INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
Creating your job: Leadership, executive succession, and strategy formation by state agency directors in Ohio

Card, Michael Andrew, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1992
CREATING YOUR JOB: LEADERSHIP, EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION, AND STRATEGY FORMATION BY STATE AGENCY DIRECTORS IN OHIO

DISSERETATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Michael Andrew Card, B.S., M.P.A.,

The Ohio State University
1992

Dissertation Committee
Robert W. Backoff
C. Ronald Huff
Paul C. Nutt

Approved by

Robert W. Backoff
Adviser
School of Public Policy and Management
To Karen...
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although writing a doctoral dissertation is mostly a solitary endeavor, without the assistance of a number of people this research would not have been possible. It is my pleasure to acknowledge these individuals and their various roles. I am more the product of the interactions with these individuals than I am the product of my own circumstance. I have been the beneficiary of these interactions. I cannot repay the debts incurred during the five years at the Ohio State University and my pursuit of knowledge. Instead, I am prepared to do the same for those who come along after me. I must pay forward.

It is my pleasure to note the contributions of Robert W. Backoff, Paul Nutt and C. Ron Huff. These three men have cultivated my experiences -- both theoretical and practical -- to engage in writing about the social settings of organizations. I have received the benefit of four years of associations from these gentlemen scholars, in activities ranging from individual tutorials to large scale field research projects to discussions of the practical limitations of methodological and epistemological commitments on the writing process.

I also wish to acknowledge the contribution of Norvell (Mac) McCaslin and Jeffrey Ford. Mac McCaslin recruited me to come to Ohio State and convinced me that I have the intellectual ability and the perseverance to complete the requirements for this degree. He has been a source of inspiration to me and to others. Jeffrey Ford has been focused on the social construction of reality and the use of language by managers to communicate as well as to determine the attention focus of human actors in social situations. Without his intervention in my life, I may not have been able to confront my own biases and limitations. I also wish to thank Carol Myer and Susan Cinadr for running around and keeping me in line with the University for five years and Susan for steering me through the graduate school’s requirements.

I wish to note the contributions of my family -- my parents Oneta and Francis, as well as my brothers Roderick, Larry and Gregory. They built a foundation of inquiry by allowing me to make mistakes. Their primary contribution was to instill an insatiable curiosity about social and political phenomena. Finally, they held me accountable for the consequences of my behavior.

I could not have completed this work without the support of a number of friends to give me support when I needed it and understood my long hours at the typewriter and in the field. They also provided me with the understanding that there is more to life than the dissertation. So, I tip my cap to Glen, Rick, Delwyn, Jackie, Jethro, Judi, Ann, Kelly, Dena, Jeanne, Jeffrey, Johanna, Michael, Erin, and Lee.

I also owe a note of thanks to the many individuals employed in the three organizations where I investigated the activities of executive level transition. Truly, without their support and patience, I would not have been able to undertake or complete this study.

Finally, I acknowledge the contribution of Karen, the woman I married. Karen, you have been a constant source of support and encouragement when needed, and love at all times. You have allowed me to experience that I am a human being, full of special gifts as well as problematic behaviors. I look forward to life with you after the (damn) dissertation.
VITA

June 16, 1959 .............................................. .................................... Born, Mobridge, South Dakota

1981 .......................................................... B.S., University of South Dakota, Vermillion, SD

1981-1983 ..................................................................... Attended University of South Dakota

1983-1986 ............................................................................................................... Deputy Secretary
South Dakota Department of Education & Cultural Affairs
South Dakota Department of Labor

1987 ............................................................. M.P.A., University of South Dakota, Vermillion, SD

1986-1987 ...............................................................................................Graduate Research Analyst
National Center for Research in Vocational Education
Columbus, OH

1987-1989 ............................................................................................................... Teaching Associate
School of Public Policy and Management

1989-1991 ............................................................................................................................. Consultant
Organizational Resources Group

1991 ........................................................................................................ Visiting Assistant Professor
Miami University, Oxford, Ohio

PUBLICATIONS

Vocational Education-Job Training Partnership Act Coordination, Columbus, OH: National Center for Research in Vocational Education, 1987 (with Morgan V. Lewis and Marilyn Ferguson)

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Public Policy and Management ................................. Robert W. Backoff
Paul C. Nutt
C. Ron Huff

Minor Fields:
   Strategic Management
   Methodology & Epistemology for Applied Social Science
   Policy Formulation, Implementation, Administration, and Evaluation
TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................. ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................... iii

VITA ................................................................................................................................................ iv

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... x-xi

LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................................... xii

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC SECTOR STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP TRANSITIONS ................................................................................................................................. 1
   The Focus ..................................................................................................................................... 3
   The Setting ................................................................................................................................. 8
   Sample Selection ...................................................................................................................... 8
   A Precautionary Note from the Author .................................................................................. 15

II. STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP TRANSITIONS ............................................................................. 17
   Definitions to Terms Used in this Chapter .............................................................................. 20
   Perspectives on the Transition Process .................................................................................... 21
   A Process Model of Executive Leadership Transitions ............................................................ 23
      Transition as a Process ............................................................................................................. 26
      End Point of Transition Process ............................................................................................. 27
   Stages of Transition .................................................................................................................. 30
      Stage One ............................................................................................................................... 31
         Performance Problems ........................................................................................................ 31
         Anticipation ......................................................................................................................... 31
         Design of the Search ............................................................................................................ 34
         Issue Assessment ................................................................................................................. 35
         Search ................................................................................................................................. 36
         Preparation .......................................................................................................................... 37
         The Announcement ............................................................................................................. 38
         Inauguration ....................................................................................................................... 38
      Stage Two .............................................................................................................................. 40
         Attributing Style and Policy ................................................................................................. 40
         Developing a Mandate ......................................................................................................... 45
      Stage Three ............................................................................................................................ 47
         Encounter Between Successor and Stakeholders ................................................................ 47
         Reassessment ....................................................................................................................... 52
         Reshaping the Authority Structure ..................................................................................... 53
### III. METHODOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS FOR ACTION RESEARCH

#### Critical Assumptions to this Research

Epistemological Commitments

- Scientific Explanation
- Evaluating Scientific Explanations
- What is reality?
- Claims to Knowledge
- Standards for High-Quality Process Research

Methodological Commitments

- Truth Value
- Internal Validity
- Credibility
- Methods to Ensure Truth Value
- Applicability
- External Validity
- Transferability
- Methods to Ensure Applicability
- Consistency
- Reliability
- Dependability
- Methods to Ensure Consistency
- Perspective
- Objectivity
- Confirmability
- Methods to Ensure the "Knower's" Perspective

Critical Responses to Naturalistic Inquiry

Summary

#### IV. THE OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES

- History and Origins of OBES
- Recent History
- Searching for an Administrator
- The Second Search and the Selection of Saunders
- The Interview
- Negotiating a Mandate
- The Appointment
- Arrival at OBES
- Value-Based Management
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>Organizing the Decision Making Process</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Budget</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel Moves</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Earning the Trust and Respect of the Governor and His Staff</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communicating with Agency Staff</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developing a Longer-Term Agenda</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concluding Thoughts and Insights</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overview of DYS in 1991</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History and Origin of DYS</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Judicial Era</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provisions of HB440</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aftermath of HB440</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recent History and Scandals</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the Interim</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Search for an Administrator</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Appointment</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Interregnum</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mullen's Parting Shots</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrival at DYS</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact of the Judicial Influence on the Origin of DYS</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact of Prior Leadership</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selection Procedures</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appointment via Press Release</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Celeste's Appointment Letter</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Management Retreat</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working with a Subordinate Who Applied for the Position</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel Changes</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building a Constituency</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media Strategy</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Using One Stakeholder to Influence Another</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outsider-Origin of Director</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation of Natalucci-Persichetti by the Governor's Office</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes to Chapter V</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recent History</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Search for a Successor</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Acting Director</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Search Committee Gets Serious</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interviewing with the Governor</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. THE CONDUCT OF THE INQUIRY</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. QUESTIONNAIRE PROTOCOL USED FOR AGENCY DIRECTOR INTERVIEWS</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. ACTUAL QUESTIONS FROM INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS OF OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES ADMINISTRATOR ELLEN O'BRIEN SAUNDERS</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. SAMPLE OF INITIAL MEMBER CHECK WITH AGENCY DIRECTOR AND SUBORDINATE</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. SAMPLE LETTER REQUESTING PARTICIPATION</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Criteria for Sample Selection</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Duration of Executive Leadership Transitions</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Stage 1: Individual and Organizational Events and Processes Occurring between Predecessor’s Resignation and the Successor’s Appointment</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Stage 2: Individual and Organizational Events and Processes Occurring Between Announcement of Appointment and The Successor’s Arrival for Work</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Stage 3: Individual and Organizational Events and Processes Occurring between the Successor’s Arrival and Resignation</td>
<td>57-58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Critical Activities for Successor by Phase of Strategic Leadership Transition</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Alternative Ontological Standards for Modes of Process Research</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Methodological Practices &amp; Standards for Process Research</td>
<td>82-83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Chronology of OBES Scandals Reported in Cleveland <em>Plain Dealer</em></td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Senior Staff Ranking Of Priority Issues: May, 1988</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Saunders’ Initial Statement</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Saunders’ Agenda and Her Enactment of OBES Division’s Agenda</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Moving Ahead With the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. OBES Goals Identified in Spring 1989 Senior Staff Retreat</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Saunders’ Memo Announcing Staffing Change</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Parole chief to head Ohio youth service</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Old neighborhood prepared new Youth Services chief</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Reform is Hard to Find</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19. Mullen's Parting Shots</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Director's Profile of Youths Committed to Custody of DYS in 1987</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Published Report of Natalucci-Persichetti's Initial Dealings with the Judges</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Closer watch put on juvenile money</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Press Release Entitled &quot;You Won't Like It&quot;</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Natalucci-Persichetti's Recognition of Opposing Philosophies</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Xenia doctor confirms he will be state health chief</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Xenia doctor to be state health chief</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. New Health Chief has Lofty Goals</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Critical Tasks of Creating One's Executive Position in Stage 1</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Critical Tasks of Creating One's Executive Position in Stage 2</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Critical Tasks of Creating One's Executive Position in Stage 3</td>
<td>260-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Saunders' Memo to Staff Regarding Research Project</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Metric for Measuring Personnel Changes</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Metric for Measuring Structural Changes</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Dependent Hierarchy of Executive Leadership Transition Outcomes
2. Observable Events Delimiting Stages in the Transition Life-Cycle of a State Agency Director
3. Toulmin Argument Structure
4. Validity and Reliability as a Dependent Hierarchy
Accounts of executive leadership successions capture the public's attention and make headlines in both the academic and popular press. These succession events often involve colorful figures in large corporations (e.g., Jobs of Apple Computer) or public figures (e.g., Gorsuch of the federal Environmental Protection Agency; Wahl of the Federal Home Loan Savings Insurance Corporation; Steinbacher of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, or Rogers of the Ohio Department of Youth Services). While executive leadership transitions are a commonplace event in both the public and private sectors, the process remains little understood (Gabarro, 1988; Wechsler & Rainey, 1988). Despite this lacuna, the process of executive leadership transitions has not received much attention by either organizational psychologists or management theorists. Research has concentrated on the broader topic of management succession, especially on the antecedents and consequences of succession, but very little has appeared on the activities and constraints faced by new strategic-level managers immediately after their appointment (House & Singh, 1987). Research in the public sector has concentrated on the electoral antecedents and on the relations with the Governor's office (Wechsler & Rainey, 1988) and not on the processes of determining organizational goals with stakeholders (March & Simon, 1958), establishing effective interpersonal relations with members of the strategic leadership group (Gabarro, 1987), or with the personal aspects of the managerial job (Nicholson & West, 1989). It is this lacuna in the succession process -- what public sector strategic managers do to take charge and what factors influence those processes that this study addresses.

On the day an agency director assumes her office, she becomes many things to many people. As she enters the building housing her department, locates her office, and finds her desk, her primary concern will be to construct how to act as the agency director -- to create her job. There are a variety of possibilities: to represent a constituency, to be an aide to the Governor with responsibility to support the elected executive, to serve as an organizational leader to improve the performance of the members of the agency, or to serve as a policy maker to address competently the policy issues remanded to the agency by the legislature through statutory mandates (Lynn, 1984;
Card, Orosz, & Backoff, 1988; Rehfuss, 1990). The political, economic, hierarchical, and cultural circumstances differ in each agency. In addition, these circumstances are in a constant state of flux. Each agency director must create her job.

Existing research has produced useful insights into the process of creating one's executive role, but there is a need to provide further integration of the political and organizational dimensions. The topics and issues reviewed in later chapters are drawn from diverse literatures. The intention is to bring them together in a single framework. The framework must look beyond an agency director's formal authority and position in the hierarchy of the agency to analyze executive leadership in the agency. An agency director's ability to move the members of the agency to action does not automatically accompany authority. If not authority, then what? If an agency director wants to accomplish something, what must she do? Why are some individuals selected as agency directors and not others? Why are some so much more successful than others? Is there such a thing as political management or leadership, from where does it come and what difference does it make? What difference does the initial operating conditions make on the efforts to create an executive role and determine an agenda for the agency? What influences how the agency director creates her role?

Although answering such questions about public executives is on the agenda of social scientists, there has been little research on the tasks of taking charge and to executive agenda creation of a state agency in particular. Additional unanswered questions include, What are the implications for managing the state? Which policies are realized and why? What is the impact of organizational routines and procedures on the creation of an agency director's agenda? Although there is a growing literature on the management styles of the Governor, there is little significant analysis on agency directors and what they do to help manage the state (cf. Card, 1990; Conant, 1989; Poister & Larsen, 1988; Olshfski, 1987; 1988; 1989; Orosz & Card, 1988; Wechsler & Rainey, 1988). Many other studies focus on how decisions are made, but few of these focus on the executive (e.g., Allison, 1971; Simon, 1976).

There is a body of research in the organizational sciences dealing with executive successions and transitions. Still, there are few empirical studies of the transition process. Gouldner (1954) studied a new manager in a gypsum plant, Guest (1962) studied of a new manager in an automobile plant, and Gabarro (1985; 1987) studied new divisional presidents. Further, these studies describe private sector executives. Much of the literature on "taking charge" is of a prescriptive order or is based on anecdotal data or personal experience (e.g., Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Smith, 1986; Whitney,
A large amount of research focuses on the conditions leading to successions and on the situational, background, and personal factors influencing executive successions. These studies do not focus on the process of creating your job and executive-level agenda formation. These studies do have relevance for understanding the factors influencing the agency director, the problems they face, and what interpersonal and organizational outcomes are realized. The process of creating your job must therefore be approached from an understanding of the individual agency director's point of view including her background (personal and professional) and her initial actions.

In order to explain the process of how an agency director creates her job, this research will focus on three questions regarding how individuals selected to be directors of agencies of state government create a leadership role.

1. By what actions do strategic level leaders create their jobs and take charge of their organizations? Are there substitutable actions?
2. What factors serve to mediate the choice of actions used to take charge?
3. Does a temporal model of stages and phases organize the process of taking charge?

The Focus

This is a study of three individuals appointed by the Governor to be the director of three separate agencies of the state government in Ohio. It has a multiple focus on the directors, the agencies they were appointed to head, their constituent and interest groups, the relations with the Governor and the Governor's staff, and on the members of the agency, specifically the members of the agency who are at the top of the civil service and those managers exempt from career service protection. To look at the process of creating the job of the agency director, it is necessary to look at the processes of becoming interested in and applying for the position, and the appointing authority selecting them for the position. In addition, this study must examine initial interactions with subordinates, interest groups and other external stakeholders, and superordinates to assess the impact of these interactions on the agenda the director determines is feasible and those eventually selected.

The first set of questions this study raises involve the agency director. These questions aim to establish what an agency director does to manage the agency. In addition, it is necessary to ask how agency directors make decisions. Analyses of public sector decisions have drawn heavily on three models of how policy-makers act (Allison, 1971). The first is the rational actor model that
assumes decision-makers consciously factor problems into component parts, making these components more subject to conscious management than if the components remained aggregated. Decision-makers analyze the values at stake and assess priorities in reaching solutions based on the values that these problems create. The obvious implication is that decision-making has three components: determining or identifying the problem, identifying alternatives, and recognizing solutions. While recent work has debunked this as a normative model of the decision making process, many believe it is the prescriptive ideal. Lindbloom (1959) builds on the work of March and Simon (1958) to argue that actors make decisions in a polyarchy (cf. democracy) through "successive limited comparisons" of the current situation that result in policies marginally different from prior situations. As such, the rational decision-making actor is bounded in their exercise of rationality as there are a variety of factors the decision-maker may not bring into conscious thought. These factors include an "unconscious conspiracy" (Bennis, 1989), "groupthink" (Janis, 1972), and "standard operating procedures" (Allison, 1971). That is, although traditional theories of decision-making explain how decisions are made, these theories are incomplete. They do not allow decision-makers to enact problematic conditions (Starbuck & Milliken, 1989; Bartunek, 1988), consider its implications (Ansoff, 1988) and define problems (Nutt, 1989; Dutton & Duncan, 1987). To understand the dynamics of directing a state agency, it is necessary to raise the argument beyond decision-making and "issues-management" to ask what agency directors consider when they make specific decisions. This study shows how the Governor's mandates, interactions with the governor, the governor's staff, subordinates, and stakeholders each influence agency directors and the manner in which the agency director creates her job.

The focus of this inquiry is on the canonical questions of executive leadership: What is it that executives do? Where do they get their ideas and their agenda? Further, are these influences on public managers standardized to the point where there is a unique public sector strategic management role inherently different from the roles taken by other managers? Is this strategic role different from the role of private-sector strategic managers? If the role of the manager's job is to lead -- how is it that one goes about leading? While there has been no shortage of answers to questions of this nature (Jonas, Fry & Srivastva, 1989), the findings and recommendations have been less than clear. These findings are often contradictory and confusing.

1 Weinberg (1977; p. 7) frames these components into questions: What am I trying to do? How can I do it? How will I know when I have done it?
The phrase in the first question, to "by what actions do strategic level leaders create their jobs and take charge" implies the new director's inherent skills and abilities must be used to diagnose current problems and develop alternate procedures, processes, and strategies to resolve those problems. Still, a variety of stakeholders internal to the organization will attempt to diagnose the current problematic situation and offer alternate resolutions for adoption. This further implies that the newly appointed agency head must work with these stakeholders to develop a reasonable consensus over the definition of the problematic conditions and of the actions to be taken to resolve these conditions.

This study will also examine the agency director's interactions with the Governor and the staff in the Governor's office. Weinberg (1977) focused on whether and why a Governor tries to control a particular agency, whether the agencies behave in a way the Governor would prefer, and why this was true. Governors appoint individuals to direct their agencies because of some specific purpose. What are the Governor's desired purposes for the agency? What organizational routines are valuable to the Governor? To the extent that the Governor and the agency director do not set the agenda, who does?

Elected officials have a stake in the management of a state agency. The expenditure of public funds for political purposes creates clashes of values, values which American democratic or pluralistic theory allows as legitimate. In effect, any activity that supports the pervasive opinion that government is wasteful, inefficient, unresponsive to severe problems, and ineffective in handling those it does address will create media problems for the agency. When there are media problems for an agency, the Governor appointing the agency director also has perceptual problems because he or she appointed the agency director, and the media may question the Governor's actions, policies, and judgment. The enactment of crisis situations dominate gubernatorial supervision of agency heads (Weinberg, 1977).

The electorate also has a stake in understanding how the state is managed? One assumption of American democratic (polyarchic) theory is that the electorate can influence the policy by electing officials who are able and willing to control the policies and behavior of the bureaucracy, ensuring the responsiveness of the apparatus of government to the people. In addition, citizens are appointed to advisory commissions and boards to ensure that the agencies have citizen input. Agency directors do not always control their agencies. Governors and agency directors may have no clear a priori agenda.
At times they do not wish to control them. They often have no clear idea of the public's or their policy agenda (Weinberg, 1977; p. 3).

Contrary to what traditional democratic theory would lead us to believe, the specialized preferences of interest groups, bureaucracies, and other levels of government often dominate the choice of policies and the outcome of issues with or without the consent of agency directors.

By examining closely what public sector strategic management means, citizens can gain important advantages. They can use this analysis to help them construct more realistic criteria to evaluate an agency director than the simplistic notion of effective management being whether the press is investigating the agency and its operations, or not. In addition, examining how agency directors create their jobs makes clear the "trim tabs" where individuals can and do influence government. When citizens, elected representatives, special interests, and the media understand how agency directors create their jobs, these groups gain new access to the decision making and allocation processes of government.

This study will also examine the agencies and the agency staff. The influences of environment upon organizational structure and process dominate the organizational science literature (e.g., Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Katz & Kahn, 1978). Subunits and procedures "are created" to cope with the uncertainties of the environment. That is, internal differentiation is a response to external or environmental pressures. Yet, organizational environments are differentiated. Environments consist of strategic constituencies or stakeholders (Mitroff, 1983; Freeman, 1984) and different agencies of state government have different stakeholders. Viewed in this manner, members inside the agency must perceive the differentiated environment to respond. Variation in internal process and structure may be thought of as arising from variation in internal and external stakeholders, and from the enactments of executives within the agency. Weinberg (1977; p. 9 and see her note 7) summarizes the importance for studying the uniqueness of each agency:

Each public agency has its own history, style, traditions, and norms. This history effects how well it functions and how accountable and responsive it is to the chief executive. It is therefore necessary to examine each organization's distinct personality in some detail to understand the degree to which it does or does not respond . . .

The three questions considers how agency directors address the role of acting as an agency director. Although the various constituents or stakeholders may (will) not agree on what makes a
good agency director or on how the agency should be managed, they have a stake in determining how the agency director creates her job. For stakeholders concerned about specific issues, understanding how an issue gets on the agency's agenda for action and what happens to it from that point, may provide a reasonable basis for their future actions. To them, the question of managing the state is can be put in specific, if biased and value-laden terms: Can a job training program be designed to help the middle class cope with the loss of employment? Why are unemployment taxes so high? Why are unemployment benefits given to people who can work? What can be done about the problem of juvenile delinquents? Why are these young criminals being released from the institution into the community? What is the juvenile justice agency doing to protect society from violent and sexual offenders? Why is the government spending resources to prevent teen-age pregnancy, AIDS, and sexually transmitted diseases? Can we spend fewer funds on AIDS research? What can be done to reduce the costs of health care to indigent individuals? to the general public? Why is the infant mortality rate so high? Who will make these decisions? Who will benefit and who will perceive that they lost?

The study of the executive leadership of an agency of the state government is important to scholars of management and government who try to determine why an organization acts as it does. For the most part, political scientists have studied transitions as an outcome of the electoral process (e.g., Wechsler & Rainey, 1988). The focus of these studies has been on the development of policy and program agendas for the individual agencies and for the government as a whole. Organizational scholars concerned with charting the antecedents and consequences of change in top management focus on relationships between the predecessor and successor, and on the effects of the transition or succession on organizational strategy, structure, process, and performance (Brady & Helmich, 1984; House & Singh, 1987). Another related area is the processes by which newly installed executives take charge of their organizations (Gouldner, 1954; Guest, 1962 Gabarro, 1987). Clearly, a leadership role within a public organization requires both political and organizational components.

The notion of "taking charge" implies the director's ability to have the agency respond to her wishes but also to change its modes of operation to reflect her preferences. At what cost or toward what benefit are these changes directed? How is influence exercised? In addition, What is the situation in each agency? How does this situation reflect on the ability of the agency director to create her job? There are some organizations embroiled in turmoil and classified by the Governor as in need of a "turnaround." What does this situational adversity do to the process of creating one's agenda? In addition, there are some bureaucratic organizations that seem immune to administrative leadership, even with the expenditure of substantial time and effort. Still others
seem to respond to both the public and the agency director with little effort. This study will speculate on why this happens -- an understanding crucial to understanding what we can expect from agency directors and from the appointing authority. In addition, internal stakeholders have immediate concerns over status and authority (Zald, 1965; Gilmore & Brown, 1985; Gordon & Rosen, 1981).

The Setting

This is a study of three agency directors and their agencies during Richard F. Celeste's second term as Governor of the State of Ohio. The focus of this study is on Ohio for a couple of reasons. First, Ohio is a large state in the midwest with a relatively brief tradition of professional government. The state recovered from a tremendous economic depression in the early 1980s and some areas of the state are returning to pre-depression growth rates. The Democratic party won most of the state's lower constitutional offices and Governor Celeste was elected in 1982 and re-elected in 1986 over popular former Governor James F. Rhodes. Competition between the Republican and Democratic candidates for the Governor's office has been brisk, resulting in a change in the political affiliation of the regime after the 1990 election.

Instead of looking at all agency directors and their activities to create their jobs, the focus is on three agency directors: Ellen O'Brien Saunders of the Bureau of Employment Services, Geno Natalucci-Persichetti of the Department of Youth Services, and Dr. Ronald (Ron) Fletcher of the Department of Health. Each of these organizations have distinct "personalities" that are the result of their history, legislative mandate, mission, funding sources, and clientele. General statements about agency directors and their agencies lack meaning. This study looks at these three agency directors and the agencies they head, in detail, to understand how an agency director's ability to manage these agencies varies and how one agency varies from another.

Sample Selection

The Directors and the Agencies included in this study were selected on a variety of criteria. The first criterion was situational adversity. When an agency director faces an adverse situation, the succession will be more complex than when the situation is less emotionally or politically charged. Gabarro (1987) found that one key determinant of failed successions was the tendency of the successor to fail to establish satisfactory interpersonal with their subordinates. Relationships are more difficult to establish when conditions are charged politically. This may lead to a succession breakdown. The implicit assumption is that the agency's problematic environment will influence the range of options perceived as viable. Two of the cases are situations where adversity is not present
at the time of the appointment. This provides a conceptual (quasi-experimental design) control over
the possibility that extreme cases, while very informing, may have similar properties to statistical
outliers, and lead to interpretations that are not transferable to other settings and contexts. If there
are general findings across all agencies, we have more evidence that a finding is a general principle
than if the conditions were solely present in the agency director handling a case when there was
situational adversity for the agency.

A second factor is the origin of the successor. Successions where the appointing authority
selects a person within the organization are expected to have an easier time of taking charge
(Helmich, 1977; Guest, 1962; Gouldner, 1954). Still, this is mediated by findings suggesting that
relevant industry experience is more valuable than being from within the organization (Gabarro,
1987; Wechsler & Rainey, 1988). Thus, prior experience in the policy area and knowledge of the
political situation and jurisdiction seems to define the relative "outsideness" of the agency director.

We limit this study to agency directors in Ohio. This allows us to hold constant the context
and reduce the plausibility of the rival hypothesis that a selection-history interaction (Campbell &
Stanley, 1966) produces the result. The interactions between the agency director and the Governor
are allowed to vary within the limit of the Governor and his office staff to allow for variation
between agencies and agency directors. This may make the results less generalizable to other
settings (though not to future times).

As stated earlier, the usual distinction to make with respect to agency directors is whether
the successor is from within or from outside the organization. Yet, the crucial distinction is whether
the successor is from within the functional area and from within the regime and not from inside or
outside the focal organization (Wechsler & Rainey, 1988; Gabarro, 1987). These serve as surrogate
or proxy measures for the successor's relevant organizational knowledge (Grusky, 1960). This
knowledge serves to inform the agency director's actions to learn about the agency, its relationships,
and its personnel and then to formulate strategies.

We have also selected directors based on their gender. Rizzo and Mendez (1988) found
that women managers used fewer assertive behaviors under the Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson's
(1980) Profile of Organizational Influence Strategy (POIS) than men. However, Rizzo and Mendez
had a small sample size and did not adjust their chi-square statistics for the high number of empty
cells. Thus, the findings regarding gender influences are open to additional study. The primary
operating hypothesis for making this distinction is that women directors have some skills that are more well suited for the interpersonal aspects of their jobs than are the men. We do know gender was an important factor, but from perusing Governor Celeste's interview notes for one interview with one applicant, and from interviews with the governor's Chief of Staff, we do not have evidence to support a conclusion that gender was the factor that made the difference in appointing one person over another.

Lastly, each agency was "chosen" because each agency director granted me access to themselves and agency records and requested agency personnel to make themselves available to answer my questions. Thus, the primary criteria that selected these individuals into this study and others out of it is whether I secured access to the agency directors. Noel (1989) reports that a major difficulty with the study of strategic leadership is that access to the leader for prolonged observation is difficult to achieve. Without this type and level of access, it is difficult to collect manifestations of manager's pre-occupations (Noel, 1989; Mintzberg, 1975). We can show how the director's agenda has changed over the years and see how they make sense of their transition into and out of the director's role.
Table 1
Criteria for Sample Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>DYS</th>
<th>HEALTH</th>
<th>OBES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Situational Adversity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successor Origin: Relative &quot;Outsideness&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Inside Government</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Inside Ohio</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Inside Governor's Regime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Inside Functional Area</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex of Director</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority for Governor's attention</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The methods used to investigate these phenomena limit the number of agencies in this study. These methods require an extensive amount of work (1) to gather background information, and to (2) triangulate the information gained from interviews with other information often gained through other interviews, interviews with others, and an analysis of agency records.

There are a variety of factors not represented in this sample. First, to our knowledge, Governor Celeste did not appoint these directors to represent geographic areas of the state. Second, the directors in this sample were appointed, at least in part, because of their policy expertise and were from within the policy community and only one held a prior position within the Celeste administration. Third, this study does not include elected officials. Further, the agencies selected are primarily human service agencies involved with the development and delivery of human service programs and not (1) government agencies that regulate private-sector affairs or (2) enterprise agencies. Using these types of organizations, this study would have derived different propositions and produced different findings.
The author has experience working with two of these agencies: the Department of Employment Services from experience in South Dakota and the Department of Youth Services in Ohio. The significance of the choice of the Department of Health is, in part, because the author has no previous experience with this agency. Thus, author bias entering into this analysis from prior experience should be apparent.

This study enumerates the factors that affected each agency director in creating their job as agency director. An analysis of other agencies or agencies in another state or during another period would have produced different narratives. As such, this study does not argue that these findings represent a complete catalogue for all agencies for all state government.

This chapter began by cautioning that agency directors are many things to many people. Agency directors are symbolic representatives of the Governor. They can be effective managers and assist the members of the organization cope with change. They can be effective leaders and assist the organization cope with uncertainty. They can even fail or succeed at achieving public policy. The next several chapters argue that these successes and failures are not random. Chapter II develops a process model of taking charge including the interactions with relevant internal and external stakeholders and temporal dimensions. Then, the chapter focuses more directly on the unique context of managing a state agency and offers a set of propositions used to guide this inquiry. The fully developed process model will enable us to understand systematically the process of creating executive roles and the issues a new leader is likely to face.

Chapter III contains the epistemological and ontological commitments made by the author of this dissertation and descriptions of the methods used to collect the empirical data. The resulting theory is grounded in empirical reality experienced by the agency directors (Strauss, 1987). The products of the research process are in-depth accounts of the process of taking charge in each agency. Accounts and documents from other internal and external stakeholders supplement the primary data base for analysis.
The accounts are written as case-studies of the transition process. For these purposes, a case study is an analytic abstraction of experience for the express purpose of presenting the theory. The grounded theory approach (Strauss, 1987) is:

... "[I]s a *detailed* grounding by systematically and intensively "analyzing data, often sentence by sentence, or phrase by phrase of a field note, interview, or other document by 'constant comparison,' data are extensively collected and coded," using the operations touched on in the previous section, thus producing a well-constructed theory. The focus of analysis is *not* merely on collecting or ordering a mass of data, but on *organizing many ideas* which have emerged from analysis of the data. (Strauss, 1987; pp. 22-3, emphases and punctuation in original).

Theoretical elements were developed concerning initial conditions, interactions among the actors, strategies and tactics, and consequences (Strauss, 1987). After specifying the model using the first case, Saunders and the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (OBES), and additional cases, Geno Natalucci-Persichetti of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) and Dr. Ron Fletcher of the Ohio Department of Health (HEALTH), will be constructed to verify the theory and to adjust the relationship and specification of the conceptual elements. In this manner, the theory will be constructed, verified, and adjusted. Additional categories will be used to connect core categories to additional concepts arising from additional cases. The significance of grounding a theory of strategic leadership transitions from the accounts of practitioners is to make a model of interest to both practitioners and scholars, then verifying that theory in other contexts.

Chapter IV is a discussion of the efforts by Ellen O'Brien Saunders to create her job as the Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services. Saunders is originally from Michigan, educated in Pennsylvania, New York and Massachusetts. Saunders was in a classified civil service position in Wisconsin, having served as a division administrator in the Department of Commerce and Industry within the regime of Governor Tony Earle (D WI). Governor Celeste recruited Saunders to head the Department of Employment Services -- an agency that had been the target of a tremendous amount of press attention on the agency events and processes under the leadership auspices of a prior administrator, Roberta Steinbacher. External stakeholders, including the media, leveled severe criticisms against lower-level bureaucrats, but Steinbacher resigned as her health deteriorated. Governor Celeste appointed Assistant Administrator Grace Kilbane to be the Acting Administrator in February, 1988. Employer constituents supported Kilbane because of her technical knowledge of the programs. The editorial boards of the state's newspapers suggested Kilbane should not be appointed as the Administrator because of her association with the agency in a position of responsibility. Saunders arrived in September of 1988 and the study of her interactions with OBES covers a retrospective of 18 months after arriving on the job.
Chapter V discusses Geno Natalucci-Persichetti (N-P), appointed in January 1988 to head the Department of Youth Services from his position as Division Director of Community Corrections with the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (the adult corrections system). Governor Celeste appointed Natalucci-Persichetti to replace an acting director, Thomas Mullen, appointed to fill the position vacated by former Director James Rogers, who had been indicted, convicted, and subsequently imprisoned for unlawful activities committed prior to and during his tenure in office. Natalucci-Persichetti had considerable experience in adult community corrections activities as well as third-sector corrections with the Department of Rehabilitation and corrections as well as Alvis House. Geno arrived in February, 1988, and this account of his taking charge covers the first ten months of his tenure.

Chapter VI discusses Ronald Fletcher, M.D., the Director of the Department of Health. Dr. Fletcher is an oncologist from Dayton, Ohio, who served as the co-chair of the Governor's Task Force on Minority Health, and applied for the Directorship soon after the Task Force delivered its report to Governor Celeste. Fletcher received his undergraduate degree from Fisk University and a medical doctorate from Meharry University, each in Nashville. While the Health Department was not considered to be "situationally adverse," the Health Department is considered an intransigent bureaucracy. The Department had been the third of the three priorities for Governor Celeste during the budget inherited as he arrived at the Health Department. Dr. Fletcher was appointed in March, 1988, and this account of his taking charge covers the first ten months of his tenure.

Chapter VII reviews the concepts found to be similar in each of the three cases. These similarities are then reviewed, and propositional statements given. If we define theory as a set of interrelated statements about empirical phenomena, these propositional statements represent the beginnings of a grounded theory of taking charge and creating your job.

Chapter VIII compares the resulting grounded theory with the published theory described in Chapter II. The discussion will draw closure by offering some conclusions about the process of creating their job as an agency director. The purpose in using this approach is that chapter II enumerates the existing public and private theory on strategic leadership transitions; chapters four through six create empirical grounded theory and test the theory developed in two contexts. By proceeding in this manner, the resulting model is both descriptive and predictive descriptive, highlighting the kinds and degrees of work needed for a new agency director in a given situation and predictive in terms of gauging the relative difficulty that a new executive is likely to encounter in
assuming this type of position. The implications for the practice of public management, strategies for appointing authority's support of new leaders when making appointments logically follow.

Chapter VIII also provides a short discussion regarding the implications of the revised theory for theory, practice, and the methods used to study public management. These implications include suggestions for appointing authorities, the individuals considering appointment as agency directors, and for those who work at the top of the civil service -- the strategic leadership group.

A Precautionary Note from the Author

While I have taken reasonable steps to ensure the validity, reliability, credibility and transferability of the data and interpretations in this study, there are several caveats that the reader should understand before proceeding further. First, I have tried to reduce the investigator bias into the questions and the interpretations by two methods. First, I have attempted to create an atmosphere where the respondent believes she or he could challenge any of the questions asked, especially if the questions are not relevant. I have not examined the respondent's challenges to the interview questions, each of the agency directors and about one-half of the subordinates and stakeholders told me that some of my questions were not relevant to their own experience. These questions were repeated in additional interviews. In addition, I offered my interpretations of their situation and reasoning behind their actions to the respondents to determine if [1] I captured their perspective and that [2] my interpretations were accurate from their perspective. I was challenged on a couple of items, and I argued my case, and asked them for additional information that would support their perspective. In all cases, the respondents were able to provide additional data. When I remained unconvinced of their interpretation, I offered them the opportunity to write a source-noted footnote describing their interpretation. In all instances, I attempted to describe the conflicting interpretations. In part, the reluctance of those who doubted my interpretations may have feared that retribution would have been forthcoming from revealing their confidentiality.

Second, confidentiality is a tricky subject. All respondents knew the purpose of my questioning and each was offered the opportunity to put their comments off-the-record (by turning off the tape recorder). I have chosen to record the subordinate responses under the file ALL (for each agency). This practice robs the story of much of its color and the authenticity resulting from that color. However, by reporting subordinate's comments and accounts by the line number of the interview transcript of the subordinates for that agency (e.g., OBES_ALL: 1021-2025), I have created an audit trail that the interested scholar may pursue. By reporting the subordinate's comments, I hope that I have retained much of the color and practical validity of a study of this nature. It is the content of these stories that tells the real story of the challenge and satisfaction gained from creating
your job. And these stories provide the value of the theory resulting from the stories of taking charge.

Finally, the reader is reminded of the factors not represented by this sample of agency directors and agencies. Party hacks, elected officials also serving in administrative roles and the inclusion of regulatory or enterprise agencies may be quite distinct from the human service agencies represented here. However, the transferability of these findings should be general to these types of organizations as well. This study has not accounted for the unique facets of strategic management inherent in leading these types of organizations. And, as always, the transferability of the truth value of any statement rests with the reader, not the author.
Chapter II
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP TRANSITIONS

Ultimately, top managers account for what happens in an organization. In the face of complex and ambiguous information that typifies complex organizations, no two executives will identify the same array of choices, evaluate them in a similar manner, or implement them in the same manner. This is not to say that the science of administration is arbitrary, it is to say that administration involves human action, and if we wish to examine what happens in human organizations, we must examine what happens at the top of the social organization. The aim of the individual at the top of the social organization is to capture the attention of the members so that their attention is allocated to areas the individual at the top considers important (e.g., March & Simon, 1958). When the person at the top, who once captured the attention focus of the members, leaves an organization, it is a major symbolic event and serves as the focus of the political processes of the organization (Pfeffer, 1981; Birubauam, 1988; Zald, 1965; Cyert, 1990). This critical nature of strategic leadership transitions has been summarized in the following ways:

Succession denotes the transmission of status, power, possession [sic] and its symbols from one person to another. It is a most important event in the social sphere, analogous in some ways to birth and death in the biological sphere. (Redlich [1977] cited in Greenblatt [1983; p. 3]).

Changes in leadership are windows of opportunity for an agency to rethink its overall direction and then find the right person for the freshly reconsidered sense of direction (Gilmore & Brown, 1985; p. 29).

How the appointment is made and who is appointed to positions of ultimate authority -- are vital indices of the underlying political structure and reflective of the directions and processes of change in politics (Zald, 1965; p. 52).

These leadership transitions have the potential to change the status and power alignment of the agency, a change representing a "window of opportunity" for the appointing authority, the members of the strategic leadership group, the organization's stakeholders as well as for the new leader.
The executive is a major holder of formal authority within the organization. While one usually thinks of authority as power, power is better conceptualized as a process. Defining power as a process, we cannot measure either control or power because power and control must be assembled for each issue, and part of the task of public-sector strategic leadership is to assemble and hold together a fragile coalition (Ring & Perry, 1985; Fenn, 1987). Metaphorically speaking, the effective public sector strategic leader creates their role as one of sitting at the hub of a power center where the spokes are actions taken to balance the pressures of the competing values expressed by conflicting interest groups. In this sense, the central political question of the strategic leadership transition involves the processes and consequences of power (see Zald, 1965; pp. 52-55) and not effectiveness, styles of leadership, and the association of rates and types of successions and other characteristics of the total system.

In the typical sense of the word "power," this is not a study of the power of the executive over subordinates. Dahl (1963; p. 41) speaks of power as the influence of one person over another, or more specifically, when A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) claim that this is only one-half of the power equation. The other half involves creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that favor one value or practice over another person's value or preferred practice. This first half of a definition of power is influence or authority and the second half is a "zone of indifference" (Barnard, 1938) or zone of acceptance of the actions of authority. Bachrach and Baratz cite Schattschneider to argue that power could be evident without one's knowledge:

All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some areas of conflict and the suppression of some others because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics and some are organized out. (Schattschneider, 1960; p. 69; emphasis in original).

However a third definition of power is evident if we combine the two halves of power from Bachrach and Baratz. Power seems to be the exercise of influence over another. Inherently power is a process of assembling and reassembling individuals and influence on each issue as it comes up. Power, writes Arendt (1970; p.44),

...corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group remains together. When we say of somebody that he is 'in power' we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name.
Thus, the moment the group (from which power originates) disappears, power disappears. Power, influence and authority are static conditions to be conceptually distinguished from the exercise of power. That is, power is temporal as well as processual— one can never "hold" power as one can hold a position of authority. While we recognize the limitations of the words, we use influence to refer to the exercise of power and authority to refer to the latent sense of the person in the position to exercise power, or the holder of kinetic power.

Public sector executives work in an "authorizing environment" consisting of multiple actors who interact with those executives. Fenn (1987; p. 57) sees the effective result of these interactions as:

. . . the ability to fashion programs and policies that attract enough support and neutralize enough opposition so that something reasonable comes out at the other end.

Combining this with Arendt's argument that power must be assembled and reassembled for each issue as it comes up, public sector executives do not have power except as they act to create it. That is, the decisions over strategic domains such as mission, goals, objectives and attention must be negotiated with respect to the influence of other actors in the authorizing environment. The person acting in the role as agency director creates their job by choosing certain objectives and initiatives from vague and adjustable statutes, regulations, and instructions and not choosing others.

It is the determination of the ability to create this temporary power center or create sufficient discretion and a "zone of indifference" (Barnard, 1938) or "zone of acceptance" (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) to allow, or tolerate action that produces disruption, decreases and increases in productivity, morale, and effectiveness within an organization. The creation of this zone is determined by:

. . . how the leader presents through action, appearance, and articulated values, a model that others will want to emulate. A successful leader draws out, promotes, and defends attitudes and values that are shared by members of the group, class, or nation [she] leads. The leader's "vision" expresses goals in line with these values. Thus, [she] reinforces and may even infuse a sense of value in people who now feel that what they are doing is valuable. (Maccoby, 1981; p. 14).

Maccoby's statement clearly differentiates the objective from subjective dimensions of executive leadership. That is, executive leadership has both desirable and undesirable effects. The perception of freedom to act and its flip side, the perception of constraints on action, are one set of moderators of the eventual outcome of the process of exercising strategic leadership. As the leader defines the
reality for the subordinates, and as followers accept that definition of organizational reality, the transition is more successful.

The remainder of this chapter is organized to define some terms, review the published studies on the strategic leadership transition process for methodological implications and for the substantive findings, and then develop a framework for the transition process. The chapter ends with a discussion of the factors found to be relevant to the study of executive leadership transitions and defines the critical tasks for new appointees.

Definitions to Terms Used in this Chapter.

The term, director is used to refer to individuals who occupy positions with such titles as Director, Secretary, Administrator, etc. The term Director is used to refer to gubernatorial cabinet-level appointees with line responsibility for managing and directing an agency. The activities of the person in this leadership role include setting direction, aligning people, choosing priorities and defending the integrity of the organization (Gilmore, 1987; Kotter, 1990a; 1990b). In contrast, there have been a variety of definitions of executive when discussing succession. Many have used the position identified as the chief executive officer or, as Brady and Helmich (1984; p. 6) define it, "... the position of the most powerful of power centers, controlling and directing the efforts of the organization toward its goals." Pfeffer and Salancik (1977) have also used this type of definition in their investigations of the background and tenure of hospital administrators. Jacques (1976) makes a rather convincing argument that organizational roles are defined by the amount of time required to learn effective role performance. Jonas, Fry, and Srivastva (1989; p. 205) defined the executive to be:

"...those individuals who either have no immediate superiors (by virtue of being owners) or who substantially control the conditions of their subordinates (essentially through choosing their own board members)."

Thus, we can see that the person in the executive role is the one who exerts or attempts to exert considerable influence over the events and circumstances of the organization and the executive is defined as the member of organization who has no superior within the formal organization.

The term appointing authority is used to refer to the individual or group lawfully authorized to hire, discipline, and dismiss the new leader. In most of the agencies of state government, and in this study, this is the governor. In the third-and private-sector, it is the board of directors. In most
cases, the appointing authority is also the lawfully authorized entity that can terminate the employment of the new leader.

The strategic leadership group (SLG, a.k.a., executive role constellation or top management group) refers to individuals who occupy positions at the top of the civil service and those exempt-from-career-service-protectios managers who report to the director. Top management serves as the nexus of political management and administrative management.

Perspectives on the Transition Process

There is a literature on private sector transitions and executive succession which is beginning to ask serious and thoughtful questions similar to those posed in this dissertation. However, executive and administrative transitions have only recently become the focus of public management and public sector organizational theory (Orosz & Card, 1988; Wechsler & Rainey, 1988; Farquhar, 1991). In the private sector, succession studies are a conglomeration of research primarily interested in the antecedents, processes, and consequences of executive succession (Brady & Helmich, 1984). Highly related, but conceptually distinct from this research is the research on the characteristics of individuals who fill CEO roles, either as discovered by the selection process or through their individual attributes (e.g., Maccoby, 1981; Kotter, 1982; Levinson & Rosenthal, 1984). The results of first body of research has been to identify factors that can be managed so that the transition of authority from one person to another is effective, in terms of some effectiveness criteria (reduce the level of disruption or the loss of morale, etc.). The result of the second literature has been to assist with the selection of persons who have characteristics highly correlated with high organizational performance (e.g., high loci of control).

There are a variety of perspectives on the executive leadership transition. In the first set of structure studies, there is the distinction between turnover and succession. In the second set, there are the differences in terms of the perspective from which to study the succession. Price (1977) draws the distinction between turnover and succession. For Price (1977; p. 4 & 7), turnover is "...the degree of individual movement across the membership boundary of a social system," and succession is "...the degree of membership movement through the roles of a social system." Succession refers to movement of an individual through any and all roles in a social system. Internal promotions are
not successions as they are within a social system, at least broadly defined social systems. Brady and Helmich (1984; p. 6) differ slightly from Price when they define executive succession as:

[T]he movement of individuals through the role in an organization that is formalized as the most powerful of the power centers, controlling and directing the efforts of the organization toward its goals.

Although these differences seem slight, there are wide conceptual differences. First, Brady and Helmich (1984; pp. 6, 241-245) define succession as movement through the role. This assumes that the role is sufficiently defined so as to provide role stability that can, hypothetically, be handed down more easily. This is consistent with Vancil (1987) who found that there are a variety of methods of transition or the "passing of the baton" that essentially allow for the effective transition of power and authority. The usual focus of structure studies of succession has been on the organizational outcomes which occur as a correlate or result of succession (Brady & Helmich 1984, Smith & White, 1987; Wechsler & Rainey, 1988). An investigator using this perspective tends to describe the broad institutional perspective noting changes in operational features and functions. Other perspectives include: (1) the effects of succession on one specific organization where the objective is to increase knowledge of the processes associated with executive succession (e.g., Redlich, 1977; Greenblatt, 1983; Gabarro, 1987; Pickhardt, 1981); (2) the executive team with the focus on processes of leadership in small groups (e.g., Gabarro, 1987; Greiner & Bhambr, 1989; Heller, 1989; Gouldner, 1954); and (3) the successor's cognitive and affective orientation to the novel situation found in succession (e.g., Nicholson, 1984). In addition to these perspectives, there are a variety of additional perspectives including (4) the appointing authority (e.g., Gilmore & McCann, 1985), (5) the members of the executive team (e.g., Gouldner, 1954; Farquhar, 1991; Heller, 1989; Pickhardt, 1981; Guest, 1962), and (6) other internal and external stakeholders (e.g., Gilmore, 1988; Farquhar, 1991). One might also include (7) the family of the executive, as well as, (8) the organization the new appointee has immediately left to become the new leader within the new (to the director) organization. The focus of this study is written from the perspective of the agency director. While the studies reviewed in this chapter cover a variety of perspectives, the case studies reported here are written from the perspective of the new appointee, and from the first few months of action in the executive role.

In developing a process model of strategic leadership transitions, I will first describe the transition process and the generic tasks in a temporal dimension. Then the text will examine more closely those successions which prior research suggests have a situational bearing on how managers create their jobs. This will enable the reader to understand more systematically the leadership transition process and the issues a successor is likely to face in a given situation. This approach will
result in a process model which is both descriptive and predictive — descriptive in terms of highlighting the kinds and degrees of work needed for a successor to create their jobs and take charge in a given situation; predictive in terms of gauging the relative difficulty a successor is likely to encounter in performing this work as well as forming a typology of means used to create one’s job.

A Process Model of Executive Leadership Transitions

Studies of transition processes examine and identify the phases, stages, and processes of the transfer of job function or position. For this study, the outcome of the transition between formal leaders is treated as an individual and group effect, behavioral and dispositional, referred to as creating your job. An individual focus would posit that individual differences in the characteristics of people and the transitions they undergo mediate the differences in the activity of the new leader. The new leader enters a social setting where interactions partially determine the actions taken by the new leader. Simon (1976) argues that a person does not live for years or even months in a particular position in an organization exposed to some streams of communication and shielded from others without an effect on what the person believes, attends to, emphasizes, fears, or proposes. That is, there is some impact of the situation on the person. Does leadership depend on creating a position or organizational role for the new leader? Again Simon:

Why not let each create his own position, appropriate to his personal abilities and qualities? Why does the boss have to be called the boss before his creative energies can be amplified by the organization? And finally, if we have to give a man some measure of authority before his personal qualities can be transformed into effective influence, in what way may his effectiveness depend on the manner in which others are arranged around him? (Simon, 1976; p. xvi).

In this sense, leadership transitions should be a natural outflow of the debate between psychologists and sociologists as to the interactions between the successor and the successor’s impact on the organization and the organization’s impact on the successor (see Nicholson, 1984). It has not (Gordon & Rosen, 1981; p. 277).

Figure 1 illustrates the distinctions between individual and organizational events and processes. This distinction is important for a variety of reasons. First, many of the career civil servants view the individual appointed to head the agency as but a "visitor" to the organization. This distinction is often manifest when the newly appointed agency director conceptualizes her or his
appointment as a watershed date in the history of the agency. In fact, the members often forget the year, much less the day, of the appointment. While the members may remember who was appointed and when they served, they will seldom remember what was accomplished. Second, there are individual events and processes which lead a person to pursue the appointment as the director of the agency. Third, an organizational event can be differentiated from an individual event and process to describe the dynamics of when an individual leaves the organization. One of the most powerful of these is for the leader to leave the organization because the appointing authority's term is ending and the position the agency director holds, will turn-over. Other individual events and processes may also induce the individual to leave their position. One of the most often cited reason for leaving the public service is the differential pay for the equivalent position (see Wechsler & Rainey, 1988 for a review). Positions in the public sector pay less than the individual's former private sector position. The individual cannot sustain the cost of public service to her or his family for an extended period of time. In this manner, we can see the rationale behind Grusky's (1960) prediction that when a predecessor leaves a position for a more desirable position, the successor's transition is expected to be less contested by members of the strategic leadership group. That is, when a transition is predicated by individual rather than organizational events and processes, there will be less stress on the new appointee. Conversely, when there is a transition predicated by an organizational event and process that is in the middle of the Governor's term, the external stakeholders and the members of the strategic leadership group will attempt to influence the newly appointed director. That is, the new leader must account for the effects of the succession on strategy, structure, and on the process by which new appointees gain control over their organizations.

The political perspective focusses on transition as an outcome of the political process. In these studies, the research focus is upon the development of policy and program agendas (e.g., Beyle, 1989; Mackenzie, 1987; Pfiffner, 1987). Another political perspective is the process of selecting the appointee. In the following quotation, Heclo describes the circumstances surrounding the search and selection process as a precursor to the appointment.

[T]he selection committee de-emphasizes operational goals, making an appointee's journey through Washington mine fields into something like a random walk. If he is not entirely sure of what is expected of him, it is not surprising; in many cases neither are his selectors, many of whom are more interested in getting their own way than in the executive's eventual output (Heclo, 1977; p. 99).
In this manner selection can be structured by political forces that have little apparent relationship to the politics or policy of the agency, much less the actual tasks of leading the agency.

Still individuals are willing and seek out the appointments to cabinet positions. They may have ego needs that can be met from the appointment, they may have a specific policy agenda to pursue, they seek a public forum for themselves or for their ideas, they desire the perquisites of the job, or they may want a legitimate excuse to "occasionally get away from home (Blair, 1987; pp. 90-91).

Different issues become salient at different stages and phases of the succession process. We continue this chapter by identifying the objective events that are used to mark the stages of leadership transitions and then turn to identifying the phases -- the individual and organizational events and processes that are salient at different stages in the process. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the findings from the studies on executive succession that can identify the form of the transition. By identifying the choices of the successor, we should be able to derive the variety of forms of creating a job -- how different successors will create their jobs.
Transition as a Process

While executive and managerial succession is often conceptualized as a process, it is often researched as a structural phenomena, focusing on emergent properties and variates to be manipulated (e.g., Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Helmich, 1974; 1975; 1978; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1985; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Compte & McCanna, 1987; Schwartz & Menon, 1985; Beatty & Zajac, 1987). The studies on structures tend to focus on several relationships: the relationship between predecessor and successor; the key characteristics of the successor; organizational context factors; the relationship with the appointing authority and the process of appointment.

Succession research has considerable variety in the beginning and ending points of empirical studies. For most studies, it is researched as a single event in time, with the research focusing on performance effects following the succession event (e.g., Compte & McCenna, 1987). The effect of mistaking a process for a static event is to miss the interactions and strategies resulting from the actors. The implicit assumption behind structure studies is that the role is sufficiently defined so as to provide role stability that can, hypothetically, be handed down more easily -- methods of "passing the baton" are routine to allow for the orderly transition of power. In contrast, Strauss and Kohler (1983) define succession as a process rather than an event and allow the leadership role to be much more variable than the others. The individual must construct the basic dimensions of the role from a variety of cues. We expect these constructions to be highly variant when the succession is unexpected, when there is no specific mandate from the appointing authority, when the appointing authority does not view the succession incident as a strategic moment for the organization (Gilmore, 1988), and when there is no process to legitimate the appointment (Vancil, 1987a; 1987b).

A frequent choice has been to study succession as starting on the first day on the job (e.g., Guest, 1962a; Gabarro, 1985; 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977) and not investigate the earlier events and processes such as the predecessor's demise, or the successor's recruitment, prior work, and life experiences. However, these events and processes are important for the task of determining how an agency director creates her role.

A more theoretically difficult, but conceptually appealing view, follows from the earlier distinction between individual and organizational events and processes to argue that succession starts when the successor begins to think in terms of the new position, even if that occurs when the successor-to-be applies for appointment to the position, prepares for an interview, shows up on-the-job, etc. The succession would start for the predecessor (or soon to become predecessor) when
events and processes begin to be individually interpreted as signals to move to another position or to retire. This would mean that much of the executive succession literature ignores much of the transition process activity occurring prior to the succession incident (e.g., Gabarro, 1987). Given the competing perspectives on the succession process, or more correctly, the leadership transition process described in the previous section, the meanings of a succession are often mixed. Specific inferences can be afforded only when speaking about a specific stakeholder or another and less generally to one cluster of stakeholders or another.

In order to clarify this distinction, executive succession is understood to be a discrete event, the permanent or acting transfer of title for the director or administrator. We refer to this as a succession event. We draw the distinction between a succession event and a leadership transition process which is congruent with the definition of Brady and Helmich (1984; p. 6), who describe succession as "the movement of individuals through the role in an organization that is formalized as the most powerful of the power centers, controlling and directing the efforts of the organization toward its goals." Operationally, the role is the chief executive officer and its public sector state agency counterparts: Director, Secretary or Administrator. Executive transitions are thus viewed as a process (Kohler & Strauss, 1983; p. 23; Gilmore & McCann, 1983; p. 127); a co-alignment of individual and organizational conditions and actions (Orosz & Card, 1988).

End Point of Transition Process

The transition process for public agencies includes what Vancil (1987a; b) calls "passing the baton," but goes beyond it, beginning earlier with the identification of a need for change in leadership (Guest, 1962) and possibly extending to what Gaertner, Gaertner, and Devine, (1983; p. 422) have defined as ending "when a workable coalition is marshalled internal to the agency in support of the new leadership," or what Gabarro (1988; p. 238) defines as taking charge, when the newly appointed manager "(1) gains understanding and mastery of a situation; (2) develops a sufficient power base and credibility to gain acceptance as the organization's leader and (3) has an

---

2 It could also be expanded to include other not-for-profit organizations by using terms like Executive Director, Superintendent, etc. The distinction is that this is the person appointed by a governing body for the organization to act in its stead. Much of the succession literature does not limit the focus to the person at the top but includes division managers and other executive level positions (e.g., Gabarro, 1987; Zajac & White, 1987, etc.).
impact on the performance and processes of the organization." Further, one could define the successful completion of the transition to be the follower’s transfer of allegiance from the predecessor or the predecessor’s view of the organizational reality to the successor and to the successor’s view of reality (e.g., Heller, 1989; p. 65).

These three components offer three levels of outcomes for creating one’s job and taking charge. First, the successor must become informed of the needs of the organization either through prior experiences (within this industry, this sector [public or private], this organization or this type of situation), through detailed discussions with the search committee and the appointing authority, or through actions taken after arrival at the workplace. Second, the successor must work to establish effective interpersonal relations with members of the strategic leadership group. The second component, is for the successor to develop a sense of legitimacy or credibility for the successor’s view of organizational reality. This legitimacy can be obtained prior to the appointment with support from the predecessor (e.g., Greenblatt, 1983), by repudiating the predecessor and the predecessor’s policies (e.g., Pickhardt, 1981; Heller, 1989), or from short-term initiatives that demonstrate the competency of the successor (e.g., Greiner & Bham bri, 1989). The successor must develop a following from among the members of the SLG. The third requirement is for the successor to have an impact on the performance and process of the organization. It is in this manner that the organizational outcome measures (initially stressed by Guest, 1962b) become so relevant. These three requirements also correspond to the individual, interpersonal and organizational perspectives on leadership transitions outlined in figure 1.

This study focuses on the idea of creating your job -- the first two components of Gabarro’s (1987) concept of “taking charge.” Without observing more-or-less objective measures of organizational effectiveness, the reader may be concerned that the study as defined cannot determine the effectiveness of an executive leadership transition. While organizational effectiveness is a variable of interest, we must keep our eye on a necessary condition -- to have individual and interpersonal effectiveness. Prior research has focused either on organizational effectiveness without

---

3 The reader is invited to compare this with Gabarro (1985; p. 111), who referred to the end point as the cessation of the process of learning and action by a manager who has already "mastered a new assignment in sufficient depth to be running the organization as well as resources and constraints allow."
accounting for the leader's behaviors or effectiveness or has not considered the leader's effectiveness, but the avoidance of failure. For example,

A succession is considered a failure if the new manager was fired within the first 36 months because of his inability to meet top management's expectations of performance. (Gabarro, 1985; p. 62; Gabarro, 1987; p. 112).

As such, the measurement of organizational outcomes are lost due to the need to measure individual performance (e.g., failed successions). The ontological problem with adopting organizational outcome measures is this study's selection of the individual as the unit of analysis. However, capturing performance variates for the individual still lack the necessary variation that can be meaningfully linked to organizational measures. What we are left with is the measurement of intermediate outcomes, or as described by Walter Williams (1975) as "outputs." That is, learning how executives become informed of the nature of their responsibilities, develop interpersonal relationships and change the organizational processes. Stated in question format: "How does the individual act to develop effective working relationships with members of the strategic leadership group (a.k.a., executive role constellation)? What do they do to establish a strategy for the organization? What directives, personnel moves, and changes in strategy are made by the new leader? Further, what trust is needed between the new leader and subordinates and/or superordinates? What actions are taken to achieve this trust?" It is in answering these questions that this study represents a redirection of the study of executive succession and begins a line of inquiry into strategic leadership transitions.

In this study, the length of time a person has to take charge is mediated by the mean tenure of state-agency directors (18-24 months). This length is significant because the individual process of the successor's role creation and the organizational processes involved with the succession intersect.

Unfortunately, this stress on outcome measures has led to a reliance on situations where the outcome data has been available, including an over-reliance on successions in sports franchises (e.g., Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1985; Wulf, 1988). These studies mistake the transition of the field manager for an executive leadership transition (see Anthony, 1965). These studies might generalize to performance effects of supervisory- or management control-level transitions, but certainly not to executive level transitions. For a full critique of research on executive succession, see Day & Lord, (1988).

To keep this discussion in perspective, some authors have directly avoided the discussion of the end point: "There is a point beyond which the successor loses his newness, and the events which occur after that point, while important, are beyond the scope of this paper" (Gordon & Rosen, 1981; p. 245).
That is, this study is an examination of a point in time when the "basic nature of work in the role changed" (Kohler & Strauss, 1983; p. 15). The length of time for a leadership transition process is represented in the following table.

### Table 2
**Duration of Executive Leadership Transitions**

(1) "Two or three years for a CEO to get a 'firm grip' on the reins of a hospital" (Kinzer, 1982).
(2) "Achieving the final stage in [an external] succession takes from one to two years for a small organization and two to three years or even longer for a large enterprise" (Pickhardt, 1981; p. 74).
(3) A new leader rarely succeeds who has not taken charge by the end of the fourth month. (Whitney, 1986; p. 5)
(4) [There is a] marked decrease in change after 27-30 months ...the manager has not only mastered the situation by 27-30 months, he has used up his newness. (Gabarro, 1987; p. 37)

To sort through this variability, in the following section, we focus on describing the individual and organizational events and processes of the strategic leadership process.

**Stages of Transition**

There are few objective events in the transition process: the resignation of the incumbent, the appointment of an individual to be a new leader, the new leader's arrival for work, the incumbent's announced resignation, and the incumbent's leaving. These four events allow for the distinction of five stages in strategic leadership transitions. Within each of these stages are a variety of actions and events. These events can be classified as to their importance to the individual and/or to the organization. Figure 2 displays one iteration of this cycle for one organization (one "transaction"). While the length of these phases within the stages can vary, the phases represent actions and events, while the stages represent observable events marking one stage from another. One important distinction is that actions and events described in one stage may occur in another stage. For example, an appointing authority can announce the resignation of the incumbent (to be called predecessor during one "transaction") and, if there was a search process (of any length, depth, or duration) the simultaneous appointment of the successor. Still, the rapid turnover of strategic leaders make it more likely that the resignation of the predecessor will correspond to the announcement of the appointment of an acting successor.
Stage 1: Announce resignation of incumbent.

Stage 2: Announce appointment of new leader.

Stage 3: New Leader's Arrival at the workplace.

Stage 4: Announcement of Incumbent's Resignation.

Stage 5: Incumbent's Last Day on This Job

Figure 2
Observable Events Delimiting Stages in the Transition Life-Cycle of a State Agency Director

Stage One

This first stage begins with the announcement of the retirement of the executive (personal event and process) or who is to be (or was) removed from the executive position or removes themselves voluntarily. Gilmore (1988) labels this as the decision to seek a change in leadership. The present leader (soon to be labeled as the predecessor) is resigning (voluntarily or involuntarily).

Performance Problems.

Prior to this individual and organizational event, the appointing authority may recognize performance problems associated with the organization's milieu, though a succession incident is usually initiated by the appointing authority to indicate that drastic action is needed to move the organization out of its present niche (Orosz & Card, 1988; Frederickson, et al., 1988), or the incumbent may resign to pursue a better "fit" between themselves and an organizational role. Performance problems were probably exacerbated as the appointing authority chose not to address performance or the leader's job satisfaction.

Anticipation.

When the appointing authority acts to remove the incumbent executive, the members of the organization, including the executive team (strategic leadership group) respond with uncertainty (Redlich, 1977; Greenblatt, 1983; Greiner & Bhambri, 1989) to the succession event (Greiner & Bhambri, 1989). From the perspective of the members of the organization and their stakeholders, an anticipatory stage (Redlich, 1977; Greenblatt, 1983), full of uncertainty and anxiety, lasts until the new manager is chosen. The uncertainty is intensified with the retirement (leaving office) of the now deposed executive (McGivern, 1978; Sonnenfield, 1988). Rumor and fantasy abound in the ranks of the internal and external stakeholders (e.g., Smith & White, 1987).
Foremost among the situational factors impacting the executive leadership process are the reasons for the demise of the predecessor and the symbolic impact of that reason upon the appointing authority and the internal stakeholders (Grusky, 1960). The departure of the strategic leader means that the leader's mode of operation also departs. These modes of operation includes interpretation of organizational policies, modes of relating to others, and other unique role behaviors. There are a variety of reasons for the demise of the predecessor including death, illness, movement to a superior position, demotion, and firing. If not anticipated, the transition destroys the influence of the predecessor -- introducing discontinuity into the actions of the members of the organization. For the successor who does not have the moderating influence of a predecessor, they are likely to promote in rapid and extreme change (Grusky, 1960). The presence of the predecessor is a stabilizing influence that persists if the predecessor left for a superior position (unless there is a high rate of transition within this organizational unit). The predecessor's promotion serves as outside recognition of the predecessor's manner of organization and the current organizational procedures. This puts the successor in a vulnerable position with respect to making changes in the organization. Assuming all else to be equal (although it never is), the extent of organizational instability tends to related to the degree the predecessor had control over leaving the executive position. The Staff's attribution for the demise of the predecessor also creates issues to be managed in the transition. Executive successions occur for a variety of reasons (illness, movement to another job, retirement, promotion, demotion, dismissal, or death. (House & Singh, 1987; p. 692). The last three mentioned have a different connotation for the stakeholders than do the others. The last three are considered to be organizational events, while the first four are considered to be individual events and experiences, but with organizational implications. The significance of the last three is that the event prevents the transfer of relevant organizational information to the successor. Further, if the succession due to these reasons is not anticipated, the organizational influence of the predecessor is destroyed, except in cases where successions are more routine (e.g., end of a term in government or in situations where this position is considered a training ground for further assignments. In these cases, there will be more personal affect for the departing executive, but less organizational disruption resulting from the departure of the executive.

The importance of the demise of the predecessor is that organizational stakeholders will make comparisons between the predecessor and the successor (Gordon & Rosen, 1981; Gabarro, 1987). These stakeholders often use the characteristics and attributes of the successors and compare them to the characteristics and attributes of the predecessor (Pickhardt, 1981; Heller, 1989). Thus, the demise of the predecessor is important to the eventual successor because stakeholders may withhold information from the successor because of the predecessor's relationship to the
stakeholders. If the relationship was positive, the successor will be more likely to use existing routines and procedures to learn about the organization.

The demise of the predecessor is also important to the eventual successor because the successor has the opportunity to learn of the executive role from the most previous incumbent -- the predecessor. If the succession incident was involuntary, there is less likelihood that the predecessor is available for a conversation regarding the key features of the position and the exercise of authority.

For the stakeholders, there is a sense of loss (Heller, 1989) continuing from the resignation of the predecessor and the state uncertainty arising from the understanding that there will be changes in status, power, modes of operation, policies, etc. The factors found relevant in the literature include whether or not there was a favorite son [or daughter] within the stakeholders who was passed over for the position (Gouldner, 1954), and whether this person is in a position to influence other important stakeholders who can control information, influence internal stakeholders and members of the SLG, and control whether changes in policy and procedure are enacted and implemented (Gordon & Rosen, 1981). In short, the position of these "unchosen" stakeholders may determine the eventual effectiveness of the successor.

In some organizations, succession incidents and transition processes become expected, almost routine processes in the context of the SLG (executive role constellation). A group's experience with succession in general is determined by the extent to which the leadership change is expected and routine. Successions where there is a rotation training system indicate less trouble with the succession. Fixed terms of office would indicate the same. Guest (1962; p. 114-115) argues that internal stakeholder will develop routines to lessen the dependence on formal leaders of the organization. Informal as well as formal roles for the executive will be better defined, and succession routines are likely to be better defined. There will be standardized processes to introduce the new leader to the organization, but the briefing will not cover all the important issues. If the leadership transitions become regularized, the members of the organization will learn how to deal without a formal leader (Gordon & Rosen, 1981; p. 243; Grusky, 1960). A high degree of turnover produces a high level of uncertainty in the SLG. To reduce this uncertainty, members of the SLG will be less likely to depend on the new leader to define the organizational reality.

If transition is regularized by design, did the predecessor have any role in the critical tasks or produce an impact on the organization (Gordon & Rosen, 1981; p. 243)? The higher the
interaction of the director with the task, in agencies with high succession, the more defined the leader's role. Likewise, the less active the leader in the accomplishment of the task, the more the norm will be strict for the successor to not "interfere" in the accomplishment of the task. The impact of the successor characteristics is less problematic than in cases where the leadership role has been preserved by the executive. The group may tolerate any leader so long as group autonomy is preserved. Further, when there is rapid turnover, the strategic leadership group may not see the qualities of any member until they are "trained" in the group's norms. For example, an organizational and functional outsider may not understand the situation until having passed some ritualistic situation or "blooding."

Design of the Search.

The appointing authority *designs the search and selection process* (Gilmore, 1988) including assessing the strategic considerations, level of stakeholder and personal participation, time lines, and expectations. The appointing authority evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the predecessor, and designs a search and selection strategy to find someone who meets the weaknesses of the predecessor in leading the organization and/or to lead the organization into the future envisioned by the appointing authority (Gilmore, 1988). This process includes assessing the strategic considerations including the level of stakeholders and personal participation, time lines and expectations of the search committee and the outcomes of the search.

Gabarro (1987) found that insiders make more changes, and made them more quickly than outsiders. It appears that if the appointing authority wants to make changes within the organization, the appointing authority should appoint a maverick insider. Regarding the work to establish effective interpersonal relations, Tushman, Virany and Romanelli (1987) found a significant modifier for outside successions in that changes in executive teams were more explanatory, and these effects were strengthened by changes in product-market mix and by changes in structure. (cf. House & Singh, 1987; p. 697). The implication is that the introduction of outsiders other than the successor (i. e., the members of the SLG) will have an impact greater than the successor's impact. This premise serves to highlight the finding that the establishment of effective interpersonal relations is important to achieving the goals of the organization. It also hints at how this is so difficult. With the appointment of an outside successor, the successor either accepts the current organizational paradigm or waits to size up the members of the SLG. If the successor was given a mandate for change, this strategy will put the successor in the unenviable position of mediating two contrary
social positions, and attempting to communicate these positions to both internal and external stakeholders.

Situational adversity (turnaround versus non-turnaround) is another area of differences. Turnaround managers are under greater pressure to improve performance (Gabarro, 1987; p. 51). As a result of this pressure, new managers are often given a charge or mandate to change the organization to improve its' performance. They were also aware that some of the changes were of a short-term nature, they would have to be redone at a later time. Thus, although decisions which were considered to be sub-optimal were made, they were made with the understanding that something had to be done to take charge more quickly.6

Turnaround managers start with a larger power base than their non-turnaround counterparts because of the urgency of the situation. They generally face less rivalry and resentment from key subordinates who might have seen themselves as candidates for the job (Zald, 1965; p. 53). If the organizational situation is conceived as a turnaround by the appointing authority as well as the internal stakeholders, there is considerably more discretion available to the new leader. Once the process of choosing a new successor is defined as related to organizational change, the successor receives a new mandate from which to develop a political realignment. That is, the succession involves a set of terms of office or, more commonly, a mandate. If the successor has presented herself as oriented toward a given set of goals or programs, and is then accepted as the successor, a mandate for change can be claimed as legitimation for his later acts (Zald, 1965; p. 60).

While it may be obvious from this discussion, the first critical task for the eventual successor is to recognize that an opening exists and that they may be qualified for the position. Beyond this initial recognition, the eventual successor must quickly identify the issues identified as salient to the governor's office and begin to develop a program to address these strategic issues.

Issue Assessment.

The appointing authority's judgment of the predecessor's tenure are sensed, categorized, and labeled as problems and attributed to the style or characteristic of the predecessor (Nutt, 1989; Heller, 1989). The appointing authority analyzes strategic issues facing the organization to avoid the

---

6 This might provide a unique public-private difference. In the private sector, the suboptimal decisions will be redone later, in the public sector, the decisions will be forgotten because of the frequent turnover; a new manager takes office in two years.
problem of carrying on business as usual and to avoid overreacting to the current leadership problems by replacing the incumbent with a successor possessing seemingly opposite characteristics and attributes. The next step is to translate this strategic assessment into specific leadership needs and job qualifications including inevitable tradeoffs, but not limited to industry-specific experience (Gilmore, 1988). The crisis is seen to produce evidence that the "opposite" type of person is needed to effectively manage the organization. Likewise, the predecessor may have been relieved of her post because of the appointing authority's intolerance for error. The political costs of adverse publicity, especially the erosion of political support, means that management is eager to avoid repetition of problems, even at the great cost involved in replacing an organization's formal leader. Thus, the appointing authority initiates the replacement of the executive, partly as a turnaround strategy (Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Orosz & Card, 1988).

Search.

The appointing authority or her agents search for the prospective candidate and conduct activities to screen the candidates including identifying candidates and screening and initial(ly) selecting the finalists based on applicant's qualifications in relation to the needs of the organization (Gilmore, 1988). The next phase is to interview and make final selection of a candidate based on a more thorough review of qualifications, intensive reference checks with previous employers, and a comparative analysis of each finalist's strengths and weaknesses (though these vary). The danger to the appointing authority is a disproportionate reliance on the interview, which tests the ability to interview, not prior performance in similar organizational situations.

Politically, there are several reasons for the increasing difficulty of making an appointment, quickly. First, the pool of well-qualified applicants may be disappointingly thin (Blair, 1987; p. 88), especially if the person is to be appointed to fill some geographic or demographic representativeness criterion. Second, many individuals looking for patronage are not individuals the governor may want to patronize. If an individual has "skeletons in her closet" they will haunt the governor, as well as the agency director. The governor wants to avoid hints of scandal or embarrassment that may cause difficulty in other areas, especially other policy initiatives and re-election. Further the governor may want to patronize a particular individual, but may not have an opening which would fit the skills, knowledge and ability of the person. If an appointee has to explain her qualifications, the battle to take charge effectively (assess the organization, establish effective interpersonal relations and work to establish a change in procedures or outcomes) is partly lost. A candidate whose qualifications are suspect serves to indicate to the press that the governor's ability to govern is suspect. Fourth, for
every appointment, there are a number of individuals who were not selected. Further, there are many individuals who sponsored and supported each of these individuals who were not selected. The result is many unhappy people and one "ingrate" who may, or may not have a degree of loyalty to the appointing authority. Finally, if the governor uses an advisory mechanism to screen candidates for appointment, the advisory committee may select people who are not sympathetic to the governor's or the governor's policy program and may want to provide patronage to people the governor does not want to patronize.7 Thus, the task is for the governor to obtain from the search committee a list of acceptable candidates with a compilation of their strengths and weaknesses.

Preparation.

Concurrent to these organizational events, the persons considering applying for this position -- to be the successor -- are undergoing preparation, reflecting their psychological readiness for a change -- an individual event and process. They review their values and experiences, education, employment, and the subculture of their current social structure to determine if they should apply for this new position (Nicholson & West, 1989).

There are a variety of reasons a person seeks appointment as an agency director. Primary among these is the status and to further specific policy initiatives (Blair, 1987; pp. 90-91). Eventually, one person agrees to be nominated and to serve. In this stage, the person selected to be the successor is reviewing their recall of experiences and their expectations of the future based on their impression of employment prospects and their conception of the job based on how the interview is conducted and their knowledge of how selection decisions are made. The (soon-to-be) successor is determining whether they have the talents to achieve, given the circumstances of the position (Feldman, 1977; Nicholson & West, 1988). Nicholson (1984) claims the basis for this is expectancy theory which predicts that motivational force toward some future outcome is determined by how much the new manager values possible outcomes tempered by the confidence that one's efforts will result in the desired outcomes. In this case, the nominee is reviewing previous experiences, education, and the subculture of the social strata of the present and future organization to determine if there is the possibility of a "fit" (Nicholson & West, 1988). The potential new

7 Califano (1981; p. 41) describes a technique used by President Lyndon Johnson when he would make appointments. When convinced of the person he would appoint, LBJ would have the person go and obtain a set of sponsors in Congress. When the appointment was announced, LBJ would send a note to the member stating that he made the appointment as a personal favor to them and that he expected favorable treatment from them.
leader's aspirations are tempered by impressions of how the interview is conducted and how selection decisions are to be made.

The Announcement.

The appointing authority announces the appointment of the successor.

Inauguration.

At some point during the announcement of the successor's nomination or when the successor arrives at the work site, the appointing authority assures the media, internal and external stakeholders (constituents) and attempts to create a sense and solidarity and optimism by inaugurating the successor (Redlich, 1977; Greenblatt, 1983). The appointing authority welcomes the appointee and assures that the transition will be smooth. If the predecessor is leaving for a better position, the predecessor offers personal support for the new leader -- an act designated to symbolically legitimate the transfer of power, thus lessening the need for the successor to degrade the status of the predecessor and the members of the strategic leadership group [SLG] (Heller, 1989).
Table 3
Stage 1: Individual and Organizational Events and Processes
Occurring between Predecessor's Resignation and the Successor's Appointment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Phases of Succession</th>
<th>New Leader</th>
<th>Organizational Phases</th>
<th>Appointing Authority</th>
<th>Internal Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issue Assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gilmore (1987)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design of Search</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gilmore (1987)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gilmore (1987)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screening and Selection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gilmore &amp; McCann</td>
<td>(1983) SCREENING &amp;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Strategic assessment may have been performed prior to organizational event reported here.
Table 4
Stage 2: Individual and Organizational Events and Processes
Occurring Between Announcement of Appointment and
The Successor’s Arrival for Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Organizational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Leader</td>
<td>Appointing Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inauguration.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Redlich (1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greenblatt (1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributing Style and Policy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stage Two
Concurrent with the announcement or the appointment, or immediately prior to the announcement is a transition process (Gilmore, 1988) where the new leader, the current staff, and the appointing authority develop an understanding of each other’s expectations, and evolve working relationships. The length of this stage varies greatly, from almost immediately with the appointment of acting directors (e.g., Farquhar, 1991) to a period of over one year with the appointment of university presidents (Birnbaum, 1988).

Attributing Style and Policy.
This stage often includes stakeholders working through the loss of the prior leader. This sense of loss (Heller, 1989) continues from the first stage when the announcement of the resignation of the predecessor created anxiety and disruption. This organizational disequilibrium often manifests itself in the form of emotional disturbances in members, the appointing authority’s promise of renewal, and the member’s perception of chaos. The appointment (Redlich, 1977; Greenblatt, 1983) serves to realize some and relieve other anxieties. Information about the
successor is sought out and then distributed throughout the organization in terms of the successor's attributes and characteristics as well as the experience of those from the information was sought. Leadership transitions serve as rather definitive proof that most all organizations are "open systems" (Thompson, 1967; Katz & Kahn, 1978).

During this appointment phase, internal and external stakeholders search for, obtain, and circulate information about the successor. Stakeholders often mythologize the new successor to be a "Messiah" (Vancil, 1987) or will treat the now deposed executive to be a "Rebecca" (Gouldner, 1954). Guest (1962b) noted the differences between his study of transition at an automobile plant and Gouldner's succession at a gypsum plant, focusing on the manner in which the employees treated the two successors.

The amount of relevant organizational knowledge a successor possesses has been discussed in terms of the demands of the appointing authority, however, this characteristic of the successor also has symbolic importance. From the literature, the perspective of whether the successor is from "inside" or "outside" the organization draws its traditional importance. Grusky (1960; p. 107-8) began this discussion by positing:

The amount of organizational knowledge and influence possessed by the successor is related to whether the successor is promoted from among the members of the present staff of the suborganization (inside man) or from another department within the organization (half inside-half outside) or from another organization entirely (outside man).

Thus, Grusky tells us that the relevant variable is not whether the successor is from within the organization, it is whether the successor is a relative "outsider" to the referent social system. This becomes important because of the dysfunction of succession (Redlich, 1977; Greenblatt, 1983; Zald, 1965; House & Singh, 1987). The successor is almost always a stranger in the sense that, except in rare circumstances, they are a stranger to that precise position or role construction. If the successor is from outside the organization, the successor is also a social stranger in addition to the fact that the physical surroundings are unfamiliar. In addition, the successor enters an ongoing group (strategic leadership group [SLG], or to use Hambrick and Mason's [1984] term, top management group) with a fairly well-defined social structure, a set of norms and tacit understandings about proper modes of interaction and a fairly well-established way of relating to the executive (Gouldner, 1954; Grusky, 1960; Gabarro, 1987; Greenblatt, 1983). In a sense, it is this social "strangeness" which causes the organizational dysfunction in the SLG. The successor imports qualities into the
group which are not a part of the group’s development or experience. The combination of "social strangeness" and authority inherent in the position as the executive serves to close the successor off from many sources of information about the organization. This, in turn, slows down the process of socializing the successor to the ways of the organization and reinforces the period of isolation.

The successor appointed from within the referent social group is in a different position. Ostensibly, the successor is already integrated into the group and the group’s norms. However, informal alliances will be altered as individuals within the SLG jockey for position and as policy changes are made. The succession of a relative "insider" also produces dysfunction. The new authority resting in the position demands an adjustment on the successor’s part as well as an adjustment on the part of the members of the SLG to the successor’s adjustment. This period of reflexivity may isolate the successor from internal social subsystems (especially those to which he did not belong [Grusky, 1960]) and may encourage commitment to known facts and people (Staw, Dutton, & Sandelands, 1983). This splitting of allegiances may cause problems of control for the successor, encouraging the use of "strategic replacements" (Gouldner, 1954). Since the person is known to many of the members of the organization (not simply the members of the SLG), rivals may cast doubt on the successor’s legitimacy.

Was a favorite son [daughter] within the group passed over when selecting a new leader? If so, will she remain with the agency or otherwise be in a position to hamper the newcomer’s efforts? If someone in the group were counting on the next promotion, had good reason to expect it, and subsequently lost out to another person, they will be in a position to create trouble for the newly selected leader in that they will try to define the organization’s reality. The effect of the appointing authority passing over a favorite son or daughter for appointment to the executive role is manifest when the individual passed-over remains with the organization, and is more intensified if from within the strategic leadership group. The loyalties of the strategic leadership group (SLG) are divided between personal loyalty and reliance on the authority structure, thus making it difficult for the new leader to develop effective working relationships. The effects will be moderated if the "sibling" leaves the organization and has little work-related contact with the members of the executive constellation.

Another factor cited by Gabarro (1987) that makes a difference is the functional roots of the successor. Functional roots are the "single most powerful factor" associated with what the new manager focused on. They determined the "... changes he made and the competence of his early actions" (Gabarro, 1987; p. 39, emphasis in original). That is, the events which transpired during
the first few epochs of the managerial experience seem to be the major intervening variable as they determined how others viewed the manager's actions. The actions seem to set a tone for the rest of the manager's term. This fits well with Smith's (1986; p. 17) charge to think about the opportunities of taking charge and Whitney's (1987; p. 266) warning of the conundrum that exists because of the draconian measures needed to accomplish a turnaround and the manager gaining the ill-repute of the organization's stakeholders, creating conditions where the organization would be better if the successor left the organization.8

The second individual characteristic was prior industry experience: industry insiders versus outsiders. The hypothesis is that insiders take less time to act than outsiders because they have more a more directly relevant experience base (Gabarro, 1987; p. 48). The situation of a failed succession was also supported by this distinction: the skills required of the manager may not be possessed in the new situation which increase the valence of other decisions, both good or poor.9

The perceived attractiveness and capability of the successor to the SLG also helps socialize the new leader to the environmental context of the new leader. The less favorable the new leader, the less the SLG will contact the new leader (Grusky, 1960). This reduces the amount of information the new leader has, and will create the situation where the successor makes mistakes. The new leader will then rely less and less on information provided by members of the SLG -- increasing the new leader's perception of the need for initiating strategic replacements (Gouldner, 1954) in order to realize their agenda or mandate.

The third aspect of the stakeholders regarding the succession of executives is the stakeholder's experience with leadership transitions. The primary question involves "What connotation does the succession of leadership have for the group?" The transition and the appointment of the successor may create the message to the members of the SLG that the appointing authority is "trimming the dead wood." In addition, there are usually affective overtones resulting from the "quick" succession. Retiring executives must have some period of time to prepare the employees that a change is coming, and to work with them to prepare for another leader and

---

8 Whitney (1987; p. 266) went on to say that the reasons for the termination should be publicized or that politics would be used to thwart further management action to achieve the turnaround.

9 A failed succession is defined as in which the new manager was terminated within three years of taking charge for failure to meet top management's expectations (Gabarro, 1987; p. 50). This definition is clearly not relevant for public sector managers as it is likely that agency directors will be "moving on" with the conclusion of the end of the Governor's constitutional term of office.
another leader's styles.

The stakeholder's perception of adversity and need for change also relates to whether the person is a relative insider. Internal and external stakeholders will compare the new leader with the predecessor producing a contrast effect (Pickhardt, 1981; Heller, 1989). If the old leader was viewed positively, the contrast creates difficulties in establishing effective working relationships with the members of the SLG. If the predecessor was viewed negatively, the successor will have a more easy time if the successor has a relatively number of attributes or characteristics different from those associated with the predecessor. Gouldner (1954) and Heller (1989) have described succession as a process of loss and substitution. The process takes two forms. In the first form, nostalgia for the predecessor interferes with the transfer of allegiance to the successor and the successor's ideas. Gouldner (1954; pp. 79-83) describes this as the "Rebecca myth," referring to the du Maurier novel in which a man was so consumed by the idealized memories of his dead wife (Rebecca) that he could not form new interpersonal attachments. In its other form, the polarization of affect is reversed, and the predecessor suffers from status degradation (Gephart, 1978) while the successor is viewed by the appointing authority and other stakeholders as a "Messiah" or savior of the organization. Unfortunately, the literature does not discuss when either form of loss and substitution will take place. We speculate that stakeholder's perception of performance problems, real or imagined, will cause the second form. The first form is more likely when the predecessor makes a voluntary move and makes a move for personal reasons, reasons not attributable to organizational motives.

There are significant attitudes, effects, and behaviors evoked even before the successor arrives. The perspective is that of the group, who relate and react to this previously inactive "successor." This, of course, is not a complete picture; it is entirely likely that the successor performs this same kind of mental inventory based on his or her perceptions, knowledge, past experience, and so on (Gordon & Rosen, 1981; p. 245-6). In the pre-arrival period, the members of the organization are going through preparations to ready themselves for the successor, more than the successor is preparing for the succession. The members may view the time after the successor's arrival as a period where they can ask for any request previously denied because of precedent or the previous leader's bias (Gordon & Rosen, 1981; p. 246)

Gordon and Rosen (1981; p. 243) provide an additional argument that when the process of training the executive requires a lengthy process, the successor's characteristics which could assist the organization go unnoticed. That is, the members see that the new leader is deficient in relevant
organizational knowledge, and because of this, discount the tools and leadership abilities the new leader possesses. This makes the successor's task of learning about the organization more lengthy and difficult. It also may reinforce the tendency of the successor to replace members of the SLG.

Developing a Mandate.

The appointing authority's motivations for change are usually perceived as whether the appointing authority enacts the reality that the organization needs a turnaround or a reorientation of strategy, or no change. Common to all is the motivation to find the most competent, qualified person (e.g., Devine & Brunley, 1989), though the criteria for "most qualified" varies according to the roles the individual is to portray. For a turnaround, the task is to correct the problems of the prior management (Greiner & Bhambr, 1989; Gabarro, 1988; Whitney, 1987). For a reorientation, the task is to find someone who will determine the organization's strategy (Vancil, 1987; Gupta, 1986) by matching the manager to the strategy (Gupta, 1986). Enacting the situation as needing "no change" represents a failure by the appointing authority to view the situation as a "strategic moment" (Gilmore, 1988). Given the first option, appointing authorities often give new leaders a mandate to correct the problems of prior management or to turnaround the performance of the organization. Gabarro (1987) found that managers who were appointed with a going-in mandate were more successful than those who did not. In addition, those whose succession was characterized as a "turnaround" made more changes than those whose succession was not so characterized, in part because the pressure for results was higher.

For the individual selected to be the new leader, this stage begins with a phase described as selecting and contracting (Gilmore & McCann, 1983) or Greenblatt's (1983) term, appointment, where initial expectations are negotiated between the successor and the appointing authority. These expectations depend on the appointing authority's motivations for change, the formality of the succession process and the successor's attributes.

The new leader will likely innovate the executive role definition when there are many goals and when the strategic leadership group has little attachment to any of them. It is in this manner that transition is likely to lead to major shifts in organizational goal definition or to basic political shifts in allocation. This is likely the case when organizations are faced with problems due to changing environmental conditions or when social forces have led to major changes in the composition and values of staff and appointing authority (Zald, 1965; p. 59).
The prevailing finding is that considerable latitude will be given a new manager facing a turnaround. Although the literature does not specify whom it is that can specify a turnaround. The distinction of symbolic and substantive aspects of performance allow any of the three primary actors (appointing authority, successor, and members of the SLG) in this social setting to define the situation. These competing perspectives allow for much of the considerable variation and for many of the interesting findings of transition literature. It is probably the internal stakeholder's perspective that is most important (Gordon & Rosen, 1981). The appointing authority's concern for defining the situation is relevant only when the appointing authority gives the successor a mandate. This mandate may be dependent on other factors. The successor can attempt to define the situation as adverse or needing a turnaround so that changes deemed as needed by the successor can be legitimated.

The actuarial studies do not provide much insight into how such matters effect the succession process as they do not take these factors into account (Gordon & Rosen, 1981; p. 245). The expectations or plans for the unit's future held by higher level administrators will be the initial activities of the new director. The existence and widespread distribution of the mandate will allow the appointing authority to signal to the relevant organizational stakeholders that the person is in charge and is legitimate. This also serves to signal to the internal stakeholders that a new order is present. The mandate is reflexive in that it signals to the appointing authority that the new director will follow orders and knows who appointed her. However, this is moderated by the use of a screening committee that gave specific recommendations to the appointing authority regarding whom to employ. When a body (such as a screening and selection committee) serves to legitimate the appointment and that body is different than the appointing authority, the appointing authority's mandate will be lessened in its value. The successor will have two authorities to follow. We expect more job creation in these instances.

We expect situations when the appointing authority pressures the new leader to institute bureaucratic routines and disciplinary measures, the process of socializing the successor is slowed. The absence of a mandate for change will allow for more time for socialization, as the new leader will not institute strategic replacements, or not as quickly. The presence of a mandate for change indicates to members of the SLG that the source of ability to mediate and distribute rewards and sanctions does not lie with the new leader.
Stage Three

The third stage begins when the successor arrives at the workplace. The appointing authority assures stakeholders of future stability and support in order to create a sense of solidarity and optimism. The purpose of this activity is to reduce many fears by legitimating the transfer of power and authority to the new leader (Greenblatt, 1983).

Encounter Between Successor and Stakeholders.

The inauguration phase (Redlich, 1977) begins when the successor arrives at the workplace. The successor develops a cognitive sense of the new surroundings and relationships gained through encounter (Nicholson & West, 1988), taking hold (Gabarro, 1987), and learning the buttons (Pickhardt, 1981). The task for the successor is to become informed about the needs of the organization (Guest, 1962a). The successor develops an understanding of the follower's need to achieve successful organizational change as well as learning, evaluating, and orienting themselves to the organization. In these encounters, the new leader's activities of sense-making in new surroundings assume extreme importance (Louis, 1980). This encounter (Nicholson & West, 1988) allows the successor to attribute meaning to current events and activities from their own wishes, needs, and scripts they have accumulated and modified from their prior experiences as well as contracting with the appointing authority. Early-on in this phase, some stakeholder anxieties are realized and relieved. Internal and external stakeholders evaluate the information and perceptions they formed after the announcement, looking for surprises and confirming evidence of their initial sense of the situation (Louis, 1980).

The new leader acts to identify and solve short-term performance problems (Gabarro, 1987; Greiner & Bhambri, 1989; Kelly, 1980) with the idea of demonstrating competence (Greiner & Bhambri, 1989). A sort of honeymoon (Redlich, 1977) occurs, which involves a period of sizing up, testing, and learning or immersion (Gabarro, 1985; 1987) between the successor and the stakeholders. The staff react to the personality, style, and initial policy postures of the successor (Greenblatt, 1983) paying attention to the seemingly unconscious choices of the new manager as to where and with whom to sit at dinners and meetings (Grusky, 1962) and where and when to have meetings (Gilmore, 1987). Disagreements and differences between the new leader and the members of the executive staff emerge, producing discomfort and conflict as norms are reinforced or removed (Grusky, 1962; Gilmore & McCann, 1983), and as the new leader replaces and moves people. The new leader makes "strategic replacements" in the executive group (Grusky, 1960; Gouldner, 1954).
in order to obtain acceptance of the members of the strategic leadership group (a.k.a. executive role constellation).

The organizational stakeholders test their initial expectations and begin a process of negotiating differences between themselves and the successor during the successor's entry (Gilmore & McCann, 1983). Staff react to the personality, style, and programs (Greenblatt, 1983) of the successor; any of which might produce discomfort and disagreements. These differences create a working through phase (Greenblatt, 1983) where the successor resolves and stabilizes (Redlich, 1977) differences with key norm-setting individuals, providing leverage for additional change. The successor is said to have made an adjustment by assimilating or accommodating to the differences in priorities and between people (Nicholson & West, 1988). Internal stakeholders adjust to the new work rules and procedures and begin the work to implement the new policies (Heller, 1989).

Gabarro also looked at the first and second major structural changes, initial area of major involvement and the subunits most involved to test the hypothesis that this was where the manager first acted. The premise is that the new manager's prior experience is the basis for learning and building her cognitive map of the organization, its environment, and internal operations (Gabarro, 1987; p. 45). While one could assume that a successor was chosen, at least in part, because of the successor's prior functional experience and thus mediate the findings regarding the successor's relative "insideness."

While executives are held as action takers or "agents of dramatic change" (Kelly, 1980; p. 38) they are brought in to reverse poor management decisions or to reorient the strategy of the organization (see also Tushman et al., 1985; p. 303 who define strategic reorientations as "organization-wide changes defined by simultaneous changes in strategy, power, structure and controls"). However, Kelly found that most executives moved extremely slowly and cautiously.

They downplay their own ego and authority, and they go to great lengths to establish personal relationships with their new subordinates (Kelly, 1980; p. 38).

---

10 It is not clear that these are events which follow one another. For example, the change in strategy, structure, and controls need not follow one another. Tushman et al. (1985; p. 311) found that the most successful firms in their sample were those without top executive succession. Neither reorientations nor executive succession by themselves were associated with enhanced organizational performance. It was only when succession was associated with a strategic reorientation was the strategy a successful.
Kelly also provided a set of questions to determine what actions the executives took during the transition to define their responsibilities. The most favorite response according to the criteria was "discussions with subordinates" and "private contemplation."\(^{11}\) In contrast to these findings, Kelly (1980) found that formal discussions with other CEOs (including the predecessors) and the writing out of responsibilities were given relatively little importance, although 90 percent found discussions with other CEOs as helpful.

Members can and will determine whether the new successor is using legitimate techniques. Hence, the sense of legitimacy is a reflexive one: it is not dependent on the perspective of the successor, it is in the perspective of the social group who will be judging that action as to whether it is legitimate or not (see Gordon & Rosen, 1981). Program expertise and management skills may best serve a stable program. Public leadership and political skills may be sought if major program changes are envisioned.

In this stage, the successor and the members of the executive constellation have a chance to "test the other out," in terms of the accuracy of perceived or expected characteristics. There are inevitable comparisons with the past, best described by Gouldner's (1954; p. 79-83) term, "Rebecca myth" in which the past manager is idealized by colleagues, despite the fact that the prior manager was disliked while present. In addition to the activities of getting acquainted, old and new members are sending, receiving and evaluating role expectations -- activities in the symbolic or subjective realm (Pfeffer, 1981; Wechsler & Rainey, 1988). Also at issue is whether altering factors such as strategy, structure, or process reflect top-level leadership or are manifestations of executive decision-making. Rarely does a new leader make such changes herself, even if she has the authority. Instead these changes require the agreement of the SLG. Attaining the agreement and approval requires the application of social influence that goes beyond formal authority and position. Thus, the attainment of influence is important to the new leader. The members of the SLG may give "headship status" (Gibb, 1968) to the successor where the influence that is granted is due to the successor's formal organizational position; attempts by the successor to exert influence are perceived as legitimate because of the successor's formal organizational position. In Gouldner's (1954) study, the new plant manager moved past headship status only when he was able to replace enough of the junior executives to get cooperation. This is not to be confused with a case of followers who are

\(^{11}\) Kelly asked, "What methods do (did) you intend to use in defining and planning the execution of your new responsibilities?"
not willing to be led. In the Guest study (1962a), the successor moved toward leadership, with positive results by actively searching for alternative sources of information including informal meetings in the worker's "turf" and openly requesting and responding to suggestions regarding problematic conditions.

Most managers believe that they have six months to resolve the problems of the past before these problems become their problems. Kelly (1980; p. 44-5) found that the time seems to vary for different tasks. The question Kelly put to managers was how much time they had before they were accountable for certain areas of management and performance and the time required for them to have an impact. The managers surveyed by Kelly believe the honeymoon period to be shorter than six months. This also points out the order in which one might expect the managers to take actions to accomplish taking charge. Most new executives believe that they are accountable for, and must impact many important aspects of the enterprise in fewer than six months. They plan to be well underway with actions and changes (especially structure and personnel) by that time. Gabarro (1987) concentrates on changes within six months periods. The events which are to transpire "within six months" are those events which the new managers feel most uncertain (organizational structure, business strategy, marketing programs, information systems, etc.). This short-time horizon indicates that the manager may have to act to create a symbolic message that they are "in charge" prior to the lapse of six months. This is confounded by the relatively short period of time CEOs felt will be (was) required for them to have an impact on these aspects of their organization. Public sector leaders turn over frequently -- can someone take charge and have an influence on the organization's structure and process over the period of one year?

This produces a paradoxical situation where "[t]he CEO is like a contestant in a long-distance walking race, using a necessarily slow and deliberate style to achieve results as quickly as possible" (Kelly, 1980; p. 40). They must achieve results quickly in order to maintain effective relations with the appointing authority and must go slowly enough to learn their subordinates and to allow subordinates to develop a trust in their abilities.

Guest (1962; p. 53) used the term "institutionally derived pressures" to refer to community pressures, traditions of inside successors, to limit the ability of the successor to exercise leadership. That is, when the successor perceives these characteristics, they serve as limits on the ability to exercise leadership. The new leader will have to address these factors prior to addressing other, perhaps, more pressing concerns.
In the initial meetings, the successor and the members of the strategic leadership group have an opportunity to "check out" one another in terms of the accuracy of the perceived or expected characteristics. This is much akin to a blind or first date where there are comparisons with the past: Gouldner's (1954; p. 79-83) "Rebecca Myth" in which the predecessor is idealized by members of the SLG and by workers, despite the fact that he (the predecessor) was disliked while present. These actions to get acquainted or to send, receive and evaluate role expectations that will guide their future actions is very similar to Pickhardt's (1981) discussion of the problems of internal candidates who face the incompatibility of old and new roles. The problem for the successor is to establish a difference between how the (Pickhardt, as well as Gouldner, referred to internal) stakeholders perceive the successor. Thus, the aspects of a person's character denoted to be most salient by the members of an agency will serve to frame the role behavior of the successor. We can offer the proposition that the most and least favorable aspects of the predecessor will be the most salient to the members of the members of the agency and to the agency's stakeholders.

The relationships with key people are important in the "three of four failed successions had poor working relationships with two or more of their key subordinates by the end of twelve months." The reasons for the dissatisfaction include unresolved rivalry between the successor and a key rival in the SLG, conflict over organizational goals, and conflict over the definition of acceptable performance (Gabarro, 1987; p. 58). The conflicts in style are conflicts which affect the taking charge when the conflicts are a source of problems. The primary difference is whether the new manager is "hands-on" or is one who delegates responsibility and authority. A key problem was that new managers had not worked through expectations about roles, performance, and results with their bosses (p. 60).

Another phenomena is the "auditioning" process where internal and external stakeholders try to capture the attention focus of the new leader so that the relationship between the stakeholder and the new leader is strengthened or, at least redefined.

The more the style of the new leader contrasts with the style of the predecessor, the more difficult the task of gaining entry into the SLG. The more the style of the new leader contrasts with the styles of the members of the SLG, the more difficult the task of gaining entry into and membership into the group. The more the style of the new leader does not correspond to how the

---

12 Gabarro (1987; p. 57) defines poor working relationships as where either the manager or the subordinate described the relationship as being dissatisfying or ineffective.
members of the SLG believe the situation should be handled, the more difficult the entry into the group. The more the style of the new leader does not correspond to the expectations of the SLG, the more difficult the new leader will have in establishing effective interpersonal relationships.

Reassessment.

For the successor, the activity early in this stage is a process of becoming informed about the needs of the organization. In this phase, the successor develops an understanding of the follower's need to achieve successful organizational change. The successor initiated most contacts but urged members to identify problems and created a process for them to do so. A convergent phase begins as the reorienting (change) work is accomplished (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). The successor begins to push the management team to install motivation systems by middle management to assure consistent policy and program implementation within the organization (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) by designing structure and transferring leadership (Greiner & Bhambrì, 1989) institutionalizing interactions and enlarging the span of cognition (Guest, 1962a). The executive's successful early concentration on solving short-term performance problems now permits a longer-term focus on setting a strategic direction (Grusky, 1962). The stability of the organization is ensured through this period of pattern setting (Gilmore & McCann, 1983) even if the norms and patterns that are set, are not those intended.

Members of the SLG who accept the situation as a "turnaround" means less resentment of "outsiders." However, this lack of resentment by subordinates, may result in the fear of the changes to be made during the turnaround by some of those subordinates. We might expect the higher the degree to which the transition is expected in the organization, the less influence the new leader will be able to exert. Further, changing executive group members (Gouldner's "strategic replacements") will reduces the negative organizational memory of succession incidents.

Kotter (1982) found that chief executives do not rely on the chain of command nearly as much as create an informal network to gather information and constantly reorder priorities as the agenda changes. Overt decisions are rare and the short, disjointed conversations are the vehicles of persuasion and change (Noel, 1989; Mintzberg, 1975; Schein, 1985).

Over time, the successors' sources of influence change from their appointing authority when first appointed to themselves and from themselves to informal leaders as they near the end of their term. These changes in power sources affect the functioning of the group as the person is forced
to move from formal power of the appointing authority to appoint them, to the informal power they hold as they gain the ability to define the organizational reality of the members of the group to the formal authority as other informal leaders try to gain control of the definition of the context for action [note that this does not allow for a honeymoon period where the managers actions are ratified because of their newness]. The use of formal authority to get action from subordinates will be dependent on their (stakeholder's) acceptance of that authority. The use of formal authority systems to enforce action when there are rival leaders will result in a deviation amplifying loop as the leader uses formal authority to get action and the members reject the leader's use of informal authority to try to place a context on member's action. The exercise of authority perceived as illegitimate will lead to resentment.

The endpoint of succession is determined by the successor's ability to transfer the commitment from themselves as a person in a role to their ideas and vision. This is transition as a change in paradigm shift followers experience at another's (usually the successor's) behest. This process is one where the successor leads followers to reject their old paradigm and to accept the successor's articulation of the new paradigm as "the truth" and then to act to carry out that new belief.

Reshaping the Authority Structure.

The successor acts to develop a consensus to secure executive team commitment to a chosen strategy (Guest, 1962; Greiner & Bambri, 1989) by assessing the consequences of earlier changes, correcting mistakes or reshaping relationships (Gabarro, 1987). This involves changing programs, stakeholder relations, acting on personnel decisions and aligning process to program intentions by altering the structure to consolidate the successor's power base (Gabarro, 1987). The successor realigns the structure with the strategy and key personnel to form a workable coalition highlighting the transfer of leadership to middle managers. By this time, the successor is clearly in charge, and the process of learning about the organization and its context is routine and incremental (Gabarro, 1987).

These two patterns are significant because the process of learning is interactive. Subordinates and superordinates must do learning and action-taking for the effective operation of the organization. Establishing a management team usually means one of two things: selecting and appointing one's own managers, or it may mean assuring that top management consists of the best people possible (Grusky, 1954; p. 292). The managers studied by Kelly did not appear to make a
wholesale change in the management team. There are a variety of reasons for this "inaction:" (1) as the successor gains experience, they realize that they need to replace more executives (members of the SLG) than originally intended; (2) unexpected turnover may increase the counts of those replaced; and (3) successors may be appointing more executives than they are replacing (Kelly, 1980; p. 42). The second point needs some embellishment. The leadership transition of the successor may be identified as the causal link for the turnover, but internal stakeholders do not count the persons as replacements if they leave on their own volition. That is, stakeholders do not place a negative connotation on the successor if the individual member of the SLG leaves on their own volition or for performance problems in their unit if the individual was given a "fair shake." When the previous manager remained with the organization (Kelly's [1980] data indicate this occurs sixty-four percent of the time), the new manager had a more difficult time creating and stabilizing a management team; the task required more time and attention and action than they originally thought.

Institutionalizing Change.

The internal stakeholders realize that these "new" conditions are apt to continue for some time and new manager's desired norms get set, most of which are accepted in an equilibrium (Redlich, 1977) or new equilibrium (Greenblatt, 1983). The members of the management team must then be allowed discretion to install programs and systems that secure cooperation with the new strategy from the workforce while simultaneously addressing a sequence of related political concerns that arise by reorienting their part of the organization to the new management environment. Reorientative tasks by the middle managers are made easier as other managers (peers) attempt to do the same (Guest, 1962a).

Preparing for Leaving the Office.

As the manager moves on, members develop routines to meet the challenges of the external conditions and generate new ideas for improvement in this aftermath (Guest, 1962a). The successor develops relationships across levels to super- and subordinates. The appointing authority sets parameters or contours of the job by setting limits on control and discretionary performance. If the manager fails at this stabilization phase, the manager re-enters the preparation phase (searches for a new appointment, stage 2 in another organization). This begins the organizational transition into stage four.

The appointing authority may perceive performance problems with the organization. If the situation is sufficiently troublesome, the appointing authority may initiate a transition between
managers. Vancil (1987) estimates ten to twenty percent of new successions were failures. This is consistent with Kelly (1980) who found that newly appointed executives believe they would be held responsible for making effective changes within the initial six months of their appointment. Thus, the time horizon is short for the new leader, while the existing social system to which she is joining, is more concerned with a longer term.

The leadership transition period occasionally ends prior to the time the person has developed an understanding and mastery of the organization, established effective interpersonal relations, and had a positive impact on organizational processes and performance. In addition to the private sector examples cited earlier (failure to establish effective interpersonal relations), transition failures could result when the leader fails to take account of their personal constituencies. Others have utilized a concept of performance to deal with less tangible indicators and argue that chief executive officers who do not meet environmental challenges may create succession incidents (e.g., Osborne, Jauch, Martin, & Glueck, 1981; Schwartz & Menon, 1985). This is similar to a typical public sector case where performance measures are less tangible (e.g., Anne Burford of the federal Environmental Protection Agency, in Gaertner et al., 1983).

Heymann (1987; p. 27) argues that differences in constituencies lead to problems for agency directors. These problems vary from decreases in salary to accept public sector positions to more symbolic differences such as tensions between positions held by close friends, and the agency director’s personal reputation held outside governmental circles. Hamilton and Biggart (1984) found that failed successions among state agency directors in California during the terms of Edmund Brown, Jr. and Ronald Reagan were more likely to cite frustration, not understanding government, a lack of a management background, not understanding the role of the legislature, and not understanding how to work with people as the reasons for their own failures.

Heymann (1987; p. 45) posits any action which leads the public to construe that government as wasteful, inefficient, unresponsive to severe problems or ineffective in handling those it addresses, creates a constraint in that such perceptions lead to political attacks on the Governor and calls for reform of the administration. With many persons and institutions serving as legitimate stakeholders for the agency, the coup can come from a junta organized from almost anywhere (Orosz & Card, 1988; Frederickson, et al., 1988). There is no way for a governor to fire quietly an agency director.
In summary of the necessary activities in this stage, the successor must demonstrate competence by activities to take hold and grab the attention of internal stakeholders by focusing on short-term solutions to initial initiatives (Gilmore & McCann, 1983) negotiated between the successor and the appointing authority or to resolve obvious problems. The successor must then work to develop consensus with the members of the SLG by converting the members to the new vision (Heller, 1989) or by strategic replacements (Gouldner, 1954). With this consensus of needed activities, the successor and the SLG design a structure to realign the structure with the strategy and the individuals. As the successor's span of cognition (Guest, 1962a) is enlarged, learning becomes more routine (Gabarro, 1987) the successor gets better information (Guest, 1962a) and begins the process of communicating the strategy to middle management to transfer leadership (Greiner & Bhambri, 1989). Patterns, standard operating procedures, and a new equilibrium are set.

There are a number of intermediate level outcomes for the transition process. First, there is the possibility of a continuity of policy with the past. In this case, there are few changes in the strategic leadership group, small or no structural reorganizations, a continuity of the relationship with external stakeholders. The new leader may vary these somehow by initiating some new relationships, maintaining a few others, and letting others decline. In any event, the successor's relations with external stakeholders are not monotonic.
Table 5
Stage 3: Individual and Organizational Events and Processes
Occurring between the Successor's Arrival and Resignation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of Succession</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Organizational</th>
<th>Internal Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Encounter between successor and stakeholders</td>
<td>New Leader</td>
<td>Appointing Authority</td>
<td>Greenblatt (1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassessment of the people and the organization's relationships</td>
<td></td>
<td>GUEST (1962)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reshaping the authority structure</td>
<td>Gabarro (1987) RESHAPING; Guest (1962) INSTITUTIONALIZING INTERACTIONS; PLANNING AND ACTION; Gilmore &amp; Brown (1985) INSTITUTIONALIZING CHANGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Organizational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalizing change by installing incentives,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reporting relationships, and modes of operating.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redlich (1977) EQUILIBRIUM; Greenblatt (1983) NEW EQUILIBRIUM; Guest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1962) REINFORCEMENT OF RESOURCES; Pickhardt (1981) INSTALLING NEW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUTTONS; Gilmore &amp; Brown (1985) TRANSFERRING LEADERSHIP; Gabarro (1987)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFINEMENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation for leaving the office and the position.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stage Four

The fourth stage begins when the incumbent strategic leader’s resignation is announced. The new leader’s actions that are important include the adaptation strategies made known through Valiant’s work. Others have described the process, extending Kubler-Ross’s work on death and dying. In any case, the strategic leader experiences a feeling described as though a "weight has been lifted off of me." After this feeling subsides, the reality of the ending of this period begins to take hold. There are heavy incentives for executives to not retire (Vancil, 1987; p. 5; Kets de Vries, 1988; p. 57; Sonnenfield, 1988; p. 269). Aside from the obvious financial rewards coming from the "descent from the peak" of one’s career, there are non-financial barriers such as a loss of status, perquisites, and the psychological costs of not being employed or viewing one’s self as not being productively employed. In the public-private sector, executives are likely to feel that this position represents the apex of their authority and influence. Public sector executives are likely to be younger and when the resigning executive returns to an advocacy or other public organization, they are likely to not be financially compensated at this level (Haas & Wright, 1990). Furthermore, they will no longer be able to exercise this degree of influence and it may appear that they will not have this opportunity again. So, there are psychological adjustments which must be met in this process. The outgoing executive must confront the reality of death (Kets de Vries, 1988).

It is during this period that the incumbent begins to prepare for another managerial work role transition (Nicholson, 1984). This phase of preparation, may be simultaneous to stage 1 activities, but in another organization’s transition process. Thus, it becomes clear that transition processes are organizational processes and events as well as individual processes and events. Stage four is analogous to the successor’s perspective in stages one and two, except the focal manager is now in another organization or has left the workforce.

The fourth stage in this leadership transition process is quite similar to the second stage. The resignation is announced and the stakeholders react much as they did in stage two, with respect to the leadership transition now completed, except that the situation is now quite different. The influence, power and authority each stakeholder established under the previous leader is now shaken as a new leader will be appointed, an acting executive may be announced, the appointing authority begins a search process, and the stakeholders begin the grieving process associated with the individual leaving. It is easier to be the one leaving than the one remaining.
Stage Five

The fifth stage of this transition process begins when the incumbent leaves the office. The departing executive must now psychologically remove themselves from operating as a member of the organization of which they once were a part. The individual begins a period of unemployment, or begins another career in another position, analogous to stage three (described above). In its best format, the manager moves on. Members have developed routines to meet the challenges of the external conditions and generate new ideas for improvement. In a more likely scenario, an interim director will be named, who will be a candidate for the position. Little will be accomplished during this interregnum from a policy perspective (Farquhar, 1991) as the insider lobbies for the job, and the appointing authority tries to locate a "permanent" successor. As the "new" predecessor exits the organization, there will be some who have loyalties to that person and to her way of defining the organizational reality (Pickhardt, 1981; Heller, 1989) and the successor will come in and replace some members of the SLG.

Vancil (1987) describes the exit where the CEO chooses a successor and then proceeds to test the new leader and then gently fades from view. However, Vancil also left open the perspective that the CEO would not want to choose a successor -- the CEO's reluctant exit. This criteria could be matched with the CEOs continued contact with the organization. Thus, we have a two-fold table describing the styles of retirement. Sonnenfield (1988; 1989; p. 292-4) explains this typology of exit styles. The two criteria used to create this typology include the willingness to retire and the continuing contact with the organization. The first style is the monarch, where the CEO does not leave office until death or through an internal palace revolt or junta (ultimatum, resignation of top officers, or other action by the board of directors). A second forced exit would be the general, where the CEO retires involuntarily but returns out of retirement to rescue the organization from the real or imagined failures of the successor. Ambassadors, by contrast, Sonnenfield describes as leaving office gracefully; they frequently serve as mentors for newly appointed CEOs, remaining on the board of directors, but do not sabotage the new leader. Instead, they provide counsel and continuity to the organization and its relationships. Sonnenfield lastly describes governors, who leave office gracefully, but quickly lose contact with the organization. In the American political system, most of the retired agency directors would be described as Sonnenfield describes the "governor" mode of retirement. They know they will be in office for a limited period of time, and adjust their employment perspectives accordingly.
### Table 6

**Critical Activities for Successor by Phase of Strategic Leadership Transition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase of Activity</th>
<th>Critical Task for the Successor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search</td>
<td>To become aware of the opening. To identify the strategic issues identified by the Governor's office and to develop a program to address these strategic issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection</td>
<td>To demonstrate to the search committee and to the appointing authority how one's skills, knowledge, and abilities will enable themselves to address the strategic issues. When the appointing authority fails to perform a strategic assessment, to fit with the personality and style of the appointing authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>To begin to change one's behavior and mode of thought from the prior position to the executive position they are about to receive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Announcement</td>
<td>To provide evidence to the media that they (the successor) have the skills, knowledge, and ability to address the stakeholder's perception of the strategic issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inauguration</td>
<td>To publicly state one's agenda and to show how that agenda fits with the larger mandate of the Governor. In addition, to symbolically address plausible stakeholders' attributions of their style and mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing a mandate.</td>
<td>To specify the expectations of, and to establish a working relationship with, the appointing authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributing style and performance</td>
<td>To act consistently with the stated mode of operating and with the mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encounter</td>
<td>To become informed about the needs of the organization and the capabilities of the people to meet those needs. To not fail at relationships with key subordinates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassessment</td>
<td>To demonstrate competence in leading the organization to the appointing authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reshaping the authority structure</td>
<td>To develop a consensus about what and how to change the organization's critical tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reshaping</td>
<td>To develop successful working relationships with members of strategic leadership group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalizing change</td>
<td>To design a structure and transfer leadership from themselves to the members of the strategic leadership group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing for leaving</td>
<td>To change the processes of the organization in ways that the members of the strategic leadership group and the appointing authority will see as improving the performance of the agency. To begin to prepare for work situations after their tenure has ended.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary

The preceding discussion describes the stages and phases of taking charge and defines a series of issues to be resolved by the appointing authority, the internal stakeholders, and the successor. Table 6 summarizes the literature to reveal the critical tasks in the first three stages of creating one’s job.

In the first stage, the critical tasks are centered around receiving the appointment to the executive position. The first critical task is to become aware of the opening, and once the opening is discovered, to identify the strategic issues of the agency. In the selection phase of stage 1, the critical task is to demonstrate to the search committee and/or the appointing authority that one has the skills, knowledge and ability to address, and possibly resolve these issues. A person enters a personal transformation as they begin to think in terms of the new position.

In the second stage, the successor’s critical tasks are bifurcated: receiving what the appointing authority gives and symbolic in terms of relating to stakeholders. The newly appointed person has to provide evidence to the media that they can address the agency’s strategic issues. They also have to show how their agenda is derived from, and congruent to, the agenda of the Governor. The new appointee also has a critical task of learning what they will be responsible for accomplishing -- obtaining a mandate. Also, they are responsible for determining how to best work with the governor’s office. Finally, they are trying to set up expectations of how stakeholders will attribute their style and performance by acting consistently with the governor’s mandate.

The third stage encompasses most of the leadership transition literature. The focus is on the encounters between the successor and his or her subordinates. The goals of this stage, as we recall, are to acquire an understanding of the people and processes of the new organization and the position. This phase of learning is dependent on establishing effective working relationships with key subordinates and members of the strategic leadership group, as Gabarro (1987) found that individuals who failed to take charge failed to establish these relationships with at least one key subordinate. The new appointee will reassess people and processes and then work to develop a consensus about what and how to change the organization’s critical tasks. Finally, in reshaping and institutionalizing change, the successor must transfer leadership from themselves to their subordinates to have an impact on the organization and its processes and outcomes. Then, in the public sector, executives must prepare to leave the organization as they know their appointments are temporary.
Chapter III describes the methods used to determine whether and how the three new appointees involved in this study met and resolved these critical tasks. Chapters IV through VI describe the activities of the three agency directors to create their jobs. Chapter VII returns to the selection criteria described in the first chapter and reviews factors and events found to be common throughout all cases. These factors are then used to develop the grounded theory of creating your job and taking charge. Chapter VIII summarizes these findings and goes through how each of these three agency directors met these critical tasks, and then offers suggestions and implications for practice, theory, and research.
Chapter III

METHODOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS FOR ACTION RESEARCH

Epistemology, roughly speaking, is the theory of knowledge. The purpose of epistemology is to attempt to define knowledge, distinguish its principal varieties, identify its sources and establish its limits. Reasonable scholars believe that knowledge encompasses but extends beyond belief. However, the specification of that residual element (somewhere beyond belief) is a matter of controversy to which this chapter is addressed.

This residual element involves the important methodological and epistemological commitments necessary for a study of the process of taking social action -- here the process of creating one's job as an executive in a state agency. Here the task is to contrast methods and epistemologies for investigating deliberate actions made by relevant social actors. The analysis that follows starts out with epistemological considerations in the tradition of modern post-positivist philosophy of science. The paper concludes with a discussion of how one would investigate the processes used by newly appointed leaders to determine their initial agenda for action.

This study relies on a critical relativist epistemology. The epistemological commitments call for a set of methods -- a form of fieldwork that can be evaluated on four qualities: a commitment to get close, be factual, descriptive, and rely on quotations in order to represent the participants in their own terms (Lofland & Lofland, 1984; Pettigrew, 1990). Fieldwork involves obtaining information about the social actor in the actor's social setting to determine the meaning understood by the actors in a social setting.

What is the underlying logic that gives meaning and significance to events? The goal is to understand these logics -- how members understand their experience and act. This requires data on events, interpretations of patterns in those events, when they occur in socially meaningful time cycles and the logic behind which these patterns occur in a particular chronological order (Pettigrew, 1990; p. 273).
And to get close to the agency director, we must begin with assumptions about how the agency director will create those meanings. Then, the epistemological commitments will be described and the methods necessary to maintain those commitments will be differentiate from the case-study methods described by, among others Yin (1984; 1989), and from the relativist methods outlined by Lincoln and Guba (1985). After distinguishing between these three methods, the methods of this study will be described.

Critical Assumptions to this Research

This study assumes that organization members actively create (Berger & Luckman, 1966), or enact (Weick, 1979), the reality they inhabit (Chaffee, 1985). They create a material and symbolic record (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; p. 726) upon which they predicate future action (Weick, 1979).

Second, individual members have a frame of reference that individual members can share within a collectivity (Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick & Bougon, 1986). This social interchange is negotiated over time (Burrell & Morgan, 1979) and this cognitive consenuality represents the dominant logic of a group (Janis & Mann, 1972), even its dominant reality.

Third, the views of the executive are central to organizational change. As holders of the formal authority, they have legitimacy to interpret events and to use those interpretations to attempt to frame the interpretations of other organizational stakeholders. Smircich and Morgan (1982, p. 261) describe the leader as a critical thinker, a manager of meaning, who transforms "what may be complex and ambiguous into something more discrete and vested with a specific pattern of meaning." Burns (1978, pp. 73-80), Bass (1985, pp. 20-21 and 182-3), Kuhnert and Lewis (1987, pp. 648-9) and Torbert (1987, pp. 226-32; 1988, p. 35) all provide examples of how an individual can understand different conceptions of self-in-role as well as role-in-organization. This level of understanding is essential to reframing subordinate’s experiences. The assumptions behind reframing are that any experience can be understood in multiple ways (Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974; Bartunek, 1988). Perspectives derive from factors that are part of role conceptions (Collins, 1981; Hamilton & Biggart, 1984) as well as from integrated sets of beliefs, values, assumptions, and understandings (Kegan, 1982; Bartunek, 1988; Lahey, Souvaline, Kegan, R., Goodman, R., & Felix, S., undated). In addition, executives have formal authority with which to "authorize" interpretations. Thus, the articulation of the new leader's vision is, or rather, can be the social architecture from which members of organizations draw meaning and significance (Bennis & Nanus, 1985).
Fourth, executives make sense of their experiences after the event, or *ex-post* (Weick, 1979; Weick, 1988). The process of "enactment" or the social process by which a material and symbolic record of action is made is crucial to this understanding (Smircich & Stubbart, 1983). Portions of the field of experience are bracketed and singled out for closer attention on the basis of preconceptions. Then, people act within the context of these bracketed elements under the guidance of their preconceptions, and often shape these elements in the directions of their preconceptions (action serves to confirm their preconceptions). Yet, individual perspectives on an event or series of events can change (Bartunek, 1988; p. 139). However, action is never focused until after the action has happened. Weick (1988; pp. 305-6) cites Bateson (1972) to say that "An explorer cannot know what he is facing until he faces it and then looks back over the episode to sort out what happened." Thus, interpretations tend to be formulated after events, not during them. For this investigation, interpretations are constructed around events already transpired and around which a collective viewpoint has emerged. The investigative task becomes to have the person recall the experiences and events. Letting people talk is a way to get them to reveal themselves and to think about what they did, then to search for corroborative as well as disconfirming evidence to the representations of the informant.

**Epistemological Commitments**

Quantitative and qualitative research are usually viewed as polar opposites. Instead, we argue that they are less separable. Qualitative research refers to the presence or absence of something while quantitative involves measuring the degree to which something is present (Kirk & Miller, 1986; p. 9; Kennedy, 1983; 2-3). Although this distinction seems counter-intuitive, quality implies knowing what features or attributes the object of study possesses. Qualitative knowing is essential to quantitative understanding (Campbell, 1978). Qualitative analysis refers to the nature of the thing being counted and to the use of a symbol scheme to represent the objects in the objective world.

Quantity and quality are not opposites -- quantity depends on quality. Faced with measuring an object, we have to determine which quality to measure (matter, energy, information, process, etc.) before making any decisions about quantities. Objectivity is itself a quality, if only an imaginary one, as if the assumption that objectivity speaks, or might be thought to speak, in numbers. The distinction between quality and quantity fails to note that we perceive relationships
in reality rather than objects, events, or facts. With this, quantitative and qualitative are only apparent opposites; they are not symmetrical.

The advantage of a qualitative approach is that it is sensitive to discrepancies between meanings presumed by investigators and those understood by the target population. The cognitive territory is controlled by the target population and not the investigator. As such, field investigation is accomplished at the mercy of the subject’s perception of the material reality.

There are several problems with using quality and quantity differences to discuss epistemological commitments. First, the ground of pure observation, untainted by theoretical assumptions is unobtainable, especially in the human sciences (Polkinghorne, 1983). That is, the deductive links between theoretical concepts are diluted by the contextual variability of conceptual definitions. Because human actors interpret stimuli, their actions are continually emergent (Ilgen & Klein, 1988). That is, the interpretations of the same question in an interview will vary among respondents and different occasions of asking the question, including the perspective of the interviewer. The task is to gain access to the meanings that guide behavior, using capacities of interacting in the meaning system we hope to interpret. Second, what is accepted as knowledge is what has withstood the tests of experience and experiment; it has provided better answers (Campbell, 1978; p. 185). Popper's (1959) *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, deduced that theoretical findings are never "proven," they can only attain the status of provisional answers to questions. Since no number of occurrences of any two social phenomena can indicate a causal condition, the task for the investigator is to attempt to falsify the conclusion not verify its existence. Finally, the use of the phrase "better answers" is to signify that knowledge is no longer certain, it is fallible. To claim knowledge is to say that a claim to knowledge represents the best explanations in which we trust enough to act.

If we accept this premise that science produces fallible knowledge, there are several implications. First, following a particular method no longer guarantees that we will arrive at "truth." We need a way to decide among fallible alternatives. The acceptance of a research result by the community of scholars is equivalent to agreement that it is worthy as a knowledge claim. This acceptance comes through the process of practical reasoning rather than through demonstrative reasoning. The methods of a social science to discover processes must provide independent measures of the same phenomena to offset biases and measurement errors (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).
Scientific Explanation

The received view of science is very basic: it refers to any reasoning which attempts to proceed from observable facts of experience to reasonable (that is, relevant and testable) explanations of those facts (Copi, 1978; pp. 461-81). In the organizational and policy sciences, many theories purport to show relationships between unobservable phenomena. To test such relationships, we must develop or adopt a symbol scheme to represent these unobservables. This is often accomplished using mathematical (numbers) or linguistic symbols (words) to represent testable propositions so that the validity of the propositions can be used as evidence to test the unobservable phenomena.

Since the propositions refer to things that are not directly observable, one must consider the truth value of the proposition. First, there must be some problematic condition for which a theory is devised to explain the condition. Otherwise, the world is simply a blooming, buzzing set of phenomena, none of which are of interest. Propositions are developed to relate the phenomena of interest and hypotheses are derived to make the propositions testable in terms of what would be observable as a consequence of the theory being true (Copi, 1978; p. 465-7). We then gather information to demonstrate that which was predicted has not or has occurred (test the theory). If the theory predicts an event to occur and the event is observed to take place, then the existence of all unobservable things to which the testable propositions refer would be considered confirmed (Copi, 1978; Lee, 1989; p. 123).

Evaluating Scientific Explanations

There are five general requirements for scientific explanations. The first is that the search for facts is guided by a relevant problem. The hypotheses (observable conditions) must be shown to be related to the propositions (unobservable states or processes). The second is that the propositions are testable as hypotheses. This is the requirement that the hypotheses be falsifiable (disprovable, refutable, or disconfirmable). Testable hypotheses demonstrate that what the theory predicts should not be observed, if they were true, could be observed (see Popper, 1959; pp. 24-42). The third is that the hypotheses be compatible with previously established hypotheses. Propositions developed from the theory should be from well established hypotheses or propositions. Well established theories usually mean materials and theories previously published in refereed journals. The hypotheses must have some predictive power and must be constructed so that they are at least as predictive, and more predictive than a rival set of hypotheses. In an evolutionary concept of science, this is the function of the literature review. Further, rival hypotheses must be rendered
implausible either by invoking logic or through the use of design features to control the plausibility of these rival hypotheses. Fifth, the hypotheses should be as simple as possible. This usually refers to developing propositions from which one can construct hypotheses that can be easily and simply tested.

So far, this paper has characterized the process of policy and organizational research as one where research involves the management of theoretical propositions, the conception that logic must be utilized to confirm or disconfirm the truth of theoretical propositions, and that theoretical propositions, when managed properly, satisfy the requirements for contributions to knowledge. This understanding of science prescribes a hypothetico-deductive logic of investigation, translates of phenomena into symbolic form, states the conclusions or logic in propositional form and demands that these propositions be falsifiable in some form (Frankel, 1986; p. 353). It is now possible to show that the nature of what is observable itself, is questionable.

What is reality?

In recent discussions of philosophy of science, positivists have been attacked and defeated on the point of direct access to reality through sense data (Polkinghorne, 1983). Psychologists such as Campbell (1966) and Hansen (1958; pp. 13-14) have demonstrated that our sense experience is a construction, an interaction of culturally given conceptual schemes, cognitive structures, and linguistic tools we use to act on the world. Thus, what is immediately available in experience does not correspond to the world as a thing-in-itself. Knowledge of external objects and events, knowledge of predictable processes re-identified as the same, hypothetical knowledge optimally invariant over points of observations and observers‘ is distal knowing. The processes and entities posed by science are all very distal objects mediately known by processes involving highly presumptive pattern matching at a number of stages (Campbell, 1966, p. 82). As such, what is available in experience is a creation composed of organizing patterns and sensation (Bateson, 1979). Given that we do not have immediate access to observations of reality, what are we to do concerning "science" and scientific study?
**Table 7**  
Alternative Ontological Standards for Modes of Process Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study Research</th>
<th>Naturalistic Inquiry</th>
<th>Critical Relativist Process Research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Yin 1989; p. 16)</td>
<td>(Lincoln &amp; Guba 1985; pp. 83-4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Critical Realist:**  
"The analyst's objective should be to pose competing explanations for the same set of events and show how such explanations may apply to other situations."

**Relativist:**  
"[R]eality is a construction in the minds of individuals...no amount of inquiry can produce convergence on it ... there will always be an indefinite number of constructions that might be made, and hence multiple realities."

**Critical Relativist:**  
choosing from among competing and falsifiable interpretations by examining and providing arguments for the relative credibility of alternative explanations.

The perspective described by Yin (in table 7) and outlined in the first column of table 8 (the other two columns outline alternate standards) sets out a method to consistent with the critical realist perspective. Cook and Campbell (1979; pp. 28-30) have described this perspective as one that allows the investigator to make assertions about the state of the world which "go beyond the experiences of perceivers and so have objective contents which can be right or wrong (albeit not always testable)." The perspective is realist because it centers on phenomena beyond the individual's cognitions and, critical because it assumes that valid causal relationships cannot be perceived with total accuracy. The distinction is that there is one reality "out there" and that science and scientific procedures provide theories to best describe that reality. This reality can be appreciated from the perspective of a particular theory, or other vantage point, but is always subject to a partial and incomplete vantage point or perception. One could distinguish this ontological position from a naive realist position of the received view described earlier which asserted that there is a tangible reality, and that simple experience can result in knowing that reality.
Yin ascribes his devotion to the critical realist ontological position in his discussions of inferences:

Basically, a case study involves an inference every time an event cannot be directly observed. Thus, an investigator will 'infer' that a particular event resulted from some earlier occurrence, based on interview and documentary evidence collected as part of the case study. (Yin 1989; p. 43)

The focus is clearly on determining the "correctness" of a particular viewpoint, even when held by a respondent in the case study. This creates a point of distinction between traditional post-positivist notions of case studies and naturalistic inquiry.13

Lincoln and Guba (1985; pp. 83-4) provide an ontological perspective that denies an objective reality. The objective reality is premised that a single phenomenon means the same to the individuals in contact with that phenomenon. Lincoln and Guba (1985; p. 84) posit that any given construction may not be in a one-to-one relation to other constructions of the same phenomena by other individuals. This view encompasses the critical realism posited by Yin (1989) and Cook and Campbell (1979) in that each person's perspective suggests a response or signifies something quite different to different individuals. There may be some mechanism to collect each different perspective into a greater perspective (often thought to be the purpose of "science") such as Campbell's (1986) discussion of the requirements for a community of inquiry. However, the differences are as compelling as the similarities.

The relativist position acknowledges tangible entities but instead focuses on the meanings ascribed to these tangible phenomena in order to make sense of them or organize them. The constructed reality refers to the meanings created, given or ascribed to the phenomena and not to the tangible phenomena itself.

The reader is invited to note the tests of truth called forth by these two positions. The critical realist position calls for a correspondence test: the observations are true if they correspond to reality. Certain components, such as inferences, can be tested by coherence theories: the inference can be warrantably asserted if and only if it is provable within some given theory; coherence is given by coherence within a framework. In contrast, the relativist position posited by Lincoln and Guba

13 Lather (1986) argues that the philosophical grounding of a set of procedures is distinct from the methods used to provide evidence for that philosophical grounding.
(1985) can handle correspondence tests, but require consensus tests: observations are warrantable if they are agreed upon through consensus of the community. This too is problematic when we consider the external constraints that limit what can be agreed upon (see Nutt, 1989).14

This author asserts that these models are of limited utility because a process study requires that investigators speak with the participants in the process to ask the question, "How?" Asking this "how" question requires investigators to ask participants their perspective on the process, seemingly linking the research endeavor to the critical realist perspective. If we make a further assertion that each individual acts on the basis of what they perceive to be happening or what has happened (Weick, 1979), we can no longer use correspondence tests as each person acts according to an individually constructed, test. Coherence tests would be useful if we could determine each individual's theory-in-use (Argyris & Schon, 1978).

One alternative that appears to be possible is to describe the process as it happened as in an ethnographic study. However, the ethnographers (e.g., Leiter, 1983) argue that describing what is happening is still dependent on the observer's perspectives, and not necessarily on the perspectives of the participants, describing actions in which investigators are most interested. It remains an open question if the investigators have indexed their interests with those of the participants. To accomplish this, investigators must become a part of the process, either describing their own thoughts and causal attributions as they engage in the process, or they must request those who do participate in the process to reveal their thoughts. Coherence tests are not useful. The investigator must create a credibility test to corroborate the evidence given by the respondent in terms of truth value as well as to establish the actual conditions that stimulated the activity within

14 The use of the criterion of internal validity, in effect, is the degree to which the data or the inquirer's statements correspond to an independent reality (Smith & Heshusius, 1986; p. 6). As such, Yin's methods can achieve truth value to the extent that the investigator's statements correspond to how things "really are." Naturalistic inquiry makes no assumptions of how things "really are." Since Campbell (1966) has shown that we do not have immediate access to sense data, we can only interpret the interpretations of others. Simply put, the difference is that there are opposing methods as to how-to-do-it. If we think of these methods or techniques as a logic of justification for our conclusions, we have serious difficulties. The use of techniques to provide certain knowledge does not agree with naturalistic inquiry's hermeneutic interpretations of interpretations. Naturalistic inquiry matches descriptions to other descriptions -- we label some to have truth value because one description makes sense given one's interests and purposes (Smith & Heshusius, 1986; p. 9). Lincoln and Guba (1985) are not compatible with Yin (1984 & 1989). They are compatible in the sense that their methods provide us a way, if we follow the spirit of their methods, to produce valid knowledge. One answer to the multiple paradigm discourse may lie in the search for a coherence theory of truth, for to follow naturalistic inquiry as a logic of justification, one will arrive at a position of ontological relativism, a state undesirable for a social scientist.
the process. This process is critical in the sense that it is falsifiable: the investigator often can determine the presence of conditions or phenomena being interpreted and then responded to. The investigator sorts through competing and alternative explanations to examine which of these explanations offers a more credible viewpoint. It is to this task of determining what can constitute a knowledge claim that we now turn.

Claims to Knowledge

How do we choose among competing claims for the acceptability of a knowledge claim? Habermas (1979) provides some guidance to our endeavor of determining which evidence can be accepted as a knowledge claim. In making an assumption, in assuming the right to perform a particular speech act, and in expressing our feelings and intentions, we implicitly but unavoidably engage to provide grounds, should the validity of the utterance be challenged with respect to its truth, rightness, or sincerity. We go to the form of discussion oriented toward the consensual resolution of validity claims by no other means than the force of better argument. Truth is not established by an appeal to ultimate evidence. Truth is a validity claim which we connect with statements when we assert them, and, like other validity claims, it has as the ultimate horizon of resolution a universal and argumentatively attained consensus. Truth or rightness cannot be defined in terms of any factually attained consensus as the existence of a consensus does not guarantee truth. Thus, in order to abandon a universal truth, speakers must possess an implicit awareness of the conditions under which a consensus would guarantee truth. These implicit claims are that (1) what is said is intelligible to the listener following certain syntactical and semantic rules so that there is a meaning which can be understood by the other; (2) the factual assertions or propositional content of whatever is said is true; (3) the speaker is justified in whatever is said since certain social norms or rights are involved in the use of speech in the context of language use; and (4) the speaker is sincere in whatever is said; not intending to deceive the listener.

A second program is the substantive logic provided by Toulmin. Mitroff (1983), Dunn (1981), and Bromley (1986) demonstrate how Toulmin's substantive logic can be applied to reveal gaps in data, assess limits of warrantable confidence in the validity of statements, and allow us to reach rational conclusions. The source of rigor in the treatment of cases is the structuring of arguments. One could visualize this as a network of statements. It is the relative soundness of the whole network (structure of the argument) which determines the degree to which one can support the inferences. The process researcher can diagram each argument and improve any argument's strength by making its assumptions visible. This author posits that the result is useful for the conduct and analysis of process studies.
Figure 3
Toulmin Argument Structure

Less formally, policy making as well as case analysis is a process of forming, weighing, and evaluating numerous premises in a complex, continually changing and unfolding argument. The premises are the assumptions that are made to the stakeholders that are judged to be relevant to the issue. Evidence represents the factual base of the argument. It makes an assertion on the state of the world. Warrants represent the if-then part of the argument which allow one to reasonably make a claim from the evidence. It is the part of the arguments that allows one to justify deriving or supporting the knowledge claim from the evidence. Backing is the set of deeper background reasons whose role is to validate of justify belief in the warrant. The various types of backing are: (1) cause-effect (given the truth of the evidence, the claim must follow or happen); (2) logical necessity (it is logically inconceivable or impossible that the claim could fail, given the truth of the evidence); (3) analogy (the situation is sufficiently like another situation such that what applied or followed from the previous situation applies in this case as well); and (4) belief (someone who is credible or powerful argues that since she believes X; therefore the claim follows). The complex nature of policy and management studies renders the use of analogy and belief to be indispensable. Few arguments will be so airtight that they are deductively certain beyond all doubt or challenge. Every argument is open to challenge (including this one) and hence, we have the need to answer the challenges with rebuttals. A rebuttal is the set of any and all challenges to any and all parts of an argument. Rebuttals can be directed toward basic facts, warrants, or backing.
There are several ways to tell a good arguments from a poorly constructed one. The various parts of the arguments should be kept separate. Good arguments have low plausibility of rebuttals. Churchman (1971) has shown all of these conditions to be lacking in one form or another. As such, the framework should be used to organize our thoughts and to pinpoint weak spots in our reasoning. Scientists do not arrive at "truth," but instead, intersubjective agreement. By applying reasoned argument rigorously, and by successfully guarding against shared bias, we come as close to truth as practical.15

By these discussions, we define knowledge as Heron (1988; p. 40-41) defines validity: "...that [the conclusions] have the quality of being well founded." Heron holds that what they are well founded on are the experiences of the researchers as co-subjects. Heron goes on to state:

I do not think it means a crude empiricism to the effect that the statement corresponds to the real world encountered in experience. For an experience is always an experience of something: it has a determinate content. To have an experience is always to identify its content: indeed, an experience is a way of construing, of giving meaning to, its content. So the real world is already construed by us. We can never get outside our constructs to find out whether our statement corresponds to it.

Thus, the task is to determine the activities of the world and then to determine the meanings attributed to those events by the participants in the situation. In this fashion, research is fallible; there are as many possible interpretations of lived experience (reality) as there individuals to construe the activities of the world.

15 There is a fundamental argument which could be offered by post-modernists to counter this view. This view represented here is what a post-modernist would call critical rationality.

Critical rationality seems to have as its goal the task of reclaiming the spirit of enlightened rationalism. Discourse is the object of analysis and language is the medium of reason. The language of the everyday life world holds strong against instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality represses communication, which produces repression of individuals.

For a post-modernist (e.g., Foucault or Derrida) the concept of 'difference' serves to show us how the ordinary serves to blind us to the familiar. As such, all discourse has an inbuilt censoring function which represses the intrinsic strangeness of symbolism. For the post-modernist, the first task of emancipation is to recognize the historicism of our existence, even the historicism (or genealogy) of discourse -- here the discourse is both the informant's and the investigator's knowledge of the leadership and the organization.

As such, any reference to reason is seen as finding answers, where post-modernists would try to "problemize" the "answers." This amounts to finding rebuttals. While critical rationalists are searching for answers to problems, post-modernists see answers as short-circuits of problems.

There is a potential for a great work to show how the critical rationalist-modernist and the post-modernist can be used for organizational analysis.
Knowledge is evolutionary in the sense that research programs and problem solutions survive through competition for better explanations. As such, there are limits on scientific revolution (Kuhn, 1970) as surely as there are limits on all markets, including markets for ideas.

**Standards for High-Quality Process Research**

Structure studies have evolved into a specialized version of logical positivism or post-positivism. The effort is to rule out alternative explanations for findings by collecting data so alternative explanations are implausible. The most common is the check against the generic threats to validity described in Campbell and Stanley (1966). Other guides are the construct validity guides in Cook and Campbell (1979) as redefined in Campbell (1986); the concepts and methods of naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln & Guba; 1985); and standards for good case research (Yin, 1984; 1989).

One means to control for variation in the observable phenomena not explained by our theory uses experimental and quasi-experimental designs. By controlling for explanatory contributions of other variables, we can show that the variation of the factor of interest is due to the variable which was not controlled. In quasi-experiments, the controlled variable is naturally occurring or is manipulable, but not the feature of random assignment to a group for control or variation of some intervention.

Both quantitative and qualitative should be based on a concept such as objectivity, here defined to be an explanation where knowable, plausible, rival hypotheses can be refuted on the basis of some evidence or argument. The notion of objectivity is to subject the explanations to empirical test and to theoretical arguing by the community (of truth seekers). In this manner, truth, or what passes for truth is bounded by the tolerance of empirical reality, the intersubjective nature of the labels of that reality and the consensus of the community (Kirk & Miller, 1986).

The experience of the respondents is to be reported in such a way that it is (1) accessible to other researchers and (2) the results are to be reported in terms which are understood by the research audience.¹⁶ That the results of social action be accessible to others is to make it possible

---

¹⁶ Feyerabend (1978) or Popper (1947) would maintain that this only maintains the domination of science in this supposedly free society. I am not sure if Feyerabend would insist that empirical generalizations should be verifiable by common citizens. It is clear that Popper maintains that social theories, based on mistaken notions of certainty breed authoritarian as individuals are seen to possess value only as they subserve the needs of the whole. Lincoln & Guba (1985; p. 314-315) insist that the interpretations of the investigators be subject to review by the participants or informants to avoid this value laden hazard of science in modern society.
to subject the experience to cross-validation; to see if the findings are reproducible. That the results
are to reported in terms which can be understood by the audience in terms of theoretically
meaningful variables (cf. variates) measured themselves in ways that are themselves justifiable in
terms of relevant theories (Kirk & Miller, 1986; p. 14-16) is an additional criterion.

The researcher must discuss the theoretical basis on which it is meaningful to make
measurements and to do so in the manner described. There is an important distinction between
knowledge and opinion. If we assume a critical realist position (Cook & Campbell, 1979; p. 28-30),
there is a hard reality and there are words and symbols which we use to describe and thereby give
meaning to that reality. Depending on the words and symbols we use, we may or may not be able
to show or see the same meanings. Science thus appears to be a discussion of the appropriate use
of words we should use to describe that reality.

Reliability and validity are components of reducing rival hypotheses. Reliability is the extent
to which we get the same result on successive trials. Validity is the extent to which we get the
"correct answer" (Webb, Campbell, Sechrest, & Schwartz, 1978). Objectivity seems to be the
simultaneous realization of validity and reliability. As such, the "problems" with reliability are the
nature of circumstances which have influenced one or more trials and the "problems" with validity
become the degree to which the finding is interpreted in a correct way.

Reliability and validity are members of a dependent hierarchy. It is possible to have perfect
reliability without validity. Using a physical world explanation, we can see how this works. A
thermometer which reads 120° F in Timber Lake, South Dakota, every day in December, where we
have ruled out "obvious" plausible rival hypotheses (extreme hot spell experienced at other
immediate regional National Weather Service Observation Locations, catastrophic radioactivity, etc.)
might prove extremely reliable (it reads the same every day) but is very invalid. However, perfect
validity assures perfect reliability ceteris paribus. If we are certain of the thing we are measuring and
our measures are invariant, we have achieved the sense of prefect reliability and validity. In this
sense, perfect validity is defined as when every replication yields the complete and exact version of
the truth as we know it.

In the social sciences, validity and reliability are seen as inversely related (Campbell &
Stanley, 1966; Chen, 1989). An emphasis on reliability produces increasing complexity while
divergent properties emerge. An emphasis on validity produces decreasing complexity and a
reduction of divergent properties. The variables need to be able to vary to capture the variation in action. However using concepts such as validity and reliability assumes we can control and accurately measure in all contexts. As such, perfect validity is not possible. The contexts themselves are not invariant. This, in practice means that there are limits to our having "ruled out" plausible rival hypotheses. The irony of all of this is that we speak of "the problem of validity and reliability" as if there were a problem. If we were not dependent on methods providing certainty of result, we would see that the difference would offer no problems as no two contexts are equal.

![Diagram of Validity and Reliability as a Dependent Hierarchy]

**Methodological Commitments**

**Truth Value**

When we speak of truth value, the concern of the writer is with the acceptability of a knowledge statement. The determinability of what is acceptable often seems confused and arbitrary, or hopelessly enmeshed in other relative principles. Here we will attempt to distill from among two distinct approaches. Structure studies have evolved from a specific version of logical positivism using contradiction and falsification to demonstrate the existence of phenomena. Process studies are not as concerned with contradiction and falsification but are concerned with the processes used to determine structures.

Further, the study is dependent on the ability of the investigator to cope with the difficulty of analytically compiling relationships among variables (e.g., coordinating data collection, volume of data, investigator's skills and preferences [interviewing skills and tenacity in gathering data], the long time horizon required for process research. The investigator must answer the critical reader who poses such questions as (1) What role do power, authority, chance, accident, and environment play in the process of transitions? (2) Are these factors cultural, political, economic, or
psychological?" (3) Are these problems sectoral (public versus private)? and (4) Are they structural in nature?17

Internal Validity

To say that a finding has *internal validity* is to say that an attempt to rule out alternative explanations for findings by collecting data to serve as evidence that plausible rival hypotheses are, in fact, implausible. In practice, the analyst checks against the eight generic threats to validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1966) or the additional four threats in Cook & Campbell (1979) which cannot be rendered implausible by randomization. Randomization purports to control an infinite number of rival hypotheses without specifying what they are. Actually, randomization never completely controls these rival explanations, but renders them implausible to a degree estimated by the statistical model (\(\alpha\)).

---

17The author credits Pettigrew, 1990; p. 273 for bringing these questions to mind.
Internal validity is a concern only for causal or explanatory studies (Yin, 1989; p. 43).\textsuperscript{18} The concern is for when the investigator is making inferences beyond the immediate experience.\textsuperscript{19} To state a claim is valid is to render as implausible, rival hypotheses or inferences. Yin (1989; p. 43) describes his attempt to rule out other rival process explanations by checking for convergence of various explanations. This convergence is accomplished through two techniques: pattern matching and explanation building.

Pattern matching (Yin, 1989; pp. 109-113) involves the comparison of experienced (lived or empirical) patterns with predicted patterns. If the patterns are congruent, the results can be said to support the hypothesis and strengthen the internal validity of the investigation. One of the more useful types of pattern matching is to look at the independent variables. This form of analysis requires the analyst to develop rival theoretical propositions, articulated in operational terms (Yin, 1984; p. 105). The explanations must be mutually independent in that the presence of one explanation precludes the other explanations.\textsuperscript{20} A single case study with the successful matching of the pattern to one of the rival explanations would be considered evidence to support the

\textsuperscript{18} Kvale (1989; p. 73; 89-90) argues that validity is an important concept in three manners: a ontological questioning of the subject matter under investigation, an epistemological matter, and a deconstruction of the validity of the validity question itself. While the first is the subject of this inquiry and the second has been the subject of many authors (e.g., Polkinghorne, 1983; Patton, 1980; Campbell, 1986) the third has not been adequately referenced. Validity concerns the justification of knowledge claims. These are present claims, not the creation of future claims of knowledge. Hence, the limits on evolutionary creation of knowledge posited by Kuhn (1970) are coming to pass as the focus on validation of past knowledge preoccupies journal editors.

The resolution to this paradox is to conduct investigations in a manner that the validity of the claims for knowledge become transparent and the claim to knowledge evident. It is in this manner that the methods of the inquiry are made evident for all to see and critique. Validity as an issue is not to be dismissed as not relevant for critical relativistic inquiry, but an issue to be discussed. The problem for the investigator is one of distinguishing between and among competing claims to knowledge, not to discriminate on the basis of one's methodological preferences, or on the basis of one's power within the community of those who call themselves scholars.

\textsuperscript{19}Some authors suggest that to emphasize internal validity over external validity is unwise. Chen (1989; p. 2-4) recites the arguments of Chronbach (1982) to argue that the emphasis of research should be on enlightening the policy-making process as we do not wish to control the process. Chronbach is said to argue that an over-emphasis on rigorous methods and internal validity will hinder the analyst from providing timely, relevant and generalizable information to bear on organizational decisions.

\textsuperscript{20} Note how this differs from Allison's (1971) analysis of the Cuban Missile crisis. Allison (1971) provided three hypotheses from the same set of experiences. The use of multiple cases can aid the process of explanation.
proposition that the theory was a valid explanation. If this identical result was to be obtained over multiple cases, this would serve as a replication of the case study, lending more support to the original proposition.

A second analytic strategy is to stipulate a set of causal links about a series of events. Most explanation building is accomplished through narrative. Narrative is the use of language, a third order account or story of one's experience, and as such, the use of language or narrative is imprecise.21 Yin (1984; p. 107) maintains that narratives which reflect significant theoretical propositions are better case studies. Explanation building is an abductive process (cf. purely deductive or purely inductive methods) where theoretical propositions are revised as evidence is gathered to support or refute propositions. The investigator must be open to other plausible rival hypotheses and be concerned with reliability, clearly follow the protocol (indicating and standardizing the data to be collected) to establish a data base for each case (storing the evidence and making it available for inspection by others), and follow a chain of evidence (Yin, 1984; p. 109). For this, the analyst would use various documents, interviews, agency records, etc. This amounts to determining the degree of convergence by source of information. For Yin, the degree of convergence determines the amount of internal validity. The task is to build our arguments on a case by case basis. We interpret each case according to its components. Yin argues that we should observe with a perspective and at a distance. The closer we are to the phenomenon, the more limited our proxy or distal knowing is. To correct for this, we should have multiple views or views from multiple actors and observers (Patton, 1980).

---

Table 8
Methodological Practices & Standards for Process Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNAL VALIDITY</strong></td>
<td><strong>CREDIBILITY</strong></td>
<td><strong>TRUTH VALUE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Use design schemes to rule out plausible rival hypotheses and check against generic threats to validity.</td>
<td>1. Collect data in field settings where phenomena is expected to unfold.</td>
<td>1. Conduct multiple &quot;clinical&quot; interviews with agency directors and other key informants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Check for convergence of various explanations through documents, records, interviews, etc.</td>
<td>2. Multiple modes of observation &amp; multiple perspectives.</td>
<td>2. Interview questions are to discover informant's perspective during different time frames, especially the respondent's sense of organizational climate and culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Degree of convergence determines the amount of internal validity.</td>
<td>3. Coherence in representation gives evidence of credibility</td>
<td>3. Interview other stakeholders to support the director's perspective and to determine the director's actions to increase shared perspectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Build arguments on case by case basis, interpreting each case according to its components.</td>
<td>4. Prolonged engagement with informant.</td>
<td>4. Unobtrusive measures to determine the links between internal and external stakeholders' and director's perspectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Debrief with peers (not merely those holding positions of authority over investigator), to determine what evidence is credible to construct the meanings as understood by the investigators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Have peers and &quot;disinterested&quot; others review tapes and transcripts to determine if interview protocol &quot;led&quot; or biased responses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Have informants review penultimate chapter interpretations of author to serve as an additional data gathering point and to increase credibility with the interpretations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Specify the information that would confirm and disconfirm the propositions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9. Systematically question to verify that surprising experiences are repeatable experiences and not random events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10. Reserve a set of documents as a benchmark against interpretations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11. Investigator describes personal reactions and interpretations, allowing the key informants to react to construct an idiosyncratic explanation for the interpretations and to minimize the creation of the respondent's defensive routines should the interpretation be sensitive to the respondent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8 (continued)

Yin (1984 & 1989)

**EXTERNAL VALIDITY**
1. Cases are equivalent to experiments that confirm or fail to confirm hypotheses.
2. What holds in several contexts across various applications can be supported.
3. Internal and external validity are inverse relationships.
4. Context is noted to see if context is a causal factor.

Lincoln & Guba (1985)

**TRANSFERABILITY**
1. Denote time and context in which the results hold.
2. Judgments about sufficiency of a match are applied by reader.
3. Transferability and credibility are largely reciprocal.

Critical Relativist Standards

**APPLICABILITY**
1. Describe the context of the action in sufficient detail.
2. Respondent reviews context of interview for adequacy of response.
3. Peers review context to check the investigator's interpretations.
4. Interviews conducted using interview protocol.
5. Investigator describes the implicit assumptions of the Director and in a meaningful manner, how they relate to the Director's actions as well as to the actions of subordinates and other stakeholders.

**RELIABILITY**
1. Clear protocol to describe how data are collected.
2. Rules used on interviews;
3. Secondary evidence [documents, archives, artifacts, etc.]
4. Interviews to corroborate accounts.
5. Multiple representations of reality, but single reality.

**DEPENDABILITY**
1. Case splitting: one set of cases to build theory and the second to check the fit of the theory to new cases; the theory is altered to account for discrepancies.
2. Audit create a trail that others can follow to see if the same conclusion is reached or is supportable.

**OBJECTIVITY**
1. Collect data to ensure that phenomena under study is not affected by observations.
2. Assumes data does not reflect observer's values or beliefs.
3. Assumes correct phenomena has been investigated.

**TRUSTWORTHINESS**
1. Perspective, not objectivity is sought.
2. Perspective takes place at a distance – after the event has transpired, with a particular focus, and through multiple means.
3. Results can be reproduced by an independent observer and auditor following the same data trail, raw data, notes, data reductions & descriptions to reach the same conclusion.

**CONSISTENCY**
1. Replicate study in other agencies, actors, and time since transition to review fit of data to theory.
2. Use interview protocol.
3. Develop hypotheses from initial impressions to determine what evidence would serve to make the finding more credible, thus making it more dependable.
4. Investigator writes out description of how assumptions are linked to actions of participants.

**PERSPECTIVE**
1. Investigator states values and beliefs, *a priori*.
2. Investigator reviews findings looking for evidence would disconfirm the interpretations and the resulting grounded theory.
3. Investigator records notes, rationale behind decisions to reduce transcripts to symbol schemes.
4. Peers review investigator notes and conduct audit of data reduction.
5. Findings are presented using words of informants to support interpretations.
6. Investigator (outsider) tests personal findings with insider for corroboration.
7. Investigator modifies findings as data support alternate propositions and records these in a notebook.
Campbell (1986) discusses how the constructs of internal and external validity have become redefined through usage. Internal validity has come to mean "similarity to pure treatment (rule of one variable), fully controlled, laboratory experiment. External validity seems to be defined as "...threats not controlled for by random assignment to treatment" (p. 68). Cook and Campbell (1979) have "fuzzed" the simple distinction made in Campbell and Stanley (1966). Campbell's first step was to add four threats to internal validity which randomization does not logically control. At least one of these threats (resentful demoralization of respondent receiving less desirable treatment) if not all four could be included in the construct validity of treatments.

For lack of a better term, Cook and Campbell (reported in Campbell, 1986; p. 69) have defined the crucial issue in validity to be the answer to the question, "Did this particular activity make a real difference in this unique application at this particular time and place?" In this sense, the choice of the phrase local molar causal validity is a complex one. Molar refers to the choice of complex activities chosen by individuals in their best judgment, not on the basis of already proven efficacy. That is, the notion is that time (eternity) is but one moment which passes and that if any moment in time (not simply duration) were different, then the unfolding of events over time would be different( see also Quinn, 1989; p. 56). As such, the restriction to molar is not in reference to universal laws, but in reference to the particular context in which managerial behavior takes place. Molar also refers to the fact that we are interested in the world of the individual, mediated by the meanings human individuals give to events and objects in the world (Frankel, 1982; p. 20). Molar also refers to concern for a world mediated by socially shared symbols and meanings. It is not as important to know what people do but what they mean by what they do. As such, the methods (methodology is of a different logical type) must be designed to specify when the analyst imposes meanings or interpretations (cf. Frankel, 1982; p. 240).

If these premises are valid, there are no culture free [-ethic] category systems that are universally applicable to all sets of "facts." There are only culture bound [-emic] category systems. It becomes important not to impose the researcher's category systems on the participants. The

---

22 Emphasis and ontological negation added pursuant to author's discussion with D. T. Campbell, August 1, 1988, Columbus, Ohio.

23 Ontologically, the most powerful of meanings are those shared by members of a social organization. Humans may edit and interpret nature but only by assigning meanings may they be seen to be creating reality. The Berger and Luckman (1966) notion of the social construction of reality is a trialectical process: an interplay between meanings assigned by individuals and by others -- which may lead to an entirely new meaning system.
methods are how the investigator attempts to capture, record, classify, and organize their actions and behaviors within a world they (the social actors) have made meaningful. This method will answer the questions of what happened as well as how it happened.

Local is used to counter the reaction to the concept of generalize-ability. Local determines what happens in one setting and time. If an action has efficacy locally, then the action might work in other locales or with specialized populations. However, if the research effort cannot determine efficacy, then we can search for plausible rival hypotheses to determine why the actions were not effective here, or speculate where they may be effective. Local molar causal validity could be taken to imply that no generalization beyond the sample is possible. Campbell (1986; p. 70) reminds us the causal relationship would be known but, there would be validated theory to guide the application of theory to other interventions, measures, populations, settings, or times. We may have causal puzzles in which the effects are very reliable, but not well understood, resulting in unstable concepts like "leadership." Thus, the task is to determine how the construct of "leadership" happens in the field of time.

Credibility

Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue that mutual causation makes the concept of internal validity unworkable. They argue that the representations of the participant must be credible. To demonstrate credibility, we collect data in a field setting. Phenomena are expected to unfold observing action-taking by "controllers" or managers.

Lincoln and Guba (1985) offer four methods to increase credibility. The first is called prolonged engagement. The purpose of prolonged engagement is for the investigator to learn the culture; to test for misinformation introduced by distortions either of the self or of the respondents; and for building trust with the participants. The second method is persistent observation. It is developed through prolonged engagement, but is determined to answer the question: "What characteristics of the situation are most relevant to the problem or issue being studied?" In this manner, the investigator can understand the participation of the respondents. Triangulation of sources is to get multiple sources of data to see that we are trying to give support (credibility) to

---

24 This author is not yet ready to abandon experimental isolation or random assignment to treatment as ideal ways of establishing local molar causal validity in a structure study. The center of the argument here is that these methods are not as useful as other epistemological groundings inherent in for process studies. See Marshall and Rossman (1989) for a discussion of methods for which alternative methods are most appropriate.
the "facticity" of a data element (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; p. 313). Triangulation of methods could involve the multi-method, multi-trait matrices (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) and unobtrusive measures (Webb et al., 1966). A fourth method of increasing credibility is for peer debriefing or member checking (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; p. 314). Triangulation give forms of sensibility to data, analytic formulations, interpretations, and conclusions to be tested with members or stakeholders from whom the data were originally collected; it serves as an internal check on the inquiry. An important distinction is that triangulation or peer debriefing checks data, whereas member checking tests the investigator's constructions (cf. Denzin, 1978). The fifth method of building credibility is negative case analysis. This is an obtrusive means to describe a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning (abductive). The investigator revises the original hypotheses as a function of conflicting data or negative analysis.

Methods to Ensure Truth Value

The first step is to conduct multiple interviews with the informant using what Schein (1987) calls a clinical format. The clinical format is an interactive interviewing format where the interviewer asks questions regarding the informant's perspective and tests the truth value and consistency of the responses (see Denzin, 1989) in order to increase the confidence in the statements of the informant. These interviews are followed up with interviews with other stakeholders to triangulate the agency director's perspective and interpretations of material reality.

The investigator also documents the activities of the agency director using unobtrusive measures. In this study, newspaper articles were gleaned to determine the perspective of the general public with regard to the pronouncements of the agency director. In addition, personal schedules were reviewed when possible to determine with whom the director was meeting in order to determine who had access to the attention focus of the director.

The interviewer "debriefs" with peers and others interested in the investigation to criticize, support, and suggest alternative interpretations to the principal investigator. In this sense, the research becomes more team like and may even include interview teams (see Gouldner, 1954; Heron, 1989). These peers and others familiar with interview methods review transcripts to determine if the interview questions, as asked, might have led or biased the responses. This set of tactics is useful to systematically question the interpretations of the investigator and the interviewers.
The interpretations and case analysis are given to the informants (including the agency director) for review and comment. If the informant offers an alternative interpretation, the investigator requests evidence to make this interpretation. If convinced, the investigator gathers and notes the evidence in a notebook and alters the interpretation. If unconvinced, the investigator offers the informant the opportunity to write a source-noted footnote to give the alternative interpretation. In any event, the alternative interpretation is noted in the field notebook, and if the difference is in the case analysis, the difference is noted in the case analysis.

Finally, the investigator describes personal reactions and initial interpretations in a section of the analysis. In this volume, this follows the philosophical grounding for the methodology. These personal reactions are reviewed by peers and advisors who comment on these interpretations in order to suggest alternative interviewer or investigator behavior which might minimize the creation of informant's defensive routines. The net effect is to inform the investigator about how she or he may be perceived by the informants.

Field research demands both flexibility and rigor in gathering, analyzing, and interpreting data. Strauss (1987) put forth the notions of accurate descriptions and saturation in discovering theory from data and developing a theory grounded in data. Geertz (1973; p. 452) talks of "thick description" and states that the investigator must read the data and look for interpretations that satisfy the informants:

The culture of people is an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles, which the anthropologist strains to read over the shoulders of those to whom they belong. . . But to regard such forms as saying something of something, and saying it to somebody, is at least to open up the possibility of an analysis which attends to their substance rather than to reductive formulas professing to account for them.

Multiple interpretations were offered of the same event by interviewing sub- and superordinates to the new director. This helps alleviate the problem of the key informant's bias as well as the use of the interview as a logic of justification as the investigator determines the responses from the questions asked. The opportunity to question the validity of the question answers the second problem.

**Applicability**

Reports of investigations are evaluated by other investigators and by practitioners. This evaluation is to determine whether the findings of the study are applicable to the investigator's situation and to the practitioner's situation. The problem we try to address by making the study
applicable is one of narrow idiosyncratic theory. The theory may have been idiosyncratic if it was not for the tests and for comparing the data from the theory to the cases, and vice versa. That is, the method of multiple cases and then comparing and contrasting similarities and differences forces one to examine the null hypothesis (meeting the criterion of falsifiability) that there are no differences between the cases -- demonstrating that the theory was, indeed, not idiosyncratic. In a sense, the use of a single case would increase the possible bias from representativeness of a single event (Kahneman & Tversky, 1986). This activity would be the same as exaggerating the salience of data because of its ready availability (Watzlawick, et al., 1974).

External Validity

The concept of external validity is the degree to which the analyst can generalize beyond the immediate population under study to different populations, settings, treatment variations, and measurement changes (Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Chen, 1989; p. 1). The criterion of falsifiability is used to rule out plausible limits to the settings to which the settings apply. The statistical analogy is to think in terms of confidence intervals on factors. However, with case studies, we are concerned with analytic and not statistical generalization. The investigator is striving to generalize a particular gestalt of results to "some broader theory" (Yin, 1989; p. 44). To accomplish this, Yin suggests linking the chapter headings to broader theoretical propositions and to test the theoretical implications through replications of experiments: to use multiple case studies as replications of entire experiments, not simply as additional cases. The Yin (1989) view on external validity is to extend the analogy of cases to be the equivalent of experiments. Each case may confirm or fail to confirm hypotheses. In each case, the context is noted to see if it influences the confirmation. The onus is on the case writer to demonstrate both the lack of bias and the potential transfer to other settings. What is seen to hold in several contexts across various applications can be supported.

External validity has also been reformulated in the post-Campbell and Stanley world. Cook and Campbell (1979) tell us that generalizing to other non-identical treatments is the construct validity of causes and generalizing from the outcome measures employed to other measures of effects is the construct validity of effects. Cook and Campbell (1979) leave external validity as a residual category to refer to the validity with which one can generalize to other persons, contexts and times as a function of the theory relevant knowledge of the persons, contexts and times to which one wanted to generalize (e.g., to determine when one can act in an effective manner). In this manner, social science is seen as a culturally determined facticity. This is not to say that we can use
representative sampling to solve our generalize-ability problems; it is logically impossible to generalize to future times because we cannot sample from them.

Proximal similarity describes the route to theory based generalization. We know that proxy measures (variates) are used to symbolically represent the phenomena of interest (variables) and we could classify a given "thing" into a group based on any number of attributes, so long as the attribute chosen is similar to other attributes chosen for inclusion into the group. If there is more than one measure used to provide the criteria for group inclusion, then it is quite possible that the relationships for each measure could be included. The closer the association is to what we are trying to generalize to, the more confidence we have to apply the action taken and validated locally. This is to say that if we can demonstrate local molar causal validity, one will apply the action taken locally with more confidence where the action taken, context of action, desired outcome, and time are closest to the same in the local.

The concept of proximal similarity opens up the possibility for testing the limits of generalization. Proximal similarity is exemplified by what people do in their everyday life when they say, "That will (will not) work here!" While Campbell (1986; p. 76) does not view local molar causal validity as theoretical, everyday life world theory does indeed. The task of process research is to determine that everyday life-world theory of managers.

Transferability

Confidence limits in statistical terms for structural parameters do not apply to process research and to process linkages. Transferability and credibility are as reciprocally linked as internal and external validity. Lincoln and Guba (1985; p. 316) tell us to denote the time and context in which the results hold. The investigator provides a thick description necessary to enable someone interested in making a transfer to reach a conclusion about whether transfer can be contemplated as a possibility. This is not to provide an index (i.e., Chronbach's alpha) of the degree to which this finding could be transferred, but to provide enough description of the context with which one could decide if we wanted to agree to the findings in another context. Lincoln and Guba posit we create judgments about the sufficiency or a match. The critical question is whether the incident or episode is relevant to the reader who is determining appropriate action from another contextual position. This is accomplished through proximal similarity.

25 See Campbell (1986; pp. 73-76) for a statistical analogy.
Methods to Ensure Applicability

The investigator must rely on the description of the context of the actor in sufficient detail for the reader to make an informed judgment regarding whether the situation has sufficient proximal similarity. In addition, the informants and the agency director review the context with the specific prompt to look for other events and practices which may have impacted the situation. This might leave some doubt in reader's minds regarding the problem of the fundamental attribution error (Kelly, 1972). That is, one usually attributes one's own successes to personal characteristics and behaviors while one attributes the successes of another to situational factors (e.g., context). By triangulating interpretations (obtaining information from multiple informants) and offering the agency director the opportunity to comment on the differing interpretations, the findings become not only more credible, but also more applicable to other contexts.

Consistency

From a pragmatic perspective, the investigator makes vulnerable the data to the investigator’s subjective (precommitted or biased) interpretation (Leonard-Barton, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989). Cause and effect may be hard for the speaker to determine except through time. While this creates a problem for the analyst, there is no problem for the speaker as events are treated as causal all the time. While this may be a spurious (causal) association, the analyst must report the events as the speaker records them. Then, the speaker can go about a search for consistency of reports (reliability or dependability). Leonard-Barton (1990; p. 250) has directly spoken on this topic:

The most significant limitation of wholly retrospective research is the difficulty of determining cause and effect from reconstructed events. Moreover, although studies have shown that participants in organizational processes do not forget key events in these processes as readily as one might suppose (Huber, 1985), the participant informant in a wholly retrospective study might not have recognized an event when it occurred and thus may not recall it afterwards.

Leonard-Barton argues that longitudinal studies are necessary for promoting internal validity (truth value) and multiple retrospective cases increase external validity (applicability). Unfortunately, a wholly retrospective case can use multiple perspective (Denzin’s triangulation of methods, sources, and interpretations) on an event. By using different informants, documents, perspectives of actors at other levels, etc., the investigator can contribute to the truth value, or as Yin (1984; 1989) defines it, internal validity, as well as provide evidence that this study does not provide idiosyncratic events. Further, the cases are prepared independently, then compared. This cross-case analysis assists with consistency as well as the truth value.
Reliability

Using a statistical analogy, tests of stability, consistency and predictability of measures is demonstrated by successful replications using various observers at different positions in time, using different respondents, etc. If the same result is achieved, then reliability is claimed. The purpose is to minimize the errors and bias in a study. As such, the importance of a research protocol is made evident as later investigators should be able to arrive at the same conclusions and findings.

For Yin (1989), validity follows reliability. Yin determines a clear protocol to describe how the data are collected. This protocol includes the rules used in interviewing, what you look for, the "believability" of the findings, the corroborative interviews, and multiple representations (narrative or schematic). The more standard the format, the more reliable the result. The emphasis is on accounting for potential bias by making the steps explicit and operational. That is, the emphasis is to create an audit trail. Another technique is to "share" preliminary findings with critical colleagues to obtain alternative explanations and suggestions for data collection. The task is to reflect evidence which could support contrary findings, but to render them implausible through logic.

Dependability

If the same procedure produces the same conclusions, then we can depend on the results of the procedure. The key concept is reproducability. For Lincoln and Guba (1985; p. 316), credibility follows dependability. Since one must have dependability to determine credibility, then a demonstration of credibility will establish dependability. In practice, the task is to establish credibility. To accomplish this, Lincoln and Guba (1985) advocate case splitting, the use of one set of cases to build theory and the second to check the fit of the theory to the cases. The investigator alters the theory to account for the discrepancies. Lincoln and Guba (1985; p. 318) also advocate an inquiry audit. The analogy is to a financial audit where the analyst creates a trail so that others can agree with the process (to show the process is dependable) and to follow to see if they would arrive at the same conclusion (to show that the data, findings, interpretations, and recommendations are supportable). Field notes provide one of many sources of credibility.

Methods to Ensure Consistency

This multiple case format removes most of the problems resulting from problems with reliability and dependability. By varying the study in multiple agencies, with different actors in different situations, and in different time (chronos and keiros) periods meaningful to the agency directors we can provide data to test the null hypothesis of idiosyncratic theory. In addition, another
investigator could use the interview protocol (provided in the appendices) to replicate the study. The propositions in the theory were compared with the theory developed using the grounded theory approach after the cases were constructed. The author specified the information that would disconfirm the interpretation. The form used to record the data which would make the interpretation falsifiable is located in an appendix. Finally, the investigator writes out descriptions of how assumptions are linked to the actions of participants.

Perspective

This epistemological journey has circled back to the concept of objectivity. The basic idea is to collect data so that (1) the phenomena under study is not effected by observations or observer (epistemological assumptions),26 (2) the data is not colored by the observer's values or beliefs (axiology) and (3) the correct phenomena has been studied (ontology). In most forms of research, the prospect of producing a defensible level of objectivity is often ignored or assumed to be not relevant.

Objectivity

Objectivity is usually approached from inter-subjective agreement. That is, when multiple observers can agree on a phenomenon, their collective judgment can be said to be objective (Taylor, 1971). Another approach is through methods: if we follow a set of rules to guide inquiry, we will arrive at objectivity. Lincoln and Guba's (1985; p. 30) term is truth value or credibility. The differences in truth value or credibility from Yin's (1989) concept of internal validity are neither to add to the "mystique" of naturalistic inquiry nor are they attempts to develop a set of arcane concepts.

Confirmability

Lincoln and Guba (1985) substitute the concept of confirmability for objectivity. In confirmability, an objective perspective is not sought as its attainment is not seen as possible. The investigators publicly recognize values inherent in their positions and then offer an account for how those values might influence their research effort. Perspective viewing takes place (1) at a distance (after events worked out, X results in...), (2) with a particular focus (decision or interpretation aspect); and (3) with multiple means (e.g., disciplinary focus). Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommend reproducing observations and inferences through audits. To follow the same data trail (raw data,

26 Or at least that the effect is known, so that the impact can be estimated.
notes, data reductions, etc.) the description can be seen to lead to the conclusion. We are also to use triangulation, where independent observations reaching the same conclusion and various points of view are imposed on the analysis. The purpose of Lincoln and Guba’s procedures are ideographic or situation-specific versus the nomothetic (law-like generalizations).

Methods to Ensure the "Knower’s" Perspective

The critical realist perspective assumes that each person views social reality from a perspective. In this sense, objectivity is a misnomer in that no one can be truly objective when objective means to have an absence of values. Instead, we argue that one must know the perspective of the author so that the reader can understand what was said or written from the perspective of the author. It is only in this manner that the representation of reality given in the text can be trustworthy in its representation.

Critical realist research argues that the investigator should state this perspective a priori. In this study, chapter II serves to represent the perspective of the author with respect to executive leadership transitions. It is in this manner that the vague boundaries and contextual variability of the author’s representation can be judged within a meaningful context. The author was not a blank slate upon which the data was impressed, and out of which come impressions and findings. Instead, the author has a responsibility to state the most obvious source of impression, other than the data.

The investigator should also review tentative findings for evidence that would disconfirm the interpretations (Lahey et al., no date). The purpose of this review is to remind the investigator that, as Popper (1959) found, theories can never be proven, they can only be supported by evidence. If the investigator searches for evidence in obvious places by theoretical sampling (Strauss, 1987) and by conscious efforts to disprove the tentative finding, the resulting theory would be much more resilient.

In making these tentative findings, the investigator should record in note format the rationale behind decisions to reduce the accounts of the informants to more manageable symbolic schemes. In this manner, data will not be lost due to memory loss. In addition, another investigator may have another perspective from which to interpret the accounts, and thus the data collected may be interpreted in a manner which will lead to a better theory. The recording of notes has a much more practical impact as well. The investigator conducting critical relativist research will be sorting through a voluminous quantity of data and related materials. In order to manage the research
process, a notebook containing impressions, findings, locations of data, strategies behind data reduction, etc., can be more easily found and then used in writing the theory.

Investigators should also have peers review these notes to ensure that the representations made by the investigator are plausible representations (Reason, 1987). The task is not to prove the theory by virtue of showing that the findings are reproducible, but that the investigator's representation is plausible, given the data available. In this case, theory will be cumulative as the findings are not dependent on finding the only, or best answer, but only a better answer than previous attempts to describe a social phenomena. The findings should be well supported by the accounts of those in-action, thus presenting the accounts in their most natural environment. This allows the reader to have an opportunity to grasp the emotion and nuance of the responses of the informant.

The investigator (insider) should also present the findings with insiders for corroboration. This corroboration is a form of obtaining inter-subjective agreement, but is independent of any particular informant. What is necessary is for the informant or member to check to see that the representation is a plausible account of the social order and not simply a re-creation of the author's values and beliefs. It also ensures that the data of value for describing the social phenomena are being collected. In keeping with this logic, the questions in the interview schedule are given in Appendix B. A third appendix (Appendix C) contains the actual wording of those questions in the interview context.

Finally, the investigator should review member checks and modify the findings as appropriate. There are multiple representations of any social order and the investigator should only modify her representation when the investigator's assumptions are sufficiently challenged or when the member provides data to rebut the investigator's findings. The investigator is then bound by these methods to respond, either to give notice to the reader that a member disagreed with the investigator's representation or to adjust the theory to account for the member's evidence.
Critical Responses to Naturalistic Inquiry.

Chen (1989) criticizes Lincoln and Guba's (1985) statement that naturalistic inquiry solves many of the validity problems inherent in "scientific methods." For Lincoln and Guba, the threats to internal validity from differential selection and mortality are about the same as they are for naturalistic and "scientific methods." Chen (1989; p. 7) rebuts this claim with the assertion that Lincoln and Guba do not address these two threats to validity, whereas Campbell and Stanley (1966) provide a variety of strategies for reducing these threats.

In response, Lincoln and Guba might claim that the Campbell and Stanley (1966) threats of statistical regression, test reactivity, and history can be avoided by the naturalistic approach. History (as a threat to validity) can be avoided by continuously making observations, noting historical impacts and taking account of these impacts as the study progresses. Chen (1989; p. 8) disputes this claim by noting that Lincoln and Guba provide few methods to correct for history and maturation, though he allows their methods may detect these threats. Lincoln and Guba (1989; pp. 301-7) might retort that actions such as structural collaboration, persistent and extended contacts, and triangulation will establish credibility with relevant audiences.

Chen (1989; p. 7) cites Lincoln and Guba (1985) as noting that statistical regression and test reactivity are problems of quantitative inquiry, but not naturalistic inquiry. Chen (1989; p. 7) rebuts this assertion by positing that regression is still possible if the naturalistic inquiry project uses extreme cases. Qualitative approaches may not detect regression artifacts, but it does not mean that are not to exist. With respect to testing (reactions due to testing), Chen (1989; p. 7) argues that Lincoln and Guba forget that the investigators are the measuring instrument. Chen grants that measuring devices such as tests are "artificial" and he seems to allow the potential that these methods allow for the systematic (as well as random) variation in respondents. Chen's point is that an outside observer is also an "artificial" intrusion into the setting. Clearly, the spirit of Lincoln and Guba is that the investigator must be able to blend in with the setting and population being studied in order to study the setting in its natural state.

Chen (1989; p. 8) contends that a lack of pretest measures hinder speculation, even informed speculation, since the investigators may mistake initial differences for the effects. This lack

---

27 The reader is invited to search Lincoln and Guba (1985; pp. 113-115) as Chen (1989; p. 6) suggests for this discussion. I could find no such discussion. The reader is cautioned to be careful to check original sources in order to avoid hypothetical (likely to be "straw man") arguments.
of pretest measures is not as important when we consider that we use purposeful sampling to account for the important variances in initial conditions.

With respect to external validity, Chen (1989; p. 8-10) argues that naturalistic methods do not account for how their methods provide for "... a firm basis for generalisation (sic) beyond the specific setting, time and place of the research in question." Chen's comment on "generalisation to other times" has been addressed earlier. Cook and Campbell (1979) divide external validity into construct and statistical conclusion validity, which Chen explicitly acknowledges by criticizing Lincoln and Guba for not addressing (p. 8), and Chronbach (1982) for his excessive reliance (pp. 9, 13-14). Chen loses sight of the advantages of naturalistic methods on inquiring. By providing a sufficiently thick description of the context, readers are able to determine if the events described are general in terms natural to the reader's setting. As such, the responsibility for statistical conclusion validity still belongs with the reader who must provide the context for the production as well as the analysis of the data. Further, construct validity is ensured by obtaining the constructs of the participants, not by imposing the constructs of the investigators. The evaluation is simple: if the constructs in two settings (the case being described and the "case" lived by the reader) are not similar, then there is little transferability. In Chen's defense, the thick description is subject to limitations: it will only capture a set of factors expected to influence the outcomes of the research. If the study focuses on the "wrong" factors (e.g., factors deemed interesting by the investigator, but not by the participants) there can be spurious associations.

Summary

The fundamental ontological assumptions behind this study are that organizations are socially constructed and that people act on the basis of their perceptions. It is in this manner that perceptions are the ontological reality. Thus, this research is outside the critical realist perspective. The relativistic perspective of Lincoln and Guba (1985) and others is also rejected for its reliance on determining a credible finding to other investigators. This study will attempt to determine if the interpretations of the investigator are credible given the interpretations of the participants. However, this research effort goes an additional step. We are comparing the interpretations of the participants with respect to their actions with their interpretations of the requirements for good government. This study is critical in this sense, but is critical of the critical methods, comparing the overtly normative interpretations of the participants with their interpretations of their actions.
Thus, this research purports to take the interpretation of the events of an agency director's process of creating the job. The present epistemological commitments follow from the critical relativist perspective described earlier. While each method is not designed to ensure truth, it is to increase the truth value. It is to the application of these methods that we now turn.
In 1988, the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (OBES) was an agency in trouble. Its Administrator, Dr. Roberta Steinbacher, had been hounded out of office, grand juries were empaneled to sort through agency records. Grace Kilbane, the Assistant Administrator, was appointed Acting Administrator and had received the support of many external stakeholders and the respect of internal senior managers. Yet, Governor Celeste believed he could not appoint Kilbane to be the administrator. Editorial boards would oppose her nomination because of her association with her predecessor. After two executive searches, Governor Celeste announced the appointment of Ellen O’Brien Saunders to head the Agency on September 16, 1988. Saunders arrived for full-time employment ten days later. How did Saunders make sense of the situation she faced? How did she deal with the pressures facing her? Who set her agenda? The governor? The bureaucracy? The external stakeholders? The Federal government? Her personal stakeholders? The media? How did her agenda relate to the agenda of the agency?

**History and Origins of OBES**

A brief examination of the Bureau’s origins and history helps understand the conditions facing Saunders in 1988. The Governor appoints the Administrator to manage the agency and serve as a member of his Cabinet. OBES has its central offices located in a central-office building and two other locations in Columbus, the capital city of Ohio. OBES employs 2,700 employees and operates with a $100 million operating budget in 76 local offices and six regional offices. In addition, 30 Private Industry Councils manage training programs under the auspices of quasi-public governmental units called Service Delivery Areas (SDAs).28

---

28 This history and description of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services derives as its primary sources a variety of agency publications and brochures. In addition, the author’s memory of the history of public employment services was supplemented by the OBES publication, *Celebrating 100 Years of Free Employment Services for Ohioans*, prepared for the Centennial Celebration Gala, August 30, 1990.
Over 100 years ago, the Ohio General Assembly created the nation's first state-operated public employment service: the State-City Employment Service. In 1913, the Legislature established the Industrial Commission to manage the operation of these offices, creating a program with joint city-state financing. In 1915, two new offices opened and procedures were developed to generate more accurate statistical reports from the local offices. The Ohio branch of the Council of National Defense administered the program during World War I. The rationale was that existing municipal, state federal employment services could not handle the war's demands on the labor market. Congress enacted the Deficiency Appropriation Act to provide funds for the interstate clearance of workers in defense employment. The Council established a central office in Columbus and expanded the number of local offices to 22. The United States Employment Services (USES) was created to administer state employment offices, but when appropriations declined, the USES was dissolved. All but the original offices were closed.

On June 6, 1933, President Roosevelt signed the Wagner-Peyser Act into law. Among other purposes, the law re-established the USES and appropriated funds to the states on the condition that the states match the funds and create state-operated employment services. Ohio accepted the terms of the Wagner-Peyser Act and designated the Ohio Department of Industrial Relations as the agency to establish and maintain a cooperative federal-state system of public employment offices. Later that year, Ohio became affiliated with the USES, with the State-City Employment service changing its name to the Ohio State Employment Service. Meanwhile, the National Reemployment Service was operating out of 72 offices in Ohio (3,000 nationwide) to place people in special relief projects. Ohio's civil service commission changed the specifications for positions to correspond with those established by the USES.29

On August 14, 1935, Congress passed the National Social Security Act, creating unemployment insurance and requiring that benefits be paid through public employment offices. The Social Security Board administered unemployment insurance and the Department of Labor

---

29 Staff for an office were specified as a manager and "such number of additional persons as are considered necessary for the work to be done." Minimum qualifications for an interviewer were: "Employment experience is desirable, but, particularly, the interviewer should be able to deal effectively with individual employers and employees. Impartiality, tact, resourcefulness, and good judgment are essential. Such persons may be drawn from industrial, commercial, or educational fields. Qualifications for clerical staff involved "... fitted for work assigned and of good repute in the community." Responsibilities were to be set by the manager. (United States Department of Labor, United States Employment Services, National Reemployment Service, Guide to the Organization and Operation of Reemployment Offices, Washington, DC, July 22, 1933; page 3.
maintained the employment services. Federal funds were appropriated to match state funds creating state-operated employment offices. The Ohio General Assembly, in a special session, passed the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Law, creating the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Commission to administer the state operations of unemployment insurance.

On February 28, 1939, the Ohio General Assembly reorganized the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Commission into the Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation. The General Assembly also created the Board of Review and the State Advisory Council (for unemployment insurance compensation). The First Administrator of the OBUC was H. C. Atkinson. Mr. Atkinson is significant in this story in that Atkinson hired several of the more senior staff members of OBES, including one interviewed for this study. Congress united the federal administration of unemployment insurance system with the employment service under the Bureau of Employment Security. The Ohio General Assembly also reorganized the state-level administration into Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation.

During World War II, President Roosevelt asked the Governors of the various states to transfer the state employment offices to the federal government for the duration of the war. The War Manpower Commission became the new administrative entity for the USES.

In September of 1945, President Truman, by executive order, transferred the function from the War Manpower Commission to the Department of Labor. In 1946, Congress passed the Employment Act asserting the federal government’s responsibility to "promote maximum production, employment, and purchasing power." Job placement for returning veterans was made a priority by USES. The U. S. Secretary of Labor issued a policy statement in the Federal Register. Staff members refer to this statement as the six point program for employment services, including (1) an effective placement service; (2) special services to veterans; (3) personnel management services; (4) labor market analysis and information; (5) and cooperation with community organizations and government agencies; and (6) employment counseling.

Congress passed the Federal Unemployment Tax Act in 1949 -- creating the first single appropriation of funds for administering both employment services and unemployment insurance. The next year, Congress eliminated the requirement for state matching funds to operate public employment offices. OBES became, in effect, a federally funded agency. Also in 1949, the federal
Bureau of Employment Services, including both the employment service and unemployment insurance systems, was transferred to the U. S. Department of Labor.

In 1954, the spirit of "forced cooperation" was ensured with the passage of the Vocational Rehabilitation amendments. State rehabilitation agencies were required to use the employment service to the maximum level possible. The Wagner-Peyser Act was amended to include individuals with disabilities among its targeted populations. This began the process of shifting the target from assisting the functioning of the labor market to serving individuals with special needs.

The social programs of the Great Society programs shifted the focus of the programs of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation. First, the Defense Manpower Policy # 4 (1960) assigned responsibility to the USES for determining areas of higher than average unemployment. Second, in 1961, the Area Redevelopment Act presented USES with the responsibility for providing training for individuals who were unemployed or under-employed and could not secure employment without training. In a move to be repeated 20 years later, the Trade Expansion Act provided benefits to workers whose jobs were adversely affected by foreign competition. Third, the Manpower Development Training Act (MDTA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act were passed by Congress. MDTA emphasized meeting the employment needs of youth, older workers, minorities and persons who were economically disadvantaged. Fourth, under the Civil Rights Act, USES became responsible for eliminating discriminatory employment practices based upon race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. In 1967, Congress authorized the Work Incentive (WIN) program to provide employment assistance to persons receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (ADC).

The 1968 Ohio General Assembly changed the name of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation to the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (OBES). At this time, OBES consisted of three operating divisions: Research and Statistics (later to become Labor Market Information), employment services, and unemployment compensation. The Legislature added the Women’s Division the next year to promote awareness and concern for women's issues throughout state government and Ohio.

In 1973, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) replaced the MDTA and the Economic Opportunity Act. CETA represented a primary shift from federal planning for employment-training programs to states and local governments. CETA was amended in 1978, revising eligibility requirements, limiting program funding, and consolidating programs.
Congress passed the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) on October 13, 1982, to prepare youth and unskilled adults for entry into the labor force, to provide job training to economically disadvantaged individuals and others facing serious barriers to employment, and to develop summer youth employment programs. JTPA enhanced the role of private sector over CETA in developing programs to meet local conditions and labor market needs. The Carl Perkins Vocational Education Act of 1984 changed OBES's division of Research and Statistics into the Labor Market Information (LMI) Division. They were charged with assisting the planning efforts of both JTPA and Vocational Education regarding occupational information, industry employment, occupational staffing patterns, and developing employment and training projections. In addition, Congress required every state to create and implement a wage-record system to collect wage data from employers. Ohio had a system, but had abandoned the system in the late 1950's. In addition, the Perkins Act required cooperation between vocational education and JTPA planning efforts and specified the State Council on Vocational Education to conduct an annual evaluation of the degree and nature of cooperation between the two entities.

Citizens generally refer to the agency as "OBES," the "Employment Service," "the Bureau," or the "unemployment office," depending on the contact they have with the agency and the services used during these contacts. OBES's basic mission is to facilitate the functioning of the labor market through the operation and administration of several programs administered by operating divisions: employment services (ES), unemployment compensation (UC), labor market information (LMI), and job training (JTPA). The services available through these divisions include employer-applicant matching, unemployment compensation claims processing and payments, unemployment tax collection, collection and publication of information on the labor markets in Ohio, contracting and providing grants for the training of disadvantaged Ohioans, and providing services for special populations targeted by federal programs.

Recent History

The economic recession of the early 1980s hit Ohio hard. Ohio lost a tremendous number of jobs -- more than 250,000 in one three month period (Lukensmeyer, 1990). In 1983, newly elected Ohio Governor Richard F. Celeste gave OBES the mandate to help Ohio return to its status prior to the recent recession. Celeste saw the solution to some of Ohio's problems as bringing new, recession-resistant industries into the state. Part of this strategy included training funds made available through the Job Training Partnership Act. Celeste saw the opportunity to regain economic
vitality through retraining the workers left by companies fleeing to foreign labor markets and by stopping the "smokestack chasing" strategy of his predecessor, four term Governor James F. Rhodes.

The incoming administrator, Dr. Roberta Steinbacher, walked into a position in an agency that had just incurred a 3.8 billion dollar debt to the federal government to pay unemployment compensation claims -- a debt resulting in daily interest payments of over one million dollars, higher unemployment insurance rates to the state's employers, and an overworked local office staff. In addition, the Agency borrowed $88.6 million from the state's general fund to make interest payments. The numbers of applicants and claimants overworked staff who had to deal with people recently laid-off with little hope of re-employment and who had waited up to four hours to file tier claims. The state's employers had few job openings in which to place unemployed job seekers in productive employment. Agency morale had plummeted.

The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) was being "phased out" for the new Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). Governor Celeste moved the staff administering the balance of state program from the Department of Development to OBES. With this transfer came U. S. Department of Labor audit findings questioning expenditures of over $100 million dollars, some dating back from 1967-68 and 1972-73. However, the largest chunk of JTPA funds (Title II) were to be distributed to local entities (service delivery areas or SDAs) with a limitation on the funds to be expended for administering the programs. That is, very limited revenue was available to the department for administration and for experimental programs designed to help Ohio's workers.

Poor administration in the JTPA program created a situation where program dollars were not allocated in a timely manner. This resulted in a surplus of funds over a three year period. In addition, management declined to schedule program audits during the past five years (Steinbacher, 1988). Many long-term OBES employees believed Steinbacher's deputies shifted the focus from one of producing a high-quality program to one of "getting the money out." They believed the JTPA program was symptomatic of the activities within the entire agency. Their belief is that the emphasis on awarding contracts led individuals to cut corners -- straining relations with service agencies within OBES and the state government agencies. Senior civil service managers who were members of Steinbacher's management group became disillusioned.

Steinbacher toured the state, visiting local offices, finding the physical condition of some local offices deplorable. Many offices had broken windows, few working telephones, were physically
located in less-desirable areas of their host city, etc. The Cleveland office not only had these conditions, but also had rats inhabiting the basement of the office. Steinbacher began efforts to push staff to upgrade the working conditions of the employees in the local offices. This included leasing different offices, upgrading telephone systems in offices and improving locations that could not be moved.

In Cleveland, the local office was moved to a prime location, but in a location with inadequate parking. Claimants wishing to park but unable to find free parking, picketed the office to protest the move of the office. The local newspaper, the *Plain Dealer* began to investigate -- they determined that the owner of the building was a contributor to the Governor's campaign. The *Plain Dealer* expanded its investigation to OBES contracts. The *Plain Dealer* found other irregularities, implicating a former OBES official selling telephone systems to the agency at a high markup and offering leases at tremendously high rates of interest. Originally, other media repeated these copyrighted stories without their own investigations. As the stories became more damaging, local papers and broadcast media began investigating the operations of the agency. Disaffected employees tipped off reporters. The U. S. Attorney in Cleveland empaneled Grand Juries to investigate the agency's lease and contracting procedures (Lowe, 1987; p. 4B). Several Republican lawmakers called for Steinbacher to resign and still others called for Governor Celeste to fire her for unethical conduct. The procurement of telephone contracts involved actions later asserted to be unlawful.

A two and one half year-old charge of sexual harassment against Deputy Administrator Don McConnell, came to light in 1987, and confounded Steinbacher's problems. Steinbacher declined to comment on media inquiries regarding the incidents, allowing the media to speculate and interpret her as condoning the sexual harassment. This created an ironic situation for Steinbacher. As an avowed feminist, Steinbacher could not condone sexual harassment. Still, she believed that if she commented to the press, she would be violating the rights of those who were allegedly victimized and those accused. The *Plain Dealer* speculated that if she remained silent, Steinbacher condoned...

30 The newspaper did not report that the building previously occupied by OBES was also owned by a contributor to the Governor's campaign. Staff recounted that they did not check into the ownership of the building prior to negotiating the lease, a practice soon modified.

31 Steinbacher apparently did not conceptualize the situation as one where she could have told the media that there was an investigation ongoing, and as soon as the investigation was completed, she would call them in and discuss the situation.
Steinbacher dismissed the deputy director implicated in the sexual harassment for his involvement in the telephone contract fiasco. Meanwhile, declining appropriations in the federal budget led OBES to project a funding cut. Steinbacher created a working committee of the strategic leadership group (senior management) to develop a plan to meet this financial challenge. OBES began to buy-out employees, offering early retirements, producing significant reductions in payroll (over 400 enrolled in the retirement program) but insufficient to absorb the funding shortfall. In addition, the employment services (ES) and unemployment compensation (UC) divisions suffered a loss of experienced employees, leaving local office staff at minimal service levels. Management closed thirty-two local offices.

Steinbacher’s health declined as the press increased attention and coverage of her management. In February of 1988, she resigned. Governor Celeste appointed Grace Kilbane as the Acting Administrator. Kilbane had been the Assistant Administrator for two years and had the support of several constituent groups for her appointment to be the Administrator. However, because of her association with Steinbacher, she would not be appointed at the Administrator.

Kilbane moved to take action in areas needed by the agency. She appointed an attorney to assure knowledge of and respect for legal and procedural requirements and removed the Chief of Lands and Buildings (responsible for leased real estate) for unsatisfactory performance. Staff training was instituted for sexual harassment and Affirmative Action/EEO. Kilbane formed a task force of the strategic leadership group to investigate the possibilities surrounding automating the employment service program. At this time, Ohio was one of 15 state systems without an automated file search or an automated job matching system, and one of fourteen with an automated job listing system. With 5.4 million workers in the Ohio labor force, job searches and placements were (and are, as of this writing) made by hand. Staff comb through cards sorted by categories of position titles, find qualified candidates, call these applicants, refer them to a job, enter this activity on the applicant’s card, and then enter the information onto a computer and then refile the card. For every applicant and for every job order, the tasks are replicated in this manual system.
Table 9
Chronology of OBES Scandals Reported in Cleveland Plain Dealer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 28, 1987</td>
<td>OBES announces cancellation of 18 year lease-purchase of building in downtown Cleveland. Deputy Administrator Don McConnell awards new lease to a blind trust held by a former Democratic office-holder, covering $24 million for the $4.6 million building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 20</td>
<td>OBES awards 61 no-bid telephone contracts worth $5.2 to a firm in a Cleveland suburb linked to a longtime supporter and contributor of Governor Celeste, ignoring lower bids. OBES Special Assistant Larry Brown awarded telephone contracts financed at 62.8 percent annual interest to a friend, who financed it through a bank owned by a major Celeste contributor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 24</td>
<td>OBES Administrator Steinbacher denies wrongdoing but calls in State Highway Patrol to investigate. Steinbacher suspends Brown with pay, but declines to give the media her reasons. Later, Brown is linked to a no-bid contract at the Department of Agriculture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 29</td>
<td>Federal Grand Jury issues subpoena for all OBES files on telephone deals and contracts with lobbyists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1</td>
<td>FBI investigating telephone reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 9</td>
<td>Independent auditors say OBES telephone violated federal purchasing requirements -- Steinbacher disputes auditor's findings but forces McConnell to resign and fires Brown. Papers also report Steinbacher disregarded allegations from five women who charged that McConnell sexually harassed them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 3</td>
<td>Steinbacher denies any wrongdoing in harassment case, saying women involved were pleased with outcome. Celeste praises Steinbacher's handling of the issue, calling it appropriate and sufficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 9</td>
<td>Reports published that Steinbacher signed 1986 agreement with McConnell not to discipline him if he agrees not to sue the agency for investigating the sexual harassment charges. OBES responds that this action was taken to protect them from McConnell. Senate President Pro-Temp Paul Gillmore and Rep. John Boechner demand Steinbacher's resignation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 3</td>
<td>Steinbacher tells supporters at Cleveland rally that she conducted a thorough investigation. Eight women state representatives demand that Governor Celeste re-open the 1985 sexual harassment case. Two other women state representatives think reopening the investigation is a useless idea, as does the Governor's press secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 9</td>
<td>PD reports Steinbacher misused a Special Administrative Fund by steering $160,000 in grants to Cleveland State University, from which Steinbacher is a Professor, on leave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13</td>
<td>Federal Grand Jury in Cleveland issues a subpoena for all OBES records relating to the sexual harassment case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 21</td>
<td>McConnell and Brown identified in state personnel board hearing as targets of criminal investigation. McConnell pleads 5th amendment and refuses to testify.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 25</td>
<td>OBES tells federal grand jury there are no records of the sexual harassment case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 4</td>
<td>Steinbacher resigns, citing stress from scandals, having lost vision in one eye. Governor Celeste appoints Grace Kilbane the Acting Administrator of the Agency from her Assistant Administrator position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 24</td>
<td>Former federal Judge Robert Duncan released report finding that women were harassed and Steinbacher failed to investigate properly and to take disciplinary action against McConnell. Celeste agrees with panel admits he was wrong; Steinbacher says report vindicates her. Duncan report says Grace Kilbane was intimately involved with what the PD calls a &quot;cover up&quot; of the internal investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 27</td>
<td>Thomas Chema, chair of the search committee and the Chair of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (a cabinet position) reveals that Kilbane informed him she would apply for the Administrator's position. Chema informs PD that his personal opinion is that the agency needs a &quot;fresh approach and we ought to look outside the unemployment bureau for someone to take care of the problems there.&quot; State representative Jane Campbell reacts to PD questions regarding whether Kilbane should be appointed Administrator by indicating the need for an &quot;outsider.&quot; Senator Gillmore said Kilbane could &quot;...expect long confirmation hearings if Celeste nominates her as Steinbacher's permanent replacement.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>OBES staff retreats to develop goals and priorities for budget to be submitted without a permanent Administrator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16</td>
<td>Ellen O'Brien Saunders announced as Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Searching for an Administrator

Even with her stakeholder support, Kilbane learned early-on in the newspaper that she would not be appointed as the Administrator (See table 9). None-the-less, many members of the senior management group believed that Governor Celeste used the search to put distance between Steinbacher and Kilbane. Many expected Kilbane to be appointed (after a time) as the administrator and acted according to this expectation. Kilbane informed members of her "inner circle" that she was not under consideration. Kilbane began to plan for the eventuality of leaving, while beginning to address those issues she deemed that needed to be handled prior to her departure.

Carolyn Lukensmeyer, Ohio Governor Richard F. Celeste’s chief of staff, appointed Thomas Chema, Chairman of the Ohio Public Utilities Commission, to chair the search committee. An independent consultant interviewed several senior managers within OBES. The consultant identified several themes to be managed by the new leader: credibility, knowledge and resourcefulness, tension between change and stability, and vision. In stressing the need for the successful candidate to have credibility, staff indicated their perception that public perception of OBES was consonant with public perception of the administrator. Staff also advocated for selection of an individual with experience to advance the agency more than someone untested, and without knowledge of the operations of state government. Many members of the senior management (strategic leadership group) had already accepted that someone from outside the organization would be interviewed and selected. In addition, the new leader would have to understand government finances, strategize within severe fiscal constraints and develop a sound financial base for long term viability of the agency because of the financial exigency. The consultant also saw the need for the organization to resolve some tension between the old and new personnel in the organization. The agency had many staff who had been with the agency since joint funding of the employment service by federal and state governments after the Wagner-Peyser Act (1935), and a recent history of agency mismanagement. However, the search process did not yield a successful slate of candidates that could be supported by the various stakeholders of the agency and be successful at turning the agency’s performance around.

As time passed, stakeholders and many senior staff developed and strengthened loyalties and relationships with Kilbane. As Kilbane began to address the substantive issues needing attention, she hoped that her substantive accomplishments would prove her competence to the Plain Dealer and other Ohio newspapers. However, she had been Roberta Steinbacher’s best friend -- the
Governor could not appoint her to be the Administrator or the papers who, up to this point, withheld criticism of the Governor and Kilbane because of Kilbane's acting title. Celeste believed appointing Kilbane would have begun another round of negative articles.

The chaos and scrutiny of the prior years had taken a toll from the members of the strategic leadership group. Lukensmeyer arranged for an organizational consultant to lead an organizational retreat in June. Senior management decided goals for the upcoming months and to treat member's needs to respond to the organizational stress. The goals generated is reproduced in table 10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staffing/Resource Issues</th>
<th>Governor's Office</th>
<th>Public Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management Development</td>
<td>Collective Bargaining</td>
<td>Pending Investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Funding</td>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>Linkages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Center Budget</td>
<td>Space</td>
<td>Women and Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automation</td>
<td>Wage Record Conversion</td>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBES Leadership</td>
<td>Welfare to Work</td>
<td>Legal Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Fund Solvency</td>
<td>ES 2000</td>
<td>Research Agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Concept</td>
<td>Worker Adjustment</td>
<td>Future Investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Policy</td>
<td>Audits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Second Search and the Selection of Saunders

During the 1988 Democratic National convention, Paul Goggin, representing Lukensmeyer called Ellen O'Brien Saunders in Wisconsin: They were searching for an Administrator for OBES. Her name had come up. Was she interested? Saunders recovered from the shock of such an opportunity coming "out of the blue," and suggested to him that they have a telephone conversation the next day. In that conversation, Goggin indicated they were searching for someone who would serve until 1991, and then "move on" as Celeste's term was ending. Saunders gave a brief overview of her background and suggested that they check her out with the former Governor of Wisconsin (Anthony Earl), for whom she previously worked. She heard nothing for several weeks.

Saunders reflected on what the trade press had recently reported about the "troubles" at OBES.
The trade press had covered the problems with the JTPA program and the dislocated worker program. I was alarmed by some of the things they were talking about. I knew I would not ... make decisions the way decisions were "alleged" to have been made. [Still,] the problems [they were] having were in programs that I know cold.

Saunders proceeded to ask trusted colleagues what they knew or remembered about OBES. She discovered that the JTPA program had experienced irregularities for the past several years, leading to and including the dismissal of the Deputy Administrator. There had been the sexual harassment incident. Saunders began to feel more comfortable that she could handle these problems.

The Interview

On August 12, 1988, Saunders came to Ohio to interview with Governor Celeste and others. Lukensmeyer and Dr. Carla Edelfson, the Governor's primary advisor for education and training policy, were absent from the office. Saunders met with the Director of the Department of Development, a Deputy Administrator of OBES, the Governor's economic development policy advisor, and Governor Celeste. In an earlier conversation, Edelfson stressed that they needed a "turnaround artist, ... someone who can take charge and dominate the management and make oneself felt -- a tough manager." They also stressed the need to have someone who knows the issues and philosophies of programs and of the governor.

When she met with one of the two Deputy Administrators from OBES (George Sheehan), they went over the agency's structure and problems. Lukensmeyer had moved Sheehan to OBES in January, 1988, to help OBES with its financial and personnel matters. They discussed what he had found. Many of the agency's problems resulted from media attacks on Steinbacher. However, a few problems were the direct result of Steinbacher's mishandling of a few personnel matters. There was a budget, but not a real budget. There was no cost center management -- no budget parameters. Managers never saw what dollars they could use to effect problems. They lacked knowledge of management flexibility. Relatedly, there were operating deficits projected in all program areas. Finally, a major audit was soon to be released.

In her meeting with the Governor, Celeste questioned her about her background, her achievements, specific program experience and outlined four goals for his administration. Ohio was to be a national leader in generating jobs (quality jobs to replace the middle class jobs lost to the depression and economic restructuring of the early 1980s), provide a world class education with emphasis on school-to-work transitions for its youth and young adults, and provide community-based
human services. Celeste's fourth agenda item was to develop peacemaking skills -- how to make this a more peaceful world -- locally and globally. Saunders quickly understood that to meet these agendas, Celeste needed the agency out of the paper, quickly. Celeste suggested that the Administrator should develop the staff and resources to do the job and to address the morale in the department. He thought the staff morale was "crippling." Celeste indicated he thought these tasks would take six months to complete. Saunders formulated an initial agenda for Celeste, stressing that in the two plus years remaining (to the end of Celeste's term as Governor), she could work to restore morale and rebuild credibility for the agency. Policy initiatives might be a "distant third." Her agenda included respecting the bureaucracy, including listening to them and working with them to develop their priorities, opening the communications process, and visiting local offices. Saunders' strategy to improve morale would be based on communications with members and working to have communications be credible internally and externally. In addition, Saunders indicated how she would deal with reporters, including developing regular briefings on agency issues and priorities.

After their meeting, Saunders went on vacation from her position in Wisconsin. She reflected upon what she had learned about the agency during her interviews. There were several vacancies in key positions throughout the organization, morale was low, and there were projected deficits in all operating programs. In addition, the agency had undergone its first audit in five years: one program had never been audited. Grand Juries were investigating alleged criminal activity dealing with the awarding of telephone contracts and JTPA contracts. There was no mention of the Ohio Job Training Coordinating Council (OJTC) -- a problem, as the OJTC offered a major opportunity for the Governor to influence the JTPA programs. She surmised that the bureaucracy might be stodgy, as well.

Negotiating a Mandate

In late August, Saunders conversed with Lukensmeyer about the position. Lukensmeyer repeated the problems with the agency that had led to the resignation of Steinbacher and those conditions prohibiting Governor Celeste from appointing Kilbane. From Saunders' memory Lukensmeyer's perspective was that the problems included media reports of OBES leasing a building supposedly owned by a major supporter of the Governor, the telephone contracts fiasco, the handling of a two and one-half year old sexual harassment case, and the complaints about the awarding of JTPA grants and contracts. Saunders discussed her agenda with Lukensmeyer. They had several more telephone conversations over the next few weeks. In addition, Saunders agreed to allow the Ohio Highway Patrol to investigate her background thoroughly.
As Saunders believed she was closer to appointment, she sought advice from a colleague about the role of an agency head and how to take charge of a large government organization:

She said, "First thing, establish [the Governor's] confidence. Second, set two or three short term goals. Third, try to pick a decent team, if you can. If you can't, try to get people responsible for things. An affinity of philosophy is more important than labored planning processes. After six or eight months, set some long term goals." I had been thinking about my priorities anyway, and, my conversation with her reinforced my hunches from a source I really respected.

With this knowledge, Saunders determined she was capable of performing the tasks required by this role and decided she would accept the position. Upon learning from Lukensmeyer she would be appointed, she forwarded a resume to the Chief of Staff for the press conference and gave two weeks notice to her employer.

Saunders prepared to leave her family and friends for a two-year stint in Ohio. The move was possible because her only child, Andrew, had one year of high school remaining -- later he would enter Haverford College. Her husband was also able to move to Columbus without a severe impact on his career. Without this family and home-life situation, any work-role transition would have been more difficult.

The night before the press conference to announce her appointment (September 16, 1988), Saunders prepared for questions she might get.

I asked for the press clippings to be left at the hotel desk I looked at them and got bored. Yeah, I did. I looked at them and thought, "Oh crap." I know how to handle sexual harassment. That's not a problem. I know how to handle grievances . . . I spent my time preparing for the press and writing a statement.

The morning of the announcement, Saunders had breakfast with Edelfson and Kilbane. Saunders discovered that Kilbane was uncomfortable with her. Saunders then decided that although she originally thought Kilbane would be an asset, it would be best if Kilbane did not remain. She supported Kilbane's request to take a leave of absence to work with the U. S. Department of Labor, later accepting Kilbane's resignation to become a Regional Administrator with the U. S. Department of Labor. Simultaneously, Lukensmeyer called OBES to arrange a meeting of members of the strategic leadership group (senior staff). Lukensmeyer informed them of the announcement and prepared a list of items they (senior staff) wanted the new leader to know.
The Appointment

Saunders then accompanied Edelfson over to the Governor's office to prepare for the press conference and to meet Lukensmeyer and other staff. Saunders described the press conference:

The press conference was excellent, people were thrilled. I felt fine. I got off a line, the press laughed, I was relaxed and the Governor was tickled. I mean, he looked like, "Look what I've got." The questions put to me by the press, by staff, by management was "Why did you do this?" I said, "How could I not? The programs are important, I'm sure the staff is committed to doing a good job. It is an opportunity to make a contribution."

This served as a threshold test of Saunders' credibility with the media. If the media met Saunders' appointment with questions about her qualifications, she would likely face intense scrutiny in the Republican controlled Senate during her confirmation hearings. This would have reflected directly back upon the Governor. However, the Senate did not hold hearings for Saunders' confirmation.

Saunders also distributed her prepared statement to the staff of the agency. Saunders' intention was to give employees something to read about her philosophy and the rationale for why she took the job. In this manner, Saunders was able to bring attention to those items she wanted attention to be directed towards. The rumor mill had her grist, not the grist of someone else's choosing.
I'm honored to accept the appointment as Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services and pleased to meet with all of you today.

Taking the reins of this agency is a big challenge. OBES workers and programs touch the lives of hundreds of thousands of Ohioans every year. Its basic programs -- Unemployment Compensation, Job Service, and the Job Training Partnership Act -- face crucial policy issues in the next few years, and, of course, its recent history has been marked by questions about management and policy decisions.

I have accepted this challenge and, in fact, embrace it, because I believe strongly in the honor and importance of public service, am convinced of the importance and the effectiveness of these programs, and have faith that the employees in OBES are capable and dedicated. I want to do my part to restore Ohio to its place of national leadership in the employment and training arena.

I believe that having productive and respected work is a fundamental aspect of being fully human, OBES programs train people in basic skills as well as skilled occupations, teach people how to look for jobs, help employers find workers and provide financial support to people who lose their jobs.

I want to help OBES be the best that it can be. I look forward to meeting the people interested in our mission and listening to their advice and concerns. I hope to meet the key OBES managers yet today and anticipate exciting times come the 26th.

Saunders' relative "insideness" in the form of being an experienced employment and training professional made her appointment credible, beyond assumptions of overt political motives. Saunders was also able to state publicly her initial agenda with the explicit backing of the Governor. Her agenda was to improve the functioning of the agency, including developing accountability, credibility, and other activities -- very short-term (though not revealed to the media as such) activities that would foster those values.

Arrival at OBES

The first day, Saunders toured the main building so that she could meet every employee. She began at 8:30 and finished at 1:30. When Saunders arrived at OBES late that afternoon, she met briefly with many members of the senior staff. Staff asked many questions, including, "Are you bringing people from Wisconsin?"

I answered that I wasn't and that I assumed that all the people here were wanting to do a good job and were committed to doing a good job. I was committed to working with them.
The first Friday, she toured six local offices -- one for each region -- so that people could "get a look at me and learn I was real."

Value-Based Management

Saunders argued the value of personal integrity over other means of compliance (namely, authority). She indicated, "government is not made up of the options that are legal. That is simply a starting place." One starting place to signal her values was to define the appropriate uses of the Special Administrator's Fund narrowly, to support only those activities which met narrow interpretations of the fund's statutory authorized activities. Prior to her arrival, the fund had been used to fund a variety of special projects including trade offices in foreign countries for economic development purposes, development of logos, etc. These uses had attracted negative press attention.

Saunders was also able to influence staff toward credibility and integrity, regarding what Saunders termed a special session, in October, to make a change for the construction trades regarding for employer wage-records. In her words,

The Governor didn't want to have one, Speaker didn't want to have one, Republicans didn't want to have one, but everyone was saying we probably need it to change [], and, um, so, I had to sort of negotiate, allowing people, [3] figuring out a way that people could have a special session that, that none of them had to say they wanted [...] The change that they made was going to cost us money to administer. It was not going to be a freebie... We were already in the hole, so I had to go and say to people whom I'd never met before, uh, "You can't just be in the business of making policy changes, you have to take some responsibility for that new administrative cost tied to these policy changes, and I'm not going to be interested in a special session that doesn't have some money tied to it." (ES_11.30: 1142-1212)

The change was a change in the statutory language regarding the construction trades, but would require additional administrative activity to collect this information, creating additional costs.

Saunders made a point of arguing with her subordinates on the morning of a planned UCAC meeting about how she would not compromise her ethical standards. The Chairman wanted to hold the meetings at the Scioto Country Club, a location fairly inaccessible to the public. Saunders' argument was that there was an ethical issue regarding the meetings of the UCAC. Saunders argued that these were supposed to be open meetings, so that the public could have access
to the meeting. Saunders reported that her staff couldn't find the open meeting law and didn't
know its general provisions. Saunders then reframed the issue using her experiences in Wisconsin.

Well in Wisconsin, what is required to be open is meetings of bodies, the major-
you know, most a quorum of a body is considered a meeting, and it must be open,
so this is NOT going to be a body, it is not the committee of the commission, it is
not a sub-committee." I said, "Is this true?" "That's right. It's just employer reps."
So I said, It's sort of like a caucus." "Yeah." They thought it was like a caucus.
(ES_11.30: 1225-1261).

The significance is that the action was taken to structure two situations. First, Saunders was able
to deal with the situation as a pedagogical device with her subordinates in order to infuse ethical
issues into this area of the organization. As this event occurred within the first two weeks of her
tenure, its significance on the activities of her staff cannot be overstated. Second, Saunders was able
to have some influence on the leadership of the UCAC to the effect that she was "clean." In this
manner, Saunders was able to show her staff as well as the UCAC, that even though she may not
be an UC expert, she was a capable and credible administrator. The episodes with the UCAC and
the introduction and passage of the bill as well as its signage into law occurred within a two week
period, within Saunders' first month on the job.

When this author asked senior staff about Saunders' credibility and integrity, they all gave
examples of their personal credibility and integrity and gave morally-based stories about not "giving
in." Thus, Saunders has influenced the members of the staff, an impact that may last beyond her
tenure. While this seems, at best, tangential evidence of a change in the agency, the staff were
influenced by more than the charisma of the successor. Her program knowledge and her emphasis
on integrity made it difficult to confuse Saunders' ability with her personality. The members of the
senior staff were now different people because they had different "scripts" to explain their actions.

Some members of the strategic leadership group continued to ask Saunders about their
future in their current positions.

About two staff meetings later, or maybe even sooner than that, I told them that
I realized I had not spelled out their particular employment future. I said that I
was not going to make any upper level changes until the end of December. I was
going to see how things worked out and uh, uh, if I made changes it would be at
the end of the year.
Staff seemed content with this answer. Saunders, as implied earlier, began her tenure at OBES with the assumption that the only way a reasonably sane person would take the appointment at OBES was to make an important assumption:

Anyone who stayed here and have lived through what they had been through wanted it [the agency] to turn around and wanted to help me succeed. If their reputation was on the line, and it was, and they had hung in there, then I could recapture their pride in their employer. I believed people would respond to a message that "We are not going to live in the past, but turn the page and move forward."

Changes in the strategic leadership group of an agency director are more difficult than one might imagine:

It is hard because everybody here, mostly everybody here has a even if they're in a staff function to me, has a line function, so if you're moving, you know, I don't know how you would do that . . . (ES_9.26: 4378-4383).

Saunders was not willing to ask people she knew in Wisconsin to come to Ohio for a two year period (ES_9.07: 734-742). Since she was not willing to bring in people she knew and trusted, she was almost "forced" to accept the people she was given in the agency, and to build a certain level of trust or to devise a means of operating with minimal levels of trust.

Organizing the Decision Making Process

Saunders organized her office by generally accepting the office organization of her predecessor. This involved accepting as her office staff an executive secretary, an office receptionist, and, initially, an executive assistant with the title of Deputy Administrator. However, Saunders changed the operations of her office. Her predecessors were perceived to run the agency with a limited participative decision-making structure. That structure was limited to a few people and a to a specific feminist influence. That is, there were select members of the "team" who were consulted. This was changed radically in Saunders' early days and weeks.

Saunders opened the decision-making structure to most of the members of the senior staff (strategic leadership group). The senior staff group consists of eighteen individuals and meets monthly. Further, Saunders and her two deputy administrators meet every monday morning. These meetings produce minutes with decisions and rationales. Their decisions are recorded, complete with decisions and the rationale behind their decisions, and are available to staff. By distributing
minutes, there are fewer "hard feelings" that someone had been left out of a decision. Written
minutes are distributed to all senior staff. Saunders met with her two deputies and devised this
format early in October (1988).

Deputy George Sheehan promoted a cost center approach to allow program managers and
local office managers to have adequate fiscal information to manage their offices and programs.
Information became more credible in terms of making management decisions. The cost-center
approach to fiscal management was the topic of the first senior staff meeting.

In decision-making, Saunders encouraged senior staff to explore alternatives and fostered
open discussion toward taking action. She pressed for improved analysis in writing; policy decision
memoranda, listing the alternatives and the pros and cons behind the favored solution. Senior
managers are expected to work through the hierarchy, but more recently have used electronic mail
to discuss the contents of the memo with others. Although memos become the "work of many
hands," members tend to get consensus toward strategic direction. One member of the senior staff
expressed the focus on Saunders' participative management style.

The responsibility of the senior staff has broadened greatly with respect to
participation in making decisions, responsibility in carrying out assignments, and so
on, and pumping feedback into the final decisions.

Saunders explicitly recognizes the limits of her authority in setting and implementing a strategic
direction. There is authority inherent in a position, but there is no guarantee that others will accept
that authority.

Just because we have these jobs, no one has to take us seriously. Generally, the
attitude is that if the director says something, everyone is supposed to "bend over,"
and of course, that's not so.

In response to internal and public perceptions that OBES decisions had been made behind closed
doors, Saunders kept her hall door open, as a symbolic message to the media and to staff that there
were no secrets. She publicized her weekly schedule and had it posted on agency bulletin boards.
This move was also symbolic to the larger group of agency staff, who indicated that they thought
the decision process was "open."
Saunders found that many Division Directors did not articulate their agendas. Saunders worked with the two deputies to review the priorities identified at the (June) staff retreat, the concerns identified by Lukensmeyer, and her commitments to Governor Celeste, and a memo describing Kilbane's thoughts about agency needs. Table 12 identifies Saunders' enactment of her agenda and her enactment of her staff's agenda.

### Table 12
Saunders' Agenda and Her Enactment of OBES Division's Agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Services</th>
<th>Needy, but goals, accountability, and selection of Division director would wait. Saunders believed Acting Director wanted to be named Director, avoid merger with JTPA, and needed funds.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor Market Information:</td>
<td>No needs. Grant lots of discretion. Wants support from Administrator for existing projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Economic Assistance Team:</td>
<td>Develop useful programs for citizenry and for Governor. Management of Grants process, accountability. Saunders believes they wanted to get closer to Governor, avoid external threats to &quot;their&quot; autonomy, and punish SDAs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Training Partnership - Ohio:</td>
<td>Improve procedures of operation: compliance reviews, audits, leader defensiveness. Select new division director as time allows. Saunders believed they wanted help dealing with OJTC and especially with SDAs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Compensation:</td>
<td>Seemed okay. (Problems with performance were hidden). Saunders believes they needed money.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Saunders and the two deputies issued a memo to staff entitled, "Moving Ahead with the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services" Table 13 is the major components of the "Moving Ahead" memo with a source of the items on the agenda. With the "Moving Ahead" memo, Saunders made her agenda even more public. Saunders determined that an early statement of values and actions planned to advance them was necessary to develop effective working relationships with her staff and give all OBES employees a sense of her leadership.
In combining agency goals and her very public commitment to actions that advance these goals, Saunders established credibility and legitimacy for herself as the administrator in the eyes of members of the senior staff. By tying specific actions to her agenda, staff began to realize that she wasn’t going away.

The exercise was important because it laid out some activities that we could do and did do. It set the stage that we could get some things done.

Saunders reported back to Bureau employees in February 1988 on their actions to achieve these commitments.

To move to a longer term agenda, Saunders worked with staff at a March, 1989, retreat to develop goal statements that could be used within OBES to guide members’ actions. Senior staff derived these goals from their priorities and their knowledge of agency needs. As such, the goal statements represented "real" problems to be addressed. Saunders then adopted these goals (table XVII) as her policy initiatives, but remained true to her agenda by transferring accountability for these goals to the members of the strategic leadership group. Her purpose was explicit: to hold people accountable for producing results. Saunders capitalized on her personal focus on productivity and accountability to transfer authority to act to members of the senior management team. Saunders used a direct, hierarchical method to include performance goals in the performance evaluation criteria of senior managers. Saunders combined this with earlier statements (October, 1988) in staff meetings such that:

I am interested in accountability, and I remember saying to senior staff, "I am accountable for everything that goes on in this agency, and [pointing to her deputies], these two are responsible or everything that goes on in their areas." I said, "It trickles down." I think that people saw that as threatening. [I was saying,] "When you sit in a particular place in a pyramid, that is what you get paid to be, accountable [for what happens under you]."

When combined with prior work to reach consensus on agency goals and strategy, Saunders communicated her agenda into the agency. Members of the senior management team initiate changes in their units in response to their accountability.

Whether these changes were felt at the lowest level is still to be determined. What does seem to matter is that Saunders’ activities had the effect of creating effective working relationships
and a mutual trust among members of the strategic leadership group. This mutual trust seems to be of two types: one is character-based and the second is competence based. The character-based competence deals with staff perceptions of the director's openness to new ideas, her integrity, and consistency of behavior. The competence-based trust involves more task-specific or programmatic competence.
Table 13
Moving Ahead With the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services

Attached please find a statement of values to guide us here at OBES through the balance of 1988 that we developed and reviewed at a recent senior staff meeting. As you can see, we have begun the work needed to improve agency morale and the perception the public has, of our effectiveness. The activities are, for the most part, special efforts that will be undertaken in addition to our regular work.

Please think about how you can advance the themes of open communication, respect, and recognition, and accountability and competence in your work, contact with the public, and in your working relationships within OBES.

Thank you for your consideration.

1. **Open communication** internally and with the public.
   1.1 Work with leadership of the Ohio Job Training Coordinating Council. (Federal law change.)
   1.2 Identify opportunities for, and develop methods of public involvement in policy development.
   1.3 Administrator's committee on the Employment Service including Legislators, Employers, and other Users, and other "Partners" to assess current status of the employment service and to make recommendations to the Administrator about its future. (ES 2000 Committee)
   1.4 Develop internal communication methods so that managers and staff are informed timely of issues and interests.
   1.5 Develop and promulgate comprehensive EEO/AA policy. (Exogenous pressures.)
   1.6 Review and revise, if necessary, grant proposal solicitation, review and approval process. (Exogenous pressures.)
   1.7 Respond promptly and fully to constituent inquiries, complaints, concerns.
   1.8 Develop public information calendar.

2. **Respect and Recognition** within OBES for our employees.
   2.1 A committee representing a cross-section of OBES employees will develop a recognition program that:
      2.1.a Provides for annual outstanding performance awards to employees for extraordinary contributions to OBES programs;
      2.1.b Develops a nomination process that allows for nominations by anyone; and
      2.1.c Includes a recognition "event" and "certificate."
   2.2 Develop plan and budget for OBES internal newsletter, including departments, samples of story topics, etc.
   2.3 Support management training on "managing change" in early December.
   2.4 Conduct space utilization study for 145 South Front Street (central office building). (Senior Staff)
   2.5 Plan and conduct stress management training(s) in cooperation with union. (Senior Staff)

3. **Accountability and Competence** in policy development and service delivery.
   3.1 Participate in '90 - '91 state budget process. (Annual Event & Process.)
   3.2 Continue national leadership in NGA on ES/UI financing issue. (Senior Staff)
   3.3 Lead orderly transition to EDWAA implementation. (Exogenous event (Federal law change)
   3.4 Implement alternate base period reporting requirements. (Exogenous event, state law change)
   3.5 Participate in Welfare Reform Planning. (Senior Staff)
   3.6 Fill key manager positions: ES, JTPA, and Budget Directors. (Normal Managerial Role Transitions, some from exogenous events.)
   3.7 Continue with cost center budgeting plan. (Senior Staff)
   3.8 Proceed with Timely and Comprehensive Audits. (Senior staff)
   3.9 ICESA/FARS Implementation Planning. (Senior Staff)
   3.10 Provide analysis on solvency issue and other key UC issues. (Senior Staff)
   3.11 Plan for disaster recovery. (Senior Staff)
   3.12 Trade Adjustment Assistance (Exogenous event & Federal law change)
   3.13 Cooperate fully with on-going investigations and follow-up recommendations. (Exogenous event)

Source: October 28, 1988 memo from Saunders, George Sheehan and Doug Holmes to OBES Management and Staff, retrieved from OBES files by Maryellen Meredith.
Table 14
OBES Goals Identified in Spring 1989 Senior Staff Retreat

1. Develop a comprehensive human resource program for OBES.
2. Improve communications network which will assist in informed decision-making and in the sharing of rationale(s) for decisions.
3. Emphasize effective service delivery and accountability in existing programs and successful implementation of new programs and services.
4. Improve the management of automated information systems and their responsiveness to OBES.
5. Improve methods for allocating human, fiscal, and time resources.
6. Improve methods for program and administrative policy development and decision-making.
7. Improve OBES's capacity for research, policy analysis, and public education on emerging work force and labor market systems.

Source: Posters located throughout OBES offices at 145 S. Front Street, Columbus, Ohio.

The Budget

In a January memo to Governor Celeste, Saunders outlined the agency's budget strategy. The basic boundaries of the budget had been determined prior to her arrival -- the budget was submitted by Kilbane to the Office of Budget and Management, prior to Saunders' appointment. The basic features of the budget were to extend the UC surcharge to fund the projected budget deficit and to obtain funds for the ES automation. In her memo to the Governor, Saunders outlined the budget strategy to ensure that employees interacting with the public were well-informed about several topics. Saunders wanted the employees to know how OBES was funded, what OBES was doing at the national level to change the funding allocations of Federal Unemployment Taxes (FUTA) to the states, and for what the surcharge funds were to be used and how they related to employer tax rates. The implication is that staff became more knowledgeable about external forces impacting the agency and that they were given this information without any real expectation of reciprocal behavior.

32 The theme running throughout Kilbane's tenure was that each day might be her last. It appeared that she focused her efforts on running the agency to the best of her ability. Her perseverance paid off, as the United States Department of Labor recruited her to be a Regional Administrator (Kansas City) in a Republican (Presidential) Administration while Kilbane had been serving in the administration of a Democratic Governor.
With respect to the UC surcharge, Saunders faced stiff review of this request from the UC Advisory Commission (UCAC). The UCAC consists of members appointed by the Governor to advise OBES regarding the administration of the Unemployment Compensation policy. Saunders describes the UCAC:

Now the UCAC, now that, those are the good old boys they know how to really fight. . . . The UCAC has, has real power and they know, they know, coming out of the labor movement, they know how to really negotiate, you know, sort of stake out their positions. (ES_9.26: 7327-7336).

The area of unemployment compensation was one of Saunders' weakest areas of knowledge. One staffer referred to her (Saunders) as being "UI impaired." She had accepted the structure and personnel of the UC division, having heard that it was the strength of the agency, only later finding out that the problems with performance were hidden.

OBES needed additional resources to fund the agency due to increased federal appropriations and the agency's heavy reliance on federal funds. Without additional resources during the biennial budget, OBES would have run out of funds during March of 1990, an election year. Saunders was prepared to take a stand that the General Assembly would not tackle a tax increase on employers during an election year.

In the late Autumn of 1988, OBES was in a financial and managerial bind -- they had to submit a final budget with the Governor to be submitted to the legislature, and have faith that they could accomplish the tasks with the resources appropriated. The difficulty was that the UCAC would not give-in on the issue of recommending additional resources and Saunders did not have the votes to have the UCAC recommend a tax increase to the General Assembly. The UCAC traditionally did not deal with what they defined to be "administrative matters" (e.g., funding the administration of these programs), concerning themselves with what they considered to be "policy matters." Saunders directed Sheehan to put the surcharge in the budget, deciding to deal with the commission later.

The Chair of the UCAC invited Saunders to come to a meeting (December 5, 1988), but the chairman requested Saunders not "bring up the money issue." Saunders worked through her staffers, including the Secretary of the UCAC (on the OBES payroll), to coordinate her meeting with the UCAC. The members of her staff coordinating with the UCAC negotiated that Saunders could bring up the tax increase, but not during discussion of the change in statutory language.
OBES's supporters counted the votes, determined they did not have a majority, and adjourned without a vote. Even though Saunders did not have the votes to garner approval from the UCAC, bringing the issue to the UCAC and not failing in a vote gave Saunders the evidence for future dealings with the General Assembly. She could say that the UCAC had failed to take action on the proposed change after they had the opportunity. Regarding the UCAC, Saunders commented:

They have all the cards. [...] If they don't want to, if they don't want to take me seriously on anything, they don't have to at all. They don't have to. They're in charge (ES_11.30: 1379-1384).

The UCAC was kind to Saunders in that they never put the surcharge to a vote so that Saunders would have to attempt damage control in the Senate. With this inaction from a body that had independent authority to act and did not have to listen to the agency, Saunders was able to deflect criticisms from members of the General Assembly and employers who charged that OBES was circumventing the prerogatives of the UCAC to review the proposed tax change. Saunders was able to say at the Ways and Means Committee hearing that the proposal was brought to the UCAC, but they had not voted on the proposal. The deniability factor allowed Saunders to say that OBES had given the UCAC the opportunity, but given the time constraints, OBES was not able to wait for another meeting without putting the policy change into the budget, and planning resource allocations, accordingly. Saunders realized that this was not the full truth, but she reconciled her logic that OBES had never obscured the "direction of their thinking from anyone" (ES_9.26: 6293-6319).

When Grace Kilbane was lobbying the Legislature during the previous fiscal crisis (the previous March), she had sent over a memo describing the revenue projections. The projections turned out to be overly pessimistic. It turned out that OBES had more money than projected. OBM officials and the staff of the Legislative Budget Office found that it always seemed to turn out that way; it was strange. While OBES was claiming they were about to go under, they always had money to pay the bills.

A couple of members of the House Ways and Means Committee remembered the reputation of OBES and recounted the story of the most previous fiscal projections. They stated, 'You came to us nine months ago, and you said that if we gave you [x amount of money], you were going to lay off about a hundred people. We gave it to you and now you said that you don't have to lay anybody off.' Representative Bob Corbin was able to parlay the half-truth to oppose the tax
increase. Saunders' memory of the telling testimony was that "When they need the money, we'll deal with it when they really need the money." The strategy of telling half-the-truth had come back to haunt OBES. The House Budget Committee removed the surcharge from OBES's budget and passed the measure to the Senate, where it was assigned to the Ways and Means Committee.

Richard Finan, chairman of the Senate Ways and Means Committee, had a clear memory of the problems earlier in the decade (1983) when the UI program went in debt and, as a member of the (then) new Republican majority in the Senate, Finan had to vote to increase taxes to avoid deficit financing. Finan held the employers responsible for the Unemployment Compensation system and believed that employers had to make the trust fund solvent. And this meant a surcharge. He was also committed to automating the Employment Service.3

Saunders' first legislative strategy had two major components. The first strategy was to work with the Director of OBM (Office of Budget and Management), Lee Walker, and her staff in a collegial manner. The second component of the legislative strategy was not to be alarmist but to provide the best evidence she could provide evidence that federal funds alone would not be able to fund the program operations for the biennium. Testimony was prepared to indicate that the shortfall of resources would force OBES to "reduce services" or OBES would return to the General Assembly for additional resources. If they were to prepare for layoffs, OBES would be required to begin in July of 1989, in order to accommodate the costs of "bumping" due to seniority, early retirements, unemployment compensation, and successful appeals.

The strategy differed from prior strategies in that in prior years, the Union (OCSEA) had been involved with encouraging employees in a "grass-roots" appeal to legislators for money to avoid closing local offices. In 1987, OBES had closed 32 offices. Saunders was careful to not use the words "layoffs" as she hypothesized that members of the General Assembly were sufficiently sensitized to know what "service reductions" meant.

On another level, OBES was attempting to educate OBM and the legislative budget staff on OBES's funding and programmatic requirements. Sheehan worked to establish credibility regarding OBES's finances, by capitalizing on his experiences with the Department of Youth

---

33 This was accomplished, in part, by Saunders' action to bring in a card file and demonstrating how the manual job matching process (described earlier in the text) worked. This strategy clearly demonstrated the need for automation.
Sheehan was able to convince the LBO and OBM staffers that OBES gave them the best information that they (OBES) had to work from. Sheehan later recounted his confidence in some of the OBES financial projections:

I don't have a whole lot of confidence in these figures. I'll be honest with you up front. This is not like it was at Youth Services, where I wouldn't bet my life, but I would bet my house on these figures. I mean, I wouldn't bet you a beer on some of the figures we got out of OBES.

Saunders did not promise the General Assembly that the agency would operate any better. The promise was that additional funds were necessary to "hold the line and arrest deterioration..." Saunders did not consider the operating deficit funds sufficient to accomplish an improvement in services.

The legislative strategy was successful in that it (the tax package) was in the senate version, and would be a topic for the conference committee. Saunders learned through one of the local office managers that Speaker of the House Riffe had made statements indicating he was not aware of the details of the plan. Saunders then made overtures to Riffe, to see if he had the information necessary to make his decision. Senator Finan was adamant about holding the employers accountable for the maintenance of the UC trust fund, and spearheaded the fight to keep the surcharge in the budget for that purpose and for ES automation. Eventually, the budget was passed with a deficit reduction funds and the ES automation funds coming from a variety of non-federal sources (leftover 1989 funds, Special Administrator's Funds, JOBS funds, and general revenue funds).

The significance of this action was that the money signalled the end of the immediate crisis. OBES was now able to move on to other areas. Saunders had restored some degree of morale within the agency and with the passage of the budget, was able to demonstrate that the agency was legitimate. In addition, the actions had made funds available to avoid layoffs and allow the senior staff to concentrate on other policy initiatives

Saunders' actions to improve employee morale and public credibility were dependent on her efforts to obtain a budget with stable resources. Without success in the Conference committee, she would have had to move immediately to planning office closings and preparing for layoffs. Saunders saw the budget to be the event that demonstrated to the employees that their leadership could achieve goals and, this success improved employee morale. The success with the budget also
indicated that there was public credibility for the agency. The tasks included team-work, with specific assignments and honesty in working with the General Assembly. It is this credibility that was caused by her work with the budget to be credible in the eyes of the members of the General Assembly and that credibility, in turn, allowed the agency to get operating funds from the General Assembly. This credibility combined with a "created impression" that legislators would not want to vote a tax increase or to close local offices in an election year allowed OBES to sell the state funding to the committee.

Saunders believed the primary mission for the department in the Spring of 1989 was to orchestrate the passage of state funds to automate ES and to make up the projected operating deficits. Saunders' idea was to give herself strategic options, or degrees of freedom within which to act. If she did not obtain this, she saw herself as constrained in what she could attempt, much less accomplish. If she could accomplish this, she could claim that she had restored credibility to the agency.

Analysis

The tasks of a newly appointed leader vary over a variety of situations. The historical background and Saunders' initial actions regarding the agency created a variety of dynamics that were to set a series of dynamics over the next several years. The following sections discuss a variety of events and processes involved in Saunders' actions to create her job and take charge of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services.

Personnel Moves

Saunders' strategy of retaining members of the senior staff limited OBES's capability to change. Long tenure and the organization's socialization patterns (e.g., Louis, 1980), tend to promote personal identification with the organization's existing strategy and culture (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). But it had other advantages. By focusing on legitimacy and credibility, Saunders met the needs of the senior executives to identify with OBES. OBES senior executives were able to perceive themselves as having more to gain from following Saunders' new direction than from not following her leadership. Thus, Saunders had an easier time obtaining consensus regarding strategies than one might expect, given the circumstances.

Saunders initially indicated that, in all practicality, she should not immediately replace any members of the senior staff just to show that she was "in charge." This is not an insignificant dynamic, especially in light of the fact that almost all of her subordinates wondered if she was going
to replace staff (especially them). This is a powerful potential. It is reminiscent of the November 4, 1990, SHOE cartoon, where cartoonist Jeff MacNelly portrays the editor sitting at his desk. The editor is speaking to himself about the tasks of being a good manager, noting that irrational behavior such as yelling and screaming doesn’t motivate the workforce. He continues, "The only thing that really works is the silent unspoken threat of irrational behavior." The situation is similar to a change of directors. The employees believe that the new leader has the authority to move personnel and that a successor will do so at the slightest real or imagined provocation.

Saunders also had reservations about some members of her staff:

I would rather not know I have people on the senior staff who are waiting for me to leave. Which I could find out, you know, by long, you know conversations, stuff like that, because, I don’t, I’d just as soon not know. Now that’s the coward’s way out, I know, but I mean, they’re not fireable, most of them, they’re in the civil service, I’d have to make a case, and I don’t want, I don’t want to make a case on attitudes. [7] I mean, as a very practical matter, uh, was that I was coming to a strange state and didn’t know anybody, so to me, these people had lived through the, the war, and and uh, if they stick around, especially the ones in the unclassified service, they must care. I mean that was the only conclusion I could draw, either that or they were really ill, um, but no, none of them had bailed out, and none of their names were surfacing in the newspaper except for Mark […] (ES_9.26: 4268-4281)

Many of the members of the senior staff had tremendous loyalties to Roberta Steinbacher and still others to Grace Kilbane. If Saunders had arrived and had attempted to establish credibility for herself by removing those who had been close to Steinbacher or Kilbane, by criticizing her predecessors, or demanding personal loyalty, the results could have been disastrous. Saunders would not have gotten the agency commitment to her and her agenda without attempting to destroy the personal and professional relationships with Steinbacher and Kilbane.

The response to Saunders' "inaction" on personnel was very positive. First, those who had personal and work relationships with Steinbacher and Kilbane were not threatened or intimidated by Saunders’ initiatives. Many of the members of the senior staff who had been there were sad to see Kilbane leave, because they had a "bonding experience," as one staff person described the situation. Many had been close to Steinbacher, believed that she had done no wrong, but that she had been unsupported by the Governor’s office. Second, those who had been "outsiders" to the decision-making process were given an equal chance to perform and to earn a place in the new hierarchy by their performance. Saunders seemed to suspend judgment about the people who
worked for her, and establish a performance expectation for each of the senior staff. Members 
would stay or go based on their performance on mutually agreed-upon criteria. By doing so, staff 
were given the opportunity to develop a working relationship with her and to have their credibility 
be determined by a series of developmental assignments.

At the level of the agency staff, Saunders made moves toward a human relations focus for 
the entire agency. One staff member stated that no terminations or suspensions were handed out 
without the employees involved agreeing that the person disciplined had "employee assistance" in 
the area for which they were reprimanded.

Saunders also faced one of the toughest quandaries that a newly appointed executive has 
to make regarding style. She came in from another state (WI), faced the fact that she knew one 
person and they were "auditioning" for favors and attention, she had to decide how to deal with 
these new people. Saunders opted for now moving people immediately. She accepted the personnel 
as a "given," at least until it was clear that any personnel moves would be based on the competency 
of the members of the senior staff, not on their loyalty to Steinbacher, Kilbane, or an individual 
need to demonstrate that she was "in charge."

The other thing is I didn't know anybody so I mean, what am I going to do? Make 
a trade of A for B when they are both unknown quantities? […] I could have 
come in and said, "Okay, now, […] George and Doug, you're going to switch 
deputies, and Katherine, you're going to be the press officer, and Karen, you're 
going to be the legislative liaison, just to show that I could do it if there was any 
doubt, […] Thinking about it now a year later, um, I think women have to make 
those kinds of, some kind of dramatic move, maybe it's not just women, maybe it's 
just new appointments. I think people, I think, especially when the agency is 
traditional and the citizen is sort of power-oriented and "hierarchical" maybe I 
would have gotten attention, you know people's attention in a substantive way a 
little earlier. Or just upsetting the apple cart just for the hell of it, just to signal 
that [5] I can't imagine my doing that but I, I have thought about that as a 
technique. […] In my view it doesn't work as a technique at all. It is seen as a 
pure power play -- and if you want to have an egalitarian work setting in which you 
say, "Okay, here's our problem, now how are we going to solve it?" and you want 
people at the table giving their ideas, that's not, I mean, that isn't the way to get 
there. (ES_9.26: 4284-4341).

Saunders' ambiguity on this matter suggests that she would consider this option more seriously in 
the future on a similar situation. However, in this situation, she did not, and the results were more 
positive. Saunders was able to get people's attention, through her actions regarding the UCAC and 
with her interactions with staff. Saunders accepted the existing structure to create stability and
continuity to deal with the morale issue (ES_9.7: 743-746) and to allow employees to relax around her and stop "auditioning" for better roles within the new hierarchy. Although Saunders was seen to know the agency, she knew the programs where there were troubles "cold." In part, her lack of knowledge about two of the four programmatic divisions as well as the Ohio system of administrative and budgetary services may have been barriers, but her technical competence in the two knows areas overcame these difficulties to establish credibility. In addition, her taking charge was facilitated by her intimate knowledge of the federal law and requirements regarding the allocation and expenditure of JTPA funds and procedures.

Saunders' developmental approach involved negotiating task and job assignments with subordinates. Saunders then kept after these people to accomplish these tasks. The purpose was two-fold. First, the tasks were designed to accomplish specific objectives. Second, the assignments were developmental in that Saunders was evaluating her subordinates to see how they would work with her and with other senior staff. The developmental assignments were to achieve commitment of the senior staff while testing their performance. The idea was that she would not make judgments about personnel until after the first of the year (1989).

Saunders' intentions speak through her words. Most of the quotations regarding problems at OBES do not refer to specific individuals. When Saunders refers to the agency's problems occurring prior to her appointment, she speaks in a passive voice, and according to Strunk and White (1979; pp. 17-19), passive voice can be used when you do not want to identify the actor. In this instance, Saunders claimed she did not want to know the source of the problems or of the history, she wanted to "turn the page and move forward." Her use of the passive voice supports this intention. Saunders did evaluate personnel, but this occurred later in her tenure, through performance in these developmental assignments.

Saunders also had to establish role expectations for subordinates and for herself. Saunders comments on her relationships with her deputies.

---

34 One comment to make is that Saunders demonstrated a keen ability to remember key phrases and her choices about language. This is demonstrated by an earlier demonstration of the choice to avoid "layoffs" in the budget negotiations and here. The implication is that she chose words that she wanted to have a specific impact on the person hearing those words. This also contributes to her successful working with the media.
I thought I was coming into a fairly well-established hierarchy and that, that the deputy director type positions were, were, really functioning like deputy directors only to discover that no, that wasn’t the case, but I didn’t discover that until months later, so I should I really should have and would in the future have at least one-hour conversations with each program director with the deputy, there in the room, or maybe not, where I’d say, "What are your priorities?" you know, "What do you think you, what do you want to get done here? How can I help you?" But I didn’t do that because, and I’ll tell you, the other thing is, "What is your agenda?" My agenda was essentially for the first quarter was a very public agenda. It was, it was, you know, but I didn’t, I couldn’t afford to know what was on their plates because it was just, would be a distraction (ES_9.26: 4400-4425).

Saunders thought the deputies had sufficient understanding to manage their areas. Her own agenda was very public and very short. She focused on her agenda without being distracted by other competing influences. In so doing, she was able to accomplish a great deal, more than she or many others expected.

After the first of the year (1989), Saunders moved her focus from reestablishing public credibility to the agency, taking full advantage of her last 15 months on the job to make progress on several key areas. Saunders moved one deputy director into a Special Assistant position to work on the National Governors Association (NGA) proposal to alter the federal government's (Department of Labor) allocation of the FUTA taxes to the states to run employment security programs and other key policy issues. By detailing the duties of the position (giving a specific job charter), Saunders suggested and the former deputy received the impression, that the position carried greater responsibility to the maintenance of the enterprise than the person's prior position, as effective performance by the person in the new position might have a great impact on obtaining financial resources for the continuing operations of the organization. Thus, Saunders met an organizational need and overcame potential resistance by allowing the Deputy to protect his status within the senior management team and the organization.

I realized [in September] in Santa Fe that I have fourteen or fifteen months left, and I thought I have lots to do! I thought, "Well, okay, I've got to deal with this. This is not working. It's not going to get any better and, why not deal with it?" In this case, I had defined the options too narrowly. I had defined the options in my own mind as whether he's here or he's gone. Those are not all the options I had available to me. I had never asked myself, "Have you identified all the options?" But I did in Santa Fe. I realized he doesn't have to be gone, because he has all these strengths. Why don't I pull these strengths and use them [for the] two big projects I want to put behind us.
Rumors spread quickly that the deputy had been demoted. However, by keeping him in close proximity and by giving a specific job charter, Saunders deflected most of the speculation concerning making a structural change.

Saunders' words seem specially pertinent. In the following, taken from the October 12, 1989, memo announcing the personnel shift, Saunders links the rationale for moving the Deputy to the continued success of the agency. With this, Saunders was able to demonstrate the abilities of this individual were still useful to her, but especially useful to the agency.

Table 15
Saunders' Memo Announcing Staffing Change

To: Directors, Department Heads, Regional and Local Office Managers.

Now that funding has been stabilized for the bureau for the 1990-91 state biennium period, I see our challenges concentrated in two areas: policy initiatives and internal management. In order to effectively address both, I have announced staffing changes that will enable the agency to maximize its impact in these key areas.

[paragraph announcing the appointment of the new deputy and her background]

I have asked Doug Holmes to focus his skills and energy on five key OBES initiatives that are demanding increasingly significant time and attention. In this role, he will: lead efforts to secure passage by Congress of the National Governor's Association employment security administrative financing proposal; coordinate efforts to address the adequacy of the Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund chair the education and training subcommittee of the interdepartmental task force on welfare reform, take responsibility for UI administrative rules promulgation and oversee implementation of the new responsibility for labor dispute mass appeals provisions of Ohio law. Separately and together, these priority areas will in large part determine the capacity and ability of this agency to effectively serve Ohioans in the years ahead.

Editor's note: this was on OBES letterhead.

Closely related to this story is the earlier non-story of the handling of the departure of Grace Kilbane. If Saunders had made a structural change involving Kilbane, whose formal authority was overshadowed by the interpersonal loyalty many former staff members shared with Kilbane, formal authority would not have been enough to overcome the expected resistance due to this change. The disaffected employees may have been able to convince others on the basis of personal loyalty to Kilbane to resist other structural and policy changes.

Saunders admits one mistake in handling the developmental assignments. This concerned the interactions between a Division Director, Mark Shanahan, and herself. Shanahan was the division director in one of the divisions handling JTPA programs, an area where the agency had many problems during the Steinbacher era. Early on, Saunders concluded that she and Shanahan
would not be able to work together. In Saunders' view, Shanahan would not offer solutions to problems, only describe and reiterate his definition of problems. The situation was complicated in that Shanahan's spouse, was employed in the Governor's office as the liaison for many of the Governor's most important economic development initiatives. This meant that Saunders and she (Shanahan's spouse) would interact on a variety of matters important to the Governor.

Following an announcement of a reorganization of the Community Economic Assistance Team (CEAT) and JTPA divisions, where his position as a division Director was being eliminated, Shanahan applied for the JTPA director's position. Saunders had determined that he was not demonstrating the initiative she needed or meeting his present assignments, and would not be appointed to this position. Saunders could have taken him aside and told him that he would not be appointed. Instead, when he was not appointed, and she did not attend the meeting where he was informed of this decision, he felt as though he had been mislead. This created difficult dynamics between the Governor's office and Saunders, partly resolved after his resignation from OBES, when Shanahan found employment in another agency in the summer of 1989. It might have been appropriate for Saunders to not speak with Shanahan, but given the other circumstances between the two, Saunders could have handled the situation differently. It is not clear whether staff found these actions as an impediment to trust or to maintaining effective working relationships with Saunders.

**Earning the Trust and Respect of the Governor and His Staff**

Saunders and the members of the agency were faced with the fallout of previous investigations. One of these investigations and the management of the investigator's report provides interesting clues as to how Saunders believes she established a relationship with the Governor's office. Prior to this incident, staff from the Governor's office had been calling to Saunders' Administrative Assistant, Maryellen Meredith, to ask "How is she doing?" It is not clear whether they were looking to determine her performance or whether she was frustrated with the agency, with the personnel, or what.

The story which is most telling about Saunders' relationship with the Governor's office involved a report by a special investigator, to be issued one month into her term.

And, the Hopkins report, oh yeah, oh yeah, oh boy, um. There was this JTPA investigation that had originally been planned for inside the agency and then they discovered that one of people they put on this task force was a felon. Uh, well he'd been a felon but he'd had his record expunged, and so when that happens to
you, you don't have to claim it... But still, when it comes out in the paper that the
guy was a felon, it makes you feel like, you know, hideous... Well anyway, so
what they did, they assigned this retired gumshoe, Joe Hopkins and he studied, he
did this big investigation, there's twelve dislocated workers grants, talked to 250
people. He and a staff of other gumshoes poured through records; they labored
mightily and brought forth a pea, um, and, they were on assignment from the
administrator. Ok, we were footing the bill, and they were to report to the
administrator. And, uh, and they did. They brought in with a great sort of "tuh,
tuh, tuh, tuh, ta, ta, ta, ta, ta, ta" presenting me with this report. Um, I had told the
governor's office, I think I was dealing most with Paul Goggin, I said, "This report
is being finished. He's going to present this report to me and I'm going to read it
over the weekend." And, uh, "We're doing a press rel...., we're going to do a press
conference absolutely as soon as we can get it together." [He said,] "Well, you
should send copies over here." "Okay." Uh, on the plane I read half the report--
this huge big thick binder with a lot of "he said that she said he said" and, there was
absolutely nothing new in it. Um, I read it, half of it on the plane, I got home, this
was a Friday, panic calls from the governor's office. Finally, at 5:30 in the
afternoon on Friday, I am on the phone in my kitchen, this is October 18?, I'm on
the phone in my kitchen, Ok?, and Carolyn's office is on (unclear) Paul, Carolyn,
Gary Sousey, I don't know, couple of other people, and they have given this report
a THOROUGH 20-MINUTE REVIEW! Now, I want to say to you, I, I, I read
two-thirds of it and it took me my entire 5-hour trip, you know, two airplanes plus
the time in the airport I had, I had read it, and, it was, believe me, I was looking
for, well I was looking for the themes, "What are the themes here?" What are the
themes, where are we going? And we had an argument. Six of them and one of
me, we had an argument. And Carolyn was listening to me and finally Carolyn
said, "I think Ellen has a point. Let's do what she says." I said, "Look, the only
thing you people have going for you right now is my integrity. We are going public
with this. Believe me, there is nothing new in this document other than that
program was mismanaged. Have you ever just admitted that it was mismanaged?
because I intend to." Finally, you know, we got agreement and, what happened was
that the press conference lasted for close to three hours.

I sat there, Joe Hopkins sat there, I was there for the whole duration, if anybody
wanted to ask me anything about the report. We got copies of all this stuff, um,
the governor's, someone from the governor's office came over and sat there to
learn whatever, went back, apparently told the folks over there that Ellen had had
a two and a half hour press conference. Everybody over there imagined that it was
a grilling. Now, it wasn't! Because I wasn't defensive, I didn't, you know, I didn't,
said, they'd ask me a question and I'd say, "I don't really know. Joe, where is that
is this, you know, Joe" and he goes through it. But, at that point, and not only that,
but the coverage was exactly as I had said it would be. So, they, that was it. That
was the moment. It was like, you know, trust, and I knew how to do this job.
(ES_9.7, total citations include lines 1846-1983).

In addition to increasing Saunders' credibility with the Governor's office, her handling of the
Hopkins report also allowed her to gain credibility with her staff. When the press conference was
over, she told the JTPA Division staff what she had said to the press and what would be in the
paper the next day. They reported that she was materially correct. Thus, the action to deal with the media had benefits with her relationships with governor's office and with the staff, as well.

For our purposes, this interaction also demonstrates Saunders' relations with the Governor's office. She could have viewed any interaction with the Governor's office to be an intrusion into her managing her agency or seen as suggestions from the Governor's office as orders. Instead, she appears to view the governor's office as a relationship to be managed. Saunders believed her best service to the Governor would be to absorb the programs and problems as her own, to put some distance between JTPA and the Governor.

But, I mean, I don't know how many [people] brand new on a job are willing to have a, uh, a, really arm-wrestling, [...] struggle with, with the [key staff in the] governor's office. I think people tend to probably to fade pretty fast. (from citation above)

This incident demonstrates Saunders' ability to integrate media relations, politics, and management. However, this perspective is integrated within her overall philosophy of management to be direct and clear in her communications.

Saunders' father had been a journalist, and Saunders has a tremendous substantive understanding of the media. This understanding is made clear in her straight-forward handling of the Hopkins report with the media. With this report, Saunders established herself with other key members of the Governor's office (i.e., Communications Director). Saunders believed that releasing the report had to be done her way -- she (Saunders) would lose credibility with the media if there was any hint of a cover-up.

Communicating with Agency Staff

Saunders efforts at communications strategies were rather deliberate. She changed the means of communicating with staff at two levels. First, at the level of all employees, Saunders pushed the PIO to arrange for the members of the senior staff to write daily sign-on messages for employees at the field offices (70 percent positive feedback to that type of message). Senior staff are each assigned a day to send a message to the employees. The goal is to have messages 90-95 percent of the time. The PIO, Karen Michael, or her assistant edits each message for clarity and coherence and gets the messages to data processing for input. Since the messages are to people who may not know the sender, messages must be informative and substantive.
Saunders also initiated an employee newsletter, and video-taped messages (3-4 per year), to communicate who she was and what she was trying to accomplish. Saunders' intent behind these messages was to let the people in the field know who she was and what she was about. She wanted to create stability and continuity -- "let them know they were in good hands."

The PIO noticed that they went more "external" after the first few months. Saunders first action to gain the trust and credibility of external stakeholders was to present herself well during the Governor's appointment press conference. According to staff present at the press conference, Saunders demonstrated humor, intelligence, and a knowledge of the field. She was able to demonstrate that she was a career professional in the employment and training field with no murmur of political ambition.

Saunders met with anyone who would schedule an appointment with her. In addition, Saunders met with the editorial boards of the major newspapers in Ohio. These meetings were reflected by positive editorials.

Saunders had the Public Information Officer combine the several agency newsletters into one unified newsletter (Working Ohio). The idea was to get people thinking of coordination -- that what happened in one area affected what happened in another area -- and the OBES as an agency, not a set of distinct programs.

Saunders also initiated and scheduled press briefings. Briefings are interactive sessions where the senior staff could present data on topics that Saunders felt the press needed to know to strengthen their reporting. This is directly contrasted by a press conference where one announces something to be important. A briefing is on some topic that the press finds interesting and Saunders was able to convince the PIO that the agency has a responsibility to inform the media. Briefings were done on labor force projections, unemployment rate calculations, UI claims increases. In addition, Saunders makes time available to address press calls.

Saunders' communications strategy seemed to follow two general modes: one at the operational level and the second at the tactical or operational level. When Saunders intentionally acted in the strategic area, it involved selecting personnel who would move the agenda forward. For example, when acting to get the agency out of the newspaper, Saunders opened her office door to allow all interested to see with whom she was meeting and she allowed the reporter from the Plain
Dealer to sit at a table in her office and review agency files. This symbolic action operated at several levels. First, the action operated at the operational level to indicate to staff that they had nothing to hide. Her action also operated at the tactical or management control level (Anthony, 1965) to symbolize to others how the press was to be treated (a practice quite different than during prior administrations). In addition, her actions also operated at the strategic level in that the press attention was diverted, although some staff indicated that both the number of press contacts with the agency and the number of stories about the agency had decreased even prior to the time when Steinbacher resigned.

Developing a Longer-Term Agenda

One major item on Saunders' long term agenda was the initiation of a management academy for Bureau managers. Saunders did not describe much of this process, effectively keeping her from becoming embroiled in the accomplishment of the tasks inherent in this goal. The point is that Saunders hired someone to find some answers and to make it happen. In this manner, Saunders assumed responsibility for making it happen, but was not burdened with the day-to-day management responsibilities. Saunders' ability to set an agenda, transfer ownership and accountability for that agenda to the senior staff, and then follow up on that accountability is how results are accomplished at OBES. In the case of the management academy, the person selected is a competent, able professional, but the management academy is not available to staff.

Concluding Thoughts and Insights

Celeste's appointment of Saunders was perhaps the most significant strategic move in that her appointment. The symbolic effect occurred when no one -- reporters, critical external stakeholders, or critical staff -- was able to question why she had been appointed. This indicated that she was accepted as a competent professional. After her appointment, a negative news story would have to be well-developed in order for the story to have face validity and be understood by the readers.

Saunders was appointed with less of a portfolio of stakeholder acceptance and commitment than most of the Governor's second term appointments. The first search committee failed to find anyone who would be appointable. The second search was less associated with external stakeholders and more closely operated out of the governor's office. Saunders had to work with these external groups and demonstrate her credibility. In addition, Saunders has a fairly integrated perspective on how policy, management, media and politics work together.
Saunders tasks were made easier by the fact that she knew the basics of all the programs and she knew two of them extremely well. In this case, an outsider to the organization was seen as necessary by the Governor's office, but an outsider who knew the programs. When policy objectives were accomplished, members of the senior staff are able to know that it is her substantive knowledge of the programs and not simply her style that has led them to achieve the results. Senior staff should be able to accept the next strategic leadership transition with far less difficulty than otherwise, ceteris paribus.

The transition was partly successful because of the activist nature of Ohio's Governor Richard F. Celeste. When we review his four broad policy goals, it was possible to align agency goals to assist him in achieving his goals. This would make it possible for him to select between priorities (relevant in deciding to allocate general funds to the agency budget). It also made it possible for Saunders to describe agency priorities in terms of Celeste's policy agenda, granting her agenda more credibility than it would otherwise garner.

Saunders was inventive enough to negotiate a very limited set of objectives with the Governor. These objectives were fairly substantial, but there were only two or three objectives. By focusing on these limited objectives, she was able to demonstrate success to the Governor's office, the media, and to the members of the agency. Saunders was able to get members of the senior staff to agree to individual performance goals, and to suspend judgment and subsequent personnel action on the basis of these judgments until after Saunders was able to test them against her agenda.

Saunders could have determined that the procedure to take charge and establish credibility with the press would have been to terminate some who had been close to Steinbacher or Kilbane. However, most of the senior staff were so close to Steinbacher that this type of action would not have allowed Saunders to achieve any policy initiatives, and achieve the commitment to her policies and to her.

In terms of personal style, staff find Saunders very clear and direct in her communications. Saunders is very straightforward. She understands the importance of setting expectations and then living by those expectations. In addition, she set out with very "accomplishable" expectations. It appears that she never put her entire program in front of anyone -- either the governor's office with whom she set her initial expectations or the members of the agency. After a substantial period of media scrutiny, staff developed a sense that "Yes, we can do this." And then they started
accomplishing those results. The case of Ellen O'Brien Saunders and OBES is clearly a case of helping people feel and taste their own successes, and getting more out of their performance than they, themselves, expected.
In 1986, the Department of Youth Services (DYS) was an agency with a troubled history and an uncertain future. Its Director, J. Thomas Mullen, had been appointed Director in May, 1985, to succeed James E. Rogers, who was awaiting trial on criminal charges for prior activity as Director of the Cuyahoga Library System and for activity while Director of DYS. Mullen announced his resignation in November of 1986, citing the lack of respect for the agency and its programs. While these events occurred prior to the appointment of Geno Natalucci-Persichetti, the focus of the organization was on the events of the Rogers era.

This study reviews the history of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) and its Director, Geno Natalucci-Persichetti, focusing on the recent history including the Rogers and Mullen eras (with specific reference to the effects of these two leaders on the Strategic Leadership Group) and then to the appointment of a director after Mullen. Then after the organizational and institutional perspectives are described, the perspective of Geno Natalucci-Persichetti is described and analyzed. Finally, the three perspectives are integrated and a story will have been told. The chapter concludes with a set of propositions resulting from this case-study of the Director's process of creating his job.

Overview of DYS in 1991

The Ohio Department of Youth Services (DYS) is statutorily mandated to confine felony juvenile offenders, ages twelve (12) through twenty-one (21), who have been adjudicated and committed by the 105 elected judges of the 88 Juvenile and Family Courts of the state of Ohio. From this, DYS is responsible for promoting and operating the effective operation of programs for the successful re-integration of these youth back into the community as productive and law-abiding citizens, and to provide reasonable safety to the citizens of the state of Ohio.
DYS operates ten institutions to ensure public safety by securely housing juvenile felony offenders. While in institutional custody, DYS attempts to provide these youths with counseling and rehabilitation, educational and vocational training, sexual offender and substance abuse treatment, recreation and creative activities, religious and medical services. Each incarcerated youth is given a battery of tests to help ensure an appropriate educational placement, medical services, substance abuse treatment, and counseling services. DYS develops a treatment team for each youth, including a counselor, a social worker, teacher and others involved in the youth's rehabilitation. The team, when it works at its best, is able to develop an individual program for each youth and monitor progress until the youth is ready for release into the community in the aftercare system. While the current linkages between the social services offered the youth in the institution and the social services offered the youth upon release are often blurred, the youth counselors prepare for the youth's release by attempting to prepare the youth and the family for re-entry into the original home.

Once the youth is released from a DYS institution, juvenile offenders are on parole, or as DYS calls it, aftercare. Aftercare services are handled through the Department's seven regional offices where youth counselors work directly with youth and the youth's family and support network to develop a community treatment package to meet the youth's continuing progress until the youth is ready for discharge from DYS. Statutorily, this happens at the end of the sentence, or the age of 21, whichever comes first, irrespective of the committing offense.

History and Origin of DYS.\textsuperscript{35}

The history of the juvenile detention and corrections in the 20th century begins with the establishment of houses of refuge in 1904, which were established to take children out of adult prisons to meet twin objectives of humanitarianism and political expediency (Karman, 1987; p. 1). During the 1930s, the problems of juveniles who were in need of service and statutorily unable to care for themselves was transferred from the State to the counties. This move led to the creation of county children's homes where services for all children in need could be grouped together, under the aegis of the Ohio Department of Public Welfare. These youths were assigned to these homes because of their "unruliness" or because they were orphans, etc. Karman (1987) reports that juvenile corrections was a subdivision of adult corrections, which was run by the Superintendents of four

\textsuperscript{35} Special thanks go to Pat Karman of the University of Delaware for allowing me to utilize her report on the history of the Department of Youth Services. Without her contribution, this history would have taken much longer to research and write.
juvenile institutions: the Boys' Industrial School at Lancaster, the Girls' Industrial School at Powell, and two youth camps in Zaleski and Mohican State Park. These Superintendents had control over the philosophy and operation of their institutions -- they were chosen for their treatment credentials -- understanding and compassion were considered more important for these positions than administrative skills. The implication is that the prevailing philosophy in juvenile corrections was treatment, grounded in social welfare with psychological counseling employed to rehabilitate (fix) children and to restore families. The Industrial Schools were focused on providing education in addition to therapy and cottage life -- so that they could be taught a trade to make their own way in life. Heavy emphasis was put upon humane treatment -- which Karman (1987; p. 2) describes as "patronizing" and "naive."

The modern history of juvenile corrections in Ohio began with the creation of the Ohio Youth Commission on October 7, 1963 with the passage of Chapter 5239 of the Ohio Revised Code. The Commission was charged with "... combating juvenile delinquency in the State of Ohio, rehabilitating those children adjudicated as juvenile delinquents and ... providing assistance to communities for prevention of delinquency (Ohio Youth Commission, 1965; p. 4, cited in Karman, 1987). The Commission had three Commissioners -- a chairperson with overall administrative responsibilities, a commissioner charged with community services, and a commissioner responsible for correctional services. Each commissioner was appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. Each commissioner was to be a full-time position. Karman (1987; p. 3) reports that the enabling legislation was drafted by members of the Juvenile Judges Association. Concurrent with the administrative structure was a Youth Services Advisory Board, which was to serve policy, advisory, and watchdog functions to the Commission. The Chairman of the advisory Board was to be a Juvenile Court Judge and its membership could include no fewer than four currently sitting juvenile court judges at any time (Karman, 1987; p. 4).

The early days of the commission had been marked with continual reduction of the length of stay (five months for boys and six and one-half months for "girls" in 1964) The Fairfield Institution was an overflow institution to take pressure off of other schools and camps. To cope with this pressure from overcrowding, the OYC built six new institutions in the 1960s. The philosophy was to have several small institutions each with no more than 200 residents) rather than the mammoth Industrial School in Lancaster which housed about 1,000 youths.

Community corrections were in vogue and were federally funded out of poverty projects. These local civic groups proposed and sponsored community-based alternatives included community
residential centers and halfway houses (Karman, 1987; p. 8). The advantages to these programs were to grant local control and to reduce the disruption of family and community ties. However, this philosophy was disrupted by the lack of local facilities. The youths were sent to State Institutions -- because (1) there was no community treatment facilities, (2) pregnant girls' obstetric care was provided by the State of Ohio, and (3) the committing Judge could get the offending youth out of the County. The policy was driven by the availability of funds. The OYC began to fund community treatment in the third sector, even the development of the third sector.

The use of community treatment marked a shift in the dominant treatment modality. In the 1960s the common treatment modalities placed heavy emphasis on education and vocational instruction. In addition, the treatment was influenced by the availability of funds -- the 1968 Elementary and Secondary Education Act funded 103 positions and a director of education at DYS. With the funding came an attempt to standardize educational practices across institutions.

By 1970, twenty percent of the Commission's budget was on community services, including foster care and subsidies. The dominant philosophy was that "... every youth should ideally return to his or her own home, if at all possible."
(Ohio Youth Commission, 1966; p. 20). The Commission established a network of foster care placements to assist the transition between a troubled youth and the youth's home. Subsidies were a way to provide services at the local level and to control institutional populations. One of these subsidies, the Probational Development Subsidy Program, had been created in 1960 to encourage the creation and expansion of county probation services and thereby decrease the need for commitments to state institutions (Karman, 1987; p. 10). Subsidy funds were used to supplement salaries and travel expenses for county probation officers, supervisors and clerical personnel. In 1965, 45 percent of the counties receiving these funds reduced the number of youths committed to OYC, relative to the prior year. The OYC also provided in-service training for juvenile court probation officers. During the 1960s, state legislation created other subsidies to provide financial assistance to communities for construction and maintenance of institutions for the rehabilitation and treatment of adjudicated juveniles, categorical subsidies to supplement the salaries of police juvenile officers and juvenile bureaus, court foster care placements, and multi-county detention and rehabilitation facilities (Karman, 1987; p. 11). While these funds were well used, inflation and decreases in state appropriations (due to reductions in state budgets) reduced the utility of these subsidies.

During the early 1970s, the prevailing treatment philosophy continued to shift from institutional rehabilitation to community-based corrections. The institutions were seen as training
schools for lives of crime and for the adult penal system. However, the policy paradox was to reduce institutional populations but members of the General Assembly resisted the idea of actually removing children from training schools and adult jails. The OYC responded with a centralized practice known as the "total bed concept." The Juvenile Court Judges committed juveniles to OYC but the Commission determined the appropriate placement (e.g., community or institutional).

The OYC developed a matrix of standards which determined whether the juveniles were in need of secure confinement.36 The OYC created a program entitled "Direct Community Placement" to directly place the adjudicated youth in the community if they (OYC) determined the youth did not need to be incarcerated. OYC then attempted to obtain the committing judge's approval to place the youth in an OYC funded home, or some community alternate placement. Without the direct placement option the state probation system paralleled the county system. The OYC position was that institutions should be the intervention of last resort for "children with problems" (Karman, 1987; p. 15). The OYC should serve as a broker of services and that a correctional officer's greatest asset was knowledge of the community. Only a few judges approved of, or even cooperated with this system. To many of the remaining judges, the direct placement represented an abandonment of the OYC responsibility to institutionalize juveniles committed to it by the juvenile court judges. Problems resulting from this philosophical, or rather ideological and power-based split were not to arise for quite a few years. With a fortuitous allocation of federal funds, OYC gave its regional aftercare offices the primary responsibility to develop delinquency programs in conjunction with local communities. The aftercare offices developed programs and were to turn them over to local authorities to administer (and fund?).

These two programs served to reduce the institutionalized populations from about 3,500 to about 2,400. However, the OYC closed many its Youth Camps for efficiency reasons. In addition, the OYC closed its Juvenile Diagnostic Center. The stated rationale was that major juvenile courts had their own diagnostic facilities. Politically, many juvenile court judges were committing a youth to OYC for 30 to 45 days for diagnosis. OYC staffers believed that the purpose was not diagnostic

36There are two euphemisms in this section. First, to call them juveniles is a 1991 interpretation on these reports. In each of these reports and in 1989 interviews with DYS Aftercare Division Youth Counselors (a.k.a. parole officers), these adjudicated youths were usually referred to as "children." The second euphemism is that children "in need of confinement" really means that to meet the society's need for safety and security, and often the locally elected judge's need to be re-elected, the youths "needed" to be incarcerated.
but to "teach the youths a lesson" by offering a "taste" of institutionalization. The message to the youth was to change their behavior or expect more of the same.

Problems began for the agency when the Director Ensign of the OYC resigned under fire because of charges of discrimination toward black youths in institutions. Direct care staff tended to be local residents who reflected community attitudes in their treatment of youths committed to OYC: this often included discriminatory treatment. Assistant Director, Commissioner Joe White was appointed as Acting Director of the OYC. A scandal that was hidden from public view was that with the total focus on community based corrections for the prior eight years, the institutions had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The youths committed to OYC institutions were treated quite inhumanely -- partly because of discriminatory practices and partly because of under-funding and under-staffing the institutions.

White, although he was the Commissioner for Community Services, saw the major management issues facing the Commission to be treatment approaches in the institutions, oversight from central office, and the development of a system-wide perspective (i.e., to integrate aftercare and institutions). White agreed with the judges that OYC was an extension of the power of the courts. If the OYC ran good institutions, then children could be rehabilitated in these institutions.

The election of 1974 brought the return of former Governor Rhodes to the statehouse in a victory over incumbent Governor Gilligan. Rhodes appointed one of the original (1963) commissioners William Willis as the Director of the Commission. Willis has been described by insiders and outsiders as a good person, a great human being who was honest, concerned and involved, but not a manager, a creative thinker or an idea person. Willis was shielded from subordinates with bad news by an administrative assistant (Karman, 1987; p. 19). The OYC policy was to use the least restrictive environment to rehabilitate youths. Under the leadership of the Commissioner (Deputy Director) for Community Services, Joe Palmer, community corrections continued unabated. Vendors were encouraged to open group homes to provide alternative placements and between 600-700 youths were placed in foster homes. Palmer ran into trouble when he tried to integrate the Commission into the community by providing a multi-county approach to community based juvenile corrections.

Palmer ran afoul of the juvenile court judges, the newspapers, and group home providers. At the same time, the federal funds for juvenile delinquency prevention began to "dry up." The Commission decided to use the state funded positions which had been devoted to prevention to
serve youth already committed to the OYC. These people were assigned to the Regional Offices and given aftercare responsibilities. The OYC's goodwill with the media and with the general assembly expired.

In 1977, Commissioner Willis closed the Fairfield School for Boys. Earlier, a task force appointed by Attorney General William Brown recommended closing the school. Willis used this recommendation to close the institution -- termed unthinkable because of the powerful forces who were opposed to the move. At this time the institutional population at Fairfield had been reduced from about 1,000 to between 200 and 300 youths. Unfortunately, the newer institutions were not able to absorb all of these youths and subsidies were increased to allow group and foster homes to take up the rest.

The history of juvenile corrections took a drastic turn in the late 1970s. The OYC was being criticized because it was doing little with an increasing number of serious and dangerous offenders. In addition, the direct community placement was challenged because there were significant and visible problems with the management of direct-community-placed youths. The juvenile court judges and the OYC squared off in what was to be a rather short battle.

The OYC did not request funds from the General Assembly to build additional institutions. Without funding, minimum institutional stays would decrease. The Ohio Juvenile Judges Association increased its power and strength when judges began to act in concert and more judges took exception with OYC direct community placements, claiming that many youths were committing new offenses while supposedly under OYC custody. The OYC had neither developed a broad-based constituency, nor had they tried to gain the juvenile judges as an ally. They had not marketed the direct community placement, lobbied for its guidelines, and, kept no records about the failure or success of placements. The judges argued that the OYC was not making a legitimate legislative or programmatic response to their complaints. The association argued that the OYC was neither treating nor rehabilitating youths.

The OYC believed that it was attempting to retain institutional care while broadening community initiatives. They argued that individualized treatment was necessary for rehabilitation. However, Willis did not have a good relationship with the judges and as Deputy Director, Commissioner Joe Palmer was found with little favor by the judges. Differences in philosophy and ideology were compounded by the differences in personality.
OYC was able to get approval for a $15 million comprehensive youth services subsidy program to begin in the second fiscal year of the biennium. The judges were not able to stop passage of the subsidy with their wording, but they were able to remove wording defining the purposes and distribution procedures. The OYC drafted a bill giving the Commission the authority to administer the subsidies as well as giving the Commission the authority to draft administrative rules and to submit these rules to the Controlling Board for approval. When Commissioner Palmer took an aggressive stance against involvement by the judges in distributing these funds and Willis condoned this stance, the judges drafted their own enabling legislation which was to become House Bill 440.

House Bill 440 (HB440) was an omnibus bill replacing the OYC with a Department of Youth Services, provided for the removal of status offenders and misdemeanants from state correctional jurisdiction, mandated minimum lengths of stay (sentences) for adjudicated juvenile felony offenders, and placed the community corrections subsidies in the hands of the judges. In the House version of the bill, the aftercare function was to be removed from the Department and placed under the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. This provision was rejected by the Senate. The conference committee, under pressure from urban courts with large caseloads, also rejected this provision.

Many policy-makers and observers of the system recognized that juvenile corrections was misdirected under the shared decision making of a commission and that it made sense for the functions to be provided by a traditional department. Two months of hearings were held during the Summer and Autumn of 1981. The OYC staff were what Deputy Director Merilee Chinnici-Zuercher describes as "60s and 70s people." They were young, well educated in social work and criminology who believed that youth had rights and that the system had the responsibility to provide opportunities for them. The OYC was opposed to HB440 -- fearing losing control over the institutions (judges would control who would be adjudicated and sent to DYS institutions and minimum sentences would determine how long these adjudicated youths would stay in DYS institutions), DYS would lose community based corrections and aftercare (i.e., parole).

The outcome of the process was never really in question because the judges were able to organize a powerful coalition of county prosecutors, defense attorneys, editorial writers and youth advocates to join their bill. One advocate group, the Ohio Youth Services Network drafted an alternate bill, but the judges' power was so great that they could not find a sponsor to introduce it (Karman, 1987; p. 27). Without a sponsor to a compromise bill, DYS supporters, such as they were,
would have to negotiate directly with the Judges. Unfortunately, they had little to negotiate unless the judges were willing. While the judges agreed to keep aftercare in the new Department of Youth Services, as mentioned earlier, the large counties did not want aftercare and giving up aftercare signaled to the observers that they were willing to compromise. As the vote neared, the OYC lost its credibility and with its credibility, whatever power it once had (Karman, 1987).

**The Judicial Era**

**Provisions of HB440.** The judges used the rhetoric that serious juvenile crime was a real problem and the only way to deal with it was to "get tough." This message was accepted by the media, the general assembly, and much of the public. The main problems of OYC had been addressed in that direct community placements which, according to the judges, placed violent offenders on the street where they could commit new crimes and harm more individuals. In addition, the institutions had been maintained, minimum sentences had been established and the Department could not release adjudicated youth without the permission of the committing judge. The courts were given control of the subsidies and, with this shift, the state juvenile correctional systems was now accountable to the 88 juvenile court judges separately elected on a county-wide.

The issue of getting status offenders (juveniles, for whom their committing offense would not be a crime if they were majority age) out of state institutions had been debated during two years prior to the passage of HB440. The Juvenile Judges Association's legislation effectively de-institutionalized these offenders by eliminating the possibility of their being committed by the judges to DYS. However, by treating youths as "habitual offenders," the judges can commit any multiple offender to DYS as long as the crime for which the youth is charged is a felony class I through IV. What the judges really wanted was minimum sentencing for adjudicated felony offenders and they were willing to give up the authority to commit "unrulies" and misdemeanants to state institutions in order to accomplish this objective.

The Ohio General Assembly had enacted a complete revision of the criminal code in 1980, and HB440 provided minimum sentences of six months for juveniles convicted of committing felonies of levels I and II, and one year for those convicted of committing level III and IV felonies. These sentences would be subject only to early releases approved by the committing judge, but in a slight nod to the philosophy of treatment, the legislation allowed juveniles to be retained in institutions for periods of time longer than their minimum sentences at the discretion of the DYS.
The law created a four-party delinquency prevention program, with the involvement of a citizen advisory board, the county government executive, the local juvenile court judge, and the Director of DYS. The legislation also provided for a subsidy of $19 million (510 subsidy) to fund the non-secure care and treatment of juvenile offenders. This subsidy program replaced all of the other subsidies then in place except for the facility construction and operation subsidies, which were expanded to facilitate the removal of children from adult jails. Three-fourths of the Commissions' direct community placement residential budget was transferred to the 510 subsidies (creatively named for the section or for the bill number of the law creating the subsidies) under the reasoning that the local community now had responsibility for status offenders and non-violent offenders -- the youth who comprised the bulk of direct community placement. These subsidies are mandated by population and the amounts are determined by the legislature; previously they had been determined and administered by the OYC.

Aftermath of HB440. Originally, it seemed that HB440 was working as anticipated. The idea was that only potentially dangerous youths would be institutionalized. The number of children held in adult jails was reduced from about 6,000 to fewer than 200 and status offenders in detention decreased from about 15,000 to about 3,500. A 20 percent reduction in commitments even resulted in some immediate lowering of the population in DYS institutions. Unfortunately, this trend was short-lived. While institutional commitments declined, another factor contributes to institutional population (not counting individual altruistic institutional population reduction programs, or escapes). The length of stay contributes heavily and HB440 provided for minimum sentences -- a factor which would increase institutional populations. Furthermore, in arguing against HB440, OYC provided data and suggested that two-thirds of the juveniles incarcerated were misdemeanants, a "fact" which was not true. Other data problems led to miscalculating the classifications of institutional residents.

The OYC staff members had spent so much time fighting the passage of the bill, they did not make adequate plans to implement its provisions. The subsidy unit did not get established and this provided residual hostility between the courts and DYS -- preventing the establishment of an effective communication network. In addition, DYS was inundated with juveniles petitioning for early releases. The average processing time was three months -- not helpful for a youth serving a six month sentence (Karman, 1987; p. 31).

The network of private contractors of direct community placements represented almost as many beds as were available in state training schools. After the passage of HB440 and the transfer
of community treatment funds from the OYC (DYS) to the presiding judge of the juvenile and family court, about 800 beds were lost within 18 months. Only financially stable contractors not dependent on the state subsidy were able to survive. Many of these contractors had been recruited and persuaded by OYC staff to open and operate these facilities.

In 1982-3, federal grant funds were no longer available to finance many of the DYS programs. The Rhodes administration budgets did not replace federal funds with state funds. Thus, when DYS began to realize that institutional populations were increasing and overcrowding would be a problem, DYS ran out of money and had to terminate (lay off) about 100 staff members. Many of these people felt they had risked a lot to fight HB440 and now found themselves out of a job. If they still had a job, they may have had to bump colleagues, co-workers, and friends with whom they had worked for many years. The workload did not decrease with the layoffs. Those who remained had more work to do. In addition, the institutions now were receiving a much more tougher, more difficult group of juveniles into their institutions, and out into aftercare. Morale plummeted.

By the Autumn of 1982, DYS had one year with a lame duck Governor who was not supporting human services programs. With the election of a new Governor would come a new administration within the agency, although some felt that nominal Republican Willis could survive under a democratic governor because he was black and non-political. The Department of Youth Services had 13 months to gear up with fewer staff to run programs for tougher youth, hear more administrative appeals, and to plan for a future with a lame duck governor and administrator. Leadership was conspicuous by its absence.

Recent History and Scandals.

Governor Celeste appointed James Rogers to be a member of his screening and selection committee according to the behest of Celeste’s friend, Arnold Pinkney, a former Cleveland school board president (Neff, 1986; p. B1). Rogers had been the director of the East Cleveland Library system, and, after screening and recommending individuals for cabinet-level appointments to the Governor, Rogers, himself, was appointed as the Director of the Department of Youth Services.

Dr. James Rogers had no real experience in juvenile corrections, but he was bright, creative, aggressive, suave, well-dressed, and a hard worker. He had the ability to assess a situation and to

---

37 His "non-political" nature was underscored by his less than adept handling of the HB440 fight.
give people a sense of direction and to motivate them to act. He was also extremely suspicious, possessed an inflated ego, and surrounded himself with people who would promote him. He played DYS politics like he played Cleveland politics -- a finite game of "hardball." DYS became a political entity. After years of inaction, members began to feel a sense of direction and hope for their passion -- youth services.

Rogers' first action to take charge of DYS was to hold an executive staff retreat the first weekend. With the assistance of the consulting firm of Arthur D. Little, Rogers set about creating a mission statement. At the end of the meeting, he told the staff members in attendance:

Before you leave today, you fill out your resignation. Don't put in the date; I'll decide when I want you to go. (DYS_ALL: 3163-3168).

Nine institutional superintendents were "let go" and the regional office directors' positions were taken out of the classified service. The were then able to apply for the positions now available in the Department. While one could argue with the wisdom of this managerial technique, the effect it had on the members of the strategic leadership group is not insignificant.

Rogers' administration was not notable or significant in many respects, but there were a few accomplishments. Rogers declared and enforced a policy against physical abuse in the institutions; terminating 28 staff members in two years who assaulted residents. Rogers was able to upgrade some physical facilities and eliminated a number of positions in the institutions. The effect was that residents received new furniture and cafeterias were renovated, but Rogers also eliminated two position classifications (assistant principals and chief social worker) replacing the second with another classification (Deputy Superintendents). Rogers filled the positions with individuals who were political appointments, not qualified corrections professionals. Staff at institutions felt that the Central Office did not care about what happened to the juveniles in institutions, and were making decisions detrimental to the way the children were treated (Karman, 1987; p. 33). As one institutional staff person claimed:

---

38 The reader is invited to contemplate the use of the word "children." By referring to children, they were attempting to get sympathy for these individuals, but the real attempt was to get better conditions for themselves through the warrant of providing better care for children. Few can resist providing care for children. Many can resist providing quality care for convicted felony offenders, who happen to be juveniles.
People would just show up at the door, and the paperwork would follow. (Neff, 1987; p. 1a).

Rogers reactivated the "continuity of care" strategy which had been considered as a meta-treatment strategy. The strategy aims to maintain gains made with individuals in institutions after release into aftercare. The strategy requires contact between institutional social workers and aftercare youth counselors, as well as between parents and juveniles. Aftercare contracts were developed, meetings were held in institutions with the juvenile, the juvenile's parents, and DYS staff to plan for the juvenile's release from the institution. These aftercare contracts provided for differential supervision (juveniles had to report to the aftercare worker less often as they met goals in the contract). The continuity of care program failed because (1) there were no travel resources to get either the aftercare workers or the juvenile's parents to the institutions; and (2) aftercare workers had to report to their home office each morning, see the youths and then report back to their home office by 5:00 p.m. The dominant treatment modality was to reintroduce the youths to school. Aftercare workers did not want to create adverse peer social pressure to the youths by visiting them in school [within the 8:30 to 3:00 time block] (Huff, Jenkins, & Card, 1990). The workday became extremely short with central office staff accusing aftercare youth counselors of "laziness" for their decreased productivity -- with reciprocal charges of being unrealistic.

The most significant administrative endeavor created by Rogers was to divide the Department of Youth Services into two regions for administrative purposes. The northern district was administered out of Cleveland Regional Office and the Southern District was administered out of the Central office in Columbus. Rogers' public rationale was that Institutional Superintendents and Regional Office Managers, who now reported to the same supervisor would now talk to each other and work together to implement the continuity of care strategy. The logical merit of the strategy was short-lived as tensions between the Central Office, regions, and institutions increased. The Cleveland Office was popular with the Rogers' patronage appointments who lived in Cleveland and did not want to move to Columbus. Strained communications channels interfered with communication and policy interpretation. The division became symbolic of the mistrust between the "central office" and the field offices. The institutional superintendents and regional office directors did not talk to each other any more than previously -- the situation was made worse because the officials did not speak to officials in the other regions. The means of geographic functional specialization did not meet the end result of providing effective dissemination and administration of policies.
Although the deletion of institutional positions was undertaken in the name of consolidation of resources, many thought that Rogers wanted to impress Governor Celeste and the members of the General Assembly that he could save money and operate on a very limited budget. His critics charged that he utilized the money saved from these cuts to create new positions in a newly formed Youngstown Regional Office. The number of positions in central office was increased by about 30 percent (Karman, 1987; p. 35). The individuals staffing these positions were seen as ranging from good people to those who were unemployable elsewhere. The number of deputies increased from three to five, superintendents and others were transferred, and people were appointed without corrections or management experience to management positions. Without a means to address the organizational conflict, the department's morale again plummeted and relations deteriorated into a variety of factions -- black v. white. treatment v. cottage, institutions v. aftercare, north v. south, etc.

Rogers' strategy with the judges was to relax subsidy reporting requirements for new detention facilities. Initially, this strategy paid off and two blocks of early releases were granted for DYS institutional population control. However, after the reporting requirements were relaxed, DYS had no other incentives to offer and no early releases were forthcoming to help the institutions control their populations. He had given away the store, and there was no further cooperation between the department and the judges.

Rogers' management style was not described as participative. He did not always gather information before acting. The staff's emotional commitment to their jobs decreased, and they were less willing to take risks. Staff meetings were discontinued between 1983 and 1985. The members of the strategic leadership group remaining or rehired after the Monday morning massacre felt isolated and lacking in a sense of direction and departmental purpose. Officers of field units (Superintendents and Regional Office Directors) allowed staff to return to the treatment modality with which they felt most comfortable (Huff, Jenkins, & Card, 1990). In a sense, this exacerbated the problems between central office and the regions as individuals became more bureaucratic -- fearing that they would lose their jobs if they were "found out."

One of the factors for which James Rogers is most notable is that he was accused and convicted of setting up a ghost employee system -- putting friends on the payroll who took home paychecks, but did not show up for work and was also accused of taking kickbacks from three contractors who did business with the Cuyahoga Hills Boys School, a state institution in Warrensville Heights. Rogers also instituted a policy of requiring each youth counselor in the aftercare division
to arrive for work each morning at the local office and sign-in, and to sign-out again each evening. Each worker had to drive to their assigned office, then return to their community, visit the youths in their caseload, arrange for community services, and then return to the regional office before five o’clock, or be docked. Often, this meant traveling over 200 miles each day.

Rogers was exposed by the Plain Dealer of being associated with a fraud case involving prescription drugs. In addition, Rogers was accused of "shaking down" state contractors and departmental employees. Eventually, Rogers was prosecuted and convicted under federal charges of criminal activity during his tenure at the East Cleveland library, and while serving that sentence, was convicted in state courts for his DYS activities. Rogers was found guilty after he pleaded no contest to charges of theft in office, complicity to commit theft in office and bribery (Lane, 1987; p. 3b). The charges while serving as DYS Director consisted of theft of state money from projects at youth camps in Marysville and Painesville as well as putting six Youngstown residents on the DYS payroll, who rarely, if ever, worked at the Department’s Youngstown regional office.

In the Interim . . .

In April 1985, Governor Celeste appointed J. Thomas Mullen, a social worker and youth advocate from Cleveland to be Director of the Department of Youth Services. The messages Mullen sent to the employees was clear: This agency is in business to serve the interests of children, not ourselves." Mullen had been Director of the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court Administrator prior to his appointment as Director of DYS. However, his family remained in Cleveland and Mullen found the commuting difficult (Lane, 1987). Informants and DYS staff reported that Mullen decreased his time in Columbus as his term continued.

Mullen used the "safe treatment" of children as a means to restore public confidence in the agency and to rebuild staff morale. He traveled around the state to DYS institutions and Regional Offices, giving pep talks to staff members and accepting speaking engagements from civic groups. A committee structure was instituted within DYS, to get employee participation from all levels of the agency. Mullen began a new initiative of developing performance criteria for all areas of the organization. This was consistent with his belief in standards and consistency. Mullen hoped that this emphasis on performance would help him implement policies and hold staff accountable for the results.
Mullen transferred people within the agency and reduced the number of deputy directors from five to three. He retained the regional structure, partly to maintain his home in Cleveland. Mullen spent two days a week working out of the Cleveland Regional Office, and another day on-the-road. Mullen also had to answer civil charges for events occurring in his former position. This put enormous pressure on his second in commands working out of Columbus. Mullen put Chinnici-Zuercher in charge of the day-to-day operations of the agency and in conjunction with Deputy for Administrative Services, George Sheehan, the two of them made most operating decisions for the agency during Mullen's tenure. When Mullen was in Columbus for one or two days each week, they would inform him of their actions and future plans.

Mullen planned to move the agency's treatment and mode of operations into line with the current treatment standards. Mullen planned a series of small institutions located around the state so that parents could be closer to their incarcerated children, thus facilitating aftercare and reintroduction of the youth to the family and community. Mullen initiated a series of planning meetings around the state and combined his internal planning process with an external planning process. However, planning takes time. Staff made Mullen realize that as this was an election year, and he might not be around for long. When this "natural reticence" was combined with prior results from Rogers actions to reduce risk-taking behavior, staff activity to enact his vision decreased. Mullen became discouraged over the lack of staff support for his initiatives and the lack of financial support from the general assembly. His methods to encourage staff participation waned as the end of Celeste's first term neared. Staff participation declined at executive levels; with the decline in activity, field staff reduced their commitment as they did not hear the results of their planning efforts. Thus, differences between the central office and the regions and institutions were intensified and reified.39

Mullen told his two principal deputies near the end of the summer that he was tendering his resignation -- it would become public shortly after the election and would be effective January

39 This is partly evidenced through field office use of the phrase "Central Office." The action of referring to "central office" when actually referring to contacts with individuals in individuals serves the purpose of defining an entity in order to legitimate a display of anger. This anger is seemingly directed at the building. However, it is directed at the anonymous position holders who come into contact with the DYS workers in institutions and regional offices. By referring to "central office," others can understand the frustration expressed by the individual and, at the same time, display anger at a non-person. The effect of this is to create considerable tension between people who work in the field and people who work in the central office. Each, to the other, becomes non-human.
1, 1987. Mullen remained in Cleveland most of the time until November 15, 1986, when his resignation was made public.

In November, Chinnici-Zuercher was representing Mullen at a meeting of the governor's cabinet and she asked Geno Natalucci-Persichetti, representing Rick Syder, Director of the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (DR&C): "Are you going to apply for Tom's job?" (NP_12_12: 218-231)

And at that point I said, "No, I never even thought about it." Literally, I had [ ] had to [ ] hadn't had the first inclination to even consider DYS at the time. And uh, [2] I didn't even think of applying. I didn't even apply. Uh, what happened was uh, some time in December of 1986, I got a call from a Governor staff person.40

Carla Edelfson called and asked Natalucci-Persichetti if we wanted to be considered for the Director. She said, "We've had a number of candidates and your name keeps coming up as someone we ought to consider.

And I said, "Well, that's flattering. Why [points to self]?" [She said.] Well, you seem to have um, good background for the field and people are just recommending you." Um, so I said, "Well let me, before I, I tell you what, let me, let me check a couple things." Uh, so I called Rick [Syder, Director of DR&C] and I said, "What's going on?" and I said, "I got a call from the Governor's Office," and I just kinda laughed, I said, "I just need to know something, am I going to get a raise?" 'Cuz that had been a bone of contention between he and I. Rick is a very conservative individual when it comes to giving his managers raises and I had written a uh, decision memo to him that others were kind of laughing about. (NP_12_12: 260-289).

Natalucci-Persichetti was earning about $33,000 and had twenty-two individuals in his division who were making an average of $5,000 more than Natalucci-Persichetti. Syder laughed and gave a noncommittal response. They then discussed the possibility and opportunities inherent in being a members of the governor's cabinet. Natalucci-Persichetti called Edelfson back and told her that he would consider it.

40 N-P later (NP_5_21: 483-495) recounted a slightly different story. In the alternate story, N-P claims to have responded, "What job is that?" to C-Z's question. N-P claims to have not thought about it until asked by Edelfson if he was interested in the position.
Shortly thereafter, Mullen began to present himself as the "interim director." He began to express his displeasure with the level of funding on juvenile corrections, the size of the institutionalized populations, and the population being incarcerated. We have no idea how Mullen dealt with the judges association, but with his parting shots as director, we can be sure that he made no lasting friendships. Mullen talked the talk -- he used the right words to encourage staff members to begin to work again.

The Search for an Administrator

Lukensmeyer decided that their task to select an agency director (not just for DYS) should be: "If we are going to resurrect this agency from the bottom-up, who are the constituents who have to the next layer of leadership?" From this construction, Lukensmeyer included Mullen, Donna Hamparian from the Cleveland Federation, Juvenile Court Judge Gerald E. Radcliffe, and Ken Ball, a DYS institutional Superintendent. This committee described the characteristics thought necessary for being an effective leader of the agency. They developed a job description and specific individual characteristics, for the Governor's approval. The initial characteristics were that the director was to be a professional and not a political appointment. Primary among these characteristics was an initial bias that DYS needed an outside expert. Stakeholders who were members of the search committee spent several weeks performing specific assignments to go out and interview other stakeholders to determine what characteristics and attributes were needed by the stakeholder to feel comfortable with the person chosen to meet those criteria (DYS_ALL: 1174-76).

Lukensmeyer created a formal search committee and placed Edelfson, the human services specialist, as the chair of the search committee. The strategy was to control the process from the Governor's office. Other members of the search committee included Hamparian; Roberta Steinbacher, Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services; Ray Miller, a black democratic state legislator; Si Dinitz, an Ohio State University professor who was close to Governor Celeste; and Tom Mullen. After reworking the job description and the characteristics, they recruited candidates. In case Governor Celeste wanted to appoint an outside person, they called other states to get a person from another state. From the perspective of the Governor's office, the strategy was to select a candidate that everyone on the search committee would feel confident enough so that they would not go the press and say that a bad choice was made. In this manner, the person selected would be known to the organization's stakeholders, supported by many representatives of these stakeholders and whose strengths and weaknesses were known to the stakeholders.
Celeste had brought in "outsiders" to manage the agency during his first term; these outsiders produced disastrous results. In this sense, many individuals inside the agency felt a need for a candidate from inside DYS, which turned out to be Chinnici-Zuercher. Another candidate from inside DYS was Ron Stipanik, who had originally applied to be a joint director with a woman of color, Barbara Chapman. Stipanik's candidacy was supported by Mullen. Mullen's overt support created some internal problems for the agency as Chinnici-Zuercher was appointed to her position as Deputy Director by Mullen. The first candidate from outside DYS was Jay Lindgren from Minnesota, who at that time, was recognized as having one of the best juvenile justice systems in the country. Another was a black male from New York, but with Mullen's history (Mullen had been Deputy Director of the New York juvenile justice system prior to his recruitment by the Cuyahoga County juvenile detention center. From there, he was recruited to be DYS Director). Without state-level credentials, the minority candidate was deemed unqualified to be recommended. A final candidate was Geno Natalucci-Persichetti, the supervisor of parole and community services for the adult correctional authority -- the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (DR&C). Natalucci-Persichetti was a personal favorite of Si Dinitz, who had worked with Governor Celeste on staffing DR&C executive positions. Dinitz also served as the chairman of the Governor's task force on Prison Overcrowding a few years earlier.

A problem began to develop when the governor's office began to notice that the committee was planning to rank-order the candidates "for" the Governor. Lukensmeyer's strategy was to have the committee send $n$ best candidates, complete with an analysis of their strengths and weaknesses, enumerating where the search committee members feel the candidate is solid. If the search committee had rank-ordered the candidates, the stakeholders would have split into traditional conflicting camps. Edelfson and Lukensmeyer ensured that every stakeholder fully participated in the assessment of the candidate's strengths and weaknesses. A subgroup of the committee "wrote-up" the assessments, but each member participated in the assessment.

In early December, the candidates interviewed with the search committee. Representative Miller asked the candidates what they thought about minorities in the criminal justice system and how they would address affirmative action with the department. Steinbacher asked candidates how their proposed actions would impact the administration. Other questions were related to the discipline of the interviewer: "What is your perceptions of the juvenile offender population problem?" and "How would you develop appropriate programs for youth?" and "What's your feeling about institutions? What is your approach with community-based programs?"
Four candidates were then given a Saturday morning meeting date with the Governor at the Mansion in Bexley. Candidates present included Merilee Chinnici-Zuercher, Jay Lindgren, Geno Natalucci-Persichetti, and Ron Stipanik. During his interview, Lindgren was asked by Governor Celeste if he (Lindgren) was appointed, would he make any changes? Lindgren said "Yes, there are changes that need to be made" (DYS_ALL: 1210-1219). Lindgren proposed emergency legislation to reduce the institutional population. His rationale was that if services could not be provided to individuals in an overcrowded facility. That response effectively eliminated him from consideration, as the committee feared that it would stage a confrontation between a newly appointed director and the juvenile judges.\(^4\) Stipanik and Chinnici-Zuercher did not describe what they would change to make DYS better. Natalucci-Persichetti said he envisioned it like adult corrections for juveniles. There would be services but that rehabilitation was not always viable. His focus would be on providing for institutional care for chronic and violent offenders and for providing resources for community supervision for felony III and felony IV property offenders. When the Governor indicated that he wanted to appoint someone from inside Ohio, the members knew that it would be Geno Natalucci-Persichetti. Search committee members thought him head and shoulders above the rest in terms of his verbal presentation.

**The Appointment**

On January 22, 1987, Governor Richard F. Celeste appointed Geno Natalucci-Persichetti as director of the Ohio Department of Youth Services. The announcement was made through a press release while the governor, the members of his cabinet, and newly appointed Director Geno Natalucci-Persichetti were "on a retreat." Reporters from the Cleveland *Plain Dealer* and the *Columbus Dispatch* were able to locate Natalucci-Persichetti and interview him over the telephone. Table 19 contains the *Plain Dealer* version of the story.

That Friday evening, Merilee Chinnici-Zuercher called Natalucci-Persichetti to congratulate him on his appointment and to invites him over to her house to talk on Saturday. They discussed the personnel and the mission of the agency. They met several times at night and on Saturday during the next few weeks.

\(^{41}\)In a great irony, Geno Natalucci-Persichetti confronted Judge Radcliffe in the first week on the job, and lost (DYS_ALL: 1278-1281).
Table 16
Parole chief to head Ohio youth service.

Governor Richard F. Celeste yesterday named Geno Natalucci-Persichetti a state corrections official, director of the Ohio Department of Youth Services. He will begin the job next month. The new director succeeds J. Thomas Mullen, who announced his resignation last month.

Natalucci-Persichetti, 42, was chief of the parole and community services division within the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections until he was chosen from among five finalists to be youth services director. He takes over a department recovering from problems, capped by the April 1985 resignation of Director James E. Rogers. Rogers was later convicted on federal kickback charges and indicted on charges related to alleged theft schemes at the department and at the East Cleveland Public Library.

Separate from the Rogers tenure, the department has problems, including the 'warehousing' of juvenile offenders and inadequate treatment programs, Mullen said after he announced his resignation. Mullen suggested more teachers, counselors, and psychologists be hired.

Natalucci-Persichetti, saying he could not respond to Mullen's remarks until he is in the job himself, agreed, nonetheless, that the department had problems.

"The organization has had a leadership change fairly rapidly. I think there's a significant morale problem in the field (offices)," he said. "Rogers was just one part of the cause for feelings of ambiguity, stress, and anxiety that might exist in that organization."

Natalucci-Persichetti said he would draft a "mission statement" to the governor, the legislature and the department that would explain some of his priorities. They include improved cooperation among the department, Juvenile court judges and county commissioners in finding a "systematic approach" in dealing with juveniles, he said.

"I want to make sure my administration is sensitive to the total environment -- what's going on with the community, with judges and with the legislature -- and work as cooperatively as we can," he said. "It sounds a bit Pollyannish maybe, but that's the approach I had taken with my current job."

Celeste, in a prepared statement, said Natalucci-Persichetti, in his 19 year corrections career, helped create programs tailored to mentally retarded offenders and minority offenders and to employment assistance for all offenders. In the statement, Celeste said, "Ohioans can count on this same innovative approach as we take on the many tough challenges of Ohio's youth services system."

Natalucci-Persichetti, a Columbus native who said he had a bachelor's degree in social work from OSU and had done graduate work at Xavier University in Cincinnati has worked as a prison social worker, director of the vocational school at Lebanon Correctional Institute, a parole officer and parole supervisor. Also, he was assistant director of Alvis House, a private community-based correction agency in Columbus, he said.

The new director said his experience in corrections would dovetail with the job in Department of Youth Services.


The Interregnum

With the announcement of the appointment of Geno Natalucci-Persichetti and the newspaper reporting of the appointment in the newspaper, the interregnum began.

After the cabinet retreat, Natalucci-Persichetti met with Lukensmeyer to clarify the Governor's charge. The charge from the Governor's office had three items. First, Geno was to rebuild relationships with the legislature. Second, Geno was to develop a mission statement for the department so that are some identifiable goals so that people can be working toward something, but he was to take two or three short-term actions so that he would clearly be seen "in charge" by people inside the central

---

42 Virtually all second term Celestial appointees received a written charge letter from the Governor, describing the administration's objectives. Additional verbal instructions w forthcoming.
office and the gossip network. By "in charge" the informants meant that staff would have the impression that he meant business and that he would take action.

The fear from the Governor's office was that the agency needed such work and was in such difficult situation that without tremendous efforts, the new director would get caught in reforming the agency and when another gubernatorial transition occurred, the agency would be in worse shape. The organizational memory was focused on the Mullen experience, where DYS employees put their trust in the newly appointed leader and when he left, they felt "abandoned."

Lukensmeyer and Natalucci-Persichetti also agreed that since the agency was in so much trouble, they were sitting at a difficult place -- where the new leader needed total systemic change, but the new leader had to prove to people in fairly short order that he was capable of producing some kind of programmatic, budgetary change. The early conversations between Natalucci-Persichetti and the Governor's Chief of Staff were described in the following manner:

Take the long haul, take as much time as he needed to develop a mission for the department, a vision for where he wanted to take the department and to get buy-in from the field level as well as from the central office, but for God's sake take three or four actions up front that demonstrate you are a "get-done" type person.

Lukensmeyer posited that if he were to take six to nine-months to do mission and vision work, he was going to "rot on the vine." In addition, Geno Natalucci-Persichetti believes he had two additional conditions on his initial activities. First, he couldn't bring anybody in with him from DR&C and he couldn't "can" anybody. The rationale was that the agency had been through tremendous turmoil. During Celeste's tenure, DYS had been through two administrations, a lot of other changes up and down the organization. Natalucci-Persichetti countered with the request that he be able to make the agency apolitical. Natalucci-Persichetti remembers "And he didn't flinch." (NP12_12: 683).

Newly appointed DYS Director Geno Natalucci-Persichetti met with Mullen about a week before the end of Mullen's term. The meeting lasted about two and one-half hours, where Natalucci-Persichetti went without an agenda to hear what Mullen had to say about where the agency was and some sense of perspective about the key people in the agency. In Natalucci-Persichetti's words, "It was a real quick and dirty conversation, it was almost like he felt rushed to get out." (NP_5_21: 834-836).
Prior to the time when Natalucci-Persichetti arrived at the office, he visited with a Dispatch feature editor for a story about his qualifications. Table 17 contains the text of this story (but not the 5x7 photograph of Natalucci-Persichetti).

Table 17
Old neighborhood prepared new Youth Services chief.

... I think my decisions at DYS will be colored by my background. It was a tough neighborhood."
Formerly chief of the Ohio prison parole and community services division, he said one of his first duties will be to stabilize the department.

THERE'S A [sic] lot of anxiety and ambiguity because of all of these changes," he said. I've got to get all the critical people and let them know we may be reassigning some people, but we're not going to be kicking anyone out.

Before any plans can be implemented, a "mission statement" must be created, he said. "Our mission is not clear. We have to decide what our mission is and what we should be doing? [question mark in original]

I think I know some of the issues, but I don't pretend to know all of them. We've got to take an overall look at things. It will take a year to get a mission statement and two years to get things organized and running.


With this article, Natalucci-Persichetti began to present his public agenda. The first item was to provide stability to the department. He would not be "kicking anyone out" but would reassign people within the organization. This was done, in part as part of his mandate from the Governor's office that he not proceed to do a wholesale personnel cleansing -- the department had undergone much of that with Mullen cleaning out Rogers' patronage appointments.43 Natalucci-Persichetti's second agenda item was to develop a constant focus for the agency and set a time line of between two to three years to accomplish this task.

With this mission statement, Natalucci-Persichetti thought DYS's actions would be much more concerted.

Mullen's Parting Shots

In a front page story in the Sunday Plain Dealer, many troubles with the DYS institution were chronicled. In the lead case example, a principal was suspended for not taking disciplinary action against a Cuyahoga Hills librarian who was found undressed with a parolee in the back seat of her automobile after other teachers had filed reports that she had allowed several juvenile felons in DYS custody grab her buttocks and breasts. The youth later told police that he had had oral sex and intercourse with the librarian in a school office. In response to his suspension, the principal responded,

43 These patronage appointments appear have been made only for Rogers' benefit, not for partisan political purposes or for the benefit of Governor Celeste.
"In the past I have filed incident reports on several staff members and not once did I receive any feedback or was anything done to those employees once the incidents were filed. If I do perform my duties and nothing occurs above, where does the fault lie?"

To confound the situation, Mullen had giving his parting shot -- charging the general assembly with non-support and spouting to anyone who would listen that many of the troubles to the agency could be solved by increasing the professionalism of the staff (perhaps they thought that he was talking about the other staff, not any particular one). However, many DYS staffers felt Mullen was not committed to the staff of DYS. He never left Cleveland, really. He would spend one or two days a week in Columbus (DYS_ALL: 1501-1505). By contrast, Mullen said the "right" things about the youth and was perceived as a child advocate whose credentials were unquestioned. However, since Mullen was an interim director (he declared himself an interim director, apparently as a part of his resignation). Mullen had developed a programmatic agenda (DYS_DOCS: 457-464) and this agenda was available to Geno Natalucci-Persichetti to assist with developing the credibility of his own programmatic agenda. Mullen also developed a tactical agenda -- one that was not seen by the staff of the DYS. Mullen proposed increasing the professionalism and incarcerating only violent offenders (DYS_DOCS: 555-560).
The problem: a poorly trained, underpaid staff has been managed by ineffective administrators, many of them jaded by a system that has warehoused, rather than rehabilitated, problem youths.

Table 18
Reform is Hard to Find

The problem has come into sharp focus because the stewardship of the Department of Youth Services changed hands this weekend. Yesterday was the last day on the job for former Department of Youth Services Director J. Thomas Mullen, who voluntarily resigned.

In a memo to Gov. Richard F. Celeste and in recent interviews, he has strongly criticized Ohio's $64 million juvenile detention program.

"We don't have a system; we have a warehouse business," he said. "...Ohio has not moved over the past 25 years as it should have. (former four-term Gov) Jim Rhodes didn't do crap for this state as far as human services.

Today, Geno Natalucci-Persichetti, a former administrator in Ohio's adult corrections system, takes over a troubled system that, per offender, spends less than two-thirds the national average.

Mullen said the problems at Cuyahoga Hills were typical of problems the eight other Ohio Detention homes.

During his two-year stewardship, Rogers quickly sank morale in the department by using patronage to hire unqualified people and steering contracts to cronies, Mullen and other administrators said in interviews.

Former youth services director Mullen said comparable states did a much better job treating young offenders. He pointed to Massachusetts and suggested several sweeping changes Ohio must make to drag it from the Dark Ages:

♦ Eliminate patronage hiring for professionals and staff members, and hire more of both.
♦ Increase salaries and qualifications for professionals.
♦ Incarcerate only the violent and unruly, which account for less than one-quarter of the estimated 1,900 youths now locked in state homes. The rest could be placed in group homes and halfway houses.
♦ Using facilities no larger than 60 beds, group offenders together by seriousness of their problems, and close down the big schools -- the warehouses. They are full of wimpy kids who don't belong there and become victims.
♦ Start counseling and rehabilitation programs.

Source: Neff Plain Dealer, February 1, 1987; p. 1a+.

Mullen was proposing a radical transformation of the agency -- to bring it in line with contemporary professional standards. Mullen suggested (see Table 22) increasing its size, incarcerating only violent and unruly offenders, placing the remainder in group and half-way homes where their behavior could be modified to a more socially acceptable level. Mullen also proposed operating small institutions with a population grouped by the seriousness and nature of the offense.

While Mullen had been able to outline the police objectives clearly, he was not able or willing to define a strategy that would achieve those objectives. This led many to characterize the situation as a lack of leadership -- a lack that led to a disarray of services. The agency needed an internal consultant who could bring fresh information to the agency. the agenda was beginning to take shape. He was going to take over an agency that was a disaster. Cabinet member number one was in federal prison. Cabinet member number two had the right reputation, but was often abusive of staff and did them few favors in the news media, with the juvenile court judges, or more importantly, with the leadership in the General Assembly.
Table 19
Mullen’s Parting Shots

Ohio youth ex boss attacks warehousing

Ohio is 6th in the nation in teen-age population, but second only to California in the number of teenagers it incarcerates. Although the nation spends an average of $30,000 a year for each secure rehabilitation bed, Ohio spent only $20,636 in the last year. He said, "Places such as Alabama and South Carolina spend more." Mullen told an Ohio Senate committee that this is the only state spending less money per youngster in 1986 than five years ago.

Mullen does not blame Celeste, decades of stagnation in the state are responsible. That is, in part, the legacy of the administration of former Gov. James F. Rhodes, who occupied the Statehouse for 16 years, he said. . . .

Mullen conceded that an error in judgement did cost the Celeste administration the opportunity to make dramatic gains at a critical time. Mullen was referring to the appointment of James E. Rogers as Celeste’s first Youth Services director.

Mullen said that other states were far more innovative than Ohio in finding alternatives to large training schools. He said most states had switched to smaller treatment or rehabilitation centers of up to 80 beds.

He advised investment in less secure and more diversified programs based on the needs of children. The goal is changing their anti-social behavior, he said. Most states employ far more sophisticated procedures to evaluate the needs of children than Ohio does, he said.

In recent years, Ohio has provided counties with Youth Services Subsidy Program funds to pay for alternatives to detention by the state. The alternatives include group homes, boarding schools, and social-service programs that help teens allowed to remain at home. "... some courts in the state have merely used them to replace county expenditures.” He said that Ohio was very slow to start the policy and that the funding it provided was inadequate.

He said even at their best, the alternative programs are more successful for middle-class white delinquents. "The choice of private placement is always in the hands of judges," Mullen [sic] said. "What is considered a bad kid in a small town may not be considered a bad kid in Cleveland. Many private agencies are geared for the middle class. They may require the participation of both a mother and a father or that a youngster have a part-time job.

One result of the state’s method of dealing with delinquency is that the number of teenagers being locked-up is increasing while their numbers in the general population are decreasing. Mullen said a daily average of 1,763 youths are housed by the youth services department in 1985, a 9% increase over the previous year. Yet, the department has room for only 1,300 without overcrowding.

The overcrowding would have risen dramatically if the Ohio Senate had passed legislation sent to it by the Ohio House last year. The bill would have mandated minimum sentences for certain acts that would be felonies if committed by adults, he said.

Mullen has been a juvenile probation officer, director of an institution for boys, deputy director of the New York State Division for Youth and executive of a private treatment agency. He is now a consultant on juvenile matters.

Source: Perry, Plain Dealer, January 25, 1987; p. 3b.

Arrival at DYS

On his first Monday, Natalucci-Persichetti met with the managing officers of the institutions. He had called his secretary-to-be (Diana Blairmont) and had her make arrangements for all DYS managing officers (officials responsible for running an institution, a regional office, a division, or were on the Director’s personal staff) to meet at the DYS Training Academy at Scioto Village. The task for two days was to begin to develop a mission statement. Natalucci-Persichetti started the meeting off with the following:
I know you've run through a lot of directors pretty quickly in the past and a lot of you think I'm the "director of the day." Both were true. Here is what I believe and here is where I'm going to go. I need your input, I want to know what your goals are and see where you see the organization as ... it is not going to happen fast. (DYS_ALL: 2706-2715)

Natalucci-Persichetti saw himself as someone bringing in fresh information and a new perspective. The tasks were for the newly appointed director to learn from the managing officers what they thought the mission of the department was, what they saw as the direction of the organization, and what they personally brought to the enterprise.

I [was] helping them try to process what they're all about and, the assumption was that the agency was floundering in terms of a mission and I wanted to make sure that was a valid premise and it was. It proved to be that way in terms of there were, there was no, uh, constancy in identifying the mission. There was no coalition to say, "Well, this is what we're all about." and were specific about it. (NP_12_19: 263-275).

Natalucci-Persichetti then worked a structured process to "help" them coalesce to a direction that made sense. After the formal process, the next step was to involve constituent groups in developing a mission statement for the organization.

I was a little dismayed to some extent but also not totally surprised of the level of thought, practice, philosophy of the folks at the time. Because we had people, still do, um, who had been with the organization for 20-30 years, people were still stuck back in the 60's in philosophical perspective of what juvenile corrections is, and how to manage, uh, what life is all about. And to me that was a little disconcerting, but I knew that was a part of the problem when I walked in and it kind of reinforced the challenge for me, I've got my work cut out, we've got some real basic stuff to do (NP_5_21: 228-245).

On Thursday, Natalucci-Persichetti worked to learn some of the details of the budget that George Sheehan and Merilee Chinnici-Zuercher had devised for the agency. Their role was to educate Natalucci-Persichetti as to why the budget was constructed as it was, and who the players were.

Friday evening of that first week, Natalucci-Persichetti met with Judge Radcliffe, chairperson of the Juvenile Judges Association (JJA) and one of the prime architects of HB440. Radcliffe was asking Natalucci-Persichetti to increase the subsidy to the juvenile courts.

"Director, if you want to be the best director this agency has ever had, you will take the money from your operating budgets and restore the cuts that the executive rendered and
you will keep the promises made by Bill Mullen made to us [sic] to give us a 20 percent increase. (NP_5_21: 286-293).

The agency had little clout with the general assembly or with the administration. DYS had been cut substantially in its operating budget and, since it was a cut across the board, it also cut the subsidy to the juvenile court judges. In fact, what Radcliffe was asking for was not simply to restore the cuts but for an increase as well.

Judge, God Bless You. As much as I believe in community corrections, having spent most of my life in it, I just said, "I can't do it. I've got institutions falling down. I've got institutions where we don't have enough staff. And so basically, I said, "You know, I'm willing to say we're here to agree to disagree. Are you? And he hasn't been willing to do that, and our life has been hellish ever since. But, uh, that was the first week. (NP_5_21: 297-310)\(^4\)

Natalucci-Persichetti spent the next two weeks dealing with the budget where he learned first-hand about dealing with powerful constituent groups. The House of Representatives cut $6 million from his operating budget. One and one-half million was restored to the subsidy to the juvenile courts. Natalucci-Persichetti forced the issue with Representative Hining over the cuts. Natalucci-Persichetti threatened to close an institution to make his payroll. It was an issue that Natalucci-Persichetti had wanted the opportunity to challenge. If the general assembly let him close an institution, then he would solve part of his overcrowding problem.

Natalucci-Persichetti began to work with his two deputies to discover who the other players were. In the adult system, the judges didn't go to the general assembly to directly lobby for funds. Secondly, that DYS wouldn't win any fights. So, the strategy was to minimize what they would lose (DYS_ALL: 2368-2374).

Natalucci-Persichetti ended up negotiating with the Speaker of the House, Vernal Riffe, over the budget cuts. In order to get three and one-half million dollars restored, he had to agree to cut one million dollars from his central office budget. To meet the cuts, Natalucci-Persichetti had to reorganize his operations. The cuts gave him the opportunity to negate the Governor's charge that he not hire nor fire

\(^4\) Natalucci-Persichetti gave substantially the same wording in a later interview. This wording from the later interview is: "Judge, uh, God bless you, I'm a community corrections person first and foremost, but in looking at, in this brief week, at the budget I inherited and the needs of my department, I just can't, you know, make up your deficit by creating another deficit in, in my internal budget, if you will. He smiled and he grinned and I've paid for it ever since." (NP12_12: 1329-1343).
anyone. The cuts allowed him to examine the functions of various staff and division directors and to see whether they fit into his strategy. In all, seven positions were cut and several other persons were moved around. One new position (legislative liaison) was created.

I still saw some folks from previous administrations that were literally not, uh, either carrying their weight here or really didn't have any appropriate role as, as far as I could see. So I used that opportunity to cut the fat, at least I was able to trim I think seven or eight positions at the time, plus some other, other things I did lose out of that million dollars, but I think I did this more civilly than people realize because all seven but one, I placed in other agencies, literally. I mean they didn't walk out of here without a job. (NP12_12: 1386-1400).

After the internal review of the functions of the department, Natalucci-Persichetti created the position of Legislative Liaison. In the aforementioned text Natalucci-Persichetti was speaking of the efforts made by recently hired legislative liaison Hearcel Craig to place these persons in other agencies. When Craig was hired in May, Natalucci-Persichetti gave him this assignment as his first.

From February through June of Natalucci-Persichetti's first year (1987), every employee in the DYS was asked to submit their views on the role and purpose of the Department. The mission work revealed a variety of perceptions. While many members recognized the current statutory mission, many staff thought the mission dealt with the rehabilitation of felony offenders as well as status offenders (those whose offenses that led to their incarceration was an offense only because of their status as a juvenile). For Natalucci-Persichetti, this range of perceptions and misperceptions reinforced the need to have a clear concise statement of the role the DYS must fill.

Once this information was gathered from employees, a primary philosophy statement was drafted and shared with key departmental stakeholders (including members of the General Assembly, the Juvenile and Family Court judges, staff in the Governor's office, and leading Ohio criminologists and sociologists) reviewed the draft and were allowed the opportunity to offer their contributions.

Analysis

The data collection and analysis strategy described in chapter III resulted in a multitude of statements, testimony, documents, and observation. To organize the data in some systematic manner and assist in making judgments about the meaning and importance of the lines of inquiry, the investigator decided upon a thematic strategy of data analysis, organized along the temporal scheme of stages described in chapter II. This temporal sequence was then examined according to the coding paradigm (Strauss, 1987) to determine the initial conditions, relationships, strategies and tactics, and consequences resulting from
activity within each stage. To derive the nature and extent to which the Director was able to create his job, themes were further examined from the perspective of individual personal and role development, internal and external environmental press, and data reflective of the process of taking charge. With the first, we demonstrate how an individual adapts to the individual stresses -- whether they accept the charge being laid upon them or whether they change the role conception to fit their individual needs and abilities. Second, the internal and external environmental press is examined for regularities and patterns within each of the themes or topics. These then became the "core concepts" that seem to be driving the process of taking charge with the larger study of whether the Director created his job.

This thematic approach emphasizes the clustering and presentation of material by key themes found in the study along a meaningful temporal sequence. Thus the findings are at once descriptive, predictive and normative to the reader. In general, there are six themes that characterize the process at DYS and with Geno Natalucci-Persichetti.

The reader is invited to recall from Chapter I that DYS was considered to be situationally adverse, that Natalucci-Persichetti was selected from inside government, inside Ohio, inside the Governor's regime, and from inside the functional area. Natalucci-Persichetti was male and DYS was a priority for the Governor's attention (Chapter I, pp. 10-13). These selecting factors were partially derived from a review of the literature on executive succession and from the author's experiences in dealing with executive leadership transitions. First, through this we see that the criteria for sample selection makes some dramatic assumptions. First, we can see the relative nature of "situational adversity." While DYS was considered to be situationally adverse by most observers and by the Governor, expressed through his Chief of Staff, the adversity was slight compared to the adversity created through the encounters with the juvenile judges association. The adversity was partly created by Mullen during the interregnum. Mullen called attention to the faults and problems of the agency.

In the first stage, we examine the events and circumstances related to the need for the Governor to make an appointment, and the activities related to the appointment as well as Natalucci-Persichetti's reason for applying for the position. We then take these findings and relate them to their eventual consequences.

Impact of the Judicial Influence on the Origin of DYS

The primary factor from the development of the agency is the dominance of the influence of the Juvenile Judges Association, or more specifically, the influence of specific judges in creating the agency, and the structuring of its mission, authority, and its continual interactions. The judges essentially took
control over the agency through legislative action. The OYC's handling of the judge's challenge to them was so inept, that DYS's future interactions with the judges in the legislative arena was settled. DYS would not win any battles as the legislative memory of DYS relations with the judges was that DYS was inept.

The judges considered Natalucci-Persichetti to be an outsider. Natalucci-Persichetti was a career corrections professional, but, to the judges, he was an outsider because he was not law trained. The judges had political concerns relative to the condition in Ohio that county judges, even Family and Probate Court Judges are elected. Thus, the judges have electoral pressures that may not correspond to professional corrections procedures. Consistent with Natalucci-Persichetti’s request of the Governor to make DYS apolitical, Natalucci-Persichetti ran afoul of the political realities of the judges. For example, Natalucci-Persichetti and HB 400 provide that the court can commit a youth who is adjudicated of a felony offense to they custody and care of DYS. However, many youths are unruly and not violent. Yet, the news media can influence a community to pressure a judge to incarcerate the youth. With DYS's mission to incarcerate only youth convicted of a felony, the judge would not be able to commit the youth to DYS. So many judges have adjudicated youth as habitual criminals in order to get them out of the community. Further, many youths from "upper income" families are given a form of shock probation as the judge will commit them to DYS, but then grant the youth an early release after a week or two. The message the judge is intending to send to the youth is that the youth must correct his behavior or he will be sent to DYS on a more permanent basis. Given the language in HB 440, each of these is possible. And, DYS has no control over its inputs, and a limited control over its end products.

Impact of Prior Leadership

For all the comparisons between DYS and DR&C, DYS has had four directors in twelve years and DR&C has had three directors in twenty years (DYS_ALL: 1098-1100). So, while the frequent turnover at DYS was considered to be a tremendous failing, one might argue that the recency of the turnover at DYS that caused the troubles. Willis was Director of the OYC and DYS (after passage of HB 440) for eight years. Rogers was Director for two and one-half years and Mullen was director for eighteen months. However, the characteristic more important than mere frequent turnover was the changing focus for the agency under each of these directors. Rogers was internally focused -- on getting some resources from the General assembly for new cafeterias and new furniture for the youths in DYS custody.

Former Director Rogers was infamous for getting kickbacks from construction contractors, for selling items to DYS employees from the trunk of his car, his authoritarian personality and his patronage
appointments and personnel practices. The investigator heard no one argue with the individuals Rogers fired -- it was only his methods and this resulting style that upset DYS upper management staff and his double messages about participation that created an atmosphere for avoidance of responsibility and avoidance of risk-taking. Mullen was known for initiating a healing process -- firing many of Rogers’ unqualified patronage appointments and working with DYS managing officers and the larger staff to participate in decision making. However, Mullen was operating near the end of the Governor’s first term and many of the managing officers reduced their commitment to Mullen’s process as the election neared. This disaffected many of the lower-level DYS staff who continued to give input, but saw little or no resulting action from their recommendations (Huff, *et al*., 1990).

The evaluation of Mullen’s tenure is decidedly mixed. Mullen set about firing the unqualified Rogers’ patronage appointments. Mullen also met in large meetings with members of the DYS staff in rented auditoriums, trying to organizationally heal those who had been abused during the Rogers tenure. Mullen initiated staff involvement in policy and program procedures, attempting to reverse the criticism resulting from Rogers’ unilateral and authoritarian decision-making processes. However, as the Celeste’s first term ended and the election neared, some of the managing officers indicated that he (Mullen) might not be around much longer and they "stopped." However, lower level staff were not told of the reticence of the managing officers. When their recommendations were not accepted or rejected -- "inacted" -- they became rather disgruntled. Programmatic and paperwork changes were half-implemented and previous procedures and practices were not eliminated. This produced an increase in the workload of the staff. Some lower-level staff became rather disgruntled, focusing on Mullen’s comments when first arriving at DYS that he was a social worker and his efforts to advocate for the children. Others focused on Mullen’s "betrayal" of their confidence.

**Selection Procedures**

Governor Celeste’s Chief of Staff, Carolyn Lukensmeyer, set up a process where the major stakeholders would identify the characteristics and attributes of the next director. The intent was to select someone who had the tacit approval of these stakeholders. The existence of two search committees indicates the problems with this strategy. In DYS, the stakeholders were given specific assignments to interview other stakeholders to identify skills, attributes and characteristics that would make an effective Director. However, only one of these key stakeholders were included in the second search committee -- the committee that identified qualified candidates and listed their strengths and weaknesses for the governor. The first search committee approved the candidate as a generality. What they did when they specified the characteristics and attributes was to begin to specify the strategy that the agency would follow. In this, the
committee identified that they needed an outsider and a corrections professional. This indicated that institutions would not be the focus of the agency. In addition, the social work philosophy of treating psychological and social conditions would be subservient to behavioral modification as practiced in corrections.

Governor Celeste has been known as an activist governor. Celeste, at the time, was involved with de-institutionalizing mental health. These beliefs and his action ensured that Natalucci-Persichetti would receive an agenda related to community based corrections. It was further assisted by its cost-effectiveness.

In thinking about what motivated Natalucci-Persichetti to apply for the position, we can see that he was motivated by a financial interest to see how much more he might get as a member of the governor’s cabinet than he might get as a division director. The second motivation to pursue this opportunity was that someone might consider him qualified to do this job (NP_12_12: 324-329). This indicated that Natalucci-Persichetti was making the move for financial benefit. Natalucci-Persichetti’s family was already in the Columbus metropolitan area, so family concerns would be negligible. In addition, Natalucci-Persichetti was not concerned with the security and stability of a cabinet-level position. He found it quite flattering that the Governor asked Syder if he (Syder) would consider letting Natalucci-Persichetti go for this opportunity (NP_5_21: 520-523). So when an opportunity combined an obvious ego boost with a possible raise, Natalucci-Persichetti began thinking as the Director and what he would do in terms of goals and objectives.

When Natalucci-Persichetti was asked what it was that convinced him that he should apply for the position. Natalucci-Persichetti replied,

Yeah, I think once you get on the roll, I mean I think you’ve gone beyond the decision point, I don’t think you get too analytical, unless you have a lot of options to fall back to, I mean I had an option, I could stay there, uh, obviously, and and, but, uh, my opportunities would be limited at that point. I’m always thinking that one of my career goals is to be DR&C chief at some point, it still is a goal in some point of my career if possible, but I’m, I felt that what better way of sliding into that kind of opportunity but from a, having at least sat in a cabinet-level position. (NP_12_12: 455-470)

It would be difficult to imagine what sort of leadership could be exercised without a strong ego. By accepting the challenge to apply, Natalucci-Persichetti set the stage for later events and promises. These statements reveal Natalucci-Persichetti’s preference and creates the distinction for DYS staff that there is
a difference between the policies and procedures for DYS and DR&C. If Natalucci-Persichetti wanted
to be the chief of an agency, and there were no significant differences between DYS and DR&C, then why
did he want to be head of DR&C? It served as a rallying cry for DYS staff who were disaffected by the
turmoil, and when change was introduced, they had warrant to resist the changes.

Appointment via Press Release

Governor Celeste announced the appointment of Natalucci-Persichetti through a press release. By
not having a press conference announcing Natalucci-Persichetti's appointment, other dynamics were
created. First, the media had to track-down Natalucci-Persichetti to get a story. This led to telephone
interviews and made Natalucci-Persichetti rely on impromptu speaking to get his initial message across.
Natalucci-Persichetti did interview with the Dispatch later that week for a feature story on his life and
career and how those prepared him for working with juvenile offenders.

Thus, when Natalucci-Persichetti arrived at DYS, the staff had been acclimated to what he had
been reported as saying during these interviews. For example, when Natalucci-Persichetti mentioned
activities that would impact the Aftercare Division, those employees were interested and excited. Then as
Natalucci-Persichetti did not work with the aftercare division and, in fact, he and Chinnici-Zuercher moved
many of the best Aftercare Regional Administrators to institutions to cover for personnel deficiencies in
the institutions, the staff in the aftercare division became less committed.

The newspaper portrayal of Natalucci-Persichetti was as a corrections official. Natalucci-
Persichetti, at 42, was chosen from among five finalists. Further, Natalucci-Persichetti was characterized
by the Governor's office in the press release reported in the PD as being a corrections professional who
would bring an innovative approach to the juvenile corrections area, an area where the administration
tacitly acknowledged their problems. It is these problems that may have determined the Governor's decision
to make the announcement via press release.

45 There is a possibility that N-P was chosen by Si Dinitz to be the Director of DYS. Dinitz
convinced the Governor, and the search committee was constructed to validate the process. This was
repeated in two cases, but both were close to Si Dinitz and they decided not to ask Dinitz if it were
ture because they "did not want to know the answer." One of these two informants was on the search
committee, and from what I have been able to gather from other interviews (e.g., the chief of staff,
a consultant working with the process, and the informant's description of the search process, it was
either well screened as an original purpose or it ranks with the best of the conspiracy theories -- it
can be disproved only by asking those directly involved to reveal a socially deviant behavior. The
validity of the response to this type of question would be dubious and would have to serve as the
basis for another probe. So, it is reported, but virtually ignored.
However, as the appointment was announced via press conference. The Governor was at a cabinet retreat one-half hour south of Columbus and could have easily taken an hour or two to make the announcement. One hypothesis is that the Governor did not want to face reporters who would ask about Mullen's parting shots. Mullen had been rather critical of the lack of funding regarding DYS. The governor is an easily identifiable figure to blame for Mullen's charges. To answer these charges would have placed the governor in the unusual spot of having to publicly attack Mullen. This would have been a deviation amplifying loop as Mullen would then be asked about the Governor's charges and there would have been a continuing charge-counter charge. This would not have assisted N-P in changing the problems of the agency. In addition, it would have given the media the fodder for attacking the Governor for poor management. The media could have asked, "If Mullen was ineffective in presenting the budget to the Governor, why didn't the Governor get someone who was more effective?" Thus, the Governor could not answer media questions about Mullen's charges. And that meant that Natalucci-Persichetti's appointment had to be announced via press release.

The Columbus Dispatch reported this information slightly differently than the Plain Dealer story (see table 20).

Natalucci-Persichetti, 42, said Gov. Richard F. Celeste and he have talked about expanding programs for youth offenders in communities.

"He's interested in expanding community services in prevention and after-care, keeping in mind that there are some who need to be locked up," the new director said. He also said he wanted to work more closely with the General Assembly and the juvenile court judges.

Natalucci-Persichetti is Celeste's third youth services director. Mullen was hired in May 1985 to replace James Rogers, who was forced to quit amid allegations of improper hiring and accepting kickbacks. Rogers since has been convicted in federal court and faces additional charges in Franklin and Cuyahoga counties.

Natalucci-Persichetti's appointment is effective Feb 1, but his salary has not been set. He and his wife Toni, have three children, ages 8, 5, and 1 month. They now live on the East Side, but will move to Pickerington in several months. (Lowe, 1987; p. D1).

The Dispatch story repeats most of Plain Dealer story about Natalucci-Persichetti's qualifications. It reports to Natalucci-Persichetti as a graduate of the Ohio State University (OSU) and said that "Natalucci-Persichetti has helped set up residential programs for mentally retarded offenders and for dealing with minority offenders." The story also mentions Mullen's career plans.

Mullen said yesterday he will work for child-care agencies in Cleveland. He said he also has been named by a federal judge to monitor the juvenile system in that state. Mullen said he will stay on until early February to help with the change in leadership. (Lowe, 1987; p. D1).
Mullen's career plans seem unsettled. State employees often read the Columbus as well as Cleveland papers for statewide news coverage; they would have been able to see this double-speak. Mullen had no set job to go to. He may have been successful as Director -- but he was not being rewarded for his past efforts with a better job. He had no job to go to. This helps explain the staff's decidedly mixed reviews of Mullen's tenure at DYS. To the youth counselors, he said the right things. They focused on his background as a youth advocate.

He was seen favorably because of his philosophy toward program goals. He stated the correct things about child care and rehabilitation and raised hell about the conditions at the institutions. His commitment was not suspect. He was a philosopher and a social worker. (DYS_ALL: 2611-2619).

But he wasn't an administrator. Many of the staff seemed to feel that he had come in after such a terrible situation -- and had put their hope in him -- and he had let them down when he resigned.

All the social workers felt so great when he was appointed, about what he said about the programs and the treatment philosophy, that when he left, they felt abandoned. (DYS_ALL: 2868-2872).

Mullen did not meet with reporters to discuss his resignation. Instead, his spouse, Julie, responded to newspaper reporters. The message was that his family had remained in Cleveland and that living apart had been difficult.

It's just a case of wanting to spend more time at home," she said yesterday. It's been a very difficult two years." Mrs. Mullen said her husband was talking with people about several different private-sector jobs, but he had noting definite yet. (Columbus Dispatch, 1986; p. 4b).

Brian Usher, spokesman for Governor Celeste (since the governor and Natalucci-Persichetti were at the cabinet retreat), praised Mullen's accomplishments to the Dispatch (p. 4b): "He stepped into a very difficult situation and made some very good moves." Unfortunately, the Dispatch article did not specify the accomplishments. The opportunity to praise Mullen and for the Governor's office to bring agency momentum forward was lost. With this failure, the governor as manager lost the opportunity to legitimate the agenda that Mullen had set (DYS_DOCS: 457-464; 775-794). Now Mullen was a voice in the wilderness -- crying for reform. He was now set against the Governor in the media.
Celeste's Appointment Letter

Governor Celeste selected Natalucci-Persichetti because he knew the system and because he fit the characteristics deemed as necessary by the search committees. Upon arrival, Natalucci-Persichetti knew that he had to accomplish the governor's agenda quickly so that he could get on with his own programmatic agenda. He had to address the history and baggage of the Rogers and Mullen era's, he had some individuals who were not suited for the positions they were in, and some for whom no good position existed. He had to address the broad mission -- there were nine missions in the legislative enactments and staff were following the enactment of the day. They had been told what to do the accomplish the new mandate, but they had not been told what not to do when a legislative mandate had been replaced. Finally, he had no constituent base and had to begin to develop one.

To accomplish this task, he had the problem of stabilizing the department while introducing a systemic change, all the while working with the existing employees. This amounts to "speed walking." He had to have the appearance of moving slowly, but deliberately to show that he was moving, but to cover a considerable distance. Natalucci-Persichetti could move employees around, but could not fire anyone. this was required by the Governor who believed that the agency had undergone enough turmoil under Rogers and Mullen regarding personnel actions (promotions, hiring and firings) that Natalucci-Persichetti should not replace people.

Natalucci-Persichetti was also instructed not to bring anyone in from DR&C. Other than the personnel cuts made through the compromise budget, Natalucci-Persichetti did not replace anyone. During that first year, he only brought in a Public Information Officer (a PIO, discussed later) and a legislative liaison. When the Governor's Chief of Staff requested a fiscal officer for the OBES (see chapter IV), Natalucci-Persichetti volunteered his Deputy Director. Sheehan was replaced by Don Elder from DR&C. Other appointments to positions directly reporting to the director have been individuals from DR&C. The positions reporting directly to the Director have been replaced through attrition.46

Management Retreat

In DYS, there was a strong memory of Rogers' management retreat. It too was held in the first few days of Rogers tenure -- and as Rogers requested everyone's resignation and then rehired individuals just to show them that he had the authority and that he was the boss, many members were skeptical of

46 Many of these individuals were displaced through the appointment of George Wilson as Director of DR&C after Rick Syder was recalled from his leave from the Federal Bureau of Corrections. Wilson had been Director of the correctional agency in Kentucky, and he brought his team in with him. This displaced many individuals -- and N-P hired these people as DYS staff left.
Natalucci-Persichetti’s intentions. There had been no management retreats during Mullen’s tenure -- so this was the first time the managing officers had been together since Rogers’ fateful meeting -- there was considerable trepidation. Natalucci-Persichetti’s purpose was to get to know the staff, to let them know what he intended to accomplish, and how he was going to go about it -- in an efficient manner. The concern staff members had may have inhibited them from fully participating, though evidence on that point is unclear. We still do not have evidence on the value of management retreats for someone assuming a new set of management responsibilities. However, Natalucci-Persichetti’s ultimate purpose for the retreat was to test a suspicion that he had regarding the agency’s personnel that they were adrift on a mission. What the retreat did was allow him to uncover who was allied with his position and who was not. In addition, he was able to determine how people interacted, generally and with specific other managing officers.

The author considered the possibility that Natalucci-Persichetti had obtained a perspective on the agency personnel from meetings and discussions with his predecessor (Mullen) and with his principal deputy (Merilee Chinnici-Zuercher). Natalucci-Persichetti demonstrates an ability to hear information, but to discount it pending empirical evidence. While it may seem trivial, it appears that a newly appointed executive must get information on subordinates and key informants in some manner and that a retreat philosophy may be adequate in some instances to accomplish this task.

Working with a Subordinate Who Applied for the Position

Geno Natalucci-Persichetti had to demonstrate that he knew what the issues were and to make a space for Chinnici-Zuercher, a space that she and her peers saw as legitimate. Natalucci-Persichetti was advantaged in that he had an ongoing professional relationship with Merilee Chinnici-Zuercher. He didn’t have to do much to show her that he was in charge and to get her attention. What Natalucci-Persichetti had to face was that he was providing a different focus and different strategy for the agency than what many of the staff would espouse. Many members inside the organization favored the appointment of Merilee Chinnici-Zuercher while others such as Mullen favored Stipanik. Natalucci-Persichetti knew the system very well, partly as a result of being from DR&C. He understood that since Merilee Chinnici-Zuercher was his second in command and since she was a strong candidate for his position, he had to demonstrate his substantive competence very quickly, and that he had to bring Merilee Chinnici-Zuercher onto his programs very quickly because she had the support of the insiders. They wanted to go for a
known entity. Lukensmeyer detailed who the subgroups were within the agency supporting Chinnici-Zuercher, so that Natalucci-Persichetti could individually pay attention to and communicate with them.

The potential effects of having to deal with a dissatisfied subordinate were mitigated by the personal and professional friendship they had and continued to enjoy. They shared the same treatment philosophy and, as Natalucci-Persichetti defined his role to work external to the agency and Chinnici-Zuercher's role to work inside the agency, there were few (if any) disagreements between the two.

**Personnel Changes**

In May, Geno hired a legislative liaison, Hearcel Craig. Craig's first assignment was to outplace seven individuals whose positions were to be cut as a result of the budget cuts stemming from Natalucci-Persichetti’s initial meeting with Judge Radcliffe. After completing this task, Craig was to get to the general assembly to develop legislative relations for the agency. Prior to Craig's arrival, DYS exhibited a benign neglect toward the General Assembly. As Natalucci-Persichetti phrased it, "They just assumed that the legislature should be helpful, whatever, or you don't get over there (NP_12_19: 658-661). Given the lack of a working relationship between DYS and the General Assembly (or the governor's office for that matter), it is not remarkable that neither Mullen nor Rogers did not have a legislative liaison.

In the summer of 1987, Natalucci-Persichetti constructed the reality that his public affairs efforts were lacking. He had inherited a public affairs director who, he had been told, was connected to the Celeste's. In fact, she was a personal friend of Dagmar Celeste.

I said "Oh? Ok. So what?" And, frankly, you know, I gave everybody a shot, an even shot: Ok, here’s what I want, I want you to produce, do what you can, I’ll measure you on your production. And this person had both physical and personal problems and just seemed to be unable, unable to perform. Um, and so I got to the point where I just called the Governor’s Office and I said, "Look, I don’t know what her connection is to you, but I can’t st-, I can’t keep her. She’s just totally not productive, not doing the work that I need. So they said, "Well, that’s no problem. So I gave her uh, you know thirty days to find another job, I mean. And Uh, I got a call, and I, I basically said I’m gonna have to look for a public information person, public affairs director.

47 Note how this differs from traditional thinking. Traditionally, a "known entity" would be desired from insiders. Outsiders would want an outsider. However, with Mullen being an outsider and not working out at all, an insider was desired. The key factor in this case may not have been the relevant organizational knowledge, but the demise of the predecessor.
Deb Phillips from the Governor's office called Natalucci-Persichetti and asked him if he was still looking for a PIO and if he was still taking applications, she had someone he should talk to. With this episode, Carol Rapp Zimmerman entered DYS. This changed the strategy of the agency with respect to developing constituent relations.

Natalucci-Persichetti may not have realized the impact this move produced on his senior management staff. They viewed him as someone who could cut through the crap in the governor's office and get results in the personnel areas. This is in direct contrast to the Rogers era where patronage appointments were made and "blamed" on the governor. The staff had a rather negative image of the Governor's office, especially with respect to personnel functions.

In these interviews, Natalucci-Persichetti stated that he needed to get the institutional side in order. Further, those personnel moves that have been made have been to move a good Regional Administrator to an Institution, and to move the institutional Supt. to be a Regional Administrator or to central office. In this manner, staff have assumed that the Aftercare Division has been the half-sister or step-child to the institutions. From an analytical standpoint, the succession literature posits that most individuals concentrate on their area of expertise and with Natalucci-Persichetti, this would have been the community corrections or, in DYS, the Aftercare Division. We posit that Natalucci-Persichetti's area of expertise was in external relations and the area of DYS that was most visible were the institutions. So, in this case, Natalucci-Persichetti did expend his time in the area where he was most familiar -- it is not the most obvious.

There were two components to the strategy: The first was to train the existing personnel; the second was to create a mission statement for the personnel who had been with the agency. A third component of this strategy was to get the media to get the Rogers era behind him. He needed to show that he could "Get something done."

Building a Constituency

The first effort to build a constituency was to build internal commitment to a strategy. As reported earlier, staff members may have been frightened by their earlier experiences and visceral learnings from the Rogers retreat. Natalucci-Persichetti's intention was to develop a mission statement for the Department. From this retreat, Natalucci-Persichetti would involve staff, important stakeholders, and managing officers in developing a mission statement that would replace the nine legislative missions. In retrospect, it appears that staff reaction to Mullen's efforts to ensure their participation was to view the mission work as rather hollow. They then reacted to the process by denying its legitimacy. The charges were that the results were pre-ordained. While many informants have denied this, there is the distinct possibility that
information was presented in such a manner that the results were rather pre-determined. She who controls the premises controls the decisions rendered.\footnote{In defense of N-P, the author is not a corrections professional and I reached the same result as N-P, Mullen, and the other candidates.} Staff resistance to the DYS mission appears to be the result of previous experiences with similar process techniques, a remembrance for the familiar treatment modality -- strongly linked to their identity as social workers and not correctional workers, and to the nature of the work which attracts and fosters iconoclastic behavior (Huff, \textit{et al.}, 1990).

Geno’s strategy was to go to editorial boards and try to convince them that he was in charge and that the continued references to Rogers were counter productive to his efforts and to introducing change in the system.

I really felt that as I went around talking to the different editorial boards uh, one of the things I did was try to shake the Rogers veil for seven or eight months. Again, every time an article came out about DYS, Rogers name or picture was a part of it. So I went around telling the editorial boards, “Look, we have staff that have felt the weight of Rogers for the last three years, he’s not even here and hasn’t been for two. And that if there’s an opportunity to kick somebody’s ass, it will be mine if you need to. So at the appropriate time, take my butt, but don’t include Rogers’ name in it or anything about him, because you’re affecting the operation, you’re affecting the very people feel.” (NP\_5\_21: 737-757).

The spin was to change the perception of the youth in the system from troubled kids who need some love and attention to one of dealing with them as juvenile offenders who pose safety and security problems for society and who are in need of some assistance themselves in order to prevent them from assuming a life of crime.
Table 20
Director's Profile of Youths Committed to Custody of DYS in 1987

- 20% of the youth committed to DYS have committed a crime against another person. Most are property offenders.
- Over half are felony 4 offenders.
- Between 70 and 80% of these kids have alcoholic or drug abusing parents
- About 2/3 have substance abuse problems of their own.

Their view of "normal" is escaping through drugs.

- At least one out of three have been sexually, physically or emotionally abused. (males = 30.8\% females = 56.3\%, just measuring physical abuse)
- About one out of every ten (11.3\%) already have a brother or sister in DYS.
- Over one-half (54.4\%) come from homes where mom or dad have a history of violence ... or a criminal record.

Their view of "normal" involves violence.

- An overwhelming majority are failing in school.... failing miserable. Only about 3\%....three out of one hundred...graduation age DYS kids are "on track" educationally with enough credits to graduate. 66\% of these kids have 5 credit hours or less!!
- Most (62\%) come from poverty.

Their view of "normal" means being unemployed...and unemployable.

- About 20\% of the DYS population are borderline I.Q. or mildly mentally retarded.
- About one out of 5 have parents with a history of mental health problems.
- And over one third (35\%) of all DYS youth currently need mental health care.

For these young men and women "normal" may mean oppressive depression, acting out, or methodically slicing cuts into their own flesh.

Source: Speech entitled "Practical Optimism" (1987; pp. 2-4)

Natalucci-Persichetti met with editorial boards to try to shake the Rogers' legacy. Natalucci-Persichetti believed that every story regarding DYS repeated the Rogers story and this reduced his ability to create change within the agency and impeded the ability of individuals to work to their best ability. In the following, are the portions of the newspaper articles from the Plain Dealer and the Dispatch regarding Mullen's parting shots and Natalucci-Persichetti's appointment from January 23, 1987 to February 1, 1987.

* Rogers was forced to resign after allegations of shakedowns of state contractors and improper hirings. He was convicted in federal court in October and faces many state charges in Franklin and Cuyahoga counties (Columbus Dispatch November 15, 1986; p. 4b)

* Mullen was hired in May 1985 to replace James Rogers, who was forced to quit amid allegations of improper hirings and accepting kickbacks. Rogers since has been convicted in federal court and faces additional charges in Franklin and Cuyahoga counties (Lowe, 1987; p.)
* He takes over a department recovering from problems, capped by the April 1985 resignation of Director James E. Rogers. Rogers was later convicted on federal kickback charges and indicted on charges related to alleged theft schemes at the department and at the East Cleveland public library. (Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 23, 1987)

* During his two year stewardship, Rogers quickly sank morale in the department by using patronage to hire unqualified people and steering contracts to cronies, Mullen and others said in interviews. . . . Rogers resigned in April 1985 after the Plain Dealer revealed that he had personally hired felons linked to an illegal Youngstown prescription mill. Many of them rarely showed up for work. Rogers later was found guilty in federal court of taking $11,500 in bribes from three contractors to whom he awarded state contracts. (Neff, 1987; p. 1a+)

The volume of these reports may mislead the reader.⁴⁹ The articles from which these snippets were taken have a combined 54.5 columnar inches. The amount devoted to Rogers amounts to 6.5 columnar inches. With over 10 percent of the space devoted to a director who had resigned over a year previously, this could produce some discomfort to the newly appointed director. However, Natalucci-Persichetti did not frame the case as such. He claimed the employees were disaffected. One would have to argue that employees were feeling disaffected by the scandals reported in the papers.

Media Strategy.

In attempting to build a constituency, DYS originally focused on social service agencies. Natalucci-Persichetti and his managing officers met with a variety of social services agencies, groups, and gatherings. However, DYS found social service agencies to be getting more single-focused in the values they publicly espouse. They were attempting to get individuals interested in their cause (safe, secure housing of violent juvenile offenders) because it was the "right thing to do." As one staff member put it, "Altruism is nice, but we [DYS] had to focus on how the issue would impact it and its stakeholders."

DYS began to broaden its messages to the broader public and to focus its message on those with vested interests. The strategy was to show the connections between areas of the system. No one can really argue with a leader's vision. No one will argue that what you want done is what should be done. But you have to show how your needs connect to the needs that they have -- showing how they fit in the network.

---

⁴⁹ When reviewing newspaper articles for this study, the investigator was struck by the propensity of the articles that mentioned DYS as being the agency once headed by Rogers, even though Rogers had resigned nearly two years previous to N-P's appointment, been convicted one year prior, and was serving a sentence for crimes committed prior to his arrival at DYS, and was about to begin serving the sentence for his criminal activity at DYS.
What made Natalucci-Persichetti’s strategy a possibility was his fortune to have a media person be referred to him by the Governor’s public information officer. She has become indispensable to Natalucci-Persichetti in involving the media with the strategic efforts of Natalucci-Persichetti. The strategy works as follows: the media is used to bring attention to the unplanned events (e.g., escapes or as they have been called, "unilateral attempts to decrease overcrowding") as well as to staged events.

Natalucci-Persichetti’s mission work (efforts to define the mission for the agency) provided additional political leverage to members of the General Assembly. By providing a mission statement that spoke of a safe and secure environment for incarcerating convicted juvenile felons, members of the general assembly could communicate that they were making the world safe for their members when they voted to expend large amounts of money. In the following, taken from the Speaker’s column to his constituents, we see that the mission statement is repeated in its essential elements while the speaker also gives a rationale for approving these funds.

The Department’s mission is to provide a secure setting for incarceration that guarantees public safety while also providing a safe, humane, and industrious atmosphere for rehabilitation of these youth. The current state of the facilities used by the department makes these seemingly modest goals impossible to reach. (Riffe, 1988).

These few words were given to Vernal Riffe, Speaker of the House of the Ohio General Assembly is given the ammunition to communicate the DYS mission and the rationale for the capital campaign.50

After getting "bloodied" from his first encounter with Judge Radcliffe and as a result of his negotiations with Speaker Riffe, Natalucci-Persichetti attempted to directly address the juvenile judges.

---

50 Unfortunately, the implications of DYS building a case for the expenditure of funds for capital projects may allow the legislators and the citizenry to think that they have solved the problem with the building and repair of facilities. There may be no conceptual space for community-based corrections.
New youth services director plans regional meetings on juvenile justice

Ohio's new director of youth services, Geno Natalucci-Persichetti, will be hearing from the State's Juvenile Court judges about what they think is right or wrong with the juvenile justice system. He will meet in Columbus tomorrow with a group of judges who will help plan a series of eight regional meetings around the state in which still more judges will participate.

The result could be a legislative program designed to improve youth correctional programs, which have been criticized by some judges in terms of placement, the availability of treatment programs and opportunities that exist after the youngster's release.

House Speaker Vernal G. Riffe, Jr. D-89 of New Boston, says major problems such as drug and chemical abuse have underscored the need for strengthening the juvenile justice system.

The speaker said the effort was a priority matter for this year's legislative session, and that he wanted to hear from judges.

Judge Gerald Radcliffe of the Ross County Juvenile Court, spokesman for the Ohio Juvenile Court Judges Association is helping Natalucci-Persichetti arrange the seminars.

Radcliffe said the sessions were aimed at closer ties and cooperation between the department and those who administered Ohio's laws from the bench.

Radcliffe said the meetings would help determine which present policies were working so that the state "can move forward and strengthen the positive things in the juvenile justice system." At the same time, officials may have to go back to the drawing board on others, he indicated.

Natalucci-Persichetti recently took the reins of the department from Thomas Mullen, a respected career officer who stepped down after complaining to legislative committees over the lack of funding for the agency.

Gov. Richard F. Celeste's budget for the 1987-89 biennium, which begins July 1, provides for an annual increase of about 5% a year, although the document contains a much larger increase for an expanding corrections program.

Natalucci-Persichetti said the department and the judges will "work as a team to see that the particular youth population we all serve receives the best possible care and has the best chance to return to their communities to be responsible citizens."

Radcliffe said the regional meetings would be announced soon. "We do not intend to wait, and we do not expect this to be a long process," he said.

Source: Plain Dealer (AP story). 2/27/87; p. 10B

Natalucci-Persichetti also used his meetings with the editorial boards to plant the idea that there was a considerable pot of funds that were being used in a manner that was not scientific. Note his inclusive language ("We, being both the department and the judges") to draw public and legislative attention to the problem, as he saw it. The evidence also points out that the judges (or at least Radcliffe) views the relationship of the juvenile judges to DYS with the phrase: "Radcliffe said the sessions were aimed at closer ties and cooperation between the department and those who administered Ohio's laws from the bench." (from above table). The implication is that the judges view themselves as administering the system of juvenile justice -- not DYS.
Table 22
Article Entitled "Closer watch put on juvenile money".

County courts are spending $19.1 million in state grants this year on programs to reduce juvenile delinquency. There is little supervision of the programs, and Geno Natalucci-Persichetti, director of the Ohio Department of Youth Services, wants to change that. He has enlisted a task force of judges to help him. "We haven't done anything, we being both the department and the judges, to look systematically at these programs," he said. He intends to refuse approval of programs he determines are wasteful.

The county programs are supported by state subsidies called 440 grants. The name uses the number of the bill that created the law in 1982. Each county is eligible for a minimum of $50,000 a year plus additional money based on factors such as population and caseload.

Franklin County, for example, is receiving $1.5 million to support five programs -- community services, branch probation offices, drug addiction treatment, prevention education and counseling.

Natalucci-Persichetti, who took over the department earlier this year, said he has not reviewed individual programs but is certain some work better than others. He said judges can profit from the give and take of eight regional task force meetings scheduled throughout the state in May and June....

Source: Bradshaw (1987; p. 10b).

Natalucci-Persichetti's effectiveness with his media strategy is demonstrated with the following editorial, published in the Columbus Dispatch. In combination with the previous article (previous table), Natalucci-Persichetti has introduced evaluation as a basis for determining the proper allocation of resources. This represents an overt attempt to make DYS apolitical -- in line with good corrections.51

Earlier this year, when J. Thomas Mullen was leaving as director of the Ohio Department of Youth Services, he complained that Ohio does little more than run warehouses for young offenders, who eventually commit another crime and wind up in the adult system. There are those who criticize Gov. Richard Celeste for not asking for enough money for some juvenile programs. As we commented several months ago, though, the problem of juvenile reform in Ohio will not be solved by throwing more money at it. Indeed, Ohio taxpayers can rightly demand to know what is being done with the millions of dollars already spend for juvenile programs. And they can rightly refuse to allow more money to be allocated for these programs until the evidence is clear that available resources are being used efficiently and effectively. The evidence, thus far, is lacking. The most critical need in juvenile reformatories is for more space, educational programs and counseling. The resources that now exist should be concentrated in those areas. (Editorial, Columbus Dispatch, April 20, 1987).

However, when Natalucci-Persichetti began to implement many of the changes that he recommended to the search committee and the Governor and that Mullen had recommended (e.g., institutionalizing

51 The reader is invited to note the similarity between Natalucci-Persichetti's efforts to make decision making more scientific as a traditional example of the politics-administration dichotomy.
only the violent offenders, providing aftercare services involving counseling and, more importantly behavioral changes for the violent and unruly, and limited monitoring for those adjudicated for lesser offenses), middle management did not tell the aftercare staff what they were to stop doing in addition to the new paperwork. When Natalucci-Persichetti initiated performance checks on paperwork and initiated personnel actions for not completing paperwork in a timely manner, the paperwork became the origin of an additional morale problem. The paperwork became something to be endured and the work product. Thus, the efforts to change the organization out of an extremely bureaucratic focus had the effect of increasing the bureaucratization of the agency.

Using One Stakeholder to Influence Another.

DYS media strategy after Rapp's arrival was to be honest with the media. In interviewing Rapp, Natalucci-Persichetti said, "I cannot do what I need to do to convince others that we are in terrible shape. We're in the dark." He continued, "I'm desperate to get people to look at the place and we have a long history of not letting people look at the place and of not telling the truth. It is demoralizing the staff, it has offended the media, and it has made the public blind to our problems." (DYS_ALL: 307-326).

They tried to use the bad news to work for them. This is clearly evidenced by the efforts to get the capital bill (1988) passed. Their strategy was to get the members of the general assembly so offended with the condition of DYS facilities that they (the General Assembly) would appropriate the funds for the capital campaign. (DYS_ALL: 360-362).
Table 23
Press Release Entitled "You Won't Like It"

September 14, 1987

JUVENILE OFFENDERS
WILL BE REHABILITATE OR MERELY WAREHOUSE THEM?

You won't like it. We can tell you right now, if you join us for a tour of the Buckeye Youth Center on September 21, at 1:00 p.m., you'll see first hand some of our problems: overcrowding, problems with the buildings, the lack of vocational and rehabilitation programs.

FOR EXAMPLE:
- on average, DYS facilities were 142% over ideal capacity in 1986
- from 1982 to 1986 admissions to DYS rose 23 %
- funding hasn't kept pace.

If you tour with us, you'll have questions. So do we.

We at the Department of Youth Services are looking for answers. That's why we put together the DYS POLICY ADVISORY GROUP.

These skilled sociologists, researchers, administrators, legislators, judges, and corrections specialists will be meeting on the 21st and throughout the year to formulate a plan to help relieve our overcrowding problems in our juvenile facilities and support community-based efforts to divert potential offenders or to rehabilitate those juveniles who have already run into trouble with the law.

On the following page you will find just a brief outline of some of the issues this group will tackle, and a listing of the group members.

These members will be available to tour with you and discuss issues and goals. We invite you to follow our progress through the year.

One component of this effort was to make the bad news (e.g., escapes) work for the benefit of the agency's other efforts. The idea was to focus the attention of the media on a problem, to tell the media what the solution was, and then to direct their action toward those who could enact that solution.

The sad part of the reality of politics is that it is hard to get change if you don't show how bad life is ... and you can't get others to show you how bad things are. It is much easier to get change when a problems exists. (DYS_ALL: 341-347).

The following paragraphs will describe the strategy of the capital campaign and the thinking behind Natalucci-Persichetti's administrative efforts to support that capital bill.
The public information strategy changed with the hiring of Rapp-Zimmerman. The first press release was entitled "You won't like it!" (see table 23). The plan was to tour a facility [Buckeye Correctional Institution in Columbus], ask legislators and members of the media to come along with the policy advisory group (PAG), and to guarantee, from the outset that they wouldn't like it. The strategy was to offend the members of the general assembly so they would fund the department's capital bill.

Senator Bowen pulled a fire alarm and nothing happened. In another room, we went to find the fire alarm and we couldn't find it. The room was dark and they had painted the alarm the same color as the wall. You should have seen a group of adults feeling the wall to find a fire alarm. The media loved it, they had never been to a place like that (DYS_ALL: 365-372).

They had never been inside an institution like that. They were told that they could talk to any youth so long as they masked the youth's identity and they could talk to them out of earshot of DYS personnel. But it has to be off the record or DYS would have to contact the youth's parents and get permission. Both legislators and media sat in classes.

However, many staff were offended. They were upset that DYS would initiate such a bevy of activity -- "... telling them [media and legislators] what a terrible building we had instead of telling them what a great educational program we have." (DYS_ALL: 386-389). The contrast was clearly marked -- previously they had been urged to say nothing. It appears that lower-level staff had not been told what the "company line" was so that they could tell the "visitors" the same story -- a story that had larger benefits for DYS. Following is one example of how "bad news" was used to inform the media and to give a message that had greater benefits for DYS.

Every time we had an escape that was related to the physical plant we would describe the escape and then link the escape to the need for physical plants. At Buckeye, the kids would wait beside the Frito Lay truck would [sic] be leaving. And when the gate opened, they would run alongside the truck outside the walls. The gate was one of those old electric slowly moving gates that would open and then slowly close. (DYS_ALL: 400-411)

Every time the media would call, we would say, the youth is a x year old y county male who is in for z offense. This only points out the need for an appropriate physical plant. We sympathize with the neighborhood. The legislature is becoming educated about the problem. They are beginning to deal with a capital bill that will solve some of these problems. You might call your legislator to see what she/he thinks about the capital bill. (DYS_ALL: 413-424)
They invited media out to show them the window and show them why the problem was as it was. The micro-strategy was to use an event in time to define a problem and give a solution -- especially when the solution worked to serve a greater goal for the agency. (DYS_ALL: 432-435).

DYS would stage media events like the one at Buckeye [described above]. DYS would stage a series of meetings between a judge to show that he cares about the kids she/he sentences to a DYS institution. DYS would also invite the County Sheriff and the members of the media to come to the institution to visit and see what goes on behind those walls.

The task is to get the media interested in a DYS issue -- overcrowding and inappropriate sentencing. DYS has to sell a variety of messages -- there is a problem, the judge is not responsible, until she/he knows and understands, he cannot do his job (DYS_ALL: 490-497).

The media does not make the next step -- that the judge is now responsible for the youth they commit to the Director of DYS. The judge ought to be looking for other alternatives. Natalucci-Persichetti believes that the judge, the Sheriff, and the media should go to the General Assembly and get funds for community alternatives.

The value of this strategy was that they defined the problem, offered a remedy, and gave reporters a new angle to cover stories of this nature -- to get these stories out of the crime news and into the remainder of the news. This benefitted the reporter and DYS. This is the use of unstructured events -- described by the [then] public information officer the fortitudious use of bad news. "You knew the media was going to call. You might as well use the time to get a message out. And not just any message but one that will help you in other endeavors (DYS_ALL: 535-542).

Natalucci-Persichetti used the first press release ("You won't like it.") to showcase his policy advisory group (PAG). The PAG was chaired by the chairman of Worthington Steel (a major corporation headquartered in Columbus), and consisted of other private-sector representatives, sociologists, and criminal justice experts. Natalucci-Persichetti's strategy was to legitimate his strategic assessment and the recommendations concerning treatment modalities and new institution size (60 to 80 beds) for DYS. The PAG's legitimacy derives from its membership -- the General Assembly would look to the private sector involvement and recognition of need for change. While Natalucci-Persichetti voices the words "private sector," he is referring to the use of experts and academic consultants -- a tactic for which he drew praise from the Governor's office.
The perspective that the treatment modality of DYS should have a correctional basis has not been fully accepted at lower levels in the organization. As a component of the corrections philosophy, Natalucci-Persichetti refers to aftercare as "parole." This is symbolic to many DYS employees, who do not want to be dealing with the adult population. They are in line with the *parens parenti*. To view themselves as correctional workers is antithetical to their self-concept. They are youth workers or counselors or social workers -- not prison guards or parole officers. These words serve as verbal symbols to the employees and serve as a rallying cry about which they can oppose the director and change.

Before getting too far off of the point, it is necessary to say a word for Natalucci-Persichetti's philosophy. Natalucci-Persichetti maintains that those who "want to work with kids" are not sure how to operationalize that construct. By contrast, he thinks his efforts to develop a mission have centered the thinking around that mission. Unfortunately, there are those who believe the end result of the efforts to develop a mission statement was pre-ordained. In this sense, the premise of a structured process was not to gather input and construct what the employees thought the problems were so that Natalucci-Persichetti could develop a mission statement "just like that in DR&C."

**Outsider-Origin of Director**

While it was not initially important, the origin of the Director has become an issue for many of the lower-level staff. While there may have been some trepidation about who the new Director was to be, it did not appear to be great. The re-thinking of the new director came after Natalucci-Persichetti's mission work. He was proposing a treatment modality that was considerably different than the modality they were used to. Natalucci-Persichetti had discovered the features of a partial philosophy during the managing officer retreat, his first two days in office. Now, he discovered it was more wide-spread throughout the agency. As Natalucci-Persichetti describes it:

> And I spent some time walking the agency as far as the institutions and field service, and that was uh, somewhat of a shocker. I found we, we weren't doing basic uh, kinds of things. I think a shocker, the biggest shocker to me was when I walked into TCY and saw, or Buckeye [correctional institutions] and saw three piles of clothes one day, and they had three lines of kids lined up, one with underwear, one with t-shirts, and one with jeans and I asked what the hell was going on and they said, "this is how we issue their clothes." They just dumped clothes on the the floor and kids just fought for them. That was insane. It was totally insane. I said they don't do

---

52 There was a flow of individuals who "auditioned" for the Director to get themselves into his "favor." While N-P claimed to meet a few of them "... just to see what they had to say," he claims not to have been influenced by them. There is considerable evidence to the contrary.
this in Goddamn prison or county jail. I mean there is, there is a civil way of, uh, but but what I found and what's still unfortunately part of the problem was, the place pretty much run on its own, a lot of the institutions were running on its own. ... It is a very, how do I say this, inappropriate subculture that seemed to be running these places. First of all they were unskilled, in many cases uniliterate people, illiterate people who moved by force and threat and didn't give a crap about um, human dignity.

Natalucci-Persichetti also held the entire agency as responsible for they as well as the facilities they were operating in were in such poor shape that individual would adapt to the environmental conditions. In addition, the directors had done little about providing appropriate facilities or providing training to the staff. In Natalucci-Persichetti's mind, the people didn't know anything about corrections or about management.

And, in Natalucci-Persichetti mind, DYS was corrections, and corrections was corrections. This may have been juvenile corrections, but it is still corrections.

In a corrections environment, it doesn't make any difference if it's youth or adult, you still have some basic mandates, none of those were being addressed or met. And frankly, people were hiding behind a, a shield of, "Well, we're a juvenile correctional agency." And I'll still say this, people in the adult system get treated a hell of a lot better than they do in our system. Unfortunately, until we address that and reverse that, this is, this is going to be an inappropriate agency. (NP12_12: 890-904).

Natalucci-Persichetti attempted to reconcile these opposing views in his public pronouncements. Excerpts from one of these generic and multi-purpose speeches is provided in table 28.
Table 24
Natalucci-Persichetti's Recognition of Opposing Philosophies

PRACTICAL OPTIMISM

Have you ever been at a cocktail party and stood between two people who were arguing what appears to be two extreme points of an issue ... but you thought to yourself, "You know, each of them really makes a good point. Both, are in some measure correct."

Chances are, depending on the heat of the discussion, if you try to point this out to the parties involved you will end up dodging (at the very least) verbal blows from both sides.

During this past year we at youth services have often felt like the "person in the middle." One ear has been filled with the concerns of truly outraged victims of crime...law enforcement officers...prosecutors...and some lawmakers...who cry out for justice...and for public safety. Their outrage is generally translated into pleas for tougher laws, longer sentences, earlier bind-over and more institutions.

The other ear has heard the laments of the child advocates, the parents, community groups, and some other lawmakers who worry that we are locking up too many of our children already ... that we need to re-think our laws and our sentencing procedures. They plead that we must tear down our institutions and find a way to integrate [sic] these juvenile offenders into their communities. . . .

Source: Practical Optimism, 1987; page 1.

Evaluation of Natalucci-Persichetti by the Governor's Office

The governor liked many of Natalucci-Persichetti's personal characteristics and attributes: his substantive knowledge of the issues facing the agency, his openness and willingness to listen to what others were able to gather about people in his agency. Specifically, Natalucci-Persichetti developed the ability to discern who needed to be brought along and in what way.53

Geno Natalucci-Persichetti learned early on (through his budget battle) how important the juvenile and family court judges are to the department and how powerful they are. On Friday, his

53 Lukensmeyer mentioned this (later) as being a major determinant or factor leading to the development of trust with a cabinet member. In this context, she mentioned that he listened to Carla's and her (Lukensmeyer's) information and was smart enough to make his own decisions. A counter proposition would be to argue that Natalucci-Persichetti was so head strong and so devoted to his own ego that he was going to make up his own mind irrespective of what anybody else told him. As the author narrowed the consideration from these polar extremes, and the ethnicity of the director is accounted as an explanatory factor, we could argue that Natalucci-Persichetti doesn't accept direction or suggestions from women. This can be ruled out as he (N-P) has surrounded himself with women in important and significant roles (administrative assistant, PIO, legal counsel, 1st deputy, etc.). The more obvious aspect is that Geno has a clear role definition for what a director should do, and he is living that role expectation. That role expectation is that the Director should make decisions that are good policy -- and the Governor will benefit as will the citizens.
first week on the job, Natalucci-Persichetti met with Judge Radcliffe on Friday evening. The outcome of the meeting was that Radcliffe arranged for six million dollars to be cut from the DYS budget and for a portion of those funds to be transferred to the juvenile courts. The first of these was when Riffe took the "community corrections" funds out of the budget bill (all other department's language were left in). Riffe did allow the department to pass some "very watered down language" to the administrative rules. Geno would have lost the funding bill in its entirety without the intercession of the Governor's office. Riffe was angered. In addition to Riffe's belief that Natalucci-Persichetti had slandered him by speaking out on how Riffe made deals, Natalucci-Persichetti deserted the administration and the party to go to the Republican-controlled senate to try to get funding for his subsidy bill. The key to this story is that Natalucci-Persichetti is not always able to know when to be candid. And in this instance, Natalucci-Persichetti needed the assistance of the Governor to get his policy initiative past the speaker's personal objections to Natalucci-Persichetti's actions.

Natalucci-Persichetti had a "savvyness" about how much he had to change the image of the agency in the general assembly -- that he had to work with Jane Campbell and Ross Boggs, even though he could have done the work of their task force in half the time, with three times more finesse. In essence, he knew that their task force would be doubling the efforts of his policy advisory group (PAG). So what Natalucci-Persichetti did was to prepare testimony for the PAG and for the legislative committee to use to reach the solution that Natalucci-Persichetti had in mind. The purpose of the PAG and for his efforts with the legislative oversight committee was to legitimate his perception of the policy perspectives and policy solutions. Natalucci-Persichetti's idea was to have "private-sector" individuals serve as the legitimation, not merely "experts" in the criminal-justice or corrections field give the policy alternatives.\textsuperscript{54}

Geno Natalucci-Persichetti also had an understanding that agency was a disaster from a management point of view. There was no managerial [administrative] budget system, no personnel system. These were things he gave to Merilee Chinnici-Zuercher to manage. This was not Chinnici-Zuercher's charge, even though she appears to have this formal responsibility, and not George Sheehan or Don Elder, the successive Deputy Directors for Administrative Services.

\textsuperscript{54} In this manner, we can see how little respect N-P had for public service. In two interviews, N-P displays his "superiority" in not being, and having never been a part of the career service. However, he catches himself to say that he has had career- and civil-service positions (NP_12_12: 536-572; NP_12_19: 745-784). His belief is captured in the remark regarding the value of the private sector, "When you work hard, people will notice." In this respect, we see that N-P is more ambivalent about the public-private differences than in the overt value of the private sector -- though those are the words he uses.
Geno has a reputation for taking good risks with delegation -- picking good people and using delegation as a way to bring people onto his team. In addition, there is tremendous congruity between what Natalucci-Persichetti says his beliefs are and what his actions were -- his actions were believable to his "twice used" troops. Contrary to the previous history of staff members dealing with Rogers and Mullen, Geno Natalucci-Persichetti's statements were consistent with his policy pronouncements. But, is this good management practice? In a sense, Natalucci-Persichetti needs people telling him what he has told them so that he can get a sense that they have internalized his talk. He would be offended if he thought he was surrounded by "yes people" yet that may be exactly what he needs. In an agency filled with "zealots," DYS has to have advocates of positions and Natalucci-Persichetti needs more than himself as a spokesperson. In this sense, he has denied the individuals working for him the opportunity to take charge and internalize the changes Natalucci-Persichetti has made in the General Assembly regarding DYS funding and regard for DYS policies and services. They are no longer a shadow agency, but there is no one within the agency who can take over and command the same respect from external sources regarding the current mission and philosophy. So, should Natalucci-Persichetti leave DYS, and an acting director be appointed, the acting director will not be able to bridge the gap between Natalucci-Persichetti's mission and the new leader's mission. There are no internal contacts between the agency and the Governor's office and the General Assembly. If the search committee is appointed, and there are no individuals who share Natalucci-Persichetti's treatment modality, then the changes are lost to the appointment of the new Director. This opens the possibility that there will be more turmoil during the transition and immediately after. In addition, the new Director will have to act to establish that she or he is "in charge" and make personnel moves or policy changes. The personnel moves will increase the possibility that Natalucci-Persichetti's policy initiatives are more temporary than currently experienced. Now, that is not to say that Natalucci-Persichetti has not been successful or that the agency has not initiated a trajectory that has great benefit for the citizens of Ohio. It is to say that more actions are necessary to move the policy initiatives down into the organization, past the level of the managing officers.

Geno Natalucci-Persichetti had a year to have a plan back in front of the Governor to outline the department's mission and the action strategy that would set the department in that direction. In the eyes of the Governor's office, much of the constituency work had to be done with the judges. Counties were rewarded for sending kids to DYS instead of keeping them at home. It
took two and one-half years. It took one budget longer than they wanted.\textsuperscript{55} Natalucci-Persichetti’s difficulties with the speaker hindered the policy initiative and kept DYS from achieving its objectives in a timely manner.

The governor’s office viewpoint was that, in terms of the planning and staging, DYS was nearly [80 percent] ready to move to community-based services. However, if a new person would be brought in, that figure could be reduced significantly or even lost entirely. Thus, the efforts of Natalucci-Persichetti to move DYS away from the traditional focus of corrections as "locking people up" to one of ensuring the safety and security of citizens while habilitating those juvenile offenders who were amenable to rehabilitation may be dependent on the efforts of the next administration to reappoint Natalucci-Persichetti or to appoint someone who will not change this policy.

The informants in the Governor’s Office believed that Geno might be kept on in a Voinovitch administration. They thought that Natalucci-Persichetti had "worked on" Republican prosecutors and judges to convince them of his plans. He has networked very well. At the time of this writing, Natalucci-Persichetti has been reappointed by newly elected Republican Governor George Voinovitch to be the Director of DYS. At one level of analysis, Natalucci-Persichetti has made the agency apolitical and much more professional. In another sense, he could be said to have switched allegiance -- an allegiance driven by Natalucci-Persichetti’s need to obtain resources to continue his strategy. At still another level, Natalucci-Persichetti has to address the relationship with the juvenile judges. the institutions are still overcrowded (1,900 inmates with a capacity of 1,300) and the judges are still able to commit virtually any youth they deem necessary.

While this may present a bleak future, these criticisms are relative to Natalucci-Persichetti’s successes. Natalucci-Persichetti has increased the professionalism of the staff. Training is now available on a variety of treatment options. Specialists have been hired and programs designed to help staff deal with the most troublesome problems (e.g., drug sales by 11-12 year-olds, sexual abusers, etc.). In addition, Natalucci-Persichetti has begun to reach down into the organization, partly in recognition that he does not have the hearts and minds of all of his staff. Current efforts seem to be headed in that direction. By all appearances, Natalucci-Persichetti is on target for the eight year window that he wanted to have to change the agency. If nothing else, he has virtually

\textsuperscript{55}This involves a story that the Speaker of the House (Vernal Riffe) held a grudge against Geno N-P for speaking out in an inappropriate process about the legislative process.
eliminated criminal activity within the agency -- where it was prevalent from its highest reaches. That alone is a major accomplishment.

In closing, I think it is important to note that Geno Natalucci-Persichetti was nominated by Governor George Voinovitch, and received one of the ten National Governor's Association Public Service Awards.
Rapp wrote the following to describe the functions of DYS. The paragraph was submitted as the introduction to the written presentation of the 1991-92 budget justification.

Company A has all these boxes that need recycling. Some of them just need some tape and some of them need to be reworked and some are damaged beyond repair. We sent them all to a central recycling plant, but we weren't doing such a good job. We give some motivated workers some tape and some scissors and let them work to recycle the boxes. And we can do this locally, and we can do it better. And then we do recycling. If this kinda makes sense to you, this is kinda what we're trying to do with kids. As you read through this budget, think about how to transport these boxes to the central factory and not being able to properly recycle and it will make sense to you. (DYS_ALL: 1042-1063)
Chapter VI
THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND
DR. RONALD FLETCHER

The Ohio Board of Health, created by the Ohio General Assembly in 1886, took on concern for a citizenry completely vulnerable to a range of communicable diseases and hazards lurking in uninspected food and water, unpasteurized milk and inadequate sanitation methods. Tuberculosis was a major killer and polio a killer and crippler. Every child could expect a bout with measles, mumps, chicken pox, whooping cough, influence and, often scarlet fever and diphtheria. There were no public clinics, no public health nurses, no emergency squads.

As years of education and technical progress raised the levels of public and private hygiene and advances in scientific knowledge produced vaccines, antibiotics and other drugs to prevent and knock out disease, the department kept in step with change in its programs and priorities. Its agenda for Governor Celeste's second term is far different but no less challenging than the one for its first year -- programs to combat alcohol, drug abuse, and a new killer called the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), a study of gaps in minority health services; programs to upgrade nursing and rest homes, teach senior citizens about medications and drugs, and control the ever-increasing costs of providing health care.

Today, the Ohio Department of Health employs over 1,000 employees and has an operating budget of over forty-five million dollars. Governor Celeste met with his advisors and cabinet during September through December to Determine the Governor's priorities. These priorities are three-fold, and, in order, are jobs, educational excellence, and a healthy Ohio. In conjunction with this priority, the Ohio Department of Health planned programs and initiatives that accounted for a sixteen percent increase in state general revenue funds during the first year of the biennium and a seventeen percent increase in the second year of the biennium.
The department operates programs to prevent health problems, promotes healthy life-style through education and employee assistance, and promotes the operation of the market for health care services. The department has received national and international recognition for innovative programs to create an equitable system of determining who should receive heart, lung, liver, and pancreas transplants; reduced the state's infant mortality rate; holding down increases in food costs for Women, Infants and Children program and allowing more clients to be served; and for programs that better meet the health needs of minorities, infants, children, and adolescents (Celeste, 1990; Reported in the 1990 Annual Report, p. 2). These fall from the Department's mission statement:

The Ohio Department of Health shall protect and improve the health of all Ohio's citizens by preventing disease, disability and premature death, securing a healthy environment and assuring that health providers meet state and federal requirements. The department shall emphasize health promotion, disease prevention, health education, and provide accountable leadership on universal health concerns while assuring that all Ohio's citizens have access to quality affordable health services. (1990 Annual Report, 1990; p. 1).

Recent History

David L. Jackson, M.D., Ph.D., was appointed by newly appointed Governor Richard F. Celeste to be Director of the Ohio Department of Health on June 1, 1983. Jackson was politically minded and had an agenda to change the concept of public health from one where the Department focused on giving immunizations and inspecting restaurants and the like to one where the Department involved itself in providing health services for crippled children, medicaid recipients, expectant mothers and for children. This shift also changed the traditional stakeholders of the department. For example, the health promotion people and local health departments were feeling stilted because their relative piece of the pie shrunk (HLTH_ALL: 88-101). Jackson was more focused on evaluating Departmental programs and on involving himself with the Governor's agenda of cost containment and community-based services.

Jackson also worked to clean up the Department's reputation with the Legislative Budget Office and with the governor's office of Budget and Management. Prior to Jackson's arrival, Health had the dubious distinction for being the laughing stock of the executive branch because of its chronic unreliability with respect to control of expenditures (HLTH_ALL: 1299-1305).
The Search for a Successor

In January of 1986, Jackson resigned his post to run against incumbent Ohio's 15th District Congressman, Chalmers Wylie. In an announced statement, Celeste released that he had appointed Dr. Thomas Halpin, Chief of the Bureau of Preventative Medicine, where Halpin focused on communicable and chronic diseases, as Jackson's interim replacement. In making the announcement, Celeste's press secretary, Brian Usher, claimed the search was progressing at a rapid pace.

The election does not figure into it at all. This is not a political issue. The search has been initiated and hopefully will be filled before the election. . . . The search is full-blown but we must find a physician that meets our requirements. While the governor would like to fill the post as soon as possible, the search will be conducted in a relaxed manner (Lilly, 1986; p. 10).

In commenting on the appointment, Brent Mulrew, managing director of the Ohio State Medical Society and Jackson agreed that Celeste would select someone who would further his initiatives concerning cost containment and the accessibility of care. Jackson assumed that the new director would have to continue Celeste's agenda of preventative programs, expanded access of pre-natal care, and alcohol and drug abuse prevention and recovery programs (Lilly, 1986). With this, Jackson outlined the major thrusts of the health policy agenda.

The Acting Director

Thomas Halpin split his duties as the Acting Director with the Assistant Director and the Chief of Staff Milt Tenenbaum. Halpin was asked to "hold the fort together." Initially, Halpin left his bureau behind him to take the acting position. He had the understanding that it would be for a month or two. As such, he had the traditional difficulties of an acting director:

You aren't the ultimate person who'll take over the job. You are in the middle. But you are the appointed authority. You can't sluff all the decisions off, but I suppose that you do when it nears the end. You have to work the issues that come up. (HLTH_AL2: 447-454)

The problem as Halpin later expressed it was that you never know when the end nears. Every day could be your last, but you know that you might be there a while. He was attuned to writing grants and was noted for not "taking care of his bureau." Halpin had been around the Department for a long time (1974) and employees knew his basic interests. In addition, there were no mandates to accomplish action.
Halpin wasn't seen by his subordinates as abusing his privilege of serving as the acting director. They recalled that Halpin was in the office every day and was very non-partisan and non-political (e.g., HLTH_AL2: 1448-1453). Halpin began to keep a journal to record his decisions and to provide a context for the new director to understand the issues and the history of the issues and policy decisions.

Halpin started several policy initiatives. First, he had the idea to begin to improve the transfer of information. The department was such a large entity, that if you didn't know the structure, you wouldn't know where to go to get an answer. Halpin worked with resident health policy expert, Barb Edwards, to develop a data center, a decision spurred by the loss of federal funds for health planning. With the loss of funds, and several capable people, they had to figure out how to productively employ these people and meet this additional goal. Halpin also demonstrated his knowledge of human behavior by moving the staff for the data center away from their prior location so that they could focus on their new responsibilities and not continue what they had been doing. Second, Halpin was taken with the opportunity to have an impact on a new disease. His professional, positional and personal interests were met by his focusing the attention of many individuals on AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome). Third, Halpin worked in Celeste's cabinet clusters to facilitate mutual interests with other cabinet officials. For example, human services vaccinates many of its clients. The Health Department now purchases the vaccines for a savings to taxpayers of over a million dollars annually. Halpin also declared the Health Department as a non-smoking department. Halpin noted that one advantage of being the boss is "that you can end the endless talking and simply announce a policy." (HLTH_AL2: 506-507). Finally, Halpin began to structure the discussion of meeting the dual problems of cost containment and access to health care. These issues are evidenced in issues surrounding nursing homes and long-term care and with the certificate of need. Hospitals and nursing homes want government control on one hand and, on the other, want the freedom to pursue their reading of the market for health care services. They have a desire to meet their bottom line. In opposition to this is the ideology that the public will pay for services as no one can go without health care services, and the public has an interest in allocating costs.

As the months went by, the election came closer and a director wasn't named, it became clear to Halpin that Celeste would not appoint one before the election. Governor Celeste invited Halpin out to the Governor's mansion and asked him if he would be willing to serve through the election (HLTH_AL2: 409-428). Former Governor Rhodes was running against Celeste and Rhodes was not doing well in the polls. Rhodes started talking about homosexuals (using more pejorative terms) and AIDS. For Halpin, it was a stressful time. He was a preventative medicine specialist and
AIDS was a relatively new disease -- and one that fit under his arena. Halpin had to decide whether to answer Rhodes with the facts of AIDS, or not. Yet, as an acting Director, he was not in Celeste's "inner circle." He did not know whether his answering these questions would stir up more controversy.

Halpin was invited to apply for the position but declined. When asked by Dr. Sawyer, the former Dean of the Wright State University Medical School, why he wasn't interested, Halpin told him that as director, he could not focus on personal and professional interests in AIDS. Halpin wanted to go back and work with those issues from his previous position as Chief of the Bureau of Preventative Medicine.

Meanwhile, Dr. Jackson was unsuccessful in his attempt to unseat Congressman Wylie. Jackson took a position as president of AssurQual, Inc., and became a clinical assistant professor of medicine/preventive medicine at the Ohio State University College of Medicine.

The Search Committee Gets Serious

The search committee began serious deliberations in December of 1986 with three meetings. The deliberations began with a determination that the statutory criteria for selection were that (1) the director be a medical doctor (a specific statutory mandate for a medical doctor and not even a D. O.), (2) the director should be someone from Ohio, if possible and if that wasn't possible, then the person should be a native of Ohio. Second, there was the issue of money. Jackson had been Celeste's highest paid cabinet official at $68,000. Medical doctors were making much more than that and the person appointed would have to undergo a tremendous financial sacrifice. Third, the search committee was looking for someone with a background in community medicine, if not public health.

Governor Celeste asked his cabinet members to call their contacts in other states for names. An advertisement in the Journal of the American Medical Association did not yield any names. Bill Keck, from Akron, was a nationally known public health physician, but he was about to enter a year as president of the American Public Health Association, and would be unwilling to serve as Director of Health during that time. Another candidate was the Health Commissioner from Hamilton County, but he wasn't willing to move to Columbus from Cincinnati. The committee determined that the pool of candidates with a lot of experience was small and they weren't available. They knew they were looking for the same set of skills that hospitals were looking for, and the hospitals were usually willing to pay more than $80,000. What they were getting as applicants were medical doctors trained...
in public health -- and the Ohio Department of Health was no longer the traditional public health department. They were getting career public health physicians who were used to government salaries, people retired from county public health departments, political aspirants, and individuals who wanted to put something back into their constituent and stakeholder group.

In February, 1986, Governor Celeste appointed a Task Force on Minority Health, at the urging of State Representative Ray Miller. The Task Force was directed to examine the disparities in health care services and access to care in the black and minority communities, as compared to the white population. An equally important charge involved recommending solutions to the problems they identified, along with implementation strategies.

Miller's principal assistant, Archie Lewis called upon black physician Ronald Fletcher, to see if he would be interested in serving as a member of the Task Force. Fletcher, who was also chairman of the Gem City Medical Society (Dayton) and was an active speaker on minority health throughout Ohio. Fletcher had also been involved with grant applications with the Ohio Department of Health.

She asked "Would I be interested in being part of this task force?" and I said "Yeah!" and I started rambling off about what the task force needed to do and blah, blah, blah, and I said "Sure, you know, anything, I'd be happy to." The next week I got a call and she said, uh, "As a matter of fact your you be interested in being the chairperson for this task force?" and I said "Sure." You know, because again, that's another thing I was always taught by parents, grandparents everyone, um, if it's offered to you, you're going to do it. You don't pass up any opportunity, um, and if you think it's overwhelming or it's too much to do, you're being lazy so, just hush and do it!" (RF_1_3: 1150-1173)

The task force met for most of Halpin's tenure under the co-chairmanship of Representative Miller and Dr. Fletcher. It produced a document that outlined the needs of minority citizens of the state and provided some resolution of these issues by directing specific actions to be taken by the Department, the Governor, and the General Assembly. One of these was to establish a Commission on Minority Health to monitor continued progress on meeting the task force resolutions.

During the meetings of the Task Force, Fletcher worked closely with Dana Madison, who at that time was working as Representative C. J. McLin's executive assistant. Madison gave quite a review of Fletcher such that McLin asked Fletcher to send him his curriculum vitae. McLin's agenda
was to get a black person in as Health Commissioner. He was quite taken with Fletcher's credentials and he forwarded it (the c.v.) to the governor's office.

Fletcher asked McLin to provide a copy of the statutes of the Ohio Revised codes that were germane to the Department of Health. Fletcher wanted to know all the statutory responsibilities of the director as well as make sure that he was fully qualified. During this process Fletcher learned about the requirements and responsibilities of the Department, including the reports they were to make. Fletcher also queried McLin to provide himself with a sense of who the stakeholders were as well as a sense of the personalities within the department. Fletcher wanted to know who were the good people and those that could be trusted, those that were good but could not be trusted those who were bad but could be trusted and those who were bad and couldn't be trusted. Fletcher wanted to make up his own mind about people but also wanted a sense of what others thought about key personnel.

Um, at least for the initial uh, inquiry, and then to find out more about them as I actually got to learn them, because one person's opinion is not necessarily true, it's just ho-, what happened when they dealt with them. (RF_12_19: 320-326)

Fletcher continued his interviewing to include several cabinet members. He spoke with the only republican member of Governor Celeste's cabinet, Bob Brown, of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities and William Sikes, Director of the Department of Administrative Services. Fletcher also spoke with two of Celeste's staff -- Joyce Chapel and Maureen Corchoran. Corchoran had been the head of the Health Policy Division at the Department of Health. Brown and Sikes provided a sense of what it was like to be a cabinet member and what it was like to work with Celeste. Chapel and Corchoran filled Fletcher in on Celeste's health-related policy initiatives.

The formal selection procedure continued as Fletcher interviewed with a panel of legislators, members of the governor's cabinet, and members of the Governor's staff. They asked questions regarding the function of the Health Department, his philosophies on specific health related issues and the direction he would take the department in the next few years. He was also asked questions regarding how he would relate to legislators and other stakeholders. For Fletcher, these were easy questions because of his experience with the Task Force.

It was really pretty easy because, essentially, through the task force, I had looked at all of the salient issues that concerned the, uh, individuals that, for all practical purposes, were on the bottom rung of the socio-economic and health stratum.
Which meant they had the worst problems. And we had already come up with solutions for those that had the worst problems. Which meant it was very simple to come with solutions for people who had lesser problems (RF_12_5a: 121-136).

Fletcher had already interacted with and was championed by legislators with significant leadership responsibilities in health. Senator Hobson was minority whip in the senate as well as chair of the Senate Health and Human Services Committee. Ray Miller was on the budget committee and chaired the budget section for health. In addition, a couple of the Cabinet members were a part of the Task Force in an ex-officio capacity. For Fletcher, everything that was asked of him as a question was a part of that interview process -- that had already been answered and the relationships had already been structured by his previous activities within the Task Force, by his experience as a physician, and by his activities to learn about the job by conversing with current and former members of Celeste's cabinet.

**Interviewing with the Governor.**

Three individuals were brought in to interview with Governor Celeste. The first candidate was Morton Nelson of Montgomery County (Cincinnati). The second was an individual from Wisconsin who was a M.D./Ph.D. and was considered one of the leading health planners in the country. Fletcher was the third candidate.

Fletcher had garnered the support of representatives McLin and Miller as well as the support of Senator Hobson. They were pushing Celeste to appoint a minority candidate to keep with his public pronouncements regarding affirmative action appointments -- a direction in which the governor was already leaning. Celeste had wanted to send the signal about the totality of the cabinet make-up and in the Health Department, an agency where the administration had difficulty getting top managers to take seriously his affirmative action agenda. In addition, former Governor Rhodes tried to make a campaign issue of Celeste's hiring of out-of-state appointments. Nelson, as it turned out, was unwilling to move to Columbus.

Fletcher wanted the Governor to know who he was appointing. Fletcher had talked with an individual who was Health Director during one of the Rhodes administrations who told Fletcher that Rhodes had him agree to two things. "First, whenever I ask you something, the answer is yes. The second one is I never want to see the Health Department in the newspaper." If anything was wrong, you would see the Health Department in the newspaper. No one wanted to take anything to the media for fear that it would be something bad about them and their agency. Fletcher wanted Celeste
to know that he would not be quiet and that the Health Department would be in the newspaper. Fletcher's initiatives would be in the area of the disparities in health care within the state -- not only with respect to ethnic but also age-related disparities. For Fletcher, the fact that Ohio's population was changing and that young people were being exposed to so many conditions and were so vulnerable to these conditions, they could be devastated.

When they were discussing health issues, Celeste asked Fletcher for his opinion on Certificate of Need (CON), health planning, and cost containment. Halpin had involved the governor in establishing an office of cost containment within the department. Fletcher was in agreement with the Governor's policy stance.

After Fletcher interviewed with the members of the Cabinet search committee and with the Governor, he talked to more legislators about the situation at the Health Department and talked to former Director Jackson and with interim Director Halpin. Fletcher also talked to the head of Legal Services and the Chief of Administrative Services. Fletcher was trying to get an overall approach to the administrative events within the department.

**Personal Considerations**

Fletcher was concerned with the distance between his family in Dayton and work in Columbus (about one hour and twenty minutes driving time each way). Otherwise he would have to move his family from Dayton, where his spouse, Donna, taught at Sinclair College, and his children were in school. His oldest daughter was a junior in high school and his two younger children were getting involved in school and sporting activities. In addition, he would have to "farm out" his medical practice and take a considerable monetary penalty for accepting the job.

As a practicing physician, the question was always asked, "Why did you do it?" It doesn't make any sense, ya know, people in private practice make money and they don't have to worry about the constraints of public office and such, so how does one pursue this -- or why does one pursue this? Well, there's often a time in your life in which you say, "If I had the chance to change that... Boy, what I could do." Well, you have to be true to yourself and if that chance presents itself then ya have to take advantage of it. and so, looking at the health care system I considered it a betrayal to myself if I did not take that responsibility, take that opportunity to make changes in a system that I saw that needed assistance.
The opportunity to do something — to actually see the results of one's actions proved a big motivation for Fletcher. While there was a degree of self-doubt, Fletcher agreed to the appointment.

Table 25
Xenia doctor confirms he will be state health chief.

Dr. Ronald L. Fletcher, director of oncology at Greene Memorial Hospital in Xenia, confirmed last night that he would the new state health director. Reached at his Dayton-area home, he said his appointment would be announced by Governor Richard F. Celeste today. "I think it's a great honor and great privilege," Fletcher, 38, said.

The acting health director, Dr. Thomas Halpin, will return to his previous job as head of the communicable diseases section. He did not seek appointment as director. He has served since January 17, 1986, when Dr. David L. Jackson [sentence abruptly ends]

Celeste's press secretary, Brian Usher, would only say that there would be an announcement today. Fletcher has a private practice in Dayton and is on the faculty of Wright State University Medical School.

Source: Columbus, (AP) Cleveland Plain Dealer, (3/17/87) p. 3b.

The next day, additional information was available to the public about Fletcher and his past. These articles containing this information are provided in table 26 and table 27.
Table 26
Xenia doctor to be state health chief.

Dr. Ronald L. Fletcher, director of oncology at Greene Memorial Hospital in Xenia, will be named state health director today.

Governor Richard F. Celeste offered the job yesterday, administration sources said.

Fletcher, 38 said, succeeds Dr. Thomas Halpin, who has been acting director since January 17, 1986 when Dr. David L. Jackson resigned to run unsuccessfully for the U. S. House of Representatives.

HALPIN, WHO did not seek the directorship, will return to his previous job as head of the department's communicable diseases section.

In an interview last night, Fletcher said he will start his state job in about a month. His salary has not been determined. Jackson was Celeste's highest-paid cabinet member, making $68,000 a year.

A native of Dayton, Fletcher was chairman of the governor's task force on Minority Health.

He did his internship and residency training at Miami Valley Hospital in Dayton, and had a medical oncology fellowship at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tenn. Oncology is the branch of medicine dealing with tumors.

He and some other Dayton-area physicians help with a medical clinic in Belize, in Central America. Several sets of doctors from the group visit the clinic every year.

Fletcher said he goes to the clinic, which is one mile from the Guatemala border, for one two-week period a year.

"If at all possible, I would like to continue to do that," Fletcher said. "It gives you a new perspective of what health care means."

AT THE CLINIC in Belize, the doctors are given a supply of antibiotics to use for a year. No additional supplies are sent if the medicine runs out before the year has past.

Politically, Fletcher is registered as an independent, he said. He is president of the Gem City Medical Society, an associate professor of Medicine at Wright State University, and a clinical researcher with the Bob Hippie Cancer Research Laboratory in Dayton.

Fletcher and his wife Donna, have two daughters and a son.


Staff knew little about Fletcher. By reading the paper they knew that he was an oncologist, he was from the Dayton area, and he had been active in speaking about minority health. Those who knew him from the commission said that he was a "nice guy." He had been a researcher with experience in getting grants from the American Cancer Society and the National Institute of Health. He had no public health experience -- both a positive and a negative as the Ohio Department of Health was no longer a traditional public health department. They were a medical assistance and regulatory agency. Those employees who had "staffed" the Task Force on Minority Health told other staff that Fletcher had a near photographic memory. Physically, Fletcher was also an imposing figure -- at about six feet three inches tall and weighing in at 220 pounds. They also let it be known that he, as a physician also had the ability to hold people in awe. Additionally, the Governor's office had made his curriculum vitae available and they knew he had little management experience (HLTH_ALL: 716-719; 1461-1471). Fletcher was expected to champion minority health and to take on the issues surrounding AIDS.
Dr. Ronald L. Fletcher gets up every morning with the belief that he can cure cancer.

Fletcher, the director of oncology at Greene Memorial Hospital in Xenia, Ohio, was named Ohio Health Director yesterday.

"I have a belief that I can cure the ills of the people of Ohio, just like I have a belief that I can cure cancer," he says.

Fletcher, 38, of Dayton will start as health director April 20.

Gov. Richard F. Celeste, at a news conference yesterday, said he wants the health department to concentrate on continuing education programs, preventing the spread of diseases such as acquired immune deficiency syndrome, dealing with substance abuse and encouraging teenagers to be more sexually responsible.

On the issue of AIDS, Fletcher said, he recently read an article headlined, "Fear is in the air, not AIDS."

He said, "I think that's the big difficulty. People are so afraid because they don't have the proper knowledge and perspective as to exactly what AIDS is. Unfortunately, a lot of the things we're hearing are more reactions to fear rather than a medically sound approach to things."

People must be taught to avoid getting AIDS and must be given reliable information, he said. Too many people ask friends and not doctors about ways the disease is transmitted, he added.

"As far as voluntary screening for AIDS, I think what should occur is that individuals who have concerns -- and at this point everyone has concerns -- should discuss things with their physicians and with people of knowledge to find out if their concerns and fears are true and reasonably or if they are mounted from hysteria and fear," Fletcher said.

Some people are more upset about the disease than they should be, he said.

The state, Fletcher said, needs to concentrate more on preventing disease than on treating people after they become sick. The programs will reach across many departments, and Celeste expects Fletcher to be the main coordinator of programs.

State Sen. David Hobson, R-Springfield, said Fletcher will bring new perspectives to health care for the poor and minorities.

Hobson, who served on Celeste's screening committee for a health director, served with Fletcher on the Governor's Task Force on Minority Health.

Hobson said Fletcher does not have much experience in public health or administration but will work hard to overcome it.


The Interregnum

The governor’s chief of staff, Carolyn Lukensmeyer, called Halpin and Fletcher over to the office to meet with Maureen Corchoran and herself. Halpin recommended they get a group together and look at administrative services and the Director's office areas together. The Health Department was beginning to have real difficulties between the Head of Administrative Services, Debra Ward Beard, and the former Director's Chief of Staff, Milt Tenenbaum. Halpin also went over his transition memo, notifying Fletcher that he had to think about the budget hearings shortly. Halpin gained the impression that he was not coming in with a big set of overriding or new initiatives. It
also became clear that the governor did not have a large set of policy initiatives for Fletcher, other
than to continue to expand regulation through the certificate of need (C.O.N.) and to continue to
work with other agencies.

Lukensmeyer then met with two Health Department staffers to go over Fletcher's strengths
and weaknesses. For the Governor's office, the budget was solidly in place through the leadership
of one of the best budget persons in the state. In addition, Celeste's health policy initiatives were also
solidly set with former Health policy analyst Corchoran now serving in the Governor's office. The
Governor had determined that policies leading to a "healthy Ohio" was one of three priority areas
for the upcoming biennial Governor's Budget, State of Ohio, 1987). While Fletcher did not have the
hands-on management experience they wanted, or even equivalent to other finalists, Fletcher was
articulate, had a sense of the dramatic, and has a bit of a philosopher in his soul -- and Governor
Celeste found these qualities very attractive. With the lack of a clear mission or vision for the Health
Department, they were expecting Fletcher to do more external work, and they planned for that
strategy by settling how they would get information to Dr. Fletcher.

Arrival at the Department

Fletcher, like most new appointees, was slightly overwhelmed on his first day. "This is, this
is actually me? The Boss?" He then got up and began to make "rounds."[56]

Well, uh, with respect to how I met the staff, I uh, you being a physician, I make
rounds. And then I sat down and talked to Tom [Halpin], and Tom had developed
sort of an informal little manual, or not even a manual, just sort of memoirs -- you
might say. They kind of talked about uh, uh, all of his, uh experiences and the goods
and the bads and some of the problems of interacting, and that was excellent! That
really gave me an insight with respect to the personalities that I was dealing with.
I had a number of discussions with uh, individuals who have worked with the
Department of Health, uh legislators who have worked with the Department of
Health, and they gave me some insight on the personalities also. (RF_12_19: 80-
128)

For Fletcher, it was a new environment. He was walked around and introduced to the Bureau
Chiefs. After a few minutes of conversation, Fletcher was moved on to the next bureau and division.
After walking around the building, he was returned to his office.

[56]Pardon the "punishing" commentary.
Fletcher set up appointments with the Speaker of the House Riffe, and the President of the Senate, Stanley Aranof; he also arranged meetings with the majority and minority whips in each house of the General Assembly. Fletcher received briefings on what concerns they had regarding the Health Department, especially its budget. Fletcher pressed them for health related problems in their districts. His strategy was to get to know those who could control the outcome of his budget, when the hearings were scheduled in a few weeks. The second component of the strategy was to begin to provide information to legislators regarding issues in their districts -- to make the health department as an extension of their constituency relations.

Fletcher continued his "rounds" to get around to each of the bureaus. He began right away, going into the bureau and sitting down at the desk of a "lesser" official, and asking that official what she or he thought. However, it took quite awhile for Fletcher to accomplish this task, because they were right in the middle of a budget session -- and Dr. Fletcher decided that the best way to learn the department was to learn the budget, and to present the budget in the senate. Tom Halpin had presented the budget in the hearings in the House and was preparing to make the presentations in the Senate. Maureen Corchoran and Tom Kassenmeyer, Celeste's legislative specialists, Jamie Young, Health's legislative liaison, and Dom Frissora, Health's Budget chief thought that Dr. Fletcher should read the opening statement, and then turn the presentation over to Dr. Halpin, who had done a tremendous job in the House. They had held mock hearings prior to the House Budget hearings. Young and Frissora believed that it was not a matter of Fletcher's ability as the staff's ability to present the context of the department, but the respect and deference that they should show to members of the general assembly. Fletcher was not aware of the protocol for calling on people in the department to answer questions, etc. Corchoran and Kassenmeyer believed that the department had a Director, and the Director, not the Assistant Director, should give the presentation. Finally, Fletcher said he would do it.

Fletcher believed that the legislators knew that he was new and none of them expected him to present the budget. He also thought that they would be tolerant of mistakes.

... when they saw me presenting the budget, they number one said, "This guy's got guts." and number two, they said, "Well I could ask him a complicated question, but he's just brand new, so ..." So really, things went very well. I mean they'd ask me

---

57 The use of the term "lesser" refers to the person's position in the hierarchy, not a general comment about the value of the individual in the position.
questions and I'd ask assistance when I needed it, but I tried to take it on as much as I possible and so, uh, we gained a lot of respect uh, at that initial presentation. (RF_12_19: 243-254)

Fletcher called upon his ability to memorize that he had perfected while in medical school and studied the briefing books that had been prepared for the agency. Fletcher had studied the policy interests of each of the individuals on the budget committee and was prepared to speak directly with them. In addition, he had met with the President of the senate and with the majority and minority whips, so that he was aware of the major "sticking" points in the budget.

Most of the departmental staff believed that Fletcher made a mockery of the process, but they remembered that one person (Debra Beard) told him what a great job he had done. Fletcher was not always sure who to pass the questions around to, one question got passed around to five or six people. Halpin also remembers that they got "fried" on a couple of questions.

Fletcher also met with some of the largest stakeholders as far as constituency groups. He met with the head of the Children's Defense Fund, the Black Elected Democratic Officials (BEDO), Planned parenthood, and a variety of family health groups, including AIDS advocacy groups. Fletcher also met with the executive council of local health commissioners. Fletcher promised the health commissioners that he would be visiting the health departments of the large cities by the end of the calendar year. In a short period of time, Fletcher was able to gather input as to what the health department's agenda should be, as well as to give them some impression of how he dealt with people.

When Fletcher and his public affairs chief went to visit the local health departments, They also visited the editorial boards of the newspapers in those towns. For Fletcher, it was a chance to hit two targets at once. First, he was able to publicize the Health Department and to let people know that it existed. Second, he was able to give the newspapers some statistics on health-related problems in Ohio, and specifically in their city and county. This second activity had the effect of giving the editors two stories: one a general interest story about making the Health Department more accessible to clients using the phrase "your department of health" but also a story about babies dying in Ohio. And infant mortality -- babies dying -- is a story that will sell newspapers and get people to listen to broadcast media.
In general, Fletcher found the department to have strong internal management. However, he found a number of procedures that he thought should have been updated. Jackson had not "touched" them and Halpin let them go because of his interim status, not knowing if any day would be his last as director. Most of these involved battles between Tenenbaum and Beard about "turf" -- purchasing, requisitions, and space.

Fletcher, from his work with the Task Force on Minority Health, believed few people knew there was a state health department. Fletcher believed that the department can only be as strong as it is perceived to be by the other departments, by the legislature, by the administration, and by the constituency. Fletcher then began to start planning to go to the constituencies. Some of this was preempted because many of them were visiting the Department to have an audience with the Director.

I was made aware from, uh, talking to people in the department, I was made aware from, uh, advocacy groups, who had heard and who immediately came and said, "Well you know, you're up to the running, uh, you know, here are some of the things that, that you need to, uh, think about. And, I had been made aware, again, through my activities with legislators, and with the Task force, so I knew that AIDS was an issue -- and not to mention that I was a physician -- so I knew that AIDS would be a major concern. (RF_12_5a: 198-215).

So, from a number of concerns and from a variety of stakeholders, Dr. Fletcher developed a list of concerns in which he would take an interest.

But I also knew, that as far as health was concerned, just like in cancer, once you've got a treatment that seems to be effective for one disease, usually a new disease pops up and you have to start all over again. So the agenda is ever increasing. I knew that would be the case and I was prepared. In, in health care, the number of problems is one more than the largest number you can think of. (RF_12_5a: 235-256).

With this, Fletcher knew that he would have to set priorities in his mind and focus his energies on a major agenda items and then, look at the other items as the time made possible or the need made necessary. He knew that he might have to modify his agenda, but there were some things such as infant mortality that would not be modified.

Fletcher's programmatic agenda was to reduce infant mortality, secure resources to prevent AIDS, begin programs to prevent of teen-age pregnancy, and to prevent and treat substance abuse.
His action agenda was to let the citizens know that there was a health department and that it was their health department. Regarding policy initiatives, he was interested in certificate of need and long-term care as well as relations between the state health department and county health departments.

Fletcher set goals and a time line for each of his agenda items. In the following, Fletcher presents his outline for reducing infant mortality.

My time line for infant mortality was, at the end of a year, we would see, uh, a drop, and at the end of three years, we would see a significant drop, in infant mortality. Uh, trying to, put Ohio below [2] the national average. At the end of the year, let's see we were at 10.7 and the national average was uh, 10.3. At the end of a year we were at 9.3. Uh, and we've been hovering in the 9's since that time. Unfortunately, cocaine is, gonna affect us, but I don't think it's gonna as much as I'd originally anticipated. (RF_12_5a: 521-536)

Dr. Fletcher had to wait for a year to get money to do additional AIDS programming since the budget had already been passed.

Fletcher's third goal was to reduce the disparity and make the Department of Health "user-friendly" for all people. To accomplish this objective, Fletcher took a high visibility position, so that the Health Department wasn't some unknown entity that no one had heard of and no one knew what it did. That meant building a constituency. And to build a constituency, Fletcher had to get out to the people and talk about health and health concerns. Fletcher and Dick Whittenberg, a former state assemblyman, brought in by Dr. Jackson to be head of public affairs, tried some catchy gimmicks such as referring to the department as "Your Department of Health" instead of the Ohio Department of Health. Fletcher also visited the health department of every major city by December. That also meant changing some internal procedures.

Each of those bureaus has a budget that is generated not only from the state but a budget that is generated from federal dollars. Each of those bureaus is concerned with the programmatic utilization of those monies to carry out their activities. What often happens in an organization is that there is an immediate confederacy and by that rather than seeing themselves as the Department of Health, environmental health sees itself as environmental health, which means the money that environmental health has is environmental health money, not Department of Health money, Environmental health money. They're very protective about their own turf. Anything that deals with central administration that affects that turf, even though it may be for the betterment of the other bureaus is perceived as a danger to their confederate standing. It's kind of tough to try to bring into an organization the
ideas of federalism but it has to be done. And it can be done by looking at centralizing certain functions, by communications with individuals and try to develop a structure which promotes interaction as opposed to promoting interaction as opposed to promoting [ ] unitarian action. . . . So, we try to take an issue and explain the fact that the issue was germane to all and that we had to take a multi-dep-bureau approach for that particular problem. And basically what this invoked and forced was that people had to work together. People that hadn't talked to each other for years had to talk to each other because they needed the expertise of one of the other bureaus in order to carry out what their functional part of solving the overall problem was. (CLASS: 1753-1816).

Fletcher's actions were to break up the confederacy of bureaus in his department and to make the department more focused on solving problems of citizens of multiple backgrounds and often, with multiple problems.

Fletcher's fourth goal was to address teen-age pregnancy. In his view, the abortion controversy was framed "all wrong." It was not pro-choice or right-to-life, but what to do about preventing unwanted babies. For Fletcher, this was a prime problem and one likely to garner his support and his efforts because it was closely related to infant mortality and was also related to substance abuse. Most teenagers who become pregnant are involved in abusing alcohol and drugs, at the time they become pregnant. In addition, substance abuse might lead to additional births and to neglect of the baby and neglect of adequate prenatal care. When two or more goals were joined in one issue, Fletcher was ready to join.

It interrelates. They all interrelate. And that, in, in the first news conference I held, I mentioned that, uh, we'd have to change our concept of health, and that it's not some, uh, dangling participle, some, independent, uh, activity out there. that health is intricately associated with, education, with belief systems, with social economics, with all the things that are part of our life.(RF_12_5a: 726-737)

For Fletcher, health was integral to an integral human being. If an individual is not healthy, that individual can not work. If not healthy, one cannot be educated. It affects your belief systems. That is, health was such a concern for Ron Fletcher that he had devoted his life to making people healthy, as he knew how. While Fletcher reported that he devoted his life to medicine because of expectations by his parents and grandparents, it is clear that he dedicated his life to becoming a medical doctor.
Analysis

Fletcher was chosen because he was the best available candidate. He was a qualified minority and that would help Celeste further his campaign to have a ethnically-diverse cabinet. In addition, Fletcher was a kindred spirit of Celeste. Both were dreamers and visionaries and quite advanced developmentally.

Dr. Fletcher was lacking in administrative experience, but Celeste’s Chief of Staff was taking steps to overcome that lacuna. Lukensmeyer called a meeting of several individuals from the Health Department and Fletcher to describe what she thought he should do to overcome his inexperience in managing people.

Absence of a Mandate

The Governor did not give Fletcher an agenda or a mandate. Celeste and Lukensmeyer had no means to hold him accountable, and, thus, no basis upon which to hold him accountable for his performance. However, even in the absence of known criteria, they were able to make a judgment about his performance and were not very positive about the results of his tenure, or of the results of his tenure with respect to the administration’s agenda.

Fletcher did not see the value in giving a charge to his bureau chiefs (division directors). He never questioned the performance in any of the divisions, except when it related to an agenda of Fletcher’s. The bureau chiefs told him what they wanted him to hear, but left out much of the story. They never told him of the problems, partly because they were afraid he would intervene and they would have less discretion after his management intervention. Fletcher never asked the bureau chiefs to outline their goals, to outline their expectations for their bureau, to make commitments to performance. Determining performance would not have had to have been used to control the bureau chiefs, as they feared, but to direct them to areas they could help with Fletcher’s goals or with the administration’s agenda. However, Fletcher never tried to make his agenda the agenda of the Governor, or vice versa. It was never clear what the objectives were. That made it nearly impossible to tie the governor’s objectives into what Fletcher created as the department’s objectives. Instead, Fletcher had his objectives.

Fletcher picked his agenda items based on his personal attraction to the issue. He focused his organizational attention on items based on whether an action or a recommendation had an immediate tie-in to his short list of priorities. The third criteria was to see if there was a way to
create a policy requiring legislative action. For example, Fletcher took on cigarette machines because it fit into one of his major personal goals (prevention of smoking) and it was something that could be done legislatively (pass a law). Fletcher knew that there would be opposition but he had a way to make it tough to argue against his position by positioning the regulation of cigarette machines so as to prevent juveniles from purchasing cigarettes from these vending machines. In this way, he could argue that he wasn't trying to get rid of vending machines and thwarted most of the criticism that regulation of cigarette vending machines would surely generate. In addition, Fletcher used the data base that had been started by Halpin to show the cost-savings that could be generated by his proposition. "Any time you can stop something from happening, it is going to be much cheaper than allowing it to happen and trying to repair the damages" (RF_12_5a: 595-599).

Lack of Executive Experience

Fletcher's lack of administrative experience caused him some problems that were to serve as structuring events in his tenure. He accepted the intervention of the governor's office and others who were giving him recommendations. Fletcher thought that everything, including personnel appointments were political. Instead, the governor's office was attempting to be helpful to Fletcher, and when he asked about Debra Beard, they agreed with his selection. This double misunderstanding led to the structuring of much of Fletcher's time his first year. Fletcher's attitude toward the Governor's office changed. He sought less direction and began to focus on his own agenda. In fact, he saw the problem as double messages coming from the Governor's office, and he saw that as their problem. He saw himself as dealing straight with people, and did not appreciate double and mixed messages, no matter who they came from.

Considering himself as a political appointee, Fletcher fell into the political appointee trap. He was following what he thought were the orders. If he had been an experienced public manager, he would not have interpreted the situation as being forced to appoint Beard. If, in fact, Beard was being pushed upon him, he would have rebelled and told the Governor that he was getting him into trouble.

Fletcher faced the problem of making strategic replacements, with a conservative perspective. Fletcher viewed himself as having three years to accomplish ten years of work.

Slowly but surely, and I also knew who was gonna stay because, things were at such a point in which, in three and a half years you've gotta do, a decade's worth of work. Uh, stick with someone who's proven and effective, not be -- if you can't work with
them and they are causing a lot of problems then unfortunately, you have to go, and they're gonna have to go and you have to go [3] to plan B. But if you can work with them and they're effective, then even if it's a little aggravation because, you you may have to always argue with them about getting something done, but it still gets done, that's okay -- I'll argue with them, the result's gonna be the same (RF_12_5A: 1586-1603).

Fletcher pursued his own agenda because he had good people working as bureau chiefs. Each of them had their own agenda, and had difficulty focusing on Fletcher's agenda, in part because their agenda was full. So, Fletcher pursued his own agenda and depended on the bureau chiefs to do the job they were doing. Fletcher did attempt to structure their agenda by making public promises, then returning to the agency and informing the staff of what he had promised.

Programmatically, Fletcher raised health to the public agenda. His initiatives were to bring public health to Ohio's citizens. The manner in which he did this was to pass himself off as Ohio's family doctor. With AIDS, he pushed the issue through his profession and through opposition. He used his expertise and credibility as a physician to get AIDS through the general assembly.

I'm a physician. I am here to save lives, regardless of how you feel about about these people and what they do and what disease they might have. You may not be supportive... (HLTH_ALL: 856-862)

Being a Physician -- Professional Expertise

Fletcher benefitted from his training as a physician and the deference people give to medical doctors in our society. Fletcher called attention to his previous work as a research scientist (note there were several newspaper articles calling attention to Fletcher's desire to find a cure for cancer and to his desire to help local health departments). Fletcher used this deference and maintained his status by referring to objective data and science in his conversations with newspaper and media people. Fletcher distinguished between objective and anecdotal data using the following analogy.

My Uncle Sid told me he took an aspirin and it uh, upset his stomach, therefore all aspirin upsets everybody's stomach. Wrong! That's anecdotal data. Objective data is I found a statistically significant number of individuals and I have given them all aspirin and I have also had a control group that I have given a placebo I have looked at how many people in the placebo group got an upset stomach, how many people in the aspirin group who got an upset stomach, and I have come up with statistically significant evidence based on those numbers in that study to show that aspirin may cause stomach upset in 10 percent of the people. But the rest of the people are fine.
By creating the distinction of objective data, Fletcher could hedge any contrary arguments by arguing that the evidence was inconclusive and that he and the Health Department were searching for the "correct" answer. He then followed up this stall technique by revealing what he was trying to learn and to make sure that they did not make mistakes. Thus, his training in science and the deference stakeholders paid to his position as a physician allowed him to control most arguments.

**Being an Organizational "Outsider".**

Dr. Fletcher presented himself as an outsider to the department. In one perspective, he was an insider. Regarding the issues and medicines, Fletcher knew what was going to happen, what the outcome would be. However, from the standpoint of political fallout, Fletcher did not know the factors that he should have been concerned with. Fletcher also saw himself as an outsider because of other reasons.

First of all, you know, okay, here's someone who has not been with state government. Here's someone who's not necessarily of our generation. Here's someone who is not a member of the majority population. Because I have preconceptions of what, someone not in public health, and not in the government, thinks about government, I know that's what he's going to do. RF_12_5a: 945-955).

What he saw was that he was younger, he was black, and that he had a different concept of public health and that the bureau chiefs had expectations of him and his behavior based on these attributes.

I mean, it's like, if you aren't, if you aren't fifty-plus, then you don't know you're not seasoned. You're wet behind the ears. You're too young. Um, and oh, I, I heard that so many times... Everyone told me what I couldn't do. "Oh, you, um, you're gonna try to get that passed? You can't do it. Just can't be done." Or, You want to try to get it funded it that way? I'm sorry, I'm sorry, you're too young. I've had the experience. I've been here for thirty years; I know it can't be done." So, it was that institutional, and, and most of it was based on, not their efforts, but based on what they had heard had been an effort that was unsuccessful, and therefore, it was automatically said that, uh, this is a path that, leads nowhere. (RF_12_5a: 990-1014).

Fletcher was a little put off with the patronizing attitude of his elder bureau chiefs. He thought that they were taunting him and treating him as if he were some wet-nosed kid. They had come to Fletcher to give him the advice from their seasoned years of experience.

And, and they they just found out that, uh, no, I don't do things that way. Um, I take into account everyone's uh, concerns and comments, and if they're good concerns and comments, by George we'll do something about it. It, it was also a
matter of process too. I did things in a different, different fashion as far as process was concerned. (RF_12_5a: 1070-1079).

Fletcher made up his own mind after he went through a process of hearing people out. Fletcher wasn't interested in wasting his or other's time. If he knew that a bureau chief was coming in with an option and Fletcher had decided that the option fit his agenda, he would give them the money.

Uh, I'm not interested in wasting my time, you know, if I've already decided I'm gonna give you the money, I'm not interested in hearing you talk to me, uh, for an hour to convince me to give you the money. So they'd walk in with their long spiels and I'd say, "Wait a minute. I appreciate what you're saying. I've already reviewed this. I agree with you. Let's do it. Thank you." (Laughter.) And it was kind of like, oh, wow, you now, what has happened? So it was a different way of doing things. (RF_12_5a: 1118-1131).

After a couple of months, Fletcher had a management retreat. It was the first retreat in a couple of years. For Fletcher, the retreat was a chance to let the people be comfortable in knowing that he respected their professionalism and that he was not there to interfere with the management of their bureau. Fletcher failed to see the strategic opportunity the retreat presented himself to tell of his agenda and to get others to get behind it. Fletcher also failed to see, or be shown, how the retreat could be used to sort out the interdepartmental conflict that was beginning to cause problems.

One of the additional problems faced by Dr. Fletcher was that many members of the strategic leadership group were afraid that when he arrived, they would lose their jobs. In one respect, they were afraid that he would be coming in to get rid of people and to change the structure.

It was assumed. Again, here's this young guy, here's this black guy. What's he gonna do? He's gonna get rid of everybody that's older and white and he's gonna pull in everybody that's young and black. (RF_12_5a: 1488-1493).

The situation was exacerbated when the Governor's office took action to assist Fletcher with his administration (see p. 209). Dr. Fletcher believes that he was to find someone who would assist him, and the Governor's office gave him the name of an individual named Debra Beard.

Fletcher believes he received he was led astray by the governor's office, as far as the structure they wanted to put into the Health Department. Fletcher was appointed without much management experience and the Governor's chief of staff, Lukensmeyer, met with Fletcher, Acting
Director Halpin, to discuss the policy initiatives, and later, Lukensmeyer met with Mike D'Arcy (the personnel officer) and Barbara Edwards (Chief of Health Policy) to discuss how to work with Fletcher and how to assist him with the management of the Department. Fletcher believes that Lukensmeyer thought he needed to have a designated management expert, without knowing that structure was in place in the Health Department in the form of the Chief of Staff, occupied at that time by Celeste loyalist, Milt Tenenbaum. Fletcher also believes that when he asked for suggestions of whom to select for this position, the Governor's office gave him the name of "Debra Beard" and Dick Blackenberry's name.58

Beard was a young, black female, head of Administrative Services in the Health Department. When Fletcher asked other cabinet members and his legislative contacts about Beard, he was told "wonderful, wonderful." So, Fletcher moved Beard into an administrative post with the understanding that she was his deputy and would run the administrative side of the organization. Beard was immediately put into a power struggle with Tenenbaum, the elderly, white male chief of staff. Beard began to fight Tenenbaum in a departmental power struggle over who would control and have final say over what. Meanwhile, Fletcher was busy with meeting staff and traveling around the state to meet with editorial boards, local health departments, and citizen groups.

Fletcher began to rely on the confidence of Beard, Maury Thornington, Dick Blackenberry as advisors instead of Barb Edwards, Dom Frissora, Frankie Edwards and Milt Tenenbaum, each of whom had been advisors to Drs. Jackson and Halpin. With these two changes, many staff perceived the issue as a black-white issue. Fletcher, Thornington, and Blackenberry were black males, Beard was a woman of color. Frissora, Edwards and Tenenbaum was white, with Tenenbaum an elderly white male. In the first few days of office, Fletcher had been taken aside by many of the elderly physicians in the department and told how he should act and what the department's mission and philosophy was, and should be. Fletcher was cautious of these elderly white men. One way this racial tension was manifest was when Fletcher would travel and Beard would go with him, Tenenbaum and a few others would ask Fletcher, "Isn't your taking only blacks going to give the impression that you are going to be the health commissioner for black Ohio?" Fletcher responded, "When a former

58 The events surrounding Beard's appointment are rather sketchy and the accounts are conflicting. What seems apparent is that Lukensmeyer believed that Fletcher needed management assistance, and she believes that Milt Tenenbaum was not in the chief of staff position. It is also clear that Fletcher asked several legislators as well as other cabinet directors for names of people who could fill this position, and when he recounted the names that he had been heard, his informants gave favorable responses regarding Debra Beard (for Fletcher's account, see RF_12_5A: 1234-1299).
Director took only whites, was he being the Health Commissioner for white Ohio? If all males go, is this the Health Department for Male Ohio? or for Women?" (HLTH_ALL: 459-473; 761-762).

Fletcher's initial months in office were overshadowed by the fight between Tenenbaum and Beard. Some staff held Beard responsible for management breakdowns within the agency -- the problem with purchasing and supplies, and these problems became worst due to the fighting between the two (HLTH_ALL: 735-738). Some staff blamed the situation on Beard's abrasive personality. Others thought the situation was due to the tight budget and the practice of using grant money to drive policy decisions.

This fight led to performance problems. There were critical shortages that were impacting performance -- writing paper, pens, copy paper, and most noticeable, toilet paper. Copy machines went without repair and there were difficulties with telephones. Beard told her staff to refuse all purchase orders and to turn back all personnel actions the first time they were submitted. Beard told her staff to say "NO!," first on all orders signed by Tenenbaum (HLTH_ALL: 788-796). Beard would hire people only after they had been interviewed by the people she trusted in the department's personnel unit. In addition, there were fights about space management, where Fletcher asked Beard for a floor plan and she refused his request on principle. Fletcher had Tenenbaum sign off on all requests by the division heads (Bureau Chiefs), then the administrative action would go to budgeting or accounting and Beard, had her staff refuse those requests first.

The Bureau chiefs began to line up, every day with complaints about how Beard was slowing down their programs. For example, Halpin had received a $250,000 grant to start a new A.I.D.S program, but Beard wouldn't let him spend any of this money -- she claimed it was unavailable. Beard was impacting program decisions by using the block grant to pay people, using up the funds from the federal block grants so that the general fund money was still available. But, Halpin's grant money was all used up. Beard's strategy could be defendable in the short term, as it increased the availability of discretionary general funds. However, in the long run, the block grant money would have run out and staff would have been terminated. The situation was replicated in several bureaus and the bureau chiefs began making plans to act after the end of Fletcher's administration, after

---

59 Note that telephones created special difficulties within Celeste's administration. As mentioned in Chapter IV, Steinbacher of OBES was hounded because some lower-level staffers did not bid out telephone contracts, instead awarding them to a contractor attributed by the Plain Dealer to be a contributor to Celeste's gubernatorial election campaign.
Beard had been removed. Internally, many administrative staff began to inform the bureau chiefs about the situation. Beard disciplined them for insubordination. The physicians appointed to head the bureaus stopped talking to Beard.

Fletcher realized that Beard had to go. He began to initiate conversations with Beard in which he began to tell her:

This is such a confined, restricting environment, I'm sure there are many more environments that are out there that will give you the breadth and width of what you can do in your potential. I really see you have great potential. It's a shame that you're here. (RF_12_19: 1250-1259).

Fletcher was promoting her, telling her of job opportunities elsewhere, conditioning her to feel that maybe the Health Department wasn't all there was, that things were better elsewhere. Eventually, Fletcher met with Beard and told her.

There are lot of jobs out there. Uh, I don't want to fire you, I want you to, submit a letter of resignation and just say, let's, let's use the catch work of the, of, of the eighties and nineties, "philosophical differences," and I promise that I will write you a letter of recommendation, I will say positive things about you to your next employer. Now, I'm not going to lie, if they ask me about uh, your interpersonal relationships, I'll say, you could use a little work with that, but as far as your expertise and your, your diligence and your abilities... (RF_12_19:1358-1374).

There was no fallout for Fletcher when he finally moved Beard out of her position, by helping her decide to leave. Fletcher called all those he expected to be affected and to explain to them what he was doing and why he was doing it. Most all responded that they were waiting for him to call, explaining that they had heard she (Beard) was making people quite irate. They were expecting Beard's situation to come to this.

The firing of Beard changed internal stakeholder's impression of Fletcher. Fletcher is quite a personable person and has quite a reputation within the department for accepting anyone at a personal level. Staff interviewed for this study often described Fletcher as a "nice guy." Fletcher told a few people of his decision to let Beard go using the following words:

It was very, very hard to let Debra go, because I thought she was a very worthwhile person. But, from now on, it is going to be SO easy to let people go if it's necessary. (RF_12_5A: 1397-1429; HLTH_ALL: 490-493)
When Fletcher fired Beard, Fletcher became more difficult for staff to predict. If he could get rid of someone who was supposed to be so tight with him, maybe he wasn't so nice. If Fletcher was black and Beard was black and he fired her, maybe there wasn't this black conspiracy. Fletcher began to pay more attention to the internal agency matters. His actions after this episode were to focus his efforts on providing what he called "objective data" on the AIDS issue and infant mortality to the public.

Fletcher's early months were also rocked by his appointment of Baxter Hill. Hill misrepresented his relationship to Fletcher by meeting with many groups and represented that he was the emissary of Director Fletcher, promising grants and, if special favors and status were granted to Hill, he would be sure to take that back to Fletcher, who would be pleased by them treating his special emissary so well. For many internal stakeholders, it was taken as another situation where [black] members of the department used Fletcher's skin color to their personal advantage. Some, such as Hill, were pursuing their own initiatives that were not the administration's initiatives. Late in Fletcher's first term, it was publicized in the *Dispatch* that Hill was a convicted felon, who used several social security numbers to apply for various positions in state government. The public outcry was tremendous and he resigned.60 Between Hill and Beard, Fletcher had to spend an inordinate amount of time putting out little "brush fires." He had to communicate to put out these fires in, what many staff characterized as the few days a week that he was in the office.

---

60This author could not determine if the Hill story was planted by someone within the Health Department.
Setting up a Decision-making Structure

Fletcher also found that this assignment was bigger than what he had faced as a physician.

The one [difficulty] that I found the greatest is the fact that I am a physician and I'm kinda one of those folks that believes that if he doesn't do it himself personally that it won't get done, it won't get done quite the way that it should be. It was very hard for me to delegate responsibilities. Um, unfortunately, or fortunately in a department as vast as the Department of Health, with issues as multifaceted as the department has, with documents being produced in such horrendous amounts as the department has, very soon you realize that you can't do it all. And so I begrudgingly learned how to delegate responsibility, although I have to keep my fingers in things to make myself feel that I'm still doing it. (CLASS: 2857-2878)

This produced great difficulty for Fletcher's staff in the Department. He didn't ask them for their sense of priorities, as Fletcher had his own and, Fletcher believed he had all the information he needed to make decisions.

Fletcher also saw a different focus for public health than was the traditional perspective. For Fletcher, health is a relationship between a physician and a patient.

The first thing I did in taking the office, was to analyze the system of public health. To say, What has existed? What needs to exist? and How can I bring about or facilitate changes that will cause these positive forward motions. I had seen in the past, public health arena as being one in which individuals had gotten considerable administrative expertise but had not looked at the associated concern dealing with individuals and programs that basically pubic health, no matter what you might say about it, is NOT pushing papers. Public health is not different than any doctor-patient relationship. One tries to set us a system of treatment in which you try to obtain the optimum outcome for your patient, but rather than working with individuals, you're working with a group of 10.5 million individuals comprising the state of Ohio. (CLASS: 1543-1566).

For Fletcher he saw that he did not fit with the traditionalists. He decided that since he did not have the commitments to "public health" as defined by many of the older male physicians in his department, he could take latitudes that others could not -- and to bring an innovative approach to the Department.

I saw that traditionally, public health systems had been designed so that the system drove the client. I wanted to make sure that the client drove the system. reason being, if you have a particular population that you wish to reach with a message, education, information, you can approach it from two ways. You can say, "The way I receive information and the majority of people in the United States can say I
receive information in an upper middle class white protestant mode of information disbursement." (CLASS: 1572-1585)

Just as Fletcher saw that the department was fractionated into fiefdoms, administratively called bureaus, he saw that the department had one focus for its clients. They had one type of client in mind. And it was not the client that Fletcher saw for the department. Fletcher was concerned with ethnic minorities and elderly clients.

Dr. Fletcher told a story that demonstrates his reliance on his previous training and socialization as a physician. In the following story, regarding a bureau chief's allegation that Fletcher violated the chain of command, we can see how Dr. Fletcher did not understand the bureau chief's desire to protect the information arising from his program.

In the hospital, yeah, I, I'd like to talk to a pathologist and get, but if I'm really in a hurry I'll run down to the tech and I'll say, "Gimme that slide so I can take a look." Now in the hospital, the pathologist will say, "He was in a hurry; he just had to take a look." But HERE, if you run down to the tech to get some information, it's assumed that, uh, "You think I can't do my job or, or, you fell that you can't get the information from me." And so it-, its kind of a put-down. (RF_12_5a: 1754-1767).

What we see is that Fletcher was relying on his own expertise and as a physician, he had more of a context of the patient so that a fuller interpretation of the "slide" could be given from his perspective. By contrast, in an organization, the bureau chief would be able to give the better interpretation to the data, yet Dr. Fletcher assumed that he would be able to give that interpretation. In addition to describing how Dr. Fletcher learned about how to get information from within the hierarchy, this story points out how Dr. Fletcher considered himself different than the physicians in public health. He viewed public health as a manner of developing systems for physicians dealing with patients instead of pushing paper. Fletcher didn't see the relevance of his story in that he as the oncologist and the pathologist were relative equals in a hospital setting. The pathologist has a well-accepted role to help the other physicians make diagnoses. In the Health Department, Fletcher had no equal. It was a power relationship and he was viewed as misusing his power and authority.

Fletcher took the route of least resistance by taking note of obsessive compulsive personalities in the agency. He would call the person and say,
So-and-so? This is the Director. I'm trying to get this [some action] done by this time. Now it's probably inappropriate for me to tell you, or to ask you to do this directly. I'm going to call your bureau chief and he will be asking you, but I thought I might give you a little advance warning so that you can uh, gauge your time so that it's not going to push anything. It's just, I'm just that kind of guy. I don't want to see you rushed and I'm thinking out for you. And so I'm going to call your bureau chief now, so, thanks. (RF_12_19: 957-972).

Fletcher knew full well that the person was shifting tasks so as to meet his request as soon as the telephone receiver was put down.

Time Away from the Office

Fletcher spent most of his time away from the office. In the words of some of the staff, "He wasn't at the office much." While much of Fletcher's early years were spent traveling around the state talking to other health officials and to members of the media, staff only saw that he wasn't at the office. Later in his tenure, when he was in the office, he commuted from Dayton, so Fletcher's day at his Health Department office started at 10:30 a.m. and ended at or before 4:30 p.m. For most staff with whom I spoke, his schedule prohibited Fletcher from dealing with the day-to-day problems. Most would go to Tenenbaum and, later, after Tenenbaum left, Jamie Young. Many staffers expressed that it was likely that Tenenbaum did not notify Fletcher about his decisions and, this led to Tenenbaum's early departure (e.g., HLTH_AL2: 1212-1219). Many bureau chiefs would call Fletcher's office as a courtesy, expecting him to not be there to handle problems. Some began to resent that he wasn't there.

Personal Development.

Dr. Fletcher had an idea of what was expected of him, and those things that weren't expectations, were open for exploration. It was through the expectations of others that he studied to become a medical doctor and, through the influence of a few selected others, selected an internal medicine residency and a fellowship in oncology. It started with the family sacrifice to put his father through podiatric school in Cleveland while his mother worked at Wright-Patterson air force base near Dayton.

And so from, from an early age my grandparents, my parents, uh, the people in my school basically uh, setup a system in which, if an expectation was given, no excuses, you do it. Okay? "I mean, don't tell me that that you won't do it, you do it." And so, that, that's always a part of who I was.
This influence continued through his undergraduate education at Fiske, one of the oldest historically black institution in Nashville, Tennessee, where he did his undergraduate schooling. Fletcher was quite active in school activities. However, the expectations of classmates and others were sublimated to the larger goal of becoming a physician. And, when Fletcher was undergoing his residency training in internal medicine, he ran across a mentor named Barrett, an oncologist who wore a beard, who made a habit of going through the annals of medical obscurity to make a diagnosis. And he pegged Fletcher, "You're going to make a good oncologist." Fletcher protested that he was going into gastroenterology, but Barrett prevailed after he got Fletcher to apply for a fellowship with the American Cancer Society, and saw to it that Fletcher received the fellowship at Vanderbilt University.

From his experiences at Vanderbilt, we also see that Fletcher was outspoken regarding his beliefs. In the following passage, we are able to see how Fletcher was adamant about exercising his professional knowledge to ease human suffering.

And we were over at the VA [Veteran's Administration] and they didn't want us to treat patients that had non-small-cell lung cancer, but we wanted to treat them anyway. But they finally did some sort of political edict to tell us not to. We, he would have us write on every chart that, or we would say, "We believe that the non-small cell carcinoma should be treated because it has a uh, 46 percent chance of response with given therapy, however, because of the administrative desire not to treat such patients, we reluctantly will withhold what could possibly be life-giving therapy to this patient." (RF_1_3: 937-954)

By writing this on the charts of the patients, the VA was pressured to change its policy. The VA had to contend with the doctors writing the compelling statements on the medical charts. The significance is that the charts are a legal record, a record that cannot be changed without the permission of the attending physician or by a very lengthy procedure.

**Summing Up**

In summary, Dr. Ron Fletcher was too good at creating his job. He believed that the discretion one has are self-determined. In the following two excerpts, we can see the general philosophy that Dr. Fletcher followed in setting his agenda and dealing with the Governor.

All the latitudes are defined by yourself. Uh and again, it, it's one of those things where, being unsure, uh, you say to yourself, "Well, let me take the sure path of doing things. You know, let's not, uh, let's not shake too many trees, let's not put too many holes in the bottom of the boat at this point." Uh, until you know that
you can rebuild the boat, sail off, or, you know, you can replant the forest. And so it was just, uh, putting some confines, uh, on myself. Um, being very, very conservative about how I, uh, dealt with, uh, major issues. And again, over a period of time, I guess it's that '88 that, um, really, uh, really '87, was actually just about half-year. I just had to learn about the department. '88 was really the growth and learning curve year, uh and the expansion of latitudes. So that, by the end of '88, you know, give me some water to walk on, cuz, if I want to do it, I'm gonna do it (RF_12_5a: 2073-2100; also in RF_12_5b: 1-27).

It was at this point that he was tackling his own agenda and had little regard for other's agendas. One example of this is Condom week. Fletcher had the health department work with local health departments to promote safe sex. Condom week was an important agenda item because it fit with two of Fletcher's agenda items (teen age pregnancy prevention and AIDS prevention). However, when the media and conservative legislators began to question the morality of condom week, Fletcher thought that the governor's office wanted him to cancel the programs and issue a release stating that the department had made an error in judgment. For Fletcher, the program was not ill-advised, it was right on target. People might be uncomfortable, but the issue was here to stay. And, as a physician, he felt that he had a responsibility to make people aware and to resolve the problem.

I told them that uh, if it was an error in judgment then I should resign, and uh, but I was not going to put the Department up for ridicule because we HADN'T made an error in judgment. And so I suggested that, . . . , if anyone was offended, we apologize, but the audience that we sent the information to had the knowledge to understand and not be offended by what we said, and that our intention was not to offend, but to inform. . . .(RF_12_19: 1671-1683)

Fletcher knew that he was unaware of all the political facets of the position. He depended on his staff to inform him of the problems he would be facing. He would tell his staff what he was going to do and when he was going to leave, and they had a short period of time to inform him of their opinions about what the impact would be.

He made little effort to tie the Governor's objectives to his objectives. In fact, many staffers spoke that Fletcher made little effort to learn of the agency's priorities. Fletcher focused on his own projects. The problem with Fletcher's strategy was that only the governor's priorities projects and things on the governor's agenda get funded. Otherwise, you have to go out and get funding from grants. Fletcher was so effective at creating his own job, that he forgot to invite the governor to adopt the department's or Fletcher's policies as his own. Fletcher did not pay much attention to the budget, except by presenting the budget to the senate committee. The purpose of the budget in a political arena is to sell the product of the agency to the Governor, and then to sell them to the
Governor. Fletcher inherited this first agenda, and did not see it as his. That left him with two years before he would have the opportunity to develop his initiatives and sell them to the governor.

It was also clear from early meetings between Fletcher and staff from the governor's office didn't give Fletcher a mandate. They had no plan to hold Fletcher accountable and little way to make a judgment about Fletcher that was performance related. Fletcher was guided by his own idea of what the agenda should be. He did not ask staff for their ideas and he did not ask what they were working on. Fletcher focused his actions to accomplish that agenda.

Most importantly, there was a lack of purpose in the Health Department's administrative services. The process becomes the objective. Fletcher did not integrate his objectives with those of the Department. Staffers spoke tremendous platitudes of Fletcher, but did not speak of his administrative acumen. One members spoke of looking at a newspaper and reading about a new program Fletcher announced.

I asked him how much it cost. He said it wasn't going to cost us anything. I asked him "What are you going to do?" It became clear that he hadn't thought it through as a manager would. What are our goals? What are our process objectives? What are our externalities? (HLTH_ALL: 1138-11147)

Fletcher had not thought about how to hold staff accountable. One task of the director is to think the idea through or to have other think the ideas through and then to ask them questions. Then, after the idea is arguably acceptable, think about how to find funding or how to alter present funding, or how can present programs incorporate additional activity. Instead, Fletcher used another process. He determined whether the idea fit his objectives, and then he would make commitments of resources. Fletcher was more focused on process than actual policy performance. One staffer labeled this as the "rain dance."

You hire someone to do a rain dance. People begin to see that the dance does not bring rain, but the dancer begins to tell others that the dance is so beautiful that they should be evaluating him on that basis. The danger is that people begin to evaluate the rain dancer's performance on that basis.

The real danger is that Fletcher and his close advisors began to evaluate their performance on its aesthetic quality, not on the outcome. That is, they begin to focus on the process and not on the outcome of their activity. It is clear that the internal staff and the governor's office knew and, to
some extent, appreciated Fletcher's external activities. However, when asked about his accomplishments, they were blinded to his symbolic accomplishments. The focus while in process was on the process, unless it influenced what they were trying to accomplish.
Chapter VII

PATTERNS IN TAKING CHARGE

Over the course of the previous chapters there are six findings that appear as constant through the variation in agencies and agency directors. These findings will serve as the building block of the beginnings of a grounded theory of creating your job: taking charge in the public sector. Before we discuss these six elements, let us return to the sample selection criteria to determine what impact these characteristics had upon the three agency directors during their initial experiences.

Sample Selection Criteria

Situational Adversity

Two of the three agency directors were selected because the Governor’s office considered their agencies to be "in trouble." The Ohio Bureau of Employment Services was facing a credibility crisis as a former Administrator, Roberta Steinbacher, was associated with unlawful activity and hounded out of her position as Administrator of the Bureau of Employment Services. Steinbacher was accused of participating in unlawful activity -- not competitively bidding telephone contracts. Steinbacher was also hounded by the Plain Dealer for her handling of a charge of sexual harassment by her chief deputy. The accused party resigned shortly before Steinbacher’s health failed her, and she resigned. The acting administrator, Grace Kilbane transferred an attorney to the position of approving all agency contracts (Kettl’s [1987] regulation-recentralization reflex). By placing this function under the control of a person she trusted, Kilbane was able to say that she had addressed the situation. Kilbane did not address the sexual harassment.

Saunders came to the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (OBES) as the results of an investigation were being announced by a special investigator. She told the press that an investigation was underway, and that when the investigation was completed, she would tell them, and with the investigator, would address all their questions. In addition, Saunders invited a reporter from the Cleveland Plain Dealer, a reporter who was not trusted by members of the SLG, to sit in her office and review documents. Saunders announced an "open door" policy, and a reporter sat taking and dictating notes with Saunders going about her business at her desk. In doing this, Saunders
demonstrated to the press that they (OBES) were an open agency and demonstrated to the agency that she wasn't afraid of the press.

Geno Natalucci-Persichetti was appointed after the tenure of Thomas Mullen, who had replaced James Rogers. Rogers, as the reader may recall, was incarcerated for unlawful activity while Administrator at the East Cleveland Public Library, and was, at this time (November, 1988), undergoing trial for accepting kickbacks for construction projects funded while he was director of DYS and for establishing a phantom employee system and absconding with the salary payments to these phantom employees. Rogers also was extremely political, but not in a partisan sense. Rogers gave patronage to certain individuals, including giving jobs in DYS to his political friends and associates. These people were, in many cases, unqualified in terms of policy orientation or in terms of managerial experience and knowledge. Mullen spent a tremendous amount of time working with employees who had experienced the stress of defending their jobs and their place of employment as credible. Mullen also spent time locating Rogers' appointments and when they were not productively employed, Mullen set about documenting their case and, when possible, firing them. Mullen tired and reduced the amount of time he spent in Columbus. His contact with the deputy directors running the agency decreased, and he announced his resignation. He then set about declaring what the policy toward adjudicated juvenile felons should be and should have been, and pointing out who and what organizations were holding the agency back from that policy. In doing this, he alienated many of the more powerful stakeholders. Natalucci-Persichetti was appointed and had to address the internal stakeholder's image of Mullen as the protector of the "children." Even thought Mullen and Natalucci-Persichetti were of the same philosophical orientation regarding how to treat these adjudicated juvenile felons (not children), Natalucci-Persichetti had to spend his time working to reduce the damage Mullen created by lambasting the agency's stakeholders after announcing his resignation. Natalucci-Persichetti lost the opportunity to convince the staff that he and Mullen favored using the same treatment modality because he had to fight with the general assembly (many of whom Mullen had alienated) over cuts to DYS's budget. While he was externally focused, lower level staff retreated into the familiar. They focused on dealing with misdemeanants and not the increasingly violent clientele they were getting into their system.

Dr. Ron Fletcher was appointed after the eighteen month tenure of Dr. Thom Halpin. Halpin did not want the appointment to the position of Director of Health. Halpin followed his own initiatives and followed the policy initiatives of the Governor. Halpin's actions to support the Governor's health policy agenda were limited to placing the items in the budget and working with the former and current health policy advisors. Still, there was no agenda for Fletcher to pursue and
with Fletcher's appointment, Halpin returned to his Bureau (Preventive Medicine) to focus on an exciting time with a new preventable disease (AIDS).

Proposition 1: The more the presence of a predecessor proves controversial, the more effort the successor will have to establish working relationships with the stakeholders who thought the predecessor controversial.

Origin of the Successor: Relative "Outsideness"

Two of the three agency directors were employed in state government. This previous employment seems to make a considerable difference in how they first acted in their positions. Geno Natalucci-Persichetti and Ellen O'Brien Saunders were experienced in the ways of government Although each pursued different tactics in working with employees socialized into government service, they have some commonalities in how they approached working with staff. Each also knew the relative value and importance of legislators, stakeholders, and of the budget and went out of their way to work with them, and involved the governor's office when it would be useful to the agency or they thought it would be useful to the governor. By contrast, Dr. Fletcher was actively involved in working with health department staff in his work with the Governor's Task Force on Minority Health. The task force examined the social forces impacting the provision of health care services. However, one cannot know government without being employed in government. Government jobs, especially executive positions, are not well conceptualized as precise, well bordered projects with clear goals, objectives resources, authority and accountability (Fenn, 1987; p. 61). They are better conceptualized as "hunting licenses" where decisions are made in complex, technical areas, with no clear answers to ambiguous questions. Fletcher discovered this rather quickly, evidenced by his hiring of Debra Beard when he believed that the Governor's office wanted him to hire her for a position that he didn't think he needed. When Fletcher thought that he should do what the governor's office told him to do, he was looking for precise borders to his position. Natalucci-Persichetti and Saunders each thought about how their actions would impact the Governor -- not on how the governor would influence them.

The second distinction made in the literature about the relative "insideness" of the agency director is whether the executive was appointed from inside Ohio. Dr. Ron Fletcher and Geno Natalucci-Persichetti were appointed from within Ohio and Ellen O'Brien Saunders was appointed from a position in Wisconsin. While Geno Natalucci-Persichetti knew much of the political situation within the state, Dr. Fletcher was not aware of the value and status of certain actors, such as the power that has been attributed to Speaker of the House, Vernal G. Riffe. Natalucci-Persichetti also
was able to call upon contacts and consultants within Ohio, with whom he had experience and confidence to lead staff retreats. Saunders brought in an organizational consultant from Wisconsin. Fletcher used someone the governor's office recommended to him.\textsuperscript{61} Fletcher was aware of the power of various officials, but this information had been provided to him by current and former agency directors when he made his first set of "rounds" prior to his appointment. Saunders faced a much more difficult situation coming in from out-of-state. She had no idea what the words "Vern Riffe" meant, not that he was the Speaker of the House or that he had tremendous influence, beyond his positional authority. In addition, Saunders was not from "Inside the Governor's Regime." While Dr. Fletcher and Natalucci-Persichetti were appointed from positions within the Governor's regime, Saunders was appointed from out-of-state with little idea of the Governor's policy or program agenda, nor of the personalities and processes of the Governor's office. Natalucci-Persichetti was serving as the Director of Adult and Community Parole within the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (the adult corrections system) and was quite aware of the personnel both within the governor's office dealing with the adult agency, but also with the personnel dealing with juvenile corrections. Fletcher knew the Governor's aide for Health Affairs and was familiar with the issues facing the Health Department because of his position as the Co-chair of the Task Force on Minority Health. The reason a director "should" have substantive expertise is that the Governor and the staff in the Governor's office must determine whom to trust. Without knowing they can get straight answers from the agency staff, and especially the agency head, they will work to develop their own source of expertise. While an "outsider's" opinion is a good check-and-balance to the views of the agency head, whom governor's office staff often view as "captured" by the interest groups, the misgivings and lack of confidence directed toward an agency head who is not trusted as a knowledgeable source of policy information creates a difficult situation. If the Director is not trusted by the Governor, and the Governor is getting information elsewhere, we see the limits to the agency director's authority. In addition, even if the governor gets better advice elsewhere, who will implement that advice? On the other hand, if the governor appoints someone personally trusted, without experience at this level or with the agency's policy agenda, there will be a long period of learning of the agency, its critical tasks, the strategic issues for the agency, and the critical stakeholders to action. Thus, the governor would be wise to appoint someone with experience in the policy area -- someone from "Inside the Policy Area."

\textsuperscript{61} When the retreat did not accomplish what Fletcher thought it should, he had another negative expectancy placed upon advice from the governor's office. See also discussion of the hiring and firing of Debra Beard in chapter VI.
All three individuals were appointed with experience in the substantive policy area of the agency. Ellen O'Brien Saunders was appointed from a position within the Job Training Partnership of Wisconsin. She also had experience in another of the agency's program areas, Employment Services. With experience in two of the four principal programs of OBES, she was easily accepted by the Ohio staff. She was able to ask the correct questions and was able to give her deputies a modicum of policy direction. She was assisted in the fact that the programs of OBES were, at the time she arrived, mostly federally funded and regulated.

As mentioned earlier, Fletcher is a physician (oncologist), and had learned much of the issues related to the department from his tenure on the Minority Health task force. In addition, Dr. Fletcher learned about working on Governor Celeste's cabinet by interviewing members of the Cabinet. Fletcher also asked Task Force personnel and legislators about critical departmental personnel.

Natalucci-Persichetti was experienced in most areas of adult corrections. He had worked as a parole worker, an institutional social worker, and in the third-sector in an administrative position. However, Natalucci-Persichetti had experience in the adult system, but this experience was not deemed legitimate by many of the staff members of DYS. While the studies of taking charge and executive succession do not specify whose perspective is important in defining whether a person is an "insider" or an "outsider" (see Gordon & Rosen, 1981), it is clearly an application of Miles' Law: "Where you stand depends upon where you sit." It seems as though each stakeholder assesses whether the successor is an insider. For example, an employee of the organization (internal stakeholder), determines tacitly whether the successor is an insider if the successor's mode of operating is consistent with the agency's mode of operating. One can also examine the activity of the leadership of the juvenile judges association to conclude that they considered him to be an "outsider" to their realm of determining policy for adjudicated juvenile felons. Natalucci-Persichetti's "intrusions," though lawful, were those of an outsider to their system and they reacted accordingly, bringing what forces they could bear to further their policies. Natalucci-Persichetti had a substantial personal and professional relationship with Marilee Chinnici-Zuercher, the DYS Deputy Director for programs. Prior to his arrival, Natalucci-Persichetti met with Chinnici-Zuercher and discussed the agency and its personnel.

In short, it seems that a person must be a relative insider in knowing about the stakeholder's policy preferences and mode of operations. Thus, a person assuming an executive position must act to convince the stakeholder groups, groups who are not monotonic in their preferences, that they
(the successor) are an insider to that group. If the successor is willing to accept the personnel, it is less necessary to be an organizational insider or an insider to the governor's regime.

**Proposition 2:** The more the successor is an organizational, policy, and regime insider, the easier the successor will learn the critical tasks of the agency and develop successful working relationships with critical stakeholders.

**Sex of Director**

Two of the directors in this study were male and one was female. For the agencies in situational adversity, one was male and one was female, however, each was separated from the director who was seen to cause the situational adversity by an interim director, and in each case the interim director was of the same gender as the director in this study. The third director was a male of color.

There appear to be subtle differences in how the men (Natalucci-Persichetti and Fletcher) assumed their responsibilities that is different than how Saunders assumed her responsibilities. First, both men assumed that they were "in charge" and did not work to develop mutually satisfying relationships with staff. Natalucci-Persichetti started acting as the director prior to his first week by telling his secretary to convey to his managing officers that they were to come to a retreat. This strategy of adjustment has continued through Natalucci-Persichetti's tenure. Natalucci-Persichetti was told by the Governor's chief of staff that if he came in and made personnel changes, he would be setting himself up for trouble, as the employees had been through quite a bit with Rogers and with Mullen's (often indiscriminant) actions to remove many of Rogers' appointees. What Natalucci-Persichetti heard was that he could not make any personnel changes. When the juvenile judges managed to get the General Assembly to cut DYS's budget, Natalucci-Persichetti was able to negotiate a solution with the Speaker of the House and was able to redesign his organization. He was able to cut seven positions, and was able to move people irrespective of the earlier suggestions from the governor's office. This argument presents a paradox of sorts. First, if Lukensmeyer had ordered Natalucci-Persichetti not to make any changes, reorganizing people as he did would have been disregarding orders. However, if this was not an order, why is this an issue at all? The concept presented here is that Natalucci-Persichetti perceived that he was ordered and that he was able to avoid punitive action from the chief of staff because the orders to cut staff came from a higher authority -- the speaker of the house. Natalucci-Persichetti replaced people in his SLG as they moved on -- and in some cases (e.g., George Sheehan), Natalucci-Persichetti was pushing to get them to voluntarily move. Natalucci-Persichetti replaced these members of his SLG with people he knew
or had confidence in, with two exceptions: Hearcel Craig and Carol Rapp. Natalucci-Persichetti believed that it was good politics to accept Craig because of Craig's ties to important members of the Ohio House of Representatives. Rapp had the skills that Natalucci-Persichetti needed to get his message out. Otherwise, the changes in the SLG have been replacements from DR&C.

Fletcher had the ability to accept people as they were without judgment about their worth or inherent value. He had well developed listening skills. In the parlance of the day, he is an active listener, and is extremely polite. Prior to his arrival, Fletcher had an idea of what his mark would be on the agency. His agenda was set rather early, and only slightly modified. While Fletcher's listening skills benefitted him in those early days, he went out to hear what people had to say about the issues. He did not ask them what they were doing, nor did he invite them to participate in his agenda. Instead, he pursued his personal agenda, creating incentives for others to participate in his agenda.

Saunders, by contrast to Natalucci-Persichetti, accepted the people in their positions and gave them the opportunity to be competent by negotiating observable performance standards with each member of her SLG. Given the situational adversity of OBES, members expected the successor to come in and make strategic replacements based on each member of the SLG's closeness to Steinbacher. Instead, Saunders and Lukensmeyer discussed each member, and Saunders, in Lukensmeyer's words, "was willing to take a neutral stand on every one of them, set up a cut-point for each one of them around, 'You stay or go based on this link in this performance.'" Some members were replaced and, from the discussion in chapter IV, strategic replacements may have taken longer than if Saunders had come in with the stance of, "I gotta remove Roberta's deadwood!" or "I gotta get people's attention by firing a few people." Saunders would not have received the agency commitment to her and to her programs if she had come in and replaced people.

Saunders and Fletcher had tremendous listening skills and were willing to take a "one-down" approach. By contrast Fletcher and Natalucci-Persichetti had good speaking and presentation skills. So what accounts for the difference? Natalucci-Persichetti believed he had to change many of the people in his strategic leadership group in order to achieve his mission and mandate. For members of the strategic leadership group, going or staying depended on congruence with Natalucci-Persichetti's perspective. With Saunders, explicit performance standards were negotiated with each member of the leadership group. Fletcher assumed that each member was competent. To the extent that each person was willing to work together, they would remain in their positions. To this extent, we see that each of the three chose different methods for attempting to establish effective working
relationships with their strategic leadership group. Fletcher assumed they were there to work with him. Saunders negotiated performance expectations. Natalucci-Persichetti set about replacing those who did not agree with his position. It is in these three cases, we see the two general models for establishing effective working relationships: (1) working with existing staff by negotiating expectations, and (2) making strategic replacements. While it may be an overstatement to generalize on the basis of gender, we make the following proposition to be empirically tested.

Proposition 3: The sex and ethnic origin of the agency director will be directly related to the manner in which successors establish working relationships with members of the strategic leadership group.

Priority for Governor's Attention

Two of the agencies in this study (OBES & DYS) were, in the governor's construction, under operating conditions of situational adversity, as mentioned in an earlier section in this chapter. The other agency (HEALTH) was not under immediate attention, but a "healthy Ohio" was stated as one of the Governor's three priorities in the budget under consideration at the time that Fletcher was appointed. So, in some small measure, each of the three agencies was a priority for the Governor's attention.

First, HEALTH was a priority for the governor's agenda and the policy issues had been in development for a number of years. In this budget cycle, most of these initiatives had been funded in the governor's budget. With the Governor's policy agenda essentially completed by the time he arrived at the Health Department, Fletcher did not learn that the governor's priorities are the priorities that get funded. This is a situation that might have been different if Fletcher had been inside the Governor's regime or had been appointed at an earlier time. As such, the task of creating your job under conditions of gubernatorially enacted situational adversity may create more authority than the mere priority for the governor's attention.

Proposition 4: Those appointed under conditions of gubernatorially enacted situational adversity will have an easier time making changes and will be seen as more effective by the governor's office.

62 The other two were jobs and educational excellence.
Other Factors of Importance

In addition to the factors we suspected to be important prior to this study, there are additional thematic areas deemed to be of importance to the study of strategic leadership transitions and the creation of one's executive leadership position. In the following sections, we review the factors common to the three cases.

Search Committee Activities

The first process common to all candidates was the Governor's office's attempt to use a search committee to develop external stakeholder commitment to the successor. This commitment was to be accomplished by having the search committee develop a list of characteristics and attributes of the ideal director for this agency at that time. The search committee then designed a process to search for candidates who met those criteria, interviewed them, and evaluated each candidate on the basis of the candidate's strengths and weaknesses, and forwarded the entire list to the governor's office. If the search committee was nurtured by its chairperson, and accomplished its work, the search committee would recommend persons they thought acceptable or desirable.

In the case of DYS, the process worked well. The search committee was chaired by Carla Edelfson, the Governor's office human services liaison. Edelfson knew that the agency had to be reworked both in terms of its policy and management, and Edelfson worked the process and the committee. With HEALTH and OBES, the process did not work as well. The OBES search was working well until the search committee chair focused his attention to his other responsibilities. Thomas Chema, chair of the Public Utilities Commission, was attempting to negotiate a solution to an extremely complicated legal question about how to allow three electric utilities to charge off their losses for a nuclear power plant without tripling electric rates.63 In short, Chema failed to get stakeholder commitment to the slate of candidates, and many of the candidates selected by the search committee were individuals the governor could not appoint, for one reason or another. The search was taken inside the governor's office and begun anew. In the case of HEALTH, there was no mandate from the governor regarding the agency. Thus, the search committee chair had no guidance for developing characteristics and attributes. The search committee focused on the statutory requirement that the Director of Health had to be a licensed medical doctor, and the committee searched for a physician who would be willing to accept a cut in pay to take the Director's position.

---

63State law mandated that operating losses had to be recouped during the year the losses were "accounted." Thus, the entire $20 billion was to be charged to electric utility consumers during 1988.
Proposition 5: The more clear the Governor's agenda for an agency, the more the search committee will take that agenda into account when making recommendations for agency director selection.

The more the search committee work develops commitment to the ideal characteristics and attributes of the director, the more likely the stakeholders involved in the committee will develop acquiescence, if not commitment, to the new director's policy changes.

Efforts to Heal the Wounds Created by the Predecessor

The second pre-selection activity was the efforts to "heal" the staff of the agencies that were situationally adverse. With OBES, Lukensmeyer arranged for a consultant to come in and to allow members of the SLG to address their pent-up feelings. Many members of the SLG had tremendous loyalty to Steinbacher, and when she was "skewered" by the Plain Dealer, the members of the SLG felt that they got skewered. And they also felt that Steinbacher was "left to hang" by the Governor, and that meant that they were left to hang. In addition, the governor was feeling pressure from the state's papers for not making cabinet-level appointments. Agency staff were beginning to make allegiances to Kilbane, who had served for four months, at the time of the retreat (June, 1988), and some members of the staff were as committed to Kilbane as they had been to Steinbacher. Lukensmeyer produced a consultant to psychologically intervene and provide an appropriate outlet for the negative emotion that had been pent-up for six months. Mullen's tenure permitted Natalucci-Persichetti to arrive on the scene without having to deal with the emotions of the more traumatic past, much like Saunders. Mullen rented auditoriums to meet with large groups of staff and to deal with the negative emotions from the Rogers' tenure. Mullen also fired many of Rogers' personal patronage appointments. But Mullen left Natalucci-Persichetti with a much-tangled treatment philosophy. While Mullen said many of the words that the social workers wanted to hear about treatment, his final words (reported in chapter V as his "parting shots") about shifting away from incarceration and treatment to de-carceration of non-violent property offenders and incarcerating violent felony offenders, passed without hearing by many lower level staff.

Proposition 6: In times of gubernatorially-enacted situational adversity, the more the governor and the governor's office intervenes with activities to heal the emotional and psychological wounds of the predecessor, the more likely the successor will develop successful interpersonal relations.
While this is tempered in DYS, the contingent condition is that Mullen burnt many bridges with many individuals in and outside the agency. While Mullen cleared the way for Natalucci-Persichetti to take charge, Mullen also sabotaged his own earlier efforts to change stakeholder's perception of the juvenile justice problem by dividing the stakeholders.

**Mandate**

Saunders negotiated her mandate directly with the Governor, prior to taking the position. In effect, Saunders created her job, and then negotiated acceptance of this job with Celeste. This also led to additional problems for Saunders as the Governor's office was constantly looking over her shoulder to see how she was doing on that job.

Natalucci-Persichetti came in with a method for dealing with adjudicated juvenile felons, and for referring the rest of the youths (misdemeanants) to the counties so that they were not "schooled in crime" and had no additional traumas that would lead to their transference to the adult system. This agenda was the agenda of the dominant group of criminologists in, not only Ohio, but across the nation. In fact, his predecessor, Thomas Mullen, after Natalucci-Persichetti's appointment and before Natalucci-Persichetti arrived on the job, went around the state telling anybody who would listen that there were troubles and that these problems had to be addressed before things were going to get better. In fact, the recommendations that were made by Mullen were the same agenda that Natalucci-Persichetti was voicing to the governor and to the agency's SLG.

There was no mandate for Dr. Fletcher to carry out in the Health Department -- either managerially or in its policies. That there was no mandate left Fletcher the opportunity to create his own job. He focused his attention on those items that interested him. While his staff was not upset that he focused his time on these issues, many expressed displeasure that he did not invite the governor to take on his (Fletcher's) agenda as his own. In that respect, Fletcher lost the opportunity to transfer these issues from the desk of the Director of Health to the governor's office where they could be translated into budget priorities. In addition, Fletcher did not ask the senior staff what their priorities were, or even try to see that there might be some overlap and that by focusing on this overlap, these issues might have lasted longer than they would. As it is, most believe that Fletcher's initiatives went out the door with him.

**Proposition 7:** The more clear the mandate, the easier it will be for the Governor's office to evaluate and give a "successful" rating to the activities of the agency director.
That is, the less clear the mandate, the easier it will be to create your job. The less clear the mandate, the lesser the likelihood that the agency director will be positively evaluated by the governor's office.

**Presence of Acting Administrators**

Each of the three agency directors replaced an acting director. In OBES, Grace Kilbane wanted to be appointed to the position of the Administrator. Even after serving for seven months, and after learning in the newspaper that she would not be appointed, she kept her hopes up to be appointed. One could argue that she had to maintain this charade in order to keep the attention of the senior management staff focused on productive endeavors. By allowing the senior staff to believe that she might be appointed, she fostered the development of commitment between some of the staff to her and her style. Saunders had to devise a strategy to address this commitment after her arrival. Saunders' strategy was to accept all individuals, not-with-standing their relationship with Steinbacher or Kilbane. When Kilbane was appointed to be Regional Administrator of the U. S. Department of Labor's Kansas City region, staff loyalty and affect for Kilbane was preserved. She had moved on to a better position.

In DYS, Mullen sought the appointment as the Director. He wanted the job, but later changed his mind and in his last months, reframed his tenure as one of an acting director. This change in intentions allowed lower level staff to create an image of Mullen that was not consonant with the reality of the managerial role that Mullen created. Staff were evenly divided in their commitment to each of Mullen's roles and policy sets. Natalucci-Persichetti had to address this disparity between the public policy pronouncements by Mullen and by the staff's belief in what Mullen's policy (treatment modality) posture was. Natalucci-Persichetti's focus on facts and objective reality left him ill-prepared to address this perceptual disparity in the lower levels of the agency. Mullen's legacy for Natalucci-Persichetti was an (albeit divided) employee perception that was not consonant with both Mullen's and Natalucci-Persichetti's policy posture. In addition, Mullen irritated many of the agency's major stakeholders, including the leadership of the Juvenile Judges Association, and the leadership in the Ohio General Assembly.

In the Health Department, Halpin never wanted the Director's job. In the interview conducted for this study, Halpin revealed that he accepted the acting appointment as a favor to the Governor. Halpin didn't see himself as a political appointee. By virtue of holding himself as an acting director and by having a position to go after the successor's appointment, Halpin created the situation where the successor could walk in, without addressing the relationships between the
previous director and the other senior managers. In addition, there were few policy initiatives for Fletcher to attach himself and his attention focus.

Proposition 8: The more the acting director takes a place-holding role, the easier for the successor to assume the position and develop interpersonal relationships with members of the strategic leadership group.

The Means of Announcing the Appointment

Ellen O'Brien Saunders' appointment was announced via press conference. Members of the strategic leadership group learned for certain whom the successor would be the morning of the press conference when Lukensmeyer came over to meet with them and to tell them of the appointment. Lukensmeyer also had each member write on an index card, some facet of the agency and its operations that they wanted Saunders to know. After the press conference, Saunders had the OBES public information officer transcribe and distribute to all members of the agency, (1) the governor's remarks, (2) her statement, and (3) the media questions and her responses during the press conference. When Saunders arrived for work two weeks later, staff had some knowledge of what she would focus upon, and had the ability to call their contacts in Wisconsin to see what type of person she was and what they could expect. While this is partly dependent on the situation that state employment security agencies have similar structure, tasks, and organization, staff from any agency will call to learn what they can about the successor to relieve their uncertainty. After Saunders arrived, she met each of her two deputies and developed operating procedures such that they would distribute minutes of these meetings (deputies meetings). Saunders also had meetings with the SLG and had the minutes of those meetings distributed to the larger agency staff, including field offices. Few staff lacked evidence to form an impression of her, but Saunders provided the material from which the perceptions would be formed. Thus, the press coverage served to give her status as an employment and training professional.

Natalucci-Persichetti's appointment was announced during a scheduled cabinet retreat, so both the Governor and Natalucci-Persichetti were unavailable for press questions. A few persistent reporters were able to locate the governor's press secretary to comment on the appointment, and a few others were able to locate and speak with Natalucci-Persichetti. However, the primary means of information that was distributed about Natalucci-Persichetti was information distributed within the agency. Given the intra-agency fight regarding the candidacy of Chinnici-Zuercher and Stipanik, the employees were forced to choose one or the other. Natalucci-Persichetti's move to keep Chinnici-Zuercher, described as a positive in chapter V, turned out to be a slight negative in that Stipanik's
supporters started to distribute information with a negative connotation — Natalucci-Persichetti was from adult corrections and we (DYS) are a juvenile justice organization. This "adult corrections" label is somewhat misleading, because Mullen's and Natalucci-Persichetti's policy postures were significantly similar, as discussed earlier in this chapter and in chapter V. Yet, in the search committee activities, Mullen supported Stipanik, an internal candidate, (not Natalucci-Persichetti) and Mullen's supporters created the distinction between Mullen and Natalucci-Persichetti. Without Mullen appearing at a press conference to legitimate the appointment of Natalucci-Persichetti, his appointment was considered to be one of an "outsider." Natalucci-Persichetti made decent attempts at damage control with the public by giving feature-length interviews early in his tenure, but was unable to overcome the lack of an opportunity to get his message to staff out first.

Dr. Fletcher's appointment was leaked to the press the night prior to the press conference. Fletcher made his statement early, and then followed up after the press conference with lengthy interviews. However, when perusing chapter VI, the reader will recall that Fletcher's agenda was directed to the general citizenry, taking advantage of his status as a medical doctor who had a dream of curing cancer. The article (reproduced in chapter V) about Natalucci-Persichetti is more general, showing his policy knowledge gained from his extensive experiences in corrections. The other contrast is that the newspaper articles announcing and following Natalucci-Persichetti's appointment followed and were interspersed with Mullen's "parting shots." Public attention was focused on DYS activities, but not always attention that was favorable to Geno or the agenda he was trying to create. With Fletcher, there was so little publicity about the Health Department, positively or negatively attributed, that any publicity would be welcome. That the feature story on the day of Fletcher's appointment mentioned that he was searching for a cure for cancer, led to a positive public perception, especially when this was the only story carried on the day of Fletcher's appointment. The previous day's stories were buried in the paper (smaller stories in terms of square inches and location).

Proposition 9: The more the Governor publicly states the agenda of the agency and gives legitimacy to the successor by word and by his presence, the more the successor will have the authority to deal with internal and external stakeholders to enact that agenda.

Means of Meeting the Members of the Strategic Leadership Group

Each of the three successors had different means to meet with their immediate reports and with the larger group of internal stakeholders. While these methods depend, and in the case of OBES
build, upon the activities of appointment, the means of the first interaction with staff structurate the interactions with staff over time. Ellen O'Brien Saunders met with her administrative assistant who headed her office staff and briefly met with each of her two deputies the first day on-the-job (mentioned earlier). She had already set staff expectations of her agenda and priorities, so she didn't have to meet with members of her strategic leadership group immediately. She was able to establish her office procedures to match her per strengths and weaknesses (e.g., how she would take telephone calls and other routines for the Office of the Administrator). Over the first week, Saunders split her time between the Office of the Administrator staff and between the Deputy Administrator for programs and the JTPA-Ohio administrator working on the problems with that division. Saunders also had an open-door policy, and was often interrupted by individuals who would stop, stick their head inside her door and say "Hi!" It was the second week before Saunders met with both of her deputies at the same time to discuss agency problems and with the larger senior management team (SLG). Saunders was able to take her time meeting staff and beginning to work to establish effective inter-personal relationships.

Natalucci-Persichetti started his first week with a retreat of his managing officers and his central office staff. Natalucci-Persichetti had called his secretary-to-be, and asked her to arrange a place for a retreat, and to inform the managing officers of this meeting. Natalucci-Persichetti used the meeting to tell them of his philosophy and to get them to agree to his perception of the client base and treatment modality. Natalucci-Persichetti also used the meeting to see how they reasoned, how they interacted, and how they made public presentations. For many staff members, the context of this retreat was the first retreat called by Rogers, back in 1983. After that retreat, Rogers distributed "pink slips" and then invited people to apply for these positions. There had been no other DYS SLG retreats during the Rogers years and no retreats during Mullen's tenure. So, Natalucci-Persichetti's retreat was the first in DYS since Roger's "Black Monday" retreat. As a result, many staff were quite apprehensive and worried about what would happen, and were not very forthcoming in the retreat. Natalucci-Persichetti's devised a plan to have the staff and important stakeholders work to define a mission statement for the agency. Many of these meetings were closely associated with the meetings called by Mullen to determine the direction that the agency should follow. As the reader may recall, these meetings lost importance as the end of Celeste's first term neared it's end, and the central office staff discontinued their participation, without telling the field personnel who continued to meet. As a result, the field personnel were quite wary of any attempts to meet to determine procedures or a mission.
Fletcher was walked around the department, spending a few minutes in each bureau to meet the office personnel, and was then whisked off to another bureau. Fletcher found this quite unsatisfactory, left his office, and went to several offices and asked people what they thought. It was Fletcher's way of "making rounds." For Fletcher, it was using a technique that worked for him, and that people seemed to eventually warm up to. While many staff later noted distaste for this practice of obtaining unbalanced perspectives, it became clear that many staff did not report on their activities or troubles, they commented on agency policies and procedures -- creating an impression for Fletcher that there were some troubles that had to be addressed. Without knowing that he was doing so, Fletcher was auditioning for his attention focus. It was a lesson quickly learned.

These three methods were set up even before the successors arrived on the job. Saunders had staged her arrival and spent time preparing for further interactions with external stakeholders. Natalucci-Persichetti spent his time using a technique he had learned from working with Tom Gilmore of the Wharton School of Business, an individual for whom both Natalucci-Persichetti and Carolyn Lukensmeyer have great professional respect. Fletcher also took an item from his repertoire to "make rounds" to visit with staff and hear what was on their minds. These activities are more or less successful in context. Natalucci-Persichetti needed to know that there had been no retreats since Rogers' meeting, and to know that his mission development meetings were going to receive a less than favorable response from field personnel and that their perception would not mean acceptance.

Proposition 10: The more the successor meets with members of the strategic leadership group to learn of their activities and of the contingent factors on those critical activities, the more the successor will develop effective working relationships with the entity of the strategic leadership group.

In Summary

This chapter reports a series of themes that form the beginnings of a grounded theory of executive job creation. These themes are reported to stimulate thinking on the variety of actions one can use to solve some of the principal problems facing any new appointee to a strategic leadership position. What is implicit in these themes is that as one ascends the hierarchy, the more one's work is comprised of communicating with others, and that the threats to taking charge are actions that could interfere with the new appointee's communication. The process of creating one's job is much akin to a long-distance walking race. You have to move quickly, but it you move too fast, you'll wear out too soon or you might become disqualified from further competition. It is in this long distance walking race that the critical activities of leadership become most distinct from behaviors of leaders.
You can do the actions most often attributed to "a leader," but it is the result of the actions that demonstrate leadership.

We now turn to a discussion of the findings from the study in light of the existing literature on executive succession and on leadership transitions. Then we present the study's conclusions and the implications for the theory of taking charge, for the practice of executive-level leadership, and for research into strategic level executive behavior.
Chapter VIII
IMPLICATIONS FROM THE RESEARCH FOR THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

This chapter takes the published theory (reviewed in Chapter II) on executive succession and leadership transitions and reviews its findings for the first three stages in light of the three cases presented here. The idea is to enrich the general topic of executive succession and more specifically, to create a new area of study on strategic leadership transitions out of the ashes of executive succession. While a thorough examination of these micro-processes holds most promise for enriching the empirical advancement of strategic management, it is well beyond the scope of this study. Instead, the hope to raise questions about the process of transition.

In chapter I, I stated that the focus of this study was to explain the process of how an agency director creates her job. The research has focused on three questions regarding how individuals selected to be directors of agencies of state government create a leadership role.

1. By what actions do strategic-level leaders create their jobs and take charge of their organizations? Are there substitutable actions?
2. What factors serve to mediate the choice of actions used to take charge?
3. Does a temporal model of stages and phases organize the process of taking charge?

The Focus of the Inquiry

The study focused on the efforts of three agency directors: Ellen O'Brien Saunders of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (OBES), Geno Natalucci-Persichetti of the Department of Youth Services (DYS), and Dr. Ron Fletcher of the Ohio Department of Health (HEALTH). Saunders is originally from Michigan, educated in Pennsylvania, New York and Massachusetts. Saunders was in a classified civil service position in Wisconsin, having served as a division administrator in the Department of Commerce and Industry within the regime of Governor Tony Earle (D WI). Governor Celeste recruited Saunders to head the Bureau of Employment Services -- an agency that had been the target of a tremendous amount of press attention on the agency events and processes under the leadership auspices of a prior administrator, Roberta Steinbacher. External stakeholders, including the media, leveled severe criticisms against lower-level bureaucrats, and
Steinbacher resigned as her health deteriorated. Governor Celeste appointed Assistant Administrator Grace Kilbane to be the Acting Administrator in February, 1988. Employer constituents supported Kilbane because of her technical knowledge of the programs. The editorial boards of the state's newspapers suggested Kilbane should not be appointed as the Administrator because of her association with the prior leader in a position of authority and responsibility. Saunders arrived in September of 1988 and the study of her interactions with OBES covers a retrospective of 18 months after arriving on the job. Geno Natalucci-Persichetti (N-P) was appointed in January, 1988, to head the Department of Youth Services from his position as Division Director of Community Corrections with the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections with the adult corrections system. Governor Celeste appointed Natalucci-Persichetti to replace an acting director, Thomas Mullen, appointed to fill the position vacated by former Director James Rogers, who had been indicted, convicted, and subsequently imprisoned for unlawful activities committed prior to and during his tenure in office. Natalucci-Persichetti had considerable experience in adult community corrections activities as well as third-sector corrections with the Department of Rehabilitation and corrections as well as Alvis House, a third-sector community corrections agency. Ronald Fletcher, M.D., an oncologist from Dayton, Ohio, served as the co-chair of the Governor's Task Force on Minority Health, applied for the Directorship soon after the Task Force delivered its report to Governor Celeste. Fletcher received his undergraduate degree from Fisk University, an historically black college, and a medical doctorate from Meharry University, each in Nashville. While the Health Department was not considered to be "situationally adverse," the Health Department is considered an intransigent bureaucracy. The Department had been the third of the three priorities for Governor Celeste during the budget inherited as Fletcher arrived at the Health Department.

Data Collection and Analysis

To develop answers to these questions, this study began with a series of interviews with three agency directors, members of the senior management team (strategic leadership group) and prior agency directors. These interviews were audiotaped and transcribed using conversation analysis paradigms (Maynard, 1988; p. 1-2), allowing for additional and sustained analysis. The interviews lasted about two hours each, for four sessions, and several additional meetings to follow up with impressions and member checking. Extensive transcripts of notes, interviews, agency documents, and newspaper clippings served as the primary data base for this analysis In two cases, minutes of staff meetings and personal schedules comprised the data set for analysis.

The analysis of transcribed data used the grounded theory paradigm (Strauss, 1987). Grounded theory involves coding interview transcripts, memoranda, and notes according to initial
conditions, strategies and tactics, relationships, and consequences. The investigator also sorted these into a meaningful temporal sequence and assessed the relationships between the initial coding and the content in the field of time. This process led to the discovery of core concepts -- theoretical linchpins that allowed the author to make sense of the new leader's action. These concepts are reported here.

The investigator gave the findings from the initial analysis to the director and a sample of the Strategic Leadership Group for review and comment. The investigator promised that their comments would be considered, and, if not accepted, the author's rationale would be returned to the member. The author requested additional evidence to warrant their interpretations, and this evidence was introduced into the text. If the member still believed that the events or the analysis should be reported differently, the member was offered the opportunity to write a source-noted footnote describing the alternative interpretation.

Putting the Topic in Perspective

State agency directors turn over, on average, every 18-24 months (Olshfski, 1987; 1989; Orosz & Card, 1988; Haas & Wright, 1986; 1990). While 45 percent of private sector chief executives hold their positions five years or more, the average tenure of state agency directors is less than three years and there are indications that the turnover rate may be accelerating.

During the 1960's nearly 70 percent of all state agency heads kept their positions for two or more years. During the 1970's and 1980's the proportions of agency directors holding their positions for more than two years has dropped to 50 percent (Haas & Wright, 1987; p. 272).

At the state level, 40 percent of incumbents were replaced over two year periods from 1959 through 1983 (Haas & Wright, 1989). From 1959 to 1967, turnover remained relatively stable over the two-year periods at 30 percent, but from 1973 to 1983, state agency heads turned over at a rate of nearly 50 percent each two-year period. In addition, cabinet officials almost always change with a change in governor. Instances of service continuing through changes in administration (whether of the same or of different political parties) are rare. If the governor is elected for a four-year term, new appointees have a job opportunity that may last four years, but it's also true that replacement occurs more frequently for initial appointments than for those made later in the term (Beyle, 1989; Haas & Wright, 1989; 1990). Further, while private sector entities can structure succession and leadership transitions, most public-sector executives take on their new assignments without the benefits of orderly succession management and (if they ponder the question) will predict that their successors will not benefit from such a process either (Gilmore, 1988; p. 13).
Given these two potential characteristics of public leadership -- almost accidental appointment and relatively abbreviated tenure -- public leaders must grab peoples' attention fast and keep the momentum going if they are to have lasting impact or, in some cases, any impact at all. What specific steps can they take to create their jobs and establish control over the agency?

It is important for new appointees to think through what they will do between the announcement of their appointment and their first few weeks on the job. Developing a perspective on their own behavior is often difficult to achieve. Consider. The appointment process is ego bolstering and encourages appointees to believe that they're "in charge." Appointment to a leadership position is preceded by speculation within both bureaucratic and political circles. Perhaps there was an application or clearance process of some sort followed by a press conference announcement. The position's authorizing statute grants very broad powers, authorities and responsibilities. Proximity to power, the trappings of office, and the deference of subordinates and stakeholders may mislead the official into believing that he or she in "in charge" in fact as well as in appearance.

For this reason, one's first days are a good time to "assume nothing" for, paradoxically, new public-sector executives who assume they are in charge may fail to take charge and, therefore, fail to achieve their goals. The short tenures expected for top public-sector officials necessarily compress the taking charge process. Approaching their new jobs systematically, newly appointed executives can avoid costly errors and instant obscurity. They can have the most positive impact on programs and policy if they act with the understanding that their initial actions have high symbolic value.

As new leaders move through the early phases of their tenure, they will identify issues for a long term agenda. Their success later on will depend to a great extent on the degree to which they have captured the attention of staff and constituents and demonstrated a credible understanding of the agency's critical tasks and the public needs to which the agency responds.

The recommendations that follow, gleaned from these three cases, should give new officials the head start they need to effectively create their jobs and take charge of their agencies. Following this list are recommendations and implications for appointing authorities, and then implications for the theory of executive succession and implications for research on strategic leadership transitions.
Statement of Findings

Public sector executives create their jobs by developing and refining their understanding of the organization (e.g., learning of required activities, assessing the operating environment, and determining the agenda for the organization under their leadership) and taking action based on that initial understanding. Agency directors were found to try to address several critical problems during each of these three stages: to be selected, to learn of the strategic issues of the agency, and to provide evidence to the media and other stakeholders that they are qualified to address the strategic issues. Directors also develop working relationships with senior staff while sending a positive message to the larger group of staff.

Factors expected and found to be relevant include gubernatorially enacted situational adversity and priority for attention, the successor's relative "outsideness," and sex. Other factors emerging from the grounded theory include search committee activities, efforts to address the activities of the predecessor, the governor's mandate, the presence of acting administrators, the means of appointment, and of meeting the members of the strategic leadership group.

In the following sections, the paper will discuss the implications for new appointees and for appointing authorities. Then the discussion will turn toward outlining some of the practical limitations of this study and then outlining future research opportunities to determine answers to these questions. Finally, some implications for the methods of research are suggested.

Implications for New Appointees

The research presented here may represent a mixed blessing to the newly appointed executive. On the one hand, there should be some comfort to know that this transition is not entirely idiosyncratic and that it can be characterized in stages, with phases representing the major tasks to be accomplished in each stage. On the other hand, being told that while it takes a short time to create your job, it takes a longer time to take charge of the organization. In the sections that follow, we offer grounded suggestions for new appointees creating their jobs.

Critical Tasks in Stage One

The principal difficulty of persons seeking cabinet level appointments is to get themselves appointed. To accomplish this task, applicants are urged to identify the strategic issues that have been identified by the Governor's office. With this information, the applicant should develop a program to address these strategic issues. In the Health Department, Fletcher was involved in a Governor's Task Force on Minority Health. In his eyes, he had seen the health care problems of the
hardest-to-serve and, with the other members of the task force, had developed methods to resolve those problems. Fletcher’s interview involved giving an oral report on the task force findings and resolutions. With DYS, Natalucci-Persichetti had experience in the adult correctional system and had worked in the not-for-profit system and had dealt with the agency (DYS). Natalucci-Persichetti had experienced corrections from nearly all levels of positions and had developed a philosophy that counseling would not work to reduce recidivism under most circumstances. In addition, the critical needs were to get people out of the institutions, and back into the community, and for the adjudicated offenders to be responsible for their behavior. When interviewing, Natalucci-Persichetti was able to put forth a philosophy that was seen as well-thought-out, and the community corrections part of it resonated with the Governor. In OBES, Saunders was able to learn of the problems with the media, and as her father had been a journalist in Detroit and Pittsburgh, she was well-aware of how to handle reporter’s questions. She also reviewed the job training and employment security press, to see who the players were and what they were saying. Saunders concluded that she could resolve many of the problems simply by bringing her perspective to the agency, and when she arrived, she negotiated what she thought she could accomplish during the remaining years of Celeste’s tenure.

The second critical task for individuals seeking appointment to cabinet level positions is to demonstrate to the search committee how they have the skills, knowledge and ability to address the strategic issues. As we have seen with the Health Department, the strategic assessment had been accomplished and was in process of being resolved. Thus, when there is no strategic assessment, the candidates should stress their professional qualifications with the search committee and then try to fit with the style and personality of the appointing authority. In OBES, Saunders spoke of what she had done in Wisconsin and what she would do when she arrived. She was able to demonstrate to the Governor that she knew how the media asked questions and how to respond ethically. In DYS, Natalucci-Persichetti spoke of his experiences with adult offenders and linked his experiences to the needs in DYS. Natalucci-Persichetti had an ally as chair of the search committee and linked his goals to the governor’s agenda for community-based services. By contrast, the Governor and his staff had little idea of what else needed to be done in the Health Department. In a sense, they evidenced the bureaucratic perspective on Governor’s offices that holds that governor’s offices view a policy as complete when the legislation is passed. The search committee had no strategic assessment to use to guide their selection. The statutory qualifications also limited the discussion of whom to interview because of the salary limitations -- both the private hospitals and the Health Department were looking for medical doctors with administrative experience. This was problematic because the private hospitals could pay considerably more than state government. As such, Fletcher was willing and available, and he fit another of the Governor’s policy initiatives (affirmative action). Fletcher was
able to convince the members of the search committee, some of whom were personal allies, that he understood the issues and had a plan of action.

The third critical task before appointment is to change one's behavior and mode of thought from the prior position to the executive position one is about to receive. Saunders spoke with a trusted friend about how to set-up and operate a strategic-level position. She also began to make provisions for moving to Ohio and began to "bone up" on other employment security areas than her area of expertise. Natalucci-Persichetti, upon learning of his imminent appointment, reviewed agency history, policy, and personnel with a close personal and professional colleague. With the increase in salary, he and his family moved to a more congenial neighborhood in Pickerington, Ohio. Fletcher conversed with members of Celeste's cabinet to determine what the appointment would involve and how he would interact with the Governor and other members of the cabinet. Fletcher arranged for other physicians to handle his practice while he was in Columbus and to continue to teach at Wright State University on weekends. It appears that Natalucci-Persichetti and Fletcher were concerned about the trappings of the position of authority while Saunders was focused on the interactive nature of the position.

The transition itself provides a challenge to the new appointees. The critical task is to provide evidence to the media that the successor has the skills and ability to address the public perception of the issues facing the agency. Fletcher's previous training as a physician and his participation in the task force on minority health gave him answers to most reporter's questions about policy and procedures. Neither the media nor stakeholders questioned Saunders' qualifications for appointment. Instead, they asked why she took the position. "Why would you come here?" Saunders turned this query into a positive statement that the people who remained must be committed to delivering high quality services. By contrast, Natalucci-Persichetti gave feature length interviews to give his background and experience. However, Natalucci-Persichetti met with the members of the media, one-at-a-time. The press release describing Celeste's appointment was filled with references to Natalucci-Persichetti's qualifications as a corrections "lifer."
### Table 28
Critical Tasks of Creating One’s Executive Position in Stage 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase of Transition</th>
<th>Tasks for the Successor</th>
<th>Director’s Actions to Resolve these Critical Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Search</strong></td>
<td>To identify the strategic issues identified by the Governor’s office and to develop a program to address these strategic issues.</td>
<td>OBES Saunders asked a colleague about the agency. She also reviewed the trade press for comments and statements about the agency and to see who was being quoted, to get a sense of the personalities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DYS Natalucci-Persichetti recalled personal experiences and memory of news accounts of the history and origins of the DYS. Also spoke with a member of the search committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HEALTH Spoke with members of the general assembly, staff to the Governor’s Task Force on Minority Health, members of the Governor’s cabinet, and staff in the governor’s office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selection</strong></td>
<td>To demonstrate to the search committee and to the appointing authority how one’s skills, knowledge, and abilities will enable themselves to address the strategic issues, and when no strategic issues have been identified, to fit with the personality and style of the appointing authority.</td>
<td>OBES (The Governor’s Chief of Staff and her staff was search committee) Saunders spoke of her experiences with a similar agency in Wisconsin, and how she would go about resolving problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DYS Spoke of his experience in Ohio with the adult system and linked his work in community corrections to the Governor’s agenda to provide social services in the least restrictive environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HEALTH Linked responses to issues to his background as a physician and his efforts to resolve health care concerns for the (economically) least advantaged and for those who experience age discrimination (young and the elderly).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preparation</strong></td>
<td>To begin to change one’s behavior and mode of thought from the prior position to the executive position they are about to receive.</td>
<td>OBES Spoke with a trusted colleague about how to set up an agency director’s office. Began to make preparations for working in other areas than her expertise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DYS Reviewed agency history, policy, and personnel with a Deputy Director (Chinnici-Zuercher).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HEALTH Spoke with other members of the Governor’s cabinet about being a cabinet member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Announcement</strong></td>
<td>To provide evidence to the media that they (the successor) have the skills, knowledge, and ability to address the stakeholder’s perception of the strategic issues.</td>
<td>OBES Governor’s press release and his announcement during the press conference identified her as a employment and training professional from Wisconsin. No background glitches were identified. The reporter from the Plain Dealer who had caused Steinbacher’s problems moved to California.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DYS Governor’s press release identified him as a corrections professional. Gave feature-length interviews to speak of his upbringing and background that would enable him to deal with adjudicated felons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HEALTH Previous training and employment as a physician. Spoke of what a great privilege and honor to be appointed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Critical Tasks in Stage Two

The process of appointment resolves some and creates other problems for new appointees to resolve. The critical tasks in the second stage are primarily symbolic—to address stakeholder’s expectations of the successor’s policy and mode of operation and to act consistently with that symbolic message. The new appointee also has the task of establishing a mandate and establishing parameters for working with the appointing authority, even though these interactions may be negotiated well after the appointee’s arrival. Thus, I refer the the crisis of leadership as the paradox of simultaneously giving and taking direction from many stakeholders.

The newly appointed agency director has an internal task to state their agenda and to show how the agenda fits with the larger mandate of the Governor. Obviously, this task is easier if the Governor assessed the strategic issues and developed a set of criteria for assessing candidates. In this stage, the task is not to convince the Governor, but the stakeholders, who will be searching for and attributing expectations of the successor’s behavior. So, stakeholders will closely scrutinize the new appointee’s actions for symbolism and meaning. These stakeholders have considerable uncertainty and express that uncertainty with anxiety. Then, the new appointees must act consistently with the message they are sending. Saunders and Fletcher directly addressed stakeholder’s concerns. Each spoke of how pleased they were to be appointed to the agencies and how impressed they were with the staff. They also spoke of what a great honor it was to them to be appointed. Saunders had her public information officer distribute copies of her press conference remarks to agency employees. Saunders gave the first salvo about who she was, why she wanted the job, what she expected from the agency personnel, and what she intended to accomplish. Fletcher’s agenda was more externally oriented and he directed his remarks to external stakeholders focusing statements on his experience as a physician and his belief that he could "...cure the ills of the people of Ohio." By contrast, the Governor’s method of appointing Natalucci-Persichetti denied both the opportunity to speak first to set stakeholder impressions. Geno had to give feature length interviews to get his points across. Celeste’s appointment of Natalucci-Persichetti was under the shadow of media reports of the Rogers’ era. Media reports of Natalucci-Persichetti’s appointment focused more on Rogers than on Natalucci-Persichetti. When given the opportunity, Natalucci-Persichetti stated that his primary mission would be to "stabilize the department." Natalucci-Persichetti tried to dispel rumors of widespread personnel moves by acknowledging anxiety and ambiguity surrounding his appointment, but also acknowledged that there might be some reassignments. Natalucci-Persichetti was giving (and/or staff were receiving) mixed messages to the internal stakeholders, and opened the possibility for resistance to his agenda.
New appointees also face a critical task of developing a mandate with the appointing authority. Saunders specifically negotiated a limited agenda of three items to be accomplished in three years (restore credibility, establish public credibility and policy initiatives). Natalucci-Persichetti publicly stated that he would take a year to clarify the Department's mission and two years to move on that mission. By contrast, Fletcher did not receive a clear mandate nor did he negotiate one with the governor. Thus, Fletcher had a greater opportunity to create his job, as he was less concerned with meeting the job defined by the governor. Saunders was able to create her job as she negotiated with the governor. Natalucci-Persichetti also created his job, but to a lesser extent, as he received and accepted, guidance from Celeste's Chief of Staff, Carolyn Lukensmeyer, about how to go about doing what he wanted to accomplish. The implication is much broader than simply being able to do as one wants. The governor's office evaluation of these three agency directors favored Saunders and Natalucci-Persichetti over Fletcher. Celeste and Lukensmeyer were unsure of how to evaluate Fletcher while they had the criteria from Natalucci-Persichetti and Saunders as these two had negotiated it with them.
Table 29
Critical Tasks of Creating One's Executive Position in Stage 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase of Transition</th>
<th>Tasks for the Successor</th>
<th>Director's Actions to Resolve these Critical Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Inauguration                 | To publicly state one's agenda and to show how that agenda fits with the larger mandate of the Governor. In addition, to symbolically address stakeholders' plausible attributions of their style and mission. | OBES Acknowledged the problems of the past, but declined to deal with them or the individuals implicated directly. Stated that the task was to move forward.  
DYS Gave realistic account of his plan of action, including addressing that some people may be reassigned, and the time line for accomplishing that agenda.  
HEALTH No actions other than the governor's press conference. Addressed external (public) concerns about health. |
| Developing a mandate.        | To specify the expectations of, and to establish a working relationship with, the appointing authority. | OBES Specifically negotiated expectations of what she thought she could accomplish during the two remaining years of Celeste's term.  
DYS Accepted governor's expressed concern that he could not make personnel changes without prior approval. Accepted mandate to begin the process of changing the entire system because current procedures were attuned to a client base that had changed.  
HEALTH Accepted attribution that he was not administratively qualified to hold position and that he should create an administrative structure (appoint someone) to assist him. |
| Attributing Style and Performance | To act consistently with the stated mode of operating and with the mandate.                | OBES Had public affairs officer distribute an edited transcript of her and the Governor's remarks during the appointment press conference.  
DYS Feature story in the Columbus Dispatch to reveal his background and his understanding of convicted felons.  
HEALTH Feature story in Columbus Dispatch about his desire to find a cure for cancer and how this fits with the mandate to improve access to health care for individuals of color and by the young and elderly. |
### Table 30
Critical Tasks of Creating One's Executive Position in Stage 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase of Transition</th>
<th>Tasks for the Successor</th>
<th>Director's Actions to Resolve these Critical Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Encounter           | To gain a better sense of the new surroundings and relationships, including the critical tasks of the agency and the capabilities of the people to accomplish those tasks. (To become informed about the needs of the organization and the capabilities of the people to meet those needs.) | OBES  Was introduced to the members of the central office. Went to visit five regional offices her first week (during the Columbus 500 auto race). Had the public information officer distribute her initial statement.  
DYS  Met with managing officers in 1st retreat since Rogers' "black Monday" retreat in 1983, to learn of their concept of the organization's mission and to assess them and how well they worked together. Initiated working groups of internal and external stakeholders to develop a mission statement for DYS.  
HEALTH  Was "walked around" to the bureaus to meet staff. Fletcher "made rounds" to individually meet with members of the organization to have them tell him what they saw as the problems of the organization. |
|                     |                        | OBES  Handling of the Plain Dealer reporter sitting in her office peering through files. Told members of the media that she would announce the results of Hopkins' investigation as soon as the report was available. In dealing with the governor's office, Saunders suggested that they admit their mistake and release copies of the report to the media, at cost.  
DYS  N/A (assumed he was in charge)  
HEALTH  N/A (assumed he was in charge) |
| Reassessment        | To demonstrate competence in leading the organization. | OBES  Distributed minutes of meetings with deputies to members of strategic leadership group and minutes of meetings of strategic leadership group to total agency and posted them on agency bulletin boards. Met with deputies to convince them of need to develop strategies to meet the agenda the senior staff had set that summer.  
DYS  Met with managing officers in first week to learn of their perception of the critical tasks and how these tasks should be addressed. Then followed up with the development of the mission statement. Openly accepted Chinnici-Zuecher as a deputy. Received appointments from agency staff auditioning for their continued status and perspective.  
HEALTH  Conducted "rounds" to meet with bureau personnel. Received appointments from agency staff (mostly elderly physicians) concerning their perspective. |
| Reshaping the authorizing structure | To develop a consensus about what and how to change the organization's critical tasks. | OBES  Met with each member of the senior management team to discuss priorities and her expectations for their continuation with the agency.  
DYS  With the restructuring made possible due to the budget shortfall, and with turnover, made strategic replacements to individuals who were more in line with his philosophy.  
HEALTH  N/A (assumed he was in charge) |
Table 30 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase of Transition</th>
<th>Tasks for the Successor</th>
<th>Director's Actions to Resolve these Critical Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reshaping the authority structure</td>
<td>To design a structure and transfer leadership from themselves to the members of the strategic leadership group.</td>
<td><strong>HEALTH</strong> Accepted all individuals and their status, save Tenenbaum, because of the appointment of Beard to meet his perception of the Chief of Staff's concern for his lack of management experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalizing change</td>
<td>To change the processes of the organization in ways that the members of the strategic leadership group and the appointing authority will see as improving the performance of the agency.</td>
<td><strong>OBES</strong> Had deputies meet with their immediate reports to develop tactics to meet these strategies, them distributed these tactics to the larger agency. Also conducted performance appraisals with the accomplishment of these tactics as items. <strong>DYS</strong> Continued to appoint people sharing his philosophy. Initiated legislation to change distribution of funds to allow and then to facilitate community based corrections. <strong>HEALTH</strong> Worked with local health departments, the media, and members of the general assembly to develop their expectations of the Health Department. Made commitments by publicly announcing policies externally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing for Leaving</td>
<td>To begin to prepare for work situations after their tenure has ended.</td>
<td><strong>OBES</strong> Made preparations to transfer authority and history to whomever was the new appointee. Gave office space and arranged meetings between new appointee and senior staff. Interviewed for executive-level positions nationally. <strong>DYS</strong> Made preparations to stay. Partly facilitated by his relationships with the Senate Republicans by his efforts to get the funding bill passed. <strong>HEALTH</strong> Made preparations to move on toward new horizons -- rejecting opportunities to move to be Health Commissioner of San Francisco and the State of Indiana. Goal to be U. S. Secretary of State.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Critical Tasks in Stage Three

New appointees face the most obvious and stressful aspect of creating their jobs when they arrive at the workplace and encounter subordinates. The critical tasks are to become informed about the needs of the organization and the capabilities of the people to meet those needs and to demonstrate competence in leading the organization. By developing successful working relationships, the successor can work with the strategic leadership group to develop a consensus about what to change and how to change the organization's critical tasks. Then, over time, the executive can design a structure to transfer leadership to the members of the strategic leadership group, and from the group to the members. The members must see the transfer as beneficial to the agency's performance. Finally, the leader begins to prepare for work situations after their tenure has ended.

The first critical task of the encounter is for the agency director to learn the needs of the organization they are entering from a strategic perspective. Each of the three directors was "walked around" to meet members of the agency. Saunders planned to start slowly, and did not plan to make immediate personnel moves or reassignments. She traveled to field offices to meet with staff. Natalucci-Persichetti met with his managing officers in a retreat setting to begin to learn what they thought about the mission should be and how they worked together. For Natalucci-Persichetti this was the most efficient manner to begin his agenda. Fletcher "made rounds" to discover additional opportunities within the agency.

The second critical task is for the agency directors to demonstrate competence in leading the organization. That is, the director must be perceived as being competent by the pivotal stakeholders. Saunders decided that she could make a point that things were more open by opening her office door, and then letting the Plain Dealer reporter sit in her office and search through agency records. Shortly after, Saunders was faced with the results of the Hopkins investigation on OBES contracts and contracting. Saunders told members of the media that she would release the report when Hopkins presented it to her. Then, she "fought" with the Governor's press secretary over this strategy. Saunders then told her Public Information Officer to call the capital press corps to inform them of the press conference and the cost of the report, and to ask them if they wanted a copy of the report. Saunders gained an attribution of competence with agency staff when the strategy worked, and with Lukensmeyer who believed that Saunders could handle the media. Saunders also made some assignments to staff and set time lines that could be easily met. By contrast, Natalucci-Persichetti and Fletcher believed they were in charge and did not have to act to demonstrate their competence. The difficulty with these strategies is that stakeholders may not accept the competence of the new
appointee. The idea is that early successes will quell opposition. The stakeholders will be more likely to attribute the agency success to the new appointee, and will be more likely to follow the agency director's leadership in other areas.

The third task for new appointees in the third stage of a leadership transition is to develop a consensus about what to change and the means to implement the organization's primary functions and implement the new appointee's agenda. Natalucci-Persichetti met with his managing officers to arrive at a consensus. Saunders distributed minutes of meetings with her deputies to the members of the strategic leadership group and minutes of her strategic leadership group meetings to the agency. These minutes were distributed to each field and regional office, and posted on a variety of bulletin boards within the central office and through the employee professional group, the International Association of Personnel in Employment Security. By contrast, Fletcher made decisions on what to attend to on his own and he often failed to ask members of his staff what they were focusing on and attending to. This failure prevented Fletcher from taking on the best of their ideas and opportunities and giving his attention to them. Instead, Fletcher made rounds and focused his attention on those items in which he had a personal and professional interest.

Agency directors are faced with the difficulty of developing successful working relationships with members of their strategic leadership groups. Fletcher had problems getting the big picture across to staff, at least in part, because there was no consensus on the big picture. Natalucci-Persichetti had a slight difficulty getting his message across because it was not a message that could be heard from the paradigm of those staff members who did not hear his message. Natalucci-Persichetti used staff turnover to replace people with individuals who were more sympathetic to his definition of the agency's mission (ala, Gouldner, 1954). By contrast, Saunders met with each member of the strategic leadership group to discuss their priorities and her expectations for their performance. She worked to develop evaluations over which all members knew what they were to perform and what the consequences would be. Fletcher also accepted the members of the strategic leadership group and his conception of what their role was with the organization. The sticking point with this strategy was that Tenenbaum had a role similar to the position Fletcher believes he was told to create, producing considerable tension within the organization. Thus, the key task is to accept the qualified personnel and to establish performance expectations with each member. Doing so will provide stability within the group and will enable members to make informed choices about career opportunities.
New appointees also have the task of preparing a structure to transfer leadership from themselves to the members of the strategic leadership group. This task is important because agency directors perform few tasks that directly lead to improved agency performance. Fletcher worked with local health departments, members of the media, and legislators to establish expectations of the Health Department. Fletcher would announce new programs and then return to the agency and meet with the staff who were waiting for Fletcher to return. After pleading with him to check with them prior to announcing new programs and policies, they would devise a means to accomplish what he had announced. Natalucci-Persichetti devised procedures that would implement his policies and then initiated a change in record keeping that, when combined with strict supervision based on this new mode of acting and record keeping, would lead to staff acting in concert with Natalucci-Persichetti's mission. Natalucci-Persichetti also continued to appoint personnel in line with his philosophy. Saunders put the negotiated expectations in performance evaluations and had members of her senior management team do the same to their immediate reports. Modes of operating that had been legitimated by earlier actions, were institutionalized.

Finally, agency directors must prepare to leave the organization. Frequent turnover eventually applies to all. All three had planned to stay until the end of Celeste's term. Saunders made preparations to transfer authority and her knowledge to the eventual new appointee by providing office space, developing a transition packet for, and arranging meetings between the new appointee with her deputies and with division directors. Fletcher planned for the transition by having each division director prepare a transition package to transmit what information they decided was worthwhile. Fletcher prepared to leave the Health Department by interviewing for positions that would get him closer to his goal of being appointed as United States Secretary of State. Natalucci-Persichetti made plans to stay in office. He had developed a significant relationship in traditional Republican strongholds such as states attorneys, and had worked with the Republican dominated Senate during his efforts to obtain permission to distribute community corrections funds. His statements reflected his belief that good corrections was good politics, irrespective of political orientation.

Recommendations for the Appointing Authority

As the preceding discussion suggests, there are a number of actions that the appointing authority can take to minimize potential problems for new appointees. The most obvious of these is to make the successor's going-in mandate as explicit as possible. When that is not possible, that
fact should be made known to the successor and to establish general operating parameters. New appointee should proceed to learn as much as possible about the organization and then return to negotiate a mandate with the appointing authority. As this research describes, the process of strategic leadership transitions is far too multi-faceted to perceive the such a process as a cornucopia or a panacea to be dispensed with an avuncular indulgence. Leadership transitions should be viewed as a naturally occurring event -- a tool rather than a solution to the task of establishing effective working relationships with the members of the SLG.

Similarly, the appointing authority can anticipate and minimize many of the potential problems that successor's face. These problems arise from the successor's lack of experience and expertise, the situation facing the organization, and the strength of the management group. If there are obvious voids in a new leader's experiences, the appointing authority should provide adequate back-up and support to the new appointee. It is far better to assess them realistically and to work with the new appointee on how to best close those voids, than to ignore the potential problem.

Conflict with key subordinates represent a more predictable problem. Ignoring conflicts has elsewhere been found to be the key determinant of whether the manager "takes charge" (Gabarro, 1987). At a minimum, these types of problems need to be marked, and actions well-planned. Saunders of OBES may have waited too long to further the career opportunities of a member of her staff who was undermining her leadership. Fletcher was able to use his style and personality to make the best of his dismissal of a key member of his staff. Mullen took care of most of the larger personnel problems facing DYS.

Another area in which the appointing authority can facilitate the taking charge process is by making a production of the appointment. This type of action can serve to relieve the disappointment inherent in internal members of the organization who failed to receive the appointment. While it is ultimately up to the successor to establish credibility with disappointed rivals and their supporters, that task will be made easier for the successor when the appointing authority explains to the disappointed rivals why the candidate was chosen.

The appointing authority can also facilitate meetings between the outgoing executive and the incoming successor. Too often, information is lost, making subordinates take sides. Also, in these cases, the successors believed the appointing authority forbade them from making personnel changes. It is not that these changes were forbidden, it is that the changes were to have been well thought-out.
The appointing authority should conduct an assessment of the strategic issues facing themselves and the issues facing the agency (see chapter II for a discussion of Gilmore, 1988). This assessment covers the issues the agency must face and allows the appointing authority to conduct an assessment of the characteristics and attributes of the successor that will enable the successor to resolve the issues identified by the assessment.

The appointing authority can assist the successor by publicizing the strategic issues. To the extent that strategic issues are publicized, the governor's office provides the opportunity for political rivals to use the problems inherent in the agency as campaign issues. Publicizing these issues also provides the opportunity for the Governor to put distance between these problems and to symbolically address the problem by removing the agency head and announcing the search for a successor. Knowledge of the strategic issues makes the job of creating one's job easier by creating the parameters under which the successor will be able to operate. In addition, knowing the strategic issues makes it easier for applicants to evaluate the job in terms of whether they are qualified for the position. It also makes easier the task of evaluating the performance of an agency director.

During the appointment, the Governor should publicly demonstrate confidence in the new appointee and to legitimate the transfer of authority from the predecessor to the new appointee. There are a variety of means to accomplish this task. One is hold a press conference announcing the appointment. The appointments of Saunders and Fletcher were announced in this manner. Natalucci-Persichetti's appointment was announced via press release ostensibly because the Governor and his cabinet were "retreating." However, the announcement of Natalucci-Persichetti's appointment could have been delayed until after the retreat. With Mullen still having credibility with many staff and with the media, his presence at the press conference could have signified to staff that there was some continuity in the agenda. Mullen would later give voice to the same agenda that Natalucci-Persichetti was proposing. Mullen was available as he was participating in the search committee. Even when Natalucci-Persichetti's appointment was announced, he was not touted for his administrative skills, only his policy expertise.

The appointing authority should continue to monitor performance so that the mission and the Governor's electoral mandate can be continued. This is dependent on developing expectations of what each agency director is to produce.

---

Mullen favored another candidate in the search process and may not have wished to participate in a press conference announcing Natalucci-Persichetti's appointment.
Summary and Implications

Of the many transitions that managers make, creating their job and taking charge of a new assignment is one of the most important. From the governor's point of view, the ability to ensure effective executive operations is critical not only for continuity, but for instilling vitality and promoting change. As this chapter has emphasized, the appointing authority and the senior leadership staff can do much to influence how successfully executives take charge in these transitions: how they obtain a mandate, the clarity of that mandate, whom and how they choose confidants and personal staff, and in how they create their jobs.

The leadership transition is, as you might expect, critically important to managers who are taking on new executive assignments. A bad start is costly -- in performance and in profound interpersonal ways. Whatever is done impacts later events and actions.

Every day, public sector executives assume new responsibilities in the public, private, and not-for-profit sectors throughout the world. A daily skimming of any daily newspaper will reveal a flavor of how pervasive executive leadership transitions are in our society. It is a sufficiently common and important event that it deserves to be better understood and managed.

These transitions are also very personal. As this study has shown, how a manager acts in those first few encounters carries his or her own personal mark. Every executive is unique in background, skills, and style. Moreover, individual situations and the organizations that surround these transitions also vary greatly, so that if no two managers are alike, neither are any two situations. The process of creating your job is both a highly individualistic and situationally dependent process. That this process is so pervasive, individualistic, and idiosyncratic makes it a difficult process to study and about which to write. Although the research upon which this study reports has attempted to shed some light on these processes, no one can offer definitive answers on strategic leadership transitions. This study has attempted to describe the dynamics involved in the transition processes and the implications of these dynamics for managerial action. In the final analysis, much of the transition process rests outside the hands of the appointees themselves. Yet, much is within their control. And to the extent that new appointees can act on those relationships under their control, they will be better off in the long run. It also appears that some tasks and relationships not under the control of the new appointee (e.g., the governor's mandate) can be changed to be under their influence. To the extent that this study informs new appointees, their senior executives and the people who appoint and support them, it will have served its purpose.
The evidence reported here indicates a substantial difference in leadership activities over the course of an executive's tenure. These factors are critical tasks that are grouped according to objective stages of the leadership transition process. In the first stage, the soon to be appointed leader faces a crisis of appointment as they try to convince the appointing authority to give appoint them. In the second stage, the newly appointed director faces a crisis of leadership as they have to establish influence and authority with organizational super- and subordinates. The third stage represents a crisis of autonomy and control as the new appointee arrives on the job. The third stage involves learning about the people and the critical tasks of the organization so that the new leader can make reasoned decisions about changes in personnel, structure, and process. The logic underpinning these stages is that initial actions are necessary to set the stage for organizational changes and transformation, though we have not examined the organizational aspects of a leadership transition.

The research presented here may represent a mixed blessing to the newly appointed executive. On the one hand, there should be some comfort to know that this transition is not entirely idiosyncratic and that it can be characterized in stages, with phases representing the major tasks to be accomplished in each stage. On the other hand, being told that while it takes a short time to create your job, it takes a longer time to take charge of the organization. The paradoxical situation is that newly appointed leaders must act quickly and do not have time, nor do they risk not taking the time to learn about the organization or its senior managers. But both the task of learning the critical tasks of the organization and developing successful interpersonal working relationships with members of the strategic leadership group are essential. The level and type of relationship may have an impact on how the director learns about the critical tasks and upon what aspects of the agency the director learns.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

These cases limit the applicability of the grounded theory in a variety of ways. This sections will discuss these limitations and then offer suggestions for future research to correct these limitations. Finally, there are some methodological suggestions garnered from three years of intense grounded theorizing.

The findings of this research are limited by the cases selected in that the none of the three agency directors attempted to change the organization's culture, each was selected after a management-oriented search process (cf. politically oriented search process to reward the Governor's
supporters). In addition, each director followed the tenure of an interim directors. Future research should attempt to explain how these factors have an impact on how a strategic level executive creates her job and takes charge.

To find out how a director changes an organizations culture and how these attempts will be influenced by and will influence early actions, research should focus on retrospective accounts of a strategic change and upon a long tenured official who did not change the culture of the agency. In addition, we should not steer away from failed attempts to take charge. There is much to be learned about managers from failure and failed attempts to take charge.

Additional research should focus on comparisons and contrasts between means of selecting the agency director. What stakeholder commitments are generated from participation? What stakeholders are involved and to what purpose? Does stakeholder involvement generate commitment to the new director’s agenda and mandate? Comparing appointment processes early and late in a governor’s term may reveal these insights (see Orosz, 1991).

It is increasingly common to find interim executives in public and third-sector agencies (Farquhar, 1991). What impact do these interim executives have upon the agency and what impact does this interim director have on later actions to create your job and take charge?

Finally, what impact does the fact that this was a public agency have upon the findings reported here? Previous chapters suggested differences between public and private sector strategic leaders. What differences do these factors make in terms of creating an executive job? We asserted that government jobs are hunting licenses, but is this a reflection the executive position or of differences between the public and private sectors? The literature suggested that turnover creates more room for the successor to create their jobs, but in turn, creates less dependence by the executive role constellation on the successor (e.g., Grusky, 1960). Public organizations with frequent turnover of strategic level managers who do not serve long enough to fully implement their new strategies leave the organization with a variety of undesirable consequences. Frequent turnover means that executives are not well versed on requirements of the executive role. The newly appointed director has fewer opportunities to develop trust and influence with immediate subordinates (Pickhardt, 1981; Friedman & Saul, 1988; Gabarro, 1978). Executive or senior management teams have incentive systems focusing on gamesmanship and short-term results (Beyle, 1989). Incumbents must rely on these subordinates to inform them of their predecessor's activity or the organization’s priorities. If the new executive changes priorities, these changes leave a series of un-implemented
and partially implemented strategies. Organizational members can choose from among the organization’s various present and prior strategies to use to justify their actions. In the private sector this is still possible, but arguably less likely? What would be the implication of a reporter sitting in the office of a president of a Fortune 500 CEO, while the CEO sat at his desk? For those who believe that there are no significant differences between the public and private sectors, this example alone should provide evidence that there are significant differences between these two sectors.

How does one write up a discussion of process variables? Most organizational research focuses on state variables, variables that describe an object or a process in one particular "state" or condition. This research focused on the process of creating one’s executive role, and in that sense, focused on action. How does one write a proposition for how one acts? The problem becomes more apparent when the reader considers that for every outcome desired, there are any number of actions that could produce a particular outcome. Likewise, for every outcome, there are an unlimited number of actions, even remotely connected, that could produce that outcome. So, without appropriate guides, investigators must struggle with writing in "normal science" about process. The current method of publishing articles in journals to report on original empirical research mystifies or trivializes the research on process. Current research reports do not describe the mechanism by which conditions serve to motivate human action and what actions serve to motivate further action (Ilgen & Klein, 1989). These mechanisms should explain both why they behave in specific situations and why they maintain other behaviors in other situations (Collins, 1981; p. 990).
APPENDIX A
THE CONDUCT OF THE INQUIRY
Appendix A
THE CONDUCT OF THE INQUIRY

Inception and Social Relations

I undertook this study as a result of several interrelated factors. First, during the Winter Quarter of 1988, I was serving as the unpaid teaching assistant to Dr. Robert W. Backoff and his class read the case of Elizabeth Best. I found the discussion enlightening because the students were surprised to find the situation she faced. Best was appointed as the deputy secretary of environmental affairs in Delaware and on her first day, the Departmental Secretary did not know what to do with her and neither did anyone else. What surprised me was that Best's situation was similar to my own experience. I was appointed to an exempt position with the Department of Education and Cultural Affairs in South Dakota to work with the Governor's Education Task Force. On my first day of work, I was introduced to the other people who worked for the Secretary and shown my office. There was nothing of value in terms of supplies or information in the desk or in the file cabinets. There was no memo as to what I was supposed to do. I sat there for a few minutes (seemed like hours) and pondered what I should do. I filled out the paperwork regarding employee benefits and direct deposit of my paycheck with the personnel officer and then returned to my office. What was I to do?

After the experience of pondering the significance of these student discussions and my own experience, I sought to find supporting evidence in the literature on leadership. I then prepared a proposal of sorts, and provided an idea paper to my advisor who read through most of my paper and then jumped up when he came to the line where I described how, at certain levels within the hierarchy, one must create their job. And I was off on what has turned out to be a three year endeavor.

The School of Public Policy and Management was engaging in a study of the preparations for the end of the Governor's term. With the support of the Governor's Chief of Staff, two investigators from the School and three Ph. D. students were interviewing agency heads and their immediate staff about the steps they were engaged in to embed the policies and programmatic changes that positively impacted the citizens of the state. Through these interviews, I was introduced to these Directors and was able to describe to them the focus of my study and ask them if they would be interested in
These three agreed. A fourth, Pam Hyde, was asked for her participation. Ms Hyde agreed to participate, but resigned before the author could set aside sufficient resources in terms of money and time to begin the interview process.

The author had a variety of problems with the participants. First, the author had to get the agency directors to take the author seriously and to set aside time with the participants. The schedules of agency directors are highly variable and subject to change almost immediately. Further, the author had to arrange schedules with the participants.

Crafting Instruments

Given the nature of interviewing elites, the investigation used open ended thematic requests for information, referred to as "grand tour questions" (Chaffee & Tierney, 1989). For example, in one interview, the investigator requested the agency director to "Tell us about getting your job and what you were doing at that time." In this sense, the interviews were rather free-flowing and focused on what the informant thought relevant. The interruptions to the free-flow were to obtain temporal information and to clarify the sequence of events and the informant's interpretations. The investigators also followed-up responses to clarify the informant's meanings and interpretations offered through the actual words of the response. Later interviews focused on questions culled from the literature.

Agency directors were interviewed about their experiences in assuming the responsibilities and duties of the executive position in an agency of state government and as a member of the Governor's cabinet. The specific advantages to this approach are that these people hold a position that provides the best perspective on their activities and they serve as a locus of attention (March & Simon, 1958) for the organization's stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). In addition, the agency directors can provide an overall perspective of the organization and this perspective in relation to other organizations, they are more familiar (in theory) with the legal and financial information of the organization, and are in the best position to provide informed commentary on the espoused policies, procedures, past histories, and future plans of the organization (Marshall & Rossman, 1989).

However, interviewing agency directors provides some unique challenges as well. First, access to executives is difficult to attain (e.g., Mintzberg, 1975; Noel, 1989). Noel (1989; p. 35) provides telling commentary regarding site selection of three cases of private sector executives regarding requests for a continuous direct, month-long observation of CEOs.
In the process of finding three data collection sites we had over 20 requests turned down by presidents who felt that our presence would be too obtrusive; we also had to decline two offers after a first interview where we concluded that the companies were too small and not sufficiently structured to support the analysis we expected to complete.

Noel (1989) and Mintzberg (1975) choose the executive because the CEO would spend time dealing with environmental, organizational, and personal issues -- and no other person, individual, or person holding a role could provide the commentary on the organization and the CEO, as the CEO.

Without CEO sponsorship of the study within organization, the investigator may have difficulty with access to others within the organization and difficulty establishing credibility with other respondents. Relatedly, the CEO can facilitate assistance in making contact with other elites.

Second, CEO's, Agency Directors and other elites provide unique challenges in terms of obtaining the information desired for the investigation. They do not want to sit through traditional question and answer sessions (Marshall & Rossman, 1989; Dexter, 1970; Merton, Fiske, & Kendall, 1990). The interviewer must provide for active interactions for respondents and negotiate control over the interview (Merton, et al., 1990). The interviewer must display a thorough knowledge of the topic and an accurate conceptualization of the problem. By using a high proportion of intelligent and provocative questions, the agency director responds to broad areas of content and by using open-ended questions, the director is able to exercise the freedom to use their knowledge and freedom to provide a response of fact and intention. Because these people are alive, we can speak with them and we will receive some response. The interviewee has the chance to say things for which there may not have been an appropriate audience.

They can put into words some ideas and thoughts that had been only vaguely formulated. When these are met with attention and interest, self-esteem rises. People who are interviewed have a chance to reflect on their lives, to take stock, to think out loud about alternatives.... (Sanford, 1982; pp. 896-903, cited in Levinson & Rosenthal, 1984; p. 8).

The nature of this study is to produce a process description of the effort to create one's job. In our interviews, the agency director was asked to provide a "grand tour" of the transition and then asked specific questions regarding the transition, the director's perspective, the source of actions to focus the director's attention, and attempts to structure the agenda of the agency. The interviewers then placed these events in a sequence and asked the agency director to review the sequence.
The tactics used were to gather data through semi-structured interviews (Denzin, 1979) to query about the transition, her perceptions (and the source of those perceptions) and the actions taken to deal with the situation. We call these a case study in light of what Frankel (1987; p. 610) defined as "...a loosely related and opportunistic set of tactics and strategies for making sense of observed behavior of entities of many shapes, sizes, and dimensions."

The nature of elite interviewing (Dexter, 1970; Marshall & Rossman, 1989) prevented the use of paper and pencil instruments. The informants were given the opportunity to elaborate on answers and to feel comfortable with the interviewer (or not). This also gave the informant the opportunity to challenge the questioning as being inappropriate. In this manner, we do not have spurious data generated and this tactic potentially serves as a direct contribution to knowledge (assuming the questions were culled from an adequate literature review).

Each agency director was asked to name a variety of stakeholders and subordinates who worked with them and who observed their behavior first-hand. The interviewers stressed the intent was to understand how the leader exerted an impact on the organization they headed and not to pursue an expose' or to evaluate performance. By allowing the agency director to name the cohort, we face the possibility of bias or distortion in the interview responses. This was circumvented by interviewing those named by the director as well as a few others in the strategic leadership group and external stakeholders. The purpose of multiple informants was for confirmation of what the agency director told us. The informants gave information, even if it was systematically distorted information. The trick for the investigator was to determine if the distortion was intentional by offering a false interpretation to the informant.

Data Gathering and Analysis of Single Cases

I began this study of the OBES in September of 1989, one year after Ellen Saunders was appointed. Interviews with her were conducted over the course of the next three months. I began interviewing subordinates over the last month (November, 1989) and continued my subordinate interviews commencing in March and extending until May. During January, I began to search the library and newspaper indexes for articles mentioning OBES and its Administrator.

I began preparing for the study of DYS during July of 1989, when I was participating in the study of the Gubernatorial transition. I accompanied two faculty members on these interviews, one of which was with Director Natalucci-Persichetti, and on a second, I accompanied Bob Backoff to speak with Dr. Fletcher. These interviews were about their respective plans to imbed their policies
into their Departments. It was at each of these interviews that I asked these Directors if they would be willing to participate in this study. These requests were followed up by a letter, reproduced in appendix E.

I began my study of HEALTH in July of 1989, under the same circumstances as the DYS study. I went with Bob Backoff to interview Dr. Ronald Fletcher to learn of his preparations for the transition -- how was he going to embed the changes in policies occurring during the prior three years. It was at this interview that I broached the subject of Fletcher's participation in this study. I followed this question up in July of 1990. I sent a letter to Dr. Fletcher in the middle of November, 1990, to see if he was still interested in participating in my study. I then followed up with a telephone call to his appointment's secretary to schedule an appointment. We pursued four interviews over the course of the next month (December 5, 1990 to January 3, 1991).

The actual interviews with each director took approximately eight hours with Saunders, and an equal time discussing the findings and interpretations of her descriptions. The interviews with Directors Natalucci-Persichetti and Fletcher lasted about five or six hours each. Interviews with stakeholder-informants lasted from 20 minutes in one sitting to over four hours in three settings. I listened as long as the respondent was willing to talk -- usually the end of the interview schedule.

I also interviewed several members of the strategic leadership group of each director. I approached the identification of each in the following manner: first, I drafted a memo for the director to use when noting my presence to staff and to indicate that the director thought it was acceptable to comment to me. This memo is contained in the following representation.
MEMORANDUM

To: Senior Management Staff
Fr: Ellen O'Brien Saunders, Administrator
Re: OSU Research Project at OBES
Dt: October 23, 1989

Two researchers at the Ohio State University, Robert Backoff and Mike Card, have contacted me regarding documenting the activities taken by senior management staff to move an agency out of an adverse situation. They are interested in studying agencies that have regained their momentum and increased their capacity to provide services. They wish to document for the academic word that negative momentum can be reversed and to examine the actions we took to see if there are any general patterns that might apply to another government agency.

From this effort to document our action, they wish to develop a set of instructional cases to show how members of senior management staffs learn of the forces acting on the organization and their actions in response to those forces. From this, they wish to document the activities of new public managers and develop a teaching case to show students the pressures facing public managers arising from actual management experience.

They may ask to interview you and to recall your impressions and provide evidence centered around a variety of topics, including the situation facing members of OBES, my first few months of activity, and your responses to the situation we faced a year ago and the situation we currently face.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

n.b. This memo was printed on OBES Office of the Administrator stationary.

I employed a tape recorder to capture the words of each informant. I demonstrated to each informant where the pause button was on the recorder and told them that I was interviewing them at their leisure. If they wanted to stop the interview at any time, they could simply say so. They could also ask that something not be on the record and I would not include this in my study. I also offered confidentiality to their responses. The data cited in each chapter where subordinates responses are recorded is a file named xxxx_ALL, where the xxx is the name of the agency under investigation. In this manner, I am able to hold their responses confidential while still including it in the analysis. These files are open to an investigator who wishes to review my field notes and audit my findings.
Using the OBES case as a test for my methods, I transcribed my handwritten interview notes, usually within 24 hours of the interview. It became intuitively obvious as I listened to the interview tapes and reviewed my notes, I was not recording the interviews in their entirety. In the HEALTH and DYS studies, I transcribed notes of the Director's interview as well as the interviews with the subordinates and the stakeholders during the same workday as the interview. This volume of work limited the number of interviews I could conduct, but given the experience with the OBES case and interviews, I was able to maintain the quality of the information.

Secondary Data.

The critical relativist, or critical action theory tradition aims to produce descriptive data: written and spoken expressions and observable behavior of the subjects under study. In addition to the interview data, the investigators reviewed newspaper data and gathered data on personnel changes and structural changes. These proxy measures were collected using the following procedures developed by Gabarro (1987; his Appendix C) to describe the sources of activity data he used to make his findings. He researched composite measures for structural and personnel changes. Gabarro claimed these proxy measures reflect changes in structure and personnel. These two component measures were used because each was comparable over cases using a common set of conventions and because each could be reduced to a common metric that could be aggregated across cases (Gabarro, 1987; p. 178). Measuring this change in systems has dubious merit as the extent of the change may determine the impact of the change and the extent has not been reduced to a metric. In addition, the cases may not be replicable over time. That is, Gabarro does not study changes prior to the arrival of the new executive at work, nor does the study reflect the performance of the organization (e.g., situational adversity may cause layoffs of members of the strategic leadership group who were deemed as non-productive, but does not determine who initiated the layoff).

Attempts to aggregate such measures as personnel and structural changes may produce data subject to alternative interpretation. Personnel and structural changes can be captured for the history through memoranda, but these changes are introduced usually through memorandum. When the memoranda reaches the members of the organization, the change has already taken place. The ability to find these historical data is important in ex post studies. In the case of HEALTH, where the

---

65 I note that Gabarro's findings on the process of "taking charge" are based on these findings. It may be that his data are insufficient to support his findings. My rationale for this statement is that he does not describe the case findings anywhere in his research. An alternate would be Leonard-Barton (cited in Leonard-Barton, 1990) who followed a similar manner of combining retrospective or ex post with longitudinal studies.
clerical staff was hostile to the investigator, information regarding Dr. Fletcher's appointment schedules and many memoranda were not available to this investigator. Thus, the data regarding this set of measures were culled from interview data.

Table 32
Metric for Measuring Personnel Changes

1. Only changes involving personnel in the top three levels of the new manager's organization were counted.
2. A personnel change is defined as any personnel action which resulted in a termination, promotion, or reassignment in the top three levels of the organization.
3. All personnel actions count equally, a promotion is no more or less important than a termination or a reassignment.
4. A personnel change is counted as occurring in the month in which it is officially announced, regardless of when the manager had actually decided to make the change.

Table 33
Metric for Measuring Structural Changes

1. Count only structural changes involving major and minor subunits of the new manager's organization;
   a. New subunits are major functional units which report directly to the new manager
   b. Minor subunits are staff units reporting directly to the new manager or departments which comprise the next level below the major subunits which report directly to the new manager
2. A change in the structure
   a. Minor subunit is counted as one unit of structural change (including controller, corporate MIS, and personnel department reporting directly to the new manager).

Gabarro (1987; p. 183) developed the metric in the following table to describe personnel changes and one for describing structural changes (1987; p. 183-4). The purpose of describing changes involving personnel in the top three levels of the new manager's organization were counted was to limit the size of the relevant population and to allow the use of the assumption that "... changes made in these ranks would comparable effects in organizations regardless of their size." (Gabarro, 1987; p. 183). Gabarro (1987; p. 183) counted personnel change as occurring in the month in which it is officially announced, regardless of when the new manager had actually decided to make the change was to allow him to assume for convenience that the organization's alignment changes when the announcement is made. His entire study is predicated on the assumption that the alignment changes well before the announcement is made. In this study, the investigators attempted to induce the agency director to reveal when they changed their attitude regarding the individual so that changes
in the director's disposition would be apparent. That is, when the Director stopped acting as though
the individual would be there to carry out assignments. This small difference reveals that Gabarro's
data must be limited because he would not make so obvious a mistake as to deduce that "the
alignment changes when the announcement is made."

The criticisms of Gabarro's (1987; p. 184) structural change conventions are similar to the
conventions for personnel changes. First, the system of providing "units" for specific types of changes
enfolds a theoretical framework for strategic management -- it is not in the level of the individuals
reporting to the new manager. The value of the unit of change is Gabarro's predisposed unit value,
a value which does not depend on the value placed on the function by the new manager. For example,
if a new manager was appointed and one of the mandates given the new manager was to clean up a
specific area of the organization, one might argue that this function be given a higher weight
irrespective of the level of the reporting relationship of the incumbent to the new manager. Gabarro
(1987; p. 1987) makes no pretense that these change measures are "... of the same type or of
comparable impact ...", yet, when Gabarro arrays these data on a histogram and then bases his
typology of the taking charge process on these data, each measure becomes a measure of internal
turbulence over time and across contexts.

Collecting a second type of data has its merits (Denzin, 1989; Fielding & Fielding, 1986;
Greene, Carcelli, & Graham, 1989). It is data describing the structuralism of the organization. A
structure describes the features of phenomena or its characteristics such as strategy, incentive systems,
organizational reporting, etc. This is in contrast with process -- the steps used to design or devise
strategy, incentive systems, organizational reporting relationships, etc. Structure research searches for
the observable linkages between factors effecting taking charge and creating one's job and creating
the individual and organizational agenda. Process research looks at the question of how the director
created her job and arranged these structural elements to facilitate (or inhibit) that agenda. By placing
managerial action within a temporal context, the investigator constructs a case representing a
description of the enfolding of the relevant episode that is of some interest to readers, and because
of the nature of the informants, to the informants themselves. This episode must have some starting
point that is identifiable so that the process can be "bracketed."

Dealing with the Inevitable Problems
Often qualitative research is reported without detailing many of the problems inherent in the process of conducting the research. The first blunder was to recognize that my style of interacting was not consonant with that of Ellen O'Brien Saunders. I was more complete in detail and she was more interested in completing the agenda for the day and in appearing correct in her affairs. Another difficulty was that I once had some tissue on my glasses. She called attention to it and asked that I remove it because "It is distracting Bob (Backoff) and me." She was also distracted by the number of comments I made in my notes that were for my reference, and had forgotten to remove from the list of questions I delivered to her secretary, Maryellen Meredith, for the upcoming discussion. These discussions produced great distress on my part, by a reanalysis of the transcript does not provide evidence that Administrator Saunders acted differently. In all occasions, she was extremely task oriented.

In my dealings with Geno Natalucci-Persichetti, my first meeting was put off because the Director elected to go to Cleveland on the day of our first meeting. He had his secretary try to contact me by telephone, but I was already downtown working with the Department of Human Services, Division of Child Support Enforcement to develop a plan for meeting federal audit requirements. When I arrived at the Director's office, I was informed by the receptionist that I was one-half hour late and that the Director had left for Cleveland. I rescheduled the meeting with the Director's secretary and agreed with her to provide a number where I could be reached. Our subsequent discussions were scheduled early in the morning and the Director always scheduled another meeting after our gathering. As our rapport developed, I kept making references that my time was over, but the Director kept saying, "One more question." It is clear to me that my missing the initial meeting may have made it more difficult to schedule appointments and only over time was I able to overcome the lack of trust by the Director, if not the Director's secretary. This produced difficulty when attempting to obtain critical documents from early in Natalucci-Persichetti's tenure.

With Dr. Fletcher, I noted a great amount of hostility with the Director's clerical staff who scoffed at any notion of a meeting prior to 10:30 a.m. I was informed that Dr. Fletcher did not arrive from Dayton prior to 10 under almost any circumstances. The office staff also informed me that he left the office about 3:00 p.m., presumably to return to Dayton. In this instance, the office staff was less than helpful and often treated me curtly. I found some refuge in the receptionist on the 7th

66 The reader is advised that the author kept a journal of analysis strategies and his thoughts during the process of conducting the study and analyzing this data. These anecdotes are taken from this journal.
floor, where most of the strategic leadership group was "officed." This woman greeted me and I was able to strike up a conversation about various topics, including office practices. I was also able to have some level of intimacy with the clerical staff of other members of the SLG.

My efforts to speak with the staff were limited to agreeing to talk with them about their experiences regarding the transition. One person, Thomas Halpin offered to have me look at the journal he kept during his period as interim director, if he could retrieve it from Dr. Fletcher. I have not heard from Dr. Halpin. Most were quite helpful in their efforts -- from completing the interview schedule and responding to my interpretations to giving me lectures on the value of leadership as compared with management.

One question often asked (e.g., Lolland & Lofland, 1984) in qualitative analysis is "How did I deal with any suspicion or distrust on the part of one or more participants?" In fact, I did not totally overcome the lack of trust coming from two of the agency directors (Natalucci-Persichetti and Fletcher). In the case of Director Natalucci-Persichetti, he chose not to relinquish information that would have revealed the names of individuals or speak of the influence of his family on his job:

It's just a matter of choice. . . . And, it's one of these things where your family knows what you're doing and involved and most people don't realize this, but my wife also worked in corrections -- that's how we met. So she's sensitive to knowing about the work, but at the same time I try to look at my life in a different perspective. I'm very dedicated to my work and I see myself as a competent professional, but it is not my, my major theme in life. My major theme is my family. . . . And so to the extent that my work is a means for me to support my family, it becomes secondary to that issue so I try to keep the family sacred if you will, because that's to me more important than anything else. (Geno Natalucci-Persichetti, 12/19/90).

Director Natalucci-Persichetti also did not wish to discuss some personnel moves because of the fear that I would discuss their names and he stated that he did not wish to cause them any more harm. Director Fletcher chose to be rather vague about personnel moves and shifts of responsibility with one notable exception, mentioned earlier. To some extent, they became more open with me over time. However, more information was provided by others within the organization. I completed these interviews and tested this information on Dr. Fletcher. I occasionally offered questions or statements for him to respond to, which were inaccurate in order to test whether he was "giving me a line" and simply completing the interviews or whether he was weighing his responses. As it turns out, he responded to the energy level I was able to demonstrate and in responding, gave far more detailed answers than when I was asking him to respond to the questions initially.
Private Feelings

My feelings toward the respondents ranged over the course of the study. With Ellen O'Brien Saunders, I found myself comparing her to the woman who hired me in South Dakota. I reminded myself that I was an investigator and that this was a human being, and that I had to find some problems. One of the difficulties that I experienced was in finding someone who would say anything about her actions that could be construed as negative. While I did eventually find some staff persons who were able to speak candidly about their Administrator, I found that I was not repulsed or defensive. I think I have reported her in a favorable light -- and this reflects of my conversations with her subordinates and colleagues.

I was very frustrated with the Department of Youth Services and the Department of Health interviews with the Directors. The subordinates were far more forthcoming than in OBES. In the case of DYS, I was able to ask pertinent questions about the policy stance, but Director Natalucci-Persichetti gave me the names of people that he brought in to DYS three months to three years after he was appointed. I interviewed some of these people to get the direction he gave them when he appointed them. Their response was to accomplish a specific task, and then to fill the responsibilities of someone who the Director thought to be performing in an unsatisfactory manner, over time. The same initial conditions precipitated my study at the Department of Health. The Director, when I asked for names of people to interview, told me of mostly recent appointments. These people, some of whom were from within the organization were difficult to steer in the direction of the tasks, remembrances, and duties from the time when the Director was appointed. They were more comfortable talking about the move to their new position. This is interesting material and somewhat related to the idea of the director's taking charge. I wondered if it was my questioning or whether these were self-centered people. My curiosity increased until I reach the possibility that these individuals may have been given a task to perform and they were performing this task as the start of their world. This, combined with the notion that the first day of someone's tenure is a watershed date for that individual, but not necessarily for colleagues or for the organization convinced me that these people were acting normally.

Data Focusing and Analysis

I began to focus the data immediately after each interview. Starting with OBES, where I was accompanied on the interviews with Director Saunders by Robert Backoff, Dr. Backoff and I "debriefed" after each interview in the half hour after to the interview and refreshed each other in the half-hour prior to each interview. We focused the interviews after the initial "grand tour" questions
(Chaffee & Tierney, 1988; p. 206), by reviewing what we thought we had learned from the interview and then planned additional questions we needed to confirm and to disconfirm our propositions.

The interview tapes were transcribed by Cathleen Payne and the author using a Sony transcribing machine and copies of the original tapes. The author reviewed the transcripts with the field notes and the original interview tapes. The transcripts (completed by Ms Payne) contained fewer than 2 percent errors (errors, including typographical mistakes and words deemed unclear without a knowledge of the context). Ms. Payne and I used a transcribing convention developed by Maynard (1988; pp 1-2).

ETHNOGRAPH is a commercial program used to store textual material in a database, and to retrieve, and sort interview transcripts. ETHNOGRAPH allocates line numbers to each line of typed material, and allows the investigator to assign a number of codes to that line. Each line can be assigned up to six codes and the text can be numbered (using the same numbers) and assigned additional codes. The effect is to create a mechanical index card system -- without the cutting and pasting usually associated with index cards. The program does not take the thought out of the process -- but it does take the tedium out of shuffling the cards. ETHNOGRAPH allows the investigator to changes the codes and to print out sections of the transcripts coded with similar codes.

The investigation followed the grounded theory paradigm described by Strauss (1987). In the OBES case, the author and adviser reviewed the interviews for the themes inherent in the interview. The two of us then reviewed the general themes we thought we had heard and stated what information we needed to confirm our thematic impressions. These themes were used to alter the series of questions intended for the next interview session. We then began that interview with our impressions and asked Ms Saunders to respond to these themes, either to confirm or to disconfirm. One difficulty in this process was to test whether Saunders would treat us with deference or would accept what we said we thought we had found. This involved taking a thematic impression and, reversing the polarity of our impression, to see if she heard what we said, and would correct me. This risked my credibility with the informant, but was possible with two investigators (see other embarrassing experiences in data collection).

The investigators also collected memoranda relating to personnel and structural changes from the Director, when possible. Directors Natalucci-Persichetti and Director Fletcher were not always forthcoming with this information, nor were their clerical staff. I then proceeded to ask individuals...
within the organization to recall the events regarding personnel and structural changes, as well as the director's initial policy announcements and collected a variety of documents from them.

The investigator scoured the newspapers for each individual regarding their predecessor, the activities in the period leading to their appointment, the announcement of the appointment, and the next six months to one year after appointment. These newspaper articles were copied off of microfilm and from agency records and used in this analysis.

We also obtained Saunders' personal schedules distributed to staff and to the governor's office to note whether she spent more structured time with particular stakeholders and with particular members of her staff. Dr. Fletcher made it clear that he did not structure his time — so this comparison strategy was not possible. In addition, the author's lateness for the first DYS interview placed him in a poor position with Director Natalucci-Persichetti's secretary. This information was not made available to the investigator.

The author first coded the transcribed data according to the codes INIT_COND, STRATEGY, TACTIC, REL_yyy (where "yyy" represents organizational units, roles, or individuals the author interprets the speaker as referring) and CONSEQ. These are the four categories of the grounded theory coding paradigm. By focusing the coding in this manner, the coding becomes deductive where the analyst-investigator assumes that there is purposeful behavior. In this step, Strauss (1987; pp. 55-81) is consistent with Miles and Huberman (1984). However, Miles and Huberman (1984; p. 57), in this section argue that "... data get molded to the codes that represent them..." The codes assigned to the textual material represent labels -- labels stored with the transcribed statements of the informant. By labeling the sections of text in this manner, the investigator could evaluate the temporal sequence associated with transition. The initial analysis confirmed the suspicion that there was a temporal sequence to the data reported in chapter II (predecessor's resignation announced, predecessor leaves the organization, the successor appointed, the successor arrives, the successor's resignation announced, the successor leaves, a new successor is appointed, etc.). The investigation then proceeded to analyze each of the four temporal periods using the Straussian coding paradigm.

After examining the themes of each interview and segment, the author examined each line of text to examine what each word meant and why each word was used. The key idea used was to demonstrate when something could be thought to be true and to specify when something would not be true. That is, the analysis proceeded along the lines of falsification (see Popper, 1959). By
indicating when the provisional analysis would be false, the investigator was forced to look for data to indicate that the provisional answer was false -- not for when the answer was true (representing a move from inductive to deductive reasoning). This method of coding proceeds from these provisional suggestions, actively looking for variations, and sampling for variations (see also Orosz, 1990) in explanations. Sampling for variations means to look at different interviews and at different contexts for alternative explanations. If one does not code in this fashion, these paradigmatic elements will be implicit or unsystematically linked with the phenomena under investigation (Strauss, 1987; p. 58). It is important to focus not on the *naming of categories* as the work of the coding but on how, in the inductive coding process, these categories are related through the active deductive process for the specific and variable conditions to other dimensions (e.g., initial conditions, relationships, strategies, and tactics, and consequences).

Once these initial codes have been developed, the investigator turned to a process Strauss (1987; p. 64) labeled as axial coding -- coding intensively and concertedly around single categories. This is accomplished by outlining the properties of the category and then specifying the varieties of conditions, consequences, strategies and tactics, and relationships that are associated with the appearance of the phenomena referenced by the code. The investigator asked the following questions:

1. What are the different ways to interpret this data?
2. Is the concept grounded on this page?
3. Is the concept grounded in the experiential data revealed by the informant or by the informant's sense-making?

The investigator stepped away from immersion in the transcripts to think about explicit concepts and their relationships. The primary difficulty was to avoid translating the events into my own framework. I had to sit and take ownership over my own transition experience and think of how what I was reading was related to what I thought. This third step is to relate the concept to other categories. For example, the idea of entering the office was closely associated with the idea of "sending a message." It is at this process that the investigator shifted the full meaning of a code. The investigator turned to the next step when the number of categories was "saturated" or when additional readings of the text began to reveal few additional codes -- codes that were not already developed in previous coding sessions. The investigator asked himself the following questions:

1. What category does this incident indicate?
2. What is actually happening in the data?
3. What accounts for their basic problems?

The investigator then turned to the process of selective coding after determining the core category -- the category or code around which the other codes begin to revolve. The core category
served to integrate the other concepts -- it was the relationship between this category and most all other categories that served to explain how individual agency directors created their jobs. While the core category is different in each case (credibility for OBES, authority for DYS, and control for HEALTH), each of these core categories

It was the point when I began to relate the concepts and categories that I began to write the theoretical memos -- notes to myself where I tried to explain how, when, and why the category I was currently working on was related to other categories. My purpose was to relate this category and its properties to other categories and other properties. By focusing on the categories as well as their properties, I was able to improve upon the informant’s sense of what happened as well as why. This helped me account for the variance in the pattern of behavior between one context and another.

I began this study with a personal experience of executive level transitions. This experience was much in my Johari window -- I was not aware of it nor to the degree to which I was influenced by this experience. The theoretical part heavily influenced the formulation of the interview schedule. However, after assembling the questions, the necessities of earning a living prevented the author from completing the chapter reviewing the literature until after all interviews for all sections were completed. That is, the literature was set aside while the interview-analysis was underway.

**Between-Case Analysis**

To meet the criticism of idiosyncratic interpretations, the study has multiple cases. These cases were selected with specific comparisons as part of a design (see Orosz, 1990). The investigators used a compare and contrast method referred to as constructive alternativism (Evered, 1980) to analyze the findings between cases. Constructive alternativism involves a pair-wise comparisons between cases (OBES-DYS, OBES-HEALTH, DYS-HEALTH) noting similarities and differences in each of the pair-wise comparisons. By focusing on differences, the investigator was forced to search for and then explain contrasting findings. Using these six comparisons for each finding, this method also forces an investigator to document similarity. By noting the similarities, the possibility is opened for a sophisticated understanding of the concepts of the process. The result is a grounded theory which has two replications and some unanswered questions (see Chapter VII).

---

67 Luft, in "The Johari Window," *Human Relations Training Review*, (1961) 5:6-7, provides the discussion of the Johari window. Luft’s term refers to things one knows and things one does not know, on the one hand, and between things one knows that are unknown and those things one does not know that one does not know. The Johari window refers to the things that one does not know that one does not know. Thus, in this instance, I do not know how much I do not know.
Reshaping the Propositions

In Chapter VIII, the text compares the grounded theory with the published and established theory reviewed in Chapter II. The investigator compares the theory resulting from the constructive alternativism to the propositions in the form of a table which summarizes and tabulates the evidence - describing the situation.

The propositions are compared for the evidence is each case, not for the aggregate theory. Thus, the logic is one of replicating quasi-experiments. If the evidence from a case supports the proposition, then the truth value (credibility or internal validity) of the proposition is enhanced. Case evidence that disconfirms the proposed relationship provides the opportunity to refine and extend the theory -- making a definite contribution to the literature. It is at this point that qualitative data are particularly useful for understanding the contradictions in the literature. For example, the insider-outsider distinction mentioned earlier.

The Writing Process -- Preliminary Findings for New Qualitative Researchers

The first thought that I have relative to the writing process is that I would do more conceptual "memoing" (Strauss, 1987) and when I began to do this memoing, I would do it earlier. The task of writing conceptual memos (conceptual memoing) is interrelating a concept with all its inter-relationships with other concepts and categories. If I had it to do over again, I would take these memos and put them in separate text files, so that they would be more contextually distinct. This way, I could think of each file as a thinking unit and could posit a notebook of each thinking unit, creating a record of my thinking toward each concept and category.

The second suggestion I have is that I would give more thought to the labels I used -- I would take the private sector labels and give them a unique public sector flavor so that the concepts would be distinct, yet useful to describing the phenomenal events I was describing. In my early efforts, I was so esoteric that my lovely wife could not understand the concepts and neither could the informants. In contrast, the use of the term "normal transition" juxtaposes the words "normal" and "transition." In an organizational context, the words have mutually opposite meanings. In a transition, the social order is greatly disturbed -- there is little normal about it. What can be surmised is that the juxtaposed term was suggested by one respondent with considerable tenure in the organization and within state government. The finding for me was that this term was meaningful and informative to those who used it, despite my hesitation to use it.
The amount of time that I spent on avoiding the use of labels has both a positive and negative effect: I spent a considerable amount of time describing the event to the informant and then the informant responded to its validity from her or his perspective. This increased the validity of the findings, but introduces the possibility that the respondent's perspectives were biased by my suppositions. The findings are useful in that they are useful but conservative findings. The full depth of the subordinate's responses must be evaluated further.

In the text, the comments of the subordinates are labeled only with the comments of the agency director or by the phrase "ALL." The word "ALL" is my means of grouping the subordinates within each agency, and placing their comments into one ETHNOGRAPH file for analysis. This allowed me to maintain the respondent's confidentiality and still provides for the data to be audited by another researcher.

At several intervals through the work, I was able to lay the dissertation aside after having written parts of it. It is these periods of laying it aside that permitted me to cogitate further on certain parts and on the unanswered questions. For example, I was particularly perplexed by the literature's vagueness on the end point of transition and succession. It seems very difficult to develop a model of the transition process without an end point to the transition. Without a conceptual end-point, it seems extremely difficult to construct a questionnaire to obtain large numbers of respondents so that I could construct confidence intervals about the range and variation in transitions. After having considered the possibility that I was modeling the wrong process (I think not) or that I missed some important part of the literature (after re-reading each article and reviewing the citations and reviewing EACH [and every damn one] of those articles) I concluded that the discussions of transitions are conceptually vague exactly because the previous authors developed concepts that have little operational stability (see especially Gabarro, 1988) or to ignore these "finer" distinctions altogether and deal with the succession incident as the objective causal event. It was when I discovered the variability in this concept that I knew I was on to something. That something is contained in chapter II and the distinction between individual, interpersonal and organizational perspectives in the transition. That something is also the symbolism that events and processes have to the social actors whose perspectives I represent as individual, interpersonal, and organizational.

It is important to recognize that there is no necessary analytic relevance despite the face validity of such concepts as insider, outsider, race, sex, social class, age, etc. It is important if it becomes important through the analysis. It is the process of axial coding -- that process that never seemed to end where the possibility that these codes were examined to see if there was a plausible
rationale as to why the code would be important and then to search for the data or to add another interview that would disconfirm this rationale. I also found that a code that is important at one level of analysis, may not be so important at another level. For example, the sex of the agency director did not mean much to the agency directors, yet it was a concern to many internal and external stakeholders. In addition, the concept of internal and external seems such a distinction -- internal is inclusive to the individual's reference. That is, the people in the governor's office thought insiders were those inside the executive branch (except when they meant inside the governor's circle). Likewise, those inside an agency referred to internal as inside the organization unless they were referring to a specific group and its insiders. The relevance is that to the people in the agency, the people in the governor's office are not "insiders" or internal stakeholders -- they are external.

When reviewing my journals for this section, I am reminded that the process of writing and thinking of this topic has covered much ground in the past three years. By laying the work aside to earn sufficient money so that I could have another concerted period of data gathering and interviewing provided me with the intellectual energy to continue with this process. It is time and consuming and emotionally draining. Without having other problems upon which to step, I would have deprived myself of sanity.

Finally, it seems to me that the ethnographers (e.g., Van Maanen, 1989) who read this will not believe the writing to be clearly descriptive enough and that I have superimposed my analysis over the description of the events and experiences of the participants. The grounded theorists (e.g., Strauss, 1987; Prestine, 1990) will take the opposite focus and assert that my efforts to focus and analyze are especially relevant, while the data can be gathered from almost anywhere in almost any fashion. Somewhere between these two perspectives I have chosen to write on the topic of executive level transitions in state government agencies. The discipline has a theoretical and practical heritage. The procedures provided me with a conceptual discipline and a creative experience that begins with a deep and emotional relation to the setting and to the personnel involved. To omit or skimp on this discussion would have deprived the reader of the depth of the data, the precision of the focus, and the incisiveness (or lack thereof) of the analysis. To do so would have been to have weakened the data with an omission. A logical error of the worst sort, as we may soon find.
APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE PROTOCOL FOR AGENCY DIRECTOR INTERVIEWS
Strategic Leadership of State Agencies
Taking Charge

Questions

School of Public Policy and Management
The Ohio State University
1775 College Road
Columbus, Ohio 43210-1399
(614) 292-8696

Dr. Ronald Fletcher
Ohio Department of Health

December, 1990
1. Getting the Job
   a. What experiences prepared you for the challenges of this position?
      i. Was there an attempt to groom you for a position through the provision of
         developmental assignments?
      ii. Were there experiences you wished you had had?
      iii. Tell me about those who "groomed" you.

   b. What did you do that is related to taking this job before you arrived here?

   c. How did you come to the position of the Director of Health?
      i. Who was involved in the selection process? What was the selection process?
      ii. Did you actively campaign for the position? What did you do?

   d. Tell me about the interview process.

   e. What were your first thoughts when Governor Celeste asked you to take the job as Director?
      i. Why did you accept the job?
      ii. What personal issues influenced your decision to accept these responsibilities?
      iii. What expectations did you have with respect to taking the position?
      iv. Selection: the screening and selection of a successor and the quality of the contracting
          between the successor and superiors including motivation for change in leadership,
          formality of selection process, and individual attributes.

   f. What were your initial policy postures?
      (1) Did these fit with those of the Governor's office?
      (2) Did you receive an action agenda and timing for implementation?
          (a) or did you need to obtain approval for these?
          (b) or were you criticized for not getting approval for any actions?
      i. How much access to the Governor or the Chief of Staff do you have? (Then)
      ii. What degree of flexibility and discretion do (did) you have in making appointments and
          in taking actions within the department?

   g. Entry: How were your initial expectations verified or redefined.
i. What resources were at your disposal? You've mentioned that you felt that you could not fire anyone. Were there any other constraints on your activities? With respect to the personnel, was it that you couldn't fire anyone or that you had to be careful not to

ii. Was there pressure for immediate action?

iii. Did you have to make resolution regarding family issues given that you have more responsibilities in this position?

h. Political appointees are called upon to employ a variety of skills in their work.

i. What skills were required and what type of orientation or training (formal or informal) were available to you?

ii. Do you feel you have had sufficient orientation to your role?

iii. What type of orientation should be available to a new agency director?

i. Were you hired with a mandate for change? whose was it? How was it developed?

j. What messages from the governor's office did you receive?

Do you have the governor's "charge" letter? Will you share a copy of it with me?

k. Did you receive any messages from the appointing screening committee?

l. What were your first actions concerning the role of the director before assuming formal duties?

2. Wrap up

a. Now you know the types of issues we are interested in for this project, With whom should I be sure to talk with about these issues?

b. Do you have any questions I should have asked, but didn't?

3. 1st Week on the Job

a. When you arrived for work that first day, what strong wishes, thoughts, or aspirations did you have in mind?

i. How did you feel when you first arrived at the Health Department (and WHY)?

ii. What expectations did you have?

b. When you were selected for this assignment, were you given a specific charge? Did this charge differ significantly from what you yourself saw had to be done? What did you hope to be able to do beyond the expectations of the governor (or the Chief of Staff)?

c. How would you describe your philosophy or style which you intended to use during the first six months of your new responsibilities?

d. What methods did you use to define and plan the execution of your new responsibilities?
e. Which techniques were the most helpful in this initial six months? Did any become less helpful after the initial six month period?

f. Which techniques were the least helpful in this initial six months?
   i. Did any become more helpful after the initial six month period?

g. How did you feel about your power base when you took this assignment?
   i. What was the basis of your authority when you took over?
   ii. Has the basis of your authority changed?

h. Did you receive any offers of help from other cabinet officials?
   i. the Governor?
   ii. The chief of staff?
   iii. employees (which ones?)?

i. Once you were on board, how did you learn about the agency: its issues, people, and operation?

j. How did you learn about the relevant external environment?

k. What do you wish you had known and why?

l. What type of transition documents and other written information was available, and what, if any was especially valuable in orienting you to the agency?

m. What would you do the same?
   i. what would you do differently?

n. How did you arrive at the decision to focus on these items?

4. Agenda/Strategy/Issues

a. Initial Initiatives: the initial set of actions to shift personnel, make programmatic changes, renegotiate relations with external stakeholders, and restructure processes and responsibilities.
   i. who did you replace? when? why?
      (1)
      (2)
      (3)
   ii. what programmatic changes have you made or have you tried to arrange?
       when? why?
       (1)
       (2)
       (3)
   iii. What relations with stakeholders (external) when? Why?
iv. what internal processes and relations have you restructured?

b. What has been the toughest issue for you since assuming these responsibilities?
   i. How is this tough?
   ii. What is it that makes it tough?
   iii. How would you have changed this?

c. What have been the three toughest agency decisions since you've been here?
   i. for the agency, five years prior to your coming here?
   ii. three toughest personal decisions
      (1) what concepts were communicated?
      (2) how were these decisions communicated?
      (3) what evidence was given?
      (4) what reactions were encountered?

d. What did you see had to be done in and to the organization in order to achieve those goals?
   That is, what policies, practices, perceptions, methods, attitudes, did you perceive had to be changed?

e. What do you consider to be your primary responsibility as agency director? (How?)
   i. do these differ from the governor’s expectations
   ii. do these differ from the expectations of staff
   iii. do these differ from those outside the agency

f. How do you manage your attention agenda and priorities your time?

h. What will be the dominant problem when your successor takes over from you?

i. What things happen outside the organization that you would like to change?

j. What were the key tasks you faced as you took office?

k. What program changes have you made?
You indicated several items that remain to be addressed. (e.g., trust fund solvency, quality service agenda, restructuring human capital agencies, etc.)

i. What do you think you will learn, if anything, from addressing these issues?
ii. What do you believe you must addressed?

m. Are there some relatively minor initiatives that have produced significant effects (even if not visible to outsiders) in your agency?

Stakeholder Relations

I. Legislative Relations
   A. Describe a typical legislative interaction.
      1. Committee testimony
      2. legislator request

II. Media Relations
   A. Describe a typical interaction with a member of the media.
      1. favorable story
      2. unfavorable story

III. Governor & Other Members of The Executive
   A. Describe your relationship with the governor and his staff members.
   B. Did you receive any offers of help from other cabinet officials?
      1. the Governor?
      2. The chief of staff?
      3. employees (which ones?) ?
   C. Did you receive an action agenda and timing for implementation or do you need to obtain approval for these?
   D. How much access to the Governor or the Chief of Staff do you have?
   E. What is the level of support expected in a pinch
   F. What degree of flexibility and discretion do you have in making appointments and in taking actions within the department?

IV. General
   A. What external support did you have for the changes you wished?
   B. What power relationships were altered as a result of your accepting this position?
   C. How have others altered themselves and their routines to you?
   D. Did you take any actions that you intended to serve as symbols of you being now in charge?
   E. Pattern Setting: reinforcing or institutionalizing desired norms and interpersonal relations.
      1. what have you done to create a predictable work climate?
      2. What have you done to induce turbulence into the established routines?
V. Key Reactions You Pay Attention To

A. What indicators do you use to determine how well the Health Department is doing?
B. What indicators do you use to determine how well you are doing?
C. If you want to assess how well the agency is doing, how do you do it?
   1. how widely shared are your indicators/
   2. how explicit are they? (observable vs. intuition)
D. What are the repeatedly frustrating problems you face?
E. Which of the accomplishments in you life would make your parents, professors, peers proud of your accomplishments?
F. Think of an agency director you respect. If he or she were in your position as administrator, what would be different about how the organization would operate? What are the subtleties that make a difference?
G. What do you want to be remembered for?
H. Looking back on it now, how well did you succeed in making those changes? Did they produce the effects you were striving for? How did you know?

VI. If you were to derive one or more principles of organizational leadership from you own experience, what would they be?

A. If you were to point out one or more major pitfalls for prospective organizational leaders, what would they be?
B. What modes of operation have proved to be refractory to your effort?
C. Think of the Health Department as a person. Describe that person to me.
D. How has this changed after the initial six month period?
E. What skills (in them or you) do you take advantage of in selecting people?
   1. What do you look for in an employee for a top position?
   2. What do you steer clear of?
F. How, if at all, did the tenure of your predecessor effect your approach to leading the agency?
G. How do you measure the performance of programs at the delivery level (given your discussion of a customer-centered DYE)?
H. Tell me about the management team you created?
   1. ask anyone to leave?
   2. make it desirable for anyone to leave?
   3. expectations you have of the management team?
      a. how did you communicate your expectations
      b. 
I. Did you have to deal with employees disappointed with your selection?
1. Their own non-selection?
2. What did you do?
J. What disruptions have you created?
K. What routines were de-stabilized?
L. What supports for attitudes have you tried to removed? how successful?
M. When will establishing routines not block innovation?
N. What capacity building exercises have you started? (1) personal, (2) staff, (3) agency
O. What transition capacity have you built?

Personal History

A. birth date and birthplace
B. parents:
   1. age,
   2. education,
   3. occupation,
   4. religion,
   5. influence on your growing up,
   6. closeness to each parent
C. siblings:
   1. name,
   2. age,
   3. education,
   4. occupation
D. home:
   1. where,
   2. when and for how long did you live in a city
E. education:
   1. schools,
   2. major area of study,
   3. class standing,
   4. extracurricular activities and positions,
   5. awards,
   6. honors
F. occupational history
   1. part-time work while in school
   2. armed forces (date, branch, rank)
3. full-time employment

G. personal health

H. family:
   1. marriages,
   2. children,
   3. wife's employment

I. non-work activities

J. commuting:
   1. where do you live,
   2. how far do you commute,
   3. mode of transport,
   4. length of commute

K. current job
   1. specific responsibilities
   2. formal authority
   3. average hours per week (including time at home)
   4. % of time working alone
   5. days per month of overnight travel because of work
   6. How many hours do you put in per week? day?

L. General
   1. happy with
      a. present job
      b. organization
      c. career progress
      d. family,
      e. lifestyle,
      f. life in general
   2. degree of tension or stress
   3. physical feelings

M. What did you bring with you to this office?

N. What stories do people tell of you?

O. Describe yourself as an individual? What kind of person are you?

P. How would you describe your leadership style

Q. Could you describe your "character?"
R. Would you describe your loyalties as to Governor Celeste or to the mission of juvenile corrections? What are your loyalties?

This file is named "FLETCHER.Q".
APPENDIX C
ACTUAL QUESTIONS FROM INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS
OF OBES ADMINISTRATOR
ELLEN O'BRIEN SAUNDERS
Appendix C

ACTUAL QUESTIONS FROM INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS
OF OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES ADMINISTRATOR
ELLEN O'BRIEN SAUNDERS

QUESTIONS FROM 9/7/89 INTERVIEW

1. Would you feel more comfortable with having the questions in advance?

2. The focus this time is just to start the process of detailing how you see, historically now, taking
over as director and we wanted to kind of focus in on when was it that you think you were
starting to act as against being in Wisconsin, or was it the first day you showed up, or something
like that?

3. Part of what we want to do, from the point of view of developing you as a case, is to present it
to people in our classroom. You are Ellen O'Brian Saunders. This is the world-- that she
experienced. What do you do and after they go through that process, then I'll say, "This is what
she said--how she made sense of it." So it's going to be very particular to how does he know two
people will do it the same way, how they appreciate it, made sense of it, how they deploy
themselves. So that's a piece of it. The other piece of it is really a more documented case of the
whole process of turn-around, but I wanted to also use taking charge of the leadership position
as one of the things I wanted to insert into my course work on strategic management of state
agencies.

4. But what we were hoping to do is, as we talked before, create a case. Mike is working on his
dissertation and wants to use this case in his dissertation work as he is very interested in the turn
around kinds of situations, agencies and what strategies are available, what the leader does and
so forth, so Mike will be taking some of the lead here with questions.

5. What I think we expect to do here is go through a process and start. As we go along we may
feed back to you what we think are the major themes or types--sort of what are the highlight
points if you will, and check those out with you, and then in terms of progression, we thought we
would start with your taking the job and how you saw that and what was going on there.
Obviously, now you were just commenting on things that have become more clear to you after
those first moments, but, is that comfortable going back in history to that point?

6. And if we could get maybe a VITA or something that you did?

7. Could we get a package of documents and some of the things like (minutes of) meetings with
deputies and staff and so forth, could we get a hold of a series of those from the start to current?

8. I know you shared at one time you got a call from the governor's office about your interest in the
job, is that right? And then, when you came down here and talked, did you have two rounds of
interviewing, one with the committee and one with the governor? (What was the hiring procedure like?)

9. What was going on at the time you got the first call, in your head--like out of the blue, or...?

10. Had you already developed the mind set of wanting to be a director or what you wanted to aspire to?

11. Your name came up from someplace but you still don't know where?

12. Did you have a concept that you were going to sell at this point or were you just going, meeting in a listening mode?

(What was the sequence of events surrounding your hiring?)

13. How did you feel about yourself at that point, in terms of your performance?

14. But at that time were you getting a sense of your interest in the job (and in) working for him?

15. It was pretty clear that what he wanted you to do was to get the agency out of the newspaper?

16. Were there any other specific directions, or did he voice that, or...?

17. Well, when did you know that they were definitely—that they were checking you out, not just as a checking process, but they were starting to commit?

18. So they just said, "We'll get back to you," and that was the end of it?

19. Did you go looking for the salary range before Carolyn called, or afterwards?

20. (What motivated you to leave your home and family in Wisconsin?)--not asked

21. (What was the sequence of events when you first arrived for work?)--not asked, but discussed

22. I was going to ask you 'cuz that goes back to the thing you raised about uh, sense of being alone, not having your network--

23. I take it from what you said (to the governor) that the kinds of things you wanted were, in fact, acknowledged and accepted or was there actually give-and-take negotiation?

24. As I recall from talking with you previously, you were surprised at how fast the earlier agenda of that office got off the ground at all.

25. Go out and do things and then try to bring them down to the potential of people(?)

26. What you were talking about (was that) in June you came to the realization that you were grappling with the essential nature of the institution. How did you know that?

27. Where did you start to make a decision to stay with the people on board—and did that happen, that first week you were here, or did you come to that notion?

28. So you were speaking that way at the press conference?
29. You said the same thing when you met with the management team?

30. And you wanted to get things done, and you really weren't in the situation of, "Gee, I'll do an investigation of these people and find out."

31. Well, maybe we can pick up next time on the staff and the people and your first conversations--and, then, we want to talk about, a little bit about the agenda that you had as it started off at that time. We hit a couple of those points, but I think one of the things we want to try to get out is literally what do you say to people in those first contacts, and how to establish those relationships and connections.

END OF INTERVIEW ON 9/7/89

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO EOBS PRIOR TO 9/26 MEETING

32. When did you formulate your basic agenda?

33. What gives a person the material to be an agency director?

34. When did you feel like being a director?

35. How did you discover whom you could trust?

36. Will you talk about your efforts to build your executive team? Would you have done this differently if you had not accepted the personnel as given?

37. How did you determine the competency of your staff? What factors led to your decision to make personnel actions? How long did you wait? What was it that made personnel actions possible or necessary?

38. How did you discover and manage the expectations of your staff?

39. Would you comment on the relationship between and among administrators, civil servants, OCSEA, and yourself?

40. How were you able to obtain state resources to compliment the federal funds allocated to Ohio for the provision of employment services?

41. What special relationships did you create for this process?

42. What made your initial conversations with editorial boards so successful?

43. How has this changed since the exchange with the Ohio Job Training Coordinating Council? How would your meeting with the editorial board of the Plain Dealer have been different if the OJTCC had not turned out as it did?

44. What will you do to deal with adverse publicity?

45. What can we generalize from your experience?

QUESTIONS NOT ASKED
46. What indicators do you use to assess OBES performance? How widely shared are your indicators? How explicit?

47. What indicators do you use to assess how well you are doing? How widely shared? How explicit?

48. What accomplishments in your life would your parents, spouse, or peers mention?

49. What personal and organizational routines have you altered? How? What do/did you expect the alteration to produce?

50. What supports for attitudes have you tried to remove? What attitudes? How will this change attitudes?

51. To what routines and relationships have you given support?

52. Are there events within the agency when those who worked for you were testing you? What happened so that they stopped testing you? What actions?

53. Are there similar events when you believe members of OJTCC or other outside interest were testing you?

54. How was your proposal for changing supervisors' position descriptions met by senior staff? To what degree have they implemented this proposal?

**QUESTIONS ASKED IN INTERVIEW OF 9/26**

55. What is it that gives the person, we think of the hudspa(SP?!) to be an agency director? What is it that gives you the capability or a person to have the, being capable?

56. I wonder what attracts you and what makes it possible and another one is what makes you appointable?

57. Is it the capacity to argue a case for the substantive service and that you have some conviction behind you which is your passion?

58. This distinction about the passion for the issue, you're not saying that's just a woman's requirement for becoming secretary?

59. Has it been a real split between what I call a perspective of policy of the directors of agencies which is that they ought to be on top of the issues, policy, substantive concerns and then others who say well, that's good under times of change, but the other question is can they manage getting anything done if their agency can't get legislation passed or anything to speak to it, but they have what you call process, can they enact the repertoires that make that happen?

60. How do you know when they have the intellectual tools?

61. They can't just appropriate your language system the way you're thinking but somehow you have to get to where they're thinking--You mentioned that you weren't sure how well you were able
to talk their language. Are there any activities that you're doing to try to get to talk their language, or are you being blunt without being rude?

62. How long have you contrasted with that strategy (to keep old employees) that it is not so powerless as it is to make the moves that free up some new relationships and then push ahead in a positive constructive way? (from p. 18)

63. That (the budget) was really kind of a fault line, if you had to do cuts, then that would have changed the whole approach, wouldn't it?

64. So those are kind of three bench marks, one starting and getting this incident, morale, behind you, second one is "Where are we going to be financially, uh, in terms of really bad situations?"— and the third one is, "Now that we have an upscale, slightly, what do we do?"

65. (With the JTPA re-organization, the trust fund insolvency issue, budget crunch and internal personnel matters, how did you prioritize?)

66. (What is the former JTPA manager's relationship with the current JTPA employees and how does that affect your getting things done now?)

67. (What is the relationship with the federal government like and what do you foresee it to be in the future?)

68. (How did you establish relations with the rest of the cabinet members, establish confidants?)

69. You spoke to "2" a little bit, about determining competency of the staff, that you, I'm not using the right words, but I think you said you pretty much took them, and you didn't want to deal with what was on their plate because you had enough on your plate at time----so you weren't looking at how competent they were.

70. (How were priorities generated among senior staff/cabinet?)

71. (What were senior staff/cabinet's expectations of a leader?)

72. (What were the effects of the transition & how it was handled on your staff?)

73. (How do you manage working relations with classified and unclassified employees?)

74. I was looking for, if you have a way you try to read people, under number two, in terms of competency of staff, more broadly, and, are there some certain kind of signals or cues that you read, and you say, "Ah, that's, that's..." either the sense of "That's the kind of person that I want to give responsibility to" or, you mentioned before, if somebody gets on the other side, you say, "Gee, they don't do the job," so forth. (What characteristics do you look for in an employee?)

75. Is it different in this position as director from your previous, I was looking at your VITA, previous positions as a division administrator, bureau administrator?

76. Does that shift what you're looking for?

77. (How does a director get an accurate perception of what's going on?)
78. (How do you handle relations with satellite offices—e.g. getting back to them after they've voiced a suggestion/problem?)

79. Having got on board, having met with the staff and so forth, you've spoken to sort of some general things you're trying to do with staff meetings and so forth—but did you also sort of informally or formally in mind, or just in the way you're acting, for each individual select this as the kind of thing I want to help this person toward or do, or test them in this situation—anything like that, where you're sort of working with them?

80. (What was your approach to the legislators & "good ole boy" networks? How did you work with your legislative aide?)

81. Did your success in the special session lay the foundation for your later dealings with the legislature on the budget issues? (And how did that tie in with your dealings with the press?)

82. (Did you act differently in the January budget process—with your legislative aide, senior staff, your agency?)

83. Did you establish a relationship with Karen that's held up since then? (How are speech-writings handled?) She have staff assistants? So your relationship with her, in terms of your qualities of, uh, people that you're looking for...

84. Is there excitement in the message they write or communicate? Or do they have to get it from you?

85. And then I guess the other key, you have a lawyer who's—do you work closely with him?

86. And what about your two deputies then, how did you connect with them one-on-one at the start, did it start off, I mean in our prior conversation you talked about how George has really been your confidant—did you start that way or not? What happened in those first interactions with him?

87. (What was the transition like in establishing relationships with other senior staff?)

88. (How was your message of "turning the agency over in the black" carried to the legislature?)

89. What was it that led up to the loosing the connection there with the house? (What happened with the UCU Advisory Commission?)

90. (How did you orchestrate this budget process?)

91. Is that what your executive team wanted to do, was that they wanted to go into that old mode? (Did you find yourself in conflict with your executive team?)

92. Is that an appreciation (not making a big deal with the union) you developed independently or did that November experience or something else trigger you to think that the legislature had that willingness to go that route, (unclear), they're ready for a new approach. You get any signals on that?

93. Had you sensed that as a big risk that you were taking or did...

94. Did you feel uncomfortable with the oath setting(?)?
95. Was there any concern you had been using the union, so forth, getting them, seems to me there's always this tug-of-war between these outside people and trying to get the job done inside, here you'd be calling on their help to get...(p. 49)

96. So your basic contacts were with the committee chairs, or key committee members?

97. Did you have any linkages with the speaker of the house?

98. Did you uh, have uh, interaction with the Legislative Budget Office people?

99. (How was the Governor's budget staff involved?)

100. There hasn't been any follow-up on that appropriation in terms of, what do they call it where they re-write the bill to--clean-up?

101. I'm curious as to what made your budget requests successful.

102. I was curious about the union civil service contract--'cuz the last time we met you were very concerned that you were going to put the governor in a bad light. (How did that situation resolve itself--money versus her "no sole source contracts" principle?) But long term, are you unhappy with that?

103. How many times have you, have you not won--mostly classic, mostly classic case of challenge and then negotiation on the basis of your interest and their interest and you come out with a--?

104. You're going to keep getting challenged like this, this is just an example of the challenge to the provision(position?).

105. Is it different here from Wisconsin?

106. Did you change the person who was the liaison, since you were not happy with that individual's performance?

107. It's a kind of uh, personal and symbolic kind of management, right?

108. Is that the only Council like that has that sort of symbolic power and influence?

109. So at this point you really are into a kind of routinized relationship with the media--

110. I did want to get your reaction to the Governor's visit here, how did his staff respond? We were, we were here just before he came over for a, was it for half a day?

111. I was curious how, especially when he met with your senior staff if they did in fact ask him any questions.

112. Yeah, and actually when we left what we thought about doing and writing something down, and also making sure that we talked with you about it because there's interaction between who we are and what you're doing and so, we would like to position it in whatever way makes sense, and we write it from an outside, pro-academic perspective--rather than reality.
113. You were speaking about a survey of attitudes of ES agencies I thought. A national study that you had access to and you were showing how people's attitudes, how they varied and were distributed, uh,...

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED PRIOR TO 10/24/89 INTERVIEW

114. Personal History: birthdate & birthplace; parents--age, education, occupation, religion, influence on your growing up, and closeness to each parent; siblings--name, age, education, occupation; home--where, when and for how long did you live in a city; education--schools, major area of study, graduate school, class standing, extracurricular activities and positions, awards, honors; occupational history--part-time work while in school, full-time employment; personal health; family--marriages, children, spouse's employment; non-work activities; commuting--where do you live, how far do you commute, mode of transport, length of commute; current job--specific responsibilities, formal authority, average hours per week (including time at home), % of time working alone, days per month of overnight travel because of work, how many hours do you put in per week? day?; general--happy with present job, organization, career progress, family, lifestyle, life in general, degree of tension or stress, physical feelings; what did you bring with you from Wisconsin; what stories do people tell of you; describe yourself as an individual--what kind of person are you; how would you describe your leadership style; could you describe your "character"; how would you describe your loyalties to Governor Celeste and to the mission of the employment service; what are your loyalties?

INTERVIEW ON 10/24/89

115. (She had filled out most of the above questionnaire) Quite often (I) want to know about, I put these in much more specificity than you may be willing to talk about, but...

116. So that was the way one, how one acted in the world--with social concern (like your parents?)

117. Active in a collective action or group action--

118. Focus more on community activities or individual activities? Did she get out in an organization--(What did your mother do after your father came back from the war?)

119. There wasn't father mother division of labor?

120. So your sense of that or your experience of that, was that one of her sending messages to you to be independent or were you taught in any way at that time for you?

121. (How did your father react to your mother's social activism?)

122. So your sense of this war-time experience is really retrospective?

123. You were the oldest too, right?

124. (Who were your mother's closest friends?)

125. She even probably felt the tension of "I wish I were doing," they were doing...

126. (Your father) wasn't just, he wasn't just an edit-, intellectual, editorial, uh--
127. Do you feel that you have to, sort of fight to stay in arguments with her, or did it work that way?

128. (What was your relationship with your mother like?)

129. You got lots of positive reinforcement and strokes from your parents that made you feel good?

130. Were they oriented toward the work ethic, so the approval was from tasks you accomplished, grades in school, things like that?

131. You were being included.

132. Were they directing you in the kinds of social activities or educational activities that...or were you basically allowed to choose?

133. So your parents' influence was strong in terms of their values?

134. (How did your father/mother relate to you--how did their backgrounds affect this?)

135. (What were her parents' reactions to her and her sister's marriages?)

136. Did they encourage you to go to an elite college?

137. (What prompted your college choice--what were your parents' reactions?)

138. So again they were giving you autonomy to make your own decisions?

139. How long were you in Detroit as compared to Pittsburgh? And four years in New York.

140. Did any of those cities have an impact in terms of your sense of urban condition or...

141. Detroit and Pittsburgh, were you in a suburban complex or just...

142. (Tell us about your high school experience--minority culture, urban flight, how the transfer in junior year affected you, your activities, etc.)

143. Deliberate--this is the first time you've gone into a cultural foreign territory.

144. You didn't notice, you were in the water swimming--

145. So did that transition ease the transition to Bernard?

146. So you had this kind of planned, deliberate kind of response and after having done that, you used an easy kind of strategy in college?

147. Social life?

148. I've written down the information that you offered about your sisters. Fairly well educated. You said a PhD in education?

149. What attracted you to medieval history then?
150. What were the most attractive attributes of the people?
151. (What was the ethnic make-up of her classes--esp. on messianic theory?)
152. (What were your early married years like?)
153. Did you draw any parallels between your mother's life and...was he at all like your father?
154. So you went off to Boston after you were married, as I see this and then went to Minneapolis?
155. What job did he take a job there?
156. The reason for the move to Boston now?
157. (What did you do while in Boston?)
158. But his vocation really was to be an actor?
159. What made you chose that particular degree?
160. Were you considering other kinds of, uh, graduate study?
161. Business never attracted you?
162. The only kind of management experience you'd had previously was in high school?
163. The most attractive part of that (school) was the money?
164. And then, you had field experience, was that after you got your degree?
165. (What did you bring away from that experience?)
166. Did you have a sense that you, you gave voice to your own needs, or expression, or was it more just a conclusion after discussing the various arguments, given certain facts?
167. (What was the "Sensitivity Training" experience like for you?)
168. Did David accept the analysis of you? He was laughing at it----I didn't know whether he was laughing at your reaction to it--
169. Was your mother private or more public, would she tell you where she was at?
170. So that, at least at that point, you didn't feel like you could predict masks that people wear, I suppose. I need to look this way or that way.
171. What was the effect--Did you bring this up because it had a big impact later, or it was just a--So that was the one experience that kind of gave you a firm, an affirmation of your personal integrity.
172. You said there was something else during this period. Was it the field work?
173. Was this (joining the abortion rights task force) a deliberate kind of decision on your part or was this something that friends of yours were saying, "Ellen, why don't you help us out on this."

174. (What was the sequence of events of your involvement with the abortion rights and anti-war movements?)

175. (How did your husband react to your activism?)

176. (Where were you living at the time?)

177. (What ended the anti-war stuff?)

178. (What occupied your mind then?)

179. Did you go to Wisconsin because your husband's work, or just friends there?

180. Well, it's interesting. You went there because you had friends there, why did you leave? Are the two the same thing?

181. And so at that time you entered an occupation, I guess?

182. How did that topic (when you were going to have kids and what you were going to do for a "real career") come up?

183. So then what happened?

184. Looking for work?

185. How did that job connection develop?

186. Mary Brighter(SP?), co-author some publications?

187. So is there a sense in which your conception of government really was shaped right there?

188. Had you had a sense of the Wisconsin populous,-Were you interpreting any of that state government's philosophy of your going back to the merit system?

189. So you did a lot of interviews (in the course of studying the whole civil service system)?

190. How long were you on the research side of the topic?

191. Now has that particular experience carried forward for you, how you do your homework on the facts and system and how it's working and questioning the reasons for the rules?

192. So you didn't have a project champion outside who lifted it up and ran for you?

193. The governor kept this issue alive for you?

194. By this time you had shifted jobs?

195. I was going to ask you how you got into training, part of all this.
196. So you never experienced the sense of being unemployed?

197. Did you pick up anything during that, both in your political activity and I guess direct action situations, I've seen you picking up organizing kind of deals in training, did setting up a training type program compact your interest in training--I was thinking when you said "civil service reform"--

198. So you were a consultant when you were 26 or 27?

199. At this point, what were you most proud of in terms of achievements?

200. (How did you get along with your bosses, how did the job end?)

201. Were there particular management practices that this individual, or things that you learned on your own time--

202. So it wasn't his leadership style that, kind of a hands-on experience?

203. Your second experience of not getting the kind of information, feedback you want.

204. But you could see the results.

205. This (next job) was an office of the governor's staff-- Governor's Employment and Trade Office?

206. (What did you do there?)

207. What do you look for or what do you see as being absent?

208. The individual that you didn't like working for, what were the things that were uh...Did you talk to him about the--

209. You were his token woman, then?

210. Did you run into any other managers who were deal-makers?

211. After that then, you were in charge?

212. Then you hopped to division administrator?

213. Well where did you run into, you mentioned earlier the person who had really been your major mentor on how to manage an agency?

214. (How did you get along with other strong women)

215. But the other factor is contesting for power and control and so far you've said you haven't really had a need for that.

216. And so she (Helene) was the person you had more interaction with on a regular basis then.

217. So was this the formative experience with regard to management team and how to make that work well?
(Tell us about your other close associations/confidants--how you got to know them, what you talked about, etc.)

It's also that you were never really lonely in your job, being in charge of something?

You always had somebody that you trusted and you could try out scenarios with.

So would you say that Helene was somebody who really modeled how to run the strategic principles of a department and how to do that well?

And Gert is really a confidante, uh, a mutual ministering, and, I guess, process person.

Did you have anybody else, you mentioned your husband, was he a person who you could use as a sounding board?

What is your husband doing now? (How do you feel about being the provider and the role reversal?)

Were there any other people in your contacts along the way that you were close to in terms of really talking about the things that are important?

The people you've met here that you mentioned previously, when you get together, you say you've become close to, are they that second tier or personal confidante?

I'd like to have at least one more conversation with you and I'd also like to start talking with some of the employees. There are many typos on here and it's not worded exactly the way I wanted, but I think you can get the gist of where we'd like to go with our conversations. And, in essence, it seems to fit in very well with how did you learn who you could trust, what actions did you take?

Oh, my goodness! You'll have to tell us sometime about your re-structuring.

You had some concerns with Doug (What were the thought processes behind your decision to remove him from the line position into internal management?)

(Is everyone satisfied with this change?)

(Who is in which office?)

Who's going to be here?

How's she feel about it?

Who's managing the Council?

Basically kept your agenda the same (with the restructure).

(How did you handle announcing these changes?)

You don't have a constituency problem?

So you got your players now and you have a retreat coming up.
239. Anything else happen since we saw you a month ago that you'd like to talk about?

240. Just not enough time to do anything else, or no need to do anything else?

241. (Do you have suggestions of who we should talk to—who was here when you came on board?)

242. This group will know through this memo you just signed?

243. Would you like this (a case study of Mike Card's experience) at some point? (Discussion of differences and similarities between Mike's and Ellen's experiences)

244. (Discussion of gender issues, opinion of changes still needed, the governor's stance on this topic)

245. Oh, you have things written on the second page. The back set. That's really talking about the current job, some of those are follow-up. There are some things on the second page that are very interesting. Ok, I'll get this back to you.

246. How do you use minutes from the meetings you attend or orchestrate?

247. But in writing those you also make clear some of your assumptions about policy and scope and process?

248. How do you have time to do all your writing?

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED PRIOR TO 11/30/89 INTERVIEW

249. Probe the relationship with constituency groups; What was her assessment in the Autumn and then what did she do to deal with the situation; What was the situation in the Winter; How did this change into the Spring—she spoke of the desire to get the budget increased using state general funds, now that she has the general funds, how has her situation changed?

250. Build on her calendars: How did she schedule her 1st moves; How did she make sense of different aspects of the agency; Interactions with Carla Edelfson and the Governor's office?

251. When finances are discussed, EOBS was talking of balancing the budget for the department: making cuts; more revenue: EOBS does not seem to try to pass a productivity gain (It could be seen that the time was too short to create a productivity gain); What happened so that the organization was changed from a federally funded one to one more state funded (EOBS was speaking of making the state on the forefront of employment security funding, but she didn't talk of this to the legislature).

252. Need to be prepared to talk of the different program areas: EOBS was an expert in JTPA, yet she doesn't talk much of the other programs (e.g. ES, UI, LMI); How comfortable with the person heading each area? Where did she see the Program's agenda; What did she do to change the agenda; If no change, why not; What did she tell subordinates when they inquired of her or tried to get the item on her agenda?

253. Themes of our inquiry: First, we are studying what people, in positions such as one of an Agency Director, do when they first take office; Second, how do they get started; Third, we are looking for, and wish to emphasize how an agency under severe external public scrutiny acts, e.g.: What special situations do these situations present for management? What lessons
can be learned here and generalized to other public managers? Fourth, we are looking for realistic public management cases to show how the leader and the staff see the situation and combine help and cooperation.

254. Comments to following: Does EOBS write well, given that she said one quality she looks for in management is for her people to write well; What family relationships besides order of birth does EOBS look for: what other characteristics does EOBS look for; How soon does EOBS want the article out--does she have a time line we should know about; What evidence can she give us that correspond to Poister's evidence; Grace Kilbane--is she sanitizing herself while in the Regional Office; How did she go from a Democrat Administration to the Federal Government during a Republican Administration; MaryEllen--How many Directors/Administrators has she worked for & how will she respond; Preparation for next EOBS Interview--we should put EOBS's comments into writing or tape; write up our first-order conclusions; disciplining ourselves.

255. EOBS has indicated that there is a distinction between process (administration or management) and policy. The basis for her comment was when talking about the qualities one has to become a Director. She has noted that the Chief of Staff (Carolyn Lukensmeyer) can design a process to determine the goals of an organization, but does she have a passion for the policy?

256. Mike is to create a list of variable or factors, conceptually organized.

257. Requirements of JTPA planning.

258. Staff positions have line responsibilities--is this common to ES agencies or has she experienced this elsewhere?

259. Field Staff have high experience and low expectations?

260. You, early on, had a meeting with George and Doug to see what they were going to attend to, what was the result of this meeting and how well have your expectations been met?

QUESTIONS ASKED IN INTERVIEW OF 11/30/89

261. (Discussion of personality patterns and testing)

262. (Discussion of chain letters and office xerox machines)

263. (Discussion of Poland's independence & East and West Germany)

264. What I'd like to do after this is we'd like to feed some of this back, after I meet with some of the staff. We had given you this list of questions of which I somehow lost off my computer.

265. I have two basic interests that I'd like you to speak about. And one is the very first question, is how did you deal with external constituent groups? I'd also like you to speak a little bit about internal constituent groups, such as how did you let the 18 people know of your expectations, how did you communicate to them what you were expecting both from them on the job and in terms of quality or I don't want to be setting, I don't want to be creating what you did, I'm just sort of inquiring as to how you let your expectations be known and
how you found out about the agency. How did you go about doing that? You had a substantial policy understanding, but how did you go about finding out about the people?

266. And then, I don't know if that's going to vary by time during a year ago when you took over, before you seemed to feel, or I sense that you seem to feel that after about six months, about the time the legislative session opened, you had a good understanding and you had a good feeling about your initial initiatives of improving morale and getting the agency out of the newspaper, and you set out on another set of initiatives, mostly budgetary in nature. And now, now that you've accomplished that, what do you see coming up to face you again. What are the new issues that you're going to have to face?

267. So we're looking at three different time periods.

268. If there's the proverbial unasked question--(please feel free to add in your own)

269. (Discussion of qualities and definitions of qualities she looks for in her staff)

270. (Describe your first contacts with the two deputy administrators--getting info from them about the state of the agency.)

271. (Describe your initial interactions with senior staff--how did you communicate your general philosophies)

272. Part of what I'm after is from your intention what you were trying to do, how you were going about that, and I'm going to triangulate by asking them what they thought was going on.

273. Did you view it that way (that the problems of the agency were her problem and not that of the employees)?

274. (Describe your initial contacts and your strategies for dealing with: the regional offices, the job service employer committee, the dislocated worker union, the UC Advisory Commission--proving your worth to the good olde boy establishments)

275. But there wasn't any connection between that October meeting at the Scioto and you weren't sure how you did or how you came out of that, but you must have come out ok.

276. Has this come up again, the linkage of the budget and policy?

277. They didn't tell you, nor did you get a retaliation kind of--(What was your strategy and the consequences of that strategy for dealing with the budget issues [and the UC?])

278. (Discussion of interactions with external constituencies--Ohio Employment and Training Association, the Ohio Job Training Coordinating Council, and the interactions of these with programs under her agency [i.e. dislocated worker]--handling grant or funding snafus, resolving conflicts in policy [i.e. wanting high performance standards on replacement wages] and in staffing [i.e. ousting Murphy from Council])

279. This is not a case where uh, this was a first time event where the administrator had come to the session.

280. How did you respond to their concerns?
281. Did you go into a defensive mood or an explanatory mode or?
282. (Tell us how you handled personnel hires for various programs--ES and JTPA)
283. Would you do that differently (re-organizing JTPA right when the new director was hired)?
284. Do you think it was the leadership of the UCAC that engineered that (the lack of action on a motion to support a surcharge)?
285. Now, did you have to have their, well obviously you didn't have to have their approval but it would have been a great help in the legislature to have had it?
286. (How do you think the legislature perceives you and what strategy would you recommend for dealing with legislatures to foster a positive perception?)
287. (How do funding cuts get implemented in an agency of this sort?)
288. So you had to explain bumping (to the employers)?
289. Did you encourage Mark's leaving?
290. You checked it with Linda Page as a confidant?
291. (How was this matter handled with Carolyn?)
292. (Describe your experience with this program--trying to balance the money situation, get processes in place, etc.)
293. Were you thinking, "What have I spent all this time on?"
294. (What's the program like now that you've chosen the staff?)
295. (Describe the situation of the OAPIC's chairman nominating himself for a Presidential award.)
296. Did he make some big contribution for it, that he feels should be rewarded?
297. (Describe what you've done for some of the programs--employment standards, etc.)
298. The words I used were, "How did you make sense of the different aspects of the agency?"
299. Is that because you just didn't have time to learn about that or (your perception of yourself?)
300. So all that strategic planning that looks pretty swell done, but it doesn't mean anything at all to EES, it's not lead to anything (long-term as far as organizational charts, mission statements, personnel management or organizational development, etc.)
301. It sounds like that one (lack of knowledge about unemployment compensation) is by choice, "If I have to," or "I'll learn what I have to"--
302. (How are personnel matters and other topics handled with Carla?)
302. Is there communication among the cabinet members, how to manage the governor's office?

303. (How are different programs assessed--unemployment compensation's effectiveness, & ES automation-- and what is your strategy for dealing with the legislature on these concerns?)

304. When you spoke about finances you said, "I'm going to have to balance the budget, that's my job and I can either do it through making cuts or finding revenue," and I just brought that out that it seemed to me that you didn't mention productivity there, that's why I asked the question.

305. Did you have the sense that your staff was imposing manipulations on you (staff using leaves and not reporting them and payroll falsification related to a drug or alcohol addiction, etc.)?

306. Does this hurt you in terms of other things going on--as a resurrection of what's going on inside that the boys are going to see in your system a blip?

307. (How did you handle the issue of filling the vacancy?)

308. How did you go about choosing him--just he's the most obvious-

309. (Discuss the initial condition of your programs--their needs, concerns, agendas, leadership problems, how you interacted with staff, how and when you found out their problems, etc.)

310. (How could programs be used politically by the governor?)

311. (Discuss policy issues with the Council and SDA's--pp 38-39)

312. (How do you analyze problems, issues or concerns that others bring to you--how do you develop a strategy for dealing with them?)

313. (What characteristics make an effective leader?)

314. (How do you deal with the press concerning a problem with a program?)

315. You sought the press out a year later, but did anything come from that as far as how satisfied they are?

316. Did you ask them, "You have the information you need?"

317. Is this three way preventative (press insert, briefings and hearings), just happenstance, all these reporting events are going to occur in this time wedge between now and December 1st?

318. Do you have a sense of how you want to position what happens tomorrow--just curious about your orientation to that.

319. What lessons (for dealing with the press) can be learned here and generalized to other public managers?

320. Is it common for governor's offices to conduct an inquiry while trying to maintain control?

321. The governor's employees who came up with (imaginary) numbers thought they were trying to take care of his interests?
322. (What are characteristics you look for in people you hire?)

323. (What is her time line--for wanting the article for her use in her job search?)

324. The "it" of what I was speaking was the write-up of what you and the senior managers at this agency have done to turn the performance around, to get the agency out of the media, to establish, or re-establish the credibility, that's a little fuzzy right now, but the write-up of that and to see what generalizations we can have for other public managers. And it exits for me on two levels, one is the teaching case we had talked about in terms of state government and the other one would be for a more scholarly audience in the public administration field and would help in terms of this article.

325. (How did you sell yourself and your integrity?)

326. One of the things I thought about with Grace Kildane is, how did a high level person in a democratic administration get a job?

327. (Staff changes and relationship of ex-director to current employees)

328. (Discuss different managers' approaches--policy vs. process)

329. When you were talking about staff position with line responsibilities, you said that your, your staff positions have, I'm trying to, I wish I could remember the exact words,

330. (Discuss divisions' lists of priorities interaction with their activities)

331. What issues still face, what issues do you still face (staffing strategies & continuity issues with a change of administrations in 1991, job performance standards, centennial events, NGA proposal, welfare reform, management development)?

332. Anything external that you're going to have to deal with, these are all, most of these seem to be internal, the continuity issue is?

333. What haven't we asked you that we should have? I have a sense that you know what we're trying to get at, the two-fold thing is how do you turn an agency around and how do you take charge, and we've asked you many, many questions, and, I'm just wondering if there is something from either your bank of concepts or your experience that we should have asked you or asked you to comment on.

334. (Strategies for being a leader, selling and proving yourself, building trust, dealing with differences of interpretations of her actions, negating the risk of miscommunication, etc.)
APPENDIX D

SAMPLE OF INITIAL MEMBER CHECK WITH AGENCY DIRECTOR AND SUBORDINATES
Dear Ms. Saunders:

Over the course of this past year and one-half, I had the privilege of speaking with you regarding the process of executive or strategic transition. From our interviews, I have transcribed my notes and have uncovered a set of themes that I consider important to the issue of "taking charge" in a state agency. I recognize that a different investigator from outside OBES or any one using different techniques may have developed a different list, so I invite your candid comments regarding interpretations that should be here, but are not. In addition, I am requesting your feedback on the accuracy of the interpretation I have given to your comments in the notes of our interviews.

This aspect of research is known as a "member check." In short, the purpose is for the researcher to check with the members of the organization studied to see if the interpretations of what was said and done are accurate. Since my concern here is to study how one would take charge and how this process influences the work and relationships between individuals, the only way I can know if I am capturing your points of view is to ask you to review my interpretations.

The writer of any summary has a great power to emphasize some things and ignore others as well as characterize the situation in a particular fashion.

Since the basis of our conversations will serve as data for my dissertation, I would like those who shared insights with me to have a chance to review it before it goes any further. I have drawn the names of Merril Baumgardner, Dixie Sommers and Maryellen Meredith out of a hat to review the final copy. However, I will wait until December 10 to distribute these copies in case there is information you wish to remain confidential. If there is a concern, please let me know. I will let the remainder of those I interviewed know that I have randomly selected three individuals to read the report, but that if they wish, they may contact those I "selected" for the report. I have, in turn, informed those I "selected" that they may be contacted for the report.

If you are willing to spend the time and energy, I would appreciate your feedback on this written account. I have included some specific questions, but if you prefer to address other issues, please feel free. There are several possibilities to give your feedback and minimize my imposition of your time. Some possibilities: (a) call me and give me your comments over the telephone (home 847-1104 -- office 292-8696); (b) write on this copy and mail it to me; or (c) call me to arrange a time at your convenience for me to come and talk to you; and, almost any alternative is allowable.

Possible review questions:
1. Does the current list of themes seem to include the pertinent topics? Is anything missing that should be here? Should any of these be dropped?
2. Although this is a compilation of different viewpoints, filtered through my viewpoint, is your point of view represented here?
3. Have I expressed any of your ideas in a way that could identify you in a demeaning manner? I am trying to avoid identifying specific individuals, except where the story could not be presented without identifying names. If I have included information that will identify you or your thoughts and you wish not to be identified, how can I tell the story to not identify you?
4. In general, do you see the initial descriptions as accurate and adequate portrayals of these two themes?
5. Has my asking about taking charge as a part of this research caused you to pay more attention to it and its implications than you might have otherwise?
6. What effect, if any, has your reading of this summary had on your view of the process of taking charge and its implications for OBES?
7. Do you wish to read and review the written descriptions of the other themes as I write them? If so, please advise me how I might reach you.

I offer you the opportunity to convince me of any counter interpretations. If you cannot convince me, I offer you the opportunity to write a counter-interpretation for a footnote, with you cited as the author.

There are few words at my disposal with which I can adequately pay my respects to you for opening up your time and energy to me. Hawthorne said,

In youth,
Men are more apt to write
More wisely
Than they really know or feel
And the remainder of
Life may be not
Idly spent in realizing and
Convincing themselves
Of the wisdom
They uttered
Long ago.

I shall not be so bold to say that what I say and have written reflects wisdom; if it does reflect wisdom, it reflects your wisdom. I can find any number of theories that would predict what you should have done in entering an agency with a "storied" past. But you were the one who was there and had the strength of character to follow your convictions about what, when, how and with whom to act.

I truly thank you for your generosity in giving me your time and insights. I wish you well in your future endeavors. I am,

Sincerely,

Michael A. Card
58 Georgetown Drive
Columbus, Ohio 43214
[date]

Karen Michael, Public Information Officer
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services
P. O. Box 1618
Columbus, Ohio 43216

Dear Ms. Michael:

On April 17, I had the privilege of speaking with you regarding the process of transition from one Administrator to another. From our interviews, I have transcribed my notes and have uncovered a set of initial themes that I consider important to the issue of "taking charge" in a state agency. I recognize that a different investigator from outside OBES or any one of you using different techniques may have developed a different list, so I invite your candid comments regarding topics that should be here, but are not. In addition, I am requesting your feedback on the accuracy of the interpretation I have given to your comments in the notes of our interview.

This aspect of research is known as a "member check." In essence, the purpose is for the researcher to check with the members of the organization studied to see if the interpretations of what was said and done are accurate. Since my concern here is to study how one would take charge and how this process influences the work and relationships between individuals, the only way I can know if I am capturing your points of view is to ask you to review my interpretations.

The writer of any summary has a great power to emphasize some things and ignore others as well as characterize the situation in a particular fashion. Since these notes will serve as data for my dissertation, I would like those who shared insights with me to have a chance to review it before it goes any further. I ask you not to share this with anyone else since I expect to revise it.

If you are willing to spend the time and energy, I would appreciate your feedback on this written account. I have included some specific questions, but if you prefer to address other issues, please feel free. There are several possibilities to give your feedback and minimize my imposition of your time. Some possibilities: (a) call me and give me your comments over the telephone (home 847-1104 -- office 292-9474); (b) write on this copy and mail it to me; or (c) call me to arrange a time at your convenience for me to come out and talk to you; and, almost any option is allowable.

Possible review questions:
1. Does the current list of themes seem to include the pertinent topics? Is anything missing that should be here? Should any of these be dropped?
2. Although this is a compilation of different viewpoints, filtered through my viewpoint, is your point of view represented here?
3. Have I expressed any of your ideas in a way that could identify you within OBES. I am trying to avoid identifying specific individuals, except where the story could not be presented without identifying names. If I have included information that will identify you and you wish not to be identified, how can I tell the story to not identify you?
4. In general, do you see the initial descriptions as accurate and adequate portrayals of these two themes?
5. Has my asking about taking charge as a part of this research caused you to pay more attention to it and its implications than you might have otherwise?
6. What effect, if any, has your reading of this summary had on your view of the process of taking charge and its implications for OBES?
7. Do you wish to read and review the written descriptions of the other themes as I write them? If so, please advise me how I might reach you.

Thank you for your generosity in giving me your time and insights.

Cordially,

Michael A. Card
58 Georgetown Drive
Columbus, Ohio 43214
APPENDIX E

SAMPLE LETTER REQUESTING PARTICIPATION
Dear Director Natalucci-Persichetti:

Over one year ago, you agreed to participate in a study. That agreement was made one year ago during the course of an interview between you, Bob Backoff, Marty Jenkins, Marilyn Trez, and me regarding your preparations for the end of the Celeste regime. I am writing this letter to determine your if your commitment has changed and to tell you that I will call your secretary to arrange a meeting on Thursday, November 8, 1990.

Ohio's agency directors turn-over, on average, every 18 months. The individuals selected to be Agency Directors have a critical role in achieving the Governor's initiatives, setting direction for the agency, and achieving agency goals. My study is to determine the activities of agency directors during their first 18 months. As I read the literature, there has been no systematic comparative effort to investigate how individuals construct the role of being a public sector executive.

This research is a part of a three-part case study to develop a theory of public sector executive transition. That is, I hope to use your experiences as a chapter in my dissertation. The reasons for my interest in you and your agency are that the agency was facing a legitimacy crisis in a public forum and you gave the agency a strong sense of direction. The second product is to construct a set of teaching cases for aspiring public managers to demonstrate how individuals lead at the strategic level of a public organization. I am open to constructing other products that might further your interests as well.

The study would involve a series of three interviews between you, Bob Backoff, and me; I will supply you with the questions prior to our interview and not duplicate the questions you were asked by Janet Foley Orosz, earlier this summer. The questions will ask you to recall the events and experiences of applying for, working to obtain, and assuming the formal requirements of the position as Director of the Department. I will also ask you questions where you assess the agenda you saw (then) to be and the initial activities to achieve those goals and objectives.

If you still agree to participate, I ask your permission to interview subordinates whom you consider to be a part of senior management group, to recall their experiences during the transition process. I will also ask them to give their interpretation of events and experiences prior to and after you assumed your duties. I will also be looking to triangulate your subordinate's recall with agency records. When I have constructed the case, I plan to return my interpretations to you to ensure that I have accurately captured your intentions and offer you the opportunity to review whether I have revealed matters which you wish to remain confidential.

I want to accomplish these interviews during the months of November and December. To meet that schedule, I will contact your secretary on the morning of November 8 to schedule a time most convenient to you. If you have questions, feel free to contact Bob Backoff (292-6118), Ron Huff (292-8096) or myself (847-1104) if you have questions concerning the process.

I look forward to meeting with you soon.

Sincerely,

Michael A. Card
58 Georgetown Drive
Columbus, Ohio 43214

cc: Robert Backoff
    C. Ron Huff
    Paul C. Nutt
REFERENCES


**Interviews**

Agee, Gerald (1990) Director, Aftercare Division, DYS. November 30, 1990.

Baumgardner, Merrill (1990), Director of Automated Data Processing, OBES, May 22, 1990.


Evans, William (1990), Director of Field Operations, OBES, April 2, 1990.


Holmes, Doug (1990), Special Assistant to the Administrator, OBES, April 30, 1990.

Kuck, Katherine (1990), Legislative Liaison, OBES, April 19, 1990.


Natalucci-Persichetti, Geno (1990) Director, Department of Youth Services.


Michael, Karen (1990), Public Information Officer, OBES, April 17, 1990.

Modica, Kathleen (1990), Director of Training, OBES, April 2, 1990.

Patzer, Roland (1990), Director, JTP-Ohio, OBES, April 3, 1990.


\(--\)--, December 27, 1990.

\(--\)--, December 31, 1990.


Valentine, Michael (1990), Director of Employment Services, OBES, April 17, 1990.


Monographs


--------, (1986) Ohio's 100th Year in Public Health: 1986 Anniversary Calendar.


Ohio Department of Youth Services (1989) *Framing Our Future*

--------, (1988) *Mission Statement*


**Bills of the General Assembly**

Amended House Bill No. 812, reported by the House Finance and Appropriations Committee. A bill to authorize the State of Ohio to issue revenue obligation bonds to pay costs associated with certain capital facilities of the Department of Youth Services and other governmental entities. 117th General Assembly, 1987-88.

**Newspaper Articles Consulted and Cited**


*Columbus Dispatch* (1986) Youth director resigns, *Columbus Dispatch*, Saturday November 15, 1986, p. 4B.


Lane, Mary Beth (1987) Former Youth chief gets 4 1/2 years in jail. *The Plain Dealer*, February 5, 1987, p. 3B.


------, (1987) Xenia doctor to be state health chief, *Columbus Dispatch*, March 17, 1987, p. 1D


------, & Yost, Mary (1988) Building projects bills on their way to Celeste, and Celeste Gets building project bills, each in the *Columbus Dispatch*, March 17, 1988.


(AP), (1987) New youth services director plans regional meetings on juvenile justice, *The Plain Dealer*, February 27, 1987; p. 10B.

--------, (1987) Xenia doctor confirms he will be state Health Director, *The Plain Dealer*, March 17, 1987, p. 3B.