox Christian
populations, was hostile toward the secular, revolutionary ideas of

3 On the formation of preindependence Greek nationalism which defined
Greek identity in terms of its relations with Europe and the latter’s debt to
Greece’s ancient past, see Xydis (1969). Xydis provides a long list of Greek
thinkers who under the influence of western ideas envisioned a liberated
Greece that would reclaim its classical heritage and find its place among the
nations of Europe. The most prominent among them were George Gemistus
(Pletho), Leo Allatius, Nikolaos Sofianos, Elias Miniatis, Cosmas the Aetolian,
Eugenios Voulgaris, I. Moisiodax, D. Katartzis, Rhigas Velestinlis, and
Adamantios Korais. Xydis considers them as the exponents of Greek liberal
nationalism, a nationalism shaped by secularist, bourgeois, rationalist ideas, to
be distinguished from the postindependence nationalism of a more
conservative nature derived from German nationalist ideology. For
background information on the above scholars and their role in the creation
of the Greek Enlightenment, also see K. Th. Dimaras (1972, 1977).

3 The Ottomans had divided the empire into millets; namely communities
which included the various ethnic groups of the empire on the basis of their
religious affiliation (Christian, Jewish, or Muslim). The largest of the
Christian millets, the Orthodox millet which included the Greeks, was
administered by the Patriarch of Constantinople.
Western rationalism that challenged their authority over the population.

These two very different traditions influenced the making of the institutions of the independent Greek state in the 1830s and account for the cultural specificity of modern Greece. Western ideas and imported western institutions were leading Greece to the path of modernity, whereas the pre-capitalist structures and traditional social institutions of its Eastern heritage were resistant to modernization.

The Formation of Greek Nationalist Ideology

After the London Protocol of 1830 recognised Greece as an independent state, the battle over the definition of a Greek identity entered a new phase. As has been remarked, "a Greek state now existed, but a Greek nation still had to be made. This was rendered difficult by the division, already noted, between the traditionalists and the westernisers" (Seton-Watson 1977: 114). Nationalist ideology had played a pivotal role at initiating the Greek war of independence, and intellectuals such as Adamantios Korais, who spoke on behalf of a small, but strategically positioned group, the
bourgeoisie, were indispensable for its diffusion outside the West.¹ Modern Greece therefore became the first state outside the Western cultural sphere where nationalist ideology spread (Kedourie 1970: 42). What needs to be examined, however, is the form Greek nationalism took with the formation of the new state.

It has been suggested that the development of the concept of the "nation" and its relation with the concept of the "state" acquired diverse meanings depending on regional variations in Western, Eastern and Southern Europe (Diamandouros 1983a).⁵ In Western Europe the content of nationalism was influenced by the presence of a strong civil society, an emphasis on individual rights, and was generally understood within the framework of liberalism. It was from within this framework that Korais argued for the liberation of Greece. And it was the French society created by the Revolution of 1789 that he envisioned as the model for liberated Greece. However, it seems that the conception of nationalism which took root in independent Greece resembles closer Eastern European nationalism which was itself a product of Western European experience centered

¹ On the role of the bourgeoisie in the rise of nationalism, see Anderson (1983).

⁵ Diamandouros argues that this differentiation between varieties of nationalism corresponds to Wallerstein’s schema which on the basis of variations of capitalist development divides Europe into Western (center), Eastern (periphery), and Southern (semiperiphery)(52).
not on French but rather German prototypes. In Germany the
construction of nationalism had as a central element "the substitution
of the concept of 'Volk' for the concepts of 'individual' or 'citizen.' We
move from the individual to the collectivity, where the 'Volk' and
'Volkgeist' dominate" (Diamandouros 1983a:54). In other words,
German and consequently Eastern European and Greek nationalism,
aimed at preserving the truths of the culture, the organic unity of the
people conceived not as individual entities but as members of the
group. It echoed Herder's admonition, "The essence of human nature
encloses a universe whose motto is: 'Nobody for himself alone, all for
one. Therefore let us all be happy and valuable for each other. An
endless variety tending towards unity is in all and advances all.'"
(Sugar 1969:14).

German nationalism and the varieties of nationalism it influenced
in Eastern and Southern Europe acquired a cultural dimension
contrary to the political dimensions of Western nationalism. Within a
context which emphasized the cultural unity of the people,
romanticism, the past, and history carry tremendous weight.6

Moreover, Greece found itself in a unique situation because of its relation to Classical Antiquity. Lest we forget, Greece was seen by Greeks of the diaspora and by non-Greeks sympathetic to the cause of the Greek struggle against the Ottoman rule through the lens of Western Hellenism. Adamantios Korais in his "Report on the Present State of Civilization in Greece" (1803) admonished his compatriots to become worthy of their heritage:

For the first time the nation surveys the hideous spectacle of its ignorance and trembles in measuring with the eye of the distance separating it from its ancestors' glory. This painful discovery, however, does not precipitate the Greeks into despair: We are the descendants of Greeks, they implicitly told themselves, we must either try to become again worthy of this name or we must not bear it (Kedourie 1970:183-184).

Also early nineteenth century was the Age of Philhellenism, when enslaved Greece became the symbol of the struggle of the forces of "light" against "darkness" (Asiatic despotism). Here's how Shelley expressed his philhellenic sentiments in 1822:

The apathy of the rulers of the civilized world to the astonishing

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6 For a detailed analysis of the influence of German nationalism on Eastern European nationalism see Sugar (1969). Also, for an account of Greek nationalist ideology from the formation of the Greek state to the present, see Pollis (1987). Although Pollis clearly shows that Greek nationalism did not rest on notions of individual rights or of civil society compared to English and French nationalism, she fails to trace the roots of Greek nationalism to German romantic nationalism, but instead attributes its formation to indigenous factors, primarily the turn of Greek culture to Byzantium. However, the turn to Byzantium, in the name of the continuity of Greek culture, is itself indicative of the influence of romantic idealism, as introduced into Greece during the second part of the nineteenth century.
circumstances of the descendents of that nation to which they owe their civilization-rising as it were from the ashes of their ruin, is something perfectly inexplicable to a mere spectator of the shews of this mortal scene. We are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts, have their root in Greece... The human form and the human mind attained to a perfection in Greece... The modern Greek is the descendant of those glorious beings whom the imagination almost refuses to figure to itself as belonging to our kind... 7

As was remarked, "Hellenomania was well and truly launched!"
(Bernal 1987: 291). 6

If Greek nationalist ideology (as epitomized by Korais's 1803 text) in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth century created Greece in the image of its glorious past, in the second part of the nineteenth-century attention shifted to the relationship of the Greeks to their most immediate past. A number of factors account for this shift. Greeks found themselves increasingly on the defensive against charges of Western scholars such as Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer who denied that modern Greeks descended from Pericles and referred to

7 From Shelley’s drama Hellas, cited in Sherrard (1979).

6 Bernal in Chapter VI of Black Athena (280-316), details the rise of romantic Hellenism from Wolf’s and Humboldt’s efforts in setting up the new discipline of Philologie or Altertumswissenschaft (Science of Antiquity) to the philhellenic movement, which he calls the ‘radical wing’ of the Romantic movement. He says that “while early-19th-century Philhellenism—though consistently racist—had both radical and reactionary aspects, the discipline of Classics was conservative from the start. The educational reforms of which it formed the centerpiece were systematic attempts to avoid or prevent revolution” (288). I find this statement quite useful for my own analysis of Greek education, which from its institutionalization in the 1830s rested on a didactic, conservative view of the classical tradition, bearing the influence of German philology.
them as "the unmoral refuse of mediaeval Slav migrations, sullying the land of their birth with the fury of their politics, and the malformation of their small brown bodies" (Sherrard 1979:11). Romantic philhellenes also, during their travels to Greece were shocked to see that modern Greeks did not fit their idealized image of classical Greeks. However, as the rationalism of the Enlightenment became the object of criticism by Romanticism, the fascination with classical antiquity subsided in favor of an appreciation of the living realities of a people's culture:

European scholarship of the nineteenth century discovered Byzantium and denied that Greek history after Pericles was a tale of unredeemed superstition and obscurantism. Greek nationalist ideology of the nineteenth century followed suit with the glorification of Byzantium as a shining expression of the eternal Greek spirit (Kedourie 1970: 47)

The doctrine of continuity was articulated in Greece by Spyridon Zambelios, who in 1852 coined the term eλληνοχριστιανικός (Helleno-Christian) to signify the synthesis of the Classical and Greek Orthodox traditions in Greek culture, and the historian Konstantinos Paparigopoulos (1815-91) whose History of the Greek Nation proclaimed the unbroken continuity of Greek civilization. The adoption of the term "helleno-christian" implied that Greece had roots not only in a Hellenic past (Ancient and Hellenistic Age), but also in a Christian past (the Byzantine and Ottoman eras). Adherents
to the "helleno-christian" concept elaborated the theory of continuity in Greek history and culture, which claims that Greek history forms an unbroken line from ancient to modern Greece.\(^9\)

The fact remains that in the attempt to either locate Greece's origins in a Hellenic past or to switch to the discovery of its roots in a Byzantine past, Greek scholars were looking at Greece through the eyes of Western Europeans. The different phases in the construction of Greek nationalist ideology are accurately captured by the following statement:

\[\ldots\text{Not only is Greek nationalist ideology entirely derived from European sources, but... it also followed with admirable docility the changes in intellectual fashions which took place in Europe during the century separating Koraes from Paparrhegopoulos (Kedourie 1970: 48).}\]

Or, in a similar comment by a Greek scholar: "From the liberal enlightenment to visionary romanticism, Greek political thought follows undistracted its western models, even when it denies it"

\(^{\text{9The idealization of culture in its organic unity and transcendental essence by proponents of romanticism is reflected perfectly in the following excerpt:}}\]

"He [who would wish for experience or understanding] must have a more receptive and unhurried kind of temperament, one that is able to let things be what they are and to express their own natures rather than serve as the raw material for some purpose or other, be it only one's own pleasure. He must have sought out not the past but the living fate of Greece, which is not a doom but a destiny, a process rather in which past and present blend and fuse, in which nature and man and something more than man participate: a process difficult, baffling, enigmatic, with its element of magic, its element of tragedy, working itself out in a landscape of bare hills and insatiable sea, in the miraculous cruelty of the summer sun, in the long generations of the lives of the Greek people" (Sherrard 1979:15)."
(Veremis 1983:66). As a matter of fact, the formation of all institutions of the Greek state was inextricably linked with the effort to prove to its Western supporters the cultural continuity of the Greek nation. Schools became important sites for the accomplishment of this mission.

The Nature of the Modern Greek State

In a country such as Greece, where education is under the control of the state, an understanding of the way educational institutions function cannot be achieved, unless we also understand the nature of the Greek state.

Contrary to the formation of the state in Western capitalist societies, where the state mechanism was the natural outcome of bourgeois socio-economic formations, in Greece the state was imposed from above in the absence of such formations. The institutions of a modern westernised state were imported in the 1830s and fitted upon a primarily agrarian society which was emerging from a nearly four-hundred-year Ottoman rule. The vast eastern Ottoman empire, which, along with Greeks, included many

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A number of scholars have provided evidence as to the involvement of various disciplines, from folklore studies, to linguistics, to literary theory, in the construction of the theory of cultural continuity and the creation of a national culture. See, Danforth (1984); Herzfeld (1982); Joseph (1985); Jusdanis (1991); Lambropoulos (1988); Tziovas (1986).
cultural and religious minorities, differed radically from the secular, capitalist states of Western Europe. Within this multi-ethnic, theocratic Asiatic empire, the Greek subjects had forged unique institutions that allowed them some security and protection vis a vis the centralised authority of the Ottoman state. The most important institution was the extended family which became the central mechanism that safeguarded the interests of its members in their dealings with state authorities. The extended family gave rise to an intricate clientage network that insured the protection of family members (clients) by powerful patrons who functioned as intermediaries between the family and the political authorities. Such arrangements had important repercussions for the relationship between state and society in Greece in the post-independence period. Indeed the deeply traditional formation of the extended family networks, along with extreme fragmentation and geographical isolation, "gave rise to an ethos of pronounced localism and parochialism that was effectively to impede national integration by placing a premium on primordial sentiments, and by producing fierce and lasting local and regional attachments" (Diamandouros 1983b:46). It was this ethos that was challenged by a small but very dynamic group of westernised Greeks who during and after the struggle for national liberation attempted to establish the
foundations of a western state. As has been stated,

The Greek moderniser's programme, though never enunciated as such, involved principally such fundamental liberal concepts as a centralised constitutional state, a bureaucratic state, a secular state, a regular army, a free press, and an 'enlightened' educational system. . . . the modernisers were able to gain control of crucial posts and institutions of the state-in-genesis, and to seek, from that position of power, to use the state as the vehicle for the modernisation and the rationalisation of the society from above. Somewhat inevitably, their programme, and above all, their assumption of positions of power very early in the struggle for national liberation, mobilised the determined opposition of the traditional power holders within Greek society, of the very elites, that is, whose political experience and power were being directly challenged by the liberal state, its institutions, and the radically different organisation and distribution of political power that these implied (Diamandouros 1983b:47).

The traditional elites which opposed the modernisers' programme and were ambivalent toward the war of independence and the subsequent modernization of the Greek state included: the Church, which during Ottoman rule had considerable power over the Christian subjects of the Ottoman empire, and feared that the spread of Western enlightenment ideas would result in the loss of its authority; the Phanariots, the aristocratic class among Greeks in Constantinople who held privileged positions within the Ottoman administration; and the Greek landowning class which had established a strong power base in the Greek countryside and was fearful that a strong centralised state would strip them of their
power base and local control. Eventually these groups joined the revolutionary struggle when they sensed its victorious outcome, but after an independent state was formed, they vehemently fought the westernizers, who rose from among the merchant class and Western-trained intellectuals.

Given the support of the Western powers (England, France, Russia) that were the guarantors of Greek independence, the westernizers scored an initial victory, which nevertheless was a pyrrhic one, because although they managed to impose their views on the form of the future political institutions of modern Greece, they were less successful in influencing the way these institutions functioned. As Nicos Mouzelis has remarked,

... it must be emphasized that the victory of the 'Westernizers' was very relative indeed. If they had succeeded in imposing a Western form of government, they were much less successful in making it function in the same way as in the West. For although the 'traditionalists' accepted the inevitability of a centralised State and army organisation and the relative loss of their local autonomy, it did not take them long to infiltrate the expanding State apparatus and to gear the whole political system to the safeguarding and promotion of their interests. So what they had lost in terms of local political and military influence, at least some of them regained in terms of control over the powerful State apparatus (Mouzelis 1978:14).

The peculiarity of the Greek state lies then in this: whereas, in Western Europe a centralised state consolidated the power of a
strong bourgeoisie, in Greece, where a strong Western-type autochthonous bourgeoisie was absent, the state became the apple of discord between rival factions, a small weak bourgeoisie and the pre-bourgeois traditional elites, both trying to colonize it for their own interests.

So, even though the newly formed state opted for Westernization, the actual process of Westernization came to be dominated by conservative elements in Greek society. The basic features of the Greek state of the nineteenth century—centralization, bureaucratization, authoritarianism, paternalism—have not changed substantially to this day, despite efforts undertaken by more liberal elements to reform it and change its course. The foundations of the Greek state were laid in the 1830s by the Bavarian administration led by King Otto who was installed as the ruler of Greece by the Western powers that guaranteed Greek independence. This administration by enacting changes from above managed to alienate the Greek populace, but in the end succeeded in establishing institutions that, even after the elimination of Bavarianism and the institution of a constitutional and parliamentary government, continued to operate in a centralized, authoritarian fashion.

The battles that were fought over the control of the state between modernisers and traditionalists paralleled the battles over control of
education. The laws of the 1830s that provided a framework for the organization of the educational system and modeled this system on German prototypes, were preceded by severe ideological clashes which appeared long before Greece gained its independence and were followed by equally fierce debates over the philosophical orientation of Greek education which are still taking place within schools, in the parliament and in the streets of Athens. To an analysis of these conflicts and an examination of their historical significance we now turn.

The Educational Context

The Pre-independence period: Revolutionary Visions

During the eighteenth century, when revolutionary ideas were sweeping the European capitals, many of the diaspora Greeks were involved in political and educational endeavors in order to form a national consciousness among their fellow Greeks and articulate the educational ideals that should lead their liberated nation into modernity.

They formed a small circle of liberally-educated Greeks who had wholeheartedly adopted the philosophies of the Enlightenment and fought what they believed were forces of backwardness and conservatism. They had to fight the bitter criticism and persecution
by traditionalists, mainly from within the Church. Two of the most prominent representatives of the Greek Enlightenment whose life and work epitomizes the adoption of modern educational ideals were Iosepos Moisiodax and Adamantios Korais. Their views, along with the criticisms they received from the Church and their conservative compatriots, merit some consideration, if we are to assess the path that Greek education followed.

Moisiodax (1730-1800) was interested in the natural sciences and pedagogy. His work exemplified clearly the optimistic cosmopolitan faith of the Enlightenment... It ascribed an almost miraculous power to education and to the popularization of science as forces of change and progress and sanctified social utility as the measure of all things (Kitromilides 1985a:84-85).

His program of educational reconstruction and his pedagogical ideas were a free adaptation of John Locke's educational philosophy. He attacked the scholasticism of Greek education and proposed that education acquire a practical orientation. In both his Pedagogy (1779) and his Apology (1780) he attacked what he saw as the closed society of the upper classes of the Phanariots whom he accused of being steeped in outmoded forms of existence, unable to meet the pressing social needs of their compatriots. In the Apology in particular, he addressed a number of issues that bear testimony to
his unequivocal commitment to the philosophy of the Enlightenment. He argued against traditional authority and religious superstition. He criticized Aristotelianism and the worship of antiquity. As was remarked:

Moisiodax was a passionate follower of modern "sound philosophy" which was based on mathematical reasoning, rationalist thought and the discoveries of empirical science. Healthy, sound philosophy represented the emancipation of human thought from the wretched learning of scholastic logic and grammatical drilling that prevailed in Greek education. . . . He appears as the exponent of a Greek utilitarianism which had its origin in the philosophic encyclopedism of the Enlightenment (Kitromilides 1985a:86-87)

Moisiodax thus added his contribution to the battle between "the Ancient and the Moderns," siding with the Moderns, a battle which in the case of Greece would continue to rage after independence. His ideas did not find much sympathy among contemporary Greek elite intellectuals who were too enamored by Greece's lineage to its classical past and resisted attempts to demythologise it. On his part, Moisiodax did not object to the teaching of classical texts, but to the methods used to teach them. In his Pedagogy he criticized the excessive emphasis on the teaching and memorization of grammar which he believed prevented students from any substantive contact with the content of classical texts (Kitromilides 1985b:200-203). He proposed that only the acquaintance of students with the ideas
expressed in these texts would allow them to use them critically as tools for solving the real needs of Greek society, instead of merely worshipping the past through parotting lists of grammatical rules. Moreover, Moisiodax took sides on the language question,\(^\text{11}\) and advocated the use of the common language of the people as the vehicle of transmitting knowledge to the population at large:

Three principal reasons have led me to prefer the simple style to the Hellenic (i.e., to any restoration of the ancient language). The first is that the more simply a subject matter is set out, the more is it made clear. The second is that a subject matter, when set out simply, becomes comprehensible even to those who have had no contact with "letters." The third is that it would be a very good thing for Greeks themselves to write about the sciences or about anything else, and to do so by employing their everyday, common language.\(^\text{12}\)

Similar views were advocated by other representatives of the Greek Enlightenment who in their capacity as diaspora intellectuals

\(^{11}\) The language question occupied center stage in the debate over the orientation of Greek education. The traditionalists (or purists) argued that, in order for modern Greece to capture the glory that Greece once was, the official language of the state, and hence the language used in education, should be closer to Ancient Greek. The progressives (or demoticists) argued that modern Greece should adopt the spoken (demotic) language of the people which was the natural outcome of nearly three thousand years of Greek linguistic development. For a history of the language question see Babiniotis (1979), Alexiou (1982), Browning (1982), Sotiropoulos (1982).

\(^{12}\) Quoted in Henderson (1970:95).
had come in contact with the works of European philosophers. Yet no other intellectual contributed as much to the cause of the Greek Enlightenment as Adamantios Korais (1748-1833). The son of a merchant, he was sent to Europe to take up commercial affairs, but chose instead to dedicate himself to letters and intellectual pursuits. He became obsessed with the cause of Greek liberation and devoted his life to enlighten his compatriots toward this end. He acquired a vast knowledge of Ancient Greek language and literature and through his writing and editing activities became a highly respected philologist of his time. He believed that through the study of the Classics, Greeks would join the family of the modern nations which had modeled their civilization on the ideas and institutions of Ancient Greece. Korais's admonition to the enslaved Greeks was twofold: they would achieve enlightenment if they became knowledgeable of their glorious past and if they turned toward the nations of Western Europe as models of admiration and emulation. Thus the national education of the Greeks should be a matter of transferring to Greece the enlightened cultural and educational practices of the European nations. As had been stated,

The battle-cry of education should be ΜΕΤΑΚΕΛΤΟΣ [meaning

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13 See also the views of Dimitrios Katartzis (1970). Katartzis in his own treatise on education, written a few years after Moisiodax's, expressed similar educational positions, in an even more advanced linguistic form. However, Katartzis, less daring than Moisiodax to face the wrath of his conservative compatriots, never published this particular work.
literally, "pouring from one vessel into another"). By what other method can the lack of 350 years of modernizing be supplied? Knowledge must be taken wholesale and ready-made, from those who have had a long time painfully to work it out (Henderson 1970:143).

Korais, in advocating the importance of the study of the Classics, made it clear that one should engage in such study not for the sake of a disinterested pursuit of knowledge, but because such study was of practical value for the future organization of Greek society. Among his targets were the "polymaths," those men of all-round learning who pursued knowledge for its own sake, who were rather receivers of knowledge than discoverers of it. These scholars would learn a lot to learn if only they paid attention to the educational realities of the European nations. As a result, "Men of learning, emulating those of enlightened nations, will then give up 'illusory and vain polymathy' and specialize" (Henderson 1970:145). Here Korais echoed Moisiodax's contempt for the grammarians who controlled Greek education at that time and whose dry grammatical instruction had stripped the teaching of Greek of its critical potential.

Korais clearly conceived of education in terms of its usefulness for a modern nation, a position which reflected the dominant ideal of the educational system created in post-revolutionary France, where Korais spent most of his adult life.
Korais’s preoccupation with creating the conditions that would bring his enslaved nation into modernity was expressed forcefully in his manifesto, “Report on the Present State of Civilization in Greece” (1803). This work he intended to function as an invitation to both a western (French) and a Greek audience, for the purpose of convincing the former about the merits of supporting the cause of Greek liberation and of instructing the latter that only their attachment to western ideals would realize this cause. His strategy was to persuade the Europeans that it was their moral duty to see that Greeks as the descendants of their illustrious ancestors claim their rightful position among the civilized nations of Europe:

The Greeks, proud of their origins, far from shutting their eyes to European enlightenment, never considered the Europeans as other than debtors who were repaying with substantial interest the capital which they had received from their own ancestors (Kedourie 1970:158-159).

He also urged his European listeners to pay attention to a dynamic group of Greeks who chose the path of enlightenment, willing to lead their nation away from the shackles of superstition and barbarism that centuries of occupation had imposed upon it. They represented the rising strata of a commercial and professional class that profited widely from its contacts with the free, European nations:

The study of the languages of those countries with which they had commercial relations gave them a tincture of learning and of
The desire to excel...made a section of this youth, once their training in the native schools was completed, decide to come to Europe in order to complete their studies; and here many of them, destined for commerce, have been seen to desert the counting-house and take refuge in some university (Kedourie 1970:161-162).

The link and mutual reinforcement between a rising bourgeoisie and the establishment of educational institutions is ubiquitous in Korais's text:

In those towns which were less poor, which had some well-to-do inhabitants and a few schools, and therefore a few individuals who could at least read and understand the ancient writers, the revolution began earlier and could make more rapid and more comforting progress. In some of these towns, schools are already being enlarged, and the study of foreign languages and even of those sciences which are taught in Europe is being introduced into them. The wealthy sponsor the printing of books translated from Italian, French, German, and English; they send to Europe at their expense young men eager to learn; they give their children a better education, not excepting girls, who had been deprived from any kind of instruction... (Kedourie 1970:170).

Korais credited the French Revolution as the cause that most contributed to the desire of Greeks to educate and liberate themselves. On the other hand, he did not fail to chastise "a superstitious and ignorant clergy" for preventing his compatriots from becoming enlightened and seeking their freedom from despotic rule. Still, Korais was careful to protect himself from charges of atheism by not attacking religion per se, but only those
representatives of the Greek clergy who used religion as a means of maintaining the privileges that the Ottoman authorities had given them. This is precisely why he praised members of the clergy who joined the ranks of the "moral revolution" that was taking place among Greeks:

Philosophy has walked over the altar's threshold, or rather has descended on it, emerging accompanied by an enlightened religion to instruct the nation. A good number of Greek ecclesiastics, so far from hindering the nation's education, are eager themselves to seek instruction. . . . These respectable ecclesiastics have realized that true piety is enlightened piety, and that enlightenment so far from being inimical to true religion, gives it, on the contrary, firmer foundations and deeper roots in the hearts of men (Kedourie 1970:174).

Korais' s conflict with the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church was manifested in an earlier exchange, spurred by the Church's publication of Διδασκαλία Πατρική (Paternal Teaching) which appeared in 1798 and was attributed to the Patriarch Anthimos of Jerusalem. This text, "one of the most extreme examples of ecclesiastical anti-Westernism" (Clogg 1969:87), was written as a reaction to French revolutionary ideas that were spreading among the peoples of the Ottoman empire. Its author warned the Christians of the empire that their safety and salvation was guaranted only within the confines of the empire which the "deceitful" calls for liberty of a corrupt, secular Western propaganda sought to
undermine. He admonished them to accept their circumstances as God-given and shy away from the "new libertines":

...Close your ears and give no hearing to these newly-appearing hopes of liberty 'for now is salvation nearer to us.' And be very certain that their boastings and teachings [are] the direct contradiction of the written word of the Scriptures and the Holy Apostles, which enjoins us to subject ourselves to the superior powers, not only to those that are just but also to those that are perverse, that we may have tribulation in this world, and keep our minds pure for the Lord; (Clogg 1969:105)

The pamphlet also contained an attack on the democratic form of government and the concepts of "liberty" that sustain it, concluding that where "liberty" is understood as "freedom of will" or as freedom of man to pursue his desires one ends up with a society in which "the powerful will dominate the weak, the healthy the sick, and the wise will deceive the ignorant" (Clogg 1969:106). Instead, the author of the pamphlet opts for a society that provides order, morality, and safety for its people. The juxtaposition of two worldviews becomes thus clear: on the one hand, modernity, secularism, liberalism within the context of a western European state; on the other, tradition, religion, communitarianism within the context of an Eastern empire.

Korais's response to the Paternal Teaching was published anonymously in Paris in the same year as 'Ἀδελφική Διδασκαλία (Brotherly Teaching). The ideological differences between the two
texts are implicit in their titles. To the paternalistic advice of the Church, Korais responds by offering his brotherly admonitions, a hint at the different power relations that structure the worlds each of the parties represent. Korais speaks from within a liberal framework in which his compatriots are treated as brothers, as equal to him in their rights and responsibilities. The Patriarch, on the other hand speaks from within a traditional, paternalistic framework as a father to his good-natured yet immature children who are in constant need of guidance and advice that will protect them from dangerous ideas.

In his response Korais was careful not to offend the religious sensibilities of his compatriots. As Richard Clogg has remarked,

... [Korais] fully aware that anti-clericalism on the French model would be of little help in his efforts to infuse the Greeks with a desire to liberate themselves, was careful to buttress his arguments in defence of liberty and democracy with copious references to biblical texts and well-judged appeals to the religious prejudices of his Orthodox readers (Clogg 1969:98).

In his polemical text against the writer of Paternal Teaching, Korais at the outset stated that he refused to believe that such a turkophile document could have been written by the Patriarch of Jerusalem and then proceeded to demolish one by one the arguments made in favor of the Greeks accepting their fate as obedient subjects of the Ottoman empire. Drawing upon the writings of the Apostles, he proposed that only subjection to lawful leaders could be justified.
The Ottomans who had brought numerous misfortunes upon their Greek subjects (persecution, heavy taxation, and the like) hardly qualified as legitimate leaders, and therefore had to be resisted by all means possible. In defense of democracy and of civil society, Korais tried to persuade his compatriots that a society in which the rule of law was paramount, abuses of power by an all-powerful clergy would be curtailed. As a model for emulation he offered the Western nations where the separation of Church and State resulted “in the humiliation of the arrogant Western Church under the invincible power of the law” (Korais 1949:57).

Korais’s ideas on the creation of a modern democratic state and the liberating role that education could play into forming free citizens were echoed among Greeks during the years of the struggle for independence (1821-1830). They were explicitly stated in the Provisional Constitutions adopted by the General Assemblies convened during this period. The first Constitution drafted in 1822, for example, provided that among the duties of the Minister of the Interior was

to engage studiously in the introduction and dissemination of the Lights, which are indispensable for the cultivation of the Greek Nation. . . . In general to assume the responsibility that all youngsters from all classes are taught the common letters and the first necessary lessons in life through the medium of the monitorial (Lancasterian) method (A. Dimaras 1973:B304).
Also in 1824 the members of the General Assembly approved a "Plan for the Common Education of the Nation" where they made provisions for three levels of education (elementary, secondary, and higher) aimed at "the desirable progress of the enlightenment and the subsequent prosperity of the nation" (Dimaras 1973:A10).

The work of the lawmakers was assisted by the liberal press of the time, such as The Hellenic Chronicles, where the following excerpt was published anonymously in 1825:

Look after the enlightenment of your mind, and the enlightenment of your children. Where there is ignorance, there one finds the most and the wickedest of demagogues. . . . [They] persecute and assail anyone who sees clearly and wishes to open your eyes too so that you discern your real duties and rights, upon the realization of which your real freedom and happiness rest (A. Dimaras 1973:A11).

Overall, during the revolutionary period, before Greece was declared an independent state, the dominant educational philosophy was influenced by Enlightenment ideals. The vision of many Greeks of the diaspora promoted the cultivation of free citizens, conscious of their rights and responsibilities. However, when the much sought about independence came, this vision was considerably modified and took a significantly more conservative turn.
The Post-Independence Period: The Formative Years and the Triumph of *Archaiolatreia*

A departure from the liberal, revolutionary educational ideals occurred with the arrival in 1828 of the first governor of Greece, Ioannis Kapodistrias, who was elected by the Greek assembly after the mediation of the three foreign powers, France, England, and Russia. Kapodistrias, a diaspora Greek who had served in the highest offices of the Russian government, schooled as he was in the manners of Russian autocratic rule, considered Greeks not ready for handling liberties, so he established an authoritarian, paternalistic state. Similarly, his educational agenda did not follow in the path of previous constitutional provisions about education, but whatever educational measures he took were of a philanthropic and disciplinary nature. It is indicative that the first institution he founded after his arrival was an orphanage, where children were treated in a harsh manner. Kapodistrias, however, did not succeed in completing his plans of building a strong, centralized state on the Russian model, because he was assassinated in 1831 by members of a clan of local notables who had wielded great power in their region of Mani in southern Peloponese and whose interests often conflicted with the governor's.
The task of building the first comprehensive educational system in independent Greece was bestowed upon King Otto, the seventeen-year old son of King Ludwig of Bavaria, who after an agreement among Britain, Russia, France, and Bavaria, arrived in Greece in 1833, accompanied by a regency council of three Bavarians who were to rule Greece until the King came of age. All the educational decrees that were drafted between 1833 and 1837 specify that all educational matters were to be decided by the central government. According to Alexis Dimaras,

this strictly centralized organization will remain a permanent feature of modern Greek education, accompanied always by the theoretical, classicist nature of studies, which is transplanted from Bavaria and is favored by the indigenous climate (Dimaras 1973:AX).

The French and English influences that were felt in Greek educational thought in the 1820s were thoroughly replaced by German influences in the 1830s and dominated the Greek system ever since. The cornerstone of the curriculum, especially in secondary and higher education, was none other than *Allgemeinbildung*, the Humboldtian ideal of a general education based on the study of the ancient Greek civilization. The Humboldtian interpretation of the Classics and Ancient Greece won over the more progressive interpretation offered by Korais under the
influence of the French Enlightenment. Korais and his disciples promoted a classical education as the basis of Greek education in the hope that their compatriots would use it in a liberal and instrumentalist fashion by focusing on the spirit of inquiry that the study of ancient Greek culture nurtured in modern man. This culture, according to Korais, ought to be brought closer to modern life and serve as a tool for testing contemporary ideas and practices. Not so for Humboldt, who conceived of the classical world in quite different terms: "At a distance, in the past, and removed from its everyday reality, only thus should the Ancient World appear to us." The idealization of the Ancient world as put forth by Humboldt fell on fertile ground in the newly liberated Greece. The new state was desperately seeking to establish its national identity and it seemed that, aided by the philhellenist movement, it would find it only by connecting itself to an illustrious past. As has been aptly remarked, "From its inception Greece was beset by a double anxiety of influence" (Jusdanis 1991). It had to prove to modern European nations that it was worthy to be part of their community, and at the same time it had to prove to itself that it was worthy of its glorious

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*On the conflict between the two "uses" of the classical tradition, the didactic use which implied an idealization of antiquity as represented in the teachings of conservative scholars who dominated the educational system after independence, and the liberal use which meant "the rational communication with the Ancients" as supported by Enlightenment thinkers, see Gotovos (1985).*
The educational system which centered on archaiolatreia, i.e. the worship of classical antiquity, mirrored the political and cultural choices of the ruling classes of the new Greek state, which constituted what Nicos Mouzelis has described as "Greek formalism." According to Mouzelis's analysis,

From a system point of view, formalism is a manifestation of the serious disarticulation between imported and indigenous politico-ideological institutions; from an actor's point of view it can be seen as an effective politico-ideological weapon with the help of which the ruling classes, in a more or less conscious manner, try to keep the masses 'in their place' (Mouzelis 1978:147).

The disarticulation between imported and indigenous institutions in the case of Greece was manifested in the split between an official culture (represented by the institutions of a centralized state moulded on Western models) and a popular culture (represented by the communal institutions and rich customs and mores that had sustained Greek traditions in the four centuries of Ottoman rule). In the educational sphere the dominance of the official culture was

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"We discussed in Chapter I the influence of the Ancient Greek ideal on Humboldt's formulation of Bildung and on the creation of the discipline of Philology in early nineteenth-century. The fascination of German intellectuals with Antiquity spurred the writing of a book by Butler, The Tyranny of Greece Over Germany (1938). Butler wrote that the voyage of Grecophile Germans to Greece was almost exclusively imaginary, as very few of them had actually travelled to Greece. In an ironic twist, given this idealization of Ancient Greece, the formation of the official culture of Greece in the post-independence period testifies to the tyranny of Germany over Greece."
firmly established and centered on the blind admiration of antiquity, scholasticism, and use of a puristic linguistic medium that imitated Ancient Greek. At the same time, the living cultural traditions (songs, dances, poetry) and the demotic language spoken by the Greek people were excluded from the curriculum as bastardized and vulgar cultural manifestations resulting from the long Ottoman occupation. The controversy surrounding the language question in particular -- i.e., whether the purified form (*katharevousa*), or the spoken form (demotic), should become the medium of instruction in school and the official language of the nation -- was the main cultural issue of the second half of the nineteenth century and preoccupied conservative and liberal educational reformers in the twentieth century. Obviously, the struggle was not merely over the choice of a linguistic form, but signified a more substantive clash over the choice between two types of identity: the Hellenic, which suggested Greece's lineage to Ancient Greece, and the Romeic, which linked Greeks to their most immediate Byzantine and Ottoman past.¹⁶

The cultural realities of Greece therefore suggest that, even though the organization of a national educational system under the

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¹⁶ The two terms, Hellenic and Romeic, derive from the two versions of the national name, Hellene, which was preferred by the purists because it linked modern Greece with Ancient Greece (Hellas), and Romios (Roman), meaning the inhabitant of the Eastern part of the Roman empire, as a Greek was called during the Byzantine and Ottoman times. For a discussion of the two conflicting images, Hellenic and Romeic, within modern Greek culture, see Herzfeld (1986:217-219).
centralized control of the Ministry of Education ushered the process of westernization, those in charge of building the system according to Western models departed from the Enlightenment ideals of Korais and likely-minded intellectuals and opted for more conservative ideas. The battle over the definition of what constituted a national educational ideal was waged between conservative and liberal westernizers, in so far it was not westernization per se that was resisted but rather certain western ideas that did not fit the authoritarian nature of the Greek state. As was stated earlier, the segments of the population that in the pre-revolutionary period were openly anti-western and anti-enlightenment (traditional elites and the Church) had to concede to the creation of western institutions after independence, but they exerted the considerable power they wielded in Greek society in order to influence the way these institutions functioned.

The case of the Church of Greece illustrates clearly the coexistence of the imported institutions with the traditional power holders in Greek society. Even though the Church lost the autonomy it enjoyed under Ottoman rule, it never ceased to influence educational and cultural matters in modern Greece. The Church constitution of 1833 separated the Greek Church from the Patriarchate of Constantinople and placed it under the political control of the state and the King.
This development reflected the will of the Bavarian administration to transfer their experience with the Church in Bavaria where the Catholic and Protestant churches were subservient to the King. It was supported by the westernized elite that staffed King Otto's government "who felt that devotion to Hellenism was the only sure foundation upon which the state could be created. They expected the attachment of the population to religion to be replaced rather quickly with nationalism as had happened in the West" (Frazee 1977:134). However, the separation between Church and State never happened in Greece as in other Western countries, because the influence of the Orthodox religion in Greek culture had deeper roots than the liberal westernizers had anticipated. Not only did the power of religion not diminish, but it asserted itself to the extent that Hellenism and Orthodoxy were eventually intertwined to form the ideological construct of "Helleno-Christian Civilization," which in turn became the ideal upon which the dominant educational philosophy was founded. It is rather telling that the full official title of the Ministry of Education in Greece is "Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs."

The influence of conservative ideas on the process of westernization in Greek culture and education is evident upon an

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17 On the interconnectedness of national and religious culture in Greece, see Kokosalakis (1987).
examination of the reception of Korais's educational and linguistic ideas and their effect on the shaping of the dominant educational philosophy after the liberation of Greece. Scholars agree that Korais's ideas contributed the most to the development of Greek nationalism and the movement towards independence, but some among them claim that his ideas were distorted in Greece so that they serve the political agendas of the architects of the Greek state (Mouzelis 1978:146; Henderson 1970:154-156; Iliou 1989:20-27).

For one, Korais's neoclassicism, the appreciation and study of the Classics, was turned into archaism, the worship and uncritical teaching of ancient texts. The removal of the classical works from the daily experiences of modern Greeks which marked the institutionalization of an official culture in separation from the popular culture of everyday life, lay far from the intentions of Korais who envisioned a modern educational system that would prepare critical thinkers and not passive receivers of ancient wisdom. On the matter of language there is also evidence that Korais's views were misappropriated to fit the conservative agenda of those in charge of shaping national education in the early years. Clearly, Korais's linguistic views were less radical than Moisiodax's, who as we have noted accepted unconditionally the superiority of the vernacular over the adoption of ancient Greek as the language of instruction.
Yet, Korais also stressed the importance of the "mother" tongue, recognizing the people's language as inalienable, as the following passage suggests:

Its language is one of the most inalienable of the people's possessions. Every member of the nation shares this possession in a, so-to-speak, democratic equality; and no one can sensibly believe either that he has or that he can procure the right to say to the people, "Thus do I bid you speak, thus write." Anyone who, professing to write in the common language, departs to a certain degree from the common mode of expression, is seeking to achieve something which not even the harshest tyrant is competent to bring about. The tyrant strips the citizen of his possessions; he may take wife and children from him, he can send him into exile or put him to death; but he cannot change that man's language: this, which is his at home, even accompanies him into exile. Only time has the authority to change the speech of nations... (Qtd in Henderson 1970:152-153).

Korais, however, also argued that Greeks should purge their spoken language from the vulgar and foreign elements of an uncultivated speech resulting from lack of education during centuries of life under occupation:

If one departs so far from the common manner of speech as to make what one is saying obscure in sense and utterly odd-sounding, this is a piece of tyranny; but, on the other hand, to speak with the vulgar to an extent that it is offensive to any educated person's taste, seems to me like demagoguery (153).

It is obvious that Korais's linguistic views, like his educational philosophy in general, emanated from his belief that Greeks, with the
help from an enlightened intelligentsia, should acquire the tools to liberate themselves from the shackles of ignorance. Without being contemptuous of the cultural and linguistic heritage that Greeks possessed, he nevertheless believed that this would not suffice, but it had to be corrected and embellished if Greeks wished to join modernity.

His conservative disciples in Greece, however, interpreted his views as a rejection of the common language of the people, and advocated the gradual turning of the Greek language toward archaism. The purified language (*katharevousa*) that became the official language of the Greek state was attributed to Korais's linguistic position, despite his advocacy of a "scholarly demotic" which was much closer to the folk idiom. Similarly, his impassioned call for the study of the Classics was turned into the sterile, formalistic teaching of texts. As has been aptly remarked, Greek education after 1829 turned decisively enough to the writings of the ancients, but what it took from them was their romance and not their philosophy. It turned to their language, but with precisely the sort of abject devotion that Koraes had condemned (Henderson 1970:155).

Thus in the nineteenth century those in charge of shaping the educational institutions of Greece appropriated Korais's classicism in support of a conservative nationalistic agenda and underplayed his
political and educational liberalism. Overall, "the 'demotic' side of his thinking has been greatly underemphasized" (154). As Philippos Iliou noted, "finally, the official image created to ornate the neohellenic pantheon was one of a very wise, moderate, and restrained philologist and patriot" (Iliou 1989:25). Korais's Enlightenment ideals, his anti-monarchism, his anti-clericalism, his call for a scientific content and orientation of the Greek educational system were conveniently set aside. He was instead canonized by the official educational ideology in Greece as the representative of a "middle road" position, a position which more or less reflects his views on the choice of a written language, but does not readily apply to Korais's educational and sociopolitical views which pointed to a much more radical path than the one traveled in Greece after independence. Indeed, his fate was similar to that of the illustrious ancients whose study Korais advocated to his compatriots. The Greek state honored him by erecting his statue in front of the University of Athens, a gesture symbolic of his place in Greek letters: Korais became a national hero, his work worshipped rather than studied in its full implications for the reform of Greek institutions.

So with the help of the educational system, the dominant power elites in Greece -- the conservative westernizers of the Bavarian administration, the Church, and conservative intellectuals -- started
forging a national identity. The role of "tradition" in the formation of the national identity has been central, because of the value Ancient Greece had acquired for Western civilization. Because of this crucial link with its past, Greece was prevented from creating a tradition, by establishing a new presence among modern nations as Moisiodax and Korais had envisioned, but was instead forced to invent a tradition, by seeking to identify itself with a glorious past.14

The ambitious task of inventing the tradition of the modern Greek nation was assumed by the schools, and in particular by the University of Athens which was founded upon an overtly nationalistic agenda. In 1836 King Otto invited Christian-August Brandis, a professor of philosophy at the University of Vienna, to organize the University. The new university was named "Ottoman University" after the King. It included originally four faculties, theology, law, medicine, and philosophy, and was moulded on the German university. Its mission was primarily to transmit the lights

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14 For this crucial distinction I am indebted to Stathis Gourgouris (1990) who writes: "...the Greek Enlightenment is indeed tradition-less, if only because it instigates, it creates...a new tradition. It institutes a new image of what neo-hellenic culture is, or better yet, that Greek culture is neo-Hellenic, which doesn't at all mean that it is an extension of Ancient Hellenism or Byzantine Hellenism, nor even a contemporary (Modern) version of their spirit—that it is instead other to their spirit...It is important to keep in mind that this creation of tradition is diametrically opposed to what Eric Hobsbawn has identified as the invention of tradition, which refers to a set of practices that 'seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by means of repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past'" (45).
from the West to the East. Henry Baird, an American traveller to Greece in the 1850s commented on this mission of the university in typically philhellenic ardor:

It is a circumstance well worth than noticing, that rather one half of the matriculated students are from districts under the rule of the Sultan. Thus "free Greece," as she is proudly styled, is furnishing to the millions of the same blood that are subject to the tyrant's sway, the benefits of a liberal education; and thus is she gradually preparing the way for their total emancipation from the shackles of ignorance and superstition (Baird 1856:43)

It is no wonder that the University of Athens became a stronghold of tradition and the most enthusiastic advocate of the linkage of modern Greeks to their illustrious forebearers. Staffed by many German professors and German-educated Greeks, it aimed at the regeneration of Greece in the image of Classical Greece. The Faculty of Philosophy in the University of Athens, in particular, was dominated by advocates of the purist form of language, a trend which persisted well into the 1970s. As was noted,

Independent Greece in the 1830s was confined to a territory which comprised southern and south central Greece. The majority of Greeks still resided outside the fixed boundaries, in territories under Ottoman occupation. The university's mission was to transmit the nationalistic spirit to the eastern territories where these Greeks resided. The liberation of these populations and the expansion of the borders of Greece for the purpose of creating a "Greater Greece" formed the core of the doctrine of the "Great Idea." It became the cornerstone of Greek national policy during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth, until it collapsed after the defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor in 1922, the destruction of most Greek communities there and the outpouring of two million refugees into the mainland Greece. For the function of the Greek state as a national center and the role of the National University as "the place par excellence for the production of the evangelists of the national idea," see Kitromilides (1983:152).
... the assumption of affinity of the Greek past with the Greek present was more zealously and more patriotically guarded in the University than anywhere else, and its resultant continued advocacy of classical Greek as the goal of education was later to lead to a bitter renewal at the turn of the century of the age-long controversy over the form which the 'national' language should take (Fletcher 1977:157).

Overall, in the post-independence period, education was entrusted with the creation of a homogeneous culture under the auspices of the nation-state. For this purpose the liberal educational ideas of the pre-independence period had to be contained because they threatened to undermine the national ideal as perceived by the traditional elites who had placed educational institutions under their firm control.

Varieties of the Humanistic Ideal: Purists vs. Demoticists

Even though the classical-theoretical orientation of education as articulated by the purists dominated the Greek educational system for most of its history, it was challenged forcefully after the 1880s by a group of scholars and intellectuals, the demoticists. The latter wanted to bring education closer to the realities of modern Greek society. They did not necessarily want to abandon the emphasis on Greece's classical past, but they aimed at balancing the classical studies with the study of the popular culture and traditions rooted in
the Byzantine and Ottoman past. In their writings they celebrated
the Romeic strand in Greek culture by studying the spoken language
of the people (demotic), folk songs, and the ways of life of the
common folk. They accused the purists of elitism and contempt of
the cultural practices of the common people. In turn the purists saw
the demoticists as populists who catered to the whims of the
uneducated masses, promoted a language which was vulgar and
uncultivated and thus obstructed the goal of making Greece worthy
of its classical heritage. The clash between the rival positions
emerged after the 1880s, was heightened during the first part of the
twentieth century and continued uninterrupted since then. The
demoticists managed to consolidate their influence in the cultural life
of modern Greece, as they dominated the literary and artistic
domains.20 However, the educational domain remained beyond their
reach, until fairly recently (1976), despite numerous attempts at
reforming schools along demoticist lines. Their failure to capture the
educational system from the grip of the traditionalists bespeaks to
the essentially conservative nature of schools which, especially
where they are under the direct control of the state, become the
carriers of the values of the class that dominates the state apparatus.
Here is how a prominent demoticist expressed his frustration over

20 For an account of the formation of the literary canon under the
the failure of demoticism to influence the educational system:

The instrument [the demotic language] exists, literature was won over a long time ago, science is on the way to be won over too. What is left if we are to say that demoticism has won? The most important domain: the school. As long as the school exists in its present condition, demoticism, despite all its successes, will continue to be what it was during Psycharis's time, a heresy of Greek life, slandered and abused, a heresy which the State accepts at times or does not tolerate at other times, but which it has definitely not adopted and assimilated... Only when demoticism reigns in school and, from within the school, saturates with its spirit all of Greece, could one speak of a final victory. Only then will demoticism cease to be heresy and will become orthodoxy, will complete its work and begin to fertilize the nation (Theotokas 1949(?):217-18).

This passage is telling, not only because it testifies as to the considerable influence of demoticism on Greek culture, but also because it reveals the nature of the demoticist project. Despite its different conception of Greek culture and "Greekness" from the purist ideology, demoticism emerged from within a nationalistic framework as well. More than anything else the struggle between the two positions was over the definition of national identity and national tradition. Simply put, the difference between the two lies in that [the purist] finds the true tradition of the nation in the distant past, whereas the demoticist, who is more enlightened, finds it in the near past—a difference, one might say daringly, of chronology (Papandreou :190).
Interestingly enough the influences on demoticist thought, as in the case of the purists, emanated also from Germany. Whereas the purists had transferred to Greece the scholasticism of the German philologists, the demoticists were inspired by the romantic idealism of Herder, Schiller, Fichte, Humboldt, and Nietzsche. Most of the leaders of educational demoticism who became influential in the first half of the twentieth century (Demetris Glinos and Alexandros Delmouzos among them) had lived and studied in Germany and their views bear the mark of German idealistic and nationalistic thought. Just like their German counterparts, they perceived the nation as an organic structure with roots in the past, sustained by the dynamic spirit of the people (the Volk) and the traditions they create. The idealization of the people as the moving force in the history of the nation is found in most of the writings of demoticists concerning education. Delmouzos articulated this view succinctly in the following passage:

Our language, the artistic genius, the mythopoetic ability, the ideology, the social and political life, the character of the Greek people we find not in the official language and its philology, not in the official schools, their curricula and games, not in the official buildings (Academies etc), not in their state organization and systems, but in the demotic language and its philology, in the embroidery and the song of the peasant girl, in the little village
Both purists and demoticists adhered to a humanistic educational ideal, in so far as for both the aim of education was the moral and spiritual cultivation of the young which took precedence over any kind of utilitarian preparation for future living. Here's how Ion Dragoumis, a prominent demoticist, expressed this ideal, echoing the Nietzschean critique of modern education:

> Of what use are the sciences in the schools? Whatever the children learn, it amounts to the same thing. The question is not for them to become educated in order to live. The question is for them to become better human beings, if this is possible, that is more dissatisfied with their environment and with contemporary civilization, and to seek something better by overcoming contemporary civilization (Augoustinos 1977:109).

The demoticists' romanticism as evidenced in their organic conception of the nation led them to place great value on the teaching of the classical tradition. As mentioned, they did not reject the preoccupation with the Hellenic past, but they wanted to make the study of the past more relevant to the life of modern Greeks. To this end they promoted the translation of classical texts into the spoken language as a means of avoiding the excessive emphasis the

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21 Delmouzos' excerpt from "Demoticism and Greek Education" is quoted in Tziovas (1986). Tziovas's work contains an exhaustive analysis of the discourse of nationistic demoticism as a rival discourse to that of nationistic purism. Tziovas also establishes the affinity between the demoticists and German Romantics concerning the nature of language and the link between language and nation. Both demoticists and German Romantics conceived of language as a living organism, as the expression of national soul, and advocated the spoken form of language (104-120).
purists placed on the form of the ancient language (syntax, grammar) at the expense of the texts' meaning. Dimitris Glinos, a pioneer of educational demoticism, defended the demoticist project against the charge that it devalued the importance of the Helleno-Christian tradition:

That the ancient past is the richest of the historical sources of our life and that the orthodox faith is a great good for the nation, is common doctrine to us and the purists. Our difference lies in our perception of the means through which we could transubstantiate our contact with these superior values of the civilization we have inherited from the past into a true moral force (Glinos 1971:23).

The acceptance by the demoticists of the unbroken continuity of Greek culture and their appeal to the nation's tradition do not allow for neat categorizations of demoticists as "progressive," "modern," in juxtaposition to the "traditional," "conservative" purists. Indeed, histories of Greek education usually present educational demoticists as those who wanted to introduce a utilitarian element in Greek education, make it more practical and rescue it from the idealistic, archaiotic orientation of institutionalized purism. Even though it is true that educational demoticists introduced a modern dimension in the philosophy and curricula of schools, largely due to their pedagogical studies in western Europe, their nationalist agenda undercut the demands of a utilitarian education which is essentially cosmopolitan in nature. Delmouzos' writings and educational
practices confirmed this important distinction between the
humanistic nature of the demoticist educational philosophy and the
utilitarian aims of modern education. He answered those who
confused demoticism with "educational modernism" as follows:

We confuse the two if we haven't felt the meaning of demoticism.
Because demoticism means return to the roots of the spiritual life
of neohellenism, i.e., live conservation of its inner unity from the
distant past to our times (Delmouzos 1958:245).

If this passage reveals the core of demoticism, it is also true that
educational demoticism entertained considerable diversity in its
midst, with positions ranging from a fierce nationalistic anti-
westernism (Dragoumis), to a moderately nationalistic pro-
westernism (Delmouzos), to a radical pro-western Marxist position
which still emanated from a nationalist perspective (Glinos).22 Given
also the nationalism of the conservative pro-western position of the
purists, one could notice that the nationalist element was common in
all educational positions, and in the case of the demoticists always
superseded whatever utilitarian views their reform proposals
contained.

This is not to say that traces of a more utilitarian educational
philosophy did not challenge the humanistic orientation of Greek

22 For a discussion of the "hellenocentrists" and the "Europeanists" within
the demoticist movement, especially its literary wing, see Tziovas (1986:293-
322).
education. Such a philosophy did exist as a reflection of the ideology of the social strata demoticists belonged to. An evaluation of the ideological positions of purists and demoticists in terms of their social class affiliation can explain the clash of humanistic and utilitarian elements in the Greek school curriculum. These positions and the class interests they reflected can be identified through a discussion of a series of reforms and counterreforms in the history of the educational system.

The history of modern Greek education according to educational historian Alexis Dimaras is the history of "the reform that never was" (A. Dimaras 1973). In the context of Greek society this reform would have moved the school from its classical-theoretical, humanistic orientation toward a practical, utilitarian orientation. Here's how Anna Frangoudaki defines such a reform:

The reform which never took place is the educational change based on the principle of everyone's right to education, i.e. the principle which states that education must be not the privilege of some social groups, but the inalienable right of all citizens, regardless of their origins and economic means. It is also the educational change which turns the schools toward the sciences, and adjusts the school--through the creation of a technical strand--to the economic needs of society. Finally it is the kind of change which bases the content of teaching on objectivity and the social function of knowledge. In other words, it is the bourgeois educational reform (Frangoudaki 1977:12)
The first attempts at such reform took place in 1889 and 1913, but the laws that were introduced in its favor were voted down. The proposed reforms contained a modern conception of education as preparation of the future worker and citizen. The transmission of practical knowledge existed as an objective side by side with the religious, moral, and national education of students. The 1913 proposal in particular made provisions for compulsory education, modern methods of teaching, the education of women, adjustment of the educational system to the social and economic needs of the country, emphasis on natural sciences, and provisions for technical/professional education (Frangoudaki 1977:28; A. Dimaras 1973:B93-97).

The staunchest opponents of the proposed reforms were faculty members of the School of Philosophy at the University of Athens who announced that "the proposed laws strike a severe blow against the teaching of the ancient Greek language and the humanistic education in general" (A. Dimaras 1973:B99). As mentioned previously, the University was a stronghold of the purist movement. One of the best known representatives of the movement, George Mistriotis, professor of Classical Philology, made fiery speeches on behalf of "the lawful defense of the national language," and on several occasions incited riots in the streets of Athens, whenever he felt that the puristic
linguistic ideal was threatened.\textsuperscript{23}

A reform that finally materialized was the one in 1917, the brainchild of educational demoticists and a result of the ascendance to power of the Liberal Party headed by Eleftherios Venizelos who campaigned on a platform of modernization of Greek society and institutions. The demoticists, who in 1910 had formed the Educational Society to promote their reformist ideals, were members of a liberal bourgeoisie which started emerging after the 1880s and in the first two decades of the twentieth century had managed to acquire considerable political power. Still its domination was far from final, given the power that traditional elites wielded within the mechanism of the state. As a result, the educational reforms that were instituted under its auspices were shortlived. The aforementioned reforms of 1917, for example were canceled in 1920 when the Venizelist government was ousted and replaced by a conservative government.

Therefore, educational reforms and counterreforms in Greece have to be understood from within the political context of power struggles over the control of the state. Frangoudaki (1977) has argued that until 1920 the "traditionalists" or "conservatives" who

\textsuperscript{23} Two such occasions were in 1901 when a newspaper published excerpts from the Bible translated into Modern Greek, and in 1903 when the National Theatre of Greece staged productions of Ancient Greek plays also translated into Modern Greek. A total of eleven people were killed during the rioting.
thwarted liberal reforms belonged to the pre-bourgeois strata which resisted the ascendancy of the bourgeois class. After the 1920s, however, when the bourgeois class had consolidated its power, “traditionalists” and “modernizers” represented two factions within the bourgeoisie. The liberal democratic faction was not strong enough to gain full control of the state apparatus from the more conservative faction which had incorporated remnants of pre-bourgeois elements and their conservative ideology of archaism and purism (98). Considering our earlier analysis of the formation of the Greek state and the peripheral character of Greek economic development (Mouzelis 1978), it suffices to say that the bourgeois class in Greece was weak compared to its counterpart in other Western countries. Its orientation toward the past, the lack of a radical spirit, and its close relationship with the Church, did not allow it to proceed with the necessary reforms that would modernize the educational system toward a more utilitarian orientation.

The liberal reforms of the demoticists were attacked by conservative elements for being unpatriotic and atheistic. Attacks were directed not only against the institutionalized reforms of the liberal governments, but also against experiments that were undertaken outside the state school system. It is worth mentioning here the uproar against a High School for Girls that was founded on
the initiative of members of the professional elite of the city of Volos in Central Greece and was directed by Alexandros Delmouzos. The school operated from 1908 to 1911, but closed down after violent protests from conservative members of the community and Delmouzos was sued for corrupting the young and for “destroying religion and nationism” (A. Dimaras 1973:89).24

Another reform introduced by a Venizelist government took place in 1929. It reiterated the same themes of the previous reforms—education as preparation for living, introduction of the demotic language in elementary schools, the need for teachers trained in new methods of teaching—and proceeded one step further by introducing a dual system of education with the creation of lower technical

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24 Delmouzos’s bold experiment in modern pedagogy at the Volos school has been compared to John Dewey’s work at the Laboratory school at the University of Chicago around the same time (1896-1904) (Polychronopoulos 1980:188). Certainly the similarities between the two educators are many. Delmouzos’ pedagogical views made him a pioneer of progressive education in Greece. In the Volos school he introduced an activity-centered curriculum which resembled Dewey’s experimental learning theories at the Lab School. However, considering what was said earlier about the ideology of the demoticists, Delmouzos’ progressivism was significantly influenced by romantic nationalism, since he was exposed to child-centered theories of education in Germany. Georg Kerschensteiner was the best known representative of progressive education in Germany, the one who had imported into Germany Kilpatrick’s “project method.” However, the influence of German philosophical traditions modified the individualistic nature of the American method, to the extent that the emphasis on the interests and the self-activity of the learner was coupled by the importance of moral training for membership in the national community. The nationalist element figures prominently in Delmouzos’s plan for the school which he wished to offer an education that was “humanistic, national, and modern” (A. Dimaras 1973:57). On the influence of German educational thought on Greek scholars and its contribution to the institutionalization of the Science of Pedagogy, see Gotovos (1984).
professional schools and a practical/technical strand in secondary schools for those who wished to specialize in the sciences. However, with the fall of the Venizelist regime in 1932, the restoration of the monarchy in 1935, and the military dictatorship of Metaxas there was once again a turn toward classicism which would dominate the educational system for the next thirty years or so.  

In the meantime a serious rift had occurred in demoticist ranks. The Educational Society was divided in 1927, when Glinos led many members of the group to break from moderate demoticists, headed by Delmouzos, and form a radical wing which took control of the Society. Glinos, who by that time had become a Marxist, spoke against what he considered half-baked reforms of the bourgeoisie and asked fellow demoticists to align themselves with the working class and support the creation of an educational system that would serve the needs of the people and not those of the bourgeois.

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* In this very broad survey of reforms and counterreforms in Greek education it is impossible to do justice to the intricacies of educational change in Greece and its relationship to the social and political upheavals of Greek history. My aim here is to provide general background information that will help explain the conflict of humanistic and utilitarian ideals in Greek education. For more information on the historical and educational realities there are many excellent works that shed ample light to the landscape of modern Greek culture and the relationship between social and educational change. For historical accounts, see Svoronos (1976), Clogg (1979), Kourvetaris (1987); for educational sources, besides the works by Frangoudaki (1977) and A. Dimaras (1973), which we have been referring to, the most important contributions include: Tsoucalas (1977), Noutsos (1979), Polychronopoulos (1980), Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora (1981), Kazamias (1968, 1983, 1987).
Glinos's educational radicalism is a fascinating case in the history of Greek educational reform. His position confirms our earlier claim that nationalism underlies all educational ideology in Greece whether conservative, liberal, or radical. Glinos's educational views, even after his conversion to Marxism, belonged to the organic discourse on nationalism. His writings consistently advocated a revival of the ancient Greek civilization in Greek scholarship, and on this basis Glinos qualifies as a "Marxist nationalist" (Katiforis 1981):

It would be no exaggeration to say that, with their joining Marxism, demoticist intellectuals transfer on the shoulders of the working class the burden of a national mission which the bourgeois class was proven incapable of carrying any longer (13).

Glinos's position was also evident in the "Plan for a Popular Education" which he drafted in 1944 on behalf of the National Liberation Front, the major resistance organization in German-occupied Greece during the Second World War. This plan did not have, of course, any impact on official educational policy in Greece, being as it was an isolated historical incident and given the crushing defeat of the leftist forces in Greece after the War. Still, in terms of

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**Footnotes:**

1 For well-argued accounts of the conflicts between the two former allies, Glinos and Delmouzos, and their roles as intellectuals in the formation of educational ideology see Frangoudaki (1977) and Noutsos (1990).

2 For an evaluation of Glinos's contribution to Greek educational and cultural life, see *Diavazo* (1983).
evaluating the ideological parameters of educational reform in Greece, this Plan easily fits into the framework of "the 'other reform' which indeed 'never took place' either in the political or the educational domain" (Kazamias 1983:418-419). It advocated a universal education, a diversified education that would educate "within production and for production," the establishment of four-year teacher training academies, of technical/professional education, etc. (418). Nevertheless, the elements which suggested that a more utilitarian conception of education was present were tempered by the appeal to the creation of a strong national identity. Thus, the invocation of the humanistic ideal, of an education that prepares individuals to partake in the inner truths of the nation, was forever present. Consider the following excerpt from the "Plan for a Popular Education" as a final comment on the dominance of the humanistic ideal as the basis for Greek education:

The education of the Greek State aims at bringing its work closer to the natural environment of the country, following the principle of adjustment to reality. It will thus seek to develop the natural resources which Greek nature contains. It will also seek to cultivate every spiritual, moral, historical, and living value of our homeland, so that Greece becomes a civilized and happy country. In this respect, it is a national education. It is also a national education because it will inspire in all children, boys and girls, as their supreme duty to work always for the defense of popular gains, the territorial integrity, the economic independence and national freedom of Greece (A. Dimaras 1973:B204).
Indeed, the commitment to nationalism qualifies all educational positions in Greece, whether conservative, liberal, or radical, as varieties of the humanistic ideal.

The Humanistic Ideal and the Challenge of Modernization: An Uneasy Coexistence

Confine the Grammarians in monasteries and the Poets in sanatoria; this is the age of steam and electricity, the age of steamboats and smokeless gunpowder. Leave the theoretical studies to one individual, and draw a thousand to technique, to applied sciences! Set the pathetic schools of theoretical and scholastic pseudo-education on fire, and erect palaces of Practical and Technical education! . . .Only then Greece will be saved, only when all Greeks turn maniacally toward the natural and mathematical sciences and their application. . .

Ioakim Pavlidis, “On Technical Education” (1902)

The above was obviously a remote voice in Greece at the turn of the century, as even the demoticists who were in favor of bringing education closer to the practical needs of the people would not be willing to do away with the study of the humanities which they considered indispensable for the forging of the national identity.

Almost half a century later, in the late 1940s, a team of Americans reached conclusions which echoed Pavlidis’s urgent call for reform:

Naturally, perhaps, in a small, poor country with a past of towering greatness, Greek education points heavily to the past. None would wish to deprive Greek young people of the lessons of pride which they can derive from reading of the golden days of
Pericles and the glories of Byzantium. But such teaching, presented as it is in Greece with doses of theoretical science having little if any connection with the actual facts of life confronted by modern Greeks, leaves a great deal to be desired by competent educational critics (Smothers et al. 1948:119-120).

As a matter of fact, the classical-theoretical orientation did not necessarily make education dysfunctional in Greek society. As Tsoukalas (1977) has persuasively argued, the absence of the sciences and technical training from the Greek school curricula was "undoubtedly connected with the unproductive character of the ruling class... there is no problem of "dysfunction" in the context of a social formation, where industrial production--which would have required more and more technical and scientific knowledge--was totally absent" (563). Similarly, Tsoukalas has interpreted the propensity toward higher education in Greece ("overeducation" or "overscalarization"), the preference for law and the social sciences and the reluctance to study technology and science, as a result of the nineteenth-century socio-economic formation. Major characteristics of Greek society were the absence of a strong industrial base and the rapid expansion of the state apparatus. Schools thus functioned as mechanisms for the production of civil servants and for the inculcation of those values that would ensure the cohesion of the
Renewed attempts at reforming the educational system appear again in the post-war period, as Greece embarks on a path of rapid socio-economic development. The tenets of modernization theory as articulated in the 1950s and 60s reached Greece and promised it a place among developed nations. The role of education in the process of modernization was paramount, as a link was established between education and economic development by the advocates of “human capital theory” which conceived of education as a form of productive investment.

In Greece the ideology of modernization appears in the unsuccessful attempts at reform in the late 1950s and 1960s. The individual whose educational philosophy was the link between

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28 This point is indicative of how even a humanistic education, which in Greece proclaimed no purpose other than the cultivation of the moral, religious and national consciousness of the individual, cannot escape an instrumentalist role. It is also interesting to note the similarities between Greece and nineteenth-century Prussia, where schools as we saw in Chapter I also promoted a liberal, non-specialized education. As Bowen noted, “since Prussia lacked large towns and industrial capacity, the state and civil service increasingly provided a major area for employment for the emerging middle classes; to survive, Prussia had to become a bureaucratic meritocracy in which education was a necessary element” (Bowen 1972:239).

29 According to C.E. Black, “[modernization] may be defined as the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man’s knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution” (Black 1966). Modernization theorists studied problems of economic development, social and cultural change in non-western societies, and developed elaborate schemes as to how these societies could effect a transition from their “underdeveloped” status to a “developed” one to match levels of development in Western industrialized countries.
the pre-war educational demoticists and the new liberal ideology of schooling was Evangelos Papanoutsos. Papanoutsos in 1958, as head of the Commission on Education set up by the Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis, spoke about the importance of linking education to economic development. Also the 1964 reforms that he engineered as Minister of Education in the liberal government of George Papandreou indicated that a new conception of education was in order: one that viewed the school not solely in terms of its moral, spiritual, nationalistic role, but also in terms of its economic function. Papanoutsos's reformism and its relationship to earlier liberal reforms is articulated by Papanoutsos himself in the following excerpt from his autobiography:

What differentiates my efforts from previous ones, in particular from the important struggle of the leaders of Educational Demoticism (from 1911 on), could be articulated as follows: They fought, through linguistic and educational reform, to breathe some fresh air into school work, to remove it from the dead forms of a sterile, archaiolatric scholasticism and to connect it organically with the roots of the Nation, the soul of the people. I, always faithful to the spirit and tradition of Educational Demoticism, tried to make everyone conscious of the necessity to restructure education from its foundations so that it responds to the new economic and social conditions of life... [I proposed] a more practical education in secondary schools. ... a more substantive education through an expansion of the concept of humanism, so that the curriculum includes mathematics and the natural sciences. The development of technical and

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For the influence of modernization theory on the proposals of 1938 and the reforms of 1964, see Kazamias (1983), and Noutsos (1979). For a critical appraisal of Papanoutsos's liberal educational ideology, see Kazamias (1987).
professional education to a grand scale, so that we modernize our national economy (Kazamias 1987:52-53).

The humanistic conception of education was very much present here also, but utilitarian ideals were represented equally strongly. The 1964 reforms were canceled by the military regime of 1967, which threw education back to the familiar patterns of archaiolatreia. However, after the fall of the dictatorship in 1974 and the restoration of democracy, educational reforms introduced in 1976 by a conservative government and in the 1980s by a left-of-center government have brought back the ideology of modernization with a vengeance, and now it seems it is here to stay. Education has taken a decisive turn toward a more technocratic/utilitarian model. Because of membership in the European Economic Community with the prospect of a united Europe in 1992, Greece has been hard pressed to modernize its educational system. Reforms undertaken include: the shift to a more practical orientation, which through the development of technical and vocational education at the secondary and higher levels aims to prepare students for entering the job market; a deemphasis of the teaching of the classics by introducing the teaching of classical Greek literature in translation and limiting instruction in ancient Greek language only to those students who will pursue the study of classics after high school graduation; the
adoption of demotic Greek as the medium of instruction at all levels of education; the establishment of the Center of Educational Studies and Teacher Training (K.E.M.E.); and the extension of compulsory school attendance from six to nine years.

The fact that both conservative and liberal parties, and even leftist parties to a lesser degree, have championed the necessity of turning education into a mechanism that serves the economic needs of the country, suggests that the distinction between liberalism and conservatism has become meaningless in a context dominated by the ideology of economic development. Furthermore, because in Greece, as in many developing countries, "the traditional" and "the modern" are perceived as being in total antithesis, those who promote modernization are eager to import uncritically any model from developed countries without regard to the cultural, historical, and political specificity of Greece. Similarly, those who reject modernization in the name of preserving traditions that sustain the Greek way of life, are locked in an ethnocentric xenophobic
mentality.  

Conclusions

The study of the traditional humanistic orientation of Greek education reveals the political and ideological function of education. Contrary to conceptions of education in developed Western countries where the ideological function of education is hidden under the technocratic, value-free language of progress and development and where education has acquired an autonomous status as an institution among other institutions, in Greece such autonomy was never possible because education from the start was treated as a political weapon for the formation of a national identity. The close link between education and politics is not so obvious in countries that have been fully integrated into the culture of modernity and where a

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For an interesting discussion of how the antithesis between tradition and modernization has been experienced in Greece as the juxtaposition of two rival discourses, one bourgeois-cosmopolitan, the other populist-prebourgeois, see Tsoukalas (1983). In the context of educational discourse, the bourgeois-cosmopolitan mentality is exemplified by the technocrats-experts who from their positions in the World Bank or as advisors to the Minister of Education devise plans that will make education more efficient and competitive. Needless to say that most of them have been trained in the United States, a telling reversal of the earlier pattern of the advocates of humanistic education being schooled in Germany and France. The populist-prebourgeois mentality is evidenced in the hellenocentric position of those who resist western models. Among the most outspoken critics of a technocratic/utilitarian education are neo-orthodox intellectuals who reject the cosmopolitanism and materialism of modern education in favor of an education rooted in the communitarian values of the Greek Orthodox tradition. These intellectuals share an anti-Enlightenment philosophy which resurfaced with vigor in the late 1970s and has recently gained momentum in light of Greece's full membership in the European Community.
separation exists between different spheres of activity (be it politics, education, aesthetics, etc.) that modernity has brought into the organization of social life. For example, in the United States the political nature of education has been overlooked during the twentieth century because of a preoccupation with efficiency, productivity and administrative concerns. Debates over the political function of education have been present, but overshadowed by the dominance of business interests. It was only after the 1960s that politicized debates over the orientation of education have surfaced. Such debates have intensified during the 1980s and have undermined the myth of the apolitical function of education in modern societies, revealing education as an area of contestation between clashing ideological forces. The current debates in the United States over a national curriculum, cultural literacy, and the need for curricula affirming the values of Western Civilization against the "threat" of other cultures and values, might be news for those who had taken a "business-as-usual" approach toward education and left its planning to professionals and experts. Not so in Greece, where from the start education has always been the apple of discord among the forces vying for control of the state. The Greek case points to the potential dangers from the centralization of educational policy and from the implementation of a national
curriculum which firmly establishes the hegemony of the ruling class over education at the exclusion of public debate on educational matters.

Now, however, that Greece, and other developing countries for that matter, are flirting with the American model—in the name of efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness in the world economic market—it is also essential to study this model and its philosophical and cultural underpinnings as it emerged in the United States. If the United States is for Greece the image of its future—and not only in the educational realm—Greek educational theorists and the general public should study the American educational experience. Thus they can determine whether the shift from the humanistic to the utilitarian ideal is desirable, and if it is indeed the only alternative.
CHAPTER III

EDUCATION AS SOCIAL ENGINEERING: THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Introduction: The Promise of Education

From the Founding Fathers to the modern urban dweller, Americans have in the course of their history exhibited a relentless faith in the power of education to solve social problems. The school is expected to assume responsibility for a number of issues that have preoccupied American society: the moulding of loyal citizens, the elimination of poverty, the Americanization of the immigrant, the eradication of racism, and the loss of technological and economic competitiveness to other nations. As Lawrence Cremin has perceptively stated, “in other countries, when there is a profound social problem there is an uprising; in the United States, we organize a course!” (Cremin 1965:11).

This faith in the power of education emanates to a great degree from the rootlessness of the American experience and the relative
absence of the burden of tradition in American culture. Education was seen from the start as the primary vehicle of social mobility and social change. Such a role was consistent with the ideals of political liberalism which was readily accepted in the United States in the absence of a feudal past. The main objective of the American school was not the transmission of venerable traditions, as in the case of the Greek school, but the dissemination of skills that would facilitate change and adjustment to new conditions. Whereas the Greek school curriculum stressed the continuity with the past, the American curriculum emphasized discontinuity. Cremin argues that this tendency of breaking away from tradition was revealed in the eighteenth century post-revolutionary attitudes of Americans:

... they argued for a truly American education, purged by all vestiges of older monarchical forms and designed to create a cohesive and independent citizenry. Deploring the widespread mimicry of European ways, they urged the deliberate fashioning of a new republican character, rooted in the American soil, based on an American language and literature, steeped in American art, history, and law, and committed to the promise of an American culture. In part, this implied a conscious rejection of Europe, a turning away from what was widely perceived as a thousand-year tradition of feudalism, despotism, and corruption. But, more important, it implied a conscious act of creation; for the American character had yet to be defined, and on its proper definition rested the health and safety of the new nation (Cremin 1977:43-44).
Rejection of their European past made Americans obsessed with their future. Nationalist ideology was present in this process, as in the case of every new nation that constructs its identity, but it manifested itself differently than in Greece. In Greece, as we have discussed, nationalist ideology had as its frames of reference classical Greece and modern Europe. In the United States it appealed to an unknown future destiny which awaited Americans as they pushed their way through an expanding frontier. There was no past to provide a model for emulation, so they had to create the structures that would bestow order upon a society in the making. Michael Katz, discussing the struggles among educational reformers in the nineteenth century over the adoption of a desirable organizational model for schooling, commented that "Americans made organization uniquely their own national problem. They did so precisely because they lacked fixed traditions and the security of ancient forms" (Katz 1987:56).

Given the urgency of preparing the population for survival in a yet untamed world, the priority of the American school became not the intellectual cultivation of superior minds, but the dissemination of practical knowledge to the population at large. The conflict between an educational ideal geared toward "the best and the brightest" and one aimed at educating the population at large was
exemplified in the positions held by Thomas Jefferson and Horace Mann. In 1779, in his "Plan for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge," Jefferson stated:

... it becomes expedient for promoting the publick happiness that those persons, whom nature hath endowed with genius and virtue, should be rendered by liberal education worthy to receive, and able to guard the sacred deposit of the rights and liberties of their fellow citizens, and that they should be called to that charge without regard to wealth, birth or other accidental circumstance (Quoted in Gutek 1970:43).

On the other hand, Horace Mann, the architect of the common school in mid nineteenth-century retorted:

The scientific and literary well-being of a community is to be estimated not so much by its possessing a few men of great knowledge, as its having many men of competent knowledge.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Daniel Gilman, President of Johns Hopkins University, made a statement that recaptured Horace Mann's educational vision: "It is neither for the genius nor for the dunce, but for the great middle class possessing ordinary talents that we build colleges" (Qtd in Bledstein 1978:293).

Even though the Jeffersonian tradition of educating "a natural aristocracy of talent" has survived in many liberal arts colleges in the United States, the spirit that triumphed was that of Jacksonian democracy and its commitment to the education of the common man. The concept of the "school as the great equalizer" as opposed to the
“school as the great selector” started gaining momentum with the rise of the common school movement and has been predominant ever since.¹

The pronounced egalitarianism of the American school is related to the dominance of utilitarianism as an educational ideal. This is not to say that egalitarianism and the humanistic ideal are necessarily incompatible, but to note that from the beginning reformers of American education relied on the assumption that the proper education for the common man was one that would prepare him for life and not one that would introduce him to a gentlemanly culture. This attitude implies that the common man is not capable of grasping high culture and/or that this culture is irrelevant to addressing the real needs of society; it is indicative of the very powerful strain of anti-intellectualism in American education and in American culture in general. As Richard Hofstadter has remarked:

At an early date, literature and learning were stigmatized as the prerogative of useless aristocracies. . . . It seemed to be the goal of the common man in America to build a society that would show how much could be done without literature and learning—or rather, a society whose literature and learning would be largely limited to such elementary things as the common man could grasp and use. Hence, early nineteenth-century America was more noted for a wide range of literacy and for the unusual amount of information, independence, self-respect,

¹On the Jeffersonian vs. the Jacksonian conception of democracy and their impact on educational philosophy, see Perkinson (1977:7-12).
and public concern possessed by the ordinary citizen than it was for the encouragement of first-rate science or letters or for the creation of first-rate universities (Hofstadter 1963:51).

In any case, the history of American education has seen the progressive domination of the utilitarian ideal. Supporters of the humanistic ideal often challenged it without ever completely displacing it. In the twentieth century the drive at restoring the humanistic ideal as the core of the curriculum was led by academicians (such as Irving Babbitt, Robert Hutchins, and Mortimer Adler) who believed that control of educational planning and policy should be taken away from professional educators. Recently there has been a renewed interest in the merits of a humanistic education as evidenced in the success of books such as Mortimer Adler's *The Paideia Proposal* (1982) and Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987) which argue from different perspectives within the humanist tradition. These books were discussed widely, but it is debatable whether they will have any impact on the institutional realities of American education. Educational policy-makers are generally more interested in raising test scores to meet the Japanese challenge rather than promoting learning for its own sake.
The Cultural Context

Individualism and the Pursuit of the American Dream

'We won', gasped the man from Marathon as he expired. 'I did it', sighs the exhausted marathon runner of New York as he collapses on the grass in Central Park.


Baudrillard's statement captures a core value in American culture, that of competitive individualism. If the ancient runner perceived himself as part of a wider whole and his victory as the outcome of a collective effort, the modern runner in the race for success views his victory as his personal property. This urge for making it on one's own has been one of the most persistent themes in the definition of the American identity. The legacy of "the American Dream" rests to a great extent on the belief that individual effort makes the achievement of wealth, prestige, and power possible.

Individualism found its expression within different traditions in American culture. Bellah et al. (1985) have identified three central strands in American culture, biblical, republican and modern individualist. The first, the biblical, was present in the early Puritan settlements in seventeenth-century America which set out to create "cities upon a hill," utopian communities built in the interests of the moral and ethical advancement of the individual under divine
guidance. The second, the republican tradition, departed from the theocratic beliefs of Colonial America and focused on the creation of a republic founded on the political equality of its citizens. In both of these traditions self-reliance was valued but within the context of community.

However, gradually, these two older traditions gave way to the sweeping tide of utilitarian individualism which focused almost exclusively on individual self-improvement and pursuit of material interests. If John Winthrop, the first governor of Massachusetts, embodied the biblical strand, and Thomas Jefferson the republican one, Benjamin Franklin, "the archetypal good boy who made good" (Bellah 1985:32) was the embodiment of utilitarian individualism. Individualist beliefs were not solely of the utilitarian mode, however, in so far as utilitarian individualism triggered a reaction on the part of those who detested its focus on material pursuits. As a result "expressive individualism" appeared which extolled the cultivation of the self and the achievement of inner freedom and spirituality. Emerson, Thoreau, and above all, Walt Whitman are the best known representatives of this trend.

Even though there have been manifestations of all strands in American culture throughout its history, the utilitarian individualist strand has been by far the most dominant, fueled by the dictates of
competitive market economy which glorifies the Economic Man.

The role of Protestantism as an underlying element of all these traditions should not be ignored. One need not enter the debate whether it was Protestantism that gave rise to capitalism, as Max Weber proposed, or whether it was the other way around, as a Marxist interpretation of the base-superstructure relationship would support, to agree that American culture bears the deep influence of Protestantism. As a matter of fact, the suggestion that Protestantism should be understood not merely as religious dogma, but as a "culture religion" makes sense in light of the variety of beliefs that Protestantism encouraged. Historian Carl Kaestle has summarized the complex belief system of Native Protestant ideology as follows:

The ideology centered on republicanism, Protestantism, and capitalism, three sources of social belief that were intertwined and mutually supporting Native Protestant ideology can best be summarized by enumerating ten strands or major propositions: the sacredness and fragility of the republican polity (including ideas about individualism, liberty, and virtue); the importance of individual character in fostering social morality; the central role of personal industry in defining rectitude and merit; the delineation of a highly respected but limited domestic role for women; the importance of character building of familial and social environment (within certain racial and ethnic limitations); the sanctity and social virtues of property; the equality and abundance of economic opportunity in the United States; the superiority of American Protestant culture; the grandeur of America's destiny; and the necessity of a determined public effort to unify America's polyglot population, chiefly through education.
The role of the school as a unifying factor in the creation of a Protestant culture was stressed by the many missionaries and preachers who throughout the nineteenth century roamed the land trying to recruit enthusiasts to the cause of establishing schools (Tyack & Hansot 1982). The emphasis on individual achievement that Protestantism promotes found its natural milieu in the school. Consequently, the American school came to be perceived as the primary means for the realization of the American Dream. It epitomized the liberal ideology that all individuals, regardless of their status and social class, should be given an equal opportunity to compete in the race for success.

**The Enchantment of Progress and the Rise of the Professional Expert**

American culture bears all the signs of what Lavine (1984) calls "Enlightenment Modernism." Enlightenment Modernism rests on the belief in the power of scientific reason to know and change the world. In a culture permeated by this belief science gradually replaces religion as the source of authority and progress becomes the undisputed law of history.

America, due to the absence of well-formed traditional institutions, became a big laboratory for testing the limits of
Enlightenment modernism. It was the belief in unmitigated progress that fueled the movement toward the expansion of the Western frontier, the development of the land, and the control of natural resources. It was also this same belief in the inevitability of progress that justified the annihilation of native peoples who refused to exchange tradition for progress. And after the Western frontier closed, the march toward progress sought other outlets in new economic markets and later in the exploration of the outer space.

It is no wonder that Herbert Spencer's ideas, which glorified the power of science, gained so much popularity in nineteenth-century America, in particular among those who subscribed to the doctrine of Social Darwinism. As Richard Hofstadter remarked:

With its rapid expansion, its exploitative methods, its desperate competition, and its peremptory rejection of failure, post-bellum America was like a vast human caricature of the Darwinian struggle for existence and survival of the fittest (Hofstadter 1955:44).

Spencer was enthusiastically received in the United States during his trip in 1882. His social views supportive of a laissez-faire individualism were very appealing. His educational views, critical of the values of Anglo-American high culture which he considered bound to tradition and hostile to the cultivation of a scientific spirit also were popular among the advocates of utilitarianism. Indeed,
"Spencer was telling the guardians of American society what they wanted to hear" (46). According to Lawrence Cremin:

For many, he seemed to incarnate the scientific spirit of the age. Moreover, that scientific spirit was joined, on the one hand, to a fierce individualism suspicious of government authority, and, on the other hand, to a firm belief in progress as the unalterable course of nature (Cremin 1988:389).

After 1880, however, American society underwent a fundamental shift in values. Even though the scientific spirit and the belief in progress were left intact, they had to conform to the new institutional realities of American society which was moving from the laissez-faire capitalism of nineteenth-century to corporate capitalism. At the closing of the nineteenth-century, American society exhibited all the characteristics of modernization that result from the applications of scientific reasoning: industrialization, rationalization, urbanization, secularization, and bureaucratization. The rugged individualism and the entrepreneurial spirit of the previous era had to be contained by the new emerging corporate structures. As Robert Wiebe (1967) remarked the small town values that existed until then were gradually replaced by the values of an emerging, bureaucratic-minded middle class. This new class comprising of urban professional men and women espoused the values of rationality, regularity, administration, and management.
As Wiebe noted, the new, increasingly bureaucratic orientation of American society "obliterated the inner man. The focus had shifted from essences to actions. The new ideas concerned what men were doing and how they did it" (148).

The members of the new rising class were identified by way of their skills and not their virtues. And if virtue is a quality liberally disseminated among all strata of society, a skill is a rare commodity that demands specialized training. This meant that a new set of relationships was created between those who possessed this specialized knowledge and the general public. According to Burton Bledstein, the emerging culture of professionalism required amateurs to 'trust' in the integrity of trained persons, to respect the moral authority of those whose claim to power lay in the sphere of the sacred and the charismatic. Professionals controlled the magic circle of scientific knowledge which only the few, specialized by training and indoctrination, were privileged to enter, but which all in the name of nature's universality were obligated to appreciate (Bledstein 1978:90).

The expansion of modern systems of education and the rise of a professional class went hand-in-hand. As Magali Larson has remarked in her study on the rise of professionalism "the emergence of modern systems of education--and, in particular, the transformation of their higher branches into centers for the
production of knowledge—appears as the central hinge of the professional project" (Larson 1977:17).

Education credentialized an army of professional helpers to meet the public's real and invented needs. Christopher Lasch, in his incisive critiques of American culture, has explained how modern society has established intricate webs of institutional controls which have meant the surrender of individual autonomy to a pseudo-liberation supervised by experts:

The family's dependence on professional services over which it has little control represents one form of a more general phenomenon: the erosion of self-reliance and ordinary competence by the growth of giant corporations and of the bureaucratic state that serves them (Lasch 1979:229).2

In such an environment the role of schooling acquires great importance as a primary agency of the socialization of the child under the guidance of an array of specialists, psychologists, nutritionists, reading experts, counselors, who come to fill the gap of the loss of parental authority.

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1 As has been suggested in a recent review (Menand 1991:40) Lasch's argument is quite similar to Foucault's analysis of the oppressive nature of modern institutional life with its social control upon individuals. The point is well taken, even though the two theorists differ considerably in their views regarding resistance against institutional violence. Foucault's anti-humanism allows him little hope in narratives of liberation, whereas Lasch's romanticism places hope for deliverance from the grip of institutions in the collective actions of a lower middle class left outside the liberal mainstream.
It is within this context of profound changes in institutions and values resulting from the transition of American society from early capitalism to corporate capitalism that educational change can be appropriately placed and discussed.

The Educational Context

The Early Years: Education as Civic Duty

The aforementioned traditions in American culture as described by Bellah et al. (1985) have influenced at one time or another the development of the American school. The Colonial educational experience was clearly influenced by the biblical tradition. Schooling was under the control of local communities and its purpose was to instil religious piety and obedience to the laws of the community.

During the National experience the role of education shifted from the creation of the pious subject to the moulding of the loyal citizen. Republican leaders differed amongst themselves in their conceptions of the role of the government in imposing civic virtue. Jefferson's classical liberal position stressed the importance of education for enlightening the public but avoided extreme interventionism on the part of the government toward this end. Others like Benjamin Rush, a distinguished physician of the post-revolutionary era, took a more dogmatic position on the role of the state in instilling values. Rush
had this to say about the aims of schooling in a republican polity:

I consider it . . . possible to convert men into republican machines. This must be done if we expect them to perform their parts properly in the great machine of the government of the state. . . Let our pupil be taught that he does not belong to himself, but that he is public property. Let him be taught to love his family, but let him be taught at the same time that he must forsake and even forget them when the welfare of his country requires it (Qtd in Spring 1986:34).

Overall in the eighteenth century the American school was influenced by the European ideal of a liberal education that instilled civic virtue along with a knowledge of Ancient Greek and Latin. There were, however, indications that a new educational ideal was emerging which anticipated the developments that were going to take place in schooling the next two centuries. The new ideal expressed the needs of a rising entrepreneurial middle class that demanded an education that would prepare its offspring for successful handling of worldly affairs and everyday business. Such an education needed to expand the old type of education offered by the grammar school. The Academy movement, incited by Benjamin Franklin's educational views that privileged the useful over the ornamental in learning, fulfilled this need.  

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3 Lawrence Cremin noted the following about Franklin's Autobiography: "Whatever we learn from it about the eighteenth century, there is no doubt that it transmitted to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries an activist educative style that placed self-education and self-determined education at the core of the American experience" (Cremin 1977:29).
institutions of secondary education that provided students with a practical education.

Education as Social Adjustment: From the Common School Reformer to the Educational Expert

By the third decade of the nineteenth century, "America had schools, but except in large cities, America did not have school systems" (Kaestle 1983:62). However, the changing social conditions demanded that education become institutionalized, centralized, and professionalized. Especially in the Northeast, where rapid industrialization and urbanization were under way, many school reformers envisioned a common school that would unify the population which under the influx of immigration was becoming increasingly heterogeneous. The "common school," in the reformers' vision, was to be not a school for the common people, but a school common to all people. According to David Tyack,

During the middle decades of the nineteenth century the common school crusaders like Horace Mann sought to translate Americans' diffuse faith in education into support for a particular institutional form, the public school. In their vision the common school was to be free, financed by local and state government, controlled by lay boards of education, mixing all social groups under one roof, and offering education of such quality that no parent would desire private schooling. The common school was to be moral and religious in impact but it was not to be sectarian; it was to provide sound political instruction without being partisan (Tyack and Hansot 1982:30).
There are conflicting interpretations about the role of the common school in American society. The traditional historical interpretation, with a consensus model as its theoretical framework, views the common school as a major democratic movement which extended the social benefits of schooling to the lower social classes. On the other hand, a revisionist interpretation resting on a conflict model explores the relationship between industrial capitalism and common schooling and suggests that the common school represented a major effort to prepare the population to serve the needs of an industrial society. Revisionist historians often give as evidence of the disciplinary nature of the common school the writings of Horace Mann himself who persuaded the conservative propertied class to support through their taxes the common school as "the cheapest means of self-protection and insurance." In his Fifth Report Mann stated:

Where else could you find any police so vigilant and effective, for the protection of all the rights of person, property and character as such a sound and comprehensive education and training, as our system of common schools could be make to impart? (Karier et al. 1973:12)

The two interpretations suggest the conflict between two functions of education, the liberating and the adjustment function. The former focuses upon the capacity of education to produce critical thinkers, the latter merely trains them for a job. The American
common school, according to its critics, departed from the liberal Jeffersonian proposal of education for citizenship and became preoccupied with serving the needs of the industrial state. As Lasch observed, this change reflects a shift of emphasis within the school system from concern with the political objectives of public education to a growing preoccupation with industrial objectives. ... the training of efficient workers, even more than the training of enlightened citizens, has turned out to require a form of education in which the original democratic elements are increasingly attenuated (Lasch 1975:16).

Lawrence Cremin also suggests that one major cause for this shift to the adjustment function of the school and placement of emphasis on the nonacademic side of the curriculum was that the school was seen as the primary means for the Americanization of the immigrant (Cremin 1964).

The model that public schooling followed in its organization was what Katz calls "incipient bureaucracy" which won over other possible choices.¹ Central features of this model were centralization, which went against revered traditions of democratic localism, and an

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¹ The four major organizational models that Katz says competed in the first half of the nineteenth century were paternalistic voluntarism, democratic localism, corporate voluntarism, and incipient bureaucracy (Katz 1987:24-57).
emphasis on supervision. If incipient bureaucracy became the organizational model of schooling in the United States, then the common perception of decentralization of education and local autonomy of schools in the United States must be mistaken. Certainly the tradition of localism has strong roots in American culture and in earlier times was an element that differentiated American from European societies where educational centralization was and still is the norm. This localism was expressed in the creation of boards of education consisting of elected members from the community, and in the absence of a central Ministry of Education. However, if we look at the social composition of these boards we will find that it does not differ from community to community. The members of school boards have always been “successful” citizens of the community, middle-class professionals and businessmen who share a cluster of values, no matter what their place of region and school district. This is not meant to minimize the potential for democratic participation in school boards and the possibility for groups other than those traditionally dominant of school boards to make a bid for power. In that sense this situation allows for greater flexibility compared to the Greek situation where power resides with the specialists in the Ministry of Education. However, the social and political conditions in the United States, the structure of corporate capitalism and the bureaucratization of society, make it possible to speak of a “national” system of education, not in the sense that directives come from a central locus of power, but in the sense that the values that structure the life of a community and the decisions of the school board are widely shared throughout the country. Homogeneity is also encouraged through textbook adoption policies. Textbook publishing companies prepare textbooks with carefully selected content to make them acceptable to a wide range of communities. Even though school boards have the freedom to select the books they need, their choices are rather limited because of the little variation existing among textbooks. For the politics of textbook publishing see, Apple (1986).
its traditional locus in the experienced, wise, members of the community, to those who would promise "a quick fix" to all problems. The new brand of school reformer concerned with efficiency shared the passion of the nineteenth-century reformer for making schools a means of attacking social ills, but there was a significant change in values, as Tyack observes: "Whereas the educational evangelists of the mid-nineteenth century aroused the citizenry against evils," the new school reformers "talked increasingly of problems to be solved by experts" (Tyack 1982:106-7). In a related statement in his ground-breaking study Education and the Cult of Efficiency, Raymond Callahan noted that:

All through the nineteenth century leading administrators such as Horace Mann, Henry Barnard, and William T. Harris had conceived of themselves as scholars and statesmen and, in professional terms, the equal of the lawyer or the clergyman. After 1900, especially after 1910, they tended to identify themselves with the successful business executive (Callahan 1962:7-8).

The American school had gone a long way from the one room schoolhouse to the expanding school system that was asked to meet the needs of the twentieth century. The forces entrusted with its organization, the new breed of professional educators, were increasingly conceiving it as an instrument of social control. None put it more accurately than sociologist Edward A. Ross in his
definition of education: "[to educate is] to collect little plastic lumps of human dough from private households and shape them on the social kneadingboard" (Ross 1906:168).

Humanists vs. Technocrats: The Struggle over the American Curriculum in the Twentieth Century

In contemplating the needs for knowledge that were emerging in metropolitan America, Herbert Spencer's question, "What knowledge is of most worth?" could not be avoided. And the various ways in which various groups of Americans answered that question and pressed their answers in the affairs of schools, colleges, cultural agencies, workplaces, philanthropic foundations, and government institutions remained at the heart of the politics of education throughout the 20th century.


In his important book The Struggle for the American Curriculum, 1893-1958, Herbert Kliebard identifies four forces that struggled for domination of the American curriculum in the twentieth century: the humanists, the developmentalists, the social efficiency educators, and the social meliorists. Each of these groups had a different answer as to what knowledge was of most worth for American society. Actually, a more basic distinction would be between, the traditionalist camp, where humanists fit, and the progressivist one, which included the other three groups. There are variations of
positions within the traditionalist and progressivist camps, but there are certain basic ideas that all humanists and all progressivists espouse, as we shall see, despite the variations one might observe within each group. Here is how Kliebard describes the humanists:

... the humanists, the guardians of an ancient tradition tied to the power of reason and the finest elements of the western cultural heritage. Although, in later years, the leaders of this interest group remained, for the most part, outside the professional education community, they exerted a powerful influence through their standing in the academic world and among intellectuals generally. To them fell the task of reinterpreting and thereby preserving as best as they could their revered traditions and values in the face of rapid social change (Kliebard 1986:27-28).

To the humanists' desire for stability, order, and certainty, the progressivists juxtaposed a belief in progress and social change. The humanists turned toward the past accomplishments of the humankind for inspiration and guidance, while the progressivists were present- and future-oriented, united in their faith in the ability of individuals to direct social change. However, despite the optimism that bound together progressivists of every persuasion, differences among them ran deeper than a perfunctory classification of all as supporters of progress might suggest. Developmentalists, inspired by Rousseau's naturalistic romanticism, espoused a child-centered education which would free the natural powers within the child to
rise to his/her true potential. Consequently they rejected what they perceived as the restrictive structures of a bureaucratic educational system which limited the freedom of the child to grow on his/her own. On the other hand, social efficiency educators, focused more on the needs of society than the needs of the individual. According to Kliebard,

their priorities lay with creating a coolly efficient, smoothly running society... By applying the standardized techniques of industry to the business of schooling, waste could be eliminated and the curriculum... could be make more directly functional to the adult-life roles that America’s future citizens would occupy. People had to be controlled for their own good, but especially for the good of society as a whole (28).

The social meliorists within the progressivist camp could not disagree more with the social efficiency educators on the issue of adjustment to the needs of society. Although they agreed with them on the need for education to acquire a social dimension as a counterbalance to the excessive indulgence with the needs of the individual, the social meliorists were concerned more with social justice than with social adjustment:

[For the social meliorists] change was not, as the Social Darwinists proclaimed, the inevitable consequence of forces beyond our control; the power to change things for the better lay in our hands and in the social institutions that we create... The answer lay in the power of the schools to create a new social vision (29).
Kliebard has contributed greatly to our understanding of the conflicting claims of the various groups, especially the ones within the progressive tradition in education. One, however, might take issue with his conclusion regarding the power that each group accrued in shaping educational policy. He surmises that,

The twentieth century became the arena where these four versions of what knowledge is of most worth and of the central functions of schooling were presented and argued. No single interest group ever gained absolute supremacy, although general social and economic trends, periodic and fragile alliances between groups, the national mood, and local conditions and personalities affected the ability of these groups to influence school practice as the twentieth century progressed. In the end, what became the American curriculum was not the result of any decisive victory by any of the contending parties, but a loose, largely unarticulated, and not very tidy compromise (29, my emphasis).

Even though the influence of all groups has been felt in the history of twentieth-century American education, the bureaucratic organization of corporate capitalist America could not but favor one particular model of school organization and curriculum development. This was the one that reflects the ideological underpinnings of the social-efficiency group of reformers.

I think that one can reasonably hold that the social-efficiency model was the dominant one with the others challenging it at times but without managing to undermine it completely. From the
progressivist camp, the developmentalists did challenge the social-adjustment ideology of the social efficiency educators by establishing their own experimental schools which allowed their students freedom of expression and existential pursuits. From the child-study movement in the 1920s to the free-school movement of the late 1960s and 1970s to the calls for the de-institutionalization of education by Ivan Illich and his disciples, the philosophy of expressive individualism challenged the utilitarian ideal of the social efficiency educators and in some instances managed to influence traditional beliefs and practices.

Similarly, social meliorism, as expressed in the theory and practice of education advocated by experimentalists like Dewey and reconstructionists like Counts who wanted schools to build a new, just social order, also made its presence felt during the 1930s and the 1960s, both decades of a heightened social consciousness and political activism.

Still, the educational system survived the attacks of those groups, and retained the structural characteristics that were acquired around the turn of the century and were best reflected in the 1918 report of the Commission for the Reorganization of Secondary Education which we will discuss later. Its relative autonomy notwithstanding, which allows for certain variations to accommodate the existence of
alternative philosophies and practices, it has been profoundly influenced by the priorities American culture has set for itself, namely economic advancement and material prosperity. If as Calvin Coolidge had stated "the business of America is business," the school was called upon to prepare individuals that would uphold this belief. And no other group articulated these values better than the social-efficiency educators. Their technocratic, utilitarian conception of education has left its indelible mark upon American education. It was against those technocrats that humanist educators turned against. The humanistic position might not have enjoyed great popularity among the American public--given the anti-intellectualist tradition in American culture--but it accrues some power institutionally within the academic establishment of the Humanities especially in the ivy-league colleges and universities. The humanist group continuously challenged the utilitarianism of the social-efficiency group which they often equated with the progressive movement as a whole. It is ironic that they included Dewey in their attacks against the technocrats, even though he shared many of the
humanists' educational aims against utilitarianism.6

In the remainder of this chapter I will trace the development of the debate between humanists and technocrats in the twentieth-century American curriculum and conclude with some thoughts on the current state of the conflict.

There were disagreements among humanists as to the true meaning of a humanistic education. Irving Babbitt, a representative of a literary humanism subscribed to a narrow classicism, conservative, and elitist; representatives of a philosophic humanism, like Mortimer Adler and Robert Maynard Hutchins, argued for a broader conception of liberal education that aims at the cultivation of rational powers.7

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6 Progressive education is a movement much more complex than its critics make it out to be. Oversimplified, ahistorical accounts of this educational movement do not do justice to its complexity and to the various, oftentimes antithetical, positions progressive educators espoused. Progressive education is usually blamed for every conceivable "evil" that befell upon American education: permissiveness, anti-intellectualism, mediocrity, functional illiteracy, etc. Even professors in the field of educational foundations hold oversimplified views of Deweyan philosophy and progressivism in general. Historian Diane Ravitch is a case in point. In her book The Troubled Crusade (1984), progressivism is reduced to the life-adjustment movement, which became popular in the post-Second World War period. Actually the life-adjustment movement was a direct outcome of the social-efficiency ideology and as such represented the conservative strain within progressivism which simply aimed at social reproduction and not social critique.

7 Bruce Kimball (1986) refers to these two traditions within humanistic education as the oratorical and the philosophical traditions. The oratorical tradition emphasized the dissemination and acquisition of venerable traditions and ideas as true knowledge; the philosophical tradition, more open-ended, emphasized the cultivation of the critical faculties that would enable the student to engage in the search for truth.
Nevertheless, the two camps within humanism were united in their belief that education should seek eternal verities in tradition, that human nature remains unchanged by time and place, that education is a changeless art and aims at a universe of stability and eternal truths (Karier 1986).

Philosophical humanism's major impact on the curriculum was felt in 1892 when the National Education Association's Committee of Ten, with Charles Eliot the President of Harvard as Chairman, was formed to propose a secondary education curriculum that would meet college entrance requirements (Kliebard 1986:9-12). The Committee's report presented a program of a liberal education, which, however, took into consideration the changing realities of American society by allowing election of programs for college preparation that did not require the study of the Classics (Karier 1986:74).  

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8 It is ironic that Charles Eliot, a humanist, opened the way to the decline of classical education in the secondary school curriculum. He is also credited with introducing utilitarianism in higher education by instituting the elective system at Harvard. He defended his policies by saying that all disciplines were of equal value. In his inaugural address as President of Harvard in 1869, Eliot stressed that "this university recognises no real antagonism between literature and science, and consents to no such narrow alternatives as mathematics or classics, science or metaphysics. We would have them all, and at their best" (Qtd in Cremin 1988:379). We see here an expansion of the older humanistic ideal so that it includes the sciences together with the humanities. His policies suggested that a humanistic education can have instrumentalist value and is not solely geared to a disinterested pursuit of learning for its own sake.
In the twentieth century no one articulated the humanistic educational ideal better than Robert M. Hutchins who from the 1930s and on argued tirelessly for the restoration to the school curriculum, especially in higher education, of a general education rooted in the basic disciplines of grammar, rhetoric, logic, and mathematics and above all in the careful study of the great books of the Western world. Hutchins, and his best known disciple Mortimer Adler, posited an educational ideal that emphasizes the universality of human experience and knowledge. Hutchins's views were summarized in his *Higher Learning in America* in which he laments the coming of an "anti-intellectual university." The following much quoted excerpt is one of the best articulations of the humanistic ideal:

One purpose of education is to draw out the elements of our common human nature. These elements are the same in any time or place. The notion of educating a man to live in any particular time or place, to adjust him to any particular environment, is therefore foreign to a true conception of education. Education implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge. Knowledge is truth. The truth is everywhere the same. Hence education should be everywhere the same (Hutchins 1936:66).

Hutchins argued against empiricism which, "having taken the place of thought as the basis of research, took its place, too, as the basis of
education. It led by easy stages to vocationalism" (26).

Indeed, vocationalism had already entrenched itself in the educational system which since the turn of the century began to respond to the needs of the corporate society. The professional educators in charge of educational policy and planning could not but be further removed from the humanist academic. They were the social-efficiency educators, or as Tyack and Hansot call them "the administrative progressives" (1982). They adopted a managerial, business style in running education. The types of changes introduced by them in the educational system are enumerated in the following list; they suggest the modern American school as it survives to this day:

- development of clear line and staff organization;
- reorganization of traditional uniform elementary and secondary schools into differentiated institutions, including junior high schools, that treated individuals and groups according to abilities and needs;
- creation of special classes for the "backward, delinquent, physically handicapped and the like," vocational tracks, and instruction in subjects like health and physical education;
- professionalization of the occupations of teaching and administration by upgraded standards of education, certification, tenure, specialization of function and supervision;
- standardization of methods of 'pupil accounting' and enforcement of attendance;
- introduction of 'sound business administration' in budgeting, plant planning and maintenance, and finance.

(Tyack 1982:153)
The new educational ethos revolved around the "cult of efficiency" (Callahan 1962). The metaphor of the school as factory became fully entrenched in the beginning of this century under the influence of Frederick Taylor's scientific management techniques and the language used to describe the workplace was applied to the classroom. The administrative progressives (planners) were concerned with arranging the conditions of learning in the classroom in such a way that the teachers (managers) supervised the work of students (laborers) who through the use of proper materials (tools) achieved learning (product, output).9

In a milieu structured on the above principles the intrinsic value of learning gives way to learning that can be measurable and has market value. This leads to regarding some subjects as more worthwhile than others. As Kliebard stated,

Humanistic subjects, to take one example, were not exactly delegitimized; but their standing vis a vis the frankly occupationally oriented subjects in the curriculum waned significantly. Even subjects commonly associated with the academic curriculum, such as mathematics and science, became sanctioned not as important ways of knowing or as invaluable repositories of knowledge but as indispensable vehicles to achieving certain high-status

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9 For a detailed look at the influence of scientific management techniques in American education see, Callahan (1962:19-46,54-64).
occupations (Kliebard 1990:25).

That mainstream American education gave priority to the smooth integration of the student body into society and not to the promotion of intellectual culture was manifested in the 1918 report of the Commission for the Reorganization of Secondary Education, known as "the Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education." According to the report, the main objectives of education should be to make the students competent in the following seven areas: health, command of fundamental processes, worthy homemembership, vocation, citizenship, worthy use of leisure, and formation of an ethical character (Spring 1986:202-203; Kliebard 1986:113-115). The shift of priorities from the Committee of Ten Report of 1892 to the 1918 report is telling. From the uniformity of study in secondary school proposed in 1892 we have moved to the specialized and differentiated curriculum of the comprehensive high school.

In the years that followed the technocratic model of schooling was further consolidated. Arthur Wirth has summarized the components of the technocratic ideology of schooling as follows:

It tends to assume that only observable behavior is real, that anything real must be measurable, that learning consists of mastery of discrete components, and that the

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10 Humanistic educators often find themselves in the position of having to justify the courses they propose in the curriculum in terms of their future usefulness in getting the students a job. Mortimer Adler does exactly this in his Paideia Proposal (1982) when he states that his program of study will allow his students to "make a living" in addition to "living well."
good person is operationally defined by scoring well on expert-designed tests. It is the competitive achievement model designed to help winners get ahead vocationally and to reinforce the attitude that in this world it is each person for her/himself (1983:13).

Interestingly, individual educational achievement at some point was tied to the collective goal of defending the nation. Following the launching of the Sputnik by the Soviets in 1957, American education came under attack, as schools were blamed for the failure of the nation to compete with the Soviets in the technological war. Measures were taken to insure that schools intensified instruction in the area of sciences. Notice the language of the National Defense Education Act that Congress passed in 1958:

The Congress hereby finds and declares that the security of the Nation requires the fullest development of the mental resources and technical skills of its young men and women. The present emergency demands that additional and more adequate educational opportunities be made available. The defense of this Nation depends upon the mastery of modern techniques developed from complex scientific principles (Qtd. in Kliebard 1986:266)."
The obsession with achievement and measurable results reached an all-time high. The educational climate was ripe for the production and implementation of a number of instructional devices, from teaching machines to prepackaged curriculum materials, with all details for their use included in the "instructor's guide." Teacher-proof curricula were proposed preventing teachers from tampering with their content. The teacher's obligation was simply to deliver the material to the students.

The emergence of a group of experts outside the schools and the development of curricula by them for use by classroom teachers had a profound effect on the teacher's role. The notion of "deskilling" of teachers has been used in educational literature to denote the separation of the conception from the execution of a task (Apple 1982). Teachers become managers whose role is to process information prepared for them by outside experts. The roots of "deskilling" can clearly be traced to the Taylorist scientific management approach which had enchanted education administrators earlier in the century.

In recent times the fascination with technology in the classroom overshadowed critical evaluations of the role of technology in
shaping values (Taylor and Johnsen 1988). Most of the reform proposals in the 1980s and 1990s continue to subscribe to the technocratic rationale in so far as they view education primarily as a weapon in the battle with foreign competitors in the international markets (National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983).

**Concluding Remarks: The Current Debate Over the Curriculum**

American education has come a long way from the one-room schoolhouse to the "shopping mall" school. However, the seeds that led to the creation of the modern day diversified curriculum which prepares youngsters for adjustment to the needs of society were sown very early in the history of American education. From the Franklin Academy in the 1770s, to the common schools and Land Grant Colleges of the 19th century, to the Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education in 1918, to the Needs Curriculum of the 1930s, to life-adjustment education in the 1940s, to programmed instruction in the 1950s, to tracking, vocationalism, and career education, American education has been the reflection of a society obsessed

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12 I am indebted to my colleagues Jane Johnsen and William Taylor, who have written extensively about instructional technology from a critical perspective, for pointing out to me that, even though programmed instruction has lost momentum over the years, the conception of curriculum that is objectives driven and prespecified is still in place. Even though various fads regarding instruction come and go--teaching machines for instance--what remains are the basic assumptions about the nature of learning (a process that results in the acquisition of a measurable product), and the nature of knowledge (an objectified reality existing outside the learner).
with material success, results, individual achievement, and immediate gratification of needs and desires. In Michael Katz's words,

In both their strengths and their limits, school systems, with their emphasis on equal access and unequal rewards, their fictive meritocracy, and their bureaucratic organization of experience, became miniature versions of America's social and political order (Katz 1987:23).

This is not to suggest that schools should be treated as "canned food." Everything that goes into them, does not necessarily come out looking the same. Directives from the outside, from the industry, the government, educational specialists, are not always implemented as intended and the results they produce when implemented might not be the ones anticipated. This is because they have to go through the medium of the classroom, where teachers and students test them, debate them, reject them, or adopt them. We might be a long way from Dewey's vision of "society as a function of education" instead of "education as a function of society," but still educational institutions retain a relative autonomy that allows them to negotiate the conditions of their existence.

American education despite the pressures to conform to technological imperatives, keeps the debate open as to the whys, the hows, and what of schooling. All the current debates over the
curriculum—centered on the issues of the canon and multiculturalism—still address the same question “What Knowledge Is Of Most Worth?” Most answers continue to fall into the same two categories: humanistic vs. technocratic, and sometimes a compromise between the two. The argument for a humanistic education is articulated either as the uncompromising, aristocratic position of Allan Bloom (1987), or the egalitarian humanistic ideal of Mortimer Adler (1982), and William Bennett. Bennett, as an enforcer of public policy, is also interested in the adjustment function of education, so he joins Diane Ravitch and E. D. Hirsch (1987) who argue for the functional role of a general, humanistic education for the formation of a homogeneous public. In the latter case the boundaries between the humanist and the technocrat are not clearly delineated in so far as the goal of both seems to be adjustment to a social norm. Is it so because the humanistic ideal, despite claims to a disinterested pursuit of knowledge, is interested in the reproduction of a social order as much as the technocratic one? To answer this question we have to examine the underlying philosophical assumptions of both ideals in the following chapter.
CHAPTER IV

THE PANOPTICISM OF HUMANISTIC AND TECHNOCRATIC IDEOLOGIES OF EDUCATION

The Myth of the "Two Cultures"

The conflict between a humanistic and a technocratic education is often discussed in terms of the distinction made by C. P. Snow in his lecture on the "two cultures" (Snow 1965). Snow's distinction between the "literary intellectuals" and the "scientists," translated into educational terms, opposes a humanistic to a technocratic/utilitarian education. The former advocates an education of intrinsic value which satisfies the desire to know with no practical purpose; the latter promotes the acquisition of useful knowledge that enables individuals to not only understand the world but control it as well.

Snow was continuing the debate that had erupted at the end of the nineteenth century between Matthew Arnold and Thomas Huxley, the former defending the supremacy of literary studies over
Huxley's staunch support of a scientific curriculum (Kimball 1986: 171-173).¹

The advocates of a humanistic education follow Kant's advice for the "disinterested exercise of reason" and propose an education that aims at capturing the timeless essences of beauty, goodness, and justice. According to this view the purpose of education is to conserve those timeless truths which are embodied in culture as a unifying element of a nation. Education thus provides cultural continuity and stability in a community which promotes the "common good" of its members and safeguards the ideals of the culture against internal and external threats. In this type of community individual natures dissolve into a whole which represents a higher, more complete order, a close-knit organic unit (the Gemeinschaft).²

For the technocrat/positivist the ideal of the educated person is not the philosopher contemplating first principles but the engineer unlocking the mysteries of the universe and proceeding to an organization of all available data for the purposes of increasing

¹ In his address "Science and Culture" (Huxley 1964:120-140) Huxley argued that the sciences should be part of a broadly conceived liberal education. Arnold supported that classical texts, "the best which has been thought and said in the world," should form the basis of a liberal education.

² As we saw in previous chapters the aim of Prussian education under Humboldt and Greek education from its inception was precisely to transmit cultural truths with the purpose of uniting the nation.
technological control over the environment. The practical life takes precedence over the theoretical one, and individuals are encouraged to act in pursuit of their self-interest.³

Both discourses, humanistic and technocratic, rely on reason, either substantive or instrumental, as the primary principle which structures our views about the world and our place in it. Reason is conceived by the idealist as the means of grasping a transcendental, metaphysical reality which is the locus of truth; and by the technocrat as the instrument that generates truth which corresponds to an objective reality existing independently from the individual's perceptions.

As far as education is concerned, the humanistic model aims at transmitting to students what is there (the perennial truths of a revered tradition or way of life), whereas the positivistic model aims at allowing students to discover what is there (the objectified reality of codified information about the world).

The two models differ on the kind of knowledge that they consider valuable. For the humanists it is to be derived from the

³ Humanists fear that such individualism destroys the unity of the community because it is unable to sustain a "common good" to which all individual needs and desires must subordinate themselves. Allan Bloom (1987:125) uses the metaphors of "hive" and "herd" to describe the kind of social arrangements that humanist and positivist aspire to. The hive signifies community, roots, interconnection, being part of a whole that is greater than its parts, the herd rests on individualism, fragmentation, indeterminacy, separateness.
Great Books of the Western tradition, whereas for the technocrat from textbooks and how-to manuals. However, in both cases knowledge is something found, not created. In both educational systems we studied, Greek and American, knowledge is something that enters the classroom from the outside. In the words of a proponent of liberal education, “to acquire knowledge is to become aware of experience as structured, organised and made meaningful in some quite specific way, and the varieties of human knowledge constitute the highly developed forms in which man has found this possible” (Hirst:124-125). However, as Walter Feinberg noted “knowledge is presented here as a world already organized into neat and tidy compartments. It is a world as organized, not the world being organized” (Feinberg 1983:109). The world “as being organized” implies an element of unpredictability and constant negotiation of the learner with his or her environment which are absent from a static conception of knowledge as correspondence to an external reality.

Furthermore, humanists and technocrats are united in what John Dewey has identified as a “quest for certainty” (Dewey 1929). Both mind sets are teleological because their goal is to establish order over disorder, certainty over ambivalence, results over process, ends over means. Both envision the structuring of society according to a
hierarchical model which allows a certain social group to acquire power over the rest of the population. The humanistic ideal entrusts the philosopher-kings, the intellectuals, the wise men of the community, with the authority to rule, whereas the technocratic one places its faith in the hands of experts who are equipped with the scientific knowledge, the know-how, to make the right decisions for the rest of society.

Both humanist and technocrat, therefore, have emerged from within the same framework which is none other than the culture of modernity, the logocentric humanistic culture that has shaped the Western world since the 18th century. If one is not prepared to criticize the structure that sustains both, then a critique of the one orientation inevitably ends in the adoption of the other, as in the case of C.P. Snow who opts for the promises of the scientific over the literary disposition.

The study of educational systems is a perfect vehicle for a critique of the claims of humanistic and technocratic ideals. It enables us to see what happens to theoretical constructs when they become institutionalized. When one considers the function of institutions one realizes that there is much more at stake besides a simple choice between a liberal arts curriculum and one in which technical/vocational studies predominate. Despite their differences
in curriculum content and teaching methods, the humanistic and technocratic orientations in education share a common objective. Their aim is to function as "regimes of truth" in their respective settings. The distinction between "pure", "disinterested" knowledge, "idle curiosity," learning as an end in itself, on the one hand, and applied, useful, goal-oriented knowledge on the other, serves as a distraction from their common aim which is the struggle for the control of knowledge.\(^4\) The two represent the "historical struggle between bourgeois moralism (aristocratic aestheticism) and new middle-class postindustrial careerism" (Zavarzadeh and Morton 1987:2).\(^5\)

To examine ways in which humanists and technocrats exercise their power within educational institutions we need to turn to

\(^4\) The complementarity of the two orientations, humanistic and technocratic, was suggested in a recent article on the merits of two prestigious institutions of higher learning, Harvard and MIT. A former MIT provost was quoted as saying, "MIT is a construction site. Harvard is an art gallery" (Warsh 1991:43). The difference in orientation does not negate the fact that the two institutions are quite similar in the way they approach the production and dissemination of knowledge. They both dwell heavily on the superior knowledge of their students and the status conferred upon them as graduates of two illustrious institutions. The fact that one produces primarily the engineers, and the other the humanist scholars is of lesser significance than the fact that they both wield tremendous power over the control of knowledge.

\(^5\) Notice how this struggle manifests itself in current educational proposals such as the "paideia"-type curricula advocated by philosophical idealists like Mortimer Adler (1982), Allan Bloom (1987), and William Bennett (1984), on the one hand, and the more technologically oriented rationales proposed by the committees and task forces responsible for the "Nation at Risk" report that prescribe utilitarian remedies.
theoretical models that explain the function of the educational apparatus in modern society.

Education as "Panopticism"

The role of educational institutions as mechanisms of control for the purpose of perpetuating the status quo has been studied by many social theorists. Pierre's Bourdieu work on education as social and cultural reproducation (Bourdieu 1977) and Louis Althusser's work on education as the dominant ideological state apparatus (Althusser 1971) have been very influential in educational theory.

Bourdieu's cultural-reproductive model of analysis views schools as sites where power relations are reproduced through the production and distribution of a dominant culture. His work has acknowledged the relative institutional autonomy of schools and has thus departed from the more deterministic Althusserian economic-reproductive model which understands schools only in terms of the role they play in the production of labor power and ignores the more subtle ways through which class control is exercised. Central to Bourdieu's analysis is the notion of "cultural capital" which refers to the different sets of linguistic and cultural competencies that individuals carry depending on their social status. Schools construct a hegemonic curriculum in order to transmit the knowledge which
embodies the cultural capital of the middle and upper classes and devalues the cultural capital of other less powerful classes.⁶

However, Bourdieu has been criticized by radical educational theorists who argue from the perspective of theories of resistance (Giroux and Aronowitz 1985) that there is very little in his work that suggests how educational institutions might be resisted and/or transformed. It seems that Bourdie’s theory of social control is guided almost exclusively by the logic of domination. Like Althusser’s Marxist/structuralist analysis of the state apparatus, Bourdieu’s analysis rests on a one-dimensional conception of power. Power is imposed upon individuals by the all-powerful government, state, etc.

I prefer Michel Foucault’s analysis of institutions because Foucault’s notion of ‘micro-powers’ avoids the deterministic explanatory model offered by Bourdieu. For Foucault

\[\ldots\] power is not exercised simply as an obligation on those who ‘do not have it’; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them. This means that these relations go right down into the depths of society, that they are not localized in the relations between the state and its citizens or on the frontier between classes and that they do not merely reproduce, at the level of individuals, bodies, gestures, and behaviour, the general form of law or

⁶For a detailed analysis of various radical theories of schooling, see Giroux and Aronowitz (1985).
government (1977a:27).

To explain how power is exercised within institutions Foucault uses the concept of "Panopticism." In his *Discipline and Punish* (1977a) Foucault describes the Enlightenment's institutionalization of supervisory mechanisms over groups of the population—the mentally ill, prisoners, students—by using as a conceptual tool Jeremy Bentham's architectural plan called "Panopticon." The Panopticon, according to his creator, was designed as a building in which individuals were to be observed at all times by someone located at a central observation-point. For Foucault this architectural plan is a metaphor for the uninhibited gaze of the Enlightenment over the individual. It represents a fine construct of reason, the culmination of man's effort to bring the social environment under his control. Foucault observed in his examination of architectural plans of the eighteenth century:

the whole problem of the visibility of bodies, individuals and things, under a system of centralised observation, was one of their most constant directing principles (1980:146).  

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7 From a pedagogical point of view I find Foucault's notion of "panopticism" very interesting as an interpretive device. It does not only comment on what kind of knowledge is transmitted through the educational system, but also what the arrangement of physical space does to the body as a whole. It forces one to think not only in terms of what happens to the minds of students but to their whole being.
Within this system disciplinary mechanisms find their ideal form in the practice of the examination: "The superimposition of the power relations and knowledge relations assumes in the examination all its visible brilliance" (1977a:185). Individuals become objectified in the process:

The examination, surrounded by all its documentary techniques, makes each individual a 'case': a case which at one and the same time constitutes an object for a branch of power. The case is...the individual as he may be described, judged, measured, compared with others, in his very individuality; and it is also the individual who has to be trained or corrected, classified, normalized, excluded, etc. (1977a:191)

A superficial reading of Foucault might suggest that he uses “panopticism” as an example of the excesses of instrumental reasoning and scientism. After all, Bentham was a utilitarian, and his was a calculated plan that befits an empiricist's approach of testing new instruments that increase the effectiveness of social engineering. With the triumph of Enlightenment Modernism and the rule of science and technical rationality, the “panopticon” seems to fit perfectly such an interpretation. However, Foucault sees the panoptic gaze not only as the dream of the scientist but also as the dream of the romantic revolutionary/humanist:

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For an examination of the implications of Foucault's work for educational theory and practice, see Ball (1990).
I would say Bentham was the complement to Rousseau. What in fact was the Rousseauist dream that motivated many of the revolutionaries? It was the dream of a transparent society, visible and legible in each of its parts, the dream of there no longer existing any zones of darkness. . . . Thus Bentham's obsession, the technical idea of the exercise of an 'all-seeing' power, is grafted on to the great Rousseauist theme which is in some sense the lyrical note of the Revolution. The two things combine into a working whole, Rousseau's lyricism and Bentham's obsession (1980:152).

One can find similar motives behind Matthew Arnold's dream of a culture that would allow men to live "in an atmosphere of sweetness and light." The supervisory gaze over the individual is in essence what Matthew Arnold's project in defense of culture and the modern technocrat's project of technical expertise have in common. Similarly, the conflict within educational institutions over which type of curriculum will be introduced, signifies the desire of both humanists and technocrats to impose their "supervisory gaze" over the educational process. And, if the technocrat's quest for power is more readily visible, the humanist's secret desire for a similar pursuit should be uncovered. As William Spanos has argued,

Arnold's humanistic educational project does not represent an alternative to scientific positivism. It constitutes, rather, a replication on a different register of the Enlightenment's transformation of metaphysical oversight into a calculative panopticism (Spanos 1985-86:27).
Foucault goes even further by refusing to differentiate between humanistic and technocratic models. He situates them both within the discourse of Humanism which has dominated Western civilization. He claims that modern educational systems, despite increased focus on practical concerns, are primarily dominated by their ties to the past and operate on the basis of deeply-rooted assumptions about knowledge and the nature of man. To turn to Foucault’s own words:

The system is telling you in effect: “If you wish to understand and perceive events in the present, you can only do so through the past, through an understanding—carefully derived from the past— which was specifically developed to clarify the present.” For this reason, we should not be fooled by the modernized educational program, its openness to the real world: it continues to maintain its traditional grounding in “humanism” while emphasizing the quick and efficient mastery of a certain number of techniques, which were neglected in the past. Humanism reinforces social organization and these techniques allow society to progress, but along its own lines (Foucault 1977:220-221).

In order to see how both humanists and technocrats, driven by “the quest for certainty,” establish authoritarian educational models we need to examine their theories and practices separately.
Humanistic Education: The Rule of Culture

The defenders of a humanistic education have always appealed to the need of introducing the young generations to Western cultural traditions which are seen as the depositories of superior values that need to be maintained for the sake of cultural continuity. In the work of many humanist educators from Matthew Arnold, to Allan Bloom, to William Bennett (1984) and Lynne Cheney (1988) the individual self has to surrender to the authority of the text where the truths of culture reside.

Even in the work of Michael Oakeshott, one of the ablest defenders of humanistic education, which celebrates the free individual, there is a clear sense that the past weighs heavily on the education of the new generations. The following passage is worth quoting at length because it is a most articulate defense of a liberal education:

As civilized human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of an inquiry about ourselves and the world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation, begun in the primeval forests and extended and made more articulate in the course of centuries. . . . Conversation is not an enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit, a contest where winner gets a prize, nor is it an activity of exegesis; it is an unrehearsed intellectual adventure. . . . Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and partnership of this conversation in which we learn to recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in which we acquire the
intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation. And it is this conversation which, in the end, gives place and character to every human activity and utterance (Oakeshott 1962:198-199).

Obviously, the type of conversation that Oakeshott proposes is a conversation with tradition, a tradition which ultimately shapes and directs this conversation.⁹

Even though humanist intellectuals extol cultural truths their conception of culture curiously ignores institutional realities which structure the lives of individuals. Teachers and students who inhabit their universe are disembodied entities, free agents, moral exemplars, ideal types that exist outside institutional frameworks.

Oftentimes this detachment is deliberate. Michael Oakeshott for

⁹ Given the heavy influence of tradition that informs the proposals of those favoring a liberal education, I think it is a mistake to equate Oakeshott’s idea of learning as conversation with Richard Rorty’s conception of philosophy as conversation. Oakeshott, along with Mortimer Adler, Robert Hutchins, and Allan Bloom, extols the Socratic dialogical method which enables learners to communicate with the wisdom of the past, but not for an instance should we assume that the parties in this conversation yield equal power in defining the rules that this conversation is subjected to. It is clear that there is an ultimate truth, a superior standard which is sought independently of the desires and actions of the participants in the conversation. Not so in Rorty’s philosophy, which rooted as it is in the American pragmatic philosophical tradition, avoids any appeal to a superior tradition determining the conversation, but instead leaves it up to those participating in it to construct their own meanings. The present moment in history has for Rorty its own autonomous existence and justification, whereas for the humanists the past definitely controls the conversation either in the form of great thinkers, great books, or great civilizations. The reverence for tradition is similarly exhibited by Allan Bloom in the following statement: “...a liberal education means reading certain generally recognized classic texts, just reading them— not forcing them into categories we make up, not treating them as historical products, but trying to read them as their authors wished them to be read” (Bloom 1987:344)
example has nothing but contempt for modern institutions of learning. He admonishes students to devote themselves to life-long learning, to pursue it for its own sake, and avoid being swayed by the lure of the modern university which is nothing but a business enterprise. His critique of the modern technocratic education is indeed powerful (Oakeshott 1989). He is a Nietzschean, a romantic who cannot bear the vulgarization of contemporary education and the substitution of "socialization" for true learning. He chooses to retreat and not dirty his hands in practical affairs. He becomes an "ivory tower intellectual," morally correct but completely removed from the world.

A telling connection was established between Foucault's panopticism and Oakeshott's project in a review which defended Oakeshott's function as an "ivory tower" intellectual:

Who would not rather live in the shadow of an ivory tower than in the shadow of the London British Telecom tower? More important still, any tower, ivory or not, is a point of vantage. From a tower one can not only see what is going on in the street below, more clearly than anyone can who is pushing a way through that crowd.

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11 It becomes clearer to me why humanists have railed against Dewey's pragmatism. They saw Dewey as having surrendered to the vulgarity of the real world, to the dictates of institutional norms. Of course, Dewey, like Foucault, had no illusions that individuals can escape institutional boundaries. He was more concerned with what people can do within and with them instead of retreating from them and go about their business of pure contemplation.
one can also look far afield—in the Ivory Tower, as distinct from ordinary towers, in time as well as space (my emphasis) (Passmore 1989:568).

However, as a reply to the humanists' appeal for "disinterested inquiry," many critics have persistently shown that a distinction between 'disinterested' research, or knowledge for its own sake, and applied knowledge, or knowledge with a practical purpose, is no longer possible. Discussing the modern role of the university Jacques Derrida claims that "one can no longer distinguish between technology on the one hand and theory, science and rationality on the other" (Derrida 1983:12). The distinction Kant established in the Conflict of the Faculties between the "architectonic" and the "technical", between pure rational knowledge and useful knowledge, does not make much sense in the advanced technological societies where the military-industrial establishment "programs, orients, orders, and finances, directly or indirectly, through the State or otherwise, the front-line research that is apparently the least "end-oriented" of all" (13). What is produced in any field can always be used.

For example, Matthew Arnold's educational project was far from being a "disinterested exercise of reason" in the pursuit of knowledge. William Spanos has admirably documented Arnold's
panoptic project centered on the elevation of the State as the
controlling mechanism of individual will, as the "true centre of light
and authority" (Spanos 1985-86:23). Burton Bledstein observed a
similar connection in the German intellectual's relationship to the
state, another instance of the "ivory tower" professor:

In theory, the cultural elite in Germany won a victory
for free higher learning. In practice, worldly obedience
was bred into patrician professors who belonged to the
civil-service bureaucracy. In the 1870s, "academic
freedom" in Germany realistically meant the absolute
right of a privileged estate to go about its abstract work
without interference from outside the bureaucracy.
Freedom did not include the right of a scholar to speak
out as an advocate on controversial issues of public
policy. For the German, freedom in the realm of the
spiritual rested on submission in the realm of the
political, a submission that inevitably drained the
original spiritual task of its vitality. (Bledstein 1978:316-17).

This is an all familiar picture. We witnessed it in the institutionaliz-
ation of Bildung, in Heidegger's rectorship address, and in the silence
of Greek professors (most of them in the humanities) during the

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12 Spanos's is the most exhaustive critique of humanistic education to date. He has written on all major representatives of humanistic education (Matthew Arnold, Irving Babbitt, I.A. Richards, Walter Jackson Bate). He has painstakingly documented the political aims of the humanistic educational ideal, namely its coercive and disciplinary nature centered on the supervisory gaze of tradition as embodied in the State (1982,1984, 1985-86). His work has been admirable, but I think it has to be accompanied by a critique of the technocratic model as well, because the two are "affiliated supplements" as he states (1985-86:14). Both have to be critiqued simultaneously especially given the technocratic model's pervasive influence on American education and its exportation to other countries around the world. Greece has suffered the consequences of the humanistic panopticism long enough, but it should be warned that in the name of modernization, progress, and economic development it is about to replace it with a technocratic one.
military dictatorship of 1967-74. The humanistic educational ideal, contrary to claims of an intrinsic value, can be equally manipulative and subservient to the state as the technocratic one.

Technocratic Education: The Rule of Technical Rationality

Since the triumph of Enlightenment Modernism Western societies have been held captive by technical rationality. Lionel Rubinoff defines technical or functional rationality as

the rationality of instrumental reasoning which is concerned exclusively with homogenizing reality by calculating the most efficient organization of means for the realization of goals and the solution of problems (Rubinoff:30).

Rubinoff suggests that concern with employment of efficient means displaces any meaningful discussion about the desirability of ends in view, and therefore minimizes the importance of questions of value for our acting upon the world. Technical rationality has allowed modern man to commit an act of hubris by declaring: "whatever is possible, is thereby desirable." To illustrate our dependence on technical rationality, Rubinoff uses the mythological figures of Prometheus and Faust. Prometheus, the mythical hero, stole fire from the gods and gave mankind the gift of knowledge. Etymologically, "Prometheus" is derived from the verb "to be
thoughtful," "wise," which points to an appropriate use of the power of knowledge. Promethean use of knowledge is the thoughtful employment of the power people possess toward a greater understanding and mastery of nature. Such mastery, however, should be mediated by a commitment to making wise choices regarding the relationship between man and the world. In Heidegger's words "not dominance, but participation in the Being of things" should be the goal of every scientific endeavor. Unfortunately, according to Rubinoff, Western man has substituted a Faustian approach for a Promethean one. The myth of Faust symbolizes the use of knowledge by man for personal self-interest and power, a thoughtless use of knowledge. Such an approach reduces all human concerns to technical questions and is therefore preoccupied with questions of whether man can do things in the world, and not whether he ought to do them. Human beings lose any sense of limits that can be applied to their relationship with nature and are taken by the possibilities open to the power of their mind.

Some of the beliefs that emanate from this framework are a cult of efficiency, a belief that what men create is under their firm control, the notion that technologies are neutral, and a view of the world as a huge puzzle consisting of problems awaiting solutions. What we have described is a positivistic, deterministic view of the
world.

In a similar analysis, Cornelius Castoriades has given a powerful account of western society's fascination with the ideas of "development" and "progress" which he sees resulting from the victory of a new "idea," the idea that the unlimited growth of production and of productive forces is in fact the central objective of human existence. . . To it correspond new attitudes, values, and norms, a new social definition of reality and of being, of what counts and what does not count. In a nutshell, henceforth what counts is whatever can be counted (Castoriades 1991:184).

The influence of technical rationality on the school curriculum should not be underestimated. Isn't Castoriades's statement that "what counts is whatever can be counted" an everyday reality in schools? Measurement, ability tracking, test scores as a measure of learning. 13 Its influence is also felt in the growing tendency of treating schools, teachers, and students, as cogs in a machine geared toward greater productivity and results. The language we use to

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13 E.D. Hirsch seems to have taken this motto at heart when he compiled his endless list of information that "everyone needs to know" in order to be considered culturally literate. The more items on it the better. Hirsch's difference from Bloom is that Bloom wants the few worthy of a liberal education to read the Great books, while Hirsch wants everybody to know their titles. As Robert Scholes has remarked: "Hirsch will make sure that everyone knows what the classics are and respects them, while Bloom will see to it that an elite can be defined by actually knowing these classics" (Scholes 1988:324). As I alluded in Chapter Three Hirsch's proposal is a curious mixture of humanistic and technocratic ideals. Hirsch retains one of the humanist's aims, the creation of a common culture, keeps much of the humanist's curriculum content (dissemination of the western tradition) but the overall project is undertaken in the interest of adjusting students to the realities of American society. See, Herrnstein-Smith (1990).
refer to teaching is laden with those significations: there is talk about “classroom management,” “information processing,” “expert teachers,” competencies, accountability and the like.

The recent call for the professionalization of teaching is consistent with the ideology of technical rationality. Talk about “empowerment” might be appealing to teachers who for a long time now have been deprived of the public’s respect. Yet the notion of “expert teachers” implies a conception of knowledge as the privilege of a select few. The models held up for teachers to emulate, if they are to become respected as professionals, are doctors and lawyers. However, the medical and legal professions have come under a great deal of criticism precisely because they operate on the basis of a rationale that allows them to wield power over patients, clients, people who rely on their services for their well-being. If “empowerment” simply means having power over others, then educators should question the implications of this new agenda for schooling.14

However, there is another conception of empowerment that treats power as shared, diffused through the educative process, power seen in a positive sense. Foucault’s analysis of “power” seems to be relevant here also. He sees power not as an imposition, but as a strategy:

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14For an insightful analysis of the concept of expertise in its educational implications, see Welker (1991).
... one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess; that one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess; that one should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory. In short this power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the 'privilege,' acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions (Foucault 1977a:26).

Such a definition allows people to see their world and their classroom as an intricate web of relations rather than a hierarchical structure in which some plan and others merely execute the work.

Conclusions: Can a Liberal Arts Education Be Liberating?

Democracy cannot flourish where the chief influences in selecting subject matter of instruction are utilitarian ends narrowly conceived for the masses, and, for the higher education of the few, the traditions of a specialized cultivated class.

John Dewey, Democracy and Education (1916)

Many scholars wish to retrieve a lost, subversive past of humanistic education and the lost role of the humanist scholar as a
critical intellectual. For this to happen, the conception of humanistic education as disinterested pursuit of knowledge separate from a useful education needs to be challenged. Dewey criticized the traditional conception of a liberal arts education according to which certain subjects are inherently liberal as opposed to other subjects (scientific and technological) that are inherently illiberal. He proposed instead a definition of liberal studies as the studies that have a liberating effect (Dewey 1960). This definition undermines the attempt

...to establish a hierarchy of values among studies. It is futile to attempt to arrange them in an order, beginning with one having least worth and going on to that of maximum value. In so far as any study has a unique or irreplaceable function in experience, in so far as it marks a characteristic enrichment in life, its worth is intrinsic and incomparable. Since education is not a means to living, but is identical with the operation of living a life which is fruitful and inherently significant, the only ultimate value which can be set up is just the process of living itself (1916:239-240).

Dewey’s contention that there is no hierarchy of values among studies has important implications for curriculum planning.

One could not imagine a better rationale for the undermining of the

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Kimball (1986) has alluded to two traditions within liberal education: the tradition of philosophers which was imbued with a spirit of critical skepticism and the tradition of the orators whose aim was to impart the truth as codified in texts and tradition. William Spanos also makes a similar distinction between the Greek paideia and the Roman Humanitas and claims that all the Western humanistic tradition was based on the Roman concept whose aims were panoptic from the start (Spanos 1985-86).
canon and the support of a curriculum based on multiculturalism.16

Henry Giroux summed up the role of a redefined liberal arts education which cancels the panoptic aims of both humanistic and technocratic rationales:

The liberal arts cannot be defended either as a self-contained discourse legitimating the humanistic goal of broadly improving the so-called "life of the mind" or as a rigorous science that can lead students to the indubitable truths. Similarly, it is insufficient to defend the liberal arts by rejecting technocratic education as a model of learning. All of these positions share the failure of abstracting the liberal arts from the intense problems and issues of public life . . . the liberal arts should be defended in the interest of creating critical rather than "good" citizens (Giroux 1990:121).17

16 Once I interviewed a Professor of Education at Ohio State for an oral history project about her remembrances and experiences as a teacher at the University School, the experimental progressive school that operated at OSU between 1932 and 1968. To my question about curricular decisions at the school she gave me an interesting definition of curriculum: "The curriculum was what you came out with at the end of the year." This open-ended approach to the construction of knowledge transcends both humanistic and technocratic educational models with their fixed ends and prespecified behaviors.

17 For an excellent collection of articles which discuss the critical intervention of the Humanities in the public sphere, see October (1990).
TOWARD A PRAGMATIC/ACTIVIST EDUCATIONAL POSITION

Introduction: From Critique to Praxis

Even though a critique of the humanistic and technocratic educational models, which have dominated the educational systems of Greece and the United States respectively, is essential in order to unveil the totalizing philosophies that sustain them, it is nevertheless insufficient unless it suggests possible alternatives to these models. The purpose of this dissertation has been so far to present and subject to scrutiny two very powerful philosophies that have dominated modern educational systems. In this respect, Foucault's analysis of the nature of modern institutions and their role in shaping the individual has been extremely useful in interpreting the function of education in modern society. Nietzsche's ideas also, in the Future of Educational Institutions, constitute an important critique of the bureaucratic organization of schooling. However, for those of us who are interested in the potential of educational institutions to
resist the official role assigned to them by the dominant forces in Greek and American culture. Nietzsche's and Foucault's remedies to the situation leave much to be desired. Nietzsche's lack of faith in the ordinary person results in the support of an elitist, exclusive educational system for the select few. Foucault offers the vague suggestion that any institution can be resisted when individuals organize and apply some pressure to it. Certainly, he is not the nihilistic, pessimistic intellectual whose unwillingness to conceive of an acting, purposive human agent deprives his project of any liberatory potential. There are instances where he clearly states that, even though individuals are defined by institutional structures, they are certainly not determined by them. In the following statement, for example, he calls for "an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them" (Foucault 1984:50). But still Foucault is primarily a diagnostician and not interested in prescriptions.

So, for suggestions on how to transcend the boundaries of elitist, oppressive, and exclusive educational theories, we should identify work by individuals or groups both in the theory and practice of education that offer alternatives to the two models we have
described. In doing this, I wish to suggest that the practicality of theory and the theoriticization of practice are indeed possible. In modern cultures the two—theory and practice—are considered not only separate but contradictory, a result of the dualistic thinking characteristic of the modern age. This has been observed in both contexts we examined. In Greece intellectual culture and theoretical studies have traditionally been privileged over practical pursuits. In the United States, on the other hand, a rampant anti-intellectualism equates 'thinking' with idleness and softness, and 'doing' with effectiveness and virility.

Educational theory and practice sometimes appear to be separate as well, the former taking place in colleges of education with professors writing papers about schooling for professional journals that elementary and secondary teachers never read, the latter in the classrooms where teachers "do," by assigning tests and disciplining the students. This distinction at first sight seems absolute, largely due to the professionalization of the academy and the rise of expertise and division of labor between those who plan and those who execute the work. However, a closer look shows that it is hard to separate the theory from the practice of education. In the case of the ivory tower professor, we have already examined how ideas do have consequences and how the research, presumably pure and
uncontaminated by practical concerns, is inevitably going to be used in one way or another. Similarly, in the case of the classroom teacher, the daily lesson plan is not merely a series of acts patched together to conform to the official curriculum, but is grounded in theories about how children learn and what the purpose of schooling should be. Given this inextricable connection between theory and practice, it might be helpful to trace work that demonstrates this unity and shows that the pedagogical encounter is the perfect instance where the two come together in unison. In Foucault's work the unity is implied when he suggests that the purpose of his critique of complex institutions, such as schools, is to lead people toward negotiating the limits that these institutions place upon individuals and eventually taking an active part in altering them and the ideology that sustains them.¹

¹The activist strain in Foucault's work is apparent in various discussions and interviews where he has talked about interventions in prisons, in the asylum, and in the educational system. See especially, "On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists" (1980), and "Revolutionary Action: 'Until Now'" (1977).
Freire whose work has deeply influenced the field of critical pedagogy. I will also investigate the current state and development of critical pedagogy. Finally, I will also present various statements by teachers, students and citizens concerned about schooling, both in Greece and the United States, that are close to Dewey's and Freire's position.

**John Dewey and Paulo Freire: Education as Process**

John Dewey (1859-1952), American philosopher and educator, and Paulo Freire (1921-), Brazilian philosopher and educator, are the two theorists who best articulated an educational position that presents a clear alternative to humanistic and technocratic models. Their work is significant for education because it achieved the blending of theory and practice that much of contemporary educational philosophy lacks. Even though both were deeply committed to the world of ideas and philosophical pursuits, they were less than satisfied with armchair theorizing. As Dewey stated, "philosophy is the theory of education as a deliberately conducted practice" (Dewey 1916:332). Both tested their educational theories, Dewey at his Laboratory School in the University of Chicago (1894-1904), Freire at his literacy campaigns in South America in the 1960s
and 1970s.²

The educational projects of both men made explicit the connection between education and a democratic politics. For Dewey the school community was to function as a model democratic community within which the students engaged in cooperative activities (Dewey 1990). Similarly, Freire's "culture circles," where illiterate peasants learned how to read and write, became laboratories of democracy that allowed the participants to imagine the possibility of transforming their world (Freire 1970;1973).

Dewey's concept of experience, and Freire's notions of dialogical communication and praxis that explain the relationship between the individual and the world, separate their philosophy from the epistemological foundationalism of idealism and empiricism. Dewey and Freire conceive of the individual as situated within the world and in constant exchange with it. Dewey's definition of 'experience' in the following passage points to the individual/world interconnectedness:

> When we experience something we act upon it; then we suffer or undergo the consequences. We do something

²A detailed look at Dewey's and Freire's work is not possible here. There is a huge bibliography of their own work and others' work about them, especially about Dewey who was one of the most prolific American writers and also the subject of numerous writings that held him responsible for everything, good and bad, that happened in twentieth-century American education. If one had to refer to one representative writing by each thinker which captures the essence of their philosophy, those would be Dewey's Democracy and Education (1916) and Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970).
to the thing and then it does something to us in return: such is the peculiar combination. Experience as trying involves change, but change is meaningless transition unless it is consciously connected with the return wave of consequences which flow with it. When an activity is continued into the undergoing of consequences, when the change made by action is reflected back into a change made in us, the mere flux is loaded with significance. We learn something (Dewey 1916:139).

Freire, also, defines 'praxis' as "the action and reflection of men upon the world in order to transform it" (Freire 1970:66), and extols the importance of open-ended dialogue between individuals and their world:

Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry men pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other (58).

These concepts cancel the dualistic thinking which distinguishes the subject/individual from the object/world and privileges one pole over the other depending on one's idealist or empiricist position. Instead, they focus on the relationship between individuals and their world and treat the two as inextricably connected and shaped by each other. The individual/subject thus is seen a construct, concrete in his/her historicity, an agent defined by his/her circumstances, but not totally controlled by them since those circumstances are also in the process of being formed as a result of human intervention.
Consequently, the act of learning, and here lies the educational significance of the Deweyan and Freirean epistemology, is not a passive reception or discovery of an objective reality that "lies out there," either in the form of concrete facts or of superior ideas. It is rather an active process of negotiation with a world which is fluid and incoherent, but acquires meaning as a result of human action and yet always remains unfinished and open-ended.

Dewey and Freire imagine the classroom and society at large as settings where conflict is considered a positive element rather than a threat to the learning process. Their admonition that we remain forever experimental suggests an educational position that sees ambiguity and confusion not as obstacles to the learning process but rather as incentives to it.³

The belief in the liberating potential of education which is at the core of Dewey's and Freire's educational philosophy raises the question of whether their ideas are but another example of

³ For specific examples as to how learning through trial and error is not discouraged but rather appreciated as a means of involving actively the learner in his/her education, see the description of progressive schools in Lazarre (1983).
Enlightenment liberalism. I think that Dewey's and Freire's fallibilistic, experimentalist attitude in dealing with social realities avoids the traps of the scientism of Enlightenment Modernism (see Chapter I). However, their celebration of human agency as a transformative force invokes the Enlightenment's faith in the power of human reason to solve social problems in the interests of human liberty and equality. Is theirs a naive faith that does not allow them to take seriously the institutional controls that modern society has imposed upon individuals? To answer this question we need to place their views in the context of contemporary debates on the culture of modernity and the fate of the project of the Enlightenment.

Living in a Decentered World

The moment philosophy supposes it can find a final and comprehensive solution, it ceases to be

Interestingly, critiques of Freire's and Dewey's thought have positioned the two in the philosophical traditions that they both tried to undermine. Freire is placed in the idealist camp and identified as a 'radical humanist' who believes that change in consciousness constitutes change in reality (Gottlieb and La Belle 1990). Along the same lines C. A. Bowers (1984) criticizes Freire and his disciples in the field of critical pedagogy in the United States for forming their views about human nature under the influence of the Western liberal tradition. Bowers claims that they regard individuals as potentially free beings, not bound by tradition and culture, the only prerequisite to their liberation being the loss of false consciousness. He criticizes Freire for romanticizing and oversimplifying the nature of social change. Dewey, on the other hand, has been criticized by revisionist historians for being a positivist, his pragmatic philosophy founded on technical rationality and thus serving as an apology for the status quo. My study and analysis of the work by Dewey, Freire, and the critical pedagogues they inspired, suggests that, even though they all share a faith in some aspects of the liberal tradition, they move beyond a bourgeois liberalism to a radical conception of democratic politics (see following sections in this chapter).
inquiry and becomes either apologetics or propaganda.


For humanists, a way of dealing with the insecurities our postmodern era has bestowed upon us is to retreat to the safety of a world removed from practical concerns. For technocrats the answer lies in predicting what the future has in store in order to plan ahead in an orderly, efficient way. Educational criticism in different historical periods reveals similar preoccupations. Walter Feinberg comments on the conditions that produced Bloom’s and Hirsch’s critiques of schooling:

The impulse behind Hirsch’s and Bloom’s works is the very same impulse that drove earlier educators to replace the moral certainty of the last century with the scientific certainty of this one. The idea that drives both is the view that there is a preestablished standard that can be used to determine membership in the public and that it is the function of education to see that everyone is given the opportunity to learn to act in accordance with that ideal. To provide a world already interpreted is to avoid the uncertainty of a world the meaning of which must continuously be interpreted and negotiated (Feinberg 1989:137).

Both idealists and positivists fear movements, trends, formations that break away from conventional wisdom and propose new, iconoclastic ways of making the future. This is especially true in our
times when the notion of a center as a standard or frame of reference has been challenged and a new vocabulary has emerged that privileges skepticism, plurality, fallibility, and heterogeneity. The "grand narratives" of the past which centered on the universality of the truth or the omnipotence of science, do not provide much comfort. We live in a diverse world, where many cultures want their claims to be heard, and the Western cultural tradition needs to come to terms with its own ethnocentrism.

The philosophical debates that map this era of unpredictability conclude that we have to learn to live with uncertainty. In place of philosophical systems and Philosophers engaged in the pursuit of Truth, many thinkers promote the notion of philosophical discourse as a method of rupturing and tearing down the validity of received logocentric or metaphysical epistemological assumptions. They praise an open-ended attitude centered on the ability of people to take part in conversations that will negotiate the making of the world not according to a preconceived scenario but according to the wishes and desires of the participants in the ongoing conversation. This attitude is reflected in the way that many academic disciplines have reevaluated their assumptions. Concerning the discipline of philosophy, John Rajchman has observed that
influential philosophers are emerging from their specialized preoccupations, challenging the "professionalized" character of the discipline, and wondering openly whether...their basic programs have not come to a dead end (Rajchman 1985:ix).

Richard Rorty's work is an example of this new trend in contemporary American philosophical thought. Rorty's anti-essentialist philosophy belongs to a post-philosophical culture "in which neither the priests nor the physicists nor the poets nor the Party were thought of as more 'rational,' or more 'scientific' or 'deeper' than one another" (Rorty 1982:xxxviii). He tells us that this pragmatic conception of culture runs contrary to idealist or positivist conceptions which seek the guiding principles that a culture should abide by. In the following excerpt Rorty comments on the traditional philosophical "quest for certainty," a theme that this dissertation has explored:

* Such a hypothetical culture strikes both Platonists and positivists as 'decadent.' The Platonists see it as having no ruling principle, no center, no structure. The positivists see it as having no respect for hard fact, for that area of culture--science--in which the quest for objective truth takes precedence over emotion and opinion. The Platonists would like to see a culture guided by something eternal. The positivists would like to see one guided by something temporal--the brute impact of the way the world is. But both want it to be guided, constrained, not left to its own devices (xxxix).
Rorty’s anti-foundationalism undermines the epistemological perspective of the Enlightenment. At the same time, Rorty has no desire to abandon the liberal political project of the Enlightenment. As a consequence, his political position, which he identifies as “postmodernist bourgeois liberalism” prevents him from engaging in a critique of the institutions of western liberal democracies. The purpose of the conversation he celebrates is merely one of ‘seeing how things hang together,’ a rather narrow vision which lacks any transformative power.

Furthermore, his assumption that all participants will have equal access to the conversation does not take into account the unequal distribution of power in society. Some of his critics, even though they are sympathetic to his undermining the epistemological foundations of modernity without abandoning the political project of modernity, take him to task for reducing this

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Even though Rorty considers John Dewey a model pragmatist and his intellectual hero, I think that he underplays the radical political implications of Deweyan philosophy expressed in a number of works such as *Individualism Old and New, Liberalism and Social Action, The Public and Its Problems*. In these writings Dewey is quite critical of bourgeois liberalism and capitalism. Furthermore, Dewey’s commitment to the formation of a ‘public sphere’ within which individuality finds expression runs contrary to Rorty’s private/public split and romantic conception of an aestheticized culture. (For an ingenious critique of Rorty’s view on public vs. private see, Frazer 1991). Rorty’s and to some extent Dewey’s pragmatism is given a radical twist in Cornel West’s call for a “prophetic pragmatism” which unites the best traditions of pragmatic thought along with contemporary concerns over enlarging the democratic debate to include the previously underepresented issues of race, gender, and class. Prophetic pragmatism rejects Foucault’s anti-romanticism without at the same time falling prey to a naive faith in human agency. The institutional constraints are acknowledged, but space is left for intelligent action. See, West (1989).
political project to a mere liberal attitude. As Chantal Mouffe has commented,

If one fails to draw this distinction between democracy and liberalism, between political liberalism and economic liberalism; if, as Rorty does, one conflates all these notions under the term liberalism, then one is driven, under the pretext of defending modernity, to a pure and simple apology for the 'institutions and practices of the rich North Atlantic democracies,' which leaves no room for a critique (not even an immanent critique) that would enable us to transform them (Mouffe 1988:32).

Many contemporary theorists appreciate postmodern perspectives critical of the Enlightenment's universalistic claims and yet they want to retain the emancipatory dimension of the Enlightenment tradition. They take Foucault's warning seriously: "The Enlightenment which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines" (Foucault 1984:211). However, even though they see the need for identifying and undermining those disciplines, they also cherish the liberties. They see that the political project of modernity has been unfulfilled, but they insist that it is carried out without appeal to preconceived blueprints. As Ernesto Laclau has said, "postmodernity does not imply a change in the values of Enlightenment modernity but rather a particular weakening of their absolutist character" (Laclau 1988:67).
This attitude which unites faith in the emancipatory potential of human action and the realization that there is no outside objective standard to which this action has to conform, can only exist within the framework of a democratic politics. A democratic arrangement presupposes an open-ended process which gives participants the ultimate power to define the conditions of the debate. As Laclau has argued in support of a democratic politics,

...if an ultimate ground is posited, political argument would consist in discovering the action of a reality external to the argument itself. If, however, there is no ultimate ground, political argument increases in importance because, through the conviction that it can contribute, it itself constructs, to a certain extent, the social reality. Society can then be understood as a vast argumentative texture through which people construct their own reality (Laclau 1988:79).

Such a conception of the democratic process is identical to Dewey's and Freire's pragmatic/experimentalist approach to learning. This approach allows for the exercise of practical reason—which Dewey calls 'intelligence'—without appeals to a universal standard of rationality. Reality thus is always, as Freire holds, in the process of becoming because its construction is the result of human action. In Dewey's and Freire's work one finds the commitment to social change and betterment of the human condition, which obviously situates their work within the culture of modernity, along with the
postmodern attitude that there is an open-endedness in the process of learning about the world and a plurality of perspectives that participants bring to it.

The current debates on the fate of the Enlightenment and on the modernity/postmodernity issue have influenced educational theory greatly, especially the field of critical pedagogy, formed under the influence of Freirean and Deweyan ideas.

Critical Pedagogy: On the Borders of Modernity and Post-Modernity

To counter the technocratic rationale which perceives of pedagogy as merely a method for the transmission of prespecified content, a growing number of educational theorists have proposed an enlarged conception of pedagogy.6 A small, but dynamic field has emerged in the past fifteen years or so known as 'critical' or 'radical' pedagogy.7 Influenced by the work of Paulo Freire, and of earlier progressive

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6 Much of the material in this section is drawn from an unpublished paper I co-authored with William D. Taylor, "The Uses of Pedagogy: From Pedagogy as Technology to Pedagogy as Cultural Politics" (1990).

7 This short section on critical pedagogy cannot possibly cover all the writings that have been produced in this field. I will only mention the names and cite the work of some of the pioneers in the field: Michael Apple (1979;1982), Henry Giroux (some works in collaboration with Stanley Aronowitz) (1985;1988;1991;1992), Peter McLaren (1988), Jean Anyon (1981). Their articles along with those of younger scholars in the field appear frequently in such journals as Educational Theory, Journal of Education, Curriculum Theory, Harvard Educational Review, Journal of Curriculum Theorizing.
traditions in the history of American education, these theorists have expanded the definition of pedagogy to signify a process of "the transformation of consciousness that takes place in the interaction of three agencies—the teacher, the learner and the knowledge that they together produce" (Lusted 1986:3). Pedagogy is defined as a cultural practice which addresses "how knowledge is produced, mediated, refused, and represented within relations of power" (Giroux 1990:123). This enlarged notion of pedagogy requires that teachers become in Henry Giroux's words, 'transformative intellectuals' (Giroux 1988) engaged in a "deliberate attempt to influence how and what knowledge and subjectivities are produced within particular sets of social relations" (Giroux 1990:123).

This essentially political conception of the role of pedagogy offers educators a vision which holds the possibility of remaking not only schools but society as well into democratic communities. Pedagogy conceived as a form of cultural critique goes thus against the narrow view of the professionalization of teaching as put forth by current proposals for school reform. Such proposals do not see teaching as an act whose ramifications extend beyond the confines of the classroom. To give an example from the contemporary scene, the ubiquitous references to 'teacher empowerment' acquire different meanings depending of one's conception of the teacher's role. In the language
of many reports and government spokespeople, the concept of 'empowerment' might mean simply making the teacher the possessor of expert knowledge in subject matter and in techniques that might be useful for 'classroom management.' This connection between empowerment and expertise is seen as natural and is never questioned in mainstream educational reform proposals. It means that one has to take for granted the structure of modern society and simply go through the moves of adjusting to it more efficiently.

Donald Oliver's incisive comments on this attitude are worth quoting at length:

As teachers, we think about education with this 'natural' bias toward delineating the world into highly differentiated functional fields, each governed by technical specialists... Once we have accepted education as a separate specific aspect of culture along with the myriad of technical specializations generated within it, our life as educators is reduced to researching, developing, understanding, and practising a specific set of professional skills. We become legitimate and credible professionals assigned the responsibility for enculturating children, youth and, increasingly, lifelong clients. We would guess that most school people--administrators, teachers, professors of education, curriculum makers, textbook publishers--consciously or unconsciously believe this dogma of progressive specialization as the normal and the right way to maintain and improve the world (Oliver 1989:12).

However, in the language of radical pedagogy, empowerment means allowing the teacher to question the very notion of expertise
which has shaped modern institutions and limits the ability of people to engage in criticism in areas outside their own specialties. To the notion of teacher as an expert/professional, radical pedagogy prefers to view the teacher as public or critical intellectual who acts not only within his/her classroom but in the public arena. The role of the teacher as cultural critic broadens the role of education by seeing, as Henry Giroux suggests in agreement with Gramsci, “all of society as a vast school” (Giroux 1990:133).

Critical pedagogy is not only a project which enables educators to rethink their role in modern society, but also a powerful critique of modernity itself. Questioning the tendency to accept the structure of modern institutions as natural is what differentiates this pedagogy from one conceived as a method of adjusting people to those very structures. Therefore, radical pedagogy broadens the meaning of education bringing it in line with Dewey’s conception of education as an experiment in democratic politics.

Oftentimes in the writings of the major representatives of the field of radical pedagogy one detects an excessive optimism and a messianic tone regarding the liberatory potential of education. Then they become vulnerable to the charge that they have bought wholesale notions of progress, human agency, and indeed that they have blueprints for an ideal society which will come about through
an educational revolution.\textsuperscript{4}

Certainly these are serious charges that imply that critical pedagogy is another "regime of truth" which constructs a plan of salvation to compete with the humanistic and technocratic ones. Given the conception of the teacher as a powerful force in the classroom, as a transformative intellectual, how do you avoid the risk of him or her constructing a totalizing discourse which silences others in the name of ideological correctness? This and other issues are constantly raised within the field and account for sophisticated scholarship which follows closely the recent debates over the modernist/postmodernist question.

Henry Giroux has attempted to deal with the charges against the concept of 'transformative' intellectuals and against the existence of a blueprint for correct action. To become a transformative intellectual, he writes, "is not a call for educators to become wedded to some abstract ideal that turns them into prophets of perfection and

\textsuperscript{4} Their critics speak from diverse theoretical positions. They are those who have a blueprint of their own for a just, egalitarian society but believe in true, orthodox Marxist fashion that radical educators are naive to believe that teachers and schools can be a substitute for the working class and class-struggle (Brosio 1990). Others, especially feminists and poststructuralists, accuse them of elitism and vanguardism; they maintain that critical pedagogy as theorized by Freire, Giroux and their disciples is but a continuation of the paternalistic project of traditional education in so far as critical educators view themselves as the source of liberatory pedagogy working to bring students up to their own level of understanding (Ellsworth 1989). Also the concept of the transformative intellectual is criticized as leading to an idealization and romanticization of agency.
certainty" (Giroux 1990:132). Similarly, the experimentalist approach allows critical educators to be committed to change, without losing sight of the fact that the diverse perspectives of the participants in the educative process can not permit a uniform solution. Here Giroux has introduced the concept of "border pedagogy" as a form of pedagogical praxis that unites the best elements in the modernist tradition with the new developments in the post-modern situation that we currently find ourselves in. He writes:

We believe that by combining the best insights of modernism and postmodernism, educators can deepen and extend what is generally referred to as critical pedagogy. We need to combine the modernist emphasis on the capacity of individuals to use critical reason in addressing public life with a critical postmodernist concern with how we might experience agency in a world constituted in differences unsupported by transcendent phenomena or metaphysical guarantees (Giroux and Aronowitz 1991:117).

Therefore, as Giroux and other critical educators have argued lately, it is essential that pedagogy focuses not so much on ends-in-view, i.e., on visions of liberation, even though a language of liberation always exists in a pedagogy of hope and possibility. There has to be a shift to narratives of resistance, to identifying those instances in the educative process that allow participants to reflect upon, challenge, and create anew the conditions of their education.
Pedagogy thus is removed from the abstract realm of idealized blueprints to the concrete situation of daily practice.

What this shift means for the structuring of schools in the United States, in Greece, or elsewhere is explored in the last section.

Educating for Uncertainty: From Visions of Liberation to Narratives of Resistance

The quarrel between Richard Rorty and his critics from the Left has been extended to discussions over the control of knowledge in the school curriculum. Rorty has oftentimes come to the defense of E.D. Hirsch's proposal for a common curriculum for primary and secondary education. The assumption that there will be agreement over what a common curriculum is stems again from his idealized notion of a conversation which underestimates the power of certain groups to define its terms.

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*Rorty has argued that no one can "prevent precollege education from being nine parts socialization to one part liberation" (Rorty 1990:230). Here he departs from Dewey's vision of an educational system that from the start plants the seeds of a liberating experience. What is problematic in Rorty's conception is the absolute distinction he draws between "socialization" and "liberation." Obviously "socialization" means to him adaptation to and acceptance of the norms of society and of conventional knowledge. In contrast, Dewey perceived of socialization as a process that enables the individual to become part of society, but of a society which is not seen as static but in the making through the conscious acts of its members. In that sense both processes, socialization and liberation, are present simultaneously in constant tension and negotiation with each other. Rorty's conception is rather old-fashioned ('first conform, then rebel against conformity') and lacking in pedagogical insight. It implies that only college-educated adults are capable of participating in the ongoing conversation over remaking society.
The participation of previously excluded groups in the debate over educational matters, requires the existence of a public sphere within which such issues are debated. Walter Feinberg in a recent essay commented on the need for teachers to develop an informed public by inquiring into the process of constituting a public. He tells us that

this public is unlike the public of Hirsch and Bloom in which each individual is seeking to find the foundation for the correct interpretation of reality. Here the public is construed as searching for a way to enter a conversation about its own nature, knowing that in the process of interpreting its nature it is also engaged in the process of constituting it (Feinberg 1989:137-8).

What this endeavor amounts to is a continual reevaluation and reconstruction of educational realities, not unlike Dewey's definition of education as the reconstruction of experience. And, although it is naive to think that one can transcend or disregard institutional boundaries, it is also self-defeating to think that one cannot create spaces of resistance within them.

It is precisely the Deweyan and Freirean definition of education as a process of reconstituting the world that is very relevant for the critique and rejection of the humanistic and technocratic blueprints. Foucault had observed that modern educational systems, regardless of their orientation, employ categories like truth, culture, order,
efficiency, etc. in order "to dispel the shock of daily occurrences, to
dissolve the event... to exclude the radical break introduced by
events" (Foucault 1977:220). The notion of an "event" is indeed
central to an understanding of how resistance to institutional norms
can take place. As I understand it, an "event" refers to any kind of
occurrence or interaction that takes place in the classroom which is
not anticipated or prespecified by the official curriculum. It entails
an element of surprise. It carries with it the possibility of liberating
teachers and students from their prescribed roles. It therefore
introduces a degree of disruption into the educational process and
makes this process contingent upon the specific "praxis" of the

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16 The material I have compiled for the Appendix serves as an illustration
of the ability of the participants in the educative process to reflect on the
conditions of teaching and learning, to take a critical distance from the
official curriculum, and to shift the focus from education as consumption of
knowledge to education as lived experience. These pieces of writing qualify as
"events" in so far as they disrupt the business-as-usual philosophy that
permeates the structuring of today's classrooms. They are in order of
appearance: 1. A manifesto issued by a group of Greek teachers from a high
school in a working-class neighborhood in the vicinity of Athens, 2. A poem
written by a Greek school teacher, 3. An essay written by a candidate at the
College entrance exam in Greece, 4. A manifesto of a Coalition of Education
Activists in the United States, and 5. An excerpt from Mike Rose's Lives on the
Boundary on the education of one of his students. There is a common thread
that unites these texts: the belief that education is too important to be left in
the hands of specialists who declare war against schools and produce proposals
in order to save them from real or imaginary crises. The prescriptive nature
of reform proposals, the absence of parents', teachers' and students' voices
from them, suggests an authoritarian approach to educational matters which
all the texts I cite explicitly resist. In Mike Rose's fine concluding statement,
"this is why the current perception of educational need is so limited: It
substitutes terror for awe. But it is not terror that fosters learning, it is hope,
everyday heroics, the power of the common play of the human mind" (Rose
participants.\

Henry Giroux has stated that "our problem is that we have a theory of knowledge but no theory of pedagogy" (Giroux 1992:14). Both the humanistic claim about the universality of truth and the technocratic appeal to instrumental reasoning are theories of knowledge which are applied to education through particular curricula. A theory of pedagogy on the other hand has to be rooted in the everyday realities of the classroom. Since those realities are not fixed or predictable because they are formed by interactions among human beings, any claims about knowledge that we derive from classroom experience have to be tentative. An alternative then to the educational blueprints of idealism or empiricism would be a theory of pedagogy which abandons the abstractions of grand theories for the piecemeal construction of plans of action. Instead of deducing plans of action from theories of knowledge, we need to form theories out of our practices, test those theories in subsequent practices, and if necessary modify both our practices and our

\[1\] My colleague Stathis Gourgouris made the perceptive remark during a recent conference, where papers on Greek education were presented, that there is a tendency among academics and professional educators to discuss education primarily as a matter of public policy and ignore the rich experience of the classroom. This is true not only in Greece, where education is a mechanism of the state apparatus par excellence, but in the United States as well. President Bush's recent "Education 2000" plan is a case in point. The planning of education is left for those at the higher levels of government, governors, administrators, think-tank specialists. Input from those who are at the heart of educational reality, teachers and students, is considered unnecessary.
theories. It is part of the pragmatic struggle to get along without the humanist's absolute truth or the positivist's correct scientific method. Such a theory of pedagogy suggests that learning does not depend on the material used in the classroom (whether they are Great Books or bland textbooks) but is rooted in the relationships that are built among teachers, students, and the knowledge that they together receive and produce.

Everyone involved in the educative process should realize that we will never know with absolute certainty whether we are speaking correctly about the world, but that we proceed through a constant reexamination of our ways and values. Such a pragmatic/activist theory of pedagogy is explicitly connected with a theory of a radical democratic politics as has been alluded to in the previous section. Dewey did not separate the structuring of the democratic classroom from the structuring of a democratic society:

The keynote of democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the living of men together (Dewey 1946:58).

In the end it is better to live with uncertainty, than with the certainties that deny people the ability to imagine individually and collectively that things could be different from what they are. It is
true that this approach demands from us to learn to live without metaphysical comfort, but what we gain instead is greater freedom in constructing our world in solidarity with others.
APPENDIX A

LETTER OF GREEK TEACHERS
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APPENDIX B

ESSAY BY CANDIDATE IN COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAM IN GREECE
APPENDIX D

STATEMENT--NATIONAL COALITION OF EDUCATION ACTIVISTS
(Z Magazine, March 1991)
APPENDIX E

EXCERPT FROM MIKE ROSE'S LIVES ON THE BOUNDARY
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