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Celluloid nationalism: Cultural politics in popular Indian cinema

Ghosh, Sanjukta Tultul, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1992
CELLULOID NATIONALISM: CULTURAL POLITICS IN POPULAR INDIAN CINEMA

DISSERTATION

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Sanjukta T. Ghosh, B.A., M.A., M.A.

* * * * * *

The Ohio State University


Dissertation Committee:

Brenda Dervin
Sonja Foss
Ron Green

Approved by

Brenda Dervin
Adviser
Department of Communication
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VITA

August 22, 1958 Born - Kashmir, India
1979 B.A., University of Delhi, New Delhi, India
1981 M.A., University of Delhi, New Delhi, India
1981-1986 Journalist, United News of India and Associated Press, New Delhi, India
1987 M.A., School of Journalism, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

Fields of Study
Major Field: Communication

Cultural Studies
Dr. Alan O'Connor

Studies in Political Economy
Dr. Rohan Samrajiva

Studies in Critical Audience Research
Dr. Brenda Dervin
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The notion that India is a nationality rests upon the vulgar error which political science principally aims at eradicating. India is not a political name, but only a geographical expression like Europe or Africa. It does not mark the territory of a nation and a language, but the territory of many nations and many languages.

-Sir John Seeley and Sir John Stratchey.  
The Expansion of England. 1883.

Cinema and the Nationalist Project

In ethnically plural societies the question of national unity is deeply problematic given the lack of a single cultural and national identity. The nation-building process is thus geared towards creating and molding this identity. But the politics of national identity subsumes a wide and contentious area regarding the way power is organized, shared and institutionalized within the State and its ideological apparatuses (in the Althusserian sense). In India, the process is particularly contradictory and complex, given the country's uneven development and the regional, ethnic, linguistic, racial, and religious cleavages. Some of these cleavages are so wide that there is almost no social or cultural traffic between the different regions and classes. Moreover, the gaps have increased because of differential access to tools of development. In this situation, the government
has tried to impose a uniform culture from above (such as the imposition of the Hindi language), but this has only served to alienate the middle and lower classes even further. Yet, despite these rifts there still is a strong sense of what it means to be "Indian" and it is here that popular communicative forms become important.

To see how the idea of Indianness is being produced and, at least marginally, maintained we may usefully turn our attention to the few cultural phenomena that appear to speak in a national idiom. One such phenomenon is the country’s commercial cinema, especially popular Indian cinema. Though Bombay Cinema is only one of the sites where the struggle takes place, its location at the center of Indian popular culture makes it one of the most important social determinants and producers of a mass national consciousness. In fact, over the years, Bombay Cinema has become so important that the consumption patterns of the industry (both on and off screen) have become a standard of reference for popular consumption in the entire country despite the divisiveness and alienation of the lower and middle classes. Whatever, the common and theoretical criticisms of Bombay films may be, there is little doubt that like other popular cultural forms these films become meaningful only within in the context of the hegemonic intent of culture to build consensus on issues of law-and-order, morality and socially productive labor in post-colonial India. They have attempted to harmonize discordant elements of the Indian experience. This study deals with this harmonizing and hegemonizing (in the Gramscian sense of the term) role of Bombay films, and in particular of films that became box office hits in the 1980s. In particular, by analyzing specific cinematic texts, I hope to identify the myths of nationhood structuring them. In keeping with the
Cultural Studies tradition, I have focused on the film texts and their consumption while at the same time attempting to identify political possibilities of resistance.

In this chapter I examine why national identity is such a problem in India. I argue that the question of identities has become entangled with the specifics of regional cultures and identities and with the larger question of the country's right to exist as one nation-state. Like many other Third World countries, the project of national development in India becomes a call to both citizens as well as institutions to rally behind the State in its objectives. Thus culture comes to serve the needs of the State. Yet, it is also an arena where different groups battle for cultural hegemony. Bombay Cinema is the most important cultural arena in this respect. Bombay films have been criticized for being banal, pornographic and violating all filmmaking rules. Yet they have also been recognized as comprising a distinct genre. What is interesting is that this Cinema has been able to unite the nation as no political leader. While several theories have been advanced to explain its popularity, this dissertation holds that it is the cinematic narrative and its ability to intersect with the nationalist discourses and the political aspirations of the people that has enabled it to become a cultural phenomenon.

Culture as State Apparatus

All culture is part of the power relationships in society, and the function of the cultural critic is to trace the workings of this power and the roles that texts, meanings and pleasures can play in its distribution and re-distribution. If we look at the relationship between culture and the state in
India, official rhetoric usually has one think in terms of culture as a source of sustenance and growth of the state. The state is seen as operating according to a fixed, universal social logic. Elements of culture that help strengthen the state are seen as good, those elements of culture which do not help the proper functioning of the state or hinder its growth are seen as defective. A mature society, in this view, is expected to shed or actively eliminate these defective elements so as to improve both the functioning of the state and the quality of the culture. This view makes sense only if we see the state as being distinct from culture.

Indian intellectuals and political pundits alike have espoused the notion that needs of the culture must be oriented towards the needs of the state. This is seen as the very epitome of political maturity, achievement and development. The main function of culture, in this scenario, is to facilitate economic growth. The whole thrust of the post-independence vision for the future India was premised on the notion that aspects of culture that stood in the way of economic growth and modernization had to be excised; scientific knowledge and "modernity" were to be encouraged. This statist ideology was seen in the vision of some leaders of the freedom struggle such as Vallabhbhai Patel. This vision was held by the Indian National Congress in creative tension with the Gandhian nostalgia for a mythical pre-colonial world of rural self-sufficiency, presided over by benevolent despots (*Ram Rajya*). Jawaharlal Nehru attempted to unite the two with his marxist-influenced model of Indian socialism where the nostalgic and progressive aspects of the anti-colonial fervor in India could be combined. This interplay of opposed elements can be seen in early post-independence cinema. In Raj Kapoor's Chaplin films, or Dev Anand's Bambai
Ka Babu, for instance, the cosmopolitanism and westernization of the city are seen as evil, against which is opposed the innocence and goodness of rural Indian Everyman. By identifying the metropolis with Westerness, the legitimacy of the progressive post-Independence Indian state was left untouched. In the 1980s, the Nehruvian vision was waning, with the Congress (Indira) increasingly being identified with the all-encompassing State, and Ram Rajya being espoused by the Hindu fundamentalist opposition, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The Bombay Cinema of the 1980s that I shall be looking at is more or less aligned, in its hegemonic content, with the present-day Congress (I) interests, which identifies the well-being of the Indian-state with that of the people. This is similar to the ideology of nationalism that has gained prominence in India since the pre-independence years; in that it has built into its codes the very arguments that are oppressive, hierarchical, colonial and divisive.

Importance of Cinema in India

It is in this context of nationalist rhetoric and contemporary politics that the Bombay film industry must be examined and understood. Most of the mainstream Hindi films can be firmly located in the colonial encounter and in Nehru's vision of modernizing India. The relatively higher importance of cinema as a popular form in India is due to several reasons, the most obvious ones being the low literacy rate, the linguistic problem which makes newspapers more influential with the English-speaking elite populations and the relatively high price and low penetration of radio and television until recently. While saying that the popular film industry in India is an instrument of the state would be tantamount to holding an
absolutist position, seeing it as a totally open and autonomous site for cultural struggle blinds one to the different hues in which state domination colors itself in. Cinema's effectiveness as a political mobilizer did not go unnoticed by nationalist leaders. Soon after independence, one of the most important government declarations on the film industry emphasized cinema's hegemonic role -- "to develop into an effective instrument for the promotion of national culture."³

Today, though radio, television, newsreels and documentary films are under direct state control through central government policies, the press and the feature film industry are in private hands. However, cinema is regulated and taxed at both central and state levels in a problematic system of "dual control" inherited from the British Raj.⁴ Thus the working idiom for the industry was to induce social and cultural change, reform or even revolution through cinema.⁵ Under this logic, culture, in the sense of traditions, is seen as automatically becoming obsolete as a consequence of the growth of modern science or technology. Popular forms such the cinema should then intersect with the discourses of the state which demand from the people greater and greater sacrifices in the name of the state and in the name of state-sponsored development and state-owned science and technology. All the films examined in this study are in fact in very simple and straightforward ways exhortations to the common folk, the Bharatiya Praja, to shed their "irrational", "unscientific" and anti-developmental traditions.

In spite of its relative autonomy,⁶ the Indian film industry has been a powerful ideological tool for the Indian State. In fact national unity and national integration have been recurrent subtexts in almost all Bombay films since the 1950s. But I assert that it is in the eighties that the nationalist
discourse becomes predominant and central to the narratives of all the top box office hits. How do these popular Bombay films forge and embody a nationalist consciousness while appearing to speak only of love and romance? What characterizes these top films? Why did they become so popular, breaking all previous box office record, at a time when television had in fact captured the national imagination and overall film attendance was dropping? What changes did this period produce in terms of the cinematic iconography and audience expectations? What relation do these films have to the political history of the times? These are some of the issues raised and dealt with in this study.

Mainly these films have been seen as escapist fantasies or ideological manipulations. However, their enormous and continued popularity suggests that they speak to the very problems and tensions of people in the country. I argue that commercial Bombay films (taken as a genre) operate at the level of contemporary myths. The myth they exemplify is that of the relationship between individuals and the larger society. Specifically, in the 1980s, the films speak of the myth of a unified nation and an essential and authentic "Indian" national identity. The oppositions of rural vs. urban, modernity vs. tradition, independence vs. community, democracy (or even polyarchy) vs. authoritarianism are prominently invoked in forging this identity. Bombay Cinema, then, is a way for the Indian masses to explore the contradictions in their own lives between cultural representations of harmony, togetherness and a common "national" heritage, and their own discordant experiences of social and political turbulence, hostility and alienation from the state they are living in as migrants. In this process the films intersect with the popular discourses on the political culture, legitimacy and effectiveness of the regime.
and its historical development; class structure and the degree of inequality; state structure and political leadership in both the national and international arenas. Seen in the context of research done within the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, the Bombay films can be examined as representations of ways in which subcultural groups negotiate a space in relations to the dominant culture, which allows for the articulation of oppositional class identities. Thus studying popular cinema in India inevitably means entering debates about political legitimacy, class identity and cultural value which inform the theoretical framework and the methodological procedures of Cultural Studies.

The argument that Bombay films are myths about nationhood and national identity may be simplistic, but this is how issues are debated and understood by the majority electorate in India. This is also how cinema is understood and enjoyed by the mass public in India. Political and national mythmaking are some of the most prominent unifying themes within the varied genres, styles and texts that has constituted "Bombay Cinema" through the years since. This mythmaking became predominant in genre that emerged in the eighties. At one level, all these films were romantic melodramas (if one can use Western genre classifications), stories about young lovers, whose passion binds together these episodic cultural forms. However, at another level, these were overtly nationalist texts, symbolically creating a shared myth of a common descent, history and memories that emphasized the possession of a demarcated territory, a common economy and common legal rights and duties. In other words they created a shared culture and identity the same time as they constituted it.
The idea that hegemonic ideologies are constituted and maintained through popular cultural representations is not a new one. Several cultural critics have pointed this out. However, few have acknowledged the mythic dimension of these representations or recognized ways in which popular forms clear away ambiguities present in the lives of real historically-situated people. This seems to be an element of popular forms across cultural boundaries. Thus it is as true of Indian cinema as of dramas on American television. Thus Gina Marchetti, in her analysis of The A-Team, says:

Underneath simple schematic tales of good triumphing over evil in these films, there lies an actual text, in a very specific historical situation, which is marked by the complexity of the social and political contradictions of the moment. Profound ideological struggle actually marks what at first appears to be a very simple narrative. Eventually, the dominant ideology manages to affirm itself as "truth," embodied by the "good guy" in the popular narrative, but the fact that this fantasy is designed to be sold to those outside the ruling classes, far removed from positions of social and economic power can never be forgotten or ignored by the mechanism of the text. Ambivalences and contradictions are structured into the aesthetic form of these fantasies. A close analysis brings out ideological complexities and exposes the way in which a hegemonic ideology can draw in those outside of the status quo and use fantasy for its own ends.  

Almost all commercial cinema coming out of Bombay are simple moral fables of good triumphing over evil, collective good, as represented by the State, rightfully winning over individual need. In the new 1980s' Bombay genre, these "truths" were offered in a situational reality where complexity and competing loyalties make choices difficult if not almost impossible and anarchic. There has never been uniform cultural expression in India. Instead the situation has always been characterized by schisms and struggles, alternatives and counter-views. But I shall be showing that in
order to construct a discursive space for Indianness that did not exclude the increasingly alienated peoples at the periphery, Bombay Cinema had recourse to the creation of a myth of shared heritage. They produced an imaginary nation, a sense of belonging to a place or habitus. Through constant modification, creation and adaptation of the past, they created a collective memory—memory of an imagined or real pre-colonial bucolic and an authentic "Indian" past. And through this nostalgia these films legitimized the past and now guide future political action. In trying to create these files of public memory, the films took advantage of the free space left behind by the massive public amnesia. However, what they produced to replace the vacuum were utopian images of the future.

There is a lot of irony in the Bombay film industry's approach to the whole notion of "Indian" identity and culture. On the one hand Bombay films have shaped and dominated not just cinematic outputs from the other film producing centers in the country but also national fashions and the whole Indian pop music scene and thus Indian popular culture. On the other hand the industry's own attitude to culture is very much in keeping with the Western rationalist ideology—one that has been supported by the Indian state since colonialism. Here culture becomes synonymous with "High Culture", classical works of art and literature frozen in time. Thus popular culture is devalued and even discouraged. This is seen in the cinematic texts themselves where the wayward hero/heroine has to learn the folly of his/her ways by ditching disco and instead striking the sitar. By this logic, any indigenous culture becomes a form of folk culture—an artistic self-expressions of tribes or language groups.
This moral and cultural conservatism can be seen as either a political or an economic response. In looking at Bombay films as an economic answer to a market and a State-sponsored program, we have to recognize that historically, the film industry in India did not start out as being in synch with either government officials or the public. The motivation for producing commercial successes is one explanation regarding the cultural mainstreaming and ideological homogeneity of these films. As critics and intellectuals remind us over and over again, films are big business. The Bombay industry employs close to 100,000 people. Production costs are comparable to figures in the United States. Yet for every film that hits the screen, there are at least four that never leave the cans. Given the economic necessity to create "hits," Bombay films can be seen as filmmakers' responses of giving-the-public-what-they-want. The problem with this approach, as with most political economic analyses of cultural phenomenon, is that it reduces a rich and complex cultural form to economic logics of supply and demand and a very restrictive and uncritical notion of the term "popular".

Politically, the conservatism inherent in Bombay films (and perhaps all forms of popular culture) can be understood as part of the larger question on the nature and function of the state. The traditional raison d'être of State has been national security. The nineteen eighties were a turbulent period in the history of the country--a time when the question of national identity was raised again and again, either as a result of the secessionist movements in various parts of the country or as an electoral issue. During the decade of the 1970s, the country experienced a steady erosion of democratic institutions, culminating in the two years of authoritarian emergency rule under Indira Gandhi. During this time, the government clamped down on all
the popular media. While much is known about restrictions on the print media (the formation of *Samachar*), it is not well known that similar boundaries were set around the film industry too. As the political strain continued in the eighties under Rajiv Gandhi right until his ouster in 1991 and his assassination later that year, cinema got increasingly embroiled in the nationalist struggles and the civil strife in various parts of the country.

To a large extent the commercial successes of the 1980s that came out of Bombay provided a symbolic resolution to real life contradictions. They were well-articulated systems of representation with a sure sense of what it meant to be an "Indian." The films provided the myth of a nation held together by something more than merely political expediency. In a country and at a time when religious, tribal and caste movements emerged as powerful symbols of political consciousness creating cleavages and obstructing national unity, these films became an important determinant of a collective consciousness. In other words, what I am arguing here is that the films of the 1980s marked a resurgence and revival of the nationalist phase in the Indian film industry (the first such period being the years preceding and following independence).

**Nation as a discursive construct**

The ideological role given to popular cinema by the state necessitates an exploration of the term "nation." Following Benedict Anderson's path-breaking work, I see the nation as an imaginative vision. For Anderson the nation is an "imagined community" which is both sovereign and limited. It is sovereign in the political sense and limited because there are always other nations. The emphasis on the imagined means that even though members of
a nation will never meet most of their fellow members, they still carry in their minds an image of the communion. Thus, the term "nation" becomes closely connected with the possession of a nation-state, and excludes groupings that call themselves nations purely on the basis of ethnicity or linguistic or religious unity. I have several problems with Anderson's ultimate formulation and a detailed critique of it will be presented in Chapter 2. However, the one problem that stands out from his arguments is the linkage of the concept of the nation with the possession of the nation-state. As my earlier discussion of the statist approach to culture shows, this notion of the possession of the nation-state itself is deeply contradictory and problematic given that it is a "foreign" concept closely linked to the colonial project of civilizing backward cultures.

A more satisfactory conceptualization and one that by-passes the dilemma regarding the possession of the nation-state is Timothy Brennan's conceptualization of the nation as a "discursive formation." He argues that the nation is not simply an allegory or imaginative vision, but a gestative political structure which the Third World artist is constantly building or suffering the lack of.\textsuperscript{17} It is a form of cultural elaboration and as such is an agency of ambivalent narration that holds culture at its most productive position, as a force for "subordination, fracturing, diffusing, reproducing as much as producing, creating, forcing, guiding."\textsuperscript{18} Race, geography, tradition, language, size or some combination of these seem, finally, insufficient for determining national essence. Yet there is a strong "nationalist" sentiment in most nations. Thus, he sees nationalism as a trope for such things as "belonging," "bordering" and "commitment." The idea of nationhood, then, is not only a political plea, but a formal binding together of disparate elements.
"[O]ut of the multiplicities of culture, race and political structures grows...a repeated dialectic of uniformity and specificity: of national culture."19

Studying India through its commercial cinema may seem strange to a political scientist whose starting point would perhaps be the Indian state or the nature of the Indian polity. However, as the CCCS (in particular the Popular Memory Group in CCCS) and cultural studies scholars elsewhere20 have shown, to study popular narratives of a people is to study its traditional culture. Several scholars, in fact, have taken narrative to be history.21 As Bhabha has pointed out, to study the nation through its narrative address does not merely draw attention to its language and iconography, it also attempts to alter the conceptual object itself; it helps to see nation as a discursive construct.

To encounter the nation as it is written or constructed by the filmic apparatus displays a temporality of culture and a social consciousness more in tune with the partial overdetermined process by which textual meaning is produced through the articulation of difference in language.22

Bombay Cinema as a whole tells the story of an entire sub-continent struggling and slowly coming to think of itself as one. All the films I examined exhibit an obvious and obsessive nation-centeredness. National identity is asserted by both accepting and rejecting elements of Otherness -- an otherness and such a juxtaposition created and promoted by the West. Though India has a rich tradition of literature and the arts (e.g. novels by nationalist writers such as Sarat Chandra Chatterjee and Bankimchandra Chatterjee), it is film that has played the pivotal role in creating and embodying a nationalist consciousness or sentiment. Print forms, such as the novel, inherently have been an elitist form, given the widespread condition
of illiteracy and shortages, and the leisure time needed for reading it. Bombay films have given the country a whole new cultural idiom, influencing the language, fashion trends, lifestyles and cinematic outputs from the other film-producing centers in the country.

Other than for reasons of centrality to Indian popular culture and lived experience, my interest in these films is also polemical. Bombay Cinema have been criticized by bourgeois critics as being formulaic and inane. It is true that these films are highly repetitive in form and content. The stories seem to be governed by a set of rules and the characters can generally be slotted into certain common categories. But perhaps, this can be said of almost all popular cultural forms -- they are more rigidly patterned and formulaic than works of "high art." However, as Wright's work on the Western and other studies of popular narratives have shown us, this does not diminish the appeal of the stories. Each given storyline may be totally formulaic but the ways in which it combines with, parallels, contrasts or comments upon other storylines can be totally unique. In fact, in Bombay films the ways in which each story is told indeed vary considerably. Similarly, the use of stock figures does not detract from the magnetism of the characters. Because we like the characters so much, and because the enigmas always center on things as psychologically potent as love, sacrifice, maturity and independence, the surface plots of these films, in a sense, become inconsequential.

It is interesting to note here that while frequent criticisms have been made of Bombay Cinema's formulaic structure, it has rarely been the subject of a rigorous investigation. No country in the world produces more films than India--more than 800 a year. In addition, Bombay films have
cultural hegemony not only in the Indian sub-continent but also in parts of Southeast Asia and Africa, and among Asian settlers elsewhere. Yet Indian film culture never has been adequately discussed in the West, until recently. While there have been several appreciative studies on the works of filmmakers like Satyajit Ray and Ritwik Ghatak, critical scholars—both western and non-western—have only now turned their attention to commercial cinema; witness the special issues of some of the most important journals within critical film or media scholarship. However, only a few of these studies have focused on filmic narratives. While Thomas totally does away with any kind of narrative structure (she calls Bombay films "complex convolutions of multi-stranded and very long succession of events"), Vasudevan in fact looks not so much at the narrative structure of Bombay films but in fact at how the plots in certain films (chosen with no apparent logic) fit into the schema of the Oedipal triad. He, however, gives us a useful reading of para-narrative devices such as the song and dance routines in these films. Basu et al. do an interesting analysis of the Amitabh Bachchan films of the 1970s. My study follows their methodological framework. However, their work lacked a theoretical base, so that their analysis seemed to point to a very monolithic view of cinema -- as reflecting the mood of the people. My study deliberately moves away from these simplistic notions of culture reflecting reality to a more nuanced notion of culture as creating a collective consciousness. Chakrabarty's study looks at narrative only to show how "India" is invested with mythic dimensions in some films. Her analysis is detailed and insightful and the current study anchors itself on the arguments and intellectual framework used by Chakrabarty. However, this study also diverges from hers in important ways. Chakrabarty's stated focus
is representations of the Indian nation in cinema. I reverse the equation examining instead the articulation of the "Indian nation" in Bombay Cinema—how the nation is produced and constructed within the discourse of Bombay Cinema. Moreover, Chakrabarty focuses on a few films of the '50s and the years immediately preceding and following independence. A "free" India had just been born and in the first flush of this post-independence glory, the films made around that time were explicitly nationalist in their very plots. The India of the 1980s was very different from the one studied by Chakrabarty. It had a very different set of problems (such as neo-colonialism and internal colonization) and a very different politics given a vastly changed geo-political situation. From Gandhi's classless Sarvodaya vision and Nehru's Western style modernization plans, we had moved to a sectarian and fragmented reality of Indira Gandhi's and later Rajiv Gandhi's India. From the assimilation politics of the Indian National Congress, which became the umbrella to absorb all sorts of opposing and diverse social classes with a wide spectrum of ideological properties, we had moved to the Congress (I) Party—a party deeply implicated in unleashing sectarian violence all over the country. There is a clear rupture in nationalist thought from the early 1960s to the 1980s. This rupture produced marked differences in the social, cultural and political ethos. The sectarian philosophies prominent in the 1980s could be seen as nationalisms at the periphery rather than nationalism at the center. But it is the hegemonic nationalist discourse that I am concerned with. The conditions that lead to this situation and the response of the culture industry to this is the subject of this study.
The parameters of my work are narrower but deeper than previous studies on the narrative and national identity through the commercial Indian Cinema. I use both a synchronic and diachronic mode of historical vision. Specifically I restrict myself to films from one decade. However, the examination is contextualized in a theoretical framework that invokes not only the history and political conditions of post-colonial India but also the cinematic tradition within commercial film industry since the pre-independence years. As I will show through my analysis, the myth of the nation has been a continuing preoccupation with popular cinema. What has undergone a change is the terms of the myth.

The main focus here is the logic of the narratives and the cinematic codes invoked to create and reject cultural difference and "Otherness." Specifically, the methodological framework I have used comes from film structuralism, especially a variant developed by Will Wright in his study on the Western genre. I am well aware of the problems of structuralism and the criticisms levelled against this kind of reductive methodology. However, I find it useful to begin with such an analysis for several reasons.

What is particularly useful about a study of the narrative structure is the recognition that signification in film depends upon cultural conventions. In its own limited way, this study traces the changes in the cultural conventions that give rise to new cinematic codes. Other than cursory remarks about some films in the 1980s, most critical scholarship on Indian cinema has tended to (for various reasons) focus on films in the 1960s. When scholars have focused on films in recent years, their choice has been capricious and their studies cursory or else they have tended to focus on "Middle Cinema" which has generally evolved to be a variant of auteur
criticism. I also move away from classical or orthodox structuralism in going from an examination of specific cinematic texts to the larger socio-political context. However, I realize that there is no detailed examination of intertextual elements in the nation's film culture in this dissertation. Stars and film magazines are important intertextual elements in the creation of meaning. Since both pertain more to the spectator habit patterns, they were outside the parameters of my study.

A second question needs to be answered in terms of methodology -- my rationale for choosing the body of work I studied. I have already briefly touched upon reasons for focusing on the decade of the 1980s. Politically these were turbulent times and marked the end of the increasingly authoritarian rule of, arguably, the most charismatic leader India has produced. While no simplistic argument is being made about culture/films "reflecting" national concerns, I was interested in examining the rupture, if any, from the first phase of nationalism to this revival of the nationalist phase and see how cinema intersected with the socio-political discourses. My study is also a response to bourgeois complaints that cinema in the 1980s hit a new low. At one level, these could be described as simple "love stories." However, at another level, the films were a trenchant comment on the social changes and political (nationalist) movements that were racking the country during the decade.

For the selection of the films, I have had to depend on a simplistic notion of the popular, one that equates the concept with box office returns. A more satisfactory way of reading the popular would be to see how cinema connects with the experiences of the masses. The different ideological readings constructed by people should be empirically verified to understand
how a film engages with the mass collective imagination. This necessitates a detailed audience analysis—a project outside the purview of the current study. My sample of ten films were chosen from the larger sample of 50 box office hits. The films that I analyze are all part of a genre that emerged in the 1980s. This is not to say that films centered on similar themes were not made before. However, I do not include them in the same genre because of the distinctly different cinematic codes used and ideologies invoked. The ten films analyzed here are also representative of the top-grossing films made in the entire decade. They characterize the 1980s both in terms of total production output and the film thematics of the decade. In terms of directorial representation, several different directors are represented. My selection of these directors' works is also shaped by the fact that their work has had a tremendous influence on other commercial directors.

In terms of the layout of the study, I begin with a very brief description of Bombay Cinema as a genre. It should be noted that generalizations about this cinema are difficult to make recognizing that it constitutes a whole corpus of works, each of which is quite unique. However, its cinematic traditions and aesthetics are distinctive and this is what I concentrate on in the next section of this chapter. Chapter 2 opens with a discussion on the notion of nationalism. From this general discussion on nationalism as an ideology, I move on to an examination of the nationalist debate within Third World political and social thought. Chapter 3 focuses on specific cinematic texts. Using Will Wright’s methodology, I examine the extent to which this variant of structuralism developed in relation to Western narrative forms, applies to Bombay cinema. I situate the entire discussion within a conceptual framework regarding the uses of myth. The
fourth chapter inserts the argument concerning the myth of the nation created through cinema into the socio-political context of India today.

Three main themes arise from the analysis of the films—the paradox of nationalist thinking in India, the construction of "Indian" womanhood and the analogy of the nation as family. The changing roles and images of the "Indian" woman emerges as one of the most interesting transformations through the history of Bombay cinema. The question is further tied to the role of the woman as mother—assimilating differences and diffusing tension. A tentative argument is offered on the analogy between the family and the nation. Both are seen as forms of social, political and economic organizations. Finally, I return to the role of cinema in State politics. I argue for seeing cinema not merely as an instrument of the dominant ideology but also as a relatively open site where meanings of the self and the Other are contested and debated—an arena where domination and resistance are intertwined.

**Bombay Cinema: A Third World Genre?**

The typical Bombay cinema is episodic in structure, moving the spectator through different modes of song and dance, drama, spectacle, action and affect. In terms of its plot and narrative, critics see the films as having evolved from the two Hindu epics — Mahabharat and Ramayan -- which serve as the meta-texts for the Bombay Cinema. The basic stories are structured by discourses regarding the importance and strength of family bonds, respect for the elderly and the downtrodden and the superiority of "Indian" values (usually identified with pre-colonial, rustic rural ways of life). All the films end by invoking a sense of social order characterized by living in harmony with one's fate (both in terms of vocation
and the character's love interest, and respecting social obligations and ties of family and friendship.

Though there has never been any direct political engagement with the issue of cultural imperialism, popular Indian cinema has evolved as a form which has resisted Hollywood domination. Yet, one cannot say that it has been uninfluenced by it either. At the aesthetic level it has been argued that Bombay films have a different grammar. They work within a Hindu philosophy of aesthetics which rejects the Aristotelian canon of unity of time and place. The films that I examine did invert many of the editing and filming rules usually followed in the West. But even while subverting Western film editing notions, these films are dependent on Hollywood, not just for filmmaking techniques, but dance routines, costumes, set designs etc. Often specific tricks or scenes too are lifted straight from Hollywood productions, such as dance sequences from Dirty Dancing or even the older Grease and Saturday Night Fever.

The west has influenced not merely cinematic codes, production techniques and storylines (e.g., versions of Irma la Douce, Sound of Music and The Citadel) but also film appreciation and criticism among the upper-middle and upper classes. However, the average Indian spectator in constituted through the cinematic text and the larger apparatus and her/his expectations are still culturally determined. For example spectator pleasures in the Indian case, comes as much from textual elements as from extra-textual elements, such as pre-released film songs on radio and television. Thus, notions of genres as used in Western film theories have limited applicability. They useful if they open up questions about Indian cinema's distinctive form. However, the terms of reference of the industry itself and
its audience remains of primary importance. Finally, at the industry level, the Indian film industry is the very model of mass production and a highly developed form of capitalist production. Big studios call the shots and a well-entrenched star-system (sometimes promoted by the studios, such as R.K.Films) is maintained.

In terms of the Hollywood genre classification, all Bombay films contain in them elements of the musical, gangster film, comedy and melodrama. And as Thomas forcefully argues, a more useful way of talking about them is studying how the industry classifies its own films: as "Social Film", "Action Film", or even "Multi-starrer" and "Costume Film". She says the narrative and storyline are less important in classifying Indian popular films than extra-textual elements such as film stars, stunts and set and costume design. Audience expectations and needs are built not through suspense of what happens, but through how things happen and in what setting. What Thomas seems to be stressing here is perhaps true of most formulaic popular cultural forms—both western and non-western—that audience interest is displaced from the syntagmatic axis to the paradigmatic, that is from the flow of events, per se, to the revelation of "existents," or setting and characters. In fact, it is characters and their interrelationships that dominate Bombay Cinema. Here briefly I would like to mention the importance of music to these films and to the country's pop music culture in general. Music is another extra-textual element that classifies a film, that guides meaning created out of the cinematic text and shapes audience expectations. Often, since songs from the soundtrack of the film are released before the film is, the filmic experience is bounded by the audience-member's need to experience and see the context of a particular song.
(Though songs are a crucial element of Indian cinema, they are outside the purview of this study. For insightful accounts on the Indian popular music scene see the special issue of *Popular Music*).

Thomas (1985) identifies three aspects which distinguish Bombay cinema from say the Hollywood realist films. These are: the way the storyline is developed; the crucial necessity of emotion; and the blending of songs, dances, stunt and fight scenes into the main narrative. I will only discuss the first one since only that is relevant to my analysis. Briefly, she argues that Bombay films have no storylines and the directors of these films seek to make up for their vapid stories by careful camera work of unusual scenery, gorgeous and gaudy costumes and set direction. The films are about three hours long and span at least two generations. However, all the action, spectacle and other elements of the melodrama are woven together so tightly as to provide coherence and narrative closure. I disagree with her here and, through my analysis, hope to show the tight narrative structure these films have.
ENDNOTES

1. That is not to say that this model or ideology arises during the independence movement. As Nandy has shown, this ideology has existed since the 19th Century. See "Culture, State and the Rediscovery of Indian Politics" in Economic and Political Weekly 19.49 (1984): 2078-2083.

2. The original Indian National Congress (INC) that was the primary force during the independence struggle no longer exists today. Yet, several different parties now call themselves the Congress party because of the INC's historically important record. Most of them are aligned with a charismatic leader rather than an ideological agenda. The Congress (Indira) was born soon after she took office and has been the ruling party most of the last 20 years. After Indira Gandhi's assassination, her son, Rajiv, was elected to power on a Congress (Indira) ticket and today, after Rajiv's assassination too the party continued in the same name. In the rest of the dissertation, I will refer to Indira Gandhi's party as Congress (I).


5. Obviously culture here is the "high culture" understanding of the term -- the worldview of the rulers and the oppressors, not the oppressed. It claims to represent universal, cumulative rationality, the "best of what is thought and said in society".

6. Most films in Bombay are privately and independently financed, though big studios, such as R.K. Films, wield considerable economic power.

7. Thereafter referred to as the CCCS.


10. Witness the kind of interaction between celebrity life-style and the popular
consumption fueled as it is by film magazines—a unique feature of the Indian
publishing scene.

11. See Raymond Williams "Analysis of Culture", in The Long revolution. London:
Chatto and Windus. 1961; Stuart Hall's "Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms" in Tony
Bennett et al. (Eds.) Culture, Ideology and Social Process. London: Open University
Press. 1987 and, Richard Johnson "The story so far: And Further Transformations?"
in David Punter (Ed.) Introduction to Contemporary Cultural Studies. Longman.
1986.

12. See Erik Barnouw and S. Krishnaswamy's Indian Film. New York: Columbia
University Press. 1980.

13. This line of argument is followed by Rosie Thomas in her "Indian Cinema:

14. A relevant case here is that of the film Kiss Kursi Ka.

15. I use it in the sense of Frederic Jameson when he writes that "the individual
narrative, or the individual formal structure, is to be grasped as the imaginary
resolution of a real contradiction" or in other words narrative can be looked as as "a
symbolic enactment of the social within the formal and the aesthetic." in The
University Press. 1981.


17. Timothy Brennan's "National Longing for Form" in Homi K. Bhabha (Ed.) Nation

18. Ibid. p. 49.

19. Ibid. p. 62.

20. Here I am referring to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's In Other Worlds: Essays in
Cultural Politics New York: Methuen. 1987; Ranajit Guha et al.'s Subaltern Studies
New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1982; Keyan Tomaselli (Ed.) Rethinking Culture.

21. See Bhabha's Nation and Narration.

22. "Introduction: Narrating the Nation" in his Nation and Narration. London:
23. The stance of the popular news media towards these films is one of lofty disdain and condescension as any review shows in India Today or Hindustan Times.


32 Thomas. Ibid. p. 128.

33 Ibid. p.128-129.

34. When signs of underdevelopment were rampant and yet India had become a significant player in world politics.


37. I am thinking particularly of Vasudevan’s study here. Ibid. p. 34.


39. Films like *Laila Mainu* or *Heer Ranjha*, though similar in their themes, do not fall in the same genre.

40. See the attached film appendices for the list of all box-office hits of the decade and the sample.


43. This is not true, however, of Indian Middle and “Art” Cinema which is highly Western-oriented, with filmmakers drawing inspiration from Renoir, Goddard, Huston etc.


CHAPTER II
NATIONALISM AS CULTURAL PRODUCTION

The very idea of the conceptual articulation of Indian texts is due to western influence. This influence is the result of the academic socialization of western models as part of our cognitive structures.

To free oneself from this, one will have to make a conscious mental effort to academically desocialize oneself. A process which, though difficult, is necessary for any innovation and creativity.

-N.K.Singhi, India's Intellectual Traditions: Attempts at Reconstructions

In the last chapter, we saw how and why culture, and especially cinema, has come to play such a strong role in Indian politics. But it remains to be established how the narratives of Bombay films intersect with the nationalist rhetoric. For this, it is necessary to examine what the term "nationalism" means both within critical discourse and specifically in the Indian context. In this chapter, I develop the idea that nationalism is not just a political rhetoric or an economic program. More than anything else it is a creative vision of a future produced by and within cultural apparatuses. This vision, often utopian, is discursively constructed through the demarcating of boundaries -- through an assertion of Self and negation of Other. In the Indian case too, I show, this vision was discursively constructed, but in very contradictory and paradoxical ways. Indian nationalist thought asserted one national identity through a rejection of the
West and an assertion of an essential "Eastern" identity, but in asserting this, it accepted the very dichotomies that had been created and promoted by the colonial West.

I begin this chapter with a concrete and historical analysis of the national question. However, instead of addressing the problem in coarse chronological terms, I restrict myself only those ideas that have helped explain the role of the cultural superstructure in both formulating and resolving the national question. From a broad theoretic discussion on the national question, I move towards locating my own understanding of the concepts of nation, nationhood and nationalism in the works of writers such as Nehru, Gandhi, Anderson, Antonio Gramsci, Said and Partha Chatterjee.¹

I put forward two main ideas here. First, nation should be seen as a creative vision, a cultural unit. While this is not to deny the importance of the State in this process, I want to highlight the constitutive role of culture in forging "nationality" in terms of setting boundaries. In the case of India, these boundaries were set using attributes of the self given by the West. Thus, nationalist texts vocalized a self-conscious cultural identity which ironically substantialized and naturalized attributes that defined them as Other to the West.

Second, nationalism must be examined within the framework of the modernization project. What I mean is that nationalism, in the history of political thought, becomes linked to the very process of historical development. According to this view, traditional pre-capitalist bases of society is a deterrent to the growth of capitalist economy. But once again, this was a logic promoted by colonialists. In their efforts at colonial expansion, they sought to displace traditional economies by both dislocating
material foundations of social existence and on the basis of ideological systems that saw pre-capitalist or non-capitalist forms of organizations (such as Gandhi's *Sarvodaya*) as backwards and undermining history or social progress. Modern industrial India became a leitmotif of integration in the discourses of the most prominent of Indian nationalist leaders like Jawahar Lal Nehru. The image of a prosperous industrialized India which could defeat the West at its own game served the purpose of forging national unity.

What is Nationalism?

The national question is not a primordial or static one. It has a changing historical and class character, especially in relation to societies like India, where heterogeneous experiences have created a deeply fragmented society. For Bartra nationalism serves as a civic culture bridging the political culture and the political structure. As an ideology, he says, nationalism has both a political and a cultural form. The two are separate but not independent of one another. For example, to take a political form, nationalism as an ideology makes extensive use of religious, linguistic and cultural symbols. In fact the political form may actually be understood only through cultural forms. While some thinkers give primacy to the cultural form, others understand nationalist discourse only as political thought and strategy. In this context questions of power, authority and domination become the core of political discourse.

The shift of focus to the cultural realm in the discussion on nationalism can be seen in the writings of John Plamenatz for whom the concept is closely tied to national development and to the acceptance of a
common standard by which to measure it. By this logic, tracing nationalist thought becomes identical to tracing the story of liberty since the development of liberty as a human right is seen as part of the same historical process which saw the rise of industrialism and democracy. In other words, Plamenatz sees nationalism as the universal urge for liberty and progress. The flaw in Plamenatz’s argument becomes obvious when we look at how repressive authoritarian and fundamentalist regimes have effectively used nationalism as a way to legitimize their own authority. Plamenatz recognizes this danger in his argument and thus concludes that there are two types of nationalisms – good and evil, where the latter is a deviant form of nationalism. But even in these deviant cases, the basic historical urge is still to attain the classical ideal of reason, liberty and progress. Thus, Plamenatz never explores the complexity of the relationship between the state and the cultural processes in determining the national question.

The connection of nationalism to some form of collective identity and a sense of belonging to a place or a habitus is articulated more satisfactorily by Anthony Giddens. Giddens sees the nation-state as a co-evolving or anticipated form of political organization. In the discourse on nationalism, he says, the reference to the nation is always an active and selective interpretation. Thus instead of Plamenatz’s simple link between existent patterns of culture and power, he postulates a position that sees nationalism as a vehicle of mutual determination and joint transformation. Moreover, Giddens says, because it is the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs nationalism is primarily psychological emphasizing communality among members of a political order. Once again, this formulation falls short
of acknowledging the cultural authorship of nationalism. As can be seen through the case of several ethnic conflicts around the world, nationalism cannot be explained merely by psychological models. As we shall see later, nationalism is closer to a collective perception or consciousness stemming from a political and cultural process of meaning production closely associated with identity formation. However, Giddens does recognize cultural fragmentation and breakdown of social integration and he examines these not as deviant forms of nationalisms (as Gellner does) but as structurelessness that has its own structure.

National Identity as Cultural Identity

It is the work of Ernest Gellner that opens up a space for studying nationalism as cultural production. In Nations and Nationalisms he says the nation comes into being with fusion of the taken-for-granted state apparatus with a relatively homogeneous cultural space. The most obvious and universal expression of nationalism is when the state as a political unit coincides with the nation as a cultural unit. Since a shared culture is a necessary condition for the existence of the national community, the core idea of nationalism can be understood as "the definition of political units in terms of cultural boundaries." In other words nationalism presupposes a specific interpretation of political power and its place in social life, it generates sentiments and attitudes which facilitate or prevent the identification with the existing structures of power, and it gives rise to movements which strive to implement its principles. He says, it is not that "nationalism imposes homogeneity; it is rather that a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in
the form of nationalism."\textsuperscript{10} The notion of a homogenized cultural space relies on a spatial metaphor which is used to assert the \textit{closed}, boundedness of the nation. By culture Gellner means "a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating."\textsuperscript{11} He differentiates between a savage, wild, low, spontaneous culture and a cultivated, high nourished national culture. The key to nationalism is to be found in the dynamics and demands of industrial society. The convergence of two initially separate processes -- state formation and the constitution of national identities -- is regarded as the main aim and achievement of nationalism. "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist." But as several commentators\textsuperscript{12} on Gellner have pointed out, for him the concept of nationhood then does not involve an authentic cultural creation but historical disingenuousness. For Gellner "invent" means "fabrication" and "falsity".

To understand the constitutive role of culture on nation and nationhood, we have to turn to Benedict Anderson and his seminal work \textit{Imagined Communities}. Anderson's chief contribution to the Marxist debate on the national question is to emphatically pose the ideological creation of the nation as a central problem in the study of national movements.

He distinguishes between three types of nationalisms. The first is the class-based model, built upon the ambitions of classes whose economic interests were ranged against the metropolis. This kind of "creole nationalisms" of the Americas, lacked linguistic communality and its state form was both retrograde and congruent with the arbitrary administrative boundaries of the imperial order. His second type was the linguistic nationalisms of Europe (as also the state divisions within India now leading
to distinctive political rhetorics and nationalisms). The third model was provided by "official nationalism" involving the imposition of cultural homogeneity from the top as in Russia.

**Nation as a Discursive Construct**

Instead of defining nation by any set of abstract and external criteria, Anderson says that the nation is "an imagined political community"; it is "thought out" and "created". With this formulation, questions of human subjectivity and human existence and more importantly cultural life become arenas where the nation is thought out and experienced. Thus, Anderson deftly subverts the deterministic schema of other thinkers. However, the main problem with Anderson's model is his emphasis on linguistic unity within the nation. He gives the example of how print-languages created "unified fields of exchange and communication" below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars. This gave a new fixity to language, and created new kinds of "languages-of-power." Through this idea, Anderson highlights the social process of creation of modern language communities which then constitute the nation. The formation of a "print-language" and the shared experience of the "journeys" undertaken by the colonized intelligentsia are crucial for the shaping of the new cultural homogeneity that is sought to be imposed on the merging nation. In this sense, Anderson's formulation is similar to Gellner's. While Gellner emphasized the role of industrial society in forging the nation, Anderson stressed on print capitalism. Also, in detailing the role of culture in the nation-building process, Anderson's position seems to border on a certain functionalism. However, his work is helpful as it opens up a space within which to locate the role of the
imagination and intellectual process of creation in the nation-building project.

Cultural politics become especially important in the context of multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious continent that is India. During the 1980s nationalism became a form of politicized ethnic identification. It represented an aspiration for political autonomy and thus always challenged hegemonic political power. Thus the task of the culture industries was two-fold: to create a national-popular will and to ensure the hegemony of State-determined one national identity over competing and contradictory ones. This is better understood using a Gramscian framework of analysis. Gramsci's formulation of the national question is complex and innovative. While some scholars have argued that his writings are only meaningful when seen as solutions to specific problems in the 1920s' Italy and while Gramsci himself has ruled out the applicability of his ideas to "backward countries or...colonies," I hope to show the importance of his ideas in the analysis of the relationship between culture and politics.

Hegemony and National-Popular Will

For Gramsci, the national-popular collective will is a new form of political subjectivity. The meaning and significance of the notion of the national-popular, Gramsci's main contribution to the conceptualization of the national question, becomes evident only when we examine the concept of historical bloc. The historical bloc is the locus for the formation of national identities. It represents the organic link of the base with the superstructure and temporarily unifies different economic, social and ideological forces. It is the concrete expression of specific historical situations, in which the
material conditions are organically linked with the superstructure. In India these historical blocs are defined not merely in terms of class and caste, but also language, ethnicity, region etc. However, the social cleavages formed as a result of these groupings are all related to the ideological superstructure through the works of "intellectuals."

In contrast to Marx, who used the term "intellectual" in the more traditional sense, Gramsci locates an intellectual aspect inherent in every form of human existence. Thus he says, "All men are intellectuals ... but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals." However, he also makes a distinction between "traditional" and "organic" intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals are those who consider themselves to be autonomous of social classes and who appear to embody a historical continuity above and beyond socio-political change. Organic intellectuals on the other hand articulate the collective consciousness of their class in a concrete political, social and economic context. The extent to which an intellectual is organic is measured by the closeness of the connection of the organization of which s/he is a member to the class which that organization represents. Thus, while the notion of a traditional intellectual is primarily historical, that of an organic intellectual is much more sociological. Each class, he continued:

creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in economic but also in the social and political fields.16

What intellectuals do is form a stratum related to one of the fundamental social classes. The organic intellectuals then represent the ideas and aspirations of their respective class. In relation to the dominant hegemonic,
organic intellectuals constitute what Gramsci calls the "ideological bloc." This is the site where the intellectuals of the subordinated class are won over to the hegemonic system, creating a medium through which the intellectuals of the leading class become examples and orientators for the intellectuals of the subordinated classes. If the ideological/historical bloc is to be successful in the task of integrating the intellectuals of the subordinated strata, it must broaden its image so that it becomes acceptable to the widest possible audience. To explain how a historical bloc expands its identity beyond the confines of the individual identities of the participant strata, Gramsci introduces the notion of the collective will.

Collective will articulates a non-antagonistic position that transcends and dissolves the divergent or even competing economic corporate interests of the participant strata. In other words, collective will is the arena where class articulations get dissolved. It gets cemented through the operations of diverse political actors acting outside of the field of class determination. In his analysis of the Italian bourgeoisie of his time, Gramsci argues that the working class can achieve this political transformation. Thus, the working class alone can constitute itself as a fundamental national class by building a hegemonic grouping with the peasants and other subordinated strata. This is what makes possible a "national-popular historical bloc" leading to a "national collective will."

In a very real sense the formation of a national will requires the raising of popular consciousness through extensive intellectual organization. This is where political education and cultural politics become important. A class may have a spontaneous instinctive understanding of the basic conditions of life and the constraints and forms of exploitation to which it is
subjected. But these are not coherent articulations. For the expressions to be unified and substantial, the intellectual work is required through the process of hegemony.

**Hegemony as Political Strategy**

Hegemonic political strategy aims at constituting national will by dissolving class interests through both coercion and consent. Unlike Lenin's use of the term, "hegemony" for Gramsci represents domination that is not forced but results from winning a substantial degree of popular consent. It represents a degree of mastery over a whole series of different "positions" at once and cannot be constructed or sustained on one front alone. The value of Gramsci's work for cultural studies becomes obvious here. The notion of national popular will, through the process of building and maintaining hegemony, helps us explain the extent to which popular culture creates consent for the State through non-coercive measures. Thus Hall, who uses a Gramscian framework to understand how popular culture constructs difference around race and ethnicity, explains that hegemony "represents the installation of a profound measure of social and moral authority, not simply over its immediate supporters but across society as a whole."17

Ironically, it seems important to remember here that Gramsci was basically critical of popular culture as a whole. He argued that popular culture was inherently conservative, but what made the texts popular was that they connected with the experience of the masses. Talking about popular songs, Gramsci said that these were neither written by the people nor for the people, but which the people adopted because they conformed to their way of thinking and feeling:
It seems to me that ... what distinguishes a popular song within the context of a nation and its culture is neither its artistic aspect nor its historical origin, but the ways in which it conceives the world and life, in contrast with official society. From this follow other criteria of research into folklore: the people themselves are not a homogeneous cultural collectivity but present numerous and variously combined cultural stratifications which, in their pure form, cannot always be identified within the specific historical popular collectivities. Of course, when one historically "isolates" these collectivities to a greater or lesser degree, such an identification is at least partially possible.15

I disagree with Gramsci that popular texts are not written for the people. As I shall show in the second part of this chapter, nationalist texts such as the 1980s films, were addressed both to the people and the regime, the new colonizers. To both it sought to assert a unified cultural identity that articulated the dominant hegemonic position and also assimilated the aspirations of the different marginalized groups within the nation-state.

Unlike other Marxist (and non-Marxist) thinkers Gramsci allows for an understanding of the specificity of the national phenomenon at both its cultural and political levels. As Eric Hobsbawm -- one of the most influential commentators on Gramsci -- has said, "he provides a basis of integrating the nation as an historical and social reality into Marxist Theory by breaking with the habit of seeing it as the national question, something external to the working class movement, towards which we have to define our attitude."19 Every social group which performs an essential function in the process of production creates, according to Gramsci, a group or stratum of intellectuals which gives homogeneity and awareness of its own function not only at the economic levels, but also in the social and political fields.

Among Western political commentators, perhaps it is Timothy Brennan who best sums up nationalism and its relation to culture. His
conceptualization of the nation combines Anderson and Gramsci's frameworks. He says the nation is what Foucault has called a "discursive formation" or even an imaginative vision. Nationalism is, for him, a trope for the condition of belonging. Using Hobsbawm and Ranger's idea on the importance of invention of tradition in nationalist discourse, Brennan says nations are imaginary constructs that depend for their existence on an apparatus of cultural fictions in which imaginative fiction plays a decisive role.

**Filmmakers as Organic Intellectuals**

The above discussion allows us to see the role of the filmmakers in creating a context within which the State can operate and wield influence. However, their position is a particularly problematic and contradictory one. Though not quite tools of the elite class, filmmakers, by virtue of their status as filmmakers, are also cut off from the mass of people. What connects them then to "the people" is the cultural form and the visual language. The 1980 films that are the subject of this dissertation carry a dominant message. However, they become popular only when they speak to the fantasies and the needs of the people. Thus, these films in some ways connect with the subordinated classes. Following Gramsci I argue that the ideology contained in these films should be seen as the expression of a determinate ruling class. But this ideology becomes hegemonic only when it interpellates not only the members of the dominant class, but also members of the dominated classes. This is precisely why the new films achieved the popularity they did. The films successfully addressed the contradictions within the social formation that emerged in the 1970s and the 1980s. Though the films continued to be
a site of contestation among different groups, they also partially absorbed into their discourse the aspirations of the classes so that the ideological contents through which the resistance to the dominant class is expressed was neutralized. Ernesto Laclau, who has expanded on Gramsci's theories, says the characteristic way of securing hegemony is to eliminate antagonism and transform it into a simple difference. A class becomes hegemonic, he says, not so much because it is able to impose a uniform conception of the world on the rest of society, but because it can articulate different visions of the world in such a way that their potential antagonism is neutralized.  

In this context, it is also necessary to clarify my conflation of the ruling elite in India with the colonizers of the pre-independence years. The Gandhi family has enjoyed dynastic rule in India since independence up until last year when Rajiv Gandhi was ousted (and later assassinated earlier this year). Other than receiving Western education, they also were "Western" in their very way of thinking. Also my position is influenced by Nandy's titular argument that the ruling elite is our actual "intimate enemy". He says it is no longer the external colonizers who are guilty of oppression but the government itself which has lost touch with the people as can be seen through the use of increasingly authoritarian measures.  

The new Bombay films became the predominant popular cultural pastime because they succeeded in eliminating the antagonistic character in different ideologies and articulating them in the hegemonic project. The concept of national identity has always been in contention at the conceptual and active levels in the country. The eighties films in particular sought to homogenize differences of religion, class ad caste, region and gender. The homogenization of differences seems to force a binary opposition in which
the Orient is opposed to the West and to urban, Westernized elite. As Grossberg says, "The moment of Otherness... is always displaced into its interpellation into, and construction within, a system of textual, signifying differences." In what ways do the films interpellate viewers as Other and absorb ideological and political resistance to the discourses of the dominated classes within its texts? The answer to this question lies in examining how these films are nationalist texts.

Nationalism sought to demonstrate the falsity of the colonial claim that the backward peoples were culturally incapable of ruling themselves in the conditions of the modern world. Like other nationalist texts, the new films were addressed both to the people who were said to constitute the nation (and here I disagree with Gramsci) and to the colonial masters whose claim to rule nationalism questioned. The films denied the alleged inferiority of the colonized people. At the same time they asserted that a backward nation could "modernize" itself while retaining its cultural identity. They, thus produced a discourse which, even as it challenged the colonial claim to political domination, also accepted the very intellectual premises of "modernity" on which colonial domination and today's authoritarian government was based.

To understand the history of this discourse, it is necessary to locate it in the convergence of nationalism with the modernization project. To be meaningful any examination of the cultural construction of national identity in a post-colonial context, must engage with the larger political questions concerning colonialist interpretations and "nativist" sentiment that have begun to inform the post-colonial intellectual discourse. It must locate itself within a framework of analysis that starts out by acknowledging, and then
combatting, the power and pervasiveness of entrenched modes of representation that arose from and supported Western colonization of the Third World. Several thinkers have begun to trace the insidious ways in which a scholarly discipline and academic tradition like that of Orientalism forged links with the imperialist project an adherence legitimized and supported by it. And as discussed before, many have pointed out the underlying assumption of modernization in the early history of national consciousness in the West. Industrialization and development were key issues in the making of new nation-states in the former colonies and these states were modelled on the premises established by the West. In the following section, I examine the extent to which this assumption legitimized and justified colonialism and neo-colonialism.

The Dilemma of Third World Nationalisms

British writer and satirist G.K. Chesterton once said about Indian nationalism that it was neither very Indian nor very nationalistic. Although Chesterton's context was different, several scholars have pointed out the irony inherent not just in Indian but almost all Third World nationalisms. The form of second level colonization it represents has been referred to as "Orientalism", "second colonization" or even a "Colonized nationalism." In the case of India, nationalism as a discourse drew its strength from its opposition to the colonizers. Yet in justifying its own legitimacy and existence, it based itself on the logic of the very discourse it sought to reject. I expect this irony to be present in all the films under focus in this study.
Most of the nationalist leaders, during independence struggle, envisioned for India a Western-style urbanization and modernization. This vision was based on a dichotomous thinking that defined India as backward and steeped in obsolete traditions and the West as progressive and civilized. However, these definitions were the very basis on which colonialism sought to justify itself. This irony of accepting Western-generated definitions of ourselves is played out again and again in the cinematic texts. In this last section of the chapter I want to explore in detail the reconciliation of Indian political thinking to these self-definitions.

In the case of Third World nationalisms, the debate has generally been framed in terms of the general discussion over imperialism. British-Indian colonial encounters affected Indian self-perceptions, which meant that even in their anti-colonialism, the early nationalists employed and even reinforced British stereotypes of India. In fact these leaders used a notion of “India” and the “non-West.” Thus Nandy writes that “conventional anti-colonialism, too, could be an apologia for the colonization of minds”. Chatterjee too writes of how powerfully British colonialists configured the self-perceptions of early Indian nationalists. The British exploitation of India dominated the cultural perceptions and identities of its inhabitants just as it deformed its economy.

Third World political scientists are not the only ones to have pointed this out. In an allusion to nationalist doctrines in the new nation-states, Habermas says that these ideologies were “developed on the basis of bourgeois society.” He says that ideologies of this type responded to the problems and conflicts of an evolving modern society, but they remained rooted in a pre-modern context. In a similar vein, Fox argues, alongside
the capitalist world system that began to develop in the sixteenth century, there grew up a world system of cultural beliefs, within which there existed cultural dominance and inequality, areally defined. This specialization and stratification of cultural beliefs was equivalent to the unequal division of labor spawned by the capitalist world economy. Sets of cultural beliefs developed within this world system that served to promote and legitimize its inequalities. Such world system beliefs attempted to displace or transform existing indigenous systems of cultural belief, as the world system enveloped new regions—much as pre-capitalist forms of labor and production were swept away or harnessed to the expanding world economy.

The Indian nationalist movement is generally regarded as starting during the pre-independence years. The task of the nationalist leaders was to reclaim community from within boundaries defined by the very power whose presence denied community. The British entered India when the central political authority in India was non-existent and the country was highly regionalized. The colonial rulers defined India as passive, otherworldly, tradition-ridden, esoteric, caste-dominated and therefore weak, backward, and unchanging. This is the very argument in Edward Said's trenchant critique of the West. In his seminal work, *Orientalism* (1978), Said shows how the West had to create the Orient in opposition to itself in order to then proceed to treat its creation in a certain way. Those with the knowledge of the Orient (that is with the knowledge of what they have created) have great power - a power, not just over the Orientals but
also over Westerners who rely upon them to understand this mysterious place. Said says:

my real argument is that Orientalism is -- and does not simply represent -- a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with "our" world.33

He also stresses the ahistoricity of Orientalist discourse. The Orient is unchanging:

In five hundred years there may no New York or London, but they'll be growing paddy in these fields, they'll be carrying their produce to the market on the long poles wearing their pointed hats. The small boys will be sitting on their buffaloes...The Orient is all absence, whereas one feels the Orientalist and all he says as presence.34

The assertion of an authentic national identity through cultural forms succeeds only in replacing colonialist discourse with neo-colonialist discourse. The binary oppositions that are created through Orientalism are invoked, re-invoked and reified through the popular texts. This irony, played out through the popular discourses of the new nation-states, has become the focus of several cultural practitioners and critics scholars after Said. Investigating the cultural role of Caribbean Cinema in forging an identity, Stuart Hall writes that the loss of identity has been integral to the Caribbean experience.35 Cultural identity is a matter of becoming as well as of being. Thus it belongs to the future as much as it belongs to the past. In other words it involves both discourses and narratives of the past as well as challenges to to that constructed past.
The Case of Indian Nationalism

In the case of India, it has generally been said that it was the British that gave India, for the first time, a sense of nationhood. The theme of the imperialists was that "there is not and never was an India". And even a thinker as radical as Marx believed it.36 Actually India, as a political entity, pre-dates modern times. However, colonialism and its accompanying Orientalism brought a complete destruction of India's cultural self. It was a total system that destroyed traditional economies, especially local patterns of trade and production and affected education, development process and even popular culture (witness the ironic embarrassment of the upper and upper-middle classes with respect to Bombay Cinema). Within this network of problems, the artistic intelligentsia displayed a tension between the forces of Westernization and tradition.

The greatest challenge that faced the Indian national movement was to work out a model of national assimilation through consensus. In his examination of the role of education in building national unity in India, Handa says that the assimilation model was one of only three choices available to the nationalist leaders:

a. a revivalist Hindu conception of nationhood, in which the dominance of the majority religious community would be accepted.

b. a radical Marxist revolutionary movement to overthrow the British and the entire colonial structure

c. an assimilation approach which could accommodate the diverse forces within the country.37

Handa suggests that it was the last alternative that emerged popular because it meant no threat to the existing economic and superstructural interests.
Thus, to accommodate various diverse elements became a relatively non-reformative task. The assimilation model, then, had to develop a widely acceptable conception of nation, in order to generate a broad based national movement for freedom struggle. Since the demographic cleavages within Indian society were too obvious to conceal or ignore, the theme of "Unity in Diversity" became a slogan not only to forge unity but also to speak to Britain's "Divide and Rule" policy. Thus Gandhi wrote:

We are all leaves of a majestic tree whose trunk cannot be shaken off its roots, which are deep down in the bowels of the earth.38

The slogan also carried with it a vision of a new sub-continental nation. This vision had both a past and a future. The past was created by invoking the Hindu scriptures and texts, and rituals and practices that were invoked more as a form of resistance. This is perhaps similar to what Hobsbawm refers to when he says tradition becomes a "useable past."39 As we shall see in the next chapter, the evocation of deep, sacred origins through cinema became a contemporary, practical means of creating a people. Like other nationalist texts, the films used interpretations of the past as an ideological weapon in the struggle against disintegration.

In addition to discovering the roots of a united India, another major task which the architects of the assimilative model had to discover and refine was the concept of secular India, living in cooperation and harmony rather than constant communal conflict. This secular perspective, first conceived by Nehru, became an important component of the ideology of the Indian National Congress before and after independence. The Congress, became an umbrella to absorb all sorts of diverse social classes with a wide
spectrum of ideological perspectives. Before independence, it was the acceptance of the minimum program as an objective, driving out the British, which held it together. After independence and Nehru's death, Indira Gandhi capitalized on the very disorganization of the party to survive politically. This gave rise not only to factionalism but also to the resurgence of various secessionist outbreaks which once again threaten and question the very unity of "India" as a nation.

One important clarification needs to be made here; this also explains the creation and use of history in Bombay films. The Nehruvian vision of a nation that would accommodate diversities and combine tradition with "Western-style development," was not the only assimilation model. The other one was Gandhi's idea of Sarvodaya/Satyagraha. His concept of a free India emphasized cultural and historical continuities. Gandhi's position on history was based on three assumptions, two of them derived from the traditional Indian orientations to time. The first of these two was the salience given by Indian culture to myth as a structured fantasy which, in its basis on the immediate, represents what in another culture would be called the dynamic of history. In Gandhi, the specific orientation to myth became a more general orientation to public consciousness. Public consciousness was not seen as a causal product of history but as related to history non-causally through memories and anti-memories. If for the west the present was a special case of an unfolding history, for Gandhi as a representative of traditional India, history was a special case of an all-embracing permanent present, waiting to be interpreted and reinterpreted. Indian commercial cinema, in its references to the past, invokes a Gandhian notion of history.
However, as we shall see, in its conceptualization of the future, it has always used the Nehruvian vision.

This model of assimilation has been conceptualized by Indian social theorists in various ways. For Partha Chatterjee, it was built around a division of the domain of culture into two spheres -- the material and the spiritual. Outlining the contradictory pulls on Indian nationalist ideology in its struggle against the dominance of colonialism and the resolution it offered to those contradictions, he says in his book, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? (1986), that nationalist leaders argued that Western civilization had its greatest influence on the material sphere, especially science, technology and rational forms of economic organization. It is development in these areas that had made the West so powerful and helped them subordinate other parts of the world. To overcome this dominance, the colonized people had to learn the ways of the West. But, the nationalist leaders warned, imitation of the West in every possible way would mean eroding the very distinction between the East and the West. So what was necessary was to cultivate the material techniques of modern civilization while retaining and strengthening the distinctive spiritual essence of the national culture. Thus nationalism was not simply about a political struggle for power; it related the question of political independence of the nation to virtually every aspect of the material and spiritual life of the people.

In a later article on the position of women in colonized India, Chatterjee broadens his argument on the material/spiritual dichotomy, pointing out that this distinction was condensed into an analogous one between the inner and the outer. The terms "home" and "world"
corresponded to the same dichotomy. The world was where the European power had challenged the non-European peoples, and by virtue of their superior material culture, had subjugated them. But, the nationalists, asserted, it had failed to colonize the inner, essential identity of the East, which lay in its distinctive, and superior, spiritual culture. Thus, no encroachments must be allowed in that inner world. Though imitation of and adaptation to the Western norms in the public sphere were necessities, at home they would be tantamount to annihilation of one's very identity. Chatterjee concludes that the "nationalist paradigm" in fact supplied an ideological principle of selection. It was not a dismissal of modernity; the attempt was rather to make modernity consistent with the nationalist project."42

For Chatterjee the whole question of nationalism and national identity subsumes a wider debate on cultural essentialism. He says the terms in which the problem has been posed make it imperative to examine the problem within the dialectic that relates culture to power. The argument crucially depends on our being able to determine the cognitive boundaries of a culture. Thus a certain cultural essentialism has been germane to the very way in which the sciences of society have developed in the West in the post-Enlightenment period.

It is an essentialism which is much more deep rooted than the obvious cultural arrogance of colonial anthropology or the inept policy prescriptions of neo-Weberian modernization theory. It is indeed an aspect of the post-Enlightenment view of the world in which the idea of rational knowledge assumes a very definite form. The sciences of nature become the paradigm of all rational knowledge. And the principle characteristic of these sciences as they are now conceived is their relation to an entirely new idea of man's control of nature—a progressive and ceaseless process of the appropriation of nature to
serve human "interests." By extension, a notion of "interests" also enters into the conception of the new sciences of society. The rational knowledge of human society comes to be organized around concepts such as wealth, productive efficiency, progress, etc. all of which are defined in terms of the promotion of some social "interest". Yet "interests" in society are necessarily diverse; indeed, they are stratified in terms of the relations of power. Consequently, the subject-object relation between man and nature which is central to the new conception of the sciences of nature is now subtly transferred, through the "rational" conception of society, to relations between man and man. Thus, the sciences of society become the knowledge of the Self and of the Other. Constrained in terms of rationality, it necessarily also becomes a means to the power of the Self over the Other.  

Thus, Chatterjee argues that the problems of a liberal doctrine of nationalism can be traced back to a much more fundamental question about the moral and epistemic status of bourgeois-rational question of universal history. It is in this context he says that the national question is historically fused with a colonial question. The assertion of national identity was, therefore, a form of the struggle against colonial exploitation. Yet an assertion of traditional cultural values would often be inconsistent with the conditions of historical progress. Nationalism then was seen in its instrumental aspect, that is, whether or not it furthered the universal movement of historical progress.

The formulation of the question, for Chatterjee, then, encompasses a great deal of complexity in the relations between thought, culture and power. First of all there is the question of the effectiveness of thought as a vehicle of change. Second, there is the question of the relation of thought to the existing culture of society, i.e. to the way in which the social code already provides a set of correspondences between signs and meanings to the overwhelming mass of the people. Third, there is the question of the implantation into new cultures of categories and frameworks of thought.
produced in other--alien--cultural contexts. Fourth, when the new framework of thought is directly associated with a relation of dominance in the cross-cultural context of power, what are the specific ways in which frameworks of thought conceived in the context of the dominant culture are received and transformed in the subordinate culture? And fifth, all the above relations between thought and culture have a bearing on another crucial question --the changing relations of power within the society under colonial domination.

In his final analysis, Chatterjee says nationalist thought appears to oppose the dominating implications of post-Enlightenment European thought at one level and yet, at the same time, seems to accept that domination at another. There is thus an inherent contradictoriness in nationalist thinking, because it reasons within a framework of knowledge whose representational structure corresponds to the very structure of power nationalist thought seeks to repudiate. It is this contradictoriness that I want to explore in the corpus of texts I will, in the next chapter, label as "Young Love" films.

Oppositions in Colonial Discourse

Post-independence India has maintained the inherited colonial structure with only some modifications. That is what, within the attendant characteristics of the capitalist path of development, makes the post-independent period one of transition from colonization to a form of self-colonization. In fact in practice, nationalist thought has still remained an apologia for imperialism. Thus, the vision that nationalist leaders had for India, was not that India would be like the British, but she would develop all the materials needed for domination and use them for a non-violent agenda.
In this context, it is interesting to note that the country's nuclear program and the massive arms buildup has continued under this banner of "peaceful uses."

If the main dialectic in Bombay films is between the West and India, what is India's self-image? For the West, "India" is imbued with color, mystery, close proximity to nature, free yet capsulating world but also heathenism that celebrates sexual precocity. This self-definition is accepted by the Indian populace to a large extent. However, the negative connotations are resolved through a recourse to an opposition between the metropolis and the countryside. The metropolis has come to stand not merely for Westernness and modernization, but also Western puritanical attitude and thus repression which makes us our own "intimate enemy." The countryside has come to stand for the utopian ideals sought by Gandhi and as the locus of historical roots that bind us together as a nation. The metropolis/countryside opposition is thus understood as the Center-state opposition, where people have tried to resist the Center through a resurgence of increasingly parochial and fundamentalist traditions and symbols. This is best understood through the Center-Periphery model. State nationalism is seen as nationalism from above; and nationalism from the masses, which often establishes itself in opposition to political power and creates its own authority, is seen as nationalism at the periphery. In democratic situations, the two nationalisms become dialectically related, and tensions between them enhance social and political development. In the Indian social reality of the pre-independence and early-independence years, mass nationalism came to encompass diverse social, cultural, age, gender and
interests groups. This was viewed as strong enough to accommodate cultural diversity.

However, the 1980s were a time of intense ethnic unrest and civil strife in India. The State reacted to these conflicts in contradictory and complex ways. On the one hand it attempted to strengthen itself through extreme measures beginning in 1975\textsuperscript{45} and until almost the end of Rajiv Gandhi's rule in 1990. On the other hand, it was also a time when the Indian state was perhaps at its politically weakest. Its sovereignty was questioned, challenged and diminished in the face of the different ethnic conflicts in different parts of the country. The state answered by invoking totalizing cultural symbols which coopted and exploited different religious and parochial symbols. Thus, a new paradox was set in motion: symbols from the periphery were used by the State to further its own increasingly repressive ends.

I realize that in this study the contradictoriness in nationalist thinking is merely being explored at the level of discourse. Following Partha Chatterjee I argue that nationalist ideology will be inherently polemical, taking as its adversary a contrary discourse. In the case of Indian commercial films, the adversaries are the two discourses of colonialism -- internal as well as foreign. Like other nationalist texts, Bombay Cinema is selective about what it takes from Western rational thought. It must reject the immediate political implications of colonialist and traditionalist thought and argue in favour of political possibilities which colonial thought refuses to admit. Thus the films will question the veracity of colonialist knowledge, dispute its arguments, point out contradictions, reject its moral claims. Even when it adopts the visual iconography and modes of thought prevalent in
Western culture and popular texts, it cannot adopt them in their entirety, for then it would not constitute itself as a nationalist discourse. Yet in its very constitution as a discourse of power, Bombay Cinema becomes a positive discourse and not just a negation which seeks to replace the structure of colonial power with a new order, that of national power. That is why Bombay films are a different discourse, yet one that is dominated by another. As several scholars have pointed out, this completed formulation of the nationalist project as an ideological justification for the selective appropriation of Western modernity continues to hold sway to this day, the primary indicator being the centrality and character of the woman in the eighties films.

It is true that Bombay Cinema does not engage with the dominant political struggles in any activist way. In fact the assertion that these films are nationalist texts can be questioned (dealt with at greater length in Chapter 4). I do not wish to argue that these films are indeed explicitly nationalist, rather my argument is that using the techniques, the discourses, the very weapons of cinema techniques and stories once exclusively reserved for films in the West, the films address the country and the west and there is either revisionism or insurgency at the heart of the project.
ENDNOTES


5. Though there is no direct reference to the work of Plamenatz, Stanley Tambiah shows this contradiction in his study of ethnic conflicts in different parts of the world in "Ethnic Conflict in the World Today" in *American Ethnologist* 16.2 (1989): 335-349.


9. Ibid. p. 11.

10. Ibid. p. 39.

11. Ibid. p. 7.


15. Ibid p. 9.

16. Ibid. p.3.


23. I am referring to the Nehru dynasty, rather than Mohandas Gandhi.

24. In fact this became a major electoral concern for Rajiv, who not only had a "foreign" (Italian) wife, but also did not have fluency in any of the major Indian languages.


33. Orientalism. p. 91.

34. Ibid. p. 95, p. 208.


39. The Invention of Tradition. p. 5.

40. For a detailed analysis of Gandhi's conceptualization of history, see Nandy's "From Outside the Imperium: Gandhi's Cultural Critique of the 'West'" in Alternatives 7.2 (1981): 171-194.


42. Ibid. pp. 627-628.


45. Witness the institution of the Gaullist constitution in the mid-seventies.
Chapter III
Young Love Films

"O, my shoes are Japanese," Gibreel sang, translating the old song into English in semi-conscious deference to the uprushing host-nation, "These trousers English, if you please. On my head, red Russian hat; my heart's Indian for all that."


If Bombay films are in fact nationalist texts, as I am asserting, their narratives should in some ways reflect the contradictions and dualities exhibited in Indian nationalist thought. But do Bombay films have a narrative at all? In this chapter I respond to an argument by one of the most influential commentators on Bombay cinema, that these films do not have any narratives at all, at least not in the Western sense. By using methods of narrative analysis, developed in the West in relation to linear storylines, to understand the textual movements within Bombay films, I demonstrate both the applicability and limitations of these methods.

The chapter opens with an examination of the concept of narrative as it has been used in Western literary and film criticism. From here I move to a detailed exploration of whether Bombay films indeed have narratives. This involves the application of a three-pronged method:
First, using Propp's method of analyzing folktales, I reduce the narrative of ten chosen Bombay films to a list of shared narrative "functions". This list tells us what the characters do.

Second, using Levi Strauss' notion of binary oppositions, I explain the codes used to structure the narrative and the characters. These binary codes reveal what the character are; the values and social beliefs they stand for.

Third, to illustrate how this narrative of social type develops, I use a method formulated by Will Wright in his work on the Westerns of grouping the narrative functions into sequences. These sequences explains how the narrative produces a change in situation.

Through this three-tiered analysis, the mythic nature of the films is made obvious. Moreover, some other issues also surface. First, the analysis shows that there is indeed a linear narrative in Bombay films. However, the movement is broken by extra textual features, such as song and dance routines. Second, barring one exception, all the hits of the 1980s are found to be straightforward love stories, tracing the initial separation and final union of a pair of young lovers. This is markedly different from the box office hits of the 1970s, all stories of revenge. Third, the position of the woman and the values she stands for come to occupy a pivotal place in the narratives of the new genre. It is through her character that the question of national identity is raised and symbolically resolved. The new Indian woman is seen to possess the characteristics of both Sita and Shakti, the two poles between which womanhood is constructed in India. Fourth, a new analogy emerges in the films between the nation and family. The old model of the traditional extended family is questioned and rejected because of its inability to resolve modern problems. However, neither is the Western
model of the nuclear family seen to help here. The films do not really present any solutions. Instead the position taken is that there is no simple model that can be proposed right now which will accommodate both the aspirations of the woman and allow her to express her Shakti Sita duality. This can be construed as a metaphor for what is happening in the nation -- neither nostalgia nor the progressive model of nation building seems to be working.

The Uses of Narrative

The process of narrative is both omnipresent and uniquely powerful. Yet it also is almost invisible and transparent. John Fiske has argued that like language, narrative is a basic way of making sense of our experience of the real.\(^1\) Thus, it is a fundamental cultural process. But what exactly is a narrative? Steven Neale says a narrative consists of "the interruption of an initial equilibrium and the tracing of the dispersal and refiguration of its elements."\(^2\) This is close to Tzvetan Todorov's formulation. He defines a minimal narrative as a move from equilibrium through disequilibrium to a new equilibrium.\(^3\) In fact narrative theorists have found that many, if not most, stories fall into predictable, discernible patterns. In his pathbreaking study, *Morphology of the Folktale*, Vladimir Propp studied a group of Russian fairy tales and concluded that although different tales may feature different characters, these characters fall into one of seven types of dramatic personae: hero, villain, donor, dispatcher, false hero, helper, and princess and her father. Moreover, despite surface variability, the actions of these personae serve identical purposes in terms of their "function" in moving the story along. Propp thus was able to formulate the following laws:
1. Functions of characters serve as stable, constant elements in a tale, independent of how and by whom they are fulfilled. They constitute the fundamental components of a tale.

2. The number of functions known to the fairy tale is limited.

3. The sequence of functions is always identical; and

4. All fairy tales are of one type in regard to their structure.

Propp listed a possible 32 functions that occurred in the fairy tales. This list specified all the different categories of events found in these tales and the sequence in which they transpired. The "functions" were actually narrative morphemes, but Propp called them "functions" because he wanted to emphasize that what they do to advance the narrative is more important than what they are. The narrative functions, are, according to Propp, always in the same sequence and they are common to all fairy tales, though not every tale will have every function.

Similarly, Propp's account of character is concerned only with what a character does in the narrative structure, not with whom he or she is as an individual. Character is defined in terms of a "sphere of action": thus the villain fights, opposes, or pursues the hero and commits acts of villainy. Different individual characters may perform the function (or character role) of villain at different times in the same narrative. This leads Propp to the conclusion that "the functions of characters are stable constant elements in a tale, independent of how and by whom they are fulfilled. They constitute the fundamentals components of a tale."4

As has been shown through different studies, Westerns, the Hitchcock film North by Northwest, television genres all correspond to Propp's model.5 Thus, there appears to be something close to a universal structure of popular
narrative of which individual stories are transformations. The cultural specificity or ideology of a narrative lies in the way this deep structure is transformed into apparently different stories. Narrative theorists have drawn two conclusions from all this. The first is that certain motifs, situations, and stock characters may have universal psychological/mythological/sociological appeal and thus appear again and again in popular cultural forms. Second, that stories are governed by a set of unwritten rules acquired by all storytellers and receivers. This explains both stories' variability and consistency. Narrative can then be seen as the means of articulating the profound and uncertain relationship of the individual with the social. Anthropologically, in Propp's structure, the struggle between the hero and villain is a metaphorical transformation of that between the forces of order and those of disorder, good and evil, or culture and nature. Such a struggle is fundamental to all societies, and the narrative explores the role of human and social agents in it.

Todorov's theory of narrative furthermore gives primacy to the interplay of social forces over the individual. A narrative charts the course of a social state from one state of harmony and order to another, possibly different and enhanced, having along the way encountered and successfully overcome the forces of disruption. The hero and the villain embody the social forces that, respectively, serve to maintain social harmony, and those that perturb it. Narrative here serves not so much to accommodate the individual within the social, but rather to explore within the social the opposition of order and entropy. Ideology enters the narrative in the comparison of the initial and final states of social order; and in the social values that are identified with harmony and disruption.
As Fiske explains, Todorov's model is particularly useful in explaining popular cultural forms as the social narrative of conflict between the social order and disruptive forces. He specifies two kinds of elements in narrative, a state (either of equilibrium or disequilibrium) and a passage from one state to another, usually through an event or chain of events. This reveals the ideology at work in fictional stories. Disruption and restoration occur at the level of individual or unique events, and thus the social system underlying the state of equilibrium is shown as coping with disruption and therefore as adequate. The model does not imply that narrative in itself is either radical or reactionary. But in popular culture the narrative structure is likely to be used in favor of status quo. In realist narrative the equilibrium is a reproduction of the values of the current social order that is rarely represented directly, but only indirectly in terms of its disruption. It is, therefore, mythologized into the taken-for-granted, the common-sense view of how things really are, which is necessarily supportive of the status quo. To present a critical view of the social order, it would be necessary to take it out of the realm of the taken-for-granted, to "nominate" it, to represent it directly and critically, and thus to demythologize it. The conservative drive of the narrative structure is undeniable. It serves to embed the meanings firmly within the dominant ideology, without casting upon the ideology itself a critical light which would permit alternative subversive readings. However, as studies done by scholars such as Fiske have shown us repeatedly, a textual structure is a hegemonic line of force that may, at any time, meet an equivalent line of resistance.

I have used Propp's method of analyzing narratives over Todorov's because I am interested in seeing narrative as an exploration within the
social of the opposing forces of stability and disruption, rather than as an accommodation of the individual with the social as in Todorov. However, there are significant variations from Propp's model as well. I have used Will Wright's method of narrative analysis, which uses morphemes as a list of shared "functions." But it also deviates from Propp's method in three significant ways. First, Propp restricted his functions to descriptions of actions. Since Bombay films are more complicated than folk tales, the "functions" that I have identified, like Will Wright's work, describe either a single action or a single attribute of a character. The characters whose actions and attributes are described by these functions are generic, not specific — that is they refer to the role of the hero as a character in all the stories, rather than the individual heroes of the tales. Second, the character referred to by the functions need not only be one individual. The generalized character in a function can be, and often is, a group of characters in a film, all of whom share a single meaning in an opposition. Thus, a function will refer to "the villains" or "the society" as a single character with respect to structural action. Third, Propp showed that the functions that characterize a set of stories occur in a rigid, unchangeable order; in each tale every function — that is every action — must appear in exactly the same sequence. But as Wright quite correctly points out9 this approach is unnecessarily restricting, for it is easy to recognize a set of essentially similar stories with slightly differing orders of events. The order of functions that characterize a Bombay film will not always correctly correspond to the order of events in a particular film, in fact, some functions may not occur at all in some films. In the next section I will demonstrate ways in which Bombay cinematic narratives fall into Propp's model. My
strategy will be, first, to give plot summaries of three representative films and then, to derive a set of functions that will characterize all of the films in my sample. Following this, I will explain how the conceptual, or oppositional meanings of each of the relevant characters are established. Semiotician Umberto Eco also uses the same methodology to analyze James Bond films. Using Propp and Levi-Strauss, he shows us that it is the very structure of the Bond films of disequilibrium to equilibrium that is the source of the viewing pleasure.

In terms of my method of selection, my population was all the box office hits between 1981 and 1990. The entire list of these films, as identified by Screen World Publications according to their box office returns, is presented in the Appendix. For the selection of these films, I depended on a simplistic notion of the popular, one that equates the concept with box office returns. The films that I analyzed are all part of a genre that emerged in the 1980s. They comprise a new genre partly because of the themes, the distinct cinematic codes used and ideologies invoked. The narrative of all these films seemed to comply with the structure derived. The variation, if any, will be explained in the following section.


The Plot Summaries of Selected Films

In this section, I will give the plot summaries of three representative films. Giving the summaries of each film is both repetitive and unnecessary.
Yet to show that these films are essentially alike, I need supporting evidence. I chose *Ek Duje Ke Liye* because it was the first film in the "Young Love" genre to become a success in the 1980s. *Mai ne Pyar Kiya* was selected because it was the film that made most money and, finally, *Ram Teri Ganga Maili* was selected because it is based on a best-selling novel and has a relatively straightforward storyline.

**Ek Duje Ke Liye**

This is the earliest of the new genre, released in 1981. It was directed by K. Balachander and introduced newcomers Kamalhasan and Rati Agnihotri. The story begins soon after the family of the hero, Vasu, migrates to Goa from the South. Vasu's family are misfits here and constantly quarrel with their neighbors who are northerners, and thus, also migrants. After resigning his job in the South, Vasu arrives at his parents' new home. One day while on a jog, he sees a girl being harassed by a town bully and rescues her. The girl, Sapna, is the daughter of Vasu's neighbors. Vasu and Sapna fall in love, even though they are divided in terms of their regional backgrounds and language. While Vasu speaks Tamil, Sapna speaks Hindi. The only language the two have in common is English.

The young lovers start meeting each other in secret and then declare their intention to wed. Both their parents object to the relationship citing regional differences. They ask their children to prove their love for one another by remaining separated for a year. The young couple agrees to this promising not to communicate with each other for a year. Vasu leaves for a new job in Hyderabad. While there, he starts going to a beautiful, young widow, Sandhya, to learn Hindi, the language used by his girlfriend's family. Meanwhile, Sapna's parents invite a distant cousin, Kumar, to be their house
guest, in the hope that their daughter will forget Vasu and fall in love with Kumar instead.

After months of separation, Vasu is sent to another town on an official trip. While there, he thinks he spies Sapna meeting with another man in a hotel where he is staying. Sapna, is in fact visiting the same town, but she is on a trip with her girlfriends. Vasu accosts the man--Kumar who has been sent by Sapna's mother to ensure that the lovers does not connive to meet. During the confrontation, Kumar lies and says that he and Sapna are engaged to be married. Heartbroken, Vasu returns to Hyderabad and tells Sandhya that he needs her support and compassion to overcome a deep hurt. Not knowing what his hurt is, Sandhya falls in love with Vasu. Later the two become engaged to be married. One day, by accident, Sandhya finds a bunch of unmailed love letters written by Vasu to Sapna over the past year. To learn more about this Sandhya meets Sapna and without revealing her own identity finds out that Sapna is still in love with Vasu. She calls off her wedding and tells Vasu the truth, urging him to fly back to Sapna. Vasu does so, arriving exactly one year after he had started his forced separation. Sapna, awaiting his arrival, goes to a lonely beach spot where the two used to meet in secret. Here she is attacked by the town bully. When Vasu arrives to rescue her, he is too late. Embracing her bruised beaten body, the two jump off a cliff recognizing that the world will not let them live together.

Ram Teri Ganga Maili

This film, released in 1984, also introduced two new faces -- Mandakini and Rajiv Kapoor. It is directed by veteran star and cine giant Raj Kapoor. Many Kapoor directorial ventures have become superhits in the
past. In this case too, the success of the film was attributed to Kapoor
directorial genius, including his ability to play to the needs of the common
masses by including a scene of frontal nudity (usually censored in Indian
films).

The film opens with a discourse on the inherent purity in human
nature and its corruption due to civilization and modernization. Industrialist
Sahay and state politician Bhagwat Chowdhury are business partners. Sahay
contributes handsomely to Chowdhury's campaign funds and Chowdhury in
turn ensures that Sahay is not penalized for dumping toxic industrial waste
into the river Ganga. Sahay's son, Naren knows about his father's his illegal
practices and wants to get away from the oppressive family. He goes to the
Himalayas to the mouth of the river Ganga. Here he meets and falls in love
with a young Himalayan village belle, Ganga. After Ganga proposes, the two
get married in the village.

A few months later, Naren returns to the city to find that his family is
planning his wedding to his childhood friend and Chowdhury's daughter,
Radha. Fearing the wrath of his father, Naren does not tell his father of his
marriage to Ganga, but refuses to marry Radha. However, his uncle Jeeva
Babu, guesses Naren's secret and promises to help him especially since Sahay
has promised to lock his son in the house.

Several months later, Ganga gives birth to Naren's son. After Naren
fails to live up to his promise of fetching Ganga, she decides to go to the city
with her son. However, midway, she is befriended by a man who is struck
by Ganga's innocent good looks. The man is actually a procurer for a
cabaret-prostitution ring. Ganga is trained by the brothel owner and is
"delivered" to a "very important client." This client turns out to be politician
Chowdhury. When Chowdhury finds out that Ganga is no seasoned prostitute, but Naren's wife, he and Sahay plot to get Ganga out of the city before Naren gets to know of her presence.

Naren, in the meantime, agrees to marry Radha after he is told that his father will physically abuse his mother if he refuses. For his part, Naren's uncle Jeeva Babu living up to his promise made to his nephew, locates Ganga and vows to help her. At a reception for Naren and Radha's wedding he manages to sneak in Ganga, who reveals her identity to everyone present. When Naren is told about the depth to which his father stooped to separate him from his bride, he renounces life in the city and sails down the river Ganga with his wife and son.

Maine Pyar Kiya
This film, released in 1988, became the top grossing film of all time. It was directed by Sooraj Barjatiya and introduced Bhagyashree as Suman. Incidentally Bhagyashree left the film world after only one film, and this added to her mystique and charm, a major reason for the film's success.

Karan and Kishen are old childhood friends. Karan is a small-town diesel mechanic while Kishen has made it big in the city. One of Kishen's business cohorts is Ranjit, a prosperous entrepreneur, who has acquired his wealth through illegal business practices. When the film begins, he is plotting the takeover of Kishen's business through a show of friendship and a "merger" between his daughter, Seema and Kishen's son, Prem.

When Karan decides to go abroad as a migrant worker, he decides to leave his daughter, Suman in the city in Kishen's care. Kishen, though reluctant, accepts the daughter, but his wife, Kausalya comes to love Suman
as her own. When Prem returns home after his studies in the United States, he falls in love with Suman. At first, hesitant about their love, because of class differences, Suman slowly comes to accept Prem’s affection for her. Kausalya approves of this match and plans an official engagement. However, on learning this, Kishen berates Suman for plotting to marry into the family’s riches. Karan, who has just returned from abroad to fetch his daughter, overhears this. He returns to the countryside with Suman severing all connections with his childhood buddy.

In the meantime Prem defies his father, rejects his inheritance and the social values the city and his father have come to stand for. He follows Suman to the village with his mother’s blessing. However, Karan, Suman’s father, doubts Prem’s love for his daughter and asks Prem to earn his own living first. Prem becomes a stone quarry laborer. Back in the city, Kishen’s business cohort, Ranjit feels he has been cheated when his son is refused a director’s position in Kishen’s company. His other plan --- for his daughter to seduce Prem --- has also failed as Prem has left the city. Feeling frustrated, Ranjit vows to humiliate Kishen and destroy his business empire. When Kishen and Kausalya go to the countryside to ask their son to return home, Ranjit’s thugs attack both Kishen and Prem. It is Karan comes to their rescue. Kishen now realizes who his true friends are and accepts Suman as his daughter-in-law.

Narrative Functions

Analyzing the narrative of all the films, I arrived at 18 functions which describe the characters and actions that are shared by the films. As explained before, these functions are one-sentence statements that describe
either a single action or a single attribute of a character. They also describe the interactions of these characters. In other words, the list of functions reveals what the characters do.

1. **Hero enters a social group.**
Usually they have names that cannot be pinned down to any one region. Often, they do not have any last names either as in *Jo Jeeta* or *Betaab*. In *Qayamat Se Qayamat Tak*, the boy goes back to his ancestral village and sees the girl for the first time. In *Ek Duje Ke Liye*, the hero's parents move to a new part of the country and he comes to his new home having been fired from his office. In *Maine Pyar Kiya*, the male hero returns home from schooling abroad while the female hero of the film moves from the village to the city.

2. **Hero realizes a void in his/her life.**
Clearly the first business of the young lovers is to search, seek and find love. All the films are in a very basic sense boy-meets-girl stories. However, unlike the classic love tragedies of the past, today's young lovers do not exist merely to love. They fight social ills and even question the meaning of life without a cause. In *Maine Pyar Kiya* and *Ram Teri Ganga Maili*, *Jawani Zindabad* and *Ek Duje Ke Liye* the heroes specifically articulate the need for a more purposeful existence.

3. **The hero questions his/her lifestyle.**
Based on the realization of a gap and void in their lives, the heroes question their own lifestyles and the values that accompany them. Here there are specific references to a post-colonial sell-out in several of the films (*Ram Teri Ganga Maili*, *Ek Duje Ke Liye* and *Dil*).
4. Male and female heroes, or the young lovers, are separated by class, regional differences, socio-economic differences and sometimes religion.

In *Ek Duje Ke Liye*, regional differences are at the heart of the entire story. In fact in the first half of the film the couple do not communicate with words, since they do not have a common language. In *Qayamat Se Qayamat Tak*, a long-standing family feud, based on class differences, separates the two lovers. In *Dil, Maine Pyar Kiya, Ram Teri Ganga Maili, Betaab* class differences exist between the male and female heroes.

5. The hero reacts positively to the heroine.

It is always the male hero who first approaches the girl and speaks to her of his romantic interest in her. The two exceptions to this are *Ram Teri Ganga Maili* and *Jawani Zindabad*, where the female hero is the more aggressive of the two in terms of initiating a romantic involvement.

6. The heroine responds ambiguously to the hero/heroine, acknowledging differences between them; but, she returns his love.

Even in *Ram Teri Ganga Maili*, where the female hero is more aggressive than the male lover, she warns him about future opposition from his parents. The opposition is recognized as being classist and discriminatory, yet as being in the young man's best interests from his parents' point of view. So she urges him to go back to the city without her. Exceptions to this are *Dil, Ek Duje Ke Liye* where differences are seen as stepping stones to a stronger relationship.

7. The hero openly declares his love for the heroine.
Even though women are bold, sexually vibrant (Dil, Betaab, Ram Teri Ganga Maili) and at the center of these narratives (a major difference from the "revenge" films of the 1970s, where they were peripheral at best, helping to further etch out the male hero's character), it is left to the men to announce their love to the society at large and thus seek its sanction. The only exception, perhaps, is Ek Duje Ke Liye. But even here, the male and female heroes make the announcement together.

8. Society and kin oppose the union of the young lovers.
Parental and societal opposition to the marriage is usually based on differences in class, regional backgrounds and social standing. In Betaab the whole film is a study of class differences and in Jo Jeeta the value of honest but menial work in society is shown. The same theme is brought up in Maine Pyar Kiya where the hero has to renounce his upper-class standing to win the girl. In Jawani, division along class lines is greater in the parallel plot.

9. The male and female heroes both realize that orthodox traditions and social practices prevent their union.
Among traditions that are rejected is the firmly-entrenched system of arranged marriage. This system is associated with other traditional practices such as socialization within the same class or caste, the giving of dowry, marriages as financial mergers and the subordination of women through a denial of choice in their selection of husbands. Every film in this study addresses the issues of dowry, women's property and social rights and intra-caste and intra-class socialization. The issue of dowry is closely connected to class consciousness. Also brought up in these films is the status of women,
state-abetted prostitution, government corruption and inefficiency, and exploitation as the cornerstone of western-style capitalism.

10. Villains keep alive social ills.
The villains usually operate thriving black market enterprises that not only contribute to the country’s underground economy, but also promote archaic social practices such as dowry and disempowerment of women in terms of their personal and property rights. In fact in Maine Pyar Kiya, Betaab, Dil and Aashiqui, there are specific references by villains to women as property and not as property owners under ancient Hindu law.

11. Parents and kin seek to enlist villains help to separate the young lovers.
The hero and the villains are past friends or kin (estranged brother, father or usually cousins). The efforts could include public humiliation as in Maine Pyar Kiya and Dil or even murder as in Qayamat Se Qayamat Tak, Jo Jeeta...and Betaab.

12. Hero takes a stand against social ills.
She/he breaks with certain societal traditions or practices (such as breaking with the practice of dowry in Jawani Zindabad; intra-caste marriage as in many films and the social ostracization of widows as in Ek Duje Ke Liye). Usually an elder (grandmother in Ram Teri Ganga or mother in Love Story and Qayamat Se Qayamat Tak) recognizes that this break in tradition is not bad, but a step toward societal progression and national development.

13. Villains harm the hero.
Usually the woman is harmed and rescuing her becomes in itself a statement of the male hero’s love for the girl, who is still skeptical of his love. This is
also a test of the hero's maturity and of the strength of the bond between the lovers.

14. **The harmed hero's lover tries to rescue him/her and endangers herself/himself.**

When alone or separated from her/his partner, the heroes are weak and in danger. The villains harm the heroine when she is away from the hero and her family. In almost all the films, the hero has to fight the villains singlehandedly. The villains usually work in packs and derive their strength through numbers rather than any superiority in the personal physical or spiritual spheres.

15. **The hero defeats the villains.**

The hero, accompanied by his or her partner fights the villains and defeats them.

16. **Society realizes the need for change.**

Elders recognize the folly of their ways and agree to change. The leader of the gang of villains, often the hero's past friend, either is killed or changes.

17. **Male and female hero pair change immediate social circle.**

However, there is still a sense that the hero and heroine do not accept this society, still steeped in practices that are outdated and sometimes evil. In a few films, the lovers die in the end (*Ek Duje Ke Liye, Qayamat Se Qayamat Tak*), in another (*Ram Teri...*) they sail down the river Ganga, never looking back. Thus, there is a sense of rejection of society in some films, while in others, the hero accepts society and assumes a place in it. But even here, we are never sure whether the hero and heroine get completely integrated into the society. Exceptions to this are *Love Story* and *Jaane Jaan* where the heroes become explicitly integrated with the society.
18. The pair is united.
The young lovers are united often by marriage or acceptance of their
marriage by society. However, another pattern in these films is a re-union
of the lovers through death. This is true for films such as Ek Duje Ke Liye,
Betaab, and Qayamat Se Qayamat Tak. The only exception is Ram Teri Ganga
Maili, where as mentioned before, there is an explicit rejection of society by
the couple.

This completes the functions for the hit films of the 1980s. This plot,
as can now be seen is that of a love story. Thus I have labelled these texts
"Young Love" films. These eighteen functions describe the narrative
structure of the eighties films, which present a dramatic model of
communication and action between characters who represent different types
of people inherent in our conceptualization of society. For the sake of
convenience, I will list these 18 "functions" again:

1. Hero enters a social group.
2. Hero realizes a void in his/her life.
3. The hero questions his/her lifestyle.
4. Male and female heroes, or the young lovers, are separated by class,
regional differences, socio-economic differences and sometimes
religion too.
5. Hero reacts positively to the heroine.
6. Heroine responds ambiguously to the hero/heroine,
acknowledging differences between them; but, she returns his love.
7. Hero openly declares his love for the heroine.
8. Society and kin oppose the union of the young lovers.
9. The male and female heroes both realize that it is orthodox
traditions and social practices that prevent their union.
10. Villains keep alive social ills.
11. Parents, kin seek/enlist villains help to separate the young lovers
forever.
12. Hero takes a stand against social ills.
13. Villains harm the hero.
14. The harmed hero's lover tries to rescue him/her and endangers herself/himself.
15. The hero defeats the villains.
16. Society realizes the need for change.
17. Male and female hero pair change immediate social circle.
18. The pair is united.

All the functions are not present in all the films and not in the same order either. Below is a table of narrative functions followed in each individual film. The numbers denote the narrative function present in each film. As is apparent, even though not each film follows a different order, the basic form of the narrative remains the same -- starting with the hero's entry into a new society, the meeting of the lovers, societal opposition to them and finally their reunion usually after a tragedy or a near tragedy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Film</th>
<th>Narrative Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ek Duje Ke Liye:</td>
<td>1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 3, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bhaag:</td>
<td>1, 4, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love Story:</td>
<td>1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ram Teri Ganga Maili:</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jo Jeeta Wo Sikander:</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 10, 13, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aashiqui:</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 9, 12, 16, 17, 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oayamat Se Oayamat Tak:</td>
<td>1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine Pyar Kiya:</td>
<td>1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 3, 12, 13, 5, 16, 17, 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dil:</td>
<td>1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jawani Zindabad:</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 10, 18, 13, 15, 16, 17.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Binary Oppositions in Young Love Films**

This list of functions reveals what the characters do and the interactions of the films' main characters. But what do these characters stand for? To discover precisely what ideas of social classification and order are embedded in the above narratives, I next examine the oppositional structure used to code the characters. In this way concepts, characters and images are structured into binary oppositions. The oppositions provide the basic categories through which the characters of a narrative take on meaning; they provide the code through which images are understood as concepts. If the list of narrative functions reveals what the characters do, the binary oppositions reveal what they mean; they provide the code through which images are understood as concepts. In *Six Guns and Society*, Wright shows that the characters of a popular narrative always represent social types who act out a drama of social order. Thus the interaction of two characters in say conflict or sexual attraction, is never simply an interaction between individuals but always involves the social principles that the characters represent. A fight in a narrative would not simply be a conflict between A and B, but a conflict of principles—good versus evil, rich versus poor, and so on. This is particularly true of popular cultural forms, as opposed to high culture texts, in which there is usually an attempt to portray complex, realistic characters in situations that challenge social attitudes. Any popular narrative must relate to the actual experiences of the people. Thus, very often, either popular narratives use stock characters (as in folk tales), or through their actions or attributes, they come to represent social types. Popular myths, thus, depend for their success on simple and recognizable meanings which reinforce rather than challenge social understanding. In
contemporary myths, says Wright, images of things, especially people, represent social types that are structured in such a way that they represent a conceptual idea of social order.11

The oppositions rich/poor, inside society/outside society and strong/weak might be regarded as some of the stable classificatory categories of a popular narrative tradition. While these are all present in the "Young Love" films, the main opposition structuring these films is between tradition/modernity or material/spiritual. I will only deal with the last two dichotomies, since these are what intersect with nationalist discourses. In terms of protagonists in these films, there seems to be a patterned use of three figures: heroes, villains and the society. The binary codes used for them is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inside</th>
<th>Outside</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>villains, society</td>
<td>hero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bad</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>villains, society</td>
<td>hero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weak</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>society</td>
<td>villains, hero (but weak when alone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>selfish</td>
<td>selfless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>villains</td>
<td>society, hero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traditional</td>
<td>modern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>society</td>
<td>villains, hero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>material</td>
<td>spiritual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>society, villain</td>
<td>heroes (usually female)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since both the Tradition/Modernity and Material/Spiritual dichotomies play themselves out through gender roles and portrayals, the figure of the woman as mother and nation becomes important. Unlike the "revenge" films of the 1970s, the character of the woman becomes prominent in the 1980s. She is in a prominent position by virtue of her
simultaneous centrality and subordination. The notion of "family" also becomes central in these films, primarily because of its iconographic force.

The Tradition vs Modernity opposition is coded two ways.

First, it is coded in terms of consumerism and fashion. Nag has argued that fashion embodies change; it is "itself only by being forever transient". Tradition, on the other hand, signifies the unchanging, the repetitious, the stable. It transcends temporality and is thereby opposed to the quintessence of modernity--changeability. Fashion and tradition are thus, apparently irreconcilable. But it is in the figure of the heroine (and sometimes the changed heroine) that this reconciliation and merging occurs. The "Young Love" films are stories about modernity and tradition. The sari is a sign of tradition and Western modes of garb such as dress, trousers and shorts is a sign of modernity. By apparently being able to switch at ease from one to another, the heroine shows how she combines in herself the two opposing lifestyles and values. Also, often there is a movement of the heroine's mode of dress from an exclusively Western form of dress to the acceptance of the sari and the social roles and values that seem to go with it.

Second the Tradition/Modernity opposition is coded through the depiction of approaches to marriage. All the heroes are initially against marriage. Marriage is rejected by the heroes who link it to domesticity, established life within parameters set by society. In Dil the hero opposes marriage in the beginning saying it means acceptance of certain societal norms and practices he opposes. On the other hand, marriage also means growth, maturity, an acceptance of moral and social responsibilities and to a degree the effacement of self in face of societal obligations. Modernity, on the other hand is seen as self-fulfillment,
independence, innovation and self assertion. It means stepping outside boundaries set by obsolete notions of social roles. Yet modernity is also shown through a rejection of social roots and historical origins, a cultural amnesia. The heroes in films end up by rejecting the boundaries set by society but accepting social responsibilities through an apprehension of their own histories. Movement toward marriage ultimately is a movement towards giving up some of the values of modernity. But since the marriage is by their choice, there is explicit rejection of obsolete social practices too.

In terms of visual iconography urban, western or science imagery is used to show modernity. Tradition is shown through rural landscapes, tribal costumes and practices and religious rituals.

**Woman as Subversive Strength**

The Material/Spiritual dichotomy is also coded in two ways.

First, this opposition is coded is through allusions to the Hindu female deities -- Shakti and Sita. The analysis of female figures within the cinematic texts in terms of archetypal feminine strength within may appear to be an esoteric exercise. But this is important in understanding the appeal of iconic characters like Sita who get reproduced endlessly in the heroines, mothers and other female characters in Indian Cinema. The New Indian Womanhood combines the strengths and qualities of both Shakti and Sita. Shakti, as the iconic mother is an image of strength, an active, creative intellectual force with the power to confront and transform evil and injustice. She is the material force of the Earth. The image of Sita denotes chastity, innocence, devotion, belief and a
submission to a "higher" (usually patriarchal) order. She is inner spiritual strength. The New Woman is the incarnation of both Shakti and Sita. The only exception here is Maine Pyar Kiya where the woman remains a passive bystander till the end, more like Sita than Shakti.

In this context it is interesting to note that while intellectual or physical strength were previously seen as purely male preserves, the new genre of films that came out in the 1980s negate that polarization between the masculine and the feminine. Within popular social schema today, nurturance, submission, faith, irrationality, self effacement are the 'positive' side of "passive" female traits and acquisitiveness, greed deviousness and jealousy the 'negative' side. The more 'active' and 'positive' traits like rationality, pragmatism, achievement drive and positive aggression get 'naturally' associated with men. However, for the first time within Indian popular culture, this separation was challenged and broken down within the "Young Love" films. Historically, this has not been the case always. In the pre-Vedic civilization, the female principle in nature, Prakriti, was viewed as fundamental reality, the cause of the universe. This ideological and philosophical theory of Prakriti Pradhana consequently resulted in the social supremacy of the woman. Aryanization brought in the precedence of the male principle, Purusha Pradhana, and its connotations of status and power of woman decreased, dregs of this supremacy got left behind in the symbolic system. Modernization and the spread of enlightenment values like rationality, reason and individualism ensured a total erosion of the femininity principle and the Prakriti Purusha dyad to give way to the more masculine notions of power and control. (It is interesting to note a
pertinent aside that in 1988, a film depicting woman in the age-old mold of Sita, became the center of a debate on censorship. The film Pati Parameswar portrays a forgiving, loving wife who looks after her husband even though he spends most of his time with a mistress. India's film censors, the Central Board of Film Certification, banned the film saying it glorified submissiveness of women. They invoked CBFC guideline 2 (iv) which endeavors to ensure that "visuals or words depicting women in ignoble servility to man or glorifying such servility as a praiseworthy quality, are not presented." The ban was ultimately revoked by the Bombay High Court. What was most interesting that feminists in India, sided with the censors.)

The Material/Spiritual coding is also achieved images of the West and the division of the social spheres into the public and private domains. The heroes in all but two films are Western-educated and in several cases the films begin with the return of the hero from "vilait" which literally means foreign land, but in Bombay Cinema has always come to mean Britain and now increasingly, the new empire the United States. This is interesting to note because the films then define Indian identity in relation, not to Africa or other Asian communities, (with similar problems, polity and culture) but to the white West. In other words, it accepts the Orientalist definitions of itself as the Other and then goes on to see how and in what ways it could emulate the West. The West is associated with a certain mode of dress, lifestyle, food, language, music and the politics of divide and conquer. Thus the villains, who are also Western educated, have Anglo-Saxon names, drink beer, womanize (treat women as sex objects) and use more English that the heroes!.
Moreover, it is the male heros that receive education in foreign lands or even go outside of their immediate regions and territory. Only in *Ek Duje Ke Liye* do we find that it is the girl's family that has migrated to another region. This also corresponds to the very post-enlightenment division between the private and public domains. The man takes charge of the public sphere and gives the woman the private where she can realize herself. Here it is interesting to note that the heros and the heroines, despite their mythic character, or may be because of it, are not part of any identifiable social milieu.

The central place of the image of woman to nationalism still needs to be explained theoretically. An important influence here and one that is explicitly invoked in the cinematic texts is the teachings of Gandhi. Colonial culture hierarchicized sexual identities that assumed that manliness was superior to womanliness and this in turn was superior to femininity in man. Gandhi opposed this ordering by countering it with another order. In his framework:

\[ \text{Naritsa} \succ \text{Purusatva} \succ \text{Kapurasatva} \]

This means that the essence of "femininity" is superior to that of "masculinity", which in turn is better than cowardice, or the "failure of masculinity". This ordering included some traditional meanings of womanhood in India, such as the belief in a closer conjunction between power, activism and femininity than between power, activism and masculinity. It also implied the belief that the feminine principle is a more powerful, dangerous, albeit uncontrollable principle in the cosmos than the male principle. However, Gandhi also said (and we can see this in films such as *Mother India* (1957) but also in the mother figures in the
In the "Young Love" films, two prototypes of women occupy central place in the narratives -- the female hero and the mother. The central female character is seen as a sexual figure, but unlike earlier characterizations of coy or concealed sexuality, the 1980s' women accept their sexuality and even act on it. The sexual energy is channeled not merely toward a personal relationship but social change. In *Ek Duje Ke Liye, Dil, Maine Pyar Kiya* and *Betaab*, regionalism, corporate greed and class divisions are seen as hindering not just the relationships between the young lovers but also development and growth in general. In *Jawani Zindabad*, Farrah's character actively wants to work against the system of socially arranged marriages which encourages the bartering of humans. However the central focus always remains on the romance of the young pair; it is as if now romance has been given a socially acceptable face. Thus, the movement of the heroine is always one of growth from a sexual being to a maternal one.

Gandhi had frequently made it clear that he drew his kernel of thought from the experience of woman and his close identification with the concept of motherhood. He was therefore able evolve a strategy of political action from a 'loser's' philosophy and was able to reach out to the masses and more specifically was able to draw women into the sphere of social action in their own terms - speaking in a familiar idiom and
language. Gandhi was therefore able to successfully give a contemporary political impetus to an essentially cultural archetype. This practical and dynamic expression and extension of the ideal of motherhood is only now being realized in India commercial cinema. We must recognize the rupture and disjunctions in the portrayals of the mother figure in the "Young Love" films and the "Mother India" archetype of the woman who possesses an inexhaustible capacity to give and take nothing in return but stoically take on the world as a violence inflicted on her by fate.

**Narrative Sequences**

To show how a myth is seen to provide social allegorical meanings, Wright says, the meaning of the narrative is contained in a series of sequences that move the action from beginning to end. A narrative sequence explains a change from one situation to another. It is a set of three functions that provides an explanation for a change in a specific situation. In other words narrative sequences embody the explanations for what happens in the plot. The sequences illustrate how images of things, especially people who represent social types, are structured in a way to represent a conceptual idea of social order. Using this method, it is possible to view the narrative synchronically. The advantages of doing so are two-fold.22 On the one-hand, the view of a given narrative as a single mechanism or synchronic unit allows us to speak about its social function in a way that would be more difficult were we dealing with a mere batch of episodes. On the other, a synchronic approach to narrative also allows us to focus on the various semantic tokens, the various mechanisms for the production of meaning, the
various binary oppositions out of which the narrative is constructed and of which it may now be seen as the articulation in time.

Since all the films in my sample seem to revolve around the theme of love and trace a young pair of lovers' union in death or marriage, we begin with the sequence SEPARATION. This sequence explains why things will not go smoothly for the lovers.

SEPARATION

2. Hero realizes a void in his/her life.
4. Male and female heroes, or the young lovers, are separated by class, regional differences, socio-economic differences and sometimes religion too.
11. Parents, kin seek/enlist villains help to separate the young lovers forever.

The main reason why the lovers will be separated is because of their differences in class, social standing etc. This is designated as:

CLASS

4. Male and female heroes, are separated by class...
6. Heroine responds ambiguously ...
8. Society and kin oppose the union ...

RENOUNCEMENT shows that the obstacle to the union of the lovers is not their own love but their own lifestyles and the morality that comes with it. For the union, then actually to take place, that set of moral values associated with their previous lifestyles must be renounced. These usually are values associated with modernization, the West and the urban community. In other words, the renouncement is a rejection of western values and an embracing
of the "real India" which breeds tolerance, rather than divisions. Thus:

3. The hero questions his/her lifestyle.

RENOUNCEMENT

CLASS

4. Male and female heroes are separated...

6. Heroine responds ambiguously...

8. Society and kin oppose the union...

9. The male and female heroes both realize that it is orthodox traditions and social practices that prevent their union.

From the beginning of the narratives, either the female or the male hero is outside of society. He or she enters a new society in the beginning, and the members of the new society never really accept them as one of their own. However, the young pair really get estranged from society when they take an explicit stand against it. The society here is a peculiar mixture of the material and traditionalism. The lovers (soon, if not at the beginning of the films) stand outside this society. This sequence I have labelled OUTSIDE:

1. Hero enters a social group

OUTSIDE

RENOUNCEMENT

CLASS

3.

9.

12. Hero takes a stand against social ills.

Just like the lovers are "outside" because of their love for each other and their renunciation of certain societal traditions, these traditions themselves become a sign of being INSIDE. The traditions are kept alive both by the
villains and the parents of the lovers, who often connive with them. Thus this sequence takes the following form:

INSIDE

9. The male and female heroes both realize that it is orthodox traditions and social practices that prevent their union.
10. Villains keep alive social ills
11. Parents, kin seek/enlist villains help to separate the young lovers forever.

The strength of the lovers' to withstand the scorn of the society and take its abuse comes from the strength of their love. The first indication we get of their love is when one of them shows a romantic interest in the other. Their love is tested by their differences, but it only grows as a result of their double estrangement from society because of their beliefs and because of their love.

LOVE

5
7

OUTSIDE

RENOUNCEMENT

CLASS

9. Hero takes a stand against social ills.

The lovers' commitment to each other and to their social cause is never truly in doubt or questioned, except perhaps in *Ek Duje Ke Liye*, where the young man, separated from his girlfriend, is befriended by a young widow. Their friendship deepens into love. However, his commitment to his old love is
kept alive by his own memories, his new girlfriend and, paradoxically, his commitment to the widow. This sequence is explained as follows:

**COMMITMENT**

- **LOVE**
  - 13. Villains harm the hero.
  - 14. The harmed hero's lover tries to rescue him/her and endangers herself/himself.

Society realizes its folly only when faced with the possibility of death of their offspring. In all cases it is the parents who inadvertently cause this because of their vow to separate the lovers. Usually the mother (or the mother figure) stands outside of this. Only in *Ek Duje Ke Liye* is the mother also against the union. Because of this, the end then is an apprehension of the values the mother stands for—a mix of the East and the West. The **REALIZATION** sequence takes the following form:

**REALIZATION**

- 8. Society and kin oppose the union...
- **COMMITMENT**
  - **LOVE**
    - 13. Villains harm the hero.
    - 14. The harmed hero's lover...
  - 16. Society realizes the need for change.

Realization and apprehension of the new values does not necessarily change society, but the heroes' immediate circle is influenced and changed. The new order reflects the values of the young pair.

**NEW ORDER**

- **REALIZATION**
  - **CLASS**
    - 17. Male and female hero pair change immediate social circle.

In the age-old tradition of love tragedies, the lovers are seen to be ahead of their times. For there to be a new social order, old barriers and traditions must be broken and there has to be a reconciliation between modernity and
tradition, the urban and the rural, the spiritual and the material, inner strength and physical strength. All are achieved through the union of the lovers.

15. Hero defeats the villains.

UNION

{ NEW ORDER } REALIZATION

{ CLASS

17. Male and female hero pair...

18. Pair is united.

This completes the narrative and draws it toward its resolution. We began with separation of the lovers, and so we end with their union. The separation occurred because of certain social differences and the traditions that reified those divisions. We end with those traditions giving way to change, leading to a new order. With this new order, separation, along old lines, is no longer possible; thus, the union results. The only exception to this is Ram Teri Ganga Maili, where there is no indication of any social change in the heroes' immediate circle--either superficial or real. The young lovers in this film renounce the whole society. Thus, in terms of their union, this film, too, complies with the structure presented here; however, its logic is different.

It can be said that my concern with the narrative of Bombay films is both limited and narrow. As with most other formalist approaches, it only explicates the general mappings of the structure. Thus, this approach can be criticized for being unconcerned with questions about "content" and thus with political or ideological judgements. However, there are several reasons why I have chosen to use Will Wright's variant of structuralism. My focus is the narrative structure of Bombay films. These films have been criticized
either for their repetitive, formulaic structures\textsuperscript{23} or for having no structures at all, at least not in the Western literary sense\textsuperscript{24}. By using the structural methodology, I showed the tight structure these films have. I am only too aware of post-structuralist and post-modernist critiques of structuralism. However, structuralism provides one the best frameworks for analyzing the structure of a popular cultural form. Moreover, the relatively lengthy and episodic nature of Bombay films makes Wright's variant of Propp's model particularly useful. Certainly there are problems with film structuralism, the most important being the charge of ahistoricism. But Wright's method answers the problematic by seeing narrative as a "form of reasoning" about experience and society\textsuperscript{25}. Also, deviations from one structure of the films identified are regarded by Wright not as aberrations but as a different genre. This is especially useful for understanding and classifying the commercial successes coming out of the Bombay Hindi film industry. It allows us to understand both conformity and variations. Because there is neither norm, nor aberrations, Wright's scheme begins to accommodate history itself and the social situation, as that external limiting situation or condition of possibility which accounts for the coming into being or a given variant. However, due to the limited scope of this current study, Wright's method has not been used to its fullest interpretive extent.
ENDNOTES


7. John Fiske's Television Culture. p. 139.

8. Ibid. p. 140.


10. A more satisfactory way of reading the popular would be to see how cinema connects with the experiences of the masses. However, this necessitates a detailed audience analysis—a project outside the purview of the current study.


13. In this context see Madhu Jain and Simran Bhargava's "Changing sexuality" in India Today October 15, 1989, Satil Tripathi's "The Image of Women" in India Today August 15, 1988 and M. Rahman's "Women Strike Back" in India Today July 15, 1988. The representation of women in Bombay films has also been the subject of
14. In this worldview the breaking of society is visualized as three dimensions of womanhood - the preserving and nurturing, the sensual and the avenging. See A.M. Ghose's "Manu's Conception of Man and Society" in Daya Krishna (Ed.) India's Intellectual Traditions: Attempts at Reconstructions. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. 1987.


16. Thereafter this board will be referred to as the CBFC.

17. But the male the hero are not much better in this aspect, treating women like property, though property to be cherished for the purpose of production.

18. This division has been explored by among others Sara Evans in Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and The New Left and Jurgen Habermas in his Towards a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics Boston: Beacon Press. 1970.

19. An interesting narrative on women is Mahasweta Devi's short story The Wet Nurse. She writes "It is the chemistry of the soil of this land that all women turn into mothers here and all men choose to be eternal sons. All those who ignore the fact that in this country all men are Balgopals and all men Nandaranis, (Krishna's foster mother), and instead look on women in a different light such as "eternal she", "Mona Lisa", "L'Appassionata", "Simone de Beauvoir" etc., are mere amateurs in the act of pasting current posters over existing, tattered ones." in Kali for Women Collective (Eds.) Truth Tales. New Delhi: Kali for Women. 1986

20. See Ashis Nandy's Intimate Enemy op. cit. for detailed analysis of this.

21. In fact a new variant of the "Young Love" films is the marital infidelity, where sexual awakenings of both the man and the women are explored and increasingly the woman's sexual fantasies or relationships outside marriage give the raison d'etre for the filmic narratives


CHAPTER iv
THE CONTEXT OF THE MYTH

Indian films have been described as "purely escapist," but this is a judgement far beside the mark. The films serve a country marked by deep tensions -- between wealth and poverty, old and new, hope and fear. The tensions are the basic material of the medium. Its images and sounds are the only means for playing those tensions -- sometimes subtly, sometimes powerfully.

-- Erik Barnouw and S. Krishnaswamy in Indian Film.

In the last chapter we saw how the eighties films constructed a new image of Indian womanhood. The cinematic image was built through a merger of the "female" virtues of submissiveness with the more "male" traits of intellectual creation and assertiveness. This process essentially granted the woman a central role in the filmic narratives. This marks a distinct rupture from the films of the 1970s where the female figure was only marginal. This concluding chapter briefly discusses how the "Young Love" films shifted away from the preoccupations of the films in the previous decade. Following this, I detail the myth contained in the "Young Love" films. The role assigned to woman, I argue, was precisely the State's vision for the nation -- a creative mixture of tradition and spiritualism held together in dialectic tension with modernity and materialism. The final
section of the chapter inserts this vision of the nation into the politics of the 1980s.

From Revenge to Love

In the 1970s, the world of Bombay Cinema is generally said to belong to Amitabh Bachchan, the avatar of revenge. He brought a new kind of hero to the silver screen --perhaps more of an anti-hero -- a protagonist more bitter and violent than any that had preceded him. His character was glorified in a new breed of films, films that were tougher and more blood-splattered than previous ones. They did not fit into the earlier categories of Indian cinema such as "family socials," or the "mythological films". These films continued into the early 1980s but were slowly superseded in the popular market by very different cinematic forms, definitely kinder, gentler than the Bachchan films. These were what I have identified as the "Young Love" films, where the central focus was the relationship of the young lovers with each other, with their families, especially parental figures, and finally, the society at large. It is significant that four of these films broke all previous box office records at a time when television had superseded cinema as the national leisure time entertainment and cinema theaters were closing all over the country due to a lack of viewers.¹

Why did these simple, if not simplistic boy-meets-girl-and-wins-her-after-obstacles stories become so popular with the audience in the 1980s? Reasons advanced were that the violence and anger of the 1970 hits had become passe; that Bachchan (who had starred in all the "revenge" hits of the previous decade) had played out his repertoire,² and that music and romantic ballads had once again become predominant in the new films. Like
the films of the early independence years, the hit films of the 1980s are full of songs. One of them (Maine Pyar Kiya) has nine songs, three of them lasting a little more than nine minutes each. Yet another explanation suggested is that the introduction of new faces and extremely young actors (in looks if not in years) had added to the believability of the films and their charm.3

However, while all these explanations hold good to some degree, they still do not adequately explain the sudden popularity of these deceptively simple love stories. First, while stars did play a major role in the market success of these films, they alone cannot explain it. Moreover, as any analysis of the cinema industry has shown, the introduction of a new unknown face is certainly no guarantee of success; the reverse -- the use of bankable stars -- has had more success. Second, the genre of romance is not entirely new to Indian folklore or popular culture, especially to the Hindi screen. Some of these in the past have become super hits4 and some of them have flopped miserably. Third, music has always played a role equal to other textual and extra-textual elements in the Bombay films. And it is true several people go to see a film to find out the context in which a film song occurs. However, the songs really have no identity independent of the films and as one critic argues the songs' charm has a lot to do with the viewer's recall of the context in which it was sung on the screen.5 Moreover, there is a common consensus among avid film goers that the musical greats of the Indian screen all belong to a golden past.

The chief problem with these explanations is that each of them on their own attempt to interpret a rich and varied mythical form in terms of one specific social or cultural dynamic. A more adequate explanation can be
found if we look at how the audience finds or creates meaning in/from these films. The Bombay films are all first and foremost stories. Thus, the first step in understanding the appeal of these films is to understand the films as narratives that take on mythical dimensions within the Indian context. In the previous section I showed how the eighties films operated at the level of contemporary myths. The "meanings" created through the films appealed and reinforced the perceptions of their audience. In turn the audience's response to the cinematic myth of "Indianness" was shaped and nourished its social beliefs and attitudes. This is also how these narratives of romance and love became part of an enduring formula.

The Family-Nation Nexus and Romance

The figure of the mother is central to understanding the power of these films in nation-building and as nationalists texts. Unlike the films of the seventies, it is the Mother that heads or brings together the family. In the films under focus here the figure of the mother came to typify the old Congress, assimilating all diverse elements under her wide wing. Unlike Lalita Pawar's character of the wicked mother-in-law, all the films analyzed showed mothers as embracing difference and mediating between warring factions.6

The family-nation nexus is not just a sociological explanation whereby the family is seen as a microcosm of the nation. I use the term "family" to mean a political and economic unit of organization. According to the Nehruvian vision, what was envisaged was not just India as a subcontinental nation-state, but one developing along Western lines. This meant embracing the values of a capitalist nation, ruled by a free market economy.
This was distinctly different from Gandhi's Utopian socialist model for India. As I have stressed before, the model of development adopted by the Indian administration may have been Nehru's, but its proposed implementation was imbued with Gandhian ideals. The assumption of building a market-based society meant an ideology that would teach people to become good consumers. The basic unit traditional in India was the family. However, it was not a nuclear family, but an extended family where instead of market transactions, barter relations existed. The exhortation to grow and development could also mean a call to switch from arranged marriage systems where the woman was bartered away to a system where free choice prevails. Thus romance becomes a commodity, used to sell not just the actual material film but also the ideology of a self-declared divorce from traditions which the becomes a signifier of modernity and growth. It is true that erotic, romantic love organizes the new 1980s genre. However, this language of love, specifically of productive sexuality in the domestic sphere, is remarkably coherent despite the programmatic differences among these and previous nation-building films. It is "natural" romance, I argue, that legitimizes the nation-family through love. The domestic romance is an exhortation to be fruitful and loving citizens tolerating and embracing (or even loving) difference, diversity and multiplicity.

The use of romance should also be linked to more pragmatic ideas such as market appeal. Kenneth Burke argues that popular appeal and identification helps create a common ground and interest. On the basis of this common ground then creating and maintaining ideological hegemony becomes easier. In terms of the market for Bombay Cinema, the resurgence in the use of romance also marks a resurgence in a woman-identified film;
marked both by a move away from the arguably "male" films of Amitabh Bachchan and the centrality of the female characters. Romance, as a narrative strategy, speaks particularly to women. As Modleski says about romance novels, they articulate women's deepest hostilities towards men as well as their own ill-defined longings for autonomy. The romance is, then, the form for the containment of women's aspirations and the management of social contradiction. And their portrayal of women, Modleski concludes that "the fact that the novels must go to such extreme to neutralize anger and to make masculine hostility bearable testifies to the depths of women's discontent." Inferring from the cinematic texts and the social conditions that prevailed in India during the last decade, there occurred a palpable transition in the attitude of the urban and middle class woman towards herself, her career and her place in society. The Indian woman became more sexually assertive, before, within and outside marriage.

These cinematic love stories are nationalist in the sense that they are all preoccupied with the themes of nationhood and national identity. The genre of romance provide a useful way to incorporate several themes arising out of the nationalist debate. The films work through a strategy conflating the nation with the nuclear family. The nation and the family are both co-evolving forms of political and social organization. The themes of social relationships, tolerance and accommodation, difference, growth and development and social reproduction are applicable both to the family and the nation. The neat cinematic resolutions represent the socially productive coming together of differences to create a new order.

Because it is such a powerful ideological tool, Bombay Cinema plays a hegemonizing role. Nation exists on the assumption of a common collective
identity, historical experience and a common culture. The "Young Love" films create and maintain this common culture. As part of this strategy is the constant invocation of the past. Also these films are as much stories about the emotional growth of the young lovers to mature and lasting love as the stories about the moral and spiritual growth of their parents and guardians away from superstition and narrow hatred and parochialism to a state of tolerance and acceptance.

The structure of the myth in the "Young Love" films corresponded to the conceptual needs of social and self understanding required by the dominant social institutions and political context in the 1980s. Also, the historical changes in the structure of the myth corresponded to the changes in the structure of these dominant institutions. Bombay cinema are filmic stories based on a social myth, but created by specific individuals for popular acceptance and never changed or standardized for public retelling.

The Tradition of Mythic Identities

The concept of the myth has been the subject of vast scholarly research and debate. While this work is very important to my analysis, a detailed discussion of the concept becomes irrelevant for my overall project. In everyday as well as scholarly parlance, the term has variously come to mean distortion or lie; mythology, legend or oral tradition; myth as popular narrative per se; shibboleth etc. Wright's working definition for his typology of Westerns is that a myth is "a communication from society to its members: the social concepts and attitudes determined by the history and institutions of a society are communicated to its members through its myths." This
seems too vague and general a definition. The most satisfactory definition perhaps comes from Malinowski who says:

Myth acts as a charter for the present day social order; it supplies a retrospective pattern of moral values, sociological order, and magical belief, the function of which is to strengthen tradition and endow it with a greater value and prestige by tracing it back to a higher, better, more supernatural reality of initial events.11

Bombay Cinema provides the people with myths of themselves, about who they are, what their institutions are and what constitutes their national identity. This formulation of the problem moves away from reductive accounts of popular fiction which would see Bombay films as a second order mirror held up to reflect what already exists. Instead they are seen as a form of representation which is able to constitute us as new kinds of subjects, and thereby enable us to discover who we are. The "Young Love" films do not merely reflect or pass on, unmodified, a series of contemporary myths. Nor do they simply narrate a series of pre-existing tensions within and between ideologies and myths. They create and shape them as much as they are the creative manifestations of those tensions.

There is no denying the fact that "Indian" identity is deeply problematic. However, through cinematic oppositions of Material/Spiritual and Tradition/Modernity, the "Young Love" films constructed a Self that both denied and accommodated an "Otherness" defined by the West. This identity also absorbed diverse values arising out of lifestyles signified through the cinematic codes as well as the factional ideologies that emerged during the 1980s. At the same time the vision of the future offered by the films remained consistent with the hegemonic intent.
The collective identity was forged through the creation of a common historical experience and a shared culture through the retelling of selected myths, memories and traditions. The myths spoke of a common descent, a heroic past and destinies cinematically coded through a juxtaposition of prevailing and mythical (Ram Rajya) values, eras, lifestyles and political leaders. These, however, were always in keeping with the hegemonic interpretations of the country’s history, culture, society and politics and the symbolic resolutions offered were always within the dominant vision of an "Indian" society characterized by a "Unity in Diversity."

To understand how this signification process worked, it is necessary to locate the myth of the "Young Love" films within the politics of the 1980s and the turbulent events in the preceding 33 years. The decade of the 1980s in Indian politics was one of violent sectarian upheavals which, relatively speaking, pushed back the growth of democratic forces. As Javeed Alam notes in his discussion on the political articulation of mass consciousness in India,12 never after 1947 had so many people died or been allowed to be killed in the name of religion, caste and community. He shows how the inherited social identities of the society were the sources of passion and frenzy among the people. Because of the number of secessionist movements raging in the country, the very definition of what constituted a danger to national unity had gotten tied up with these identities.

The Communalization of Thinking

The rapid communalization of the social perceptions and political understanding of the people soon threatened the survival of the whole nation-State. It also provided widespread grounds for the justification of
sectarian and nascent fascist forces. This communalization created hierarchies of treason that people began to associate with the different communities living in India.

In this sense, the 1980s stand in sharp contrast to the 1970s. The 1970s too were years of struggle, turbulence and crises, notwithstanding the great hopes of renewal with which they started. But the struggles and crises were of a different nature. Whether in Gujarat or Bihar or later in the all-India JVP movement, the upheavals were essentially secular and wholly social in nature. The agitations symbolized the growing discontent and exasperation of the people with the performance of the economy, the management of the polity and the corroding influence of corruption in society. Although the class outlook of the leadership of those movements and the content of the demand that were raised were basically in opposition to the unified all-India ruling class interests, the movements were essentially democratic in thrust and anti-authoritarian in character. In spite of the fact that bourgeois formations provided the leadership, the movements had an all-people's character. There is evidence to assert that in the mobilization process, inherited structures or ideologies, whether of caste or community, did not divide the people. In fact, in spite of these, there was a great deal of self-mobilization by people across social divisions.

The articulation of regional identities in the eighties and even today is quite different from what it was at the time of the national movement or at the time of the struggle for autonomy of linguistic communities. To be sure the divisiveness has revolved around issues of language, race, religion and territory. But the shift in regional articulation is part of the larger change in the structure of political articulation marked by an incremental rise in
reactionary movements. Political articulation in the 1980s was definitely more populist and conservative. The decade witnessed an unprecedented upsurge in religious fanaticism, an exacerbation of sectarian tensions, and an increased polarization of Indian society along caste and communal lines. The discontent and dissatisfaction of the people in the 1980s were not articulated in democratic struggles. Moreover, the political movements of the peoples were deflected in caste and communal conflicts. But as Hasan argues, the recent intensification of regionalism, communalism and casteism is a product of inequalities created and perpetuated by the operation of capitalism in the last four decades after independence. Hasan's whole argument is based on the thesis of unequal capitalism and development and the structural dependence of capitalism in India on pre-industrial social forms. The organized articulation of the politics of class acquired greater significance after independence. Its overall importance is directly related to the force of pre-capitalist structures and status orders. This might be one of the principal reasons why caste and community-based politics has been revived and intensified today.

The Installation of a Gaulist Constitution

Another significant reason why communalism grew in the eighties is perhaps Rajiv Gandhi's intensive use of Hindu chauvinistic themes which his mother, Indira, had taken up in 1983 and in 1984. Indira Gandhi's use of factionalist discourse, in turn, can be traced to the social problems that arose during her rule due to the frustrations and contradictions of the Nehru era. During the years just preceding the independence, the debate on the modernism/tradition dichotomy was at the forefront of the Congress Party's
politics. It was well known that Gandhi was opposed to any kind of industrialization, especially in contradistinction to Jawaharlal Nehru's position (Chatterjee provides us with a critical account of this debate between Gandhi's khadi program and Nehru's modernist strategy 1986.) After the intra-party feuds in the Congress from 1946 to 1951 between the reformists and the conservatives, the line articulated by Nehru prevailed. This meant the acceptance of the modernist strategy by the Congress party, the primacy of the modernist group in providing the main ideological thrust and support for the strategy of institution building and development.

Indira Gandhi continued Nehru's line with significant variations in the modalities. The fundamental objective of both Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi was the modernization of the country. Though both these rulers are characterized by a distinct streak of Bonapartism, the former sought to achieve modernization by a quasi-liberal path and the second by an increasingly authoritarian one. Neither eventually achieved anything more than superficial successes because both of them passed a radical restructuring of social relations. This default intensified the inherent socio-political contradictions and deepened the secular crisis.

Each new government has also marked a shift in State strategy and the paradigms of State intervention. The closing years of the Nehru era were characterized by the weakening of the political regime. This trend continued into the early years of Indira Gandhi's rule. There was a great reliance on Mrs. Gandhi's charismatic authority and this led to a weakening of party structure, the decline of state-based leaders and enlarging of the powers of the center. As state autonomy weakened, interests groups within the states became stronger and, together with regional opposition parties, formed
coalitions challenging the authority of the center. The center responded in a
decisively repressive manner—through the Emergency, storming of the
Golden Temple, and the crackdown on Sikh militants.

Since the years preceding independence, the Indian political structure
has favored a strong central authority. Since 1969, when Indira Gandhi
became prime minister, political centralization and accumulation of power
have been especially acute. At the same time state governments, finding
themselves getting weaker and weaker, found it difficult to tackle problems
of governance and to execute plans and policies embodied in their programs
and election manifestos. As a result of this difficulty, and pressure from
interests groups within the states (such as the rich peasants), the states
challenged the center’s authority. The center’s response to this was
increasingly repressive, culminating in the emergency in 1975. However, as
several political historians have argued, centralization was counter-
productive as a strategy for dealing with the upsurge of issues and
movements surrounding the states. In the 1970s and throughout the 1980s,
the issues facing the center were the problems of regionalism and
culturalism. The exacerbation of regional tensions gave rise to wide-ranging
social conflicts and movements which occasionally threatened national unity.
A centralized political system that India had developed since then had
become ill-equipped to deal with regional pressures, particularly because
these movements had sprung from divergent causes and bases. To be sure,
all demands of state autonomy did not threaten national unity. However, the
center viewed all state demands with suspicion, on the general assumption
that regional movements are basically secessionist and, therefore, pose a
threat not merely to the imperial authority of New Delhi but also to national
cohesion. The immediate response was further curtailing of States' mights, deemed necessary for the preservation of the integrity and unity of the nation-state.

Obviously, what was at the forefront was the complex issue of national identity. The center's answer was to reinforce its national integration program to create unity out of "an extremely complex and extraordinarily diverse and segmented social fabric." Like the events of the first nationalist phase (independence movement), the stress on national integration now had ideological implications. The exaltation of the nation, implied in the approach during the Nehru-Gandhi era, was justified because nationalism emerged in response to colonialism. The Indian nation-state was the product of an anti-colonial movement which represented the interests of a large majority if people belonging to various classes and ethnic groups. In the 1980s, once again national integration became the guiding ideology of India's quest for national identity, which sought to assimilate the diverse population in a bond of common identity which transcends parochial loyalties. Once again the specter of the "foreign hand" was invoked, this time more vague and nebulous, since the main colonizers were the bourgeois rulers themselves. However, as in the colonial era, this conception of national integration too was based on both a policy of pluralism and recognition of diversity and the idea of a strong center.

The Nation-Family

During the pre-independence years and the years immediately following independence it was the Indian National Congress that achieved the status of being seen as the site where different political articulations
merged. However, with the successive weakening of the party and its virtual demise, in terms of its identification with the Nehruvian vision of modernization and the Gandhian ideals of democracy, the fragmented social fabric had no overarching ideological umbrella. Thus, political pundits like Vanaik say of the Rajiv years that the crucial problem of adequately replacing the old Congress remained "unresolvable." It is at this point that the idea of the family becomes important. The family was now seen as the only site where lineage (cultural roots) could be maintained at the same time as new blood from outside, with different values, was brought in. This is not to say that the system of arranged marriages, where the attempt has always been to ensure caste, lineage and cultural "purity", was changed or even reformed. However, the symbolic resolutions offered through the popular forms revolved around the motifs of "unity in diversity" and "historical continuity." The "Young Love" films offered a harmony of divergent discourses, using the signifier of the family. Traditional emotions like pride in one's heritage, and the incorporation of change and reform were seen as both integrationist philosophies as well as cultural markers. The twin discourses of Tradition and Modernity were brought under a single umbrella through marriage, which is a traditional institution yet one that signified new relations and progress (of lineage and heritage). It is my argument that ideally marriage also equalizes the two people in the relationship. In capitalism, it becomes the cornerstone of social reproduction. Here the ideology of romance also seems useful. In an ideal capitalist situation, a free market system, the acting forces are equal because supply should balance demand. Moreover, it is a situation of free choice. The arranged marriage system is thus opposed, not merely because it is based on archaic
practices of the bartering of the daughter, but also because it opposes freedom of choice, a centerpoint of capitalist rhetoric. The young lovers in the films signify an important break with tradition. Yet, because the movement of the films is always towards marriage, it is also an acceptance of very traditional universal, yet actually empty, values of freedom, justice, equality, the benchmarks of capitalist discourses.

What I have tried to show in this study are the processes through which Bombay Cinema produces (and consumes) one national and cultural identity. I have argued that national identity is not a given object but itself a product of specific cultural technologies such as cinema. These technologies, in their turn, are themselves sites of contradictory tendencies and interests. That is why the production, maintenance and reconstitution of cultural identity is seen as a problematic process. In the second chapter, I theoretically addressed the question why national identity and nationalism has to be seen not only by its positive content but always by its relation to, and differentiation from, other national and cultural identities. The third chapter showed how the politics of identity was played out through the re-invention of old dichotomies that created the Self as Other. The young lovers of the Bombay screen were sometimes elites, crossing no racial lines and sometimes they did not even cross class lines. But they did represent and reconcile rival regions and more often different castes and religions. In this context the idea of family and the notion of “Indian Womanhood” also became important. The dress and deportment of Indian women took on increasing symbolic value in the struggle over cultural identity. It led to the politicization of normally uncontentious aspects of everyday lower middle-class life -- wearing western dresses, changing to a shorter, more
Westernized and definitely an androgynous look with shorter hairstyles. The archetypal Mother India figures gave way to more assertive and independent female characterizations, who were at the center of the cinematic narratives. The notion of the Mother, however, still remained at the very center. But here again the figure was reconstituted. No longer was she seen merely as the mother of her sons or as the Sita figures (as devoted, submissive wife), but as a leading dissenter, and in some cases even as a leader. Also, the mother was now a sexual being too. She not only accepted her sexuality, but also asserted it. Thus, I argued that instead of being portrayed as a crucible of obsolete and "evil" traditions (the Lalita Pawar mother-figures of the sixties films), the mother is now the site where traditional beneficial values have been filtered and where new values can be tested.

Questions of Third Cinema

Even though the "Young Love" films are nationalistic in the sense that I arguing, they cannot be seen as a form of "Third Cinema". According to Gabriel, Third Cinema seeks to: decolonize minds; contribute to the development of a radical consciousness; lead to a revolutionary transformation of society; and develop a new film language with which to accomplish these tasks. Bombay Cinema is political only in a limited sense. They fail to develop a radical consciousness, so that in the end, the films remain firmly rooted within the hegemonic vision of the ruling bourgeoisie. The question then arises, whether or not these films are merely economic enterprises of an industry and whether they speak a populist discourse. Laclau defines populism as the presentation of popular-democratic
interpellations as being antagonistic against the dominant ideology. The important point here is that populist ideology may not be very different from the dominant ideology but it works precisely because it incorporates within it non-class articulations and popular sentiments which are synthetically presented as being opposed to the dominant ideology. The problem arises when applying the term to popular culture. Does a certain popular cultural form work because it appeals to "populist" sentiments or because it is part of the dominant ideology which is part of a "populist" movement. This is a question that the current study did not satisfactorily investigate.

Another issue that arises is about the success or failure of these films as nationalist texts. The "Young Love" genre had its precursors in the 1975 film Bobby. However, it is only in the 1980s, that the genre came into its own and the nationalist sub-text was placed at the center of the narrative. Yet the divisiveness and sectarian violence increased through the decade, culminating in Rajiv Gandhi's assassination in 1991. This raises the question of the effectiveness of the films as nationalist texts. The fact that popular cinema in India took up the themes plaguing the national and the political regime fighting to maintain hegemony shows how responsive popular culture is to social conditions and changes in those conditions. This is not to say that Bombay Cinema mirrors events in society directly, but that it was part of the events and perhaps even created them the same time as it intersected with them and shaped and molded a consensual opinion about them. That the political cleavages and ethnic unrest continued doesn't necessarily mean Bombay Cinema's failure, but the cultural superstructure's limited intervention and role in the events. The "Young Love" films are
powerful forces and expressions of social and political consciousness. But they are not the sole determinants of this will. Religious and ethnic experiences and symbols played an equally important role in India in shaping a mass consciousness. Leslie Fisher, in the case of North America, and Sommer,19 in the case of the Latin American novel, have shown how literary romance and national consolidation were born together, or at least coincided. All this assumes that popular cultural texts have the capacity to intervene in history, to help construct it.20

National Cinema

It is important to explain why I consider Bombay Cinema to be representative popular Indian Cinema and a form of "national cinema." Whether Bombay Cinema is defined in economic terms, textual terms, by audience tastes or modernist high art terms, all but the last criteria point to the feasibility of calling Bombay Cinema a form of national cinema in India. Though raw film still has to be imported21, the films are totally financed within the country, made by an indigenous industry. The texts have evolved as peculiarly Indian22, a fact that has caused critics to dismiss this cultural form. If audience tastes can be gaged by the box office, these films definitely form a focal part of the Indian collective imagination. But the process of identifying a national cinema is more complex than that. Higson says that histories of national cinema can only be understood as a history of crisis and conflict, or resistance and negotiation.23 In this sense too Bombay Cinema is national. It has been successful at picking up the actual mixed and contradictory experiences of ordinary people and inserting into its own vocabulary the discourses of the divergent and marginalized peoples. It has
both constructed a national collective identity and displaced oppositional impulses by articulating into its discourse elements of both state nationalism and what I called nationalism at the peripheries.

However, there is a more important reason why this form of cinema is national cinema. The Bombay films are in the Hindi language. This is spoken only by 30% of the entire population. In other words, Bombay Cinema's success really means that it has transcended linguistic and regional division. Though commercial cinema is also produced in other regions, such as Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh, Bombay Cinema is the main source of inspiration for these regional vernacular cinemas.

Finally, the emergence of the Bombay film has been a self-conscious process. Rather than describing Bombay Cinema as a confusing mixture of western genres and a violation of Hollywood editing, Thomas argues that Bombay Cinema should be seen as a resistance to Western cinematic codes. She says, interviews with the filmmakers show that they aim to make films that differ in format and content from Western films and that comparisons with these or with Indian art film, is irrelevant. Indian commercial filmmakers are cognizant of the fact that they violate classical Hollywood editing and mix different western genres and thus rightly reject any criticism based on the canons of dominant western filmmaking. By their own admission the filmmakers agree that their films sometimes have preposterous narratives, overblown dialogues and exaggeratedly stylized acting. Moreover, camera placement rules are frequently broken. But since Indian cinema always had its own vast audiences capable of sustaining the industry, the conventions of Bombay Cinema were able to develop without conforming to the expectations of the international audiences. The Bombay
film industry prides itself on forging a new and distinctive film genre that negates or even "deconstructs" Western traditions, like the use of a sustained narratives. Though Bombay films do indeed have narratives, as I have shown, the narratives get broken through extra-textual elements such as song and through the use of several climaxes instead of one. However, the final resolution remains in place like Western linear narratives. Thus, Bombay Cinema could be seen as a self-conscious resistance against Western cinematic conventions. Like other "national" cultural forms, it definitely creates a different aesthetic and artistic convention. However, the intervention is made not only in the aesthetic arena, but also the political, economic and social spheres. In the words of Frantz Fanon then, the "Young Love" films constitute a corpus of texts "made by a people in the sphere of thought to describe, justify and praise the actions through which that people has created itself and keeps itself in existence."25

An Essentialist Identity?

Speaking of an authentic Indian culture and locating a site for a unitary Indian identity is a necessarily essentialist notion. This was realized by Indian nationalist leaders long before post-structuralism made its debut on the academic scene in the west. Humayun Kabir, Minister of Cultural Affairs under Nehru, said in 1960:

I do not think that in any realm of human life we can have closed systems. The fiction of a purely indigenous culture has been destroyed more effectively today than at any time in the past. As a student of history, I have not come across any culture that was pure at any time in the world.26
As Orientalism has shown us false essentialisms invoked in defining Indian identity in opposition to the West, have proved harmful and inadequate, so that at every crisis point, the identity issue has been raised again and again. The incorporation of Western dichotomies into Indian thinking and popular culture may seem self-defeating. But Nandy asserts that it could also be the form of ultimate struggle. As he argues, perhaps the uniqueness of India culture lies not so much in a unique ideology as in the society's traditional ability to live with cultural ambiguities and to use them to build psychological and even metaphysical defenses against cultural invasions.
ENDNOTES


3. Padmanabhan. Ibid. p. 1

4. Raj Kapoor's *Bobby*, released in 1975, is regarded as an all time hit and as the precursor to the 1980s' "Young Love" films.


6. Only in *Jawani Zindabad* is the old characterization of the evil mother-in-law invoked.

7. See *The Rhetoric of Motives*, pp. 21, 24.


20. Sommer, Ibid. p. 78.


25. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. p. 188.


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Filmed as received.


Vasudevan, Ravi. in Quarterly Review of Film and Video 11.3(1989): 34-44.


APPENDIX A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Movies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1. Bk Duje Ke Liye</td>
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<td>2. Love Story</td>
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<td>3. Llaawaris</td>
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<td>4. Kranti</td>
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<td>5. Meri Aawaz Suno</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>1. Namak Halaal</td>
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<td>2. Vidhaata</td>
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<td>4. Farz Ka Kanoon</td>
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<td>5. Jeeo Aur Jeene Do</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>1. Betaab</td>
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<td>2. Andhaa Kanoon</td>
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<td>4. Avtaar</td>
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<td>5. Coolie</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>1. Chota Chetan</td>
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<td>2. Aaj Ki Awaaz</td>
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<td>3. Ghar Ek Mandir</td>
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<td>4. Purana Mandir</td>
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<td>5. Yeh Hai Aurat</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>1. Ram Teri Ganga Maili</td>
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<td>2. Mard</td>
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<td>3. Pyar Zookta Nabin</td>
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<td>4. Ghar Dwar</td>
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<td>5. Aaj Ka Daur</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>1. Jo Jeeta Wo Sikander</td>
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<td>2. Swarg Se Sundar</td>
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<td>3. Naam</td>
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<td>4. Karmaa</td>
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<td>5. Nache Mayuri</td>
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1987
1. Aashiqui
2. Pratighat
3. Aag Hi Aag
4. Kudarat Ka Kanoon
5. Mr. India

1988
1. Qayamat Se Qayamat Tak
2. Tezaah
3. Dariya Dil
4. Pyar Ka Mandir
5. Shahenshah

1989
1. Maine Pyar Kiya
2. Ram Lakhan
3. Tridev
4. Chandni
5. Chaalbaaz

1990
1. Dil
2. Jawani Zindabad
3. Aaj Ka Arjun
4. Ghayal
5. Pratibandh
Source Trade Guide

1. Maine Pyar Kiya
2. Qayamat Se Qayamat Tak
3. Ram Teri Ganga Maili
4. Ek Duje Ke Liye and Laawaris
5. Dil
6. Betaab
7. Love Story
8. Jawani Zindabad
9. Ashiqui
10. Jo Jeeta Wo Sikander
APPENDIX C

SAMPLE OF FILMS
Source: Screen World Publications

Ek Duje Ke Liye (1981). **Producer:** L. V. Prasad; **Director** K. Balanchander; **Music:** Laxmikant Pyarelal; **Cast:** Kamalahasan, Ratna Agnihotri, Madhavi, Shobha Khote.

Love Story (1982). **Producer:** Rajendra Kumar; **Director:** Rajendra Kumar; **Music:** R.D. Burman; **Cast:** Rajendra Kumar, Vidya Sinha, Kumar Gaurav, Vijayeta.

Betaab (1983). **Producer:** Bikram Singh Dehlal; **Director:** Rahul Rawail; **Music:** R. D. Burman; **Cast:** Shammi Kapoor, Sunny Deol, Amrita Singh, Prem Chopra.

Ram Teri Ganga Maili (1985). **Producer:** Randhir Kapoor; **Director:** Raj Kapoor; **Music:** Ravindra Jain; **Cast:** Rajiv Kapoor, Divya Rana, Mandakini, Saeed Jaffrey.

Aashiqui (1987). **Producer:** Gulshan Kumar; **Director:** Mahesh Bhatt; **Music:** Nadeem Shravan; **Cast:** Salman Khan and Arti Gupta.

Qayamat Se Qayamat Tak (1988). **Producer:** Nasir Hussain; **Director:** Mansoor Khan, **Music:** Bappi Lahiri; **Cast:** Juhi Chawla, Aamir Khan

Maine Pyar Kiya (1989). **Producer:** Tarachand Barjatya; **Director:** Sooraj Barjatya; **Music:** Ram Laxman; **Cast:** Salman Khan, Bhagyashree, Alok Nath.

Jawani Zindabad (1990). **Producer:** N. Sippy; **Director:** Nassir Hussain; **Cast:** Aamir Khan, Farrah.

Dil (1990). **Producer:** Indra Kumar; **Director:** Indra Kumar; **Music:** Anand-Milind; **Cast:** Aamir Khan, Madhuri Dixit, Saeed Jaffrey, Deven Verma and Anupam Kher.